RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/CTD/W/4/Add.1
1 July 2002
(02-3666)
Committee on Trade and Development
Special SessionOriginal:  English
SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT PROVISIONS
Joint Least-Developed Countries Proposals on Special and Differential Treatment
Addendum
The following communication has been received from the Ugandan delegation on behalf of
the above group of countries on 19 June 2002.
_______________
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In the present proposals, we make reference to our earlier proposals submitted to the Special
Session of the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) on May 16, 2002.  The Least-DevelopedCountries (LDCs) proposed, inter alia,  a general framework to be adopted to guide the work on the
overall issue of strengthening, operationalizing and making special and differential (S&D) treatment
provisions more effective for developing countries, including LDCs.
2. We summarise below the four elements of the general framework and submit our proposals to
the CTD within this framework, as follows:
3. First,  there must be a re-affirmation and operationalisation of development as the primary
goal of the WTO agreements, which requires the current framework, principles, rules, operations andproposals in the WTO to be assessed and improved.  The process which the CTD is presently
undertaking addresses some aspects of this element but we stress that the strengthening of S&D
should not be confined only to examining existing pr ovisions but should also come up with additional
measures as envisaged in 
Paragraph 12 of the Implementation Decision.
4. Secondly , there must be a strengthening and operationalizing, or introducing, general
development principles within the agreements in the four major areas of WTO, i.e. goods, services,intellectual property and dispute settlement.  In addition to "development principles" or "development
goals" based on generic development indicators, each agreement should have specific "development
benchmarks" that would facilitate the assessment of the S&D provisions and their impact on
development.
5. Thirdly,  developing countries, particularly LDCs should have recourse to financial resources
in order to enable them to undertake their obliga tions and enjoy their rights, including their rights
under SDT.  This requires a costing of additional resources required by each developing country
under each agreement, and for the meeting of the financial requirements to be considered.  The
"costing" should include, inter alia , (i) the costs of implementing commitments, and (ii) the cost of
upgrading facilities to meet any new or contingent measures imposed by an importing country on anLDCs product(s).TN/CTD/W/4/Add.1
Page 2
6. Fourthly,  supply side constraints in developing countries and their need to retain the
flexibility of being able to adopt pro-development policies and options should be addressed.  This can
be done in several ways, including: (i) exemptions from obligations for developing, particularly least-
developed countries, if those obligations would constrain or prevent developing countries from
adopting policies or measures required for their economic and social development, and (ii) obligationson the part of developed countries to assist developing countries to build their supply-side capacity to
foster national production capacity as well as export supply capacity.
7. In the context of this general framework, the LD Cs make the proposals below.  It is noted that
the four elements sometimes overlap within the specific proposals.
II. PROPOSAL FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE PROVISIONS IN THE DECISION ON
DIFFERENTIAL AND MORE FAVOURABLE TREATMENT, RECIPROCITY AND
FULLER PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Provisions relating to improvement of market access for LDCs
Issues
8. The Decision on More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and the Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries (the Decision) inter alia  provides that:
(i) Paragraph 2(d)) differential and more favorable treatment may provide for
"special treatment of the least developed countries".
9. In pursuance of the these provisions, measures have been taken by developed countries to
extend to the least-developed countries under their Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) more
favorable and special treatment than that extended to developing countries by providing higher
preferential margins or duty-free treatment for imports.
10. There are some positive indications that such arrangements encourage both domestic and
foreign investment across sectors, to take advantage of the special preferential access.  There are,
however, apprehensions that it may not be possible for producers in these countries to take full
advantage of the potential which exists for the deve lopment of trade with the countries extending such
preferential treatment if as a result of reductions that are made in the multilateral trade negotiations inMFN tariffs, preferential margins from which their exports benefit are reduced or eroded.
Proposals
11. For effective operationalisation of the provisions of the Decision on More Favorable
Treatment and to ensure that the least-developed countries derive continued and sustained benefits
from the special preferential treatment extended by the developed countries, it is suggested that its
provisions shall be clarified as follows:
(a) Special treatment to be extended to least-developed countries in accordance with the
provisions of 
Paragraph  1 and 2(d) of the Decision shall take the form of duty-free
and quota free access for all products.
