RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONG/C/W/374
14 May 2002
(02-2674)
Council for Trade in Goods
 ARTICLE X OF THE GATT 1994 –  SCOPE AND APPLICATION
Note by the Secretariat
1. Introduction
To "review and, as appropriate, clarify and improve relevant aspects of Articles V, VIII and X
of the GATT 1994"  was one of the tasks given to the Counci l for Trade in Goods (CTG) at the Fourth
Ministerial Conference. It forms part of the work program set out in the Doha Declaration to be
carried out by the Fifth Ministerial.
At an informal meeting on trade facilitation on 25 February 2002, Members requested the
Secretariat to prepare a background document on the above-mentioned articles to facilitate
delegations' deliberations on this matter. The following note aims at meeting one part of this request.
As a first component of what is planned to be an examination of all three relevant provisions, this
paper focuses on Article X as the core article to be discussed by Members in the course of the first
formal trade facilitation meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods.
In line with the request by Members, the note wi ll restrict itself to a factual outline of the
Article from a legal perspective, and refrain from entering into an analysis of whether, and to what
extent, there is room for possible clarification and improvement. As a key element of the work
programme Ministers set themselves at Doha, such an assessment is deemed to be the prerogative of
the Members. The paper will also take a look at how Article X has been applied in GATT/WTO
jurisprudence so far.
2. Structure
The paper is structured as follows: A first part will briefly introduce the text of Article X and
its negotiating history, followed by an analysis of its coverage. After an outline of the basic
obligations established by this Article, the note wi ll then look at how it has been applied by dispute
settlement panels and the Appellate Body under the GATT and the WTO.G/C/W/374
Page 2
3.           Article X: Publicatio n and Administration of Trade Regulations
3. 1. Text
1. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulin gs of general application, made
effective by any contracting party, pertaining to th e classification or the valuation of products for
customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or ot her charges, or to requirements, restrictions or
prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfe r of payments therefor, or affecting their sale,
distribution, transportation, insura nce, warehousing, inspection, exhibi tion, processing, mixing or other
use, shall be published promptly in such a manne r as to enable governments and traders to become
acquainted with them.  Ag reements affecting international trade policy which are in force between the
government or a governmental agency of any cont racting party and the government or governmental
agency of any other contracting party shall also be  published.  The provisions of this paragraph shall
not require any contracting party to disclose confidential information which would impede law
enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate
commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.
2. No measure of general application taken by any contracting party effecting an advance in a
rate of duty or other charge on imports under an es tablished and uniform practice, or imposing a new
or more burdensome requirement, re striction or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer of payments
therefor, shall be enforced before such measure has been officially published.
3.  (a) Each contracting party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its
laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article.
    (b) Each contracting party shall maintain, or in stitute as soon as practicable, judicial, arbitral or
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose,  inter alia, of the prompt review and correction
of administrative action relating to customs matters.  Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent
of the agencies entrusted with adm inistrative enforcement and their de cisions shall be implemented by,
and shall govern the practice of, such agencies unle ss an appeal is lodged with a court or tribunal of
superior jurisdiction within the tim e prescribed for appeals to be lodged by importers;  Provided that
the central administration of such agency may take st eps to obtain a review of the matter in another
proceeding if there is good cause to believe that the decision is inconsistent with established principles
of law or the actual facts.
    (c)  The provisions of s ub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph shal l not require the elimination or
substitution of procedures in force in the territory of a contracting party on the date of this Agreement
which in fact provide for an objective and imparti al review of administrative action even though such
procedures are not fully or formally independent  of the agencies entrusted with administrative
enforcement. Any contracting party employing su ch procedures shall, upon request, furnish the
CONTRACTING PARTIES  with full information thereon in orde r that they may determine whether such
procedures conform to the requi rements of this sub-paragraph.
