RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONIP/C/W/194
17 July 2000
(00-2915)
Council for Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property RightsOriginal:  English
SCOPE AND MODALITIES OF NON-VIOLATION COMPLAINTS
UNDER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Communication from the United States of America
The following communication, dated 28 June 2000, has been received from the Permanent
Mission of the United States with the request that it be circulated to members.
_______________
Background
Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement addresses the manner in which dispute settlement
regarding the Agreement will be carried out.  It makes unambiguously clear in the first paragraph that
the provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994, as elaborated in the Dispute Settlement
Understanding are to apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes under the Agreement,
except as otherwise provided.  The second paragraph provides for a delay in the application of
subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 to the TRIPS Agreement for a period
of five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement on 1 January 1995.  The
paragraph makes unambiguously clear that the delay applies only for five years, until 1 January 2000.Finally, the third paragraph provides that, during the five-year delay provided in the second paragraph,
the TRIPS Council was to "examine the scope and modalities for non-violation complaints and to
submit any recommendations to the Ministerial Conference for approval". Any decision approving
recommendations, including to extend the period of non-application, had to be made "only by
consensus".
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 64 were included in the final text of the TRIPS Agreement as a
result of concerns expressed about possible infringement on sovereign rights that might result from
non-violation complaints in relation with an agre ement viewed by some as different from other
Uruguay Round agreements.  The presence of extended transition periods also caused some to believethat a delay in non-violation complaints was necessary to ensure that such complaints were not raised
prior to the time when substantive obligations began.  As with the substantive provisions of all of the
agreements under the WTO, the delay in the application of non-violation complaints was part of the
final package negotiated during the Uruguay Round.
During 1999, the TRIPS Council did examine, duri ng its meetings, particularly the latter two,
the scope and modalities of non-violation complaints.  Papers were circulated by Canada and the
United States.  The Council, however, reached no conclusions and made no recommendations.
1 January 2000 arrived and the delay in application provided by Article 64.2 ceased.IP/C/W/194
Page 2
In the March meeting of the TRIPS Council, a number of WTO Members proposed that the
discussion of the scope and modalities of non-violation complaints, in spite of the fact that
Article 64.3 makes it clear that the "examination" was to have taken place during the period of the
delay in application provided for in paragraph 2.  The United States stated at that meeting that it was
not in a position to agree to a continued discussion but was willing to listen to others' views regardingwhat purpose continued discussion might serve.  We remain willing to listen to such views.
This paper is intended to make clear the view of the United States that the period for
discussion of views on scope and modalities of non-violation complaints has passed and that no
purpose will be served in continuing discussions, particularly at a time when the Council's build-in
agenda already requires substantial, significant work.
The TRIPS Agreement is a Market Access Agreement
A number of WTO Members have asserted that  the TRIPS Agreement is somehow different
from other WTO agreements merely because the Agreement establishes affirmative standards for the
protection of intellectual property rights, which are recognized as private rights.
1  The United States
disagrees with such a limited view of the TRIPS Agreement.
During the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations, some GATT Members recognized
that the tariff and other trade benefits they were negotiating would not result in the level of market
access they sought in exchange for concessions they were being asked to make, if trademarks on theirinternationally traded goods were not respected.  Those governments proposed that an agreement be
developed that would provide for border enforcement against international trade in counterfeit
trademarked goods.  Unfortunately, that negotiation did not begin until the Tokyo Round was nearly
at an end and the negotiation, therefore, did not result in an agreement in the final results of the Tokyo
Round.
By the time the Uruguay Round was initiated in 1986, the need for international rules on the
trade-related aspects of intellectual property generally was recognized as necessary by many GATT
Members because, in the same way that technical barriers to trade or sanitary and phytosanitary
standards can interfere with market access of Members' important internationally traded goods
2, so
can varying standards of protection for the various forms of intellectual property rights and for
enforcement of those rights.
