WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTGP/2
17 November 1998
(98-4525)
Working Group on Transparency
in Government Procurement
REPORT (1998) TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL
1. The Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement was established by a
decision at the WTO Ministerial Conference held in December 1996 "to conduct a study on
transparency in government procurement practices, taking into account national policies, and, basedon this study, to develop elements for inclusion in an appropriate agreement".
2. The period covered in this report is November 1997-October 1998.  The work of the Working
Group up to November 1997 is described in the Working Group's Report (1997) to the
General Council (WT/WGTGP/W1).  The Working Group held formal meetings on
19-20 February 1998, 22 June 1998 and 8-9 October 1998.  Reports on these meetings have beencirculated in documents WT/WGTGP/M/4-6.
3. At its meeting of 19-20 February 1998, the Working Group had a detailed discussion of
transparency-related provisions in existing intern ational instruments on government procurement and
national procedures and practices on the basis of an informal note by the Chair listing the issues that
had been raised, and points made on these issues at the Group's November 1997 meeting ("List of theIssues Raised and Points Made" - Job No. 73).  The Working Group took up in turn each of the
headings to this note, which correspond to those used  in the earlier Secretariat note "Synthesis of the
Information Available on Transparency-Related Provisions in Existing International Instruments on
Government Procurement Procedures and National Practices" (WT/WGTGP/W/6), with the addition
of headings on technical cooperation and special and differential treatment.  The list of headings of
the Chairman's note, the latest version of which is annexed, has formed the structure of the Working
Group's substantive work.  Written submissions were presented by Hong Kong, China;  the CzechRepublic;  Uruguay;  and Australia containing factual information on their national procedures and
practices (WT/WGTGP/W/10, 12, 13 and 14 respectively).  Other written contributions were
submitted by Australia relating to the principles of government procurement (Job No. 136) and by the
United States on review mechanisms and transparency in procurement methods (WT/WGTGP/15 and
16).  The Group was also presented with a communication from the Chair of the APEC GovernmentProcurement Expert Group (WT/WGTGP/W/11).
4. At its meeting of 22 June 1998, the Working Group reverted to its discussion of transparency-
related provisions in existing international instruments on government procurement and national
procedures and practices on the basis of the informal note "List of the Issues Raised and Points Made"
(Job No. 1860) which had been revised in light of the discussion at the February 1998 meeting.Written submissions were presented by Morocco and Slovenia, containing factual information on their
national procedures and practices (WT/WGTGP/W/19 and Job No. 3387 respectively).  Other written
contributions were submitted by the European Community and Norway, addressing the issue of how
one might ensure that transparency in procurement policies and practices is achieved
(WT/WGTGP/W/17 and Job No. 3245), by Switz erland on minimum requirements for relevant
information to be published in tender notices (Job No. 3436), by Venezuela on particular
characteristics of government procurement, privatization and concession-granting systems
(Job No. 3295), and by the European Community on technical assistance (WT/WGTGP/W/18).WT/WGTGP/2
Page 2
5. At its meeting on 8-9 October 1998, the Working Group reverted to the issues before it on the
basis of the Chairman's informal note, "List of th e Issues Raised and Points Made" (Job No. 4281).  It
also had before it an informal factual note by the Se cretariat, prepared in response to a request at the
Group's June meeting, reflecting the written and oral proposals made under items III-VII of the topics
before the Working Group (Job No. 4695).  A written submission was presented by Turkey,containing factual information on its national procedures and practices (WT/WGTGP/W/21).  In
response to a request by the Group to the Secretariat to provide information on the availability of
technical cooperation programmes in the area of government procurement, communications received
from UNCITRAL, OECD, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, IMF,
APEC Government Procurement Experts Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, ITC and UNDP were circulated in documents WT/WGTGP/W/20 and Addenda 1 to 7.
6. At its next meeting, the Working Group will revert to the issues contained in the annexed
revised version of the Chairman's informal note, "L ist of Issues Raised and Points Made", using this
note as the basis for its discussions.  As an auxiliary informal paper for the use of Members wanting
to draw on it, delegates will also have available to them a revision of the Secretariat informal note
reflecting the proposals made on items III-VII in a succinct form, which will identify the source of the
different proposals and summarize the comments made at the October meeting on those proposals.
7. The IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations represented by the United Nations Commission
for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and UNCT AD have observer status in the Working Group.
During the period covered in this report, the Working Group considered requests for observer status
from OECD, SELA and OIC (the Organization for Isla mic Conference) and agreed to revert to these
requests in light of the consultations that are being held on this matter by the Chairman of theGeneral Council.
8. There will be three meetings of the Working Group in 1999, the first two of which will be
held on 24-25 February and 28-29 June 1999.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 3
ANNEX
LIST OF THE ISSUES RAISED AND POINTS MADE
Informal Note by the Chair
Third Revision
1. This note attempts to set out the issues that have been raised, together with the points made on
these issues, under each of the items that were discussed by the Working Group at its meetings of
3-4 November 1997, 19-20 February 1998, 22 June 199 8 and 8-9 October 1998.  This non-paper is
without prejudice to the position of any delegation and, in particular, to whether the Working Group
would decide to include or exclude any particular aspect addressed in it from the elements that it will
develop for inclusion in an appropriate agreement.
I. DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
2. It has been recalled that the mandate of the Group is confined to issues of transparency in
government procurement practices.  The view has been expressed that, as regards national practices
limiting market access, their transparency but not their substance should be covered;  rules on
transparency in government procurement should only apply on a non-discriminatory basis andobligations on transparency should only be applicable to the extent that market access for foreign
supplies and suppliers was permitted.  For example, procurement from local markets, to be paid in
local currency, might be distinguished from procurement from international markets, for which
foreign exchange was available.  The question has been asked whether transparency of procurement
processes would be of any interest to foreign suppliers when access was reserved to domestic
suppliers.
3. Another view expressed in this connection has been that transparency disciplines should
apply to government procurement practices as broadl y as possible.  One of the purposes of developing
rules on transparency was to create national procurement systems that were not only transparent but
also perceived to be transparent;  if the scope of requirements on transparency would be limited to
open procurement markets, procurement systems would not be seen to be transparent.  It was in the
interest of all concerned, domestic as well as foreign suppliers and entities, that information on whatprocurement was open to international competition and what was not should be readily available to
all.  The view has also been expressed that the distinction that had been suggested would give rise to
an imbalance in rights and obligations since transparency obligations would apply more widely in
those Members whose procurement markets were more open to international competition;  the
distinction would also narrow the scope of a transparency agreement.  Moreover, the point has alsobeen made that, given the variety of ways by which market access was limited in national practices,
for example in the form of absolute exclusions of foreign suppliers and supplies, price preferences or
the awarding of contracts to foreign suppliers only in the absence of competitive bidding from
domestic suppliers, it would be technically difficult to identify those government practices that should
be exempted from transparency obligations.   It has also been said that, if the underlying reason for the
suggestion to limit the application of transparency disciplines to open procurement markets was
concerns about excessive burdens, these concerns should be addressed in their own right in the course
of the Group's work.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 4
4. As regards the issue of the definition and scope of government procurement, a distinction has
been made between the definition and scope that should be used by the Working Group for working
purposes and those which might be used to govern the scope of application of the elements to be
developed for inclusion in an appropriate agreement.  In regard to the former aspect, a view has been
expressed that a broad approach, without preconceived limitations, should be employed, sufficientlywide to accommodate the differing meanings and levels of detail given to the term "government
procurement" in national legislation and practices in individual Members and compatible with
innovative procurement procedures and new types of government structures.  This would enable the
Group to study the full range of issues relating to an eventual agreement on transparency in
government procurement and, as regards the latter aspect referred to above, to develop a more exact
definition for the purposes of the scope of an eventual agreement on transparency.  Another view
expressed has been that there would be an interrelationship between the scope of a transparencyagreement and the level of detail that its elements would contain.  A transparency agreement,
incorporating simple and straightforward core principles, could have a very broad coverage.  It has
also been said that the work of the Group on th is issue would need to reflect the realities of
procurement practices in individual countries in order to guarantee an effective implementation of an
eventual agreement.   In this connection, a range of issues that would need to be taken into account has
been identified.  These are summarized below.
5. It has been suggested that a useful way of approaching these issues was to draw a distinction
between the following questions:
- Who is doing the procuring?
- What is being procured?- What types of transactions are covered?
A.
WHO IS DOING THE PROCURING ?
6. In regard to the first of these questions, who is doing the procuring, the following views have
been put forward:
- entities at all levels of government, including at sub-central levels of government and
enterprises owned or influenced by government, might be covered by a transparency
agreement;
- the rules of a transparency agreement should extend to procurement by entities at the
central and sub-central levels of government;
- the degree of coverage of sub-federal entities should take account of differences in
government structures;
- the rules of a transparency agreement should only extend to procurement by entities
at the central or federal government level.  It would be difficult to frame international
rules that would ensure transparency at su b-central levels in countries with complex
government structures.  In countries with federative administrative systems, the
authority of federal governments to undertake obligations on transparency in respect
of entities at the state or local levels of government equivalent to those of the centralgovernment level might be limited by the constitution.  Another view expressed has
been that the limitation of the obligations  of a transparency agreement only to central
government level would give rise to an issue of equity among countries with different
government structures.  A further point made has been that a number of provisions inWT/WGTGP/2
Page 5
various WTO agreements, for instance GATS Article I:3(a)(i), addressed the issue of
obligations undertaken with respect to sub-central levels of government;
- the coverage of state enterprises should depend on how they were operated.   One
view that has been expressed is that public enterprises required to run on the basis of
the same economic considerations as private enterprises should not be subject torequirements on transparency, at least where they did not fall within the ambit of
GATT Article XVII.  Another view has been that a distinction should be drawn
between state enterprises that operated in a competitive environment and others, even
if run on the basis of commercial considerations;
- in the light of experience, consideration might be given to extending the coverage
further.
