WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTCP/3
11 October 1999
(99-4245)
REPORT (1999) OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL
TABLE OF CONTENTS Paragraph Nos.
A. INTRODUCTION 1-3
B. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ON THE GROUP'S 
ACTIVITIES
(a) Sources and materials used in the Group's work 4
(b) Meetings held in 1999 5
(c) Cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations 6-7
C. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DONE  IN THE GROUP IN 1999 8-9
I. THE RELEVANCE OF FUNDAMENTAL WTO PRINCIPLES OF
NATIONAL TREATMENT, TRANSPARENCY AND MOST-
FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT TO COMPETITION POLICY
AND VICE VERSA10-37
II. APPROACHES TO PROMOTING COOPERATION AND
COMMUNICATION AMONG MEMBERS, INCLUDING IN THE
FIELD OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION38-64
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF COMPETITION POLICY TO
ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE WTO, INCLUDING THE
PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE65-84
IV. OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY MEMBERS RELATING TO THE
GROUP'S MANDATE TO STUDY THE INTERACTION BETWEENTRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY85-91
ANNEX 1:  TEXT OF THE SINGAPORE MINISTERIAL
                          DECLARATION, PARAGRAPH 20
ANNEX 2: CONTRIBUTIONS PROVIDED TO THE WORKING
GROUP ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADE
AND COMPETITION POLICY IN 1999WT/WGTCP/3
Page 2
A. INTRODUCTION
1. In December 1998, the General Council decided that the Working Group, which had been
established pursuant to paragraph 20 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration1, should continue its
work in 1999.  The terms of the General Council's decision (WT/GC/M/32, page 52) read as follows:
The General Council decides that the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy shall continue the educative work that it has been undertaking pursuant to
paragraph 20 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration.  In the light of the limited number of
meetings that the Group will be able to hold in 1999, the Working Group, while continuing at
each meeting to base its work on the study of issues raised by Members relating to the
interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-competitive practices, would
benefit from a focused discussion on:  (i) the relevance of fundamental WTO principles of
national treatment, transparency, and most-favoured-nation treatment to competition policyand vice versa;  (ii) approaches to promoting cooperation and communication among
Members, including in the field of technical cooperation;  and (iii) the contribution of
competition policy to achieving the objectives of the WTO, including the promotion of
international trade.  The Working Group will continue to ensure that the development
dimension and the relationship with investment are fully taken into account.  It is understoodthat this decision is without prejudice to any future decision that might be taken by the
General Council, including in the context of its existing work programme.
2. This report provides an overview of the work done by the Working Group in 1999, pursuant
to the General Council's decision.  It constitutes a complement to the Working Group's previous report
on its activities in 1997 and 1998 (WT/WGTCP/2).
3. The report is organized as follows.  Part B provides a procedural summary of the Group's
activities in 1999.  Part C provides an overview of the substantive work done in the Group during the
year, pursuant to the General Council's decision.
B. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ON THE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES
(a) Sources and materials used in the Group's work
4. As was the case in 1997 and 1998, the work of the Working Group in 1999 has been based on
written contributions by Members and on oral statements, questions and answers by Members in the
Group.  This material has been supplemented by information received from observerintergovernmental organizations (see subsection (c) below) and notes prepared by the Secretariat.  A
tabular summary of written contributions to the Group in 1999 is attached as Annex 2.
(b) Meetings held in 1999
5. The Working Group held three formal meetings in 1999.  The dates of the meetings were:
19-20 April, 10-11 June and 14 September.  The dates of these meetings were determined in the light
of the instruction in paragraph  22 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration that careful attention begiven to coordinating meetings of the Working Groups established under paragraphs 20 and 21 with
those of relevant UNCTAD bodies.  At the meetings in April and June, consideration was given to the
full range of topics called for in the decision of the General Council referred to above.  The principal
purpose of the meeting held on 14 September was to review and adopt the Working Group's Report
(1999) to the General Council.  Reports on these meetings have been circulated indocuments WT/WGTCP/M/8, 9 and 10.
                                                     
1 The text of paragraph 20 is reproduced in Annex 1.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 3
(c) Cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations
6. The Singapore Ministerial Declaration (paragraph 20) encouraged the Working Group to
undertake its work in cooperation with UNCTAD and other appropriate intergovernmental fora, to
make the best use of available resources and to ensure that the development dimension was taken
fully into account.  In this regard, the IMF and the World Bank have continued to attend the WorkingGroup's meetings in an observer capacity, pursuant to the cooperation agreements concluded between
the WTO and these organizations.  UNCTAD and the OECD also attended the meetings as observers,
on the basis of an invitation from the Working Group.  In the course of the Group's meetings, they
have kept the Group updated on relevant activities of their organizations and contributed to the
debate.  The Working Group is highly appreciative of the valuable contributions to its work made by
the observers.
7. As a further aspect of cooperation, a third symposium, organized by the WTO Secretariat
jointly with UNCTAD and the World Bank, was held on 17 April 1999 in the Centre William
Rappard.  The subject of the Symposium was Co mpetition Policy and the Multilateral Trading
System:  the Relevance of Fundamental WTO Principles, International Cooperation and the
Contribution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectiv es.  A fourth Symposium, organized by the
WTO Secretariat with financial support from, and participation by staff of the Secretariats of,UNCTAD and the World Bank, took place on 13 September 1999 at the WTO.  The subject of this
Symposium was Competition Policy and the Multilateral Trading System:  A Dialogue with Civil
Society.  Although formally se parate from the work programme of the Working Group, these events
were aimed at facilitating its work.
C. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DONE  IN THE GROUP IN 1999
8. This section of the report provides an over view of the substantive work done in the Group,
pursuant to the General Council's Decision in December 1998 (WT/GC/M/32, page 52).  By its very
nature, such an overview cannot reflect everything that was said and capture all nuances of the
discussion, such as can be found in the detailed records of the two meetings of the Working Group(WT/WGTCP/M/8 and 9) and in the written contributions of Members (see Annex 2).
9. The section is organized in accordance with the way in which the Group structured its
discussion of the issues, on the basis of the General Council's decision calling for the work to be done.
It will be noted that the discussion which took place on a number of issues cut across more than one
of the sub-headings used below.  This means that, in order to have a full appreciation of the discussion
that took place on these issues, it may be necessary to refer to more than one subsection of this Part of
the report.  It also means that some degree of repetition has been unavoidable in the preparation of the
various subsections.
I. THE RELEVANCE OF FUNDAMENTAL WTO PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL
TREATMENT, TRANSPARENCY AND MOST-FAVOURED-NATION
TREATMENT TO COMPETITION POLICY AND VICE VERSA
10. The matter of the relevance of fundamental WTO principles of national treatment,
transparency and most-favoured-nation treatment to  competition policy and vice versa was discussed
by the Working Group at its meetings on 19-20 April and 10-11 June 1999.  Written submissions on
this item were provided by the representatives of the European Community and its member States,
Switzerland, Japan (two contributions), the United States and Turkey (documents W/115, W/117,
W/119, W/120 and W/131, respectively).
2  Turkey provided a non-paper.  Australia; Brazil; Canada;
the Czech Republic; the Dominican Republic; Egypt; the European Community and its member
                                                     
2 In this Part of the report, documents issued in the series WT/WGTCP/W/- are referred to as "W/…".
Documents issued in the series WT/WGTCP/M/- are referred as "M/…"WT/WGTCP/3
Page 4
States; Hong Kong, China; India; Japan; Korea;  Malaysia; Norway; Switzerland; and the United
States; and observers from Croatia and the Russian Federation provided oral comments or posed
questions on this item.  In addition, the Group had before it two background notes prepared by the
Secretariat, one dealing with the fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment and Transparency (W/ 114) and the other on the Fundamental Principles
of Competition Policy (W/127).
11. A major component of the discussion concerned the content and application of the
fundamental WTO principles of national treatment , most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency
and their significance for competition policy.  The point was made that the importance of these
principles was greater than ever in the current era of the globalization of world trade.  It was
suggested that they provided a basis for achieving the aims of competition policies and also for
effective international cooperation in this field.3  The view was also expressed that adherence to the
fundamental WTO principles of national treatment , most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency
was important for the sound application of competition law and for maintaining the effectiveness,
impartiality and credibility of such law4;  in fact, it would not be possible to conceive of a sound
national competition policy without much attention being paid to these principles.5  It was also
suggested that the principles of national treatme nt and most-favoured-nation treatment, on the one
hand, and transparency, on the other hand, were extensively intertwined, in that if a high degree oftransparency was maintained, this would make it difficult for a competition agency to discriminate in
any consistent way over any length of time, since, if it did, this would become publicly known, and it
would not be a sustainable position.
6
12. The point was made that, under GATT/WTO jurisprudence, a core objective of the principles
of national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment was to promote the equality of competitiveopportunities for Members and their respective goods, services and enterprises.
7  Moreover, these
principles were applicable in respect of both de jure and de facto discrimination.  They sought the
avoidance of distortions in the competitive process, not the guarantee of specific results in terms of
market access.8  In the light of this, it was said that there was an intrinsic relationship between
competition policy and the principles of national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment, inthat competition policy provided a tool to address certain kinds of discriminatory policies and
arrangements which denied equal competitive opportunities to foreign competitors.
9  The view was
also expressed that the importance of the principles of national treatment and most-favoured-nation
treatment in the area of competition policy reflected a basic tenet of such policy which was that it
protected competition rather than individual competitors.10  The nationality of individual competitors
was irrelevant in this regard.11
13. The view was expressed that the principle of transparency was critical to ensuring the fair
application of national laws and policies, including those implementing Members' WTO obligations,
in demonstrating and promoting a Member's compliance with those obligations to other Members, and
in reinforcing support by the public at large for relevant laws and policies and for the operation and
objectives of the multilateral trading system.12  The view was expressed that this was both a general
principle and a principle that acquired special aspects when applied to specific types of measures dealtwith in the WTO framework.  It had at least thr ee dimensions:  first, publication;  second, uniform,
                                                     
3 M/9, paragraph 19.
4 M/8, paragraphs 3, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22 an d 24; M/9, paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 19.
5 M/8, paragraph 15
6 M/8, paragraph 24.
7 M/8, paragraph 3.
8 M/8, paragraphs 3, 8 and 11.
9 M/8, paragraphs 3 and 8.
10 M/9, paragraph 13.
11 M/9, paragraphs 3 and 13; M/8, paragraphs 8 and 18.
12 M/8, paragraphs 15, 18 and 24.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 5
impartial and reasonable administration of measures that had an impact on trade;  and third, the rights
of parties to legal proceedings that might lead to the adoption of measures that had an impact on trade,
for example the right to be heard, and that needed to be recognized under domestic legislation.
Further, it was suggested that transparency in the application of competition law and policy fostered
confidence in an economy and increased its attractiveness as a location for investment.13  It was also
stressed that, as under the rules of the WTO, an important qualification concerning the principle oftransparency in competition law enforcement was the provision of appropriate safeguards for the
protection of confidential information; this was vi tal to maintaining confid ence in the administration
of justice, and therefore to public support for the law.
14
14. A number of points were made regarding the extent to which the WTO rules embodying the
fundamental principles of national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency were
already applicable in the field of competition law and policy.  The view was expressed that these
principles applied only in respect of government measures and not in regard to private practices, oreven hybrid practices, as had been amply demonstrated in the recent Fuji/Kodak matter.
15 A number
of examples were cited of anti-competitive practices which could have restrictive or discriminatory
effects, and which would not be reached by existing WTO instruments.  These included, inter alia,
collective boycotts, exclusionary actions by professional associations, abuses of a dominant position
which were intended to prevent the entry of new competitors, price-fixing cartels, export and importcartels, and market-sharing arrangements.
16  The view was also expressed that effective application of
the principles of national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency in the sphere of
competition policy depended on the existence and active enforcement of a well-constituted national
competition law.  In cases where no such legislation existed or it was not effectively applied, or where
competition rules were applied through sector-specific legislation or where there were exceptions,exclusions and derogations from the competition laws, the relevance of the fundamental WTO
principles to competition rules was unclear.
17  The view was also expressed that Articles VIII and IX
of the GATS, which addressed monopolies and restrictive business practices in the services sector,
might be able to address private barriers to the market that could not be handled, at least not with
sufficient efficiency, within the GATT itself.18  This reflected the fact that trade in goods was
extensively intertwined with distribution services.  Distribution services that were within the regime
of the GATS included agency agreements, distribution agreements and franchising agreements.  It
was said, further, that the impact of the ideas that had been put forward for multilateral rules should
be examined with reference to the services se ctor, given the limited coverage of the GATS with
regard to competition and the concept of progressivi ty of commitments as had been floated in the
discussion.  Attention was drawn to the approach th at had been followed in the telecom negotiations,
i.e., a deadline had been set and gradual implementation provided for.19  Another view was that the
basic WTO principles were indeed already applicable to competition law and policy, to the extent that
they affected trade, by virtue of Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement.20
15. The view was expressed that effective application of the fundamental WTO principles of
national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency in the field of competition policy
would require the adaptation of the principles to the particular subject-matter.  Adaptation of theseprinciples had already proved necessary in the case of services and trade-related intellectual property
rights, in the GATS and the TRIPS Agreement, respectiv ely.  In this regard, it was suggested that the
Group look together into the development of common principles relating to the adoption and
                                                     
