WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTCP/W/232
23 May 2003
(03-2764)
Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition PolicyOriginal:  English
COMMUNICATION FROM AUSTRALIA
The following communication, dated 22 May 2003, has been received from the Permanent
Mission of Australia with the request that it be circulated to Members.
_______________
INTRODUCTION
1. With the forthcoming Ministerial nearly upon us, Australia wishes to use the opportunity of
this working group meeting to offer some reflectiv e comment and our current views on some of the
main issues discussed in the working group to date.  In presenting such views, the usual qualification
applies – this represents work in progress, and Australia's objective is to support and encourage active
discussion rather than present a definitive position.
2. As an overarching comment, for many issues before the working group, there appears to be a
high degree of common ground and understanding among Members, while in a few areas there are
still some important discussions before us.
3. Australia also welcomes the opportunity of this meeting to discuss in greater detail the items
under agenda items B and C that have had comparatively less examination, at least in terms of writteninput from Members, prior to the May 2003 meeting.
4. Australia will also report briefly on technical assistance and capacity building and some
significant recent policy debate and review outcomes.
A. E
LEMENTS RAISED IN PARAGRAPH 25 OF THE DOHA DECLARATION
5. The Doha declaration recognises the case for a multilateral framework to enhance the
contribution of competition policy to international trade and development.  Australia supports this.
6. Australia considers that its competition policy and competition law provides critical support
to Australia's welfare through enhancing efficiency, productivity and consumer welfare.  Australia's
enhancement of its competition policy framework through the 1990s has been an important
contributor to a very strong economic performance over the past decade, and through recent years
when significant forces have been buffeting many economies.  Australia notes that this view has also
been widely endorsed internationally.  This supports the conclusion that competition policy isfundamentally compatible with economic growth a nd development.  Australia also considers that
effective competition policy is fundamentally compatible with an open multilateral trading system
that supports the interests of all participants by raising aggregate growth and development potential.WT/WGTCP/W/232
Page 2
7. Also by way of introductory comment, Australia will make brief observations on the research
study by Dr Evenett, a draft of which was considered in the February working group meeting and on
the Symposium on Trade and Competition Policy held on 22 February 2003.
8. The study addresses thoroughly the call for an examination of the benefits and costs of a
possible multilateral competition framework (MCF).  It presents strong evidence that there are
significant net benefits from a multilateral framework and that there is no significant inconsistency
between a framework and industrial and development policies.
9. Australia also wishes to record its congratulations and appreciation to the Secretariat for the
high quality Symposium held in February.  It provided very useful and complementary observations
on many of the issues being addressed by the working group and featured many high qualitypresentations.  Some of the key observations made during the Symposium were:
• Poor quality domestic regulations and anti-competitive practices can defeat trade
liberalisation and deprive nations of the benefits of free trade.
• The damage from anti-competitive agreements is s ubstantial, with the costs being even greater
in developing countries.  That is, there is a persuasive case for multilateral cartel enforcement.
Further, enforcement costs are very minor compared to the benefits.
• A MCF offers the prospect of shortening significantly the time frames that developing
countries would need to build and embed competition law and policy by offering a moresupportive environment and targeted assistance.  That said, patience and an ongoing
commitment to progressivity and flexibility is essential.
• The need for technical assistance and capacity building efforts cannot be overstated, and the
multilateral institutions have a leading role to play in delivering this objective.
• In terms of dispute settlement/compliance mechanisms, a range of options are available for
consideration in any MCF, but flexibility should be a consideration.
• Civil society and consumer perspectives are fundamentally supportive of competitive market
frameworks.
10. Some of these themes will be revisited in later comments.11. Working group discussions on potential elements and principles for inclusion within a MCF
have revolved particularly around the proposals/suggestions of the European Community, identified
mainly in WT/WGTCP/W/222.  Key components include: an objective of very basic competition
principles; no requirement for harmonisation of competition laws; an assumption that all WTO
Members – at some point in time – will have a competition law and enforcement agency with
progressivity and flexibility as a driving principle; a narrow focus on and definition of core principles(transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness) and hard core cartels; a flexible approach
to exclusions and exemptions that are transparent; defining non-discrimination only in terms of
preventing reference to corporate nationality in competition law and involving a binding principle
only in respect of de jure discrimination; limiting transparency to laws, regulations and guidelines of
general application; and protecting confidential information.
