RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/CTD/M/3
16 July 2002
(02-3959)
Committee on Trade and Development
Third Special Session
NOTE ON THE MEETING OF 16 MAY 2002
Chairman:  H.E. Mr Ransford Smith (Jamaica)
Subjects discussed:
A. A DOPTION OF THE AGENDA .......................................................................................................1
B. S PECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT .................................................................................2
1. Identification of Provisions Members Consider Should be Made Mandatory....................2
2. The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ...................................................5
3. Article 10.3 of the SPS Agreement ........................................................................................18
4. Article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement ........................................................................................20
5. Article and 10.4 of the SPS Agreement.................................................................................23
6. Article 12.3 of the Agreement on Te chnical Barriers to Trade ..........................................25
7. Article 3.5(j) of the Agreement on  Import Licensing Procedures ......................................26
8. Article 27.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.......................27
9. Article 12.10 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (document TM/CTD/W/2)...............................................................30
10. Articles 4.10 and 21.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes..................................................................................................... .33
C. O THER BUSINESS ......................................................................................................................36
ANNEX I ............................................................................................................................... ............................... 38
A. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA
1. The Chairman noted that the draft agenda for the meeting was contained in airgram
WTO/AIR/1787 of 1 May 2002.  This draft agenda had been prepared in accordance with the
agreement to facilitate structured discussions by focusing on pre-specified agreements and decisions.
The Committee had requested to be kept informed of any issues related to special and differentialtreatment (S&D) within the other WTO bodies and the Chairman expressed his intention, under Other
Business, to draw the attention of delegations to the responses received.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 2
B. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
1. Identification of Provisions Members Consider Should be Made Mandatory
2. The Chairman noted that, as agreed at the last meeting, he had sent a fax to all Members on
15 April 2002 outlining the allocation of agreements and decisions to be addressed at the current
meeting and that of 14 June 2002.  The Committee received two submissions from Members inresponse to that fax.  Document TN/CTD/W/1 reproduces the submission by the delegations of Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and
Zimbabwe.  Document TN/CTD/W/2 was received from the same ten delegations and the delegations
of Egypt and Mauritius.  These proposals were circulated to Members before the meeting.  He also
indicated that two other sets of submissions had recently been received, one from Kenya on behalf of
the African group of countries and the other from Uganda on behalf of the least-developed countries
(LDCs).  These submissions were available in English only.  They were circulated prior to themeeting and their sponsors were requested to introduce them.  The delegation of India had introduced
several proposals at the previous meeting and it was the Chairman's understanding that the delegation
of India wished these proposals to remain on the table.  Proposals from the African Group and the
Group of LDCs, received one day before the meeting, were also to be introduced.  Given that
delegations had only recently received these doc uments the Chairman suggested that the Committee
agree upon an appropriate time at which to consider them substantively.
3. He continued by saying that, before moving to the introduction of proposals, delegations
might recall that the background documents in the WT/COMTD/W/77 document series had been
provided to delegations to facilitate discussion on the issue of special and differential treatment and to
assist Members in their preparation of inputs.  Members in the process of preparing submissions, asclarified at the last meeting, were at liberty to draw and expand upon the information provided in
these documents.  It was also anticipated that Members would utilize those documents as they saw
appropriate in their discussions.  The deliberations would not, however, be based upon these
background documents.  They would be based upon th e submissions received from Members.  It was
noted that Agenda item B contains three sub-component s.  B(I) relates to the identification of those
provisions which Members consider should be manda tory.  Agenda item B(II) is a consideration of
Members' inputs on the legal and practical implications of making non-mandatory provisions
mandatory.  Agenda item B(III) concerns the identification of how provisions might be made more
precise, effective and operational.  The Chairman recommended that the proposals be taken up in the
order of the agreements and decisions previously circulated.  He emphasized that it was not his
intention to deter Members from submitting subsequent comments or proposals on these agreements
and decisions.  Given the time constraints upon the Committee he did, however, stress the need forefficiency.  As already indicated, written submissions had been circulated to all Members.  These
submissions relate to the four agreements dealing with Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Technical Barriers to Trade, Subsidies and Counte rvailing Measures and the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
4. The Chairman asked that proposals relating to the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures be introduced.  These proposals are contained in document TN/CTD/W/2, pages 3-5.
5. The representative of India wished briefly to introduce the entire document.  Representatives
of other delegations would then introduce its specific proposals.  In the run up to the Seattle
Ministerial Conference, a group of developing countries had placed before the General Council the
need to examine the S&D provisions with a view to making them effective, mandatory, precise andoperational.  The reason was that many Members felt that they did not benefit from the operation of
these provisions to the extent they had expected once these provisions had been incorporated into the
various WTO Agreements.  In the run up to the Doha Ministerial Conference issues relating to the
S&D provisions were pursued in various bodies.  The CTD also decided to handle the issue of S&DTN/CTD/M/3
Page 3
provisions.  Since sufficient progress on S&D had not been made in the CTD, the matter was further
discussed at the Doha Ministerial Conference and a few decisions were then taken.  The Doha
Ministerial Declaration noted the concerns expressed regarding the operation of S&D provisions in
addressing specific constraints faced by developing countries, particularly the LDCs, and reaffirmed
that the provisions for S&D treatment were an integral part of the WTO Agreements.  Ministers hadagreed that all S&D provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them
more precise, effective and operational.  They had endorsed the Work Programme on S&D treatment
set out in the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns contained in
document WT/MIN(01)/17.  That Decision instructed the CTD (a) "to identify those special and
differential treatment provisions that are already mandatory in nature and those that are non-binding
in character, to consider the legal and practical implications for developed and developing Members
of converting special and differential treatment measures into mandatory provisions, to identify thosethat Members consider should be made mandatory, and to report to the General Council with clear
recommendations for a decision by July 2002", and (b) "to examine additional ways in which special
and differential treatment provisions can be made more effective, to consider ways, including
improved information flows, in which developing countries, in particular the least-developed
countries, may be assisted to make best use of special and differential treatment provisions, and toreport to the General Council with clear recommendations for a decision by July 2002".  Pursuant to
the above decisions at the Doha Ministerial Conference, the TNC gave the CTD Special Session the
task of looking into the S&D provisions with a vi ew to achieving the objectives outlined in the Doha
Ministerial Declaration.  Since then, the CTD Special Session has been examining the S&D
provisions with a view to making them mandatory in cases where they were non-mandatory and tomake them more precise, effective and operational than at present.  In their submission his delegation,
in cooperation with the delegations of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Indonesia,
Kenya, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, were putting forward proposals for
making S&D provisions, as they exist in some of the agreements, more precise, effective and
operational.  It was hoped that they would thereby be strengthened.  The submission was an initialcontribution and his and other delegations might submit additional proposals in due course.  The
contribution should be seen as aimed at facilitating  the deliberations of the CTD Special Session.  The
co-sponsors reserved their right to modify or amend any of the proposals.
6. The representative of Kenya, on behalf of the African Group, drew the Committee's attention
to the African Group proposal on S&D.  This initial proposal from the African Group was circulated
at the meeting.  It would be circulated as a formal WTO document as soon as possible.  The African
Group would be submitting an additional comprehensive proposal on each and every agreement aslisted in the Chairman's communication circulated on 15 April 2002.  Work in the African Group on
these additional proposals was at an advanced stage and would soon be completed. The present
proposal, however, focussed on two main areas.  The first was the African Group's views on the
essence of S&D and the second its suggestions for a framework within which to organize and conduct
the exercise.  It was the view of the African Group that S&D provisions should aim to enabledeveloping and LDC Member countries to address their developmental needs in the context of the
WTO multilateral trading system.  He therefore emphasized that the work should ensure the effective
implementation of S&D provisions in keeping with the spirit of the Doha Development Agenda which
in this regard had given a clear and broad mandate.  The compilation by the Secretariat of all S&D
provisions had been one important step forward.  The African Group urged the Committee to adopt aclear framework for fully executing its broad mandate.  The Committee was required to consider how
to strengthen the S&D provisions and how to make them more effective.  It was required to find
additional measures for that purpose, where necessary, and to consider how to include S&D
provisions in the architecture of the WTO Agreement in the context of the Doha Work Programme.
While each agreement would be considered provision by provision, it was equally important to bear inmind that the CTD mandate required a broad approach that would facilitate the adoption of a
comprehensive solution that would make all S&D provisions fully operational.  In the African Group
proposal, the African delegations suggested the first four elements of a framework in that regard.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 4
There should be clear principles and objectives to guide the operation of all S&D provisions and an
objective approach to all specific cross cutting issues such as technical cooperation and capacity-
building as well as transition periods.  Effective monitoring and review mechanisms had to be
established within the Committee and the General Council.  These mechanisms must function on the
basis of clear targets and measurable performance criteria that could be regularly evaluated.  TheAfrican Group would be happy to work with all delegations to develop a suitable framework.  The
African Group would also welcome substantive comments and discussion on its proposal and it would
be happy to work constructively with the other delegations towards concluding the mandate given to
the Special Session both expeditiously and comprehensively.
7. The representative of Uganda wished to introduce the proposal submitted by the LDC Group
of countries.  He invited all Members to ensure th at the enterprise mandated by the Ministers at the
Doha Ministerial Conference was finalized in a satisfactory and comprehensive manner.  The LDCsattached great importance to the mandate of the CTD to strengthen and make effective and operational
all the S&D provisions in all WTO Agreements and decisions.  It represented an important
opportunity to address concerns raised by the LDCs about certain imbalances and inequities in the
WTO Agreements.  The CTD exercise should aim, among other things, to find effective solutions to
bottlenecks and other constraints to the capacity of LDCs to benefit from the multilateral tradingsystem.  Against that background the Group of LDCs  presented a proposal that focused on the need
for a comprehensive framework to make all S&D provisions fully operational and to incorporate them
into the architecture of the WTO Agreements.  The direct promotion of economic growth had to be
the principal function of S&D.  In their proposal, the African Group articulated the need to include
comprehensive development provisions in all WTO Agreements, to adopt clear developmentbenchmarks, to adopt special customs and standards procedures that would facilitate the growth of
LDC exports, and to set up an instrument to make fully operational the commitments on providing
duty-free and quota-free market access for products originating in the LDCs.  The proposal was
preliminary in nature and the LDC Group reserved its right to make additional proposals or
modifications.  In view of the concerns of the LDCs and the need for a framework approach, as putforward in the proposal, it was suggested that the Committee hold a Special Session devoted
exclusively, or mainly, to the consideration and adoption of precise goals within the context of the
multilateral trading system and to the framework elements necessary to strengthen S&D provisions to
be incorporated into the architecture of WTO agreements .  The LDC Group supported the approach,
which included a substantive discussion on cross-cutting issues, proposed by the African Group.  A
full discussion of these proposals had to be broad and go beyond the conversion of "should" and
"may" to "shall".  The LDC Group agreed with statements that had already been made that such aconversion, while helpful, would not constitute a comprehensive and satisfactory solution to the
concerns over the effectiveness and operation of S&D provisions.  All S&D provisions should
nevertheless be made binding.  That a provision was binding meant that it was binding on individual
Members and collectively on the WTO Membership.  Binding meant that provisions conferring
certain rights on LDCs and developing countries should be fully respected by all Members.  While notdirective in nature, the provisions should be construed to give LDCs specific rights that could not be
questioned or undermined.  The implications of strengthening S&D provisions should be viewed and
considered in the context of addressing certain imbalances, particularly those affecting the LDCs, and
the subsequent benefits available to all Members, particularly the LDCs.  The LDC Group welcomed
comments and discussion on its proposal.
8. The representative of Cuba said that the S&D provisions had been recognized since the
creation of the Charter of Havana.  They included a number of decisions and ministerial declarations
as well as understandings which came from the subsequent rounds of negotiations, including Part IV
of GATT 1994.  The S&D provisions contained in the WTO Agreements should therefore not be
interpreted as a series of concessions made to developing countries.  The objectives included in thepreamble to the Doha Ministerial Declaration were clear.  One of these, as set out by the WTO
Members, was to realize the greater participation of developing countries in international trade.  SoTN/CTD/M/3
Page 5
S&D was a right which developing countries had acquired in order to improve their effective
participation in the multilateral trade system.  The provisions on S&D should therefore be considered
as a bridge between the potential benefits to be derived from the WTO Agreements and the present
level of LDC development.  It was the fact that developing countries could not benefit from most of
the objectives of the multilateral trading system that had motivated the introduction of the S&Dprovisions into the WTO Agreements. Many of them were not applied, however, as they were neither
clear, binding, nor straightforward to implement.  In parallel with a necessary increase in market
access for products of export interest to developing countries, revision of the S&D provisions is, for
these reasons one of the priorities for developing countries.  The reality is that many developing
countries remain dependent on a limited number of basic products for which world prices are in
constant decline.  These exports then face additional restrictions:  sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, technical barriers to trade, and anti-dumping measures, for example, measures which oftenfail to take into account provisions adopted in various WTO Agreements for their reduction or
elimination.  So it is necessary for a revision of S&D provisions to take into account the four
objectives for the work on S&D provisions as stated at the Doha Ministerial Conference,
i.e. strengthening them when required and making them precise, more effective and operational.
Finally, her delegation considered that this work would not be completed if a follow-up mechanism
were not created.  Such a mechanism should ensure the effective implementation of all provisions and
identify any difficulties arising from such implementation.
9. The representative of Pakistan said that at the Second Special Session of the CTD, held on
9 April 2002, Members had been requested to submit their written statements on how to improve
S&D provisions.  According to that decision, such proposals by Members must contain (a) anidentification of the provisions that were to be made mandatory (b) indications of how provisions
might be made more effective and operational and (c) the legal and practical implications of making
provisions mandatory.  The purpose of the exercise was to fulfill the mandate given at the Doha
Ministerial Conference.  If that objective was to be achieved, certain parameters for a quality test had
to be identified to make it possible to analyze th e provisions accordingly.  One such parameter could
be the objective sought when the provision had been adopted.  It would then be possible to assess if
the provision corresponded to the initial motivation for including it in the agreements.  Second, the
action required to meet the objective had to considered.  Third, the party responsible for that action
had to be identified.  Fourth, it would be helpful to identify the beneficiaries of the action.  Fifth, it
would also be important to consider the time-frame for the action.  This would respond to the question
of which time-frame should be adopted in order for the beneficiaries actually to benefit from it.  Sixth,
and more importantly, an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism should be established.Once the five above-mentioned elements had been dealt with, it would be important to establish such
a monitoring mechanism to ensure that the action and elements identified were acted upon.  An
effective monitoring mechanism should contain an element of compliance to see whether a provision
was enforceable, and if not enforced, whether the beneficiary deprived of a certain benefit could
ensure compliance by taking the responsible party to dispute settlement.  The analysis based on such aquality test should enable all Members to determine whether the existing provisions were satisfactory,
whether they required improvements or clarifications in language, or whether a deeper review of the
agreement would be necessary.
2. The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
10. The Chairman noted that there were three proposals pertaining to the Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures.  They related to Articles 9.2, 10.1, 10.3.
