RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/GC/M/43
30 June 1999
(99-2674)
General Council
Special Session
17 June 1999
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 17 June 1999
Chairman:  Mr. A. Mchumo (Tanzania)
Subjects discussed: Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference
(a) Continuation of discussion of substantive issues arising from the
Ministerial Declaration of May 1998, including proposals by
Members, with the following suggested focus:  "Proposals on
paragraph 10 of the Ministerial Declaration"
(i) Proposals on paragraph 10 of the Ministerial Declaration
(ii) Proposals on paragraph 9 of the Ministerial Declaration
(b) Indicative schedule of meetings
1. The Chairman recalled that, as agreed by the General Council at its Special Session on
25 February, the suggested focus of the present meeting was "Proposals on paragraph 10 of the
Ministerial Declaration".  While no specific written proposals had thus far been received in regard to
paragraph 10, several additional proposals in regard to paragraph 9 issues had been received since the
informal General Council meeting on 7-8 June.  He suggested that Members begin with presentationsof specific proposals, whether circulated in writing or not, starting with paragraph 10 of the
Ministerial Declaration, and moving on to paragraph 9.  He sought the cooperation of delegations and
urged that they not revisit issues and concerns of a general nature that had been raised previously, and
that they avoid, as much as possible, repetitions or declarations not related to specific proposals.  As
he had indicated previously, it would help the process if the formal meetings were geared as much aspossible to the presentation of specific proposals, and that the necessary interactive exchange and
dialogue on these proposals was undertaken in informal meetings.
(a)(i) Proposals on paragraph 10 of the Ministerial Declaration
2. The representative of Mexico said that Members needed to begin to define the kinds of results
that could be obtained at Seattle.  Mention had been made on earlier occasions of the concept of
"deliverables".  Other possibilities included the establishment of work programmes, adoption of
certain decisions by Ministers, and, above all, a negotiating package.  A distinction needed to be
drawn between what could be included in a Punta del Este-type Ministerial declaration, where a
negotiating package would be put together in the light of paragraph 10 of the 1998 Ministerial
Declaration, and the other concepts he had referred to.  It was important to have a clear picture onWT/GC/M/43
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this, so that deliverables, work programmes and other decisions by Ministers were not mixed up with
a possible negotiating package.  Regarding the post-Seattle package, the Punta del Este Declaration
was a good point of reference, including the elements it contained, such as special and differential
treatment, standstill, and single undertaking.  Mexico believed that the post-Seattle negotiations,
whatever their scope, should be conducted as part of a single undertaking.  Furthermore, anything notcovered in the scope of the post-Seattle negotiations, as referred to in paragraph 10, should not be
subject to principles such as standstill.  There was no need either to have a standstill on agriculture or
services, since neither Article 20 of the Agriculture Agreement nor Article IX of GATS referred to
this concept.  Beyond the post-Seattle negotiating package, his delegation had a positive interest in the
idea of deliverables.  However, by its definition, this concept was excluded from the scope of
paragraph 10.  In this connection, his delegation intended to consult with others to consider the
possibility of deliverables in terms of implementation of existing agreements and decisions.Regarding the scope of the negotiations, Mexico was in favour of comprehensive negotiations.  It
would consider favourably any subject that was trad e or investment liberalizing, but not other issues
such as trade and environment or those that did not come under the WTO's mandate.  As to structure
and time-frames, these would depend on the scope.  If the scope were reasonable, the time-frame
should correspondingly be brief and realistic.  A short time-frame would also make it possible toavoid the need to deal with concepts such as early harvests, which ran counter to the concept of a
single undertaking.  However, early harvests could be considered if (i) the areas for such results were
not determined in advance and (ii) they were impl emented provisionally while awaiting the results of
the final package.
3. The representative of Hungary, speaking on behalf of the CEFTA countries and Latvia
, said
that since the beginning of the preparatory process, the CEFTA countries had clearly advocated that
only a comprehensive and balanced new round of negotiations, allowing for necessary cross-sectoral
trade-offs, could ensure satisfactory results reflecting the interests of all Members, whether developed,
developing or transition countries.  The CEFTA countries and Latvia believed that a comprehensive
and balanced round should cover the built-in agenda of agriculture and services, the Singapore issuesof investment, competition, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation, together
with negotiations to reduce non-agricultural tariffs.  These negotiations might also cover areas related
to implementation, with special attention paid to  assisting the integration of LDCs into the WTO
system.  The CEFTA countries and Latvia were deeply convinced that the results of a new round
should be adopted in their entirety and apply to all WTO Members.  A single undertaking constituted
the only guarantee of equivalent benefits to all Members, and the best means to ensure an end-result
acceptable to all.  Any approach other than a single undertaking would make it virtually impossible tostrike a generally advantageous balance of rights and obligations.  However, within the framework of
a single undertaking, the possibility of achieving early harvests before the end of the round should not
be excluded, provided this did not lead to the final package becoming unbalanced.  Given the speed of
far-reaching changes in the world economy, the new round should deliver results fast, through a
relatively short negotiation of maximum three years.  The subjects that might be covered in a newround had been extensively discussed in the WTO and were therefore relatively well prepared for
negotiations.  In order to expedite the negotiating process, the Seattle Ministerial Declaration should
be clear, concise and explicit so as to provide an appropriate, firm guidance to negotiators.  As regards
the management of the new round, the CEFTA countries and Latvia were flexible as to whether the
most appropriate forum for directing the negotiatio ns would be the General Council in special session
or any other arrangement.  The fourth Ministerial Conference could be an opportunity for Ministers to
exercise political supervision of the whole negotiating process as a whole.
4. The representative of Hong Kong, China said that the key element of the Seattle Ministerial
Declaration was the future negotiating package.  The Declaration should set out in clear and concise
terms  the level of ambition  and the scope of negotiation  on each negotiating issue.  Although the level
of ambition might vary among negotiating objectives, the package should embrace all elements of the
future work programme.  To exclude elements with  limited objectives would mean that little or noWT/GC/M/43
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progress would be made on them, and the essential balance would be lost.  Where there were limited
objectives, one could consider a "built-in agenda" approach  to build up more work at a later stage.
Separately, negotiating guidelines for individual subjects  would also need to be developed, and these
could vary in their level of specificity.  In some subject areas, Members might only feel comfortable if
the parameters were well defined in advance, e.g. agriculture.  In others, it might well be moredesirable to have only general guidelines, e.g. services, in order to allow scope for negotiations to be
decided after Seattle.  The Seattle Declaration should set out the negotiating principles, covering such
parameters as single undertaking, deadline for conclusion of the round, standstill and rollback,
possible early harvests, participation of acceding countries and structure of negotiating groups.  While
the concept of a single undertaking was not constitutionally necessary as it was under the Uruguay
Round, it was nevertheless useful and instrumental.  A single undertaking involving a common
deadline would enable linkages and trade-offs to be made in the negotiations and meet the diverseneeds of different Members.  Some Members were concerned about the inherent inflexibility in this
concept, since it would require Members to accept all outcomes of the negotiations as a package at the
same time and might prevent so-called early harvests in the course of the negotiations.  However, the
problem could be alleviated to a large extent by keeping the round to a short duration, such as three to
four years, and by setting realistic negotiating objectives for the individual elements.  One possibilitywould be to seek early harvest at the fourth Ministerial Conference.  A single undertaking and early
harvests were not mutually exclusive and, subject to consensus, early harvests might be possible,
particularly in the rule-making issues mandated by the built-in agenda.
5. Hong Kong, China believed that the time-frame fo r the future negotiations should be shorter
than the Uruguay Round, lasting, say, three to fo ur years, partly because the Uruguay Round had
already laid a good foundation for further work and partly because a shorter time-frame should be
more conducive to sustaining the momentum of trade liberalization.  As regards the organization of
the negotiations, with existing WTO bodies continuing with their day-to-day work, his delegation
preferred the General Council to take charge of the overall negotiations, and would consider the need
for a trade negotiations committee and separate negotiating groups (to take charge of negotiations inareas such as services, agriculture and industrial tariffs) after a better idea regarding the elements to be
included in the negotiations.  Some negotiating groups might be necessary for reasons of management
and to avoid distraction from ongoing work.
6. The representative of Egypt said that his delegation would shortly be submitting a proposal
relating to paragraph 10 which would address the scope, structure and time-frame of the future work
programme.1  As his delegation had indicated on numerous previous occasions, utmost priority should
be given to addressing implementation issues, particularly those identified by developing countries.This consideration would be based, inter alia , on the outcome of the examination of paragraph 8 of
the 1998 Ministerial Declaration.  However, his delegation believed that despite their best efforts
Members might not be able to conclude the consideration of all implementation issues before the
Seattle Ministerial Conference.  In Egypt's view Members were thus far only committed to starting the
mandated negotiations and addressing other elements of the built-in agenda in accordance with theprovisions of various agreements.  Egypt was also  willing to continue the ongoing exploratory work
on the issues initiated in Singapore in a constructive manner.  However, it would not be able to accept
any commitments to negotiating new issues without completion of the consideration of
implementation difficulties in a satisfactory manner.  Particular attention should also be given in the
future work programme to the follow-up to the High-Level Meeting on LDCs.  In regard to structure,Egypt believed that a negotiating group should be established at the Seattle Ministerial Conference to
find meaningful solutions to implementation difficulties, other than those identified in the areas of
agriculture and trade in services.  This negotiating  group would address the difficulties that Members
were unable to conclude by Seattle.  The objective was not to unravel the Uruguay Round Agreements
but rather to address the difficulties associated with the process of implementation.
                                                     
1 Subsequently circulated as WT/GC/W/216.WT/GC/M/43
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7. Negotiations in the areas of agriculture and trade in services should take place in the
Committee on Agriculture and the Council for Trade in Services, respectively, and should be overseen
by the General Council.  As for the work programme initiated in Singapore, it should continue with
less frequent meetings in order to provide adequate focus on implementation issues and the
negotiations in the areas of agriculture and trade in services.  The work of the negotiating group onimplementation should be completed before the end of the year 2000.  As regards negotiations in the
areas of agriculture and trade in services, Egypt proposed that a review of the progress in these
negotiations take place two years after their initiation.  At that time, it would be possible for Members
to consider a realistic deadline for the completion of these negotiations.  His delegation reserved its
right to make additional proposals to address various  elements of the organization and management of
the future work programme.
8. The representative of Uruguay recalled his Gove rnment's position in favour of a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations as the best means of achieving ambitious results.  The new round
should include the built-in agenda issues without any limiting interpretations, as well as any additional
issues on which there was consensus.  Uruguay wa s looking to a short round of maximum three years'
duration, conducted as part of a single undertaking.  Members should also draw up a detailed
programme of work on all the issues, with specific modalities, clear goals as well as clear guidance asto scope and time-frames.  In order to achieve these objectives, all proposals, in particular on new
issues, should be on the table at least by the end of July.  Possible deliverables at Seattle should also
be identified clearly by the end of July so that Members might be able to consider them.  However,
the content of the deliverables should not undermine the principle of the single undertaking, which
was of paramount importance.  A similar comment could be made on the concept of early harvests.  Ifthere were to be any early harvests, Members should be clear on this from the outset, and identify
before Seattle the issues to be subject to early harvest, which should reflect a balance of interests of all
Members.  The Seattle Ministerial Declaration should contain a political statement, and outline a
detailed negotiating programme for each issue.  The General Council should be designated as the
trade negotiations committee responsible for the w hole process.  Existing subsidiary bodies could be
used in the process to work on specific issues and report back to the trade negotiations committee.
