RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/DSB/M/155
7 November 2003
(03-5972)
Dispute Settlement Body
29 August 2003
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 29 August 2003
Chairman:  Mr. Shotaro Oshima (Japan)
Prior to the adoption of the agenda, the item concerning the adoption of the Panel Report in
the case on:  "Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples" was removed from the proposed
agenda following Japan's decision to appeal the Panel Report.
Subjects discussed: Page
1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB.........................2
(a) United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Status report by the United States.......................2
(b) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Approp riations Act of 1998:  Status report by
the United States .............................................................................................................. ...........3
(c) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from
Japan:  Status report by the United States...................................................................................4
(d) Egypt – Definitive anti-dumping measures on steel rebar from Turkey:  status report
by Egypt....................................................................................................................... ...............4
2. Australia – Certain measures affecting the importation of fresh fruit and
vegetables..................................................................................................................... ..............5
(a) Request for the establishment of  a panel by the Philippines.......................................................5
3. European Communities – Export subsidies on sugar............................................................7
(a) Request for the establishmen t of a panel by Australia................................................................7
(b) Request for the establishm ent of a panel by Brazil.....................................................................7
(c) Request for the establishmen t of a panel by  Thailand ................................................................7
4. United States – Anti-dumping measures on cement from Mexico .......................................9
(a) Request for the establishm ent of a panel by Mexico ..................................................................9
5. United States – Anti-dumping measu res on oil country tubular goods (OCTG)
from Mex ico.................................................................................................................... .........10
(a) Request for the establishm ent of a panel by Mexico ................................................................10
6. United States – Countervailing duties on steel plate from Mexico.....................................11
(a) Request for the establishm ent of a panel by Mexico ................................................................11WT/DSB/M/155
Page 2
7. European Communities – Measures affecting the approval and marketing of
biotech products............................................................................................................... .......12
(a) Request for the establishment of  a panel by the United States .................................................12
(b) Request for the establishm ent of a panel by Canada ................................................................12
(c) Request for the establishmen t of a panel by  Argentina ............................................................12
8. European Communities – Protection  of trademarks and geographical
indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs...........................................................14
(a) Request for the establishment of  a panel by the United States .................................................14
(b) Request for the establishmen t of a panel by Australia..............................................................14
9. Proposed nomination for the indicative list of governmental and non-
governmental panelists ......................................................................................................... ..16
10. European Communities – Anti-dumping duties on malleable cast iron tube or
pipe fittings from Brazil ...................................................................................................... ...16
(a) Statement by Brazil......................................................................................................... ..........16
1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB
(a) United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Status report by the United States
(WT/DS136/14/Add.18 - WT/DS162/17/Add.18)
(b) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropri ations Act of 1998:  Status report by the
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.11)
(c) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan:
Status report by the Unit ed States (WT/DS184/15/Add.11)
(d) Egypt – Definitive anti-dumping measures on steel rebar from Turkey:  Status report by
Egypt (WT/DS211/7/Add.3)
1. The Chairman recalled that Article 21.6 of the DSU required that "unless the DSB decides
otherwise, the issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the
agenda of the DSB meeting after six months following the date of establishment of the reasonable
period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue isresolved".  He proposed that the four sub-items to which he had just referred be considered separately.
(a) United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Status report by the United States
(WT/DS136/14/Add.18 - WT/DS162/17/Add.18)
2. The Chairman drew attention to docume nt WT/DS136/14/Add.18 – WT/DS162/17/Add.18
which contained the status report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's
recommendations in the case concerning the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916.
3. The representative of the United States said that his country had provided an additional status
report in this dispute on 18 August 2003, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.  As noted in the
report, legislation repealing the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act and terminating all pending cases had been
introduced in the US Senate on 19 May 2003.  Other bills repealing the 1916 Act had been introduced
in the House of Representatives on 4 March 2003, and in the Senate on 23 May 2003.  The USWT/DSB/M/155
Page 3
administration was continuing to work with the US Congress to achieve further progress in resolving
this dispute with the EC and Japan.
4. The representative of the European Communities recalled that, at the arbitration hearing
regarding the compliance deadline in the Byrd Amendment case, the United States had described
itself as a "strong advocate of prompt compliance".  However, Members were now approaching the
third "anniversary" of the condemnation of the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act, but there was still noconcrete move of the United States towards implementation.  All that had been achieved in those three
years was the introduction of 6 repealing bills.  Three had become void after the last US Congress had
adjourned in November 2002 without even discussing them.  The other three were now pending in the
new US Congress for several months without again being even discussed.  Moreover, several of the
bills pending before the US Congress only envisaged to repeal the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act without
terminating the pending litigation.  The US failure to abide by its compliance duty had led to the
situation where, in three instances, EC companies were bearing substantial litigation costs to defendthemselves against the application of a law condemned almost three years ago.  He recalled that the
EC had accepted to extend the implementation deadline and to suspend the arbitration on its request
for retaliation on the express understanding that the repealing Act would also terminate the pending
litigation.  However, given the persisting situation of non-compliance, the EC had no other option
than to exercise its WTO rights and would proceed forthwith to resume the above-mentionedarbitration.
5. The representative of Japan said that her country greatly regretted that the United States had
failed to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings before the summer recess of the first
session of the 108th Congress, despite Japan's repeated calls to do so.  Compliance by the United
States at an earliest possible time was imperative not only for solving this dispute, but also forpreserving the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system.  Therefore, Japan strongly urged the
United States to make every effort to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings by passing
the necessary legislation immediately after the session resumed.  Japan reiterated that, among the bills
introduced to the Congress, those with proper retroactive effect had to be passed.  Termination of the
pending cases with the retroactive effect was critical since the relevant Japanese companies had beenforced into the proceedings under this WTO-inconsistent Act and had been suffering substantial
damages, including significant legal costs.  Japan e xpected the United States to report to the DSB on
the status of all the repealing bills introduced to th e Congress, and to describe in more detail how the
United States planed to ensure the earliest passage of the repealing bills with the proper retroactive
effect. In view of the statement made by the EC at the 21 and 23 July DSB meeting as well as at thepresent meeting, Japan would further contemplate what action it might take, since it too had the right
to suspend concessions or other obligations.