13 M/8, paragraph 13.
14 M/8, paragraphs 4, 7 and 13.
15 M/8, paragraph 7; M/9, paragraphs 9 and 11.
16 M/8, paragraph 6 and M/9, paragraph 9.
17 M/8, paragraph 7; M/9, paragraph 4.
18 M/8, paragraph 26.
19 M/8, paragraph 27.
20 M/9, paragraph 15.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 6
enforcement of competition law.  Such an exercise would not be aimed at the harmonization of
competition laws, as there were many reasons why competition laws had to be different in individual
countries.  Rather, what would be desirable would be to define the elements relating to transparency
and non-discrimination that were common to most jurisdictions and were most important for the
international trading system.21
16. The view was also expressed that, in many, if not most, jurisdictions having competition laws,
the content and application of such laws were already generally consistent with the fundamental WTO
principles of national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency.22  Some Members
affirmed this as regards their own competition laws and policies.23  In this connection, the point was
made that this should not be understood to mean that differential treatment of arrangements or firms,
including between foreign and domestic firms, could not arise in some cases, but that such
differentiation would be attributable not to differences in nationality, but rather to factors such as
differences in the degree of culpability among parties in a particular case, the differing evidenceavailable with respect to such parties, or differences in the nature and extent of their cooperation in
the investigative context.
24  In the light of this, the view was expressed that the assessment that most
countries' competition laws and policies were consistent with basic WTO principles demonstrated
that, from a WTO standpoint, matters were fine as they stood and no action was needed at the
multilateral level in this regard.25
17. In response to this view, it was suggested that, if consideration was being given to certain
commitments at the multilateral level, it was not solely a question of determining whether existing
national laws or the laws of other countries created a problem in terms of those commitments.  Rather,
the starting-point should be a consideration of wh ether competition law was relevant for the trading
system.  On this point, the discussions that had taken place in the Group thus far had shown clearlythat there was a very large degree of agreement that the effective application of competition law
complemented and reinforced the process of trade liberalization.
26
18. The point was made that the interaction between trade and competition policy was bi-
directional as was this item of the Group's work programme due to its "vice versa" element.27
Therefore, in addition to the implications of fundamental WTO principles for competition policy, it
was important to give due consideration to the matter of how the principles of competition law and
policy could contribute to international trade.  Further to this suggestion, the Group, at its meeting on
10-11 June, had before it a Note by the Secretariat on the Fundamental Principles of Competition
Policy (W/127).  It was said that the categorization and explanation of principles that had been set out
in this Note were helpful.28  The suggestion was also made that it might have been preferable to make
                                                     
21 M/8, paragraphs 3, 4 and 7.
22 M/8, paragraphs 4, 8, 18 and 24;  M/9, paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 9 and 14.
23 M/8, paragraphs 4, 8, 15, 16 and 24;  M/9, paragraphs 3, 4 and 9.
24 M/9, paragraph 3.
25 M/9, paragraph 12;  see also M/8, paragraphs 17, 19, 24, 33 and M/8, paragraph 15.
26 M/9, paragraph 16.
27 M/8, paragraph 11.
28 M/9, paragraphs 7 and 13.  The first category of principles set out in the Note by the Secretariat
concerned principles in the sense of the overriding goals or objectives of competition policy - for example thepromotion of economic efficiency, the promotion of consumer welfare and economic development.  Theseobjectives served as important guide-posts for officials in applying diverse aspects of related laws and policies.
The second category of principles consisted of operational principles of policy design and application.Examples of principles in this category included the promotion of market-opening measures, the identification
of situations in which market power was likely to be exer cised, and the distinction that was made in virtually all
competition law systems between arrangements that were primarily horizontal in nature and those that wereprimarily vertical in nature.  The third category of prin ciples related to the institutions and processes through
which competition policy was applied.  Examples of principles in this category included adherence to dueprocess in the application of competition law and policy, optimizing the scope of competition policy andWT/WGTCP/3
Page 7
a clearer distinction in the note between the objectives of competition policy and its operational
principles.29  Thus, the objectives of competition policy would be limited to achieving economic
efficiency, consumer welfare and economic development, whereby the maintenance of competition is
not a goal in itself but a means to achieve those objectives.  The point was made that the relevance of
the fundamental principles of competition policy to trade policy concerns had been clearly established
in the initial meetings of the Group.30  It was said, further, that such principles could contribute to
secure market access and provide predictability in markets; and that establishment of an orderly
relationship between these principles and those of the multilateral trading system would contribute
importantly to the core objectives of both competition policy and the WTO, namely efficiency,
consumer welfare and economic development.31
19. Particular emphasis was placed by some Members on the principle, noted in paragraph 34 of
the Note by the Secretariat on the Fundamental Principles of Competition Policy, that competition
policy protects competition and not competitors.  The point that this implied that nationality wasirrelevant in well-constituted competition policies was recalled.
32
20. Reference was made to a "competition-oriented principle" as being a concept that placed
maximum emphasis on the market mechanism.  It was suggested that this concept was of direct
relevance to the WTO, whose primary objective was the optimal use of resources at a global level
through the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers.  When considering the "competition-orientedprinciple" in the context of WTO competition disciplines, it was suggested that four implications
could be identified. The first was that the basic philosophy of a pro-active response to anti-
competitive practices would be assured.  The second was to extend the prevention of anti-competitive
practice across all sectors.  The third was to minimize sectors or areas exempted from national
competition laws.  The fourth was to introduce the competition policy perspective into governmentregulations and industries.
33
21. With regard to the further elaboration of the fundamental principles of competition policy, the
suggestion was made that, in order to ensure that the principles identified were capable of wide
application, core competition principles should first be agreed upon and then second-level principles
aimed at underpinning these core principles should be identified.  In doing so, the Group should guard
against narrow, prescriptive rules with limited applicability.  The view was expressed that the work
under way in the context of APEC would be helpful in this regard.34
22. The Group was informed that, at the APEC Competition Policy and Deregulation Workshop
in Christchurch on 30 April and 1 May it had been agreed to develop a set of APEC competition and
regulatory principles.  Subsequent work had developed and refined the principles with the end resultbeing the APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reform  which were endorsed by
APEC Ministers and Leaders in September 1999.  Four core principles (non-discrimination,
comprehensiveness, transparency and accountability) and a set of action-oriented undertakings had
been endorsed, in this regard.  The aim of these non-binding principles was to provide a basis for
policy development rather than a stringent set of specific rules.  It was suggested that these principles
                                                                                                                                                                    
ensuring coherence between competition policy and dir ect economic regulation, adherence to the fundamental
WTO principles of non-discrimination and transparency, and international cooperation to the extent permittedby national laws.
29 M/9, paragraph 13.
30 M/9, paragraph 9.
31 M/9, paragraph 13.
32 M/9, paragraphs 3 and 13.
33 M/8, paragraph 9.
34 M/9, paragraph 7.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 8
would assist in the process of introducing competitive markets within Member economies and
recognized the diverse circumstances of Member economies that sought to implement them.35
23. The view was expressed that the discussions which had taken place in the Working Group
over two years of discussion had shown clearly that anti-competitive practices could, under certain
circumstances, reduce market access and distort trade.36  In order to deal effectively with these
barriers to international trade, it was necessary to develop rules.37  The report which the Working
Group had adopted in December 1998 (WT/WGTCP/2) provided explicit documentation of these
problems.  It was also suggested that a number of WTO instruments, including the GATS in general,
Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement and the results of the basic telecom negotiations, all suggested
that competition enhancement was an important aspect of trade liberalization.38  In the light of this,
the question was raised as to whether such rules had to be implemented by countries purely at the
domestic level, or whether such rules and the development of related institutions could usefully be
reinforced through common commitments and understandings.39
24. The suggestion was made that three possible approaches could be considered for addressing
anti-competitive practices that impacted adversel y on international trade.  First, Members could
attempt to eliminate these practices by making use of national trade and competition legislation to the
maximum extent.  This could be referred to as the unilateral approach.  The second possible approach
was the bilateral approach, which would involve greater use of cooperation arrangements.  Both theunilateral and bilateral approaches had their own problems.  In the case of the unilateral approach, this
often resulted in jurisdictional disputes or frictions as a result of the unilateral enforcement of
competition law by one State.  The bilateral approach also had significant institutional constraints.
Bilateral arrangements tended to be established only between countries with plenty of experience in
competition policy.  In the light of these considerations, the suggestion was made that the Groupconsider the possibility of introducing a further approach, namely a multilateral framework on
competition.
40
25. Various suggestions for action by the WTO were presented as based on strengthening the
application of the fundamental WTO principles of national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment
and transparency in the field of competition law and policy, including in regard to anti-competitivepractices of enterprises that impacted adversely on international trade.
41  Although differing in some
respects, including the degree of detail in which they were set out, these suggestions envisioned
defining specific elements of competition law and policy relating to the fundamental WTO principles
which were common to most jurisdictions having such laws/policies and which were considered to be
important for the multilateral trading system.42
26. One view was that the following elements were relevant to the nexus between WTO
principles and competition law and policy.43  In regard to the existence and scope of application of
competition legislation, it was suggested that such legislation should cover, at least, the following
types of anti-competitive practices, as these were the practices that had the most significance for
international trade:  anti-competitive horizontal restraints, vertical restraints and abuses of a dominant
position that had a negative impact on competition.  With regard to the matter of mergers, it was
                                                     
