RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/GC/M/75
27 September 2002
(02-5186)
General Council
8 and 31 July 2002
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 8 and 31 July 2002
Chairpersons: Mr. Sergio Marchi (Canada)
(for items 1 - 7, 9(a) - (d), 17 and 18)
Mr. Carlos Pérez del Castillo (Uruguay)
(for items 8, 9(e), 10 - 16 and 19)
Subjects discussed: Page
1. Iran – Request for Accession ................................................................................................ ..2
2. Procedures for the appointment of future Directors-General – Statement by the
Chairman....................................................................................................................... ............3
3. Review of the exemption provided under Paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994 ........................5
4. Work Programme on Electronic Commerce – Progress report by the Chairman .............6
5. Internal transparency and effective participation of Members – Preparatory
process in Geneva and negotiating procedure at Ministerial Conferences ........................7
6. Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration ...........................................................27
(a) Reports of the Committee on its m eetings of 15 April and 8 May ..........................................27
(b) Statement by the Chairman of the Committee in relation to pledges announced and
payments received to finance the implementation of the WTO Secretariat Annual
Technical Assistance Plan ..................................................................................................... ...27
7. Election of the Chairman, Members and Alternates of the Management Board of
the WTO Pension Plan .......................................................................................................... 28
8. Report on the evaluation of the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance
Programme (JITAP) – Statement by the Deputy Director-General ..................................28
9. Waivers under Article IX of the WTO Agreement..............................................................32
(a) Romania - Introduction of Harmonized System 2002 changes into WTO schedules of
tariff concessions – Re quest for waiver ...................................................................................32
(b) Côte d'Ivoire - Customs Valuation Agreement – Reques t for waiv er ......................................32
(c) El Salvador - Customs Valuation Agreement – Request for waiver ........................................33
(d) Least-developed Countries – Obligations under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement
with respect to pharmaceutical products – Draf t waiver ..........................................................33WT/GC/M/75
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(e) New EC Special Tariff Arrangements to  Combat Drug Production and Trafficking –
Request for Waiver ............................................................................................................ ......34
10. Marrakesh Ministerial Decision concerning the possible negative effects of the
reform programme on least-developed and NFIDCS – Report of the Inter-
Agency Panel on short-term difficulties in financing normal levels of commercialimports of basi c foodstuffs .................................................................................................... .34
11. Report by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee ........................................43
12. Work programme on small economies – Report by the Chairman of the
dedicated sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development......................................44
13. Committee on Rules of Origin – Report by the Chairman of the Committee to
the General Council ........................................................................................................... ....45
14. Council for Trade in Goods – Recommendations for appropriate action
regarding proposals contained in paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 of the Doha Ministerial
Decision on Implementati on-Related Issues and Concerns relating to the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.....................................................................................51
15. Committee on Trade and Development – Report by the Chairman of the
Committee in Special Session on Special and Differential Treatment inpursuance of paragraph 12.1 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns ....................................................................63
16. Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures – Report on review of
provisions regarding countervailing duty investigations in pursuance of
paragraph 10.3 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation-RelatedIssues and Concerns............................................................................................................ ....71
17. Proposal to remove and avoid inconsistencies in the texts of the WTO
Agreements – Communication from Chile ..........................................................................73
18. One-day retreat for Permanent Representatives of WTO Members – Statement
by the Chairman ................................................................................................................ .....74
19. Farewell to the Di rector-General ..........................................................................................75
1. Iran – Request for Accession (WT/ACC/IRN/1)
1. The Chairman drew attention to the communicat ion from Iran in WT/ACC/IRN/1, requesting
accession to the WTO Agreement.  He recalled that the General Council had last considered this
matter at its meeting in May, and had agreed to revert to it at the present meeting.
2. The representative of the United States said that her delegation did not have anything to add
to its statement at the May meeting.  The issue of Iran's accession to the WTO Agreement was under
review by her Government, and her delegation was not in a position to speak to this matter at the
present meeting.
3. The representative of Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the Informal Group of Developing
Countries, said that he had taken note of the statement by the United States.  At the May meeting of
the General Council, these countries had expressed th e hope that they would get a positive response to
Iran's request for accession as soon as possible.  This request had been on the agenda of the General
Council for some time, and they were disappointed that the United States was still not able to provide
a positive response on the matter.  They strongly urged the United States to respond positively to this
issue at the next meeting of the General Council.WT/GC/M/75
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4. The representative of the European Communitie s informed Members that the Community had
recently agreed on a mandate for the negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement with Iran that foresaw
the reciprocal granting of most-favoured-nation treatment.  In this connection, the Community saw
merit in starting a process that would lay the fo undation for granting such status also at the
multilateral level.
5. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next
meeting.
2. Procedures for the appointment of future Directors-General – Statement by the
Chairman
6. The Chairman recalled that the July 1999 Decision of the General Council on the
Appointment of the next Director -General (WT/L/308) called for a comprehensive set of rules and
procedures for the appointment of Directors-General to be elaborated and adopted by the end ofSeptember 2000, and that good work had been d one under this mandate by Ambassador Bryn of
Norway, both in his capacity as General Council Chairman in the course of 2000, and in more recent
consultations at the request of his successor in that post, Mr. Harbinson of Hong Kong, China.  As he
had indicated at the May General Council meeting, it was his intention to tackle this issue this year,
given the express desire of many delegations to take advantage of the window of opportunity this yearoffered.  Since May, he had held extensive consultations aimed at ascertaining delegations' views and
determining where Members would need to focus thei r work, and had also solicited the views of the
non-resident Member delegations.  On 12 June, he had circulated some background materials in
document Job(02)/56 to assist Members in their reflection on this matter and, on 19 June, the General
Council had met in open-ended informal session to cons ider this issue.  In his view, that meeting had
been very constructive, as well as a valuable contribution to the discussion of this issue.  Some
35 delegations had taken the floor.  There had been a broad convergence of views on many of the nine
points identified in document Job(02)/56.  The discussion had also served to underline a number of
issues where more focused work was clearly necessary.  These included:  (i) decision-making, and
whether or not there was need for a "circuit breaker" should consensus not be reached by an agreeddeadline;  (ii) whether a principle of rotation should be followed and, if so, what kind;  and
(iii) whether an advisory committee to assist the Chairman should be provided for.
7. On decision-making, all delegations had expressed a strong preference for a decision by
consensus, while many had been prepared to contemplate other alternatives as a last resort.  Two
delegations had said they could not accept any deviation from consensus, and several others had
expressed strong reservations on voting, although there had been a cross-section of support for the use
of straw polls at established stages in the process in order to facilitate consensus.  It had been stressedthat a consensus decision was important in order for the Director-General to have the level of
confidence of the Members necessary for him or her to operate effectively, and that the focus should
be on devising a process that would facilitate a consensus decision.  Some had felt that providing an
alternative to consensus decision-making would in fact make Members less inclined to make efforts at
accommodation and building a consensus.  On the question of voting, many delegations had said theycould accept this as a last resort "circuit breaker" if it were circumscribed only to the appointment of
the Director-General.  However, there were differences of view as to the method of voting, with many
countries insisting on a simple majority as provided in Article IX of the WTO Agreement, or a
qualified majority – such as two-thirds or three-fourths of Members voting – while others had opted
for a trade-weighted vote.  In a spirit of compromise, a good number of delegations had spoken infavour of a double majority, such as, for example, trade-weighted plus simple majority.
8. On rotation, there had been a broad cross-section of views as to whether there should be no
rotation, a developing-country/developed-country rotation, or a geographic rotation.  A broad mix of
Members had felt that the selection of a Director-General should be based solely on merit, and thatWT/GC/M/75
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any rigid rotation principle could limit the pool of capable candidates at any given time and run
counter to the interests and needs of Members and the organization.  However, many developing
countries had spoken in favour of some type of rotation, most supporting a simple
developing/developed-country rotation, with some arguing for a geographic rotation.
9. On an advisory committee, while all seemed to  agree that the Chairman needed assistance in
the selection process – for example, to conduct consultations and get a reading on candidates' levels of
support – and that transparency was essential in this context, views varied on how to provide for this.
Most delegations seemed to favour an informal "Friends of the Chair" approach and felt that any more
formal approach would unnecessarily politicize the process and make it more difficult.  Others had
suggested that Chairs of other main WTO bodies could play this role, while still others had also called
for regional representation in any such group.
10. The other points that had been discussed, and on which some broad convergences were
beginning to emerge, were the following:  First, on the time-period for the entire process, most
delegations had suggested starting the process 6-12 months prior to the expiry of an incumbent's term,
with a deadline for decision 3-6 months before the term expired.  All were in favour of specific
deadlines that would need to be honoured throug hout the process of nomination, campaigning by the
candidates and decision-making.  Second, on nominations, all who spoke had felt that nominationsshould be made by Member governments only;  however, there were differing views on whether a
government might nominate a non-national.  Third, on qualification criteria, most delegations had felt
that since nominations would come from governments, detailed criteria should not be fixed in
advance, and that a General Council discussion of the broad attributes required in the post at any
given time, with a summing-up by the Chairman, could provide useful guidance for governments.Fourth, with regard to the term of office, many delegations had favoured a four-year term with one
renewal.  Some had stressed that there should be no expectation of automaticity in the renewal.
Others had suggested that one longer term, such as five or six years, with no renewal might be more
appropriate.  Fifth, on the senior management structure, most delegations had felt that this discussion
should remain separate from the present exercise, but that there was a need to ensure continuity in the
transition period through staggering the terms of office of the Director-General and the Deputy
Directors-General.  Finally, on remuneration, there was an overall view that the remuneration package
should be set in advance in a transparent way and non-negotiable.
11. Overall, the discussion at this informal meeting had been very positive and had provided an
excellent basis on which to build.  He intended to hold more focused consultations in the early autumn
on those issues Members had identified as the most important and those that required additional work,
with a view to moving this exercise towards a successful conclusion by the end of the year.  Wherethere was a will there was clearly a way, and he believed that all Members shared a common will to
succeed on this matter.
12. The representative of Brazil said that his delegation fully supported the Chairman's efforts
aimed at clarifying the procedures for appointment of future Directors-General.  Brazil believed that
Members should strive to ensure a smooth transition between the outgoing and incoming Directors-General and, to that end, clear guidelines could facilitate the process.  As his delegation had
participated in the Chairman's consultations, he would not expand on the various aspects mentioned in
the Chairman's statement.  However, he wished to stress that Brazil considered it essential that the
basic WTO rules should stand.  Article IX of the WTO Agreement was clear that to the extent
possible, decision-making should be by consensus, and that where a decision could not be arrived at
by consensus, the matter at issue should be decided by voting, with each Member of the WTO having
one vote.  He wished to put on record that Brazil categorically rejected any attempt to override this
basic principle of the WTO with proposals regarding weighted voting or a double majority vote or,
indeed, any other possible scheme of weighted voting.  If consensus were unattainable, and in order to
facilitate consensus, Members could explore ideas such as a direct election in two rounds, in caseWT/GC/M/75
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there were more than two candidates.  Other ideas could also be further developed, such as an
informal advisory committee to help the Chair, the possibility of rotation and a deadline for the
appointment process.  Irrespective of the direction taken in the consultations by the Chairman, Brazil
considered that the selection process should, above all, be transparent and take on board the views of
the whole membership.
13. The representative of India expressed appreciation for the Chairman's efforts to try to resolve
this matter.  His delegation believed that the main problem Members were likely to face related to the
circuit-breaker issue.  Like Brazil , India would not find it possible to support trade-weighted voting of
any kind, whether direct trade-weighted voting or a double majority vote.  If Members were to go
ahead with the circuit-breaker issue, the provisi ons of Article IX of the WTO Agreement should be
followed.  Regarding the other issues identified in  the Chairman's statement, there was a high degree
of flexibility and desire on the part of Members to move forward, and his delegation was convincedthat, with further discussion, resolution of these issues would be achieved.
14. The Chairman, referring to Brazil's statement on the transition between outgoing and
incoming Directors-General, said he wished to put on record his appreciation to both Mr. Moore and
Dr. Supachai for having worked out an efficient transition process that would serve as a positive
precedent for future transitions.  Dr. Supachai's attendance at the forthcoming meeting of the TradeNegotiations Committee on 18-19 July was reflective of that healthy transition process.
15. The General Council took note of the statements.
3. Review of the exemption provided under Paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994 (WT/L/444)
16. The Chairman recalled that Paragraph 3(a) of the GATT 1994 provided an exemption from
Part II of GATT 1994 for measures under specific mandatory legislation, enacted by a Member before
it had become a contracting party to the GATT 1947, which prohibited the use, sale or lease of
foreign-built or foreign-reconstructed vessels in commercial applications between points in national
waters or waters of an exclusive economic zone.  On 20 December 1994, the United States had
invoked the provisions of Paragraph 3(a) with respect to specific legislation, known as the "Jones
Act", that met the requirements of that Paragraph.  Paragraph 3(b) of the GATT 1994 called for areview of this exemption five years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, and
thereafter every two years for as long as the exemp tion was in force, in order to examine whether the
conditions which created the need for the exemption still prevailed.  The General Council had last
considered this matter at its meeting in May, and had agreed to revert to it at the present meeting.
From the discussions that had been held thus far on this issue, there did not yet seem to be a meeting
of minds on the conduct of the review to be undertaken by the General Council under this provision.
Therefore, while he did not wish to pre-empt any discussion at the present meeting, he believed that itmight be helpful, under the circumstances, if he were to consult informally with the delegations who
had spoken on this item thus far, at least in the first instance, with the aim of trying to get a sense of
the way forward and to bring some closure to this issue at a future meeting.  If this were agreeable, he
would propose to begin consultations on this matter early in the autumn, and that the General Council
agree to revert to this item at a future meeting before the end of the year.
17. The representative of the European Communities welcomed the Chairman's proposal to
proceed to informal consultations.  For the Community, it was important that the review be a
substantive one and not a pro forma exercise.  He believed that the Chairman's consultations could
contribute to a substantive review.
18. The representative of Norway said that his delegation also welcomed the Chairman's proposal
to hold consultations in the autumn and wished to  participate therein.  Norway hoped that there wouldWT/GC/M/75
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be a substantial discussion on this issue in order to examine whether the conditions for the exemption
still existed.
19. The representative of the United States thanked the Chairman for his proposal to hold
consultations in the autumn and welcomed the opportunity to participate in them.
20. The representatives of Australia, Panama , Japan , Korea  and Chile  expressed their interest in
participating actively in the consultations to be held by the Chairman.
21. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at a future
meeting before the end of the year, and that the Ch airman would hold consultations on it early in the
autumn.
4. Work Programme on Electronic Commerce – Progress report by the Chairman
22. The Chairman recalled that at the May meeting of the General Council, Deputy Director-
General Mr. Stoler had reported on the second dedicated discussion on cross-cutting issues under the
auspices of the General Council, which had been held on 6 May 2002.  A factual summary of that
discussion had been circulated in WT/GC/W/475.  Also at that meeting, delegations had expressed
views on how to handle future work on cross-cutt ing issues.  As a follow-up to that discussion,
Deputy Director-General Mr. Stoler, on behalf of the Chairman, had held consultations with interested
delegations on the most appropriate way to continue the work on cross-cutting issues.  The results ofthose consultations were as follows:  First, there was broad support for continuing in the format of
periodic dedicated discussions of cross-cutting issues under the auspices of the General Council;  no
delegation continued to advocate the establishment of a horizontal task force.  Second, the agenda for
future dedicated discussions should be narrowed in order to focus the debate, on the understanding
that any delegation might expand the agenda at any time;  thus, the next dedicated discussion wouldfocus on (a) "classification" issues and (b) fiscal and other revenue-related issues.  Third, delegations
could accept a notional schedule of future meetings as follows:  September or October;  late
December;  late February 2003;  and the May-June 2003 period, during which Members would take
up drafting the report to the General Council for incorporation in the overall report to be sent to the
Fifth Ministerial Conference.  Fourth, on the issue of whether reports on future meetings should be inthe current factual summary format or a more extensive format reflecting each delegation's position, it
had been agreed to revisit this at the next dedicated discussion.  He wished to thank Deputy Director-
General Mr. Stoler for having chaired these consultations.
23. On the separate issue of the most appropriate institutional arrangements for handling the
Work Programme as a whole, which Ministers at Doha had instructed the General Council to
consider, he wished to invite delegations to reflect on this, with a view to taking a decision at the
October meeting of the General Council.  Informal consultations would be held on this matterbetween now and that meeting.  As Members were aware, to date these institutional arrangements had
been that the Councils for Trade in Services, Trade in Goods and TRIPS, and the Committee on Trade
and Development would examine and report on aspects of electronic commerce relevant to their
respective areas of competence, and that the General Council would play a central role in the entire
process, would keep the work programme under continuous review and would consider any trade-related issue of a cross-cutting nature.
24. The representative of Chinese Taipei said th at his delegation wished to commend the fine
work done under the Work Programme on Electron ic Commerce and chaired by Deputy Director-
General Mr. Stoler.  The Work Programme had crystallized five cross-cutting issues which constituted
a very useful basis for future discussion.  He expressed appreciation to Members who had contributedto progress on this issue.  As stated in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, electronic commerce posed
challenges and generated opportunities for Members at all stages of development.  It had a far-WT/GC/M/75
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reaching effect on trade facilitation and liberaliza tion.  Members should pay great attention to the
development of electronic commerce in order to seize its ample business opportunities.  Chinese
Taipei had been one of the beneficiaries of a robust electronic commerce environment, as
demonstrated by, inter alia , its vibrant e-banking and online securities trading system.  His delegation
was willing to take part in the Work Programme and to share Chinese Taipei's experience in thisregard.  As recognized in Doha, it was important to  create and maintain an environment that was vital
to the future development of electronic commerce.  In this regard, the development of a set of rules on
electronic commerce and adequate infrastructure in e-commerce was a must, in order to achieve the
goal set by the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
25. The representative of the United States said that a liberalized trade environment for digital
products in both the goods and services sectors would facilitate a vibrant e-commerce economy.  For
example, making meaningful market-access and national treatment commitments in the relevantservices sectors would create a globally networked environment where digital products and services
would flow unimpeded by trade barriers.  His delegation believed that the WTO Work Programme on
Global Electronic Commerce had been a useful exercise, and was encouraged by the commitment to
extend the Work Programme, as well as the current practice of not imposing customs duties on
electronic transmissions.  The Work Programme should continue in a manner that would assist theongoing negotiations in a meaningful way.  While there was disagreement on how to classify a small
set of products – digitally downloaded products (e.g., books, videos, movies, software) – this should
not impede progress in recognizing the importance of applying all WTO rules to the development of
e-commerce.  In order to provide appropriate guidance on trade in digital products, the following
goals should be at the core of the overall negotiations:  first, trade in digital products should continueto flourish in a liberal and open trade environment re flected in the principles of national treatment and
other non-discriminatory measures;  second, greater market access and national treatment
commitments across a broad range of relevant goods and services sectors would lead to greater
development of e-commerce and economic growth;  third, if necessary, domestic regulations affecting
e-commerce should follow existing WTO principles, namely, they should be transparent, minimal,non-discriminatory and the least trade-restrictive means to accomplish legitimate objectives;  finally,
in light of the importance of trade liberalization in trade in digital products, the moratorium on
customs duties on electronic transmissions should be made permanent and binding.
26. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed
 to revert to the question of
appropriate institutional arrangements for the conduct of the Work Programme as a whole at its next
meeting.
5. Internal transparency and effective participation of Members – Preparatory process in
Geneva and negotiating procedure at Ministerial Conferences (WT/GC/W/471,
WT/GC/W/477, WT/GC/W/422)
27. The Chairman recalled that the General Council had discussed this item at its meeting in May,
and had agreed to revert to it at the present meeting.  He had indicated at the May meeting that
subsequent to the discussion at the present meeting, this issue could be taken to the next step ofconsultations, which would start in the autumn.  Since the discussion in May, a further
communication on this subject had been received from a group of eight delegations and circulated in
document WT/GC/W/477.  Also, at the request of Bulgaria at the May meeting, its communication on
internal transparency circulated in November 2000 (WT/GC/W/422) would be included in the
document references for this item each time it was taken up by the General Council.
28. The representative of Australia, introducing the communication in WT/GC/W/477 on behalf
of its co-sponsors, recalled that at the final panel session of a seminar hosted by UNCTAD the
previous week on the WTO's dispute settlement sy stem, a number of suggestions had been made by
the panel as to how WTO Members should approach the review of the Dispute SettlementWT/GC/M/75
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Understanding (DSU) with which Ministers has tasked Members.  It had been suggested that in
improving the existing system, Members should be guided by four considerations:  first, that they
avoid setting overly-prescriptive rules of procedure;  second, that they maintain a balance between
general principles and elaborated procedures;  third, that they ensure sufficient flexibility to
accommodate unforeseen developments;  and fourth, that they have faith in the institution's ability tomake appropriate adjustments as the need arose.  While the panel had been referring specifically to
the DSU, the suggestions seemed equally applicable to the system for preparing for Ministerial
Conferences.  In fact, these latter thoughts had been among the reasons the co-authors of the
communication in WT/GC/W/477 had decided to reflect collectively on the discussion at the May
General Council.  The question was what was the most sensible way to balance the interests of
transparency, inclusiveness and predictability with the interests of flexibility, efficiency, pragmatism
and progress.
29. The communication sought to capture a view th at had been widely expressed at the May
meeting that in looking ahead to preparations fo r the Cancún Ministerial Conference – which was not
much more than a year away – Members needed to draw on their shared experience over recent years
in how to prepare for such meetings.  That experience embraced both the success at Doha and the lack
of success at Seattle.  Many delegations had recalled in May that the experience of failure in Seattlehad spurred Members collectively to do things better, and that that commitment to find a better way of
working had led very directly to the success Member s had collectively experienced in Doha.  In turn,
the experience of Doha had encouraged Members to agree on and implement further improvements in
management practice.  Some delegations had talked in May about trying to codify best practice since
Seattle and, by inference, avoiding the perceived mistakes of the past.  Many delegations had alsoappeared to conclude that best practice, in fact, meant minimal practice – that keeping processes light
and flexible was the key to successful management of the difficult process of securing agreement
among 144 Members through a process of consensus-based decision making.  At the same time,
Members needed to maintain the best practice of consultation and internal transparency built up
during 2000 and used to good effect during the run-up to Doha in late 2001.
30. He doubted that any of the co-sponsors of the paper would argue that the Doha experience
had been perfect.  There were always things that could be improved.  However, he felt that all would
agree that the Doha process had been measurably better than the previous approach, and had produced
measurably better results.  Members would not need a lot of convincing to move away from the sort
of approach taken collectively to Ministerial Conferences prior to Doha and some of the practices that
had proved to be seriously flawed.  In concrete terms, Members needed to avoid setting themselves –
and their Ministers – up for a situation where a 32-page text full of square brackets was forwarded toMinisters as a negotiating document.  As the communication pointed out, while criticism of any
preparatory process was inevitable, the fact was that the document referred to Ministers in Doha had
emerged pretty well intact at the end of the Conference.  That said something very positive about that
process and, of course, about the judgment, skill and tact not only of the then Chairman, but also of
delegations in Geneva.
31. He wished to make two other observations about the background to this communication.
First, the principal reason Members needed to give attention to the issue of preparation of Ministerial
Conferences was the fact that this was an organization with treaty status and with significant
commercial interests at stake, comprising a large number of Members of necessarily diverse interests,
which took decisions by consensus.  This point was critical.  Few delegations, if any, wanted to moveaway from consensus decision-making.  But that came at a cost to the organization in terms of the
amount of time and effort put collectively into securing agreement on issues.  Since the negotiation of
the Marrakesh Agreements, decisions had inevitably been taken with even more caution than under
the GATT, reflecting the increased level of commitments, a strengthened dispute settlement
mechanism, and a substantially larger membership.  However, the corollary of this was that Membersmight be tempted to try to take decisions at every turn in the road on the way to Ministerial meetings,WT/GC/M/75
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and that, in turn, would mean that they did not always allow themselves to see the whole picture.  On
the other hand, Ministers would insist on weighing up the whole picture in terms of perceived national
interest, and that meant being able to identify and assess both the perceived benefits and the costs.
32. Second, – a point that had been made at the May meeting and was also critical to
consideration of the issues being discussed – representatives in Geneva were tasked by Ministers toprepare a meeting at which they expected to be able to take decisions about the future of the
organization, and to advance what they saw as national trade interests.  Ministers would not thank
representatives in Geneva for making preparations for their meeting more complex than necessary, by
introducing a heavy decision-making process for each step on the road or by limiting their capacity to
engage with their fellow colleagues.  As had be en observed in May, Ministers had to work out
political deals.  There was a need to avoid risking paralysis and getting in the way of Ministers being
able to see where the most important consensus la y, i.e. the consensus at the conclusion of the
Ministerial Conference.  Just as the lack of progress in this multilateral trade forum had encouraged
Members to look for bilateral and regional solutions, overly prescriptive rules of procedure would
likely lead to driving substantive discussion into informal groups, with all the dangers this posed for
transparency and the interests of smaller delegations.  In concluding, he suggested that Members
avoid introducing unnecessary rigidities into their work, avoid strait-jacketing themselves and theirMinisters, keep their decision-making light, flexible and pragmatic, continue to follow best practice as
collectively identified over the past few years, and ensure sufficient flexibility to accommodate
unforeseen developments and evolution in the international environment.
33. Any attempt to codify best practice would require Members to be very cautious about whether
they should specify more than they had already, through the internal transparency work they had
developed and implemented since Seattle.  That approach should inform the whole range of
components that made up a Ministerial meeting, including the preparatory processes in Geneva,
arrangements for the hosting of the meeting, the role of the Chair and whatever facilitators he or she
might wish to invite to help run the conference, and the practical management of the meetings,
including the consultative process on the ground.  As one of the panel members at the UNCTADseminar had said, Members should all show some faith in the system.
34. The representative of Chile said that although his delegation had worked on the paper in
WT/GC/W/477 together with the other sponsoring delegations, it had not been possible to include
Chile as a co-sponsor, owing to last minute differen ces with his capital.  However, Chile now wished
to be included in the list of countries sponsoring this paper1, and wished also to endorse the statement
by Australia.  The paper by the group of 15 countries in WT/GC/W/471 had been a very useful
contribution and had served to awaken the awareness and attention of all delegations to the need tohave a good preparatory process for the next Minist erial Conference.  Although this contribution had
raised several aspects that were of concern to Members and which needed to be discussed, Chile did
not see it as a proposal for a rigid and inflexible process.  Chile was appreciative of this contribution,
which had allowed it and other delegations to respond with a complementary paper.  As Chile had
stated on other occasions, experience showed that changes in terms of processes had been importantin the WTO.  This was, to some extent, very impor tant in marking the differences between the process
leading to the failure of Seattle and that leading to  the success of Doha.  In other words, it was the
process by which Members arrived at decisions that would give sustainability and credibility to
results.  Doha had been the result of an open and transparent process.  However, no process was
perfect and Members would continue to learn over the years and improve their processes andprocedures.  One also had to improve the exercise of confidence-building and take a further step in
that direction.  While the process leading up to Doha had not been perfect and could be improved on,
each Ministerial Conference had its own particularities, and the Cancún Conference would certainly
have its own.  The differences and particularities of  each Conference would have to be accompanied
                                                     
1 The revised list of sponsors was circulated in WT/GC/W/477/Add.1.WT/GC/M/75
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by adjustments in the process that was employed.  Therefore, the first point that Chile wished to
highlight was that in adding to the existing practice, Members should be prudent, cautious and
flexible.  Any process should be capable of responding with flexibility and fluidity to the different
challenges that Members would face along the way.  The Chairman of the General Council should be
given the freedom to conduct the process, which should take into account the collective interests andopinions of Members.  The Chairman's room for manoeuvre needed to be preserved, in order to allow
the best results to be achieved in a way that responded appropriately to the interests and needs of
Members.  Ministers needed to have in their hands not only a report which reflected substantively the
work carried out, but also as much room as possible to be able to take decisions and assume the
political responsibilities which fell to them.  It was very difficult to prescribe criteria, which was why
flexible and fluid procedures were needed. As a developing country, Chile was highly committed to
the multilateral trading system, and had a vital and urgent interest in having good results withinestablished time-frames, and was certain that the current process would lead to that objective.  His
delegation urged that consultations be held on this matter, in which it wished to be included.  Chile
wanted the process to result in some type of understanding among Members as soon as possible so
that work in the final run-up to Cancún could be carried out on the basis of improved procedures.
35. The representative of Colombia said that this  issue was closely linked to that of internal
transparency within the organization, which had been extensively discussed in recent years.  In
Colombia's view, it was a matter of the greatest priority to establish clear rules and criteria for these
Ministerial processes.  Her delegation agreed with the approach in WT/GC/W/477 and the fact that
transparency was an issue on which major headway had been made since the Seattle Conference.
Under the leadership of the two previous Genera l Council Chairmen – Amb. Bryn and Mr. Harbinson
– and the present Chairman, the organization had taken great strides forward by guaranteeing
inclusive consultation mechanisms which allowed all Members to voice their concerns and interests in
the different activities of the organization.  It went without saying that there would always be room
for improvement, and it was Members' job to remain open to each others' suggestions.  However,
pragmatic criteria that would enable Members to complete preparations for the forthcomingConference on time and, subsequently, to bring the negotiations mandated by Ministers in Doha to a
successful conclusion, had to be maintained.  In this respect, Colombia felt there were a number of
ways, in keeping with the matter at hand and the particular circumstances, in which progress could be
made with negotiations and the difficult consensu s-building process.  Her delegation considered that
no one single method should be adopted for the work to be undertaken by the Chairpersons of the
various negotiating committees and facilitators at Ministerial Conferences.  Her delegation therefore
wished to reiterate that it welcomed proposals that helped to enhance the transparency of Members'work and would analyse each in terms of the contribution it made to this objective, while remaining
attuned to the need to maintain flexibilit y and pragmatism in the negotiating processes.
36. The representative of Bulgaria said the most important aspects of transparency were those that
related to the decision-making process.  The debate about transparency had started after Seattle, where
some delegations had not been admitted to closed meetings, the aim of which had been to producelast-minute proposals to be tabled for a decision at the official session of the Ministerial Conference.
His delegation believed that the debate in the General Council about transparency would not be
successful if Members could not agree on procedur al guarantees against such last-minute proposals
prepared by some Members to the exclusion of others.  Under the current rules of procedure,
proposals for decisions had to be tabled in writing 12 hours before a decision was taken.  This, inBulgaria's view, was clearly inadequate for a transparent and inclusive decision-making process.
Therefore, his delegation had proposed in document WT/GC/W/422 that draft decisions be tabled
before the circulation to Members of the convening notice for the relevant meeting, and that such draft
decisions be referenced in the convening notice.  Bulgaria's proposal would not make last-minute
bargains between delegations impossible, but would make it impossible that such last-minute bargains
between some delegations were imposed on others under the pressure of time.  Bulgaria proposed that
draft decisions or amendments to them that were circulated to delegations after the convening noticeWT/GC/M/75
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for a meeting could be adopted on an ad referendum  basis only, in order to give time for consultation
with capitals and interested national stakeholders.  The proposal provided for the kind of flexibility
and fluidity that would be helpful for an efficient and result-oriented process advocated by the paper
just introduced by Australia.  It would soon be three years since the General Council had started the
discussion on transparency and inclusive participation in decision-making.  There had been someimprovements, but in order to provide real and last ing solutions, there needed to be more than mere
discussion.  There needed to be procedural guarantees that would make it impossible to revert to non-
transparent practices.  Indeed, there had recently been cases which demonstrated the need for such
procedural guarantees.  Bulgaria felt that its propos al provided such guarantees against what could be
considered the worst form of non-transparency.
37. The representative of Brazil said his delegation joined others in thanking the co-sponsors of
WT/GC/W/471 for having raised a number of issues that deserved the General Council’s careful
consideration.  There was much that Brazil could agree with in that paper.  The preparatory process in
Geneva should indeed proceed under the close supervision of the General Council and its Chairman,
with the assistance, if necessary, of working groups and facilitators.  At the Ministerial Conference
itself, consultations should be transparent and inclusive, and marathon negotiating sessions should be
avoided.  Recently, another paper on this issue had been circulated by a group of countries inWT/GC/W/477, which helped to enrich and broaden th is debate.  Brazil agreed with several of the
points set out in these papers, in particular that consensus should remain the rule for decision-making
and that the preparatory process should leave space for the Ministerial Conference to take up those
issues which called for resolution at a higher political level.  Brazil had also taken note of the
communication from Bulgaria in WT/GC/W/422.
38. As the communications showed, this was indeed a very timely discussion.  The WTO was a
young organization that was quickly evolving in t une with its expanding membership.  At the same
time, institutionally it was influenced by a tradition established over almost half a century under the
GATT.  The challenge facing the WTO was that of reconciling the GATT legacy for pragmatism and
efficiency with the contemporary call for greater transparency and more democratic and inclusivedecision-making processes.  Just as Brazil had supported the idea of establishing “principles and
practices” for the TNC, from the very outset it would not be averse to looking at a set of general
guidelines for Ministerial Conferences and the preparations for them.  Brazil believed that a greater
degree of procedural predictability was desirable and could be attained without strait-jacketing the
consultative process or micro-managing Ministers.  It seemed to Brazil that one was dealing with a
structural problem.  Members went from long prep aratory meetings in Geneva at the Ambassadorial
level to an intense, concentrated Ministerial process lasting a few days, without anything in betweento iron out the most politically sensitive difficulties.  He noted that most Ministerial gatherings or
summits had a senior-officials-meeting component that set the stage for the adoption of decisions.