7. It has also been suggested that, in defining the scope of a transparency agreement, the Group
would need to define criteria for determining when  an entity should be considered as one engaged in
government procurement for the purposes of a tr ansparency agreement.  For example, it has been
suggested that government ownership of less than 50 per cent should mean that it was excluded. It has
also been suggested that account should also be taken of national legislation which conferred on
entities the legal right to conduct government proc urement activities or gave governments the power
to exercise control over the procurement decisions of entities and enterprises.
8. Another suggestion has been that the substance of a relevant provision should determine the
scope of the application of the specific requirements in a transparency agreement.  For example,
requirements on publication of laws and procedures might be applied across the board to entities at all
levels of government.
B. 
WHAT IS BEING PROCURED ?
9. In regard to the question of what is being procured, the suggestion has been made that the
scope of a transparency agreement might extend to all goods and services and any combination of
goods and services.
10. With respect to the use of threshold values in determining the coverage of a transparency
agreement, the view has been expressed that, in principle, the coverage of a transparency agreement
should not be limited to contracts above a certain threshold level, but that certain provisions might be
more flexibly applied for smaller contracts.  Also, it would not be appropriate to exclude low-value
procurement from the requirements relating to the provision of information on national legislation or
to procedures for the qualification of suppliers on the basis of threshold values.  On the other hand,
requirements on the publication of tender notices, particularly in a foreign language, might be
relatively less strict for low-value procurement.  Suggestions have also been made that, transparency
obligations should only apply to procurement above certain threshold levels in order to avoid
burdensome procedures and costs related to publication of all procurement opportunities and that the
work of the Group should take account of national practices in this respect.  Minimum threshold
values could vary according to the level of government and be used for defining the scope of
application of the rules to entities at sub-central levels of government.  The suggestion has also beenmade that thresholds might differ according to the level of development of Members.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 6
C. WHAT TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS ARE COVERED ?
11. As regards the issues relating to what types of transactions should be covered, it has been
suggested that acquisition by any contractual means, including, for example, through lease or rental,
might be covered.  Questions have been raised as to whether, and, if so, to what extent, concessions
and build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts should be covered.  The point has also been made thatprivatization should not be covered.
12. Concerning concessions - in the sense of the grant of certain exclusive rights by a government
to a private party for a set period of time in order to produce a product or offer a service to the public
on its behalf (for example for building and operating motorways or airports) - one view expressed has
been that, even if not considered as government procurement transactions per se , concessions should
be addressed under the scope of a transparency agreement to the extent that principles of transparency
should apply to the procedures used for the award of concessions.
13. The question has been asked whether concessions were more properly treated as a matter of
investment or the supply of services on behalf of the government and, therefore, should be covered
under the scope of other relevant agreements or initiatives.   Those concessions that fell within the
definition of GATS mode three supply of services might be subject to the disciplines of GATS
Article III.  It has been said that GATS Article III would not apply to concessions that were not within
the scope of GATS Article I.
14. The view has been expressed that concessions should not be included in the coverage of a
transparency agreement.  Rules which governed concessions and government procurement were
separate sets of legislation in national practice.  National legislation on government procurement did
not apply to procurement by private companies that operated concessions granted by a government.In this regard, the following comparisons betw een government procurement on the one hand and
concession-granting and privatization on the other have been made:
- with regard to definitions, government procurement was a procedure intended to
regulate the selection of contractors for the supply of goods, the execution of works
and the provision of services.  The granting of a concession took the form of aunilateral act of the State giving a private party the right to manage public works or
offer a public service that is within the exclusive competence of a government, for
example for mining or exploitation of natural gas.  Privatization involved a sale of a
state-owned company or assets.  A question has been asked seeking further
clarification of this distinction;
- with regard to form, government procurement was made effective through an
administrative act of the procuring entity.  Concessions and privatization were madeeffective through a decree of the executive power at the level of the head of
government or State, and, in some cases, subject to authorization by the legislature;
- with regard to subject-matter, government procurement covered goods, public works
and services;  concessions covered public works or services;  and privatization
covered state corporations, property and assets;
- with regard to the methods, open, restrictive or limited tendering methods were used
in the area of government procurement.  Open, restrictive or limited tendering or
auctioning were used in the granting of concessions.  Public sale or auctioning and
liquidation of debt in return for a share of the company were the methods used in
privatization;WT/WGTGP/2
Page 7
- as regards the application of the GPA, procurement by concessionaires listed in
Appendix I was covered but the granting  of a concession was not.  The act of
privatization was not covered but enterprises in which government control or
influence had been withdrawn through privatization could be excluded from the
coverage of the GPA;
- moreover, it has been said that government procurement transactions were reflected
in government expenditure.  Governments did not necessarily enter into contracts
with private parties in the process of granting concessions.
15. It has been suggested that Members should provide information on national legislation and
practice as regards concessions in their countries.  A view has been expressed that the issue of
concessions raised complex questions to which the answers were not clear as yet.  It has been said that
some concessions could be outside the scope of a government procurement.  Nevertheless, the Groupshould maintain a broad approach to their coverage at this stage, pending further study of the issue.  In
this connection, reference has been made to the information-gathering activities in the GATS Rules
Group.
D. 
OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO DEFINION AND SCOPE
16. The issue of the exceptions that might be allowed to the basic coverage of a transparency
agreement has been raised.  One suggestion has been that there may be reason to allow the exclusion
of those areas that track general exceptions in GATT 1994, such as national security exceptions.  It
has also been suggested that exceptions on development grounds might be envisaged.  The view has
been expressed that the question of permissible exem ptions was better left for discussion at a stage
when a better idea of the general definition that might be employed would be available.
17. In regard to developmental aspects, in addition to the points reflected above, the general point
has been made that the function of national laws in taking into account social and developmental
needs should be considered in the definition of government procurement to be employed in a
transparency agreement.
II. PROCUREMENT METHODS
18. The point has been made that, from a transparency perspective, the method of procurement
employed was less important than ensuring that it conformed with basic principles on transparency
and maximized the level of competition feasible under the particular circumstances.  The point has
also been made that the method of procurement used should not undermine the principles and
objectives of a transparency agreement to encourage open and competitive regimes.  Other views
expressed have been that an eventual transparency agreement should aim at transparency with regard
to the methods employed in different countries rather than seek to limit or modify those methods.According to these views, specific circumstances governing a given procurement dictated the choice
of a particular method among alternative methods and procurement authorities should retain the
flexibility to use the best method in the interests of efficiency and competition as well as of
transparency.  Any provisions in a transparency agreement should be sufficiently flexible to
accommodate the differing procurement methods used in national practices, and should allow for thepossibility of using methods which were not based on tendering.  Whilst the methods used by WTO
Members - at least for larger value contracts - mostly seemed to be based on the principle of tendering
(open, selective, limited), they were not necessarily limited to this (e.g. purchase cards, electronic
catalogues).WT/WGTGP/2
Page 8
19. The view has been expressed that the Group should consider the issue of procurement
methods from the perspective of transparency.  The Group's examination of the transparency aspects
of procurement methods could focus on the following three categories:  where information on the
procurement opportunity and selection criteria was made publicly available to all interested suppliers;
where a pre-selection of qualified suppliers was made and  information was transmitted only to thosesuppliers;  and where no information was made publicly available but the procuring entity negotiated
with an individual supplier.  Such a categoriza tion, focused on transparency aspects, would avoid
getting into the details of procurement methods.
20. With respect to the main procurement methods used, the view has been expressed that open or
international bidding in which there was no limit to the number of potential bidders was the most
transparent method;  selective procedures were justifiable where it would not be feasible or efficient
to consider and evaluate a large number of potential bids, as long as all potential interested supplierswere given the same opportunity to seek access to information on a procurement and seek to be
invited to bid.  Another view has been that open and selective tendering should be regarded as equally
transparent, provided selective tendering was conducted in accordance with the appropriate principles.
One view has been that, while open tendering was the most transparent method, it might not be the
most cost-effective, in particular in the case of complex procurements.  As regards the third mainprocurement method, limited tendering (e.g. individual, sole-source, single-source or direct
tendering), it has been suggested that, since information opportunities and selection criteria were not
made publicly available, this method should only be used in justified and exceptional circumstances.
International instruments and national practice commonly accepted a range of circumstances and
conditions under which the use of limited tendering would be warranted.