3. 2. Negotiating history
Article X was partly based on Articles 4 and 6 of the 1923 International Convention Relating to
the Simplification of Customs Formalities .1Most of its provisions can already be found in the Geneva
Draft of the Havana Charter, whose Article 37 conc urs with Article X, except for the requirement for
                                                     
1 E/PC/T/C.II/W.41, E/PC/T /C.II/54/Rev.1, p. 29.G/C/W/374
Page 3
governments to supply the organization with copies of their laws and regulations.2 The Geneva text was
altered at the Havana Conference. It was decided to  change the provision prohibiting the enforcement of
certain measures of general application prior to their official publication, by replacing the words "made
public"  with the term "published" . The Havana Reports note that Members agreed that the provision
"did not require the prior public issue of an offici al document, but that th e effect could also be
accomplished by an official announcement made  in the legislature of the country
concerned."3Furthermore, the Havana Conference added the obligation that "suitable facilities shall be
afforded for traders directly affected by any of those matters [the respective laws and regulations]  to
consult with the appropriate governmental authorities."4
None of these alterations were carried into the GATT, whose Article X remained unchanged.
3. 3. Coverage
General
Article X's paramount objective is the attainment of transparency. A report of the Technical
Sub- Committee to the Drafting Committee drawing up the Havana Charter notes: "It was agreed that,
as far as possible, prompt and adequate publicity s hould be given to change in laws and regulations
affecting foreign trade."5
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1 requires each contracting party to promptly publish its laws, regulations, judicial
decisions and administrative rulings of general appl ication that affect imports and exports. Agreements
affecting international trade policy shall be published as well. The publication must be of such form " as
to enable governments and traders to  become acquainted with them."  To address concerns about
possible negative side-effects arising from this notific ation requirement, it is stated that paragraph 1
"shall not require any contracting party to disclose  confidential informati on which would impede law
enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate
commercial  interests of particular enterprises, public or private."
While the Geneva Draft provision requiring governments to communicate copies of their
respective laws to the ITO was not carried into the GATT, Members agreed in 1964 to recommend suchconduct.
6 The notification requirements were reaffirmed and strengthened in the Tokyo Round. An 1979
Understanding stated that parties "… undertake, to the maximum extent possible, to notify the
CONTRACTING  PARTIES of their adoption of trade measures a ffecting the operation of the General
Agreement…".7The Understanding calls for an endeavor to notify measures prior to their
implementation, but provides for the opportunity to notify ex post facto , where advanced notification has
not been possible. The following years saw a fu rther strengthening as well as an expansion of
                                                     
2 This obligation, contained in paragraph 1 of the Geneva Draft Charter, was not carried into the
GATT.
3 Havana Reports, U.N. Doc.ICITO/1/8, p .79, para.52.
4 Havana Reports, U.N. Doc.ICITO/1/8, p 79 para 52.
5 U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/54/Rev.1 p 28.
6 Recommendation on Cooperation in the Field of Trade Information and Trade Promotion:
"Contracting parties should forward promptly to the secretariat copies of the laws, regulations, decisions,
rulings and agreement of the kind described in paragraph 1 of Article X if the General Agreement, together withsuch other information they consider relevant to the objectives of this Recommendation;"  The recommendation
even went beyond the Geneva proposal in noting that "should use their best endeavors to assist in the
identification of market opportunities, including the exchange of market rese arch studies …. and to provide any
other assistance deemed appropriate which would further the objectives of the services." BISD 125/50, 1964.
7 L/4907, adopted on 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/210, para. 3.G/C/W/374
Page 4
notification and publication requirements, both in terms of general decisions8 and specific provisions
contained in the GATT. The 1994 Ministerial Decisi on on Notification Procedures incorporated the
1979 Understanding and further provided for a central S ecretariat registry of notifications and review of
procedures by the Council for Trade in Goods.
Paragraph 2
According to this paragraph, no party is allowe d to enforce certain measures prior to their
official publication. The measures cove red by this obligation include those:
(i) effecting an advance in a duty rate or other charge on imports under an established and uniform
practice, or
(ii) imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohib ition on imports, or on
the transfer of payments therefore.
