Note: Advance written questions by WTO Members and replies provided by the Government of  
 Singapore are reproduced in document WT/TPR /M/130/Add.1 and will be available online 
 at:  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm.  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/TPR/M/130 
16 August 2004 
 (04-3436) 
Trade Policy Review Body 
14 & 16 June 2004 Original:  English 
 
 
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW 
 
SINGAPORE 
 
Minutes of Meeting  
 
Chairperson:  H.E. Mrs. Puangrat Asavapisit (Thailand) 
 
 
   P a g e  
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 3 
II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE RE PRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE 4 
III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 8 
IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY 11 
V. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE AND ADDITIONAL 
COMMENTS  21 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 28 
 
  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 3 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
1. The fourth Trade Policy Review of Singapore was held on 14 and 16 June 2004  The 
Chairperson (H.E. Mrs. Puangrat Asavapisit) we lcomed the delegation of Singapore, headed by 
Mr. Heng Swee Keat, Permanent Secretary, Minist ry of Trade and Industry, and the discussant 
H.E. Mr. Eirik Glenne (Norway).  As usual, the discussant would speak in his personal capacity and, 
in accordance with established procedures, he had ma de available in advance a broad outline of the 
themes he intended to raise (document WT/TPR/D/107). 
2. The Chairperson recalled the purpose of the Trad e Policy Reviews and the main elements of 
the procedures of the meeting.  The Report by the Government of Singapore was contained in 
document WT/TPR/G/130 and that of the Secret ariat in document WT/TPR/S/130.  Copies of 
advance written questions, submitted by:  Japan;  Colo mbia;  Canada;  the United States;  Argentina;  
Australia;  Hong Kong, China;  the European Communi ty;  Switzerland;  New Zealand;  the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu ("Chinese Taipei");  Indonesia;  Brazil;  and Venezuela, had been transmitted to the delega tion of Singapore.  These questions and the replies 
provided by the delegation of Singapore are reproduced in WT/TPR/M/130/Add.1. 
3. It had been clear from the Government and S ecretariat reports that during the period under 
review, Singapore had committed to liberalize its eco nomy, thereby maintaining its position as one of 
the most open economies in the world.  Nonethele ss, it faced several long-run challenges, including 
the apparent lack of growth recently in total fact or productivity, a key indicator, together with more 
intense competition from low-cost regional producers.  She was sure Members would be interested in 
leaning about how Singapore was addressing these challenges.   
4. During the period under review, Singapore's trade policy focus appeared to have shifted 
towards greater bilateralism and regionalism.  More specifically, whereas at the time of the previous 
Review, Singapore had no bilateral free-trade agre ements, since then it had signed several such 
agreements and was in the process of negotiating others. 
5. Before handing the floor over to the delegation of Singapore for their opening remarks the 
Chairperson also reminded Members about two housek eeping matters.  The first involved a request by 
the Commission of the West African Economic a nd Monetary Union (WAEMU) for ad hoc observer 
status at the TPR of Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali , due to take place on 28 and 30 June 2004.  The 
second was to advise Members that the periodic ap praisal of the operation of the TPR Mechanism 
needed to be undertaken shortly;  she proposed that  the TPRB begin this soon and would be tabling a 
paper for its consideration. WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 4  
 
