WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTCP/W/116
25 May 1999
(99-2099)
Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition PolicyOriginal:  English
COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES
The following communication, dated 15 April 1999, has been received from the Permanent
Mission of the United States with the request that it be circulated to Members.
_______________
Approaches to Promoting Cooperation and Communication
among Members including in the Field of Technical Cooperation
I. INTRODUCTION
As trade barriers fall and business becomes increasingly global, cooperation and
communication among WTO Members become increasingly important in order both to pursue more
effectively Members' public policies and to create a global economic climate more conducive to
economic and trade expansion, sustainable development, and improvements in the standard of living
and the quality of life.  The trend towards more, and more effective, cooperation and communication
in the competition policy domain is a leading example.
In recent years, US antitrust authorities have accumulated a wealth of experience in
cooperating and communicating with their counterparts in many Members, and have found that this
has generally furthered such goals as promoting a culture of competition, institution building,
enhancing understanding of one another's systems, convergence in process, procedures and analysis of
competition matters, and facilitating effective and efficient competition enforcement.  The FederalTrade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have made it a "high priority . . . to
cooperate wherever appropriate with foreign authorities regarding [antitrust] enforcement".
1  US trade
agencies, like their own counterparts in other countries, have also had many years of experience in
working with foreign government authorities with the goal of encouraging more competitive and open
foreign markets.  This has been pursued with the obvious goal of creating more and better commercialopportunities in foreign markets for US exporters.  However, irrespective of the immediate goal, the
broader policy objective aligns very frequently with the missions of foreign antitrust authorities;
therefore, the focus of such work often extends beyond the negotiation of trade agreements to include
direct consultations and cooperation with foreign antitrust and regulatory agencies with respect to
domestic regulatory environments and addressing anti-competitive market conditions.
This paper summarizes US approaches to cooperation and communication, including through
bilateral, regional, and multilateral arrangements, focusing in particular on the types of information
                                                     
1 DOJ and FTC, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (April 1995) at 1.WT/WGTCP/W/116
Page 2
and assistance that can be provided under each approach, as well as the objectives and the limitations
or requirements of each approach.
II. BILATERAL APPROACHES TO COOPERATION AND COMMUNICATION
AMONG ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES
A. AD HOC SHARING OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
The simplest approach to cooperation and communication among antitrust authorities consists
of informal bilateral contacts occurring outside the context of any formal agreement or legislation.
The importance of these kinds of contacts should not be underestimated.  Both the DOJ and the FTC
frequently receive ad hoc requests for publicly available information from foreign competition
authorities.2   The types of information sought and the reasons for the requests are diverse.  For
example, over the past several years, officials of nascent competition authorities in other countrieshave asked the FTC for information on its organization and procedures, including staffing and
budgetary statistics, organization charts, administrative staff manuals, and rules of practice and
procedure that could assist those authorities in setting up an administrative enforcement agency.
Others contemplating the adoption or amendment of a pre-merger notification programme have
contacted the FTC and DOJ for copies of US legislation, implementing regulations, staff speeches,reports to Congress describing the US programme, and recent enforcement activities.  The two
agencies have also provided countries undertaking regulatory reform with examples of advocacies
before federal or state regulatory bodies, economic studies, or Congressional testimony by agency
officials on issues pertaining to the deregulation of such industry sectors as transportation, electricity
and telecommunications.
As these examples illustrate, some requests could be characterized as a type of technical
assistance.  However, requests for public information are often received from antitrust officials of
some of the United States' major trading partners.  These officials are seeking to keep abreast of
current developments or to increase their understanding of US procedures and substantive standards,sometimes with a view to refining or amending thei r own procedures and standards.  Foreign antitrust
authorities also seek publicly available information from US authorities in support of their
investigation and prosecution of cases that involve issues, such as market definition, that have been
litigated in the United States.  The sharing of such information promotes consistency in the definition
of markets and in approaches to other enforcement issues.  The sharing of public information on
enforcement policies, analytical frameworks, adjudicative decisions and emerging enforcement issues
is a particularly valuable form of cooperation which often does not require a formal request.
Both the FTC and the DOJ disseminate public information by various means including, most
importantly, through the Internet.  Each agency's  home page  provides access to a wealth of
information, including press releases and annual reports on enforcement actions, speeches,
administrative guidance (business review letters and advisory opinions), and other documentsexplaining how and why the agencies acted against alleged anticompetitive conduct, including the
rationale for proposed settlements.
