RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTI/M/22
17 July 2003
(03-3853)
Working Group on the Relationship
between Trade and Investment
REPORT ON THE MEETING HELD ON 10 AND 11 JUNE 2003
Note by the Secretariat
1. The Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment met on 10 and
11 June 2003 under the chairmanship of Ambassador de Seixas Corrêa (Brazil). The Working Group
adopted the agenda contained in WTO/AIR/2109.
2. The Chairman said the purpose of this last formal meeting of the Group before Cancún was
fourfold:  (i) to receive a report from the Secretariat on recent and upcoming technical assistance
activities, to introduce a note by the WTO and UNCTAD on their future collaboration in investmentrelated technical assistance (WT/WGTI/W/161), and to discuss a written contribution from the EC
on technical assistance and capacity-building activities relating to foreign direct investment
(WT/WGTI/W163);  (ii) to invite the Group to continue its discussion of the subjects set out for
clarification in paragraph 22 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, including a new written
contribution from Canada, Costa Rica and Korea (WT/WGTI/W/162);  (iii) to give the Group, if itso wished, an opportunity to continue discussion of other issues that had been raised in the course of
the Group’s work so far; and (iv) to invite delegations to discuss and agree on the working Group's
draft report to be submitted to the General Council before Cancún.
A. 
PARAGRAPH 21 OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION
3. The representative of the European Community introduced its paper on an “Overview of
Technical Assistance and Capacity-building Acti vities Related to FDI” (WT/WGTI/W163).  He
explained that the paper was not intended as a proposal or policy recommendation, but simply as afactual overview of activities that had either taken place - or were planned to take place - in the area
of investment-related technical assistance and capacity-building.  There were many issues - in
addition to adherence to international investment rules - that determined a host country's capacity to
attract and to benefit from FDI, including political and macroeconomic stability, infrastructure,
market size, stable and transparent legal and policy frameworks, the business environment at large,education and skills levels, and the effectiveness of institutions.  The paper therefore gave an
overview of the EC’s many and diverse activities in these areas, and grouped them according to
broad categories and regional focus. This task was not easy given that many of these activities were
carried out by the Commission’s development or aid experts, and not necessarily by trade or
investment officials.   Moreover, the paper did not attempt to include the many investment-relatedactivities that had been - and were being - conducted by individual Members states.  He pointed out
that in all instances the process was “demand-driven” - i.e., host countries were involved directly in
the planning and execution of each project.   Efforts had also been made to improve coherence with
activities carried out by other donors and international agencies, in keeping with the mandate of the
Doha Development Agenda.  This mandate had provided an important template for the design of theEC’s investment-related technical assistance and capacity-building programme, but it was not the
only reason why such activities were being carried out.WT/WGTI/M/22
Page 2
4. The Chairman acknowledged and welcomed the participation of African capital-based
officials in the deliberations of the Working Group, and who were in Geneva to attend the joint
WTO/UNCTAD/JICA Seminar on Friday and Saturday.
5. The representative of the Secretariat introduced the Note that it had prepared jointly with
UNCTAD (WT/WGTI/W/161).  It was intended to offer some ideas on how the two Secretariats
might streamline their technical assistance and capa city-building activities in the investment area,
taking into account comments made in the Workin g Group and feedback received from participants
over the past eighteen months.  It was important that the programme of activities continued to be
designed in response to Members’ needs, and in  future it might warrant a more varied menu of
activities suited to the needs of individual Memb ers or groups of Members, such as the least-
developed countries.  It was also important to reach out to other international organisations with
experience in this area, as they could help provide a richer menu of activities.  One organisationrefered to in the Note was the World Association of investment Protection Agencies (WAIPA),
which could make a particularly valuable contribution in the area of long-term capacity and
institution building in developing and least-developed countries.
6. He clarified two points raised by delegations:  First, this paper did not require any form of
action in the Working Group for the time being.  Technical assistance activities in future would bedetermined, in the first instance, by whatever decisions Ministers took on the subject in Cancún.
However, the Secretariat felt that it might be valu able for delegations to reflect on the issue now in
order for the Secretariat to be able to receive guidance as soon as possible after the Cancún
Conference, and to make a timely start to any new programme of technical assistance activities that
was warranted.  The second point was that the reference in paragraph 10 to the Secretariat seekingfunding through the WTO in 2004, as appropriate, separately from the annual Technical Assistance
Plan, did not imply that additional funding throug h the WTO’s budget was being sought.  Rather, the
reference was intended to alert Members to areas where extra-budgetary funding might be valuable.
Several Members had generously provided dedicated financing on this basis in the past, and it might
be desirable to keep that window open in the future too, as a possible way to enhance the programmeof technical assistance and capacity-building activities beyond the core activities of the WTO and
UNCTAD Secretariats.
7. The representative of UNCTAD noted that since the Group’s meeting in April, the joint
UNCTAD and WTO technical assistance programme had continued to progress, with the delivery of
a number of activities at the regional and national levels, including a sub-regional seminar in
Jamaica, intensive training courses in South Africa and Egypt, and several national seminars.
Moreover, between the current meeting and the Cancún Ministerial Conference in September, therewould be an additional four regional seminars (one for Central and West Asia in Pakistan, one for
Arab countries in Qatar, one for Central and Eastern Europe in Prague and one for Latin America in
Mexico), as well as one national seminar (for Cuba).  A workshop for French-speaking capital-based
African officials was commencing immediately after the current Working Group meeting.  And
shortly after Cancún, the series of intensive training courses would continue in Trinidad and Tobago(for the Caribbean) and in Peru (for Latin America).
8. However, beyond these upcoming events, the cycle of post-Doha technical assistance work
was coming to a close.  It was time to take stock, evaluate outcomes, and draw lessons for post-
Cancún work.  He offered a summary of what had been achieved in pursuit of the Doha mandate
since the beginning of 2002, as well as a preliminary assessment of the impact of this work in lightof the evaluations of these activities.  By mid-2003, eleven regional seminars will have taken place
(three in Africa, three in Asia, four in Latin America and the Caribbean, and one in Central and
Eastern Europe), six intensive training courses will have been conducted (four in Africa and one
each in Latin America and in Asia), six Geneva-based workshops will have been undertaken, and
thirteen countries will have benefited from national seminars.  In short, all technical assistanceWT/WGTI/M/22
Page 3
requests will have been responded to.  In all these activities, the two secretariats have sought to
ensure that the largest number of activities possible, given the resources available, were offered to
least-developed and other low-income countries whose needs were felt to be the greatest.
9. According to UNCTAD’s estimates, some 700 officials (and a substantial number of private
sector representatives) will have participated in one or more of the technical assistance activitiesoutlined above.  Over 100 officials will have part icipated in the Geneva-based workshops, and over
600 officials will have participated in one or more of the regional and national seminars and training
courses.  About half of these officials came from African countries, around 200 from Asian
countries, and around 150 from countries in Latin America.
10. Participants were asked to evaluate the usefulness of the events in which they participated.
The results of these evaluations, which were overwhelmingly positive, were summarized in the
progress report by the UNCTAD Secretariat which was available to delegations.  On the basis of theparticipant evaluation forms received to date, 77 per cent of participants felt the technical assistance
activity delivered had achieved its objective in terms of imparting information and strengthening the
understanding of the issues, and 73 per cent felt that the activities had been relevant to and useful for
their responsibilities.  Generally, the activities had been viewed as carried out competently and
effectively by the UNCTAD and WTO Secretariats.  These assessments were underlined by the mid-term evaluation of UNCTAD's work programme that emphasized its overall "positive and
measurable impact" and its success in achieving its objectives in almost all areas.
11. Regarding UNCTAD's own activities in this area, including its own follow-up work to the
Doha Declaration, at the intergovernmental le vel, the Commission on Investment, Technology and
Related Financial Issues had recognized and commended the contributions of the Secretariat in thefield of investment policy analysis and capacity-build ing.  In particular, it highlighted the follow-up
to the Doha work programme in the area of in vestment and technology and UNCTAD’s successful
cooperation with the WTO secretariat.  The Commission also called on the Secretariat to continue its
post-Doha technical assistance and capacity-building work in the three areas of paragraph 21 of the
Doha Ministerial Declaration.
12. At the secretariat level, UNCTAD had progressed with its post-Doha policy analysis and
development work.  Specific policy analysis work on issues of relevance to developing countries in
the post-Doha investment context was initiated in autumn 2002 - and a number of analytical papers
would be available in the near future.  Furthermore, work on the 2003 World Investment Report  was
drawing to a close.  The 2003 report would deal with the development dimension of foreign direct
investment and the role of national policies and international agreements in this context. The report
was scheduled for release on 4 September.  Finally, as delegates were aware, UNCTAD had alsomade presentations, as observers, on all issues under discussion in the Working Group, focussing on
the development perspective.  UNCTAD's technical assistance work extended to contributing to a
number of regional conferences and seminars, including with civil society (e.g. CUTS). UNCTAD
had also collaborated with the Government of India in organizing an international conference in May
on "Trade, Investment and Development".  Fu rthermore UNCTAD had facilitated a round of
bilateral investment treaty negotiations for least-developed countries last November.
13. In summary, the representative of UNCTAD felt that the Secretariat had implemented a
substantial technical assistance programme in a relatively short period of time.  However, the subject
matter was complex - and as indicated by the WTO representative, all of the work could be
strengthened and improved.  This applied to policy analysis and development, as well as to humanand institutional capacity-building.  Particularly activities to develop and support the institutional
capacity of developing countries in the area of international investment discussions and/or
negotiations and their capacity to attract and absorb foreign investment warranted further emphasis.
