RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE WT/REG13/M/1/Rev.1
ORGANIZATION WT/REG14/M/1/Rev.1
WT/REG15/M/1/Rev.1
18December 1997
(97-5560)
Committee onRegional Trade Agreements
EXAMINATION OFTHE EFTA -ISRAEL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT,
THE EFTA -POLAND FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND
THE EFTA -HUNGARY FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Note ontheMeeting of17September 19961
Chairman: H.E. Mr.Miguel J.Berthet (Uruguay)
Revision
1. TheCommittee onRegional Trade Agreements tookupitems B.I,B.IIandB.IIIoftheAgenda
foritsFourth Session, which included thefollowing:
A. General Introductory Remarks
B. Examination oftheEFTA-Israel FreeTrade Agreement
C. Examination oftheEFTA-Hungary FreeTrade Agreement
D. Examination oftheEFTA-Poland FreeTrade Agreement
A. General Introductory Remarks
2. Therepresentative ofNorway, speaking onbehalf oftheParties totheAgreements, saidthat
hiscomments wereapplicable toallthreeAgreements under examination. TheEFTA States andtheir
partner countries hadconcluded theAgreements under review in1992and1993andhadnotified them
inaccordance withGATT Article XXIV. However, theexaminations ofthese Agreements hadnever
beeninitiated intherelevant Working Parties established forthem. Nevertheless, theParties tothe
Agreements hadprovided written answers toallquestions putforward relating totheAgreements.
In1994, therehadalsobeenanattempt bytheParties tothesefreetradeagreements (FTAs) toaccelerate
theworking party procedures, butthetransition phase fromtheGATT totheWTO hadnotpermitted
thecontinuationoftheexaminationprocess.HementionedthistoindicatetheParties'interestinbringing
theexaminations toaconclusion, withthegreatest possible transparency, inlinewiththekeyaims
oftheWTO system. With thattransparency inmind, theParties hadalsosupplied theCommittee
withnew,consolidated information ontheAgreements under review. Theinformation corresponded,
toalargeextent,withthatforeseenunderthenewly-introducedStandardFormat.Thatkindofhorizontal
information afforded delegations abetter andmore comprehensive perspective ontheAgreements and
theireffects.TheAgreementswereallbasedonthesamestructureandhadsimilarsubstantiveprovisions
1Themeeting wasconvened inAirgram WTO/AIR/404, dated 23August 1996.WT/REG13/M/1/Rev.1
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andcommitments, buteachAgreement should beexamined onitsownmerits. TheParties wereof
theviewthatalloftheAgreements wereincompliance withtherequirements andprovisions ofGATT
Article XXIV, andthattheywereimplemented inaWTO-consistent manner. TheAgreements thus
complemented andadded totheliberalization achieved within theGATT system, and,inparticular,
asaresult oftheUruguay Round. TheParties totheAgreements werefullycommitted totheletter
andspirit andthestrengthening ofthemultilateral trading system.
B. Examination oftheEFTA-Israel FreeTrade Agreement
C. Examination oftheEFTA-Hungary FreeTrade Agreement
D. Examination oftheEFTA-Poland FreeTrade Agreement
3. Therepresentative oftheUnited States saidthatmostofhisdelegation 'scomments, ifnotall,
referred toallthree Agreements. GATT Article XXIV provided thatafree-trade areashould be
understood tomean agroup oftwoormorecustoms territories inwhich theduties andother regulations
ofcommerce hadbeeneliminated onsubstantially allthetrade between theconstituent territories in
theproducts originating insuchterritories. However, Annex 1ofeachoftheAgreements examined
listed items inHSChapters 25-97 thatwere excluded from thecoverage ofthefreetrade
agreements (FTAs). Additionally, most agricultural products were notcovered, andsome ofthose
covered were subject tobilateral arrangements between eachEFTA country andIsrael, Poland and
Hungary, respectively. According totheinformation provided, thebilateral arrangements within the
framework ofthefree-trade areawereintended tofacilitate trade inagricultural products. Could the
Parties tothese Agreements clarify whatwasmeant by"tofacilitate trade inagricultural products"?