6. The representative of the United States said that his country regretted that the EC had decided
to request the resumption of the arbitration in this dispute.  As he had already indicated, the US
administration would continue to work with the US Congress to resolve this dispute.
7. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
(b) United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriat ions Act of 1998:  Status report by the
United States (WT/DS176/11/Add.11)
8. The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS176/11/Add.11 which contained the status
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the
case concerning US Section 211 Om nibus Appropriations Act of 1998.
9. The representative of the United States said that his country had provided a status report in
this dispute on 18 August 2003, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.  The US administrationWT/DSB/M/155
Page 4
continued to work with the US Congress with resp ect to appropriate statutory measures that would
resolve this matter.
10. The representative of the European Communities said that the introduction of a bill to repeal
Section 211 in June 2003 was a positive move towards implementation.  This bill would not only
remove a damaging special interest legislation.  It would also provide a whole scheme of measures
that would ensure an effective protection of intellectual property rights.  This reaffirmed the USattachment to ensure adequate protection of intellectual property rights.  The EC hoped that this
would offer the opportunity to solve this dispute to the benefit of all.
11. The representative of Cuba said that, as indicated in the status report submitted by the United
States, a bill was pending approval in the US Hous e of Representatives that would repeal Section 211.
Cuba hoped that a decision on this matter would be taken as soon as possible.
12. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
(c) United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan:
Status report by the Unit ed States (WT/DS184/15/Add.11)
13. The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS184/15/Add.11 which contained the status
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the
case concerning US anti-dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan.
14. The representative of the United States said that his country had provided a status report in
this dispute on 18 August 2003, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. The US administration
continued to work with the US Congress to addres s the DSB's recommendations and rulings that had
not been addressed by the original deadline of 23 November 2002, and had supported specific
legislative amendments that would do so.  The US administration was working for passage of theseamendments.
15. The representative of Japan said that it was regrettable that the United States had not
implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings before the summer recess of the first session of
the 108th Congress.  The protracted failure by the United States to meet its obligation was
undermining the confidence in the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system.  The UnitedStates must do its best to restore the confidence by promptly implementing the DSB's
recommendations and rulings in this proceeding.  Although the United States claimed that the US
administration had expressed its support for the legislative action to be taken, no bills had been
introduced to the US Congress even more th an four months after the joint letter by
Ambassador Zoellick and Secretary Evans.  The United States did not seem to appreciate at all Japan'slegitimate concern.  Japan demanded the US administration to work more intensively with the
Congress so that bills amending the relevant US statutes had been introduced and passed at an earliest
stage of the first session of the 108th Congress once it resumed.  Her country also expected that the
United States would consult closely with Japan on the status and contents of the implementation.
16. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed
 to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
(d) Egypt – Definitive anti-dumping measures on steel rebar from Turkey:  Status report by
Egypt (WT/DS211/7/Add.3)
17. The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS211/7/Add.3, which contained the status
report by Egypt on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the case
concerning definitive anti-dumping measures on steel rebar from Turkey.WT/DSB/M/155
Page 5
18. The representative of Egypt said that his delegation wished to inform the DSB that Egypt's
investigating authorities had submitted on 30 July 2003 the final report to the Turkish authorities;  i.e.
within the reasonable period of time determined upon agreement with Turkey, pursuant to
Article 21.3 of the DSU.  The final report reflected faithfully, and in a proper manner, the
implementation of all the recommendations of the Panel taking into account the comments of all the
interested parties.  By submitting this final report in due time, Egypt was in a position to declare at thepresent meeting its full compliance with the DSB's recommendations.  Consequently, Egypt would no
longer be required to provide any further status report regarding this matter.
19. The representative of Turkey said that his Government and the companies concerned had
received the Egyptian authorities' revised assessment of dumping and injury.  After a careful review
of the revised calculation of dumping margins for the two companies in question, Turkey had
submitted, orally and in writing, its comments about the calculation methodology employed and the
calculation itself made by the Egyptian authorities.  However, the Egyptian authorities had not givenpositive consideration to those comments.  Turkey was of the view that Egypt, in revising its
implementation to bring its measure  in line with the Panel's recommendation had made some material
errors.  Therefore, Turkey, even though appreciated the improvement on the duties imposed on
exports of the two companies within the reasonable period of time, could not agree that the solution
proposed by Egypt was sufficient to meet the Panel's recommendations and was mutually agreeable.However, for the sake of further improving its trade relations with Egypt, Turkey had decided neither
to take the issue to a compliance panel nor to maintain it rights under Article 22.6 of the DSU as an
indication of its goodwill.  In conclusion, Turkey did not have any objection that the matter should no
longer appear on the agenda of future DSB meetings.
20. The representative of Mexico said that his delegation wished to put on record its deep concern
about the systemic problems in the area of implementation and the need to discuss seriously and
substantively the changes in  this area.
21. The DSB took note of the statements.
2. Australia – Certain measures affecting the importation of fresh fruit and vegetables
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by the Philippines (WT/DS270/5/Rev.1)
22. The Chairman recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on 21 and
23 July 2003 and had agreed to revert to it.  He drew attention to the communication from the
Philippines contained in document WT/DS270/5/Rev.1.
23. The representative of the Philippines said that , as mentioned in the statement made at the
DSB meeting when the Philippines' request for establ ishment of a panel was considered for the first
time, the Philippines had consistently raised concerns about Australia's import measures, in particular
on fresh fruits and vegetables, including fresh bananas, plantains and fresh papayas.  These measures
imposed by Australia had, for a long time, effectively prevented access of Philippines' exporters of
these products into the Australian market.  Despite continued and persistent efforts, including bilateral
discussions and exchanges of information, the above-mentioned products continued to face
unreasonable restrictions.
