RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
29 June 2000
(00-2681)
Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries
Integrated Framework  
REPORT OF THE REVIEW OF THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK
Attached is the Report of the mandated review of the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related
Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries (IF).  The review was conducted pursuant to thedecision by the Inter-Agency Working Group on 24 November 1999
1.  In the decision, it was agreed
that an independent review would be task-managed by the World Bank on behalf of the six core
Agencies.  The report of the review was submitted to the core Agencies on 8 June 2000.
At the meeting of the Inter-Agency Working Group, 21-22 June 2000, Agencies considered
the Report, as an input, into the final stage of the review process, without prejudice to positions of the
Agencies.  It was agreed that the report would be  circulated with a factual addendum, now attached to
the report.  In this regard, Agencies expressed vi ews and positions on various aspects of the report,
which are reflected in the records of the 20th meeting.
                                                     
1 WT/COMTD/LDC/6.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 2/3
REVIEW OF THE
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK
FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR
TRADE DEVELOPMENT
OF LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Sarath Rajapathirana
Charles Lusthaus
Marie-Hélène Adriene
June 6, 2000WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 4/5
Review of the Integrated Framework for Technical Assistance
for Trade Development of Least Developed Countries
Advisory Committee
Washington, DC. June 6, 2000
The World Bank asked this Advisory Committee to provide independent advice and counsel
to the evaluation team secured by the World Bank at the request of the Integrated Framework Inter-Agency Working Group to conduct the Review.  As members of the Advisory Committee we confirm
that we are satisfied that the enclosed report covers the essential issues outlined in the terms of
reference for the Review.
We recognize that the report’s recommendations are rather broad. This is the consequence of
the constraints of time – and budget – available for the Review. However, we believe that itsrecommendations nonetheless provide a basis for making some fundamental decisions about the
Integrated Framework. These can then be followed by the preparation of an appropriate in-depth plan
of action.
Sincerely,
John Eriksson Hans WyssWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 6
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Review team members acknowledge a large debt to many of the individuals and agencies that
engaged them in frank and open discussions of the Integrated Framework (IF) and provided writtendocuments. They include Least Developed Country (L DC) representatives in Geneva and in the two
countries visited by the review team; officials of donor agencies both in Geneva and in the two
countries that the team visited; officials of the six agency members of the IF Inter-Agency Working
Group (IAWG); and private sector individuals. They also include those “focal point” representatives
in LDC governments who responded to the survey . The International Trade Center (ITC) was a
gracious host to the team in Geneva, providing office space and secretarial assistance. The
Administrative Unit (AU), located in the ITC, helped with the arranging of meetings in Geneva andwith the identification of LDC officials to whom the questionnaire survey was addressed.
The review team would also like to acknowle dge the guidance and counsel it received from
the Advisory Committee at each stage of preparation of this review.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
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Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms..........................................................................................8
Executive Summary.............................................................................................................. ....10
Introduc tion................................................................................................................... .........................13
Chapter 1.  Least Develope d Countries’ Context ................................................................................. .15
(a)  Diversity and LDCs  and Constraints..................................................................................15
(b)  Policy Developments and Recent Economic Performance ................................................15
(c)  LDCs Concerns ............................................................................................................. .....16
Chapter 2.  Objectives and Perceptions of the Integrated Framework .....................................17
(a)  Obje ctives ............................................................................................................... ...........17
(b)  Elements of Trade-Rela ted Technical Assistance..............................................................17
(c)  Per ceptions ............................................................................................................... ..........18
Chapter 3.  Implementation of the Integrated Framework.....................................................................19
(a)  Governance Structur e and Administration .........................................................................19
(b)  IF Procedures ............................................................................................................. ........20
(c)  The Pr ocesses ............................................................................................................. ........21
(d)  Some Less ons Learned...................................................................................................... .21
Chapter 4.  Impact of the Integrated Framework......................................................................23
(a)  The Six IF Agencies ....................................................................................................... ....23
(b)  Resource Mobilization ..................................................................................................... ..23
(c)  LDC Institutions and Policies............................................................................................. 24
(d)  The Overall Impact on Trade Policies and LDC Economies .............................................24
Chapter 5.    Issues  and Conclusions........................................................................................... ...........25
(i)     Different Percepti ons Regarding Objectives....................................................................25
(ii)    Lack of Prioritization due to the Absence of IF Country-specific
   Strategies .................................................................................................................. .......25
(iii)   Need to be More Demand-Driven and Country-Owned..................................................25(iv)   Weak Governance and Administration ............................................................................25
(v)    Coordi nation I ssues..................................................................................................... .....25
(vi)   Lack of Fund ing to Support IF.........................................................................................25
(vii)  Weak Monitoring of Trad e-Related TA Performance .....................................................25
(viii) Expandi ng the IF........................................................................................................ ......26
Chapter 6.  Recommenda tions for th e Future ..................................................................................... ...27
Annexes........................................................................................................................ .................
Annex 1: Terms of Refe rence for th e Review ..........................................................................30
Annex 2:  List of  Principal Documents....................................................................................32
Annex 3:  LDC Survey Results..................................................................................... 33
Annex 4:  List of Persons Interviewed......................................................................................38
Annex 5:  Bangladesh Case ...................................................................................................... 42
Annex 6:  Uganda Case .......................................................................................................... ..43
Annex 7:  Selected Bibliography ..............................................................................................44
Factual Addendum ……………………………………………………………………………………45WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
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List of Abbreviations
AU Administrative Unit
CAS Country Assistance Strategy
CDF Comprehensive Development FrameworkCGs Consultative GroupsCOMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern AfricaEAC East African Co-operationESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment FacilityGDP Gross Domestic ProductHIPC Heavily Indebted Poor CountriesHLM High Level MeetingIAWG Inter-Agency Working GroupIF Integrated FrameworkIRs Integrated ResponsesIMF International Monetary Fund
ITC International Trade Center
LDC Least Developed CountriesMFA Multi-Fiber ArrangementMYP Multi-Year ProgramNAs Needs AssessmentsODA Official Development AssistancePRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy PaperRTs Round Tables (IF, UNDP)SAC Structural Adjustment CreditSCs Steering CommitteesTA Technical AssistanceTOR Terms of ReferenceTPRs Trade Policy ReviewsWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 9
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance FrameworkUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeWTO World Trade OrganizationWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 10
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The principal objective of the Integrated Framework (IF) is to increase the benefits that Least
Developing Countries (LDCs) derive from trade-related Technical Assistance (TA) made available to
them by the six agencies involved in the IF and from other sources. The IF intended to assist LDCs
respond to market demands and accelerate their integration into the multilateral trading system.
2. Other related objectives are to ensure that trade-related TA is demand-driven and to enhance
ownership of the IF by LDCs, so that it meet s individual country needs effectively. The WTO
Ministers who initiated the IF in their first meeting in 1996 perceived ample opportunities to increase
the effectiveness and efficiency of trade-related TA provided to LDCs. Synergies were expected to be
realized from the six agencies working together more closely. Another objective implicit in the IF was
to provide comprehensive and coordinated information to the six agencies about specific LDC needs
in trade-related areas, so that the agencies could build upon their individual experiences andcomparative advantage.
3. In the event, many of these objectives have not been realized. The principal issues associated
with this outcome are: (a) different perceptions regarding the objectives of the IF between LDCs and
donors: LDCs expected additional funding; donors expected the IF to realize greater efficiency andeffectiveness by coordinating trade-related TA; (b) on the whole, IF processes did not lead to a
prioritization of TA needs and there was no link to the overall development assistance architecture; (c)
the IF was not sufficiently demand driven in the minds of LDC officials; (d) governance and
administration were weak since they depended on management by committee without clear
responsibility assigned to any single entity; (e) coordination was found more complex than anticipatedbetween the LDCs and donors, among donors, and betwee n the six agencies themselves; (f) the IF has
been a generally “unfunded mandate,” with varying degrees of priority being given to the IF by
different donors and agencies.
4. As to the future of the IF, three broad options suggest themselves.
(a) A first option is to complete the IF process as having had limited success. However,
virtually all stakeholders canvassed through a survey of LDC IF “focal points” (see
Annex 3 below), and in interviews of LDC, donor and agency representatives
conducted by the review team, find value in the IF. Furthermore, the time periodelapsed since the inception of the IF is insufficient to justify a conclusion that it
should be wound down; the process of creating capacity is always a lengthy one.
(b) A second option is to expand the IF, as a few donors have suggested, to other
developing countries such as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). However,
without showing real success on the ground, there is no track record to justify now
extending the IF to additional countries.
(c) A third option is to improve the IF by addressing the main issues that have been
identified in the process of the review. This is the option recommended by this
review. The following measures would form the core of the needed improvements:
(i) Clarify Policy Objectives
Clarify the objectives of the IF by restricting it to TA for trade-related
development, to support, inter alia, policy reforms, manpower and human
resources development, customs reforms, institutional change and legalenvironment reforms. Infrastructure investment and other hardwareWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 11
development, as well as TA solely related to equipment and bricks and
mortar, would be handled in the context of Consultative Groups (CGs)supported by the World Bank and the UNDP-supported Country Round
Tables (as distinguished from the round tables presently held for the IF).
(ii) Prioritize and Link to Overall Development Assistance  Architecture
In the future most development assistance  strategy issues are likely to be
developed through participatory processes, in the context of such exercises as
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the Comprehensive
Development Framework (CDF) and the United Nations Development
Strategy Frameworks (UNDAF). These efforts will be prepared by LDCs in
consultation with the World Bank, the IMF, UNDP and other UN agencies,
donors and stakeholders. In all such endeavors, country strategy will definethe role of trade development and rela ted TA. The IF will then be linked to
the priorities established through the formulation of country development
strategies.