The TRIPS Agreement is intended "to reduce di stortions and impediments to international
trade ... and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade".3  The standards and procedures established are for
the identification, grant, enjoyment and enforcement of private rights, in most cases4, but, as noted
earlier, it does so in the same way that the Ag reement on Technical Barriers to Trade or the
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures establish minimum requirements that
governments must meet before imposing limitations on goods that may be sold in their markets based
on health, environmental or other factors.  Inadequate legal systems for protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights can mean, for example, that an anticipated increase in market accessresulting from a negotiated tariff reduction for a certain product or elimination of a quota would not
                                                     
1 With the exception of geographical indications, which the responses to the Article 24.2 "checklist"
indicate are, in many cases, either government rights  or government administered labelling requirements.
2 In addition to goods, the TRIPS Agreement also reduces distortions and impediments to trade in
services, as provided for under the GATS.
3  Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement, initial paragraph.
4 As noted in footnote 1 above, geographical indications are, in many cases, government rights or
government administered labelling requirements.IP/C/W/194
Page 3
be realized because others could market identical products freely in spite of the existence of a patent
claiming that product or a trademark associated wi th it.  Individuals without authorization of a
copyright owner could, without authorization, copy and distribute copyrighted books, movies, sound
recordings, or software in competition with the c opyright owner.  The inability to obtain in some
markets patent protection for certain products, thereby allowing others to "free-ride" similarly canreduce the expected market access negotiated.  Under those circumstances, the market access for
which countries negotiated could be devalued, absent some uniform minimum standards on which
WTO Members can rely.
The TRIPS Agreement, therefore, is a market access agreement because it helps reduce
market distortions that existed prior to its negotiations by establishing adequate standards and
principles concerning the availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual property rights andby ensuring that effective and appropriate means for enforcement of those rights are available.
The TRIPS Agreement is One Part of a Coherent System of Agreements
The assertion is made that somehow a non-violation complaint under the TRIPS Agreement
might possibly undermine the overall coherence among WTO agreements.  If such a possibility exists,
it exists in connection with each and every WTO Agreement.  First, it should be noted that the filing
of complaints undermines nothing.  WTO Members are entitled to file complaints when they believe
that benefits to which they are entitled and bein g nullified and impaired.  The focus of the Council
should be on the results of cases, not on the filing of complaints.  Second, panels and the AppellateBody are bound by Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settle ment Understanding that expressly states that
"Recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settleme nt Body cannot add or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements".  (Emphasis added.)  Third, because the Marrakesh
Agreement and its subsidiary agreements were the results of a single undertaking, it is highly unlikely,
even if Article 3.2 did not exist, that a panel would determine that something a WTO Member agreedto accept under one part of that single undertaking could nullify and impair benefits in another area.
One of the conditions that panels have held must exist for a non-violation complaint to succeed (see
cases cited by the WTO Secretariat in its very useful paper on the history of non-violation
complaints
5) is that the action complained of should not have been foreseeable at the time of the
negotiations.  Obviously, if another WTO agreement expressly provides for an action to be taken, that
action was foreseen at the time of the negotiations and the complaining party would not be able to
demonstrate that it is entitled to succeed in its non-violation claim under the TRIPS Agreement.
An example given in a paper introduced by the European Communities (EC) is that of a
country that bans the manufacture, processing, importation and distribution of materials or products
that contain a prohibited substance.  Of the forms of intellectual property addressed by the
TRIPS Agreement, this example would seem relevant primarily to patents or trade secrets, with thepotential involvement of geographical indications.  The TRIPS Agreement provides patentees only the
right to prevent third parties from taking certain actions;  it does not guarantee the patentee that it can
exploit its rights if other provisions of law, otherwise consistent with the WTO Agreements, prohibit
that exploitation.  Section 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement requires that those in control of
undisclosed information be given the right to prevent disclosure of undisclosed information or itsacquisition or use by third parties in a manner contrary to honest commercial use.  Furthermore, the
protection provided geographical indications does not ensure that given products bearing such
indications can be sold if other WTO-consistent actions prohibit such sale.  A non-violation claim
based on the hypothetical ban would fail, therefore, because no negotiated benefit exists.  The other
examples proposed likewise would be unsucc essful because no benefits would be found.