35 M/10, paragraph 6.
36 M/9, paragraph 9.
37 M/9, paragraphs 9 and 17.
38 M/9, paragraph 17.
39 M/9, paragraph 16.
40 M/8, paragraph 10.
41 M/8, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18; M/9, paragraph 10.  To some extent, this discussion of
possible approaches to a framework agreement overlapped with discussions that took place in relation to other
aspects of the Group's work.  See, in this regard, Parts C(II) and (III), below.
42 M/8, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16 and 18; M/9, paragraphs 4, 9 and 10.
43 M/8, paragraph 4 and M/9, paragraph 10.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 9
suggested that the issue to be discussed was not so much whether individual countries should have
legislation to control mergers, but rather, where th ere was such legislation, how it could be applied in
a transparent and non-discriminatory manner and what the requirements were in terms of international
cooperation to guarantee this.  Another important issue was the matter of exclusions from the
application of competition law and policy.  Clearly, exclusions could contribute to discriminatory
practices and it was vital to restrict such exclusions to a minimum, for the sake of both non-discrimination and transparency. Another specific matter was that of export cartels which resulted in
discrimination between the domestic and the export market and, as such, could have a negative effect
on other WTO Members.  It was suggested that the correct approach to dealing with this issue would
be based on the principle of cooperation, since there were jurisdictional limits to the solution of the
problem solely through the application of competition legislation in the exporting country.  An
additional matter related to the application of competition policy.  Under this rubric, reference was
made to measures to promote the progressive development of institutional capacities, includingthrough enhanced international cooperation with developing countries, the existence of effective and
transparent enforcement powers and the appropriate protection of confidential information.  In
addition, measures could be developed to support the competition advocacy role of competition
authorities.  It was said that these elements could contribute importantly to promoting the equality of
competitive opportunities.
44
27. Another suggestion was that the Group could consider developing a principle that would call
for no less favourable treatment in terms of competition rights for citizens or firms of foreign
countries than that accorded to firms or nationals of the host country.  This could mean that national
competition legislation could be applied to anti-competitive behaviour that took place outside a
country's borders, on the basis of minimum standards or principles which would be agreed throughnegotiations, for example on the treatment of hard-core cartels, cooperation to deal with export cartels
or an agreed set of factors to be considered in the treatment of vertical market restraints.  From a
procedural standpoint, it could also involve the granting of no less favourable treatment to a foreign
product or company in the exercise of their rights in legal or administrative proceedings in the field of
competition law and policy.  The national treatment provision would apply in respect of any existinglegislative provisions.  To give the principle more practical application in this field, its application
could be based on substantive minimum standards or principles to be adopted at the multilateral level.
Matters that could be addressed in this regard w ould include the prohibition of hard-core cartels, the
treatment of export cartels and an agreed set of factors to be considered in the treatment of vertical
market restraints.
 45
28. With regard to the principle of transparency, three further considerations were said to be
relevant.46  First, it was important to ensure transparency as regards the legal framework, including
both the law itself and any related guidelines or administrative regulations.  Second, transparency
needed to be ensured in the enforcement process.  With regard to this aspect, it was also essential to
ensure due protection of confidential information.  Third, it was important to ensure due process in the
enforcement of the law.  This had at least two aspects:  first, the possibility for private firms to have
access to domestic competition law systems, whether through complaints presented to the competitionauthorities or through the judicial system.  Second, it was important to ensure fair treatment of parties
in the application of the law. The view was also expressed that adaptation of the principle of
transparency to the field of competition policy could involve, for example, requiring publication of
decisions relating to anti-competitive practices such as cartels, horizontal agreements, vertical
restrictions, abuses of a dominant position and mergers.  In framing any new provisions to enhance
                                                     
44 M/9, paragraph 10.
45 M/8, paragraph 7; see also M/9, paragraph 9.
46 M/9, paragraph 10.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 10
transparency, a key consideration would be to maintain appropriate safeguards for the protection of
confidential information whose disclosure would be prejudicial to the interests of private companies.47
29. The view was expressed that an important feature of any multilateral framework in the area of
competition law and policy would be its adaptation to the differing levels of development of
Members.  It was said that four aspects needed to be considered.48  First, with regard to the application
of the principles to developing countries, it was important to take into consideration their differenteconomic realities and degrees of economic development.  This was relevant, for example, to the
question of the breadth of exemptions that would be  appropriate in particular economies.  The second
aspect was the different cultural conditions that prevailed in different countries, which were important
in view of the far-reaching social and economic changes that the introduction of competition policy
could entail.  The third aspect had to do with differences in resource endowments in the sense that
certain applications of competition policy required more human and material resources.  Again,
differences in levels of development had to be taken into account.  The fourth aspect concerned thedifferent degrees of institutional development that were present in Member countries.  In particular, it
had to be recognized that the more than 80 countries having, or in the process of introducing,
competition laws were at many different stages in their institutional development.
49  Recognition of
the development dimension in any agreement on competition policy should include, but not be limited
to, matters such as transition periods, progressivity of commitments and technical cooperation.50
30. A number of objections were raised and questions posed in response to the various
suggestions that had been put forward.  The vi ew was reiterated that in many, if not most,
jurisdictions having competition laws, the content and administration of such laws was already
broadly consistent with fundamental WTO principles and, consequently, no action was called for by
the WTO.51  In addition, the view was expressed that a competition law was not strictly necessary to
ensure effective application of fundamental WTO principles in the area of competition policy.  In this
regard, reference was made to the examples of Singapore and Hong Kong, China which, it was
suggested, had been regarded, for years, as being among the most, or perhaps the most, competitive
markets in the world, despite the fact that neither of these countries had a comprehensive competition
law.52  Furthermore, it was said that the proposal for a requirement for a comprehensive competition
law did not take into account the diversity of legal systems and the state of development of individual
WTO Members.53  For example, it was not clear why a se ctoral approach could not work equally as
well as a comprehensive competition law approach, at least for some economies.54
31. In response, the point was made that no-one had called into question the fact that there were
many other policies which could contribute to promoting competition and enhancing economicwelfare.  However, as had been discussed extensively in the Group, there was plenty of evidence that
a competition law still had an important role to play from the perspectives of development and
international trade.  On the question of sectoral policies, while it could well be that, in some cases,
competition policy considerations might also have to be discussed at the sectoral level, the question of
the interaction between trade and competition policy in general was something that had to be
considered with reference to all sectors of the economy.  The view was also expressed that
competition policy was now a global phenomenon.  It was something that affected countries at all
                                                     
47 M/8, paragraph 7.
48 M/8, paragraph 15.
49 M/8, paragraphs 15, 21, 25 and 30.
50 M/8, paragraph 30.
51 M/8, paragraph 17; M/9, paragraph 12
52 M/8, paragraph 19.
53 M/8, paragraphs 19 and 23.
54 M/8, paragraph 19.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 11
stages of development and something on which there would, therefore, be benefits from working
together at the multilateral level.55
32. The question was posed as to whether the suggestions that had been made by some
delegations were intended to apply only in the international or also in the domestic context.  In this
regard, it was said that if, as appeared to be the case, they emphasized the international sphere of
application, this would not address many of th e most pressing competition problems facing
developing market economies.56  In response, the point was made that the reason why the matter of
competition law and policy was being discussed in the WTO was precisely because anti-competitive
practices could have a significant impact on international trade, and that the type of rules that would
be the focus of discussions in the WTO would be t hose dealing with practices that had an impact on
trade.  However, when it came to the adoption and implementation of relevant elements of
competition law, one would not imagine that a country would introduce a rule which applied only to
those anti-competitive practices which had an impact on international trade.57
33. The points were also made that only some 70 countries had competition laws, that a number
of developing countries were still considering the possibility of enacting competition laws, that even
amongst countries having such legislation, there was a high degree of disparity in the scope and level
of national competition regimes which would reduce room for consensus on any possible multilateral
disciplines, and that a multilateral framework on competition in the WTO could put constraints onnational sovereignty and create difficulties in achieving the necessary balance between competition
policy and other economic policies and might also restrict the powers of competition authorities.
58
The view was expressed, further, that the proposals that had been outlined were inconsistent with the
culture of the WTO.  In the WTO, the requirement was for individual Members to ensure that their
laws, regulations and restrictive procedures, etc., were in conformity with the rights and obligations inthe relevant Agreements.  For example, the Anti-Dumping Agreement prescribed the principles and
steps and the requirements for individual Members who had or who wished to introduce anti-dumping
legislation, but it did not require individual Members to introduce anti-dumping legislation.  Subject
to this, it was up to individual Members to see whether and how they should put the rights and
obligations into effect in their own domestic legislative or administrative processes.  Some of theAgreements did not require any legislative means whatsoever.
59
34. The view was expressed that three alternative approaches to a mandatory requirement for
competition legislation could be envisioned.  The first one was a sectoral approach.  It was not clear
why a sectoral approach could not work equally as well as a comprehensive competition law
approach.  The second alternative was a multilateral framework that did not specify or requireindividual Members to introduce any comprehensive competition law, but merely prescribed
principles to be followed if a Member wanted to  introduce competition law.  The third alternative
would be a plurilateral framework, like the existing Agreement on Government Procurement.
60
35. With regard to the point that only about 70 countries had competition laws, it was said that
this was a considerable improvement over the situation prevailing at the time of the drafting of the so-
called Havana Charter almost 50 years ago, when only a few countries had competition laws.  This
had gone a long way towards establishing a common background among WTO Members in this area,which would facilitate the development of an effective multilateral framework on competition.
61
                                                     
55 M/8, paragraph 32.
56 M/8, paragraph 17.
57 M/8, paragraph 31.
58 M/8, paragraphs 22 and 23.
59 M/8, paragraph 19.
60 M/8, paragraph 19.
61 M/8, paragraph 10.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 12
36. A further suggestion that was made to strengthen the application of the principle of
transparency concerned the adoption of a system of voluntary notification for countries regarding
national competition legislation and regulations.  It was said that a system of voluntary country
reviews could be a particularly useful tool for sharing and benchmarking different national
experiences.  Such a system could help to demonstrate the advantages of competition, and show how
good competition laws and good enforcement of such laws could help countries to achieveimprovements in economic welfare.  It was suggested, further, that the publication of world reports on
competition on a regular basis would also be a useful activity that could be undertaken by the WTO as
an aspect of the educational role that some delegations wished to see it take up in this area.
62
37. The view was expressed that further study was needed of the complex issues posed by the
interaction between trade and competition policy before it would be appropriate to commence
negotiation of a WTO framework agreement in this area.63  In particular, it was said that the Group
was in an exploratory and educative process and was still a long way off from the point where it couldbe in a position to gauge the need for multilateral rules.
64
II. APPROACHES TO PROMOTING COOPERATION AND COMMUNICATION
AMONG MEMBERS, INCLUDING IN THE FIELD OF TECHNICAL
COOPERATION
38. This item was discussed by the Working Group at its meetings of 19-20 April and 10-
11 June 1999.  Written submissions on this item were provided by the delegations of the United
States;  Japan;  Korea;  Australia;  Zimbabwe  on behalf of the African Group at the WTO; the
European Community and its member States ;  and Romania (documents W/116, W/121, W/124,
W/125, W/126, W/129 and W/132, respectively).  In addition, the representatives of Australia;
Brazil;  Canada;  the Czech Republic, Egypt;  the European Community and its member States;  HongKong, China;  India;  Japan;  Korea;  Morocco;  Peru;  Romania;  Singapore on behalf of ASEAN
WTO Members;  Switzerland;  and the United States made oral statements or posed questions on this
item.  Further, the observers from the OECD, the World Bank and UNCTAD provided information on
relevant activities of their organizations.
39. The view was expressed that globalization and falling trade barriers had resulted in a greater
need for cooperation and communication between WTO Members, on both the competition and the
trade fronts.
65  While the ultimate objective of cooperation was to protect and promote public welfare,
including consumer welfare, from a trade perspective, the purpose of cooperation on competition
matters was to ensure that anti-competitive practices did not adversely affect the commercial
advantages resulting from elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers.66  Areas of concern mentioned
in this regard included anti-competitive conduct by  firms in foreign markets, for example vertical
market restraints and cartels, in addition to anti-competitive market structures fostered by government
action or inaction.  The point was made that, while not every market access problem could be
attributed to the presence of anti-competitive private practices, or to anti-competitive regulatory
structures, where there had been a history of such conduct or structures, cooperation with foreign
competition authorities could help to address the problem.67  From a competition perspective,
cooperation was aimed at improving the coordination of national competition policies.68  T h a t  i s ,
given the growing interdependence of markets, th e enforcement work of competition authorities
                                                     