24. Hence, in accordance with Article 4 of the DSU, the Philippines had requested consultations
with Australia to discuss these as well as other related issues and concerns.  The consultations had
been held between the Philippines and Australia on 15 November 2002.  Unfortunately, however,
these consultations had failed to resolve the dispute and the Philippines was obliged to make the
request for the establishment of a panel for the second time.  Hence, at the DSB meeting on 21 and
23 July 2003, the Philippines had requested the establishment of a panel, in accordance with Article 6of the DSU.  Since Australia had exercised its right under Article 6 of the DSU at the above-WT/DSB/M/155
Page 6
mentioned meeting, the Philippines was now making its request for the establishment of a panel for
the second time.  Like Australia, the Philippines believed that these concerns could be appropriately
resolved through bilateral initiatives and mechanisms.  The Philippines had hoped and continued to
hope that Australia would avail itself of the parties' respective openness to such opportunities.  Unlike
Australia, however, the Philippines did not think that Australia's characterization of the Philippines'
legal challenge as "a broad systemic challenge to Australia's quarantine regime that strikes at thefundamental right of WTO Members to have quarantine systems" was complete and accurate.  From
the Philippines' perspective, its challenge was focused on, among other things, the WTO-consistency
of Australia's quarantine regime which prohibited as a general rule the entry of fresh fruits and
vegetables.  To its mind, Australia's regime subverted fundamental principles enshrined in the various
WTO Agreements in a unique way which did not appear to be replicated in any other Member's
import regime.  Furthermore, other elements specific only to Australia's import regime elicited the
sense on its part that its regime was distinct fro m those of other WTO Members as to preclude any
suggestion at all that other "WTO Members maintain approaches to quarantine which are either
similar to Australia's system, or have similar elements".  Therefore, while the Philippines expected
that other WTO Members would share serious concerns about the implications of its challenge, it
believed that such concerns would be more in line with questioning whether an import regime which
prohibited "a priori" any entry of fresh fruits and vegetables could be characterized as a fundamentalright of WTO Members or even as an appropriate quarantine regime.  Other concerns mentioned by
Australia in the consultations and at the previous DSB meeting similarly appeared to be legal issues
which could only be resolved at the Panel's proceedings themselves.  Hence, the Philippines would
refrain from offering further comments on these matters at this point in time.
25. The representative of Australia said that his country was disappointed with the Philippines'
decision to proceed with its request for a panel, an action which was both unnecessary and
unproductive for all concerned.  Australia considered its measures to be fully WTO-consistent, and
was confident that a panel would so agree.  Although Australia understood the Philippines intended to
persist with its request for panel establishment at this meeting, it considered that the Philippines'
concerns could be addressed more constructively through bilateral mechanisms and remained open tofurther consultations.  As mentioned at the 21 and 23 July DSB meeting, Australia had serious
concerns, which it expected would also be shared by other Members, about the approach taken by the
Philippines in framing its panel request.  The Philip pines appeared to be interested in making a broad
systemic challenge to Australia's quarantine regime, rather than contesting the WTO-consistency of
import conditions contained in specific SPS measures.  If permitted, this sort of broad open-endedchallenge would strike at the fundamental right of WTO Members to have quarantine regimes which
provided for the application of WTO-consistent measures necessary for the protection of human,
animal or plant life or health within their territory.  The Philippines' complaint was a direct challenge
to the carefully negotiated balance reflected in the SPS Agreement between WTO Members' shared,
but sometimes competing interests in the promotion of trade and the protection of human, animal or
plant life or health.  Contrary to the claim made by the Philippines, many WTO Members maintained
approaches to quarantine which were either similar to Australia's system or had elements that weresimilar to its import permit system.  Australia expected they would share its serious concerns about
the potential implications of the Philippines' challenge on the fundamental right of WTO Members to
address their legitimate quarantine concerns.  As mentioned previously, Australia had strong doubts
about the consistency of the Philippines' request with the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU and
reserved its WTO rights fully in this regard.
26. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed
 to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
27. The representatives of China, EC,  Ecuador , India , Thailand  and the United States  reserved
their third-party rights to partic ipate in the Panel's proceedings.WT/DSB/M/155
Page 7
3. European Communities – Export subsidies on sugar
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Australia (WT/DS265/21)
(b) Request for the establishment of a panel by Brazil (WT/DS266/21)
(c) Request for the establishment of a panel by Thailand (WT/DS283/2)
28. The Chairman proposed that the three sub-items to which he had just referred be considered
together.  He recalled that the DSB had considered these matters at its meeting on 21 and
23 July 2003 and had agreed to revert to them.  First, he drew attention to the communication from
Australia contained in document WT/DS265/21.
29. The representative of Australia said that his country was making a second request for the
establishment of a panel in this dispute at the present meeting.  Australia's position on the issues
raised in this dispute was set out in the panel request (document WT/DS265/21) and in its statement at
the time of the first panel request on 21 July 2003.  Therefore, at the present meeting, he would not go
into details again, but he would like to reiterate two key points:  first, Australia remained extremelyconcerned at the high levels of export subsidies on sugar being provided by the EC.  The EC, despite
being one of the highest cost producers in the world, exported approximately 6 million tonnes of
subsidized sugar, an amount which significantly ex ceeded the EC's export subsidy obligations.  This
caused great damage to other sugar producing countries, including Australia.  In taking this dispute,
Australia was asking the EC to adhere to the commitments made at the time of the Uruguay Round,
which had been hard won by countries such as Australia.  Second, he also wished to reiterate that the
dispute was not about preferential access by ACP countries to the EC.  It was not within Australia's
gift to deliver on the EC's treaty obligations to ACP countries.  Australia, therefore, requested the
DSB to establish a panel pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU to examine the matters set out in document
WT/DS265/21. Australia also submitted that under Article 9.1 of the DSU a single panel beestablished to consider the matters raised by Australia, Brazil and Thailand.