1
                                                     
1 This extremely brief identification of the main proposals seeks to provide context for subsequent
comments.WT/WGTCP/W/232
Page 3
12. While discussions in the working group have on occasion considered whether more
comprehensive commitments might be appropriate, it seems fair to conclude that there is no current
widespread support for more ambitious proposals.
13. Australia finds considerable merit in the EC proposals and suggests, at the broadest level,
there appears to be wide support for many of the elements.  There has, however, been some divergent
views expressed in some areas, so the opportunity for further discussion is welcomed.
14. From Australia's perspective, some of the key issues include the following.
Binding versus non-binding
15. A threshold issue is whether, or to what  degree, possible elements of a MCF would be
binding on Members.  There are, of course, significant linkages with the way that progressivity and
flexibility is to be defined, and to consideration of possible compliance mechanisms, and the meeting
will address them in detail later.
16. At this point, we only wish to raise the issue in a general way.  Australia's understanding is
that the EC proposes that the main elements of the core principles and hard core cartel arrangements
should be binding, with some qualifications, such as that non-discrimination would be limited to de
jure definition.  On the other hand, some Members have questioned the capacity to deliver, or in some
cases the appropriateness, of binding commitments in some of these areas.
17. The submission from Hong Kong, China to the February meeting (WT/WGTCP/W/224)
observed that for Members to make an informed decision on whether or not they will be ready to
undertake any multilateral obligations in the area of trade and competition policy, it is necessary for
them to know the breadth and depth of possible obligations.
18. Australia endorses this view and consequently considers it important to endeavour to reach
greater clarity in this area.
A commitment to having a competition law/enforcement agency at some point in time?
19. This proposal, of course, only has direct implications for those Members, most commonly
developing country Members, that currently do not have a competition law or enforcement agency.2
A number of those Members have expressed reticence about whether they could "commit" to this
element, including for such reasons as competition policy being overshadowed by higher priority
government objectives.
20. In considering this issue, it may be helpful to observe the following:
• More and more countries are embracing competition policy/law and its enforcement.  This
trend appears inexorable (and no country is removing such law).
• This trend is undoubtedly influenced by the emerging evidence of the benefits of competition
law, and the potential costs of not having it,  with the Evenett study providing significant
further impetus to that evidence.
                                                     
2 The proponent has suggested that this might be achieved on a regional basis and/or through a
multipurpose enforcement agency.WT/WGTCP/W/232
Page 4
• Multilateral institutions (and individual Members) are delivering significant technical
assistance and cooperation in support of such policy reform – and a potential MCF shouldendorse and enhance this.
21. Against this background, and given the scope for progressivity and flexibility provisions to
ensure no-one is forced to make such changes be fore they are ready, the "commitment" might not be
considered to be demanding, indeed, it could be very helpful to policy makers.
Core principles/hard core cartels
22. As identified in earlier papers and interventions, Australia considers the core principles of
non-discrimination, transparency and procedural fairness to be the key foundations necessary to
underpin any successful competition regime.  Australia therefore supports these principles forming the
bedrock, along with provisions dealing with hard co re cartels, of any MCF.  At this point, Australia
offers only brief further comment on these issues.
• While it is, of course, appropriate that close consideration be given to the detailed manner in
which these principles might be expressed in a MCF, it should be kept in mind that noMember has identified any competition regime in existence or contemplated that is
fundamentally inconsistent with the principles.
• In discussing these issues, there has been broad recognition among Members that adjustment
costs would involve a greater burden for developing countries.  The key to addressing this lies
with appropriate provisions dealing with pr ogressivity and flexibility, and with ongoing
commitment to technical assistance and capacity building (rather than any change to the core
principles).
• An important feature of the proponent's model,  with ramifications for the more specific
provisions of each of the core principles, is that a MCF would deal only with the general laws,
regulations and guidelines and would avoid dealing with case specific application of such
provisions.  Australia supports this, but recognises the concerns noted particularly by
colleagues from the United States that delivering this objective will require careful thought.
• With respect to hard core cartels, Australia s upports provisions that clearly prohibit them and
are sufficiently broad to include domestic and international cartels.  Rule of reason should
apply where potential competitive benefits may occur from activity that is anti-competitive on
its face.  The OECD Recommendations
3 provide good guidance in this area.