21. The following approaches to how limited tender ing should be dealt with in a transparency
agreement have been suggested:
- since the use of the method permitted procurement authorities to dispense with many
of the procedural guarantees associated with transparency, a transparency agreement
should set forth an illustrative list of the specific circumstances and conditionsjustifying the use of this method;
- provisions of a transparency agreement should not impinge upon the right of
procuring entities to use this method.  Spelling out the exact circumstances and
conditions justifying the use of this type of method might go beyond the scope of a
transparency agreement.  It had to be taken into account that governments had other
policy objectives apart from transparency;
- while not limiting the circumstances under which limited tendering might be allowed,
the Group should develop disciplines to be included in a transparency agreement to
ensure that, when used, limited tendering procedures should be employed in a way
which maximized transparency at each stage of the procurement process;
- a distinction might be made between a situation in which the purpose of using this
method was precisely to avoid transparency, e.g. for national security reasons, andother cases where the purpose of using limited tendering was to meet needs that
might arise from special circumstances of the procurement;
- a transparency agreement should not cover procurement not open to tendering.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 9
22. A range of circumstances which might figure in an illustrative list or define the general
circumstances under which limited tendering would be justified has been referred to.  These are:
- for reasons of extreme urgency brought about by circumstances unforeseeable by the
procurement authority (e.g. natural disasters);  such circumstances should not be
caused by the procuring entity itself, for instance as a result of its negligence;
- in the absence of responsive tenders, under tendering procedures which do not restrict
competition;
- when tenders already submitted have been collusive;
- when it is clear at the outset of a procurement that only one supplier or a limited
group of suppliers has the proprietary rights to goods or services being procured,  for
example procurements involving the protection of patents, copyrights or other
exclusive rights, or for other technical or artistic considerations;
- in commodity markets where there may be no individual suppliers since the market is
the supplier;
- in so-called "fire sales" where the procurement authority can realize exceptional
savings at a one-time event (e.g. liquidation sales);
- when a product or a service is supplied by a supplier with a monopolistic position in
the market;
- when a product or a service can only be procured in a specific geographical location
or place of production;
- when a procurement is for research or experimental purposes and not for commercial
use;
- for national security reasons.
23. Reference has also been made to the circumstances justifying the use of the limited tendering
method contained in Article XV:1(a)-(j) of the pl urilateral Agreement on Government Procurement.
24. With regard to ensuring that limited tendering, when employed, is used in a way which
maximizes transparency, the following suggestions have been made:
- a procuring entity should generally seek more than one bid if circumstances
permitted;
- a procuring entity should be required to document the specific circumstances giving
rise to the need for such limited tendering;
- public notices of contract awards should disclose the specific circumstances and
reasons for contacting a particular supplier.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 10
III. PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND
PROCEDURES
25. The point has been made that transparency meant ensuring that information on procurement
rules, practices and opportunities was made widely available in an easily usable form to all interested
parties (and particularly potential suppliers), as well as ensuring the right of access to thatinformation.  Publication of information regarding the general environment in which public
procurement took place and interested parties were expected to operate was an essential component of
transparency.  Publication of national legislation not only provided a clear roadmap for potential
suppliers but also a check against arbitrary practices within the procurement regime.  The resulting
procedural certainty also reduced costs in the procurement cycle.
26. The point has also been made that there were two questions regarding this matter:  the scope
of the information that should be made available and in what way.
27. On the first issue, it has been said that there a ppeared to be two approaches to establishing the
scope of the information that should be made available:  a formal approach that would require, for
example, that all laws, ministerial ordinances, administrative guides or internal rules and procedures
should be published;  and an approach that would consist of determining the substance of the
information that should be made available, irrespective of the legal form.  This second approach mightbe preferable since what was of importance was the substance of the information to be made
available.  The key substantive information that should be made available was that which defined
what rules of general application had to be follow ed in determining participation in the tender and
making the decision on the award of the tender and what remained at the discretion of the procuring
entity.  The second approach would have merit in that the objective of transparency would not beachieved if the publications that contained the relevant laws and regulations did not cover important
aspects of national procurement practices and procedures.
28. It has also been suggested that all laws, regula tions, judicial decisions, policy guidance, and
administrative and other procedures on government procurement should be published promptly or be
readily and easily accessible in a usable form to a ll interested parties, including potential foreign
suppliers and other Members.  Any changes to such laws and regulations should also be published
promptly.  Concerning publication of administrative guidelines, it has been said that it might not be
appropriate to publish information relating to internal procedures of government agencies since their
disclosure might prejudice the position of a purchasing agency for instance in its negotiations with
suppliers;  rather, the relevant obligation should be limited to publication of administrative guides to
the operation of the procurement systems.  It has also been said that publication of regulations of each
individual procuring entity would incur burdensome administrative costs.
29. In regard to the second issue, how the inform ation should be made available, the following
points have been made:
- the important point was that information should be made publicly available, not how
it should be made available;
- a distinction should be made between publication of information and accessibility of
information.  It has been suggested that laws, regulations and measures having the
force and effect of law should be published.  Regarding judicial decisions, it has been
stated that publication requirements in an  agreement had to take into account the
different ways of developing national legislation and procedures.  For instance, in
judicial systems where laws were developed on the basis of case law, judicialdecisions could play a central role in defining national legislation and procedures;WT/WGTGP/2
Page 11
- publishing information on judicial decisions, policy guidance and administrative
guides could be onerous.  But any judicial decisions that would have a bearing on
procurement practices and that were not customarily published should be made
accessible within the country;
- publication requirements could be met through publication in printed or electronic
media.  The choice should be left to the discretion of Members.  There should be no
mandatory provisions requiring the use of electronic media.  It has also been
suggested the two forms of publication should not be mutually exclusive.
30. The view has been expressed that publication obligations, including in the area of government
procurement, already existed in the goods area under Article X of GATT 1994 and in the services area
under Article III of the GATS.  The provisions of these two Agreements which exempted government
procurement from the scope of certain GATT 1994 and GATS obligations (Articles III:8(a) andXVII:2 of GATT 1994 and Article XIII of the GATS) did not apply to these transparency provisions.
31. The suggestion has also been made that information on national legislation and procedures
should be provided at no more than cost.  It has been said that the matter of fees charged was not
within the ambit of a transparency exercise.  Govern ment entities should have the discretion to charge
fees above cost price.  However, any fees for provision of information on national legislation andprocedures should be charged on a non-discriminatory basis.
32. The point has also been made in connection with the publication of laws and regulations that
the obligation to publish should be limited to publication in a national language and should not
involve burdensome and costly translation obligations.   It has been stated that some domestic public
agencies provided information on legislation in a foreign language or a summary of specificlegislation in a WTO language.
33. The suggestion has been made that interested pa rties should know either where to go to locate
this information, or who to ask.  A transparency agreement might provide for Members  to notify either
the source of this information and/or to establish and notify contact or enquir y points (which could take
the form of an Internet Website), from which other Members and maybe interested suppliers couldobtain explanations about national legislation and procedures, including information on the practical
steps involved in tendering, any preferential treatment of national suppliers and domestic review
mechanisms.  In this connection, reference was made to the provision of Article III:4 of the GATS,
and also to that of Article IV:2 of that Agreement which requires developed country Members, and to
the extent possible other Members, to establish contact points to facilitate the access of developing
countries suppliers to information.  It has been stated that the feasibility of providing contact or
enquiry points in respect of decentralized procurement systems, especially in federal States, wouldhave to be studied carefully.  Any obligations should be without prejudice to decentralized
procurement systems.  In this connection, the suggestion has been made that in decentralized national
procurement systems a central office should be designated for keeping a list of the contact points at
sub-central levels.  One view in this respect has been that the establishment of  enquiry points at sub-
central levels might incur burdensome administrative costs.
34. In the discussion of this item, the relevance of the overall coverage of a transparency
agreement has been recalled.  In this regard, it has been suggested that the publication obligation
should only relate to situations where access was open to foreign supplies and suppliers.  The opposite
view has also been expressed, with the argument that  it would be essential to have information on any
policies including preferences in favour of national suppliers in order to determine whetherprocurement markets were open to foreign suppliers.  In respect of the term "foreign suppliers", the
point has been made that in some national practices government procurement was used as an
instrument for the promotion of domestic supplies and suppliers and national treatment would not beWT/WGTGP/2
Page 12
granted to those suppliers who did not have a commercial presence in the country of the procuring
entity.
35. The link between this item and that in Section X, concerning the provisions on notification of
information to other governments under an appropriate transparency agreement, has been referred to.
36. A number of comments have been made on specific proposals put forward by Members as
reflected in the note by the Secretariat entitled "List of Proposals on Items III-VII of the Checklist".
These comments will be incorporated in the revision of this note under preparation.
IV. INFORMATION ON PROCUREMENT OPPORTUNITIES, TENDERING AND
QUALIFICATION PROCEDURES
37. The point has been made that advance information on government procurement opportunities
enhanced the participation of potential bidders in a procurement procedure.  Broad participation of
bidders in the procuring process contributed to improved efficiency in government procurement.  Inorder for such participation to be achieved, information about procurement opportunities must be
available in notices of invitation to tender and in tender documents.
38. The point has also been made that information on procurement opportunities in notices of
invitation to tender should be sufficient to allow potential suppliers to assess their interests in
participating in the proposed procurement procedure and to seek tender documents;  and thatinformation in tender documents should be sufficiently specific to enable suppliers to prepare
responsive bids.  It has been recognized that national practices concerning the amount of detail
included, respectively, in initial tender notices and in the subsequent tender documentation, varied
considerably and that it might not be necessary to have precise minimum requirements concerning
their specific contents or to seek harmonization on this  point.  It would be sufficient for a transparency
agreement to develop elements in the form of general principles.
39. In this connection, views have been expressed suggesting that the level of detail of
information to be supplied might also vary among the different stages of tendering and procurement
methods used.  Whereas detailed information should be given under open procurement procedures,
the requirements to publish tendering information in a widely available medium under selectivetendering procedures should be flexible to enable tender documents to be sent directly to registered
suppliers.  Information provided to prequalified suppliers could be more specific than information in
public notices available to all suppliers.
