WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/TE/W/40 
21 June 2004 
 
 (04-2671) 
Committee on Trade and Environment 
Special Session Original:   English 
 
 
SUB-PARAGRAPH 31(I) OF THE DOHA DECLARATION 
 
Submission by the United States  
 
Paragraph 31(i)  
  
 The following submission, dated 21 June 2004, is  being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of the United States
. 
 
_______________ 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. During the last two years, the CTE in Special  Session has engaged in fruitful dialogue 
concerning the mandate in sub-para graph 31(i) of the Doha Declaration.  Based on these discussions 
over many meetings, and the 26 submissions offere d under 31(i), a consensus has emerged that the 
Committee should proceed with an an alysis based on fact and experience.  There also appears to be 
wide agreement among Members that certain multila teral environmental agreements (MEAs) of 
common interest contain Party-to-Party specific trad e obligations (STOs) within the 31(i) mandate.  
Building on these welcome developments, this submi ssion seeks to contribute to further progress in 
the CTE’s discussion of the 31(i) mandate.  
2. This submission also builds on the first U.S. submission under 31(i) (TN/TE/W/20), which 
discussed the mandate’s limits and categories of  STOs in MEAs, including identification of STOs 
covered under the mandate, and proposed an ex perience-based way forward to focus future 
discussions.  Consistent with the framework prop osed by Australia (TN/TE/W/7), and following 
Hong Kong’s submission concerning its experience  (TN/TE/W/28), this submission continues down 
the path to a new phase in the discussions.  In lig ht of the shared understanding that certain MEAs 
contain STOs within the 31(i) mandate, this paper moves to the next phase of sharing Members’ experiences with the negotiation and implementati on of the STOs set out in certain MEAs.   
3. This submission provides U.S. observations concerning the similarities and differences 
among certain features of STOs in several MEAs  enumerated in WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.1 and builds 
upon examples contained in TN/TE/W/20.  It is without prejudice to U.S. views on any other 
provisions contained in those MEAs that are not specifically referenced in this submission and without prejudice to U.S. views on the applicability of  WTO rules.  Finally, the inclusion of particular 
MEA provisions in this submission and exclusion of  others is intended to  further a constructive 
discussion in the CTE and is not an indication of the importance or environmental significance of any 
particular MEA provision in relation to any other. TN/TE/W/40 
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 II. U.S. EXPERIENCE REGARDING CERTAIN STOS IN CERTAIN MEAS 
4. The United States has participated in the deve lopment and implementation of a number of 
MEAs.  In a previous submission, the United Stat es identified six MEAs that we believe include 
STOs within the meaning of the mandate.  For purpo ses of this submission, we will highlight U.S. 
experiences related to particular STOs in three of th ese MEAs that appear to be of common interest to 
Members:  the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES);  the Stockholm Convention on Persis tent Organic Pollutants (POPs);  and the 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed C onsent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals 
and Pesticides in International Trade (PIC).  We have had a varying duration of experience with the 
mechanisms established by each of these MEAs.  Fo r example, CITES entered into force in 1975 and 
offers decades of implementation -related experience.  The POPs C onvention entered into force only 
this year and offers a fresh perspective on nego tiating MEAs containing STOs.  The PIC Convention, 
while entering into force only this year, derives ma ny of its relevant features from the pre-existing 
voluntary London Guidelines. 
5. The identified STOs set out in these three MEAs present a useful array of common and 
distinguishing features.  The discussion below of U. S. experience regarding a subset of STOs (export 
restrictions) set out in these three MEAs highlights the importance of: 
 - National coordination, transparency, a nd accountability generally in the negotiation 
  and implementation of MEAs containing STOs;  and   - the design and implementation of STOs in particular.   
 
