RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/AG/R/6
21 February 2003
(03-1112)
Committee on Agriculture
Special Session
SUMMARY REPORT ON THE SIXTEENTH MEETING
OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE SPECIAL SESSION
HELD ON 24 JANUARY 2003
Note by the Secretariat1
1. The Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, which was established by the General
Council (WT/GC/M/53), is pursuing negotiations under paragraphs 13, 14 and other relevant
provisions of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and held its sixteenth meeting on 24 January 2003.
Mr. Stuart Harbinson chaired the meeting.
2. The agenda as contained in WTO/AIR/2005 was adopted.
ITEM A(i):  R EPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ON THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING
POSSIBLE MODALITIES , INCLUDING RULES -RELATED ELEMENTS
3. The Chairman presented his summary report of the main features of the informal discussions
on 22-24 January 2003 which took place on the basi s of the Chairman's Overview Paper dated
18 December 2002 (TN/AG/6).  A copy of the report is attached (Annex 1).
ITEM A(ii):  S TATEMENTS BY MEMBERS
4. Uruguay was prepared to make a constructive contribution and indicate areas of possible
flexibility and eventual lines of convergence.  However, the lack of specific proposals from important
trading partners and statements such as "tariff peaks and tariff escalation do not fall within the
negotiating mandate", "tariff quotas could not be increased in these negotiations", "the agreements on
modalities, to be established in March, must take into account commitments regarding geographicalindications and other non-trade related concerns", "only the Uruguay Round formula can give us
balanced results in these negotiations" posed serious difficulties as bridges could not easily be built.
Nonetheless, in Uruguay's view respecting the deadlines set by Ministers in Doha was a fundamental
requirement to maintain the credibility of the pro cess, reaffirm Members' commitment to development
and pave the way for a successful Ministerial meeting in Cancún.  Uruguay considered that the agreeddeadlines were not flexible and could not be ignored or extended.
5. Referring to the Chairman's Overview Paper, Uruguay concurred that modalities must
faithfully reflect the Doha mandate and added that they should only include proposals in line with the
level of ambition set by Ministers in Doha.  Proposals seeking to maintain the status quo or reverse
Uruguay Round commitments or to include elements that did not fall within the Doha mandate shouldbe avoided.  Uruguay also agreed that there was a need to concentrate on the key aspects as matters
not directly required for the purpose of establishing draft schedules could be addressed after March
2003.  Uruguay stressed that the preparation of the Chairman's modalities paper must take into
                                                     
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice
to the positions of Members or to their rights or obligations under the WTO.TN/AG/R/6
Page 2
account the fact that the Doha work programme had to achieve balanced results within the overall
context of the negotiations, not only within one particular sector such as the negotiations on
agriculture.  In this light, Uruguay looked forward to a highly ambitious first draft of modalities.
6. In the view of Venezuela, the negotiations must lead to fair and well-balanced trade
commitments.  Venezuela regretted that there had been no signs towards convergence.  Regarding the
Chairman's modalities paper, Venezuela suggested that the relationship between the three pillars mustbe clearly stated and that improvements in market access could not be achieved unless significant
changes in the other two pillars were made allowing Venezuela to address social needs of rural areas
and food security concerns.  A future Agreement on Agriculture should include a special safeguard
for all developing countries, the use of which would be adapted to their own individual circumstances.
Venezuela regretted that the debate had brought to light the unwillingness on the part of major trading
partners to accord due importance to S&D treat ment, which was one of the conditions by many
developing countries for the launch of the Round.  Venezuela expressed the hope that the modalitiespaper would consider the interests and needs of developing countries and noted that the deadlines
agreed upon by Ministers at Doha should be met without adversely affecting the interests of
developing countries.
7. Argentina stressed the need to send a positive signal to the markets regarding prospects for
further liberalization.  The absence of this signal would undoubtedly have negative consequences, notonly for agriculture but for all economic activities, and not only for the developing but also for the
developed countries.  Regarding the Overview Paper, Argentina expressed reservations with respect
to the sections dealing with initiatives which fe ll outside the Doha mandate, such as geographical
indications, labelling, and food safety.  Argentina noted that as from 2004 agricultural export
subsidies would no longer be exempt from act ions based on Article XVI of the GATT 1994 or
Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures which underlined the
need to meet the timetable set out in paragraph 14 of the Doha Declaration and to carry out the
substance of paragraph 13.  In Argentina's view, the Members' effort must be proportional to the
magnitude of the distortions caused to the world agricultural trade.  As the negotiations on agriculture
were part of a wider package, compensation needed to be given within the context of the singleundertaking and without adversely affecting the agricultural reform process.  Also, the fact that many
developing countries had made substantial efforts in the Uruguay Round and did not reserve the
possibility of applying distortions needed to be taken into account.  Argentina urged all Members, and
particularly the main partners in the trading syst em, to do their utmost to adhere to the scheduled
timeframe.
8. The United States could not agree with a number of working hypotheses in the Overview
Paper nor could it support numerous statements by other Members in the informal meeting.  The
United States noted that it was difficult for any Member to work creatively when some of the most
vocal participants had yet to identify how they would achieve the objectives established at Doha.  To
meet the agreed deadlines and establish ambitious modalities at the end of March, Members needed to
be on track for significant liberalization, for the sake of growth and development and for the sake of
keeping the Doha Agenda alive.  Failure to take strong steps in this direction posed a serious threat tothe Doha Agenda and the legitimacy of the WTO as an institution.
9. The United States called for the ultimate harmonization through the elimination of
trade-distorting measures in all three pillars and appealed to Members to identify areas where they
could make meaningful contributions to reform or bear the consequences of failing to engage in the
process.  On the margins of the Special Session, the United States had held a number of discussionswith other Members to clarify its proposal and he lp move forward with substantial reform.  The
United States considered that Members faced a once-in-a-generation opportunity to tackle the huge
disparities in levels of trade-distorting support and protection by agreeing to move forward
ambitiously in all pillars, including on issues where Members had sensibilities.  The stakes were very
high as Members could move forward on meaningful market oriented reform that led to growth orTN/AG/R/6
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stall the WTO reform process.  In the view of the United States, an incremental result was not
possible because without substantial reductions and greater harmonization, the terms of the Doha
mandate would not be met and countries would turn from the Doha process to advance their interests
in agricultural trade.  That included maintenance of subsidy programmes and market access barriers,
and expansion of discriminatory trade agreements.  The United States noted that the status quo only
worked for farmers in a select group of wealthy countries that had the necessary resources to take careof themselves under the framework of existing disciplines.  However, this status quo did not address
Members' commitment in Doha, and the status quo in agriculture was not the road for sustainable
economic development.
10. Brazil was not in a position to subscribe to some of the views reflected in the Overview Paper,
particularly those contained in paragraph 28, as they fell outside the scope of the mandate.  Brazil
regretted that the European Communities had not come forward with a proposal as it would have
created an environment more conducive to negotiations although the deadlines of the agriculturenegotiations were carefully planned with a view to meeting the EC's internal calendar.  Cognisant of
the difficulties in coordinating positions among different countries, Brazil recalled that the Cairns
Group included developed and developing countries who did not share a common agricultural policy
but who were brought together by a common position predicated on a commitment to the reform of
agriculture and to the ideals of the WTO.  Brazil stressed that it was time to rise to the occasion as inthe next few weeks Members would be deciding not only the modalities but also the fate of the Round
and the shape of agriculture trade for a substantial period of time.
11. In the view of Egypt, the agriculture negotiations were the most important item of the Doha
Development Agenda and success in agriculture was a condition sine qua non  of a successful round.
Unless the Chairman's modalities paper reflected a high level of ambition, there would be no progressin other areas of negotiations.  A viable S&D treatment was another key element.  Egypt explained
that the S&D component should be seen as a means for all developing countries to enjoy improved
access to all markets and that S&D should translate beyond longer implementation periods and lower
rates of tariff reductions.  The modalities paper s hould also address the current inequities in the
Agreement on Agriculture, with special emphasis and "surgical" treatment applied to the existingprotectionist mechanisms.  The focus of the paper should be on achieving a level playing field.  In
Egypt's view, non-trade concerns, although of great importance to some Members, did not constitute a
pillar of work and the mandate was to take them into account.
12. China noted great differences among Members on some key issues and called for further
efforts by all Members to accelerate the negotiations .  According to China, the draft modalities should
reflect the ambitious goal to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system.
