WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/DS/W/7
30 May 2002
(02-2994)
Dispute Settlement Body
Special SessionOriginal:  English
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES' REPLIES TO INDIA'S QUESTIONS
Communication from the European Communities
The following communication, dated 21 May 2002, has been received from the Permanent
Delegation of the European Commission.
_______________
By its Communication to the Dispute Settle ment Body (DSB) (TN/DS/W/5) India sought
clarification and information from the European Communities (EC) on its proposal relating to the
improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) (TN/DS/W/1).
The EC welcomes the Indian document, which raises important issues, that would help in the
process of clarifying the implications of the EC proposal.
In order to take full advantage of the Indian  contribution and with a view to foster the
dialogue among DSB's Members on the important questions raised by India, the EC submits to the
Members the attached document.
India structured its document in four main subject matters, which are further explored through
39 questions.  The EC's reply follows the four-tier structure of the Indian paper, and clusters some of
the questions when they appear to refer to similar matters.
The text submitted by the EC does not pretend either to be complete or to state fixed and final
positions by the EC on the various issues discussed.
Accordingly, the EC is ready to enter meaningful discussion on all such issues and would be
pleased to give orally or in writing any further explanation, information and clarification that India or
other Members might request.TN/DS/W/7
Page 2
PERMANENT PANELISTS
Question 1-2
How would adequate number (15-24) of suitable individuals be available for consideration as
permanent panelists?  Please point specific instances or trends of the growing quantitative
discrepancy between the need for panelists and the availability of ad hoc panelists since the
establishment of the WTO.
When the EC refers to the limited availability of ad hoc  panelist s, it does not mean that there
are not enough ad hoc panelist s potentially available, but that it is becoming more and more difficult
to find and agree on them at short notice.  The growing number of panels (see Annex 1) requires moreand more panelist s to serve, but at present the available panelist s do not work full time, but only on an
ad hoc basis.  This inevitably reduces the number of panels that the available candidates can handle.
Due to this factor, together with the delays relate d to the selection process, the composition of panels
takes considerably more amount of time than in the past.
This is confirmed by the fact that in 1996 the average time for the selection of panelist s was
30 days, while in 2001 it had increased to 67 (see Annex 1).  Article 8.7 of the DSU gives to the
parties to a dispute the possibility of requesting the WTO Director-General to appoint the members of
the panel 20 days after the date of the establishment of a panel.  This suggests that the intention of the
Members was that panels would be composed more quickly than this occurs at present.  The creationof a restricted roster of permanent panelist s would eliminate these delays in all cases.  So, instead of
losing time in the selection process the Members will engage actively in the actual resolution of the
dispute at once.  Depending on the quality of the panelist s to be selected in the permanent roster, this
is also expected to increase the quality and consistence of panel reports.
Question 3
Is the requirement that panelists should not be nationals of Members involved in the dispute a
constraint on the choice of potential panelists?
Yes, the experience shows that it is the case.  In principle, under the EC's proposal nationality
of the panelists would be irrelevant for the selection purposes.  Nevertheless, some exceptions couldbe envisaged, to ensure participation of panelists from developing countries (DCs) in certain disputes.
In particular, the EC considers that the rule enshrined in Article 8.10 of the DSU should be
maintained.
Question 4-5
Please provide details on recourse to the Director General under Article 8.7 of the DSU.  Is
the increasing recourse to Article 8.7 an undesirable trend?  Why?
Up until February 2000, 22 of 54 panels composed under the WTO were appointed by the
Director-General.
Lately, recourse to Article 8.7 have become the rule (see Annexe 2).  Of 24 panels established
in the period 2000 to April 2002, 14 were composed by the Director-General under Article 8.7 of the
DSU (58%).  The trend is on the increase.  Of the 9 panels in 2000, only 4 were composed by theDirector-General (44%).  Of the 15 established si nce then, 10 were composed by the Director-General
(75%).TN/DS/W/7
Page 3
A potential advantage of a system of ad hoc  panelists is that the parties are involved in the
selection process.  Accordingly, resort to appointm ent of panels by the Director-General should have
been an exceptional procedure.  On the contrary, the data show that the exception has become the rule
and that, therefore, the involvement of the parties in the selection process is more illusory than real.