While some progress had been made – witness the ongoing discussions with the World AssociationWT/WGTI/M/22
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of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) - more needed to be done.  In this connection, he
emphasized that UNCTAD's joint work with the WTO was embedded in UNCTAD's own and
broader work on international investment agreements (based on the Bangkok mandate) which
included efforts at the bilateral and regional levels.   Assisting developing countries to take informed
decisions and facilitating their effective participati on in possible future international rule-setting in
the area of investment at the levels at which th ey decide to negotiate was of importance for their
successful integration into the world economy.  The scope and time frame for such activity therefore
extended well beyond Cancún, as did the need for continued strengthened and adequately resourced
technical assistance  in this area.
14. He noted that UNCTAD’s work had been made possible to a large degree by extra-
budgetary financing, and he took the opportunity to express gratitude for the support received from
countries.  His remarks concerned the countries that had made a financial contribution as well ascountries that had hosted symposia and training events, and the international organizations, non-
governmental organizations and academic instit utions that had cooperated with UNCTAD in the
implementation of many of our activities.  He also thanked the WTO Secretariat for extending
excellent cooperation in this endeavour.
15. The representative of Malaysia thanked the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats for the
invaluable work and technical assistance provided to Malaysia and to other developing countries and
economies in transition.  However, he noted that officials in capitals were still far from being fully
informed about the implications of closer multilateral cooperation in investment, and it was his
delegation’s view that one round of technical assistance was clearly insufficient for Malaysia to be
able to say that its officials were completely pr oficient or that Members were ready to commence
negotiations on a multilateral framework.  Therefore, Malaysia would continue to urge that technical
assistance be pursued further.  While, clearly, that decision would need to be made in Cancún,
Malaysia certainly looked forward to a positive direction from Ministers regarding technical
assistance.
16. The representative of Mexico informed the Group that Mexico was hosting a regional
seminar on trade and investment in Mexico City on 14 - 15 July.  Its aim was to facilitate the
effective participation of countries in the region in the further development and organization of
activities in the area of investment.  It was hoped that the participation of other Latin American
countries would contribute to enriching the discussions.
17. The representative of India thanked the UNCTAD and WTO Secretariats for the update on
the technical assistance and capacity-building activit ies, and for their Note on options for the future
organization of work.  His delegation noted with satisfaction that the WTO and UNCTADSecretariats had worked well over the past eighteen months or so in providing a joint programme of
technical assistance pursuant to the mandate of paragraph 21 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
He also took note of the observation made by the WTO Secretariat that the Note was not for
Members to approve or decide upon but only to reflect on in terms of planning future technical
assistance and capacity-building in the area of investment.  In this context, with respect to expandingthe scope of technical assistance activities or establishing any linkage with the WAIPA, MIGA
(Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agencies), or FIAS (Foreign Investment Advisory Service)  - as
suggested in the Note - his delegation would need to reflect further.
18. His delegation also took note of the point made by Malaysia that technical assistance was
not a one-time activity, but a dynamic and ongoing process.  At this stage, India could only say thatthe WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats should continue to collaborate actively in planning a
meaningful coordinated programme of technical assistance and capacity-building pursuant to
paragraph 21 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, and to respond to the needs of the developing
countries and the least-developed countries.WT/WGTI/M/22
Page 5
19. The representative of Canada agreed with the assessment that the cooperation between the
WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats over the past ei ghteen months had been impressive, and had
proven significant in terms of helping the Group to meet its mandate on technical assistance and
capacity-building as set out in paragraph 21 of the Doha Declaration.  Canada took the opportunity
to thank both Secretariats for their exemplary work in facilitating the delivery of Members’commitment to these activities.  She noted that both Secretariats had been putting in long hours,
many trips away from their families and working very hard - and her delegation appreciated the
work that had gone into this.
20. Certainly Annex 3 of the draft report to the General Council was witness to the energetic and
ambitious programme of activities that had been undertaken since Doha.  Her delegation also agreed
with the notion that the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats should continue to cooperate in meeting
the needs of Members as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible.  Canada had been concernedinitially that the Note circulated failed to draw  the connection between future technical assistance
activities and the mandate that would come out of the Cancún Ministerial Conference, and in that
regard her delegation was grateful for the Secretariat's clarification.  In Canada’s view, it was
important to note that further or enhanced investment-related technical assistance and capacity-
building was in large part dependant on whether the WTO had a mandate on these issues post-Cancún.
21. The representative of Cuba thanked the WTO Secretariat for organising a national seminar
on trade and investment to be held in Havana in July.  Cuba appreciated the efforts to date in the area
of technical assistance but, as other delegations had noted, her delegation hoped to continue
receiving this support in the future.  She highlighted in particular the support received by UNCTAD- in association with the WTO - in these activities.  Regarding cooperation with other agencies with
experience in institutional capacity-building, Cuba felt that this question should be considered more
carefully at the Cancún Ministerial Meeting.
22. The representative of Japan was impressed to hear delegations stress the importance of
technical assistance and capacity-building, and wa s encouraged to read the EC's comprehensive
overview of their technical assistance activities.  Like the EC, Japan had been providing a great deal
of technical assistance to developing countries in areas such as micro-economic stability, the
development of legal and other infrastructures, and support for the private sector.   Japan was of the
view that this technical assistance work had contributed greatly to a healthy and stable atmosphere
for investment.
23. Fully recognizing the importance of paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration, Japan had also actively supported and implemented capacity-building activities at alllevels - multilateral, regional and bilateral levels - to help developing and least-developed countries
understand the various important issues related to investment.  For instance, on 19 May Japan had
held an investment seminar in Bangkok, Thailand, which was financed by the Trade and Investment
Liberalization Fund (TILF) of APEC.  Thirty four participants from thirteen economies took an
active part in the seminar which was of immense benefit.  APEC Ministers responsible for trade tooknote of such seminars at their Ministerial Meeting in Kohn Kaen, Thailand, and Japan believed that
the seminar had contributed greatly to the promotion of a better understanding of the relationship
between trade and investment among APEC member s.  Japan thanked the Government of Thailand
for hosting these events.   Unfortunately, the APEC investment seminar that was scheduled for
Beijing in April - again with the support of AP EC’s TILF Fund - was postponed.  Japan and China
were currently looking into rescheduling the seminar.
24. Japan had also placed emphasis on capacity-building activities for African countries.  Japan
was supporting the WTO workshop for twenty-seven French-speaking African countries to be held
directly following the Working Group meeting.  The workshop would be identical to the one held forWT/WGTI/M/22
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English-speaking African countries last December.  At that workshop, his delegation was very
impressed with the Secretariat’s well-arranged programme, and the active discussion among
participants.  Japan was fully convinced that the upcoming workshop would be as effective and
productive as the earlier one, thanks to the efforts of the WTO and the UNCTAD Secretariats.
25. More generally, Japan thanked the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats for their tremendous
contribution in providing technical assistance.  His delegation believed that effective collaboration
between the two Secretariats was the key to success,  and he hoped that this close cooperation would
be further enhanced.  However, Japan did not believe it was desirable to place a WTO-UNCTAD
coordinated programme outside the WTO Annual Tec hnical Assistance Plan or to establish a new
funding mechanism for the programme.  Japan believed that it was most effective to first work
within the framework of the existing WTO Technical Assistance Plan, and then to discuss carefully
in a broader context whether a new framework was necessary.  He added that additional voluntaryfunding from Members on specific programmes was important to enhance technical assistance, and
that efforts to use bilateral and regional frameworks could also contribute greatly to meeting the
diverse needs of developing and least-developed countries.
26. The concerted efforts of the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats - and indeed all participating
countries - meant that a very significant number of technical assistance activities had taken place.These technical assistance activities had contributed directly to the constructive discussions in the
Working Group.  Japan fully recognize the necessity of  capacity-building activities at all stages, and
was determined to continue supporting capacity-building activities aimed at meeting the various
needs of developing countries.
27. The representative of the European Community thanked the WTO and UNCTAD
Secretariats for their update on ongoing technical assistance activities pursuant to paragraph 21 of
the Doha Declaration, and hoped that they would be able to continue with such a positive degree of
cooperation in the future.  The EC was also lookin g forward to receiving more evaluations.  Up to
this point, his delegation had heard very positive feedback from all participants, and the EC
congratulated the Secretariats for this.  The EC also thanked the WTO Secretariat for its clarificationthat the decision to continue these activities - and perhaps to increase them - was linked to the work
programme that would be decided upon by Mini sters in Cancún.  The EC looked forward to
expanding and improving these activities in the future.
28. The Chairman noted that it was clear from interventions that there was a demand from
developing countries for a continuation of the technical assistance programme.  Delegations had
heard from the representative of UNCTAD that it had its own mandate and that UNCTAD's long-
standing work on investment would continue to be carried out under its own mandate beyondCancún.  It seemed clear also that the WTO's mandate for continuing its technical assistance
activities would be contingent upon the decision taken by Ministers in Cancún - and that this
decision would also have an impact on the WTO' s and UNCTAD's joint programme of work.  So at
this point, delegations would have to wait for the Ministerial decision in order to plan for the
activities ahead.  However, the joint note by UNCTAD and the WTO provided useful guidance fordecisions that would have to taken based on whatever Ministers instruct the Group to do in Cancún.
He thanked the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats for th e excellent work that they had carried out and
expressed the hope that, depending on the decisions taken in Cancún, this work would be continued
in the future.  He also thanked the countries that had provided funds and facilities
29. The representative of India briefed Members on the seminar that India had recently
organized in May in cooperation with UNCT AD on Trade, Investment and Development.
Representatives of developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America had participated in this
seminar which was organized to facilitate understanding of the implications of closer multilateral
cooperation in the area of trade and investment for the development policy objectives of developingWT/WGTI/M/22
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countries consistent with the mandate under paragraph 21 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
Twenty six participants from fourteen developing countries had attended the conference and had
engaged in deliberations.  While India would have liked to have invited all developing countries,
both time and resource constraints posed limitations in this regard.  India was, however, grateful to
the countries that responded to its invitation.
