RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/GC/M/84 
27 February 2004  
 (04-0825) 
General Council 
15-16 December 2003  
 
 
 
MINUTES OF MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard  
on 15-16 December 2003  
 
Chairman:  Mr. Carlos Pérez del Castillo (Uruguay) 
 
 
1. Follow-up to the Cancún Ministerial Conference – Report by the Chairman and 
the Director-General........................................................................................................... ......2  
2. Iran – Request for Accession .................................................................................................60  
3. China – Transitional Review under Section 18.2 of the Protocol of Accession to 
the WTO Ag reement.............................................................................................................. .60 
4. Work Programme on Small Economies – Report by the Chairman of the 
Dedicated Sessions of the Committ ee on Trade and Development.....................................66  
5. Review of the Exemption provided under paragraph 3 of GATT 1994.............................67  
6. WTO Pension Plan – Annual report of the Management Board for 2002.........................71  
7. Committee on Budget, Finan ce and Administration ...........................................................72  
(a) Report of the Committee on its meetings of 11 July, 14 August and 
25 September 2003 .............................................................................................................. .....72  
(b) Recommendations of the Committee following its meetings of November and 
December 2003 .................................................................................................................. .......73  
8. Waivers under Article IX of  the WTO Agreement..............................................................74  
(a) Introduction of Harmonized System 1996 changes into WTO schedules of tariff 
concessions – Requests for waivers from Israel and Thailand .................................................74  
(b) Sri Lanka – Establishment of new Schedule VI  – Request for extension of time-limit ...........75  
(c) Review of Waivers under Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement ..............................................75  
9. Trade in Textiles and Clothing – Developing Members' concerns about potential 
reduction in market (quota) access in 2004 – Statement by the Chairman.......................76  
10. Appointment of Officers to WTO bodies – Announcement by the Chairman..................80  
11. Review of WT O activities....................................................................................................... 81 
12. Widening of EC textiles quota restrictions following accession of new member 
States ......................................................................................................................... ...............81  
13. Chairmanship of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation...........82  
 WT/GC/M/84 
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 1. Follow-up to the Cancún Ministerial Conferen ce – Report by the Chairman and the 
Director-General 
1. The Chairman
 reported, on behalf of both the Director-General and himself, on the 
consultations they had been conducting since early  October pursuant to the Statement adopted by 
Ministers at Cancún (WT/MIN(03)/20).1 
2. The Director-General  reported on his recent activities to complement the Chairman's own 
efforts in Geneva.2 
3. All delegations who spoke th anked the Chairman and the Director-General for their 
comprehensive statements and for their tireless effo rts in moving the post -Cancún process forward, 
as also for the commitment and dedication they had brought to this process. 
4. The representative of Australia  thanked the Chairman for hi s personal contribution over the 
course of the year to help move the Doha negotiatio ns forward.  In the lead-up to Cancún, and since 
then, the Chairman had worked tirelessly and unselfi shly, and against the odds, to find solutions that 
would enable Members to move towards a successful and timely conclusion of the negotiations.  All were indebted to him for his commitment and impar tiality.  Australia had been fully supportive of the 
Chairman's efforts and the complementary activities of the Director-General in seeking to come up 
with the solutions Members had hoped to achieve in Cancún.  In resuming work after Cancún, all had 
been mindful that if decisions had eluded Minist ers in Cancún, there was no guarantee that a speedy 
resolution could be achieved by Ambassadors and sen ior officials in Geneva by mid-December.  
Members had realized that if they set the bar too high they might stumble once again.  The Director-
General had reminded Members again at the present meeting that in his extensive contacts with 
Ministers since Cancún, he had encountered overwhe lming support for the Doha Round.  Everywhere 
he had been, Ministers had indicated their determin ation to ensure that the negotiations regained 
momentum as soon as possible.  At the APEC meeting in October, the heads of 19 APEC governments had called for the urgent resumption of negotiations.  Australia's extensive contacts with 
Cairns Group partners – in capitals and in Geneva – also reflected th is attitude.  On 12 December, the 
G-20 Ministers had reaffirmed their commitment to the Round and had pledged their preparedness to 
contribute to completing the negotiations in 2004.  The Director-General had already referred to a 
much wider range of similarly encouraging signal s at political level from a range of other groups.  
Thus, at the political level delegations were clearly being asked to get on with it.  Unfortunately, there 
was still an apparent gap between words in capitals  and action in Geneva, and further effort was 
needed to bring them together. 
5. While the negotiations might not have been co mpletely brought back on track, considerable 
progress had been made in identifying the key issu es.  These issues had to be addressed as Members 
moved to the next phase.  The elements were  well understood.  The political commitment was 
evident.  The technical work was in hand.  The ta sk before Members was to keep moving forward by 
building the package one step at a time.  No one would underestimate the challenges to be faced in 
finding the convergence and accommodation necessary to conclude these nego tiations.  But no one 
would deny the potential for these negotiations to reduce poverty and raise living standards.  Most 
Members recognized that a collapse in the negotiations  would come at considerable cost to each of 
them, to global growth and development prospect s and to the multilateral trading system.  The 
Chairman had identified the main issues which needed  priority attention in the early part of 2004 and 
the way ahead in the next few months.  Australia ag reed that agriculture and NAMA were the keys to 
unlocking the negotiations.  It was imperative to move forward quickly to reach a common basis for 
                                                     
 
1  The full text of the Chairman's statement was subsequently circulated in document JOB(03)/226. 
2 The full text of the Director-General's statemen t was also subsequently circulated in document 
JOB(03)/226.  WT/GC/M/84 
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 proceeding with approaches to negotiating modal ities, establishing a way forward that neither 
prescribed the final outcome, nor qualified the level of ambition Ministers had agreed in Doha when 
establishing the mandates for these two areas. 
6. In the area of agriculture, it was clear that additional flexibility and renewed leadership from 
the major subsidizers were needed in what those countries might be prepared to do to reduce their 
trade-distorting subsidies and eliminate their export s ubsidies.  It was clear from reactions in the lead-
up to Cancún, and since, that, on the part of th e major subsidizing countries, sitting on their pre-
Cancún positions was a recipe for stalemate.  At the same time, one needed to  devise an approach to 
market access that offered prospects for genuine im provements in access in all markets.  Using the 
Derbez text (document JOB(03)/150/Rev.2) as a starting point, Australia believed it should be 
possible to lift the text's ambition to a point where it attracted consensus.  However, the focus had to 
be on the substance of the improvements required to meet the Doha mandate, and Members should 
avoid being distracted by the point at which they moved from negotiating frameworks to full 
modalities.  In the interest of balance, openness a nd inclusiveness, it would be sensible to reactivate 
all of the negotiating groups once a slate of chairs  was settled in early February.  The Chairpersons 
should then get on with the work that had been on the table at Cancún and that might have progressed 
since then.  There should also be provision to c ontinue, once the negotiations resumed in January, 
with informal consultations at the HODs level and in  a variety of formats, to find a way forward on 
the Singapore issues and cotton.  The suggestions outlined by the Chairman  at the present meeting 
might not provide all the answers.  There might be  still be some loose threads, but Australia hoped 
that all could endorse the Chairman's approach as a sensible and pragmatic way forward. 
7. The representative of Switzerland  thanked the Chairman for his initiatives and able 
leadership.  Members were now in a position to view the negotiations in their true perspective and to 
pave the way for the next stage in the process.  Switzerland's objective in these negotiations remained 
the consolidation and development of the three pilla rs of the multilateral trading system, i.e. market 
access, rules, and the coherence of trade-related polic ies.  In Switzerland's view, this objective was the 
purpose of the plan set in motion at Doha.  Member s now needed to take stock of the situation and 
agree on the means to advance towards that goal.  In this context, one should take full measure of 
what had been accomplished since Doha.  On the b asis of a largely political Declaration, Members 
had done a vast amount of substantive work.  They  had thoroughly examined the core problems and 
circumscribed the most sensitive issues.  They had identified the key frameworks that would serve to 
establish the negotiating modalities.  They therefore knew the direction to take and the problems that 
still needed to be resolved.  This in itself represente d tangible progress that deserved to be recognized.  
Going back to the drawing board would not serve Members' purpose.  On the one hand, the same problems would arise and Members would probably arri ve where  they were at present, except that 
precious time would have been wasted.  On the other hand, Members would once again lose the opportunity to address the real problems of the negotiations.  All needed to overcome the fear of 
really entering into negotiations.  In Switzerland's  view, the end of the problem-identification phase 
had almost been reached.  The question now w as how to move on to a further stage in the 
negotiations.  To achieve this, one  would have to build on the resu lts of the post-Cancún consultation 
process, based on the Derbez text, which would enab le Members to develop frameworks in order to 
define the modalities of a final package in line with  the Doha mandate.  His delegation was aware that 
major aspects of the text remained the subject of contention and were ev en being challenged.  
However, Switzerland did not see those difficulties as obstacles preventing Members from moving on 
to the next step, as long as they were willing to  address these difficulties.  His delegation believed 
there were enough points in common for Members to begin working constructively in 2004. 
8. One should not make the mistake of already trying to negotiate results that would emerge 
from the next stage in the negotiations.  Switzerland shared Australia's views that this would be both 
premature and counterproductive.  At the present po int, Members had to agree on the basis for the 
next negotiating phase and should refrain from seek ing to determine its outcome.  His delegation WT/GC/M/84 
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 believed the Chairman's proposals offered such a basis without prejudging the results, and was 
globally in agreement with those proposals.  Switzerland had amply expressed its views on specific 
matters in the consultations the Chairman had conducted, and those views remained valid.  To 
supplement the Chairman's introduction, he wished to say that the G-10 – which was a group of developing and developed countries – had difficulti es with some of the aspects of the blended 
formula.  Switzerland stood ready to address all aspec ts necessary to continue  the negotiations in a 
constructive manner in the ne w phase due to begin in February 2004.    In that same spirit, Switzerland 
was also willing to discuss issues of specific concern to its partners. 
9. The representative of Chile
 said that in the process of intensive consultations following 
Cancún, Members had gained in transparency – as he believed that the Chairman had spoken to 
virtually all delegations – and in accountability.  These elements were important to preserve and to 
underline, and provided a good basis on which to con tinue work.  It might be disappointing that 
Members had not yet achieved the kind of result th ey had expected.  However, one should not shy 
away from concluding that progress had been made – before, at and since Cancún.  As the Chairman's report indicated, progress had been made since Cancún in terms of greater flexibility, constructiveness 
and engagement by delegations.  He understood from the Chairman's report that Members had 
virtually exhausted the possibilities of further pr ogress in the consultations.  As stated by the 
Chairman, it was time to reactivate the substantive work at the level of the negotiating groups as early 
as possible – February or March 2004 – once the Chairs  of the different groups had been decided, and 
on the basis of all the work done prior to Cancún, with the Derbez text as one element of reference.  
The Chairman's identification of the key issues in the areas on which he had held consultations was 
also very useful.  There was now a basis on which to  proceed with the work.  This basis was open, did 
not prejudge the outcome and would help Members to advance their work. 
10. Chile was among those who had suggested in recen t weeks that the loss of a sense of urgency 
was one of the problems Members faced.  This cont rasted with the meetings of the G-20, as well as 
the meeting of the G-20 with the European Union, during which specific reference had been made to 
concluding the negotiations within the timeframe agr eed in Doha.  This meant that the negotiations 
had a renewed sense of urgency.  He asked if all Members could agree to this sense of urgency and 
proceed with a view to concluding the negotiatio ns within the agreed timeframe.  This was an 
important question.  Once Members defined when they wished to finalize the negotiations, they could determine how to organize their work.  Therefore,  one of the outstanding tasks for the incoming 
Chairman, or perhaps at the level of the TNC, w ould be to engage in a frank and open exchange and 
to come to an understanding about the timefram e within which Members would be operating.  
Members also had to make further progress in de fining what was within and what was outside the 
single undertaking, without which there would not be  a reasonable basis on how to proceed with the 
negotiations. 
11. Some Members had now come to the conc lusion that the Singapore issues should be 
unbundled.  These issues had never been part of a package, and there was no basis on which to 
proceed to launch negotiations, even on one or two of these issues.  Members had to agree on modalities, and Chile believed that the Chairman, with assistance from the Di rector-General and his 
deputies, should conduct consultations with a view  to identifying whether or not there was agreement 
on modalities on trade facilitation and po ssibly government procurement.  This should be done with a 
view to launching this process along with the reactiv ation of the negotiating groups in early 2004.  
This was an important element that Members had to work on in order to give a final shape to what 
was the single undertaking, and therefore to determ ine where the balance of interests lay in the 
negotiations.  As for competition policy and investme nt, it was clear for his delegation that Members 
were very far from a consensus to start negotiations  in these areas, and consequently that these issues 
were not within the single undertaking.  Members therefore had ample time to discuss how to deal 
with these two issues.  While there were many possi bilities, care should be taken in approaching these 
issues.  Chile agreed with the Chairman's conc lusion that Members should discuss these issues at a  WT/GC/M/84 
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 later stage, after the negotiations had been reactiv ated and the parameters of the single undertaking 
defined.   
12. The TNC should have an enhanced role.  Memb ers had to increase the overall oversight of the 
negotiations, and perhaps at the level of the TNC it would be appropriate to start thinking about the 
timing for implementation of the results of the ne gotiations.  The longer the timeframe to implement 
results, the easier the adjustment.  Members should perhaps be thinking about this overall for all the 
issues in the negotiations, and not only for agricu lture, for NAMA, or for other issues, and should 
have one timeframe for implementing all results.  Chile wished to stress once again the importance of this issue, because the easier the adjustment, the greater the ambitions  reflected in the results would 
be.  Chile hoped that the present meeting would be able to send a positive message to the rest of the 
world that negotiations would resume in early 2004.   
13. The representative of Brazil
, reporting on a meeting of the G-20 Ministers in Brasilia on 
11 and 12 December, said that the Group had met wi th the Director-General and with the European 
Union Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, as special guests.  The G-20 Ministers had discussed with 
the Director-General how to move the negotiations  forward, and had had a positive and open dialogue 
with Commissioner Lamy, with a view to considering possible new approaches to making progress in 
the negotiations.  The G-20 Ministers and Commis sioner Lamy had issued a joint press communiqué 
in which both sides had expressed their willingness to continue exchanging views through their 
delegations in Geneva and at Ministerial level in order to contribute, together with other trading 
partners, to a successful and timely completion of the Doha Round.  The G-20 Ministers had also issued a detailed communiqué on their deliberations.
3  However, given the relevance of the views 
expressed by the G-20 Ministers to the current discu ssion, he wished to summarize, on behalf of the 
G-20 Members, the main conc lusions reached in Brasilia. 
14. The Ministers had reiterated the importance they  attached to the WTO and to the multilateral 
rules-based trading system.  They had highlighted that by bringing together developing countries from 
Africa, the Americas and Asia with different agricu ltural structures and orientations within a common 
negotiating platform, the G-20 had substantially contributed to making the WTO process more 
inclusive.  They had stressed that the G-20 was prepar ed to continue to play an important role in that 
respect and to extend its cooperation with other gr oups.  They had specifically mentioned in that 
regard the African countries, th e Caribbean, the LDCs and the countries that were dependent on 
preferences.  Ministers had underlined the importance of cotton for a large number of African countries and had called on WTO Members to think in  innovative ways to address this problem within 
the Doha mandate.  Note had been taken of the Gene ral Council Chairman's consultations in line with 
the Ministerial Conference's instructions, and Mi nisters had stressed that the only way to reach a 
successful outcome in the discussions on agriculture was to achieve a fair basis for the negotiations 
which neither predetermined their outcome nor imp lied a reduction in the level of ambition of the 
Doha mandate.  The G-20 had take n note that the text in documen t JOB(03)/150/Rev.2 had been the 
subject of extensive consultations and concer ns expressed by many delegations.  The G-20 had 
insisted that in the process of reaching agreement on a final set of modalities, the level of ambition of 
the Doha mandate remained the guiding principle of  the negotiations, and that in such a process any 
framework, in order to be viable, should be cons istent with the Doha mandate and lead to the 
establishment of modalities capable of ensuring that  negotiations in agriculture would result in 
substantial reductions in domestic  support, substantial increase in market access, phasing out of all 
forms of export subsidies and ope rational and effective S&D treatm ent that took into account rural 
development and food security con cerns of developing countries. 
15. Moreover, the particular concerns of recently  acceded Members should also be effectively 
addressed in that context.  The G-20 had expressed its readiness to contribute to the success of the 
                                                     
 
3 Circulated as document WT/L/559. WT/GC/M/84 
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 Doha Round in general and in agriculture in particul ar.  Ministers had remarked in that context that 
the biggest trading countries, which were responsible  for the main distortions in agricultural trade, 
should set the example so as to permit further strid es in the attainment of the long-term objective of a 
fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system.  While pledging their support for the efforts undertaken by the General Council Chairman and the Director-General, Ministers had emphasized 
their willingness to contribute to the prompt resump tion of the work in the negotiating bodies so as to 
permit progress to be achieved during 2004, with a vi ew to completing the Round within its original 
time-frame, because any delay would be to the detr iment of developing countries, LDCs and all 
Members.  This would require intensification of the negotiations as of early 2004.  Ministers in 
Brasilia had instructed their repr esentatives in Geneva to devel op a work programme for the G-20 
Group based on the discussions held in Brasilia and on their communiqué.  They had agreed to meet 
again whenever necessary to consider progress in the agriculture negotiations a nd to coordinate their 
positions.  The G-20 Ministers hoped that all Memb ers would approach the upcoming negotiations 
with an open spirit and readiness to reach consen sus that would pave the way for an effective 
liberalization of agricultural trade, capable of reflecting the needs and sensitivities of developing 
countries and the interests of the international co mmunity as a whole.  The G-20 Ministers had met 
with President Lula of Brazil who, in his address to the group, had stressed that its strength resided 
with its commitment to the Doha mandate, its cons tructive proposals and its political legitimacy.  It 
had thus been a very timely and fruitful meeting,  and the G-20 had come out of this meeting 
reinforced in its disposition to pursue an active negotiating stance capable of facilitating the necessary 
consensus for the successful and faithful implementation of the Doha mandate. 
16. Reverting to the item under consideration, he joined those who had paid tribute to the 
Chairman's unflagging efforts throughout 2003 and, in particular, in the months following Cancún.  
The Chairman's report to the present meeting would be extremely useful for the remainder of the 
Doha process.  Members were now entering another crucial stage in the negotiations.  No one had 
expected these negotiations to be easy.  Members had set themselves a daunting task and they were 
pursuing it.  This process had had its  ups and downs, but all were equa lly engaged.  It was important 
to keep in mind that this Round belonged to all Memb ers, and they should all persevere.  If it was true 
that little headway had been made in 2003, it was al so true that Members' determination to succeed 
remained as strong as ever.  The difficulties faced were more than offset by the importance of 
measuring up to the Doha mandate. 
17. Members were not here to look back at the past and try to reinvent the negotiations, but to 
look ahead and move forward.  There was much to be gained by developed and developing countries 
alike from the successful conclusion of the Round.  The wisdom of the Doha mandate lay precisely in 
its balance, in its careful blend of goals and prescr iptions aiming at bringing pr oportionate benefits to 
developing and developed countries al ike.  Developing countries had much at stake and they had to 
try harder, for the simple reason that the multilateral trading system was not altogether structured in 
their favour.  The Doha mandate had been meant to change that by bringing to an end the export 
subsidies that compromised livelihoods in devel oping countries, by agreeing on substantial reductions 
in the domestic subsidies that depressed prices and distorted trade, by increasing market opportunities for agricultural and industrial products from devel oping countries, and by addressing inequalities in 
WTO rules through targeted flexibilities as we ll as strengthened and more operational S&D 
provisions.  These were not empty slogans or mere rhetorical expressions, but goals in which Brazil 
believed.  Brazil had signed onto the Doha mandate  because these goals had been there, and that 
indeed had nourished Brazil's hope that the time ha d finally come to effectively incorporate the 
development dimension in trade negotiations.  This could not be achieved without a strong 
commitment to change and reform in agriculture , which for Brazil remained  the main development-
oriented component of this Round.  One could not  reap the benefits of a development Round while 
only paying lip service to development conditions and needs.  Developing countries needed the Round 
to succeed.  Brazil was fully prepared to play its part, as it had always been.  It believed in the 
multilateral trading system and in a strong WTO, and was conscious that both the future of the  WT/GC/M/84 
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 multilateral trading system and of the WTO were linked to the successful outcome of this Round.  In 
order to realize its promises, the Doha mandate should be faithfully respected.  The sooner these 
negotiations could be concluded, the better – for developing as well as developed countries.  Any 
delay would be regrettable, and any attemp t to dilute the mandate unacceptable.   
18. At their meeting in Brasilia the past week, G- 20 Ministers had reiterated the importance they 
attached to the WTO and to the multilateral rules- based trading system.  In particular, they had 
reaffirmed their commitment to the successful comp letion of the DDA based on the fulfilment of the 
mandate agreed in Doha.  It was now time to look to  the future.  The Chairman in his statement had 
proposed a way forward.  Brazil believed that the Chairman's proposal provided a sensible and 
realistic first step towards regaining momentum in these negotiations.  Members should reactivate the 
TNC and the negotiating bodies and start working as soon as possible.  The Chairman's consultations 
would certainly help in a meaningful way in the next stages of the negotiations.  The Chairman had 
covered the field and had identified major areas of convergence and divergence.  Members should 
build thereon and see how they could create moment um and gradually generate consensus, while 
remaining faithful to the mandate and incorporatin g every Member's main legitimate concerns.  The 
artistry of any consensus-driven negotiation lay not necessarily in making everyone equally unhappy, 
as was sometimes argued, but in keeping everyone  committed.  For that to happen one needed 
adherence to the mandate and trust in the fairn ess of the process, as well as strong and continued 
leadership.  Members should work as well. 
19. With respect to the task to be assigned to the negotiating groups, he wished to make two brief 
points.  First, it was essential to promote contact.  By that he meant face-to-face negotiations among 
different countries and different groups.  Considerat ion should be given to ways to move beyond the 
traditional way of doing business in the WTO based  on cycles of assorted consultations followed by 
subsequent attempts at producing Chairman's texts.  He believed all would benefit at this point from a 
more interactive delegation-to-delegation negotiatin g process.  Second, his delegation was not fully 
convinced of the usefulness of spending a lot of  time and energy on the "framework vs. modalities" 
discussion.  What really mattered was that the fina l result should be in line with the Doha mandate.  
Procedure, as well as technical work, could not substitute for the political will required to fulfil the 
development promises of this Round.  As the G-20 Mi nisters had stressed in Brasilia, in the process of 
reaching agreement on a final set of modalities, the level of ambition of the Doha mandate remained the guiding principle of the negotiations.  In such  a process, any framework, in order to be viable, 
should be consistent with the Doha mandate, and should lead to  the establishment of modalities 
capable of ensuring that negotiations in agriculture  would result in substan tial reductions in domestic 
support, substantial increase in market access, phasing-out of all forms of export subsidies and 
operational and effective S&D treatment that took into account rural development and food security 
concerns of developing countries, as mentioned in th e Chairman's report.  He would not go into the 
details of the other main issues of the Doha ma ndate, as Brazil's positions were well known.  Brazil 
had consistently argued that the "raison d'être" of th is Round was to fully incorporate agriculture – the 
main unfinished business of the Uruguay Round – in to the multilateral trading system.  Brazil was 
prepared to move and to deal in any segment of the mandate, on the understanding that significant 
progress in agriculture could be made.  As his dele gation had often said, for Brazil everything in this 
Round was linked to everything, and the centre of everything was agriculture.  As 2004 approached, 
Brazil would continue to engage on that basis. 
20. With respect to the Singapore issues, the decision to unbundle the four issues had been wise, 
if somewhat belated.  Members might have found th emselves in an altogether different situation at 
present if that simple, sensible step had been taken in due time, and if Members had discussed 
substantive modalities for possible nego tiations in due time.  Brazil was prepared to work with a view 
to the preparation of draft modalities for trad e facilitation and transparency in government 
procurement.  He reiterated, however, that Brazil did not consider the corresponding Annexes in the 
Derbez text as draft modalities.  These Annexes actually amounted to not much more than negotiating WT/GC/M/84 
Page 8  
 
 mandates.  Clearly, drafting these modalities would, to  some extent, prejudge the final outcome in 
these areas, but modalities in NAMA and agriculture would also prejudge, to some extent, the final outcome of the negotiations in those areas.  This  should serve as no excuse for brushing aside the 
precondition – established by Ministers in Doha – of explicit consensus on modalities for the formal 
launching of negotiations on any of the Singapore issues. 
21. The representative of the United States
 said that the Chairman's report provided a 
comprehensive and balanced picture of the work done since Cancún.  The United States remained 
firmly committed to the successful conclusion of the DDA.  While her delegation had hoped for more 
than the modest progress that had been recorded since September, the United States could see that 
there had been an effort to rebuild trust and confiden ce.  That was an important first step.  It was also 
important that Members had spent this time engaging on substance, even if this had not yet led to the 
convergence all were seeking.  Most importantly, this work had brought Members to a point where 
the membership was ready to renew its efforts to advance the DDA.   Like others who had attended 
the APEC meeting in Thailand in October, and lik e many other delegations in Geneva, the United 
States was prepared to build on the text of 13 Sept ember as a means of moving forward.  Obviously, 
adjustments would necessarily need to be made, but the United States remained of the view that this 
text provided a point of departure for serious discu ssions.  She wished to assure other Members that 
the United States was ready to build on the Canc ún text to advance their common objectives in 
negotiations.  The aim of the United States continue d to be to try to see where further work would 
yield compromises that would ensure an ambiti ous outcome.  The specific questions and issues 
highlighted in the Chairman's statement would be helpful in this effort. 
22. At the 18 November consultations, the Chairm an had reported on progr ess to date and his 
sense of the issues.  In agriculture , he had asked Members to re-establish the links between the three 
pillars and to consider whether the package coul d include greater reductions in domestic support, a 
stronger commitment on elimination of all expor t subsidies, and a renewed sense of common 
commitment on market access.  These were not easy issues, but there did seem to be a willingness to 
look at these questions in order to help shape the way forward.  With the Cancún text as a basis, 
Members had something on which to build.  The Unite d States was ready to continue this work.  
Similarly, on NAMA the United States shared the con cerns of several other delegations that the text 
as it stood did not meet their ambitions or expectations.  The Chairman had rightly flagged the issue of the formula and sectoral approaches as being par ticularly difficult, along with other problems.  The 
United States did not see any of these issues as insu rmountable, provided all Members were interested 
in improving effective market access opportunities fo r one another.  If the answer was yes, then 
Members could build on the text on that issue as we ll.  On the Singapore issues, the United States had 
agreed to follow the Chairman's lead and had focused on the questions of trade facilitation and 
transparency in government procurement.  He r delegation thanked Deputy Director-General 
Mr. Yerxa for having led consultations aimed at cl arifying issues.  Well before Cancún, the United 
States had advocated taking up each of the Singapor e issues on its own merits, and her delegation still 
believed that this made good sense. 
23. On cotton, the United States agreed that ther e were two substantive issues that needed 
attention – the trade-related aspects, and those de velopment-related issues that were more in the 
purview of technical assistance and capacity buildi ng in the WTO and were the subject of other 
programs under the Integrated Framework.  Cotton ha d not been singled out as an issue in the DDA 
mandate any more than horticultu ral products.  The United States stood ready to see how best to move 
these interests forward, recognizing that for some of its partners, this was “the” issue in the 
negotiations.  The United States believed that the best  way to deal with the trade-related aspects of 
this issue was as an integral part  of the agriculture negotiations. 
24. On process, overall it was clear that one was looking  to start afresh in the new year.  A plan 
should be put in place by the time of the February  General Council or soon thereafter that allowed the  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 9 
 
 
 work to begin again.  How detailed this plan woul d be was yet to be determined.  The United States 
knew that the Chairman would be consulting on Ch airmanships in the coming days, which obviously 
would be an important part of the continuing process.   In the informal consultations, some had argued 
that the issues under consideration there needed to remain in the HODs proces s.  Others wanted to 
reactivate the TNC and its negotiating groups.  The Unite d States' sense was that some type of hybrid 
approach was likely to be necessary.  At a certain po int, in order to move forward one would need to 
engage on the broad agenda in the DDA, and not just  the four issues identified thus far.  To be 
credible, a work plan needed to ensure that all the negotiating and issue areas on the agenda had a 
good basis on which to resume.  Whether some or a ll of this preparatory work should go on in the 
HODs process was a subject her delegation wished to explore further.  No matter what was decided 
by Members on the way to structure the work, th ere was no substitute for substantive engagement 
among delegations.  Delegati ons had to get out of the habit of tr ying to negotiate with Chairmen and 
should instead negotiate with one another.  The Unite d States stood ready to work with other partners 
to move the DDA negotiations forward in a positive di rection.  In closing, she wished to express 
gratitude and admiration to the Chairman for his le adership and untiring efforts before, at and after 
Cancún to move the negotiations forward. 
25. The representative of Hong Kong, China  said that under the Chairm an's leadership, Members 
had come a long way since Cancún.  Although his de legation was disappointed that delegations in 
Geneva had been unable to accomplish what Minister s had failed to achieve in Cancún, one should 
not over-dramatize this as yet another failure.  Ind eed, one should not take for granted the fact that 
considerable progress had been made over the two years since the launching of the Round in Doha.  
As the Chairman had said, the key issues were much clearer and the possible solutions more apparent.  
Members should not give up because they had run in to difficulties or setbacks.  Instead, they should 
redouble their efforts collectively to realize thei r common goal of getting the Doha Round back on 
track as soon as possible.  Members had to maintain  the momentum of the negotiations and further 
strengthen their political resolve to brid ge differences and seek compromises. 
26. He thanked Brazil for its report on the recent  G-20 meeting, and welcomed the renewed 
commitment of G-20 members for a successful and timely conclusion of the Doha Round.  He also welcomed similar statements from other delegations for a successful conclusion of the Round.  On the 
way forward, his delegation supported the Chairm an's suggestion to reactivate all the DDA bodies, 
including the negotiating groups and the TNC, once the Chairmanship issue was settled, and agreed 
that the Chairman and the Director-General should c ontinue to maintain oversight of other aspects of 
the DDA falling outside the TNC's mandate.  The reactivation of the negotiating groups and TNC 
process should be seen as a reaffirmation of Member s' commitment to the DDA.  However, for the 
negotiating groups to function meaningfully, Members needed to provide them with some guidelines 
or benchmarks.  His delegation supported the Chairm an's statement that the TNC and General Council 
would have to give further consideration to objec tives and benchmarks for the work in 2004.  His 
delegation was aware of concerns th at benchmarks were of little practi cal use in this organization, as 
Members had so far missed most, if not all, benchm arks in the Doha Declaration.  However, without 
some benchmarks or common targets for some of th e negotiating subjects that were closely related in 
the eyes of many, his delegation feared there would be a greater tendency for procrastination.  Thus, 
on balance his delegation believed that setting some guidelines or benchmarks would still be 
beneficial to the process and would increase the chance of making progress.  This should be a prime 
task of the TNC after its reactivation early in 2004. 
27. On substance, his delegation wished to make some brief comments on the four subjects.  On 
agriculture and NAMA, Hong Kong, China supported the individual negotiating groups continuing to 
work on the frameworks, building on the Derbez text.  Nevertheless, these groups should also work on 
individual elements of the modalities in parallel, pa rticularly on technical issues that could benefit 
from the participation of experts.  On NAMA, for instance, the negotiating group should start further 
examination on how to proceed with tackling non-tari ff barriers on the basis of Members' notifications WT/GC/M/84 
Page 10  
 
 so far.  The Secretariat could also be tasked to  assess the implications of different formulae proposals 
on Members' applied tariffs, while keeping the bound ra tes as the basis of formula reductions.  On the 
Singapore issues, his delegation supported the Chairm an's view that Members should continue work 
to explore possible modalities for two of the four is sues.  As his delegation saw it, the gaps on trade 
facilitation were fairly narrow.  Members should redouble their efforts to build consensus for 
launching negotiations on this, a s ubject that would benefit all.  On transparency in government 
procurement, Members had been working on this subj ect for a number of years.  There seemed to be 
no dispute that policies and procedures on transparency in government procurement would help create an open and predictable trading e nvironment and would foster effec tive competition.  His delegation 
considered that more flexibility could be built into  the modalities to address the concerns of some 
developing-country Members. 
28. Regarding investment and competition po licy, Hong Kong, China had no difficulty 
continuing to explore these issues in working groups.  Nevertheless, a better prospect would be to 
make progress on trade facilitation and possibly on tr ansparency in government procurement, if the 
proponents of the investment and competition policy issues could give a clear indication regarding the 
option of taking the latter two issues off the table.  On cotton, his delegation recognized its importance 
for the development and livelihood of people in a number of developing countries, and appreciated 
the need for urgent action to address the trade i ssues.  Hong Kong, China hoped Members could show 
greater flexibility and avoid getting bogged down on procedure, and could m ove quickly to address 
this issue in a practical and creative manner. 
29. In mapping out the way forward in the coming year, Members should not lose sight of certain 
procedural and organizational issues, including when they could realistically conclude the Round.  At 
some point, Members would also need to consider the timing of the next Ministerial Conference, once they had a clearer picture of the future direction of the negotiations, and bearing in mind the lead time 
required for the organizational work.  Any dive rgences among Members on individual subjects should 
not divert them from the collective responsibility to get a positive and unwavering message to the 
outside world that they remained fully committed to the DDA negotiations and were determined to 
make concrete progress in 2004.  Hi s delegation hoped that others w ould join in to get this message 
across to their constituencies. 
30. The representative of Argentina
 said his delegation had listened with great attention to the 
Chairman's statement.  Worthy of particular me ntion was the frankness with which the Chairman had 
presented a realistic diagnosis of the situation.  Wh at that assessment reflected could in no way be 
deemed a failure.  On the contrary, it could provi de an even more solid basis for continuing the 
process.  Like other Members, Argentina would have  preferred to have been in a position at the 
present meeting to adopt a structure on the basis of  understandings, such as those which Members had 
hoped to achieve in Cancún.  Nevertheless, th e Doha work programme was clearly a complex 
undertaking.  If its objectives were to be achieved, all Members would be required to translate their 
public expressions of political will and flexibility into  concrete facts.  The work in the run-up to 
Cancún and in the process launche d subsequent to Cancún was characterised by a sense of its 
exceptional nature.  The imminence of the Fifth Ministerial Conferen ce, coupled with evidence that 
Members would not be able to fulfil the objectives set out in the Doha Declaration, had compelled 
Members to focus on developing framework agreem ents as a "short cut" to achieving minimal 
agreements in a short space of time. 
31. Likewise, in the wake of the Cancún Confer ence and in accordance w ith instructions from 
Ministers to continue working with a view to the present meeting, Members had embarked on a process tackling only four issues – issues consider ed key to unblocking the stalemate and making 
headway in the negotiations.  From the terms of th e Chairman's statement, Argentina inferred that it 
was acknowledged that with both the Fifth Minist erial Conference and the present General Council 
meeting behind them, Members once again had to ta ke up the Doha work programme in its entirety  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 11 
 
