RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/AG/R/2
10 July 2002
(02-3839)
Committee on Agriculture
Special Session
SUMMARY REPORT ON THE TWELFTH MEETING
OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE SPECIAL SESSION
HELD ON 20 JUNE 2002
Note by the Secretariat1
1. As agreed by the Trade Negotiations Committee (TN/C/M/1) the Special Session of the
Committee on Agriculture, which was established by the General Council (WT/GC/M/53), is
pursuing negotiations under paragraphs 13, 14 and other relevant provisions of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration and held its twelfth meeting on 20 June 2002.  Mr Stuart Harbinson of Hong Kong, China
chaired the meeting.
2. The agenda as contained in WTO/AIR/1831 was adopted with the modification in item A(i)
of the term "including export restraints" to "including export restrictions" to reflect the exact wording
used in the programme adopted by the Special Session at its meeting on 24 March 2002 (TN/AG/1).
ITEM A (i):  REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ON THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING
TECHNICAL ELABORATION OF DETAILED POSSIBLE MODALITIES , INCLUDING RULES -RELATED
ELEMENTS IN THE AREA OF EXPORT COMPETITION (INCLUDING EXPORT RESTRICTIONS )
3. The Chairman read out a summary report of the main features of the discussions concerning
export competition which is attached in Annex 1.
ITEM A (ii):  S TATEMENTS BY MEMBERS
4. A number of Members made statements concerning the Chairman's report.  Australia,
supported by Canada, Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, Chile , Bolivia and Argentina, stated that the section
on export subsidies was unbalanced because it failed to reflect the support given to the proposals bythe Cairns Group and others that export subsidies should be eliminated as quickly as possible.  They
felt that these proposals should have been mentioned at the beginning of the section dealing with
export subsidies.  Australia also pointed out that the Cairns Group proposal called for an immediate
reduction of 50 per cent in export subsidies from the first day of implementation as part of a plan to
phase them out over three years for developed countries rather than a reduction in the first year of50 per cent and elimination over three years as was suggested by the report.  The Philippines added
that, while export competition issues should be treated in a comprehensive manner, export subsidies
were the most trade-distorting form of support and, therefore, should be eliminated as soon as
possible.
5. Australia and Canada also stated that the language in the section of the report that dealt with
the discussion on exporting state trading enterprises sh ould be more neutral.  Australia said that the
discussion had been about whether  the activities of state trading enterprises resulted in the distortion
of competitive conditions in international markets.  Canada stated that it would have been more
                                                     
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice
to the positions of Members or to their rights or obligations under the WTO.TN/AG/R/2
Page 2
accurate to suggest that the discussion had been about the alleged  trade-distorting activities of these
enterprises.  In response, Bulgaria pointed out that the debate had been about trade distortion and
exporting state trading enterprises, and therefore, the statements in this regard by Australia and
Canada were incorrect.
6. Canada pointed out that, in addition to the definitions of export credits mentioned in the
report, it too had suggested a definition, which it stated was "officially supported export credit is anyexport credit transaction in which government undertakes some or all of the credit risk or the cost of
providing credits and the disciplines would apply to all officially supported export credit activities
carried out by and/or extended to all actors with no exceptions".
7. Colombia noted, that under the question of minimum interest rates for export credits, it had
proposed that commercial interest rates or the opportunity cost of capital should be the bench mark for
export credit programmes.
8. The representative of India, supported by Sri Lanka, thanked the Chairman for providing a
useful summary of the discussions on export co mpetition.  However, these delegations emphasized
that special and differential treatment for developing countries had not received enough prominence in
the report, especially given the large number of statements made which included special and
differential treatment and the requirement in the Doha Ministerial Declaration that it be an integral
part of all elements of the negotiations.  They noted in particular that in the section on initial
comments a clear reference was missing that many developing countries had underlined the need for
special and differential treatment in the negotiations.  Norway and Switzerland agreed that the Doha
Ministerial Declaration required special and differential treatment to be an integral part of the
negotiations and underlined that they had also stressed that the Declaration required non-trade
concerns to be taken into account in the negotiations.  Mauritius noted that paragraph 13 of the DohaMinisterial Declaration referred to both special and differential treatment for developing countries and
to non-trade concerns.  The Chairman pointed out that special and differential treatment was referred
to in many places in his report in operational terms although not always using those specific words.