The question is not whether this is an undesirable trend but whether, in the systemic structure of thedispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, this is an optimum development.
Question 6
Why would permanent panelists take less time in handling various procedural developments?
The EC paper does not argue that permanent panelists will take "less time" in handling
procedural developments.  It rather maintains that a system of qualified permanent panelists would
better deal with the increasing complexity of the cases, as regards both substance and procedure.  Ad
hoc panelists often have not much experience in deal ing with procedural matters or to become fully
acquainted with WTO case law.  Of course, the WTO Secretariat assists panelists and informs them of
how previous panels have ruled on similar issues.  However, final decisions rightly belong to the
panelists, who can decide in a different way.  A system of permanent panelists would help in attaining
more consistent rulings both procedurally and on substance.
Questions 7-9, 14 and 20
Please explain the reasons why a system of permanent panelists would most likely result in
better rulings and in fewer reversals of panel reports by the Appellate Body.
This set of questions is closely related to the previous one.  The argument made in the EC's
proposal is that most ad hoc panelists face a steeper learning curve in their work, as they cannotdevelop enough experience.  According to a recent study, the average panelist has served on
1.5 panels since 1995: i.e. one panel every 5 years.  It is clear that creating a system of permanent
panelists would allow each of them to participate more often in panels.  Consequently, they would
develop the knowledge required to better deal with procedural and substantial complexities of today's
panel proceedings.
Of course, the fact that some panelists have previously served in a WTO/GATT panel does
not give any absolute guarantee on the fact that the panel report will not be partly overruled by the
AB.  Other factors have to be taken into account as the complexities and novelty of the legal claims at
issue.  Nevertheless, generally speaking, an experienced permanent panelist should be better prepared
to deal with the substantial and procedural matters involved in a panel work than a panelist serving
una tantum .
Question 10
Legitimacy and credibility of a system of permanent panelists.
The EC does not consider that ad hoc panelists lack legitimacy or credibility.  Nevertheless, it
considers that a system of permanent panelists would appear to both WTO Members and the general
public as more independent and more credible, due to the more limited likelihood of potential conflict
of interests that such a system is likely to entail and the full time dedication of panelists to their tasks.TN/DS/W/7
Page 4
Question 11
Which number of permanent panelists from developing countries would be representative of
the WTO Membership?
As noted in the EC's proposal, the permanent roster of panelists would be broadly
representative of the WTO membership.  While it is difficult to assess precisely the number of
panelists from developing countries without having established the total number of the permanent
panelists, it is clear that panelists from DCs would pr obably constitute a substantial part of the roster.
A clear improvement when compared to the relatively low average (about 35%) of ad hoc  panelists
from developing countries, which served in WTO panels since 1995.
It should be noted that the limited number of ad hoc panelists from developing countries is
probably due to the fact that it is difficult for a developing country diplomat to assume the additional
duties derived from serving in a panel.  This would be corrected under a system of permanent
panelists.
Question 12
Collegial consultations among all the permanent panelists.
On issues of general and horizontal relevance and importance, the EC could envisage a
system of collegial consultations among all the permanent panelists.  This is likely to help the
consistency and predictability of the findings both on substantial and on procedural matters, an
objective expressly set out in Article 3.2 of the DSU.
Question 13
Estimate of the time saved in various stages of the proceedings.
It is difficult to give a precise estimate of the time that a system of permanent panelists would
allow to save during the various stages of the DS procedure.  As noted above, the fact that the
permanent panelists will get progressively better acquainted with procedural matters is expected to
accelerate the proceedings.  However, the main saving of time will take place in the initial stage, sincethe composition of the panels instead of taking two to three months will be decided immediately.