 
 and comply with the mechanisms established th erein.  Argentina agreed both with this 
acknowledgement and with the fact that Members on ce again had to bring development-related issues 
– the horizontal nature of which meant that they touched upon all sectors of the agenda – to the 
forefront of the negotiations. 
32. As regards agriculture, Members had to recogni ze once and for all that this was the most 
important issue on the DDA and the one that would determine possible progress in all other 
negotiating areas.  In this context, it was essential that  it be addressed as a priority and with the utmost 
urgency.  Only the effective liberalization of agri cultural trade, involving a removal of barriers and 
distortions, would enable Members to move this co mplex negotiating process forward.  With regard to 
cotton, Argentina agreed that substantive treatment of this issue was more important than procedural 
aspects.  Although Members were well aware of the significance of cotton production and trade to a 
considerable number of African countries, it should be  recognized that addressing this issue would, to 
some extent, require specific instruments and possibly also specific timeframes.  On NAMA, a 
number of issues remained to be resolved.  Although no guarantee of success, if tangible progress on agriculture was perceived, it would undoubtedly be easier to make progress on NAMA. 
33. On the Singapore issues, Argentina believed it woul d be a step in the right direction to accept 
that these issues should be dealt with individually on their own merits.  Despite the fact that the roots 
of this dissociation lay clearly in the Doha Declara tion, considerable effort was required to reach such 
a conclusion.  Recent consultations on trade fac ilitation and transparency in government procurement 
seemed to indicate the inadequacy of the existing texts to allow for the adoption of decisions by 
"explicit consensus" in order to la unch negotiations.  A greater degree of specificity in defining core 
elements was required in order to reflect clearly th e level of ambition sought, without having to start a 
fresh debate on the definition of the term "modalit ies".  Argentina urged Members to respect the 
chronological order and balance of the Doha Declara tion, given that agreements had to be reached in 
the established order.  All of this would help a gr eat many Members to adopt positions on these issues 
that would lead to the endorsement of consensus fo rmulae which, in turn, would enable progress to be 
made across the entire negotiating spectrum. 
34. With regard to future work and, to a great  extent, in order to address the demands for 
inclusiveness and transparency, Argentina was in favour of the negotiating bodies resuming their 
work at the beginning of 2004 and of the TNC once again overseeing the negotiations.  The basis for this work had to be the Doha Declaration, in c onjunction with the elements which had emerged either 
in Cancún or during the post-Cancún consultation pr ocess and which were consistent with the Doha 
Declaration.  In this respect, and as proof of its fl exibility, his delegation would be prepared to work, 
in some areas, on the basis of the objective of achieving a framework agreement, provided the following:  (a) that the text did not predetermine the outcome of the Round;  (b) that the text did not erode the Doha mandate;  and (c) that the text ser ved to expedite and fac ilitate the establishment of 
modalities and thereby ensure that negotiations were  completed by the 1 January 2005 deadline.  The 
present time was an extremely sensitive period, and one which should motivate Members to make 
major efforts for convergence.  Such efforts needed  to come from all sides, although the greatest 
efforts were required from those Members responsible for the greatest trade distortions. 
35. In Argentina's capacity as a member of the G-20,  and pursuant to the decisions taken by the 
G-20 Ministers in Brasilia, Argentina reaffirmed its commitment and willingness to contribute to the 
urgent resumption of the negotiating process with a view to concluding the Round by the mandated 
date.  In this spirit, his delegation was prepared to  provide proof of its real negotiating will, in the 
context of a constructive and equitable process a nd during actual negotiating sessions.  The success of 
the negotiations would hinge on an ambitious outcome  compatible with the explicit balance in the 
Doha Declaration with regard to the predominance of  the development dimension.  The next stage of 
work had to be undertaken with the urgency needed  to resolve the structural problems that were WT/GC/M/84 
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 affecting international trading rules, and thereby to strengthen both this institution and multilateralism 
itself. 
36. The representative of Colombia
 commended the Chairman's efforts to put Members back on 
track after the Cancún Ministerial Conference, wh ich had allowed for the participation of all 
delegations.  His delegation also supported the Chairm an's suggested approach for future work based 
on reactivating the work of the negotiating groups and the TNC.  Colombia believed that on most 
issues, the Derbez text continued to serve as a goo d basis for continuing the negotiations, while of 
course using as the main source of inspiration the mandate from Ministers in Doha.  The task had by 
no means been easy.  Quite clearly, over the past years the pendulum of public opinion had swung against globalization.  This had had a negative im pact on the overall atmosphere in which Members 
conducted their negotiations.  Howe ver, there were two reasons wh y these negotiations continued to 
be of the highest importance for all Members.  Fi rst, over the past years there had been a clearly 
increasing imbalance between the regional negotiatin g processes and those of a multilateral character.  
This could lead to the creation of trade blocs whic h in future could make it more difficult to achieve 
trade liberalization in the multilateral process.  Seco nd, the critical issues – those that were lagging 
most regarding the liberalization process, such as  agriculture – could only be dealt with in a 
multilateral framework.  The only way to ensure that  in the long run international markets remained 
open and liberalization increased was through mu ltilateral negotiation.  Thus, Members had to 
consider what could be done to ensure that negotia tions got back on track in the immediate future. 
37. The definition of the scope and coverage of the negotiations was essential, so that Members 
could organize their work in a productive manner for the future.  The fact that Members had not had 
such a definition was what had made the atmosphere very difficult and could al so lead to surprises in 
the future.  Colombia therefore believed it was ess ential that Members were very clear about what 
remained within the purview of the negotiations and what remained outside.  Regarding the latter, his 
delegation had in mind the Singapore issues and th e extension of geographical indications.  The 
essential point for Colombia was to know whether or  not the latter issues were included in the 
negotiations, and whether or not those issues which remained outside the purview of the negotiations 
would be part of the single undertaking in the wo rk programme from Doha.  One could imagine all 
sorts of different scenarios and possible results and interlinkages.  However, once Members had 
determined and defined the scope and coverage of the negotiations, it would then be much easier to 
determine what Members did with those issues whic h remained outside the framework – whether they 
continued to deal with them within the WTO or rem oved them from their agenda of work altogether.  
However, trying to decide now what issues should be in or out made the discussions much more 
difficult.  His delegation was ready to negotiate on modalities for trade facilitation and transparency in 
government procurement.  Colombia had always ma de it absolutely clear that it was a proponent of 
trade facilitation, and his delegation was ready to work on the issue of government procurement as 
well, where it felt there was still some possibility in the negotiations.   
38. Once the scope and coverage of the negotiations were defined, Members had to consider the 
results they hoped to achieve.  Quite clearly, unl ess Members had an ambitious result in agriculture, 
many delegations – particularly th e developing countries, including Colombia – would find it difficult 
to demonstrate an ambitious approach in other ar eas, such as industrial goods or services.  This was 
why the balance Members had to strike between the different issues on market access would ultimately determine how ambitious they could be, ge nerally speaking, regarding the overall results of 
the Round.  Thus, it would be important to draw up  an ambitious package including all the crucial 
issues of these negotiations.  For well-known reasons , 2004 would not be an easy year in which to 
push forward these negotiations.  However, Colombia felt that Members should not rush to meet the 
initial deadline for the completion of the negotiations . Rather, the work in 2004 should serve to help 
Members advance the negotiations.  The initial deadline  of 1 January 2005 should in no way become 
a strait jacket that would result in a less ambitious  outcome than Members would have been able to 
obtain had they spent the time necessary to create conditions conducive to a more ambitious package.  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 13 
 
 
 39. Regarding S&D treatment and whether or not this organization could consider new 
plurilateral agreements, on the one hand the develo ping countries – in particular the poorer ones – had 
made it quite clear that they needed tangible resu lts from the multilateral trading system, and for this 
reason they had raised certain specific issues like cotton.  An organization with increasingly complex 
and numerous agreements needed to take into accoun t the differences in the level of development of 
its Members – some might have a US$200 per capita  income and others US$37,000.  Thus, Members 
unquestionably had to be constantly rethinking the whole issue of S&D treatment in order to see how 
certain agreements could perhap s be improved upon, with a view to helping Members implement 
them, since some could do this easily while othe rs lacked the minimum level of development 
necessary to assume certain obligations.  This issue would inevitably require a lot of discussion in the 
context of the future of this organization. 
40. However, it was clear that for developing count ries to take the extreme position that any 
potential obligation they could not assume could not be discussed in the WTO would not be beneficial to anyone, because it meant that th ese discussions would be pushed over to other fora outside the 
WTO.  This would be the worst possible situation that could arise for the developing countries.  If 
Members wanted to make progress in these negotiati ons, 2004 could onl y be successful if they had a 
pragmatic approach.  His delegation therefore joined its voice to those who had said Members should not discuss at great length whether they would achie ve a framework or modalities or not.  This was 
terminology that tended to confuse Members.  All Members had to do was forge ahead step by step 
with the requisite political will.  It was only in this way that with such a complicated political 
environment in 2004, Members could maintain a ce rtain vitality and dynamism in these negotiations.  
The Chairman's approach was fully acceptable to hi s delegation, who again thanked the Chairman for 
his considerable efforts and the results achieved. 
41. The representative of Canada
 said that while the consultations had not led to the kind of 
convergence Members would have hoped for, Canada sh ared the views of others that this process had 
been useful, as the Chairman had said.  This had required a lot of time and care from both the 
Chairman and the Director-General.  In addition, the consultations had served to reconfirm Members' 
collective support for the negotiations launched in Doha two years earlier, as well as their collective 
interest in obtaining the benefits these negotiati ons could bring to all.  Furthermore, these 
consultations had also clarified where there were similar views and where there were divergent views 
and differences, as well as some options for closing some of the gaps that had arisen.  While delegations in Geneva had not ach ieved by 15 December all that Ministers had failed to achieve in 
Cancún, this should not be totally surprising, a nd Members were saying at the present meeting that 
they had re-engaged.  This was im portant to reconfirm not only to themselves but also to the outside 
community.  Cancún had not been an easy meeting, and as most had said, had been very disappointing.  Cancún had been the source of many different divides.  It was not easy to pick up the pieces after Ministers had come together and failed,  and yet there had been no recriminations or 
vindictiveness.  Thus, Members should not sell themsel ves too short.  The reality was that Cancún had 
failed and Members were trying to pick up the pieces, and the message that Members were indeed back in business and re-engaged constructively would hopefully be received by the outside 
community.  There was need for a positive reaffirmati on of belief in the Doha agenda, but not to re-
launch negotiations, as one could only launch negotiations once.  Chile had made an appropriate point 
in suggesting that Members had lost a sense of urge ncy.  Members needed to recapture that sense of 
urgency and re-establish the momentum lost in Cancún. 
42. All knew that over the past 50 years and eight rounds of negotiations, Members had had some 
very good and some very bad meetings.  Those de legations were right who had said that Members 
needed to find the urgency and momentum that would bring them closer to the completion of the DDA.  As the Chairman had said, the challenge was threefold.  First, to build on the progress made 
before and at Cancún and on the pr ogress made during the past sever al months of consultations.  
Leadership had to come from the rank and file.  Some Members had said that the biggest delegations WT/GC/M/84 
Page 14  
 
 had to move the most, and while there was validity in  that, it did not mean all others could sit back 
and watch.  Movement had to come from both bi g and small delegations – from both developed and 
developing countries – and this wo uld not happen if Members took an "over to you" attitude.  The 
latter would not comprise the give and take of a justifiable negotiation.  As Australia had noted, a 
number of countries had been suggesting in the past  few months that Members should get on with the 
task, but doing so meant getting on to the details , and that was clearly where the devil resided. 
43. On agriculture, which was the first among equals of issues, there was an expectation that the 
two big delegations – while they should be, and had been, commended for their joint paper and for 
that first important step without which Memb ers would not have had any semblance of any 
negotiations anywhere – would have  to go beyond that first paper and to try to converge their 
respective positions with the rest of the membership, if progress were to be made.  He said that it had 
not been until these two delegations had put their pa per on the table that Members had really seen the 
cut and thrust of anything that could be called negotiations, which was why Canada and many other 
countries had commended both the United States and th e Community for their paper.  At the same 
time, these two delegations would need to see so me movement from other countries and groups of 
countries.  From what Brazil had said, the G-20 had had a fairly successful meeting in Brasilia, which 
had also involved the Director-General and the Eu ropean Trade Commissioner.  The G-20 had been a 
very successful force for pushing for serious agricultural reform, whic h Canada fully supported.  At 
the same time, there also had to be a healthy gi ve and take shown by the G-20, whether in the 
agricultural domain or outside of it.  At some point, all Members would need to move together.  It was 
not clear when that point would come and how this would be done, but there was a sense that all 
Members needed to move together and perhaps towa rds the centre, not only in agriculture, but in the 
other issues as well.   
44. The second challenge was to develop a process th at would allow Members to address as many 
outstanding questions and issues as possible, and thereby help close gaps and build consensus.  
Colombia had been very candid in saying that 2004 might not be an easy year, and Members needed 
to be realistic about this.  Canada did not agr ee with those who had said it did not matter whether 
there was an election in the United States or historic  European expansion in Europe.  Members needed 
to find a way in which some major delegations coul d deal with their local political circumstances, 
while at the same time trying to maintain a certain  sensitivity to many of their trading partners on 
many sensitive issues in an attempt to try to get th e international politics right.  Thus, 2004 would be 
challenging, but it could also be profitable if Member s defined their goals and work plan in a realistic 
way.  If approached in a pragmatic way, 2004 coul d be a profitable, worthwhile year, notwithstanding 
the fact of certain undeniable realities in a number of constituencies. 
45. The third challenge was to sustain the ambiti on Members had set out in Doha, so that all 
could benefit from the completion of an ambitious DDA.  In this regard he agreed with Brazil's statement that Members should not dilute the agenda or the historic commitments of Doha.  Members 
should try to hold out for the right deal rather th an the proverbial quick deal, and he hoped that 
Members would not give in to the temptation – for the sake of the clock or for any other reason – to forsake the historic commitments of Ministers in Doha.  In view of these three challenges, Canada 
very much supported the agenda set out by the Chairman, and encouraged other delegations to 
embrace that approach at the present meeting.  Regarding the selection of the 2004 Chairs, Canada 
felt that this too should be approached with pragma tism, and that a change s hould not be made merely 
for the sake of change.  Where Chairs were doing a good job and wished to pursue that responsibility, 
Members should not seek to replace them.  Regardi ng the resumption of the work of the negotiating 
bodies early in 2004, Canada supported an early re sumption, even though it might not be easy to 
establish on what immediate grounds the work of e ach negotiating group would resume and what the 
2004 work plan would be.  At some point in 2004, Me mbers – as well as Ministers – would have to 
give some attention to the overall agenda, but until further notice, the January 2005 deadline would 
remain valid.  However, candidly he did not think Members would be hard pressed to meet that date,  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 15 
 
 
 and he had heard similar views e xpressed.  This did not mean that Members could allow themselves 
to be oblivious to that date.  However, at some point Members would have to deal with it again in a 
pragmatic way, if not for any other reason, to main tain the credibility not only of the DDA but of the 
organization.  Members had also agreed that wo rk plans should include focussing on the issues and 
differences identified through the work  done to date, including the con cepts and elements contained in 
the Derbez text and the work on the two frameworks.   He encouraged all Members to look to the 
possibilities of the future, rather th an the shortcomings of the past. 
46. The representative of Bolivia  recalled that at the Cancún Ministerial Conference, Ministers 
had instructed the Chairman and the Director-Gen eral to coordinate the coming work, which had 
consisted of an intensive process of  consultation.  The Chairman's ha rd work had provided Members, 
through the identification of key issues, with a clearer picture of the differences between and 
sensitivities of the various Members.  Part of the Chairman's report referred to the headway made in 
the various consultations.  Her de legation would above all stress th e willingness expressed by many 
Members to carry out a more in-depth analysis of issues of interest to developing and least-developed 
countries – an aspect which Bolivia welcomed and w ould take into consideration when negotiations 
resumed.  Bolivia also appreciated that two rounds of consultations had been held within a short 
period of time, which was proof of delegations' constructive spir it – a spirit which her delegation 
hoped would prevail in 2004.  Furthermore, Bolivia  considered that all of the Doha Ministerial 
mandates, none of which should be subject to reinte rpretation, constituted the basis for future work 
and, in this respect, Members would ensure the balanced progress of all issues making up the "single undertaking" of the negotiations. 
47. Bolivia had maintained its faith in multilatera l trade liberalization and had fully implemented 
the commitments it had undertaken.  In its capacity  as a developing country, Bolivia believed it had 
the right to request that this "Development Round"  attend to the needs and address the sensitivities of 
economies such as its own.  In this context, Bolivia believed that the only way to strengthen multilateralism was through evolution in a framework of  healthy competition, with the elimination of 
trade barriers and distortions.  The process of trade liberalization and, in particular, negotiations, 
should therefore start with fair treatment in term s of agriculture – an issue on which proposals had 
been tabled by various groups of countries, su ch as the G-20, and on which discussions should be 
pursued in a spirit of cooperation and flexibility.  Her delegation endorsed the Chairman's procedural 
proposal for the immediate future and expressed its  willingness to establish the formal resumption of 
negotiations. 
48. The representative of China
 said that although the basic goal in the consultations held by the 
Chairman had not been achieved and the negotiations were yet to be brought back on track – due to 
divergent positions among Members – the Chairman's  report and the enormous amount of time and 
energy he had spent were highly appreciated.  His de legation shared the Chairman's assessment of the 
state of play of the work and fully agreed to  his proposal that starting from 2004, Members should 
reactivate the negotiating bodies for the sake of more  transparency and inclusiveness as well as the 
involvement of capital-based officials.  Doing this, however, did not mean that the negotiations would 
be brought back on the right track.  To resume the momentum for the negotiations, Members had to make some progress on the substance of important issues such as agriculture, NAMA, services and 
development issues.  The Chairman had identified in his report the key issues that had emerged in the 
consultations and that would need to be addressed on the way forward.  He wished to touch briefly on 
some of the issues of great concern to China. 
49. Regarding the starting point for further work, his delegation was prepared to continue 
building on the Derbez text.  At the same time, Members should maintain sufficient flexibility and 
keep their minds open to proposals.  In this c onnection, Members should resume their work from 
where they had left off at Cancún, taking into accoun t the consultations held since then and bearing in 
mind the level of ambition set out in the Doha De claration.  Regarding agriculture, China fully WT/GC/M/84 
Page 16  
 
 supported the statement by Brazil on behalf of the G-20 countries.  China welcomed the dial ogue 
between Commissioner Lamy and the G-20 Ministers.  This was a very positive signal to restart the 
negotiations in the agriculture area.  As expr essed on many occasions by his delegation and many 
others, agriculture was a key issue of great concer n to them.  Putting an end to the existing serious 
trade distortion and its sources – including producti on distortion – in agriculture remained at the 
center of this Round.  Therefore, a specific date s hould be negotiated for the elimination of all export 
subsidies, and for substantial reduction in the am ber box and blue box.  On market access, Members 
had devoted great effort since before Cancún to developing a framework approach.  However, no 
substantive progress had been made, and none was se en in the foreseeable future.  The lack of 
transparency due to this situation had given Me mbers a sense of uncertainty.  China supported the 
proposal that Members should include some specifi c figures or shift their work on the framework 
directly to that on modalities – which Members were  bound to face sooner or later with or without a 
framework.  Moreover, S&D treatment for the developi ng countries and the particular concerns of the 
recently acceded Members had to be effectively addressed. 
50. The issue of cotton should be dealt with with a sense of urgency.  China had a population of 
900 million in the rural areas.  Many poor farmers in the remote areas who were engaged in cotton 
cultivation had been living on less than one dollar a day.  China therefore fully understood and had 
great sympathy for the legitimate concerns of th e African countries on cotton.  The WTO should do 
whatever was possible to address the concerns on th is issue effectively and as a matter of urgency 
within its terms of reference, from both the trad e-related and development- related perspectives.  
Priority should be given to the treatment of th is issue within the frame work of the agriculture 
negotiations.  In China's view, the solution should focus on financial and technical assistance.  In 
addition, S&D treatment should be given to devel oping-country Members in this regard.  On NAMA, 
his delegation wished to highlight the principle of less-than-full-reciprocity for the developing 
countries, which could be realized through different coefficients and longer periods of implementation 
for these Members.  Space should be provided for the implementation of their industrial policies and 
their efforts to make industrial and technological progress.  China also believed that a sectoral trade 
liberalization approach should be adopted on a voluntary basis. 
51. On the Singapore issues, China supported the Chairman's proposal to unbundle the four 
issues.  Since the agenda for the Round was alre ady overloaded and Members were far behind the 
timetable for the negotiations, further work – incl uding the initiation of negotiations on these issues – 
would put the majority of developing-country Members in a more difficult position in terms of their 
participation in WTO activities and their fulfilling new commitments.  China therefore shared the 
position of many other developing-country Member s that three issues among the four should be 
dropped, and that Members should continue their cl arification work on trade facilitation only.  Once 
consensus was reached on modalities, Members could proceed to start negotiations.  On development 
issues, the title "Doha Development Agenda" indicat ed that the current Round of negotiations was a 
development Round.  China supported the initiative to reactivate the relevant negotiations on the 
development issues early in 2004.  This included not  only the development elements involved in each 
and every sectoral negotiation, but also those S&D and implementation issues that had been left over 
both before and at Cancún.  China looked forwar d to a more positive engagement from all Members 
in the negotiating bodies in 2004, with a view to an early a nd successful conclusi on of the Round. 
52. The representative of the European Communities
 said that while the Chairman and the 
Director-General had been working hard since Ca ncún to move matters forward, the Community had 
revisited its own strategy in the light of the brea kdown in Cancún.  He recalled that the Community's 
constituency included 26 WTO Members – the Eur opean Communities and its 25 member States.  
The Community had revisited its strategy in a transparent way, and the EU Council of Ministers had endorsed the Commission's reassessme nt.  All parts of the European Union's "enabling environment" 
– the Council, Parliament, business, civil society, et c. – had reiterated their support for the multilateral 
trading system as the cornerstone of the Europe an Union's trade policy, and specifically for a  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 17 
 
 
 successful outcome of the DDA such as would respo nd effectively to the ge nuine development needs 
of Members.  All this gave the Commission, as the EU's negotiator, a solid basis to play a full and 
constructive role in any revival of the negotiati ons.  The Community had shown flexibility before, 
during and after Cancún, and hoped this could be matched by other Members in the next few months. 
53. His delegation was encouraged by the Director-General's report on his various contacts at 
Ministerial level, which showed a widespread Ministerial commitment to revive the DDA.  The 
Community also shared the Direct or-General's positive assessment of  the recent meeting in Brasilia, 
where both the latter and Commissioner Lamy had b een special guests, and thanked Brazil for its 
detailed report on this meeting.  His delegation hoped Members could build on the Brasilia meeting in 
their work in Geneva.  In Brasilia there had been  genuine engagement and a frank and constructive 
exchange of views.  This same open and construc tive attitude should guide Members' work in the 
coming months.  There was an urgent need to get into substantive negotiations and to put aside the 
usual tactical manoeuvring which had characterized Members' dealings so far.  The Community had 
all along supported the objective of the Chairman's c onsultations, as well as the way the Chairman 
had conducted them.  Like the Chairman, the Community was of the opinion that the primary 
objective for re-launching the negotiations – and in deed the only way to re-launch them – was to 
achieve what Members should have achieved in Ca ncún, i.e. to agree on a framework for modalities 
for agriculture and NAMA, a decision on how to hand le the Singapore issues and a clear direction on 
cotton.  The Community had also supported the pro cess thus far focusing on these four key issues.  
While there was a clear development dimension to these four issues, Members should not lose sight of the other specific development-related issu es of the DDA, as the Chairman had said. 
54. The Community shared the Chairman's overa ll sober assessment of the work done since 
Cancún.  While there seemed to be widespread  commitment to revive the DDA, the current 
consultations had hardly revealed any real moveme nt or significant additional flexibility, except on 
the part of the Community.  While his delegation agreed with the positive signals emerging from the 
present meeting, it should be clear that Members were not as yet back on track.  More work would be 
needed.  Members also needed more of a sense of urgency.  There was a serious risk that 2004 might 
turn out to be a lost year.  It was of concern th at some Members seemed not to realize this, and his 
delegation agreed with the Director-General th at there was a disconnect between Ministerial 
statements and progress on the ground.  To avoid the risk of a lost year, Members needed a collective 
commitment to resume serious substantive negotia tions, with the clear objective of preparing the 
frameworks for modalities in agriculture and NAMA and otherwise reaching the decisions Members 
should have taken in Cancún.  The Community agreed with the Chairman's statement in this respect.  
Members should achieve this objective well within th e first quarter of 2004.  While this might seem 
ambitious to some, the window of opportunity was not wide open.  Only once Members had agreed on the "Cancún-type package" could they truly state that negotiations were back on track. 
55. His delegation had taken note of the Chairman's progress report and of the key issues 
identified in his statement.  While the Community might not agree fully with the way the Chairman 
had described some of the key issues, he had given a fair thrust to the wo rk ahead in the various 
sectors.  His delegation would not spell out at the present meeting the Community's position on either agriculture or NAMA except to reaffirm its willingn ess to get into real negotiations.  Regarding the 
process ahead, the Community had questions rega rding the resumption of the negotiating groups 
before Members reached the stage of a Cancún- type package.  However, the Community was 
prepared to go along with this resumption, provi ded that the negotiating groups complemented the 
top-down approach done at horizontal level – th e General Council Chairman's HODs process – and 
that the objective of the work re mained to prepare the framework for modalities for agriculture and 
NAMA and to take the other decisions as part of th e same package.  It remained paramount that the 
Chairman and the Director-General continue to wo rk hand in hand.  His delegation could also accept 
that work would build on the Derbez text and subse quent discussions since Cancún.  It went without 
saying that for the Community – as for others – part s of the Derbez text were unacceptable.  It was WT/GC/M/84 
Page 18  
 
 equally obvious that other texts c ould be relevant reference points in this respect.  His delegation 
agreed with Brazil that within the process ahead, Members needed genuine interaction between the 
various constituencies. 
56. Part of the package should be a clear decisi on on how to handle the Singapore issues within 
the WTO context.  The Community had shown great flexibility and openness in this respect.  In fact, 
it had made a major shift in its position.  The Co mmunity agreed on unbundlin g, i.e. that each issue 
should be dealt with on its own merits, and that one or more of these issues could fall outside the 
DDA single undertaking.  The Community had made concrete suggestions on how Members could 
deal with any Singapore issues which might fall outside the single undertaking, and as part of the package, Members would need clarity on both cat egories.  At the present stage, there was no 
consensus among Members on how to treat any of th e Singapore issues in a way different from the 
text agreed by Ministers at Doha, and for the Commu nity, the Doha mandate stood in its entirety.  The 
Community agreed that Deputy Director-General Mr. Yerxa continue his consultations on modalities 
for trade facilitation and transparency in governme nt procurement, without prejudice to the overall 
outcome on the Singapore issues.  However, the Comm unity wished to have clearer indications on the 
process to take place in the next few months, in or der to determine a satisfactory way forward on all 
Singapore issues.  This was in any event part of  the work programme.  His delegation assumed that 
the Chairman would conduct this process in a tim ely manner, and the Community would appreciate a 
confirmation in this respect.  On cotton, one coul d count on an open and constructive attitude from the 
Community which could enable the proponents to have  their concerns effectively and specifically 
addressed in a timely manner as part of the agricu lture negotiations.  His delegation again wished to 
thank the Chairman and the Director-General for their efforts.  The Community knew it could count 
on the Chairman not spending all his time betw een the present and the next General Council on 
putting together a new slate of Chairs, but rather to  continue to work on substance.  His delegation 
sincerely hoped that these efforts would pay off in the very near future.   
57. The representative of Bangladesh
, speaking on behalf of the Least-Developed Countries , said 
that the LDCs particularly wished to express thei r appreciation for the manner in which the Chairman 
had been conducting the consultations, both prior to and after Cancún.  His approach had been fair 
and, to the extent possible, transparent.  They al so wished to compliment th e Director-General for the 
efforts he had undertaken, both as Chairman of th e TNC and in the post-Cancún phase, to support the 
Doha Round.  The Director-General's contacts in ca pitals had given the LDCs reassurance, and they 
hoped he would maintain his thrust.  The LDCs were fully committed to the multilateral trading 
system, and were of the view that a rule-based appr oach, such as was reflected in the WTO, was best 
for them.  At the same time, within the framewo rk of the multilateral trading system, the LDCs 
required sufficient policy space to promote their ow n exports and development.  This was precisely 
why the development dimension and th e S&D treatment provisions were so critical to them.  All were 
aware of the special difficulties the LDCs faced.  These countries had been marginalized in world 
trade, and even their industria lization process was in jeopardy. 
58. The Doha Declaration that had launched the Doha Round of trade ne gotiations had provided 
Members considerable hope.  The LDCs had been reassured when this Round had come to be called 
the "Development Round".  Despite their limitati ons, the LDCs had been participating in the 
negotiations to the best of their ability.  Wherev er Members considered necessary, the LDCs had 
submitted specific proposals.  These proposals had been  debated, and some of the suggestions had 
found their place in the texts that Ministers had c onsidered at Cancún.  In the consultations the 
Chairman had conducted post-Cancún,  the LDCs had participated and had articulated their positions, 
which he did not feel it was appropriate to repeat at the present meeting.  At an appropriate moment, 
the LDCs would come back to these.  All were l ooking to the future, and what Members could do to 
meaningfully engage in negotiations.  The basis of  the negotiations was critical.  The Chairman had 
suggested the Derbez text as the basis on which to move forward, with appropriate changes as might 
be required.  The LDCs were of the view that in most areas this text could form the basis of moving  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 19 
 
 
 forward.  In the negotiations that would follow, many of their concerns and interests could be 
appropriately reflected, particularly through smal l changes in the texts on agriculture and NAMA.  
However, major changes would be required in the text on cotton.  In the Chairman's opening 
statement he had clearly identified cotton as one of the important issues.  For many countries in the 
LDC Group, cotton was a means of livelihood for milli ons of farmers.  This issue should be given 
special attention and resolved with utmost priority. 
59. The LDCs were concerned about the undue emph asis being given to the Singapore issues.  
Their position on these issues was quite clear.  Accord ing to the Doha Declaration, these issues were 
not part of the single undertaking.  Except for tr ade facilitation, the LDCs did not understand what 
these issues had to do with the multilateral trade rul es the WTO dealt with.  In any event, the basic 
purpose of the WTO was trade facilitation, and each Member was taking measures internally to 
facilitate trade.  The proponents of these issues had to explain to Members what they wanted from 
negotiations on these subjects.  If the LDCs were asked  to enter into negotiations on even one of these 
subjects, they first had to see the framework of th e agreements under the Doha Development Round in 
areas that were of interest to them.  In whatever Members did with the subjects that were part of the 
Doha Round, it was vital that the development dimens ion be at the core.  The LDCs had to be given 
the policy space and comfort level required to enab le them to participate meaningfully in the 
multilateral trading system.  Regarding the process  Members were contemplating, the LDCs fully 
supported the Chairman's approach of reviving the negotiating groups.  The LDCs felt that these 
groups were mechanisms to engage meaningfully in  negotiations.  What they wished to emphasize 
was that the major players in the multilateral trading system had an important responsibility in moving 
the process forward.  No matter what the LDCs – and many other developing countries – wished to 
do, Members would not progress very much without the active engagement of the major players.  The LDCs hoped that the political will the Director-Gener al had witnessed in capitals would be reflected 
in the negotiations in Geneva in the coming months. 
60. The representative of Korea
 said that although Members had not been able to put together a 
breakthrough, thanks to the Chairman's and the Dir ector-General's efforts they  had been able to at 
least maintain some momentum in the negotiations.  Korea agreed with the Chairman's assessment on 
the current state of the negotiations and also suppor ted the future work programme he had outlined.  
Given the current situation, Members needed to ta ke practical steps that could help them move 
forward without creating further stalemate on the poin ts where it was difficult to build a consensus at 
the present juncture.  In this re gard, his delegation was concerned about the widely held perception 
that Members would continue to have difficulties in  2004, given the political calendar of some of the 
major players.  Members needed to get over this negative perception, lest it become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, and instead make every effort to re-e nergize the negotiations and make progress where 
progress could be made.  From this viewpoint, the Ch airman's suggestions regarding the direction of 
work in each of the four main areas were reasonable and balanced. 
61. Korea welcomed the Chairman's confirmation of the Derbez text as the effective starting point 
in the agriculture and NAMA negotiations.  In th e absence of such a basis, the negotiations would 
have been in danger of going back to square one .  Of course, as Members had witnessed during the 
consultations, some parts of this text posed various difficulties for many delegations, including Korea.  
He wished to highlight some of Korea's difficulties in agriculture and NAMA.  In agriculture, Korea 
still had serious difficulties with tariff capping and TR Q expansion.  In NAMA, the level of ambition 
was not high enough for Members to meet the manda te.  However, despite these shortcomings, his 
delegation was ready to work with the Chairman  and other Members in building on this common 
basis.  Regarding the Singapore issues, his delegati on wished to note that the Derbez text again fell 
short of the Doha mandate.  Korea remained convin ced that all four of the Singapore issues belonged 
to the WTO, and that establishing multilateral rules in  these areas was in the interests of all Members, 
developed and developing alike.  Ho wever, in order to move the ne gotiations forward, his delegation 
was ready to consider the Chairman's suggesti on of unbundling these issues and considering each on WT/GC/M/84 
Page 20  
 
 its individual merits.  At the present stage, however, Members should avoid any notion that prejudged 
the final outcome of negotiations on any one of these issues. 
62. Regarding the way forward, his delegation s upported the Chairman's proposal to reactivate 
the work of the negotiating groups as soon as possibl e.  However, before Members reactivated the 
negotiating groups, Korea hoped Members would give sufficient thought to the objectives and 
benchmarks of their work at TNC and Genera l Council level.  Without establishing a general 
understanding on the objectives and benchmarks, it would be difficult for the negotiating bodies to 
make prompt and meaningful progress.  Korea understood the uneasiness of some Members about setting new timeframes, but entering negotiations on substance without even a target date risked 
having the negotiations drift.  This was especially tr ue with respect to those negotiating bodies whose 
deadlines had expired.  In establishing such benc hmarks, Members needed to be practical and 
realistic, or would otherwise damage their own credibilit y.  For Korea, agriculture  was also key to this 
Round, but Korea had a wide-range of other importa nt issues on its agenda.  Only a comprehensive 
package that addressed all of th ese issues in an equitable manner would not only enable this 
organization to maintain its relevance in today's ra pidly changing trade environment, but would also 
ensure the balance of interests for all Members.  Further, only a balanced approach would enable 
Members to successfully conclude the Doha Round of ne gotiations in a timely fashion.  He wished to 
reconfirm Korea's strong commitment to the successful  conclusion of the Doha negotiations.  With 
the enormous collective interests at stake, Members could not afford to let this Round fail.  Korea 
would participate constructively and actively in th e efforts to put the negotiations on a fast and 
successful track. 
63. The representative of Mauritius
, speaking on behalf of the African Group , said that the reports 
by the Chairman and the Director-General had provide d an indication that the process was still to pick 
up, that there was some way to go before Members reached their destination and that Members still 
had to surmount several difficulties.  Exactly two months earlier at the HODs meeting on 14 October, 
he had reaffirmed the African Group's deep commit ment to the multilateral trading system, and had 
expressed the Group's support for the Chairman's end eavour to put the negotiations back on track.  
This commitment had not changed, and the African Group remained more than ever a strong supporter of the multilateral trading system.  These c ountries stood ready to support all initiatives that 
would strengthen the system and enable the full and e ffective participation of all Members, so that the 
goals enshrined in the Doha Declaration could be achieved.  After the events in Cancún, African 
countries had spared no effort to engage in the process.  The African Group had been meeting in 
Geneva regularly and in other parts of Africa in order to consider the possibilities to meaningfully 
take the work forward, so that the overall out come would be satisfactory and acceptable to all 
Members.  The African countries would support work  to make the multilateral trading system more 
open, fair and transparent.  African delegations and Ministers continued to engage tirelessly for the 
progress of the negotiations, while safe guarding the continent's interests. 
64. Africa, with its large number of LDCs and its relatively marginal share of world trade, had 
compelling needs for development and trade expans ion.  This was why the LDC Group had insisted 
that development issues be made an integral part  of the multilateral trading system, to ensure a 
balanced and equitable outcome.  The African c ountries would support the efforts for injecting the 
necessary momentum to deal with all the issues of negotiations.  They had taken note of the 
Chairman's and Director-General's affirmation that  during the consultations with Members in Geneva 
and with Ministers in various fora, there had been  a deep sense of commitment.  This positive signal 
was very encouraging to moving further ahead towa rds a successful and expedi tious conclusion of the 
Doha work programme.  However, Members had to acknowledge that, under present circumstances, 
these challenges were of a tall order.  The best guarantee to overcome these challenges was Members' 
total, renewed and collective commitment and efforts.  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 21 
 