40. In regard to tender documentation, it has been said that their contents should provide all
information relevant to submitting responsive bids th at was not provided in the tender notices.  They
should set forth the parameters for evaluating bids and awarding the contract, including requirements
in respect of technical specifications and any preferences granted to national supplies and suppliersand on any other assessment criteria based on socio-economic considerations.  It has also been said
that the information contained in tender documents should be comprehensive enough to lead to the
submission of bids that would enable procuring entities to compare them and to allocate their
resources efficiently.
41. The view has been expressed that rules on information on tendering opportunities in a
transparency agreement should apply on a non-discriminatory basis but only in cases where national
markets were open to foreign suppliers;  otherwise domestic procedures would be applicable.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 13
42. Another view expressed was that provision of information on procurement opportunities was
an essential element of transparency in procur ement irrespective of the entitlement of foreign
suppliers to participate and that such prior information had benefits both from domestic and from
foreign suppliers' perspectives.  Points made regarding this view have been:
- the obligations of a transparency agreement should apply to all procurement within its
scope, whether or not suppliers had access to procurement opportunities.  The
principle of non-discriminatory access to information would need to be observed
regardless of any policies excluding foreign suppliers from access to procurement
opportunities or the existence of preferences for domestic suppliers.  The
establishment of the conditions of competition and transparency in domestic markets
was essential to achieving transparency at the international level;
- access to information on any policies, including preferences in favour of domestic
suppliers would allow suppliers to determine whether the procurement markets were
in fact open to foreign suppliers.  From the government's perspective, transparency in
the extent to which markets were open would prevent further requests for information
from foreign suppliers on market access matters.  Such information would also
benefit suppliers who would know in adva nce whether it would be worthwhile for
them to prepare tenders;
- if the obligations on transparency applied only to the extent that foreign bidders were
provided access to procurement markets, this would give rise to inequity among
Members to a transparency agreement.  The end result would be an agreement which
would require those countries that had thei r markets fully open to foreign suppliers
and had no rules in place regarding national preference to undertake a much greater
level of obligations as regards transparency.  On the other hand, other countries that
had relatively closed markets and excluded foreign suppliers in a large number of
sectors would take on lesser obligations;
- since a transparency agreement would not prevent government procurement from
being limited to domestic suppliers, the rights of other Members would not be
breached by a Member limiting transparency obligations to government procurement
open to international competition because foreign suppliers would not have any
interest in obtaining information on a procurement that was not open to them;
- a requirement for transparency in procurement, irrespective of the openness of
markets, would result in a transposition of obligations on market access into a
transparency agreement.  The arguments in favour of transparency in all procurementwould imply that all Members should be required equally to provide access to their
markets since, by keeping their markets closed, they would assume lesser obligations
on transparency.  Any country was free to undertake greater obligations on
transparency by opening its markets if it chose  to do so;
- a decision to open a country's market was independent of the requirements of an
agreement on transparency.  The balance in a transparency agreement was to be found
in obligations with respect to transparency  and not in those with respect to market
access.  In undertaking obligations on transparency, countries had to take into account
their individual national practices;
- this matter was better dealt with in regard to the overall scope of an agreement (c.f.
Section I);WT/WGTGP/2
Page 14
- participants in the Working Group should be encouraged to provide information on
their national practices in regard to the provision of information in respect of
procurement not open to international competition.
43. The question has been raised as to whether openness would depend only on general criteria
prescribed by law or whether it could depend on a case-by-case decision of the procuring authority.In this regard, the following views have been expressed:
- to the extent that procurement contracts would be decided on a case-by-case basis, it
would be the prerogative of a government authority not to open a specific
procurement contract to foreign suppliers;
- it would defeat the objective of a transparency agreement if the question of whether a
given procurement would be open to foreign suppliers were to be decided on a case-
by-case basis;
- in those countries where decisions to open procurement to foreign suppliers were
made on a case-by-case basis, such decisions could be taken, either at the onset of a
tendering process or at the time of the award of a contract.  With the latter type of
case-by case decision, it would be significantly non-transparent should a
governmental authority decide to award contracts only to domestic suppliers.Disciplines should be developed in order to provide maximum transparency in those
situations in which the decisions were taken on a case-by-case basis.
A. PUBLICATION
44. On advance information on tender opportunities, it has been suggested that there are two key
issues: where the information can be found (publication) and content.  With regard to where theinformation can be found (publication) by potential suppliers,  the following points have been made:
- procurement opportunities and procedural requirements relating to those
opportunities should be made known and be generally available to interested parties
through an accessible source;
- the source used to make information on procurement opportunities generally available
should be left to the discretion of WTO Memb ers, but its level of availability should be
proportionate to the likely level of interest in  the procurement.  In other words, where a
procurement opportunity was likely to attr act international interest, procurement
opportunities should be published through a source which potential foreign suppliers
and service providers had access to, as opposed, for example, to posting a notice in a
town hall.  It has also been stated that it would not seem necessary to have arequirement to publish tender notices in an international publication;  rather,
interested suppliers should be expected to keep track of national publications;
- publication of tender opportunities should be made available in printed and/or in
electronic media.  Printed media could be an official gazette or a national newspaperof wide circulation;
- electronic publication should be used where feasible and taking into account the level
of development of individual WTO Members.  The internet address of electronic
publications could be made available. It has also been stated that electronicpublication offered significant benefits in terms of both time and costs, and based on
current trends would be used increasingly in the coming years (see also
Section IX B);WT/WGTGP/2
Page 15
- the choice should be available to each WTO Member to publish in the appropriate
media and electronic publication should be an option rather than an obligation.  This
would permit account to be taken of the divergences in the capability to make use of
electronic means of publication between WTO Members and between regions withina WTO Member and between suppliers;
- allowances should be made for systems by which information was furnished  by
private sector service providers acting on behalf of procuring entities;
- under limited tendering procedures where a procuring entity contacted the
prequalified suppliers directly, advance publication of tender notices did not seem tobe necessary;
- some Members' notices of invitation to tender and to prequalify were published also
under selective procedures;
- requirements for publication of tender notices might be less strict for low-value
procurements in order to avoid burdensome administrative costs;
- publication of tender opportunities should not be limited to contracts above a certain
threshold level (see also Section I).
45. The view has been expressed that exceptions to the obligation to publish procurement
opportunities (e.g. to take account of limited tendering in the case of some national practices) should
only be permitted in exceptional and justified cases.  These circumstances should be the same as those
set out for the use of procurement methods which severely restrict competition.  Some suggestionshave been made concerning situations where publication should not be required.  This could be the
case for purchases below threshold levels and for purchases not made through open tendering
procedures for instance for limited tendering.  The point has been made that, in the latter instance, it
would be important that information on how to qualify for selective tendering procedures be
adequately available, and that post-contract awar d notices should be published. Another view has
been that, for transparency reasons, publication of procurement opportunities should in principle not
be limited to contracts above a certain threshold level.
B. CONTENTS OF INFORMATION
46. With regard to minimum requirements for the information to be published on procurement
opportunities, the point has been made that, while national practices with regard to the amount of
information to be included might differ, information on procurement opportunities in notices of
invitation to tender and tender documents notices should be sufficient to allow potential suppliers toassess their interests in participating in the propo sed procurement or in a qualification system and
enable them to prepare responsive bids or proposals for qualification.   Members should be able to
decide whether the provision of information on pr ocurement opportunities shoul d be done just through
the use of tender notices, or whether the bulk of  information should be contained in the tender
documentation or be made available by other means.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 16
47. The suggestion has been made that an illustrative list of the types of information that such
documents should contain should be developed to provide at least:
regarding the procuring entity:
- full contact details (the name and the address) of the procuring entity (the buying
department or agency, the location of the responsible office and the division orbranch of the department or agency);
- coordinates of a contact point or document centre from which additional information
including on technical and commercial requirements and any other relevant
information or documents may be requested and obtained, the final date for making
such requests and, if applicable, the cost of such information; unique reference
number identifying the request in the department or agency's records;
regarding suppliers:
- any requirements relating to the supplier or service provider, for example economic
or qualification requirements;
regarding the intended procurement:
- an identifiable description (nature) of the goods and/or services to be provided,
together with their quantity or an indication of their extent;
- the place of delivery, site or place of performance of the service and, if applicable, the
time-limit for delivery, completion or duration of the contract;
regarding evaluation of tenders:
- the procurement procedure envisaged to be used (open, selective, whether
negotiations are involved, etc.);
- the criteria for the award of the contract including factors other than the price that are
to be considered in the evaluation of tenders (economically most advantageous bid) in
the evaluation  of tenders;
- information on the existence of any conditions in favour of national suppliers in
awarding contracts, such as price preferences, local content requirements or any other
policies of discriminatory nature.  In this connection, it has also been said that
provision of such information would not be necessary if a description of nationalpreferences or discriminatory policies was already published in the Official Gazette;
- any technical specifications required;- where applicable, the location, date and time of any public briefing on the
requirements;
regarding submission, receipt and opening of tenders:
- the final date for the submission/receipt of tenders or requests to be invited to
participate in a qualification system;WT/WGTGP/2
Page 17
- the address to which submission of tenders or requests to be invited to participate in a
qualification system must be sent;
- details of any language requirements in respect of submission of tenders;
- date and place of opening of tenders.
48. The view has been expressed that such a list might be excessively burdensome and costly, in
particular in those countries in which the number of tenders issued by government entities was high.
49. In addition, it has been suggested that entities might publish, on a voluntary basis, a summary
of information on their intended procurements at regular intervals.  The point has been made that only
those entities which could sufficiently plan their procurement activities ahead could have such
procedures.