9. The delegation of Cuba stated a number of times that it understood the need to summarise
discussions in a summary report, that this meant all nuances and statements could not be recorded,and at the same time the report should not refer to statements that had not been made.  Cuba also
pointed out that in the section on export restraints only one participant had suggested that an
exemption should be made to a general prohibition on export restrictions in cases of agreed UN
sanctions or under Article XX of GATT.
 2  Furthermore, this statement had been made before, and not
in response to, Cuba's specific proposal that trade embargoes should be prohibited, particularlyembargoes against net food-importing developing countries.  In addition, Cuba noted that it had also
made a suggestion that export credits should not be used to apply political pressure to net food-
importing developing countries, especially because export credits for imports of food products
affected food security.
10. In thanking the Chairman for producing a well balanced summary of the discussions on
export competition, Japan pointed out that it had proposed disciplines on domestic support measures
that had the effect of subsidising exports.  It had proposed that such subsidies should be reducedaccording to the formula for export subsidy reduct ions to be worked out in the negotiations.
Furthermore, the reductions should start from 64 per cent of the budgetary outlay and 79 per cent of
the quantities benefiting in the base period 1986 to 1990 in order to take account of the absence of
such disciplines under export competition in the Uruguay Round.
                                                     
2 The participant concerned has since indicated that it had in fact referred to Article XX of GATT and
not Article XXI as indicated in the Chairman's report.TN/AG/R/2
Page 3
11. The United States also thanked the Chairman for his report which it found very useful.  In the
section on food aid it noted that it had suggested that the WTO Secretariat should maintain its contacts
not only with the WFP but also with the other rele vant international organizations involved in food
aid activities.
12. Brazil and Australia, supported by India, Bolivia and Canada, suggested that the Chairman
should consider revising his report based on the statements made by Members.  Malaysia, Indonesia,Norway, Switzerland, Mauritius, St Lucia, Bulgar ia, the European Communities, Egypt, Japan, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Philippines, Hungary and Peru stated that the report should remain
unchanged and some of these Members noted that the specific points made by delegations would be
fully reflected in the Secretariat summary report of the formal Special Session.  Australia stated in
response that the opposition from certain delegations to changing the report showed why it did not
feel that the report was balanced.
13. Argentina indicated that it wanted to be reco gnised as the participant that had, according to
the fourth paragraph of the Chairman's report (see Annex 1), stated that export taxes were not part of
the mandate for negotiations.  It pointed out that  the Doha Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1) did not
contain any reference to export taxes in either paragraph 13 or 14 and that they were not included in
the programme adopted by the Special Session on 26 March (TN/AG/1).  In addition, it stated that
export taxes were not export subsidies and neither were they export restrictions because they were notmentioned in Part VI of the Agreement on Agri culture and such a distinction was confirmed by
Article XI of GATT.  For these reasons, nothing in the documentation for the Special Session or in
WTO documents produced in the past could be taken as consent by Argentina that export taxes were
part of the mandate arising from the Doha Ministerial Declaration nor could they be considered to be
export subsidies, prohibitions or restrictions.
14. Malaysia and Indonesia agreed with Argentina and went on to argue that export restrictions
should not be included in the agenda either because there was no direct reference to them in the Doha
Ministerial Declaration.  Colombia pointed out that some developing countries had stated during the
informal Special Session that export restrictions and taxes could be justified not only on the grounds
of food security but also that other commercial and marketing policy objectives could justify suchrestrictions.  Switzerland, however, noted that export restrictions and taxes were linked to food
security, an important non-trade concern, and did distort international trade, and therefore, they were
an integral part of the mandate for negotiations agreed at the Doha Ministerial Conference.
15. Mexico stated that it shared the concerns raised by the Chairman in his concluding comments
in the report.  As had been stated in Mexico 's proposal (G/AG/NG/W/138), progress on market access
would be difficult if other countries were able to continue to distort trade through export competition
measures.  However, despite intensive work over four days of negotiations at both the inter-sessional
informal consultations and the informal Special Session many questions remained unanswered.
Mexico had not expected a final result from the four days of technical discussions but it noted that a
considerable amount of work was still needed in order to meet the deadlines set out in the Doha
Ministerial Declaration.