Uruguay was agreeable to the idea of a mid-term review, which could be undertaken at the fourth
Ministerial Conference.
9. The representative of Australia said that his delegation was working with others on a proposal
on issues covered by paragraph 10.  The proposal would suggest that Ministers at Seattle launch a
round of multilateral trade negotiations aimed at the progressive liberalization of trade in goods and
services and the improvement of WTO rules underpinning market access in a way that would achieveoverall balance of the interests of all Members.  The proposed round should end no later than three
years after it began, and the negotiations should be in the form of a single undertaking.  As regards
scope, it was clear that the future negotiating programme would be determined by the decisions that
Ministers would take at Seattle on specific proposals to add to the negotiations already mandated on
agriculture and services.  Australia was very much in favour of a negotiating programme that focusedon market access by adding negotiations on non-agricultural tariffs to the mandated negotiations.  It
would also be willing to look at other areas related to implementation and other issues, with particular
emphasis on measures to assist the integration of LDCs into the trading system.  Australia was also
strongly in favour of a single undertaking, which would ensure that Members were not required to
agree at the end of the negotiations to a package that did not produce a balance of benefits for all.  Acommitment to a single undertaking could allow the possibility of early harvests in some sectors.
10. Political supervision over the round would be important, and the fourth Ministerial
Conference would be an opportunity for Ministers to asses progress and give direction to the
negotiations, and also perhaps take decisions on early harvests.  Interim supervision could be provided
by the General Council in special session or by a designated trade negotiations committee.  Australiawas open to whether individual negotiations should be handled by subsidiary bodies or special bodies,WT/GC/M/43
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although it would favour the latter, particularly in regard to agriculture.  As regards time-frames,
Australia preferred a quick conclusion to the negotiation, and three years seemed appropriate.  Many
delegations had been saying for some time that governments, business and the wider community did
not want to wait for outcomes and their implementation over the sort of time-frame experienced in the
Uruguay Round.  A three-year time-frame with one y ear afterwards for ratification would be sensible,
partly because of expiry at the end of 2003 of the so-called peace clause in the Agriculture
Agreement.
11. The representative of Norway reiterated his Government's view that a comprehensive round
of negotiations was the best way of securing a balanced outcome in a new round of multilateral trade
negotiations.  A comprehensive round would be the best way to ensure that the end result reflected the
interests of all Members.  In this context, it was of particular importance that the interests of
developing countries were taken duly into account.  Norway considered a single undertaking to be thebest way to allow for the appropriate trade-offs during the negotiation process, in order to ensure that
there was something for everyone at the end of the day.  There was, however, a need to clarify what
this would mean in practical terms, in order to allow for, inter alia , deliverables at Seattle, a possible
early harvest at the fourth Ministerial Conference, and other developments that might emerge as the
negotiation process gained momentum.  As regards the time-frame for the negotiations, there seemedto be an emerging consensus that three years would be desirable and realistic, and Norway supported
this idea.  The main objective when establishing a time-frame should, however, be to provide enough
time for the necessary comprehensiveness and at the same time secure a certain efficiency in a new
round of trade negotiations.  Norway believed that  the General Council should play a coordinating
role in the negotiations, either in special sessi on, or in any other form that might be appropriate.
Furthermore, the principle of subsidiarity should guide the process of establishing negotiating groups,
and Members should aim at establishing only as many groups as were necessary.  Norway also
believed that the special problems of small delegations, the questions of appointing chairpersons on an
annual or more long-term basis, the role of the Director-General and the Secretariat in the
negotiations, and so on, would have to be addressed in order to include a complete set ofrecommendations on a negotiation structure in recommendations to Ministers at Seattle.
12. The representative of Chile said that the future negotiations should cover a comprehensive set
of issues that would cover the interests of all Members in a balanced way and allow the necessary
trade-offs.  The second phase of the preparatory process was therefore important in defining the
maximum scope of the forthcoming negotiations.  The Seattle Ministerial Declaration should be clear,
and contain sufficient detail so that time was not spent subsequently on interpretations and agreeing
on how to proceed.  A new round should be based on th e principle of a single undertaking, which was
the only way to ensure benefits for all participants and satisfactory progress in all areas.  Chile
believed that three years was sufficient for the futu re negotiations, since the issues that would possibly
be included were already familiar to all.  As regards structure, the overall supervision should be
provided by the General Council in special session.  Separate negotiating groups could also be
established, as necessary, depending on the scope of the negotiations.  Such negotiating groups shouldbe set up for the negotiations on agriculture and services.  Some existing bodies could also undertake
work in some areas, although the negotiations should not paralyse the regular work of the WTO.
Certain implementation issues could be taken up in this way.  Her delegation believed that Uruguay's
proposal to use existing WTO bodies operating in a negotiating mode and reporting directly to the
General Council could be a viable alternative.  The fourth Ministerial Conference would be anopportunity to take stock and provide the necessary impetus.  The fifth Ministerial Conference would
be an opportunity to approve the results and decide on the date of implementation, providing a period
of, say, one year for ratification.  Given that the new round would be short, there would be no need to
agree to an early harvest explicitly in Seattle, although this question could be left open.  Chile would
prefer that such an early harvest be identified at the fifth Ministerial Conference with the immediateimplementation of some agreements while waiting for the ratification of the overall package.WT/GC/M/43
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13. The representative of Costa Rica said that his Government would support comprehensive
negotiations which represented a balance of interests of all Members.  Costa Rica would be willing to
accept and to support the inclusion of any issues that were directly related to trade liberalization,
including rules on investment.  Costa Rica also supported the conclusion of the negotiations in three
years, although this would depend on the scope of the negotiations.  The negotiating process shouldbe guided and supervised by the General Council and subsidiary WTO bodies could be used as
negotiating fora.  The negotiations should be based on the principle of a single undertaking, and Costa
Rica would support the inclusion of other principles such as standstill and rollback.  Costa Rica
believed that if the negotiations had only a short duration, the idea of early harvests did not
necessarily need to be included in the mandate from  Ministers.  However, if this idea were to be
accepted, it should reflect an adequate balance of the interests of all Members.
14. The representative of Switzerland said that a Seattle Ministerial Declaration should set out the
objectives, modalities and subjects for the new negotiations.  It would therefore be advisable, in the
lead up to Seattle, to refrain from introducing and promoting proposals that constituted outcomes of
the future negotiations.  This would be counterproductive and strain the preparatory process.  The
model of the Punta del Este Declaration could possibly be helpful to guide Members' work, although
the pattern of that Declaration would clearly have to be adapted to reflect the requirements of the newnegotiations.  The Seattle Declaration should therefore contain both a list of subjects for future trade
talks and horizontal principles governing the negotiations on each subject.  The horizontal elements
would consist of:  (i) objectives for the negotiations;  (ii) modalities governing negotiations, such as
time-frame (three years), the structure of the undertaking (single undertaking) and participation in the
negotiations.  Switzerland was not opposed to accommodating the possibility of early harvests insome sectors, provided that such results were implemented on a provisional basis;  (iii) a reference to
special and differential treatment for developing countries;  and (iv) a standstill commitment.  As
regards the subjects for negotiation, they could be divided into three main baskets:  (i) market access
issues for services, agriculture, industrial products, including trade facilitation.  Non-tariff measures
should also be addressed under the heading of market access on the basis of a rules approach and,where necessary, on a case-by-case basis;  (ii) Singapore issues,  such as competition, investment and
transparency in government procurement;  and (iii) institutional aspects,  such as dispute settlement
and coherence issues.  As regards organization of work, a body would have to be established to
oversee the entire negotiating process.  This role had been given to the Trade Negotiations Committee
during the Uruguay Round, and the same approach should be applied to the forthcoming negotiations.
Finally, Switzerland believed that issues relating to implementation should be dealt with in the Seattle
Declaration, and in particular measures aimed at fostering the integration of LDCs into themultilateral system.
15. The representative of Cuba said that the first element to bear in mind in establishing the future
work programme was the solution of problems regarding implementation.  Until favourable results
were reached on this issue, it would be extremely di fficult to make progress in other areas.  This was
in keeping with paragraph 8 of the 1998 Ministerial Declaration.  Also, pursuant to the 1998Declaration, and its paragraph 8, the reviews, negotiations and other tasks already mandated should be
completed in the time-frames agreed.  In this connection, the mandated negotiations on agriculture
and services should be started on time and take account of developing and least-developed country
interests and concerns.  Cuba noted with concern the wish of some Members to include industrial
tariffs on the agenda as an already mandated area of work.  However, further negotiations onindustrial tariffs were not part of the commitments undertaken in the Uruguay Round, and this issue
should not be forced onto the agenda.  As regards the Singapore issues, Cuba believed that the
relevant working groups were working positively and had pointed to the complexity of the issues
involved.  It was therefore premature to indicate the possibility that these groups could arrive at
concrete conclusions.  In its future work, the WTO should take into account the development of these
issues, keeping in mind that this work did not prejudice in any way the question of future negotiations
in these areas.WT/GC/M/43
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16. Cuba believed that the time-frame of the next negotiations should be determined subsequently
in the light of the complexity of the issues include d, and noted with interest the suggestions at the
present meeting regarding the possibility of a mid-term review.  As regards a single undertaking,
Cuba believed that this too would depend on the issues to be included in the negotiations.  On the
possibility of early harvests, his delegation believed it was premature to reach any conclusion at thistime.  Regarding the structure of the negotiations, C uba believed that a parallel structure would be too
big a burden for small and medium delegations.  The negotiations should therefore be conducted in
the framework of the existing WTO bodies under the guidance of the General Council.  Finally, the
future WTO work programme should take account of the possibilities, the needs and the interests of
all developing and least-developed countries.  In this connection, Cuba welcomed Switzerland's
statement stressing the need to incorporate special and differential treatment for developing countries
as an important principle of the next negotiations.  Only in this way would one be able to say that theWTO safeguarded the legitimate interests of all Members, and was a different organization than the
GATT.
17. The representative of Korea said that the work programme to be established at the Seattle
Ministerial Conference should include the launching of a new, comprehensive round of multilateral
trade negotiations.  In recognition of the need to prevent a resurgence of protectionism, and theimportance of trade expansion for world economic development, the 1998 Ministerial Declaration had
called for broad-based trade liberalization, which could best be achieved through a comprehensive
round.  Only a comprehensive round could reflect the interests of all participants in a balanced
manner.  The agenda of the new round should therefore go beyond the built-in-agenda to include
negotiations on industrial products and some of the new issues.  Addressing key concerns of
developing countries, in particular the issues relating to implementation of existing agreements,
should also be an integral part of the new round.  The new round should be a single undertaking,
without which it would be difficult to achieve a proper balance of interests among the participants.
Korea did not agree with the suggestion that the built-in agenda negotiations be excluded from the
package of a single undertaking.  It also did not accept the assumption that a single undertaking wouldinevitably lead to long, time-consuming negotiations.  In order to garner the support of civil and
business society, the new round should be completed within a reasonably short period of time, and
three years seemed to be reasonable.  However, the necessity of completing the new round in three
years should not be used as an excuse to limit the scope of its agenda.  Establishment of realistic goals
and the proper organization of the negotiating proce ss was the key to a short round.  Agreeing on the
negotiating plans before the Seattle Ministerial Conference would save much valuable time for the
negotiations.  Yet, to a large extent, the scope of the negotiations would dictate how the negotiatingprocess should be organized.  Korea therefore wished to have an outline of the scope before
considering organization of the negotiations in detail.
