RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONG/ADP/Q1/CHL/4
G/SCM/Q1/CHL/4
30 April 2001
(01-2154)
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing MeasuresOriginal:  Spanish
NOTIFICATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS UNDER
ARTICLES 18.5 AND 32.6 OF THE AGREEMENTS
Replies to the Questions Posed by ARGENTINA1 Regarding the Notification of CHILE2
The following communication, dated 26 April 2001, has been received from the Permanent
Mission of Chile.
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I. ARTICLE 10
1. Article 10 states that anti-dumping and countervailing duties will be applied to "imports
of goods of which the entry into the country caus es or threatens serious injury to the domestic
industry by entering at diminished prices as a result of artificial effects in their respective
markets".  What does the expression "diminished pr ices as a result of artificial effects" mean?
To what extent is this concept compatible with the definition of dumping in the Anti-DumpingAgreement (AD)?  Can the expression "artific ial effects in their respective markets" be
understood to cover situations other than dumping or subsidies?
Reply
The expression "diminished prices as a result of artificial effects" means that as a result of
intervention by the government (subsidies) or the private sector (dumping), the prices of imported
goods are lower than they would be in the absence of  any distortion.  Accordingly, this concept is in
no way incompatible with the definition of dumping in the AD Agreement.  It should further be borne
in mind that this concept of diminished prices is more stringent than that in the AD Agreement since,
as well as the existence of dumping or subsidies, it requires the prices be diminished as a consequence
of these distortions.
It follows that the expression "artificial effects in their respective markets" covers only
situations pertaining to dumping and subsidies.
Without prejudice to the above, the WTO Agreements being part of its domestic legislation
Chile's interpretation of dumping and subsidies matches the definitions given in the GATT, the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the Subsidies Agreement.
                                                     
1 G/ADP/Q1/CHL/2-G/SCM/Q1/CHL/2.
2 G/ADP/N/1/CHL/2-G/SCM/N/1/CHL/2.G/ADP/Q1/CHL/4
G/SCM/Q1/CHL/4
Page 2
2. The second sentence of Article 10 states th at "The President of the Republic shall
determine the goods to which these surcharges, anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties
shall apply …".  Is the concept of "surcharges" th e same as the concept which, according to the
notification of 9 March, was revoked in Arti cle 10?  How can the authority given to the
President to determine the goods to which surch arges, anti-dumping duties and countervailing
duties shall apply be reconciled with the investigation to be carried out by the Commission?
Reply
Law 18.525 was amended on 31 May 1999 to incorporate the Commission's authority to
conduct an investigation when imports have increased under the conditions established in the WTO
Safeguards Agreement.  The Commission was also empowered, on completing the investigation, tomake a recommendation as to the application of safeguard measures in the form of ad valorem  tariff
surcharges.  The amendment consisted of removing the concept of surcharges in Article 10 and
amending Article 9 to encompass all attributions and procedures pertaining to safeguard measures.
Argentina asks whether the concept of surcharges in the former Article 10 is the same as that
in new Article 9.  The answer is no:  the former tariff surcharges applied where prices diminished as a
result of the market circumstances whereas the present surcharges are a response to increases in
imports under the conditions described in Article XIX of GATT 1994 and the WTO Safeguards
Agreement.
In the first part of question 2, Argentina refers to the beginning of the second sentence of
Article 10 of the law in question:  "The President of the Republic shall determine the goods to which
these surcharges, anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties shall apply …".  However, it becomes
clear if one reads to the end of this provision that the President of the Republic, in addition to
determining the goods, also determines the amount and the duration of the measures – which may notexceed one year – subject to a favourable report by the investigating authority, the Commission on
Distortions.
In other words, as the investigating authority the Commission, on concluding its investigation,
submits a recommendation to the President of the Republic on which the latter will base the final
determination regarding the adoption of the measure.  Hence, the President of the Republic may not
make determinations regarding goods which have not been the subject of an investigation.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
In document G/ADP/W/156, Chile reports that it is preparing a law specifically covering, in
accordance with the Agreements, the structure, composition and functions of the investigating
authority, the body responsible for reviewing its decisions and those procedural rules not explicitlyprovided for in the Agreements.  It also states that this must be "consistent with the structure of our
administrative procedures".  Chile has not notified to the WTO the rules which govern the "structure"
of its administrative procedures as such.