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3 calls on Members to administer all their laws, regulations, decisions as well as
rulings of the kind listed in paragraph 1, in a "uniform, impartial and reasonable manner". It further
requires every party to maintain or institute judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures
"as soon as practicable" , for the purpose of, inter alia , prompt review and correction of
administrative action relating to customs matters. Certain guarantees are made with respect to theirindependence. The provision obliges those tribunals or procedures to be independent of the agencies
in charge of the administrative enforcement. Furthermore, their decisions shall normally be
implemented by those administrative enforcement agencies, except for the case of an appeal by an
importer with a court or tribunal of superior jurisdiction.
9 This is important as it makes sure that it is
not the same entity that makes both the decision and takes care of its implementation.
An exception is made for procedures, which "in fact" provide for an objective and impartial
review of administrative action, even though they are not fully independent  of the administrative
enforcement agencies, if they  have already been in force "on the date of the Agreement ."10Any party
wishing to employ such procedures is however required to notify them to the other parties upon
request.
3. 4. Basic Obligations
In essence, Article X requires a party to do the following:
(i) publish its trade-related laws, regulations, rulings and agreements in a prompt and accessible
manner (paragraph 1);
(ii)     abstain from enforcing measures of general application prior to their publication (paragraph 2);
and
(iii)     administer the above-mentioned laws, regu lations, rulings and agreements in a uniform, impartial
and reasonable manner. In this context, parties ar e required to institute or maintain tribunals or
                                                     
8 See for example the decisions of 12 April 1989 on the "Functioning of the GATT System"  and on the
creation of a Trade Policy Review Mechanism.
9 This exception requires "that the central administration of su ch agency may take steps to obtain a
review of the matter in another proceeding if there is good cause to believe that the decision is inconsistent with
established principles of law or the actual  facts."
10 According to Article XXVI:1, "The date of the Agreement shall be 30 October 1947."G/C/W/374
Page 5
procedures for the, inter alia, prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to
customs matters (Paragraph 3).
3. 5. Application
Article X has been applied by GATT and WTO pa nels as well as by the Appellate Body on
various occasions. The following section outlines thei r main findings with respect to how to interpret
individual provisions of this Article.11
General
The Appellate Body in EC - Poultry  described the scope of Article X as follows:
"Article X relates to the publication  and administration  of 'laws, regulations, judicial
decisions and administrative rulings of ge neral application', rather than to the
substantive content  of such measures."12
Consequently, the Appellate Body held that, to the extent that the complainant's appeal relates
to the substantive content of the respondent's rules themselves, and not to their publication or
administration, such an appeal would fall outside the scope of Article X.13
Paragraph 1
Interpretative guidance has been given with respect to the following terms:
(i) "of general application"
In US – Underwear , the Appellate Body upheld the panel's interpretation
"… that Article X:1 of GATT 1994, which … uses the language 'of general
application', includes 'administrative rulings ' in its scope. The mere fact that the
restraint at issue was an administrative order does not prevent us from concluding that
the restraint was a measure of general application. Nor does the fact that it was a
country-specific measure exclude the possibility of it being a measure of general
application. If, for instance, the restrain t was addressed to a specific company or
applied to a specific shipment, it would not have qualified as a measure of general
application. However, to the extent that the restraint affects an unidentified number of
economic operators, including domestic and foreign producers, we find it to be a
measure of general application."14
In EC - Poultry , the Appellate Body upheld the pane l's finding that the withholding of
information regarding a specific shipment was not inc onsistent with Article X as being outside its scope.
It noted that
                                                     
11 The note limits itself to an outline of the panels' findings that are relevant for an interpretation of key
provisions of GATT Articles V, VIII and X. It does not indent to be a comprehensive analysis of all findings
related to those Articles that have been made by GATT/WTO dispute settlement panels.
12 Appellate Body Report,  European Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain
Poultry Products, ("EC – Poultry") ,  WT/DS69/AB/R, adopted 23 July 1998, para. 115.
