RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONS/WPGR/M/42
19 June 2003
(03-3282)
Working Party on GATS Rules
REPORT OF THE MEETING OF 13 AND 14 MAY 2003
Note by the Secretariat1
1. The Working Party on GATS Rules opened its forty-second meeting under the chairmanship
of Mr. Thomas Chan, from Hong Kong, China.  The agenda for the meeting was contained in
WTO/AIR/2089.  It included six items:  appointment of the Chairperson;  negotiations on emergency
safeguard measures under GATS Article X;  ne gotiations on government procurement under GATS
Article XIII;  negotiations on subsidies under GATS Article XV;  date of the next meeting;  and other
business.  The Chairperson drew attention to the Annotated Agenda (JOB(03)/80) in which his
successor, Mr. Santiago Urbina, proposed themes for discussion.
2. He indicated that his successor intended to have, under "other business", a first informal
exchange of views on the item, contained in the three work programmes (S/WPGR/7), which called
on the Working Party "to prepare for the opportunity provided by the Fifth Ministerial Conference to
take stock of progress made in the negotiations".  The agenda for the meeting was adopted.
A. APPOINTMENT OF THE CHAIRPERSON
3. The Chairperson said that, in accordance with the rules of procedure for meetings of the
Council for Trade in Services (S/L/15), the election of the new chairperson should have taken place at
the first meeting of the year in order to take effect  at the end of that meeting.  However, when the
Working Party had met in February, the Chairperson of the Council for Trade in Services was still
consulting on the slate of chairs for the subsidiary bodies.  It had been decided that the election of the
new Chairperson would take place at the beginning of the May meeting.  He proposed that the
Working Party elect Mr. Santiago Urbina, from Nicaragua, as Chairperson of the Working Party on
GATS Rule.
4. Mr. Santiago Urbina was elected by acclamation.
B. NEGOTIATIONS ON EMERGENCY SAFEGUARD MEASURES  (ARTICLE X OF THE GATS )
5. The Chairperson recalled that, as mandated by the work programme on emergency safeguard
measures, the outgoing Chairperson had circulated on 14 March 2003 a Report on Negotiations on
Emergency Safeguard Measures (S/WPGR/9).  Delegations had been invited to exchange views onthis Report at an informal meeting held on 15 April.  The record of that meeting was found in a Note
by the Secretariat, circulated as JOB(03)/80.  As agreed at the April meeting, delegations could ask
that the comments they had made during that informal meeting, and which were reflected in the
Secretariat's Note, be included in the formal minutes of this meeting.  Delegations so wishing were
invited to make further statements on this issue.
6. The representative of Brazil said his delegation was satisfied with the approach taken in the
Chair's Report on ESM.  The conclusion pointed out an essential element, i.e. that political will was
                                                     
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and without prejudice to
the positions of Members and to their rights and obligations under the WTO.S/WPGR/M/42
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needed.  This observation did not pass judgement on anybody's position, but indicated that there was a
need for flexibility from all Members in order to get out of the current impasse.  The same questions
and answers had been repeated, and there was little progress towards common views.  In these
conditions, there would be no substantive result by March 2004.  It was also time to discuss how to
approach the stocktaking.
7. The representative of the United States requested that the statement her delegation had made
at the last informal meeting be reflected in the report of this meeting.2  At the informal meeting, the
United States had noted that the Report had been drafted under the Chair's own responsibility.
Nevertheless, her delegation would have liked to have an opportunity such as this one to react and add
further thought during the preparation of the report.  With respect to the period covered by the Report,
her delegation had understood that it would start from July 2002;  she took note that the Chair had
chosen a more comprehensive approach.  Much of the Report highlighted areas of convergence anddivergence, but some elements might have been mi splaced.  For instance, the question of desirability
and feasibility also involved concerns regarding economic and practical feasibility, which called for a
more practical and focused discussion.  Her delegation agreed with the Chair's assessment that the
way forward involved adopting a more practical approach.  The EC paper on modal application
should be further addressed.  The United States was concerned with the emphasis the Report put onpolitical will.  Political will was required on both sides, and the substantive aspect of this political will
could be, for instance, a willingness to engage in a more precise and concrete debate, or
responsiveness on concrete examples.  But it should be avoided passing judgement on delegations
which had difficulties with some issues in this negotiation.  Concerning the work programme, there
was no need for proposing any particular way forward.  Rather, it was more important to lay out thefacts, the areas of convergence and divergences, and indicate where further work might be possible.
In view of next year's deadline, the Working Gr oup should focus more on specific issues, rather than
preparing some sort of political decision.  There should be a discussion on how to prepare for the
stocktaking provided for in the work programme.  The way forward should include the elements just
stated by the delegation of Japan.
3  For any future work on this sensitive issue, in particular the
stocktaking, the United States would insist that any report be agreed by consensus of the Members,
and not in the form of a Chair's note.  If there was a stocktaking, Members should be able to make as
much input as possible.
8. The representative of Argentina said that the Report on ESM reflected the state of play of the
negotiations, i.e. that there was no convergence of views for the time being.  Political will was
important and was linked to the question of desirability.  The issue of feasibility could be treated from
a technical point of view.
9. The delegation of Japan requested that the statement that his delegation had made at the last
informal meeting be reflected in the report of this meeting.4  At that informal meeting, Japan had
agreed that the debate had not brought about any convergence of views among delegations.  The
reason was not a "lack of eagerness", as mentioned in paragraph 22 of the Report, but was rather due
to the fact that the negotiations on emergency safeguard measures involved complex issues and weredifficult to conceptualize.  His delegation took note of the observations contained in the last part of
the Report.  The questions of feasibility and desirability were crucial and essential to the discussions.
As stated in paragraph 29 of the Report, basic issues regarding the raison d'être of an ESM remained,
such as:  for what situations a safeguard was needed;   when would it be needed;  who should be
protected;  against what, etc.  Answering these questions was a prerequisite because they could ariselater in a dispute and were related to the legal stability of the commitments.  It was necessary to
                                                     
2 See JOB(03)/80, paragraph 5.
3 See paragraph 9 below.
4 See JOB(03)/80, paragraph 4.S/WPGR/M/42
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further discuss concrete examples because this would help answering the basic questions.  His
delegation was ready to participate in future discussions.
10. The representative of the European Communities requested that the statement that his
delegation had made at the last informal meetin g be reflected in the report of this meeting.5  At that
informal meeting, the European Communities had said  that it was important to clarify the purpose of
the work undertaken under this agenda item and keep in mind that all outcomes were possible.  The
purpose was not necessarily the establishment of an ESM.  Many basic questions remained open.
