WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/MA/6
5 February 2003
(03-0772)
Negotiating Group on Market Access
OVERVIEW OF PROPOSALS SUBMITTED
Introduction
1. Paragraph 3 of the "Programme of meetings for the negotiations on market access for non-
agricultural products" adopted by the Group on 19 July 2002 foresees "a consolidated overview ofproposals to be submitted to participants at the first meeting of the Group in 2003".
 2. The overview has been prepared on the basis of written submissions by participants which
were circulated in the TN/MA/W/- document series.  The overview has not taken into account points
made in the area of environmental goods and non-tariff barriers.  In light of the rather preliminarynature of the discussion on these subjects, it was felt that an overview on these subjects would be
more useful at a later stage.   For the purpose of this review, more than one communication from the
same delegation has been counted as one submission (this concerns the EC, US, Japan, Korea and
India).  In addition,  a submission made by a group of participants was also considered as one
submission (this concerns LDCs and  Mercosur).   In light of the above 18 submissions may be
considered to have been received and have been taken into account in this overview
3. While the "Programme of meetings…" foresees an overview of the proposals of modalities
submitted, the attention of participants is drawn to the fact that the nature of the submissions differed
considerably.  In some instances the submissions contained concrete proposals on modalities, in
others they contained views or ideas on the negotiations and yet in others there was a mix of both. No
distinction was made between the various submissions and information provided in all of them hasbeen taken into account, if relevant to this exercise.
4. The overview is structured in the following ma nner.  Section I contains a listing of eighteen
issues which have been identified in the submissions.  In addition, items 19 and 20 refer to newly
acceded Members and LDCs, respectively and reflect points raised in connection with these twocategories of participants.  Each subject has been looked at from two angles: firstly an overview of the
submissions relating to each subject has been presented and secondly the special and differential
treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments aspect of the subject as contained in the
submissions has been provided.  Section II  sets out in a tabular form the items listed in Section I and
reproduces the specifics of the submissions pertaining to each of the items as well as any special anddifferential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in  reduction commitments aspect. Participants have
also been identified in this section for ease of re ference.  An annex reproducing the various formulas
proposed has been attached to the end of the document.TN/MA/6
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Section I:
1. Product Coverage
Overview of submissions
Nine submissions were identified in which refe rence was made to product coverage.  Five of
them state that all non-agricultural products should be subject to negotiations. Another submission
states that in principle the entire tariff universe would be subject to negotiations. Two other
submissions speak of comprehensive or broad product coverage without a priori  exclusions. Another
submission qualifies that there should be no exceptio ns on product coverage for  developed countries.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
-
2. Elimination of Tariffs
Overview of submissions
Four submissions make a reference to the elimination of tariffs.  In one case elimination of all
duties is foreseen for 2015.  In another case, elimination of tariffs on most non-agricultural products atleast in OECD countries has been proposed.   Anot her submission provides that developed Members
could have as an objective to eliminate their tariffs within a certain specified period following an
initial one-off reduction at the conclusion of the Doha Round. The fourth submission makes a
reference to expanding the scope of duty-free trade.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
In one of the four submissions, it is noted that, where possible, elimination of tariffs on
products of interest to developing countries should take place.
3. Core Modality
Overview of submissions
A variety of modalities are proposed.  Thirteen  of the eighteen submissions suggest the use of
a formula approach. In some of these cases no detail regarding the formula has been provided.
Among the proposals where some detail has been provided, a distinction has been made for thepurpose of this overview between formulas that apply on a line-by-line basis and formulas that foresee
a reduction in the average tariff.   It is to be noted that in one case the modality proposed uses both
approaches.  Two of the thirteen submissions foresee sectoral initiatives as being a core part of the
modality along with the formula.
Of the remaining submissions, one submission proposes giving priority consideration to
approaches of general application (formula cut and sectoral approaches), and the Swiss formula with
different coefficients has been referred to as a po ssible formula. Another submission suggests  the use
of a formula approach as an option.  The remaining three submissions propose a "cocktail approach",
a "combination of approaches" and a sector-by-sector approach,  respectively.TN/MA/6
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Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Thirteen submissions make a specific reference to special and differential treatment.  Nine of
them state that formula-based approaches could vary the cut for developing and developed countries.
One example which is provided is through the use of different coefficients. Another submissionspeaks of higher percentage reductions to be set for developed countries than for developing
countries.  The percentage reduction for the latter group of countries is also to be determined in light
of their dependence on customs revenue.  Two of the nine submissions state that sectors and products
of substantial export interest to developing country Members should be subject of priority reductions.
Of the remaining four submissions, one  submission states that Members should agree to deeper cuts
for textiles, clothing and footwear. Another submi ssion proposes the use of a "cocktail approach" for
developing countries rather than the formula approach it has proposed for developed countries.Another submission states that once agreement has been reached on the modalities, Members can turn
to "more precise and customised approaches" to take account of individual development needs.  The
last submission speaks of adopting a broad rather than restricted approach to the negotiations.  It
provides that developing countries should be able to maintain the same concession level for certain
products or apply only minimum reductions to them.
4. Supplementary approaches
Overview of submissions
- Harmonization and/or sectoral elimination initiatives
Eleven submissions make a reference to sectoral initiatives. Although contained in the section
entitled" supplementary approaches",  there are two submissions which view sectoral initiatives as
being part of the core modality.  Another submission states that sectoral initiatives might be asupplementary  method to a formula for sectors where a critical mass (ex. 80% of world trade) can be
achieved.  Three submissions speak of expanding existing sectoral agreements both in terms of their
membership and products, and introducing new sectoral initiatives.  Details have not always been
provided regarding the sectors for which such initiatives are proposed.  Additionally it is not always
clear which new sector is being proposed for zero-for-zero and which for harmonization.  In one
submission the view was expressed that once a general formula was applied, an evaluation could be
undertaken and if deemed necessary, work could be undertaken at a later stage on the basis of zero-for-zero initiatives. Another submission states that Members should be free to decide their
participation in such initiatives in light of their own needs. Three submissions indicate that recourse to
sectoral initiatives should be kept to a minimum, may be useful in exceptional circumstances or
should be taken when reductions obtained through the formula were insufficient, respectively.
- Request/offer approach
Six submissions make a reference to the use of the request/offer process. Five of them
indicate that such an approach can be used in certain circumstances, for example on a limited number
of products.  The sixth submission favours such an approach due to variations in tariff structures ofMembers.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
- Harmonization and/or sectoral elimination initiatives
Four of the eleven submissions make a reference to this aspect.  One of them states that
sectoral initiatives would need to incorporate higher harmonized tariff levels, greater credit for tariff
reductions and longer implementation periods for developing countries.  Two submissions note thatTN/MA/6
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there could be flexibility for developing countries in terms of implementation and staging periods.
One submission states that particular emphasis should be put on sectors of interest to developing
countries.
