WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/TPR/M/118 
WT/TPR/M/119 
13 November 2003 
 
 (03-6086) 
Trade Policy Review Body 22 and 24 September 2003  
 
 
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW 
 
NIGER AND SENEGAL 
 
Minutes of Meeting
 
 
Chairperson:  H.E. Mrs Mary Whelan (Ireland) 
 
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON.....................................................3  
II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NIGER ....................................4  
III. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF SENEGAL ..............................5  
IV. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT....................................................................................6  
V. STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS.......................................................................................9  
VI. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF NIGER AND SENEGAL AND 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ..................................................................................................15  
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON........................................................23   
  WT/TPR/M/118 
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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON  
1. The first Trade Policy Review of Niger and second Trade Policy Review of Senegal were 
held conjointly on 22 and 24 September 2003.  The Chairperson welcomed the delegation of Niger, 
headed by Mr Amadou Soumana Gouro, Deputy Gene ral Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and 
Private Sector Promotion, and the delegation of Sene gal, headed by Minister of Trade Aïchatou Agne 
Pouye, and the discussant Mr Niklas Bergström (Swe den).  As usual, the discussant spoke in his 
personal capacity and not as a representative of his country.  In accordance with established 
procedures, he had made available in advance an  outline of the main points he intended to raise 
(document WT/TPR/D/97). 
2. The Chairperson recalled the purpose of the Trad e Policy Reviews and the main elements of 
the procedures of the meeting.  The Reports by th e Governments of Niger a nd Senegal were contained 
in documents WT/TPR/G/118 and WT/TPR/G/119 resp ectively, and those of the Secretariat in 
documents WT/TPR/S/118 and WT/TPR/S/119 respectiv ely.  The delegations of Niger and Senegal 
had received copies of advance written questions subm itted by Japan;  the European Union;  Canada;  
Hong Kong, China;  and the United States.  If full replies could not be provided during the meeting, 
additional written replies would be given at a later date.  
3. The documents prepared for the joint review of  Niger and Senegal highlighted the progress in 
economic liberalization made by those two Least Developed Countries (LDCs) within the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).  Since its first Trade Policy Review in 1994, 
Senegal had abolished quantitative rest rictions and reduced the simple average applied tariff rate from 
37 per cent to 14.7 per cent and bound all the tariff lines.   Foreign direct investment and privatization 
had also played a part in opening the market to competition, even though there were still areas of protection.  Niger's first Review highlighted the a bolition of quantitative restrictions in 1990 and tariff 
liberalization within the WAEMU.  Niger relied on the regional market to diversify its exports, 
currently dependent on uranium, into agriculture  and livestock raising.  Niger and Senegal had 
acknowledged the difficulties met in order to partic ipate fully in the WTO;  training and technical 
assistance would be beneficial with that aim in mind.  Fields of particular interest were notification, implementing obligations, in particular customs va luation and the Doha Agenda.  Efforts in those 
fields would underpin further integration within the world economy, which was an objective featuring 
in the Poverty Reduction Programmes set up by both the Government of Niger and the Government of 
Senegal.  WT/TPR/M/118 
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II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE RE PRESENTATIVE OF NIGER  
4. The representative of Niger stressed the difficu lties experienced by Niger's economy since the 
beginning of the 1980s, leading to domestic and exte rnal imbalances.  Fundame ntal reforms of Niger's 
economy had consequently been implemented, in or der to reduce State involvement in the productive 
sector, liberalize trade in agricultural products a nd prices, liberalize foreign trade and abolish 
monopolies.  
5. The General Policy Statement made by the H ead of Government outlined the following 
economic objectives:  to draw up an orientation programme for economic and social policy for 2000-
2004;  to encourage the participation of the private sector in economic activity;  and to organize the 
rural sector by developing export-oriented agro-p astoral production.  The Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) clearly laid out the aims and strategies for different sectors and for trade. 
6. The countries of the West African Monetary Un ion (WAMU) were aware of the challenges of 
globalization and had been furthering economic inte gration within the WAEMU since January 1994.  
A Common External Tariff (CET) had taken eff ect as from 1 January 2000 and sectoral policies 
(agriculture, trade, transport, taxation) ha d been harmonized.  The WAEMU had adopted an 
agricultural policy for the Union (PAU), and signed a trade and investment agreement with the United 
States of America.  Other trade agreements we re being negotiated with Morocco and Tunisia. 
7. Niger aimed to improved the business envir onment, to foster economic and social 
development, and to facilitate the integration of its economy within the multilateral trading system.  
As an LDC, Niger attached great importance to bilate ral and multilateral cooperati on.  In order to take 
greater advantage of the multilateral trading system, Ni ger needed assistance in order:  to develop the 
supply of its export products, in both quantitative an d qualitative terms;  to strengthen its institutional 
and human capacities with a view to better implem enting the WTO Agreements;  and to participate 
effectively in multilateral trade negotiations.  A Perm anent Mission would open in Geneva in the near 
future. 
8. Regarding future prospects and orientations, the following points were to be noted:  the 
inclusion of trade within the PRSP strategic framework;  the Private Sector Promotion Policy and implementation of the results of the Round Table on the Private Sector organized in November 2000;  
the promotion of a partnership between public and private sectors;  the improvement of Niger's 
participation in the activities of subregional, regi onal and international orga nizations;  the benefits 
from expected international support for trade, and in particular the Integrated Framework (IF) for 
Trade-Related Technical Assistance and the JITA P programme;  development of the institutional 
environment for the promotion of Niger's foreign tr ade;  and effective participation in multilateral 
trade negotiations.  WT/TPR/M/118 
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III. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE RE PRESENTATIVE OF SENEGAL  
9. The representative of Senegal noted that her c ountry's second TPR would allow her to outline 
the reforms implemented since the first TPR in 1994  and to underline the constraints met on the way 
to achieving better integration within world trade.  The reforms had been undertaken in a stable 
political environment and involved liberalizing the economy, privatizing State enterprises and 
permanently withdrawing State control from the mainstream of economic activities.  
10. Senegal had instigated institutional reforms within the framework of the private sector 
development strategy, in particular in the fields of  investment, SMEs and standardization.  Setting up 
a more efficient Export Promotion Body (OPE) was also under consideration as an essential part of 
the country's Export Development and Promotion Strategy (STRADEX).  STRADEX was being set 
up with technical assistance from the UNCTAD/WTO International Trade Centre (ITC) and financial aid from Canada, and aimed to increase producti on and export supply capacity.  The National 
Committee for International Trade Negotiations  (CNNCI) was founded in 2001 and provided a 
framework to discuss and formulate positions for nego tiation at the multilateral, regional and bilateral 
levels. 
11. Senegal had abolished the prior authorization for imports and simplified and reduced customs 
tariffs.  The maximum rate of duty actually applied under the WAEMU Common External Tariff 
(CET) was 20 per cent, below the 30 per cent bind ing level in the Schedule of Concessions.  In 
July 2001, Senegal had introduced the Customs Valu ation Agreement, covering all products with the 
exception of about 20, for which a reservation rega rding minimum values was being examined at the 
WTO.  Senegal was making efforts to comply with  the WTO rules, and the rules of the WAEMU and 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).  It was encountering difficulties in implementing WTO requirements on notifi cation and trade defence measures.  
12. Despite all the reforms undertaken, Senegal, wh ich had been classified as an LDC since 2001, 
still found it hard to record positive economic and tr ade results.  There was a chronic balance of trade 
deficit and negative annual average growth of e xports for 1990-2000.  Senegal could not yet fully 
exploit the opportunities for market access offered to LDCs because of the weakness of its production 
and export supply capacity. 