Questions
1. Should it be understood that the legislation notified in document G/ADP/N/1/CHL/2 is
the law referred to by Chile in document G/AD P/W/156 as the law being prepared specifically
to cover, in accordance with the Agreements, th e structure, composition and functions of the
investigating authority, the body responsible fo r reviewing its decisions and those procedural
rules not explicitly provided for in the Agreements?G/ADP/Q1/CHL/4
G/SCM/Q1/CHL/4
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2. How is the "structure" of these administrati ve procedures organized and what is the
legal hierarchy of the mechanism?
3. How does this mechanism apply to anti-dumping investigations in relation to the
Agreement and its specific regulations?  If th e aforementioned regulations on administrative
procedures are included among the laws and regulations under Article 18.5 of the AD
Agreement, Argentina interprets this to mean that they should be notified, with special
reference to this Article.
Reply
No, it should not be understood that the legi slation notified in document G/ADP/N/1/CHL/2
is the law in the process of being drafted which Chile referred to in document G/ADP/W/156 of 1995.
Chile repeats its statement in document G/ADP/N/1/CHL/2:  the amendment notified introduces no
significant changes in anti-dumping or countervailing duty investigations.
When it stated in 1995 that the planned amendments were to be "consistent with the structure
of our administrative procedures", Chile simply m eant that any amendment or adjustment of domestic
legislation to take account of the required parameters of an international obligation must also be
consistent with the needs, uses and practices of a country's public administration.
Consequently, apart from the legislation already notified by Chile in 1995 and 2000 there is
no "structure" of administrative regulations falling within Article 18.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.  Chile therefore has nothing new to notify.
III. COMPLAINTS
In the regulations notified, it is not stated what information the parties must submit for the
purposes of initiating an anti-dumping or subsidies investigation.  In document G/ADP/W/99, Chile
states that "Chilean regulations provide for a form in which the interested parties must provide the
information needed for submitting their complaint".
Questions
1. As Law No. 18.525 and Decree No. 575 – the only regulations notified to the WTO – do
not mention any such form, to what "Chile an regulations" does this statement refer?
2. How are these "regulations" to be communicated?  What is their legal status and their
relationship to the other provisions in Chile's legislation.  Argentina considers that these
regulations should also have been notified.
Reply
The Chilean regulations correspond to the provisions of Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.  Consequently, the application must include evidence of dumping, injury and a causal linkbetween the two.  The information to be provided incl udes the particulars given in indents (i) to (iv) of
the above-mentioned article, which takes account of aspects such as the identity of the applicant;  a
description of the volume and value of production;  a description of the product;  export prices and
sales prices in the exporting country;  evolution of the volume of the imports and their impact on the
domestic industry.G/ADP/Q1/CHL/4
G/SCM/Q1/CHL/4
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IV. EVIDENCE
Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement provides that  "All interested parties in an anti-dumping
investigation shall be given notice of the information which the authorities require …" andparagraph 1 of Annex II specifies that "As soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation, the
investigating authorities should specify in detail the information required from any interested party,
and the manner in which that information should be st ructured by the interested party in its response.
The authorities should also ensure that the party is aware that if information is not supplied within a
reasonable time, the authorities will be free to make determinations on the basis of the facts available,
including those contained in the application for the initiation of the investigation by the domestic
industry."
Questions
1. As it was not possible to identify in th e Chilean regulations the procedure for giving
interested parties notice of the information whic h the Commission requires for the purposes of
its determination, could Chile provide information on the form in which the Commission gives
notice of its information requirements and the stage at which it does so?
2. Is the information regulated in any way?  If the reply is in the affirmative, do these
regulations come within the concept of "laws and regulations relevant to this Agreement" in
Article 18.5?  If the answer is yes, will Chile make the relevant notification?
3. If the information is not regulated, when does Chile intend to regulate it and, in the
meantime, what guidelines does the authority use and how are the parties notified of these
guidelines?
Reply
1. Once notice of the initiation of an investigation has been published in the Diario Oficial
(Official Journal), the Technical Secretariat of the Commission sends a standard questionnaire which
it has prepared for the purpose to the enterprises (in the event of dumping) and countries (in the event
of subsidies) against which complaints have been lodged.  The questionnaire sets forth all the initialinformation requirements, including details of the distortion reported, the injury and the causal link
between the two.  In accordance with Article 6.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 12.1 of
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, a period of 30 days is allowed for reply.
Similarly, whenever the need for further information arises in the course of an investigation,
the Technical Secretariat sends a letter and in some cases a new questionnaire supplementing theinitial one.
2. The information elicited in the questionnaire is drawn from the Agreement itself, which spells
out in various articles the information to be considered by investigating authorities in pursuing and
concluding their investigations.