Reaching this ambitious goal might require Members to take the necessary risks however failing to
meet the deadlines set by the Doha Ministerial Declaration would put the Doha Development Agenda
into a deadlock.  China suggested that to reach a balanced package, a link to horizontal issues needed
to be made by rewarding recently acceded Members for the substantial commitment made in the
accession process and elaborating S&D treatment for developing countries.
13. Jamaica, supported by Mauritius and Fiji, said that the results of negotiations should be
balanced and the outcome should accommodate the issues affecting the more vulnerable amongst
Members.  Meaningful S&D treatment must be integrated in the modalities.  Jamaica was concerned
about its dependence on a narrow range of agricultural commodities and preferential access for them
as well as the issues of food security, rural livelihood and its needs as an NFIDC.  Jamaica supported
a Uruguay Round approach to tariff reductions, lower rates of reduction and longer time frames fordeveloping countries, reduction exemptions for certain strategic products, maintenance of preference
margins and expansion in the scope (i.e. developing country and product coverage) and simplification
of the special safeguard mechanism.  Jamaica supported further reform but it needed to take into
account the needs of small vulnerable economies.TN/AG/R/6
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14. Kenya, supported by Uganda, noted that the challenges in reaching a consensus on modalities
were great.  Nevertheless, a compromise was possible through accommodating each others' concerns.
Referring to its earlier submissions, Kenya highlighted the issues of key importance.  First, S&D
provisions for developing countries should not only be limited to longer implementation periods and
lower reduction commitments but also take into consideration development needs of those countries.
Second, the interlinkages between the three pillars should be taken into account in the outcome ofthese negotiations.  Third, the level of ambition by developing countries to undertake commitments in
the area of market access should be matched by a substantial reduction in all trade-distorting domestic
support and export subsidies in developed countries.  Fourth, the need to maintain trade preferences
should not be undermined.  In addition, any commitments to undertake reforms should take into
consideration the possible negative effects on least-developed and net food-importing developing
countries.  Lastly, Kenya considered that it was important to meet the deadlines established by
Ministers in Doha without compromising the substance of negotiations.
15. Thailand recalled that its primary objective in  joining the consensus to launch the new round
was to eliminate trade-distorting subsidies in world agricultural trade.  Thailand noted that in
comparison with the market access negotiations on services and non-agricultural products, progress in
agriculture negotiations was disappointing due to the inability of some Members to seriously engage
in the process.  In Thailand's view, draft modalities should take into account the proposals that hadalready been put forward and the ambitious mandate given by Ministers at Doha.  Only the views
coinciding with the mandate should be taken into account.  As Members agreed on a single
undertaking approach, progress should be made evenly in all issues under the Doha mandate so that
the overall balance of the package could be seen.  Thailand urged Members to establish modalities by
the end of March as missing this deadline would not bode well for negotiations in other areas.Thailand stressed that modalities must provide an ambitious outcome as mandated by Ministers in
Doha, the product coverage must be comprehens ive without excluding any products from the reform
process, S&D treatment must be incorporated for developing countries with no discrimination among
the developing countries, and the interlinkages between the three pillars must be observed.
16. The Czech Republic considered that the Doha mandate covered all elements of market access
(not only tariffs), export competition (not only export subsidies) and domestic support that enabled
each participant to identify the economic and political  choices that needed to be made to achieve a
balanced outcome.  As significant differences in th e interpretation of the level of ambition remained,
the Czech Republic recalled that negotiations on agriculture started under Article 20 of the Agreement
on Agriculture which established the basis for initiating a process of reform in agricultural trade andthat the Doha Declaration provided Members with cl ear guidelines regarding that process.  In this
light, the Czech Republic hoped that the Chairman's modalities paper would leave no doubt about the
base for the reform process.  Regarding the Chairm an's summary report of the informal meeting, the
Czech Republic underlined that it attached great importance to the issue of the Peace Clause.
17. The Slovak Republic said that negotiations on modalities should strictly follow the mandate
in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Doha Declaration.  Hence, considering the long-term objective of
reform, it was not yet the time to quickly eliminate all distortions.  In addition, non-trade concernsneeded to be taken into account not just taken note of.  Noting that participants had continued to focus
on the parts of the mandate that corresponded closely with their ambitions, the Slovak Republic
advocated a more realistic approach that necessari ly covered all elements.  With respect to the
Chairman's modalities paper, it should contain modalities as well as the steps to facilitate a reasonable
and constructive dialogue.
18. Referring to its statement at the informal meeting (see Annex 3), India underlined the
interlinkage between the three pillars and the cr ucial need to take on board its livelihood security
concerns.TN/AG/R/6
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19. Pakistan expressed concern about the pace of progress on various issues of the Doha
Development Agenda as well as the comments by some Members to maintain the status quo.  Pointing
to the missed deadlines in other areas, Pakistan considered that modalities might not be established by
the end of March.  Pakistan underlined that any liberalization should be real and comprehensive.
Specifically, there was a need to substantially reduce tariffs and to increase tariff quotas so that in five
to seven years they would be eliminated.  Tariff quota administration should be transparent andpredictable.  Export subsidies should be reduced to zero.  On domestic support, Pakistan stated that it
resulted in dumping and so long as domestic support existed, it was difficult for developing countries
to produce their own food.  Regarding food aid, clear rules should prevent using food aid as an
instrument of surplus disposal.  A mechanism for developing countries should be established to ensure
food security, including a right to use export taxes if tariff escalation was maintained in developed
countries, and S&D should be made more effective.  Pakistan appealed to Members to focus on
establishing modalities by the end of March in order to bring agriculture on an equal footing withother sectors under the WTO rules.
20. Malaysia noted that the lack of signs for convergence undermined the establishment of
modalities by the end of March.  Malaysia hoped for a very ambitious modalities paper, taking full
account of S&D provisions for all developing countries and incorporating flexibilities that Malaysia
indicated during the informal meeting.  Malaysia supported the proposal on the Special andDifferential Countervailing Measure put forward by a group of countries in November 2002.
21. Indonesia emphasized that this round of agricultural negotiations needed to rectify the
existing imbalances in the Agreement on Agriculture which had allowed the developed countries to
protect their farmers from the impact of trade liberalization while farmers in the developing countries
had been left to fend for themselves facing the pressure of trade liberalisation.  Agricultural reformshould not only open and provide a more liberalized agricultural trade but should lead to a much fairer
trade in agriculture so that all developing countries could reap the benefits of trade and attain food
security.  In this light, a fair trade must address the concerns of developing countries particularly on
food security, rural development, and other S&D provisions by taking them into account and
stipulating them as an integral part of the Agreemen t.  Indonesia stressed that the reform in the area of
domestic support and export subsidies would help advance the market access discussions.  However,
if such distortions were not eliminated, developing countries should not be asked to open their
markets.  With respect to product coverage, Indonesia noted that some Members supported the S&D
proposal for an exclusion list for staple food products sensitive for food security and rural
development.  Indonesia was prepared to consider a formula based approach to further reduce boundtariffs and increase market access opportunity provided that some food security products be excluded
from reduction commitment.  Indonesia argued for a Food Security Mechanism which it considered
was in line with the Doha mandate and should be seen as a development tool for developing countries.
22. Switzerland stated that the negotiating modalities formed a package and it was essential for
Members to negotiate, at the same time, the elemen ts leading to the list of commitments as well as
rules.  Without clarity on the rules elements of the modalities, Switzerland doubted how figures
relating to Members' commitments could be put forward.  The lack of constructive discussions onmatters of concern to Switzerland could put the Doha timetable in danger.  Nonetheless, Switzerland
was committed to make every effort to meet the deadlines.
23. Paraguay was concerned about the slow progress of the negotiations and called on Members
to respect the deadlines as it was vital for the credibility of the WTO and the global trade round.
Anticipating proposals from some major trading partners, Paraguay would have liked to seenegotiating approaches that corresponded with the mandate and were balanced with other market
access negotiations where an ambitious outcome was sought by those Members.  Regarding draft
modalities, Paraguay referred to its statement made during the informal Special Session (see Annex 3)
and highlighted that formulae or mechanisms used in the past would not allow to put agriculture on an
equal footing with other sectors.TN/AG/R/6
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24. In the view of Hungary, the main obstacle to  building bridges was the fact that Members
continued to ignore fundamental agriculture-related interests of others.  Examples included the issues
of geographical indications and new disciplines on state trading enterprises.  For Hungary, global
balance could not mean that some Members would be deprived of gaining anything important in
agriculture while giving significant concessions.  As the issues were interlinked, negotiations on rules
should proceed in parallel with those on matters directly related to the establishment of schedules.