62 M/8, paragraph 16.
63 M/8, paragraphs 20 and 25.
64 M/8, paragraph 20.
65 M/8, paragraph 44.
66 M/8, paragraph 68.
67 M/8, paragraph 50.
68 M/9, paragraph 24.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 13
increasingly was no longer conducted in isolation but rather in a more coordinated fashion in
cooperation with foreign competition authorities.69
40. The point was made that cooperation could be conducted at a bilateral, a regional or a
multilateral level.  It was said that bilateral cooperation was the most common form of international
cooperation on competition policy.70  The simplest form of bilateral cooperation was ad hoc
consultations and sharing of public information.  This did not require a formal agreement.Competition authorities habitually consulted one another and exchanged publicly available
information with respect to a variety of administrative, procedural and policy issues.
71  While such
meetings did not specifically address trade problems, they served to improve understanding of the
competition laws and policies of trading partners.72
41. It was noted that a number of Members had signed or were involved in negotiating formal
bilateral cooperation agreements amongst themselves.73  These agreements had dual motivations and
functions:  one was to step up the level of cooperation per se ;  another was to avoid conflicts.  The
agreements could contain several common types of pr ovisions, including provisions for notification of
appropriate authorities of one country about actions to be taken by the national competition authority
of another country, where such actions could affect the important interest of the first country;  sharing
of information and coordination of investigations conducted by both competition authorities;  positive
comity;  and consultations on various issues.74
42. The uses and limitations of positive comity were discussed.  This concept involved a situation
where the competition agency in country A concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that
certain anti-competitive practices, causing it harm, also constituted a violation of the competition rules
of another country B.  In this case, the competition agency of country A would ask the competition
agency of country B to undertake an investigation of such practices and take whatever action wasappropriate.  The point was made that one important benefit of positive comity was that it allowed
cases to draw on evidence available in other jurisdictions, although these cases were conducted by a
foreign competition authority.  It could also serve as a tool for minimizing tensions involving
enforcement.  The point was made that positive comity  tended to be a more useful tool in situations
where competition agencies had developed a relationship of mutual trust and confidence, and wherethe agencies involved respected the principle of national treatment, had adequate investigative and
remedial powers, and had a sufficient degree of independence.
75  There was a risk of inaction, since it
was up to the requested country to decide whether to initiate an antitrust investigation on behalf of the
complaining country.  The requested country might be reluctant to enforce its competition law at the
expense of its own domestic industry and primarily for the benefit of the complaining country.Differences in the coverage and application of competition law could further constrain the role of
positive comity.
76  The point was also made that positive comity was unlikely to be an appropriate
tool for dealing with an export cartel.  In particular, the exporting country would not find it in its
interest to combat the export cartel and, even if it did, its legislation might not allow it to take
measures against it.77
43. The view was expressed that the provision of technical assistance constituted another
important form of cooperation in a bilateral context.  Competition agencies with substantialexperience helped others engage in the process of implementing a competition regime on issues
                                                     
69 M/9, paragraph 29.
70 M/8, paragraph 53.
71 M/8, paragraphs 44, 51 and 53.
72 M/8, paragraph 51.
73 M/8, paragraph 45 and M/9, paragraph 29.
74 M/8, paragraphs 45 and 46.
75 M/8, paragraph 46.
76 M/8, paragraph 54.
77 M/8, paragraph 72.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 14
ranging from drafting new laws and amendments to specific case analysis.78  The point was made that
the modalities of technical assistance were related to the stage of development of competition law in
the recipient country.  For instance, local training in the foreign country appeared to be most effective
once that country had legislation in place and was actively conducting investigations.  Prior to that,
for countries at the exploratory stage, it was more effective to bring officials to the host country to see
legislative and regulatory structures first-hand.  Programmes grouping together delegates fromdifferent countries tended to be fruitful in terms of exchange of information and experiences, and
helped form specialists' networks.
79  The point was made that the benefits from technical assistance
could be mutual.  On the one hand, developing countries welcomed technical assistance for setting up
their competition regimes because this helped them  ensure efficient competition in their markets and
the protection of the consumer.80  On the other hand, through the provision of technical assistance,
competition agencies from developed countries increased their sensitivity to conditions and concerns
in other countries.81
44. The view was expressed that effectiveness of bilateral cooperation agreements could be
constrained by a number of factors, including differences in substantive laws, the degree of
independence of competition agencies, whether a competition agency was adequately resourced, and
differences in national laws governing the exchange of confidential information.82  Another
significant constraint was the need to protect confidential information.83  This constraint could be
relaxed in two circumstances.  First, in certain cases private parties to a proceeding had waived this
right, because they recognized that it was in thei r own interest to facilitate cooperation between the
two competition agencies.84  Second, some cooperation agreements allowed the sharing of
confidential information and thus they did not involve this constraint.85  The point was made that a
broader limitation to bilateral cooperation, be it informal or formal, was that this type of cooperationtended to take place among countries economically interdependent and sharing a similar level of
experience in competition law enforcement
86, or countries that shared the same ideas in the field of
competition policy.  Furthermore, bilateral agreements were set up on a case-by-case basis and this
approach did not make it possible to take up all the challenges arising from globalization.  In this
regard, the point was made that, under a bilateral approach, countries affected by competitioninvestigations were consulted only if a bilateral agreement existed with that country.  However, it was
not feasible to set up a bilateral agreement with every country, since in many cases very few business
transactions were involved.
87
45. The view was also expressed that bilateral agreements could open the door for abuse, since
countries could use such agreements to obtain evidence and information from foreign firms andgovernments, with a view to enforcing their competition law extraterritorially.  This observation was
said, however, to be analytical in nature rather than  being based on actual experience and not to be a
general aspect of the operation of bilateral cooperation agreements.
88
46. The view was expressed that regional fora on competition issues could be useful in promoting
effective policy development and enforcement.  Relevant examples cited included regular meetings on
competition matters held by APEC, NAFTA and the Free Trade Area of the Americas.89  I n  s om e
                                                     
78 M/8, paragraph 44.
79 M/8, paragraph 58.
80 M/9, paragraph 23.
81 M/8, paragraph 44.
82 M/9, paragraph 29.
83 M/8, paragraph 45 and M/9, paragraph 29.
84 M/8, paragraph 45.
85 M/8, paragraph 47.
86 M/8, paragraphs 53 and 75.
87 M/9, paragraph 22.
88 M/8, paragraph 53 and related comments in paragraph 47.
89 M/8, paragraphs 49, 51 and 55.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 15
cases, cooperative activities had grown into efforts to introduce competition law and policy into the
frameworks governing intraregional trade.  Fo r instance, APEC members had recently undertaken
studies on competition laws and policies and were now working on a set of non-binding principles to
enhance competition and regulatory reform.  In addition, many regional trade agreements such as the
European Union, the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
(ANZCERTA) and NAFTA were concerned, to various degrees, with the harmonization of
competition policies.  The degree of harmonization was a function of the level of economic
integration.  For example, the European Union had established a supranational body to enforce
relevant competition provisions under the Treaty of Rome.  In contrast, NAFTA did not set forth
common standards on competition policy, but simply required parties to adopt or maintain measures
proscribing anti-competitive business practices and to take appropriate action with respect thereto.
Moreover, a high level of economic integration had led the European Union and ANZCERTA to
eliminate anti-dumping laws in regional trade, while anti-dumping laws continued to be maintained inthe context of NAFTA.
90
47. It was suggested that regional cooperation could also play a useful role in the provision of
technical assistance.  This did not involve developed countries exclusively.  For instance, one
developing country with a fully functioning comp etition regime had run since 1996 an international
training programme for other developing countries.91  It was pointed out that, through participation in
regional seminars, competition officials became familiar with and gained confidence in their
counterparts from other countries of human networks of competition.92
48. The point was made that cooperation on competition issues at the multilateral level often took
the form of policy advice, technical assistance, and the preparation of specialized studies.  UNCTAD,
the World Bank and the OECD had been especially active in this regard.  More specifically, theGroup was informed that activities carried out by UNCTAD with respect to cooperation on
competition matters included the conduct of meetings of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts
(IGE) and the provision of technical assistance, in addition to preparing research studies, and drafting
and reviewing guideline documents such as the Model Competition Law, the Handbook on
Competition Laws, and the UN Set on Restrictive Business Practices.  Issues currently addressed bythe IGE included the relationship between the competition authorities and relevant regulatory
agencies, especially in respect of privatization and demonopolization processes;  international merger
controls, in particular where they had an impact on developing countries;  and the creation of a culture
of competition.  UNCTAD had regularly held traini ng activities for national competition authorities,
sometimes in cooperation with institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD.  In addition,UNCTAD had assisted a number of countries in the process of drafting and adopting competition
legislation.  UNCTAD concurred with the view that cooperation should not be limited to assisting
national competition authorities, and that in parallel broader efforts were needed to help national
competition authorities educate all constituencies, including consumer organizations and businesses,
with respect to the benefits of competition policy.  Current research studies by UNCTAD focused on
experiences with international cooperation on competition policy and how competition policy
addressed the exercise of intellectual property rights.
93
49. It was noted that the World Bank had provided advice on the implementation of competition
policy in the context of country-specific structural adjustment programmes.  A number of national
governments had been assisted in addressing competition issues at times of economic crisis, with a
view to strengthening the role that competition policy could play in the revival of the domestic
economy.  In addition, the Bank had provided extensive technical assistance by organizingconferences, seminars and workshops.  The Bank had also prepared a number of specialized
                                                     
90 M/8, paragraph 55.
91 M/8, paragraph 55.
92 M/8, paragraph 60.
93  M/8, paragraphs 64 and 65.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 16
publications intended to disseminate best practices in the field.  A recent publication entitled "A
Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Policy"94 provided a comprehensive
overview of issues concerning the application of competition law in developing and transition
economies, together with various options reflecting different country circumstances.95  In performing
its cooperation activities in the area of competition policy, the Bank increasingly attempted to involve
the private sector in conferences, seminars and workshops, as well as in the provision of technicaladvice.
96
50. The Group was also informed that up to the end of 1998, the OECD had conducted and
participated in over 90 programmes on competition policy, for both member and non-member
countries.  Most of these programmes had been organized and led by the OECD itself;  the remaining
programmes had been joint ventures, typically with the World Bank, a single country such as Korea,
or with a competition agency like the United States Federal Trade Commission.  In other cases, the
OECD had sent in experts to participate in events such as APEC conferences, and the trainingseminars organized by the Japan Fair Trade Commission.  In addition, the OECD had provided
technical assistance to non-member countries by way of preparing commentaries on draft competition
laws.  This had often been followed by seminars that examined case studies.  Typically, new
competition officers presented cases and a panel of very experienced enforcers from a number of
OECD countries discussed how those cases might be analysed.  Such seminars had proved to be oneof the most effective ways to convey the best competition practices.  Best practices were also
disseminated through publications, including the b ook prepared jointly with the World Bank on the
framework for the implementation of competition law.  Recently, the OECD had launched a journal
97
as a vehicle to make available to the public the extensive analytical work on competition issuescarried out by this organization.
98  Lastly, the OECD had held a conference on trade and competition
policy featuring participation by 30 non-OECD member countries and representatives of the
Secretariats of the WTO and UNCTAD, in addition to the 29 OECD member countries.  A report on
the conference had been published recently.99
51. Differing views were expressed as to whether cooperation on competition matters at the
multilateral level should be formalized through an ag reement to be negotiated in the WTO.  The main
arguments in favour of setting up a multilateral agreement on competition issues were as follows.
First, the points were made that OECD a nd UNCTAD could not go beyond issuing non-binding
guidelines and recommendations and that, in contrast, the WTO was the best-suited forum for
undertaking discussions on multilateral competition rules, as it was equipped with legally binding
rules and an effective dispute settlement system, and had a long experience with multilateralnegotiations striking a balance of interests between developed and developing countries.
100
Competition-related provisions of existing WTO Agreements were inadequate for addressingcompetition problems across the board, including private anti-competitive practices.  The Kodak-Fuji
case had illustrated the lack of tools at the disposal of the WTO.  Hence, there was a need to reinforce
the WTO regime by the incorporation of competition-related norms.  The view was expressed that an
ideal model for an international competition fram ework would contain provisions on a supranational
competition authority, as well as unified substantive and procedural norms.  One model close to thisideal form was the 1993 Munich Code which had been proposed by the International Antitrust Code
Working Group (IACWG).  However, a TRIPS-type  agreement could be considered as a more
practical option.  Under this type of agreement, ev ery Member would be required to commit itself to
                                                     
