WT/GC/W/778/Rev.4  
 
11 February 2022  
(22-1289) Page: 1/11 
General Council  Original: English  
 
 
STRENGTHENING THE WTO TO PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT AND INCLUSIVITY  
COMMUNICATION FROM THE AFRICAN GROUP , CUBA AND INDIA  
Revision  
The following communication, dated 10 February 2022 , is being circulated at the request of the 
African Group, Cuba and India . 
 
_______________  
 
 
1  IMBALANCES AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AT THE WTO  
1.1.  The Uruguay Round was concluded with many imbalances in the rules for developing countries. 
Over the course of ti me, these imbalances have become even more problematic for developing 
countries many of whom were already facing financial crisis before the onset of COVID -19. Unlike 
the previous financial crises, the COVID -19 pandemic exerted a much more radical and abru pt effect 
on both supply and demand, putting the real economy to a halt.    
1.2.  The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO recognizes that international 
trade is not an end in itself, but a means towards "raising standards of living and ensuring full 
employment ". More importantly, it recognizes that "there is a need for positive efforts designed to 
ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share 
in the growth in international trade commensur ate with the needs of their economic development ".  
1.3.  For the fulfilment of these founding objectives of the WTO, all Members, no matter their trade 
share, must have an equal say in decision -making.  
1.4.  Throughout its history, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has experienced a number of 
challenges. Recently, some of these relate to a wider 'crisis of multilateralism', but others can be 
understood as the result of a confluence of factors rooted in the le gal commitments that WTO 
Members undertook at the establishment of the Organization in 1995. Specifically, inequities and 
imbalances in some of the existing multilateral trade rules have provided an inherent advantage 
mainly to the developed Members. Thus,  whilst WTO rules such as those on border trade measures 
have helped developing countries by providing certainty to trade, more often than not, developing 
Members found themselves constrained from pursuing their development and industrialization 
objectives  due to other rules which have been overly intrusive or imbalanced. Trade -Related 
Intellectual Property Rights  (TRIPS ) rules, for instance, have facilitated monopoly rents, and 
diminished the possibility for technology transfer. The Trade -Related Investmen t Measures  (TRIMS ) 
Agreement has disallowed Members to use local content requirements. Trade rules on subsidies 
constrain  the policy space developing countries need to nurture their industries. However, they 
allowed advanced economies to provide substantia l support throughout their industrialization  
history, and yet they are using them now to encourage the reshoring of traditional manufacturing 
and to keep the leading position in emerging industries including high -tech, knowledge -intensive 
industries deemed  critical to their future prosperity. The Agreement on Agriculture has allowed 
developed countries to continue their high subsidies on agriculture products, including those 
exported to developing countries, impacting their small farmers' livelihoods and fo od security. This 
has been compounded by the lack of inclusiveness and transparency in the process of WTO 
negotiations.  WT/GC/W/778/Rev.4  
 