11. The representative of Pakistan noted that document TN/CTD/W/1 reproduced the joint
communication from the delegations of Cuba , Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.  This communication
contained various proposals on a few agreements.  He would introduce the proposals relating toTN/CTD/M/3
Page 6
Articles 9.2, and 10.3 of the SPS Agreement.  The proposal on Article 10.1 would be introduced by
the representative of Egypt.  The stringent SPS requirements imposed by importing developed
countries often constrained market access for developing countries and LDCs.  However, the S&D
provisions in the SPS Agreement had done little to protect the interests of developing countries.  The
text of Article 9.2 of the SPS Agreement reads:  "Where substantial investments are required in orderfor an exporting developing country Member to fulf il the sanitary or phytosanitary requirements of an
importing Member, the latter shall consider providing such technical assistance as will permit the
developing country Member to maintain and expand its market access opportunities for the product
involved".  The provision reads "shall consider".  And the reason why developing countries wished to
make that provision obligatory, in order for it to become more effective and operational, was that
developing countries and LDCs experienced problems fulfilling the SPS requirements of the
importing developed countries.  These problems stemmed from their lack of technical, infrastructuraland financial capacity which had, in turn, contributed to the restriction of market access opportunities
for the products involved.  The sponsors of the document had a proposal for making the provision
effective, operational and mandatory.  The proposal contained two elements.  The first was to make
the provision mandatory by removing the word "consider" which currently appeared between the
words "shall" and "providing", in order for it to r ead:  " … the latter shall provide such technical
assistance as will permit the developing country Member to maintain and expand its market access
opportunities for the product involved".  As the current wording implied an obligation only to
consider with no real obligation to provide actual technical assistance, the sponsors of the proposal
wished to delete the word "consider".  The second step would be to add a sentence to the provision
which would state that:  "If an exporting developing country member identifies specific problems ofinadequate technology and infrastructure in fulfillin g the sanitary or phytosanitary requirements of an
importing developed country Member, the latter shall provide the former with relevant technology
and technical facilities  on preferential and non-commercial terms, preferably free of cost, keeping in
view the development, financial and trade needs of the exporting developing country".  If the above
proposals were accepted, the provision would be made effective and operational.  He looked forwardto a positive response to this suggestion from other Members.
12. The representative of the European Communities said that his delegation had received two
documents with a document symbol beginning "TN".  He asked what this meant since the CTD in
Special Session was not a negotiating fora.  His delegation believed that it was an error of the
Secretariat to provide a symbol which classified it as a negotiation document.  He asked for a
correction to be made and for future documents to appear with a Special Session symbol which
reflected the true status of the documents.  His delegation welcomed the fact, however, that theCommittee had a substantive amount of material to consider.  As his delegation had received the
specific proposals rather late he was not in a position to give its complete view.  He nevertheless
observed that making the provision mandatory did have a number of implications, notably financial,
which trade negotiators might not be able to control.  Analysis was therefore required as to how the
proposal could be incorporated into the general way in which technical assistance was provided, andin particular whether such an obligation would be practically feasible given the budget constraints and
budgetary procedures in place.
13. The representative of the United States said that, as the new proposals had not been submitted
within the time-frame given, her delegation was not prepared to comment on them, but only on the
proposal submitted at the last meeting.  In terms of the process in general, she reiterated herdelegation's belief that it was important to examine the utilization of the existing provisions and to
identify the specific problems encountered by developing country Members.  Some of the questions
considered by her delegation, and which her delegation expected other delegations likewise to
consider, included the question as to what the specific impediments actually were, if there were other
developmental reasons for a provision not being used, if the suggested change would encouragegreater participation of Members in the rules-ba sed trading system, and if a given proposal would
have any negative impact.  Her delegation would address some of those elements in responding to theTN/CTD/M/3
Page 7
proposals made by the delegation of India. Having seen the number of proposals made and having
heard a number of delegations indicate an intention to submit more comprehensive proposals,
possibly relating to every single agreement, her delegation was becoming increasingly convinced that
the relevant WTO bodies dealing with the specific agreements would have to be more seriously
involved.
14. The representative of Canada said that, although her delegation had not had the opportunity to
analyze the document which it had just received, it nevertheless had a couple of general comments to
add to the discussion.  First, it supported the comments from the representative of the European
Communities regarding the fact that the documents had been given the "TN" symbol.  This
classification was incorrect and her delegation wished to see it changed.  Second, her delegation was
prepared to comment on the original proposals put forward by the delegation of India but would wait
for the appropriate moment in the agenda.  Finally, proposals coming to the Special Session of theCTD which might lead to changes in the WTO Agreements or affect the negotiations launched at the
Ministerial Conference in Doha, should be taken up for consideration and action either in the
appropriate negotiating fora established by the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) or, as
appropriate, in the relevant WTO Committee.  The proposal before the Committee relating to
Article 9.1 of the SPS Agreement should therefore be addressed in the SPS Committee.
15. The representative of Japan said that his delegation shared the concerns expressed by the
previous speakers regarding the document symbol of the document before the Committee.  As his
delegation had only just received this document it needed more time to reflect on it.  If future
proposals were submitted before the meetings with such short notice then consideration and
discussion of these proposal would of course be delayed.  He therefore suggested that the Chairmanurge Members intending to submit proposals to do so  in sufficiently good time so as to allow other
delegations the necessary time  properly to consider them in advance of the meetings.
16. The Chairman said that at the last meeting th e Committee had agreed to set a deadline for the
submission of proposals and that this deadline was 2 May 2002.  Regrettably the proposals had not
been submitted on time.  It was therefore recognized that a difficulty had been created by limiting thetime available between the circulation of the proposals and the meeting itself.  With respect to the
proposals submitted just one day before the meeting, he said that the Committee would have to decide
on when these should be taken up for substantive consideration.  He also reminded delegations that
the deadline for the submission of proposals for the next meeting was 31 May 2002, two weeks before
the 14 June meeting.  He encouraged all delegations to try to meet the deadlines.
17. The representative of Norway said that, with respect to the proposal on Article 9.2, her
delegation agreed that exports from developing countries were often adversely affected by the
introduction of new SPS or TBT regulations to which they had difficulties adjusting.  Her
Government would continue to focus on such probl ems and is currently working on concrete projects
to see how the problems could be alleviated. She referred, in this context, to the meeting of the
Committee on Trade in Environment on 21 March 2002 at which her delegation had raised and
discussed this issue.  The first proposal had been with delegations for a long time and it had also beenissued as a formal WTO document.  Her delegation agreed, however, with the comments made by the
representative of the European Communities, who spoke of financial and budgetary constraints.
Committing Members to provide financial assistance through the WTO Agreements was not the
correct way to solve the problem.  The second part of the proposal, relating also to the TBT proposal,
was too far-reaching in its consequences and so c ould not be implemented.  Governments could not be
committed to provide exporting developing country Members with the technology that would
normally be in the hands of private companies in the importing developed countries.  She could not
understand how such a proposal could be implemented or who should judge whether, in the context of
commitments, technical assistance and technology transfer were sufficient.  Therefore her delegation
does not believe that committing Members through the WTO Agreements to provide relevantTN/CTD/M/3
Page 8
technology and technical facilities on preferential and non-commercial terms is not the solution to the
problem.  The solution was rather the consideration of other aspects of assistance and capacity-
building.
18. The representative of New Zealand said that it was useful that SPS provisions received early
attention in the S&D context.  His Government  had also experienced how important SPS measures
could be in terms of facilitating trade.  Like other delegations, he had only recently seen the proposals.
His Government's own practice might serve as an illustration.  It acknowledged the importance of
technical assistance in enabling developing countries better to cope with SPS requirements in markets.
It had been active in providing such technical assistance.  He knew from experience in a number of
Pacific Island countries that such assistance had been extremely effective and that it had offered real
commercial benefits to some of the countries concerned.  His Government believed that technical
assistance provided on agreement between two countries, on the basis of recipient country prioritiesand within an overall assistance programme, was the correct approach for trade-related SPS
assistance.  His guess was that Pakistan might have had access to the same sort of assistance.  If
Pakistan and other delegations sponsoring the proposal could elaborate on their own experience,
however, it might help other delegations to respond to the proposal submitted.  His delegation might
have the same difficulties as those outlined by the representative of Norway in considering how theproposal could be managed within the regular technical assistance framework.  The proposal seemed
to imply a carve-out for trade-related infrastruc ture assistance that his Government would find
difficult to manage.  Regarding the process itself he said that the Chairman had mentioned his hope
that proposals would have been available for the discussion at an earlier date.  He appreciated that
delegations were under pressure and were working to tight deadlines.  Nevertheless it was difficult torespond substantively to proposals unavailable before the meeting.  One specific idea that the
representative of Malaysia had raised in other meetings, which his delegation had endorsed, and
which he believed Committee secretaries were considering, was to ask for papers to be circulated to
delegations by e-mail if they were submitted close to the meeting for which they were intended.  Such
a system would have a number of advantages.  First, it would alert those delegates who were notchecking the website twice a day that new documents had become available.  Second, it would make
it easier to get these documents immediately through to capitals and so to give the officers in capitals
a chance to examine them and provide their comments, even if only a limited amount of time was
available to them.
19. The representative of Korea said that the two proposals from the ten delegations and the
12 delegations would facilitate discussions.  His delegation had not had sufficient time to examine the
proposals in depth.  However his remarks applied not only to Article 9.2 but also 10.1 and 10.3 of theSPS Agreement.  If it were made mandatory to provide technology transfers and technical facilities, as
well as to conduct consultations with all the developing countries prior to imposing SPS regulations or
other technical requirements vis-à-vis  developing countries, the provisions might effectively be
rendered unoperational with regards to developing country exports.  This would not be in line with the
objectives of those agreements and nor would it be in line with the mandate under which theCommittee was working, which was to make the provisions more operational.  Any side effects of the
proposed amendments would therefore need careful examination.  The conversion of non-binding
provisions into binding ones amounted to an amendment of the agreements concerned.  Unless a
change dealt with purely procedural aspects of the agreements, this normally meant a change in an
existing balance of rights and obligations among Members.  So the Committee needed to take acautious approach in fulfilling its mandate.  His Government was of the view that there was a need to
ensure that any alteration of any provision did not result in a substantial change in the way the
agreement concerned was being implemented.  By substantial change his Government meant a
situation where conversion would cause such conf usion as to make the provisions in question
unoperational vis-à-vis  developing countries.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 9
20. The representative of Chile said that the proposal on Article 9.2 was important with respect to
the provision of technical assistance for the appli cation of the SPS Agreement.  It was understood that
in order to be implemented the proposed change to the text, making it mandatory for developed
countries to provide technical assistance to developing countries , required important financial
investments.
21. The representative of India said that his delegation understood the spirit in which the
proposals by the African and LDCs groups had been made.  His delegation also recognized and
understood the reasoning behind the proposals.  His delegation had to study them further but could
support most of them and would participate constructively when they were taken up for discussion.
At the last meeting, on 9 April, his delegation had submitted some proposals for making mandatory
some of the S&D provisions which were currently non-mandatory.  These proposals related to
Article 3.5(j) of the Agreement on Importing Licen sing Procedures, Articles 10.2 and 10.4 of the SPS
Agreement, and Articles 4.1 and 21.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes.  He reconfirmed that these proposals were on the table and that his delegation
looked forward to substantive comments from Memb ers.  He explained that he had not sent the
document to the Secretariat for circulation among Members because of a misunderstanding.  Members
who had been present at the last meeting would reca ll that copies of the document had been circulated
to all the Members at that time.  Some comments  had been made at the meeting regarding the late
submission of the document.  His delegation admitted to having been somewhat late in its submission.
His delegation would attempt to meet the deadline for the next meeting.  He went on to address the
issue as to whether or not the document should carry the "TN" symbol.  His delegation's
understanding, following the decisions in the TN C in January/February 2002, was that the Special
Session of the CTD was a negotiating fora.  According to his recollection, paragraph 12 of the
Ministerial Declaration clearly stated that outstanding implementation issues were part of the
negotiations.  Making S&D provisions operational and effective had been on the table, a reality
reflected in the relevant documents brought out at the time of the Doha Ministerial Conference.  S&D
had there been identified as an outstanding implementation issue and he was certain that many of theother developing countries agreed with him in that regard.  S&D was a negotiating issue.  That was
why the decision regarding the establishment of the CTD Special Session was part of the TNC
decision, thus placing it clearly within the context of negotiations.  Some delegations had mentioned
that some of the proposals would involve amendments to agreements.  He confirmed that this was the
intention.  As the CTD Special Session was in negotiating mode his delegation was looking at the
issue in the context in which it had been considered in the run up to the Doha Ministerial Conference.
The existing WTO Agreements would be considered as part of the negotiations.    The proposals onS&D formed part of these negotiations and the possibility of subsequent amendments of already
existing agreements.  The Secretariat identified  the authoritative interpretation of the existing
provisions as an alternative way of proceeding.  Both approaches were possible.  His delegation
looked forward to considering the approach favoured among a majority of Members.
22. Mr Patrick Low, Director, Development and Economic Research Division said that the
symbol used on the documents for the Special Session was intended to reflect the fact that the
CTD Special Session had been established by the TNC.  It did not intend to prejudge the status of the
Special Session with respect to whether or not it was a negotiating body.  The Secretariat needed more
guidance on which symbol to choose if it were going to do anything other than what it had done
already which, according to the Secretariat, was simply to reflect that, without prejudging its status,the Special Session of the CTD came from the TNC.
23. The Chairman, in response to the statement by the Secretariat, suggested that it might be
necessary to hold consultations before the next meeting in order to address the issue of the document
symbol.  If Members agreed to proceed in this way the Committee could continue developing its
substantive comments on the proposals on the understanding that such consultations would beconducted before the next meeting.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 10
24. The representative of Australia said that the proposals before the Committee provided
delegations with a possibility to examine S&D more closely than had previously been possible.  His
delegation agreed on the need to consider ways to improve the effectiveness and utilization of S&D
provisions.  His delegation had not had enough time to study the specific proposals.  However, they
raised similar questions for his delegation, such as the open-ended funding nature of the SPS proposal,as those already mentioned by other delegations.  The work should be done in close cooperation with
other expert committees. There is a need for close involvement of the SPS Committee, especially in
relation to the discussion of SPS issues,
25. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation was one of the proponents of the
proposals presented by a group of developing countries.  He expressed his delegation's full support for
the points made by the Members who introduced the proposals.  His delegation looked forward to
receiving reactions to the proposals from other Members and hoped that the proposals wouldcontribute positively to the deliberations aimed at strengthening and making operational the S&D
provisions.
26. The representative of Switzerland said that his delegation acknowledged the fact that the CTD
had been instructed to review the S&D provisions .  From a procedural point of view, however, he
suggested that it perhaps made sense to consider proposals regarding S&D provisions for areas inwhich negotiations were under way in the respective negotiation bodies.  It would be essential to
consider the implications of making provisions mandatory and more effective from two angles.  First
in light of how they fitted into the agreement as a whole.  This appeared to be most efficiently
addressed by the experts on the agreement in questio n who would in any case also be the negotiators
on the agreement.  The second was the developmental angle.  It had to be considered whether theproposed change actually brought a benefit in terms of economic development.  In terms of analysis
and recommendations, the CTD would appear here to be at a comparative advantage.  Turning to the
proposals he said that his delegation, like others, had not had sufficient time to consult with capital.