ITEM B:  O THER BUSINESS
16. The Chairman noted that the next informal Special Session, which is to be held on
2-3 September and is to be followed by a formal Special Session on 4 September, will take up the
technical elaboration of detailed possible modalities, including rules-related elements, in the area of
market access.  He also noted that under the programme informal and formal Special Sessions on
domestic support were scheduled in the week of 23 September.  It was agreed that, in order to preparefor these meetings, inter-sessional informal consultations on market access would be held on
29-30 July and on domestic support on 5-6 September.  It was also agreed that, in order to facilitateTN/AG/R/2
Page 4
the participation of non-resident and smaller delegations,  informal summary notes would be prepared
and made available on each of these informal inter-sessional consultations.
ITEM C:  C HAIRMAN 'S REPORT TO THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE
17. The Chairman outlined his report to the Trade Negotiations Committee (a copy of TN/AG/2
is attached in Annex 2).TN/AG/R/2
Page 5
Oral Report by the Chairman of the Sp ecial Session, Committee on Agriculture
Negotiations on Export Competition
20 June 2002
Introduction
The Special Session on 26 March agreed that the Chairman would report to the formal Special
Sessions on the work undertaken at the Informal Special Sessions and at other inter-sessional informal
consultations that he might hold (TN/AG/1).  This is my first report under the programme agreed to
by participants at the Special Session of 26 March.
This report is not an attempt to draw conclusions from the work undertaken by participants since
26 March.  Nor is it meant to suggest a direction for future work.  It represents my understanding of
major points made by participants during our work on the subject of Export Competition.
Meetings Held
Since the 26 March Special Session I held consultations with different groups of Members on the
organisation of our meetings.  As a result of those consultations we agreed to hold inter-sessional
informal consultations on 3 and 4 June.  To help our discussions I circulated a tabulated annotated
agenda on 2 May which suggested a structure fo r our work on Export Competition (Job No 3653).
That annotated agenda was then used at the inter-sessional informal consultations.  Since it proved tobe a useful tool for organising our work it was used again for the informal Special Session held on
17-18 June.  As stated on its covering page the annotated agenda was not meant to restrict participants
in their presentations or to prevent anyone from raising additional issues related to Export
Competition.  Indeed, during the discussions a number of participants raised additional and related
issues at both the informal Special Session and the inter-sessional informal consultations and, ofcourse, the relevant parts of the Doha Ministerial Declaration are the only authoritative guide for our
work.
Initial Comments on Export Competition
One participant, with some support, stated that export taxes were not part of the mandate for
negotiations.  It pointed out that the Doha Ministerial Declaration did not contain any reference to
export taxes in either paragraph 13 or 14 and that they were not included in the programme adopted
by the Special Session on 26 March.  Export taxes were not export subsidies, neither were they export
prohibitions or restrictions, as they are not mentioned in Part VI of the Agreement on Agriculture and
such a distinction is confirmed by Article XI of GATT.  Therefore, it had never consented to export
taxes being part of the negotiations resulting from the Ministerial Declaration.
Other participants accepted that export taxes were not export subsidies.  However they also noted that
the Ministerial Declaration referred to Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture and to the general
reform process for agricultural trade.  Therefore, export taxes and restrictions were part of the
negotiating mandate.  Furthermore, export restrictions and taxes affected importing countries' foodsecurity and what they might be prepared to consider under other areas of the agriculture negotiations
would be influenced by the development of disciplines or commitments on export restrictions and
taxes.  In addition, it was pointed out that Article XI of GATT referred to export taxes as a form of
non-prohibited export restriction.
Two general statements were made concerning the negative effects of export subsidies on other
countries.  These effects were not caused by direct export subsidies alone but were also caused by
other forms of government support for exports such as that provided through export credits.TN/AG/R/2
Page 6
There were some general comments concerning the need to take non-trade concerns into account in
the negotiations, as required by the paragraph 13 of the Ministerial Declaration.  In this regard, it was
stated that disciplines and commitments in the ar ea of export competition should recognise the need
for flexibility to enable participants to address their specific non-trade concerns.  It was also noted that
food security was a particularly important concern for many countries, especially least-developed and
net food-importing developing countries.  In this view, any new commitments or disciplines wouldhave to be developed taking into account their impact on food security.
Export Subsidies
Export Subsidies – General
A number of participants stated that the extent to which they were prepared to reduce export subsidies
would depend on the rules or commitments affectin g other types of supports for exports, such as
export credits, food aid and support that could be provided through exporting state trading enterprises.