Something similar could be contemplated for the WTO's Ministerial Conferences, so that Ministers
were not confronted with proposals for bridging gaps, even as their Geneva representatives strove to
stay abreast of complex evolving scenarios they were no longer in control of.  If MinisterialConferences could be preceded by two or three days of preparatory work at the senior officials level –
at the same venue as that of the Ministerial Conference – the transition from the preparatory process
to the decision stage might become smoother and less challenging for small and medium-sized
players, who constituted the vast majority of the membership.  This would probably obviate the need,
felt by some, for very detailed procedures for either the Geneva process or the Ministerial phase.  Hisdelegation believed that, among other valuable suggestions, Members might give some thought to this
idea.
39. The representative of Morocco welcomed the initiative behind the paper in WT/GC/W/477.
As this document was still under review in his capita l, he wished to make the following preliminary
comments.  The paper would enrich the present debate at a time when Members were starting thepreparatory process for the next Ministerial Conference and the process of negotiations.  The paperWT/GC/M/75
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asserted that the membership of the WTO was made up of a diversity of countries, interests, positions
and points of view.  This was a clear reality.  The conclusion of the paper was a call for less rigidity,
and more flexibility and pragmatism.  This was a conclusion that his delegation supported.  The paper
contained positive elements that Members should make the best use of in the light of past experience.
Morocco had always said that lessons should be learned from both failures and successes.  In thehistory of the WTO there had been both successes and failures, and Members should not base their
approach to future processes only on the successes, but should also reflect on and learn from the
failures, with a view to not repeating them.  The views in WT/GC/W/477 were not totally in
contradiction with those in WT/GC/W/471.  There were links that should be explored, and a synthesis
of the two papers should be made with a view  to finding the common ground between them.  Every
contribution on this issue should be encouraged, as even the most contradictory submissions would
shed light on this issue and aid in addressing it.  The submissions in both WT/GC/W/471 and 477 hadthe same goal, which was a successful Ministerial Conference in Mexico, and to make the preparatory
process flexible, transparent, inclusive, without friction and satisfactory to all Members.  As long as
the objective was clear, even though there might be differences in tactics and approach between
developed- and developing-country Members, it would be possible to achieve this objective.  What
was necessary was flexibility, political will and a longer-term global view.  His delegation wished tobe included in consultations on this matter.
40. The representative of Norway said that the communications in WT/GC/W/471 and 477
deserved very close attention and study because they addressed the problem from different
perspectives.  He agreed with Morocco that the two papers were complementary in style.  In his
delegation's view, both papers had their strengths and their weaknesses.  He recalled that the
overriding theme of the discussion in May of the paper in WT/GC/W/471 had related to flexibility,
i.e. the need for flexibility as opposed to creating very strict rules, strict deadlines and so forth.  That
theme had been well picked up in WT/GC/W/477.  His delegation had stated clearly in May that there
should not be too strict rules which would entail a strait-jacket, but that, on the other hand, the call for
flexibility did not mean there should be no guidance at all.  There was a need for balance, and Brazilhad made a very good point regarding the need for procedural predictability, i.e. some predictability
in the way things would be done which would allow fl exibility in addressing the substance.  In his
view, it was a question of including flexibility in how Members developed the substance, rather than
in how Members would change from one system, structure or procedure to another.
41. The communication in WT/GC/W/477 had picked up on the flexibility which the General
Council had been trying to implement since Seattle in order to develop its own accommodation and
some understanding on what was needed – i.e., as Brazil had said, how to marry the old GATT andthe new WTO.  This was exactly what was at stake and what Members were trying to do.  Regarding
the process in Geneva in 2001 leading up to Doha, his delegation, for its part, had basically had very
few grievances, if any, and it seemed that most delegations would say that the process had worked
quite well.  Australia, in introducing the paper in WT/GC/W/477, had said that Members should be
very careful not to return to the sort of process that had produced a 30-40 page draft declarationbefore Seattle.  Indeed, it would be catastrophic to go back to such a procedure.  While there were
obviously some things Members could improve on in the Geneva process leading up to a Ministerial
Conference, Norway felt that Me mbers now had, in the Geneva process, the sort of procedural
predictability that Brazil had talked about.
42. Regarding how this applied to Ministerial Conferences, there were two points he wished to
highlight.  The first related to decisions on the structure for Ministerial Conferences and how the work
during Ministerial Conferences should be concluded, because based on the most recent experience,
Members might have the impression that the Ministerial Conference was owned by the host country.
It had very much been left to the host country to decide, in co-operation with the Director-General, on
the Conference's structure and how it should be or ganized.  He was certain that Norway had not been
the only delegation to find out only on arrival in Doha, how that Conference was going to beWT/GC/M/75
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organized.  The situation had been the same at Seattle two years earlier.  Norway had not had a clear
picture of the organizational structure of the Co nference, and his delegation questioned whether that
system was a good one.  While the host country had of course to have a say on the structure and
organization of the Conference, Norway agreed with the suggestion in WT/GC/W/471 that Members
should decide on this, in co-operation with the host country and the Director-General, before theyaccepted another invitation from a Member to host a Ministerial Conference.  Norway also questioned
whether, as the main rule, Ministerial Conferences should not be held at the WTO's headquarters.
This was not to say that Members should not take up an invitation for the Conference to be held
elsewhere.  However, Norway questioned whether this should be the main rule.  This was the first
point on which his delegation felt that perhaps some procedural guidance might be useful.
43. The second point related to what happened during the Ministerial Conference.  In many ways,
the Doha experience had been good for 90 per cent of the duration of the Conference, but what wassomewhat striking in the paper in WT/GC/W/477 was th at it talked about the entirety of the process in
Geneva and the 90 per cent of the Ministerial Conference, but left out what had happened during the
last 24 hours of the Doha Conference, which was not insignificant.  His delegation did not have a
solution to that problem, and neither, it seemed, did others.  This had to be admitted and the problem
looked at, because it seemed to his delegation that for part of the meeting in Doha, the WTO hadperhaps ceased to exist, and the old GATT had been resurrected.  Obviously, if Members were going
to set up guidelines, these would have to cover th e whole process, from the very beginning until the
final Ministerial Declaration was adopted, and not leave out the 24 hours that were the most crucial.
Having said this, Norway supported continuing consultations on this issue in order to take it further.
In his delegation's view, the two communications provided a very good basis for refining the
procedures even more than had already been done, and Members could, before the next Ministerial
Conference in Cancún, have the sort of procedural predictability Brazil had mentioned.
44. The representative of Zimbabwe said that the submission of the paper in WT/GC/W/477 was
a positive development in terms of Members engaging on this issue.  There was now a basis to move
forward and to start consultations on this issue.   The issues raised in WT/GC/W/471 were quite
fundamental, and the fact that other delegations had responded showed that, in this spirit, Members
could improve the working systems within the WTO.  The WTO was the Members' organization, and
there was room for improvement.  Members should not stick to the status quo if the latter did not suit
the greater part of the membership.  Zimbabwe agreed on the need for predictability.  Members
needed to have rules that would guide them in thei r work.  Flexibility and informal rules would, in his
delegation's view, lead to anarchy.  It would be the rule of the jungle, whereby everything would
depend on who was in the Chair.  Rules did not have to be rigid or create a strait-jacket, as some hadsaid, but would at least provide a road map or guidelines for whoever was hosting a Ministerial
Conference.  His delegation had seen situations in which the host of a Ministerial Conference did not
know how to proceed, which showed the need to put procedures or a general outline down on paper.
In certain circumstances, Members had found themselves in the hands of the Secretariat, which had
made an interpretation of a particular situation.  His delegation would feel more secure were theorganization run on the basis of clear procedures.  Such procedures needed to be established, and the
papers submitted would form the basis for further consultations on this matter.
45. There were specific quotations in WT/GC/W/477 from the findings of Ambassador Bryn, as
General Council Chairman, on internal transparency.  However, those findings needed to be taken as a
whole, because they clearly demonstrated the urgent need to ensure full transparency and envisagedfurther work, as suggested by the paper.  Members needed to be more holistic in their approach, and
not to select just a few of Ambassador Bryn's findings to support their own position.  Australia, in
introducing the paper, had talked about faith, but religious faith had to be based on belief, and faith in
a system had to be based on a protocol of guidelines that could be relied on.  The Chairman had a
basis to take this process further, so that when Members arrived at Cancún, they would havesomething in place, and the rule of the jungle – where negotiations could continue until 5 a.m andWT/GC/M/75
Page 14
people would accept this as normal – would not apply.  There had to be guidance for Ministers on
how to resolve such situations.  The paper in WT /GC/W/477 praised what had happened in Doha, but
included no mention of the objections made in Geneva by many delegations regarding the text that
had gone to Doha, or that at the opening of the Conference, developing-country Members had
objected to the process.  This could not be ignored, unless the organization was to become power-driven instead of Member-driven.  In Zimbabwe's  view, the organization remained Member-driven.
46. The representative of Japan said that the importance of and the need for transparency in order
to ensure predictability and the effective participation of all Members could not be overemphasized.
At the same time, however, the imposition of excessively rigid rules on the negotiation process could
compromise the process itself, to the point of thwarting efforts for the successful outcome of a
Ministerial Conference.  In this spirit, Japan welcomed the communication in WT/GC/W/477 and
echoed the support for it expressed by previous speakers.  Japan intended to participate in the furtherwork on this matter.
47. The representative of South Africa welcomed the views in the communications in
WT/GC/W/471 and 477 on the preparatory process a nd the negotiating procedures at Ministerial
Conferences.  Both papers reflected South Africa's concern to ensure that Members built a strong
multilateral trading system that had the confidence and support of all its Members.  His delegationwished to stress the following points.  First, in the processes and procedures adopted, both for the
preparatory process for and the conduct of Ministerial Conferences, Members should ensure the
fullest possible transparency and inclusiveness.  Second, negotiations would only result in a
successful outcome if all parties were prepared at the end of the day to give up some of their high
expectations and to be willing to take on board some onerous obligations.  Thus, some flexibility inthe process to enable Ministers to engage intensively and to make the hard decisions that were
necessary was essential.  Thus, in his delegation's view, some flexibility would be required to enable
Ministers to make these compromises.  However, Members should ensure that this was done in a
spirit of inclusiveness and total transparency.  South Africa supported the process the Chairman had
embarked on and would continue to work with him to find a proposal acceptable to all.
48. The representative of Egypt recalled that Egypt was among the 15 delegations that had co-
sponsored the communication in WT/GC/W/471.  That document had outlined some practical
difficulties encountered in the preparatory process for Ministerial Conferences and during those
Conferences.  It had also proposed some solutions or scenarios to avoid the recurrence of those
difficulties in the future, particularly with regard to the next Ministerial Conference in Cancún
and to ensure a smooth preparatory process.  Although there had as yet been no opportunity to have
informal consultations on these proposals, a new submission had been made by eight delegations inWT/GC/W/477, which her delegation welcomed, as this would help enrich the discussion.  While her
delegation would need more time to study the elements in the new paper, a quick reading of it gave
the impression that there was an existing process for consultations.  Unfortunately, this was not the
case, although Egypt recognized the efforts and im provements made by the former General Council
Chairman, Ambassador Bryn, to make the process more inclusive.  The subsequent Chairman of theGeneral Council, Mr. Harbinson, had also made similar efforts.  However, there had been no decision
by the General Council on any structure or method for the preparation of Ministerial Conferences, and
thus no legal certainty that any structure would be implemented or followed.  For this reason, among
others, Egypt and the other co-sponsors had proposed specific modalities in their paper.  The intent
was not to be restrictive or inflexible.  To th e contrary, the paper called for inclusiveness and
flexibility by all Members.  Egypt remained ready to engage constructively in informal consultations
on this issue, including on Bulgaria's submissio n, after the summer break, as the Chairman had
suggested.
49. The representative of the Czech Republic said that this discussion was about how to combine
efficiency and the effective participation of all Members in the preparation and conduct of MinisterialWT/GC/M/75
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Conferences.  It was also about Members' collective ability to deliver results in a timely manner and
the need to engage all Members in consensus-buildin g.  The fact that the WTO was both changing and
expanding made the process of consensus-building more complex.  He had deliberately used the word
"consensus-building" because the discussion, as his delegation understood it, was not about the
manner in which Members took decisions in the WTO.  No one seemed to want to change theprinciple of decision-making by consensus.  What Members were discussing were certain practical
and organizational measures to enhance inclusiveness, transparency and information flow.  From his
delegation's perspective, these measures should be of a fine-tuning character and should be drawn
from the experience of the successful process leading up to, and including, the Doha Ministerial
Conference, while taking account of further improvements in terms of greater transparency and
inclusiveness that had occurred in the daily activities of the WTO since Doha.  This was certainly not
to say that everything was well in the WTO, or that there was no room for further improvement.  Onthe contrary, he agreed that more work remained to be done, especially concerning the desirability of
setting up, during the preparatory process in Geneva, any negotiating structures to deal with specific
subjects at Ministerial Conferences.
50. Another issue which required further discussion was the role of the host country.  The
experience gained in Doha demonstrated that the host country could and should help to forge aconsensus, and that the Chairs of the General Council and the Trade Negotiations Committee and the
host country should play mutually supportive roles.  However, like many other delegations, the Czech
Republic believed that Members, when searching for additional procedural rules regarding the
preparatory process for and the conduct of Ministerial Conferences, should make every effort to avoid
putting themselves in a strait-jacket or subjecting themselves to unnecessary rigidity.  The co-sponsors of WT/GC/W/477 were right in stating th at in a Member-driven organization, processes
needed to be kept flexible.  Indeed, a certain amount of flexibility in the process was an absolute
necessity if Members wanted to make Cancún a success.  At the same time, Members should not lose
sight of the fact that preparations for the Cancún Ministerial Conference would be somewhat different
from the process leading up to Seattle, and also from the road map to Doha.  The Cancún meetingwould not be just about the future work programme, nor would it be about trying to launch a new
round of negotiations.  That Conference would have different objectives which would determine the
nature of the process to be followed.  Ministers had provided a time-bound mandate, and the Cancún
Conference would be an opportunity to assess jointly  the progress in the negotiations and to agree on
how to channel the process onwards.  Ministers in Mexico would also address a number of important
decisions regarding modalities for negotiations in areas like competition, investment, trade facilitation
and transparency in government procurement, and decisions concerning other elements of the DohaDevelopment Agenda.  It was apparent that this Ministerial Conference would be about negotiations
that, at the end of the day, would result in new contractual obligations for Members.  In this situation,
it was more important than ever to ensure that the preparatory process and the conduct of the
Ministerial Conference were truly transparent, inclusive and predictable.  Members should hold no
illusions about any Member's willingness to move unless it was reassured of being part of thedecision-making process, and that its voice had been properly heard.  His delegation supported
consultations by the Chairman after the summer break, and would comment then in more detail on a
number of points that had been raised in the discussion to date.
51. The representative of Indonesia recalled that Indonesia was one of the co-sponsors of the
paper in WT/GC/W/471.  Her delegation appreciated the discussions that had taken place and the
interest Members had shown both in the paper and in  the issue.  In this connection, her delegation
wished to thank Bulgaria and the group of coun tries who had submitted the paper in WT/GC/W/477
for having submitting papers reflecting their views on this issue.  Indonesia believed that these papers
would stimulate further discussion on this issu e.  In preliminary comments on WT/GC/W/477, she
said that Indonesia shared some of the views expressed in the paper, in particular that the WTO'sexpanding membership and the wide differences in delegations' capacities had practical consequences
for the preparatory process for Ministerial Conferences and the negotiations in the WTO, and that theWT/GC/M/75
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principle of WTO decision-making by consensus had to be maintained.  However, Indonesia was a
little dismayed by the conclusions offered in the paper.  In Indonesia's opinion, the existence of a
diverse membership capacity and interest in the WTO further highlighted the need for some clear
basic principles and procedures for the decision-making process, as well as for the preparatory process
and negotiations.  Her delegation did not see the connection between having clear basic principles andprocedures for the decision-making process, and creating circumstances that would hamper the
principle of decision-making by consensus, as mentioned in tiret 1 of the conclusions in
WT/GC/W/477.  In Indonesia's view, such principl es and procedures would in fact ensure the
effective participation and inclusiveness of all Members.  While a prescriptive and detailed approach
might not be the best approach, Members should not sacrifice the principle of total transparency and
inclusiveness for the sake of being flexible.  In this regard, Indonesia agreed with Norway that being
flexible did not mean there was no need to ensure transparency and inclusiveness.
52. Regarding the argument in tiret 2 of the paper's conclusion that “In a Member-driven
organization processes need to be kept flexible.  We need to avoid rigidities", Indonesia disagreed
with this conclusion and felt there was a basic misunderstanding of the concept of a Member-driven
organization.  In Indonesia's view, the basic meanin g of a Member-driven organization was that any
issues to be raised, discussed or negotiated in the WTO had to be initiated by the Members.  This hadnothing to do with being flexible.  Therefore, Indone sia strongly believed that laying the foundation of
basic principles and procedures to ensure predictability and certainty in the preparatory process and
negotiations did not detract in any way from the concept of a Member-driven organization.  Her
delegation had the same understanding with regard to Ministerial Conferences taking up unresolved
issues that could not be settled in Geneva, and was of the strong opinion that any issues to be decidedand resolved by Ministers had to be previously agreed by all Members.  Furthermore, considering the
short time over which Ministers met at each Ministerial Conference, the issues that Ministers took up
at those Conferences should be limited to those that reflected the priorities and interests of the entire
membership.  In conclusion, she stressed the urgent need to have clear guidelines, especially for
preparations for the Cancún Ministerial Conference.  Her delegation stood ready to welcome anddiscuss any constructive proposals in order to achieve this objective.
53. The representative of Thailand said that the objective of having a preparatory process in
Geneva was to assist Ministers in arriving at consensus at Ministerial Conferences.  Thailand agreed
that too prescriptive and detailed an approach to the preparatory process might be counterproductive,
with unnecessary delays or procedural hurdles, and that the process should be kept flexible.  The
preparatory process for the Cancún Ministerial Conference might require a different approach from
the previous one.  However, his delegation believed that there should be some appropriate principlesor guidelines for the process to follow.  The prepar atory process had to be inclusive, transparent and
predictable.  Open-ended consultations should be standard practice.  Whenever it was necessary to
have small-group consultations, the results of these should be reported to open-ended meetings at the
earliest opportunity.  From its past experience, Thai land tended to agree with some of the suggestions
made in WT/GC/W/471, for example, that the agenda for the Ministerial Conference should be agreedin Geneva before being forwarded for adoption to the Ministerial Conference, in order to avoid
unpleasant surprises.
54. Reaching consensus at the Ministerial Conference was the prime objective, but not at any
cost.  Members should be given opportunities to express their views and to participate in open-ended
consultations.  Members who were not included in small-group consultations should be informed ofdevelopments immediately after such meetings.  They should be able to raise their concerns at an
open-ended meeting before a conclusion was reached at a formal meeting.  In addition, Thailand
agreed with the proposal to have the draft agenda for the Conference adopted at the first formal
plenary session, and not at the ceremonial opening session.  While Thailand was attracted to the ideas
in WT/GC/W/477 that focussed on the flexibility that was necessary to achieve consensus amongMembers, at the same time it favoured the positive elements on basic principles and guidelinesWT/GC/M/75
Page 17
provided in the paper in WT/GC/W/471.  His delegation expected that there would be additional
suggestions and proposals from other Members during the consultations on this issue, and hoped to
arrive at the best compromise solution well before the next Ministerial Conference.
55. The representative of Hungary said that this was a very important question because of the
recognized need to ensure full participation and a sense of ownership for all Members of the
organization.  The discussion thus far seemed to show that this was not a North/South issue.  The
various views, which went in a similar direction, were evenly distributed among the developed and
developing countries and, for example, there were a number of developing countries among the co-
sponsors of WT/GC/W/477.  Hungary recognized that there were positive intentions behind all of the
papers submitted.  The paper in WT/GC/W/471 contained many positive thoughts and very
commendable goals.  The question was to what extent they were achievable.  Clearly, as was pointed
out in sub-paragraph (v) of that paper, it would be better if any draft declaration was clear andunambiguous and could be based on consensus.  Hungary would also agree that the work in Geneva
should be completed to the maximum extent possible.  These were very positive intentions, but
experience thus far had shown that, more often than not, this was impossible, simply because the
WTO was an organization with a large number of Members with very distinct economic interests, and
it was extremely difficult to find common approaches and common interests on controversial issues.The Geneva-based process was important, but it was not the end of the road.  There was a higher-level
political process, in the form of the Ministerial Conference, that followed the Geneva process.  The
question was what could or should be done to solve the well-known contradiction between
transparency and participation on the one hand, and flexibility and efficiency on the other.  The
General Council's discussion in 2000 that was referr ed to in WT/GC/W/477 had provided some ideas.
However, this might not be sufficient, and Members might have to work further on the details.
56. His delegation wished to note two issues th at had come out of WT/GC/W/471 and which, he
was sure, had been unintended, but which might still give some cause for concern.  First, the proposal
seemed to have a basic lack of content regarding the present process and the need for basic changes or
reform.  Members had to recognize the important progress that had been made since Seattle in the pre-Doha process and even during the Doha Conference.   While no one would say that this process had
been perfect, there had very clearly been major improvements, and Hungary was not sure whether the
proposals to make the process extremely regulated and prescribed – even micro-managed – would be
feasible and would achieve the intended goal.  There was another, and more problematic message in
this document, which was the relationship between the Geneva-based process and the role of
Ministers and the Ministerial Conference.  When his capital had read WT/GC/W/471 it had had an
uneasy feeling that there was some kind of – no doubt unintended – message of patronizing Ministers.Ambassadors in Geneva were, after all, executing policy and not making policy.  The policy-makers
were governments and Ministers, and when Ministers came together for a high-level meeting, it was
not clear to what extent they needed an extremely detailed prescription from Ambassadors.  His
delegation would not like to be put among those officials who treated their Ministers in a
patronizing way.  Members had to think in a serious manner about the extent to which it wasadvisable to micro-manage by procedural rules the clearly political process that took place at
Ministerial Conferences, and whether too much in this  case would not perhaps translate, in the end, to
too little in the outcome.  In conclusion, his delegation felt that the concerns in all of the papers were
valid.  A number of good ideas had been raised.  His delegation had noted, among others, the proposal
by Brazil on the possibility of a senior officials meeting prior to a Ministerial Conference.  Theremight also be other issues that could be discussed, and Hungary was ready to work on this.  However,
as he had said, it would be important not to lose sight of the basic objectives of this work and the
basic role of Ministerial Conferences.
57. The representative of Korea said his delegation agreed that both the preparatory process and
the conduct of Ministerial Conferences should be transparent, inclusive and predictable.  Korea
sympathized with the co-sponsors of the paper in WT/GC/W/471 on some points that had been raised.WT/GC/M/75
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However, as his delegation had stated at the May General Council meeting, the flexibility and
efficiency of WTO activities, and the practicability of formulating any guidelines, should be
emphasized as well.  In this regard, Korea had co-sponsored the paper just introduced by Australia.
On specific points, his delegation did not have much to add to Australia's statement, but wished to
emphasize that when Members sought to reach a consensus on certain items, the snowball effect wasquite useful, rather than a flat discussion .  Any guidelines that were developed should be very general,
should not set out too specific procedures, and should not be overly prescriptive.  His delegation
looked forward to a constructive discussion on this matter.
58. The representative of the European Communities said he had noted with much interest
Australia's presentation of the communication in WT/GC/W/477, and agreed with most of what
Australia and the other co-sponsors had said during this discussion.  However, this did not mean that
the Community would disagree with most of what was suggested in WT/GC/W/471.  In fact, the two
documents were complementary.  All agreed on th e paramount need for internal transparency and
inclusiveness, on which he believed significant progress had been made.  Members should continue to
follow up on their best practices, to build on the positive experiences and to put trust in the
chairpersons of the General Council.  His delegation agreed with previous speakers that one should
avoid being overly prescriptive, should be sufficiently flexible and should avoid strait-jacketing theprocess.  It also agreed that one should allow sufficient room for manoeuvre for chairpersons of
negotiating groups and, more particularly, for the Chair of the General Council.  Members had to put
their trust in the system and in those whom they had tasked collectively to guide their work.
Regarding the role of the host country, Qatar had been a good experience, and he was certain that
Mexico would match this performance.  The Community remained open-minded about settingadditional guidelines as suggested by a number of Members.  It had also taken note of the interesting
suggestion by Brazil regarding a possible senior officials meeting.  However, all of these guidelines
should help Ministers to reach decisions, and not render the decision-making process more
cumbersome or complicated.  The overall process should contribute to a balanced overall result for all
Members.  In this spirit, the Community would c onstructively participate in any consultations the
Chairman might wish to conduct.
59. The representative of India said that, along with other delegations, India welcomed the paper
in WT/GC/W/477.  His delegation considered it to be an important step forward and an attempt to
engage in serious discussion of a subject which 15 Members had introduced at the May meeting of the
General Council.  The discussion at the present meeting had shown that the objective of all
delegations was the same – to ensure the success of the Cancún Ministerial Conference by finding
consensus within WTO processes and delivering on the Doha mandate.  As the co-sponsors ofWT/GC/W/477 had indicated in their paper, Members had a huge task before them.  There was a large
amount of work to do in a limited time, some of it involving issues on which there were divergent
views.  The key to success, in India's opinion, would lie in creating a degree of comfort among all
delegations.  This would necessitate creating a certain predictability in the process, ensuring that
Ministers knew the agenda for the Ministerial Conference, the issues on which they would need totake decisions, the format within which deliberations would take place, the manner in which decisions
would be taken, and how inclusiveness and transp arency would be ensured.  There would be a
manifold increase in the chances of success at Cancún if Members were able to create confidence
among all delegations in the preparatory process and at the Ministerial Conference itself.
60. He said that all delegations recognized the need for flexibility.  The important point was not
the concept of flexibility itself, but the manner in  which such flexibility was exercised.  Flexibility
should be exercised, and should be seen to be exercised, in a fair, objective, transparent and inclusive
manner.  The parameters within which flexibility would be exercised and the manner of exercising
such flexibility should be defined, so that the re quisite level of comfort and confidence was attained.
No delegation should ever have the feeling that flexibility was being exercised in such manner as todrive a particular, predetermined agenda, known only to a select few delegations.  This would notWT/GC/M/75
Page 19
detract from flexibility or pragmatism.  On the other hand, it would add credibility to the system and
build confidence in it.  Members should not forget that they were engaged in the task of formulating
virtually inflexible rules and rigid commitments enforceable through a dispute settlement mechanism.
There had to be a certain degree of predictability in the procedures leading to these rules and also to
these commitments.  Members should also not presume that the outcome of Doha necessarily justifiedthe Geneva process that preceded it or the procedures at the Ministerial Conference itself.  The Doha
Ministerial Conference had taken place in a particular historical context;  Cancún would take place in
another context.  Doha had laid a framework for a work programme;  Cancún would endeavour to
flesh out this framework.  Even the Doha framewor k had many holes in it.  The fact that the mandate
was not clear and explicit in all aspects was evident from the time and resources delegations were
spending in Geneva debating the meaning of certain decisions.  His delegation believed that at the
Cancún Ministerial Conference, Ministers would demand a much higher degree of precision in thefinal draft, as serious commercial and developmental interests would be at stake.
61. He also wished to comment on a point made by  Hungary at the present meeting.  It was not
the intention of India or of any other Member  who had co-sponsored the paper in WT/GC/W/471 to
be patronizing towards, or limit the role of, Ministers.  The document in WT/GC/W/471 had not been
drawn up by 15 Ambassadors in Geneva, but in fact  represented the views of 15 governments and
15 trade Ministers.  It was an attempt to contribute to a constructive discussion of this subject.  It was
important that Members saw the multilateral trading sy stem as an evolving process.  In this context,
he wished to recall the statements by Australia, Chile and others at the present meeting that no system
was perfect and that every system could be improved.  Members would, therefore, need to constantly
re-evaluate the system to improve it and to make it more effective, more inclusive, and more capableof fulfilling the expectations of all Members.  His delegation also wished to support the suggestions
by Bulgaria in WT/GC/W/422.  Changes in the syst em would need to be reflected in the rules of
procedure, and Bulgaria had made an important contribution to strengthening the rules of procedure in
order to make them more transparent.  His delegation was also attracted by Brazil's idea regarding a
preparatory committee of senior officials prior to the Ministerial Conference.  This idea should beseriously discussed during the Chairman's consultations.  India requested the Chairman to engage in
further consultations on this important subject on the basis of the papers in WT/GC/W/471, 477 and
422, the discussions that had taken place in the General Council in 2000, and the views expressed by
delegations at the present meeting.  India attached the highest priority to a decision on this matter
before the next Ministerial Conference.
62. The representative of the United States said that at the May meeting her delegation had
spoken to the proposal in WT/GC/W/471 and had agreed  with the over-arching goal identified in that
paper.  The preparations for Ministerial Conferences and the Conferences themselves should be
transparent, inclusive and predictable.  She would not comment at the present meeting on the paper in
WT/GC/W/477, which her delegation believed represented a thoughtful assessment of the elements
necessary for a preparatory process that could facilitate a successful Fifth Ministerial Conference in
Cancún.  Her delegation concurred with the proponents of that paper that the practical points outlinedin Section V had to be taken into consideration when making decisions on the format of the
preparatory process.  It also agreed with the conc lusions that were drawn in the paper, such as that
prescriptive and detailed approaches would not create the best circumstances for consensus, that
processes needed to be kept flexible, that current processes on internal transparency and the effective
participation of Members should continue and that room should be left for the Ministerial Conferenceto take up the issues that called for resolution at Ministerial level.  Most importantly, these guidelines
would help Members achieve their ultimate goal of consensus in the negotiations.
63. The representative of Jamaica, recalling that Australia, in introducing the paper in
WT/GC/W/477, had asked Members to show faith in the system, said that Jamaica was prepared to
show faith, but would stop short of showing blind faith in this or any other system.  His delegation
believed that all could accept that change and improvement in rules and procedures were desirableWT/GC/M/75
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and should be sought.  Thus, criticism had to be examined seriously.  This would help Members move
continuously towards rules and procedures that, as far as possible, safeguarded the interests of all
Members.  Jamaica was grateful to the co-sponsors for having put forward their ideas in
WT/GC/W/477, because they believed that, at the very least, it would contribute to a process of
critical analysis that was necessary.  However, Jamaica hoped that the discussion would not proceedon the basis of polar extremes, such as over-prescriptiveness, strait-jackets and rigidities, as these
were not the intention, nor should they be.  One spoke often of the uniqueness of the WTO, but the
WTO was not unique as an institution or as an organization in needing to balance procedural certainty
and predicability with the need for flexibility and the need to take account of different circumstances
and different situations – in the present case, as they related to Ministerial Conferences.
64. Jamaica was a great supporter of flexibility.  It had emphasized the importance of flexibility
and recognized its value and usefulness, not only in terms of organizational and procedural matters, assome seemed to, but also in terms of obligations and application of substantive rules.  Thus, his
delegation had absolutely no difficulty with flexibility and had been consistent in being able to see its
merit, both in terms of process and substance.  Ja maica believed there remained difficulties with the
organization and conduct of Ministerial Conferences that needed to be recognized and addressed.  His
delegation was prepared to put faith in Members' collective capacity to examine the experience thusfar with Ministerial Conferences, and to examine critically the three papers submitted and possible
remedial measures.  He wished to clarify that it had not in any way been the intention of his
delegation to diminish the involvement of Minister s in Ministerial Conferences.  To the contrary,
Jamaica had thought that the quality and scope of their involvement could be improved in ways that
would enhance rather than diminish their involvemen t, and raise the level of that involvement both in
terms of numbers and in terms of Ministers' capacity to make desired inputs that were necessary.
65. The representative of Canada said that as a co-sponsor of WT/GC/W/477, Canada associated
itself with the statements by Australia and Chile.  His delegation wished to reiterate that as a Member-
driven organization, one of the most important features of the WTO was the role of Ministers, as set
out in Article IV of the WTO Agreement which provided authority to Ministers to take decisions onall matters under any of the multilateral trade agreements.  This Ministerial direction was essential to
ensure the political impetus that Members were required to live up to and to advance their trade
liberalization agenda.  In order for Ministers to carry out this mandate, Canada believed that Members
had to maintain flexibility as well as transparency, predictability and inclusiveness in the preparatory
process for Ministerial Conferences.  His delegation wished to thank New Zealand for its work in the
preparation of the paper that Canada had jointly submitted with other delegations, and would be
pleased to participate in any process of consultation which the Chairman deemed appropriate toadvance this issue.
66. The representative of Switzerland said that as a co-sponsor of WT/GC/W/477, his delegation
clearly supported the statement by Australia introducing that paper.  His delegation had read with
great interest the paper in WT/GC/W/471 submitted by a group of 15 other Members, and had found
many interesting points that merited reflection.  However, the approach of the co-sponsors ofWT/C/W/477 was not fully in tune with that of WT/GC/W/471, which was why they had felt it
necessary to make the dialogue easier by putting this matter back into a more appropriate context.  His
delegation wished to underscore several points.  The first was that Members were faced with a new
situation each time there was a Ministerial Conference, as each Conference was clearly of a different
nature and scope from the previous or future one.  This fact could not be ignored.  Therefore,Members had to try to reduce to a minimum the procedures and mechanisms for Ministerial
Conferences.  Regarding the management of Ministerial Conferences, there were two different
constraints, which were not very different from those in the General Council.  One was the increase in
the number of WTO Members, and thus an increased diversity in the individual positions taken.  This
had already led Members to work within an evolving process of procedural adaptation.  Members hadWT/GC/M/75
Page 21
learned from past experience, be it before or after Doha, and the various documents and
understandings that had been developed in the past few months confirmed this readiness to adapt.
