WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/RL/W/28/Rev.1
22 November 2002
(02-6499)
Negotiating Group on Rules Original:  English
GENERAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE
NEGOTIATING GROUP ON RULES ON ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
Paper from Brazil;  Chile;  Colombia;  Costa Rica;  Hong Kong, China;  Israel;
Japan;  Korea;  Mexico;  Norway;  Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu;  Singapore;  Switzerland;  Thailand;  and Turkey
Revision
Two prior communications to the Negotiating Group on Rules relating to anti-dumping
measures, TN/RL/W/6 and TN/RL/W/10, indicated provisions and issues in the Agreement on the
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (“ADA”) which we seek to clarify and improve in
line with the Doha Declaration.  Furthermore, a third document with specific issues is being
presented.  We have also provided further explanation on some of these issues in our prior
communication TN/RL/W/18.  This paper is intended to address those and other specific issues in a
broader context.
This paper is also intended to be read together with these papers and to help Members further
focus on the objectives of the negotiation.  Additional papers, either on a general level or indicating
specific issues, that will be submitted during the course of the negotiation, will also serve as integral
parts of our overall contribution to the discussion of the Negotiating Group on Rules.
I. GENERAL CONCERNS TO BE ADDRESSED
Anti-dumping measures have proliferated as a mechanism to provide often unduly excessive
protection  for domestic industries from international competition rather than to counteract injurious
dumping, notwithstanding the efforts during the Uruguay Round to improve disciplines on the
imposition of such measures.  It is our concern that anti-dumping measures, when abused andmisused, significantly undermine sincere and serious efforts that Members have been making and will
make in various WTO agreements for trade liberalization, including tariff concessions.
We are also concerned that, as more Members actively use anti-dumping measures, there have
been considerable divergences among Members in the interpretation and application of the currentrules in the ADA, resulting in inconsistent and unpredictable application of anti-dumping measures.
Through providing more precise and clearly defined rules imposing disciplines on each Member’s
application of anti-dumping measures, the ADA should ensure that all Members apply a common
standard throughout the 
procedures under the ADA, which will provide greater transparency and
predictability.   
The negotiating mandate of the Doha Declaration is to clarify and improve disciplines under
the ADA, while preserving the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of the Agreement and its
instruments and objectives.  This mandate reflects the concerns of the Members about the present
disciplines on the application of anti-dumping measures.  As such, clarification and improvement of
the disciplines in order to prevent their abuse and misuse as well as to prevent divergent methods ofTN/RL/W/28/Rev.1
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application is the central purpose of this negotiation based on the mandate of the Doha Declaration.
One of the most important principles of the ADA  is to ensure that anti-dumping measures are limited
to achieving the objective of counteracting injurious dumping.  Changing present provisions and
filling out serious lacunae with that goal in mind are practical and effective ways to improve and
clarify existing disciplines.
We see the adoption of stronger and more clearly defined disciplines governing the
imposition of anti-dumping measures as an important objective of the Doha Development Agenda
negotiation.  The ADA must be further clarified and improved in order to achieve this objective.  We
believe that achieving this objective is not only essential to maintaining and realizing the benefits of
trade liberalization that have been achieved in trade negotiations in the past, but it is also
indispensable for meaningful trade liberalization through the negotiations to come.
II. ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES
The concerns mentioned above lead, in turn, to a series of objectives that need to be pursued
in clarifying and improving the disciplines on application of anti-dumping measures in this
negotiation.  We should note that addressing the needs of developing countries also constitutes anaspect of this negotiation.
We hereby provide explanation on these objectives, including examples of specific items.
Please note that the examples provided are not exhaustive and each example may not necessarily be
relevant for only one particular objective.
1. Clarify and improve rules to prevent abusive and excessive anti-dumping measures
Reducing the abuses of anti-dumping measures through providing more precise rules is an
important area to be addressed.  Any “injurious dumping” should not be artificially created nor
enhanced through the manipulation of dumping margin calculations, arbitrary injury determinations,or arbitrary causation analyses.  It is our common understanding that anti-dumping measures should
be applied to the extent necessary to counteract injurious dumping.  However, increasingly, anti-
dumping measures are imposed in excess of what is required to address the injurious dumping.  A
way to achieve the purpose of strengthening disciplines on the application of anti-dumping measures
is to provide for clearer rules, thereby limiting the room available to authorities for abuse of those
rules.
A number of our proposals seek to pursue this objective, including, inter alia , definition of
ordinary course of trade, zeroing, constructed va lue, mandatory lesser duty rule, injury analysis,
causation analysis, and conduct of reviews.
2. Clarify and improve rules to avoid excessive burdens on respondents
Anti-dumping investigations must not be overly burdensome so as not to obstruct daily
business activities.  Some anti-dumping investigations go into too minute or irrelevant items in light
of current business realities and commonsense, and consequently impose increased and onerous costs
and burdens on respondents in anti-dumping investigations and reviews.  The economic costs and
burdens for companies seeking to cooperate in investigations or reviews are often so substantial thatthe costs of cooperation outweigh any possible benefits to be gained from such cooperation.  It is a
reality that companies are increasingly declining to cooperate because of the costs and burdens.  In
order to reduce the costs and burdens on responding parties, we should address the issues in line with
following two approaches.TN/RL/W/28/Rev.1
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One approach that should be taken is to seek the balance between the requirements for
investigation and the reality of business.  Members should explore ways to reduce the costs and
burdens on responding parties by taking into account current business realities, while maintaining the
effectiveness of investigations and reviews.  Issues such as, inter alia , treatment of affiliated party
transactions, and use of cost data should be addressed to find solution in line with this objective.
Another approach is to seek the balance betw een the requirements for initiation standards and
subsequent investigation with the trade restrictive effects of these actions.  Members should recognize
that not only the imposition of anti-dumping measures, but also the mere initiation of a proceeding,
has serious chilling effects on international trade.  National authorities are apt to apply inadequate
evidentiary standards and arbitrary procedures in the initiation determination and subsequent
investigation.  Undisciplined standards for initiation and subsequent investigation invite frivolous andunwarranted anti-dumping proceedings, which both impede international trade and undermine the
credibility of the ADA.
A number of our proposals seek to pursue this objective, including, inter alia , initiation
standards, definition of product under investigation, standing requirements, definition of domesticindustry, de minimis  threshold, definition of dumped imports, and sampling.
3. Clarify and improve rules to enhance the tr ansparency, the predictability and fairness
of the system
Ambiguities in the curre nt ADA allows for arbi trary interpretations and applications by
national authorities, thus undermining the predictability of the anti-dumping regime.  Narrowing or
eliminating divergences among Members in the interpretation and application of the rules would
indeed enhance the predictability of the ADA.   In addition, in terms of enhancing fairness of whole
anti-dumping proceeding, authorities shall take broader perspective into account.
There is substantial room for clarification and improvement of existing rules and a number of
issues, including those already mentioned above, are related to this objective.  Issues such as, inter
alia, the conduct of reviews, use of price undertakings, initiation standards, consideration of public
interest are also based on this objective.
In discussing particular issues and provisions, these objectives and concerns should be kept in
mind and inform the discussions and subsequent negotiations.
Again we note that examples as provided above are not exhaustive and may be related to
other objectives.  We may indicate other issues that we should discuss in the Negotiating Group on
Rules in order to adequately address the above-mentioned objectives.
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