He anticipated, however, that two questions relating to Article 9.2 of the SPS Agreement could be
raised.  One concerned the nature of the exact side effects of the proposal regarding Article 9.2.  Heasked whether the proposal meant that, if his Government had to take some SPS action, it would be
forbidden from doing so on the grounds that it had provided insufficient technical assistance.  Second,
he asked as to exactly which countries were concerned.  It was not clear whether the proposal related
to all developing countries or only certain groups of developing countries.
27. The representative of Argentina said that the proposal by the delegation of Pakistan and the
other co-sponsors touched upon a vital aspect of the SPS Agreement.  His Government was still
considering the proposal.  As had been explained by the representative from Pakistan, he believed thatthe first step in dealing with the issue and the proposal was to address a real problem faced by
developing countries, that of market access.  Developing countries often suffered from not being able
to accede to markets where new SPS measures had been imposed.  Developing countries often lacked
the technological and financial means to comply with new measures or standards.  He had heard
representatives of various delegations say that the issue had to be examined in light of what thecollateral effects might be of rendering the article mandatory and in light of the effects on financing
and transfer of technology.  The possible future effects had to be examined in light of the present
situation.  The existing provisions had real and concrete effects in that they forced developing
countries to make efforts to comp ly with sanitary and phytosanitary measures in order to maintain
their market access.  The current negative effects for developing countries should therefore be used asthe starting-point, the perspective from which the provisions should be analyzed.  It was the
developed countries who had the technical capacity to provide technical assistance.  Furthermore,
with regard to the second paragraph in the proposal presented by the delegation of Pakistan and the
co-sponsoring delegations, the possible financial impact, taking into account present financial
implications with regard to SPS measures and future SPS standards for the exports of developingcountries, had also to be evaluated.  The proposal focussed on a real and concrete problem and notTN/CTD/M/3
Page 11
only on possible future effects.  The focus should be kept on the real effects of the proposals and
provisions.
28. The representative of Cuba said that her delegation was one of the co-sponsors of the
proposals and that her delegation supports all of the elements therein.  She quoted from the document
approved on 1 February by the Trade Negotiations Committee1 whereby "The review of all special
and differential treatment provisions with a view to strengthening them and making them more
precise, effective and operational provided for in paragraph 44 of the Ministerial Declaration shall be
carried out by the Committee on Trade and Development in Special Sessions".  The Special Session
of the CTD should therefore be considered as the appropriate forum in which to discuss S&D.  There
were also specific conditions for the review, as recommended by the Ministers.  The proposals had
been presented late and she therefore understood that some delegations required more time to reflect
on them.
29. The representative of Venezuela said that her delegation agreed with the interpretation of the
representative of Cuba regarding the conditions under which the Special Session of the CTD was
discussing S&D.  The outstanding implementation issues from the Doha Ministerial Conference were
to be the subject of negotiations.  Regarding the proposal by the delegation of Pakistan and others on
Article 9.2 of the SPS Agreement, her delegation understood its motives and reasoning and supportedthese.  The proposal fitted perfectly with the objectives of the SPS Agreement.  Although the SPS
Agreement recognized the importing country's right to impose SPS measures, existing trade flows,
and particularly the participation of developing countries in import markets, had nevertheless to be
preserved.  Her delegation had taken note of the limitations mentioned by those delegations arguing
the needs of importers and suggested that here the discussions should continue.  The proposal withrespect to Article 10.3 was also entirely within the objectives of the SPS Agreement.  It was clear that
many developing countries had encountered delicate problems in the implementation of this
Agreement and it was only natural that the Committee, in the light of these difficulties, would
authorize time extensions for compliance.
30. The representative of the United States submitted that delegations were not in negotiating
mode in the Special Session of the CTD.  She recognized that the TNC provided for a Special
Session.  In so doing, however, the TNC distingu ished the CTD Special Session from those bodies
that had been given a specifically negotiating remit.  The Director-General, as Chair of the TNC, had
also mentioned in his remarks at the meeting of 24 April 2002, that the report by the Chairman of the
CTD Special Session would be without prejudice to the position of any Member on the nature of the
Special Session of the CTD.  Her delegation looked forward to the Chairman's consultations on this
issue.
31. The representative of Canada said that on this point the views of its delegation concurred with
those stated by the representative of the United States.  She was prepared to abstain from engaging in
a debate on this topic for the time being although her arguments were ready in anticipation of the
Chairman's decision to take up the issue separately.  She requested, however, that all delegations
agree with the decision to take it up separately.
32. The representative of Pakistan said that his delegation was not pleased with the reaction
received on the proposal that his and other delegations had submitted.  He looked forward to a
substantive discussion of the proposal in the coming days.  Unless the perspective of the developed
country delegations changed in relation to the pr oposal, their views would not satisfy its sponsors.
Paragraph 2 of the Doha Development Agenda mentioned the need to put the developing countries atthe heart of the WTO work programme, bringing the issue of development to its core.  Much of the
Doha Development Agenda related to technical assistance.  There was a commitment by Ministers to
                                                     
1 TN/C/1.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 12
put it at the heart of the work programme.  The sponsors of the proposal only asked for a commitment
with respect to the SPS Agreement.  The representative of Argentina rightly pointed out that the real
problem was one of market access.  The present language of the Article ensured an obligation only "to
consider". It contained no obligation to provide assistance to the developing countries:  assistance
sorely needed in view of their lack of infrastructu re, technical, and financial capabilities.  This was
where the real problem lay.  An acceptance of the proposal would contribute to enhancing the
confidence of developing countries and LDCs in the system as well as in the Doha Development
Agenda as a whole.  In response to a question raised by one delegation, he said that the proposal
would contribute to a better participation of the developing countries in the system.  In addition to the
enhancing confidence in the system among the developing countries it would also demonstrate that
the developed countries were serious about addressing the needs of the developing countries.  The
developing countries and the LDCs needed more technical assistance in areas where they were facingspecific difficulties - not in the areas in which the developed countries had an interest and in which
they were pushing developing countries to enter into new obligations.  Developing countries did not
need much technical assistance in these areas.  They needed technical assistance in the areas in which
they already had obligations.  For the Doha Development Agenda to be credible there had to be a
clear commitment to provide technical assistance in the areas where developing country Members hadreal market access problems.  In response to the statement that the proposal was an open-ended
funding proposal he said that it was not.  If it were agreed that the specific problems of a specific
developing country in a specific product should be addressed, this could not be construed as an open-
ended funding proposal.  The exporters in his country had problems exporting fruits and vegetables to
certain markets.  These exporters needed technical assistance from those countries imposingstandards.  With the exception of a research plant which failed to result in any additional exports, it
had been years since exporters from his country had last received meaningful technical assistance.
33. The representative of China added his delegation's voice to that of some previous speakers in
saying that the nature of the work of the Special Session of the CTD was per se  a negotiating process
because it was within the framework and under the guidance of the Trade Negotiating Committee.  Itwas the Trade Negotiating Committee itself which had given the Special Session of the CTD the
mandate to negotiate.  Otherwise it would not have been necessary to put the Special Session under
the TNC.  In addition, the work of changing non-mandatory provisions into mandatory ones and
making the S&D provisions more precise, effective and operational was per se  a negotiating process
without which it would be impossible even to make the non-mandatory provisions mandatory.  In
order to make effective and operational those provisions currently lacking in precision, there had to be
negotiations.  If Article 9.2 of the SPS Agreement were not made mandatory as suggested in theproposal by India, Pakistan and other developing Members, it would be impossible for the developing
countries fully to implement the SPS Agreement well and this, in turn, would affect their market
access.  Finally, without a satisfactory solution to the problems that the developing countries face in
relation to S&D and other important issues, the entire negotiating process of the Doha Development
Agenda would be difficult.  In addition it would be impossible for the Round to be a DevelopmentRound.
34. The representative of Japan said that certain developing countries had expressed the
sentiments that it was necessary to make the particular articles of the SPS Agreement mandatory and
that it was necessary for developed country delegations to commit to extend technical cooperation to
those countries facing difficulties in that area.  He said that the developing country delegations shouldask their capitals to come forward with their requ ests for technical cooperation for the coming couple
of years.  After such requests had been receiv ed from the developing countries they would be
processed.  That was how the developed countries operated.  Therefore he did not believe that there
was a lack of commitment to extend the necessary technical assistance in response to requests
received from developing countries.  The collection of requests from developing countries did notexclude any area.  If developing countries felt in need of technical assistance in a field such as that of
the SPS Agreement, they were free to register their request.  If the debate were limited to one area ofTN/CTD/M/3
Page 13
the WTO's work the scope of technical assistance would be limited.  However there are many other
forms of technical cooperation and capacity building mechanisms outside the WTO.  The WTO is
developing a database in cooperation with the OECD  (DAC).  This database would enable developing
countries to build up a picture of what had been implemented and what would be implemented in the
future.  His delegation wished to avoid such sentiments as those expressed by certain developingcountries that, in not wishing to make the particular SPS Article mandatory, developed countries
displayed a lack of commitment to technical cooperation.
35. The representative of the United States said that she had already mentioned that her
delegation was not prepared to discuss the proposals introduced because of the inadequate period of
time that had been available in which to scrutinize them.  Her delegation was concerned, however, to
avoid an unnecessary drama over issues that had not been properly discussed:  there needed to be a
fuller discussion of specific case examples and of what had already been done in such cases.  It wouldbe difficult to justify a response to the proposals without such an exercise having been undertaken.
Her delegation had circulated a document in the SPS Committee (G/SPS/GEN/181) which concerned
the technical assistance that her Government had been providing to developing countries.  That
document listed a number of projects which had been carried out in the SPS area.  These projects were
not listed in a comprehensive way, however, and numerous other projects remained ongoing.  Someof these projects included infrastructure management in practical areas such as exiting port operations
in Venezuela, a number of training programmes in  Africa, an SPS distance learning programme and
an introduction of international SPS measures, approval of a process for importing plants, animals and
related products into the United States in the Caribbean, hurricane reconstruction assistance in Central
America and the Caribbean, others involving Nicaragua, Russia, Estonia, China, Latvia, Lithuania,Chile, and the APEC region.  Almost every region was covered and nor were these projects exclusive
to WTO Members – they also included countries in accession.  Her Government was serious about
ensuring that technical assistance was made and that developing countries thereby gained necessary
experience.  But it might be helpful for her Government to know what the specific problems were so
that then it could do better.  It seemed odd to request governments to tell their budget entities that theyare under an obligation impossible to meet.  The objective was to make the provision more effective
and operational.  The way to do this was first to reach an understanding of the specific case problems.
She noted that a number of developing countries were doing business with each other.  She therefore
asked if the obligations proposed were the type of obligations that developing countries wished to
impose on each other.  The provision itself did not restrict its analysis to importing developed
countries.  It also included developing countries.  There had been many debates in the WTO and other
fora about the amount of South-South trade and how beneficial that trade was to the economicdevelopment of developing countries.
36. The representative of Malaysia said that he hoped that the lack of responses to the proposal
and the reference to its late submission was not an attempt to delay the process or the discussion on
the proposals before the Committee.  However, he did not believe this to be the case.  His delegation
was concerned with the process.  Delegations were even discussing the symbol of the document.However, this should be the least interesting issu e, especially bearing in mind the definite timeframe
of July 2002 after which the Committee is supposed to present its recommendations to the General
Council.  The clarification by the Secretariat with respect to the symbol was good and should be
quickly accepted so that energy and resources can then be devoted to the substantive discussions on
the proposals.  A second point of concern was that some delegations had the perception thatdiscussions on S&D did not entail negotiations.  This was surprising as when the implementation
issues had been dealt with, over the last three to four years, it had been said that the issues required
negotiations and therefore had to wait until delegations were actually in negotiations.  The launching
of a new round of negotiations had been agreed at the Doha Ministerial Conference.  It was therefore
strange to hear that S&D was a matter that did not call for negotiations.  The mandate given byMinisters to the CTD spoke of reviewing, strengthening, and making effectively operational S&D
provisions. Obviously implies the introduction of changes.  The objective should be to address theTN/CTD/M/3
Page 14
proposals and if there are difficulties in agreeing to them then other options should be considered.  It
should be in this spirit that the Committee proceeds with its discussions on the subject.  Finally, one
or two delegations had stated that it would be appropriate to have some of the proposals sent out to the
relevant Committees.  The CTD has a definite deadline of 31 July 2002.  He was therefore concerned
that if a process of sending out the proposals to other committees were to be followed, it might bedifficult to rationalize such a process in order to meet the CTD deadline.  If delegations agreed that
the CTD was indeed the appropriate forum for discussion, it would seem fitting, especially for the
major delegations who appeared to experience most difficulty with the proposals put forward by the
developing countries, to invite their own experts to contribute to the CTD.
37. The Chairman said that the Committee had agreed  that proposals would be put forward in the
areas that had been identified for discussion.  The present predominant objective was to see concrete
reactions, including requests for more information if necessary, in response to the various proposals.
38. The representative of New Zealand said that his delegation shared the sense of urgency
expressed by the representative of Malaysia in relation to meeting the July deadline and had come
prepared substantively to discuss the proposals that he thought were going to be on the table at the
meeting, namely those tabled by the delegation of India at the last meeting.  On the question of
referral to other committees, he shared the concerns expressed by others about the involvement ofSPS experts.  It made sense to continue to work as far as possible in the CTD on the basis of detailed
briefings that could be used issue-by-issue by delegates who were not themselves experts in the field.
However, delegations might collectively wish to note a possible need, as the deadline approached, to
bring in their respective technical experts.  And once delegations are involved in serious discussion on
some of those points they may feel that they have reached the limit of how far the officers responsiblefor the CTD can go.
39. The representative of India said that the representative Japan had pointed out that a series of
technical cooperation activities had been planned by the Secretariat based on demands put forward by
developing countries.  No delegation disputed th at.  These demands had been put forward in the
context of what was contained in the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  That Declaration identifiedspecific areas in which technical cooperation would be provided, such as in the area of investment,
where it was meant to assist delegations better to understand the implications of a multilateral
investment agreement .  The proposals for technical cooperation and the requests for it had been made
in that context.  What the co-sponsoring delegations were attempting to address through the proposal
regarding Article 9.2 of the SPS Agreement was a specific problem relating to a specific provision of
the SPS Agreement which could not be dealt with through the technical assistance programme funded
from the Global Trust Fund.  Second, the Japanese delegation had always maintained that the WTOwas not a development organization and that the technical assistance provided by the WTO should be
limited to providing training for personnel.  Turnin g to the point made by the representative of the
United States, he noted that the representative of the United States had listed technical assistance
activities provided by her Government.  His delegation appreciated these efforts despite the fact that
his country's name had not figured in the list read out.  She had effectively put across the difficultiesfaced by developing countries.  The reason why hi s Government had approached the Government of
the United States about technical assistance was because his Government faced a problem.  The fact
that many delegations did request technical assistance proves that there are serious problems to be
addressed in the S&D process.  What was said in the proposal was that the current Article only states
that countries "should consider" providing technica l assistance.  But there is no guarantee that a
request would lead to any actual assistance.  The co-sponsors of the proposal wished to receive
assurance on this score.  That is why they propose that this particular phrase be changed to "shall
provide", which would give an indication of finality in terms of the expected outcome of a request.
