Indonesia WT/TPR/S/117
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I. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
(1) I NTRODUCTION
1. Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Indonesia has embarked on a major economic reform
programme to restore growth, with some success.   Indonesia's macroeconomic policies improved with
the adoption of the IMF-supported stabilization programme.  The rupiah exchange rate stabilized and
growth rebounded relatively quickly to 4.9% in 2 000.  However, growth slowed in 2001 to 3.4%,
before rising again to 3.7% in 2002.  Indonesia has made steady progress towards its core economic
objectives, including fiscal consolidation, helped by reduced consumer fuel and food subsidies,
despite adverse domestic and external developments.  Structural reforms, also a key component of the
IMF programme, have centred on rehabilitating the financial sector, especially bank restructuring,
recapitalization and divestment of state-owned ente rprises, corporate debt rescheduling and, mainly at
the programme's commencement, trade liberalization;  however, recent signs of policy backsliding in
key areas, such as rice and sugar, may signal a more protectionist stance.
2. Despite notable improvements, Indonesia's economy remains frail;  growth is below other
Asian economies affected by the financial crisis.1  This crisis has heavily strained government
finances in Indonesia.  Public debt, although declin ing faster than expected, remains high, largely due
to the use of bonds to finance bank recapitalization and restructuring as well as the blanket guarantee
on bank liabilities.  Uncertainty associated with Indonesia's difficult political situation and demands
by key provinces for greater autonomy, along with periodic social unrest, has also hampered
economic recovery.  Weak economic governance and rule of law, reportedly high public corruption,
and delayed structural reforms in these areas, including privatization, strengthening of the commercial
court, revising bankruptcy laws, and establishing the anti-corruption commission, have also
undermined Indonesia's international image a nd sapped foreign investor confidence.2  Other negative
growth factors include the 1999 East Timor cr isis, the global economic slowdown following the
September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the serious impact on tourism and the
Indonesian economy generally of the Bali bombing in  October 2002.  The Government therefore faces
formidable challenges to overcome the chronic economic problems of heavy debt, low foreign
investment, and a weak banking system.  The Government has recently renewed efforts formacroeconomic and structural reform.
3. Indonesia is ranked 110
th overall on the UN development index, and is 57th in the medium
human development category (Table I.1).  GDP per capita in 2001 was US$678;  over 30% below the
1997 level (10% in rupiah terms).  It is rich in natural resources, and has a wide range of exports of
oil, gas, minerals, manufactured products (such as textiles, garments and electrical appliances) andagricultural commodities (including coffee, tea, rubber, timber, and palm oil), and shrimps.
Manufacturing accounted for  26% of GDP and around 75% of non-petroleum exports in 2001.  Oil
and gas is important to the economy, directly accounting for 14% of GDP in 2001 and 22% of
merchandise exports.  Services (including construction, electricity, gas, and water) accounted for 44%
of GDP in 2001.
                                                     
1 World Bank (2003), p. 1.
2 IMF (2002a).WT/TPR/S/117 Trade Policy Review
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Table I.1
Main economic and social indicators
Land area 1.9 million km2Urban share of population (2001) 44%
Population (2001) 213.5 million Nominal GDP at current market prices (2001) US$141.6 billion
Population growth (1995-01) 1.6% GDP per capita (2001) US$678
UN human development index (2000) GDP per capita annual growth rate (2001) 1.8%
- Overall ranking 110thGDP at constant 1993 prices (2001) Rp 411,690.7 billion
- Category Medium human
developmentGDP shares (2001):
     Primary
     Secondary     Services (incl. construct, elect, gas & water)30.0%
26.1%43.9%
- Ranking within category 57thEnrolment ratio (net) in education (2001)
Life expectancy at birth (2000) 68 years - primary 92.9%
Infant mortality rate per '000 (2001) 40.9 - secondary 48.8%
Adult literacy (2001) 89.3%
Source : UNDP (2002), Human Development Report ;  World Bank (2003), Indonesia Maintaining Stability, Deepening
Reforms , Report No. 25330-IND, January;  and Indonesian authorities.
(2) RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
4. Macroeconomic developments in 2001 and early 2002 were disappointing, due mainly to
internal factors, especially unresolved structural economic problems and high domestic risk and
uncertainty, which adversely affected production and investment.3  Growth slowed, inflation
accelerated, and the rupiah depreciated nominally.  Macroeconomic conditions have since appeared to
stabilize, despite the Bali setback, underpinned by continued fiscal consolidation, eased inflationary
pressures, a strengthened and less volatile rupiah exchange rate, and better than expected growth in2002.
(i) Growth and employment
5. Indonesia's recovery has slowed since 2000 when  growth accelerated to 4.9% (Table I.2).
Lower growth of 3.4% in 2001 and 3.7% in 2002, was largely due to sharply deteriorating investment
and exports resulting from internal structural problems and the global economic downturn.  Foreigninvestment remained negative in 2002, and exports declined slightly.  Indonesia's short-term growth
prospects are modest, and weaker than for many neighbouring economies.  Sustained economic
recovery requires not just greater political stability but also prudent macro-stabilization policies, and
greater policy coherence, including accelerated structural reforms to strengthen economic governance
and the institutions needed for an efficient private sector.  Restoring the overall investment climatewould help attract much-needed foreign investment, which has almost stopped;  it has one of the
highest country risk ratings in the region and some long-term investors, such as in the electronics
sector, have relocated offshore.
4
6. Recent growth has been driven mainly by consumption, boosted by higher minimum wages
and consumer credit.  Private consumption amounted to 69% of GDP in 2001 (62% in 1997).  In
contrast, investment has performed dismally.  Gross fixed capital formation fell sharply in 1998 and
1999, and although rebounding in 2000, contracted by 0.2% in 2002 (7.7% in 2001).  Gross
investment amounted to 20.2% of GDP in 2002.  In vestment approvals (domestic and foreign) are
well down (section (4)).  Manufacturing, previously  the main impetus to growth, slowed markedly in
late 2001 and early 2002;  output in some sectors, such as wood products and paper, declined.