67. There seemed to be a fairly broad consensus, if not unanimity, on the concepts of
transparency, inclusiveness and predictability.  However, there were differing assessments, as some
felt there was incongruity between the concept of flexibility and these latter three concepts.  Hisdelegation, however, believed that flexibility w ould make it easier, both in individual cases and
generally, to achieve transparency, inclusiveness and predictability.  Switzerland agreed entirely with
Brazil's suggestion to beware of the temptation to put the process into a strait-jacket and to engage in
a type of micro-management that would not be positive for preparing Ministerial Conferences.
Recent experience had shown the importance of the individuals and bodies in charge of the process –
the Chairman of the General Council, the Chairman of the TNC and the Director-General as head of
the WTO Secretariat.  Experience had also shown that the limited flexibility they had – limitedbecause it was linked to an ongoing dialogue with all Members – had been very positive in the
preparations for Doha.  Members should continue to  maintain and recognize the specific role played
by the governing bodies of the WTO, and the impor tance of the ongoing dialogue between Members
and those governing bodies.  Finally, he stressed that the entire process that was being examined
should have a very clear goal, which was to make it easier for Ministers to take decisions atMinisterial Conferences, and not simply to transfer to Ministers the problems that delegations had not
been able to solve in the General Council or in other WTO bodies.  His delegation agreed with the
comment by Hungary that Ministers wanted to play th eir own role – as he had witnessed this with his
own Minister several times – and this should be kept in mind regarding questions of organization and
management of Ministerial Conferences.
68. The representative of Mexico said that since his Government had the responsibility for
organizing the Fifth Ministerial Conference, it was particularly interested in ensuring the best
conditions for a harmonious, productive, inclusive and effective Conference that would allow
Members to provide impetus to the work started in Doha.  Mexico would accept any proposal coming
from the General Council, and he expressed his delegation's appreciation in advance for all of theproposals that might be made.  His delegation wished to highlight certain points that were particularly
relevant for it in the paper in WT/GC/W/477 which Mexico had co-sponsored.  For Mexico there
were three basic aspects of the preparatory process for and conduct of Ministerial Conferences.  These
were transparency, flexibility and trust.  Transparency was necessary in order to ensure active
participation by all Members, to maintain a continuous flow of information and a free exchange of
points of view, and to facilitate the analysis and internal decision-making of each Member.  Flexibility
was necessary in order to adapt to circumstances which were usually changing, to maintain freedom
of movement, and to give Ministers the space they needed to take decisions.  Trust was a vital
condition if Members were to cooperate efficiently throughout the entire process.  There was a lot of
work ahead if Members were to achieve the objective of concluding the negotiations before 1 January
2005.  There was no doubt that it was very important to lay down suitable procedures that would set
standards for Members' actions.  However, he had no doubt that what would truly determine thesuccess or failure of the negotiations would be the substantive work – in other words, proposals,
debate and the agreements Members would reach in the two and a half years ahead.
69. The representative of Pakistan, recalling that Pakistan was a co-sponsor of the paper in
WT/GC/W/471, said his delegation welcomed the submissions in WT/GC/W/477 and 422 and looked
forward to having detailed discussions on this important subject.  His delegation would examine thesubmission in WT/GC/W/477, and welcomed consultations in order to arrive at common acceptable
principles for the preparatory process.  Some interesting points had been made by Brazil and Norway,
especially about the last 24 hours of a Ministerial Conference, as pointed out by Norway.  It was
encouraging to note that delegations found merit in the paper in WT/GC/W/471.  There was no
denying the fact that procedures were required for the preparatory process and for the MinisterialConference, and the paper submitted by the 15 delegations was proof of this need.  Regarding theWT/GC/M/75
Page 22
statement by Hungary that the paper was patronizing to Ministers, Pakistan wished to reiterate what
had already been stated by India, namely that the joint submission was an outcome of the views of the
respective Ministers, and that Ambassadors in Geneva had acted on their behalf.  There was a need to
have rules and guidelines, and Pakistan hoped that the consultations proposed by the Chairman would
result in a positive outcome.
70. The representative of Kenya said that while his delegation agreed with document
WT/GC/W/477 that finding consensus on the Doha mandate remained a challenge, it did not share the
view that because of the large number and diverse membership, forming consensus was difficult and
time-consuming.  What created difficulties and was time-consuming for the membership was a
decision-making process that did not include all of the Members.  Kenya did not share the view that
the results of the Doha Conference confirmed a successful preparatory process in Geneva.  Members
had been successful in Doha, but the process had not been right.  While the process in Geneva mighthave been transparent and all-inclusive, the results of that process had not been reflected in the
Chairman's text that was sent to Doha.  Kenya therefore agreed with delegations that had stressed the
need for the process to be Member-driven and to pr oduce results that reflected Members' views.  This
was one reason, among others, that 15 Members had proposed improvements to the process both in
Geneva and at Ministerial Conferences in WT/GC/W/471, which her delegation believed formed agood basis for future consultations.  Kenya welcomed the proposal by Brazil to hold preparatory
meetings of senior officials before Ministerial Conferences.  This was a very good idea that should be
explored further.
71. The representative of Malaysia said that his delegation welcomed the contribution in
document WT/GC/W/477 as another important input on this issue.  Malaysia saw the paper as an
opportunity for Members to offer suggestions to improve the preparatory process and also to
understand each others' position on the matter at hand.  Malaysia agreed with the co-sponsors of
WT/GC/W/477 that the process instituted after the Seattle Ministerial Conference had been by far a
vast improvement.  It had served the membership well and had also paved the way for a relatively
satisfactory process prior to Doha.  However, this did not mean that the process could not beimproved upon, especially in the light of experience gained prior to and at Doha.  Malaysia sincerely
believed that there had been instances at the Doha Ministerial Conference that made it necessary for
Members to consider certain changes to the current procedures, as well as to fine-tune some aspects to
ensure that transparency and inclusiveness were not sacrificed for political expediency.  There had
never been any disagreement that flexibility was necessary.  While his delegation agreed that the
process should not be strait-jacketed, it also believed that over-flexibility could have adverse effects.
Hence, Members needed to find a balance that ensured that flexibility did not provide a "carteblanche" that could be used to disadvantage some Members.  In short, what was needed was
procedural predictability.  Members should strive to find a balance between general and detailed
procedures.
72. The representative of Singapore said that as a co-sponsor of the paper in WT/GC/W/477, her
delegation fully endorsed Australia's statement introducing the paper.  Singapore wished to reiterate
further several points.  The starting point for Singapore's overall position was guided by the
Marrakesh Agreement of 1995, in which Ministerial Conferences were given full powers under the
Agreement to "carry out the functions of the WTO and take actions necessary to this effect."
Ministerial Conferences also had the "authority to take decisions on all matters under any of the
multilateral trade agreements."  The key to achieving this objective was to provide Ministers with the
flexibility and manoeuvrability that would allow them the space to take the necessary political
decisions at Ministerial Conferences.  One should therefore not have prescriptive rules that would
straitjacket the preparatory process in the run-up to the Ministerial Conference and at the Ministerial
Conference itself.  Members' overall decision-making process should be kept flexible and pragmatic.WT/GC/M/75
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73. The paper in WT/GC/W/477 had been developed based on experiences gained from past
Ministerial Conferences – the failure at Seattle and the success at Doha.  Following the failure at
Seattle, Members had pursued a flexible preparatory structure that had led to the success at Doha.  In
particular, Singapore saw the following strengths of  the present system:  In the run-up to Doha, the
General Council Chair had undertaken a combination of formal and informal processes, with open-ended and small-group meetings that had allowed for the flow of information and an outcome of
consultations between small groups and the entire membership.  This process had enabled the
Chairman of the General Council to produce a draft declaration that encapsulated the sense of the
entire membership.  Members should continue to give the General Council Chair the flexibility to
submit a document to the Ministerial Conference that did not contain a compendium of issues with a
host of square brackets.  To do otherwise would be a recipe for disaster, as had been the case in
Seattle.  Members had made significant progress on internal transparency, inclusiveness andpredictability.  They should therefore build on the good experience of the pre-Doha preparatory
process.  At the Ministerial Conference proper, it was paramount that Members recognized that
Ministers attended Ministerial Conferences to work out the final political details and compromises in
order to reach an outcome.  Ministers were not acting as rubber stamps at Ministerial Conferences.
The successful Ministerial process at Doha, together with the key role played by the host Minister,had achieved a compromise outcome that had la unched the Doha Development Agenda.  Members
should therefore avoid paralyzing the process at future Ministerial Conferences by putting in place
rigid rules to micro-manage Ministers.  Her dele gation looked forward to working closely with the
Chairman in any consultations he might conduct on this subject.
74. The representative of Chinese Taipei said that  his delegation wished to pay tribute to all
Members who had contributed to the discussion on this topic.  It seemed that the core issue was to
strike a balance between maintaining the effectiveness of Ministerial Conferences and ensuring the
transparency of all negotiating procedures.  His delegation believed that it was Members' common
goal that the preparations for Ministerial Conferences, and the Conferences themselves, should be
transparent, inclusive and predictable.  While sharing some of the remarks made by previous speakers,his delegation invited Members to consider the following three aspects of this issue:  First, in such a
wide-ranging negotiating forum, there was always ample room for further improvement in the
preparatory process for and the conduct of Ministerial Conferences.  However, as mentioned by many
delegations, the effort undertaken after Seattle had been quite encouraging, including the great success
in Doha.  Therefore, the course for enhancing transparency, inclusiveness and predictability had been
set.  His delegation would therefore suggest allowing the process to run its course, since Members
were more or less on the right track.  Second, all understood that the core functions of the WTO wereto serve as a negotiating forum, to develop trade rules and to provide a dispute settlement mechanism.
While it was imperative to enhance internal transparency and to promote effective participation of
Members, the maintenance of efficient WTO functions should remain a top priority.  Third, given that
the next Ministerial Conference was approaching in September 2003 and that there were serious
delays on most topics mandated by the Doha Declaration, it seemed to his delegation that the time-limit should be a serious concern, as Members continued to engage in a time- and energy-consuming
discussion.  In conclusion, his delegation believed that it would be appropriate to maintain the status
quo and to try to improve the existing process as much as possible.  The intention to improve the
process should not become, in itself, another potential problem.  All understood that in the WTO, it
was by no means easy to develop a perfect solution that met the needs and aspirations of each andevery Member.  What was needed at present was to stay the course and try to improve the process as
the occasion arose.
75. The representative of China said that his delegation joined others in welcoming the papers in
WT/GC/W/471 and 477, as well as the paper by Bulgaria in WT/GC/W/422.  These submissions
formed a good basis for thorough discussions in preparation for the next Ministerial Conference.  Hisdelegation believed it was very important to draw on the good experiences and lessons from Seattle
and Doha, and to ensure the smooth running of the Cancún Conference.  While it was important toWT/GC/M/75
Page 24
have flexibility, there was a need for certain guidelines in order to guarantee the principles of
transparency, inclusiveness and predictability.  China believed the paper WT/GC/W/471 provided
some good elements for consideration – for instance, the proposal that "any new draft on specific
issues should be circulated to all Members well in advance so that Members have sufficient time to
consider them".  This and other proposals in the paper provided a good basis for further discussion.His delegation fully supported the proposal by Brazil that preparatory meetings of senior officials be
held prior to Ministerial Conferences.  China believ ed that this kind of meeting would be conducive to
the success of Ministerial Conferences.  His delegation would study further the three papers and
would take an active part in the discussions aimed at ensuring transparency, inclusiveness and
predictability of Ministerial Conferences.
76. The representative of Tanzania said that as a co-sponsor of the paper in WT/GC/W/471
Tanzania fully endorsed it.  Tanzania also associated itself with the statements by Members of the
Like-Minded Group.  Her delegation emphasized that Members needed to establish clear guidelines
for the preparatory process for Ministerial Conference  so as to ensure a process that was transparent,
all-inclusive and predictable.  Her delegation would further study the submissions in WT/GC/W/422
and 477.  Tanzania supported Brazil's proposal to convene a preparatory senior officials meeting prior
to Ministerial Conferences.
77. The representative of the Philippines recalled that at the May meeting of the General Council,
his delegation had subscribed to the general principles and approaches in WT/GC/W/471 as a starting
point for discussions on an important issue in preparation for the Cancún Ministerial Conference.  He
could also endorse some elements of the paper in WT/GC/W/477 as a very useful basis for achieving
some positive movement in the process towards Cancún.  However, he wished first to comment on thequestion of faith mentioned by Australia.  Faith to the Philippines was both a religious and temporal
way of life.  As a temporal experience, it was related to the saying that "Man proposes but God
disposes."  Thus, one had to work hard enough to merit the promise of God among a society of men
with different pre-dispositions about the state of things in the world.  In the course of this discussion,
there had been many references to principles like transparency, flexibility, inclusiveness, proceduralpredictability, and fairness, to which all subscribed, versus rigidity and straitjacketing, which
Members obviously rejected.  However, the search was for the right and acceptable balance which all
could agree to in guidelines, rules or operating procedures to serve as standards to make the Mexico
Ministerial a truly successful, effective event in the evolution of the WTO process – something all
could take ownership for, and not reject as an imposition in a setting clouded with uncertainty.  Thus
far, this balance had been elusive, but his delegation was pleased that Members were approaching it
from the most candid and pragmatic point of view, using practical examples from their experience inSeattle and in Doha, and the useful inputs from those who were deeply involved in the Geneva
process.
78. His delegation's objective was from the "outcomes" and not the "process" point of view.
First, regarding the structure of the preparations in Geneva and the Ministerial Conference itself,
given a transparent and all-inclusive process, outcomes of the Geneva process should be up to 90 percent complete.  To those insisting that this robbed Ministers of the exercise of political judgement, he
said that Ambassadors in Geneva also got their mandates from their Ministers, and exercised nothing
less than political judgment on most of the issues that were sensitive to domestic constituencies, and
oftentimes the level of support for an issue in Geneva had to be accepted as such, and the issue not
pushed to the Ministerial Conference for an altogether objectionable process in order to ensure itsacceptance.  He seconded Norway's question as to who really owned the Ministerial Conference if it
was hosted outside Geneva. Given that Members were preparing decisions for Mexico on rules and
market-access commitments, the paper in WT/GC/W/471 calling for clear and unambiguous language
would be in order, and Chile's proposal for clarity and consistency in the legal texts of the decisions
was also relevant here.  In this connection, his delegation noted, for example, the statement inWT/GC/W/477 that "[f]inal judgments on the more intractable issues had to be made by Ministers inWT/GC/M/75
Page 25
Doha on the basis of their assessment of overall balance."  He said that if, by definition, these issues
had been intractable in Geneva – for example, environment and the Singapore issues – what sort of
balancing could have prevailed upon Ministers, had they all been part of the process, to cause them to
change their positions?  The answer was not the perception of balancing imposed on Members by a
few developed countries – least of all the main proponents of this paper – in the final 12 hours of thedeliberations.  In fact, as it turned out, this experience had spoiled the balance of Members' current
negotiating positions in Geneva.  In terms of outcomes, one could expect that final decisions would
receive the overall acceptance of Ministers, rather than frustration that after painstakingly shaping
their country positions on the so-called intractable issues – negotiating with partners and allies – the
outcome would be a rejection of their positions and of the legitimate interests of this group of
countries.  However, there were issues of a not such intractable nature which might need to be
discussed by Geneva-based and capital-based negotiators, and these could well be addressed byBrazil's proposal for a senior officials meeting of two to three days betwee n the General Council and
the Ministerial Conference.  This was a common practice in all multilateral meetings, and his
delegation supported this proposal.  Members were very candidly and positively engaged in making
the Cancún process better than the previous ones, and he hoped that some of the experience and
observations – in particular the outcomes experienced in the past – would guide Members to a betterfuture.
79. The representative of Cuba said that the proposals submitted on this subject, together with the
debate they had engendered, were a clear indication of the importance delegations attached to this
issue, and proof that there were grounds for concern.  The paper in WT/GC/W/477 recognized the
major differences in delegations’ capacity to participate in Geneva processes.  This was a realitywhich had to be taken into consideration.  However, her delegation was of the opinion that this was
not merely a procedural, but also a substantive aspect.  Many delegations, in particular those from
developing countries, encountered great difficulties both in participating and in ensuring that their
interests were taken into account during such proces ses.  Transparency was, for this very reason,
particularly significant to Cuba.  There was a need for effective participatory transparency so that all
Members were familiar, by way of formal sessions and their official records, with the opinions of
other Members on the issues under discussion, and were able to judge on which matters agreement
had or had not been reached, and thus avoid making individual interpretations which merely served to
hinder the process.
80. Her delegation's attention had been drawn by the reference in WT/GC/W/477 to the fact that
"the preparatory process for the Fifth Ministerial Conference will probably need to get under way
from early 2003". Were Members therefore talking a bout a six-month preparatory process?  Her
delegation was of the opinion that the preparatory process was already well under way, since there
were timetables to be observed, some within the next few days, and Cuba had no wish to embark on
an intensive process at the very last minute.  She wished to endorse the elements in the paper in
WT/GC/W/477, which Cuba had co-sponsored, and which was designed to ensure the adoption of
principles and procedures that would enable all Members, with no exceptions whatsoever, to preparethemselves appropriately for and participate in these processes, which would lead to a more viable
and lasting multilateral trading system that met the needs of its Members.  Given the significance of
this issue, Cuba endorsed India’s suggestion that consultations open to interested parties be launched
on the basis of the proposals submitted, so that the required procedures for the Fifth Ministerial
Conference could be agreed upon sufficiently in advance.
81. The representative of New Zealand said that as one of the delegations that had participated in
the preparation of WT/GC/W/477, that this initiative had been prompted by the important questions
raised in WT/GC/W/471 by 15 delegations, on which the General Council had had an initial
discussion in May.  The approach in WT/GC/W/477 emphasized several things:  the fact that
Members had made a serious effort to identify and apply the lessons from the Seattle experience;  thecontinuing validity of the work done in the General Council in 2000 under the then Chairman,WT/GC/M/75
Page 26
Ambassador Bryn, which had been applied directly to the Doha preparatory process in 2001 and had
provided an excellent framework for that process;  and the fact that Members needed to be cautious
about departing from that framework.  In New Z ealand's view, the 2001 Geneva process had worked
well.  New Zealand had had problems with some elements of the draft declaration that had emerged,
as had all delegations.  However, all things considered, he said it was not easy to see how one couldhave had a better basis for Ministers' work in Doha.  The Doha process had likewise been a model in
many respects, but as Norway had noted earlier, there had been a problem with the final 24 hours.
Like many other delegations, New Zealand had been  disconcerted at what had emerged and the lack
of opportunity for input into that final process.  His delegation did not have an easy solution to offer.
However, part of the answer lay in comments made earlier by South Africa on the need for Members
to limit their ambitions.  The final paragraph of the paper made the point that much depended on
Members' level of ambition and the force with which they pursued their objectives.  Consensus wouldbe possible only if individual Members were ultimately prepared to moderate their objectives and to
take a broader view of where their interests lay.  It followed that New Zealand was not convinced
there were simple procedural solutions to this issue.  However, his delegation was happy to be part of
an effort to work with other delegations to see whether there were ways one could improve
procedures and offer delegations more of the "comfort" that India had referred to.
82. The representative of Nigeria said that his delegation associated itself fully with the statement
by Kenya.  Nigeria believed that that statement contained positive elements and would assist
Members in finding a process acceptable to all.  It also welcomed the proposal by Brazil for a
preparatory meeting of senior officials before Ministerial Conferences.  This was an idea which
should be further explored.  Nigeria looked forw ard to working with the Chairman on this issue.
83. The representative of Hong Kong, China said that as a co-sponsor of the paper in
WT/GC/W/477, his delegation endorsed what Australia had said on behalf of the group of co-
sponsors.  Despite the differences in the papers tabled and in the interventions made, all shared a
common objective:  to ensure that the process leading up to and at Ministerial Conferences was
strong, predictable, inclusive and transparent.  The differences among Members might have arisenfrom different perceptions of the Doha preparatory process and the lessons learned from Doha.  His
delegation agreed that the Doha process had not been perfect.  As many delegations had said, there
was room for further improvement.  His delegation welcomed opportunities for engaging in further
consultations in the autumn, as the Chairman had indicated.  While it was not averse to developing
some guidelines for the preparation and conduct of Ministerial Conferences, Hong Kong, China
believed that such guidelines should be broad and flexible, and capable of taking into account the
different needs of each Conference and the situation at the time.  It was concerned that overlyprescriptive preparatory and Ministerial Conference processes would discourage compromises and
make delegations entrenched in their positions.  There was also a risk, as some delegations had
mentioned earlier, of some Members turning to informal processes outside the WTO.  As his
delegation had said at the May meeting, rigidity could lead to failure to deliver timely results in the
organization.  This could lead frustrated Members to turn even more to preferential tradingarrangements.  His delegation agreed with Switzerland that flexibility and the principles of
transparency, inclusiveness and predictability were not trade-offs, and could be advanced in a
complementary manner.  Hong Kong, China was confident that in the forthcoming consultations
Members would be able to find ways to promote these principles in parallel.
84. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed
 to revert to this item at a future
meeting, and that the Chairman would hold consultations on this matter in the meantime.WT/GC/M/75
Page 27
6. Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration
(a) Reports of the Committee on its meetings of 15 April and 8 May (WT/BFA/58 and 59)
85. The Chairman drew attention to the reports of the Committee on Budget, Finance and
Administration in WT/BFA/58 and 59.
86. Mr. McMillan (United Kingdom), Chairman  of the Committee on Budget, Finance and
Administration, said that the Committee had met on 15 April and 8 May, the reports of which were
contained in documents WT/BFA/58 and 59, as well as  on 5 July, for which no written report was yet
available.  At its meeting on 5 July, and at an informal meeting beforehand, the Committee had
looked at a number of recommendations from an independent consultant on the introduction of
Results-Based Management in the WTO Secretariat.  The Committee had agreed that the Secretariat
would incorporate as many elements of the recommendations as possible in the 2003 budget
proposals, and that it would monitor progress on objective-setting and reporting of outcomes.  TheCommittee had also agreed to work further on the possibility of including in the 2003 budget an
amount to set up an agreed termination scheme for WTO staff, using the existing provisions of the
WTO staff regulations.  With regard to the report in WT/BFA/58, the Committee recommended to the
General Council that a pro rata  contribution to the 2002 budget amounting to SwF 2,830,632 be
assessed on the Government of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen andMatsu.  That assessment, calculated as from 1 January 2002, was based on an annual contribution of
1.992 per cent, taking into account the international trade figures – which were imports plus exports in
goods, services and intellectual property rights – of Chinese Taipei for the years 1997-1999.  The
Committee also recommended to the General Council to assess an amount of SwF 171,449 on the
Government of the Separate Customs Territory of  Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu as an advance
to the Working Capital Fund.
87. The General Council took note of the statement, approved
 the Budget Committee's specific
recommendations in paragraph 9 of its report in WT/BFA/58, and adopted the reports in WT/BFA/58
and 59.
(b) Statement by the Chairman of the Committee in relation to pledges announced and payments
received to finance the implementation of the WTO Secretariat Annual Technical Assistance
Plan (WT/BFA/SPEC/77)
88. Mr. McMillan (United Kingdom), Chairman  of the Committee on Budget, Finance and
Administration, recalled that at its meeting in December 2001, the General Council had approved the
terms of reference of the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund (DDAGTF), which was
contained in the report of the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration in WT/BFA/56.  In
particular, the General Council had approved a target of SwF 15 million for the DDAGTF for 2002,
and that 100 per cent of this amount should be in the bank by the end of June 2002.  Equally, the
pledging conference held on 11 March had produced an unprecedented level of pledges from
Members, as set out in WT/BFA/SPEC/77.  At that pledging conference, donors had announced
pledges totalling SwF 21.3 million to the DDAGTF for 2002 and a further SwF 4 million of
earmarked contributions.  This had been against a Secretariat estimate of the requirements ofSwF 17.3 million.  Since May, when he had last reported to General Council, the situation had
improved dramatically and the June deadline had almost been met.  As shown in WT/BFA/SPEC/77,
the WTO had received a total of SwF 14.7 million by 25 June.  Since then, new contributions of
SwF 15,000 and US$20,000 had been received from Iceland and the United States respectively.  This
change over the past three months had been highly encouraging and he wished to thank all the donorswho had helped to meet the target.  He had also heard that a number of other contributions were
expected to be remitted shortly.  However, there were another SwF 6.6 million pledged for 2002
which had not yet been remitted.  There was a very clear link drawn in the Doha MinisterialWT/GC/M/75
Page 28
Declaration between availability of technical assistance and agreement to deal with the issues set out
therein.  The Secretariat needed these funds quickly if it was to deliver on a very ambitious plan on
time.  He therefore urged all the donors who had not yet done so to transfer their promised
contributions as quickly as possible.
89. The representative of Japan said that his Government took pride in having managed to make a
substantial contribution to the Global Trust Fund in addition to its contribution to the WTO regular
budget.  These contributions had come from hard- earned taxpayers' money, and his Government was
held accountable for the way that money was used.  As in the case of the WTO, the call for greater
transparency and accountability was heard more frequently in Japan as well.   Therefore, Japan
wished to request that the Secretariat provide information on the use of the contributions, as well as
on how effective each technical assistance mission had been in meeting its objective.  This
accountability was crucial for Japan's future contributions to WTO technical assistance.
90. The General Council took note of the statements.
7. Election of the Chairman, Members and Alternates of the Management Board of the
WTO Pension Plan (WT/GC/W/474)
91. The Chairman recalled that Article 4 of the Regulations of the WTO Pension Plan
(WT/L/282) provided for the establishment of a Management Board comprising, inter alia , a
Chairman, four members and four alternates elected by the General Council.  The term of office of the
current membership of the Management Board had expired on 29 March 2002.  Following
consultations that had been held on this matter, he proposed that the General Council agree to the
election of the following candidates, whose names had been submitted to Members in advance in
WT/GC/W/474, to serve in these positions on the Board for a three-year term:
Chairman: Ambassador Mary Whelan (Ireland)
Members: Mr. Andrew Johnston (United Kingdom)
Mr. Iba Mar Oulare (Senegal)
Ms. Andréa Saldanha da Gama Watson (Brazil)Mr. Terry Collins-Williams (Canada)
Alternates: Mr. Mark Linscott (United States)
Mr. Jean-Marc Mignon (France)
Mr. Xiaodong Wang (China)
Ms. Lai-Peng Yap (Malaysia)
92. The General Council agreed to the election of the above candidates to the Management Board
of the WTO Pension Plan for a three-year term.2
8. Report on the evaluation of the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme
(JITAP) – Statement by the Deputy Director-General
93. The Chairman invited Mr. Ouedraogo, Deputy Director-General, to report on the meeting of
the JITAP Common Trust Fund Steering Group that had been held on 25 June to discuss the
evaluation report of two international consultants relating to the effectiveness of JITAP in building the
human and institutional capacities of beneficiary countries and on its future direction.
                                                     
2 The Decision was subsequently circulated as WT/L/474.WT/GC/M/75
Page 29
94. Mr. Ouedraogo, Deputy Director -General, said that the JITAP Common Trust Fund (CTF)
Steering Group was composed of representatives of the JITAP executing agencies (ITC, UNCTAD
and WTO), representatives of the 13 donors contributing to the CTF (Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, German y, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United
Kingdom), as well as representatives of the eight partner countries of the programme (Benin, BurkinaFaso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tunisia, Ug anda and Tanzania).  The CTF Steering Group also
had a number of observer countries.  The 25 June meeting had been dedicated to reviewing the
findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Summative Evaluation Report (SER), the
management response and the joint proposal by ITC, UNCTAD and WTO with regard to the way
forward, as the current phase of JITAP was expected to end on 31 December 2002.  The SER had
been presented by two international consultants, Mr. Leelananda De Silva (Sri Lanka) and Ms. Ann
Weston (Canada), on behalf of the team of evaluators.  The SER was based on their findings and fieldvisits, and on eight reports by national evaluators that were specific to the participating JITAP
countries.  All consultants had been appointed by ITC, UNCTAD and WTO, and the evaluation
process had been conducted on the basis of terms of reference agreed by the CTF Steering Group in
December 2001.
95. The achievements of JITAP had been highlighted in five substantive areas:  (i) human
resource development;  (ii) domesticating the multilateral trading system (MTS);  (iii) policy
development;  (iv) infrastructure of trade;  and (v) export strategy development, as a way of exploiting
market access opportunities.  The SER further took cognizance of the sustainable elements of JITAP,
namely the inter-institutional committees, the referenc e centres, the development of cadres of trainers
and trainees, and the creation of capacity for export-sector strategy development.  The SERparticularly acknowledged the contribution of JITAP to promoting a greater understanding of MTS
issues in general, and of the WTO in particular, among the different stakeholders in beneficiary
countries.  The evaluators had pointed out that JITAP had helped promote a positive image of the
WTO in beneficiary countries.  The SER recommended that JITAP should be extended for a further
period of three years, beginning in January 2003, and that a future JITAP should focus on threesubstantive areas:  (i) developing capacities at the national level to discuss and elaborate on MTS
issues;  (ii) building human resources development capacities;  and (iii) assistance to the development
of export-sector strategies, focusing on supply-side issues.  It considered greater emphasis on trade
and poverty issues to be essential in these three areas.  The SER also recommended that “the current
cluster approach be replaced and that a radical overhaul” be operated “in terms of substance and in
management systems.”  The current eight beneficiary countries in Africa should continue to
participate in JITAP for the next two to three years, but with their programmes on a smaller scale,with a view to consolidating work  already undertaken.  It was important to underline that in view of
the great success generated by the Programme, 32 countries had submitted requests to join JITAP.  In
doing so, the Programme would cover almost all Afri ca.  The SER established that “both conceptually
and in practice, there is no conflict between JITAP and the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related
Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries (IF).  They are, indeed, complementary.  A futureJITAP has important opportunities for building close working relationships with the Integrated
Framework Processes."  The SER also made the following recommendations and remarks:  (i) close
links should be established with the IF at the country level;   (ii) instead of the IF process and JITAP
being in conflict or overlapping each other, they were mutually complementary and could indeed be
supportive of each other;  (iii) a future JITAP should place more emphasis on inter-country and sub-regional scales of activities, and the country coverage needed to be geographically contiguous;
(iv) bilateral donors and multilateral agencies such as UNDP should buy into any one of the three
broad areas of activity which had been defined as the substantive focus of JITAP for the future;  and
(v) the three agencies (WTO, ITC and UNCTAD) should establish a "Task Force to, inter alia,  review
the current JITAP model, make recommendations for a revised or a new model of MultilateralTrading System-Related Technical Assistance, and provide an outline of the main components of the
next phase of JITAP."WT/GC/M/75
Page 30
96. After extensive discussions, the CTF Steering Group Meeting had taken note of the
evaluators' report with the overall conclusion that  JITAP made an important contribution to raising
awareness and developing capacities in the beneficiary countries for managing their integration into
the multilateral trading system.  The donors had agreed to the request, submitted in early 2002, for
extension of the current phase of the programme to end-2002.  The CTF Steering Group had approvedthe joint recommendation presented by ITC, UNCTAD and WTO regarding the preparation of
detailed proposals on successor arrangements to JITAP and had endorsed the establishment of an
Inter-Agency Task Force (ITF) to take the process further in full consultation with all stakeholders,
including donors and beneficiaries.  The ITF would inter alia:  (i) review the current model and the
results of implementing the programme and draw lesso ns from the experience to date;  (ii) lay down
the process parameters for future programme development, on the basis of the Summative Evaluation
Report and observations of the CTF Steering Group, and formulate recommendations for a revised, ornew model, of Multilateral Trading System-Related Technical Assistance to underpin the successor
arrangement for JITAP;  (iii) elaborate various scenarios, both in relation to composition and delivery
modality of such arrangement by the three Geneva-based agencies;  (iv) make a realistic assessment
of the financial resources needed and the likely availability of such resources for implementing a
successor programme in the short and medium term, and rank the identified scenarios accordingly;(v) provide recommendations on an appropriate management structure and on the processes that
should be used for efficient delivery of Trade-Related Technical Assistance by the three agencies,
including oversight mechanisms, the needs of the three executing organizations to strengthen their
capacity to implement and manage the successor arrangement of JITAP, and the modalities for
delegation, decentralization and extensive use of subcontracting;  and (vi) recommend mechanisms toensure that the programme could be effectively coordinated and linked to other multilateral and
bilateral initiatives in the field, including the Integrated Framework.  The CTF Steering Group had
taken note that a Management Meeting/Workshop would be held on 11-13 September 2002, with the
participation of donors and beneficiaries.  The meeting would consider the findings and
recommendations of the Task Force and deliberate on the draft proposals for a successor arrangement,within a feasible and realistic framework.  The Inter-Agency Task Force would present the detailed
proposals for a feasible successor arrangement for JITAP to the Steering Group at its next meeting in
October 2002.
97. He recalled that JITAP had been mentioned by name at the recent G-8 summit held at
Kananaskis, Canada on 27 June 2002, where the Government of Canada had announced a
contribution to this programme in the following terms:  "Specifically, Canada will invest Can$7
million over three years in the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme of the InternationalTrade Center, the World Trade Organization and United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development.  The Programme is supported by thirteen donors, including Canada, and provides
support to African countries so they can better participate in the multilateral trading system and take
advantage of trade opportunities.  Because of similar needs in many countries, JITAP can efficiently
provide support and enable African countries to benefit from each other's experience."  With thispositive signal from Canada, it could be expected that other donors would follow Canada's example.
In concluding, he noted that in their report the eval uators had stated that "JITAP has a claim to be the
most high-profile technical assistance programme in the world."  The atmosphere at the meeting
among donors and beneficiaries had been very positive, indicating the necessity to undertake the
second phase, in order to consolidate the current phase of JITAP in beneficiary countries, and also toenable other developing countries to benefit from the JITAP experience in the area of capacity
building.