II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE RE PRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE 
6. The representative of Singapore thanked the Ch airperson for her introduction.  He also 
thanked the discussant for agreeing to lead the di scussion for this review and noted that, having 
previously served as the Norwegian Ambassador to Malaysia, he was no stranger to the region.  He thanked the WTO Secretariat for its report (W T/TPR/S/130) which, along with Singapore's 
Government Statement (WT/TPR/G/130), provided a comprehensive review of Singapore’s trade 
policies and practices. 
7. The period since the last Trade Policy Review in 2000 had been tumultuous.  The Singapore 
economy grew by 9.7% in 2000, fuelled by growth in IT spending and the dot-com boom.  The bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001, the gene ral global economic slowdown and the systemic 
shock to the global airline industry from the 11 Sept ember attacks resulted in a recession.  This set the 
stage for a difficult year in 2002.  Nevertheless, the economy grew by 2.2%.  The growth trajectory 
was interrupted in 2003 by the Iraq conflict and SARS, which affected regional tourism.  Happily, the 
fourth quarter of 2003 saw renewed growth mome ntum which had carried into 2004.  GDP growth 
was robust at 7.5% in the first quarter of 2004, ma rking the third successive quarter of growth.  The 
Government expected GDP at 5.5%-7.5% and low inflation at 1.5%-2% in 2004. 
8. These positive figures were in no small part due  to Singapore's pr udent macroeconomic 
policies and a firm commitment to open trade.  Singapore was known as a stable, reliable and transparent place for business.  In 2004, the IMD ranked it the world's most competitive economy for 
countries with a population below 20 million while  the 2004 Index of Economic Freedom, called it 
the world's second freest economy.  But figures and ra nkings told only part of the story.  The global 
environment had changed fundament ally since 2000.  Many policies and expectations built around the 
New Economy had been retested in light of econom ic realities.  Start-ups now controlled their burn 
rate to demonstrate managerial competence;  in th e dot-com years, they had maximized their burn-rate 
to demonstrate their visionary potential.  However,  the central theme, that innovation and creativity 
were critical for long-term and sustainable grow th, remained sound.  The prospect of greater 
economic volatility also had to be taken into account , especially due to the threats posed by global 
terrorism, a key lesson of 11 September and 12 October. 
9. Hence, the period under review had been for Si ngapore a time of reorientation to the global 
environment.  To do this, it had thoroughly review ed the policies needed to make it as resilient and 
adaptable in the future, as in th e past.  This was the key objective of the Economic Review Committee 
(ERC), formed in 2002, which completed its work in 2003.  Most of its recommendations had been 
accepted and formed an integral part of Singapore's economic policy.  Singapore's road ahead 
required responses to two challenges:  to respond to accelerating globalization, and to mitigate the 
increased vulnerability of the economy, which was more  closely intermeshed and linked to the world. 
First Challenge – Accelerating Globalization  
10. Singapore envisaged an increased pace and de pth of economic globalization.  When it had 
adopted an export-oriented development strategy in  the 1960s, it was one of the exceptions rather than 
the rule.  Today, regardless of economic size, th e conventional wisdom was that exports were an 
important part of any country's developmental strate gy.  Similarly, virtually no country today would 
contemplate an economic strategy that did not incorporate to some extent, the free market.  Thus, what used to be a leisurely flying-geese formati on, had become an intense race to stay ahead.  
Singapore's response had been to accelerate economi c restructuring to remain competitive, and to 
ensure its integration with the rest of the worl d through deeper multilateral,  regional, and bilateral 
links.  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 5 
 
