RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/GC/M/78
7 March 2003
(03-1315)
General Council
10 February 2003
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 10 February 2003
Chairman:  Mr. Sergio Marchi (Canada)
Subjects discussed: Page
1. Iran – Request for Accession ................................................................................................. ..2
2. Ethiopia – Reques t for Acces sion ............................................................................................2
3. Council for TRIPS – Report on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.....................................................8
4. Committee on Trade and Development – Report by the Chairman of the
Committee in Special Session on Special and Differential Treatment in
Pursuance of Paragraph 12.1 of the Doha Ministerial Decision onImplementation-Related Issues and Concerns.......................................................................9
5. Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration – Progress report on the
Committee's review of methodologie s for future pay adjustments ....................................26
6. Report by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee ........................................27
7. Work Programme on Small Economies – Report by the Chairman of the
Dedicated Sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development.....................................30
8. Review of the exemption provided under Paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994.......................319. Proposal to remove and avoid inconsistencies in the texts of the WTO
Agreements – Communication from Chile ...........................................................................32
10. Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference – Administrative matters..............................36
(a) Annual report of the General Council to the Ministerial Conference – Statement by
the Chairman................................................................................................................... ..........36
(b) Attendance of observers from governments and international intergovernmental
organizations – Statemen t by the Ch airman .............................................................................36
(c) Attendance of non-governmental organi zations – Statement by the Chairman........................37
(d) Election of Officers for the Fifth Session – Statement by the Chairman..................................38
11. WTO Pension Plan – Election of an Alternate to the Management Board –
Proposal by the Chairman .....................................................................................................38
12. Appointment of office rs to WTO bodies...............................................................................39
13. Meeting of the General Council on Coherence in Global Economic Policy-
making......................................................................................................................... .............40WT/GC/M/78
Page 2
14. Improving the services provided by the Secretaria t to Members.......................................40
15. Possibility of a short break prior to  the Fifth Ministerial Conference...............................41
16. Election of Chairperson..................................................................................................... .....41
1. Iran – Request for Accession (WT/ACC/IRN/1)
1. The Chairman drew attention to the communi cation from Iran in WT/ACC/IRN/1 requesting
accession to the WTO Agreement pursuant to Article XII.  He recalled that the General Council had
last considered this matter at its meeting in December 2002, and had agreed to revert to it at the
present meeting.
2. The representative of the United States said that the issue of Iran's accession to the WTO
continued to be under review by his Government, and his delegation had nothing to add to its
statement at the December meeting of the General Council.
3. The representative of Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the Informal Group of Developing
Countries, said that these countries took note of the statement by the United States.  They noted with
regret that the United States was not in a position to respond positively to this issue and continued to
hope that a positive response would be forthcoming from the United States at the next meeting of theGeneral Council.
4. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed
 to revert to this matter at its next
meeting.
2. Ethiopia – Request for Accession (WT/ACC/ETH/1)
5. The Chairman drew attention to the comm unication from Ethiopia in WT/ACC/ETH/1
requesting accession to the WTO Agreement pursuant to Article XII.
6. The representative of Ethiopia, speaking as an observer , said that his Government was fully
convinced that the best way to accelerate economic  growth and development was to integrate its
economy into the multilateral trading system.  To be a Member of the WTO was to be part of the
rules-based multilateral trading system, and this would create confidence for investors and serve as aninstrument to attract foreign direct investment for diversifying the production base and expanding the
supply capacity of the country.  It would also help to secure predictable and transparent market
access.  The effective participation of the least-developed countries in the decision-making process of
the multilateral trading system would encourage them that the speed, nature and direction of
globalization would be compatible with their developmental needs.  These, among others, were some
of the reasons which had led his Government to decide to start the WTO accession process and to be
part of the multilateral trading system.
7. Ethiopia had had observer status in the WTO since October 1997, and this had been renewed
in May 2002.  During this period the Government of Ethiopia had exerted every effort to acquaint and
familiarize itself with the WTO agreements and the working of the multilateral trading system, as well
as to enhance its negotiating capacity.  The Government had also commissioned a study to determine
the full implications of the WTO agreements on Ethiopia's economic policy and sectoral strategies.  Inaddition, in order to create awareness among different stakeholders about the multilateral trading
system and the WTO framework, two national workshops had been organized in 1998 and 1999 in
collaboration with the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats.  Despite these efforts, Ethiopia's institutional
capacity to deal with the complex WTO agreements, procedures and decisions had not yet reached the
level desired.  It therefore needed further technical assistance and capacity building that covered allWT/GC/M/78
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phases of the accession process, and called upon all its development partners to provide it with the
necessary assistance and support in this regard.
8. With a surface area of 1.1 million square kilometres and with a population of 67 million in
2002, Ethiopia was the third most populous countr y in Africa.  The country had a long-standing
history, diverse cultural heritage and reasonably good resource potential for development.  However,during the years from the mid-1970s until the fall of the military government in 1991, the country had
undergone a period of turmoil and economic stagnation.  The performance of the economy during
these periods had revealed deterioration in the socio-economic condition at an accelerating pace.
GDP growth rate was on average 1.5 per cent, but in  contrast, the population had grown at about 3 per
cent per annum, resulting in a stagnation of per capita income and hence a worsening of living
conditions.  The macro-economic balance was also in crisis, with a very low saving rate and inflation
reaching 21 per cent.  This situation had come about as a result of the command economic policiesthat had restricted the role of the private sector, the protracted civil war and the recurrent drought, all
of which had left the economy in deep crisis.  Th is situation had severely hampered the much-desired
socio-economic development of the country, resulting in widespread poverty among the vast majority
of the population.  After the fall of the military regime in 1991, and the establishment of the
Transitional Government of Ethiopia and later the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic ofEthiopia in 1995, Ethiopia had witnessed a marked departure on the political and economic fronts.
9. The political transformation had consisted mainly of changing the hitherto unitary state into a
federal system, the one-party system into a multiparty system, and instituting human rights buttressed
by an independent judiciary.  These developments had provided a huge peace and stability dividend to
the nation.  On the economic front, the Government had initiated and implemented a series ofsuccessful economic reform programmes supported by the multilateral financial institutions and other
multilateral and bilateral development partners.  The economic reform programmes were aimed at re-
orienting the economy from a command to a market economy, rationalizing the role of the State and
creating legal, institutional and policy environments to enhance private sector development.  The
adoption of the Agricultural-Development Led Industr ialization ( ADLI) strategy provided a long-term
framework and direction to the reform programmes.  In addition, a number of structural adjustment
policies had been carried out, including full liberalization of prices and markets, removal of subsidies,
and implementation of civil service reform in order to improve and ensure efficiency and
accountability.  There had been liberalization of the foreign exchange regime and of the foreign trade
regime by removing quotas and the progressive reduction of import tariffs – the latest reduction had
been implemented in January 2003 and had brought the weighted average tariff to 17.5 per cent.
There had also been privatization of most of the public enterprises and reorganization of theremaining ones so that they operated purely on a co mmercial basis, and promulgation and revision of
liberal investment codes, with the latest revision in July 2002.  These had been buttressed with fiscal
and monetary policy disciplines.  The favourable policy environment created by economic reform
coupled with macro-economic stability had invigorated the private sector, which had been suppressed
during the previous regime.  The country had also designed and implemented a number of sectorinvestment programmes.  Moreover, cognizant of the fact that poverty reduction necessitated
multidimensional and well-integrated approaches to  development, the Government, by consolidating
the economic results achieved so far, had designed and was implementing the country's Sustainable
Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP).
10. As a result of these and other measures Ethiopia's economy had attained an annual average
growth rate of 5 per cent over the past 10 years, with inflation being contained below 5 per cent on
average, thereby representing a marked improvement compared to the situation in the 1980s.  These
results would have been much better had it not been for the erratic weather, external trade shocks and
unfortunate border conflict caused by the regime in Eritrea.  His Government believed that the reform
measures it had been undertaking autonomously conformed in a number of respects with therequirements of the WTO agreements.  It was also confident that they would serve as a springboard in
Ethiopia's accession negotiations.  In this connection, his Government wished to request WTOWT/GC/M/78
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Members, in due course and as appropriate, to give credit to Ethiopia for the liberalization measures it
had implemented within the framework of the structural adjustment programme.  His Government
recognized that accession to the WTO was a complex, lengthy and challenging process for all
acceding countries, and especially the least-developed ones.  Lack of understanding of WTO
agreements and their implications for the development of a country, weak enforcement mechanisms,absence of a professional administration and judicial system and extremely limited human and
financial resources – just to mention a few – were some of the challenges these countries faced.
While acceding LDCs should leave no stone unturned to overcome these challenges, WTO Members
on their part should take the necessary steps to facilitate the accession process and to provide
technical assistance to acceding LDCs.  In this regard, the Decision on the accession of LDCs adopted
by the General Council in December 2002 (WT/L/508) was a major step in the right direction.  He
expressed his Government's appreciation to all Members for the efforts they had made to adopt thisDecision, and called upon all Members to ensure its full implementation, from which Ethiopia looked
forward to benefiting.  The benefits, both to existing Members and to acceding countries, of ensuring
universal membership was clear.
11. He assured Members of his Government's strong commitment to comply with established
procedures for the accession process.  In this connection, Ethiopia had established a WTO unit withinthe Ministry of Trade and Industry and a national committee, composed of various ministries,
agencies and other stakeholders, to look after the accession negotiations.  These were some of the
preliminary steps that demonstrated his Government's commitment to speed up the accession process.
It was Ethiopia's hope that this commitment would be complemented by the individual and collective
support of Members to achieve the desired result.  Ethiopia looked forward to interacting with the
working party in the multilateral and bilateral di scussions leading to the conclusion of a mutually
satisfactory protocol of accession and schedule of WTO commitments.  His Government remained at
the disposal of Members to provide any information that might be useful regarding its application for
accession.
12. All delegations who spoke warmly welcomed Ethiopia's statement, and supported its request
for accession and the establishment of a working party to examine it.
13. The representative of Morocco, speaking on behalf of the African Group
, congratulated
Ethiopia on its statement.  These countries fully supported the request for accession by Ethiopia,
which had already undertaken considerable efforts since 1997 to comply with the WTO agreements.
As an LDC, Ethiopia should benefit from the new procedures agreed by the General Council to
facilitate and, above all, accelerate the accession of LDCs, and in particular African LDCs.  This
should go hand in hand with the technical assistance required to strengthen the capacities of theEthiopian Government in multilateral trade matters, so that it could carry out the accession
negotiations under the best conditions.  The African Group appealed to Members to reply positively to
Ethiopia's request for technical assistance.  It attached particular importance to this request since it
knew the positive impact trade could have in efforts to reduce poverty, especially in Africa, as had
been noted and highlighted in the latest report on  LDCs prepared by the LDCs and UNCTAD.  These
countries hoped that Ethiopia's request would be given the priority importance it required and, above
all, hoped that it would be dealt with under an accelerated and facilitated procedure, since Ethiopia
had expressed its interest in accession since 1997.
14. The representative of Bangladesh, speaking on behalf of the LDCs
, said that from the
perspective of these countries, Ethiopia's decision to accede to the WTO was very significant.  It
reaffirmed the principle that smaller countries had to integrate into the multilateral trading system as
quickly as possible, in order to benefit from the potential gains such participation offered.  Ethiopia's
decision clearly reflected its commitment to abide by the rules-based multilateral trading system, and
the LDCs congratulated Ethiopia on its decision.  Ministers at Doha had put a special priority on
LDCs' accession.  In paragraph 9 of the Doha Declaration, they had attached great importance toconcluding accession proceedings as quickly as possi ble, particularly those of LDCs.  In addition, inWT/GC/M/78
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paragraph 42 of that Declaration, Ministers had agreed to work to facilitate and accelerate
negotiations with acceding LDCs.  Following on those decisions, Members had worked under the
very committed Chairman of the Sub-Committee on LDCs to draw up Guidelines for the quick
accession of LDCs, which the General Council had adopted at its meeting in December 2002.  The
LDCs looked forward to working within the scope of those Guidelines to deal with the accessionrequest of Ethiopia.
15. The LDCs were the weakest link in the chain that bound Members in the WTO.  They faced
daunting challenges to their development.  They had recognized these serious handicaps, and were
committed to reversing their marginalization.  At Doha, Ministers had reiterated their commitment to
improving the effective participation of LDCs in the multilateral trading system.  The efforts of the
LDCs to integrate into that system needed to be complemented by the cooperation and support of the
entire membership.  The LDCs hoped that Et hiopia and other acceding LDCs would receive
expeditious and adequate technical assistance so as to accede speedily to the WTO.  With Ethiopia,
there were now 10 LDCs in the process of WTO accession.  Not all of these were in advanced stages
of accession.  The LDCs urged Members to collectively assist the LDCs in their accession
negotiations.  As with Ethiopia, they hoped that the accession of all LDCs desiring membership would
be on a fast track, and on simplified terms that were consistent with their level of development andadministrative and institutional capability.  The LDCs eagerly awaited Ethiopia's joining the WTO as
a full Member, and asked that Members immediately establish a working group for Ethiopia's
accession.
16. The representative of the European Communities,  said that as an LDC, Ethiopia should fully
benefit from a speedy accession process in line with the General Council's Decision to facilitate the
accession of LDCs.  The Community was committed to apply these Guidelines fully during its future
negotiations with Ethiopia.  It stood ready to continue providing technical assistance to Ethiopia in
areas of relevance to WTO accession, and was in contact with the Ethiopian authorities on this matter
to identify priority needs.  In addition, Members co uld also draw on the experience in the Integrated
Framework, in which Ethiopia was a participant.
17. The representative of India said that the very comprehensive statement by Ethiopia outlined
the various reform measures Ethiopia had already undertaken, which would augur well for its faster
accession.  India had strong and long-standing economic  and commercial relations with Ethiopia.  It
was obvious that Ethiopia had felt encouraged by the General Council's Decision on faster accession
for LDCs, and had decided to apply for membership.  He recalled Ethiopia's constructive contribution
in the discussions in the Sub-Committee on LDCs when this draft decision was being discussed.  India
was confident that the spirit of the Decision would guide Members in the entire process of Ethiopia'saccession.  Ethiopia's statement had referred to the need for assistance and support, and his delegation
strongly endorsed that request and felt that Ethiopia deserved all the necessary support and assistance
in its accession process.
18. The representative of Israel welcomed the start of Ethiopia's accession process and hoped it
would be speedy.  Israel and Ethiopia had enjoyed a history of friendly relations for millennia, and it
was therefore a special pleasure for Israel to fully support Ethiopia's request and to wish it a speedy
accession.
19. The representative of Kenya said that apart from sharing a common border, Ethiopia and
Kenya were both members of the African Union, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.  Ethiopia, with a population close to 70million and an LDC, had undertaken substantial market reforms through the structural adjustment
programme.  It was hoped that Ethiopia, by joining the WTO, would derive the benefits associated
with the multilateral trading system.  WTO memb ership would help boost its industrial production
growth rate, currently estimated at 7 per cent, and thereby expand its industrial base beyond food
processing, beverages, textiles, chemicals, metal processing and cement.  Kenya urged Members toWT/GC/M/78
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consider favourably the establishment of a working party on the accession of Ethiopia.  In view of the
complexity and costs of the accession process, Ethiopia needed, and had requested, technical
assistance to speed up its accession, and her delegation hoped Members would be forthcoming in that
regard.  As a neighbouring country, Kenya looked forward to participating actively in Ethiopia's
accession process.
20. The representative of Pakistan said that his delegation fully endorsed the previous statements.
The reforms outlined in Ethiopia's statement were very  significant, and Pakistan felt that Ethiopia had
already unilaterally prepared itself to meet WTO membership requirements.  In view of Ethiopia's
enthusiasm and paragraph 9 of the Doha Declaration, Pakistan hoped that Ethiopia would be able to
join the WTO as soon as possible.
21. The representative of China said that China had a long friendship and close trade and
economic relations with Ethiopia.  It believed that  integrating Ethiopia into the multilateral trading
system would make a positive contribution to the trade, economic and social development of that
country.  At the same time, Ethiopia's accession to the WTO would also make the WTO more
universal.  Given that Ethiopia was an LDC, Me mbers should bear in mind the Decision on LDCs'
accession, which set out guidelines to be followed by Members in their negotiations with acceding
LDCs.  Members should faithfully implement this Decision in the accession negotiations withEthiopia, and China sincerely hoped that Ethiopia would become a Member in the near future.
22. The representative of the United States welcomed Ethiopia's decision to move to align its
trade regime with the WTO, and hoped that Ethiopia would lose no time in supplying the information
required to activate accession negotiations.  The General Council had recently agreed on Guidelines to
help simplify and streamline the accession process for LDCs like Ethiopia.  This should help relieveEthiopia of some of the procedural and resource burdens that normally came with accession
negotiations, without undermining the ability of the accession process to build trade capacity and
promote economic and trade reform.  The WTO accession process presented acceding countries, and
especially LDCs, with an exceptional opportunity to promote investment and economic growth,
including through the establishment of greater transparency, predictability and the rule of law in theapplication of trade measures, and by expanding market access for goods and services, minimizing
non-tariff barriers and reducing the cost of international trade.  The United States looked forward to
the accession negotiations and to welcoming Ethiopia as a Member at their conclusion.
