RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/ADP/AHG/W/46
20April 1998
ORGANIZATION(98-1576)
Original: English Committee onAnti-Dumping Practices
AdHoc Group onImplementation
TOPIC 1*-ARTICLE 6.5: TREATMENT OFCONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
TOPIC 2*-PERIOD OFDATA COLLECTION
TOPIC 3*-ARTICLE 6.10: SAMPLING METHOD
TOPIC 4*-ARTICLE 5.6: SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
TOPIC 5*-ART. 5.5: NOTIFICATION TOTHE EXPORTING MEMBER
TOPIC 6*-ARTICLE 6.2: HEARINGS
Paper byBrazil
Thefollowing communication, dated 17April 1998, hasbeen received from thePermanent
Mission ofBrazil.
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TOPIC 1:ART. 6.5–TREATMENT OFCONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
1. TheAnti-Dumping Agreement
Art.6.5determines thatanyinformation which isbynature confidential (forexample because
itsdisclosure would beofsignificant competitive advantage toacompetitor orbecause itsdisclosure
would have asignificantly adverse effect upon theperson supplying such information) orthathasbeen
provided onaconfidential basis shall betreated assuch bytheinvestigating authorities, aslong as
good cause isshown forconfidential treatment. Such information shall notbedisclosed without explicit
authorization oftheparty submitting it.
Theparty requesting confidential treatment must alsoprovide anon-confidential summary of
thesubmitted information. Itshould besufficiently detailed topermit areasonable understanding of
thesubstance oftheinformation submitted inconfidence. Inexceptional circumstances, itmay be
alleged thatsuch information isnotsusceptible ofsummary. Inthese cases, astatement ofthereasons
why summarization isnotpossible must beprovided.
Iftheauthorities findthatarequest forconfidentiality isnotwarranted andifthesupplier of
theinformation isunwilling tomake theinformation public ortoauthorize itsdisclosure ingeneralized
orsummary form, theauthorities may disregard such information, unless itcanbedemonstrated to
their satisfaction from appropriate sources thattheinformation iscorrect.
*Seedocument G/ADP/W/401 fordescriptions ofthetopics.G/ADP/AHG/W/46
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2. TheBrazilian Practice
2.1 Submitting Confidential Information
Theparties have theright torequest confidentiality regarding information theyaresubmitting.
During thecourse ofaninvestigation, inthecommunications senttotheinterested parties, theright
forconfidentiality isclearly pointed outaswellastheconditions thatmust beobserved when exercising
this right: due justification fortherequest ofconfidential treatment andtherequirement ofa
non-confidential summary.
(i) Justification forarequest ofconfidential treatment
Theparty must explain how itwould beadversely affected bythedisclosure ofthe
information. This explanation isevaluated onacase bycase basis. Theauthorities
take into account theparticular situation oftheparty aswell asthecompetition
circumstances towhich itissubmitted. Iftheauthorities find thattherequest for
confidential treatment isnotwarranted andiftheparty isnotwilling todisclose the
information submitted (even inasummarized format), itmay bedisregarded unless
itisproved tobeaccurate bymeans, forexample, ofon-the-spot inspections.
Itisgranted, however, thatsome types ofinformation aredeemed tobeconfidential
innature andthattheir disclosure would provide advantage tocompetitors. Such type
ofinformation would notrequire formal justification oftheir confidential nature. They
would bethose concerning specific trade operations (such asinformation found ina
specific sales slip), listings ofsuppliers andbuyers, ordetailed structure ofcosts.
(ii) Non-confidential summary
Thenon-confidential summary thatmust beprovided with theinformation submitted
asconfidential must beinsufficient detail topermit areasonable understanding ofthe
substance oftheinformation submitted inconfidence sothattheother interested parties
intheinvestigation would beincondition toeffectively exercise their right ofdefense.
Iftheparty requesting confidential treatment alleges thatitisimpossible toprovide
anon-confidential summary, such allegation must beproperly justified. The
investigating authorities willevaluate ifthesubmitted justifications aresatisfactory.
Ifnot,theauthorities willreiterate totheparty thatanon-confidential summary must
beprovided.
Article 6.5.2 establishes theprocedures tobeadopted incases where theauthorities
findthattherequest forconfidentiality isnotwarranted andtheparty supplying the
information isunwilling tomake itpublic ingeneralized orsummary form. However,
theAgreement does notestablish theprocedures tobeadopted when:
• theauthorities findthatarequest forconfidentiality iswarranted and
thattheinformation issusceptible ofsummary;
• theauthorities have reiterated totheparty thatanon-confidential
summary must beprovided; and
• the supplier ofthe information isunwilling toprovide the
non-confidential summary.
