RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/C/M/11 
2 February 2004 
 (04-0367) 
Trade Negotiations Committee 
14-15 July 2003  
 
 
 
MINUTES OF MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard  
on 14-15 July 2003  
 
Chairman: Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi (Director-General)  
 
  Prior to taking up the first agenda item,, the Chairman
 welcomed the Permanent 
Representatives of non-resident Members and Observers  and said he was sure that all delegations 
would benefit from their presence at the meeting. 
 Subjects discussed
: Page  
 
1. Reports by the Chairpersons of bodies established by the TNC ..........................................1  
2, Overview of negotiations in relation to the Fifth Ministerial Conference ...........................9  
3. Outstanding implementation issues (par agraph 12(b) of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration) – Report by the Chairman ...............................................................................71  
  1. Reports by the Chairpersons of bodies established by the TNC 
1. The Chairman
 introduced the reports by the Chairper sons of bodies established by the TNC.  
Written reports had been circulated in the following official documents: 
Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture:  TN/AG/10 
Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services:  TN/S/10 and 11 Special Session of the Council for TRIPS:   TN/IP/7 and 8 Negotiating Group on Rules:     TN/RL/6 and Corr.1 
Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Environment: TN/TE/7 
 
2. As Members were aware, the Chairpersons of  the bodies established by the TNC had over the 
past few weeks engaged in a cons iderable number of consultations, formal and informal, with the 
objective of finalizing their reports to the TNC.  Th e intensity of this important work had resulted in 
some of these reports being circulated only in th e last few days.  However, he thought all Members 
appreciated the tremendous pressure that the Chairpers ons had been under to finalize their reports.  Of 
course, more work would have to be  done in some areas in the coming weeks.  He pointed out that the 
report from the Negotiating Group on Market Access  would be available in the following days. 
3. The present meeting was the last TNC scheduled before the Ministerial Conference, and it 
was therefore a particularly important meeting.   Members had approximately 6 more weeks to 
complete the work in Geneva and he did not think there was any delegation that did not appreciate the 
scale of the task ahead.  He was sure, however, that with a firm commitment to work hard in pursuit 
of compromise, Members could help the Minister s at Cancún to deliver the renewed momentum 
needed.  Today Members had in front of them the reports of the various groups established by the TN/C/M/11 
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TNC.  The authors of the reports had worked ha rd to ensure that these provided both guidance and 
assistance to all Ministers as they prep ared to fulfil the Doha mandates. 
4. Since the June TNC meeting, th e Chairman of the General Counc il and he had intensified the 
informal process at the level of Heads of Delegati on.  They would be continuing open-ended Heads of 
Delegation meetings as a core element in the prepar atory process.  They had also engaged delegations 
in various formats of smaller groups to deal with specific issues and had reported back to the full 
membership on the outcome of all these consultati ons.  For the present meeting, he had consulted 
closely with the Chairpersons and a number of dele gations, and he thought that the positive feed-back 
received from delegations on this process refl ected the process as being on the right track. 
5. The Chairman of the General Council and he inte nded to circulate a first draft of a brief 
operational text for Ministers at the end of this w eek and he wanted to give Members a sense of how 
they saw this: First, this document would reflect the issues which had been listed in the Checklist of 
27 May – though not necessarily in the same order.  Second, it would be a brief and operationally 
focused framework which could not be much more than a skeleton at this stage.  This simply reflected 
the reality of the situation.  Thir d, the text should be clearly guide d by the mandates given at the Doha 
Conference and it should focus on the actions necess ary to provide momentum and guidance for the 
negotiations and the other elements of the Doha Work Programme.  It should, of course, reaffirm the 
Doha commitments, including the timetable for the Round. 
6. It was important to be clear about what such a draft could and could not do at this stage of the 
negotiations.  Clearly, it would not provide any magic solutions to major problems of substance in key 
areas.  These were not problems which could be solv ed by clever drafting in the absence of significant 
movement by participants.  This draft could and sh ould give a sense of structure and unity to the 
negotiations as a whole.  By providing an overall framework for the actions Ministers were committed 
to take, it should help add coherence and focus to Members' further work. 
7. Clearly, the reports which the Special S ession and Negotiating Group Chairpersons had 
produced, and his report as TNC Chairman to the General Council on 24-25 July, would support and 
complement this brief operational text w ith analyses of key issues and priorities .  It was very likely 
that there would be gaps, or possibly options, in some  areas in the first draft of the operational text.  
The task in the remaining time before Cancún would be to fill in the gaps – to refine and complete the 
operational text so that the Ministers had a clear basis for action. 
8. He strongly hoped that the discussion at the present meeting would provide Members with 
new and constructive input to the process .   It would be disappointing for all if delegations decided to 
repeat well-known positions rather than attempt to  engage in a constructive and result-oriented 
manner.  He was looking for an overview of the ne gotiations at this stage of the work and he hoped 
that, aided by the analyses received from the Chairp ersons, delegations would take the discussion to a 
higher level. 
9. In particular, he asked delegations to focus on i ssues of substance rather than process.  He still 
had the impression that, despite the progress that was being made in various areas, overall Members 
did not yet have a real negotiation and he urged them to seek the sort of instructions that would enable 
them to enter seriously into one.  The time had co me for delegations to start seriously communicating 
with each other and searching for compromise solutions  to their substantive problems.  No amount of 
negotiating with Chairpersons would ever produ ce the substantive compromises which should be 
made in order to move forward. 
10. As Members were aware, the work had recei ved powerful support from a wide spectrum of 
political leadership in recent weeks.  He persona lly – and in one or two cases his Deputies – had 
attended a number of internationa l gatherings in which the Doha  Round negotiations had featured 
prominently on the agenda.  These gatherings, incl uding the meetings of the Heads of State and 
Government of the African Union, the CARICOM Heads of Government, the African Union Trade  TN/C/M/11 
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Ministers, the LDC Trade Ministers, the APEC Trade Ministers and the Arab Monetary Fund of Trade and Finance Ministers, had all emphasized the importance of trade as an engine of growth and development.  The declarations from a number of  these meetings had been circulated for the 
information of Members.  They reflected not only the growing participation of developing countries in 
multilateral trade negotiations, but also the impor tance which these countries attached to the WTO 
and to the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in particular. 
11. Mr. Harbinson, Chairman of the Special  Session of the Committee on Agriculture
, said that in 
presenting his written report on the agriculture nego tiations in document TNC/AG/10, he wished to 
thank delegations for the constructive comments they made on a draft of this report, which had been 
discussed on 27 June.  No doubt some would be disa ppointed that the points they had made on that 
occasion had not been fully reflected in the final ve rsion.  However, it was his report made on his own 
responsibility.  It was not meant to reflect views of all participants and was without prejudice to their 
positions in the negotiations. 
12. He would not go into the details which were c ontained in the report itself.  Essentially, some 
progress had been made, particularly in a number of technical areas, such as possible rules on export 
credits, food aid and tariff quota administration.  These areas were vital parts of  the overall package in 
the agriculture negotiations.  However, on what he w ould call the core issues of market access, export 
subsidies and domestic support, pa rticipants had found it difficult to move away from well known and 
firmly entrenched positions toward s compromises acceptable to all. 
13. Since the beginning of this year he had, as was known, repeatedly and continually called for 
compromise and for creative solutions in the core areas.  While a few delegations had responded, or 
tried to respond, his impression was that most we re still unwilling to contemplate an outcome which 
did not correspond with their own positions.  In othe r words, as the TNC Chairman had just said, 
Members did not yet have a real negotiation. 
14. It was clear that Members would not succeed in  establishing the modalities while participants 
were in this frame of mind.  Members had precious li ttle time left – perhaps only four or five weeks of 
real work – to make the significant progress require d.  He stood ready to revise the draft modalities 
paper just as soon as he could discern some sense of  collective movement.  He also hoped the recent 
decision by the European Council on the pack age of measures known as "CAP Reform" would 
provide a spark, and that Members would at last  be able to generate some momentum in the 
agriculture negotiations. 
15. Ambassador Jara (Chile), Chairman of the Special Session of the Council for Trade in 
Services , said two reports had been issued: one concer ning the last Special Session (TN/S/11) and the 
other on the overall work since Doha and the future  (TN/S/10).  The Special Session had recently held 
an important cluster of meetings and was pushing forward with its work.  As usual, a discussion had 
taken place on the permanent agenda item on the assessment on trade and services and the Special Session had agreed to hold consultations to have a more focused exercise on trade in services in the 
coming weeks.  Canada had been thanked for its d onation to the International Trade Centre to help 
Members better assess their trade in services in national programs – an example he encouraged 
Members to follow.  An OECD paper entitled "Services Trade Liberalization: Identifying 
Opportunities and Gains" had been circulated and th ere would be a presentation by the Secretariat of 
that organization in a future Special Session. 
16. The Special Session had made progress on modalities for the treatment of Least-Developed 
Countries (LDCs), and he was holding consultations a nd had kept this item open in the hope that over 
the next weeks Members could agree on the modalities.  Completing this item would complete the architecture of the services negotiations. 
17. The Council had had extensive discussions on the review of progress in the negotiations and 
he was pleased to report that since last Thursday, 30 offers were on the table, counting the European TN/C/M/11 
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Union as one, and 8 to 10 delegations would be presen ting their offers in the weeks to come before 
Cancún.  He had not commented on the quality of  these offers, but Members had challenges and 
problems and were pushing ahead. 
18. Turning to TN/S/10, this report had been pr epared on his own responsibility and the factual 
part had been made available to delegations.  The Chairman of the Special Session read out the 
section of the report on future work: 
"While there is a degree of satisfaction with  how the negotiations are proceeding, it is 
imperative to ensure that the negotiations con tinue to progress in acco rdance with the agreed 
Guidelines and Procedures (S/L/93) towards a su ccessful conclusion.  It is also necessary to 
achieve a higher level of participation and e ngagement by all Members in the negotiations. 
 
Technical assistance is essential at this  stage of the negotiating process.  The 
Secretariat must therefore be able to respond ra pidly and flexibly to all relevant requests with 
priority being given to those from least developed countries. 
 
In order to facilitate the participation of  least-developed country (LDC) Members in 
these negotiations, Members must make every e ffort to reach agreement on the modalities for 
the special treatment of LDCs in the negotiati ons prior to the Cancún Ministerial Conference. 
 
As agreed in the Negotiating Guidelines, the assessment of trade in services, in 
overall terms and on a sectoral basis, will continue  to be an ongoing activity in the Special 
Session for the Council Trade in Services.  It w ill continue to inform the negotiating process.  
Members will be examining ways in which th e ongoing exercise could be improved and given 
greater focus. 
 
Ministers have agreed in Doha that partic ipants would submit their initial offers by 
31 March 2003.  So far only 30 offers (coun ting the EC as one) have been received.  
Members who have not yet submitted their initial offers must endeavour to do so as soon as 
possible.  It is recognized that the quality of so me of the offers leave much to be desired in 
respect of coverage of sectors and modes of supply as well as the depth of commitments.  It 
should be recalled that the Negotiating Guidelines state that this process shall aim to achieve 
progressively higher levels of liberalization of trade in services with no a priori  exclusion of 
any service sector or mode of supply and shall gi ve special attention to sectors and modes of 
supply of export interest to developing countries.   It shall also take place with due respect for 
the right of Members to regulate in pursuance of national policy objectives.  Considering the 
final deadline for negotiations of 1 January 2005, the Ministerial Conference might wish to 
provide guidance, including landmark dates by  which Members would improve their initial 
offers and finally revise them with a view to concluding the negotiations. 
 
The negotiations on rule-making under the GATS have been underway since 1995.  
The lack of progress is of concern.  These negotia tions are important and we must ensure that 
they conclude in accordance with their mandate  and within the agreed time-frames.  On 
safeguards, Members would need to make ev ery effort to narrow down the gaps between 
positions.  Members must also devote the necessary time and effort to advance the negotiations on domestic regulation under Ar ticle VI:4, government procurement under 
Article XIII and subsidies under Article XV.  In order for these negotiations to proceed 
towards their conclusion, it might be desirable to envisage a meeting of the Special Session of 
the Services Council devoted to a revi ew of progress by 31 March 2004." 
 
19. Finally, he could not fail to me ntion that in the discussions that had taken place last week and 
on previous occasions, several Members made the linka ge that they saw between the negotiations on 
services and other areas of the Doha agenda  – in particular with agriculture.  TN/C/M/11 
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20. Ambassador Chung (Korea), Chairman of the Special Session of the Council for TRIPS , said 
that in his report (TN/IP/8), he had tried to accommodate all the relevant points that had been 
suggested by Members at the 2-3 July meeting, but  knew the report might not be satisfactory to all 
delegations.  It had been submitted on his own resp onsibility and had been prepared without prejudice 
to the positions of delegations on the issues. 
21. In Doha, Ministers had mandated the Special S ession of the Council for TRIPS to complete 
negotiations on the establishment of a multilateral syst em for the notification and registration of wines 
and spirits by the Fifth Ministerial Conference.  To fulfil this mandate, the Special Session had met 
formally seven times over the last one and half y ears, including most recently on 2-3 July.  He had 
also held a number of informal consultations, eith er in an open-ended mode or in other formats. 
22. Intensive discussions at the formal meeti ngs and informal consultations had made 
considerable headway on certain procedural aspects of  the system to be established, but had failed to 
narrow the significant gaps on the main substantive issues.  In particular, Members' positions had 
been quite divided on the issues regarding the ne ed for an international mechanism for settling 
differences, the legal effects of registration for a geographical indication and the nature of Member 
participation in the system. 
23. He had circulated a draft negotiating text in Ap ril, containing options reflecting the different 
positions of delegations on these key issues.  As he  had reported to the TNC on several occasions, his 
intention had been to table a new draft text with a single set of ideas on the key issues before the July 
Special Session as a basis for the final stage of the negotiations.  But informal consultations in June 
had revealed that delegations had not been ready to  show sufficient flexibility to warrant his tabling 
such a text at this stage.  Therefore, at the July  Special Session, Members had to continue to use the 
April draft text, so despite sincere efforts, he re gretted to report that Members once again failed to 
make meaningful progress. 
24. He was disappointed at the continuing stalemate.   Positions remained entrenched and the gaps 
were as profound as ever.  However, given the mand ate to complete the negotiations by the Cancún 
Ministerial, there was no choice but to continue the work in the remaining period before Cancún.  He 
hoped that with more constructive engagement and flexibility, Member s would be able to establish a 
system which had sufficient added value to fulfil th e terms of the mandate of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration while effectively addressing the pr actical difficulties faced by some Members. 
25. Ambassador Groser (New Zealand), Ch airman of the Negotiating Group on Rules , drew the 
attention of delegations to his report contained in document TN/RL/ 6.  For a number of good reasons, 
he believed the Rules Group was in fine shape.  This was because the mandate had set out some 
additional timing flexibility throug h the construction of initial and subsequent phases without making 
the political error of defining this too closely.  He had always said that he had a more flexible 
mandate, which had proven useful to the Group Member s and this flexibility had been fully exploited. 
26. Another point was the distinct paths of the wo rk.  One related to regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) and the other related to rules, in the us ual WTO sense.  So there were two essentially separate 
negotiating groups under one umbrella .  On RTAs, he recalled that he had introduced the distinction 
between the transparency side of RTAs and the sy stemic or legal issues, and that distinction had 
served some practical use.  It had allowed Member s to have some very intensive consultations and 
discussions on the transparency side and considerab le progress had been made.  He had said that he 
was aiming for a decision on transparency at Cancún,  which was a slight exaggeration on his part, but 
this had served some purpose.  The two parts of the work were always linked, but keeping them 
separate had allowed progress to be made on tran sparency although he would not seek a formal 
Ministerial decision in Cancún. TN/C/M/11 
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27. The Group had held several useful discussions on S&D treatment in the context of RTAs, and 
he wished to emphasize that this would be kept at the forefront of attention including any further 
proposals in this area. 
28. On the rules issues of subsidies and trade remedi es, it had been an intriguing 15 or 16 months 
in the position of Rules Chairman.  With respect to anti-dumping, there was a large body of proposals 
on the table with still more coming in, and the sa me was true of S&D and implementation issues, 
which naturally had migrated to the Rules Group at an  earlier phase of this negotiation.  He drew the 
attention of those present for Geneva Week to the footnote on page 2 and pa ragraphs 14 and 15 in his 
report which contained important si gnals.  He would be grateful if delegations would convey those 
parts of his report to their Ministers. 
29. Ambassador Biké (Gabon), Chairperson of th e Special Session of the Committee on Trade 
and Environment , said the Special Session of the CTE had he ld its Seventh and last meeting before 
Cancún on 8 July.  At that meeting, delegations had taken note of her repor t (TN/TE/7), drafted under 
her own responsibility, which took stock of the stat e of play of the negotiations on trade and the 
environment.  The proposal by one delegation for a recommendation on the question of observer 
status and exchange of information had been discu ssed at length, and despite having the support of a 
number of delegations, no consensus had been found  on transmitting it to the Ministerial Conference 
in Cancún.  A somewhat shorter, but inter esting, discussion had taken place concerning new 
submissions presented by delegations  on paragraphs 31(i) and 31( iii).  Following discussions, her 
report had undergone certain amendments as suggested by Members. 
30. The negotiations on trade and environment had b een under way for a year and a half, and had 
been focused mainly on the first part of the manda te – paragraph 31(i).  Progress had been achieved 
on the understanding of the terms used and the questi ons contained in the manda te.  Participants had 
exchanged points of view on what constituted an MEA and what a specific trade obligation implied, 
and a certain number of these observations had al ready shown that there was a link between WTO 
rules and specific trade obligations as stipulated in MEAs. 
31. Paragraph 31(ii) was a slightly less complex part of the mandate because it was less technical 
and less legal than the previous paragraph.  Under th is particular point, participants had agreed that 
improved and reinforced cooperation and informati on exchanges among the Secretariats of the MEAs, 
the UNEP and the WTO would be beneficial and th at it would be useful to work more towards 
increased collaboration in the future. 
32. The question of observer status was still difficu lt due to the fact that, while the Special 
Session had a mandate on this issue, this question ha d also been taken up in the TNC and the General 
Council.  The Special Session would nevertheless pu rsue its examination of this question and it had 
found a provisional solution through invitations on an ad hoc basis for a certain number of MEAs, 
UNEP and UNCTAD in the near future.  She had b een heartened by the exchange of information 
session that had taken place with six MEAs and the UNEP last November.  These two practical 
experiences had enabled Members to have a fruitful dialogue. 
33. Negotiations on paragraph 31(iii)  concerned two other more targeted and technical 
negotiating groups – the Negotiati ng Group on Market Access and the Special Session of the Council 
for Trade in Service.  Progress in these groups coul d contribute to the work being carried out in the 
Special Session on the concept of environmental goods  and provide input on questions of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. 
34. With the DDA, negotiations on trade and envir onment had been started at the WTO for the 
first time.  She welcomed the commitment shown by developed and developing countries alike in 
what was a complex negotiating process.  At the halfway point in the round of negotiations, while 
praising the considerable efforts made by participan ts over the past year and a half, she wished to 
point out that on paragraphs 31(i) and 31(ii), further efforts would be required in several areas.  After  TN/C/M/11 
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Cancún, the Special Session would need to focus on pa ragraph 31(iii), in particular the identification 
by countries of environmental goods for import or export with a view to negotiating the reduction or 
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers accordi ng to the modalities to be defined by Members.  
Given the importance of the subjects that remained to  be covered and the limited time left before the 
end of December 2004, it would be necessary to c onsider holding more frequent meetings of the 
Special Session, and substantive work w ould have to be done by delegations. 
35. To conclude, she wished to say that with rega rd to her written report,  paragraph 21 had been 
sent to Members following the 8 Ju ly meeting.  This paragraph contained the comments that she had 
just made and was intended to be added to  report TN/TE/7 under the title Future Work. 
36. Ambassador Girard (Switzerland), Chairman  of the Negotiating Group on Market Access , 
said his Group's report would be made available s hortly after the present meeting.  The Group had 
meet on 9-11 July, and while at the previous  meeting on 16 May, Members had given their 
preliminary and general reactions to the draft elem ents of modalities that had been tabled, at this 
meeting the elements had been addressed in a subs tantive way, including the tariff formula, sectoral 
tariff elimination, additional provisions for developing countries, LDCs and newly-acceded 
participants, and supplementary modalities.  A pos itive discussion had also taken place on the issue of 
non-tariff barriers. 
37. He believed this meeting had b een excellent, with focused and substantive statements.  Basic 
concerns had been expressed openly and clearly and innovative ideas had been presented.  The Group 
had moved forward with its work, but was not yet there.  A huge amount of work remained to be 
done, but he was confident that if the Group succeed ed on staying on track with the same spirit, new 
steps could be made and new progress could be accomplished. 
38. He wished to give his preliminary personal assessment of the discussions on the various 
issues which had been taken up.  On the formula, he  sensed a general agreement that it represented the 
proper way to deal with tariff reductions.  Subject  to a number of qualifications, some of them 
substantial in nature, the type of formula suggest ed in TN/MA/W/35 had been found to be creative 
and to constitute a proper instrument to work on with a view to correct the imbalances and 
deficiencies it contained. 
39. He would note clear divergences among particip ants on two general issues regarding the 
formula.  First, its effect in practice.  One group of  participants were of the view that the formula was 
constructed in too soft a way and that, as a c onsequence, it was weak in terms of genuine 
liberalisation, including reduction of high tariffs and treatment of tariff peaks and tariff escalation.  
Another group of participants de fended the position that the reductions implied by the formula would 
be too ambitious given their economic situation and that a further softening of its various elements 
would be warranted.  In addition, the problem face d by developing countries who had both low levels 
of bound and applied duties had been mentioned as needing to be  addressed.  Clearly, there was a 
need to pursue serious discussion on this matter. 
40. The second general issue which had generated much discussion re garded the appropriate level 
of binding once the tariff reductions had been made , and serious divergences existed on this also.  
Nevertheless, some interesting ideas had been presente d which might be worth exploring further.  He 
would not go into the specific comments which had b een made on individual elements of the formula 
such as the "Ta" and "B" coefficients and the base ra te, which all the participants needed to seriously 
reflect upon. 
41. The views of participants were clearly far ap art at this stage on the question of possible 
sectorals.  Leaving aside the question of sectors to be retained, he noted that one group wanted this 
question to be addressed only once a better consensu s had been reached on the formula and this same 
group envisaged sectorals to be of a supplementary  and voluntary character.  Others argued that 
sectorals were of a mandatory nature, had value in themselves and formed an integral part of the TN/C/M/11 
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modalities in order to balance the perceived weakn ess of the formula.  This was another issue on 
which further discussions would be needed as Members progressed on the other elements of the modalities. 
42. On the issue of additional provisions for de veloping countries and LDCs, he believed the 
suggestions made had been well received, but for the question of flexibility in binding coverage, so 
there was a good basis for further discussions.  On bindings, there had been, as he had already 
mentioned, some interesting ideas on which the partic ipants might work.  On the question of how to 
treat newly-acceded Members, he had identified firs t a basic agreement that their special situation 
should be properly taken into account, but there was a divergence of views on the way to do it.  In this 
respect, a number of participants were of the vi ew that the suggestion that had been made in 
TN/MA/W/35 might not be the best way, but here too interesting suggestions had been made which 
should be explored further. 
43. On supplementary modalities, he sensed a genera l agreement to have them as part of the 
modalities, to keep open the possibility of having recourse to all supplementary modalities listed in 
paragraph 11 of TN/MA/W/35, and to come back to the issue once progress had been made on other 
issues.  On the elimination of low duties, it had been  confirmed that this was a controversial issue and 
closely linked in the view of a number of partic ipants to the results ach ieved on the formula and 
sectoral approaches. 
44. Turning to the subject of NTBs, he noted that mu ch time and effort had been spent at the last 
meeting and it appeared that Members had a rene wed commitment to make progress and continue on 
this equally important aspect of the work.  As a way to stimulate discussion and push the work 
forward, the Secretariat had prepared a paper listi ng the NTBs notified by participants according to 
the four categories of possible treatment listed in TN/MA/W/35.  The Secretariat's paper had been judged quite useful and participants had emphasi zed the opportunity of a practical step-by-step 
approach for NTBs.  As a first step, it had been agreed that Members should review and revise their 
NTB notifications to clarify the issues, or make new submissions, whichever was relevant for the 
participants concerned.  Afterwards, the simple and pragmatic approach which had been outlined in 
the Draft Elements paper would be pursued to ascertain whether it could fulfil the needs and 
expectations with respect to the implementati on of the mandate of the Group on this issue. 
45. In this context, he sensed that participants had seen no reason to take up or duplicate efforts 
with respect to NTBs relating to other areas of the Doha mandate such as anti-dumping and subsidies, which could be taken up in the re levant negotiating group.  A sim ilar situation would arise with 
respect to matters relating to trade facilitation, should Ministers choose to launch negotiations on this 
subject at Cancún.  There was, however, a large third category which was a grey area.  It concerned matters relating to other existing WTO agreements which did not ha ve a specific negotiating mandate 
in the Doha Declaration, and therefore the Group would have to do some more work on them.  
Finally, there was a group of NTBs that would need to  be dealt with in the Group itself and the type of 
treatment or instrument to use to address them w ould need to be decided upon.  This could include, 
among others, request/offer, vertical or horizontal approaches. 
46. Regarding the way forward, he was confident that the Group could build on the very good 
work done at the last meeting.  With respect more specifically to tariffs, participants would need to 
assess the innovative and constructive ideas that had been  submitted at the meeting.  In light of the 
next meeting of the Group on 13-15 August, he inte nded to try to develop some options for various 
elements of the draft modalities which could be fi rst treated in an informal way by the Group.  
Following that discussion, he might come out with a revision of the draft elements of modalities for further consideration. 
47. Ambassador Balás (Hungary), Chairman of th e Special Session of the Dispute Settlement 
Body , said that at the 10 June meeting of the TNC an understanding had been reached on holding one 
additional informal meeting of the Special Sess ion which had taken place.  Also, smaller group  TN/C/M/11 
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discussions had taken place on the issues, which had been useful but had not brought about any new 
results.  So his original report of 10 June remained unchanged. 
48. The Chairman  thanked all the Chairpersons for their re ports and for their hard work on behalf 
of all delegations. 
49. The Trade Negotiations Committee took note  of the reports of the bodies established by it. 
2, Overview of negotiations in relation to the Fifth Ministerial Conference 
50. The Chairman  said that delegations had pa rticipated in quite a number of meetings at the level 
of Heads of Delegation, in small and big gro ups, and they had now heard the reports from the 
Chairpersons.  He was sure that everyone would share his sense of concern that there was still a void 
to be filled with substance to produce real and meaningful negotiating results. 
51. Thus far, little had been seen in terms of r eal negotiations and yet, when he had attended 
various meetings with Ministers and leaders, he had been persuaded that all of them shared the 
concern that progress had to be made in Geneva .  However, there was no forward movement.  
Members might be waiting for others to make a move , which was the usual situation, and they could 
wait until Cancún, until the end of 2004 or beyond, but if no one  moved, nothing would progress. 
52. The message from the international meetings he had referred to earlier and from capitals 
showed the need for movement before Cancún.  For this reason, the present meeting should be 
devoted to asking the right kind of questions and to helping each other respond to those questions.  
Delegations might have the impression that they  had already responded, but for example, the 
Agriculture Special Session Chairman had just sai d that there was no movement to report.  Some 
Chairpersons had used words such  as "no flexibility", "no movement", "entrenched positions" and 
"stalemate", and as much as the Chairpersons would like to expand the areas of progress, the failure to 
do so was due to Members failing to help them make progress. 
53. After the present meeting, work would continue on all fronts.  Precision was needed on both 
agriculture and non-agricultural market access, so  that agreement could be reached on modalities 
before Cancún.  The major players should be encour aged to indicate how and when they could move, 
but they also would need an indication as to when others could respond to their offers.  At this 
meeting, Members should try to focus on some specific issues and to make clea r what they needed in 
those areas and what their expectations were.  Member s needed to have a real sense of urgency and he 
hoped that they would respond. 
54. The representative of Morocco , on behalf of the African Group , said the eleventh meeting of 
the TNC, the last before Cancún, was all the more  crucial than previous meetings because significant 
results had not been achieved on the main elem ents of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).  
Despite its disappointment with the overall evoluti on of the negotiations, the Group was ready to do 
everything possible so that Cancún took place under optimal conditions, in the interests of all Members.  As the Chairman had aptly pointed out, several regional conferences had recently been 
held focussing on the Cancún Ministerial.  Afri can Ministers of Trade, meeting 19-20 June in 
Mauritius, had adopted an important declaration summarizing the African countries' concerns on the 
lack of progress on the essential issues of agricu lture, TRIPS and Public Health, Special and 
Differential (S&D) treatment and the reso lution of implementation-related issues. 
55. African Ministers had called upon WTO Members to observe the Doha deadlines in order to 
see to it that the negotiations came to a conclusion in 2005.  Furthermore, the Ministers had stated 
their preference for continuing the clarification process on Singapore issues, while recognizing the 
importance of those issues.  They had stre ssed the importance of technical assistance and 
strengthening capacity building to enable Africa n countries to assess the impact of these issues on 
their economies.  The Ministers had also highlighted  the importance of crucial issues for the African TN/C/M/11 
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continent, such as the erosion of trade preferences,  the negative impact of subsidies and the need to 
facilitate the accession of African LDCs in keeping with the decision that had been taken by the 
General Council. 
56. Turning to agriculture, he said the African Gr oup wished to reiterate its position on the main 
elements: better access to agricultural products, mechan isms aimed at correcting the distortive effects 
of preference erosion, the recognition of stra tegic products as related to food security, rural 
development, poverty reduction and pr oduction diversification.  The Group reiterated its 10 June 2003 
statement to the TNC on the need to focus seriously on and find appropriate solutions to the effects of 
subsidies on the cotton exports of a number of African countries, along the lines of the Doha Declaration.  President Blaise Compaoré of Burkin a Faso, on behalf of his country, Benin, Chad and 
Mali had, on that occasion, launched a cry of alar m to save the sensitive cotton sector of African 
agriculture, which was being decimate d by developed-country subsidies. 
57. This cry from four West and Central African countries was awaiting a response, not through 
compassionate speeches, but by decisi ons based on solidarity and cour ageous measures to correct the 
trade distorting effects of cotton subsidies on world tr ade.  Cotton was a true test for the Doha agenda 
and depended only on devel oped Members to become a true deve lopment agenda item, otherwise it 
would become a simple trade negotiation issue. 
58. The African Group welcomed the efforts of th e Agriculture Special Session Chairman to 
make progress in the negotiations and remained fi rmly committed to the continuation of constructive 
dialogue with Members.  The African Group had take n note of the recent CAP reform initiative by the 
European Commission, which was a first step in th e right direction.  The Group was waiting for this 
reform to be put into practice through concrete proposals with a view to making progress in the 
negotiations on agriculture, not just in domestic suppor t, but also the elimination of export subsidies 
and market access for developing countries. 
59. On the implementation-related issues under para graph 12(b) of the Doha Declaration, the 
African Group repeated its support for their rapid r esolution and encouraged th e Director-General to 
continue his consultations.  On S&D treatment, the African Group welcomed the efforts of the 
Chairman of the General Council to reach consensus in this area and believed that his most recent 
proposals were made in a spirit of flexibility bearing in mind that all proposals should, in line with 
paragraph 44 of the Doha Declara tion, make existing provisions more  precise and operational, and the 
Group would continue to work to wards achieving concrete results. 
60. With respect to market access for non-agricu ltural products, the African Group believed that 
the harmonization formula and the sectoral approach  did not meet the specific needs of African 
countries and would not enable them to redress imbalances suffered by African economies.  The 
approach proposed was considered by the Group to be too ambitious, because African countries 
would have to make major tariff reductions not in keeping with the principle of less than full 
reciprocity under paragraph 16 of the Doha Declaration. 
61. With respect to the services sector, the reason for the Group's modest participation in offers 
and requests were due to the scarce number of studies in the sector where liberalization had already taken place, the difficulties of identifying strategic products and the weakness of technical and resource capacity to carry out analysis to assess the situation nationally.  The Group wished to 
emphasize the fundamental importance of mode 4 wh ich, in the current context, needed to be 
rebalanced since it had been the orphan child of the Uruguay Round.  Taking into account S&D in this 
context, especially for African LDCs, it was essentia l to give a real sense of flexibility where the 
GATS was concerned. 
62. 
On TRIPS and Public Health, the Group wish ed to express its regret for the unacceptable 
delay in reaching a solution for the implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.  In the absence of a concrete outcome, the African Group could only repeat the humanitarian and urgent  TN/C/M/11 
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nature of the resolution of this matter as well as its attachment to the draft Decision of 16 December 2002 as a lasting legal multilateral solution.  The Afri can Group had actively contributed to the efforts 
to re-establish the confidence betw een the various parties through cont acts and bilateral exchanges.  
He expressed the urgent need to have the numbe r of statements made by WTO Members put into 
effect in other international or regional venu es before the Ministerial Meeting in Cancún. 
63. In the dispute settlement negotiations, at the end of May 2003 Members had been unable to 
reach consensus on improvements and clarifications  to the DSU in keepin g with the mandate in 
paragraph 30 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  This setback had been despite the efforts of the 
Chairman of the Special Session of the DSB and th e readiness of delegates who had pursued intensive 
discussions in the latter half of Ma y 2003.  In its participation in this work, the Group had emphasized 
the need to improve the developing countries' acce ss to dispute settlement mechanisms by making 
S&D treatment effective and operational.  With resp ect to the mandate of this negotiation, the Group 
had already expressed its readiness to continue the work and the need to address the legitimate 
interests of Members in the Chairman's text.  Members should seek the approval of the appropriate 
body to extend the mandate.  In order to avoid a heavy work burden on sma ller delegations, it would 
be desirable to postpone these nego tiations to an appropriate date  after the Cancún Ministerial. 
64. In the area of trade and environment, the repor t by the Chairperson of the Special Session of 
the CTE gave Members an overview of the progress ach ieved in the negotiations in this area.  While 
Members had made significant progress on certain asp ects of the mandate on the relationship between 
WTO rules and specific trade obligations in the MEAs, and on the improvement of cooperation and exchange of information between the WTO, the MEA secretariats and UNEP, that progress on the 
question of observer status would allow the Special Session to move ahead. 
65. The African Group agreed with the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Rules that the 
process of identifying issues had been effective an d productive.  The Group encouraged the Rules 
Chairman to work on systemic issues so as to dete rmine the impact of RTAs on development.  The 
Group also noted the importance of paragraphs 14 a nd 15 of the Rules Chairman's report on future 
work of the Group. 
66. On the second agenda item related to the Canc ún Ministerial Conference, the African Group 
wished to express its support for the TNC Chairm an's introductory comments.  Despite the little 
progress on essential questions as Cancún neared, the Group continued to believe that agreement was 
still possible, and it appealed to developed Members for flexibility to achieve the objectives set out in 
Doha and to maintain the road map towards the conclusion of the negotiations in 2005. 
67. The Group had taken note of the Chairman's in tention of circulating a draft document the 
following week, and while expressing its firm and tota l support for this initiative, the Group wished to 
reiterate the importance of respecting basic pr inciples in the review of this document. 
68. These principles were: 1) transparency and the importance of the involvement of all 
delegations; 2) objectiveness and factuality in the stocktaking since Doha; 3) non-repetition of the 
content of the Doha Declaration; 4) clarity of vi ew for the rest of the Round, maintaining ambition 
and demonstrating realism and pragmatism with a view to 2005; and 5) the importance of the 
development dimension, giving it the place it merited in this document. 
69. The African Group was resolutely committed to  participate in discussing the Chairman's 
document with a spirit of openness and real political will to achieve a draft based on consensus which 
could transmit a faithful view of Members' work w ith a view to Cancún and after.  The African Group 
assured the Chairman of its readin ess to work actively towards this  end to make Cancún a successful 
and fruitful stage after the recent difficult period. 
70. The representative of Hong Kong, China  said his delegation shared the Chairman's concern at 
the lack of progress in a number of key areas.  Hi s delegation was aware of the hard task facing the TN/C/M/11 
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Chairmen of the TNC and the General Council in coming up with a first draft text for the Cancún 
Ministerial.  Without collective guidance from the membership there were bound to be many gaps in 
this first draft.  With approximately five worki ng weeks before Cancún, time was running out, but his 
delegation remained cautiously optimistic that Members could still make progress if there was 
political will and commitment on the part of all Members. 
71. His delegation hoped to see real engagement and movement towards some common ground at 
the present meeting since Ministers would not be pleased if delegations just passed on to them 
unresolved problems.  Ministers could not be expect ed to deal with technical details such as the 
coefficients of a formula.  Without the necessar y groundwork in Geneva to narrow differences and 
facilitate positive results, Cancún w ould be a missed opportunity and the timely conclusion of the 
Doha Round would be elusive.  Among the various negotiating areas, Members might need to spend 
more effort on the modalities on agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) by Cancún, 
as they were the crucial links in the DDA negotiations. 
72. In the agriculture negotiations, Hong Kong, China had neither offensive nor defensive 
interests, but it could see that movement in other areas could be difficult without movement in this 
area.  His delegation welcomed the European Communities' recent decision on CAP reform and 
looked for it to be translated into additional negotia ting flexibility.  In the crucial Agriculture Special 
Session to be held shortly, Hong Kong, China hope d to see delegations move beyond their stated 
positions toward common ground and narrow their differences, otherwise the chances of reaching 
agreement on the modalities by Cancún would be adversely affected. 
73. The Negotiating Group on Market Access had had a useful and focused discussion the 
previous week with Members having done their homework on the Chairman's proposal and its 
implications.  It was through this kind of fo cused discussion that Members could understand each 
other's priorities and concerns, but much work rema ined to be done.  One key question was the level 
of ambition and how to strike a balance between  obtaining real market access opportunities for all 
Members, while also providing S&D treatment and less than full reciprocity to enable the more 
vulnerable Members to make the necessary adjustments. 
74. His delegation believed that Members should conti nue to work on the basis of the Chairman's 
paper.  The introduction of the average tariff ("Ta" co efficient) as one element in the core formula for 
tariff reduction had the merit of building into the fo rmula the concept of less than full reciprocity, but 
also raised a number of important questions.  Give n the rather diverse range of Members' average 
tariffs, one key question was whether it was sustai nable to build such a big difference into the 
formula.  In this connection, various ideas had b een mentioned at the previous week's meeting on 
possible ways to moderate this "Ta" coefficient to  a more limited range while retaining the formula's 
basic structure.  His delegation had an open mind on different technical ideas, but Members needed to 
proceed quickly in view of the limited time left be fore Cancún.  At this stage, it was important for 
Members to reach a common understanding on the unde rlying objective, namely preserving the basic 
structure of the formula including the less than full reciprocity element, while moderating the range of 
the "Ta" coefficient to a more limited range.  His delegation did not rule out other possible means to 
improve the formula, so it encouraged Members to share their thinking as early as practicable to have 
sufficient time to deliberate and reflect before Cancún. 
75. The Chairman of the Negotiating Group had men tioned the possibility of preparing informal 
notes on different options on elements in the moda lity package, and Hong Kong, China welcomed the 
plan and would encourage the Chairman to circ ulate such informal notes in good time before the 
August meeting.  There might also be a need to ha ve informal sessions on selected elements, similar 
to the technical consultations in the agriculture negotiations. 
76.
 With regard to the services negotiations, the less that Ministers had to deal with, the better it 
would be, since they could leave the services expert s to get on with their work on the basis of the 
guidelines and modalities available.  His delegation not ed the importance that the LDCs attached to  TN/C/M/11 
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the development of a set of modalities that addressed their unique concerns, and it urged them to work 
with the Services Special Session Chairman and the rest  of the membership to identify solutions in the 
weeks ahead with a view to adopt ing such modalities before Cancún. 
77. Some delegations had suggested setting furthe r timelines for submission of improved offers 
or providing a roadmap leading to the conclu sion of the services negotiations.  His delegation 
supported the need to provide impetus for improvement s in offers both in quality and quantity with a 
particular emphasis on quality.  It could go along w ith any emerging consensus on further timelines or 
roadmaps, although it was not sure that they were  absolutely necessary or whether they would be 
pivotal in bringing about progress.  The dynamics of  the negotiations, not just in services but also in 
other important areas, would have a natural bearing on when the time was ripe for improved offers.  
Such an assessment should best be left to services experts as the negotiations progressed.  One 
possible option might be for Ministers to provide positive encouragement for Members to submit improved offers and to instruct the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services to set dates 
for submissions of improved offers, having regard to  the target date for the conclusion of the overall 
negotiations. 
78. In the rules negotiations, Members were m oving seamlessly towards more substantive 
negotiations after Cancún under the Negotiating Group Chairman's guida nce.  His delegation expected 
Ministers at Cancún to take stock of the progress a nd confirm the importance of the rules negotiations, 
particularly anti-dumping, in the overall balance of the DDA negotiations.  On the DSU negotiations, 
his delegation hoped that the extension of the deadline to May 2004 could be agreed at the forthcoming General Council meeting.  Ministers in  Cancún should not be bothered with this issue, 
and it should continue to be outside the Single Undertaking, as mandated by Ministers in Doha. 
79. Regarding the negotiations on a register for geog raphical indications for wines and spirits, his 
delegation agreed with the assessment by the Chairm an of the TRIPS Council Special Session of the 
state of the negotiations.  The Doha mandate was for Members to conclude the negotiations by the 
Fifth Ministerial and his delegation strongly sup ported the Chairman's call to provide for the 
continuation of work in the remaining period befo re Cancún.  His delegation detected hardly any 
change in Members' key positions since the negotiati ons had started more than 16 months ago.  There 
had been many general comments on how to fulfil the mandate.  His delegation was fully aware of the 
potentially enormous commercial interests involved,  and it certainly did not want to belittle the 
discussions thus far.  However, this was a negot iation and unless Members were prepared to be 
flexible and look at compromise options, they woul d fail collectively to meet the mandate given by 
Ministers in Doha.  Although Hong Kong, China did not have commercial interests in the register 
area, it had put forward a proposal mainly to help bridge the gaps, and his delegation stood ready to 
work with other Members with a view  to expediting the ongoing negotiations. 
80. In the environment negotiations, Members had actively engaged in the discussions from their 
launch in Doha.  Since there was no timeline specified for Cancún, hi s delegation expected Ministers 
simply to take note of progress made so far.  In the post-Cancún process, his delegation had an open 
mind on whether to hold more frequent  meetings of the Special Session of the CTE.  It agreed that 
more focus should be devoted to paragraph 31(iii) on environmenta l goods and the aim should be for 
the Special Session to come to an understanding on  the broad parameters for defining environmental 
goods, while leaving the detailed negotiations to the Negotiating Group on Market Access. 
81. On S&D treatment, his delegation looked forw ard to the Chairman of the General Council 
circulating a decent proposed pack age.  Only with a heightened level of enthusiasm and greater 
flexibility of all interested parties would Member s be able to produce results by Cancún.  On 
implementation, his delegation agreed that furthe r work in the relevant subsidiary bodies would 
contribute to progress on a couple of issues and hoped th at the relevant subsidiary bodies could start 
working as soon as possible.  Nevertheless, given th e limited time left before Cancún, his delegation 
was not hopeful that substantive progress could be made. TN/C/M/11 
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82. Singapore issues and TRIPS and Public Health did not fall under the ambit of the TNC, but 
they were also important for the success of Canc ún.  On Singapore issues, his delegation still believed 
that the best way forward was to develop tailored modalities for each of the four issues.  Regarding 
the more difficult issues of investment and comp etition policy, his delegation urged proponents to 
show greater flexibility in addressing the concerns of other Members, especially the developing and 
the least developed.  Otherwise, it would be very difficult to bring the whole membership on board for 
the launching of negotiations at Cancún.  On TRIPS and Public Health, his delegation hoped a 
solution could be found before Cancún to boost the confidence of developing Members in the DDA. 
83. The coming weeks would be crucial.  Delegati ons should all try to secure a good basis for 
Ministers to make decisions on a few crucial issues so as to inject momentum in the overall 
negotiations, otherwise political and business leaders might lose their interest and confidence in the 
multilateral trading system.  All Members would suff er if there was a weakening of the WTO.  The 
success of the DDA would depend on collective commitment here and now, and it was time for Members to try and build common ground.  Hong Kong,  China would continue to work with the TNC 
Chairman and other Members to make the Cancún Ministerial a success. 
84. The representative of the United States
 said her delegation welcomed this important 
opportunity to take stock of the work that fe ll under the supervision of the TNC as Members soon 
moved to the point where all preparations for th e Cancún Ministerial Conference would converge in 
the General Council.  During the course of a nego tiation, the tides of momentum ebbed and flowed 
and as Members approached the mid-term review in  Cancún, there was a strong desire to create the 
positive momentum that would move the negotiations to  their next level.  As focused as each country 
was on its interests – and appropriately so – he r delegation believed that all Members remained 
committed to the vision of a strong multilateral trad ing system.  A good deal of work needed to be 
done from the present to Cancún and time was short. 
85. Members were going to need to work togeth er in a spirit of cooperation and shared 
commitment in order to ensure that Cancún provid ed the necessary momentum for the negotiations to 
conclude successfully and on schedule.  Looking at th e Checklist of Issues put out by the Chairmen of 
the General Council and TNC, her de legation saw some progress since the last meeting of the TNC in 
laying the groundwork for Cancún.  However, it was clear that fundamental differences remained in 
key areas and Members would need to redouble efforts to close these gaps. 
86. The report of the Chairman of the Agriculture Special Session underlined that Members 
needed to make additional progress between now and Cancún in each of the three pillars.  Substantial 
reform in each of the areas of market access, export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support 
needed to be made to create a balanced and work able package.  Two of the three pillars needed 
greater focus if Ministerial direction was to be secu red at Cancún.  More focused attention was needed 
on reduction and harmonization of tr ade-distorting domestic support a nd substantial improvement of 
market access of all Members through more ambitious  tariff reductions.  The issues in the area of 
export competition appeared to be better defined,  with an overall commitment to eliminate export 
subsidies. 
87. Since the last TNC session, the European Commun ity had completed its interim review of the 
CAP and had made what appeared to be important changes to its internal programme.  Her delegation 
looked forward to seeing how the Community could tr anslate these changes from the language of the 
CAP to the language of the WTO.  The United Stat es remained committed to ambitious overall reform 
in agricultural trade.  An ambitious package woul d not only fulfil the Doha mandate, but would result 
in valuable trade increases worldwide – for developed and developing countries alike. 
88. On NAMA, her delegation believed a good subs tantive discussion had taken place at the 
previous week's meeting and a number of inte resting new ideas had been tabled.  However, it 
remained concerned that Members were sharply di vided on the fundamental issue of the level of 
reform and significant work remained to craft a cceptable modalities for non-agricultural tariffs.  Her  TN/C/M/11 
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delegation believed that Member s had an agreement that the modalities for NAMA liberalization 
would be a set of 6 integrally linked components: a single formula applicable to all tariff lines, a 
sectoral component, provisions on S&D treatment, treatment of newly-acceded Members, supplementary measures and non-tariff barriers. 
89. The Chairman's structure had taken root, but the branches now needed trimming and 
strengthening and Members needed to ensure the tr ee was stable and could grow.  They should not 
allow the weak branches, or individual sens itivities in market access, to undermine the basic 
objectives set at Doha, which were the reduction or el imination of tariffs, tariff-peaks, high tariffs and 
tariff escalation and effective liberalization of non-tariff barriers.  The United States was pleased that there was broad agreement on the approach to NTBs , the need for special tr eatment for the LDCs and 
the need to provide some special considerati on for recently-acceded Members, but the precise 
character of the special treatment or c onsideration still had to be determined. 
90. As the Negotiating Group Chairman had ou tlined, key areas of divergence remained, 
including on the level of ambition in the formula, the mandatory character of the sectoral component and the appropriate level of bindi ngs.  Significant amendments were necessary to these elements to 
achieve the collective mandate.  While her dele gation had been generally encouraged by the 
seriousness of purpose exhibited by Members the prev ious week, it was also concerned that some of 
the ideas that had been introduced might set Members back significantly, further amplifying the wide 
disparities that already existed in tariff schedules of Members and offering little in terms of real 
market access improvements. 
91. The United States was ready to work with othe rs to find acceptable solutions, and its tariff 
sensitivities – all of them – remained on the table, but others should also keep their sensitive products 
on the table too.  It was critical to remember that ambition and momentum on NAMA would be conducive to progress in agriculture and other areas,  since progress in one area drove accomplishment 
in others.  Although there were many important issues under negotiation, market access remained the 
lynchpin in any trade Round and this Round was no different. 
92. The NAMA negotiations were at a critical j uncture and her delegation wondered whether 
Members were going to choose the path that offere d real market access opportunities.  If so, it would 
help the world economy, fuelling the engine of mu ch needed growth and development and supporting 
Members' mutual interest in expanding trade.  As Cancún approached, Ministers needed to be 
presented with an approach that delivered r eal market access and focused energies on creating 
opportunities, rather than dwelling on individual sens itivities.  The United States was conscious that 
the give-and-take of tariff and non-tariff measures negotiations was a very labour and time intensive 
process and the clock was ticking. 
93. On services, as the United States had indicated at the last TNC meeting, it believed that 
Members should give greater prominence to the ser vices negotiations at Cancún, as well as confirm 
the purpose of the negotiations, given the scope of confusion in the public today.  A number of 
Members had expressed concern about the quality of  offers submitted to date and the need for 
improvement, so Ministers had to confirm a roadmap at Cancún that would encourage Members to improve their offers, guide the Members through the end of this year and bring a sense of urgency to 
the negotiations to bring others along, particularly developing countries. 
94. At Cancún, Members should be provided guidance to  ensure that in pursuing a higher level of 
services liberalization overall, there were no a priori  exclusions of sectors and that liberalization 
encompassed sectors key to infrastructure growth and development, such as telecommunications, 
distribution, construction and engineering, energy and environmental services, tourism, audio-visual, 
and financial services.  Members had also emphasized the importance they placed on securing commitments on the temporary movement of natural persons supplying services. TN/C/M/11 
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95. The report to Cancún should also recognize the s ubstantial progress that had been made in the 
services negotiations since the Doha Ministeria l – including adoption of modalities for autonomous 
liberalization, the many requests and offers that had been tabled by both developed and developing 
countries, and that the request/offer process was well underway. 
96. At Cancún the United States would also expect Ministers to encourage Members, the WTO 
Secretariat and intergovernmental organizations to in tensify their efforts to ensure effective delivery 
of technical assistance to developing countries with  respect to all aspects of the services negotiations, 
including the ongoing services assessments.  Special atte ntion should be given to the needs of LDCs 
in these negotiations.  The United States also belie ved that Members should aim to reach agreement 
on LDC modalities by the Cancún Ministerial since th ey were critical to secure the highest possible 
level of LDC participation in the negotiations, in cluding those sectors of particular interest to 
developing countries. 
97. With respect to the multilateral register of ge ographical indications for wines and spirits, her 
delegation remained of the view that the deadline set  by Ministers could be met to complete the work 
by Cancún.  However, this would only be possi ble if delegations respected the scope of the 
notification system that was ag reed in the Uruguay Round.  The mandate set out in the TRIPS 
Agreement was very clear.  It spoke of a multilatera l system of notification and registration, that 
facilitated the existing protection provided under th e agreement for those who were interested in 
participating in the system.  Under the mandate , the objective of the system was to facilitate 
protection, not to substantively add to that level of protection, as some proposals would do. 
98. Also, the mandate envisaged a voluntary system in which there were two classes of Members: 
participants and non-participants.  Again, some proposals ignored this fundamental point and would 
impose new legal obligations on each Member.  The United States and other countries had put 
forward ideas for a multilateral register that woul d meet these criteria.  The United States did not 
insist that its proposals were the only way forward, but it did insist that whatever was agreed should 
respect the parameters that had been set for this ne gotiation.  It was prepared to compromise, but was 
not prepared to accept something beyond the agreed mandate. 
99. Turning to development issues,  she said that on TRIPS and Public Health, as had been 
reflected during the G-8 leaders meeting and discu ssions on subsequent occasions, her delegation was 
continuing its efforts to resolve this issue successfu lly before Cancún.  At the urging of the Chairman 
of the General Council and Ambassador Seixas Corr ệa, as a Friend of the Chairman, the United States 
and other delegations had put a great deal of time  and focused attention into this work.  Members 
were making good progress, though he r delegation noted with some concern a sense that Members 
had moved backwards in recent days.  However, it ha d full confidence in the leadership that had been 
shown by the Chairman of the Gene ral Council and Ambassador Seixas Corr ệa and was prepared to 
match the level of engagement of other interested delegations in working to bring this effort to 
fruition. 
100. While addressing development issues, Members should not lose sight of the fact that the 
greatest potential gains for development would come with success on market access.  If this 
negotiation was to achieve the expectations that it had created in terms of development and growth, 
Members were going to have to do the hard things that they had been unable to bring themselves to do 
in previous Rounds, or had only done poorly.  In order to achieve this, all Members were going to 
have to contribute, providing meaningful new opportunities for all of them. 
101. Her delegation understood that there were con cerns regarding the adjustments engendered by 
liberalization, including as a result of erosion of preferences – though these concerns were less 
convincing when presented by developed countries with a strong stake in the status quo.  It urged the 
Director-General to work with the World Bank and the IMF to identify ways to address these 
concerns and welcomed the interest seen from the le adership of both institutions in doing so.  But one 
had to remember that preferences were eroding every day due to events taking place outside of the  TN/C/M/11 
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WTO and that the first best approach to build op portunities for all countries to grow and prosper was 
through the opportunities that the DDA offered to  open markets and strengthen the multilateral 
trading system. 
102. On the Singapore issues, her delegation welc omed the General Council Chairman's initiation 
of work on modalities.  As agreed in Doha, the United States would work with Members to develop 
modalities that would permit Ministers to give di rections on how the negotiations should proceed 
individually on the four issues – trade facilitation,  transparency in government procurement, 
investment and competition – based on the merits a nd specificities of each of them.  On trade and 
environment, the CTE in Special Session, as well as the CTE in Regular Session, had done good work in wrapping up discussions in the run-up to Cancún.  With respect to the work of the CTE in Special 
Session, her delegation agreed with the Chairpers on of that body on the need to focus on market 
access for environmental goods and services, and we lcomed the constructive discussions that had 
taken place on this issue the previous week in the Negotiating Group on Market Access.  Finally, the 
report by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Rules had provided a good picture of the work that had been done thus far and a glimpse of the road ahead. 
103. In conclusion, she said that Members stood at a critical juncture with only eight weeks to go 
before Cancún.  To ensure that Cancún set the stag e for a successful conclusion of the negotiations, all 
Members were going to have to focus on their hopes rather than on their fears.  All Members had a 
great deal to gain if they had the courage to sei ze the opportunity, and the United States was ready to 
play its part. 
104. The representative of Switzerland
 agreed with the Chairman th at there was hard work ahead 
in the coming days, and assured him of his dele gation's dedication to prepare for Cancún.  The 
negotiations had provided Members wi th three lessons to look at in order to prepare for Cancún and 
post-Cancún.  First, there had never been such a la rge number of participants with different views and 
sensitivities in a multilateral negotiation, and if Member s were to listen to one another, more time was 
required than had been scheduled.  Second, Canc ún would be about political stocktaking and would 
be a test to determine whether Members were su fficiently up to the challenges ahead.  Finally, 
Members would need elements now to move forw ard in the preparation for Cancún and guidelines 
and decisions in Cancún to move forward afterwards. 
105. The report by the Chairman of the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture was 
constructive and balanced.  His de legation thanked the Chairman for taking up a number of issues 
which in previous versions had not appeared, in pa rticular paragraph 7 with the full-fledged quote of 
the agriculture negotiations mandate, paragraph 8 with regard to the status of the working basis and 
paragraph 13 with regard to non-tr ade concerns.  His delegation appreciated the multilateral process in 
agriculture and was satisfied by the increased number  of supporters for the Uruguay Round approach 
in market access, which gave Members the respons ibility to address concerns of tariff escalation and 
took into account the needs of those who pr ovided market access through preferences. 
106. With regard to non-trade concerns, Switzerland be lieved that the more instruments that were 
available, the easier it would be to maintain the mood of change among its pr oducers, and this was a 
very significant element.  Switzerland appreciated  the European Communities' decision on the mid-
term review of the CAP and it had also complete d its own reform package at the last session of 
parliament.  In Cancún, Members needed broad di rection which would allow an assessment of the 
situation and to talk about figures afterwards.  As soon as Members had come to a more reasonable 
approach on figures, many things would become possible. 
107. On non-agricultural market access, his delegation noted with satisfaction that a basis existed 
for entering into negotiations even if an important number of questions still remained open, but it was 
up to the negotiations to provide the answers to them .  With regard to services, his delegation noted 
with satisfaction that 30 offers were on the table a nd it encouraged others to submit them as well.  On 
mode 4, he wished to repeat what his Minister had said that much pragmatism was needed to avoid TN/C/M/11 
Page 18  
 