In addition some of these countries stated that so me types of domestic support given to producers who
exported a significant amount of their production could have a similar effect to export subsidies.
These subsidies would have to be carefully addressed under Domestic Support to ensure they did not
undermine export subsidy commitments.
A number of participants noted that only a relatively small number of Members had the right to use
export subsidies.  On the other hand, lack of resources and the commitments of the Uruguay Round
meant most developing countries were unable to use export subsidies.  In addition some developing
countries stated that there was some inconsistency between the export subsidy rules in the Agreement
on Agriculture and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  Under Article 27 of
the SCM Agreement export subsidies were not prohib ited for the countries listed in Annex 7 of that
Agreement.  Therefore, some developing country participants proposed that a similar measure, or
some other flexibility, should be introduced into the Agreement on Agriculture, at least for the time
that other countries had the right to use export subsidies.  However, some other developing countriesopposed this.  They stated that, regardless of the classification of the user, export subsidies damaged
other countries, especially other developing countries.
Policy Coverage
For various reasons most participants appeared to favour maintaining the policy coverage set out inArticle 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture with exemptions for developing countries for the
transport and marketing subsidies set out in Article 9.1(d) and (e).  However, for some participants
this depended on the treatment of other types of export supports such as export credits, insurance and
guarantee schemes and support that could be given by exporting state trading enterprises.  One
delegation also sought a clarification of Article 9.1(d) as it was felt that some forms of export
promotion that could be permitted under this provision would be more trade distorting than other
kinds which would be counted against a Memb er's commitments.  Some developing country
participants also suggested that the flexibility to gi ve subsidies listed in Article 9.1(d) and (e) could be
extended to cover the other sections of Article 9.1.
Product specificity and Base level
Those participants that spoke on the issues of product specificity and the base levels for commitmentsstated that they should be as set out in the final bound levels as specified in Members' Schedules.
However, it was pointed out that the base levels may need to be adjusted depending on the results of
the negotiations on other forms of export support.  It was also stated that for some countries,
particularly countries with economies in transition, the existing base levels might not be
representative.
Formula/targets for further commitments, Implem entation Period and Staging of further commitments
There were specific proposals for formulae for reduction.  One such proposal was a 50 per cent
reduction from final bound levels as specified in Schedules for the first year of implementationTN/AG/R/2
Page 7
followed by phasing out over three years for developed countries and six years for developing
countries in equal instalments.  Another proposal was the elimination of export subsidies over 5 years
in equal annual instalments with special and differential treatment for developing countries.
Another participant proposed that, in case there was no phasing out of export subsidies, then Members
should have the option of modulating reduction commitments.  That is, in return for a higher averagereduction a Member should be able to reduce export subsidies by lesser amounts on some products.  A
number of other participants disagreed with this proposal.  They noted that such flexibility could
permit countries to reduce export subsidies on sensitive products by a lesser amount than on other
products effectively slowing down reform in the sectors where it was most needed.  Another
suggestion concerned permitting export subsidies in cases where the exporting and importing
Members agreed and notified the WTO.
Another proposal concerned introducing commitments on the unit value of export subsidies.  These
commitments would be in addition to the existing commitments on the total budgetary outlay and the
total volume that could be exported with export subsidies.
A number of delegations requested those participants that did not agree to the elimination of export
subsidies to make a specific proposal.  However, those other participants declined to do so, although
one of them stated that  the size of the reductions it was prepared to accept would depend on the rules
or commitments agreed to for other forms of export support.
Export Credit, Insurance and Guarantees
Export credit, insurance and guarantees - General
Two general approaches were considered concerning disciplines on supported export credit, insurance
or guarantee schemes;
− the first was to establish maximum limits that would be reduced or eliminated over the
implementation period; and
− the second was to develop rules with which Members would have to comply.
The second approach did raise the issue of whether or not there should be a transition period for
Members to bring their credit, insurance and guarantee schemes into line with the rules.  However, a
number of participants stated that the alternative of scheduled reduction commitments would require
defining base periods, calculating subsidy equivale nts, agreeing reductions in budgetary outlays and
quantity commitments and so on.  Not only was this complicated and difficult to monitor it would also
create a small group of countries that would have the right to use these instruments while others
would be unable to do so.