 
Accelerating the process of restructuring  
11. Human capital was an essential asset for any economy, especially for Singapore, which had 
no natural resources.  Singapore's wage reform po licy aimed to introduce wage flexibility and help 
companies respond to shorter business cycles and in creased economic volatility.  Through an effective 
tripartite system, the Government worked closely with employers and unions to implement a system 
where a larger portion of wages was variable and linked to individual and company performance.  A 
Workforce Development Agency had been establishe d to enhance the employability of the local 
workforce and the competitiveness of industries.  Th e approach was to encourage workers to acquire 
new skills and to target assistance to the needy without  undermining the incentive to work.   This was 
especially vital, given Singapore's lack of natura l resources except for the abilities of its workforce. 
12. Entrepreneurship was essential in an innovati on-driven economy.  To reward enterprise, 
Singapore was gradually moving to an indirect tax system, with low direct taxes on companies and individuals.  The public service would continue to promote a pro-business environment by actively 
soliciting business-related feedback on rules and regul ations and cutting red ta pe.  To make Singapore 
more conducive for business, the financial, tel ecommunications, and energy markets had been 
unilaterally liberalized.  In line with longstandi ng policy to promote competition and the regulatory 
experience built up from liberalizing specific sectors, a generic competition law would be enacted.  To 
ensure the right incentives for innovation, the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) was also 
being strengthened.  Singapore would accede to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phono graphs Treaty by the end of 2004, and to the 
International Union for the Protection of New Variet ies of Plants (UPOV) by the end of June 2004. 
13. These efforts were bearing fruit and enhanci ng Singapore's competitive strengths.  In  
manufacturing, they supported efforts to enc ourage companies to upgrade capabilities and move 
towards higher-value-added activities, while taking advantage of opportunities to extract synergies 
with their investments in south-east Asia.  By remaining open to foreign talent, despite difficult 
economic circumstances, Singapore had enabled r esearch facilities like Biopolis (built in 2003) to 
thrive and contribute to the biomedical sciences industry.  Biopolis provided space for biomedical 
R&D activities and a conducive environment for colla borative private and public research.  It also 
catalysed international collaboration, such as with the U.S. (the Regional Emerging Disease 
Intervention Centre), the U.K.'s Imperial College , and Germany's Max Planck Institutes.  These 
achievements showed the possibilities for mutually  beneficial global cooperation in biomedical 
research.  Singapore's open-door policy was also he lping it to develop globally competitive sectors in 
healthcare, education, and creative industries.  Growth in these sectors would create new opportunities 
in general services and new jobs for which th e Workforce Development Agency could retrain 
workers. 
Multiplying External Links 
14. With such an open economy, policy measures also  sought to address the external dimension.  
Thus, Singapore was promoting greater multilateral, regional, and bilateral in tegration.  A vigorous 
WTO that continued to promote global trade libera lization was an essential prerequisite for favourable 
growth.  Therefore, the WTO and the DDA remained Singapore's top international trade priority.  
Singapore had been active in the negotiations on non-agricultural market access (NAMA), anti-
dumping, trade facilitation, and services, tabling sever al papers and proposals.  In services, Singapore 
had made an initial offer, which it was prepared to  improve during the negotiations.  While it had no 
significant agriculture sector, Singapore recognized that the negotiations in agriculture were a 
centrepiece of the DDA and had therefore tried to play a constructive and br idging role.  Singapore's 
Trade Minister, George Yeo, had been the facilitato r for agriculture at the last three Ministerial 
Conferences.  In TRIPS, Singapore was one of the first WTO developing Members to declare that it 
would not avail itself of the paragraph 6 solu tion except in national emergencies or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.  Singapore would continue to play its part in ensuring the success WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 6  
 