(iii) Give Ownership to the LDCs
Make the IF process more demand driven and country-owned by requiring
LDCs to prioritize their specific needs from the list of trade-related TA
activities listed in the Needs Assessments (NAs). Once a particular trade-
related TA project or program is identified as a priority by an LDC, thatparticular project or program would be submitted to the agency responsible
for managing and coordinating such TA.
(iv) Strengthen Governance and Administration
The review considered two options: (a) strengthening the Administrative Unit
(AU) to the point that it can manage the IF while continuing to be located at
the International Trade Center (ITC) in Geneva, and (b) moving the
responsibility for managing the IF to WTO (where the AU would be
integrated). On balance, the review concluded that the superior option is tomake the WTO responsible for IF management. This is because the IF
requires leadership in the trade field. This leadership in trade resides in WTO,
following the Uruguay Round. Given the specific capacities required for
managing the IF (within the sharper focused objectives as per (i) above),
WTO will need to strengthen its ability to handle trade-related TA. The Inter-
Agency Working Group (IAWG) would continue as an advisory group,
meeting not more than twice a year, and help WTO in its coordination withthe other IAWG agencies.
(v) Coordination Issues
Once governance is strengthened along the lines of the foregoing
recommendation, coordination can be better assured, as WTO will be the
designated clearinghouse for inter-agency coordination issues. After
completion of all NAs, the IF process can be simplified. There is also no need
to hold round table meetings for the IF, if no trade-related TA funding is
expected. As to coordination within LDCs, the lead ministry in the country(whether it be Finance or Planning) that now discusses and presents
infrastructure projects to the donors in the context of World Bank-supported
CGs and UNDP-supported Round Tables, should bring the Trade orWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 12
Commerce Ministers to support their requests for trade-related investment
assistance at these forums. A special session for trade development may beconsidered in these forums.
(vi) Funding the IF
First, the IAWG agencies and donors will need to ensure that they budget
their administrative costs related to the IF while providing whatever other
incentives are needed for a better recognition of the responsibilities which
they undertook when the IF was created. Second, when it comes to the
financing of trade-related TA projects, one approach would be for WTO, as
the managing agency for the IF to set up and manage a Trust Fund to finance
such TA projects. All donors, including multilateral agencies, would
contribute (on a voluntary basis) to the Trust Fund as an expression of theircommitment to the IF. The Trust Fund could be replenished every three
years, depending on the demand for such funds. The LDCs would access the
funds according to well-established criteria and use them within the priorities
established under the IF process. The LDCs should be able to draw from the
Trust Fund to procure TA from any source, including the private sector. Thiswould not only make TA truly demand-driven but will also create incentives
for the agencies to tailor-make their assi stance to specific country needs. The
use of funds would be subject to standard rules utilized by donors for their
projects as to commitments and disbursements. The TA provided by the six
agencies and the private sector would be subject to international competitivebidding norms. The alternative to the Trust Fund option would be that the
WTO would play the role of a clearing-house for trade-related TA - an option
that is less likely to achieve the objectives of a revised IF.
(vii) Monitor Trade-Related TA Performance
As trade development activities are brought into the mainstream by including
them in the overall assistance process, they will be monitored and evaluated
along with the progress of other programs in the countries. This can could be
done through the World Bank’s Economic and Sector Work and through theWTO’s Trade Policy Reviews. WTO trade policy reviews should specifically
monitor and evaluate the progress achieved towards integration of LDCs into
the multilateral trading system. However, these reviews should go beyond the
review of consistency with trade rules to assess how well trade regimes and
trade-related TA are contributing to the integration of LDCs into the global
trading environment.
(viii) Enlarging the IF to Other Countries and Agencies
This review recommends that the question of enlarging the IF be revisited in
the future, after the new recommended arrangements are in place for about
three years. At that time a review could be undertaken to see what progresshad been made since 1997 to advance the objectives established for the IF.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
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INTRODUCTION
(a) Background to Review
1. At the first Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Singapore in
1996, the trade ministers adopted the Comprehensive and Integrated WTO Plan of Action for LeastDeveloped Countries (LDCs). It envisaged closer cooperation among the WTO and other multilateral
agencies assisting LDCs in the area of trade.
1 To implement the Plan, the High Level Meeting (HLM)
on Integrated Initiatives for LDCs, in October 1997 established the Integrated Framework (IF) to
provide trade-related technical assistance to LDCs.2 The six agencies that constituted the IF were the
WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), th e International Trade Center (ITC), the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), and the World Bank. The present review was mandated by paragraph 6 ofthe HLM document.
2. The eighteenth meeting of the Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) that manages the IF
agreed that (i) the World Bank would select an indi vidual to prepare an initial draft; (ii) the initial
draft would be considered and revised, as appropr iate, by the IAWG; (iii) the IAWG would receive
instructions from their Agencies on the draft Report; (iv) the Heads of the Agencies would meet to
consider the draft Report, and (v) the Report would be forwarded to the General Council of the WTO
and the Governing Bodies of the other Agencies
3
3. To preserve the independence of the review process, the World Bank selected SarathRajapatirana, a former staff member of the World Bank and at present a visiting scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research in Washington, to lead the review of the IF.
Charles Lusthaus and Marie-Helene Adriene of Universalia, a Canadian consulting firm, were the
other review team members. Hans Wyss and John Eriksson, consultants to the Bank’s Operations
Evaluation Department, were asked to form an Advisory Committee.
(b) The Scope of Review4. Given the IF experience during its first two and a half years, the IAWG agreed that the review
should, inter alia , focus on the following elements: (i) identifying perceptions of IF objectives by
involved parties; (ii) evaluation of the IF with rega rd in particular to: (a) processes, (b) output, (c)
implementation of integrated responses, (d) pledges, indications of assistance and new money, (e)
impact of the IF in terms of the relevance and role of trade in overall development strategy of LDCs;
(iii) review of trade-related assistance: institution building, building human and enterprise capacity
and infrastructure; (iv) policy considerations: main streaming, enlargement of the IF, the trade and
macro-economic policy environment; (v) the administration of the IF; and (vi) recommendations for
the future.
4 The terms of reference (TORs) for the review team are listed in Annex 1.
                                                     
1 WTO, WTO Plan of Action for the Least-Developed Countries, WT/Min (96)/14 January, 1997.
2 WTO, High Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for the Least-developed Countries’ Trade
Development,  WT/LDC/HL 1/Rev 1, October 1997.
3 Sub-Committee on Least-developed Countries, Integrated Framework for Trade-related Assistance to
Least-Developed Countries, Report of the 18th Inter-Agency Working Group Meeting, Geneva, 24 November
1999, WT/COMTD/LDC/6.
4 Ibid.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
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(c) The Review Process, Sources and Methodology
5. IAWG asked that the review be conducted in consultation with itself, LDC governments, as
appropriate, and the donor community. The review process included (i) a survey directed at the 48
LDCs and carried out with the help of the Administrative Unit (AU) of the IF, located in the ITC; (ii)interviews of officials from LDCs and donor countries as well as officials of the six IF agencies,
based on a set of interview protocols; (iii) field visits to Bangladesh and Uganda to interview the
countries’ officials, donor agencies represented in the two countries, and private sector participants at
the IF Round Tables (RTs) held in the same countries . In all, the review team interviewed more than
75 individuals. It also reviewed IF-related documents and memoranda received from LDC
representatives and multilateral agencies. The list of documents is given in Annex 2. Both the
interview process and the review of documents confirmed that most issues and findings presented inthis report have been recognized by many IF participants in the recent past.
6. The methodology used for the IF evaluation follows the well-established criteria of (i)
relevance, i.e., the consistency of IF development with the initial objectives; (ii) efficacy, or the
achievement of objectives set by the IF originators; (iii) efficiency, or the extent to which IF benefitsare commensurate with the efforts and expense incurred; and (iv) overall development outcomes and
impact.
7. A review of this nature has its limitations. First, the period of two and a half years during
which the IF has been under implementation may not be sufficient to assess its impact adequately.Second, the review team received only nineteen res ponses to the survey of 48 LDCs. Third, it is very
difficult to attribute trade developments in the LDCs to the implementation of the IF since only some
influences of the IF on the countries’ decision making could be captured in the survey. There are a
number of other forces at play in the trade outcomes of these countries. Finally, given the broad range
of topics identified by the IAWG for review, more time and financial resources would have been
necessary to undertake a more in-depth review.
(d) The Plan of the Review8. Following this introduction, Chapter 1 provid es a brief overview of the LDCs’ context.
Chapter 2 identifies objectives and perceptions with respect to the IF. Chapter 3 examines the
implementation of the IF. Chapter 4 analyzes the IF’s impact. Chapter 5 identifies issues and Chapter
6 makes recommendations. The annexes include, in addition to the review team’s terms of reference
(TORs) and the list of documents reviewed, a summary of survey results, a list of persons interviewed
and two brief descriptions of the IF as it operated in Bangladesh and Uganda. A selected bibliography
is also attached.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
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CHAPTER 1: LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES’ CONTEXT
(a) Diversity of LDCs and Constraints
1.1 Despite common characteristics of poverty and low development, LDCs differ from each
other in many ways. This is one reason why the IF has emphasized that Technical Assistance  (TA)
provided under it should be demand-driven, ow ned by the individual LDCs and tailor-made to
different country characteristics and circumstances. Of the forty-eight LDCs, thirty-three are in Sub-Saharan Africa, thirteen are in Asia, and one each is in Latin America and the Middle East. Fourteen
of the LDCs are land-locked and ten are small islands. These features lead to different constraints on
trade that the IF was designed to address. Some countries may have infrastructure needs such as
transport networks, while others may need ports and other access to frontiers to lead to increased
trade. LDCs’ resource endowments and past policies ha ve led to their exports to be concentrated in a
few commodities. LDCs’ exports also face higher tari ffs and quantitative restrictions in industrial and
developing country markets compared to exports of other countries.