Question 15
Additional costs.
From an approximate calculation made by the EC services, it would appear that such
additional costs would not be disproportionate compared to the expected benefits.  In any event, the
financial aspects and implications of the EC's proposal should not overshadow or prime over the most
important systemic reason which are behind it.
Questions 16-17
The principles of the DSU and the evolution of the dispute settlement system since the
Uruguay Round.
A system of permanent panelists would not deviate from the basic principles established by
the DSU.  The modification proposed by the EC aims at better enabling compliance with importantTN/DS/W/7
Page 5
principles embodied in the DSU, i.e. the need for a consistent and predictable solution of trade
disputes and an efficient and timely system for settling these disputes.
Question 18
Potential difficulties  to find permanent panelists on a full-time basis.
It could be that academic institutions and other professional bodies would be reluctant to
agree with secondment of staffs for a long period to the WTO.  On the other hand, such a difficulty
would not apply to retired government officials, w hose experience could make a valuable contribution
to the permanent panel body.  All in all, the EC considers that it would be possible to find 15 to
24 highly qualified personalities willing to take up the job.
As far as assignment to the roster of permanent panelists of government officials, see
questions 19 and 21.
Question 19 and 21
Nationality of permanent panelists and conflict of interests.
In the EC's view, nationality could only cause a problem of conflict of interests in the case of
government officials, due to the fact that, after ha ving served as permanent panelist in the WTO, the
official will have to be reintegrated in his/her national administration.  Accordingly, in the system
proposed by the EC, secondment of government officials is not, in principle, envisaged.
In the EC's view, as a general rule, the fact that one selected panelist is national of one of the
Members parties or third parties to a dispute would not constitute, a priori,  a situation of conflict of
interest.  Of course, each panelist will have the responsibility to declare himself/herself in conflict of
interests in relation with a specific dispute as appropriate, for any reason, including those related to
his/her nationality.
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Questions 22-25
The EC entirely agrees that the key objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure
withdrawal of WTO inconsistent measures.  The EC  proposals on "compensation" in no way seek to
reduce the incentive to comply, rather their aim is to make compensation a more realistic alternative
to suspension of concessions when compliance has not proved feasible.  Indeed, WTO practice has
shown that suspension of concessions, while creating disruption in international trade, is not alwaysan efficient means to induce prompt compliance.
Under the EC's proposal, any compensation agr eement would remain voluntary, temporary
and based on an agreement between complaining and defending party.
Indeed, the initiative to request compensation would always be with the complainant.  If such
a request is made, the requirement to present a compensation offer would introduce an important
discipline for the defendant, which will have to go through the domestic procedures to offer
compensation, thereby making clear that non-compliance is not a cost-free option.  This is likely to be
of particular importance to induce compliance in those cases in which the complainant has limited
retaliation power or is, for political and/or economic reasons, reluctant to suspend concessions.TN/DS/W/7
Page 6
An additional possibility to "encourage" the acceptance of a compensation package, as noted
in the EC's proposal, could be to require that, if the defending party decides to present a compensation
package, its value should be higher than the level of nullification and impairment, so as to allow the
complaining party to choose within that package up to the level of nullification and impairment.  The
EC is open to reflect on other means to enco urage the non-complying party to offer meaningful
compensation.
The EC also recognises that an inconsistent measure may adversely affect trade interests of
countries not party to the dispute.  However, the EC does not agree that making trade compensation a
more realistic alternative would go against the premise that the DSU serves to preserve the rights and
obligations of all the Members.  In particular, the EC notes that trade compensation, while based on a
bilateral agreement, will have to be applied erga omnes  on a MFN basis, whereas suspension of
concessions is a measure only available to the parties of the dispute.  Thus, the EC proposal is further
expected to induce compliance with DSB recommendations.
TRANSPARENCY
Questions 26-27
The EC is in principle of the view that all Member countries, independently on whether they
are party to the dispute or not, should have right of attendance during panel/AB proceedings.  There
may be, however, a need to develop special rules to deal with business confidential information in
specific cases.