13. Trade had a central role to play in order to reach the PRSP objective of 7 to 8 per cent growth 
for 2003-2005.  The IF approach had been acclai med and its projects and programmes were included 
in the PRSP.  Efforts made by participants and de velopment partners were welcomed, but it was vital 
to rationalize them.  There still remained the ch allenge of setting up an appropriate multilateral 
mechanism to finance development in order to en sure a significant increase in production and export 
supply capacity, enabling companies to become more competitive on export markets.  That viewpoint 
was upheld by the initiators of the New Partners hip for Africa's Development (NEPAD), for whom 
one of the main objectives was access to the markets of developed countries.  It was an issue of key 
importance both for Senegal and for all the LDCs. WT/TPR/M/118 
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IV. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 
14. The discussant noted that Sweden was one of the major donors of development aid and 
among WTO Members was also one of the main donors in terms of technical assistance and capacity-
building, for which about 50 million Swedish kr ona had been earmarked for 2004.  Although 
Sweden's bilateral cooperation with  the countries under review was modest, a strategy for the West 
African region was being considered for the end of 2003.  Setting up a focal point in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was being envisaged in order to f acilitate developing countri es' exports, which would 
be complementary with the "help desk" initiative in troduced by the European Commission in Cancún. 
15. With regard to the overall economic outlook , the discussant wished to have the two 
delegations' views on the impact of the crisis  that had affected Côte d'Ivoire and the coup d'état  in 
Guinea-Bissau.  The discussant observe d that a considerable part of economic activity and trade went 
through informal channels, and requested informati on on the two Governments' plans to integrate the 
informal sector in order to improve State revenue.  He also wished to know what benefit the "income 
loss" as a result of incentives for investment brought  to the two countries' economies.  An update on 
the Round Table and the investors' meeting in Niger would also be appreciated. 
16. Niger's aim was to diversify its products and export markets by developing agricultural and 
livestock exports to the subregional and regional ma rkets.  The discussant requested an update on the 
improvement of the institutional trade environment and on the establishment of standards for the main 
export products.  The discussant wanted to know why intra-community (intra-WAEMU) trade was so 
weak and the measures envisaged. 
17. With regard to Niger's participation in the multilateral system, the country's authorities had 
noted that it was insufficient because of Niger's weak human and financial resources;  setting up a mission in Geneva was being considered.  However,  Niger could benefit greatly from the services of 
the Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation (AITIC).  Few notifications had been 
made within the WTO framework and there we re gaps in Members'  understanding of their 
obligations.  The discussant asked what progress ha d been made and what plans to improve the 
situation were under consideration.  
18. Niger's tariff had been entirely based on the WAEMU CET since 1 January 2000.  The simple 
average of MFN customs duties had fallen from 20 per cent in 1997 to 12.1 per cent in 2000.  Over and above the CET, Niger and other WAEMU memb ers applied additional duties.  Outside the 
WAEMU framework, Niger had an import veri fication programme resulting in a 1 per cent 
ad valorem  tax for certain transactions.  There was a s ubstantial gap between the bound and applied 
levels, theoretically leading to a degree of unpred ictability, and the discussant asked for details of 
ongoing plans to improve the situation. 
19. Despite the implementation of the Customs Valuation Agreement, the authorities used 
administrative values for 868 products, which should be replaced by the WAEMU reference values, 
for which Niger intended to enter a request fo r reservation from WTO Members.  The discussant 
requested details on developments in that field. 
20. The discussant asked for confirmation about the preparation of standards in 2003 for Niger's 
food products (rice, oil, milk), building materi als (cement, reinforcing steel), water and the 
environment.  He also asked for details on  the standards programme within the WAEMU. 
21. Niger was not party to the WTO Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement but was 
considering becoming an observer.  Despite the a doption of a new Government Procurement Code in 
May 2002, which was not yet in force, preference  was still given to domestic enterprises with the  WT/TPR/M/118 
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 exclusion of foreign enterprises for contracts finan ced by the National Treasury.  The discussant asked 
for clarifications on the usefulness of such preferences. 
22. With regard to export-related measures, the di scussant asked if there were plans concerning 
the 3 per cent ad valorem  statistical export charge and the special re-export tax.  He also requested 
information on export subsidies;  the main subsidi es were those provided under the Investment Code  
or sectoral codes (exemptions from import duties, VAT or company tax). 
23. As an LDC, Niger had benefited from an  additional time-period until 2006 for full 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.  The di scussant wondered whether the technical assistance 
given was sufficient.  In that context, he asked for the opinion of the Government of Niger concerning 
the decision taken on 30 August 2003 at the WTO that allowed the poorest countries to import more 
easily cheaper generic drugs, produced under compulsory licensing, provided that they could not manufacture the drugs themselves. 
24. The Report of the Government of Niger laid  down liberalization and sectoral promotion 
objectives and strategies in order to help the agri culture, handicrafts, mining, energy, industry, 
tourism, telecommunications and transport sector s to reduce poverty by creating conditions for 
sustainable economic and social development.  Th e discussant asked for more details on the subject 
from the delegation of Niger. 
25. With regard to agriculture, th e Government intended to suppor t the development of promising 
subsectors (cowpeas, cattle on the hoof, meat, hides and skins), by providing public assets 
(infrastructure, coverage of social and health  needs, support/advice).  The discussant asked both 
delegations to give more details on th e plan for a WAEMU agricultural policy. 
26. With regard to services, Niger had undertaken commitments under the GATS on tourism, but 
had not taken part in negotiations since the e nd of the Uruguay Round.  However, Niger had 
liberalized the telecommunications sector, and the discussant asked if Niger was ready to submit its 
conditional offer in the ne w GATS negotiation round. 
27. Coming to the overview of the economic situati on in Senegal, the discussant asked why the 
share of primary products in exports (cotton, fish eries products, groundnut oil, horticultural products) 
had increased since 1994. 
28. The investment climate was undermined by a number of problems relating to administrative 
procedures, labour regulations, high energy supply costs and a lack of infrastructure.  The discussant asked about plans to address these problems, and a bout the impact of the free export enterprise regime 
on Senegal's economy. 
29. Senegal's participation in the multilateral tradi ng system seemed to be below the authorities' 
expectations, particularly with regard to the le vel of notifications and understanding of Members' 
obligations and the benefits whic h Senegal could derive from the system.  The discussant asked for 
details of the Government's plans in this respec t.  The Report by the Secretariat contained a draft 
technical assistance programme which would be th e WTO's contribution to the pilot programme of 
the revised IF (a diagnostic trade integration study of Senegal had already been carried out).  Senegal 
was eligible for JITAP II;  the diagnostic study for JITAP II would be made jointly by the ITC, 
UNCTAD and the WTO, and would be submitted to  the donor community in order to set up a 
cooperation and technical assistance programme. 
30. Constraints on the exercise of professions toge ther with quantitative restrictions had been 
abolished in 1994.  Regular  consultations were organized with the private sector when trade policy 
was drawn up.  With the introduction of the WA EMU Common External Tariff (CET), the simple WT/TPR/M/118 
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 average of customs duties actually applied had been lowered, even though supplementary duties were applied.  All tariff lines were bound;  the ceiling rate  had been fixed at 30 per cent for customs duties 
and at 150 per cent for other duties and taxes.  Although the duties actually applied on some agricultural tariff lines exceeded the 30 per cent bound rate for some pr oducts, the Senegalese 
authorities considered that that extra amount was wi thin the margin permitted by the bound rate for 
"other duties and taxes".  
31. Senegal had requested a waiver in order to ma intain "reference values" for over 29 products 
of non-WAEMU origin.  The Senegalese authorities ju stified that request by the need to protect 
domestic production and the absence of operationa l mechanisms for anti-dumping, countervailing and 
safeguard measures. 
32. The new Government Procurement Code mainta ined a policy of preference for domestic 
enterprises.  The discussant requested information on the usefulness of those preferences up to the 
present time.   The discussant wanted to know if  the Government was considering becoming an 
observer to the Plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. 
33. As an LDC, Senegal could defer full appli cation of the TRIPS Agreement until 2006.  The 
discussant wished to know whether the technical assistance provided by the WTO was sufficient for 
its implementation. 