Services growth also slowed overall, although elec tricity and transportation were the fastest growing
sectors.
                                                     
3 Bank Indonesia (2002a), p. 7.
4 World Bank (2003), p. 17.Indonesia WT/TPR/S/117
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Table I.2
Selected macroeconomic indicators, 1997-02
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001a2002b
National accounts (1993 constant prices) (Percentage change)
Real GDP, market prices 4.7 -13.1 0.8 4.9 3.4 3.7
Private consumption 7.8 -6.2 4.6 1.6 4.4 4.7
Total consumption 7.0 -7.1 4.3 2.0 4.8 5.5
Gross fixed capital formation 8.6 -33.0 -18.2 16.7 7.7 -0.2
Gross investment 28.3 25.4 20.1 21.8 21.8 20.2
Private consumption 61.7 67.8 73.9 67.3 67.3 70.7
Prices and interest rates
Consumer price inflation (period average) 6.1 58.5 20.5 3.7 11.5 11.9
Bank rate (December, per cent)c15.3
(17.4)25.6
(26.9)25.2
(24.6)12.9
(12.5)15.3
(14.8)15.8
(15.5)
Central bank certificates (SBI)  (period average) 14.5 49.3 23.1 12.5 16.6 14.9
Public finance (Per cent of GDP)
Budget deficit -0.7 -2.9 -1.5 -1.6 -2.7 -1.7
Expenditure 17.8 17.6 21.1 21.7 24.5 19.7
Revenue 17.2 15.4 18.6 20.3 20.7 18.0
Total outstanding public debt .. .. 105.4 138.4 100.1 89.2
Domestic debt .. .. 45.5 66.8 46.9 42.7
Monetary sector ( period average) (Percentage change)
M0 (base money) .. .. .. 18.6 17.9 9.1
M1 23.2 22.6 18.8 22.7 19.8 9.9
M2 22.2 62.3 11.9 9.9 14.7 8.1
External sector (Per cent of GDP, unless otherwise specified)
Trade balance 4.6 18.9 14.8 16.6 16.0 13.5
Services (net) -6.9 -14.7 -10.7 -11.3 -11.2 -9.2
Current account balance -2.3 4.2 4.1 5.0 4.7 4.0
Capital and financial account balance 1.2 -4.0 -3.3 -4.5 -4.8 -2.1
Official flows 1.3 10.2 3.8 2.1 -0.5 0
Private flows -0.1 -14.2 -7.1 -6.6 -5.9 -1.7
Foreign direct investment, net 2.1 -0.4 -2.0 -3.0 -4.2 -4.1
Portfolio investment, net -2.2 -13.8 -5.1 -3.6 -1.7 2.4
Total external debt (end-period)d62.1 154.8 106.2 94.0 94.0 76.4
Short-term external debt 15.0 16.9 12.9 15.4 .. 9.3
Debt-service ratioe30.0 31.7 30.4 41.0 39.7 32.2
Gross official reserves, US$ billionf17.5 23.6 27.3 29.4 28.0 31.6
Reserve cover (months of GS imports)g4.5 8.7 10.9 8.6 9.0 10.9
Exchange rate (percentage change, period average)
Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based)h-5.6 -51.7 45.2 -1.9 -4.7 26.1
Nominal effective exchange rate -9.1 -69.0 22.6 -5.3 -13.9 ..
Merchandise trade (average of imports and exports) 23.4 42.2 29.3 35.1 32.5 27.0
(Twelve-month growth rate in US$, end period, per cent)
Merchandise export growth 12.2 -10.5 1.7 26.5 1.9 -1.2
Merchandise import growth 4.5 -30.9 -4.2 21.1 8.1 -8.3
Memorandum items :
Nominal GDP (US$ billion) 219.0 97.5 139.5 150.7 141.6 171.9
Gross national savings (per cent of GDP) 31,5 26.5 19.5 25.6 24.9 21.1
Table I.2 (cont'd)WT/TPR/S/117 Trade Policy Review
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001a2002b
Gross domestic investment (per cent of GDP) 31.8 16.8 11.4 16.1 17.4 14.3
Exchange rate (Rupiah per US$, period average) 2,866 9,804 7,882 8,394 10,238 9,367
Unemployment rate (per cent) 4.7 5.4 6.3 6.1 8.0 9.1
.. Not available.
a Provisional.
bP r e l i m i n a r y .
c On rupiah six-month time deposits at state banks.  The rates in brackets are for foreign and joint banks.
d Includes both public and private debt.e Debt service as a share of exports of goods and non-factor services in convertible currencies.
f Total reserves, including gold, end-of-period.
g GS = goods and services.h Increase equals rupiah appreciation.
Source : Data from Bank Indonesia (2002), Annual Report 2001 ;  World Bank (2003), Indonesia Maintaining Stability,
Deepening Reforms , Report No. 25330-IND, January;  IMF (2002), Indonesia: Selected Issues , Country Report
No. 02/154, July;  IMF (2002), International Financial Statistics , CR-ROM, October;  World Bank (2002), World
Development Indicators 2002 , CD-ROM;  and Indonesian authorities.
7. Poverty alleviation, helped since the crisis by lower relative food prices, especially rice, has
stalled recently following subdued growth.  "Open" (involuntary formal and informal) unemployment
rose from 4.7% in 1997 to 9.1% 2002;  the unemployment rate would probably be much higher ifunder-employment were taken into account.  Rising unemployment is likely to continue until
substantive growth is restored;  annual growth of about 6% is needed to maintain current employment
levels.  Wages, especially for formal workers, have risen sharply, due mainly to higher minimum
wages (up on average by 30% in 2002) and higher  salaries for government employees (section
(2)(iv)).  Unless real wage increases  reflect improved productivity, growth and employment prospects
in key labour-intensive export industries, such as textiles and office electronics, may be threatened.