Under the EC's proposal, the general public woul d as a general rule be allowed to attend
proceedings of the panel or the Appellate Body, but not to make oral interventions during such
proceedings.  At the same time, no restrictions on reporting of proceedings that are open to the public
should be imposed.
REGULATION OF AMICUS CURIAE  SUBMISSIONS
Questions 28-39
Amicus curiae briefs are already permitted
The EC does not discuss in its proposal the issue of whether amicus curiae should or should
not be allowed.  The question has already been largely resolved by the Appellate Body and by now a
developing practice allows the submission of amicus curiae  briefs on a case by case basis: the EC's
proposal simply aims at setting clear rules for such practice.
Procedures for dealing with amicus briefs
The EC maintains that the acceptance of amicus curiae  submissions should not slow down the
proceedings.  This can be achieved by retaining the present two-stage approach, i.e. an application for
leave and an effective submission.  In the EC's  view, the panel and/or the AB will have the
responsibility to decide whether amicus curiae  submissions are directly relevant for the factual and
legal issues under consideration by the panel, or the legal issues raised in the appeal.  It will also be
the panel/AB that would have to evaluate all information on any relationship between the entity
(Member or natural or legal person) submitting the brief and any party or third party to the dispute.  In
the EC's view, the adjudicating body would have to provide the reasons for which it decides to admit
or dismiss amicus briefs.  On the other hand, the AB/panel would be free to address as they see fit
arguments included in amicus briefs  that have been admitted.TN/DS/W/7
Page 7
In the EC's view, all parties should be given the opportunity to present their views on these
matters and to respond to the arguments emanating from amicus curiae briefs accepted by the panel
and/or the AB.  The EC consider that this coul d be resolved in a manner that would not put an
excessive burden on the parties, nor that it would impose on them substantive new additional
obligations not presently provided by the DSU.
Of course, the panel/AB would not address new claims raised in the amicus briefs : the terms
of the dispute will continue to be set by the request of the establishment of the panel.  On the other
hand, in the EC's view, the panel/AB could be free to address new arguments made in amicus briefs,
even if such arguments were not otherwise made by the parties to the dispute.
Amicus briefs and developing countries
The EC's proposal expressly stresses that the acceptance of amicus briefs  should not create
substantial additional burdens for the developing Members.  While it is true that some entities with the
capacities to make amicus curiae submissions may at present exist more in developed countries than
in developing ones, this does not mean that such entities will always take positions in favour of theinterests of developed countries.  Indeed, recent experience shows the opposite: on various issues
(e.g.: access to medicines), non-governmental organisations in developed countries have frequently
taken positions radically different from those adopted by their governments.