 
 65. Regarding the Chairman's suggested way forwar d, the African Group was encouraged that the 
process the Chairman envisaged would be all-inclus ive and transparent.  As all knew, the African 
Group attached a high significance to this aspect, as th is alone could ensure the participation of each 
and every Member of this organization in the ne gotiating groups.  The African Group therefore stood 
ready to work constructively in the TNC and th e various negotiating groups, which should resume 
their work as early as possible in 2004.  Sim ilarly, and as the African Group had been saying 
throughout the consultations, the development issues , in particular S&D and implementation issues, 
should be a priority.  These issues should be a ddressed urgently.  The African Group could accept 
maintaining these issues on an equal footing with othe r issues as long as there was certainty that they 
were being dealt with seriously.  The African Gr oup looked forward to constructive engagement on 
the part of all Members once work resumed in the respective negotiating bodies.  However, the 
African Group wished to have a clearer view of  the Chairman's approach to reactivating these 
negotiating groups.  Equally important for the Afri can countries were the Working Groups on Trade, 
Debt and Finance and on Trade and Transfer of Technology, and they wished to know how the 
Chairman proposed to deal with these Groups. 
66. Regarding the four issues on which consultati ons had been held, all Members had had the 
opportunity to hear details of the concerns of the African countries, and in the interests of time, he 
would not dwell on these issues.  However, he wish ed to underscore that the development dimension 
of all the issues under negotiation should be dealt with  upfront.  Agriculture was of critical importance 
to African countries.  They therefore regretted that to date it had not been possible to reach agreement 
on a framework.  Consequently, it was more than im perative that the work to be pursued took on 
board Africa's concerns and interests, as expressed  by Members of the African Group.  On NAMA, 
Members had to take full account of the reality of African countries – de pendence on tariff revenue, 
preferences and a weak industrial structure.  The African Group urged that the elements of S&D and 
less-than-full reciprocity should remain core features of the negotiations.  On the Cotton Initiative, the 
African Group had been supportive of the proponent s and called on all Members to find an urgent 
solution in the WTO to the problems faced by these countries.  On the Singap ore issues, the African 
countries had made it clear that this was not a priority for them, and stood ready to continue the clarification process on these issues. 
67. Taking into consideration the developments that had taken place on the Singapore issues in 
Cancún, the African Group wished to recall that Mi nisters had stated in Cancún that "we will bring 
into this new phase all the valuable  work that has been done at this Conference".  Further, to the 
extent that these developments were taken into acc ount and that all the developments concerns of 
Africa could be addressed, the African countries w ould engage constructively.  The African Group 
had taken note also that any discussion the Chai rman envisaged on the possibility of developing 
modalities for two of these issues would be without prejudice to delegations' positions.  Having made 
these observations on the importance of the development dimension as a sine qua non  condition for 
lifting Africa from its marginal position in the multila teral trading system, the African Group could go 
along with the Chairman's proposed way forward.  They wished to assure the Chairman and the 
Director-General, as well as all Members, of their full collaboration to help achieve the goals of the Doha Round.  The African countries were looking forw ard to seeing all their WTO partners engage in 
earnest to deliver on the Doha promises.  The African Group supported the statement by Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs. 
68. The representative of Egypt
 associated her delegation with the statements by Mauritius on 
behalf of the African Group and by Brazil on beha lf of the G-20 countries.  Egypt had been among 
those delegations consulted and ha d drawn its own conclusion on the current state of play, which was 
not very different from the Chairman's conclusion.  Unfortunately, the realization of the objectives of 
the Doha negotiations required more than the effort s made to date – namely, political will, flexibility 
and leadership from major trading partners beyond the narrow interests of some of their 
constituencies.  Those who benefited more from th e system in terms of economic value should be WT/GC/M/84 
Page 22  
 
 more ready to accommodate the concerns of others , particularly the weak and vulnerable.  An 
important starting point would be for all Members to realize that negotiations under the Doha work 
programme were an evolving process and that Cancún was meant to be merely a step or a mid-term 
review on a difficult journey.  While Egypt, like othe rs, stressed the need to move forward, Members 
should avoid any move that would be a step backward  from what they had agreed in Doha in terms of 
the objectives and the development dimension of this Round. 
69. Concerning the Chairman's proposal on the wa y forward, Egypt welcomed the idea of 
continuing the work in the bodies concerned, be they the negotiating bodies or the regular bodies, depending on the nature of the issue in the Doha D eclaration.  Regarding the Chairmanships of these 
bodies, Members had clear guidelines established at bot h the General Council and TNC levels.  As for 
the valuable work undertaken so far in the negotiating bodies, Memb ers needed to build on this.  
Having said this, Egypt believed that work s hould now target reaching a decision on the full 
modalities, rather than just a framework.  Focus on the latter had been justified only by the time 
constraints before Cancún.  However, Egypt was al so ready to consider continuation of the work 
based on the framework approach, but a revised one  that had some clarity on where Members were 
heading.  On the substantive elements related to  what had been described as reactivation of the 
negotiating groups, Egypt would have a slightly di fferent approach to what the Chairman had 
suggested aimed at identification of key issues b ased on the Derbez text.  The identification Members 
had heard in the Chairman's oral report might risk  overlooking some of the key concerns of a group of 
delegations on one topic.  For example, on NAMA the discussions Members had had so far revealed 
the amount of real difficulties many developing co untries in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean had on 
the proposed framework for establishing modalities.  These concerns were not new.  They had been 
expressed repeatedly during the preparatory pro cess leading up to Cancún and in commenting on the 
text in JOB(03)/150/Rev.1.  Unfo rtunately, the Derbez text – which was the subsequent revision of 
JOB(03)/150/Rev.1 – was not a step forward in th is regard.  To the contrary, it included more 
debatable issues such as the following:  the continuous ambiguity in paragraph 3 on the type of 
formula to be applied, let alone its elements, wh ile at the same time excluding the approach Egypt 
favoured, and many developing countries, especially in Africa and elsewhere, had called for, namely, 
a linear reduction;  the instruction in paragraph 6 to the negotiating group to discuss product coverage 
and participation in any possible sectoral initiative, to be read in line with paragraph 8, leaving no 
room for Egypt's interpretation that participati on in such initiatives should be voluntary;  and the 
restriction on dealing with preference erosion for non-reciprocal preference beneficiaries, excluding 
beneficiary countries from reciprocal arrangement s, such as those in Partnership Agreements. 
70. On cotton, her delegation saw merit in the Chairman's suggestion that Members not be locked 
into the Derbez text on this issue.  The starti ng point as well as the governing framework for the 
NAMA negotiations, as well as for other tracks includi ng agriculture, remained the Doha mandate, 
which Members should all respect and adhere to with  no reference to any abstract notions.  Members 
should examine carefully whether the proposed m odalities for NAMA operationalized the principles 
set out in paragraph 16 of the Doha Declaration, such as less-than-full reciprocity, or whether the 
modalities directly contradicted those principles.   On the Singapore issues, once again the Doha 
mandate came into the picture on whatever Member s were trying to do concerning the four, or some, 
of those issues.  It was clear that Members had not yet discussed any real modalities for negotiations 
on the four issues, and were therefore quite far from the consensus required to commence negotiations 
on them.  Moreover, Egypt welcomed the move by the major proponent of these issues in Cancún to 
drop some of them.  That would probably allow fo r focusing on elaborating agreeable modalities on 
the remaining issues, or rather issue.  Thus, Egypt joined others who had calle d for all further work on 
investment, competition and transparency in government procurement to be stopped and the respective working groups to be dissolved.  Meanwh ile, clarification work on trade facilitation might 
continue.  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 23 
 
 
 71. It was also important to recognize that paragr aph 47 of the Doha Declaration, concerning the 
single undertaking concept, dealt with the areas under negotiation set out in the Doha work programme.  Clearly, trade facilitation or any of the Singapore issues did not fit there.  First, they 
were part of a clarification process.  Second, th e reports of the Working Groups on these issues went 
to the General Council and not the TNC, as did the reports of the other two Working Groups on 
Transfer of Technology and on Debt and Finance.  There was great need for a horizontal approach to 
the negotiating process.  However, the reference point s were those identified in the relevant sections 
of the Doha Declaration.  Moreover, Member s needed to agree on a roadmap concerning the 
remaining areas in the draft Cancún package, particul arly the development issues, so they could reach 
a stage where a wider package would facilitate tr ade-offs and hence the necessary decisions.  Her 
delegation reiterated its commitment to remain ready to engage constructively with the rest of the 
membership, not only to restore credibility to the mu ltilateral trading system, but more importantly to 
achieve the economic gains needed to boost Member s' economic development and ensure prosperity 
to their people. 
72. The representative of Chinese Taipei
 said that the information the Chairman had shared with 
Members on the current status and possible roadmap fo r the future of the DDA was testament to his  
leadership and dedication.  Chinese Taipei also wish ed to pay tribute to the Director-General for his 
work in seeking support among Members as well as the support of other prominent international 
organizations.  His delegation wished to emphasize that despite the current difficulties, substantial 
progress had been achieved since the DDA was launc hed in November 2001.  For example, the 
Decision adopted by the General Council on 30 August 2003 on the issue of TRIPS and Public Health 
represented a significant and timely achievement of the DDA.  Notwithstanding the setback of the 
Cancún Ministerial Conference, the Derbez text showed Members a possible way forward for the Doha Round and could serve as a useful basis for future discussions.  Without going into detail and 
reiterating Chinese Taipei's negotiating position on th e relevance of the DDA, he wished to share 
some of his delegation's observations.  As the end of the year approached, it was the custom of the 
people of Chinese Taipei to review the major events of the past twelve months in the hope of better 
projecting the direction of events in the coming year .  On this basis, and being a strong supporter of 
the multilateral trading system, his delegation was confident that the momentum, or the sense of urgency articulated by Chile, towards a more lib eralized and open multilateral trading system would 
continue, although progress might not be quite as ra pid as Members wished.  All Members wanted the 
WTO to remain the primary forum for negotiations to further liberalize international trade, and 
Chinese Taipei remained strongly committed to the successful completion of the Doha Round.  His 
delegation therefore encouraged all Members to participate fully in this momentous journey. 
73. At the present juncture, his delegation also wished to recommend that Members find ways to 
strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat to meet Members' expectations as well as those of the outside world.  This was an important task for all Members.  In light of the increasing coverage of 
trade rules and the fast-changing conditions of th e global economy, his delegation believed that a 
better-equipped Secretariat would improve the effi ciency and functioning of the WTO and would 
eventually benefit the multilateral trading system .  The WTO was a Member-driven organization and 
should remain so.  However, there was perhaps a case for th e Director-General's ro le to be reinforced 
when it came to the DDA negotiations.  This might  then allow Members to narrow the gap between 
their negotiating positions and t hus make negotiations more productive.  Chinese Taipei looked 
forward to a more positive environment in which to continue work. 
74. The representative of India
 said that the present meeting was of significance in Members' 
efforts to conclude the Doha work programme on time.   Ministers had directed at Cancún that Senior 
Officials should take necessary action not later th an 15 December 2003 to work on a road map to 
successfully conclude the negotiations.  During the post-Cancún period, the Chairman and the 
Director-General had worked tirelessly.  India, lik e many other delegations, had made genuine efforts 
to facilitate reactivation of the multilateral proces s.  Recently, Ministers of the G-20 meeting in WT/GC/M/84 
Page 24  
 
 Brasilia had issued a communiqué in which they "r eaffirmed their commitment  to the successful and 
timely completion of the Doha Development Agenda based on the fulfilment of the mandate agreed to 
during the Fourth Ministerial Conference".  It was in  this spirit that India, like other members of the 
G-20, approached the negotiations.  India agreed with  the Chairman's view that there was now need to 
revive the negotiating structure brought into pl ace by the TNC's Decision of 1 February 2002 in 
pursuance of Ministers' decision at Doha, with such changes as were necessary to ensure early 
completion of all aspects of the negotiating mandate.  In India's view, this would necessitate a meeting 
of the TNC early in 2004 to decide on the structur e and work programme.  The mandate in respect of 
each negotiating issue had already been decided by Mi nisters in Doha.  Members' task, therefore, was 
limited to the formulation of a work programme  that would ensure expeditious completion of 
negotiations.  The key issues identified by the Chai rman would need to be examined and developed 
by each of the relevant bodies. 
75. After Cancún, all Members had utilized every o pportunity to re-launch the Doha agenda.  
While there was a manifest desire on the part of all delegations to make fast progress in the negotiations, there still remained strong differences on substance.  On the starting point for the 
negotiations, India wished to recall the Ministerial Statement at Cancún, which stated:  "We will bring 
into this new phase all the valuable work that has been done at this Conference.  In those areas where 
we have reached a high level of convergence on te xts, we undertake to maintain this convergence 
while working for an acceptable overall outcome."  Ministers had not directed Members to start from a text, but from texts.  Second, they had asked  Members to maintain convergence on those areas 
where there was a high level of convergence and to bu ild on the valuable work that had been done at 
Cancún.  Members had also engaged themselves in discussions on the issues in various fora after the 
Cancún Ministerial Conference, and should not fail to capitalize on the work already carried out pre-
Cancún, at Cancún and post-Cancún.  The areas in which convergence had so far emerged and 
valuable work had already been done should be the basis for carrying on further work. 
76. The issue of agriculture w as at the core of the ongoing negotiations.  Resolution of 
fundamental differences in this area would depend  on the depth of agricultural reform that was 
proposed to be carried out in the developed count ries, along with adequate safeguards to address 
livelihood and food security concerns  of billions of farmers in developing countries.  Members had a 
responsibility to translate the Doha mandate into provisions that woul d ensure balance across the three 
pillars.  The right level of ambition in agriculture  would be that which balanced the extent of 
reductions in distortions in world markets due to  high support and protection in developed countries 
against the increased vulnerability of farmers in de veloping countries due to further opening of their 
markets.  Members had been working on a framework  approach in agriculture, as in NAMA.  India's 
assumption was that agreement on a framework woul d facilitate and expedite the finalization of 
modalities which would form the basis of agricu ltural and non-agricultural liberalization.  A 
framework would, however, find acceptance only if certain conditions were fulfilled.  The first 
condition was that it had to fully reflect the prin ciples laid down in the Doha mandate.  The G-20 
Ministerial communiqué stated that:  "The G-20 insi sts that, in the process of reaching agreement on a 
final set of modalities, the level of ambition of the Doha mandate remains the guiding principle of the 
negotiations.  In such a process, any framework in or der to be viable should be consistent with the 
Doha mandate, and lead to the establishment of m odalities capable of ensuring that negotiations in 
agriculture will result in substantial reductions in  domestic support, substantial increase in market 
access, phasing out of all forms of export subsid ies and operational and effective special and 
differential treatment that takes into account ru ral development and food security concerns of 
developing countries", besides effectively addressi ng the particular concerns of recently acceded 
countries. 
77. 
The second condition for acceptance of a framework was that it must not be ambiguous or 
uncertain.  In this context, India had already bro ught to the Chairman's attention its apprehensions 
regarding the blended approach for market access su ggested in the Derbez text, as it seemed to impact  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 25 
 
 
 differently on Members, depending on the tariff disp ersion prevalent in each country, and also did not 
take into account the cardinal principles of S&D treatment through less-than-full reciprocity and a 
balance between the average tariff reduction undertak en by developed countries and that undertaken 
by developing countries.  The "Harbinson appr oach" and the tiered Uruguay Round formula for 
developing countries, as given in the text in JO B(03)/150/Rev.1, were examples of approaches which 
could provide parity in efforts between various Members.  The th ird condition for acceptance of a 
framework would be that the elements of the frame work not be structured in a manner that would 
prejudice the position of Members in further negotia tions.  Members could not unwittingly agree to a 
framework that limited the scope for trade-offs in  the future.  In the light of all these problems 
associated with frameworks, India,  as well as several other countries, had suggested that it would be 
advantageous to negotiate some key numbers along with the framewor k, in order to make it more 
certain and unambiguous.  He noted that China had ma de this point in its intervention at the present 
meeting. 
78. The issue of cotton subsidies, raised by sev eral African Members, was one that deserved 
concrete action.  Members' discussion of this issu e had been largely confined to the procedure to be . 
followed rather than the substance.  Progress on th is issue could be achieved only if there was a 
response on the substance of the issue, as the Chai rman had mentioned in his report.  On NAMA, 
India wished to emphasize that it was essential to remain faithful to the mandate given under 
paragraphs 16 and 50 of the Doha Declaration, par ticularly the principle of less-than-full reciprocity 
in reduction commitments for developing countries.  The right way forward did not appear to be a 
simple "Swiss Formula" with a single coefficient, nor the concept of harmonization of tariffs.  The 
formula proposed by the Chairman of the Negotia ting Group incorporated suitable S&D provisions, 
and India was willing to work further on this.  Howeve r, if there was to be only a general reference to 
a formula approach to reduction of tariffs, it should be  explicitly clarified that proposals relating to the 
formula put forward by all Members were still on the table.  It also needed to be recognized that developing countries needed a degree of flexibility with respect to sensitive products.  Accordingly, 
the flexibility provided under paragra ph 7 of Annex B in the Derbez text could be further refined.  It 
would be appropriate to have th e options of using both types of flexibilities proposed, rather than 
having them as mutually exclusive alternatives.  Th e sectoral initiative should be voluntary rather than 
mandatory for developing countries, and could form part of supplementary modalities.  The principle 
of less-than-full reciprocity in reduction commitme nts needed to be incorporated in any sectoral 
initiatives for elimination of tariffs, so that there was non-zero tariff for developing countries.  India 
wished to reiterate that non-tariff barriers were an  integral part of the NAMA negotiations and should 
be adequately dealt with in the finalization of modalities. 
79. At Doha, Ministers had emphasized the need to find effective and adequate solutions for the 
implementation issues raised by Members, and th e importance of making S&D treatment provisions 
precise, effective and operational.  The subsidiary bodies of the WTO had been mandated by the Doha 
Declaration to deliberate upon certain implementa tion issues and make recommendations for adoption 
by the General Council/TNC by December 2002.  There had been hardly any progress in the 
successful resolution of implementation issues in the period after Doha.  As implementation issues were an integral part of the Doha Ministerial Decl aration, India had been consistently advocating the 
stand that all these issues would have to be addressed on a priority basis, as decided by Ministers in Doha.  There was urgent need to agree on specific procedures for resolving the outstanding 
implementation issues and to operationalize S&D provisions.  Before Cancún, a number of 
developing countries, including India, had sought the creation of a separate negotiating body to 
address and resolve implementation issues.  These c ountries' experience during the past two years had 
convinced them that there could be no other soluti on to deal with implementation and S&D treatment 
issues in an effective manner, and India called upon the General Council or the TNC, as the case 
might be, to create a separate negotiating body excl usively for these issues.  This negotiating body 
should also address the issue of commodity price st abilization in agricultural products that had been 
raised by Kenya and other African countries in the run-up to Cancún.  As Kenya had pointed out in WT/GC/M/84 
Page 26  
 
 the General Council discussions that had followed introduction of its paper (WT/GC/W/508), this was 
one of the unresolved issues arising from Part IV of GATT and was of great significance to many 
developing countries. 
80. On the Singapore issues, a large number of developing and least-developed countries, 
including India, had already clearly set forth their views in document WT/GC/W/522 of 
12 December 2003.  India fully endorsed the views set out in this document, and therefore did not 
need to further elaborate its position, which was essen tially that further work on trade and investment, 
trade and competition policy and transparency in gov ernment procurement should be dropped.  With 
regard to trade facilitation, work on clarification of  various aspects of this issue might continue in the 
light of the interest expressed by several delega tions.  However, many of the proposed elements 
would require substantial commitments in terms of modernization and upgrading of systems, 
infrastructure and computerization.  A related i ssue was how resources would be made available to 
developing countries.  Clarity was also required on the mechanisms for handling situations where 
infrastructure facilities available at different entry poi nts in a Member country varied widely.  Another 
grey area was how the proposed principles of propor tionality, necessity, least trade restrictiveness, 
periodic review and non-discrimination would appl y to customs procedures adopted on account of 
security considerations.  India would also be very interested in discussing a multilateral framework for 
effective cooperation between customs authorities to  combat unlawful activities, as part of any 
package on trade facilitation.  India believed this  was an integral component of adopting trade 
facilitative procedures.  Similarly, India was also  keen to ensure that while discussing trade 
facilitation, Members did not lose sight of other pending trade facilitative issues, particularly a time-
bound completion of the Harmonization Work Prog ramme under the Agreement on Rules of Origin, 
and to address the implementation issues related to the Agreement on Customs Valuation.  India also 
held the view that any discussion on trade facilitation could not exclude the trade restrictive aspects of 
quarantine procedures followed by many countries, and the fact that such procedures should be 
subject to definite timeframes and stricter conditi ons.  Any clarification on trade facilitation, however, 
should not attempt to seek an early harvest in a dvance of progress on core issues in the Doha work 
programme.  Furthermore, any subsequent decision on modalities would need to be taken by explicit 
consensus before negotiations could commence. 
81. India would need clarity on many aspects of the Singapore issues.  It would need to know 
what issues remained on the WTO work programme, what structures would be put in place and what 
would constitute the terms of refere nce of any future work.  More consultations at the level of the 
General Council would be needed to clarify these as pects, and India would engage constructively in 
all such consultations.  The way forward would invo lve genuine effort on the part of all Members to 
show a spirit of goodwill and accommodation in th e negotiations.  Members needed to discuss 
substance now, and the negotiating bodies were the only place where this could be done.  On the 
Singapore issues, India noted that a large number of Members, and perhaps the majority, had 
expressed their views clearly.  It was essential th at Members not repeat the Cancún experience and 
ignore the views of this large number of Members any longer.  Finally, addressing the issue of cotton 
and other development-related issues in a sinc ere and time-bound manner was essential.  The Doha 
agenda had been termed the Doha  Development Agenda, and there s hould be conscious and concerted 
efforts to ensure that the development dimension w as not diluted, but rather occupied centre stage.  
This alone would ensure progress in trade liberalization on a sustainable basis.  India hoped that 2004 
would be a productive and useful year in wh ich substantial progress could be achieved. 
82. The representative of South Africa
 said that the Chairman's tireless efforts to put the 
negotiations back on track had been largely su ccessful, but Members were not there yet.  His 
delegation wished to reflect on the progress Memb ers had made, both in the past few weeks since 
Cancún and since Members had begun the negotiations in Doha.  It was clear that other than the very 
significant decision Members had taken on TRIPS a nd Public Health, they had not made much 
progress in advancing the negotiations of the DDA.  Agriculture was the central issue of the Round,  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 27 
 
 
 and still remained the key to unlocking meaningful progress in the DDA.  This was because 
agricultural products, like other products of interest  to developing countries, had not been brought 
fully within the rules of the multilateral trading sy stem in the Uruguay Round.  Thus, the multilateral 
trading system had yet to address this imbala nce and inequity.  The launch of the DDA had 
recognized that significant inequalities remained in the global economy and that the rules of the game 
in the trading system were still largely unbalanced.  It was for this reason that world leaders, listening 
to the voices of developing countries and civil so ciety groups, had agreed in Monterrey at the 
Financing for Development Conference, in Joha nnesburg at the World Summit for Sustainable 
Development, at several G8 Summits and then at  Doha, to address these issues in a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations.  It was for this reason that the Round had been named the Doha 
Development Agenda.  There was no doubt that the barriers and distortions in global markets 
remained a significant obstacle to the economic development of most developing countries.  Moreover, the current subsidies provided by develo ped countries destroyed livelihoods of farmers in 
developing countries.  The plight of cotton farmer s in West Africa was an illustration of this.  
However, cotton was not the only example.  Subsid ized milk powder, tomato paste and a range of 
other products had had similar devastating effects on poor peoples' livelihoods in several poor 
developing countries. 
83. It was for this reason that agriculture was th e central issue of the Round.  The successful 
resolution of this issue would without doubt ha ve a significant positive impact on both the economic 
development of a large number of developing countri es and the reduction of poverty.  The failure of 
the WTO to make progress on the establishment of m odalities in agriculture – as was also the case on 
missed deadlines for S&D and implementation i ssues – was very disappointing for developing 
countries.  Within this context the failure of  Cancún to advance the DDA was seen as a lost 
opportunity for development.  While the Common Agricultural Policy reforms of the Community 
were a step in the right direction, they did not go far enough.  Similarly, the enhanced Members Farm Bill of 2002 went against the spirit of reform by in creasing subsidies to EU member States' farmers.  
The EU-US joint text had not helped either.  In attempting to reach a compromise, it had reduced the 
level of ambition in agriculture by accommodating each party's protectionist interests.  In response, 
developing countries had come together in a tr ade union, as Commissioner Lamy had called it, to 
form the G-20.  Brazil had provided an excellent repo rt of the recent meeting of the G-20 in Brasilia.  
In the view of South Africa, the G-20 stood for th e following:  First, the G-20 combined the resolve 
and determination of the Cairns Group to remove  distortions and barriers in global agricultural 
markets, with sensitivity to the livelihoods and fo od security concerns of farmers in developing 
countries.  Second, the G-20 wished to contribute to building and shaping a strong multilateral trading 
system.  In this challenge the fullest co-operation of all was needed, particularly from the large and 
economically powerful countries of the North.  Third, the G-20 also sought to make its contribution to 
addressing the challenges of development for all.  In  this regard, Ministers of the G-20 countries had 
underlined the need to effectively address devel opment issues such as food security and rural 
development, as raised by the G-34 and others, eros ion of preferences and the special needs of LDCs.  
Fourth, the G-20 would contribute to the efforts to build consensus and advance the development 
dimension of the DDA by working closely with othe r developing countries in the G-90, which was 
comprised of the ACP, African Group and LDCs.  Fifth, the G-20 intended to work with other 
countries with legitimate concerns – even those in developed countries – in an attempt to find 
solutions that recognized the need to not distort gl obal markets and destroy the legitimate rights of 
poor people in developing countries.  Sixth, the G-20 was a progressive force for reform of world agricultural markets.  In this effort, its members wo uld work with all forces of change in the North 
and South, and had been encouraged recently by the support of the private sector, farm groups and 
NGOs, both in the North and South. 
84.
 The recent meeting in Brasilia of the G-20 and the dialogue with the EU provided a new and 
positive tone in the negotiations and renewed resolv e of both the G-20 and the EU to intensify the 
negotiations in line with the Doha mandate.  S outh Africa was committed to re-engaging with all WT/GC/M/84 
Page 28  
 
 other players in a similar spirit of "can do".  There was no doubt that Members in the African Group – 
as Mauritius, coordinator of the African Group, had st ated – were committed to playing a positive role 
in contributing to the Round.  At the recent Cairo Ministerial meeting, Ministers from 12 African countries had reaffirmed their commitment to work for the success of the Round and their willingness 
to be flexible.  They had underlined that agricultu re was central to the success of the Round and to 
their development, illustrated most significantly recently as two more African Members had become 
part of the G-20, underlining the importance of ag ricultural reform and liberalization for Africa's 
development.  On the Singapore issues, as his delega tion had indicated in the consultations, this was 
one area where all had shown flexibility and had m oved from their original positions.  This issue 
should not be allowed to hold up progress on the core  issues of the Round.  The flexibility shown by 
the Community in Cancún in offering to remove tw o of the issues from the Round – investment and 
competition policy – should be honoured.  It should be made clear that these issues were no longer 
part of the single undertaking.  South Africa had made  it clear that it was willing to engage on one or 
two of the remaining issues, on the basis of full y-fledged modalities to be agreed on by consensus 
before embarking on negotiations.  As the DDA work programme had established, the Singapore 
issues should be dealt with after the modalities on ag riculture and NAMA had been dealt with.  This 
was more likely to contribute to advancement of the Singapore issues, as Members would be 
encouraged by progress in other areas. 
85. As South Africa had indicated in the Chairman's consultations, a plurilateral approach in areas 
such as investment and competition policy would create two classes of Members in the WTO, and 
South Africa strongly advised against the WTO follow ing such a practice.  If it was clear that these 
two issues were not part of the single undertaking and would not re-surface in  negotiations at a later 
stage, Members would be more likely to succeed in building consensus on the remaining Singapore 
issues.  On the way forward, advancing agricultu re and cotton was the key to unlocking progress and 
providing momentum to the rest of the issues in  the Round.  Members needed to set a work 
programme and target dates for the finalization of modalities on agriculture that they had scheduled to 
complete in March of 2003.  Members needed to blend the work on completing the framework 
agreement, which they had used as a transitional device before Cancún, with the work on modalities, 
so that they could move in a seamless fashion from framework to modalities.  Members should not 
waste too much time on process and should get down  to negotiations.  South Africa agreed that 
Members should re-establish the TNC and the negotiating groups as soon as possible in 2004. 
86. The representative of Thailand
 said her delegation recognized that advancing the DDA would 
offer the potential for real gain to all Members, as  had also been confirmed by the APEC leaders’ 
statement in Bangkok in October 2003.  At that meeting, the APEC leaders had shown their full 
support for the multilateral trading system by sending  a strong message calling for an urgent need to 
re-energize the Doha negotiations , building on the Derbez text.  Members had come a long way and 
progress had been made in a number of areas since th e start of the Doha Round.  This was because all 
Members firmly believed in the benefits of the mu ltilateral trading system and were determined to see 
the DDA conclude successfully.  In this regard, he r delegation was encouraged by the Chairman's and 
Director-General’s reports and assessment that Members, particularly at the Ministerial level, were committed to the multilateral trading system and were  re-engaged in the negotia tions.  Thailand hoped 
that early in 2004, once the issue of chairmanships was settled, Members would translate their political will into substantive nego tiating positions.  Her delegation w as certain that the Chairman's 
future work plan would help Members move forwar d and prepare themselves to engage in the real 
negotiations in 2004.  However, this engagement should cover not only the four key subjects of the 
recent consultations, but also extend to all issues in the DDA, particularly development issues.   
87. Regarding the four key issues reported on by  the Chairman, her delegation hoped that 
Members would be willing to show flexibility when they resumed work in 2004.  On agriculture, 
Thailand believed that Members should keep the high  level of ambition in all three pillars of these 
negotiations, namely, real market access for agricu ltural products, substan tial reduction in all trade- WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 29 
 
 
 distorting domestic support and elimination of all form s of export subsidies, since substantial reform 
in agricultural trade would help to generate higher incomes for developing countries and would 
enhance their efforts to combat poverty.  In additi on, bearing in mind that a constructive movement on 
agriculture could create significant development in  other areas, Members should prepare to meet 
halfway.  Developed countries should be prepared to  agree to limit their trade-distorting domestic 
support and export subsidies, particularly the product-specific AMS reduction commitment, the 
capping and reduction of blue box subsidies and the est ablishment of an end date for the elimination 
of all forms of export subsidies.  At the same time, developing-country Members should be prepared 
to provide substantial improvement in market acc ess by accepting a more ambitious formula for tariff 
reduction, taking into account S&D treatment for developing countries.   
88. On NAMA, Thailand hoped to see substan tial concessions from both developed and 
developing countries.  In this re gard, developed countries’ demand for an ambitious tariff reduction 
formula should take into account developing count ries’ request for the voluntary and supplementary 
sectoral tariff elimination initiative.  On the Si ngapore issues, Members should bear in mind that 
divergent positions remained and that not all Me mbers were ready to explore possible modalities of 
negotiations.  As such, each Singapore issue should be treated on its own merits, as proposed by the 
Chairman.  In this regard, Thailand hoped that developed-country Member s could reaffirm their 
intention to drop the more controversial issues from the negotiating table, and at the same time, 
developing countries should be open to exploring modalities of negotia tions for the less controversial 
issues, such as trad e facilitation, so that negotiations coul d move forward, taking into account 
developments in other areas of ne gotiations, particularly agriculture.  On cotton, Thailand encouraged 
all Members to be flexible and to include this i ssue in the agriculture negotiations, and to provide a 
product-specific reduction commitment on trade-dist orting domestic support as well as an elimination 
commitment on export subsidies so that this problem  could be addressed urgently and specifically in a 
meaningful way.  Thailand supported the way forw ard suggested by the Chairman to reactivate all 
negotiating bodies in order to ensure transpar ency and inclusiveness in advancing the DDA 
negotiations.  Her delegation looked forward to engaging in real and s ubstantive negotiations, 
including trade-offs, in the coming year.  
89. The representative of Turkey  said that her delegation had liste ned carefully to the Chairman's 
report, which specified the results of his consulta tions, the identification of key issues and his outline 
of the future approach.  That report had enabled Me mbers to better clarify some of the key issues and 
options for a possible way forward.  Turkey noted  that some progress had been achieved and that a 
strong sense of commitment to the multilateral trading system and to the DDA had been shown during 
the consultations.  In this regard, Turkey wished to reaffirm its commitment to the WTO as the unique 
forum for global trade rule-making and liberalization.  It was Turkey's sincere belief that the current 
stage of the multilateral trade talks represented onl y a temporary setback in the Doha Development 
Round of negotiations.  With a view to completing the DDA, it was vital to maintain and consolidate 
what had already been achieved at Cancún and in it s aftermath.  With this in mind, her delegation 
shared the idea that all the negotiating bodies under the Doha mandate should resume their work early 
in 2004 under the supervision of the TNC.  Within th is context, Turkey wished to emphasize the great 
importance of carrying out that work in line with  the principles of transparency and inclusiveness. 
90. For the future negotiations, Members might take the Derbez text as a basis.  However, her 
delegation continued to urge  substantial improvements and modificati ons to that text, in order to make 
it respond to the needs and expectations which had b een rightfully voiced in Cancún.  On agriculture, 
Turkey was dissatisfied with the existing imbalan ces in the level of ambition between the market 
access pillar and the other two pillars, as well as the co mmitments to be undertaken by developed and 
developing-country Members.  For non-agricultu ral products, taking into account the ambitious 
mandate of the Doha Declaration, it was clear that  Members were well behind in achieving substantial 
reductions in tariffs and eliminati on of all non-tariff barriers on the basis of an equitable, fair and 
balanced understanding.  Regarding the Singapore issues, it was clear that there was a growing WT/GC/M/84 
Page 30  
 
 preference to take up of each of these issues on its  own merits.  In order to find a common ground to 
move the process forward, Turkey was ready to show flexibility and a real sense of engagement. 
91. On cotton, her delegation was fully aware of the challenges that certain cotton-producing 
countries faced.  Since there were both trade-rela ted and development-relate d implications for the 
economies of the countries concerned, the problem s hould be dealt with in an effective way without 
delay.  Turkey supported the integration of this issue into the agriculture negotiations in all its 
dimensions, including market access and trade-distor ting support.  As the Chairman and the Director-
General had pointed out earlier, the present mee ting was intended to convey an overall positive 
message by underlining Members' commitment to the multilateral trading system and the DDA.  
Thus, her delegation wished to reiterate its readin ess to contribute to a successful re-launching and 
completion of the DDA process, with an equitable and balanced outcome.  It was Members' collective 
responsibility to act constructively and to demonstr ate mutual understanding fo r each others' specific 
interests and concerns throughout the difficult process ahead. 
92. The representative of Bulgaria
 said that like other Members, Bulgaria continued to be 
committed to the DDA and regretted that so far Member s had not been able to fulfil the tasks set out 
in the work programme, which all had agreed in D oha.  Bulgaria also believed that Members should 
not lose patience with each other and should explor e more intensively new and different possibilities 
to arrive at a successful outcome before 1 Janua ry 2005.  His delegation would study carefully the 
suggestions in the Chairman's proposal, and looke d forward to discussing them with other Members 
in order to adopt the appropriate decisions that woul d set the stage for a successful continuation of the 
negotiations.  Bulgaria would not object to the reac tivation of the negotiating bodies, but before this 
was done, Members would need to know what they would be doing.  All should agree on a clear 
mandate for further work.  Continuing with what ha d been done thus far might not necessarily lead to 
meaningful results.  As the Director-General had said, Members should all reflect on what they might 
have done differently and what they might do differen tly in future.  Such a reflection could best be 
undertaken at a TNC meeting, which would then take the necessary decisions on the mandates of 
negotiating bodies for their further work. 
93. At this TNC meeting it would also be necessary to  take decisions on the negotiating structure.  
There were some views that the mandates of some negotiating bodies had expired.  There were also proposals to drop some of the negotiating issues, and it would be appropria te to hear from the 
opponents of these issues as to whether they wished  the mandates of the negotiating bodies dealing 
with these issues to be terminated , and from the proponents as to whether they agreed with this.  
There had been proposals for new negotiating bodies, e.g. the setting up of a negotiating group on 
implementation issues.  The Chairman himself ha d highlighted the importance of the development-
related issues, which many de legations had emphasized.  Under the schedule of the DDA, 
implementation issues were the first to be resolv ed.  Ministers had explicitly attached "utmost 
importance" to them and had provided that they "be addressed as a matter of priority", unlike the other 
negotiating subjects, for which no priority had b een provided but for which negotiating groups had 
been set up.  Therefore, the setting up of a nego tiating group on implementation, as proposed before 
Cancún, would reflect more adequately the manda te under the DDA and would definitely contribute 
to overall progress in the negotiations.  Regardi ng chairmanships of negotiating bodies, it would be 
illogical to proceed to new appointments or reap pointments before decisions on the negotiating 
structure and mandates of the respective bodies were take n.  The directions to be given by the TNC to 
negotiating bodies before their reactivation needed to be clear and in conformity with the Doha 
mandate. 
94. Building on the elements which had emerged in wo rk at or after Cancún could not and should 
not mean accepting the Derbez text.  Members had ne ver accepted any of the elements or structure of 
that text.  Its status was that of a proposal on the Chair's own responsibility, and it could of course be 
discussed, along with other proposals and negotiati ng positions.  However, his delegation did not  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 31 
 