34. The Report by the Government indicated that five  sectors had been targeted in an action plan 
to implement a technical assistance programme ai ming to increase export capacity:  agriculture (the 
horticultural sector, edible peanuts and cotton, all ac tivities with a competitive advantage);  tourism (a 
source of currency and whose potential was under-explo ited);  textiles and clothing (to take greater 
advantage of opportunities offered by the opening up of American and European markets;  fishing 
(the exploitation of which had been rationalized to  conserve this resource);  and handicrafts.  The 
discussant wished to know what concrete measu res had been taken up to the present time. 
35. With regard to agriculture, th e discussant wanted to know the reason for the existence of the 
Special Import Tax (TCI) on imports of sugar, wheat  flour and refined vegetable oil from countries 
outside the WAEMU.  He also wanted to know th e authorities' plans for the "temporary surcharges" 
on imports of onions, cigarettes, potatoes, bananas,  millet and sorghum of any origin, and for the 
excise duties on refined oils and cigarettes.  He requested an update on the National Agricultural 
Framework Law and the WAEMU agricultural policy.  Moreover, he wished to have the Senegalese 
Government's opinion on the lack of result in Canc ún with regard to the cotton initiative, which had 
been the subject of a presentation by one of th e WAEMU countries at the Ministerial Conference 
(WT/L/539, 19 August 2003).   
36. With regard to services, the Report by the Secretariat indicated that Senegal had made no 
commitments on the supply of services through the presence of natural persons (mode 4).  The 
discussant wished to know whether the Government was ready to make a commitment on mode 4 in 
the revised version of its offer presented on 14 Ap ril 2003 in the negotiation round under the GATS.  WT/TPR/M/118 
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V. STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS 
37. The Representative of Japan  underlined the good bilateral relations that his country 
maintained with Senegal, with the economic and technical cooperation between the two countries.  
There was also "Japan's Initiative for Coopera tion for Africa" and the forthcoming Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development  
38. Japan welcomed the reforms undertaken by Senega l since the devaluation of the CFA franc in 
1994.  However, Senegal had to take a certain number  of measures in order to ensure its development 
in the face of increasing unemployment, overp opulation in urban areas and the increasing gap 
between rich and poor. 
39. Progress had been made in increasing copyright protection.  Tourism was the second export 
sector, and Japan hoped that Senega l would take additional measure s to facilitate procedures for 
tourists or their guides in order to promote tourism. 
40. Japan had a privileged relationship with Niger th rough uranium exports.  As there had been a 
drop in this market, the economy had suffered badly.  International payment deficits had been bridged 
by economic aid from foreign countries.  Japan had also granted aid to Niger. 
41. Japan recognized the efforts made by Nige r to stabilize domestic politics, nonetheless 
ongoing instability was a major barrier to trade.  Jap an hoped that adequate measures would be taken 
to stabilize the domestic situation.  With regard to  sectoral questions, it was important for both Niger 
and Senegal to increase protection of intellectual property rights and to promote the tourism sector. 
42. The Representative of the European Union  noted that Niger and Senegal were closely linked 
through economic and monetary integration with in the WAEMU and through the ECOWAS.  Those 
two regional organizations had di fferent strong points but the same aim of converging towards an 
integration process that would cover all the countries of West Africa.  The aim of the ECOWAS was a free-trade area before the end of 2004 and th e adoption of a CET before the end of 2007. 
43. Despite the differences between Niger and Sene gal, the overall challenges they faced were 
very similar.  Both countries were LDCs and enc ountered real difficulties in integrating their trade 
within the global economy.  Their participation in  the multilateral trading system was still weak and 
both countries would have to continue making great  efforts in order to adapt to the demands of 
national, regional and international markets. 
44. The EU's answer to those challenges consisted in a series of measures of cooperation on the 
basis of "development is the objective, trade is the instrument".  The Cotonou Agreement and the 
"Everything but Arms" initiative were points of refe rence as they allowed duty-free imports into the 
EC's market.  Negotiations on an Economic Partne rship Agreement (EPA) between West Africa and 
the European Commission (EC) would be launched on 6 October in Cotonou.  The EPA was to be 
implemented as from 1 January 2008.  It was abov e all an agreement aiming to ensure that the 
regional market was created.  The EPA would be comp atible with WTO rules, applying all the current 
flexibility in order to take into account the economic  and social constraints of the countries in the 
region. 
45. The IF was a pertinent tool, when considered in the wider context of support from the 
international community for the LDCs' integra tion within the world economy.  The European 
Commission was Senegal's facilitator within the IF .  The process was well underway and different 
stages had been passed.  There remained to implem ent the Action Plan and to set a timetable with 
definite deadlines.  WT/TPR/M/118 
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 46. Cambodia was often referred to as an example, and the Commission wished that the same be 
true for Senegal in Africa.  The key factor in Ca mbodia was the authorities' determination to give a 
key role to trade.  And as for Cambodia, where development partners had followed by backing the 
process, the same could happen in Senegal. 
47. Niger and Senegal were encouraged to make further progress in the effective implementation 
of reforms, and to continue respecting and implementing their engagements at the regional and 
multilateral levels.  The EC's back ing would boost that momentum. 
48. The Representative of Canada
 congratulated Senegal on its structural and sectoral reforms 
undertaken since 1995, which had already brought ta ngible progress.  Senegal had made substantial 
resources available during the recent consultative Gr oup to finance the implementation of its Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (PRS).  The PRS, like th e Export Promotion and Development Strategy 
(STRADEX) and the IF, provided the elements Senegal needed to meet the challenges of 
globalization. 
49. Senegal was going to update its production system s and set up structures to advise and help 
investors and developers.  Such measures were una voidable if the country wanted to free itself from 
the rents arising from protective measures, and if it wanted to maintain and draw maximum benefit 
from the technologies that had already been transferred. 
50. The project of reforming the administration of public finances and government procurement 
systems would create a climate conducive to investme nt and socio-economic development.  However, 
the obstacles to private investment in Senegal had to be underlined, as administrative procedures 
remained both long and costly.  It was also im portant to keep open options to liberalize the 
telecommunications sector, which was planned for 2004.  
51. Senegal had to speed up its efforts to improve expertise of operators in buoyant sectors that 
had been identified in the STRADEX, while opening  up its sectors to competition by lowering tariff 
protection.  Senegal should also rapidly rationali ze its export support and promotion instruments and 
mechanisms.  The Senegalese authoriti es were invited to give a substan tial role to the private sector in 
the implementation of the IF. 
52. Senegal was a member of the World Intellect ual Property Organization (WIPO) and should 
continue adhering to certain intellectual property protection treaties currently in force that were 
administered by the WIPO, in accordance with the revised Bangui Agreement (1999). 
53. With regard to Niger, Canada praised the re markable efforts made to strengthen domestic 
political stability, stabilize the ma croeconomic framework, improve tr ade policies and practices, and 
promote private investment.  Despite the efforts made in the field of trade, there were risks of fraud 
arising from the existence of informal trade channels.  
54. Niger had ratified the revised Bangui Agreemen t (1999) and also should adhere to certain 
intellectual property protection treaties administered  by the WIPO, of which Niger was a member.  
Niger was encouraged to actively pursue the simp lification of its regulatory framework and the 
improvement of its legal and judicial system.  
55. Canada was in agreement with the Secretariat' s view concerning the im portance of enhancing 
the knowledge and expertise of the administration, bu t wished to widen that objective to other public 
bodies and Niger's private sector. 
56. Canada had made a substantial financial commitment in order to help countries, such as 
Senegal and Niger, to participate fully and efficien tly in the current round of negotiations.  Niger and  WT/TPR/M/118 
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 Senegal also benefited from the initiative of acces s to Canadian markets for LDCs, which gave duty-
free and quota-free access to all imports from the 48 LDCs, with the exception of dairy products, 
poultry and eggs.  Canada, however, wished to underline the importance of the progress and objectives of the Doha Agenda, for which Canada w as going to work much harder in the wake of 
Cancún.  Strong African leadership could play an important role, and Canada urged Niger and 
Senegal to remain actively engaged.  