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  1.5.  Developing Members have called for certain reforms in the WTO since 1996 in an effort to 
address asymmetries and bring balance to the W TO rules, as well as create more policy space for 
themselves to pursue development and to use the same policy tools as developed countries to 
industrialize. The reform agenda put forth by developing Members was incorporated into the Doha 
Development Agenda  in 2001. This included the strengthening of Special and Differential Treatment 
Provisions, Implementation Issues, addressing the existing asymmetries in the WTO Agreements, 
particularly in Agriculture with a view to facilitating the realization of the SDG s on food security and 
alleviation of rural poverty. As well as agreement that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should 
not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health.  However, increasingly the WTO 
is moving away from the principles entai led in the Marrakesh Agreement and the negotiations 
mandate contained in the Doha Development Agenda which sought to place the needs and interests 
of developing countries at the heart of the Work Programme.  
1.6.  In the last three  years, some Members have sugges ted a broad range of reforms at the WTO 
including a slate of new rules, even though existing mandates from the DDA remain unaddressed. 
"WTO reform " does not mean accepting either inherited inequities or new proposals that 
would worsen imbalances. Reforms m ust be premised on the principles of inclusivity and 
development  and respond to the underlying causes of the current backlash against trade and the 
difficulties that developing Members continue to face vis-à-vis their industrialization challenges.  
Inclusivity would require, at a minimum, preserving consensus decision  making  in the WTO.  
1.7.  In addition to these challenges, the WTO is now confronting immediate existential crises: The 
resort to unilateral and protectionist measures and the breakdown of th e Appellate Body (AB). 
Clearly reform is needed in these areas.  
1.8.  Through this concept paper, we seek to identify the issues that must  be addressed if the WTO 
is to be strengthened in a balanced manner. In some areas, no change may be required but simply 
a reinforcement of existing rules and architecture as some of the existing foundational WTO rules 
are currently being sought to be changed or adjusted. The final section of this paper will address 
COVID -19 and how the WTO must be strengthened to support deve loping countries in their response 
to this very serious pandemic and economic crisis.  
1.9.  In various discussions, the functions of the WTO ha ve sometimes been looked at from the 
viewpoint of 3 areas. We will also use this categorization for this paper:  
a. The neg otiating function of the WTO.  
b. The dispute settlement function.  
c. The monitoring function of regular bodies.  
A. THE NEGOTIATING FUNCTION OF THE WTO  
The WTO serves as a forum to negotiate, administer and monitor WTO agreements, including further 
negotiatio ns concerning multilateral trade relations as decided by the Ministerial Conference. The 
negotiating function of the WTO is underpinned by the following:  
 
a. the core principles of the Multilateral Trading System including rules on decision -making 
and how ame ndments are made;  
b. the Special and Differential Treatment architecture; and  
c. rule-making and the central role of development.  
2  PRESERVING CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM  
2.1.  Recent actions by some WTO Members indicate a weakening of the commit ment to the 
multilateral trading system. Preserving and strengthening the WTO must include:  WT/GC/W/778/Rev.4  
 
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  2.2.  First, laws and regulations of WTO Members which mandate unilateral action on trade issues 
that are inconsistent with WTO rules would need to be amended. This will ensure that WTO Members 
are not perpetually under threat of unilateral action on trade issues by some Members.  
2.3.  Second, the following rules in the Marrakesh Agreement are fundamental and must be 
respected:  
a. Articles II and III on the multilateral functions of the WTO;  
b. Article IX on the continuation of the practice of decision -making by consensus;  
c. Article X – when there are amendments (additions or changes) to WTO rules, there must 
be consensus, followed by ratification by Members. New rules enter into force only when 
the ratification numbers required have been attained.  
2.4.  Third, multilateral avenues, based on consensus, remain the most effective means to achieve 
inclusive development -oriented outcomes. In the post -MC11 phase, many Members have evinced 
interest in pursuing outcomes in some areas through joint statement initiatives (JSIs). Provisions 
governing plurilateral agreements in the Marrakesh Agreement must be adhered to. If they are to 
be multilateral agreements, the outcomes of these initiatives, by way of new rules, can be introduced 
into the WTO when there is consensus; and Art. X of the Marrakesh Agreement on amendments 
must govern any changes or additions to the WTO Agreement. The JSIs should not change the 
fundamental multilateral architecture of WTO  and should not change consensus -decision making  - a 
key principle that should continue to govern multilateral relations.  In addition, JSIs should be without 
prejudice to the rights and obligations of non -participating Members in WTO Agreements.  
3  THE ARCHITECTURE OF SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT MUST BE PRESERVED  
3.1.  Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) is a treaty -embedded and non -negotiable right for all 
developing Members.1 The available data indicates that the gap in the standards of living b etween 
developing and developed countries has not narrowed since the establishment of WTO.2 In fact, the 
GDP per capita between developed and developing countries has widened considerably.  
GDP PER CAPITA IN CURRENT US$ OF SELECTED COUNTRIES AND 
COUNTRY G ROUPS 1980 -2017  
  