3
                                                     
2 A listing of the types of publicly available information relating to the FTC is found in section 4.9 of
its Organization, Procedures, Rules of Practice and Standards of Conduct (July 1997).  Many DOJ materials can
be found at http://www/usdoj.gov.atr.
3 See http://www/usdoj.gov/atr;  http://www/ftc.gov .WT/WGTCP/W/116
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B. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
In recent years, the DOJ and the FTC have been active in providing technical assistance to
countries establishing or revitalizing antitrust regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of
the former Soviet Union, Latin America and Africa.   Most of the funds for these efforts are provided
by the US Agency for International Development ("USAID").  The objective of these activities is toassist the responsible authorities in the relevant countries in their efforts to promote development of a
competition culture and, more specifically, in establishing the legal and institutional framework for
ensuring that markets function competitively.
4  FTC and DOJ attorneys and economists have, among
other things, worked with foreign antitrust officials on developing policies, drafting new antitrust laws
or amendments to existing laws, analysing indivi dual cases, and providing advice on a wide range of
issues or problems confronting their agencies.
Such technical assistance efforts have encompassed both short-term missions and assignments
lasting several months, working in the country's antitrust agency.  During these missions, US staff
have, among other things, explained the structure and administration of the DOJ and the FTC, US
investigative techniques, and legal and economic analyses of a wide spectrum of antitrust issues (e.g .,
market definition, market dominance, horizontal and vertical agreements, merger review andprivatization).  In addition to working through these USAID-funded programmes, FTC and DOJ
advisors have participated in various conferences addressing competition issues, such as those
sponsored by the Organization for Economic Coop eration and Development ("OECD"), as part of
their technical assistance work.
One beneficial consequence of explaining our legal and economic antitrust analysis to others
is that we enrich our own understanding of how antitrust law works in various settings around the
world.  Our experience in providing technical assistance has confirmed the general applicability of the
legal and economic principles applied in the United States to the analysis of competition issues in
economies that are very different from our own.  However, we also have learned the importance ofbeing - and to be - sensitive to and account for the specific national conditions in a given economy
before reaching conclusions about how broad enforcement priorities should be set or applicable legal
and economic principles should be applied in a particular case.  We have also found that the
communication that takes place among enforcers in the course of providing technical assistance leads
to a clearer and more practical understanding of mutual goals and concerns in the application of
antitrust laws and policies.  The more closely and frequently we work with our counterparts, the more
a consensus develops concerning the appropriate goals and methods of antitrust law enforcement.
C. B
ILATERAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
The United States has entered into bilateral agreements on antitrust cooperation with
Germany (1976),  Australia (1982), Canada (1995), the European Communities (1991) and, on
15 March 1999,  Israel.   These agreements have been motivated by a mutual desire to cooperate andcoordinate more closely in antitrust enforcement and to avoid or manage possible conflict arising
from the application of antitrust laws to international business conduct.
5
Under US law, these bilateral agreements are "executive agreements".  Although they
represent formal and binding international agreemen ts for the US authorities, they do not have the
legal status of treaties in the US system.  As a result, the agreements do not supplant domestic laws
that, for example, prohibit sharing confidential in formation without the submitter's consent.  Thus,
                                                     
4 The programme also covers assistance in consumer  protection matters such as deceptive advertising
and marketing practices that fall outside the parameters of antitrust law.
5 See Submission from the United States on US Experience with Antitrust Cooperation Agreements,
WT/WGTCP/W/48 (24 November 1997);  Antitrust Division Manual, Chapter VIII.WT/WGTCP/W/116
Page 4
these "first generation" agreements may simply codify informal cooperation among competition
agencies that frequently deal with each other on antitrust matters.  However, we have found that the
agreements provide a catalyst for broader and deeper cooperation with the foreign antitrust agencies.