Thestated intent hadbeentoabolish tariffs andother restrictions forindustrial products, fishandother
marine products, andprocessed agricultural products, inaccordance withArticle XXIV. According
todataprovided bytheParties, lessthan8percentofagricultural tradebetween theEFTA andHungary
wascovered bytheFTA. About 26percentofagricultural trade between theEFTA andIsrael was
covered bytheEFTA-Israel Agreement, these being primarily EFTA exports toIsrael. Inthecase
ofPoland, thefigure wasabout 61percent.Were therecommon rulesanddisciplines intheAgreements
thatapplied toalltrade inagricultural products? Itwasworth noting thatanumber ofcountries had
suggested thatthere wasadefactoexclusion ofagriculture intheNAFTA because theUnited States
andCanada retained theagriculture provisions oftheCanada-United States FreeTrade Agreement.
However, theNAFTA clearly stated thatagriculture wassubject toNAFTA rules, except inafew
explicit instances. Tariffs werebeing eliminated onagricultural products. Would thetradeliberalization
provided forintheAgreements under examination beextended totheagricultural products thatwere
currently excluded, andifso,when? TheParties totheAgreements hadalsoindicated thattheitems
inArticle 1hadbeenpermanently excluded. Could theygiveanexplanation concerning thisexclusion?
Why hadsomany important items, notably inagriculture andthose mentioned inAnnex 1,been
excluded? Intheviewofhisdelegation, acalculation of"substantially allthetrade" could notbemade
solely onamathematical basis, particularly ifthere wereitems forwhich notrade existed atpresent.
Ifnormal trading patterns laybehind thelackoftrade inthese goods, itdidnotmake sense toexclude
them fromcoverage. Theonlyconclusion thatcould bedrawn wasthattheelimination ofduties and
other restrictive trade measures hadnever beenintended toapply tothose items.
4. TherepresentativeofNorwayrepliedthatastheEFTAStatesdidnothaveacommonagricultural
policy, itwasnecessary totreatthesector through bilateral arrangements. Thebilateral arrangements
concluded within theframework oftheFTAs provided forthereduction orelimination ofduties. SuchWT/REG13/M/1/Rev.1
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measures alsocontributed tothedevelopment ofcloser integration between theeconomies oftheParties
totheAgreements without raising barriers totrade withthirdparties.
5. Therepresentative ofSwitzerland saidthatthedefinition of"substantially allthetrade" had
beendiscussed before, andthat"substantially allthetrade" never hadbeenclearly defined. TheParties
totheAgreements were oftheviewthattheyhadrespected thecriteria ofcovering substantially all
thetrade. Itwasclear thatitdidnotmean "all" thetrade. Ithadnever been decided whether
"substantially allthetrade" should beunderstood as"thetrade insubstantially allthesectors" ofthe
economy, butthere wasroom fordiscussion onthatissue. TheParties totheAgreements were of
theviewthatthecriteria setoutinArticle XXIV hadbeenmet.
6. TherepresentativeofNorwayrepliedtotheUnitedStates'questionontheexclusionofproducts,
aslisted inAnnex 1.ThatwaspartoftheEuropean trade policy history. Intheoldnomenclature,
those products hadbeenclassified as"agricultural products". However, inthetransformation tothe
HSsystem, theyhadbeenclassified as"industrial products" andhadthenbeenexcluded from the
coverage ofEuropean FTAs. Hecontinued byinforming thatanumber ofproducts listed intheAnnex
totheEFTA-Israel Agreement related toAustria, andtheEFTA States could notsayhowthose products
werecurrently treated. Infact,theonlyproducts towhich Annex 1currently applied, i.e.those which
were excluded from thecoverage oftheFTAs, were items 35.01 and35.02 related toagriculture,
though insome cases covered bybilateral arrangements. There might beliberalization oftrade in
those products, butitwasoutside thescope oftheFTAs. Items 45.01, 53.01 and53.02 werenolonger
excluded from thescope oftheAgreements.
7. Therepresentative oftheUnited States saidthattheprovisions concerning stateaidineach
ofthethreeAgreements examined wereimportant. Aidgranted byastatethatdistorted, orthreatened
todistort, thefunctioning oftheFTAs wasincompatible withtheFTAs. Foralimited period oftime,
until31December 1995, tolerance ofahigher level ofaidbytheEFTA States hadbeenallowed,
provided thattheconditions oftrade hadnotbeenaltered toanextent inconsistent withtheinterests
oftheParties totheAgreements. TheAgreements alsoprovided forthetransparency ofinformation
onstate-aid measures between theParties. Intheviewofhisdelegation, theParties should, inlight
oftheprovisions oftheirFTAs, reaffirm theircommitments toensure thatallstateaidtobeapplied
under theprovisions oftheFTAs would comply withtheWTO disciplines, andthatapplication of
allsuchmeasures would promptly benotified totheWTO. Hisdelegation considered thework done
bythevarious Parties totheAgreements andthedocuments theyhadprovided tobearealmodel of
howanexamination should becarried out.TheuseoftheStandard Format forresponses facilitated
thework oftheCommittee, andeachdelegation should takeitasaguideline forthefuture.