 
Source: World Bank , https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD  
 
1 See WT/GC/202/Rev.1 . 
2 See WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2 . 
WT/GC/W/778/Rev.4  
 
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  3.2.  Most of the world 's poor also live in non -LDCs: 61.8 per  cent (non -LDCs) versus  38.2 per  cent 
(in LDCs). These non -LDCs are called the "new bottom billion".3,4 
3.3.  The development gap between developed and developing countries continues to be very wide.5 
This necessitates the preservation and strengthening of the S&D provisions in both current and 
future WTO agreements, with priority to outstanding LDC issues.  
3.4.  The pursuit of S&D does not mean that developing countries are seeking unlimited carve -outs 
from the MTS. Developing countries have consistently made a contribution to international trade  
commensurate with their level of development. This contribution is recognized and was 
acknowledged as far back as the Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994 that acknowledged the 
notable active role played by developing countries in delivering on the wide  mandate of the Uruguay 
Round, including the significant measures of economic reform and autonomous trade liberalization 
implemented by developing countries.   
3.5.  There is an indivisible relationship between developing country status and S&D. Any unilateral 
action depriving developing Members , including LDCs of treaty -embedded rights would be 
inconsistent with Members ' obligations, and would in fact erode the founda tion of the multilateral 
trading system , which functions on the basis of being 'rules-based '. This will cause lasting and 
systemic damage to the trading system.6  
3.6.  Thus the following principles must be upheld:  
• Developing countries ' unconditional rights to S&D must continue;  
• Developing countries must be allowed to make their own assessments regarding their own 
developing country status (self -determination);  
• Existing S&D provisions must be upheld;  
• S&D must be provided in current and future negotiations.7 
4  RULES MUST SAFEGUARD DEVELOPMENT CONCERNS  
4.1.  The multilateral trading system must give policy space for developing Members to fulfil their 
development goals including industrialization. Developing Members continue to confront many 
formidable challenges and capac ity constraints, which underscores the continued relevance of S&DT 
provisions in their favour.  
4.2.  The long -awaited outstanding 'development' issues from the Doha Round continue to be 
paramount and include:  
• Implementation Issues8 – aimed at rebalancing the i mbalanced rules from the Uruguay Round 
such as in the areas of agriculture, TRIMS, TRIPS, Subsidies Agreement9 etc. Developing 
countries should be enabled to support their industries under the Subsidies Agreement. 
Developed countries are doing so through stimulus packages and incentives for manufacturing 
and reshoring of medical and related products. Local content requirements are another critical 
policy instrument – hence the need for flexibilities under the TRIMS Agreement and GATT 
Articles III and XI. There must be more technology transfer and access to technologies i.e. 
 
3 See WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2 . 
4 See Bellagio I nitiative on "Poverty in Middle -Income Countries ", in November 2011, 
www.cbm.org/article/downloads/82788/Summary_Poverty_in_MIC.pdf , accessed on 25 January 2019.  
5 A broad range of these statistics are provided in WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2 . 
6 This paragraph is from WT/GC/202/Rev.1 "Statement on Special and Differential Treatment to 
Promote Development ", Cosponsored by the African Group, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, C ambodia, China, 
Cuba, India, Lao People 's Democratic Republic, Oman, Pakistan and the Bolivarian Republic  of Venezuela, 
14 October  2019.  
7 This paragraph is also from WT/G/202/Rev.1, ibid.  
8 Developing countries' requests are contained in the Implementati on issues agenda or Para. 12 of the 
Doha Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 . 
9 See Para. 5.8 of the developing country submission WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2.  WT/GC/W/778/Rev.4  
 