30. The Chairman drew attention to the communication from Brazil contained in document
WT/DS266/21.
31. The representative of Brazil said that this was the second time that Brazil was requesting the
establishment of a panel to examine the EC's suga r regime;  i.e. the "Common Organization of the
Markets in the Sugar Sector".  As Brazil had stated at the DSB meeting held on 21 July, this regime
was characterized by import quotas, high tariffs, high domestic intervention prices and export
subsidies.  It grossly distorted world trade in sugar.  At the present meeting, he wished to briefly point
out again the main concerns raised by Brazil regard ing the COM for sugar.  First, the payments on the
so-called C sugar enabled it to be produced and exported at prices below its total cost of production.These payments were financed by virtue of the high prices that the EC's regime secured for growers
and processors of A and B sugar quotas.  They were export subsidies within the meaning of Article 9
of the Agreement on Agriculture, and were subject to reduction commitments.  Second, the export
subsidies that the EC provided to an amount of white sugar was ostensibly equivalent to the quantity
of raw sugar that it imported under its preferential  import arrangements.  This amount was reported by
the EC to be approximately 1.6 million tonnes annually.  The EC had unjustifiably excluded these
subsidies from the calculation of the total amount of export subsidies that it provided for sugar.
32. He reiterated that this latter challenge was totally unrelated to the preferential arrangements
that applied to the EC's imports of sugar from the ACP countries.  Brazil supported and continued to
support the waiver concerning the "ACP-EC Partnership Agreement".  In fact, Brazil's request for the
establishment of the panel contained no claims of violation concerning the access of ACP sugar to the
EC's market.  Brazil had tried to resolve these difficulties in consultations with the EC held on 21 and22 November 2002.  These consultations had been held with a view to resolving the dispute.WT/DSB/M/155
Page 8
Unfortunately, they had failed to lead to a mutually satisfactory solution to this case.  Thus, Brazil,
together with Australia and Thailand, had no alternative but to request, for the second time, the
establishment of a panel.  Brazil, therefore, dr ew Members' attention to document WT/DS266/21 of
9 July 2003, which contained the request for the establishment of a panel to examine the conformity
of certain aspects of the EC's sugar regime with  the WTO rules.  Brazil also submitted that under
Article 9.1 of the DSU a single panel should be established to consider the matters raised by Australia,Brazil and Thailand.
33. The Chairman drew attention to the communication from Thailand contained in document
WT/DS283/2.
34. The representative of Thailand said that at the DSB meeting on 21 and 23 July 2003, Thailand
had requested that a panel be established to examine the matter set out in its request for the
establishment of a panel contained in document WT /DS283/2.  On the same day, Australia and Brazil
had also asked the DSB to establish panels to address similar complaints.  The EC had objected to theestablishment of those panels.  Since then, Thailand and the EC had been unable to reach a mutually
agreeable solution.  Accordingly, Thailand requested that the DSB establish a panel to examine the
matter set out in document WT/DS283/2.  As stated at the previous DSB meeting, Thailand had
significant trade interests in the sugar sector.  Together with Australia and Brazil, Thailand was
among the world's most competitive exporters of sugar:  Thailand's share of world white sugar exportswas about 6 percent of total exports.  Thailand's national development depended mainly on exports, of
which sugar exports formed an essential component.  The sugar industry employed almost 1.5 million
workers.  It was Thailand's goal to boost the incomes received by sugar producers.
35. The subsidies granted by the EC to its suga r exports were an impediment to Thailand's
development of its sugar sector. It was well-documented that the EC routinely produced more sugarthan it could consume.  Under the EC's regime, su gar in excess of requirements had to be exported.
Thailand submitted that it was profitable for EC sugar exporters to export this sugar because they
benefited  from illegal and WTO-inconsistent export subsidies provided by the EC.  As well as having
the substantial interest in the sugar sector, Thailand as a WTO Member had a systemic interest in the
observance of WTO rules, and was concerned about an appropriate interpretation of the WTO'ssubsidy disciplines.  Thailand was particularly concerned about the use that developed countries
appeared to be making of export subsidy schemes that encouraged production in excess of domestic
consumption, and guaranteed the exports of excess production.  Thailand was concerned that such
practices circumvented WTO rules, and had resulted in situations where exports from developing
countries were not able to compete with subsidized exports from developed countries.  Thailand,therefore, had both substantial trade and systemic interests in the EC's sugar regime.  In conclusion,
Thailand wished to endorse the statements made by Australia and Brazil, who had joined Thailand in
requesting that panels be established to consider claims relating to the EC's sugar regime.  Thailand
wished to confirm that although the three request s presented to the DSB at the present meeting had
been differently worded, the three WTO Members, Australia, Brazil and Thailand, had made
substantially the same claims.  Thailand, therefore, joined Brazil and Australia in requesting that the
DSB establish a single panel to consider the matters raised in those requests.
36. The representative of the European Communities said that the EC had already indicated its
views on this matter and would not repeat them at the present meeting.  Australia, Brazil and Thailand
had chosen to ignore the EC's arguments and remained insensitive to the legitimate concerns strongly
voiced by the ACP and LDC's sugar exporting countries.  This was deeply regrettable, but the EC
would vigorously defend its interest and those of  the ACP and LDC's beneficiaries of the sugar
regime in this dispute.  He said that the EC could agree to the establishment of a single panel, referred
to by Australia, Brazil and Thailand to examine their complaints.
37. The representative of Australia said that, once again, claims had been expressed at the present
meeting by the EC that the parties were insensitive to the concerns of ACP countries and that thisWT/DSB/M/155
Page 9
dispute was a de facto attack on ACP countries’ preferential access to the EC's market.  As it had been
set out when Australia had first presented its request for establishment of a panel to examine the EC's
export subsidies on sugar, it was clear from Australia’s panel request that it honoured the assurances it
had given to ACP countries that it would not challenge the preferential arrangements in this dispute.