While there are some variations among these agreements, they generally provide for the
following types of communication and cooperation: (i) notification to the other party of an
enforcement investigation or proceeding that may affect another country's important interests;
(ii) sharing information relevant to each other's in vestigations or proceedings to the extent permitted
by domestic law; (iii) coordination of parallel investigations, for example, when each party is
investigating the same firm, conduct, or transaction; and (iv) consultation to resolve issues arising
from enforcement activities or any other matter arising from the agreement.  The 1991 EC and 1995
Canada agreements  provide for meetings to exchan ge information on the parties' current enforcement
activities and priorities, economic sectors of common interest, policy changes under consideration,
and other matters of mutual interest relating to the application of antitrust laws.  Although, in practice,
much of this occurs informally at the staff level, our experience has been that the operation of the
agreements facilitates communication and cooperation in ways that increase the effectiveness of
enforcement and foster an informal convergence of approaches.
The recent worldwide merger boom has provided many opportunities to cooperate closely
with other competition authorities.  In a typical global transaction that raises competition issues, the
process of cooperation begins with the notification of the authority of another country in which a
party or important evidence or assets are located.  If another country is also reviewing the transaction,our staffs communicate regularly, often daily.  The communications consist of, for example, sharing
views on relevant market definition, analysis of competitive effects, the investigatory process,
deadlines, publicly available industry information, and potential remedies.  If the parties under review
seek to settle a case in more than one jurisdiction (e.g ., through a divestiture), we often coordinate
with the other competition authority to arrive at co mpatible remedies - an approach which can benefit
the parties as well as the enforcement agencies.  Recent examples of such cooperation include the
DOJ's collaboration with the European Commission in the MCI/WorldCom and Dresser/Halliburton
mergers; the FTC's collaboration with the Canadian, Mexican, Australian, and EC competition
authorities to fashion compatible relief in the Guiness/Grand Metropolitan merger; and the FTC's
cooperation with British, French, German and Italian antitrust authorities in developing a compatible
settlement in the Federal-Mogul/T&N merger.
6  Outside the merger area, the DOJ and the European
Commission worked together to develop identical settlements in a 1995 action against certainlicensing practices by Microsoft.  Cooperation does not, of course, guarantee that authorities will
always reach the same conclusion, even in the same  matter, as the US and EC experiences in the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger illustrates.  It s hould be expected that differences in laws and
policies will occasionally lead to such differing results.  This does not in any way detract, however,
from the major benefits of cooperation in most cases.
Of course, confidentiality protections can place an important limitation on the extent to which
authorities can cooperate under bilateral agreements.  For example, we cannot divulge any
information submitted pursuant to our pre-merger notification process, nor can we share most
information provided during investigations wit hout the submitter's consent.  However, parties
sometimes waive their confidentiality rights in order to facilitate, and expedite, the review and
settlement process, particularly of mergers for which prior approval is a pre-condition to closing.
                                                     
6 U.S. v. Halliburton Co., No. 98-CV-2340 (D.D.C. 1 April 1999); Guiness PLC, Dkt C-3801, 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,441 (1998); Federal Mogul Corporation and T&N PLC, FTC Dkt. No. C-3836, Final
Order (8 December 1998), reported in 5 Trade Reg. Rpt. (CCH) 24,400.WT/WGTCP/W/116
Page 5
Thus, the parties in all of the cases referred to in the previous paragraph granted confidentiality
waivers to facilitate cooperation between the relevant agencies.
Any sharing of confidential information is ba sed on a commitment by the party receiving the
information to protect its confidentiality.  Bilateral agreements facilitate such waivers by requiringmaintenance of the confidentiality of information provided by and to each party to the agreement.
The successful use of this provision is predicated on mutual trust that the commitment will be
honoured and that each party's laws enable the agencies to preserve the confidentiality of such
information to the fullest extent.  Confidence in the ability of the agencies to protect the
confidentiality of shared information is a precondition to parties' grants of confidentiality waivers.
D. P
OSITIVE COMITY AGREEMENTS
The bilateral agreements with the European Communities, Canada, and Israel contain a
provision on "positive comity" which goes beyond traditional notions of cooperation and
coordination.  Under these provisions, one country can request that the other party investigate and act
against anticompetitive conduct taking place in the latter's territory that affects the important interests
of the requesting country.  This could arise, for example, where firms in Country A are engaged inanticompetitive conduct that excludes competing firms in Country B from Country A's market, or
where a cartel in country A also injures consumer s in Country B.  If the competition authority in
Country A accepted the referral from Country B, it would conduct its own investigation of the matter
and take whatever action it found appropriate.  Country B could then accept these results or take
appropriate action under its own laws.