13 Ibid.
14 Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear,
("US – Underwear"), WT/DS24/R, adopted 25 February 1997, as modified by the Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS24/AB/R, para. 21.G/C/W/374
Page 6
"… Article X does not deal with specific transa ctions, but rather with 'rules of general
application'. (…) Although it is true … that any measure of general application will
always have to be applied in specific cases, nevertheless the specific treatment
accorded to each individual shipment cannot  be considered a 'measure of general
application' within the meaning of Article X."15  
The Appellate Body further agreed with the panel that
"conversely, licenses issued to a specific company or applied to a specific shipment
cannot be considered to be a measure of 'g eneral application' within the meaning of
Article X."16
In the Japan - Film case, the panel referred to the panel Report on US – Underwear  when
interpreting the term "of general application" as follows:
"…inasmuch as the Article X:1 requirement applies to all administrative rulings of
general application, it should also extend to administrative rulings in individual
cases where such rulings establish or revise principles or criteria applicable in
future cases."17
(ii) "published promptly in such a manner as  to enable governments and traders to become
acquainted with them"
In EEC – Dessert Apples the (GATT) panel found that publicati on in the Official Journal of the
European Communities did fulfill Article X:1's requirement to promptly publish a measure in a manner
as to enable governments and traders to become ac quainted with it. The panel noted that no time-limit or
delay between publication and entry into force was sp ecified by this provision. On the other hand, it held
that Article X:1 would prohib it the use of backdated quotas. 18Identical findings were made in the EEC –
Apples case.19
In Canada - Alcoholic Drinks , the panel held that Article X
"… did not require contracting parties to ma ke information affecting trade available to
domestic and foreign suppliers at the same time, not did it require contracting parties to
publish trade regulations in advan ce of their entry into force."20
The sharing of information relating to price pol icy of governmental authorities with domestic
brewers before that information was available foreig n authorities, as well as the announcement of a new
pricing policy in the legislature only five days before it entered into effect, were therefore not a violation
of Article X.
                                                     
15 Appellate Body Report, EC –Poultry, WT/DS69/AB/R, paras 111 and 113. See also Panel Report,
US – Underwear,  WT/DS24/R, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS24/AB/R, para. 7.65.
16 Appellate Body Report, EC –Poultry, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 113.
17 Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, ("Japan Film"),
WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, para. 10.388.
18 Panel Report, EEC – Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples ("EEC – Desert Apples) , L/6304,
adopted on 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/37, 88 –89, para. 4.20.
19 Panel Report, EEC – Restriction on Import of Apples  ("EEC – Apples"),  L/6513, adopted on 22 June
1989, BISD 36S/135, 166-167, paras. 5.20 – 5.23.
20 Panel Report, Canada – Import, Distribution, and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial
Marketing Agencies, ("Canada – Alcoholic Drinks"),  DS17/R, adopted on 18 February 1992, BISD 39S/27, 85-
86, para. 5.34.G/C/W/374
Page 7
However, referring to paragraph 1's requirement to promptly publish all laws and the
relationship of that requirement to the provis ions of Article X:3 (a), the panel in the Argentina –Bovine
Hides  case noted that:
"While it is normal that the GATT 1994 shoul d require this sort of transparency
between Members, it is significant that Article X:1 goes further and specifically
references the importance of transparency to individual traders. Thus, it can be seen
that Article X:3(a) requires an examination of the real effect that a measure might
have on traders operating in the commercial world.  This, of course, does not require
a showing of trade damage, as that is ge nerally not a requirement with respect to
violations of the GATT 1994.  But it can involve an examination of whether there isa possible impact on the competitive situation due to alleged partiality,
unreasonableness or lack of uniformity in the application of customs rules,
regulations, decisions, etc."