Insuch cases itisunderstood thatiftherequested non-confidential summary ofthe
information isnotprovided theinvestigating authorities could disregard suchG/ADP/AHG/W/46
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information, unless itisproved tobecorrect bymeans of,forexample, on-the-spot
investigations. That is,itisunderstood thatinsuchsituations theprocedures established
byArticle 6.5.2 should beadopted.
(iii) Question
Brazil would liketoknow what istheprocedure adopted byother Members when a
party refuses toprovide anon-confidential summary ofinformation that hasits
confidential nature duly justified?
2.2 Access ofOther Parties toConfidential Information
Parties inaninvestigation have theright toaccess thepublic version oftheprocess, which
includes allnon-confidential documents, including thenon-confidential summaries, ifany.
Information submitted asconfidential willnotbedisclosed without explicit authorization by
theparty thatsupplied it.Such information willconstitute aseparate process, towhich theparties
have noaccess. Brazil hasnomechanism thatwould allow thedisclosure ofconfidential information
under some form ofprotective order.
TOPIC 2:PERIOD OFDATA COLLECTION
1. TheAnti-Dumping Agreement
TheAnti-Dumping Agreement does notspecify theperiod thatshould beused todetermine
themargin ofdumping. However Article 2.2.1 makes reference totheperiod oftime (normally one
year butinnocaselessthan sixmonths) thatshould betaken intoaccount fordetermining when sales
atprices below costs may betreated asnotbeing intheordinary course oftrade.
TheAgreement alsolacks definitions about theperiod fordatacollection todetermine injury
andcausal link.
2. TheBrazilian Practice
TheBrazilian anti-dumping legislation (Decree 1602/95) determines that:
“Art. 25. Inthecourse oftheinvestigation, theevidence ofdumping andinjury caused by
itshall beexamined simultaneously.
25.1 Theperiod ofinvestigation forascertaining theexistence ofdumping must include the
twelve previous months asclose aspossible totheinitiation oftheinvestigation and, under
exceptional circumstances, may belessthan twelve months butnever lessthan six.
25.2 The period ofinvestigation regarding theexistence ofinjury must besufficiently
representative topermit analysis asprovided forinChapter III,may notbelessthan three
years, andshall necessarily include theperiod during which dumping isinvestigated. ”
Therefore, theBrazilian authorities usetwoperiods toassess thedata, depending onthepurpose
oftheanalysis, whether todetermine dumping orinjury.
• When verifying theexistence ofdumping, theauthorities usethe12months prior to
theopening oftheinvestigation; thatis:theclosest period ofoneyear forwhich there
issufficient data foranappropriate determination ofdumping existence.G/ADP/AHG/W/46
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• When verifying theexistence ofinjury tothedomestic industry, theauthorities use
theclosest period ofthree tofiveyears prior totheopening oftheinvestigation for
which there issufficient data foranappropriate determination ofinjury.
• Theperiod used todetermine theexistence ofdumping must bewithin theperiod used
todetermine theexistence ofinjury tothedomestic industry.
IntheSECEX(SecretariadeComércioExterior)announcementoftheopeningofananti-dumping
investigation –published inthe“Diário Oficial daUnião”–theperiod forthedumping investigation
isestablished, sothattheanalysis beconducted using themost recent dataavailable. Such period may
beupdated with relation totheoneused todecide ontheinitiation oftheinvestigation.
Intheanalysis todetermine theexistence ofinjury, with aview toevaluate thesituation of
thedomestic industry before theperiod ofthedumping investigation andtheimpact ofdumped imports
onthedomestic industry, theBrazilian authorities usually examine aperiod offiveyears, possibly
breaking down thedataforsome months oftheyear closest totheopening oftheinvestigation. For
example, aninvestigation opened inJuly 1997 would collect data from 1993 to1996, plus thedata
forthefirst semesters of1996 and1997. This procedure would allow (i)abetter evaluation ofthe
behaviour oftheeconomic indicators forthenational industry andtheinternal market and(ii)amore
precise assessment oftheimpact oftheinvestigated imports onthedomestic industry.