6. Drawing on U.S. experiences, the submission also identifies features of these STOs that have, 
in our view, contributed to the effective achieve ment of each MEA’s objectives and furthered the  
mutually supportive relationship that has exis ted between these MEAs and the WTO.  The 
United States hopes these experiences offer insight a nd information useful to the Committee in its 
discussions of the 31(i) mandate.  
A. N
ATIONAL COORDINATION , TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY WITH RESPECT TO 
NEGOTIATING AND IMPLEMENTING MEA S 
7. The United States has stressed the critical im portance of domestic c oordination between MEA 
and WTO policy-makers and negotiators.  Domestic coordination is the most direct and effective 
means of maintaining harmony between STOs in  MEAs and WTO disciplines.  Additionally, 
transparency and accountability in the domestic po licy-making process can contribute to better 
policy-making.    
8. U.S. federal government agencies work togeth er to accomplish U.S. objectives across a 
number of international policy areas relating to trade or  environment.  For example, the Department of 
State leads in negotiation of MEAs and in develo pment of U.S. positions across many international 
environmental policy discussions in international fora .  In advance of an international environmental 
meeting in which there is expected to be a negotiate d outcome, the Department of State, or in the case 
of CITES, the Department of the Interior, leads an  interagency process to ensure the views of the 
various U.S. agencies are resolv ed into a single unified U.S. position.  Examples of how the 
interagency process worked in the POPs negotiati ons and CITES implementation are provided below.  
9. In the international trade area, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is 
responsible for developing U.S. international trad e policy.  USTR engages in extensive interagency 
coordination on trade policy matters, including matte rs relating to trade and environment.  In 
particular, such coordination involves agencies with expertise in domes tic and international  TN/TE/W/40 
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 environmental issues that might be affected by  trade, including the Departments of Interior, 
Commerce, State and Justice, and the Environmental Protection Agency.  For example, these agencies, among others, participate in preparations for the CTE meetings.  This interagency process is 
highly transparent within the government, and all agencies contribute their unique perspectives and expertise to a wider interagency group.  The r esult of this robust interagency process is better 
informed, more thoughtful U.S. policies and positio ns on the environmental aspects of trade policy 
matters. 
10. In addition to the interagency policy-making process, the United States government routinely 
invites and receives input from the public in order to promote transparency and accountability in the policy-making process and to contribute to well-info rmed, mutually supportive trade and environment 
policies.  This is done informally through ad hoc meetings and discussions with stakeholders, 
including NGOs and other members of the public, as well as formally through the mechanism of 
public advisory committees established by the U.S.  Congress, and/or a formal request for comments 
in the Federal Register.  One rele vant public advisory committee for the CTE’s work is the Trade and 
Environment Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC) , whose members come from a variety of 
organizations, including business, academia and non-profit.    
 
National Coordination in Negotiating MEAs:  POPs Experience 
 
11. In the case of the POPs Convention, the State Department established an  interagency group to 
work on the day-to-day preparations for the negotia tions, including developing  U.S. positions and text 
proposals.  Technical working groups were created as well to address specific issues, including a 
working group to discuss and develop U.S. positions re lated to trade in POPs.  This “trade working 
group” included experts from agencies with envir onment and trade responsibilities.  Together, these 
experts discussed how trade-related measures mi ght contribute to achieving the Convention’s 
objectives and how such measures might be tailored to meet those objectives.  
12. Through this coordinating process, the U.S. delegation identified and discussed instances 
where a proposed mechanism could raise trade po licy implications, but worked together to find 
equally effective alternatives that met the objective and reduced trade-related concerns.  For example, 
one issue that emerged in the negotiations was how best to handle trade in DDT (a chemical 
commonly used for malaria control).  Given the natu re and complexity of the DDT issue, experts from 
the trade, environment, and health communities work ed together to discuss the options for dealing 
with DDT.  Suggestions to ban trade in DDT under the Convention raised concerns in both the trade 
and the health communities.  Ultimately, the U.S.  working group developed a proposal addressing all 
relevant policy objectives:    
- Parties that chose to produce or use DDT would need to register with the Secretariat, 
and limit their production and use of DDT to the specific purpose of disease vector 
control in accordance with World Health Organization recommendations and guidelines.   
 
 - Likewise, Parties would be obligated to  ban import and export of DDT, except for use 
in disease vector control in the importing Party.  
 
13. Working together, the group was able to tailor and propose measures that took into account 
environmental and health objectives, as well as trad e-related concerns.  The U.S. proposal received a 
favourable reception by the Intergovernmental Nego tiating Committee (INC) and formed the basis for 
Annex B of the POPs Convention, which ou tlines certain requirements concerning DDT. 
14. In addition to interagency coordination, the de legation consulted with a wide variety of NGOs 
and stakeholders throughout the negotiating process.  Before each INC meeting, the U.S. delegation TN/TE/W/40 
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 invited interested stakeholders, including industry and environmental NGOs, to briefings and offered 
opportunities to provide feedback on U.S. positions for the meeting.  At each INC meeting, the U.S. 
delegation offered routine briefings to inter ested U.S. stakeholders in attendance.   
 