18. The representative of Singapore, speaking also on behalf of the Philippines
, said that the
scope of any negotiations beyond those already mandated would be determined by the proposals that
Members addressed over the following months.  Th e crucial issue was how to decide on a scope that
would meet the balanced interests of all Members.  Not all issues were ripe for negotiations.  In
addition to mandated negotiations, there were also issues for which the end results could not be
foreseen at this stage, but which might be important enough not to be excluded from a balanced
negotiating package.  There was also the question of the intensity and the level of ambition for each
negotiating issue, which could be broadly defined in  the parameters for each negotiating topic that
might be agreed in Seattle.  As regards modalities, the reality was that, in practice, progress was best
achieved and advanced if negotiations were conducted as a single package with a common deadline.
However, there was also the view that any new issues that might be taken up should find their own
balance, and the issue of modalities required further reflection.  He noted that the biennial Ministerial
Conferences were a new institution that could be harnessed to provide new dynamism in the WTO.They would provide an opportunity, during the period of the negotiations, for Ministers to take stock,
to review progress and to provide any fresh directions that might be required to meet the end targetsWT/GC/M/43
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of the negotiations.  They could also approve, by consensus, any results that might be forthcoming by
that stage which entailed systemic benefits for the WTO.
19. The representative of Canada said that, as others had noted, a lot of what would be decided
under paragraph 10 would relate to the outcome of the work on paragraph 9, under which Members
would be determining the scope and content of the future work programme or negotiations.  In thisconnection, he noted that Mexico had suggested that Members try and separate the implementation
aspects from the negotiation aspects.  Subsequently, Egypt had suggested that perhaps even with the
best of intentions all of the implementation issues might not be resolved by Seattle, and therefore that
Members would have to look at how some of these aspects might be incorporated into the
negotiations.  In this regard, he noted that both paragraphs 9 and 10 referred to a "work programme",
which clearly would encompass all of the kinds of issues that delegations had been referring to at this
meeting, including issues arising out of implementation, the mandated negotiations and the built-inagenda, possible new issues, and the other issues referred to in paragraph 9, although this work
programme might end up being called negotiations by the time of Seattle.  As regards time-frames, his
delegation believed that in terms of marshalling fo cus, energy, political interest and commitment for
the negotiations, it was necessary to have time-frames that provided some sense of urgency to getting
on with the task.  It would also be useful to set in terim objectives in the course of the negotiations for
various aspects of the work to be undertaken.  In the agriculture negotiations, for example, it would be
useful to fix a time for Members to come forwar d with more specific proposals on what they would
wish to accomplish in the negotiations.
20. As to scope, while his delegation had a preference for broad-based negotiations, he believed it
was unproductive at this time to debate labels instead of the substance of the negotiations.  The scopeand content of the negotiations would become clear by the time Members got to Seattle.  On the
management of the negotiations, he agreed with Singapore that there was now a new structure in the
WTO that had not been present in the GATT.  There was an obligation to hold a Ministerial
Conference at least once every two years, and at the Ministerial level that would certainly seem to be
the body to manage the future negotiations.  In the Uruguay Round, the Trade NegotiationsCommittee had been the managing body at Ministerial level, which had also met at official level in
the interim between Ministerial meetings.  For the management of the future WTO negotiations at
official level, his delegation agreed with others th at it would be useful to consider using the General
Council, whether in Special Session or not.  While Canada would be very interested in early harvests,
it was difficult to determine before the negotiations began whether or not these would be possible.
Canada therefore wished to explicitly keep open the prospect of early harvests, though it would have
to be for the Ministerial Conference or the Genera l Council to determine whether conditions existed
that would allow such early harvests, and that these were in the interests of all Members.  This would
be possible, for example, in areas that were seen to  be of general systemic benefit to Members.  With
regard to the idea of having an additional negotiating structure, he noted that the WTO already had
some 35 or so standing bodies, and that it was not  always easy to find chairpersons for all these
bodies.  Members needed to reflect clearly on the real benefits that they expected to get from creatingadditional negotiating machinery.  He believed that the differentiation between the regular WTO work
and the negotiating work would have to be made at the level of delegations, and not in the structure.
These clearly would be some areas where supplementary machinery would need to be created, but
Members should not begin with the idea that they needed to create a separate machinery that would
parallel the existing WTO structure.  Regarding the idea of a single undertaking, he said that thisconcept seemed to have had quite a different meaning at the beginning of the Uruguay Round
negotiations than at the end, and that the label was perhaps not as important as what Members' precise
objections were pursuant to paragraph 9.  Finally, regarding participation, this was an issue that
merited careful consideration.  Canada believed that Members needed an approach similar to that used
in the Uruguay Round, and that governments in the pr ocess of accession should not be left with the
impression that their participation in the negotiations would be on the same level as that of WTOWT/GC/M/43
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Members.  Arrangements for the participation of acceding governments were intended to enable them
to follow the negotiations, but not to take part in determining their outcome.
21. The representative of India said that there was some artificiality about a debate at this stage
on paragraph 10 when the outcome of the debate on paragraph 9 was still unclear, given that
paragraph 10 referred clearly to the "work programme arising from the above", i.e. the workprogramme arising out of paragraph 9.  In offering preliminary views on paragraph 10 issues, he
recalled that India had repeatedly highlighted the paramount importance of dealing with
implementational issues and concerns.  India had also made clear that finding meaningful solutions to
implementation concerns could not be made subject to the acceptance of new commitments.  In this
connection, his delegation was concerned that Canada appeared to be implying that every
implementation issue and concern under paragraph 9 was a matter for future negotiations.   This
seemed to have been a view taken in the past by the Community, and India hoped that this was notalso Canada's position.  India supported the broad thrust of Egypt's statement, and wished to reiterate
its view that a meaningful solution to the implementational issues and concerns highlighted by
developing countries should be found at the latest by the time of the Seattle Ministerial Conference.
As Egypt had also stressed, implementation issues should be dealt with by delinking them from the
mandated reviews and negotiations, and that the issues and concerns that remained unresolved evenby Seattle should be resolved at the latest by the end of 2000.
22. As to the scope of the future work programme -- which he noted were the words in
paragraphs 9 and 10 -- India believed it could be composed of many elements.  In some sectors it
could be negotiations, in some cases it could be study programmes, and in other cases it could be
something else, depending on the subjects and what Members wished to achieve and were able todecide collectively on by consensus.  India had always indicated that it had no problem with the
mandated negotiations, mandated reviews, and work relating to the follow-up to the High-Level
Meeting on LDCs, and these should definitely be part of the scope of the future programme.
However, as regards the Singapore issues in paragraph 9(b) and the other matters in paragraph 9(d),
his delegation had repeatedly made clear that it did not accept their inclusion as subject matters fornegotiations in the next round, which would cover agriculture, services, and some aspects of
intellectual property.  India's position with regard to the scope of the next round of negotiations was
too well known to need repetition.
23. Several delegations had refer to a time-frame of three years, on the ground that they did not
want a repetition of the Uruguay Round which had gone on for seven to eight years.  In this context,
he wished to note that the prolongation of the Uruguay Round was probably more due to the
differences between major powers on a sensitive sector  than any desire on the part of participants to
prolong the negotiations.  His delegation was concerned that the time-frame should not be so short
that Members with limited resources found it impossi ble to participate meaningfully in the various
negotiations.  It would not be politically possible for many developing countries to accept the results
of the forthcoming negotiations unless they had had the opportunity to participate effectively.  As to
the structure of the negotiations, his delegation believed that Members should avoid creating newstructures.  It would be possible to maintain a distinction between normal work and negotiations even
if the same body dealt with both.  As some delega tions had already pointed out, this could be achieved
by calling special sessions of the relevant bodies to deal with negotiations in order to maintain the
distinction between 'negotiations' and 'normal work'.  India believed that the General Council could
perform the role of a trade negotiating committee.  He reiterated India's position that a SeattleMinisterial declaration should be clear and precise about what it meant.  Members could not afford the
luxury of building constructive ambiguities into this declaration, as was done in the past in some
situations, and spend months arguing as to the meaning.  His delegation agreed with Chile in this
regard.  As for Switzerland's statement that Members should not try to decide what the negotiations
should result in, his delegation believed this was relevant for all sectors even though Switzerlandmight have had a particular sector in mind.  There could not be meaningful negotiations if someWT/GC/M/43
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delegations tried to decide now as to what these should result in;  any negotiations in any particular
sector should take place without preconditions and without predetermined results.
24. Regarding the concept of standstill, he noted that Mexico did not see any need for a standstill
commitment, especially in areas and sectors no t included in the basket of negotiations, while
Switzerland had spoken in favour of a standstill commitments.  He was aware that the Punta del Estedeclaration had contained a standstill commitment, and suggested that the Secretariat prepare a factual
paper regarding the concept of standstill commitments, indicating, inter alia , the extent to which such
commitments were honoured during the Uruguay Round negotiations.  Such a factual paper would
help delegations in deciding whether they should agree to a standstill commitment or not.  Reference
had also been made to the concept of single undertaking.  Canada had suggested that the single
undertaking had had one particular connotation when the Punta del Declaration had been drafted and
an entirely different connotation when the negotiations had ended.  His delegation had also had somedifficulty in understanding the full import of this concept.  He had all along proceeded on the basis
that the concept of 'single undertaking' implied that one either accepted the entire range of
commitments or did not accept any.  In other words, one could not enter reservations with regard to
some agreements or some provisions of some agreements.  It would be useful if the Secretariat could
also prepare a factual paper providing a legal inte rpretation of this concept and explaining how this
concept was understood during different stages of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
25. The representative of Pakistan said that there were obvious difficulties in making specific
recommendations regarding the organization and management of a work programme that had not as
yet been decided on.  Nonetheless, Members could at this stage consider certain ideas that should
underpin an eventual work programme.  As to scope, the work programme to be agreed on woulddefinitely have to include recommendations regarding implementation issues, mandated negotiations
and reviews, and the follow-up to the High-Lev el Meeting on LDCs.  Recommendations on other
issues could only be included if there was an agreement on them.  The work programme should be
organized in such a manner that the focus was on addressing implementation issues, and that the
importance given by Ministers at their Second Session to implementation issues was given practicaleffect.  The priority regarding implementation issu es would also need to be translated into the
organizational structure.  Implementation issues not resolved before or at Seattle could either be
addressed in a separate negotiating body or in the General Council.  With regard to the built-in agenda
issues, these should be negotiated and deliberated within existing WTO bodies.  Finally, as regards
time-frames, negotiations on what would inevitably be complex trade issues should not proceed with
undue speed, since that would compromise the ability of developing countries to participate
meaningfully.  Sufficient time should be allowed for the conduct of these negotiations, enablingdeveloping countries to protect or advance their interests.  The "sufficient" time could only be decided
once the overall scope of the work programme was decided on.  Finally, his delegation requested that
the minutes of the meetings in the preparatory process be made available to delegations as soon as
possible.