 
 understand why, at the present stage of the negotia tions, any text that had been proposed but not 
agreed should be given a special status or priority  over other proposals, and how this could bring more 
balance and advance the negotiations.  What would make sense for further work would be to direct 
the negotiating bodies, when they were reactivat ed, to discuss issues which had so far not been 
sufficiently dealt with at a technical level.  Th ese were, for example, issues for which there were no 
substantive  proposals, but only some procedural indications in the texts, prepared on the 
responsibility of the respective Chairs.  Included in  this context were issues of interest to his 
delegation.  In agriculture, these were the non-trad e concerns, including improved market access for 
geographical indications, and state-trading export en terprises.  In the area of implementation, it was 
extension of the additional protecti on for geographical indications to ot her products, and so on.  These 
issues were not uncontroversial, but Members had so  far participated in the discussions on many other 
issues which were of no interest, or of only a defens ive interest, to Bulgaria.  It was now time to 
rebalance the negotiations and to focus on tho se negotiating subjects which had thus far been 
neglected.  Bulgaria was prepared to continue to participate in the discussion of issues which were of 
interest to others.  Identifying possible substantive solutions for all outstanding issues at a technical 
level would not mean that those Members who oppos ed these issues would have to agree on them at 
such technical discussions.  It would, however, prepare a broader base of possible elements which 
could be dealt with substantively in future texts,  and would thus provide extended possibilities for a 
balanced outcome. 
95. Regarding the direction of future work a nd the possibilities for what Members might do 
differently, it seemed that so far the prevailing effo rts, especially those of various Chairs, had been 
focused more on the commitments and market-access aspects of the negotiations rather than on the 
rule-making aspects.  Reduction formulae for tariffs  and support had been described as the key to 
further progress in the work.  Now that it had become  increasingly clear that this focus and preference 
for commitments over rules had not produced the expected overall progress in the negotiations, it 
might be time to devote more attention to the ru le-making components of the negotiating agenda, all 
the more so since they constituted the more difficu lt part of the negotiations, for which consensus was 
absolutely necessary.  The commitments which ma ny participants in the negotiations might be 
prepared to assume in the market access and dom estic support areas would be influenced by the 
outcomes of negotiations in the rule-making areas.  The fewer agreed rules Members had at any stage 
of the negotiations, the narrower the scope would be  for commitments by some participants in non-
agricultural and agricultural market access and domest ic support at that stage of the negotiations.  
Therefore the rule-making areas should not be pos tponed to the very end of the negotiations, but 
should be dealt with now.  Building on the elements  that had emerged should not mean neglecting the 
rules areas or keeping them hostage to progress on commitments. 
96. What Members could do differently on the co mmitments aspect of the negotiations was to 
explore approaches that went beyond rigid formul ae and one-size-fits-all solutions, and that would 
allow for flexibilities and take into account the different sensitivities and concerns of various 
participants.  Technically speaking, the decisi on-making method for the commitment aspects of the 
negotiations did not necessarily have to be consensu s on one single approach, formula or combination 
of formulae.  Since commitments were set out in individual national schedules, the method of critical 
mass was much easier and could lead more rapidl y to satisfactory results, ensuring different but 
sufficient levels of liberalization that were mutua lly accepted by the various participants.  At some 
point in the negotiations the insistence on formulae, agreed to by consensus and by all participants, 
might actually become an obstacle to further ove rall progress in the negotiations.  Therefore, the 
negotiating bodies, once reactivated by the TNC, should be directed to focus intensively on the rules 
aspects of the negotiations, especially in their further work on frameworks and/or modalities. 
97. The representative of Mexico  said that his delegation agreed with the Chairman's assessment 
that Members had come a long way since Cancún but had not yet succeeded in putting the negotiating 
process back on track.  In his delegation's view, th e basic problem was not that Members had not yet WT/GC/M/84 
Page 32  
 
 carried out the instructions received from Ministers in Cancún, i.e. to agree on a document recording 
the progress made to date and serving as a basis for the next phase in the negotiations.  Although time 
was running shorter and shorter, that objective c ould still be achieved, provided all Members were 
willing to engage in a constructiv e effort.  Mexico's real concern was the discrepancy between the 
general awareness – at the political level among de legations in Geneva – of the importance of 
supporting the Doha Round, and the e qually general lack of movement  or concrete signals in the 
substantive discussions.  It seemed that both in Ge neva and in capitals, there was an ever-growing 
temptation to believe that things were returning to  normal and that Members could fall back into their 
old habits, returning to convenient positions and ha bitual tactics.  As Chile had said, Members had 
lost a sense of urgency, and this tendency could be  accentuated with the reactivation of the negotiating 
groups. 
98. This was extremely dangerous.  The window of opportunity created by political developments 
in a number of major developed and developing-coun try Members was already beginning to close and 
would grow narrower as Members moved into 2004.  If Members failed to consolidate swiftly what 
had been achieved so far, they ran a very real risk of losing all the work done and the progress – 
clearly insufficient but nevertheless concrete – they ha d made over the past few years.  In other words, 
Members would be going back to square one almost  three years after the process had been launched, 
and at a time when they should have been near the point of completion.  At the end of the day, all 
knew what they had to do in regard to the issues pinpoi nted by the Chairman as vital, if they wished to 
ensure the successful completion of this Round, wh ich was the following:  the developed countries 
would have to make further efforts in the three p illars of the negotiations on agriculture in order to 
reform this sector and subject it to market rules.  In this context, cotton was a central element.  The 
developing countries would have to make real effort s in the area of NAMA.  On the Singapore issues, 
all Members, both proponents and opponents, woul d have to adjust their initial and current 
expectations so as to reach some intermediate agr eement.  On all of these points, the ideas in the 
Chairman's report could help guide the specific work. 
99. The problem at present was that Members s eemed to believe they  could postpone the 
necessary efforts to a later date.  Clearly, Member s were still far from the final phase in which the 
really difficult decisions would be taken.  Howe ver, if Members did not start now to narrow the 
playing field and to agree on conceptual frameworks to guide them in the next phase – albeit in very 
general terms, since this was what the incipient st age of the process compelled Members to do – they 
would never reach the moment of truth.  All had to resist the temptation to take a "business as usual" 
approach.  As Members tackled their work in early 2004, it was crucial to bear in mind how important 
and delicate a stage they had now reached, if they were to deliver positive results in the short time 
allowed by the dynamics of the global political envi ronment.  In other words, it was necessary for 
Members to start taking substantive decisions that w ould not be final but that would involve costs to 
everyone.  In Mexico's view, this was the only wa y to truly put the Doha Round back on track and to 
sustain the hope of completing an ambitious negotiating process within a reasonable timeframe, for 
the benefit of the world's population, and especially the poorest.  That still seemed to be a goal all Members shared. 
100. The representative of the Philippines
 said that the Philippines, and probably all developing 
countries, recognized the big stake Members ha d placed on the successful outcome of the DDA, 
promising for the first time in the history of the multilateral process the real impetus it could have on 
their development, ambitions and aspirations.  Hi s delegation would not sacrifice these genuine efforts 
for a game of dubious tactical subterfuges or ne gotiating brinksmanship.  The Philippines simply 
wanted, and Members urgently needed, successful outcomes that would put its development needs 
and priority concerns in the forefront.  One could not underestimate th e benefit of deep and 
substantive discussions on a wide range of issues  and elements – the exchange of meaningful 
information, and the exploration of the different levels of ambitions and perceptions among Members 
on the four issues taken up in the Chairman's consu ltations.  While Members had not gone deeply into  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 33 
 
 
 negotiating exchanges of concessions, they should not be far from that.  Setting aside the Singapore 
issues – which he would address later – the three issues of agriculture, NAMA and cotton, together 
with what the Chairman had identified as other development issues, such as S&D treatment and less-
than-full reciprocity, really underpinned the broa d stake of development ambitions in the Doha 
Round.  Throughout the pre-Cancún period, at Ca ncún and in the post-Cancún phases of Members' 
work led by the Chairman together with the Direct or-General, Members had been able to get a clearer 
understanding of the issues, stake out common ground and collective confidence among like-minded 
Members in terms of alliances, and as Members ap proached the new phase of  work outlined by the 
Chairman, they were in a better position to engage in  meaningful ways to move the process closer to 
engagement and negotiations, and hope fully to a satisfactory conclusion. 
101. This would be more possible if the develope d countries embraced and operationalized the 
principles of equity and balance, the letter and spir it of the Doha mandates, the full commitment to the 
principles of S&D treatment and less-than-full reci procity, and a recognition that the WTO – as the 
principal engine for strengthening the multilateral trading process – should not be used to impose 
obligations that were outside its ambit.  In the c ontext of the latter, the Philippines would include the 
Singapore issues, with the exception of trade fac ilitation, because these three issues were far removed 
from the core elements of the trading process a nd could even be counte r-productive to developing 
countries' development interests.  On agriculture, his delegation fully endorsed the statement by Brazil 
on behalf of the G-20 countries, outlining the key message of the G-20 membership, which embraced 
developing countries on a transcontinental basis.  The Philippines reaffirmed its commitment to 
engage constructively in the nego tiations in order to achieve the level of reforms, ambitions and 
development objectives clearly stated in the Doha  mandate.  His delegation exhorted Members to 
refrain from any unproductive debate on the issue of framework versus modalities, as this would 
detract from resolving the more substantive issues and the wide diversity of positions in this sector.  
Consistent with the G-20 Ministerial Declaration, the Philippines wished to st ress that the objectives, 
including the level of ambition and timeframe of th e negotiations prescribed in the Doha mandate, had 
to continue to be the guiding principle of the negotiations. 
102. As the Chairman had mentioned in his report, linkage among the three pillars in agriculture 
was necessary to a successful outco me.  The Philippines believed this was the only way in which 
balance, fairness and equity could be achieved in th e agriculture negotiations.  In line with this, his 
delegation shared the view that reform commitme nts had to be commensurate with the degree of 
distortions they contributed to in the multilateral trad ing system.  Furthermore, this balance had to be 
attained within the context of the agriculture nego tiations and without the need for payment in other 
negotiating areas.  On market access,  the Philippines shared the concer ns of the vast majority of 
developing countries on the so- called blended formula that had come out of Cancún.  Initial 
assessment of the formula showed that on the whole it was prejudicial to developing countries.  The formula did not contribute to the harmonization of  tariffs.  On the contrary, it had a tendency to 
increase tariff discrepancies.  The formula ostensib ly offered flexibility for all Members in accordance 
with their different tariff structures, but actually offered disproportionately more room for manoeuvre 
to developed countries, to the detriment of ma rket-access opportunities for developing countries.  
There was nothing in this formulation that effectiv ely linked commitments in market access to reform 
commitments in the support pillars.  In addition, no  framework or set of modalities would be viable 
without taking into account the priority concerns of rural development, including food security and 
livelihood concerns of developing countries.  Much work and consultation had been undertaken in the 
development of the concepts of Special Products  and Special Safeguard Mechanism that could 
address these concerns for developing countries.  Me mbers should continue to make efforts to refine 
these concepts and to bring them to a beneficial and logical conclusion.  On export subsidies, the 
Philippines supported calls for a specific e nd-date for export subsidy elimination. 
103. On NAMA, earlier discussions had clearly split  supporters and opponents on the level of 
ambition in Annex B of the Derbez text.  In contr ast with their position on agriculture, the developed WT/GC/M/84 
Page 34  
 
 countries insisted on a highly ambitious level of market access openings in NAMA, and that 
developing countries contribute an equal share, contrary to the principles of less-than-full reciprocity and S&D treatment.  The DDA did not aim for tariff elimination in NAMA or for harmonization, and clearly recognized the principles of S&D treatment and less-than-full reciprocity, and concern for the 
special trade, financial and development needs of developing countries in the negotiations.  Therefore, 
the formula should provide for different coefficients , the sectoral approach should be supplementary, 
and the binding of unbound tariffs by developing countries should be considered a concession by 
itself and not subject to further reduction obligations. 
104. On the Singapore issues, his delegation had not b een happy with the way this issue had been 
managed from the start, and had made this known.  The process had been artificial, non-transparent, 
and muddled.  Thus, his delegation had not been surprised that the Community had pleaded for clarity 
in the way these issues would be dealt with in future.  His delegation supported the Chairman's 
proposal on the way forward, but sought clarificatio n as to whether there was no other option than to 
reactivate the negotiating groups on the negotiating issues and the re gular bodies for other aspects of 
the DDA work programme.  The regular bodies the Chairman had referred to included the Working 
Groups on Transparency in Government Procurement,  Investment and Competition Policy, but there 
was a legal issue regarding the mandate for this work, which had expired in Cancún.  Thus, the 
reactivation of these Working Groups would have to  be submitted to Members for further discussion.  
Furthermore, the Chairman had proposed the contin uation by Deputy Director-General Mr. Yerxa of 
technical and substantive work on the issues of tr ade facilitation and transparency in government 
procurement with the objective of a decision by explicit consensus on modalities, after which these 
issues would presumably be included as part of the single undertaking.  At the most fundamental 
level, there was no basis for any convergence on transparency in government procurement, although his delegation had always insisted that trade fac ilitation was a core responsibility of the WTO and that 
everything Members did in the Doha work programme was in fact about trade facilitation.  Clarity was needed, and he recalled that in the consulta tions the Philippines had asked the Chairman to 
provide this.  Chile had asked what fell within and what fell outside the so-called single undertaking.  
It seemed that the Community used this term in a flexible sense that would include one or all of the 
four Singapore issues.  However, in Cancún, one or  two of these issues had been proposed to be taken 
entirely out of the WTO agenda.  He believed th is clarification should perhaps come from the 
Community, who was the initial demandeur and who now claimed that it would not pay for these negotiating issues, but rather considered this matter a systemic issue which had to be part of the WTO 
architecture, and that in pursuit of this systemic  architecture they would be willing to consider a 
plurilateral approach.  The Philippines asked, how ever, how a plurilateral approach would be 
consistent with the single undertaking character of th e WTO.  There was too much confusion, even in 
the way Members used terms involved in this di scussion, and before agreeing on the Chairman's 
proposal, Members should first clarify the situation.  The Singapore issues could never be the key to a 
successful Doha outcome, but could pose a big obst acle to successful negotiations, or re-engagement, 
as they had proved to be a breaking rod at Cancun.  The Philippines did not want to repeat this.  In 
Cancún, the Philippines, together with a group of  developing countries, had consistently opposed 
negotiations without explicit consensus on modaliti es.  Now the same group of countries, who 
numbered more than 70, had circulated a paper (WT/GC/W/522) that proposed flexibility on the issue of further work on trade facilitation, but was clear  on the treatment of the other issues.  Members 
should take these other issues off the agenda and no t contaminate the process of re-engagement and 
re-negotiation.  On this issue, the Philippines shared the views of the 70-odd countries that had been 
clearly articulated in the statements by Malaysia, India, South Africa and others. 
105. The representative of Malaysia
 said his own country's experience had been that trade was key 
to development.  It was on this basis that the in ternational community had taken part in successive 
rounds of trade negotiations, earlier under GATT a nd now under the WTO.  Malaysia therefore 
supported the continuing efforts to advance the DDA  negotiations.  A group of developing and least-
developed countries had jointly submitted a comm unication in document WT/GC/W/522.  These  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 35 
 
 
 countries warmly welcomed Jamaica as  an additional co-sponsor of the document since its circulation.  
The document sought to remind Members that a decision on modalities by explicit consensus was 
required before negotiations could commence on the Singapore issues.  At Cancún, a number of 
developing-country Members had expressed concern, inter alia,  about the impact that multilateral 
rules on the four Singapore issues would have on thei r policy space and the fact that they had neither 
the negotiating resources nor the capacity to impl ement obligations which such multilateral rules 
would entail.  No decision had been taken at  Cancún by explicit consensus on the modalities of 
negotiations on any of the four issues.  A number  of delegations had reminded Members of what 
Ministers had said in Cancún in terms of bringing into this new phase all the available work done at 
the Cancún Conference. 
106. Article III:2 of the Marrakech Agreement estab lishing the WTO was clear, i.e. that the WTO 
shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade 
relations.  The core competence of the WTO lay in trade in goods and services.  In the "Green Room" 
at Cancún, one major proponent of the Singapore issues was considering dropping further work on 
two issues, namely, investment and competition policy.  During further discussions in that setting, it 
became clear there was no  consensus on the need for any multila teral disciplines on transparency in 
government procurement, and hence there was a sugges tion that further work on this issue might also 
be dropped.  At present there continued to be si gnificant divergence of views among Members on the 
Singapore issues, and in the absence of explicit c onsensus, there was no basis for commencement of 
negotiations.  The co-sponsors of document WT/GC/ W/522 had therefore submitted that all further 
work on investment, competition policy and transp arency in government procurement should be 
dropped.  With regard to trade facilitation, work on cl arification of various aspects of this issue might 
continue.  However, this work should be carried out  in parallel with other segments of the Doha work 
programme, and there should be no attempt to seek an  early harvest on trade facilitation in advance of 
progress on core issues in that work programme.  Th is work also had to address points raised by a 
group of developing and least-developed countries, such as the course of compliance, justification of 
any binding rules subject to the DSU, and commit ments regarding technical and financial assistance 
to meet the costs of compliance and implementa tion of any possible multilateral framework.  After 
completion of the clarification process, a decision would need to be taken on the modalities by explicit consensus before negotiations could commence. 
107. The co-sponsors of this document were also agai nst the adoption of a plurilateral approach in 
respect of multilateral issues, because this was sy stemically unsuitable in a multilateral organization 
like the WTO, and a plurilateral approach could lead  to a two-tier system of membership that would 
be contrary to the basic character of the WTO.   If Members all stepped back just briefly and 
considered the big picture, they would appreciate the relative impact that progress in the areas of 
agriculture, NAMA, services and development issues – as compared to the Singapore issues – would 
have on the objective of expanding international tr ade and spreading prosperity.  For the time being, 
Members were bound to act in conformity with the intent that the DDA negotiations were a 
development Round. 
108. The representative of Singapore
 said the Chairman deserved to be commended for his 
determination and positive outlook.  If Members had not made sufficient progress in their negotiations 
since Cancún, it was due to no shortage of effort by the Chairman, but rather to the fact that Members 
had not shown the resolve and the political will to ac commodate each other's concerns and help move 
the process forward.  Singapore was committed to th e multilateral trading system and the DDA.  As a 
small country, but one which was hi ghly dependent on international tr ade for its livelihood, Singapore 
felt strongly about the need for a rules-based multilate ral trading system that was alive and vigorous, 
not one that languished in intensive care.  Needle ss to say, his delegation was very disappointed with 
the outcome of Cancún.  If Cancún had been successful, Members would have had at least a solid 
framework or frameworks in place to serve both as an  anchor and a compass to guide the negotiations 
in a changing political landscape.  This would ha ve greatly enhanced th e chances for a successful WT/GC/M/84 
Page 36  
 
 conclusion of the Round by the mandated deadline of 1 January 2005.  However, with the failure in 
Cancún, it was now all but a certainty that this dead line would not be met.  This was not to suggest 
that the path before Members was hopeless.  Ho wever, it would require tremendous efforts and a 
strong political commitment on the part of all Members to re-start the Doha process. 
109. In this regard, Singapore was concerned, as it did not sense – at least at present – a 
willingness to bridge the divide that existed between  Members.  While all, including Ministers, might 
have expressed a desire to see the process put back on track, Members had yet to see that desire and the generalized expressions of political support transl ated into action in Geneva.  Words were not 
enough.  There had to be political will, practical ef forts and joint action from all stakeholders in the 
process.  Notwithstanding this, his delegation was fu lly behind the Chairman's continuing efforts to 
inject new momentum into the negotiations.  The Chairman had outlined his plans for the future, 
which involved re-activating the negotiating groups and the TNC in its supervisory role.  Singapore 
would back those efforts to re-start the process, in  whichever form the Chairman deemed best.  his 
delegation hoped that over the next  few months, Members would be able to reach agreement on the 
framework texts on agriculture and NAMA.  Agre ement on the framework text on agriculture 
probably held the key to unlocking the current stalemate.  Singapore also hoped that by early in 2004, 
Members would have a clear picture of what they  wished to achieve on the Singapore issues, and 
would concentrate on those issues on which there was agreement for launching negotiations.  In this 
process, Singapore saw a continued strong oversight role for the General Council Chairman and the 
Director-General to shepherd the process and k eep it moving firmly forward and on track.  The 
Chairman and the Director-General could step in from time to time to iron out kinks in the process. 
110. The HODs consultative process need not be discar ded.  There was utility in maintaining the 
HODs process alongside the negotiating groups.  Not a ll issues could be resolved in the negotiating 
groups, e.g. the Singapore issues.  For this particul ar set of issues, Singapor e endorsed the Chairman's 
approach of continuing dedicated consultations und er a Deputy Director-General as a Friend of the 
General Council Chairman.  Some Members might comf ort themselves that this was not the first time 
that trade talks had collapsed or that a trade round ha d had to be extended.  Others might say that it 
did not matter if it took a few more years to concl ude the Doha Round.  Howe ver, Members should be 
clear about the consequences of a long delay in completing the DDA.  If the Doha Round dragged on 
without any tangible sign of progress, the main losers would be developing countries.  As The 
Economist  magazine of 20 September 2003 put it, "The humbling of the WTO not only worsens 
economic prospects for the developing countries ... but also shifts the balance of global political 
power from poor to rich ... ."  However, it would not only be the poor and small countries that would 
suffer.  If the sense of injustice and unfairness beca me too great, one way or another the problems of 
the Third World would become those of the First.  Economic globalization had also globalized the problems of poverty, terrorism and disease.  Members had spent three months trying to pick up the pieces after Cancún.  It was now time for action.  His de legation would work with the Chairman, with 
his successor, with the Director-Gen eral and with other like-minded c ountries to help put the process 
back on track. 
111. The representative of Djibouti
 said that a lot of will to give new impetus to the negotiations 
had been shown, and as a number of delegations had pointed out, Me mbers had to look forward to the 
future, and not to the past.  This was the only wa y to make progress.  Not too much should be said 
about what had transpired in Cancún.  Members would be well advised to examine how they could 
move forward and give new impetus to the negotiations  without raising too many questions at present.  
They should not focus too much on technical matte rs.  Once the negotiations were back on track, 
Members would be able to look at details, but the main thing at present was to build up momentum to 
get things moving.  In doing so, Members had to look at all aspects, including development and technical assistance, which was very important to help the least-developed countries better integrate 
into the system.  On the issue of  technical assistance, Djibouti wished to thank the Secretariat and 
Deputy Director-General Mr. Rana and his team fo r what they had done.  The developing and least- WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 37 
 
 
 developed countries represented different cases, and this  had to be borne in mind.  It was important 
that the LDCs were able to better inte grate into the multilateral trading system. 
112. His delegation hoped for the full success of the negotiations, and trusted that Members would 
be able to put the negotiations back on track and then focus on details.  Members had to make major 
efforts once negotiations got started again.  The effort had to be made without posing too many 
questions and without predicting results.  Multilateral negotiations were what they were.  Canada had 
said that multilateral negotiations should not be pr ecipitated.  Negotiations were a long process, and 
Members had to be tenacious.  This required stamina,  but all agreed that they had to focus on bringing 
new momentum to the process. 
113. The representative of Botswana , speaking on behalf of the ACP Group , said the Chairman's 
and Director-General's reports provided a concise overview of the consultations undertaken since 
Cancún to try to get the Doha work programme back on track, as mandated by the Cancún Ministerial 
Statement.  The present meeting gave Senior Officials and Ambassadors an opportunity to assess 
progress since Cancún.  However, he wished to  express the ACP Group's disappointment that the 
meeting had been diluted by combining the present issue with regular agenda items of the General 
Council.  The expectation had been that the presen t meeting would only review progress regarding the 
post-Cancún negotiations, as mandated by Ministers at Cancún.  The ACP Group had taken note of 
the Chairman's assessment of the key issues that had emerged during the consultations and of the 
possible way forward.  However, that report had onl y just been received, and consequently there had 
not been time to study it in detail.  Therefore, Botswana could only offer preliminary comments and reserved the right to come back at an appropriate time with detailed comments. 
114. The ACP Group wished to highlight the follo wing elements on the four issues to be 
considered in the next phase of work.  On agriculture and NAMA, the ACP Group believed that not only the Derbez text but also other contributions th at had been made before , at and after Cancún 
should be the starting point of the negotiations.  Cott on continued to be an issue of vital importance to 
the ACP Group and required an urgent solution.  In this regard, the ACP Group had emphasized that 
cotton should be treated as a stand-alone issue and not as part of the negotiations on agriculture.  On 
the Singapore issues, the ACP Group did not consider these issues to be fundamental to its interests at 
the present time in the Doha work programme.  The Gr oup believed that priority focus had to be given 
instead to the development issues.  If work on the Singapore issues resumed in 2004, the ACP Group 
re-iterated, among other conditions, that explicit consensus on modaliti es had to be attained before 
there could be any launch of negotiations.  The AC P countries urged their developed-country partners 
to build on the discussions that had taken place in Cancún by agreeing to remove altogether some, if 
not all, of these issues from the Doha work programme.  Of paramount importance to members of the ACP Group were the specific deve lopment-related issues such as  S&D treatment, implementation 
issues, the special situation of LDCs, the Work Programme for Small Economies and the rules governing regional trade agreements.  In this re gard, the Group wished to recall that the Doha 
mandate unequivocally identified development as the gui ding principle for the future evolution of the 
multilateral trading system. 
115. Regarding the way forward, the ACP Group had taken note of the Chairman's proposal to 
reactivate bodies created under the Doha work progra mme, but wished to request that this be done 
cautiously, given that some bodies had a specific time  period.  The General Council needed to come 
up with a clear mandate on some issues before the reactivation of these bodies.  The ACP Group was 
ready and willing to work with the Chairman and other delegations to secure the necessary conditions 
to create momentum for the full and successful implementation of the Doha work programme.  The ACP Group reaffirmed the importance of a more ba lanced and equitable multilateral trading system, 
underpinned by transparency and inclusiveness in  the decision-making process.  The Group also 
wished to reaffirm its commitment to putting b ack on track the negotiations under the Doha work 
programme on the basis of the fullest recognition of and attention to the needs and interests of WT/GC/M/84 
Page 38  
 
 developing countries, in accordance with the Doha  mandate.  The ACP Group supported the statement 
by Mauritius on behalf of the African Group and by Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs. 
116. The representative of Indonesia
 said that the Chairman's work had been useful in restoring 
Members' confidence, not just in the DDA, but also  in the multilateral trading system.  The Director-
General's relentless effort – in travelling from one co rner of the world to another to assure Ministers 
that only by showing greater flexibility could the post-Cancún work bring a satisfactory outcome – 
had also been valuable.  Indonesia wished to put  on record its renewed commitment to the DDA and 
the multilateral trading system.  In an increasi ngly globalized and interd ependent world, the 
multilateral avenue provided the best means of achieving Members' common goals and containing 
their common threat.  There was a need for all Me mbers to recommit to the multilateral approach and 
to demonstrate greater flexibility on individual short- term interests in favour of the long-term benefit 
that would accrue to all if a genuine developmen t agenda was pursued in the multilateral trading 
system. 
117. Regarding the work for 2004, Indonesia fully su pported the Chairman's proposal to reactivate 
all of the negotiating bodies as of early 2004.  For issues such as agriculture and NAMA, the 
respective negotiating bodies provided a better forum for more focus and for technical negotiations.  
The reactivation of the negotiating bodies was thus  timely.  For the Singapore issues, however, a 
political agreement first had to be reached on wh at to do on each of th ese issues before Members 
could undertake further work in this area.  In undertaking work in 2004, Members also had to set a clear timeframe.  While recognizing that the WTO had a tendency to miss deadlines, Indonesia felt 
this would help bring a sense of urgency to the work Members would be undertaking in 2004.  While 
welcoming the Chairman's plan to resume the wo rk of the negotiating bodies, Indonesia wished to 
stress that these bodies had to hold their meetings and make decisions in an open, transparent and 
inclusive way, and that all delegations should be able to take part.  The General Council's agenda 
resulting from the decisions at Cancún and at the present meeting appeared to be fairly heavy for 
2004.  Indonesia nevertheless wished to have assuran ce that this would in no way detract from the 
Council's pending and ongoing work, which should c ontinue to receive the attention it deserved. 
118. On the Singapore issues, a clear decision should be taken on what action would be taken on 
each of these issues, before any further substantiv e work could be undertaken on any of them.  In 
deciding on the action to take on the Singapore issues, developments during the last few hours of the Cancún Ministerial Conference on these issues had to be fully taken into account.  In the same vein, 
the Chairman's proposal to continue to hold cons ultations on possible modalities for trade facilitation 
and transparency in government procurement were premature.  Many of the pre-Cancún reservations 
and arguments on these two particular issues were equa lly relevant at the present time.  Thus, without 
a political decision taken to decide on the action to be taken on each of the Singapore issues, consultations for modalities would only be in vain.  As stated in the recent submission in WT/GC/W/522 by a group of developing countries, in the post-Cancún period, Members should only 
be discussing what action to take on one Singapore issu e, which was trade facilitation.  However, this 
work should be carried out in parallel with the other segments of the Doha work programme, and 
there should be no attempt to seek an early harvest on trade facilitation in advance of progress on core 
issues in the Doha work programme.   
119. On the issue of agriculture, there were still great differences among Members on each of the 
three pillars.  Progress on agriculture could only be ma de if the big players demonstrated a willingness 
to commit to reforming their distorting and protectio nist policies and thereby to creating a basis for 
fairer trade in agriculture.  His delegation appreciat ed the highlighting of the issues that were common 
interests of most developing countries, i.e. the concepts of special product and special safeguard 
mechanism.  These issues would contribute to so lving the problem of rural development, food 
security and livelihood security.  On NAMA, the Chairman had identified the three paragraphs that 
had been the most contentious in the negotiations.   These three paragraphs also happened to be  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 39 
 
 
 the pargraphs Indonesia still had problems with.  Regarding the non-linear formula, it had not yet 
been taken fully into consideration the distress that such a formula might cause and the particular conditions facing many developing countries.  Wi th regard to sectoral initiatives, Indonesia 
continued to feel that this should be on a voluntar y basis.  This was the most appropriate way to 
go in NAMA. 
120. A successful and timely conclusion to the D oha Round could only be achieved when all 
Members carried out the commitments they had ma de.  All  Members needed to show greater 
flexibility, especially on issues and concerns of de veloping and least-developed countries.  In line 
with the Doha mandate, Indonesia believed that post-Cancún, the work in agriculture and NAMA 
should aim at establishing modalities as soon as possi ble.  However, given the current negotiating 
realities, Indonesia was willing to continue to wo rk towards an agriculture /NAMA framework, as long 
as such a framework maintained the Doha level of  ambition and there was no ambiguity on the level 
of commitment to be taken by Members.  His dele gation would continue to work constructively with 
the Chairman and the Director-General to ensure  that Members could bring these negotiations to a 
timely conclusion. 
121. The representative of New Zealand
 said that it was good to hear the high level of agreement at 
the present meeting on the question of process.  In broad terms, Members seemed to be converging 
around the suggestions the Chairman had put forw ard in his statement, and New Zealand could 
certainly add its support to that.  The basis for that  seemed to be increasingly clear – the Derbez text 
was widely accepted as the effective starting point for further work.  The Doha mandate remained 
New Zealand's point of reference on the question of ambition.  The Chairman's identification of key 
issues based on the intensive consultations held also offered some of the additional guidance 
Members were looking for and had not gotten from Ca ncún.  These elements together gave Members 
at least a basis for resumption of work in the ne gotiating bodies in the early part of 2004.  Members 
could not afford to get into a situation where the re-launch of negotiati ng groups and substantive 
movement forward on the issues was held up by  unnecessary arguments about process.  Members 
were going to have to give each other the benefit of the doubt for a few months early in 2004 if they 
were to avoid this.  As the Chairman had said, Me mbers had a window of opportunity and it was up to 
them to use it.   
122. Against that background, his delegation par ticularly welcomed the positive feedback from 
both the G-20 Ministerial and the meeting between the G-20 Ministers and Commissioner Lamy, including commitments to the timely completion of th e Round.  It was also good to hear at the present 
meeting comments signalling a degree of pragmatism  on an issue that had earlier seemed highly 
problematical, i.e. the question of frameworks ve rsus modalities.  The reality was that whether 
Members talked about frameworks or whether they used some other term, the development of full 
modalities in at least the market access area – in other words, those areas where Members were going 
to need to develop schedules – would require a stag ed process, and inevitably the first stage or task 
would be to tie down both the structure and th e means by which language from the Doha mandate 
would be translated into those detailed modalities.  That was essentially what the Derbez text set out 
to do in the case of agriculture, and the same woul d have to be done for NAMA, although this was a 
little further from being achieved on NAMA.  Thus, wh atever Members called it, this was going to be 
the first task of negotiating groups in 2004.  In go ing about this, Members would have to operate in a 
different mode.  As Brazil had reminded Members, it was time to stop negotiating with Chairmen – 
Members should be negotiating with each other. 
123. Members also had to be realistic about the fact  that while they could grope their way forward 
in the Geneva process, sooner or later some political  input would be needed.  This was because the 
issues Members were confronting, including those the Chairman had identified under some of the 
specific headings indicated, were acutely political in nature.  The G-20/EU exchange the pervious 
week had already shown how critical  that political input could be.  It was likely that Members would WT/GC/M/84 
Page 40  
 
 need to look for further such opportunities to keep th is process on track through the first half of 2004.  
This would be doubly important if Members were not to lose the sense of urgency that Chile and 
others had referred to.  At the present meeting, a number of issues had been raised by delegations 
which had the potential to block progress, and many of these were issues of a horizontal nature.  
Members would need a process for dealing with these issues that could operate in parallel with the 
work of the negotiating groups.  Reconvening the TN C would obviously be part of the answer, but a 
process convened by the Chairman and his successor  that addressed, among other things, objectives 
and benchmarks for work in 2004 would be needed.  This also had been anticip ated in the Chairman's 
statement. 
124. Regarding the Singapore issues, the genuine unbundling of these issues was going to be one 
of the keys to success in this process.  It was cer tainly the key to getting the debate on the Singapore 
issues back on to the individual merits of these four very different issues, which in the view of many Members was where it should have always been.  Th e Chairman had proposed that Members continue 
work on possible modalities on two of those issues.  This seemed the obvious approach in terms of a 
first stage.  The idea of negotiations on trade f acilitation seemed to command broad acceptance, albeit 
with some qualifications, but the modalities would ne ed to be developed.  New Zealand did not think 
that modalities for this issue would call for much mo re detail than was set out in the Derbez text, but 
obviously the content would need to be looked at very closely.  Transparency in government 
procurement looked more problematical, but Members should certainly make the effort.  On the other 
two issues, Members would eventually have a mo re sensible discussion if they gave themselves a 
little more time.  In this regard, the G-20 communi qué sent a useful signal in that it acknowledged the 
delicate balance among various negotiating fronts with in the wider Doha agenda.  However, trying 
too early to find an answer that respected this de licate balance would not be helpful.  Members were 
in an extremely difficult situation after Cancún.  The fact that they were having a fairly constructive 
discussion at the present meeting, when they could easily have been in a much more uncomfortable 
situation, was very largely due to efforts of th e Chairman and the Director-General, to whom his 
delegation extende d warm thanks. 
125. The representative of Nigeria
 said his delegation fully supported the thrust of the Chairman's 
report, including the proposal to return the negotiatio ns to the negotiating bodies.  Nigeria also fully 
shared the goal of putting the DDA back on trac k, as mandated by Ministers in Cancún.  His 
delegation had contributed towards reviving the Ca ncún process and would continue to do so.  While 
there were of course some problems, the fact th at Members had not recorded much success was not 
the fault of the Chairman or the Director-General , and in fact, slow progress was good progress.  In its 
efforts to revive the negotiations, his delegati on believed that future texts coming out of the 
negotiations should be produced by the Members, who would also have ow nership and responsibility 
for them.  Efforts by Chairmen of the General Council or other bodies to produce texts on their own responsibility had created problems, and Nigeria w as waiting for the time when the membership itself 
would prepare texts and have responsibility for them .  His delegation wished to emphasize some of 
the views it had expressed at previous meetings, including the previous week's HODs meeting regarding the process and substan tive issues under consideration. 
126. Movement on agriculture would be key to achie ving significant movement in other areas of 
the negotiations.  The Derbez text, which had been u sed as the basis for consultations so far, drew 
heavily from the framework document developed by the Community before Cancún.  His delegation 
was concerned with many aspects of this text, since it did not address major issues of interest to 
Nigeria and did not contain figures.  In Nigeria's view, this text was not a suitable roadmap for future reform in agriculture, because it would not lead to  substantial reduction of trade-distorting domestic 
support and export subsidies.  The fact that there had been little progress in the consultations was an 
indication that relying mainly on this text would not yield the desired results for many delegations, 
including Nigeria.  The text should be only a re ference document, and ot her relevant documents, 
including the G-20 proposals, should be used in fu ture consultations and ne gotiations.  This would  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 41 
 