23. The representative of Peru, speaking on behalf of GRULAC
, said that these countries, like
others who had spoken, considered that in Ethiopia's accession process, account should be taken of its
status as an LDC.  It was also important that it be given all the necessary technical cooperation during
this process.
24. The representative of Japan said that Japan enjoyed close ties with Ethiopia, had been
cooperating with and contributing to its economic development, and stood ready to strengthen this
relationship.  The accession of Ethiopia would strengthen the multilateral trading system and would
further contribute to the development of the international trading regime.  At the same time it would
be beneficial to the promotion of Ethiopia's ec onomic reform in the context of the international
economy.  Japan was prepared to actively engage in negotiations in accordance with the recently
adopted Guidelines on LDCs' accession.
25. The representative of Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the ASEAN Members , said that they
had listened carefully to the statement by Ethiopia, and firmly believed that its accession would
contribute to the strengthening of the multilatera l trading system by bringing all trading partners
together under the same set of rules and disciplines which provided equality to all Members.  Two
national workshops had been organized with the support of the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats with
the objective of creating awareness and building understanding among the stake-holders in Ethiopia
about the multilateral trading system and WTO framework.  It was essential for Ethiopia to build theWT/GC/M/78
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necessary human and institutional capacities and to better acquaint itself with the WTO agreements.
WTO accession remained a major challenge, particularly for LDCs.  A lack of the necessary
infrastructure, legislative and enforcement mechanisms, and trained personnel had hampered
accession.  However, the urgency of addressing this problem had been recognized by Ministers in
Doha.  Paragraph 9 of the Doha Declaration stated that the accession of the LDCs remained a priority.The ASEAN Members sincerely hoped that Ethiopia would be successful in its accession process.
26. The representative of Bahrain said his delegation hoped that the accession of Ethiopia would
be speedy.  As an LDC, Ethiopia's request deserved to be given priority.
27. The representative of Botswana congratulated Ethiopia on its statement and on its painstaking
efforts to fulfil the accession requirements of the WTO.  This was an example of an LDC which had
queued for a considerable length of time to fulfil the WTO accession requirements.  It was also
gratifying that Ethiopia would be one of the first LDCs to benefit from the recently adoptedGuidelines on LDC accession.  Ethiopia was the seat  of the African Union, and Botswana wished it a
speedy accession.
28. The representative of Canada said his delegation wished to restate its commitment to the
application of the recently agreed Guidelines for the accession of LDCs, which aimed at facilitating
the accession of countries like Ethiopia.
29. The representative of Turkey congratulated Ethiopia for its outstanding statement.  Turkey
was ready to extend its support to Ethiopia in its accession process.  It was convinced that the
accelerated accession of Ethiopia to the WTO would have a positive effect on Ethiopia's economy as
well as on the daily lives of its people.
30. The representative of Slovenia, speaking also on behalf of Bulgaria , Croatia , Czech Republic ,
Estonia, Hungary , Latvia , Lithuania , Poland , Romania  and Slovak Republic , wished Ethiopia a
speedy inclusion as a WTO Member.
31. The General Council took note of the statements and of the expressions of welcome and
support, and agreed to establish a working part y with the following terms of reference and
composition:
Terms of Reference:
"To examine the application of the Government of Ethiopia to accede to the WTO Agreement
under Article XII, and to submit to the General Council recommendations which may include
a draft Protocol of Accession."
Membership:
Membership would be open to all Members indicating their wish to serve on the Working
Party.
Chairmanship:
The General Council would authorize its Chairman to designate the Chairperson of the
Working Party in consultation with representatives of Members and with the representative of
Ethiopia.
32. The General Council so agreed.WT/GC/M/78
Page 8
33. The Chairman invited the representative of Ethiopia to consult with the Secretariat as to
further procedures, in particular regarding the basic documentation to be considered by the Working
Party.
34. The representative of Ethiopia, speaking as an observer , thanked delegations for their warm
welcome and support for Ethiopia's request.  He assured Members that Ethiopia would do its best to
speed up the accession process.  In thanking Member s for their confidence in its efforts, he said that
Ethiopia would do its best to be the right type of Member.
35. The General Council took note of the statement.
3. Council for TRIPS – Report on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
36. The Chairman recalled that the General Council had considered this matter at its meeting in
December 2002, and had invited the TRIPS Council to resume work on this matter promptly at the
beginning of 2003 to resolve the outstanding issues in the Chairman's text of 16 December and to
report to the General Council, so that a decision implementing a solution to the problem identified in
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was taken at the first
General Council meeting in 2003.
37. Mr. Pérez Motta (Mexico), Chairman of the Council for TRIPS, reporting on that Council's
further consideration of this matter, recalled that the General Council had agreed on 20 December that
the TRIPS Council should resume work promptly at the beginning of 2003 to resolve the outstanding
issues in the text he had circulated on 16 December, and to report to the General Council so that a
decision implementing a solution to the problem identified in paragraph 6 could be taken at the first
General Council meeting in 2003.  In line with these instructions he had been actively engaged inconsultations aimed at resolving the outstanding problem.  His impression was that there was a widely
shared desire to find a solution as soon as possible and to be willing to look positively at proposals
aimed at providing the level of comfort necessary for the text of 16 December to be acceptable to all.
Indeed, he sensed that a certain momentum towards finding a solution had been generated in recent
days, and felt it was important that advantage should be taken of this.  He had been exploring certainideas with Members and had had positive reactions, but it was too early to be able to report on
whether these would be able to lead to a final solution.  In these circumstances, he requested the
General Council to consider providing an additional period for further deliberations in capitals and
consultations in Geneva.  His aim was to have something more concrete to report to Members by the
end of the TRIPS Council meeting scheduled for the week of 17 February.
38. The Chairman proposed that the General Council take note of the progress report by the
Chairman of the TRIPS Council on the status of his further consultations, and agree to suspend
discussion on this item and to revert to it at a reconvened meeting to be held shortly.
39. The General Council so agreed. 1
                                                     
1 In a communication dated 3 March 2003 (JOB(03)/46) the Chairman informed Members that for
reasons indicated therein, and in light of a letter addressed to him from the Chairman of the TRIPS Council, the
General Council meeting of 10 February would be considered closed unless any delegation informed him by5 March of its wish to have the General Council reconvene in the coming days.  No such communications wasreceived.WT/GC/M/78
Page 9
4. Committee on Trade and Development – Repo rt by the Chairman of the Committee in
Special Session on Special and Differential Treatment in Pursuance of Paragraph 12.1 of
the Doha Ministerial Decision on Impl ementation-Related Issues and Concerns
40. The Chairman recalled that the General Council had considered this matter at its meeting in
December 2002 and had authorized the Committee on Trade and Development in Special Session to
continue its work towards finalizing its report on special and differential treatment in pursuance of
paragraph 12.1 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, and
to report back to the General Council at its first meeting in 2003.
41. Mr. Smith (Jamaica), Chairman of the Committee on Trade and Development in Special
Session, reporting on this matter, recalled that when the General Council had met in December, he
had indicated that the Special Session had not been able to finalize its report and was therefore unable
to report, in accordance with its mandate, to the General Council with clear recommendations fordecision.  He had drawn attention to the draft report that was under consideration by the Special
Session and had indicated that there were two main outstanding elements – the Special Session had
not been able to agree on (i) a package of Agreement-specific proposals, and (ii) the Way Forward.
The General Council had instructed the Special Session to continue work towards finalizing its report
and to report to the present meeting.  The Special Session's finalized report was contained inTN/CTD/7, which was before the Council.  The report had two main sections.  The first part
recounted factually in summary form the proceedings of the Special Session since July 2002, when
the previous report had been submitted to the General Council.  Since then, the Special Session had
met formally nine times and on numerous occasions in informal sessions.  It had received
15 submissions from Members, and had considered during its meetings Agreement-specific proposals,systemic and cross cutting issues, the Monitoring Mechanism and, preliminarily, the incorporation of
special and differential treatment into the architecture of WTO rules.
42. The second part of the report made recommendations on the Way Forward.  The Special
Session recommended that the General Council take note of the agreement in principle that had been
reached on 12 Agreement-specific proposals, and revert to the question of the adoption of theseproposals at a later date.  It also recommended that the General Council "provide clarification, as it
considers appropriate, regarding paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and paragraph 12
of the Decision on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns, and the means to give effect to the
mandate."  Finally, it recommended that, in the intervening period, the Special Session suspend
further work.  As a brief background to these recommendations, he said that a large number of
Members, and particularly those who had submitted Agreement-specific proposals, had expressed
disappointment with the missed deadlines that had attended the work of the Special Session, and withthe outcome of the consideration of the Agreement-specific proposals.  They had expressed the view
that progress would not be possible unless issues relating to the mandate of the Special Session were
clarified.  It had also been proposed by these Members that work on all matters before the Special
Session be suspended, pending such clarification.  Other Members had been of the view that some
progress had been made in the Special Session's work, including on the Agreement-specific proposals.They considered that the source of difficulty relate d mainly to the nature of some of the Agreement-
specific proposals and the expectations by proponents regarding the outcome of their consideration.
These Members had expressed willingness to continue working on the issues before the Special
Session.  The recommendations to the General Council for its consideration reflected the concern
raised by a large number of Members that clarification of the paragraphs containing the SpecialSession's mandate was required, and that work should be suspended on all matters before the Special
Session while this was undertaken.
43. All delegations who spoke expressed their deep  appreciation to the Chairman of the CTD in
Special Session for his tireless efforts and for his determination to move the work of that body
forward in very difficult circumstances.WT/GC/M/78
Page 10
44. The representative of Pakistan said that had it not been for the patience and personal initiative
of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, even the little progress made would not have been
possible.  As Pakistan had stated in the CTD in Special Session, it had tried to facilitate the discussion
and the process by not insisting on decisions on proposals put forward by a group of developing
countries, including his own.  It had patiently aw aited a meaningful outcome on the LDC and African
Group proposals.  The results, however, had not been as encouraging as had been hoped.  The reasons
were obvious from the report just made by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session.  Pakistan was
willing to commence work in the Special Session m eaningfully as soon as the clarification being
sought was provided by the General Council.  It was hopeful that given the collective wisdom of the
General Council, Members would be able to infuse fresh impetus and renewed vigour and dedication
into the work of the CTD in Special Session, so that a meaningful and substantive report could be
presented to Ministers at Cancún, and to restore conf idence of the LDCs and developing countries that
the Doha mandate was indeed a development agenda.
45. The representative of Bangladesh, speaking on behalf of the LDCs , said that while submitting
their proposals on S&D provisions, the LDCs had made their best efforts to take on board the
concerns of the membership.  The LDCs' concerns were very specific – they wanted to integrate into
the multilateral trading system as soon as possible.  The S&D provisions were key to this process, andwere what enabled these countries to slowly take on their responsibilities.  The key to this process was
the latitude the membership allowed LDCs during the period of their integration.  In this area, the
LDCs felt that their development partners had to take the lead role.  Taking into account their needs,
the LDCs had suggested proposals for making S&D provisions more precise, effective and
operational.  Their latest suggestions had been submitted on 30 January and they were contemplatingsubmitting a few more.  While the LDCs appreciated the progress on some of the proposals they had
submitted.  However, the proposals that contained substantive elements and had economic value had
not been given due consideration.  In fact, the proposals of critical importance to LDCs had not been
included in Annex III of TN/CTD/7.  The LDCs wished to see their proposals considered in their
entirety, and wished to emphasize that the Annex III proposals could not be considered in isolation of
other proposals submitted by LDCs.  Further, they felt there was scope for improvement to the
proposals in Annex III.
46. From the report of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, it was clear there were
divergent views regarding the interpretation of some aspects of the Doha mandate.  The only way to
make S&D provisions precise, effective and operational was to convert the "best endeavour"
provisions into action-oriented language.  The LDCs had hoped that after Doha, their development
partners would consider implementing S&D provisions in the spirit reflected in the Doha documents,and had hoped that others would join them in implementing the mandate from Ministers.  Despite the
extension of the mandated deadline for resolution of this matter, not much progress had been
achieved.  He emphasized that the LDCs still maintained an open mind on this subject, and wanted
serious engagement and meaningful progress.  It was therefore necessary for the General Council to
provide clarification of paragraph 44 of the Doha De claration as well as paragraph 12 of the Decision
on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.  The LDCs requested the General Council, which
discharged the functions of the Ministerial Conference in the intervals between meetings of the latter,
to clarify the Doha mandate as recommended in the report presented by the Chairman of the CTD in
Special Session.  All past Ministerial Declarations had reiterated that LDCs were the least integrated
group of countries in the multilateral trading system.  The existing S&D provisions were aimed athalting their increasing marginalization in world trade.  Unless these provisions were made precise,
effective and operational, the LDCs would not be able to effectively integrate into the multilateral
trading system.
47. The representative of Cuba said that for Cuba, S&D was a fundamental part of the Doha
Declaration and an integral part of the WTO agreements.  World trade statistics indicated that the
under-developed countries continued to face growing obstacles to their trade, which made their full
integration into the trading system more difficult.  Because of this, the incorporation of theWT/GC/M/78
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development dimension into the multilateral rules as had been decided in Doha was an unavoidable
necessity.  Nevertheless, Cuba noted with great dissatisfaction that in spite of the proposals submitted
by the African Group, the LDCs and other developing countries, more than 70 issues were still
awaiting a decision and, even worse, attempts were being made to use delaying tactics by trying to
introduce new interpretations which limited the scope of the principle underlying S&D treatment.This was not in compliance with the Doha Declaration.  Her delegation deplored the fact that the
proposals submitted had not been favourably received.  For Cuba, the only way to implement the
Doha mandate was to produce language on S&D provisions to make them more operative, more
functional and more effective.  It was difficult to make any progress on other areas of the work
programme without a substantial and sustained result on S&D treatment, which was a fundamental
issue.  Cuba supported the statement by Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs.
48. The representative of Brazil said that the Doha mandate on S&D represented a consensual
commitment by Members to correct imbalances and prevent actual disadvantages that developing
countries faced in the multilateral trading system.  Brazil had hoped that Members would actively
engage in these negotiations.  Rebuilding the confidence of developing countries in this organization
had, after all, been a major objective since Seattle and one of the pillars of the Doha mandate.
However, after more than one year of work Members were forced to recognize that no results wereforthcoming.  Increasing frustration among developing countries as to the overall negotiating context
in the WTO should thus not be surprising.  However, Members had to insist, and Brazil was prepared
to continue seeking further clarification of the Doha mandate in the General Council as recommended
in the report of the CTD in Special Session, with a view to allowing concrete and effective results for
developing countries, in particular the LDCs.  Brazil supported the Director-General's initiatives inthis regard.  It remained committed to fulfilling Ministers' mandate and appealed to those who were
still resisting a solution to this very important and urgent problem to fully engage in the negotiations.
49. The representative of China said it was obvious that after the extension of the deadline of the
work of the CTD in Special Session, the outcome of the discussions was far from a satisfactory
solution to the relevant issues.  Little substantial progress had been made in the implementation of the
mandate in the Doha Declaration on the improvement and strengthening of existing S&D treatment
provisions of the WTO agreements.  As a developing-country Member, China attached great
importance to the negotiations on the issue of S&D treatment.  A successful result of work in this
regard was of paramount significance to the confidence-building of the developing-country Members
in the multilateral trading system and in the ongoing negotiations.  It was also a touchstone, as to
whether Members really wanted to make the Doha Development Agenda a development round.  His
delegation was of the view that the essence of the whole matter was political will from Members.Negotiations in the past year had proved that, without a will, Members could never accomplish
anything.  China therefore appealed to Members, particularly the major trading partners, to
demonstrate their will and adopt a more positive and flexible attitude towards the S&D issues of great
concern to the developing-country Members, thus paving the way for the negotiations in other areas.
Regarding the interpretation of the Doha mandate on S&D, China felt that this was clear enough toimplement.  However, since there were big diff erences on the way to fulfil this mandate, and this
constituted a major obstacle in the Special Session's deliberations on Agreement-specific issues,
China agreed that the General Council should give further directions in this regard.  His delegation
was of the view that changing the existing language, wherever necessary, of relevant S&D treatment
provisions was part of that mandate and the best way to make these provisions more precise, effectiveand operational.  If the General Council could give clear directions, the discussions in the CTD in
Special Session should continue in order to make clear recommendations before the Cancún
Ministerial Conference.