26. The representative of the United States said that her delegation intended to submit in due
course some proposals on paragraph 10 issues.  From the language of paragraph 10, it was clear that
Ministers wished to be given recommendations designed to ensure that the future round of
negotiations would be started and finished within the agreed time-frames.  This language could be
said to reflect both satisfaction with aspects of the Uruguay Round experience and a certain amount of
frustration with that round in dealing with missed time-frames and delayed start of the negotiationsdue to the need to establish negotiating plans after the round was initiated.  In the light of the
emerging consensus that the next round of trade negotiations should be concluded in three years,
Members should retain the best from the Uruguay Round and fix the rest.  Of particular importance
was the question of time-frames.  In paragraph 4 of its communication on the objective and overall
framework for the agriculture negotiations (WT/GC/W/186), the United States had already drawnMembers' attention to the need to establish benc hmark time-frames to ensure that the agricultureWT/GC/M/43
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negotiations were started and completed within a three-year time-frame.  Similar considerations
would apply to the services negotiations and other areas yet to be agreed for negotiation.  The
inclusion of an assessment at the Ministerial level in the course of the negotiations should be used to
ensure that these agreed time-frames were being respected and results achieved on a timely basis.  As
regards structure, the United States believed that  the Uruguay Round design would be an appropriate
model.  The overall conduct of the negotiations would be overseen by a trade negotiations committee
headed at the official level by the WTO Director-General, with negotiating groups established to
coordinate negotiations on key topics such as agriculture, services, market access and institutional
issues bearing on the WTO system.  Members had the benefit, however, of various committees and
councils that should continue their important work.  The United States agreed with others that the
system should not be overburdened by increasing the number of bodies.  Members needed to be
practical in setting out the structure, and to ensure, above all, that the new negotiations did notundermine the shared commitment to the implementa tion of existing agreements.  She noted that in
the Uruguay Round, the various negotiating groups had not started their work immediately due to the
need to develop negotiating plans for each area.  To the extent possible, Members should ensure that
sufficient direction was provided at Seattle to avoid this problem.  She noted that some delegations
had referred to the need for a new commitment on standstill and rollback.  Her delegation was unsureas to what others might have in mind as regards rollback in the context of the WTO where all
Members had an obligation to maintain measures that were consistent with the agreements.  A new
standstill commitment would need to be drafted diff erently than that agreed to in the Uruguay Round
if it were to be considered.
27. The representative of Guatemala, speaking also on behalf of the Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, supported the statements by Egypt and India regarding the
scope of the negotiations.  On previous occasions, their delegations had already indicated that priority
should be given to resolving implementation problems identified by developing countries.  If
implementation issues were not dealt with adequately, their countries would not be prepared to accept
any issues other than those already agreed to under the built-in agenda.  Their countries were still inthe process of examining the various issues of scope and structure, and elements such as standstill and
single undertaking.  Certain concepts raised at the present meeting, such as that of deliverables,
needed to be further clarified.  Their delegation considered positively the idea of setting up a
negotiating group on implementation, where implementation problems not resolved by Seattle could
be dealt with.  As regards the negotiations on agriculture and services, these should be dealt with in
the already existing bodies.  The negotiations should have a well-defined time-frame, and a consensus
seemed to be emerging on a three-year period.  However, one needed to be flexible on this to allowfor more meaningful participation of developing countries.
28. The representative of the European Comm unities said that the Community's position on
implementation was not that all issues relating to this issue could and must be dealt with through a
process of negotiation.  The Community had on previous occasions spoken favourably and with
interest on Uruguay's categorization of implementation issues (Job(99)/1799) as a way of taking thiswork forward.  It had also spoken of the need to address the difficult question of the evaluation of
individual agreements and the realization of their objectives, as provided for in paragraph 8.  The
Community would agree entirely with India that the use of the words "work programme" in both
paragraphs 9 and 10 clearly did not imply that there should necessarily be negotiations on all the
issues referred to in paragraph 9.  The issue of implementation was certainly of major importance, andthe Community was willing to look at various ways of addressing that problem as it related in
particular to developing countries.  In some areas, however, the route of negotiation was perhaps the
most appropriate, but not the only possible or  viable approach to resolving questions of
implementation.  With regard to paragraph 10, the Community was also working on a paper for
submission to the General Council.  As was well known, the Community favoured a comprehensiveapproach to the scope of the future work programme;  while this was not the only way, there was a
better guarantee that the interests of all Members would be taken into account by spreading the net asWT/GC/M/43
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wide as possible.  The Community was also in favour of a single undertaking and, although the matter
was to be further refined among the Community's member States, would not wish to rule out the
possibility of an early harvest at this stage, if the opportunity were to arise.  However, like others, the
Community believed that this was not a matter that could be decided on now.  The Community's
views regarding the time-frame were also well known, and it hoped that the negotiations could becompleted within three years.
29. The representative of India said that if he had misinterpreted the Community's position this
had not been deliberate, and expressed gratitude to the Community for having clarified its position
regarding implementation issues.
30. The representative of Canada clarified that Canada was also not of the view that all
implementation issues should be addressed through new negotiations.  Clearly, implementation had to
be the first priority if Members were to honour their past commitments and undertakings.  However,some of the ideas that had been advanced on impl ementation might best lend themselves to further
development through a process of negotiation, and some implementation issues might, in this sense,
be taken up in the work programme to be agreed at Seattle.  The bulk of implementation matters
should, however, be addressed independently of any new negotiations.
31. The representative of Jamaica said that Members needed to consider whether they really
needed a Seattle Declaration, which would once again call for a strenuous and time-consuming
drafting exercise.  He noted that Hungary's co mmunication on the Budapest Informal Ministerial
Meeting (WT/L/298) indicated the view of that meeting that the Ministerial Conference could adopt a
declaration along with some specific decisions.  Th is matter required some clarity in order to frame
Members' participation.  A further question was wh ether Members at Seattle should launch a balanced
and comprehensive "round" of negotiations.  Hung ary's statement on behalf of CEFTA countries and
Latvia, and the communication in WT/L/298, suggested that there should be a comprehensive or new
round of negotiations as part of a single undertak ing.  However, a number of other WTO Members
had not yet made up their minds on this question, including the G-15 group of developing countries,
whose communiqué from their Ninth Summit meeting had been circulated some months earlier in
document WT/L/295.  Since there appeared to be a wi dely held view that any future negotiations on
trade liberalization and the strengthening of rules should lead to the greater integration of developing
countries and to securing benefits for them, a new round, if one were to be held, should be called a
"development" round.  That would send a clear message that the objective of the new round would be
to ensure that the entire WTO membership secu red the benefits of their participation in the
negotiations.  Another point for further consideration was the concept of the single undertaking.
Document WT/L/298 indicated that many Ministers at Budapest had strongly favoured the single
undertaking approach, i.e. "that the results of the new round should be adopted in their entirety and
apply to all Members".  However, in their statement, the CEFTA countries and Latvia had indicated
that in the framework of a single undertaking they  would not exclude the possibility of achieving
early harvests before the end of the new round, provided that this did not mean that the final package
would become unbalanced.  He believed it extremely important to have a clear understanding of whata single undertaking could mean.  He also believed that the concept of a critical mass, i.e. of a
significant number of countries in the WTO with the same view being able to engage in or call for
certain initiatives, such as in the areas of information technology or basic telecommunications, was a
systemic issue which had implications for the definition of a single undertaking.  He hoped that those
Members that had suggested a single undertaking approach would clarify the modalities of thisapproach so that others could understand and feel comfortable with it.
32. A further point in regard to the single undertaking concerned decision-making.  He noted that
the WTO was now a permanent negotiating forum, and that Members did not need to wait for a round
to launch and conclude negotiations.  Members could, in the regular work of the General Council, for
example, discuss and agree on an issue which would then become part of the set of WTOWT/GC/M/43
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commitments.  He believed that decision-making, in the context of the WTO, the single undertaking
and the idea of a new round should also be explored.  The different decision-making methods that
Members had devised appeared to be at odds both with logic and the smooth and effective functioning
of the WTO in the future.  On the one hand, Members could take decisions by vote, although they did
not want to in practice and agreed that decision-making by consensus was the preferred route.  Inaddition, there could be a consensus-minus-one decision in the DSB.  However, Members also
seemed to have agreed that there was something called a negative consensus, which meant that if an
agreement did not make sense, and even though a majority of Members could agree that it did not
make sense or that it needed interpretation or clarification, it required all Members to change that, i.e.
the so-called negative consensus.  This was a recipe for stalemate and disaster.  If an agreement was
clearly not sensible Members should find a way to interpret it and amend it without, as it were,
waiting for the so-called negative consensus to appl y.  Furthermore, various panels and the Appellate
Body had recently added to the jurisprudence or  even the interpretation and the implementation of
agreements.  But the WTO did not have a settled body as to what constituted the juridical practice in
this Organization, i.e. a negotiating history and a record of the negotiations which could assist in
understanding what Members had intended.  Such a practice applied at the national level, insofar as
courts interpreted the laws of the country.  This practice did not exist in the WTO.  Nevertheless, anincreasing number of panel and Appellate Body decisions were increasingly becoming the proxy for
decision-making by Members.  He hoped that this point would be instructive in how Members
formulated the organization, modalities and structure of future work programme.
33. As regards the participation of countries in the negotiations mentioned in document
WT/L/298, he believed it was timely and should be settled in a clear and balanced way.  On thequestion of implementation of existing agreements and decisions, and the review of implementation,
he proposed that if Members agreed to have a ne w round of negotiations, they should also agree to
periodic assessments beginning in the first quarter after the first full year, say, in the first quarter of
2001, on the basis of a development impact assessment statement by each developing country.  This
could be developed through the Trade Policy Re view Mechanism or by a proposal which would
involve the relevant international organizations such as the Bretton Woods institutions, UNCTAD,
OECD, WIPO, ITU, and FAO.  The objective should be to have a development impact assessment
paper which would allow Members to adequately review how each developing country was
implementing the agreements in such a way that it wa s able to measure the benefit it derived and in so
doing would remove the opportunity for them to claim that they were deriving no benefits from the
system.  The issue of an impact assessment stat ement had been brought up in the framework of the
symposia on trade and development and trade and environment, and Jamaica believed that such animplementation and review mechanism could be built into the preparations for Seattle.  Another
aspect regarding modalities concerned how any negotiations should be conducted, i.e. whether in the
General Council, a special General Council, a spec ial negotiating forum or in the appropriate WTO
bodies.  He believed that since the WTO was a permanent negotiating forum, the negotiations on the
implementation of agreements, and on the so-called built-in agenda, should proceed without waitingfor another round of negotiations.  He urged Members to consider how such ongoing negotiations in
the permanent negotiating forum of the WTO could be conducted.  With respect to the time-frame, it
would be particularly useful if Members could have a clearer sense of whether three years was
sufficiently long or short. He suggested that a nego tiating mandate at Seattle indicate that, at the end
of the third year and on the basis of a report by the Secretariat to the General Council, a reviewconference be held, i.e. the Ministerial Conference, to review the progress made and the results
achieved and, on this basis, determine whether the negotiations could be concluded.  With respect to
early harvests, he believed that this should be geared towards those countries that might require more
benefits from the trading system by virtue of their small size or relative lack of trading weight, and
wondered whether this should not be agreed prior to, and confirmed at, the Seattle MinisterialConference.  Finally, on the formal conclusion of the negotiations, he said that the negotiations and
the resulting agreements should be kept firmly w ithin one constitutional framework, which was the
Marrakesh AgreementWT/GC/M/43
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34. The representative of Hungary said he wished to make clear, in order to avoid any
misunderstandings, that the communication from H ungary on the Budapest Informal Ministerial
Meeting (WT/L/298) had been submitted in the interests of transparency, and reflected the views of
the Chair of the meeting and not necessarily the positions of individual delegations.  As regards the
statement by Hungary on behalf of the CEFTA countries and Latvia, this clearly reflected thepositions of these countries at the present time vis-à-vis  the organization and management of the work
programme including scope, structure, and time-frames of the future negotiations.  This was clearly
not their final position.  On the question of early harvests, he believed that these could not be
excluded at the outset.  If, for example, Members were able to make some progress, say, with regard
to Article XXIV, it was not inconceivable that consideration could be given to implementing the
results even before the conclusion of the round as a whole.
