RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONS/WPGR/M/21
7 May 1999
(99-1882)
Working Party on GATS Rules
REPORT OF THE MEETING OF 16 APRIL 1999
Note by the Secretariat
1. The twenty-first meeting of the Working Party on GATS Rules was chaired by
Mr. Siva Somasundram of Singapore, after taking ov er from Mr. Harald Fries of Sweden.  The agenda
of the meeting was contained in WTO/AIR/1053.  It  consisted of six items: installation of new
chairman;  negotiations on safeguards under Article X of the GATS;  negotiations on subsidies under
Article XV of the GATS;  negotiations on government procurement under Article XIII of the GATS;date of the next meeting of the Working Party;  and other business.
ITEM A: INSTALLATION OF NEW CHAIRMAN
2. Mr. Harald Fries, who had served as Chairman of the Working Party for 1998, announced that
Mr. Siva Somasundram had been appointed Chairman for 1999 at the meeting of the Council for
Trade in Services of 23 March 1999.  Mr. Fries expressed his thanks to all delegations for theirpositive contributions and the cooperation extended to him during the past year, and to the Secretariat
for its support.
ITEM B: NEGOTIATIONS ON SAFEGUARDS UNDER ARTICLE X OF THE GATS
3. The Chairman (Mr. Siva Somasundram) observed that the negotiations on safeguards
warranted particular attention, given the June-deadline.  To assist delegations in their preparations for
the meeting, an informal Note (Job No. 1998)  had been circulated.  It contained some background
information and suggestions for discussion.  It should not, however, prevent Members from raising
any other issue considered relevant.
4. He gave a brief summary of points raised during the informal discussion held on 24 March in
the Working Party:  First, it was generally agreed that work should continue on the basis of the "Listof issues for future discussion" contained in a Secretariat Note of November 1998 (S/WPGR/W/27).
Second, participants welcomed a statement by Indonesia indicating that ASEAN was working on a
draft text for discussion.  It was felt that a concrete draft might provide fresh impetus to the work.
Third, given the upcoming deadline, several delegations noted a possible need to accelerate the
frequency of meetings and/or envisage informal meetings before end of June.  He thus recommended
that, in scheduling the next formal meeting, delegatio ns keep the possibility of additional meetings in
mind.
5. The Chairman turned to the individual issues raised in Section II of document W/27.  As
discussed at the informal meeting and outlined in th e Chairman's note for the meeting, he stressed the
need to focus on key issues.  As a starting-point, he  took stock of elements of past discussions whose
importance appeared to be widely accepted in principle.  These seemed to include:
(a) First, definition and scope:  There was a widely held view that only governments and
government-mandated bodies should be authorized to take safeguard actions.
Concerning the potential beneficiaries of such action, delegations had embraced theS/WPGR/M/21
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principle that "acquired rights" of established suppliers must be respected.  There
were questions, however, concerning the compatibility of this principle with MFN
treatment.
(b) Second, the notions of temporariness and degressivity of safeguard actions appeared
to be broadly accepted as well;  Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards (AS) might
provide a model.
(c) Third, no delegation had questioned the need for procedural rules governing
investigation of injury in the event that an injury criterion was included (modelled on
Article 3 of AS).
(d) Fourth, the range of applicable measures:  many participants had expressed the view
that any measures should be limited to the temporary suspension of Market Access
and National Treatment obligations.  However, the ensuing question whether certainmeasures – such as subsidies – might be preferable to others – e.g. quotas – had not
drawn particular attention to date.
(e) Fifth, the concepts of transparency and notification:  again, the AS (Article 12) might
be used as a model.
(f) Sixth, the inclusion of a provision ensuring special and differential treatment of
developing countries, where Article 9 of  the AS might prove a useful example.
6. The Chairman stressed that the above summary was without prejudice to delegations' general
position on the need for a safeguards mechanism in services, its actual form and a satisfactory solution
to other open issues.  In turning to the issues whic h seemed to warrant further discussion at this stage,
he mentioned:  First, questions related to the use of horizontal versus sector-specific safeguards.  For
example,  the delegation of Japan had proposed at the previous meeting a distinction between three
principal approaches for safeguards:  (i) horizontal (available to all Members in standard format
across all sectors);  (ii) sector-specific (available to all Members in sector-specific format);  and
(iii) sector-specific/scheduled safeguards (available only if included in schedules).  There might be
even more variants, whose relevance had not been thoroughly explored.  Second,  situations justifying
the application of safeguards measures (type of injury).  The question had been raised whether there
were compelling examples of situations where safeguards would be (or would have been) needed to
facilitate sectoral adjustment in the absence of other remedies.  Third, the availability of sufficiently
precise statistical information on the existence of injury, and the possibility of establishing a causalrelationship between increased foreign presence in a market and such injury.