With respect to paragraph 25 of the Report, the Eu ropean Community was of view that the question of
desirability was also linked to feasibility, and not only to the form of an ESM.  On paragraph 26, she
noted that many safeguard-type provisions in bilateral trade agreements referred, for instance, to
balance-of-payments and infant industry problems and, hence, were not of the same nature as the
GATT Article XIX safeguard provision.  Moreover , these agreements were based on a top-down
approach and did not entail a possibility to withdraw commitments.  Since the GATS was different,
another approach was required.  With respect to paragraph 27, she said that the question of feasibility
did not involve any political dimension.  It was necessary to discussion concrete examples.  As her
delegation had stated at the last formal meeting, three different outcomes were possible in this
negotiation:  (i) should the WPGR be able to iden tify situations justifying an ESM and demonstrate
the feasibility and desirability of an ESM to deal  with them, the result could be an ESM agreement;
(ii) should the WPGR have identified such situations, but failed to prove feasibility and desirability of
an ESM, the result could be making Article X:2 permanent;  and, (iii) should the WPGR be unable to
identify such situations, this would suggest that there was no need for an ESM.  Political will was
needed to reach any of these three outcomes, not only to agree to establish an ESM.
11. The representative of Thailand, speaking on behalf of ASEAN, said her delegation had taken
note of all the points made in the ESM Report as we ll as of the suggestions for a way forward.  She
shared the view that political will was needed in order to solve certain issues.
12. The representative of Switzerland requested that the statement his delegation had made at the
last informal meeting be reflected in the report of this meeting.6  At that meeting, Switzerland had
agreed with the Chair's Report that the discussi on on emergency safeguard measures had not brought
about convergence and that views remained very different.  ESM was a difficult issue.  The question
of desirability involved a political dimension, while that of feasibility referred to technical issues.  The
Working Party should concentrate on the latter one.  Solving the many technical problems would help
to take a political decision.
13. The Chairperson thanked delegations for their comments on the Report on emergency
safeguard measures.  In light of the comments made at the last formal and informal meetings, but also
taking into account suggestions by the outgoing Chair in his Report, he invited Members to continue
their examination of concrete examples of situations where safeguard action might be needed, and of
the form such action could take.  With respect to the elements of a possible ESM, Members might
also wish to revert to issues such as:  (i) id entification of possible common elements for an ESM
based on the Synopsis (JOB(01)/122 + Add.1) and the Overview of the Synopsis(JOB(02)/200/Rev.1);  and (ii) discussion of process-related issues, such as transparency, notification,
consultation, surveillance provisions and expedited dispute settlement proceeding.  Members might
also wish to continue their deliberations on the issues of desirability and feasibility.  He recalled that,
since the last formal meeting, the European Communities had circulated a written contribution on
Scope for Emergency Safeguard Measures (ESM) in the GATS  (S/WPGR/W/41).
                                                     
5 See JOB(03)/80, paragraph 6.
6 See JOB(03)/80, paragraph 11.S/WPGR/M/42
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14. The representative of the European Communities said that the written contribution in W/41
reflected the statement made by his delegation at the last formal meeting.  The objective was to focus
the discussion on what the Working Party was mandated to do.  Negotiations  under Article X should
not aim at introducing a series of exceptions into the GATS with a view to granting a specific
treatment to infant industries, or to escaping the disciplines of Article XXI.  A positive conclusion onthe question of ESM presupposed two things.  First, the identification, in case they existed, of
concrete examples of emergency situations in the services area that were not already addressed by
GATS provisions.  In this regard, his delegation welcomed the example presented by ASEAN at the
last meeting.  Other such examples could also help to determine whether an ESM was necessary.
Second, it should be demonstrated that an ESM would be feasible and desirable to deal with these
situations, i.e. that the difficulties and concerns raised in respect of an ESM could be overcome in
practice.  The question of feasibility called for technical responses and it was necessary to work onexamples.  The matrix proposed by New Zealand could be helpful in his regard.
15. The representative of Norway said that his delegation was increasingly sceptical regarding
feasibility and desirability of an ESM.  He shared the doubts expressed by the European Communities
in their contribution.  It was difficult to identify real examples, and the goods' safeguard model was
not appropriate for services.  The flexibility provided by the architecture of the GATS and exceptionclauses such as Article XII already served as safety valves and allowed countries to defend their
interests.  Norway was ready to listen to more examples and to discuss desirability and feasibility.
16. The representative of Switzerland supported the contribution by the European Communities
and the statement just made by Norway.  His delegation was also increasingly sceptical.  The structure
of the GATS and existing safety nets explained why Article X referred to "the question" of anemergency safeguard measure.
17. The representative of Chile said that both the EC paper and the Shangri La example provided
by ASEAN at a previous meeting could be useful means to overcome the current "stalemate" situation
described by the outgoing Chair.  The mandate was to finish negotiations no later than
15 March 2004.  This could mean three things:  (i) not reaching an agreement on a mechanism andending these negotiations;  (ii) finding a solution acceptable to all;  or (iii) continuing the negotiations.
Chile agreed with much of the content of the EC paper.  One of the merits of the GATS was its
flexibility.  In addition, the GATS provided numerous escape valves, such as general exceptions,
Article XXI, domestic regulations, prudential measures in the financial services sector, etc.  Chile's
free trade agreements with the EC and the US did not contain an ESM although they provided for a
very high level of liberalization in services.  Nevertheless, her delegation could understand the need of
some Members to have an additional mechanism.  For Chile, this mechanism would need to have
certain characteristics so as not to affect the legal certainty of commitments.  For example, it must
only be used in times of emergency, be of a temporary nature, and adopted and applied in a
transparent and objective manner.  Chile wished to make the following questions with respect to the
Shangri La example:  Why had Shangri La made far reaching commitments in such a sensitive sector?
Why and how had the employment structure in the retail sector changed with the entry of foreigncompanies?  Was there a way, other than a safeguard measure, that would allow Shangri La to deal
with this problem, for example, modification of domestic regulations or some other kind of legislative
response?  How much time would Shangri La need  to adapt to the situation arising from the
liberalization of its retail sector?  At what point in time could the authorities of Shangri La distinguish
between "old" service providers and "new" ones?  How did they distinguish between national andforeign providers?  How and when could injury be determined by the authorities of Shangri La?  How
did the authorities define domestic industry in Shangri La and what would happen with acquired
rights?  Answers to these questions could promote a concrete discussion that would allow delegations
to make progress on the basic question of feasibility of an ESM.  Her delegation was willing to aid in
the search for answers to these and any other quest ions.  The Working Party should use the next fewS/WPGR/M/42
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months to discuss the technical merits, or the absence of such, of an escape valve, be it called ESM or
otherwise.