35. The General Council took note of the statements.
(a)(ii) Proposals on paragraph 9 of the Ministerial Declaration
36. The representative of Honduras, presenting a proposal by Cuba, the Dominican Republic,
Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Nicaragua and Pakistan (WT/GC/W/208) on the extension of the
scope of protection of geographical indications in the TRIPS Agreement, said that the protection of
geographical indications was an industrial property measure which made it possible to protect all
products, whether man-made or natural, that were distinguished by their quality, reputation or other
characteristics essentially attributable to their geographical origin.  Articles 22 to 24 in Section 3 of
the TRIPS Agreement regulated all matters relating to this important means of protection, particularlyArticle 23, which granted additional protection only  to wines, and the same protection had been
extended to spirits in the Singapore Ministerial Declaration.  The proposal concerned further
extending the scope of protection to other types of products that would also benefit from this
protection, since the countries tabling the proposal had a diversity of agricultural, handicraft, and
industrial products which also needed the security that protection of geographical indications wouldconfer.  A second proposal, submitted by Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, and Honduras,
concerned the extension of the transition period accorded to developing-country Members under
Article 65:2 of the TRIPS Agreement (WT/GC/W/209).  The TRIPS Agreement necessitated the
modernization of national intellectual property systems including legislation, with the long-term aim
of enabling developing countries to benefit from institutions which were of the most use to them, in
addition to attracting the foreign direct invest ment that was of importance to their economic
development.  The challenge faced by developing countries in adapting to the requirements of theAgreement, taking into account the technological and financial gap between developing and
developed countries, could be seen in the difficult and costly tasks that lay ahead.  These included
modernizing administrative infrastructures, modernizing and drafting new laws on the granting and
protection of intellectual property rights, strengthening institutions while creating a culture for the
protection of intellectual property, as well as creating an appropriate framework for promoting
research and development to ensure that developing countries did not continue to be mere consumers
of foreign technology.  Some of these tasks we re already being implemented by many developing
countries, but the outstanding tasks could only be implemented if sufficient resources and technical
assistance were made available by developed countries.  Despite the efforts which had already been
made, the countries submitting the proposal noted with concern that the end of the transition periodallowed under Article 65:2 was approaching, and they thus proposed its extension until such time as
developing countries were in a position to fully implement the Agreement.
37. The representative of Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the ASEAN Members
, referring to
ASEAN's proposal on the responsibility of Me mbers under the WTO Agreement (WT/GC/W/187),
said that the aim of the proposal was to clarify that it was the basic and residual obligation of eachMember to ensure that all laws, regulations a nd administrative procedures within its territory,WT/GC/M/43
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including those of regional or local governments, were in conformity with its WTO obligations.  In
response to the proposal, one delegation had expressed strong opposition on a previous occasion,
citing Article XXIV:12 of GATT 1994 and Article 1:3 of GATS as a basis for its opposition.  Those
Articles indeed provided that the responsibility of a Member in respect of observance by regional and
local governments and authorities was the taking of "such reasonable measures" as may be availableto that Member.  However, Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement provided that "each Member
shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures" with its WTO
obligations.  The obligation to take reasonable measures, as provided for in GATT 1994 and in
GATS, was not the same as the more stringent obligation to ensure, as provided for in the Marrakesh
Agreement.  Thus, there was a conflict between the GATT 1994 and GATS, on the one hand and the
Marrakesh Agreement on the other.  With respect to this apparent conflict, Article XVI:3 of the
Marrakesh Agreement provided that:  "In the event of a conflict between a provision of thisAgreement and a provision of any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the provision of this
Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict".  Thus, based on Article XVI:3 of the Marrakesh
Agreement, the obligation to ensure prevailed over the obligation to take reasonable measures.  For
this reason, ASEAN's proposal was legitimate.  Turning to ASEAN's proposal on compliance with the
"Enabling Clause" under GATT 1994 (WT/GC/W/188), he said that non-discrimination was a coreWTO obligation, and the "Enabling Clause" allowed preferential treatment as an exception to this
core obligation, but subject to certain conditions.  Among such conditions was that such preferential
treatment should be generalized, non-discriminatory , and non-reciprocal.  However, preferential
treatment schemes were currently being implemented in violation of those conditions.  Some
developed-country Members were discriminating among developing countries on the basis of aunilateral decision to impose compliance with labour and environmental standards as conditions for
preferential treatment.  Such conditions were in violation of the "Enabling Clause", and of the core
obligation of non-discrimination.  Under such conditions, preferential treatment ceased to be non-
reciprocal and became discriminatory and non-generalized.  Of course, violations of the "Enabling
Clause" and of the non-discrimination obligation could be subjected to dispute settlementproceedings.  However, priority should always be accorded to ensuring compliance before a violation
occurred, particularly in this instance where the only potential violators were developed-country
Members, and the only Members prejudiced were developing-country Members.
38. With regard to the Community's proposal on government procurement (WT/GC/W/192), he
said that since its establishment, the Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement
had undertaken useful work in furthering the understanding among Members on possible elements for
inclusion in an appropriate agreement.  Despite progress in some areas, many areas required furtherdeliberations, some of which were extremely conten tious and of concern to ASEAN.  In this regard,
ASEAN wished to reiterate four points which it ha d consistently made in the Working Group:  (i) any
agreement should deal only with transparency in government procurement and not market access.
Despite repeated assurances, proposals to the contrary had been heard in the working group;  (ii) any
agreement eventually concluded should be applicable at all levels of government.  In this context,ASEAN noted that the EC proposal had also alluded to this;  (iii) Ministers had only mandated
Members to develop elements for inclusion in an appropriate agreement;  and (iii) any agreement that
contained elements which were too "tight" could only be a disservice, in the sense that WTO
Members, particularly developing-country Members, could inevitably end up restricting market
access opportunities while signing an agreement on transparency.  Turning to the Community'sproposal on competition policy, ASEAN wished to place a few important markers with respect to the
arguments that had been made in favour of multilateral rules on competition policy.  ASEAN believed
these markers raised vital questions on the limits to what could be done, what was feasible and what
was practical in the light of the progress made in the area of competition policy and law.  The debate
in the Working Group on Trade and Competition Policy had clearly highlighted the divide that existedbetween Members on the issue.  Differences in what constituted competition policy, differences in
substantive competition laws or doctrines, differences in enforcement practices or procedures,
differences in the economic, social and political environment underpinning the direction thatWT/GC/M/43
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Members took on competition law, all constituted legitimate impediments to multilateral rules.
Several reasons had been put forward as to why Members should consider multilateral rules on
competition.  For example, it had been argued that globalization had increased the scope for the
effects of private anti-competitive practices to be felt across countries.  It had also been suggested that
individual attempts by governments to deal with such negatives might result in conflicts of law andjurisdiction, and excessive costs for firms as well as the concerned regulatory agencies.  These
arguments raised several important questions:  (i) how significant were truly private anti-competitive
business practices with cross-border effects?  There was evidence to suggest that in many instances
anti-competitive business practices by firms were either actively or tacitly supported by government;
(ii) if indeed the bulk of private anti-competitive practices were supported by governments, could the
existing disciplines of the WTO not address them?  Some commentators had suggested that both the
violation and non-violation routes of the WTO Di spute Settlement Mechanism already provided an
effective means of curtailing those private anti-competitive practices that nullified or impaired
negotiated market access;  (iii) if the objective was market access, would not further impetus in the
WTO to reducing trade barriers and trade restrictive practices be a more effective means of promoting
the contestability of markets?  and (iv) would other approaches be more realistic?  Here past
experience bore important lessons.  If one could generalize the success of past approaches, it wouldappear to ASEAN that bilateral and regional approaches had been relatively more successful than
attempts at the multilateral level.  None of the instruments that had been negotiated or discussed at the
multilateral level, such as the UN Set of Multilatera lly Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the
Control of Restrictive Business Practices and th e numerous instruments formulated by the OECD,
were binding.  They remained as recommendations  or provided guidelines to the approaches that
countries could take on cooperation.  This of course raised the important question as to why there
were varying levels of success with the existing instruments.
39. Regarding agriculture, ASEAN recognized that  along with commitments on domestic support
and export subsidies, market access concessions were an important pillar in the mandated negotiations
on agriculture.  In particular, market access was fundamental to any policy aimed at enhancing theparticipation and share of developing countries in  international trade.  In this context, ASEAN
supported Australia's proposals on agricultural market access, and agreed with several points in the
joint proposal by Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Pakistan,
which included a specific proposal on market access negotiations.  The flexibility allowed in the
Uruguay Round for tariff reductions had enabled countries to introduce minimum tariff cuts on
sensitive products while effecting higher reductions in products which were not significantly traded.
This dilution effect had served to perpetuate the gap in protection levels among agricultural products,and had frustrated the translation of tariff concessions into meaningful market access.  Distortions in
tariff levels had been further preserved through the persistence of tariff escalation.  An analysis by the
OECD in 1997 on the impact of the Agriculture Agreement on processed agricultural products had
revealed that, despite the Uruguay Round tariffication exercise, tariff escalation in developed
countries remained considerable in processed products, most of which were products of exportinterest to developing countries.  This tariff structure in developed countries offered effective
protection to their food processing industries at the expense of efforts by developing countries to
diversify exports into higher-value processed product s.  On tariff quotas, ASEAN believed that trade
volumes under tariff quotas should be increased substantially in order to provide a major expansion of
market access for agricultural products, particularly for high value-added export products ofdeveloping countries.  ASEAN wished to stress the need for improving the disciplines in the
administration of tariff quotas so that they did not result in the reduction of the size of the quotas and
so that the commercial value expected from the TRQs  could be realized to the fullest extent.  In this
regard, ASEAN believed that the principles of transparency, predictability and non-discrimination
should govern the rules for administering TRQs.  As stated at the outset, ASEAN considered marketaccess to be one of the principal elements in pursuing the reform process in agriculture.  However,
ASEAN also believed that the objective of achieving fair and market-oriented trade in agriculture
would be best attained not by im plementing deep cuts in tariffs per se , but more importantly byWT/GC/M/43
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correcting the imbalances in the levels of protection and distortions within product categories and
among Members.
40. As regards the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, ASEAN wished to raise
its concerns with respect to the implementation of the Agreement, particularly Article 9 on technical
assistance, and Article 10 on special and differential treatment for developing countries.  The reporton the review of the operation and implementation of the SPS Agreement bore witness to the fact that
Article 10 had not been given full effect during the implementation of the Agreement.  Article 10 had
been envisioned to provide balance for developing countries to enable them to enjoy the benefits
expected from the Agreement.  ASEAN believed that  the only means to remedy this imbalance was to
develop concrete guidelines on the implementation of Article 10.  Such guidelines might include, for
example, the establishment of a trust fund within the WTO that would effectively channel technical
assistance to developing countries.  Finally, in view of the pressing need to address the concerns ofdeveloping countries under the SPS Agreement, ASEAN proposed that such guidelines should form
part of the Ministerial Declaration at the Seattle Conference.