It was also stated that the development of disciplines on export credits, insurance and guarantee
schemes was part of implementation of the Urug uay Round Agreement on Agriculture.  It was also
noted that such schemes were already subject to the disciplines of Article 10.1 of the Agreement.  Tosome Members, this made the concept of establishing an additional set of reduction commitments
difficult to accept as it would effectively condone circumvention of existing commitments.
On special and differential treatment for developing countries a number of developing countries
pointed out that such treatment should address the concerns of both importing and exportingdeveloping countries.  The food security of importing countries, especially some least-developed and
net food-importing developing countries had to be taken into account because disciplines would affect
the cost of their imports.  On the other hand, exporting developing countries may want to use export
credit, insurance or guarantee schemes to promote their exports and their development needs also
needed to be taken into account.TN/AG/R/2
Page 8
Measures to be covered and providers of support to which disciplines would be applicable
In considering what measures should be subject to modalities for further reform it was noted that a
definition of "officially supported" export credits, insurance and guarantees would be useful.  One
definition was suggested which defined it as "any support given by or on behalf of governments in
respect of export credit, credit guarantee, loan and insurance programmes, including direct credit,
refinancing, and interest rate support, and all other forms of government involvement – direct andindirect.  This includes support provided by special institutions controlled by and/or acting under the
authority of governments".  Another Member suggested basing the definition on the Illustrative List
of Export Subsidies item (j) and the first paragraph of item (k) in the SCM Agreement.
Forms of support, maximu m/minimum terms/conditions that may be provided, and other terms and
conditions
It was suggested that, as a general principle, commercial terms should be the bench mark for anymaximum or minimum terms or conditions that could be applied to export credits, insurance and
guarantee schemes.  It was also stated that the possible effect of any such terms or conditions on
developing countries would have to be considered.
A list of measures that could be covered by ma ximum or minimum terms or conditions was proposed
along with some suggestions as to what those terms or conditions should be.
− Maximum Repayment Period:  A number of delegations identified the maximum repayment
period as being the most important condition associated with credit programmes.  It was statedthat if the maximum repayment period was 180 days or less then disciplines with respect to other
parameters became less important.  Under special and differential treatment it was considered thatthis period could be extended by an additional 90 days.  Some developing countries did not
consider this to be adequate.  It was also noted that some agricultural exports that were of a
capital nature could qualify for longer repayment periods.
− Minimum Insurance Premium:  In line with the principle that commercial terms should be applied
to credit, insurance and guarantee schemes it was suggested that insurance premiums should be
risk based – although it was also noted by one delegation that an allowance should be made for
exports to least-developed and net food-importing developing countries where risks were often
higher.  Applying commercial terms could increase the costs of their imports.
− Interest Rates:  A number of participants noted the importance of establishing a bench mark for
the minimum interest rate that could be supported.  However, it was also pointed out that a low
bench mark could disadvantage some developing countries.
Other measures that could be the subject of maximum or minimum terms or conditions included
repayment of principle, cash payments, the starting-point of credits, end dates, validity periods,
market windows and the practices of exporting state trading enterprises in this area, such as delayedinvoicing.
Transparency and notifications
The importance of transparency and notifications was stressed by a number of Members.  It was
suggested by one delegation that Members should list in their Schedules of commitments their export
credit, insurance and guarantee programmes and then make regular notifications on their use of these
programmes.  However, other participants did not support this suggestion and raised a number ofquestions concerning what countries would have the right to use export credit, insurance or guarantee
schemes even if at commercial terms.  It was also proposed that a notification be required before a
credit, insurance or guarantee programme was introduced as well as notifications on actual use of
such programmes.TN/AG/R/2
Page 9
Food Aid
Food Aid - General
It was generally acknowledged that food aid is a very complex area and that nothing should be done
in the WTO that might hinder the delivery of aid in cases of real need.  At the same time, a number of
Members stated that some countries used aid as a disguised form of export subsidies and that they hadlost traditional markets as a result of such aid deliveries.  Therefore, it was suggested that the
objective of WTO disciplines in this area should be to prevent circumvention of export subsidy
commitments by addressing only government to government aid leaving the rules and commitments
on real aid to the responsible international organisations.  However, other Members stated that WTO
rules should address all types of aid.