21
Paragraph 2
According to the Appellate Body in US - Underwear,
"Article X:2 …. may be seen to embody a principle of fundamental importance – that
of promoting full disclosure of governme ntal acts affecting Members and private
persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality. The relevant
policy principle is widely know as the prin ciple of transparency and has obviously due
process dimensions. The essential impli cation is that Members and other persons
affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental measures imposing restraints,
requirements and other burdens, should ha ve a reasonable opportunity to acquire
authentic information about such measures a nd accordingly  to protect and adjust their
activities or alternatively to seek modification of such measures."22
The Appellate Body further addressed the issue of whether Article X:2 prohibits the
retroactive application of transitional safeguard measures under the ATC Agreements, observing that
"Article X:2 … does not speak to, and hence not resolve, the  issue of permissibility
of giving retroactive effect to a safeguard restraint measure.  (….) Where no
authority exists to give retroactive effect to a restrictive governmental measure, that
deficiency is not cured by publishing the measure sometime before its actual
application."23
Paragraph 3
General
In EC – Bananas III, the panel dismissed the argument that paragraph 3 applies only to internal
measures. It held that
                                                     
21 Panel Report, Argentina - Measures Affecting to Export of Bovines Hides and the Imports of
Finished Leather ("Argentina- Bovine Hides"),  WT/DS155/R, adopted 16 February 2001, paras. 11.76 and
11.77.
22 Appellate Body Report,  US – Underwear", WT/DS24/R, para. 21.
23 Ibid., para. 22.G/C/W/374
Page 8
"internal laws regulating border measures constitute '…requirements … on imports….'
in the meaning of Article X:1 [defining Article X:3(a)'s coverage] and cannot be
excluded from its scope."24
According to the panel's ruling, Article X:3's scope would include licensing regulations for
tariff quotas.25
Subparagraph a
Scope
In the US – Stainless Steel  case, the panel rejected Korea's claim that the United States had
violated paragraph 3 (a) by departing from its ow n established policy regarding the determination of
local sales prices. The panel reasoned that Article X:3 (a)
"was not in our view intended to function as  a mechanism to test the consistency of a
Member's particular decisions or rulings with the Member's own domestic law and
practice; that is a function reserved for each Member's domestic judicial system, and a
function WTO panels would be particularly ill-suited to perform. (…) In our view, the
requirement of uniform administration of laws and regulations must be understood to
mean uniformity of treatment in respect of  persons similarly situated; it cannot be
understood to require identical results wh ere relevant factors differ. Nor do we
consider that the requirement of reasonab le administration of laws and regulation is
violated merely because, in the administrati on of those laws and regulations, different
conclusions were reached based upon differences in the relevant facts."26
Different form requirements among EU member st ates for import license applications, as well
as differences with respect to the requirement of  pro-forma invoices within these countries, were
considered minimal  and not in themselves a breach of Article X:3 by a GATT panel in the EEC –
Dessert Apples  case.27
Similarly, in EC – Bananas III,  the Appellate Body stated th at Article X:3(a) would not
preclude the imposition of one system of import licen sing procedures on a product originating in certain
Members and a different system on the same product originating in other Members.28 According to the
Appellate Body,
"The text of Article X:3(a) clearly indi cates that the requirements of 'uniformity,
impartiality and reasonableness' do not apply to the laws, regulations, decisions andrulings themselves , but rather to the administration  of those laws, regulations,
decisions and rulings. The context of Article X:3 (a) within Article X, which is entitled
'Publication and Administrati on of Trade Regulations', and a reading of the other
                                                     
24 Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for th e Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas ("EC – Bananas III"),  WT/DS27/R/GTM, adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by the Appellate
Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 7.206.
25 Ibid., paras. 7.206 and 7.225.
26 Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless
Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea ("US – Stainless Steel"),  WT/DS179/R, adopted 1 February 2001, paras. 6.50 –
6.51.