41. Regarding trade and environment, ASEAN had reviewed the proposals on this issue
submitted by both the EC and Norway (WT/GC/W/194 and WT/GC/W/176 respectively), and agreed
that the issues raised in both proposals were pertinent.  However it firmly believed that these issuescould be effectively dealt with within the current mandate of the Committee on Trade and
Environment.  As Members would recall, the Committee had been undertaking useful analytical work
as mandated by Ministers at both the Marrakesh and Singapore Conferences.  These proposals
prejudged the on-going work of the Committee and ASEAN did not see the need to change the
present mandate.  The EC had suggested that consensus should be sought on the accommodationwithin WTO rules of trade measures pursuant to MEAs.  ASEAN did not reject this, and such trade
measures could be accommodated through a waiver from the General Council of the WTO.  The EC
had also called for a clarification of the relationship between WTO rules and non-product-related
process and production requirements, and in particular, of the WTO compatibility of eco-labelling
schemes based on a life-cycle approach.  ASEAN recognized that this was an important area whichneeded further analysis within the CTE.  This was because exports of Members, particularly
developing countries, had been affected by these voluntary schemes.  However, ASEAN seriously
doubted the utility of Members engaging themselves in an exercise which implicitly recognized the
life-cycle of a product.  The WTO should remain concerned only with the treatment of the final
product, and not the way in which it was produced.  There should not be any linkages between trade
and non-trade concerns.  In its proposal, Norway had suggested that the effects on sustainability of
further liberalization/draft agreements should be c onsidered and/or reviewed.  This was for national
governments to decide, and if they so decided, they might wish to seek the technical assistance of the
relevant expert agencies in this field.  There was no need of any multilateral decision to this effect.
ASEAN hoped that this was not an attempt to furthe r entrench the concept of the multifunctionality of
agriculture and introduce non-trade concerns into agricultural liberalization.
42. Finally, India's proposal on TRIMs (WT/GC/W /203), and the proposal by the Dominican
Republic also on behalf of a group of developing countries on Subsidies (WT/GC/W/164/Rev.1)
raised important concerns with respect to the operation of the Agreements in question.  ASEAN fully
subscribed to the observation that certain measures disciplined by the TRIMs and Subsidies
Agreements constituted useful tools that promoted  growth, investment and the overall development of
developing countries.  ASEAN also agreed that the existing disciplines on these measures hadconstrained the capacity of developing countries to achieve higher levels of capability for greater
integration into the multilateral trading system.  It was indeed ironic that the rules which had been
developed purportedly to assist developing countries to promote their trading interests, might have
become a bane rather than a boon.  This was particularly acute for developing-country Members
which had experienced falls in their per capita GNP.  ASEAN did not discount that there might be aneed to further fine-tune the approach taken in these Agreements to more effectively remedy theWT/GC/M/43
Page 18
imbalances they contained.  These included those raised in connection with the flexibility under
Annex VII of the Subsidies Agreement and the pr oblems that the TRIMs Agreement posed to the
developmental objectives of the developing countries.  ASEAN called on Members to find solutions
that would inject balance into the implementation of these particular Agreements, in recognition of the
unique and real difficulties that developing countries faced and to give full effect to special anddifferential treatment of developing countries.
43. The representative of Japan, presenting a proposal on regional integration,
2 said that the basis
of the proposal was its need to clarify certain key concepts of Article XXIV of GATT 1994 and
Article V of GATS, and at the same time strengthen the current examination procedure on regional
trade agreements, in order to ensure the primacy of the multilateral trading system.  The proposal
included an indicative list of issues that Japan saw as being appropriate for inclusion in future work
and which should form part of the forthcoming negotiations.  The proposal was in line with thosesubmitted by Australia, Korea and Hong Kong, China.  Japan would also be submitting shortly a
number of proposals in the following areas:  (i) services;  (ii) agriculture, forestry and fishery;  (iii)
market access for industrial products;  (iv) investment;  (v) anti-dumping; and (vi) trade facilitation.
On services, Japan would propose that such elements as voluntary liberalization, standstill, and
special and differential treatment for developing countries should be included in the guidelines for theforthcoming negotiations.  Japan's basic thinking in the area of agriculture had already been stated on
previous occasions, and would be reflected in its proposal.  As regards forestry and fishery, Japan
would propose that these two areas, which were closely linked to environmental conservation and
other issues, should be dealt with separately from other non-agricultural products.  In the area of
market access for industrial products, Japan would propose that negotiations should be based on theformula-cut approach, combined, as appropriate, with zero-for-zero or harmonization initiatives
taking into account the specificity of sectors.  On investment, multilateral rules would benefit both the
host country as well as investors, and Japan believed it important that rules on investment be
negotiated in WTO.  In the area of anti-dumping, Japan saw the necessity to have stricter and clearer
disciplines as there was a lack of fair and effective application of existing rules, which was a source ofconcern to many Members, in particular developing countries, and the proposal would address this
issue in particular.  Lastly, he wished to comment on some of the proposals recently submitted.
Regarding the ASEAN proposal on anti-dumping (W T/GC/W/205), Japan shared many of the points
ASEAN had raised, and concurred that there were certain weaknesses in the existing Anti-Dumping
Agreement which should be addressed.  Turning to the proposal by the Dominican Republic and
others on subsidies and countervailing measures (WT/GC/W/164/Rev.2), and with regard to the
proposal for the expansion of the category of countries under Annex VII, Japan held the view that itwas necessary to take into account the degree of development of Members as well as the trade impact
that export subsidies might have.  Japan was therefore cautious about the proposal, but at the same
time believed that it would be useful to address the problem of the criteria used for inclusion of
countries where the GNP had surpassed that of the criteria in Annex VII, but subsequently had fallen
back to a lower level.
44. The representative of Sri Lanka, referring to the Non-Paper on Implementation Issues
(Job(99)/3169 and Add.1) circulated by Zambia al so on behalf of Jamaica, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania and Uganda and Zimbabwe, said that this paper, as well as Zambia's statement at a
previous meeting, had highlighted the main problems that had arisen in the implementation of the
Uruguay Round Agreements and the steps which these countries considered were essential to makethe multilateral trading system more responsive to the trade, financial and development needs of
developing countries.  Sri Lanka fully subscribed to the concerns expressed in the paper, and wished
to highlight some critical areas that might need further emphasis in so far as they related to Sri Lanka,
which fell into a group of countries broadly described as small and vulnerable economies.  In
particular, he would enumerate the areas where Sri Lanka wished to make concrete proposals for the
                                                     
2 Subsequently circulated as WT/GC/W/214.WT/GC/M/43
Page 19
attention of Ministers at the third Ministerial Conference.  Sri Lanka was clearly one of the
developing countries affected by the erosion of  the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
consequent to the MFN tariff reductions under the Uruguay Round.  Examination of the issues
relating to rules governing trade in goods, and particularly those concerning access to the markets of
developed countries, would suggest that serious consideration should be given to the proposalsidentified in the Non-Paper for the removal of constraints which prevented taking full advantage of
the preferential access available under GSP, in particular, the concrete actions in paragraphs 1.1.1.3
and 1.1.3.1.
45. Another area of specific interest was agricultur e and at a previous meeting he had supported a
paper on market access issues relating to the Agriculture Agreement circulated by the Dominican
Republic on behalf of a group of developing countries.  On that occasion, his delegation had
highlighted its concerns that very little had been achieved by small trading partners in terms ofobtaining any immediate market access for their agricultural products under the Agreement.  One
could argue that applicable tariffs on agricultural commodities of particular interest to developing
countries, such as tea, coffee, cocoa, sugar and so on, were low in developed-country markets, and ask
what more could be achieved.  However, developing countries wished to add value to their exports by
further processing these products, and would note that tariff rates on processed agricultural exports, aswell as tropical fruits, vegetables and horticultural products, currently remained high.  Another
problem which developing countries like Sri Lanka had experienced over the years, and which was
outlined in the Non-Paper, was the continuing decline of international market prices for these
products.  The price of tea, which accounted for approximately 25 per cent of Sri Lanka's export
earnings, had continued to decline year after year, while the cost of production inputs for tea sourcedfrom developed markets had continued to spiral upwards.  In this context, it was necessary to evaluate
the commitments and obligations under the Agriculture Agreement by developing countries such as
Sri Lanka, before embarking upon commitments to further concessions in this area.  As Members
were aware, agricultural farming in most developing countries and particularly in small economies
was based on small-holding operations where the bulk of production was for domestic consumption
rather than for export.  These activities also involved large sections of the rural population whose
livelihood was totally dependant on such activities.  Consequently, it would be unfair to place the
agricultural activities of small developing countries and LDCs on a par with those of developed
countries.  The Agriculture Agreement had already had adverse effects on the majority of these
countries, with their governments having to review most domestic support measures, export subsidies
and so on, which were so crucial to the survival of these countries in the wake of increasing external
competition.  In addition, an equally important factor in agriculture was higher levels of protection toensure that an appropriate level of production was undertaken in the country and that these countries
did not become entirely dependent on imports.  The Non-Paper highlighted many of these inequities
which Sri Lanka believed needed immediate rectification, and accordingly fully supported the
following recommendations:  (i) deeper reductions in tariffs and tariff peaks (paragraph 1.3.3.1);
(ii) adequate provision for allocation of quotas for small suppliers from developing countries,including new suppliers (paragraph 1.3.3.2);  (iii) flexibility to use export subsidies by developing
countries (paragraph 1.3.4.1);  (iv) Green Box subsidies (paragraph 1.3.4.2);  (v) flexibility to
determine the level of reductions in tariffs (paragraph 1.3.4.3);  (vi) food security (paragraph 1.3.4.4);
(vii) implementation of the Decision Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform
Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Countries (paragraph 1.3.4.5);  and(viii) assistance to developing countries affected by declining commodity prices (paragraph 1.3.4.6).
46. As regards the concerns arising from the TBT and SPS Agreements, he said that international
standards were being developed regardless of the conditions prevailing in developing countries,  and
developing-country exports often subject to various forms of hidden trade barriers, thus causing
unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  In addition, countries had often taken undue advantageof the inadequate technical capacity of developing countries and particularly of least-developed
countries by introducing arbitrary measures which affected their trade.  In this connection, the specialWT/GC/M/43
Page 20
and differential provisions of these agreements  should be given their full meaning so that SPS
measures and technical standards applied under these agreements did not discriminate in any way
against the trade of developing countries and LDCs.  Accordingly, Sri Lanka fully supported the
proposal made in paragraph 5.2.3.1 of the Non-Paper for the adoption of a system that would
distinguish international standards and SPS measures as being either voluntary or mandatory.  Asregards export subsidies, the Non-Paper noted that such subsidies, which were important to
developing countries for their diversification efforts, were being treated as actionable subsidies and
were therefore liable to a levy of countervailing duties.  This was discriminatory when one took into
account the level of development of these countries.  Hence, Sri Lanka fully supported the proposal
that the gross inequities in the provisions in the Subsidies Agreement needed to be removed.
Sri Lanka also had a special interest in the proposa l in the Non-Paper for action in respect of TRIMs,
and shared the view that the use of local content regulations was a crucial policy instrument fordeveloping as well as least-developed countries, not only for furthering the process of
industrialization being undertaken in such countries, but also as an effective way of conserving scarce
foreign exchange reserves through the use of less costly domestic inputs, and therefore fully endorsed
the proposal in paragraph 8.3.  Finally, his delegation proposed that all the issues and specific
proposals contained in the Non-Paper be referred to the various competent committees and councilsfor due consideration.