In June 1998,  the United States and the EC entered into a new agreement elaborating on the
positive comity provisions of the 1991 agreement.  The new agreement clarifies the circumstances
under which the parties will refer cases of anticompetitive activities to each other, and sets forth the
circumstances under which one party normally will defer to the other to investigate allegedanticompetitive practices in the other's territory.  It spells out the obligations that the antitrust
authorities undertake in handling these cases, while preserving the right of each authority to act
independently.  The agreement excludes mergers because of the short time-frames in which they must
be reviewed and because statutory obligations to review certain mergers preclude deferring to the
other jurisdiction's authority.  In addition, the agreement allows the parties to pursue separate
enforcement activities where - as in the case of  international cartels - anticompetitive conduct
affecting both territories justifies the imposition of penalties in both jurisdictions.
The principle of positive comity is based on the recognition that even though a country may
have jurisdiction to investigate and act against anticompetitive conduct taking place abroad, there may
be cases in which it is more efficient or appropriate to defer, at least in the first instance, to a foreign
competition authority.  A case may be referred because, for example, a foreign antitrust agency maybe better placed to obtain necessary evidence or may be in a better position to impose an effective
remedy.  In addition, use of  positive comity may avoid tensions arising from so-called extraterritorial
application of antitrust laws.
Positive comity can be a useful tool in some cases, particularly where the respective antitrust
agencies have had the opportunity to develop a relationship of sufficient trust and confidence in each
other's ability and commitment to enforce its antitrust laws soundly and effectively.  Laws and
regulations need not be identical, but a commitm ent to national treatment in the application of
antitrust principles, adequate investigative and remedial powers, and sufficient independence of
antitrust authorities are among the necessary underpinnings of an effective positive comity agreement.
The United States has had limited practical experience to date with positive comity
provisions.  There has been one case formally referred by the DOJ to the European Commission underWT/WGTCP/W/116
Page 6
the 1991 agreement, involving allegations that anticompetitive conduct by European airlines
prevented entry by US-based airline computer reservation systems; the European Commission
recently issued a Statement of Objections with respect to some of the alleged conduct in question.
There has been no case to date under the 1998 agreement.  Some cases have also been handled
informally following positive comity principles, including a case in which the FTC decided not totake any action against a group of Italian Parma ham producers who had agreed on a production quota
limiting exports because the Italian antitrust authority was investigating the matter and eventually
imposed an effective remedy.
E. M
LATS AND IAEAA AGREEMENTS
The United States has also entered into agreements that go beyond "soft" or "first generation"
bilateral agreements to enhance antitrust cooperation in international matters.  Mutual legal assistancetreaties ("MLATs") allow enforcement authorities engaged in criminal investigations to exchange
information obtained in those investigations that ot herwise would have to be kept confidential and to
provide comprehensive law enforcement assistance, including use of each other's compulsory
investigatory powers.  This information-sharing and assistance are all subject to confidentiality
safeguards.   The United States currently has 20  MLATs in force with other countries, many of which
cover assistance in criminal antitrust investigations and proceedings.
The DOJ has sought and received assistance in cartel investigations pursuant to MLATs,
particularly under its MLAT with Canada which specifically applies to antitrust matters.  In recent
years, the United States and Canada invoked this MLAT to coordinate investigations leading to the
prosecution of cross-border price-fi xing in the plastic dinnerware and thermal fax paper industries.  In
the fax paper case, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police conducted a successful raid in Canada to
assist a US grand jury proceeding.
To encourage sound international cooperation in civil and criminal antitrust matters,  the US
Congress passed the International Antitrust Assistance Act of 1994 ("IAEAA"). 
7  This legislation
authorizes DOJ and FTC to enter into bilateral anti trust mutual assistance agreements with foreign
governments that authorize the agencies to share confidential information obtained in the agencies'
investigations and to use their respective investigator y powers to gather evidence on behalf of  foreign
antitrust authorities.  The law is conditioned on mutuality - both parties must have comparable
authority to provide assistance.  Congress also requ ired that both countries have laws adequate to
protect materials provided in confidence from unauthorized public disclosure.  Thus, the lawauthorizes the FTC and DOJ to withhold from public disclosure any antitrust evidence obtained from
foreign antitrust authorities.  Information shared pursuant to the statute can be used only for law
enforcement purposes.  The IAEAA does not cover in formation provided to the agencies under their
pre-merger notification provisions.
