RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTGP/M/17
15 April 2003
(03-2084)
Working Group on Transparency
in Government Procurement
REPORT ON THE MEETING OF 7 FEBRUARY 2003
Note by the Secretariat
1. The Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement held its seventeenth
meeting on 7 February 2003 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ronald Saborío Soto
(Costa Rica).
2. The agenda for the meeting consisted of:  (i) transparency-related provisions in existing
international instruments on government procurement and national procedures and practices;(ii) technical assistance and capacity building;  (iii) observer status of international intergovernmental
organizations;  and (iv) date of the next meeting.  The Working Group agreed to adopt the agenda as
proposed.
A. TRANSPARENCY -RELATED PROVISIONS IN EXISTING INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND NATIONAL PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES
3. By way of a general statement under this agenda item, the representative of Sri Lanka said
that his Government attached great importance to transparency in government procurement, which it
considered as being critical to good governance, and building confidence in the management of
government affairs.  A transparent government procurement system helped governments to achieve
greater value for money, ensure efficient use of public resources, and purchase better quality goods
and services.  Commenting on the work done in the Working Group, he said that his Government had
carefully examined many aspects of transparency in  government procurement.  As reflected by the
documentation before the Working Group, since its establishment in 1996, considerable progress had
been made in examining the issu es related to transparency in government procurement;  a large
number of submissions on relevant specific issues had been made;  Members had exchanged
information on national procedures and practices;  and information had been provided on
transparency-related provisions in international instruments.  Considering that the procurement
systems of many countries were based on th e UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods,
Construction and Services, and that many countries followed the World Bank Guidelines when
undertaking certain types of procurements, those instruments could be drawn upon by the Working
Group to advance its work.  A multilateral agreement on transparency in government procurement did
not need to be a complex undertaking and the Doha Ministerial Declaration had narrowed its scope bylimiting the parameters to transparency aspects and by providing explicitly that an agreement neither
restrict domestic preference nor require market access commitments.  Further, publication of
information on national legislation and procedures was a necessary element of a transparent
procurement system.  While its views were flexible w ith regard to the issues pertaining to information
on procurement opportunities, tendering and qualification procedures, time-periods, transparency ofqualification procedures and transparency of decisions on contract awards, his delegation believed
that there was a need for more focused discussions on the elements relating to definition and scope,
procurement methods and domestic review procedures and its relationship to the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding so as to allow further clarity to emerge on these four issues.  Finally, hisWT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 2
delegation recognized the importance of a multilateral agreement on transparency in government
procurement, and believed that the elements contained in the submissions made so far and the work in
the Working Group would contribute to positive decisions at the Cancun Ministerial Conference on
this important subject.
4. The Working Group took up the items in the informal note by the Chairman "List of Issues
Raised and Points Made" contained in JOB(99 )6782 of November 1999.  Comments were made on
items I, VIII and XI.
5. In relation to item I, namely definition and scope of government procurement, the
representative of Sri Lanka said that higher threshold values should be applied in respect of
requirements for developing countries on account of their limited administrative and technical
capacity to apply the future requirements.
6. Addressing the issue of whether both goods and services should be covered by a possible
future multilateral agreement, the representative of Sri Lanka said that there might be a need to
provide flexibility for developing countries in the procurement of services, as small-sized developing
countries did not procure services of a significant nature.  However, his delegation also recognized
that procurement of goods was often associated with procurement of services and, therefore, there was
a need to find a way to accommodate this aspect.
7. The representative of Switzerland said that the Working Group might need to explore further
the possibility of applying different threshold values and including flexibility for developing countries
in the area of services in a future agreement.
8. The representative of Malaysia, joined by the representatives of Venezuela, India, Pakistan,
and Egypt, reiterated their delegations' position that any eventual agreement should be limited in
scope to goods only and should not include services.  Supported by the representative of Pakistan, the
representative of India said that bringing the issue of transparency in procurement of services within
the ambit of the discussion of the Working Group went beyond its mandate.  The representatives ofPakistan and Egypt
 said that the Group should seek to build on the progress made in the discussions
pertaining to transparency in relation to goods procurement.  Reopening the issue of transparency in
procurement of services might be counter-productive.
9. The representative of India asked whether all the elements identified in the Group related to
transparency in their entirety.  Even on those elements where such a relationship had been established,
the purely transparency-related aspects of procurement procedures as against application of
transparency in the larger context of the procurement activity needed further clarification.  India
continued to remain unconvinced about considering any future obligations on transparency in
procurement of services or a combination of goods and services.
10. The representative of the European Communities,  joined by the representatives of Chinese
Taipei and the United States, said that the substance of the Working Group's discussion was
transparency in the procurement process, irrespective of whether this related to contracts for goods,
services or a combination of both.  The representative of Chinese Taipei said that, since a future
agreement would not have a market access component, it should have a broad coverage extending to
goods, services and construction services.  The representative of the United States said that, given the
difficulty of distinguishing between procurement th at should be subject to transparency rules and
others that should not and that procurement regimes in most countries applied the same rules to
procurement of both goods and services, it was important that the whole system, including goods and
services, be transparent.  The United States therefore considered it important that the coverage of afuture agreement be extended to both goods and services.WT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 3
11. The representative of Brazil said that the divergence of views on the issue of scope and
coverage was a problem that was likely to recur throughout most of the other provisions, the more
prescriptive a future agreement tended to be.  The Group should reflect upon whether there was a
need for a future agreement to specify whether it covered goods and services.  In Brazil there was one
legislation which covered goods, works and services.  Commitment to transparency in a procurementlegislation implied agreeing to transparency in all sectors.
12. Continuing with the discussion of the items in the informal note by the Chairman, the Group
took up items VIII and XI, namely domestic review procedures and application of WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedures.  For the discussion of these items, the Group had before it a communication
by the United States entitled "Considerations related to Enforcement of an Agreement on
Transparency in Government Procurement" and a communication from the European Communities
entitled "Domestic Review Mechanisms Related to Transparency in Government Procurement"contained in documents WT/WGTGP/W/38 and 39, respectively.
13. The representatives of the United States and the European Communities
 introduced their
delegations' respective communications.
14. The Working Group heard comments related to the suggestion by the United States that the
obligations of a transparency agreement should be  subject to the same types of enforcement as
existing commitments in other WTO agreements.
15. The representative of Sri Lanka considered that the approach presented in the communication
by the United States in document WT/WGTGP/W/38, which sought to draw on the provisions on
domestic review mechanisms currently available in a number of WTO agreements was helpful.