98. All delegations who spoke expressed apprecia tion to the Deputy Director-General for his
report on the evaluation of the JITAP.
99. The representative of Canada recalled that at the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis in June 2002,
Canada had announced its intention to invest Can$20 million over three years in three initiatives toWT/GC/M/75
Page 31
help African countries identify export opportunities, produce new products in demand by export
markets and build capacity, including by training personnel in African trade organizations.  More
specifically, Canada would invest Can$7 million in the next phase of JITAP, which would emerge
from this recent evaluation.  Canada looked forward to collaborating closely with the three agencies,
with African partners and with other donors in the design of the second phase of JITAP.
100. The representative of Kenya said that as one of the beneficiaries of this programme Kenya
welcomed its extension for another period of three years.  JITAP would enable many developing
countries, especially those in Africa, understand and be able to integrate fully into the multilateral
trading system.  In Kenya's case, since the programme was to be extended for another three years,
more work would be done, especially on the inter- institutional committees, the reference centres, the
communication discussion facilities and also the technical tools, especially those designed by the ITC,
which could be used both for marketing strategies as well as for the current negotiations in the WTO.The joint operation of this programme by the three agencies offered one important way of making the
multilateral trading system more acceptable to and more friendly in low-income developing countries,
especially those in Africa, and Kenya in particular.  In Kenya's view, a formal and sustainable
arrangement should be put in place and one should start thinking of JITAP beyond the three-year
extension.  As stated in the report, the programme should focus on capacity development, multilateraltrading system, human resources and export sector strategy development, since that was what trade
was.  Kenya hoped to see many African countries join this Programme, welcomed Canada's recently
announced contributions to the JITAP and other programmes for Africa, and encouraged other donors
to follow Canada's example.
101. The representative of Uganda said that the JITAP had been very successful in helping Uganda
build capacity to integrate into the multilateral trad ing system.  Like Kenya, Uganda also believed it
was necessary to extend this programme with a view to consolidating, in particular, the work of the
inter-institutional committees which brought together the various stakeholders within the nation
interested in both export and the ongoing negotiations.  Uganda had made it known to the three
agencies that this was a priority for the country.  Uganda wished to underscore that JITAP and theIntegrated Framework were complementary though not  necessarily the same, and that both aimed at
mainstreaming trade into national development strategies.  Both programmes could learn from each
other.  Uganda welcomed Canada's contribution and encouraged others also to support financially the
extension of JITAP to other African countries.  One important question indicated in the evaluation
report related to building capacity on inter-regional cooperation, and this was vital in particular for the
East African Cooperation Organization since in the short run, its members intended to have a common
external tariff and negotiate jointly within the context of the WTO.  Uganda hoped that the JITAP andother programmes would support regional cooperation efforts and strengthen the capacity of the East
African Cooperation Organization in order to enable it to follow up on the negotiations.  In
concluding, he wished to express appreciation to the UNCTAD and the ITC, which had been
cooperating with the WTO in offering technical assistance to Uganda.
102. The representative of Zambia said his delegation hoped that the next JITAP would strengthen
the existing complementarity between the Integrated Framework and JITAP.  Zambia welcomed
donors for the financial support needed for JITAP, and particularly welcomed Canada's recently
announced contribution.  Zambia would also welcome the extension of JITAP to the 32 applicant
countries, and in particular to the LDC African countries, and indicated its own interest in taking part
in this programme.
103. The representative of Tanzania noted that her country was one of the beneficiaries of the
JITAP, and welcomed its extension for an additional three years.  Tanzania would also welcome the
extension of JITAP to the other 32 applicant countries.  Regarding the future JITAP, her delegation
believed its focus should be on building capacity in beneficiary countries, in particular since the East
African Cooperation Organization was in the process of building a customs union.  Tanzania calledWT/GC/M/75
Page 32
upon the donor community to make contributions follow ing Canada's example in order to make this a
reality.  As JITAP and the Integrated Framework were complementary and aimed at mainstreaming
trade, Tanzania hoped that the international community would assist both programmes adequately.
104. The representative of Djibouti said that the JITAP could play an important role in all of
Africa.  Djibouti wished to congratulate all the countries which had contributed financially to JITAP,
and in particular Canada which had recently also made available funding for different programmes in
Africa.  He hoped that other donors would follow Canada's example.  His delegation also wished to
express gratitude to the three executing agencies which had worked together and made these
programmes available.  He believed that other countries should be added to the list of beneficiaries,
and noted that Djibouti had requested to be a beneficiary for a long time, to no avail.
105. The General Council took note of the statements.
9. Waivers under Article IX of the WTO Agreement
(a) Romania - Introduction of Harmonized System 2002 changes into WTO schedules of tariff
concessions – Request for waiver (G/L/553, G/C/W/383)
106. The Chairman drew attention to the request from Romania (G/L/553) for a waiver for the
introduction of Harmonized System 2002 changes into WTO schedules of tariff concessions, and to
the related draft Decision (G/C/W/383).
107. Mr. Supperamaniam (Malaysia), Chairman of th e Council for Trade in Goods, reporting on
the Council's consideration of this request, said that at its meeting on 27 June, the Council had agreed
to the request by Romania and had recommended that  the draft Decision in G/C/W/383 be forwarded
to the General Council for adoption.
108. The General Council took note of the report and, in accordance with the Decision-Making
Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement agreed in November 1995 (WT/L/93),
adopted the draft Decision in G/C/W/383.3
(b) Côte d'Ivoire - Customs Valuation Agreemen t – Request for waiver (G/C/W/301 and Add. 1
and 2, G/C/W/385)
109. The Chairman drew attention to the request fr om Côte d'Ivoire (G/C/W/301 and Add. 1 and 2)
for a waiver from its obligations under the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of
GATT 1994, and to the related draft Decision (G/C/W/385).
110. Mr. Supperamaniam (Malaysia), Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods, reporting on
the Council's consideration of this request, said that at its meeting on 13 June, the Council had
approved the revised waiver request in G/C/W/301/Add.2, and had recommended that the draft
Decision in G/C/W/385 be forwarded to  the General Council for adoption.
111. The General Council took note of the report and, in accordance with the Decision-Making
Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement agreed in November 1995 (WT/L/93),
adopted the draft Decision in G/C/W/385.4
                                                     
3 The Decision was subsequently circulated as WT/L/477.
4 The Decision was subsequently circulated as WT/L/475.WT/GC/M/75
Page 33
(c) El Salvador - Customs Valuation Agreement – Request for waiver (G/C/W/372, G/C/W/388)
112. The Chairman drew attention to the request fr om El Salvador (G/C/W/372) for a waiver from
its obligations under the Agreement on Implementa tion of Article VII of GATT 1994, and to the
related draft Decision (G/C/W/388).
113. Mr. Supperamaniam (Malaysia), Chairman of th e Council for Trade in Goods, reporting on
the Council's consideration of this request, said that at its meeting on 27 June, the Council had
approved El Salvador's request and had recommended that the draft Decision in G/C/W/388 be
forwarded to the General Council for adoption.
114. The General Council took note of the report and, in accordance with the Decision-Making
Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement agreed in November 1995 (WT/L/93),
adopted the draft Decision in document G/C/W/388.5
(d) Least-developed Countries – Obligations under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with
respect to pharmaceutical products – Draft waiver (IP/C/W/359)
115. The Chairman drew attention to the draft waiver in IP/C/W/359 regarding the obligations of
least-developed country Members under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with respect to
pharmaceutical products until 1 January 2016.
116. Mr. Perez Motta (Mexico), Chairman of the Council for TRIPS, said that at its meeting on
25-27 June, the Council for TRIPS had adopted a Decision on the Extension of the Transition Period
under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain
Obligations with respect to Pharmaceutical Products (IP/C/25).  In connection with this, the TRIPS
Council had also approved a draft waiver in respect of the obligations of least-developed country
Members under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement for the same period, i.e. until 1 January 2016,and had agreed to forward it to the General Council for adoption.  As reflected in the recitals of the
draft waiver, the TRIPS Council had considered that obligations under Article 70.9 of the Agreement,
where applicable, should not prevent attainment of the objectives of paragraph 7 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, and had noted that, in light of the
foregoing, exceptional circumstances existed justifying the waiver.  In connection with the approvalof the draft waiver at the meeting of the TRIPS Council, he had noted that it was understood, in regard
to the review foreseen in paragraph 2 of the draft waiver, that the exceptional circumstances justifying
this waiver would continue to exist for least-developed country Members until its expiry date of 2016.
117. The representative of Zambia, speaking on behalf of the Least-Developed Countries
,
expressed appreciation to Members for their effo rts to provide special measures within the
Agreements in order to enable LDCs to use trade to  raise their standards of living.  It was through
steadily growing volumes of real income and effective demand and expansion of the production ofand trade in goods and services that LDCs would benefit.  Member partners, both developed and
developing, had recognized that LDCs had special difficulties that had to be taken into account when
implementing the Agreement on TRIPS.  The Agreement had made a special provision for LDCs in
paragraph 1 of Article 66 which stated that "such Members shall not be required to apply the
provisions of this Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 5, for a period of 10 years from the date ofapplication as defined under paragraph 1 of Article 65.  The Council for TRIPS shall, upon duly
motivated request by a least-developed country Member, accord extensions of this period."  The
language in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement was mandatory and unambiguous.  The LDCs
wished to remind the membership of this provision in  order to clarify their interpretation of the draft
waiver in IP/C/W/359 to be approved at the present meeting.  No LDC Member had made "a duly
                                                     
5 The Decision was subsequently circulated as WT/L/476.WT/GC/M/75
Page 34
motivated request" in accordance with the provisions of Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Hence, the draft waiver had not been based on a request from an LDC as provided for in that Article.
The draft waiver was to be read in the context of the provisions of paragraph 7 of the Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health adopted by the Ministerial Conference in Doha
(WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2).  The LDCs wished to reaffirm that neither the provisions of this draft waiver,nor the procedure under which it had been requested, should in any manner be construed to curtail the
right of any LDC Member to obtain an extension from the Council for TRIPS under Article 66.1 of
the TRIPS Agreement.
118. The General Council took note of the report and of the statement and, in accordance with the
Decision-Making Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement agreed in November
1995 (WT/L/93), adopted the draft Decision in IP/C/W/359.6
(e) New EC Special Tariff Arrangements to Combat Drug Production and Trafficking – Request
for Waiver (G/C/W/328 and Add.1)
119. The Chairman said that, as delegations were aware, this waiver request was presently under
consideration by the Council for Trade in Goods, in accordance with the procedures laid down in
Article IX(3)(b) of the WTO Agreement.  Although that Council had not yet been able to submit a
report, he had been informed that its Chairman wa s continuing to hold consultations with a view to
finalizing the report.  He would therefore encour age the Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods,
Amb. Supperamaniam (Malaysia), and all delegations to persevere in their efforts to reach agreement
as soon as possible.  Taking into account the situation he had just described, he proposed that
Members not, on the present occasion, enter into a discussion of this topic, the positions on which
were well known to all the parties.  In this regard, he would therefore propose that the GeneralCouncil take note of his statement and revert to the matter once the Council for Trade in Goods had
submitted its report pursuant to Article IX(3)(b).
120. The General Council so agreed.
10. Marrakesh Ministerial Decision concerning th e possible negative effects of the reform
programme on least-developed and NFIDCS – Report of the Inter-Agency Panel onshort-term difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic
foodstuffs (WT/GC/62–G/AG/13)
121. The Chairman drew attention to the report of the Inter-Agency Panel on short-term difficulties
in financing normal levels of commercial impor ts of basic foodstuffs (WT/GC/62-G/ AG/13).  The
Panel had been composed of representatives of the World Bank, IMF, FAO, International Grains
Council and UNCTAD, and had completed its report by 28 June.  However, the translation of this
report, which consisted of some 150 pages, into French and Spanish was still under way.  Given thissituation, he understood that some delegations wished to defer consideration of the report until
31 July, in order to allow time for the French and Spanish versions to be made available, as this was a
matter of considerable interest to all delegations.  Accordingly, he proposed that delegations start
discussion of this item at the present meeting with the presentation of the report of the Chairman of
the Inter-Agency Panel, Mr. Suzuki (Japan), who was not in Geneva, by Mr. Matsushima (Japan), onhis behalf.
122. Mr. Matsushima (Japan), on behalf of the Chairman of the Inter-Agency Panel, recalled that
the Panel had been established following the recommendation adopted by the Doha Ministerial
Conference and had submitted its report to the General Council on 28 June, in accordance with the
terms of reference agreed by the Committee on Agriculture and approved by the General Council.
                                                     
6 The Decision was subsequently circulated as WT/L/478.WT/GC/M/75
Page 35
The work of the Panel was part of the follow up to the Doha Decision on Implementation-Related
Issues and Concerns.  In the context of discus sion on how to improve the implementation of the
Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform
Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries ("the Marrakesh
NFIDC Decision"), the Panel had explored ways and means of improving access by LDCs andNFIDCs to multilateral programmes and facilities, in order to assist with short-term difficulties in
financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic foodstuffs, and had examined the concept and
feasibility of the proposal for the establishment of a revolving fund.  The detailed terms of reference,
as agreed by the Committee on Agriculture and approved by the General Council, were contained in
the report.
123. The Panel had made a detailed analysis of the price trends on international markets for basic
foodstuffs since the entry into force of the Agreement on Agriculture.  It had continued by studyingthe trends in the cost of cereal imports by LDCs and NFIDCs and the short-term difficulties in
financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic foodstuffs, taking into account the written
contributions made by the Members concerned.  The Panel had then examined the issue of access by
the LDCs and the NFIDCs to short-term multilateral financing facilities, i.e. the IMF and World Bank
facilities.  It had also considered the Arab Monetary Fund facilities.  The Arab Monetary Fund hadbeen the only regional financial institution that had responded positively to its query about the
existence of a short-term concessional financing facility.  Subsequently, the Panel had analyzed the
proposal on a revolving fund, as well as other options  to address the concerns expressed by the LDCs
and NFIDCs in securing short-term financing for normal levels of commercial imports of basic
foodstuffs.  These other options were an ex-ante food import financing scheme, commodity price riskmanagement and the Integrated Framework studies.
124. The conclusions and recommendations of the Panel on the basis of these examinations and
analyses were contained in Section III of the report.  As they were short and concise, rather than
restating them at the present meeting he invited Me mbers to read them.  Regarding the proposal for a
revolving fund, the Panel was of the view that the potential usefulness of such a fund in its proposedform was limited, and that if any future work was to be conducted, it could be of greater value to
explore the possibility of an ex-ante financin g mechanism aimed at private-sector importers.
125. The representative of Sri Lanka said that the establishment of the Panel had been approved by
the Doha Ministerial Conference in the context of implementation of the Marrakesh NFIDC Decision.
This group of countries consisted of 49 LDCs and 19 NFIDCs.  Broadly, the Panel's terms of
reference provided a mandate for it to address thre e main issues:  First, to examine the terms and
conditions of existing facilities of the international financial institutions, namely the IMF and WorldBank, to which these groups of countries would have recourse in order to address short-term
difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic foodstuffs;  second, to examine
the concept and feasibility of the proposal by a group of countries to establish a revolving fund;  and
third, to make recommendations for consideration by the General Council.
126. On the first issue, the Panel had stated in paragraph 162 that the existing multilateral
financing facilities assessed the need for financing in the context of the balance-of-payments situation
in the country concerned.  Paragraph 165 stated that the World Bank did not have facilities especially
designed to help countries cope with short-term difficulties in financing food imports.  Based on its
conclusions, the Panel had recommended in paragraph 168 of the report that consideration of this
issue be given in the context of the impending re view of the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF)
of the IMF, to extend the product coverage of the facility to cover all basic foodstuffs and to provide a
greater degree of automaticity without requiring an IMF support programme, and also to clarify
access in the context of an existing arrangement with the IMF.  While Sri Lanka recognized the
importance of these positive recommendations, the Panel had not indicated when the impending
review of the CFF would take place.  While recognizing the importance of these positiveWT/GC/M/75
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recommendations, Sri Lanka believed that they did not adequately cover all of the conclusions the
Panel had drawn in its report on this issue.  However, Sri Lanka could accept the Panel's
recommendations on this first issue.
127. On the more important second issue concerning the examination of the concept and feasibility
of the proposal for the establishment of a revolving fund submitted by a group of developingcountries, in its conclusion in paragraph 167 of the report, the Panel had stated that "[w]e have
examined the concept and feasibility of the proposal for the establishment of a revolving fund."  Thus,
the Panel had examined the concept of a revolving fund and had accepted its usefulness.  However, on
the feasibility of the fund, it had examined the relevant aspects of ex-post operation of the fund and,
having addressed the limited potential usefulness of an ex-post revolving fund to support food import
bills, had recommended in paragraph 168 (b) that "[t]he feasibility of an ex-ante financing mechanism
aimed at food importers be explored."  Therefore, the most promising modalities of the operation ofthe fund ex-ante had not been examined by the Panel.  Therefore, the Panel had not yet completed its
work as mandated by Ministers, as well as stated in paragraph 2 of the terms of reference to examine
the concept and the feasibility of the proposal which should cover the operational mechanism ex-ante
as well.  The Panel's own recommendation was that the feasibility of an ex-ante financing mechanism
aimed at private-sector importers should be explored.  Hence, this promising part of the Panel's workhad yet to be completed.  Therefore, Sri Lanka considered that it was necessary for the Panel to be
reconvened in order to complete its work and submit its report and recommendations on the feasibility
of an ex-ante financing mechanism to the General Council.  The Marrakesh NFIDC Decision
remained to be operationalized.  This Decision had been meant to address the concerns of 49 LDCs
and 19 NFIDCs, i.e. 68 Members.  Thus, the valuable work undertaken by the Panel on this importantissue, and implementation of its recommendations, were extremely important, as this would also have
an impact on the ongoing negotiations in agriculture, and developing instruments to address concerns
of NFIDCs would enable these countries to engage positively in the agriculture negotiations.
128. The representative of Egypt said that the technical elements in the report were now being
considered by her capital, particularly those related to the conclusions and recommendations.
However, Egypt wished to highlight one aspect in the recommendation dealing with access to
financial facilities, and the implicit notion in the report that current facilities were inadequate to
address the objectives of the Decision.  Egypt looked forward to continuing its consideration of this
important implementation issue in light of the elements of the Panel's report.
129. The representative of Jordan said that all of  the recommendations in the report were clear
except the recommendation on the feasibility of establishing a revolving fund, which in Jordan's view
was due to the limited time available to the Panel.  Jordan proposed that the same Panel bereconvened and complete its study by October, and that its report be submitted again to the General
Council in October.
130. The representative of Cuba said that the Panel's mandate had not been fully implemented
inasmuch as the aspects relating to the concept and feasibility of the establishment of a revolving fund
had not been tackled.  Cuba proposed that the Panel be reconvened and the planned activitiesconcluded, in accordance with the terms of reference approved by the General Council, and that the
Panel's recommendations be submitted to the General Council in October.
131. The representative of Pakistan said that the terms of reference envisaged a mandate for the
Panel to examine three issues.  On the issue of examining the terms and conditions of existing
facilities of international financial institutions, the Panel had concluded that facilities offered by theWorld Bank did not cater to the short-term diffic ulties in financing normal levels of commercial
imports of basic foodstuffs.  The Panel had also stated that the existing international financial
institutions' facilities for financing were linked to the balance-of-payments situation in the beneficiary
countries.  In paragraph 168 of its report, the Panel recommended two steps:  expansion of the productWT/GC/M/75
Page 37
coverage to include all basic foodstuffs, and an enhanced degree of automaticity in financing in the
context of existing arrangements with the IMF.  These recommendations should be given
consideration, as the report said, in the context of the impending review of the CFF under the IMF
compensatory facility.  However, the report failed to indicate the exact timing of such a review.  The
Panel had fallen well short of fulfilling its mandate on the examination of the concept and feasibilityof the proposal by a group of developing countries for the establishment of a revolving fund.  On this
issue, the Panel had recognized the need to explor e the feasibility of an ex-ante financing mechanism
for private-sector importers.  Clearly this mandate had been left unaccomplished, hence the need for
the Panel to fulfill this mandate.  Pakistan urged that this mandate be fulfilled at an early date
so that Members would be able to discuss the recommendations in this regard as well.
132. The representative of Japan said that the report of the Panel contained many ideas and
suggestions that would be useful in tackling th e issues of food security of LDCs and NFIDCs.
As the report pointed out a number of difficulties to be overcome before establishing a revolving fund,
it was essential that Members heed the points raised by the report, and then give careful consideration
to the feasibility of establishing such a fund.  There was an acute need for Members to address
seriously the situation the LDCs and NFIDCs experienced.  These countries faced difficulties in
financing even normal levels of commercial imports  of basic foodstuffs when the prices of those
commodities were rising.  Members had to remember that such a situation had been the starting-point
of developing such ideas.  With these observations in mind, Japan had proposed the establishment of
an international food stockholding, so as to fully encompass the objective and purpose of the
Marrakesh NFIDC Decision.  As Japan had already explained the details of this scheme at the Special
Session of the Committee on Agriculture, it would refrain from repeating this explanation.  Japan hadproposed this scheme as a part of its continuing initiative towards addressing the food security
concerns of LDCs and NFIDCs.
133. The representative of Mauritius said that his delegation supported the statements by Sri
Lanka, Egypt and Pakistan.  As an NFIDC, Mauritius was greatly concerned by the implementation of
the Marrakesh NFIDC Decision.
134. The representative of Tunisia said that his delegation believed the mandate given the Panel
had not been completely fulfilled, especially with regard to the concept and feasibility of the proposal
to establish a revolving fund.
135. The General Council took note of the report and of the statements, and agreed  to revert to this
item at its meeting on 31 July.
136. At the reconvened meeting of the General Council on 31 July, the Chairman recalled that at
its meeting on 8 July, the General Council had started its consideration of the report of the Inter-
Agency Panel and had agreed to revert to it at the present meeting, in order to allow delegations more
time to examine this report.  Eight delegations had commented on this report at that meeting, and
there had been several suggestions that the Panel's recommendation in Paragraph 168(b) with regard
to the feasibility of an ex-ante financing mechanism aimed at food importers should be pursued.
137. The representative of Canada said that the Panel had provided a useful set of
recommendations setting out practical ways to improve access by LDCs and NFIDCs to multilateral
programmes and facilities to meet these countries' needs.  Having done so, Canada believed that the
Panel had completed its task.
138. The representative of Mauritius said that his delegation fully endorsed the various comments
made by the NFIDCs on 8 July.  He noted that the report in its analytical part was quite
comprehensive and provided useful information, particularly to small delegations.  However, when it
came to concrete measures, it fell short of their expectations.  Reference was made to a review of theWT/GC/M/75
Page 38
CFF of the IMF, and the report recommended that consideration be given to a certain number of
factors which would, if implemented, be of help to these countries.  However, no indication had been
given as to the date of this review, and Members would have to ask the IMF to take account of these
recommendations.  This issue also related to coherence, and Mauritius believed that the WTO should
liaise with the IMF to ensure the smooth implementation of this measure.  The ex-ante financingmechanism was a very important measure.  Mauritius welcomed it, but was frustrated by the fact that
the report merely suggested that is should be explored whether a feasibility study should be
conducted.  Mauritius had been expecting concrete proposals.  In fact, Members were back to square
one.  In Mauritius' view, the Panel should reconvene and complete its task.
139. Members had agreed in Doha to an ambitious work programme in agriculture, and in this
regard, they had to establish modalities by 31 March 2003 and submit comprehensive schedules by
the Fifth Ministerial Conference, i.e. September 2003.  This work programme leading to furtherreform would yield results which might compound the problems faced by LDCs and NFIDCs.  In this
work programme, the LDCs and the NFIDCs, as other countries, were expected to come up with
proposals and eventually make commitments which would be designed to address their particular
concerns.  In this sense also, the report was not helpful, as Members would be conducting vital
negotiations without even knowing how their past predicaments were being addressed.  Not only werethey bearing the brunt of reform, but they were also deprived of vital data to address the future.  All of
this had to be viewed in the perspective of the small NFIDCs, i.e. the small-economy developing
countries.  These countries' preferences had been eroded and would be further eroded, but they still
did not know what would be done to address their concerns as NFIDCs.
140. The representative of Japan said that the Panel had been required to examine the concept, as
well as feasibility, of the proposal for the establishment of a revolving fund as had been described in
the Panel's terms of reference.  After conducting a thorough analysis, the Panel had concluded that the
revolving fund as proposed had limited feasibility and usefulness in addressing short-term financial
difficulties of the countries in question.  While some Members might not be happy with this
conclusion, there was no question that the Panel had duly fulfilled its mandate.  In Japan's view, ifsome Members considered that it was necessary to conduct a further analysis of an ex-ante revolving
fund, they needed to submit a new proposal, together with a detailed operational scheme.  Should such
a new proposal be submitted, Japan was ready to  discuss it, including the appropriateness of
establishing another panel to examine it.  Regard ing the current financial mechanism under the IMF's
CFF, Japan considered that it was within the discretion of the IMF to review how its own CFF
mechanism should operate.  Therefore, the WTO should ask the chairman of the Committee on
Agriculture to officially convey to the IMF the report of the Inter-Agency Panel, so that the IMFcould give due consideration to the Panel's report in  the course of reviewing the CFF.  The Chairman
should then report back the results of the IMF 's review to the General Council.  It was also
indispensable that Members continue their efforts to make LDCs and NFIDCs more familiar with the
conditionality of the CFF and the reasoning behind it.
141. With respect to the Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies mentioned in paragraph 168(c) of the
report, Japan suggested that the proponents raise this issue at the next meeting of the steering
committee of the Integrated Framework, scheduled for 24 October, and that Members discuss what
the Integrated Framework could do within its ow n mandate.  Regarding the Commodity Price Risk
Management Group of the World Bank, the World Bank had its own responsibility for reviewing its
own financing schemes.  Therefore, the WTO should ask the Chairman of the Committee onAgriculture to send the Panel's report, with its clear explanation, to the World Bank and ask the
Chairman of the Agriculture Committee to report b ack subsequently to the Members on the results of
the World Bank's review.
142. The representative of Egypt said that it was Egypt's feeling that the Panel had not fully
complied with its mandate from Ministers.  The Panel was to have discussed the feasibility of theWT/GC/M/75
Page 39
revolving fund and report on it, but it had not been ab le to come up with a conclusion as to whether
the revolving fund would be feasible.  The Panel had merely said that the fund would be more useful
had it been ex-ante, but it had still not said that an ex-post fund was absolutely untenable.  Egypt had
heard proposals by some delegations, and in its vi ew, the ex-ante option should be further looked into.
However, it was not clear whether this should be done by the same Panel.  Members could, asdemandeurs, make some input into the process, but in Egypt's view, it would be  useful for the Panel to
examine this.  On other recommendations, Egypt believed that the ideas relating to the CFF, as
reported by the Panel, should be related to the IMF in no uncertain terms.  Since most Members were
members of both organizations, it would be useful for the General Council Chairman to suggest to the
Executive Director of the IMF that during the fo rthcoming review of the CFF, something be done to
ameliorate the conditionalities of the CFF and to make them more in line with the Marrakesh Decision
on NFIDCs and LDCs.  Egypt also agreed with the proposal by Japan relating to Paragraph 168(d) onthe commodity price risk management idea.  In Egypt's view it was most important that the General
Council give some credibility to what Ministers had decided in Doha.
143. The representative of Zambia, speaking on behalf of the LDCs
, said that the subject matter
under discussion was very important to all LDCs.  These countries were still studying the report, and
would need more time to study it further before they could provide detailed comments on it.
144. The representative of the European Commun ities said the Community believed that the
Panel's terms of reference had been closely respected and that its recommendations contained
interesting ideas on ways and means to improve access by LDCs and NFIDCs to multilateral
programmes and facilities to assist with short-term difficulties in financing normal levels of
commercial imports of basic foodstuffs.  In the Comuunity's view, the Panel had duly fulfilled its
mandate.  Thus, the Community did not favour a re- opening of the Panel.  However, if the NFIDCs
insisted on the idea of an ex-ante financing mech anism and tabled a proposal in this respect, the
Community, like Japan, would be open to examining such a proposal in the appropriate competent
body, which in its view, would be the Committee on Agriculture.
145. The representative of Chile said that his delegation did not have a clear and definite opinion
on whether the mandate of the Panel had been completely fulfilled.  However, the conclusions at the
end of the report gave Members some indications.  First, the Panel had said that there had been no
clear ascending trend in food imports by LDCs and NFIDCs since the start of the reform process in
the agriculture sector in 1995, so there was no clear trend that the invoicing for food had increased.
Second, the report also recognized that from 1995 to 1997 there had been an increase in the price of
cereals, but it added that the available evidence had brought the Panel members to conclude that it
was a result of a number of factors in both the short and long term, was only partially related to thereform programme of the agriculture sector under the Uruguay Round Agreement, and was not due to
the international price increasing.  Moreover, developing countries that were net food importing
countries had come across authentic difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports of
basic foodstuffs, although this had little relationship with the agricultural reform programme of the
Uruguay Round.  Therefore, in Chile's view, the difficulties experienced by those countries were notin large measure related to this agricultural reform programme.  Several conclusions could therefore
be drawn;  first, that the fears of several develo ping countries and NFIDCs that the account for food
would increase had not materialized;  second, that in reality the agricultural reform of 1995 had not
had the results expected, since the prices of agricultural products had not increased substantially.
Thus, these fears had not materialized as a result of the agricultural reform programme.  This did notmean that in the future there would be no problems as a result of the negotiations which were under
way.  Chile wished to point out these conclusions provided a factual basis for dealing with this topic,
which was of interest to many developing countries.
146. The representative of Sri Lanka said that her delegation was not very optimistic about the fact
that the Panel had recommended that there would be an opportunity – when the IMF undertookWT/GC/M/75
Page 40
certain reforms, which it intended to do on a regular basis – for that process to take into account the
recommendations made by the Panel.  Sri Lanka believed that the previous reforms undertaken by the
IMF, particularly on the issue of the CFF, had had very limited results.  Rather, an attempt had been
made to strengthen the link between access to the CFF and the balance-of-payments situation of the
country concerned.  The Panel had, of course, suggested that certain flexibilities be entertained withrespect to reforming the CFF facility.  However, the most recent review by the IMF in 2000 had not
provided much hope.  Therefore, Sri Lanka was not optimistic about the IMF taking into account the
recommendations of the Panel.  Regarding the revolving fund proposal, the Panel's recommendation
to examine the possibility of an ex-ante mechanism posed several questions of both a procedural and
substantive nature.  With regard to the procedur al issues, the question remained as to who should
undertake the examination and whether the ex-ante mechanism proposed by the Panel would really be
able to address the problems set out by the LDCs and NIDFCs.  Sri Lanka believed that the process of
examination of whether there was any possibility of an ex-ante mechanism should be undertaken by
the Panel.  Hence, her delegation believed that the Panel should be continued.  With regard to the
substantive issue, the Panel had raised difficul ties relating to the implementation of the proposed
revolving fund, which went beyond its express nature.  Some of those constraints or difficulties would
reappear even in an ex-ante mechanism, such as the risk of default and the implications of the fund for
indebtedness.  Similarly, due to the limited time that had been available to the LDCs and NFIDCs
before the Doha Ministerial Conference, they had agreed to the establishment of this Panel with the
specific mandate to look into the short-term difficulties of the LDCs and NFIDCs.  This was only one
window of the Marrakesh Decision, along with two ot her windows, i.e. on food aid and on technical
assistance for improving agricultural productivity in further detail.
147. She recalled that the proposal of the LDCs and NFIDCs was very comprehensive and had
encompassed all three windows.  However, due to the time available, Members had been able to deal
with only one window of the short-term facilities .  The proposed revolving fund actually served the
purpose of responding not only to short-term difficulties, but also, and particularly, regarding the
window of technical assistance aimed at improving agricultural productivity.  Since the Panel hadlooked into the relevance of the revolving fund only  with respect to the short-term difficulties, Sri
Lanka believed that in its continuation of the work, it would also have to look into the necessity of the
revolving fund with respect to addressing the difficulties of NFIDCs through technical assistance.
This was a further reason why Sri Lanka believed the Panel had to continue.  Regarding Chile's
statement, in Sri Lanka's view, the Panel had tried to dealt with the issue of the impact of the
agricultural reform programme on LDCs and NFID Cs.  Members knew how markets functioned and
they had been able to build up some linkages with respect to prices for the period 1995-1997.  Whenthe reform process in the agricultural sector had really begun, countries had made commitments, so
there was some kind of a linkage between prices and the reform process.  However, subsequently
when countries had notified their commitments, th ey used all of those commitments and, according to
information from the Secretariat pertaining to the ut ilisation rate with respect to commitment levels,
these countries clearly had not only fully utiliz ed the commitments they had made for the period
1998-2000, but they had also carried forward some of the unutilized commitments from previous
years.  This had been due to a kind of imbalance in the agreement, which allowed Members to carry
forward their unutilized commitments.  Therefore, during that period they had a high utilisation rate
with respect to their commitments.  In Sri Lanka's vi ew, this point should not be raised in the General
Council over and over again, because agricultural trade was highly distorted and there was actually a
direct link between the prices of agricultural products and the reform process.  In Sri Lanka's view,
this issue needed more consultations, and her delegation therefore wished to request the Chairman to
have informal consultations in order to identify the way forward with respect to the Panel report and
the other issues that were pending.