The Government established the Poverty Reduction Commission in late 2001 to develop a nationalpoverty reduction strategy by 2004.  The public interim (draft) strategy indicates that the
Government's objective is to mainstream poverty reduction into national pro-poor growth and
development policies, using the main pillars of opportunity creation, "empowerment", human capital
development, and social protection.  Efficient public provision of essential social and infrastructural
services, such as health, education, and transportation, helps alleviate poverty by "empowering" thepoor to undertake economic activities.  Trade policy reforms also combat poverty by improving
economic efficiency and growth, and lowering prices, especially for important staples, such as basic
food and clothing, which constitute a proportionately higher share of income for the poor.  Highertariffs on rice may thus worsen poverty by raising prices.
5
(ii) Stabilization policies
8. Indonesia's improved macroeconomic policies remain vulnerable to pressures arising from the
fragile economy, which is yet to establish robust growth prospects.
(a) Fiscal developments9. The fiscal deficit widened from 1.6% to 2.7% of GDP in 2001, but fell to 1.7% in 2002 (well
below the deficit target of 2.5%), despite adverse economic and political developments.  Fiscal
disciplines reflected mainly expenditure reforms,  such as cutting consumer fuel subsidies in
June 2001 and again in January 2002 when fuel prices were tied to international levels (an expected
                                                     
5 For example, raising tariffs from Rp 430 per kg. to Rp 510 per kg. could raise the poverty rate by up
to 0.5 percentage points (equivalent to one million people) relative to 2002 levels (World Bank, 2003, p. 45).Indonesia WT/TPR/S/117
Page 5
saving of Rp 37.2 trillion in 2002).6  Fuel subsidies are expected to fall from over 6% of GDP in 2000
to 0.7% in 2003.  Total public spending was expected to fall by 3% in 2002,  equivalent to 19.7% of
GDP (Tables I.2 and I.3).  Shortfalls in development spending also occurred, due mainly to low
utilization of foreign project loans.  Government revenue rose only slightly in 2002, representing
18.0% of GDP;  higher oil/gas revenues from rising world oil prices compensated for weaker non-oil
income tax and VAT receipts.7
Table I.3
Central government finances, 1997-02
(Rupiah billion)
1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000a2001 2002b
Revenue 107,965 146,872 204,422 205,335 299,842 304,182
Tax 81,752 118,795 135,533 115,913 184,737 214,074
Import duties 2,999 2,306 4,177 6,697 9,828 11,699
Export taxes 129 4,630 859 331 720 305
Oil and gas 15,431 15,431 35,854 66,661 81,885 64,026
Forestry 0 0 0 8,719 3,001 2,539
Expenditure 111,543 168,096 231,082 217,199 354,578 344,637
Current 75,232 115,272 173,444 178,587 232,796 200,138
Personnel 17,269 23,216 32,719 29,613 39,544 42,196
Transfers to regions 11,061 13,074 17,485 16,010 0 0
Debt service 16,735 32,574 42,288 50,068 95,527 91,583
On domestic debt 0 8,385 22,230 31,238 66,251 63,258
Subsidies 20,413 33,872 65,916 62,745 81,575 42,636
Fuel 9,814 28,607 40,923 53,810 68,381 31,162
Development 36,311 52,824 57,638 38,611 39,382 46,690
Balanced funds 0 0 0 0 82,400 94,038
Revenue sharing funds 0 0 0 0 21,183 24,266
General allocation fund 0 0 0 0 60,517 69,114
Overall deficit -3,578 -21,224 -26,660 -11,864 -54,737 -40,711
Domestic financing 0 1,634 16,867 18,900 44,190 23,993
Foreign financing 1,636 20,769 28,766 10,196 10,538 16,264
a Nine months, from 1 April to 31 December.  The fiscal year was changed from 1 April to 31 March to a calendar year in 2001.
b Provisional.
Source : World Bank (2003), Indonesia Maintaining Stability, Deepening Reforms , Report No. 25330-IND, January.
10. The Government remains committed to fiscal consolidation.  Revised 2003 budget estimates
envisage a slight increase in the deficit from 1.3%  of GDP to 1.8%, thus providing a modest fiscal
stimulus after the Bali incident.  The Government aims to ease fiscal pressures from greater receipts,
especially through IBRA asset sales, but a substantial shortfall in bank asset recoveries appears likely
(Chapter IV).  High public domestic debt (46.9% of GDP in 2001 and 42.7% in 2002) has sharply
raised interest payments, from Rp 8.4 trillion in 1998-99 to Rp 63.3 trillion in 2002 (Rp 66.3 trillionin 2001).  The budget deficit has been mainly domestically financed since 2000;  over two thirds of
interest payments in 2002 were on domestic debt.  While domestic financing requirements are
expected to fall in line with declining debt to GDP  ratios, public debt is likely to remain above the
                                                     
6 The Government announced in January 2003 that it would temporarily suspend the domestic fuel
pricing formula linked to world prices to cushion price in creases, especially for automotive and industrial diesel
and industrial kerosene (Ministry of Finance, 2003).
7 The Ministry of Finance is to undertake a comprehensive review with a view to overhauling the tax
structure so as to improve collection, eliminate exemptions, and reduce distorting rates by 2004 or 2005(Ministry of Finance, 2003).  A Large Taxpayers Office was also established in 2002 to improve taxadministration;  it handles the 200 largest taxpayers and collects about 40% of tax revenues.WT/TPR/S/117 Trade Policy Review
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pre-crisis level of 25% of GDP for some time.  Prudent fiscal policy and sound debt management are
therefore essential.