94 A Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Policy (World Bank and OECD,
1999).
95 M/8, paragraph 62.
96 M/8, paragraph 63.
97 OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy.
98 M/8, paragraphs 59 and 61.
99 OECD, Trade and Competition Policies:  Exploring the Interface (Paris:  1999).
100 M/8, paragraph 56.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 17
incorporate substantive norms of competition into its domestic law, and to establish independent
administrative and judicial bodies to oversee implementation and guarantee greater uniformity in
interpretation of the agreement.  The WTO dispute settlement procedures could be used as the
appropriate mechanism for addressing violations of the substantive norms.  This approach would not
presuppose the pre-existence of domestic competition laws, but would require the eventual
incorporation into the national legislation of provisions relating to competition.101
52. It was also suggested that a multilateral initiative through the WTO could augment and
reinforce bilateral and regional initiatives.  Through commitments on transparency and national
treatment, such an agreement would confirm the rules of business conduct in foreign markets and
ensure that firms were treated in a non-discriminatory manner with respect to the application of
competition policy.  The WTO provided the most appropriate forum for an effective and
comprehensive discussion of competition issues within a multilateral framework.  A multilateral
agreement on competition policy could serve to solidify the gains from trade liberalization bydisciplining private barriers to trade, improving cooperation and communication among Members on
competition policy matters, and promoting greater certainty as to the rules for conducting business in
foreign markets.
102
53. The view was expressed that an international framework for competition policy rules could be
structured around the following three points.103  First, each WTO Member would commit itself to
adopting domestic competition rules.   Second, such rules would be based upon common principles.
Third, there would be some rules for cooperation.  There were two alternatives for developing rules
on cooperation.  Under the first approach, one would seek convergence and subsequently one would
envisage cooperation.  Under the second approach, lack of convergence would not delay cooperation;
rather, the degree of cooperation would be tailored to the degree of convergence already achieved.Both approaches could be applied concurrently.  This was a good illustration of the complementarity
between bilateral and multilateral approaches to cooperation.  It was suggested that positive comity
should not enter this multilateral framework as a binding tool.  It had rarely been applied and could be
a problem for competition authorities closely attached to their work programme and priorities and
who did not wish to be overwhelmed by inquiry requ ests transmitted by other countries.  In contrast,
the multilateral framework could feature an obligation to notify investigations having an important
effect upon WTO Members.  In addition, the provisi on of technical assistance could play an important
role within a multilateral framework.  It was suggested that technical assistance would be provided
more efficiently if there was increased cooperation among the agencies performing this function.
104
54. The view that development of a multilateral agreement on competition matters was premature
and might prove unwarranted was also expressed.  In this connection, it had been suggested that an
adequate competition policy could in some countries reside basically in measures liberalizing trade
and investment flows, complemented by sectoral regulatory policies where appropriate, without a
competition law or enforcement authority. In this context, there was a question as to how such a
country could cooperate with other WTO Members on competition matters.  More generally, the point
was made that half of the WTO Members had still not adopted a competition law nor had they
established a competition authority.  Hence, proposals to set up a multilateral agreement oncompetition issues seemed premature.  In addition, it was suggested that proposals regarding a
multilateral framework agreement addressed the question of how to construct a WTO agreement on
competition policy, but not why such an agreement was necessary.  In addition, the proposals tabled
were not sufficiently clear in many aspects.  For instance, would the proposed agreement be binding?
Would it be limited to rules regarding cooperation?  Would it feature dispute settlement provisions?
105
                                                     
101 M/8, paragraph 57.
102 M/9, paragraph 29.
103 M/8, paragraph 70.
104 M/9, paragraph 22.
105 M/9, paragraph 30.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 18
In addition, it was suggested that notification of competition actions would make the burden of WTO
notifications even more onerous.  This was a serious concern for developing countries.  Moreover, it
was said that notification of competition actions could be unnecessary given that the firms concerned
would be better placed to inform their governments about such actions directly and this was a quicker
procedure than notification.  The point was also made that the dissemination of experiences in the
application of competition policy did not require a multilateral framework or a WTO agreement.106
55. Certain "markers" were put down in respect of the arguments made in favour of developing
WTO instruments addressing cooperation on compet ition law and policy.  The question was posed as
to whether anti-competitive practices with cross-border effects were all that prevalent? A few well-
publicized multi-jurisdictional cases did not make such problems global nor did they make a case for
a global solution.  Second, the view was expressed that bilateral and regional approaches had been
relatively more successful than multilateral ones.  None of the instruments that had been negotiated or
discussed at the multilateral level, such as UNCTAD's Set of Multilaterally Agreed EquitablePrinciples and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, or the numerous instruments
developed by the OECD, were binding.  They rema ined as recommendations or guidelines.  Third, did
the benefits of cooperation under the auspices of the WTO outweigh the considerable costs entailed in
achieving the degree of commonality of approach required to ensure the success of multilateral
cooperation?  Members would only be prepared to cooperate if there was a shared perception ofcommon interest and mutual benefit.
107  The view was also expressed that the notion that bilateral
agreements were of limited scope and had to be supplemented by a multilateral agreement was
directly contradicted by experience with respect to the WTO Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  In this case, the existence of a multilateral agreement had not
generated the expected benefits and it was now argued that such benefits were contingent upon theestablishment of bilateral agreements.
108
56. In addition, the view was expressed that the notification of competition law enforcement
actions on a multilateral basis would be burdensome and unworkable.  Such notifications called for
great confidentiality and secrecy, given the due process protection that had to be accorded to
companies involved in antitrust investigations.  They  were made ordinarily on a bilateral basis;  that
is, only the affected country was notified.  Notifying upcoming enforcement actions on a multilateral
basis would be inconsistent with requirements of confidentiality and could seriously impair the
effectiveness of such actions.  Second, the justification for a multilateral agreement standardizing
country practices in the area of competition was not evident. There was nothing theoretically
inappropriate or offensive about having 80 plus competition laws in the world.  Third, centralizing theprovision of technical assistance to new competition agencies did not seem warranted.  Countries
seeking assistance usually had a clear idea of what they needed and who they needed it from, and thus
there was no point in having some centralized orga nization step in to provide overall coordination.
There was nothing wrong with a developing country seeking technical assistance and policy advice
from several countries at once.
109
57. In response to the foregoing observations, it was suggested that one of the main reasons
justifying cooperation on competition matters within a WTO framework was that anti-competitivepractices increasingly had an international dimension and therefore affected the interests of a
multiplicity of WTO Members.  Second, the notion that anti-competitive practices with a global
dimension were unimportant was inaccurate.  On the contrary, investigations against international
cartels, merger reviews involving multiple jurisdictions, and anti-competitive practices with cross-
country effects were a frequent occurrence.  Third, if a WTO Member conducted a competitioninvestigation and this investigation affected the interests of other WTO Members, it seemed normal
                                                     
106 M/9, paragraph 31.
107 M/9, paragraph 26.
108 M/9, paragraph 31.
109 M/9, paragraph 25.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 19
that there should be some process for signalling that such investigation had taken place, as well as a
framework for consultations where other WTO Members could raise any particular concerns relating
to that investigation.  Fourth, the need to avoid overburdening the WTO system of notifications was
clear, and it was recognized that this called for a high degree of flexibility.  Fifth, while there were
obvious limits to the exchange of confidential information, it was important not to lose sight of the
fact that in every investigation there was a significant amount of non-confidential information whichcould be exchanged.  Sixth, it was important that the commitments with respect to cooperation
undertaken as part of a multilateral framework were seen as binding, although some aspects of those
commitments, for instance those relating to notifications and consultations, did not easily lend
themselves to dispute settlement.  Finally, awaiting a broader dissemination or development of
competition law across the world to engage in cooperation was not practical, because WTO Members
risked in fact never cooperating if they waited to have enough convergence.
110
58. The suggestion was also made that, independently of whether a multilateral framework on
competition issues materialized, as a further step in the dissemination of experiences regarding the
application of competition law, it would be worthw hile to launch regular reviews at the WTO in the
area of competition policy, including the handling of individual cases.  The WTO already had the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) in place but the TPRM dealt with broader trade issues and
one could not expect to have sufficient discussion of competition law and policy as part of the TPRMwork.  It was also said that technical assistance could make a substantial contribution towards helping
Members solve some of the difficulties involved in implementing a competition regime.  An option
worth considering was the creation of technical cooperation and competition advocacy support
systems within the WTO.
111
59. The point was also made that multilateral cooperation should not and would not absorb or
replace bilateral and regional cooperation schemes.  Rather, all three approaches could and should
develop in a mutually complementary and reinforcing way.112  It was also suggested that cooperation
on competition matters should have at its heart an educational purpose, instead of being driven by a
results-oriented agenda.  It was said in this regard that competition policy, despite its positive effects
on welfare, was not supported by strong constituencies.  As a result, the world was getting less thanthe optimum in terms of competition policy.  This "political market failure" could be remedied by
educating the public on the benefits of competition policy.  Any of the three basic approaches to
cooperation (bilateral, regional and multilateral) would be helpful to meet this purpose, although
cooperation at the level of the WTO could be especially helpful in addressing this problem.
Furthermore, the implementation of competition policy involved very large economies of learning andhence cooperation at the multilateral level was bound to be useful especially for countries beginning
to operate competition regimes.
113
60. The view was expressed that the nature of cooperation on competition matters varied with the
degree of institutional development.  Cooperation in this area seemed to follow a pattern consisting of
three stages.  At a very early stage, cooperation focused on the provision of technical assistance.  In a
second and perhaps intermediary stage, cooperation took the form of relatively simple agreements not
requiring the exchange of confidential information.  At a more advanced stage, cooperation took placethrough sophisticated agreements, including provisions on the exchange of confidential
information.
114  Another view was that cooperation should be  structured into four stages.  The first
stage would be educational, in broad terms.  Th e second would involve the provision of technical
training, in order to allow a lesser developed competition regime to grow into a mature and
sophisticated system. The third would involve voluntary cooperation among competition authorities
                                                     
110 M/9, paragraph 34.
111 M/9, paragraph 27.
112 M/8, para 52.
113 M/8, paragraph 66.
114 M/8, paragraph 66 and M/9, paragraph 28.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 20
regarding, for instance, the exchange of ad hoc information.  The fourth stage would involve formal
cooperation on the basis of legally binding instruments.  This progressive approach would be
reflective of reality and would best address the actual needs of individual Members.115
61. It was suggested that there was a need to develop mechanisms, both regional and global, for
cooperation and communication with other competition agencies.  The future design of international
cooperation mechanisms should be directed at meeting four specific needs: (i) technical assistance toMembers, especially those that still did not have competition systems in place or were at the initial
stages;  (ii) promotion of a culture of competition, in view of the fact that national competition
agencies and competition legislation were necessary but not sufficient to accomplish this objective;
(iii) the identification of priority areas with respec t to which the efforts of competition agencies could
be more effective;  and (iv) the dissemination of information concerning best practices in applying
competition policy, including institutional transparency.  Some of these ideas had been reflected
already in a Declaration of Principles issued in October 1998 by the countries participating in the FreeTrade Area of the Americas.  The generalized adoption of specific cooperation mechanisms, such as
positive comity, or the OECD Recommendation on Ha rd Core Cartels, could require some prior
efforts at harmonization.  This was the case because cartels, for instance, could be treated under the
per se  rule or under the rule of reason depending upon the jurisdiction.
116
62. The view was expressed that special attention should be accorded to the specific situation of
certain developing countries, including African countries, that had not yet adopted domestic
legislation on competition matters, or created institutions for the enforcement of competition policy.
Two levels of technical cooperation were potentially useful for such countries.  At the operational
level, countries could be assisted in developing their institutional capabilities on a bilateral, on a
regional and on a multilateral basis;  relevant institutions and organizations in this regard were theWorld Bank, the OECD, the European Commission as well as the UNCTAD and the WTO.  A second
level of cooperation related to the analysis of certain anti-competitive practices with cross-country
effects;  mega-mergers, for example.  Furthe r work was warranted on both of these aspects.
117
63. The view was also expressed that cooperation intrinsically had a bilateral, a regional and a
multilateral facet;  each of these approaches had some advantages and some inherent shortcomings.Countries could adopt one or more of these approaches in a non-exclusive manner, depending on their
own experience in implementing competition law and their level of economic development.
118  More
specifically, it appeared that bilateral cooperation tended to take place between countries with similar
competition policy regimes.  Since competition policy regimes were closely linked to the level of
economic development of Member countries, this implied that bilateral cooperation, or at least formalbilateral cooperation, was taking place predominantly between developed countries.  This also seemed
to be the case for regional cooperation.  It was important for the Working Group to examine more
closely how cooperation could be fostered amongst countries with different competition regimes, at
different levels of development.  This would make cooperation a global tool.  In fact, enhanced
cooperation with countries with nascent competition policy regimes would provide these countries
with valuable insights.  Similarly, enhanced communication with countries which did not yet have a
national competition policy regime would go a long way in convincing them of the benefits ofadopting such a regime.  The Working Group should focus on this aspect of cooperation.
Furthermore, multilateral cooperation on competition matters did not have to be based on a formal
framework of rules.  The view was also expressed that it was imperative to ensure that global welfare,
and not national welfare, was used for evaluating anti-competitive practices.  A national welfare
standard implied treating anti-competitive behaviour in the home market differently from anti-competitive behaviour in foreign markets.  Further, priority in international cooperation should be
                                                     