148. The representative of the United States said that the Panel had met the terms of reference for
its work and her delegation agreed with the Panel's recommendation in paragraph 168(c), which
proposed that work under the terms of reference of the Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies beWT/GC/M/75
Page 41
undertaken within the context of the Integrated Framework to include, as appropriate and if requested
by a Member, "food security implications of trade development strategies, and availability of, and
access to, adequate financing, in particular by the private sector, to support food imports."  The United
States believed that the Panel's recommendation in paragraph 168(d) that the World Bank's
Commodity Price Risk Management Group consider  commodity price risk management issues of
developing countries, was reasonable.  Regard ing the Panel's recommendation in paragraph 168(a),
the United States did not believe that the WTO should intervene with guidance for the operation of the
IMF's CFF.  Decisions on the use of this IMF facility had to be made by the respective organization's
membership.  However, the United States could support having the WTO Committee on Agriculture
or General Council Chairman send letters asking the IMF and the World Bank to review the Panel
report as it related to this issue.  Finally, re garding the issue of a revolving fund identified in
paragraph 168(b) of the Panel's recommendations, the Panel had examined very thoroughly theconcept embodied in the revolving fund proposal, which it had described as an "ex-post financing
mechanism" in paragraph 116 of its report, and had determined that it had not been a workable
solution to potential short-term financing problems of developing countries.  In the United States'
view, the idea of an ex-ante mechanism, which had been proposed by UNCTAD, was new and
differed substantively from the original proposal.
149. The United States was willing to examine w ithin the Committee on Agriculture an "ex-ante"
revolving fund idea, on an expedited basis if appropriate, and invited interested Members to develop
suggestions to address these and other relevant considerations.  However, before deciding whether
and how to pursue this idea further, it would be impor tant for the United States to have further details
on this idea from those Members who would like to pursue it, and to have an opportunity to discuss itfurther.  In particular, it would be helpful if the proponents of this approach could lay out their
thoughts on:  first, what the criteria would be for access to financing, and participation by
governments, state-owned enterprises, and private importers;  second, which developing countries
would have access to the fund;  and third, what repayment conditions would be set to ensure that this
would be truly a  revolving fund.
150. The representative of Switzerland said that the Panel had fulfilled its mandate and his
delegation was ready to accept the Panel's conclusions and recommendations.  In Switzerland's view,
solutions other than a revolving fund had to be av ailable for dealing with short-term difficulties in
financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic foodstuffs.  Two options had been highlighted
and some comments had been made at the present meeting to give Members elements for possible
action.  First, of course, was the CFF of the IMF, which could be better utilized.  In this regard,
Switzerland believed that the IMF could expand the product coverage of the mechanism to include allbasic foodstuffs in order to better satisfy needs.  However, the World Bank could also come up with
strategies for NFIDCs for better management of food prices.  Switzerland was ready to discuss any
other options in the appropriate body, which in its view was the Committee on Agriculture, to the
extent that the concerned Members submitted a concrete proposal, which should include modalities
for implementation and consequences.  Switzerland was also open to discussing the other elementsrelating to the Marrakesh Agreement, which had not been looked at in detail thus far.
151. The representative of Djibouti said that since his delegation had not yet read the report, it was
not able to make a detailed analysis of it.  However, after listening to certain delegations' views, he
believed that the WTO and other concerned bodies should reach a consensus on the reform framework
to cover all LDCs and certain NFIDCs.  Djibou ti was sure that Members would come up with a
solution with respect to the main body concerned, which was the IMF.
152. The representative of Cuba said that this matter was of great importance to her delegation.
During the period 1995-1996, Cuba had been engaged in an intensive process of negotiation to obtain
private financing to ensure essential levels of food imports for its people.  The value of the food
imports that were financed had risen by approximately 26 per cent from one year to the next.  ThisWT/GC/M/75
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increase had represented an additional expense of US$150 million.  In 1999, the increase in the value
of imports financed had been 36 per cent relative to the same figures for 1997.  The need to manage
these credits, determined by the urgent need to import food regardless of the increase in market prices,
had led Cuba to bear very high costs and, in 1997, Cuba had paid as much as 18 per cent in annual
interest.  At the same time, she wished to point out that Cuba did not have access to the resources ofthe multilateral financial institutions, since it was not a member of the IMF or the World Bank.  Cuba
considered that since the Panel had not managed to bring its discussions to a conclusion, its mandate
had not been fully discharged, and therefore, the examination of this item should continue.
153. The representative of Hungary said that the Panel had fulfilled its mandate and had provided a
number of conclusions.  Hungary wished to make tw o general comments.  First, it agreed with Chile
that, as was seen in paragraph 160(a), there had been no negative effect of the agricultural reform on
the food bill of the countries concerned, and this showed that certain positive expectations could be
made with respect to the continue d reform.  Second, regarding the issue of the use of food aid and the
purpose of food aid, paragraph 36 of the report referred to statements by a number of participants and
the World Bank that food aid tended to respond to the need to reduce surpluses in donor countries,
rather than responding to needs in the recipient c ountries.  In Hungary's view, this was an important
observation, which had also been underpinned by the conclusions of the Panel itself inparagraph 160(c), with a clear reference that food aid had tended to decrease the difficulties of
importing countries when prices had been on the high side, and that in these years the volume of food
aid shipments had been lower than normal and there had been a higher share of commercial cereal
imports.  This had also underpinned the usefulness of the Panel report for the ongoing negotiations on
agricultural reform, and Hungary believed that this provided new evidence, if such was needed, thatfood aid – especially in the form of concessional food aid, which was not in the form of a grant – was
used as one of the forms of supported exports.  In Hungary's view, these findings could be useful in
Members' work on trying to establish uniformly applied rules and disciplines on all forms of export
support.
154. The representative of Senegal said that work still remained to be done because risks continued
to exist, insofar as the report stated clearly that the four countries which had responded to the
questionnaire on short-term financing difficulties – Cuba, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia – had
encountered funding difficulties for their food imports, even if they had stated that this did not seem
to be linked with the reform programme in agricultur e.  Further, the report established that in the light
of the experience of these countries, the multilateral funding facilities that existed did not play a key
role in resolving this problem.  This simply signified that if countries had had difficulties and had not
been able to resolve them through multilateral fu nding facilities, Members then had to think about
facilities that could enable them to overcome thes e difficulties, because the facilities existing at the
time these countries had faced difficulties had not been beneficial to them.  The idea that this was not
linked to the reform programme in agriculture did not enable Members to affirm that there was no
problem.  Senegal believed that the reform programme had not led to the expected results, because the
level of subsidies for domestic support and export subsidies remained very high.  When Membersdecided to address the problem of subsidies, it was not clear what would happen to NFIDCs.  This
was why the risk still existed.  The point was not to wait until the negative affects cropped up to
consider funding mechanisms, because the funding mechanisms had up to the present not met the
expectations of countries facing difficulties.  Members needed a prevention mechanism enabling them
to resolve this problem.  It was true that in the report, mention was made of ex-ante mechanisms.  InSenegal's view, these possibilities could be explored further and the work should continue.  Senegal
had also noted that for the LDCs, it had been proposed or recommended in the conclusions that as part
of the diagnostic studies, an effort should be made to introduce certain points, in particular, to
examine the strategies for food security and to develop such strategies and offer appropriate funding
to the private sector, in particular for food pro ducts and access to financing.  The LDCs for whom
diagnostic studies had been concluded were going to  see how they could take them into account and
to implement the programmes.  As Zambia had correctly said, LDCs should try to reflect on this issue.WT/GC/M/75
Page 43
In conclusion, Senegal observed that on page 28 of the French version of the report, Senegal's name
was not mentioned in the list of LDCs, and it therefore asked the Secretariat to add its name to the list.
155. The Chairman noted the following aspects from Members' discussion.  First, many countries
had highlighted the crucial  importance of this issue for developing countries, in particular for the
LDCs and the NFIDCs, and the need to instrumentalize the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision.  Second,Members had heard different opinions as to whether the Panel had fully completed its mandate.  In
particular, many delegations had affirmed that the Panel had not completed its study of the feasibility
of an ex-ante financing mechanism for food importers.  Members had also heard differences of
opinion as to the appropriate formula for dealing with the recommendation for an ex-ante financing
mechanism, and while some countries felt that the same Panel should pick up the examination of this
matter, others had indicated there was a need to define some modalities, some working method, on
this.  These countries would prefer that the Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture consult theinterested Members so that the most appropriate formula could be given to the follow-up on this
matter, and some Members had indicated that this work should take place in the Committee on
Agriculture itself.
156. He noted that some countries had stated that they were ready to approve at the present
meeting the recommendations in the Panel's report.  A series of countries had noted that they did notsee favourably the recommendations in paragraphs 168(a), (c) and (d) that the General Council
authorize its Chairman to write to the IMF, the World Bank and the Integrated Framework Agencies,
drawing their attention to the fact that the General Council had approved these recommendations of
the Panel, and urging them to take up these matters promptly within the framework of their own
institutional structures.  However, an important group of countries, the LDCs, had said they neededmore time to be able to study in more depth the Panel's report, and in particular the recommendations
made.  Based on this – especially the last point – and on the differences of view on how to proceed
with respect to the Panel's recommendations in paragraph 168, he proposed that at this stage, the
General Council take note of the statements and agree to return to this matter at its next meeting.  In
order not to lose time, he also proposed that the General Council invite the Chairman of theCommittee on Agriculture to consult with interested Members on the way forward with regard to
following up on the Panels' recommendations, especially with regard to paragraph 168(b), which had
to do with the ex-ante financing mechanism, and to  report on the results of his consultations to the
General Council at its next meeting.
157. The General Council so agreed.
11. Report by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee
158. The Director-General, Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, reporting on the
TNC's third meeting on 18-19 July, said that the meeting had been constructive and fruitful.  Members
had made a good start to the negotiations, which had been better than many had predicted.  The
meeting had been attended by a number of capital-based officials, and he had also been pleased to
welcome his successor, Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, to the meeting.  The process of transition to the
next Director-General was procee ding smoothly.  Under the first item on its agenda, the TNC had
considered reports by the Chairpersons of the bodies established by it.  On behalf of all participants,
he expressed appreciation to all the Chairpersons for their hard work over the past few months.  While
all of these bodies had submitted written reports to the TNC meeting, the respective Chairpersons had
all been good enough to take the floor to share the latest information on the work of their respective
groups.  Roughly 40 delegations had commented on these reports, and his sense from the discussionwas that everyone was committed, and even optimistic.  It was only natural that problems would crop
up – this was part of the very nature of the negotiations Members had embarked on.  He recalled that
when he had opened the meeting, there had been one major unresolved issue, i.e. the programme of
meetings for the Negotiating Group on Market Access.  However, thanks to the hard work of thatWT/GC/M/75
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Group's Chair and the cooperation and flexibility shown by participants, an acceptable solution had
been reached.  The Negotiating Group had subsequently met in formal session directly following the
TNC meeting on 19 July, and had adopted its programme of meetings.  Nevertheless, other problems
still remained.  On the issue of observership for international intergovernmental organizations, some
creativity would be necessary.  Members were not yet near a solution to this problem, and he urgeddelegations to continue to seek a creative and pragmatic way forward.
159. Overall, the work was moving ahead at a steady and deliberate speed.  All Members were
aware that time was the only thing they could not replace or recycle.  Thus, Members could not
indulge in spending too much time in the next few months on issues of process.  The focus in Geneva,
in capitals and at cabinet tables had to be on substance and on the Doha Development Agenda.  Many
delegations had touched on the meeting's second agenda item, Future Work, in their statements under
the first agenda item, so this discussion had been shorter.  He recalled that at the TNC meeting in
April, he had said that by the time of the July meeting, Members should have a more precise road map
to Mexico.  To facilitate discussion at the TNC, he had circulated, in Job(02)/78, a timeline from the
present until Cancún, showing the key dates and deadlines that had been established thus far.  He
believed that this road map was clear, that the deadlines were known, and that everyone was
committed to meeting those deadlines.   It was now about substance and real negotiations.  He hadtalked to a number of Ministers about Ministerial-le vel involvement in this work, and believed that it
was also important that senior officials continued to be closely involved in Geneva from time to time,
so as to allow this Member-driven, Ministerial-led organization to achieve what Members wanted it to
achieve by the time of the next Ministerial Conference.  He had also passed on to his successor his
best advice concerning the road map.  Following consultation with Dr. Supachai, he had informedparticipants that the next meeting would be held on 3-4 October, and that at least one more meeting
was foreseen thereafter in 2002, i.e. on 4-6 December.
160. The General Council took note of the report by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations
Committee.
12. Work programme on small economies – Report by the Chairman of the dedicated
sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development
161. The Chairman recalled that at its meeting in February and March 2002, the General Council
had taken note of a framework and procedures fo r the conduct of the Work Programme on Small
Economies, under which this Work Programme should be a standing item on the General Council's
agenda.  The framework and procedures also provided that the Committee on Trade and Development
should report regularly to the General Council on the progress of work in its Dedicated Sessions on
this subject.
162. Mr. Ali (Bangladesh), Chairman of the Committee on Trade and Development, reported on
the Committee's activities in this matter.  This report was being made pursuant to the decision of the
General Council at its meeting on 1 March 2002.  The General Council had instructed the Committee
on Trade and Development (CTD) to develop a programme of work on small economies through
dedicated sessions.  It had also been stated that the CTD should report regularly to the GeneralCouncil on the progress of the work in the dedicated sessions.
7   As had been stated in the first report,
the CTD had formally begun this work by holding its first dedicated session on 25 April 2002.  A
submission for that meeting had been made jointly by Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, and Trinidad and Tobago (WT/COMTD/SE/W/1).The small-economy Members had been requested to take into account the comments on their
document and to develop a road map to present at the second dedicated session.
                                                     
7 Document WT/L/447WT/GC/M/75
Page 45
163. The second dedicated session had been held on 1 July 2002.  For that meeting, a submission
had been made by Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mauritius
and Sri Lanka (WT/COMTD/SE/W/3).  Since then, Cuba, El Salvador, Fiji, Nicaragua and Paraguay
had added their names to the list of Members co-sponsoring the paper.  A second submission had been
received from Macao, China (WT/COMTD/SE/W/2).  Both documents had been introduced and therehad been an initial discussion of them.  The submission in WT/COMTD/SE/W/3 was substantial, and
as most delegations had seen it for the first time at the meeting itself, they had been unable to provide
substantive comments.  However, several delegations had given their preliminary comments on the
paper as well as the procedure for dealing with the issues it contained.  The Secretariat had prepared
and circulated a paper on small economies (WT/COMTD/SE/W/4).  Further research and analysis
requested by the small-economy Members would be undertaken by the Secretariat.  It was his
intention to convene an informal meeting soon after the summer break, tentatively on10 September 2002, to discuss these issues.  Thereafter, discussions would be held in the next
dedicated session in early October.  He hoped th at Members would continue their work on fulfilling
the mandate given in paragraph 35 of the Doha Declaration and the instructions to the CTD given by
the General Council on 1 March 2002
164. The representative of Mauritius, speaking on behalf of the small-economy Members
,
welcomed the intention of the Chairman of the CTD to hold consultations on 10 September and
expressed the hope that these consultations would be fruitful.
165. The representative of the United States said that her delegation was ready and willing to
continue to work with interested delegations to iden tify and examine the issues relating to the trade of
small economies in order to move forward on this initiative.
166. The General Council took note of the statements and of the report by the Chairman of the
dedicated sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development.
13. Committee on Rules of Origin – Report by the Chairman of the Committee to the
General Council (G/RO/52)
167. The Chairman recalled that at its meeting in December 2001, the General Council had agreed
that the Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO) should hold two additional sessions in the first half of
2002 to resolve remaining issues under the harmoniza tion work programme (HWP), and that in the
process, it might identify a limited number of core policy-level issues which in its view needed to be
reported to the General Council for discussion and decision at that level.  It had also been agreed that
the outcome of the CRO's further work would be reported by the Chairman of the Committee, on his
own responsibility, to the General Council at its first regular meeting after the end of June 2002, at
which point the matter would be in the hands of the General Council.  The General Council hadfurther agreed that the deadline for completion of the HWP would be extended to the end of 2002.
168. Mr. Costa Filho (Brazil), Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Origin, speaking on
behalf of Mr. Moser (Switzerland), Chairman of th e Committee, said that the report to the General
Council in G/RO/52 was being made by the Chairman of the Committee on his own responsibility.
He recalled that in December 2001, the General Council had agreed on a specific mandate for theCRO.  Accordingly, the CRO had held two sessi ons in April and June 2002 during which it had
resolved 18 outstanding issues.  As indicated in G/RO/52, the number of issues resolved in 2002
compared to the 300 issues resolved in 2001 was quite modest, and it was clear that the encouraging
progress made in 2001 had slowed in 2002.  He noted that issues informally agreed in 2001 and 2002
were still pending formal approval in the CRO.  As mandated by the General Council at its meeting inJune 2002, the CRO had forwarded 93 product-specific core policy issues (paragraph 3 of G/RO/52),
as well as one overarching issue, the so-called "implications issue" (paragraph 4 of G/RO/52), to the
General Council for discussion and decision.  In view of the relatively high number of core policyWT/GC/M/75
Page 46
issues and the likely difficulties in addressing these issues, the Chairman had included in the report,
on his own responsibility, the recommendation that the General Council first focus on 12 of the
94 core policy issues (paragraph 5 of G/RO/52).  One of the 12 issues, the implications issue, had
been identified by several delegations as the main stumbling block to progress in the CRO's
work and was closely related, among other things, to the problem of circumvention of anti-dumpingprocedures, and the application of SPS measures and quota regulations.  The implications issue had
first been raised in 1998, and paragraph 4 of G/RO/52 referred to the relevant paragraphs of the
minutes of the Committee's discussions on this issue.  He suggested that delegations read through
those minutes during the summer break in order to grasp the full impact of this issue.  If the General
Council could reach a common understanding on the im plications issue, a major breakthrough would
be possible that would facilitate the conclusion of the HWP for non-preferential rules of origin.  This
was also true for the 11 other core policy issues.
169. The Chairman thanked the CRO Vice-Chairman for the report and recommendations, and for
the efforts made in the Committee to bring this matte r to a close.  However, although the pace of the
HWP had picked up in November 2000, that encouraging progress had recently slowed.  As a result,
Members were faced with a considerable number of outstanding issues to tackle in a very short time.
As Members had agreed in December 2001, this matter was now in the hands of the General Council.Taking into account the CRO Chairman's recommendations, he proposed holding a first General
Council meeting on this matter, concentrating on the 12 core policy issues proposed by the CRO
Chairman in paragraph 5.1 of G/RO/52.  Given the complexity of the questions to be resolved, he
suggested that in cooperation with the CRO Chairman, consultations be held after the summer recess
to prepare and organize that meeting.  In order to make further progress and meet the deadline of31 December 2002, he encouraged delegations to reflect on this matter during the summer break and
to seek new ways of resolving the outstanding problems.
170. The representative of Japan
8 supported the Chairman's procedural proposal and commented
on the question of the relationship between harmonized rules of origin and domestic regulations, and
on the value-added rule.  The CRO had begun work on the HWP seven years earlier, and Japan hopedthat the deadline of 31 December 2002 set by the General Council would be met.  Regarding the
implications of the harmonized rules of origin on other WTO agreements, in its communication in
G/RO/W/74 Japan had stressed the need to clarify the relationship between the harmonized rules of
origin on the one hand, and domestic consumer labelling requirements on foods and sanitary and
phytosanitary measures on the other.  The line of thinking that seemed to be broadly shared by
Members in the CRO was the following:  (i) the policy objectives of Members regarding domestic
consumer labelling on foods, or sanitary and phytosanitary measures, were quite different from theobjectives of origin determination for customs purposes, which were to be enforced under the
harmonized rules of origin;  (ii) since these objectives were not mutually exclusive and there was no
hierarchy between them, there should be no conf lict between them;  they were supplementary in
nature and should coexist without any particular difficulties.  Although this line of thinking might not
be a definitive conclusion in a legal sense, it prov ided useful guidelines as a working basis, thus
providing comfort to Members for continuing the current harmonization process in the General
Council.  In this regard, Japan requested that the details of the discussions in the CRO under the HWP
be recorded in an appropriate form, such as, for exam ple, in the formal report of the Chairman of the
Committee to be attached to the final results of the HWP.  Japan was prepared to show further
flexibility on many of the product-specific issues related to agricultural products, provided thisrequest was accorded.
171. In Japan's view, harmonized rules of origin should not create a new trade obstacle and should
be easily usable by customs officials as well as trading business people.  Harmonized rules of origin
were to be used for all non-preferential purposes.  This meant that they covered a very broad range of
                                                     
8 The full text of the statement was subsequently circulated in WT/GC/63.WT/GC/M/75
Page 47
trade cargo.  For example, trade statistics would be prepared on the basis of non-preferential
harmonized rules of origin.  Adoption of the value-added rule for harmonized rules of origin would be
very burdensome on companies as well as on customs officials.  Moreover, adoption of the value-
added rule would not only run counter to the fund amental objective of trade facilitation, but would
also lead to a situation in which the origin of a product might change daily, depending on changes inexchange rates or other cost factors.  This would be detrimental to transparency, consistency and
predictability.  The value-added rule would compromise impartiality and neutrality, and Japan
therefore strongly opposed its adoption.
172. The representative of India recalled that pursuant to Article 9.2(a) of the Agreement on Rules
of Origin, the HWP was to be initiated as soon as possible after the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement and completed within three years of initiation.  That three-year period was long past.  In
December 2001 the General Council had extended the deadline for completion of the HWP to the endof 2002.  In his report in G/RO/52, the CRO Chairman  had indicated that 138 issues still needed to be
resolved.  While much had been done since 1995 under the HWP, much still remained to be done.
Recognizing the trade-facilitation potential of harm onized non-preferential rules of origin, India was
convinced that clear and predictable harmonized non-preferential rules of origin were essential to
facilitate the flow of international trade and to reduce unnecessary obstacles to trade.  The HWP waspart of the unfinished agenda of the Uruguay Round.  India recognized that the hard work done by
Members actively participating in the CRO meetings and the flexibility shown on several issues had
made progress possible.  India was also appreciative of the work of the CRO Chairman and the
Secretariat in trying to find a solution to contentious issues.  His delegation was disappointed that this
work had not led to the completion of the HWP, but welcomed the mechanism by which the GeneralCouncil would take over that work with a view to completing it within the shortest possible time.
173. Among the core policy issues identified in G/RO/52, India had strong concerns relating to the
agriculture and textile sectors, as well as footwe ar and marine products.  In India's view, certain
restrictive origin rules in the textiles sector proposed by some Members would not serve the purpose
of a liberal trade regime.  In the agriculture sector, India had concerns about conferring origin tocountries on account only of minimal operations like mi xing.  A rule of origin should not confer an
artificial origin on considerations merely of trade interest, but on the principle of what constituted the
last substantial transformation.  With respect to fish products, the rule of origin should be harmonized
with the rights of the coastal states under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
However, India was willing to engage constructively on all issues in order to take the process forward.
174. Regarding the so-called "implications issue", which could alter the balance of rights and
obligations provided under the Agreement on Rules of Origin, his delegation had the impression thatsome Members wanted the adoption of harmonized non-preferential rules of origin to be optional.
Should such an approach be adopted, this would open the floodgates to disputes, and Members with
fewer resources and technical expertise would bear the brunt of the ill effects thereof.  That approach
would be in total conflict with the provisions of Articles 1.2 and 9.1(a) of the Agreement on Rules of
Origin.  India could not be a party to the burial of  the Agreement on Rules of Origin, to which such an
understanding would inexorably lead.  In its view, the progress that had been made was not sufficient.
A number of crucial issues pertaining to agriculture, fish and fish products, textiles, footwear,
machinery and chemicals, among other issues, remained on the table.  In order to end the deadlock,
new methods to resolve outstanding issues could be adopted.  One way might be to identify areas
where flexibility could be attempted on a cross-product sector basis.  India stood ready to considerany suggestions to carry the HWP forward in a constructive and positive spirit, and urged the General
Council to put in place an appropriate mechanism to ensure quick decision-making, so that the work
could be completed not later than December 2002.
175. The representative of Chile said that his delegation had concerns about the progress of this
work, as crucial matters had to be addressed, particularly in relation to the repercussions of these rulesWT/GC/M/75
Page 48
of origin. The Chairman's report reflected a strong divergence between Members as to the purpose of
harmonized rules of origin and made reference in paragraph 4.2 to a proposal by the CRO Chairman.
Paragraph 1 of that proposal stated that the harmonized rules of origin should be applied to
commercial policy instruments. This included, for example, those set out in Articles I, II, III, XI and
XIII of GATT 1994;  anti-dumping and countervailing duties under Article VI of GATT 1994; andsafeguard measures under Article XIX of GATT 1 994, among others.  Paragraph 2 of that proposal
stated that each Member should decide which rules of origin it would use.  Therefore, paragraph 2 of
the proposal nullified paragraph 1.  Consequently, Members would have to clear up that confusion,
and the consultations proposed by the Chairman were the most appropriate means to do that.
176. The representative of New Zealand said it was clear that although this issue was technical, its
political implications were very important.  Members had already faced this type of problem, where
the political implications of a technical issue could not be resolved at a technical level, but where itwas not simple to resolve the issue at a political level because the currency of the debate was
necessarily technical.  This was not a new conundrum, and the proposed procedure was appropriate.
This issue was serious and not pro forma.   Some flexibility had been shown in earlier interventions,
and provided Members kept in mind priorities, principles and ultimate objectives, real progress could
be made.  However, there was very little time.  New Zealand would participate in trying to solve thesubstantive technical and political issues within the proposed procedure.
177. The representative of Switzerland said his country regretted that the work on harmonizing
non-preferential rules of origin had not been completed, particularly as these rules played an essential
part in trade policy, insofar as they were used in the implementation of numerous trade policy
instruments.  In this regard, his delegation endorsed the general remarks at the beginning of India'sstatement.  Successful completion of the work on harmonization, in accordance with the terms of
reference, would constitute an important contribution to trade facilitation and the establishment of
stable and predictable market-access conditions.  Moreover, an agreement on the harmonization of
rules of origin would help prevent a number of po tential conflicts.  The report of the CRO Chairman
clearly indicated that the General Council should henceforth assume its share of responsibility in thisprocess.  Indeed, the CRO was currently encountering obstacles that it could no longer overcome
without a policy decision being taken.  In this regard, his delegation was grateful to the General
Council Chairman for his suggestions.  Switzerland be lieved it was the task of the General Council to
consider how to give a clear direction to future discussions on rules of origin, and therefore urged the
Chairman of the General Council to begin consultations on the 12 core issues identified by the CRO
Chairman in his report, especially the first indent of sub-paragraph 5.1 of that report, with a view to
determining the dimensions of the problems and to explore solutions which would allow Members toget out of the current impasse.
178. The representative of Brazil supported the proposal by the Chairman of the General Council
to hold consultations on this issue in cooperation with the CRO Chairman.  He wished to highlight
two of the main issues.  The first related to the implications of harmonized rules of origin on other
WTO agreements.   In his delegation's view there was no fundamental incompatibility between theAgreement on Rules of Origin and other WTO agreements.  A reading of the Agreement on Rules of
Origin clearly indicated that whenever a determination of origin was required under the provisions of
any WTO agreement, it was the harmonized non-preferential rules of origin that should be used.
What could not be envisaged was an interpretation that undermined the provisions of the Agreement
on Rules of Origin itself, which required that Members "apply rules of origin equally for all purposesas set out in Article 1".  Brazil was confident that a solution was within grasp.  With regard to the
other issue he wished to highlight, he recalled that in the preamble to the Agreement on Rules of
Origin, Members had recognized that "clear and predictable rules of origin and their application
facilitate the international flow of trade".  In D oha, Ministers had instructed continued work on trade
facilitation, with a view to possible negotiations after the Cancún Ministerial Conference.  Brazilwould rather view the conclusion of the HWP, as mandated by Ministers in Marrakesh, as a majorWT/GC/M/75
Page 49
trade-facilitation item, and one which would have a confidence-building impact if satisfactorily dealt
with.  Brazil supported the recommendations of the CRO  Chairman on the issues to be dealt with as a
matter of priority by the General Council, as this could give the impetus to the HWP required to meet
the current deadline.  The conclusion of the HWP was a matter of urgency on its own merits, but
could also be seen as a contribution to improved implementation of the Uruguay Round under morebalanced rights and obligations, and as an indispensable step in moving forward the work programme
established in Doha.
179. The representative of the Philippines said that her delegation attached utmost importance to
work on the HWP because of the contribution it woul d make to Members' trade-facilitation agenda.
The trade-facilitating objective of the HWP had also been an issue raised by Australia and New
Zealand, as identified in paragraph 4.3 of the repo rt in G/RO/52.  The comp letion of the HWP without
further delay would demonstrate to the global tradin g community Members' collective effort to ensure
clear and transparent rules.  These rules would not onl y facilitate the flow of goods across borders, but
would also help the trading community to reduce unnecessary transactions regarding compliance,
which in the end would benefit all consumers.  As such, her delegation was concerned by the inability
of Members to conclude the work despite several attempted deadlines.  This did not speak well of the
WTO, especially at a time when Members were working under strict deadlines to be able to deliver,by the time of the Ministerial Conference in Cancún, what Ministers had collectively agreed in Doha.
The HWP was unfinished business from the Uruguay Round and an implementation-related issue that
had to be concluded.  Failing to conclude it would result in yet more unfinished business.
180. In her delegation's view, efforts at technical resolution of the issues identified in the CRO
Chairman's report had been exhausted.  It was now time for the General Council to demonstratepolitical will and to make the necessary compromises on those issues.  The deliberations in the
General Council should not be a repeat, at a higher level, of the CRO Committee debates.  Agreement
on the list of core policy issues in the product-specific rules in paragraph 3 of G/RO/52 had been
reached with great difficulty and debate in the CRO.  Consensus had eluded the Committee because
on some issues, one or two delegations could not accept the majority view.  On the first indentidentified in Appendix 1, definition 2(i), which was the issue of origin of products of sea fishing, her
delegation believed that the origin rule should be consistent with the provisions of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea.  A good number of other product-specific issues belonged to the
agriculture and textiles sectors, which were very important for developing countries.  With regard to
the so-called implications issue in paragraph 4 of G/RO/52, her delegation did not understand this
issue, because in the Philippines' view there should be no incompatibility between the Agreement on
Rules of Origin and other WTO agreements.  Where a particular WTO agreement called for thedetermination of origin, it was the harmonized non-preferential rules of origin that should apply.
Some delegations seemed to have a different view.  Given this situation, her delegation was prepared
to work constructively in the General Council to find a fair solution that would enable some
delegations to be more forthcoming with regard to the resolution of product-specific rules.  The
Philippines agreed with the CRO Chair's recomme ndations outlined in paragraph 5 of G/RO/52 on
how the General Council should proceed.  As such, it agreed to the Chairman's proposal and
encouraged him to consult soon after the summer break.
181. The representative of Norway supported the Chairman's proposal and said that Members
should instruct the Chairman to take up consultati ons in the autumn with a view to preparing a
General Council meeting to discuss the 12 core policy issues identified by the CRO Chairman.  In thisregard, he wished to stress the following points:  fi rst, the harmonized rules should facilitate and not
hamper trade.  To achieve this objective, the rules should be simple and administered in a consistent,
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner.  They should not be used as instruments to pursue trade
objectives or to impose unduly strict requirements.  Second, the implications issue, as referred to by
the CRO Chairman, was very complex and had gradually surfaced as the major problem in the currentwork.  Such problems concerned the implications of rules of origin in relation to, inter alia,  SPS,WT/GC/M/75
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labelling and anti-dumping rules.  The various problems brought forward, although they might reflect
legitimate concerns, should not render the completion of the HWP impossible.  These problems could
be adequately addressed only in the respective Committees established for such purposes.
Completion of the HWP by the end of 2002 would demand discipline and flexibility from all parties,
as well as a willingness to prioritize and make compromises.  He was convinced that by taking thisissue up in the General Council and with Members' willingness, compromises would be found in the
consultations the Chairman would hold in the autumn.
182. The representative of China supported the Chairman's proposal to hold consultations after the
summer break.  Work under the HWP had been going on for seven years, and had set a certain record
in the history of the WTO.  This issue was of crucial importance to facilitate trade flows and avoid
potential trade obstacles between Members.  China therefore urged the parties concerned to adopt a
more positive attitude and to show more flexibility, so as to bring the HWP to an early conclusion.
183. The representative of Thailand commended the CRO Chairman's perseverance in trying to
bridge the disparate positions in order to fulfil the task mandated to the CRO.  However, progress on
the HWP in the first half of 2002 had been disappointing, since it was below Members' expectations
regarding the number of issues resolved thus far.  Thailand believed that Members, and more
particularly developing-country Members, could reap real benefits for market-access commitmentsonly if there was one single predictable rule on each issue under the HWP.  The HWP was at a critical
stage, and the Members concerned should exercise flexibility.  In this regard, his delegation supported
the CRO Chairman's recommendation that the Genera l Council take appropriate action on this issue.
However, in view of the deadline for completion of the HWP, the General Council should have a clear
work plan for how to deal with the 12 core policy-level issues, and should instruct the CRO tocontinue and to complete its work on the remaining core policy issues and make periodic progress
reports to the General Council.  There was no longer  any time to waste.  After six years of discussion
and several deadline extensions for the completion of the HWP, it was time for all Members to show
to the outside world the integrity and credibility of the organization.
184. The representative of Australia supported the Chairman's proposal that the General Council
accept the CRO Chairman's recommendations and consider the 12 core policy issues.  This support
was on the proviso that the remaining issues would also be dealt with in due course.  Australia shared
the Philippines' view that the General Council should  not simply elevate the technical discussion to a
higher level.  He sought clarification on the process for the examination of these issues.