of the DDA and was committed to working towards a favourable outcome at the forthcoming General 
Council meeting in July.  As July politically ma rked the end of the year for the negotiations, 
agreement on a good package before the summer br eak was essential to keep the DDA on track. 
15. Singapore also supported greater regional economic integration.  It participated actively as a 
member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC) forum, and the Asia Europe Mee ting (ASEM).  Of the three, ASEAN provided the 
deepest level of economic integration.  Toge ther with other ASEAN countries, Singapore was 
working towards an ASEAN Economic Community by  2020.  APEC and ASEM also included clear 
trade and investment dimensions.  They provided opportunities for members to deliberate on WTO issues, and feed these back to the Geneva process.  For example, in the run up to Cancun, two ASEM 
consultations on the DDA were held where frank exch anges of views took place.  At the recent APEC 
Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Trade held in  Pucon, Chile, APEC Ministers issued a statement 
on the DDA negotiations, affirming support for effort s to move negotiations forward, and outlining 
elements of the package that could be adopted at  the forthcoming General Council meeting in July. 
16. Bilateral FTAs had been concluded with Ne w Zealand, Japan, the European Free Trade 
Association, Australia, the United States, and Jord an, complementing regional integration efforts.  
The FTAs with Japan and the U.S. had been precurs ors to subsequent initiatives with ASEAN.  By 
strengthening external linkages, Singapore hoped to create an external wing for its economy and encourage its companies to expand their activ ities.  The Trade Development Board had been 
reorganized into International En terprise Singapore, to help Sing apore-based companies grow and 
internationalize successfully. 
Second Challenge – Increased Vulnerability  
17. The second challenge was one of increased vulnera bility due to increased economic linkages.  
As a node in global communications and commerce,  Singapore was acutely aware of the systemic 
impact of any disruption to these flows.  In recent years this had been amply demonstrated.  September 11 and SARS both disrupted internati onal air travel with consequences for global and 
regional tourism.  After the terrorist attack on the French tanker, Limburg,  off the coast of Yemen in 
October 2002, ships started to avoid Yemen, insu rance firms raised premiums and imposed war 
insurance.  With international trade in goods conduct ed largely by sea, the implications of a systemic 
disruption due to a terrorist strike were grave.  Internally, Singapore had learnt a lot from the 
management of such incidents.  National emerge ncy management systems had been adapted, while 
coordination across ministries, agencies, and the i ndustry had improved, enhancing the readiness to 
cope with new threats. 
18. However, national solutions on their own would not be sufficient to mitigate the risks to 
global trade.  For instance, the Singapore economy, like many others in the region, remained vulnerable to volatile oil prices.  In this r espect, Singapore recognized the importance of better 
regional and international cooperati on.  For example, Singapore and other countries recognized that a 
regional response to SARS was necessary to effec tively deal with the problem and to restore 
confidence.  Leaders from ASEAN, China, and th e region met in Bangkok quickly to adopt effective 
responses.  Similarly, APEC leaders had also endorsed measures to enhance trade security and 
minimize the threat of disruption to regional trad e.  Being at the crossroads of international 
commerce, Singapore was particularly conscious of this issue.  Like many other economies, it was 
dependent on international sea lane s.  It was therefore willing to wo rk closely with its neighbours and 
all stakeholders, to minimize any threats to mariti me traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 
19. As at self-governance, Singapore currently faced two key challenges.  First, an economic one 
– the Singapore of 1959 had to respond to fund amental changes in the economic environment 
including restructuring the workforce to go beyond si mply serving as a regional entrepot.  Second, a 
geopolitical challenge – the Singapore of 1959 f aced security threats from communists and racial  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 7 
 
 
extremists.  These challenges were eventually ove rcome, and in the process, Singapore grew as a 
nation and made economic, social, and political progr ess.  Singapore's short history had imbued in its 
people and institutions, collective instincts on how to adapt to changing circumstances.  It had also 
made Singaporeans acutely aware of how their fort unes were tied to global developments.  It was 
these instincts that would now be harnessed in e fforts to remain relevant in the years ahead. WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 8  
 