50. The representative of Paraguay said that his delegation welcomed the report in TN/CTD/7
which reflected the status of the negotiating process on S&D treatment, which was the essence of the
Doha Development Agenda.  That report allowed Members to measure the major effort still required
and the limited degree of progress achieved so far.  Paraguay considered S&D treatment to provide anWT/GC/M/78
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opportunity for countries to participate and integrate in the multilateral trading system.  It was
therefore not a coincidence that ever since the launch of the work programme under paragraph 44 of
the Doha Declaration, his delegation had been actively involved in these negotiations in the
constructive spirit needed to reach understandings which were beneficial to all Members, while taking
a firm and resolute line to ensure that the Doha Ministerial mandate was fulfilled.  Testimony to thiswas the number of proposals Paraguay had tabled, as listed in Annex 1 of the report.  Several of its
proposals had been submitted with a view to reaching an understanding on and ensuring effective
implementation of S&D treatment.  It was his delegation's understanding that S&D treatment was not
an end in itself, but rather a means to help establish freer and fairer trade, and that it should therefore
provide positive responses for the benefit of all developing countries.  For this reason, his delegation
had repeatedly claimed that no S&D treatment should cause prejudice to another developing-country
Member.  In this context, Paraguay accepted the principle of flexibility, but the limit of flexibility wasprecisely that such differential treatment did not cause prejudice to other developing countries.  This
position was clearly embodied in the first part of paragraph 12 of the report in TN/CTD/7.
51. In December 2002 Members had reached a particularly important understanding on the
Enabling Clause, and Paraguay hoped that this Clause would be implemented in spirit and in letter as
agreed in 1979, i.e. S&D treatment which was "generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory".This was confirmed in Annex III of the report.  However, yet another deadline would have to be
extended.  Paraguay had voiced its concern over this to the TNC the previous week and wished to do
so again at the present meeting, since this would be the third time that a new deadline had been
established.  Similarly, the progress which had been made was not sufficiently encouraging to spark
discussions, which in itself explained the lack of political will on the part of developed countries toproceed further.  His delegation was committed to the implementation of what had been established at
Doha.  Members had agreed that S&D treatment provisions should be strengthened and made more
precise, effective and operational.  However, the discussions in the CTD in Special Session had led to
a consensus that significant clarifications by the General Council were required, as clearly stated in
paragraph 18 of the report.  Paraguay hoped that at the end of this process an understanding would bereached that S&D treatment should not cause prejudice to developing countries not receiving such
treatment, and that it should, above all, prevent discrimination.  He reiterated that his delegation was
committed to the negotiating process currently under way and that it was hoping for more – indeed, a
great deal more – given that the results to date were unsatisfactory.
52. The representative of the European Communities said his delegation was somewhat
disappointed by the report of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session.  The Community had been
working hard and in good faith on Agreement-specific proposals.  Work on these issues had takenmore time than might have been required, and the result might have been more substantive.
Nonetheless, there was agreement on 12 measures, and in the Community's view Members should
take a decision on these at the present meeting.  It was demotivating to be unable to decide on matters
where there was agreement.  The fact that there was apparently no agreement on the way forward
should not be an excuse to renounce taking decisions wherever that appeared possible.  Membersshould try to highlight the areas of agreement rather than avoiding progress on a broad front.  The
Community was fully committed to making the Doha Development Round a success, and therefore
the need to specifically address development needs in each and every one of the negotiating areas.
The Community had been doing so in its proposals on agriculture and industrial products.  In its
services offers it would specifically take account of developing countries' interests, and would do soin any other sector.  The Community remained fully committed to taking whatever decision was
necessary on the basis of paragraph 44 of the Ministerial Declaration with a view to strengthening
S&D provisions, and remained of the opinion that more Agreement-specific measures could be
decided before Cancún.  The Community attributed an important role, as others, to the CTD in Special
Session, which should continue to monitor and give overall guidance to the work on S&D.  However,Members needed to be realistic and follow the earlier advice of the Chairman of the CTD in Special
Session to rationalize future work on S&D.WT/GC/M/78
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53. No one could deny that part of the 85-odd proposals fell in the remit of the Negotiating
Groups which, as a matter of fact, had already started to deal with S&D related issues, for example,
the Agriculture Committee.  One could not deny either that, on some matters, further input of
technical subsidiary bodies appeared to be not only useful, but sometimes essential.  At the same time,
however, all agreed that it remained up to the CTD in Special Session to have the overall overviewand to give guidance.  His delegation did not understand the reluctance of Members to make full use
of the CTD in Special Session in addressing, as well, cross-cutting issues which might be of value to
give guidance to the work in the various Negotiating Groups.  Members needed to develop a clear
S&D strategy in the interests of developing countries, and it would therefore be necessary to link up
effectively S&D, capacity building and domestic development, a point made by South Africa at the
February meeting of the TNC.  Under these circumstances, his delegation was not pleased with the
recommendations included in the report by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session whichimplied a standstill in future work in that body.  Members urgently needed to find ways and means to
break the present deadlock in the work on S&D, and to seek whatever clarification was necessary.  He
reiterated his delegation's suggestion at the February meeting of the TNC to organize a kind of retreat
to discuss in-depth how to link up effectively S&D, capacity building and domestic development, and
to clarify what should be done in the short term and what could be done in the medium and longerterm.  Such a discussion should be at the level of Heads of Delegations and might contribute to the
necessary clarifications.  This could be done either in the CTD in Special Session or in the General
Council in Special Session.  Members needed to speak  clearly to each other, putting aside technical
considerations, in order to increase mutual understanding in a result-oriented way and to see how they
could make enough progress, both in the short and longer term.
54. The representative of Morocco, speaking on behalf of the African Group
, noted with
satisfaction that progress had been made since the last meeting of the CTD in Special Session, and
noted also that these results had been obtained as a result of the tenacity and determination of the
Chairman of the CTD in Special Session.  Nevertheless , in view of the mandate in paragraph 44 of the
Doha Declaration, the results did not meet the expectations of the African Group, which hadsubmitted more than 80 proposals.  The more proposals they had submitted, and the more flexible
they had been, the fewer responses and political will they had received from the other side.  However,
in order to enable the Special Session to continue its work in a positive spirit, he hoped that the
General Council would clarify the interpretation of paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration and also
paragraph 12 of the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.  Only this clarification,
which should be clear, precise and totally unambiguous, would make it possible to end the deadlock
in this work and enable Members to work on a common consensus interpretation with a view to theCancún Conference.  Consequently, the African Group supported the recommendation by the
Chairman of the CTD in Special Session to suspend the work of the Special Session until that
clarification had been provided by the General Council.
55. The representative of Kenya said that her delegation supported the statement by Morocco on
behalf of the African Group.  In spite of the efforts of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session
and the numerous formal and informal meetings of that body, the outcome had been unsatisfactory.
This had been stated by others, including the Community and China, and Kenya shared their
disappointment.  It was concerned that only 12 Agreement-specific proposals had been concluded,
and that further work was required even on some of these.  Her delegation was extremely frustrated
that of the 80 proposals the African Group had submitted, only three had been agreed, after nearly ayear of intensive consultations and discussions.  At this rate, more than 20 years would be needed to
go through the 80 proposals made by the African Group, and probably another 10 years to go through
all the other submissions.  This was not encouraging, nor did it send the right signal regarding
Members' seriousness to conclude the work under the Doha mandate on time.  As her delegation had
stated previously, it had expected that the CTD in Special Session would focus on Agreement-specificproposals in order to fully realize the mandate that had been given to it.  This had not been the case
and, as could have been expected, it had been difficult to agree on a clear future work programme orWT/GC/M/78
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on the issues and proposals themselves.  Members were unable to agree either on process or on
substance.
56. It was clear from the factual report by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session that
because of the differences in the interpretation of the Doha mandate, Members had not been able to
agree.  Kenya therefore supported the proposal that the General Council clarify this mandate so thatall could have a common understanding on what should be done to strengthen and operationalize the
S&D provisions.  The clarification sought in the Chairman's report should not be seen as a challenge
to instructions given at Doha, but rather as a way of bridging Members' thinking on this issue so that
the CTD in Special Session could resume its work and complete its mandate before Cancún.  Her
delegation wished to stress that the mandate of the CTD in Special Session under paragraph 44 of the
Doha Declaration had been stated with a degree of urgency.  The intention was to conclude the review
of all S&D treatment provisions in order to strengthen and operationalize them before the FifthMinisterial Conference.  That urgency had unfortunately not been respected.  However, Kenya
remained hopeful that once the General Council had clarified the mandate, Members would embark
on this work with a sense of seriousness and urgency.  Although Kenya was committed to this process
and stood ready to engage, it had to caution that its resources were limited and its ability to engage in
multiple negotiations and consultations was under serious strain.  This was a result of the slippingdeadlines and the lack of political will to move the process forward.
57. The representative of Venezuela said that incorporating S&D treatment into the multilateral
trading system was necessary in order to balance the vast differences between Members resulting
from the Uruguay Round.  The developing world's interest in maintaining the validity of this
principle, an important one within the system, had once again been reflected in the Doha Declarationas one of the concessions made, so that developing countries would accept a new round of
negotiations.  Consequently, developing countries and LDCs had been treating these issues very
seriously and had made constructive proposals for identifying ways of implementing their obligations
and exercising their rights in a manner consistent with the postulates of development.  However, since
work on this matter had begun, one group of developed countries had maintained that the mandatefrom Ministers did not include introducing any amendments to the agreements in order to render S&D
treatment provisions effective, operational and mandatory, and had sought to portray S&D treatment
as limited to a few horizontal issues.  Venezuela believed that an adequate balance of rights and
obligations between such diverse Members might well require recourse to re-interpretation or some
other approach, including amendment of the texts, to ensure that the S&D treatment provisions were
operational, mandatory and effective.  The General Council was being called upon to give renewed
impetus to the task entrusted to Members.  Vene zuela therefore appealed to the General Council to
work constructively and not to repeat the sterile discussion which had taken place in the CTD in
Special Session.  Incentives were needed to keep spirits high in the run-up to Cancún and to guarantee
the success of that Conference.
58. The representative of Canada said that Canada was fully committed to and engaged in
fulfilling the mandate of the Doha Declaration on S&D treatment.  It believed that the report
presented by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session represented a comprehensive account of the
work in that body, and demonstrated that some progress had been made in the consideration of the
Agreement-specific proposals.  However, this had been rejected by some Members as insufficient.
This rejection was unfortunate, as some of the agreed proposals would have set Members on a path to
reducing some of the problems identified by developing-country Members, and in particular the least-developed.  Having reached this impasse, the CTD now turned to the General Council for guidance as
to how to proceed.  Canada believed the Genera l Council should draw from the experience of the
work of the CTD in Special Session to date, and suggested that the following four points be taken into
account to ensure that the work proceeded more efficiently and more productively than it had to date.
First, many of the Agreement-specific proposals related to trade-related technical assistance (TRTA).Canada, along with many other Members, was working actively to enhance TRTA and capacity
building.  His delegation could not, however, commit its Government to undertaking in the WTO toWT/GC/M/78
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deliver mandatory and open-ended technical assistance.  Canada believed that technical assistance
proposals should be examined in the context of the WTO's integrated TRTA plan.  Second, Canada
was prepared to give sympathetic consideration to proposals for extensions of transition periods or
other S&D provisions.  In the interests of transparency, it believed that such extensions should be
reviewed on their individual merits and therefore should not operate on an automatic or self-determined basis.
59. Third, Canada was willing to examine proposals for amendment of WTO agreements in the
appropriate WTO bodies.  To that end it supported the active engagement of the CTD in Special
Session as set out in paragraph 51 of the Doha Declaration.  Fourth, and more specifically, Canada
was working actively with developing-country Members to assist them in meeting WTO-agreed
health and safety standards.  It believed that the SPS and TBT Committees had achieved a
considerable measure of success in meeting this objective, but wished to make clear that it was notable to agree to proposals which would compromise health and safety standards in Canada.  Canada
supported the report presented by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, and regretted that it
had not been possible to harvest agreement on the set of proposals set out in Annex III of that report.
Canada agreed that faced with this impasse, Me mbers needed guidance from the General Council as
to how to proceed more effectively to meet the mandate on S&D treatment set out in the DohaDeclaration.
60. The representative of Argentina said that the report submitted by the Chairman of the CTD  in
Special Session showed the enormous difficulties that had confronted the work of that body and
which were reflected in the very meagre results achieved.  This had been in spite of the enormous
input of energy, imagination and diplomatic talent the Chairman of that body, with the excellentassistance of the Secretariat, had injected throughout the process.  In addition, Members had spared no
energy or resources during this process.  Proof of this was the large number of proposals that had been
made and the great number of meetings, both formal and informal, that had taken place.  There was no
doubt that only very powerful factors could explain the lack of progress in spite of this enormous
amount of resources and energy that had been devoted.  The main reason delegations had highlightedwas the differing interpretations of the Doha mandate, particularly regarding paragraph 44 of the
Doha Declaration and paragraph 12.1 of the Decision on Implementation.  While there clearly were
differences, it was important to pinpoint the basic factors underlying the different approaches.  In the
final analysis, and as some delegations had said, what defined substance and the direction of action
was political will – in this case the political will to produce changes in the multilateral trading system
necessary for a fair, balanced and beneficial integration of the developing and least-developed
countries.
61. Members were supposed to be dealing with a development agenda, and the Doha round was a
development round.  However, it was the issues of most interest to the developing countries which
were being postponed and not being resolved.  There had been a succession of circumstances which
were becoming a trend, and which applied to all areas of the negotiations.  It could be discussed in the
General Council whether paragraph 44 of the Doha  Declaration or paragraph 12.1 of the Decision on
Implementation made it possible to amend the agreements or not.  Positions for or against would be
eloquently defended with serious arguments on both sides.  However, this discussion would not
resolve the current difficulties.  Apart from an ex change of views, it was necessary that all actors,
particularly the main ones, recognized that the health, flexibility, and solidity of the multilateral
trading system imperatively required the active involvement of the developing countries and theLDCs, and that this involvement required that the system involve them as actors and protagonists, so
that as a result of their interaction with other actors, they could fulfil their needs and meet their
expectations.  Lack of progress on these issues did not affect just the developing countries, but the
multilateral trading system as a whole.  Based on these considerations, his delegation would support
any initiatives, and would make all the necessary efforts to ensure that in the context of therecommendations by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, these were based on the
considerations Argentina had outlined.WT/GC/M/78
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62. The representative of Indonesia recalled that at the General Council meeting in July 2002,
developing and least-developed countries had again shown flexibility in accepting an extension of the
deadline to continue the discussion of S&D treatment provisions.  In light of the discussions held thus
far, especially in the past two months, what had been achieved had been really insignificant.
Indonesia agreed with others that progress had been  made on some S&D provisions.  However, if one
compared the number of Agreement-specific proposals submitted by the African countries, LDCs, and
a group of developing countries, including Indonesia, what had been agreed was far short of the
expectations of many delegations.  His delegation was deeply disappointed with the slow progress of
the discussions on S&D provisions.  Regarding the i ssue of the way forward and paragraph 22 of the
report in TN/CTD/7, where the General Council was asked to give further clarification and directions
on how to deal with the different views and perceptions regarding the mandate, Indonesia supported
previous speakers who had reiterated what Ministers had stated in the Doha Declaration, namely thatthey attached importance to the issue of the S&D tr eatment, and agreed to seek a prompt solution and
to take concrete actions on these issues.  His delegation believed therefore that this subject had the
highest priority in the work programme, and that it had to be concluded before the Cancún Ministerial
Conference.
63. The representative of Colombia said that his delegation had been carefully following the work
of the CTD in Special Session and wished to state its disappointment over the lack of any concrete
results to the benefit of the developing countries.  Colombia very much regretted that some countries
had put on the table issues that, rather than strengthening the position of developing countries, had
promoted differences among those countries.  His delegation wished to stress the factual nature of the
first part of the report.  Colombia supported the discussions that would take place in the GeneralCouncil on the Special Session's scope and mandate, and would take part in them in a constructive
way.  He said that it might be useful for the General Council to try to find different ways of
undertaking the process that would lead to more productive discussions in the CTD.  In particular, one
could examine which provisions relating to S&D had actually been applied in an effective way to the
benefit of the developing countries, and the impact and benefits on those countries.  In the same wayone could identify those provisions that had not been applied, or had been applied only in a marginal
way, and these analyses could help Members determine what type of S&D treatment was being
applied by developed countries and to understand why certain provisions were applied and others not.
This might shed light on how to make operational more effective S&D treatment which at present was
an integral part of WTO agreements and was essential for the strengthening of the multilateral trading
system.  The imbalances of the Uruguay Round in view of world circumstances were now acquiring
greater dimensions.  It was extremely important that the multilateral system continued to support thedifficult situation in which many developing countries found themselves, and their lack of capability
to face on their own the great challenges involved  in participating in world markets and meeting
major international challenges.
64. The representative of Uganda said that whatever little – and it was indeed very little – had
been achieved in the CTD in Special Session was due to its Chairman.  He associated his delegation
with the statement by Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs and Morocco on behalf of the African
Group.  Both the LDCs and Africa remained very much marginalized in the multilateral trading
system.  It was therefore not surprising that they had a special interest and had made enormous efforts
with regard to the question of S&D treatment.  These countries were a clear example of those needing
S&D treatment.  They had had high expectations from the adoption of paragraph 44 of the DohaDeclaration and paragraph 12 of the Decision on Implementation, regarding the review of S&D
treatment provisions to make them more precise, effective and operational, and that had been their
objective.  He recalled the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on measures in favour of LDCs,
paragraph 1 of which stated that, "notwithstanding their acceptance of these instruments, the least-
developed countries and for as long as they remain in that category, while complying with the generalrules set out in the aforesaid instruments, will only be required to undertake commitments and
concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs, or
their administrative and institutional capabilities".  Paragraph 2(v) of that Decision also stated that,WT/GC/M/78
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"[l]east-developed countries shall be accorded subs tantially increased technical assistance in the
development, strengthening and diversification of their production and export bases including those of
services, as well as in trade promotion, to enable them to maximize the benefits from liberalized
access to markets".