16. The representative of Brazil, noting that the nature of an agreement on transparency in
government procurement would be inherently diff erent from any existing WTO agreement, wondered
why the United States had made this presumption from the outset.  Unlike other WTO agreements, an
agreement on transparency in government procurement which, in terms of the Doha mandate, would
allow Members to continue to discriminate in favour  of national suppliers, would not seek to address
trade relations among Members.  The WTO dispute settlement mechanism was based on thepresumption that a violation of an obligation woul d have an effect on the trade of Members, whereas
in the context of an agreement on transparency in government procurement, there could be no such
presumption.  Further, under the DSU, the way to correct non-compliance was through  compensation
or retaliation.  It would be difficult to base any dispute settlement system on that premise because
there would be no violation of trade rights in the case of a transparency agreement.
17. The representative of Canada said that the listing of the provisions on domestic review in
other WTO agreements in the communications by the United States and the European Community
had clearly highlighted the widespread applicability of that concept to trade matters.  Procurement
involved domestic implementation of trade-related matters and, in that sense, procurement rules were
similar to the rules in other WTO agreements.  Me mbers should work towards identifying the models
of enforcement mechanisms that could be appropriately applied to a transparency agreement.
18. The representative of Korea said that domestic review procedures and the DSU should be
among the core elements of the future transparency agreement.  The appropriate content of the
appropriate provisions could be discussed in future negotiations.  Members had fully recognized the
importance of the domestic review process as stipulated in other WTO agreements.  In the context of
transparency, domestic review procedures were importa nt not only for foreign suppliers, but also for
domestic constituencies.WT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 4
19. The representative of Japan said that her delegation agreed with the United States that an
agreement on transparency in government procurement would be an important addition to the
rules-based international trading system, and its obligations should be subject to the same types of
enforcement procedures as existing commitments in other WTO agreements.  Joined by the
representatives of Hungary and Jordan, she said that Japan attached great importance to enforcementmechanisms and, as underlined in its submission (document WT/WGTGP/W/37), her delegation
regarded domestic review procedures and application of WTO dispute settlement procedures as
important elements of a future transparency agreement.
20. The representative of Australia said that the establishment and maintenance of a transparent
procurement system provided confidence to potential suppliers that they would be treated fairly in a
procurement process.  When procurement processes became clouded and decisions were perceived
not to follow a logical outcome, suppliers could lose confidence in the system.  Therefore, availabilityof domestic review procedures was an important requirement in a transparency agreement.
21. The representative of the United States noted that most Members already had domestic review
procedures, not because WTO had imposed them but because such Members had determined within
their own system that that was in their best inte rest, and that their suppliers required a means to
challenge procurement decisions.  The United States had had a domestic review mechanism for manyyears, which had preceded the requirements in the plurilateral Agreement on Government
Procurement, and existed because suppliers wanted to have an opportunity to challenge, when
necessary, how procuring entities had handled procurements.  That mechanism was available for
foreign suppliers as well as domestic suppliers.  In the experience of countries that had domestic
review procedures, those kinds of procedures provided credibility and gave assurance to suppliersthat, if they had a complaint against a decision of a procuring entity, they would have the means for
having that decision reviewed by an impartial body .  Domestic review procedures should therefore be
part of a transparency agreement.
22. The representative of Malaysia, joined by the representative of Pakistan, said that the WTO
agreements providing for domestic review procedures that were mentioned in the communications by
the European Communities and the United States were related to market access in contrast to the
mandate of the Working Group which was limited to transparency.
23. The representative of Malaysia reiterated his delegation's view that the issues of domestic
review procedures and application of the DSU had nothing to do with transparency and were therefore
outside the scope of a transparency agreement.  As long as those two elements were on the table, there
would be no consensus at the Cancun Ministerial Conference to negotiate an agreement in this area.
Any eventual agreement on transparency in government procurement should be limited in scope,should not be prescriptive, and should not have provisions on domestic procurement review that could
be used to question the decisions of Members' governments, administrations and procuring entities.
The idea of domestic review procedures was fundame ntally flawed in the context of a transparency
agreement, the provisions of which would basically allow the provision of information on what
Members did and how they did it, under what proc edures, what time-periods, and what requirements
for potential bidders.  Without a reassurance that  domestic review procedures would not question the
decision of domestic authorities, his delegation co uld not agree to including such procedures in a
transparency agreement.
24. Noting the statement by the representative of Ma laysia that an agreement on transparency in
government procurement should not make it possible for a procurement decision to be revoked orcalled into question, the representative of Chile said that this raised the question of what sort of
measures would go into a future agreement focusing on transparency.  In particular, what sort ofmeasures could make it possible for a procurement-related decision to be renounced, or stopped by a
review authority at the national level.WT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 5
25. The representative of Egypt asked why the proponents believed that the obligations of a
transparency agreement should be subject to the same type of enforcement as existing commitments
in other WTO agreements.  Existing enforcement mechanisms had been devised to ensure fair trade,
and to avoid the creation of unnecessary obstacles to trade which were market access issues.  Without
obligations on market access, an agreement on transparency in government procurement should not betreated like other WTO agreements.  There should be requirements to put in place domestic
enforcement mechanisms.
26. The representative of Switzerland noted that the communications by the United States and the
European Communities made a strong case for ensuring adequate enforcement mechanisms, in
particular by demonstrating that availability of domestic review mechanisms were current
requirements in existing WTO agreements.  Concerning the argument that enforcement mechanisms
in existing WTO agreements related more to market  access, he opined that, similar to other WTO
agreements, a transparency agreement would stipulate obligations and requirements, and an
enforcement mechanism was needed in order to make  them meaningful.  Therefore, while accepting
the distinction between market access and transparency, which had been made in the Doha mandate,
he disagreed with Malaysia's point that enforcement mechanisms were unnecessary for the
transparency obligations in a future agreement.
27. The representative of India said that, while various domestic review provisions existed in a
number of WTO agreements, those agreements were not related to transparency.  A transparency
agreement would basically require making available certain information on Members' relevant rules,
regulations and procedures.  Accordingly, domestic challenge procedures did not have their place in a
transparency agreement.  The Working Group had run through the list of issues in the informal noteby the Chairman, without having a focused discussion on what Members meant by transparency.  The
issues raised by the two communications did not figure on her delegation's list of priorities.  Joined by
the representatives of Pakistan and Egypt, she went on to say that the Working Group was still in the
study phase and was trying to define what transparency would entail, and until the contours of
transparency were clarified, there was not much point in discussing whether domestic reviewprocedures should or should not be available.
28. The representative of Pakistan said that the proponents should elaborate more on what was
meant by "challenge" and "enforcement" in the context of transparency disciplines.
29. The representative of the European Communities said that, in an agreement without market
access, in practical terms, the only possibility for disputes was when a Member would omit to publish
a tender notice or would be late in publishing some procurement rules.  He agreed that there was very
little to implement and the costs were quite reduced.  However, the Working Group was discussingprinciples, and Members had to agree on the principles even if the implementation of the future rules
would not be problematic.