Protection of confidential information
23. Australia supports the proposal that a MCF should not seek to extend non-discrimination to
cover existing or future cooperation arrangements.  It is important that decisions about whether
information needs to be disclosed or protected remains solely with the domestic competition
authority.  It has been argued in the working group, convincingly in Australia's view, that any
approach that sought to coerce the provision of confidential information would inflict significant
damage on enforcement capabilities, so would be highly counterproductive.
24. That said, some have noted their frustration that information asymmetry limits their capacity
to prosecute cartel activities, and consider this a problem for smaller economies in particular.
                                                     
3 OECD Council Recommendation Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on Restrictive
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, adopted 28 July 1995; and OECD Council Recommendation
Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, adopted 25 March 1998.WT/WGTCP/W/232
Page 5
However, seeking to make cooperation arrangements binding appears to risk significantly greater
costs.
25. Australia would be interested to hear the views of other Members on whether there may be
other approaches, other than a requirement to share confidential information, that could go some wayto address these concerns.  For example, is there scope for a general principle that regulators will give
consideration to international implications of their agreements in leniency programmes and the like?
The objective would be to encourage, to the maximum degree possible, regulator enforcement actions
facilitating cessation and appropriate punishment of illegal cartel behaviour not just within the
regulator's formal area of jurisdiction.
B. T
HE NATURE AND SCOPE OF COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS
26. Three broad approaches to this issue have been flagged: a formal binding mechanism based
on the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU);  a peer review process; or some combination
of these.  The importance of this topic was clearly recognised at the February meeting, although
divergent preferences were raised at that point.  While a number of Members supported (at least)
some element of binding and enforceable commitment, others indicated no interest beyond non-binding and voluntary arrangements.
27. Australia welcomes the opportunity to participate in a substantive discussion of this issue in
the May meeting, particularly as the working group has had little opportunity to consider the matter in
any depth as yet.  At this stage, Australia does not have a fixed preference among the options butwould characterise its starting point prior to this meeting as follows:
• Australia agrees that some form of complian ce mechanism is an important element of any
MCF.
• Australia has reservations about the merits of the DSU being applied to a MCF.  Key factors
influencing this initial view include questions about the applicability of DSU components
such as binding panels and sanctions, the capacity to reassess individual cases and de facto
compliance issues.  That said, a fuller understanding of the form of dispute settlement
mechanism being proposed will be important for Members to refine their views on this issue.
• Australia considers that a peer review mechanis m could be a very useful component of a MCF
that would support development of best practices in a non-adversarial environment, and it
could also be a very useful component of technical assistance delivery to developing country
Members.
28. Against this background, Australia welcomes the European Community's submission on
Dispute Settlement and Peer Review Options for a WTO Agreement on Competition.  The submission
provides an excellent focal point for further discussions, particularly in respect of the dispute
settlement issue.
29. Australia recognises the observation in the submission that it does not seek to deal
exhaustively with all related issues.  However, to seed further discussion, and to facilitate the working
group's understanding of the submission, Australia wishes to raise some questions relating to this
dispute settlement option:
• To what extent does the option contrast with ex isting elements of the DSU?  In particular,
preventing application to individual cases appears to represent a marked variation to the scope
of the DSU.WT/WGTCP/W/232
Page 6
• Similarly, would the option proposed prevent application of dispute settlement to de facto
compliance issues?
• What possible form of sanctions could be applicable to the binding option raised?
30. Australia is also submitting a separate short paper on compliance mechanisms, focusing on
peer review design options.
C. POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF PROGRESSIVITY AND FLEXIBILITY
31. Australia wishes to make some very broad observations on this issue.
• There is universal agreement that 'one size does not fit all'.  Along with every other Member
that has expressed a view on this matter, Australia supports embedding the concepts ofprogressivity and flexibility in a MCF.  It will be especially important for developing
countries and those that do not have a competition law and an enforcement arrangement.
• Australia also considers that a MCF should be premised on the basis that competition should
be the general rule, while also accepting the principles of flexibility and exemptions.  Ofcourse, exemptions and exclusions operate to some degree in all Members that have a
competition law already, but there should be a commitment to transparency and periodicreview wherever these exist.