18. The representative of Thailand, speaking on behalf of ASEAN, said she was concerned to see
that scepticism was spreading.  Examining concrete examples was not everything since the
mechanism to be negotiated was meant to address future situations.  The GATS already containedsome safety nets, but they were not necessarily adequate for a Member having undertaken extensive
commitments in a sector.  The flexibility provid ed for in Article XIX would become increasingly
irrelevant as Members continued to liberalize and GATS' ultimate objective was full liberalization.
Article XXI offered permanent solutions, which was different from the kind of situations
contemplated under Article X.
19. The representative of the United States said that the EC contribution was useful in clarifying
the scope of Article X.  Her delegation hoped to get more concrete examples and to continue to fine
tune the scope of these negotiations.  The Working Party should also examine to what extent those
examples could be addressed under existing GATS provisions.  The United States shared the view of
the European Communities that Article X clearly stipulated that the negotiations addressed "the
question of" an ESM.  The problems faced by the drafters of the GATS on this question had not been
solved.  The matrix presented by New Zealand should be introduced more formally because it wouldhelp future discussions.  Her delegation hoped the Working Party would be able to find elements of
common understanding on the concept of "emergency" and noted that this question had been raised in
the informal contribution by Chile, Costa Rica and Switzerland.
7  The comments and questions by
Chile on the Shangri La example were interesting and useful.  It was necessary to understand what
was intended with a temporary remedy in such a si tuation, and whether that remedy was contemplated
under Article X.
20. The representative of Brazil said his delegation took note of the EC's understanding that the
GATS provided enough flexibility to allow countries to take into account concerns related to infant
industries and other sectoral constraints.  This position was important in view of bilateral market
access negotiations.  Referring to paragraph 8 of the report of the last meeting,8 he noted that some
examples in the Secretariat's compilations referred  to agreements between the European Communities
and other countries.  Some of these agreements might contain safeguard provisions applying to trade
in goods and services.  In cases where they a pplied to services, he enquired how the European
Communities had addressed the question of desirability and feasibility when drafting these provisions.
21. The representative of Uruguay drew attention to the Note by the Secretariat in JOB(03)/20,
containing a compilation of references made by delegations to safeguard type measures, which could
provide possible examples.  Uruguay was not a "demandeur" on this subject, but wished to have moreinformation, in particular on certain measures notified to the Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements.  His delegation had mentioned some exam ples of safeguard-type provisions, including in
agreements by the European Communities.  It had been recognized that they covered services, but had
not been applied.  Those delegations which had notified such provisions should explain how these
would be applied, based on the elements contained in the overview of the Synopsis
9 (situation
justifying an ESM, like services, domestic industry and acquired rights, compensation, etc.).  Practical
information could help to focus the debate.  He agreed that the purpose of an ESM was not to protect
infant industries or correct structural problems (para. 5 of S/WPGR/M/41), but wondered why infant
industries were referred to in bilateral agreements concluded by the EC as a possible reason for a
safeguard measure.  He also enquired how Japan had solved feasibility and desirability problemsconcerning the safeguard provision contained in its schedule of specific commitments.
                                                     
7 Possible Comprehensive Approach for an Emergency Safeguard Mechanism , JOB(01)/81.
8 S/WPGR/M/41.
9 JOB(02)/200/Rev.1.S/WPGR/M/42
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22. The representative of Norway, referring to comments by Brazil, explained that the EFTA
Convention had to be considered in a historical pers pective.  It had been negotiated in the 60's and
covered only goods.  Under a recent modification, it had been extended to new sectors, such as
services.  That explained why the safeguard provision had become general to cover goods and
services.  Other agreements contained a safeguard clause only for goods.
23. The representative of the European Communities noted that the representatives of Uruguay
and Brazil were coming back to questions to which his delegation had already provided answers, as
reflected in minutes of past meetings.  He noted that delegations agreed that an ESM was not intended
for infant industry protection or to address structur al adjustment.  Free trade agreements provided for
full liberalization and did not contain an Article XXI-type provision.  GATS Article XXI provided for
permanent solutions, while Article X envisaged temporary protection in emergency situations.  The
Shangri La example could be helpful and the questions raised by Chile were pertinent.  How longwould it take Shangri La to correct the situation?   How would it avoid a repetition of the problem?
What was the damage, in particular in sectors where there was a majority of foreign suppliers?  Was it
really impossible to foresee the situation at the time of making the commitment?  These were some
questions which should be discussed.
24. The representative of the Philippines said that the debate was circular.  Questions, such as
those on infant industries, had been raised 3 years ago.  A great deal of technical discussion had taken
place in the past, in formal and informal meetings.  For the time being, it was not possible to move
beyond hypothetical examples.  All this signalled that other delegations had done their analysis, and
had decided they did not want an ESM.  ASEAN still wanted to discuss technical issues.  The
questions by Chile were useful.  His delegation would like to get indications from other Members asto what ASEAN should undertake in order to move the debate forward.  These negotiations were not
heading towards a conclusion because Members were discussing the same issues time and again:
characteristics of an ESM, concepts of "emergency" and of "unforeseen developments", etc.  Should
suddenness and "unforeseen developments" be demonstrated ?  He enquired how the EC defined
"structural adjustment".  For instance, did the EC consider that the problem described in the Shangri
La example was one of structural adjustment?  He indicated that ASEAN was not looking for a
permanent solution under Article X.
25. The representative of Argentina said that, instead of focusing on positive listing and
flexibility provided for by the GATS, Members should consider to what extent the existence of an
ESM would facilitate the undertaking of specific commitments.
26. The representative of Switzerland said that the Shangri La example reflected developments
which a number of countries had experienced.  Improved access to capital allowed to create big shops.
New forms of organizing distribution were contempl ated.  Most countries that had moved from small
to big shops, a foreseeable development, had implemented accompanying policy measures (working
time, etc.).  One should not assume that the overall outcome was bad only since some shops were
loosing, but had to consider the global efficiency of the economy.  The main aspect of the Shangri La
example was that capital came from abroad and not from national sources.  Why had Shangri Laundertaken a full commitment?  To what extent could other measures be implemented (such as
opening hours, social schemes, etc.).
