RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/SG/Q1/ARG/9
20August 1997
ORGANIZATION(97-3426)
Original: Spanish Committee onSafeguards
NOTIFICATIONS OFLAWS AND REGULATIONS UNDER
ARTICLE 12.6OFTHE AGREEMENT
Replies from Argentina totheQuestions Posed byMexico1,
European Community2,Korea3andtheUnited States4
Thefollowingcommunication,dated22July1997,hasbeenreceivedfromthePermanentMission
ofArgentina.
_______________
Mexico
Question
1. HowdoesArgentina intend toreconcile itsWTO obligations, inparticular theprovisions
oftheAgreement onSafeguards, withtheprovisions oftheLatin American Integration Association
Agreement?
Reply
TheALADI safeguard iscontained inResolution No.70oftheALADI Committee of
Representatives (27April 1987).
Theapplication ofsafeguard measures bythemember countries ofALADI isbased on
considerations completely different fromthoseofArticle XIXoftheGATT-94 andtheWTO Agreement
onSafeguards.
Thereconciliation towhich Mexico refers could beexamined inrelation totheapplication
ofWTO safeguard measures according towhether itisaquestion ofatariff measure oraquantitative
restriction.
1G/SG/Q1/ARG/5 .
2G/SG/Q1/ARG/6 .
3G/SG/Q1/ARG/7 .
4G/SG/Q1/ARG/8 .G/SG/Q1/ARG/9
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Inthecaseofatariffmeasure, thequestion iswhether anyexisting preferences based onALADI
agreements inforce aremaintained. Thatistosay,whether thenegotiated preferences areapplied
tothetariff established.
Inthecaseofquantitative restrictions, inprinciple, anALADI member country should not
begranted differential treatment ascompared withother Member countries oftheWTO.
Question
2. Article 4ofDecree 1059/96 (theDecree) establishes thatconfidential information willbe
treated assuchwhen "this hasbeen sostated attheappropriate timebytheUnder-Secretariat
andtheCommission respectively". Does thismean thattheArgentine investigating authority
hasthepower toclassify theinformation submitted bytheparties? Andifso,canitnotbe
consideredthatthisArticlegrantsexcessivelybroadpowerstotheArgentineinvestigatingauthority?
How doesArgentina seektoreconcile these facts withtheobligation under Article 3.2ofthe
Agreement onSafeguards whereby theinvestigating authority ofamember isauthorized torefuse
confidential treatment ofinformation onlywhere suchtreatment isnotdulywarranted?
Question
3. What would bethereasons forwhich theArgentine authority would consider thatarequest
forconfidential treatment wasunwarranted andhowwould itreconcile thiswithitsobligations
under theAgreement onSafeguards?
Replies
Asboththesequestions relate to"confidential information", theArgentine delegation haschosen
toanswer them bothinasingle combined reply.
Articles 3,4,5and6ofDecree 1059/96 make itclearthattheconfidentiality oftheinformation
provided bythevarious interested parties depends onconfidential treatment being requested bythe
parties themselves.
Thus, theapplication forconfidentiality comes fromtheprovider oftheinformation whomust
givedetailed reasons fortheneedforsuchtreatment. Theapplication must beaccompanied bya
non-confidential summary oranexplanation ofwhytheinformation cannot besummarized.
Itfollows thatthetextofArticle 4regulates theprovisions oftheapplicable legislation with
respect tothenature oftheprocedure which must befollowed prior toaspecific application togive
confidential treatment toinformation submitted byoneoftheparties. Inthisconnection, thelawlays
down thatforsuchtreatment tobegranted theneedforitmustbejustified, while establishing theright
oftheimplementing authority toaskforthedocumentation tobeaccompanied byanon-confidential
summary or,iftheinformation cannot besummarized, astatement ofthereasons whythisisimpossible.
Ifconfidential treatment isnotgranted, theparty providing theinformation maychoose tomake it
non-confidential orwithdraw it.
Theauthorities responsible forimplementing Decree 1059/96, within theirrespective spheres
ofcompetence, aretheonlyonestohaveaccess toconfidential information. Consequently, inorder
nottoinfringe theprinciple ofdefence, Argentina laysspecial stress onthenon-confidential summary,
while insisting thattheparties donotabuse thepossibility ofapplying forconfidential treatment.G/SG/Q1/ARG/9
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Theimplementing authority objectively assesses therequirements relating totheprovision of
detailed reasons andthesubmission ofaconfidential summary, orastatement ofthereasons whythis
isimpossible, inorder todetermine whether suchtreatment complies withtherules, while providing
specifically forthepossibility oftheinformation being withdrawn bytheparty ornotbeing taken into
account bythecompetent body.