• There is a range of matters that could be included in the menu of progressivity and flexibility
measures including exclusions and exemptions, interim and transitional periods, enhancedflexibility of commitments, links with technical assistance measures and so on.
• Australia prefers that progressivity and flexibility not be considered a core principle, as it
seems to be a concept rather different from transparency, non-discrimination and proceduralfairness.  The latter might be characterized as absolute and invariant elements of a MCF,
while progressivity and flexibility address relative and transitional elements.  This view does
not diminish the importance of progressivity and flexibility.
32. On a related matter, in an attempt to assist working group Members that have expressed
particular concerns about the scope for a MCF to compromise achievement of social or industrial
policy priorities, Australia has prepared case studies of the way exceptions or public interest tests may
operate to achieve broader public policy objectives in Australia.  Interested Members are referred to
Attachment A to this submission.
D. T
ECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING
33. A summary is provided below of the Austra lian Competition and Consumer Commission's
(ACCC) most recent technical assistance and capacity building activities.
Barbados
34. From February to April 2003, the ACCC provided 'in country' assistance to the Fair Trading
Commission of Barbados in the establishment of its Competition Division.  The assistance included
providing guidance to Director of Fair Competition and staff; providing insights on lessons learnt
from experience in enforcing this type of legi slation; and contributing to the development of
guidelines in the various areas.WT/WGTCP/W/232
Page 7
Fiji
35. With funding assistance from AusAID, the ACCC will implement the first stage of a project
to establish the technical assistance needs of the Fiji Commerce Commission.  The work will involvepreliminary investigation, research and information collection that will result in the development of a
technical assistance implementation plan for the Commerce Commission.
Thailand
36. Following a successful joint application by the ACCC and the Thai Department of Internal
Trade under the Thailand-Australia Government Sector Linkages Program, the ACCC has receivedfunding approval from AusAID to run a five day investigation course for sixteen staff of the Thai
Trade Competition Commission (TCC) in Bangkok in September 2003.  The funding also provides
for translation of customised training materials to be retained by the TCC in hard copy and CD Rom.
E. O
THER BUSINESS , INCLUDING STOCKTAKING OF NATIONAL EXPERIENCE
37. Australia advised the working group, in WT/WGTCP/W/211, of an independent review being
undertaken of the competition provisions of Australia's Trade Practices Act 1974  (the Act).  Australia
now wishes to report on the outcome of this process.
38. The object of the Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians through the promotion of
competition and fair trading and provision for consumer protection – the competition laws are
contained within Part IV of the Act.
39. Broadly speaking, Part IV of the Act prohibits collusive agreements; misuse of market power;
exclusive dealing; and mergers that substantially lessen competition in a market.
40. The Act also recognises that not all anti-competitive conduct is necessarily detrimental to the
economy.  This is reflected in the authorisation and notification provisions (Part VII of the Act) that
empower the ACCC, Australia's competition regulator,  to grant immunity from prosecution for anti-
competitive conduct that would, or would be likely to, result in a net public benefit.
Background
41. The Prime Minister announced in October 2001 that there would be a review of the
competition provisions of the Act, and their administration.  On 9 May 2002, the Treasurer announced
the membership and terms of reference of the independent Committee of Inquiry.4
42. The terms of reference required the Committee to consider whether the Act providessufficient recognition for globalisation factors and the ability of Australian companies to compete
globally.  At the same time, the review considered wh ether the Act is sufficiently flexible to respond
to the transitional needs of certain industries, specifically those in rural and regional Australia.  The
review considered whether the Act provides an appropriate balance of power between small and large
businesses.  The review also examined the administration of the Act, and particularly whether the Actprovides sufficient protection to the position of individual businesses.
43. The Committee's Report follows an exhaustive consultation process.  Over a period of eight
months the Committee received and examined 213 submissions and 320 representations from
                                                     
4 Sir Daryl Dawson, AC KBE CB, a former Justice of the High Court of Australia, chaired the
Committee, and the members were Ms Jillian Segal and Mr Curt Rendall.WT/WGTCP/W/232
Page 8
consumers, business, regulators, industry groups and others, and conducted consultations with a range
of interested parties around Australia.  The Committee also undertook additional meetings with
international regulators and experts.