27. The representative of Malaysia said there was a link between this issue and the bilateral
market access negotiations.  His delegation did not feel obliged to participate in these negotiations if
there was nothing new to add.  Not reaching an agreement on an ESM could adversely affect the levelof ambition in the services negotiations to the detriment of the common objective of progressive
liberalization.  The absence of an ESM was a perfect excuse for the private sector not to do anything.
Would Malaysia be able to open its market in future rounds of negotiations?  Malaysia had not made
extensive commitments during the Uruguay Round, but had liberalized autonomously since.  HisS/WPGR/M/42
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government might prefer not to schedule recent liberalization measures, thereby retaining sort of an
"inherent" safeguard.  Shangri La was a good example.  The case for an ESM was not linked to the
question of infant industries, but to the need for a safety valve.  Both the top-down approach in FTAs
or the bottom-up system of the GATS ultimately let to the same result.
28. The representative of the European Communities  said that it was possible to focus the debate
with examples and pertinent questions.  He took note that ASEAN considered that an ESM should be
available in unforeseen circumstances and applied on a temporary basis.  Structural problems needed
permanent solutions and conjunctural problems temporary solutions.  Did the Shangri La situation
require a permanent or a temporary solution?  Delegations should discuss examples of conjunctural
problems and examine what type of temporary solutions might be needed.
29. The representative of Uruguay noted that, while the EC delegation considered that certain
provisions in bilateral agreements were not "emergency" safeguard provisions, it had not questioned
that these were "safeguard" provisions.  Moreover, they had been notified as such.  His delegation
wished to have more information on how these provisions were applied in practice.  This could be
useful to those Members that did not have such provisions in their bilateral agreements.  He had not
found a reply from the EC on this questions in the minutes of past meetings.
30. The representative of Brazil said that the report of the last meeting had motivated his
questions to the EC.  He wondered whether the EC ha d taken into account the questions of feasibility
and desirability when designing the safeguard provisions in its bilateral agreements, or in the EEA.
His delegation was still interested in understanding how these provisions worked.  He also noted that
the EC had made a distinction between safeguard and emergency safeguard.  However, the question
of feasibility arose with respect to  both.
31. The representative of New Zealand took note of the suggestion to circulate the matrix that her
delegation had presented informally at a previous meeting in a more formal way.  New Zealand would
be ready to do it at the July meetin g, if the Working Party so wished.
32. The representative of China said that, in the goods sector, liberalization had been deepened
since 1947 because the GATT provided for a safety valve.  The same should apply in services.  The
compilation undertaken by the Secretariat showed that no delegations questioned the need for
safeguard measures in agriculture, steel, etc.  Un foreseen developments could occur in services trade
as well.  They even occurred in the TRIPs area.  Thus, an ESM was desirable.  She noted that, at the
last meeting, the EC had stated that an ESM in agriculture was "possible".  The EC did not question
the desirability of such a safeguard provision, but focussed only on feasibility.  Thus, the Working
Party could agree now on the desirability of a services ESM and focus on feasibility.
33. The representative of Switzerland considered  that the difference between the top-down
approach in FTAs and the bottom-up in the GATS was crucial.  Bottom-up approach allowed
Members to gather experience with domestic policy adjustments, without legally binding
commitments.  This was unique to the GATS.  The drafters of the GATS had chosen this approach
because services trade involved complex questions, and it had not been possible to simply copy the
goods model.  Taking action against the import of a good was easy.  An horizontal ESM would,however, be highly controversial:  how to calculate the damage, where to find statistics, etc.
34. The representative of Japan said that the reply to the questions regarding the schedule of his
country could be found in paragraph 15 of the report of the last meeting (S/WPGR/M/41). The
measure referred to as "emergency safeguard measures" in the Japanese Schedule, under Road
Transport Services, subsector of Freight Transport Services, aimed at ensuring a stable supply ofservices in exceptional situations where over-capacity in a clearly delimited area disturbed the normal
operation or continuation of the business in question;  the measures would allow to prevent, for aS/WPGR/M/42
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limited period of time, operators from coming into the market or to restrict the output of already
existing operators in that market.  Those measures were applied on a non-discriminatory basis, i.e.
they did not make any distinction between foreign and domestic suppliers and only in exceptional
circumstances, as defined in detail in relevant rules and regulations, which ensured transparent
application.  Therefore, there was no unforeseen situation.  Moreover, they concerned one specificsubsector, not any sector.  On the other hand, discussions under Article X addressed measures
discriminating foreign suppliers, non-transparent, and potentially applicable in all services sectors.
35. The representative of the European Communities said the Working Group would not progress
if questions were raised again, that had already been answered.  Delegations needed to work on
examples, including the questions posed by Chile and contributions from delegations such as the EC
communication in S/WPGR/W/41.  Work should focu s on identifying situations where a safeguard
action could be needed and what type of reply could be given.  The EC had notified measures in
bilateral agreements for transparency purposes, and this did not imply that these measures were
"safeguards" within the meaning of Article X.
36. The representative of the United States said that the Working Party should address the EC
contribution and earlier contributions, such as that from Chile, Costa Rica and Switzerland.  The
New Zealand matrix should facilitate a more specific discussion.  It would be useful if the actualstructure of the matrix could be circulated, because it would allow for a more concrete discussion of
the EC proposal on modal application.  Comparing an emergency safeguard mechanism in goods and
in services amounted to comparing apples and orange s.  The situation referred to in relation to the
TRIPs Agreement involved a waiver (Article IX of the WTO Agreement) and not an ESM.  The
Shangri La example should be examined in the light of the questions raised by the EC submission onmodal application.
10  Her delegation had various questions with respect to this example:  What was
the situation involving the application of an ESM?  What would be the response in a situation where
people were obliged to buy more from discount and superstore shops in suburban areas?  Would the
government act on mode 3?  Many questions had already been discussed, as mentioned by the
delegation of the Philippines, but had not received  an adequate answer.  She wondered whether the
introduction of zoning requirements might amount to  closing a market.  Another question was how to
draw the line between responses to truly unforeseen situations and mere domestic protection.  It was
also necessary to discuss the question of desirability from the perspective of potentially affected
foreign suppliers.