8. TherepresentativeoftheUnitedStatescontinuedbyaskinghowtheprovisionsontheadjustment
ofstatemonopolies, sothatnodiscrimination would existbetween theEFTA States anditspartners,
could bereconciled withobligations under Article III.Thequestion related toArticle 9oftheEFTA-
Israel Agreement, Article 11oftheEFTA-Poland Agreement, andArticle 12oftheEFTA-Hungary
Agreement. Hadthestatemonopolies referred tointhese provisions beennotified, asrequired by
Article XVII ofGATT 1994? Ifnot,could theParties totheAgreements listallsuchentities covered
bytherelevant article ineachAgreement andexplain whytheywerenotcovered byArticle XVII of
theGATT 1994?
9. Therepresentative ofNorway saidthatanyactions taken inaccordance withthestate-aid
provisions oftheFTAs would beinaccordance withtherelevant provisions oftheWTO. Thestate-aid
criteria andthenotification obligations, introduced under theFTAs, weremore stringent thanthose
under theAgreement onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures .Therelevant information onstateWT/REG13/M/1/Rev.1
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aidcould befound inparagraph 36ofdocument WT/REG12/2. What could beadded wasthatthe
lastsentence,whichtreatedthepossibilitygrantedtosomeEFTApartnercountriestoapplymoreflexible
criteria during aspecially defined transition period, didnotapply toIsrael. Anindirect answer tothe
question relating tostatemonopolies could befound inparagraph 32ofthedocument justreferred
to.
10. TherepresentativeoftheUnitedStateswonderedwhethertheAgreementsrequiredthatamargin
ofpreference vis-à-vis third countries bemaintained when thesafeguard provisions were invoked.
WouldthePartiestotheAgreementsobservetheprovisionsofArticleXIXintheapplicationofsafeguard
measures thatinvolved third-country trade? Hadthisprovision beeninvoked inthepast? Ifso,by
whom, onwhich products, andunder what circumstances? Towhom hadtheaction applied? The
Agreements under review didnotseem toprovide clearguidelines ontheoperation ofthesafeguard
provisions, similar tothose provided inArticle XIX. Could theParties explain howthesafeguard
actions were applied inthecontext ofthese Agreements?
11. Therepresentative ofNorway replied thattheParties totheAgreements maintained the
interpretation thatArticle XIXtaken withArticle XXIV:8 meant thatthepartners inanFTAmight
beexcluded fromArticle XIXmeasures imposed byoneoftheParties. Inasituation where theincrease
inimports camefromaFTAparty, thematter wasdealtwithinaccordance withthesafeguard provisions
oftheAgreements, sothatanymeasures taken byanaffected party should beimposed onlyonthe
party thatwasthesource ofthose imports. Inasituation where therewasageneral increase inimports
fromanumberofsources,theprovisionsofArticleXIXmightbeappliedonimportsfromthirdcountries
while thesafeguard provisions oftheFTAwereapplied toimports fromtheParties totheAgreements.
12. Therepresentative oftheEFTA Secretariat saidthatthere wasnopreferential margin defined
within thescope ofsafeguard measures andemergency action. Theonlyareawhere there wasa
preferential margin wasinrelation totheprovisions onstructural adjustment. Those provisions related
totheEFTA 'spartner countries which hadbeenmaking transitions tomarket economies atthetime
oftheconclusion oftheAgreements. There hadbeenafewinstances inthepastwhere EFTA States,
orevensome oftheformer EFTA States, hadapplied safeguard provisions within FTAs, butthose
measures hadbeennotified under Article XIX. Nosafeguard measures werecurrently inforce between
theParties totheAgreements under review.
13. Therepresentative oftheUnited States reiterated thatalmost every question orcomment he
made wasapplicable toallthreeAgreements discussed. Hereferred tothewebofdifferent agreements
existing inEurope andthefactthatsome ormaybe allParties totheAgreements under review were
consideringmembershipintheEuropeanUnion,andtheotherrevolvingagreementssuchastheCEFTA.