                                                     
5 IP/C/W/124, dated 28 January 1999.IP/C/W/194
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For these reasons, it is the view of the United States that the number of instances in which a
non-violation complaint could succeed in the WTO in relation to the TRIPS Agreement (or any other
agreement, for that matter) is very limited.  The possibility of such complaints, however, needs to be
preserved as a safety net to discourage actions that evade obligations without directly violating them,
actions that non-violation complaints were intended to prevent from the beginning.
Conclusion
For the reasons given in this paper and in that appended hereto, circulated as a non-paper
earlier, the United States believes that no purpose would be served in continuing the discussion of
scope and modalities in the TRIPS Council, particul arly in light of the Council's considerable work
under the built-in agenda.IP/C/W/194
Page 5
APPENDIX
NON-VIOLATION NULLIFICATION OR IMPAIRMENT UNDER THE AGREEMENT ON
TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Views of the United States of America
BackgroundArticle 64.2 and 64.3 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(the TRIPS Agreement or TRIPS)
Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement concerns the settlement of disputes that might arise in
connection with WTO Members' implementation of their obligations under the Agreement.
Paragraph 1 of Article 64 states that the provisi ons of Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994
apply to consultations and disputes arising under the TRIPS Agreement, except where otherwise
expressly provided in the TRIPS Agreement.  Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 64 of the TRIPS
Agreement then provide an express exception to this rule.1
Paragraph 2 of Article 64 delays for five years from the date the WTO Agreement came into
force the application of disputes alleging non-viol ation nullification or impairment, and of those
involving the existence of any other situations, under GATT Article XXIII:1(b) and (c), respectively.
Paragraph 3 of Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement requires the TRIPS Council, during that five-year
period, to examine the scope and modalities for non-violation nullification or impairment complaints
under the TRIPS Agreement, or disputes arising as a result of the existence of any other situation.The TRIPS Council is to submit any recommendations to the Ministerial Conference.  Any decision
of the Ministerial Conference to approve such recommendations or to extend the delay of application
of GATT 1994 Article XXIII:1(b) and (c) to the TR IPS Agreement can be made only by consensus.
Recommendations approved by the Ministerial Conference apply to all WTO Members without
further formal procedures.
The United States will not agree to any extension of the period referred to in Article 64.2 of
the TRIPS Agreement.  This paper is intended to provide the views of the United States of America
on the scope and modalities of disputes that might arise in relation to Article XXIII:1(b) and (c).  The
United States invites other WTO Members to submit written views for the TRIPS Council's
examination to give the Council the basis for any recommendations regarding Article XXIII:1(b) and
(c) to the Ministerial Conference.
Non-Violation Nullification or Impairment
Article XXIII:1(b) and (c) were included in the original text of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, based upon Article 93.1(b) and (c) of the Havana Charter.2  Although the
provisions have been available to GATT Members, now WTO Members, for fifty years, there have
                                                     
1 Article 6 also exempts from dispute settlement questions of exhaustion of rights, unless such disputes
involve national or MFN treatment.
2 Article 93.1 of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization states, in relevant part:  If
any Member considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly, implicitly or explicitly, under any of
the provisions of this Charter other than Article 1, is being nullified or impaired as a result of:
(b) the application by a Member of a measure not conflicting with the provisions of this Charter, or
(c)  the existence of any other situation.IP/C/W/194
Page 6
been, as reflected in the Secretariat's note, Non-Violation Complaints and the TRIPS Agreement3, very
few cases based upon subparagraph (b)4 and none based upon subparagraph (c).  The Secretariat's
thorough review of panel cases shows that most of  the disputes involved newly introduced subsidies
or changes in existing subsidies that affected imports for which tariff concessions had been
negotiated.  The complaints in these cases generally argued that the effect of the challenged subsidieswas to deprive imports of market opportunities in ways that could not have been foreseen at the time
the relevant reduction in tariffs was negotiated.