25. Japan recalled that it had made a series of spec ific and realistic inputs mainly regarding rule-
related aspects and pointed out that the figures presented by some Members were unrealistic and if
applied would lead to a collapse of agriculture in many countries, including developing countries.
Japan underlined that a number of rule-related issues needed to be discussed prior to discussing
figures.  For example, it was impossible for food im porting countries to make any further commitment
in the area of market access and domestic support without knowing what kind of commitment food
exporting countries were to undertake in the areas of export restrictions and export taxes.  Furtherdiscussion was also needed on whether harmonization was a right approach for the agriculture sector
where conditions of production differed significantly from one country to another.  Regarding S&D,
Japan recalled its proposals including the flexibility for developing Members to apply lower reduction
rates and longer implementation period and the exemption of LDC Members from the reduction
commitments.  Japan outlined its latest initiative to expand preferential tariff regimes for LDCs aswell as developing countries which would be implemented from 1 April 2003, subject to approval by
the Diet.  Japan argued that in order to preserve the effects of such initiative, it was necessary to use
the Uruguay Round formula for further tariff reductions rather than the Swiss formula 25.  With
respect to the Overview Paper, Japan considered that it covered important rule elements of the
modalities, including strengthened disciplines on export restrictions and taxes.  In Japan's view, thedraft modalities should be comprehensive and the scope of rule-related elements should not be
narrowed down.
26. The European Communities noted that further input as well as technical work and
clarifications were required on a number of issues and expressed full commitment to play an active
role in moving the process forward.  The European Communities expressed the hope that themodalities paper would reflect the need for a comprehensive package aimed at an outcome that would
find widespread support among Members.
27. New Zealand supported Uruguay's intervention and emphasized two points.  First, it was
necessary to respect the deadlines agreed by Ministers of all WTO Members in November 2001.
Second, the modalities established must faithfully reflect the level of ambition agreed in the Dohamandate.
28. Bulgaria was prepared to make concessions however other Members appeared to seek only to
gain from the negotiations.  Bulgaria hoped that the Chairman's modalities paper would reflect the
overall balance which necessarily meant that each delegation would be able to find a positive balance
of interests for itself.
29. Noting little progress in the informal discussions, Mexico appealed to all Members to
intensify efforts and engage in negotiations with a more ambitious focus.  Mexico underlined that the
fundamental link between the three pillars should not pose limits on progress but should imply an
ambitious agricultural reform.  Mexico hoped that the modalities paper would set out ways of
embarking on clear reform as soon as possible.
30. Mauritius, supported by Fiji, underlined the need for a balanced and equitable outcome of the
negotiations.  Referring to the ACP paper on the importance of preferential access to developagricultural markets, Mauritius noted that the ACP countries constituted a major component of the
WTO membership but accounted for a very negligible proportion in world trade and had no capacity
to distort trade.  In the view of Mauritius, balanced and equitable results meant that the importance ofTN/AG/R/6
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preferences be duly recognized and adequately featured in modalities.  To this end, paragraph 26 of
the Overview Paper was a good basis for further work.  To fulfil food security objectives, adequate
means should be put at the disposal of vulnerable countries, namely the LDCs, the NFIDCs, the small
island developing states and the landlocked countries.  Regarding the level of ambition, Members
should aim for a win-win result for all which could not be achieved if the Swiss formula were
adopted.  Regarding the level playing field, Mauritius considered that it was inappropriate to comparecountries with huge land resources with cyclone- or drought-prone small countries.  Mauritius urged
Members to recognize that there were numerous stakeholders and that no one should come out of the
negotiations empty-handed.
31. In Norway's view, further discussions must be based on the Uruguay Round formula.  It was a
compromise solution during the previous round and should be used again as it would probably be the
only way toward an outcome that all Members could live with.  Regarding domestic support, the less
trade-distorting part such as the Green Box and Blue Box support should be continued without any
caps.  The AMS trade-distorting support should be subject to differentiated reduction commitments
according to export orientation.  Norway pointed to the need for stricter disciplines in the area of
export competition and was prepared to show flexibility as part of a balanced approach in the other
areas of negotiations.  Norway considered that before the end of March, Members should also agree
on the rules-related aspects such as the future of the special safeguards, the Blue and Green Boxes, thePeace Clause, and disciplines on export credits and food aid.
32. Speaking on behalf of the LDCs, Bangladesh recalled that the LDCs had bound their tariffs at
a rate much lower than their trading partners and that the applied tariff rates were also low.  Due to the
need for revenues for investment and economic development, LDCs should not be required to make
any reduction commitment.  Bangladesh noted that tariff peaks and tariff escalation in developedcountries posed serious constraints on the exports of agricultural and agro-processing industries from
the LDCs and should be eliminated.  With respect to tariff quotas, modalities should incorporate
quota-free access for all LDCs' products in both deve loped and developing country markets.  As the
LDCs did not have the right to use Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, they needed a special
safeguard based on a price or volume trigger.  Therefore, the existing special safeguard underArticle 5 should be abolished and be replaced with a new S&D measure.  Bangladesh noted that
although LDCs were given preferential tariff margins, there was an increasing trend among the
developed countries to impose conditions on GSP benefits.  Hence, the GSP principles should be
elaborated and maintained in the framework of  the Agreement with an explicit commitment by
developed countries to the principles of non-discrimination and non-reciprocity.
33. Bangladesh considered that the export subsidy provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture
were asymmetric and sought greater disciplines in the use of export subsidies by the developed
countries and an immediate abolition of export subsidies on products of particular interest to the
LDCs.  Considering that all LDC Members were ne t food-importers, exporting Members should not
impose any restrictions or taxes on exports of f ood to the LDCs.  Bangladesh continued that LDCs
were also exporters of certain agricultural products.  They had the potential to attain sufficiency in
food and become net exporters in agricultural commodities but the imbalances in the Agreement onAgriculture had forced them to remain importers.  Bangladesh noted that LDCs needed investment in
agricultural sector to spur economic development.  To this end, the LDCs should be free to use any
type of domestic support measures that they deemed appropriate and necessary as part of their
development strategy.  LDCs should be allowed to  provide support including price support and cash
incentives to their agricultural sector. Also, the provision of paragraph 13 in Annex 2 should berevised allowing the LDCs to provide assistance to low-income, resource-poor producers in all
regions in pursuance of their respective poverty reduction strategies.
34. Regarding the Overview Paper, Bangladesh noted a broad consensus with respect to
exempting LDCs from reduction commitments in the areas of market access, export competition and
domestic support.  In response to one Member who spoke about voluntary reduction commitment byTN/AG/R/6
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the LDCs, Bangladesh considered it contrary to the existing provision of Article 15.2 of the
Agreement on Agriculture and therefore not acceptable.  The second sentence of Article 15.2 should
be maintained and a reaffirmation that LDC Members should not be required to undertake reduction
commitments should be part of the draft modalities.  On other matters, Bangladesh pointed out that
developed countries had applied the SPS and TBT measures with greater stringency on imports from
LDCs.  In light of difficulties that LDCs face in order to export, developed countries should restrainfrom applying SPS and TBT measures on exports from LDCs.  Referring to the lack of knowledge on
SPS and TBT matters, Bangladesh underlined the need for technical and financial assistance and
suggested that the provision of financial a nd technical assistance in SPS and TBT should be
incorporated in the Agreement on Agriculture.
35. The Philippines reiterated that reform and trade liberalization necessarily meant the
dismantling of production and trade-distorting subsidies by developed countries together with
disciplining of high tariff barriers.  The Phil ippines suggested that the framework of the next
agreement must ensure that the three pillars be effectively integrated and that commitments be clearly
inter-linked.  According to the Philippines, furthe r market openings by developing countries must be
fully dependent on reforms by developed countries in domestic support and export subsidies.  The
modality must have a balancing mechanism prov iding for proper incentives to encourage a
comprehensive reform while at the same time allowing some degree of flexibility to all countries.Stressing the importance of food security to developing countries, the Philippines expressed the hope
that the modality paper would include an effective food security mechanism to address this key issue.