(b) The Committee on Trade and Development shall prior to the Fifth Ministerial
Conference review the progress made by the developed countries in providing access
to the least-developed countries on the above basis and shall make appropriaterecommendations for consideration at the Ministerial Meeting.TN/CTD/W/4/Add.1
Page 3
(c) Paragraph 3(d) of the Decision provides that the extension of differential and more
favorable treatment to developing countries, including special treatment to the least-
developed countries, shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or
elimination of tariffs on MFN basis.  Howe ver, it should be recognized that MFN
tariff reductions results in the erosion of preferential margins and the consequent lossof competitiveness for the affected LDC exports.  In such a situation, the LDC
affected would require compensatory or adjustment support measures in the trade,
financial and technological fields to mitigate adverse effects on their export earnings
as well as enable them cope with increased global competition, through, inter alia ;
(i) Elimination of all internal and border constraints inhibiting the full utilization
of existing preferential access.
(ii) Support diversification efforts including elimination of all tariff peaks and
tariff escalation affecting semi-processed and processed products.
(iii) Provide debt relief through cancellation to release resources for building
productive capacities.
(iv) Provide targeted incentives to their enterprises to facilitate technology
transfer in the spirit of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement.
(v) Remove all non-tariff barriers to all LDCs exports.
(vi) Provide temporary financial compensation for fall in export earnings
resulting from a reduction of MFN tariff rates in the case of products whose
share in the total export earnings of an LDC exceeds 50 per cent.
Provisions relating to the contributions and concessions to be made by the developing and least-
developed countries in trade negotiations
Issues
12. The main provision relating to the "contributions and negotiated concessions" which
developing and least-developed countries should make in trade negotiations are contained in
Paragraph  8 of Article. XXXVI in Part IV of GATT.  These provisions have been clarified and
elaborated upon by the Decision on Differential And More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (The Enabling Clause).
13. Paragraph  5 of the Decision states that "...The developed countries do not expect reciprocity
for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to
the trade of developing countries, i.e. the developed countries do not expect the developing countries,in the course of trade negotiations, to make contri butions which are inconsistent with their individual
development, financial and trade needs.  Developed contracting parties shall therefore not seek,
neither shall less-developed contracting parties be required to make, concessions that are inconsistent
with the latter’s development,  financial and trade needs."
14. Almost all least-developed countries have undertaken during the last two decades
liberalization measures through reductions in tariffs and removal of other barriers to trade, such as
quantitative restrictions.  In most cases, however, such measures have been taken by them in thecontext of structural adjustment programmes or conditionalities.TN/CTD/W/4/Add.1
Page 4
15. Because of the lack of adequately developed physical and human resource infrastructure and
supply constraints from which these countries suffer, liberalization measures undertaken with the aim
of promoting export oriented growth have in several instances resulted in:
(a) displacement in certain sectors of agriculture, of the domestic production by
increased imports; and
(b) "de-industrialisation" in the industrial sector as the few existing industries which were
not able to withstand competition have closed down while at the same time no
domestic and foreign investment was being made for the development of new
industries.
16. This experience has brought out the need to ensure that the decisions on both the pace and the
extent of the liberalizations, both in sequencing and timing, have to be left to be taken by the least-
developed country concerned, taking into consideration its economic and trade situation, and takeninto account in trade negotiations and structural adjustment programmes.
Proposals
17. Towards this end it is suggested that the provisions of the Decision on More Favourable
Treatment should be clarified to provide for the following:
(a) In exceptional cases where it is considered that the liberalization measurers in the
trade field are essential for the attainment of the development and other objectives of
the structural adjustment programmes, both the extent and the pace of liberalization
shall be determined in consultation with the government of the recipient country,
taking into account the relevant provisions in the Decision on More Favourable
Treatment which require that least-developed countries shall not be required to takeliberalization measures that are inconsistent with their development trade and
financial needs.  The new WTO Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance should
look into these issues and make appropriate recommendations.
(b) In multilateral trade negotiations credit shall be given to the measures taken by
developing and least-developed countries by providing flexibility in determining the"base year" for the selection of tariffs on the basis of which reductions are to be
made.