57. The Representative of Hong Kong, China
 congratulated Niger and Senegal on their 
substantial liberalization efforts.  Quantitative rest rictions on imports had be en abolished and tariff 
barriers reduced and simplified by the adoption of the WAEMU CET.  It should, however, be pointed 
out that Niger and Senegal applie d additional taxes on goods importe d from third countries.  Senegal 
also applied surcharges on certain imported goods .  All these additional taxes were a burden which 
was added on to the MFN tariff, and Niger and Sene gal were invited to abo lish them, or to reduce 
them as soon as possible. 
58. The fact that an Import-Export Card was demande d of people involved in international trade 
in Senegal seemed to be an obstacle to trade.  Th e delegation encouraged the Senegalese authorities to  
carry out their planned abolishment of the Card. 
59. Niger had liberalized its telecommunications services without commitments under the GATS, 
but could consolidate such liberalization by comm itments in the current round of negotiations.  
60. The Representative of Mauritania  noted the signification of the joint TPR of two West 
African countries linked by several integration ag reements, which bore witness to the importance of 
regional integration as a factor strengthening the multilateral trading system.  The progress registered 
within the framework of the WAEMU or of other su bregional organizations illustrated the useful and 
positive contribution of integration.  
61. Senegal had made appreciable progress since its  first TPR in 1994.  The Government had 
made trade an instrument devoted to growth a nd economic and social development under the PRSP.  
The promotion of investment, control of public fi nances, the implementation of the tariff reform 
within the WAEMU, the improvement of procedures facilitating trade, the binding of all tariff lines, and the effective application of the provisions of  the Customs Valuation Agreement since July 2001, 
together with the commitments made covering sev eral sectors within the GATS framework, were 
proof of Senegal's untertaking to better integrate into the multilateral trading system. 
62. The Senegalese Government had made consider able efforts to reinforce the regional and 
multilateral dimensions of foreign trade and to deri ve greater benefit from trade liberalization, in 
particular the efforts made within the framework of the WAEMU and of the ECOWAS, together with 
the signing of several bilateral or regional agreements.  
63. Mauritania enjoyed good bilateral relations with Senegal.  Th e programmes carried out under 
the auspices of the Organization for Development of  the Senegal River (OMVS) in the fields of 
irrigated agriculture, electrification and river tran sport laid the foundation stone for a strategic 
partnership between Senegal, Ma li and Mauritania, generating a s ubstantial flow of trade and 
partnerships in different fields such as fishing, livestock raising, tourism,  education or small and 
medium-size processing industries. 
64. Niger had made considerable progress since the 5
th Republic came into being in 1999.  The 
resolute commitment to implement the obligations arising from the WTO Agreements had led to the 
binding of all tariff lines covering agricultural pr oducts and most lines concerning non-agricultural 
products, the submission of a schedule of specifi c commitments under the GATS, the implementation 
of the Customs Valuation Agreement in 2001, t ogether with the setting up in 2002 of a national WT/TPR/M/118 
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 standardization, accreditation and certification system, and the revision of the Government 
Procurement Code. 
65. Mauritania also enjoyed excellent relations w ith Niger, both on the subregional level and 
within the framework of the African Union and the ACP Group of States.  There was a substantial 
community of people from Niger in Mauritania, and of Mauritanians in Niger. 
66. The WTO Members, and the international comm unity more generally speaking, should be 
aware of the efforts made by Niger and Senegal and consequently step up their aid in order to help 
these two countries to pursue the reforms undertaken a nd to create the conditions for complete success 
of their export promotion and develo pment strategies, and their PRSs.  
67. The Representative of the United States
 noted that his country gave substantial preferential 
access to exports from Niger and Senegal, in partic ular through the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) and by identifying the fields where technical assistance would be strengthened.  The governments were encouraged to use that assistance and to take on a stronger leadership role in the 
region as defenders of free trade a nd the multilateral trading system;  their efforts would be backed by 
the United States. 
68. The United States congratulated Senegal for rene wing its efforts to attract investments and 
diversify the basis of the economy.  The groundnut crop was on the decline and the subsector was being liberalized.  Sizeable participation by the private sector in the framework of a competitive 
economy was another means of stimulating growth, a nd it was thus encouraging that the Government 
was pursuing its privatization and restructuring programme.  The Senegal ese economy had made the 
transition from a State-dominated economy to a market-based economy.  The Government had 
abolished price controls, export subsidies, quantitative restric tions on imports and exports, and 
monopolies, and had modernized the regulatory fra mework and begun a privatization programme.  
Senegal was encouraged to stimulate the developmen t of the private sector and to pursue structural 
reforms, the latter being a subject about which the delegation would like to have further information. 
69. The United States expressed concern over the fact  Senegal that had not enacted legislation to 
apply its WTO obligations.  The representative asked  for more details on the delay and plans about 
implementing the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation. 
70. The United States backed the effo rts made by the Government of Niger to promote the market 
economy, to expand investments and trade, stimulate growth and facilitate the integration of Niger's 
economy in the world economy.  It recognized the di fficulties met in introducing economic, social and 
cultural reforms.  The United States would continue  to encourage trade and development in Niger by 
offering preferential access to its exports and iden tifying the fields where technical assistance would 
be strengthened. 
71. The Government of Niger had made rapid pr ogress towards a market economy, even though 
the country had limited financial resources.  State en terprises had been privatized, particularly in the 
key sectors of energy and telecommunications, and th e privatization of other enterprises was in the 
pipeline.  It was vital to make energetic efforts in the fields of economic management, privatization 
and public finances in order to promote trade, i nvestment and economic development.  Efforts to 
impose fiscal discipline and macr oeconomic stability should be pursued, as should those concerning 
the strengthening of the banking and financial system , and diversification of the economy, which was 
dependent on uranium. 
72. Even though vast progress had been made, th e Governments of Niger and Senegal still had 
much work in front of them in order to attain the objective of a greater opening up of both trade and  WT/TPR/M/118 
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 the economy, which would be the basis for increased productivity, diversifie d exports and, perhaps 
the key objective, the arrival of investments.  The United States intended to back those efforts. 
73. The Representative of India
 noted the importance of the change in Senegal's status (LDC 
since 2001).  Even though Senegal had managed to  reach a higher level of economic growth during 
the period 1995-2002 thanks to its major structural reforms, poverty had not declined.  In spite of 
those difficulties, the Senegalese Government's commi tments to pursue the reform process remained a 
firm one. 
74. Niger had confronted economic problems since the beginning of the 1980s.  Since 1994, the 
Government had firmly set off down the path to reform and macroeconomic stabilization, but there 
could not be real benefits because of political uncerta inty up to 1999.  There was currently hope for a 
rise in the growth rate and stabilization.  The delegation of India backed the efforts aiming at 
diversifying the economy of Niger. 
75. Niger and Senegal had begun to reform their trade policies within the WAEMU, and had 
bound almost all their tariff lines.  Both countries had recently taken measures to implement the WTO 
Agreements on Customs Valuation, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Technical Barriers to 
Trade, and TRIPS.  Those were considerable achie vements.  However, Niger and Senegal were not 
yet in a position to be able to participate fully in the multilateral trading system, and needed substantial and targeted technical assistance.  WTO Members should consider what means were 
available to better integrate Niger and Senegal into the multilateral tr ading system.  India had offered 
technical assistance and training support, as far as its resources allowed. 
76. The Representative of Morocco
 noted that the difficult situation of Niger had thus far limited 
all attempts for it to become integrated in the multilateral trading system.  As a landlocked country, 
Niger was economically highly dependent on agricu lture, which had suffered from the vagaries of 
unfavourable rainfall.  Government initiatives had run up against political instability.  The economy 
had not been able to take advantage of devalua tion, as had been the case in other countries in the 
region, because of insufficient supply and lack of accompanying measures. 
77. Niger had nonetheless made praiseworthy effort s with regard to its commitments under the 
WTO Agreements.  Even though, despite its wishes, Niger was not included in the redefined IF pilot 
programme, there was hope that the country would be eligible for the WTO technical assistance 
programme.  
78. Niger benefited from Morocco's initiative to a llow duty-free imports of products from African 
LDCs.  The two countries had bilateral c ooperation programmes in several fields.  