There is no reason why, in the event of a WTO finding against the EC, the preferences currently
accorded to ACP countries by the EC could not co ntinue to be honoured by the EC.  Yet comments
continued to be made such as these by the EC at the present meeting.  Australia was left wondering
once again why the EC did not settle this issue once and for all.  He said that what was sought was an
unambiguous undertaking that, in the event the WTO found against the EC on export subsidies, the
EC would continue to honour its treaty obligations  on preferential access to ACP countries.  Surely
the EC, if it was genuine, would be in a position to give that assurance right now.  Failure by the EC
to do so would confirm the view that this issue, while a critical one for ACP countries, was merely a
smokescreen being used by the EC in the context of this dispute to deflect the debate from the centralissue:  i.e. the EC’s failure to observe its export subsidy obligations in the sugar sector.
38. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed
 to establish a single panel pursuant to
Article 9.1 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
39. The representatives of Barbados, Canada , China , Colombia , Jamaica,  Mauritius , New
Zealand, Trinidad and Tobago  and the United States  reserved their third-party rights to participate in
the Panel's proceedings.
4. United States – Anti-dumping measures on cement from Mexico
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Mexico (WT/DS281/2)
40. The Chairman recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on
18 August 2003 and had agreed to revert to it.  He drew attention to the communication from Mexico
contained in document WT/DS281/2.
41. The representative of Mexico said that at the DSB meeting held on 18 August, the United
States had blocked the establishment of a panel.  As a result, Mexico, once again, had found itself
obliged to request the establishment of a panel.  At the present meeting he did not wish to  repeat the
"catalogue" of violations by the United States and would simply refer to what had been stated by theUnited States at the previous meeting.  Regarding the substance of Mexico's complaint, the United
States had failed to mention any of the reasons for which it was still applying anti-dumping duties on
cement from Mexico, which should have never been applied.  The United States had not explained
either why it had rejected Mexico's efforts to reach a mutually satisfactory solution.  Instead, the
United States had indicated that certain aspects of Mexico's request were not "sufficiently specific toclearly present the matter in question", and had added that Mexico's request did not allow "the legal
basis for Mexico's complaint" to be determined.  In Mexico's view this statement appeared to be
delaying tactics.  He, therefore, wished to make two comments in this respect.
42. Regarding the statement that some aspects of Mexico's request were not sufficiently specific
because it did not cite paragraphs of the articles violated, he wished to recall that:  (i) in the Bananas
case, the United States had failed to cite the paragraphs of the Articles in its request for the
establishment of a panel, but this had not preven ted the procedure from going ahead;  (ii) in the
Fructose case, the United States had not specified the paragraphs of the articles of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement either and had not related its claims to the articles mentioned.  Here again, this had not
prevented the procedure from going ahead. In addition, the United States had indicated that "it is
unable to determine the legal basis for Mexico's complaint".  In this connection, it appeared incredible
that the United States stated that it "does not recognize our complaint" after:  (i) 13 years in whichmany bilateral meetings had been held at all levels in order to express Mexico's concerns regarding
the conduct of the investigation;  (ii) eleven administrative reviews in which many claims andWT/DSB/M/155
Page 10
evidence regarding the anti-dumping measures had been presented;  (iii) two sunset reviews;
(iv) several dispute settlement procedures unde r the NAFTA;  and (v) ex tensive consultations in
which Mexico's claims were explained in detail.  In the light of the foregoing, it was difficult to
understand how the United States could credibly affirm that the claims had not been presented clearly
or that it could not understand the legal basis for this case.  To summarize, he said that it was clear
that Mexico's request was fully in conformity with Article 6.2 of the DSU.  He noted that 13 years hadalready been enough and it was now time to enter into the substance of the case.
43. The representative of the United States said that his delegation did not wish to repeat the
points made at the previous DSB meeting concerning this matter.  It continued to be disappointed that
Mexico had chosen to pursue this matter further by requesting the establishment of a panel, but
remained confident that US law – as such and as applied in the determinations concerning Gray
Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico – would be found to be consistent with the United States'
WTO obligations.  The United States was also disappointed that Mexico had declined to cure thenumerous defects in its panel request, examples of which had been discussed by the United States at
the previous DSB meeting.  The United States took note of Mexico's statement at the present meeting
but continued to believe that Mexico had not complied with the basic requirements of Article 6.2 of
the DSU.  Regrettably, Mexico had not acted on the suggestion that it refile its panel request.  As a
result, the United States had to reserve its right to pursue these issues at an appropriate point beforethe panel.  It thus appeared that the resources of the dispute settlement system would be devoted to
seeking to enforce Mexico's compliance with Article 6.2.  This resource drain was both unfortunate
and could have been avoided, inasmuch as the United States had set out its concerns to Mexico at the
previous meeting and suggested a way forward for Mexico.  In summary, while the United States
acknowledged Mexico's right to have a panel adjudicate those claims that it had presented in a propermanner relating to the US antidumping measures on cement, the United States insisted that its rights
under Article 6.2 of the DSU be respected.  Because Mexico had not respected these rights, the United
States could not go along with the establishment of a panel.
44. The representative of Canada said that his country was very closely examining the allegations
of Mexico and the procedural issues raised by the United States.  Both were very important to Canada.
However, on account of the extent and range of these allegations, Canada continued to examine them
very closely and would indicate its third-party interest later on in writing.
45. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
46. The representatives of China, EC , Japan  and Chinese Taipei  reserved their third-party rights
to participate in the Panel's proceedings.
5. United States – Anti-dumping measures on oil country tubular goods (OCTG) from
Mexico
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Mexico (WT/DS282/2)
47. The Chairman recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on
18 August 2003 and had agreed to revert to it.  He drew attention to the communication from Mexico
contained in document WT/DS282/2.