30. Discussion at the conference was divided into four working sessions (in addition to the
concluding round table), spanning two days, to review and identify issues that participants could take
away for further reflection.  The first session covered issues such as the need for a multilateral
framework, whether the WTO was the appropriate forum for such a framework, and the state of play
of discussions in the Working Group.  The issue of national treatment in the context of an
investment framework was discussed in the second session.  The third session focused on the
relationship between GATS and investment.  The fourth session was devoted to the subject ofinvestors’ and home governments’ obligations.  Th e final session took the form of a round table
where participants gave an overview of their countries’ positions.  The conference provided a useful
opportunity for an exchange of views on this impor tant issue.  India appreciated the assistance
received from the UNCTAD Secretariat in enabling India to contribute to a greater understanding of
the implications of various issues relating to the subject as foreseen in paragraph 21 of the DohaMinisterial Declaration.
B. 
PARAGRAPH 22 OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION
31. The representative of Canada introduced a joint submission with Korea and Costa Rica on
“Negotiating a Multilateral Framework on Investment in the WTO” (WT/WGTI/W/162), which was
intended to put the progress of the Working Group into perspective, with respect both to the work ithad performed under its mandate, and to its broader context in the world economy.  Doing so has led
Canada to conclude that little would be gained by more analytical work without an unequivocal
negotiating mandate with respect to multilateral investment rules in the WTO system.  After almost
seven years, the preparatory work of the Group was complete.  This work had been particularly
fruitful since Doha.  The scale and quality of engagement on the mandated work of the Group hadbeen considerable thanks to the contributions of  delegations, the Secretariat, other international
organizations, all under the chairman’s skilful guidance.  There was not agreement on all issues, but
delegations now had a greater understanding of issues to be taken into account during the
negotiation, as well as a better appreciation of other considerations relevant to the design of an
investment agreement within the superstructure of the WTO.
32. As several delegations had reminded the Group, the relationship between investment and
trade agreements - and indeed with investment flows more generally - was complex.  But this wasnot to deny that investment and trade would not benefit from clear rules at the multilateral level.
Moreover as countries sought to diversify their sources of - and destinations for - international
investment, a multilateral framework could be well suited to complement the large but less than
universal network of bilateral and regional agreements that already existed.
33. It was difficult to gauge the effects of a failure  to agree to negotiate rules in the WTO on the
international economy.  In addressing the issue of developing country participation in the WTO as a
whole, Peter Sutherland, the former Director-Gener al of the WTO noted "we must start from the
observation that the GATT and WTO systems do not guarantee anybody a greater slice of world
trade.  What they strive for is some equality of opportunity through open, competitive and
predictable markets".  This speech was a great tour de raison  of the role of the WTO, and its
importance today and in the future.  What Members could take from this observation with respect to
investment was that a multilateral framework in the WTO would not guarantee greater investment
flows.  It simply represented an opportunity - an opportunity not only to tidy up loose ends within
the WTO family of agreements, but more importa ntly to help lay the groundwork for meaningfulWT/WGTI/M/22
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rules that both responded to and shaped the framework under which international investment took
place.
34. It was worth recalling that this work has been going on in the Working Group for seven
years.  Indeed the WTO's 1996 annual report contai ned a useful section focusing on the special topic
of trade and FDI that remained relevant to the Group’s work today.  It observed that investment layat the very heart of the WTO system because of the inherent links between investment and trade.
Thanks to further emphasis on the needs of developing countries at the Doha Ministerial Conference,
including deference to flexibility, balancing home and host-country interests, technical assistance
and capacity-building, and other relevant issues, the WTO was in a better position than ever to take
into account the needs and circumstances of developing and least-developed countries as Members
negotiated investment rules within the WTO.
35. In short, the negotiation of investment rules in the WTO, after seven years of deliberations,
was overdue.  Such negotiations should be part of a single undertaking associated with WTO
agreements as a whole.  Through negotiations, Members could collectively commit to addressing the
challenges and opportunities imposed by the grow th and importance of FDI to the trading system,
which was one of the challenges Ministers recognized in Singapore in 1996.  Further delay risked
undermining prospects for investment rules in the WTO system.  Consistent with the mandate of theWorking Group under paragraph 22 - which was of course the subject of the joint paper - Canada
believed that such a WTO investment framework s hould reflect in a balanced manner the interests of
home and host countries and take due account of the development policies and objectives of host
governments, as well as their right to regulate in  the public interest.  The special development, trade
and financial needs of developing and least-developed countries should be taken into account as anintegral part of any framework - a framework which should enable Members to undertake any
obligations and commitments commensurate with  their individual needs and circumstances.
Parenthetically, based on the work of this Group since Doha, Canada noted that the right to regulate
in the public interest was a right of all countries, and that the special development needs of least-
developed countries warranted particular attention.
36. The representative of Korea observed that the Working Group had been established seven
years ago upon instructions from the Ministers at the WTO’s first Ministerial Conference in
Singapore to examine the relationship between trade and investment.  The work done by the Group
since then had progressed in full accordance with this mandate, and its deliberations had
demonstrated the potential benefits of a multilateral investment framework to all WTO Members.
Ministers meeting at the Doha Ministerial Conference had endorsed the work of this Group, by
"recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable and predictableconditions for long-term cross-border investment, particularly foreign direct investment that will
contribute to the expansion of trade".  Based upon this recognition, Ministers had agreed to initiate
negotiations after the 5th Session of the Ministerial Conference.  Furthermore, Ministers had set out
two preliminary tasks in order to pave the way for negotiation: first, to decide the modalities of
negotiations at the 5th Ministerial Conference; and second, to instruct the Working Group toundertake further clarification of seven elements elaborated in paragraph 22 in the Doha Declaration.
37. The clarification exercise undertaken by the Group had been fruitful, in part because of the
concrete and precise mandate in the Doha Declaration, and in part because of the excellent guidance
of the discussions by the Chairman.  It was not Korea’s intention to presume that every element of a
possible investment framework was fully agreed by WTO Members.  This was not the objective ofthe Group’s preparatory work, but rather was a matter for negotiation.  In the first stage of the
Group’s work, delegations were instructed by Ministers to focus clarifying key elements which, in
his view, had been accomplished.  Korea believed that Members were now ready to proceed to the
next phase of work as Ministers had agreed in Doha.WT/WGTI/M/22
Page 9
38. Korea also recognized that the launch of investment negotiations did not have the full
support of all WTO Members and that some still had reservations.  Nevertheless, given the positive
contribution of the GATT and the WTO to the world economy in the past, it was Korea’s contention
that the outcome of negotiations on investment would similarly give benefits to developed,
developing and least-developed countries alike.  Korea understood the importance of FDI and madegreat efforts to attract it.  Korea successfully overcame the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis by attracting
more FDI.  As a result, by 2000 foreign invested companies represented 7 per cent of total
employment in Korea's manufacturing sector, and 13 per cent of total manufacturing output.
Increasingly SMEs as well as MNEs played a significant role in the global FDI market.  Multilateral
negotiations in the WTO would provide a balanced global framework for all players, including
SMEs.  The Cancún Ministerial meeting offered an excellent opportunity to examine how the WTO
could help to enhance global investment.
39. With regard to its development aspect, Korea believed that the proposed multilateral
investment framework could provide host countr ies with ample flexibility to pursue national
policies.  A GATS-type, positive list approach, in particular, would reflect to a great extent the
development needs of countries at different deve lopment stages, as obligations would apply only to
those sectors in which individual Members had made commitments.  Korea hoped that all WTOMembers would contribute positively to the negotiations as they had already done during the
preparatory phase.  His delegation stressed that Members would start negotiations after the
5
th Ministerial Conference as agreed by Ministers in Doha, and that the outcome of the negotiations
should be integral part of a single undertaking.
40. The representative of Costa Rica was extremely pleased by the work completed by the
Group.  Delegations had been working on this issue for almost seven years.  Thanks to the Doha
Mandate, skilful guidance from the Chairman, and support from the Secretariat, recent work had
been far-reaching.  From this standpoint, Costa Rica considered that the Group had satisfactorily
completed the process of study mandated by Mini sters at Doha.  His delegation was now ready to
move ahead to the second stage, the actual negotiations.
41. Costa Rica was a developing country and it favoured a multilateral framework on
investment within the WTO.  His delegation was conscious that the participation of developing
countries in this framework would be extremely important.  The Group had discussed at length
provisions and structures that would provide special and differential treatment for developing
countries.  His delegation was certain that these provisions and structures could facilitate the
participation of developing countries in the propo sed multilateral investment framework.  Indeed,
Costa Rica possibly would make use of - and would want to participate in - such provisions on
special and differential treatment.
42. Beyond this, Costa Rica was certain of the benefits for developing countries of a multilateral
context for investment negotiations.  In recent years, developing countries had benefited from a
broad technical assistance programme and the discus sion that had been undertaken by this Group, as
well as from the negotiation of two international investment instruments.  Governments hadpromoted liberal FDI policies and had sought inte rnational instruments for their implementation and
protection - in particular through the use of bilateral treaties for the protection and reciprocal
promotion of investment.  Costa Rica considered that  this experience had been extremely useful for
the work in WTO.  According to the 2002 World Investment Report, a total of 97 countries had
concluded some 158 bilateral investment treaties the previous year - bringing the total number ofbilateral treaties to 2,209 at the end of 2001.  What was interesting was that 75 per cent of these
agreements were concluded between developing countries or between developing and developed
countries (42 per cent were between developing countries, and 33 per cent between developed and
developing countries).  A multilateral framework for investment in the WTO would be a reflection
of these wider trends in the global economy, and would strengthen the capacity of countries,WT/WGTI/M/22
Page 10
especially developing countries, to define their own investment policies within a framework of
predictable international regulations.