Hesaidthatthisraised anumber ofquestions. Could theParties totheAgreements offertheirviews
astohowtheoverlapping tariffpreferences, granted byeachoftheparties totheEuropean Communities
aswellastoeachother, would mesh? HowdidtheFTAs provide orallow formargins ofpreference
granted tothird parties suchastheEuropean Communities? How didtherules oforigin work and
interlock among those Agreements? What benefits would theEuropean Communities receive inits
trade withcertain EFTA States under these FTAs asaresult oftheestablishment oftheEuropean
Economic Area? Didthese Agreements haveimplications forother agreements thatexisted orthat
might benegotiated? How hadtheParties 'tariff reductions inconnection withtheUruguay Round
affected thelevelofpreference granted among themselves? Would these levels ofpreference decline,
orwould anabsolute percentage margin ofpreference bemaintained?
14. Therepresentative ofNorway responded thatsome ofthequestions posed bytheUnited States
weredifficult toanswer. Thecomplexity wentbeyond thefactthattheissues wereofvarying relevance;WT/REG13/M/1/Rev.1
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thequestions notonlyreferred totheEFTA States andtheirpartners, butalsowereposed inrelation
totheEuropeanCommunities.SomeotherforumwasnecessaryfortheMemberstodiscusstheseissues.
15. Therepresentative oftheEFTA Secretariat wasoftheview thatwhat theCommittee was
conducting wasareview orexamination ofthree specific Agreements. Itwasthusbeyond thescope
oftheexamination todiscuss thewhole horizon oftrade preferences prevailing inEurope. The
EFTA States could speak neither onbehalf ofitspartner countries, noronthepartoftheEuropean
Communities, anditcould certainly notspeak about therelations between theEuropean Communities
anditspartner countries. Thefactthatpreferences sometimes wereoverlapping wasnotaunique feature
oftheEFTA. There seemed tobeanumber ofWTO Members whohadentered intonetworks of
sometimes overlapping preferential agreements. Those wereperhaps more favourable forsome than
forothers, butthiswasaquestion ofamoresystemic nature which theCommittee might wishtoaddress
atacertain stage. TheEFTA States hadbeenseeing toitthattheirpartners would notbebadly treated
vis-à-vistheEuropeanCommunities.TheEFTApartnerswishedtoseethatthepreferencestheyreceived
under theFTAs would besimilar tothose theEFTA States hadgranted theEuropean Communities.
There wasacertain parallelism which prevailed, andthatwasnormal during thenegotiations. Regarding
rulesoforigin, theEFTA freetradeagreements currently contained rulesoforigin which weresimilar
tothose prevailing inother agreements inEurope. Itwashisdelegation 'sunderstanding thatthose
rulesoforigin matched wellwiththose agreed toduring theUruguay Round negotiations, inrelation
tothepreferential rulesoforigin. However, agreement hadbeenreached onwidening thecumulation
oforigin within thescope ofEuropean freetradearrangements; ofthebeginning ofnextyear,cumulation
ontheEuropean scale would betackled. Hethenturned tothequestion oftariff reductions resulting
from theUruguay Round andhowtheyaffected themargins ofpreference. Itwastruethatifparties
toapreferential agreement werewilling toreduce oreliminate duties, thereductions andliberalization
reached during multilateral tradenegotiations would narrow themargin. There werenoclauses orsecret
protocols within thescope oftheFTAs examined which provided thattheParties would maintain the
same margin ofpreference among themselves.
16. TherepresentativeofHungaryagreedthatHungary'sAgreementwiththeEuropeanCommunities
wasnotthesubject matter forthediscussion. There washarmony between Hungary 'sFreeTrade
Agreement withtheEFTA andthatwiththeEuropean Communities, asthephase-out ofindustrial
tariffs wasalmost identical inthetwoAgreements. Astothequestion concerning themargins of
preference, henoted thatHungary hadoffered almost a30percentreduction initsindustrial tariffs
within theframework oftheUruguay Round. Themargin ofpreference would thusbereduced infavour
ofWTO Members aslongastheUruguay Round Agreement wasinplace.
17. Therepresentative oftheUnited States wondered whether theParties totheAgreements,
specifically Hungary, butalsoPoland, hadplans toexpand thescope oftheirAgreements toinclude
asubstantially larger portion oftheagricultural sector.