37. The representative of Thailand, speaking on behalf of ASEAN, said that the ASEAN
Members had presented their Draft Agreement on ESM11 (ADA) nearly three years ago.  A recap of
the major points contained in this draft was appropriate at this juncture because it would also respondto some of the questions just raised.  The ADA contained a horizontal mechanism based on
investigation and establishment of a causal link be tween injury and increased supply or consumption
of foreign services.  It was modelled on the safeguard mechanism in goods, rather than the
agriculture’s special safeguard or the safeguard in textiles because ASEAN felt that the majority of
the membership preferred such an investigation-ty pe mechanism.  Second, the main aim had been to
find a reasonable recourse to temporary measures for Members in emergency situation that might
arise from their specific commitments.  Because of its temporary nature, the ESM was distinct from
Article XXI.  Third, ASEAN had tried to use existing agreements and terms as much as possible.  For
example, the preamble, object and purpose, and definitions were mostly based on the GATS and other
WTO agreements.  Staying on familiar ground should provide some comfort for Members.  Fourth,the ADA contained many elements to ensure transparency and increase accountability.  For instance,
the relevant authorities had to examine numerous criteria to ensure that abusive use would not occur
easily.  There were separate articles covering issues such as compensation, consultation, transparency,
                                                     
10 Modal Application of an Emergency Safeguard Measure , S/WPGR/W/38.
11 Job No. 6830, dated 31 October 2000.S/WPGR/M/42
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notification and surveillance, and a reference to WTO dispute settlement.  No less important were the
"conditions of application" or, in other words, the situations justifying a safeguard action.  Thus, the
ADA contained necessary sub-mechanisms for prevention of abuse.  Fifth, the draft contained some
provisions for developing countries in recognition of their particular needs.  The preamble mentioned
developing countries' need to enhance competition in services.  There were de minimis clauses, both
for general application and for mode 4 in particular.  Special consideration on timeframe was also
proposed.  The requirements on consultation and transparency had no special condition for developing
countries because they were devised so that all WTO members could meet them comfortably.
38. She further explained that the preamble of the ADA set out the object and purpose of possible
rules governing an ESM in services.  It referred to  Article X of the GATS and mentioned the need for
Members to have reasonable recourse to temporary measures in response to emergencies.  Contrary to
what some had perceived, the reference to “structural adjustment” and “competition” were intended tounderline the fact that a safeguard measures was not to be used for protectionist purposes.  The
definitions contained in Article I were borrowed from the GATS and other WTO agreements as far as
possible.  The two notable exceptions were "domestic industry" and "like or directly competitive
services".  The definition of domestic industry had to be read in conjunction with Article II on
Conditions of Application, which defined the "situation justifying a safeguard action".  Taking intoaccount other views, ASEAN had come up with a middle ground solution and proposed a de facto  use
of two definitions of "domestic industry" – one for establishing injury and one for the application of
the measure (ADA Articles I and II).  If the ASEAN text were to be put into practice, injury caused by
foreign suppliers would be a basis for safeguard action, but foreign companies might or might not be
affected by the measure which protected acquired rights.  Therefore, the only remaining key issue washow much and how far "acquired rights" would be pr otected.  On this point, Article II proposed three
options.  Option 1 fully protected the rights of foreign investors acquired before the safeguard
measure was applied, based on domestic laws and regulations.  Option 2 was also based on domestic
laws and regulations, but would not protect rights granted but not yet exercised, which meant that
foreign companies might have to "freeze" their expansion during the period of application.  Option 3limited the rights of foreign suppliers only to those contained in the invoking Member's schedule of
specific commitments.  This was a workable and technically sound solution.  It solved the problem of
establishing mode 3 injury, without affecting already established foreign suppliers or affected them
only to a limited extent, depending on the acquired rights protection.  For protection of acquired rights
in modes 1 and 4, the non-retroactivity provision in Article II:5 was adequate. This meant that
contractual rights obtained before the use of an ESM would not be affected.  Article III governed the
determination of serious injury and threat thereof.  The criteria were mainly derived from an earlierpaper by Venezuela (Job No. 5294) while the investigation was modelled on the safeguard in goods.
First, the competent authority had to determine that there was an increase in supply or consumption of
foreign services on the basis of a non-mandatory, non-exhaustive list of indicators and sources of
information.  Second, it had to find out whether there was serious injury or threat thereof on the basis
of another list of criteria.  Then it had to establish the causal link between the increase and the seriousinjury or threat thereof.
39. In her view, Article IV provided for applicable measures, whereby Members could temporary
withdraw or modify their specific commitments on market access and national treatment and any
additional commitments.  This would grant sufficient  flexibility to Members to find suitable measures
for each situation.  If Members believed that they we re able to enforce the limitations in their specific
commitments, then they should have no problem suspending or modifying these commitments when
applying a safeguard measure.  Another important point in Article IV was the "necessity test", which
was meant to prevent unjustified trade restrictions on a case-by-case basis.  Article V referred to
compensation, which was important to guarantee a reasonable use of an ESM.  A compensation
mechanism should be efficient but not too cumber some.  Article VII was modelled on the Agreement
on Safeguards and contained provisional measures that might be applied under critical circumstances.
There were some specific rules for invoking and applying provisional measures to ensure that theyS/WPGR/M/42
Page 10
would be used under strict disciplines and in a transparent manner.  Transparency was an important
principle to prevent abuse and was complemented by an obligation to consult.  A multilateral
surveillance mechanism was foreseen under Article X.  These requirements were not overly
burdensome, especially for developing countries.  The surveillance provisions were borrowed from
the goods' approach and the CTS should be the body to discharge this function.  Article IX aimed atassisting developing countries and provided, inter alia , for a longer application period and for less
cumbersome compensation.  Finally, there were provisions for dispute settlement, review and entry
into force of the agreement.  ASEAN had done it s best to come up with a possible mechanism for
ESM which was usable, flexible and feasible.  The investigation-based model was the best way to
prevent abuse.  However, ASEAN recognized that there had been other proposals and approaches, and
had expressed on many occasions its readiness to work on combining elements of the ADA with other
suggestions.  The ADA was a good basis of any workable emergency safeguard mechanism, butASEAN Members were open to listening to other ideas.  The deadline of 15 March 2004 was drawing
near and there was no more time to be wasted on rhetorical debate.