43. The representative of the United States said that his delegation agreed with the principal
message of the paper by Canada, Korea and Costa Rica – namely that the Doha Declaration gave
members both a rationale and a mandate for investment negotiations, that the necessary preparatorywork in the Working Group had been accomplished, and that investment negotiations should be
launched at the 5th Ministerial Conference in Cancún.  The United States also agreed with the
paper's assertion in paragraph 11 that "in failing to take the opportunity ... to negotiate an investment
agreement in the WTO, we would miss an opportu nity to shape the multilateral environment in
which international investment can contribute to the development prospects of all our citizens."  As
the paper noted in the next paragraph, "Members are indeed already familiar with negotiating rules
governing non-discrimination, transparency, and other relevant issues bilaterally and regionally." Hisdelegation noted further that the purpose of multilateral investment rules was not simply to protect
the interests of developed-country corporations.  By adopting multilateral rules, developing countries
would send a reassuring message to investors.  Investment would increase, helping to upgrade
domestic industries.  And growth in export capacity  would follow increased investment.  The steady
growth in the number of bilateral and regional investment agreements suggested that most WTO
Members already accepted the idea that international investment rules were good for their
economies.  Members now had an opportunity to enhance those benefits by doing at the multilateral
level what many were already trying to do on a bilateral and regional basis.
44. The representative of Indonesia noted that the co-sponsors of the joint submission had again
tried to make a case for the importance of a multilateral framework on investment in the WTO.
Since his delegation had only just received the paper, his comments would be of a preliminary
nature.   There was an explicit assumption in paragraph 5 of the paper that after completion of the
process of clarification in the Working Group, the next step would be the launch of negotiations on a
multilateral framework of investment in the WTO.  In Indonesia’s view, the process was still not ripefor negotiation, and many issues required further clarification in order to improve Members’
understanding of the relationship between trade a nd investment.  It was obvious from the Working
Group’s draft report to the General Council that there were still divergent views on all elements of
the Doha Declaration in paragraph 22.
45. The paper argued that these divergent views could be addressed in the negotiations
themselves.  Indonesia was of the view that investment was a new area, beyond the traditional remit
of the WTO, with many ramifications for social and economic development.  Indonesia needed tohave a solid understanding of all the elements of a possible agreement before it could agree to launch
negotiations.
46. Although Indonesia recognized that there was a relationship between trade and investment,
in some cases the framework proposed by the proponents seemed to extend well beyond trade-
related investment issues.  Dispute settlement, for example, was in his delegation’s view aninvestment issue only - without any linkage to trad e issues - and went beyond the scope of the WTO.
47. His delegation was unclear about the meaning of paragraphs 9 and 10 of the joint paper that
attempted to explain the benefits of a proposed investment framework by comparing it with existing
WTO rules.  Indonesia did not question the significance of open, competitive and predictable
markets for international trade.  After all, developing countries were both exporters and importers.In the area of investment, however, many developi ng countries were only recipients of foreign
investment.  Moreover, proposed investment rules were attempting to regulate the measures taken by
host countries only.  Under these circumstances, th e real benefit of any investment framework would
go to investors, the majority of whom were based in the developed world.WT/WGTI/M/22
Page 11
48. On relations with developing and least-developed countries addressed in section III of the
paper, Indonesia noted that developing-country requests for technical assistance arose out of the
work programme in paragraph 21 of the Doha Declaration.  These technical assistance programmes
were not intended - and could not be viewed - as a precondition of accepting negotiations.  Rather,
after participating in various technical assistance activities, it was assumed only that developing and
least-developed countries would be in a better position to understand complex investment issues and
to evaluate the need for a multilateral framewor k on investment in the WTO. Indonesia wished to
highlight again that investment was an important but complex issue, especially in its impact on
development policy.  Members had to be very cautious before changing gears and shifting into a
process of negotiations.
49. The representative of Japan made three points regarding the joint paper by Canada, Costa
Rica and Korea.  First, Japan agreed fully that the preparatory work of the Working Group was now
complete, and that delegations were ready for the next phase of work, namely negotiations on a
multilateral framework for investment within the WTO.  While it was true that at present differing
views concerning some issues remained, Japan believed that such differences should be addressed
within the framework of future negotiations.  He reminded delegations that the mandate of the
Working Group was not to negotiate an investment agreement, but to clarify its substantiveelements.  Japan’s second point concerned the objectives of a multilateral investment framework.
As Japan had suggested in previous papers (such as the one it submitted in April 2003), a
multilateral investment framework would supplement existing bilateral and regional agreements, and
increase predictability for investors.  If Member s missed the current deadline, they might lose an
important opportunity to formulate investment rules that could contribute to the future expansion of
trade.  Japan’s third point was the importance of responding to concerns raised by developing
countries.  Japan agreed with the ideas set forth in section 3 of the joint paper – especially the need
to balance the interests of home and host countries in the negotiation of investment rules.  However,
in order to adequately reflect these interests, deve loping countries needed to participate actively in
the negotiations.  For that reason, Japan shared the view that continuing the programme of technicalassistance and capacity-building was essential.  More generally, Japan felt that the joint paper had
been extremely useful and valuable, and his delegation hoped that the Group’s work in clarifying
key issues had established a solid base for the launch of negotiations after the Cancún Ministerial
Conference.
50. The representative of Cuba felt that that the conditions for starting negotiations on a
multilateral framework for investment had not been achieved despite intense discussions in the
Working Group - and elsewhere - since the Doha Ministerial Conference.  Major differencesremained on most of the key issues set out for clarification in the Ministerial Declaration – especially
on the modalities, scope, and content of a possible agreement, on which consensus was an
indispensable requirement for launching negotiations.  Cuba, as a developing country, shared many
of the concerns expressed by other countries, and felt a number of important issues required further
clarification.  Among the most important was the need to preserve the absolute independence ofstates to regulate the entry and establishment of foreign investment in accordance with their general
development objectives.  Other issues requiring further clarification included home-country
obligations (and the harmonization of those obligations with the legislation in effect in host
countries), protection against unrestricted liberalization, anti-competition practices, and concerns
about the potential negative impact of an investment agreement from a socio-cultural orenvironmental point of view.  Cuba also highlig hted the need to focus on ways of encouraging
capital flows to export and other productive sectors in order to generate income and to promote the
transfer of technology.   Finally, Cuba noted that its overall evaluation of ongoing WTO negotiations
in key areas such as agriculture, special and differential treatment, and TRIPS and public health was
not a positive one for developing countries.  The priority was to focus on achieving significantprogress in those areas.WT/WGTI/M/22
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51. Before commenting on the paper, the representative of Thailand began by observing that
Thailand remained open to the possibility of negotiations on trade and investment.  Thailand had
held this position since the Singapore Ministerial Conference, and today, many years later, her
delegation was still waiting for the proponents of an investment negotiation to put forward a
proposal with which all developing countries could live comfortably.  Unfortunately, her delegationfelt that the level of ambition that had been reflected in the debate so far made Thailand wonder
whether it could accept negotiations.  Thailand continued to view the issue with an open mind, but
its decision in Cancún would be based on the nature of the agreement (i.e., its scope and substantive
elements) which the proponents were advocating.
52. Regarding paragraph 11 of the paper, she understood the co-sponsors’ point that a
multilateral framework on investment in the WTO would not guarantee greater investment flows.
Nevertheless, this raised a question for developing countries as to what positive outcomes could beexpected from such an agreement.  If it were only gr eater predictability and clarity for investors, her
delegation believed that developing countries would have to think hard about what they were going
to get from an investment agreement in the WTO.
53. In paragraph 12 the co-sponsors asserted that skills and strategies which developing
countries had gained from negotiating bilateral and regional investment agreements could betransferred easily to WTO negotiations.  Her delegation did not believe that the situations were
analogous.  When Thailand negotiated bilaterally with another country the task of identifying key
interests in an agreement  - and its likely implications - was fairly straightforward.   This was not the
case in a WTO context where Thailand would be negotiating non-discriminatory investment rules
with 146 other countries - all of which had different interests reflecting their different economies andlevels of development.  She agreed with the paper’s assertion that bilateral agreements were often
characterized by asymmetries of negotiating power and leverage - but was it automatically true that
these same asymmetries disappeared in a multilateral agreement?   Nor could her delegation agree
with section 3 of the paper which seemed to impl y that technical assistance had been provided to
developing countries first to negotiate - and then to gain benefit from – an investment agreement.Such conditionality was presumably not the intent of the Doha technical assistance programme.
54. For WTO investment rules to be viable for developing countries, there needed to be clear
S&D provision built into the substantive provisions of the agreement.  It also needed to be clear that
these provisions could be made operational.  It was not enough for developing countries to be
offered greater technical assistance - or longer transition periods - to implement agreements,
although these were important.  Developing countries needed to attach specific conditions to market
access and national treatment, and to have special and differential treatment in undertaking specificcommitments.
55. Finally her delegation was confused by the assertion that the right to regulate was somehow
compatible with binding commitments. The “right to regulate” was mentioned everywhere by the
proponents as if this were the final answer to any concerns about the unintended consequences of
accepting binding investment rules.  But if a country undertook specific commitments with regard tomarket access or national treatment in a multilateral investment agreement, it seemed clear that the
country must be prepared to forego some flexibility regarding its right to regulate.  Binding rules
would not automatically allow a country to take discriminatory measures if the need arose in
emergency situations.  Nor did a positive list approach to scheduling commitments - which Thailand
favoured - alter this fundamental reality.  Her basic point was that before agreeing to bindingcommitments in an investment agreement, developi ng countries needed to know exactly what this
would mean in terms of making policy and employing discriminatory measures.  She was not saying
that Thailand would set out intentionally to discriminate against foreign investors; but at the same
time, no country could see into the future, and occasions might well arise when extraordinary
measures were necessary to attract foreign investors or to adjust domestic economic structures.  TheWT/WGTI/M/22
Page 13
Working Group did not do justice to developing countries by glossing over key issues such as the
right to regulate.