(i) Use of horizontal versus sector-specific safeguards
7. The representative of Thailand, on behalf of ASEAN, discussed the different approaches
outlined by the delegation of Japan.  The distinction made between the format of a mechanism and the
conditions of its use was helpful.  A safeguard mech anism could adopt a horizontal or sector-specific
format, depending on the outcome of the negotiations under Article X of the GATS.  The conditions
of use were a separate issue;  the GATS did not make the availability of safeguards contingent on
scheduling.  The safeguard mechanism envisaged under Article X was meant to be available toMembers facing unexpected problems arising from their obligation under the GATS.  Thus, they
could not be defined ex-ante and included in Members' schedules of commitments.  Scheduled
safeguards could only cope with foreseeable difficulties.
8. The representative of Hong Kong, China concurred that safeguards should be available for
unforeseen situations, which was not possible with an ex-ante approach.  He favoured a horizontalS/WPGR/M/21
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mechanism applicable to all Members, but did not exclude the possibility of applying it only to certain
sectors.  The representative of the European Communities observed that ex-ante safeguards required
reasonably precise information on the situation to be addressed, while an ex-post mechanism could bemore general and, thus, cater for unforeseen circumstances.  In supporting a horizontal approach, the
representative of Korea felt that scheduled safeguards could not cover all possible contingencies,
given the pace of technological progress.  Moreover, the scheduling of safeguards would depend on
bargaining power;  small economies would be disadvantaged.
9. The representative of the United States favoured a sector-specific mechanism, available only
if included in schedules.  He emphasised the concept of liberalization, the most valid motivation for
developing a safeguard mechanism.  The representative of Canada appreciated the conceptual
distinction introduced by the delegation of Japan.  He wondered whether the application of anemergency safeguard to individual modes would create advantages for those service suppliers whichcould switch relatively easily between modes.  However, application across several modes could
prove more trade restrictive than necessary to address the perceived problem.
10. The representative of Argentina found that the distinction introduced by Japan was interesting
from an analytical perspective.  However, his delegation favoured a general approach, either
applicable to all or some sectors.  The rules should be the same for all Members, without prejudice topossible preferential treatment being accorded to developing countries.  A schedule-based approach
could result in fragmentation of the system.  The representative of Egypt supported a horizontal
approach applicable to all modes and all sectors.  The representatives of Uruguay, Australia , Cuba  and
Hungary shared this view.  While supporting a horizontal approach, the representative of India  added
that it might be necessary to develop separate rules for the four modes of supply in view of their
particular characteristics.  The representative of Brazil, also favouring a horizontal approach,
acknowledged the possible need for flexibility in some sectors.  The representatives of Pakistan
associated himself with the comments made by Egypt and India.
11. The representatives of New Zealand and Poland,  while arguing for a horizontal mechanism,
did not exclude the possibility of developing sector-specific rules.  The Polish representative noted
that the use of a horizontal mechanism could be made subject to certain conditions in relation to
modes 3 and 4.  The representative of Japan felt that a schedule-based approach was excessively
flexible which could lead to instability, while a sector-specific approach might suffer from dataproblems in virtually all sectors.
(ii) Situations justifying the application of safeguards measures
12. The representative of Thailand, on behalf of ASEAN, mentioned a situation where, as a result
of unforeseen developments and of GATS obligations, a Member's market was inundated by foreign
services supplied via commercial presence and/or presence of natural persons.  The increase could be
in absolute or relative terms, to an extent that caused or threatened to cause disruption to domestic
producers of like or directly competitive services.  This could happen to any Member, considering
especially that the GATS required progressive liberalization.  Like the representative of Egypt he
suggested adopting the parameters contained in Article XIX of GATT 1994 and the Safeguards
Agreement in this respect.  The representative of Poland felt that a definition of the circumstances
allowing for an action might need to be developed, reference to unforeseen developments was toobroad a term.  He acknowledge that, while Article XIX of GATT used this term, more concrete
language had been provided in the AS.