Amicus briefs and third party rights
There is a clear qualitative difference between the wide-ranging rights of a Member third
party to a dispute (participation in the proceedings, oral statements, access to parties' submissions),
which the EC would like to see substantially enhanced, and the minimal right for a Member or natural
or legal person to file an amicus brief .  In particular, the EC would like to point out that the entity
submitting the briefs would not have any standing before the panel/AB, nor any rights comparable to
those accruing to third parties.  They simply have the possibility to submit a brief, which the panel/AB
could address in the proceedings and in the report, if they consider this appropriate.TN/DS/W/7
Page 8
ANNEX 1
case complainant respondent consultation panel report/
agreement
request request establishment panelist
1996
WT/DS 11 United States Japan 07/07/1995 14/09/1995 14/09/1995 30/10/1995 11/07/1996
WT/DS 2 Venezuela United States 23/01/1995 25/03/1995 10/04/1995 28/04/1995 29/06/1996
WT/DS 4 Brazil United States 10/04/1995 19/05/1995 31/05/1995 31/05/1995 29/06/1996WT/DS 24 Costa Rica United States 22/12/1995 22/02/1996 05/03/1996 04/04/1996 08/11/1996
WT/DS 22 Philippines Brazil 27/11/1995 05/02/1996 05/03/1996 16/04/1996 14/10/1996
WT/DS 7 Canada EC 19/05/1995 07/07/1995 19/07/1995 06/09/1995 05/08/1996WT/DS 12 Peru EC 18/07/1995 18/09/1995 11/10/1995 12/10/1995 05/08/1996WT/DS 14 Chile EC 24/07/1995 25/09/1995 13/09/1995 12/10/1995 05/08/1996WT/DS 8 EC Japan 21/06/1995 14/09/1995 14/09/1995 30/10/1995 11/07/1996
WT/DS 10 Canada Japan 07/07/1995 14/09/1995 27/09/1995 30/10/1995 11/07/1996
1997
WT/DS 31 United States Canada 11/03/1996 24/05/1996 19/06/1996 25/07/1996 14/03/1997
WT/DS 27 United States EC 05/02/1996 11/04/1996 08/05/1996 29/05/1996 22/05/1997WT/DS 43 United States Turkey 12/06/1996 09/01/1997 / / 14/07/1997
WT/DS 26 United States EC 26/01/1996 25/04/1996 20/05/1996 02/07/1996 18/08/1997
WT/DS 50 United States India 02/07/1996 07/11/1996 20/11/1996 05/02/1997 05/09/1997WT/DS 56 United States Argentina 04/10/1996 09/01/1997 25/02/1997 04/04/1997 25/11/1997
WT/DS 33 India United States 30/12/1994 14/03/1996 17/04/1996 24/06/1996 06/01/1997
WT/DS 48 Canada EC 28/06/1996 27/09/1996 16/10/1996 04/11/1996 18/08/1997
1998
WT/DS 62 United States EC 08/11/1996 11/02/1997 25/02/1997 18/04/1997 05/02/1998
WT/DS 67 United States EC 14/02/1997 07/03/1997 07/03/1997 18/04/1997 05/02/1998WT/DS 68 United States EC 14/02/1997 07/03/1997 07/03/1997 18/04/1997 05/02/1998
WT/DS 44 United States Japan 13/06/1996 20/09/1996 16/10/1996 17/12/1996 20/03/1998
WT/DS 59 United States Indonesia 08/10/1996 12/06/1997 12/06/1997 29/07/1997 02/07/1998WT/DS 84 United States Korea 23/05/1997 10/09/1997 16/10/1997 05/12/1997 17/09/1998WT/DS 76 United States Japan 07/04/1997 03/10/1997 18/11/1997 18/12/1997 27/10/1998TN/DS/W/7
Page 9
case complainant respondent consultation panel report/
agreement
request request establishment panelist
WT/DS 58 India United States 08/10/1996 25/02/1997 10/04/1997 15/04/1997 15/05/1998
WT/DS 69 Brazil EC 24/02/1997 12/06/1997 30/07/1997 11/08/1997 12/03/1998