56. The representative of Chile agreed with almost everything stated in the joint paper, and
especially with the conclusions in paragraph 6.  After seven years, the Group had completed
preparatory work based on paragraph 22 of the Doha Declaration, there was a commonunderstanding of the key topics that needed to be taken into consideration in a negotiation.  Certainly
there was no convergence of views on how these different elements would be treated.  There was no
convergence either on whether these should be the only elements in the negotiations.  However,
Chile believed that all of this should be defined within a negotiation, that the negotiation should be
launched in Cancún, and that it should fall within the scope of the single undertaking.
57. Why was there a need for a multilateral framework on investment?  Chile recognized that
investment flows would continue flowing, and that investors would continue to take decisions onwhere and how to invest, with or without an investment agreement.  But Chile also knew that it was
in the interests of all countries, but particularly developing countries, to attract more foreign
investment.  One way of promoting greater invest ment was through rules that provided greater
security, predictability and transparency for investors.  It was because of this that Chile had included
chapters relating to investment in its bilateral tr ade agreements.  However, these bilateral agreements
were not sufficient.  Chile believed that it was necessary to have multilateral rules in which all
Members would participate and which would be of benefit to all.
58. Discussions in the Working Group - as well as in bilateral and regional contexts - had
prepared the way for the negotiation of a multilatera l agreement, or at least a multilateral framework.
Chile also thought that the linkages with devel opment were key, as pointed out by Costa Rica and
Thailand.  Most of the bilateral and regional agreements were, as Canada had said, characterized by
asymmetrical relationships between Members.  This meant that in many instances provisions relating
to development were left aside.  Only in the WTO could Members safeguard the interests of
developing and least-developed countries, and to seek ways in which flexibility could be
incorporated in an agreement.
59. The representative of Hungary agreed with the thrust of the joint paper, and supported its
call for proceeding to the next phase - the launch of investment negotiations, as part of the single
undertaking, and the establishment of a multilateral framework for long-term cross-border
investment.  Hungary agreed with the co-sponsor s that such a framework could not guarantee an
increase in overall FDI flows or greater shares from such flows for particular WTO Members.  As
the paper pointed out, no other WTO agreement had, or could, provide such guarantees.  But the fact
that no absolute guarantee could be given for increased FDI flows did not automatically mean thatthe multilateral framework would not have such an effect.  The GATT/WTO system did not
guarantee an increase in trade, but experience - and analytical work - had shown that a rules-based
trade system had indeed contributed significantly to maintaining and increasing international trade.
It was not unreasonable to expect that a multilate ral framework for investment would have the same
impact in the area of investment.  As both a capital importing and exporting country, Hungarybelieved that the multilateral rules it was seeking would first result in a more efficient allocation of
FDI, and second would increase overall flows of FDI as a result of greater legal stability,
transparency and market-access commitments.
60. Lastly, his delegation pointed out that the Doha Ministerial Declaration, in particular
paragraphs 20 and 22, had set out very important parameters for negotiations, about which theWorking Group had had intensive discussions with a view to their clarification.  Hungary agreed
with paragraph 5 of the paper that the preparatory work had been completed.  Hungary also believed
that the parameters in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, some of which were referred to in
paragraph 20 of the paper, should also guide the negotiations after the Cancún MinisterialWT/WGTI/M/22
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Conference.  Some other issues were also raised in the course of the Group’s discussions since the
Doha Ministerial Conference, and this delegation wa s ready to consider how best those issues not
mentioned explicitly in paragraph 20 and 22 might be addressed in the course of the negotiations.
61. The representative of Norway agreed that the work of the Working Group had been
completed, and that Members should proceed to the negotiating phase of a multilateral framework
on investment.  As others had underlined, there was no agreement on the various elements in a future
multilateral investment framework, but Norway believed that the issues had been clarified
sufficiently so that meaningful negotiations coul d start.  Norway was in broad agreement with the
positions put forward in the joint paper, and his delegation believed that Ministers in Cancún should
agree on a mandate for an investment framework.
62. The representative of Morocco recalled that Morocco's position was to keep an open mind
with regard to a possible investment negotiati on.  Morocco had already concluded more than forty
bilateral agreements, and his delegation could view a multilateral investment framework as a
complement to this process.  Such a framework, of course, had to embody a new approach that drew
on past experience - and past errors - and gave the term 'flexibility' full meaning.  In terms of the
content of a possible multilateral framework, Morocco believed that developmental needs - as well
as the specific concerns of developing and least-developed countries - had to be mentioned explicitlyin the preamble.  The development dimension also needed to be reflected in concrete provisions -
such as longer implementation schedules, exemptions in certain areas, and binding contractual
agreements to give meaning to special and diff erential treatment.  Any prospective multilateral
framework also needed to take into account existing bilateral and regional investment treaties.
63. As regards its scope, Morocco thought that a possible multilateral framework on investment
should be limited to FDI and exclude portfolio investment - possibility borrowing the structure of the
GATS whose positive-list approach to scheduling commitments provided developing countries with
greater flexibility in pursuing their development objectives.  Regarding dispute settlement, Morocco
believed that any prospective agreement should not be subject to the dispute settlement mechanism
of the WTO.  There was a need to look further into the question, and to find an approach that couldbe compatible with existing mechanisms.  Regarding modes of participation, developing countries
should be afforded flexibility to adhere gradually to an agreement in different stages - or to have a
longer transitional period before accession.   A waiver system might also be envisaged as a means of
easing the eventual accession of developing countries.  Developing and least-developed countries
needed to preserve their strategic interests by securing an appropriate balance between the rights and
obligations of investors and host countries.  Finally, particular attention needed to be paid to
strengthening technical and financial assistance to developing countries so as to help them giveeffect to any commitments made.
64. The representative of China stressed the importance of technical assistance and capacity-
building.  His delegation believed that the quantity and the quality of these activities - as mandated
by the Doha Ministerial Declaration - would have a direct bearing on the speed and progress of
Members work in Geneva.
65. As regards the joint paper, China felt that it contained some broad assumptions and hasty
generalisations.  It argued that the preparatory work of the Group was complete.  Did this
preparatory phase include technical assistance and capacity-building?  Did the co-sponsors believe
that technical-assistance related work was also complete?  How to explain the fact that delegations
were as yet unable to agree upon the basic elements to be contained in the negotiation’s modalities -including the definition and scope of a prospective agreement?  While he did not know how the co-
sponsors defined “preparatory work” - or indeed how they defined the proper work of the Group - as
far as China was concerned the Group’s work was far from complete. He reiterated the
overwhelming importance of coming to terms with basic concepts, such as definition and scope, andWT/WGTI/M/22
Page 15
their implications, before Members could reach a consensus as to whether the negotiations should
proceed or not.  China did not believe that the decision as to whether or not negotiations should start
was long overdue, as suggested in the paper. It was important to get basic concepts and ideas clear
first before Members could make a firm commitment to launch negotiations.   It was precisely
because China attached great importance to the su bject matter that it was adopting such a prudent
approach. In that regard, his delegation was prepared to work and collaborate very hard with other
Members to try to make progress in discussions and deliberations here.
66. The representative of Chinese Taipei agreed with the important point made in paragraph 20
of the joint paper regarding the need, in any prospective agreement, to balance the interests of home
and host countries, to protect the development policies and objectives of host governments, and to
guarantee their right to regulate.   He noted that technical assistance would not only benefit host
countries, but investors as well through improvements to investment infrastructures.  Chinese Taipeibelieved that if Members gave the WTO a mandate to negotiate a multinational investment
agreement after Cancún, it would be in the common interest of both host and home countries.
67. The representative of Switzerland agreed with the content of the joint paper.  While there
was nothing that could guarantee FDI flows, Sw itzerland believed that a better framework of
investment rules was conducive to attracting foreign direct investment.  Over the past 50 years,world trade had grown faster than world GDP.  Indeed, the countries that had benefited most from
world trade, were the ones that had adopted a trade regime which allowed them to participate in the
world trading system most readily.  Subsequen tly, trade had pushed up growth rates in those
countries.  Similar influences were at work in investment.  Ten developing countries accounted for
50 per cent of foreign investment between 1993/98 according to UNCTAD and World Bank data;and the top 20 developing countries accounted for about 80 per cent of foreign investment inflows.
One conclusion which could be drawn from these figures was that a lot remained to be done in
expanding FDI flows.  Switzerland believed that there were a large number of countries for whom a
internationally recognized framework of investment rules would make them more attractive and
conducive to foreign direct investment.
68. The Doha Declaration had had a major impact on making the work of the Group more
focused, more rigorous, and more clearly directed towards a concrete objective – which was to
clarify the elements of a multilateral framework on investment.  Discussions had been intense, lively
and motivating.  The journey had been impressive, with more than 60 submissions in eighteen
months.  The technical assistance and capacity-building programme had also contributed to a further
deepening of Members’ understanding of the issues.   As a result, his delegation believed that it was
now possible to see the shape of a future multilateral framework on investment, the detailed contentof which would have to be negotiated.  He did not agree with China’s claim that the Group’s work
was not complete simply because all elements had not been agreed upon.  Switzerland believed that
the detailed content would be part of the negotiation.  After Cancún it was important to maintain the
momentum that the Group had built up since Doha, and that Members should have the courage and
the wisdom to move into the next stage.