79. Senegal had managed to face the challenges on th e horizon when it submitted to its first TPR 
in 1994.  The authorities had launched a progra mme of structural reforms and macroeconomic 
stabilization, with encouraging results.  Senega l had made much progress in terms of regional 
integration and was very well placed among WA EMU members for its financial discipline. 
80. Despite Senegal's commendable efforts to meet  its commitments under the WTO Agreements, 
macroeconomic results remained weak and socio-ec onomic indicators had continued to deteriorate, 
resulting in Senegal being classified among the LDCs since 2001.  However, it was a status that gave 
the country new perspectives as it allowed increased support from its development partners in the 
fields of debt relief, market access, and other initiatives resulting from the Uruguay Round and the 
Doha Agenda, in particular through technical cooperation in the context of the IF.  
81. The Senegalese authorities were encouraged to continue the efforts already made since the 
first TPR with regard to structural reforms and th e development of human capital in the framework of WT/TPR/M/118 
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 the PRS, with the hope that the strategy would bear fruit in the medium term and help redress 
imbalances in favour of the rural population.  
82. Morocco brought its whole-hearted support to th e Governments of Niger and Senegal for the 
fulfilment of their economic and trade objectives. 
83. The Representative of Mauritius
 underlined the strong links between his country and Senegal, 
which were strengthened by their belonging to region al and international orga nizations, in particular 
the African Union, NEPAD, the ACP Group and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie  
(OIF).  
84. Despite a programme of structural reforms a nd macroeconomic stabilization since Senegal's 
first TPR, the country's economic growth had been variable.  Like Mauritius, Senegal was vulnerable 
to external shocks, the vagaries of the climate and its debt burden.  According to the Report by the 
Secretariat, 65 per cent of the population was poor, with per capita income below US$545, and with a 
low percentage of literacy and short life expect ancy.  Senegal was faced with a long struggle. 
85. Several noteworthy initiatives had been taken by  the Senegalese authorities to redress the 
situation, in particular the STRADEX, particip ation in the IF and the JITAP II programme, and 
institutional reforms.  It was vital for Senegal to ad opt an Agricultural Orientation Law, in order to 
lessen the poverty of the rural population, to incr ease the level of food security and the quality and 
diversity of foodstuffs, and to mana ge the country's natural heritage. 
86. The Mauritian delegation had noted the Senegalese Government's determination to reverse the 
major macroeconomic trends, in partic ular by drawing up the PRSP, the 10th Social and Economic 
Development Plan 2002-2007 and commitment to the NEPAD.  The PRSP deserved the support of 
the international community as a whole in terms of  resources mobilization and bilateral initiatives.  
Trade was a key instrument to bridge the gap separating Africa from the developed countries. 
87. Given the affinities between Mauritius and Senega l, several avenues for cooperation were to 
be developed, in particular in tourism, handicraf ts, the textiles and clothing sector, SMEs, fisheries 
and questions relating to the over-exploitation of fisheries resources, education and experiences of 
regional integration.  Such coopera tion was all the more necessary as the Mauritian private sector had 
shown keen interest in Senegal. 
88. The Representative of Malaysia  noted the substantial efforts ma de by Senegal to liberalize the 
investment, trade and services regimes.  Niger ha d taken on considerable multilateral commitments, in 
particular the binding of most tariff lines and th e implementation of the WTO Agreement on Customs 
Valuation and the GATS, and was considering becomi ng an observer to the Plurilateral Agreement on 
Government Procurement.  Ni ger had shown that stronger ec onomic growth was possible in 
favourable climatic conditions. 
89. Niger and Senegal had many points in common, in  particular the key role of agriculture in 
their development and the significant efforts already made in order to stimulate growth and 
development.  However, substantia l progress remained to be made, in particular with regard to the 
promotion of trade and investments.  The internatio nal community had an important part to play in 
providing technical assistance and plans to raise standa rds.  Coordination of e fforts would enhance the 
efficiency of ongoing programmes.  WT/TPR/M/118 
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VI. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF NIGER AND SENEGAL AND 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
90. The Chairperson  noted that the discussion was centred on three majo r themes:  the economic 
environment;  trade policy;  and sectoral policy.  The remarks by the delegations of Niger and Senegal 
on each theme would be followed by  those of other participants. 
91. The representative of Niger  stated that some replies would be given jointly and others would 
be provided later, in particular those concerning the United States. 
92. With regard to the overall economic environment and the stabilization of the country's 
domestic affairs, constitutional life was back to normal in Niger following the elections of 1999, 
thanks to the establishment of democratic institu tions and better management of the socio-economic 
concerns of civil and military personnel working for the State. 
93. Concerning the economic impact of the crisis  that had affected Côte d'Ivoire, the 
representative indicated that as Côte d'Ivoire was Niger's second largest partner in imports, there had been negative consequences on the quality and pri ce of goods, supplies of industrial inputs and budget 
receipts.  Since Burkina Faso had closed its borde r with Côte d'Ivoire, transit traffic bound for Niger 
had been interrupted.  Credit institutions in Niger had recorded a slowdown in transactions with their 
correspondents in Côte d'Ivoire. 
94. Concerning the consequences of the coup d'état  in Guinea Bissau, he underlined that the 
WAEMU and the ECOWAS condemned changes of government by means of force.  Niger supported that principle and that of the peaceful resolution of conflicts in a member State. 
95. With regard to the Round Table on the private sector and meetings with investors, he 
explained that the Round Table had taken place in November 2000 as an outcome of the private sector 
promotion policy adopted in March 1997.  A Follow-Up  Unit under the direct control of the Ministry 
for Promotion of the Private Sector had taken over responsibility. 
96. The Government of Niger was taking the following measures to reduce the size of the 
informal sector and to improve revenue for the State:  adopting the law on competition and prices 
which governed trade activities;  applying measures to  encourage investment (the Investment Code), 
which incited the informal sector to join the fo rmal sector;  establishing an Investment Promotion 
Centre;  setting up a Centre to deal with forma lities for enterprises, such as the Single Window;  
restructuring the Consular Chamber;  and the La bour Code, obliging enterprises to comply with 
regulatory provisions.  Those provisions appeared to be inadequate and other provisions were 
currently being studied. 
97. Concerning the benefit on Niger's economy of the income loss as a result of incentives for 
investment, he confirmed that there had been a lo ss of revenue, but that the Government was hoping 
to attract investors with a view to increasing added value and employment.  
98. The technical assistance and capacity-buildi ng programmes had insufficient resources and 
were not able to cover needs.  The Cotonou Ag reement was binding, as it was an Agreement that 
Niger had signed and ratified. 
99. Concerning Niger's view on its regional priorities, the authorities had the following plans:  
reducing informalization;  using in ternal taxation to make up for the loss of customs revenue resulting 
from the setting up of the free-trade zone, as 35 per cent of trade was with Nigeria and 30 per cent 
with the other WAEMU countries, with Côte d'Ivoire at the top;  implementing territorial planning in 
such a way as to reduce transport costs and improve competitiveness, and thus overcome the WT/TPR/M/118 
WT/TPR/M/119 Page 16 
 
 disadvantages of being landlocked.  Those regional priorities also allowed a single currency to be 
established, and enabled Niger to benefit from the ECOWAS compensation mechanism and to achieve compatibility in trade policies within the region. 
100. With regard to the reasons for the low level of intra-community trade within the WEAMU, 
the explanation could be found in the frailty of th e industrial fabric and the weak production of local 
products destined for intra-community trade. 
101. The representative of Senegal
 noted that an IMF study had shown that the crisis in Côte 
d'Ivoire had had a negative impact on the economies of the countries in the subregion.  The growth 
figures of the seven WAEMU member countries plus Guinea and Ghana had dropped to an average of 
2.5 per cent in 1999-2000, compared with the averag e rate of 5 per cent enjoyed by the region over 
the period 1994-2000.  However, the impact on Se negal had been less hard compared to other 
countries.  With regard to the crisis in Guinea Bi ssau, there was hope of democratic elections in the 
near future. 