115 M/8, paragraph 77.
116 M/8, paragraph 67.
117 M/9, paragraph 23.
118 M/8, paragraph 74.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 21
accorded to the control of anti-competitive behavi our of firms with international market power.
Responsibility for such control would tend to fall on large economies, since firms with international
market power tended to be based in large economies.119
64. The view was also expressed that, by questioning the possibility of increasing degrees of
cooperation, some Members had already taken a position on what was the level of cooperation they
could accept.  This seemed prejudicial, however, since there was not a direct connection betweencooperation consisting of technical assistance and more developed and elaborate forms of
cooperation.  Besides, the context in which cooperation took place was evolving given the speed at
which developing countries and transitional econom ies were adopting competition policy.  Limiting
discussions to educational cooperation could mean failing to anticipate the real needs that developing
countries and transitional countries might face in the near future.  In other words, it did not seem
sensible to differentiate in a static way educational cooperation from more elaborate forms of
cooperation.
120
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF COMPETITION POLICY TO ACHIEVING THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE WTO, INCLUDING THE PROMOTION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
65. This item was discussed by the Working Group at its meetings on 19-20 April and 10-
11 June 1999.  Written submissions on this item were provided by the delegations of Hong Kong,China;  Japan;  the European Community and its member States;  and Korea (documents W/118 in the
case of Hong Kong, China;  documents W/119, W/122, W/134 and W/135, in the case of Japan;
document W/130 in the case of the Community;  and document W/133 in the case of Korea).
Subsequent to the meeting of 10-11 June, a written submission on this item was provided by
Mauritius (W/137).  In addition, the representatives of the Dominican Republic;  Egypt;  the EuropeanCommunity and its member States;  Hong Kong, China;  Hungary;  India;  Japan;  Korea;  Malaysia;
Norway;  Pakistan;  Switzerland;  the United States;  and Zimbabwe, on behalf of the WTO African
Group, made oral statements or posed questions on this item during the two meetings.  The observer
from the OECD provided information on relevant activities of his organization.
66. The view was expressed that the application of certain WTO rules benefited import-
competing producers rather than promoting competition and consumer welfare.  This was an anomaly,
particularly in an increasingly globalized economy.  It was suggested that, to ensure that WTO rules
remained valid, credible and up to date, there was a need for a competition-oriented reform of the
WTO system.  The focus of this reform should be to link WTO rules to the broad competition
principles of open markets, non-discriminatory conditions of competition, and consumer welfare.
Along with the implementation of this approach, due attention needed to be directed to governmental
restraints, such as trade measures restricting import and export competition, and exemptions from
competition rules such as those concerning export cartels.
121 It was also suggested that it would be
unproductive to introduce into the WTO system a multilateral framework for competition policy,
without first addressing the anti-competitive elements built into the current WTO disciplines.  There
was no question that competition policy must be concerned with both governmental restraints and
private practices restricting competition and trade.122  The view was also expressed that the purpose of
the Working Group was to examine the interaction between trade and competition policy, with the
long-term goal of seeing how the WTO could strive  towards a greater convergence between these two
areas.123
                                                     
119 M/8, paragraphs 74-76.
120 M/9, paragraph 28.
121 M/8, paragraph 80 and W/9, paragraph 49.
122 M/8, paragraph 84.
123 M/8, paragraph 88.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 22
67. The suggestion was made that competition policy could contribute to achieving the objectives
of the WTO by helping to shape trade policy.  While competition policy perspectives could be
brought into sectoral regulatory schemes by including the competition agency in policy-making,
competition laws had no power to affect trade-restrictive measures taken by the government itself
directly impeding competition with foreign competit ors.  The view was expressed that trade remedies,
such as anti-dumping, were good candidates for reform;  therefore, the possibility of introducingcompetition policy perspectives into the agreemen ts governing such measures should be examined.
124
The view was expressed that anti-dumping measures had a greater distorting effect on trade than
safeguard measures, in that they did not require offsetting concessions or adherence to the WTO
principles of MFN treatment and non-discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions.  The
abuse of anti-dumping measures could be remedied by bringing such measures in line with their
original function.  In this regard, the view was expressed that anti-dumping measures had originally
been intended to regulate "predatory pricing" in international trade, while competition laws did so
with respect to the domestic market.  Article VI of the GATT, however, restricted "price
discrimination" in general, instead of regulating specifically "predatory pricing" in international
transactions.  Thus, there was a disparity between the wording of this provision and the original
objectives of anti-dumping measures.125  Economists generally agreed that, in the absence of
predatory intent, dumping was basically harmless for the importing country, because the benefitsconsumers gained from dumping were greater than any harm undergone by producers.
126
Accordingly, it was suggested that the focus of anti-dumping measures should be changed to bedirected at the regulation of "predatory pricing", rather than of "international price discrimination".
The above standard would require the following:  first, use of the concept of "marginal cost" or
"average variable cost" as the basis for the definition of normal value;  second, verifying theprobability of future success in predation prior to the application of anti-dumping measures, which
would require examination of the conditions of co mpetition in the domestic market of the importing
country;  and third, when considering the application of anti-dumping measures, the examination not
only of producer interests (reflected in injury to the domestic industry), but also of the benefits to
consumers that arose from low-priced imports and would be curtailed following the application of
such measures.  In other words, the application of anti-dumping measures should be assessed from the
viewpoint of the economy as a whole.
127  The view was also expressed that the mere initiation of an
anti-dumping investigation was in itself a large th reat to exporting companies, and that the trade
distortive effects of the filing of anti-dumping suits should be considered when reviewing anti-
dumping regimes from the perspective of competition policy.128
68. The argument was made that the WTO rules on safeguard measures also needed to be
reviewed from a competition perspective.  For example, Article 11 of the Agreement on Safeguards
did not address purely private business practices, which raised the question of whether measures such
as voluntary restraints initiated by private firms were prohibited under this Article.  The reason why
Article 11 banned grey-area measures such as voluntary export restraints and ordinary market
arrangements was that such measures adversely affected competition.  Therefore, whether or not
certain grey-area measures were prohibited under Article 11 should be decided on the basis of theeffects these measures had on competition rather than on the basis of whether the government was
involved in the establishment of such measures.  This interpretation appeared to be consistent with the
letter and the spirit of the Preamble to the Agreement on Safeguards, which emphasized the need to
enhance rather than limit competition in international markets.
129
                                                     
124 M/8, paragraph 81 and W/9, paragraph 52.
125 M/8, paragraphs 81 and 82.
126 M/8, paragraph 84.
127 M/8, paragraph 82.
128 M/8, paragraph 81.
129 M/9, paragraph 50.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 23
69. In response to the foregoing suggestions, the view was expressed that the development of
possible reforms of existing WTO rules was inconsistent with the mandate set for the Working Group
in the recommendation that had been approved by the General Council (WT/GC/M/32, page 52),
since this recommendation referred to the "contribution" of competition policy to the objectives of the
WTO.  In addition, if the Working Group were to make a decision to consider how competition
elements could be infused into WTO provisions, this examination should be holistic and non-discriminatory as between WTO provisions.  For instance, a theoretical argument could be made that
this review should include the issue of how comp etition elements could be infused into the WTO
provisions regarding special and differential treatment, among many others. It should not be neglected
that certain WTO rules, such as those on trade remedies, fulfilled a particular role in the balance of
concessions offered by Members and that any attempt to philosophically refashion those rules would
fundamentally disrupt the existing balance in the WTO system.
130  The view was also expressed that it
was an over-simplification to posit the convergence of trade policy and competition policy and it wasnot necessarily the case that one policy was superior to the other.
131  By way of response to these
points, the view was expressed that suggesting that WTO provisions on special and differential
treatment had an anti-competitive effect, and could therefore be subject to review, showed a lack of
clarity about what those provisions did, and how they contributed to increasing the competitiveness of
developing countries.132  Further, the mandate to study the interaction between trade and competition
policy had clear limits and could not possibly encompass themes such as labour or the environment,
since both themes were clearly unrelated to the mandate of the Group.133
70. The view was expressed that competition cases having an international dimension were
relevant to market access and thus to achieving the objectives of the WTO.  They were bound to
increase in numbers as globalization proceeded, posing a major challenge to the WTO.  However,actions to curb anti-competitive behaviour originating in a foreign country were difficult or at times
impossible to enforce.
134  This was an area of concern for developing countries and merited further
discussion by the Group.135  In such cases, the competition authorities of the country concerned had to
request the assistance of the competition authorities of the country where the anti-competitive
behaviour took place.  For a variety of reasons, however, such assistance was not alwaysforthcoming.
136  The Working Group should focus on anti-competitive practices with a significant
impact on international trade.  There was a common understanding that hard-core cartels were of
special significance both from the point of view of international trade and from the point of view of
competition law.137  The argument was made that the lack of multilateral rules and insufficient
cooperation among the relevant authorities in the field of competition affected negatively bothinternational trade and investment, since anti-competitive practices of a private or regulatory nature
could seriously restrain market access and market presence.
138
71. The impact of import cartels, export cartels and international cartels on international trade and
market entry by foreign firms was considered.  It was said that the impact of import and export cartels
was fairly obvious.  Import cartels directly restricted competition in the domestic market between
domestic and foreign suppliers by restraining imports of goods and services.  Export cartels restricted
competition in the foreign market to which exports were directed.  International cartels, in turn,
prevented competition in global markets.  Of course , this had an effect upon the domestic market as it
generated a rise in the price of goods and services sold domestically and a reduction in consumer
                                                     
130 M/8, paragraph 85.
131 M/9, paragraph 46.
132 M/8, paragraphs 88 and 89.
133 M/8, paragraphs 87, 88 and 90.
134 M/8, paragraph 86.
135 M/8, paragraph 89.
136 M/8, paragraph 86.
137 M/8, paragraphs 91 and 92.
138 M/8, paragraph 83.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 24
welfare.  A complicated question was whether domes tic hard-core cartels, such as price-fixing, output
allocation, and the division of markets, had adverse effects on international trade.  Such cartels did not
distort international trade by themselves.  For example,  price-fixing would result in high prices in the
domestic market.  As high prices in the domestic market would attract entry by foreign firms, a
successful domestic cartel had to be accompanied by government measures excluding foreign
companies from the domestic market, such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  Another possibility wasfor domestic firms to behave anti-competitively to jointly prevent the entry of foreign firms;  for
example by controlling the distribution of imported goods.
139
72. The view was expressed that functioning competition policies contributed to the fulfilment of
WTO objectives not only in the area of trade but also in that of investment.  Open policies toward
foreign direct investment and properly constituted and functioning competition policies were mutually
supportive.  On the one hand, liberal investment rules, by making the market contestable, could
challenge domestic oligopolies and reduce the likelihood of cartels and monopolies.  On the otherhand, effective competition policies could safeguard against possible abuses of market power by
foreign investors.  The decision of the General Council taken in December 1998 to extend the
mandates of the two Working Groups established in Singapore gave Members an opportunity to
prepare the ground for opening negotiations on establishing multilateral sets of rules for investment,
as well as for competition.
140
73. Views were expressed regarding the potential benefits of a multilateral framework agreement
on competition policy, and the choice of the WTO as the forum to address this issue.  It was said that,
while divergences between countries with respect to the substantive provisions of competition laws
and enforcement practices might pose difficulties for establishing a multilateral framework on
competition policy, they also heightened the potential benefits of an agreement.141  The absence of
competition laws in many Member countries should not be allowed to constitute a difficulty, just as
had not the fact that, at the time that the Uruguay Round negotiations on intellectual property had
begun, relatively few Members had had a functioning regime protecting intellectual property rights.142
74. The view was expressed that a multilateral framework on competition policy would make a
major contribution towards the promotion of international trade.  Such a framework should be soughtas part of a more general and balanced WTO agenda.  There were several benefits to be derived from
such a multilateral framework.  First, although it was generally recognized that anti-competitive
practices had a significant adverse impact on inte rnational trade and investment, especially in the
context of globalization, there was no mechanism at the WTO to address such practices.  A
multilateral framework on competition would play this role.  Second, because many countries hadadopted and were enforcing competition laws, and because anti-competitive practices increasingly
had an international dimension, there seemed to be a need for a multilateral framework of
cooperation, complementing cooperative efforts at the bilateral and at the regional levels.  Third, a
WTO agreement on competition would contribute towards the spread of a competition culture and this
would reinforce the WTO system overall.  Finally, a multilateral agreement on competition would be
very helpful in cases falling under a multiplicity of jurisdictions and this could help reduce
unnecessary costs to business regarding compliance with the competition regime.
143
75. The view was expressed that the principles/standards incorporated into such a framework of
rules had to be flexible enough to accommodate the differences in objectives, priorities, rules,
procedures and institutions in the competition regimes of Members.  This diversity called for the
adoption of a broad competition perspective rather than for harmonization.  Convergence should
                                                     