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  the TRIPS agreement needs re -examination. WTO safeguards and countervailing duties should 
well address developing members ' concerns and be accessible.  There should a lso be fewer 
conditions and constraints on the use of GATT Art . XVIII particularly regarding assistance to 
infant industries and balance of payments difficulties.  
• S&D – strengthening and making effective and operational the S&D provisions in WTO 
Agreement s, in accordance with paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration.  
• Cotton – the imbalances in Agriculture Domestic Support due to Aggregate Measures of 
Support (AMS) beyond de minimis  must be addressed. These supports, leading to subsidized 
exports by some, show up clearly in the area of cotton, where cotton prices have been 
depressed. This has impacted negatively on rural livelihoods and employment across many 
developing countries including the C4 Members.  
• Public Stockholding (PSH) – a permanent solution must be  agreed upon and adopted by MC12 
which contains less onerous safeguard conditions, including less exacting transparency 
requirements. It must also allow for new programmes to be covered.  
• Special Safeguard Mechanism  (SSM) – Ministers in Nairobi (MC10, 2015 ) mandated Members 
'To pursue negotiations on an SSM for developing country Members in dedicated sessions of 
the Committee on Agriculture in Special Session'. An effective and easy to use SSM should be 
adopted in MC12.  
• Agriculture Domestic Supports – to rectify the imbalances in the existing rules due to some 
Members having AMS entitlements whilst others do not. High per farmer subsidies by OECD 
countries, with huge flexibility continue to have serious implications on food insecurity and 
rural poverty in de veloping countries.10 The first step - eliminating AMS entitlements is urgent, 
with S&D for developing Members.  
4.3.  In addition to the issues mentioned above, work should also continue on the following issues  
emphasizing the development components and in acco rdance with existing mandates:  
• Fisheries Subsidies – in accordance with the Doha, Hong Kong and MC11 Ministerial 
Declarations. All of these emphasize the importance of S&D in the outcome of these 
negotiations because of the 'importance of this sector to de velopment priorities, poverty 
reduction, and livelihood and food security concerns.11 SDG 14.6 also reinforces S&D. Due to 
the COVID crisis which continues to unfold across many developing countries, the conclusion 
of the negotiations should be based on me aningful progress made that fulfills  the mandate set 
out in SDG 14.6.  
• E-Commerce discussions under the 1998 Work Programme12 – E-commerce and digital trade 
must be pursued in an inclusive manner or it will exacerbate existing imbalances in global 
trade. CO VID-19 has demonstrated the importance of the 1998 Work Programme and the 
need to address the digital divide. We must reinvigorate the work under the Work Programme 
to inform decision -making in MC12. This necessitates that all the relevant bodies take up t his 
discussion based on their mandate, so as to make progress by MC12. We must also prioritise 
the work of the CTD that is mandated to discuss the developmental aspects that are key to 
ensuring inclusive participation in the digital economy.  
Particularly  important is the issue of the E -Commerce moratorium. As more goods are 
transmitted electronically, i) the loss of customs duties and ii) loss of  the possibility to use 
tariffs to support domestic industries, will be increasingly costly. It is important fo r the 
Membership to come to a common understanding on the scope of the moratorium. Without 
clarity on this, there can be no predictability for business, trade and industry. Importantly, 
Members would also not know their obligations and rights. Only a clear  understanding on 
 
10 See Graph 5 of WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2 for a comparison of agriculture subsidies between some 
developed and developi ng Members.  
11 WT/MIN(05)/DEC 2005 "Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration ", Annex D para. 9.   
12 WT/L/274 1998 'Work Programme on Electronic Commerce' adopted by the General Council on 
25 September 1998.  WT/GC/W/778/Rev.4  
 
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  scope and an appreciation of its impact would help Ministers take a well -considered decision 
at MC12.  
 