- Request/offer approach
-
5. Elimination of low/nuisance duties
Overview of submissions
Eleven submissions make a reference to the elimination of "low"/"nuisance" tariffs.  Two
submissions indicate that a definition of such duties is required.  Of which, one states that only those
"nuisance tariffs" considered to be "truly burdensome" should be eliminated.  In two other
submissions the view was expressed that the formula should incorporate a feature whereby duties
below a specified level are eliminated. In another two cases a definition has been provided wherebyduties are considered low when they stand at 2.5% or less (for developed countries) or at 5% or less,
respectively.  One submission considers that an elimination of such a duty is a concession like any
other reduction or elimination of tariffs.  While another submission states that the elimination of
nuisance tariffs should not be considered as a concession equivalent to the reduction of higher tariffs.
In another submission, a participant expressed the view that developed country Members shouldeliminate all their "lowest tariffs".
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Two submissions make a reference to this aspect. One submission specifies that all duties
beneath a floor are to be eliminated, and since such duties are mostly in developed countries, such
action would benefit developing countries.   The second submission states that developing country
Members should be free to maintain low tariffs.
6. Tariff Peaks, Tariff Escalation and High Tariffs
Overview of submissions
Twelve submissions make a reference to these issues.  One submission proposes a formula
which will address the question of tariff peaks and high tariffs and indicates that for the problem of
tariff escalation additional steps might need to be taken.  In three submissions, an idea is advanced to
have a cap on maximum level of tariffs. Another submission states that following agreement on adefinition of tariff peaks an average reduction of X per cent can be agreed upon.  A view is expressed
in one submission that tariff peaks and tariff escalation should be rectified through zero-for-zero and
harmonization sectoral approaches.  It also states that tariff escalation should be subject of
consultation. Another submission states that these issues may be addressed through the request/offer
approach. Three of the twelve submissions speak of th e need to clarify the definition of one, two or all
of these terms. Of which one states that negotiations would need to discuss the methodology and
definitions related to tariff escalation in order to address the issue adequately. Another submission
states that a definition of these terms is not needed, while another submission defines a tariff peak as a
tariff rate which is three times more than the simple average tariff level.  One submission proposes
that Members should not impose a tariff on any product in excess of three times their average tariff.The last submission states that mechanisms should be incorporated in the modalities to reduce or
eliminate tariff peaks and tariff escalation.TN/MA/6
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Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Two of the twelve submissions refer to this aspect. One of which states that problems of tariff
peaks, high tariffs, tariff escalation on products of export interest to developing countries should be
effectively dealt with.  Some examples of products of export interest to developing countries and on
which tariff peaks are concentrated have been provided.  The second submission states that a formula
could tackle tariff peaks and high tariffs which are common to products of export interest to
developing countries.
7. Bindings/Binding coverage
Overview of submissions
Thirteen submissions refer to the subject of binding coverage. Nine of those submissions call
for an increase in the binding coverage, with six of them proposing the binding of all non-agricultural
products. A tenth submission indicates that only de veloped countries should bind all items, while the
eleventh one makes a reference  to all Members binding their tariff rates "after reduction".
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Four of the thirteen submissions make a reference to this aspect.  Two submissions indicate
that developing countries should have the flexibility to not bind all tariff lines.  If bindings are to bemade, one of the three submissions speaks of the fl exibility for developing c ountries to bind them at
levels "generally above the higher of the bound rates prevailing for bound items in a country's tariff
schedule".  Another one speaks of the flexibility to bind tariffs at rates commensurate with the level of
the country's industrial development. One of the re maining two submissions suggests that bindings at
present applied rates would be counted as concessions from poorer developing countries, while thelast submission states that longer transitional periods should be given to developing countries.
8. Binding Overhang
Overview of submissions
Seven submissions refer to this subject.  Five speak of narrowing the gap between bound and
applied rates as an objective. The sixth speaks of an approach based on an average reduction once
tariff peaks have been defined.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
The seventh submission states that flexibility should be given to developing countries to
determine the level of bindings of their tariff lines.
9. Base rates
Overview of submissions
Sixteen submissions refer to this point.  Tw elve of the submissions propose the use of bound
rates as the starting-point of these negotiations.  There is some question in certain instances as to
whether reference is being made to final bound rates or to current bound rates.  In two of the fourremaining submissions, a proposal has been made to use applied rates as  the base rate. In one case the
applied rates which are closer to the start of the negotiations are to be used, while in the other applied
rates as of 1 January 2002 or UR final bound levels are to be used whichever is lower. Another
submission provides that developed country Members should take 2000 applied rates as base rates.TN/MA/6
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Another submission provides that for developed countries the base rates should be the target rate of
10% or the bound rate, whichever is lower.   As to unbound rates, six submissions have suggested one
or the other of the following rates as base rates: applied duties in force in 2001, applied rates in force
at the launch of the Doha Round or applied rates  in force in 2002.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Among the sixteen submissions, one submissi on proposes that for developing country
Members the simple average rate between their applied rates in 2000 and their UR final bound rates
should be their base rate.  In another submission, it was noted that the base rate for developing
countries should be the bound rate. In a third submission it was noted that for unbound tariff lines,
developing countries should have the flexibility to bind the tariffs at levels generally above the higherof the bound rates prevailing for bound items in a country' schedule.
10. Base Year
Overview of submissions
Three submissions make a reference to the base/reference year. Of which two indicate that the
base year should be the one for which data are available for the majority of Members .  The third
submission proposes 2000 because more Members notified their data for that year than 2001.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
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11. Nomenclature
Overview of submissions
One of the five submissions referring to this issue states that HS2002 should be used.  Three
of the remaining four submissions state that HS96 s hould be used, Of which two state that the results
of the negotiations should nevertheless be incorporated in HS2002.  The remaining submission states
that there should be flexibility to use the nomenclature in which the Member has bound its tariffs
subject to concordance tables being provided, if necessary.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
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12. Implementation and staging
Overview of submissions
Fourteen submissions reference this issue.  Five of which propose five years as the
implementation period.  Three of them speak about linear cuts.   Of the remaining nine submissions,one indicates that a short implementation period would be preferable.  Another one  notes that
previous negotiations had as norm a maximum of  five equal annual instalments. One submission
proposes that developed Members should phase out all tariffs in five years in equal cuts, while another
one states that longer implementation periods should be established to enable higher levels of
ambition. One  submission states that longer impl ementation periods should be given for sensitive
products.TN/MA/6
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Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
Nine submissions refer to this aspect. Two submissions speak of giving a longer
implementation period for developing countries.  Another two submissions specify that the
implementation period should be seven years or extended up to ten years, respectively.  Threesubmissions state that a system of differentiated staging periods was appropriate for developing
countries. Two other submissions speak of longer than five years being given to developing countries
in exchange for major cuts or deeper than average cuts, respectively.