185. The representative of Singapore said that over the past seven months, Members had managed
to make some progress on some of the outstanding is sues, albeit at a much slower pace compared to
2001.  As the Vice-Chairman had reported, 94 issues still needed to be resolved.  In this regard, hisdelegation supported the CRO Chairman's recommendation that the General Council should first
focus on the 12 core policy issues which he had identified.  Like previous speakers, Singapore hoped
that this matter would be resolved before the end of 2002.  It also hoped that the work to be
undertaken on the outstanding unresolved issues would not hold up progress in other areas where
negotiations were ongoing under the Doha Development Agenda.
186. The representative of the United States said that Members had come very far in work under
the HWP through the serious efforts and commitment of all delegations.  The United States remained
committed to meeting this objective.  There appeared to be a consensus emerging that a fundamental
cross-cutting issue had emerged as the linchpin for further progress, pertaining to the implications of
harmonized rules of origin for rights and obligations under other WTO agreements.  The UnitedStates was pleased to join with other Members in  seeking a solution to this issue.  It remained
committed to achieving, with others, a successful completion of the harmonization work, and
supported the Chairman's suggestion for the next steps to be taken.WT/GC/M/75
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187. The representative of Colombia supported the CRO Chairman's recommendations in
G/RO/52, as well the Chairman's proposal, in order to make progress on this matter.  Colombia was
flexible as to the steps to be taken for the completion of the pending work.  His delegation would
continue to participate actively in the CRO's work until the completion of the HWP before the end of
2002.  To this end, the CRO could make an additional effort and focus on the core issues identified byits Chairman in paragraph 5 of G/RO/52.  As to the remaining issues, delegations should leave aside
positions of principle and show flexibility in orde r to find points of convergence, and should accept
the recommendations that had resulted from the many technical discussions in the marathon working
sessions of the Committee.  Colombia supported the inclusion of the implications issue as part of the
core issues to be addressed.  To this end, the Secretariat should draw up a compendium of the
discussions thus far and positions expressed by Members, which would serve as guidance for this
discussion.
188. The representative of Pakistan said that his delegation also attached great importance to the
completion of the HWP and endorsed Norway's view  that the harmonized rules of origin should be
simple, easy to administer and, above all, should facilitate rather than restrict trade.  Pakistan therefore
welcomed the Chairman's suggestion to take up the core policy issues after the summer break with a
view to completing all of the work by the end of 2002.
189. The representative of the European Communitie s said that the Community shared the views
expressed by India.  With regard to the CRO Ch air's proposal regarding working procedures, as it
would be difficult to deal with all of the 94 items together, his delegation agreed to focus first on the
12 so-called crucial issues identified in G/RO/52.  This did not mean that the 82 remaining issues
were less important.  On the contrary, many of the latter were crucial to the Community.
190. The Chairman said that he wished to provide some clarification with respect to his procedural
proposal.  Following the recommendation of the CRO Chairman, the General Council would hold a
first meeting on the 12 issues identified in paragraph 5.1 of G/RO/52.  This meeting would be
preceded by consultations to be held by the General Council Chairman.  These 12 core policy-level
issues were horizontal issues, and it was understood that the resolution of the problems involved inconnection with these issues could have a positive impact on the resolution of the other 82 issues,
which had also been identified and had to be resolv ed by the General Council.  This would be the first
of several meetings that would deal with all 94 issues identified by the CRO.  Therefore, he was in no
way suggesting that the General Council would take up only these 12 core issues.  He would hold
consultations after the summer recess for the purpose of preparing and organizing this first meeting.
191. He then proposed that the General Council take note of the report by the Chairman of the
Committee on Rules of Origin in G/RO/52 and of the recommendations contained therein, as well as
of the statements by Members, and that it agree to hold a first meeting on the 12 issues identified in
the above-mentioned report.  This meeting would be  preceded by informal consultations after the
summer recess for the purpose of preparing and organizing the meeting.  It was understood that these
General Council-level meetings would deal with all of the issues identified by the Committee on
Rules of Origin in G/RO/52.
192. The General Council so agreed.
14. Council for Trade in Goods – Recommendations for appropriate action regarding
proposals contained in paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns relating to the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing
193. The Chairman recalled that pursuant to paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 of the Doha Ministerial
Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, the Council for Trade in Goods had beenWT/GC/M/75
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requested to examine two proposals relating to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, and to make
recommendations to the General Council by 31 July 2002 for appropriate action.
194. Mr. Supperamaniam (Malaysia), Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods, said that the
two proposals set out in paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 of the Doha Decision on Implementation-Related
Issues and Concerns related to the method of calculating quota growth rates under the Agreement onTextiles and Clothing (ATC).  The examination of the two proposals had begun in March and April,
with three informal meetings to discuss ways to appr oach this task.  It had been decided to begin the
examination at the formal meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) on 2 May, with a series
of informal sessions to examine the proposals in detail and prepare the draft report and
recommendations, along with the formal meetings to put matters on record.  This item had been on the
agenda of four formal meetings of the CTG in May, June and July, and had been discussed at eight
informal consultations during that period.  A great deal of documentation had been provided duringthis exercise in support of the arguments made at the meetings, in the form of statistics on trade
developments during the ATC period, as well as de tailed submissions setting out the positions of
Members.  It had become clear from the outset that there were fundamental differences between the
views and understandings of the restraining Members and those of the developing-country exporting
Members, on both the contents of the report and the recommendations.  Great effort had been made totry to present these views in a factual and balanced manner in a draft report.  Discussion of the draft
text had led to repeated demands for further points to be included, which in turn had resulted in
demands for balancing texts.  The draft report had been re-written repeatedly in order to accommodate
these requests.  However, the required consensus on the report and on the recommendations had not
been reached.  In view of this, there had been no alternative but to conclude the exercise withoutresults.  Consequently, he was not in a position to present a report with recommendations to the
General Council.
195. All delegations who spoke expressed gratitude to the CTG Chairman for his efforts and skill
in trying to achieve a positive outcome on the mandate given by Ministers on the two proposals on
textiles.
196. The representative of Hong Kong, China said that despite the CTG Chairman's efforts, the
CTG had not been able to come up with any recommendations, mainly because of the lack of
flexibility of the restraining Members.   He recalled that in paragraph 12 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration, Ministers had agreed to "attach the utmost importance to the implementation-related
issues and concerns raised by Members and are determined to find appropriate solutions to them".
They had also agreed in paragraph 3 of the preamble of the Decision on Implementation-Related
Issues and Concerns that "[T]he Ministerial Conference [is] determined to take concrete action toaddress issues and concerns that have been raised by many developing-country Members regarding
the implementation of some WTO Agreements and Decisions," and in paragraph 4 they had recalled
the General Council Decision of May 2000 to meet in special sessions to address outstanding
implementation issues and to assess the existing diff iculties, identify ways needed to resolve them,
and take decisions for appropriate action.  The specific mandate given by Ministers in paragraphs 4.4and 4.5 of that Decision consisted of two parts:  the CTG was first to examine the two proposals, and
then to make recommendations to the General Council by 31 July 2002 for appropriate action.
197. The restrained Members, including Hong Kong, China, had put forward detailed arguments in
favour of the two proposals at the CTG meetings on 2 May, 13 June and 23 July, as well as in the
numerous informal consultations.  In his delegation's view, the approval and implementation of thesemarket-enhancing proposals would go towards redressing the balance of rights and obligations under
the ATC, without requiring any modification to th e Agreement.  The International Textiles and
Clothing Bureau (ITCB) members had also submitted a 16-page document in the context of the
Second Major Review, which had comprehensively made the case that the balance in the ATC had
been impaired.  The detailed justifications provided by Hong Kong, China could be found in theWT/GC/M/75
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relevant minutes of the CTG meetings, in docume nt G/C/W/304, as well as in the statement his
delegation had made at the CTG meeting on 23 July.  Despite the clear and unambiguous mandate
given by Ministers, the CTG had not been able to come up with recommendations.  It was clear from
the Doha Decision that Ministers themselves did not, as they had some others, reject these two
proposals.  The inference from paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 of the Doha Decision was that Ministersexpected some progress and some recommendations.
198. The developing-country exporting Members had made it clear that they were open to any
possible means of making progress, however meagre, towards further progressive liberalization of
trade in textiles and clothing.  Members were not wedded to these two proposals as the only way
forward.  However, the response from restraining Members had been uniformly and totally negative.
The latter would not take one additional step beyond the absolute minimum legally required of them
under the ATC.  To justify such a lack of movement, it had been argued that the markets of therestraining Members were already opening up very quickly and could not bear any further
acceleration of imports.  The statistics showed that imports were indeed increasing, but in a highly
skewed way.  In the clothing sector of the US market, in which Hong Kong, China had the closest
interest, overall imports had increased in value terms by 74 per cent between 1994 and 2000.  This
impressive figure hidden the fact that the increase had been only 44 per cent for restrained suppliers,while it had been 220 per cent for unrestrained suppliers.  Even Canada, which was not so competitive
in the clothing sector, had recorded a 170 per cent increase.  In terms of import shares, the restrained
suppliers had dropped from 83 per cent to 69 per cent over that period, and Hong Kong, China from
12 per cent to 7 per cent.  The unrestrained suppliers' import share had increased from 17 per cent to
31 per cent.  The import increase from unrestrained suppliers was due largely to the combination ofcontinued quotas, high tariffs and very restrictive preference-qualifying local content rules
incorporated in preferential schemes.  These preferential schemes often required considerable input
from US domestic industrial sources.  This was another form of protectionism, and created a culture
of dependence among the beneficiaries, who in fact might do better in an open market.  These trends
and the ongoing protectionism exhibited meant that little was being done to prepare the domesticindustries in restraining markets for liberalized trade in textiles and clothing.  In fact, the US market
was being even more distorted as the end of the transitional period approached.  With regard to job
losses, it was obvious that the majority of these losses were at the instigation of the US domestic
manufacturers themselves, who were trying to make the most out of regional preferential schemes,
and the traditionally restrained suppliers could not be asked to bear the blame for this.
199. In the European Union market, the share of clothing imports from the restrained suppliers had
declined from 47 per cent to 43.5 per cent between 1994 and 2000.  The share of non-restrainedsuppliers had increased, while that of Hong Kong, China had decreased.  The question was what could
justify keeping under restraint exporters who accoun ted for much less than half – and a declining
share – of EU imports, especially at a time when restraints had even been eliminated on some
non-WTO Members.  As in the US market, restrained suppliers in the EU market should not be worse
off under the ATC, with its commitment to progressive liberalization, than they were under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement.  However, this appeared to be the case.  The legitimate expectations of many
exporters regarding what should have resulted from the implementation of the ATC had been
undermined.  It had been argued that the quota grow th rates had already been so high that that they
had become no barrier to trade.  Some greatly inflated statistics had been quoted in this respect.
However, on the basis of Hong Kong, China's analysis, for quotas that still remained in place, theaverage yearly pre-ATC growth rate had been 3.26 per cent for the EU and 3.84 per cent for the US.
For the period 1995-97, these rates had increased to 3.78 per cent for the EU and 4.45 per cent for the
US.  For the period 1998-2001, these had been 4.72 per cent for the EU and 5.56 per cent for the US.
Such figures did not translate to significant additional access resulting from the operation of the ATC.
Meanwhile, the number of embargoes placed on certain categories as a result of full utilization ofquotas had been increasing.  The argument had also been put forward in some instances that
restraining Members would only be prepared to increase their market access on a reciprocal basis,WT/GC/M/75
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through the lowering of tariffs of developing-country exporting Members.  This did not compare like
with like.  One could not equate the removal of GATT-inconsistent quantitative restrictions with the
lowering of GATT-bound tariffs.  Members should remember that they were now engaged in
negotiations in which the issue of tariffs all around could be addressed.  Furthermore, the restraining
Members' sudden conversion to the cause of reciprocal market access in textiles and clothing came ata suspiciously late time, just over two years before Members were legally bound to eliminate
quantitative restrictions under the ATC.  Hong Kong, China would no doubt become an exception
even if the principle of reciprocal market access were to be embraced, since its market had always
been completely open.  It had also been argued that agreeing to the two proposals would require a
change in the ATC.   However,  the ATC stipulated minima, but not ceilings, in terms of growth rates.
Therefore, no change would be required.
200. He believed that the CTG discussion had demonstrated that it was not the ATC that would
need to be changed, but rather the undertakings and promises given by governments in the restraining
countries to their domestic industries.  This was an entirely different matter.  It was clear that the
restraining Members refused to budge on this issue.  Hong Kong, China had never harboured any
illusions on this count.  As it was familiar with the power of the textiles lobbies in the importing
countries and the susceptibility of the governments concerned to their arguments, Hong Kong, Chinadid not expect any substantive benefit from that exercise and therefore was not disappointed.
However, WTO Members would have to take into account more broadly the following:  a number of
developing-country Members had implementation c oncerns regarding some of the Uruguay Round
agreements, including the ATC;  they had joined  the consensus to launch the Doha Development
Agenda partly on the basis that these concerns would be addressed;  and textiles and clothing was akey sector for their development.  Accordingly, Hong Kong, China was concerned that the total
rejection of these proposals might have a negative effect on the Doha Development Agenda and
would be seen as requiring rebalancing elsewhere in the Agenda.  Therefore, the issue of ATC
implementation was of interest to the WTO membership as a whole.  In this context, in its Hanoi
Communiqué dated 23 May 2002, the ITCB Council had stressed that "the engagement of developingcountries in the Doha Development Agenda is predicated on full delivery of the Uruguay Round
legacy, in particular the commitment to fully and faithfully integrate trade in textiles and clothing into
the normal disciplines of the WTO".  The fact that the CTG had not been able to make any
recommendation to the General Council meant that the second part of the mandate had not been
fulfilled.  Under these circumstances, these proposals were now back in the domain of the General
Council, performing the function of the Minister ial Conference between Ministerial Conferences.
201. The representative of Pakistan
9, referring to the trade policy review of the European
Communities on 24 and 26 July, said that a point had been raised on the question of whether the EU
had considered compensating developing countrie s for serious impediments to their growth and
development, as the result of the Community's trad e policies in key sectors, especially textiles and
clothing.  In an ideal world, the answer would have  been affirmative.  Developing countries had been
called upon to make tremendous sacrifices in accepting to live under quota restrictions on theirexports for over 40 years.  In the Uruguay Round, they had also had to make significant concessions
to secure a progressive and gradual phase-out of these restrictions.  Despite seven and a half years of
the ATC, however, the promise of progressive quota elimination had remained only a hope.  This was
due to the rather ineffectual implementation by  major restraining Members of their commitments
under the ATC.  Developing countries, including Pakistan, had made a comprehensive casedemonstrating that ATC implementation had impaired the balance of the Agreement to their
disadvantage.  Virtually all quota restrictions remained in place. Other actions had also been
responsible for disrupting the balance of the ATC, such as a number of safeguard actions without
justification under the ATC, most of which had been found by the Textiles Monitoring Board or
dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body to be inconsistent with ATC obligations.  New
                                                     
9 The full text of the statement was circulated in WT/GC/64.WT/GC/M/75
Page 55
restrictions had been imposed, including on imports from Pakistan.  Rules of origin had been changed.
Anti-dumping actions had been initiated, causing great damage to the exports of developing countries,
including in products that had already been under severe quota restrictions.  Losses in business and
import shares had taken place.  Some restrictions had then been withdrawn on non-WTO Members,
while kept on WTO Members.  The principles of equity and non-discrimination had therefore beendiscarded.  The restraining Members had not contested these facts.  While developing countries had
made written submissions based on facts and figures, restraining Members had merely made oral
remarks, with the exception of the United States, which had made a written submission.  The US
submission had essentially made three points:  first, that the proposals would require modifying the
ATC;  second, that as imports had generally been increasing under the ATC, the ATC implementation
should be deemed to be on track and without proble ms;  and third, that the proposals would subvert
the balance of the ATC.  At the CTG meeting of 23 July, the US submission had been considered anda number of delegations had proved the US reasoning to be unconvincing.  While detailed records of
that meeting would have to be awaited, those inte rested could refer to documents G/C/W/404 and 405.
These documents reproduced the statements made at the CTG by Pakistan and Hong Kong, China, in
which it was pointed out that implementing these proposals would require no modification of the ATC
or of the domestic legislation of the restraining Members.  The purported increases in imports werenot the result of ATC implementation, but rather of the preferential arrangements made by major
restraining Members of their own volition.  The proposals would go towards correcting the imbalance
created by the implementation of the ATC rather than disrupting it.  The adoption of the proposals
would be beneficial not only for restrained developing-country Members, but would also assist
restraining Members in fulfilling their commitment to fully implement the Agreement.  This could
result in a win-win situation and would be beneficial to restrained Members, restraining Members and
consumers.  Furthermore, it would be a positive and concrete signal to the outside world that the
WTO system could be responsive to calls from developing countries.
202. His delegation had been disappointed that the CTG had not been in a position to produce a
consensus report with recommendations to the General Council.  This issue involved an importantmandate by Ministers and an equally important element of the Doha Development Agenda.  Its
satisfactory resolution was critical to the confidence of developing countries in the Doha work
programme.  The General Council should now play its role in taking up and fulfilling the Ministerial
mandate in accordance with its responsibility in the interval between Ministerial Conferences.
203. The representative of China said that the failure of the CTG to fulfil the mandate given by
Ministers in Doha was due to the stringent attitude of restraining Members, even though the ATC
provided the possibility for Members to adopt the two proposals.   At the CTG meeting of 23 July, therestraining Members had recognized that adoption of the two proposals would not require amendment
to or reopening of the ATC, since the ATC merely  provided for minimum thresholds for increases in
growth rates.   Regrettably, these Members had c hosen not to take any appropriate action on the two
proposals.  His delegation fully endorsed the comprehensive analysis and comments made by Pakistan
and Hong Kong, China.  As this was an important implementation issue of great interest todeveloping-country Members and a part of the Doha  Development Agenda, this failure was contrary
to Ministers' commitments in the Doha Declaration, which stated that they were "determined to take
concrete action to address issues and concerns that have been raised by many developing-country
Members regarding the implementation of some WTO Agreements and Decisions".  Restrained
Members had expressed their concerns over the manner in which restraining Members hadimplemented various provisions of the ATC.  Un disputed facts were contained in the submissions
(G/C/W/368, 304, 325 and 339) by developing-country exporting Members to the CTG to facilitate its
examination of the two proposals and in the context of the Second Major Review.  Adopting the two
proposals would not only benefit exporting Members, but also restraining Members by facilitating
their internal industrial adjustment.  It was clear that one important benefit of the multilateral tradingsystem was to facilitate domestic reform and adju stment.  It was hard to imagine that industrial
adjustment in restraining Members would become easier when most of the quotas were to beWT/GC/M/75
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eliminated at the very end of the implementation period of the ATC, i.e. 1 January 2005.  It was also
clear that the textiles and clothing sector played a significant role in the economic and social
development of developing-country Members.  The unsatisfactory implementation of the ATC in the
past seven and a half years had greatly weakened the confidence of developing-country Members in
the multilateral trading system.  The failure to adopt these two proposals would also send a negativesignal to the outside world about the ability of the multilateral trading system to address the problems
and concerns of developing countries.  It would also unavoidably affect Members' enthusiasm for
other issues of the Doha Development Agenda.  In order to restore and maintain developing-country
Members' confidence, his delegation urged the General Council to address this issue.
204. The representative of Brazil said that the issue of implementation of the ATC was of great
importance to the developing countries in the overall balance of the Doha work programme.  Textiles
constituted a key sector in terms of generating revenue for developing counties.  In the context of aso-called "development round", one would have expected a little more flexibility on the part of the
restraining Members.  According to paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, the CTG had been required to "make recommendations
to the General Council by 31 July 2002 for appropriate action".  For well-known reasons, this had not
been possible and the mandate had therefore not been fulfilled.   The implementation of the ATC hadnot met the expectations of developing countries in respect of enhanced market-access opportunities
for textiles and clothing exports in the restraining countries' markets.  The process of implementation
of the ATC by restraining Members, who were leaving the large bulk of quotas in place until the end
of the transitional period, had caused serious imbalance to exporters' rights.  The purpose of the ATC
was to secure a progressive phase-out of quota restrictions during the transition period.  Therestraining Members, however, seemed to pay little attention to this element of progressiveness.  In
terms of trade, barely 20 per cent of imports that had been under specific quota restrictions had been
liberalized.  The approval and implementation of th e two proposals would partly redress the balance.
The CTG had a specific mandate to take appropriate decisions to ensure that the balance of rights
embodied in the ATC had not been impaired.  The two proposals fell within the existing provisions ofthe ATC, and their adoption would not require any modification in the Agreement or in the domestic
legislation of the restraining countries.  The dissatisfaction of his delegation was amplified by the fact
that the absence of results in implementation had b ecome the rule rather than the exception.  Brazil
hoped that this situation would be corrected in the near future and that Ministers' instructions on an
issue of fundamental importance to developing countries would be fulfilled.
205. The representative of Bangladesh associated his delegation fully with the statement by Hong
Kong, China.  As a developing country, Bangladesh appreciated the goodwill of the WTO
membership for issues of concern to Bangladesh.  Special provisions were embedded in the WTO
agreements that were designed to enable developing countries to develop more rapidly.  Members,
both developed and developing, recognized that developing countries had problems that demanded
special attention and treatment until these countries were able to engage in this phase of globalization
as equal partners.  Bangladesh had been gratified when, in the Doha Declaration, Ministers had statedthat "we shall continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate
with the needs of their economic development."  This was a reaffirmation of the will of the
community in this respect.  Moreover, the Doha Declaration reflected a compromise.  Each country
had accepted the decisions in a spirit of cooperation and accommodation.  Members might recall thatBangladesh had asked for much more in the area of textiles, but had accepted what had emerged out
of the process of negotiations, on the basis that what had been agreed upon would be taken seriously.
Consequently, Bangladesh had been extremely hopeful with regard to the outcome of these two
outstanding proposals relating to textiles and clothing.  Members were aware of the key role that
export-led growth now played in restrained economie s. Textiles were the thrust sector for their
growth, for exports, and also for the relative ease  with which they were able to provide employment.
Many countries that were now developed had relied on the textiles industry in their early stages ofWT/GC/M/75
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development, and therefore might appreciate these concerns.  Bangladesh  had been eagerly
anticipating a successful result, especially as its quota entitlements for some of its major export items
to the largest single import market were almost fully utilized.  For example, seven months into the
quota year, 75 per cent of Bangladesh's quota for 2002 for cotton knit shirts had already been filled.
Likewise, 76 per cent of its quota for cotton and man-made fibre skirts, 95 per cent for cotton trousers,and 70 per cent for man-made fibre trousers had already been utilized.  Although not directly related
to the two proposals, he wished to point out th at Bangladesh's products faced the highest tariff
barriers, compared with other products from developed countries.  These restrictions were a severe
barrier to the country's export possibilities.  For th e first time in two decades, Bangladesh's total
export earnings in the 2001-2002 fiscal year had dropped.  Bangladesh was disappointed that the CTG
had not come to any conclusion with respect to  the examination of the two proposals for making
recommendations for action to the General Council, in  keeping with the mandate from Ministers.  He
recalled that the Ministerial decision in favour of least-developed countries adopted at the conclusion
of the Uruguay Round provided that various agreements should be applied in a flexible and supportive
manner for the least-developed countries.  To this effect, sympathetic consideration should be given to
specific and motivated concerns raised by least-developed countries in the appropriate Councils in the
WTO.  Unfortunately, two major restraining countries had not given any effect to Bangladesh'sspecific concerns or to the implementation of the relevant provisions of the ATC in favour of
least-developed countries.  Bangladesh had repeatedly raised its concern with respect to this situation,
including during the consideration of implementation-related issues prior to the Doha Ministerial
Conference, the major review of ATC implementati on, and in connection with the examination of the
two proposals by the CTG.
206. The proposals in paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 of the Doha Ministerial Decision had been designed
to enhance market-access opportunities for developing countries.  The adoption of paragraph 4.4, in
particular, could alleviate the market-access constraints on Bangladesh's exports and would be a
concrete manifestation of the goodwill to which he ha d referred earlier.  In the examination of the two
proposals, Bangladesh had not been convinced by the reasons put forward by the restraining Membersagainst their adoption. Contrary to the claim that they would disrupt the balance in the ATC, their
adoption was necessary to redress the imbalance that had been created due to the manner in which the
restraining Members had been implementing the ATC.  However, he expressed appreciation to those
countries providing Bangladesh free access to their markets.  In 2001, the European Union had given
considerable access to its markets, through the Everything-But-Arms initiative.  Norway had
announced significant market-access opportunities for the LDCs, while Canada had also announced
its desire to eliminate all quota restrictions on exports from LDCs as from 1 January 2003.Bangladesh would have hoped for a similar dispensation from the other major developed country that
maintained quota restrictions on its exports.  As the CTG had been unable to come up with a
recommendation, it was now for the General Council to deal with the mandate given by Ministers in
Doha.  This issue was an important element of the Doha work programme and the WTO membership
should continue its efforts to find a solution to it for the remaining years of the ATC.
207. The representative of the European Communities
10 said that the intensive discussions
concerning the implementation of the ATC, which had lasted several months, were now coming to an
end.  The process of integration of the textiles and clothing sector under the normal rules of the WTO
was in its seventh and a half year, and all Members were committed to the full and faithful
implementation of the ATC, which included the termination of the ATC on 1 January 2005.  Inaddition, as the report on the second stage of the ATC had pointed out, all countries had been living
up to their commitments.  There might have been disagreements on a number of issues, but overall
things were well on track.  Against this background, the Community wished to stress several points.
First, regarding compliance with their ATC obligatio ns, the restraining Members had proceeded to the
different stages of integration of products under the ATC.  More than 51 per cent of their imports in
                                                     
10 The statement was subsequently issued in WT/GC/65.WT/GC/M/75
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1990 volume terms had now been freed and subject to normal WTO rules.  In the Community's case,
82 quotas had been eliminated in the second and third stages of integration.  The Community had not
used the temporary safeguard mechanism of Article 6 of the ATC one single time.  The Community
noted with satisfaction that the use of this safeguard mechanism had decreased and almost fallen into
disuse.  Second, facts showed that the ATC had made a difference when it came to exports fromrestrained Members in real life.  In the EU, between 1994 and 2001, its imports from all WTO
countries which were subject to one or more quotas had grown between 1994 and 2001 by 58 per
cent, to reach €72.2 billion in 2001, accounting for one-third of its total consumption of textile
products and garments.  In that same period, its imports from the same WTO countries of products
subject to quota had grown by 66 per cent.  The latter  growth was not only higher than growth of all
textiles and clothing imports from those countries, but also four percentage points higher than the
growth of all textiles and clothing imports from all countries.  Such relatively good performance ofimports into the EU of products subject to quotas could only be explained by a combination of two
factors.  First, EU quotas vis-à-vis WTO Members had increased steadily.  They had almost doubled
in volume between 1994 and 2001. This was also due to the ATC provisions for accelerated growth.
Second, many of the EU quotas were not very much utilized and therefore were not often a major
restriction to imports.  In 2001, out of a total of 299 quotas applied vis-à-vis WTO countries, only 40had been utilized at 95 per cent or more, representing 13.4 per cent of the total number of quotas.
Total EU textiles and clothing imports under quota had represented over the last few years a
consistently low share of total textiles and clothing imports, between 23 and 25 per cent only.
208. Other factors could explain the performance of non-EU suppliers, and especially from
developing countries, which were by far the Community's largest suppliers.  These were low customduties and the absence of technical barriers to trade.  The average EU import duty of 9 per cent in the
sector was amongst the lowest in the world, and there were no tariff peaks, as its customs duties did
not exceed 12 per cent.  Moreover, the EU did not maintain any quotas against least-developed
countries, which benefited from duty exemption for te xtiles and clothing.  Some 40 per cent of the
Community's imports entered duty free, almost all from developing countries.  Over one third of EUimports from developing countries benefited from reduced customs duties under the Community's
GSP scheme.  Over 90 per cent of yearly increases in EU imports in this sector were accounted for by
developing countries.  The EU had an integrated internal market with no technical or administrative
barriers on textiles and clothing imports.  The EU textiles and clothing industry had taken a full share
of the brunt of this steady market opening in th e sector.  In 1995, that industry had comprised 132,162
firms and had employed 2,549,100 people;  in 2001, these figures were 112,968 companies and
2,117,200 people, representing drops of 17 per cent and 20 per cent respectively, mostly in areasexperiencing difficulties of industrial decline in the EU.  With regard to EU compliance, he said that it
should be noted that EU textiles and clothing imports bore no comparison with the very low levels of
imports of many of those countries that were insisting most that the EU and other countries proceed to
faster liberalization of their markets, beyond their ATC obligations.  As shown in document
G/C/W/402, imports of some of these countries, not only from the EU but also from amongthemselves, were almost negligible for clothing and very modest for textiles.  At the Community's
request, the WTO Secretariat had provided comparative information on Members' bound and applied
duty rates (G/C/W/406), in order to enable them to make an assessment of the various market-access
conditions.  As compared with the so-called "exporting countries", the EU duty rates were
considerably lower.  The 9 per cent average duties of the Community contrasted with the duties ofother Members which were bound at higher levels or not bound at all.  The average bound levels were
20 per cent for some countries and 30 to 35 per cent for others.
209. Regarding the request for "rebalancing" the ATC, he would concentrate on paragraph 4.5 of
the Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation, since, regarding paragraph 4.4, the EU had already
been applying the most favourable methodology for imports from small suppliers. The Communityunderstood that the restrained Members would like to have increased access to markets such as its
own.  However, the Community failed to see any ne ed for rebalancing, as its alleged non-complianceWT/GC/M/75
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with its ATC obligations had not been proved.  The proposals for a recalculation of the "growth-on-
growth" provisions would introduce a new commitment absent in the ATC, which had established
very precise calculations for the acceleration of the growth rates of quotas.  In the Community's case,
this would require a change of current legislation, as increases in quotas could take place only as
implementation of agreements or stand-alone legal acts that would need to be properly justified.  Inthis regard, it would be very difficult to justify a concession to a number of countries which, in many
instances, had not opened up their textiles and clothing markets in any meaningful way so as to enable
the EU to export its products into those potential mark ets.  It would also be very difficult to justify a
concession that would benefit many countries that were not WTO Members at the time of negotiation
of the ATC, and which could therefore not hold any legitimate expectation from the implementation
of the ATC.
210. The ATC was designed to put an end to thirty years of textiles and clothing quotas.  It was a
very finely balanced instrument and one of the cornerstones of the WTO.  The EU had done its share
of adjustment in the sector, prompted by consta nt market opening.  Unfortunately, many other
countries were not taking real steps to secure a level playing field in textiles trade worldwide. This
was worrying because the EU was the largest textiles exporter in the world and the second largest
combined exporter of textiles and garment products.  The Community considered that textiles tradeshould not be a one-way affair.  While reasserting its commitment to ending the quota system in 2005,
the Community did not believe that much could be gained by maintaining what amounted to a certain
re-reading of the ATC, which had been agreed by all WTO Members.
211. The representative of Thailand, speaking also on behalf of Indonesia
 said that these
delegations were disappointed that the CTG had been unable to fulfil its mandate on either the
examination of the proposals or on making any recommendations to the General Council.  Such a
situation was the result of the inflexible approach adopted by the major developed restraining
Members.  It was universally recognized that the implementation of the ATC had not lived up to its
billing.  The large bulk of quota restrictions still remained in place after more than seven years of the
ATC implementation period.  In a number of instances the rights due to developing-country restrainedMembers had not been faithfully delivered.  Thus, the promise of the ATC to developing countries
had not been delivered.  On the contrary, there was ample evidence that the manner in which
restraining Members had been implementing the ATC had led to a situation of serious imbalance, to
the disadvantage of restrained developing-country Members.  In his delegation's view, the reasons put
forward by the restraining Members to justify this imbalance were not convincing.  Under these
circumstances, his delegation believed that the Ge neral Council should now consider how to deal with
the situation, in order to fulfill the mandate given by Ministers in Doha.
212. The representative of Panama said that the process in which Members were currently engaged
would lead to the termination of the ATC on 1 January 2005.  His delegation had sympathy for those
Members that defended the opening of a market w ith trade barriers.  Panama's clothing industry,
though small compared with others, had managed to survive the opening of its market to international
trade and was prepared to compete and possibly increase its market share.  However, his delegationhad concerns with respect to the positions that had emerged from the discussions on the phasing-out
of the ATC.  In these discussions, the needs of small industries such as those in Panama seemed to
have been overlooked.  Panama would pay particular attention to any initiative under the phasing-out
procedure that would result in an increase in the shar es of traditional exporters to the detriment of the
small industries which were currently engaged in a preparatory process for 2005.
213. The representative of India recalled that in paragraph 12 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration,
Ministers had attached the utmost importance to the implementation-related issues and concerns
raised by Members and had expressed their determination to find appropriate solutions to them.  The
CTG had been given the clear mandate to examine the two textile proposals contained in paragraph 4
in the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns and to make recommendation to theWT/GC/M/75
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General Council by 31 July 2002 for appropriate action.  Like the EU, his delegation also wished to
provide statistics to justify India's position.  Clothing imports shares from the restrained countries had
declined from 83 per cent in 1995 to 69 per cent in 2000 in the US market, and from 48 per cent in
1995 to 43 per cent in 2000 in the EU market.  That share had slightly increased in Canada only, from
69 per cent in 1995 to 70 per cent in 2000.  As shown in the Secretaria t document (G/C/W/366),
during the period 1994-2000, the market share of textiles and clothing of restrained Members exports
had declined from 77 per cent to 66 per cent in the US market, and from 46 per cent to 43 per cent in
the EU market.  India's annual growth rate of expo rts in value terms to the US market had been 17.7
per cent in the period 1990-94 and had come down to 10.3 per cent during the period 1995-2000.  In
the EU market, that annual average rate had been 11 per cent for the period 1990-94 and had
decreased to a negative growth rate of 0.8 per cent for the period 1995-2000.  With respect to India's
market access conditions, the quantitative restrictions on most textiles products had been removed,peak rates had been slashed and the rates currently applied were far below the bound rates.  India's
textile imports had increased from US$ 1.168 bill ion in 2000/2001 to US$ 1.535 billion in 2001/2002,
representing an increase of 31.4 per cent.  India's textile sector provided employment to 35 million
persons and indirect employment to another 58 million.