30. Commenting on application of WTO dispute settlement procedures to a transparency
agreement, the representative of Egypt reiterated his delegation's position that the dispute settlement
mechanism in whole or in part should not apply to  a transparency agreement.  Members had to abide
by the mandate given to the Working Group, namely to clarify and define transparency, and not what
would apply in case Members did not abide by transparency rules.  Urging Members to focus on the
issue of transparency, he said that it was inappropriate to discuss the questions of application of DSU
and market access in the Working Group.
31. The representative of India said that her delegation maintained its position that application of
WTO dispute settlement procedures had no place in the Working Group's discussion.WT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 6
32. The representative of the United States said that, as well as having market access as their
principal focus, many WTO agreements included transparency elements.  The agreement on
transparency in government procurement would be un ique in the sense that it would not cover market
access;  at the same time, it was similar to other WTO agreements in that it would cover transparency.
The agreements that had transparency elements did not carve out the transparency elements to providethat such elements were not subject to WTO dispute settlement procedures.  Any Member could
challenge another Member's implementation of such transparency provisions.  Her delegation was
seeking the same kind of enforcement with regard  to an agreement on transparency in government
procurement as in transparency provisions in other WTO agreements.  Agreeing that the agreement
was about transparency, and not about market access, she said that if a Member did not implement
any of the provisions of the transparency agreement, Members would not be seeking concessions or
retaliation, but compliance.  Further, as opposed to just arguing for a carve-out from the application ofdispute settlement procedures, Members should be thinking about ways of increasing the capacity of
Members to comply with the requirements in a transparency agreement.  Also, the Working Group
should try to identify provisions that might be more difficult for Members to implement, and perhaps
such provisions should be subject to transition periods.
33. The representatives of Australia, Canada
, Switzerland  and Pakistan  endorsed the suggestion
by the United States that a transparency agreement could include simple and flexible provisions on
domestic review procedures that accommodated different Members' existing independent
administrative or judicial tribunals and review procedures.  The representative of Australia expressed
his delegation's preference for strong but non-prescriptive domestic review obligations.
34. The representative of Sri Lanka said that, in many countries, in particular in parliamentary
democracies, adequate domestic administrative, audit and judicial mechanisms were already in place
to ensure that all participants in the procurement pr ocess acted in conformity with the applicable rules
and procedures.  Such a mechanism would need to be in place in a country to ensure the enforcement
of the underlying rules.  The need for the establishment of a domestic review mechanism in a Member
would arise only if that Member's currently available system did not guarantee the overalltransparency of government procurement.
35. The representative of Australia said that his delegation recognized the relevance of domestic
review procedures and application of WTO dispute settlement procedures to a future agreement on
transparency in government procurement.  At the same time, he acknowledged that the scope of
application of such provisions would need to be addressed in future negotiations.  The final outcome
on dispute settlement would be determined by the rules that might emerge from the negotiations and
had to be consistent with the governance objectives of Members.  Noting that the United States hadnot chosen to identify in its communication which levels of government might be covered by
domestic review procedures, he said that this underscored the difficulty of delving into domestic
review and dispute settlement issues except in a rather general way until Members knew the content,
coverage and elements of a transparency agreement.  In response, the representative of the United
States said that her delegation was not suggesting having domestic review at the local level.  Whether
or not obligations in this respect would apply at the sub-central level, related to the scope of theoverall agreement.
36. The representative of Brazil said that, while his delegation regarded domestic review
procedures as an essential element in any viable government procurement regime at the domestic
level, his authorities' experience had been that suppliers who lost a procurement would use each and
every possible recourse, administratively and judicially, to delay the procurement, perhaps even feel
that if they could protract a process long enough the whole bidding process could be declared null and
void and they could get a second chance.  Domestic procurement systems would become too
complicated if they were allowed to be bogged down by too many and abusive challenge procedures.
Joined by the representative of Pakistan, he continued by saying that the various submissions beforethe Working Group emphasized the issue of suppliers'  rights, and that the Working Group had toWT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 7
balance those rights with the interests of governments in conducting efficient procurement processes.
Not only the rights of suppliers and the rights of governments would need to be balanced but the
purpose of having a transparent and open procurement system, a more efficient allocation of public
resources, should also be guaranteed.
37. The representative of Switzerland said that Switzerland had had the same concerns expressed
by the representative of Brazil but, subsequently, its experience had been that bidders normally did
not use domestic review procedures very often, possibly because they wished to avoid problems in
future tenders.  Therefore, he was not convinced that the availability of an avenue for recourse to
domestic review procedures would result in signif icant administrative burden.  In response to the
comment by the representative of Switzerland, the representative of Brazil noted that suppliers were
perfectly aware of their rights under legislation and they used them to the extent they could withoutany fear of being sidelined in future procurements because the government authority might be upset.
38. Turning to the issue of the interaction between domestic review procedures and the
application of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, the representative of Sri Lanka said that
the respective roles of the two mechanisms should be made explicit in the future agreement.  Noting
the statement in the communication by the United States that the provisions of domestic review
procedures and application of the DSU should serve different purposes and that their different rolesshould be reflected in a possible agreement, he said that this suggestion might provide an answer to
the question of whether there was a need to apply the WTO dispute settlement procedures to a
transparency agreement when there was adequate existing domestic review mechanisms.
39. The representative of Brazil said that domestic review procedures and application of the DSU
were two distinct phases in a dispute resolution process and there was not much scope for their
interaction.  Domestic review procedures had the purpose of ensuring that the interests of individual
suppliers were protected at the domestic level.  This went above and beyond the minimum standards
for domestic review procedures that could be agreed to in the context of a WTO agreement.  The
communication by the United States made it clear that the DSU would not be used to address
problems of individual suppliers, since resort to the DSU would not be available to challengeindividual procurement decisions.  Taking a cas e against a Member under the DSU for a violation of
its obligations in the agreement was an entirely different matter than taking a case against a
government entity under domestic review procedures for not respecting its obligations vis-à-vis  a
supplier under national legislation.
40. The representative of Korea asked whether there would be two separate enforcement
mechanisms for different types of disputes, or whether the rules would require the exhaustion of
domestic review procedures before any recourse to WTO dispute settlement procedures.
41. The representative of the United States emphasized that domestic review and WTO dispute
settlement procedures should serve different purposes, and that there could be no overlap between the
two.  The transparency agreement could provide, explicitly, that resort to the DSU would not be
available to challenge how a procurement authority had handled a specific procurement or to overturn
a contract decision.  The representatives of Sri Lanka, Korea, Japan and Switzerland supported thesuggestion by the United States.  The representative of Sri Lanka added that the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body could not overturn the decisions of the domestic review mechanisms.  Therepresentative of Switzerland said that bidders would not have the possibility of having award
decisions reversed under the DSU, and recourse to the DSU would be open only to WTO Members.