13. Credit for autonomous liberalization
Overview of submissions
Seven submissions refer to this subject.  Four of which speak about giving credit for
autonomous liberalization measures which are bound. Another  submission proposes that credit
should be accorded for autonomous liberalization measures undertaken since 1995. Another
submission speaks of negotiations being able to take account of cases in which countries have "gonebeyond the trade liberalization agreed during the UR".  The last submission indicates that this issue
needs to be carefully handled as assessment methods for such credits are difficult.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
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14. Non ad valorem  duties
Overview of submissions
Eight submissions refer to this subject.  One submission proposes that all Members should
commit to converting specific duties to ad valorem  equivalents during the negotiating process.  Two
submissions foresee that only developed countrie s should make that conversion.  Two submissions
speak of the need to maximize the use of ad valorem  rates.  One submission states that Members
should consider converting to ad valorem  duties and stop using complex or mixed tariffs.  While
another submission indicates that Members should have the flexibility to maintain such ad valorem
tariffs at the end of the negotiations.  One proposal states that consensus is required on how to deal
with this issue.   It was not always clear whether the proposal to convert non ad valorem  duties to ad
valorem  equivalents was limited to the negotiating process, or whether it was to be the status quo
following conclusion of this process.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
One of the eight submissions states that developing country Members should limit the number
of their non ad valorem  tariffs to no more than 3% of the total number of tariff lines in their national
tariff nomenclature. 
15. Simplification of tariff structures
Overview of submissions
Two submissions refer to this matter.  One submission suggests harmonizing tariffs on similar
products within similar HS headings/classifica tions, while the other proposes the combination of
national subdivisions under HS subheadings carrying the same bound rate.TN/MA/6
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Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
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16. Export taxes
Overview of submissions
Two submissions refer to this subject. One submission states that export taxes should be
discussed, while the second one states that removal of export duties is required.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
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17. Initial Negotiating Rights (INRs)
Overview of submissions
One submission refers to this issue and indicates that modalities should see how INRs are
reflected in the final results of the negotiations.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
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18. Erosion of Preferential Margins
Overview of submissions
One submission has been made on this matter and the suggestion has been made to set up a
competitiveness fund on the basis of contributions from International Financial Institutions to enable
countries affected by any erosion in preferential market access to undertake competitive adjustment.(see point 20 on LDCs where there is also reference to this subject).
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
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19. Newly Acceded Members
Overview of submissions
Four submissions refer to this issue. One submission envisages that newly acceded Member
should only make contributions on their own initiativ e.  Another submission provides that credit for
liberalization measures undertaken as well as longer implementation periods should be accorded to
newly acceded Members. One submission provides that reduction commitments of newly-acceded
Members should be fully taken into consideration and no further reduction required. In addition,newly-acceded Members are to take the simple average rate of their applied rates in 2000 and their
final bound rates committed in their accession negotiations as their base rates for the negotiations.
Another submission indicates that consideration should be given to the conditions of accession of
newly acceded Members.TN/MA/6
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Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
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20. Least Developed Countries
Overview of submissions
Eleven submissions have been made on the subject of LDCs.  Two of them foresee exemption
from tariff reduction obligations by LDCs.  One of  the two submissions states that LDCs should,
however, substantially increase their binding ratios while the other one states that LDCs could  bindtariffs at higher levels than applied rates for a limited number of products or sectors or across-the-
board with ceiling binding. Another submission indicates that no reciprocal tariff concessions are
required from LDC. Another proposal states that substantial reductions would in principle not be
expected. Another two submissions propose that all developed countries should implement tariff and
quota-free access for all products from LDCs, in one case the date of  31 May 2003 has beenprovided.  Another proposal suggests flexibility to LDC with respect to the binding of tariffs,
conversion of ad valorem   tariffs, elimination of tariff peaks and tariff escalation.  Another proposal
states that LDCs may determine the coverage of their bindings on an autonomous basis.  One proposal
provides for the designing of an individually tailored capacity-building programme.  One submission
proposes the postponement of the staging of reductions, for example by five years or spread thestaging of reductions over a period of ten years in cases where the preferential margins enjoyed by
LDC exports is going to be seriously affected.   The same submission foresees developing countries
extending preferential tariff treatment on a non-reciprocal basis to products requested by LDCs, and
also proposes that LDCs get credit for autonomous reductions in tariffs.
Special and differential treatment/Less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments
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Section II
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
1. Product Coverage (1) Tariff reductions across-the-board for all non-agricultural products,
without excluding any sector or group of products from the initial offer.
(Norway)
(2) The proposed approach will apply to all products with the exception of
those listed in Annex I of the Agreement on Agriculture.  (EC)
(3) Broad product coverage without a priori  exclusions. (Hong Kong, China)
(4) the entire tariff universe would in principle be subject to negotiation.
(Mexico)
(5) There should be no exceptions on product coverage for developed
countries. (Oman)
(6) Negotiations should aim for a comprehensive package without a priori
exclusion.  (Japan)
(7)  Formula to be used should be applied directly to all tariff headings
without exception. (Chile)
(8) A comprehensive approach with no exclusions. (US)
(9) All sectors should be covered. (Chinese Taipei)
2. Elimination of
Tariffs(1) Modalities should include an element that secures tariff elimination on
an across-the-board basis as a supplement to a formula.  One possibilitywould be to introduce a minimum tariff rate under which rates are set at
zero.  Another might be to supplement the formula with a proportion of
trade or tariff lines governed by WTO rules that should meet zero tariffs.The goal should be the elimination of tariffs on most non-agricultural
products at least in OECD countries.   (Norway)
(2) Expand the scope of duty-free trade (Canada)
(3) Developed Members can on top of the one-off tariff reduction
implemented upon the conclusion of the DDA undertake to further reduce
tariffs by equal annual cuts until all tariffs are eliminated within a specifiedperiod. (Hong Kong, China)(1) Where possible elimination of tariffs on products of
interest to developing countries. (Norway)TN/MA/6
Page 11Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
(4) Elimination of all remaining duties in the form of linear cuts from 2010 to2015. (US)
3. Core Modality
 Formula – general (1) To ensure comprehensive coverage without a priori  exclusions, a
formula approach is required.  The formula must  include a high minimumrate of reduction.  (Norway)
(2) Give priority consideration to approaches of general application e.g.
formula cut and sectoral approaches (refer to point 3 for more details).
Members could also consider applying the “Swiss formula” to harmonise
and substantially reduce tariffs for non-agricultural products.  Memberscould examine the effect of using various coefficients in the “Swiss formula”
in achieving tariff reductions. A coefficient that would result in deeper cuts
to give meaningful and significant market access for non-agriculturalproducts would be favoured. (Singapore)
(3) A one-off reduction/elimination of tariffs upon the conclusion of the DDA
negotiations through the use of a formula followed by progressive
elimination and reduction of tariffs by developed and developing countries,
respectively. A formula has not been specified although reference wasmade to the Secretariat document TN/MA/S/3. (Hong Kong, China)
(4) The basis for negotiations should be a formula which fulfils several
criteria. No formula has been specified. (Switzerland)
(5) In favour of an approach centered on a formula, such as the Swiss one.