40. The representative of Brazil said that his delegation had been one of the proponents of this
issue and believed that there might be some room for an ESM under the GATS.  Brazil remained open
to arguments.  The debate should be open and frank.  Concrete examples were useful to testdesirability and feasibility and all Members should engage in this exercise.  Members which had
safeguard measures in services should be able to give information on why they had them (desirability)
and how they were applied (feasibility).  Further reflection would be needed on how a safeguard
applying in goods could be translated in the services context.  He enquired how Japan had solved the
question of feasibility when it had scheduled an emergency safeguard, irrespective of whether it wasan Article X type provision, and whether Japan would accept that other Members use the same device.
He drew attention to footnote 29, page 102 of the US  initial offer (TN/S/O/USA), which read:  "Rural
local exchange carriers may be exempted by a state regulatory authority for a limited period of time
from the obligations of section 2.2. with regard to interconnection with competing local exchange
carriers".  He asked whether this could be considered a safeguard measure under mode 3 and, if so,whether the United States had solved the question of feasibility when scheduling this measure and, in
particular, how it would be implemented it.
41. The representative of Canada said that desirability and feasibility were linked.  If an ESM was
not feasible, it was not desirable.  Hence, desirability was not only a political issue.  Today's
discussion showed how useful it had been to present the Shangri La example.  The matrix by
New Zealand could be helpful too.  He suggested that the Shangri La example could be tested against
the different safeguard models presented by Members, which might allow to identify their merits anddisadvantages.
42. The representative of Chile said that her delegation was interested in looking at how the
ASEAN draft agreement and other proposals would work when applied in a Shangri La-type situation.
43. The representative of Cuba said that her delegation saw the current situation with concern.
The same arguments were repeated, which showed a lack of willingness of some Members to
establish an ESM.  Such a mechanism was desirable and the Working Party should continue to
examine concrete examples.
44. The representative of the United States took  note of the suggestion made by Canada and
would come back to it.  Further clarification was needed.  Her delegation did not want to discuss a
mechanism before answering the core questions of desirability and feasibility.  She was concernedabout delegations going through other Members' schedules and trying to characterise certain
commitments as "safeguard measures".S/WPGR/M/42
Page 11
45. The Chairperson said that the proposal by Canada was something for Members to undertake.
The representative of Canada agreed.
46. The representative of Colombia said her delegation was still considering what type of solution
should be given in this negotiation.  The debate should focus on technical elements.  Colombia had
some doubts, in particular with respect to mode 3.  One could revert to the ASEAN draft agreementand also discuss how the Shangri La situation would be addressed in this context.
47. The representative of Mexico said that the discussion was in a stalemate.  The suggestion by
Canada might help to move forward.  Feasibility and desirability were not referred to in the mandate
of Article X.  As noted in the Chair Report, the question of desirability was unique to this negotiation.
He enquired whether the Secretariat could explain why this was the case.
48. A representative of the Secretariat said that the articulation of this debate had been in the
shape of desirability.  Questions of feasibility had also been raised at the beginning of the discussions
on safeguards.  It was true that this was the on ly rule-making area out of  the four under the GATS in
which the question of desirability and feasibility had arisen in such a focused manner.
49. The representative of Thailand, speaking on behalf of ASEAN, took note of the suggestion by
Canada, and of the various questions raised during the meeting.  She hoped that the next meeting
would be as fruitful.
50. The representative of the European Commun ities remarked that the debate was not only
rhetorical.  It was not so easy to implement a safeguard measure.  Acquired rights had to be taken into
account.  The EC submission on modal application raised a number of questions, and so had the
representative of Chile in her intervention.  This should be the basis for further work.
51. The representative of Australia said that the discussion of both the mandate of Article X and
the objectives of an ESM in the context of the Sh angri La example was interesting.  In Australia's
view, Article X provided a mandate to discuss the question of emergency safeguards.  The word
"emergency" should be emphasised.  Relevant measures were temporary and selective;  their objective
was to limit imports to enable a particular services industry to adjust to heightened competition from
foreign service suppliers.  It was therefore essential that the industry already existed and that it wasexposed to a sudden surge in imports.  The timef rame for the implementation of emergency measures
should be short and the remedies designed to enable industry to adjust.  Article X did not provide a
mandate for measures designed to achieve broader policy objectives, such as long-term plans for
industrial development through protection of infant industries.  His delegation welcomed the
comments by Thailand on behalf of ASEAN and the reaffirmation of ASEAN's commitment to
negotiations as mandated by Article X of GATS.  The Working Party should focus on a procedure or
mechanism to govern possible safeguard actions.
52. The representative of Chinese Taipei wondered whether it was feasible to apply an ESM to
the four modes of supply.  The existence of an ESM might help domestic industries support the
liberalization of trade in services.  In this respect, her delegation shared the view of ASEAN that
Members might need to convince their domestic industries to support the further opening of their
markets, reminding their industries that emergency actions might be employed whenever injury orthreat of injury occurred.  From this point of view , justifying the necessity of an ESM would not be a
problem.  Due to the different nature of each industry, whether an ESM was practicable for each mode
might need to be assessed case-by-case.  Nevertheless, this should not stall the negotiations.  Her
delegation hoped that Members would agree to step up the pace of the negotiations and enter as soon
as possible into substantive discussions of the procedures for an ESM.S/WPGR/M/42
Page 12
53. The representative of Thailand, speaking on behalf of ASEAN, said that ASEAN was open to
consider any element which might allow to move forward, such as the suggestion by Canada.  The
Shangri La example was a first attempt.  Other papers on the table should be taken into account.  The
matrix proposed by New Zealand was a good contribution and ASEAN would try to find examples to
fill it.  She recalled that the ASEAN draft agreem ent merely called for the suspension of measures,
without prescribing what kind of action should be taken.
54. The representative of China said that her delegation supported Brazil in asking those
Members which had safeguard-type provisions in their schedules to explain how they implemented
them in practice.
55. The representative of the United States called for further clarification of the suggestion put
forward by Canada.  Her delegation wanted to see concrete examples of experiences and problems to
further discuss questions of desirability and feasibility.  However, the US had reservations regardingany formalised exercise involving the application of the various types of mechanisms presented by
delegations to the Shangri La example.
56. The representative of Thailand, speaking on behalf of ASEAN, said that the situation
described in the Shangri La example was not merely hypothetical because it was based on experiences
made in various countries in retail services.  She enquired how Canada's suggestion would beimplemented.  She encouraged delegations to read the ASEAN draft agreement again and hoped that
those delegations which had been asked questions regarding safeguard-type provisions in schedules or
bilateral agreements would reply.