the issue from becoming amalgamated with political issues of immigration and asylum requirements.  
His delegation hoped that in the coming days, mo dalities for LDCs could be accepted to produce 
forward movement. 
108. Switzerland favoured work on modalities for the four Singapore issue, which should not be 
very difficult to devise given that a lot of wo rk had been done and the guidance of the Doha 
Declaration was quite clear.  Members had to find a balance between the need to avoid pre-
negotiations and the degree of the precision in th e mandate to address the concerns that had been 
raised by a certain number of participants. 
109. Turning to geographical indications (GIs), he  said the Chairman's consultations had given 
new momentum to this issue and he congratulated the Ministers of LDCs who had signalled that they 
were interested in the extension of geographical i ndications.  He recalled the two-day trade show in 
Geneva organized by Origin which had enabled one to see that very practical products would benefit 
from an extension of GI protection. 
110. Switzerland, together with 22 other participants , had tabled a new paper on GIs.  These 23 
participants represented 37 Members from Africa , Asia, Latin America and Europe, and the 
submission provided additional answers to numerous questions received so far and constituted an 
additional basis for the preparation of the Cancún me eting including a detailed answer to how Article 
23 of the TRIPS Agreement should be reviewed.  He  quoted from the conclusions of the submission 
(TN/C/W/14): "'Extension' will open new market op portunities by preventing trade distortions.  The 
benefits resulting from ‘extension’ will foster de velopment of local rural communities and encourage 
a quality agricultural and industrial policy.  In a time of trade liberalization in these sectors, 
‘extension’ will help make GIs a valuable tool fo r the marketing and promotion of quality products 
from developing and developed countries alike".  Hi s delegation hoped that on this basis and with 
consultations, that a constructiv e and substantial dialogue could start with those Members who 
remained sceptical about GIs. 
111. On TRIPS and Public Health, his delegation woul d really like the issue to move forward and 
reach a solution.  It had noted with interest some  new elements presently being discussed informally 
and would like the answer to be drafted in a way un derstandable to the outside world.  Presenting such 
a complicated issue in a digestible manner might be a job for the Secretariat's public relations 
specialists. 
112. Environment was another area where his delegation expected decisions in Cancún: his 
delegation appreciated the work done thus far, and believed it was importa nt to find a practical 
arrangement for the observers.  This decision had nothing to do with the general discussion and the 
criteria for general observership in the WTO.  Fi nding an arrangement for the observes was practical 
so that delegations could benefit from thei r knowledge.  Discussions under the various Doha 
paragraphs should continue.  On the DSU negotiations , Switzerland supported extending the deadline.  
On S&D treatment, Switzerland hoped further prog ress was possible before Cancún.  After Cancún, 
Members would have to think in a broader sense of  how they could improve the situation of the 
various situations faced by some of them.  Swit zerland was neither pessimistic nor optimistic, but 
rather realistic in hoping for success in Cancún. 
113. The representative of Bulgaria
 said the report by the Chairman of the Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture was submitted on his own r esponsibility, but at the same time it attempted 
to reflect the state of play of the negotiations, hi ghlighting some "key issues and questions" for "the 
way forward".  At the open-ended informal meeti ng of the Special Session, some participants had 
stated that these issues and questions would "direct Ministers' attention in Cancún" and would "shape 
the questions, which Ministers will have to answer".  Bearing these statements in mind, he wished to 
express Bulgaria's position that the attention of Mini sters and the questions which they would have to 
answer could not and should not be shaped by Chairpersons' texts submitted on their own 
responsibility, but by a multilateral process and texts agreed by consensus.  TN/C/M/11 
 Page 19 
 
 
114. Substantively, the "key issues and questions",  as outlined in the Chairman's report on the 
negotiations on agriculture, did not take into acc ount the interests of all participants, including 
Bulgaria's positions and concerns.  They were on the Chairman's own responsibility and therefore his 
delegation did not believe that these  were the formulations of the issues and questions which could 
show Members the way forward and to whic h Ministers should be responding in Cancún. 
115. He would not attempt to comment and give hi s country's position on all aspects of the report 
on agriculture, but would rather try to focus on a fe w issues, which were of particular importance for 
the further process of the negotiations.  As his dele gation had pointed out at the informal discussion 
on the text of the report, since the revised first draf t of modalities had been explicitly rejected by some 
participants as a basis for further negotiations and di d not have any formal status in these negotiations, 
it was not appropriate to annex it to or to make re ferences to it in the report.  In some instances the 
report assumed, although it did not state it explicitly, some degree of consensus on some issues which, 
in reality, was not at hand.  The "key issues" and "questions" were influenced by the draft modalities 
and in many respects constituted their continuati on, but the draft modalities were not able to 
command consensus and instead of continuing to insist on them, they could now be left aside and 
other ways of taking the negotiations fo rward could and should be explored. 
116. On market access, the report stated  that "a formula reduction in tariffs will play a key role in 
achieving the objective of 'substantial improvements in market access' as agreed by Ministers in Doha".  It even seemed that the Chairman assumed some sort of agreement on a formula approach, by 
asking the questions "whether" the market ac cess package should include what he called 
"complementary approaches", such as sectoral in itiatives or any other means, and "whether" some 
Members and groupings "should have" certain flexibiliti es.  In fact there was no such agreement on a 
formula and it would be wrong to assume there was an agreement when outlining the way forward. 
117. It was true that if there had been consensus on such a formula, it could have facilitated the 
reduction of tariffs, and hence the improvements in market access envisaged by Ministers in Doha.  A formula, if there was agreement on it, could make such reductions simple and easy.  This did not 
mean that a formula approach was the only possibl e approach to achieve tariff reductions.  Other 
methods for tariff reductions could be the critical mass approach and the request-offer method.  Under 
a critical mass approach, different participants or gr oups of participants could use different formulae, 
proposed by them and accepted by others.  This  had occurred on non-agricultural goods in the 
Uruguay Round and had led to tariff reductions. 
118. Throughout the informal work on modalities, Bulgaria had been pointing out that the request-
offer method should be considered as a possible way fo rward.  It believed that even if a formula was 
agreed, if it operated on its own and was not su pplemented by a request-offer negotiation, Members 
could arrive at an unbalanced outcome from the point of view of the interests of some participants.  
Bulgaria did not think that it would obtain the mark et access needed for its products through a general 
reduction formula.  With the implementation of a general formula, Bulgaria might end up with 
reductions of its own tariffs wit hout having obtained the market access it wanted from others, hence 
becoming net losers in these negotiations. 
119. In some circumstances, the insistence on one agreed formula was not the best method and the 
shortest way to consensus.  If the formula appr oach was unworkable and other methods of tariff 
reductions were not explored, then the formula coul d become an obstacle to finding other ways for 
improved market access.  Members now seemed to be in a situation where there was no movement in 
the negotiations, precisely because there was no consen sus on a formula.  Some participants with 
offensive interests were not prepared to negotiate  on other issues before there was agreement on their 
preferred formula.  Others, with defensive inter ests, could not agree on a formula before counter 
concessions were made on other issues – such as rul es and disciplines, both in agriculture and in other 
areas – so that a balance of their interests was ensu red.  Thus Members remained in a vicious circle 
with no real negotiations taking place. TN/C/M/11 
Page 20  
 
120. The Chairman's draft modalities were neither th e result of negotiations, nor did they open up 
space for genuine negotiations, if they were to be a dopted.  The way they were conceived and if they 
were accepted, would remain a purely technical exercise of preparation and verification of the 
schedules.  There would be no negotiations in wh ich each participant would have control over the 
balance of his interests, expressed through the individual balance of his commitments and 
concessions. 
121. Bulgaria viewed an incremental bottom-up a pproach as one way out of this state of 
stagnation, which would aim at achieving a critical ma ss of reductions by in dividual participants.  
Such an approach should not be based on what par ticipants wanted from others, on their ambitions – 
as currently was the case in the Chairman's revised draft modalities – but on what participants were 
prepared to give, namely to contribute themselves.   The starting point for such an approach would 
necessarily be a minimal package which would co mmand consensus, and which would make positive 
linkages possible.  Such a starting package coul d then be further deve loped through negotiations, 
including through requests and offers. 
122. Regarding deadlines, his delegation did not be lieve that Members could find a way forward 
by readjusting the deadlines set in Doha.  The seque ncing of all deadlines reflected a delicate balance 
of interests and individual deadlines could not be cha nged separately.  The date of submission of draft 
schedules also depended on how Members organized further work – through a request-offer and a 
critical mass method – as outlined, or through conti nued waiting for consensus on a formula.  If this 
second path was pursued, then a date could only be set after there was consensus on the formula.  
Bulgaria's position that had been expressed in the informal and formal discussions throughout the 
meetings of the Special Session on Agriculture continued to stand. 
123. The representative of Brazil
 said he wished to highlight some pressing aspects in each area of 
the negotiations.  On NAMA, work had been prog ressing at an adequate pace and in a spirit of 
constructive engagement.  The first draft of el ements for negotiating modalities, tabled by the 
Chairman of the Group last May, had helped  focus the discussions and had established the 
groundwork to envisage concluding this phase by th e Cancún Ministerial.  The Chairman had a good 
basis on which to revise his paper and Brazil would c onsider it extremely important that he reconsider 
the section dealing with the sectoral negotiations as th is created an insurmountable obstacle for Brazil. 
124. On agriculture, his delegation agreed with th e Chairmen of the TNC and the Agriculture 
Special Session that Members did not yet have a negotiation, and this was possibly due to some 
Members' reluctance to accept the Chairman's draft paper as a basis for the negotiations.  In addition, 
one major Member had yet to fully share how its recent internal policy changes would translate into 
meaningful negotiating proposals, which was a matter of concern for Brazil.  His delegation was also 
concerned that the Chairman of the Special S ession had chosen to highlight the questions of 
geographical indications, precaution and labelling.   These questions did not constitute non-trade 
concerns, since they were dealt with in WTO Agre ements and should not be considered within the 
context of modalities for the agriculture negotiations. 
125. As to the peace clause, his delegation failed to  see the linkage between its expiration and the 
establishment of modalities.  That was why this point  had not been covered in the revised first draft 
and should not be covered in future drafts.  Th e deadline for the peace clause did not formally 
constitute an element of the Doha mandate as it represented a date set out in a specific prior context 
within the organization and one should not take anything for granted concerning it. 
126. In the rules area, his delegation agreed with the Chairman of the Negotiating Group that the 
Group would have to accelerate its work after Cancún  with a need to shift emphasis from identifying 
issues to seeking solutions.  On trade and environm ent, the solution adopted in February by the 
Special Session of the CTE regarding the particip ation of MEAs in its meetings, through ad hoc 
invitations, represented a groundbreaking achievement , especially taking into account the sensitivity 
and the horizontal dimension of the issue of observership in the WTO.  This should serve as a  TN/C/M/11 
 Page 21 
 
 
precedent for similar decisions by other WTO bodi es, such as the TRIPS Council, regarding the 
participation of the Convention on Biological Divers ity.  On paragraph 31(iii), work remained to be 
done, especially regarding the need to establish lis ts of environmental goods and services that took 
into account the interests of developing countries. 
127. On the TRIPS negotiations, Brazil would have expected by now that an agreement would 
have been reached on the establishment of a volunta ry multilateral register of geographical indications 
for wines and spirits that duly took into account the interests of all participants and preserved the 
balance of rights and obligations under the TRIP S Agreement.  However, his delegation would 
continue to engage constructively in the negotiations, in accordance w ith the terms of the mandate set 
forth in Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
128. Accomplishments in the services negotiations were far from meaningless, but the pace was 
uneven among the different areas within GATS and no t entirely satisfactory.  The GATS could not be 
reduced to its market access dimension.  Market access commitments might turn out to be no more than an expectation without the certainty accruing from a multilaterally developed set of rules on 
subsidies, safeguards, domestic regulation and classifi cation.  He wished to stress that the services 
negotiations were not an isolated endeavor and th at Brazil's initial offer and subsequent ones would 
reflect whatever progress, or lack thereof, occurre d in other areas of the Round where it had priority 
interests. 
129. On a more general note, he wished to share some views on the run-up to Cancún and Brazil's 
expectations with regard to the Ministerial Confer ence itself.  Time and again, Brazil had stated its 
readiness to engage in meaningful negotiations on each and every issue in the Doha Work Programme 
and it expected a similar willingness to engage fro m all partners.  From developed countries in 
particular, it also looked for the correction of some of the imbalances left over from the Uruguay Round on issues, such as: S&D treatment, implem entation-related issues a nd the uneven standards 
applicable to different sectors of trade in goods – for agriculture and industrial goods.  His delegation 
wondered whether there was a willingness to engage.  There had clearly been some progress in 
several areas as heard in the reports made to the pr esent meeting.  But that was clearly not enough to 
set the stage for agreement in Cancún on the key is sues which had eluded Members so far, such as 
agricultural and non-agricultural modalities, Singa pore issues and the so-called development issues. 
130. His delegation understood that, in a Single Undertaking, pieces had to fall into place at more 
or less the same time, but if the most powerful pl ayers – the ones who had benefited the most from the 
multilateral trading system – held back, it wonde red whether one could be  optimistic about the 
outcome and whether developing countries could be e xpected to come forward in return for promises 
of opportunities which might or might not materia lize in the future.  Brazil wondered how it could 
really press the negotiations button until it was sufficie ntly reassured by its partners that they were 
prepared to move substantially in the areas of legitima te concern to it, especially in all the three pillars 
of the agriculture negotiation.  He agreed with  the Chairman on not repeating well-known positions, 
but he wished to make it clear that substantive pr ogress in agriculture was essential for Brazil to move 
substantially, as it was prepared to do, in other areas of this negotiation. 
131. Success in Cancún depended in part on the ab ility of delegations to present a manageable 
package for Ministers to decide upon.  For that, th ey had to have, sufficiently in advance, a clear 
perception of the broad outlines of the final package.   His delegation thus looked forward to the draft 
paper to be circulated by the Chairman of the TNC and General Council.  His delegation wished to 
underline its full confidence that common sense, as  well as a shared vision in the importance of 
strengthening the multilateral trading system at this  crucial juncture in the world economy as a whole 
and in the development process in particular, would finally prevail.  Brazil hoped that the busy period 
of the last few months had been an exercise whic h would prepare them for the final sprint to Cancún 
and beyond to a successful and ambiti ous outcome by the 2005 deadline. TN/C/M/11 
Page 22  
 