36. Chinese Taipei noted that the gap between Members' positions remained wide and the
political will for further liberalization was required from each Member to meet the March 31 deadline.
Chinese Taipei reminded that although the objective of these negotiations was to promote furthertrade liberalization and reduce trade-distorting domestic support, the non-trade concerns mandated by
the Doha Declaration should be taken seriously into consideration at the same time.  Chinese Taipei
considered that the balance of these two elements would result in a more feasible, practical and
realistic solution to these negotiations, otherwise they would be unnecessarily delayed.  Emphasizing
that agricultural reform was a long and gradual process and that each Member had its own uniquepace of progress, Chinese Taipei appealed to Memb ers to take the time element into consideration
when making proposals for drastic change.
37. Bolivia supported statements made by Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Thailand and the Philippines.  Bolivia regretted that at the time when the public opinion needed to
receive a clear, optimistic and positive  message, the Committee did not live up to the expectationsand its responsibility.  Bolivia reiterated that the success of negotiations would only be possible
through a deep reform of agricultural trade.  Th is should be reached within the global negotiating
framework, putting an end to the imbalance in agricultural trade and the differences it made between
farmers in developed and developing countries.  Bolivia urged those developed Members who had yet
to submit proposals or whose proposals attempted to preserve the status quo or reverse the reform
process to keep in mind the Doha commitment to trade liberalization and development.  With respect
to the modalities paper, Bolivia hoped that it would reflect faithfully the Doha mandate.
38. Uganda noted that significant differences existed among Members on the interpretation of the
Doha mandate, on the issue of the appropriate provisions for S&D treatment and on how to take into
account non-trade concerns.  Uganda said that Members were drawing linkages between agriculture
negotiations and other elements of the Doha Development Agenda.  With respect to the level of
ambition, Uganda recalled the Doha mandate which stat ed that S&D was to be an integral part of all
elements of the negotiations and should be embodied in the Schedules of concessions and
commitments and that modalities should include provisions for S&D treatment.  Uganda stressed that
LDCs required special attention and should not be required to undertake reduction commitments in
the areas of market access, export competition and domestic support.  Uganda noted Japan's support
for such modality and urged other Members to build  bridges with a view to addressing the problemsTN/AG/R/6
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of the LDCs.  Uganda pointed to the need to meet the Doha deadlines and asked those Members who
had yet to submit proposals to do it soon.
39. Referring to its statement at the informal meeting (see Annex 3), Fiji underlined the need for
trade preferences for some Members.  Fiji consider ed that the time had come for the major trading
partners to build bridges and hoped that the small countries would not fall in the gaps.
40. Australia stressed that failing to meet the deadlin es or to faithfully reflect the objectives of the
Doha mandate would put at risk the prospects for any outcome on agriculture, and the prospects of the
whole round. Australia agreed with the United States that such a scenario would call into question the
relevance of the WTO.  Urging the Chairman to aim for a high level of ambition in his modalities
paper, Australia stated that every modality put forward should contribute directly to the objectives set
out in the Doha mandate and modalities should flow logically from the mandate, e.g. no modality
should allow Members to increase their tariffs.  Australia urged Members who had yet to submit
proposals to come forward with ambitious propos als to help move the negotiations forward.
41. In response to Japan's concerns over potential destruction of agriculture as a result of the
ambitious reform, Australia recalled Japan had raised the same fears in relation to the liberalization of
its beef sector fifteen years ago but fifteen years after opening of Japan's beef market Japan's beef
production was basically unchanged.  Australia urged the Chairman to seriously consider calls for
flexibility, realism and balance but only in the case of real concerns of developing countries.Australia rejected claims from some Members that  reform would only benefit efficient exporters
pointing out that the biggest gainers from reform would be countries with high levels of support and
protection therefore the real concern for these countries was a political one rather than the lack of any
gains which would flow from reform.  Australia em phasized that the modalities must be cautiously
crafted so that the inclusion of non-trade concerns would not be used as a basis for avoiding reform.Australia was concerned about attempts to introduce issues that would be more appropriately raised
under other WTO agreements or where reforms would be conditional on reopening or reinterpreting
of the existing WTO agreements.  While these demands might represent genuine objectives of the
proponents, they diverted attention from the core reform objectives.  In Australia's view, non-trade
concerns should be taken into account by the provision of measures allowing targeted, transparent anddecoupled mechanisms which did not distort production and trade.  As a key issue, the three pillars of
the reform process and the interlinkages between them needed to be addressed.  According to
Australia, developing countries would not have the confidence to move on market access unless the
other two pillars were substantially addressed.  Special and differential treatment for developing
countries should be an integral part of all three pillars and special consideration should be given todeveloping countries facing particular challenges in the areas of food security, rural unemployment
and rural development.
42. Ecuador underlined that the Doha mandate was clear and ambitious because the reform had to
be deep and beneficial to all.  As development was a central theme of the Doha Declaration, it should
be reflected in the agriculture negotiations.  Ecuador placed an emphasis on the great responsibility
that WTO Members had in fulfilling this ambitious mandate and delivering a result that would affect
an important part of world's population.  With respect to the Chairman's modalities paper, Ecuadoradvocated that it should be ambitious and cover all and only those areas contained in the mandate.
43. Chile expressed disappointment and concern regarding the lack of progress in the negotiations
and cautioned about its effects on the Doha Round, including the impact for the world's poor, peace
and international security, and multilateralism.  Referring to a lack of concrete proposals from some
participants, Chile compared the negotiations thus far to shadow-boxing.  Chile called for a seriouseffort to deliver on the Doha Agenda that met the needs of all Members, and in particular the needs of
development.TN/AG/R/6
Page 10
44. The representatives of Venezuela, India, Indonesia, Paraguay, Bulgaria, the Philippines, Fiji,
Bolivia and Honduras requested that their statements made at the informal Special Session form an
integral part of the record of the 16th formal Special Session (Annex 3).
ITEM B:  O THER BUSINESS
Date of the next Special Session45. The Chairman noted that the next informal Special Session, which is to be held on
24-28 February 2003, would be dedicated to discuss the first draft of modalities for further
commitments.  This discussion will take place on the basis of the Chairman's paper to be circulated in
advance of the February Special Session.
Chairman's Report to the Trade Negotiations Committee
46. The Chairman outlined his report to the Trade Negotiations Committee (TN/AG/7).  A copy
of the report is attached (Annex 2).TN/AG/R/6
Page 11
Annex 1
JOB(03)/11
Report by the Chairman of the Special Session, Committee on Agriculture
24 January 2003
Introduction
Under the programme adopted by the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture on
24 March, the Chairman is required to report to the formal Special Sessions on the work undertaken in
the informal Special Sessions (TN/AG/1 refers).  Th is is my brief summary of the comprehensive and
substantive review that took place on 22-24 January of possible modalities, including rules-related
elements.  It should be noted that this report refers only to the main themes of our discussions.
In accordance with the agreed programme, our work over the past days was based on the
Overview Paper circulated on 18 December 2002 (TN/AG/6 refers).  We had extensive discussions onpossible modalities and rules-related elements, covering the broad range of issues and questions set
out in that paper and on the scope of the modalities themselves.  In the discussions there were some
signs of progress on some issues but in critical areas there was little sign of movement towards
compromise.
Presentation of Proposals
At the start of the informal Special Session, a number of delegations took the opportunity to
present proposals that they had submitted after the November meeting.
A. Market Access
Under the first agenda item, there was an extensive discussion under the headings of tariffs,
tariff quotas, special safeguards and other market access issues.  With regard to these issues, as well
as under the following Agenda items, possible modalities for special and differential treatment fordeveloping countries were an important feature of our discussions.
As at previous Special Sessions, different ideas for modalities for tariff reductions were
advanced and, in response, other delegations set out the reasons why they considered these proposals
to be unacceptable or impractical.  On tariff quotas several participants called for both their expansion
and strengthened disciplines of their administration, although the views on an appropriate formula for
the expansion differed.  Others were only in favour of improvements in tariff quota administration.There were different views on whether or not the current special safeguard should be continued.
Various types of special safeguard mechanisms for developing countries were commented upon.
Points were raised on tariff preferences.  Possible flexibility regarding the market access
commitments of certain groups of Members, including transition economies and newly-acceded
Members, were also the subject of interventions.