65. These had guided the LDCs in their presentatio ns.  The LDCs had engaged constructively and
had been willing to be flexible, but regrettably in some cases their developed partners had diluted the
Decision taken by Ministers in Marrakesh.  They regretted that agreement had been reached on only a
few of their proposals.  Suggestions had been made that some of the issues should be taken up either
in negotiating groups or in specialized subsidiary bodies.  However, as his delegation had said at the
February meeting of the TNC, the LDCs' stance on this issue had been born of their experience with
implementation issues, which had taken a similar route and on which no progress had been achieved
to date.  Thus, it was understandable why these countries were very apprehensive to take that route.Moreover, most developing countries, in particular LDCs, would require more resources to follow
these issues in many of the subsidiary bodies, whereas in the CTD in Special Session they had been
able to be more focused and to put their manpower where they felt it would have maximum effect.  It
was their hope that S&D issues would not suffer the same fate as implementation issues.  The CTD in
Special Session had requested the General Council to  clarify the mandate from Ministers, and Uganda
hoped this would be possible, since it seemed that some were revisiting that mandate.  His delegation
would remain engaged.
66. The representative of Hungary said that the report unfortunately indicated there was no
possibility of even a partial outcome at the present time on the issues on which agreement had been
reached.  Hungary was concerned about this situation, as it agreed with those who had emphasizedthat S&D was one of the most important elements  of the Doha Development Agenda.  Hungary had
taken an active part in this work, had made proposals and had tried to carry the negotiations forward,
and was concerned that there might be implications from the kind of stalemate Members were in.
From paragraph 22 of the report it was clear that all work in the CTD in Special Session would be
suspended pending clarification of the mandate by the General Council, which meant that work couldnot continue even in areas where the mandate was not an issue, and that no further progress could be
made.  Hungary very much regretted this situation, as it had been ready to go further and to look for
solutions acceptable to all.  However, Members had to recognize that there was no possibility to
continue the work if there was no consensus on the mandate, especially in the absence of agreement
from those countries which would be the beneficiaries of the provisions in question.
67. He wished to make three remarks about the present situation.  First, Hungary was concerned
over the possible precedent Members were setting with this kind of decision, i.e. asking forclarification by the General Council regarding paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  As
all were aware, the negotiation and agreement of this Declaration had taken basically three years and a
major effort.  First there had been the failure in Seattle and the need to agree on the language of a
mandate on which the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) could be launched.  Hungary was
concerned that by asking the General Council for clarifications about certain aspects of the Dohamandate, Members would be stepping back to a pre-Doha situation.  Many delegations, including
Hungary, were unhappy with various aspects of the Doha Ministerial mandate.  In other cases, the
provisions of the Doha Declaration were ambiguous, which was either intentional or the outcome of
difficult negotiations.  Hungary was concerned that based on this precedent, some countries might ask
for clarification of, for example, the meaning of non- trade concerns in agriculture.  He could list other
controversial subjects.  Members were at a major cross-roads in their negotiations and had to think
about the implications of any such decision.
68. Second, there was no deadline set for this clarification, which meant that the issue of the
meaning of the mandate would be like a Damocles ' sword dangling above Members, who would not
know whether or when it would fall, damaging ne gotiations in other areas.  Third, there was a need
for balanced progress, and he recalled the Director-General's statement at the recent TNC meeting thatWT/GC/M/78
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uneven progress would endanger the whole set of negotiations.  The route being considered would
leave one of the most important aspects of the negotiations in a kind of frozen state, with no progress
on any aspect.  This would clearly affect progress in other areas.  Members had to recognize this
situation and look for all possible ways and means to  carry this work forward.  In Hungary's view, it
would be useful to continue work in the CTD in Special Session, including on the implications andimplementation of the mandate.  Those issues which had been put forward in the CTD in Special
Session and which were covered by negotiations in other bodies could and should be taken up in those
bodies.  Lastly, Hungary could support the Community's  idea of Members dealing with this issue in a
targeted way at a retreat.  What it could not do was to sit back and leave this issue unattended.
69. The representative of Japan said that without the able guidance and hard work of the
Chairman of the CTD in Special Session over the we ekend as well as the support by the Secretariat,
the report could not have been approved.  Japan had been working with other Members, bothdeveloped and developing, to solve as many Agreement-specific proposals as possible and to
contribute to the discussions on broader issues such as cross-cutting issues, including the Monitoring
Mechanism.  Since the General Council meeting in December 2002, Members' collective efforts had
brought eight additional Agreement-specific proposals to the list of these for final approval of the
General Council.  His delegation was deeply disappointed that the report of the CTD in SpecialSession failed to recommend the Annex containing  the list of 12 Agreement-specific proposals for
approval by the Council.  It was regrettable that the very countries which had made these proposals
now opposed their approval by the Council.  Japan, together with other Members, was ready and
willing to continue the work in a manner which did not cause serious difficulties for Members with
small missions in Geneva, in order to make a final push towards adding some Agreement-specificproposals to the list, while focusing the work on the broader issues following the present meeting.
However, work depended on the action of the General Council on the points of major disagreement
among Members.  Japan noted that many delegations took the position that unless the General
Council clarified the interpretation of the Doha  mandate on S&D, meaningful work would not be
possible, and that this mandate included amending the existing S&D provisions.  The same group ofcountries also claimed that it was not until all Agreement-specific proposals were solved that other
issues, such as cross-cutting issues, would be a ddressed.  Japan could not share these views, but
would actively participate in the discussions in the General Council in order to enable all Members to
resume work as soon as possible on this very important issue.
70. Japan believed that the mandate was clear and unambiguous, and it had been working in the
CTD in Special Session to carry out this mandate.  Obviously, Members were free to make any
proposals, including amendments to the existing S&D provisions, but the mandate did not providethat the proposals be accepted as proposed.  Japan believed that those proposals calling for
amendments of the existing S&D provisions would be most appropriately addressed in the relevant
negotiating bodies.  It also believed that the proposal seeking the automatic application of S&D
provisions would jeopardize the existing procedures and damage the transparency of work in the
WTO.  Binding commitments to duty-free and quota-free treatment for all LDC products, andintroduction of obligations to extend technical assistance to unknown or indeterminate needs of the
developing countries would not be accepted, for well explained and clear reasons.  However, these
views had largely been neglected or opposed.  It took two to tango, and 144 Members to carry out a
mandate.  Japan was of the view that all Members should focus on how much they could achieve on
this important issue of S&D under the Doha mandate and should be aware of their collectiveresponsibility in this endeavour.
71. The representative of Switzerland said that despite enormous efforts, Members had come up
with what was in his delegation's view an unsatisfactory result.  Switzerland regretted this turn of
events.  His delegation felt that real progress had been achieved in recent weeks on specific proposals
submitted by developing countries and LDCs.  It had been possible to reach agreement on12 proposals, which Switzerland did not consider to be a mean result.  This result was especially
significant because it would probably have been possible to reach consensus on other proposals hadWT/GC/M/78
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Members had more time and had they been more ready to compromise.  Unfortunately, this process
had now been interrupted because of a disagreement about the meaning of the mandate given by
Ministers in Doha.  In his delegation's view, the difficulties encountered did not necessarily mean that
Members had to go back and examine the meaning and content of the mandate.  If they could not
agree on the responses to specific proposals, this was not because the mandate from Ministers wasambiguous.  Rather, the difficulties stemmed from the fact that Members judged the merits of the
proposals in different ways.  This could occur in any negotiation process and in any exercise
undertaken within this organization.  It was a fact of WTO life and one of the rules of the game.  If it
had not been possible to reach agreement, it was essentially because Members differed on the
substance of what was involved in these problems, and this had little to do with the mandate from
Ministers.
72. There were also differences of view on the appropriate place to conduct such an exercise.
Some, including Switzerland, felt that proposals wh ich involved amendments to WTO agreements
could only be successful if they were dealt with in their proper context, i.e. within a negotiating group.
In addition, the claim that all issues raised regarding WTO agreements had to be resolved before
moving on to anything else, such as cross-cutting is sues or those related to the architecture of the
WTO, was excessive.  The problems which had arisen essentially had to do with differences aboutsubstance.  It was clear that certain claims could not be satisfied, and as negotiators, Members had to
accept this.  His delegation had continued to push forward as much on specific issues as on more
general, cross-cutting and horizontal issues which had to do with the architecture of S&D in the
context of the WTO.  The problems of development were fundamental to all that had been done in
Doha, and there were various contexts in which Members could express their views on such matters.Some contexts, for example the respective negotiations on certain issues, were perhaps better suited
than others to achieving the results sought.  His delegation hoped that developing countries could
benefit from the opportunities open to all Members to express their views.  The decision to suspend
the work of the CTD in Special Session would not prevent any Member from voicing its claims or
making its proposals in the existing bodies of the WTO, especially in the negotiating bodies.
73. The representative of the United States said th at the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session
had made such dedicated use of his time that this had undoubtedly been at some cost to his ability to
follow other issues, and all owed him a debt of gratitude.  As others had said, the dearth of progress
on these issues had in no way been the fault of that Chairman.  His delegation shared the
disappointment of others that more had not been achieved in the process, since many hours had been
dedicated, both in Geneva and in capitals, to produce results.  From the beginning, the United States
had seen the Special Session process as an opportunity to engage in real problem solving, and todetermine where existing S&D provisions were and were not working.  His delegation agreed with
Colombia that a useful starting-point for the work of this group would be to look at the utilization and
actual experiences with existing provisions.  For that reason, the United States had been disappointed
when its proposals at the beginning of the process had not been met with much interest.  However,
when specific proposals had been made, his delegation had welcomed them as a means for Membersto focus their work and to share their interests.
74. The United States had consistently seen this as a qualitative process, not a quantitative one.
Success could not only be measured meaningfully by the number of proposals ultimately agreed upon.
The United States had taken this exercise seriously and had dedicated many hours to examining
proposals, providing comments in formal meetings and engaging in active dialogue on them.  In anumber of cases, where it could not agree on proposals, the United States had suggested alternatives.
However, on many other proposals, it had not been able to do so for several reasons.  First, it had
found that a number of proposals dealt with issues that were inextricably intertwined with matters
under consideration in negotiating groups and did not see how they could be dealt with separately
from those groups.  On some proposals, his delegation believed that acceptance would have negativeimplications for the trading system itself.  For example, his delegation did not believe it was
constructive to agree that any WTO Member could unilaterally change its WTO obligations throughWT/GC/M/78
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automatic extensions at its request, by allowing that Member to have a waiver without further
examination of its merits.  Nor did it believe that the fundamental transparency obligations of the
WTO should be eliminated in perpetuity for any set of countries.  Similarly, the United States had
strongly supported advancing technical assistance in the WTO through the establishment of the
Global Trust Fund.  However, proposals that called for binding commitments to technical assistanceor the piecemeal meeting of objectives were inappropriate and unwise.
75. The United States was committed to continuing work on making S&D provisions more
precise and meaningful to developing countries, in particular the LDCs.  However, it did not believe
that changing every "should" to "shall" was a meaningful way of accomplishing this goal.  Success
would not be measured by how many of any group's proposals were accepted.  Rather, it would be
measured by what Members had done to make the system function more effectively for all.  The
United States remained committed to that goal.  His delegation was disappointed with the report of theCTD in Special Session and its call for the suspension of work.  It was particularly disappointed –
although there had been difficulties on specific proposals – that Members had not agreed to continue
at least some work on the monitoring mechanism and architectural issues – which were clearly part of
the mandate – or other horizontal issues.  Time was a precious commodity and even if Members felt
that they might not be in a position to reach closure on some issues, the United States believed it wasa waste of resources and time not to have continued, or at least to begin discussion of these issues
which Members had barely spent any time on.  Regarding the recommendation of the Special Session
to the General Council, the United States did not see the problem as one of interpretation of the
mandate, but rather as honest differences of views on  substance.  Nevertheless, it would join in the
work of the General Council on these issues in the hope of moving work forward.
76. The representative of Australia said his delegation welcomed the agreement the Chairman of
the CTD in Special Session had been able to achieve in presenting a report to the General Council, but
was very disappointed that Members had not been able to make more progress.  One of the areas
many delegations had spoken about was the fact that there had been agreement on 12 proposals, but
there was no consensus to adopt them.  This was particularly unfortunate.  Members had made someprogress, and his delegation did not understand why they could not inscribe that progress.  The notion
of everything or nothing would not stand Members in good stead in  the negotiations.  In fact,
Australia had been in a position to agree to some additional proposals, which the Chair of the CTD in
Special Session had put forward, but progress had not been possible.  Australia wanted to continue to
work on this, and was very disappointed that the conclusion of the Special Session was that it should
suspend its work, as this was a very retrograde step.  His was one of the delegations which was very
sceptical about the need to clarify the mandate for the Special Session's work.  For the reasonsHungary had put forward, even though the General Council might be entitled to look at this mandate,
the idea of revisiting any one particular paragraph of the Doha Declaration had all sorts of
implications that would not make the task of achieving the results Ministers wanted any easier, and
would undoubtedly complicate the whole process of the preparations for Cancún.
77. Australia was one of the delegations which thought that the problem of making progress on
the Agreement-specific proposals involved the proposals themselves, not the mandate.  For the
reasons set out by Switzerland, Canada, the United States and others, Australia believed that obtaining
progress on these was a matter of political will, but that the political will would have to come from all
sides.  In the next few months in the negotiations, delegations were going to focus on some key core
areas of the WTO, i.e. in market access.  These were the areas which, in Australia's view, were goingto deliver some real and meaningful development results for developing countries – elimination of
agricultural export subsidies, a substantial reduction in the agricultural support policies rich countries
maintained, and the elimination of tariff escalation and tariff peaks on tropical products, fishery
products, forestry products, electrical products and leather goods.
78. That was not to say, nor did Australia wish to imply in any way, that it did not attach
importance to paragraph 44 of the Doha Declaration.  What he was trying to suggest was that thereWT/GC/M/78
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were synergies between what Members were trying to achieve on the core issues of market access and
what they were trying to achieve on paragraph 44, and there was no reason why these should not go
together.  Members should be very reluctant to  accept the recommendations of the CTD in Special
Session to suspend its work.  To the contrary, delegations should ask the Special Session to get back
to work, try to push ahead with negotiations both on Agreement-specific proposals and on cross-cutting issues, while perhaps not at the break-neck speed of recent weeks, but this work should
proceed in parallel with the work in other areas.  It would be very useful if developing countries
could, amongst themselves, work out some priorities in terms of the Agreement-specific proposals put
forward.  Australia would be happy to put priority on proposals from LDCs or countries in Africa.
His delegation wished to reiterate that nothing much would come of a debate in the General Council
to try to interpret the meaning of paragraph 44.  What was important was that delegations got back to
the work in the Special Session and made some progress across the board.
79. The representative of Norway said his delegation felt that in the present situation it seemed
that the beneficiaries of this work – developing countries and LDCs – wished to reflect further on
what Members were doing in the CTD in Special Session before taking decisions on these issues.  His
delegation too was disappointed that the important work of the CTD in Special Session could not go
forward in a clear and dedicated way.  Norway felt that the requests of the beneficiaries to thinkthrough what was going to be achieved in this work had to be taken seriously.  This was why his
delegation felt there was no alternative but to accept the recommendation which had come from the
CTD in Special Session.  It was normal to make a clarification of the mandate in a negotiation setting.
However, Members should not paint the devil on the wall.  While this was the first time that any of
the negotiating groups had asked a superior body to express a view on a mandate, in at least a coupleof negotiating groups there had been an active discussion on how to interpret the mandate, for
example, in the Committee on Trade and Environment and to some extent in the Negotiating Group
on Rules.  In itself, this was just a way to help the issues progress.
80. Having said this, his delegation felt that perhaps "clarification" was not the right word.  What
Members were really looking for was some guidance in order to see how they could deal with some of
the underlying issues that were holding up the process.  Members had to be honest with themselves.
For example, the discussion on the cross-cutting issues, described in paragraphs 10-12 of the report,
showed that on some of the fundamental cross-cutting issues, it would be very difficult to agree on the
level of ambition regarding the Agreement-specific proposals, because this was the crux of the matter.
Some Members had said that some of the Agreement-specific proposals, which had a very wide
context, were really less committing than the original  S&D provisions in the agreement.  The question
was how to approach these issues.  The Community 's proposal for a dedicated session was obviously
linking some of the more fundamental development issues to the work on S&D, and there should be
follow up on how that could be done.  Whether the discussion was in a dedicated session or a special
session of the General Council, it was very important to have more guidance on the crucial issues
which could help remove the present bottle-neck.  Norway believed that if Members could find a
greater level of understanding on some of these crucial issues, which basically were some of thosementioned under the paragraphs on cross-cutting issu es, work would be able to continue, including on
the Agreement-specific proposals, in due course.