3. The investigating authority comp lies with the prescriptions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
V. PERIOD FOR PARTIES OR THIRD PARTIES TO SUBMIT INFORMATION
The Chilean Law and Regulatory Decree, Articles 11.2 and Article 14 respectively, provide
that within 30 days from the date of publication in the Diario Oficial of the notice of opening of an
investigation, referred to in the preceding Article 12, the Commission shall receive the informationG/ADP/Q1/CHL/4
G/SCM/Q1/CHL/4
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which the parties or any interested third party wishes to submit concerning the case and shall request
any reports it considers necessary.
Questions
1. In document G/ADP/W/156, Chile explains th at "the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the
Agreement on Subsidies … neither supplant nor supplement national legislation but form an
integral part of it, with the status of laws ".  Does Chile consider that the aforementioned
Articles are consistent with footnote 15 to the AD Agreement, which states that "As a general
rule, the time-limit for exporters shall be counted from the date of receipt of the
questionnaire …"?
2. In connection with the words "request any rep orts it considers necessary", are there any
general guidelines on what repor ts are "necessary" and should be part of any investigation?  If
the reply is in the affirmative, could Chile inform us of these guidelines?
Replies
1. As Chile has stated in this Committee since 1995, the WTO Agreements are part of its
domestic legislation.  Since the Agreements came into effect after Law 18.525, and bearing in mind
that when a new law contains provisions incompatible with those of an earlier one the latter isrepealed except for those provisions which are not inconsistent with the new law, it follows that the
relevant legislation in Chile consists of the WTO Agreements and all the provisions of the domestic
legislation that are not incompatible with them.
2. The reports to be required are determined on a case-by-case basis according to the needs of
the investigation, for example the need for addition al information from an interested party or for
information from a third party having no interest in the investigation.
VI. VERIFICATION
The verification referred to in Article 6.6 and 6.7 and Annex I to the AD Agreement are not
addressed in the regulations notified.
Questions
1. Does the Commission have recourse to  the provisions in Article 6.6 and 6.7 and
Annex I to the AD Agreement?
2. If the reply is in the affirmative:
(a) At what stage are the verifications mentioned in Article 6.7 and Annex I to the
AD Agreement conducted?
(b) Is verification carried out in all investigations or does the authority decide on a
case-by-case basis?  If it decides on a case-by-case basis, what parameters does
the authority use when deciding on the need for verification?
(c) How are the parties and interested parties given access to the findings of the
verification?  Do they have an opportunity to submit comments on the
verification?G/ADP/Q1/CHL/4
G/SCM/Q1/CHL/4
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(d) If the authority does not verify, how does it satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the
information used when making its final determination?  What type of
information is verified by official sources and what are these sources?
Reply
1. Yes, the Commission does have recourse to the provisions of Article 6.6 and 6.7 and Annex I
to the AD Agreement.
2. (a) Verifications are carried out upon receipt of the replies to the questionnaires sent out
when the investigation was initiated.
(b) In all investigations, the investigating aut hority satisfies itself as to the accuracy of
the information submitted by the parties.  Verifications pursuant to Article 6.7 are not
necessarily carried out in every investigation, but only when the information supplied
by the parties is unclear and there are no independent sources of information against
which to check it.
(c) Interested parties do not have access to the findings of verifications directly but
through decisions on the use of the information taken by the investigating authority.
(d) The authority always verifies the information submitted by the parties, either on-site
visits or by other means such as the subm ission of supporting documents (invoices in
the case of prices, for example), or international publications or official sources suchas governments or other entities in the case of interest rates, exchange rates, consumer
price indices, etc.
VII. PRICE UNDERTAKINGS
In document G/ADP/W/99, when questioned with regard to price undertakings, Chile stated
that "There are no plans to apply this option in the Chilean regulations."
Questions
1. Given the legal status accorded to the AD Agreement by Chile, can an exporter present
an undertaking?
2. If the reply is in the affirmative, how will the authority deal with an undertaking
presented by an exporter?
Reply
The question referred to by Argentina is No. 31 posed in 1995 by the United States asking
whether Chile ever enters into undertakings in lieu of imposing anti-dumping or countervailing duties
and, if so, to explain the basis in law for doing so.
Chile points out that its answer – which Argentina cites – to that question was that Chile had
no plans to include provisions on undertakings in its domestic legislation.