To date, the United States has negotiated one agreement under the IAEAA, with Australia,
that we expect to sign shortly.   Australia was a logical first country because its enforcement authority
and confidentiality laws fulfilled the mutuality re quirements of the IAEAA and because Australia and
the United States have developed a cooperative and productive relationship in antitrust cooperation.
                                                     
7 Public Law 103-348, 108 Stat.4597, codified  at 15 U.S.C.§ § 6201-6212.WT/WGTCP/W/116
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III. REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO COOPERATION AND
COMMUNICATION
Cooperation and communication are also facilitated by participation in regional and
multilateral fora, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC") forum, the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), the Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA")
initiative, the Competition Law and Policy Committee ("CLP") of the OECD, and the Working Group
on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy of the WTO.  In meetings conducted under
the auspices of these organizations, as well as in conferences sponsored by countries,
non-governmental organizations, and private entities, senior antitrust and trade officials have the
opportunity to share ideas and learn from one another's experiences in competition law, policy, and
enforcement.  These meetings and conferences serve to advance understanding of the goals, principlesand analytical approaches of the antitrust law regimes of the participating countries, and can result in
the adoption of work programmes or commitmen ts to promote enforcement cooperation and
substantive convergence.
For example, the OECD's CLP reviews annual reports on competition law and policy
developments in member countries and holds discussions of various important issues in competition
law and procedure.  A principal goal of its work programme is the development and dissemination of
key concepts and policy instruments to promote analytical convergence and use of best practices by
national antitrust authorities.  One of the CLP's working parties focuses specifically on strengthening
international cooperation in antitrust law enfor cement.  The OECD's Recommendation on cooperation
among member countries in international antitrust law enforcement, first adopted in 1967 and revised
most recently in 1995,
8 was a model for some earlier bilateral cooperation agreements, and is now a
plurilateral equivalent of the more recent forms of "first generation" bilateral agreements.   The United
States cooperates regularly with OECD members pur suant to the provisions of this Recommendation,
which include notification, information exchange, and coordination; the Recommendation alsoprovides for positive comity.
In addition, the CLP developed, and the OECD Council adopted last year, a recommendation
to encourage member countries to implement more systematic and effective enforcement against
cartels.
9   The new Hard Core Cartel Recommendation encourages OECD members to ensure that
their laws effectively halt and deter hard core cart els; to enter into mutual assistance agreements to
permit evidence-sharing with foreign authorities to th e extent permitted by national law; and to review
provisions in their laws that stand in the way of such cooperative efforts.  This Recommendation, like
all OECD recommendations, is voluntary.
The Hard Core Cartel Recommendation has influenced antitrust authorities beyond  OECD
member countries.  In October 1998, antitrust official s from eleven of the twelve Western Hemisphere
countries with antitrust laws held the First Antitrust Summit of the Americas in Panama.  The Summit
culminated in a Communiqué in which the participants pledged, among other things, to cooperate
with one another to maximize the efficacy and efficiency of competition law enforcement, particularly
in combating hard core cartel practices.  The Communiqué also contains a commitment by the
participants to share best practices for the implementation of competition policies.10
                                                     
8 OECD, Revised Recommendation of the Council concerning cooperation between member countries
on anticompetitive practices affecting international trade, C(95)130/Final (1995).
9 OECD, Recommendation of  the Council concerning  effective action against hard core cartels,
C(98)35/Final (1998) ("Hard Core Cartel Recommendation").
10 Communiqué from Antitrust Summit of the Americas, located at
"www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9810/communique.htm" (20 October 1998).WT/WGTCP/W/116
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Other fora that foster communication and cooperation in competition policy include NAFTA,
where the United States, Canada, and Mexico have promoted mutual understanding of one another's
policies in a Working Group on Trade and Competition; APEC, which provides an opportunity for
many countries with a new-found commitment to competition policy to benefit from the experience of
countries with a more robust antitrust history; and the FTAA, where thirty-four Western Hemispherenations participate in the Negotiating Group on Competition Policy which is considering the role of
competition policy in a future free trade area.  Finally, of course, there is this Working Group.