III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 
20. The discussant said that his point of departur e was one of lessons learned, and he had 
therefore looked for developments of potential inte rest to Members.  His comments were organized 
under three headings:  macroeconomic framework, tr ade and investment regime, and selected sectoral 
policies.  
Macroeconomic framework 
21. Singapore had been recovering well from the Asian financial crises but the first few years of 
the new millennium had not turned out as expected.  2001 was a dramatic year for growth, mirroring 
the fact that Singapore was among the world's most open economies.  With a global economic slowdown, and with its neighbours taking longer to  recover from the Asian crisis, external demand for 
Singapore's exports slowed.  The effects were compo unded by SARS and events in the Middle-East in 
2003.  Nevertheless, GDP growth of 3.5%-5.5% wa s expected in 2004, and possibly more, provided 
oil prices did not remain at their current histor ically high levels for long.  The recovery was 
impressive and proof of economic resilience.  Th e history of economic policy in Singapore showed 
that one of its characteristics was adaptability and adjustment to the changing global economic 
environment. 
22. In the medium term, Singapore was transf orming its economy into a knowledge-based one. 
Government policy was to continue to develop manufacturing and services as the twin engines of 
growth, which implied the upgrading of capab ilities and a move towards higher-value-added 
activities.  One of the key elements required was to also upgrade the workforce.  Investment in 
education showed a basic understanding of the importance of the labour force for economic 
performance.  This policy had resulted in a workfor ce at par with competitors like South Korea, Hong 
Kong, China and the United Kingdom, when it came to the share of the workfo rce holding a degree.  
However, the share of the workforce with little or no formal education below the secondary level was 
quite high and he wondered why, despite government investment in education.  He noted that the 
Workforce Development Agency was established in 200 3, and that was probably part of the answer. 
23. Singapore had one of the world's highest saving ra tes, averaging an impressive 45.4% of GDP 
during 1999-03.  Consequently, domestic investment had been high and contri buted to raising labour 
productivity to its present levels.  National saving greatly exceeded domestic investment, with the 
excess being invested abroad, mainly in ASEAN, Ch ina, India, and Australia.  Singapore was also one 
of the world’s top destinations for foreign direct investment (FDI), a position that many other countries would have liked to enjoy;  this had to be characterized as a formid able success.  However, 
being rich could have mixed blessings.  The Secr etariat Report suggested that capital productivity 
may have declined since 1994, posing a challenge  for long-term productivity and economic growth. 
24. Economic theory generally regarded competition as a way of improving the effectiveness of 
the economy.  The search for effective use of factors of production was one of the characteristics of Singapore's macroeconomic policy.  Policy at the microeconomic level had probably not been so 
visible and pronounced and the inten tion to have a competition law for that purpose was welcome.  It 
was notable that the law would apply to all co mmercial and economic activities by private sector 
entities, including government linked companies (GLCs), in all sectors unless there were exclusions and exceptions for public policy and interest reas ons.  Depending on the definition of "public policy 
and interest", this would hopefully also reduce diffe rences in analyses of the effect and role of GLCs. 
25. With regard to the challenge from ASEAN ne ighbours and other fast-growing economies, in 
particular in Asia, competition from low cost producers was most strong.  The pressure was therefore 
more intense in manufacturing, resulting in struct ural change and lower em ployment.  Improvements 
in the competitiveness of manufacturing were neces sary, especially by moving into higher-value-
added production.  Continued improve ment in labour productivity, which appeared to be high on the  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 9 
 