27 Panel Report, EEC – Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples, L/6491, paras 6.3 – 6.6 and 12.30.
28 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, ("EC – Bananas"),  WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, paras. 200 – 201.G/C/W/374
Page 9
paragraphs of Article X, make it clear that Article X applies to the administration of
laws, regulations, decisions and rulings. To the extent that the laws, regulations,
decision and rulings themselves are discrimi natory, they can be examined for their
consistency with the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994."29
In Argentina – Bovine Hides , the panel rejected the respondent's claim that Article X:3 (a)
would only apply to situations of discrimination between WTO Members .30The panel reasoned that
Article X:3(a)
"Nowhere …. refer (s) to Members or products  originating in or destined for certain
Members' territories (…)."31 
Referring to paragraphs 1 and 3 (b) of the same Article, and highlighting their focus on private
traders as main beneficiaries of the obligations established in those provisions, the panel found that
Article X could not be reduced to apply onl y to incidents of discrimination between Members .32
The panel further rejected Argentina's argument that a violation of paragraph 3 (a) could only be
found in the  administration of a regulation, not in its substance . It held that
"If the substance of a rule could not be challenged, even if the rule was administrative
in nature, it is unclear what could ever be challenged under Article X."33
According to the panel, resolutions  of an administrative nature, were "properly subject to review
under Article X:3 (a)." Read in conjunction with the Appellate B ody's finding in the EC – Poultry  case
that "Article X relates to the publication  and administration  of 'laws, regulations, judicial decisions and
administrative rulings of general a pplication', rather than to the substantive content  of such measures"34,
this suggests that, while Article X's focus is on the administration of the above-mentioned regulations, a
Member can nevertheless challenge the substance of a rule, if that rule is administrative in nature.
"in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner"According to the panel in Argentina – Bovine Hides , the test of whether there has been a
violation of a Member's obligation to administer it s laws in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner,
".. generally will not be whether there has been discriminatory treatment in favor of
exports to one Member relative to another. Indeed, the focus is on the treatment
accorded by government authorities to the traders in question."
35
With respect to the meaning of the term " uniform" , the panel noted that
"…this provision should not be read as a broad anti-discrimination provision. We do
not think this provision should be interpreted to require all products being treated
equal. That would be reading far too much  into this paragraph which focussed on the
                                                     
29 Ibid., para.  200.
30 Argentina had argued that paragraph 3 (a) was only applicable to cases of discriminatory treatment
regarding, for example, exports to two or more Members. For details see Panel Report, Argentina – Bovine
Hides, WT/DS155/R.
31 Ibid., para. 11.68.
32 Ibid., paras 11.67 – 11.68.
33 Ibid. , para. 11.71.
34 Appellate Body Report, EC –Poultry, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 115.
35 Panel Report, Argentina - Bovine Hides,  WT/DS155/R, para. 11.76.G/C/W/374
Page 10
day to day application of Customs Laws , rules and regulations. There are many
variations in products which might require differential treatment and we do not think
this provision should be read as a general invitation for a panel to make such
distinctions."36
On the interpretation of "impartial" , the panel observed that
"Whenever a party with a contrary commercial interest, but no relevant legal
interest37, is allowed to participate in an export transaction such as this, there is an
inherent danger that the Customs laws, regulations and rules will be applied in a
partial manner so as to permit persons with adverse commercial interests to obtain
confidential information to which they have no right."
As regards "reasonable" , the panel held that
"… it is unreasonable to allow ADICMA [Association of Industrial Producers of
Leather, Leather Manufactures and Related Products] representatives into theCustoms clearance process in light of the access to information that it affords.( … )
We do not see why ADICMA must have access to such information, which by its
nature is confidential and which is made available to it as a participant in the
Customs clearance process for the purposes of proper classification, in order to
combat fraud and mistakes with respect to assessment of export duties and awardingof export 'refunds'."
38
It reasoned that
".. a process aimed at assuring the pr oper classification of products, ... which
inherently contains the possibility of revealing confidential business information, is anunreasonable manner of administering the laws, regulations and rules identified in
Article X:1 and therefore inconsistent with Article X:3 (a)."
39
__________
                                                     
36 Ibid.,  paras 11.81 – 11.84.
37 It a footnote, the panel stated: "Again, we note that there is, arguably, a 'legal interest' created by
RG 2235 [the Argentinian resolution allowing ADICMA representatives to be present when customs authoritiesinspect bovine hides and skins before export] itself. However, that is the measure in question and should not beseen to self-generate a legal relationship that would not otherwise exist."
38 Panel Report, Argentina - Bovine Hides,  WT/DS155/R, para. 11.91. The quotation does not include
footnotes.
39 Ibid.,  para. 11.94.