102. Concerning the measures taken by the Govern ment of Senegal to reduce the size of the 
informal sector and improve State revenue, it was significant that the sector already made a 
substantial contribution to State re venue.  Institutional reforms had been  carried out in order to control 
the informal sector.  One such measure encouraging formalization was the creation of a synthetic tax, 
applicable from January 2004.  An Approved Mana gement Centre had also been set up, whose 
function was to help SMEs in the informal sector in  their integration into the formal sector.  The two 
measures were linked, since a stamp from the Management Centre was necessary in order to benefit 
from the synthetic tax.  The setting up of a Ministry of Female Entrepreneurship and of Micro-credits 
was also being studied, as women were important players in the informal sector.  In 2003, an international forum on SMEs had been organized.  Re gular meetings with the informal sector had also 
been arranged by the Government over the last three years. 
103. With regard to the usefulness of the policy of preference for domestic enterprises in 
government procurement, such a policy helped to  expand Senegal's networ k of SMEs and was a 
measure encouraging the formalization of the info rmal sector.  It involved domestic enterprises and 
industries and enterprises established in Niger, wh ether foreign or not.  The question of Senegal 
becoming an observer to the Plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement was not 
currently under consideration. 
104. With regard to the weakness of intra-community  trade within the WAEMU, the main reasons, 
apart from those mentioned by the delegation of Niger, were:  the lack of communication and 
transport infrastructure, the constraints on treasu ries' budget receipts, and insufficient industrial 
production.  The customs union had not been totall y put in place, but the objective was to improve 
intra-community trade, in particular through fr ee circulation of products imported from a member 
country and the relaxing of community rules. 
105. With regard to the proposed plans to reduce el ectricity supply costs, the authorities were 
intending to pursue the privatization of SENELEC , and there were also subregional plans.  
Concerning the impact of the free export enterprise  regime on the Senegalese economy, an evaluation 
was being carried out.  With regard to the increase in the share of the primary sector in exports, the 
reasons were:  good levels of rainfall in 200 0 and 2001;  the record production of groundnuts 
(1 million tons in 2001);  the increase in cotton pr oduction;  erratic variations in fisheries products 
(octopus);  and the increase in horticultural produc ts for export thanks to the Agricultural Export 
Promotion Project (PPEA). 
106. The representative of Rwanda
 underlined the efforts made by Niger and Senegal in order to 
strengthen their participation in the multilateral tradi ng system.  Given their status as LDCs, some of  WT/TPR/M/118 
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 the WTO Agreements should be implemented with  flexibility by including certain waivers, in 
accordance with the Doha development mandate.  LD Cs could only be integrat ed into a rules-based 
multilateral trade system if they benefited fro m effective special and differential treatment. 
107. The representative of the European Commission
 noted the concern expressed by the 
delegation of Niger concerning the harmful eff ects resulting from the setting up of the ECOWAS 
customs union on tax revenues.  However, greater regional integration would boost the economies of 
member countries.  His delegation requested more  details from the delegation of Senegal on the 
privatization of SONACOS, planned for 2003. 
108. The representative of Chinese Taipei  underlined the interest of his Government in a 
deepening of bilateral relations with the countries of West Africa and in particular with Senegal.  A 
considerable effort to implement the reforms of  the Uruguay Round had been made, and opening the 
telecommunications sector to competition under the GATS would help Senegal to benefit from that 
sector with its high added value. 
109. The experience of Chinese Taipei confirmed that price and trade liberalization together with 
the privatization of State enterprises, which were processes currently under way in Senegal, and the 
emergence of SMEs would result in a more stable  and transparent economic environment, which in 
turn would attract foreign direct investment and consequently generate e xport capacity.  Senegal was 
to be congratulated for being on the path to sustained economic growth. 
110. On the topic of trade policies, the representative of Niger  noted that with regard to approval 
under the Investment Code, dossiers were approved provi ded that they were within the Code's field of 
application and respected the conditions.  Befo re taking the decision to approve, a technical 
commission made observations which enabled applican ts to make the necessary corrections before the 
full examination of their applications.  Decisions we re final, but dossiers could be reconsidered if 
there were modifications. 
111. Concerning the question of whether the specifi c benefits under the Investment Code were 
similar to tax and customs concessions, he pointed out that they were rather different.  Special 
provisions had been established for certain sole prop rietorship or cooperative handicrafts enterprises, 
namely exemption from the business licence fee, the tax on commercial and industrial profits (BIC), 
the minimum fiscal tax (IMF), and duties and taxes, including VAT, for five years.  Such exemptions were also in place for the building of schools and clinics and for enterprises working on technological 
innovations.  
112. With regard to the progress made on notifi cation to the WTO and plans to improve the 
situation, Niger recognized its  shortcomings within the WAEMU framework.  Concerning the 
possibility of modifying bound rates in order to re duce the gap with applied rates, the representative 
indicated that there were currently no plans to that effect.  The reply to the question about the 
proposed request to WTO Members for a reservati on in respect of administrative values would be 
given later. 
113. Standardization in Niger had begun with the establishment of a Department of 
Standardization, Quality and Metrology in Novemb er 2001, and the adoption of a law in September 
2002.  Standardization and accreditation were d ealt with by the Ministry responsible for 
standardization and the National Standard s Council (CNN).  The CNN was responsible, inter alia , for 
putting forward regulatory and fina ncial measures and for approving  draft standards before their 
adoption by the Minister responsible for standardizat ion.  Draft standards were drawn up by technical 
committees for standardization. WT/TPR/M/118 
WT/TPR/M/119 Page 18 
 
 114. As soon as the institutional apparatus had been set up, it was determined that the priority 
needs for domestic standards c oncerned agro-food products, build ing materials, water and the 
environment, and quality management.  Four techni cal committees for standardization had thus been 
established.  The technical committee for standardi zation in quality management had already adopted 
the ISO 9001 standard.  Draft standards for water, iodized salt, cement, bricks, and hides and skins 
had been prepared.  Standards for onions were  at the draft stage.  Products derived from 
biotechnologies had not yet undergone a standardiza tion process.  Niger was also considering fully 
taking over the standards of the Codex Alimentarius .  In accordance with the provisions of the WTO 
Agreements, mandatory standards would be  notified as soon as they were adopted. 
115. The development of such standards could help production enterprises to satisfy environmental 
requirements on international markets, but that would imply strengthening capacity.  Concerning 
technical assistance, a list of needs had recently been sent to certain partners, who were studying 
them.  Niger did not rule out giving accreditation to foreign bodies. 
116. A programme to set up a system of accredita tion, standardization and quality promotion was 
being implemented within the WAEMU, with the help  of the EU.  The programme had identified the 
state of standardization activities in the member  countries.  A regional general Secretariat for 
accreditation had also been established within the WAEMU. 
117. With regard to the usefulness of the preferen ce given to domestic enterprises for government 
procurement, the representative explained that  the policy concerned domestic enterprises and 
industries, and enterprises established in Niger, wh ether foreign or not.  The purpose was to favour 
domestic entrepreneurship and the setti ng up of foreign enterprises in Niger. 
118. In answer to the discussant's question, there were no plans  concerning export measures (the 
statistical export charge and the special re-expor t tax).  The discussant had also asked for more 
information about the scope and usefulness of export subsidies, but Niger did not use such subsidies 
as defined in the relevant WTO Agreement. 
119. With regard to intellectual property, Niger woul d give its replies to the questions concerning 
the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and on the amount of technical assistance required to allow Niger to modernize its intellectual property re gime to the Secretariat.  With regard to the 
implementation of a new copyright regime, draft te xts had been sent to the WIPO for comment.  The 
comments had been included and the texts were cu rrently being forwarded to  the National Assembly 
for adoption. 
120. Concerning the WTO decision on the importation of generic medicines, he indicated that 
Niger was one of the LDCs who had asked for such a measure, and thus approved of it.  However, it 
was important that there be flexible conditions governing its implementation. 
121. The representative of Senegal
 underlined that it was the la w passed in 1979 that governed 
copyright, but that a draft law had been put before  the National Assembly and would be voted before 
long.  Senegal applied the revised Bangui Agreem ent, which had been harmonized with the TRIPS 
Agreement in 1999. 