81. The representative of Haiti said that Bangladesh, on behalf of the LDCs, had already
explained the reasons why S&D treatment was important for the LDCs, and many delegations had
repeated them.  In light of the statements made at the present meeting, and aside from therecommendations of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, it seemed necessary for Members
to see more clearly where they were going.  As his delegation saw it, the mandate was clear.  It was to
examine and analyze all the provisions relating to S&D treatment and make them more operational
and more effective, with all that this implied.  Having heard Members' statements under this item, the
question was should these provisions be made more binding on Members, and this became moreurgent when Members examined how to implement what Ministers had decided in paragraph 12.1 of
the Decision on Implementation.  He had even heard several delegations say that Members should notWT/GC/M/78
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deal with cross-cutting issues, but this paragraph spec ifically said that such issues – all issues relating
to S&D treatment – had to be examined.  Members were now deadlocked.  Haiti understood the
reactions of many Members, and especially of the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session.  Should
explanations be given every time Members found themselves in a deadlock, this would hold up and
make impossible the organization's work.
82. His delegation had followed the discussions in the Special Session as far as it had been able.
It supported those who had said that the heart of the problem was the lack of political will.  Some had
said there was a difference of views as to substance.  If this were so it was important that the General
Council take note of this and help to break the deadlock.  This would have consequences for the
Ministerial Conference in Cancún.  It would have c onsequences for small delegations such as his own,
which were unable to go to all of the meetings where Members repeated their positions again and
again.  This was a dialogue of the deaf and ther e was no political will.  As Norway had said, some
guidance was needed.  The Chairman of the CTD in Special Session had asked the General Council
for clarification, but was not calling for an interpretation.  It was being asked to indicate the way
forward, and it was the General Council that was in a position to provide guidance on this.  Without a
methodology, Members would lose their way, and as the United States had correctly pointed out, time
was money.  It was time for the General Council to take a decision.  If it could not or did not want topoint the way forward, Members would have to go to the Ministerial Conference, as this was the
highest body.  If Members had to take this failure to the Ministerial Conference, it would be to their
shame.  However, this was not a desirable course, and Members should try to find appropriate means
to get out of this deadlock.  The Chairman of the CTD in Special Session was asking for light to be
shed on this matter, and the General Council should try to do that in the way its Chairman felt wasmost appropriate, so that this mandate – which was so important not only for the LDCs but for all
Members – would be given the treatment it deserved.  Haiti, despite its weakness, was prepared to
contribute to a successful outcome, and could be relied upon to do everything to try to find a solution
to this problem.
83. The representative of Korea said that his delegation had mixed feelings about the results thus
far of the S&D review.  It shared with many deve loping countries their disappointment that the CTD
in Special Session could not fully meet what Mini sters had mandated, even with the extension of the
deadline at the end of July 2002.  At the same time, it was also disappointed that Members could not
harvest some of the meaningful progress they had made.  Agreement had been reached in principle on
12 proposals and an additional 21 proposals were in the final stage of discussion.  There had also been
limited but substantial progress in other areas, such  as cross-cutting issues, the monitoring mechanism
and technical and financial assistance and training.  The General Council was about to be entrustedwith the difficult and daunting task of providing a clarification on, and the legal and practical means
to give effect to, the mandate.  Korea hoped this ex ercise would be conducted not only in an expedited
manner so as to avoid overburdening the Cancún Ministerial, but also in a positive manner so that
Members could contain its spill-over effect on the negotiations in other areas.  His delegation would
support any initiative which could lead to an early and constructive solution.
84. The representative of India said it was a tribute to the patience of the Chairman of the CTD in
Special Session that Members had been able thus far to engage in constructive work, and a tribute to
his perseverance that they were close to agreement on at least 12 of the Agreement-specific proposals.
His delegation agreed with many of the statements made earlier by the proponents of various
proposals and also the statements by some other developing-country delegations that had taken anactive part in the discussions in the CTD in Special Session, namely China, Brazil and others.  His
delegation shared the disappointment expressed by so many at the present meeting.  The lack of
sufficient progress was not, in India's view, in consonance with the development dimension of the
Doha Development Agenda.  China and Paraguay had pointed out that the lack of progress was due to
the lack of political will.  Many Members at the previous General Council and TNC meetings hadobserved that implementation issues and S&D issues were the litmus test for the development
complement of the DDA.  One now had the results of that litmus test, and it was there for all toWT/GC/M/78
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evaluate and draw their own conclusions.  The pr oblems developing countries had faced in the CTD
in Special Session had been highlighted in the report submitted by its Chairman.  The road blocks
were also clearly identified therein.  India looked forward to early clarification and guidance from the
General Council which would help Members to restart the work in the CTD in Special Session.
85. The Chairman said that the results reported at the present meeting were a disappointment for
all of the reasons Members had stated, but that care should be taken in simply referring matters to the
General Council.  While this sometimes appeared to be easy or convenient, nothing could be further
from the truth.  He recalled, for example, the experi ence of sending the rules of origin issue to the
General Council, which had been supposed to deal with it at the political level, by engaging
Ambassadors, turning a new page, and sending a message to capitals.  While he was not saying that
this issue was similar to the rules of origin issue, it was a fact that in the General Council discussions
on the latter, it had proved to be very difficult to get more than four or five Ambassadors at any onemeeting.  That exercise had not yielded very different political value.  In his view Members should
think twice about sending matters to the General Council, which already had a full plate with issues
going to Cancún.  While he was in delegations' hands, he would advocate that, rather than adopting
the report with the repercussions that would have, Members consider taking note of it.  This would
allow a period of reflection.  There would obvious ly be a need for consultations, but he would be
more comfortable, as Chairman, proposing that the General Council take note of the report, given the
great trepidation many Members had expressed about formalizing the issues of clarification of the
mandate and suspension of the Special Session's work.  The action he suggested would perhaps do
better justice to all Members' positions at the present meeting.  He was prepared to do whatever the
membership wanted, but wished to invite Members to consider taking one small step back, in order toallow for some flexible reflection.  He did not know  how the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session
might feel about this suggestion, and invited the latter's thoughts.
86. The Chairman of the CTD in Special Session said that he too was in Members' hands on this
question.  The recommendations in TN/CTD/7 were those of the Special Session itself, and it was for
Members to decide whether or not they were prepared to take the step back the General CouncilChairman had, in his wisdom, suggested.  He woul d be comfortable with either course of action,
given that this matter had been discussed exhaustively in the Special Session, which had decided, after
great consideration, on the recommendations in the report.  There had been many thought-provoking
statements under this item at the present meeting, and if Members were of the view that they should
take a step back, as Chair of the CTD in Special Session he would not and could not have difficulty
with that.
87. The representative of India said that his delegation had also listened carefully to what others
had had to say.  There was an essential difference between the mandate on other negotiating subjects
and the mandate on S&D issues.  A specific deadline was mentioned in the Doha Declaration for
completing the work of the Special Session by 31 July 2002.  That deadline had been extended to
31 December and again later to the present meeting.  Despite these two extensions, India did not think
Members had progressed meaningfully in the Special Session.  He took the General CouncilChairman's suggestion in the right spirit, but needed some time to consult other proponents of the
proposals, in order to see whether it would be desirable to adopt the report or to take note of it.  He
thus requested that consideration of this item be suspended until after the upcoming lunch break or
perhaps until the end of the meeting.
88. The General Council agreed to suspend consideration of this item, and to revert to it
following the lunch break.
89. Following the lunch break, the Chairman recalled that delegations had been asked to reflect
on this issue, and said that he had done some reflec ting himself.  As Chair, he would be disposed to
propose taking note of the report and of all the statements, and that there be consultations, which hisWT/GC/M/78
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successor would have to conduct, in collaboration and cooperation with the Chairman of the CTD in
Special Session.
90. The representative of Bangladesh, speaking on behalf of the LDCs , recalled that their views
on the text prepared by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session was reflected in that text.  They
had also expressed their position in their earlier statement at the present meeting.  They had heard theoptions presented, and wished to reiterate that they would prefer adoption of the report by the General
Council.
91. The Chairman asked if Bangladesh's preference for adoption meant it would be opposed to
taking note of the report.
92. The representative of Bangladesh, speaking on behalf of the LDCs , replied in the affirmative.
93. The Chairman proposed, on this basis, that the General Council adopt the report by the
Chairman of the CTD in Special Session and take note of the statements.
94. The representative of Chile said that his delegation had participated quite actively in the
discussions in the Special Session and agreed that the Chairman of that body had done excellent work.
As he had not been at the meeting of the CTD in Special Session when the report had been adopted,
he had only seen the report that morning.  Throughout the discussion at the present meeting his
delegation had felt disappointment, like many others.  However, his delegation felt uncomfortable atbeing obliged to adopt a report in a situation where there seemed to be no reasonable way out, and
when Members were doing so without having had time to reflect or for him to consult with his capital.
Thus, what the General Council Chairman had suggested earlier seemed to make very good sense, as
it would provide a breathing space which did not have to be very long.  This would allow Members to
think things over again and see whether they really wanted to adopt the report and find themselves seton a course of action which might make things more difficult.  Chile would feel much more
comfortable if Members could have this breathing space and be able to reflect on this matter more
calmly.  This would not harm the development of events or any Member's interests, and would
provide a more solid foundation on which to take a decision.
95. The representative of Morocco, speaking on behalf of the African Group
, said these countries
wished to see the report adopted.
96. The representative of the European Communities said that his delegation was in the same
position as Chile.  It would feel extremely uncomfortable with a recommendation that would suspend
work on S&D treatment, as provided in the last paragraph of the report.  Members had to make their
best efforts to find ways and means to make progress on S&D treatment.  There had been several
suggestions from delegations at the present meeting, including the Community, to go into more depth
in the discussion and to make progress.  It was only fair to ask the incoming Chairman of the GeneralCouncil, in close contact with the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session and in consultation with
the membership, to consult on how to make a breakthrough in the existing deadlock.
97. The Chairman said that he was obviously in delegations' hands.  While two delegations had
responded in the negative concerning taking note of the report, two others were concerned about
adopting the report.  Thus, there seemed to be no clear consensus to adopt the report.  Under thecircumstances, all the General Council could do was to take note of all the statements, including the
report, and ask his successor to hold consultations as soon as possible in conjunction with the
Chairman of the CTD in Special Session.
98. The representative of Cuba said that her delegation also considered it necessary to adopt the
report, and drew attention to the fact that one of the two delegations in favour of adoption represented
a large number of Members, namely, the African Group.  If the report were not adopted, this issueWT/GC/M/78
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would be left in a kind of limbo.  Cuba did not thin k it would be fair to transfer the issue to the
incoming General Council Chairman.
99. The representative of India said that the two delegations who had requested adoption of the
report were speaking on behalf of two large groups, the LDCs and the African Group.  His delegation
had also considered very carefully what the General Council Chairman had said, and wished to havethe report adopted.  The Chairman had made the very pertinent point that there was no consensus on
adoption.  However, he respectfully wished to note that there was no consensus either on taking note
of the report.
100. The representative of Japan supported the statements by Chile and the Community that work
had been done and there was a need for some breathing space to think about the recommendation
from the CTD in Special Session.  Thus, Japan supported the suggestion to take note of the report.
101. The representative of Hungary noted that some delegations had said that only two delegations
were against adoption of the report while numerous others supported adoption.  Having regard to the
situation his country would be in in just over a year's time, he said that Hungary was very much
disturbed by the reference to the Community as "one delegation", when it represented a group of 15 –
and soon to be 25 – countries with roughly 30 per cent of world trade.  Aside from this, one
delegation had referred to the danger that if Members followed this route for this particular subject, itmight set a precedent for all difficult subjects – and every subject under the DDA was difficult – to
stop negotiations and to send the issue back to the General Council for clarification of the mandate.
Hungary remained of the view that it would be  a momentous decision from the General Council at
this point in time to take this route which was a rather slippery slope.  He proposed that as there was
apparently no consensus either for adoption or taking note, Members would perhaps have to consultinformally and come back to this issue.  This was just a procedural step, but for the reasons he had
outlined, Hungary also did not consider adoption of the report to be a good idea.
102. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation supported adoption of the report.
103. The representative of New Zealand said that his delegation's view was the same as Hungary's.
In the circumstances, where delegations were positioning themselves on the report per se  and what
should be done with the report, the only option was to take note of the statements and to keep this
issue on the agenda for the General Council's next meeting.
104. The Chairman said it was his view as Chair that there was no consensus to adopt the report.
He therefore wished to ask the Secretariat, in order to provide clarity for the Indian delegation and
others, what action, if any, the General Council took when there was no consensus.
105. Mr. Rogerson, Director of the Council and TNC Division, said that, on the technical point,
taking note of reports or statements before the General Council was simply the basic act of the
General Council to show that it had heard the reports or statements.  This did not imply either
approval or disapproval of any reports or statem ents, but simply showed that the Council had heard
the reports or statements.
106. The Chairman said that as Chair, he felt he had no other option but to say essentially that
there was no consensus for adoption of the report, and to propose therefore that the General Council
revert to this matter, after having taken note of the report and of the statements, and invite its
incoming Chairman, in coordination with the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, to undertake
consultations immediately on how to take this very important matter forward.
107. The representative of India said that he was not quite sure as to what decision the General
Council had taken on the TRIPS issue earlier that day.  If the intention had been to suspend the
discussion on that item and to come back to it, once the TRIPS Council had taken a view, at aWT/GC/M/78
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reconvened meeting of the General Council, then Members could discuss the present issue also, prior
to which some informal consultations could be held on this particular aspect.
108. The representative of Kenya said that her delegation supported the statement by India.
Members should perhaps consider continuing consultations and putting this item on the agenda of the
next Council meeting, instead of taking note of the report.  Kenya would not find it easy to accept thatafter having actually adopted the report in the CTD in Special Session, Members were now only
willing to take note of it.  Thus, perhaps Members should continue consultations until such a time as
there was a consensus.
109. The Chairman said he thought the net effect was the same.  India was basically saying that if
the General Council suspended its consideration of the TRIPS item and anticipated coming back to it,
perhaps it could also come back to the present item.  Kenya was suggesting that Members keep it
informal and consult.  His own suggestion before the lunch break had been to take a step back, take adeep breath and proceed.  In his view, Member s were now basically converging around the same
position.
110. The General Council agreed to the Chairman's proposal that the General Council revert to this
matter, after having taken note of the report and of the statements, and invite its incoming Chairman,
in coordination with the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, to undertake consultationsimmediately on how to take this very important matter forward.
5. Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration – Progress report on the
Committee's review of methodologies for future pay adjustments
111. The Chairman recalled that at its meeting in December 2002, the General Council had
adopted the recommendations of the Committee on B udget, Finance and Administration contained in
document WT/BFA/62.  The Committee's recommendation on the salary adjustment for the
Secretariat recommended a 3 per cent salary increase as from 1 January 2003, a 1 per cent increase as
from 1 July 2003, and such further adjustment as was necessary to restore parity with equivalent
grades in the UN Common System.  It further recommended that the Committee carry out a review of
the methodologies for future pay adjustments, to be completed by 31 March 2003.  The GeneralCouncil had also taken note of his statement su ggesting certain elements to help guide the
Committee's work on this matter, including that the Committee be requested to make a progress report
on this review to the General Council at the present meeting.
112. Mr. McMillan (United Kingdom), Chairman  of the Committee on Budget, Finance and
Administration, reported on the Committee's progress on the review.  The Committee had met twice
since the December meeting of the General Council to examine the question of methodologies for
future pay adjustments for the Secretariat, and a further meeting was scheduled for 17 February.  Ithad examined a number of documents, including one provided by the WTO Staff Council, which had
been introduced in the meeting by a representative of the Staff Council.  In addition, it was his
understanding that the Staff Council would present another paper at the Committee's next meeting.
The Committee would continue to keep the Staff side informed of its discussions and allow them to
present from time-to-time their views to the Committee.  The information which had been presentedby both the WTO Secretariat and the Staff Council had provided the Committee with a good basis for
its discussions.  While it was too early in the pr ocess to foresee what shape the final recommendation
to the General Council would take, he sensed on the part of Members a very real determination to put
this issue on a firm footing so that both Members and WTO staff would have a fair and equitable
methodology for pay adjustments which was based on predictability and a mutually-acceptableprocess.  The Committee would undoubtedly need to hold a number of meetings in order to come to a
consensus on this question, but he assured the General Council that no effort would be spared to meet
the deadline of 31 March 2003 for completion of the review.WT/GC/M/78
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113. He then informed the General Council on three points which he felt might be of interest and
which were before the Committee but were not strictly related to the question of pay.  The first related
to a paper which had been circulated to delegations (CRP(03)03) which proposed to set up a Trust
Fund to facilitate the participation of LDC Members and observers at the Ministerial Conference in
Cancún.  In this connection, Members might wish to consider making donations to this Trust Fund,and a resolution of the Committee was attached to th at paper asking Members to consider doing so as
quickly as possible in order to allow the bookings to be made early, thus saving money.  The second
point was that the Committee was following up on its discussions, begun in the review of the budget
proposals for 2003, regarding the reliance on temporary assistance for long-term staffing needs in the
WTO, and also on a move to biennial budgeting.