13. The representative of the United States sought further clarification as to what was meant by
unforeseen as against foreseen circumstances.  He recognized that GATT Article XIX referred to
unforeseen developments, but failed to find such reference in the Safeguard Agreements.  The
perceived need for safeguards implied the possibility of injury in the future;  thus, any approachS/WPGR/M/21
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involved some element of foreseeability.  The representative of Japan wondered why the term
"unforeseen" had been eliminated from the Safeguards Agreement.
14. The representative of Thailand felt that the concept of unforeseen developments was very
relevant for legal reasons.  Article 1 of the AS referred to Article XIX of GATT, which contained the
terms "emergency" and "unforeseen".  Those terms suggested that the mechanism was meant to copewith situations that were unexpected when the commitments were made;  there was no need to repeat
this notion in the Safeguards Agreement.  He saw no basis for establishing a link between the
availability of safeguards and scheduled commitments under Part III of the GATS.
15. The representative of India felt that a safeguard mechanism should address unforeseen
emergency situations not anticipated by Members at the time of scheduling commitments under
GATS.  It should provide for flexibility and enable a domestic industry to gradually adjust.  For
instance, rapid technological changes might permit developed countries to supply serviceselectronically through mode 1 although such supplies had not been considered feasible at the time of
scheduling.  Existing provisions under the GATS were not sufficient to deal with such problems.
16. Several delegations wondered whether it was possible to describe situations, actual or
hypothetical, where safeguards might have been useful.  The delegation of Brazil noted that a similar
exercise had been carried out in the Antidumping  Committee's discussion on circumvention issues.
(iii) Injury and causality
17. The representative of Thailand, on behalf of ASEAN, said that the relevant injury criterion
should be "serious injury".  It would cover an adverse situation beyond normal expectations at the
time of scheduling.  For the determination of injury, the concepts contained in Article 4.2(a) of the AS
could be utilised.  The causality requirement in the area of goods, i.e. Article 4.2(b) of the AS, couldalso be translated into the services context, provided some key terms were modified.  The
representative of Canada reiterated doubts whether there were sufficiently objective empirical criteria
to apply these concepts.  The representative of Brazil observed that statistical problems also existed in
the goods context.  The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT (Antidumping
Agreement) thus provided for flexibility and allowe d injury determinations to be based, for instance,
on concepts such as constructed value, best information available, and even consultations with
affected Members during an investigation.  The repr esentative of Egypt felt that the application of
such concepts should not be prejudged and that, in any case, the burden of proof should be left to the
invoking Member.
18. The representative of Australia said that the applicability of safeguards could be made
contingent on the existence of adequate data.  Injury and causality were important concepts, and
Members should not be allowed to take action in response to injury that was unrelated to a surge inimports.  To illustrate the difficulties in determin ing causality, the representative of the United States
cited a goods case, in which all indicators pointed to the existence of injury.  However, the
investigating authority, seeking to establish a causal link, found that the main cause was not imports,
but a downturn in the economy.  Several Members noted that the lack of services statistics was a
serious impediment, which could also affect the determination of appropriate remedies;  the WorkingParty should further discuss this issue.
19. The representative of Venezuela gave examples of indicators that could be used in
establishing injury: losses experienced by domestic suppliers; decline in capacity utilisation;  capacity
reductions;  decline in sales in a sector;  reduction in productivity; reduction in prices or changes in
the structure of prices; declining number of domestic suppliers; and decreasing employment in thesector concerned.  An increase in  foreign supplies would be reflected in:  tax declarations (e.g. for
sales taxes);  indicators related to financial transactions;  statistics maintained by competentS/WPGR/M/21
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professional associations or regulators (including information on market shares or number of foreign
professionals);  capital flows;  and revenue figures.   Such information might not be centralized in one
agency, but could be available in various private and public entities.  Confidentiality should not be a
problem;  it had been takled in antidumping cases.  For the determination of causality, data series
(before and after market entry) could be used as in the goods area.  The burden of proof would rest onthe invoking party.  He noted that any type of administrative information might be admissible in such
cases.  In most legal systems, the standard of proof necessary for administrative action on economic
grounds was lower and allowed for more flexibility than in penal cases.  The Working Group could
invite antidumping experts to explain how injury determinations were made in relevant situations.