B. Export Competition
The discussions on export competition were divided into issues related to export subsidies and
those relating to export restrictions.  A number of Members stressed that export subsidies were to bephased out and that the only issue for negotiations was the time-frame to achieve this result.  Others
reiterated their readiness to reduce export subsidies provided all forms of export subsidization were
treated in equivalent ways.  There was also a discussion on the treatment of the subsidy element of
export credits and related programmes.TN/AG/R/6
Page 12
There was a debate on whether export restrictions and/or taxes were part of the mandate given
by Ministers at the Doha Ministerial Conference and, on this issue, several participants referred to the
proposals they had made earlier.
C. Domestic Support
Domestic support issues were discussed next.  There were some comments concerning the
architecture of the domestic support chapter of the Agreement on Agriculture.  In addition, specific
points were made regarding possible amendments, deletions and/or additions to the existing Green
Box provisions.  Some participants suggest ed that Annex 2 should not be changed.
While all participants accepted that trade-distorting domestic support should be reduced as
required by the Doha Ministerial Declaration, there continued to be different opinions concerning
what would be a "substantial" reduction and how best to achieve it.  Some participants called for
AMS commitments on a product-specific basis while others advocated the current methodology.  As
with most other matters, there was no sign of changes in positions concerning the Blue Box.  There
appeared to be broad support for maintaining the provisions of Article 6.2 and some specificsuggestions were made aimed at enhancing its policy coverage.  Reference was once again made to
the proposals for flexibility for transition and newly-acceded Members.
D. Least-Developed Countries
Under the agenda item on least-developed countries the proposal that least-developed
countries should not be required to undertake reduction commitments was addressed.  One participant
suggested that the least-developed countries should be encouraged to take commitments on a
voluntary basis.
E. Other Matters raised in connection with the areas of market access, export competition
and domestic support
As regards Agenda Item E, some participants stressed the great importance they attached to
making progress on the issues of labelling, geographical indications and food safety.  However, it wasclear that there continued to be wide differences of opinion on these issues, including on the question
of whether they were part of the Doha Development Agenda and whether they should be part of the
negotiations on agriculture or dealt with in other WTO bodies.  Comments were also made about the
difficulty developing countries were facing in meeting the SPS and TBT standards they have to
comply with in export markets.
State trading enterprises, food aid, export credits and tariff quota administration were also
discussed.  On the last three of these issues there was some common ground.  The peace clause was
referred to by one participant.
Conclusion
Over the past two and a half days we have addressed a heavy agenda and I am grateful for the
cooperation of participants in making it possible to conclude our work on time.  We have heard a few
ideas which will help us in our efforts to move the process forward.  However, I have to note that we
have made very little headway in building bridges between positions.  At this late stage in the run up
to 31 March, this must be a matter of serious concern to us all.  It is clear that we urgently need tochange gear and engage in serious negotiations.  If everyone remains camped on their current
positions the prospects for the negotiations are not encouraging.TN/AG/R/6
Page 13
For my part, I would have liked to have had more guidance from our informal Special Session
in terms of how bridges can be built.  Nevertheless, I will carefully reflect on the discussions over the
past two and a half days and, no doubt, on this afternoon's session as well.  On this basis, and on the
basis of the considerable amount of work carried out in the negotiations to date, I shall then prepare
the first draft of the modalities, as I am required to do under the agreed work programme.  My
intention is to circulate that draft well in advance of the Special Session to be held from24-28 February.
In the meantime, I must urge all participants to continue their work both in Geneva and in
capitals, including by way of bilateral and plurilateral contacts, with a view to having a much more
productive Special Session when we next meet at th e end of February.  May I finally remind you that,
after the February Special Session, a second draft of the modalities is to be produced for consideration
at the Special Session at the end of March when modalities are to be established.TN/AG/R/6
Page 14
Annex 2
TN/AG/7
SIXTEENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
Report by the Chairman, Stuart Harbinson, to the Trade Negotiations Committee
I. STATUS OF WORK
1. The Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, which is pursuing negotiations under
paragraphs 13, 14 and other relevant provisions of the Doha Ministerial Declaration as agreed by theTrade Negotiations Committee (TN/C/M/1), held its sixteenth formal meeting on 24 January 2003.
The agenda as set out in WTO/AIR/2005 was adopted.
2. The Chairman presented a report on his own responsibility concerning the main features of
the discussions at the 22-24 January informal Special Session.  In accordance with the agreed work
programme, these comprised a comprehensive and substantive review of possible modalities, basedon the Overview paper circulated on 18 December 2002 (TN/AG/6).
3. The Chairman's report will be included in th e Secretariat summary report on the sixteenth
formal Special Session (to be issued as TN/AG/R/6).  A number of statements were made by
participants in the formal meeting regarding the negotiations and the various issues and questions
raised by the Chairman in the Overview paper.  Participants' statements and contributions will also bereflected in the Secretariat summary report.
II. OUTSTANDING ISSUES
4. The Special Session addressed a heavy agenda.  Although a number of ideas were raised that
will help efforts to move the process forward, very little headway was made in building bridges
between positions.  At this late stage in the run-up to 31 March, this is a matter of serious concern.
5. Overall, Members are still far apart on many of the critical issues set out in the Overview
paper.  They include the methods to be applied by Members in preparing their draft Schedules and the
levels of ambition concerning the depth of further reform.  Outstanding issues also include a variety of
matters  relating to the rules and disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture.  In addition, certain
collateral issues have been raised by a number of  Members but, so far, there is no agreement on how,or in some cases whether, these matters should be addressed.
III. FURTHER WORK
6. A considerable effort will have to be made by Members in order to meet the end-of-March
deadline.
7. In accordance with the agreed work programme, a first draft of a modalities document will be
prepared and circulated for consideration at the next Special Session on 24-28 February.
Subsequently, a second draft will be prepared and circulated for consideration at the Special Sessionscheduled to take place on 25-31 March, on which occasion the modalities are to be established.TN/AG/R/6
Page 15
Annex 3
Statements by Members at the Informal Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture
held on 22-24 January 2003
Statement by Bolivia
Firstly, I would like to thank you for submitting document TN/AG/6 of 18 December 2002.
We know that preparing the document was a difficult task and that it provides us with a good basis for
our work. However we consider that the text goes beyond the Doha mandate, especially paragraph 28,
and this is a matter which causes us some concern.
We would like to express our support for the statements made by the delegations of Australia,
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Thailand and Argentina.
We agree that we must now concentrate on key aspects, that is to say the three pillars and
Special and Differential Treatment, which form an integral part of the negotiations.  After doing that,
we will consider the other issues.  We cannot spend the little time that we have left dealing with suchissues, to the detriment of matters within the negotiating mandate. In this connection, we are surprised
that one group of developed countries has not submitted its negotiating proposal and is now trying to
tell us that if we do not negotiate issues which are not part of the mandate, no progress will be made
in this process.  In fact we would like to ask these countries, what has become of the Doha
Development Agenda?
As regards the questions you have put forward, we would like to answer with just one word:
flexibility.  The vast majority have demonstrated flexibility, by accepting to begin negotiations on
agriculture in 1986 and by accepting minimum commitments in the liberalization of agricultural trade.
It is now the turn of certain developed countries which apply protectionist policies.
Equal efforts are not possible.  We are in the middle of a reform process which began
16 years ago.  Flexibility cannot be asked of countries such as Bolivia, which has already liberalized
its trade and is now suffering from the effects of  unfair competition from subsidized products and
from the lack of market access for its products, both of which cause poverty levels to rise.  Marketaccess is of the utmost importance for alternative development products, for diversification
programmes aimed at eradicating the production of illicit narcotic crops, and for tropical products, as
the delegations of Peru and Colombia have pointed out.  We are prepared to use the Uruguay Round
list to redefine tropical products and draw up a list of alternative products for the purpose of
diversification.
Finally, in response to repeated calls to ap ply the Uruguay Round formula, we would like to
remind everyone that only by putting a theory into practice does the truth come to light, and practice
has shown us that the Uruguay Round formula has not liberalized agricultural trade;  on the contrary,
market access is still ruled by protectionism.  Let us ask the question once again: how is this group of
developed countries expressing its commitment to the much-publicized Doha Development Agenda?