132. The representative of the European Communities
 said it was clear from the Chairpersons' 
reports that the following few weeks would be crucia l for the preparation of Cancún.  Most of the 
technical work had been done and it was now time to assemble the various building blocks to find the 
right balance between and within them.  Members ha d also come to the stag e where the work of the 
TNC and the General Council had to converge.  Only  a comprehensive approach could pave the way 
for success in Cancún.  Such su ccess would be achieved with decisions on modalities in agriculture, 
non-agriculture goods and Singapore issues and deci sions on development-related issues, such as 
implementation-related issues, S&D treatment and TR IPS and Public Health.  Members had to ensure 
that these decisions were prepared in a way that Ministers were in a position to decide. 
133. With the experience of Seattle, delegations could not take the risk of putting much unfinished 
business on the Ministerial Conference table, which implie d that they needed to get to the core of the 
negotiations in the next days and weeks.  Delega tions could not permit themselves to backload the 
entire process into the second half of August.  This would require strong and effective leadership, and 
the Community was confident that the Chairman of  the TNC and General Council could provide that 
leadership.  But obviously the Membership also ha d to show engagement and provide guidance, and 
some Members might carry a larger responsibility in  this process than others.  The Community was 
ready to assume its part. 
134. There was now a need to go well beyond the Ch ecklist of Issues and to provoke Members to 
converge on the crucial issues.  Convergence on some  issues would facilitate convergence on others, 
as some had said at the present meeting.  His delegation was pleased that in the coming days Members could expect to have a skeleton paper to work on.  It would be their working tool and their 
responsibility to put flesh on its bones.  On developmen t-related issues, he had the impression that this 
process was already under way, and hard work wa s being done in a constructive manner on both S&D 
treatment and implementation.  Members had also  heard some encouraging signals on TRIPS and 
Public Health, which might lead to the adoption of the 16 December 2002 compromise, and he would 
hope that all decisions could be finalized by the e nd of the month.  Everyone knew that substantive 
S&D treatment and implementation is sues were of a highly technical nature and it was incumbent to 
solve them in Geneva well before Cancún. 
135. The comprehensive report of the Chairman of th e Agriculture Special Session listed most of 
the key issues to be resolved for the modalities,  but his delegation believed that it addressed 
insufficiently key issues, such as non-trade con cerns (NTCs), and that it gave an imbalanced 
presentation of other issues, such as export subs idization.  However, the European Communities 
remained committed to establishing ambiti ous modalities on agriculture at Cancún. 
136. The Community had recently substantially reform ed a large part of its agricultural policy, 
which would reduce remaining trade-distorting subsid ies.  Provided that others were capable and 
willing to accept comparable disciplines and reduc tions, an agreement to substantially reduce 
distortions in world agriculture trade in line with  the Doha mandate would become a realistic goal for 
Cancún.  His delegation hoped othe rs would be able to match the Community and its negotiating 
mandate was clear – his delegation could commit the European Communities to a huge reduction in 
trade-distorting domestic support if others did the same .  This should, of course, include similar cuts 
for all trade-distorting subsidies, especially in de veloped countries, including in the sector of export 
subsidization. 
137. Progress on market access was also essential and Members knew which formula the European 
Communities and many other Members preferred.  It  was also known that the main objective of some 
Members was to open up developing-country markets to  a very substantial extent, which did not seem 
very realistic.  Due to the huge interests involved,  a compromise was needed to safeguard developing-
country defensive concerns while still leading to  a significant tariff reduction and to the complete 
opening of developing-country markets to agricultural exports from the LDCs.  TN/C/M/11 
 Page 23 
 
 
138. The European Communities was ready to engage  in negotiations with a very ambitious 
objective.  It now had a huge agricultural domestic subsidy chip to put on the table which many had 
clamoured for over many years.  However, the Community wondered whether the other main subsidizers would match this and undertake their ow n reform.  The Community's objective for Cancún 
remained an ambitious and comprehensive package,  which also took into account some of its main 
concerns.  It had to be a process of give and ta ke.  The Community's concerns on NTCs and, more 
particularly, GIs had to be part and parcel of the package.  While there were some weak signals of 
engagement on the question of GI extension, his delegation remained disappointed at the lack of 
progress on the question of the wines and spirits register. 
139. On NAMA, it was paramount for the European Communities that all elements of the Doha 
mandate be fully respected.  This entailed:  1) The reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs 
and tariff escalation in a fair and equitable manner, which guaranteed effective market access for all.  
The result of these negotiations should not and could not be a mere confirmation of the status quo.  
2) A visible S&D dimension, including through l ess than full reciprocity, increasing predictability and 
taking into account the degree of integration of  developing countries in the multilateral trading 
system.  3) A need for a fair and balanced form ula approach, which encouraged a higher binding ratio, 
and effective reduction between  applied and bound rates. 
140. While the principle of a single formula was widely accepted and a number of technical 
parameters seemed to be accep ted, there was still some work to be done on the Negotiating Group 
Chairman's formula to meet the objectives of the Doha Mandate.  The aim should be to maintain 
ambition in line with the mandate, to focus on simplif ying the formula and to make it more equitable 
between developing countries. 
141. Both on agriculture and on non-agriculture, th e European Communities took the concerns of 
developing countries to heart, particularly LDCs .  It was necessary to seriously address these 
countries' concerns on the erosion of tariff pr eferences, which would require a comprehensive 
approach of transitional arrangements, less th an full reciprocity, S&D treatment and effective 
technical assistance and capacity building. 
142. Establishing modalities on Singapore issues was an explicit mandate of the DDA, as explicit 
as the need for explicit consensus to start negotiations on all four issues.  The Community was ready 
to address concerns of its partners in further defini ng the scope of the various issues, and it accepted 
the concern that Members should have an idea wher e the journey was going.  However, the mandate 
was to decide on opening the negotiations in Cancún,  not concluding them.  Therefore, Members had 
to set the same timeframe as other subjects within th e Single Undertaking.  He wished to reiterate that 
the European Communities had no particular offensiv e interests in the Singapore issues, but that it 
rather considered all of them of great systemic interest to the WTO as a whole. 
143. On environment, the Community believed it was important to decide in Cancún on the 
observership of the MEAs in the CTE Special Sess ion.  There was no objection as such to this, but 
rather a linkage to the general question of observers hip.  Members should make a major effort either 
to solve the general question in time for Cancún, or to decide on MEA observership on its own merit 
as it was a very specific case.  His delegation s upported the Chairperson of the CTE Special Session 
in her call for intensified work in the coming mont hs, in particular on market access for environmental 
goods and services.  On the DSU negotiations, his de legation was prepared to continue after Cancún 
with the view of concluding them by 1 May 2004. 
144. The representative of Nicaragua
 said he wished to set out his delegation's preliminary views 
on the Chairpersons' reports, since these would be on e of the elements that Ministers would consider 
in Cancún.  On agriculture, his delegation shared th e views of the Chairman of the Special Session as 
outlined in his 7 July report, particularly that Members urgently needed to reach agreement on 
modalities which was the way to comply with the ma ndate that had been laid down by Ministers in 
Doha.  The achievement of the objectives of this mandate would determine the success or failure of TN/C/M/11 
Page 24  
 
the negotiations in general.  The specific and cl ear mandate in paragraphs  13 and 14 could not be 
ignored, since this would be departing from the urgent need to reduce, with a view to eliminating, all 
measures which currently distorted agricultural trade. 
145. While Cancún was not the end of the process star ted at Doha, it was rather the mid-way point, 
where an assessment would be made of the steps ta ken and Ministers would be able to reorient the 
process.  His country, like many others, wished for real liberalization in agricultural trade, which 
would start with the elimination of measures that di storted agricultural markets.  With this in mind, 
there could be no significant tariff reductions if co untries like his did not have guarantees for reducing 
distortive measures as a first step. 
146. Nicaragua, being a small economy with devel opment that was below the average of the 
continent and below the average of  the Central America, was more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of 
international trade in agricultural goods.  For this  reason, protection of sensitive products was an 
indispensable pre-condition in the negotiation.  His delegation understood that, for many Members, 
special products was a difficult concept to think abou t, but for his country it was even more difficult 
to think that while markets continued to be greatly distorted, there would be a lowering of Nicaragua's 
agricultural tariffs.  So it was necessary to estab lish a comfortable balance, not only for the large 
competitors, but for all Members. 
147. On services, Members needed to balance the progress between the negotiations on market 
access and those on horizontal issues.  Nicaragua was in favour of open markets, and given the 
circumstances in agriculture, the only opportuniti es were in services.  However, although Nicaragua 
appreciated the many offers submitted by other Memb ers, it was concerned that despite its requests in 
March, little or nothing had been done to include these in the initial offers on the table.  His delegation 
was aware that in this negotiating process a lot remain ed to be done, but to start a process with such a 
meagre offer with regard to Nicaragua's interests, in particular in the light of the ambitious requests 
that it had presented, led it to belie ve that many Members were expecting to receive a lot in exchange 
for nothing.  This perception was de trimental to the overall negotiations. 
148. His delegation believed it was important to mention the need to establish coherent and 
functional mechanisms with regard to the horizont al issues.  It had doubts about modifying its 
schedules in this negotiation under a classification that did not reflect the dynamism of the world of 
services.  With the current classification, it would be  difficult to include new services that were being 
created everyday.  Despite not being a Member with strong demands in GATS rules, Nicaragua believed that, to achieve a good atmosphere in th e overall negotiations, it would be necessary to see 
more flexibility and will to negotiate positively in the three main areas of the group.  In domestic 
regulation, it was imperative to have full complia nce with the legitimate objectives of national policy 
as a point of departure for international rules. 
149. On environment, his delegation wished to stress the relevance of the TBT Committee, which 
was the body in charge of discussing issues relati ng to eco-labelling, because the mandate of this 
Committee meant it was ideally placed for the analysis of issues of this nature, which would avoid the 
duplication of this discussion in other forums.  Hi s delegation viewed the work carried out by the 
Special Session of the CTE on the conceptual di scussion on environmental goods as important.  His 
delegation was aware of the complexity of the issu e, however, he wished to reiterate the importance 
and validity of paragraph 16 of the Doha Minister ial Declaration, which promoted the reduction or 
elimination of tariff-peaks as well as non-tariff barriers,  particularly with respect to products of export 
interest to developing countries. 
150. As to the discussion of granting observer stat us to MEAs, his delegation would favour this, 
but there was a need to continue the discussions on the criteria and procedures for this.  His delegation 
welcomed the progress achieved in this regard and was pleased with the practice of inviting MEAs on 
an ad-hoc basis to the Special Session of the CTE.  TN/C/M/11 
 Page 25 
 
 
151. On TRIPS and Public Health, his delegation was committed to searching for a solution to 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration and regrette d that no solution had been found to date.  
Nicaragua, like most Members, did not have the means to manufacture its own drugs, did not produce 
active ingredients and suffered from a void in phar maceutical sector scientific research.  All this 
placed his country at a disadvantage in allevia ting and confronting diseases, many of which were 
reappearing after having thought to be overcome a nd this was why it was necessary to find a solution 
to this deadlock as soon as possible. 
152. On NAMA, his delegation welcomed Norway's proposal on IDA-only countries, since it was 
in response to the appeal of paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration to formulate coherent economic 
policies at a global level.  The Bretton Woods In stitutions and the WTO were two actors with an 
important role to play in the future of many c ountries, and the coherent action contained in this 
proposal not only promoted the development of tho se who most needed it, but also gave a positive 
external image to this organization.  On S&D tr eatment, his delegation welcomed the initiative of the 
General Council Chairman and assured him and the Fr iends of the Chair of its support in the work 
aimed at finding solutions to the issues to the benefit of all developing countries. 
153. In conclusion, he said that the objective was not for Cancún to show major results, but rather 
that the results be positive and this needed much more flexibility on the part of some Members who 
continued to maintain inflexible positions.  He believed the words of W. W. Dyer were prophetic and 
quite apt:  "Progress and development are impossibl e if one continues doing things the way one has 
always done them".  Nicaragua thoug ht it was time for all Members to  yield to change otherwise there 
would be little progress to celebrate in Cancún. 
154. The representative of Kenya  recalled that at Doha, Members had agreed to an ambitious 
agenda that had put development at the heart of the negotiations.  The agenda had promised real 
progress for both agricultural and industrial mark et access for developing-country exports.  It 
promised services negotiations that offered real benef its for developing countries, particularly those at 
low levels of development.  The Doha agenda promised to provide flexibility to developing countries 
to cope with public health problems, to strengt hen existing S&D provisions by making them precise, 
effective and operational, as well as resolving the implementation issues and concerns of developing 
and least-developed countries.  In short, Members had committed themselves to improving the multilateral trading system so that it could delive r benefits to developing and LDC Members of the 
WTO.  There had been a clear testimony by Minister s that the present system was flawed, and that it 
did not favour some categories of countries, na mely developing and leas t-developed countries 
especially in Africa.  In fact, the present system ha rdly responded to the concerns and interests of 
these countries in any meaningful way. 
155. Kenya believed that the expectations and aspir ations of developing  countries and LDCs 
contained in the Doha Ministerial Declaration s hould be realized through these negotiations.  Based 
on the reports that had been presented, Members seemed to be some distance from this goal with the 
mid-point of the negotiations timeframe approaching.   This was worrying, bearing in mind that the 
present meeting was the last TNC meeting before the Ministerial Conference in Cancún.  It was 
disappointing that progress had not only been slow, but slowest on the development-related issues that 
mattered most to developing countries.  Virtually  all deadlines had been missed in succession and yet 
work had continued as if those deadlines did not ex ist or matter.  Her dele gation wondered what the 
reasons were for this dismal performance. 
156. On agriculture, the proposed modalities would not  address the current imbalances, but instead 
could exacerbate the inequities of the Agreement and make it difficult for countries, such as Kenya, to 
attain developmental goals in ag riculture.  While the Doha Declaration had called for S&D treatment 
to be an integral part of all elements of th e negotiations, developed c ountries had contested the 
proposals that Kenya had submitted with others.  Kenya wished to re-emphasize the critical 
importance of the concepts of strategic or speci al products and a special safeguard mechanism for 
developing countries, which were issues that should be handled individually as they were distinctive TN/C/M/11 
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in character and application.  Therefore, the s uggestions in the report of the Chairman of the 
Agriculture Special Session to link strategic produc ts and the special safeguard mechanism to the 
formula that might be established for tariff re duction was difficult for her delegation to accept. 
157. If Members were going to achieve the commitments of Doha, they should be prepared to go 
beyond longer timeframes and lo wer reduction commitments as S&D treatment for developing 
countries.  They should also address the issue of pref erences to ensure that the current beneficiaries, 
such as Kenya, did not lose out.  Kenya believed th at preferences were a trade issue and should be 
addressed in the WTO and any reference to other bodi es should be seen as ancillary to the efforts by 
the WTO.  Caution should be taken not to replace market access with technical assistance.  Kenya was 
not in favour of the modalities paper being transmit ted to the Fifth Ministerial Conference, as an 
annex or otherwise, because there was no agreement on it. 
158. On market access for non-agricultural produc ts, Kenya had moved away from an import 
substitution industrialization stage and was focuse d more on export manufacturing.  Kenya was, 
therefore, pursuing policy measures aimed at build ing domestic production capacity.  For some time 
to come, it would need to use tariffs as a policy inst rument to develop a stable industrial base capable 
of withstanding global competition.  Some of th e elements proposed in the Chairman's modalities 
paper would greatly curtail Kenya's effort to est ablish a competitive industrial base.  The modalities 
paper would need to be revised to take into acc ount the untapped potential within a country and make 
provisions which could guarantee the economic explo itation of such resources.  Her delegation thus 
saw merit in exploring other core modalities that had been proposed earlier by a group of African 
countries to assess options that yielded results consiste nt with the letter and the spirit of paragraph 16 
of the Doha Declaration.  Some elements of the proposal presented by South Africa at the last meeting 
of the Negotiating Group on Market Access should also be accorded the necessary consideration. 
159. On non-tariff barriers, Kenya believed that the best approach would be for the discussions to 
take place in the Negotiating Group.  It would not  object to NTBs that fell under disciplines where 
specific negotiating mandates were referred to th e relevant negotiating bodies, but it did have 
problems with NTBs being referred to other re gular bodies that did not have the mandate to 
renegotiate the existing rules.  The Chairman's re port did not cover the issue of studies being included 
in the modalities as stated in paragraph 16 of the Doha Declaration, and her delegation hoped that the 
Chairman would continue to keep this in mind. 
160. On services, her delegation welcomed the services offers presented by a number of Members, 
mainly developed countries.  Given the number of o ffers received so far, the Special Session should 
review the progress in the negotiations in accord ance with paragraph 15 of the Guidelines and 
Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in Services,  on the basis of the initial offers of developed-
country Members and assess the extent to which tho se offers would contribute to the objectives set in 
Article IV of the GATS.  The review should also be based on the initial requests tabled by a number 
of developing countries, including Kenya.  This  should be done before the Fifth Ministerial 
Conference in order to seek further guidance from Ministers, if necessary. 
161. Kenya noted that considerable progress had been  made on negotiations in the Special Session 
of the CTE, and although the Chairperson's repor t argued that more freque nt meetings might be 
necessary to complete the work, her delegation believed that greater focus was required on the 
substantive work and not additiona l meetings.  For instance, the Committee should have defined by 
now what constituted environmenta l goods and services to facilitate negotiations in the Negotiation 
Group on Market Access for non-agricultural products  and the Special Session of the Council for 
Trade in Services.  As it had said before, Kenya did not favour the use of existing APEC or OECD lists as the basis for environmental goods and services  for the purpose of negotiations under paragraph 
31(iii) because the goods contained in the two lists we re mainly of export interest to developed 
countries.  The reference to environmental goods to be nego tiated under NAMA meant that the 
conditions of paragraph 16 applied to such goods.  Hence ther e was a need to take account of  TN/C/M/11 
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increased market access for products of export inte rest to developing countries, less than full 
reciprocity and the application of concrete S&D to such negotiations. 
162. In Kenya's view, the future Work Progra mme should focus on producing a WTO list of 
environmental goods, as already proposed by some Members, which should be done in co-ordination 
with the Negotiating Group in Market Access.  Given the limitations that developing countries had 
both in human and financial resources, assistance should be sought from UNCTAD, UNEP and the 
WTO Secretariat as well as other relevant intergovernme ntal organizations with expertise in this field. 
163. On rules, her delegation was encouraged to  note that the Negotiating Group remained 
committed to achieving significant results in both di sciplines and procedures relating to RTAs.  It 
believed that the process of clarifying and improvi ng existing WTO provisions applicable to RTAs 
should enhance the flexibility in the application of  these provisions.  This was to assist developing 
countries achieve their development goals and obj ectives, as well as to integrate them into the 
multilateral trading system through regional integration initiatives. 
164. Turning to other development-related issues, sh e said that, at Doha, Members had told the 
world that the WTO could respond to the public health problems afflicting developing countries, 
particularly in Africa.  Members had not lived up to their commitments which was a bad omen for the 
rest of the work.  Members should rapidly find a so lution to the current impasse on TRIPS and Public 
Health.  In fact, finding a solution before Cancún was not only critical for improving confidence in the 
rules-based multilateral trading system, but would al so send the right signal to the international 
community that Members cared about lives as well as livelihoods. 
165. On S&D treatment, Ministers had mandated de legations to consider both changes to the 
existing provisions as well as the wider question of  how to make WTO rules more flexible to the 
needs of developing countries.  Despite the good efforts of the Chairman of the General Council and the Friend of the Chair from Brazil, the discussions  that had taken place so far did not promise to 
deliver the results that would meet the expectations  of developing countries.  Much more flexibility 
needed to be shown and there w as a need to agree to change th e existing imbalance of rights and 
obligations in this exercise, otherwise it was going to be extremely difficult to convince developing 
countries and LDCs to be forward looking when thei r development-related pr iorities were being set 
aside.  The recent discussions had been more positive,  but one had to keep the discussions in their 
proper perspective and recall that the proposals bei ng considered had been submitted more than 14 
months previously. 
166. On process, according to the WTO Programme of  Meetings, this was the last TNC meeting 
before the Cancún Ministerial Conference.  Member s still had a number of negotiating bodies meeting 
after the present meeting and the Chairman had said that he did not intend to hold another formal 
meeting before Cancún.  Whatever method the Ch airman intended to use between now and Cancún, 
her delegation proposed that records of the consultati ons and meetings be kept  and made available for 
Members' comments.  The Chairpersons' reports should facilitate discussions  and should not in any 
way be seen to take over the role of Members to ne gotiate and agree on texts th at were then forwarded 
to Ministers. 
167. In conclusion, her delegation agreed with the Ch airman that Members had to work harder to 
make progress and Kenya was ready to do its share.   Both developed and developing countries should 
reap the benefits of the multilateral trading sy stem, but one should not forget that the Doha 
Declaration had placed the interests of developing  countries and LDCs at the heart of the Work 
Programme and had directly addressed the need to in tegrate them into the multilateral trading system 
and not the other way around. 
168. The representative of Mexico  said that what he had heard at the present meeting was frankly 
quite regrettable.  Although this was the last meeting before the Ministerial Conference, the 
statements seemed to be a good de monstration of the lack of good will shown by the majority of TN/C/M/11 
Page 28  
 
Members to make progress on the agenda.  However, on the main issues on which progress was an absolute prerequisite for all others  to move, he believed the responsibility lay principally with the two 
largest Members.  There was still no progress either in  agriculture or on TRIPS and Public Health.  It 
was very unfortunate that in the case of agricu lture, the European Communities still had not shown 
other Members the meaning of the announcement they  had made a few days previously.  Few people 
seemed to understand what it meant in the language  of the WTO, and the momentum following the 
Community's announcement of CAP reform was being lo st.  The reality was that to date Members had 
yet to initiate any negotiations in agriculture and he did not see how the Chairman of the Agriculture 
Special Session would be able to spontaneously  come up with a document that everybody would 
accept.  Delegations had to be realistic and ask th e two major players to sit and begin to discuss the 
issue between themselves, and only then would the othe rs be able to enter into serious negotiations on 
agriculture. 
169. In the case of TRIPS and Public Health, just  as in agriculture, there had been a good 
presentation by the United States, but he did not ye t see the political will to find a serious response to 
this issue and time was running out.  If Members thought  that they were going to be able to go Cancún 
without progress in agriculture or TRIPS and Public  Health, they were being overly optimistic.  He 
believed this would lead to serious difficulties in Cancún, because he could not imagine Ministers 
entering into details and beginning negotiations when  they arrived in Cancún.  He would not use up 
delegations' time by repeating yet again Mexico's positions on the other issues – time was too precious 
to waste at this juncture. 
170. The representative of Argentina
 said the work in Cancún was going to be troubled by the 
seeming confusion between what was stated in the mandates and what seemed to be taking place in 
Geneva.  In agriculture, there were a number of qu estions which were not c overed by the mandate, as 
mentioned by Brazil.  On the question of the multilateral notification and registration process for 
wines and spirits, there were substantial differe nces in the way various Members understood the 
mandate.  Argentina believed that the objective was not to renegotiate the terms of the TRIPS 
Agreement since, if this was the case, then perh aps other delegations woul d have raised a large 
number of other issues to be subject of the negotia tion and it would have been  interesting to review 
the whole agreement.  Rather, Members had to be extremely careful to not indirectly bring about 
negotiations which would alter the bala nce of existing rights and obligations. 
171. There was also a serious problem in the rules negotiations - whether it was a question of 
rewriting the Anti-dumping Agreement or rather simply clarifying some parts.  This seemed to be the 
kind of difficulty that Members could not overcome in Geneva.  At the same time, it was not a good 
idea to present all these problems to Ministers in Canc ún.  Ministers would not be ready to solve all 
the problems of the negotiations, so Members had to  identify the points which might serve to move 
this negotiation forward, keeping in mind that ther e was no magic formula.  His delegation hoped that 
the Chairman's skeleton text would clearly  respect the mandates agreed in Doha. 
172. Without progress in a number of areas, such  as implementation issues, TRIPS and Public 
Health and agriculture, progress in other areas woul d be jeopardized.  On agriculture, his delegation 
was not sure whether the European Communities' propo sal represented a point of departure, because it 
was difficult to assess a proposal that allowed EU me mber states the freedom to move ahead with 
production support policies.  However, even with a total reduction of the global level of support 
within CAP reform, it would only represent 3 per cen t of the value negotiated in the Uruguay Round 
which would not be a substantial c ontribution to the negotiation exercise.  His delegation believed that 
the four or five issues that should be sent to Mi nisters were those where the necessary political will 
was lacking, but it would be preferable to see signs of political will before Cancún.  It was extremely 
difficult to be optimistic on the po ssibilities of success in Cancún, but all efforts had to be made to 
ensure that this process moved forward. 
173. Mercosur was involved in a series of plurilatera l negotiations with impor tant trading partners 
and for Argentina, the current WTO multilateral nego tiations were an important part of the these  TN/C/M/11 
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plurilateral negotiations.  The fact that these multila teral negotiations were not moving at the pace he 
would like to see was of concern, not only for its multilateral impact, but for its impact on Mercosur's 
plurilateral negotiations.  Plurila teral negotiations would not necessarily move ahead irrespective of 
the progress in the multilateral negotiations, so it was possible that the plurilateral negotiations would 
not find an easy result without progress in the multilateral talks. 
174. The Chairman  said he was sure that all Members were joined in the common goal of trying 
not to overload agenda for Ministers.  He hoped th at the message of political will would be echoed not 
only within the TNC, but also throughout the vari ous capitals around the world so that delegations 
would receive instructions from their capitals to help move the process forward in Geneva. 
175. The representative of Norway  agreed that the agenda in Cancún should not be overloaded.  
The report of the Chairman of the Agriculture Speci al Session had outlined the state of play in the 
negotiations well, and although it would assist furthe r work in this area, no-one was entirely happy 
about it.  The key question in this area was one of  flexibility.  Members were trying to map out a 
future trading system in agriculture which had to take into account vastly different situations in 
various countries.  Smaller countries felt that a straig ht jacket was being constructed that fitted some 
of the larger players fairly well, but which might be  a bit problematic for countries like his.  It was not 
a question of lowering the level of ambition, but rather  trying to adapt the trading system to the reality 
of different situations. 
176. An example of this was non-trade concerns.  Th is was not a problem for a country that did not 
have an agricultural sector.  But for those for w hom the question of non-trade concerns was an 
attempt to preserve agriculture in small countries who were pre-dominantly importers of agricultural 
products rather than exporters, the issue was a pre-c ondition.  This could also be seen in the way the 
three pillars were addressed in isolation.  Norway had proposed that export subsidies be treated in the 
same way as national support for products being e xported.  This was the dilemma in the cotton 
initiative by Burkina Faso and ot hers because support which went to a product being exported had 
exactly the same economic effect whether one called it export subsidy or national support.  So all of 
this came under the umbrella of flexibility, because it was these sort of different situations which had 
to be recognized in any proposal acceptable to al l.  Again, this was not a question of lowering 
ambitions.  Given more time, the right type of fl exibility combined with high ambitions would allow 
the agriculture negotiations to move ahead. 
177. On NAMA, his delegation was encouraged by the report by the Negotiating Group Chairman 
and by the large number of ideas for improving th e Chairman's modalities paper.  The Negotiating 
Group should be in a position to make progress befo re Cancún.  His delega tion believed the sectoral 
approach was an interesting way to improve the form ula, but it had problems wi th this approach being 
of a voluntary nature, since this would not be in ha rmony with the formula.  He recalled the zero-for-
zero approach of the Uruguay Round, which was in use by countries which had low tariffs but which 
did not really need them.  His delegation believed the sectoral approach had to be mandatory.  If 
Members had to drop the sectoral approach, they w ould be required to go back to the drawing board 
for the formula because, as the Chairman ha d said, the various elements were linked. 
178. Like agriculture, services was part of the built-in agenda stemming from the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.  Services had not been highlighted cu rrently, but Members, in the coming year, would 
have to raise the level of ambition on it both in market access and rule making.  His delegation hoped 
that Members would agree on modalities for LDCs by Cancún at the latest.  On the Singapore issues, 
his delegation believed, like others, that the WT O should now launch negotiations on these issues and 
hoped for positive decisions in Cancún.  His delegati on understood the hesitati on of some developing 
countries and would hope that agreement could be found  on modalities that were fairly close to those 
found in the Doha Declaration.  This should be a priority issue during the last few weeks before 
Cancún.  On other issues, his delegation had full confidence in the Chairman of the General Council 
in his work on both S&D treatment and TRIPS and Public Health and hoped so lutions could be found. TN/C/M/11 
Page 30  
 
179. In conclusion, he said that Norway felt it was na tural at this stage of the negotiations for the 
analysis to be mixed, so Members should not d espair or become complacent.  However, it was 
important that progress in all fields was made in Cancún, while remembering that the goal was the end of the Round, not Cancún.  The negotiations shoul d not be the victim of the need for short-term 
decisions if they were not the right ones.  The im portant thing was to keep up the momentum for the 
end-phase of the negotiations. 
180. The representative of Korea
 said Members were entering a critical phase of the Doha Round 
with the Cancún Ministerial Conference less than two months away.  Cancún was the half-way point 
to the conclusion of the negotiations, but the task at Cancún went beyond a routine mid-term review 
of the negotiations.  In Doha, Members had comm itted to conclude substa ntial portions of the 
negotiations by the Cancún Minister ial, and should Members fail to  do this, it would send a negative 
signal to the world and would cast serious doubt over the fate of the Doha R ound.  Failure at Cancún 
would make it extremely difficult to successfully conclude the substance and timeframes of the 
negotiations.  Failure was not an option and the cen tral challenge over the next two months was to 
make Cancún a success. 
181. Like others, his delegation had national positions which were of fensive as well as defensive, 
and it had staked out its positions as clearly as po ssible.  But sitting on national positions would not 
help the current impasse in the negotiations.  To make Cancún a success, delegations had to change 
course.  The question was in which direction, and hi s delegation had no answer to that question.  He 
would, however, attempt to make four suggestions.  First, he suggested Members start to think of the 
negotiations from a broader perspective than that of the Single Undertaking.  Agriculture was a key 
issue, but it was not all.  In parallel with credible reform in agriculture trade, Members had to achieve 
substantial extension of market access in non-agri cultural goods and services.  Negotiations on rules 
and Singapore issues were also to be treated as integral parts of the final package.  Improvement of existing disciplines in trade remedy measures, in cluding anti-dumping measures and development of 
new rules in the Singapore issues, were crucial to harness improvements in market access.  This was a 
question of the relevance of the multilateral trad ing system in the rapidly changing global trade 
environment.  In the absence of progress across th e board, significant movement in any single area 
was not likely to happen, so Members had to have a sense of the overall balance to reach compromise 
on a wide range of issues. 
182. Second, Members needed to be more realistic.  This did not mean giving up high levels of 
ambition in any area, but the level of ambition had to be based on an understanding and appreciation 
of the prevailing realities and sensitivities of Member s.  These were the constraints Members were 
operating under, and flexibility was another key elemen t.  It was not possible to find a solution that 
could address the sensitivities of each and every Member, so built-in flex ibility was necessary to 
arrive at a package acceptable to all.  The polit ical and practical aspects of net importers of 
agricultural products should be ta ken into account in establishing modalities, and the use of the 
Uruguay Round formula and introduction of the con cept of special products could provide Members 
with flexibility to address their difficulties. 
183. For the NAMA negotiations, Members needed to ma intain a high level of ambition to address 
the problems of high tariffs, tariff peaks and tariff escalation.  Here again, providing flexibility for 
sensitive products would be crucial to reaching an agre ement.  He wished to refer to footnote seven of 
the draft modalities of the Chairman of the Nego tiating Group concerning the flexibilities in sectoral 
tariff elimination.  If the flexibility provided for in the footnote could be drafted in clearer language, it 
would help mobilize support for even broader sect oral liberalization.  Regarding the issue of 
differentiation for developing countries, raised by  some Members during the course of negotiations, 
the principle of self declaration had always worked well by enabling developing-country Members to make contributions comparable to their capabilities.   The introduction of artificial criteria for a 
developing country's status woul d remove this flexibility and further complicate the negotiating 
process.  TN/C/M/11 
 Page 31 
 