 
political agenda, would complement the policy and augured well for economic growth.  The intention 
to develop globally competitive healthcare, edu cation, and creative industries seemed sensible. 
26. Singapore had prudent fiscal policies and, by an d large, avoided counter-cyclical measures.  
To lower production costs, relative labour costs had been reduced through redu ctions in direct taxes 
with the lower income being compensated through increases in indirect taxes.  The policy was to 
reduce corporate and personal income tax rates to 20% by 2006, in response to the ERC report.  
Monetary policy, it appeared, had not changed duri ng the period under review.  Nevertheless, with 
high savings and a successful FDI policy, it was strange  that interest rates were relatively high.  He 
asked whether the relatively high ratio of public  debt to GDP had something to do with it. 
Trade and investment regime 
27. The discussant was tempted to call Singapore's tr ade policy rather dull, but as a very sincere 
complement.  As the previous discussant had not ed, Singapore was recognized for its open trade 
regime and vigorous support for the multilateral trading system, and it was not easy to find fault with its performance in relation to its WTO commitments and trade liberalization efforts.  The statement 
still held true.  However, a significant change wa s that Singapore had signed five FTAs (Japan, New 
Zealand, EFTA, Australia, and United States) an d was negotiating six new FTAs (Canada, Chile, 
India, Jordan, Mexico, and Korea).  He asked how this fitted in with its staunch support of the 
multilateral system. 
28. Singapore made little use of contingency measu res and all remaining anti-dumping measures 
had been removed on 21 January 2003.  He noted  and commended the position on safeguards.  Import 
restrictions applied mainly for environmental, h ealth, and public security reasons with the exception 
of rice, on which restrictions were for food security and price stability.  The picture for exports 
appeared to be similar.  There was a new body on standards, the Singapore Productivity and Innovation Board (SPRING Singapore), a statutory board under the Ministry of Trade and Industry.  It was encouraging that 75% of Singapore standards were aligned to international standards and he 
asked whether there was a policy to increase this ra tio.  As discussants before, he too was puzzled by 
the approach towards tariff binding s especially that unbound tariffs were found in HS chapters 25-97.  
Presumably this would end when the current round of  negotiations had been successfully concluded.  
He also asked whether the authorities had analys ed (for example, by using income and price 
elasticities) the effect of the high tariffs and consequently high alcohol and tobacco prices on 
consumption. 
29. All ASEAN countries had different schemes for attracting FDI, including various incentives.  
Singapore's track record suggested that the it was doi ng better than fair in fulfilling its goals.  It had 
also started liberalizing FDI policy in services,  which, according to the Government, had been 
beneficial for costs.  For example, internationa l call rates had fallen by 60-80% since the telecom 
sector was fully liberalized.  He asked how the G overnment foresaw further services liberalization. 
Selected sectoral policies 
30. Deregulation and liberalization of  utilities had reduced costs, creating the basis for increased 
competitiveness.  Singapore’s experience in the el ectricity and telecommunication sectors had shown 
impressive results;  the negotiations on services could benefit from studying this concrete illustration.  
Liberalization was also proceeding in other sectors, like banking and insurance, and he was interested 
in learning more about these.  With regard to GLCs, he understood that Government policy was to 
liberalize and divest and to in crease transparency, and he asked  for further details.  Increased 
competition was considered to improve the effici ency of an economy, but not in all cases and 
circumstances.  Developments in th is regard were of interest to Me mbers, and he looked forward to a 
response to questions posed. WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 10  
 
31. He drew attention to labour market policy developments especially the recommendations of 
the Tripartite Taskforce on Wage Restructuring, which were made public in 2003.  He asked for 
further details on the follow-up to these recommenda tions, given that they had a bearing not only on 
individual sectors but also on the competitiveness of the whole economy.    WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 11 
 