5
1.2 Twenty-nine of the LDCs are WTO members. Six are in the process of accession and four
have observer status. Accession to the WTO and being within a rule-based system of multilateral
trade are important for these countries. Policy and other measures, including TA, are vital to bring
about open and growth-friendly trade regimes.
1.3 Many LDCs face other constraints than those directly related to trade, yet overcoming these
hurdles is as important, or even more so, in order fo r the LDCs to participate fully in the international
trading system. These constraints include access to foreign direct investment (FDI), macro-economic
stability, and political stability. Many countries have experienced some resumption of FDI in the lasttwo years, and many have achieved macro-economic stability. Some continue to face political
problems and civil strife, while others have experienced political stability only recently after many
years of civil strife. For these reasons, the IF cannot be expected to be implemented at the same pace
in all the LDCs.
1.4 In order for LDCs to benefit from expanding world trade, these constraints have to be
overcome at different levels: domestic policy and strategy, physical infrastructure, and human and
institutional capacity. TA will be needed in all these areas.
(b) Policy Developments and Recent Economic Performance
6
1.5 While many of the LDCs undertook trade reforms in the early 1990s, the process has slowed
in the latter part of the decade. Despite the small size of many of the countries in this group, they have
higher levels of protection than many of their competitors, a situation which they can ill afford.
Consequently, many of the LDCs have not been able to integrate adequately into the global market
and to participate in the growth-inducing benefits of expanding world trade. It is also true that open
trade by itself is not likely to generate rapid growth in these countries; other factors, includinginstitutional and human resource development, are needed to achieve higher growth while reducing
poverty.
                                                     
5 WTO Annual Reports and UNCTAD Annual Reports, various issues.
6  The economic performance of LDCs is described based largely on the UNCTAD 1999 Annual Report
of the Least-Developed Countries (Geneva, 2000) and the WTO 1999 Annual Report (Geneva, 2000).WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 16
1.6 In the 1980s to mid-1990s, the IMF and the World Bank supported trade reforms in
developing countries and LDCs on a wide scale, th rough enhanced structural adjustment facilities
(ESAFs) and structural adjustment credits (SACs), respectively. In the wake of growing criticisms of
the conditionality attached to these loans and of changing priorities of donors, support for trade
reforms waned. Some LDCs have halted the liberalization process altogether, while others have yet to
embark on strong reforms. Meanwhile, with the implementation of the Uruguay Round, opportunitiesfor greater participation in world trade have increased for all countries. While trade reforms alone
cannot be credited for higher growth, empirical and theoretical literature supports the general
proposition that open trade favors growth.
7 Therefore, the slow pace and limited extent of trade
reforms in many of the LDCs do not augur well for rapid growth and poverty reduction.
1.7 Economic performance of LDCs accelera ted in the mid-1990s but slowed down more
recently, reflecting the fragile nature of these economies. Even though their economic growth asmeasured by GDP accelerated in the mid-1990s, it fell to 3.8 percent during the latter part of 1998,
compared to the 4.5 percent growth achieved in 1997 . The ratio of exports and imports  to GDP rose
from 40 percent in 1990-96 to 46 per cent in 1997-98. But the share of LDC exports in world exports
remains a minuscule 0.4 percent, down from 0.8 per cent in 1980. The share of LDC imports also
remains low, at 0.6 per cent of world imports in 1998. FDI flows to these countries are a mere 0.5 per
cent of world FDI.
8
1.8 The principal reasons for the poor economic performance of these countries are the slow
recovery of primary commodity prices, declining official development assistance (ODA) to these
countries, and the slow or halted pace of policy reform. Thirty of the LDCs are HIPCs and some 25percent of their export earnings are spent on debt service.
(c) LDCs Concerns1.9 The LDCs are concerned that if they continue to face barriers to their products in both
industrial and developing countries, their policy efforts alone will not be sufficient to address issues of
growth and poverty reduction. The special access of LDCs to industrial markets has been declining in
recent years. The present system of trade preferences, which should give them special access, has
benefited mainly the higher-income developing countries. It has excluded the so-called “sensitive
products,” such as agriculture and textiles a nd clothing, in which LDCs and other developing
countries have comparative advantage. In addition, the present system of preferential access is
complex, non-transparent, and could be withdrawn by the importing countries at will. The WTO has
argued for duty- and quota-free access for LDCs to industrial and developing country markets. This
initiative has recently been receiving increased attention.
9
1.10 In sum, LDCs face a number of supply constraints that limit their ability to take advantage of
the multilateral trading system. Alleviating these supply constraints, while at the same time resumingand initiating policy reforms, would enable these countries to take better advantage of the  system.
The system is rapidly evolving and continually de mands more of participants who would reap its
benefits. The IF is a potentially important instrument  to help LDCs meet the challenges and reap the
benefits of the international trading system. LDCs are concerned that without adequate support they
will become increasingly marginalized in world trade.
                                                     
7 See (Dollar 1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), and Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(forthcoming).
8 UNCTAD, 1999 Annual  Report on Least Developed Countries, Geneva (2000).
9 WTO, 1999 Annual Report, Geneva (2000)WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 17
CHAPTER 2: OBJECTIVES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK
(a) Objectives
2.1 The principal objective of the IF is to increase the benefits that LDCs derive from trade-
related TA made available to them by the six agencies involved in the IF, as well as from othermultilateral, regional and bilateral sources. The intention is to assist LDCs respond to market demands
and to accelerate their integration in to the multilateral trading system.
10
2.2 Related objectives are to: (i) ensure that trade-related TA is demand driven by the LDCs and
meets their individual needs effectively; (ii) enhance ownership by each LDC over the trade-related
TA being provided; (iii) enable each agency involved  to increase its efficiency and effectiveness in
the delivery of trade-related TA; (iv) keep under review trade-related TA in each LDC and evaluate itperiodically; and (v) provide comprehensive information about the specific needs of each LDC and
about the trade-related TA provided by the six agencies to others, including the private sector. The six
agencies and other donors had previously tended to provide different types and levels of trade-related
TA to LDCs without much knowledge of each other’s activities. Nor were there incentives for the six
agencies to work together to realize a common set of objectives. The rationale for the IF was toaddress these lacunae .
(b) Elements of Trade-Related Technical Assistance
2.3 The IF identified six elements of trade-related TA.
11 These are:
(i) Institution-building to handle trade policy issues , such as enhancing the capacity of
institutions to make and implement trade policy consistent with WTO obligations,
coordination of trade policy making among the relevant government departments and
among others, strengthening the capacity for implementation and application ofobligations and commitments made under multilateral trade negotiations.
(ii) Strengthening of export supply capabilities . This would entail strengthening the
policy environment for trade liberalization, improving the competitiveness of
enterprises, increasing investment including FDI, and removing bottlenecks toincreased production of tradable goods and services including through the
development of infrastructure.
(iii) Strengthening of trade support services . This would entail trade facilitation, access to
trade finance, and support at the enterprise level for issues including access to
business information, use of information technology, adaptation and development of
new products, advice on standards and packaging, quality control, marketing anddistribution channels, commercial representation, international purchasing, and
supply management.
(iv) Strengthening of trade facilitation capabilities , such as the modernization and reform
of customs and other government agencies participating in trade transactions and thesimplification of export and import procedures.
                                                     
10 High Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least Developed Countries, Ob.cit . October 1997.
11 Ibid.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 18
(v) Training and human resource development , which would constitute large components
of the other four areas described above.
(vi) Assistance in the creation of a supportive trade-related regulatory and policy
framework  to encourage trade and investment.
2.4 The list of elements reflects a very ambitious agenda for the IF. The reference to such
elements as infrastructure development has led many LDC officials to believe that the IF goes beyond
TA and includes the provision of hardware and bricks and mortar. In addition, some elements
included in the list, such as the adaptation of new products, go beyond the comparative advantage of
public institutions relative to that of private sector. The IF envisaged that it would go beyond the
traditional areas of competence of the agencies to include the private sector in the determination of
support for TA.
(c) Perceptions2.5 The IF was a response to the WTO Ministers’ desire to help LDCs expand their involvement
in global trade. This overarching purpose continues to be relevant to the majority of the stakeholders,three years after the inception of the IF. The vast majority of those interviewed for the review agreed
that there is a need to support LDCs in a coordinated fashion, in their attempt to engage in global
trade and to integrate into the multilateral trading system. All stakeholders agreed that the IF was a
potentially vital instrument to realize this aim. As one interviewee said, “If we did not have an IF we
would need to create it.”
2.6 LDCs have expected more from the IF than what has been delivered to date. Since the IF has
not led to the financing of infrastructure, and has not led to additional resources, LDCs have felt that
the process is not sufficiently demand-driven. These views were held by a majority of the LDC
representatives interviewed. Only one of the nineteen LDC survey respondents agreed that the IF wasachieving its objectives (see Annex 3 below). A third of the survey respondents identified
infrastructure, after lack of financial and human resources, as one of the three most important
constraints to their trade development. LDCs have therefore expected additional funding for
infrastructure activities. Consequently, they are not satisfied with mere improvements in the
efficiency and effectiveness of resources as the principal objective of the IF.