The Secretariat's note provides a thorough history of the negotiation of Article 64 of the
TRIPS Agreement.  That history will not be repeated here except to note that the five-year delay in
application of Article XXII:1(b) resulted from concerns similar to those expressed recently in the
TRIPS Council.  Members concerned about the application of non-violation complaints under theAgreement wanted an opportunity to consider the question after some experience had been gained
with the Agreement.  The Council has now undertaken that examination.
The Council should, in the course of its examination, keep in mind the objective of
Article XXII:1(b).
5  In its opinion AB-1997-5, India - Patent Protection For Pharmaceutical And
Agricultural Chemical Products  (the "Mailbox Case"), the WTO Appellate Body discusses
non-violation nullification and impairment in detail.  The Appellate Body explains the objective of
such non-violation cases as follows:
"Under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994, a Member can bring a 'non-violation'
complaint when the negotiated balance of concessions between Members is upset by
the application of a measure, whether or not this measure is inconsistent with the
provisions of the covered agreement.  The ultimate goal is not the withdrawal of the
measure concerned, but rather achieving a mutually satisfactory adjustment, usually
by means of compensation."6
The Council should note, in particular, the point made in the last sentence.  If non-violation
nullification and impairment of a benefit is found in a particular case under any of the WTO
agreements, a panel or the Appellate Body cannot direct that the measure in question be withdrawn
because that measure does not violate any of the express provisions of a relevant agreement.  All that
can be recommended to remedy non-violation nullification and impairment is an adjustment in the
balance of concessions aimed at re-establishing the equilibrium of concessions.  Such an adjustment,
as the Appellate Body notes, is usually achieved through compensation in the form of additionalconcessions.
                                                     
3 IP/C/W/124, dated  28 January 1999.
4 The Appellate Body in its opinion AB-1997-5, India - Patent Protection For Pharmaceutical And
Agricultural Chemical Products identifies eight: Report of the Working Party on Australian Subsidy on
Ammonium Sulphate, adopted on 3 April 1950, BISD II/188;  Panel Report on Treatment by Germany of
Imports of Sardines ("Germany - Sardines"), G/26, adopted on 31 October 1952, BISD 1S/53;  Uruguayan
Recourse, adopted on 16 November 1962, BISD 11S/95;  Panel Report on EC - Tariff Treatment on Imports of
Citrus Products from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region ("EC - Citrus Products"),GATT document L/5576, dated 7 February 1985 (unadopted);  Panel Report on EEC - Production Aids Granted
on Canned Peaches, Canned Pears, Canned Fruit Cocktail and Dried Grapes ("EEC - Canned Fruit"),
GATT document L/5778, dated 20 February 1985 (unadopted);  Japan - Semi-conductors, adopted on
4 May 1988, BISD 35S/116;  EEC - Oilseeds, adopted on 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86;  United States -
Agricultural Waiver, adopted on 7 November 1990, BISD 37S/228.
5 As there have never been any disputes involving subparagraph (c), this paper will concentrate on
subparagraph (b).
6 AB-1997-5, India - Patent Protection For Pharmaceutical And Agricultural Chemical Products ,
pg. 4.IP/C/W/194
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Legal Basis For The Position Of The United States Regarding Expiration Of The
"Moratorium" On Non-Violation Cases
The TRIPS Agreement was not negotiated in a vacuum.  It was an integral part of the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  During the Uruguay Round, negotiations involvedmany subject areas and concessions made and benefits gained were negotiated across the range of
those subject areas.  Benefits gained in the form  of higher standards of protection for intellectual
property rights under the TRIPS Agreement were often "paid for" in the form of concessions made
under other Agreements cited in Annex 1 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (the WTO Agreement).  Other concessi ons agreed to in the Uruguay Round with respect
to the TRIPS Agreement were made within the Agreement.  The five-year delay in the application of
so-called "non-violation" complaints was, itself, a concession on the part of some parties to thenegotiations, as were transition periods and various  limitations on rights contained in the Agreement.
Because the TRIPS Agreement obligations are tied to all of the concessions made within the
Agreement and under other agreements that resulted from the Uruguay Round, delaying further the
applicability of Article XXIII:1(b) and (c) of the GATT 1994 would upset the equilibrium of
concessions reached at Marrakesh.  It is for this reason that the United States will not agree to anyfurther delay.