A number of proposals were made concerning genera l principles of food aid.  It was suggested that
aid should be demand driven and that it should be given on the basis of requests from international
agencies, given in grant form only, accompanied by technical and financial assistance for improving
productivity and infrastructure that aid should not be tied to commercial transactions.  It was also
proposed that Members should bind aid levels, with as much as possible being provided by triangular
transactions or by local purchases.  It was also stated that bilateral aid should be only permittedfollowing the request of one of the international food agencies.
Concessionality and Specific Disciplines
Another proposal suggested that aid donations sh ould be based only on appeals by international aid
organisations and that the rules on food aid should permit both aid in grant form and on concessionalterms.  This delegation also suggested, with some support, that an international stockpile should be
created to deal with emergencies by earmarking part  of the national stockpiles of WTO Members.  On
concessionality however, most participants that spoke stated that food aid should be given in grant
form only.
Concerning government to government aid it was noted that this currently formed a significant part of
total aid and that it was nearly always provided at the request of other countries, therefore, it was
unrealistic to suggest that it could be abolished.  One Member proposed that non-grant aid levels
should be bound in Members' Schedules, reduced over the implementation period and replaced by aid
in grant form.
In considering specific rules it was suggested that the current rules in Article 10.4 should be made
more operational in preventing tying aid to comme rcial transactions.  Another Member stated that
more assessment was needed of the effect of food aid on recipient countries and it suggested that such
assessments should be required of WTO donor countries.
Transparency/notification requirements
A number of delegations stressed the importance of transparency and notifications and it was pointed
out that the notification requirements of the FAO's CSSD could be used.  It was also noted that these
notification requirements were not well respected and it was suggested that they could be made into
binding commitments under the WTO.  Some Members went even further and suggested that if aid
was not notified and if it did not comply with the rules of the responsible international organisationsthen it should be treated as an export subsidy.
Following a request from Members the WTO Secretariat had contacted the World Food Programme a
copy of the correspondence was made available during the informal Special Session.  Some
participants suggested that the Secretariat should continue its contacts with the WFP.TN/AG/R/2
Page 10
Exporting State Trading Enterprises
Exporting state trading enterprises - General
There was considerable debate concerning the distortions by state trading enterprises of competitive
conditions in international markets.  On one side some Members maintained that the exclusive rights
and privileges given to exporting STEs meant they could distort trade.  Therefore, specific disciplinesand notification requirements were needed to ensure they were not used to circumvent export subsidy
commitments.  On the other side other Members stated that the simple existence of an exporting STE
did not automatically mean it subsidised exports.  Furthermore, exporting STEs were needed in many
cases because the markets of so many export destinations were badly distorted by protection and
subsidies and because they were needed to counter the market power of some very large private sector
entities.  Furthermore, many of the practices listed as trade distorting and used by STEs were in fact
common to many exporting entities, like price discrimination between different markets.
A number of developing country participants pointed out the positive role STEs could play in
developing countries by helping to stabilise prices and production and in assisting small exporters to
find and develop export opportunities.
One delegation pointed out that the multilateral trading system had developed special rules for non-
market economies and it was suggested that these were essentially economies structured around state
trading enterprises.  If special rules were necessary in these circumstances it was hard to justify not
having special rules for exporting state trading enterprises in countries that claimed to have market
orientated economies.
Scope of entities
In discussing the scope of entities that might be the subject of rules and disciplines one Member stated
that the scope should include all large state owned or controlled entities or entities with special rights
or privileges.  Another delegation pointed out that the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises haddeveloped an illustrative list of STEs and there was no need to repeat this work.  Under special and
differential treatment it was suggested that STEs in developing countries that had a relatively small
share of world trade should be exempt from disciplines.
Specific Disciplines and Notification Requirements
Concerning the areas that should be subjected to disciplines a number of proposals were made
including disciplines to cover exclusive rights and privileges, price pooling, cross subsidisation, an
end to exclusive export or domestic purchase rights, government financial support and export credit
activities of STEs.  Another delegations suggested disciplines should be developed to prohibit
government assistance, establish minimum volumes of exports, commitments on minimum stocks and
contributions to international food aid organisations.
The discussion on specific disciplines and notification requirements was divided into two general
groups.  One group of participants wanted disciplines to prevent STEs from circumventing export
subsidy commitments and notifications to enable others to assess compliance.  Other Members stated
that the existing notification requirements and the rules in Article XVII of GATT and the Agreement
on Agriculture were sufficient.  Some of these Members also suggested that disciplines andtransparency requirements should apply equally to STEs and to private sector enterprises.