 
184. Third, the hard work had to be completed in Ge neva, not in Cancún.  Given the gravity of the 
required decisions, deal making would be part of Ca ncún, but in the interest of transparency and 
avoiding the risk of failure in Cancún, the Minister ial Conference should be as scripted as possible.  
Members should not be forced into making hasty j udgments on a last minute deal in Cancún without 
having adequate time to reflect upon national prioriti es.  The package put to Ministers needed to be 
simple, easily understandable, and with clear options  for Ministers to choose from.  Members needed 
to avoid any surprises in Cancún, and he hoped that  development-related issues would be resolved 
before the Cancún Ministerial.  As the European Co mmunities had said, most of these issues were of a 
technical nature and Ministers could not be expected  to resolve these issues in a matter of days.  His 
delegation hoped the resolution of the issues of  S&D treatment, implem entation and TRIPS and 
Public Health before Cancún would help  Ministers focus on the core business. 
185. Fourth, it was important that the first draft operational text be more than a skeleton or a 
modified version of the checklist from May.  Rather than providing a summary of the current state of 
play, it should suggest possible ways to move forw ard.  His delegation understood that the Chairmen 
of the TNC and General Council were still not in a position to provide magic solutions to the key 
areas without significant moves being made by Memb ers.  Some had argued that it was too early to 
put forward such a text, but given the limited amount  of time, it was important that serious discussions 
take place at the present to conclude the preparat ory work for Cancún on time.  A substantial draft 
provided before the summer break would enable cap itals to reflect on where flexibility could be 
shown, and permit Members to serious ly engage in the final stage of the negotiations before Cancún.  
In conclusion, he said delegations needed to enga ge in intensive negotiations in the coming weeks, 
and, if necessary, make efforts in every format and mode. 
186. The representative of El Salvador  agreed with the Chairman that  Members had to focus on the 
main areas of negotiations.  For the Round to succeed , there had to be a balance between the level of 
ambition needed to obtain results and the effec tive implementation of S&D treatment.  For El 
Salvador, the agricultural negotiations were a funda mental aspect of the DDA and a decisive element 
in progress on other negotiating issues.  El Salvador supported any formula which reflected the 
ambition contained in the mandate of the Doha Decl aration and which addressed tariff peaks and tariff 
escalation.  However, this support was subject to th e ambition and progress in the other two pillars of 
these negotiations.  As had been recognized by th e Ministers in Doha, it was necessary to reduce 
domestic support and export subsidies which to date had not met his country's interests.  Ministers in 
Doha had agreed that S&D treatment would be an in tegral part of the negotiations.  This was why El 
Salvador, as a developing country, requested that this mandate be respected and that it was given 
adequate flexibility to deal with sensitive products through a list of strategic products which would be 
given S&D treatment. 
187. On non-agricultural market acces s, there had been a fruitful discussion on the Chairman's 
modality paper at the last meeting of Negotiating Group.  Like others, his delegation believed the 
Chairman's paper could serve as a basis for es tablishing modalities for these negotiations.  The 
formula for tariff reduction was positive, but his delega tion would prefer the sectoral elimination to be 
undertaken in a second phase and on a voluntary basis.   His delegation continued to have concerns 
about the existing inequity in S&D treatment for countries with a similar level of development.  
Members needed to seek alternative forms of flex ibility for developing countri es and LDCs which had 
made important concessions in the past Round.  NT Bs should be included as an integral part of 
modalities in parallel with tariff negotiations.  Hi s delegation was heartened by the commitments of 
others in this area, since these barriers had ofte n been a major obstacle to exports from developing 
countries, like tariff barriers, and Members had to deal with this issue. 
188. On services, the 30 offers to date was a dem onstration of the interest and commitment of 
Members to opening up their services sectors to bring benefits to all Members, but there had to be 
balance to ensure that the interests and limitations  of each country was taken into account, especially 
developing countries and LDCs.  Mode 4 was import ant for El Salvador and his delegation hoped 
that, as the negotiations continued,  improvements in the commitments would become visible in line TN/C/M/11 
Page 32  
 
with El Salvador's needs, which were not reflected in  the lists of offers made so far.  His delegation 
shared Brazil's concern at the lack of progress on rules issues, emergency safeguards, subsidies, 
government procurement and domestic regulation, since the establishm ent of a framework to regulate 
these new commitments was of vital importa nce to achieve openness in this sector. 
189. On the establishment of a multilateral register of wines and spirits, he wished to reiterate the 
need to comply with the Doha mandate to respec t the principle of territoriality with regard to 
intellectual property rights.  El Salvador had carried  out significant efforts in the area of intellectual 
property, and, as a developing country, it would be di fficult for it to participate in an onerous system.  
On the DSU, his delegation supported all initiatives aimed at guidelines to continue the negotiations 
in accordance with the Doha mandate. 
190. His delegation believed the work of the Rules Group had been productive, in accordance with 
paragraph 28 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  It  agreed with the Chairman that after Cancún, the 
pace of the discussions should be stepped up to identi fy the necessary elements in search for solutions.  
In conclusion, he said that, at less than 8 weeks fro m the Cancún Ministerial Conference, a lot of work 
was needed so that a manageable package coul d be presented to Ministers.  Not having clear 
guidelines after Cancún would make the work difficult and complicated, and would put at risk the 
aims and objectives that each governme nt had outlined for this Round. 
191. The representative of Colombia
 said he wished to highlight market access and agriculture 
among the difficult areas in the negotiations over the past 18 months.  On agriculture, the impasse in 
the negotiations and the limited ambition in the revised text by the Agriculture Special Session 
Chairman on the three central pillars were of  grave concern.  During the Doha Round, many 
developing countries, including his own, hoped for more ambitious results, both on the modalities and 
on the rules, than those presented by the Chairman in his revised text.  Accepting the current form 
would represent a loss for developing countries an d would be an admission that the benefits of 
agricultural reform through multilateral rules would only be possible in the long term. 
192. His delegation hoped that the European Commun ities' CAP reform would give a final impetus 
to the negotiations, but it had been unable to interpre t the results of the Eur opean agreement in terms 
of the Agriculture Agreement, nor whether the European Communities could revise their proposal 
offering greater ambition and clarity in the agricultural negotiations.  At the last meeting of the Agriculture Special Session, several delegations ha d been unable to accept the Chairman's modalities 
paper as a basis for negotiations.  This further da rkened the picture because the paper would be the 
minimum result which could be expect ed in Cancún so that the negotia tions could continue with clear 
political orientation after the Ministerial Conference.  For this all delegations would have to be more 
flexible. 
193. On non-agricultural goods, Members would have to seek alternatives to ma ke the principle of 
less than full reciprocity a reality, which had been id entified as a key provision by Ministers in Doha.  
There was a need for flexibility to guarantee that sensitive products and sectors were recognized in a 
horizontal and balanced way for all developing countries.  His delegation was ready to study 
alternatives to achieve this, such as replacing th e various exceptional provisions included in the 
Chairman's draft elements with a common approach  for all developing countries.  His delegation was 
concerned at the treatment being given to sectoral ta riff elimination as a central part of the modalities, 
because it believed that all efforts should be concen trated on a general formula which would cover the 
interests and expectations of all Members. 
194. On services, his delegation was concerned at th e imbalance in the process.  The negotiation 
was not only market access through a bilateral appr oach, but it should also take up multilaterally a 
number of horizontal issues including rules, par ticularly on national regul ations, subsidies and a 
possible mechanism on safeguards.  His delegation' s initial assessment of th e market access offers 
presented showed a symmetry in the level of commitm ents.  The majority did not include any of the 
interests that Colombia had set out in its propo sals and initial requests.  Colombia's competitive  TN/C/M/11 
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advantage was focussed on the provision of services through the movement of  natural persons and it 
had hoped for better offers by its tr ading partners.  Mode 4 was a subject of interest to everyone and 
for this reason it would be appropriate that it be refl ected in the text for Ministers.  Colombia would 
not oppose the Services Chairman's proposal for a schedule for revised offers.  However, the 
definition of a new calendar should be accompanie d by guidelines aimed at achieving substantial 
improvements in market access in areas of  interest to developing countries. 
195. The issue of erosion of preferences had been raised, in particular in the context of the 
agriculture negotiations.  Some developing countries ha d identified this as a serious problem.  While it 
was true that that preferences were temporary and should not be an argument to avoid making 
progress in trade liberalization, Members should seek  alternatives to prevent affected countries from 
losing the position they had reached on certain produc ts, due to advantages granted under preferences.  
One alternative would be to design a package with  multilateral and regional credit organizations to 
focus on maintaining their competitive edge and increasing productivity with investments in new 
technologies or improvements in management and administration, greater efficiency in processing raw materials, in distribution processes, in trad e infrastructure and through the elimination of 
unjustified levies or bureaucratic inefficiencies.  However, these programmes should only compensate 
for the loss of competitive advantage through the er osion of preferences and not include direct 
subsidies, increased cultivation areas or the devel opment of new sectors because other developing 
countries would then have to pay the bill for these  programmes.  This probl em could certainly be 
resolved with gains in certainty and predic tability for countries which substituted temporary 
preferences with permanent profits and a co mpetitive edge in the international market. 
196. Although the Singapore issues were not part of the Single Undertaking, he wished to 
comment on them because they would be taken up by Ministers in Cancún.  Colombia considered the 
definition of modalities for these is sues as essential and the only way to take account of developing-
country concerns was to look at substantive elem ents and not simply procedure.  His delegation 
welcomed the openness of the proponents to take account of these concerns and would continue to 
work constructively in this area, recognizing the clea r links with the rest of the negotiation process.  
The ongoing technical discussions were useful because they would contribute to finding an appropriate solution in this area for all Members. 
197. Colombia was concerned at suggestions for ne gotiations on the extension of the protection 
provided in Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement for GI s to products other than wines and spirits, and, 
for this reason, it opposed such negotiations.  It did not see the benefits of this proposal within a 
mechanism of intellectual property protection mainly used for trademarks.  It was even more worrying 
that some delegations had linked su ch extension to progress in the ag riculture negotiation, proposing a 
long list of agricultural products.  To accept this pr oposal would imply having a long list of products 
from various countries which used this type of inte llectual property right, none of which were from 
Colombia.  This would be a high price to pay for his country, since it would have to accept conferring 
intellectual property rights which gave absolute protection from competition, while the proponents 
were only willing to make efforts in the agriculture  negotiations comparable to those made in the 
Uruguay Round, in terms of market access and domes tic assistance.  This would be neither fair nor 
equitable. 
198. Cancún was an opportunity to put the negotiati ons back on track and to give them the 
necessary impetus.  Resolving the issues he ha d mentioned and agreeing on an appropriate 
development package would not be easy.  Members should try to make progress and solve each of 
these issues.  For this, it would be necessary to sh ow not only flexibility in  all the negotiations, but 
also renewed political will to comply with the D oha mandate.  Some Members had not been able to 
translate this mandate into their proposals.  If the situation changed in agricu lture by leaving to one 
side pretensions that would only lead to incr eases in protection for a few, his delegation was 
convinced that the global level of ambition of th e negotiations would be able to accommodate the 
needs of all Members. TN/C/M/11 
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199. The representative of Bangladesh
, on behalf of the Least-Developed Countries , said that for 
the last few months, Members had encountered an  overwhelming workload with meetings held 
simultaneously, and many were in formal consultations from whic h understandings might emerge.  
Being small delegations, LDCs neither had an opport unity to participate in some of these discussions 
nor did they get to know the outcome immediatel y after these consultations.  The LDC delegations 
had tried hard to engage in those exercises, but  their limitations were well known.  On an earlier 
occasion, he had requested that whenever any inform al consultations were he ld, the general body of 
the membership should immediately learn the outcome of those discussions, and he wished to reiterate 
that call at the present meeting.  In addition, the LDCs urged that notices of the informal discussions 
be displayed on the bulletin board, and in the meeting schedule available on the Web site.  Any 
delegation that felt that its interests were at st ake could then approach the Chairperson of the 
consultations for participation.  Each delegation wa s interested in transparency and participation and 
these suggestions were being made with a view to advancing both of these objectives. 
200. The LDC Trade Ministers had met in Dhaka from 31 May to 2 June, and they had reviewed 
the progress in the negotiations and developed a common position for this Round.  The Dhaka 
Declaration had been circulated as an official document of the WTO1.  What the Ministers had 
identified as the LDCs interests would not be di fficult for the membership to accommodate since 
given their share of world trade, concessions in t hose areas would hardly upset the pattern of world 
trade.  The LDCs hoped the modalities being consid ered, as well as the decisions that would emerge 
from Cancún, would take on board the expectations a nd concerns outlined in the Dhaka Declaration.  
The objective was to create a level playing field fo r the LDCs and allow them to integrate into the 
multilateral trading system throug h promotion of their exports. 
201. Turning to some specific areas of the nego tiations, he said that everyone understood and 
appreciated the importance of a breakthrough in the agricultural negotiations for the Cancún 
Ministerial to deliver a meaningful package.  Th e LDCs had not submitted any proposal in agriculture 
on the understanding that their concerns would be met.  First and foremost, they needed duty-free and 
quota-free access for their agricultural exports.  Mark et access would remain ineffective if producers 
in the preference granting countries continued to re ceive high trade-distorting subsidies for products 
that were of export interest to LDCs.  The President  of Burkina Faso had vividly illustrated this when 
he had addressed the TNC.  Market access improveme nts needed to be complemented by phasing out 
trade-distorting support in products that  were of export interest to LDCs. 
202. Tariffs on agricultural commodities were quite low in the LDCs, comp ared to those in 
industrialized countries with many LDCs having bound th eir tariffs in agriculture at a low rate.  LDCs 
had gone beyond the requirements of the Uruguay Round and it was their expectation that they would not be asked to make any new reduction commitmen ts.  Reduction commitments in the context of 
domestic support and export subsid y were generally meaningless for LDCs, since they did not have 
the resources to provide subsidies or were prohi bited from doing so based on understandings with the 
Bretton Woods Institutions. 
203. The LDCs also had another concern in the current  negotiations – most of  them were importers 
of staple foods, either commercially or through food aid.  The LDCs wished to reiterate that the 
regime of food aid provided by Members to them  to meet emergency situations, humanitarian, 
development objectives, and to address the chronic fo od deficit situation in LDCs should be allowed 
to continue on acceptable terms to both the donors and their countries.  The LDC Group hoped that 
the modalities of further commitments in agricultu re would usher in new opportunities for LDCs in 
agricultural trade. 
204. On non-agricultural market access, although not all the proposals by the LDCs were 
contained in the Negotiating Group Chairman's pa per, the LDC Group had expressed its willingness 
to build on the Chairman's submission.  As per current understandings, the LDCs would not be 
                                                     
 
1 Document WT/L/521.  TN/C/M/11 
 Page 35 
 
 
required to undertake any tariff reduction commitment .  Given that they had already considerably 
lowered their tariffs on an autonomous basis, th e LDCs requested that Members not insist on 
increasing their binding coverage.  LDCs required pol icy space to enable them to pursue their 
development objectives.  They hoped that duty-free and quota-free market access, with realistic and 
flexible rules of origin, would be an integral pa rt of the modalities for the non-agricultural sector.  
According to estimates, the origin requirements we re largely responsible for the non-utilization of 
trade preferences and the application of MFN rates fo r at least three-quarters of LDC exports.  This 
aspect should be included in Chairman's draft modalities. 
205. Other barriers were also thwarting the growth  prospects of LDCs such as anti-dumping duties 
imposed against them which were a major cause fo r concern.  The LDCs wanted an immediate 
moratorium on anti-dumping duties against exports of their products.  They also faced serious supply 
side constraints to reap the benefits from prefer ential schemes, and they hoped to be provided with 
meaningful and targeted technical assistance to overcome such barriers. 
206. On services, he said that LDCs were at a par ticularly disadvantaged position.  The assessment 
of trade in services as mandated in the GATS had not been carried out, and this had imposed serious 
constraints in negotiations as the LDCs lacked ade quate statistics, informa tion and understanding of 
barriers to services of export interest to them.  They also faced difficulties to manage the complex 
request and offer process.  It would be a zero sum game if they entered into bilateral request-offer 
negotiations without a comprehensive analys is and understanding of the services sector. 
207. In line with the GATS, the LDCs had submitted a draft of modalities for special treatment.  
Following the comments of the membership on their modalities, they had submitted a revised version 
of the draft modalities.  It had been their intention to introduce specificity into the language, to avoid 
the pitfalls that all Members were familiar w ith.  The Special Session Chairman had shown his 
commitment to move the process forward.  The Secr etariat and a few other delegations had come up 
with alternative texts to the LDC submission, which,  in most cases, proposed to weaken considerably 
the content of the LDC proposals.  The alternate te xts implied that commitments from LDCs were to 
be made stronger while those from the rest of the membership were made much weaker.  In some 
cases, they found the drafting suggestions weaker th an "best-endeavor" clauses that were familiar to 
them.  They understood that the membership might lik e to retain a degree of flexibility in their 
commitments, but LDCs had very few options and tho se areas of interest to them would be pursued to 
make the negotiations meaningful for them.  LDCs would like to integrate into the fastest growing 
component of world trade – services – and unless there was a clear commitment on mode 4, the 
services sector would remain elusive for their develo pment.  They urged the membership to consider 
their revised submission and work towards an early adoption of it. 
208. At Doha, Ministers had given clear directions to make S&D provisions precise, effective and 
operational, and negotiations over a year and a half had failed to produce the desired results.  The 
LDCs agreed to work with the Chairman of the General Council on his categorization of proposals to 
be treated as a package.  The propo sals that were procedural in natu re were easier to resolve.  The 
ones that had a development dimension, or had the potential for economic benefit, were facing 
"barriers".  Members spoke of the "development di mension" of the Doha Round, but the negotiations 
did not seem to reflect that perspective all the time.  The Members needed to restore the balance of the 
Uruguay Round, without which the current negotia tions would not have much value to LDCs. 
209. On Singapore issues, the LDC Group believed that the clarification process had not been 
adequately covered.  It was importa nt that the implications of each of the items to LDCs be examined 
thoroughly, before LDCs could ente r into negotiations.  The LDCs ag reed with others that each of 
these subjects was important, particularly in the incr easingly globalized world.  Given the little time 
left before Cancún, the LDCs believed it was not  possible to forge common ground on substance and 
that it was not appropriate to only begin work based on procedural modalities.  They hoped the 
membership would understand their limitations. TN/C/M/11 
Page 36  
 
210. The LDCs had assumed an onerous burden of implementing the Uruguay Round, without 
reaping concomitant benefits.  Th e Doha Round offered the LDCs an opportunity to integrate into the 
multilateral trading system and they looked forward to the Cancún Meeting.  The success of the Doha 
Round would depend on whether the WTO could bring back  development to the core of its objective, 
and whether it could redress the imbalances and cr eate opportunities for the LDCs to raise their 
market share in world trade and accelerate their economic development. 
211. The representative of Indonesia
 said the reports by the various Chairpersons, once again, 
showed the uneven progress of the negotiations.  While negotiations on issues such as trade and 
environment were making progress, negotiations closer to the interest of developing countries such as 
agriculture were moving at a much slower pace.  As the mid-point of the negotiations neared, he 
believed it might be useful to recall some of the el ements which had enabled Members to agree to the 
Doha Work Programme.  His delega tion believed one of the main reas ons for the success of Doha had 
been the development dimension.  Development i ssues of concern to developing countries cut across 
all areas of the Work Programme.  The fact that the majority of Members were developing countries 
was an important reality to remember.  Success in  Cancún, as well as the success of the Doha Round 
as a whole, depended on how far the development co mmitments were reflected in the modalities and 
the final outcome, so as to truly help devel oping and least-developed countries benefit for the 
multilateral trading system. 
212. On agriculture, the Chairman of the Special  Session had rightly pointed out that any 
modalities should faithfully reflect the Doha mandate , and there should be linkages between the three 
pillars under negotiation.  His delegation fully agr eed with this.  One could not expect developing 
countries to undertake further tariff reduction commitm ents if there was no change in the subsidies 
given to farmers in developed countries.  Subsidie s, whether they fell under amber, blue or green 
boxes, were a trade barrier and a threat of extinc tion to developing countries' agricultural products.  
Any modalities that did not address food security would be very difficult for his delegation to accept.  Indonesia fully supported the special products concept in the Chairman's draft modalities, which was a 
cornerstone to it accepting any draft modalities. 
213. On NAMA, the negotiations would unques tionably reduce the gap between bound and 
applied rates.  After the Uruguay Round, some  developing countries including Indonesia had 
autonomously and significantly reduced their applied rates.  This meant that these developing Members had already given more market access to  other countries without receiving reciprocal and 
favorable treatment from others, so some Members had enjoyed greater market access for several 
years than they would otherwise have expected at the conclusion of Uruguay Round.  Given that 
Members still held divergent views on the leve l of ambition for these negotiations, his delegation 
believed they should work towards a common unders tanding in this area.  Flexibility from all 
Members, in particular those who maintained a hi gh level of ambition would be required.  Only by 
doing so could Members then move on to the details. 
214. The negotiations on services were moving well and should be judged on successful results in 
both market access and rules.  In this regard, he wished to emphasize the importance of the 
negotiations on emergency safeguard measures, wh ich should conclude before the end of the 
negotiations on specific commitments, as provided for in the negotiating guidelines.  On rules, his 
delegation agreed with the Negotiating Group Chairman  that the issue identification process had been 
efficient and productive.  Not only did the Group have  a good idea of the range of issues participants 
would like to see addressed, but also substantial progr ess had been made in clarifying the scope of the 
issues.  His delegation hoped that further issues and approaches would be identified for negotiation 
before or after Cancún.  In conclusion, he sai d that, for many developing countries, development 
issues were the backbone of the Round, and concrete  results were needed before or at Cancún.  
Indonesia urged Members to throw their political wei ght behind resolving these issues, as this was the 
key for progress in all ar eas of the negotiations.  TN/C/M/11 
 Page 37 
 
 
215. The representative of Japan  said delegations, given the lim ited time before Cancún, would 
have to focus their efforts and engage substantia lly or else their Ministers would find it difficult to 
forge constructive momentum to successfully concl ude the negotiations within the agreed deadline.  
The present meeting and the draft operational text that  would follow would be crucial in preparing the 
ground for the final push towards Cancún. 
216. On agriculture, he wished to reaffirm Japan's  conviction that the result of the negotiations 
should be acceptable to all Members.  It flowed from this notion that in order to conclude the 
negotiations within the limited timeframe, Members with excessive and unattainable demands had to 
begin to embrace realism.  Japan had been seriously  engaged in the reform of its agricultural sector 
since the Uruguay Round and was committed to continuing the reform.  It hoped that those countries 
which to date had failed to give due credit to the progress of such reforms, while continuing to make 
demands with unrealistically high levels of ambition,  would soon realize the benefits of successful 
negotiations in pursuing reforms.  Only then woul d his country have interl ocutors who engaged in a 
realistic manner. 
217. His delegation noted that the report by the Chairman of the Agriculture Special Session had 
been made on his own responsibility and had not been intended to prejudge the results of the 
negotiations.  Since the revised first draft of moda lities was attached to the Chairman's report as a 
reference, his delegation wished to re-emphasize that, in its view, this revised draft would not serve as 
a basis for future negotiations.  The draft imposed heavy burdens on importing Members in the area of 
market access, such as broad and uniform tari ff reductions, while only proposing rather weak 
disciplines in export competition, export credits, expor t restrictions or export taxes.  It lacked 
flexibility in reflecting the differences in the c onditions for agricultural production among Members 
and non-trade concerns, thus it was not conducive th e continuous reform.  His delegation strongly 
emphasized that the modalities should contain th ree key elements: product specific flexibility, 
continuity of reform and a balance between exporting and importing Members. 
218. While his delegation recognized that the revised draft was one of the inputs to the negotiation 
process, the Chairman had noted in paragraph 8 that:  "It should be noted that some participants do 
not accept the revised First Draft as a basis for th e negotiations.  These as well as a number of other 
participants have noted that their negotiating pro posals remain on the table."  Members should ensure 
that the new rules and disciplines that they were  negotiating promoted the reform efforts that 
respective Members were making.  If those rules and disciplines threatened the very existence of 
agriculture in certain Members' countries, those Members would not accept such rules and disciplines. 
219. The purpose of the non-agricultural market access negotiations was to further stimulate trade 
liberalization.  Failure to require sufficient liber alization efforts by countries with higher average 
tariffs was a serious problem because trade libera lization would bring subs tantial benefits to 
developing countries through the expansion of S outh-South trade.  To achieve equitable and 
substantial market access, Japan had proposed that a single formula be applied to both developed and 
developing Members, which would s ubstantially harmonize the general tariff levels among different 
categories of Members.  The broad consensus on applying a single formula as the proper method for 
tariff reduction and the positive discussions on NTBs we re encouraging.  However, Japan considered 
the Chairman's formula to have room for improvement in order to lead to substantial tariff reductions.  
It also put those countries with already low average tariffs at an unfair disadvantage. 
220. A balance should be achieved between achieving equitable and substantial market access on 
the one hand and development and less  than full reciprocity on the other.  This could be attained by 
giving credits to developing countries which had made  or would make efforts for substantial market 
access improvement, such as an increase of binding coverage, tariff elimination or reduction.  A 
number of Members had asked for a certain flexibili ty for sensitive items, which was important to 
obtain in the end, more ambitious reductions for all Members.  Japan also s upported the idea that the 
sectoral approach should be an integral part of the core modality.  It understood the Chairman's 
intention that a certain consideration of the export interests of developing countries was needed.  TN/C/M/11 
Page 38  
 
However, since trade liberalization was the main purpose of this Round, Members should seek to reach an agreement on elimination or tariff harmoniza tion in reflecting the interests of all Members.  
Japan wished to re-empha size that the modalities had to be bala nced, and that it was determined to 
press forward resolutely with the negotiations. 
221. On services, Japan appreciated the progress made  thus far, but the 30 initial offers submitted 
was still small.  Since the submission of offers  marked the starting point of the market access 
negotiations, it was important that  offers were submitted by as many Members as possible before 
Cancún.  From now on, it was important for Member s to engage in substantive discussions based on 
the offers submitted.  His delegation hoped that at Cancún, Ministers would guide Members on the 
way forward for the fifteen months until the deadline of December 2004. 
222. Japan wished to underline that the Singapor e issues constituted a crucial part of the 
comprehensive negotiations, along with agriculture  and NAMA.  Pursuant to the Doha mandate, 
much steady work and discussion had been conducte d in the various working groups and committees.  
Many Members, including developing countries, ha d been engaged in meaningful and constructive 
discussion.  In the area of capacity building activitie s related to the Singapore issues, Japan had been 
quite active, thanks to the assistance from the S ecretariat and the cooperative engagement of 
developing countries.  At Cancún, it was impor tant that a decision be taken on modalities of 
negotiations on all four issues.  It was best to establish concise modalities while avoiding pre-
negotiations that might prejudge negotiation results .  Japan fully supported the Chairman of the 
General Council's initiatives and looked forward to  his guidance at reaching a common understanding 
on the modalities. 
223. Japan placed much importance on the developm ent issues, and it highly appreciated the 
initiatives undertaken by the General Council Chairman, together with his Friends of the Chair.  The 
importance of S&D issues was such that placing them under the leadership of the General Council 
Chairman was the best way to advance them.  All Members needed to aim at positive results within 
the limits of the rules-based multilateral trading sy stem, and Japan hoped that future S&D meetings 
would be scheduled to accommodate the constraints on small missions.  The participation of Members 
who submitted the proposals was indispensable in S&D meetings.  On TRIPS and Public Health, 
Members needed to find an early solution from a hum anitarian point of view.  It was also important 
from the point of view of positive participation, in pa rticular of African countries, and to maintain the 
momentum of the DDA.  Members should aim for an early multilateral solution, before Cancún. 
224. The negotiations to clarify and improve th e disciplines under the Anti-dumping Agreement 
were important in order to prevent the abuse and misuse of anti-dumping measures.  Given the 
growing trend in the number of anti-dumping inves tigations and measures, and bearing in mind the 
chilling effects of those measures on trade, all WTO Members were the potential victims of the unwarranted abuse of anti-dumping measures.  Member s had to make sure that the proliferation of 
abusive anti-dumping measures would not substitute for trade barriers that had been eliminated 
through painstaking negotiation.  Substantial r esults in anti-dumping negotiations was the key to 
overall market access liberalization and success of the DDA.  Japan supported the Chairman's positive 
assessment of the Rules negotiations in hi s report, especially paragraphs 14 and 15. 
225. Japan supported the General Council Chairman's decision to extend the DSU deadline to 31 
May 2004.  Given the divergence of views, it could go along with using the proposals put forward to date and the text of the Chairman of the Special Session of the DSB.  On trade and environment, the 
progress on paragraphs 31(i) and 31( ii), should further push Members to a satisfactory outcome within 
the timeframe of the DDA. 
226. The representative of Nigeria
 associated his delegation with the statements by Morocco on 
behalf of the African Group, Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs and Kenya.  Agriculture was the key 
to the present Round of negotiations because the livelihood and food security of millions of people 
were at stake and because it was central to many development strategies.  Rural livelihood and food  TN/C/M/11 
 Page 39 
 
 
security constituted vital public concerns, which we re not negotiable, yet the strategic products and 
special safeguard mechanism provisions that developing countries, including Nigeria, had requested to be addressed were current topics of controvers y.  His delegation wished to reiterate that the 
agricultural products which were critical for empl oyment, poverty alleviation and food security be 
classified as strategic products on a self-declaration basis to be exempted from reduction 
commitments.  The special safeguard mechanism to deal with import surges and price fluctuations 
should be established with no trad e-offs and drastic tariff cuts. 
227. His delegation did not support the inclusion in the agriculture modalities of provisions for 
additional protection for GIs, authoritative interpreta tions of Article 5.7 of the SPS and Article 2 of 
the TBT Agreements, as well as traditional and non-tr aditional concerns with respect to agricultural 
products.  Rather, these issues should be addressed in  the appropriate WTO bodies.  It also did not 
support the extension of the peace clause because the Doha Mandate gave no such directive. 
228. On services, his delegation supported the need to  improve the quality of the market access 
offers, to incorporate mode 4, and to have balan ce between the various components.  It called for a 
review and evaluation of the offers to determine th e attainment of the objectives of Article IV of the 
GATS in accordance with Paragraph 15 of the Gu idelines and Procedures of the Negotiations on 
Trade in Services. 
229. On market access, his delegation believed that fixing percentage fi gures, 95% for bound and 
5% for unbound tariff lines, should be subject to nego tiations in the same way as the "B" co-efficient, 
the list of sectoral elimination of tariffs, and NTBs .  His delegation supporte d categorizing NTBs into 
four broad areas, as had been identified in Secret ariat paper Job(03)/128.  While agreeing with the 
need to avoid duplication efforts, his delegation w as concerned about the fate and shape of the NTB 
negotiations, if and when they were to be tr ansferred to other WTO bodies.  On trade and 
environment, his delegation believe d that the process should pay attention to the special needs and 
concerns of developing countries to enable them to  participate meaningfully in the negotiations and 
benefit from the outcome.  While his delegation believed in establishing a system of registry for wines 
and spirits as mandated by Ministers, the system  should be voluntary and not burdensome either 
financially or otherwise. 
230. He wished to highlight agriculture, TRIPS and Public Health and NAMA as issues to be 
resolved before the Cancún Ministerial Conference.   His delegation had noted the recent CAP reform 
and believed more had to be done  to achieve the goal of establishing a fair and market-oriented 
system free from support and distor tions.  His delegation urged all c ountries that give subsidies to 
make further efforts to liberalize agriculture to achieve the objectives set out in Article 20 of the 
Agriculture Agreement and move the negotiations forward. 
231. Resolving the TRIPS and Public Health issue would be crucial to generate confidence and 
have a soft-landing in Cancún a nd his delegation appreciated the efforts of the United States to 
resolve this issue.  His delegation suggested that c onsultations be intensified to translate these efforts 
into the adoption of the 16 December 2002 text. 
232. Singapore issues continued to be a problem for hi s delegation and other developing countries.  
In light of the different nature and complexities of  the issues, there should not be one set of modalities 
for all the subjects and each issue should be treated  separately.  There was no consensus on this issue 
and Ministers should be briefed accordingly.  Nige ria did not accept the elements contained in the 
European Communities paper as the substantive modalities directed by Ministers in Doha, and it had 
submitted comments on the paper.  Any modalities shoul d be worked out in Geneva before going to 
Ministers. 
233. Agriculture was the key issue in these nego tiations, but until now there had been no 
agreement on modalities for the negotiations, and no t much movement was taking place in the other 
subjects being negotiated.  Despite this, Nigeria sh ared the optimism of the Chairmen of the TNC and TN/C/M/11 
Page 40  
 