(iv) Questions related to compensation
20. The representative of Thailand, on behalf of ASEAN, noted that Members needed to carefully
think about the conceptual issues contained in Article 8 of the AS, and their applicability to services.
It might prove difficult to determine the level of any compensatory measures.  In addition, he
proposed considering differential treatment of deve loping countries;  Articles 8.3 and 9 of the AS
were relevant in this context.  The representative of Argentina said that his authorities were studying
this issue.  A solution might depend on the form of the safeguard mechanism ultimately adopted; therewere different approaches within the WTO.  The representative of Hong Kong, China, noted
difficulties with the interpretation of Article 8 of the Safeguards Agreement which might cause
problems.  The representative of Japan shared this view.  The representative of Brazil  said that, to his
knowledge, Article 8 of the AS had not been used frequently.  He would expect that, if Members saw
an imbalance in the application of safeguards, they would seek compensation.
21. The representative of the European Communitie s noted that the need for compensation would
depend on the type of adjustment, (e.g. minor adjustments might not require compensation), and the
nature of the services industry involved.  The representative of Poland said that further discussion
might be useful, starting from the existing rules for goods.  The representative of Korea felt that
Article 8 of the AS could be a model in services.  The representative of New Zealand wondered
whether all aspects, in particular Articles 8.2 and 8.3, could be applied.
(v) Other issues
22. The representative of Thailand, on behalf of ASEAN, distinguished two broad categories of
safeguard measures, relating either to market access or national treatment.  The representative of
Argentina expressed a preference for the suspension of market-access commitments in emergency
cases.
23. The representatives of Canada and the United States  reiterated their delegations' basic
position concerning the desirability of safeguards;  however, the discussion of feasibility issues might
provide helpful insights in this context.  The repr esentative of  Brazil called for a rapid conclusion of
the negotiations in order to promote new liberaliz ation commitments in the next round of services
negotiations.  The representative of Argentina observed an increased need for a safeguard mechanism,
as the new round was expected to improve significantly on the Uruguay Round schedules.  Therepresentative of  Korea also favoured an expeditious conclusion of the safeguard negotiations.
24. The representative of the European Communities added that any safeguard mechanism should
address emergency situations.  It should thus be used for limited periods only, otherwise Article XXI
of the GATS would need to be invoked.  The concept of adjustment, and how it could be best
achieved, required further discussion;  it was related to the principles of transparency and notification.
The range of possible measures might need to be discussed case-by-case.S/WPGR/M/21
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25. The representative of India said that it would be preferable if safeguard measures were taken
only by governments, and not by agencies with delegated powers.  Safeguards should protect the
national industry, including natural and juridical persons, of the Member taking the measure.  The
interests of foreign suppliers under mode 3 should be protected and there ought to be no measures
requiring disinvestment.  However, it might prove necessary for developing countries to temporarilysuspend national treatment obligations even for established companies.  He supported the concept of
special and differential treatment for developing countries, in particular with regard to mode 4.  The
representative of  Cuba concurred.  The representative of Thailand,
 on behalf of ASEAN, noted that
special and differential treatment for developing countries was consistent with the objectives of theGATS;  Article 9 of the AS would be of relevance.
26. In summarizing the discussion, the Chairman observed that the concept of unforeseen
developments, as contained in Article XIX of the GATT, had been a focal issue for many delegations.
It might be useful to consider its absence from the Safeguards Agreement at the next meeting.  He
encouraged delegations to provide examples of situations, be it even hypothetical ones, justifying the
application of safeguards measures;  document S/WPGR/W/24 might prove a source of inspiration.
Further work was also needed on the question of compensation as provided for in Article 8 of the AS,
and its applicability to services.  Continued discussion of feasibility issues might assist Members intheir judgement of the desirability of a safeguards mechanism.  He proposed requesting the Secretariat
to update document W/27 to reflect all contributions, without prejudice to delegations' positions, as a
basis for future discussion.  The Working Party agreed.