48. The representative of Mexico said that as in the cement case, the United  States had blocked
the establishment of a panel at the 18 August DSB meeting.  Once again, instead of considering the
substance of Mexico's complaints, the United States had used delaying tactics that made no sense.
Mexico did not intend to repeat what had been stated at the previous DSB meeting and would only
refer to the US comment on the alleged lack of clarity in Mexico's request.  He wished to refer toMexico's statement concerning cement regarding what the United States had done in the Bananas andWT/DSB/M/155
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Fructose cases.  As in the cement case, the request for consultations and the questions were fully
detailed.  Consequently, the United States could not affirm that the claims had not been presented
clearly or that it was unable to understand the legal basis for the case.  Mexico repeated that its
request was fully compatible with Article 6.2 of  the DSU.  This was why Mexico respectfully
requested the United States to abandon its delaying tactics and to move on to consideration of the
substance of its violations.
49. The representative of the United States said that it would not repeat the points made at the
previous meeting of the DSB concerning this matter.  Suffice it to say that, as in the case of the
cement dispute, the United States was confident that US law – as such and as applied – would be
found to be consistent with its WTO obligations.  The United States was also disappointed that
Mexico had declined to cure the numerous defects in its panel request, defects that had been discussed
at the previous meeting of the DSB and that were similar to those that appeared in Mexico's panel
request concerning cement.  As with the previous agenda item, the United States had taken note ofMexico's statement, however, the United States continued to believe that Mexico had not complied
with the basic requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.  It regretted that Mexico had not acted on the
US suggestion to refile its panel request and, once again, wished to reserve its rights to pursue these
issues at an appropriate point before the panel.  In conclusion, here too, because Mexico had failed to
respect US rights under Article 6.2 of the DSU, the United States could not go along with theestablishment of a panel.
50. The representative of Canada said his country had a keen interest in both the substance and
the procedural issues that were raised in this di spute.  However, on account of the extent and range of
the allegations at play, Canada was not in a position to indicate its third-party interest at the present
meeting and might do so at a later date.
51. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
52. The representatives of Argentina, China , EC, Japan , Chinese Taipei , and Venezuela  reserved
their third-party rights to partic ipate in the Panel's proceedings.
6. United States – Countervailing duties on steel plate from Mexico
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Mexico (WT/DS280/2)
53. The Chairman recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at its meeting on
18 August 2003 and had agreed to revert to it.  He drew attention to the communication from Mexico
contained in document WT/DS280/2.
54. The representative of Mexico said that at the DSB meeting held on 18 August, the United
States had blocked the establishment of a panel regarding the countervailing duties based on a
methodology that had already been rejected by the A ppellate Body "as such".  Of even more concern
was the fact that the United States was cynical enough to state that there was no reason to conduct this
procedure because the countervailing duties collected as a result of this investigation had already been
paid and to suggest that Mexico should await the review under way before contesting them.  This was
not only totally absurd, but it was also a violation of the principle of good faith laid down in
Article 3.10 of the DSU.  This case also showed that the incentives' scheme in the DSU faced aserious problem of effectiveness.  Therefore, what  the United States was doing in this case amounted
to an abuse of the system, and in this particular case to the detriment of Mexico.
55. The representative of the United States said that his country was disappointed that Mexico
had decided to make a second request for a panel with respect to a measure which would have no
effect six months from now.  As the United States had stated at the previous DSB meeting, the 1998WT/DSB/M/155
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administrative review that was the subject of this panel request would cease to have any effect no later
than 26 February 2004.  Given this situation, it seemed to the United States that the resources of all
involved, including those of the parties, the Secretariat, and the panel that would be established at the
present meeting, would be better served if Mexico were to assess the results of the soon-to-be
completed administrative review, and determine at that time whether it wished to pursue WTO dispute
settlement proceedings.  The United States, therefore, hoped that Mexico would reassess its decisionto pursue panel proceedings.  Finally, on a procedural matter, Mexico stated in its panel request that
the measure at issue "includes" the 1998 administrative review final results cited in Mexico's panel
request, as well as "the actions that preceded it".  Article 6 of the DSU required that Members
"identify the specific measures at issue" in a dispute.  The United States did not understand what
"actions" Mexico might be referencing in this re quest, in addition to the final results of the
administrative review, but considered that the only "specific measure" identified was the final results
of the 1998 administrative review.
56. The representative of Mexico said that his country noted the statement made by the United
States as to how the resources of the dispute settlement mechanism should be used.  He said that the
resources of Mexico, the United States, the Secretariat, the panel and third parties could have been
saved if the illegal methodology had not again been applied.
57. The representative of Canada said that, as a procedural issue, the United States had noted that
it did not consider the words "the actions that preceded it" to constitute a reference to specific
measures.  Without taking a position whether or not this was the case, that seemed to be at variance
with the US position in the Wheat case where the United States had argued and had won that actions
did constitute reference to specific measures in accordance with Article 6.2 of the DSU.
58. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.
59. The representatives of China, EC  and Chinese Taipei  reserved their third-party rights to
participate in the Panel's proceedings.
7. European Communities – Measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech
products
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by the United States (WT/DS291/23)
(b) Request for the establishment of a panel by Canada (WT/DS292/17)
(c) Request for the establishment of a panel by Argentina (WT/DS293/17)
60. The Chairman proposed that the three sub-items to which he had just referred be considered
together.  He recalled that the DSB had considered these matters at its meeting on 18 August 2003 and
had agreed to revert to them.  First, he drew attention to the communication from the United States
contained in document WT/DS291/23.