69. The representative of India agreed with China that the joint paper contained a number of
assumptions and generalisation, with which India strongly disagreed.  Firstly, its assumption that
negotiations on trade and investment would commence after the Cancún Ministerial Conference was
not correct. The status of the discussion remained the same as was decided at the Singapore
Ministerial Conference.  In this context, his delegation felt it would be appropriate to draw
Members’ attention to Chairman’s concluding statement at Doha Ministerial Conference reiterating
this position.  Explicit consensus was a pre-condition for negotiations to commence.
70. The assumption in joint submission that the Singapore issues were part and parcel of the
single undertaking was also not correct.  In current discussions at the WTO, the four issues were notWT/WGTI/M/22
Page 16
treated as part of negotiations in the Doha Work Programme, and thus did not come under the Trade
Negotiating Committee.  It was thus incorrect to state that these issues were part of the single
undertaking.
71. The assumption in joint submission that WTO Members agreed to engage in preparatory
work on trade and investment up to the Cancún Ministerial was also not correct.  As per the DohaMinisterial Declaration, in the period up to 5th Ministerial Conference, Members agreed to focus on
the clarification of certain elements relating to trade and investment.
72. India had constructively engaged in discussions in the Working Group. However, these
discussions had shown clearly that there was no clarity even amongst proponents regarding the
structure or components of any possible multilateral framework.  The divergence of views and lack
of clarity among proponents had also impacted on developing and least developed Members ability
to better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral cooperation for their developmental policiesand objectives, and their human and institutional development - a key component of the Doha
mandate.
73. No convincing argument had been advanced th at a single international standard could be
applied across the board to all countries in the form of any possible multilateral investment
framework.  In addition, no convincing argument had been presented to indicate that lack ofpredictability or certainty was the main constraint to investment flows.  Discussions in the Working
Group meetings had been useful in the sense that they had revealed the complexities of issues
involved and the divergence of Members’ views.  As also noted by China, his delegation strongly
disagreed with the observation in the joint submi ssion by Canada, Costa Rica and Korea that this
divergence of views among Members could be resolved once Ministers decided to launchnegotiations. As pointed out by Indonesia and Cuba, a number of issues had been raised in the
course of discussions in the Working Group that would require deeper examination and clarification
so that developing and least developed countries could better understand the implications of any
closer multilateral cooperation on their development polices. Finally, he stressed that the core
competence of the WTO lay in trade in goods and services. This should remain so.
74. The representative of Hong Kong agreed with  the joint paper’s observation that the Group’s
recent work in clarifying the elements set out in paragraph 22 of the Doha Declaration had been
fruitful in deepening Members' understanding of the issues involved.  Hong Kong also shared the
view that that there was still no agreement among delegations on many of these issues.  Past
discussions revealed quite different expectations and understanding of the possible elements of a
multilateral investment framework.  This was not surprising given the different levels of
development and the different needs and concerns of Members.  His delegation was not particularlysaddened by this.  Hong Kong believed that Memb ers now had a better idea of what a multilateral
investment agreement would mean to them, so that a conscious decision on the way forward could
be made.
75. As a major source and recipient of foreign investment, Hong Kong saw some merit in
devising a set of multilateral investment rules wi th a view to fostering transparent, stable and
predictable conditions for long-term cross-border investment.  Yet it was the reality of life that the
WTO could - and should - only proceed at a pace acceptable to all Members.  From the past
discussions in the Group, Hong Kong believed that wh at lay at the heart of the issue was flexibility.
It was of paramount importance that a future multilateral investment framework, if developed, was
designed with adequate flexibility to accommodate the various needs, concerns and expectations ofMembers.  As rightly pointed out in paragraph 17 of the joint paper, any framework should take into
account in a balanced way the interests of all the Members of the WTO, be they developed,
developing and least-developed alike.WT/WGTI/M/22
Page 17
76. The representative of Australia agreed that discussions to date had been valuable in
clarifying the objectives and expectations of Members in terms of a multilateral investment
framework.   His delegation shared the view that the Working Group had taken the preparatory
clarification phase as far as it could go at this time.  In reality, further clarification required a move
to the next phase, negotiations.  Australia supported a positive outcome on investment at Cancún.His delegation believed there were benefits for all Members, developed, developing and least-
developed, from the launch of negotiations at Cancún.
77. The representative of the European Community subscribed to most of what was written in
the joint paper, in particular its broad messages.  He pointed out that the Working Group was not
starting from a blank sheet of paper.  Discussion had been progressing for seven years in the
Working Group.  More than fifty submissions that had been discussed and presented in the past
eighteen months alone.   Developing countries had negotiated a growing number of bilateral andregional investment treaties that gave them greater experience in dealing with the concepts that the
Group had been discussing.  His delegation shared the view expressed in the joint paper that the
Working Group had done very useful work in clarifying the substance and implications of a
multilateral investment framework.  The EC recalled that the mandate of the Group was not to agree
on the issues set out in paragraph 22 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration; it was to clarify theseissues and to examine the various options.  Against the claim that the Working Group had not
established any convincing arguments for launching negotiations, he pointed out that this was not the
mandate of the Group in the first place.
78. His delegation had heard no convincing arguments as to why policy space for development
would be impeded by a multilateral investment framework.  A multilateral investment frameworkcould not guarantee FDI flows - any more than the existing WTO agreements could guarantee
increased flows of goods or services.  It could guarantee one thing: increasing opportunities for
investment, as noted in the joint paper.  The fact that an agreement would probably result in
conditions beneficial to investors - as implied by Thailand - was not such a bad thing.  Improving
conditions for investors might actually increase in vestment flows, in turn would help developing
countries to pursue their development objectives.
79. The EC believed that there were two objectives to be achieved in any prospective
multilateral framework on investment - to secure transparent, stable and predictable conditions for
investment as stated by the Ministers; and to preserve the right of all countries to regulate in the
national interest and to maintain sufficient policy space for development.  These two objectives were
mutually exclusive or incompatible.
80. The representative of Kenya noted that the joint paper by Canada, Costa Rica and Korea
clearly highlighted their level of ambition as far as the work of the Group was concerned.  Like
Indonesia, China, India and Cuba, his delegation did not share the views expressed in the paper that
the preparatory work was now complete and that the Group therefore needed to move to a different
level of discussion - or rather to start negotiations.  Kenya believed that the clarification of the
elements contained in paragraph 22 of Doha Declaration should lead to a convergence in
understanding of the issues.  This convergence had not been achieved as far as his delegation was
concerned.  He concurred with Indonesia that inve stment was a new area for the WTO, and therefore
Members needed to understand fully the development implications of the issue before plunging into
negotiations.  Kenya did not believe that the many questions that so far remained unanswered could
be resolved in a negotiating mode.
81. As Thailand noted, if a multilateral framework on investment did not guarantee greater
investment flow, as highlighted in paragraph 10 of the paper, why was it needed?  His delegation
was not convinced by the explanation given by the EC in this regard. More often, this Working
Group heard statements of good intention on provisi on of technical assistance and capacity-building;WT/WGTI/M/22
Page 18
appropriate flexibility for developing and least-developed countries, and taking into account fully the
development interests of developing and least-developed countries, as an inducement to start
negotiations in this area.  For Kenya, technica l assistance and capacity-building should aim to
achieve sufficient convergence in understanding the issues involved before negotiations could begin.
The Group also needed to know clearly how the interests of developing and least-developed
countries would be taken into account in an eventual agreement before starting negotiations.
82. The representative of Malaysia said that his delegation could not subscribe to the general
thrust of the joint paper.  He was surprised to hear that simply because there were sixty submissions
to the Group in the past eighteen months, this should be taken to mean Members were ready to enter
into a negotiating phase.  The fact that there had been active and constructive participation in the
Group in the period after Doha was a sign that Members were still trying to understand difficult
issues and to clarify the implications of a highly complex subject.  Many of these key issues – ondevelopment provisions, policy space, progressive liberalization, rescheduling commitments, and so
forth - had not been resolved, despite the Group’s considerable efforts.  Malaysia had asked many
questions but had received few straight answers.  The joint paper argued that these answers would be
found through a process of negotiations; but Malaysia could not enter into a negotiation without
knowing its parameters, and without being as precise as possible as to its details.
83. The representative of Argentina observed that two opposite positions were clearly emerging.
Some delegations believed that the Group's analytical work was complete, so the negotiating phase
could begin.  Others believed that the Group’s work was incomplete, and that negotiations could not
begin until key elements were sufficiently clarified and resolved.  Argentina approached the subject
with an open mind.  However, it was essential that the Working Group reach clarification on its nextsteps - especially the requirement, as mandated in paragraph 20, to make a decision on investment
negotiations based on an explicit consensus on modalities.  This was a fundamental requirement, and
without it Argentina did not see how Members could move forward into a negotiating phase.
84. Moreover, Argentina did not think that the Group had achieved a common vision on how to
devise a future multilateral framework on investment that preserved sufficiently a country’s right toregulate in the public interest.  As far as his delegation was concerned, this was more than a question
of special and differential treatment.  It was about the ability of governments to implement public
policies in all aspects of the state.  The problem was that the options were not sufficiently clear.
85. Argentina also agreed with those delegations that argued that experience gained in the
negotiation of bilateral and regional agreements could not be easily or automatically transferred to a
multilateral context.  This was because bilateral and regional agreements had as their objective the
protection, promotion and - in some cases - the liberalization of investment.   But in almost noinstance were these agreements concerned with protecting the policy space of countries and
maintaining their right to regulate in the public inte rest.  Argentina believed that a future multilateral
framework on investment should have as its main objective a development objective - and this
objective should provide a point of convergence for assessing specific issues and elements.  This was
the only basis on which Members could have a common vision for Cancún and adopt a possibledecision on the modalities of negotiations.