114. Regarding the state of Technical Assistance Fund s, he recalled that in December the General
Council had approved a target of Sw F 24 mil lion for the Doha Global Trust Fund.  The Council
Decision of 2001 required 25 per cent of the funds available to be remitted by 1 January and for the
Budget Committee to report to the General Council on that.  By 31 March a further 50 per cent was to
be remitted, i.e. 75 per cent of all of the funds should be made available.  There had been a significant
balance at the end of 2002 of Sw F 6.5 million, which would be used in 2003 to finance the
implementation of the 2003 Technical Assistance Plan.  However, Sw F 2.3 million of pledgedcontributions had still not been paid to the Secretariat, and the Committee hoped that the cash would
be paid in soon to allow the Secretariat to finance the implementation of the 2003 Plan.  A further
Sw F 1.1 million of contributions pledged for 2003 had already been paid by Canada and by Denmark
into the WTO's bank account.  This had brought total pledges registered for 2003 up to
Sw F 6.7 million.  Therefore, with the contributions pledged already paid into the WTO bank account,there was an amount of Sw F 19.5 million.  The figures on this were included in
document CRP(03)05.  This amount should be measured against the target amount of
Sw F 24 million.  Therefore, the cash position of th e Trust Fund was satisfactory at the moment and
the 25 per cent target had been met.  The next threshold would come at the end of March when there
should be Sw F 18 million in the bank, and unfortunately Members were still some way from that.  Itwas thus his duty to remind donors that, the pledges having been made, it would be very useful to
have those cash amounts in as quickly as possible.
115. The General Council took note of the statement by the Chairman of the Budget Committee.
6. Report by the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee
116. The Director-General, Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, reported on the TNC's
activities since the last report to the General Council in December 2002.  The TNC had met on
4-5 February and had taken up two agenda items.  The first concerned reports by the Chairpersons ofbodies established by the TNC, of which there were four, since the other bodies had not held any
meetings since the TNC meeting in December.  Although some progress had been noted by
participants in some areas, Members seemed to agree generally with his assessment that progress
continued to be uneven.  In comparison to the situation in December, the overall imbalance was now
even more noticeable and preoccupying.  He sensed that Members were accumulating unresolvedissues as the next deadlines approached.  The necessary political will to move forward on substance
was yet to be seen in most areas, and genuine engagement among participants to explore avenues of
convergence had not yet materialized.  Given this situation and with only seven months remaining
before Cancún, Members would need to intensify this  process very rapidly.  All knew what had and
what had not been achieved so far.  All knew as well what had to be done to ensure a successfulConference in Cancún, and the danger of going to Cancún with an overloaded agenda.
117. Members were now a third of the way through the time Ministers had given them to conclude
the negotiations, and had now entered a more intensive phase – the phase of real negotiation.  This
was when one had to start building positive linkages, and maintain the perspective of what one was
trying to achieve.  It was now that Members had to start to honour the commitment of Ministers atWT/GC/M/78
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Doha to place development at the heart of the Round.  He had suggested that the recent TNC meeting
should signal a change of gear.  Some important deadlines had been missed in 2002, positions
remained far apart on many issues, and Members were moving too slowly in some negotiations.
However, he remained guardedly optimistic.  Members had not missed everything yet, and he was
confident that progress was possible across the board.  This was the message he conveyed to Ministersin his contacts with them.  He had found that, whatever their misgivings about the results so far,
political leaders in all regions were clear about the value of the WTO system as a vital element of
stability and security.  He had also found, in the private sector in both industrialized and developing
countries, a renewed and very welcome positive interest in the WTO's agenda.  He believed it was
Members' job to build on this interest in the negotiations.  The DDA had the potential to offer much to
each and every participant, regardless of their level of development.  The gains from a successful
outcome to this work, and also the systemic stability that would result, were becoming increasinglynecessary in the face of growing international uncertainty.
118. Under the second agenda item, he had reported on his informal consultations on possible next
steps towards resolving outstanding implementation issues under paragraph 12(b) of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration.  Since the TNC meeting in December, he had undertaken a number of
consultations on possible steps forward, including w ith the Chairpersons of the eight Councils and
Committees which had been handling implementation issues in 2002.  The objective of these
discussions had been to seek a way in which the framework of five options, which he had outlined at
the December TNC, could assist in the pursuit of mutually agreeable solutions.  In this context, he had
asked these Chairpersons to assist him in carrying  out his further consultations as TNC Chair.  In
particular, he had asked them to consult and advise him further as to how they saw the possibilities forprogress on their respective issues in terms of the five categories.  At the TNC meeting, he had
emphasized that this was not the same as just referring the issues back to the respective bodies.  In
other words, he had asked the eight Chairs to act as "Friends of the TNC Chair" and to consult on an
informal basis, under the aegis of the TNC, in order to provide him with their best advice and
assessment of possible ways forward.  The Chairs would be assisted in their task by the DeputyDirectors-General.  He would make a further report on his consultations to the TNC at its meeting in
March.
119. He also wished to report that the formal meeting of the TNC had been complemented by an
informal exchange of views on the overall situation of the work.  He believed this had provided a
useful opportunity for participants to inject some fresh thinking into the debate and to respond more
directly to each other.  He felt that this format would prove conducive to a more dynamic and
interactive exchange on some of the issues requiring attention, so that the TNC could better carry outits function of guiding the negotiations.  It would perhaps be fruitful to focus on a few key areas in a
similar informal segment at the next meeting, sche duled for 4-5 March.  He also wished to mention
that he had informed the TNC that he was considering convening a future TNC meeting at senior
capital-based officials' level, to underline the importance of the negotiating targets and to increase the
breadth as well as the depth of capitals' involvement.  Such a meeting could take place in early April,and perhaps another in mid-year, as Members entered the home stretch to Cancún.
120. The representative of Botswana, speaking on behalf of the ACP Members
, said that the ACP
countries consisted of a fairly significant constituency of the WTO membership, as they included
some 56 Members of the WTO and 10 observers.  In addition, about half of these countries were
LDCs.  The collective concerns and interests of these countries therefore warranted serious andspecial attention.  The ACP countries were faced with two sets of simultaneous negotiations – one
relating to the Doha Development Agenda and the other relating to the Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union under the Cotonou Agreement.  As Members would
recall, negotiations on the EPAs had been launched in Brussels in September 2002 and were due to be
completed by 31 December 2007.  These countries therefore had to ensure that there was coherencebetween the Geneva and the Brussels negotiation processes, particularly in the light of the overlap in
the subjects for negotiation.  These included agriculture, services, market access, intellectual propertyWT/GC/M/78
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rights, S&D treatment and rules.  It therefore went without saying that negotiations on these issues in
the WTO were of paramount importance to the ACP countries.  They fully shared the deep sense of
disappointment and frustration already expressed by many other developing-country delegations
regarding the lack of any meaningful progress in the negotiations on many of the issues of priority to
developing countries.
121. He then highlighted some of these issues as follows.  On TRIPS and Public Health, it was
generally acknowledged that many ACP countries currently faced major public health challenges,
whose scale was unprecedented.  According to UNAIDS/WHO Regional HIV/AIDS Statistics of
2002, out of the 42 million adults and children living with HIV/AIDS in the world, 29.4 million were
in Africa, 440,000 in the Caribbean and 300,000 in the Pacific.  There was therefore an urgent need
for effective measures to assist ACP countries to cope with these public health challenges within the
framework of the TRIPS Agreement.  These countries were disappointed that an expeditious solutionto the problem faced by countries with no or insufficient manufacturing capacity for pharmaceutical
products had still not been found.  The sticking point continued to be the scope of diseases to be
covered under the compulsory licensing solution.  As far as the ACP countries were concerned, the
parameters of this issue were defined by the words "the public health problems afflicting many
developing and least-developed countries" which appeared in paragraph 1 of the Doha MinisterialDeclaration.  This was therefore not an issue for negotiation by delegations in Geneva.  Ministers had
conclusively negotiated this issue at Doha.  It was only fair and proper that Members should stick to
the broad scope of diseases agreed by Ministers.  The ACP countries therefore wished to appeal to
their trading partners in the developed world to exercise the necessary flexibility in order that
agreement could be reached on this issue which was of vital importance to some countries wherethousands of lives were lost on a daily basis.  These countries welcomed the positive spirit of the
Community's proposal, but it unfortunately fell short of their needs and expectations.  There was a
moral compulsion to find a sustainable, legally secu re multilateral solution to this problem.  The ACP
Members remained hopeful that this could be achieved.
122. On S&D treatment, it was important to bear in mind that the objective of S&D treatment
provisions in WTO Agreements was to facilitate the integration of developing countries into the
multilateral trading system so as to avoid their marginalization.  For the ACP countries, the
strengthening and operationalization of S&D treatment provisions was not only a core element, but a
top priority in the Doha Work Programme.  They again wished to place on record their
disappointment with the painfully slow rate of progress so far recorded on this matter, and were even
more concerned over the prospect of missing yet another deadline on this issue.  They therefore
wished to appeal to their developed-country partners to demonstrate greater political will andcommitment with respect to S&D treatment issues in the WTO.  On regional trade agreements
(RTAs), the ACP Members were very concerned with the slow pace of negotiations, particularly as
they had a bearing on the EPA negotiations in Brussels.  The ACP Members therefore wished to see
meaningful progress in this area..  For the ACP countries, it was crucial that the negotiations should
clarify and improve WTO rules covering RTAs between developed and developing countries, andtake adequately into account the development dimension for developing countries.  Regarding
agriculture, this was an area of crucial importance to the economies of most ACP countries.  They
believed that current negotiations on agriculture should lead to real and meaningful reforms in the
Agreement on Agriculture.  There were essentially two areas of reform – one was the effective and
rapid decrease of protectionism in the developed countries, and the other was effective S&D treatmentfor developing countries.
123. In the first area, it was important that all forms of domestic subsidies and support in
developed countries should be subject to discipline, as otherwise there would only be a substitution of
one type of subsidy for another, and the net result would be continued distortion with detrimental
effects on their countries.  All forms of export subs idies should also be subject to a time-frame for
elimination.  The ACP countries were concerned in particular about their farmers' livelihoods, as they
might be overwhelmed by cheap subsidized imports.  Finally, high tariffs, tariff peaks and escalationWT/GC/M/78
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in developed countries should be subject to rapid reduction in order to facilitate market access for
developing countries.  In addition, for the purposes of achieving rural development, poverty
alleviation and employment creation, products of small farmers in developing countries for
consumption within the country should not be subj ect to reduction commitments in relation to tariffs
and domestic subsidies.  The developing countries should also be allowed the use of the specialsafeguard mechanism for their agricultural products, and it was important that the procedures for
using this mechanism be simple and not burdensome.
124. On market access for non-agricultural products, the negotiations were at an important phase,
as the decision on the modalities would influence the course of the whole negotiation.  The needs and
interests of developing countries had to be taken into account.  These interests could be summarized
as follows:  greater access to developed countries' markets for developing countries' products, and the
ability of developing countries to set appropriate levels of import tariffs in line with their domesticconditions and policies.  Many of the ACP countries had already faced problems where local firms
had closed as they could not compete with cheap imports.  If the modalities did not incorporate these
considerations, the consequences could be detrimental and contrary to the stated purpose of the Doha
Declaration.  Tariff revenues as a percentage of government revenues for developed countries were
negligible, at about 1 per cent for the OECD countries.  Therefore, while complete or significantelimination of tariffs might have no negative impact on developed countries, it would deprive many
developing-country governments of an important source of revenue.  The modalities had to take into
account the level of strength or weakness of local industries in the ACP countries, which could be
affected by too rapid or too steep a rate of import liberalization.  These modalities could not be in the
nature of a one-size-fits-all approach or formula.  Therefore, developing countries which did not havecompetitive local industries should not be pressu red to reduce their tariffs below what they could
reasonably bear.  The modalities should guarantee sufficient flexibility for developing countries so
that they could set their tariffs in line with their domestic industrial capacity.  Thus, developing
countries should not be subject to common formulas or to other approaches that imposed tariff
reductions on them which could cause injury to their local industries.
125. In order to inspire confidence in the ACP countries that the Doha Agenda was indeed a
development agenda, meaningful progress should be made in the negotiations on areas which
addressed the development concerns and interests of the ACP and developing countries.  As things
currently stood, there was a real danger that the st atus of the entire post-Doha work programme could
be thrown into jeopardy.  Indications were that the road to Cancún was also most likely to be rough
and bumpy, and with the potential to reverse the gains made at Doha.  This had to be avoided at all
costs.  He assured Members that the ACP Members remained committed to the negotiations.  As thenegotiations progressed, these countries would be submitting proposals on the various aspects of the
Doha Work Programme which were vital to their interests and concerns.
126. The General Council took note of the Director-General's report and of the statement.
7. Work Programme on Small Economies – Report by the Chairman of the Dedicated
Sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development
127. The Chairman recalled that at its meeting in February and March 2002, the General Council
had taken note of a framework and procedures fo r the conduct of the Work Programme on Small
Economies, under which this Work Programme would be a standing item on the General Council's
agenda.  The framework and procedures also provided that the Committee on Trade and Development
would report regularly to the General Council on the progress of work in its Dedicated Sessions on
this subject.
128. Mr. Thompson-Flôres, Deputy Dire ctor-General, on behalf of the Chairman of the Committee
on Trade and Development, reported on the Committee's activities in this regard.  He said that a
substantial report on progress on the Work Programme on Small Economies had been made at theWT/GC/M/78
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December meeting of the General Council.  This item appeared on the General Council's agenda as a
standing item, and was very important to a large number of countries.  Since the December 2002
General Council meeting, the Committee on Trade and Development had not met in Dedicated
Session to discuss the issue of small economies.  Therefore he did not have much to report.  The next
Dedicated Session had been scheduled for 10 March.  He hoped that Members by then would havehad enough time to consider the various documents before the Committee, would have new proposals
to make, and would be ready to move the process fo rward.  A preliminary date for another Dedicated
Session had also been reserved.  However, as a desire had been expressed to schedule the Dedicated
Session during the Geneva Weeks in order to permit the participation of many non-resident missions
that had an interest in this topic, the next Dedicated Session would most likely be held during the
summer, and the date would only be announced once the dates for the Geneva Week had been fixed.
As the Work Programme on Small Economies regularly appeared on the agenda of the GeneralCouncil, it provided Members the opportunity to make  statements to indicate their interests and views.
He would greatly value any input interested delegations could provide, which would facilitate work in
the coming months.
129. The General Council took note of the report  by Deputy Director-G eneral Mr. Thompson-
Flôres on behalf of the Chairman of the Dedicated Session of the CTD.
8. Review of the exemption provided under Paragraph 3 of the GATT 1994 (WT/L/512)
130. The Chairman recalled that paragraph 3(a) of the GATT 1994 provided an exemption from
Part II of GATT 1994 for measures under specific mandatory legislation, enacted by a Member before
it became a contracting party to GATT 1947, which prohibits the use, sale or lease of foreign-built or
foreign-reconstructed vessels in commercial applications between points in national waters or watersof an exclusive economic zone.  On 20 December 1994, the United States had invoked the provisions
of Paragraph 3(a) with respect to specific legislation that met the requirements of that paragraph.
Paragraph 3(b) of the GATT 1994 called for a review of this exemption five years after the date of
entry into force of the WTO Agreement, and thereaf ter every two years for as long as the exemption
was in force, in order to examine whether the co nditions which created the need for the exemption
still prevailed.  The General Council had last considered this matter at its meeting in December 2002,
and had agreed, inter alia , as follows:  first, that under the two-yearly cycle provided in
paragraph 3(b) of GATT 1994, this exemption would have to be reviewed again in 2003;  second, that
the General Council would come back to the issues raised at previous meetings of the General
Council in the context of the review  to be conducted under the next cycle in 2003;  and third, that this
review would be on the Agenda of the present meeting.
131. Interested delegations were also invited to submit comments and questions to the US
regarding the operation of the legislation under the exemption, to which the US was invited to
respond.  These questions and responses, together with the annual report to be provided by the US
under Paragraph 3(c) of GATT 1994, would form the basis for the review.  It had also been agreed
that for the purposes of the review, this matter would be on the Agenda of subsequent General
Council meetings in the course of 2003 as the Chairman deemed appropriate or at the request of aMember.  Further, at its meeting in December 2003, the General Council would be invited to take
note of the discussions held in the course of the review until then, take any other action it might agree
on, and take note that the subsequent review would normally be held in 2005.  He drew attention to
the annual report circulated by the United States in WT/L/512.
132. The representative of the United States said that as the Chairman had already noted, his
delegation had submitted the notification required under paragraph 3(c) of GATT 1994, which
included statistical information the United States was required to provide pursuant to this measure.
His delegation did not have anything to add to the information in the notification, and stood ready to
answer any questions Members might have.WT/GC/M/78
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133. The representative of Panama thanked the United States for having introduced its
communication in WT/L/512, but said that the introduction of the document should not be interpreted
as discharging all of the United States' obligations  under paragraph 3 of GATT 1994.  Since Panama's
statement at the December 2002 meeting of the General Council, there had been no new
developments which might change its position – a position it had defended for almost a year.  Panamaagain invited the United States to examine questions of interpretation of the exemption for the notified
legislation which was damaging the interests of his country.  Only once these issues were resolved
could it be considered that the review under paragraph 3 had indeed been carried out.