Inview oftheabove, itcanbesaidthatinnocasedoestheDecree gobeyond thepowers
conferred bythelaw,butspecifies theassessment tobemade inorder toverify thefulfilment ofthe
minimum requirements tobeconsidered.
Question
4. Inaccordance withArticle 13oftheDecree, when itisdecided thatitisappropriate to
initiate aninvestigation, thedecision willbepublished intheOfficial Journal, butthisArticle
doesnotsaywhether theparties considered tohaveaninterest intheinvestigation willbenotified.
Does thismean thatitisnotmandatory tonotify theother parties oftheinitiation ofthe
investigation? Otherwise, what isthetimeperiod fornotifying theinitiation oftheinvestigation
totheother parties? What timeperiod willbegranted toexporters toexercise theirright tomake
representations? Isitplanned touseinvestigation questionnaires? Ifso,willthese questionnaires
besenttogether withthenotification ofinitiation oftheinvestigation?
Reply
UndertheArgentinelegalsystem,thedecisiontoinitiateaninvestigationwithaviewtoapplying
asafeguard measure isanadministrative decision ofgeneral scope and,accordingly, isaddressed to
anunspecified number ofparties.
Inaccordance withthisdefinition andinconformity withtheprovisions ofArticle 11ofLaw
No.19.549onAdministrativeProcedures,whichsupplementstheoldregulations,administrativedecisions
ofgeneral scope mustbepublished intheOfficial Journal inorder tobecome effective, noother form
ofnotification being required.
Theabove notwithstanding, theimplementing authority isalsorequired simultaneously tonotify
theCommittee onSafeguards, within thecontext ofwhich consultations maybearranged andinvitations
issued totheMembers likely tobeaffected.
Asregards theintervention oftheparties, itshould bepointed outthatonceaninvestigation
hasbeeninitiated, subject toverification oftheirlegalcapacity anddemonstration oftheirsubjective
interest, parties mayassociate themselves withtheinvestigation inorder tomake known theirpoints
ofview.Nevertheless,initsdecisioninitiatingtheinvestigationtheimplementingauthorityalsoindicates
thedateforahearing atwhich alltheinterested parties mayexpress theirviews onthedesirability
ofapplying themeasures inquestion.
There isnoprovision forquestionnaires intheAgreement ofSafeguards, although theyare
aspecific feature ofdumping andcountervailing dutyinvestigations. However, theimplementing
authority may, ifitdeems itnecessary, apply procedures forcirculating questionnaires, asprovided
byArticle 15oftheDecree.G/SG/Q1/ARG/9
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Question
5. Inaccordance withArticle 32oftheDecree, thedecision adopted inconnection withan
investigation orasaresult thereof isnotopen toappeal. Does thismean thatthere isnomeans
ofdefence thatparties canusetointervene intheproceeding? What means ofdefence would
anexporter have inthecaseofprocedural orconstitutional violations, forexample?
Reply
Although theDecree rulesoutanappeal through administrative channels, thisinnowayaffects
therights ofthevarious intervening parties sinceunder theArgentine legalsystem onceadministrative
channels havebeenexhausted thematter canbetaken directly tothecourts (National Administrative
Court).
European Community
Article 15ofDecree 1059/96 states that,during theinvestigation, "theUnder-Secretariat and
theCommission shall(...)engage inanyconsultations theydeem necessary (...)when theybelieve
itopportune ...".
Question
Would interested parties suchasimporters orexporters havetheopportunity tobeincluded
inthedebate during theinvestigation even when theArgentine authorities didnotbelieve it
opportune?
Reply
ThefulltextofArticle 15oftheDecree states that"theUnder-Secretariat andtheCommission
shall, during thisperiod, engage inanyconsultations theydeem necessary togather anyinformation
considered desirable and,when theybelieve itopportune, shallendeavour toverify suchinformation,
referring toimporters, businessmen, representatives, producers, consumer associations andtrade
organizations".
Itfollows from areading ofthecomplete article thattheauthority isempowered toengage
inconsultations. Theauthority isalsoempowered toverify theinformation gathered asaresult of
theconsultations inwhich ithasitselfengaged, within thecontext ofcooperation which prevails during
aninvestigation.
Theparticipation ofimporters andexporters isalways possible. Indeed, theauthorities have
nopower toexclude aninterested party fromaninvestigation orrefuse toallow ittoparticipate. On
thecontrary, theArgentine constitutional right ofdefence would notpermit theadoption ofany
regulations withsucharestriction.