 
IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY 
32. Members praised Singapore on its economic refo rms, which had been continued despite a 
number of external shocks including the Asian fi nancial crisis, a global ec onomic slowdown in 2001, 
and the effects of the SARS crisis and events in the Middle East in 2003.  Singapore's economy had shown remarkable resilience to these shocks, in part due to sound macro economic policies and its 
openness to trade and investment.  Some Members al so remarked that despite the external shocks 
Singapore had not resorted to protectionism but , on the contrary had continued its economic 
liberalization programme.  They also noted Singapo re's active participation in WTO and its strong 
support of the multilateral trading system despite  having signed a number of bilateral free-trade 
agreements since its previous Review in 2000.  Se veral Members were also appreciative of the role 
played by Singapore in the WTO since its inception, most notably the bridge-building activities of 
Singapore's Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr. George Yeo, in chairing the negotiations on 
agriculture, and of Ambassador Menon in the TR IPS Council.  A number of Members raised 
questions in writing and appreciated written respon ses provided by Singapore.  They believed that 
Members could learn from Singapore's experiences. 
33. The representative of Japan
 noted the close and amicable partnership in many areas between 
the two countries.  Both were actively collabora ting in regional fora, such as APEC, ASEM and 
ASEAN+3.  APEC trade Ministers had released a Ministerial Statement on 5 June 2004 to move the Doha negotiations expeditiously forward.  Singapore was one of Japan's most important economic 
partners.  In fact, the agreement for a ne w-age economic partners hip (JSEPA) signed in 
November 2002 between Japan and Singapore, whic h entered into force in November 2002, was 
Japan's first bilateral agreement for economic pa rtnership.  The JSEPA contributed to reducing 
economic barriers a nd to promoting economic partnership and linkages between the two countries in a 
comprehensive manner, in trade and also in area s such as investment, intellectual property rights, 
financial services, information and communication t echnology, and human resources development.  It 
also complemented and reinforced the multilateral tr ading system.  Japan believed that it would have 
a significant impact in creating more attractiv e markets and revitalizing the two economies. 
34. Japan had very few specific points to raise.  As one of the most important centres for financial 
transactions in the world, Singapore was encouraged to further liberalize financial services.  Japan 
was puzzled by recent measures subj ecting foreign reinsurance compan ies to several conditions, such 
as authorization and deposit since 1 January 2004.   Additionally, in th e case of ceding, foreign 
reinsurance companies were subj ect to more severe conditions than domestic companies under the 
risk-based capital regulations.  He hoped that su ch regulations conformed with GATS commitments 
on market access and national treatment.  Japan be lieved Singapore would improve these measures in 
the current round of negotiations and was paying atte ntion to the liberalization of financial services 
under Singapore's FTA with the United States.  Japan believed that nati onality requirements for 
lawyers should be abolished and joint projects between foreign and domestic lawyers should be 
initiated in order to facilitate such services.  Re garding government procur ement, Japan welcomed 
Singapore's participation in the GPA and hoped fo r further policy improvements.  He reiterated 
Japan's hope that, through this review exercise, Singapore would continue to maintain an open and 
active policy and contribute to move the current  negotiations forward in a constructive manner. 
35. The representative of Colombia
 praised the exemplary nature of Singapore's economy, which 
was based on competitiveness and efficiency resulti ng from consistent macroeconomic policies, its 
openness to international trade, and aggressive polic y of providing incentives for foreign investment.  
It was not always possible in the short and medium te rm to consolidate a strategy to benefit from such 
comparative and competitive advantages as Singapo re had, but it had succeeded in becoming an 
important destination for FDI and exporter of high  value-added manufacturing products and services, 
permitting the development of an efficient economy based on exports as the engine of growth.  
Industrial policies that had sought to improve in frastructure, promote i nnovation and technological 
change, in industry and services, were worthy of  further study and emulation.  Although Singapore's WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 12  
 
economy depended to a considerable extent upon extern al markets, its policy orientation had made it 
possible to overcome the adverse effects of the As ian financial crisis in 1998, the slowdown in world 
economic growth in 2001, and the SARS virus, r esulting in a sharp economic recovery in 2003. 
36. Singapore was also supportive of the multilateral trading system and the Doha Development 
Agenda.  Colombia was happy to see further libe ralization through bilateral agreements with 
important trading partners, and the deepening of ex isting regional trading agreements.  This showed 
support for and complementarity between FTAs and th e multilateral trading system.  Bilateral trade 
between Colombia and Singapore was not very signifi cant.  Singapore exported five fold Colombia's 
exports to Singapore.  Furthermore, imports from Singapore were rising and were increasingly 
concentrated in industrial products especially basic ch emicals, textiles, and machinery and equipment.  
Colombia's exports were mainly light industrial pr oducts, including animal fur and skin, and leather, 
as well as tropical goods and coffee.  She believed that there were other market segments in which trade could be improved.  For Colombia, it was im portant to learn from, and draw on, Singapore's 
experience in areas such as the production of high- value-added goods and services, resulting from its 
industrial policy. 
37. The representative of Canada
 said that Singapore was an 'A student' when it came to the 
openness of its economy to trade.  Given its high pe r capita GDP, however, he questioned its status in 
the WTO as a developing country and suggested that it would be worth discussing how countries labelled their respective economies.  Singapore’s econom y had remained strong in the face of external 
and internal pressures and had become more open, pred ictable and generally more transparent.  It had 
responded well to the demands of an increasingly globalized world with a commitment to remove 
multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade barriers.  Canada was pleased that it had remained steadfast 
in fulfilling its WTO obligations and was moving fo rward on privatization, anti-dumping, competition 
policy, and trade facilitation.  Nevertheless, a si gnificant proportion of tari ffs remained unbound, and 
where bound rates existed they were substantially hi gher than applied rates.  Canada was therefore 
pleased to hear in the NAMA, that Singapore a dvocated increasing bindings to 100% and narrowing 
the gap between applied and bound rates. 
38. Canada was concerned by the amount of state in tervention in the economy and its lack of 
transparency.  Canada was pleased to see the re cent disinvestments by Temasek of GLCs, and a 
speech by Madame Ching, the CEO of Temasek, on 13 February 2004, disclosing Temasek’s investment record for the first time ever, and an nouncing plans of "opening up and demystifying 
Temasek".  Transparency and a commitment to ensu ring that the principles of most favoured nation 
and national treatment were respecte d were central to WTO interests.   Canada looked forward to the 
adoption of a wide-ranging competiti on law that applied to private sector companies and GLCs alike.  
Canada also appreciated learning more about Singa pore’s strategy for managing the decline in total 
factor productivity (TFP), as cited in the Secretariat’s report. 
39. Singapore continued to play an active role in  the APEC forum, ASEAN and ASEM.  It had 
expanded its portfolio of bilatera l FTAs significantly since its last Review and had initiated several 
others, including with Canada.  Six rounds of ne gotiations had been completed thus far and Canada 
was hopeful of a successful resolution of the remain ing issues so that a high quality, comprehensive 
agreement, with tangible benefits for both sides, could be concluded.  Ca nada looked forward to 
continuing to work with Singapore to advance the multilateral agenda. 
40. The representative of the United States
 was pleased to participate in the TPR of Singapore, 
not just because of Singapore's longstanding suppor t for the multilateral trading system, but also 
because, Singapore was a very important tradi ng partner.  The U.S. applauded Singapore's 
demonstrated commitment to opening markets for tr ade, development, and economic opportunity, in 
addition to its active role in the campaign to adva nce openness, democracy, and the rule of law.  
Singapore was one of the most open economies in the world and its consistent efforts to open markets 
through multilateral, regional, and bilateral initiatives had enhanced its own competitiveness and that  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 13 
 