 
 help in advancing negotiations on agriculture.  The concepts of Special Products and Special 
Safeguard Mechanism, as well as S&D treatment, shoul d be given due attention in the negotiations in 
future on agriculture, because they would ensu re food security for those in need as well as 
employment and rural development. 
127. On NAMA, Nigeria was concerned about several aspects of the Derbez text.  The level of 
ambition of the developed countries was very high.  The non-linear approach proposed was not 
acceptable as the basis for tariff reduction by many developing countries, including Nigeria, since it would lead to drastic tariff cuts by developing countries and the attendant loss of revenue which was 
badly needed for development.  Nigeria was also no t in support of the mandatory approach to sectoral 
tariff elimination, and preferred a voluntary appro ach.  Furthermore, Member s needed flexibility to 
determine the scope of tariff bindings.  Issues such  as less-than-full reciprocity and S&D treatment 
should be given priority attention in the NAMA ne gotiations.  On the Singapore issues, his delegation 
was a member of the Core Group on Singapore issu es, which had submitted their views and concerns 
on both the process and substance of  consultations on this matter. 
128. No agreement had been reached to negotiate any of the Singapore issues, since the modalities 
for such negotiations were yet to be agreed.  Therefore, the Chairman's proposal on the Singapore 
issues was not acceptable.  Nigeria wished to see three Singapore issues dropped from the WTO work 
programme, i.e. investment, competition and transp arency in government procurement, while trade 
facilitation should be referred back to the Goods C ouncil for further clarification.  On cotton, his 
delegation fully associated itself with the views e xpressed by the proponents of the cotton initiative.  
This was an important matter which deserved ear ly solution, considering the difficult economic 
situation existing in the countries behind this in itiative and the specific role of cotton in their 
economies.  An early solution would assist not only the proponents, but also other cotton-producing African and developing countries who were affected by  cotton subsidies.  Development-related issues 
in the DDA deserved priority attention as Member s moved ahead with the negotiations.  It was 
therefore imperative to give more attention to S&D treatment and implementation issues as Members 
moved ahead.  Achieving meaningful progress on th ese issues would help in advancing negotiations 
in other areas of work. 
129. Nigeria fully supported the statements by Ma uritius on behalf of the African Group and by 
Botswana on behalf of the ACP Group, as also the statements by Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia on 
these issues.  The Director-General had alluded in his introductory statement to the meeting of the 
Commonwealth Heads of State and Governments (C HOGM) in Abuja the previous week at which 
they had reiterated their strong support and comm itment to the principles and objectives of the 
multilateral trading system.  They had called for the early revival of the post-Cancún process and 
timely completion of the Doha Round.  On agriculture,  they had called for the early phasing out of all 
forms of export subsidies, substantial reduction in trade-distorting domestic support and significant 
improvements in market access.  Nigeria would hold the Chairmanship of the CHOGM for 2004, and 
he would be reporting to the Chairman and the re levant bodies on inputs from the CHOGM meetings 
as they affected Members' work.  A number of de legations at the present meeting had referred to the 
need to show flexibility and had indicated their w illingness to show more flexibility in order to move 
the process forward.  Nigeria expected that these pos itive statements would be translated into reality 
in 2004.  His delegation was prepared to participat e actively and positively in the task ahead so as to 
achieve the objectives of the  DDA. 
130. The representative of Norway
 agreed that Members had come a long way from Cancún in a 
short time.  The Chairman's tireless efforts had provided Members with a clearer sense of what the key questions were, and where movement in positions  was required in order for Members to proceed 
to the final stage of the negotiations.  As the Chairm an had rightfully pointed out, real negotiations or 
movement of positions on key issues had not occurred.   In order for that to happen, political will to 
move was required from all parties.  This had not been possible in Cancún, and the political WT/GC/M/84 
Page 42  
 
 parameters did not seem to have improved since then.  It was perhaps overly optimistic to expect that 
Members would be able to deliver where Ministers had failed, but it was not clear where this left 
them.  It seemed that all were committed to the Doha Round and to making this Round a success, but 
that still more time was needed to  move the process forward towards the final negotiations.  The main 
task at present would be to pave the way for a negotiating environment where the necessary trade-offs 
were possible.  The process the Chairman had proposed  reflected this fact.  At the same time, that 
proposal seemed to take Members in the right di rection by underlining the need to build on the 
progress made in the consultations aimed at getting work back on track. 
131. Norway supported the Chairman's suggestion that all DDA bodies should be encouraged to 
resume their work early in 2004.  Members should build on the elements that had emerged in their 
work in these groups prior to Cancún, as well as wh at had been achieved at Cancún and the work 
since Cancún that had taken as its point of depart ure the Derbez text.  This would also enable 
Members to get back to the issues that had not, a nd rightly so, been in focus since Cancún.  Norway 
was particularly eager to get back to the services and rules negotiations.  Clearly, one sticking point 
was agriculture.  The Chairman's consultations had been helpful in identifying key issues that had to 
be dealt with.  He wished to add one issue which had not been mentioned by the Chairman, which was 
the substantive difficulty Norway had with the pr oposed capping of tariffs.  On NAMA, Members 
needed to develop modalities that would provide real market access, while at the same time providing 
for the less-than-full reciprocity laid out in the Doha mandate.  On the Singapore issues, Norway 
could support the suggestion to build on the general acceptance of unbundling the four issues.  Furthermore, Norway supported the proposal to continue the work on exploring possible modalities 
for trade facilitation and transparency in government procurement.  With regard to cotton, Norway 
supported the proposed way forward.  His delegation also appreciated the Chairman's points regarding 
the importance of the specific development-re lated issues as Members moved into further 
negotiations.  To sum up, on the positive side there was no sense of crisis.  Members now had a clearer understanding of the key issues and stumbling blocks.  On the other hand, Members needed to 
keep the process moving forward at a steady pace.  Experience showed that proposals and concepts 
had a tendency to have an expiry date.  If Memb ers waited too long, they might run the risk of 
missing this window of opportunity.  This might leave them with nothing but the Doha Declaration.  
This would not only be a major setback for the nego tiations, but would also pose a substantial threat 
to the multilateral trading system. 
132. The representative of Benin
, speaking on behalf of the co-sponsors of the sectoral initiative on 
cotton ,4 said that at the conclusion of the Cancún Ministerial Conference, Ministers had instructed 
officials "to continue working on outstanding issues with a renewed sense of urgency and purpose and 
taking fully into account all the views we have expr essed in this Conference."  They had also asked 
"the Chairman of the General Council, working in close co-operation with the Director-General, to 
coordinate this work and to c onvene a meeting of the General C ouncil at Senior Officials level no 
later than 15 December 2003 to take the action necessary at that stage to enable us to move towards a 
successful and timely conclusion of the negotiations ."  Members had now reached that deadline of 
15 December 2003.  He assured the Chairman an d the Director-General of the full support and 
cooperation of his delegation in discharging their h eavy responsibilities.  In implementing Ministers' 
instructions, the Chairman had he ld two rounds of consultations on the four sensitive issues – i.e. 
agriculture, cotton, NAMA and the Singapore issues – aimed at getting the Geneva process back on 
track. 
133. At present, there was no question that, generally speaking, Members would be hard put to 
claim they had achieved the results anticipated.  Thes e consultations had not led to real progress, even 
if Members had been unanimous in stating their willi ngness to be flexible and in affirming their faith 
in the multilateral trading system.  Considering the am bivalent results of these consultations, it was all 
                                                      
4 Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali.  WT/GC/M/84 
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 the more important for Members to resume the tr aditional approach to their work.  The various 
negotiating bodies and working groups should be re-activated without delay and their new 
chairpersons appointed.  Members should also go back to addressi ng the other issues arising from the 
DDA in order to take stock of the situation regardin g development issues.  With regard to the specific 
question of the sectoral initiative on cotton, Benin, on behalf of the four co-sponsoring countries and 
the group of 29 African cotton-producing and net expor ting countries, fully shared the view that a 
sense of responsibility should prevent discussions  from becoming bogged dow n on controversial 
issues of procedure which, up to the present, had been unanimously accepted and implemented 
without arousing debate, and should not therefore po se any problem.  He was referring here to the 
handling of the cotton issue on a stand-alone basis.  He recalled that at Canc ún, cotton had been dealt 
with separately as the second item on the Agenda of the Conference.  The most important thing now 
was that work should focus on seeking firm and rapi d solutions to the concerns raised, taking into 
account their trade and development aspects, which both fell – exclusively or partially – within the 
purview of the WTO.  The urgent need to settle th is matter had already been recognized by Ministers 
in Cancún, and was now even more pressing, since Members had not managed to find a just and 
equitable solution at the Fifth Ministerial Conference.  Economic trends which suggested a likely 
increase in cotton prices in the months to come s hould not in any way serve as a pretext for Members 
to shirk their responsibilities.  The four co-sponsor s of the sectoral initiative had repeatedly shown a 
spirit of openness and flexibility, and had demonstr ated their flexibility, since the sectoral initiative 
had been submitted on 30 April 2003.  They had made  major concessions, fully aware of the tragic 
situation of their populations, of the dangers which threatened their already vulnerable economies, and 
the urgency of finding an effective and equitable solution.  Since the end of April, their position had 
evolved considerably in comparison with their origin al expectations.  In spit e of the cost to their 
countries, the number of their demands had diminish ed.  The date for the start of phasing-out of 
distorting practices in cotton trade, with a view to  their elimination, had been pushed back.  The 
period for the completion of the process of total el imination had been extende d, and it had even been 
suggested that the treatment of domestic support and export subsidies should be decoupled.  In short, 
these countries had shown tremendous flexibility. 
134. No effort should be spared.  The progress a nd results Members could achieve depended on 
their collective will to move forward, by taking bold,  responsible and courageous decisions.  The four 
co-sponsors of this initiative wished to launch a sole mn appeal to all their partners, inviting them to 
start engaging in real dialogue and negotiation.  Th ey hoped that Members would not continue in the 
situation that had prevailed up to the present.  In  the almost eight months since the sectoral initiative 
had been presented, and despite contacts made by  the co-sponsors at both mu ltilateral and bilateral 
level, no firm and written counter-proposal had been  made by any of their partners.  The latest 
positions of the co-sponsors, supported by the ACP Group, the African Group and the LDC Group 
were well known and had been clearly expressed  in document WT/GC/W/516.  The co-sponsors 
maintained these positions and others  which had subsequently been endorsed by several Ministerial 
meetings in November 2003, and in particular the informal African Ministerial meeting in Cairo and 
the ACP Ministerial meeting in Brussels. 
135. These countries would welcome firm, precise and early responses to their pressing concerns 
and to their proposals, which were equally firm and precise.  They were looking for a strong and 
meaningful signal from the parties concerned, dem onstrating their will to ne gotiate and to rapidly 
resolve this problem in an equitable fashion, so  that Members could make real progress in their 
deliberations.  The credibility and image of the organization were at stake.  The way Members 
managed this issue would greatly influence interna tional public opinion, pos itively or negatively, in 
its assessment of the multilateral trading system .  In setting up the WTO, Members had recognized 
that their relations in the field of trade and econom ic endeavour should be conducted with a view to 
raising standards of living and to expanding the pr oduction of and trade in goods and services, while 
allowing for the optimal use of the world's resource s in accordance with the ob jective of sustainable 
development.  Moreover, at the end of the Doha  Ministerial Conference, Members had solemnly WT/GC/M/84 
Page 44  
 
 expressed their belief that international trade could play a major role in the promotion of economic 
development and the alleviation of poverty, and in th e need for all people to share in the benefits from 
the increased opportunities and welfare gains genera ted by the multilateral trading system.  Members 
had recognized the particular vulnerability of the least-developed countries and the special structural difficulties they faced in the global economy, and ha d also stated their co mmitment to addressing the 
marginalization of least-developed countries in inte rnational trade and to improving their effective 
participation in the multilateral trading system.  Members had a serious responsibility to honour their 
commitments.  Failure to do so would, as far as th e rest of the world was concerned, discredit the 
organization and Members' shared world view, to which Members were expect ed to be the committed 
and devoted protectors.  The co-sponsors of the sectoral initiative on cotton supported the statements 
by Bangladesh on behalf of the LDCs, by Botswa na on behalf of the ACP Group and by Mauritius on 
behalf of the African Group. 
136. The representative of Jamaica
 expressed his delegation's disappointment that despite the 
expressions by many Members of their preparedness to  engage and re-engage, very little appeared to 
have concretely changed on substance.  The present meeting,  convened at the level of Senior 
Officials, had been mandated by Ministers "to take  the action necessary ... to enable us to move 
towards a successful and timely conclusion of the negotiations."  The Chai rman and others had 
interpreted this to mean that Members should be  taking, at the present meeting, the decisions 
Ministers had been unable to take at Cancún.  D espite the Chairman's concerted efforts, dedication 
and leadership, it appeared that Members now ha d to collectively acknowledge that it was not yet 
possible to make up the ground that should have b een covered by and at Cancún.  While Jamaica 
would not call it a missed deadline, this was deeply regrettable and could have serious implications 
for the Doha Round timetable.  Regarding the Chai rman's statement, Jamaica wished to place on 
record a few comments so that its position was clear on some issues it considered very important.  His 
delegation noted the view, expressed more than once  in the Chairman's report, that if there was 
progress in certain key areas in the subjects under nego tiation, other elements would be brought along 
or would fall into place more easily.  The fact, thou gh, was that these other elements, in subjects like 
agriculture and NAMA, included issues of immense importance to a large number of Members, especially small developing countries.  An approach  that sought to move forward across the range of 
issues critical to all Members within and across ne gotiating subjects was imperative.  It was only in 
this way that many Members, developed and de veloping, large and small, would be able to 
realistically and accurately assess how their interest s were being taken on board as the negotiations 
evolved.  For this reason, Jamaica shared the con cerns of those who wished to see as much specificity 
as possible and as soon as possible.  This specificity  should seek to cover critical elements for small 
developing economies as well as for the major play ers, so that Members could make informed 
judgements about the emerging balance of interests. 
137. His delegation was disappointed that some of these elements had not been cited in the 
Chairman's detailed report, which Jamaica consider ed to be a good overview and which provided a 
balanced assessment of the current situation in many  areas.  Regarding a few matters of importance to 
Jamaica, in addition to the Derbez text, the propos als put on the table before and at Cancún were 
essential to the full reflection of the views and intere sts of all Members as they went forward.  The 
members of Caricom, for example, had made proposals on agriculture and on NAMA that were central to their interests in these negotiations.  These had not been reflected in the Derbez text.  
Particularly important were the proposals on Speci al Products and on a Special Safeguard Mechanism 
that had been introduced by some Members and that were insufficiently and inadequately reflected in 
the Derbez text.  In NAMA, Jamaica opposed manda tory sectoral tariff elimination and the use of a 
non-linear formula by developing countries, and these were elements of concern to Jamaica in the 
Derbez text.  As a cross-cutting comment and as a fo llow-up to his delegation's earlier reference to 
critical issues of importance to small developing coun tries, Jamaica wished to underscore that in both 
the agriculture and NAMA negotiations, preferences,  tariff revenue dependence, and the vulnerability 
of domestic producers, were key issues which sm all developing countries wished to see addressed  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 45 
 
 
 effectively and clearly in any framework and/or modalities that were developed, so that Members 
would be in a position to track the benefits and co sts to them of the mark et access negotiations. 
138. On the Singapore issues, Jamaica had noted th e Chairman's proposal that Members continue 
work on possible modalities for two of the four Singapore issues, namely, trade facilitation and transparency in government procurement, and that the treatment of the other two issues should be a 
matter for further reflection.  Jamaica was a co-s ponsor of the communication circulated by a large 
number of countries on the way forward on the Singapore issues (WT/GC/W522).  This proposal called for work to cease on three of the four Singapo re issues and for clarification to continue on the 
fourth, i.e. trade facilitation.  At the same time , Jamaica continued to emphasize the necessity of 
agreeing on modalities prior to the launch of negotia tions on any Singapore issue.  Further, Jamaica 
was not persuaded of the need for binding, justiciabl e obligations in trade facilitation, where the real 
need was for technical assistance and capacity bu ilding in such areas as customs modernization and 
the simplification of import and export procedures.  In this context, Jamaica noted that in what was an 
example of coherence, the World Bank – in response to the emphasis placed on trade-capacity-building
 by Ministers at Doha – had doubled its trade cap acity lending, and more than half of this 
lending now went to trade facilitation.  A third point Jamaica wished to speak to was development 
issues.  The Chairman's consulta tions since Cancún had focused on f our issues, and the Chairman had 
emphasized throughout that this wa s without prejudice to other issues on the Doha agenda.  
Nevertheless, Jamaica wished to re iterate that it was imperative that work resumed quickly and fully on 
development and implementation issues.  It was also necessary that the cotton initiative be resolved to 
the satisfaction of the proponents.  Jamaica supported the Chairman's proposal that the bodies under the 
Doha work programme be re-activat ed early in 2004.  Despite the value of the consultations held, they 
could not substitute in substance nor in transparency  for the formal negotiating structure and process. 
139. His delegation wished to note, however, that it might prove unnecessary to reactivate some of 
the bodies dealing with the Singapore issues if a deci sion were taken to cease work altogether on 
some subjects, as many countries had proposed.  Jamaica regretted that the willingness to engage 
shown by many developing countries had not been reci procated in concrete terms by their partners.  
The negotiations might be back on track, but it was not evident that the coach had begun to move.  Given this situation, Members might soon have to  admit what everyone outside the WTO seemed to 
be saying, which was that the 1 January 2005 timeframe for completion of these negotiations 
appeared to be in serious jeopardy.  It was ev ident that unless Members made rapid progress in 2004, 
this was likely to be the case, and a realistic  and meaningful roadmap would soon have to 
acknowledge this.  Jamaica would wo rk constructively with all othe r partners to seek to ensure a 
timely and successful conclusion to the negotiations.  However, his delegation would continue to 
insist that the legitimate interests of small, deve loping economies, like Jamaica, be taken fully into 
account, and this was Jamaica's para mount concern.  His delegation fully supported the statement by 
Botswana on behalf of the ACP countries. 
140. The representative of Kenya
 associated her delegation with the statements by Mauritius on 
behalf of the African Group and by Botswana on beha lf of the ACP Group.  As the coordinator of the 
African Group had said, it had not been an easy task to  try to put the negotiations back on track and to 
move the process forward.  Kenya took note of  the Chairman's report, prepared on his own 
responsibility, and of his understa nding and assessment of the current state of play.  Her delegation 
shared some of the Chairman's assessment of the resu lts of his consultations.  Kenya agreed that much 
effort had been put in and that there was a str ong sense of commitment by Members to the multilateral 
trading system and the Doha work programme, and willingness to move forwar d, as evidenced by the 
Chairman's and Director-General's report.  Howe ver, the results of the consultations had been 
disappointing, and as such, delegations had betrayed  the trust bestowed on them by Ministers who 
expected them to seek compromises and converg ence on key issues, so as to move towards a 
successful and timely conclusion of the negotiations. WT/GC/M/84 
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 141. When Members had agreed to engage in cons ultations on agriculture, NAMA, cotton and the 
Singapore issues, it had been with the understanding that these four issues would assist in unblocking 
the negotiations, and Members were expected to c over other important subjects such as development-
related issues so as to achieve the objective of Doha  – i.e. to put the development and needs of the 
poor at the heart of WTO activities.  Sadly this had not been the case.  Since Doha, many Members 
had tried very hard with their limited resources to turn development rhetoric into tangible outcomes in 
this organization, but despite their best efforts, had faced difficulties and failed to make significant 
progress.  This notwithstanding, Members needed to collectively shift gears in order to discharge the 
Doha mandate, as instructed by Ministers, without further delay.  This should include paying more 
attention to commodity issues along the lines propo sed by Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania in their 
submission in document WT/COMTD/W/113. 
142. On the issues of agriculture and NAMA, Kenya took note of the Chairman's proposal that the 
negotiating groups should continue to build on the De rbez text.  In the Chairman's assessment, he had 
indicated that the elements and the structure of that document seemed to be generally acceptable.  
Kenya did not share that view, because if that were the case, Members would have completed their 
work by now.  She recalled that Members had agr eed to the framework approach for the Cancún 
Ministerial Conference, since th ey had missed the deadlines for agreeing on modalities.  Members 
might therefore have to question the wisdom of c ontinuing with the framework approach given the 
experience they had had so far.  It had to be exam ined whether it was necessary to continue with the 
framework approach or embark on modalities as provi ded for under the Doha work programme.  On 
the Singapore issues, it was Kenya's understanding th at there was no agreement whatsoever on how 
these issues should be dealt with.  Regarding unbu ndling these issues, Kenya recalled that according 
to the Doha work programme, these four issues had distinct mandates and as such should be treated 
that way.  Kenya had a problem with some Memb ers making the interpretation that these issues were 
part of the single undertaking.  Paragraph 47 of the Doha Declaration was self-explanatory on what 
fell within the single undertaking.  Proposals by so me Members to drop some of the issues from the 
single undertaking could not be seen as a concession.  While the Chairman had proposed that 
Members could continue exploring the possibility of agreeing on modalities on transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation and c ould reflect further on the other two issues, 
Kenya felt it would be a step back from developm ents at Cancún on dropping investment, competition 
policy and transparency in government procurem ent from the WTO work programme.  The proposal 
made at Cancún should be the basis for any further reflection on the Singapore issues.  It was in this 
regard that a number of developing and least-dev eloped country Members, including Kenya, had 
submitted a joint communication in WT/GC/W/522 in  which they had made a concrete proposal to 
consolidate the gains realized in Cancún. 
143. On cotton, a solution could be found faster if cotton was treated as a stand-alone issue, given 
its importance to a number of African countries, including Kenya.  Kenya took note of the Chairman's 
proposal that Members should not get tied down with  the procedural issues on cotton, but wondered 
how this issue could be resolved if Members were  not willing to discuss it separately.  If particular 
problems facing the poorest and weakest Members were not addressed promptly, the WTO would continue to get an A+ for effort and an F for achievement, thus exacerbating the global inequalities.  
This issue was just as critical and compelling at present as it had been prior to and at Cancún.  Kenya welcomed the proposal to reinstate the negotiating bodies and the TNC.  This was a good move, as it 
would allow all Members to participate in the negot iations.  The General Council should, therefore, 
request the TNC to hold a meeting and take a decision on the resumption of work under the negotiating bodies before the General Council meeting in February 2004.  At this meeting the TNC 
might consider the establishment of a negotiatin g group to take up all implementation issues and 
concerns which had been outstanding for a long time.  The establishment of a negotiating group on 
implementation issues and concerns would de monstrate Members' goodwill and commitment to 
ensure that WTO agreements delivered the promised benefits to all.  Regarding other bodies under the 
DDA, Members needed to reflect further, particular ly on the legal implications of certain mandates  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 47 
 
 
 that had specific time periods.  With respect to the selection of Chairs for 2004, and for various 
negotiating bodies, Kenya proposed that the Chairm an consult as widely as possible to ensure a 
balanced representation.  It was not Kenya's inten tion to stand in the way of the process that seemed 
to be emerging regarding the way the Chairman in tended to revive negotia tions.  However, Kenya 
expected the issues it had raised to be taken into consideration.  
144. The representative of Pakistan  said that his delegation particularly appreciated the way the 
Chairman had been able to revive the negotiation process after Cancún.  After two rounds of intensive 
consultations, the Chairman had brought Members to a point where they were not far from a take-off 
position.  Unfortunately, as had already been noted by the Director-General and the Community, the 
support from outside Geneva had not always carried through to the Geneva process.  An example was 
the recent G-20 meeting at Brasilia.  Brazil had alre ady given a detailed account of that meeting, and 
his delegation wished only to add that the communi qués from that meeting had not fully captured the 
positive atmosphere and willingness of all to move fo rward.  In fact, there had been so much goodwill 
that Commissioner Lamy was asking for the G-20 and the Community to work together on areas other 
than agriculture.  Perhaps Co mmissioner Lamy was presuming that Members had already found a 
solution on agriculture, and so was suggesting th at Members go even further.  However, the 
Community would have to show the same flexibility Commissioner Lamy had shown at Brasilia, so that the disconnect between regional Ministeria l meetings and the Geneva process could be 
minimized. 
145. Regarding the way forward, Pakistan agreed th at the present system of selective negotiations 
with the Chair could not be carried on for too long and needed to be supplemented.  Members needed 
to negotiate with each other.  Pakistan therefor e fully supported the Chairman's proposal for the 
revival of the negotiating groups and reactivation of  the TNC to oversee progress in the negotiations.  
However, there would be a need at the same time to  continue meetings at the HODs level to guide the 
process.  Pakistan also felt that the Director-Gen eral's present approach to keeping Ministers and 
capitals involved in the negotiations and to seek their support was essential and should continue.  
Regarding specific issues, several delegations had spoken about the central role of agriculture and not 
lessening the ambition of the Doha mandate.  At th e meeting in Brasilia, Commissioner Lamy and the 
G-20 had showed their keenness to start serious nego tiations and to show flexibility.  Pakistan hoped 
other major subsidizers and countries with high ta riffs could do the same, so that Members could 
achieve some results and move forward.  On cotton,  it was important that Me mbers gave due attention 
to this issue and not bundle it with other issues.  Th erefore, Pakistan would prefer that this issue be 
dealt with as a separate item.  However, so far Members had spent too much time on process and not 
enough on substance.  The cotton issue could be cons idered as part of the agriculture negotiations if 
there was a clear indication or road map as to how Members would deal with it on a separate fast track within those negotiations. 
146. On NAMA, the framework in Annex B of th e Derbez text should be acceptable to all 
concerned.  This text was the result of diffi cult negotiations, and Members should build on this 
compromise.  As was being done on agriculture, th e Secretariat could perhaps once again do some 
simulations to show developed countries who thou ght it was not ambitious enough that all non-linear 
formulas – even if they took into account the presen t tariff levels of developing countries, as in case of 
the Swiss formula – did result in substantial tariff reductions.  In order to make progress on sectoral 
reductions of tariffs, Pakistan hoped that devel oped countries would not lose sight of the accepted 
principle of allowing less-than-full reciprocity and S&D treatment.  If marginal tariff protection of 
15-20 per cent was allowed for developing countries  as S&D treatment, Members could work on a 
sectoral basis as well.  Otherwise, the sectoral approach should be on a voluntary basis.  On the Singapore issues, it was clear there was not enough support for any further work on investment and competition policy, and Members should not persist in carrying on with these two issues.  Even the 
proponents of these issues had categorically stated th at these were not part of the single undertaking.  
Therefore, Members should concentrate their work on  the remaining two issues, i.e. trade facilitation WT/GC/M/84 
Page 48  
 
 and transparency in government procurement.  Cons idering the difficulties many delegations had with 
the frameworks in Annexes D and E of the Derbez text, Members should not shy away from trying to 
work on these texts and to draw up draft modalities so they could eventually decide on commencing 
negotiations.  On developmental is sues, although Pakistan felt that the major developmental issues 
were market access issues, which he had already briefl y covered, due attention should also be given to 
S&D and implementation issues.  In the interest of moving the negotiation process forward, Members 
had agreed that during the past two rounds of cons ultations by the Chairman consideration of these 
issues could be deferred.  Pakistan hoped that in the new year due consideration would be given to 
these issues. 
147. The representative of Burkina Faso
 said his delegation was particularly grateful for the 
Chairman's vision of the challenges ahead, and ab ove all for the Chairman's proposals aimed at 
guiding Members' discussions towards a successful ou tcome.  His delegation's statement would focus 
on this aspect, and in particular on cotton.  As a co-sponsor, Burkina Faso supported the statement by Benin on behalf of the co-sponsors of the cotton initiative, as well as the statements by Bangladesh, 
Mauritius and Botswana.  Burkina Faso wished to express its appreciation for the Chairman's 
suggestion that in dealing with the cotton issu e, Members avoid getting bogged down on procedural 
matters.    Clearly, what Members needed was concre te and constructive answers to the questions that 
had been raised, whether trade- or development-rela ted, because it had to be admitted that so far, no 
truly concrete answers had been forthcoming.  Hi s delegation continued to believe that the negative 
role of export subsidies and domestic support was larg ely responsible for the serious distortions that 
had been observed on the market – distortions that we re destroying efforts to combat poverty.  Cancún 
had seen the initiation of discussion on this issue as the co-sponsors of the cotton initiative had wanted 
– i.e. in a specific framework.  Rather than qu estioning this procedure, Members should pursue the 
Cancún process and get to the bottom of this issu e, and this clearly involved finding pragmatic 
solutions to the damage suffered by cotton producers in the least- developed countries, thus avoiding a 
collapse in those countries of what, paradoxically , was one of their most competitive sectors. 
148. Burkina Faso had heard the appeal for flexibilit y the Chairman had made from the outset of 
the post-Cancún consultations, and th ought that Members had answered that appeal.  His delegation 
had reformulated its demands several times fo r no other purpose than to seek the necessary 
compromise.  However, thus far no other Member had responded, at least not concretely.  The time 
had come for a response, and his delegation wished to  join Benin in appealing to the membership to 
step up its efforts to find a solution to the serious problem confronting them.  While Burkina Faso was 
ready to show the necessary goodwill,  it could not willingly accept solutio ns that were contrary to its 
interests and to the rules of the WTO – solutions th at would ultimately exclude Burkina Faso from the 
world cotton market.  He thanked all who had spoken out resolutely in support of the cotton initiative.  
Burkina Faso reiterated its commitment to the multilateral negotiations, to  transparency and to 
inclusiveness in the WTO negotiating process. 
149. The representative of Japan
 said that without the Chairman's commitment, devotion, 
optimism and outstanding leadership, Members c ould not have achieved as much as they had, 
particularly in the time since Cancún.  Members might not yet be back on track, but they knew where the track was and where it should lead.  His delegation also paid tribute to the Director-General for his 
untiring efforts to gauge the political temperature an d seek re-engagement at the political level, which 
had apparently been obtained.  Japan was fully committed to the multilateral trading system and the 
WTO, which embodied this system.  The successful  conclusion of the Doha Round was critical to 
strengthening the multilateral trading system, whic h comprised not only the market access aspect but 
also the rules-formulating aspect, in order to better serve the globalizing world economy of the present and future.  With respect to the way forward and how to proceed in 200 4 to further re-energize 
the negotiations, Japan generally su pported the Chairman's proposal.  On substance, he would not 
repeat Japan's well-known position, wh ich his delegation had consisten tly reiterated during the past 
months, be it on agriculture, NAMA or the Singapore issues.  As his delegation had already stated,  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 49 
 
 
 Members should rely on and build on the Derbez text  as the point of departure.  On agriculture and 
NAMA, Japan supported the work plan proposed by the Chairman in pursuit of a framework 
agreement building on the Derbez text.  This w as the most pragmatic path for advancing the 
negotiations and for assessing the overall balance.  On cotton, Japan supported the work plan 
suggested by the Chairman, namely, addressing this issue in the agriculture  negotiations, with the 
development-related aspects address ed appropriately.  On the Singapore issues, Japan took note of the 
useful efforts made so far in this area.  His dele gation wished to see all Members exercise flexibility, 
and would itself be willing to be flexible and move together with others in advancing this important 
area, wherever possible, based on the discussions held so far.  He wished to stress that Japan was 
willing to cooperate with other Members to move  the negotiations further forward under the work 
plan suggested by the Chairman , with the determination to bring the negotiations to a timely 
conclusion. 
150. The representative of Costa Rica  said his delegation was pleased to note that some progress 
had been achieved as a result of the Chairman's trem endous work – advances that had been outlined in 
the Chairman's report.  The full implementation of the Doha work programme was important not only 
in order to accommodate the interests Members might have – as Members and in their individual 
capacities – but also in terms of the need to strengthen the multilateral trading system and safeguard 
its functioning as a forum for negotiation.  Costa Ri ca therefore welcomed the Chairman's report and 
accepted the Chairman's suggestions, because it was confident that these would contribute to the 
achievement of this objective.  In spite of th e progress achieved to date, Costa Rica would have 
preferred to adopt substantive results at the present time.  His delegation recognized the complexity of 
this task as well as the responsibility of all Members, a nd thus trusted that in the next phase, the issues 
before Members would be handled pragmatically  and from a real negotiating perspective.  
Agricultural trade reform was the most significant contribution this Round could make to development, and was indeed the focus of Members'  agenda.  With regard to NAMA, his delegation 
had already expressed its concerns over the curren t text.  There were still some elements which 
prevented Members from reaching the level of ambiti on to which they aspired in this area, and to 
which they had committed themselves in Doha. 
151. With regard to the Singapore issues, Cost a Rica had said on various occasions that the 
proposed focus fell short of the progress outlined in  the Derbez text.  Specifically, there was neither 
coherence nor a parallel between the treatment of these topics and other areas of negotiation.  Costa Rica remained convinced that rules on the four Singapore issues would help strengthen the 
multilateral trading system.  Nevertheless, Costa Ri ca was aware that not all these issues enjoyed the 
same level of support and, for this  reason, had agreed to treat them on their individual merits and to 
consider solutions adapted to each of them.  His delegation was therefore willing to accept the 
Chairman's proposed procedures.  Costa Rica was confident that Members would soon reach 
agreement on the modalities for negotiations on two of these issues – trade facilitation and 
transparency in government procurement – and that in the near future they would also be able to find 
a solution to the other two issues.  This solution,  as in all other areas, should take into account the 
balance achieved at Doha.  Costa Rica reiterated its  interest in an early resumption of substantive 
negotiations, and supported the Chairman's initiative to re-activate the work of the negotiating groups.  
His delegation would cooperate c onstructively in this process. 
152. The representative of Sri Lanka
 said that Members had been instructed by Ministers in 
Cancún to meet at the level of Senior Officials not later than 15 December 2003 to take necessary 
action to enable them to move towards a success ful and timely conclusion of the negotiations.  
However, at the present meeting Members had been una ble to achieve what had been envisaged in the 
Cancún Ministerial statement.  Thus, in light of th is situation, Members needed to take a pragmatic 
approach to moving the process forward.  It w as the shared responsibility of both developed and 
developing countries to engage constr uctively and positively in finding solutions, rather than drifting 
to extreme positions.  Furthermore, all Members n eeded to give signals that they were willing to WT/GC/M/84 
Page 50  
 
 undertake commitments to ensure a collective comfor t level for all, and that all would gain from 
participation in the negotiations and from any final deal Members might make at the conclusion of the 
DDA.  In this context, a high level of amb ition in agriculture, NAMA and services would be 
important to achieve the development dimension of  the DDA.  Sri Lanka reiterated its commitment to 
the DDA, and could support the Chairman's proposed  approach to move the process forward.  His 
delegation could also agree to the key issues the Chairman had identified during the consultations.  
However, Sri Lanka wished to reiterate its position on issues of importance to it. 
153. On agriculture, Sri Lanka could agree to the De rbez text as a starting point for negotiations.  
As Sri Lanka had highlighted at Cancún, being a net-food-importing developing country with low 
bound tariffs, its interest lay primarily in the ma rket access pillar.  However, his delegation 
recognized the linkage between mark et access and the other two pilla rs.  Sri Lanka also attached 
significant importance to the concept of Special  Products and had proposed a Special Safeguard 
Mechanism for developing countries, which had now been accepted in the negotiations.  These 
concepts should be given due recognition in the framework to be agreed and in subsequent modalities, 
so that they became meaningful instruments for deve loping countries.  For this reason, his delegation 
shared the view that the concept of Special Products  should be a stand-alone concept, and the Special 
Safeguard Mechanism should be a simple and fl exible instrument.  However, his delegation 
recognized that these instruments should not be a llowed to be used for protectionist purposes. 
154. On NAMA, Sri Lanka had already stated that agreeing to a non-linear tariff cutting formula 
and a sectoral approach were important to achievi ng a high level of ambition, as envisaged in the 
Doha mandate.  However, ambition should be balanced  with flexibility.  Sri Lanka wished to reiterate 
the importance of paragraph 5 of the Derbez text.  In  terms of the flexibility to be provided under this 
paragraph, as an exception, participants with a bindi ng coverage of non-agricultural tariff lines of less 
than 35 per cent should be exempted from making tari ff reductions through the formula.  Instead, they 
would bind a percentage of non-agriculture tariff li nes at an average level that did not exceed the 
overall average of bound tariffs for all developing countries.  Sri Lanka wished to re-emphasize that 
the expected level of binding coverage for this gr oup of countries should also be the average bound 
coverage of developing countries.  On the Singapore issues, even prior to Cancún, his delegation had 
argued for unbundling the four issues, i.e. treating ea ch on its own merits.  Sri Lanka was pleased that 
there was now a general acceptance of this ap proach.  In Cancún, Sri Lanka had supported 
commencing negotiations on trade facilitation and tr ansparency in government procurement, and its 
position remained the same.  However, while Sri La nka could support continuing to address these two 
issues based on Annexes D and E of the Derbez text, his delegation believed that in order to reach 
consensus, Members needed to build on Annexes D and E in the next phase of work.  With the 
general acceptance of unbundling these issues, various options had been proposed to move the process 
forward.  The "2+2" approach seemed a pragmatic way forward which would allow trade and competition and investment to be referred to the respective working groups for further reflection. 
155. On process, in order to get the DDA back on tr ack, Sri Lanka strongly believed that the TNC 
and all the DDA bodies should resume their work early in 2004 and build on the elements that had emerged in the work undertaken since Cancún.  Re-activating all these bodies was essential, as it 
would ensure greater transparency and inclusiven ess, to which all Members were committed.  Sri 
Lanka was somewhat concerned regarding the post-C ancún process, as it had been limited to a select 
number of countries.  Therefore, re-activating all negotiating bodies would not only provide an 
opportunity to get into more detailed technical discussions, but also allow for a wider section of the 
membership to express its views and ensure its active participation.  Members also needed to inject a 
sense of urgency in the next phase of work in 2 004.  Sri Lanka attached importance to putting the 
multilateral trading system back on track, as it belie ved that multilateral solutions to trade issues 
provided wider and more equitable benefits to all Members.  Multilateralism was the best option for a 
small external trade-dependent country like Sri Lank a.  However, if multilateralism did not provide a 
level playing field and the benefits Members sought, countries like his would be compelled to look at  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 51 
 