Issues of Concern to Other Members
In February 1999, the Government of Canada submitted a paper to the TRIPS Council,
IP/C/W/127, outlining its concerns regarding the application of subparagraphs (b) and (c) of
Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994.  Those concerns are also reflected by Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan in the proposal introduced in April, IP/C/W/141.
Some Members supported the views orally at recent meetings of the TRIPS Council.  These concerns
are addressed below.  As the most detailed expression of these views, the Canadian paper provides thebasis for this discussion.
Uncertainty as to scope
In its paper, Canada argues that the TRIPS Agreement is different from other agreements
under the WTO and that the difference causes uncertainty about the way in which GATT
Article XXIII:1(b) and (c) would work in the event a non-violation dispute were raised.  The UnitedStates believes that the TRIPS Agreement does not differ significantly from other agreements
negotiated in the Uruguay Round.  The history of disputes under Article XXIII:1(b), described
objectively and thoroughly in the Secretariat's note, coupled with the guidelines for such disputes in
Article 26 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, therefore, would enable a panel and the Appellate
Body to reach an appropriate conclusion in connection with a non-violation dispute.
In its paper, Canada asserts that the TRIPS Agreement is not principally concerned with
market access and does not include a commitment to a certain level of market access.  These
assertions are not accurate.  First, it should be noted that the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement begins
with the words "Members, Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade ... "in precise recognition of the fact that variable levels of protection for intellectual property rights
around the world distort and impede international trade.  It is these distortions and impediments that
the TRIPS Agreement addresses by establishing uniform minimum standards of protection and
enforcement for the forms of intellectual property addressed in Part II of the Agreement.  Second, it
should also be noted that most of the WTO agr eements contained in Annex 1 of the Marrakesh
Agreement generally do not include commitments to a certain level of market access.  They, like the
TRIPS Agreement, establish conditions under which international trade is to be conducted.IP/C/W/194
Page 8
The assertion that there are not, within the TRIPS Agreement, "the same exchange of rights
and obligations" as there are in the GATT and GATS likewise is not accurate.  The TRIPS
Agreement, as noted above, establishes minimum standards of protection and enforcement for the
forms of intellectual property addressed in Part II of the Agreement.  The principles of national and
most-favoured-nation treatment apply with respect to protection and enforcement of intellectualproperty rights.  Although developed country Member s were required to implement their obligations
fully on 1 January 1996, the Agreement authorizes longer periods of time for developing country
Members and Members with economies in transition to implement their obligations.  Least developed
countries are given a total of eleven years in which to implement the obligations.  Developing country
Members that do not provide product patent protection for particular fields of technology on
1 January 2000, are given until 1 January 2005 to do so.  The Agreement also reflects an exchange of
rights and obligations in the form of certain limitations and exceptions in relation to various forms ofintellectual property.
In addition, as noted, the TRIPS Agreement was not negotiated in a vacuum.  It was part of a
complex negotiation in which concessions were given in one context in exchange for benefits gained
in another.  Were that not the case, the WTO would administer a group of agreements with variedmembership, much in the way WIPO does.  It is only because the results of the Uruguay Round
represented a "package deal" that WTO Members must be Members of each of the agreements cited in
Annex 1 of the Marrakesh Agreement.
In its paper, Canada states that the "benefit" Members receive under the TRIPS Agreement
consists primarily of the right conferred on the intellectual property holder to prohibit unauthorized
use.  It is true that the TRIPS Agreement's obligations are couched in terms of rights granted to
Members' nationals, rather than treatment to which goods or services originating in Members'
territories are subject in the territory of other Members.  That is not, however, as significant a
difference as Canada and other WTO Members seem to perceive.  Protection of intellectual propertyrights results in market access for products and services of the WTO Members' nationals.  Limitations
on technical barriers to trade, uniform application of rules of origin, national treatment obligations in
relation to goods, for example, also result in market access for products and services of WTO
Members' nationals.  It is only because intellectual property rights are granted to persons rather than
applied directly to goods that there is a perception that the TRIPS Agreement somehow differs from
other WTO agreements.  The rules the TRIPS Agreement establishes, however, determine the way in
which a WTO Member's goods and services are treated in the territories of other Members and thattreatment benefits the Member in the same way that it benefits under the rules established by other
WTO agreements.