WT/DS 18 Canada Australia 05/10/1995 07/03/1997 10/04/1997 28/05/1997 12/06/1998WT/DS 54 EC Indonesia 03/10/1996 12/05/1997 12/06/1997 29/07/1997 02/07/1998WT/DS 79 EC India 28/04/1997 09/09/1997 16/10/1997 27/11/1997 24/08/1998WT/DS 75 EC Korea 02/04/1997 10/09/1997 16/10/1997 05/12/1997 17/09/1998
WT/DS 55 Japan Indonesia 04/10/1996 17/04/1997 12/06/1997 29/07/1997 02/07/1998
WT/DS 64 Japan Indonesia 29/11/1996 17/04/1997 17/04/1997 29/07/1997 02/07/1998WT/DS 60 Mexico Guatemala 15/10/1996 04/02/1997 25/02/1997 01/05/1997 19/06/1998
1999
WT/DS 90 United States India 16/07/1997 03/10/1997 18/11/1997 20/02/1998 06/04/1999WT/DS 103 United States Canada 08/10/1997 02/02/1998 25/03/1998 12/08/1998 17/05/1999
WT/DS 126 United States Australia 04/05/1998 11/06/1998 22/06/1998 27/10/1998 25/05/1999
WT/DS 108 EC United States 18/11/1997 01/07/1998 22/09/1998 09/11/1998 08/10/1999
WT/DS 152 EC United States 25/11/1998 26/01/1999 02/03/1999 31/03/1999 22/12/1999WT/DS 138 EC United States 12/06/1998 14/01/1999 17/02/1999 16/03/1999 23/12/1999WT/DS 99 Korea United States 14/08/1997 06/11/1997 16/01/1998 19/03/1998 29/01/1999
WT/DS 70 Brazil Canada 10/03/1997 10/07/1998 23/07/1998 22/10/1998 14/04/1999
WT/DS 46 Canada Brazil 18/06/1996 03/10/1996 23/07/1998 22/10/1998 14/04/1999WT/DS 87 EC Chile 04/06/1997 03/10/1997 18/11/1997 01/07/1998 15/06/1999WT/DS 110 EC Chile 15/12/1997 09/03/1998 09/03/1998 01/07/1998 15/06/1999WT/DS 98 EC Korea 12/08/1997 09/01/1998 22/07/1998 20/08/1998 21/06/1999
WT/DS 121 EC Argentina 03/04/1998 10/06/1998 23/07/1998 15/09/1998 25/06/1999
WT/DS 34 India Turkey 21/03/1996 02/02/1998 13/03/1998 11/06/1998 31/05/1999WT/DS 113 New Zealand Canada 29/12/1997 12/03/1998 12/03/1998 12/08/1998 17/05/1999WT/DS 72 New Zealand EC 24/03/1997 06/11/1997 18/11/1997 13/01/1998 24/11/1999
2000
WT/DS 132 United States Mexico 08/05/1998 08/10/1998 25/11/1998 13/01/1999 28/01/2000
WT/DS 163 United States Korea 16/02/1999 11/05/1999 16/06/1999 30/08/1999 01/05/2000
WT/DS 170 United States Canada 06/05/1999 15/07/1999 22/09/1999 22/10/1999 05/05/2000WT/DS 161 United States Korea 01/02/1999 15/04/1999 25/05/1999 04/08/1999 31/07/2000
WT/DS 178 Australia United States 23/07/1999 14/10/1999 14/10/1999 21/03/2000 21/12/2000
WT/DS 136 EC United States 04/06/1998 11/11/1998 01/02/1999 01/04/1999 31/03/2000
WT/DS 160 EC United States 26/01/1999 15/04/1999 26/05/1999 06/08/1999 15/06/2000TN/DS/W/7
Page 10
case complainant respondent consultation panel report/
agreement
request request establishment panelist
WT/DS 165 EC United States 04/03/1999 11/05/1999 16/06/1999 08/10/1999 17/07/2000
WT/DS 166 EC United States 17/03/1999 03/06/1999 26/07/1999 11/10/1999 31/07/2000
WT/DS 162 Japan United States 10/02/1999 03/06/1999 26/07/1999 11/08/1999 29/05/2000WT/DS 177 New Zealand United States 16/07/1999 14/10/1999 19/11/1999 21/03/2000 21/12/2000WT/DS 179 Korea United States 30/07/1999 14/10/1999 19/11/1999 24/03/2000 22/12/2000
WT/DS 169 Australia Korea 13/04/1999 12/07/1999 12/07/1999 04/08/1999 31/07/2000
WT/DS 190 Brazil Argentina 29/06/1999 11/02/2000 / / 27/06/2000
WT/DS 135 Canada EC 28/05/1998 08/10/1998 25/11/1998 29/03/1999 18/09/2000