86. The representative of Poland underlined that any future multilateral investment framework
should embody a certain amount of flexibility so that governments could formulate their priorities in
relation to development, the environment, and social matters.  Governments must also be able to
carry out their obligation with regard to multinational corporations.  It was his delegation’s opinionthat the multilateral framework on investment would benefit developing countries because it could
enhance economic as well as political stability.  Regarding the joint paper, Poland agreed that the
mandate of the Working Group, as set out in paragraph 22 of the Doha Declaration, was to clarify
issues and not to initiate negotiations.  Poland shared the opinion of certain delegations that theWT/WGTI/M/22
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mandate of the Working Group should be revised.  Up to now, the Group had to limit the scope of its
discussion to those elements mentioned in paragraph 22 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration to
facilitate consensus with regard to policy issues.  But there were a number of other issues or
questions which were also important - such as investors’ and home countries’ obligations, restrictive
business practices, consumer responsibility, and environmental protection.  Poland felt that theseissues could be dealt with during the negotiations.
87. The representative of the United States used the opportunity to comment in more detail on
several papers that has been submitted to the Working Group at previous meetings, as well as on the
joint paper by Canada, Korea, and Costa Rica.  Regarding the communication from Japan on
"Consideration of the Necessity of Multilateral Investment Rules from Diversified Viewpoints"
(WT/WGTI/W/158), the United States agreed with many of the arguments and observations in the
paper.  One of the most useful things this paper did was place the discussion of investmentdisciplines in a real-world context.   It was important to try to link the concepts and principles the
Working Group had been discussing over the past 18 months to what was actually happening on the
ground with respect to international investment.  The Japan paper did this in several ways.  The
paper noted, for example, some truly remarkable findings from a recent UNCTAD study of foreign
investment in China.  In the year 2000, according to UNCTAD, foreign affiliates accounted for48 per cent of China’s total exports, almost one-third of its manufacturing sales, more than one-fifth
of its industrial output, and 17 per cent of its tax revenues. These figures, documented in dramatic
fashion, just how significant is the contribution that policies aimed at welcoming foreign investment
could make to a country’s domestic economic performance.
88. The paper also observed that small and medium-sized enterprises were accounting for a
growing share of some countries’ outgoing FDI.  SMEs were responsible for half of all Japanese FDI
in manufacturing during the first half of the 1990s, for example.  But as the paper noted, SMEs often
lacked the capacity that larger multinational enterprises had to gather information about a host
country’s investment regime.  The creation of a stable and transparent investment environment was
therefore especially valuable for SME investors,  who often transmit valuable technologies and
entrepreneurial energy to developing country economies.  Another reality of today’s world economy
highlighted by Japan’s paper was the close relationship between export performance and foreign
investment.  According to UNCTAD, “intra-firm” trade now accounted for about one-third of global
trade.  Through intra-firm trade, FDI often directly contributed to export competitiveness.  When
they arrive in a new country, foreign investors often brought with them established links to foreign
markets.  So investment liberalization helped  maximize the returns to trade liberalization.
89. The United States wanted to highlight what might be the paper’s most important observation
about the international economy.  The implication of  much of the discussion in this Working Group
was that only developed countries exported capital, and that it was therefore only those countries that
had an interest in multilateral investment disciplines.  But as the Japanese paper pointed out, the
reality of today’s world economy was much more complex.  Developing countries accounted for a
growing share of outgoing foreign investment.  The interests of developing countries wereincreasingly aligned with those of other capital exporting countries.  Developing countries had a
stake in the adoption of multilateral rules that woul d protect foreign investments made by their firms.
90.  The United States then commented on the communications from China on "Transparency"
and "Scope and Definition" (WT/WGTI/W/160 and W/159 respectively).   It was his delegation’s
impression that most Members would agree with the first sentence of this paper, that “Transparencyis one of the basic principles of the World Tr ade Organization and is of great importance to a
possible multilateral framework on investment.”  The United States also agreed, in principle, with
the paper’s recommendation in paragraph 2 with respect to the transparency obligations of
governments under a potential multilateral investment framework.  While the United States was not
prepared at this time to endorse this or any other specific list of transparency obligations, it didWT/WGTI/M/22
Page 20
believe that all WTO members should be prepared to undertake the fundamental commitment
expressed by this paragraph – to make public, incl uding through the provision of enquiry points, all
laws and regulations relating to the treatment of foreign investment. Indeed, the transparency
principles suggested in China’s paper sounded quite similar to those found in Article III of the
GATS, so Members were already quite familiar with this approach.
91. His delegation did not think it was useful, however, to distinguish between home and host
country obligations with respect to transparency.  Many Members were both a country of origin and
a host country for foreign investment.  Members’ commitment should be to make as transparent as
possible all laws and regulations that related to foreign investment, whether incoming or outgoing.
The United States had reservations about two other recommendations in the paper.  First, at the end
of paragraph 2, the paper argued that the transparency obligations of governments “should not
include procedures relating to domestic legislation, judicature, arbitration and administration of thehost countries.”  The United States disagreed with this argument.  His delegation believed Members
should be willing to assume transparency obliga tions that went beyond merely publicizing relevant
laws and regulations in a timely manner.  Members should be willing to take on commitments
related to procedural transparency and fairness that would enable foreign investors to operate on a
level playing field with domestic investors.  Elements of procedural transparency included, but werenot limited to, the following: clear, publicly available procedures for applying for or renewing
relevant investment authorizations; clear, firm deadlines for processing applications; a mechanism
for appealing authorization decisions; established procedures or mechanisms for responding to
inquiries on regulations and applications; standard formal processes for informing the public of
proposed regulations, or proposed changes to existing regulations, prior to their final considerationby the relevant authority or their entry into force.   These procedures should also provide meaningful
opportunities for comments and questions by investors and other interested parties, and a
commitment to apply these and other elements of pro cedural transparency to foreign investors in the
same manner as they apply to domestic investors.  The United States emphasized that making a
commitment to provide this kind of procedural transparency had nothing to do with the structure oroutcome of domestic decision-making processes: Ev ery WTO Member must be able to design its
domestic processes as it sees fit.  Procedural transparency only meant opening a window on the
process itself, so that foreign actors had fair opportunities to educate themselves about matters in
which they have a stake and can make their views known.
92. Second, the United States could not support the paper’s recommendation, also in
paragraph 2, that the WTO adopt transparency rules for private investors.  His delegation did not
believe that any international institution should be in the business of prescribing the information that
private enterprises must make publicly available about their operations.  Decisions of this kind had
long been - and should remain - the responsibility of national governments.  All WTO Members
maintained certain requirements with respect to the provision of information by private firms.  In
devising these requirements, Member sought to balance the obligation to promote public welfare
with the confidentiality of proprietary information that was so important to a successful marketeconomy.  Striking that balance was difficult, and it was not something international institutions
were well-qualified to do.  Indeed, the United States believed most Members would agree that, in
this area, it would be unwise to ask international in stitutions to substitute their rules or judgments for
those of national authorities.  Moreover, the WTO lacked the expertise and experience even to offer
much helpful advice to governments with respec t to private sector transparency requirements.
93. Regarding China’s paper on scope and definition, the United States noted that the paper
argued that portfolio capital flows should be excluded from the coverage of a potential WTO
investment agreement.  As Members knew, the United States disagreed with this view.  First, if a
multilateral agreement employed too narrow a definition of investment, it would exclude from its
coverage a wide range of current business activity.  It would thereby miss a significant opportunityWT/WGTI/M/22
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to promote increased capital flows into all economie s.  A broad definition of investment, however,
would be consistent with the way business was conducted in the world economy today.
94. Second, it was often impossible in practice to separate portfolio and direct investment.
Direct investors conducted a wide range of portfolio operations as they managed their cash flows.
A direct investor in a manufacturing plant, for example, must carry out a variety of local andinternational financial transactions while managing its business.  Or consider the example of a
venture capitalist that loaned a foreign company a large share of its start-up assets.  If the venture
capitalist acquired debt, rather than shares in the new venture, it might not hold any clear evidence of
ownership, and it might not have measurable control over the new firm.  Would Members want to
argue, however, that such an investor should not enjoy the same rights under a WTO investment
agreement as a direct investor?
95. Third, because portfolio and direct investment were less and less easily distinguished,
removing portfolio flows from the scope of an investment agreement would require countries to
make a case-by-case determination of which kind of investment a given investor had made, or
intended to make, and whether it was covered  by the terms of the agreement.  At best, this would
complicate the investment process; at worst, it could lead to disputes between Members and
constrain investment flows.
96. Fourth, portfolio investment could play an extr emely valuable role in promoting sustainable
growth in developing economies. Access to capital was essential to economic growth and
development.  Portfolio investment added to national savings, broadened the array of financing
available to domestic businesses, and stabilized economies by spreading credit risk.  China’s paper
was correct to suggest in paragraph 5 that the financial crises of the late 1990s demonstrated thatcountries with, as the paper puts it, “less effective supervision and regulation capacities” could be at
greater risk from capital market volatility.  But in the United States’ view, it was much more
effective to try to address these capacity gaps directly, through the improvement of domestic
safeguards, such as stronger financial sector supervision and stronger prudential standards, than
through controls on the flow of capital.  Measures aimed at strengthening financial regulation - forwhich significant donor assistance was now available - helped countries make better use of foreign
capital.  But limiting capital inflows simply cut off economies from a critical input to growth.
97. The representative of Japan noted that one of the important messages that Japan wanted to
make in its paper on "Consideration of the Necessity of Multilateral Investment Rules from
Diversified Viewpoints (WT/WGTI/W/158) was that multilateral investment rules were not just for
the benefit of investors or in the interest of the advanced industrialized countries.  Multilateral
investment rules were of great importance for the host country as well.  First, by enhancingpredictability, host countries could achieve better cond itions for attracting future inflows of FDI.  Of
course there was no guarantee of an actual increase in FDI flows.  However, multilateral rules could
guarantee at least equality of opportunities for potential investments (all other things being equal in
terms of macroeconomic economic stability, the level of infrastructure, and so forth).  So host
countries could derive significant advantages from committing themselves to disciplines regardingtransparency and liberalization.