11. The Sovereign Debt Securities Law, passed in September 2002, facilitated debt management
by regulating the auction of treasury bonds to restructure government debt;  Rp 2 trillion of treasury
bills were auctioned in December 2002 to redeem securities maturing in February 2003.
Recapitalization bonds held by state banks, worth Rp 22 trillion, some maturing in 2004 and 2005,were also re-scheduled.  In addition, the Government has agreed (pending parliamentary approval) to
finance past Bank Indonesia liquidity credits (BLBI)  to banks by swapping Rp 160 trillion of BLBI
bonds (out of a total Rp 218 trillion) with "perpetual promissory notes" (PPN).  These measures have
aided macroeconomic stability by cutting domestic debt repayments due in 2004 and 2005.
(b) Monetary and exchange rate developments
8
12. Inflationary and exchange rate pressures persist, but eased slightly in late 2002, in line with
Bank Indonesia's implementation of indicative inflation and monetary targets.9  Inflation (CPI) more
than doubled in 2001 to 11.5% and while rising slightly to 11.9% in 2002, fell from 15.1% in
February to 10% in December (just above the Bank's CPI target of 9-10%);  "core" inflation declined
to 7% in 2002.  The rupiah depreciated by 17% against the U.S. dollar in 2001 as the investmentclimate deteriorated and political and economic uncertainties worsened, but rebounded in 2002,
including after the Bali bombing, to appreciated by, on average, 12%;  thereby lessening inflationary
pressures from induced price rises, especially on imported inputs.  Government reforms to raise
administered prices, such as by cutting fuel subsidies and increasing transportation fares and
electricity charges, along with higher minimum wages and civil service salaries have exacerbated
inflation.
10  Monetary policy initially responded slowly to inflationary pressures;  money supply
expanded in 2000 (M0 by 18.6% and M2 by 9.9%), interest rates declined and consumer creditremained buoyant.  Base money growth and inflati on frequently exceeded targets during this period,
despite several downward revisions.  Money supply  growth continued in 2001 (M0 by 17.9% and M2
by 14.7%).  Monetary policy effectiveness was weakened by the public's high propensity to hold
currency, and poor bank intermediation;  this high share of assets held in riskless government
securities increased bank liquidity.
11
13. Tighter monetary policy during 2002, through open market operations and other measures
such as selling foreign exchange receipts to offs et government spending from international reserves,
                                                     
8 Since August 1997, when the flexible crawling peg exchange rate mechanism was abandoned due to
the currency crisis, the rupiah has floated, subject to central bank intervention.  The authorities indicated thatsuch intervention supports monetary management by evening out daily exchange rate fluctuations, and does notinfluence the rupiah's underlying market value.
9 The 1999 banking legislation requires Bank Indonesia to announce indicative inflation and monetary
growth targets.  The core inflation target was set at 4-6% from 2000, and base money (M0) expansion at 11-12%
for 2001 and 13-14% for 2002.  In 2002, CPI inflation replaced core inflation, which excluded the impact ofgovernment policies on prices, as the target to improve monetary policy effectiveness by enhancingtransparency and public acceptance.  Mid-term inflatio n targets were also adopted, and set at 6-7% by 2006
(Bank Indonesia, 2002a).  The act also strengthened the bank's independence by declaring it to be "anindependent state institution", and reinforced as its main objective the setting of monetary policy to maintain a
stable currency, including internationally;  other tasks include safeguarding the payments system and regulatory
supervision of banks).
10 These measures directly accounted for almost four percentage points (about one third) of inflation in
2001 (Bank Indonesia, 2002a).
11 Bank Indonesia (2002a).Indonesia WT/TPR/S/117
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reduced liquidity and contained inflation, thereby alleviating interest rate pressures.12  Base money
grew at 9.1%, below the target.  The Bank's CPI inflation and base money growth targets for 2003 are
9% (+ or -1%) and 13%, respectively;  medium-term r eal interest rates of 4-5% are also targeted.  The
rupiah remained relatively resilient in 2002, appreciating to around Rp 9,000 per U.S. dollar, buoyed
by the Government's economic and political response to the Bali incident.  Due to Indonesia's higher
albeit declining inflation, relative to its major trading partners, the rupiah appreciated in real terms by26.1% in 2002 (Table I.2).  This may undermine Indonesia's competitiveness at home (against
imports) and in export markets, at a time of rising real wages and when its traditional exports, such as
clothing and footwear, face intensive competition from China in third markets.
13
(iii) Balance of payments and external debt
14. Indonesia's trade surplus has improved since the crisis, helped initially by the substantial real
rupiah depreciation (51.7%) in 1998, but declin ed from 16.6% of GDP in 2000 to 13.5% in 2002
(Table I.2).14  Exports, although rebounding in 2000 to grow by 26.5%, grew by only 1.9% in 2001
and declined by 1.2% in 2002.  Current account surpluses, reduced by deficits on "invisibles"
(services), fell from 4.7% of GDP in 2001 to an estimated 4.0% in 2002 (peaking at 5% in 2000).Substantial capital account deficits have occurred  since 1998, peaking at 4.8% of GDP in 2001 (2.1%
in 2002).  These reflect large private investment  outflows of between 1.7% of GDP (2002) and 7.1%
(1999), and declining (negative in 2001) net official inflows.  Overall, the balance of payments has
been in surplus, except for 2001.  International reserves provided almost 11 months of import cover in
2002 (US$31.6 billion, up from US$28 billion).  These current account surpluses reflect the excess ofgross national savings over domestic investment.