4.4.  Another issue that must be addressed in any reform process relates to the alleged theft of 
traditional knowledge that is held, preserved and developed by traditional communities/indigenous 
people. The rules of the multilateral trading system must also support developing countries in 
building their technological capacities, and their access to affordable medicines and medical 
techn ologies.  
4.5.  The SDGs articulate important development challenges still confronting developing countries, 
including overcoming poverty and hunger. WTO rules must be supportive, rather than a constraint 
to these efforts.  
B. THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT FUNCTION OF TH E WTO  
5  RESOLVING THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ISSUES  
5.1.  A functioning, independent and effective dispute settlement system is indispensable for 
preserving the rights and obligations of all WTO Members and for ensuring that the rules are enforced 
in a fair and even -handed manner. Hence, a sine qua non  for strengthening the WTO system is the 
restoration of the AB. This is an urgent priority since without such a system the rationale for 
negotiating new rules or to undertake reforms remains questionable. Therefore,  the resumption  of 
the appointment process of the AB members must be high on the agenda of reforms and in fact 
needs to precede other reforms.  
5.2.  As per Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ( DSU), all WTO 
Members have a collective duty to  ensure the maintenance of a standing AB. It would be 
disingenuous to use the pretext of the Appellate Body's alleged digression from the clear mandate 
of the DSU to justify wilful non -compliance with the same by the Membership . 
5.3.  Attempts at addressing the crisis in the dispute settlement system must preserve its essential 
features namely an independent, two -tier dispute settlement system, automaticity in the launch of 
proceedings and  decision -making by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) by negative consensus , 
where provided. Developing Members' concerns about affordability and equitable access to the use 
of the dispute settlement system are also very important.  
5.4.  The priority for the membership must be to find a permanent multilateral solution. Abandoning  
the AB will fragment the dispute settlement system and will have a negative impact on the balance 
of rights and obligations that have been carefully negotiated in the DSU.  A two -stage dispute 
settlement system is essential to ensure security and predictability  of the multilateral trading system, 
including prompt, efficient and effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.  
5.5.  There is also a need to reflect on  the structural imbalances underlying the dispute settlement 
system , and the  challenges f aced by developing countries in accessing the dispute settlement 
system . The imbalances and challenges will remain  as long as t he dispute settlement system is not 
cost-effective for developing countries to deploy and if the ultimate remedies are insubstant ial. 
C. THE MONITORING FUNCTION OF REGULAR BODIES  
The functioning of its Councils and Committees i.e. the regular work of the WTO, was carefully 
negotiated in the Uruguay Round. Mandates were agreed to. These were negotiated outcomes that 
must be respected .  
 
6  NO ADDITIONAL TRANSPARENCY AND NOTIFICATIONS OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
EXISTING AGREEMENTS  
6.1.  Developing countries face challenges in complying with all their notification obligations due to 
human resource and institutional capacity constraints. Any non -complianc e is not willful. Treaty 
obligations must be performed in good faith. Yet despite the best of intentions, the ability to fulfill 
all notification obligations inevitably depends on capacities that are commensurate with a Member's 
level of development and re sources available. In light of these difficulties, we do not agree to WT/GC/W/778/Rev.4  
 
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  additional transparency obligations. Any work in this area must be in the provision of capacity 
building to developing countries.  
6.2.  Developed Members themselves should lead by example in submitting comprehensive, timely 
and accurate notifications. They have not always done so, as seen below. Given this, surely the 
resource constraints of developing countries should be well appreciated?  
• In the area of Agriculture, developed Membe rs that have Final Bound AMS entitlements should 
submit their notifications within three months of the end of each year (calendar, marketing or 
fiscal year).13 Many developed Members have taken up to two years or more to do so.  
• In the area of Services, GA TS Art . III.3 requires Members to 'promptly and at least annually 
inform the Council for Trade in Services of the introduction of any new, or any changes to 
existing laws, regulations or administrative guidelines which significantly affect trade in 
service s covered by its specific commitments under this Agreement '. Some developed 
Members have not been implementing this.14  
6.3.  Some Members have found innovative ways to undermine their WTO commitments, or not 
implement the spirit of those commitments. If the dis cussion on Transparency goes beyond 
addressing capacity issues, the first step must tackle the undermining of WTO commitments 
through:  
• Regular notification of entry -related measures affecting existing Mode 4 commitments of 
Members;  
• Article 66.2 of the TRIP S Agreement. Developed countries have a legal obligation in the area 
of technology transfer towards LDCs. More transparency would be supportive of LDCs' efforts 
to build a viable technological base;  
• Disclosure of origin of traditional knowledge and genetic  resources in patent applications;  
• Transparency in tariffs – non-ad valorem tariffs should be notified in ad valorem terms or 
converted to ad valorem tariffs.  
6.4.  Transparency must also permeate the entire functioning of the WTO including:  
• Taking note of the resource constraints of small delegations and thus rationalizing meetings 
at the WTO so that there are no overlaps. In areas where there are active negotiations for 
outcomes, these meetings should as far as possible take place in formal mode. They should 
always be open, inclusive and transparent and take seriously the resource constraints of 
developing countries.  
• Ministerial Conferences (MCs) and the processes preceding them in Geneva. The basic 
principles and procedures for this Member -driven organization need to be agreed upon. For 
instance, all meetings in the MC, which is the body for decision -making, should be open to all 
Members without restricting the decision -making process to smaller Green Rooms.  
7  REGULAR COMMITTEES ARE ALREADY FU NCTIONING WELL  
7.1.  It has been suggested that there should be a "strengthening " of the WTO 's regular committees.  
7.2.  We support improving upon meeting arrangements: making available documents to be 
considered at a formal meeting available 15 days before the meeting; circulating at the end of each 
year, an indicative yearly schedule of meetings for each of the WTO bodies for the following year; 
and timely circulation of the agenda and minutes of meetings.  
 
