WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/GC/W/118
30 November 1998
(98-4796)
General Council Original:  Spanish
AGRICULTURE:  CONTINUATION OF THE REFORM PROCESS
Communication from Argentina
The following communication, dated 23 November 1998, has been received from the
Permanent Mission of Argentina.
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I. OBJECTIVES
1. Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides for the "continuation of the reform
process" in agricultural trade.  To this end, negotiations are to be initiated one year before the end of
the implementation period, i.e. the end of 1999.
2. The purpose of these negotiations flows both from the text of Article 20 and from the
Preamble to the Agreement:  "to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system", a
"long-term" objective calling for "substantial progressive reductions in support and protection
resulting in fundamental reform" of agricultural trade.
3. In a word, the "long term" has to come one day, and setting that date is precisely what should
be done in the negotiating process that is to begin at the end of next year.
4. The objective is clear and stems from the Marrakesh mandate:  agriculture must cease to be a
second-class citizen in the system.  As from the conclusion of the forthcoming negotiations,
agriculture must become definitively and completely  integrated into the general disciplines of the
system.
II. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
5. The Third Ministerial Conference will have to convene these negotiations and define the
necessary procedural points, so as to enable the negotiating process directly to address the substantive
issues.
6. To this end, this General Council will have to reach consensus on the procedural issues to be
included in that mandate:  starting date for the negotiations, manner in which they will be conducted,
and time-limit within which the body responsible for the negotiations will have to submit its results.WT/GC/W/118
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7. The decision in question should therefore include:
(a) Starting date for the negotiations.  These are due to begin before the end of 1999.  In
this connection, the task of the Third Ministerial Conference is relatively simple,
namely to set an exact date within those parameters.
(b) The negotiating mandate has to include a planned date for completion.  Obviously,
the expiry of the Peace Clause (31/12/2003) sets a limit to the negotiating process,
and it would be wise to schedule the completion of the process, some time in advance
of the expiry of that Clause.  The commitm ents and disciplines provided for in the
Agreement on Agriculture give rise to obligations and duties for Member States, and
consequently any modification to be made in them will first have to be dealt with by
the legislative bodies of our respective governments.  Accordingly, the negotiationsshould end by 31 December 2002.  This would give us a period of one year to make
the necessary legislative amendments to adapt our domestic legislation to the new
Agreement.
(c) It will also be necessary to set a time-limit for submission of specific negotiating
proposals.  While it will certainly be nece ssary to continue receiving proposals aimed
at narrowing differences between positions af ter that date, these subsequent proposals
should refer to those submitted before the deadline.  In other words, after a given
moment the negotiating process should exclusively address the preparation of a final
outcome, for which purpose it will be necessary to focus efforts on the search forconsensus.
(d) The negotiations should be conducted by a body set up exclusively for this purpose,
and this process should not affect the regular work of the Committee on Agriculture.
III. AGENDA FOR THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS
8. The objective of integrating agriculture into the general rules of the multilateral trading
system will call for an agenda embracing all aspects covered by the current Agreement on Agriculture
without exclusions of any kind.  Nevertheless, some items such as administration of tariff quotas and
state trading enterprises extend beyond the bounds of that Agreement.  Since at this stage in our work
we do not yet know how comprehensive the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations will be, it
does not seem advisable to take a definite position on this issue.
9. If the negotiations were limited to those already provided for in the Marrakesh mandate, these
items would have to be included in the agenda of  the agricultural negotiations.  If on the other hand
the forthcoming negotiations are more comprehensive, then some of these aspects could be discussed
separately.
10. Finally, as appeared from the discussions during the last special meeting of this General
Council devoted to considering the implementatio n of the Uruguay Round Agreements, two aspects
should be highlighted:
(a) There are still some outstanding accounts which have to be settled before the new
round of negotiations is begun.  In agriculture, these include in particular the failure
to fulfil the obligation under Article 10.2 of the Agreement relating to the adoption ofdisciplines on export credits, export credit guarantees and export insurance
programmes.  It is often sought to justify the lack of results in this area by the
continuing and intensified use of export subsidies, and we must admit that this link is
not entirely groundless.  Article 10 is indeed entitled "Prevention of Circumvention ofWT/GC/W/118
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Export Subsidy Commitments".  Developing countries have access only to legitimate
instruments of competition:  quality and price.  If we wish to sell our products, we
have to strive to produce better and cheaper.  We therefore find it equally
unacceptable that the main world exporters should enjoy the privilege, the "special
and differential right" to drive us out of the market by subsidizing either the prices orthe payment terms for their exports.
The commitment that has been undertaken to draw up disciplines governing the grant
of export credits, credit guarantees or insurance programmes should not be negotiated
all over again;  it should be implemented.  We developing countries have already paid
and are continuing to pay for this Clause every time we are displaced from a market,
either through the use of subsidies or through the use of subsidized credits.
(b) Precisely in this connection, at the last meeting of this Council a message was clearly
delivered to all those present:  the application of "special and differential treatment"
for developing countries is far from allowing us to participate equally in the benefits
of the Uruguay Round Agreements.  During the forthcoming renegotiation of theAgreement on Agriculture this situation should be reversed.  The first step is that the
law must be the same for everyone.  Export subsidies are an additional privilege, in
favour of countries that do not need to add further privileges to their already
privileged situation;  they should be don e away with immediately.  Beyond this, the
outcome of the forthcoming agricultural negotiations must permit the developingcountries to participate fully in the benefits of the liberalization of agricultural trade.
The idea that "non-trade concerns" as mentioned in Article 20 of the Agreement
should enable some developed countries to find new arguments to justify
protectionism is unacceptable to us.
Neither consumer concerns nor protection of the countryside, rural culture or the
environment need to lead to mountains of surpluses that are subsequently tipped on
the world market at prices with which we cannot compete and which ultimately
generate yet more marginalization and poverty in our countries.
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