15. The balance of payments remains vulnerable to high, albeit declining, external debt (down
from 154.8% of GDP in 1998 to 76.4% in 2002);  short-term (under one year) debt amounted to some
9% of GDP in 2002 (around half of international reserves).  Most  (56%) external debt in 2002 waspublic (rising from US$67 billion in 1998 to US$73 billion), while private debt (including that of
state-owned enterprises) fell from US$78 billion to  US$58 billion.  Restructuring "distressed" (or
non-performing) private external debt has been rela tively slow, due mainly to disagreements between
parties on terms, declining collateral asset values, high country risk, which raised interest costs and
discouraged foreigners from taking over debt, exchange rate volatility, and uncertainty in lawenforcement.  Over half of corporate external debt still failed to meet repayments at end 2001.
Restructured debts reported to Bank Indonesia covered only 68 corporations and totalled
US$4.1 billion, or just 13.7% of non-performing corporate foreign debt.
16. Official external debt has been substantially restructured.  A third Paris Club agreement in
April 2002 rescheduled repayments of US$5.4 billion (over two thirds of Indonesia's budget deficit)
due between April 2002 and December 2003.  A London Club rescheduling on similar terms was
agreed in September 2002.  Indonesia intends to end the Paris Club rescheduling in early 2004;  this
will add US$3 billion in debt servicing.  Indonesia's debt service ratio declined from 41% in 2000 to
32.2% in 2002.
                                                     
12 Bank Indonesia also introduced controls in 2001 prohibiting rupiah transfers by Indonesian banks to
non-residents (particularly those involving no underlying transactions supporting Indonesian economic activity)and limiting derivative transactions by non-residents and foreign currency credit offered by banks, to stemcurrency speculation and internationalization of the rupiah (Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 3/3/2001,
12 January 2001).
13 Indonesia's market share in G-7 countries is stagnant, while that of China is increasing rapidly
(World Bank, 2003, p. 7).
14 Major real appreciations of the rupiah in 1999 and 2002 have, however, removed most of this
advantage.WT/TPR/S/117 Trade Policy Review
Page 8
(iv) Structural reforms
17. A key component of the IMF's rescue programme remains wide-ranging structural reforms to
improve the economy's efficiency and private-sector growth through strengthened economic
governance and institutions, including divestment of  state ownership in banking and other key sectors
(Box I.1).  Such reforms should contribute to Indonesia's international competitiveness.15  Many of
these reforms have been delayed, however.  Legal and judicial reforms to establish better rule of law,
more independent and less corrupt courts, and improved governance, as well as establishing the Anti-
Corruption Commission, have lagged.  Some newly created institutions, such as the National
Ombudsman Commission and the Commission to Audit the Wealth of State Officials, are also
working under difficult political, economic, and legal constraints.  The Commercial Court, establishedin 1998 as part of revised bankruptcy legislation, has not restored confidence in the legal system.
16
The Court's credibility has been undermined by inconsistent decisions; cases heard have declinedsubstantially and further amendments to bankruptcy legislation have been delayed.  Privatization has
also been slow;  initial plans to divest state eq uity in 25 enterprises have not been met, amidst
stiffening political opposition, and deadlines for divesting recapitalized state banks have been missed.
18. However, reforms appear to have accelerated, especially since late 2002.  Legislation to
establish the Anti-Corruption Commission was passed in November.  Two major state banks, BCA
and Bank Niaga, were divested in March and November 2002, respectively, and Bank Bali merged
with four weak recapitalized banks to form Bank Pertamina in September.  Renewed timetables fordivesting state banks were announced, based on par liamentary approval obtained in November;  at
least 51% equity in Bank Danamon is to be sold to a strategic partner in early 2003, and shares in
Bank Lippo, Bank Mandiri, and Bank International Indonesia are to be sold to the public.  A 42%
stake in the majority-state-owned telecommunications company, Indosat, was divested overseas in
December 2002, and privatization receipts exceeded the budget target.
19. Wholesale fiscal decentralization has devolved significant expenditure and revenue
responsibilities to the provincial and local governments (Chapter II).  These changes were
implemented rapidly following increased pressures for regional autonomy after the Asian crisis and as
part of Indonesia's democratic transition.  While generally successful, decentralization has generatedbusiness uncertainty and adversely affected the investment climate.
17  The changes have implications
for foreign investment, including approvals, and allow regions greater autonomy to impose taxes,
fees, and levies on business (Chapter II(8)).  Some resource-rich provinces, such as Aceh and Papua,
have been granted Special Autonomy Status a nd have specific revenue-sharing agreements.
20. Labour market policies have changed following the collapse of real wages during the crisis
and recent political reforms.  Increased labour market regulation, especially setting and enforcing
minimum wages, is now a key plank of employment  policy.  Authority to set minimum wages was
devolved to regional governments in 2001;  provinces set the wage floors and districts set minimum
levels within their jurisdiction.  Wide disparities ex ist in these decentralized minimum wages, with the
highest in industrial regions.18  Real minimum wages rose nationally by around 20% in 2000, 2001,
                                                     
15 Indonesia is ranked well down on world competitiveness indicators.  For example, one such exercise
ranked it 47th out of 49 countries in 2002 (IMD International, 2002).
16 World Bank (2003).
17 World Bank (2003).
18 Minimum wages differ between provinces and districts, and vary within industries in one district. At
Rp 576,000, Jakarta had the highest monthly minimum wage in 2002, followed by Papua (Rp 530,000) and EastKalimantan (Rp 500,000).Indonesia WT/TPR/S/117
Page 9
and 2002, to well (50%) above pre-crisis levels.19  Such labour market rigidities may jeopardize
economic growth and employment generation if real wages  substantially exceed productivity levels.20
Box I.1:  IMF Structural Benchmarks (June-December 2002)
June 2002
- Finalize and implement burden-sharing on Bank Indonesia credits with the Government;
- Commence operations of Large Taxpayer Direct orate at headquarters of the Directorate-
General of Tax, and 1-2 large-taxpayer offices in Jakarta;
- Produce report on 2001 local government finances;
- Achieve at least half of 2002 ta rget for privatization receipts;
- Establish Anti-Corruption Commission;  and
- Collect at least Rp 13.0 trillion in cash by IBRA (net of expenses).