We repeat that the best way to apply special and differential treatment is to eliminate protectionist anddistortive policies, and that it is this, and not a special safeguard, that can eradicate food insecurity.TN/AG/R/6
Page 16
Statement by Bulgaria
On the question of timeframes, we too are aware of the fact that under the Doha Declaration
the mandate to establish modalities for the commitmen ts on agriculture, to be agreed to in these
negotiations, expires on 31 March 2003.  After that date negotiations can continue on a bilateral basis
with a view to submitting draft schedules by the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference.
On the issues addressed in the overview paper (TN/AG/6):We cannot accept the approach, outlined in para 10, to try to adopt modalities on "key
aspects" only.  We are of the view that the modalities must be comprehensive and include the new
rules or the amendments to existing ones which are to be agreed in the course of the negotiations.
On para 14 (a) of the paper:  we see no scope for accepting the Swiss formula in any
modification.
On para 14 (b):  we can accept the Uruguay Round formula and we can be flexible on
implementation periods but we will not be able to be flexible on reduction rates.  We are of the viewthat harmonization of tariff structures is not a matter for the modalities and can be dealt with
bilaterally.  It is difficult for us to formulate specific proposals for the reduction rates because there is
no clarity on other matters which are of utmost importance to us, including some matters in the other
areas of the negotiations, the deadlines for which have already expired.  We are in a position to say,
however, what we will not be able to accept - even if our demands are met on other matters in thenegotiations on agriculture and in the other areas of the negotiations: we will not be able to accept
such reduction rates which are equal or more than those in the Uruguay Round.  If we do not have
progress on other matters of importance to us (both in these negotiations, as well as in other areas), we
cannot discuss rates which are close to those of the Uruguay Round.
On para 14 (c) - if there is no consensus on the proposed reduction formulae by 31 March, the
only option left for the negotiations is to continue on a request-offer basis.
We would note that the matter addressed in para 29 of the overview paper should have been
addressed in para 15.  We think that the way, in which the flexibility proposals are presented inpara 29 is biased and does not reflect the discussions in the Special Session.  It is biased, since
questions whether specific proposals are "acceptable" can be and actually were raised about other
proposals for the modalities, without being reflected in the paper.  On the other hand, the proposal for
flexibilities for countries in transition was not explicitly rejected in the course of the discussions.
On para 15:  we are of the view that the reduction formula should be the same for developed
and developing countries, with the same reduction rates, but possibly with longer implementationperiods for developing countries.  We can agree with lower cuts for LDCs, but not for developing
countries generally, since we do not have clarity as to which countries exactly would be included in
that category.
On para 16 - as noted by others - it is obvious that there is no consensus. If on this subject
matter clear rules, which would be applicable to all Members, are not agreed upon, we will proceed
on the assumption that we will be free to undertake modifications to our own schedule.
On para 21 - with respect to country specific quotas we have the position that they should be
either abolished, or - if not - be made available to others and Members should be able to ask for suchcountry specific quotas in the request-offer process.
On para 23 (b) - we cannot accept a countervailing mechanism as special and differential
treatment specifically for developing countries.TN/AG/R/6
Page 17
Statement by Fiji
I wish to join other delegates in thanking you for the paper.  It summarises quite well the
issues that have been discussed so far.  More importantly it has assisted delegations like mine which
seldom appears in this forum for reasons that you are well aware of.
I will be brief in accordance with your instructions.  My delegation wishes to support the
previous interventions made by small island developing states such as Mauritius and St. Lucia on
behalf of the Caribbean countries.  My delegation would like to convey its support for paragraph 26 of
the overview paper mentioning preferential schemes, specifically (iii), on the need to provide longer
implementation timeframes for tariff reduction in respect of products which are of vital export
importance for developing country beneficiaries of such preferences and (v) to extend to small islanddeveloping states the facility currently available for LDCs that enables special WTO compatible
market access arrangements on terms that do not require extension of reciprocal preferences.
On paragraph 27, my delegation will not over-emphasise the vulnerability, smallness and
isolation of small island states such as those of us in the Pacific which coupled with our mono-cropeconomies underscores the need for preferential categorization.
We also agree that modalities for such schemes be predictable, meaningful and secure.TN/AG/R/6
Page 18
Statement by Honduras
The delegation of Honduras would first of all like to stress the importance which it attaches to
the relationship between the three pillars of the Agreement on Agriculture and why it considers that
they should be dealt with together, as other delegations have suggested.
As far as tariffs are concerned, it should be borne in mind that developing countries are not
responsible for the existing distortions in the markets for agricultural products and, moreover, that
tariffs are the main instrument used by those countries to support and protect their agricultural sector.
We would therefore be prepared to make market access concessions only if they are in proportion and
comparable to the concessions that other Members are willing to make in relation to domestic support
and export subsidies.
From this perspective, we are of the opinion that the most appropriate approach for defining
new reduction commitments must be based on the Uruguay Round formula, with possible
amendments thereto, so that the legitimate concerns over the tariff peaks and tariff escalation of some
Members can be addressed and flexibility shown in exempting certain products from further reductioncommitments.
Thus, the joint proposal which we and several other Members tabled last November suggests
establishing a 50-per-cent ad valorem  tariff ceiling for all tariff lines over a three-year period,
followed by a further three-year reduction proc ess applying the Uruguay Round formula, with an
average reduction of 50 per cent from the tariff ceiling or bound level, whichever is lower.  Each tariff
line would be reduced by a minimum of 20 per cent.
With regard to special safeguards, we consider that discussions on the advisability of
establishing a new special safeguard mechanism within the framework of special and differentialtreatment for developing countries are necessarily linked to any decision taken by Members on
validity and country and product coverage pursuant  to Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
These negotiations must solve the basic problem of the inequality which currently exists,
whereby only a group of WTO Members are entitled to use special safeguards, in spite of the fact thatdeveloping countries apply a tariff-only regime.
Experience gained since the Uruguay Round has shown that the developing countries should
be the ones entitled to use this type of instrument, since we, like every Member of this Organization,
have been confronted with sudden and considerable increases in imports and significant drops in the
prices of agricultural products, but have not had the opportunity to take safeguard action to prevent
their devastating impact on our food security and rural development.
Furthermore, we are concerned that your paper should include several of the proposals
submitted by developing countries and geared towards tackling the range of problems that we face,
but presents them as "options" or mutually exclus ive instruments, in spite of the fact that their
elements are complementary and necessary to fulfil the Doha Mandate.
If we continue along these lines, the outcome will be the definition of an incomplete
instrument which is totally ineffective in addressing any of the problems which developing countries
have set out to solve during these negotiations.TN/AG/R/6
Page 19
Statement by India
Allow me to extend our greetings to you and to Members and the Secretariat for the New
Year, and to compliment you for circulating th e Overview Paper on negotiations on agriculture
consistent with the road map we had agreed upon last year.
In the context of paragraph 10 of the Overview Paper which suggest that the modalities we
establish may now perhaps be limited to the requirements of draft Schedules of further commitments,
we would like to emphasize that the modalities mu st comprehensively deal with all aspects of the
mandate for negotiations, including rules-related elements, so that the interests and expectations of
Members from these negotiations are fully addressed in the ongoing negotiations.  In our contribution
during the November 2002 Session, we had highlighted the need for the modalities for negotiations tobe an integral part of the outcome thereof.  The coverage of products for the application of
commitments and rules is also an issue that is important in the negotiations.
We propose to structure our remarks on the Overview Paper largely in accordance with the
scheme suggested by you for this Session during the informal meeting held on 16 January 2003.  Themodalities that we establish must ensure that, consistent with the mandate from Ministers at Doha,
special and differential treatment for developing countries, including the least-developed among them,
is integral to our work and its outcome.  Creating hierarchies among developing countries' interests is
divisive and not quite in accordance with the Doha mandate.  In paragraphs 25 and 38 on State
Trading Enterprises, extending special and differential treatment to developing countries has beenquestioned.  We do not see the need for raising this question.
The significance of, and the need for, special and differential treatment for developing
countries in the agriculture sector rests on two pillars.  The first pillar is the elimination of distortions
in the agricultural sector through heavy subsidization of domestic production and exports by manydeveloped countries which, by every analysis, adversely affects developing countries' opportunities
for development.
The second pillar is the need to enable developing countries to effectively address food and
livelihood security and rural development interests through appropriate flexibility in domestic policyfor agriculture.  The Overview Paper does not recognize this concern.