 
 bilateral options to protect their trade and econom ic interests.  His Government had a social 
responsibility to provide and protect employment for thousands of people in a quota-free world by the 
end of 2004, in a post-Agreement on Textiles and Cl othing era.  Members needed to find increased 
market access opportunities as they diversified thei r exports.  Therefore, Sri Lanka reiterated its 
commitment to the DDA, as all would gain by its ti mely conclusion.  Sri Lanka would constructively 
participate in the negotiations, and was prepared to  undertake commitments and exercise flexibility so 
that the Doha Round would lead to a balanced outcome from which all Members could benefit. 
156. The representative of Zambia  thanked the Chairman for his efforts to reach out to many 
delegations during the consultations.  Only a process  of consultations that embraced each and every 
Member would result in a positive outcome for all Members.  His delegation had been encouraged 
when the Chairman had indicated, in his compre hensive and informative opening statement, the 
importance of transparency in the consultations.  Th at kind of spirit was most welcome and should not 
be abandoned.  His delegation ec hoed and endorsed the statements by Bangladesh on behalf of the 
LDC Group, Mauritius on behalf of the African Gr oup and Botswana on behalf of the ACP Group.  
Zambia wished to see the negotiating agenda put b ack on track.  His delegation was determined to 
play its part to ensure that nothing was done that might derail the Doha mandate, which placed 
development issues at the centre of the work progra mme.  In this regard, it was important that all 
Members had a common understanding on the prioriti es of the negotiations as set out in the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration. 
157. That Declaration called upon Members to addr ess the issues of agriculture, NAMA, S&D 
treatment and other implementation-related issues.  This, of course, did not mean that the issue of 
cotton – which was an emergency and required immedi ate action – was relegated to the back burner.  
The issue of cotton was a matter of life and deat h.  Canada had been right in saying that the 
developing and developed countries a like had to make significant moves in order to realise what all 
were looking for.  The only additio n his delegation would make to that important statement was that 
the developed countries had the capacity to move fa ster.  Zambia assured all that it too would move, 
but that due to a lack of capacity, it could not move at the same speed or at the same time as certain 
other Members.  As Members moved to fulfil their obligations, Zambia wished to state that it did not accept some of the proposals that had been made to  the effect that the IMF and the World Bank would 
assist developing countries with adjustment costs that would result from commitments taken in the 
context of the WTO.  This issue had been raised in Cancún and was still in the air.  Zambia viewed 
such proposals as only adding to its debt burden, and not as contributing to solving its problems of 
adjustment. 
158. With regard to the Singapore issues, his de legation's position was clearly spelled out in 
document WT/GC/W/522, to which Zambia fully sub scribed.  Zambia did not understand the role of 
the Singapore issues in the multilateral trading syst em.  Members needed to go back to the basics – 
which were about development issu es – as clearly stated in the Doha  Declaration.  After the present 
meeting, developing countries, especially the LDCs, would be expected to report to their 
constituencies.  Their business people anxiously waiti ng to hear how they would participate in the 
world trading system.  Their farmers wanted to know  when they would start exporting their crops to 
the European Union, other Members' markets and developed markets in the North, without facing 
serious difficulties in terms of heavy subsidies.  To his delegation's dismay, as had been stated by 
Singapore, what had been heard so far were a lo t of sweet words and diplomatic language.  His 
delegation still could not draw pr oper conclusions, which farmers a nd business people in Zambia were 
waiting to hear from their Government.  There was too much diplomacy in Members' statements.  At the WTO, Members needed pragmatism, and had to use business-like language and practice less 
diplomacy and more candidness. 
159. Members needed to ask whether they were getti ng returns on their investments in the time and 
resources spent.  The Doha Round was nearing its end, and he asked whether Members had tangible WT/GC/M/84 
Page 52  
 
 results to show for the efforts they were making.  The people of Zambia were waiting for tangible 
results.  They had placed all their hopes in what  Members were doing in the WTO.  Those from 
developing countries were in a hurry to develop, and Zambia wished to fully participate and to be a 
full partner in the world trading system.  Zambia did not wish to be an observer in the global economy.  His delegation appealed to Members to l ook at the plight of many developing countries, 
especially the LDCs, and to translate the D oha Declaration into something concrete. 
160. The representative of Grenada
 said that his delegation was fully committed to working with 
the Chairman and the Director-General in achieving the objectives agreed to within the framework of 
the DDA.  While Grenada was not completely satisfied  with the Derbez text, it was prepared to adopt 
it as one of the tenets on which further progress to wards getting the negotiations back on track would 
be based.  The other basis for recommencing the negotiations should be the comprehensive reform 
agenda contained in the DDA.  While some areas in  the Derbez text would require further fine-tuning 
and elaboration – agriculture, for example – with th e correct measure of political will and negotiating 
flexibility in Geneva, the differences would not be insurmountable.  There were some elements of the 
Derbez text on which Grenada had seen some prog ress and convergence at Cancún and since.  His 
delegation had already signaled that other areas would require continued negotiations. 
161. On NAMA, Grenada acknowledged the areas of diffi culty contained in the Chairman's report, 
which in particular highlighted the difficulties some  Members had with the suggested formula.  On 
the issue of sectoral initiatives, Grenada shared the position of othe r delegations that these initiatives 
should only be on a voluntary basis and should not be  mandatory.  As the Chairman's excellent report 
indicated, Members' continued efforts should be g eared towards achieving a balanced outcome, where 
the more developed countries provided the requisite leadership by making deep er concessions.  That 
sense of balance would still need to be pursued in the coming months, but this too was not an 
insurmountable task.  Members needed to find a solution to the cotton issue – which might not 
necessarily have to await the conclusion of these ne gotiations – whether within the framework of the 
agricultural negotiations or elsewhere.  On the Sing apore issues, his delegation was heartened by the 
approach of unbundling these issues.  This would pr ovide the basis for a clear identification of the 
precise scope of the single undertaking.  At the same  time, all Members had to be prepared to show 
flexibility if they were to achiev e their objectives within the initiall y agreed timeframe.  There was a 
limit to that flexibility, particularly where the obj ective realities of the different sizes, capacities and 
resources of Members were concerned.  Members should therefore give consideration to a three-plus-one approach, which would see the incl usion of trade facilitation as part of the single 
undertaking.  Members could continue their dialogue on  the other three issues after they had agreed to 
the process for restarting the negotiations. 
162. Chile had raised an important question as to whether Members were prepared to commit to 
concluding the DDA on the basis of the consensu s timeframe to which they had agreed.  The 
unambiguous response from Grenada was yes, and that it was prepared to re-energize the process with 
a view to meeting that timeframe.  However, if  Members could not meet the agreed 2005 time-frame, 
they should seek to complete the negotiations at th e earliest time thereafter.  Grenada recognized that 
at some stage Members would need to examine the systemic and other implications for the process of 
any such delay.  His delegation was similarly prepar ed to engage on the basis of the hybrid approach 
intimated in the United States' statement.  On th e question of framework versus modalities, Members 
should also be very flexible, and should be w illing at the level of the General Council and the 
negotiating bodies to employ whatever method would give rise to an early consensus.  He supported 
resumption of the process by February 2004.  Finall y, the Director-General's visit to the Caribbean 
had been quite beneficial, and Grenada wished to place on record its satisfaction with this 
engagement.  Pursuant to these discussions, and pr emised on the issues contained in its submission 
that morning, Grenada endorsed the pragmatic proce ss for re-energizing the negotiations outlined by 
the Director-General and the Chairman.  WT/GC/M/84 
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 163. The representative of Cuba  said his Government remained firmly committed in its search for 
a more balanced and equitable multilateral tradi ng system, in which transparency and effective 
participation by all Members would become an incr easingly tangible reality.  In this connection, the 
developing countries had demonstrated their interest in playing a constructive part in the process and 
undertaking commitments , while the key players in internatio nal trade seemed to have failed in 
general to become involved in such efforts.  This had again prevented Members from achieving 
concrete results, as Ministers had agreed in Cancún,  for the successful conclusion of the negotiations.  
His delegation believed that the main players woul d have to show true po litical will in reaching 
meaningful decisions in the trade sphere, especially  on issues relating to development and agriculture.  
In view of this, negotiations would have to begin in  February 2004 in order for Members to be able to 
continue with a positive negotia ting scenario in this process. 
164. His delegation, along with those of other deve loping countries, had also demonstrated its 
support in moving the multilateral process forward th rough a commitment to ensure that the Doha 
work programme succeeded.  Cuba had engaged in  those efforts together with various other 
delegations and fully endorsed Bo tswana's statement on behalf of the ACP Group, Brazil's statement 
on behalf of the G-20 countries, and the statemen ts made on behalf of the African Group and the 
LDCs.  The G-20 had emerged strengthened from the r ecently held Ministerial meeting in Brasilia as 
a major player in a constructive dialogue in search of effective liberalization of agricultural trade, 
capable of accommodating the needs of developi ng countries and the complex realities of the 
international economic scene.  His delegation w as encouraged by the G-20's establishment of a 
common stance, since the agriculture negotiations we re central to the successful implementation of 
the Doha Agenda.  These principles should be reflected in any frame work working towards 
modalities, to ensure that the negotiations on agri culture led to substan tial reduction in domestic 
support, significant expansion of market access, th e elimination of export s ubsidies, and operational 
and effective S&D treatment.  All of the former  should address the developing countries' food security 
and rural development concerns, as well as the s ituation of countries that were dependent on 
preferences. 
165. Regarding the Singapore issues and in line with the document co-sponsored by Cuba 
(WT/GC/W/522), Cuba endorsed the position that the issues of investment, competition policy and 
transparency in government procurement should not  be included in the WTO agenda.  Regarding 
trade facilitation, the process of clarification should  be pursued and explicit consensus reached on any 
decision concerning modalities, before the negotiatio ns began.  It was unacceptable that developing 
countries who were not demandeurs in this area would have to bear the financial costs of 
implementing any agreement that might come out of negotiations in this area.  His delegation, along 
with others, underscored the importance of the st atement by the Chairman, whose consultations had 
revealed the need to focus in 2004 on specific devel opment-related issues and to give full attention to 
S&D treatment, implementation, the Work Programme  on Small Economies, as well as the remaining 
working groups dealing with development matters.  This included the Working Groups on trade, debt 
and finance and on trade and the transfer of technology  – bearing in mind the need to restore the Doha 
Agenda's development dimension.  The integrit y of the Doha Agenda was the key to these 
negotiations.  His delegation suppor ted India's proposal to establish a negotiating group specifically to 
handle development issues in the context of th e working groups under the Doha mandate.  Cuba 
considered that in addition to using the Derbez text  as a starting point, account should be taken of the 
remainder of the proposals, as reflected in the Cancún  Ministerial statement.  Cuba would continue to 
play a constructive role in the negotiations, giving pr iority to the interests of developing countries.  It 
was important that the programme that would enab le Members to pursue their task early in 2004 
should include the ingredients necessary to move the negotiations ahead in a realistic way, and that 
Members should gain confidence and credibility in the process.  To achieve those objectives, Cuba 
fully supported the re-activation of the nego tiating groups and the TNC as soon as possible. WT/GC/M/84 
Page 54  
 
 166. The representative of Uruguay
 said that the Chairman's and Dire ctor-General's efforts had, in 
a short period of time, made it possible to jump-s tart the negotiation process following Cancún.  As 
the Chairman and the Director-General had noted in  their report, there was a sharp contrast between 
the clear statements of commitment to the Round at  a political level, and the very clear lack of 
flexibility in positions around the negotiating table in Geneva in order to move forward in key areas of 
the negotiations.  This flexibility was a necessary pr erequisite for the new phase of the Round, which 
would be starting up early in 2004.  Political w ill should of necessity be reflected in negotiating 
positions.  At the present stage of the process, all Me mbers had an obligation to contribute, but it was 
the major trading partners who should lead th is process of rapprochement and finding common 
ground, giving the necessary signals of flexibility.  On the key issues in th ese negotiations – issues 
which the Chairman had identified in his report – and on the state of play that the Chairman had given 
on each of these key issues, Uruguay agreed with the Chairman's analysis.  This could be used as 
Members resumed work in 2004 on a constructive and realistic basis.  His de legation would not refer 
now to each of the points identified in the Chairm an's assessment, but rather when work in the 
negotiating groups was resumed. 
167. His delegation wished to stress the key and centr al role of agriculture in these negotiations, 
and that any progress Members made in this area woul d be the best incentive to resolve many pending 
conflicts of interest and other aspects of the negot iations.  Within agriculture, the elimination of 
export subsidies by a certain date should now be a necessary condition.   Uruguay also joined those 
who had said it would be appropriate that Member s concluded these negotiations within the agreed 
timeframe.  The Chairman's suggestion that work  in the negotiating groups be resumed was the 
appropriate way to proceed.  Members also needed to  re-start the TNC.  However, doing all of this 
would not necessarily imply movement in these grou ps, and would not  have any meaning if Members 
did not start off this new phase of negotiations by recovering a sense of urgency, as many delegations 
had said at the present meeting.  A greater willingness to compromise was also required.  
168. The representative of Guatemala  said that in general, his delegation accepted the Chairman's 
approach.  Guatemala was committed to the multilatera l trading system and believed that in the long 
run, multilateralism would provide Members with the b est results for all, particularly for those with 
small economies such as Guatemala.  For some mont hs the Chairman had been asking Members to be 
flexible, but it seemed that Members had not yet fu lly understood this request.  Flexibility was key to 
moving these negotiations forward.  In virtually al l statements that had been made at the present 
meeting, Guatemala had heard the word "flexibility".  Members needed, however, to be able to define 
it.  According to one Spanish dictionary, flexibilit y meant (i) a willingness to bend easily;  (ii) in a 
conflict, easily bowing to the opinion, the word or the position of another or others;  (iii) not being 
subject to strict rules or dogmas;  and (iv) su sceptible to change or variation according to 
circumstances or needs.  Any of these four defin itions could apply to the present situation.  Every 
Member needed to be flexible vis-à-vis the DDA a nd not vis-à-vis its own interpretation of it.  The 
Doha mandate would bring Members to a scenario of greater economic liberalization, not one in 
which they maintained the status quo – a scenario of even greater protectionism.  Those Members 
with freer economies than others should by definitio n have fewer problems in being flexible.  Those 
who had greater distorting elements in their economi es would have greater difficulties in showing this 
flexibility.  Members could exercise flexibility in each  of the four key areas addressed in the course of 
the consultations, and would then realise that in a pplying this principle properly in order to comply 
with the Doha mandate, they would have an almo st immediate balance, and the pieces of the puzzle 
would begin to fall into place.  Without sufficient flexibility shown by all, be they small, medium-
sized or large countries, Members would not be able  to move forward towards the next phase of the 
negotiations.  Flexibility was where Members needed to focus their end-of-year thinking to give new 
energy to the process early in 2004. 
169. The representative of Zimbabwe  supported the statements by  Mauritius on behalf of the 
Africa Group, Botswana on behalf of the ACP Group, Bangladesh on behalf of the LDC Group,  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 55 
 
 
 Brazil on behalf of the G-20 countries, and Mala ysia on behalf of the Core Group on the Singapore 
issues.  His delegation wished to highlight three issues.  In accepting the De rbez text as the basis for 
further negotiations, Zimbabwe trusted that all th e other proposals and suggestions submitted before 
and at Cancún would be taken into account, in order to have fair and balanced negotiations.  With 
regard to the Singapore issues, Zimbabwe hoped th at a decision would be taken by the General 
Council to drop all four of them from the WTO ag enda and to concentrate on the core issues of 
market access, agriculture and S&D treatment.  His delegation hoped that by reactivating the work of 
the negotiating groups, a clear ma ndate would be given to adhere to the DDA and work towards 
finalizing the modalities in NAMA and agriculture. 
170. The representative of Morocco  said that in spite of the efforts of the Chairman and the 
Director-General, and even though some positive resu lts had been achieved since Cancún, the process 
was not yet back on track.  In endorsing the statem ent by Mauritius on behalf of the African Group, 
his delegation wished to express its full support for the Chairman's approach.  Morocco regretted that 
in spite of all the effort made thus far, Members had been unable to move ahead with the initial plan 
outlined by Ministers in Cancún.  However, while  divergences still remained, the problems were not 
insurmountable.  Morocco agreed with  the Chairman's analysis of the situation and with his proposed 
approach for dealing with the key issues, as well as with the suggested arrangements for pursuing 
work at the beginning of 2004.  The Chairman's proposal was logical and coherent, and Morocco wished to launch an appeal for the resumption of negotiations as soon as possible.  
171. The Derbez text contained positive elements th at should be preserved, consolidated and 
exploited, particularly in the areas of agricultu re and NAMA.  The reactivation of all of the 
negotiating groups in these areas would unquestiona bly enable Members to move forward and to 
adopt a comprehensive and balanced approach, re flecting the interests of all participants and 
incorporating the development dimension as a fund amental element of the Doha Round.  In this 
connection, Members had to draw inspiration from th e spirit that had guided the consultations leading 
to the adoption of the Decision on the Implementati on of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.  Restarting the negotiations required the political commitment 
of all Members as well as their commitment to the mu ltilateral trading system and to the DDA.  As 
the Director-General had said, the time had come to  transform the political will expressed by all into 
genuine flexibility in the negotiations.  The present s ituation called for acts, rather than professions of 
faith.  What was needed was a proper distribution of  liberalization efforts among all Members, which, 
in turn, clearly presupposed the effective participa tion of all in the Doha Round of negotiations, and 
the full implementation of what had been ach ieved during the Uruguay Round.  Moreover, the 
proposed process could not genuinely succeed unless Members found a proper solution to the question of selecting chairpersons for the negotia ting groups.  Morocco called on the Chairman to 
ensure, during the consultations to be held at the beginning of 2004, that the choice of chairpersons responded to the appropriate criteria, taking account of the importance of the current context, the 
overloaded work schedule for the coming year, the sens itivity of the subjects to be dealt with, and the 
deadline for the next Ministerial Conference.   
172. His delegation also hoped that discussions in the board to be appointed by the Director-
General  to improve the functioning of the Secretariat would help facilitate the substantive work 
Members would be called upon to perfo rm at a later stage, and would contribute to providing suitable 
answers and appropriate solutions to the growing pa ins the organization was currently experiencing.  
The shock all had felt at the failu re of Cancún had increased the at mosphere of uncertainty and the 
feeling of mistrust among Members.  Given the scale of that event , this was perfectly logical.  
However, the history of multilateralism suggested th at these situations, which were often short-lived, 
merely presaged sounder progress and more solid achi evements to come.  Morocco hoped that this 
would turn out to be the case in the weeks ahead and urged all to  work towards that end.   WT/GC/M/84 
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 173. The representative of Venezuela
 said that the wisdom and leadership of the Chairman had 
proved instrumental in bridging positions and bringing sides together in the search for renewed 
momentum that would enable Members to resume  the work that had been assigned to them by 
Ministers at Doha.  According to the Chairman's statement, three major elements had emerged from 
the post-Cancún consultative process:  (i) key issu es and possible solutions;  (ii) maintaining the 
primacy of the development dimension envisioned at Doha;  and (iii) strengthening the multilateral 
forum of the WTO as a legitimate sphere in which to discuss trade relations in the context of the 
global economy.  However, one thing Venezuela ha d learned in the period of reflection following 
Cancún was that the negotiating process was an open one, that it should be synergic with its own 
momentum and, as Switzerland had said, that Members should undertake negotiations without 
trepidation and without seeking to negotiate overly-ha sty results.  Her delegation had also gained from 
the learning experience of this process, which had been open and substantive and had related to the 
realities faced by people in the multilateral environment. 
174. The Doha Declaration recognized the need for all peoples to benefit from the increased 
opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral tr ading system could generate, and stated that 
international trade could play a major role in  the promotion of economic development and the 
alleviation of poverty.  It was therefore important  to take into account the indicators in the United 
Nations Human Development Report for 2003, which re vealed the following:  (i) The number of poor 
people had increased from 6 to 24 million in Easter n Europe and Central Asia, from 40 to 57 million 
in Latin America, from 5 to 6 million in the Middle East, and from 241 to 315 million in Africa;  (ii) over a billion people struggled for survival on less  than a dollar a day;  (iii) one child in five 
worldwide did not complete primary school;  (iv) in the developing world, the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
was spreading at an increasing pace, with 20 million deaths, 42 million cases and 14 million children having lost one or both parents in 2001.  Further, it was very significant that 800 million people, approximately 15 per cent of the world's populati on, suffered from chronic hunger, a fact which 
proved that food security should be a priority in the agricultural  negotiations. 
175. This record of the critically poor worldwide showed that the Doha mandate, whose objective 
was to address the concerns of de veloping countries to achieve real  integration into international 
trade, was unquestionably the essential guide for future work.  It should be made very clear that it was 
not a matter of re-launching the Doha work programme , but rather of preventing further delays in the 
negotiating schedule.  This implied reactivating a ll of the bodies involved in the negotiating process 
through action which translated the political will of governments into tangible progress by 
negotiators.  Development issues had to be treated as a priority, rather than diverting efforts away to 
issues that were not a priority.  It was also necessary to retain a sense of urgency in addressing development issues, so that the problems of poverty and social exclusion could be tackled 
successfully.  The aim of such an  agreement was not merely to prevent any shrinking of the Doha 
mandate, but to fundamentally maintain c onfidence in the multilateral trading system. 
176. On the negotiations on agriculture, her delega tion welcomed and applauded the Chairman's 
proposal on the issues under review.  Venezuela endorsed the statement by Brazil on behalf of the G-20 countries which made it clear that progress in these negotiations was conditional on a significant reduction in domestic support, in export subsidies and in other measures which distorted world 
agricultural markets.  On cotton, Venezuela belie ved that this was not merely a technical or 
procedural issue, but required ur gent and substantive decisions, as it was an issue upon which the fate 
and the lives of thousands of families depended.  Th is issue should therefore be addressed from this 
point of view and with due urgency.  Venezuel a supported the co-sponsors who had introduced the 
cotton initiative. 
177. Headway on NAMA remained dependent on progr ess in the agriculture negotiations.  It 
should be borne in mind that S&D treatment im plied recognizing not only longer timeframes for 
developing countries, but also the necessary margin  required by such countries to be able to  WT/GC/M/84 
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 implement the agricultural, industrial and technologica l policies that would enable them to bridge the 
widening gap separating them from industrialized countries.  On the Singapore issues, the only one that could truly help to implement the Doha mandate  was trade facilitation, and this issue alone should 
be addressed, concurrently with the developm ent issues under the Doha Agenda.  Venezuela 
supported the submission from a number of count ries in WT/GC/W/522.  Her delegation would  
continue to strive to bring the work to be undertak en in 2004 to a successful conclusion.  Venezuela 
wished to recall that international trade was set in a framework of comprehensive development which 
should encompass inclusiveness, tr ansparency, coherence and equity, and in which S&D treatment, 
technical assistance and capacity-building – the cross-cutting threads which made these negotiations 
possible – should be present in order to ensure good governance, quality of life and the promotion of 
peace.  Her delegation was sure that Members w ould secure a consensus on these objectives in this 
multilateral forum.   
178. The representative of Namibia
 said that his delegation had noted of the progress reported by 
the Chairman and the Director-General in the consultations after Cancún, and affirmed its commitment to completing the work programme agre ed at Doha.  The setback of Cancún had been a 
missed opportunity.  Pessimists had said that Members had gone to Cancún with an empty bowl and 
had returned home with a broken one.  However, hi s delegation was optimistic and confident that the 
process would be brought back on track.  Namibia wished to stress its unwavering support for the 
multilateral trading system and for the Doha declar ations and decisions.  Namibia associated itself 
with the statements by Botswana on behalf of the ACP Group and by Mauritius on behalf of the 
African Group.  His delegation also supported calls for renewed urgency to cover the lost ground and 
to inject much-needed momentum in the process, in  order to realize the objectives Members had set in 
Doha.  In this regard, Namibia ca lled for renewed political will from developed partners, and for this 
to be translated into concrete practical realiti es and results.  All Members needed the DDA to succeed, 
and Namibia was ready to contribute to the process. 
179. Of paramount importance to Namibia was redre ssing the balance in favour of development 
issues, as enunciated and encapsulated in the DDA .  Therefore, implementation-related issues and 
S&D treatment remained high on its agenda.  For the Doha Agenda to succeed, Members had to live 
up to the spirit of the Doha mandate and to do so faithfully, openly and creatively.  It was time to 
move away from entrenched and fixed positions and to apply innovative thinking, in order  to move 
the overall negotiations forward with urgency.  Me mbers should now try to move beyond the rhetoric 
and to intensify their work to transform the Doha objectives into concrete results.  Regarding the four 
key issues outlined by the Chairman, agriculture was the key to unlock the current logjam.  This was 
crucial for the development of developing countri es, and it was imperative that the developed world 
assumed the political leadership to move the pro cess forward.  The cotton issue should be addressed 
as a stand-alone issue and not be linked to the negotiations on agriculture, and Namibia asked 
Members not to backtrack from the political will shown and support given by Ministers in Cancún.  
By moving as Namibia suggested, developed part ners would demonstrate their dedication and 
commitment to addressing the development concerns of the poor within the WTO.   
180. On the Singapore issues, Namibia was willing to show flexibility and to engage in the process 
constructively, and would therefore study new pr oposals and ideas with an open mind.  On NAMA, 
Namibia appreciated the linkages of the NAMA negotia tions to the agriculture  negotiations and hoped 
that the balance would help Members to eventual ly establish modalities in these two critical areas.  
His delegation also attached great importance to finding a solution to the problems of the dependency 
of many developing countries on a few commodities and the associated problems created by long-term declines and pronounced fluctuations in the pr ices of these commodities.  On the organisation of 
future work, Namibia welcomed the reactivation of all the negotiating bodies as well as the TNC in 
2004, and wished to emphasize the need for inclusiv eness in this process.  Is sues were clearer than 
they had been earlier, and Namibia hoped to move with the required speed to conclude the DDA on 
time.  However, 2004 should not be seen as the magi c year to deliver the results of Doha.  This WT/GC/M/84 
Page 58  
 
 required pragmatic efforts and the need to infuse impe tus into the process, as well as the political will 
to exercise the necessary flexibilit y and compromise in search of common solutions for the challenges 
posed by global trade.  It had been said that ta lking trade was talking freedom, but Namibia would say 
that implementing free and fair trade was ensuring world peace and liberty. 
181. The representative of Ecuador
 said that his delegation was committed to supporting the 
Chairman's efforts.  Ecuador was convinced that the multilateral trading system was an instrument 
capable of producing real benefits for all partic ipants, provided there was enough political will and 
commitment to recognize that the development di mension needed to be incorporated in these 
negotiations.  In this respect, Ec uador considered that the Doha ma ndate provided the right framework 
to pursue the negotiations, and agreed that negotiatio ns should be resumed as soon as possible in all of 
the respective groups.  Members should begin by d ealing with the four areas identified by the 
Chairman, without neglecting any of the other subj ects, which were equally important in seeking a 
balance and success in this process, in particul ar the cross-cutting principles that guided the 
participation of the developing countries. 
182. It was particularly important that Members c onsidered the following elements, which were 
fundamental and derived from the DDA:  Progress in the process as a whole should take place in a 
context of concrete progress in agriculture.  For Ec uador, this issue was at the very heart of the 
negotiations and comprised the need for substantia l reductions in subsidies, in particular the 
elimination of the blue box, the establishment of a ceiling and strict criteria for the green box, and 
ambitious targets and timeframes for the reduction of  amber box commitments.  A specific date also 
needed to be established for the elimination of expo rt subsidies.  Most of the assistance programmes 
for developing countries should be covered by S&D treatment provisions.  Less aggressive tariff cuts, 
and market access for non-agricultura l products should take account of  the development dimension.  
To try to agree on a date and a non-linear tariff reduction formula in the industrial sector when there was no ambitious commitment in the agricultural sect or was to neglect the fair balance that should 
prevail in the negotiations.  It was therefore es sential to establish differential concessions for 
developed and developing  countries, and to adopt a voluntary sectoral reduction mechanism for the 
developing countries.  On the Singapore issues, as Ecuador had repeatedly stated, it did not oppose the initiation of negotiations on any of these issues, but these issues could only be addressed if there was 
clear and concrete progress in the negotiations on agriculture.  With respect to government 
procurement, the negotiations should be lim ited exclusively to transparency aspects. 
183. Ecuador agreed with other delegations on the n eed to define the scope and coverage of the 
negotiations to decide how the work should be or ganized, both in capitals and in Geneva.  Ecuador 
wished to see a strengthened multilateral trading sy stem based on common rules and regulations that 
reflected the recognition of the differences be tween countries through S&D treatment for the 
developing countries and the LDCs, founded on the pr inciples of balance and equity, and that would 
permit the enhanced presence of the developing coun tries in world trade in agricultural products, non-
agricultural products, services and intellectual property.   This priority was shared by many Members 
and should be a priority for all.  It was time for th e much-vaunted benefits of free trade to manifest 
themselves as tangible and credible benefits for a ll, and not merely as the exclusive privilege of a 
handful of Members. 
184. The representative of El Salvador
 said that at the present meeting, his delegation would have 
liked to have had more concrete results enabli ng Members to advance the DDA.  However, it was 
realistic and important for Members to maintain their objectives throughout the present phase, in the 
form of achievable goals.  El Salvador agreed with  the Chairman's assessment that one of the most 
significant results of the recent consultations was th e reaffirmation of the commitment of all Members 
to the multilateral trading system.  In this respect, the time had come to transform the political will 
expressed during both rounds of consultations into  concrete action, involving a convergence of 
Members' positions, in order to provide the necessary impetus to put the process back on track as soon  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 59 
 
 
 as possible.  The messages which had come out of th e visits by the Director-General to El Salvador 
and subsequently to Tegucigalpa for the regiona l meeting for Central America and Mexico had 
demonstrated the firm commitment of El Salvador to the multilateral trading system and to the successful conclusion of the DDA.  With regard to future work, El Salvador considered it appropriate 
to continue on the basis of the progress made to date, with the Derbez text serving as the foundation.  
El Salvador had taken note of the Chairman's repor t, which his delegation considered objective, and 
agreed with the Chairman's proposal on how to pro ceed.  His delegation hoped that in the very near 
future, i.e. the first few months of 2004, Member s would be able to agree, through a transparent 
procedure, on the reference framework necessary to give fresh impetus to the work of the negotiating 
groups and thus to make substantial progress in the work entrusted to Members under the Doha 
mandate. 
185. The Chairman
 said5 he would not try to make a full summary of what had happened over the 
past one and a half days.  Given that there had been 52 interventions, many of them on behalf of 
groups of countries, he felt that the positions of the vast majority of Members had been expressed.  
These positions and views were not particularly new to  him, but the usefulness of this exercise was 
that countries had been able to put on record positions  and views that they had expressed over the past 
eight weeks informally during the consultations.  Th is added value to the work.  Although the present 
meeting had not brought a major breakthrough in the work, all had acknowledged that Members had 
made progress, that the key issues were clearer, that Members knew the challenges they would have 
to face, and that while the Round was not yet back  on track, they had made considerable progress in 
that direction.  He had not sensed from the meetin g any sense of failure, crisis or disappointment.  
Rather, he had seen a pragmatic approach that more  time was needed in order to deal with the 
unfinished business Ministers had given Members in Cancún and that Members had tried to implement over the past few weeks.   
186. There had been a reconfirmation of engagement, and commitment to the DDA and the 
multilateral trading system had been highlighted by  all.  He had even seen – as a positive feature – 
renewed support for efforts directed at trying to fini sh the Round on time.  This was a positive feature, 
because at times during the recent consultations, ma ny had questioned the da te of 2004.  At the 
present meeting many delegations had committed themse lves to do their utmost to try to fulfil that 
mandate.  However, as he had sensed during the cons ultations and had reflected in his report, he had 
not seen at the present meeting any closing of the gap between expressions of flexibility, commitment 
and engagement and a translation of these into ne w negotiating positions that would allow Members 
to look for common ground or to accommodate the pos itions of others. This was work that would 
remain pending for the next few weeks.  If Members wanted to make progress, they had to recapture 
the sense of urgency that seemed to have evaporat ed, as some delegations had said, and they had to 
narrow the gap between expressions of goodwill a nd commitment, and their translation into 
negotiating positions.  Political determination an d willingness to make compromises was the name of 
the game for the next few weeks and months ahead.  He still felt that Memb ers had a small window of 
opportunity to move forward, and they needed to use it to the fullest. 
187. Regarding the future process, he sensed that hi s proposal had been generally accepted.  There 
was a willingness to restart the work of the negotia ting groups and of other bodies dealing with the 
Doha agenda, on the understanding that restarting this work did not in any way mean losing an overview of the process or a sense of the horizontal  integration of the issues, which in his view 
remained an essential ingredient for success.  He also  felt that by identifying certain issues, his report 
gave a sense of direction and guidance as to future work.  He sensed that all wished to build on the 
progress and valuable work achieved so far, a nd avoid unravelling what had been done.  Some 
delegations had raised procedural questions or questions which comb ined procedural and substantive 
                                                     