61. The representative of the United States said that, as explained at the DSB meeting held on
18 August, his country was concerned that the EC and its member States, in implementing EC
legislation on the approval of biotech products, had adopted measures that were inconsistent with the
EC's WTO obligations.  In particular, the EC's moratorium on the approval of biotech products as well
as product-specific bans adopted by EC member States appeared inconsistent with various provisionsof the WTO Agreement, including provisions of the SPS Agreement.  Furthermore, these measures
had restricted imports of agricultural and food pr oducts from the United States.  More broadly, the
United States was concerned that the EC's measures , which were not based on science, were hindering
the worldwide development and application of agri cultural biotechnology.  In a world where hungerWT/DSB/M/155
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and starvation remained a tragic reality for many throughout the developing world, it was essential to
take advantage of the benefits of biotechnology in terms of raising farmer productivity, reducing
hunger, and improving the environment.  Accordingly, the United States made its second request that
the DSB establish a panel pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference to
examine these matters.  The United States took note of the panel requests by Canada and Argentina.
Assuming those panels were also established, the United States submitted that under Article 9.1 of theDSU, a single panel should be established to consider the matters raised by the United States,
Argentina, and Canada.
62. The Chairman drew attention to the communi cation from Canada contained in document
WT/DS292/17.
63. The representative of Canada said that his country's position with respect to this dispute had
been amply and clearly set out in the statement made at the 18 August DSB meeting. However, he
wished to make a few observations with respect to the statement made by the EC at that meeting.Canada was surprised by the EC's allegation at the previous DSB meeting that Canada was not
interested in seeking a satisfactory outcome and was not interested in doing so during the
consultations.  Not only had Canada participated in good faith in the consultations with a view to
resolving this dispute;  Canada had spent the past five years trying to engage the EC to resolve this
issue.  Unfortunately, despite repeated assurances fr om all levels of the EC that the moratorium would
be lifted, Canada had only seen continued delays.  This panel request was a last resort to address
measures that were inconsistent with the EC's obligations under the WTO.  Canada agreed with the
EC that WTO Members had the right to establish their own level of protection to address risks.
However, this dispute was not about levels of protection or risks.  This dispute was about the EC's
failure to apply its own approvals procedure for pe nding biotech product applications and about bans
imposed by EC Member State on products that had already been approved as safe by the EC.
64. He said that Canada agreed that a single panel should be established to consider the matters
raised by Canada, the United States, and Argentina in this dispute.  Canada noted that there were
differences in the panel requests made by Canada, the United States, and Argentina.  Canada
considered, however, that these differences could be accommodated in the context of a single panelwithout prejudice to the rights of the parties involved, as envisaged in Article 9.2 of the DSU.  Canada
reserved its right, under Article 9.2 of the DSU, to request a separate panel report, if necessary.
65. The Chairman drew attention to the communication from Argentina contained in document
WT/DS293/17.
66. The representative of Argentina said that, at the 18 August 2003 DSB meeting, Argentina had
requested the establishment of a panel in accordance with the terms of the request contained in
document WT/DS293/17 concerning actions and meas ures adopted by the EC that affected the
approval and marketing of agricultural biotechnology products.  It merely wished to add that, as there
had been no further developments since then, which might indicate the possibility of a settlement to
this dispute, Argentina was requesting the establishment of a panel for the second time.  In this
connection, and taking into account the requests by other Members relating to the same matter, his
country considered appropriate that a single panel be established under Article 9.1 of the DSU.
67. The representative of the European Communitie s said that he wished to express the EC's
regret with regard to the reiteration of panel requests by Argentina, Canada and the United States.  As
had been explained when these requests were first discussed a few days ago, the approval of
genetically-modified organisms and genetically-modified food was perfectly possible in the EC.  A
number of applications were being examined at present, and decisions on pending applications wouldbe taken within a reasonable time-frame in accordance with the relevant procedures.  However, it
would appear that the complainants had regarded the consultations stage as a purely formal step,
necessary to proceed to request the establishment of  a panel, rather than as a meaningful dialogueWT/DSB/M/155
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aimed at resolving the dispute, as required by the DSU rules.  The EC was disappointed by this non-
constructive attitude, but would vigorously defend its interest in this dispute. He said that the EC was
agreeable to the single panel approach.
68. The representative of Mexico said that his delegation wished to continue to examine the panel
requests and would indicate its intention to participate as a third party in this case.
69. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  to establish a single panel pursuant to
Article 9.1 of the DSU,  with standard terms of reference.
70. The representatives of Australia, China , Chile , Colombia , El Salvador , Honduras , New
Zealand, Norway , Peru , Chinese Taipei , Thailand , and Uruguay  reserved their third-party rights to
participate in the Panel's proceedings.
8. European Communities – Protection of tr ademarks and geographical indications for
agricultural products and foodstuffs
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by the United States (WT/DS174/20)
(b) Request for the establishment of a panel by Australia (WT/DS290/18)
71. The Chairman proposed that the two sub-items to which he had just referred be considered
together.  First, he drew attention to the communi cation from the United States contained in document
WT/DS174/20.
72. The representative of the United States said that his country had had serious concerns for
many years regarding the EC's Regulation 2081/92, which governed the protection of geographical
indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs.  Among other things, Regulation 2081/92 did not
allow the registration of non-EC GIs unless the GI was from a country that offered GI protection that
was equivalent to that of the EC.  This "reciprocity requirement" appeared to be inconsistent with the
national treatment or MFN obligations of the TRIPS Agreement and the GATT.  Nor didRegulation 2081/92 provide the legal means for foreign nationals to prevent the misleading use of
their GIs.  This also appeared inconsistent with the EC's national treatment and MFN obligations
under TRIPS and the GATT 1994.  Simply put, when it came to the protection of GIs, the EC did not
treat foreign nationals and products originating outside the EC the same as its own nationals and
products.  Regulation 2081/92 also diminished the value of foreign trademarks by not allowingtrademark owners to assert their rights to protect their trademarks against confusing use.  This
appeared inconsistent with Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 16 required the EC to provide
trademark owners the exclusive right to prevent unauthorized use of identical or similar signs, where
such use would result in a likelihood of confusion.  The United States had held numerous
consultations with the EC since 1 June 1999, when it had first requested WTO dispute settlementconsultations.  The EC had yet to address its concerns .  Accordingly, at this juncture, the EC had left
the United States no choice, but to request that the DSB establish a panel pursuant to Article 6 of the
DSU with standard terms of reference to examine these matters.