(Chile)
(6) One option would be to adopt a formula approach which could be
complemented with additional approaches. An alternative or
complementary option is a request and offer approach. (Mercosur)(1) Particularly substantial reductions on products of interest
to developing countries should be undertaken.  Tariffreductions should be undertaken by developing countries in
line with their level of development particularly through the
use of differentiated coefficients in the different elements ofthe formula and the supplementary provisions such as
minimum reductions, "ceiling" and "floor" for tariff rates and
rate of harmonization.  (Norway)
(2) The formula can allow different levels of tariff cut for
developing Members while ensuring a common minimumlevel of reduction for each group of Members. Developing
Members can on top of the one-off tariff reduction undertake
a programme of continuous tariff cuts over a longer period oftime by re-applying the agreed formula or by means agreed
otherwise.  To serve as guidance for drawing ups such a
tariff reduction programme, a common overall targetreduction rate may be set (Hong Kong, China)
(3) A formula approach may be modulated to take into
account different levels of development, of trade participation
and of competiveness in international trade. (Switzerland)
 (4) Use differentiated coefficients for developing and
developed country participants.  Deeper reduction
commitments are required from developed countries thandeveloping countries. (Mercosur)
Formula – line by
line(1) A compression mechanism which will reduce all tariff duties
considerably by compressing them into a flatter range Formula has been
proposed (see annex) (EC)
(2) Developed countries are to reduce all tariffs to 10% then the Swiss
formula or an equivalent harmonization formula is to be applied.  Theformula would also apply to all other rates  below 10'%. (Oman)
(3) A 40% average reduction is to be achieved through at least a 20 per
cent reduction for each bound non-agricultural product.  For those products(1) Members agree to deeper cuts for textiles, clothing and
footwear with a view to bringing these tariffs within a narrow
common range as close to zero as possible.  (EC)
(2) Use a "cocktail approach" for developing countries.
Request/offer, formula (different from that used bydeveloped countries), or a combination thereof. (Oman)
(3) A higher percentage reduction is to be set for developed
countries than for developing countries. In determining theTN/MA/6
Page 12
Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
whose current bound tariff rates are above either two times each Member'scurrent simple national average tariff rate or 25 percent, the tariff rates areto be reduced by more than twenty per cent. Formulas have been provided
for the amount of the reduction.  If the tariff reduction through the use of the
formula results in a tariff reduction which is under the 40 per cent reduction,Members will make additional tariff reduction at their own discretion to
achieve the targeted 40 per cent reduction.  (see annex) (Korea)
(4) A simple percentage cut on bound tariffs of each Member. Members
shall not impose a tariff on any product in excess of three times their
average tariff.  The average for this purpose shall be calculated aftereffecting the tariff reduction. (cf point 6 also) (India)
(5) Between 2005 and 2010  tariffs above 5 per cent are to be reduced by
applying the Swiss Formula with a coefficient of eight.  (cf also point 4) (US)
(6) A uniform formula for tariff reduction. A formula has been proposed (see
annex) (China)reduction to be effected by developing countries their
dependence on customs revenue has to be kept in view.Flexibility to be available to developing countries to decide
on the actual bindings of some tariff lines as a special and
differential measure while still maintaining the percentagereduction on an average basis.  (cf point 8 also) (India)
(4) Once Members have secured agreement on the
modalities, they should turn to more precise and customised
approaches to ensure participation by developing countries
consistent with their individual development needs. (US)
(5) The actual reductions achieved through the formula
approach shall reflect the needs and interests of allMembers, in particular developing country Members and
shall abide by the principle of less than full reciprocity in
reduction commitments. Sectors and products of substantialexport interest to developing country Members shall be the
subject of priority reductions in the negotiations. (China)
Formula –Average reduction(1) Each Member shall reduce its trade weighted average tariff rate by 40
per cent. with a minimum 20% cut on each  bound tariff.  (see annex)
(Korea)
(2) A formula which relies on an average general tariff reduction by (X per
cent) of the previously bound tariff for the universe of tariff headings.(Mexico)
(3) Each Member shall set a target level of a trade-weighted average tariff
rate according to a formula.   Each Member will reduce its trade weighted
average tariff rate to that level. Formula has been proposed (see annex).
Each Member may choose to include reductions in the sectoral initiativesfor the calculation of its trade weighted average target tariff rate. (cf also
point 4). Important to ensure the flexibility of each Member regarding the
level of tariffs on forest and fishery products. (Japan)
(4) A  trade weighted tariff reduction would be the more appropriate way to
proceed. (Mauritius).(1) The modalities shall take into account the current tariff
structures of Members which reflect their respective levels of
development.  (Korea)
(2) Adopt a broad rather than restricted approach to the
negotiations.  Should not be limited to setting longer time-limits for implementation on sensitive products.  Developing
countries should be able to  maintain the same concession
levels for certain products or apply only minimum reductionsto them. (Mexico)
(3) A target level of a trade-weighted average tariff rate is set
which corresponds to the level of development of each
Member and takes into account its current trade weighted
average tariff rate.  (Japan)TN/MA/6
Page 13Main items
(1)Sub-items
(2)Specifics
(3)Special and Differential treatment/Less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments
(4)
Others (1)  A combination of approaches will be required including sectoral
agreements (cf also point 4), formula-based approaches and therequest/offer process. (Canada)
(2) Favours a sector-by-sector approach to the negotiations with the
possibility to use differing modalities depending on the sector.  Participation
in existing zero-for-zero agreements broadened to include the critical mass
of trading partners participating in world trade for each of the sectorsinvolved. Special consideration to be given to the treatment of exhaustible
natural resource sectors. (Chinese Taipei)
(3) Adopt a "cocktail approach", under which agreement could be reached
on  the different types of modalities which would be used by taking into
account the stages of development among countries. (LDCs)(1) With respect to formula-based approaches these should
be sensitive to the varying circumstances of Members.(Canada)
4. Supplementary
approaches
Harmonization
and/or sectoral
eliminationinitiatives(1) Sectoral agreements based on a zero-for-zero approach at a multilateral
or plurilateral level  might be a supplementary method for sectors where a
critical mass (normally representing a minimum of 80% of world trade) canbe established.  However, such an approach should not lead to an
unbalanced result favouring major trading partners. (Norway)
(2) In this regard, proposals to advance discussions based on notable
sectoral initiatives accomplished in the Uruguay Round, such as the
pharmaceutical zero-for-zero, ITA, and chemical harmonisation aresupported.  Discussions could cover issues such as expanding the list of
products covered by the initiatives, increasing the number of participating
Members, reducing the rates of harmonised tariffs, and introducing newsectors to be covered by zero-for-zero initiatives. (Singapore)
 (3) Broaden the membership and expand product coverage within existing
sectoral agreements.  New "zero-for-zero" sectoral agreements in areas
such as fish products, forest products, fertilizers, energy-related equipment
and non-ferrous metals should be negotiated. Additional sectors might beof interest. (Canada)(1) In case of zero-for-zero or tariff harmonization
agreements are reached, implementation periods could
include some country-specific flexibility. (Canada)
(2) Higher harmonised tariff level for developing countries;
greater credit for tariff reductions by developing countries;and longer implementation periods would need to be
incorporated in sectoral initiatives. (India).