18. Therepresentative ofHungary saidthathecould confirm thatthatwasthecase.
19. TherepresentativeoftheUnitedStatesaskedwhetherthePartiescouldcommentonanynon-tariff
import measures, suchascharges andquantitative restrictions which wereapplied tothirdcountries
andnottointra-FTA trade? Hisdelegation would appreciate alistofsuchmeasures. Therequest should
beseenintheinterests ofgeneral transparency.
20. Therepresentative ofHungary saidthat,asreflected intheanswer toquestion 14ofdocument
WT/REG13/2 Hungary hadthose types ofcharges. However, Hungary wasapplying andlevying theWT/REG13/M/1/Rev.1
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charges onanergaomnes basis andplanned toabolish these charges onanergaomnes basis. No
preference wasgiven tothepartners oftheFTAinthatrespect.
21. Therepresentative oftheUnited States asked whether eachoftheParties could provide
information totheCommittee onthepercentage ofitstotaltrade covered bythepreferences.
22. Therepresentative ofNorway wondered whether what theUnited States hadasked forwas
trade statistics foralltheproducts falling within theFTAbetween Poland andtheEFTA States. For
clarity, hewished tostress thatitwasspecific FTAs theCommittee wasexamining, andnottrade in
general terms. However, theParties would comply withtherequest andprovide theinformation. The
working document usedforthisexamination contained already those figures.
23. Therepresentative ofPoland saidthathisdelegation considered thestatistics prepared forthe
meeting more thansufficient, buthisdelegation wasready toconsider anyfurther request forstatistics
inwriting, astheproblem ofstatistics oftenwastechnical. Itwasdifficult todistinguish theexactamount
oftrade conducted strictly under thepreferential concessions fromtheother trade because there were
nostatistics which registered thedifference. Astheexperience ofvarious freetrade agreements
demonstrated, exporters werenotapplying theso-called certificates oforigin iftheydeemed themargin
ofpreference insufficient tooffset thecostofthecertificate.
24. TheChairman noted thatthematter could beraised again through written questions.
25. TherepresentativeoftheUnitedStatesreferredtoGATTArticleXXIV:4andArticleXXIV:5(b)
provisions instating thatthefactofraising most-favoured nation (MFN) duties while atthesame time
negotiating anFTAwhich provided preferential treatment fornearly 75percentofimports, arguably
raised trade barriers tothirdparties. Thatclearly failed thetestofArticle XXIV:5(b). Inlate1991,
while negotiating twoAgreements, Poland significantly raised itsMFN tariff rates. Article 5ofthe
FTAlisted theMFN ratesofFebruary 1992 asthebaseratesforpurposes oftheFTA. Given this
situation, could theParties explain howtherequirements ofArticle XXIV:4 andXXIV:5(b) were
satisfied? Didanyother Parties increase MFN ratesduring negotiations orprior toentry intoforce
ofthecorresponding Agreement? Theresponse byHungary toquestion 8stated thattheprovisions
ofArticles 9and10onlyapplied totheproducts covered bytheFTA. Inother words, those provisions
didnotcover trade inmostagricultural products. Could theParties confirm thatthesame applied to
theEFTA-Poland Agreement? DidArticle 9oftheEFTA-Poland Agreement apply onlytotheproducts
covered inArticle 2?
26. Inreplying tothefirstpartofthequestion from anEFTA perspective, therepresentative of
theEFTA Secretariat saidthattheEFTA States hadnotraised MFN duties tomaintain themargin
ofpreference. Each EFTA partner hadtorespond foritself. Healsostressed that,withrespect to
theapplication oftheFTAprovisions toagricultural products (especially those relevant toArticle 9),
Article 2oftheAgreement defined itsscope andthattheprovisions intheFTAapplied onlytothe
products within itsscope.
27. Therepresentative ofPoland recalled thatArticle XXIV:5(b) hadbeenextensively debated
inbothGATT, andtheWTO. Fortherecord, hisdelegation maintained thatthere wasnoconflict
between theactions taken byPoland inthefieldofunbound tariffs andArticle XXIV. Astothequestion
related toagriculture, itwashisdelegation 'sunderstanding thatArticle 9wasapplicable toproducts
which fellwithin thescope oftheFTA.WT/REG13/M/1/Rev.1
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28. Therepresentative oftheUnited States saidthatArticle 13oftheEFTA-Poland Agreement
indicated thattheParties were ready tofoster harmonious trade inagricultural products. Which
agriculturalpolicieshadthepotentialtohinderharmoniousdevelopmentoftradeinagriculturalproducts?