2.7 Donors, on the other hand, have an entirely different perception. They say that the IF was
meant only for TA and for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of donor assistance. In the
interviews conducted for the review, all donors insisted that additional funding was never intended.
The sharp divide between these two perceptions has le d to frustrations with the IF on the part of both
LDCs and the donors. The review team concludes that these differences in perceptions stem from the
ambiguity in the documentation prepared at the inception of the IF.
12  For this reason, a clarification
of objectives of the IF is needed.
                                                     
12 See item  III (b), Notes on the High Level Meeting of October 1997, document
WT/LDC/HL/1Rev.1.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 19
CHAPTER 3: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK
(a) Governance Structure and Administration
3.1 Management of the IF resides with the Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG). The group is
composed of representatives of the six IF agencies. The IAWG has met 20 times since October 1997.
A WTO official chairs the IAWG and is assisted by a small Administrative Unit (AU), located in ITC.
With no one agency having been assigned responsibility for governing or managing the IF, this
responsibility is of a collective nature. The Chairman of the IAWG has to use his moral suasion to
bring the six agencies to work together to realize the objectives of the IF. The IAWG has sought to
make the best of this loose governance arrangement by attempting to reach conclusions by consensus.
3.2 At the level of the participating six agencies , the review team found through its interviews
with agency staff that there were no clear incentives within agencies to coordinate on the IF. The IF is
generally seen as an unfunded mandate competing with other emerging priorities.
3.3 IAWG’s work is complicated by the fact that Geneva representatives of donors  tend to be
trade-related, while the country representatives of donors who deal with mainstream foreign
assistance are located in their capitals and/or resident missions in LDCs. Thus, with the IF being
administered outside the traditional foreign assistance channels, internal coordination among donors
has been more complicated than expected. Clearance procedures among the hierarchies of the donor
agencies have also been cumbersome. Finally, LDCs have complained that IF processes tend to bebureaucratic and slow moving.
3.4 The administrative cost structure of the present IF has three dimensions: recipient countries,
donors and the six agencies. Budgeting for these costs has been ad hoc in nature. The following are
rough estimates based on interviews conducted by the review team. 
13
3.5 For the LDCs , it has been estimated that a Needs Assessment may cost from $15,000 to
$50,000 each. IF Round Tables cost around $150,000 each for the recipient country and preparation
for the pre-launch meeting (which may entail a trip by the Minister of Trade, Commerce or Tourism
with a few advisers to Geneva) could cost anywhere from $15,000 to $30,000. Therefore, eachcountry incur a cost in the neighborhood of $180,000 to $230,000. The review team found that LDC
representatives in Geneva were concerned that incurring these costs did not generate additional
resources.
3.6 For the donors , participation in an IF round table in a country capital could require travel
from its capital to an LDC capital and staff time spent on attending the meeting and preparing for it.
This could cost in the neighborhood of $3000 per trip and six days of staff time (at $1000 a day),implying about $9000 to $10,000 per round table per country. Alternatively, a donor could use a
representative already located in the country, who may or may not be versed in trade-related TA. On
many occasions, donors have not attended IF round tables due to a variety of reasons, including the
additional financial costs involved.
3.7 IF administrative costs for the six agencies  include costs for the Administrative Unit (AU),
located in the ITC, and other administrative costs borne  by the six agencies required to keep the Inter-
Agency Working group (IAWG) functioning. Rough estimates for the budget of the AU are around
$260,000 per year (includes a full and a half time staff member, and part-time support staff), plus an
ITC overhead of roughly $41,000 per year. It is estim ated that IAWG member agencies have spent
something in the order of $228,000 for the nineteen meetings over two and a half years, without
                                                     
13 These are rough estimates based on the interviews of country representatives.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 20
taking into account the opportunity costs of the time of the IAWG representatives.14 These amounts
do not appear excessive against the work expected from, and done by, the IAGW and the AU, given
the present governance arrangements of the IF.
3.8 Budgeting for TA-related costs presents a similar picture. IF documentation is ambiguous on
this matter. While it indicated that the IF should be financed by existing resources, it also mentionedthat “additional funds could be mobilized through bilateral and multilateral sources from both
traditional and non-traditional sources.”
15 One reason for the lack of new funding under the IF has
been that it is outside the mainstream; donors were already contributing to the development budgets of
the LDCs in their regular assistance programs and the IF appeared more as an “extra-budgetary”
item.16
3.9 The review team was not able to document cost-effectiveness resulting from the IF process.There is more information available on possibilities for trade-related TA than pre-IF, particularly as a
result of the web-site developed by the AU. But beyond this, there is no evidence of cost-saving
arising from the IF. When the inventory of all technical assistance for trade development was put
together by aggregating the TA provided by the six agencies, 15% of all activities was found to be
provided jointly by two or more agencies. This was not duplicative but complementary and reflected
the different comparative advantages of the six agencies.
3.10 In sum, governance and administration arrangements for the IF have been weak. While a
spirit of cooperation has helped to overcome day-to-day problems, the IAWG remains a committee
that operates by consensus. Even with the best of leadership, it is not suited for managing a programintended to fulfill the expectations of the various IF stakeholders.
(b) IF procedures3.11 The IF process goes through five stages. It begins with a detailed questionnaire that forms the
basis for the Needs Assessment  (NA). Respondents in an LDC are asked to identify major supply-side
constraints on export growth as well as the TA required to enhance human resources and institutional
capacity in order to achieve the objectives of the IF. These guidelines have been developed in
considerable detail (and are well related to the “elements” of the IF discussed in the preceding
chapter). LDCs are encouraged to identify a “focal point.”  This senior official within a relevantministry is to coordinate the preparation of the NA, to keep the country’s evolving needs in review
and to coordinate the implementation and monitoring of the program. The resident missions of the
UNDP and the World Bank or other agencies involved in trade-related TA are expected to assist the
focal point in the preparation of the NA.
3.12 At the second stage of the process, the six IAWG agencies provide an Integrated Response
(IR) to the IF. The IR indicates the trade-related ac tivities that each agency is implementing in the
country, as well as their plans for the future in support of the NAs that have been examined by each
one of the agencies. The IAWG and country officials are expected to interact during this phase to
determine how trade-related TA could be best designed and sequenced to meet the needs efficiently
and effectively.
3.13 At the third stage, a pre-launch workshop  or round table  is held in which all the stakeholders
of the IF (including the private sector and donors) are invited. At this stage a Steering Committee
                                                     
14 The IAWG cost estimates take into account the cost of travel between Geneva and Washington and
New York.  Staff day is estimated at $ 1000 per day.
15 Ibid.
16 The WTO has allocated some funds to trade-related TA from ad hoc  donor contributions.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 21
(SC) is appointed which includes all the actors. The LDC determines the leadership of the SC. The
pre-launch workshops or round tables are an innovation of the IAWG to prepare all the parties for the
next stage, the final IF Round  Table. As a next step, it was envisioned that the outcome of IF round
table meetings would feed into the UNDP-supported Round Table cycle and into World Bank-
supported Consultative Group (CG) meetings.17 A multi-year program (MYP) is typically presented at
the latter meetings and donors normally announce pledges as to what projects or programs in theMYP they could support (either at the meetings or in association with them).
3.14 Finally, the trade-related TA needs that are identified are aggregated in a single document and
it is sent to the country as well as posted on the website, which is accessible to the public globally.
This forms a basis for subsequent monitoring.
3.15 The procedures underlying the IF process have been spelled out in varying degree, some in
considerable detail. In particular, there is an extensive checklist for the NA phase. This is not the case,
however, for the IR phase. In theory, the IR provid es an opportunity for the participating agencies to
introduce a country strategy dimension, but this has not been done. The use of the common NA check
list, in combination with the already mentioned weak management of the IF program and the general
absence of a country strategy being introduced in the process has led to the identification of rather
similar needs across countries. This is partly a result of common constraints among LDCs, but is also
due to the use of an extensive common IT procedural framework.
(c) The Processes
3.16 Forty out of the 48countries have prepared NAs. This has been achieved within a remarkably
short period. The IAWG has responded to all 40 NAs by preparing 40 IRs from the six agencies.
However, only five IF round tables have been held (Bangladesh, the Gambia, Haiti, Tanzania and
Uganda). Some twelve IF round Tables have been  planned for 2000. A proposal to postpone the round
tables until the present review was completed was not accepted. Instead, the IAWG, in consultationwith the WTO Sub-Committee on Developing Countries, has decided to proceed with the round tables
so as not to disrupt the process.
(d) Some Lessons Learned
3.17 NAs comprise comprehensive li sts of projects or programs (more realistically described as
project concepts) that LDCs identify in the NA process established by the IF. Some interviewees have
called them “wish lists.”  As noted earlier, in addition to trade-related TA, they include investment
projects. Moreover, many countries have included in their NAs projects that had been under
discussion with donors, so as not to lose them in preparing a new list. NAs have been found not to be
strategy-driven, i.e., they lack a systematic effort to address a prioritized list of constraints in a well-
defined sequence. Rather, they tend to be a list of project concepts that have been identified by thosepreparing the NA through adhering closely to the standard questionnaires for the process, and by
asking the various public agencies and private enterprises which project concepts they would favor.