July 2002
- Begin primary auctions of treasury bills;
- Implement new tax filing and payment systems at large-taxpayer office(s);
- Under the Bank BII strategy, reduce fully the equity position of the original shareholders
and install an independent management team;
- Finalize and publish initial determinations of former bank owners’ compliance for each of
the shareholder settlement agreements;  and
- Launch sale of majority stake in Bank Danamon.
15 September 2002
- Conclude majority sale of Bank Niaga.
September 2002
- Collect at least Rp 3.5 trillion in cash by IBRA (net of expenses).
October 2002
- Complete restructuring of Bank Indonesia’s overseas subsidiary in preparation for its
divestiture.
December 2002
- Complete third round of special audits of state enterprises and ad apt corrective actions;
- Collect at least Rp 36.1 trillion in cash by IBRA (net of expenses);
- Launch sale of majority stake in Bank Lippo;  and
- Complete sale of majority stake in bank Danamon.
Source: IMF, Indonesia – Letter of Intent , 11 June 2002 [Online].  Available at:  http://www.imf.org/
external/np/loi/2002/idn/02/index.htm.
21. Structural reforms have also focused on rehabilitating the banking system.  Indonesia
recognizes the importance of sound banking and financial systems to efficiently mobilize and channel
savings into productive investments.  This requires disclosure of accurate financial information, a
sound legal system, and an effective prudential regulatory framework.  Pre-crisis deficiencies in the
financial system included inadequate supervision and weak regulation, poor enforcement, ineffectivedisclosure requirements, and, in some cases, distorted incentives for project selection and credit
allocation based on non-market criteria.  While financial reforms have been at the heart of Indonesia's
economic recovery programme, progress has been slow.  Good progress has been made, however, by
the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), and in reforming the banking legislation and the
prudential responsibilities and supervisory requirements of Bank Indonesia (Chapter IV(5)(i)(a)).
                                                     
19 IMF (2002b) and World Bank (2003), p. 20.
20 Evidence suggests that sharply rising minimum wages is already diminishing employment
generation.  See Social Monitoring and Early Response Unit (2001).WT/TPR/S/117 Trade Policy Review
Page 10
Nevertheless, contingent liabilities from the banking sector constitute the country's greatest fiscal
risk.21
22. Corporate restructuring is continuing.  Total corporate debt stood at US$127.6 billion in
May 2002;  some 57% comprised non-performing loans.  IBRA held about one fifth of these loans at
end 1992, and is moving to auction them, thereby recovering on average some 25%.  The mandate ofthe Jakarta Initiative Task Force (JITF), formed to fa cilitate corporate debt restructuring by providing
technical support to affected companies, was extended until end 2003.  It had restructured corporate
debt totalling US$18.8 billion (at December 2002) , and was mediating another US$10.1 billion of
debt covering 40 companies.  Nonetheless, progress has been slow.  The Indonesian Debt
Restructuring Agency (INDRA) also facilitated debt restructuring by guaranteeing foreign exchangefor domestic firms that reached agreements with creditors.  The Interbank Exchange Offer (IEO),
whereby Bank Indonesia guaranteed overseas loans, facilitated the restructuring of most inter-bank
foreign debt.
(3) D
EVELOPMENTS IN TRADE
(i) Trade in goods
23. While merchandise trade had rebounded after the crisis, performance deteriorated in 2001 and
2002 due to a worsening Indonesian economy associated with political and economic uncertainties,
and depressed overseas markets.  Merchandise trade (average of exports and imports) as a share ofGDP declined from 35.1% in 2000 to an estimated 27% in 2002.
(a) Composition of trade
24. The share of manufactured exports increased to 56% of total exports in 2001 (44.1% in 1998)
(Chart I.1).  This largely reflected increased e xport shares for machinery and transport equipment
(16.2%), especially office machines and telecommunications equipment, and textiles and clothing(13.7%).  The share of oil and gas exports ("fuels") increased from 19.3% in 1998 to 25.3% in 2001,while that of agricultural products, especially natural rubber, declined (15.8% to 12.5%).
25. Imports are mainly manufactured products, although their share fell in 2001 to 61.1% (69.1%
in 1998).  While the share of transport equipment and chemicals rose substantially, the share of non-electrical machinery has almost halved since 1998 (13.3% in 2001).  The import share of fuels has
almost doubled since 1998 (17.8% in 2001), while the share for agriculture products has remained
largely unchanged at 17%.
(b) Direction of trade
26. Indonesia's geographical trade structure has not changed substantially since 1998.  East Asian
countries are Indonesia's major trading partners, accounting for over half of exports and imports
(Chart I.2).  East Asian markets, especially Japan and Korea, are also major destinations for
Indonesia's oil and gas exports.  Japan is Indonesia's main trading partner (23.1% of exports and
15.1% of imports in 2001).  Indonesia's second largest trading partner in 2001 was the EU (13.8% of
exports and 13.1% of imports;  the 1998 import share was 21.5%), followed by the United States(13.8% of exports and 10.4% of imports) and Sing apore (9.5% of exports and 10.2% of imports).
China's share of Indonesian imports rose to 6% in 2001 (3.3% in 1998).
                                                     
21 World Bank (2003), p. 13.Indonesia WT/TPR/S/117
Page 11
Chart I.1
Product composition of merchandise trade, 1998 and 2001
1998 2001
(a)    Exports
Other
16.4
Manufactures
44.1
Total:   US$48.9 billion Total:  US$56.3 billion
(b)    Imports
Iron & steel 
5.2Non-
electrical
 machinery
23.6
Other semi-manuf.