(3) Developing countries may implement zero-for-zero or
harmonization sectoral agreements in a special and different
manner  with regard to implementation period and staging.(Japan)
(4) Particular emphasis to be put on sectors of interest to
developing countries. (Switzerland)TN/MA/6
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(4) Supplemental "zero for zero" proposals are to be kept to  a minimum.(India)
(5) Using a formula approach as a basis does not preclude the possibility of
supplementary approaches such as sectoral initiatives or harmonization
 proposals which may be useful in exceptional circumstances. (Hong Kong,
China)
(6) Once a general formula has been applied, the degree of liberalization
achieved by Members can be evaluated, and if deemed necessary, it would
be possible to work at a later stage on the basis of zero-for-zero initiatives.
(Mexico)
(7)  For existing agreements on ITA and Chemicals, expand membership
and product coverage.  ITA should include consumer electrical products,optical fibres.   New sectoral initiatives are proposed for the following
sectors: consumer electrical products, bicycles, rubber and articles thereof,
glass and articles thereof, ceramic products, cameras, watches, toyselectrical machinery parts, titanium and articles thereof, motor vehicles,
textiles and clothing, machine tools, construction equipment, bearing,
certain articles or iron or steel and paper. No support for sector-specifictariff reduction, including zero-for-zero or harmonization, in the forest
products sector in addition to the general tariff reduction formula. No
support for a zero-for-zero approach in the fishery sector. (Japan)
(8) Supplement a formula based approach with new sectors or products to
zero for zero or harmonisation initiatives at a very low level. Increase thenumber of participating Members in existing initiatives and expand the
coverage of such initiatives as well as reduce the rates of harmonized
tariffs on chemical products.  In this context, special consideration shouldalso be given to substantially lowering or eliminating tariffs on
pharmaceutical products needed to treat diseases referred to in
paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs agreement and publichealth. (Switzerland)
(9) The sectoral approach should only be used to complement the formula
approach when the reductions obtained through the chosen formula are
insufficient (Chile)
(10) As soon as possible, but no later than 2010 elimination of tariffs in the
UR zero-for-zero sectors (including agricultural equipment, constructionTN/MA/6
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equipment, furniture, medical equipment, paper, pharmaceuticals, steel andtoys) in addition to tariffs covered by ITA and Agreement on Trade in CivilAircraft.  As soon as possible, but no later than 2010 eliminate tariffs in the
following additional sectors and others as agreed by Members: wood
products, non-ferrous metals, bicycle parts, certain chemicals and alliedproducts including soda ash and photograph film, electronics, fish and
fishery products, scientific equipment, and environmental goods. (US)
(11) Sector approach could promote the negotiations forward and
supplement the formula approach.  Members shall be free to decide their
participation in light of their own needs. (China)
Request/offer
approach(1) Limited use of request/offer approach, when necessary. (Korea)
(2) Using a formula approach as a basis does not preclude the possibility of
supplementary approaches such as request/offer which may be useful in
exceptional circumstances. (Hong Kong, China)
(3) Once a general formula has been applied, the degree of liberalization
achieved by Members can be evaluated, and if deemed necessary, it would
be possible to work at a later stage on the basis of request/offer methods.
(Mexico)
(4) For a limited number of sensitive products, a request/offer approach
could be envisaged in parallel to a formula.  However, the use of this
approach should not have the effect of sheltering specific sectors fromconcessions.  (Switzerland)
(5) The request/offer approach should only be used to complement the
formula approach when the reductions obtained through the chosen
formula are insufficient (Chile)
(6) Supports the use of a request/offer approach because of variations in
tariff structures. Such an approach can be used to address the issues of
tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation. (Chinese Taipei)
4. Elimination of
low/nuisance duties(1) To eliminate "nuisance" tariffs, the formula should be supplemented with
a "floor" where the calculations using the formula results in all rates below
the "floor" being set at zero. (Norway)
(2) Negotiations would need to define what constitutes nuisance tariffs, and
then they should be eliminated.  (Singapore)(1) All duties beneath a specific floor – to be negotiated – to
be eliminated by all WTO Members.  This would benefit
developing countries comparably more since tariffs  at sucha low level are generally applied by developed countries
(EC)
(2) Developing country Members shall be free to maintainTN/MA/6
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(3) Favour elimination of "nuisance duties". (Canada)
(4) Other features such as elimination of tariffs below a specified level may
be added to the formula (Hong Kong, China)
(5) Developed countries should eliminate duties of 2.5% or lower (Oman)
(6) Low duties should also be the subject of negotiations.  However, an
elimination of such duties is a concession like any other reduction or
elimination of tariffs. (Switzerland)
(7) Elimination by 2010 of tariffs on all products with tariffs at or below 5%
ad valorem . (US)
(8) Define the scope of "nuisance" tariff and eliminate only those
considered to be truly burdensome. (Chinese Taipei)
(9) Developed country Members shall eliminate all their lowest tariffs.
(China)
(10) Elimination of "nuisance tariffs" should not be considered as a
concession equivalent to reductions of higher tariffs. (Mercosur)their low tariffs. (China)
6. Tariff Peaks, Tariff
Escalation and High
Tariffs(1) The definitions of the terms tariff peak, high tariff and tariff escalation
should be clarified.  (Korea)
(2) The modalities should set a maximum tariff rate and generally reduce
high tariffs more than lower ones. This means that the formula needs to
include an element of tariff harmonisation, and be supplemented by a"ceiling" for all tariffs. (Norway)
(3) Negotiations would need to define what constitutes tariff peaks and then
they should be substantially reduced, if not eliminated.  Negotiations would
need to discuss the methodology and definitions related to tariff escalation
in order to address the issue adequately. (Singapore)
(4) Members shall not impose a tariff on any product in excess of three
times their average tariff.  The average for this purpose shall be calculatedafter effecting the tariff reduction. (cf point 2 also) (India)
(5) Compression mechanism will result  in tariff peaks and high tariffs being
eliminated.  In case of tariff escalation, the mechanism shall – if necessary
– be complemented by additional steps aimed at compressing disparities(1) Tariff peaks, tariff escalation and high tariffs, on products
of export interest to developing countries should be
effectively dealt with. Tariff peaks often concentrated inproducts that are of export interest to developing countries
such as in textiles and clothing, leather, rubber, footwear and
travel goods; transport equipment; fish and fish productsneed to be effectively dealt with (India) .
(2) Tariff peaks and high tariffs which are common in
products of export interest to developing countries can be
tackled with such a formula. (Hong Kong, China)TN/MA/6
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between tariff headings corresponding to products at different stages ofproduction.   (EC)
(6) The formula to be agreed can tackle tariff peaks and high tariffs by
introducing deeper cuts for higher tariff rates.  A cap on a maximum level oftariffs might be added.(Hong Kong, China)
(7) Once a definition has been agreed on tariff peaks, an average reduction
of (X per cent) can be agreed upon.  This would assist in reducing the gap
between bound tariffs and applied tariffs.  (Mexico)
(8) Tariff peaks and tariff escalation should be rectified through "zero-for-
zero" or "harmonization" sectoral approaches. Tariff escalation would be
subject to consultation although its definition and the way to measure it arenot easy. (Japan)
(9) The mechanism of a "tariff ceiling" may be a good way of dealing with
those goods which even after the formula has been applied still maintain
high tariffs.   No need to define the terms before the choice of a modality.