The Report
44. On 16 April 2003, the Treasurer announced the release of the Report and the Commonwealth
Government's response.  The Committee concluded that the competition provisions of the Act have
served Australians well.  The Act has sustained a competitive environment in terms of service and
price.  The Committee found that the Act had achieved an appropriate balance between the
prohibition of anti-competitive conduct and the encouragement of competition.
45. The overall theme of the Report is that the competition provisions should protect the
competitive process, rather than particular competitors.  Further, competition laws should be
distinguished from industry policy.
46. The Committee made a total of 43 recommendations to further improve the operation and
effectiveness of the Act.  The Government response endorses the Report.  The significant features ofthe Government response
5 are:
• the introduction of an optional formal clearance process for consideration of mergers, and
provision for direct application to the Australian Competition Tribunal (rather than theACCC) for merger authorisations;
• the introduction of a notification process to facilitate collective bargaining by small
businesses dealing with a large business;  and
• an increase in the maximum pecuniary penalty for corporations breaching the competition
provisions, and in-principle acceptance of a proposal to introduce criminal sanctions forserious cartel behaviour, subject to further examination of the issue by a working party.
47. While noting that the ACCC has been commendably rigorous in enforcing the Act, the
Government also provided in-principle support for several recommendations designed to enhance the
accountability of the ACCC in the administration of the Act.
48. Under the terms of the 1995 Inter-gove rnmental Conduct Code Agreement, the
Commonwealth will now commence a period of consultation with the State and Territory
Governments on the proposed amendments to the Act prior to those amendments being introduced
into Parliament.
                                                     
5 The Government's announcement, containing links to the response and the report is available at
http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/pressreleases/2003/021.aspWT/WGTCP/W/232
Page 9
ATTACHMENT A
A MULTILATERAL COMPETITION FRAMEWORK AND SOCIAL
 AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
1. A number of Members have expressed concern that a multilateral competition framework
may compromise the achievement of social or industrial policy priorities.  However, Australia
considers that such concern could be misplaced as many countries use arrangements such as
exceptions or public interest tests to balance policy objectives where a case for this is demonstrated.
2. This note outlines some key features of Australia's competition arrangements and provides a
number of case studies of the way public interest tests have operated in Australia.
Australia's competition policy framework
3. Under Australia's National Competition Policy framework (details of which were included in
WT/WGTCP/W/159), governments (federal, state and local) are only required to implementcompetition reform measures where the benefits outweigh the costs.  Governments have recognised
that encouraging effective competition may not always deliver efficient resource use and maximum
community benefit, or may conflict with other social objectives.
4. Accordingly, the framework establishes a public interest test mechanism to examine the
relationship between the overall interest of the community, competition and desirable economic and
social outcomes.  These factors are broader than the economic benefits and costs of a proposed
reform, and include consideration of:
• government legislation and policies relating to ecologically sustainable development;
• social welfare and equity considerations, including community service obligations;
• government legislation and policies relating to matters such as occupational health and safety,
industrial relations, access and equity;
• economic and regional development, includi ng employment and investment growth;
• the interests of consumers generally or of a class of consumers;
• the competitiveness of Australian business; and
• the efficient allocation of resources.
5. The list is open-ended, and the process requires that all relevant matters should be considered
in assessing the public interest.
6. Under the National Competition Policy framework, individual governments ultimately make
an assessment of the public interest.  However, each jurisdiction's performance in implementing the
required competition policy reforms is assessed by an independent agency – the National Competition
Council.
Australia's competition law
7. Furthermore, Australia's competition law, the Trade Practices Act 1974  (the Act) also enables
the competition regulator, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the ACCC), toWT/WGTCP/W/232
Page 10
grant immunity from prosecution for certain anti-competitive conduct where the conduct would result
in a net public benefit.
8. This process, known as authorisation, is available for the competition provisions of the Act,
except the misuse of market power provision.  Public  benefit for the purpose of authorisation is not
generally defined in the Act, however the Australian Competition Tribunal (the appellate body for
ACCC decisions) has stated that a public benefit is:
Anything of value to the community generally, any contribution to the aims pursued
by the society including as one of its principal elements (in the context of trade
practices legislation) the achievement of the economic goals of efficiency and
progress.