139 W/9, paragraph 45.
140 M/8, paragraph 83.
141 M/9, paragraph 43.
142 M/9, paragraph 48.
143 W/9, paragraph 40.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 25
occur only where convergence mattered and where it helped the process of international cooperation.
A WTO framework imposing rigid requirements would not only hinder meeting the specific
development needs of developing countries, but could also undermine the more sophisticated
competition policies/rules of developed economies.144
76. The point was made that, in examining proposals for multilateral rules, the development
dimension should be firmly borne in mind.145  While one of the objectives of a competition agreement
could be to gradually limit exclusions from competition law, the progressivity of this process would
have to take into account differences in levels of development.  Another example of the kind of
flexibility that was required was that a multilateral framework would not necessarily envisage
commitments regarding merger control.  A flexible  approach could also be adopted with respect to
small- and medium-sized enterprises.  Cooperation was another key aspect from a development
perspective.  It would provide sustained support for the process of progressive development of a
competition enforcement structure in developing countries.  Cooperation in individual cases andgeneral exchanges of experiences should be core components of a multilateral agreement on
competition and should be geared towards meeting the particular concerns that developing countries
had expressed in this field.  The WTO itself could become a significant provider of technical
assistance in the competition area.
146
77. The point was made that somewhat more specific guidance and support were needed for
small, open developing countries which were committed to market principles but lacked experience
with the administration of competition laws and policies.  In the light of this, the view was expressed
that the development of a possible WTO discipline preceded by voluntary guidance and support
regarding competition law and policy implementation could help to support ongoing liberalization
efforts and sustain the momentum for deepening the integration of small economies as well as thelarge number of developing countries who were looking forward to getting well entrenched in the
mainstream of the multilateral trading system.  This could also be viewed in the context of the
international coherence initiatives approach.  Taking account of these challenges and constraints, it
was suggested that future work on competition policy in the WTO could focus on the following
matters:  (a) the core elements of competition policy in a developing economy context, with particularreference to smaller economies;  (b) practical approaches to institution-building that would economize
on administrative costs and permit the exploitation of synergies with other relevant market-place
institutions;  (c) promotion of coherence between competition policy and related laws/policies and
WTO disciplines and also coherence in related activities and initiatives of the international
community;  and (d) practical approaches to cooperation and assistance in the implementation ofcompetition law and policy, both at the regional and multilateral levels.
147
78. The point was made that the analytical demands placed on developing countries regarding
preparations for the next Round of negotiations were huge.  In the light of this, certain conditions
should be established as a basis for possible negotiations regarding multilateral competition rules.  In
particular, technical assistance should be provid ed that would venture beyond the traditional support
to competition agencies in terms of development of competition laws and their enforcement and
include scrupulous assessment of the expected outcomes and the implications for developingcountries of multilateral competition rules.  A necessary condition for negotiating multilateral rules
should therefore be the conclusion of a thorough educative process (for a period of up to two years),
following which negotiations would be launched.
148
                                                     
144 M/8, paragraph 80 and W/9, paragraph 41.
145 M/8, paragraphs 89 and 90, and W/9, paragraph 42.
146 M/9, paragraph 42.
147 M/10, paragraph 4.
148 M/10, paragraph 5.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 26
79. A number of specific ideas regarding the elements of a multilateral framework on competition
policy were tabled for discussion.  According to one suggestion, a first element related to common
principles and rules on competition law and policy.  These would include principles such as
transparency and non-discrimination which were essential building blocks for both effective
competition law and the multilateral trading system.  A second element concerned measures to
address anti-competitive practices that had a significant impact on international trade and investment.The view was expressed that it was generally recognized that hard-core cartels fell in this category
and could be treated under a common rule.  In contrast, in areas where competition law relied on a
case-by-case assessment, such as abuse of dominant position or monopolization, and vertical
agreements, a common rule was not the right approach because it would eliminate the flexibility
which was essential for a proper assessment.  It was suggested that the Working Group could discuss
how other practices might be incorporated into the framework.  A third element suggested for
consideration concerned cooperation.  Fourthly, it was suggested that dispute settlement within a
multilateral agreement on competition was a very complex issue which would require further study.
It was clear, however, that dispute settlement in  the area of competition law and policy should not
involve the review of individual decisions taken by national competition authorities.
149
80. Another suggestion posited that non-discrimination and transparency should be two key
elements of a multilateral competition framewor k.  According to this proposal, the substantive
provisions of this multilateral framework should in clude commitments with respect to issues such as
the adoption of a competition law, the establishment of a competition authority, and the prohibition of
hard-core cartels.  A multilateral framework should also feature provisions on international
cooperation for better enforcement of competition law and policy.  However, there would not be any
commitments regarding positive comity.  Further, a number of specific provisions would address the
development dimension:  grace periods, exemptions from certain obligations, waivers, and
reservations.  Technical assistance would also be of importance in this connection.  Finally, while it
would be difficult to impose an obligation on competition agencies to assume a competition advocacy
role, positive support could be provided for competition advocacy to enhance the contestability of
markets.150
81. A number of further suggestions were made regarding the implementation of a WTO
framework on competition policy.  First, it was suggested that transitional arrangements should be an
integral element of a multilateral framework.  A second suggestion was to prioritize anti-competitive
practices to be banned.  A third suggestion was to examine the appropriateness of exemptions
systems, particularly any adverse effects on economic development.  A fourth suggestion was to studyfurther whether competition law was a necessity.  In particular, it should be discussed whether there
were ways to render markets competitive without resorting to a competition law.  Fifth, it was
desirable to conduct regular reviews of competition policy, including the handling of individual cases
by Members.  Sixth, it was suggested that a tech nical cooperation and competition advocacy support
system be created within the WTO.
151
82. In response to the above proposals and observations, the view was expressed that a
multilateral agreement of a binding nature would provide no assurance of doing a better job inpromoting mutual education, cooperation and understanding than the efforts that were taking place in
the Group and other international fora.  In fact, activities such as education, cooperation, technical
assistance, and further analytical exploration could occur quite naturally outside the bounds of a legal
framework.  In addition, such an agreement, even if it were relatively general in scope and content,
would still pose the risk of interfering seriously with the intelligent and dynamic evolution ofmethodologies and practices to address anti-competitive conduct.  At this stage there were many ways
in which the Working Group could continue to pursue many of the sensible goals motivating the
                                                     
149 M/9, paragraph 41.
150 M/9, paragraph 43.
151 M/9, paragraph 44.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 27
various suggestions made.  Whether the WTO could continue to host some or all of these activities
was to be settled elsewhere in the context of creating an agenda for the future work of the WTO.
According to this view, where appropriate and necessary, competition considerations would continue
to influence the development of WTO rules and market access provisions.  For instance, competition-
related measures had been integral to the achievement of a high-quality agreement on the
liberalization of trade on basic telecommunications services.  The means by which competition-related concerns became important for the purpose of ensuring market access was frequently a
function of the attributes of the trade involved, in particular the products or the particular markets
concerned, and it was not necessary or even desirable to consider such means on a general basis.
Thus, there was no need to undertake some sort of comprehensive review of all WTO provisions to
determine whether they needed to be infused with allegedly pro-competitive modifications.
152
83. The view was also expressed that competition policy could make an important contribution to
the WTO objective of promoting economic development.  In this regard, the point was made that,while limiting the number of the players in a given industry might be thought to facilitate the
attainment of economies of scale and the allocation of resources in accordance with policy priorities,
experience had shown that promoting rather than curbing competition in the domestic market was
more likely to improve international competitivenes s.  A second issue was the impact that exemptions
and exceptions from competition law had on economic development.  Again, experience had shownthat such regimes had had a negligible impact on i ndustrial development.  This suggested that careful
studies should be undertaken prior to the introduction of exemption systems, taking into consideration
the balance between the negative impacts of these systems on competition and other policy objectives.
In addition, after their introduction such systems shou ld be regularly reviewed in order to determine
whether they should be revised or abolished following changes in the domestic and global economies.A third issue meriting special consideration was the social effects of competition policy.  In inefficient
industries, the introduction of competition policy could result in heavy unemployment.  An optimal
approach to tackling this problem would be to combine the implementation of competition policy on
the one hand with policies to minimize its adverse effects on the other hand by way of creating new
industries, promoting job mobility and implementing relief measures for the unemployed.
153
84. The view was also expressed that, in considering any requirement to apply competition policy
in a non-discriminatory way, the "development caveat" should be borne in mind.154  It was also stated
that it was important to avoid reducing the discussion to one of the merits of two extreme positions;
the situation facing Members was more complicated and a spectrum of possibilities existed for
nurturing the existence of effective competition policies.155
IV. OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY MEMBERS RELATING TO THE GROUP'S
MANDATE TO STUDY THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADE AND
COMPETITION POLICY
85. In the meetings held on both 19-20 April and 10-11 June 1999, a number of other issues were
raised by Members relating to the Group's mandate  to study the interaction between trade and
competition policy.  Japan and Mexico provided written contributions on this matter (documents
W/123 and W/136, respectively).  Argentina; Au stralia; Canada; the Dominican Republic; Hong
Kong, China; India; Japan; Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; Romania; Singapore; the United States; and the
observer from the Russian Federation made oral comments or posed questions on this item.  The
observers from UNCTAD and the OECD provided updates on relevant activities of their
organizations.  In addition, the Group had before it an Overview of Members' National Competition
Legislation (W/128) prepared by the Secretariat.
                                                     