13 See p. 11 of G/AG/2, 1995 "Notification Requirements and Formats " adopted by the Committee on 
Agriculture on 8 June 1995.  
14 See p. 6 of JOB(09)/10/Rev.10, 2020 "Overview of Notifications Made Under Relevant GATS Provisions: 
Informal Note by the Secretariat ", 20 February.  WT/GC/W/778/Rev.4  
 
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  7.3.  With regards to mandates for committees, these were carefully negotiated in the Uruguay 
Round. We cannot give new mandates that upset the delicate balance that was struc k.  
7.4.  There is also the suggestion to bring up trade concerns in every committee. Addressing specific 
trade concerns (STCs) is provided for under certain agreements. Mainstreaming of STCs across all 
committees and councils is likely to prompt Members to rais e STCs very frequently. This will increase 
the paralysis in the operation of the organization and will negatively impact developing countries 
who already do not have the capacity to cope with current challenges. We therefore do not believe 
that the horizon tal implementation is acceptable.  
7.5.  The existing procedures already allow for trade concerns to be addressed. Additional obligations 
and onerous burdens on developing Members e.g. encouraging submission of written questions and 
replies within a specified pe riod will overstretch our limited human and institutional capacities.  
7.6.  The WTO is a Member -driven organization. Chair spersons have a n obligation to maintain 
impartial ity in accordance with the rules of procedures governing the respective WTO bod ies they 
preside over . This  is also applicable to the WTO  Secretariat  who are  required in terms of Article VI 
of the  Marrakesh Agreement and read together with the  Staff Regulations  and Rules under the 
Standards of Conduct15 to maintain their international character and remain  neutral. Their roles 
cannot be increased from their current mandates and functions.   
7.7.  The role  and presence  of other stakeholders , intergovernmental or I nternational Organi zations 
in the WTO must be limite d to preserve the Member -driven nature  of work  and with due respect to 
their competences , mandates  and limitat ions.  
7.8.  The goals of development have not been raised in the discussion. Especially in the current 
COVID pandemic and economic crisis, discussions on the role of Reg ular Bodies must be seen 
through the lens of development.  
8  ALLOWING FOR DIFFERENT ECONOMIC MODELS  
8.1.  The objectives of the WTO were negotiated and are entailed in the Marrakesh Agreement. It is 
expected to contribute to strengthening the world economy and pro mote a rules based multilateral 
trading system, improve investment, employment, living -standards and income growth throughout 
the world in a fair and just manner.  
8.2.  The WTO consists of diverse countries with different levels of development, national challen ges 
and development priorities. Its contribution is important, distinct and clearly defined. It provides a 
legal framework for the conduct of international trade, a more effective and reliable dispute 
settlement mechanism and a forum for negotiations. The WTO was never conceptualized as a forum 
that will define nor change economic models of Members.  
8.3.  Whilst the role of the market is important, government policies are required to address market 
failures or to achieve development objectives. This is clearly se en in the context of COVID -19 where 
many governments have stepped in to support businesses as well as give direction, incentives, and 
subsidies regarding production decisions. The role of the State is further amplified in a consensus 
resolution passed at t he United Nations Human Right Council entitled 'The central role of the State 
in responding to pandemics and other health emergencies, and the socioeconomic consequences 
thereof in advancing sustainable development and the realization of all human rights ' 
(A/HRC/44/L.23/Rev.1 of 15 July 2020).  
9  COVID -19 AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES – MEASURES TO ADDRESS THIS CRISIS  
9.1.  The world is facing its worst recession since the 1930s. Developing countries are 
disproportionately affected. The pandemic is exposing the fundament al weaknesses in our global 
system. The profound social and economic fragilities across developing countries, already very 
present pre -COVID, are now being exposed and further exacerbated with the crisis. These include 
entrenched poverty (SDG 1), hunger an d food insecurity (SDG 2), lack of clean water and sanitation 
 