the General Council and their urge for action.  His delegation wished to have a transparent and all-
inclusive process in both Geneva and Cancún and for the entire membership to be part of all the 
processes and its outcome.  The draft text to Minist ers should reflect the differences and views on all 
issues, and Members should have the opportunity to respond to it before it was transmitted to 
Ministers.  Nigeria, for this reason, proposed a jo int General Council/TNC meeting to look at the final 
preparations for Cancún and to adopt the draft going to Ministers. 
234. The representative of Pakistan
 said progress had been made on some issues and guidance 
from Ministers would speed up the negotiations in the se areas.  However, work was at the initial stage 
on other issues and Ministers should take note of them.  If specific decisions were sought on these 
issues at the present stage, they might inadvertentl y end up blocking the whole process.  He wished to 
highlight those areas where his delegation belie ved progress could be made and agreed options 
presented to Ministers for decision. 
235. On NAMA, participants were increasingly b ecoming convinced that the Negotiating Group 
Chairman's formula was the best option so far, an d the pain that it caused would be shared by all 
Members.  While some developed countries believed that this formula was not based on equity 
because of their desire to reduce tariffs to the same level irrespective of the starting level, his 
delegation believed the tariff average concept did br ing some equity but was still rather ambitious.  
However, if longer timeframes and adjustment in the coefficient level were  allowed for developing 
countries, most of them might be able to accept it.  In the proposed formula, high rates would be cut 
substantially even if tariff averages were higher as in the case of developing countries.  A 100 per cent 
tariff rate with an average at 30 per cent, which w as the general average of developing countries, and 
the coefficient of one would be cut to 25 per cent – quite a steep cut.  So proposals to make the 
formula more ambitious would not be acceptable to the majority of countries.  It was not only a question of revenue implications;  protection for nascent industries was needed for the foreseeable 
future because developing countries generally had lo wer economies of scale and higher input costs. 
236. On the sectoral approach, it would not be easy for developing countries to accept all sectors 
from complete elimination of tariffs.  However, if some adjustment was allowed in the staging, it 
could become acceptable, for example, if developi ng countries were allowed to maintain some level 
of protection.  Financial institu tions, including the IMF, had worked out that these countries would 
need a level of protection of 10 to 15 per cent fo r the foreseeable future.  Overall, his delegation 
believed there was a workable framework in NAMA, and the Chairman could work towards 
consensus. 
237. Turning to agriculture, he said the recent CAP reform partially addressed only one pillar of 
agriculture reform, and it seemed that even this si ngle step had many exceptions for the key products 
of sugar, dairy products and rice.  Unless Memb ers made progress in agriculture, not much headway 
would be possible in other areas, and Members should at least accept the framework or general 
guidelines indicated in the Chairman's document TN /AG/W/1/Rev.1.  Like NAMA, there was a need 
to supplement the general approach with a sectoral  approach, and Members sh ould not ignore the case 
made by President Compaoré of Burkina Faso for re moval of subsidies on cotton.  He agreed with the 
European Communities that other countries which made use of domestic support and other subsidies 
should also start moving. 
238. On S&D treatment and implementation, progress had been made, but it was still not possible 
to reach decisions on major areas of interest for developing countries and LDCs.  However, his 
delegation was confident that the current level of  commitment and increased engagement would allow 
Members to make substantive progress and have a po sitive impact on Cancún.  On TRIPS and Public 
Health, there was a general agreement that any acco rd should not be blocked on the question of scope 
of diseases.  With this issue resolved, Members s hould now finalize the issue on the basis of the 16 
December text of the Chairman.  TN/C/M/11 
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239. On services, his delegation was concerned with the offers by certain developed countries in 
sectors and modes of supply of interest to developi ng countries, especially on the importance of mode 
4 for developing countries.  He was concerned with  the lack of progress in the rule making areas of 
GATS and thought that the unfinished business of GA TS, for establishment of Emergency Safeguard 
Measures, had lingered on for too long and was jeopa rdizing the mandate in this area.  On the 
assessment of trade in services, as per the mandate of Article XIX, the Council for Trade in Services 
should be able to draw some conclusions, with a view to facilitate the ongoing services negotiations.  
As a developing country, Pakistan wished to engage in the market access negotiations in an informed 
manner.  The assessment of trade in services – on a sector al basis or on an "overall" basis – needed to 
be completed on the basis of numerous submissions made to the Special Session. 
240. Except for a few countries, there was general c onsensus that each Singapore issue had to be 
tackled on its own merit.  Progress had been made on trade facilitation, but if some countries insisted on binding disciplines, it would be difficult to move forward.  On rules, Pakistan was awaiting the 
results of negotiations in anti-dumping and RTAs an d until Members were able to finalize their work, 
they might examine the reiteration of the Doha Decl aration relating to back-to-back application of 
anti-dumping inquiries. 
241. The representative of Malaysia
 said that at two months from the Cancún Ministerial, it was 
important for Members to collectively and individually  prepare for that meeting.  Members needed to 
remind themselves that they were on track and this needed to continue.  It was important to make 
progress on S&D issues and to put to rest the noti on that S&D could be used for protectionist 
purposes or shielding developing countries from taki ng up their trade obligations.  This suspicion 
could be put to rest if Members all worked together  to ensure that S&D was not geared towards those 
objectives, and to ensure that developing countries were not burdened with onerous obligations that 
stifled their trade capabilities.  It was important at least on this particular subject to have a package 
that was reasonable, not meagre and one that  would not be derided by civil society. 
242. On market access, his delegation's main preocc upation was to ensure that exports, especially 
of developing countries, were given priority attenti on.  On agriculture, he hoped that there would be 
some engagement before Cancún on the initial step that the European Communities had taken on CAP 
reform and what this would mean in terms of substantive reductions of  domestic support, export 
subsidies, or in market access.  This reform  should be the platform upon which the European 
Communities needed to build so that  agricultural trade would be dictated by market forces in the very 
near future. 
243. On NAMA, Members had made steady progress and it was not an area of difficulty for many, 
mostly because of familiarity with the subject fro m many Rounds since the GATT's founding in 1947.  
However, some delegations had high expectations.  Given the differences  in the levels of ambition, he 
was confident of constructive e ngagement and while developing countries' concerns should be 
addressed, he acknowledged that they too would ha ve to contribute to the negotiations.  Since 
progress in this area would lead to movement in other areas, his delegation believed the approach 
should be to work on a formula that would bring co ntributions from all countries, and at the same 
time, take into account the sensitiviti es of some developing countries. 
244. All Members had to do on services, which ha d been moving smoothly, was to request 
Ministers for political guidance for post-Cancún.  Hi s delegation agreed with many others that both 
developed and devel oping countries should increase the number of offers and improve their quality.  
He highlighted the need to resolve some of the wo rk in the rules area with respect to the emergency 
safeguard measure.  Progress had been made on environment, which could be pointed out to 
Ministers, but more work had to be done.  On th e register for wines and spirits, the issues to be 
resolved were voluntary participation and whet her non-participants would be subject to new 
obligations with legal effect. TN/C/M/11 
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245. His delegation believed that the Singapore issues should each be treated on its own merits and 
that the clarification process should continue.  The fear of losing national policy space and not 
knowing the consequences made nego tiations impossible at this juncture.  Creativity was needed in 
dealing with these issues, and his delegation urged a paradigm shift in the way new issues were dealt with in the WTO.  Not every issue up for negotiatio n in the WTO should result in binding rules or be 
subject to the DSU.  His delegation wondered why this always had to be the case and asked why 
Members could not be creative in adopting new appr oaches to deal with new issues, especially those 
which had implications on the regulatory measu res countries had implemented.  In the GATT 
negotiations, goods, border issues and binding issues had been dealt with, and that had been simple.  
So his delegation urged Members to reflect on cohere nt measures that could be put in place to deal 
with the new issues under discussion. 
246. Cancún could not appear to be a setback.  It w as in Geneva that the negotiations took place 
and it was from Geneva that solutions should emerge  for decisions at the Ministerial level.  He 
believed that delegations in  Geneva were not doing enough to prep are the stage for Cancún.  While he 
agreed with many who had said political will was needed from the political masters, he believed that 
some in Geneva were not trying their best to deal with some of these issues.  Some issues might not 
enjoy consensus, but delegations had to put their head s together to find a certain direction to take to 
Cancún.  He was sure that delegations were in a position to guide their Ministers to move in a 
direction that was practical, realistic and pragmatic. 
247. The representative of China
 said that, according to the mandate in the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, Cancún would appare ntly be judged on whether Ministers would make any objective 
assessment of what had been achieved since Doha  and what remained to be done, and whether 
Ministers could guide their negotiators to comple te successfully the unfulfilled mandate laid down at 
Doha.  If that was not completed by their nego tiators, Cancún would also be judged by whether 
Ministers could provide more political guidance to th e future Work Programme so as to maintain the 
momentum of the negotiations and ensure that the result of the on-going negotiations and other 
aspects of work of the organization would prove that the Doha Agenda was truly a development 
agenda.  Finally, it would be judged by whether Mi nisters could make an objective judgment on the 
situation Members faced on the deliberations on the modalities of agriculture and non-agriculture 
market access as well as on the Singapore issues and make appropriate decisions. 
248. Since this Round was the development round, Members had to ensure that developing 
countries could fully participate in the negotiati ons and see their concerns addressed, and he urged 
Members to be flexible in the informal consu ltations on S&D and implementation so as to produce 
positive results before Cancún.  Success in these is sues, as well as on TRIPS and Public Health, 
would build the confidence of developing Members.  Agriculture was the centre of the Round, and it 
was high time to put an end to the distortion of agricultural trade by eliminating export subsidies and substantially reducing domestic s upport.  The levels of ambition on these pillars would have a direct 
impact on market access achievements.  Developi ng Members' concerns on tariff peaks and tariff 
escalation should be addressed as should the concepts  of special products and special agricultural 
safeguards.  Special consideration should be given to newly-acceded Members who were still 
implementing extensive commitments and could not affo rd to enter into substantive new obligations.  
His delegation attached great importance to CAP re form and looked forward to its translation into 
specific new proposals. 
249. On non-agricultural market access, his delegati on believed that the Chairman's text provided 
the basic elements for the negotiations.  To im plement less than full reciprocity, his delegation 
preferred a different "B" coefficient to be applied at different stages for developing Members.  Since 
many developing Members were not ready to accept a mandatory sectoral approach, a voluntary 
approach might be the right solution.  His dele gation believed that ways should be explored to 
guarantee that the negotiations on non-tariff barri ers progressed in tandem with those on market 
access.  In addition, the treatment for the newly- acceded Members should not be confined to longer 
periods of implementation and a diffe rent coefficient was necessary.  TN/C/M/11 
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250. On services, it was necessary to accelerate th e negotiations on GATS rules, such as 
emergency safeguard measures, subsidies and domest ic regulations.  The est ablishment of emergency 
safeguard measures were of particular importance for developing Members to take an active part in the process of liberalization in trade in services.   His delegation also attached importance to 
commitments by developed Members in mode 4, cons truction and maritime transport.  He hoped that 
sectors of great export interests for developing Memb ers would be further liberalized in this Round.  
The concerns of newly-acceded Members should also  be addressed as their trading partners had 
benefited from their extensive commitments.  The newly-acceded Members had not had the opportunity to make specific requests during thei r accession, and these should be taken into account. 
251. Singapore issues were one of the key items to be  dealt with in Cancún, and Members needed 
to make an objective assessment of where these issu es stood.  His delegation was not against the start 
of the negotiations, as long as explicit consensus was reached on each of the issues.  The modalities 
were not only procedural – some of the substan tive elements should be clarified in them.  For 
example, on investment, there should be clear defi nition of whether the negotiation would concentrate 
on FDI or cover portfolio investment as well, wh ether it would cover obligations of host countries 
only or of both host and home countries, and whether the agreement would be binding.  On 
competition policy, clarification should be made whether hardcore cartels would only refer to 
international ones or also include local ones, and whether the result would be binding and apply the DSU or have only a peer review.  Since many deve loping Members did not yet have competition laws 
and did not have relevant administrative bodies, the eventual costs and financial burdens also had to 
be considered.  On transparency in government pr ocurement, there was a need to determine the scope 
of transparency and the possible threshold of pr ojects to be covered, and whether the agreement 
would be binding.  On trade facilitation, financ ial and technical assistance would be of importance 
and the question of whether the agreement should be binding was an important element.  His 
delegation hoped appropriate proposal s would be submitted to the Ministers for consideration at 
Cancún. 
252. The representative of South Africa
 said that as Cancún approached, Members needed to 
remind themselves why development should be at th e center of the Round.  His delegation believed 
that globalization had benefited and continued to benefit mainly developed countries.  This outcome 
had been partly the result of protectionist polic ies of developed countries, denying developing 
countries their right to realize their development pot ential and stifling their capacity to grow their way 
out of poverty.  The rules of the game, including in the WTO, had been driven by the North which had 
shaped globalization to advance its interests.  Examples included the TRIPS Agreement on Public 
Health and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, but also the relatively high standards reflected in the TBT 
and SPS Agreements. 
253. The costs of these practices to developing coun tries were high – more than US$100 billion a 
year, at least twice the value of total ODA.  There was no doubt that the removal of these protectionist 
policies, and the introduction of more balanced rule s, would usher in a new growth stimulus in the 
global economy, an increase in GDP of at least 1.3 per cent for developed countries and 2 per cent for 
developing countries, according to World Bank estimat es.  Substantial liberalization, according to 
these estimates, could result in reducing the numbe r of people living in poverty by over 300 million 
by 2015. 
254. There was no doubt that agricultural liberalizati on would result in the highest gains for most 
developing countries.  Continued protection in the No rth was the main obstacle.  The recent so-called 
"final reforms" of the European Union had once ag ain reflected the insensitivity of the North to the 
devastating effects of their policies on the lives of poor people in developing countries.  The much diluted partial de-coupling of subsidies from protect ion and the delayed action by some countries to 
only begin reforms in 2007 was unlik ely to introduce market related prices and remove the distortions 
in global trade.  The postponement and exclusion of products from the reforms, such as cotton and 
sugar, would provide no hope to poor African fa rmers whose livelihoods had been destroyed by the 
protectionist policies of the North in these areas.  The reforms did not address the issues of market TN/C/M/11 
Page 44  
 
access, such as tariff peaks and escalation that prev ented African countries from diversifying their 
production and export subsidies, despite the French President's acknowledgement  of the damage these 
had caused African farmers and his promise to address them. 
255. South Africa had been disturbed by the ne gotiating tactics of the European Communities 
since it had heard that it would not table a new negotiating proposal based on these reforms to the 
WTO.  Instead, Members were expected to belie ve that these reforms provided the Community with 
sufficient space to negotiate an ambitious outcome , and they were supposed to respond positively to 
the Community's checklist, both in agriculture a nd other areas of the DDA, before it made a 
meaningful offer on agriculture.  These tactics were disingenuous and a recipe for disaster at Cancún.  
There were too many experiences of "bounced cheq ues" and his delegation needed to see whether the 
Community had anything at all to offer before making painful concessions. 
256. South Africa was working hard to table its initial services offer before Cancún.  There was a 
serious debate among stakeholders  on how vital and whether public  services should be liberalized 
further.  However, the continued reforms and re-str ucturing of state assets was enabling his country to 
advance the delivery of basic infrastructure and re duce the cost of inputs, and the services sector 
presented an opportunity to compete in global mark ets.  Among the 30 countries that had made initial 
offers, his delegation was studying the offers of the major developed counties and was disappointed at 
the lack of meaningful liberalization in these offe rs.  Both the offers by the United States and the 
European Communities made unilateral classification ch anges, and in some cas es, rolled back existing 
liberalization.  These offers merely created a stands till of existing liberaliza tion and had not made any 
significant positive response to the requests of devel oping countries – in particular on the need to 
open their markets to foreign service providers and on mode 4.  Their offers amounted to putting on 
the table what amounted to almost an empty shell. 
257. These countries were now poised to adopt a mercan tilist approach to liberalizing their markets 
by calling for concessions from others before they made any concessions themselves.  This was a sector in which developed countries already had massi ve competitive advantages.  It was time they 
filled this empty shell with real substance, providing deve loping countries with the opportunity to also 
develop their services sector, thus creating greater balance and opportunities for the increased growth 
of developing countries.  Those with greater cap acity should provide others with encouragement and 
leadership. 
258. On NAMA, there was much unfinished business.  Developed countries had protected their 
markets through high tariffs, tariff peaks and escalati on, quotas and restrictions, plus non-tariff 
barriers, including anti-dumping and technical barr iers to trade, in precisely those sectors where 
developing countries had significant comparative adva ntage.  Thus poor peoples' exports had faced 
the highest barriers to trade and this should be the main focus of this Round.  South Africa had made a 
proposal on the NAMA modalities as a contribution to try and create a more balanced outcome in the 
negotiation.  The Negotiating Group Chairman ha d put forward a draft elements paper, which 
provided Members with a good basis to develop a balanced set of modalities, and South Africa had 
proposed some adaptation to these proposals. 
259. First, South Africa had argued that these negotia tions should strive to be as inclusive as 
possible, rather than further marginalize those c ountries who had a small and declining share of global 
markets.  Thus, it had called for increased bindings – of at least 95 per cent for all, with due credit for 
those who had liberalized autonomously.  In additi on, the modalities should result in real adjustments 
creating genuine liberalization for all.  Devel oped countries and the larger developing countries 
should make greater efforts.  Second, South Africa ha d called for the formula approach to be the main 
modality.  While the Chairman's proposed formula ha d some built-in asymmetry, it was insufficient to 
create the necessary comfort for many smaller countries, particularly those that had relatively low 
average bound tariffs.  South Africa's proposal called for a differentiated "B" coefficient, with the 
more industrially advanced countries making greater effort, with a smaller coefficient, and others 
proportionately less effort, with a larger coefficient.   Third, South Africa's proposal recognized that  TN/C/M/11 
 Page 45 
 
 
Members were not starting from a level playing field, and thus the sectoral and zero-for-zero approaches should only be undertaken after the ef fects of the formula were understood; and on a 
voluntary basis.  In addition, this approach, if u tilized by developing countries, should have a built-in 
asymmetry, providing some exclusions for developing  countries and an end rate that was above zero. 
260. In conclusion, as Members approached Cancún,  his delegation urged the large developed 
countries to recognize that they had the greatest responsibility for advancing a successful outcome, 
particularly in agriculture and TRIPS and Public Health.  They should not look only to their own 
constituencies, but also take responsibility for the br oader global impact of their policies.  They had 
an opportunity to re-shape globalization so that the flows of trade, investment and finance, as well as 
the rules of the game were more equitably balanced.  They continued to be the main beneficiaries of 
globalization, while their policies stifled the grow th and development prosp ects of many developing 
countries.  Cancún provided all Members the oppor tunity to address these imbalances in the global 
trading system and to make a significant contribution to the reduction of poverty. 
261. The representative of Thailand
 expressed disappointment over the missed deadlines in a 
number of areas and said that to conclude the ne gotiations by 1 January 2005, Members needed a 
successful Ministerial Conference in Cancún.  She w as encouraged that the Chairmen of the General 
Council and TNC would circulate the first draft of the Ministerial text for comments in a transparent manner.  Her delegation had con cerns over the decision to be taken by explicit consensus on the 
modalities for the Singapore issues in  Cancún and agreed with Malaysia that not all these issues 
needed to have a legal binding effect. 
262. Many areas of the negotiations would depend upo n progress in agriculture.  Her delegation 
was encouraged by the CAP reform which might gi ve the European Communities more flexibility to 
negotiate within the level of ambition require d by the Doha mandate.  On market access, both 
substantial tariff reduction commit ments and expansion of TRQ volume was needed.  Her delegation 
was concerned that the concept of special products might exclude produc ts of export interest to other 
developing countries.  Her delegation advocated focu sing on problems of world agricultural trade as a 
whole, rather than problems of specific groups of Members.  It would be difficult to accept 
discrimination among developing countries or among the products to be reformed.  On reductions in 
trade-distorting domestic support, Members needed to  substantially reduce the trade-distorting amber 
box, the blue box and decouple payments in the green  box.  Only the elimination of all forms of 
export subsidies would satisfy the mandate of ph asing out the most trade-distorting subsidies. 
263. In the NAMA negotiations, although Members had varying levels of ambition on the 
appropriate ways of incorporati ng S&D and less than full reciprocity in the formula and on whether 
mandatory sectoral tariff elimination should be incl uded in the package, her delegation was optimistic 
that a compromise solution would be reached befo re Cancún.  Thailand wanted to see similarly 
ambitious outcomes in market access for both agricultural and non-agricultural products. 
264. On services, there was an imbalance between th e multilateral and bilateral processes with the 
multilateral negotiations in the rules area, such as emergency safeguard measures, subsidies and 
domestic regulation, not having made progress in c ontrast to the bilateral negotiations on market 
access and national treatment.  Her delegation would like to see Ministers in Cancún provide guidance 
on these negotiations, especially on emergency safeguard s, which was of interest to Thailand.  Her 
delegation was disappointed with the quality of of fers from developed countries in the sectors and 
modes of supply of interest to Th ailand.  Her country's initial request s had also not been taken into 
account, and her delegation hoped th at developed countries would send a positive signal by making 
greater efforts to respond to developing countri es' requests, so as to provide incentives to table 
meaningful offers that would lead to more balanced market access. 
265. On TRIPS and Public Health, her delegation urged the key Me mbers to demonstrate political 
will and to adhere to their commitments so as to  break the gridlock and develop an expeditious 
solution before Cancún.  On Rules, her delegati on welcomed the substantial progress that had been TN/C/M/11 
Page 46  
 
made in the initial phase of identifying issues and it hoped that Ministers would give guidance to the 
Rules Group to accelerate its work  after Cancún and to shift emphasis from identifying issues to 
seeking solutions.  Her delegation also welcomed the breakthrough on ad hoc participation of UNEP 
and six MEAs in the Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Environment.  Her delegation believed that the question of observership should be  solved on a horizontal basis.  It supported the 
current system of exchange of information underway  in the Special Session.  In conclusion, she said 
that establishing modalities in agriculture would pave  the way to reach deals in other areas of the 
negotiations. 
266. The representative of Hungary
 said that the CAP reform decision on domestic support was a 
major one, because it redirected and substantially re duced trade-distorting subsidies.  The European 
Communities had created the necessary conditions for further successful negotiations on agriculture.  
There had been much criticism of the decision in th e statements at the present meeting, but it was an 
important step.  The question now was the steps othe rs would take to follow this initiative, and no-one 
had said how they would reciprocate.  The ne gotiating process could not  be one-sided.  The 
agriculture negotiations were beset by imbalances,  which was also the case in the report by the 
Chairman of the Agriculture Special Session.  A lthough the report had been made on the Chairman's 
own responsibility, it was to be submitted to Ministers and the imbalances were a matter of concern to 
his delegation.  The report implied an agreement on the phasing out of export subsidies, and the only 
question was the formula to be used.  This did no t correspond to the Doha mandate.  This ambitious 
approach was reserved only for European-type export  subsidies, and there was no reflection of such 
an ambitious approach for other types of government  export support.  On export credits and food aid, 
some basic issues were mentioned which his dele gation believed should be the subject of further 
discussions, such as on critical situations when food  aid disciplines could be exempted.  In paragraph 
21 on state trading export enterprises, the matter of allowing further monopoly rights for such enterprises was put in the form of a question.  Th is was a typical imbalance – on the one hand, it was 
flatly stated that the phase out of  European-type export subsidies w as taken for granted, while on the 
other, it was unclear how state trading disciplines w ould be dealt with.  He wondered how this could 
be justified.  This imbalance was also evident in the market access section.   In paragraph 10 on the 
tariff reduction formula, "strong and widespread support" was indicated for the Uruguay Round formula and, a few lines below, there was "strong s upport" for a Swiss-type formula.  His delegation 
believed that the importance of agriculture demanded steps and compromises on all sides, not just one side. 
267. For Hungary, the agricultural mark et access negotiations were rela ted to GIs.  The work on 
the issue of GI extension was blocked.  The rece nt meetings on this had been of little use with 
opponents questioning whether this issue should be discussed, let alone negotiated.  The negotiations 
on the register for wines and spirits were also effec tively blocked.  In the light of the strong opposition 
from a group of agricultural exporters, the Special Sess ion Chairman had been unable to put forward a 
new proposal, and he wished to reiterate that the opponents' proposal did not respect the mandate.  
The mandate provided for a multilateral system, but th eir proposal was for a plurilateral notification, 
because it was based on voluntary participation and a vol untary choice of any effect of the system.  In 
addition, it did not go beyond the act of notification and did not address the issue of the register.  In Hungary's view, such a proposal did not even come close to the Doha mandate. 
268. On NAMA, his delegation believed progress ha d been made.  It supported using the 
Chairman's paper as a basis for further negotiati ons, although it had concerns with the text.  The 
proposed formula was not in line with developmen t considerations.  It was based on taking into 
account average tariff levels, but there was no rela tionship between the level of development and 
tariff averages between various countries.  Neverthe less, his delegation was ready to work further in 
this area.  On S&D and implementation, his delegation commended the initiatives taken by the 
Chairman of the TNC and General Council and hoped for progress in the coming weeks.  His 
delegation also hoped for rapid progress on TRIPS and Public Health and agreed with those who said 
success on this issue would be a precondition for a successful Cancún.  TN/C/M/11 
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269. On Singapore issues, some delegations had ques tioned the need for a decision in Cancún and 
had suggested that the study phase should continue , but the mandate showed that Ministers had 
already decided on negotiations on all four issues a nd all that was missing was a decision by explicit 
consensus on the modalities.  At this stage, it woul d be futile to continue discussions on whether it 
was a good idea to negotiate on these issues.  However,  Hungary was ready to consider the specifics 
of all four issues and take them into account when  establishing modalities.  His delegation hoped that 
other delegations would be pa rtners in this exercise. 
270. The representative of India  said that the Chairman's statemen t regarding the manner in which 
the document for Cancún would be finalized had b een highly reassuring.  Like the Chairman, his 
delegation hoped that the document, which would be skeletal in the first instance, would be fleshed 
out collectively by all delegations and that ther e would be a sense of ownership among them all, 
without exception.  In this connection, he wished  to recall the decisions taken on 1 February 2002 
which had laid down the principles and practices to be  followed in the negotiati ons, and in particular 
that: "In their regular reporting to overseeing bodies, Chairpersons should reflect consensus, or where 
this is not possible, different positions on issues".  He was sure this would be borne in mind by all 
Chairpersons when reporting on their own responsibilit y, since the reports needed to reflect entirely 
the views of the bodies they were ch airing without subjective elements. 
271. Morocco had stressed the importance of transp arency, objectivity, inclusiveness and realism 
combined with ambition in the pre-Cancún process and at the Ministerial Conference itself.  Bangladesh had stressed the importance of keeping records of all meetings and ensuring that the 
deliberations at informal sma ll group meetings were communicated to others for complete 
transparency and inclusiveness.  His delegation wi shed to point out that minutes of some formal 
meetings were being circulated late .  His delegation urged the Chairman  to pay particular attention to 
the process hereafter and the manner in which th e process was conducted at Cancún, so that all 
apprehensions were laid to rest and a new dynamic introduced into the work of this organization, 
building on the progress made since Seattle. 
272. His delegation requested the Chairman to cons ider how the programme hereafter could be 
planned in such manner that productive work was maximized, while at the same time taking full 
account of the limitations of small delegations.  It h oped also that the time limits laid down in Rule 3 
of the Rules of Procedure for Ministerial Confer ences would be observed and that the provisional 
agenda be drawn up by the Secretariat in consultation with the Chairperson and communicated to Members at least five weeks before the commencement of the Session. 
273. Turning to agriculture, he said that some pr ogress had been made.  Issues had been identified 
and detailed discussions had taken place.  There ha d to be understanding on all sides to carry the 
negotiations forward and a realisation that agricultu re was a sensitive sector.  The extent of domestic 
support and export subsidies continue d to be considerable and, as Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and 
Mali had reminded Members, the effect on devel oping countries' agriculture sectors could be 
disastrous.  The extent of subsidy given in agricu lture, even though it might be in the form of 
decoupled income support, indicated the importance attached to ensuring incomes and standards of living in the rural sectors of developed countries.  India did not have the resources to provide such 
subsidies to prop up millions of farmer s, it had to resort to border meas ures, particularly tariffs.  The 
Uruguay Round approach to reduction of  tariffs gave India some flexibilit y to deal with this issue.  
The concepts of special products and special sa feguards measures had been introduced by the 
Chairman of the Special Session precisely to take into account this important problem of livelihood 
security, not to speak of food security.  Unfortunate ly, his delegation did not see sufficient sensitivity 
to these problems on the part of some trading partners.  Indonesia had stated that modalities in agriculture would not be acceptable without special  products on a self-declaration basis and special 
safeguard measures for developing countries. 
274. On non-agricultural market access, he said the report by the Chairman of the Negotiating 
Group had been objective.  Much more work was needed on the formula and on various other TN/C/M/11 
Page 48  
 
elements of the Chairman's paper.  The most cont roversial element related to the sectoral approach.  
He recalled that work had started on the Info rmation Technology Agreement, as a plurilateral 
agreement, as early as 1996 at the Singapore Minist erial Conference, but Members were still unable to 
agree on the tariff lines to be covered under ITA 2.  The Chairman's sectoral approach was modelled 
on the same pattern, but it was expected to be mand atory in nature and cover all countries.  India did 
not see how Members could conclude such a majo r negotiation covering several sectors in the 
foreseeable future.  On binding coverage, there were huge differences of opinion on the manner in 
which the "B" and "Ta" coefficients were to be dealt with, and here also there was a need for 
flexibility and genuine understanding of the problems faced by other countries if rapid progress was to 
be made. 
275. On services, he noted the overall progress, but em phasized the need for symmetry both within 
the market access negotiations themselves and with the complementary rule making areas that would 
facilitate effective market access.  A group of 15 developing countries had submitted an important 
proposal (TN/S/W/14) to the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services on 4 July for 
effective liberalisation of mode 4, which was an area of enormous commercial significance for 
developing countries.  He wished to reiterate the unsatisfactory progress in mode 4 as reflected in the 
initial offers on the table and hoped that, both in th e multilateral process and in the bilateral request 
and offer negotiations, the issues raised in the pr oposal would be suitably a ddressed with substantive 
improvements made to mode 4 commitments in sub sequent offers.  His delegation would look for 
political direction from Ministers at Cancún to suita bly address these concerns.  The Chairman of the 
Services Special Session had suggested benchmarks  by which Members would improve their initial 
offers, and a number of delegations  had also referred to revised deadlines to be decided upon by the 
Ministers.  His delegation suggested specific benchmarks for improvements in offers in sectors and modes of delivery of export interests to developi ng countries, particularly mode 4, to establish a 
proper balance in the market access negotiations in services. 
276. In the rules area, India attached great impor tance to negotiations under paragraph 29 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration aimed at clarif ying and improving disciplines and procedures under 
WTO provisions applying to RTAs.  His delegation's recent discussion paper (TN/RL/W/114) had highlighted preferential rules of origin, RTAs a nd regulations relating to TBT and SPS, RTAs and 
trade defence measures and definiti ons of "substantially all trade".  India welcomed the initiative by 
the Negotiating Group Chairman to commence cons ideration of these systemic issues.  Many 
implementation issues were to be  negotiated in the Rules Negotia ting Group and his delegation hoped 
that these issues would be dealt with expeditiously and adequately. 
277. He noted that some delegations had referre d to progress on the TRIPS and Public Health 
issue.  His delegation hoped this was indeed tr ue and that Members would have results before 
Cancún.  Failure to achieve progress in this area would have a negative impact on the negotiating process initiated at Doha with its emphasis on the de velopment dimension.  On S&D treatment issues, 
it was necessary to have positive results on some commercially meaning provisions before Cancún.  
But his delegation had found few signs of progress d espite the best efforts of the Chairman of the 
General Council and the Ambassador of Brazil.  Th e key to progress in S&D lay in whether Members 
were able to deliver something that was commerciall y meaningful to developing countries.  It was too 
late in the day to tinker with a few words here  and there, leaving the meaning of the provision 
virtually untouched and no more pr ecise, operational or effective.  Since the start of the S&D 
discussions after Doha, and from the point of view  of developing countries, all that had been 
accomplished was that Members had acquired a deeper understanding of the meaning of each provision in commercial terms. 
278. His delegation was aware that the Singapore issues did not fall under the purview of the TNC, 
however some delegations had referred to them at the present meeting.  Several delegations, including 
his, had had serious doubts about the negotiations on th ese issues even at Doha.  Ministers, therefore, 
had decided to initiate a clarification process and a technical assistance programme to address the 
concerns of countries like India.  They had also d ecided that if there was explicit consensus at the  TN/C/M/11 
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Fifth Ministerial Conference on modalities of nego tiations, then further negotiations would be 
initiated.  The language had been wisely chosen.  Th e Ministers had resolved not to begin negotiations 
on the basis of explicit consensus at the Fifth Mini sterial Conference, but to  launch negotiations after 
a decision on modalities was taken at the Conference .  Their objective was very clear.  The modalities 
would give a clear and unambiguous picture of the natu re and direction of obligations that they would 
have to undertake.  It would then be possible for Ministers to approach their domestic constituencies, 
higher decision-making authorities and their government s, to formulate a national view on whether or 
not a particular Singapore issue would be in the ov erall interests of their country and whether their 
country could join in an explicit consensus decision. 
279. Singapore issues had always been contentious  and there was an obvious and noticeable 
reluctance on the part of developing countries to ente r into negotiations without a clear understanding 
of the negotiating parameters of each issue.  This  had been echoed by the Dhaka Declaration of LDC 
Trade Ministers, the Nairobi Declaration of  Commerce and Trade Ministers, the Mauritius 
Declaration of African Union Trade Ministers and ma ny other statements made by Ministers on other 
occasions.  At this point, Members were no closer to a definition of modalities on most Singapore 
issues, and as had been stated by China, this exte nded to key elements of the negotiating structure.  
Without this, no government could possibly decide wh ether to join negotiations or not.  It was not 
enough to list elements and then determine a nego tiating schedule since, if  that were the case, 
modalities in agriculture could have been confined to  a bland statement consisting of the three pillars 
and a schedule of meetings.  It was not possible to leave the formulation of modalities to the negotiating process after negotiations had been la unched, because for many, including India, the 
decision to negotiate was itself contingent on the commitments and obligations they had to undertake 
and their own rights and privileges.  At this stage, therefore, wisdom lay in not attempting to force the 
issue at Cancún. 
280. Informed sections of industry and civil societ y, even in the North, had raised important 
questions regarding these issues.  The United St ates Business Round Table, while supporting the 
ultimate goal of a strong binding investment agreement,  believed that "the cont entious negotiations of 
a WTO investment agreement is more likely to distract  from, rather than contribute to the success of 
other on-going WTO negotiations.  Example, agricu lture, services and tariff liberalization".  The 
United Kingdom Parliament's Inte rnational Development Select Committee had recently released a 
pre-Cancún report where it stated that: "The gove rnment should unequivocally drop its support for 
opening negotiations on the Singapore issues.  These issues would overload an already full agenda.  
They are not wanted by most developing countries a nd it is questionable whether the WTO is the right 
forum for agreements on investment and competition.   The Singapore issues are not developmental 
priorities". 
281. India had a deep commitment to success at Cancún and any negative signal from Cancún 
could have a deep and lasting effect on the entir e negotiation.  His delegation agreed with South 
Korea that Cancún should not be overl oaded with issues that were incapab le of immediate solution.  It 
also agreed with Pakistan that any attempt to fo rce the pace at Cancún without adequate preparatory 
work could prove to be counterproductive.  Members should focus on building a forward looking agenda to add impetus to the negotiations and to  steer them towards early consensus on issues. 
282. The representative of Chile
 agreed with Mexico that nothing new or constructive had been 
heard, even from those who bore the greatest respons ibility in trade liberalization.  Members had not 
entered into real negotiations and with a few exce ptions such as services, Members were negotiating 
with Chairpersons rather than with each other.  In agriculture, no constructive progress had been made 
on the central issues of the three pillars.  Hungary had suggested that some would say that any CAP 
reform would never be sufficient.  This was true, since the latest reforms did not touch upon market 
access or export subsidies.  The European Communi ties had said that, with the completion of their 
internal reform, other countries should respond in kind.  This was troubling because even once the 
reform in domestic support was completed, not al l the evaluations were positive.  An assessment by 
independent experts in the Un ited Kingdom showed that massiv e amounts of domestic subsidies TN/C/M/11 
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would still be available, export subsidies and mark ets access would largely be untouched, sugar would 
not be included, and dairy reforms would be very lim ited.  In addition, substa ntial dairy reform might 
not be forthcoming until 2014 and decoupling mi ght still increase production.  Furthermore, 
decoupled subsidies were tied to recent production a nd for some in the European Union, decoupling 
could be delayed until the year 20 07.  Finally, market access for rice was possibly to be renegotiated. 
283. These conclusions showed that while the steps that  had been taken were significant, they were 
insufficient.  It was disconcerting that European Co mmunities were not prepared to move any further.  
The European Communities' Trade Commissioner ha d said he expected to make new offers in 
agriculture and Chile looked forward to these as s oon as possible.  In addition to this modest and 
incomplete step, the European Communities were also making proposals on geographical indications, 
non-trade concerns and Singapore issues, and when it talked of market access in agriculture, it took up 
the defence of developing countries.  Chile wi shed to emphasize that developing countries could 
defend themselves perfectly well.  It was st range that the European Communities defended 
developing countries when discussing agriculture, but when it came to GIs it wanted to impose more 
obligations on them than those alread y existing under the TRIPS Agreement. 
284. His delegation was pleased that the non-resi dent Members were present to witness that, 
through the multilateral register for wines and spir its, the advocates for GIs sought to impose more 
obligations on developing countries and to alter the pr inciple of territoriality, which was the basis for 
protection of intellectual property of all types.  Furthermore, the proponents wanted a system that 
imposed obligations on Members that did not particip ate in the register and this took Members down a 
route which had no legal foundation and which was wrong. 
285. In conclusion, he said that Chile wanted th e maximum flexibility with the highest possible 
level of ambition.  However, the package had to be balanced and it could not be without having a 
positive outlook in the area of agriculture.  His de legation was open and flexible, but Members needed 
to remain within the framework of their obligations  and did not need to liberalize everything.  Chile 
wanted to improve the rules and the multilateral trad ing system, but it seemed that protectionist forces 
were pulling in the opposite direction.   Nevertheless Chile would continue to pull in the right direction 
and continue to struggle for more liberalization. 
286. The representative of the Philippines
 said that the present meeting, being the last TNC before 
Cancún, gave his delegation a mixe d feeling of concern and challenge .  His delegation did not wish 
the Chairman's skeletal paper to remain a skel eton of unfulfilled promises; it hoped these promises 
would turn into a sturdy edifice that could nourish and sustain healthy and viable human existence in 
the years to come. 
287. On agriculture, he said the failure to establish cl ear inter-linkages in commitments in the three 
pillars made it difficult to successfully address deve loping-country concerns on balance, equity and 
fairness.  All Members had known that the Chai rman's draft modalities would not make everyone 
happy.  Its conventional architecture would continue  to allow the persistence of trade distortions, 
falling far short of the DDA and the legitimate objectiv es of developing countri es.  Nevertheless, the 
Philippines and many developing countries had s hown willingness to engage on the basis of the 
structure being proposed, banking on a few useful elements, such as special products and the new 
special safeguard mechanism, where intense and more focused technical work might move them 
closer to the intentions for S& D treatment contained in the DDA. 
288. However, the rejection of the draft by major players had not contributed to the prospect of any 
real progress in the negotiations.  Without a structure under which meaningful engagements could be 
pursued, there was no negotiation and nothing in th e side-show of technical work could replace the 
non-event in the main arena.  Even with CAP refo rm, enthusiasm had not been ignited because there 
was only incomplete knowledge of the exact paramete rs of these reforms.  From informal reports, it 
seemed that the reforms were ample in export comp etition, that some room for manoeuvre might exist 
in domestic support, but that there were greater cons traints in market access.  Whatever the truth, it  TN/C/M/11 
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was still a useful basis for engagement and his delegation urged engageme nt, and the sooner the 
better, for the sake of wider overall progress in the DDA to which agriculture held the key. 
289. In the services negotiations, asymmetries were beginning to show.  Despite the increased 
number of offers on the table, the quality of the offers in sectors and modes of supply of export 
interest to developing countries left much to be desired.  Mode 4, where there continued to be an 
imbalance since the Uruguay Round vis-à-vis other modes of supply, had engendered expectations 
among most developing countries.  But they now faile d to find satisfaction in the initial offers on the 
table.  The rules aspect of the negotiations, partic ularly emergency safeguard measures, had failed to 
show corresponding progress, even after 8 years of negotiations and even after the recognition and emphasis given to it in the Negotiating Gu idelines and Procedures approved in 2001. 
290. There had been suggestions that Ministers in Cancún might establish benchmarks to mark out 
clear windows for wider or more enhanced offers.  His delegation believed this was not necessary, 
because Members had tried to be as constructive as po ssible.  In the services negotiations, there had 
been no talk of positive or negative linkages, at least  not openly, and delays in submitting offers were 
attributable to the careful study and understanding, pa rticularly on the part of developing countries, of 
their particular domestic situation and the implica tion of a multilateral obligation.  As his delegation 
has emphasized before, on-the-ground technical assistance would be a more useful track than 
benchmarking.  If benchmarks we re agreed, his delegation believe d corresponding benchmarks would 
need to be established also for the rules negotiations. 
291. On the TRIPS wines and spirits register, ther e was a window for agreement, or convergence, 
on a system with "sufficient value added" which fu lfilled the terms of the mandate.  However, as the 
Chairman of the TRIPS Council Special Session had cl early noted in his report, this should be in 
accordance with Article 23.4 of th e TRIPS Agreement.  In this regard, the system should be only to 
facilitate existing protection of wines and spirits, not increase protection, and be only applicable to 
those choosing to participate in the system.  In add ition, there should be substa ntive differences in the 
legal consequences or obligations to be borne by  those choosing to participate as opposed to those 
who opted not to participate.  Those choosing no t to participate should not have to incur new 
obligations under any system. 
292. On TRIPS and Public Health, Members needed to find a workable solution consistent with the 
Doha Declaration.  As they had the benefit of time, Members need not rush and compromise their work, as they had done in the lead up to the deadlin e of December 2002.  They should rather aim to 
do it right by not restricting the scope nor the elig ibility of beneficiary countries, and not incurring 
TRIPS-plus obligations.   His de legation hoped that the Chairman  of the regular TRIPS Council 
would take these minimum baselines into account in hi s work on this issue.  The added value of a 
decision in this area should be the long -term legal certainty it would provide. 
293. On environment, he said that paragraph 31(i) of the Doha Declaration was the core mandate 
of the Special Session of the Committee on Trade an d Environment and the work had moved forward 
in a focused and practical manner on the identifi cation of STOs which should legitimately be 
addressed to fulfill the objective of a mutually-rein forcing relationship betw een existing WTO rules 
and STOs set out in MEAs.  Despite some attempts  to push the negotiations to a set of immediate 
outcomes, his delegation believed all legitimate con cerns should be looked into.  Side shows on the 
issues of observership, eco-labelling and informati on exchange should not distract work on the core 
issue. 
294.
 The NAMA negotiations represented a sound possib ility for ambitions to exist side-by-side 
with development concerns.  The mandate called for the reduction, if not elimination, of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, as well as tariff peaks, high tari ffs and tariff escalation.  To a large extent the 
convergence on this matter would follow with close consultation.  However, successive negotiations 
under the GATT and the WTO had brought tariffs down to  levels considered by developed countries TN/C/M/11 
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to be nuisance levels which they proposed should be  eliminated.  But for developing countries these 
were primary sources of state revenues which needed to be preserved. 
295. Major developed Members had criticized the form ula-based approach using the average of the 
base rates, the "Ta" coefficient, as inconsistent w ith the mandate, but it was the ingenious use of this 
formula and the "Ta" coefficient which provided co mfort to a large number of developing countries 
with regard to their trade, financial and de velopment needs which, under the mandate, deserved 
priority attention. 
296. One major delegation had referred to NAMA as the lynchpin of the negotiations and his 
delegation believed it could be at th e leading edge of the negotiations provided that the rules were not 
changed.  While this same delegation was a stickl er for respecting the mandate in the case of anti-
dumping, it seemed to believe the NAMA mandate  could be overruled.  However, unlike in 
agriculture, the NAMA modalities and the formula-b ased approach had been embraced by all except 
this one major delegation.  And even more distur bing was the attempt to deny the principle of S&D 
treatment and less than full reciprocity through the suggestion of using only one coefficient for all Members.  That suggestion would harmonize tariffs,  irrespective of whether a country was developed 
or developing, to 8 per cent or lower. 
297. His delegation hoped that this distorted principl e of equality would be met with rejection by 
those Members who were seriously engaged in finding solution to the issues that divide them on the basic elements, namely the use of differing coeffici ents and deeper and accelerated tariff reduction as 
a contribution from developing countries without ad equate compensation.  The same blind ambition 
was also inherent in the proposal for zero-for-zero sectoral liberalization, which developed countries 
wanted to be mandatory, but which developing countries could only agree to on a voluntary basis. 
298. The Chairman was hopeful that, before Doha, he  could release an informal paper which could 
provide options, if not consensus.  His delegati on supported the Chairman and, provided that blind 
ambition did not stand in the way, NAMA might just provide the leading edge in the TNC Chairman's report to Ministers. 
299. Finally, with regard to the statement by Hunga ry on the Singapore issues, he wished to point 
out that there was no done deal in this area.  Ther e was still a need for decisions by explicit consensus 
on modalities in Cancún, only after wh ich the negotiations could begin.   The reports by the various 
working groups had reflected the wide divergen ce of views on these issues, including on how to 
implement the mandates.  For this reason, his dele gation believed that explicit consensus was unlikely 
to be reached. 
300. The representative of Bolivia
 said that since November of 2001, many proposals had been put 
forward in the various areas of negotiations, but in most cases they had only reflected unilateral considerations and left little room for flexible positions.  Finding solutions which responded to the 
different levels of development of countries was comp lex, but Members had to recall that this was the 
Development Round.  Like other developing countries, Bolivia hoped for ambitious results from this 
Round and that the negotiating process would be equ itable and balanced, and respect the principle of 
the Single Undertaking and the credibility of th e multilateral trading system.  Her delegation hoped 
that the draft Ministerial text to be circulated would set out a factual state of play of the negotiations to enable Ministers to engage in a proper assessm ent of the negotiations and to guide the work 
towards strict compliance with the Doha mandate s and a particular emphasis on S&D treatment for 
developing countries and LDCs. 
301. Bolivia believed that a central aspect of the negotiations was to achieve greater market 
opening, principally in developed countries, and it agreed with many others on the need for fair 
competition, both for agricultural products and non-agricultural products.  Finally, on trade in 
services, Bolivia was analyzing the various offers that had been submitted, and it hoped for greater 
liberalization in movement of natural persons, including more transparent rules.  TN/C/M/11 
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302. The representative of Barbados  said Geneva Week was an important event in the WTO 
calendar and it served a key role in enhancing the e ffective participation of non-resident Members.  
On agriculture, her delegation noted the statement by the Chairman of the Special Session that his 
report was on his own responsibility and that it did not reflect the positions of all Members.  Her 
delegation agreed with this, and also appreciated hi m stating he would be willing to revise his draft 
modalities at a later date.  Barbados believed that  Ministers at Cancún should have before them 
negotiating modalities which would, in the context of further agricultural reform, allow the survival of 
small agricultural sectors, such as in Barbados, through addressing food security, rural development 
and macro-economic objectives.  The achievement of  these objectives, which were of a low level of 
ambition compared to others, would require reducti on modalities that allowed Barbados adequate time 
to make the necessary adjustments without ha ving to experience severe social and economic 
disruption, but that also preserved Barbados' prefer ential arrangements during that adjustment period.  
In addition, Barbados believed that the concep ts of designated strategic products and a special 
safeguard mechanism for developing countries were essential elements of S&D treatment and had to 
be included in any modalities.  In this regard, her delegation was willing to make positive linkages 
between its general approach to tariff reduction and the treatment given to these two complementary, 
but separate instruments. 
303. With regard to the services negotiations, Barb ados welcomed the positive momentum which 
had generally prevailed and wh ich had served to facilitate the achievement of some initial 
benchmarks, such as the beginning of the requ est-offer phase and the adoption of modalities for 
autonomous liberalization.  However, her delegati on shared the concerns of the Special Session 
Chairman on the quality of the offers by some de veloped countries, both in terms of coverage of 
sectors and depth of market access.  In addition, he r delegation remained concerned that there was a 
lack of balance between the market access negotiatio ns and the rule-making negotiations.  There were 
a number of critical rule-making issues, including  subsidies, emergency safeguard measures and 
domestic regulation, which were relevant to mark et liberalization, but which remained unresolved 
while the market access negotiations were progressing at a faster pace. 
304. On the services market access negotiations, Barbados believed that it was important for 
Ministers to have evidence before them which s howed that all Members recognized and were willing 
to act upon the recognition that: 1) effective market  access in mode 4 was of critical importance to 
developing countries, 2) paragraph 15 of the Negotiating Guidelines regarding the effective 
implementation of GATS Article IV should be fu lly operationalized, 3) the size of economies of 
developing countries and the needs of small service suppliers should be taken fully into account, and 
4) the capacity constraints and special needs of small developing economies  should be taken into 
account.  On the issue of negotiating modalities fo r LDCs, Barbados looked forward to the speedy 
adoption of the text. 
305. With regard to the TRIPS negotiations on the establishment of a multilateral register, 
Barbados believed that the outcome should result in  a multilateral system with no legal effects on 
non-participants and which did not compromise the in tegrity of national systems for GI protection.  
On rules, Barbados agreed with the Negotiating Gr oup Chairman that the work was progressing well.  
Barbados believed that any discussions undertaken on systemic issues and the clarification of rules 
should not have a restrictive impact on the deve lopment strategies and priorities of developing 
countries, especially considering that the overall aim of the negotiations was to integrate these 
countries further into the international trading system. 
306. On anti-dumping, Barbados was particularly inte rested in the discussion of issues of specific 
relevance to developing countries, such as the issu e relating to making the lesser duty rule mandatory 
and the development of more transparent rules on sunset  reviews.  In the area of subsidies, Barbados 
had sought to emphasize the importance of subsid ies to the economic development of developing 
countries.  It was also interested  in the possibility of having further discussions on the issue of non-
actionable subsidies.  As a small island developi ng state for which artisanal fishing was important, 
Barbados welcomed the opportunity to continue discussions on fisheries subsidies, including on TN/C/M/11 
Page 54  
 