42. The representative of Pakistan asked whether WTO dispute settlement procedures would
review the applicable laws and domestic review procedures would review specific procurements, or
would a particular procurement dispute be subjected to two parallel mechanisms.WT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 8
43. In response, the representative of the United States stressed that the United States did not
intend to have two bites of the same apple.  Rather, her delegation suggested that, if there was a
question about how a procurement was being conducted,  it would be up to the supplier to take that
issue up with the domestic review mechanism.  Such procedures would be available only for suppliers
participating in a procurement, and DSU could not be used by WTO Members to question nationalauthorities' procurement decisions.  Members could invoke WTO dispute settlement procedures only
for repeated failures to comply with the rules in the agreement or to implement its basic obligations.
44. Agreeing with the representatives of the United States and Australia that the Group would not
need to decide the particulars of an enforcement mechanism until the full contours of an agreement
had been determined, the representative of Switzerland said that this consideration also applied to the
issue of the link between domestic review procedures and application of the DSU.
45. The representatives of Japan, Korea and Switzerland supported the suggestion by the United
States for phasing-in application of certain provisions of a transparency agreement and thus
application of the DSU for developing countries.  The representative of Korea asked whether
phasing-in applications of the DSU would entail the phasing-in application of certain provisions of the
future agreement and, if so, what type of provisions.  In response, the representative of the
United States said that Members could not foresee which provisions would lend themselves to
phasing-in application until the Working Group had discussed the exact content of those provisions.
In the context of a transparency agreement, some provisions would be easy to implement as most
Members already had transparent procurement systems.  At the same time, the Working Group should
assess which provisions could be problematic for some countries.  She urged Members to approach
this whole discussion by focusing on what they considered they needed as elements of an agreement,and then looking at which Members would have problems, how much time such Members would need
to bring their systems into compliance, and to de velop a flexible approach to phasing-in those
provisions.
46. The representative of Canada, joined by the representative of Switzerland, said that the
communication by the European Communities made a useful distinction between obligations aimed at
ensuring transparency in domestic review procedures maintained by Members and ensuring suppliers'
rights to challenge a procurement in breach of transparency provisions.  Transparency of domestic
review procedures should include making inform ation available on the decisions of review bodies
which should be independent.
47. The representative of Switzerland agreed with the suggestion by the European Communities
that the agreement should contain provisions allowing a supplier to challenge a procurement in breach
of the provisions related to transparency of the procurement process.  At the WTO level, the DSUwould only apply to the implementation of the transparency provisions in the agreement.
48. The representative of Korea noted that establishment of domestic review mechanisms was an
area where developing countries might be able to seek technical assistance for capacity building.
49. The representatives of Sri Lanka, Canada  and Japan  said that, consistent with the Doha
mandate, which explicitly excluded domestic preference schemes, enforcement mechanisms in a
transparency agreement could not be used to challenge them.
50. The representative of Chile asked for clarification on the kind of situations in which a
decision by a national authority could be called into question or revoked, bearing in mind that the
agreement would not in any way limit the power of national authorities to accord preference to
domestic suppliers.WT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 9
51. With regard to access to domestic review procedures, the representative of Brazil said that he
had no objection to the basic principle that suppliers' rights to challenge a procurement procedure
must be ensured.  Nevertheless, it had to be made clear that only those suppliers who were eligible for
that particular procurement had such rights.  If a national procurement system allowed governments to
maintain domestic preferences, the right to challenge a procurement procedure should be limited tonational suppliers.
52. The representative of Chinese Taipei pointed out that, although the transparency agreement
would exclude market access, government authorities in WTO Members did not only meet their
procurement needs from domestic suppliers or domestic sources but also from foreign suppliers.
Therefore, foreign suppliers' interests should also be protected.  The representative of Japan said that
the transparency agreement should require Members to make available domestic review procedures
for both domestic and foreign suppliers who had concerns that a particular procurement was not incompliance with the transparency provisions of the agreement.  The representative of Switzerland said
that domestic enforcement mechanisms should be open to all bidders who have an interest and thepossibility to bid in a particular tender.
53. Asking for clarification on the suggestion by the European Communities on access to review
procedures rules, more particularly of the phrase "suppliers affected by a measure" (point 2.1 indocument WT/WGTGP/W/39), the representative of Hong Kong, China asked whether the intention
was to cover suppliers whom the procuring entity had intended to award, or had awarded a contract,
or those who were affected by a decision of the review body.  For example, if a review body had
found that a procuring entity had failed to publish an invitation to apply for pre-qualification in the
appropriate newspaper, whether the bidders who had not had notice of the invitation due to theprocuring entity's breach of publication obligation be regarded as bidders who were affected by the
measure.  In response, the representative of the European Communities said that, if a contract award
decision by a procuring entity was challenged by another supplier, and the domestic reviewmechanism found that the procurement process was void and should be repeated, that decision was, in
principle, in response to the complainant;  however , it should also be transmitted to other interested
suppliers because the measure also affected other suppliers and they would be interested to know that
the process had been cancelled and would be repeated.
54. The representative of Egypt asked why it was important that the possibility to challenge be
available to all suppliers given that the Working Group's work had nothing to do with market access.
55. The representative of Australia asked the representative of the European Communities
whether a supplier affected by a measure would have the right to bring a challenge during the
procurement process prior to any decision, or he also would have that right after the conclusion of theprocess.  In response, the representative of the European Communities said that each Member should
be left to have its own meaning of the term "procurement process".  He noted that, for some Members,
the procurement process ended at the stage of a contract award decision while, for other Members, it
ended at the signature of the contract.  It was not for the agreement to decide on the duration and
scope of a procurement process;  that should be left to each national regime.
56. The representative of Switzerland endorsed the suggestion by the European Communities that
it was important to secure sufficient independence of the domestic review bodies whether they be
administrative, judicial or arbitral.
57. The representative of Switzerland endorsed the suggestion by the European Communities that
the choice of domestic review procedures should be left to individual countries;  however, theprocedures chosen should be governed by certain common principles stipulated in the agreement.
This would be an effective way of ensuring application of those principles while accommodating the
disciplines in existing domestic procedures.WT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 10
58. The representative of India said that most WTO Members had fairly reasonable and adequate
administrative, arbitral and/or judicial mechanisms to suit their domestic needs, and to ensure that all
players in the procurement process acted in conformity with the relevant rules and procedures.  Since
each WTO Member had domestic review procedures suited to its own specific situation, level of
development and requirements, the stipulation of any mandatory rules or prescriptive guidelines in atransparency agreement would not be feasible.  The primacy of domestic laws and procedures had to
be preserved, and there should be no requirement to change them.  Considering that the Working
Group's work was to study the transparency aspects of procurement, as long as Members had a review
mechanism that should satisfy any transparency requirements.