WT/DS 142 EC Canada 17/08/1998 14/01/1999 14/01/1999 15/03/1999 11/02/2000WT/DS 114 EC Canada 19/12/1997 11/11/1998 01/02/1999 29/03/1999 17/03/2000WT/DS 155 EC Argentina 23/12/1998 31/05/1999 26/07/1999 31/01/2000 19/12/2000WT/DS 141 India EC 03/08/1998 07/09/1998 27/10/1999 12/01/2000 30/10/2000
WT/DS 139 Japan Canada 03/07/1998 12/11/1998 01/02/1999 15/03/1999 11/02/2000
WT/DS 156 Mexico Guatemala 05/01/1999 26/07/1999 22/09/1999 12/10/1999 24/10/2000
WT/DS 122 Poland Thailand 06/04/1998 13/10/1999 19/11/1999 20/12/1999 28/09/2000
2001
WT/DS 210 United States Belgium 12/10/2000 01/03/2001 12/03/2001 07/06/2001 18/12/2001
WT/DS 199 United States Brazil 30/05/2000 08/01/2000 / / 05/07/2001
WT/DS 175 United States India 02/06/1999 15/05/2000 27/07/2000 24/11/2000 21/12/2001
WT/DS 192 Pakistan United States 24/12/1998 03/04/2000 19/06/2000 30/08/2000 31/05/2001
WT/DS 194 Canada United States 19/05/2000 24/07/2000 11/09/2000 23/10/2000 29/06/2001WT/DS 176 EC United States 07/07/1999 30/06/2000 26/09/2000 26/10/2000 06/08/2001WT/DS 202 Korea United States 15/06/2000 14/09/2000 23/10/2000 22/01/2001 29/10/2001WT/DS 184 Japan United States 18/11/1999 11/02/2000 20/03/2000 24/05/2000 28/02/2001
WT/DS 189 EC Argentina 26/01/2000 07/11/2000 17/11/2000 12/01/2001 28/09/2001
WT/DS 193 EC Chile 19/04/2000 06/11/2000 / / 23/03/2001
WT/DS 146 EC India 12/10/1998 12/10/2000 12/10/2000 24/11/2000 21/12/2001TN/DS/W/7
Page 11
Time for the selection of the panelists (in days)
1996
________
WT/DS 11 United States Japan            46
WT/DS 2 Venezuela United States            18
WT/DS 4 Brazil United States                 1 ________
WT/DS 24 Costa Rica United States            30
WT/DS 22 Philippines Brazil            42
WT/DS 7 Canada EC            49
WT/DS 12 Peru EC             1
WT/DS 14 Chile EC            29
WT/DS 8 EC Japan            46 AVERAGE:
WT/DS 10 Canada Japan            33 30
1997
WT/DS 31 United States Canada            36
WT/DS 27 United States EC            21
WT/DS 43 United States Turkey no panelist
WT/DS 26 United States EC            43
WT/DS 50 United States India            77 ________
WT/DS 56 United States Argentina            38
________
WT/DS 33 India United States            68
AVERAGE:
WT/DS 48 Canada EC            19 43
1998
WT/DS 62 United States EC            52
WT/DS 67 United States EC            42
WT/DS 68 United States EC            42
WT/DS 44 United States Japan            62
WT/DS 59 United States Indonesia            47
WT/DS 84 United States Korea            50 ________
WT/DS 76 United States Japan            30
________
WT/DS 58 India United States             5TN/DS/W/7
Page 12
Time for the selection of the panelists (in days)
WT/DS 69 Brazil EC            12
WT/DS 18 Canada Australia            48
WT/DS 54 EC Indonesia            47
WT/DS 79 EC India            42
WT/DS 75 EC Korea            50
WT/DS 55 Japan Indonesia            47
WT/DS 64 Japan Indonesia          103 AVERAGE:
WT/DS 60 Mexico Guatemala            65 46.5
1999
WT/DS 90 United States India            94
WT/DS 103 United States Canada          140 _________
WT/DS 126 United States Australia          127
WT/DS 108 EC United States            48
WT/DS 152 EC United States            29