National Coordination in Implementing MEAs:  CITES Experience  
 
15. The United States has a long history of coordi nating effective national implementation of 
CITES.  The United States implements CITES thr ough national legislation, the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA).  As required by Article IX of CITES,  the ESA designates a Management Authority and a 
Scientific Authority to implement CITES obligations , including those under Articles III, IV and V.  
Both these authorities are housed in the Department of the Interior, to be carried out through the Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS).  These authorities ar e responsible for the evaluation of whether 
applications for import or expor t of CITES-listed species meet the requirements of CITES and for 
coordinating U.S. CITES policy and evaluating species for CITES listing.  These primary CITES authorities work with FWS Law Enforcement,  which has port inspection and enforcement 
responsibilities for animals, and the U.S. Departme nt of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) and the Department  of Homeland Security, which share these 
responsibilities for plants.   
16. The FWS coordinates U.S. implementation of CITES with other federal agencies through the 
CITES Coordinating Committee (CCC).  Regular par ticipants in the CCC process include the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (Forest Service, Forei gn Agricultural Service), the Departments of State, 
Justice and Commerce, and USTR.  There are also subcommittees, including a subcommittee 
exclusively focused on marine issues. 
17. In addition to cooperating intern ally, the United States consults extensively with the public on 
CITES implementation, including its participatio n in CITES technical committee meetings and 
meetings of the Conference of the Parties (COP).  For example, the FWS has repeatedly sought public 
comment on the U.S. position in the next meeti ng of the CITES COP scheduled for October 2004 in 
Bangkok (see, e.g., June 19, 2003 and January 12, 2004 notices available at http://international.fws.gov/fedregister/fedreg.ht ml.)  The FWS consider such comments in 
formulating U.S. positions for COP meetings. 
18. Policy coordination at the national level in  negotiating and implementing STOs is a key 
contributing factor to a mutually supportive re lationship between trade and MEA obligations.   
B. S
PECIFIC TRADE OBLIGATIONS :  DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPORT RESTRICTIONS  
19. In its first submission concerning 31(i), the United States emphasized the variety of STOs set 
out in MEAs.  The wide variety reflects the comp lex environmental concerns that these STOs were 
designed to address.  The United States notes that the variety in the design and scope of STOs suggests that STOs are not easily categorized.  
20. For purposes of this submission, the United States will focus in particular on export 
restrictions
1 in MEAs.  Export restrictions offer a useful point of comparison both because there are 
considerable differences in their features and becau se they appear to be one of the most common 
forms of STOs set out in MEAs.  In reviewing U.S. experience, this submission identifies some of the 
                                                      
1 For purposes of this submission, the United States refers to the various export-related obligations in 
these three MEAs by using the generi c term “export restrictions.”  Howe ver, it should be noted that each MEA 
uses a precise terminology for its export-related STOs (e.g., CITES refers to the “regulation” of trade in 
endangered species because in some cases, such as Appendix II-listed species, th e permitting requirements 
would function as regulations rather than restrictions on trade).    TN/TE/W/40 
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 factors that have contributed to successful design and implementation of these export restrictions, so 
as to achieve MEA objectives in light of WTO rights and obligations. 
21. The U.S. experience with the negotiation and implementation of export restrictions also 
suggests that there have been tremendous efforts to work together to craft STOs in a manner that takes 
into account the specific objectives of the MEA, th e nature of the environmental harm to be 
prevented, the other types of control obligatio ns set out in the MEA (e.g., production and use 
restrictions), the concerns and needs of all partic ipating countries and relevant trade rules and trade 
implications.  
Features of the Export Restrictions 
 22. In the U.S. experience, export restrictions can vary in design in several important respects, 
including:  the purpose of the export restrictions;  the role of the export restrictions within the MEA; the extent to which the importing Party’s view abou t the proposed export is relevant;  the procedures 
and criteria by which export restrictions may evolve;  and the level of clarity of the export restrictions.  
 (1) Purpose.   Export restrictions may be aimed at  protecting the environment of either 
the exporting or the importing Party.  In CITES, for example, export restrictions are generally aimed at protecting populations of species found in the exporting Party that are, or may become, threatened with extinc tion unless trade in such species is strictly 
regulated.  In the PIC and POPs Conventions, in contrast, the purpose is to protect the importing Party from an environmental or health hazard, such as hazardous 
chemicals.   
  (2) Role of the export restriction within the MEA.    Export restrictions may also differ in 
terms of the role that they play in the MEA.  In the PIC Convention and CITES, for example, the purpose of the MEA itself is to  regulate trade to address a particular 
environmental concern, and the STOs are the primary mechanism for doing so.  In 
contrast, the STOs set out in the POPs Convention are supportive of the primary control measures, which restrict Pa rties’ production and use of POPs. 
 