(c) The provisions in the Decision on More Favourable Treatment, which provide that
the least developed countries "shall not be required to make concessions that are
inconsistent" with their "development, trade and financial needs" shall be clarified to
provide that these countries shall be permitted in trade negotiations, if they
considered that this was warranted by economic and trade situations and the stage ofdevelopment:
(i) to make no reductions in tariffs in the agricultural and/or industrial sectors;
(ii) exclude from tariff reductions certain sub sectors in both of the above sectors;
and
(iii) bind the rates reduced in the negotiations and the prevailing applied rates at
levels consistent with the development, trade and financial needs of
developing countries and LDCs.TN/CTD/W/4/Add.1
Page 5
III. CLARIFICATION OF THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE XVIII (C): SAFEGUARD
ACTION FOR DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES
Issues
18. Article XVIII:C, and the "Decision on Safeguard Action for Development Purposes" which
was adopted in the Tokyo Round (Decision of 18 November 1979), permits developing countries,including the least-developed countries, to take "s afeguard actions" involving measures that are not
consistent with the provision of GATT 1994, where they consider "governmental assistance is
required to promote the establishment of a particular industry", including "the development of new or
modification or extension of existing production structures with a view to achieving fuller and more
efficient use of resources in accordance with the priorities of development".
19. The adoption of such measures is, however, subject to the requirement that they must be
notified to WTO and its approval obtained, before they are applied at the national level.  In particularthe rules of the Article provide that the country proposing to adopt the measures must before their
adoption:
(a) Notify to the WTO secretariat the nature of the measure affecting imports which it
proposes to take (
Paragraph  14).
(b) Enter into consultations on multilateral basis on the proposed measure if any country
requests that such consultations should be held within a period of 30 days of
notification ( Paragraph s 15 and 16).
20. The unilateral measures for liberalization of trade which least developed countries have
undertaken in the past, either on their own volition or in pursuance of the conditions imposed under
structural adjustment programmes, has brought down the level of tariffs to substantially low levels.
As noted earlier, the resulting onslaught of imports are however in a number of countries, displacing
domestic production both in industrial and agricultural sectors and discouraging investment fortechnological up-gradation by the affected industries as well as investment for the development of
new industries.
21. In the situation, in order to promote development of the existing industries as well as for
encouraging investment in new industries, these countries may have to provide for increased level of
protection in selected sectors of production for temporary period, by taking advantage of the
flexibility provided by Article XVIII:C for taking safeguard action for development purposes.  The
strictness and rigour with which the rules requiring prior approval were applied in the past, has been
however effectively discouraging countries from making full use of these provisions.
Proposals
22. Members shall exercise restraint in seeking compensation from least-developed countries
when they need to modify or withdraw a tariff concession.
23. In order to facilitate adoption by developing countries, particularly by least-developed
countries, of such measures in appropriate cases, it would be necessary to examine how the existing
procedures prescribed by Article XVIII:C, for gran ting of approval are modified and improved.  One
possible approach would be to make the rules app licable to safeguard actions taken for "development
purposes" under Article XVIII:C comparable to those applicable under the Agreement on Safeguards,
to safeguard actions taken "in emergency situations".  In the latter case, countries can take actionsinvolving increase in the bound rates of duties or imposition of the quantitative restrictions, if the
conditions laid down by the Agreement on Safeguards are met.  There is no need to seek priorTN/CTD/W/4/Add.1
Page 6
approval of WTO, except in cases where the safeguard action takes the form of application of
quantitative restrictions to imports on a selective country basis.
24. The improvements in the rules governing the use of safeguard measures for development
purposes on the above basis would, by assuring countries that they could when needed, provide
increased protection across sectors on a selective basis for the attainment of development objectives,also enhance their willingness to continue with the overall liberalization process.
IV. CLARIFICATION OF THE RULES RELATING TO NOTIFICATION
OBLIGATIONS
Issues
25. Member countries of WTO are under an obligation to ensure that their laws and regulations as
well as the trade policy measures taken by them are in full conformity with the provisions of the
multilateral agreements and of the plurilateral agreements to which they are parties.  Theresponsibility for monitoring the compliance of these obligations rests primarily with the various
committees that have been established under the agreements.