47. The representative of Jamaica, referring to the Non-Paper on Implementation Issues
submitted by Zambia, Jamaica, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe
(Job(99)3169 and Add.1), suggested that the Secretariat transmit to the relevant WTO committees and
councils the proposals in this non-paper that fell within their competence for further study andexamination. He suggested that the proposals also be forwarded to the Committee on Trade and
Development.  If this were agreed to, the Members concerned could work with the Secretariat in
following through with this task.
48. The representative of the Dominican Republic, also on behalf of Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Nicaragua and Thailand presenting a proposal regarding the Subsidies
Agreement (WT/GC/W/164/Rev.2) said that their countries were concerned by the deficiencies and
imbalances encountered during the implementation of the Agreement, and thus proposed a new text
for Annex VII, which would allow developing countries with an annual income in the Low and
Lower-Middle Income Category of the World Bank to  benefit from Annex VII.  It would also allow
for automatic entrance to, and exit from, the list in this annex in accordance with this economic
indicator.  The developing countries within this category did not have sufficient resources to obtain
direct assistance for their production sectors, so that the most appropriate measures in their favourwould be investment incentives.  The fact that, at the present time, these measures were not generally
in use by developed countries did not mean that they had lost their meaning and utility for developing
countries.  The countries submitting the proposal believed that these measures were of vital
importance to allow developing countries to participate efficiently in the multilateral trading system.
They also wished to underline that although it was true that they still supported the rule-basedmultilateral trading system, this system should not neglect the different levels of development of
Members, nor the specific economic needs of developing countries, which were in the majority in the
organization.
49. The representative of India said that from the outset of the preparatory process India had
emphasized the importance it attached to the redressal of implementational concerns, and believed
that full implementation of existing agreements and de cisions, in the proper spirit, was imperative.  In
particular, the implementational concerns related to special and differential provisions for developing
countries in the agreements was of critical importance.  These special provisions were designed to
take into account the constraints inherent in the developing countries' international trade relations
occasioned by the peculiar structural features characterizing their economies, their low level ofindustrialization, their inability to access advanced technologies, and the non-availability of adequateWT/GC/M/43
Page 21
infrastructure.  India believed that these concerns reflected the imbalances and asymmetries in the
existing agreements, and for this reason the developing countries should not be required to make any
additional concessions for what was only a redressal issue.  Only a realistic alignment and balancing
of an earlier unbalanced package would ensure th e integration of developing countries into the
multilateral trading system.  With these concerns in mind, India had recently submitted fourproposals.  The first concerned the Anti-Dumping Agreement (WT/GC/W/200).  Recent years had
seen increasing resort to anti-dumping actions, and new investigations had often been started on the
same products immediately after the termination of an investigation.  The uncertainty and
restrictiveness of these measures had created trade disruption affecting not only particular
consignments but also longer-term trade in the ta rgeted product.  The lack of clarity in certain
provisions of the Agreement had compounded the problem, including the fact that Article 15, which
provided the only reference to the special situation of developing countries, was ambiguous andpractically inoperative.  Moreover, certain provisions, particularly those relating to de minimis
dumping margin and the threshold volume of im ports below which no anti-dumping duty should be
levied, needed to be revised in view of the changed global trade and economic scenario, especially for
exports from developing countries.  The special provisions in the Agreement relating to the settlement
of disputes in the anti-dumping area needed to be modified so that the common rules provided by the
Dispute Settlement Understanding applied to disputes relating to anti-dumping actions.  India's paper
contained 10 specific proposals or amendments which it believed were necessary in order to ensure
that developing countries received the due benefits of global trade liberalization.
50. The second proposal concerned the Subsidies Agreement (WT/GC/W/201), which in India's
view had serious imbalances because the subsidies commonly used by developing countries for theirindustrialization and development had been included in the actionable or prohibited category, while
those used by developed countries were in the non-actionable category.  These initiatives were
indispensable for developing countries, especially those with small and vulnerable economies, and
could enable developing countries to strengthen their industrial sector and diversify their exportable
product, thereby becoming active participants in international trade.  Developing countries also
needed special dispensation as far as the provisions of Article 11:9 was concerned, so that subsidy
investigations were started only if the subsidies being provided by developing countries were above a
revised minimum threshold.  Annex VII of the Agreement also needed to be suitably amended to
ensure that a developing country was excluded from the Annex only after its GNP had been above the
maximum level for a continuous period of three years and not just in the case of a one time attainment
as present.  India also believed that the prohibition of using export subsidies under Article 27:6 should
become applicable to a developing country only after its export levels in a product had remained over3.25 per cent of world trade continuously for a period of five years.  Furthermore, an automatic
inclusion provision should be added to Article 27:6 to enable developing countries to reintroduce
export subsidies once the share of their export of a product decreased to a level below 3.25 per cent of
world trade.
51. The third proposal related to the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(WT/GC/W/202).  Arbitrary and restrictive sanitary and phytosanitary measures continued to
represent a major obstacle to the international trade in agricultural products.  Developing country
exports were usually affected in two ways.  First, because SPS measures were often developed in a
non-transparent manner and developing countries invariably did not get adequate opportunity to
respond to the proposed measures.  Second, the Agreement provided that in order to ensure that theadoption of a new SPS regulation did not cause barriers to trade, there should be a reasonable interval
between its publication and its entry into force.  It further provided that "longer time-frames for
compliance" be provided for developing countries.  In practice, compliance with these provisions by
countries introducing new measures had been largely non-existent.  India accordingly proposed that
the provisions of Article 10:1 of the SPS Agreement, which provided that in the preparation andapplication of SPS measures Members should take into account the special needs of developing
countries, and those of Article 10:2, which provided for longer time-frames for compliance onWT/GC/M/43
Page 22
products of interest to developing-country Members, be made into mandatory provisions.  Also, the
participation of developing countries in international standardization activities had been limited and
ineffective, and a number of international stan dards were thus being developed without their
participation.  As a result, standards were often being adopted without taking into account the
problems and constraints that developing countries faced.  Some of these problems could perhaps beovercome by reviewing what constituted an international standard, which was different from a
recommendation or a guideline.  India proposed that the definition of an international standard,
guideline and recommendation (paragraph 3 of Annex A) needed to be revised so that a differentiation
was introduced between mandatory international standards and a voluntary international guideline or
recommendation.  In addition India's paper contained six other specific proposals which were
necessary to ensure that the provisions of the SPS Agreement did not constitute barriers to trade from
developing countries.
52. The fourth proposal related to the TRIMs Agreement (WT/GC/W/203), which in India's view
posed problems both with respect to the limited transition period available for removing TRIMS and
the denial of freedom to countries to channel investments in a manner that fulfilled their
developmental needs.  There was therefore a need to review the provisions in the Agreement relating
to local content requirements as the existing provisions obstructed the acceleration of theindustrialization process in developing countries and denied those countries the means to maintain
balance-of-payments stability.  With a view to ensuring that these instruments might be maintained by
developing countries until such time as their developmental needs demanded, the transition period
mentioned in Article 5:2 needed to be extended.  The TRIMs Agreement also needed to be modified
to provide developing countries another opportunity to notify existing TRIMs measures which theywould then be allowed to maintain until the end of the revised transition period.  Furthermore,
Article 5:3, which recognised the importance of taking into account the development, financial and
trade needs of developing countries when dealing with trade-related investment measures, had
remained inoperative and ineffectual.  The provisions of this Article should therefore be suitably
amended and made mandatory.
53. The representative of Hungary, referring to a proposal on regional trade agreements his
delegation was submitting,3 recalled that several proposals had already been submitted by other
delegations recommending the inclusion of GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V in the
forthcoming negotiations, and while these proposals contained several interesting elements, Hungary
believed they lacked a balanced approach.  Hung ary's proposal emphasized the important and positive
effect of regional trade agreements on the growth of world trade and on the multilateral trading
system.  It was aimed at accelerating the reviews of regional trade agreements under way in theCommittee on Regional Trade Agreements, and at cr eating greater certainty for the negotiation of
future RTAs.  To facilitate the review process of these agreements, existing WTO rules concerning
RTAs should be further clarified both from the substantive and the procedural points of view.
54. The representative of Hong Kong, China welcomed the proposals on regional trade
agreements presented by Hungary and Japan, both of which, along with the proposals submitted by
her delegation, and Australia and Korea, highlighted the need to clarify existing rules in this area..
Hong Kong, China believed that action was needed to redress a situation which was unsatisfactory
both to the parties of RTAs and to those outside such agreements.  There were some interesting ideas
in Hungary's proposal and her delegation would be reflecting on these, but remained willing to work
with any interested delegations on this issue.
55. The representative of Australia welcomed the proposals by Hungary and Japan on the
clarification of WTO disciplines relating to regional trade agreements, and said that his delegation
agreed with most of the suggestions in Japan's proposal.  Australia's proposal in this area had been
                                                     
3 Subsequently circulated as WT/GC/W/213.WT/GC/M/43
Page 23
concerned essentially with the need to clarify existing rules that had, in the experience of the
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements and also  under GATT, been impossible to administer.
Australia could understand the concern of Hungary a nd other Members that they would want to avoid
the retrospective application of new disciplines, which was a question that needed to be discussed, but
it was important not to lose sight of the main problem which was that, both under WTO as well asunder GATT for more than 50 years, disciplines in this area had never been understood, at least on an
agreed basis, and had never been applied.  It was clear that opinions might vary among Members on
how to solve this problem.
56. The representative of Turkey, addressing regional trade agreements, said that parallel to the
trade liberalization under the GATT/WTO, regional economic integration among Members had
substantially increased.  Since 1 January 1995, 60 new regional trade agreements had been notified
under Article XXIV of GATT 1994, most of which were presently in force.  In February 1996, theGeneral Council had established the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements with the mandate of
examining all the RTAs notified to the relevant organs of the WTO.  The mandate of the Committee
also included the consideration of "the systemic implications of the RTAs and regional initiatives for
the multilateral trading system and the relationship between them".  The Committee had had 62 RTAs
before it for examination at the end of 1998, but had not been able to complete its work on any ofthem and no report had been adopted up to the present.  The main reason the Committee had not been
able to fulfill its mandate for the examinations was a lack of consensus on the interpretation of the so-
called systemic issues originating from Article XXIV.  The Committee had been working on systemic
issues for more than two years, and there was unfortunately still no consensus among Members in this
area, as had also been the case when negotiators had revisited certain aspects of Article XXIV in anendeavour to clarify some of these provisions during the Uruguay Round.  The only result of these
negotiations was embodied in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT
1994.  However the provisions of the Understanding had also not been found satisfactory by some
Members for interpreting certain elements of Article XXIV.  While there was a need to move forward
on the discussion of systemic issues, it was clear that it would take time to reach consensus.  At thesame time, the examination of RTAs should not be slowed down.  The General Council should
therefore submit a recommendation to the third Ministerial Conference that the examination of the
RTAs before the Committee should continue under existing WTO rules.   Such a recommendation
was necessary for the credibility of the multilateral trading system.  On the other hand, if Members
reached a consensus on systemic issues, the new rules should apply exclusively to the RTAs signed
after the adoption of those rules.