(Chile)
(10) Definition of these terms needs to be clarified. The definition of
"international peaks" and "national peaks" may be used as a benchmark toclarify these definitions. Request/offer approach can be used to address
these issues (Chinese Taipei)
(11) Tariff peak of a Member shall be defined as a tariff rate three times
more than the simple average tariff level of that Member. Supports the
reduction of tariff peaks.  Members shall take concrete measures to reducetariff escalation in their respective tariff regime.  (China)
(12) Modalities to be agreed must build in mechanisms to reduce or
eliminate tariff peaks and tariff escalation. (Mercosur)
7. Bindings/Binding
coverage(1) The modalities should include a commitment to bind all tariff lines fornon-agricultural products, at the rate resulting from the negotiations, and
where in exceptional cases no tariff reduction takes place, as a minimum at
the present applied rate.  (Norway)
(2) Increase binding coverage. (Singapore)
(3) Reduce and bind applied tariff levels which are not yet bound (Canada)(1) Count binding of present applied rates as concessions
from poorer developing countries. (Norway)
(2) Developing countries should have the flexibility to not
bind certain unbound tariff lines considered highly sensitive
or strategically important  (cf. also point 1). For unbound
tariff lines, developing countries should have the flexibility tobind them at levels generally above the higher of the bound
rates prevailing for bound items in a country's tariff schedule.TN/MA/6
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(4) WTO Members, other than least developed countries have as close to100 per cent bindings as possible. (EC)
(5) All countries will have to commit to binding the entire universe of tariff
headings for non-agricultural goods as from the implementation of the
results of this negotiating process.  (Mexico)
(6) Developed countries should bind all items. (Oman)
(7) Improve the binding ratio by binding as many tariff lines as possible.
(Japan)
(8) Coverage of bound tariffs must be improved with a view to having all
tariff lines bound in the schedules of all Members.  The binding level
should, in principle, be at the applied rates in 2001 with the possibility of a
binding at a higher rate.  (Switzerland)
(9) All tariff lines should be bound. (US)
(10) Members should commit to bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at
the conclusion of these negotiations. (Chinese Taipei)
(11) All Members shall bind their tariff rates after reduction. (China)(cf also point 8) (India).
(3) However, longer transitional periods could be given to
developing countries. (China)
(4) Developing countries which have not yet bound their
tariffs in exchange of not undertaking any reduction
commitment be given the flexibility to do so at reasonablerates which are commensurate with the level of their
industrial development. (Mauritius)
8. Binding overhang (1) Narrow the variance between ceiling bindings and applied rates as far
as possible (Singapore).
(2) There must be a significant narrowing of the gap between some bound
and applied rates.  Reduce high bound rates and re-bind them at lower
rates. (Canada)
(3) The reduction of the gap between the bound and applied tariffs is of
high interest to many WTO Members.  Open to discussion on the minimum
level of credit which should be given practical effect in the negotiations toassess tariff bindings and reductions, including what constitutes a
meaningful rate of bindings. (EC)
(4) Important to rectify the great differences between bound tariff rates and
applied tariff rates. (Japan)
(5) Reduction of large gaps between bound and applied rates is an
objective. (Switzerland)(1) Flexibility to be available to developing countries to
decide on the actual bindings on some tariff lines as a
special and differential measure while still maintaining the
percentage reduction on an average basis. For unboundtariff lines, developing countries should have the flexibility to
bind them at levels generally above the higher of the bound
rates prevailing for bound items in a country's tariff schedule.(cf point 7 also)  (India)TN/MA/6
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(6) Once a definition has been agreed on tariff peaks, an average reductionof (X per cent) can be agreed upon.  This would assist in reducing the gap
between bound tariffs and applied tariffs.  (Mexico)
9. Base rates (1) The base rates for tariff reduction shall be the final bound rates agreed
at the UR negotiations.  The base rates for unbound tariff lines shall be the
applied rates for the year 2001. (Korea)
(2) The starting-point should be the bound tariff rates after the
implementation of the Uruguay Round results, and where such bound rates
do not exist, the generally applied rate at the start of the Doha Round.(Norway)
(3) Applied rates should be used as the base rates for the negotiations.
The reference year for the base rates should be the one that is closer to the
start of the negotiations. (Singapore)
(4) Bound rates should be used as the basis for the negotiations, bearing in
mind the requirement that there must be significant narrowing of the gap
between some bound and applied rates.  In those cases where rates are
not bound, the applied rate in place at the beginning of the Round should
be the basis for negotiation. (Canada)
(5) For bound tariff lines, reductions should be undertaken only from bound
levels. (India)
(6) Final bound UR rates and other bound rates as per Members'
Schedules, or in the case of unbound duties, on a level related to theapplied duties as of 14 November 2001. (EC)
(7) Start with current WTO bound tariff levels. (Mexico)(8) For developed countries, base rates should be the target rates of 10%
or the bound rates, whichever is lower. (Oman)
(9) Basis for the negotiations should in principle be bound rates. (Japan)
(10) Bound rates at the end of the implementation period of the UR should
be used. If there is no bound rate, the applied rates in the year of the
launch of the Doha negotiations (2001) should be taken as the basis.(Switzerland)(1) Base rate for developing countries should be the bound
rate. (Oman)
(2) For unbound tariff lines, developing countries should
have the flexibility to bind them at levels generally above the
higher of the bound rates prevailing for bound items in a
country’s tariff schedule. (India)
(3) Developing country Members to take the simple average
rate between their applied rates in 2000 and their UR finalbound rates. (China)TN/MA/6
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(11) Bound rates must be the basis for the negotiations.  For unboundrates, no tariff higher than that applied at the date of launching the DDRshould be used as the basis. (Chile)
(12) Applied rates as of 1 January 2002 or UR final bound levels, should be
used whichever is lower. (US)
(13) Bound rates to be used as the basis of the negotiations.  In case of
unbound dues, applied rates in effect in 2002 should be used in conjunction
with the standstill and non-roll-back principle. (Chinese Taipei)
(14) Developed country Members to take 2000 applied rates as base rates.
(China)
(15) Tariff cuts should be effected from the bound rates.  (Mauritius)
(16) Bound tariffs of all WTO Member whenever they are available are the
only viable starting-point for the negotiations.  (Mercosur)
10. Base  year (1)  In principle base year should be the most recent year in which data areavailable for  the majority of Members. (Canada)
(2) The use of import data of values for the year 2000 as basic statistics is
proposed because more Members notified their data for the year 2000 than
for the year 2001. (Japan)
(3) The base period for the negotiations should, in principle, be the most
recent year for which there is up-to-date statistical information available for
the majority of Members.  (Mercosur)
11. Nomenclature (1) HS96 should be used  for the negotiations. (Korea)
(2) HS2002 should be used.  (Japan)(3) HS96 should be used, however results of the negotiations should be
published in HS2002. (Switzerland)
(4) Flexibility to use the nomenclature in which Member has bound its
tariffs, be it HS96 or HS2002 but tariff nomenclature concordance tableswould be required. (Chinese Taipei)
(5) Tariff reduction shall be made on the basis of HS96 and final resultsTN/MA/6
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scheduled in HS2002. (China)
12. Implementation
periods and staging(1) The implementation period for tariff reduction is five years. The cuts areto be equal annual cuts. (Korea).