9. The decision to grant an exemption through the authorisation process is based on an
assessment of public benefit gains from the conduct. This involves a trade off between the objectives
of preventing anti-competitive conduct and attaining public benefits from well functioning markets.
10. While authorisation is not granted lightly, the public benefit test in the authorisation process is
flexible and has responded to the transitional needs of industries and communities affected by
structural change and to the requirements of rural and regional areas.
11. Both economic and non-economic public benefits are included in the concept of 'public
benefit' for authorisation of anti-competitive conduct. Examples of economic benefits recognised bythe ACCC and the Australian Competition Tribunal include: fostering business efficiency, growth in
export markets and industrial harmony. Examples of recognised non-economic benefits include:
improvements to health and safety, environmental protection, avoiding conflicts of interest and
adopting provisions that lead to equitable dealings between businesses.
Case Study 1 – Dairy Authorisations
Helping dairy farmers adjust to negotiating in a deregulated market and facilitating the
international competitiveness of Australia's dairy industry
12. On 1 July 2000 the dairy industry in Australia was fully deregulated and there are no longer
any formal quantitative controls on the supply or price of milk in Australia.
Premium Milk Supply Pty Ltd authorisation
13. In December 2001 the ACCC granted authorisat ion to allow Premium Milk Supply Pty Ltd to
collectively bargain farm-gate prices and milk standards in negotiations with Pauls Limited in theState of Queensland. Pauls specialises in producing branded milk and dairy products and is the largest
milk processor in Queensland. The 580 Queensland dairy farmers that supplied milk to Pauls through
six cooperatives were offered Premium membership.
14. The ACCC accepted that this arrangement would lead to a net public benefit because
efficiency gains from transaction costs savings and by smoothing the transition from a regulated to a
deregulated market. The ACCC grante d authorisation until 1 July 2005.
Australian Dairy Farmers' Federation authorisation
15. On 12 March 2002 the ACCC issued a final de termination granting au thorisation to the
Australian Dairy Farmers' Federation (ADFF) to  allow groups of dairy farmers to collectivelyWT/WGTCP/W/232
Page 11
negotiate pricing and supply arrangements with dairy processing companies across Australia. The
authorisation was subject to a number of conditions and was granted until 1 July 2005.
16. ADFF applied for authorisation in very broa d terms and the ACCC considered that the
collective bargaining arrangements proposed by ADFF were likely to have a detrimental effect oncompetition with consumers likely to be charged higher prices for dairy products. To address these
concerns the ACCC imposed conditions to limit the scope of the collective bargaining groups that
could be formed.
17. The ACCC considered that the conditional authorisation of collective bargaining by dairy
farmers would lead to several public benefits, including:
• increased competition in the supply of raw milk by allowing dairy farmers to take advantage
of additional market opportunities for their milk;
• reducing the likelihood of harsh or unfair contractual terms by improving the confidence of
individual dairy farmers in dealing commercially with processors and increasing theirindividual bargaining power;
• assisting with the transition to a deregulated market by giving farmers the opportunity to gain
negotiating and information collection skills and increasing their ability to conduct efficientand effective negotiations when they ultimately assume independent responsibility for
negotiations; and
• to the extent that the ability to collectively negotiate would stop farmers exiting the dairy
industry, benefiting the rural communities that rely on dairying through continued
employment and commercial activity.
Case Study 2 – CSR
Assisting the Burdekin community, North Queen sland and facilitating the international
competitiveness of Australia's sugar industry
18. In July 2001 the ACCC granted authorisation to allow sugar cane growers and CSR to
collectively negotiate terms and conditions for supplying sugar cane to the CSR-owned Pioneer and
Invicta mills in the Burdekin region of the State of Queensland.
19. The ACCC was satisfied that the agreements would deliver economic public benefits to the
Burdekin cane growing region flowing from increa sed mill throughput and farm output and associated
new investment and efficiency from improved infrastructure use.
20. The ACCC acknowledged that th e communities and many towns in the Burdekin sugar region
are substantially maintained and/or affected by the raw sugar industry and its associated service areas.
