RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/TBT/W/47
25June1997
ORGANIZATION(97-2618)
Committee onTechnical Barriers toTrade Original: English
SINGAPORE PAPER ONTHE FIRST TRIENNIAL REVIEW
Thefollowing communication, dated 18June1997, withrespect totheTriennial Review of
theAgreement onTechnical Barriers toTrade hasbeenreceived from thePermanent Mission ofthe
Republic ofSingapore withtherequest thatitbecirculated toMembers oftheCommittee.
_______________
1. Thephrase"...havingregard...totheexperiencegainedintheimplementationoftheAgreement
..."inArticle 15.4oftheAgreement onTechnical Barriers toTrade alludes totheneed forthe
Committee toascertain theextent ofadherence toandimplementation oftheAgreement. Only with
athorough review ofthestatus oftheimplementation oftheAgreement andtheproblems arising thereof
would WTO Members beinaposition tomake adjustments totherights andobligations oftheTBT
provisions. Thus, therunuptotheTriennial Review should bedevoted tomaking athorough
examination andstudy oftheimplementation oftheAgreement.
2. Inapproaching theTriennial Review, wepropose thefollowing keyissues forconsideration
bytheCommittee:
(i) Forthereasons indicated inparagraph 1,weshould notprejudge atthisstage whether
adjustments oftherights andobligations oftheAgreement would benecessary.
(ii) Implementation issues should beaccorded thehighest priority. TheCommittee should review
andascertain whether allMembers hadfullyandproperly applied theTBTprovisions including the
notification obligations. Asnotification obligations intheTBTAgreement areamong themostextensive
ofallWTO Agreements, theCommittee should notseektointroduce more transparency provisions.
Instead, thefocus should betoensure theproper andfullimplementation ofexisting transparency
provisions. TheCommittee could focus onthefollowing areas:
(a) Transparency ofVoluntary Standards
Ascertaining ways toenhance thetransparency ofvoluntary standards applied by
non-governmental standardizing bodies. Inparticular, theCommittee could consider means formore
standardizing bodies toaccept theCode ofGood Practice. Standardizing bodies which haveaccepted
theCode ofGood Practice arerequired topublish andnotify totheISO/IEC Information Centre a
work programme ofstandards. Itshould benoted thatin1996, only60standardizing bodies outof
anestimated 600accepted theCode ofGood Practice.
Theproliferation ofvoluntary standards could havepotential adverse impact ontrade. The
Committee should consider procedures toprovide forcloser coordination andcooperation ofthe
Committee andinternational standardizing bodies. Inthisregard, theCommittee could consider ways
toprovide forvoluntary standardizing bodies topublish andnotify theirwork programme ofstandards
toacentral body suchastheISO/IEC Information Centre inGeneva.
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(b) Timely Notification
Timely notification ofproposed technical regulations, standards andconformity assessment
procedures attheirdrafting stage isessential toensuring transparency. TheCommittee should give
impetustosuchtimelynotification.Membersshouldcomplywiththeagreedtimeframesfornotification.
(iii) Theraison d'êtreoftheTBTAgreement istofacilitate theelimination oftechnical barriers
totrade. Whether theAgreement hasfulfilled thisgoalcould onlybeascertained withempirical data
ontheeffect thattheTBTAgreement hasonexport opportunities andmarket access. Case studies
focusing ontheeffect oftheAgreement onsmall andmedium sized enterprises (SMEs) willbeuseful.
TheWTO Secretariat could undertake suchastudy.
(iv) Inorder torationalize timeandhuman resources, itwould beuseful fortheWTO Secretariat
tomake useofexisting work onTBTrelated issues inother WTO fora. Forexample, inexamining
theTBT/eco-labelling interface, itwould beuseful todraw ontheextensive discussions thatthe
Committee onTrade andEnvironment hasontheissue intherunuptotheSingapore Ministerial
Conference. Ontheeco-labelling issue, wewould liketoemphasize thatduerecognition should be
accorded tothenegotiating history oftheTBTAgreement andtotheconcerns thathavebeenexpressed
ontheissueofnon-product-related PPMs particularly theirpotential tradedistorting effect andimpact
ontheWTO legalsystem.
(v) Further clarification oftheconcepts ofthemutual recognition andequivalency could facilitate
theelimination oftradedistortive effects oftechnical regulation, standards andconformity assessment
procedures. Weconcur withtheCanadian delegation 'sconcerns ontheportability ofcertification,
i.e.,evenwithinternational standards, barriers could taketheform ofmultiple certification ofthe
standards. Weareoftheview thatMutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) ontheresults ofthe
conformity assessment procedures would savetimeandcosts forexporters through theavoidance of
multiple testing orcertification intheimporting country. Theprovisions forconclusion ofMRAs in
theUruguay Round Agreements arerather weak. TheTBTAgreement forexample merely encourages
countries toconclude MRAs ontheresults ofconformity assessment procedures. Given thecosts
associated withthenegotiations ofbilateral MRAs, itwould beuseful iftheTriennial Review could
attempt tostrengthen theprovisions onMRAs. Two possible ways are(a)review ofArticle 6
(Recognition ofConformity Assessment byCentral Government Bodies) withaviewtoaddressing
theproblems highlighted above; and(b)liketheWorking Party forProfessional Services (WPPS),
theCommittee could attempt todraw upvoluntary guidelines forMRAs. Withregard totheconcept
ofequivalency inrelation tovoluntary standards, itwould beuseful fortheCommittee tocontemplate
formulating provisions similar toArticle 2.7(equivalency fortechnical regulations) forinclusion in
theCode ofGood Practice.
(vi) Technical regulations established inaccordance withinternational standards are"rebuttably
presumed"nottocreateunnecessaryobstaclestointernationaltrade.Inotherwords,technicalregulations
based oninternational standards arepresumed tobetrade neutral. Nonetheless certain international
standards could haveadverse effects ontrade, theCommittee should therefore becautious about the
proposals toincorporate suchstandards intotheTBTAgreement. Athorough study ofthepotential
tradedistortingimpactofthesestandardsshouldbeundertakenbeforeanydecisionismadetoincorporate
them intotheAgreement.
(vii) While recognizing theutility ofusing international standards forthepurpose ofharmonization,
theCommittee should becognisant ofthedifficulties thatdeveloping countries could have in
implementing thesestandards. Inthisconnection, Committee Members should takenoteofArticle 12.4
(Special andDifferential Treatment ofDeveloping Country Members).