26. To assist the committees in carrying out their surveillance function, the agreements impose
obligation on member countries to notify to the WTO Secretariat:
(a) Their legislations and regulations and subsequent changes; and
(b) Certain types of specified measures or actions.
27. The technical assistance that is being provided by the WTO is having some positive effect on
improving the technical competence of the officials in developing countries, particularly the least-
developed ones in complying with these obligations.
28. Despite these efforts by the WTO, a large number of least-developed countries are facing,
except in the case of those notifications which have to be made only for one time, practical problems
in meeting their notifications obligations.  Even though the officials from trade ministries are making
their best efforts to see that the notifications are made on time, they are not always receiving
cooperation needed for this purpose from other ministries.
29. Two factors are responsible for this.  Firstly, it is easier to promote inter-ministerial
cooperation, if the officials are satisfied that the time spent and the resources applied bring in some
immediate national benefits.  The routine work involved in notification obligations does not provide
for them such incentives.  Secondly, in the case of  some of the notifications (viz. annual reports on
subsidies granted to industrial products or domestic support to agricultural production), the sheer
complexity of the information to be collected and processed makes reluctant the middle level officials,
who are responsible for such work, to take active interest.
Proposals
30. Taking into account these practical difficulties and in order to prepare gradually least-
developed countries to abide fully by their notification obligations under the WTO system, it is
suggested that the possibility of extending to thes e countries "special and differential treatment" in
complying with them should be examined.  Such S&D treatment could inter alia take the following
three factors:
(a) Longer frequencies of three or four years for certain types of notification.TN/CTD/W/4/Add.1
Page 7
(b) Simplification of questionnaires or forms.
(c) Exemption from notifying certain types of ad hoc measures.
31. In this context it is relevant to note that in the past, particularly in the eighties, the GATT
Secretariat used to prepare comprehensive periodic reports on trade policy developments, by using the
information contained in the notification as well as "information on developments in the tradingsystem obtained from sources other than notifications" (see G/NOP/W/l).  In order to ensure that on
measures that were required to be notified only information that was authentic was included in the
report, the draft text relating to such measures was cleared by the Secretariat with the delegation of
the country, where it included material not specifically notified by it.  As the report contained not
merely listing of the measures, but also gave some background information on the reasons which lead
the country to take the measure, it was found useful, both for reviewing the developments in the
organization as well as by the general public.
32. The revival of the practice of the preparation of such reports which contains a digest of all
information that is required to be notified on the basis of the information contained in the notifications
as well as in the other publications, would go a long way in ensuring that information on measures
taken by least-developed countries is available in the WTO soon after the measures are taken, even
though they are required to make some of the notifications only every third or fourth year.
33. Further, if any country considers during the three or four-year period, that measures taken by
such countries has adversely affected its interests.  It could use cross-notification procedures.  Resort
to such procedures should be made only in exceptional situations where the information required is
not otherwise available, and not with a view to hara ssing the country that has not been able to notify.
V. UNDERSTANDING ON BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROVISIONS OF GATT 1994
Issues
34. Paragraph 12(b) of article XVIII of GATT 1994 requires developing countries maintaining
restrictions on balance-of-payments grounds to consult on a multilateral basis once in every two years.
Further, the 1979 Declaration on Trade Measures Ta ken For Balance- of-Payments Purposes requires
"full consultation" or shorter and less rigorous "simplified consultations procedures".
35. The Understanding adopted in the Uruguay Round of Negotiations on the Balance-of-
Payments Provisions of GATT 1994 states that "consultations may be held under the simplified
procedures….in the case of least developed country members".
Proposal
36. The relevant provision in Paragraph 8 of the Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments
Provisions of GATT 1994 should be modified to make obligation to require least-developed countriesunder the simplified procedures by providing that "consultations shall be held under the simplified
procedures…in the case of least-developed country member".  This would remove the option for full
consultation procedures implied by the use of the word "may" in 
Paragraph  8 which would make it
less burdensome for the least developed countries.
VI. UNDERSTANDING ON ARTICLE XXIV OF GATT 1994
Proposals
37. It is understood that this Understanding shall not prejudice the right of developing and least-
developed country Members to enter arrangements for mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs andTN/CTD/W/4/Add.1
Page 8
non-tariff barriers to their trade, in accordance with the Decision of November 18, 1979 (Enabling
Clause).