ITEM C: NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBSIDIES UNDER ARTICLE XV OF THE GATS
27. The Chairman recalled the two issues which had been raised in the preparatory Notes for
previous meetings:  the applicability of current GATS disciplines to either "import-substituting" or
"export-enhancing" subsidies.  Cases in point were assistance programmes which might enable
domestic transporters, hospitals, hotels or banks to expand their sales to foreigners at the expense of
foreign suppliers.  He invited delegations' comments on this or any other relevant issue.
28. The representative of Norway pointed out the lack of progress in this area.  In particular,
Members were very hesitant to contribute to the exchange of information mandated by Article XV of
GATS and explain their subsidies regimes.  To advance work, he suggested that delegations provide
any available information regarding trade-distorting subsidies in other markets.  Such information
should be submitted without reference to any particular country.  However, this was not intended to
substitute for the information that Members were required to submit under Article XV of GATS.  The
representative of Brazil noted that, as subsidization in general was not a very transparent practice in
goods, this could also be the case in services.  However, subsidies might have an important trade-
distorting effect.  The representative of Argentin a found Norway's proposal very useful.  Concrete
examples could also help to clarify whether the subsidy definition used in the questionnaire was
appropriate, given that some Members had raised doubts in the past.
29. The representative of the United States acknowledged the lack of transparency.  However, the
workload on administrations should not be further increased.  Subsidy experts in capitals were already
inundated with reporting requirements in other fora, possibly preventing them from replying to the
WPGR questionnaire.  The representative of Uruguay reiterated the need for balanced discussion of
all three areas covered by the Working Party's mandate.  The lack of replies to the questionnaireshould not prevent delegations from exploring other ways to advance work.  The representative of
Hong Kong, China, had no objection to the proposal ma de;  but noted that it should not distract from
the exchange of information under Article XV.
30. The Chairman encouraged delegations to submit answers to the questionnaire.  In addition, he
noted that several participants had expressed support for the additional initiative proposed by NorwayS/WPGR/M/21
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under which Members would provide information on subsidy-related problems encountered in export
markets.  He suggested that this may be a further way of taking the work on subsidies forward.
ITEM D: NEGOTIATIONS ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT UNDER ARTICLE XIII
OF THE GATS
31. The Chairman recalled that discussions at previous meetings revolved around the scope and
coverage of government procurement of services.  The starting point was three questions raised in an
informal submission by the European Communities: (a) What transactions constitute procurement?;
(b) who is the procuring entity?;  and (c) what is being procured?  It had been agreed to continue this
discussion at today's meeting, focusing in particular on the first question and, in this context, the
treatment of concessions.
32. The representative of Japan stated that concessions did not exist in his country.  Without
prejudging Japan's position, he noted the different form s that they might take:  (a) a contract between
a government agency and a private company for the purpose of developing natural resources;  (b) a
government contract with a private company for the purpose of constructing and managing industrial
sites, railways, public water supply systems, and others;  and (c) government purchases of services
which may be consumed by the government, e.g. cleaning of government buildings, or by the public
in general, e.g. garbage collection.  In cases (a),  where a company paid for the right to exploit the
natural resources, and (b), where consumers paid the company, it was not evident that the relevant
transactions constituted government procurement.  The third case, however, where the government
paid companies, seemed more typical of government  procurement.  The financial responsibility for a
transaction might be useful in distinguishing government procurement from concessions.
33. The representative of Korea said that in his country licenses, authorizations, and approvals
related to concessions were regulated by the competent ministries.  For example, the Ministry of
Industrial Resources was responsible for approving mining rights.  Since the definition of concessions
and their role in services was unclear, it might be problematic to include them in the Working Party's
discussion at this stage.
34. The representative of Australia felt that the discussion of concessions showed some links to
the recent Secretariat paper (S/WPGR/W/29), which she found useful.  The Paper noted that the
relevant GATT Articles dealing with government procurement used different wording, i.e.
"governmental purpose" in Art. III and "government use" in Art. XVII.  Apparently, this had not been
intended to imply different meaning, suggesting a relatively narrow interpretation of "governmental
purposes".  She recommended that Members consider whether "government purposes" in Article XIII
of the GATS should be interpreted to mean "government use" in a narrow sense, i.e. that the
government "consumes" the service, or to include cases where the government was not the actualconsumer.  It could be argued that certain serv ices were purchased for government purpose, but not
for government use.  For example, when a government contracted out training services destined for
the private sector, these would be fulfilling a purpose of, but not be used by, the government.