This was the spirit in which the proposal had been put forward.  The representative of the
United States also requested details of all the problems faced.  There was no need to go into detail asthe Government of the United States had apparently been providing that type of technical assistanceTN/CTD/M/3
Page 15
already.  This must have given them an idea of what the problems are.  The representative of Pakistan
mentioned that Pakistani exporters had problems exporting vegetables and fruits to certain countries.
They had tackled the problem by asking, over a period of many years, for technical assistance.  Their
request had not met with any response.  This was the sort of problem that the co-sponsors had had in
mind when putting forward their proposal.
40. The representative of the United States referred delegations to document G/SPS/GEN/181,
where India was mentioned on page 14 and where some  of the assistance provided by the Government
of the United States with respect to CODEX activities was listed.  Another reference in that document
concerned the work done in the South Asia region, which included India.  The WTO Secretariat was
in the process of establishing a database which would compile not just what the Government of the
United States was providing, but also what other bilateral donors and multilateral institutions were
providing.  The establishment of such a database would provide delegations with a knowledge of theactual facts rather than making changes based simply on generalisations.  Her delegation made these
points because it was sensitive to the issue:  it did not wish to be operating in conflict with its other
responsibilities.  As her delegation was refraining from prejudging the exact nature of the review,
whether delegations were engaged in a negotiation or not, it would refrain from further comments on
what the exact language should be.  Nevertheless, changing "consider" into a "shall" obligationseemed strange.  She observed that when she went to university she would have wished to see a
"shall" clause when she filled out a grant form requesting student aid from the United States
Government.  She was confused about why and in what way the "shall" would actually increase the
amount of assistance to developing countries and resolve their specific SPS problems when she
thought that delegations were actually involved in a process to revamp and enhance all WTOtechnical assistance provided and  to inform delegations of the provisions made available.  Her
delegation encouraged other delegations to review the material supplied and to inform her
Government if there was anything it could do better.  Such changes could then be introduced prior to
her Government engaging in any kind of negotiation or amendment.  As some delegations had
mentioned, the bottom line was market access and the type of information and assistance necessaryfor developing countries to be able to operate under the agreements.
41. The representative of the European Communities said that the discussions were valuable as
they helped his delegation to clarify how they wished to address the exercise.  The proposal before the
Committee had much in common with how his own delegation considered the issue.  Delegations had
returned, however, to the question of whether or not making a decision mandatory meant making it
more effective.  His delegation supported those delegations that had pointed out that the SPS and TBT
standards issue was important and that the problems were real.  The European Community and itsMember States carried out a large amount of technical assistance.  It was technically accurate to argue
that the provision which stated "shall consider" was actually implemented.  His delegation did much
"considering".  There were several bilateral efforts in addition to the efforts under the Trust Fund.
Developing countries which had spoken were probably right to say that more could be done, however,
even though it would be good to have a closer look at the facts.  More could always be done.  The real
problem was how to achieve more and better technical assistance in the SPS fields so that developing
countries could meet the standards which they were asked to meet.  One proposal tabled suggested to
make it an obligation to pay compensation once a problem had been identified. Given the budgetary
implications and the way that such an obligation would operate, he was sceptical as to whether this
was the right answer to the question.  If somebody identified a problem there would immediately bean obligation to pay.  But this could not be easily accomplished.  He suggested that it might be better
to get back to the real problem of how the providers of technical assistance could do more and better.
If the Government of India had been disappointed so far, his delegation would attempt to do better so
as not to disappoint the developing countries in the future.  This was the type of discussion that
delegations should have and he agreed with those who had requested more factual background.  Thenew database would provide such data.  Developing countries would be able to inform the providers
of technical assistance in which areas they had requested technical assistance without receiving it andTN/CTD/M/3
Page 16
why they still wished to get it, and the technical assistance providers would consider what they could
do about it.  If there was an obligation or a change in the SPS Agreement which would facilitate
provision of technical assistance and give more urgency to it, his delegation would be open to its
discussion.  It would be difficult to turn it into a legal obligation, however, to be triggered by the
identification of certain problems.  This would be to set a precedent.  And no government wouldactually wish to be faced by that sort of automaticity.  The problem is nevertheless a real one and his
delegation expressed itself willing to consider the solutions.  This, in his view, is what the debate
should focus on.
42. The Chairman said that the comments made by  the European Communities fitted well into the
three indents which the Committee was discussing; provisions which Members believe should be
made mandatory, consideration of inputs on the legal and practical implications of making
non-mandatory provisions mandatory, and the identification of how provisions might be made moreprecise, effective and operational.  As indicated at the outset, Members were free to make comments
on any of these indents in discussing the proposals submitted.  The Committee had had an extensive
initial exchange of views although it was clear that further discussions of the proposal were necessary.
The next proposal related to Article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement and was to be introduced by the
representative of Egypt.  He recalled that there were three remaining proposals under the SPSAgreement, one on Article 10.3 to be introduced by the representative of Pakistan and two proposals
relating to SPS Articles 10.2 and 10.4. which had been introduced at the last meeting by the
delegation of India.
43. The representative of Egypt said that she wished to present a proposal submitted by a number
of developing countries including her delegation to make more effective and operational Article 10.1
of the SPS Agreement.  Experience had revealed that exports from developing countries had been
affected by those SPS measures in place in the developed countries.  This in itself ,despite its
legitimacy, hindered the flow of developing country exports.  The Agreement on SPS recognized and
further mandated Members to take account of the special needs of developing countries.  That
mandate had not, however, secured the effectiveness and the operation of that article in a way thatcould help developing countries achieve their development policy objectives.  The co-sponsors of the
proposal were of the view that the language of that Article should be amended in such a way that it
would deliver the required trade benefits for de veloping countries and LDCs through maintaining,
inter alia , the current levels of exports and raising the technical capacities of developing countries to
conform with the proposed measures.  In that re gard, the sponsors proposed that the following
language be added to Article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement:  "If an exporting developing country
Member identifies specific problems in complying with a sanitary or phytosanitary measures of animporting developed country Member, the latter sha ll upon request enter into consultations with a
view to finding a mutually satisfactory solution.  In this regard, such special needs shall include:
securing and enhancing current levels of exports from developing and least developed country
members, maintain their market shares in thei r export markets, as well as developing their
technological and infrastructural capabilities.  While notifying a measure, Members shall, inter-alia ,
indicate the following:  (i)  systems and/or equivalent systems that could be used to comply with such
a measure;  (ii)  the names of the developing and least-developed country Members that could be
affected by the applied measure."  This addition would make the operation of the Article more
effective.
44. The representative of Chile said that each proposal had to be analysed on the basis of the
collateral effects it would have, not only for developing countries, but also among developing
countries.  There were two elements in the first paragraph of the proposal with respect to Article 10.2
of the SPS Agreement.  The first related to the drawing up of sanitary measures and the second to
their application.  The proposal focussed on the application of these measures.  A mechanism was
presented which was almost a legal mechanism for making the system operational through acceleratedconsultations once specific needs had been identified.  The aim of these consultations was to findTN/CTD/M/3
Page 17
mutually satisfactory solutions.  His delegation questioned whether going through legal measures was
the right way of finding solutions to the specific problems that exporting developing countries faced
when entering the markets of developed countries.  His delegation found both the suggested
"consultations" and the suggested "mutually satisfactory solution" problematic and asked what would
happen if a mutually satisfactory solution could not be found.  The proposal might then lead to legalsolutions which would have other effects upon the SPS Agreement.
45. The representative of Cuba requested a modification to the Spanish text.  The proposal
referred to a case in which an exporting developing country identified specific problems in complying
with the sanitary and phytosanitary measures of an importing developed country Member.  The
Spanish translation, however, referred to an exporting developed country Member.  This
mistranslation could pose a problem as Spanish speaking delegations would have difficulty
understanding exactly what the proposal meant.
46. The representative of Norway said that there was a real problem in that developing countries
lacked, inter alia , the administrative, technical, infrastructural and financial capacities to comply with
SPS measures in developed countries.  It was im portant that technical assistance focused on these
problems in order to attempt to surmount them.  Her delegation questioned whether the proposal
should be put into practice.  An importing country could not be obliged to secure and enhance exportsfrom other countries in disregard of its own national legislation under the SPS Agreement.  In
addition, committing to the maintenance of market shares, as was proposed, would imply agreement
to manage trade through a quota system.  Her delegation agreed, however, that efforts should be made
to assist developing countries to comply with the SPS measures.  With respect to notification her
delegation asked whether a list of countries that could be affected by measures applied would coveronly the status quo or whether it would also include potential exporters.  The latter would go far
beyond the scope of any reasonable notification requirement.  If it only covered present exporting
countries, however, such assistance could be discussed further.
47. The representative of New Zealand said that his delegation had always regarded the SPS
Agreement as one of the landmark achievements of the Uruguay Round from the point of view of
exporters of agricultural products, without distinction between developed and developing countries.
As New Zealand had many major exporters of agricultural products his Government had been
conscious of the value of the SPS Agreement in bringing predictability of access to those products.
The Agreement also seemed to operate without a great deal of discrimination in terms of trade,
whether it was North-South, South-North or South-S outh.  The first paragraph of the proposal related
specifically to exports from developing countries to developed countries.  As drafted, it would only
impose an obligation on developed countries to enter into consultations with a view to finding amutually satisfactory solution.  He asked the co-sponsors of the proposal how they regarded this in
relation to some of the issues that arose in relation to South-South trade:  a particularly important
issue given the widely varying stages of developm ent amongst developing countries and the size of
some developing country markets for the produc ts in question.  He agreed with the concerns
expressed by the representative of Norway regarding the reference, in the second paragraph of theproposal relating to Article 10.2, to the maintenance of market share.  This was not a concept with
which his delegation felt comfortable and it did not belong in the WTO.  His delegation would resist
any move in such a direction.  Finally, the c oncept of making obligatory a call to enter into
consultations with a view to finding a mutually satisfactory solution was one that his delegation had
been able to accept in 2001 when it had been raised in the context of the lead-in period for new SPSmeasures.  An agreement was recorded as Paragraph 3.1 of the Decision on Implementation-Related
Issues and Concerns.  He questioned whether the same approach, a legally binding obligation to enter
into consultations with a view to finding a mutua lly satisfactory solution, was appropriate in the case
of Article 10.1.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 18
48. The representative of the United States said that when discussing issued related to
"developing countries" her delegation recognized the lack of a specific definition.  Some of the
assistance provided by her delegation related to transition economies and other types of countries in
need.  And in general when the S&D provisions were used there was still a need to bridge the gap
between the nature of the text and interpretation by those who would be its beneficiaries, withoutprejudice to views on how to define the respective be neficiaries in light of the specific provisions.
49. The Chairman said that a number of specific questions had been raised regarding Article 10.1
of the SPS Agreement.  The delegation of Chile had raised some concerns and questions regarding the
requirement for consultations towards a mutually satisfactory solution as had the representative of
New Zealand.  The delegations of New Zealand and No rway had also raised a number of issues which
he asked the sponsors to reflect on and possibly respond to.
3. Article 10.3 of the SPS Agreement
50. The representative of Pakistan said that Article 10.3 of the SPS Agreement had been included
in the SPS Agreement on the specific request of the developing countries.  This provision recognized
the possibility that the developing countries would not be able fully to comply with the provisions of
the SPS Agreement even after the expiry of any transition period which might be granted.  However
sentence 1, line 2, of the provision stated that "… the Committee is enabled to grant to such countries,upon request, specified, time-limited exceptions in whole or in part from obligations under this
Agreement, taking into account their financial, tr ade and development needs."  One reading of this
text suggests that the provision enables the SPS Committee to grant such exceptions whereas such
exceptions might only rarely be granted in reality.  Although Members might face problems in
complying with the Agreement's obligations, few would make such a request because of therecommendatory language of the provision.  The co-sponsors of the proposal suggested that, in order
to make the provision mandatory, the word "shall" be inserted in place of "is enabled".  The Article
would then read:  "With a view to ensuring that developing country Members are able to comply with
the provisions of this Agreement, the Committee shall grant to such countries, upon request…".  In
granting such exceptions the Committee should also  take into account the development needs of the
Members.  If such a change were to be accepted by Members it would render the provision
purposeful, operative and mandatory, and would send the signal that the developing countries' needs
were being taken into consideration.
51. The representative of Chile said that the fact that the SPS Committee was enabled to authorize
exceptions to countries in difficulties in order fo r them to comply with th eir commitments meant that
the SPS Committee was free to grant or not grant such exceptions.  If the wording was changed it
would mean that only the fact that a Member requested an exception would lead to that exceptionbeing authorized.  It should be clear what the exact scope of such a change would be given that no
analysis is provided.  He asked whether it meant that the SPS Committee would act on or only support
the requests.
52. The representative of New Zealand said that the proposal with respect to Article 10.3 of the
SPS Agreement was sweeping in its scope.  It would have the effect, as far as he understood it, of
depriving the SPS Committee of its discretion to decline or to approve a request put forward by a
developing country Member.  This would have the practical effect of releasing a developing country
Member from its obligations under the SPS Agreement.  He did not expect his Government to be able
to go along with such a sweeping proposal.  He said  that it would be useful if the proponents could
explain the underlying objective and then give other delegations more detail as to how it mightoperate in practice.  The proposal would have to be substantially modified in order to be taken
seriously.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 19
53. The representative of Malaysia said that some delegations had mentioned that the proposal
would deprive the SPS Committee of its discretion to reject requests.  The duration of exceptions
would, however, be limited in time.  The length of the exception granted to requesting Members was a
form of discretion.  If the exception requested was important and pressing to the Member requesting
it, the SPS Committee might grant it for a longer time-period.  In a case where the problem of therequesting Member was considered less important, however, the time-frame for the exception could
be shorter.  So the SPS Committee would to some extent have the discretion to consider requests on a
case-by-case basis.
54. The representative of Canada said that, when considering the utilization made of the proposal
(document WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4), she had no ted that no request had been made for the
use of Article 10.3 of the SPS Agreement.  Her delegation wondered whether this was a sign of the
fact that countries had not yet considered it necessary to make use of the Article.
55. The representative of Japan said that his delegation shared the concern raised by the
representative of Canada.  He asked why, when no Member had attempted to use the Article in the
past, could delegations assume that the Article was not operational and state that there was a need to
change it.
56. The representative of United States said that her delegation concurred with the last
intervention made by the representative of Canada.  She also reiterated her delegation's concern that
the Committee had not yet had any full discussion of the utilization of the provisions.  Her delegation
would, at the end of the meeting, table a proposal for the next meeting.  This proposal would concern
utilization and the document that her delegation had circulated in the Committee concerning the
Secretariat's text on utilization.
57. The representative of the European Communities said that Article 14 of the SPS Agreement
had given rather specific derogations for developing countries and LDCs at the time when the
Agreement had been adopted.  The real question was whether the proposed change to the Article
could really be said to be in the best interests of developing countries.  If the ultimate aim was to
integrate developing countries into the System and to level the playing field for all others who did notwish to face discriminatory or more trade-restrictive than necessary SPS barriers, the way forward
might not be through the proposed use of wholesale exceptions.  Rather the opposite, perhaps.  It was
to consider the situation case-by-case and assist individual Members to apply the rules appropriately
so as to create a level playing field for trade.  The proposed change would not be an incentive to do
that.