5.7Food
10.5
Transport equip.  6.1
Fuels  
9.8Electrical 
machines
6.7
Manufactures
69.1
Chemicals
15.1Textiles & clothing  3.8Other 
consumer
  goods  
2.9Food
9.9 Textiles & clothing  3.6
Fuels  
17.8
Other semi-
manufactures
4.4Transport equipment
11.2
Iron & steel
4.0Manufactures
61.1
Chemicals
17.4
Total:   US$27.3 billion Total:   US$31.0 billionPer cent
Manuf.
56.0Other 
0.8Food 
8.9
Fuels  
25.3
Non-electrical 
machinery
13.3Agricultural raw 
materials 
4.5Textiles & clothing
13.7
 Electrical machines
4.7Other
consumer 
goods
2.5Other 
0.4Food 
11.3
Machinery &
 transport equip.
9.5Fuels
19.3Textiles & 
clothing
10.2Other consumer 
goods  8.2
Machinery &
 transport equip.
16.2Other consumer goods
           8.4
Other mining
3.7Other mining
5.5Chemicals
5.0Chemicals
4.3 Other semi-manuf.
11.9
Note: Trade statistics used in this chart differ from those in the text, which are sourced from Bank Indonesia.
Source :  UNSD, Comtrade database (SITC Rev.3).Other semi-manuf.
12.6
Other mining
3.4Mining
23.7Agric.
15.8
Other mining
4.4Agric.
12.5Agricultural raw 
materials 
3.6
Mining
30.8
Agric.
17.3Agric.
17.2
Mining
21.5Mining
13.2Agricultural raw 
materials 
6.7Agricultural raw 
materials 
7.4WT/TPR/S/117 Trade Policy Review
Page 12
Chart I.2
Direction of merchandise trade, 1998 and 2001
1998 2001
(a)    Exports
Other East Asia
35.1
Middle East   3.4Korea, Rep. of
            5.3
Africa   1.9
United States
 14.4Other 
ASEAN
7.4
Total:  US$48.9 billion Total:  US$56.3 billion
(b)    Imports
Other America
3.7United States
12.9
EU15
21.5Other East Asia
29.2
Other  1.6China
6.0
Japan
15.1 Australia  5.9
EU15
13.1Othe East Asia
32.6
United States
10.4
Total:  US$27.3 billion Total:  US$31.0 billion
Note:   Trade statistics used in this chart differ from those in the text, which are sourced from Bank Indonesia.  
Source :  UNSD, Comtrade database (SITC Rev.3).Per cent
Korea, Rep. of
              6.7
H.K., China  2.3
Other East Asia
39.9China
3.9
Other Europe  1.2Chinese Taipei  3.9
Other America
2.5Africa  2.1
EU15
13.8United States
13.8
Other E. Asia  1.0Japan
15.7 Other E. Asia  0.9
Australia  6.4Oceania  3.7South Asia  2.9
EU15
15.9Middle East  3.3 Other America  2.4Other America
2.7Oceania  3.5South Asia  2.6
Other Europe  1.4
China 
3.3
Middle East  3.4Other   1.2
Middle East
7.8Japan
23.1
Korea, Rep. of  
     7.1     Korea, Rep. of 
                  5.6China 3.8
Chinese Taipei  3.5Hong Kong, China  3.8
Singapore
11.7Singapore
9.5
Other 
Europe  
1.8Other Europe  1.8Singapore
9.3
Singapore
10.2Chinese Taipei  
   3.5
Chinese Taipei  3.6
Africa   4.4Africa   1.6South Asia  2.2
South Asia  1.7
Other 
ASEAN
7.4Other 
ASEAN
7.2Japan
18.7
Other 
ASEAN
7.4
ASEAN
17.6ASEAN
16.5ASEAN
19.1 ASEAN
16.9Indonesia WT/TPR/S/117
Page 13
27. Indonesia's share of exports to ASEAN partners decreased from 19.1% of exports in 1998 to
16.9% in 2001.  Over the same period, its share of  imports from ASEAN part ners increased slightly
from 16.5% to 17.6%.  ASEAN members may be diverting trade between themselves and non-
members by providing each other tariff preferences on most imports under AFTA (Chapters II and
III).
(ii) Trade in services
28. Indonesia incurs a yearly net deficit on services trade of about US$15 billion (around 10% of
GDP in 2001).  Three quarters of this relates to non-oil and gas imports.
(4) FOREIGN INVESTMENT PATTERNS
29. Foreign investment has performed badly since the economic crisis, and has been adversely
affected by subsequent events, such as political and economic uncertainties in 2001 and 2002.  Private(net) investment outflows from Indonesia have occurred in each year since 1997, peaking at 14.2% of
GDP in 1998, and declining to 5.9% (US$8.3 billio n) in 2001 and 1.7% (US$3 billion) in 2002.
Direct and portfolio investments have both suffered;  in 2001, net direct investment outflows were
US$5.9 billion.  However, portfolio investment turned positive in 2002 (US$3.9 billion).  Restoring
investor confidence to attract foreign direct investment, especially in key sectors such as mining, is amajor challenge confronting Indonesia.
30. Indonesia's investment performance has deteriorated sharply in recent years, dropping from
having "high FDI performance and low potential" in 1988-90 to having" low FDI performance and
low potential" in 1998-00.  Its ranking slipped from 63
rd to 138th on performance, and from 73rd to
110th (out of 140 countries) on potential.22  The establishment of a National Investment Team was
recently announced to help improve the investment climate, and the Government approved a "One
Roof" investment facility in the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) to help investors withinvestment approval and in implementing plans.  Recent privatizations in telecommunications and
banking may also help stimulate foreign investment.
