WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONS/CSS/W/130
30 November 2001
(01-6139)
Council for Trade in Services
Special SessionOriginal:  English/
Spanish
COMMUNICATION FROM BRAZIL, COLOMBIA, CUBA, ECUADOR, DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, NICARAGUA,
PAKISTAN, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, PHILIPPINES, SENEGAL,
URUGUAY AND VENEZUELA
Autonomous Liberalization and Developing Countries
The following communication has been received from the above-mentioned delegations with
the request that it be circulated to the Members of the Council for Trade in Services.
_______________
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This document1 refers to autonomous liberalization and developing countries with the aim of
making a contribution to the current discussions on autonomous liberalization in the Special Session
of the Council for Trade in Services, through an analysis of the origin, historical background and
discussion of this issue during the Uruguay Round.
2. This paper is based on the WTO’s Secretariat note (WT/TF/COH/S/1, 18 June 1999) entitled
“Autonomous Trade Liberalization”, among other documents. The WTO’s Secretariat was requested
to prepare that note during the General Council meeting of 16 February 1999 under the agenda item“Agreements between the WTO and the IMF and the World Bank” and it was prepared within the
framework of the issue “Coherence in Global Economic Policy-Making: WTO cooperation with the
IMF and the World Bank”.
II. URUGUAY ROUND
3. Based on this WTO’s Secretariat note and other documents prepared during the Uruguay
Round, a brief background summary of this issue is as follows:
1. The issue of giving credit in GATT for autonomous trade liberalization measures
adopted by developing countries  was raised in the World Bank/IMF Development
Committee in 1985
2 and at the OECD Ministerial meeting in 1986.3  The issue was
                                                     
1 This proposal is not a legal text. It is submitted solely for the purpose of negotiation and does not
prejudge the position of Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Uruguay andVenezuela regarding the issues raised in it and they reserve the right to modify this proposal during thenegotiations.
2 Background paper (Number six) for the Development Committee on “Trade and Development”,
World Bank (September 1985).
3 1986 OECD Ministerial Communiqué (April 1986).S/CSS/W/130
Page 2
introduced into the Uruguay Round negotiations by the United States in a
communication to the Negotiating Group on the Functioning of the GATT System
(FOGS) in June 1987.4
2. In September 1989, a report by the Director -General on Ways of Achieving Greater
Coherence in Global Economic Policy-making Through Strengthening GATT’s
Relationships with Other Relevant International Organizations5 referred to the issue in
these terms:
"Much interest has been shown by FOGS Group participants in the possibility that
developing countries  might obtain negotiating credit in GATT for trade policy reforms
introduced by them under Fund or Bank programmes.  This interest is shared by theheads of the Fund and Bank, and their staffs have enquired about the modalities which
governments intend to adopt for granting negotiating credit. Although such reforms
will generally be fully justified by their favourable effects on the economy of the
country which undertakes them, they can serve a double purpose if they also provide
negotiating credit which can secure market-opening concessions from a country'strading partners...”
3. The issue of autonomous liberalization was taken up in the Negotiating Groups on
Tariffs and on Non-Tariff Measures with respect to all autonomous liberalization
measures, whether or not these were undertaken in the context of IMF or World Bank
Programmes.
6
4. At the Mid-Term Review7 (Montreal, 5-9 December 1988 and Geneva 5-8 April
1989), paragraph 7 (f) “Increasing participation of Developing Countries ” of Part II.
Negotiations on Trade in Services states that “Autonomous liberalization of market
access in favour of services exports of developing countries  should be allowed”.
5. In December 1991, at the Negotiating Group on Market Access under the title
“Uruguay Round Market Access Negotiations and Developing Countries ”, the
Chairman issued the Chairman’s Guidelines8 on a common approach towards
granting credit and recognition for autonomous liberalization measures, and
paragraph 3 states that “The guidelines below are … aimed at supplementing the
traditional GATT approach to assessing the value of specific tariff bindings byindividual developing countries  within the Uruguay Round.  The guidelines would be
applied in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Punta del Este Declaration
and the Mid-Term Review on Market Access, including the principle of differential
and more favourable treatment”. Paragraph 4 also establishes that “These guidelines
would provide a minimum level of credit which should be given practical effect in the
                                                     
4 MTN.GNG/NG14/W/9, Section 3 (“Strengthening the GATT’s relationship with other international
organizations responsible for monetary and financial matters”) states that “Strengthening the GATT’s
relationship with the international organizations responsible for international monetary and financial issues, theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (WorldBank) would lead to greater coherence and mutually re inforcing economic policies at both the national level and
at the level of international organizations. The OECD Ministers have already endorsed increased cooperation
among the GATT, the IMF and World Bank by agreeing to consider giving credit in the multilateral trade
negotiations for trade liberalization measures that developing countries undertaking in IMF and the World Bankadjustment programmes...”
5 MTN.GNG/NG14/W/35, para. 32.
6 MTN.GNG/NG1/6 y 7, MTN.GNG/NG2/W/15.
7 MTN.TNC/11.
8 MTN.GNG/MA/W/13.S/CSS/W/130
Page 3
negotiations where each participant can make a qualitative assessment of tariff
bindings and reductions, including on what constitutes a meaningful rate of ceiling
bindings.  This could take into account the trade coverage of the tariff bindings, and
have regard to particular developing countries ' trade and economic development
stage. ... Developing countries  which reduce substantially or eliminate totally NTMs
should be given additional credit towards achieving the Montreal target”.
Furthermore, paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of these Chairman’s Guidelines include express
references to developing countries .
6. No further discussion of the issue is recorded in the Uruguay Round documentation.
III. FINAL COMMENT
4. As a result of the summary above, and as it was expressed by many WTO Members during
the current discussions in the Special Session of th e Council for Trade in Services, the origin of this
issue of autonomous liberalization and the subseq uent discussions during the Uruguay Round show
that it was specially thought up in favour of  developing countries and to establish how these countries
could obtain recognition and/or credit for their autonomous liberalization measures. Moreover, it isclear that this point should have even more validit y now if we consider the general framework of what
various WTO Members have called the “Doha Development Agenda”. In this context, we consider
that the close link between autonomous liberalization and developing countries must, during the
current negotiations on trade in services, be specially taken into account when establishing the
modalities and/or criteria for the treatment of autonomous liberalization referred to respectively inGATS Article XIX and in paragraph 13 of the Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on
Trade in Services (document S/L/93).   
___________