Examining the question of what constituted "governmental purposes" would help to clarify which
concessions could be considered government pr ocurement and which would be subject to normal
GATS disciplines.  In Australia, procurement of serv ices was not defined in law.  However, at the
federal level, entities were obliged to have re gard to the Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines in
all procurement cases.  A footnote to the Guidelines stated that the terms property and services
covered all goods and services, including: consultancies and professional services of all types;  real
property activities;  construction and related services;  financial and operating leases for equipmentand real property;  individual and collective training and educational programmes;  services obtained
from public utility suppliers;  and  outsourcing or contracting, including programme delivery and
programme support.  The inclusion of the latter activities indicated a very broad interpretation of
government procurement.S/WPGR/M/21
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35. The representative of Hong Kong, China, pointe d out that the draft Multilateral Agreement on
Investment discussed in the OECD contained a definition of concessions, which included the
delegation of activities normally carried out by a government authority to a distinct and independent
legal entity.  The representative of the European Communities mentioned a recent draft document on
the treatment of concession under Community law which could be of interest to other delegations
(Draft Interpretative Document on Treatment of Concessions under Community Law;  Official
Journal of the EC, C94, 7 April 1999).  The representative of Venezuela noted a fundamental
characteristic of concessions which needed to be analysed and borne in mind, i.e. exclusivecompetence of the State.  Other arrangements to be discussed were Built, Operate and Transfer
contracts, and contracts pertaining to the management of public utilities.  The representative of
Argentina noted that not much information was available on concessions;  he stressed the need for
factual material describing how Members defined concessions.
36. The representative of Mexico recalled that contracts of the third type described by the
Japanese delegation, involving disbursement of funds by the government, had been an element that
Mexico had used to identify government procurement.  In addition, the Secretariat Note
(S/WPGR/W/29) recounted that a panel had used paym ent by the government as one factor to identify
government procurement.  More information on Members' definition of concessions was necessarybefore any further analysis could be requested from the Secretariat.  The representatives of Malaysia,
the United States, and Uruguay  concurred.
37. The representative of the United States said that it was apparent from the Secretariat's Note
that the existing precedents (negotiating history or dispute panels) did not provide sufficient guidance
for the interpretation of the relevant terms in GAT S.  The Working Party might have to develop its
own working definition.  The representative of Poland also called for such a definition;  the responses
to the procurement questionnaire might contain useful elements.  In Poland, government procurementincluded construction procurement, the delivery of goods, and the provision of services financed fully
or partially with public funds.  The concept of concessions was not used in public procurement.
38. The representative of Thailand, on behalf of ASEAN, felt that the Working Party needed to
fully understand the meaning of government procurement.  He observed that there was no
authoritative WTO interpretation of the term;  the existing interpretations by various GATT/WTO
bodies of Articles III:8 and XVII:2 of GATT were , however, useful.  A key element to be retained
was the understanding that "government purpose" and "government use" both meant government
consumption.  In that context, it was difficult to include the notion of concessions if it meant the
supply of services in the exercise of governmental authority.  According to the rules of international
law interpretation, drafting history was only a supplementary means of interpretation to be used on anexceptional basis.  As a rule, one had to take into account the ordinary meaning of "government
procurement" in its proper context and in the light of relevant GATS provisions.
39. A representative of the Secretariat pointed out that document W/29 made reference to a 1992
panel report (GPR.DS1/R, 23 Ap ril 1992) which might be interesting for the Working Party's
purposes.  However, the report had never been adopted and therefore was not legally relevant.  Therepresentative of the United States emphasised that, although the panel arrived at a questionable
conclusion, its report illustrated some of the difficulties implied in defining government procurementof services, as in many cases government contracts combine the supply of goods and services.
40. The Chairman encouraged the delegation of Japan to submit its contribution in writing.  He
suggested continuing the discussion of S/WPGR /W/29 at the next meeting, taking into account
considerations contained in the 1992 panel report.  To clarify the concept of concessions, it would be
very useful for delegations to submit written contributions.S/WPGR/M/21
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ITEM E: DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING
41. The Chairman suggested holding the next meeting on Wednesday, 19 May 1999.  The
Working Party agreed.
ITEM F: OTHER BUSINESS
42. No points were raised under this agenda item.
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