Therefore theanswer tothequestion "would interested parties suchasimporters orexporters
havetheopportunity tobeincluded inthedebate during theinvestigation evenwhen theArgentine
authorities didnotbelieve itopportune?" isyes,theywould havethatopportunity.
Under Article 5.1oftheWTO Agreement onSafeguards ameasure should beapplied only
totheextent necessary toprevent orremedy serious injury andtofacilitate adjustment ofthedomestic
industry concerned.G/SG/Q1/ARG/9
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Question
CanArgentina explain howthiscomplies withArticle 18ofDecree 1059/96 thatprovides
fortheapplication ofsafeguard measures "toprotect thegeneral interest"?
Reply
Theprotection ofthegeneral interest isnotacondition thatrelates totheperiod ofapplication
ofameasure. Onthecontrary, itreinforces theWTO rules since, inaddition totheobjective
requirements laiddown intheAgreement fortheadoption ofasafeguard measure, bearing inmind
thattheapplication ofameasure isoptional fortheMinister oftheEconomy, itiswithin thediscretion
ofthelatter todetermine whether themeasure isnecessary toprotect thegeneral interest. Thatisto
say,ifalltheelements necessary fortheapplication ofasafeguard measure arepresent andheisin
aposition toapply it,ourMinister willalsodetermine whether themeasure isnecessary inthelight
ofanyinvolvement ofthegeneral interest.
Korea
Question
According toArticle 19oftheDecree circulated on13January 1997 (document
G/SG/N/1/ARG/3), safeguard measures maytaketheform of(a)anincrease inimport duty,
(b)aquantitative restriction and(c)anyother measures available totheimplementing authority.
Please provide amore specific explanation about theabove-mentioned "other measures"
thattheMinistry oftheEconomy andWorks andServices ofArgentina maytakeassafeguard
measures.
Reply
Theobject oftheabove-mentioned alternative (c)istoleave openthepossibility oftheadoption
ofsafeguard measures different fromthose described under (a)and(b),provided thattheiruseisagreed
byorcustomary among Members oftheWTO. Thisistheonlyinterpretation thatshould begiven
tothemeasures "available to"theimplementing authority.
United States
Question
1. Article 2(f),Interested parties: What isthemeaning ofthephrase "without prejudice
towhether theexercise ofsuchright iscontingent oncompatibility withthepublic interest giving
risetotheinvestigation"?
Thephrase"withoutprejudicetowhethertheexerciseofsuchrightiscontingentoncompatibility
withthepublic interest giving risetotheinvestigation" means thatevenifallthelegislative requirements
fortheapplication ofthemeasure aresatisfied, theimplementing authority isauthorized nottoapply
itongrounds ofpublic interest.G/SG/Q1/ARG/9
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Question
2. Article 2(h), Presentation ofevidence: Please explain themeaning ofthisprovision and
howitisintended tooperate inpractice. Inparticular, doesitpermit interested parties tosubmit
written evidence andarguments totheCommission?
Thisprovision means thatthevarious interested parties cansubmit theirarguments andevidence
without theneedforformal action bytheimplementing authority. Theaimoftheprovision isprecisely
tomake things easier fortheparties bysimplifying theprocedure.
Question
3. Article 2(k), Domestic industry: How dothe"asawhole" and"30percent" standards
relate? Forexample, ifproducers accounting for30percentoftheindustry submit apetition,
willtheCommission baseitsdetermination ofinjury onlyonthecondition ofthat30percent
oftheindustry?
The30percentrequirementwasestablishedforthepurposeofdeterminingtherepresentativeness
ofthedomestic industry requesting theapplication ofthemeasure. Inthisrespect, theArgentine
legislation ismore demanding, since theAgreement onSafeguards doesnothaveaprovision ofthis
kind.
Thisexplanation answers thesecond partoftheUnited States 'question. Theanalysis ofthe
injury andthesubsequent determination made bytheCommission willnecessarily bebased ona
significant proportion, namely more than30percent, oftheproduction ofthesector concerned.
Question
4. Article 10(b)(ii), (iii),(iv),(v):What istherelevance ofthese factors, suchasbalance
oftrade between Argentina andtheexporting countries atissue, toadetermination ofserious
injury?
These provisions ofArticle 10(b) havenorelevance tothedetermination ofinjury.
Question
5. Article 30:Does thereference toArticle 9.2mean thatArgentina considers itself a
developing country member?
Argentina isadeveloping country andissoclassified inthevarious instruments which
differentiate between countries according totheirdegree ofdevelopment.