Export Restrictions and Taxes
Export Restrictions
A number of proposals were made to convert export restrictions into export taxes, to list taxes in
Members' Schedules and to bind them and subject them to reduction commitments.  However, someTN/AG/R/2
Page 11
developing countries stated that in some circumstances export restrictions might be needed to address
food security concerns.
One delegation stated that embargoes on trade in agricultural products should be prohibited,
especially embargoes against net food-importing developing countries.  Such embargoes reduced food
security and increased costs for importing countries affected.  While some other countries alsosuggested that quantitative restrictions on exports should be prohibited they also made an exception
for cases involving UN agreed sanctions or cases under Article XXI of GATT
3.  It was also proposed
that developing countries should be able to have access to an equivalent of an export safeguard
allowing them to introduce restrictions or taxes in certain emergency situations.
Export Taxes
Further views were exchanged relating to export taxes and the negotiations.  It was also stated that in
any discussion of export taxes or restrictions, the effect of rules on food security in developing
countries needed to be taken into account.
One participant proposed that export restrictions and taxes should be prohibited for all Members
except developing countries.  Under special and differential treatment it suggested that a developingcountry should have the right to use export taxes provided the tax applied to the export of all
agricultural products, was applied at a uniform rate and was applied for a year with no variation.
Notifications would be needed on introducing such a tax or whenever it was modified.
Final Observations
The two days of negotiations in the Special Session and the two days of inter-sessional informal
consultations were very useful in bringing forward a number of specific suggestions for possible
modalities and in improving the understanding of different Members' positions.  It was encouraging to
see all participants working in a focussed, business-like and interactive way (that may not necessarilybe apparent from my brief report).
However, much more work needs to be done.  Although specific suggestions were forthcoming from
some participants, others were more reserved in detailing their own ideas or in reacting to those put
forward, the configuration varying to some extent from one issue to another.  Overall, a greater degreeof concrete and interactive engagement will be required if we are to develop a sound basis for an
overview paper in December.  This means more intensive work between participants with a view to
developing specific ideas for draft modalities that others are likely to find acceptable.  The Chairman
will also need to pursue a number of the issues that were raised in future consultations in a variety of
formats.
                                                     
3 See footnote 2 to paragraph 9 of the Secretariat Summary Report.TN/AG/R/2
Page 12
TN/AG/2
TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
Report by the Chairman, Stuart Harbinson, to the Trade Negotiations Committee
The Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, which was established by the General
Council (WT/GC/M/53) and  which is pursuing negotiations under paragraphs 13, 14 and other
relevant provisions of the Doha Ministerial Declaration as agreed by the Trade Negotiations
Committee (TN/C/M/1), held its twelfth meeting on 20 June 2002.
The agenda as set out in WTO/AIR/1831 was adopted.The  Chairman presented a brief oral report on his own responsibility concerning the main
features of the technical work on the elaboration of detailed possible modalities, including rules-
related elements, in the area of export competition (including export restrictions) which had been
undertaken, in accordance with the programme adopted at the eleventh  Special Session (TN/AG/1refers), in an informal Special Session held on 17-18 June and in inter-sessional informal
consultations (TN/AG/1 refers).  This report will be included in the Secretariat summary report on the
twelfth Special Session (to be issued as TN/AG/R/2).
A number of statements were made by participants regarding the work undertaken thus far on
export competition, including with respect to th e manner in which, or the extent to which, the
contributions and positions of some participants had been covered in the Chairman's report.  Some
participants objected to the inclusion in the negotiations of export taxes and/or export restrictions.
Participants' statements will be reflected in the Secretariat summary report on the meeting.
In accordance with the programme adopted at the eleventh Special Session the next informal
Special Session, which is to be held on 2-3 September and is to be followed by a formal Special
Session on 4 September, will take up the techni cal elaboration of detailed possible modalities,
including rules-related elements, in the area of  market access.  It was noted that under the programme
informal and formal Special Sessions on domestic support were scheduled in the week of23 September.  It was agreed that, in order to prepare for these meetings, inter-sessional informal
consultations on market access would be held on 29-30 July and on domestic support on
5-6 September.  It was also agreed that, in order to facilitate the participation of non-resident and
smaller delegations,  informal summary notes would be prepared and made available on each of these
informal inter-sessional consultations.
__________