From many of the proposals, it is evident that  the developed countries that heavily subsidize
their farmers and exports of agricultural products, either directly or indirectly, have not shown any
real desire to effectively reduce, let alone remove, distortions in agriculture.  Moreover, attaching
conditions to reduction in support and protection by developed countries is neither consistent with the
mandate for negotiations, nor will it serve to establish sets of compromises that are realistic andlegitimate.  Any trade-offs which pitch developing countries' interests against non-trade concerns of
developed countries, or indeed serve to entrench the disadvantages faced by developing countries,
such as those implicit in the fifth bullet in paragraph 9, cannot be supported.  And then, some
Members who are also significant exporters of agricultural products, attach importance to obtaining
additional market access.  Subjecting all products in all countries to substantial tariff cuts, andultimately eliminating tariff barriers, ostensibly to reduce inequities, cannot be accepted since this will
eliminate the agricultural sector itself in developing countries.  Moreover, unlike market access
commitments, the consequences of reductions in subsidies will only be observed after a lag.  We are
sure this is not how the WTO Membership should define equity.
In this situation, we re-emphasize that the ability of developing countries like India to offer
further market access commitments is conditional upon the commitments offered on reduction of all
trade-distorting domestic support and all forms of export subsidies, and on comprehensive andTN/AG/R/6
Page 20
effective treatment of food and livelihood security and rural development interests of developing
countries.  This facet of the negotiations has not been duly reflected in the Overview Paper.
In relation to the second core aspect of special and differential treatment for developing
countries, in order to provide clarity on food and livelihood security and rural development interests
of developing countries like India, we have just circulated a written input for consideration by thisCommittee.
The underlying issues involved are not new and have been highlighted by many Members.
The manner suggested for resolving these issues focuses on policy space to address specific concerns
and situations of the agricultural sector of many developing countries, keeping in mind the diversity
of their agricultural systems.
The development needs of developing countries, including food and livelihood security and
rural development, emanate from features specific to  their agriculture;  in particular, dependence of a
large proportion of the population on agriculture and related activities, the diversified nature of
production, and the high incidence of poverty.  The basic approach to address development needs
must, therefore, serve to improve production systems, provide for opportunities to enhance incomelevels, ensure physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food, and reduce
vulnerability to market fluctuations and enhance stability of prices of agricultural products, through
governmental support and appropriate protection at the border through price-based and quantity-based
measures.  If developing countries are expected to reduce their tariffs, while developed countries
maintain support for farmers and exports, safeguarding against surges in imports becomes inevitableto meet the food and livelihood security of their farmers.
In this scenario, any consideration of the scope or coverage of applicable safeguards cannot
limit itself to one or the other characteristic of the agricultural sector in developing countries, but must
focus on "enabling developing countries to effectively take note of their development needs", whichspan diversified production systems and diverse food and nutritional requirements and preferences.
Regional aspects of agricultural production systems of large agrarian economies, including diverse
agro-climatic conditions, also militate against establishing either a list of products eligible for
protection or safeguards, or limiting the nature of available protection through different
instrumentalities.
Moreover, determining "essentiality" among different products pre-supposes that domestic
agricultural policies in developing countries are product-specific and, therefore, largely static, and
without regard to evolution of a competitive and dynamic agriculture.  Accordingly, developing
disciplines based on "essentiality" would not be desirable.
Finally, no market access commitment translates into actual access unless NTBs operating on
items granted such access are removed.
The Committee on Agriculture, while facilitating negotiations, should also provide for
resolution on the large number of NTBs that bedevil market access in agriculture.  Instead of leaving
these for resolution in the non-negotiating bodies, the Committee on Agriculture should agree on amethodology for addressing this issue which is of vital significance to the developing countries.  The
practice being followed in the Negotiating Group on Market Access could give us necessary guidance.
We, therefore, feel that this issue should also be resolved as part of a single undertaking to which we
continue to be committed.
We are confident that you will take due account of our suggestions in the collective process
forward towards establishing modalities for negotiations in agriculture, consistent with your final
observations in paragraphs 50 and 51.TN/AG/R/6
Page 21
Statement by Indonesia
Market Access
Let me firstly express our appreciation to you, for your comprehensive Agriculture
Negotiations Overview Paper.  We are encouraged, to see that the overview paper has managed to
capture many specific inputs and important suggestions made by members during our negotiations
process so far.  Your paper has again clearly shown your ability to skillfully juggle the divergence of
views in the negotiation.
As you have requested, I will try to be brief and only address the issues of tariffs as stipulated
in paragraph 13–16 and SSG in paragraph 22–23 of your paper.
Tariffs (paragraph 13–16)
On the issue of tariffs as stipulated in paragraph 13 to 16 of you paper, we should like to
make the following comment:
We do not share your view that the main outs tanding issues under the subheading of tariffs
are only the formula and quantitative  target for the further tariff reductions that are to be applied, as
stipulated in paragraph 13.  My delegation believes that the issue of product scope has not been fully
agreed and thus should also be included as an ou tstanding issue.  Whilst we recognized that many
members have referred to product coverage to cover all agricultural products in Annex I of the
Agreement of Agriculture, we also recall that there were many other members that stated developing
countries should be allowed to have an exclusion list  for staple food products sensitive for food
security and rural development. Indonesia does not agree with the view that an exclusion list for
developing countries is contradicting the current effort to further liberalized agriculture trade.Indonesia has long embraced liberalization.  As a developing country our current average tariff rate
for agriculture products of 8.4 per cent is relatively low . We are also ready to consider a formula
based approach, to further reduce bound tariff  and increase market access opportunity.  However ,
our genuine plea to exclude some food s ecurity product from reduction commitment should not
be disregarded.  With over 70 per cent of our population earning their living relying on food securitycrops as subsistence farmers, the political and economic repercussion would be too much to bear for
Indonesia, should current tariff on our food security product be reduced.  We further view that bound
tariff  reduction in developing countries should also be linked to the reduction in developed countries
agricultural support, a point which we do not see in your paper.
As regards reduction method or formula, Indonesia believes that whatever formula is
eventually agreed upon, the issue of developing countries non-trade concerns must be accommodatedand be given full flexibility, and tariff peaks and escalation in developed countries be addressed.  We
are ready to work and agree to a formula approach on this basis.
Special Safeguard Measures (Paragraph 22-23)
On the issue of Special Safeguard Measures, we have noticed that you have categorized
proposals for the establishment of a food security mechanism as an alternative to the current SGG.
We do not agree with this approach . SSG is a mechanism that was already given to some members
during the Uruguay Round as an incentive for tari ffication.  Whether the current SSG is to be
eliminated for some countries or retained for all countries is to be decided in these negotiations.
However, the issue of food security is a recognized non-trade concern in the Doha Declaration that
has been requested by Ministers to be taken fully into account in the negotiations.  For these reasons,
we are of the position that proposals and issues relating to food security and rural developmentTN/AG/R/6
Page 22
should be given a separate heading and thus separated from the issue of SSG .  Putting the issue
of food security under SSG may create the misunderstanding that food security problems of
developing countries can be addressed by merely extending the current SSG to be given to developing
countries, which is certainly not the case.
For SGG as stipulated in Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Indonesia views the
current agriculture special safeguard as unfair and thus it needs to be rectified.  Developed countries
producers with no supply side constraint and substantial domestic support should not have recourse to
an agriculture special safeguard.  We are of the position that the current SSG be extended only  to all
developing countries. Product coverage of the existing SSG should also be modified to only include
products, which are of strategic importance and particularly sensitive to food security, rural
development and employment, and poverty alleviation.  Developing countries that do not yet have
recourse to the current SSG may have recourse to such SSG for their agricultural products, whichhave been tariffied.
Indonesia fully supports the establishment of a food security mechanism , which
specifically addresses the problem of food security in  developing countries.  This is in line with the
mandate of the Doha Declaration.   Such a food security mechanism can be along the lines of theproposal by the Philippines and Indonesia, or of a combination of other proposals that members have
put forward or will put forward. It is imperative that food security mechanism not be mixed-up with
SSG or other countervailing mechanism.  A food security mechanism should be seen as a
development tool for developing  countries , which may include but not be limited to some kind of
countervailing mechanisms.TN/AG/R/6
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Statement by Paraguay
Like other delegations, we would like to thank you for submitting the Overview document,
which provides a proper balance among the various proposals put forward in the negotiations so far.
We have studied this document closely and the relevant questions, and would like to make
some comments, although we reserve the right to make further comments at a later stage.