134. The representative of Chile endorsed the statement by Panama.
135. The representative of Australia said that as Members entered the third scheduled review of
this matter, his delegation hoped that all parties with an interest would have the opportunity to have a
more meaningful discussion and exploration of the circumstances behind this very long-standing
derogation, and that this exchange would be far better than it had been in the past.  A more rigorous
review process would ensure that there would not be the rather sterile exchange which had
characterized discussions in the past.  As Australia had said on many occasions, its concerns on these
issues were not only of principle but of important commercial interests for its shipbuilding industry.
136. The representative of Japan said that his delegation had noted that despite the Chairman's
suggestion to proceed on an informal basis and to deepen the review in question, this process had not
borne much fruit to date.  In this new review cycle, Members would pose questions, and it was hoped
that the US delegation would be forthcoming in responding to those questions and to the process
Members would be following.  He understood that in the informal consultations there had been some
good ideas from the United States, and his delegation looked forward to discussions of an informalnature.
137. The representative of the European Communities fully supported the statement by Australia.
138. The representative of Hong Kong, China said that his delegation wished to echo the views of
previous speakers.  It looked forward to the Unit ed States' active engagement in a meaningful and
substantive review of this exemption.
139. The representative of the United States said that his delegation shared the interests of others in
not spending time in sterile debates.  While it was clear that Members held differing views on the
nature of the review provided for under paragraph 3, the United States was looking forward to finding
ways to make these reviews a more satisfactory and, hopefully, less protracted experience for all
concerned, without prejudice to any Member's position.
140. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed  to revert to this item at a future
meeting.
9. Proposal to remove and avoid inconsistenc ies in the texts of the WTO Agreements –
Communication from Chile (WT/GC/W/489)
141. The Chairman drew attention to the communication from Chile in WT/GC/W/489.
142. The representative of Chile said that in the months since his delegation had first raised this
issue, it had been able to reflect on a number of points.  First, as time passed, new examples of
inconsistencies were appearing in the texts, and this  was even starting to become an issue in some of
the negotiations.  Second, Chile recognized that in dealing with this problem, there was a potential
danger of opening a Pandora's box and seeking to use its proposal to renegotiate the Uruguay Round
Agreements.  That was certainly not Chile's aim.  Third, the past months had given his delegation time
to submit a document which contained two very straightforward examples of how to resolve the mostWT/GC/M/78
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common cases of inconsistency in a practical manner.  Chile was proposing that the General Council
adopt decisions which would establish the primacy of certain versions of the texts where
inconsistencies existed.  In the case of Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the notion of a
time element which existed in the English and French versions had, by mistake, been omitted in the
Spanish version.  This was not a matter of interpretation, but of merely filling the gap in one versionin order to harmonize its meaning and scope with th e other two.  In the example of Article 18.2 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, the binding and mandatory nature of the three versions was clear,
at least in relation to Appendix 3 on Working Procedures.  Therefore, the use of the term "podrá", or
"may" in English, in the Spanish version appeared to be a simple error of translation.  Some Members
had reacted to this proposal by asking why Chile had opted to use a decision by the General Council
rather than the Council's authority to interpret the Agreements.  Its reply was simple:  in the cases
cited, as in many others, the meaning and scope of the obligations assumed by Members, or rather ofthe issues negotiated in the Uruguay Round, were clear and required no further clarification.  The only
problem was that they had been reflected more clearly in some languages than in others, which was
why textual harmonization was now needed, so that no doubts remained regarding the negotiators'
intent.
143. Chile recognized that in some cases, the inconsistencies could give rise to problems of
interpretation, for example, if all three versions, or  at least two of them, led to interpretations that
were different, absurd or patently contradictory.  In  such a case, it might be necessary to resort to the
authoritative interpretation of the General Council.  His delegation wished to propose that the
Chairman, or one of the Deputy Directors-General,  hold consultations with Members in order to seek
common wording for the draft decisions, as well as to analyze other inconsistencies Members mightidentify.  The document in WT/GC/W/489 also reflected the need to be aware of the consequences of
the existing inconsistencies in the Agreements, some of which, in Chile's opinion, could be resolved
in the course of the current negotiations.  Furthermore, consideration should be given to the need to
establish mechanisms to obviate further inconsistencies in the texts produced at the conclusion of the
current Round – a point not included in the proposal, but which Members should begin thinkingabout.  In fact, in less than four months the exercise of clarification and amendment of the DSU – an
Agreement already replete with discrepancies in the three language versions – would be nearing
completion.
144. The representative of Argentina said there was no doubt that given the enormous number of
areas where there might be differences in understanding among Members, the possibility of
eliminating one of them – that relating to the diff erent language versions of the WTO texts – was a
praiseworthy initiative.  It was also praiseworthy, given the large number of important issuesMembers were charged with, that Chile had taken this initiative on a matter of systemic interest to all.
His delegation believed in the merits of this initiative, and that the organization should pay special
attention to the translation of documents into the WTO official languages.  The fact that the type of
inconsistencies identified by Chile existed showed that  it would be appropriate to be vigilant in order
to avoid these inconsistencies recurring.  Correctin g these errors might require the cooperation of the
delegations whose language was involved, and his delegation was prepared to collaborate in this
regard.
145. Argentina wished to make two comments on this subject.  One was specifically linked to the
example submitted by Chile and the other was more general.  There was no doubt that the initiative
was in some respects rather complex, and these complexities arose precisely in the example in Chile'sdocument relating to Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  Chile proposed harmonizing the
text and pointed out the alleged difference in mean ing between the text in Spanish, and the texts in
English and French.  The document indicated there was a time element in the French and English
versions – which in Chile's document was perceived as being the correct version of the rule – that
would result in the possibility that if the exports of a developing country, at any moment the safeguardmeasure was in force, were to exceed 3 per cent of the total imports of the product concerned, the
safeguard measure would be applied to that country.  Argentina did not agree with that interpretation.WT/GC/M/78
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It did not believe there was a time element in the text which gave permission to apply a safeguard
measure to a developing country if it had been determined from the outset that its exports did not
exceed 3 per cent, as indicated in the Article.  First of all, this was so because both the term "as long
as" in English and the term "tant que" in French were open to more than one interpretation not
connected with any time element.  In actual fact, these terms related to a condition.  For example thenew Oxford Dictionary of English indicated "provided that" as one meaning of "as long as".  There
was no doubt that this was one meaning in harmony with the Spanish version of Article 9.1 which
read "cuando", or "when" in English.  In Argentina's opinion, in this case there was no difference
between the texts in Spanish and English.  In addition, it was logical to provide that in the time-period
during which the safeguard measure was applied, the exports of developing countries excluded from
the safeguard could increase.  This was almost a logical consequence of the safeguard measure
applied to other countries.  In fact, if the interpretation proposed by Chile in WT/GC/W/489 wereaccepted, a developing country that was originally excluded from a safeguard measure could find
itself subsequently affected by the application of that measure to third parties.  This had obviously not
been in the minds of the drafters.
146. His delegation did not at present wish to engage in a substantive discussion of the safeguards
issue, but did wish to indicate that of the two examples Chile had identified among the whole range ofmatters in WTO documents, his delegation already had a difficulty with one of them.  This indicated
that what was apparently a simple matter of de finition might become something more complicated.
As Chile itself had said, this might become a concern when Members considered the size of the task
they were being asked to tackle.  On the one hand, the scope of this exercise caused Argentina
concern because all of the specific rules that would have to be the subject of this harmonization hadnot yet been identified.  This indicated that Members would be embarking on an exercise with no
limits.  In addition, the legal consequences of an exercise of harmonization of texts might be multiple,
and the harmonization of many of the rules requiring this might open up the interpretation of the
obligations and rights contained therein.  While Argentina agreed it would be necessary to be
extremely careful in the future so as to avoid this type of difficulty arising, it wished to warn Members
about the major difficulties of trying to achieve an objective retrospective of the texts of the
organization.
147. The representative of Cuba said that since Chile's initial proposal on this issue in 2002, her
delegation had strongly supported it, and considered it to be deserving of attention as it could change
the balance of Members' rights and obligations.  Her delegation considered that the type of error or
inconsistency identified by Chile occurred in most  cases because the documents were negotiated in a
language which was not the native language of many Members.  The documents were adoptedwithout having been translated, and this had led to the present problems.  In addition, her delegation
considered that sometimes last-minute decisions led to this type of fatal error, which Members should
try to eliminate, particularly when there were only a few months left before the next Ministerial
Conference.  Cuba therefore supported the initiation of consultations on this subject and wished to
participate in them, and thanked Chile for its proposal.
148. The representative of the United States thanked Chile for bringing this issue before Members
and for sharing the evolution of its own thinking on this issue.  His delegation had only received the
document in English the previous week, and due to the demands of other work was not in a position at
present to take a view on how best to proceed.  However, he would report back on the complexity of
this issue, which had been underlined by the f act that even two Spanish-speaking delegations had
difficulty agreeing on how one might interpret one of the two provisions cited in Chile's document.
149. The representative of Chile expressed his delegation's appreciation to Argentina for its
statement, which illustrated the point Chile was trying to make.  Chile had seen an inconsistency in
the two texts and Argentina had said there was no inconsistency.  This immediately made the problem
one of interpretation – in other words, it was no longer a problem of inconsistency, and Chile thuswould not insist on continuing to approach this as a matter of adjusting the inconsistencies in the text.WT/GC/M/78
Page 35
That task should perhaps be entrusted to the Safeguards Committee or the DSB.  Thus, Argentina had
solved 50 per cent of the problems Chile had raised, because it was clear that this particular case did
not involve a problem of inconsistencies but of interpretation.  Therefore, the type of action chosen to
solve the problem would have to be different, and this could be crossed off the list of problems of
inconsistency.  There were other issues, and it was perfectly feasible and prudent and possible toexamine them on a case-by-case basis, resolving the problems of inconsistency, but not the problems
of different interpretations.
150. The representative of Australia said that his delegation appreciated the work Chile had done
in addressing an issue which should concern all Members, i.e. to ensure that whatever Members came
up with in terms of legal texts, there was consistency among the WTO official languages.  What
concerned Australia a little at the present stage was the idea of entering into a phase of open-ended
and informal processes and exactly what these might address.  He understood Chile to have said thatthere were two issues.  The first was an issue where there were apparently some inconsistencies
between the Spanish version and the English and French versions, and thus an issue from the past that
Members needed to resolve.  Australia was happy to look at this type of issue on a case-by-case basis
and try to resolve the problems.  However, it was very hesitant about setting up a big discussion that
might invite all Members' legal experts to point out any inconsistencies between any of the officiallanguage versions of WTO texts.  In other words, if it was just a problem with the Spanish version of
a text, his delegation could understand, but if it involved revisiting all of the official language versions
of the texts, he was not sure where that would lead.
151. The second point he had understood Chile to be making was that there was a prospective
problem, in that Members did not want to get into this situation in the future.  At the end of 2002Members' legal experts were already suggesting, with the aid of the Secretariat, the need for a legal
drafting group in order to ensure that whatever was negotiated was subject – before it was finally
agreed – to Members' legal experts.  At the time, many had felt it was not the time for such an
exercise.  Regarding Chile's second example, on the DSU, this could be examined in the context of
the DSU review, because Members were now starting to  talk about legal texts.  While he knew that
Chile felt this was a little premature, inconsistencies in the current texts was something that could be
addressed in those negotiations, as the mandate was to review the current Agreement.  He reiterated
his delegation's qualms about setting up an open-ended informal process which might involve
Members in any legal inconsistencies between any of the texts.  Australia agreed on the need to think
carefully about how to ensure there was legal consistency and that there were as few ambivalent
provisions in any agreements that might be negotiated.  The particular example Chile had identified
on the DSU might be addressed in the context of the DSU negotiations.
152. The representative of Norway joined in thanking Chile for having raised this potentially
important issue.  He also agreed with Chile's comments that Members should not open a Pandora's
box on issues which were not purely translation issues.  His delegation supported Australia's
statement.  There was a procedure under the Vienna Convention for correcting translation mistakes in
multilateral agreements.  This could be done by a note from the Depository on a no-objection basis,and he seemed to recall that Members had used this procedure to reinsert a Member on a list on which
it should have figured.  This had been resolved by the Director-General circulating a note on a no-
objection basis.  If a genuine translation mistake was first agreed in the respective Committee or
Council, and if there was consensus that this was a translation mistake, one could use the procedure he
had just referred to.
153. The Chairman thanked Chile for raising what was obviously a significant issue by virtue of
the interventions made.  Australia had raised some pertinent issues, as had Argentina and others.
Chile had requested his successor to hold consultations, perhaps along with a Deputy Director-
General.  The General Council would clearly revert to this issue at a future meeting.  However, given
some of the concerns that had been registered by a number of delegations, it might be wise forWT/GC/M/78
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Members to reflect on the statements made at the present meeting and to allow his successor to reflect
and consult with them on the most efficient way forward.
154. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed  to revert to this item at a future
meeting, and that in the meantime the Chairman would consult with Members on the most efficient
way forward.
10. Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference – Administrative matters
(a) Annual report of the General Council to th e Ministerial Conference – Statement by the
Chairman
155. The Chairman recalled that under the procedures for an annual overview of WTO activities,
adopted by the General Council in November 1995 (WT/L/105), the Ministerial Conference was to
carry out an overview of WTO activities over the previous two years on the basis of annual reports of
the General Council and its subsidiary bodies.  This overview by Ministers was part of the Agendaitem entitled "Overview of WTO Activities", under which general statements were made.  Normally,
when Ministerial Conferences had been held in November or December, the full annual reports of the
General Council and its subsidiary bodies for that year were made available as part of the
documentation for the Conference.  This year, howev er, there was a nine-month interval between the
General Council meeting in December 2002 – when the Council had conducted the end-of-yearreview of WTO activities – and the Fifth Session in September 2003.  In order to avoid a duplication
of work, he wished to propose that, as had been done for the Second Ministerial Conference in
May 1998, the General Council submit to the Fifth Session a brief update to its annual report for 2002
which would describe developments since December 2002.  He was referring only to the routine
annual reports of a factual nature that all WTO bodies were required to make under existingprocedures, and not to any specific reports that Ministers at Doha had requested to be submitted to
them.  The Ministerial Conference would therefore have before it, as the annual report of the General
Council, a compilation of the 2002 Annual Reports of all the WTO bodies, together with an update
report concerning developments in 2003.  He proposed that the General Council take note of his
statement and agree to follow the procedure he ha d just outlined, as had been done for the Second
Ministerial Conference.
156. The General Council so agreed.
(b) Attendance of observers from governments and international intergovernmental organizations
– Statement by the Chairman
157. The Chairman recalled, regarding Government observers, that 39 Governments had
participated as observers at the Doha Ministerial Conference in accordance with the Guidelines in
Annex 2 of the General Council's Rules of Procedure (WT/L/161).  A list of these Governments wasset out in WT/MIN(01)/INF/5/Rev.3.  Out of these 39 Governments, 3 had since acceded to the WTO
Agreement, namely Armenia, China and Chinese Taipei.  Thirty-one of these Governments currently
had observer status in the General Council and were therefore automatically invited to attend the
Ministerial Conference in that capacity, pursuant to the Guidelines.  Five other Governments had, at
their request, previously been accorded observer status only at Ministerial Conferences:  Comoros,Eritrea, Liberia, Libya and San Marino.  He proposed that these Governments also be invited to attend
the Cancún Ministerial Conference as observers in keeping with the agreed Guidelines.  Requests
from any other Governments for observer status, either at the General Council or at the Ministerial
Conference, would have to be considered on their merits in accordance with the Guidelines when they
were received.  None had so far been submitted.
158. The General Council took note of the statement and so agreed
.WT/GC/M/78
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159. With regard to International Intergovernmental Organization observers, he recalled that the
Guidelines for Observer Status for IGOs in Annex 3 of the General Council's Rules of Procedure,
provided that "[i]n addition to organizations that request, and are granted, observer status, other
organizations may attend meetings of the Ministerial Conference, the General Council or subsidiary
bodies on the specific invitation of the Ministerial Conference, the General Council or subsidiarybody concerned, as the case may be."  The Guidelines also went on to state that if for any two-year
period after the grant of observer status, there had been no attendance by the observer organization at
Ministerial Conferences, such status shall cease.
160. Members would recall that prior to each of the past sessions of the Ministerial Conference,
the General Council had agreed to invite IGOs as observers to the Ministerial Conference on the basis
of the following elements:  (i) organizations that were observers to the General Council would be
automatically invited;  (ii) organizations that were  observers to subsidiary bodies would be invited if
they requested to attend;  and (iii) consultations would be held to determine which other organizations
that were not observers to the WTO, and who requested attendance at the Ministerial Conference,
should be invited.  A list of the IGOs that had been invited to attend the Doha Ministerial Conference
on the basis of these elements was set out in WT/MIN(01)/INF/5/Rev.3.