3.18 These procedures, within a generally well-orchestrated process, may have contributed
unwittingly to the neglect of specific factors that operate in different country situations. Manycountries with different resource endowments were found to have similar NAs and similar project
proposals. This is due largely to the process being carried out in relative isolation from country
strategy formulation and close interactions between the LDCs, donors and multilateral agencies. The
IF process as now implemented is not directly related to country strategy. For example, it rarely, if at
all, refers to the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) exercises of the World Bank or to the StrategyNotes of the UNDP. Moreover, the process currently is not integrated with such new instruments and
                                                     
17  See High Level Meeting document, op.cit. , paragraph (e).WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 22
processes as the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) or the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSP) being initiated by LDCs in cooperation with the World Bank, IMF, and UNDP and
other stakeholders. Perhaps it was taken for granted that country strategy would be incorporated in the
NA. In the event, however, this has not taken place. Nor have the six agencies invoked country
strategy in their responses to the NAs, i.e., through the IRs.
3.19 The responsibility for  preparing NA has been with Ministries of Trade, Commerce and
Tourism of the particular country, rather than with the traditional agencies that deal with foreign
assistance such as Ministries of Finance, Planning or Development. In many cases one of the six
agencies or bilateral agencies financed foreign consultants to prepare the NA under the aegis of the
Ministries of Trade, Commerce and Tourism. Thus, the IF process was outside the main stream of
foreign assistance relationships in the country as well as among the donor countries. Consequently, it
did not benefit from past experiences and individual relationships that are significant factors infostering donor assistance. Moreover, Ministries of Trade, Commerce and Tourism rarely have the
same influence over the conduct of trade policy as do Ministries of Finance, Economy or Planning.
Thus, the IF process has not obtained a particularly  high profile in LDCs or in donor capitals.
3.20 The quality of the work done in the NAs, in setting up the Steering Committees (SCs), and
running IF round tables has differed among countries. There has been no attempt to monitor quality,
even though the High Level Meeting that launched the IF spoke of the need to monitor quality. As
suggested in Annex 6 (the Uganda case), the IF process worked well in some countries. Even so,
LDCs have been more interested in the results th at the process produced in terms of pledges and new
money than in the process of preparing inputs, ranging from NAs to the pre-launch round tables andIF round tables.
3.21 Finally, there is tension between the need for the IF to be demand-driven and frequent
weaknesses of project and program design and implementation capacity in the LDCs. To address this
issue a few donors have provided ad hoc  resources to fund IF processes. For example, Canada has
provided funds to launch IF round tables in the Francophone African countries.
3.22 In sum, the IF process seems to have been more process- than issue-and strategy-led. This
must be ascribed in part to weak governance arrangements (especially management-by-committee),
while in the recipient countries the leadership of foreign assistance policy remained outside IFprocesses. But there has also been a major pr oblem of procedures. The Needs Assessment (NA)
process has been nominally demand-driven but not prioritized. Therefore, the IF process has not been
country strategy–driven as had been anticipated. Functionally, and in terms of results, the IF has had a
low profile and has not produced the additional resources that had been expected by the LDCs. The
process has led to frustrations on the part of donors who have not seen the IF as part of the
mainstream of development assistance processes.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 23
CHAPTER 4: IMPACT OF THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK
4.1 The impact of the IF must be assessed at different levels. At the level of the immediate
“outputs” of the IF, reported in the previous chap ter, the impact looks impressive. For example, 40
Needs Assessments (NAs) and 40 Integrated Responses (IRs) have been produced. But the relevance
of these outputs to the strategic development priorities of the LDCs has been very limited, which is
undoubtedly a main reason why only five IF round tables have been held and tangible development
activities attributable to the IF have emerged in only a few instances.
4.2 This chapter discusses IF impact at four levels;
(a) the six IF agencies;
(b) resource mobilization;(c) LDC institutions and policies;(d) The overall impact on trade policies and LDC economies
4.3 The overall conclusion is that the main impact of the IF has been non-financial—an increased
sensitivity to trade issues after the relative hiatus of the last few years. This emerged in the results
from the LDC Survey, as well as from the interv iews of LDC officials (see Annex 3 below).
(a) The Six IF Agencies
4.4 Consistent with one of its original objectives, the IF has led to increased coordination and
information exchange among the six agencies. According to agency officials interviewed by the
review team, agencies have through the IAWG lines of communication been able to avoid duplication
and to sequence support in a more useful way. The web-site has also facilitated interagency
communication.
4.5 However, the limited usefulness of the IRs prepared by the agencies demonstrates that
coordination is not as effective as it could be. Most IRs prepared so far comprise a database of TA
activities undertaken by the six agencies. They are not well-considered responses based on country
strategies that result in a set of priorities for TA. It is therefore difficult to establish the linkagesbetween IRs and country strategies. Many of the proposed TA programs appear to be no different
from those that had been in existence in the past.
18  One agency mentioned to the review team that it
would have provided the same types of trade-related TA whether the IF existed or not.
(b) Resource Mobilization
4.6 The mobilization of additional resources from donors is an important impact but is
intermediate as compared with impact in the LD Cs. In Chapter 2 above, fundamental differences in
perceptions between LDCs and donors were noted with regard to resource mobilization. The LDCs
believe that the IF was meant to provide new money; the donors believe that the objective of the IF is
to create synergies and realize greater efficiency and effectiveness of TA. Consequently, despiteexpectations of additional resources resulting from the IF, only one country, Uganda, received new
                                                     
18 There are some new initiatives reflected in IRs associated with the implementation of the Uruguay
Round and those associated with the need to update t echnology of data-keeping and recording export and import
transactions.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 24
money—US $2.0 million for enterprise development. In the case of Bangladesh, the IF advanced what
had been an ongoing discussion to provide US $600,000 for a policy research institute to create think-
tank capability in the country.
(c) LDC Institutions and Policies
4.7 The review was not able to identify any dire ct impact of the IF on the ground in LDCs in
terms of its influence on institutions and policies. What the IF seems to have done is to bring trade
policies back into focus among LDC institutions. This is as yet not reflected in the policies of the
institutions at the country level.
4.8 At the country level, the IF could have made LDCs more competitive if it had given the same
emphasis to import liberalization as it did to export promotion. A greater link to country strategycould have resulted in more balanced support for import liberalization relative to the prevailing
emphasis on support for export promotion. This would have led to a greater degree of integration with
the world trading system, as liberalizing imports reduces the bias against exports inherent in many of
the trade regimes of these countries.
4.9 In addition, through WTO membership, further unilateral trade reforms and increased access
of LDCs to industrial country markets (with th e new initiatives to provide duty- and quota-free bound
access to their goods and services), LDCs could pursue growth-producing trade strategies with greater
confidence than at present.
4.10 Another potential gain from coordination through the IF is the bringing together of all trade-
related agencies in an LDC government into a single framework. Equally, coordination with the
private sector could be achieved through the Steering Committees. For example, in this way the
private sector is said to play an important role in Bangladesh.
(d) The Overall Impact on Trade Policies and LDC Economies
4.11 In the late 1990s other policy priorities have been sought by LDCs, donors and some of the
six IF agencies. Trade is the main activity of the ITC, UNCTAD and WTO. For the IMF, World Bank
and UNDP, many other activities that go beyond trade are their métier .
4.12  As was shown above, the pace of trade reform slowed in the mid-to-late 1990s. During the
earlier decade, many countries, including LDCs, unde rtook trade reforms with the help of IMF and
World Bank loans, but this support waned in the late 1990s. This seems to have been an overall trend
for the World Bank in the 1990s and to a lesser extent in the IMF.19 In many cases activities that are
only remotely connected to trade have been described as trade-related activities.
4.13 The impact of the IF on such economic magnitudes as the growth of real output or on
components of trade, such as exports, is difficult to discern. This is in part because the time that has
elapsed since the inception of the IF has been relatively brief. In addition, it is difficult to attribute
changes in these magnitudes to interventions such as the IF when other factors have major impacts of
their own.
                                                     
19  Krueger and Rajapatirana (1999).WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 25
CHAPTER 5: ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1 The review has identified a number of issues that need to be addressed if the IF is to become a
more relevant instrument. Each issue is listed below with a commentary to clarify why it has arisen.
(i) Different perceptions regarding objectives. LDCs and donors clearly have different
perceptions about the purpose of the IF, especially when it comes to the scope of
activities that would be financed under the IF. As long as such a difference exists, it
will not be possible to make good progress toward achieving the IF objectives. Thesedifferences not withstanding, all parties agree that the IF has an important role to
play. Thus, the challenge is to define its role more clearly.
(ii) Lack of prioritization due to the absence of IF country-specific strategies. The near-
complete absence of a country-specific strategy in the IF process for recipient LDCshas meant that the process has not resulted in a sound prioritization of assistance,
including for trade-related TA. With a country strategy identified through
participatory processes, there would be a strong basis for the recipient LDC to be in
the driver’s seat when it comes to the choice of assistance, including TA.
(iii) The need to make the process genuinely demand-driven and country-owned . The
survey of the LDCs revealed that only a minority believes that the process is demand-driven. One reason why the majority considers it not to be sufficiently demand-driven
is that LDCs have not had access to more funds. They believe that a demand-driven
process should lead them to have access to more funds than at present. One way to
make it demand-driven is to bring all assistance under a shared country strategy while
separating trade-related TA from the rest of the country assistance. This would meana narrower definition of the role of the IF as a complement to country strategy. A
clear interface between the IF and coun try strategy would need to be devised.
(iv) Weak governance and administration. The IF needs to be managed by one entity,
eschewing the collective responsibility under the present arrangements. The absenceof clear responsibility leads to process routine rather than to strategic decision making
that is critical for an effective IF.
(v) Coordination issues. The main coordination issue identified in this review relates to
the general absence of a country strategy in the present IF process. There are alreadyprocesses in place for the articulation of country strategies in which the country is the
locus, e.g., in the context of CGs supported by the World Bank and UNDP-supported
Round Tables.