DidtheParties haveanyspecific policies inmind? Didcertain policies cause sectors oritems tobe
excluded fromtheAgreements? Would thecontinued existence ofsome orallofthesepolicies prevent
theinclusion ofcertain items throughout thelifeoftheAgreement? Hewondered iftheintent ofthe
bilateral arrangements therefore wastocoordinate agricultural policies rather thanfoster freetrade,
andifso,given thespirit andletter ofArticle XXIV, itseemed those policies should bealtered to
allow integration oftheproducts intotheAgreement. Itwashisdelegation 'sview thatinorder to
comply withtheletter andspirit ofArticle XXIV, theParties should extend theAgreement tothose
products currently excluded, particularly agricultural products. DidanyoftheParties provide bilateral
preferential treatment toagricultural products under MFN tariff-rate quotas? Ifso,hisdelegation
would appreciate itiftheParties would specify types ofpreferences? Finally, whatspecific changes
intherespective bilateral agricultural arrangements hadtaken placeasaresult oftherecent enlargement
oftheEuropean Communities andtheimplementation oftheWTO Agreements? Herealized thatthe
European Communities were notdirectly concerned, butalloftheagreements were sointerwoven
thatheconsidered thequestion relevant.
29. Therepresentative ofNorway requested thedelegation oftheUnited States tosubmit its
questions inwriting, saying theywould beanswered inwriting aswell.
30. With reference tothesuggestion bytheUnited States delegate thatcoverage beextended to
agriculture, therepresentative ofSwitzerland saidthattheideacould bediscussed inanother context.
Hisdelegation restated what hadbeensaidbefore concerning thatissue: asfarasthedevelopment
oftheAgreement wasconcerned, itwasclearthatanFTAwasnotanagreement which would remain
unchanged forever. There wereelements intheAgreement which permitted theParties toreconsider
itsprovisions.
31. TherepresentativeofPolandsaidthatthisquestiondealtwithaproblemidenticaltothosealready
discussed withrelation toother agreements andthatfullsatisfaction might notbereached ontheissue.
Itwasimportant tokeepinmind thattheAgreement hadbeennegotiated before thetermination of
theUruguay Round. Thelanguage ofArticle 13oftheAgreement hadbeendrafted according tothe
situation prevailing atthattime. Hecould confirm thatthebilateral arrangements werenotconsolidated
forever. They conceptually covered allagriculture products, theywere open andthecontent of
concessions could beenlarged. Hisdelegation hoped thatPoland would enjoy larger preferences in
thefuture thanthose existing atpresent. Asforpreferential quotas, hestressed that,withrespect to
Poland, therewerenoPolish preferences onagricultural imports intotheEFTA States asaconsequence
oftheimplementation oftheUruguay Round. Forthetimebeing, there wasnopoint inthePolish
delegation 'sconsidering thisquestion.
32. Therepresentative ofNorway clarified thatreferences tothepreferential quotas under theFTAs
could befound inthebody oftheAgreements, andthattheyhadbeenincluded intheglobal quotas
forthedifferent products. Thatwasspecified ineachAgreement. Speaking onbehalf oftheEFTA
States, healsowished tomake some points relating bothtothatday'sbusiness andtheprocedure to
follow.Theoriginalwritteninformationandtheupdatedinformationwhichhadbeencirculated,together
withthediscussion, allowed theCommittee tocomplete thefactual partoftheexamination. The
Committee seemed tobeinagood position toconsider therespective reports, atitsnextmeeting.
Hefurthermore suggested thattheSecretariat hadsufficient elements todraftsuchreports forsubsequent
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tosimilar examinations, forinstance inrelation toFTAs between theEFTA andTurkey, theEFTA
andtheCzech Republic, andtheEFTA andtheSlovak Republic.
33. TheChairman saidthatthere wasonequestion tobeputforward bythedelegation ofthe
United States tobeanswered bythedelegation ofPoland. Thatexchange should becarried outas
soonaspossible. TheCommittee should asktheSecretariat tobegin preparing thefactual partofthe
reports forthenextmeeting.
34. TheCommittee tooknoteofallthecomments made.