58. The representative of Norway said that the ar gument made for the change in the proposal did
not show whether the current provision did in fact restrict  the possibility of developing countries to
get such exceptions.  One of the reasons for the provision not having been utilized, might be the
possibility of a negative impact on the exports of any Member using such an exception.  It is therefore
important to understand why the provision had not been utilized.
59. The representative of Pakistan said that the basis for the proposal was that it should be
expected that a developing country would request exceptions only as and when it had genuine
difficulties.  With respect to the scope of the amendm ent, he said that the replacement of the words "is
enabled" by "shall" was not intended to exempt developing countries from the examination to be
conducted by the SPS Committee.  The intention was rather that the SPS Committee should undertake
a review or examination on a case-by-case basis and should grant an exemption, taking into account
the development needs of the developing country in question, unless there were compelling reasonsnot to do so.  There would be an examination by the SPS Committee.  No waiver was being sought on
that account.  What was being sought, however, was the assurance that, if the developing country had
cogent grounds to justify its request for an exception, it would be granted one.  He said that he hadTN/CTD/M/3
Page 20
explained the reason for the current non-utilization of the provision in his introduction.  The
non-utilization was due to the recommendatory nature of the provision.  If developing country
Members had the assurance that, once approved, they would be granted an exemption, the utilization
would probably be more encouraging.
60. The Chairman said that this intervention had made  clear that in some respects the language of
the proposal might need to be looked at.  The Committee ended its preliminary exchange of views on
Article 10.3 of the SPS Agreement.
4. Article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement
61. The representative of the United States said that the preliminary comments her delegation had
made at the previous meeting were still valid.  At the heart of any discussion of SPS, however, was
the Members' overarching concern for the protection of human health.  Making mandatory S&D
provisions which would delay the implementation of SPS measures would affect the overall balanceof the Agreement, the goal of which was the protec tion of human health.  The provisions could not be
considered out of context.  They had to be seen in relation to their links to the rest of the Agreement.
Putting aside those overriding concerns, her delegation believed that it would not be appropriate for
the Special Session to consider a proposal to rewrite a decision which had been agreed to by Ministers
only six months earlier.  The proposal revised the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues andConcerns taken at the Doha Ministerial Conference.  Her delegation was of the view that although the
Special Session was engaged in the exercise, any proposal for longer timeframes for the introduction
of new sanitary or phytosanitary measures had ultimately to be addressed by the appropriate
specialists in the SPS Committee.
62. The representative of New Zealand said that his delegation had reservations about simply
converting provisions that read "should" into mandatory provisions with the word "shall".  The
particular proposal relating to the revision of Article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement was an illustration of
the limitations of any approach that sought to make S&D provisions more precise or effective simply
by a change of word to make it mandatory.  A fundamental feature of the SPS Agreement was that it
recorded a Member's sovereign right to determine the appropriate level of protection.  Accordingly,and regardless of whether or not a duty was expressed with the word "shall", the phrase "where the
appropriate level of SPS protection allows" would still seem to allow Members sufficient flexibility to
determine for themselves when the circumstances wo uld be such that they should accord a longer
timeframe for developing countries.  It was his delegation's assessment that, in terms of benefit to
developing countries, changing the word "should" to "shall" would have only a rather limited effect.
With respect to the value of the longer timeframe s, his delegation had detected in the proposal a
presumption that longer timeframes were genera lly to the advantage of developing countries.
However it was more complicated than that.  Many new SPS measures could, in practice, be trade-
facilitating rather than trade-limiting.  One illustration of this being that it was possible that an
importing Member could introduce conditions for the importation of a commodity from a wider range
of countries than from which it had previously taken the product.  If, in such an instance, there was a
mandatory delay for developing countries, this seeming to be the implication of the proposal,developing countries could find themselves denied access to new markets.
63. The representative of Norway said that when her delegation had considered the Secretariat
paper on changing non-mandatory provisions into mandatory ones, it had felt that it could consider
supporting a change from "should" to "shall" in the context of Article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement, as
long as the interpretation of "normally" was not altered.  The proposal was made on two levels,however.  Her delegation did not wish to reopen a negotiated text after such a short time.  Delegations
first had to be given the time necessary to evaluate the possible positive or negative effects of the
Ministerial text agreed to at the Doha Ministerial Conference.  The word "normally" was important.
Acute situations did come up and Governments needed the safety net of being able to implementTN/CTD/M/3
Page 21
measures at once and without making any special treatment for anyone.  Her Government needed that
sort of possibility to protect its population and most Governments needed it against health and
environmental hazards.  Her delegation is therefore reluctant to change what had been agreed upon at
the Doha Ministerial Conference.
64. The representative of Pakistan said that Article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement remained one of
the most important provisions in the SPS Agreement.  It sought to address one of the most critical
areas of difficulty faced by the developing countries, namely compliance with new SPS measures
introduced by the importing trading partners.  Developing countries had repeatedly stated that the
introduction of new SPS measures had often resulted in a complete blockade of their exports since
developing countries most often did not have the technical know-how and financial capacity
immediately to put in place new systems in conformity with SPS measures adopted by the developed
countries.  This was the reason why developing countries requested additional time for compliance:their exports would otherwise be impeded by the introduction of new measures.  During the last few
years experience of SPS Agreement implementation has unfortunately shown that developing country
exporters were rarely given the necessary additional timeframes in order to comply with new SPS
measures.  The introduction of new measures had, as a result, become synonymous with the loss,
although temporary, of certain export markets.  One of the main reasons for the non-use of the
provision was the general, recommendatory nature of the exhortation to give additional time to
developing country exporters.  This is probably why the delegation of India has put forward its
proposal to make the provision mandatory:  the real benefits of the recommendatory exhortation given
in that provision might then be provided to the developing countries.  His delegation supported a
favourable consideration of this proposal.
65. The representative of Argentina pointed out that Members had the sovereign right to set the
appropriate level of protection for themselves under the SPS Agreement.  The S&D provisions should
not affect their right to protect the health of their citizens.  But when a Member raised what it
considered to be its appropriate level of protection, it had to provide developing countries with
sufficient time to adapt to this change.  The time- limit of 6 months had to take into account not only
the time taken to apply a measure but also the fa ct that agriculture and most food commodities are
dependent upon a one-year cycle.  If appropriate level of protection in a Member country were going
to change, therefore, this change should be acknow ledged directly but only gradually introduced:  a
gradual introduction of such a change would at least allow the exporters of the developing countries
the necessary time in which to adapt.  This time-period would be symmetrical to the importing
country's right to raise its level of protection.  The situation would be eased with technical assistance
which would assist the developing countries to adapt more easily to the appropriate levels ofprotection.  Some emergency measures, depending on the sanitary position of the country, might still
need to be considered.  Nevertheless, when an importing country raises its appropriate level of
protection it must allow sufficient time for the exporting developing countries smoothly to adapt to
this change.
66. The representative of Venezuela said that the proposal from the delegation of India was
positive as the objective was to protect the existing flows of trade.  It was therefore in line with the
goals of the multilateral trade system.  No decision taken at the Doha Ministerial Conference had
solved the problem of the uncertainty regarding the time-limit that would be given to developing
countries to allow them to adapt to new standards.
67. The representative of Cuba said that his delegation considered Article 10.2 of the
SPS Agreement to be one of its most important clauses .  It addressed a critical area where developing
countries were often faced with great difficulty in complying with new sanitary and phytosanitary
measures introduced by the importing partners.  Developing country exporters had the right to request
more time to adapt to the introduction of new measures which often resulted in a complete blockageTN/CTD/M/3
Page 22
of their exports.  Sufficient time should be allowed for developing countries to acquire the financial
capacity and human resources needed to be able immediately to comply with new measures.
68. The representative of Malaysia said that she was of the view that the representatives of
Argentina and Cuba had raised some valid points regarding the Indian proposal and the adaptation to
new SPS measures.  New measures normally involved a change that could include changes toproduction methods, changes to the production facilities and could even involve a change of the entire
production process from start to finish.  Such complicated technical processes took a long time.
Extended compliance periods would therefore be useful to developing country Members.  In addition,
the proposal only referred to extended time-periods for compliance with respect to products of interest
to developing countries.  The proposal was thus limiting the S&D treatment to products of interest to
developing countries.  It therefore merited consideration by Members.
69. The representative of Chile said that there were still too many missing elements for his
delegation to be able to have a clear opinion on the proposal.  The collateral effects associated with a
response had, however, to be appropriate to the measure looked for.  Developing countries did need
an extended timeframe for compliance when a developed country raised its levels of protection.  What
concerned his delegation was how to get a good understanding of the situation in developed and
developing countries and how to understand the possibl e extent of associated effects in a situation
involving only developing countries.
70. The representative of Sri Lanka said that her delegation supported the proposals submitted by
the delegation of India and some of the views expr essed by others, in particular that developing
countries needed time to adapt to new SPS measures imposed by developed countries.  A number of
studies had been undertaken within UNCTAD and ot her organizations on the procedural and logistical
changes developing countries would have to make when adapting to new measures.  Her Government
had undertaken a study of how Sri Lankan exporters had tried to comply with new measures adopted
by the developed countries.  Most of the measures in place related to agro-based industries.  The
production chain could not be changed within a period of only six months.  It usually required longer
time-periods than that.  That was only as far as the production was concerned.  Costs were sometimesincurred relating to the training of personnel, however, as well as in changes to infrastructure and
storage facilities.  Her Government's assessment showed that the effects of new SPS measures on Sri
Lankan spice exporters would mean lost export earnings of nearly US$2.2 million due to their
inability to comply sufficiently swiftly with the new measures.  The loss of employment must also be
considered.  Nearly 400,000 people were involved in the sector and many would lose their jobs.  The
cost of the necessary training alone amounted to  US$1.9 million.  These were examples of the
additional costs that a developing country would have  to incur.  She asked how it could therefore be
expected that a developing country would be able to meet new standards within a period of only six
months.   It was an impossible task.  The period agreed to seemed inadequate.  A longer time-period
had to be considered.  The study she had mentioned was also relevant to the issue discussed under
Article 9.2 and Sri Lankan exporters had encountered difficulties with respect to Article 9.2 as well.
These were concrete examples of real difficulties of the type that other delegations had asked for.  Inaddition, there was currently an ongoing meeting in UNCTAD relating to the SPS agreement where
other examples of the different types of difficulties faced by developing countries were provided.
Contrary to the beliefs of those delegations who su ggested that there was insufficient evidence to say
that the SPS posed difficulties for the developing countries there is, in fact, ample evidence available,
including numerous case studies.
71. The representative of India said that it was the type of problems mentioned by the delegations
of Pakistan, Argentina, Venezuela, Cuba, Sri Lanka and Malaysia with respect to Article 10.2 of the
SPS Agreement which had led to the tabling of the proposal.  He said he wished to assure the
Committee that human health took precedence over market access for his Government as well.  Some
comments had been made, during the course of the discussion, about acute situations, Members'TN/CTD/M/3
Page 23
sovereign right to define adequate levels of protection, human health, and the term "normally" which
his delegation had sought to delete from paragraph 3.1 of the Decision on Implementation-Related
Issues and Concerns.  He was of the view that none of the changes proposed related to the crucial
parts of the provision in question.  The most important point was how the provision began:  "Where
the appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection allows scope for the phased introductionof new SPS measures …".  That was a crucial phrase which his delegation did not seek to amend.
The subsequent phrases flew from the assumption that the measure of the appropriate level of SPS
protection would allow for phased introduction.  If it did not allow for that, the proposal his delegation
had put forward would not take effect.  An acute si tuation would clearly not satisfy the first condition
as it did not allow for phased introduction.  Similarly, if human health was going to be affected, there
could probably not be allowance for a phased introduction of the measure.  There was no need to
focus only on that angle as that particular provision was to be left untouched.  That clarification would
hopefully address the concerns expressed by many delegations.  His delegation's proposal did attempt
further to modify the Decision arrived at in the context of the Doha Ministerial Conference, however,
as his delegation believed that Decision to be insufficient.  The proposal which his delegation had
submitted, together with other delegations, as part of the implementation process did not contain the
word "normally".  When delegations had been faced with the situation of accepting that Decision or ofhaving nothing at all, however, they had nonetheless considered it to be of some value.  What his
delegation currently sought to achieve was a further improvement of it.
5. Article and 10.4 of the SPS Agreement
72. The representative of the United States said that the comments her delegation had made
earlier regarding assistance were linked to the proposal on Article 10.4 of the SPS Agreement.  She
emphasized that her Government was active in assisting the objective behind Article 10.4, and its
revised version found in the Doha Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.  She
reiterated her delegation's concern about revisiting Ministers' decisions from the Doha Ministerial
Conference.  That was one of the reasons why her delegation was not in a position to entertain the
proposal.  Positive results would flow from the action taken by the Ministers concerning the Article.
73. The representative of Canada said that her Government had given special attention to the
Article in creating a specific mechanism to assist developing countries to participate in the relevant
international institutions.  It was organized by the Standards Council of Canada.  If any delegation
wished for further details her delegation would be happy to provide them.
74. The representative of Argentina said that his delegation saw the participation of developing
countries in the three international organizations mentioned in the SPS Agreement as a point of real
interest.  His delegation was interested in the Govern ment of Canada's initiative in that respect, and
recognized the efforts which the Government of United States had made with regard to the
participation of developing countries in the CODEX Alimentarius Commission.  Nevertheless,
something had to be done as, in the sessi ons in the CODEX Alimentarius Commission, the
International Office of Epizootics (OIE), and the relevant international and regional organizations
operating within the Framework of the Internat ional Plant Protection Convention, international
standards were set and the measures taken where those standards were presumed to be in compliance
with the SPS Agreement.  That was why it was so important for developing countries to participate in
the work of those organizations.  Nobody had drawn up a list of participation of developing countries
in the CODEX, for example, because the result woul d be surprising.  It was necessary to work with
the organizations to consider how participation could be improved given that many of the questionsthey dealt with had a direct impact on the SPS measures discussed within the WTO.  This was an area
that needed improvement.
75. The representative of the European Communities said that his delegation wished to make a
general comment on both of the proposals.  Although it had been clarified by the representative ofTN/CTD/M/3
Page 24
India that the reason why the proposals had not been formally circulated was because of a
misunderstanding, his delegation had interpreted that as a sign of agreement with its views that it
might not be good to reopen issues just recently settled, or to pursue the other issues on that settlement
in the CTD while the DSU review was ongoing.  The comments his delegation had made at the last
meeting were still valid.  As mentioned by the representative of Argentina, it would be useful to getmore factual information as to what the effects of the Decision taken at the Doha Ministerial
Conference were, and what the status was with respect to assistance provided.  Such assistance is
necessary to enable the active participation of developing countries in these organizations.
Delegations would have to consider what, at a practical level, could be done to assist.