IV. COOPERATION AND COMMUNICATION INVOLVING TRADE AUTHORITIES
In the United States, as elsewhere, trade agencies have a vested interest in encouraging the
development and enforcement of sound foreign antitrust laws and competition policies and in
supporting the stature and credibility of foreign antitrust authorities as a means of facilitatinginternational trade in goods and services and access to foreign markets for US goods and services
exporters.  From the market access perspective, trade agencies are concerned both about anti-
competitive conduct by businesses in foreign markets and anti-competitive market structures which
may be fostered by government action or inaction.  Therefore, depending upon the nature of the
industry and of the problems that US exporters may be experiencing in particular markets, the missionof trade agencies such as the Office of the United States Trade Representative or the US Department
of Commerce can range from seeking more vigorous enforcement of a foreign government's antitrust
law to urging foreign governments to deregulate in a given sector, or to "regulate" in a much more
pro-competitive fashion.
In a variety of situations, US trade officials engage proactively with officials of both their
counterpart trade/industry ministries in foreign governments as well as with the foreign antitrust or
regulatory authority.  Direct contact with the antitrust authority can serve two beneficial purposes.
First, it provides an opportunity for an immediate,  two-way flow of information in which the trade
agency can provide useful information gathered and digested from the full array of US businessesabout their experiences in the foreign market, while  the antitrust authority can provide information
and clarify any misperceptions about enforcement standards, priorities and resources.  These
exchanges of information can either help buttress the enforcement of the foreign competition law and
policy or they can shed light on other explanations for the exporters' difficulties in accessing the
foreign market.  A second beneficial purpose is served because such direct contact with foreign trade
and diplomatic officials can help enhance the domestic authority and credibility of the antitrust
agency.  To the extent that the sound enforcement of  antitrust laws can help to defuse potential trade
frictions, in addition to serving the interests of that country's economy and consumers, the antitrust
agency may be able to garner additional stature a nd influence within its own government and national
"establishment" which help it to fulfill to its mission.
Among the various forms of potential anti-competitive conduct, vertical restraints and cartel
activity are likely to be of the most interest - and concern - to trade agencies.  Depending upon the
extent to which these or similar arrangements stem from, or are facilitated by, governmental measures
and regulations, the contacts initiated by trade officials may range beyond the counterpart trade
ministry and the antitrust authority to include foreign regulatory bodies.  This becomes an obvious
consideration in the case of sectors that are exempt  from the application of antitrust law, but it may
also become appropriate in instances when the antitrust authority lacks sufficient experience,
independence or political clout.  Needless to say, these contacts are not necessarily going to be
collegial in every respect; in certain cases, adversarial encounters may arise.  But, especially given
recent trends world-wide accepting the benefits of privatization, regulatory reform and economic
liberalization, the long-term objectives of trade agencies, competition agencies and regulatoryagencies are increasingly more compatible, even if not always identical.WT/WGTCP/W/116
Page 9
To be sure, not every market access "problem" can be attributed to the presence of anti-
competitive private conduct or the existence of anti-competitive regulatory structures.  But where
there has been a history of such conduct or struct ures, working with the foreign antitrust authority can
potentially offer a more productive and efficient approach toward addressing market access problems
than more piecemeal efforts aimed at each and every market access problem.  The success of suchefforts depends, of course, on that authority's commitment to vigorous antitrust law enforcement and
the existence of a broadly applicable and soundly structured law.  At a minimum, such an approach
can at least serve as a useful supplement to the pursuit of trade policy solutions.  However, to the
extent that "structural" problems are able to be effectively tackled using systemic solutions, the end
result can be the reinvigoration of the domestic economy coupled with a broad diminution of trade
tensions.  Trade agencies find this attractive because it can vastly simplify the picture both in terms of
solving real problems and separating out the legitimate from the less legitimate complaints.  Thus,they can share a common goal with the foreign antitrust authority to empower that authority to do its
job well and in as transparent a manner as possible.  If successful, clear benefits result for both foreign
exporters and domestic consumers.
V. CONCLUSION
Globalization has made cooperation and communication a necessity if there is to be effective
competition enforcement and assurance of market access concessions.  Cooperation under voluntary
mechanisms, such as OECD Recommendations, and under bilateral agreements has enhanced the
efficacy of national antitrust enforcement.   In addition, cooperation, communication, and technical
assistance have fostered convergence through learning in antitrust law and policy.  Thesedevelopments have contributed to opening markets to foreign competition, enhancing consumer
welfare, and removing impediments that could otherwise hinder international trade.
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