122. With regard to the amount of technical assist ance required to modernize the intellectual 
property regime, she indicated that it was necessar y:  to provide logistical support to the TRIPS 
subcommittee of the CNNCI (National Committee for International Trade Negotiations);  to finance 
training seminars at the national and regional levels for magistrates, customs officials, policemen, and 
trade inspectors, in order to promote better unders tanding of the TRIPS Agreement;  and to support 
economic players, particularly in the handicrafts fiel d, for the financing of costs incurred to register  WT/TPR/M/118 
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 intellectual property rights.  The informal sector did not have the necessary resources to protect its 
intellectual property. 
123. With regard to the measures taken by Senegal in order to combat piracy on the domestic 
market, she stated that the Senegalese Copyright  Office (BSDA) was responsible for applying the 
1979 law, which provided for the filing of lawsuits  and the seizure of counterfeit goods.  The draft 
legislation on copyright, once voted, would allow piracy to be combated more effectively as the penalties provided for were severer.  Technical assi stance was necessary to back up the work of the 
BSDA, even though its limited resources had not pr evented it from achieving significant results in 
seizing counterfeit goods. 
124. The protection of service marks and geographical  indications was governed by the Bangui 
Agreement.  According to the African Intell ectual Property Organizati on (OAPI), the expression 
"distinctiveness of the trademark" mentioned in Anne x III, Article 1, of the Bangui Agreement meant 
what was visually distinctive, which excluded both sound and smell. 
125. She explained how foreigners who were right  holders could register their rights under 
Annex VI of the revised Bangui Agreement.  Their rights had to be registered in their countries of 
origin before they approached the OAPI.  In re ply to the question of who handed down penalties on 
infringement of the use of geographical indications , and how damages were assessed in proceedings, 
she indicated that such matters fell within the competence of the courts. 
126. There was no national legislation on patents, industrial designs or plant varieties, for in 
Senegal, only the Bangui Agreement applied.  Se negal did not intend to join the Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants for the mo ment as the Annex of the revised Bangui Agreement 
dealing with the question was not yet being implem ented, fundamentally for reasons of technical 
know-how. 
127. With regard to the elimination of surcharges on imports, she explained that they had been 
levied on a limited number of products in the wake  of the trade liberalization programme, which had 
abolished quantitative restrictions.  Their levels di d not exceed those of the other duties and taxes in 
Senegal's schedule.  There was a link with the dossi er that Senegal had submitted to the Committee on 
Customs Valuations in July 2002 relating to mini mum values on a number of strategic products.  
Unfortunately, the issue had not yet been resolved because of the intransigence of certain developed 
countries, in particular the United States.  It was desirable that a solution be quickly found so that 
Senegal could benefit from the waiver that had been granted to LDCs under the Doha Agenda. 
128. With regard to investments, and in particular  the harmful effects of the bureaucratic burdens 
facing investors, in the question put by Canada, it was true that there were still efforts to be made in 
this field.  That was why a Presidential Investors'  Council (CPI) had been set up, presided by the Head 
of State.  The Council had recently identified 35 measures to simplify administrative procedures.  Moreover, the establishment of the following was be ing considered:  a code of good governance and a 
good governance surveillance and anti-corruption Council;  performance indicators and evaluation 
criteria for all the agencies and departments dealin g with administrative formalities and procedures 
(including the National Agency for the Promotion of  Investment and Major Public Works (APIX));  
an investment framework law defining principles of investor/government relations and establishing 
statutory deadlines for the handling of cases referred to  public authorities.  The first steps to realize 
these objectives had been taken during the first half of 2003. 
129. With regard to standardization, Niger had re plied to the question on the regional aspect.  
Concerning Senegal, the European Commission wa s asking questions on the effectiveness of the 
reform of the system, on the conformity of Senega lese standards adopted in 2002, and on the regular 
participation in international sta ndardizing bodies.  The reform was i ndeed effective and had led to the WT/TPR/M/118 
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 setting up of the Senegalese Standards Associati on (ASN), which had replaced the Senegalese 
Standards Institute (ISN), highlighting greater impli cation of the private sector in the standardization 
process.  A total of 197 standards had been develope d, of which 110 were international standards.  
Participation in international bodies was s till undermined by budgetary constraints. 
130. The mandatory standard on tomatoes was not a protective measure contrary to the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade as it aimed to preven t the presence of additives and colouring that were 
harmful to public health. 
131. Both Senegal and Niger, and the other countries in the subregion, were engaged in negotiating 
an EPA with the European Commission with a view to developing the subregional market. 
132. The representative of the European Commission
 observed in relation to the representative of 
Senegal's remarks on reference values, that a mini mum price, which was more than 50 per cent higher 
than that of the world market, was imposed on exports of matches from the EU to Senegal.  That 
minimum price was apparently based on a study ca rried out by the Senegalese authorities, and the 
Commission requested additional information on the study or on the basis of the calculation of the 
minimum value. 
133. With regard to sectoral policies, the representative of Niger  confirmed that the technical 
assistance provided met Niger's main priorities concerning the sustainable management of natural resources.  Niger confirmed that the committee responsible for evaluating the impact on the 
environment intended to look at the question of sustainability. 
134. Regarding the terms and conditions  to be met by the branches or subsidiaries of financial 
institutions setting up on the territory of Niger, he indicated that the market was open, and that the 
establishment of branches or subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions was subject to the current 
banking regulations.  Applications for approval were submitted to the Central Bank of West African 
States (BCEAO), which then asked the opinion of th e Banking Commission, on the basis of which 
approval was granted by decree from the Ministry of Finance.  On average, a minimum of three 
months was necessary to deal with applications  for approval, as the meetings of the Banking 
Commission were quarterly. 
135. Prudential standards for management defined by the WAEMU Banking Commission 
followed the rules of the Basel Agreement.   The BCEAO and the Banking Commission were 
represented at the annual meetings on the Basel Agr eement, with the aim of harmonizing standards. 
136.  Up to six months were on average necessary to process applications  for approval submitted 
by enterprises supplying credit insurance services. 
137. Financial services were not included in Niger' s schedule of specific commitments under the 
GATS.  However, current banking regulations did not discriminate between foreign companies and 
domestic firms, once the former had been set up  on the territory of Niger.  Another question 
concerned Niger's opinion that such commitments were not consistent with those of the WAEMU, 
pointing to the fact that other member countries had made commitments.  Niger indeed considered 
that a single schedule of commitments for financ ial services was necessary fo r countries in the same 
economic area.  The schedule would be notified to  the WTO, since the WAEMU could not do so. 
138. The representative of Senegal
 noted that the WAEMU agricultural policy covered all 
agricultural, forestry, livestock raising and fishi ng activities.  Its objective was to contribute in a 
sustainable manner to meeting the population's food needs, the economic and social development of 
the member States, and poverty reduction.  Three stra tegic themes had been identified to attain that 
objective:  adapting production systems and impr oving the production environment;  enlarging the  WT/TPR/M/118 
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 common market in agriculture and management of shared resources (fishing and livestock raising);  and integrating into the subregional market and th e world market in order better to ensure export 
outlets for regional products, to limit food depende ncy and to secure the progressive integration of 
agriculture in the subregional and world markets.  
139. On the institutional level, in order to facilitate the implementation of the WAEMU 
agricultural policy, focal points had been set up in  each member country to follow up implementation 
at the national level.  The activities required to  adapt agricultural industries and improve the 
production environment would be conducted in a consultative framework. 
140. Regarding the drafting of the Agricultural Fr amework Law, its main objectives were:  to 
reduce poverty in the rural community, raise the st andard of living and keep as many farmers and 
stock breeders as possible on the land;  to increase th e volume of production in order to improve food 
security and make Senegal independent as far as f ood was concerned;  and to improve the ability of 
Senegalese agriculture to compete with imports.  The Law also aimed:  to diversify and increase agricultural production and exports while meeting quality  standards;  to manage natural resources, and 
particularly the soil, water and forests, on a sustai nable basis;  and to improve the living environment 
in rural areas and promote balanced land use. 