matters relating to the importance of the fishi ng industry as a source of revenue while ensuring 
environmental conservation.  On RTAs, Barbados w as of the view that within paragraph 29 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration, discussions of th e Negotiating Group should focus on the concept of 
substantially all trade and on the issue of rules of or igin.  In addition, careful consideration should be 
given to the importance of not undermining the be nefits accrued to developing countries under the 
Enabling Clause. 
307. With regard to NAMA, Barbados supported th e innovative suggestion by South Africa for a 
tiered modalities approach, which me rited serious consideration.  Ba rbados believed the current draft 
modalities did not adequately address its interests as a small developing economy with limited export 
potential and marginal comparative a dvantage.  Barbados expected Mini sters to have before them for 
adoption modalities on market access that included, inter alia :  1) effective implementation of the 
principle of less than full reciprocity as the foundation of the modalities;  2) S&D treatment for strategic products which were critical to the speci al needs and interests of developing countries and 
LDCs;  3) a paced reduction of tariffs to address the importance of tariffs for certain developing 
economies in maintaining revenues and ensuring the vi ability of vulnerable domestic industries;  4) 
the agreement of appropriate phased timeframes for the implementation of tariff reductions.  
Implementation periods were to be  commensurate with Members' le vels of development, size of 
economy, fiscal and other strategic development need s;  5) flexibility to not bind tariff lines which 
were particularly sensitive to individual deve loping countries;  6) the granting of credit for 
autonomous liberalization measures undertaken by developing countries since the end of the Uruguay Round;  7) the adoption of measures to mitigate against the negative impact of the erosion of 
preferential market access;  8) the receipt by sm all economies of adequate technical cooperation and 
capacity-building assistance to enable them to pa rticipate effectively in the negotiations.  The 
technical assistance should include, but not be lim ited to, the completion of studies on the impact of 
small economies of further liberalization of industr ial tariffs as well as activities aimed at improving 
the competitiveness of their private sectors and at modernizing the operation of their statistical 
institutions and strengthening data collection and an alysis systems;  9) the use of supplementary 
approaches such as sectoral (zer o-for-zero) initiatives on a voluntary basis only between interested 
trading partners.  The use of supplementary appr oaches should be kept to a minimum and the process 
of negotiations conducted in a manne r which was transparent to all WTO Members;  10) the reduction 
and elimination by developed countries of tariff peak s, tariff escalation and high tariffs on products of 
export interest to developing countries; and 11) a periodic assessment of the impact of tariff 
reductions on the economies of developing countries.  The outcome of these assessments should form 
the basis of a review of commitments undertaken by developing countries with a view to making 
periodic adjustments.  This would be a positive effort  to ensure that developing countries could secure 
a share in the growth of international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic 
development. 
308. On TRIPS and Public Health, Barbados c ontinued to attach high importance to the 
operationalization of paragraph 6 of  the Doha Ministerial Declarati on on TRIPS and Public Health.  
The implementation of this para graph should meet the needs of all developing countries with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in ma king effective use of the TRIPS Agreement 
compulsory licensing provisions with regard  to all relevant areas of public health. 
309. With regard to the Work Programme on Small Economies, Ministers shoul d have before them 
for their consideration and approval a meaningful  outcome document which would include effective 
measures to be taken to facilitate the fuller inte gration of small, vulnerable economies into the 
multilateral trading system.  Ministers would also be  expected to give strong impetus to continued 
deliberations in the context of the Work Programme. 
310. In work on implementation issues and S&D, Members should take full advantage of the 
ongoing consultative processes in order to ensure that a significant package of concrete and 
substantial measures was agreed upon.  With rega rd to the Working Groups on Trade, Debt and  TN/C/M/11 
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Finance and on Trade and Transfer of Technol ogy, Ministers should have before them 
recommendations on concrete steps to be taken in these areas. 
311. On the treatment of the Singapore issues, Barba dos was fully aware of the terms of the Doha 
Mandate in this area, as well as the clarification in the statement by the Chairman of the Doha Ministerial Conference, and it believed that the wi de divergence of views indicated the need for 
further clarification and analysis.  Her delegation was not yet convinced that the time had come for 
multilateral disciplines in these areas.  On the issue of  procedural issues related to transparency and 
inclusiveness, her delegation agreed with the va rious statements made at the present meeting, 
including by Bangladesh and Nigeria. 
312. Finally, her delegation looked forward to the Ch airman's operational text and to working with 
the Chairman and other Members to put meat on the bones of the skeleton in the hope that what came 
out at the end would be a document that all Memb ers could embrace and not an orphan of the process. 
313. The representative of Venezuela
 said that, in the view of his delegation, the draft modalities 
circulated by the Chairman of the Agriculture Special Session were a starting point for the 
negotiations.  As the Chairman had stated in his report, developing countries' possibilities for 
improved market access depended on developed co untries commitments in domestic support and 
export competition.  Developing countries were looking for flexibility in some areas, especially to 
address food security, rural development and livel ihood security.  As long as developed countries 
remained silent on these areas of reform, developing countries such as his could not be asked to make 
greater sacrifices than they had already made, while they were seeing S&D treatment being granted in reverse.  Special products and the special safegua rd mechanism, as conceptualized by developing 
countries, were key elements of these negotiati ons.  His delegation was concerned to see some 
delegations looking for compromises between themse lves without taking his country's concerns fully 
into account. 
314. The report by the Chairman of the TRIPS C ouncil Special Session on the negotiations on a GI 
register showed it had been difficult to make progr ess in this area.  His delegation was concerned that 
the evolution of the negotiations could lead to rein forced or new obligations on developing countries 
without practically any economic benefit to them at  all.  On the regular TRIPS Council's work on non-
violation complaints under the Doha Decision on Implementation, it should be recommended that the 
Cancún Conference determine that violations of the type identified in paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of 
Article 23 of GATT 1994 were not applicable to th e TRIPS Agreement.  On the other TRIPS issues, 
his delegation hoped that Ministers would recomm end more focussed and conclusive work on the 
issues of health, Article 27.3(b) and patentability co nditions and that it could be decided that the CBD 
could be an observer. 
315. On the non-agricultural market access, there was no agreemen t on modalities but there did 
seem to be a willingness to work on the basis of th e current draft and make the necessary changes so 
that it could become a basis for the negotiations.  To achieve this, it was important that developing 
countries be consulted on the various issues, particul arly the tariff reduction formula.  The Secretariat 
had an important role to play by providing techni cal cooperation so that the repercussions on tariff 
reductions in trade of the formula could be understood. 
316. In Venezuela's view, balance in agriculture al one was not enough to move the negotiations 
forward.  Overall balance could only be achieved by taking into account the concerns, reservations 
and legitimate expectations of the de veloping countries.  Many of th eir concerns were related to the 
question of the impact on their industrial and deve lopment policies, the consequent adjustments and 
the treatment of their sensitive sectors.  Venezuela hoped that its concerns would be duly taken into 
account.  With respect to the Singapore issues, a de cision should be taken by explicit consensus on 
modalities for negotiations on these issues, and Ve nezuela considered this decision to be a 
precondition to launching such negotiations on any of them.  This was his delegation's understanding 
from the Fourth Ministerial Conference.  No nego tiations on these issues had been launched at Doha, TN/C/M/11 
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which entailed that they were not part of the Singl e Undertaking and that any decision would be taken 
on the basis of the balance achieved in the outcomes of the current negotiations. 
317. The representative of Australia
 endorsed the statements by Mexico and South Africa on the 
need for leadership and genuine engagement from the major trading countries, who could make an 
important contribution to unblocking the process.  Au stralia's approach in the coming weeks would be 
guided by what Ministers at Doha had asked dele gations to do, which was in contrast to some 
delegations who continued to adopt a seemingly oppor tunistic approach to the way they interpreted 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration, sometimes referring religiously to the text and sometimes, if it did 
not suit their position, ignoring it.  In some cases, they were apparently oblivious to the written word 
and on other occasions they wanted to proceed w ith issues not even mentioned in the mandate. 
318. Similarly, delegations liked to play down the fact that they were demandeurs in specific areas 
by referring to the potential systemic benefits to be  gained from issues they had advanced.  He wished 
to inform the European Communities that if it was in Members' collective interest to negotiate on 
investment, competition and the environment, then the same went in spades for agriculture.  If 
Members were going to make progress in the coming weeks, they would all have to stick to the 
mandate agreed at Doha.  The idea of seeking a new mandate or amending th e Doha Declaration was 
something to be approached with extreme caution.  His delegation realized there was plenty of scope 
for ambiguity in interpreting the Doha Declaration,  but clearly some delegations were seeking to 
stretch imagination beyond the point of credibility. 
319. He mentioned this point because in at least two of the Chairpersons' reports there were 
references to issues which relate d directly to the mandate.  The first was the reference in the 
Agriculture Chairman's report in paragraph 16 whic h referred to proposals that clearly fell outside the 
Agriculture Agreement and on which Ministers had gi ven no instructions or au thority to negotiate.  
The references in this paragraph were to specific WTO agreements, which were not part of the 
Agriculture Agreement.  Nor were they non-trade concerns – they were very much trade concerns.  
Similarly the reference to the peace clause had no re levance to modalities.  On the wines and spirits 
register, the Chairman's report talked of the leve l of ambition in the mandate.  Ministers had been 
quite clear in the mandate they had given and that w as to facilitate the existing level of protection, not 
to extend, modify or amend the level of protection. 
320. Australia supported proceeding with negotiations on all four separate Singapore issues, but it 
could well understand that some delegations would lik e to clarify the scope of negotiations.  He said 
this in the light of the experiences with the appro ach adopted by some delegations on agriculture, the 
environment and GI's over the last sixteen months, where the mandate had placed no effective 
constraints on the imagination of some delegations.  On agriculture, Ministers had been very explicit 
in the task they had given.  On market access, they had said Members should negotiate substantial 
improvements.  They had not said s ubstantial reductions in tariffs or even the reduction or elimination 
of tariff peaks and high tariffs as they had said in the non-agriculture area.  They had said substantial 
improvements in market access. 
321. Australia was not fussed about the modality used  to accomplish this objective and the Cairns 
Group had put forward some ideas, as had the Un ited States and the Agriculture Chairman.  The 
response from the European Communities and Japan was that they could do no better than a repeat of 
the Uruguay Round formula.  They suggested th at Australia and other Members were being 
unrealistic and excessive when they pointed out that a 15 per cent cut in a tariff of 200 per cent would 
not result in any, let alone substan tially improved, market access.  It was not a matter of being realistic 
or pragmatic, but about fulfilling the mandate Ministers had given in Doha. 
322. The European Communities said it had a big chip to play following CAP reform.  Having 
distorted international trade for so long with its huge taxpayer-funded subsidies, it had now decided, 
in its own interests, to reduce them.  It said it wanted ambitious modalities and could commit to huge 
reductions in domestic support, which was great.  His delegation assumed they could fulfil the  TN/C/M/11 
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mandate on the domestic support pillar as proposed by the Agriculture Chairman, and it looked forward to seeing how the big chip would translat e into a modalities package and whether they could 
now show the same commitment to carrying out the mandate on market access. 
323. On GIs, Australia's position was well known and had not changed.  If Members were to make 
the progress that Ministers expected by Cancún, de mandeurs who wanted to extend the Doha mandate 
to include a substantial renegotiation of the TRI PS Agreement – and Members should be clear that 
that was what they were seeking – needed to refl ect carefully on the implications.  If the European 
agenda was accepted, developing countries would be obliged – all Members would be obliged – 
whether they wanted to participate or not, to take  on new costly obligations, not unlike the obligations 
they took on in the Uruguay Round for patents.  In return for protecting thousands of European GI's, 
they might be able to protect one or two of their own GI's.  It would do nothing to ensure access for 
those products nor would it do anything to raise commodity prices.  Hungary had spoken about 
monopoly rights and GIs were simply a form of monopoly rights.  Australia recommended that GIs, 
along with state-trading enterprises, be referred to  whatever new group that was established after 
Cancún to work on competition policy. 
324. The representative of Costa Rica
 said that, at the present meeting, he had again heard certain 
delegations accusing others of having unrealistic amb itions.  This showed the level of inflexibility that 
existed in these negotiations because when those w ho were trying to fulfil the Doha Mandate and the 
main objectives of the organization were accused of  being unrealistically ambitious, it was unfair.   
Cancún would be a critical point on the path towards a significant outcome of the Doha Round within the agreed timeframe.  It was paradoxical for him, as a representative of a developing country, to have 
to remind developed countries of the dangers that  protectionism and mercantilism posed to them and 
to others, when the collective objective of the Roun d was to achieve significant levels of openness in 
various sectors to the benefit of all Members.  And it should be developing  countries that reminded 
developed countries of the importance of increasing trade levels for higher economic growth and for 
obtaining greater levels of development. 
325. A high level of ambition had led to success in th e past, had enabled the organization to have a 
broad agenda, and had been respons ible for a satisfactory outcome in previous Rounds.  It had also 
allowed the inclusion of some issues on the agenda.  This was well known and he was not reproaching 
other delegations for their interests because Costa Rica, too, shared some of these same objectives, 
which would not be achieved unless flexibility was s hown.  The only truly unrealistic approach in 
negotiations was to hope to give the minimum while hoping to obtain the maximum.  Balance was the 
key to the success of the negotiations and the bala nce between the high levels of ambition in the 
various areas would be the key to the negotiations being a real tool for growth and development. 
326. The Chairman of the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture had provided a 
balanced report on the major problems faced by Members after having missed the deadline for 
modalities.  Although Costa Rica did not agree with many elements of the Chairman's revised draft 
modalities, it considered the document to be a basis for negotiations which shou ld enable Members to 
carry out the task of presenting a modalities text to be  approved in Cancún.  With respect to the "key 
questions" in the Chairman's report, Costa Rica ag reed with him that the modalities should faithfully 
reflect the Doha mandate. 
327. The European Union's internal CAP reform had given Costa Rica hope for progress in the 
agriculture negotiations.  However, this initial feeli ng of hope was beginning to  wane in the light of 
doubts on how this decision would impact the negotiations, as well as on the pillar of the negotiations 
not mentioned in the CAP reform.  These doubts needed to disappear prior to the Ministerial.  It was 
important for all Members, partic ularly developing Members, to have more time to evaluate the 
breadth of the new European position and the possible repercussions that it w ould have in the other 
areas of the negotiations.  This kind of evaluation coul d not be done in three or four days and in order 
to facilitate decision making in Cancún, developing  countries needed clear signals sufficiently in 
advance.  A take it or leave it approach in Cancún would be a high risk negotiating strategy. TN/C/M/11 
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328. The report by the Chairman of the Negotia ting Group on Market Access had adequately 
summarized the main issues that Ministers would need  to deal with in Cancún.  The previous week's 
meeting of the Negotiating Group had made it clear  that the draft modalities brought together a 
number of interesting elements which would enable Members to continue in the direction set out in 
paragraph 16 of the Doha Declaration.  However, so me elements of the document had to be reviewed, 
including changes in the elements of the form ula with the objective of achieving significant and 
meaningful results with respect to the mandate and a line-by-line formula at the centre of the tariff 
reductions, which was the only way of ensuring that all interests could be satisfied. 
329. Costa Rica believed that it was possible to take  into account the development concerns of 
Members, however it had serious difficulties with the tariff average (the "Ta" coefficient) functioning 
as an indicator of the level of development.  If th e level of development was what Members wanted to 
take into account, there were other indicators which better reflected this condition and they should be 
examined.  It also believed that the mechan isms for S&D treatment should be equitable and 
horizontal, which was not the case for those who c ould leave up to 5 per cent of their tariff lines 
unbound.  Some 34 developing countries had bound 100 pe r cent of their tariffs, and they would be 
discriminated against with this idea.  He wondere d how it was possible to justify that Members with 
higher levels of development enjoyed greater flexib ility.  Some Members required flexibility for some 
of their unbound lines, and his de legation believed this should be based on the level at which lines 
should be bound and on the number of lines whic h remained to be bound.  Some Members had 
mentioned a possible incentive system, which Costa Ri ca was prepared to consider, but he reiterated 
that it was essential that all Members bind all tariff lines in this Round. 
330. Some delegations had mentioned their interest in the issue of erosion of preferences.  As his 
delegation had mentioned, there was a need to resp ect the objectives of the WTO and the very idea of 
preferences ran counter to the goals of developmen t itself.  The Enabling Cl ause had been established 
precisely so that preferences would not impede exceptions to the MFN principle.  However, his delegation was aware that certain developing count ries needed a period of readjustment due to the 
erosion of their preferences, and it would support the use of other mechanisms to find a solution to 
overcome these difficulties. 
331. On rules, good work had been done on anti-dumping and there was not only a high level of 
participation in this area, but also a significant critical mass.  Members were moving seamlessly into 
the second phase of these negotiations and further im petus was needed in Cancún.  Turning to 
development issues, he thanked the Chairman for hi s work on implementation issues, which had led to 
recent progress in this area.  On S&D treatment, th e General Council Chairman's work had helped the 
discussions move forward, but more  flexibility would be needed fro m all Members to produce results 
in Cancún.  On TRIPS and Public Health, he noted  the recent positive signals and said it was vital to 
reach a solution before Cancún because of the importa nce of this issue for many developing countries.  
This would allow Members to do their accounting on ot her issues before going to Cancún.  Costa Rica 
considered the Singapore issues to be part of th e overall balance of the Round and believed it was 
necessary to reach an agreement on modalities in Ca ncún.  On the DSU, Costa Rica supported the 
proposal of the Chairman of the General Council on extending the deadline to May 2004.  It believed 
that an agreement on this topic coul d be reached in Geneva and this could be reported to Ministers in 
Cancún. 
332. The representative of Poland
 said while work was ongoing in some areas, such as S&D 
treatment and implementation-re lated issues, and there was in creased understanding among Members 
on important issues such as NAMA, services, and rules,  work still had to be done on agriculture, GIs, 
TRIPS and Public Health and Singapore issues.  Hi s delegation wished to underline the importance of 
following the Doha mandate to establish modalities on all four Singapore issues in order to develop 
further the multilateral trading system and to ensure the overall success of the Round.  Similarly, work 
was under way on modalities for NAMA, and his de legation hoped they would soon be agreed.  
Poland remained committed to working with the TNC Chairman and all Members in order to achieve 
results in all areas given the short time before the Cancún Ministerial Conference.  TN/C/M/11 
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333. The representative of Saint Lucia , speaking also on behalf of Antigua and Bar buda, Barbados, 
Belize, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Mauritius,  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, 
Solomon Islands, and Trinidad and Tobago , said it was significant that many non-residents were able 
to attend the present meeting.  Success at Cancún was crucial, but it would depend upon the extent to 
which the developmental dimension of the Doha Declaration was fully and genuinely incorporated 
into the decisions to be taken.  It was of cruc ial importance to address the developmental needs of 
some of the most vulnerable developing countries and he referred to the serious threat posed to trade 
by erosion of preferences.  These countries needed preferences, not as a security blanket of a disappearing era or in support of discrimination, but without such preferences, these countries would 
lose a substantial portion of most of their export  trade, setting back or reversing sustainable 
development prospects. 
334. A country not faced with such a predicament might not immediately appreciate or be 
sympathetic with their insistence on this point, but their ability and right to trade was no less vital to 
them, or sacrosanct in the multilateral trading sy stem, than to any other Member.  While these 
preferences were of incalculable benefit to them, the impact on actual global trade was negligible and 
had not harmed anyone.  These countri es were too small to threaten anyone's trading interests.  They 
appreciated the recognition in the Agriculture Special  Session report of this difficulty.  It had also 
been raised by delegations from Africa, the ACP a nd the Small Economies Group in various meetings 
of the NAMA Negotiating Group.  At the recent meeting of the Negotiating Group, Morocco on 
behalf of the African Group, Kenya on behalf of a Group of African countries, Jamaica on behalf of 
the CARICOM countries, Mauritius, Fiji and Papua New Guinea had vigorously spoken out on the 
issue of erosion of preferences and vigorously appeal ed for its inclusion in the modalities.  They were 
hopeful that the Negotiating Group Chairman would issue a note on this topic, which would be an opportunity for him to rectify the modalities to incorporate this issue, thus securing the kind of advance to which Members referred to  repeatedly in the negotiations. 
335. At this crucial juncture in the preparations for Cancún, it was imperative that the concerns 
expressed by all Members be taken on board so that there was an effective balance in the outcomes of 
the negotiations.  The delegations for which he spoke took comfort from the statements indicating 
Members would give due consideration to this issue, and they remained committed to working 
concretely with other Members to ensure equity an d fairness of the process for a balanced outcome of 
the negotiations.  They wished to stress that  progress was essential in addressing issues which 
impacted upon their ability to trade and to obtain real benefit from the multilateral trading system.  
For them this was the acid test of the DDA and the immediate challenge of Cancún. 
336. The representative of Suriname
 voiced her strong support for the statement made by Saint 
Lucia, and said the issue of erosion of preference s was of critical importance to Suriname and other 
small economies. 
337. The representative of Senegal  said his delegation supported the statements by Bangladesh on 
behalf of the LDCs and Morocco on behalf of the African Group.  While much intensive work had 
taken place since the beginning of 2002, this wo rk had often been to the detriment of small 
delegations such as his.  Many intermediary dead lines had been missed, so developing countries and 
LDCs could rightly wonder whether their partners wi shed to make the DDA a reality.  Although many 
interesting contributions had been made in the negotiations thus far, the progress made had been 
marginal.  Much work would be required, especia lly for smaller delegations, in the post-Cancún 
period to make up for lost time. 
338. One group of countries had been advocating market  access in the broadest sense of the term, 
which spanned the field of rules as well.  This c ontrasted with developing countries and LDCs, which 
had emphasized the importance of development results from the DDA.  Synergy might be possible between these two groups when it came to mark et access, but there should be an emphasis on 
development.  The lack of priority given to  development created a shadow on the process and 
although nothing could be foreseen in any negotia ting process, as had been the case in previous TN/C/M/11 
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Rounds, the present Round had highlight ed development.  This justif ied the belief that credible 
solutions would be found on the issues of priority  to developing countries and LDCs.  Everyone had 
to recognise that trade played a vital role in deve lopment, but there were yet to be positive signals 
from the leading players that would breath such dynamism into the multilateral trading system. 
339. The hope that Senegal placed in this Round w as commensurate with the modest ambitions of 
LDCs.  They hoped to benefit from world trade d espite their many weaknesses and limited number of 
exports, which represented a negligible  percentage of world trade – ne gligible but of great importance 
to them.  So one of the challenges in the context of these negotiations would be to ensure that these 
countries were not further isolated or marginalis ed in world trade.  According to UNCTAD, the 
percentage of LDC exports had decreased by 47%  between 1980 and 1999.  His delegation recognised 
the worthy efforts by developed countries in th e area of trade-related technical assistance, and 
although this did not have a direct role in the current negotiations, it was notable because it would 
assist LDCs to play a greater role in the negotiations. 
340. On the subject of agriculture, the Chairman had modified his report to take into account the 
suggestions that had been made by various delegations.  In this spir it, his delegation wished to stress 
three points.  First, the exemption of LDCs from certain commitments was couched in terms to which 
his delegation could not agree.  Making it into a question gave the impression that there were 
divergences on this question, but his delegation und erstood that such an exemption had never been 
challenged.  His delegation hoped that there was an understanding that LDCs would not have to make 
reduction commitments.  Second, duty and quota-free market access for LDCs should be stable and 
predictable.  This should be mentioned in the Ch airman's paper.  Third, a new special safeguard 
mechanism should take into account the administrati ve and the financial capacities of the LDCs to 
enable them to benefit from flexible implementation. 
341. On NAMA, his delegation had concerns about th e outcome on the question of the erosion of 
preferences.  There was an imbalance in this ar ea, which, if not re-established rapidly, risked 
weakening these negotiations, and his delegation supported the statemen t by Saint Lucia on behalf of 
others.  On services, the 30 initial offers were  proof of the difficulties faced by a number of 
developing countries and LDCs to effectively particip ate in the negotiations.  This was not due to any 
deliberate effort on their part to link this to other ar eas of the negotiations, but rather their lack of an 
overview of the overall and sectoral progress which s hould be taking place, in particular on special 
modalities for LDCs.  His delegation noted the recen t evolution on this issue which it hoped would 
allow progress. 
342. In conclusion, Senegal detected a continuing desire on the part of Members to engage in 
progress on development issues, but at the same time, the burgeoning workload would make it 
difficult for smaller delegations and his de legation hoped Cancún w ould not overload the 
negotiations.  Senegal placed its trust in the Chairm an and in the process, and was ready to play its 
part. 
343. The representative of Mauritius
 associated his delegation with the statements made by Saint 
Lucia and a number of other delegations on the issu e of preferences.  Both developed and developing 
countries had underscored the importance of preferences for the economies of several developing countries.  Erosion of preferences was a serious trade problem for his country – a trade problem.  
Therefore a solution should be found within the WTO,  if necessary with the help of other relevant 
bodies.  His delegation also supported the statement by Kenya. 
344. He appreciated the Chairman's reference to th e Declaration of the African Trade Ministers 
with regard to the preparation of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference.  The African Ministers had 
taken important decisions in respect of the various elements of the Doha ma ndate, all of which were 
central to the developmental agenda agreed in Doha.  One important recommendation of the African 
Trade Ministers related to the issue of erosion of preferences.  For the Cancún Ministerial Meeting to 
have a balanced outcome, it was imperative that  the concerns of all Members be given due  TN/C/M/11 
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consideration in the negotiations.  His delegation supported Barbados' appeal to the General Council 
to make concrete recommendations to the Cancún Ministerial Conference on the Work Programme on 
Small Economies. 
345. The representative of Iceland  said that while it marked neither the initiation nor the 
conclusion of the Round, Cancún came at a time when fresh political impetus was needed in the 
negotiations.  There was still a long way to go, but his delegation was convinced that Members could 
deliver.  To do so, they must be realistic and prep are the ground in Geneva so as to enable Ministers 
to take the necessary decisions.  In the NAMA negotiations, his delegation could support total 
elimination of tariffs on all products, but it unders tood the sensitivities involved with such a drastic 
approach for many Members.  Therefore, the proposal by the Negotiating Group Chairman was a 
good basis for negotiations and for addressing these sensitivities.  The proposal had all the elements to 
create a balanced package, but if one of the elemen ts was taken out, the balance would be upset.  The 
formula needed to be adjusted and it was not r easonable to reward Members only for having high 
average bindings.  On services, his delegation shared the concern of the Chairman that only a limited 
number of Members had submitted their offers and agr eed that some of the ser vices offers needed to 
be improved.  Iceland enjoyed an open and liberal  market for services and was willing to go even 
further in the direction of libera lization as reflected in its offer. 
346. In the agriculture negotiations, Iceland had c ontinually emphasized its commitment to the 
principles of continuity and adaptation as for eseen in the Agreement on Agriculture.  It was 
accordingly committed to the ultimate goal of phasing out all forms of export subsidies, as foreseen in 
the Doha mandate.  The other two pillars of the agricu ltural negotiations were of  serious concern.  On 
market access, his delegation was seriously concer ned about the process in Geneva and it welcomed 
the Agriculture Chairman's stat ement that there was strong and widespread support for the Uruguay 
Round approach.  Iceland could not accept the appli cation of a tariff harmonization formula because it 
did not take into consideration non-trade concerns, in  particular the challenges faced in maintaining a 
vibrant agricultural sector on the edge of the Arct ic Circle.  On domestic support, the Chairman's 
report paid inadequate attention to the different pos itions that had been presented by Members, either 
individually or collectively, while too much emphasis was placed on the modalities draft itself. 
347. Iceland advocated a Uruguay Round approach to these negotiations as the only realistic 
avenue to achieve substantial reform, in accordan ce with the Agreement on Agriculture and the Doha 
mandate, while retaining the flexibility required to saf eguard the viability of its vulnerable agricultural 
sector.  This should not be understood as an indicator of a very restrictive market for importation of 
agricultural products.  Iceland imported more than ha lf of its domestic food consumption in calorific 
terms and most agricultural imports, from developi ng countries as well as other Members, entered the 
market without any duty or quantitative restri ctions.  The modalities draft from the Chairman 
represented an input for further work, not an agreed basis for negotiation. 
348. The representative of Belize  supported the comments by Saint Lucia on the subject of erosion 
of preferences.  This was of great concern for sm all and vulnerable countries such as Belize, since the 
options before them were few.  Members needed to ensure that issues of concern for these small 
countries were taken on board at Cancún.  She requ ested that the Chairman of the Negotiating Group 
on Market Access give consideration to the inclusi on of this important subject in the note that he 
would be issuing. 
349. The representative of Antigua and Barbuda  agreed with the statement by Saint Lucia and 
stressed that the issue of prefer ences was vital for the survival of  CARICOM countries.  Antigua and 
Barbuda did not trade extensively in goods, but was part of a common market – the Caribbean Single Market economy.  The continued erosion of preferences in the Caribbean was leading to increasing social crises, higher levels of crime, poverty and de bt, and this issue should be addressed at national, 
regional and international levels if these countries we re to survive the effects of globalization and 
liberalization.  The Negotiating Group on Market A ccess had to address the issue of preferences.  
Antigua was a small and vulnerable country, and for the first time, it was using the Dispute Settlement TN/C/M/11 
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Body to deal with an issue that was of critical im portance to its economy.  It looked forward to this 
issue, as well as the erosion of preferences, bei ng treated in the serious manner which they both 
deserved. 
350. The representative of Sri Lanka
 said there were a number of i ssues for which solutions needed 
to be found to address the developm ent concerns of developing countries, before or at Cancún.  His 
delegation was confident that the TRIPS and Public Health issue could be resolved before or at 
Cancún.  Similarly, with the ongoing work on S&D a nd implementation, it believed that a package of 
decisions with commercial value would be possible before Cancún.  However, if the DDA was truly 
to become a development Round, the issues of agri culture, services, and non-agriculture tariffs were 
more important, because developing countries c ould derive real benefits to achieve their 
developmental objectives.  The agriculture negotiatio ns and the resultant market access was the single 
most important development issue in the DDA.  Theref ore, a high level of ambition in all three pillars 
could determine the outcome of the whole Round.  Lowering the level of ambition in agriculture 
could inevitably lead to lower ambitions in ot her areas of the negotiations.  The revised draft 
modalities of the Agriculture Chairman provided a good basis for further ne gotiations.  Although it 
was accepted that there would be large benefits at aggregate levels from agricultural liberalization for 
developing countries, there was concern that at disa ggregated levels there was likely to be a group of 
developing countries who could be losers – in particular Net Fo od-Importing Developing Countries.  
Their concerns should be taken into account by providing flexible provisions on export credit for 
longer repayment period, exemption from minimum cash payment and consideration of food aid. 
351. There was also a group of countries with lo w bound tariff levels on agricultural products 
which were not in a position to further reduce tari ffs on sensitive products.  The concept of special 
products had to be retained also to counter the high  level of distortions in the developed countries due 
to domestic support and export subsidies.  However, this concept should not be allowed to be abused 
for protectionist purposes, and an approach was need ed to prevent its misuse.  A special safeguard 
mechanism should be accepted in the new draft m odalities as this was an extremely important 
instrument for developing countries like his.  Speci al products and the special safeguard mechanism 
were not protectionist instruments but merely defe nsive responses to current overall levels of OECD 
subsidies. 
352. On NAMA, the proposed formula could have an  adverse effect on countries whose average 
tariff levels were already low.  Sri Lanka had simp lified and lowered its tariff structure and its average 
applied rate of 8.8 per cent would increase to 16.74 pe r cent if the proposed "Ta" formula was applied.  
Every applied tariff which exceeds 8.3 per cent should be bound below that rate, if co-efficient 1 was 
used and every applied rate which exceeded 16.7 pe r cent would have to be bound below that rate 
even under co-efficient 2.  Countries who had a lower average were being penalized versus those with 
a higher one at the end of the Uruguay Round. 
353. He was concerned that Sri Lanka 's applied rates at 5, 10 or 15 per cent would have to be 