98. Secondly, Japan did not think it was appropriate to differentiate between host and home
countries for various reasons.  The dynamism of the global economy meant that host countries could
become capital exporters - as well as capital importers - in future.  Their investors would also want
greater transparency, discipline and liberalization in the markets in which they were investing.Indeed, there were already a number of cases of developing-country companies becoming outward
investors in certain markets.  For example, in  the Information Technology sector about 60 Indian
companies already owned Japanese firms.  Japan was convinced that this trend would accelerate, not
slow down.WT/WGTI/M/22
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99. Lastly, Japan wanted to emphasize the close link that existed between investment and trade.
As the United States pointed out, in order to maximise the benefits of the trade liberalization
Members also needed to pursue investment liberalization.  They were two sides of the same coin.
C. OTHER RELATED ISSUES
100. The representative of the OECD drew attention to the recent activities of the Committee of
the OECD dealing with international investment and multinational enterprises, known as the CIME.
First, the CIME had published a report in April on the benefits of transparency policies for
international investment and overall governance.  On the basis of this report, the Committee was
now drawing up a reference framework that would enable governments to improve transparency
policies focused in particular on foreign investors.   As regards FDI incentives, the CIME had drawn
up a check-list of different issues to be taken into consideration by governments in order to minimize
the adverse or wasteful effects that were sometimes inherent in incentives programmes.  Both thesereports were available on the OECD web site.
101. The Committee continued its work on the interface between the different MFN clauses to be
found in investment agreements, the proliferation of which was allowing for many permutations.
Discussions were also underway on the scope of obligations in the area of investment protection.  In
April, the CIME had also launched a study on the contribution of development assistance to settingup more favourable investment regimes.  It also intended to work in cooperation with NEPAD and
other international bodies on the problems encountered by Africa in attracting investment.
102. Over the past year, the Committee had been able to consolidate the OECD’s guiding
principles for multinational enterprises since their 2000 review.  Two of the G8’s declarations
refered to these principles specifically.  National contact persons would be holding their third annualmeeting on 23 June, to be followed by a round table on the responsibility of multinational
enterprises.  The subject chosen for this year’s discussion was the fight against corruption, and the
synergies that existed between the OECD’s guiding principles and its anti-bribery convention.
Regarding the OECD’s contact with non-Members, Slovenia had expressed its interest in joining.
Other accessions were underway, while cooperation agreements were now in place with China andRussia, as well as with the Black Sea and the Caribbean regions.
D. 
DRAFT REPORT TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL
103. The Chairman noted that, as requested at the last meeting of the Working Group, a draft
report had been prepared by the Secretariat that was circulated in document Job 03/103.  As directed,
the draft reported in a factual way on the Group's last meeting in 2002 and on its first meeting this
year.  The draft would also need to be amended to reflect discussions from the present meeting.  The
revised report, incorporating whatever suggestions delegations might see fit to make, as well as therecord of the present meetings, would need to be circulated o delegations as soon as possible with a
view to its formal submission to the General Council at the latest on 11 July.
104. He asked delegations to consider whether the draft report that had been circulated
represented a factual and accurate summary of our Group's discussion.  If delegations could agree in
principle that this was the kind of report that should be submitted to the General Council, herequested that delegations send any specific editorial comments that they might have to the
Secretariat within the coming week.   He noted that the Secretariat had already received a number of
comments of an editorial nature from one delegation and others might wish to do so as well.  Any
comments received from delegations on the text - as well as the additions reflecting the current
meeting - would be circulated shortly in a final version of the report.  The Working Group could be
reconvened to approve this report formally - if delegations felt it necessary - or the report could beWT/WGTI/M/22
Page 23
re-circulated, with time for delegations to react and comment, on what was called "a lapse of time
basis".
105. The representative of the United States thought the approach taken by the Secretariat in
drafting this report was factual and straightforward. It offered a clear, accurate, and balanced
summary of the principal views expressed during  the post-Doha meetings of the Working Group.
More comments might be forthcoming, but they were likely to be of an editorial nature, and his
delegation would be more than happy to go with the "lapse of time" approach suggested by the
Chairman.
106. The Chairman suggested that on that basis he would propose a deadline of 18 June for any
comments on the report as circulated.  A final version would then be circulated on 20 June, allowing
ten days for considering the report approved by the end of June.  The synopsis of the current meeting
would be circulated immediately, with  ample time for delegations to comment.
107. The representative of Japan agreed with the Chairman’s suggestion in terms of procedures
for completing the Report to the General Council.  Japan had just one point of clarification.  The
current draft report covered the activities of the three Working Group meetings from December
2002, and April and June of this year.  However, the Group also had had high quality and intensive
discussion on major elements of a prospective agreement in the three meetings held in the first halfof 2002, and summarized in the Report to the Ge neral Council submitted last December.  When the
General Council reviewed the result of the Workin g Group's activities in its entirety since Doha, it
was important to ensure that those two reports were considered equally.   Japan wanted to make sure
that the Group’s work would be recorded in a complete sense, and wondered if there was any way to
indicate explicitly that the Group’s work was recorded in two reports, the December report and thisJune report.
108. The Chairman agreed that a way should be found to address Japan’s concern.  A covering
letter could be sent indicating that the issues specified in paragraph 22 had also been addressed in the
Group’s meetings in 2002, and should form part of the material to be taken into consideration by the
Ministers as they meet in Cancún.
109. The representative of India said that his delegation fully subscribed to the view that the
Working Group’s report to the General Council should be a factual and balanced one and India felt
that a good attempt had been made by the Secretariat in capturing the breadth of the views of
Members on various issues in the draft report that had been circulated to delegations.   India also
agreed with the Chairman’s suggestion regardin g the way in which the draft report could be
managed in terms of various deadlines.  Regarding the present draft, India had only two minor
comments which, for the sake of transparency, he wished to share with the Group (these commentswould also be forwarded to the Secretariat in wr iting).  One related to paragraph 10 of the draft
report.  India felt that the content of this paragraph, in its present form, lacked substance.  His
delegation wanted a reference in this paragraph - as well as elsewhere in the Report - to the fact that
a number of Members spoke in the Group’s meetings, and submitted papers, without prejudice to
their position on the need for an investment framew ork in the WTO, and their support for the launch
of negotiations.  His delegation also wanted to see the revised draft Report incorporate the current
meeting of the Working Group, and hoped to have the possibility of commenting on a revised draft
in case his delegation had any last minute points.
110. Lastly, regarding the point made by Japan, India agreed that the two reports of the Working
Group -  last years’ and this years’ report - captu red the breadth of the discussions.  As India
understood the instructions from the General Council, the present report was basically intended to
update the last year-end report, so his delegation had no difficulty in incorporating some reference -
either in the report itself or in some other manner - that this report represented an update of theWT/WGTI/M/22
Page 24
previous report, and captured the discussion in the meetings of last December, as well as April and
June of this year.
111. The representative of Malaysia agreed that the present draft represented an objective and
balanced summary of the discussion of the Group.  Nevertheless, Malaysia needed more time to
assess it, so his delegation agreed with the procedures suggested by the chairman.   Malaysia alsoagreed with the changes suggested by India.  Malaysia would examine the revised report with the
aim of submitting it to the General Council by the deadline.  If there were too many changes, the
Chairman might wish to call a meeting simply to allow delegates to look through the revised report
and endorse it.  But if the Chairman thought it appropriate, Malaysia could support the adoption of
the report on a lapse of time basis.
112. The Chairman thanked delegations for their sugge stions - which would be incorporated in a
revised text by the Secretariat - and said he would follow the procedures indicated.   If, before the
end of the month, and after the revised draft of the report had been circulated, he felt there was a
need to re-examine major changes to the text, he would make sure that the Group was given the
opportunity to meet again.  Otherwise, the report would be circulated as suggested.
113. It was important at this stage for delegations to be clear about the next steps before Cancún.
By approving this report, the Group would have discharged its mandate to clarify the issues set outin paragraph 22 before the Ministerial Meeting in Cancún. The Chairman of the General Council had
already indicated in an informal Heads of Delegations meeting on Friday that he would, with the
help of the Chairs of the different Working Groups dealing with the Singapore subjects, undertake
consultations in order to see whether the General Council could make any recommendation to the
Ministerial Meeting as far as the question of modalities was concerned.  Hopefully the GeneralCouncil would be in a position to make some contri bution to the Ministerial Meeting in that regard.
But this was under the responsibility of the General Council.  As the Chairman of the General
Council explained, the chairpersons of the Singapore Working Groups would be helping him, not in
their capacity as chairpersons, but as Friends of the Chair.  This underlined that the mandate of the
Working Group was fully respected in the sense that it was limited to clarifying the issues and goingno further than that.  He would be working with Ambassador Perez de Castillo in that capacity; and
at his request would be conducting consultations.
114. He was happy with the way the Working Group’s meetings had unfolded.  It’s success was
owed not only to the good background work provided by the Secretariat, but also to the engagement
of all delegations in clarifying the issues, and in submitting interesting and important papers.
Members would have to think about what the Group would do after Cancún.  There was already the
paper circulated by WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats on technical assistance, but delegations couldnot think much beyond that because no one knew what Ministers would decide.
115. The representative of the European Community, on behalf of the Commission, Member
States and even the future Member States, wanted to congratulate the Chairman on his very efficient
guidance of the Working Group.  He had stimulated debate in a subtle and pleasant way, and it had
been a pleasure to work with him.  The harvest of the Group was impressive.   In spite of that,Members still had challenging work ahead in Cancún, but the Chairman’s contribution to the
preparation of the 5th Ministerial Conference had been perfectly in line with the mandate given to
this Group in Doha and had been exemplary.
__________