(2) A short implementation period and a simple linear staging within such a
period would be preferable (Norway).
(3) It was noted that previous non-agricultural negotiations had as norm a
maximum of five equal annual instalments beginning on the date of entry
into force of the agreement (Singapore)
(4) A five-year time-frame combined with the use of linear cuts. Members
would be free to make a case for longer or shorter transition periods
depending on circumstances. (Canada)
(5) Developed Member should commit to the phasing out all tariffs on  non-
agricultural products in five years in equal annual cuts. (Hong Kong, China)
(6) Staging may be five years, in principle, with equal instalments on the
basis that implementation periods will begin in January 2005. (Japan)
(7) Five years as a general rule (Switzerland)
(8) Establish longer implementation periods to enable higher levels of
ambition. (Chile)
(9) Staging should be over five years, in principle commencing either from
the conclusion of their implementation periods already committed to each
Member in its schedule or from the conclusion of the negotiations,
whichever is the later. (Chinese Taipei)
(10) Stagger the liberalization process  for products that are highly
sensitive. Longer period for tariff reductions for sensitive products.(Mauritius)(1) The implementation period should be seven years.  The
cuts are to be equal annual cuts. (Korea)
(2) There should be various staging periods for non-
agricultural tariff reductions in order to enable developingcountries to be given more flexibility to make substantive
tariff commitments, and to take into consideration product
sensitivity. (Singapore)
(3) The precedent set in the Uruguay Round may be
followed and developing countries should be permitted toimplement tariff commitments over a longer period of time
than developed countries.  The duration will depend on the
extent of commitments undertaken.  For developingcountries it should extend up to a ten-year period. (India).
(4) Different timetables for the implementation of tariff
commitments depending on status of Member and level of
results (EC).
(5) A programme of progressive reduction of tariffs for a
longer period of time is appropriate for developing countries.(Hong Kong, China)
(6) Longer than five years should be allowed for developing
countries that implement deeper than average cuts amongdeveloping countries. (Japan)
(7) Longer than five years in exchange for major cuts on
sensitive products for developing countries. (Switzerland)
(8) Longer implementation period to be given to developing
country members. (China)
(9) Modalities should include differentiated staging periods.
(Mercosur)
13. Credit for
autonomous
liberalization(1) The modalities need to include ways to acknowledge autonomous tariffreductions representing significant steps towards liberalising international
trade, to the extent that members having made such autonomous tariff
reductions as a minimum are prepared to bind tariff rates as part of theirTN/MA/6
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commitments. (Norway)
(2) Credit should be given for prior autonomous liberalization which goes
beyond existing UR commitments.  This is on the understanding that credit
would be given only in those cases where changes have been bound or willbe bound as a result of the current negotiations (Canada).
(3) A number of developing countries have reduced and bound their tariffs
since the Uruguay Round, and credit for such autonomous liberalization of
tariffs should be given. (India)
(4) Ready to discuss guidelines concerning the assessment of the credit
arising from initiatives of autonomous liberalization undertaken by members
since the end of the UR or to be undertaken during the course of the DDAnegotiations provided final rates are bound. (EC)
(5) Negotiations should be able to take account of cases in which the
countries have gone beyond the trade liberalization agreed during the
Uruguay Round. (Mexico)
(6) As to voluntary liberalization, since assessment methods for credits are
difficult and are likely to be arbitrary, careful handling is required. (Japan)
(7) Credit should be given for autonomous liberalization undertaken by
Members since 1995.  The Member States could provide information on the
autonomous liberalisation undertaken by them by end of January 2003while the Secretariat in the interim could prepare a paper on how the
autonomous liberalisation could be taken on board. (Mauritius)
14. Non ad valorem
duties(1) Non ad valorem  duties are to be reduced on the basis of their ad
valorem  equivalents. Following the reduction, Members shall have the
discretion to convert the non ad valorem  tariffs or maintain non ad valorem
tariffs. (Korea).
(2) Members should also consider converting to ad valorem  tariffs and
cease using complex or mixed tariffs. (Singapore)
(3) Maximize the use of ad valorem  rates (Canada).
(4) Consensus needs to be built on how to deal with the matter of use of
specific duties. (India)
(5) Developed countries should convert all specific duties to ad valorem(1) Developing country Members shall limit their number of
non ad valorem  tariffs to no more than 3% of the total
number of tariff lines in their national tariff nomenclatures.(China)TN/MA/6
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tariffs. (Oman)
(6) Maximize the use of ad valorem  rates. (US)
(7) Members shall convert their existing non ad valorem  tariffs into ad
valorem  form through a uniform method and use them as the basis for tariff
reductions.  Developed country Members shall eliminate all non ad valorem
tariffs on non-agricultural products. (China)
(8) Members should commit to converting their specific duties into ad
valorem  tariffs during the negotiating process. (MERCOSUR)
15. Simplification of
tariff structures(1) Harmonize tariffs on similar products within similar HS
headings/classifications.  This would lessen substantially the complications
arising from levying taxes on similar products with varying tariff rates(Singapore).
(2) Examine the simplification of subdivisions under HS subheadings, for
example, combine national subdivisions as long as those subdivisions carry
the same bound rates (Japan)
16. Export taxes (1) Negotiations should address export duties. A level playing field does
require the removal of export restrictions, and in particular export duties,
which are the flip-side to tariff escalation. (EC)
(2) Export tax should be discussed in the negotiations on market access for
non-agricultural products. (Japan)
17. INRs (1) Modalities should see how INRs are reflected in the final results of themarket access negotiations (Switzerland).