(vi) Lack of funding to support the IF: First, the IF has generally been an “unfunded
mandate” for the IAWG agencies and donors, resulting in less than adequate attention
to the responsibilities these entities had taken on when the IF was created. Second,there is no identified pool of funding available to support trade-related TA once the
priority for it has been established in country strategy formulation.
(vii) Weak monitoring of trade-related TA performance.  This could be addressed by
linking with ongoing in-country monitori ng and evaluation efforts involving the
country and international agencies and donors active in the country. There is potential
to use the World Bank’s Economic and Sector Work and the WTO’s Trade Policy
Reviews (TPRs) to assess the  relevance and effectiveness of trade-related TA
provided for a country. In the case of TPRs,  monitoring and evaluations must goWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 26
beyond examining whether the country is fo llowing policies consistent with the WTO
to see to what extent the TA and related policies are based on sound development
strategy.
(viii) Expanding the IF.  While there is a proposal by some donor countries to enlarge the
scope of the IF beyond the LDCs, those LDC representatives interviewed by  thereview team were not very keen about extending the IF to include other countries. On
the issue of inviting other agencies to join the IF, there was also some ambiguity on
the part of the LDCs.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 27
CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 In developing its recommendations, the Review team grappled with (i) issues related to the IF
founders’ intent,  (ii) issues that have arisen in its implementation over the last two years,  and (iii) the
sensitivities of the different parties to particular solutions, or options, that are available for thedirections which the IF might take in the future. The overarching conclusion of the review is that a
major shift in orientation of the IF is required - aw ay from a process-driven approach to getting results
on the ground through a predominantly LDC-driven approach.
6.2 Three broad options suggest themselves. A first option is to wind up the IF as having had
limited success. However, virtually all stakeholders canvassed in the survey and through interviews
find value in the IF. Furthermore, the time period elapsed since the inception of the IF is insufficientto justify a conclusion that it should be wound down; the process of  creating capacity is always a
lengthy one. A second option is to expand the IF, as a few donors have suggested, to other developing
countries such as the HIPC countries. However, without showing real success on the ground, there is
no track record to justify now extending the IF to additional countries. A third option is recommended
by this review: improve the IF by addressing the core issues that have been identified in the process ofthe review and summarized in Chapter 5. The fo llowing recommendations are made with respect to
these issues:
(i) Clarify Policy Objectives
The objective of the IF will be clarified by restricting it to TA for trade development to
support, inter alia , policy reforms, customs reforms, institutional support and legal reforms,
and manpower and human resources development needed in support of such policy and other
reforms. Infrastructure investment and other hardware development, as well as TA solely
related to equipment and bricks and mortar, would be handled in the context of ConsultativeGroups (CGs) supported by the World Bank and the UNDP-supported Country Round Tables
(as distinguished from the round tables presently held for the IF).
(ii) Introduce IF Country-Specific Strategies, Prioritize and Link to Overall Development
Architecture
Once an overall IF country-specific strategy is defined through the above-mentioned
processes, the prioritization of trade development related TA would follow. In the future,
most development assistance  strategy issues are likely to be developed through participatory
processes, in the context of such exercises as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs),
the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and the United Nations Development
Strategy Frameworks (UNDAF). These efforts will be prepared by LDCs in consultation with
the World Bank, the IMF, UNDP and other UN agencies, donors and stakeholders. In all such
endeavors, country strategy will define the role of trade development and related TA. The IF
will then be linked to the priorities established through the formulation of country
development strategies. It may be that a LDC will not consider trade development a priority.
In that case, it would not request funding under the IF.
(iii) Make the IF Process More Demand-Driven; Give Ownership to the LDCsMake the IF process more demand driven by requiring LDCs to prioritize their specific needs
from the list of trade-related TA activities listed in the NAs. Once a particular trade-relatedTA project or program is identified by the LDC as a priority, that particular project or
program would be submitted to the agency responsible for managing and coordinating such
TA.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 28
(iv) Strengthen Governance and Administration
The review considered two options: (a) strength ening the AU to the point that it can manage
the IF (while continuing to be located at the ITC), and (b) giving the responsibility for
managing the IF to WTO (where the AU would be integrated). On balance, the reviewconcluded that the superior option is to make the WTO responsible for IF management. This
is because the IF requires leadership in the trade field. This leadership in trade clearly resides
in WTO, following the Uruguay Round. Given the specific capacities required for managing
the IF (within the focused  objectives as pe r (i) above), WTO will need to strengthen its
ability to handle TA. The IAWG would continue  as an advisory group, meeting not more than
twice a year, and help WTO in its coordination with the other IAWG agencies.
(v)  Coordination Issues
Once governance is strengthened along the lines of the foregoing recommendation,
coordination can be better assured, as WTO will be the designated clearinghouse for inter-
agency coordination issues. Once all NAs are completed, the IF process can be simplified.There is also no need to hold round table meetings for the IF, if no trade-related TA funding is
expected. As to coordination within LDCs, the lead ministry in the country (whether it be
Finance or Planning) that now discusses and presents infrastructure projects to the donors in
the context of World Bank supported CGs and UNDP-supported Round Tables should bring
the Trade or Commerce Ministers to support their requests for trade-related investmentassistance at these forums. A special sessi on for trade development may be considered in
these forums.
(vi) Funding the IF
First, the IAWG agencies and donors will need to ensure that they budget their administrative
costs related to the IF while providing whatever other incentives are needed for a better
recognition of the responsibilities which they undertook when the IF was created. Second,
when it comes to the financing of trade-related TA projects, one approach would be for WTO,
as the managing agency for the IF, to set up and manage a Trust Fund to finance such TAprojects. All donors, including multilateral agencies, would contribute (on a voluntary basis)
to the Trust Fund as an expression of their commitment to the IF. The Trust Fund could be
replenished every three years, depending on the demand for such funds. The LDCs would
access the funds according to well established criteria and use them within the priorities
established under the IF process. The LDCs should be able to draw from the Trust Fund to
procure TA from any source, including the private sector. This would not only make TA truly
demand driven but will also create incentives for the agencies to tailor-make their assistanceto the specific country needs. The use of funds would be subject to standard rules utilized by
donors for their projects as to their commitment and disbursements. The TA provided by the
six agencies and the private sector would be subject to international competitive bidding
norms. The alternative to the Trust Fund option would be that the WTO would play the role
of a clearing-house for trade related TA - an option that is less likely to achieve the objectivesof a revised IF.
(vii) Monitor Trade-Related TA PerformanceAs trade development activities are brought into  the mainstream by including them in the
overall assistance process, they will be monitored and evaluated along with the progress of
other programs in the countries. There is potential to use the World Bank’s Economic and
Sector Work and the WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) to assess the  relevance andWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 29
effectiveness of trade-related TA provided for a country. WTO trade policy reviews should
monitor and evaluate the progress achieved towards integration of LDCs into the multilateral
trading system. However, these reviews should  go beyond the review of consistency with
trade rules to assess how well trade regimes and trade-related TA are contributing to the
integration of the LDCs in the global trading environment.
(viii) Enlarging the IF to Other Countries and Agencies
This review recommends that the question of enla rging the IF be revisited in the future, after
the new recommended arrangements are in place for about three years. At that time a review
could be undertaken to see what progress had been made since 1997 to advance the objectives
established for the IF.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 30
ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE
1. At the suggestion of the WTO, the interagency group that manages the Integrated Framework
for Least Developed Countr ies’ Trade Development  (IF) has asked the World Bank to take the lead to
conduct a review of the implementation of the IF ov er the two years it has existed. The IF is a joint
undertaking of the World Bank, IMF, WTO, UNDP, UNCTAD, and ITC. Its objective is to help the
least-developed countries to take advantage of opportunities offered by the international trading
system; its ambit is trade-related assistance, from seminars on WTO rules to improvement of ports
and harbors. It functions basically by helping individual countries to identify their needs, then to bring
a program of requested assistance to a Round Table or Consultative Group meeting for support from
donors
2. At its 18th meeting in November 1999, the interagency group agreed that the review should,
inter alia,  cover the following six topics:
(a) identify perceptions of the objectives of the IF by exploring the views of involved
parties (agencies, donors, LDCs);
(b) evaluate the implementation of the IF with regard in particular to (a) process of the
IF; (b) output; (c) implementation of integrat ed responses; (d) pledges, indications of
assistance, new money; (e) impact of the IF, i.e., its relevance to enhancing thecontribution of trade to development of LDCs
(c) review of trade-related assistance: instit ution-building, building human and enterprise
capacity and infrastructure;
(d) policy considerations: mainstreaming, enlargement of the IF, the trade and macro-
economic policy environment;
(e) administration of the IF; and
(f) recommendations for the future.
3. In covering these topics, the consultant should assess the relevance of IF operations to IF
objectives. The cost-effectiveness, or efficiency, of the IF in achieving its objectives should also be
assessed. This assessment will take into account, in particular, assessments of the relevance and cost-
effectiveness of the activities of the IAWG and of the Administrative Unit.
4. The consultant should also assess the effectiveness of coordination among the 6 core agencies
that comprise the IAWG; between the IAWG and LDCs; and between the IAWG and other donors,
respectively. The effectiveness of other relevant aid coordination mechanisms in addressing IF-related
issues and objectives should also be assessed. These include  (1) IAWG-organized Round Tables
(RTs);  (2) World Bank-convened CGs; (3) UNDP/LDC-convened RTs; and  (4) LDC-led IF SteeringCommittees.