76. The representative of New Zealand said that there seemed to be agreement on the importance
of achieving the fullest possible participation of de veloping countries in international standardizing
bodies.  The practical question that the Committee had to deal with was whether a change in the SPSAgreement, or an interpretation of it which would make participation almost mandatory, was the most
effective way of doing so.  There had been a number of discussions in both the TBT and the SPS
Committee on that point.  A variety of practical m easures which could be undertaken to achieve that
objective had been identified in those discussions.  Considering those discussions in light of the SPS
Agreement, the sort of mandatory formulation proposed would not deliver the practical benefits thathe believed it sought to achieve.
77. The representative of Japan said that it was his delegation's understanding that the Director-
General of the WTO was trying to facilitate the participation of the developing countries in the
relevant international organizations based on paragraph 3.5 of the Decision on Implementation-
Related Issues and Concerns.  His delegation was interested in information regarding anydevelopments with respect to that effort.  His s econd point related to the fact that even though, from
the WTO perspective, it was important to facilitate the participation of the developing countries in the
work of these organizations, it was for these organizations themselves to decide to accept the
participation of developing countries.
78. The representative of India said that some of the developing country delegations would
respond to the offer made by the representative of Canada.  The representative of Argentina had
eloquently stated the importance of Article 10.4 to de veloping countries and also of the proposal.  He
said that many delegations had made the point that his proposal aimed to reopen the Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns almost before it had begun to be implemented.
Paragraph 3.5 of that Decision stated "Takes note of the actions taken to date by the Director-General
to facilitate the increased participation of Members at different levels of development in the work of
the relevant international standard setting organizations as well as his efforts to coordinate with theseorganizations and financial institutions in identifying SPS-related technical assistance needs and how
best to address them".  That implied that action had been taken.  A decision on that issue had been
taken in the October 2000 Session of the General Council when Ambassador Bryn had been the
Chairman of the General Council.  The Director-General had since then been in touch with the other
international standard setting organizations.  There had not been much progress, however, despite thebest efforts of the Director-General.  Even the second part of paragraph 3.5 of the Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns only urged the Director-General to continue his co-
operative efforts.  That again implied that the Dire ctor-General had already been carrying out efforts
and that he was only being asked to continue thos e efforts.  His delegation's proposal emanated from
its experience of the last year and a half when the Director-General had been pursuing the issue withthe international standard-setting organizations.  His delegation did not believe that the progress had
been satisfactory and had therefore felt the need to submit the proposal.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 25
6. Article 12.3 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
79. The representative of Cuba said that she wished to introduce the proposal contained in
document TN/CTD/W/2 regarding measures covered by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade.  Developed country markets had seen a proliferation of regulations and technical standards
which had affected the market access for exports from developing country Members.  They wereaffected in two ways.  First, because the standards, regulations and the evaluation processes for
compliance applied by importing countries were incompatible with the standards under the
Agreement.  Second, because developing countries did not have the technical and financial capacity to
meet the standards, even though those measures might be in compliance with the Agreement.  That
was the reason why the group of sponsors had submitted the proposal.  Furthermore, measures
relating to the environment constituted an additional obstacle to exports from developing countries.
Article 12 of the TBT Agreement referred in detail to S&D for developing countries.  Thoseprovisions either had not become a reality or had not been applied in a sufficient manner.  That was
why the delegations of Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mauritius, Pakistan, the Dominican
Republic, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Cuba had made the proposal on page 6 of
document TN/CTD/W/2.  The proposal was an addition to Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement which
stated that "Members shall, in the preparation and application of technical regulations, standards andconformity assessment procedures, take account of the special development, financial and trade needs
of developing country Members, with a view to ensuring that such technical regulations, standards
and conformity assessment procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles to exports from
developing country Members."  The sponsors of the proposal suggested that the following text be
added:  "If an exporting developing country Member identifies specific problems of inadequatetechnology and infrastructure in complying with the technical regulations and standards of an
importing developed country Member, the latter shall provide the former with relevant technology
and technical facilities  on preferential and non-commercial term, preferably free of cost".  That
addition would make the special and differential treatment under that Agreement effective and
operational.  In view of the comments made with respect to other proposals, she said that theprovisions on technical assistance which were in force would not be applicable to the additional
provision proposed, taking into account the lack of technical and financial capacity and infrastructure
of developing countries in order to comply with the new standards.
80. The representative of Canada said that there would be a discussion in the TBT Committee in
June 2002, prior to the report that the Special Session of the CTD had to make in July 2002.  There
would be a full discussion of all outstanding implementation and other issues.  It therefore seemed
appropriate that the proposal might be dealt with in the TBT Committee at that time.  In addition, sheagreed with the points made earlier by other delegations regarding the fact that the proposal was for a
sweeping and costly measure.  It would therefore be difficult for most of the donor countries to
comply with it.
81. The representative of Argentina noted that the technical regulations to which reference was
made in the proposal seemed to be related to the provision of technology.  The scope could be
widened to include other types of technical regulations for those regulations to cause as little
distortion as possible to trade.  That would not require much in the way of financial resources and
would still be an improvement to S&D.
82. The representative of Thailand said that her delegation supported the proposal presented by
the representative of Cuba relating to Article 12.3.  She had just received a preliminary proposal from
her capital relating to Articles 12.4 and 12.6 of the TBT Agreement which would be submitted at a
later stage.  It was in the Thai language and had to be translated into English.
83. The representative of Norway said that she had in part referred to the TBT proposal when
speaking about the proposal on the SPS Agreement.  However, paragraph 5.4 of the Decision onTN/CTD/M/3
Page 26
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns urged "Members to provide, to the extent possible, the
financial and technical assistance necessary to enable LDCs to respond adequately to the introduction
of any new TBT measures…".  It was prudent to see how the Decision from the Doha Ministerial
Conference was followed up before the issue was disc ussed further.  It was important to keep in mind
that the TBT Committee would also be considering implementation.
84. The representative of Venezuela expressed her delegation's interest in the proposal.  The
problem identified therein reflected true concerns which affected the market access for many export
products from developing countries.
85. The representative of Malaysia said that, as far as her delegation had understood, the
discussion of the TBT Committee only related to the two implementation tirets on the table and would
not relate to the proposal under discussion in the Special Session of the CTD.  The proposal tabled in
the Special Session of the CTD was better dealt with in the Special Session of the CTD.
86. The representative of Cuba agreed with the final comment made by the representative of
Malaysia regarding the discussion which would take place in the TBT Committee.  The Article 12.3
proposal should therefore be discussed in the Special Session of the CTD.
7. Article 3.5(j) of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures
87. The representative of India said that his delegation's proposal related to Article 3.5(j) of the
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.  The propos al aimed to address the last sentence of the
provision, which read:  "In this regard, special consideration should be given to those importers
importing products originating in developing country Members and, in particular, the least-developed
country Members".  The use of the word "should" in that last sentence of the provision made the
mandatory nature of the provision doubtful.  It was this aspect of the provision that the proposalsought to address.  What his delegation had suggested was that the provision be made mandatory to
enable products originating from developing country Members to benefit from it.  This could be done
either through an authoritative interpretation or through an amendment which would change the word
"should", in the last sentence, to "shall".  Making the provision mandatory would help developing
countries, especially the LDCs, to increase their market share for products of export interest to them,as envisaged in the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement.
88. The representative of the United States said that her delegation understood the desire of
developing countries and, in particular, of LDCs, to access new or non-utilized licences.  Concern had
been expressed in the context of the agriculture negotiations.  That was also the forum where the issue
should be treated.  However she also suggested that the proposal advanced by the delegation of India
might create some unintended consequences.  For example, the mandatory distribution of import
licences to developing countries might weaken previous market access concessions by allowingMembers to allocate quotas to countries which had no production.
89. The representative of India said that his delegation believed that the Special Session of the
CTD, and not the agricultural negotiations, was the right forum to address the issue.
90. The representative of Sri Lanka said that her delegation supported the Indian proposal.  In
response to what had been said by the representative of the United States, she said that her
delegation's understanding of Article 4.2 of the Ag reement on Agriculture was that Members should
not maintain or revert to any measure of the kind that they had been required to be converted into
ordinary customs duties.  There was a footnote wh ich suggested which measures were included, and
that it included quantitative import restrictions.  Members normally had a policy of adopting import
licences when they had quantitative restrictions.  The two went hand in hand.  According to thecurrent Agreement, most Members should already have eliminated those duties. Probably there wouldTN/CTD/M/3
Page 27
not be any large implications and discussions should therefore continue in the Special Session of the
CTD.  Delegations should not prejudge future negotiations.
91. The representative of Venezuela said that the proposal did not clearly establish that the
measure would apply only to developed countrie s who would provide the conditions for market
access for the exports from developing countries.  She asked whether the proposal applied todeveloped countries and developing countries or only to the former.
92. The representative of India said that the intention of the proposal was that it be applied
exclusively to the developed countries and not to developed and developing countries alike.
8. Article 27.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
93. The representative of India said that on behalf of the delegations of Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and his own, he
wished to introduce the proposal contained in document TN/CTD/W/1 concerning Article 27.1 of theAgreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  That was the first part of the Article and it
was an overarching provision which reinforced what was contained in the rest of the Article.  The text
of the Article read:  "Members recognize that subsidies may play an important role in economic
development programmes of developing country Members".  This laid down the basis for S&D for
developing countries on the issue.  The value of  the recognition had been considerably diluted,
however, by the use of the word "may" in the provision.  There was a need for an unambiguous
recognition of the role played by subsidies in developmental policies.  The sponsors of the proposal
sought to delete the word "may" from the text.  If approved, the amended text would read:  "Members
recognize that subsidies play an important role in the economic development programmes of
developing country Members".  Since this was the fundamental basis for the S&D treatment outlinedin detail in the rest of the Article, the change woul d be of value to developing countries.  In the Tokyo
Round, Article 14, part 3 dealt with developing countries and Article 14.1 read:  "the signatories
recognize that subsidies are an integral part of economic development programmes of developing
countries".  There was a clear recognition in the Tokyo-Round documents that subsidies were an
integral part of the economic development programmes of developing countries.  Further, Article 14.5of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement /Supplement  of the Tokyo Round reads that:
"A developing country signatory should endeavour to  enter into a commitment to reduce or eliminate
export subsidies when the use of export subsidies is inconsistent with its competitive and development
needs".  This wording gives priority to development needs more than anything else.  It only requested
the elimination of all such subsidies when they we re inconsistent with the development needs of a
developing country.  These cited provisions we re diluted in the Uruguay Round Agreements.  He
recognized that Article 27.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures includedrights and obligations of Members.  However, the sponsors had submitted the proposal since it was an
S&D provision meant to benefit developing countries and since it was the first sentence which
provided a basis for the S&D treatment of the rest of the Article.
94. The representative of Chile asked whether all subsidies played an important role in the
development of developing countries.  If the "may" was eliminated from paragraph 1 of Article 27, as
proposed, it would mean that all subsidies do.  However, economic reality had shown that they did
not.  There had to be a recognition of the fact that there were different types of subsidies.  Some
would play an important role in the development of Members, but others would not.  On the contrary,
they might generate inefficiencies within the economies and ultimately hamper development.  One
additional aspect to be considered was that in spite of the fact that some subsidies played an importantrole in the development of countries, these subsidie s had to be analysed, at least within the WTO, in
terms of whether or not they were trade distorting .  The challenge for developing countries that
wished to use subsidies in their development policies was to find subsidies which would help those
policies without distorting trade.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 28
95. The representative of Ecuador said that the proposed change would, in a general way,
authorize the use of subsidies by developing countries.  One of the purposes of the WTO, however,
was liberalization of trade and the elimination of protectionism.  Generally speaking subsidies were,
in addition, for those countries which could finance them: normally the smaller developing countries
could not afford to do so. From the perspective of the developing countries there existed also the riskof distortion from subsidies that would affect international competitiveness, especially for like
products.  These would at the same time affect investment, the generation of employment, and the
relationship between developed and developing countries.  The language proposed reflects this
argument.  His delegation was not necessarily in op position to the proposal.  Nevertheless, there was a
need to consider the issues in more depth and to evaluate the consequences of that type of mandatory
language before taking any decision.
96. The representative of Switzerland sought clarification on two issues.  First, it was proposed
that instead of saying "subsidies may play an important role in economic development", the Article
should state that "subsidies play an important role".  He asked if the underlying assumption and
reasoning of the proponents of the proposal was that any given subsidy per se  was beneficial for
development.  He further asked whether it was not conceivable, as was implied in the current wording
of Article 27.1, that some subsidies might do more harm than good for overall economicdevelopment.  Secondly, he asked what the proponents concretely expected from the proposed change
and in what sense the provision would become more effective after the proposed change was
introduced.  His delegation had repeatedly insisted that it was important to have a fundamental
discussion on the objective of S&D.  It would be helpful if the proposals could be analysed in greater
depth in order more accurately to evaluate what might be achieved, in terms of economicdevelopment, by adopting the changes proposed within them.
97. The representative of Argentina said that his delegation shared the view, expressed by a
number of other delegations, that the discussion should be extended to include agriculture.
98. The representative of Venezuela said that the proposal was positive.  Non-actionable
subsidies applied by developing countries in order to maintain their development objectives were
important to her Government.  At the Doha Ministerial Conference, Ministers had agreed to deal with
this issue alongside paragraph 12 of the Ministerial Declaration.  It had a specific negotiating mandate
in paragraph 10.2 of the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.  Developing
countries needed instruments which could be used to improve their competitivity.  The objective of
these instruments is not only to improve traditi onal trade flows in commodities but also to promote
the transformation of the economy's structure and to add value to their exports.  Non-actionable
subsidies are, in this respect, important.  Maintain ing the possibility for developing countries to use
this type of subsidy had to be considered and utilized as a principle for S&D.  The provisions of
Article 8 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures should also be part of S&D.
99. The representative of Paraguay pointed out that developing countries had trade relations both
with developed and developing countries.  Subsidies, rather than being beneficial, in many cases
constituted obstacles to trade.  They could distort trade and in general have a negative impact onmultilateral trade liberalization, the principal objective of the WTO..  Any proposal suggesting that all
subsidies are beneficial to development would not seem to comply to reality:  subsidies could rather
be prejudicial to development.  So the suggested change did not seem appropriate and might even be
disadvantageous for the development of multilateral trade.
100. The representative of the European Communities said that it was a fact that economic
development took place without subsidization and that this needed to be more generally recognized.
If the Article were phrased as suggested it would mean that all developing countries would be free to
grant subsidies as they wished.  It seemed to him unclear that this was necessarily what other
developing countries wanted.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 29
101. The representative of Japan said that Article 27.1 articulated the core principle of Article 27
taken as a whole since the following part, beginning from 27.2, contained the actual rights and
obligations.  He therefore asked the sponsors of the proposal for a clarification of the purpose of the
proposed change and what they hoped to achieve by the amendment.
102. The representative of Norway subscribed to the previous comments made by the
representatives of the European Communities, Japan, and Switzerland.  He asked the sponsors if they
believed that all subsidies always contributed to development.  His delegation found it difficult, if not,
to understand why they saw a problem with maintaining the word "may" in the sentence.