bound below current applied rates.  On the other hand, countries who had bound their tariffs at a 
higher level, with a higher bound pr oduct coverage, and with a higher country average would be able 
to keep their applied rates at a higher level unde r the proposed formula, and reduction commitments 
they undertook would allow them to keep the final b ound rate higher than the applied rate.  This was a 
serious problem, as there would be inequity, so th e specific situation of a group of developing 
countries, whose tariffs were already below 15 to 20 per cent should be addressed as this would have 
serious revenue implications.  The 15 per cent level was generally considered as the revenue 
maximizing tariff by the Bretton Woods institutions. 
354. The traditional one-size-fits-all S& D approach to all developing  countries, might no longer 
provide answers to problems of specific groups of  developing countries.  To address concerns of 
countries who had liberalized trade, lowered their tariffs, provided effective market access, and who 
were facing revenue implications, Norway had proposed that a list of countries, LDCs and IDA only,  TN/C/M/11 
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should be considered, and he strongly supported this proposal to be incorporated in the modalities to 
be agreed in NAMA negotiations. 
355. Services as represented by telecommunications, energy, ports and financial services were a 
pre-requisite for economic devel opment and he expected that de veloped-country Members would 
undertake significant market access commitments in mode 4.  Singapore issues related to the 
development dimension and were important to developing countri es since a small trade-dependent 
developing country like Sri Lanka needed to attr act foreign investment and provide employment and 
growth to face challenges of phasing out of tex tile quotas by end of 2004.  Trade facilitation was 
important, as recent studies had shown, since it could bring more benefits to the economy than 
liberalization in other areas, as speedy clearance  of goods and simplified procedures would reduce 
transaction costs. 
356. Similarly, transparency in government procur ement could lead to competitive purchasing and 
better value for money.  Sri Lanka was prepared to take a positive stand on trade and investment, 
trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement and to work on modalities to include 
both procedural and substantial issues based on elem ents identified in the DDA.  However, he added 
that more clarity on the DSU aspect of these issues would facilitate a positive decision.  Each of the 
Singapore issues should be addressed on its own mer it and a decision need not be taken on all four 
issues, but positive decisions on Singapore issues could be only an integral part of an overall decision 
to be made in all areas of negotiations which woul d address Sri Lanka's specific concerns.  The end of 
this Round should see every WTO Member benefit with no losers. 
357. The representative of Cuba  supported the statements by Bangladesh, China, India, Kenya and 
South Africa expressing concern at the absence of r esults in the Doha Work Programme.  It was 
dangerous that, with five weeks before the Ca ncún Ministerial, little progress had been made on 
development issues.  However, some delegations were asking for progress on issues of low priority 
for developing countries, and she wished to recall that development was a central issue, as confirmed 
in paragraphs 12 and 44 of the D oha Declaration.  Cuba could not accept that Members were raising 
the need to reduce levels of ambition in implemen tation-related issues and S&D treatment, since what 
had been proposed was already a concession for the proponents.  The majority of the proposals were 
based on aspirations that pre-dated Seattle, and it w as time that trading partners showed political will 
and got involved in the process. 
358. It was also time to find a transparent, rapid,  sustainable and legally secure solution on TRIPS 
and Public Health.  It should be applicable to  all Members with insufficient or non-existent 
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector w ith no exceptions.  Furthermore it should not be 
limited to specific diseases and illness to ensure that these countries could make use of obligatory 
licensing to confront situations of national emergency.   It should also not be linked to other areas of 
the negotiations. 
359. On agriculture, her delegation wished to reite rate its support for the following: 1) the 
developing countries' proposal for strategic product s, which was the most appropriate manner of 
heeding concerns in the area of rural and food security; 2) the creation of a special safeguard 
mechanism for developing countries to deal with the instability of the agricultural market, which 
should not be linked to the reduction formula to be adopted and which would need to be less 
restrictive than the current criteria in Article 5 of the Agreement; 3) the adoption of a mechanism 
would guarantee the demand of developing countries who benefited from preferences, and in this 
regard it supported the statements by Saint Lucia a nd others;  and, 4) the compliance with the Doha 
mandate with regard to eliminating restrictions a nd distortions in world agricultural markets, in the 
belief that all restrictions on e xports should be eliminated, both ne w and existing, which should be 
mentioned in paragraph 22 of the re port of the Agriculture Chairman. 
360. On trade and the environment, Cuba did not object to the participation of MEAs in the work 
of the Special Session, but did not support the European Communities' proposal that the Fifth TN/C/M/11 
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Ministerial Conference take a decision on this matter.  The issue of observers was a systemic one which should be decided at the TNC or General Co uncil level, and it was not necessary for Ministers 
to reach a decision at this point. 
361. On Singapore issues, it seemed that the conditi ons for the initiation of negotiations were not 
ripe, given the wide divergence in Members' positions.  More clarification and further analysis of the 
implications of these commitments for developing countries and LDCs was needed and her delegation 
supported the Declarations made by African Ministers in Kenya and the LDC Ministers in Bangladesh, as well as the statements by India and Barb ados at the present meeting.  In the services 
negotiations, progress depended not only on market ac cess, where substantially improved offers were 
needed, but also in the establishment of clearer rules.  Her delegation supported the statement by 
Barbados expressing regret that the negotiations on the emergency safeguard measure were not 
advancing.  Her delegation wished to underline the important contribution of various developing 
countries at the last Special Session to provide im petus to the assessment of negotiations, which was 
essential to comply with the provisions of Article 4 and 19.2 of the GATS.  Finally, Cuba supported 
the statements by the African countries and LDCs on the need for technical assistance in drafting their 
offers and in identifying their interests so th ey could be fully involved in the negotiations. 
362. On procedure, her delegations shared the con cerns of India and others that any document 
submitted to the Ministers in Ca ncún should have prior approval fro m Members in Geneva.  It was 
essential to guarantee transparency and the full participation of all Members in this process and to 
ensure that the experiences of the past were not repeated.  In conclusion, she said that, at the 
beginning of the year, around 35 countries in the wo rld had been facing severe food shortages.  There 
had been significant losses in crops and livestock,  in some cases because of drought, in other cases 
because of floods and this only served to exacerbate the critical food situation in the developing world.  This vulnerability was just one of the problems which affected small economies, developing 
countries and LDCs.  These were issues which need ed to be given priority through specific 
commitments and it was the only way that development could be put at the heart of the DDA.  Cuba 
agreed that commitments were needed to make pr ogress, but these commitments should be targeted at 
reducing existing inequalities. 
363. The representative of Guyana
 supported the statements by Saint Lucia and others on the issue 
of erosion of preferences, which should be taken into account in the modalities for market access for 
non-agricultural products.  In the context of the development agenda, it was crucial for this 
organization to properly address issues such as th is, since it could adversely affect the economic, 
social and political stability of many vulnerable de veloping countries.  As a highly indebted country 
with a small vulnerable economy, Guyana was confr onted with severe economic  and social challenges 
resulting from the erosion of preferences.  Guyana strongly advocated the principle of S&D treatment.  
She affirmed her delegation's commitment to working closely with other delegations to ensure a fair 
and balanced outcome of the negotiations which t ook account of the special interests and needs of 
developing and developed countries alike. 
364. The representative of Papua New Guinea  said the question of a reference by the Negotiating 
Group on Market Access to erosion of preference s was an important matter for small economy 
developing Members, such as his country.  Over 83 per cent of Papua New Guinea's total exports 
were non-agricultural products.  His delegation's paper highlighting the erosion of preferences 
deserved due consideration.  He fully supported th e statement by Saint Lucia and urged that the 
erosion of preferences be included in the modalities of the NAMA negotiations. 
365. The representative of Fiji  said that despite its very limite d resources and capacity to engage 
effectively in the discussions, it attached great importance to the on-going negotiations.  Fiji had circulated a paper to the Negotiating Group on Mark et Access, which raised concerns regarding the 
erosion of preferences.  Fiji strongly supporte d the DDA on the understanding that further trade 
liberalization should not result in small vulnerable economies becoming worse off, but rather that it 
should effectively strengthen their gradual integra tion into the multilateral trading system.  Finding  TN/C/M/11 
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effective solutions to mitigate against the negative im pact of loss of market ac cess, due to the erosion 
of preferential margins, should be an integral part  of these negotiations.  He was concerned that the 
report on NAMA had not included Fiji's position on th e retention of preferences for small vulnerable 
economies.  He hoped that a more fair and balanced report would be forthcoming that took into 
account the legitimate concerns of small vulnerable economies. 
366. The representative of Chinese Taipei  said agriculture was the ke y to the DDA's success, and 
narrowing the gaps among Members would be impor tant in Cancún and beyond.  A majority of 
Members had already expressed their support for the Uruguay Round formula for market access because it could take the most number of concer ns into account.  His delegation hoped the CAP 
reform package could prove to be the needed im petus for harvesting resu lts in the agriculture 
negotiations. 
367. On NAMA, as a newly-acceded Member, Chinese Taipei attached importance to having a 
grace period for the implementation of possible c oncessions to be made during the Round.  Although 
it was important to maintain a high level of ambition, his delegation noted with concern the 
inequitable effect that could result from the draft fo rmula.  The formula might create a situation where 
Members with lower average tariff rates would be required to make deeper tariff cuts, and his 
delegation urged that this inequita ble outcome be remedied in the course of finalizing the modalities. 
368. His delegation would like to see more services of fers and a higher quality of initial offers 
from Members in the months ahead, and it hoped the Cancún meeting would inject new momentum 
into the negotiations with a view to ensuring a su ccessful completion of th e DDA.  On the Singapore 
issues, his delegation believed Members were read y to start negotiations in Cancún.  The initial 
preparatory work had been done and all four issues s hould be tacked as a single package.  In preparing 
the modalities in this area, his delegation encourag ed flexibility in order to take into account the 
special needs of LDCs. 
369. The proper functioning of the WTO was vital to  all Members, developing and developed 
alike.  During a global economic downturn, it was even more essential to further liberalize 
international trade and to strengthen the multilateral tr ading system to spur much needed growth.  The 
December 2004 deadline for the completion of the DDA wa s a target that no-one could afford to miss.  
Although upcoming was a mid-term stock taking, a good outcome in Cancún would certainly provide 
Members with a good chance of fulfilling the mandates by the end of the following year. 
370. The representative of Grenada
 said the Chairman's recent visit to the Meeting of the 
Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community had been timely and the 
commitments entered into by the S ecretariat with the countries of the Caribbean served as meaningful 
evidence of the seriousness in which technical assi stance and capacity buildin g was treated.  Grenada 
believed that the Agriculture Chairman's text w as a basis for moving forward, especially on issues 
related to the special safeguard mechanism and sp ecial products.  Members had to seek ways to 
balance the proposals regarding the treatment of is sues such as preferences with those of domestic 
support and export subsidies.  Small countries that  benefited from preferences found themselves in 
somewhat of a conundrum.  Many of these countri es were dependent on the mechanisms delivered 
through domestic support and export subsidies whic h underpinned many of the preferential schemes 
and arrangements. 
371. Over 60 per cent of Grenada's GDP was account ed for by services, and he shared several 
concerns already tabled by many developing c ountries, specifically over the context, scope and 
quality of the services offers.  On NAMA, he sugg ested a more concerted effort at addressing the 
treatment of small states benefiting from preferences, since preferential erosion was continuous.  Many countries benefiting from trade preferences conceded that these preferences were temporary 
and that transition arrangements would be required to assist them in structural and institutional 
adjustments.  He agreed with the submissions by  the United States and Colombia, but the process of TN/C/M/11 
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addressing preferences through compensatory financ ial and technical aid flows and adequate 
timeframes should be seen as just one of th e several required S&D treatment modalities. 
372. Countries like his, which were largely without  subsidies or sophisticated support schemes, 
had begun the process of transition away from pref erence dependence, but had been restricted from 
pursuing areas of genuine competitive advantage, such as in services.  Although these countries had 
much to gain from proposals in the area of GIs, they might also have much to lose.  Nevertheless, his 
delegation would continue to support the process.   Granada had shown it's engagement through 
autonomous liberalization, but it had recently ha d recourse to GATT Article XXVIII.1 for nine 
products, which had been aimed at redressing auto nomous liberalization gone too far.  This had 
resulted in the near disappearance of critical deve lopment sectors, and he thanked the countries that 
supported Granada's request.  Clearly, Grenada had already made substantial concessions and 
continued to be engaged in the process of negotia tions.  The present meeting was taking place at a 
particularly timely point.  Grenada urged those w ho would wish to see a disproportionate extent of 
further adjustment being borne by small states, ma ny of which were dependent on preferences, begin 
the process of real negotiations to ensure that  Cancún would be fruitful.  Granada supported the 
statements by Antigua and Ba rbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Saint Lucia and South Africa. 
373. The representative of Uganda
 agreed with Australia that seri ous negotiations ha d to take place 
in agriculture.  Japan and the European Communities had important roles to play, and he hoped that 
CAP reform would be translated into WTO negotia ting language to advance work towards Cancún.  
His delegation welcomed the Agriculture Ch airman's proposals on exempting LDCs from 
commitments.  It also welcomed paragraph 16 of  the draft modalities text on preferences which was 
aimed at providing a balanced resolution of the matter and which could be supplemented by other 
approaches outside the WTO.  His delegation wished  to emphasize the importa nce of special products 
and the special safeguard mechanism and it believed th at they should not be linked to the formula for 
establishing the tariff reductions. 
374. On NAMA, he emphasized the importance of preferences in the context of modalities and the 
need for unconditional exemptions from commitments for LDCs.  On TRIPS and Public Health, he 
welcomed commitments to resolv e the issue.  On services, he emphasized modalities for special 
treatment for LDCs, which should help these countri es to participate in the process of requests and 
offers.  Members had to place before Ministers the is sues in a manner that facilitated decision making.  
It was important to avoid the temptation of ove rloading the agenda in Cancún.  His delegation 
supported India and Kenya on the issue of transparen cy.  Finally, S&D treatment was very important 
for African countries and his delegation hoped for meaningful decisions before Cancún. 
375. The representative of Jamaica  said he would have hoped that the last meeting of the TNC 
would have been able to discuss concrete recommend ations and decisions for Ministers, but very little 
was agreed at this point which should raise con cerns on the overall progress of work.  Significant 
movement forward would only come if Members were prepared to adhere scrupulously to the 
priorities and orientation given by Ministers at Doha and were w illing to acknowledge and 
incorporate into modalities the interests and concer ns of the vast majority of the membership. 
376. Many of Jamaica's concerns had been covered in the interventions by Kenya, Cuba, India, 
Saint Lucia, Barbados and Grenada.  Success in Cancún would hinge on market access in agriculture 
and non-agriculture, services; the development s ubjects of S&D treatment, implementation, TRIPS 
and Public Health, and Singapore issues.  He was concerned about missed deadlines and overloading 
work on resource constrained dele gations as this could undermine the inclusive and participatory 
process which should exist. 
377. The balance in agriculture was uneven, requiring deep cuts in tariffs of developing countries 
while other countries with the wherewithal to provi de domestic and other forms of support would be 
able to continue their actions.  As a result, an agreement would have to incorporate the user-friendly 
special safeguards mechanism and special products .  Jamaica supported others on the erosion of  TN/C/M/11 
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preferences and preferred the Uruguay Round formula approach.  The Chairman's helpful text in 
paragraph 16 needed further elaboration so that it could more fully meet the concerns of preference 
receiving countries. 
378. On NAMA, where developed countries had been slowly engaged in progressive reduction of 
tariffs over fifty years and eight rounds of multilate ral negotiations, the methodology should take into 
account variables that related to developing co untries.  These included significant levels of 
autonomous liberalization on the part of many devel oping countries, the need to ensure viability of 
certain sensitive sectors, reliance on tariff revenues a nd preference erosion.  The Chairman's efforts 
had not yet managed to meet these concerns adequa tely.  His formula and sectoral initiatives would be 
evaluated by his Minister with these elements in mind in Cancún.  He hoped to see more progress 
after Cancún in addressing the Negotiating Group's mandate on non-tariff barriers. 
379. In services, the thirty offers that had been s ubmitted were still less than a quarter of the 
membership and the technical burden in this area migh t be an impediment to effective participation of 
many developing country Members.  Services was a sector of the future for many developing 
countries, but for that future to be economically  meaningful, they should have improved access in 
areas in which they were compe titive such as the movement of natural persons, and in those service 
areas which were the fastest growing and in which there was greatest value added such as business 
services.  The overall balance of the Doha Round woul d depend to a great extent, for some developing 
countries, on the extent of improved access and rem oval of barriers to their services trade.  It was 
necessary that developing countries be assisted in ev aluating the offers on the table – and those to 
come – so that a clearer picture of adhe rence to Article IV could be developed. 
380. He said that no substantive linkage existed among the Singapore issues and that each subject 
should be considered on its own merit.  The hist ory of these issues and the actual content of the 
decision at Doha suggested clearly that Ministers were expecting more than procedural modalities for 
their consideration at Cancún.  He hoped that any such modalities would be put forward by the 
membership as a whole for consideration by Mini sters.  Many important issues required further 
discussion and taking into account the limited time left to the end of the Round and the already 
burdensome negotiating agenda, his delegation believed that the clar ification process should continue. 
381. He emphasized that S&D treatment and TRIPS and Public Health c onstituted a development 
down payment on the Round which had not yet been made .  On DSU, the Chairman's text contained a 
number of elements of importance and relevance to developing countri es and particularly to small, 
developing ones that traditionally had not been ab le to utilize the dispute settlement mechanism for 
various reasons, including resources.  Some helpful el ements in the Chairman's text should be further 
elaborated on. 
382. Jamaica shared the view that a WTO list of environmental goods should be developed and 
that such a list should be based on function and en d use, and further should take into account the 
export interests of developing countries.  He  supported those who hoped to see the issue of 
observership resolved as soon as possible.  Regardi ng the multilateral register for wines and spirits, 
Jamaica did not wish to have additional commit ments and it supported voluntary participation. 
383. Some very useful submissions had been made in the Rules Group on regional trading 
arrangements and substantive enga gement on this aspect of the Group's mandate would occur after 
Cancún.  If Ministers were to be placed in a positi on to carry out the tasks set out in paragraph 45 of 
the Doha Declaration much would have to be acco mplished in Cancún.  Both the substantive and 
organizational aspects of the Fifth Ministerial would be important to its success.  The more substance 
that was left to be done, the more important would be the structure and organizational aspects of the 
meeting itself so as to ensure that regre ttable past experiences were not repeated. 
384. The representative of Botswana , on behalf of the ACP Group , endorsed the statements by 
Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs, Cuba, Kenya, Jamaica, Saint Lucia on behalf of the small TN/C/M/11 
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economies, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda.  On agriculture, the ACP Group reiterated that 
preferences, the special safeguard mechanism, and special products  should be given priority attention 
in the revised modalities paper to be issued by th e Chairman.  On the implementation of paragraph 6 
of the Doha Ministerial Declaration concerning TR IPS and Public Health, the Group appealed to all 
Members to join the consensus on the 16 December 2002 text to resolve the issue before Cancún.  
This was necessary given that many developing count ries were afflicted by many public health 
challenges, including HIV/AIDS, and the Group was en couraged by the United States' statement at 
the present meeting. 
385. On NAMA, the ACP Group was concerned that the Negotiating Group Chairman's draft had 
not taken into account the Group's interest in the poten tial erosion of preferences, the impact of tariff 
reductions on revenues, and the need to allow de veloping countries to choose their own rate and 
extent of future import liberalization, so as to mi nimize the adverse impact on local industries and the 
impact assessment studies on previous tariff reductions. 
386. On trade in services, only a few developing countries, including some ACP countries, had 
been able to make offers.  This underscored the n eed for enhanced technical assistance and capacity 
building to enable these countries to fully particip ate in the GATS negotiations to derive maximum 
benefit from services liberalization.  On trade and environment, the Group hoped future deliberations 
in the Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Environment would take into account the 
interests of the ACP countries, particularly in relation to Paragraph 31 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration.  The Group supported the extension of the mandate of the Special Session of the DSB to 
facilitate work to clarify and improve the WTO Dispute Settlement system making it more accessible 
to developing countries.  On Singapore issues , the clarification process on these issues should 
continue as this would allow a common understanding  of the implications of these complex issues. 
387. It was essential that the preparatory process to Cancún, including Cancún itself, be done on 
the basis of transparency and inclusiveness.  Th is particular meeting of the TNC was significant 
because it was the last before Cancún.  The draft Ministerial text intended for Cancún should reflect 
any divergent viewpoints from delegations, and the text should clearly state what these different 
viewpoints were and where possible, the different viewpoints or the alternative formulations should 
be placed in square brackets in order that Minister s had an appreciation of the areas of difference.  
Any texts intended for consideration and endorsem ent by the Ministerial Conference should be 
reviewed and approved by WTO delegations in Geneva  before they were transmitted to Ministers and 
this process had to be as transparent as possible and a void a repeat of the Doha experience.  He agreed 
with Nigeria regarding the convening of a special  joint General Council and TNC stocktaking session 
after the last General Council meeting to see where things stood just before Cancún.  The entire 
decision making process leading to and at Cancún shoul d be Member driven a nd consistent with the 
inter-governmental nature of the WTO. 
388. The representative of Ecuador
 said his delegation was concerned about the failure to observe 
the Doha mandate in agriculture and the lack of interest by some developed countries in completing 
the commitments of Ministers with regard to the three pillars.  For Ecuador, the agriculture 
negotiations should not just be a way to maximize th e profitability of companies or to raise existing 
standards of living, as was happening in developed countries.  What was at stake for Ecuador was the 
actual livelihood of broad sectors of its population.  In the light of what was agreed in Doha, Members should ensure progress in the three pillars without di scrimination or selectivity.  It was essential that 
the Agriculture Chairman's document contain the co ncept of strategic products instead of the words 
"special product".  This would be more in line with products of great importance to economies of 
developing countries for economic development, rural society, culture and the environment. 
389. On NAMA, he said that the level of flexibilit y and equity which S&D treatment required had 
not yet been met for developing countries.  The leve l of ambition in tariff reductions should take into 
account each country's situation if Members were to en sure that the benefits for some did not lead to 
excessive sacrifices from others.  As an example, in Latin America much of the tariff spectrum had  TN/C/M/11 
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been bound in the process of trade liberalization.   His delegation was also concerned about the 
importance attached to the sectoral approach in th e draft modalities, given that it had understood that 
the formula was the essential element of the moda lities.  Ecuador felt it was premature to identify 
specific sectors given that the essential point was to resolve the application of the formula.  Ecuador 
had a particular interest in the inclusion of provisi ons to eliminate non-tariff barriers, to ensure that 
the negotiations incorporated reduction commitments, and that they did not imply full reciprocity in 
line with the provisions of GATT Article XXVIII bis. 
390. On services, his delegation believed that negotia tions were far from meeting the expectations 
of developing countries.  There was an imbalance be tween market access and the lack of agreement in 
development in rules on the development of a safe guard mechanism, rules for subsidies and national 
regulations.  There was also an imbalance within  market access where developed countries had more 
than 80 per cent of the world market for service s and there was an asymmetry in commitments and 
offers in the sectors and modes of supply. 
391. On trade and environment, significant progress had been made and the fact that six MEA 
Secretariats and the UNEP had participated in th e special meetings of the committee on an ad hoc 
basis was an innovative aspect of the WTO.  His delegation believed this participation could be 
broadened to other organizations  who could make significant contributions, such as UNCTAD.  On 
the register for GIs on wines and spirits, his delegati on believed that if this did not remain voluntary, 
it would be difficult to move ahead.  In conclusion , he said that Ecuador was certain that progress 
would be made on the issues in the Doha Declarati on so that the Ministerial Conference could have a 
role to play in the negotiating process. 
392. The representative of Peru  said there was an urgent need to provide new impetus to the Doha 
Work Programme and this would only be possible if Members provided the necessary momentum in 
the key areas of negotiations, namely agriculture  and market access for non-agricultural products.  
Members also had to achieve solutions in the areas of particular importance for development, such as 
S&D treatment, TRIPS and Public Health and the outstanding questions on im plementation, before 
Cancún to prevent overloading the agenda.  The majo r trading powers would have to generate positive 
linkages and incorporate the development dimensi on in current negotiations and this would be a 
decisive contribution to progress in the current R ound and enhance the credibility of the multilateral 
trade system. 
393. The Agriculture Chairman's involvement had enabled much technical progress to be made.  
His delegation believed that CAP re form had to be applied to achieve greater levels of access to 
markets.  It was important to have significant re ductions in domestic support and export subsidies to 
overcome the serious distortion effects on trade which affected developing countries.  He said that the 
so-called non-trade concerns mentioned in paragra phs 15 and 16 of the Chairman's report should not 
lead away from the substantive questions of comm itments and reduction of internal support.  On 
paragraph 13, it was fundamental to maintain the co ncept of special products for developing countries 
since they were the primary mechan ism to heed the concerns of food security and rural development, 
and it should therefore be an inherent  part of any future draft modalities. 
394. On NAMA, the draft needed to take into acc ount S&D treatment, the pr inciple of less than 
full reciprocity, and developing countries like Peru w ho had bound 100 per cent of their tariffs.  It was 
necessary to continue working on the various compone nts of the formula, and the sectoral approach 
proposed should be subject to renewed analysis.  On services, he wished to draw attention to the joint 
submission by a group of 18 developing countries wh ich proposed guidelines for evaluating whether 
the objectives in Article 4 and 28.2 of the GATS ha d been achieved.  On the request and offer 
process, Members should continue making efforts to  achieve a critical mass of initial offers, if 
possible before Cancún.  On the quality of the o ffers, no sector, sub-sector or mode of supply should 
be excluded from the negotiations, and he stres sed the importance of improvements to mode 4. TN/C/M/11 
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395. His delegation looked forward to the draft documen t to be circulated by the Chairmen of the 
TNC and General Council, and it was certain that, with their leadership and with the necessary 
political will by Members, success would be achie ved at Cancún on the areas he had mentioned. 
396. The representative of Chile
, noting the many references to the issue of preferences in both the 
agriculture and non-agriculture negotiations, said that  after months of discussions, Members needed to 
speak in less general terms and be more specific .  The issue of preferences was specific to each 
exporting country, to product and to each importing market and the relevant data was not always 
available.  Without such data, Members would not be  able to act on a timely basis to design specific, 
effective and practical solutions to this issue.  He appealed to the delegations  concerned to move away 
from clichés and to indicate the preferences they wished to have protected.  He also urged the 
importing countries to release the relevant data so th at Members could react in an appropriate way. 
397. The representative of Saint Vincent and Grenadines  fully supported the statement by Saint 
Lucia both on the serious threat posed by the erosion of preferences to his country and regarding preparations for Cancún.  He wished to express hi s gratitude to all delegations who had given their 
support on the critical matter of the non-inclusion of the erosion of preferences in the modalities that 
had been presented by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Market Access. 
398. The Chairman
 expressed his appreciation for the Chairpersons' untiring efforts to provide 
flesh for the skeleton paper and he urged them to continue to work towards a framework Ministers 
would be able to use in Cancún.  Delegations' st atements had contained many perceptive remarks and 
had reflected varying degrees of hope and optimism, which he believed was a true reflection of the 
situation in the negotiations.  Convergence was yet to be seen on many issues, and although it was 
perhaps not at hand, the remarks gave hope that the negotiations could conclude within the mandated 
time.  He welcomed the participation of non- resident delegations, which demonstrated the 
inclusiveness that the organization aimed for.  Th e Secretariat had timed Geneva Week to coincide 
with the present meeting of the TNC, so that these  delegations could partic ipate in this important 
undertaking. 
399. He hoped the present meeting of the TNC would be a source of encouragement for Members.  
The statements made had reflected the urgency of the situation, and he believed Members needed to 
tackle the negotiations with a keen sense of urge ncy as they had done at the launch of the Round in 
Doha.  They should seek to understand each other' s positions so as to reach compromise, and they 
could not wait too long for this.  While the pr esent meeting was the last scheduled TNC meeting 
before Cancún, Members would have ample opportun ities to meet and advance the negotiations.  The 
Chairman of the General Council a nd he would hold various meetings in the coming weeks, including 
at the level of Heads of Delegation to allow for fu ll transparency as many delegations had mentioned. 
400. The initial framework paper that the Chairman  of the General Council and he would be 
circulating shortly should evolve in to a paper with the full ownership of all Members.  The aim was to 
complete it in time so as to facilitate the participation of Ministers at the Ministerial Conference, and 
he called on all Members to contribute.  He also  urged Members to engage in more communication 
among themselves.  It was necessary for them to have  a real sense of where they were heading and of 
the areas needing Ministers' attention, so that he could facilitate the process and try to avoid accumulating problems up to Cancún.  It was also cr ucial for delegations in Geneva to communicate 
fully with their capitals.  All dele gations had to be fully informed so that there were no surprises for 
anyone. 
401. As for expectations for Cancún, he agreed w ith those who had said that Members should be 
guided by their hopes and not their fears.  He remained hopeful that there were enough encouraging signs, in particular in the key market access are as of agricultural and non-agriculture goods.  The 
pieces were beginning to come together, but Memb ers should be concerned about the urgency of 
consolidating the area of agricultu re.  Although the prospects were better in this area, he urged 
Members to move as quickly as possible to have a good idea of the kind of agreement that could be  TN/C/M/11 
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reached in Cancún.  On non-agricultural market  access, there were still some differences and 
substantial work remained to be  done, but he believed Members were  relatively comfortable with the 
state of play.  On S&D treatment, he expressed appreciation for the collaboration of the Friends of the Chair and their efforts to achieve at least some technical solutions to some of the issues.  He 
encouraged all delegations to support their work in  the hope of reaching early solutions.  On TRIPS 
and Public Health, he remained optimistic that the membership could reach a multilateral agreement 
before Cancún. 
402. In conclusion, he said Members should have appr opriate expectations for Cancún.  It was not 
a question of success or failure, because the Conf erence was to receive a progress report on an 
ongoing Work Programme.  As he had mentioned, there was widespread commitment to the 
negotiations at every level, and a desire to see the negotiations completed in line with the Doha 
mandate and on time.  With such a build up of coll ective will in all parts of the world, Cancún should 
provide a strong and solid foundation on which Memb ers could build for the completion of the Doha 
Development Agenda. 
403. The Trade Negotiations Committee took note
 of the statements. 
3. Outstanding implementation issues (paragraph 12(b) of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration) – Report by the Chairman 
404. The Chairman  recalled that he had reported to Me mbers on his consultations on outstanding 
implementation issues at an open-e nded consultation of Heads of De legation on 7 July.  As Members 
were aware, the outstanding issues for which no specific negotiating mandate was provided in the 
Doha Declaration, had gone to the various subsidia ry bodies for examination the previous year.  They 
had then come back to the TNC in December 2002 for appropriate action, which was the TNC's 
mandate in this respect, as set out in paragraph 12(b)  of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  Since then, 
he had held consultations on possible next steps wi th regard to the 22 outstanding issues in the areas 
of Balance of Payments, Customs Valuation, Market  Access, Safeguards, Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Trade-related Investment Measures and Trade-re lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
405. Following the procedural understanding reached at the Heads of Delegation consultation on 
14 May, he had held consultations, with the assist ance of the Deputy Directors-General on all these 
issues.  He thanked all delegations for their efforts in this work and also th e DDGs for the work they 
had carried out on his behalf.  The consultations had shown that there was a willingness to engage 
constructively on these issues by all concerned, whic h was important to note.  These consultations had 
provided some indication of possible forward moveme nt in a few areas and he hoped this could be 
built upon. 
406. He then outlined the situation as he saw it, taki ng up the issues by subject cluster, as follows: 
"Balance of Payments (BOP)  
 