Facilitating international competitiveness
21. The sugar industry is Australia's second largest crop industry and Queensland's largest rural
commodity. Around 85 per cent of raw sugar is exported.  The effect of the ACCC's decision to grantauthorisation was to allow implementation of indust ry agreements to provide for a gradual extension
of the cane crushing season, together expansion of mill crushing capacity. In its decision to grant
authorisation the ACCC recognised that the agreement was likely to result in export growth and an
increase in the international competitiveness of the sector.WT/WGTCP/W/232
Page 12
Case Study 3 – Homeworkers Code of Practice
Facilitating occupational health and safety
22. On 11 July 2000 the ACCC granted authorisation to the Homeworkers Code of Practice (the
code).
23. The code – a voluntary self-regulatory scheme negotiated by industry participants in 1997 –
was designed to supplement the outworker provisions of the Clothing Trades Award 1982 .
24. The aim of the code is to redress the non-aw ard conditions of many people employed in the
garment-making industry as homeworkers – that is, people who sew in premises other than a
registered factory.  The garment industry increasingly uses homeworkers to do their sewing.
25. The code provides for the accreditation of parties along the garment manufacturing and retail
chain.  Competition issues include the potential use of commercial sanctions, which retailers andmanufacturers may impose on contractorswho engage homeworkers if they do not comply
with the code.
26. The ACCC was satisfied that the arrangements in the code would benefit the public because
they helped to:
• lessen the risk of exploitation of a disadvantaged group;
• improve compliance with statutory award requirements;
• provide information to help homeworkers understand their employment conditions;
• ensure satisfactory employment options fo r women who choose to stay at home; and
• improve the social environment of the families of homeworkers by providing standard
working conditions.
27. While the code could restrict the use of contractors by suppliers, the ACCC decided the code
would not substantially affect their ability to compete.  The ACCC also considered that adequate
safeguards existed to minimise the adverse effects on competition from trading sanctions under thecode.
Case study 4 – Agsafe
Facilitating the safe use of agricultural and veterinary chemicals
28. In 2002 the ACCC reauthorized an agricultural and veterinary (agvet) chemical industry self-
regulation compliance program run by Agsafe Limited.
29. The Agsafe program has been operating successfully under ACCC authorisation for more
than ten years. In that time the program has benefited users and the community by promoting the safe
use of agvet chemicals and Australia-wide uniform standards for their safe storage.
30. The authorisation granted by the ACCC appl ies to Agsafe's industry accreditation scheme
requiring persons and premises involved in the transport, handling and storage of agvet chemicals toWT/WGTCP/W/232
Page 13
be accredited and to comply with a code of conduct.  The authorisation also allows Agsafe to apply
trading sanctions to premises that fail to meet accreditation standards.
31. Agsafe trains industry participants in the relevant safety and regulatory requirements.  Agsafe
also inspects premises where agvet chemicals are stor ed to ensure they comply with all relevant state
and federal safety regulations.  Where premises breach these regulations Agsafe is able to, as a last
resort, impose trading sanctions.  Trading sanctions prohibit other businesses purchasing from or
supplying to the offending premises until safety concerns have been addressed.
32. The Agsafe program brings benefits to rural and regional Australia where agvet chemicals are
mostly used.  Through its accreditation and training scheme, the Agsafe program has increased
knowledge and understanding of existing regulatory requirements for the safe transport, handling, andstorage of agvet chemicals.
33. This decision is one of several the ACCC has released in recent times that demonstrate how
the authorisation process accommodates social issues – such as public safety and the specific needs of
rural Australia – as well as economic considerations.
Case Study 5 – Port Waratah Coal Loading Services
Facilitating workable solutions to promote Australia's international competitiveness
34. In 1997 a large queue of coal ships developed at the coal loading facilities in Newcastle with
queues of between 35 and 40 vessels common.  The effect of this queue was to damage the reputation
of the port in the eyes of overseas buyers wi th the potential to da mage the international
competitiveness of the Hunter Valley coal industry.  Over 68 million tonnes of coal is exported each
year through the Newcastle port.  This represents over 90 per cent of total exports from the Hunterregion.
35. To provide a short-term solution to the queuing problem, the ACCC granted an authorisation
for a capacity allocation system.  The ACCC recognised a clear public benefit in promoting the
quantity and the value of coal exports out of Newcastle.  The ACCC accepted the need for a short-
term exemption from the competition provisions of the Act to be granted, subject to conditions, to
resolve the vessel queuing problem that was damaging the international competitiveness of Australia'scoal industry.
__________