141. The Agricultural Framework Law was fully consis tent with the WAEMU agricultural policy.  
In addition, a Joint National Committee had been set  up to finalize the draft, which was due to be 
completed at the end of December 2003 at the latest.  A meeting with donors was planned for 
November 2003 to bring them up to da te and receive their contributions. 
142. With regard to the lack of data on the size of subsidies for agricultural production, the 
representative indicated that there was no financial aid for production in Senegal, which was a poor 
country.  Imported products , however, were subsidized. 
143. With regard to the fact that import surcharg es had been maintained, they were designed to 
offer a lifeline to certain agro-industrial branches,  and as a LDC, Senegal had the right to maintain 
them as a safeguard measure.  
144. Concerning the Cancún initiative on cotton, a question put by the discussant, it had 
demonstrated the solidarity and cohesion of the de veloping countries.  As the initiative had not been 
accepted, Senegal was expecting the issue to  be addressed as a matter of priority. 
145. Regarding the delays in the approval of a pplications from enterprises supplying insurance 
services, two months (five at the very most) were  necessary for the preliminary examination by the 
Ministry of the Economy and Finance before app lications were sent to the Regional Insurance 
Monitoring Commission, which met four times a year. 
146. Japan had noted that Japanese tourists would be  encouraged if Japanese tourist guides and 
interpreters were allowed to set up in Senegal without conditions.  However, it was obligatory either 
to be a Senegalese national or to be a national of a State with a reciprocal agreement with Senegal, 
and to obtain a professional card from the Ministry of Tourism.  To fight insecurity, Senegal, with the 
help of the police force, was setting up tourist brigad es, which regularly patrolled tourist sites (charter 
on tourism). 
147. Concerning the environment, the EU had asked  if the trade and environment subcommittee 
had been able to identify the priority fields of c ooperation with the EU, but such was not yet the case.  
Senegal was responsible for the matter in the NE PAD, and would certainly ask the Commission for 
technical assistance when the time came. WT/TPR/M/118 
WT/TPR/M/119 Page 22 
 
 148. The type of technical assistance that helped Se negal to participate more effectively in the 
multilateral trading system was a technical assistance programme built around a financial 
development plan.  That was a vital elemen t, for although Senegal had access to many markets 
through a variety of initiatives, without nationa l capacity, access remained potential only.  The TPRB 
meeting was an opportunity to request technical assistance funds. 
149. Given the importance of the IF and JITAP II pr ogrammes, Senegal was expecting appropriate 
support from its development partners in order to fi nance the spheres of action of the IF aiming to 
strengthen its production and expor t supply capacity.  Like Cambodia, Senegal was expecting to 
benefit from technical assistance to make trade a growth factor in the PRS. 
150. Concerning the measures to implement the IF programme, an action plan had been approved 
both by the Government at Cabinet level and by th e donor community.  The plan had been unveiled to 
development partners during the meeting of the Cons ultative Group held in Paris in June 2003.  Some 
donors had already announced their financial backing for some of the spheres of action of the IF.  A close link had been established between the IF and the PRSP thanks to collaboration between the 
relevant ministries. 
151. With regard to the minimum value applied to  imported boxes of matches, it should be noted 
that matches were subject to dumping and the Sene galese authorities were not yet able to combat the 
problem effectively in accordance with the complic ated WTO procedures.  The current study would 
be made available to the European Commission. 
152. The discussant
 asked for additional information on the participation of Niger and Senegal in 
the current GATS negotiations. 
153. The representative of th e European Commission  had a question for Senegal on the fisheries 
sector, and in particular on the details of the timi ng and procedure for the setting up of a system of 
controls and licences for the 10,000 strong fleet of pirogues. 
154. The representative of Senegal  replied that industrial fishing was already subject to  licensing, 
and hence to access fees, whereas small-scale fishing was not.  It had been observed that 80 per cent 
of boats were used for the latter.  In order to combat the over-exploitation of resources, a scheme for 
the granting of access rights had been in force for si x months.  Its aim was to establish a system of 
concessions and access rights, including their app licability and implementation and monitoring 
procedures.  The longer-term objectives were to define  the tools to evaluate sectoral policies in order 
to set up a fisheries resource management plan within the WAEMU. 
155. The revision to Senegal's initial offer in the current GATS negotiations had been held up until 
the signal from trading partners concerning the moda lities of special treatment for LDCs was given, 
only just before Cancún.  The question of mode 4 concerned above all the developed countries;  the 
developing countries were awaiting market  access for semi-skilled and unskilled labour. 
156. The representative of Niger  indicated that his Government intended to make an initial offer in 
the current GATS negotiations, and that th e step was currently being studied.   WT/TPR/M/118 
 WT/TPR/M/119 
 Page 23 
 
 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
157. The Chairperson  noted that the review of the trade po licies of Niger and Senegal had enabled 
all the participants to gain a far better understa nding of the two countries' trade policies, which were 
shaped by the WAEMU, and of their trade-related policies and aspirations.  The discussion had been 
both thorough and exhaustive, thanks to full a nd open cooperation from high- level delegations, and 
the discussant's judicious remarks. 
158. Members had congratulated Niger and Senegal on the efforts they had made in recent years to 
achieve stabilization and implement economic reform s, mainly in the field of public finances and 
investment.  Members had noted that sustainable de velopment and the fight against poverty, together 
with the integration of the informal sector in the formal economy, remained difficult challenges. 
159. Members had stressed that trade was an inst rument of development and underlined the 
importance of the IF and other cooperation initiatives.  Niger and Senegal were not taking full benefit 
from their status as WTO Members, given that their own constraints with regard to resources did not 
allow them to recognize and/or to exploit the po ssibilities on offer.  Several Members had indicated 
that, despite their direct or indirect contribution in the shape of technical assistance and the promotion 
of trade with Niger and Senegal, integration of the two countries in the multilateral trading system had 
not advanced very rapidly. 
160. Members had recognized the efforts made to simp lify the tariff structure and the influence of 
the WAEMU regarding the reduction of the average le vel of MFN rates.  They had noted the use of 
additional duties and taxes, together with admini stered prices agreed by the WAEMU for customs 
valuation purposes.  Several Members had inquire d about what was being done to improve the 
protection of intellectual property rights. 
161. In light of their recent macro-economic results , Niger and Senegal had been encouraged to 
move forward with the implementation of structural  reforms, including privatization, and in the 
diversification of markets and pr oducts.  Budgetary reforms and new sources of revenue for the State 
were necessary to face up to the expected effects of further tariff liberalization and the increase in 
budgetary expenditure linked to health and the fight against poverty. 
162. Members had also sought clarification on the following points: 
• Investment; 
• national standards; 
• government procurement; 
• intellectual property rights; 
• questions linked to national and regi onal agriculture and fisheries; 
• privatization; 
• questions linked to financial services, telecommunications and tourism; 
• commitments made under the GATS and negotiations. 
 WT/TPR/M/118 
WT/TPR/M/119 Page 24 
 
 163. Members had appreciated the thorough and comp lete replies given by the delegations of 
Niger and Senegal, and expected to receive further responses and details. 
164. The TPR had allowed Members to gain a fuller appreciation of the progress made by Niger 
and Senegal, and of the challe nges awaiting them.  The highly active participation of the two 
delegations in the meeting, the number of ques tions asked and the lively debate had shown the 
importance that Members attached to the review.  Niger and Senegal were encouraged to improve 
their multilateral commitments, both in the field of goods and in that of services, and to continue implementing their reform programmes in order to  enhance the transparency, predictability and 
credibility of their trade regimes and their comp liance with WTO principles.  It was nonetheless 
necessary to put such considerations in their contex t.  Niger and Senegal faced genuine constraints in 
their resources;  technical assistance was required fr om the WTO and other re levant organizations;  
needs had been identified in the Reports of the S ecretariat and had to be met.  Moreover, trading 
partners should participate in the effort by guara nteeing that their markets were completely open to 
products from Niger and Senegal. 
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