Undermining regulatory authority
Under this heading, Canada argues that, because TRIPS-consistent measures enacted in
pursuit  of legitimate public policy objectives could have an impact on intellectual property rights,
application of non-violation disputes under the TRIPS Agreement might constrain WTO Members'
abilities to introduce new social, economic development, health, environmental and cultural measures
that might be construed as denying ill-defined benefits under the TRIPS Agreement.  Once again, thesame could be said of most of the other agreements in Annex 1 to the Marrakesh Agreement.
The benefits under the TRIPS Agreement are not generally "ill-defined". For the most part,
they are straightforward and clear, at least to those familiar with the various forms of intellectual
property.  As noted, the history of disputes u nder Article XXIII:1(b) to date, coupled with the
guidelines for such disputes in Article 26 of th e Dispute Settlement Understanding would enable a
panel and the Appellate Body to reach an appropriate conclusion in a non-violation dispute under the
TRIPS Agreement.  Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding empowers panels to seek
information and technical advice where needed.IP/C/W/194
Page 9
To succeed in any dispute involving a claim of non-violation nullification and impairment,
the complaining Member must demonstrate through argument and evidence that;  (1) a benefit accrues
to that Member as a result of the terms of the relevant agreement;  (2) the other Member has
implemented a measure that could not have been foreseen during the negotiations of the relevantagreement;  and (3) the application of the measure by the defending member has nullified and
impaired the benefit accruing to the complaining Member.
7  These would not be easy hurdles to clear,
and thus concerns about a tremendous influx of non-violation complaints are unfounded.
The requirements for succeeding, in a non-violation dispute also provide guidelines for
Members in determining whether a measure they might be considering could possibly give rise to a
dispute.  As would be wise in considering any measure that might affect international trade adversely,a WTO Member should factor into its consideration, of measures that might be adopted to address
particular social, economic development, health, environmental and cultural  concerns, what effect, if
any, those measures might have on the intellectual property rights of foreign nationals.  If an adverse
effect is likely, the Member should then consider  whether the measure being contemplated could have
been foreseen when the Uruguay Round negotiations were under way.  Because there generally are a
variety of ways in which a social, economic devel opment, health, environmental and cultural policy
might be implemented, these considerations might be of assistance in selecting an appropriate
measure.  The application of subparagraphs (b) and (c)
8 of Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 to the
TRIPS Agreement should not, therefore, constrain Members from implementing social, economic
development, health, environmental and cultural policies.
Conclusion
Because the expiration of the delay in application of GATT Article XXIII:1(b) and (c) was
part of the overall balance of concessions established in the Uruguay Round, the United States willnot agree to any extension of that delay.  The United States recommends that the TRIPS Council
focus its discussion on recommendations, if any, that it might make to the Ministerial Conference on
how Article XXIII:1(b) and (c) are to be applied in the context of the TRIPS Agreement.  The United
States believes that the rules contained in the Dispute Settlement Understanding currently provide
sufficient guidance for panels and the Appellate Body for dealing with any disputes that might arise
under Article XXIII:1(b) and (c), but would be interested in any suggestions and rationale that other
WTO Members might wish to offer.
__________
                                                     
7 See, for example, EEC - Oilseeds, BISD 37S/86, paras. 142-152;  Australian Subsidy on Ammonium
Sulphate, BISD II/188, paras. 192-193.
8 It should be noted that the rules under Ar ticle XXIII:1(c) are different than those for
subparagraph 1(b). The Dispute Settlement Understanding rules regarding adoption or implementation of panelreports in Article XXIII:1(c) disputes (although none has ev er occurred) do not apply.  It is possible, therefore,
for a WTO Member to block adoption of a panel's report.  The provisions on suspension of concessions under
Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding also do not apply.