161. He proposed that these organizations also be invited to the Ministerial Conference in Cancún
as observers, in keeping with the agreed Guidelines.  Requests from any other IGOs that had not
already been observers at the Ministerial Conference in Doha, and who were neither observers in the
General Council nor in other WTO bodies, would of course have to be considered on their merits in
accordance with the Guidelines when they were received.  None had so far been submitted.  If such
requests were received in the future, the General Council would revert to them at a subsequentmeeting.  He said that one delegation had suggested to him that there should perhaps be a deadline for
the consideration of any such requests from other organizations, which might be set at three months
prior to the date of the Conference.  He suggested that Members reflect on this and return to it at a
subsequent meeting if necessary.
162. The representative of Egypt, speaking on behalf of the Arab Members
, thanked the Chairman
for his statement proposing a procedure for accepting the requests of or extending invitations to IGOs
wishing to attend the Fifth Ministerial Conference as observers.  Egypt believed, however, that any
procedure should ensure equal treatment for the relevant organizations, probably through fixing a
deadline for receiving such requests.  The General Council could then consider all such requests at an
appropriate time later in the year.  Egypt also wish ed to highlight the importance it attached to all
relevant IGOs, particularly those involved in regional integration activities and in promoting trade
liberalization, as well as assisting acceding countries in many trade-related areas.  Her delegationhoped that this time all requests to attend the Ministerial Conference would be accepted, including the
request of the League of Arab States.  It looked forward to participating in any consultations in this
regard.
163. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed
 to follow the procedure outlined
by the Chairman.
(c) Attendance of non-governmental organizations – Statement by the Chairman
164. The Chairman recalled that in preparing for the previous Ministerial Conferences, the General
Council had agreed on the following procedure regarding registration and attendance of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) at the Conference:  (i) NGOs would be allowed to attend only the
Plenary Sessions of the Conference, without the right to speak;  (ii) applications from NGOs to beregistered would be accepted on the basis of Article V, paragraph 2, of the WTO Agreement, i.e.
NGOs "concerned with matters related to those of the WTO";  and (iii) a deadline would be
established for the registration of NGOs that wished to attend the Conference.  In order to deal with
the requests from NGOs to attend the Fifth Ministerial Conference, he proposed that Members adoptWT/GC/M/78
Page 38
similar criteria to those which had been adopted by the General Council for the four previous
Ministerial Conferences held in Singapore, Geneva, Seattle and Doha.
165. Following this practice, NGOs that wished to attend the Fifth Ministerial Conference would
be requested to supply, in detail, all the necessary information indicating how they were concerned
with matters related to those of the WTO.  The large and growing number of NGOs with WTO-related activities had made the registration procedure for WTO Ministerial Conferences more and
more burdensome.  In order to facilitate the registration process for NGOs and the WTO Secretariat,
he proposed that the detailed presentation of activities be waived for those NGOs who had been duly
registered for at least two previous Ministerial Conferences, and that registration for them be granted
automatically.  NGOs that qualified would still be ob liged to officially request registration and would
be subject to all other procedures and deadlines that applied to NGOs requesting to attend the Fifth
Ministerial Conference.
2
166. Concerning deadlines, he suggested that all NGOs be invited to submit their requests for
registration not later than 30 April.  Registration forms should be sent by 31 May to all NGOs which
fulfilled the registration criteria, and all registration forms returned duly completed by the NGOs to
the External Relations Division of the Secretariat not later than 30 June.  Based on the information
provided, the Secretariat would process a list of registered NGOs.  He proposed that in line with pastpractice, this list be circulated to all WTO Members for information during the course of July.
Confirmation of registration would then be sent to the NGOs as from 1 August.  He proposed that
Members agree to follow the procedure he had outlined in order to allow sufficient time for the NGOs
to be informed and to make the necessary arrangements for their attendance at the Fifth Ministerial
Conference.
167. The General Council took note of the statement and so agreed
.
(d) Election of Officers for the Fifth Session – Statement by the Chairman
168. The Chairman recalled that Ministers at Doha had requested the General Council to hold
consultations with a view to determining the presiding officers – i.e. the Chairperson and three Vice-
Chairpersons – of the Ministerial Conference who would hold office until the end of the Fifth Session.As the date of that Conference was quickly approaching, the General Council would need to take a
decision on the election of these officers soon.  In keeping with customary practice, the General
Council would elect a representative of the host go vernment – in the present case, Mexico – to chair
the Conference.  He proposed that his successor hold consultations with regard to the election of the
three Vice-Chairpersons of the Conference, and that the General Council revert to this matter at a
future meeting in order that the full slate could be agreed at the same time.
169. The General Council took note of the statement and so agreed
.
11. WTO Pension Plan – Election of an Alternate to the Management Board – Proposal by
the Chairman (WT/GC/W/488)
170. The Chairman recalled that Article 4(a) of the Regulations of the WTO Pension Plan
provides, inter alia,  for the election by the General Council of four members and four alternates, each
for a three-year term.  The current composition of the Management Board, as set out inWT/GC/W/488, included Mr. Mark Linscott (United States ) as an alternate.  As also indicated in that
document, Mr. Linscott was no longer available to serve on the Management Board.  His intention to
propose the candidature of Ms. Rachel Schub (United States) to replace Mr. Linscott had been
communicated to all Members in a fax sent on hi s behalf by Deputy Direct or-General Mr. Abbott in
                                                     
2 These procedures were subsequently circulated in WT/MIN(03)/INF/1.WT/GC/M/78
Page 39
January.  Accordingly, he proposed the election of Ms. Schub to hold the office of alternate on the
Board during the remainder of the three-year term, expiring on 7 July 2005.
171. The General Council so agreed.
172. The Chairman then said it had recently come to  his attention that Mr. Wang (China) who was
also an alternate on the Board would no longer be available to serve in this capacity, and that a
suitable replacement for him would need to be found.
173. The General Council took note of the statement.
12. Appointment of officers to WTO bodies
174. The Chairman said that in accordance with the Guidelines for appointment of officers to
WTO bodies approved by the General Council in December 2002 (WT/L/510), he and his two
colleagues, Mr. Bryn (Norway) and Mr. Pérez de l Castillo (Uruguay), had conducted consultations
with delegations on this matter.  On the basis of these consultations, he considered that there was aconsensus on the following slate of names:
General Council H.E. Mr. Carlos PÉREZ DEL CASTILLO
(Uruguay)
Dispute Settlement Body H.E. Mr. Shotaro OSHIMA
(Japan)
Trade Policy Review Body H.E. Mrs. Mary WHELAN
(Ireland)
Council for Trade in Goods H.E. Mr. Milan HOVORKA
(Czech Republic)
Council for Trade in ServicesH.E. Mr. Ousmane CAMARA
(Senegal)
Council for TRIPS H.E. Mr. Vanu Gopala MENON
(Singapore)
Committee on Trade and
  EnvironmentH.E. Mr. Peter BR ŇO
(Slovak Republic)
Committee on Trade and
  DevelopmentH.E. Mr. Mohamed Saleck OULD MOHAMED LEMINE
(Mauritania)
Committee on Balance-of-
  Payments RestrictionsH.E. Dr. Manzoor AHMAD
(Pakistan)
Committee on Regional Trade
  AgreementsH.E. Mr. Jaynarain MEETOO
(Mauritius)
Committee on Budget, Finance
  and  AdministrationMr. Joshua C.K. LAW (Hong Kong,
China)WT/GC/M/78
Page 40
Working Group on the Relationship
  between Trade and InvestmentH.E.Mr. Luiz Felipe DE SEIXAS CORRÊA
(Brazil)
Working Group on the Interaction
  between Trade and Competition  PolicyProf. Frédéric JENNY
(France)
Working Group on Transparency in
  Government ProcurementH.E. Mr. Ronald SABORÍO SOTO
(Costa Rica)
Working Group on Trade and
  Transfer of TechnologyH.E. Mr. Stef'an Haukur JÓHANESSON
(Iceland)
Working Group on Trade, Debt and
  FinanceH.E. Mr. Hernando José GÓMEZ
(Colombia)
175. These appointments would formally be made by the WTO bodies concerned at their
subsequent meetings in 2003.
176. The General Council took note of the statement and of the consensus on the slate of names.
177. The Chairman, on behalf of all Members, congratulated the incoming Chairpersons of the
various bodies and wished them every success.  He also expressed sincere appreciation to all of the
outgoing Chairpersons for their very dedicated work in chairing their respective bodies during the past
year, which had been a particularly demanding period, given the heavy work load all had faced in the
aftermath of the Doha Ministerial Conference in addition to these bodies' regular work.  Their wisdom
and commitment had contributed to the considerable work Members had been able to accomplish.  Hewas certain Members would continue to receive the same dedicated guidance and service from the
new slate of Chairs.
178. The General Council took note of the statement.
13. Meeting of the General Council on Coherence in Global Economic Policy-making
179. The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business ", recalled that the General Council had met
from time to time in the past on the subject of Coherence in Global Economic Policy-making, most
recently in January 2001.  These meetings had provided an opportunity for the Director-General to
report to the General Council on WTO cooperation with international organizations responsible for
monetary and financial matters, pursuant to Article III of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the
WTO and to the General Council’s 1996 Decision on Agreements between the WTO and the IMF andthe World Bank (WT/L/194).  The Director-General considered that a further meeting in the spring
would be timely, and that it would be valuable for him to inform Members of his consultations with
the Managing Director of the IMF and the Pres ident of the World Bank, both of whom would be
invited to participate.  The date in mind for this meeting was 13 May.
180. The General Council took note of the statement.
14. Improving the services provided by the Secretariat to Members
181. The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business ", reported that he had been working with the
Secretariat over the past few months on severa l possible approaches to using new and existing
technologies to improve the services provided to  WTO Members, and in particular to enable theWT/GC/M/78
Page 41
increased involvement in the WTO's work of smaller delegations.  Among the several projects that
had been considered, he was pleased to be able to report that the following should be possible to
implement in the very near future.  The first proposal was to establish a Delegates' Cyber Room in
which delegations would have at their disposal a number of high-speed computers together with
Internet facilities and easy access to relevant document databases.  Delegations would be assisted intheir work as necessary by staff from the Language Services and Documentation Division.  Second, as
a complement to the Delegates' Cyber Room, the Se cretariat would start to provide two types of one-
day training courses in English, French and Spanish, one aimed as an introduction to online
documentation services and the other an advanced course on legal and documentary research online.
These courses, as well as the Cyber Room, could be integrated with other initiatives aimed at
connecting smaller delegations to the Internet.
182. Third, as part of other short-term projects, several enhancements were being introduced by the
Secretariat to the Documents Online facility, such as an easy link between meetings and documents so
as to enable Members to retrieve all documents associated with a particular meeting.  Fourth, a new
project was being started by the Secretariat to provide Members with enhanced access to the Central
Registry of Notifications which would give them the possibility of consulting the CRN online.
Finally, the Secretariat was also considering ways of harnessing new technologies to improve existingconference services in areas such as accreditation, registration, access rights, and security.  He
believed that these initiatives would prove most useful in the day-to-day work of Members, and
trusted that delegations would support and make use of the proposed projects.  He was confident that
the Secretariat and Members would continue to work together to fully exploit future possibilities to
assist their work.  He wished to express gratitude  for the support shown by the Director-General, and
to Mr. Pérez Motta (Mexico) for his enthusiasm early on for examining ways to harness new
technologies to enhance the efficiency of Members' work.  He also wished to thank the Secretariat for
its invaluable assistance in examining the implicat ions, technical challenges and cost-effectiveness of
various possible improvements, and in designing, developing and progressing the more promising of
these to a stage where their implementation could be considered within existing resources.
183. The General Council took note of the statement.
15. Possibility of a short break prior to the Fifth Ministerial Conference
184. The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business ", said that since the TNC meeting the
previous week, a number of Members had raised wi th him the importance of deciding sooner rather
than later whether to designate a one to two-week period prior to the Cancún Ministerial as a summer
break.  He said that it would be far more efficient to  resolve this issue soon, so that all involved might
be in a position to plan accordingly.  He therefore as ked that his successor, together with the Director-
General and Deputy Director-General Mr. Abbott, reflect on this matter, and hoped that an
understanding could be reached relatively soon.
185. The General Council took note of the statement.
16. Election of Chairperson
186. The Chairman said that he wished to say farewe ll by saying three thank yous – first, to all
Members and colleagues for an extraordinary cooperative joint venture.  He had enjoyed the privilege
of serving delegates in the capacity of General Council Chairman and had also enjoyed a very
thoughtful cooperation, with a sense of humour, from all.  He was certain this same courtesy would be
extended to the incoming Chairman.  Second, to the Council and TNC Division of the Secretariat for
truly working as a solid and efficient team and for going beyond the strict demands of their work.And lastly, to the Canadian delegation who had had to carry most of the load of his delegation during
his tenure as Chairman.  He looked forward to regaining both his freedom as well as his CanadianWT/GC/M/78
Page 42
voice to join in the great opportunities that lay ahead, and wished Mr. Pérez del Castillo every success
as he led Members to Cancún and beyond.
187. The General Council then unanimously elected Mr. Pérez del Castillo (Uruguay) to the Chair.
188. The newly elected Chairman, on behalf of all Members, thanked the outgoing Chair for his
excellent work at the head of the General Council.  That work had been very efficient, and all –
particularly himself – had drawn lessons from it which would guide them in their future work.
Mr. Marchi's work would be a source of inspiration to him in the work that lay ahead.  He wished to
thank all for his appointment as General Council Chairman, which was a great personal honour for
him and for his country.  In particular, he wish ed to thank the Latin American Group for having
endorsed his nomination, and all the Members of the organization for their firm and warm support.
The Chairmanship of the General Council was the highest post to which a WTO Ambassador could
aspire, and he was very satisfied with his nomination and the opportunity it offered him.  He realizedthat he was taking on this post at a difficult time.  The progress achieved to date had not been very
encouraging and many agreed deadlines had not been met.  There were still important differences in
position in key areas of negotiations.  All this had contributed to a feeling of frustration and low
morale among many Members.  To this picture one had to add the very little time available before the
Fifth Ministerial Conference.
189. He recognized the seriousness of the situation and was not underestimating the size and
extraordinary complexity of the task ahead.  There was no doubt that this situation posed an enormous
challenge and responsibility for him as Chairman.  He wished to assure Members that he was taking
on this post with humility, but also with optimism and an enormous conviction that Members could
reverse the current process.  This could be done if all committed themselves to doing so and toagreeing to do it together.  His task would essentially be that of guiding and facilitating the process.
He was committing himself, and would make his best efforts, to work towards a successful meeting at
Cancún.  Three main criteria, which were based on the mandate given by Ministers at Doha, would
guide all of his actions.  First, he would ensure that the development dimension was present in all
areas of negotiation and that it was clearly reflected in the results.  Second, he would ensure thatresults in all areas of negotiation faithfully reflected the agreed mandates.  And, third, he would
ensure that Members sought a balance in the global context of negotiations and not in sectors or
specific areas, and that the final results or solutions agreed on should be acceptable and provide
benefits for all parties.  For these purposes, he committed himself to an open-door chairmanship.  He
would always be available and prepared to listen to the objectives, interests and concerns of each
Member.
190. He also wished to state now that he would accept invitations to meetings or consultations at
various different levels that would enable him to have a clearer picture of positions or situations
Members were confronting, whether these were positions of regional groups, or those corresponding
to a specific area of negotiation open to all Members, or possibly confined to certain Members only.
He assured Members that he would do this without compromising his post as Chairman.  He
considered that it was part of his duty to listen to all sides.  This knowledge and a better view of the
situation could be very useful if the Members decided to request his services to find compromises or
to put on the table some draft declaration for Cancún.  He realized that this chairmanship would not
have any honeymoon.  Time was pressing and he woul d have to take an active position immediately,
together with the Director-General.  He wished to confirm his full determination to work together
with the Director-General to contribute to the se arch for answers that would strengthen confidence
and achieve the necessary agreement on positions that would push forward the process.  This activism
was one he would take on with serenity, objectivity and the care that the post of General Council
Chairman required, but with the firmest determination, creativity and courage demanded by
circumstances.WT/GC/M/78
Page 43
191. He said that he would prefer, at the end of hi s term of office, that he be judged by his
initiatives and actions, whether these were good, so-so, or bad, rather than by laziness or lack of
leadership that might contribute to a continued postponing of opportunities for dialogue, negotiation
or even confrontation that was necessary and inevitable.  Throughout his life he had fought for the
causes in which he believed, and on the present occasion he was convinced that the solution to allMembers' problems, however difficult they might appear, could be found if Members were prepared
to work to solve their differences.  He wished to repeat his sincere thanks to the Members for the trust
they had placed in him at this crucial juncture in the negotiations.  He hoped not to disappoint, and to
be able to rise to the circumstances.  Members could rely on his best efforts to find a satisfactory
solution for all, and he hoped that he could rely on the support of Members to continue to contribute
to a reality that would be the success of all Me mbers and would lead to the strengthening of the
multilateral trading system to which all were committed.
192. The General Council took note of the statements.
__________