57. With respect to the suggestion by Canada, the Chairperson felt that it was up to the Members
that had presented a proposal to try and apply the Shangri La example to it.  He noted that many
proposals were not exhaustive, but focused on specific elements of an ESM.
58. The representative of the United States said her delegation needed to hear from delegations
what problems they had encountered would justify the use of a safeguard measure.  Some countries
had undertaken extensive liberalization, but had not signalled any problem.  The United States would
carefully study the responses given by Thailand.
59. The representative of Brazil said that several tracks could be pursued.  They included
discussing concrete examples of safeguard provisions and experiences in implementing them.
60. The Chairperson noted some progress on substantive issues as well as on feasibility and
desirability.  Technical issues had also been discussed in the latter context.  The Shangri La example
had raised many questions.  The matrix by New Zealand was welcomed.  He recommended that the
suggestion by Canada would be left for Members' consideration and noted that some Members were
also interested in discussing safeguard provisions in RTAs.
61. The representative of the United States said that  desirability and feasibility raised substantive
issues, not only technical problems.
C. NEGOTIATIONS ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT  (ARTICLE XIII OF THE GATS )
62. The Chairperson drew attention to the work programme on government procurement,
whereby Members were encouraged to put forward submissions as early as possible before 31 March
2003.  It had been agreed to continue discussion on the basis of submissions from Members and
materials available.  He recalled that, at the last meeting, the European Communities had requested
the Secretariat to undertake a compilation of transparency rules and procedures contained in bilateral
and plurilateral agreements.  At that meeting, it had been decided that, before undertaking thisS/WPGR/M/42
Page 13
compilation, the Secretariat would check whether relevant information was already available in the
Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement (WGTGP) and would report to the
Working Party on GATS Rules.  It now appeared that no such work had been undertaken in the
WGTGP.  The Secretariat would therefore undertake the requested compilation and endeavour to
circulate it by the next formal meeting of the Working Party.  A preliminary research made by theSecretariat on procurement-related provisions in various agreements showed that it was difficult to
separate transparency-related provisions from othe r provisions.  Moreover, the question of what were
transparency-related provisions in the field of government procurement was still debated in the
WGTGP.  In order not to prejudge this issue, the document to be produced by the Secretariat would
be a compilation of all provisions related to government procurement found in economic integration
agreements.  This document would be without prejudice to the scope and the results of the
negotiations under Article XIII.  With respect to information on relevant activities of the WorkingGroup on Transparency in Government Procuremen t, he intended to consult informally with
Ambassador Saborío Soto, the Chairperson of that Group, to see what kind of contribution could be
made to this Working Party.  Finally, he recalled the work programme on government procurement
which stipulated, inter alia , that the Chairperson would "circulate a note by 30 June 2003 to report on
the progress of work".  As to the form of the report, his intention was to follow the approach taken inthe Report on ESM.  Practically, this meant that the report would consist of (i) a factual introduction,
recalling work done so far under this agenda item, and (ii) the Chair's assessment of the situation and
suggestions for a way forward.  This report woul d be circulated on the Chair's responsibility and
would not prejudge the position of any delegation.  He would welcome comments and suggestions
from delegations in this respect.
63. The representative of the European Communities recalled the EC proposal for a legal
framework for services procurement (S/WPGR/W/39).  Opening government procurement was
beneficial, in particular to developing countries.  The purpose was to develop a multilateral
framework which would allow Members to liberalize their public procurement market in a flexible
manner, sector by sector, according to their developmental needs and national policy objectives.  Itwould also be possible to progressively open oppor tunities for bidding which would allow Members
time to implement the necessary regulatory frameworks.  A Member taking no commitment on its
government procurement under the GATS would have no obligation.  The Working Party had already
discussed in detail the EC proposal, which had helped to see how such a framework could be
implemented.  A services procurement agreement could take the form of an annex to the GATS,
which would specify the conditions under which the GATS would apply to public procurement.  This
annex would include three parts.  First, a fourth column would be added in the current schedules,entitled "Government procurement", where Members would indicate, for each sector, the possibilities
for bidding.  "Unbound" would mean no commitment.  "None" would indicate that foreign suppliers
were allowed to bid and would be treated like nationals;  limitations could be listed, concerning
entities covered, thresholds, national treatment (oth er than those in Article XVII column).  Second,
most-favoured-nation treatment would apply to government procurement, except for commitments
taken by signatories to the Agreement on Government Procurement under that Agreement.
Exemptions to MFN treatment could be scheduled at the time of signing on the GATS Agreement on
procurement.  Third, procedures were indispensable to ensure non-discriminatory treatment.  In order
to avoid duplication, the GATS Annex on Government Procurement could refer to the future
Transparency Agreement and indicate that this Agreement would apply to procurement under theGATS.  The EC intended to submit a written proposal containing these elements.
64. The representative of the United States said that, although the report on government
procurement would be submitted on the Chair's responsibility, Members should be given the
opportunity to comment.  In fact, the work programme did not indicate that the report was under the
Chair's responsibility.  The section of the report discussing the way forward might have seriousimplications for Members.S/WPGR/M/42
Page 14
65. The Chairperson said he hoped to rely on Members' inputs and views, so that the report would
be acceptable to everybody.  On the other hand, it was not his intention to negotiate the draft.  But
Members would have ample opportunity to make their views known.
66. The representative of Switzerland stated his delegation was interested in the EC proposal.
The flexibility proposed by the EC, in line with the GATS structure, would take into account
development levels and the right to regulate.  Commitments on government procurement would be a
significant achievement from the point of view of services suppliers.
67. The representative of Thailand said that it was the prerogative of the Chairperson to draft his
report.  Members should be consulted, but should not be involved in drafting the report.  With respect
to the EC proposal, her delegation was of the view that Article XIII did not allow to engage in market
access negotiations.  Her delegation would further comment after seeing the EC proposal in written
form.
68. The representative of Chile expressed interest in the EC proposal and the flexible framework
suggested.  Further clarification was needed regarding the rules of procedures.
69. The representative of India was concerned about the direction taken by the debate.  The
Article XIII mandate was clear:  it did not includ e negotiations on Articles II, XVI and XVII.  His
delegation would come back on the EC proposal.  India trusted that the report to be submitted by theChair would be factual and balanced.  Members should be granted an opportunity to give their input
and all views should be taken into account.  The compilation to be undertaken by the Secretariat
should be without prejudice to Members' position on Article XIII.