18. Erosion of
Preferential Margins(1)  Any erosion in preferential market access resulting from the
negotiations should be duly compensated.  Would appreciate ideas of
Members on the possible compensation mechanism that could be set up.  Itis suggested that a competitiveness fund on the basis of contribution from
the International Financial Institutions be set up to enable them to
undertake competitive adjustment.  (Mauritius)(cf also point 20 on LDCs)
19. Newly Acceded
Members(1) General modalities should not apply to newly acceding countries whichmay make contributions at their initiative. (Oman)
(2) Allow newly-acceded Members a longer staging period and credit forTN/MA/6
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autonomous liberalization. (Chinese Taipei)
(3) Reduction commitments of newly-acceded Members shall be fully taken
into consideration and no further reduction required. Newly-acceded
Members shall take the simple average rate of their applied rates in 2000and their final bound rates committed in their accession negotiations as
their base rates for the negotiations. (China)
(4) Consideration should be given to the terms of accession of a number of
recently acceded Members. (Switzerland)
20. Least Developed
Countries(1) Least developed country Members to be exempted from the tariff
reduction obligations, but are required to substantially increase their tariff
binding ratios. (Korea)
(2) No reciprocal tariff concessions are expected from least-developed
countries. As a minimum, elimination of tariffs for products of importance to
LDCs. (Norway)
(3) There should be various staging periods for non-agricultural tariff
reductions in order to enable LDCs to be given more flexibility to make
substantive tariff commitments, and to take into consideration product
sensitivity. (Singapore)
(4) Developed countries should implement tariff and quota-free access for
all products from least developed countries by 31 May 2003. The mostdeveloped of developing countries are invited to joint this initiative. All WTO
Members other than LDCs should have as close to 100% bindings as
possible. All duties beneath a specific floor – to be negotiated – to beeliminated by all WTO Members.  This would benefit LDCs comparably
more since tariffs  at such a low level are generally applied by developed
countries (EC)
(5) The formula can allow different levels of tariff cut for least developed
Members. (Hong Kong, China)
(6) All Members are to use the trade-weighted average target tariff formula
with the exception of LDCs. GSP providers should study the possibility ofreviewing the scheme based on the enabling clause, taking into account
the competitiveness of the products and improving market access for LDC
products. Appropriate capacity-building should be carried out. (Japan)
(7) Particular emphasis to be put on sectors of interest to LDCs.TN/MA/6
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Substantial reductions from LDCs would in principle not be expected.(Switzerland)
(8) Once Members have secured agreement on the modalities, they should
turn to more precise and customised approaches to ensure participation byLDCs consistent with their individual development needs. (US)
(9) LDCs may determine the coverage of their binding undertakings on an
autonomous basis. Design a capacity-building programme which is
individually tailored to the particular needs of each of the Member
concerned, which also contain certain milestones and assessment criteriato show what progress a country is making internally with the capacity-
building assistance already provided. (Chinese Taipei)
(10) More flexibility to least developed country Members with regard to
binding of tariffs, conversion of ad valorem  tariffs, elimination of tariff peaks
and tariff escalation. Sectors and products of substantial export interest toLDCs shall be the subject of priority reductions in the negotiations. (China)
(11)  Adoption by all developed countries of separate arrangements under
the umbrella of their Generalized System of Preferences, which would allow
imports of all products from least developed countries on duty and quote
free basis. Preferential treatment extended under the arrangements shouldnot be modified to the disadvantage of the least developed countries during
an agreed period of time (e.g. fifteen to twenty years).
- In order to ensure that the erosion of preferential margins do not result in
sudden disruption of trade of the preference receiving countries, the
modalities to be used by the least developed countries should provide forthe following:
• Where a least developed country considers that preferential
margins which its exports enjoy in relation to certain tariff lines orheadings are of meaningful advantage in trade terms, and the
reduction or erosion of preferential margins resulting from MFN
reductions is likely to seriously affect its exports, it may requestthe preference giving countries to:
- Postpone commencement of the staging of
reductions by agreed number of years (e.g. five
years) or
- To spread the staging of reductions over a period
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that may be agreed in the negotiations.
• The preference giving countries to whom such request are made
should agree to consider such requests sympathetically andprovide reasons, in cases where it is not possible for them to
agree to such requests.
- Developing countries should extend preferential tariff treatment on a
non-reciprocal basis, on the basis of request lists to be submitted by the
least developed countries.
- Modalities should recognize that in this round of negotiations, LDCs are
not in a position to make reductions in tariffs in the context of multilateraltrade negotiations.
- LDCs could agree to bind their tariffs at levels which are higher than their
applied rates of tariffs.  The modalities should provide such bindings being
offered on limited number of products or sectors, or across the board on all
tariffs by giving a “ceiling binding”.
- LDCs should get credit for reductions in tariffs which they have been
making on an autonomous basis. (LDCs)TN/MA/6
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Annex
Korea (TN/MA/W/6/Add.1)
1. Korea proposes that each Member reduce its trade weighted average tariff rate by 40  percent.
Members will achieve this goal in accordance with the following tariff reduction formulae:
(a) The bound tariff rate for each non-agricultural product shall be reduced at least by 20 percent
with no exceptions.
(b) For those products whose current bound tariff rates are above either two times each Member’s
current simple national average tariff rate or 25 percent, the tariff rates shall be reduced by more than20 percent.
- The tariff rates above two times the national average, after minimum reduction of 20 percent,
shall be further subtracted by 70 percent of the difference between them and two times the
simple national average.  For example, if the national average tariff rate is 3 percent and thetariff rate for product A is 15 percent, the final tariff rate for product A shall be less than
5.7 percent.
T
1=(T 0*0.8)-0.7*(T 0-2*T a)
T1: maximum tariff rate after reduction
T0: tariff rate before reduction (above 2 times the national average)
Ta: national average tariff rate
- The tariff rates above 25 percent, after minimum reduction of 20 percent, shall be further
subtracted by 70 percent of the difference between them and 25 percent.  For example, if the
tariff rate for product B is 50 percent, the final tariff rate for product B shall be less than 22.5
percent.
T1= (T 0*0.8)-0.7*(T 0-25)
T1: maximum tariff rate after reduction
T0: tariff rate before reduction (above 25 percent)
- If a tariff rate is above two times the simple national average and at the same time above 25
percent, the final tariff rate shall be whichever is lower after the reduction as described above.
(c)  If the result of tariff reduction in accordance with the formulae as described above is under the
targeted 40 percent reduction of the trade weighted average tariff rate, Members shall make additional
tariff reduction at its own discretion to achieve the targeted 40 percent reduction.  However, if the
result of tariff reduction in accordance with the formulae as described above goes beyond the targeted
40 percent reduction, Members shall apply the result.
_______________TN/MA/6
Page 28
EC (TN/MA/W/11/Add.1)
duty. initial  whereand bracket, new in the limits same as 1 and 1 and bracket, basein  limits upper  and lower  as 0 and 0with  ,
)0 0()1 1(
*)0(1)(
=/g239/g238/g239/g237/g236
−−
−+ =
xUBLBUBLBLBUBLBUBLBxLBxf
_______________
Japan (TN/MA/W/15 and Corr.1)
to  * A
tt =                     + α
to + A
to ≤ 10%, A = 10
10% < t o  ≤ 20%, A = 20
20% < t o  ≤ 30%, A = 30
30% < t o, A = 40
α = 0.3
tt : trade-weighted average target tariff rate
to : bound rate (trade-weighted average)
_______________
China (TN/MA/W/20)
T0 : Base rate
T1 : Final rate
A : Simple average of base rates
P :  Peak factor,  P=T 0/A
B : Adjusting coefficient, e.g. for the year 2010, B=3; for the year 2015, B=1
_______________020
1T)PA(T)PBA(T+ +××+=TN/MA/6
Page 29
Swiss formula
T0 : Base tariff
T1 : New tariff
A  : Coefficient  ( US - TN/MA/W/18 : A=8 ))
__________00
1TATAT+×=