Although the provisions on price undertakings are optional for Member countries and
although such arrangements have never been resorted to or encouraged, the Chilean investigating
authority may – if it so wishes and  if it is satisfied that the arrangement is compatible with the law on
domestic competition – agree to such undertakings provided that they meet the requirements of theG/ADP/Q1/CHL/4
G/SCM/Q1/CHL/4
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relevant provisions (Article 8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 18 of the Agreement on
Subsidies), since the WTO Agreements are an integral part of domestic legislation.
VIII.  JUDICIAL REVIEW
In document G/ADP/W/99, Chile reports that it "w ill either have to set up a special system for
judicial review, which may be of this kind, or a separate administrative or arbitral tribunal in
accordance with the new provisions of the respective agreements".
Question
1. As no regulations have been notified in this regard, what means have been available to
interested parties for the review of a determination of dumping, injury and a causal link, and/or
anti-dumping measures over the five years during which the AD Agreement has been applied in
Chile?
Reply
The remedies that have been and are available to interested parties in dumping investigations
are the legal remedies available in the ordinary Courts of Justice.  Recourse has been had in particular
to the Remedy of Protection and the Remedy of Constitutional Economic Guarantees.
IX. TRANSPARENCY
In October 1995, Chile stated that it was drafting a regulation "which lays down all those
minor aspects of procedure to be followed, ensures transparency and the precise manner in which the
methods of calculation, adjustments and sources of  relevant information within the scope of the
Commission (investigatory authority) are to be carried out and any other matters which enable easieraccess to the mechanisms under the Agreements".
Questions
1. Has Chile drafted this regulation?
2. If the reply is in the affirmative, has th is regulation been notified to the WTO in
accordance with Article 18.5 of the AD Agreement?
3. If the reply is in the negative, what criter ion does the Commission use when dealing with
this type of issue?
Replies
Chile did not see fit to draft such a regulatio n since, in practice, the legal and regulatory
provisions in force (Law 18.525, Decree No. 575 of  the Ministry of Finance and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement) have sufficed.  The regulation of minor aspects of procedure is optional for Members andit has been deemed unnecessary for carrying out the procedures and ensuring transparency.
For the purposes of calculation, adjustment etc., the Commission takes as a basis the
guidelines provided in the law in force, particular ly the provisions of Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.G/ADP/Q1/CHL/4
G/SCM/Q1/CHL/4
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X. ESSENTIAL FACTS
In document G/ADP/AHG/W/6, Chile reports that it s practice in this area is based on written
notification to the concerned parties of the essential facts of the investigation.  This document
summarizes the information in the public record of the investigation into dumping and the injury it
has caused, the source of this information, and the methodology used to calculate the margin of
dumping, all of which serve as the basis for the final decision by the investigating authority.  With
regard to the timing of the determination of essential facts, Chile reports that it considered that this
should be done at a date sufficiently close to that of the final determination so that the Commission
already possesses virtually all the information need ed to reach a decision, while at the same time
leaving sufficient time for parties to be able to make their comments, defend their viewpoints and even
submit some final information.  For this purpose a period of 15 days from the notification is allowed
for parties to be able to make their observations.
Questions
1. The legislation notified does not contain any provision on the "essential facts".  Could
Chile explain whether there is a regulation governing this matter?
2. If the reply is in the affirmative, what is  the status of this regulation and how is it
applied in relation to the AD Agreement?
Reply
The basis in law for Chile's compliance with the notification of essential facts is Article 6.9 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which, as explained earlier, is an integral part of domestic legislation.
XI. CONFIDENTIALITY
Article 8 of Decree No. 575 provides that "The official records shall be kept in the archives of
the Technical Secretariat and shall be public.  The corresponding information shall also be public,
except when by its nature it is confidential or the interested party which provided it expressly
requested confidentiality on justified grounds.  In this latter case, the interested party shall furnish
public summaries and if, in such cases, it fails to du ly provide such summaries without just cause, the
Commission may disregard the confidential or reserved information."
Questions
1. With regard to information that is conf idential by nature, have any criteria been
established for defining the confidential nature of information?  If they exist, are they known to
the parties?  Are there any regulations defining them?
2. In this Article of the Chilean Regulations there is a mention of "confidential or reserved
information".  Is there any legal difference betw een the two words?  If the reply is in the
affirmative, could Chile please explain this?
3. In practice, if the party providing the information does not request that it should be
treated as confidential, what procedure is followed to declare it "reserved"?  Is there a public
summary so that the other parties can exercise their right of defence?