38. Special treatment shall be accorded to the l east-developed among developing countries in
arrangements involving developed and developing  countries or among developing countries in
accordance with that Decision notwithstanding Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Article XXIV of GATT1994.
VII. UNDERSTANDING IN RESPECT OF WAIVERS OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
GATT 1994
Issues
39. The Understanding specifies the type of information that a country requesting for waiver has
to provide in its request.  In particular it states that such information should include:
(a) The measure which the member proposes to take.
(b) The policy objective which the member wishes to pursue; and
(c) The reason that prevents the member from undertaking its policy measures by
measures consistent with the obligations under GATT 1994.
40. Because of the "single undertaking" rule appl ied in the last phase of the Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations the least-developed countries were required to become members of all multilateral
agreements belonging to the WTO system, without any examination of whether, given their economic
and trade situation, they would be in a position to  accept fully all of the obligations which these
agreements impose.  It is possible, therefore, that in the future situations may arise where, because of
the low level of stage of development, they are not able to fully meet the obligations.
41. In this context it is relevant to note that Paragraph. 1 of the Decision on Measures in Favour
of Least-Developed Countries recognizes, by implications if not explicitly, that the least-developed
countries may have difficulties "in complying with  the general rules" set out in the multilateral
agreement.  If such a situation arises, from the legal point of view, in order to be consistent with the
WTO system, the least-developed country which is no t able to comply fully with the rules, may have
to request for a waiver from its obligation for temporary period of time.
Proposal
42. The Understanding in Respect of Waiver Obligation under GATT 1994 should be clarified to
provide that request for waivers from least-developed countries of their obligation under the GATT
1994 and other multilateral agreements shall be considered sympathetically and waivers granted
expeditiously.
VIII.  AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING (ATC)
Issues
43. Paragraph 18 of Article 2 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing lays down guidelines on
how an importing country could provide "meaningful improvement in access" to exporting countries
where "restrictions represent 1-2 percent" of the total volume of restriction applied by the importing
country.TN/CTD/W/4/Add.1
Page 9
44. Paragraph 2 of Article 1 states that the members agree that the above provisions could permit
"meaningful access possibilities being provided to small suppliers and the development of commercial
trading opportunities for new entrants in the field of textiles and clothing".  A footnote to the above
provision states that "exports from least-developed countries may also benefit from this provision".
45. These provisions, which are recommendatory, are generally ignored by importing countries in
applying growth rates to quotas allotted and flexibility provisions.
Proposal
46. The footnote should be modified to provide that Members shall use the provision of
Paragraph 18 of Article 2 in such a way as to permit meaningful increase in market access for textiles
and clothing exported by the least developed countries.
IX. HOW TO MAKE THE PROVISIONS IN FAVOUR OF THE LDCS IN THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT IN TRADE AND SERVICES (GATS) MORE EFFECTIVE
Issue(s):  Article IV.1
47. Due to the imbalances in negotiating strength LDCs may not be able to achieve the desired
outcome through negotiated specific commitments as foreseen in Paragraph 1 of Article IV of GATS,
which would ensure that special priority is given to the least-developed country Members.
Proposal
48. Therefore special priority to LDCs should be granted at a sectoral level where sector-specific
measures could be agreed upon by all Members in terms of the development, trade and financial needs
of LDCs aimed at ensuring their increasing participation in the multilateral trading system.  At the
beginning of the negotiations on the offers/requests in sectoral services, the LDCs should be asked toindicate the sectors and modes of supply that represent a priority in their development policies, so that
the WTO members can take these priorities into account in the negotiations.
Proposed addition under IV.2:
49. "(d) Measures taken in favour of the least-developed countries in the implementation of
paragraph 1".
Issue(s) and proposal(s):  Article IV.3
50. To achieve effective implementation and operationalize the provisions of the GATS Article
IV.3 additional measures ensuring the increasing participation of the LDCs have to be established in
the sectors of their trade interest . These measures could be inscribed as additional specific
commitments by the WTO members in favour of the LDCs, which could be drafted as sectoral
annexes for LDCs or included into the additional sectoral specific commitments or attached as thereference papers. Where such additional measures are already in place or will be negotiated by all
Members, special mandatory provisions aimed at addressing the trade concerns of the LDCs should be
included.