C. EVALUATION CRITERIA
50. With regard to the specification of criteria for the evaluation of tenders and awarding of
contracts in public notices and/or tender documents, it has been recalled that the question of whether
national preferences, or other policies underlying practices of a discriminatory nature should be part
of such criteria, was not within the scope of the work of the Group.  However, emphasis has been put
on the importance of information on such national preferences and other measures in favour of
domestic supplies or suppliers being made known in advance in the tender documents and/or tendernotices.  The point has been made that transparency in regard to the existence of preferences or other
discriminatory requirements would enable potential foreign tenderers to determine whether they had
an interest in entering a specific procurement process in spite of discriminatory national policies.
Interested suppliers would only be able to distinguish between procurement opportunities that were
reserved for domestic suppliers and those that were  open to international competition if information
on any discriminatory policies were made available to them in advance.  Provision of information
upfront on price preferences or qualification requirements favouring domestic suppliers would enable
suppliers to gauge their interest and assess the real opportunity to win a contract.  Such information
would also allow interested suppliers to make the appropriate decisions in preparing bids that would
be responsive to the conditions set out in this respect in tender documentation.  By avoidingparticipation in procurement processes in which their bids would be ultimately dismissed, suppliers
would save not only their own resources but also those of procuring entities.  Moreover, the clear
specification of requirements based on socio-economic considerations in the tender documentation
would facilitate the implementation of such policies by providing transparency in respect of the nature
of the socio-economic needs applicable to specific procurements.  One view has been that information
on preferences to national supplies and suppliers need only be included in tender notices and/or tender
documents when it was not adequately provided through laws or regulations of general application,either through setting out the relevant information or through an explicit reference to the applicable
legislation.  Another view has been that clear references to any national policies, including any
preferences applied, should always be included in tender notices and/or tender documents.  In this
regard, the point has been made that the establishment of links between electronically published
tender documents and relevant laws and regulations would enable suppliers to search easily for furtherinformation on any applicable discriminatory policies.  In regard to offsets, the view has been
expressed that, if used at all, they should form part of the qualification criteria rather than the criteria
for evaluating bids.
51. The point has been made that technical specifications were an important element of
evaluation criteria and their role in procurements would become even more significant in future withincreasingly complex procurements.  Another point made has been that technical specifications should
not be developed in such a way as to require the use of technology only available to a limited number
of suppliers.  Views have been expressed that a transparency agreement should have provisionsWT/WGTGP/2
Page 18
encouraging the use of performance-based specificati ons in preference to design-based specifications;
and wherever possible, basing technical specifications on existing internationally agreed or other
relevant standards.  It has also been said that any changes in technical specifications should be made
known to all interested suppliers.
D. CLARIFICATION AND MODIFICATIONS
52. With respect to clarifications of tender documents given by procuring entities to potential
suppliers, it has been stated that any questions raised by interested suppliers should be responded to in
good faith by the procuring entity.  Any information provided in response to requests for clarification
from one supplier should be transmitted simultaneously to all other suppliers participating in the
procurement process.
53. It has also been said that all potential s uppliers should be informed of any changes to
information contained in tender notices and tender documents.  In this connection, it has also beensaid that a transparency agreement should clearly specify that all those suppliers who had originally
ordered tender documents or had indicated an interest in the procurement opportunity should have any
additional information transmitted to them through th e same means as the one used for providing the
original information.
E. LANGUAGE
54. The suggestion has been made that requirements concerning publication of notices of
invitation to tender should be limited to publication in an official national language.  The translation
of the whole publication into a WTO language could become too burdensome.  Another suggestion
has been that, where possible, tender notices should be published in a WTO language.  It has also
been suggested that procuring authorities should have the discretion to decide whether translation oftender notices should be limited to those tendering opportunities that might be of interest to
international suppliers.
55. It has been suggested that, in addition to the publication of the whole information in the
official national language of the WTO Member conc erned, consideration might be given to whether a
summary of the main elements of the information in  an invitation to tender might also be published in
one of the official WTO languages.  Such a summary might contain the following elements:
- the name and address of the procuring entity;
- the nature (subject-matter) of the contract;- the time-limits for submission of tender or application to be invited to tender;
- the address from where further information can be obtained.
56. It has also been suggested that there could be a limited requirement for giving a summary of
tender notices in one of the WTO official languages allowing, for example, the exemption of tender
notices for small-value procurements which might be of limited interest to international suppliers.One view has been that providing a summary of every tender notice would incur undue administrative
costs (see also Section IX C).
57. A number of comments have been made on specific proposals put forward by Members as
reflected in the note by the Secretariat entitled "List of Proposals on Items III-VII of the Checklist".
These comments will be incorporated in the revision of this note under preparation.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 19
V. TIME-PERIODS
58. In regard to minimum time-periods to be available to potential suppliers to fulfil the
requirements of the different stages of the procurement process, the point has been made that
time-periods in existing international instruments and national practice varied significantly.   The
suggestion has been made that, rather than establishing specific minimum time-periods in atransparency agreement, the Group might agree on a general principle, as in the UNCITRAL Model
Law or in Article XI:1 of the GPA.
1  A transparency agreement should not be overly prescriptive in
this respect.  Any provisions on time-limits should be accepted only as recommendations.  Time-
periods should be sufficiently long to give both foreign and domestic suppliers a meaningful
opportunity to avail themselves of the relevant information and to submit responsive bids.   It has also
been said that a balance should be found in settin g any requirements on time-limits; with longer time-
periods, procuring entities might resort to limited tendering procedures more frequently.  A furtherpoint in this connection has been that Members should not be required to set time-periods to suit
foreign suppliers, who should be treated on a national treatment and MFN basis.
59. Sufficient time should be allowed for the preparation, submission and receipt of responsive
bids to individual procurement opportunities.  Any time-limits which are set should not undermine the
principles and objectives of a transparency agreement.  They should be determined with dueconsideration to the particular circumstances of the procurement (including the likely level of interest)
as well as the complexity of the procurement.  Any changes in the time-periods should be made
known to all suppliers.
60. A number of comments have been made on specific proposals put forward by Members as
reflected in the note by the Secretariat entitled "List of Proposals on Items III-VII of the Checklist".These comments will be incorporated in the revision of this note under preparation.
VI. TRANSPARENCY  OF DECISIONS ON QUALIFICATION
61. The point has been made that registration and qualification systems had a useful role in the
procurement process provided that they were run in a fully transparent manner.  The key principle of
transparency as regards this issue was that decisions on registration and qualification of suppliersshould be taken only on the basis of criteria that had been identified early in the process and
predisclosed to suppliers sufficiently in advance.  Any changes in qualification requirements   should
be made known to all interested suppliers.  Another point has been made that prequalification systems
should not be exclusive:  new suppliers should be given the same (or, in one view, at least a
reasonable) opportunity to be included on a qualification list as had been enjoyed by those already
qualified.  A distinction has been made between qualification systems which potentially could cover a
number of different procurements and qualification on a procurement-by-procurement basis.  It hasalso been noted that the issue of qualification of suppliers could play a greater role in the procurement
of services than in the procurement of goods.
62. The point has been made that, once the qualification criteria were set out in invitations to
prequalify or tender documents, they should be applied in a non-discriminatory way as regards
transparency.  Prequalification criteria should be made known to all suppliers in a non-discriminatoryway.   This would not prevent preferential elements in favour of domestic supplies or suppliers from
being built into the criteria themselves.  The point has also been made that transparency in
                                                     
1 Article XI.1(a) of the GPA reads as follows:
"Any prescribed time-limit shall be adequate to allow suppliers of other Parties as well as domestic
suppliers to prepare and submit tenders before the closing of the tendering procedures.  In determining anysuch time-limit, entities shall, consistent with their own reasonable needs, take into account such factors as
the complexity of the intended procurement, the extent of subcontracting anticipated and the normal time fortransmitting tenders by mail from foreign as well as domestic points."WT/WGTGP/2
Page 20
qualification procedures involved matters of due process.  Suppliers should have the right to challenge
qualification decisions if the rules of the system had not been followed.  The view has also been
expressed that application of the principles of objectivity and non-discrimination to prequalification
criteria extended beyond the concept of transparency.  There could be non-discrimination as regards
transparency notwithstanding discrimination in favour of national suppliers pursuant to preferences orother domestic sourcing requirements.  It has also been said that under certain tendering methods it
was not possible to overturn decisions on qualification even if certain other suppliers could be
considered to be qualified in terms of the published criteria.  Another issue with respect to
transparency to which attention has been drawn is the situation in which a supplier who had applied
under the predisclosed qualification criteria had received no decision on its application.
63. A number of comments have been made on specific proposals put forward by Members as
reflected in the note by the Secretariat entitled "List of Proposals on Items III-VII of the Checklist".These comments will be incorporated in the revision of this note under preparation.
VII. TRANSPARENCY OF DECISIONS ON CONTRACT AWARDS
64. The point has been made that an essential feature of transparency in decision-making on the
award of procurement contracts was that such decisions be taken strictly on the basis of the evaluation
criteria (including in relation to technical specifi cations) which had been set forth in advance in the
tender documents and in accordance with the info rmation provided on how those criteria would be
applied.  Furthermore, in order to ensure that decisions were seen to be taken in this way, criteria
should be set out in such a way as to ensure as objective an application as possible.  The view has also
been expressed that a transparency agreement would not, as a general rule, set out what those criteria
should be.  The point has been made that allowance would need to be made for cases where, forreasons of force majeure , for example in the case of the lifting or imposition of an embargo, the
criteria set out in tender documents could not be strictly adhered to.