4. Are there any supplementary administrative regulations concerning reserved
information?  If the reply is in the affirmative, Argentina considers that they should have been
notified with special reference to Article 18.5 of the AD Agreement.G/ADP/Q1/CHL/4
G/SCM/Q1/CHL/4
Page 9
Replies
1. Confidentiality is determined on a case-by-case basis according to how sensitive the
information is for the firm concerned.  Confiden tial information usually refers to particulars
concerning the market or a firm's internal affairs, the disclosure of which would imply a significant
advantage for a competitor.
2. There is no difference between confidential and reserved information.
3. The Commission is not empowered to declare information reserved.  It may determine only
whether information submitted by a party as confidential warrants that qualification, and may request
that the information be made public or that public summaries be submitted for communication to the
other interested parties.
4. There are no supplementary administrative regulations.  All the provisions on confidential
information that the Commission applies are contained in the Anti-Dumping Agreement and
Articles 8 and 13 of Decree No. 575 of the Ministry of Finance.
XII. NEW SHIPPER'S REVIEW
In document G/ADP/W/99, when questioned on this  aspect, Chile stated that "The notified
Chilean regulations do not provide for this type of investigation.  However, as provided for in the
agreements, Chile is obliged to adopt the necessary regulations  and carry out such investigations."
To date, Chile has not notified any regulations on this subject.
Question
1. How will the implementing authority proceed  in cases where a new shipper's review is
requested if there are no regulations in this respect?
Reply
The provision under which a new shipper's review is carried out is Article 9.5 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, which, as explained earlier, is an integral part of domestic legislation.
This subject has not been regulated because an evaluation of the provisions currently applied found
them to be sufficiently clear to carry out accelerated review proceedings and because so far there have
been no requests for a new shipper's review.
XIII.  PROVISIONAL MEASURES
Article 19 of Decree No. 575 states that "Before reaching the decision referred to in the
previous Article, the Commission may, at any stage in the investigation and within a period of 60 days
of its initiation, when it is necessary to avoid or prevent injury to the domestic industry, request the
President of the Republic, through the Minister of Finance, to establish provisional minimum customsduties, surcharges, anti-dumping duties or countervailing duties as referred to in Articles 9 and 10 of
Law No. 18.525".
Questions
1. Does the above Article mean that the Commission can request the imposition of
provisional measures prior to expiry of the time-limit given to the interested parties to provide
information (30 days after the initiation, Article 14)?G/ADP/Q1/CHL/4
G/SCM/Q1/CHL/4
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2. Bearing in mind that the AD Agreement has the status of law in Chile, if the reply is in
the affirmative, how can this be reconciled with  Article 7.1(i) of the AD Agreement in the sense
that "Provisional measures may be applied only if … interested parties have been given
adequate opportunities to submit information and make comments"?
Reply
No, the provision of Decree No. 575 has been tacitly revoked by Article 7.3 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement under which provisional measures may be applied only as from 60 days
after the date of initiation of the investigation.  Tacit revocation occurs when a new law contains
provisions which cannot be reconciled with those of a law already in force, the latter ceasing to apply
except for such of its provisions as are compatible with the new law.
XIV. ESTABLISHMENT AND PAYMENT OF ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES
Questions:
1. Do the Chilean customs regulations co ntain any rules governing the payment of
anti-dumping duties?
2. Could Chile explain the mechanism for such payment?
Reply
These duties are governed by Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 (tax base), Article 10 (duration of
definitive measures), Article 11, paragraphs 6 and 7 (duration of provisional measures), paragraph 8
(refund of amounts paid under provisional measures) of Law 18.525, and by Articles 20 (duration ofprovisional measures), 24 (refund of amounts paid under provisional measures), 26 (payment of
provisional duties) and 27 (refund application) of Decree No. 575 of the Ministry of Finance.
Anti-dumping duties may be established as specific duties or ad valorem  duties on c.i.f.
prices.
When an anti-dumping duty is established in respect of a product, it is levied in an appropriate
amount and without discrimination on imports of the product whatever their origin declared to have
been dumped and to cause injury.  The Commission designates the supplier or suppliers of the product
in question.  However, if there are several suppliers in the same country and if it proves impossible in
practice to designate all of them, the Commission may designate the country concerned as the
supplier.  If there are several suppliers from more than one country, the Commission may designateall of them or, should this be impracticable, all the countries.
The amount of the anti-dumping duty may not be higher than the margin of dumping and may
be lower provided that it suffices to eliminate the injury to the domestic industry.
Persons subject to provisional duties which are definitively eliminated or modified may apply
for a refund of their payments or of any amounts paid in excess where the Commission delivers a
negative final determination of dumping or subsidy and injury or where the definitive anti-dumping or
countervailing duty is lower than the provisional duty.
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