152 M/9, paragraph 46.
153 M/9, paragraph 44.
154 M/8, paragraph 89.
155 M/8, paragraph 90.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 28
86. The view was expressed that further consideration was desirable in the Group of matters
concerning the interaction between trade and competition policy.156  In particular, it was said that,
given the differences between the underlying assumptions and perspectives of competition policy and
trade policy, it could be useful to consider the contrasting approaches of the two disciplines to several
issues that had a bearing on both trade policy and competition policy and that had been the subject of
some discussion in the meeting.  Matters that me rited consideration in this regard included the
competition and trade policy perspectives in regard to export cartels, extraterritorial enforcement of
competition laws and anti-dumping.157  Furthermore, it was important to search for ways to address
distortions of competition directly at their source, so as not to create further distortions of trade and
competition.158  Where appropriate, distortions could and should be addressed at source from the
perspective of competition policy.
87. With regard to views that had been put forward previously by a Member regarding the
purpose and effects of anti-dumping, the following views were expressed.159  First, regardless of the
original intention, the current WTO rules allowed anti-dumping measures to serve as protection for
domestic industries.  In particular, anti-dumping measures permitted under the current rules prohibited
low-price sales which were completely legitimate under domestic competition law.  Second, contrary
to a view which had been expressed in the course of the Group's discussion of anti-dumping in 1998,
it could not be maintained that the main objective of the anti-dumping system was to protect domesticindustries against exports by foreign competitors that had unfair advantages in their home markets,
since there was no requirement for an anti-dumping authority to stop the existence of such unfair
advantages or to identify a cause and effect relationship in this regard.  Third, the potential problems
in the home markets of exporting countries which were alleged to justify anti-dumping measures did
not, in fact, justify such measures since they either could be addressed by other WTO rules or werematters that should not be addressed by trade rules.  Clearly, international economic rules should not
in any way allow the invocation of sanctions based on differences in national economic systems.
Fourthly, while noting the existence of domestic political realities regarding anti-dumping in some
countries, imperfections in the current WTO rules should not be used as an excuse for imposing anti-
dumping measures, given the magnitude of the market-distortive effects of such measures.  The pointwas also made that anti-dumping actions were often taken by countries with relatively closed markets
against imports from countries with relatively open economies, such as the United States.
160
88. The view was expressed that certain principles of competition policy could contribute to the
objectives of the WTO, since the fundamental goal was to improve the well-being of the populations
of WTO Members through continuing liberalization and efforts to ensure the better functioning ofmarket forces.
161  In this context, further progress was desirable in the area of international
cooperation relating to predatory pricing and price discrimination, as a means of refining the
application of anti-dumping measures.  The Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT set up a series of disciplines which covered the fundamental concepts of transparency, national
treatment and implied precepts or concepts which, in one way or another, guaranteed reciprocity in
dealing with these types of matters among Member countries.  A first objective of anti-dumping
measures was to protect the national firm from undue displacement.  A second objective, and this hadto be consistent with the previous criterion, was to avoid undue displacement without affecting the
functioning of other markets.  This necessitated the making of allowances for the necessary
adjustment of markets, which would require an assessment of the costs and benefits of possible
interventions.  To some extent, the costs and benefits were recognized in certain criteria which were
used in anti-dumping legislation.  From this, it might be inferred that the criteria specified permitted
                                                     
156 M/8, paragraphs 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105 and 106; M/9, paragraphs 56, 57 and 58.
157 M/8, paragraph 103.
158 M/8, paragraph 104.
159 M/8, paragraph 98 and related comments in paragraphs 102, 103 and 104.
160 M/8, paragraph 98.
161 M/9, paragraphs 54 and 55.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 29
the assessment of the minimum costs that would be acceptable in order to achieve market adjustment
which in the long term would be of benefit to the entire population.  However, the definition of
dumping raised problems in terms of its effective application under the criteria described.  First of all,
the concept of dumping, as it was reflected in the law, was based on price differentiation related to
market power.  However, the practice of price differentiation was difficult to fit into general concepts
of protection of competition since it did not necessarily involve the undue displacement of economicagents.  The practice of predatory pricing was included in the broader concept of price discrimination.
The view was expressed that it would be important to specify these concepts clearly in the Agreement
on Article VI, to provide a more rational and economically sound basis for the administration of anti-
dumping measures.  The concept of price discrimination should be defined in terms of competition
theory, with reference to concepts of costs and market power.  Similarly, an effort would be made to
properly define the concept of predatory pricing, through specification of variables that would be
considered and the application of relevant tests.  A further element which merited consideration withreference to the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI and which could help to refine the
application of anti-dumping measures was that of injury.  Rather than the mere displacement of
competitors, this should be concerned with the displacement of efficient competitors.  It should not be
concerned with injury, which reflected medium- rather than long-term changes.  Adverse changes in
market structure should be part and parcel of the assessment of injury, as should be the considerationof net consumer welfare effects and the ability to abuse a dominant position.  The concepts of the
relevant market and market power as they were addressed under competition law and policy would
also be relevant.  The former, in particular, would facilitate assessment of the extent to which and
ways in which a particular practice was affecting the efficient functioning of markets.
162  The view
was also expressed that there was no reason why allegedly unfair price discrimination should betreated differently in the domestic and international settings.
163
89. In response to the above points, the view was expressed that the Working Group had been
formed with the aim of exploring, in a pedagogical way, a set of issues with which the trading system
had had very limited experience and understanding, primarily with respect to the structure, operation
and implications of competition law and policy for trade in the broadest context.  Its purpose was not
to provide a focus for consideration of anti-dumping issues.  The rules on anti-dumping had been
negotiated at length and the question of any renegotiation was something that could not be taken up in
this Group.  Any suggestion to mutate anti-dumping rules into a different set of rules to govern
predatory pricing was misplaced and misguided.  It gave short shrift to the legitimate differences that
existed between trade policy and competition policy objectives with respect to those issues.  As hadbeen discussed previously in the Group, anti-dumping and competition rules had different objectives –
they were founded on different principles and they sought to address different problems.  Article VI of
the GATT had never had anything to do with the issue of predatory pricing, even in 1948 when it had
been concluded.  If the anti-dumping rules were eliminated in favour of competition laws or if they
were modified to reflect competition principles, the problems which those rules had sought to remedy
would go unaddressed.  Anti-dumping rules were a remedial mechanism which was necessary to the
maintenance of the multilateral trading system, and they also reflected a broad consensus amongMembers – developed and developing – which had been refined over many years.  The overall
understanding embodied in the WTO agreements had been achieved only because Members,
particularly those with relatively open markets, had recourse to instruments such as anti-dumping
laws.  It was recognized that neither the GATT nor the Anti-Dumping Agreement specifically referred
to the existence of anti-competitive practices in the home market as a prerequisite for definingdumping.  For this reason, anti-dumping had been described merely as an indirect response to such
practices, and not as a direct response or remedy for such practices.  There was a forum in which
WTO Members could take up these issues if it was j udged that they were worthy of being taken up,
and that forum was the Anti-Dumping Committee.  That Committee was in a position to address
alleged abuses of the anti-dumping rules, and, if deemed appropriate, to undertake a work programme
                                                     
162 M/9, paragraph 55.
163 M/8, paragraph 104.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 30
on the implementation of relevant WTO agreements, more generally.164  The view was also expressed
that, if the Group should follow a broad approach to its work which included the subject of anti-
dumping and other subjects that had an influence on the organization of markets, it would have to
consider also the impact on trade and competition of matters as diverse as state assistance, subsidies,
banking subsidies and subsidized interest rates.  Ho wever, this did not appear to be the intended role
of the Group.165
90. The view was expressed that the concerns that had been raised regarding the impact of anti-
dumping would have to be addressed adequately in the WTO, though not necessarily in the Working
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy.166  It was also suggested that direct
participation of competition authorities in the implementation of trade policy could contribute to
minimizing the anti-competitive effects of trade measures.167
91. The view was expressed that, alongside the work described in paragraph 88 above, a general
agreement as to the application of competition legislation on a national level would make animportant contribution to achieving the objectives of the WTO, since most countries had set
themselves the goal of drawing up this kind of legislation and of applying it in a manner consistent
with the principles of transparency and national treatment.  National systems for the protection of
competition should be strengthened through international cooperation agreements, some of which had
already been established regionally.  Through such agreements, with better coordination and anattempt to achieve integration, the effectiveness of existing national legislation had been maximized
and efforts had been made to eliminate restrictions affecting competition in markets, thereby ensuring
the benefits of liberalization.  Transparency, national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment
were essential principles for such cooperation.  Implicit in the concept of most-favoured-nation
treatment was the principle of reciprocity.  It needed to be expressed in substantive ways incompetition legislation.  This by no means implied a need for full convergence of competition law
among WTO Members.  However, much remained to be done to promote reciprocity in the
application of competition law and policy.  Perhaps the most problematic aspect concerned waivers
and exclusions from the application of national laws.  Fundamental criteria to be used in competition
legislation should be specified.  For example, it would be possible to specify fundamental criteria usedby Members in addressing vertical market re strictions and abuse of a dominant position.  In
addressing these practices, all countries, to some extent or another, made use of concepts such as the
relevant market(s) and market power.  Further exploration and analysis of these concepts in the
international arena would contribute to promoting the use of common analytical tools across
jurisdictions, which would promote reciprocity and the effective resolution of situations in which anti-competitive practices distorted trade or impeded access to markets.
168
                                                     
164 M/8, paragraph 100.
165 M/9, paragraph 57.
166 M/9, paragraphs 56 and 58.
167 M/9, paragraph 61.
168 M/9, paragraph 54.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 31
ANNEX 1
TEXT OF THE SINGAPORE MINISTERIAL DECLARATION (WT/MIN(96)/DEC),
PARAGRAPH 20
(Adopted 13 December 1996)
20. Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters related to
investment and competition policy and the built-in agenda in these areas, including
under the TRIMs Agreement, and on the understanding that the work undertaken
shall not prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in the future, we also agree
to:
/g109 establish a working group to examine the relationship between trade
and investment;  and
/g109 establish a working group to study issues raised by Members relating
to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including
anti-competitive practices, in order to identify any areas that maymerit further consideration in the WTO framework.
These groups shall draw upon each other's work if necessary and also draw upon and
be without prejudice to the work in UNCTAD and other appropriate
intergovernmental fora.  As regards UNCTAD, we welcome the work under way as
provided for in the Midrand Declaration and the contribution it can make to theunderstanding of issues.  In the conduct of the work of the working groups, we
encourage cooperation with the above organizations to make the best use of available
resources and to ensure that the development dimension is taken fully into account.
The General Council will keep the work of each body under review, and will
determine after two years how the work of each body should proceed.  It is clearlyunderstood that future negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral disciplines in these
areas, will take place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO
Members regarding such negotiations.WT/WGTCP/3
Page 32
ANNEX 2
CONTRIBUTIONS PROVIDED TO THE WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERACTION
BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY IN 1999
Symbol
(WT/WGTCP/W/-)Member/other source Where introduced
(Reference in Minutes)Topic
W/112 Turkey M/6, paragraph 15 (originally
introduced as a non-paper)The Impact of State Monopolies, Exclusive Rights and Regulatory
Policies on Competition and International Trade
W/113 Turkey M/5, paragraph 10 (originally
introduced as a non-paper)Intellectual Property Rights and Competition
W/114 Secretariat M/8, paragra ph 2 Fundamental WTO Principles
W/115 EC and member States M/8, paragraphs 3-6 F undamental WTO Principles & Competition Policy
W/116 United States M/8, paragraphs 44-50 Interna tional cooperation in competition law/policy
W/117 Switzerland M/8, paragraph 7 Fundamental  WTO Principles & Competition Policy
W/118 Hong Kong, China M/8, paragraph 80 Contri bution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/119 Japan M/8, paragraphs 10, 81-82 Fundament al WTO Principles & Competition Policy;
Contribution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/120 Japan M/8, paragraphs 8 and 9 Fundament al WTO Principles & Competition Policy
W/121 Japan M/8, paragraph 51 International cooperation in competition law/policy
W/122 Japan M/8, paragraphs 81-82 Contributio n of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/123 Japan M/8, paragraph 98 Respons e to US views on anti-dumping
W/124 Korea M/8, paragraphs 52-57 Internationa l cooperation in competition law/policy
W/125 Australia M/8, paragraph 58 Internationa l cooperation in competition law/policy
W/126 Zimbabwe (for the
WTO African Group)M/9, paragraph 23 International cooperation in competition law/policy
W/127 Secretariat M/9, paragraph 5 Fundament al Principles of Competition Policy
W/128 and
W/128/Rev.1Secretariat M/9, paragraph 53 Overview of Members' National Competition Legislation
W/129 EC and member States M/9, paragraph 22 Intern ational cooperation in competition law/policy
W/130 EC and member States M/9, paragraphs 40-42 C ontribution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/131 United States M/9, paragraph 3 Fundamental  WTO Principles & Competition PolicyWT/WGTCP/3
Page 33Symbol
(WT/WGTCP/W/-)Member/other source Where introduced
(Reference in Minutes)Topic
W/132 Romania M/9, paragraph 24 Internationa l cooperation in competition law/policy
W/133 Korea M/9, paragraph 43 Contribution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/134 Japan M/9, paragraph 44 Contribution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/135 Japan M/9, paragraph 45 Contribution of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/136 Mexico M/9, paragraphs 54-55 Anti-Dumping Measures and Competition
W/137 Mauritius M/10, paragraph 4 Interaction betwee n Trade and Competition Policy:  Small Economy
Perspectives
W/138 South Africa M/10, paragraph 5 Contributio n of Competition Policy to WTO Objectives
W/139 New Zealand M/10, paragraph 6 APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reform
__________