31. The investment downturn is reflected in declining foreign direct investment levels approved
by the Investment Coordination Board.
23  While very few approvals are currently being implemented,
such trends may provide a useful guide to investor sentiment.  Such approvals more than halved from
1977, to US$15.0 billion in 2001, and fell again substantially in 2002 to US$6.5 billion (Table I.4).
The largest fall was in 1998;  a recovery in approvals in 2000 was short-lived.  Approvals declined
across all sectors.  Most recent foreign investment approvals have been in services (49% in 2002, up
from 29% in 1997), followed by manufacturing (44% in 2002, down from 69% in 1997).  FDI stocks
amounted to US$57.3 billion in 2001.24
32. Most direct investment approvals are from Asia, especially from Japan, Malaysia, and
Singapore; these accounted for over two thirds of total approvals in 2001 (Table I.5).  European
investment approvals, especially from UK and Germany, have declined more sharply; their share of
approvals fell from 35% in 1997 to 10% in 2001.
                                                     
22 UNCTAD (2002).
23 Figures for domestic investment approvals also show a large fall in investor activity, which fell by
50% in 1998 and again by 36% in 2001 (Bank Indonesia, 2002a).
24 UNCTAD (2002).WT/TPR/S/117 Trade Policy Review
Page 14
Table I.4
Approved foreign direct investment by sector, 1997-02
(US$ million)
Sector 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Agriculture, forestry & fish 464 998 492 445 393 402
Agriculture 437 965 413 390 367 390
F o r e s t r y 0095 2 09
Fish 27 33 70 50 6 3
Mining 2 0 14 1 118 37
Manufacturing 23,017 8,388 6,335 9,597 5,145 2,880
Food 572 342.0 681 701 289 219
Textiles 373 217 240 401 330 62
Wood 70 71 113 157 21 24
Paper 5,353 41 1,412 88 742 10
Chemical & pharmaceuticals 12,376 6,179 3,267 7,375 2,310 1,785
Non-metal mineral products 1,457 237 110 10 108 21
Basic metals 357 394 501 831 1,007 460
Other 127 17 10 35 337 298
Services 9,644 4,171 4,051 5,241 9,387 3,180
Construction 307 198 153 161 37 60
Hotels 463 451 229 257 6,892 236
Transportation 5,900 79 103 1,217 374 1,550
Real estate 1,394 1,271 171 302 178 6
Other 1,581 2,171 3,396 3,305 1,908 1,327
Total 33,127 13,557 10,892 15,284 15,043 6,499
Source: World Bank (2003), Indonesia Maintaining Stability, Deepening Reforms , Report No. 25330-IND, January.
Table I.5
Approved foreign direct investment by source, 1997-01(Per cent)
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Europe 34.7 39.2 6.7 38.4 10.2
Netherlands 0.9 3.0 0.4 7.6 1.0
United Kingdom 16.2 35.0 4.7 23.4 8.1
Germany 13.2 0.5 0.8 6.3 0.5
France 1.4 <0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2
America 3.3 5.2 1.3 1.7 0.9
United States 3.3 4.2 1.3 1.6 0.8
Asia 44.8 34.5 59.6 24.9 68.5
Hong Kong, China 0.7 4.0 0.7 0.7 0.4
Japan 16.0 9.8 5.9 12.8 8.5
South Korea 4.2 1.5 2.4 4.5 4.0
Malaysia 6.8 7.8 1.7 1.1 24.8
Singapore 6.8 9.3 6.7 3.5 12.6
Chinese Taipei 10.1 1.2 13.7 0.9 0.8
Australia 0.6 0.6 22.7 0.4 2.9
Africa 0.3 0.5 0.6 3.1 6.2
Joint countries 16.3 20.0 9.1 31.5 11.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:  Bank Indonesia (2002), Annual Report 2001 .Indonesia WT/TPR/S/117
Page 15
(5) OUTLOOK
33. The economic recovery, which was showing encouraging signs from mid 2002 due to the
improved macroeconomy, and less political uncertainty, suffered another major setback from the Bali
terrorist attack in October 2002.  While the economic outlook has deteriorated, the full economic
impact remains uncertain, and will depend largely upon the Government's policy responses.  Its re-
commitment to sound stabilization policies and structural reforms is encouraging.  These helpedregain relative stability of the rupiah and the Jakarta stock exchange by end 2002.  Indonesia's recent
macroeconomic efforts, including continued tight monetary policy to control inflation, and approval
of only a mildly expansionary 2003 budget, up from 1.3% of GDP to 1.8% (1.7% deficit in 2002),
will help consolidate the fiscal position.  High public debt levels, declining faster than expected, are
forecast to fall further with continued fiscal co nsolidation; the Government intends to reduce the
budget deficit to under 1% of GDP in 2004.
25  While the Government's fiscal requirements remain
substantial, maintaining fiscal discipline and implementing further key structural reforms would
promote robust economic growth.
34. The Government's 2003 growth target was revise d downwards in the Budget from 5% to 4%,
and subsequently to 3.5-4%.  The World Bank projects that the Bali fallout could reduce growth by asmuch as 1 percentage point, and has forecast lower growth of 3% to 3.5%.
26  G r o w t h  w i l l  r e m a i n
consumption driven.  The authorities expect the overall balance-of-payments surplus to fall by over
US$2 billion in 2003,  reflecting a reduced current account surplus from lower tourism receipts (a
major export earner accounting for about 10% of total exports), and an increased capital account
deficit due to larger private investment outflows.  Inflation, reduced during 2002, is expected to fall
further in 2003 to the 9% target.  The currency is forecast to stabilize at existing levels of around
9,000 rupiah per U.S. dollar.
                                                     
25 Ministry of Finance (2003).
26 World Bank (2003), p. 13.