57. The representative of the Czech Republic, presenting a proposal on the TRIPS Agreement
(WT/GC/W/206), said that the issue of the scope of additional protection of geographical indications
had first been discussed in the context of the preparations for the Singapore Ministerial Conference,
and, as a result, Ministers had endorsed the annual report of the TRIPS Council, which had
recommended allowing inputs from delegations on this issue.  Since that time, the TRIPS Council had
been discussing the issue of expanding the additional protection to products other than wines andspirits.  Although an increasing number of countries had shown an interest in expanding the additional
protection, no formal decision had been taken.  One of the reasons for this was the difference in views
on whether the existing provisions of the TRIPS Ag reement and the Singapore Ministerial Declaration
provided a sufficient legal basis for extending the ongoing work to other products.  It was for this
reason that the Czech Republic had submitted its proposal, which was motivated by the necessity toprovide adequate standards concerning the availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights in
the area of geographical indications, with the aim of contributing to attaining the objectives of the
section on geographical indications of the TRIPS Agreement.  The Czech Republic believed that the
provisions of this section, together with the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, provided sufficient
room and opportunity for taking action to facilitate the operation of this section and to expand themore absolute protection of geographical indications to products other than those currently indicated
in Article 23.  It was no surprise that the Czech Republic had shown a strong interest in securingWT/GC/M/43
Page 24
additional protection of geographical indications also for beers, since this product deserved the same
treatment and level of protection as the products already covered.  This also applied to other products
capable of being identified by their geographical origin.  The Czech Republic hoped that Ministers in
Seattle would agree on a clear mandate to continue and complete the work within a given time-frame,
with a view to expanding the scope of Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement and to providing theincreased protection of geographical indications also to products other than wines and spirits.  His
delegation looked forward to working with all Members with a view to reaching a positive and
balanced result.
58. The representative of New Zealand, presenting his Government's proposal on industrial/non-
agricultural tariffs (WT/GC/W/211), said that New Zealand was firmly of the view that agreement on
commencing further negotiations on the reduction and, where possible, elimination of all tariffs on
industrial products should be one of the central and priority outcomes from the third MinisterialConference.  As was evident from many of the proposals already submitted on this issue, tariff
reductions on industrial products remained a central concern for all Members in seeking improved
market access.  Despite the major progress made in successive GATT rounds in reducing tariffs on
industrial products, these tariffs continued to be a significant barrier to trade in many developing and
developed countries.  This particularly impeded access to developed-country markets for productswhere developing countries had a comparative advantage, and both tariff peaks and tariff escalation
were serious problems that needed to be addressed.  In order to facilitate that outcome and to jump-
start the negotiations, New Zealand proposed that the negotiation should encompass, from the outset,
the objective of securing zero tariffs on a balanced range of product sectors that reflected the interests
of, and offered real benefits to, the membership as a whole.  This approach could be extended toinclude additional zero-for-zero products areas as negotiations progressed, and could be coupled with
the application of a formula approach to deal with the residual balance of tariff lines.  Modalities that
reflected these principles would offer the opportunity for deeper and earlier tariff cuts and would
ensure a more predictable and balanced outcome than other approaches.
59. New Zealand had been heartened by the work on tariff liberalization undertaken by APEC in
recent years.  In 1994, APEC economies had committed themselves to achieving free trade and
investment by 2010 for developed country members, and 2020 for developing country members.
More recently, on the sectors covered by the Accelerated Tariff Liberalization (ATL) initiative,
covering 44 per cent of industrial product tariff lines, a group of developed and developed country
members had committed to substantial liberalization ahead of these dates, in most cases indicating a
willingness to move to tariff elimination in these sect ors.  He recalled that details of the ATL initiative
had been circulated to Members in documents WT/GC/W/138 and Add.1.  APEC was a grouping that
spanned north and south, and the work carried out by APEC reflected the diverse range of interests of
its membership.  In many ways, these interests were a major microcosm of the similar diverse range
of interests reflected in the broader WTO membership.  If such a large grouping of developed and
developing members within APEC could see benefits  in tariff elimination on such a high proportion
of industrial tariff lines, it suggested to New Zealand that in any forthcoming WTO negotiations
serious consideration should be given to the wider elimination of tariffs wherever this was possible.
New Zealand remained firmly committed to seeking the achievement of critical mass on accelerated
tariff liberalization sectors in 1999, in line with the agreement reached by APEC Ministers in Kuala
Lumpur in November 1998.  In this regard, New Z ealand was pleased with the progress that had been
achieved on the ATL initiative since its introduction to the WTO, and would work to maintain themomentum in the run-up to the Seattle Conference.  In this connection, his delegation would shortly
be hosting a series of further consultations on the initiative.  Finally, on the modalities for effecting an
early-harvest element as part of a wider negotiation on industrial tariffs, New Zealand had an open
mind, as mentioned in the proposal, and the sugges tion in the annex to the document for reversible
outcomes was only one of a number of possible modalities that could be considered.WT/GC/M/43
Page 25
60. The representative of Hong Kong, China we lcomed New Zealand's proposal on industrial
tariffs, and shared the view that future indust rial/non-agricultural tariff negotiations should be
comprehensive with the objective of reducing and, wh ere possible, eliminating all tariffs.  The issue
of tariff peaks and nuisance tariffs should also be addressed through the application of an appropriate
formula.  The Accelerated Tariff Liberalization initiative was closely linked with the future tariffnegotiations, and Hong Kong, China would be prepared to consider New Zealand's suggestions on
early harvest.  His delegation looked forward to more substantive discussions on issues such as the
implementation time-frame and modality and the relationship with the new round and to participating
in the series of further consultations on the ATL initiative.
61. The representative of the United States said that his delegation supported the inclusion of
industrial tariff negotiations in the WTO's forward agenda although further work was needed to
identify the appropriate modalities for undertaking such negotiations.  He noted that detailedanalytical work by the Secretariat would be needed once the negotiations had been launched.  One
endeavour that needed to be part of any plan for industrial tariffs was the Accelerated Tariff
Liberalization initiative (ATL) which the APEC Members wanted to finalize by the time of the
1999 Ministerial.  However, the ATL initiative was not the complete US agenda for the industrial
tariff negotiations and the United States was engaged in intensive consultations with Congress and theprivate sector regarding their perspectives and priorities for industrial market access negotiations, as
well as other topics on the Ministerial agenda.  These consultations had thus far indicated that there
was a broad interest in further liberalization, and that Members needed to be creative and innovative
in their approach, particularly since the past approach to negotiations was not an adequate basis for
moving forward.  In this respect the input re ceived by his Government suggested that new
negotiations on tariffs needed to be structured in an innovative and flexible way that did not favor a
single approach but accommodated the possibility of pursuing sectoral initiatives and/or expanding
the scope of country participation in existing initiatives such as zero-for-zero and/or harmonization,
allowed countries to pursue liberalization in addition to sectoral initiatives, resulted in more uniform
tariff structures, urged countries to negotiate from applied versus bound rates, and enabled Membersto carefully address non-tariff measures and other measures affecting the conditions for imports, on
specific products and on a sector basis, as needed.  He said that his Government would be presenting a
proposal on this subject shortly.
62. The representative of Australia welcomed New Zealand's proposal on industrial/non-
agricultural tariffs,  and said that the extensive and creative work that had been pursued by most
APEC members on accelerated tariff liberalization was something that the WTO should take
advantage of in order to reap an early harvest in the next round of trade negotiations.  His delegationlooked forward to Japan's two proposals on industrial tariffs and forestry and fisheries.  Australia
hoped that these proposals would suggest that liberalization in these two sectors that were of great
importance to developing countries could be pursued on the same basis as liberalization in other
industrial or non-agricultural sectors.  On the background of the work already done in APEC on
forestry and fisheries the WTO would be able to make rapid and important progress in these sectors.
63. The representative of Egypt said that his delegation had already indicated its position in
regard to negotiations on industrial tariffs.  In thanking New Zealand for its proposal, Egypt wished to
express its concern at the raising of the level of expectations in the tariffs area beyond what was
reasonable.  His delegation was also concerned at the US suggestion that tariff negotiations take place
on the basis of the applied rate and not the bound rate.  Egypt wished to reiterate its view that the levelof expectation should be realistic.  As to the uncertainty in the minds of some delegations, including
New Zealand, regarding where negotiations on industri al tariffs should be taken up under paragraph 9,
he sought clarification as to why they believed this was so.  In Egypt's view, industrial tariff
negotiations came under paragraph 9(d), which dealt with recommendations arising from
consideration of other matters proposed and agreed to by Members concerning the multilateral tradingnegotiations.WT/GC/M/43
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64. The representative of India said that India's position with regard to industrial tariffs, which
was clearly a paragraph 9(d) issue, was well known.  At the informal meeting on 7-8 June, his
delegation had explained clearly why it was concerned about the possibility of industrial tariff
negotiations.  While India would examine New Zealand's proposal in detail, it did not believe in the
appropriateness of including industrial tariff negotiations in the basket for the forthcomingnegotiations.
65. The representative of Brazil expressed support for the statements by Egypt and India
regarding where the issue of industrial tariffs should be placed.
66. The representative of Pakistan endorsed the views expressed by Egypt and India.
67. The General Council took note of the statements.
(b) Indicative schedule of meetings
68. The Chairman said he wished to suggest a ch ange to the indicative schedule of meetings
agreed in February, namely that the formal Special Session scheduled for 9 July be brought forward to
7 July.  As a result, the informal meeting scheduled for 6-7 July would be held only on 6 July.  With
this change, the indicative schedule of meetings for the remainder of Phase 2 would be as follows:
6 July Informal meeting7 July General Council Special Session: Suggested focus – Further discussion of
proposals on paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Ministerial Declaration
28-29 July General Council Special Session: Suggested focus – Further discussion of
proposals on paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Ministerial Declaration, and the
organization of future work
69. As had been agreed at the February meeting, this was a flexible process and one might, as the
need arose, consider holding more meetings in an in formal mode if delegations felt that this might be
appropriate as the end of Phase 2 approached.
70. The representative of Australia said that in the way the process had worked thus far, some
proposals were presented for the first time at formal meetings and some at informal meetings.  Even
though Members had endeavoured to keep a distinction between the two kinds of meetings, the fact
was that some proposals were discussed on the record at formal meetings and others off the record at
informal meetings.  He noted that delegations had had quite useful exchanges at the informal meeting
on 7-8 June at which a large number of proposals had been presented.  He wondered what might be
done about this, since the record of the discussions would be increasingly useful for delegations as
they prepared for Seattle.  Delegations could of course all ask for their statements at the informal
meetings to be placed on the records of the formal meetings;  while he would be happy to do this forhis delegation, it might prove somewhat cumbersome.
71. The representative of Brazil asked whether the Chairman was planning to schedule additional
informal meetings in the coming weeks, since he  had suggested at a previous meeting that such
meetings were performing a useful function.WT/GC/M/43
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72. The Chairman said that in the view of many delegations the informal meetings were very
useful in terms of allowing them to interact and discuss the various issues.  However, it was up to
Members themselves to suggest whether they would be prepared to have further informal meetings.
73. The representative of Brazil said that many delegations were still in the process of intense
domestic consultations, as a result of which a large number of proposals might end up being presented
and discussed at the last formal meeting scheduled for the end of July.  If the Chairman could
envisage additional informal meetings in the interim, it could help to avoid such a bottleneck.
74. The Chairman said that as the process moved forward and Members felt the need for more
informal meetings, these could be held.  However, at this point it was perhaps inappropriate for the
Chair to impose more informal meetings when Members had not said so.  If more delegations shared
the need for more meetings, one would have to respond to those demands.
75. The representative of Brazil said that his delegation wished to reserve the possibility of
presenting proposals later than 28-29 July.
76. The General Council took note of the statements and agreed  to the change to the schedule as
proposed by the Chairman.
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