15 See Annex B of the Dec ision of the General Council and the ICITO Executive Committee on 
16 October  1998 on the Conditions of Service s Applicable to the Staff of the WTO Secretariat in  WT/L/282 .  WT/GC/W/778/Rev.4  
 
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  (SDG 6), weak economic growth and the absence of decent work (SDG 8), pervasive inequalities 
(SDG 10).  
9.2.  Even prior to the crisis, developing countries were already experiencing deepening financi al 
and debt vulnerabilities in the context of tepid economic growth, slowing trade, sluggish real 
investment and growing income inequalities. Almost half of poorer economies were assessed by the 
IMF to be at high risk of debt distress, or already in debt d istress by end 2019. In 2018, the total 
debt of developing countries reached 191 per  cent of their combined GDP, the highest level on 
record.16 The UNCTAD concludes that "the current levels of reserves on average, cast a question 
mark over the ability of developing countries to stave off the C OVID -19 shock, in particular where 
reserve accumulation has occurred through borrowing rather than (or in addition to) export 
earnings ". COVID -19 thus exposes the importance of the trade, debt and finance n exus.  
9.3.  One hundred million people could be pushed into extreme poverty in 2020 (below $1.90 a day). 
A few more hundred million will join the ranks of the poor if the yardstick of $3.20 or $5.50 is used. 
We could see famines of historic proportions. Economic  activity across the world has plummeted, 
and unemployment has soared. These impacts are especially bad for LDCs, Sub -Saharan Africa and 
countries in South Asia. 70 per  cent of LDC labour force is self -employed; 60 per  cent in South Asia 
are in the informa l sector; and the same is true for over 60 per  cent in Sub -Saharan Africa. There is 
a need to preserve policy tools that are necessary to weather the health crises, promote economic 
recovery and economic resilience.17 
9.4.  According to the 2021 FAO report on th e State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 
Report,  there is an exponential increase in  moderate or severe food security  with one in three people 
in the world not having access to adequate food  in 2020 – an increase of almost 320 million in just 
one year. The high cost of healthy diet s coupled with persistent high levels of income inequality put 
healthy diets out of reach for around 3 billion people in 2019 across all regions , likely increasing in 
2020.  
9.5.  The combination of very tight fiscal space, weak and fragile health care and social protection 
systems mean that developing countries will experience a much higher human and financial toll. Add 
to this the need to import specialised goods and services to d eal with COVID -19 means that 
developing countries face huge pressures in their balance of payments situation.  
9.6.  There is a need to reflect on the role of the MTS in promoting economic recovery and in 
addressing the current and future health crisis. Multilat eral cooperation is needed now more than 
ever to enable Members to effectively respond to the crisis based on their needs . One size fits all 
approaches are unhelpful. Such cooperation should:  
a. ensure timely access to affordable medical products including the vaccine, diagnostic kits, 
PPE and ventilators;  
b. preserve policy tools to promote economic recovery;  
c. provide policy flexibility with a view to rebalance global rules and national economic 
development imperatives; and  
d. ensure that trade rules support production -led growth, jobs and structural transformation.  
9.7.  Developing countries should preserve policy space to respond to the pandemic and to boost 
productive capacity to respond to their develop ment objectives and needs. This includes key policy 
tools such as tariffs and export restrictions which must be implemented in accordance with their 
obligations under the covered Agreements.  
 