214. Developing-country exporting Members had repeatedly expressed concerns about the
implementation of the ATC.  These related to lack of meaningful integration of retrained categories,
unjustified anti-dumping actions on products already under quota restrictions, and other customs and
administrative formalities, including changes in ru les of origin and other issues affecting market
access of developing-country exporting Members.  Most of the quotas would remain in place until the
end of the ATC, against the objective and purpose of the Agreement of a gradual and progressivephase-out of quota restrictions.  In India's case, 95 per cent of its apparel, fabric and yarn trade would
remain non-integrated with some of its major trading partners even after the third stage.  During the
Second Major Review of the ATC implementatio n, ITCB members had demonstrated how the
balance of rights and obligations had been impaired to the detriment of developing-country exporting
Members (G/C/W/304).  In a joint submission wi th the ITCB (G/C/W/368) and at the CTG meetings
over the last three months, developing-country exporting countries had made a strong case, backed by
logic and facts, arguing for the acceptance of these proposals.  They had emphasized that adoption of
these two proposals would not require any modification in the ATC and would go some way toward
redressing that imbalance.  However, India was disappointed that restraining Members' stance on
these two proposals had made progress on these issues impossible.
215. As Members were aware, the two textile tirets were part of the overall package negotiated by
Ministers at Doha.  If the intention had not been to take any action on these two tirets, Ministers
would not have incorporated paragraph 4 in the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns.  This, in turn, would have impacted on other decisions taken at Doha, and the resulting
Doha package would have been different.  The D oha work programme constituted an overall package
with emphasis on development.  What was coming out of the current situation on this issue was that
the development dimension had been jettisoned af ter Doha.  The first two deadlines under the Doha
package were both of great interest to developing countries.  In the case of a decision under paragraph
44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration relating to special and differential treatment, the deadline for
completing the work would need to be extended to 31 December 2002, much to India's
disappointment.  The non-acceptance of these two proposals by the restraining Members and the
inability of the CTG to make recommendations to the General Council clearly went against the
mandate given by Ministers to address all outstanding implementation issues as a matter of priority.
If the package negotiated at Doha were recast in the post-Doha process in Geneva in such a manner
that the development aspects were sidelined, it would inevitably impact on other aspects of the
negotiations and discussions.  Any attempt to driv e the Doha work programme forward at two speeds
– at a faster pace for areas of concern to developed countries and at a lower pace for areas of concernto developing countries – would lead to unraveling of the package and would create roadblocks in the
process.  This should be avoided at all costs, in the interest of the future of the multilateral tradingWT/GC/M/75
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system.  These two tirets, as unresolved implemen tation issues, were now within the domain of the
General Council.  His delegation hoped that substantial progress would be made on all
implementation issues, as well as on special and differential treatment in the months to come.
216. The representative of the United States said that the CTG had completed its examination, met
its deadline and exhausted its mandate.  The inability of the CTG to agree on any recommendations
did not alter this fact and should not come as a surprise.  Her delegation had actively participated in
the extended debate in the CTG.  It had requested data to inform the discussion and had prepared
submissions in which it had carefully responded to the arguments advanced by the proponents.  It had
carefully reviewed other Members' data submissions.   However, at Doha, it had made clear to all
parties that they should not expect a change in the US position.  At Doha, it had not been in a position
to agree to these proposals, and this remained curr ently the case.  The difficulties with these tirets
had been acknowledged in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, as the two tirets had been handleduniquely in the Declaration.  The plight of the US industry had worsened since Doha and the pace of
plant closing, bankruptcies and job losses had accelerated over the past nine months.  Since the entry
into force of the WTO agreements, employment in the textiles and apparel industry had fallen by
700,000 jobs, representing 42 per cent of the work force, with 87,000 of those job losses over the past
12 months.  Meanwhile, statistics showed a rapid increase in textile and clothing imports since 1994.US imports of textiles and apparel had increased 79 per cent in value and 90 per cent in quantity since
the WTO agreements had entered into force.  Some of the speakers at the present meeting had argued
that the share of retrained countries in the US market had declined.  It should be noted, however, that
that share was still 69 per cent, in a market that had grown 79 per cent in value.
217. ITCB countries, in particular, had benefited from the growth in trade in textiles and apparel
vis-a-vis the US market.  According to data on the ITCB web site, the value of US imports of textiles
and apparel from ITCB members since the inception of the ATC had grown faster than total imports.
In the period 1994-2000, US imports from ITCB members had increased 91 per cent from 1994 to
2000, while total imports of textiles and apparel had increased 79 per cent.  The value of US imports
of textiles and apparel between 1994 and 2000 had increased by US$ 31.7 billion.  The value of USimports from restrained countries and from ITCB members had increased by US$ 24.5 billion and
US$ 22.2 billion respectively, while the value of CBI and NAFTA imports had increased by US$ 14.8
billion.  The percentage increase in the value of US textile and apparel imports from the CBI and
NAFTA countries had been larger between 1994 and 2000, which had to be expected since their 1994
level had been relatively low.  However, the dollar value increase from the ITCB countries, and all
restrained sources, had been nearly 50 per cent larger, and nearly 65 per cent larger, respectively, than
the dollar value increase from the CBI and NAFTA countries.  Finally, the share of US imports invalue terms of textiles and apparel from ITCB members had increased from 61 per cent in 1994 to
65 per cent in 2000.  The ATC had also extended similarly impressive benefits to small suppliers,
least-developed countries and cotton-producing textile exporting countries.  According to US
statistics, under the ATC, between 1994 and 2001, the US textile and apparel imports from its
22 "small supplier" partners had increased 63 per cent in volume terms and 64 per cent in value terms.The US textile and apparel imports from its only least-developed country trading partner under ATC
restraints had increased by 140 per cent in volume and 137 per cent in value.  That least-developed
WTO Member was the fourth largest supplier of apparel to the US market, accounting for
US$ 2 billion of such imports.  The US textile and apparel imports from cotton-producing exporting
countries had increased 240 per cent in volume and 204 per cent in value.  Conversely, the USexpectations for improvements in access to the markets of the exporting countries had not
materialized.  The European Union had recently circulated statistics generated by the Secretariat that
showed virtually no clothing imports in some major exporting countries.
218. These proposals were not about the implementation of the ATC, but rather would effectively
amend its balance.  The economic justification advanced by the proponents of these proposals simplydid not withstand scrutiny.  These proposals would harm the prospects of smaller exporters and someWT/GC/M/75
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of the most vulnerable least-developed country trading partners of the United States.  They called for
billions of dollars of additional access for certain exporting countries, that would be extremely
disruptive to the adjustment process that the US industry was in the midst of as a result of the ATC.
Despite the hardship to its industry resulting from the ATC, the United States was faithfully meeting
its requirements and remained committed to its full implementation.  Her delegation encouraged allMembers to focus time and energy on preparing for the challenges that increased competition would
bring in the coming months, particularly when quotas disappeared in 2005.
219. The representative of Canada said that the Doha mandate to examine the two textile
implementation proposals had been completed.  The facts did not support the exporters' contention of
problems with the implementation of the ATC, still less of any impairment of rights.  In the case of
Canada, it had met and exceeded its obligations under the ATC transition arrangements.  Apparel
imports into Canada from restrained exporters had increased over 80 per cent from 1994 to 2001, andthe domestic market share held by the restrained importers was up from 31 to 45 per cent from 1994
to 2001.  Canada remained committed to the full integration of the textile and clothing sector into
GATT 1994 disciplines by 1 January 2005, as provided for in the ATC, and for the elimination of all
remaining quotas by that date.  The ATC had also provided for a negotiated ten-year transition
process to allow domestic industry to adjust.  This represented a fundamental commitment thatCanada had made with its industry and workers.  Th erefore, no one should expect Canada to agree to
proposals that would alter this ten-year transition process.  However, while not directly related to
these implementation proposals, Canada had announced a major market-access liberalization package
for LDCs other than Myanmar, that would provide full quota-free and duty-free access for all
products of LDC origin other than a very few s upply-managed agricultural goods.  This would take
effect on 1 January 2003 and would include clothing and textiles.  He said that it should be noted that
apparel alone accounted for more than half of the LDCs' exports to Canada.  The CTG Chairman had
described the difficult and protracted examination of these proposals, which had been undertaken over
the past months.  In the light of the fundamental differences that remained, Canada believed that the
process had reached its conclusion.
220. The representative of Bolivia said that his delegation attached great importance to the issue of
implementation.  The full integration of textiles and clothing under the WTO rules negotiated during
the Uruguay Round was a step forward towards strengthening the multilateral trading system for
developing countries.  This fact had led to initiatives and expectations in several developing countries
and adjustments in others.  The legitimate aspirations of some developing countries to speed up the
process that could signify modifying some commitments was understandable.  However, given the
importance of this issue and the social and economic impact that it could have, Bolivia believed thatMembers should continue to analyze these proposals and see how developing countries' concerns
might be met.
221. The representative of Colombia said that his country attached great importance to the
implementation process as a whole, and to this issue in particular.  The examination carried out in the
CTG on this issue had enabled Members to become aware of the aspirations of some countries and thedifficulties faced by others.  The historical exclusion of the textiles sector from multilateral disciplines
prior to the Uruguay Round had made it more difficult to wait for the ten-year transition period
provided for in the ATC pending the establishment of a fully liberalized market.  However, Colombia
had some concerns about the implications of the proposals for the negotiating process that had been
undertaken.  It was therefore important to maintaining favourable conditions, to enable Members tofully participate in the negotiations, since it would be impossible to progress without their cooperation
in the expansion of the multilateral trading system.
222. The representative of Hong Kong, China said that he wished to clarify that the statistics
quoted in his earlier intervention were data circulated by the WTO Secretariat at the request of the
United States in G/C/W/366.  These statistics therefore carried some authority and weight.  TheWT/GC/M/75
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statistics he had quoted dealt with import share and not market share.  It was clear that in terms of
import share, the restrained Members had been losi ng out very markedly.  In value terms, however,
the restrained Members had increased their exports into the US over the period 1994-2000 by 44 per
cent, while the unrestrained Members had increased in value terms over the same period by
222 per cent.  With respect to the US statement in relation to the hardship to its industry resulting
from ATC implementation, it was clear from the statistical data that this hardship was mainly caused
by the unrestrained suppliers.  Portraying the hardship to the US industry as being caused only by the
ATC implementation could mislead the public and political circles.  In his delegation's view, the
restrained suppliers were not causing the entire problem.  Regarding the argument that it was
impossible for restraining countries to open up further when they were faced with high barriers
elsewhere, Hong Kong, China was the living proof that this was a hollow linkage.
223. The Chairman said it was clear from the discussion that although, in accordance with the
mandate received, this matter had been examined in the CTG, it had not been possible to formulate
any recommendations for the General Council by 31 July 2002.  Second, it was clear that the matter
continued to be of great concern to a substantial number of delegations, from both importing and
exporting countries.  Third, it was apparent that there were still fundamental differences between the
views and understandings of the importing countries and of the exporting developing countries withrespect to the mandate and possible recommendations.  Fourth, delegations had expressed very
differing views on how best to deal with this issu e, and Members had clearly not reached a consensus
on how to resolve it.  In view of this situation and having examined various possible options, he
proposed that the General Council take note of the statement by the Chairman of the CTG and of
those by delegations, on the understanding that this would not prejudice the various positions taken byMembers, which would be duly reflected in the minutes of the present meeting.  He was convinced
that all Members would use the summer break to continue to reflect on the various views that had
been expressed.
224. The General Council so agreed.
15. Committee on Trade and Development – Repo rt by the Chairman of the Committee in
Special Session on Special and Differential Treatment in pursuance of paragraph 12.1 of
the Doha Ministerial Decision on Impl ementation-Related Issues and Concerns
(TN/CTD/3)
225. The Chairman recalled that in Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, Ministers
had agreed that "[a]ll special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational."  Ministers had also
endorsed the programme of work on S&D treatment set out in paragraph 12.1 of the Decision onImplementation-Related Issues and Concerns, which had mandated the Committee on Trade and
Development (CTD) to report to the General Council with clear recommendations for a decision by
July 2002.  In pursuance of this mandate, the Trade Negotiations Committee, at its meeting of
28 January and 1 February 2002, had agreed that the review of all S&D treatment provisions with a
view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational provided for inParagraph 44 of the Ministerial Declaration should be carried out by the CTD in Special Sessions.
The report by the CTD in Special Session had been circulated in TN/CTD/3.
226. Mr. Smith (Jamaica), Chairman of the Special Session of the Committee on Trade and
Development, said that the report had been adopted at the sixth Special Session of the CTD held on
24 July 2002, and consisted of four sections:  an introduction, a section on cross-cutting issues, a
section entitled "Agreement-Specific Proposals a nd Issues", and a section entitled "The Way
Forward".  The first three sections were factual in nature.  They essentially summarized very briefly
the discussions in the Special Sessions' formal and informal meetings.  Annexed to the report were
lists of the submissions received from Members.  The "Way Forward" section containedWT/GC/M/75
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recommendations to the General Council, inter alia,  (i) that the reporting deadline contained in
paragraphs 12.1(i) and 12.1(ii) of the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns be
extended to 31 December 2002, (ii) that the analysis and examination of the Agreement-specific
proposals and issues raised in written submissions and in discussions be continued, and that Members
should provide detailed responses to the various  Agreement-specific proposals by 31 October 2002,
(iii) that the analysis and examination of the cro ss-cutting proposals and issues raised in written
submissions and in discussions be continued at the same time, (iv) that a monitoring mechanism for
S&D treatment be established, and the functions, structure and terms of reference be elaborated for
the General Council’s approval, (v) that there be continued examination of other proposals on
institutional arrangements, (vi) that the proposals on criteria for technical and financial assistance and
training be submitted to the CTD regular session fo r the inclusion of any agreed elements in future
technical assistance plans, and finally (vii) that consideration be given to how S&D treatment mightbe incorporated into the architecture of WTO rules, in accordance with paragraph 12.1(iii) of the
Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.
227. Following the adoption of the report, he had stated that the recommendations in paragraphs 15
and 16, as they appeared, preserved the opportunity for those Members who so wished to make cross-
linkages between the two areas of work indicated, and to make inputs from one to the other as they
considered appropriate.  He had also stated that some delegations had felt strongly that the new
deadline at the end of 2002 would be impossible to meet, and that he recognized that it had only been
in the spirit of achieving the consensus necessary to continue the work that these delegations had gone
along with the new deadline.  These Members had been of the view that the results achievable by the
end of 2002 had to be assessed in the light of the views on the new deadline.  He had also stated thatother delegations had expressed their disappointment that the July 2002 deadline had not been
adhered to, given the importance that these delegations attached to this deadline in the overall process
agreed in Doha.  However, they had been willing to agree to a new deadline of 31 December 2002, as
they had seen it as an appropriate and reasonable extension.
228. The Special Session had made several recommendations to the General Council regarding the
work on S&D treatment which had been undertaken pursuant to the Doha mandate. He wished to
emphasize that considerable substantive work still re mained to be done.  As the report indicated, a
large number of Agreement-specific proposals had been tabled.  At the same time, a number of cross-
cutting and systemic issues had also been raised.  It was clear from the report and from his concluding
remarks when the report had been adopted that there were different views on important matters, such
as the pace of the work, the relevance to the mandate of some of the matters raised, the priority to be
accorded to different areas of work and the appropriate sequencing of the work to be undertaken.Should the recommendation to extend the deadline be  approved by the General Council, it would be
vitally important to have a focussed work plan that could move the work expeditiously and effectively
forward.  He looked forward to Members' full coop eration in this regard.  The coming months would
be critical insofar as the work of the Special Session was concerned.  Considerable effort and thought
had gone into the elaboration of submissions that had been tabled in the Special Session, and therewas an opportunity for useful discussion and constructive engagement in the months ahead.  Many
Members had repeatedly emphasized the importance they attached to the work of the Special Session
as a pillar of the Doha Development Agenda.  He hoped that Members would show the flexibility and
goodwill required to arrive at clear recommendations for decision by the time of the new deadline.
229. The representative of Kenya, speaking on behalf of the African Group,
 noted that further
work would have to be done on the detailed Agreement-specific proposals that had been tabled but
not fully discussed by the Committee.  It was the African Group's understanding that work during the
additional period would focus on these proposals.  It would be essential to focus on these
Agreement-specific proposals in order to avoid any delays in fully discharging the mandate given to
the Special Session of the CTD.  In this regard, these countries expected less time to be spent onissues that had already been more or less exhaustively discussed, on which there had been nearWT/GC/M/75
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agreement and on which there could have been concrete recommendations to the General Council.
They would include in this category of issues the monitoring mechanism and technical assistance.
These countries had participated in discussion of the report and, as pointed out by the Chairman of the
Special Session of the CTD in his closing remarks wh en the report had been finalized, delegations had
not been entirely satisfied with the report.  However, in the spirit of moving the process forward, theywere ready to adopt it.  As delegations would note from the report, the Special Session had not yet
delivered on its mandate in any concrete manner.  All the various items mentioned in the
recommendations were in terms of further work to be done, without any final product being delivered
at the present time.
230. The mandate to the Special Session of the CTD had been given in urgent terms – Ministers
had expected results by 31 July 2002.  This was a serious matter, because in the discussion in the
Special Session various proposals, particularly fr om the African Group, had received substantial and
general acceptance by practically all delegations.  Clear examples of this included the proposals and
various explanations on the monitoring mechanism and on technical assistance.  There had been broad
support for the monitoring mechanism as proposed by the African Group.  The functions of the
mechanism had been identified and explained, as the Chairman's report indicated.  However, the
report recommended additional work on some aspect s of the mechanism.  The African Group urged
the General Council to instruct the Special Session of the CTD not to dwell so much on the
monitoring mechanism.  Rather, work on the monitoring mechanism should be concluded almost
immediately.  Should any guidance be required in this regard, the establishment of the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements could serve as a reference.  That Committee had been established by a
short and precise decision of the General Council in February 1996.  Therefore, the African Group didnot envisage any further complications and delays, and urged the General Council to proceed along
these lines expeditiously.
231. While not a single delegation had objected to the proposals on technical assistance, the report
provided for further work in the CTD in regular session to take up elements to be agreed.  The
proposal had been for inclusion of these criteria and considerations in the architecture of the WTOagreements and to do this in accordance with the Doha mandate – i.e. the Special Session was to
recommend these criteria and considerations to the General Council for adoption as a decision
governing all subsidiary bodies in implementing and operationalizing technical assistance provisions.
It had not been proposed that these criteria operate on an ad hoc basis, nor that they operate in a
truncated manner that could still result in main taining the current manner of providing technical
assistance.  The proposals had been a critique of the latter, and the African Group would be
disappointed if the results were anything other than a distinctly different approach to technicalassistance, taking the form of obligations to be complied with by all WTO bodies and Members.
Finally, they wished to re-emphasize their disappointment that concrete results had not been obtained,
and urged the General Council and all delegations to show good will in fully discharging the mandate
to the Special Session of the CTD.  The result of this exercise would determine whether the Doha
Development Agenda became a reality or not.
232. The representative of Zambia said that the mandate given the Special Session of the CTD was
very clear in terms of the work required of Members and of the results they were expected to deliver
by 31 July 2002.  However, clear recommendations on the three different subjects had not been made,
and Members had agreed to a new deadline.  His delegation wished to reiterate the importance
Zambia attached to the issue of S&D and, as had been previously pointed out, that this issue lay at theroot of justifying the outcome of Doha as a de velopment agenda.  Without it, there would be no
"development" in the Doha Development Agenda.  Zambia hoped that Members would take
advantage of the new deadline to ensure that the work was completed by 31 December 2002.  Zambia
also recommended adoption of the report.WT/GC/M/75
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233. The representative of Uganda said that issues of S&D were interconnected with the issues
discussed under item 14 of the present meeting regarding the interests of developing countries.  The
need for S&D treatment for the LDCs, as provided under the enabling clause, was not in question.
Although Uganda had hoped that some of the reco mmendations the LDCs had made would end up as
specific recommendations for decision at the present meeting, there had been progress on the questionof the monitoring mechanism.  Uganda hoped that when the Special Session of the CTD met again, it
would work expeditiously, so that the monitoring mechanism could be agreed.  Regarding the other
issues, it seemed to Uganda that Members had postponed addressing these.  The issue of S&D
treatment was critical, and Uganda hoped that a me ssage would be sent that Members would seriously
examine, and make positive responses to, the proposals made.
234. The representative of Korea said that although the CTD had not been able to fulfil its mandate
in the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, it had made substantial progress.
More than 80 specific proposals had been submitted, and agreement had been reached on the
establishment of a monitoring mechanism which would represent an important step forward to
enhance the effectiveness of S&D treatment provisions.  Now that the deadline had been extended,
Members needed to use the additional time for in-depth discussions on the remaining issues.  Korea
would actively participate in the work of the CTD Special Session, which should be held back-to-backwith the relevant negotiating groups and other special committees.  Under this format, the CTD
Special Session would benefit from participation of capital-based experts.  When the CTD Special
Session resumed its work in September, Members should do their best to fulfil the mandate, since
there was not much time, given the number and complexity of remaining issues, before the new
deadline.  In this regard, Members should bear in mind that S&D treatment provisions had beenagreed on as part of a single undertaking at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations.  In pursuing
its mandate, the CTD Special Session needed to maintain the delicate balance between the rights and
obligations incorporated in the relevant WTO Agreements.
235. The representative of Thailand said that the S&D treatment issue was the core element that
truly reflected the fact that the WTO respected the unequal level of development of its Members in
participating in the multilateral trading system.  This had been confirmed when Ministers in Doha had
reaffirmed that provisions for S&D treatment were an integral part of the WTO agreements, and had
clearly instructed Members to seriously review S&D provisions with a view to strengthening them
and making them more precise, effective and operational and to make clear recommendations by
31 July 2002.  While Thailand was disappointed that the Special Session of the CTD had not been
able to come up with any single clear recommendation based on the specific proposals submitted by
developing countries and LDCs, it had not given up hope, and encouraged others to do the same.Thailand still believed that everything could be accomplished if Members tried hard enough, and thus
urged the CTD Special Session to make a greater effort in order not to miss the new deadline and fail
the trust of developing-country Members.  Thailand supported the establishment of the monitoring
mechanism with terms of reference to be discussed in the CTD Special Session and approved by the
General Council.  On technical assistance and capacity building, it supported this being discussed inthe regular sessions of the CTD under the Technical Assistance Work Plan, in order to balance the
limited financial and human resources.
236. The representative of Brazil said that Brazil was discouraged by the lack of progress in the
Special Sessions of the CTD.  Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and paragraph 12.1
of the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns mandated Members to consider S&Dtreatment provisions with a view to strengthening and making them more precise, effective,
operational and, as appropriate, binding.  After several formal and informal meetings of the CTD
Special Session to tackle this mandate, very little progress had been made, and there were signs that
the exercise could derail into discussions for which it had not been conceived.  According to the Doha
Ministerial Declaration, implementation issues were an integral part of the work programme.  Thosethat fell under the mandate of the negotiating groups were being considered in those bodies, and theWT/GC/M/75
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remaining issues were to be addressed by the rele vant WTO bodies.  He recalled the terms of the
cover letter through which the Director-General and the then General Council Chairman, Mr. Stuart
Harbinson, had conveyed the draft Ministerial Declaration and the draft Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns to the Fourth Ministerial Conference.  That letter had
underlined that issues not proposed for immediate action, including those referred to other WTObodies – a category that included the mandate on S&D treatment – as well those listed in the
compilation on outstanding issues, would be addressed in the course of the future work programme, in
accordance with paragraph 12 of the Ministerial Declaration.  In Brazil's view, Members should abide
by these terms and conditions.
237. Brazil was highly skeptical of the motivation behind the position taken by a few developed
countries who had been reinterpreting the mandate given by Ministers at Doha, by proposing to
include under the review of S&D provisions a debate on the different levels of development amongdeveloping countries.  This attitude was not conducive to creating the positive atmosphere necessary
to allow progress in Members' discussions on S&D.  As Brazil's Undersecretary-General on
Integration, Commerce and Economic Issues had stated at the most recent TNC meeting, "we should
be wary of re-interpreting the Doha mandate in such development-unfriendly ways".  The report
prepared by the Special Session of the CTD to the General Council contained only one, and as yetincomplete, result.  It recommended the establishment by the General Council of a monitoring
mechanism to follow up on the implementation of S&D provisions.  It was not clear what the terms of
reference and parameters of such a mechanism would be.  In any case, in Brazil's view this was a
procedural proposal and not a substantive one.  Its usefulness would depend on whether it was
oriented towards constructive objectives, as Brazil hoped it would be.  Brazil shared the widespreadfrustration over the missed deadline of 31 July.  At the same time, it remained committed to the
exercise in the CTD and hoped that political will and true commitment, commensurate with the spirit
of the Doha Ministerial mandate, would be forthc oming in order to advance discussions over the
coming months.  There were more than 80 specific proposals to improve S&D provisions of particular
interest to developing countries and LDCs, and Members should not lose any time in demonstratingtheir commitment to the new round by effectively providing it with its much-heralded development
dimension.
238. The representative of China said that his delegation shared the position and comments set out
in the statement by Kenya on behalf of the African Group.  S&D provisions were extremely important
to developing-country Members.  Concrete progress on improvement of S&D provisions would have
a meaningful impact on the success of the negotiations.  All WTO Members, especially the developed
ones, should show good faith on this issue and sincerely implement the mandate given by Ministers inDoha.  In China's view, the main reasons for the inefficient utilization of the existing S&D provisions
were the ambiguity in the wording of the provisions and the lack of precise, effective and operational
means of implementation.  The Doha mandate gave Members very explicit instructions on what they
should do in this area.  China did not believe that there was any need or room for Members to
re-interpret the Doha mandate.  It agreed that it was important to have a clear idea of the principlesand objectives of S&D provisions.  However, discussions on principles, objectives and other
cross-cutting issues should not detract from the negotiations on the further clarification and
improvement of the specific S&D provisions in the existing WTO agreements, which it believed
should be the focus of Members' work in the WTO in the area of trade and development.  China
hoped that the major developed-country Members could show flexibility in the discussions andnegotiations so that concrete progress could be made to fulfil the mandate given by Ministers, and so
that the Chairman of the CTD would be able to report positive results to the General Council by the
end of 2002.
239. The representative of Cuba said that her delegation agreed with the statements by Kenya on
behalf of the African Group and by Zambia on beha lf of the LDCs.  Cuba was concerned about the
failure to meet the deadline of 31 July 2002 for a report to the General Council with concreteWT/GC/M/75
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recommendations for strengthening S&D provisions, as Ministers had mandated.  However, Cuba was
not surprised at this outcome, since from the time the CTD had begun its work, her delegation had
noticed that there was no political will on the part of the principal industrialized countries to engage in
an in-depth discussion of the proposals submitted.  S&D treatment was an issue that had been given
priority by Ministers in Doha, and her delegation was concerned about the discussion being side-tracked into a reinterpretation of the principle of S&D treatment by adjusting its application.  Cuba
expected the future discussions to be oriented towards fulfilment of the Doha Ministerial Declaration
mandate within the new deadline, since it formed an integral part of the package adopted in Doha and
failure to fulfil it would upset the general balance made possible by the Doha compromise.
240. The representative of Indonesia said that her delegation agreed to a new deadline of
31 December 2002 since Indonesia saw this as an appropriate and reasonable extension.  Since time
would not be on Members' side, they had to organize the work in an optimal way.  In this regard, her
delegation was of the view that the extension of the deadline had to provide Members with the
opportunity to agree on a detailed work plan.  While it recognized that some innovative ideas needed
to be developed,  Indonesia urged Members to make extra efforts to overcome differences in order to
be able to make the same progress as in other areas of negotiations.  Indonesia strongly suggested that
the General Council take note of the various cross-cutting issues and proposals raised in writtensubmissions and discussions in the CTD Special Session.  The Special Session should also further
examine these issues without prejudging whether an issue constituted part of the mandate under
paragraph 12 of the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns and paragraph 44 of the
Doha Ministerial Declaration.  The issue of S&D being discussed in the Special Session of the CTD
was very crucial to developing countries, including Indonesia.  Thus, Indonesia's position was thatprogress in other areas of negotiations could not be de-linked from progress on the issue of S&D, as
Members had agreed in Doha that it was a part of the package.
241. The representative of Paraguay said that S&D treatment was a very complex subject area and
the Doha mandate in this regard was important, along with other matters that Members dealt with in
the CTD.  Members had clarified concepts, they had looked at the rules that existed and at presentthey were clearly in a better position to achieve an understanding on S&D treatment for developing
countries – one which contemplated their needs, incorporated flexibility and included the proviso that
what was granted to one did not hurt the other.  Paraguay believed that Members needed to make a
special effort in the months ahead to 31 December.  It was ready to work together with all Members to
determine S&D treatment clearly in order to make the new round truly a development round.
242. The representative of Malaysia said that his delegation shared the views of previous
delegations who had expressed disappointment that the exercise had not yielded any
recommendations.  However, Malaysia wished to acknowledge that at least some progress had been
achieved, especially with regard to the establishm ent of the monitoring mechanism.  The fact that
Members had this – although not very significant – accomplishment, showed that if they had the will
and put sincere effort into an exercise like this, they should be able to bring about more tangible
results.  Malaysia had noted that there were several proposals before Members but that unfortunately,due to the lack of substantive engagement on some of these proposals, Members had not been able to
arrive at any concrete results on the specific proposals.  S&D treatment remained an integral part of
the WTO agreements and was part of the rights and obligations under the Uruguay Round
agreements.  Malaysia did not believe that any strengthening of S&D should result in the dilution of
these rights or in denying the right of developing countries to S&D treatment.
243. It was concerned about recent discussions in the Special Session of the CTD in which the
right of developing countries to S&D treatment had been raised, and viewed with strong concern
attempts to differentiate between developing countries by income level or size and to make
unnecessary cross-linkages with Agreement-specific proposals.  In Malaysia's view, such attempts
diverted attention from the real issue at hand, whic h was to review all S&D provisions in order toWT/GC/M/75
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strengthen them by making them more precise, effective and operational, as well as mandatory.
Ministers in Doha had given clear instructions on such a review.  These instructions were to address
concerns of developing countries regarding the operation of S&D provisions, in addressing specific
constraints faced by developing countries.  In this respect, the principles and objectives of S&D, as
enshrined in Part IV of the GATT 1994, should be recognized and respected.  As Members now had anew deadline, Malaysia urged them to strengthen their collective resolve with a view to achieving a
tangible outcome by 31 December 2002.  If Members did not move in this direction, the extension of
the deadline would be meaningless.
244. The representative of India said that Ministers had been clear and specific in their mandate.
They had noted the concerns expressed by developing countries with regard to the operation of S&D
provisions and had agreed that "[a]ll special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed
with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational."  Inparagraph 12 of the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, they had laid down a
specific work programme for conversion of S&D treatment measures into mandatory provisions and
to examine additional ways by which S&D provisions could be made more effective and more user-
friendly.  The CTD had been directed to make clear recommendations for decision by July 2002.  On
this basis, a number of proposals had been put forward by developing and least-developed countries,the majority of them from the African Group.  It was unfortunate that there had been no constructive
engagement on any of these proposals, with the result that at the end of the period specified by
Ministers, no progress had been achieved on even one of the proposals.  India could not accept the
argument that there had been inadequate time or that the issues were exceedingly complex.
245. The time available for discussion had been known to all delegations from the beginning.  In
addition, these were not new issues.  Members had been dealing with them for the past seven years,
and in the pre-Doha period they had had a series of discussions on many of them.  Even after Doha,
proposals had been put on the table as early as April 2002, and if the developed countries had
seriously wanted to make progress, Members would not be in the situation in which they found
themselves at the present meeting.  The Doha work programme was a composite package negotiatedover several months.  It consisted of two elements – both carefully negotiated – namely, a sequence of
events with clearly defined deadlines, and substantive issues prescribing the content of the work
programme.  According to the Doha package, certain events were to take place in July and December
of 2002, in March and May of 2003 and at the Fifth Ministerial Conference.  Members had missed all
the July deadlines.  There were no recommendations whatsoever from the Council for Trade in Goods
in respect of paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 of the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns
relating to textiles, no serious progress on paragraph 10.3 of the same Decision relating tocountervailing duty investigations, and no clea r recommendation on any specific S&D provision.
India believed that a very negative signal had been sent to all developing countries.  Many statements
had been made by Ministers, both of developed and developing countries, regarding the strong
development dimension built into the Doha work programme.  Unfortunately, in the present situation
developing countries were beginning to look at these statements with a great deal of skepticism,disbelief and disillusionment.