5. The consultant is expected to examine documentation available on IF implementation;  carry
out interviews with operational staff of the six agencies; and seek out the views of representatives of
LDCs and donors in Geneva, as well as of government and business representatives in at least twoLDCs benefiting from the IF, one of which should be from Africa (Bangladesh and Uganda are
proposed).WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 31
OUTLINE OF GUIDELINES FROM ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO EVALUATION TEAM
Topics and Issues to be Covered
(A) Clarity and Coherence of IF Objectives:
1. Planned or original objectives2. Current or evolved objectives – as reflected in perceptions of stakeholders
and in documents
(B) Achievements in Terms of Relevance and Efficacy:
1. Outputs
2. Outcomes
3. Impacts
(C) Management and Administrative Processes; Cost-Effectiveness in Producing IF
Outputs.
1. Data requirements
2. IAWG structure and processes3. AU processes and procedures
4. Effectiveness of relations between IAWG/AU and LDCs and donors
5. Effectiveness of Round Table, Steering Committee and related  processes
Sources and Methods
(A) Sources:
1. Cost Data
2. Personnel Data
3. Economic Data4. Key Documents
(B) Methods:
1. Key Informant Interviews and Protocol of Questions for Representatives of
LDCs, Donors, and Agencies
2. Survey Questionnaire to be submitted to LDCs
3. TORs for Field VisitsWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 32
ANNEX 2: LIST OF PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTS
The World Trade Organization
WTO Plan of Action for the Least Developed Countries , WT/MIN (96/14), 7 January 1997.
High Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least Developed Countrie s’ Trade Development ,
Annex 1 WT/LDC/ HL/1/Rev 1. of October 1997.
Committee on Trade and Development, Report of the Meeting on 27-28, October 1997.
(i) Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Coun tries, “Trade-Related Round Table
Meetings/Consultations: Outline Suggested to Assist the Least-Developed Countries in
Preparing their Documentation for Trade-Related Round Tables/Consultations and an Indicative
Timetable for the Preparation of Such Meetings,” Note by the Secretariat , 17 May 1999.
Sub-Committee on Least Developed Countries, Integrat ed Framework for Trade Related Assistance to
Least Developed Countries, Report of the 18th Inter-Agency Working Group Meeting, WT/
COMTD/LDC/6, 24 November 1999.
Report of the Director-General to the Ministerial Conference , The High Level Meeting on Integrated
Initiatives for Least-Developed Countries’ Trade Development, Seattle, November 30-December 3, 1999.
Sub-Committee on Least Developed Countries, Report of the 19
th Meeting of the Inter-Agency
Working Group , WT/COMTD/LDC/7, 22 February 2000.
Sub-Committee on Least Developed Countries, Note on the Meetings on 3 February and 21 March
2000,  WT/COMTD/LDC/M/19.
Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries, Report of the 20th Meeting of the Inter-Agency
Working Group , WT/COMTD/LDC/8 , 7 March 2000.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 33
ANNEX 3: LDC SURVEY RESULTS
1. The review team used a variety of methods in  the review process. One consisted of a survey
sent to 48 LDCs to obtain the broadest spectrum of  views from the target population of the Integrated
Framework. The Administrative Unit (AU) helped in identifying the officials to whom the survey wasaddressed in the LDCs. The results are subject to three limitations: (i) only 19 of the 48 countries
completed and returned the questionnaire, (ii) questionnaires were addressed to “focal points” or
persons responsible for coordinating the work of the IF in the LDC and not to independent parties to
the process, and (iii) since the IF is new, there is nothing to compare it with; consequently, there is the
general sense that having something is better than having nothing. Despite these limitations, the
survey provided helpful insights on the LDCs’ percep tions of the IF relating to general perceptions,
demand-driven and ownership issues, and process aspects as to the Needs Assessments (NAs),Integrated Responses (IRs), Steering Committees (S Cs), and the IF Round Tables (RTs), as well as to
resources.
2. It should be emphasized that the findings reflect perceptions by the respondents and not
necessarily views shared by other representatives from the LDCs concerned. Indeed, the interviewswith representatives of LDCs in Geneva indicated differences from the views expressed in survey
responses from LDC country capitals. Nonetheless, taken together with the interviews (for a list of
interviews see Annex 4), the team believes that the survey has provided significant information for the
review. The following summarizes the main themes and issues stressed by the survey respondents
(with differences noted in perceptions expressed in interviews of LDC representatives in Geneva.)
3. A large majority (11 out of 17) of respondents felt that the objectives of the IF  should not
change (Graph 1). However, as many respondents disagreed that the multilateral agencies provided
adequate TA to support the IF process  as those who agreed (6 out of 18 in each case) (Graph 5). The
majority (9 out of 15) felt that the IF improved the LDCs capacity to analyze their trade development
needs (Graph 12). On the other hand, there was about the same number of respondents who agreed,
and did not agree, that the IF helped to build stronger country leadership on trade issues  (Graph 13).
These responses indicate differing LDC perceptions regarding the IF. But there is broad agreement
about the support that LDCs need in their attempts  to engage in global trade and integrate into the
multilateral trading system.
4. The survey attempted to find out the views of the LDCs on the issue of ownership  and
whether the IF was demand-driven . Only a minority of respondents agreed that the IF has increased
the feeling of ownership of trade-related TA in their countries (7 out of 17). Five respondents
disagreed, 3 of them strongly; while five neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition (Graph 2).
However, on the issue whether trade-related TA was demand-driven, almost half of the respondents (7
out of 15) agreed with the proposition, while only 3 disagreed (Graph 3).
5. The survey sought views on governance, administration and process issues  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o
NAs, IRs, SCs and IF RTs . With respect to the NAs, 10 out of 15 respondents agreed that they led to
new approaches and projects related to trade development (Graph 4). Most respondents (13 out of 17)
found IRs to have been helpful (Graph 6). However, in the interviews by the review team with LDC
representatives there was little support for the view that the IR was helpful.
6. Country Steering Committees (SCs)  were to provide the LDCs with an opportunity for
country-specific coordination. Survey data indicate that very few countries (only 2) believe these SCs
are working well (Graph 7). Respondents also provided mixed reactions as to whether or not the IFhelped to improve trade coordination with the private sector. While 7 out of 13 respondents said that
the IF did help in this respect, five disagreed or strongly disagreed (Graph 8).WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 34
7. IF Round Tables (RTs)  were also intended to foster consultation and coordination. The IF RTs
have been viewed as the culmination of an in-dep th consultative process leading to a document that
presents a prioritized list of possible projects. RTs have thus been seen as a significant way to increase
the benefits of trade-related aid. The fact that at the time of the survey only five RTs had been
conducted since the start of the IF underlies the mixed reaction from respondents. Six of 13
respondents agreed that RTs worked well, against 2 who disagreed, and 5 who were neutral on thequestion (Graph 9).  However, when the question was asked as to “ donors’ supporting the IF
processes by providing increased resources in priority areas”,  the negative answers were clearly in
the majority (8 disagreed, with 5 strong disagreements, against 2 neutral and 5 agreed, with only one
strong agreement) (Graph 10).
8. IF coordination  issues have been discussed in the IAWG and a number of other forums. More
than half of the respondents (8 out of 14) felt they were better able to coordinate with their national
stakeholders  on trade issues as a result of the IF (Graph 14). There was a similar feeling with regard
to building coordination capacity  among LDC Ministries in charge of trade matters, where 9 out of 14
respondents felt that the IF had a positive impact (Graph 11).
Graph No. 1 Graph No. 2
Should the IF objectives change?
611
05101520
Yes NoNo. of respondents=19We have increased our feeling of ownership with respect to trade related 
TA.
3
257
01
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 35
Graph No. 3 Graph No. 4
Trade-related Technical assistance is now more demand driven.
125
34
2
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19The needs assessment process led to new approaches and projects 
related to trade development.
03
26
4
3
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19
Graph No. 5 Graph No. 6
The Multilateral Agencies provided adequate technical assistance to 
support the IF process
336
5
11
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19The integrated response to our needs assessment was useful to our 
country.
0228
5
2
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 36
Graph No. 7 Graph No. 8
The steering committee on trade development is working well.
025
117
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19The IF helped us improve trade coordination with the private sector.
4
117
04
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19
Graph No. 9 Graph No. 10
The Round table(s) worked well.
1155
15
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19Donors are supporting the IF processes in our country by providing 
increased resources in priority areas.
5
3
24
13
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 37
Graph No. 11 Graph No. 12
We built capacity to coordinate the Ministries in charge of trade policy 
matters.
2
127
22
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19The IF improved our capacity to analyze trading needs.
2
138
12
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19
Graph No. 13 Graph No. 14
The IF helped build stronger leadership in our country on trade issues.
3
236
02
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19We are better able to coordinate with our national stakeholders on trade 
issues.
3
127
12
05101520
Strongly
DisagreeDisagree Neither
Disagree nor
AgreeAgree Strongly
AgreeNot
ApplicableNo. of respondents=19WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 38
ANNEX 4: LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED .
Bangladesh
Mr. Khurshid Alam, World Bank, Dakha
Mr. Z. Alam, UNDP
Dr. Debapriya Bhattacharya, Centre for Policy DialogueMr. Zaidi Sattar , World Bank
Mr. Rashid Faruquee, World Bank
Mr. Y. Harun-, Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce
Mr. Haq , Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce
Mr. Ron Hicks, IMF Representative
Altaf  Hossain, Deputy Chief, Ministry of Cmmerce
Syed Janaluddin, Secretary General, FBCCIShorm Matra DFID
Mr. Abdul Awal Minto President. FBCCI
John Moore CIDA --=Fahmeedu Wahab
Ghulam Rahman-Secretary in charge Ministry of Commerce
Prof. Mustafizur Rahman , Centre for Policy Dialogue
Uganda
Mr. Nimrod Waniala, Senior Commercial Office r, Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry
(member of the IFTTAP Steering Committee)
Mr. Robert Blake, Country Programme Manager, World Bank (member of the IFTTAP
Steering Committee).