TOPIC 3:ART. 6.10 –SAMPLING METHOD
1. TheAnti-Dumping Agreement
Article 6.10 determines that, asarule, theauthorities shall determine anindividual margin
ofdumping foreach known exporter orproducer oftheproduct under investigation. Nonetheless,
incases where thenumber ofexporters, producers, importers ortypes ofproducts involved issolarge
astomake such adetermination impracticable, theauthorities may limit their examination either to
areasonable number ofinterested parties orproducts byusing samples which arestatistically valid
onthebasis ofinformation available totheauthorities atthetime oftheselection, ortothelargest
percentage ofthevolume oftheexports from thecountry inquestion which canbereasonably be
investigated.
Anyselection ofexporters, producers, importers ortypes ofproducts shall preferably bechosen
inconsultation with andwith theconsent oftheexporters, producers orimporters concerned.
2. Answer totheQuestion Presented byCanada
Brazil hasnever applied asampling method inadetermination ofmargin ofdumping.
Nevertheless, astrict reading oftheBrazilian legislation would prevent theinvestigating authorities
toinclude data voluntarily provided bycooperating entities notincluded intheoriginal “sample ”.
Since theauthorities needed toconsult with theparties when selecting the“sample ”,theinclusion of
“extra-sample ”datawould, infact, constitute analteration oftheoriginal “sample ”.This procedure
should only beenvisaged ifoneorseveral oftheentities oftheoriginal “sample ”failed toprovide
therequested information.
2.1 Question
Brazil would liketoknow atwhat point intime doother Members make theselection of
producers, exporters, importers ortypes ofproduct with aview tocalculate themargin ofdumping
byapplying thesampling method. Once the“sample ”isdefined, what circumstances would justify
itsmodification? Ifthe“sample ”needs tobemodified, should there benew consultations with the
interested parties?G/ADP/AHG/W/46
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TOPIC 4:ART. 5.6–“SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ”
1. TheAnti-Dumping Agreement
Article 5.6oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement establishes thatif,inspecial circumstances, the
authorities concerned decide toinitiate aninvestigation without having received awritten application
byoronbehalf ofadomestic industry fortheinitiation ofsuch investigation, they shall proceed only
ifthey have sufficient evidence ofdumping, injury andacausal link, asdescribed inparagraph 2,to
justify theinitiation ofaninvestigation.
Ontheother hand, Article 5.4establishes thataninvestigation shall notbeinitiated unless
theauthorities have determined, onthebasis ofanexamination ofthedegree ofsupport for,oropposition
to,theapplication expressed bydomestic producers ofthelikeproduct, thattheapplication hasbeen
made byoronbehalf ofthedomestic industry. Theapplication shall beconsidered tohave been made
"byoronbehalf ofthedomestic industry" ifitissupported bythose domestic producers whose collective
output constitutes more than 50percentofthetotal production ofthelikeproduct produced bythat
portion ofthedomestic industry expressing either support fororopposition totheapplication. However,
noinvestigation shall beinitiated when domestic producers expressly supporting theapplication account
forlessthan 25percent oftotal production ofthelikeproduct produced bythedomestic industry.
2. Brazil 'sInterpretation
2.1 TheExistence ofLinkage between Articles 5.4and5.6
Regarding thepossible existence ofalinkage between Arts. 5.4and5.6,Brazil considers that
noconnection exists between these twoprovisions, since both dealwith distinct situations regarding
theinitiation ofaninvestigation:
• when anapplication ispresented byproducers ofthelikeproduct; and
• when thegovernment ofanimporting country, duetotheexistence of"exceptional
circumstances", autonomously decides toevaluate theexistence ofsufficient evidence
ofdumping, injury, andcausal linkwith aview toinitiate aninvestigation.
Inthefirstcase, itwould bemandatory toascertain thedegree ofsupport thattheapplication
enjoys amongst theproducers ofthelikeproduct. Inthelatter, theabove mentioned tests are
unnecessary.
Consequently, nolinkage would exist between thetwoarticles, since they apply todifferent
situations.
Inbothsituations, regardless ofwhotakes theinitiative tostarttheprocess leading totheopening
oftheinvestigation, itisessential that, when determining theexistence ofinjury (before theinitiation
oftheinvestigation), thedomestic industry bedefined inaccordance totheprovisions ofArticle 4of
theAnti-Dumping Agreement.
2.2 TheRole oftheGovernment in"Assisting" Industries inPreparing Applications
TheBrazilian investigating authorities adopted acomprehensive approach. Itseeks toprovide
guidance totheprivate sector asawhole regarding theprocedures ofananti-dumping investigation.