70. The representative of Brazil said his delegation would come back to the EC proposal after it
was circulated in written form.  The Chair should be given the flexibility he needed to draft his report,
and he should not feel compelled by any delegation.  Delegations would be given an opportunity later
on to disagree or criticize the report.
71. The representative of Hong Kong, China r ecommended, with respect to the scope of the
discussion, that the EC proposal could be discussed on the understanding that it would be without
prejudice to delegations' position on the scope of the mandate.  Concerning the report, the Chairshould consult with delegations, but needed flexibility to draft it.  Moreover, having Members draft
the report would be a waste of time and resources.
72. The representative of the Philippines said that th e preparation of the report should left to the
Chairperson.  It was his prerogative to conduct c onsultations.  Like India, his delegation understood
that the compilation to be undertaken by the Secretariat would be without prejudice to Members'
position on Article XIII and would be subject to comments by Members.  The proposal by the EC
went beyond the mandate contained in Article XIII.  It was premature to consider a possible annexreferring to the agreement in the Transparency Group because it was impossible to know whether
there would be such an agreement.  The issue should  be left aside for the time being, pending a result
in the other group.  Inviting the Chairperson of the Transparency Group would allow to know what
that Group was doing.  It would be ambitious to go beyond that.
73. The representative of Peru noted that the mandate of Article XIII did not include negotiations
on market access and national treatment.  The report on government procurement would be on the
Chair's responsibility and should be balanced.
74. The representative of Malaysia said that the mandate was limited.  Transparency in
government procurement was to be dealt with in another group, which had met certain difficulties in
drawing the line between transparency and market access provisions.  Despite the flexibility itS/WPGR/M/42
Page 15
provided for, the EC proposal did involve market access issues.  The report should be drafted under
the Chairperson's responsibility.  Consultations should be held to take into account Members'
concerns, but Members should not be engaged in the drafting process.  His delegation wanted to
reflect on the suggestion to invite the Chairperson of the Transparency Group.
75. The representative of Japan said that duplication of work should be avoided.  The framework
proposed by the EC gave more concrete ideas on what could be done in this Working Party.
76. The representative of Chinese Taipei enquired whether the framework just presented by the
EC differed greatly from the previous EC contri bution in S/WPGR/W/39.  At the time, transparency
procedures were mentioned.
77. The representative of Indonesia said his delegation was concerned about the scope and
direction of the EC proposal.  According to Article XIII, the negotiations should be limited to
transparency and not include Articles II, XVI and XVII.  The report should be drafted under theChair's responsibility.  His delegation was ready to participate in consultations.
78. The representative of the Republic of Korea said the report should be left in the hands of the
Chairperson.  Discussions on the EC proposal should not prejudge the result of the negotiations and
should not duplicate work in the Committee on Government Procurement.  She enquired how parallel
market access negotiations on government procurement would be conducted under the GATS and theAgreement on Government Procurement.
79. The representative of the United States said that her delegation preferred transparency-related
issues, in relation to both goods and services, to be dealt with in the WGTGP and looked forward to
Ministers giving a mandate to negotiate an Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement.
Procurement law did not always distinguish between  goods and services.  The United States looked
forward to a more concrete discussion on how to  achieve the objectives of the WGTGP.  In that
regard, it would be useful to keep in contact with the Chairperson of that Group.  The report should be
without prejudice to Members' views and positions.  No position should be compromised.  She wished
that delegations would hold the same views in other bodies of the WTO.  The section on the way
forward should take into account all positions expressed in this Working Party.  Her delegation wasnot interested in drafting the report, but would li ke to have an opportunity to express views.  The
report should be balanced, even if it were under the Chair's responsibility.
80. The representative of Singapore said that Article XIII:2 was silent on what should be the
object of the negotiations.  Thus, any issue could be discussed.  His delegation was ready to give
further consideration to the EC proposal.  He enquired what implications the EC proposal would have
on Article III of the Agreement on Government Procur ement.  Duplication of work should be avoided.
81. The representative of the European Communities said that the scope of Article X III was not
limited to transparency issues, nor constrained by the activities of another group.  Despite the doubts
expressed by some delegations, opening government procurement had positive effects, in particular
on the budget and national economies generally.  The arguments concerning the scope of the mandate,
which had no foundations, served only to underline the absence of substantive arguments.  The EC
proposal, which was based on total flexibility, could benefit all Members, especially developingcountries and his delegation was ready to listen to suggestions on how to improve it.  This proposal
would be circulated soon in written form.  The annex in the third part could refer to the future
Agreement on Transparency and, hence, avoid duplic ation.  This was why it was also important that
the Chairperson of the Transparency Group informed this Working Party, preferably at the next
meeting.  The negotiations of commitments would no t take place in this Working Party, but in the
usual context of bilateral market access negotiations.  The discussion in this Working Party concerned
only a general framework and the annex specifying the conditions under which governmentS/WPGR/M/42
Page 16
procurement would be dealt with in the GATS.  Today's proposal was a concrete follow-up of the EC
proposal made last July, taking into account questions and comments made at the last meeting.
Article III of the GPA did not affect market access under the GATS.  The new column proposed by
the EC would contain commitments under the GATS for opening possibilities to bid for government
procurement, but would not exempt Members from complying with Articles XVI and XVII or thecommitments under the GPA.  Similarly, the GP A did not prevent Members from complying with
their GATS commitments on government procurement.
82. The Chairperson said he would prepare the report under his responsibility.  He would consult
with the Chairperson of the Transparency Group and would revert to this issue at the next meeting.
The Secretariat would undertake a compilation of provisions related to government procurement,
found in economic integration agreements.
D. NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBSIDIES  (ARTICLE XV OF THE GATS )
83. The Chairperson regretted that, due to lack of time, it was not possible to discuss subsidy
issues.  He suggested that it would be the first ag enda item at the next meeting of the Working Party.
E. DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING
84. The Chairperson said that the next formal mee ting of the Working Party was expected to take
place during the next cluster of services meetings, which had been tentatively scheduled from 30 June
to 11 July 2003.  The Working Party would meet dur ing the first week of the cluster and the exact
date would be communicated to delegations in due time.
F. OTHER BUSINESS
85. The Chairperson said that, due to lack of time,  it was not possible to have a first informal
exchange of views on the sentence, contained in the three work programmes (S/WPGR/7), calling on
the Working Party "to prepare for the opportunity provided by the Fifth Ministerial Conference to
take stock of progress made in the negotiations".  He intended to convene an informal meeting for that
purpose.
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