 (3)  Role of the importing and exporting Parties .  The role of the importing Party 
concerning export restrictions varies significantly depending on the role of the export 
restriction within the MEA and its design.  Export restrictions that are intended to 
protect the environment in the exporting Party (e.g., CITES) typically do not put as much emphasis on the conditions in, or the vi ews of, the importing Party.  In contrast, 
export restrictions intended, at least in pa rt, to protect the environment and/or human 
health in the importing Party (e.g., POPs and PIC Conventions) typically take into 
account the conditions in, and/or the view of, the importing Party.  However, export 
restrictions under all three MEAs involve so me degree of interplay of obligations and 
activity on the part of both the exporting and importing Party.  For example:  
 
• Under CITES, trade in Appendix I species is allowed only if the exporting 
Party issues an export permit based on a finding, inter alia , that the export 
will not be detrimental to the survival of the species, and the importing Party 
issues an import permit based on a finding that the import will be for a purpose that is neither commercial nor detrimental to the survival of the 
species.  For Appendices II and III, trade can go forward without an import permit, but the importing Party may a llow import only upon presentation of a 
valid export permit or (in the case of Appendix III) either an export permit or 
a certificate of origin.   
 TN/TE/W/40 
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 • Under the POPs Convention, there is an export and import prohibition that 
complements the general prohibition on  the production and use of POPs.  
However, exceptions exist as well.  The export restriction (Article 3.2(b)) does not apply if:  the export is destin ed for environmentally sound disposal 
in the importing Party;  or if two condi tions are met, one of which must be 
agreed to by the Parties generally (i.e., a continuing need for the chemical in 
question has been identified by the Parties in an annex to the Convention), and the other of which depends upon the importing Party specifically (i.e., the 
importing Party has chosen to permit the use of that chemical in its territory and has availed itself of a specific exemption under the Convention for that particular purpose).  
 
• Under the PIC Convention, which also deals with hazardous chemicals, 
importing Parties also play an important role in the application of the export restriction.  However, in this case, unlike the POPs Convention, the importing 
Party is entirely in control of whether the export restriction applies.  The importing Party decides (Article 10), on a fi nal or an interim basis, whether it 
consents to the import of a chemical listed in Annex III, with or without 
conditions.  The exporting Party must then  ensure that its exporters comply 
with the decision taken by the importing Pa rty (Article 11.1(b)).  In essence, 
the export restriction is aimed at helping the importing Party enforce its import decisions.  It should be noted that an importing Party’s ability to withhold its consent to imports is not wi thout limitation.  In all cases where a 
Party decides not to consent to import a chemical or to consent to its import 
only under specified conditions, the importer must simultaneously prohibit or subject the chemical to the same conditions domestically, and its decision must apply to all import sources (Article 10.9).   
 
23. As a practical matter, the above export restric tions that are aimed at helping the importing 
Party to enforce an import decision appear unlikely to generate trade concerns.  For example, it is 
unlikely that an importing Party, who set the impor t condition in accordance with the terms of the 
MEA, would raise concerns or complaints about th e export restriction (within the MEA or in another 
forum), which is intended to help the importing Party enforce its domestic policies.  It is also unlikely 
that an exporting Party would raise concerns with an importing Party’s decision, if that decision is 
clearly articulated within the ME A and consistently applied.   
 (4) Evolution of the scope of the export restriction .  The export restrictions considered 
here generally have in common that their sc ope can evolve in order to maintain and 
improve effectiveness in response to scientif ic and other relevant developments.  In 
the U.S. experience, there are two elements to this evolution that are likely to be 
relevant to the extent to which trade concerns are raised:  
 