 There are two tirets in which BOP issues arise.  On one of these – tiret 3 – our 
consultations suggest that further refinement of the draft language prepared at the end of last 
year in the BOP Committee might offer a way forward.  I believe we should therefore encourage the BOP Committee to take another look at the issue under the supervision of the TNC, and report back to us as soon as possible. 
 
 On the second issue – tiret 1 – our consulta tions showed that delegations continue to 
hold differing views on the substance of the i ssue and the desirability of undertaking further 
work on it.  It would appear difficult, therefore,  at present to suggest a course of action that 
could lead to a satisfactory conclusion. 
 TN/C/M/11 
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Customs Valuation
 
 
  The 5 issues in this area were the subj ect of a long and comprehensive examination in 
the Customs Valuation Committee last year.  In our consultations, it became clear that delegations continue to hold differing views both on the substance of the issues and on the 
desirability of undertaking further work on them.  It would thus appear that it is difficult at 
present to suggest a course of action which is likely to be agreed on any of the issues. 
 Market Access
 
 
Here also, much effort was put into the cons ideration of the one issue in this area in 
the Market Access Committee in 2002.  In our c onsultations, some sugges tions were made in 
an attempt to move the work forward on this issue, but it would seem that agreement remains 
elusive on a possible course of action. 
 
Safeguards  
 
Here we have one issue – tiret 84.  From our consultations, it seems clear that 
Members have exhausted their discussions on this issue.  Nevertheless, in this case I suggest 
that we ask the Safeguards Committee to ensure th at the issue remain part of its regular work 
programme.  I understand that this approach  would be acceptable to the proponent of the 
original proposal. 
 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)  
 
For the two issues in this area, tirets 33 and 34, I have the definite impression that 
further technical work by the TBT Committee could contribute to substantive progress, both 
in the technical assistance context and on the question of supplier's declarations.  Let me explain this:  the prospects for good progress are closely linked to the Committee's existing programme of work on both these items; and the f act is that there are specific proposals (from 
New Zealand for example aiming to match requests and resources available) on technical assistance, and an approach to ensure impr oved information about supplier's declaration 
possibilities through better notification procedures. 
 
I suggest therefore that we request the TBT Committee to consider further the two 
issues, under the supervision of the TNC.  The TNC would ask the TBT Committee to convene as necessary to undertake this work and to  report back in December.  Since this work 
is in the context of the Triennial Review, to be concluded by November, the real possibilities 
for accelerating the programme are not easy to see, and maybe getting the right solution is more important than the timing. 
 
Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs)
 
 
 There are four outstanding implementati on issues relating to the TRIMs Agreement, 
tirets 37 through 40.  Our consultations have continued to focus on tiret 40, as this would 
seem to encompass much if not all of the substa nce of the proposals contained in tirets 37, 38 
and 39.  Members show willingness to continue  exploring a compromise solution on this 
issue, but more time is still required for dele gations to reflect on an acceptable outcome and to 
seek guidance from their capitals.  I believe we  should therefore keep the TRIMs issues under 
review in the TNC, and as necessary be prep ared to ask the TRIMs Committee to meet at 
short notice to work on a compromise solution. 
  TN/C/M/11 
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Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)  
 
Here I am speaking of the 7 outstanding TR IPS implementation issues other than tiret 
87, which deals with extension of additiona l protection for geographical indications to 
products other than wines and spirits.  These c onsultations have shown that the issue that 
might be pursued most actively at this stage c oncerns ideas put forward in regard to tirets 88 
and 95.  In particular, it appears that it may be beneficial to conduct a more focused 
examination of proposals that have been made  on the disclosure by patent applicants of 
information relating to genetic resources and traditional knowledge used in their inventions.  I 
would therefore propose to request Ambassador Vanu Gopala Menon, acting in the capacity 
of a friend of the Director-General, to hold su ch discussions with a view to finding a way 
forward. 
 
I should also recall that on the issue of additional protection for geographical 
indications to products other than wines and sp irits, I have held two open-ended consultations 
at Heads of Delegation level in my capacity as Di rector-General.  Clearly this remains a very 
difficult issue and we are a long way from an y agreement.  However, I appreciate the 
willingness of delegations to discuss it constructiv ely and to look for common ground.  As I 
have earlier informed you, I will continue my  consultations, with the assistance of DDG 
Abbott, with a view to exploring the possibility for finding a way forward." 
 
407. He proposed that the TNC endorse the course of action as he had just set out under each 
subject cluster.  He also proposed that he c ontinue his consultations on the other outstanding 
implementation issues, with the assistance of the DD Gs, and report back to the TNC.  Before opening 
the floor, he said that what he had just set out was based on his careful consideration of the views expressed by delegations in the c onsultations he and his DDGs ha d undertaken.  In making these 
suggestions, he was trying once again to move this very difficult area of the work forward and he 
would continue to do so. 
408. The representative of th e European Communities
 said implementation i ssues were part of the 
overall negotiations and needed to be fully addressed  in the preparation of Cancún and beyond.  Many 
Members had important stakes in issues such as TR IMs, TBT, BOP, biodiversity and others.  Many 
were also important stakeholders in the extension of geographical i ndications (GIs), and as could be 
seen in the proposal by Switzerland and others, which had been co-sponsored by the European 
Communities, proponents came from every c ontinent of the world, except Australia. 
409. Under agenda item 2, some delegations had adva nced arguments, legal and otherwise, against 
GI extension and the wines and spirits register.  His delegation's views on th e legal interpretation of 
paragraphs 12(b) and 18 of the D oha Declaration were known to Memb ers and he considered them to 
be the only authentic interpretation and would not re peat them but rather focus on substance.  His 
delegation was grateful to the Chairman who, in his capacity as Director-General, had started 
engaging Members for the first time in substantive di scussions on this issue.  The detailed questions 
he had put to proponents had been addressed by  the European Communities both in writing and 
orally.  His delegation was still waiting for a reply to  the questions it had addressed to the opponents. 
410. His delegation supported fully the statement by Switzerland under item 2.  GIs were not about 
protectionism, but about free and fair trade and a bout enabling small producers and their high quality 
products to reap the full benefits of international tr ade.  These quality products were deeply rooted in 
specific regions and based on longstanding and traditional methods of production for which 
consumers were willing to pay a premium, provided th at they could be assured of the genuine origin 
of a product.  If there was any protection, it w as protection of the consumer who wanted the real 
thing. 
411. There were many misconceptions about GI extensi on.  GIs were not an exclusive interest of 
the European Communities as the list of sponsors of  the proposal had shown, and the protection TN/C/M/11 
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offered was "on demand", not requiring countries to automatically protect GI s of other Members.  
Extended protection had been available for wines and spirits since 1996, and his delegation was not 
aware of any country having encountered major diffi culties in this area.  It was false that GIs 
extension imposed the establishment of burdensome ad ministrative structures, it was rather a question 
of setting norms, involving simple legislative amendments which many Members already had.  
Finally, it did not require a special enforcement m echanism, since it remained  the sole responsibility 
of right holders to monitor and police the protection of GIs. 
412. On the wines and spirits register, his delegati on disagreed completely with the statements 
made by Australia and Chile under item 2.  On pr ocedure, his delegation could accept the Chairman's 
procedural proposals on the different outstanding implem entation issues.  It urged him to continue his 
discussions on the extension of GIs, and was confid ent that under the Chairman's guidance a balanced 
result would be obtained in the overall package. 
413. The representative of India
 said that, having participated c onstructively in the consultations, 
his delegation shared the Chairman's assessment that  not much progress had been possible on most of 
these issues.  He recalled that Ministers at Doha had stated that they attached the utmost importance to 
implementation-related issues and c oncerns and were determined to  find appropriate solutions to 
them.  They had agreed that negotiations on these issu es were an integral part of the Work Programme 
established in Doha.  They had further decided that  agreements reached at an early stage in these 
negotiations should be treated in accordance with  the provisions of paragraph 47 of the Doha 
Declaration, which provided for the implementa tion of such agreements on a provisional or a 
definitive basis.  The relevant WTO bodies had b een requested to address paragraph 12(b) issues as a 
matter of priority and to report to the TNC by e nd 2002.  At the December meeting of the TNC, the 
reports from the Chairpersons of these bodies had revealed that progress, if any, had been scant 
despite these issues being under discussion since 1999.   Subsequently, the Chairman had recently 
commenced consultations on these issues and his report at the present meeting did not sound encouraging. 
414. His delegation was concerned with the tardy progress in addressing implementation issues 
which were an important element of the development dimension of the Doha Work Programme.  The 
lack of progress was due to the reluctance on the part of some Members to show any flexibility.  India 
and other developing countries continued to attach the highest importance to early resolution of these 
issues. 
415. His delegation urged that tiret 1 under BOP be taken up in the TNC for providing appropriate 
guidance regarding the timeframe for resolving this crucial issue.  His delegation was concerned about 
the lack of progress in addressing the Customs Valua tion tirets.  In particular, it looked forward to 
early solution to tirets relating to cost of servic es supplied by the buyer being included for customs 
valuation purposes (tiret 57), sole agents being d eemed as related (tiret 61), and completion of work 
on harmonization of Rules of Origin (tiret 62).  On TBT issues, the TBT Committee should be 
requested to continue the work in dedicated meetin gs and to report back prior to Cancún.  On the 
TRIMs tirets, his delegation reiterated its interest in the proposals put forward jointly by India and Brazil.  These proposals were comprehensive and s ubstantially covered most developmental concerns 
related to TRIMs, and he urged that  further consultations on this issue be held in the TNC.  India was 
interested in all the tirets on TRIPS issue.  The proposal on requiring norms of disclosure to include 
the source of origin of the biological resource and associated traditional knowledge as well as 
evidence of prior informed consent and benefit sh aring was ripe enough for decision in Cancún, if 
intensive work was undertaken. 
416. Similarly, some proposals had been forwarded to the relevant WTO bodies as part of the 
Doha Decision on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns.  Although the deadline had passed, 
some of these issues were still outstanding, and the paper by the Secretariat in document 
WT/GC/W/500 of 8 July 2003, set out the progress card on these issues.  TN/C/M/11 
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417. In the Chairman's report, there had been no clear indication of how some of these issues 
would be dealt with in the future.  In view of the commitment that had been given by Ministers at Doha that they were determined to find appropri ate solutions to outstanding implementation issues, 
Members should, at the very least, identify a su itable mechanism for addr essing these issues also, 
apart from the paragraph 12(b) issues.  No useful purpose would be served by sending these issues 
back to the WTO bodies, which had not been able to  come up with solutions even after nearly three 
and a half years of work, although they had done so me valuable technical work.  India strongly urged 
that these issues be dealt with directly by the TNC in dedicated sessions, and he looked forward to the 
views of other delegations on this. 
418. The representative of Kenya
 said the large number of times the words "differing views" had 
appeared in the Chairman's report was not a positiv e sign for resolving the implementation issues.  No 
noticeable progress had been made and this had led to  a feeling of frustration, injustice, bitterness, 
division and mistrust for those who had been expec ting the matter to have been resolved a long time 
ago.  The deadline that had been set in Doha had unf ortunately not been met.  International trade rules 
should be made fairer so that the poor of the wo rld had the chance to improve their standards of 
living.  He hoped that there would be a renewe d commitment to resolve implementation issues and 
concerns once and for all.  Like India, Kenya did not see any rationale in sen ding those issues back to 
the same subsidiary bodies that had failed to co me up with solutions and Members might have to 
explore the possibility of dealing with them directly at the TNC level. 
419. The representative of the Czech Republic  said he hoped today's meeting would mark a change 
away from Members focusing exclusively on thei r own positions and towards commonly shared 
positions acceptable to all, while maintaining a high level of ambition as had been set out by Ministers 
in Doha.  Members should talk to each other and not at each other, and more effort and goodwill 
would have to come from all.  Members needed  a vision and a recognition that global problems 
required global solutions, and that bilateral and regional initiatives c ould deliver only partial solutions. 
420. The Czech Republic had always been willing to  consider all implementation issues on their 
own merits and was ready to do so in the future.  On the extension of the additional protection of GIs 
to products other than wines and spirits, he wished to reiterate that the extension and the issue of the 
register represented an integral part of the Si ngle Undertaking and were essential ingredients for 
success in Cancún. 
421. The purpose of the joint proposal on GIs which had been co-sponsored by his delegation was 
to explain the rationale behind ex tending additional protection to ot her products and to address an 
anomaly in the TRIPS Agreement.  The paper was clear and it had been prepared in response to 
doubts some delegations had on this issue and to disp el their concerns on the implications extension 
might have for them.  It was also an attempt to  undertake the mammoth task of making the extension 
more attractive in the eyes of those who continued to raise systemic objections.  The paper was intended as a strong message through which the propone nts wished to reassure others of their 
readiness to listen to these concerns and take them  into account when searching for a result that was 
acceptable to all.  However, he emphasized that Ca ncún was the forum to dispel any ambiguity that 
still might exist regarding the nego tiating mandate.  Extension of GIs had been on the table since the 
Singapore Ministerial Conference and the proponents ha d made every possible effort to provide the 
necessary level of comfort.  The proponents had show n patience, but it was now wearing thin and the 
time had come to proceed. 
422. The representative of Australia
 said the demandeurs' paper on GIs was misleading and 
inaccurate in some of the comments it made, but he  would prefer to take up the substance of the 
paper.  The demandeurs were asking for a substantia l rewrite of the TRIPS Agreement that had been 
negotiated in the Uruguay Round and concluded in 1994.  It had come  into effect for developing 
countries only in the year 2000 and would not come  into effect for LDCs until 2006.  So this 
agreement was new and had only come into effect for the majority of Members recently and had yet 
to be implemented by many developing countries.  The demandeurs were seeking to substantially TN/C/M/11 
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rewrite the agreement because they had put forwar d three separate but related proposals, not all of 
which were described in their recent joint paper. 
423. First, they sought to extend the higher level of  protection accorded to wines and spirits to all 
products.  Second, they wanted to create a new in ternational register of all GIs which would have 
legal effect in all Member countries of the WTO.  And third, they wanted to extinguish the rights that 
countries now had under the TRIPS Agreement to protect  generic terms and tradem arks in respect of a 
specific undisclosed number of products. 
424. The only mandate Members had received from Mi nisters in Doha was to negotiate the 
multilateral register on wines and spirits and this was being negotiated now.  But even there, the 
demandeurs had once again tried to crib on the mandate by extending it from what Ministers had 
actually said.  As the situation stood, there was a wide gulf between the opponents and the proponents 
on their demands.  There was a very clear lack of  understanding about what the current agreement 
said in relation to trademarks and how one protect ed GIs, much less an understanding of what the 
demandeurs were seeking to do in rebalancing the Agreement. 
425. Clearly the demandeurs had yet to convince the sceptics that the Article 22 level of protection 
in the TRIPS Agreement was not sufficient to protect GIs that they wanted to protect.  No assessment 
had been made of the impact of what the demand eurs were seeking.  Respectable and reputable 
independent NGOs and academics had looked at this  and counselled caution on the part of developing 
countries about weighing these issues up.  All the many NGOs and academics that had reported on this in the last year had said the jury was still out on whether this was of benefit to developing 
countries or whether it would harm developing countries.  There was also clearly a lack of trust 
among those delegations who were concerned about this agenda, because of the way in which the 
demandeurs had sought to introduce these issues into  the negotiations through, first, trying to go 
through the back door of the Agriculture Special  Session, instead of going through the TRIPS 
Council, and, second, trying to raise it under the guise of implementation which was supposed to be 
about developing country concerns. 
426. Clearly there was no guarantee that fanciful  terms which many de veloping countries had 
indicated they would like to protect, such as basmati rice, jasmine rice or others, would be protectable if this agenda was accepted.  It might be likely that  developing countries might or might not be able to 
protect one or two GIs of their own, but would be forced to introduce a new register in their own countries to protect thousands of GIs from Europe.  Clearly there were major costs, which were not 
quantifiable at this stage, for governments, c onsumers and producers that would result from this 
agenda if it was accepted.  This needed much more discussion.  It was evident from the discussion 
that no guarantee existed that by agreeing to this GI agenda one would be able to obtain access for 
one's products, nor would it guarantee a higher retu rn for the commodity through the protection of 
GIs. 
427. Members were at an impasse, but in the view of many, this issue was not ripe for negotiation 
except in respect of that single issue which Minister s had agreed at Doha.  He suggested that much 
more work needed to be done before this issue wa s ripe for negotiation.  He urged the demandeurs, if 
they wished to seek something, to  do so in the appropriate forum, the Council for TRIPS.  They 
should also encourage opponents to have trust in wh at they were doing, and try to help them better 
understand the issues.  If this negotiation was for ced, he guaranteed that in a couple of years, 
Members would be back complaining about the re-w riting of the TRIPS Agreement in the same way 
as many delegations believed that th ey were conned into agreeing to the TRIPS Agreement in the first 
place.  He thought it would be a regressive step to  further unbalance the agreement with many more 
costs incurred through registering thousands of GIs. 
428. The representative of Hungary
 said the statements by some delegations seemed to imply that 
the issue of GI extension was a kind of conspiracy by  European countries agains t the rest of the world, 
in particular developing countries.  The joint communication and the list of co-sponsors, which  TN/C/M/11 
 Page 77 
 
 
included a number of developing countries, showed that this was a continued misrepresentation and 
was misleading.  This was in fact a longstanding de bate between the original historical initiators and 
owners of a number of geographic names and the su bsequent users of them, who were often abusers 
who did not want to renounce their use of such names.   It was interesting to hear a developed country, 
Australia, protecting the developing countries against their own interests.  Hi s delegation did not see 
why only wines and spirits should have a higher le vel of protection than ot her products under Article 
23 of the TRIPS Agreement.  The value of ot her products, including wood products and some 
industrial products, with similar traditional origins was equally high and should be protected for the 
reasons pointed out in the communication. 
429. Under agenda item 2, Australia  had equated GIs to monopoly tr ading rights.  He understood 
monopoly trading rights to be characteristic of state trading countries, while intellectual property 
rights, including monopoly rights, were character istic of developed market economies, and he 
believed Australia belonge d to the latter group. 
430. The representative of the United States  said that varying views existed on the substance and 
the prospects of each issue and that the Chairman had put forward sound ideas on the way forward.  
Her delegation was not convinced that a Special Session of the TNC would advance the work.  Her 
delegation stood ready to work with the Chairman a nd other delegations as the work moved forward.  
Some delegations had called for flex ibility and had decried what they saw as the lack of it.  She 
agreed on the need for flexibility, but it should come from all sides.  She recalled that, prior to Doha, 
Members had resolved approximately 50 implemen tation items and after D oha had referred another 
30 items to negotiations.  Having moved forwar d on almost 80 per cent of the outstanding 
implementation items, it was difficult for her delegati on to understand some of the statements made at 
the present meeting. 
431. On the question of GI extension, she did not see any new elements from previous debates in 
the demandeurs' paper.  The United States had set out why it opposed such negotiations in detail on 
various previous occasions, so she would summarize its  position.  The status quo adequately protected 
GIs and the United States had an effective trademar k system that protected products and country place 
names in particular from a variety of countries represented in the WTO.  The United States did not wish to shift inappropriately the burden of inte llectual property protection and enforcement from the 
right-holder to the government, and all the additional  government burdens that this entailed.  There 
were harmful and trade distorting effects on commerc ial interests both domestically and all around the 
world in third markets, particularly through the de mandeurs' likely insistence that companies in her 
country stop using words such as "feta" and "parmesan". 
432. The United States saw conflicts with trademarks through the so-called "co-existence" 
approach taken by the European Communities, which was an approach to GIs that led to consumer 
confusion and harmful effects on tr ademark owners.  Finally, the Un ited States saw no balance in the 
equities, as most Members with interests in only a few GIs would be asked to  provide the means to 
protect hundreds or thousands of GIs of only a few other Members.  In short, the United States 
believed this would create an implementation issue rather than solve one. 
433. The representative of Bulgaria
 agreed with the United States that the GI paper contained no 
new elements which was true, however the statem ent by the United States was indicative of the 
opponents' approach to this issue.  The demande urs had repeatedly responded to the opponents' points 
and asked them to come forward with proposals, but the opponents just kept repeating the same 
positions.  The United States had claimed that trademar ks provided protection to GIs, but in fact the 
trademark system was more burdensome for sm all and medium-sized producers and governments 
than what was being proposed by his country a nd others.  Many of the criticisms raised on the 
proposal would be true for trademarks.  The Unite d States saw a conflict between the protection under 
a trademark system and GIs, but this had nothing to do with the demandeurs' proposal.  If the United 
States was not happy with the existing relationship between trademarks and GIs, they should come 
forward with proposals.  On the balance of equiti es, he wondered how many trademarks and patents TN/C/M/11 
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developing or other countries had to protect, whic h were owned by foreign countries, such as the 
United States, and how many the United States prot ected for which the owners came from developing 
and other countries.  This kind of debate would lead nowhere because intellectual property protection 
under the TRIPS Agreement was different from the system of exchange of concessions on goods and 
services.  The TRIPS Agreement was a minimum standards agreement and did not work with national 
schedules and exchange of concessions. 
434. Australia had said the paper by the demandeurs was misleading and inaccurate, but this 
description was more a characterization of Australia 's statement because it had not stated what was 
misleading or inaccurate about the paper.  This w as very indicative of Australia's approach to the 
debate on GIs, which was also misleading and in accurate.  As Hungary had said, Australia had 
attempted to represent the interests of developing count ries.  Bulgaria noted that the group of friends 
of GIs, including those who co-sponsored the pa per, included many developing countries who 
probably knew their own interests better than Aust ralia.  Over 80 Members, on one occasion or the 
other, had supported the initiative of extending the add itional protection for GIs to products other than 
wines and spirits.  This was more than half of the Membership, including developing countries, LDCs 
and others. 
435. Another misleading and inaccurate statement from Australia was that if developing countries 
agreed to the extension, they would be forced to in troduce a register to protect GIs from Europe.  This 
was false because the proponents were proposing a mere legislative change to provide for the 
protection already existing for wines and spirits to  be extended to other products.  There was no 
requirement to introduce a register to protect GI s from Europe.  If a country wanted to introduce a 
register, it could do so, not necessarily to protect GIs from Europe but to protect domestic GIs which 
would be registered there. 
436. Another even more misleading statement was th at the issue was not ripe for negotiation and 
that more work needed to be done.  More work  would not help this ki nd of attitude among the 
opponents.  The issue of a mandate had been raised , but he wished to point out that Australia and 
others had agreed to paragraph 18 of the Doha Decl aration, where extension of GIs to products other 
than wines and spirits had been explicitly qualified as an implementation issu e, and to paragraph 12, 
where negotiations had been explicitly provided fo r.  The proponents were asking for negotiations, 
which were already mandated under paragraph 12.  He did agree with Australia that there was no 
guarantee that one would gain access for products even with extension.  It was for this reason that the 
proponents insisted that in the agriculture ne gotiations, market access was provided for GIs. 
437. With regard to Chile's statement that the ne gotiations on the register were going down a non-
legal road, which meant that the register would go beyond current obligations, that it would change 
the principle of territoriality of intellectual propert y protection and that it would impose obligations on 
non-participants.  His response was that these nego tiations were indeed about going beyond existing 
obligations, in the same way as Chile was intere sted in going beyond existing obligations in 
agriculture or anti-dumping.  At the same time, it was not true that the register would go beyond 
existing obligations, because it concerned a legal pr esumption which could be challenged in domestic 
courts.  He did not unders tand Chile's questioning of the legality of  the register introducing changes in 
the principle of territoriality in the TRIPS Agre ement.  This was not true because there was the 
possibility of opposing this aspect, and the principle of territoriality in GIs had a specific form.  If a country protected a GI on one's own territory, then one was entitled to protection also in other WTO 
Members.  The register would change nothing in th at.  He asked whether Chile could agree that the 
discussions on the issue of TRIPS and Public Health  and Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement were 
not comparable to the discussions on the re gister with regard to territoriality. 
438. 
He did agree with Chile's argument that the re gister imposed obligations on non-participants, 
because this was in line with the ch aracter or the philosophy of inte llectual property protection in the 
multilateral trading system since it was a minimum standards agreement.  Yet he wondered whether 
this meant that in other areas of the negotia tions, obligations should not be imposed on non- TN/C/M/11 
 Page 79 
 
 
participants.  The modalities in agriculture were fu ll of proposals for obligations by others, which 
have be the same effect, so in the e nd he did not understand Chile's argument. 
439. The representative of Brazil  said his delegation had substantiv e concerns with respect to the 
issue of GI extension.  As a country that had r eceived throughout its history a very large influx of 
immigrants from all regions of the world, Brazil was concerned about the potential negative impact of 
GI extension as put forward by the European Communities and other proponents on the cultural and 
other practices of its peoples.  There was great unc ertainty regarding the potential economic impact 
for producers and consumers, as well as potential le gal and administrative costs in countries with very 
little experience with the protection of GIs, such as Brazil.  An economic and statistical analysis of 
existing protected GIs would certainly be a useful in strument in understanding the real impact of such 
protection, and Brazil believed that such an anal ysis would certainly show its concerns were 
warranted. 
440. Brazil was also concerned about the interacti on of the proposal on extension with other 
proposals on GIs that the European Communities had put on the table, both in the Special Session of 
the Council for TRIPS on the establishment of a multila teral register on GIs for wines and spirits and 
in the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture.  Taken together, these various proposals 
would imply considerable and unjustifiable costs fo r developing countries, and Brazil agreed with 
those who believed that these issues were not ripe for negotiations. 
441. The representative of China  echoed the positions of India and Kenya on outstanding 
implementation issues.  Paragraph 12(b) of the Doha Declaration was considered as a matter of 
priority and was a very important issue of interest to many developing countries.  For this reason, 
China believed that Members should accelerate th e negotiations on these issues, and preferably 
achieve results before Cancún.  It was importa nt to avoid over-burde ning Cancún and China hoped 
that all Members, in particular developed countri es, would demonstrate flexibility because this was a 
paramount issue of development.  His delegation hop ed that either a dedicated session of the TNC or 
informal consultations under the auspices of TNC woul d be held to try to reach  results before Cancún. 
442. The representative of Argentina  said paragraph 2 of the document TN/C/W/14 stated that GIs 
were an intellectual property right equal to trademarks , designs or patents.  This was true in the legal 
sense on the basis of the TRIPS Agreement, but from the experience in the negotiations on wines and 
in other spheres, what was being sought was the su premacy of intellectual property rights related to 
GIs with respect to trademarks and the questi on of territoriality was an important one.  The 
proponents were trying to break the principle of territo riality in their desire for the protection of GIs to 
be universal and general in nature.  In Euro pe, this was the case because trademarks were 
subordinated to GIs in a given territory and the oppo nents could only assume that this was what was 
being asked. 
443. The TRIPS Agreement contained a delicate ba lance between incentives for creativity by 
granting rights to those who created something and the well-being of the community and mankind 
through the dissemination of this knowledge.  In othe r spheres, like patents or trademarks, there was 
the concept of a time limit that was in force while GIs had a permanent ongoing status.  The concept 
of creation and seeking to advance knowledge did not exist with GIs.  In its place, there was an attempt to preserve monopolistic capacities and territorial advantage for a product. 
444. In paragraph 3 of the paper, it was claimed th at there were no commercial, economic or legal 
reasons to limit effective protection only to GIs for wines and spirits or not to provide such protection 
also to GIs for all other products.  Exceptions had been negotiated for wines and spirits, and now the 
proponents were asking that more exceptions be ma de.  However, in paragraph 5, it was suggested 
that the exceptions to Article 24 should continue to  be effective with no request to go backwards.  
This was the opposite of what was occurring in th e negotiations on the register, where it was being 
asked that exceptions be outside national jurisdictio n.  The same thing was happening in the third leg TN/C/M/11 
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of the proponents requirements for GIs where they hoped that for a limited list of products, exceptions 
would be withdrawn. 
445. Paragraph 6 indicated that the extension of GIs was going to facilitate the protection of 
intellectual property rights in many cases because some  of the difficulties or costs inherent to Article 
22 of the TRIPS Agreement could be prevented.  Wh ile this might be true, the problem was that the 
demandeurs were trying to transfer these costs fro m the rights holders to the governments of other 
countries.  There were many other aspects of this  document that Argentina could not accept, and it 
agreed with the Chairman that there was no possibility of agreement in the near future. 
446. The representative of Japan
 had often stated that work on implementation issues should not be 
done in any one-size-fits-all approach, but rath er should be based on a case-by-case appraisal of 
respective proposals through reflecting on discussion he ld thus far, as well as the prospects for further 
advancement of respective issues.  The Chairman , in the light of the views expressed in his 
consultations, had made proposals on the way forwar d for respective proposals.  Japan was in full 
accord with his proposal. 
447. During the discussions at the present meeting, some delegations had expressed frustration at 
what they considered to be lack of progress, but  in Japan's view, the issues were complex and had 
systemic implications, and it was up to all Members to  be forthcoming.  On the question of the TNC's 
role in further discussions, Japan believed it w as not the right place for further discussions on 
technical issues.  Japan was prepared to continue its engagement in the adva ncement of discussions on 
these issues based on the Chairman's proposals. 
448. The representative of Switzerland  said that open discussion on the issue of GIs was essential.  
There were many open questions on this issue, which could only be clarified in the negotiating 
process and he wondered when this could start.  He was puzzled that a certain number of countries that exported sophisticated goods and specialities had no interest in using such a tool to market their 
products.  The success of a certain number of pr oducts on the Swiss market depended on the quality 
and identification of the product.  Some of th e opponents to GI extension would not export their 
agricultural products without a label which informed  the consumer where their products were from. 
449. If the United States offered protection of GIs thro ugh its system of trademarks with the same 
conditions Switzerland had for protecting GIs, which cost much less than trademarks, his delegation 
was ready to explore it, but through negotiations.  Australia had suggested holding more discussions.  
However, discussions had been taking place for more than three years and all the questions had been 
answered many times.  The proponents had now prep ared a simple version of their proposal, but 
Argentina found it too simple.  Being simple was wh at trade was all about when it came to convincing 
consumers to buy products, and this al so held true for GIs.  The cost s of a GI system were minimal, 
although it could be implemented in a complex fashi on, and technical assistance could be offered to 
those who wished to learn how a simple system could function.  The implementation of such a system could, of course, be subject to a tran sitional period for developing countries. 
450. There were some basic reasons for entering into ne gotiations on this issue.  It was the simplest 
negotiation in the WTO – just some changes in TRIPS Article 23.  It was far less complex than those 
on agriculture, rules or Singapore issues.  It concerne d the simple modification of a text which was in 
violation of the basic rules of the WTO, because there was discrimination between wine and spirits and other products.  It was just a question of complimenting what had been done during the Uruguay 
Round. 
451. Those who were demandeurs in agriculture s hould think of those countries who would have 
to pay in those negotiations, among them Switzerla nd.  These countries also had a right to be 
demandeurs and they were not ashamed.  In nego tiations, all Members were demandeurs on certain 
issues, and on the defensive or neutral on others.  He wondered what logical argument there could be 
against the extension of a system which existed for two categories of products and which had caused  TN/C/M/11 
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no harm since its introduction in 1994.  Politically speaking, his arguments highlighted the adequacy 
of entering into negotiations, if there was a will to come to a result in these negotiations. 
452. The representative of Chile  said his delegation agreed with the Chairman's suggestions on the 
way forward on implementation issues.  Turning to the document on GIs, he noted it was co-
sponsored by 23 Members of which 18 were in Eu rope and only one in the Americas.  One positive 
aspect of the paper, as mentioned by Switzerland, was the suggestion that there should be no 
discrimination between wines and sprits and ot her products.  He suggested deleting additional 
protection for wines and spirits so that all produ cts could be treated equally.  This additional 
protection was not needed.  Members had been ma king progress in the Chairman's consultations, 
getting down to specifics, and for the first time c onsidering issues on a serious basis.  The GI paper 
did not help, it took Members back into generalities,  and it was not constructive in terms of the work 
they were doing. 
453. The representative of Bulgaria  said he wished to respond to a number of points made by 
others.  GIs were the least monopolistic intellectua l property rights, and they did not prohibited the 
production of products, as was the case with patent s.  One could produce the same product, but not 
use the name, so this was not monopolistic.  GIs were  also time limited.  If one was to delete the 
additional protection for wines and spirits, one might  as well delete the TRIPS Agreement as a whole. 
454. The representative of Mexico  agreed with Argentina, Au stralia, Brazil and Chile that 
Members were not ready to begin any type of negotiation on GIs. 
455. The representative of Colombia  said that the history of the New World had a parallel in the 
history of GI extension; both involved more myths and magic than anything else.  When the 
demandeurs spoke of the advantages that developing  countries would obtain from GI extension, he 
was tempted to invite a delegation of the Colo mbian Coffee Federation to present informally its 
history, how much had been spent and the main features of obtaining international recognition of 
Colombian coffee.  This recognition had involved mo re than just registering a product to extend GI 
protection.  It had involved much work and invest ment over 60 years.  He invited all delegations to 
reflect on this. 
456. The Chairman  said that there was clearly still much work to do on implementation, and he 
proposed to continue his consultations  with the assistance of his Deputies. 
457. The representative of India  said that his delegation could not agree to the Chairman's 
proposal, and believed that China and Kenya had made the same point.  India wished to have a place 
where these issues would be negotiated, and did not be lieve that the current way of proceeding led to 
results. 
458. The Chairman  said that, in his recollection, China had stated that it could support either a 
dedicated session or other means of consultation. 
459. The representative of China  clarified that his delegation ha d suggested that one could have 
either a dedicated session or some informal consultations under the auspices of the TNC. 
460. The Chairman , in response to India's concerns, said that he would not relegate any issues to 
secondary treatment, and that all paragraph 12(b) i ssues would be treated in the same way.  He hoped 
India would not forego the opportunity for trying to make headway, since there was clearly no consensus for convening a dedicated sessi on of the TNC to consider these issues. 
461. The representative of India
 said he appreciated the Chairman's efforts to get things going.  
However, he believed that participants in the discussions since Doha on these issues would recognize 
that nothing had been achieved so far in these discussi ons, except on perhaps two or three tirets.  India 
had been assured in Doha that all outstanding impl ementation issues would be negotiated as a matter TN/C/M/11 
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of priority.  His delegation did not see any urgency in any of these issues being dealt with in the various WTO bodies, which was why it had made its suggestion on instruction from its capital.  His 
delegation would refer the Chairman's words to its cap ital to seek fresh instructions.  But, as of the 
present, India's position remained that these issues s hould be dealt with in dedicated sessions of the 
TNC.  India could not see any meaningful progress on any of these issues otherwise. 
462. The Chairman
 said he was hopeful that India would, in time, agree to continuing 
consultations.  In view of the complexities of the issues, he believed the only way was to continue to 
search for solutions.  Much as he wished to see consensus on further work in this area, he believed 
this was not the case, and he proposed therefore that  the TNC take note of the statements made during 
this discussion. 
463. The representative of Bulgaria  said he hoped that work would not be blocked on these issues 
because of disagreement on whether or not to  hold dedicated sessions.  He hoped that the 
disagreement over the issue of dedicated sessions would not mean that the Chairman would stop working on implementation issues.  He believed th at the Chairman did not need a consensus to 
convene sessions of the TNC, and that it was well with in the latter's powers, even without consensus, 
to convene meetings of the TNC.  However, he hoped that the fact that the Chairman did not wish to 
convene dedicated sessions would not mean th at the latter would stop his consultations. 
464. The Chairman
 proposed that the TNC take note of the statements made and that he continue 
with his consultations in some areas.  He still hoped his earlier suggestions would eventually be 
accepted by all delegations. 
465. The Trade Negotiations Committee took note  of the statements and agreed  to the Chairman's 
proposal. 
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