WT/DS 138 EC United States            27 _________
WT/DS 99 Korea United States            62
WT/DS 70 Brazil Canada            91
WT/DS 46 Canada Brazil            91
WT/DS 87 EC Chile          225
WT/DS 110 EC Chile          114
WT/DS 98 EC Korea            29
WT/DS 121 EC Argentina            54
WT/DS 34 India Turkey            90
WT/DS 113 New Zealand Canada          153 AVERAGE:
WT/DS 72 New Zealand EC            56 89
2000
WT/DS 132 United States Mexico            49
WT/DS 163 United States Korea            75
WT/DS 170 United States Canada            30 _________
WT/DS 161 United States Korea            71
WT/DS 178 Australia United States          159
WT/DS 136 EC United States            59
WT/DS 160 EC United States            72
WT/DS 165 EC United States          114
WT/DS 166 EC United States            77
WT/DS 162 Japan United States            16
WT/DS 177 New Zealand United States          123 _________
WT/DS 179 Korea United States          126TN/DS/W/7
Page 13
Time for the selection of the panelists (in days)
WT/DS 169 Australia Korea            23
WT/DS 190 Brazil Argentina no panelist
WT/DS 135 Canada EC          124
WT/DS 142 EC Canada            60
WT/DS 114 EC Canada            56
WT/DS 155 EC Argentina          189
WT/DS 141 India EC            77
WT/DS 139 Japan Canada            42
WT/DS 156 Mexico Guatemala            20 AVERAGE:
WT/DS 122 Poland Thailand            31 76
2001
WT/DS 210 United States Belgium            87
WT/DS 199 United States Brazil no panelist _________
WT/DS 175 United States India          120
WT/DS 192 Pakistan United States            72
WT/DS 194 Canada United States            42
WT/DS 176 EC United States            30
WT/DS 202 Korea United States            91 _________
WT/DS 184 Japan United States            65
WT/DS 189 EC Argentina            56
WT/DS 193 EC Chile no panelist AVERAGE:
WT/DS 146 EC India            43 67TN/DS/W/7
Page 14
ANNEX 2
Panel composition 2000-2002 (April)
DS Number
(and document number)DSU Article Date of
composition
DS238/3 - 16.04.02
DS236/3 8.7 08.02.02
21.5 Panel DS103/26, DS113/26 - 17.01.01
DS213/4 8.7 15.11.01
DS212/5 8.7 07.11.01
DS217/6, DS234/14 8.7 05.11.01
DS206/3 8.7 31.10.01
DS221/5 - 31.10.01
DS231/7 8.7 25.09.01
DS219/3 - 11.09.01
DS211/3 - 20.07.01
DS210/3 8.7 08.06.01
DS207/3 8.7 23.05.01
DS222/3 8.7 17.05.01
21.5 Panel DS103/19, DS113/19 - 12.04.01
21.5 Panel DS46/27 - 22.02.01
DS202/5 8.7 22.01.01
DS189/4 - 16.01.01
21.5 Panel DS108/19 - 05.01.01
DS146/5, DS175/5 8.7 30.11.00
21.5 Panel DS132/7 - 16.11.00
21.5 Panel DS58/18 - 08.11.00
DS176/3 8.7 27.10.00
DS194/3 - 27.10.00
DS192/2 - 04.09.00
DS184/3 8.7 24.05.00
21.5 Panel DS99/9 - 11.05.00
DS179/3 - 24.03.00
DS177/5, DS178.6 - 23.03.00
DS155/3 - 02.02.00
DS141/4 8.7 24.01.00
Summary (excluding 21.5 panels)
Of 24 panels established in the period 2000 to April 2002, 14 were composed by the Director-General
under Article 8.7 of the DSU (58%).
The trend is on the increase.  Of the 9 panels in 2000, only 4 were composed by the Director-General
(44%).  Of the 15 established since then, 10 were composed by the Director-General (75%).
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