59. The representative of Egypt asked whether there would be common obligations on domestic
review procedures or whether it would be left to each Member to establish its own procedures.  The
provisions of existing WTO agreements on domestic review provisions did not require that allMembers have or apply common rules but that rules were consistent with their commitments in the
WTO.  His delegation was not in a position to accept the stipulation of common obligations, common
procedures and common mechanisms in the agreement.
60. The representative of Australia, noting that the statement in the communication by the
European Communities that government procurement regimes contained legislative and regulatory
provisions to review decisions of procuring entities, suggested that the Secretariat review the existing
submissions that had been made to the Working Group to determine whether there was a broadly
representative body of information available on Members' domestic review processes.  If such was not
the case, he urged Members to provide, briefly, information on their national experience with
domestic review procedures.
61. The representative of Venezuela pointed out that, whereas his Government attached great
importance to the issue of transparency, the WTO should not impose on Members a uniform system.
Venezuela had enacted a new procurement legislation and had been implementing it over the past few
years.  Before the adoption of the new procurement laws, an intense internal debate had taken place
with all the sectors involved and it had received mixed reactions from various sectors, which wasquite normal in a democracy.  It would be unacceptable to Venezuela if the WTO, as some sort of
supranational body, would tell his Government to disregard the domestic discussions over past years
by prescribing how Venezuela should deal with the issue of transparency.  Venezuela had its own
legislation, procedures and its own concept of transparency, which had been recently reviewed by the
WTO in the context of Trade Policy Review.
62. Commenting on the procedural points made by the representative of Venezuela, the Chairman
noted that, in the Working Group, Members were working on the basis of a Ministerial mandate, and
that work would be submitted to Ministers for their decision.  The WTO operated on the basis of
decisions taken by Members, and it would be a serious misunderstanding to see it as a supranational
body.  Many Members had been working on their legislation, and it was the Members that took
decisions whether or not to ratify agreements.  From a procedural point of view, the WTO did not
impose any positions;  it was Members themselves that took any decisions emanating from the WTO.It was clear that, independently of the type of system a government had, all decisions in the WTO
were made by its Members.  Finally, he recalled that the mandate of the Working Group clearly
required the explicit consensus of Members for any kind of agreement.
63. The representative of Venezuela said that, as a matter of principle, the Constitution of
Venezuela provided full support to the work of supranational bodies and intergovernmental
organizations.  Further, having supported the Doha Declaration, his delegation had to take into
account everything that was being discussed in the Working Group as if it was an internal discussion
in Venezuela.  The decisions taken in the Working Group at the supranational level could have an
effect on the debate on government procurement at the national level.  Whether at the Cancun
Ministerial Conference or in any other forum, his delegation would not support any decision thatWT/WGTGP/M/17
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would require abrupt changes in its national legi slation, which had been discussed in a transparent
way.
64. The representative of the United States said that her delegation was open to the question of
how detailed the provisions on domestic review pr ocedures should be.  As the communication by her
delegation indicated, the mechanism should be flexible and simple.  The level of detail that should beprovided in the provisions on domestic review in  an agreement could be discussed later in the
negotiations.  In any event, other parts of the agreement would not prescribe how the agreement
should be implemented.  Rather, it should set out general obligations, and each Member would then
have to implement it in the way that worked best within its domestic system.
65. Reverting to the relationship between a transparency agreement and domestic laws, she noted
that there was perhaps an unnecessary fear that the Working Group would come up with one model
that would fit all.  Many countries had used th e UNCITRAL Model Law as their guide for developing
their procurement systems.  Others had used the World Bank Guidelines, while others had developed
their laws in other ways.  All Members had developed procurement systems that worked best for them
based on their legal traditions, experiences and background.  For instance, the United States had an
incredibly complex system, which it was trying to simplify, and her delegation was not suggesting
that that was the best model.
66. Continuing, she said that the DSU would be available for systemic failures to comply with, or
a high level of disregard to, the agreement, for instance if there were refusals to ever publish a notice,
or refusals to ever make information available about procurement methods.  She went on to say that
the likelihood of a transparency provision being challenged in the DSU was very low.  Referring to
transparency provisions in other WTO agreements, she said that there had been very few cases ofdispute settlement, if any, relating strictly to transparency obligations.  So, that was probably not
likely to happen under the transparency agreement eith er.  Without a link to the DSU, an agreement
could not be effective.  Members would simply ignore the requirements of the agreement knowing
that they would face no detriment to doing so.  Even if the DSU might not be ideally suited to a
transparency agreement, that did not mean that Members should not be looking at how they couldmake the agreement effective.  Her delegation's overall concern was that there should be some means
of ensuring enforceability, and was looking forward to suggestions from other delegations as to how
this issue could be best approached.
67. The representative of Brazil agreed with the representative of the United States that, in all
probability, a case under the agreement on transparency in government procurement would not be
raised under the DSU.  Referring to a note prepared by the Secretariat on Article X of GATT in the
context of the discussions on trade facilitation, he said that, according to that note,transparency-related cases had been raised in a couple of instances but had never moved beyond the
consultation phase.  Therefore, he agreed with the representative of the United States that it was very
unlikely that a transparency issue would go to a pa nel.  However, if Members included any provisions
relating to application of the DSU in the agreement, they had to be absolutely clear as to what could
potentially happen.  Joined by the representative of Egypt, he said that Members had to be aware ofcertain types of situations before moving forward on the issue of application of the DSU to a future
agreement.  For instance, a Member who was fou nd, by a panel and the Appellate Body, to be in
systematic violation of a commitment in the agreemen t, might not be in a position to comply with the
recommendation of the DSB to bring its legislation into conformity with the agreement because of the
refusal of its Congress to adopt the relevant legislation.  Such a situation in which there was nonullification or impairment of trade rights could create an impasse in the DSB.
68. The representative of the United States said that, over the long course of discussions in the
Working Group on these issues, she had never heard any Member saying that its procurement system
was completely non-transparent or that it would prefer to have a non-transparent procurement system.
The basic understanding and general acceptance that transparency was a good thing was common toWT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 12
all Members, albeit perhaps to varying degrees with some Members.  Turning more specifically to the
scenario outlined by the representative of Brazil, she opined that such a scenario was not very likely.
If there was a case where a Member reported to the WTO that it could not change its laws, other
Members would not rush to take that Member to disp ute settlement as that was not going to be in any
Member's interest.  She believed that Members would be more likely to ask how they could worktogether to try to address those issues.  The overall goal was not to try to retaliate and penalize
Members;  it was to develop a common set of transparency obligations that would go across the whole
membership of the WTO.  Instead of looking at this  as a confrontational issue, Members could look at
it as an issue where they would try to reach the co mmon goal of raising procurement procedures to the
same level of transparency in all Members.