One aspect which my delegation considers relevant is the reiteration of paragraph 14 of the
Doha Declaration, in which our Ministers established dates and deadlines:  31 March 2003 as the
deadline for modalities for the further commitments and as paragraph 10 of your document clearly
states, "the negotiations on agriculture do not end at the end of March 2003";  the 5th MinisterialConference, to be held in September 2003, for the submission of draft schedules; and, finally,
1 January 2005, when the entire negotiating agenda of this development round will be concluded.
The Doha mandate also states that the negotiations will be "aimed at substantial
improvements in market access", and this is the issue we would now like to discuss.
The importance of substantial improvements in market access for agricultural products is vital
for many developing countries that greatly depend on this sector.
At this stage, we would have liked the proposals made by the main negotiating partners to
clearly indicate that the current negotiations on agriculture will conform fully with the mandate, and
be integrated and balanced with other market access negotiating, above all considering that in other
negotiating forums, the proposals made by these partners are extremely ambitious and are
unreservedly aimed at liberalizing trade and establishing rules and regulations which will undoubtedly
make the "development" sought after in this Round possible.
As regards tariffs, my delegation considers that the Uruguay Round formula has been unable
to redress the discriminatory situation which still prevails in the agricultural sector, nor has it resolved
the problem of tariff peaks or tariff escalation, although the latter is particularly prejudicial to
developing countries in that it impedes both market access and the possibility of giving their productsmore value added.
We therefore agree with the statements made by other delegations, especially those of the
Cairns Group, which propose the Swiss formula.  We believe that such a formula will contribute to
the fundamental reform and substantial improvement of the agricultural sector, inasmuch as our aim is
to establish a fairer and more market-oriented trading system for agricultural products.
A proposal that repeats past formulae or mechanisms that have failed to yield positive results
will not only negate all the efforts made to put this sector on an equal footing with others, but will
increase trade distortions and consequently not achieve the much-awaited result.
As regards tariff quotas, we believe that, as indicated in paragraph 17, the expansion of
import volumes under existing tariff quotas will improve the current situation.  Under no
circumstances could we be flexible and agree to reductions.  An improvement in the way tariff quotas
are administered is also essential, because many de veloping countries either do not participate or only
participate to a limited extent in their administration.
Finally, with regard to other market access issues, we are particularly concerned that existing
preferential schemes are not producing the desired results and are creating discriminatory situations
which distort trade.  These issues must be resolved during the current negotiations.TN/AG/R/6
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Statement by the Philippines
The Philippines would like to convey its deep appreciation to you for your hard work in
preparing the overview paper.  We will follow the agenda that you have outlined to us today, but
before doing so, allow us to offer some general observations with regard to the Overview paper.
Let me touch on the first part of the paper, which contains your general assessment of the
negotiations.  We appreciate that this section mentions some of the issues, such as the Food Security
Mechanism, which are crucial to us and to many developing countries.  In doing so, the paper has
rightly accorded special focus to this very impor tant issue.  At the same time, we share the
observation by Indonesia that the proposal has been somehow subsumed under certain categories
which had the effect of re-orienting and narrowing the proposed measures intended to address them.
We would also note that other key concerns of developing countries have not been given
enough attention in your general assessment.  For instance, while the paper clearly acknowledged the
link established by some participants between agriculture and other areas of negotiations, the paper
has missed the importance of the inter-linkage between the three pillars, which is a paramountconcern for many developing countries, including the Philippines.
We will now shift to the agenda before us, in particular, on market access.  On tariffs, we are
not convinced that applying the Uruguay Round formula will address the issue of tariff peaks and
escalation which are confronting developing countries.  In our view, a harmonization approach wouldbe more effective in addressing these problems and would translate to greater market access openings
for developing countries.  Developed countries should therefore commit to apply such reduction
formula.
It would be a different matter, however, to demand developing countries to apply the same
harmonization formula.  Developing countries could not be expected to commit to reduce tariffs to the
same level as that for developed countries, while at the same time compete with products which
continue to enjoy subsidies and trade-distorting  support.  Any reduction formula that developing
countries would be asked to apply should take into account these residual subsidies and trade-
distorting support in the agriculture markets of developed countries.TN/AG/R/6
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Statement by Venezuela
We would like to thank both you and the Secretariat for the presentation of the overview
paper which provides a sound basis for negotiation.  Before turning to the matter at hand, I would like
to make a few remarks on an issue which, given its significance, has implications on the discussionsunder way as a whole, namely the interrelation betw een the three negotiating pillars.  Although the
dynamics of your proposal pave the way for an orderly and above all particularly fruitful discussion,
we cannot lose sight of the interrelation between these three negotiating pillars.  In the absence of
such a relationship, unless the substantial reductions in domestic support and export subsidies
specified in the Doha Declaration are forthcoming, we cannot conceive how market access can be
improved.
In this respect, a paragraph should be included in the draft of modalities making the
implementation of the new commitments by developing countries conditional upon substantial
reductions in domestic support and export subsidies.
There is no sense in the results of the various negotiating groups being taken into
consideration for the "single undertaking" in the overall context if the three negotiating pillars are
dealt with separately in the same negotiations.  A reduced "single undertaking" should also exist.
Another point at issue is the scope of th e products to which reductions will apply.
The scope of the reduction modalities approved for developing countries must also be taken
into consideration.  By this, we mean that there is a need to establish which developing country
products will be subject to reductions.  The formula cannot be discussed in the abstract and a decision
then taken at the very end as to whether certain products will be subject or not.  This is a key issue for
developing countries and one on which a decision has to be taken first or, failing that, concurrently.
In this respect, a discussion on which agricultural products would be exempt and the criteria
for exemption from reduction commitments becomes increasingly important.
Tariffs
Paragraphs 13 to 16 of the overview paper propose that we decide upon the reduction
formula.
As has been mentioned previously, we, in conjunction with other developing countries, have
proposed applying a modified version of the Ur uguay Round formula in order to accommodate our
aspiration to harmonize tariff structures and address tariff peaks and escalation.
As we have already pointed out, this simple modification would consist of establishing a
ceiling for all developed country tariff lines.  Thus, the tariffs of these countries would be reduced by
50 per cent over the first few years;  the Uruguay Round formula would then begin to apply to this
new tariff on the basis of the agreed percentages.
In our opinion and that of several other delegations here present, this would provide a
compromise between the proposed formulae.
The special and differential treatment referred to in paragraph 14 can be dealt with on the
basis of the following two complementary rather than alternative options:
(a) Firstly, developed countries would make more substantial reduction commitments in
relation to products of special interest to developing country Members;TN/AG/R/6
Page 26
(b) secondly, on the basis of the compromise formula which we have suggested,
developing countries would have the possibility of starting to apply the Uruguay
Round formula starting from their present bound levels once the developed countries
had made their 50-per-cent down payment.  Moreover, the reduction percentages
would, in this case, be at least half those applied to developed countries.
Tariff quotas
We merely wish to emphasize that special and differential treatment must afford developing
countries the possibility of applying lower rates of expansion and longer implementation periods so
that their financial, development, trade and food security needs are taken into consideration.  This is
particularly important for net food-importing countries.
Special safeguard measures
We agree that a new safeguard mechanism which addresses the needs of developing countries
while respecting the minimum benefits granted by the current mechanism provided for in Article 5
should be established.  Only by respecting these benefits will elimination for the developing countries
be possible.
We consider that the key features of such a mechanism should include the following:
(a) Developing countries alone should be eligible.
It is a matter of fairness for all developing countries to have a mechanism which, in
the event of a disproportionate increase in imports or a sharp drop in prices, enables
them to adapt to the circumstances and th ereby prevent increased poverty in rural
areas and the consequent social impact which this would have on the whole economy.
(b) The mechanism should be designed in such a way as to make it easier to apply and
more beneficial than the current mechanism.
(c) Product coverage should aim to protect products which developing countries consider
significant to rural development and food security.  The number of developing
country products already eligible for the mechanism provided for in Article 5 should,
in any case, be respected.
Other issues
We merely wish to point out that our delegation considers that there are suitable fora dealing
with issues which are amongst its concerns, and it is to these councils and committees, namely the
Council for TRIPS and Committees on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Barriers
to Trade, and the discussions currently underway  within these bodies, that we would turn.
Given the need for streamlining in all negotiat ing areas, there is no need for a repetition or
proliferation of discussions in different fora.
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