103. The representative of Ecuador said that, having considered the procedure established in the
Doha Ministerial Declaration, he thought it important  to highlight something that had been referred to
in  Article 27.4 with respect to export subsidies.  There had been a number of discussions in the
Subsidies Committee regarding which Members did or did not qualify for extensions of the time-period during which continued export subsidies were permitted.  The new proposal would clear the
way for anyone to use it:  both the Members who complied with what was set out in the Doha
Ministerial Declaration and the Decision on Implem entation-Related Issues and Concerns, and those
who did not.  The consequences of the proposal needed further consideration.  It had to be recognized,
for example, that some subsidies can have a positive impact on the development policies ofdeveloping countries.
104. The representative of Korea, on behalf of his delegation, shared the concern expressed by the
representative of Japan.  As had been said in the proposal's introduction, paragraph 27.1 was the
overarching paragraph, critical to the entire Article.  And it therefore recognized the positive role that
subsidies might play in the current development programmes of developing countries.  On the basis ofthat recognition the following fourteen paragraphs of Article 27 provided for S&D for developing
country Members.  Article 27, paragraph 14, although dealing exclusively with export subsidies, does
state that the Subsidies Committee should examine the extent to which such export subsidies conform
with development needs.  And if the nature of paragraph 1 were changed it would fall out of line with
these subsequent paragraphs.  Of course it coul d be questioned whether subsidies always played a
positive role in the economic development programmes of developing countries.  It was quite widely
recognized, for example, that subsidies could have adverse affects on the long-term competitiveness
of any industry concerned regardless of whether or not it was in a developing or a developed country.
105. The representative of Australia asked whether the proponents of the proposal considered that
the proposed amendment of the text of Article 27.1 would change the obligations contained within
Article 27 as a whole.  He also wondered if the proponents considered that Article 27.1 was in
isolation to the rights and obligations contained in Article 27.  By presuming that subsidies play animportant role in economic development programmes it might be difficult to argue that a developing
country could not continue to subsidize a particular product or to continue with a particular export
subsidy programme.  His delegation finds it difficult to accept the argument that all subsidies play an
important role in economic development.  And likewise he agreed with some of the comments made
on the possible implications of the proposed change in the area of agriculture.  As the proposal wouldimply a significant change in the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement it should be
considered by some of the experts of the Negotiating Group on Rules.
106. The representative of Colombia said that the proposals represented an interesting beginning to
the debate.  They related, however, to an issue to be debated in the Negotiating Group on Rules and it
was important that they be maintained there in or der for the technical experts to have the opportunity
to give them their consideration.
107. The representative of the United States said that her delegation had serious concerns with the
proposed change.  Some of these were similar to those already mentioned by other delegations.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 30
108. The representative of Sri Lanka said that her delegation had noted the questions and
comments made by various other delegations to which it would come back with answers.  With
respect to the relationship with agriculture, referred  to by some delegations, she said that the sort of
parallelism employed could not in fact be made as the Agreement on Agriculture mentioned
reductions of export subsidies while Article 27 of the Agreement on Subsidies and CountervailingMeasures related to prohibitions.  The agricultural negotiations had itself not yet progressed to a
discussion of that kind.  There was therefore no relation between the two issues.
109. The representative of Argentina said that the Doha Ministerial Declaration spoke of the
elimination of export subsidies and a substantial reduction of domestic support in agriculture.
110. The representative of Sri Lanka agreed that the Doha Ministerial Declaration spoke of the
elimination of export subsidies.  But she said that no delegation knew how many years this would
take.  There also seemed to be different views on how to reach a total elimination.  An agreement toprohibit certain subsidies, in respect to the Subsidies Agreement in particular, had already been
established.  This was not yet the case in respect to the Agreement on Agriculture.  It might be the
case in the future.
111. The representative of India said that, in response to some of the questions posed, his
delegation did not consider agriculture subsidies to be good for development:  they were good neither
for the subsidy giver nor for other countries.  Second, in response to the question of what the sponsors
expected to achieve from the suggested amendment he said that, as explained in the beginning,
Article 27.1 was an overarching provision which, if suitably strengthened, could reinforce the rest of
the provisions of Article 27 which dealt with developing country issues.  Third, a couple of
delegations had mentioned the functioning of the proposed changes within the legal framework of theSubsidies Agreement.  He responded that the joint proposal in no way undermined that framework.
Whatever was done would be within the limits of the legal framework of the Subsidies Agreement.
Fourth, some economic arguments had been adduced to state that subsidies might not always be good.
This was a matter for debate:  it was, however, a debate into which he did not wish to enter.  Although
he did recall that throughout 2001 there had been a series of short programmes on BBC televisionwhich looked at developments in the last century.  Several of these programmes focussed on the
"economic miracles" achieved by a number of countries in the Far East.  Two reasons put forward to
explain such success were, (1) that the development had been preceded by high levels of subsidies for
industrial production and (2) that high levels of protective tariffs were maintained by these countries.
They subsequently managed to reach a level of development from which they could ask others not to
provide subsidies.  But in terms of their own development the sponsors were far behind such
countries.  So it would be useful for developing countries, as an initial stage in economic growth, if
they too were permitted to give some subsidies within the provisions of the Subsidies Agreement.
What the sponsors of the proposal were seeking, therefore, was the reinforcement of the current
provisions. And in particular they would like to see the current provisions reinforced within the
existing ambit of the Subsidies Agreement.
9. Article 12.10 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes (document TM/CTD/W/2)
112. The representative of India wished to present the proposal contained in document
TM/CTD/W/2 on behalf of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya,
Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and his own delegation.  It related to
Article 12.10 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.The text of the provision reads:  "In the context of consultations involving a measure taken by a
developing country Member, the parties may agree to extend the periods established in paragraphs 7
and 8 of Article 4.  If, after the relevant period has elapsed, the consulting parties cannot agree that the
consultations have concluded, the Chairman of the DSB shall decide, after consultation with theTN/CTD/M/3
Page 31
parties, whether to extend the relevant period and, if so, for how long.  In addition, in examining a
complaint against a developing country Member, the panel shall accord sufficient time for the
developing Member to prepare and present its argumentation.  The provisions of paragraph 1 of
Article 20 and paragraph 4 of Article 21 are not affected by any action pursuant to this paragraph".
This provision conceived of situations in which a developing country Member was a defending partyin a dispute settlement proceeding.  The other party to the dispute might or might not be a developed
country Member .  The provision was divided in two parts.  The first related to consultation fees and
the second to panel proceedings.  The first part of  the Article dealt with the extension of consultation
periods by the parties themselves or by the DSB Chair.  The next part directed the panel to give
sufficient time to a developing Member country to prepare its defence.  The final provision subjected
that grant of time to the overall time frames set for dispute settlement proceedings.  Since the word
"shall" was used in the second and third sentences the provisions could be considered mandatory.  Butdespite of the use of the word "shall" it was left to the discretion of the DSB Chairman to decide on
(1) whether or not to grant an extension of the consultation period, and (2) on the length of any such
extension.  In the case of a panel, however, it did not seem to have any such discretion:  the provision
clearly stated that the panel shall allow sufficient time.  But the paragraph does not give any guidance,
either to the DSB Chair or to the panel, as to how much additional time should be given.  The panelwas therefore constrained by the last sentence, the sentence concerning application of overall time
frames.  In relation to developing country Members the provision thus seemed to be of limited
practical use or was arguably inoperable.  This was perhaps the reason, as rightly pointed out in the
Secretariat's Note, why no developing Member had so far invoked the first part of the paragraph.  His
delegation had invoked the second part of the paragraph in the first stage of the panel proceedings inthe dispute India-QRs (DS90) and had been allowed ten days additional time for preparation of its
first written submission.
113. He continued by saying that the proposal comprised three parts.  The first suggested that the
words "whether" and "if so for how long" be delete d from the second sentence and replaced with the
words "for not less than fifteen days in cases of emergency as envisaged in paragraph 8 of Article 4and not less than thirty days in normal circumstance s".  If these initial amendments were agreed to,
the second sentence should then read:  "If, after the period has elapsed, the consulting parties cannot
agree that the consultations have concluded, the Chairman of the DSB shall, after consultation with
the parties, decide to extend the relevant period for not less than 15 days, in cases of urgency as
envisaged in Paragraph 8 of Article 4, and not less than 30 days in other cases in normal
circumstances".  This suggestion gives guidance to the DSB Chair upon being approached by either
Party to extend the period, in normal circumstances, by at least 15 or 30 days.  In case of exceptionalcircumstances, the expression used in Article 21.4, they could exercise discretion so as to give more
time to the Parties.  The second suggestion put forward by the proponents was to introduce the words
"not less than two weeks extra in normal circumstances" into the third sentence, after the expression
"sufficient time", and for the word "argumentation " to be substituted by the words "first written
submission and not less than one week extra thereafter at each stage of written submission orpresentation".  The sentence would thus read:  "In addition, in examining a complaint against a
developing country Member, the panel shall allow su fficient time, not less than two additional weeks
in normal circumstance, for the developing country Member to prepare and present its first written
submission and one additional week thereafter at each stage of written submission or presentation".
This suggestion directs the panel to give additional time of at least two weeks for the first submission,one week each for the second submission, first and second oral presentations and for interim
submissions, if any.  The third part of the proposal was to rephrase the last sentence to:  "The
additional time taken above shall be added to the time frames envisaged in Article 20 and paragraph 4
of Article 21".  This last suggestion seeks to extend the overall time frames to the dispute settlement
proceedings involving a developing country Member as a defending party.  These suggestions, onceimplemented, would make the provisions of Article 12.10 of the DSU effective, operational, and of
value to developing country Members.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 32
114. The representative of the European Communities said that his delegation welcomed the
proposal although it had not yet had sufficient time to examine it.  This was also the case for the other
two proposals relating to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes.  His delegation would prefer to discuss them in the ongoing negotiations on DSU review.
115. The representative of the United States said that her delegation had not had sufficient time to
study the proposals.  Her delegation still maintained, however, that the proposal should be presented
in the context of the DSU negotiations.  It seemed odd to be negotiating one part of an issue in the
Special Session of the CTD while a full review exercise taking place elsewhere.  And except for some
theoretical idea, i.e. that no developing country had taken advantage of the provision because it had
not been changed to reflect some of the proposals put forward, the precise nature of the problem with
utilization remained unclear.  The given rationale did not seem to fit with the assessment of
utilization.
116. The representative of Japan said that his delegation agreed with what had been said by the
representatives of the European Communities and the United States.  The proposals had to be
presented to the DSU negotiations.
117. The representative of Pakistan pointed out that his delegation was a co-sponsor of the
proposal.  Several Members had mentioned that the proposal should be pursued in the context of the
DSU Review currently underway in the Special Sessions of the DSB.  Article 12.10 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes was an S&D provision.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration had mandated the CTD to conduct a review of the S&D provisions.
The S&D provisions should therefore be taken as a part of the overall review in which Members were
engaged.  An attempt to filter down or select provisions to be part of broader negotiations in differentfora would not be acceptable to his delegation.  The Special Session of the CTD was where Members
were engaged in a review of the S&D provisions and the provision in question was an S&D provision.
The basic examination of that provision should therefore be conducted in the Committee and it was up
to the Committee to try to make it operational.  The provision created two obligations:  one was the
possibility of extending the consultation period and the second was that enough time had to begranted, if need be, for a developing country to prepare its argumentation.  The broader objective was
to create favourable conditions that at the same time avoided the tight timelines that, especially when
they lacked expertise in the area, constituted an additional burden on developing countries.  Their lack
of experience and limited capacity often meant that they had difficulty preparing for their submissions
to the DSB.  It was also difficult for them to find the relevant information and data adequately to
prepare themselves.  His delegation looked forwar d to a positive engagement on the issue from the
members of the Committee .
118. The representative of United States asked whether the reference made by the representative of
India to the panel proceedings in the dispute "Indi a-QRs", when the delegation of India had received
ten extra days for the preparation of its first written submission, was to be characterized as a problem.
The delegation of India had invoked the provision and received ten extra days.  That seemed to
indicate utilization of the second part of the provision although it was still not clear why the otherparts of the provision had never been invoked and so where the particular problems at issue were to be
located.
119. The representative of India noted that the representative of the United States wished to know
what had been the precise nature of the problem with respect to the panel proceedings in the dispute
"India-QRs".  It was a complicated case, the background of which she would already be aware.  Hisdelegation had asked for thirty additional days.  It had received only ten extra days and this had
created considerable difficulties for his delegation.  What should be considered is what his delegation
had suggested towards the end of its introductory comments.  The provisions clearly stated that the
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 20 and paragraph 4 of Article 21 were not effected by any actionTN/CTD/M/3
Page 33
pursuant to that paragraph.  This meant that the ov erall time-frame specified in the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes would not be affected by the provision, at
various stages, of extra time to developing countries.  But this posed a serious problem as it reduced
the time available to the panel to deliberate and decide upon an issue.  The panel would naturally be
reluctant to provide extra time to developing count ries if this meant that its own time was then
reduced.  This was why the proponents had suggested that the overall time-frame should be extended
by taking account within it of the extra time given to developing countries.  He entirely agreed with
what the representative of Pakistan had said about whether the issue should be discussed in the CTD
or in the DSB Review.  The CTD Special Session discussed all S&D provisions and the provisions in
question were S&D provisions. They had been identified as such by the Secretariat and agreed by
almost all delegations.  The discussions had subsequently to be followed by negotiations in the
Special Session of the CTD where they were being handled in a completely different context than inthe Rules Negotiating Group.  A point had been made about the low utilization of the provision.  The
low utilization was caused by a lack of certainty as to whether any benefit would finally be received.
The language, for example, was vague:  "shall decide after consultation with parties whether to
extend".  He had recent experience of this:  experience dating back only six months to a moment at
which he had approached his capital regarding whether or not his delegation should seek additionaltime.  The officers in the capital had pointed out that, as there was no certainty of actually receiving
an extension, it was better for the delegation simply to submit whatever it could by the original
deadline.  The existing language does not provide developing countries with any guarantee that they
will be granted additional time.  What the proponents had proposed was to rectify this difficulty by
incorporating into the provision a certainty that, when the DSB Chairman or the panel wasapproached, extra time would be received.
120. The representative of Ecuador said that the proposals had been made from the positive
perspective of the developing countries' point of view.  Its purpose, based on their experience, was for
developing countries to use their right to legitimate defence within appropriate time limits and
deadlines.  Such a purpose is in keeping with the real situation in developing countries.  Hisdelegation therefore supported the proposal.  He  also said that, with respect to reflection upon the
appropriate forum, the issue under discussion came under the Special Session of the CTD for the
reasons stated by the representatives of Pakistan and India.  It was the right context regardless of the
fact that a similar debate could be held in other appropriate fora of the WTO besides that of the
Special Session of the CTD.
121. The representative of Argentina said that his delegation was not in a position to give an
opinion.  He would pass the issue on to his colleague dealing with dispute settlement issues in order
for his delegation to give its opinion on a subsequent occasion.
10. Articles 4.10 and 21.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes
122. The representative of India wished to present his delegation's proposal relating to Article 4.10
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.  Article 4.10
reads:  "During consultations Members should give special attention to developing country Members'
particular problems and interests".  The first part of the proposal aimed to make the provision
mandatory by replacing the word "should" by "shall".  The second part of the provision states that
"special attention to be given to the particular problems and interests".  But it does not go beyond that.