69. In response, the representative of Brazil said that his delegation was as committed to
transparency as any other Member.  This was evident from the presentation his delegation had made
at the WTO Symposium on Transparency in Govern ment Procurement in October 2002.  He had been
trying to get the Working Group to consider whether the DSU was the best way to ensure
enforcement.  He agreed that his scenario was hypothetical and very unlikely, but it highlighted the
fact that perhaps application of the DSU could not ensure enforceability of an agreement on
transparency.
70. The representative of Venezuela noted that the DSU did not include a mechanism to ensure
enforceability of a transparency agreement.  His delegation considered the DSU as the cornerstone of
the WTO.  There should be some sort of dispute settlement mechanism to ensure the enforcement of
the agreement.  Perhaps it would be more interesting to have this discussion within the framework of
the ongoing negotiations on the DSU.
71. The representative of the European Communities said that the Working Group was
confronted with a unique case.  Indeed, there was no government procurement regime in the world
with transparency provisions isolated from the rest  of the procurement rules.  Members were trying to
develop rules on transparency without having rules on procurement, and this was extremely
complicated.  They had difficulty in understanding how transparency provisions isolated from the restof the procurement process could be implemented in practice and how they could be enforced, in the
absence of market access obligations, through domestic review procedures and application of the
DSU.  There was no precedent for the exercise that the Working Group had been engaging in for six
years.  This was also unique in the WTO, for instance the DSU had been conceived in the WTO to be
applied to agreements related to market access, and, in principle, the DSU did not apply to agreements
with no market access or clear economic impact.  Further, it was difficult to develop rules on
enforcement without having an idea on the scope of the underlying rules or the contours of theagreement itself.  Most of the questions that had been raised by Members had been related to the
difficulty of not having sufficient basis for discussion.  Members were thinking that this would affect
the link to market access because there were economic and trade issues in the background.  Members
could not imagine transparency rules alone because there was a procurement process in the
background with economic and trade impact.  He main tained that the transparency agreement should
include dispute settlement procedures.  This was primarily a matter of principle because the
agreement would be part of the WTO system of rules.  Nevertheless, the fact that there was a need for
enforcement measures did not mean that they had to be identical to the existing rules in the DSU.
There could be specific provisions on implementa tion of the DSU tailored to the scope of the
transparency agreement.  There were already a number of WTO agreements with specific provisionsrelating to application of the DSU, for instance, Article XXII:4 of the plurilateral Agreement on
Government Procurement on Consultations and Disput e Settlement with regard to cross-retaliation.
His delegation's aim was to secure the existence of domestic procedures allowing bidders to challenge
a procurement decision.  Finally, he said that enforcement was a difficult issue, but he believed it was
the core of the future agreement because, without enforcement provisions, the agreement would bemerely a general list of requirements.  The WTO would not impose any decisions on domestic review
bodies because domestic review bodies would review on the basis of the domestic rules onWT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 13
transparency which, in principle, would be in line with the rules in a transparency agreement.
Provisions on application of the DSU should be included in the agreement like in any other WTO
agreement, although he recognized the difficulty with finding appropriate sanctions for a breach of
transparency rules.  He was not convinced that Members needed sanctions or suspension of
concessions or cross-retaliation to ensure that the agreement was enforced.  When negotiating theagreement, Members could engage in an imaginative exercise to find an appropriate way to apply the
DSU to the transparency agreement.
72. The representative of Korea said that the Working Group might consider the flexibilities
provided in the provisions of the DSU and in other agreements, for instance Article 17 of the
Anti-dumping Agreement.
73. Commenting on the linkage between application of  domestic review procedures and the scope
of the agreement, the representative of the Eur opean Communities said that the agreement might
include some provisions that would apply to procur ement in general.  For instance, he had difficulty
in imagining that only the rules applying to the sc ope of the agreement should be transparent and the
others should not.  In principle, all the rules of all WTO Members were publicly available, sometimes
even notified.  Thus, some provisions of the agreement would be applicable to all government
procurement independently of thresholds, whether the agreement covered goods only or also servicesand whether it applied also at sub-central levels.  At the same time, some provisions, including those
relating to domestic review procedures, would ap ply only to procurement within the scope of the
agreement to be defined.
74. The representative of Brazil said the debate had made it evident that application of the DSU
might not be an efficient way to ensure enforceability, and that Members would have to be creative in
finding other ways.  One possible way was to devel op specific provisions in the agreement relating to
how dispute settlement should be conducted within the context of the transparency agreement.  The
general thrust of having a provision on domestic review in a transparency agreement would be to
ensure that each Member's domestic legislation incorporated provisions that ensured that all suppliers
participating in a procurement had the legal right to challenge, independently of whether that issuewas covered or not by the agreement.  He believed that that was independent of the scope of the
agreement.  For example, even if a procurement was subject to a national preference, and even if only
a Member's national suppliers had the right to have recourse to domestic review, the limitation of the
scope of the agreement to transparency should not affect the ability of a national supplier to challenge
procurement decisions.  There should be non-prescriptive provisions stating that domestic
mechanisms existed to ensure the right of suppliers to challenge bids.  If it was a case for national
suppliers only, then those suppliers were the eligible suppliers;  if it was an open or internationaltender, then all suppliers should have recourse to those instruments.  He noted that the last indent
under point 3.2 of the communication by the European Communities stating "challenge procedures
provid[ing] for adequate measures to correct proven infringements of the agreement" was mixing up
Member's rights in the WTO with supplier's rights at the domestic level.  The infringements of the
agreement had to be dealt with at the WTO by whatever mechanisms Members agreed on, whereassupplier's interests had to be assured through domestic review procedures.  Thus, the discussion on the
two concepts had to be kept separate so th at the Working Group could move forward on both.
75. In response, the representative of the European Communities said that he could not imagine
that a Member would set up rules on transparency consistent with the agreement only for goods, only
above a certain threshold and only for the federal level.  He believed that, to be logical, consistent andsimple, most Members would apply a general framework of rules applying to all kinds of
procurements at all levels and for all thresholds without making a distinction between services and
goods.  He noted that, in most cases, transparency rules would apply to all goods and services without
distinction.  He was wondering why the Working Group had spent so much time discussing the scope
of the agreement while it recognized that, in practice, most Members applied transparency ruleshorizontally.  His delegation took into considerati on the concerns of those Members that wished toWT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 14
have a reduced scope by agreeing that Members could limit the implementation of the transparency
rules, including the domestic review procedures, to that scope.  For instance, even if the domestic
rules provided that a supplier had a right to challenge a procurement decision, a foreigner could not
invoke the agreement in the case of a tender that did not fall under the scope of the agreement.  It
would be up to the domestic judicial system to decide whether the agreement had been breached, butsince the particular tender did not fall under the scope of the agreement, the domestic review
mechanism would not take into consideration the WTO agreement.