65. Concerning the receipt and opening of tenders, the view has been expressed that, while it may
not be necessary to require public opening of tenders to ensure transparency, procuring entities should
have procedures in place to ensure the regularity and impartiality of the procurement process and thatthere was no opportunity to manipulate the specific elements of tenders or to provide a particular
tenderer with information on other tenders.  In this respect, the view has been expressed that the
details of the procedures on how tenders received by procuring entities should be handled were not
within the ambit of the Group's work.  Another vi ew has been that further consideration should be
given to whether it would be sufficient to embody these concepts in general principles or whether
more specific requirements should be envisaged.
66. With respect to ex post  information on contract awards, the point has been made that
procurement procedures might provide for some form of public announcement of the contract awards
and also give tenderers the opportunity to be debriefed, for example on written request from an
unsuccessful tenderer.  A  public announcement on contracts awarded was also of interest to industry
generally (as potential future bidders) and to other governments which would want to see the
transparency agreement working in practice.  The Group would need to consider whether laying downgeneral principles would be sufficient in this respect or whether the minimum types of information
that should be given on contract award notices should be set out.
2  It has also been said that decisions
                                                     
2 The following specific elements for contract aw ard notices have been suggested:  the buying
department or agency, the location of the arranging office and the division or branch of the department oragency;  description of the supplies including the departme nt or agency for which they are required, if different
from the above, and in enough detail to identify their nature, quantity and any period that may be applicable;
the unique reference number identifying the purchase or  agreement in the department or agency's records and
the date of the purchase or agreement;  the total liability of the contract at the date of entering into the contract.
Where it is not possible to predict accurately the total liability with precision because of the basis of thecontract, for example cost escalation, labour and materials, or schedule of rates, the total estimated liabilityWT/WGTGP/2
Page 21
on contract awards need not include the types of information that had been included in the relevant
notices of invitation to tender, provided that a reference was made linking the ex post  information to
the earlier information.
67. As to the purpose and operation of ex post  information, the following points have also been
made:
- this type of information provided losing tenderers with the opportunity to ensure that
they had been treated equitably according to  the specific requirements and to assess
that criteria set forth in the tender documentation and that the applicable rules and
practices had indeed been properly followed in the procurement proceedings;
- the means by which such information was given should be a matter of choice for
individual Members, but it should be known to interested parties.  In this connection,
the view has been expressed that it would be time-consuming and burdensome toinform unsuccessful bidders individually of the outcome of their bids.  Another view
expressed has been that unsuccessful bidders should be informed but it would be
burdensome and costly to make this information publicly available;
- unsuccessful bidders should be informed of the outcome of their bids and debriefed,
when they themselves requested it, as to why their bid had been rejected and/or thewinning bid had been chosen.  This was an important guarantee of transparency,
particularly in circumstances where limited information on the contract awarded was
provided;
- ex post  information on contract awards should be given regardless of the procurement
method used;
- under limited tendering, the information should explain the reasons why that method
had been used.  In this connection, another view expressed has been that the provision
of this type of information would be outside the scope of a transparency agreement.
Another approach suggested to this ma tter has been that the provision of ex post
information was particularly important in cases where certain information had notbeen provided ex ante.  This would include an explanation of the reasons why such
information had not been given at the start of the procurement process;
- national practices would determine whether ex post  information on contract awards
should be given through prompt publication of contract award notices or directly by
writing to individual tenderers;
- ex post  information should be provided within a fixed time-frame.  The comment has
been made that this should not preclude the fixed time-frame differing betweencountries.
68. In the debriefing process, purchasing authorities should follow the evaluation criteria and
indicate where each bid had been deficient and why it had not been selected.  On the other hand, it has
also been stated that debriefing of all unsuccess ful tenderers on the reasons why they had not obtained
an award would be time-consuming.
                                                                                                                                                                    
should be published; the name of the suppliers, location and postcode.  Where a panel contract has been made,
details of all suppliers should be notified.  However, if this is impractical, a contact address within the agencyshould be published for persons seeking further information;  and relevant product and service code.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 22
69. It has been noted that a number of other WTO agreements, for example the Agreement on
Customs Valuation and the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, included requirements on the
provision of ex post  information to economic agents.  The link between the provision of ex post
information and item VII on review and item VIII(a) on maintenance of records of procurement
proceedings has been referred to.
70. In connection with ex post  information, it has been suggested that it might be necessary to
include a provision safeguarding the confidentiality of information on contract awards in order to
protect the legitimate commercial interests of parties concerned (whether public or private) or for
public interest reasons.  In this connection, a starting point for consideration of this matter could be
the provisions of other WTO agreements on confidential information.  Procuring entities should not
be obliged to provide confidential information which would prejudice the legitimate commercial
interests of particular enterprises (whether public or private).
71. A number of comments have been made on specific proposals put forward by Members as
reflected in the note by the Secretariat entitled "List of Proposals on Items III-VII of the Checklist".
These comments will be incorporated in the revision of this note under preparation.
VIII.  DOMESTIC REVIEW PROCEDURES
72. The view has been expressed that it was not su fficient for rules to be introduced to ensure
transparency in government procurement practices; there must also be a domestic review mechanism
to introduce accountability into the process and to ensure that the rules were respected by everyone
involved in a procurement process.  The availability of an avenue for review of procurement
processes was a key element of transparency.  The mechanism for review of complaints by suppliers
or a bid challenge system guaranteed due process and public accountability throughout a procurementprocess and enabled the process to be seen as transparent.  The existence of a review mechanism
might make public procurement authorities more awar e of the need to ensure the consistency of the
procedures used in a particular procurement with the applicable laws and regulations.
73. It has been suggested that precedents for review or appeal mechanisms could be found in a
number of WTO agreements, for example the Agreements on Anti-Dumping, Customs Valuation,Preshipment Inspection and TRIPS.  Additionally, Article X of the GATT 1994 on publication and
administration of trade regulations contained a general provision requiring independent review of
administrative action relating to customs matters.  Reference has also been made to the element of due
process in the APEC non-binding principles on  transparency in government procurement.
3
74. It has been stated that any obligation to provide for review procedures in a transparency
agreement should only concern actions within the scope of that agreement, not the substance of
preferential measures relating to market access in government procurement.  While it might often bedifficult to dissociate transparency aspects of government procurement from other aspects, the
mandate of the Group should guide its work on this matter as on others.
75. The suggestion has also been made that a domestic review mechanism could be achieved
through a variety of means.  It has been noted that administrative or judicial review procedures in the
interest of assuring due process and public accountability were common to most national regimes,which in consequence already contained the main features that might be applicable to domestic
review procedures in a transparency agreement.  The view has been expressed that any obligation to
provide for domestic review procedures in a transparency agreement should take into account such
national practices and procedures;  no attempts should be made to develop special review mechanisms
where appropriate domestic administrative or judicial procedures already existed.  The view has alsobeen expressed that a transparency agreement should not have provisions requesting Members to
                                                     
3 Circulated in document WT/WGTGP/W/11WT/WGTGP/2
Page 23
adapt their domestic systems to certain prescribed criteria and the existing national systems should be
fully respected.   The Group should guard against developing overly prescriptive provisions on the
specific characteristics that national systems must have.  Any provisions should be flexible enough to
allow Members to design their domestic review mechanisms in accordance with their national
legislation and to rely on administrative or judicial  review mechanisms that were appropriate to their
national legal systems.  They could be in the form of an exhortation to Members of a transparency
agreement to provide for domestic review mechanisms.  The choice of review procedure should be
left to individual Members provided the review mechanism itself was transparent and provided a
guarantee of independence.  In this connection, the suggestion has been made that, as a first step,
Members should provide information on whether their domestic administrative or judicial review
systems addressed government procurement-related matters and, if so, under what conditions.
76. The view has been expressed that the issue of review went beyond that of transparency and
therefore the mandate of the Working Group and that it was premature to take up this question.  It has
been said that domestic administrative or judicial review mechanisms were in place in national
systems for the purpose of public accountability at the domestic level, a matter not within the ambit of
a transparency agreement.  Concerns have been expressed that review provisions in a transparency
agreement might be used as a means by certain vocal private parties to create complications in thedomestic political arena;  and additional review procedures might increase the number of challenges
and give rise to unnecessary costs.  Since the purpose of domestic procedures in many countries was
to review whether procurement had been made in accordance with domestic law and procedures, the
scope of which went further than the obligations that might be agreed in a transparency agreement, it
might not be feasible to limit the application of re view procedures to specific transparency obligations
in a WTO agreement on transparency.  It has been suggested that transparency requirements in respect
of review procedures should be limited to the provision of information on the possibilities available
under national review procedures.
77. The view has been expressed that a review should be available to all potential suppliers
including suppliers from other WTO Members.  In this connection, the question has been askedwhether foreign interested parties could file comp laints against domestic governmental authorities
under existing national administrative and judicial mechanisms or whether there would be need for
special procedures under a transparency agreement to guarantee the receivability of complaints by
foreign suppliers.
78. While some delegations have indicated that they had not yet formulated their views on the
specifics of a review mechanism, attention has been drawn to the following features of review
mechanisms that might be studied by the Working Group:
- encouraging suppliers, in the first instance,  to take up the matter directly with the
procuring entity for an early resolution.  Agencies might have procedures in place to
handle complaints directly;
- in some cases, the mediation or good offices of an independent authority might be
sought;
- if the matter was not resolved mutually, provisions enabling suppliers to bring an
action against the procuring entity before a judicial authority or other independent
body;  the point has been made that review provisions should allow flexibility to
Member governments to choose whether to designate judicial or administrative
bodies or both;
- review provisions should require that review bodies be impartial and independent of
the procurement process itself. The point has also been made that Article X:3(b) of
GATT 1994 provided some guidance in this regard;WT/WGTGP/2
Page 24
- account should be taken of such principles as objective legality, ex officio action and
material delegation in the review procedures;
- in addition to procedures based on formal complaints, initiation of review procedures
by competent public authorities on an ex officio basis or national mechanisms for
monitoring procurement proceedings;
- the review procedure should result in a published and reasoned conclusion.