His delegation had attempted to specify how the provision of special attention in the second part ofthe proposal could be made more substantive.  His delegation had proposed that (a) if, in the context
of developing country Members, the complaining party was a developed Member, seeking the
establishment of a panel, it should be made mandatory for it to explain, in the panel request as well as
in its submissions to the panel, the ways in which it had paid special attention to the particular
problems and interests of the responding developing country;  and (b) if the developed Member was aTN/CTD/M/3
Page 34
defending party it should be made mandatory for it to  explain, in its submissions to the panel, how it
had addressed or paid special attention to the particular problems and interests of the complaining
developing country;  and (c) the panel, when adjudi cating the matter referred to it, should also give its
ruling on this parallel issue.  These suggestions, when implemented, would make the provisions of
Article 4.10 both more meaningful and of more value to developing countries.
123. He went on to say that his delegation's second proposal related to Article 21.2, which reads:
"Particular attention should be paid to matters effecting the interests of developing country Members
with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute settlement".  This provision was part of
the Article that required the DSB to ensure that the implementation of its rulings were kept under
surveillance.  The Article provides for the determination of a reasonable period of time for
compliance with DSB rulings, for the periodic issuing of status reports and, in the case of
disagreement, for initiation of further dispute settlement proceedings to determine whether thedefendant Member had complied with DSB rulings.  The first part of the proposal suggested the
replacement of the word "should" by "shall" so as to make the provision mandatory.  The second part
of the proposal tried to clarify the phrase "matters effecting the interests of developing country
Members".  It was in this context that his delega tion proposed that the provision, having been placed
at the beginning of the long and important Article 21, should be interpreted as an overarchingprovision in all disputes involving a developing country Member and, as such, that it should be made
mandatory for the panels and Appellate Body.  If the defending party were a developing Member, and
the complainant a developed Member, the normal reasonable period of time would be fifteen months.
But if the measure at issue were the change of strategy provisions or the change of long held practice
or policy, the reasonable period of time would be two to three years and the panel and theAppellate Body would indicate, as necessary, the requirement of an additional reasonable period of
time.  The second element of the proposal related to Article 21.5 procedures.  The time for
consultation of 21.5 panel proceedings should be increased from 90 to 120 days.  The panels should
give all due consideration, as any normal panel would, to the particular needs of the developing
country Members.  And the third part dealt with the filing of status reports which, his delegationsuggested, should be done in alternate meetings rather than at every regular meeting.  This would help
to ease the otherwise considerable burden that they place upon developing countries.  The third
element of the proposal was that if a complaint was lodged by a developing Member against a
developed Member, the defending developed country Member should, no matter what the
circumstances, be given no more than a 15 day reasonable period of time.  The existing 90 days time-
limit for 21.5 procedures should be observed. there should be an obligation to compensate for
continuing trade losses to the developing country complainant in the case of any further delay.  Thesesuggestions, if implemented, would make the provisions of the Article mandatory, effective, and
operational.
124. The representative of the United States said that her comments applied to both proposals.  The
analysis of the proposals was to be made in light of the fact that the review and the mandate provided
that the identification of what should be made mandatory, effective and operational would be on thebasis of a consensus.  Her delegation was of the view that the ultimate discussion of DSU proposals
had, however, to be held within the Special Session of the DSB which is currently under way.  There
were numerous instances of disputes involving de veloping country defending parties in which the
consultation period had been extended well beyond 60 days.  Reasonable period of time requests had
been dealt with on a case-by-case basis with special attention being given to developing countries.She questioned whether it would be constructive to establish a mandatory revision in the manner of a
"one size fits all" approach.  And her delegation was concerned that, while discussing time frames,
numerous proposals were being made and discussions  taking place in the DSU negotiations on the
same point.  Of course she looked forward to the re sults of these discussions as well.  It was important
to consider the impact of any proposal on the reality of the dispute settlement system.  The rulesshould be applied in a manner that allowed for the efficient resolution of disputes.  Any consideration
of changes concerning time frames should therefore take this into account.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 35
125. The representative of Canada said that her delegation was of the view that the technical
experts in the DSU should review the proposals as they were already in the process of discussing
these issues.  With respect to Article 4.10, however, her delegation noted that in the Secretariat
document WT/COMTD/77/Rev.1, only one developing country Member had made a complaint
relating to the Article.  This did not constitute evidence of a systemic problem.  She wondered if otherdelegations had experienced difficulties as she would welcome more clarification on the issue of
specific problems and interests.  The same Secretariat document noted that that Article 21.2 had been
referred to in arbitral awards and her delegation wondered what, regarding its inadequacy, had been
the specific complaint in this instance.  It was not clear how the effectiveness of the provision would
be improved by making it mandatory.
126. The representative of Japan said that his delegation believed that the three proposals should
be presented to the Special Sessions of the DSB for the same reasons as those given by Canada and
the United States.  With regard to the proposal concerning Article 21.2 he said that difficulties relating
to the change of statutory revisions or the change of long held practice and policy would be almost the
same for developed as for developing countries.  There was therefore no compelling reason to
distinguish between the time applied to the deve loping and the time applied to the developed
countries.
127. The representative of Cuba said that, although his delegation was aware of the fact that
Article 21.2 had rarely been used, his delegation did know of a case involving a developing country
where the reasoning used had given cause for concern.  This case involved an appeal, based on
Article 21.2, for an extension to the period for compliance.  The extension was justified by invoking
the special situation of the country, however, which at the time had been experiencing economicproblems.  In the absence of special economic problems the extension of the time period could not
have been justified.  But this made the scope of the provision rather restrictive.  And the same
argumentation might be applied to any other developing country regardless of the economic situation
at a given time.  For this reason his delegation considered that the proposal was relevant and that the
Special Session of the CTD should continue to discuss it.
128. The representative of India recalled that one delegation had mentioned that the reasonable
period of time was considered on a case-by-case basis.  This was precisely why the need existed to
add certainty to the provision so that developing countries could then count on it.  Second, the
question had been asked as to whether there had been any specific problems.  There had been
problems in the dispute "India-QRs" during which his delegation had asked for a longer reasonable
period of time without receiving it.  Third,  the question of reasonable period of time had been
examined in two cases.  It had not been examined in any great length, however, and he did not believe
that the delegations in question had received full satisfaction.  One case was the Indonesia auto case
and the other was the Chile alcohol case.  One delegation had said that, in the settlement of disputes,
the aim should be to ensure that the rules were applied in an efficient manner.  No delegation would
wish to object to such a statement.  All that his delegation wished for was to incorporate a certain
flexibility into the system.  Greater flexibility would help to address some of the problems andconcerns of developing countries so that compliance with some of the DSB provisions would then
seem less burdensome on them.  Finally, a comment had been made on the proposal regarding
Article 21.2 relating to changes in long held practices and policy, pointing out that it was as true for
developed countries as it was for developing countries.  This was possible.  But on the other hand it
was true, nevertheless, that developing countries had less capacity to absorb the economic shock thanthe developed countries and hence the suggestion that they be given a longer reasonable period of
time.  He had understood that one small aspect of the proposal on 21.2 had been tabled by a
delegation in the DSB review.  But none of the other points, as far as he was aware, had so far been
put forward as formal proposals in the DSB review.  He was therefore surprised to hear that the same
proposals were being discussed in the DSB review.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 36
129. The representative of the United States said that there were other proposals in the DSU
concerning time-frames.  Her delegation's comments had been part of the "review" of S&D
provisions.  Whatever was reported to the General Council in July 2002 had to be based on a common
understanding.  Proposals had been put forward in the Special Session of the CTD but at the same
time there were also proposals concerning time-frames in the DSU.
130. The Chairman said that the Committee had reached the end of the examination of the
proposals on the table.  The Committee had considered eleven proposals and had had a useful
exchange of views on them.  The Committee would have to decide what to do next in moving forward
the process of considering the proposals.
C. O THER BUSINESS
131. The Chairman observed that, as indicated at the beginning of the meeting, he would draw
Members' attention to the responses received, from the chairs of the other bodies, to the Committee's
request to be kept informed of any issues relatin g to S&D  from within their respective bodies.  He
had indicated in April that the Committee had received responses from several bodies.  Ten such
responses had been received.  Of these responses, five bodies had indicated that the issue of S&D had
not been raised within their Committee.  These bodies were the Committee on Trade andEnvironment, the Committee on Safeguards, the Committee on Trade and Civil Aircraft, the
Committee of Participants and the Expansion of Trade and Information Technology Products and the
Textiles Monitoring Body.  The other five bodies, namely the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,
the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, the Committee on Agriculture and the Working Group on the RelationshipBetween Trade and Investment, had given updates on the status of S&D discussions in their
respective bodies.  The relevant documents were available at the back of the room.  He urged
Members to read these so that any questions or queries could be addressed at the next meeting of the
Committee.  He reminded delegations that the next formal meeting was scheduled for 14 June 2002 at
which time the Committee would take up the agreements and decisions listed in the fax circulated on15 April 2002.  The Committee would also take up any proposals related to those agreements to have
been circulated by that time.  The deadline for the circulation of proposals was 31 May.  He also
recalled the draft work plan that had been circulat ed to Members.  This had been discussed at the
informal meeting of 19 March and which Members continued to work on it on an informal basis.  It
was his understanding that Members were in a position formally to accept this work plan and its
schedule
2.
132. It was so agreed.
133. He continued by saying that a number of issues had been raised and that the Committee now
had to reflect on how best to proceed.  In terms of the proposals that had already been considered,
including the proposals that had been submitted and the proposals introduced, he suggested that it
might be necessary to have an informal meeting before 14 June to pursue further discussions.  Since
the proposals by the African group and the LDCs had already been formally introduced it might beuseful, he thought, to include an exchange of views on them in an informal meeting prior to the next
formal meeting.  The other matter that the Committee had to address, as raised by the representative
of the European Communities, was the question of the appropriate symbol to be given to the
documentation.  He undertook to hold informal consultations on this issue before the next meeting.
He proposed that the Committee take up the question of the nature of the Special Session in aninformal consultation, and that another informal mee ting be scheduled for an initial exchange of views
on the proposals from the African and the LDC Groups, as well as to receive further comments on the
                                                     
2 See Annex.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 37
proposals already discussed.  He made these proposals aware of the limited time-frame in which the
Committee had to work.  One formal meeting was scheduled for 14 June at which the Committee had
a number of agreements and decisions to address.  The Committee also had to address the fourth
indent of its work plan which related to the wa ys in which developing countries, including LDCs,
might be assisted in making best use of S&D provisions.  He suggested that this issue also be put onthe agenda of the next formal meeting on 14 June, in addition to the agreements and decisions which
had been circulated in the facsimile message convening that meeting.  It was his understanding that
the proposals submitted by the Africa and LDC Groups would shortly be available in all three official
languages of the WTO.  Informal consultations could take place once these proposals were available
in the three languages.
134. The representative of the United States asked if the intention was to translate the informal
discussion on the Africa Group and LDC Group proposals into formal mode, as had been done with
other proposals, or if it was simply to discuss them in informal mode.  She asked if the full discussion
of these proposals could be in formal mode and on the record rather than having a second formal
discussion.
135. The Chairman said that the intention was to translate the informal discussions into formal
mode.  The objective was to get ahead with the work.  What had been suggested by the representative
of the United States would facilitate that.  If the Committee were to have a second discussion in
formal mode it would not save time.  He asked if Members agreed to what he had suggested.  What he
suggested was to have an informal meeting at  which the Committee would further consider the
proposals already considered and to have a first consideration of the proposals that had been
introduced by the Africa and LDC Groups.  In addi tion there would be informal consultations on the
question of the document symbol and the nature of the Special Session of the CTD.  All this work
would be undertaken before the next formal meeting scheduled for 14 June.
136. It was so agreed.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 38
ANNEX I
Committee on Trade and Development:  Special Sessions
Work Plan and Schedule of Meetings
137. It will be recalled that paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration mandates that all
special and differential treatment provisions shall be  reviewed with a view to strengthening them and
making them more precise, effective and operational.  It will also be recalled that paragraph 12 of the
Doha Decision on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns mandates the Committee on Trade and
Development (CTD),  inter alia , to identify the special and differential treatment provisions that
Members consider should be made mandatory;  to examine ways in which special and differentialtreatment provisions can be made more effective in their operation;  and to consider ways in which
developing and least-developed countries can be assisted in making best use of these provisions.  The
CTD was instructed to report to the General Council with clear recommendations for a decision by
July 2002.
138. Pursuant to the Agreed Process on the work programme on special and differential treatment
contained in WT/COMTD/36, the Special Session has four main tasks before it.  They are:
(I) members to identify those provisions that they consider should be made mandatory.
(II) members  to provide inputs on the legal and practical implications of making non-mandatory
provisions mandatory.
(III) members to examine those provisions which could be made more effective in their operation.
(This task could apply to both mandatory and non-mandatory provisions).
(IV) members to consider ways in which developing countries, including LDCs, may be assisted in
making best use of S&D provisions.  This should include through improved information
flows.
139. Given the foregoing tasks, it is proposed that five meetings be held between April and July;
each meeting will give focussed attention to the tasks identified above with due regard for flexibility
in considering them given their inter-related nature.  The dates proposed for these meetings are:
9 April, 16 May, 14 June, 2 July and the afternoon of 17 July.
The meeting on 9 April  would be devoted to:
A. (i) Members identifying the provisions they consider should be made mandatory;  and
(ii) considering inputs from Members on the legal and practical implications of making
non-mandatory provisions mandatory.
The meetings on 16 May and 14 June  would be devoted to:
B. (i) examining provisions which could be strengthened and made more effective, precise and
operational (inclusive of mandatory and non-mandatory provisions);  and (ii) consideringways, including through improved information flows, in which developing countries,
particularly the least-developed countries, may be assisted to make best use of special and
differential treatment provisions.TN/CTD/M/3
Page 39
The two final meetings on 2 July  and the afternoon of 17 July  would be dedicated to
preparing and considering the recommenda tions of the Special Session.  Open-ended
informal consultations may be convened as agreed with due regard to the guidelines for thescheduling of meetings.
140. The information on mandatory provisions contained in WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add. 1 and
Add.2 and on the utilization of special and differential treatment provisions contained in
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4 could assist Members, as appropriate, in the tasks listed at (I), (III)
and (IV) above.  As indicated in paragraph 2(a) of the Agreed Process, Members may also wish to
consider WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1, in particular para graph 20, with a view to structuring their inputs
and discussions relating to the task listed at (III).  Members may also find the information in
WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.3 useful in providing inpu ts on the legal and practical implications of
making non-mandatory provisions mandatory.
141. Updates from chairpersons of other WTO bodies, to which have been referred
implementation-related issues which may have a bearing on the work of the Special Sessions of theCTD, will be provided as they become available.
142. Finally, it is recalled that Paragraph 12 (iii) provides for consideration, in the context of the
work programme on special and differential treatment, to be given to how special and differential
treatment may be incorporated into the architecture  of WTO rules.  This task is not bound by the
July 2002 deadline.  Given the work to be accomplished by July, this aspect of the work programme
may be addressed after July 2002.
__________