76. After the conclusion of the discussion of items I, VIII and XI in the informal note by the
Chairman, the Working Group took up the communication from Korea entitled "Work Ahead up to
the Cancun Ministerial", circulated in document WT/WGTGP/W/40.  The representative of Korea
introduced the communication.
77. The representative of Malaysia expressed regret that Korea had tabled its communication
because of its timing as well as its content.  The paper was not helpful to the process and could add to
the confusion in the Working Group, given that there appeared to be confusion which related to many
elements as evidenced by the discussions on domestic review procedures and application of the WTO
DSU even though there seemed to be emerging consensus on some elements.  The Working Group
was not in a pre-negotiation stage, but still in an educational and clarification stage.  In order to have amandate at Cancun to move on to the negotiations, there had to be agreement in the Working Group
on the elements of a future transparency agreement.  There had to be an explicit consensus to move on
to the negotiations.  Referring to the interlinkages between the work of the Working Group and other
WTO activities, he remarked that Korea seemed to be enthusiastic about making progress in the area
of government procurement, where there was not yet an explicit consensus for negotiations, butapparently not so enthusiastic in the area of agriculture where there was a clear mandate.
78. The representative of Brazil said that the whole concept of a round of multilateral trade
negotiations was to facilitate interlinkages and trade-offs and the Working Group had to be very
attuned to developments in the rest of the WTO in order to move the process forward beyond Cancun.
While welcoming Korea's suggestion to discuss what the Working Group should do in the periodleading up to Cancun, Brazil nevertheless fully agreed with the representative of Malaysia that the
current phase of the Working Group's work was educational.  The discussion at the present meeting
showed that there was still some lack of clarity on the issues of domestic review and application of the
WTO dispute settlement procedures and further debate was necessary to have a clearer view on the
concepts related to those issues.  Recalling that paragraph 26 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration
required explicit consensus before a decision could be taken on negotiations, he said that it should be
highlighted to Ministers that the Working Group had reached a higher level of consensus on someissues than on some others.
79. As regards Korea's proposals to address developing country concerns, the representative of
Brazil said that his country's experience from the Uruguay Round was that transitional periods or
other types of flexibilities had proven to be inadequate for addressing effectively those concerns.
There were still a number of Uruguay Round agreements that Members had not been able toimplement due to lack of technical assistance, and, in fact, some Members had still not understood the
commitments to which they had signed up to then.  He said that the Working Group therefore had to
give serious attention to the issue of technical assistance as well increasing efforts to try to make the
process move forward beyond Cancun.
80. The representative of the Philippines said that the Korean communication proposed traditional
ways of addressing the issue which were inadequate as they did not allow developing countries the
needed policy space.WT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 15
81. The representative of Morocco said that transitional periods had proved ineffective in the past
in solving problems of substance and his delegation favoured a more holistic approach to the issue of
special and differential treatment for developing countries.
82. The representative of Pakistan said that temporary suspension of obligations or transitional
periods were not adequate in addressing what were complex and multi-dimensional issues of
development.
83. The representative of Switzerland supported the views in the communication from Korea
regarding new ways of addressing the concerns of developing countries.
84. The representative of Switzerland said that the communication from Korea was timely and
shared the views expressed therein.  As regards the current phase of the Group's work, the period
before Doha represented an educational phase, the period between Doha and Cancun a pre-negotiation
phase, and in the period after Cancun the work would move into a negotiating phase.  On some issueswhere the positions had been clear, there was no need for further educational work.  It was not
necessary to have convergence on all issues before moving on to the negotiations, but rather to
identify the core issues and reach an agreement thr ough negotiations.  Only future negotiations would
show how to make the elements acceptable to Members.
85. The representatives of the Philippines, India
, Morocco  and Pakistan  said that they shared the
views expressed by the representative of Malaysia.
86. Expressing her delegation's perception of what was mandated at Doha in relation to
transparency in government procurement, the representative of India said that the work being
undertaken by the Working Group was on the basis of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration.  TheDoha Ministerial Declaration mandated the continuation of the work.  As evidenced in the discussionsat the present meeting, there was still a considerable divergence of views among Members on
elements such as domestic review procedures and application of the WTO DSU.  India was therefore
of the view that the Group was still in an educational phase and greater clarity was required on a
number of issues.
87. The representative of the Philippines, supported by the representative of Malaysia, said that
the Singapore issues were not part of the Single Undertaking and thus still required a negotiating
mandate.
88. The representative of Brazil said that, as it had been the case with the issues put forward by
developing countries such as implementation and special and differential treatment, the debate as to
whether the Singapore issues were part of the Single Undertaking was beside the point.  Ministers had
agreed to a work programme that included these issues which had given rise to expectations amongst
delegations that their concerns would be addressed;  that they were not being addressed, irrespectiveof whether or not they were part of the Single Undertaking, created a less positive environment for
discussions or negotiations in other areas.
89. The representative of the United States said that the debate as to what was or was not part of
the Single Undertaking was not productive for the work of the Working Group.
90. The representative of Pakistan said that, while the questions raised in the communication
from Korea were relevant, his delegation was not in total agreement with the answers it provided.  He
said that the Doha Ministerial Declaration did not provide a clear indication as to what needed to take
place at Cancun.  Noting that there were gaps amongst Members on various issues, he said that much
further thought and reflection needed to go into some of the items identified as core elements in
Korea's communication including definition and scope, domestic review, application of the DSU andspecial and differential treatment for developing count ries.  Pakistan would hesitate to commit itself toWT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 16
any agreement without fully understanding the contours of the elements.  While Korea considered that
multilateral rules on transparency in government procurement should be legally binding and subject to
the WTO DSU, the present discussion was clear evidence of divergences of views among delegations
regarding application of the DSU.
91. The representative of the European Communities welcomed the communication from Korea
suggesting ways of moving forward with the process, an issue which had also been addressed in the
earlier proposals by Japan and the United States (WT/WGTGP/W/37 and 35, respectively).  Korea's
communication presented ways of looking not only at  the technical issues before the Group but also to
the overall context of the Working Group's work a nd how the negotiations should be shaped in the
future.  Korea's suggestion to developing countries to outline their concerns would enable the Group
to further address the outstanding issues and clarify them before the Cancun Ministerial Conference.
With regard to the comments concerning the negotiating mandate, his delegation's view was that therewas an agreement on negotiations and that this was supported by the Doha Ministerial Declaration,
the relevant section of which would have read "…a decision on modalities of negotiations…" and not
"…a decision on negotiations…" if the case had been otherwise.  The Decision clearly stated that a
decision on modalities would be taken at the Fifth Ministerial Conference and not after that.  All four
Singapore issues were part of the Single Undertaking and transparency in government procurementwas one of the key elements of the Doha Development Agenda.  The suggestion by Korea to examine
the core elements to be included in the negotiations by no means pre-empted the outcome of the
negotiations.  There would be sufficient flexibility in the process of negotiations to consider what is
acceptable to all Members regarding a specific element.