73. The Chairman drew attention to the communi cation from Australia contained in document
WT/DS290/18.
74. The representative of Australia said that his country was seeking the establishment of a panel
to consider its concerns regarding the EC's regime for the registration and protection of geographical
indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs.  The details of Australia's request were set out in
WT/DS290/18.  As confirmed in a public statement released in Brussels on 28 August 2003, the EC
was seeking through a three-pronged approach in the Doha negotiations to fundamentally re-write the
TRIPS Agreement's provisions on IPR's.  This, despite the fact that for many WTO Members theWT/DSB/M/155
Page 15
current provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreement were  yet to enter into force and the EC itself had
failed to implement its existing obligations.  In Australia's view, the EC regime was inconsistent with
WTO rules prohibiting discriminatory treatment, did not give due protection to trademarks, and was
overly complex and prescriptive.  The EC's regime diminished the legal protection for trademarks
under the TRIPS Agreement. Among other difficulties for trademark owners under the EC regime,
they had no right to prevent the registration and confusing use of a similar sign, thereby potentiallysignificantly diminishing the value of the trademark.   However, the problems that existed with the
EC's GI regime did not relate only to trademarks.  If a third country wished to protect even one GI
under the EC's regime, it had to agree to register, and to protect, at the same level as in the EC, over
600 EC products.  Even then, the third country GI could not be registered under the EC's regime
unless the third country offered guarantees that its GI registration system was identical or equivalent
to the EC's system.  In other words, the EC was stating that its system was the way the rest of the
world had to do it.  And it was precisely this objective;  i.e. to force all Members of the WTO to adoptits burdensome, convoluted and bureaucratic system – that the EC had embarked upon in the Doha
negotiations.  The EC was in fact asserting the exclusivity of the EC's system of law.  Quite simply
such a requirement was not in keeping with any of the covered agreements.  In accordance with
Australia's rights under the DSU and the other covered agreements, Australia requested the
establishment of a panel to examine its claims.
75. The representative of the European Communities said that the EC deeply regretted this
initiative by the United States and Australia to request the establishment of a panel with respect to EC
Regulation 2081/92 on the protection of geographical indications for agricultural products and
foodstuffs.  The EC considered that Regulation 2081/92 was fully compatible with WTO rules and
accordingly would reject this first request for the es tablishment of a panel.  Considering the subject
matter (geographical indications) and the timing of the request, on the eve of Cancun, it was difficult
not to see an attempt to hamper the Doha negotiations on geographical indications for agricultural
products.  If the United States and Australia remained committed to pursuing this regrettable action,
the EC would vigorously defend its interests and those of all WTO Members who wished to see a
correct interpretation of the WTO provisions on geographical indications.  The US request had failedto meet the minimum requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU, which provided that the request had to
"identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly".  Regulation 2081/92 was a complex piece of
legislation consisting of numerous provisions imposing many distinct legal requirements.  The US
request did not specify which aspects of Regulation 2081/92 it considered to be inconsistent with eachof the numerous provisions of the WTO Agreement (no less than 19!) that it cited.  As a result, the US
request failed to "present the problem clearly" and did not achieve the purpose of providing adequate
notice to the EC.  Indeed, at this stage, and afte r two rounds of consultations, the subject of the US
complaint remained most unclear.  The EC recalled that in a recent case ("Canada 
– Wheat Board")
the panel request made by the United States had been found by the Panel to be inadequate on similar
grounds.  In order to avoid similar problems in this case, the EC would invite the United States to
submit a new panel request in which its legal claims were properly stated in accordance with the
requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU.  Although Australia's panel request was somewhat morespecific, it failed also to present the problem clearl y.  The EC therefore would extend to Australia the
invitation to submit a new panel request where its legal claims would be properly stated in accordance
with Article 6.2 of the DSU.  Should the United States or Australia not submit a new panel request
which met the requirements of Article 6.2, the EC reserved the right to raise this issue before the
panel.
76. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed
 to revert to these matters.WT/DSB/M/155
Page 16
9. Proposed nomination for the indicative list of governmental and non-governmental
panelists (WT/DSB/W/239)
77. The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DSB/W/239 which contained an additional
name proposed for inclusion on the indicative list in accordance with Article 8.4 of the DSU.  He
proposed that the DSB approve the name contained in document WT/DSB/W/239.
78. The DSB so agreed.
10. European Communities – Anti-dumping duties on malleable cast iron tube or pipe
fittings from Brazil
(a) Statement by Brazil
79. The representative of Brazil, speaking under Other Business", said that on 18 August 2003 the
DSB had adopted the Appellate Body Report and the Panel Report in the above-mentioned case.  In
its Report the Appellate Body had found that the EC had breached Articles 2.4.2, 6.2, 6.4 and 12.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In accordance with Article 21.3 of the DSU the EC had now anobligation to inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of the implementation of the DSB's
recommendations and rulings at a DSB meeting held within 30 days after the date of adoption of the
Reports.  In view of the fact that the EC had deci ded not to inform the DSB of its intentions at the
present meeting and no other regular meeting was scheduled until 30 days had elapsed, Brazil wished
to know when and how the EC intended to comply with Article 21.3 of the DSU.
80. The representative of the European Communities said that the EC understood the impatience
of Brazil, but noted that Article 21.3 of the DSU specified 30 days for notification of intentions.  Thus
far only 11 days had elapsed and a lot of time was still left.  He wished to assure Brazil and other
Members that the EC would meet its obligations unde r Article 21.3 of the DSU in relation to this case.
81. The DSB took note of the statements.
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