Mr. Ron Styker, USAID, Chief Agriculture and Private Sector Development (member of the
IFTTAP Steering Committee).
Oskar Rothen, Swiss Consul  (member of the IFTTAP Steering Committee)
Ms. Angela Katama, Executive Director, Private Sector Foundation  (member of IFTTAP
Steering Committee)
Ms. Jennifer Powell, Project Manager USAID – PSF Project
Mr. Peter Haggai Omondi, JITAP Regional Co-ordinator, Chief Technical Advisor for East
Africa
In addition to interviews and document review, the consultants attended a one-day workshop
on Trade Development to which 50 representatives were invited. At this workshop,
presentations on the situation in Uganda regarding trade development were made by the
following speakers:
Mr. James Mulwana, Chairman, Private Sector FoundationWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 39
His Excellency Mr. Martin Brennan, Ambassador of the United States to the Republic of
Uganda
The Honorable Gerald Ssendaula, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Uganda
Professor Patrick Asea, EPRC, Makerere University
Geneva
Country Representatives
Mr. A. Mannan, Bangladesh
Ambassador Bap Kesang, Bhutan
Ambassador A Nahayo, Burundi
Mr.H. Doulaeh,, Djibouti
Mrs. Woinshet Tadesse, Ethiopia
Mr. Mr. Mussie Arega, EthiopiaMiss A Kourouma, Guinea
Dr. R. Clerisme, Haiti
Ambassador M. Zafera, Madagascar
Ambassador Ould Mohamed Lemine, Mauritania
Miss. Rl Lesoli, LesothoAmbassador H. D. Williamson, Liberia
Mr. S.M.Shrestha, Nepal
Mr.C. Kananura, Rwanda
Mr. Ali Mamoud, Sudan
Mrs. Nyasugara Kadege, TanzaniaAmbassador N. Irumba, Uganda
Mr. E, Chisanga, Zambia
Integrated Framework Consultants
Mr. P. Hein
P. Queyrane
T. Noyelle
World Trade Organization
Mr. Michael Moore, Director General
Mr. Ablasse Ouedraogo, Deputy Director General
Mr. J.M.Leger,
Mr. Sam LairdWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 40
Mr. Peter Tulloch
Mr. Chiedu Osakwe
Ms. Gloria Bartoli
Mr. Richard Elgin
Mr. Patrick Low
Mr. S. Mathur
International Trade Centre
Mr. J. Denis Belisle, Executive Director
Mr. J. Smadja
Mr. M.V.Dagata
Mr. F.Geoffroy
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Mr. J. Cuddy
Mr. J. Burley
Mr. A Abbas
Mr. A. Shah
United Nations Development Program
Ms. O. Sorgho-Mouliner
Ms. P. Andrea
International Monetary Fund
Ms. Susan Prowse
Bilateral Donors
Ms. L.M. Tremblay, Canada
Mr. A. Wright, Denmark
Mr. I.Wilkinson, European Commission
Mr J.M. Mignon, France
Ambassador B. Jonsson, Iceland ( Chairman, WTO Sub-Committee on Least Developed
Countries)
Ms. Yuki Daijo, Japan
Mr. O.Genee, Netherlands
Mr. J. de Mol, NetherlandsWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 41
Mr. Hattrem, Norway
Mr. J. Borgstam, Sweden
Mr. Patrick Pardo, Switzerland
Mr. P.R.Jenkins, United Kingdom
Ms. Alice Greenidge, United StatesWT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 42
ANNEX 5: BANGLADESH CASE
1. Bangladesh is a special case for many reasons. First, Bangladesh plays an important role
among the LDCs as leader and spokesperson for the LDCs. Second, it progressed farthest in the
integrated IF process, being one of only five LDCs that so far has gone through to the RT stage.
Third, while Bangladesh began to liberalize its trade regime in the mid-1990s, the process sloweddown in the last two years, and therefore, the IF has the additional challenge of raising the
consciousness of policymakers, donors, and private sector alike to give new impetus to the process.
2. As the first step in the IF process, an independent policy institute , the Center for Policy
Dialogue (CPD), prepared a N eeds Assessment (NA) that indicated a good understanding of the IF
process. The close cooperation of the Ministry of  Commerce with the CPD brought together personnel
well-versed in the objectives of IF with individuals  with high technical competence. This interaction
provided a solid basis for a high-quality NA.
3. The GOB viewed the IF as a means to approach donors for additional assistance. In addition
the GOB understood the IF as a mechanism created to improve the use of existing funds through
better management and coordination to be achieved in the context of a common set of objectives.
Thus, in the minds of the GOB officials these two aims were not mutually exclusive. On the other
hand, the donor participants in the RT were taken somewhat by surprise that assistance sought underthe IF was to be additional to the normal flows of aid that Bangladesh had received from multilateral
and bilateral donors as part of their commitments. Particularly so, since Bangladesh was seen as
having difficulties in spending funds already pledged.
4. The time delays –for example, between the preparation of the NA  in September 1997 and the
creation of a Steering Committee in June 1999—created some cynicism among both governmentofficials and private sector leaders in Bangladesh. An Export Diversification Project financed by the
World Bank provided some support for the IF pr ocess –for example, funding the NA for the GOB—
and helped to speed up the process. As of March 2000, there was a perception that the IF process has
been going on too long with too few results. Another perception was that so far, there had been more
talk from multilateral and bilateral donors than action and commitment.
5. Interviews conducted by the review team revealed that all IF participants thought they had
done their work. However, there was no coherent strategy that linked the projects suggested in the
document submitted to the IF Round Table and, in the case of the World Bank, to its Country
Assistance Strategy, developed in consultation with the GOB and the various donors and multilateral
agencies.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 43
ANNEX 6: UGANDA CASE
1. Uganda improved its macroeconomic environment and witnessed impressive growth during
the last ten years. Nevertheless, it still faces numerous impediments that constrain its domestic supply
response to opportunities created by the multilateral trading system ruled by the WTO agreements.
Chief among these are: poor physical infrastructure (roads, railways), unreliable public utilities(power, water, telecommunications), low levels of education and skills, poor technological research
base, weak export institutional framework, market access problems, and limited access to trade
finance and cumbersome customs procedures.
2. Uganda faces several serious challenges with respect to trade. First, it must define its
relationship within the multilateral agreements with it s trading partners in Europe in the context of the
Lomé Convention, and with its neighbors in the regi on within the frameworks of East African Co-
operation (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The potential
impact of these relationships is not well understood by stakeholders, primarily because they were not
actively involved in shaping them. Secondly, Uganda  needs to make changes in legislation, regulatory
rules and enforcement to ensure consistency with various WTO and regional agreement provisions.
3. The IF for Uganda was initiated almost three years ago. Yet there still is confusion regarding
its objectives and scope. The review team also found mixed views on whether the IF objectives metthe country’s needs. Finally, some stakeholders have difficulty identifying tangible results from the
framework.
4. Uganda is the only country in the IF that has received additional funding under the IF. Several
reasons are adduced for this. The Government had made a strong commitment to trade reforms, so the
donors were prepared to support the IF process as an instrument to help Uganda in continuing thereforms.
5. In terms of the IF process itself, Uganda differed from other LDCs because the process was
mainstreamed from the beginning; i.e., the IF process was brought under the umbrella of the
Consultative Group supported by the World Bank. Therefore, the main foreign assistance agencies
were involved in the IF from the beginning. Many of the coordination difficulties encountered inparallel processes in other countries (including the Bangladesh case) did not prevail in Uganda.
6. However, the review team did not find it possible to evaluate the role of the IF on the ground,
i.e, in terms of the framework’s impact on Uganda’s export and macro-economic development. All it
could confirm was that the IF process has worked rather smoothly and benefited from the link to
country strategy from the start.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 44
ANNEX 7: SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dollar, David. (1992) “Outward Oriented Economie s Really do Grow more Rapidly: Evidence from
95 LDCs (1976-85).” Economic Development and Cultural Change  (April) pp 523-544.
Edwards, Sebastian. (1998) “Openness, Productiv ity and Growth: What do we Really Know?”
Economic Journal , 108 (March) pp 383-98.
Krueger, Anne and Sarath Rajapatirana. (1999) “World Bank Policies Towards Trade and Trade
Policy Reform.” World Economy , 22(6) August, pp 717-740.
Sachs, Jeffrey and Andrew Warner. (1995) “Eco nomic Reform and Global Economic Integration.”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity , Vol: 1, Washington, DC.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Annual Report for 1999 , Geneva.
World Trade Organization. Annual Report for 1999,  Geneva.WT/LDC/SWG/IF/1
Page 45
FACTUAL ADDENDUM
1. A few donors have provided ad hoc  resources to fund preparatory stages, including
strategy formulation leading to Round Tables.  For instance, the Agence Intergouvernementale de
la Francophonie (AIF) provided an amount of US$ 800,000 (partially funded by Canada) through
the International Trade Centre (ITC) to launch IF Round Tables in the Francophone LDCs and tostrengthen their capacities to participate actively in the IF process.
2. Concern for country ownership and demand-driven technical assistance was perceived to
have contributed to the initial slow progress.  This static picture of the IF was an accurate
description for the first two-years.  Subsequently, however, a more pro-active process was made
possible with the assistance provided by core Agencies in the framework of trade strategy
formulation and technical assistance priority setting.
3. In discussing the report, the core Agencies stressed that trade policy was important for all
core Agencies.
__________