92. The representative of Malaysia said that Members could not move into the phase of
negotiations without having reached an agreement on th e basic elements to be incorporated in a future
agreement, for instance on its scope, domestic review procedures and application of the WTO dispute
settlement procedures.
93. The representative of Chinese Taipei said that the fact that the APEC principles on
government procurement were non-binding enable d the members of the APEC Group of Experts on
Government Procurement to share their experience on transparency in a useful way.  With respect to
Korea's communication, he suggested that other elem ents, such as valuation methods for threshold
levels and a common website for providing information on national practices, could also be
considered.
94. The representative of the United States said that the elements identified by the Working
Group had been included in the informal note by the Chairman "List of Issues Made and Points
Raised".  The Working Group was not yet in a negotiating phase and Members could continue to havedivergent views.  In response, the representative of Malaysia said that the identification of possible
elements in the Chairman's note did not imply any form of agreement, or tacit understanding, orconsensus to include those elements in a future agreement.  For instance, the inclusion of domestic
review procedures and the WTO DSU in the List of Issues did not mean that there was any
convergence of views on them.
95. Referring to the comments on the current status of the Working Group's work, the
representative of Korea said that the important point was that Members exchanged views on the core
elements to be included in a multilateral framework in preparation for negotiations.  Suggestions onnew and more effective ways of addressing developing country concerns were welcome.  Finally, the
list of elements suggested in Korea's communication was not final and the Group should be open todiscuss other possible elements.WT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 17
B. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING
96. The representative of the Secretariat provided information on the technical cooperation and
capacity building activities that the Secretariat had undertaken since the October 2002 meeting, as
well as on the activities foreseen in the period leading up to the Cancun Ministerial Conference.
Since the October 2002 meeting, the main focus of the Secretariat's technical cooperation activitieshad been on regional events organized in cooperation with the multilateral development banks.  On
12-14 November 2002, a sub-regional workshop for participants from 14 Caribbean countries had
been organized in Kingston, Jamaica with fundin g provided by the Inter-American Development
Bank through its affiliate INTAL and with the cooperation of the Government of Jamaica.  On
14-17 January 2003, a workshop had been held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania for participants from
20 English-speaking African countries.  It had been organized jointly with the World Bank in
cooperation with the African Development Bank and the Government of Tanzania.  Officialsparticipating in both of these workshops represented both the trade and procurement communities.
Turning to the plans for 2003, she said that the Secretariat would continue with the regional
workshops, where possible, in order to ensure that, before Cancun, there would have been one
regional workshop held in each of the developing country regions.  In the coming months, similar to
the events organized for the Central American and Caribbean countries, a workshop was expected tobe held in Buenos Aires, Argentina for the Latin-American countries that had not yet been covered by
the sub-regional events in 2002, using IADB/INTAL funds;  another workshop for the Asia-Pacific
region, in cooperation with the Asian Development Bank was foreseen in May in Manila, the
Philippines;  and a further workshop was being planned jointly with the World Bank in early July for
French-speaking African countries.  There were a number of general Secretariat training activities of aregional and national kind for high-level officials, for instance, one recently held in Cairo for Arab
countries, and upcoming ones in Tiblisi, Georgia for the Caucasian and Central Asian countries and
for Chinese officials in Beijing.
1  These activities covered WTO issues as a whole, and the Secretariat
was contributing to them with regard to governme nt procurement matters.  Thirdly, there were also
requests from a number of countries for national events contained in the Secretariat's CoordinatedProgramme for 2003.  The Secretariat was in the process of contacting the delegations concerned
about these activities.  Finally, the Secretariat was planning to hold a further Geneva event on
19 June 2003 which would be held back-to-back with the meeting of the Working Group on 20 June,
so as to facilitate the participation of as many interested delegations as possible.  The Secretariat's
intention was to allocate the first half of the day to an Information Session on the activities of the
IGOs involved in government procurement work, which would be held in response to a suggestion
made by some delegations at the October 2002 meeting.  Presentations had been made byrepresentatives from the World Bank and the UNCIT RAL Secretariat at the first meeting of the
Working Group in 1997 and by the representatives from the World Bank and the African
Development Bank as well as the Chairman of the FTAA Negotiating Group on Government
Procurement at the October 2002 Symposium.  The second half of that day would be devoted to issues
related to capacity building, with the participation of government experts from developing countries.
97. The representative of India asked about the benefits which had accrued to the beneficiary
countries as a result of the technical cooperation activities, for instance, in what way the technical
assistance had been of use in their national systems or had helped countries to identify gaps, if any, a
matter which might be taken up at the June workshop.
98. The representative of Switzerland provided information on a pilot project that had been
developed in Ghana.  Switzerland had provided exte rnal support to the project, the main objective of
which was to set up a mechanism for monitoring the progress of implementation of the new
procurement legislation in a manner that was transparent to all actors including the private sector,
civil society, and the international community including the donors.  Switzerland considered this to be
                                                     
1 The latter two events were subsequently postponed.WT/WGTGP/M/17
Page 18
an important way of raising confidence in the public procurement system, presenting benefits at both
the national and international levels.
C. OTHER BUSINESS
99. Taking the floor under this item, the representative of Turkey gave a brief account of the
recent procurement reform in his country which had been undertaken as a component of public sector
reforms carried out since 1999.  The first aspect of the reform involved changing the role and function
of the Government in the public procurement market to ensure the effectiveness of the system.  This
had been done by putting into place mechanisms, rules and procedures that followed the principles of
transparency, accountability and predictability.  The second aspect related to opening up the
procurement market to international competition.  The new public procurement law was adopted by
the Turkish Parliament in January 2002 and had entered into force on 1 January 2003.  The law aimed
at enhancing transparency and curbing corruption and provided for equality of treatment, impartiality,accountability, competition and predictability, while, at the same time, ensuring a more effective and
efficient utilization of public resources.  The principal functions of the Public Procurement Authority
that had been established under the Law were the preparation and development of, and provision of
guidance on, implementing legislation and the preparation of standard tender documents.  As of
January 2003, the PPA had completed the secondary legislation, and had begun its work on settlingprocurement disputes.  The adoption of the new public procurement law was a big step forward for
Turkey, bringing its legislation in line with contemporary international standards and the EU " acquis ".
D. 
OBSERVER STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
100. The Chairman said that, at its past meetings, the Working Group had considered requests for
observer status from three international intergovernmental organizations (OECD, SELA and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference) and agreed to revert to these requests in the light of the
ongoing consultations in the framework of the General Council.  Given the overall status in the WTO
regarding this matter, he suggested that the Workin g Group revert to this matter at its next meeting in
the light of developments in those consultations.
E. DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING
101. The Chairman said that the second meeting of the Working Group would be held on
20 June 2003.
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