 
5 The full text of the Chairman's closing rema rks was subsequently circulated in document 
JOB(03)/227. WT/GC/M/84 
Page 60  
 
 elements concerning difficult issues on which ther e was so far little convergence among delegations, 
such as the Singapore issues.  He reiterated what he had already highlighted in his report with regard 
to these issues, which was that the work Members had already started would continue.  This meant 
that Members would continue to explore the possi bilities of agreements on a multilateral approach on 
trade facilitation and transparency in government proc urement, and that this work would take place at 
the level of the General Council with assistance from Deputy Director-General Mr. Yerxa.  He had 
not made any proposals with regard to the working groups.  
188. All Members would understand that in such a situation concerning these issues, he as 
Chairman could not further clarify matters on which the membership had not yet found common ground.  The problem was not lack of clarity from the Chair, but rather l ack of agreement among 
Members.  These were issues on which further refl ection and consultation would be necessary, and he 
agreed strongly with those who had cautioned against trying to negotiate with Chairs.  Members could 
be sure that Chairs did not want this either.  The urgent need was for serious negotiation among 
Members.  As he had said in his report, the Counc il Chair and the Director-General, who was also the 
TNC Chair, would continue to ensure the mainte nance of a horizontal sense of the work programme, 
and as he had noted, some issues might require furt her consultation on how to take them forward.  
Views expressed at the present meeting, as well as in  previous consultations , would of course form 
part of the context of any such future consultations. 
189. He proposed that the General Council take note of his statement as well as of all the other 
statements that had been made duri ng the consideration of this item. 
190. The General Council so agreed
. 
2. Iran – Request for Accession (WT/ACC/IRN/1) 
191. The Chairman  drew attention to the communicati on from Iran in WT/ACC/IRN/1 requesting 
accession to the WTO Agreement pursuant to Article X II.  He recalled that the General Council had 
last considered this matter at its meeting in October, and had agreed to revert to it at the present meeting. 
192. The representative of the United States
 said that the issue of Iran's accession to the WTO 
continued to be under review by  her Government, and her delega tion had nothing to add to its 
statement at the October meeting of the General Council. 
193. The representative of Tanzania , speaking on behalf of the Informal Group of Developing 
Countries , said that these countries took note of the statem ent by the United States.  They hoped that 
the United States would complete its review soon a nd would be able to provide a positive response on 
this issue at the next meeting of the General Council. 
194. The General Council took note  of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next 
meeting.  
3. China – Transitional Review under Section 18.2 of the Protocol of Accession to the 
WTO Agreement (WT/GC/75, G/L/664, S/C/20, IP/C/31, WT/BOP/R/73) 
195. The Chairman  recalled that Section 18.2 of the Pr otocol of Accession of China to the WTO 
Agreement (WT/L/432) provided that:  "The Genera l Council shall, within one year after accession, 
and in accordance with paragraph 4 below, revi ew the implementation by China of the WTO 
Agreement and  the provisions of this Protocol.  The General Council shall conduct such review in 
accordance with the framework set out in Annex 1B and in light of the results of any reviews held 
pursuant to paragraph 1.  China can also raise issu es relating to any reservations under Section 17 or  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 61 
 
 
 to any other specific commitments made by other Members in this Protocol.  The General Council 
may make recommendations to China and to  other Members in these respects."  
196. The General Council's first review had been conducted in December 2002.  Paragraph 4 of 
Section 18 provided that this review should take  place each year after China's accession for eight 
years, with a final review in the tenth year or at an earlier date decided by the General Council.  In 
accordance with Annex 1B of China's Protocol of Accession, the following issues were to be 
addressed by the General Council:  (i) reports of s ubsidiary bodies on China's implementation of the 
WTO Agreement and of the related provisions of the Protocol;  (ii) development of China's trade with 
WTO Members and other trading partners;  and (iii ) recent developments and cross-sectoral issues 
regarding China's trade régime.  He proposed that, in addressing this agenda item, delegations address 
all three of these points in a single intervention.  In connection with the review, he drew attention to a 
communication from China in document WT/GC/75,  which provided information required in 
Sections I and III of Annex 1A of the Protocol of  Accession.  The reports of the subsidiary bodies on 
their respective reviews of China's implementation of the WTO Agreement and of the related provisions of the Protocol of A ccession were contained in documents G/L/664, S/C/20, IP/C/31 and 
WT/BOP/R/73. 
197. The representative of China
 thanked the Chairs of all the s ubsidiary bodies for their reports.  
Just a few days earlier, China had celebrated the second anniversary of its accession to the WTO.  
During the past two years there had been a great  enhancement of the Chinese people's awareness of 
the organization.  In spite of the setbacks in Ca ncún for the current round of negotiations, China's 
commitment to the multilateral trading system remained as strong as ever.  There was unabated 
enthusiasm among the Chinese people to study WTO rul es, to discuss the impact of China's accession 
on economic and social life and to  get ready to meet, in a pos itive manner, the huge challenges 
brought by WTO accession.  The dramatic chang es in China and the rapid growth of its economy 
were drawing ever-growing attention in the world.   The Chinese Government had made tremendous 
efforts to fulfil its WTO commitments in a serious a nd responsible manner.  Si nce the first transitional 
review in 2002, and in spite of all the difficulties – such as the uncertainty of the prospects of the 
world economy and the rapidly-changing domestic ci rcumstances in China – the Chinese Government 
had adopted a whole series of positive measures to  meet its WTO obligations, including measures to 
amend legislation in order to strengthen the legal fra mework and to enhance transparency in its trade 
policies, to lower import duties for the purpo se of expanding market-access opportunities and 
improving the investment environment.  The ge nerally positive comments on China's performance by 
the 16 WTO subsidiary bodies were a fair refl ection of China's efforts and achievements. 
198. Since 25 September, transitional reviews had been conducted by the 16 subsidiary bodies 
within their respective terms of reference.  In his delegation's view, the process so far had been 
positive, useful and constructive in the sen se that it had strengthened understanding and 
communications between China and its trading part ners.  The Chinese Government had devoted a lot 
of resources to the review process.  The work of preparation and collection of data and information 
had involved more than 30 Government agencies.   Since September, 17 delegations with over 
100 experts from various Government agencies had come to Geneva for the reviews.  During the 
whole process, these experts had done their best to provide relevant information in accordance with 
paragraph 18 of China's Accession Protocol, had list ened carefully to the opinions and concerns of 
China's trading partners and had engaged in a po sitive dialogue.  This was conducive to further 
improvement of future work.  He wished to st ress the following issues which his delegation believed 
were relevant to the review work in the General Council. 
199. First, regarding fulfilment of the transparency  obligation, his Government attached great 
importance to this matter.  During the two years si nce China's accession, more than 400 notifications 
had been made under various WTO agreements.  As  required by Annex 1A to China's Protocol of 
Accession, a large amount of information had been  submitted in advance of the reviews in the WT/GC/M/84 
Page 62  
 
 subsidiary bodies.  China had also submitted the re quired economic data and other information to the 
General Council.  Following its accession, China ha d put emphasis on public comment in the process 
of drafting laws and regulations.  Many foreign-fund ed enterprises in China had participated in this 
process directly, and many of their comments and op inions had been taken into account in the drafting 
of relevant regulations.  In an effort to prom ote a better understanding by Government officials at 
national and sub-national levels of WTO rules and Ch ina's commitments, and to enable them to better 
fulfil these commitments and participate in WTO ac tivities, the Government had organized extensive 
training programmes for these officials. 
200. Second, regarding the review and enforcement of  laws and regulations, in order to meet its 
WTO commitments, the Chinese Government was gradua lly adapting its domestic legislation to WTO 
requirements and rules through the implementation of various legislative programmes.  The draft of 
the law on foreign trade had been adopted in the ex ecutive meeting of the State Council and had been 
submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for review.  Furthermore, development and modification of la ws and regulations relating to or  having an impact on trade had 
already been incorporated into the agenda of legislation, including the law on commercial banks, 
regulations on import and export duties, regulations  on protection of intellectual property rights at 
customs, regulations on the origin of import a nd export goods, and regula tions on certification and 
accreditation.  Third, regarding the uniform impl ementation of the trade regime and legislation 
review, China had set up a working mechanism allo wing enterprises or individuals to make proposals 
to relevant bodies for review of an y inconsistency between laws, regul ations and other measures.  As 
a result, the State Council had addressed 33 written pr oposals for review of conflicts between local 
measures and national legislation br ought forward by relevant bodies, enterprises and individuals.  At 
present, another 35 proposals were under review.  The ongoing reforms in ad ministrative mechanisms 
and government bodies had also laid a solid foundation for uniform enforcement of trade regimes.   
201. Fourth, with respect to recent developments and cross-sectoral issues regarding China's trade 
regime, the trade regime of China was improvi ng in accordance with WTO rules and China's 
commitments.  The Government was now in the process of further streamlining the procedures for 
approvals under the principles of rationality, e ffectiveness, openness and accountability, and to 
improve administration work according to the laws .  The introduction of a number of reforms had 
changed the previous traditional trade management m ode into a more effective, fair and transparent 
one.  The spirit of a market economy under WTO rules had been incorporated into the whole economic management system.  He wished to reitera te that China had always taken its commitments 
seriously.  His delegation thanked all the Members for their active participation in the review process.  
All of the comments and concerns of Members had b een taken note of by China's experts, who would 
carefully study the specific issues and seek solutions in consultation with Members. 
202. As a result of China's implementation of its co mmitments, its average tariffs for agricultural 
products had been reduced to 16.8 per cent in 2003 and would be lowered further to 15.1 per cent by 
2005 – compared to the world average tariff of 62 pe r cent on agricultural products.  This represented 
a major opening of the Chinese agricultural market.  In 2003, China's tariffs for industrial goods had 
been reduced to an average of 10.3 per cent, which would be further lowered to 9.3 per cent in 2005.  
In addition, 100 per cent of China's tariffs on indust rial goods were bound.  Due to all the measures of 
liberalization taken by the Government, China's impo rts had grown rapidly over the past two years.  
In 2002, China's imports had increased by 21 per cen t to reach US$295 billion.  In the first 9 months 
of 2003, its imports had expanded further, by 40.5 per cent, to reach US$298 billion.  China's total 
trade surplus would be narrowed from US$30 billion  in 2002 to about US$15 billion in 2003.  The 
environment for foreign investment had greatly improve d due to the efforts of trade liberalization.  In 
the first nine months of 2003, total foreign inv estment had amounted to US$40.2 billion, an increase 
of 11.9 per cent over the same period in 2002.  Accord ing to a recent survey by a foreign chamber of 
commerce, 93 per cent of the foreign companies surveyed which had invested in China expressed  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 63 
 
 
 optimism for their business over the next five years.   His delegation wished to express its sincere 
thanks to Members and to the Secretariat for the spirit of understanding and cooperation shown.  
203. All delegations who spoke expr essed appreciation to the Chinese delegation, including the 
experts from capital, for their enormous efforts in  the course of the review exercise, and to the 
Chinese representative for his comprehensive statement. 
204. The representative of the United States  said that as Members wrapped up the current year's 
Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM) for China, her delegation wished to share its views on how 
that review had gone, and to discuss more broadly China’s WTO implementation record in its second 
year of WTO membership.  The United States recogni zed the enormous amount of time and effort the 
TRM required.  In its view, the 2003 review had gone relativel y smoothly.  This ha d been due in large 
part to the time and effort spent by the Chinese delegation, along with its experts from capital that had 
attended the TRM meetings.  The United States had al so made an effort to use regular Committee and 
Council meetings throughout the year to undertake mu ch of the preparatory work for the TRM.  In 
that more routine setting, her delegation had rais ed implementation questions with China and had 
generally received informative responses, which had he lped to clarify the matters that needed to be 
addressed more fully during the TRM meetings.  Me mbers now had before them the reports of the 
various Committees and  Councils that had conducted their respective 2003 reviews under the TRM.  
Procedurally, these reports showed that important qu estions had been raised, and that China for the 
most part had been responsive.  The TRM activiti es in the TRIPS Council, for example, had been 
especially useful.  However, in other Committees and Councils, such as the Council for Trade in 
Services, the results had been more uneven.  As  Members looked ahead to 2004, her delegation still 
believed that this exercise was useful, positive a nd constructive – to use the words of the Chinese 
representative – and that there was still room for improvement in the handling of the TRM.  The 
United States looked forward to working with China and other delegations to improve this important 
exercise. 
205. Substantively, the reports from the subsidiary  bodies reflected the important progress China 
had made in implementing its WTO commitments, while also reflecting areas where more progress 
was needed.  Overall, while her delegation recogni zed that much remained to be done, it welcomed 
the progress China had made, and continued to make, in implementing its WTO commitments.  China had taken steps to correct systemic problems in the administration of its TRQ system for bulk agricultural commodities.  It had opened its motor vehicle financing sector, and reduced capitalization 
requirements in the insurance sector.  It had so lved outstanding concerns that had prevented its 
membership in the WTO Committee of Participan ts on the Expansion of Trade in Information 
Technology Products.  In some areas, her delega tion noted that China ha d even accelerated the 
implementation of its commitments.  For example, Ch ina had lifted certain geographic restrictions in 
the insurance sector ahead of schedule.  It had also lifted quotas on certain industrial products ahead 
of schedule.  China had achieved this progress ev en in the face of substa ntial challenges in 2003, 
including a major leadership change, a difficult na tional SARS epidemic, a sizeable restructuring of 
the Government’s economic and trad e functions, and the need to confront a host of dislocations 
inherent in its transition from a planned economy  to a more market-oriented economy.  The United 
States also recognized and welcomed the impor tant contribution China's economic progress was 
making to global growth.  China’s trade with Members was an importa nt engine for global 
development. 
206. However, expanding trade, no matter how impressive, was not the sole indicator of 
improvements in fairness, predictability, transparency  or other systemic market reforms that were the 
true measure of WTO implementation.  China's work was still incomplete, and opportunities for 
selective intervention by Chinese Government officials in the market were pervasive.  Indeed,  in a 
number of areas China's implementation efforts over th e past year had been disappointing.  In her 
delegation's view, looking back over 2003, China's WTO implementation efforts had lost a significant WT/GC/M/84 
Page 64  
 
 amount of momentum.  In a number of different sectors, China had fallen short in implementing its 
WTO commitments, offsetting many of the gains made  in other areas she had mentioned earlier.  The 
agriculture sector provided a good example.  Impor ts by China had increased significantly in 2003, 
but US and other Members' trade officials had fr equently had to engage China to contain the 
disruptive effects of various proposed or actual restrictions imposed by China’s agricultural 
authorities.  In the area of  intellectual property rights, the United States welcomed China’s efforts to 
bring its legal framework up to TRIPS Agreement st andards.  However, effective enforcement of 
intellectual property rights was still weak.  Her de legation urged China to make intensified and 
sustained efforts to improve its enforcement of inte llectual property rights, particularly through much 
more effective use of criminal remedies. 
207. With respect to the cross-cutting issue of tran sparency, her delegation recognized that some 
Chinese Ministries and agencies had taken steps to improve opportunities for public comment on draft 
laws and regulations.  However, China's overall effo rt was characterized by uncertainty and the lack 
of uniformity.  Her delegation also had serious concerns in several sectors where China's regulatory authorities had adopted policies designed to limit ma rket access to major foreign businesses, or 
designed to favour domestic produc ts over imported products.  For example, China's regulatory 
authorities had imposed high capital requirements on foreign businesses in a number of services sectors.  China had also adopted tax policies that  appeared to discriminate against a number of 
different types of imported produc ts.  Although still in draft form, China's new automobile policy 
raised serious national-treatment and other concerns.  An area of particular concern, as Members looked ahead to 2004, involved China's important commitments on trading rights and distribution 
services.  These commitments affected a wide ra nge of sectors in China’s economy, and full 
liberalization in these areas was required by 11 D ecember 2004.  It was essential that China got these 
commitments right, and the United States looked forward to China taking steps to implement these commitments well in advance of the deadline.  Th e United States was encouraged that the Chinese 
Government, at senior levels, had recently indicat ed its resolve to expand trade, intensify economic 
cooperation, implement its WTO commitments and fu rther open its markets.  Her delegation looked 
forward to these statements being transformed into c oncrete actions in the coming year.  In sum, the 
United States appreciated the efforts China had ma de in 2003 in implementing its WTO commitments 
and participating in the current year's TRM exerci se.  Her delegation looked  forward to improvements 
on both fronts in 2004 and beyond, and was committed  to working with China and other Members in 
this important undertaking.  
208. The representative of the European Communities
 said that China's statement had provided a 
helpful overview of the review and China's implem entation process.  The Community was grateful for 
the documents and statements prepared in the cour se of the review – which it knew had involved a 
considerable amount of work – and also wished to th ank the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies for their 
reports.  He recalled that in 2002 the Community had listed a number of con cerns with regard to 
China's implementation of WTO commitments.  Howeve r, as 2002 had been the first year of China's 
accession, his delegation had maintained a cautious optimism.  In the current year, with two years passed since China's accession and while recognizi ng a number of positive developments, there were 
grounds for some serious concerns on a number of implementation issues.  These related either to 
questions flagged in 2002 but which remained unresol ved, or to new problems that had appeared in 
the past 12 months.  On the positive side, the Co mmunity welcomed the progress made by China in 
bringing its legislation closer to its commitments  or general WTO rules in a number of areas.  For 
example, the Community – as the United States had mentioned and had set out more fully than he 
would at the present meeting – welcomed China's decisions to lower capital requirements in the 
insurance sector, thus bringing them more into line with international practice.  His delegation also 
welcomed the publication of the law on automobile  financing, even though the latter was slightly 
behind schedule, as well as – in the area of SPS – th e lifting of the ban impos ed on Dutch products of 
animal origin imposed without, in the Community's opinion, scientific justification.  The Community 
also very much welcomed the accession of Chin a to the Information Technology Agreement.  WT/GC/M/84 
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 209. However, having said this, on the negative side the Community had identified a number of 
key concerns that the discussions held in the context of the TRM exercise had not really dispelled, and 
had sometimes even confirmed.  The present meeting was not the place to provide an exhaustive list.  
These concerns were described in detail in the Community's written submissions to the various 
Committees and Councils involved in the TRM.  Howeve r, he wished to at least mention three broad 
areas.  First, the introduction of restrictions not  foreseen under China's Protocol of Accession and 
which limited the access of foreign companies to a number of key sectors.  This was notably the case 
in the services sectors – of major importance to the Community – of banking, telecommunications and 
construction.  Second, the setting up in some areas of a multifaceted industrial policy which impacted 
very negatively on the activity of foreign firms.  He wished to mention here the example of the 
automobile sector – which had already been cited by the US – where, among other areas, the Chinese 
authorities had confirmed their plan to set up separate distribution channels for imported and locally produced cars, which would impose a tremendous burden on foreign manufacturers and which might 
– as the Community understood it – soon cause the Community's industry to be confronted with new potentially very damaging legislation on tari ff reclassification of parts in vehicles. 
210. Third, there were a number of horizontal issues, such as enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, the granting of trading rights, and rights to import and export to foreign companies, which the Community hoped would be brought into compliance w ith China's commitments in the context of its 
future foreign trade law.  He wish ed to reiterate a point his delegation had made in other bodies, that 
the Community's assessment was that the current year's  exercise had been rather mixed.  Although his 
delegation had obtained some very useful clarif ications on several matters of concern, the 
Community's overall impression was that it had not been possible to obtain satisfactory replies to a 
number of questions.  His delegation shared China's view that this exercise was of considerable 
importance.  Therefore, along with other Members,  the Community was keen that this exercise be 
conducted in such a way that it did not become a pur ely formal exercise without real substance.  The 
WTO implementation issues raised by the Community  during the present year's TRM were priorities 
for the Community's industry.  His delegation w ould of course continue to pursue these issues 
throughout 2004, both in the context of regular ac tivities of the WTO and in bilateral meetings with 
the Chinese authorities, and looked forward to working with China to ensure that the next year's TRM 
exercise was more productive and led to a greater degree of common understanding.  In the meantime, 
he wished to thank the representative of China and hi s colleagues for their efforts in the current year's 
review. 
211. The representative of Japan
 commended China's efforts to im prove the effectiveness of the 
review process and expressed appreciation for th e mutual understanding that had been achieved.  
There had been instances, however, in which th e explanations received had not fully addressed 
Japan's concerns.  His delegation wished to encour age China to make furthe r improvements in this 
regard by the earlier submission of relevant r esponses and information.  Japan looked forward to 
continuing consultations with China concerning issues of concern through various channels. 
212. The representative of Korea  said his delegation wished to congratulate China on the second 
anniversary of its accession to the WTO.  Korea appreciated the tremendous efforts of the Chinese 
Government in implementing its WTO accession-rela ted commitments in a faithful manner.  Korea 
recognized that this was a difficult and challenging task for China.  Rather than going into details, his delegation wished to take a positive approach a nd to note the progress China had made in meeting 
these challenges during the past year.  Korea hoped, lik e others, that China would continue its efforts 
to meet its commitments within the framework of its accession Protocol, and looked forward to China 
engaging actively and positively in the TRM exercise in the years to come. 
213. The representative of Australia
 said his delegation wished to congratulate the representative 
of China and the Chinese delegation for its very comprehensive statement under this item on China's 
accession related commitments.  Like others, Australia welcomed the significant progress China had WT/GC/M/84 
Page 66  
 
 made since joining the WTO in implementing its accession commitments.  In anyone's assessment, 
this had been a major achievement.  As a resu lt of China's accession, trade and commerce between 
Australia and China was growing very rapidly.  Ho wever, he wished to foreshadow his delegation's 
interest, as China knew very well, in China's tariff-ra te quota administration.  Australia welcomed the 
clarification China had already provided concerning its future plans for some products, but there was 
still some uncertainty regarding wool, and his delega tion looked forward to discussing this issue with 
China in the relevant Committees. 
214. The representative of Chile
 said the report China had presented showed a very notable macro-
economic development in China's economy – China was perhaps unique, given the current world economic context, in being the only Member to regi ster an increase in imports of over 40 per cent.  
Chile was certain that these results were the produc t of major and deep transformation, which were 
bound to cause difficulties and become concerns for other Members.  Chile wished to express its 
recognition and acknowledgement of this, because Ch ina had been able to listen to these problems 
and, in the particular case of Chile, had responded effectively and promptly to solve one particular 
problem.  Chile wished to put on record its appreci ation to China for this very constructive attitude. 
215. The representative of China
 thanked all delegations who ha d spoken for their comments and 
positive evaluation of the efforts and performance by China in implementing its WTO commitments.  He had listened carefully to all the issues and concer ns raised.  However, his delegation did not wish 
to repeat what it had said in the subsidiary bodies and to enter into detailed discussions on those issues 
at the present meeting.  Experts in his delegation had taken good note of the points raised and would 
study them carefully.  China's long-term developm ent goal was to build a well-off society in the 
coming two decades.  In order to realize this objectiv e, China would continue to  open wider to the rest 
of the world and to further expand its trade and economic operation.  His delegation hoped that in 
future the transitional review woul d be conducted in a more smooth a nd, if possible, more simplified 
manner, to meet Members' shared objectives and to th e benefit of all.  He again wished to express 
appreciation to the Chairman and to all dele gations for their unders tanding and cooperation. 
216. The General Council took note
 of the statements and of the reports submitted by the 
subsidiary bodies on the conduct of their respective reviews, and agreed  that the second review by the 
General Council  of China's implem entation of the WTO Agreement and the provisions of its Protocol 
of Accession had been concluded. 
4. Work Programme on Small Economies – Report by the Chairman of the Dedicated 
Sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development  
217. The Chairman  recalled that at its meeting in Febr uary and March 2002, the General Council 
had taken note of a framework and procedures fo r the conduct of the Work Programme on Small 
Economies, under which this Work Programme w ould be a standing item on the General Council's 
agenda.  The framework and procedures also pr ovided that the Committee on Trade and Development 
would report regularly to the General Council on th e progress of work in its Dedicated Sessions on 
this subject. 
218. Mr. Mansour (Tunisia), Chairman of the Dedi cated Sessions of the Committee on Trade and 
Development , said that since his most recent report to the General Council in Octobe r,  there had been 
no meetings of the CTD in Dedicated Sessions on small economies.  However, work was continuing, with some Members currently revising some of  the proposals in WT/COMTD/SE/W/3 for the fuller 
integration of small and vulnerab le economies into the multilateral trading system.  At the Dedicated 
Session on 17 October, it had been agreed that th e authors of that document would revise some of 
their proposals and would present them to the next Dedicated Session, which would also examine any 
additional proposals Members might wish to submit, including specific suggestions for how to resolve 
the trade-related problems of la nd-locked developing countries.  WT/GC/M/84 
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 219. The representative of Paraguay  thanked the Chairman of the Dedicated Sessions of the CTD 
for his report.  Paragraph 35 of the Doha Declara tion spoke of achieving a better integration of the 
small and vulnerable economies into the multilatera l trading system, and of not creating another 
category of Member.  This was fully in line with th e task outlined by Ministers.  Pursuant to the 
mandate of the first international conference of de veloping, landlocked countries, transit and donor 
countries and the financial institutions for interna tional development on cooperation in the area of 
transit transport held within the framework of the United Nations in Kazakstan in August 2003, 
Ministers from several developing landlocked count ries – some, Members of the WTO, and others in 
the process of acceding to the WTO, such as Af ghanistan, Albania, Azerbeijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Kazakhstan, Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, Paraguay, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia , Zimbabwe, Nepal and Laos – ha d reviewed the report of the 
CTD in Dedicated Sessions on small economies.  In this context, they had put forward a series of 
recommendations which had been distributed at the Cancún Ministerial Conference to all Members in 
document WT/MIN(03)/W/23.  It was in that framework that the resp ective delegations had 
committed themselves to putting forward a proposal, in order that the marginalization suffered by 
many developing countries – and which was a danger faced by many  others – could be discussed.  
This concern had been reiterated by Ministers since the First Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in 1996, and subsequently again in  Geneva in 1998, in Doha in 2001 and recently in Cancún.  As the 
CTD Chairman had said in his report, this was a matter which these delegations hoped would be 
tackled and discussed by Members in this framework. 
220. The General Council took note
 of the statements and of the report by the Chairman of the 
Dedicated Sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development. 
5. Review of the Exemption provided un der paragraph 3 of GATT 1994 (WT/L/512) 
221. The Chairman  recalled that paragraph 3(a) of GATT 1994 provided an exemption from Part II 
of GATT 1994 for measures under specific mandatory legislation, enacted by a Member before it became a Contracting Party to GATT 1947, which prohi bited the use, sale or lease of foreign-built or 
foreign-reconstructed vessels in commercial applicat ions between points in na tional waters or waters 
of an exclusive economic zone.   On 20 Decembe r 1994, the United States invoked the provisions of 
paragraph 3(a) with respect to specific legislati on that met the requirements of that paragraph.  
paragraph 3(b) of GATT 1994 called for a review of th is exemption five years after the date of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement – and thereafter every two years for as long as the exemption was 
in force – in order to examine whether the conditio ns which created the need for the exemption still 
prevailed. 
222. In December 2002, the General Council had agreed, inter alia , as follows:  (i) that under the 
two-yearly cycle provided in paragraph 3(b) of GATT 1994, this exemption would have to be 
reviewed again in 2003;  (ii) that the General Council would come back to the issues raised at previous meetings of the General Council in the context of the review to be conducted in 2003;  
(iii) that this review would be on the Agenda of the first meeting of the General Council in 2003, and 
that the Chairman would invite interested delega tions to submit comments and questions to the US 
regarding the operation of the legislation under the exemption, to which the US would be invited to 
respond.  These questions and responses, together w ith the annual report to be provided by the US 
under paragraph 3(c) of GATT 1994, would form the b asis for the review;  (iv) that for the purposes 
of the review, this matter would be on the agenda  of subsequent General Council meetings in the 
course of 2003 as the Chairman deemed appropriate or at the request of a Member;  and (v) that at its 
meeting in December 2003, the General Council would be  invited to take note of the discussions held 
in the course of the review until then, take any ot her action it might agree on, and take note that the 
subsequent review would no rmally be held in 2005. WT/GC/M/84 
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 223. The General Council had also taken note that , as provided in paragraph 3(e) of GATT 1994, 
this exemption was without prejudice to solutions  concerning specific aspects of the legislation 
covered by this exemption negotiated in sectoral agreem ents or in other fora.  He further recalled that 
in February 2003, the General C ouncil had considered this matter – as well as an annual report 
circulated by the United States in document WT/L/512 – and had agreed to revert to this review at a 
future meeting.  At the October General Council me eting, he had indicated, under "Other Business", 
that as agreed in December 2002, this matter would be on the agenda of the present meeting.  In 
connection with the consideration of this item at th e present meeting, he wished to draw attention to 
two communications recently received from Japan and the European Commun ities.  These had been 
circulated as documents WT/GC/W/520 and 521, respectively. 
224. The representative of the United States
 said that her delegation stood ready to participate in a 
review of the exemption under paragraph 3 of GA TT 1994.  This was the third review of this 
exemption.  The United States had continued to provide Members with annual statistical reports 
pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 3(c) of the exemption.  These reports provided detailed annual reporting of vessel orders and deliveries from US  shipyards, as required by paragraph 3(c).  As 
promised when this review had been initiated at  the first General Counc il meeting of 2003, her 
delegation had tried to break out of the cycle of st erile debate on the nature of the review, by hosting 
an informal consultation where interested dele gations had been free to discuss issues without 
prejudice to their national positions.  Her delega tion had been pleased with the high level of 
participation in this meeting and had welcomed the lively give and take.  The United States had also 
done its utmost to respond to questions that ha d been put to it on a more formal basis. 
225. The representative of Japan
 said that his delegation attached great importance to conducting a 
substantial review of the exemption provided fo r in paragraph 3 of GATT 1994.  In order to 
contribute to a more substantive and effective di scussion in the current review process, Japan had 
submitted a communication in document WT/GC/W/520 raising several points to which Japan requested the United States to respond.  As that document contained the details of Japan's concerns 
and questions, he would not go into  any detail at the present meeting,  but wished to say that Japan 
wished to actively participate with all other Members in this review process. 
226. The representative of the European Communities
 thanked the United States for its statement 
and for the consultation it had hosted on this ma tter.  The Community, like Japan, had submitted a 
number of questions to the US which had been ci rculated in document WT/GC/W/521, and wished to 
thank the United States for the replies to these qu estions which his delegation had recently received 
and which he understood would be circulated to  Members in due course.  The Community was 
reviewing those responses, which in part sugg ested consulting a number of US websites of 
government agencies, something which the Comm unity had not yet done.  Accordingly, his 
delegation would not yet judge whether the replie s represented a fully satisfactory response to its 
questions.  On previous occasions when this item ha d been on the agenda of the General Council, the 
Community had made clear its general position on th e scope and purpose of this review, and it stood 
by those points. 
227. The representative of Australia  said that as Members came to the final stages of the third 
scheduled review of the exemption under paragr aph 3 of GATT 1994, many of the issues that had 
been raised regrettably remained unanswered.  Continuing different perceptions on the nature of the 
review were at the heart of this problem, although Au stralia wished to reiterate its firmly held view 
that what was required was a substantive review of th is exemption.  While efforts by the US to bring 
an expert on the "Jones Act" legislation covered by  the exemption to Geneva for informal discussions 
were appreciated, and while Australia welcomed the latest answers provided by the United States, the 
reality was that most of Australia's substantive c oncerns with the legislation had not been addressed.  
Australia's primary driving force in this issue w as its concern at the overarching impact of the US 
restrictions.  All access for vessels for commercial operations was effectivel y constrained through the  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 69 
 
 
 Jones Act restrictions on merchandise and passenge r transport vessels, as well as restrictions on 
documentation.  These effectively limited imports to personal vessels, while the areas where Australia 
had significant comparative advantage – such as cruise vessels and fast ferries – were effectively excluded.  While the US continued to claim that  there had been no change in circumstances that 
would warrant any adjustment to the laws covered by the exemption, his delegation continued to be 
confused about a number of aspects of how the legislation itself worked, and its questions about how 
waivers operated under the legislation or how provisi ons on "US-built" were interpreted by the Coast 
Guard had not been answered in any detail.  In  addition to these commercially motivated concerns, 
the review itself had turned into a largely ster ile and meaningless discussion.  Australia did not 
believe that obligations were properly met by mere ly submitting statistical information and saying that 
the conditions warranting an exemption still prevailed.   The unilateral nature of this assertion was also 
troubling, as this was surely something that was fo r the membership as a whole to determine.  Thus, 
his delegation looked forward to cont inuing consultations on this subject. 
228. The representative of Norway
 said that this was an important issue for Norway as the waiver 
in essence made it very difficult to sell ships to  the United States.  Thus, his delegation had 
participated and intended to continue to participat e actively in the consultations on this matter.  
Norway still believed that the review should focus on  the salient point of paragraph 3(b), which was 
the examination of whether the conditions which crea ted the need for the exemption still prevailed.  
Members needed to move beyond discussing me rely the statistical information submitted under 
paragraph 3(c) and address also the conditions necess itating the exemption.  His delegation wished to 
note that a number of questions had been put to th e United States concerning previous notifications 
and the effects of the legislation.  Depending on th e answers and on the content of the next submission 
of the United States in 2004, Norway reserved its right to present further questions to the United 
States and to consult, as appropriate, in the General Council or elsewhere. 
229. The representative of Panama  said his delegation wished to re iterate its concern regarding the 
way legislation notified by the United States under paragraph 3 of GATT 1994 was being interpreted 
and applied.  His delegation had already spoken in the past of the need to explore other options 
offered by paragraph 3(e) of GATT 1994.  Panama wished to stress again the importance it attached to seeking solutions to specific questions raised by le gislation notified in other forums or even at the 
bilateral level.  Over the past two years, his de legation had had constructive technical discussions with 
the United States.  While Panama was not in a position, for the moment, to announce that it had 
settled its differences with the United States, his de legation wished to thank the United States for the 
opportunity to discuss with its authorities in Washingt on and in Geneva the technical aspects of this 
matter.  His delegation urged the United States to  look into the possibility of settling the specific 
issues raised by Panama concerning the way in whic h the legislation in question was being interpreted 
and applied, with the firm intention of finding sp ecific solutions to the specific problems the notified 
legislation posed for Panama.  His delegation was c onfident that this approach offered the possibility 
of leading, finally, to the path Members had been seeking in vain over the past few years, and that 
Members would ultimately be able to reach a mutual understanding on this matter. 
230. The representative of Hong Kong, China
 said that his delegation appreciated the opportunity 
to review again the exemption provided in para graph 3 of GATT 1994, and recalled its wish to see a 
meaningful and substantive review undertaken.  In  this regard, his delegation welcomed the US 
initiative of bringing in an expert for informal  consultations with c oncerned delegations and 
answering some factual questions.  This constr uctive approach had helped to provide factual 
information for the purpose of facilitating the revi ew.  However, notwithstanding this constructive 
exchange, Hong Kong, China remained disappointed that the core purpose of the review, which was 
to examine the conditions which created the need for the exemption, had thus far still not been 
fulfilled.  Such an examination should require, inter alia , a substantive and systematic analysis of 
whether the legislation covered by the exempti on was still serving its intended objectives effectively 
and proportionately.  His delegation therefore looke d forward to seeing the substantive replies by the WT/GC/M/84 
Page 70  
 