Allover thecountry, several seminars have been held with thisaimandthegovernment published
a"Guide forCommercial Defense", which covers thedefinitions andbasic procedures pertaining to
theimposition ofanti-dumping, safeguards, andcountervailing measures.G/ADP/AHG/W/46
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Inpractice, when apotential petitioner seeks government assistance, theauthorities tryto
elucidate eventual doubts related tothepreparation ofanapplication ortotheprocedural aspects of
ananti-dumping investigation.
TOPIC5:ART.5.5–NOTIFICATIONOFTHE GOVERNMENT OFTHE EXPORTINGMEMB ER
1. TheAnti-Dumping Agreement
Article 5.5establishes thatafter thereceipt ofaproperly documented application andbefore
proceeding toinitiate aninvestigation, theauthorities shall notify thegovernment oftheexporting
Member concerned.
2. TheBrazilian Practice
When theBrazilian investigating authority considers thattheapplication contains sufficient
information toallow ananalysis ofthepetition, aNote isaddressed totheEmbassy oftheexporting
country informing thattheBrazilian government received aproperly documented application.
Regarding topic 10ofdocument G/ADP/AHG/W/33 from Norway, inaccordance with the
above mentioned Brazilian understanding, theBrazilian authorities notify theexporting country when
anapplication isconsidered properly documented (Art. 5.5) andwhen aninvestigation isinitiated
(Art. 12.1). Brazil isoftheopinion that:
• thenotification mentioned inArticle 5.5oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement must be
made before theinitiation oftheinvestigation;
• thenotification ofArticle 12.1 must memade immediately after theinitiation ofthe
investigation anditshould include acopy ofthepublic notice thatannounces the
initiation oftheinvestigation, aswell asacopy oftheapplication thatgave risetothe
investigation.
TOPIC 6:ART. 6.2–HEARINGS
1. TheAnti-Dumping Agreement
Article 6.2oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement establishes thatthroughout theanti-dumping
investigation allinterested parties shall have afullopportunity forthedefense oftheir interests. To
thisend, theauthorities shall, onrequest, provide opportunities forallinterested parties tomeet those
parties with adverse interests, sotheopposing views maybepresented andrebuttal arguments offered.
Provision ofsuch opportunities must take account oftheneed topreserve confidentiality andofthe
convenience totheparties. There shall benoobligation onanyparty toattend ameeting, andfailure
todososhall notbeprejudicial tothatparty 'scase. Interested parties shall alsohave theright, on
justification, topresent other information orally.
2. TheBrazilian Practice
2.1 Time limit forhearing requests
Inaccordance with Art. 31ofDecree 1602/95, thetime limit forhearing requests should be
included inthedirective ordering theinitiation oftheinvestigation. Thedirective determines thatthe
interested parties may request hearings uptothedate when thefinal hearing issummoned bythe
investigating authorities.G/ADP/AHG/W/46
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2.2 Therequest forahearing
Theinterested party requesting ahearing must present, together with theformal request, a
listofthespecific issues tobeaddressed inthehearing.
2.3 Holding ahearing
Atleast thirty days inadvance, theinvestigating authorities inform theinterested parties about
thedate andvenue ofthehearing, andtheissues thatwillbeaddressed atthattime.
2.3.1 Hearing Procedures
There isnoobligation toattend ahearing andtheabsence ofanyparty shall notbeprejudicial
toitsinterests.
Atleast fivedays before thehearing, theinterested parties must designate who willbetheir
legal representatives inthehearing. Uptotendays before thehearing, theinterested parties must
indicate, inwriting, thearguments itwillpresent atthattime.
Ifitisproperly justified, theinterested parties maypresent additional information orally. Such
information shall beconsidered only ifitisreproduced inwriting -inPortuguese -andmade available
totheother interested parties, within tendays following thehearing.
The holding ofhearings shall nothinder theauthorities toreach apreliminary orfinal
determination.
Inthehearings, whenever appropriate, consideration shall begiven totherules ofconfidentiality
andtheconvenience oftheparties.
2.4 Types ofhearings
TheBrazilian legislation offers nodefinition forthepossible types ofhearings thatmay be
requested bytheparties. Itmerely indicates atime limit fortherequest, namely thedate when the
investigating authorities summon thefinal hearing. There arenolimitations onthenumber oftimes
thataparty mayrequest hearings, oronthenumber ofhearings thatmaybeheldduring aninvestigation,
aslong asthelegal time frame fortheduration oftheinvestigation isrespected.
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