79. The view has been expressed that procurement decisions were different from many other
administrative decisions, in that review mechanisms often had to function after the contract had been
awarded.  A review provision should ensure that claims from interested suppliers could be heard and
decided upon in a manner that did not prejudice their interests in the procurements in question.  Such
guarantees could be available through rapid decisions on challenges or through suspension of the
procurement process while claims were pending.  In this regard, the point has been made thatsuspension of a procurement process upon a challenge by a supplier could hold up the whole
procurement process until a decision had been reached concerning the challenge.  Since this could be
detrimental to the public interest and create difficulties in cases of urgent procurements, most national
review procedures and the provisions of the GPA provided for exceptions enabling, in circumstances
so warranting, public interest considerations to override the interest in suspending a procurementprocess.  In cases in which the procurement process might be suspended, there could therefore be
provisions in a transparency agreement for contin uing nonetheless with the award of procurement in
the public interest.
80. In connection with remedies that might be provided under review provisions, the following
views have been expressed:
- most national review systems already provided remedies for suppliers whose rights
had been denied under the applicable laws and regulations;
- review provisions should provide for adequate remedies that would protect the
interests of suppliers and would deter procurement entities from engaging in future
actions that would be inconsistent with the provisions of an eventual agreement ontransparency;
- remedies should include the possibility of corrections including altering the
procurement process, re-tendering for the procurement or awarding damages to cover
legitimate claims;
- an independent review should review compla ints about tendering procedures in order
to determine possible damages or administrative responsibility;
- account should be taken of the fact that review systems might provide for remedies
which could include compensation only after administrative or judicial procedures
had determined that an injury or an econom ic loss had flowed from the inconsistency
of a procurement process with the applicable legislation.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 25
81. Another view expressed on remedies has been that a transparency agreement should not
specify them for the following reasons:
- provisions requiring adequate remedies would fall outside the scope of the work on
transparency.  It would be sufficient to have provisions requiring the establishment of
a review procedure without specifying the remedies that should be available;
- obligations on remedies might have counter-productive repercussions on the
procurement practices of governmental authorities; to the extent that procuring
authorities would be liable to remedies, they might have a tendency to restrict access
to foreign suppliers in order to minimize any such risks.
82. It has also been suggested that a transparency agreement should require procurement entities
to maintain written records of the procurement process in order to ensure that review bodies had an
adequate factual basis for review (see Section IX A).  As another possible means of reviewmechanism provision of ex post information to unsuccessful suppliers and debriefing by procuring
authorities have also been mentioned (see also Section VII).
IX. OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO TRANSPARENCY
A. MAINTENANCE OF RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
83. The view has been expressed that procuring authorities should maintain a proper record of
decisions and actions taken during the procurement process and the reasons for them.  The
maintenance of a record of procurement proceedings and the availability of non-confidential
information contained in it to interested parties was one of the principal mechanisms for ensuring
adherence to agreed rules and was of particular importance in the functioning of an administrative or
judicial review process.  Such records provided the basis for an audit trail and supported anyevaluation of the procurement
4 and thus introduced an element of accountability into the process.
With regard to the length of time that records of proceedings should be maintained, it has been said
that the requirements in this respect could be lin ked to the time provided to domestic suppliers in
domestic legislation to challenge a procurement decision and to seek a review of a procurement
process.  It might not be necessary to keep a record of proceedings beyond that period.  It has alsobeen suggested that information should be provided on the national practices of those Members in
which procuring entities were required to maintain records of procurement proceedings.
84. The question has been asked whether record maintenance should be treated as a separate
element providing an additional guarantee of transparency or whether this item would be sufficiently
addressed under other elements.
85. By way of general comments under this Section, a view has been expressed that prescription
of stringent rules on transparency and review could be counter-productive to market access.  Havingno obligations on market access in the area of government procurement, national governments would
have the tendency to close their procurement markets to foreign suppliers in order not to run the risk
of breaching these rules on transparency.
                                                     
4 The following details of the matters that should be documented have been suggested:  approval to
make the procurement;  the selection criteria upon which evaluation and selection decisions will be based;
discussions with potential bidders before bids close;  details of clarification of bids during evaluations;  reasonsfor variations to a tender;  steps to provide all bidders with an equal opportunity to revise their bids;  agreementsreached during negotiations;  authorization and signing of a contract;  details of debriefings;  reasons for varyinga contract;  and records of contractor performance.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 26
B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
86. It has been suggested that the work of the Group in developing a transparency agreement
should take full account of innovative government procurement practices.  Information technology
was already being rapidly adopted by procurement communities and offered tremendous opportunities
to level the playing field by increasing access to information at low cost to all suppliers.  Atransparency agreement should provide for the possibility of using information technology tools  to
disseminate information on procurement opportunities  and contracts awarded as an alternative to
more traditional methods of communication (see also  Section IV above).  The view has also been
expressed that, for the time being, procuring entities should be able to continue to maintain
paper-based tendering procedures.
87. On the other hand, it has been suggested that, because of the lack of uniformity among
countries' stages of development in this area, any requirements for the use of information technologyin government procurement should be optional and that the use of information technology tools
should not undermine the basic transparency principle of guaranteeing access to information for all,
including small and medium-sized suppliers and suppliers from countries less advanced in the use of
information technology.  A balance should be found whereby a transparency agreement would not
constitute an unnecessary barrier to progress in the area of information technology and wouldaccommodate the increasing use of information technology in government procurement in Members,
while ensuring that the use of information tec hnology would not result in discrimination against
countries which did not have a competitive edge in this area.  Electronic tendering using Internet-
based systems facilitated access of suppliers worldwide with a minimum requirement of equipment
and technological know-how and was the most efficient way of ensuring non-discriminatory access totender information.
88. It has been said that one of the issues that had to be dealt with in electronic procurement
concerned procedures for opening tenders when they were submitted electronically.  It has been noted
that there was scope for international cooperation in  the area of information technology, for example
in developing electronic databases or maintaining lists of qualified suppliers.
5  The point has also been
made that procuring entities should be allowed to charge for electronic access to information and
tender documentation and other tendering procedures, in particular if the information was supplied by
a private service provider.  It has also been said that the Group would need to consider at a later stage
whether it would be appropriate to cover such specific matters as information technology in a
transparency agreement.  In this connection, it has been noted that information technology was an area
where there was scope for technical cooperation (see Section XII).
C. LANGUAGE
89. It has been said that information on national practices showed that documents and other
information relating to tendering proceedings were generally provided in the official language(s) of
the country of the procuring entity.  As a rule, documents and other information relating to
procurement procedures and individual procurements should be allowed to be provided to potential
suppliers and service providers in an official language of the country of the procuring entity.  Ingeneral, potential suppliers wishing to do business in another country would have the necessary
language facilities available to them;  there should not be a specific requirement to provide such
information in a WTO language.  Nevertheless, procuring entities could be encouraged to provide
information, where possible, in a WTO language where a particular procurement opportunity was
likely to attract international interest (see also Section IV).
                                                     
5 It has been mentioned that the APEC Group of Experts in Government Procurement has established a
Home Page with linkages to existing databases on government procurement in member economies(www.apecsec.org.sg/govtproc/gphome.html).WT/WGTGP/2
Page 27
X. INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS
(NOTIFICATION)
90. The view has been expressed that it was somewhat premature to discuss in detail this aspect,
which might be better taken up once a clearer notion of the nature of a transparency agreement had
been generated.  Nonetheless, a number of issues ha ve been raised relating to the possible notification
arrangements under a transparency agreement and other mechanisms by which information can be
exchanged between Member governments.
91. While some views expressed have put emphasis on the importance of adequate information
on relevant national legislation and any amendments thereof being notified to other Members of a
transparency agreement, other views have drawn at tention to difficulties that would have to be
addressed in this connection.  It has been suggested that the notification of all national laws,
regulations and administrative guidelines, including those of sub-central and other levels ofgovernment covered, might prove to be unduly burdensome.  This would particularly be the case if
they all had to be notified in a WTO language.  An additional concern that has been expressed was
that it was doubtful that Members would be ready to share confidential information.  A number of
possible ways of overcoming these difficulties have been put forward:
- Members might be expected to notify their basic law on government procurement, but
not each and every law and regulation;
- an approach of employing a checklist of points, or questionnaire, to elicit basic
information on how the national laws and regulations of each member responded to
the requirements of a transparency agreement might be employed;
- each Member might be required to respond to requests from any other Member for
specific information on its laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding
transparency in government procurement.  Contact points might be established by
each member for this purpose.  In this connection, reference has been made to the
discussion on this point reflected in item III of this note;
- greater use of electronic databases might be made for providing information on
procurement procedures at sub-central levels;
- the government of an unsuccessful tenderer might be entitled to seek information on
the contract award in question from the government whose entity conducted the
procurement.  This could be a vehicle for forestalling disputes.  The view has also
been expressed that the information sought should relate to how the commitments on
transparency had been complied with in the contract award process.  Another view
was that the provision of such post-contract award information might not benecessary in an agreement on transparency, since it would not extend to matters of
market access;
- enhanced use could be made of existing WTO transparency mechanisms, including
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism;
- the question has been raised as to whether the existing provisions of Article X of
GATT 1994 and Article III of the GATS were sufficient for the purposes of a
transparency agreement on government procurement or whether additional rules
should be provided for.  Should there be, for example, a requirement to specify where
the relevant laws were published?  In this regard, the view has been expressed that the
provisions of the GATT 1994 and GATS that had been referred to would not beadequate for the purposes of notification in an eventual transparency agreement.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 28
92. It has also been suggested that Members might provide information identifying government
departments, agencies and enterprises subject to the rules in a transparency agreement.  The point has
been made that this could be done through notification of a positive list of such entities or through
notification of a negative list of those entities not su bject to the agreement.  It has been suggested that
the latter approach might have the advantage of avoiding the problem of frequent changes in listsresulting from changes of a formal nature, such as the renaming or restructuring of departments.  The
issue of the most appropriate technique for the presentation of the coverage of entities would depend
on the outcome of discussions on the scope of the agreement, in particular which type of entities were
covered.  It has also been said that it was premature to consider the form in which the coverage of
entities should be presented.