246. Lack of progress on these issues also led to other inescapable conclusions.  Members had to
conclude that the deadlines laid down by Ministers were flexible and could be changed by delegations
in Geneva.  They also had to conclude that even the meaning of the decisions made by the Ministers
could be altered.  Members had to remember, moreov er, that when Ministers had laid down a specific
schedule of work, which was to proceed in accordance with certain clearly defined deadlines, they had
also expected that certain events would be completed before others.  This was of great importance,
particularly for smaller delegations.  If deadlines were missed and the work spilled over to later
periods, there would obviously be a serious impact on the ability of delegations to deal with other
issues in a time-bound manner.  This could impact adversely on other deadlines.  India sincerelyhoped that hereafter Members would engage constructively in the Special Session of the CTD to fulfilWT/GC/M/75
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the mandate given by Ministers on S&D treatment provisions, at least by the next target date they had
set for themselves at the present meeting.  To achi eve concrete results, it was necessary that the CTD
Special Session had a detailed plan structuring its future work for the remaining period, as the
Chairman had proposed in his report.  Considering the commitment of all delegations to the process
initiated at Doha, it was important to ensure that the package Ministers had put together at Doha did
not evolve in a lopsided fashion in the post-Doha process, thus jeopardizing the balance in the
package.
247. The representative of United States welcomed the report of the CTD Special Session and the
significant engagement on the issues that had taken place there, and said that her delegation was
poised to take the work forward in a positive manner.  Work on this issue had been enriched by the
many ideas that had been put forward, including a very detailed proposal by the African Group that
suggested a number of new ideas.  Not surprisingly, various views had emerged during the work,including the sense that Members needed to look carefully at their approaches to S&D, given the
varying levels of development of trading partners, and to tailor their responses accordingly.  The
United States agreed that this was an area that deserved more attention in Members' future work.
Thoughtful comments and suggestions had been made about specific agreements, including the use of
transition periods.  Whether the subject was agriculture or subsidies, the discussion had shown that asingle approach was not necessarily the best approach in all circumstances.
248. The United States was pleased that the CTD in Special Session had been able to agree on
recommendations to establish an appropriate monitoring mechanism on S&D, and pledged to work
with the Chairman and other Members of the CTD in developing this idea and bringing it to fruition.
Similarly, the United States supported the recommendation of the CTD in Special Session to submitthe proposals of the African Group on technical and financial assistance to the CTD for inclusion of
any agreed elements in future Technical Assistance Plans.  Given the large number and complexity of
the proposals submitted to the Special Session, the United States believed that it was important that its
report set out a roadmap for further work.  She reassured Members that her delegation was prepared to
engage in a discussion of ideas on specific S&D provisions.  However, a note of caution was in order.In several cases, the issues raised were part of the ongoing negotiations or had been the subject of
previous debate and review under the heading of "imp lementation."  As the United States had stated at
the recent TNC meeting, Members would need to have realistic expectations in this area.  In the
United States view, S&D was not an end in itself.  It was a tool to foster economic development,
adjustment and integration into the multilateral trading system.  The certainty and predictability of
adhering to a rules-based system, combined with thoughtful recourse to S&D provisions, had been
shown to be the best way to promote long-term economic growth.
249. The representative of the European Communitie s said that the Community was pleased that
the hard work in the Special Session of the CTD had allowed Members at the present meeting to
continue their important work on S&D.  The recommendations contained in the report of the Special
Session were well balanced and allowed his delegation to better examine, with more time available,
the numerous specific proposals by Members.  They also allowed the Community to step back a littleand to examine the principles and objectives whic h governed the WTO's approach to S&D treatment.
Such basic reflection on the principles and objectives of S&D was an essential component of its
examination, helping it to frame its responses to individual proposals.  The Community wished to
underline that it remained fully committed to a successful outcome of the review.  It was aware that
the legitimate aspirations of developing countries would have to be met in the Doha workprogramme, and believed that meaningful, precise and operational S&D provisions which enhanced
developing countries' participation in world trade were in all Members' interest.  The new deadline of
the end of the year might still be ambitious, but the Community would work hard and constructively
with other Members under the stewardship of th e Chairman of the CTD in Special Session.WT/GC/M/75
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250. The representative of Nigeria that this matter was very important to his delegation because
without it, low-income countries like Nigeria would not be able to cope in the WTO.  Nigeria believed
that S&D treatment was an integral part of the Doha mandate and that it should not be diluted.
Members should remain faithful to this mandate and not  try to reinterpret it.  Nigeria believed that this
mandate was a package in which everything was linked to the everything else and nothing should bedone to undermine any part of it.  Nigeria supported the new deadline of 31 December 2002 agreed by
Members and endorsed the report to the General Council.
251. The General Council took note of the statements and of the report of the Chairman of the
Special Session of the CTD (TN/CTD/3), and approved the recommendations contained in paragraphs
14 to 19 of the report.
16. Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures – Report on review of provisions
regarding countervailing duty investigations in pursuance of paragraph 10.3 of theDoha Ministerial Decision on Implem entation-Related Issues and Concerns
252. Mr. Kim (Korea), Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, speaking on behalf of the Chairman of the Committee, said that the Chairman's report in
G/SCM/45 was presented on the latter's own respons ibility and was without prejudice to the position
of any Member.  The report was submitted pursuant to paragraph 10.3 of the Decision onImplementation-Related Issues and Concerns adopted on 14 November 2001 at the Doha Ministerial
Conference, where Ministers had agreed "that the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures shall continue its review of the provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures regarding countervailing duty investigations and report to the General
Council by 31 July 2002."  Since establishing a framework for the mandated review in December2001, the Committee had been engaged in the review of the numerous proposals made by the
proponents.  It had held a series of informal meetings, and the Chair had conducted informal
consultations.  The issues involved in the review were highly technical.  Members had exchanged
numerous documents containing proposals, explanations, questions and answers, and had engaged
actively in discussions, and the results were contained in G/SCM/45.
253. The review of these issues had revealed that many Members recognized the importance of the
issues raised.  During the course of the review, some delegations had expressed their understanding –
and, in some cases, support – in respect of some of the proposals or elements thereof.  In addition, the
Chair's perception was that many delegations, regardless of their views on the substance of a given
proposal, had found the review extremely useful in enhancing their understanding of the proposals
and the technical issues they raised, as well as of Members' views concerning the proposals.  In the
Chair's view, this was confirmed by the high degree of constructive spirit with which Members hadengaged in the detailed discussions on these highly technical and complex issues.  This said, however,
the Chair had noted that there existed divergin g views on whether and how the Committee could or
should proceed after the completion of the 31 July 2002 mandate, and he had been unable to identify
any significant basis for a consensus on any specific suggestion by the Committee in terms of the
substantive aspects of the review or with respect to any next step.  He had noted that certaindelegations had expressed disappointment in this regard, as they had hoped that the Committee might
be in a position to formulate some sort of recommendations to the General Council on some or all of
the proposals, and had also hoped that the Committee might be able to agree to make a
recommendation regarding next steps forward in respect of these proposals in another forum.  Other
delegations, however, had emphasized their view that the Committee had satisfied the terms of itsmandate, that the issues involved, as developed an d clarified through the review process, could now
be left in the hands of Members, and that any Member might, if it so wished, submit the proposals and
the report itself, or portions of it, for discussion in an appropriate forum.WT/GC/M/75
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254. In the light of this, the Chairman had had to conclude that in the context of the Committee,
the discussions of these issues had been taken as far as possible.  While the Chairman realized that
this might be less than had originally been expected by some Members, he nevertheless was reassured
that the quality of the discussion and exchange of ideas was, in itself, valuable, and supported his
belief that the Committee had usefully spent the time devoted to the review.  The Chairman expressedappreciation to the Members of the Committee for their active and cooperative engagement in the
review, with each other and with him as Chairman, and to the previous Chairman of the Committee
for his hard work on these issues, as well as to the Secretariat for its support in this process.  As the
Committee had completed its work under the existing mandate, he hoped that Members would find
useful the information in the detailed report pres enting the results of the Committee's review of the
provisions of the SCM Agreement regarding countervailing duty investigations, and in the documents
submitted in that context.
255. The representative of Brazil thanked the Chairman of the Committee, his predecessor in that
post, and the Secretariat for their hard work and dedication in the process of examining Brazil's
proposals.  He also wished to thank the delegations which had presented questions or comments on
the different points raised, either in writing or orally.  The proposals were of a systemic nature.  They
stemmed from Brazil's assessment, which was shared by many, that the countervailing duty (CVD)part of the Subsidies Agreement could and should be improved, by means of interpretations or
amendments to the text, as appropriate.  Contrary to the view expressed by some in the course of this
exercise, if a proposal was labeled as an implementation one, it did not follow that it should not entail
amendments to a WTO agreement, if necessary.  In any event, now that Members were in a
negotiation mode, and paragraph 12 of the Ministerial Declaration was clear in this regard, thisdistinction lost its meaning.
256. It was clear that Brazil was disappointed that Members had not been able to reach a consensus
at the present time on at least some of its proposals.  This was particularly frustrating since it appeared
that many of those suggestions enjoyed a considerable degree of support.  In fact, the practice of many
Members already went in the same direction as the some of the proposals.  Brazil had hoped that thisextensive period of almost one year would have been enough to reach some conclusions on these
issues, but unfortunately this had not been the case.  Regarding the implementation process as a
whole, it was clearly not an encouraging sign that  no sort of recommendation on this issue could be
reached in the Committee.  This was even more worrying when one noted, as his delegation had under
another Agenda item, that the lack of results on implementation had become a most disturbing trend.
Independent of the treatment given to these CVD issues under the responsibility of the General
Council, Brazil intended to come back to them in the appropriate forum.  That being said, hisdelegation wished to affirm that the status of th ese issues remained unresolved.  The mandate that
Ministers had given the Committee was to "continue its review of the provisions of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures regarding countervailing duty investigations and report to the
General Council by 31 July 2002".  As the Committee had not been able to present a consensus report
to the General Council, but simply a text under the responsibility of its Chairman, it could not be saidthat the mandate had been fulfilled, regardless of the line of action Brazil followed in the future.
257. The representative of India thanked the Chairman of the Committee for a comprehensive
report, and the Vice-Chairman for presenting it, pursuant to paragraph 10.3 of the Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns adopted at the Doha Ministerial Conference.  His
delegation had hoped that the deliberations in the Committee, which had lasted over ten months,would have resulted in final recommendations on at least some of the proposals.  There were many
issues which, in India's view, were not difficult, given a will to address them.  However, constructive
engagement with a view to finding solutions to th e problems had been lacking.  The result had been
that the Committee had failed to make any recommendation to resolve these issues.  Most
disconcerting had been the reticence on the part of some Members to make even a recommendation toaddress these issues as a priority in another forum.  Therefore, the Chairman of the Committee had notWT/GC/M/75
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been able to come up with a consensus report on further work.  His delegation, in its comments under
Item 14 of the Agenda, had already underscored the danger of an adverse impact on other deadlines if
deadlines on issues relevant to many developing countries were not met.
258. The representative of the United States said that her delegation had been pleased with the
active participation of Members in the Subsidies Committee during its review of the procedures for
CVD investigations.  She wished to express particul ar appreciation to Brazil and India, both of whom
had worked tirelessly to answer numerous questions, on a timely basis, from her delegation and other
interested Members, in order to bring greater clar ity to these issues.  It was evident from even a
cursory glance at the Chairman's report that the Committee had had a full and rich discussion of these
important but highly technical items.  All Members had obtained a greater understanding of the items,
as well as of the concerns of those Members requesting that they be reviewed.  The Doha
Implementation Decision mandate had charged the Committee with reviewing procedures for CVDinvestigations, and her delegation was pleased that this work had been completed within the
prescribed deadline.  From the United States' perspective, further work within the Committee would
be unwarranted, because there was little likelihood that a decision could be reached on a possible
recommendation on any of these items.  Moreover, none of the items had appeared to attract broad
support.  In fact, none of the proposals had attracted support from more than a few Members.  Indeed,although the discussion in the Committee had been interesting and detailed, it had been limited to
relatively few participants.  She recalled that specific proposals to undertake negotiations on the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ha d initially been tabled well in advance of the
Ministerial Decision.  Should the proponents be so inclined, they could pursue further work on these
items in the Negotiating Group on Rules.  Her delegation believed that the Members who had madeproposals on these items would benefit from the Committee's discussion and the Chairman's report
thereon, as they considered the possibility of bringing these items as proposals to the Rules
Negotiating Group.  The technical analysis of, and Members' reactions to, the items should be
considered as important inputs in assessing the likely viability of the items as proposals within a
negotiating process, and in reformulating the proposals to attract support.
259. The Chairman proposed that the General Council take note of the report of the Chairman of
the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and of the statements by delegations, which
he noted would be duly reflected in the minutes of the meeting.
260. The General Council so agreed.
17. Proposal to remove and avoid inconsistenc ies in the texts of the WTO Agreements –
Communication from Chile (WT/GC/W/473)
261. The representative of Chile, speaking under "Other Business", recalled that this matter had
been discussed at the May General Council meeting.  Since then, his delegation had held consultations
with various Members, and there was an awareness that there was a real problem.  However,
Members still did not have complete knowledge of the precise scope and depth of the problem, and
therefore of its real implications.  The consultations thus far had also brought to light more examples
of differences and discrepancies between texts, based on the experiences of different Members.  ManyMembers had also raised concerns that were shared by Chile, the main concern being that any
exercise aimed at resolving discrepancies should not be transformed into a renegotiation of the
agreements.  This had never been Chile's intention, and he agreed that Members needed to be careful
to avoid this.  Some Members had also pointed out that there were inconsistencies not only among the
different language versions of the WTO agreements but also panel reports and other formal WTOdocuments.  However, Chile's intention had always been to limit this exercise to the legal texts of the
WTO agreements.WT/GC/M/75
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262. Concerns had also been expressed that this could be a time-consuming exercise that could
take up resources at a time when Members had the ongoing negotiations and other work to attend to
as a priority.  While Chile was aware of this, it believed that if there were a will and a consensus to
address this problem now, Members would avoid sim ilar problems in the future and prevent the loss
of time and resources that would otherwise be spent under the dispute settlement system.  OtherMembers had indicated that in any negotiations there were ambiguities in the texts and that problems
of this type could result in an exercise aimed at clarifying these ambiguities.  Chile's proposed
exercise, however, was not aimed at resolving ambiguities, but rather those situations where there
were clear differences among the texts, or where there were omissions in one text as compared to
another.  The view had also been expressed that, generally, texts were negotiated in English and that
many delegations used the text in English as a reference.  Some delegations – especially the English-
speaking delegations – had stated that this was not a problem for them.  However, these samedelegations could have a problem when a non-English speaking delegation applied the text as it stood
in another official language, the scope of rights and obligations resulting from which could damage
the trade interests of English-speaking Members.  Chile believed that Members should proceed with
caution and point out clearly – and agree on – where the problems lay.  Many delegations believed
there was a need to avoid similar problems in the future, and that during the course of the ongoingnegotiations, Members could set up the necessary mechanisms in a timely manner, so that the texts
resulting from these negotiations would not contain inconsistencies similar to those contained in some
of the Uruguay Round texts.  While his delegation had several suggestions to make in this regard, it
would be premature to table them at the present time.  He hoped that at the next General Council
meeting, Members would be in a position to take up this matter again on a more solid basis.Accordingly, his delegation requested that this matter be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of
the General Council.
263. The General Council took note of the statement and agreed
 to revert to this matter at its next
meeting.
18. One-day retreat for Permanent Representati ves of WTO Members – Statement by the
Chairman
264. The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business", said that during the WTO's seven years of
existence, it had extended its geographic coverage significantly, as its family of Members had grown.
Similarly, the agenda of the WTO had widened and deepened considerably, and it was in many
respects a different and more complicated organization than when it had been established.  It was
almost inconceivable for such a large and growing organization to exist for this long without some
kind of informal discussion on the institutional and systemic challenges facing its owners.  Membershad perhaps become so focussed on the day-to-day business of negotiating and advancing national
positions that they had not taken the time to reflect on and discuss the larger issues facing the WTO.
Based on these considerations, and on the positive comments he had received from colleagues, he
informed delegations that it was his intention to organize a one-day retreat for all Permanent
Representatives of WTO Members on Saturday, 12 October.
265. The overall objective of the retreat would be to provide Permanent Representatives with an
informal and off-the-record setting in which to discuss broad systemic and institutional challenges
facing the WTO and the multilateral trading system.  It would be an opportunity for all Members to
discuss informally important issues which otherwise had no obvious outlet in the daily work of the
organization.  The event would also allow Permanent Representatives to shed the rigidities of theirnational positions and think collectively as shareholders of the system.  The retreat would also provide
an opportunity to encourage personal interaction among Permanent Representatives for the benefit of
the system.  He stressed that this would be an informal, casual event where no record would be kept.WT/GC/M/75
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266. The timing of the event was a reflection of the need to make it as inclusive as possible, as the
second Geneva Week of 2002 would begin on 14 October, thus making it possible for non-resident
Members to participate in the retreat.  It was also his intention to organize an informal dinner on the
eve of the retreat, on Friday 11 October, at which he hoped the new Director-General, who was very
supportive of the retreat, could share his thoughts on the way forward for the WTO.  Also, in line withthe nature of the retreat, the aim was for this event to have no implications for the WTO budget.  He
was hopeful of finding appropriate sponsorship for the modest costs involved, and would report
further on this.  He would communicate the final details of the retreat in the very near future.  While
there were still a few loose ends to tie up, he believed that all would benefit from an opportunity to
have a frank, informal and off-the-record discussion outside the General Council meeting room.
267. The General Council took note of the statement.
19. Farewell to the Director-General
268. The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business", recalled that this was the last meeting of the
General Council that Mr. Mike Moore would be atte nding as Director-General.  Although tributes had
already been paid to him at the meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee held on 18-19 July, it
was also fitting to bid farewell to him at the present meeting.  He requested the Secretariat to read out
a message from the Chairman of the General Council, Ambassador Marchi, who was unable to bepresent on this occasion.
269. Mr. Rogerson, Director of the Council and TNC Division, read out the following message
from the Chairman of the General Council:
"I sincerely regret that I'm not here in person for your last General Council
appearance, and I am grateful to Carlos for arranging to pass on this message of thanks,appreciation and friendship.  When I say we will all miss you very much, I am speaking not
only as Council Chairman and Canadian Ambassador, but also as a fellow member of the
Geneva branch of the politicians' trade union.  I am, in fact, proposing you for life
membership of the union, in recognition of all you've done to encourage your brethren about
life beyond national politics.
"There is of course a serious point to this message, just like there's always been a
serious vein to your work, ever since you entered public life.  Yet, you are also a man with a
great sense of humour, someone whose scribbled notes and witty comments are already the
stuff of folklore.  The world's stock of New Zealand expressions has been permanently
expanded in the last three years, at least for those of us who understood your English.  It was
English, wasn't it?  We have all learned about backing the truck up, about feeling pumped andvery competitive, and especially about smelling a deal.  And of course our interpreters have
had to enter an entirely new and frightening world!
"However, the charm of your humour has alwa ys been its warmth.  In a world where
words are cheap, your genuine humanity and compassion have been an inspiration.  Eventhose who may not have agreed with you, have never doubted the sincerity of your
commitment to making the WTO system work for all, particularly for its least advantaged
Members.  You have also demonstrated that international economic organizations need not be
boring or heartless.  And in this regard, the international community as a whole owes you a
major debt of gratitude.  The WTO owes you much more.  You helped us get back intobusiness, and reminded us what line of business we are supposed to be in.  You drew on all
the resilience acquired in the ups and downs of a long political career and made it ours.  You
never lost faith or optimism.  And you never forgot that organizations like ours exist to serve
people, not the other way around.WT/GC/M/75
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"You have always been quicker to accept blame rather than credit, which is definitely
not a good move for a politician.  Yet, you can't escape your major share of the credit for
Doha.  Sure it was a team effort, but as we all know the right coach can make all the
difference.  Thanks to you, we all lifted our play.  Finally, it is a measure of your generosityof spirit and commitment to the WTO community , that you have arranged the transition to
your successor better than it has ever been done before.  Mike, I know I speak for all the
membership when I say a simple, but heartfelt Thank You.  We will miss you, and wish you
and Yvonne every success and happiness in the future."
270. The Chairman said that he wished to add his own words of tribute and farewell to the
Director-General, which he believed also reflected the feelings of Members, as follows:
"I would like to say that all of us wish to  thank you for the efforts you have made and
for the leadership you have shown as the head of this organization.  I believe that you can feel
very satisfied at the excellent work that you have done.  All of your achievements will be
remembered.  You have made a huge contribution towards the launching of a new round in
Doha, and you have helped in the reestablishment of the credibility of the WTO after the verydifficult moments the organization had gone throug h earlier.  On top of this, during your term
of office ten new Members have joined the organization and many negotiations with others
have been started, technical assistance has been strengthened, as has training, and there has
been better coordination with other organizations.  There have also been obvious changes in
the functioning of the organization through a working style of open doors, greatertransparency, greater participation of the devel oping countries and always in an environment
where good humour has prevailed.  All of this is part of the inheritance we have received
from Mike Moore.  On behalf of all delegations, I would like to wish you all success in your
new function.  Whatever it may be, we know that the WTO will always have support and
inspiration from Mike Moore."
271. The Director-General then made the following statement:
"In my farewell speech to the New Zealand Parliament in 1999, I described my new
position at the WTO as continuing a life-long career in public service.  I said I would travel to
Geneva and give this job everything I have got.  I have done that.  I travelled here with an
agenda.  Yes, I was biased.  I wanted to see a new round launched with development issues at
the centre.  I wanted to enlarge our member ship.  I wanted to re-position the WTO and
advance multilateralism.  As my term as Director-General of the World Trade Organization
nears its conclusion, as I clear my desk and take down the paintings of beautiful New Zealand
landscapes from my office wall, I want to tell you that every day that I have been able to
serve this institution has been a great personal honour and every day has been a privilege.
"It is not my intention here to rehearse the history of our time together.  That will be
the subject of my next book which, when comple ted, will be available in all good bookstores.
I come out of it pretty well but I have instructed the publisher not to put your names in the
index so you will have to buy the book.  Three years on, I believe we are entitled to look back
on a record of very solid achievement.  This will also help remind us how much there is stillto do and why the work is so important and so urgent.
"When I arrived in Geneva in September 1999, the WTO was at a crossroads.  Never
before had the multilateral trading system enjoyed such prominence in international life; yet
never before had it been so fiercely attacked.  Never before had the fundamental principles ofthe system – consensus, non-discrimination, the rule of law – been so right and so necessary;
yet never before had it been so hard to see them applied in practice.  Never before had openWT/GC/M/75
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trade within a rules-based system done so much to lift living standards and increase
opportunity, yet never before had the persistence of poverty and exclusion been so glaring.
"In Seattle, the intersection of these intere sts became the site of a major pile-up, a
collision, a clash of priorities and imperatives.  Much has been written about Seattle.  Some ofit is even true.  Ministerial meetings had failed before, but never in such spectacular fashion.
In truth, we did not fail because of the protestors or because of gaps in our processes,
although neither helped.  We failed on substance and because Members were too far apart on
key issues.  Seattle cost us two years and, for some at least, called into question the very
legitimacy and survival of the multilateral trading system.  However, through continued faith
in the core principles and objectives of this institution, as well as hard work by Ambassadors,
Ministers, officials and the Secretariat, we are very much back in business.
"I am proud of what we have achieved together in these last three years.  Confidence
in the system is restored after the setback of Seattle.  We have maintained our core focus on
trade liberalization but also placed development issues and the interests of our poorer
Members rightfully at the centre of our work.  We are doing more than ever before to assistpoorer and smaller Members to integrate into the trading system and participate successfully
in WTO processes.  I believe also that our outstanding success in launching a new round of
trade negotiations in Doha last year has opened up enormous possibilities to advance the
conditions of people throughout the world.
"We can take pride as well in the momentum we have maintained since Doha.  Our
negotiating structures are in place and substantive work is well under way.  Members have
also acted decisively by approving an increased budget for 2002 and pledging 30 million
Swiss Francs to a new Global Trust Fund for technical assistance.  It is now up to negotiators
to work with commitment and flexibility to re alize the benefits offered by the multilateral
trading system.  This work is urgent.  It is urgent because there are just 13 months until the
Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún.  It is urgent because Ministers have set a deadline of
January 2005 for completing the round (this is not a three-year round because we have
already spent four years on it).  The Doha Development Agenda is urgent too because more
than half of the world's population continue to live on less than two dollars a day, and a
successful conclusion to the round can help lift billions of people out of poverty.  This
Agenda is about them.  Our greatest motivation is the people we serve.
"It is a source of great personal satisfaction that in the last three years we have been
able to welcome more than a quarter of the world's population into the World Trade
Organization – from Estonia, Jordan, Georgia, Albania, Oman, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova,
China and Chinese Taipei.  I pay tribute to those hard-working negotiators and Secretariatstaff who were able to conclude these accession processes.  Looking at the long list of
countries still seeking to join the WTO, I am profoundly confident in the long-term prospects
of this institution.  In the immediate term, Armenia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
and Vanuatu should join our membership this y ear.  If we get Russia in by the time of the
Fifth Ministerial Conference next year, that will be a great victory.  If Russia is not in by thetime of the Sixth Ministerial Conference in 2005, that will be a great defeat.  We can all take
pride in changes made to the way the WTO operates.  Let us reflect briefly on some of these
changes.
"First, we are now much more inclusive in ou r processes.  It used to be difficult for
smaller and poorer Members to attend meetings in Geneva and follow our processes.  Now,
we are bringing these representatives here ourselves and scheduling training activities so they
can also be present for key meetings of our General Council and Trade Negotiations
Committee.  We have also greatly expanded our technical assistance and training activities,WT/GC/M/75
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both in Geneva and in capitals, and we are utilising new technologies such as the internet and
distance-learning facilities.
"Second, we are more transparent and accountable in the way we do things and in the
way we take decisions.  This shows in all areas of our work – in technical assistance wherewe have new systems for auditing and evaluation;  in Councils and Committees where we
now declassify documents with much greater urgency;  and on our website where information
on WTO activities flows freely to delegations and the public.
"Third, we are cooperating with international and regional agencies more closely than
ever before.  Also, the growing role of our institution in the management of the world
economy continues to be recognized through invitations to participate in various UNConferences, summits of the G8 and many other ministerial-level meetings. It has been an
honour to work closely with great international public servants like Kofi Annan, Jim
Wolfensohn and Horst Kohler.  I believe we have made real progress in our efforts to ensure
coherence in the work of our respective institutions.  I am pleased too at the progress that has
been made in re-energising the Integrated Framework and JITAP and in expanding ourdialogue with regional and developmental institutions.
"Fourth, I believe we have made real progress in our efforts to enhance the WTO's
image and engage civil society.  We are reaching out to NGOs through regular seminars and
symposia.  We have developed important new links with parliamentarians and policymakers.We are also seeking to encourage a greater leve l of engagement from business leaders, trade
unions and other sectors of civil society.
"Finally, the Secretariat has re-positioned itself so we are better able to assist
Members in the work programme.  We have consolidated our internal structures andrefocused our priorities clearly to reflect the Doha Development Agenda.  Also concerning
the Secretariat, we have continued efforts to achieve the broadest possible diversification of
the Secretariat consistent with the highest standards of competence, efficiency and integrity.
In just 10 years, the number of women in the Secretariat occupying professional posts has
more than doubled;  the number of developing countries represented in the Secretariat has
increased by over 40 per cent.  As well, in just the last three years we have seen very
encouraging movement in the overall number of nationalities represented in the Secretariat,our re-energized internship programme is now taking almost twice as many young people
from developing countries as three years ago.  Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi takes office at the
WTO on 1 September.  Transition arrangements are well in hand and he has been receiving
all the papers for several months.  I am in regular contact with him and will do all I can to
support him and the WTO.
"I take this opportunity to thank you all for the support, cooperation and friendship I
have received during my time here.  I thank you too for your wisdom, leadership, compassion
and commitment.  You are outstanding representatives of your peoples.  I pay tribute to you,
your Ministers, and your Governments.  I should like to pay tribute also to the Chairman ofthe General Council, the previous Chairmen, and the other fine diplomats who have presided
over our various committees and working groups.
"This is a moment too to pay tribute to the Directors-General who have gone before
me, particularly Arthur Dunkel, Peter Sutherland and Renato Ruggiero.  I shall never forgetthe advice and support I received from these three great public servants.  In the more difficult
moments of my tenure, their phone-calls and words of encouragement always helped to lift
my spirits.  Both you and I have been well served by the WTO Secretariat.  They have
worked hard over these last three years, with commitment and dedication.  They areWT/GC/M/75
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professional.  They are objective.  I owe a great debt to my Deputies.  I should also like to
acknowledge and thank all other members of staff – my own office, Directors, divisional
staff, conference officers, translators, guards, cleaners, drivers, everyone.  You are all part of
the team.  You have all done a fine job.  A special word of thanks also to the interpreters.
One Ambassador recently expressed regret that I was leaving, saying that she was justbeginning to understand my English.  "Exactly the reason I should go", I replied.  "And don't
worry, no one in New Zealand understood me either".  Thank you to the interpreters who had
to struggle with a fourth official language – NZ.
"I know that I have sometimes offended people and I offer apologies.  I have made
some mistakes.  But never out of malice.  Mostly, my mistakes were borne of enthusiasm to
get the job done, complete our agenda, serve the public.  George Bernard Shaw said thatreasonable people do not make change.  Thus, all human progress is based on the
unreasonable person.  So, I have sometimes been unreasonable.  Let me end by quoting a
great English statesman.  Asked what qualities were required of a politician – and I might add
a Director-General – Winston Churchill replied:  "'The ability to foretell what is going to
happen tomorrow, next week, next month and next year.  And to have the ability afterwards to
explain why it didn't happen."  My book will be  published in due course.  It will show how
things did happen here.  And it will show how you and I, together, made them happen.  I will
continue to serve the public.  I can think of no greater vocation.  I may even join an NGO or
march with the protesters to the gates of this very institution.  You will know me
immediately.  My banner will say 'Justice Now, Finish the Round'."
272. The Chairman said that while he did not wish to cut short the homage to the Director-General,
in view of the lateness of the hour and given that delegations had already expressed themselves in the
context of the 18-19 July meeting of the TNC, he would invite only four delegations to speak.  Three
would reflect the three regions of developing-country Members – Indonesia for Asia, Zambia forAfrica, and Panama for Latin America – and New Zealand would reflect the developed-country
Members.
273. The representative of Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the ASEAN Members
, expressed
heartfelt thanks to the Director-General for his rele ntless efforts on behalf of the WTO as well as for
his high sense of responsibility regarding the task he had shouldered, both as Director-General and as
Chairman of the TNC.  Despite the fact that Mr. Moore’s tenure as Director-General had been marked
by some challenging years in the history of WTO, the ASEAN Members recognized the achievementshe had made. One of his most notable achievements had been the efforts to develop the focus on
technical assistance and capacity building, with a view to helping LDCs and developing countries
better participate in the various negotiations and in the multilateral trading system.  The ASEAN
Members wished to express their deepest appreciation for Mr. Moore's impressive stewardship in
giving the WTO a fresh impetus and purpose.  They had every confidence that his perceptiveleadership would do justice to his endeavours in another challenging assignment now awaiting him,
and wished him every success in the future.
274. The representative of Zambia, speaking on behalf of the LDCs
, congratulated and thanked
Mr. Moore for the tremendous contribution he had made to the WTO.  There was no doubt that the
organization had experienced a welcome metamorphosis, particularly when one remembered the longjourney from Seattle to Doha.  The LDCs thanked him for the emphasis on development that he had
worked so hard to infuse in the work of the WTO.  This also demonstrated his unwavering desire to
assist LDCs in terms of technical assistance and capacity building.  Mr. Moore's special efforts to
assist LDCs had led him to create an LDC office in the WTO which he had immediately put directly
under his own office.  This act alone had done much to elevate the profile of LDCs in the WTO.  Ithad also helped to send a positive signal both to the WTO Secretariat and the entire WTO
membership to start taking LDC issues much more seriously.  The LDCs also rememberedWT/GC/M/75
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Mr. Moore's tireless campaign among the donor community to mobilize resources needed for various
LDC programmes in the WTO.  For all this, and much more, the LDCs wished to express their
gratitude to Mr. Moore, and to wish him the very best in his future plans.
275. The representative of Panama, speaking on behalf of GRULAC , expressed their sincere
appreciation to the Director-General.  Mr. Moore had made an unforgettable impact on the
organization and would remain with it in spirit.  These countries wished to say "see you later", rather
than "good-bye", as it had been a real pleasure for them to get to know him.  They hoped that he
would soon return to meet with them again in future.
276. The representative of New Zealand said that he knew perhaps better than any other delegate
how hard Mr. Moore had worked over the years as a servant of the New Zealand public and
subsequently as a servant of the international comm unity.  He also knew how hard he had worked to
make the transition to the next Director-General a success.  Mr. Moore had one of his greatachievements behind him, which was the launch of the new round.  His own advice to fellow New
Zealanders was not to be too pessimistic about this process.  It was and always had been very difficult
to get consensus.  However, there had been other negotiating rounds, none of which had ever failed.
Sometimes the timetable had had to be adjusted, and although he was not making a prediction, this
was the historical reality.  But participants had never failed to keep the commitment, and he wasconfident that the round that Mr. Moore had been so central to getting under way would not be the
first failure.  Mr. Moore had left this round in excellent shape, and since the most recent TNC
meeting, there had been an indication of the impending passage of trade promotion authority in the
United States.  Thus, there had been a successful launch of the round, delegations had been getting
their proposals together during the past six months, and this excellent news had developed.  Thus,Mr. Moore could leave the organization not only feeling he had done a very good job, but that
Members were going to succeed with the Doha Development Agenda he had so ably put together.  On
behalf of all of the Members, he sincerely thanked Mr. Moore for his huge commitment during the
time he had been with the WTO.
277. The Director-General thanked all who had spoken for the kind words that had been expressed.
He would be watching and working in whatever capa city he could to make sure that the round was a
success.  To paraphrase a great Australian, he said that he was a true believer.
278. The Chairman regretted that due to the lateness of the hour, he had not been able to give the
floor to all delegations who wished to speak.
279. The General Council took note of the statements.
__________