16 UNCTAD 2020 "The Coronavirus Shock: A Story of another Global Crisis Foretold ", p. 5.  
17 UNCTAD 2020 ibid.  WT/GC/W/778/Rev.4  
 
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  A Moratorium on Trade Measures and Sufficient Flexibilities on In tellectual Property 
Disciplines  
9.8.  The severity of the COVID crisis requires that governments are enabled to take the measures 
needed to limit the human toll caused by the pandemic on their people.  
9.9.  The policy space is particularly important for developing co untries since they lack the fiscal 
space developed Members have to support their economies and people such as through historically 
large stimulus packages. In contrast, developing countries have no other choice but to be more 
creative in their responses, i ncluding through the use of trade measures if these can be helpful. The 
trade regime should not penalize developing countries for taking action to support their citizens 
during such an extraordinarily difficult time. Developing countries should therefore b e exempt from 
being taken to the WTO 's DSB if they implement trade measures that are essential and necessary 
in response to the pandemic.  
9.10.   Such a moratorium on trade measures and flexibilities on intellectual property disciplines shall 
have a clearly define d scope and should be maintained only temporarily for the duration of the 
COVID crisis. It is recognised that intellectual  property rights should be interpreted and implemented 
in a manner supportive of the right of members to protect public health, and in  particular, to promote 
access to medicines for all and to ensure that IPRs are protected for the benefit of all.  
9.11.   The exact measures useful to individual Members to respond to the pandemic will depend on 
their individual circumstances.  
10  IN CONCLUSION  
10.1.   The pr iorities for reform at the WTO must include:  
a. The negotiating function  of the WTO.  
• Strengthening the multilateral character of the WTO. Critically, this must include the 
preservation of consensus decision -making and respecting Art. X of the Marrakesh 
Agree ment on Amendments with regards to new rules;  
• Addressing the unilateral and protec tionist actions taken by some Members;  
• Reaffirming the principle of S&D, which is a treaty -embedded, non -negotiable right for all 
developing countries in the WTO; and promot ing inclusive growth, widening spaces for 
states to pursue national development strategies in the broad framework and principles of 
a rules -based system;  
• Keeping development at its core through delivering on the long -promised development 
concerns, in parti cular the outstanding development issues of the DDA; as well as address 
the asymmetries in WTO Agreements such as those in Agriculture, the Subsidies 
Agreement, TRIMS and the related GATT articles (Art . III and XI), TRIPS and other areas; 
continuing with t he on -going multilaterally mandated negotiations; reinvigorating the 
discussions in the 1998 E -Commerce Work Programme particularly looking at the E -
Commerce Moratorium and the issues of digital divide.  
b. The dispute settlement  function.  
• Restoring the AB and the two -tier WTO DSU , and addressing challenges of access to the 
dispute settlement system  by developing countries . 
c. The monitoring function  of regular bodies.  
• Reaffirming existing commitments and not adding more obligations in the are as of 
transparency; specific trade concerns and the functioning of regular bodies. The WTO must 
also allow for different economic models rather than push for one form or another.  WT/GC/W/778/Rev.4  
 
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  d. COVID -19 
• Responding to the COVID -19 pandemic, including through introducing a Moratorium on 
trade measures and providing sufficient flexibilities on intellectual property disciplines for 
developing countries. Such a Moratorium will be in place for the duration of t he pandemic 
for governmental action taken to directly respond to the pandemic. Unlike developed 
countries, developing countries without deep pockets must be more creative, including by 
using trade policy measures to provide medicines, diagnostics, health e quipment, and to 
address the serious balance of payments crises many developing countries now find 
themselves in.  
• To address COVID -19, developing countries should not be asked to relinquish their 
required trade policy space such as through the permanent l iberalization of tariffs or 
agreement to end the use of export restrictions.  
 
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