- The degree to which changes to the scope  of the export restrictions are based 
on science;  and 
- The degree to which the process for modifying the scope of the export 
restriction is transparent and provides for input from all Parties.  
24. All of the MEAs highlighted in this submission provide for science-based and participatory 
decision-making, but they also differ in several particular respects.   
• In the case of CITES, the Convention requires that COP decisions concerning the listing 
of species in the Appendices be made on the basis of objective scientific criteria.  The  TN/TE/W/40 
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 COP periodically meets to consider chang es in the listing of species in light of 
developing knowledge and new information.  The Animals and Plants Committees 
review scientific and technical data and ma ke recommendations that can lead to listing 
proposals by Parties.   All Parties to CITES ar e entitled to participate on an equal basis in 
meetings of the COP, and the members of the various committees are elected on a 
regional basis.   At the national level, key decisions about whether a specimen may be 
traded are based on evaluation of scientific evidence by national authorities as specified 
in Articles III and IV.  This well-developed system of institutions ensure that export 
restrictions are defined, adjusted and a pplied on the basis of solid information and 
analysis in which all Parties have a chan ce to be involved, so as to target the 
environmental problem that CITES seeks to address.  Non-governmental organizations, 
such as TRAFFIC and the IUCN (World Con servation Union), also provide valuable 
scientific and technical information and analysis.   
 
• In the case of the PIC Convention, a Chem ical Review Committee will be established by 
the Conference of the Parties (COP) to review certain information, e.g., related to 
national regulatory actions re garding banned or severely restricted chemicals.  Based on 
information submitted by a Party and pursuant to criteria specified in the relevant 
annexes, the Committee makes recommendations  to the COP concerning new listings of 
chemicals.  With respect to banned or severel y restricted chemicals, for example, these 
criteria include, among other factors, s ound science (e.g., whether data have been 
generated and assessed according to gene rally recognized scientific principles and 
procedures) and risk (e.g., whether the regul atory action is based on a risk evaluation 
involving prevailing conditions in the Party) .  The Committee is composed of experts 
from a variety of Parties.   
 
• In the case of the POPs Convention, a Pers istent Organic Pollutants Review Committee 
(POPRC) will review all proposals for listing new POPs according to scientific criteria established in Annex D.  The POPRC has the authority to set aside proposals that do not, in its view, meet the scientific criteria established and/or pass the risk evaluation, and to make recommendations to the COP concerning the listing of new POPs chemicals.   All 
Parties are entitled to participate on an equal basis in meetings of the COP, and the COP 
is charged with appointing members of the POPRC.  Members of the POPRC must make 
every effort to operate by consensus (Article 19.6(c)).   
 25. The extent to which an MEA’s procedures rely on objective criteria and scientific input in 
making decisions (with full opportunity for input by  all Parties and for the collection of information 
from reliable sources) contributes to the MEA’s effectiveness and may significantly reduce the 
likelihood of disagreement among Parties concerning an export restriction.   
26. In addition to science-based and participatory decision-making processes, these MEAs require 
varying degrees of consent regarding changes to the scope of the export restrictions, and additionally, 
provide opportunities for Parties to opt out of changes to the scope of the export restrictions.  For 
example: 
 - Under the PIC Convention, consensus is required for the adoption of an amendment 
to add or remove a chemical from Annex III, but all Parties are bound by the amendment.  
 
 - In contrast, under the POPs Convention, consensus is not required for adoption of an 
amendment to add a chemical, but a Party has the opportunity not to be bound by the resulting amendment.   TN/TE/W/40 
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 - In the case of CITES, all Parties are bound by a listing decision, unless a Party takes a 
reservation, which Parties infrequently choose to do, and the trade restrictions on the 
listed species go into effect 90 days after the COP decision.   
 