 United States to the questions raised by interested de legations, in order to enab le a meaningful review.  
It would be essential for such replies to address th e key question, i.e. whether the legislation was 
serving the objectives for which it was originally in tended, and in an effective and proportionate 
manner. 
231. His delegation also wished to know if there had been any legislative changes, and if so, 
whether those changes had affected the conditions for the exemption under paragraph 3(b) of GATT 
1994.  In this regard, Hong Kong, China would also appreciate the United States providing answers to the following questions:  "(i) First, we understa nd during the informal consultations with the US 
expert that a waiver has been granted earlier this year  to the legislation covered by the exemption.  We 
would appreciate having in writing more detailed in formation regarding that waiver, including its 
rationale and the details of the actual waiver grante d.  (ii) Specifically, we would like to know 
whether this waiver has allowed a ship intended for commercial operation within US waters to be 
built outside the US, and whether this opportunity of building the ship is open to all Members.  We 
would also like to know under what circumstances and for what reasons the waiver was granted, and 
whether that means the legislation covered by the exemption has become unwarranted under those 
circumstances or for those reasons.  (iii) Furthermor e, we would like to know whether this waiver has 
allowed a foreign-owned cruise company or ship to  operate cruise services within US waters, and 
whether this opportunity of operating cruise services within US waters is also open to all Members.  We would appreciate if figures could be provided on the amount of cruise services trade involved 
under the waiver and its proportion  to the overall cruise services opera tions in the US.  (iv) Lastly, 
we have also been given to understand that some other exceptions to the legislation covered by the 
exemption – e.g. small vessels, shortage of supply, specialized vessels – have  been made previously 
and would appreciate more specific information on  such exceptions made, preferably also in 
writing.  Specifically, we would like to know whet her those exceptions have the effect of allowing 
foreign-owned shipping companies or ships to operate within US waters." 
232. Hong Kong, China wished to reiterate its positi on that this exemption under paragraph 3 of 
GATT 1994 was a major derogation from the fundamental principles of the WTO Agreement, and 
that its perpetuation was of great systemic concer n to Hong Kong, China.  His delegation was also 
puzzled by the continued demand for such an exem ption for legislation which was outdated and which 
was not commensurate with the liberal trade regime of  the United States overall, or with its level of 
ambitions in seeking trade liberalization, both in goods and services.  Hong Kong, China would 
continue to contribute to this review  on a rational and constructive basis.  
233. The representative of the Philippines
 welcomed the opportunity to discuss this issue in the 
context of the review mandated under paragraph 3( b) of GATT 1994, and thanked the United States 
for its consultations with interest ed delegations and for its statement at the present meeting.  His 
delegation's interest in this issue stemmed from systemic concerns rather than purely commercial 
ones.  The Philippines remained unconvinced by th e US interpretation that the review mandated under 
paragraph 3(b) of GATT 1994 relating to the questi on of whether the conditions which created the 
need for exemptions still prevailed, simply required a sole beneficiary Member, i.e. the US, to show 
that the legislation which had given rise to the ex emption was still in force and that it had not been 
amended, changed or otherwise superseded in a way that would alter its conformity with Part II of 
GATT 1994.  The US insistence on such an interpre tation had reduced the current and two previous 
reviews to pro forma exercises which could not have  been the intent of the provisions, given the 
exemption's stark deviation from the fundament al principles governing the multilateral trading 
system.  As his own and several other delegations  had said on numerous occasions, the review called 
for by paragraph 3(b) required an examination of whether the conditions, be they economic or 
otherwise, which gave rise to the legislation bei ng exempted from WTO rules remained valid grounds 
for maintaining the exemption.  WT/GC/M/84 
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 234. The United States had throughout each of the re view cycles abstained from undertaking such 
an examination.  However, if – as the United Stat es maintained in its various interventions – the 
context or conditions for this legislation were su ch that US commercial shipbuilding for domestic 
trade could sustain the US core shipbuilding industr ial base in light of declining military orders from 
the US Navy, then at least this observation could be made.  Evidence had to show that commercial 
shipbuilding for domestic trade, in and of itself was sufficient to maintain or sustain the US 
shipbuilding industrial base.  In this regard, the US  responses to the questions recently posed by Japan 
would provide useful guidance.  According to prev ious statistical reports by the United States, the 
average tonnage delivered appeared to have been insubstantial, and thus contrary to the underlying 
context claimed by the United States.  Other obser vations could be made, but his delegation would 
abstain from offering these at the present time.  Th e Philippines merely wished to emphasize that 
Members were supposed to examine whether the conditions that had created the need for the 
exemption still prevailed.  His de legation continued to ask whether – in a case where there was, or 
appeared to be, no consensus that the conditions  still prevailed – the exemption should not lapse 
automatically.  In any case, given Members' presen t context of broad-based negotiations, the United 
States could perhaps avail itself of an appropriate opportunity to revisit this exemption. 
235. The representative of New Zealand  said that his delegation had not been particularly active in 
the current review, and in particular had not been able to participate in the informal consultation 
hosted by the United States, although it appreciated having been invited.  New Zealand had nevertheless been following this issue from a distance , and in the previous two reviews had set out its 
positions and concerns in some detail.  Other delega tions had outlined at the present meeting the core 
issues as they saw them.  His delegation would not comment in any detail at the present meeting, but 
wished to record two points.  First, New Zeala nd shared the view expressed by Hong Kong, China 
and others on the continuing systemic importance of th is issue.  Second, it shared the interest of other 
delegations who had spoken with re gard to achieving a genuine substa ntive review of this exemption 
and the continuing basis for it. 
236. The representative of the United States
 noted that Hong Kong, China had asked several 
detailed questions in its intervention, and said that her delegation would be responding to these 
questions as they had been asked. 
237. The General Council took note  of the statements and also that the subsequent review under 
the two-yearly cycle provided in paragraph 3(b)  of GATT 1994 would normally be held in 2005. 
6. WTO Pension Plan – Annual report of the Management Board for 2002 (WT/L/546) 
238. The Chairman  said that the Annual Report of the Management Board for 2002 (WT/L/546) 
was being submitted to the General Council in accordan ce with Article 5(d) of the Regulations of the 
Pension Plan.  This was the fourth report of th e Management Board since the establishment of the 
Pension Plan on 1 January 1999. 
239. Mr. Jóhannesson (Iceland), Chairman of the Management Board , introducing the Board's 
annual report, said the Board had been confronted by  a number of difficulties in 2002.  The Board had 
met on only four occasions during the year.  The relati vely small number of meetings was a reflection 
not of a lack of business to be dealt with, but of  the difficulty in gathering the necessary quorum to 
conduct business.  He was pleased to report that this  difficulty had been overcome in 2003, and the 
Board had been able to make better progress with its work in 2003.  As indicated in the report, the 
performance of the Pension Plan's investments had been  poor in 2002.  The real rate of return for the 
year had been minus 19.21 per cent.  The principal reason for this result was the continuing gloom in 
the world’s stock markets.  It should be recalled that  for a pension plan it was important to maintain a 
long-term perspective with respect to the investment strategy, and not to resort to short-term measures 
in order to seek to maximise returns.  Striking th e right balance between profitability and security was WT/GC/M/84 
Page 72  
 
 vital.  That having been said, the Board was fully conscious of the need to review the investment 
strategy on a regular basis and had recently retain ed the services of an outside consultant for this 
purpose.  The external auditor had also recomme nded that such a review should be carried out. 
240. The results of the first triennial actuarial valuation of the Pension Plan had been made 
available in 2002, showing that despite the poor pe rformance of the investments, the contribution rate 
required over the long term in order to ensure the balance of the Plan could remain unchanged.  The 
Board had decided that the actuarial position should c ontinue to be monitored on an annual basis.  At 
the end of 2002, the consulting actuary had again confirmed that the current contribution rates and 
benefit levels should remain uncha nged.  The external auditor had confirmed the wisdom of regular 
monitoring of the actuarial position of the Plan.  In 2002, the Board had decided to establish an 
Investment Committee in order to provide advice to  the Board on the investment strategy and the 
performance of the fund managers.  The Committee had begun its work towards the end of 2002, but 
had unfortunately not been able to continue, owing to the resignation of two of its members.  The 
Board intended to reconstitute the Committee in orde r to complement the work  to be undertaken by 
the outside consultant.  In conclusion, although 200 2 had not been a particularly good year for the 
Pension Plan, the long-term actuarial situation re mained sound and no change was required at present 
to the contribution and/or benefit structure.  Ind eed, the latest information indicated that 2003 would 
prove to be a much better year from the point of vi ew of investment performance.  He remained ready 
to respond to any questions delegations might wish to pose. 
241. The General Council took note
 of the statement and of the Annual Report of the Management 
Board for 2002 in WT/L/546. 
7. Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration 
(a) Report of the Committee on its meetings of 11 July, 14 August and 25 September 2003 
(WT/BFA/68) 
242. The Chairman  drew attention to the report of the Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration contained in document WT/BFA/68. 
243. Mr. Law (Hong Kong, China), Chairman of  the Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration , said the report covered the meetings held  from July to September 2003 and should be 
read in conjunction with document WT/BFA/ 67, which contained part of the report's 
recommendations.  Those recommendations had been  presented to and approved by the General 
Council on 26 August 2003.  The agenda taken up by the Committee in these meetings were 
contained in documents WTO/AIR/2142 and Add.1 and Corr.1 and WTO/AIR/2158.  They included 
(i) various administrative up-dates and progress reports;  (ii) financial matters:  the Director-General’s 
Budgetary and Financial Report for 2002 and Report  of the External Auditor thereon, Divisional 
Reporting on Objectives and Expenditures for 2002, and Report on Extra-Budgetary Funds for 2002;  (iii) Results-Based Budgeting;  (iv) WTO Salaries:  calculation of Alpha adjustment to net salaries and dependency allowances;  (v) Biennial Budget;   (vi) Appellate Body Operating Fund;  and 
(vii) Review of the Guidelines on Voluntary Contri butions from Non-Governmental donors.  He drew 
attention to paragraphs 15 and 16 of the report.  The recommendation in paragraph 15 concerned 
transfers between budgetary sections in the final audited accounts for 2002 of the WTO Secretariat and the Appellate Body and its Secretariat.  The recommendation in paragraph 16 concerned the 
approval of the audited accounts for 2002 and an expressi on of thanks to the External Auditor.  Both 
paragraphs required the appr oval of the General Council. 
244. The General Council took note
 of the statement, approved  the Budget Committee's specific 
recommendations in paragraphs 15 and 16 of  the report in WT/BFA/68, and adopted  the report.  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 73 
 
 
 (b) Recommendations of the Committee following its meetings of November and December 2003 
(WT/BFA/70) 
245. The Chairman  drew attention to the recommendations of the Budget Committee which had 
resulted from its meetings of November and Dece mber 2003, and which had been circulated in 
document WT/BFA/70. 
246. Mr. Law (Hong Kong, China), Chairman of  the Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration , introducing the recommendations in document WT/BFA/70, said that these 
recommendations concerned (i) the International Tr ade Centre (ITC) budget estimates for 2004-2005;  
(ii) the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust F und 2004;  (iii) the new Annexe Building for the 
WTO;  and (iv) the WTO budget estimates for 2004 and 2005.  The Committee had examined the 
2004 and 2005 budget proposals for the ITC and had formulated recommendations in paragraphs 1 
and 2 of WT/BFA/70 that the budgets amounting to Sw F 32,014,300 and Sw F 32,254,100 respectively, be approved.  The relevant WT O contributions to the budgets of the ITC – 
Sw F 15,889,400 for 2004 and Sw F 16,009,300 for 2005 – formed part of the budgets for the WTO as a whole.  With regard to the Doha Developmen t Agenda Global Trust Fund, the target level of 
resources in 2004 had been set at Sw F 24 million.  In  this context, Members were urged to pledge 
additional contributions to the DD A Global Trust Fund up to the 2004 targ et level in order to ensure a 
stable and solid financial basis for the WTO progr amme of technical assistance and training.  The 
relevant recommendation was containe d in paragraph 3 of WT/BFA/70. 
247. The Committee had also recalled the authorization of the General Council to launch, in 
cooperation with the Swiss authorities, a draft proj ect study aimed at producing a building plan for a 
new annexe building for the WTO.  The Committ ee had formulated a recommendation which was 
contained in paragraph 4 of WT/BFA/70, to the e ffect that the project identified as “Golden Eye” be 
implemented, bearing in mind the overall envelope of Sw F 50 million.  With regard to the WTO 
Budget Estimates for 2004 and 2005, the recommendati ons contained in WT/BFA/70 were the fruits 
of various meetings and consultati ons over the past weeks.  In this context, he wished to recognize 
that there had been a pragmatic approach and cons tructive dialogue on the part of Members, which 
had permitted this exercise to be completed.  The recommended budgets for the WTO Secretariat and 
the Appellate Body and its Secretariat, as contai ned in paragraphs 5 and 6 of WT/BFA/70, amounted 
to Sw F 161,776,500 for 2004 and Sw  F 166,804,200 for 2005, representing increases of 4.4 per cent 
and 3.11 per cent respectively.  These figures in cluded the contributions to the ITC for 2004 and 
2005, which he had mentioned earlier. 
248. Two themes had come up frequently in the cour se of the Committee’s meetings.  First, the 
Committee had felt that the uncertainty regarding the workload, especially in 2005, rendered the 
projection of 2005 budget estimates difficult.  For this reason, the draft recommendation on page 4 
contained specific reference to the need to review  the proposals for 2005 in the context of the mid-
term review referred to in the guidelines for bi ennial budgeting.  Members had also frequently 
brought up the problem concerning their Governme nts' own resources, which were becoming more 
limited than in the past.  Consequently, Members had felt that further efforts at efficiency, cost-
effectiveness and rationalization in the WTO were necessary.  In this regard, the Committee was 
looking forward to having information on the estab lishment of a standing committee within the WTO 
Secretariat, which would be charged with examining possibilities for cost savings on an on-going basis.  With regard to staff r esources, the Committee had noted that the Director-General would bear 
in mind the views expressed by Members and inform  the Committee of his d ecision on the allocation 
of the two new posts for 2004 as soon as he had deci ded.  Finally, the Committee intended to follow 
closely further initiatives on the Dir ector-General’s efforts in the area of redeployment of resources, 
out-sourcing and structural rationalization, as well as  the question of control of long-term temporary 
assistance posts.  In concluding, he drew attenti on to paragraphs 1 through 6 of WT/BFA/70, which 
required decisions by the General Council. WT/GC/M/84 
Page 74  
 
 249. The representative of Japan
 expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Chairman of the 
Budget Committee for his report and particularly fo r his efforts in producing an agreement on the 
budget estimates for 2004 and 2005.  Japan suppor ted approval and adoption of the Committee's 
recommendations.  These budget proposals were indeed  precedent-setting in that they accounted for 
the first biennial budget programme for the WTO, which had been introduced at a time when the 
WTO was expanding its membership and its responsib ilities.  It was an achieve ment worth noting that 
Members had been able to carefully examine all the budget items, reverting to the fundamentals of 
each item, rather than simply fo cussing on the overall budget increase.  It was thus important to 
realise that the budget compiled by the Secretariat,  as well as the budgetary exercise, had been based 
on initiatives by Members.  Japan was very grateful  to the Secretariat for having provided Members 
with a detailed explanation in order to meet their high expectations.  Japan also appreciated the work 
of the Budget Committee, which had engaged in ex tensive discussions, beginning with the necessity 
of such a budget, examining the justification thereo f and even conferring on the final allocation of 
assets.  While the 2004 budget had been increased by 4. 4 per cent, a more effective and efficient use 
of the budget was required, and in Japan's view th is was a matter of importance for all Members, 
regardless of their financial contribution to the WTO.   The amount of the budget had now been fixed.  
However, it was still important to continue to t horoughly examine the biennial budget, in order to 
prevent any unnecessary divergence or increments, and to prevent it from becoming a black box, 
thereby ensuring that transparency  was maintained.  Japan was fully  aware that the present year's 
budgetary exercise was a turning poin t for all Members.  Japan also wi shed to thank the Director of 
the Administration and General Services Division of the Secretariat and his team for their great 
efforts.  Japan hoped the Secretariat would be able to make further efforts towards improvement in the 
cost-efficiency exercise.   
250. The General Council took note  of the statements, approved  the Budget Committee's specific 
recommendations in paragraphs 1 through 6 of  document WT/BFA/70, including the draft 
Resolutions referred to in pa ragraphs 5 and 6, and adopted  the draft Resolution on the Revised 
Expenditure of the WTO in 2004 and the Ways a nd Means to Meet Such Expenditure, as well as the 
draft Resolution on the Expenditure of the WTO in 2005.  
8. Waivers under Article IX of the WTO Agreement 
(a) Introduction of Harmonized System 1996 changes into WTO schedules of tariff concessions – 
Requests for waivers from Israel and Thailand 
251. The Chairman  drew attention to the requests for waiv ers from Israel (G/L/646) and Thailand 
(G/L/647), and to the relevant draft decisions in documents G/C/W/468 and 470, respectively. 
252. Mr. Hovorka (Czech Republic), Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods , reported on that 
Council's consideration of these matters. 
253. The Chairman  proposed that, in accordance with the Decision-Making Procedures under 
Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement ag reed in November 1995 (WT/L/93), the General 
Council adopt the draft decisions in G/C/W/468 and G/C/W/470. 
254. The General Council took note  of the statement and so agreed . 6 
                                                      
6 The Decisions were subsequently circulated in documents WT/L/554 and 555.  WT/GC/M/84 
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 (b) Sri Lanka – Establishment of new Schedule VI – Request for extension of time-limit 
(G/L/644, G/C/W/469) 
255. The Chairman  drew attention to the request from Sri Lanka for an extension of the waiver 
previously granted in connection with its establis hment of a new Schedule VI (G/L/644), and to the 
related draft decision in G/C/W/469. 
256. Mr. Hovorka (Czech Republic), Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods , reported on that 
Council's consideration of this matter. 
257. The Chairman  proposed that, in accordance with the Decision-Making Procedures under 
Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement ag reed in November 1995 (WT/L/93), the General 
Council adopt the draft decision in G/C/W/469. 
258. The General Council took note  of the statement and so agreed .7 
(c) Review of Waivers under Article IX:4 of the WTO Agreement 
259. The Chairman  recalled that, in accordance with para graph 4 of Article IX of the WTO 
Agreement, "any waiver granted for a period of mo re than one year shall be reviewed by the 
Ministerial Conference not later than one year af ter it is granted, and thereafter annually until the 
waiver terminates".  There were thirteen wa ivers before the General Council for review: 
 - El Salvador – Agreement on Implem entation of Article VII of GATT 1994  
  (WT/L/476);  - LDCs – Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with respect to pharmaceutical    products (WT/L/478);  - Canada – CARIBCAN (WT/L/185); 
 - Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries (WT/L/304); 
 - Switzerland – Preferences for Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina (WT/L/406);  - United States – Former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (WT/L/183);  - Cuba – Article XV:6 of GATT 1994 (WT/L/440);  - Colombia – Extension of the Applicati on of Article 5.2 of the Agreement on Trade-
  Related Investment Measures (WT/L/441); 
 - EC – Autonomous Preferential Treatment to the Countries of the Western Balkans   (WT/L/380);  - EC – Transitional Regime for the EC Autonomous Tariff Rate Quotas on Imports of 
  Bananas (WT/L/437);  - EC – The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (WT/L/436); 
 - Turkey – Preferential Treatment for Bosnia-Herzegovina (WT/L/381); 
 - United States – Caribbean Basi n Economic Recovery Act (WT/L/104). 
260. The Decisions on the waivers for Canada, Cuba, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States, 
and on two of the waivers for the EC, provided th at an annual report be submitted by these Members 
on the operation or implementation of the respective waivers, with a view to  facilitating their annual 
review by the General Council under paragraph 4 of Article IX.  The reports from these delegations 
on the relevant waivers had been circulated in documents WT/L/545, WT/L/547, WT/L/548, 
WT/L/550 through 553 and WT/L/549, respectively. 
261. The representative of Turkey
 said that with regard to Turkey's waiver for preferential 
treatment for Bosnia-Herzegovina, granted on 8 Decemb er 2000, her delegation wished to inform the 
                                                      
7 The Decision was subsequently circulated in document WT/L/556. WT/GC/M/84 
Page 76  
 
 General Council that Turkey had signed a Free Trad e Agreement with Bosnia-Herzegovina which had 
entered into force on 1 July 2003.  This Agreemen t, which covered all of the issues in the waiver, 
had been notified to the WTO in September in  document WT/REG157/N/1 and considered by the 
Council for Trade in Goods on 26 November.  Sin ce Turkey had accorded no preferential treatment 
for Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1 July 2003, and trade between the two countries was conducted in 
accordance with the FTA, Turkey called for the termination of the waiver. 
262. The Chairman
 proposed, in the light of Turkey's statem ent, that the General Council take note 
of that statement and that the exceptional circumst ances justifying the waiver no longer existed, and 
decide, in accordance with the terms of paragraph 4 of Article IX of the WTO Agreement, that the 
waiver for Turkey's preferential treatment fo r Bosnia-Herzegovina granted on 8 December 2000, 
contained in document WT/L/381, was terminated. 
263. The General Council so agreed , and took note  of the reports contained in documents 
WT/L/545 and WT/L/547-553. 
9. Trade in Textiles and Clothing – Develo ping Members' concerns about potential 
reduction in market (quota) access in 2004 (WT/GC/W/503) – Statement by the 
Chairman 
264. The Chairman  recalled that at its meeting in July , the General Council had considered a 
communication from a number of developing-country  textiles and clothing exporters outlining 
difficulties they would face as a result of an y decrease in quota access in 2004 due to the non-
availability of the quota "carry forward" provision  of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) 
in that year.  These countries had requested th e General Council to recommend that restraining 
developed-country Members take steps to ensure  there was no diminution of effective quota access 
for developing-country Members on account of a deni al of quota carry-forward in 2004.  In the light 
of the discussion at that meeting, he had suggested th at more time would be needed to reflect on this 
proposal and to provide a response to it, and that the General Council was not then in a position to 
take a decision as requested by the co-sponsors.  He had also indicated his intention to hold 
consultations as to the best way to deal with this  matter.  At the October Council meeting, he had 
indicated his intention to hold these consultations with the aim of making a report to the December 
Council meeting.  He wished to inform delegations  that on 10 December he had held consultations 
with the interested parties with the aim of explor ing this matter further, as well as possible means to 
meet the concerns raised. 
265. At the consultations, the exporting countries ha d reiterated their concer ns about the adverse 
economic and social impact of potential reductions in market access in 2004 as a result of the loss of 
quota carry-forward, and also their concerns about resu lting shifts in market share.  It had also been 
suggested that these concerns were shared by a num ber of importers and retail organizations in the 
restraining countries.  The exporting developing co untries had urged a collective consideration on the 
part of Members to see how the potential difficultie s could be overcome, and had indicated flexibility 
as to the instruments that might be  used.  The restraining Members, for their part, had reiterated that 
the important watershed event was the phase-out of all quotas by 1 January 2005, and had reaffirmed 
their commitment to the full and faithful implementati on of the ATC in this respect.  They had also 
added that the ATC had led to a significant expansion of quotas since 1995, and that although quota carry forward would not be available in 2004, there were other flexibilities provided in the ATC, such 
as "swing" or "carry-over", which could provide so me assistance in 2004.  Two of the restraining 
Members had also indicated that under special progr ammes for least-developed countries, textiles and 
clothing products from these countries entered their markets quota and/or duty free, thereby providing them the stable market access they sought.  His c onclusion on the basis of this discussion was that the 
reaffirmation of the commitment to the full and faithful implementation of the ATC, as well as the measures that had been undertaken in favour of  the LDCs, were both positive signals.  However,  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 77 
 
 
 regarding the proponents' request for considerati on of measures to ensure there would be no 
diminution of quota access because of the loss of carry  forward, his sense from the consultations was 
that this proposal did not have  a favourable response, unless any Me mber had new developments to 
report at the present meeting. 
266. The representative of India , speaking on behalf of the co-sponsors of the proposal in 
WT/GC/W/503, thanked the Chairman for his report a nd for the consultations he had held to follow 
up on the discussion at the July General Council mee ting.  These countries were disappointed that a 
resolution of this issue had not yet been possible, but they were not discouraged.  Indeed, they were 
confident that with goodwill, Me mbers could find a way to ensure  that market-access possibilities for 
developing-country Members' expor ts of textiles and clothing in  2004 were not reduced.  Their 
confidence was based on the merits of their case.  As he had noted in his statement introducing the 
joint submission to the General Council in July , the overarching objective and purpose of the WTO 
was to increase market-access opportunities, not to re duce them.  If "carry-forward" possibilities were 
denied, it would cause significant reductions in th ese countries' exports.  The issue raised in 
WT/GC/W/503 was at once a developmental issue, an S&D issue, a mark et-access issue, an 
implementation issue and a systemic issue.  As  he had pointed out during the consultations on 
10 December, a number of developing-country Members were faced with the prospect of losing millions of dollars' worth of export opportunities if  the carry-forward facility was not made available 
in 2004. 
267. He then gave examples of the potential losses to only a few countries.  Bangladesh's loss was 
estimated at 53 million square meter equivalent of  garment exports, valued at over US$100 million.  
This would amount to a loss of around 25,000 jobs during the year.  This was not merely a theoretical 
calculation, because Bangladesh had continued to use its quotas in full, including by utilizing the 
carry-forward quotas year after year.  Likewise, Pakistan's export loss in one market would be 76 million square meter equivalent of  exports, about 20,000 tons of e xports in the second market, and 4 
million square meters equivalent to the third.  Taking only the products in which Pakistan fully 
utilized its quotas, the total export loss would be US$120 million.  This translated to about 24,000 
jobs, given the fact that Pakistan's export mix was different from that of Bangladesh.  For India, the 
loss of potential access to one market  was calculated at 47 million squa re meter equivalent of exports, 
over 16,000 tons of exports to the second, and to the third about 3 million square  meter equivalent.  In 
the case of Indonesia, the access loss in the first ma rket was calculated at 62 million square meter 
equivalent of exports, to the sec ond about 10,000 tons of exports, a nd to the third 3 million square 
meter equivalent.  Thailand's poten tial loss in one market would be 67 million square meter equivalent 
of exports, in the second 7,000 tons, and in  the third 2.5 million square meters. 
268. He would not cite the losses for each of th e developing-country Members concerned, but 
similar losses were likely for China;  Hong Kong, Ch ina;  Macao, China;  Sri Lanka and many others.  
In short, it was a matter of the loss of millions of dollars worth of exports and thousands of jobs in 
each case.  India trusted that the General Council would be in a position to respond positively to a 
problem of this magnitude.  As he had mentioned in his statement in July, the problem had been 
exacerbated by the manner in which the restraining Members had implemented their integration programme under the ATC, back-loading the phase-out  of quota restrictions to the end of the 
transition period.  This was also a matter of system ic concern for the WTO.  The tight quota access in 
2004 would keep export prices artificially high.  After quotas were eliminated at the beginning of 
2005, there would be a sharp downward pressure on pr ices, which, in turn, might generate pressure 
for recourse to anti-dumping actions.  It was theref ore in the interest of both the exporting and 
importing Members, as well as the multilateral trading system, to prevent this situation from developing.  The exporting developing countries ther efore urged the General Council to approach this 
issue in the best interests of all concerned, a nd of the multilateral trading system itself.  The 
suggestion in the submission was a modest one.  There was nothing in the ATC that prohibited the 
restraining countries from allowing the continued use of carry-forward in 2004. WT/GC/M/84 
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 269. During the consultations on 10 December, a point had been made by one restraining Member 
that even if carry-forward was not available, one could use other flexibilities, such as carry-over of 
some unutilized quotas from the previous year, or swing provisions.  While this suggestion might theoretically sound plausible, it did not entirely mitig ate the problem of loss of carry-forward.  In the 
case of a number of exporting Members, the large ma jority of quotas had been fully utilized, making 
it impossible to transfer quotas from one category of product to another.  Moreover, there were also 
ceilings on the use of carry over as well as swing.  In short, therefore, the use of other flexibility provisions did not fully solve the problem.  These countries were open to any constructive solution 
that the restraining Members themselves might wish to propose.  They urged the General Council to recommend that the restraining developed-country Me mbers take steps to ensure that there was no 
reduction in effective quota access for developing-coun try Members on account of the denial of carry 
forward in 2004.  Such concrete steps would cr eate developmental space for developing-country 
Members.  These countries requested the Chairman to  continue his efforts to bring a satisfactory 
resolution to this issue. 
270. The representatives of Pakistan
, Indonesia , Bangladesh  and Thailand  said that as co-sponsors 
of WT/GC/W/503, their delegations fully supported the statement by India on this important issue.   
271. The representative of Pakistan  said that Members had already heard the details of the number 
of jobs involved and the social, economic and politi cal problems that might result if this issue was not 
satisfactorily resolved.  As already noted by India,  this issue was not only a market-access issue but 
had several other dimensions.  It was an implementation issue which Members had been discussing for a long time.  As indicated by India, the co-spons ors of the submission were flexible on this matter 
and were open to any meaningful solution.  Pakist an urged the General Council to make a categorical 
recommendation that there should be no reduction in the quotas in question for 2004, so that the countries involved would be able to avoid problems in the quota-free 2005 scenario.  Furthermore, this would show that the multilateral trading system worked. 
272. The representative of Indonesia
 said that his delegation was not going to repeatedly raise this 
issue, as it had been very frequently discussed.  Ho wever, as this issue was of great importance to 
Indonesia and other developing-country Members, hi s delegation was of the view that the more 
Members discussed it, the more likely it was they would find a way to resolve it.  The ATC was a 
transitional agreement to eventually integrate the textiles and clothing sector into the GATT 1994.  
Nevertheless, the ATC had never been fully and fa ithfully implemented, since there had been no 
meaningful integration in every integration stage.  The fact was that although the integration process 
had been done in three stages, the bulk of quotas were  still in place.  In Indonesia's view, the failure of 
the ATC to phase out quota restrictions in a smooth manner had created other problems.  The worst effect was that no adjustment could be made  by the developing-country Members during the 
transitional period for those quotas which had not yet been phased out.  There was a big problem as 2004 approached, in relation to the termination of the ATC.  As all knew, the ATC did not have any 
provision to settle the problem of carry forward.  Members were now realizing that the ATC was 
actually flawed and left many questions unanswe red.  The weakness of the ATC as a transitional 
agreement would remain in place until its termination at the end of 2004. 
273. Article 2.16 of the ATC was only focused to main tain provisions governing flexibility such as 
swing, carry-over and carry-forward applicable to all restrictions maintained under the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement.  Those forms of flexib ility could only be used if quota r estrictions were still in place.  
Logically, because there would be no more quotas in place for 2005, the right to use flexibility in the 
form of carry forward in 2004 was not possible, an d if that was the case, this would no doubt very 
adversely affect trade in textiles and clothing in 2004 , due to the reduced supply.  This situation would 
ultimately substantially decrease the benefit to bot h developed and developing  countries.  The Doha 
Declaration clearly stated that positive efforts shall be continued to ensure that developing countries, 
and especially the least-developed, secured a share in  the growth of world trade commensurate with  WT/GC/M/84 
 Page 79 
 
 
 the needs of their economic development.  In this context, his delegation strongly urged the General 
Council to take the necessary steps and to recomme nd that developed-country Members ensure that 
there was no loss of carry forward in 2004.  The solution his delegation wished to propose was the adjustment of 2004 quota levels upwards, as if there were quotas in 2005.  As only a short time 
remained, Indonesia wished to see political will from the developed-c ountry Members to resolve this 
matter.  As India had just proposed, Indonesia strongl y wished to have a constructive solution to this 
problem and fully supported the Chairman's effo rts to seek a mutually satisfactory resolution. 
274. The representative of Bangladesh
 said that his delegation attached great importance to this 
issue.  Any reduction in market access due to in equitable implementation of the ATC would cause 
immense hardship to Bangladesh's export sector and to the millions who would be affected.  In 2002 
Bangladesh had utilized the facility of carry forward in 19 out of 20 export categories in a major 
importing country.  The same situation was likel y to persist in 2003 and 2004 because of its 
consistently high utilization rate in the quota categor y.  India, which held the chairmanship of the 
International Clothing and Textiles Bureau, had give n an account of the loss Bangladesh would incur.  
He wished to add a few words to highlight the si gnificance of this loss for Bangladesh.  The garment 
sector accounted for 75 per cent of Bangladesh's to tal export earnings during 2001 and 2002.  This 
sector had generated direct employment opportunitie s for two million workers, of whom 80 per cent 
were female.  In addition, one million workers were engaged in the accessories and recycling 
industries related to garments.  The business of ba nks, insurance, hotels, c.i.f. agents, transport, 
shipping and many other backward and forward linka ge operations had flourished with the growth of 
this sector.  All in all, around ten million people were indirectly dependent on the garment sector in 
Bangladesh.  Bangladesh was an LDC and was striving hard to develop, using an export-led growth 
strategy.  Bangladesh was doing its utmost to deve lop its industry on a competitive basis.  At the 
present stage, if Bangladesh faced a non-tariff, market-d istorting hurdle, this would set back its efforts 
to develop its industry.  As an LDC, Bangladesh face d the reality of erosion of preferences.  At the 
same time, his delegation had seen the non-implementati on of the footnote to paragraph 2 of Article 1 
of the ATC, permitting meaningful increases in  access possibilities for l east-developed country 
Members in the field of textiles and clothing tr ade.  Bangladesh hoped that its developed-country 
partners would realize its difficulties and make a special concession for LDCs, and also implement the WTO Agreement in spirit and not only in letter.  His delegation wished to highlight that the WTO 
membership could take a pragmatic approach to  the LDCs and could ensure that there was no 
diminution of quota access for these countries during 2004.  A legal constr uct should not deter 
Members from taking a realistic approach to this matter. 
275. The representative of Thailand
 said that, as indicated by India, the potential losses in quota 
access to markets of the three restraining Members were phenomenal.  For Thailand, a loss in access 
of that magnitude was liable to affect thousands of jo bs in the country.  Thailand could not afford to 
absorb such losses.  In addition, this matter also concerned the credibility of the multilateral trading 
system and its ability to respond to the concerns of  developing countries.  His delegation therefore 
added its voice to India's and urged the Chairman to  continue his consultations until a resolution of 
this issue was found, to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned. 
276. The Chairman  said that the General Council had heard the statements made under this item, 
including the suggestions by India and others as to the General Council taking steps that would enable 
a solution to be found to this matter.  However, from the consultations he had held, it was clear that no 
agreement existed among Members on this issue, a nd there was thus no basis for a General Council 
decision on it.  As General Council Chairman, he  wished to encourage the proponents and the 
restraining Members to continue their dialogue to  see if there were other possibilities for addressing 
these concerns. 
277. The General Council took note  of the statements. WT/GC/M/84 
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 10. Appointment of Officers to WTO bodies – Announcement by the Chairman 
278. The Chairman
 recalled that in December 2002, the General Council had adopted Guidelines 
for the Appointment of Officers to WTO bodies (W T/L/510).  These Guidelines provided that the 
outgoing Chairman of the General Council would conduct consultations on the appointment of 
chairpersons to the WTO bodies outlined in Groups 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the Annex to the Guidelines.  The 
Guidelines also provided, in paragraph 7.1(a), that  in order to promote transparency, the selection 
process should be started with an announcement by th e Chairman at the General Council meeting held 
in December each year.  Accordingl y, he wished to inform the Council that he would be starting the 
selection process for the appointment of chairpersons  to the WTO bodies outlined in Groups 1, 2, 4 
and 5 of the Annex to the Guidelines.  In accordan ce with paragraph 7.1(b) of the Guidelines, he 
would be assisted in the selection process by the serving Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, 
Mr. Oshima (Japan), and any former Chairpersons  of the General Council still serving in Geneva as 
Permanent Representatives, in this case Mr. Marc hi (Canada).  Further, in keeping with 
paragraph 7.1(c), he would request the Secretariat to  distribute to delegations in the meeting Room a 
list of past Chairs of major bodies, in order to provide some structure for Members' subsequent 
deliberations on the possible distribution of chairs based on past practice and the need for balance.  
Also, in keeping with paragraph 7.1(d), his co lleagues and he would communicate, as early as 
possible, a specified time-period in which they woul d be available to hear the views and suggestions, 
if any, of Members, individually and/or in groups.  He also wished to note  that, in accordance with 
paragraph 2.1 of the Guidelines, representatives of Members in financial arrears for over one full year 
could not be considered for appointment. 
279. The General Council took note  of the statement.   WT/GC/M/84 
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 11. Review of WTO activities 
 - Reports of: 
 
(a) General Council (WT/GC/W/518), Dispute Settlement Body (WT/DSB/35 and 
Add.1), Trade Policy Review Body (WT/TPR/140) 
(b) Sectoral Councils (G/L/665, S/C/19, IP/C/30) 
(c) Committees on Trade and Development (WT/COMTD/48), Balance-of-
Payments Restrictions (WT/BOP/R/72), Budget, Finance and Administration 
(WT/BFA/69), Regional Trade Agreements (WT/REG/13) and Trade and Environment (WT/CTE/10) 
(d) Committees under the Plurilateral Trad e Agreements (WT/L/544 and Corr.1) 
280. The Chairman
, in pursuance of the Decision concerning procedures for an annual overview of 
WTO activities and for reporting under the WTO (WT/ L/105), drew attention to the annual reports of 
the various Councils and Committees in the above documents.  He noted that a number of WTO 
bodies had not met in the period since the Cancún Ministerial Conference, and had therefore not 
submitted any reports covering their work since they  last reported to the General Council in July.  
This was the case with regard to the bodies dea ling with the four Singapore issues, the Working 
Groups on Trade, Debt and Finance and on Trade a nd Transfer of Technology, and the Committee on 
Government Procurement.  He suggested that since the reports before the C ouncil covered mostly the 
work of these bodies since the Cancún Ministeria l Conference in September, the respective 
Chairpersons not introduce the reports orally at th e present meeting, unless they felt they should draw 
particular attention to some aspect of the work carried out in their respective bodies. 
281. The General Council took note  of the statement, adopted  the report of the Committee on 
Trade and Development (WT/COMTD/48), and took note  of the following reports of the other WTO 
bodies, including the reports of the bodies under the Plurilateral Trade Agreements:  Dispute Settlement Body (WT/DSB/35 and Add.1), Trade Policy Review Body (WT/TPR/140), Council for 
Trade in Goods (G/L/665), Council for Trade in  Services (S/C/19), Council for TRIPS (IP/C/30), 
Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions  (WT/BOP/R/72), Committee on Budget, Finance 
and Administration (WT/BFA/69), Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (WT/REG/13), 
Committee on Trade and Environment (WT/CTE/10), Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft (WT/L/544 and Corr.1). 
282. The General Council then adopted
 the draft report of the General Council contained in 
WT/GC/W/518, on the understanding that the Secret ariat would make the necessary adjustments to 
that draft report so as to include matters that  had been considered at the present meeting.8 
12. Widening of EC textiles quota restrictions following accession of new member States 
283. The representative of India , speaking under "Other Business ", on behalf of members of the 
International Textiles and Clothing Bureau that were also Members or observers of the WTO, recalled 
that at the General Council meeting in October 2003, he had drawn attention to an Act published in 
the official journal of the European Union, da ted 23 September 2003, concerning the conditions of 
accession of ten newly-acceding countries which inter alia  stipulated that quantitative restrictions 
applied by the Community on imports of textile and clothing products shall be adjusted to take into 
account the accession of the new member States to the Community.  This matter was of great 
                                                      
8 The report was subsequently circulated in document WT/GC/76. WT/GC/M/84 
Page 82  
 
 importance, both because of its systemic implications for the multilateral trading system and the 
economic and practical considerati ons related to it.  This Act was to become effective as from 
1 May 2004, which was just eight  months before the scheduled elimination of all quantitative 
restrictions on 1 January 2005 pursuant to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.  India had 
requested the European Communities to provide th e General Council with further details in this 
respect, and the Community had stated that it would come back with answers in due course.  India 
would appreciate the Community informing the Gene ral Council of its plans and providing further 
details on this matter as soon as possible. 
284. The representative of the European Communities
 said that his delegation was unfortunately 
not in a position to say anything on this matter at the present meeting.  The Community had obviously 
reconsidered the position it had taken earlier.  The services of the European Commission were 
examining an adjustment to the bilateral quotas fro m 1 May 2004, which would ultimately lead to a 
proposal to the Council of the European Communities.   However, this had not yet taken place, and it 
was only the Council that could take a decision on th is matter.  This was expected in the coming 
weeks. 
285. The General Council took note  of the statements. 
13. Chairmanship of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation 
286. The Chairman , speaking under "Other Business", said th at following consultations held on his 
behalf by the Accessions Division of the Secretar iat, and upon its recommendation, he wished to 
inform delegations that Mr. Jóhannesson (Iceland) had kindly agreed to Chair the Working Party on 
the Accession of the Russian Federation, replacing Mr. Bryn (Norway) who ha d left Geneva and was 
no longer available to Chair the Working Party. 
287. The General Council took note  of this information. 
 
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