93. On statistical reporting, the following points have been made:
- such provisions should not be included in a transparency agreement;- there should not be an obligation, but governments might be invited to provide what
information they have available, for example on the size of their procurement market;
- the issue should be put aside for the time being.
94. The view has been expressed that any requirements relating to the provision to other
Members of information on and explanation of national procurement rules and procedures shouldapply only to the extent that such rules and procedures were within the scope of a transparency
agreement.  Requirements on the provision of information and explanations should be limited to those
relating to transparency matters, and not otherwise relate to market access questions.
XI. WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
95. With regard to dispute settlement between governments, the general view has been that it
would be premature to consider the applicability of provisions on dispute settlement before the
elements of a transparency agreement had been more clearly identified.  However, the view has also
been expressed that any commitments on transparency  should be subject to the DSU in the same way
as the existing clauses on transparency in any other WTO agreement.  Another view has been that it
was questionable that the dispute settlement system should apply to obligations on transparency in theabsence of commitments with respect to market ac cess.  For example, it has been asked whether any
decision resulting from a dispute regarding the provision of transparency in a government
procurement process could apply retroactively.  A further view expressed in this connection has been
that the Group's mandate was to discuss the elements of an appropriate agreement on transparency
which could be in the form of guidelines or a code;  only an agreement with binding obligations
should be subject to WTO dispute settlement procedures.
96. Regarding the relationship between domestic review procedures and the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, it was said that a distinction should be made between domestic review
mechanisms which involved responding to complaints by suppliers against procuring authorities
under the law of a country and dispute settlement procedures between governments under the law and
procedures of the WTO.  The legal criteria for domestic reviews and WTO dispute settlement were
different.  In the case of domestic procedures, a review related to the consistency of a procurementprocess with the domestic laws and regulations, whereas in the case of WTO dispute settlement the
grounds for a dispute were an alleged breach of a WTO agreement.  The view has been expressed that
the possibility for foreign suppliers to have recourse to effective and independent domestic review
procedures, as a first avenue for resolving complaints, would minimize the likelihood that such
complaints might eventually rise to the level of a government-to-government dispute.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 29
97. In regard to the way in which national review procedures and the WTO dispute settlement
procedures might interact, it has been suggested th at the Group might wish to examine the approach to
this matter adopted in the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994.  Another view
expressed was that there should be no particular relationship between a domestic review process and
government-to-government dispute settlement.  WTO dispute settlement procedures should apply toissues relating to the consistency of laws of general application and should not be invoked with regard
to decisions resulting from national review procedures concerning a particular procurement.  In this
connection, the view has been expressed that national practices would not allow the WTO dispute
settlement process to override a specific procurement decision taken by a national judicial body.
WTO dispute settlement procedures should only appl y in respect of obligations of governments in
their capacity as regulators.  Any procurement decision taken by them in their capacity as purchasing
entities should not be subject to dispute settlement procedures.  It has also been said that provisionsshould reflect the principle of exhaustion of domestic  judicial review mechanisms before recourse to
WTO dispute settlement procedures.  Moreover, the point has been made that recourse to WTO
dispute settlement procedures, being a prerogative of governments, could not be initiated by suppliers
who might challenge procurement procedures of  government entities.
XII. TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
98. The point has been made that technical cooperation was important for ensuring the successful
implementation of a future transparency agreement.  It could also play an important role in helping
Members to develop domestic procurement regimes and in taking practical steps to enhance
transparency of procurement policies and practices.  The view has been expressed that, in discussing aframework for technical cooperation, inspiration might be drawn from the language of Article 67 of
the Agreement on TRIPS.  This required developed country Members to make available technical and
financial cooperation, on mutually agreed terms, in response to requests from developing country
Members.  It also listed specific areas where such cooperation should be provided, including
assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations and support regarding the establishment ofdomestic offices and agencies, including the training of personnel.  Technical cooperation plans could
be drawn up identifying the needs of individual developing and least-developed countries in meeting
their obligations under a transparency agreement and targeting technical cooperation activities to
specific purposes, for instance for the establishment of contact points.  The view has been expressed
that the provisions on technical cooperation should match the specific requirements in a transparency
agreement; compliance with the rules of a transpar ency agreement might require changes in national
legislation and procedures and the building up of new institutions in individual countries.  Thefollowing types of areas in which technical cooperation would be beneficial have been suggested:
regarding development of national legislation and procedures:
- legal advice and assistance in drawing up national legislation;
- administrative and policy option analysis and guidance;
- drawing up procedures on publication;- establishment and implementation of bid challenge systems;- taking practical steps to make procurement more user-friendly by developing standard
forms for tender notices and fill-in-the-blank bid forms, as well as developing a
common procurement vocabulary;WT/WGTGP/2
Page 30
regarding training:
- training for those who have to implement,  use or enforce new legislation, procedures
and/or practices, training the judiciary, a nd training local traine rs who would continue
training programmes in, for example,  business schools or colleges of public
administration in the beneficiary country;
- exchange of officers;
- training of purchasers and suppliers;
regarding institution building:
- administrative cooperation to enhance institution building and the exchange of
information;
regarding access to information by suppliers:
- workshops, seminars and the production of user guides, including the development of
Internet  Websites, search engines and databases, to help provide information about
opportunities to do business with governments at home and abroad, and to facilitate
access to that information;  in particular, such assistance could benefit small- and
medium-sized enterprises, by increasing their confidence and effectiveness in
successfully entering procurement markets at home and abroad;
regarding use of information technology:
- the development of information technology tools which could be used to disseminate
information about procurement opportunities and practices, and/or to establish fullelectronic tendering, as well as to facilitate the collection of relevant economic data
and statistics;
- the provision of office, information technology and/or other equipment necessary for
the implementation and enforcement of legislation, procedures and/or practices.
99. The view has been expressed that the practices under the TRIPS Agreement might also be
useful in assessing and monitoring assistance on an ongoing basis, while avoiding the creation of
additional bureaucratic structures and red tape.  The point has also been made that the issue of
technical cooperation should be discussed not only in terms of ensuring compliance of developing
countries with the requirements of a future agreement, but also in terms of the practical steps that
could be taken to enhance transparency in developed as well as developing countries.
100. It has also been suggested that requirements similar to the provisions of Article 66.2 of the
Agreement on TRIPS might be included in an agreement on transparency.  Developed country
Members might be required to provide incentives to en terprises and institutions in their territories for
the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to developing country suppliers in
order to enable them to participate in bidding for public contracts in developed countries.  Incomparison with Article 67 of that Agreement, under which technical cooperation depended on the
mutually agreed terms and conditions between developed and developing country Members, technical
cooperation under Article 66.2 was provided unilaterally and at the initiative of developed countries.
Technical cooperation could be useful in achieving the objective of economic efficiency in
government procurement.  For instance, providing information to developing countries as to whatgovernments usually procure and information as to worldwide sources would be relevant in this
regard.WT/WGTGP/2
Page 31
101. The point has been made that the technical cooperation activities of international
intergovernmental organizations and fora, including international financial institutions and regional
development banks, in the field of government procurement could contribute to transparency and the
implementation of a transparency agreement.  It has been suggested that consideration should be
given to developing a framework under a transp arency agreement for rationalizing the various
activities in this area at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.  In this respect it has been
suggested that the Secretariat  would prepare a background paper containing information on technical
cooperation programmes of international and regional intergovernmental organizations related to
government procurement, so as to enable the Group to have as complete a picture as possible of the
availability of technical cooperation in this area.6
102. It has been suggested that potential recipien t and donor countries should be encouraged to
share their views on particular needs and the available forms of technical cooperation in the area ofgovernment procurement.  It has also been suggested that special attention should be paid to the
problems of institution-building, in particular in least developed countries.  The Chair invited
Members to provide information in writing to the Working Group on their needs and on the technical
cooperation already available.
103. With regard to special and differential treatment for developing countries, the view has been
expressed that this issue might be addressed once the elements of an eventual agreement were more
clearly defined.  In this connection the suggestion has been made that transitional periods in respect of
developing countries might be provided.
__________
                                                     
6 The information communicated from UNCITRAL, OECD, the Asian Development Bank, the African
Development Bank, IMF, the APEC Government Procurement Experts Group, European Bank forReconstruction and Development, ITC and UNDP on their respective technical cooperation activities in the area
of government procurement has been circulated in documents WT/WGTGP/W/20 and Addenda 1-7.