27. As a practical matter, mechanisms that provide  Parties appropriate flexibility in terms of 
whether or not to be bound by changes to the scope  of an export restriction reduce the likelihood of a 
formal disagreement among Parties concerning an export restriction.    
 (5) Clarity of the export restriction’s scope .  In the U.S. experience, the degree to which 
the STO and its scope are clearly define d in the MEA facilitates consistent and 
complete implementation of the STO, increases understanding of the MEA and its 
goals among government officials and the public, and reduces the opportunity for disagreement among Parties in terms of th e STO’s application.  Clarity can be 
promoted through various means, including through: 
 
  - A publicly available list of items subject to the export restriction; 
   - application of science-based, objective criteria;  and    - specificity.  
28. For example, all three MEAs include a clear a nd publicly available list of specific items that 
are subject to export restrictions under the MEA (e.g., POPs Annexes A and B; CITES Appendices I, 
II, and III; and PIC Annex III).  In the case of th e POPs and PIC Conventions, even the Chemical 
Abstract (CAS) Number is included in the listing in or der to ensure technical specificity.  In addition, 
in the case of the POPs Convention, the procedure for obtaining permission to use a POP is open - all 
acceding Parties may register for one or more types of specific exemptions.  The procedure for 
ascertaining whether the importing Party is permitte d to use the substance in question is highly 
transparent, as all permissible uses for each subs tance are clearly listed in Annexes A or B of the 
Convention, and each Party that has availed itself of a specific exemption is listed in a publicly 
available Register.  This clear and transparent a pproach is preferable to approaches that allow 
disparate interpretations by different Parties of  a list framed in general terms, or disparate 
interpretations of non-specific obligations, wh ich can open the door to disagreement among MEA 
Parties concerning how an expor t restriction is applied.  
III. CONCLUSION 
29. Based on the U.S. assessment of its experiences, as reflected above, the United States believes 
that the MEA/WTO relationship is working quite well.  This is especially true where:   
 - Trade and environment experts have work ed together nationally (and internationally) 
to tailor STOs to meet particular environm ental objectives in a way that takes account 
of Parties trade-related ri ghts and obligations;  and  
  - both the design of the STOs in the MEAs and Parties’ practice in their 
implementation (at both the national and in ternational levels) incorporate certain 
features, which contribute to their effective operation. 
  
30. The United States also believes that certain features of the STOs have, in practice, contributed 
to a mutually supportive relationship.  These design and implementation features include, e.g.,:   TN/TE/W/40 
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  - The careful design of export restrictions (and their complementary import 
provisions), so as to target a specific environmental problem;  
  - science-based procedures by which the export restrictions can be adjusted in light of 
advances in knowledge or other ch anges in relevant conditions;  
 
 - procedures for changes to the scope of the export restriction over time that are both 
inclusive and appropriately flexible;  and 
  - the clarity and transparency of export restrictions.   
 
31. In light of these factors it is not surprising that no formal disputes, on trade or other matters, 
have arisen concerning the STOs discussed here.   
 - In the nearly 30 years that CITES has been  in force, to the knowledge of the United -
States no Party has ever invoked the provisions for formal resolution of disputes by 
arbitration under Article XVIII of that C onvention, nor has any dispute ever been 
raised in a trade forum, such as the WTO.   
  - Similarly, although the PIC Convention entered into force only recently, the PIC 
procedure for ascertaining whether the importing Party has consented or not, and whether conditions have been set, is fairly  well developed given that it builds on the 
existing voluntary PIC procedure, opera ted by UNEP and FAO since 1989.  The 
PIC Convention takes into account experien ce gained during the implementation of 
the voluntary procedure (as set out in th e London Guidelines for the Exchange of 
Information on Chemicals in International Trade and the FAO International Code of 
Conduct on the  Distribution and Use of Pesticides).  None of this experience has 
involved formal disputes in trade forums or elsewhere. 
 32. The United States notes that this submission reflects practical observations related to certain 
STOs in certain MEAs and is not put forward in th e nature of principles or other guiding factors, 
either specific to certain STOs or generic.  Inst ead, the United States offers these observations in an 
effort to move the discussions forward by initiatin g an experience-based dialogue among delegations.  
Through such a dialogue Members can move beyond definitional discussions of terms in the mandate 
itself (e.g., what is an MEA, a specific trade oblig ation, etc.) and initiate a practice-based discussion 
in which members can share concrete experiences.  The United States hopes that this submission will 
help to advance the Committee’s discussion and invit es other delegations to share their experience in 
negotiating and implementing STOs in MEAs.   
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