Proposed addition under Article IV.3, after the first sentence:51. "In sectors of their export interest multilaterally agreed criteria for giving priority to the least-
developed country Members shall be established, and when developing further disciplines and general
obligations under the agreement".TN/CTD/W/4/Add.1
Page 10
Paragraph 6 of the annex of telecommunications:
Proposed addition, as 6(e):
52. "Developed country Members will promptly notif y the Council for Trade in Services of any
measures they have taken with regard to implementation of subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) under this
paragraph".
X. AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS (TRIPS)
Issue(s): Article 66.1
53. Article 66.1 provides LDC Members an automatic transition period for ten years from the
date of entry into force of the Agreement, with the possibility of further extensions by the TRIPS
Council.  However, further extensions shall only be granted upon "duly motivated" requests by least-
developed Members.  It is unclear whether the term "duly motivated" implies an obligation on LDCs
to justify the need for further extension.  It should be clarified that there is no such obligation.
Proposal
54. If at the end of the transition period the least-developed Member has not established a viable
technological base, a further extension of transition period shall be automatically granted by the
TRIPS Council on request by the least-developed Member.  Where any other Member is opposed to
the extension, it shall rest on that Member to show that the objective of the transition period has beenmet for that least-developed Member.
Issue(s):  Article 67
55. Article 67 creates a mandatory obligation on developed country Members to provide technical
and financial cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed country Members conditioned
on requests by developing or least-developed country member and on mutual agreement on the termsand conditions for this assistance.  In implementing the TRIPS Agreement, least-developed country
Members are confronted with financial and administrative constraints.
56. The tasks would consist of changes in national legislation, the elaboration of judicial
procedures for enforcing law, and the establishment of an administrative framework including
customs procedures but more importantly, the coordination with other policies in order to maximize
the benefits arising from the provisions of international agreements.  The latter would not only deal
with the upgrading of existing arrangements but also with establishing additional arrangements forareas not currently covered by the policy, legal and administrative machinery.  In this respect, it is
important to recognize that strengthening the IPR system alone, while bearing some potential for
expanding access to trade, FDI and technology, is liable to be of little value unless done in a coherent
framework of broader policies.  This assistance should help them to achieve proper adaptation,
implementation, and general application of the TRIPS Agreement.
Proposal
57. This calls for a comprehensive programme of assistance  under Article 67 of the TRIPS
Agreement that would enable these Members to put in place an array of institutional arrangements
including training schemes in order to contribute to the creation of a sound and viable technological
base, on the one hand, and to the ability to attract investment and technology, on the other.TN/CTD/W/4/Add.1
Page 11
58. The programme of assistance should include the following components:
(a) Improving the relevant legal framework in line with the general obligations of the
Agreement.
(b) Enhancing enforcement mechanisms.
(c) Increasing training of personnel at the various levels.
(d) Changes in law and procedures to comply with the increasing the capability to
encourage and monitor technology transfer.
(e) Making use of the rights and policy flexibility in the Agreement; and
(f) Strengthening or establishing coordination between IPRs, investment and competition
authorities.
XI. ACHIEVING GREATER COHERENCE IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC POLICY
MAKING
Issues
59. In order to achieve greater global coherence in economic policy issues, the LDCs wish to
propose  as follows:
(a) The General Council on the basis of the recommendations of the WTO Working
Group on Trade, Debt and Finance, shall devote one session annually for the
examination of the interaction and compatibility between global economic policy
making and policy flexibility allowed in the Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs)
for meeting trade, finance and development needs of developing and the least
developed countries.
(b) Bretton Woods conditionality should ensure coherence with WTO commitments and
new measures in favour of the LDCs in accordance with the Declaration on the
Contribution of the WTO to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic
Policymaking..
(c) The WTO Working Groups on Trade, Debt and Finance, and on Trade and Transfer
of Technology should be given specific mandates in this regard, and should include,
on a regular basis, the participation other relevant agencies, including UNCTAD to
assess the implementation of the coherence and the achievement of the development
goals of the LDCs.  Specific development benchmarks should be  adopted by these
Working Groups in order to facilitate the assessment.
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