 
of its trading partners.  Singapore's deep integr ation into the global economy – its merchandise trade 
was three times its GDP – had helped to make it a prosperous nation, with a per capita GDP in 2003 
of over S$38,000 (about US$23,000).  The openn ess had helped Singapore to weather financial 
turmoil in recent years and the Government's initiati ves to inject additional vigour into the economy, 
including by divesting more of its holdings in GL Cs, reflected sound and flexible economic policies. 
41. Robust and growing economic, trade and cultura l ties between Singapore and the U.S., which 
were enhancing employment opportunities for both countries.  Reflecting this positive and growing 
trade relationship, the U.S. was proud to have Singapore as its first Asian FTA partner.  As 
Ambassador Zoellick had said, the FTA with Singa pore was an excellent, comprehensive agreement 
that broke new ground in services, an area of gr eat importance for both economies, and intellectual 
property protection.  Bilateral trade between the two economies had increased significantly over the 
past decade.  Singapore was currently the 13th largest trading partner of the U.S. with around US$32 
billion in two-way goods trade and US$8 billion in bilateral services trade each year.  These numbers 
could grow significantly with the implementati on of the FTA.  The U.S. was Singapore's second 
largest export market, taking in roughly 15% of Si ngapore's exports, while Singapore was the U.S.'s 
10th largest export market – impressive ranki ng considering that Singapore was only around 
650 square kilometres in size.  The expanding  commercial relationshi p went beyond goods and 
services to FDI, where U.S. and Singapore companies were important investors in each others' markets – so important that the stock of U.S. FDI in Singapore more than doubled between 2001 and 2002. 
42. At the WTO Singapore was one of the most e ffective advocates of, and role models for, 
global trade liberalization.  The U.S. did not ag ree with Singapore's position on all the DDA issues, 
which made for a good negotiation, but drew attent ion to, and applauded, Singapore's proactive and 
creative approach to finding mutually beneficial so lutions at pivotal points in the negotiations.  She 
recalled Minister Yeo's speech in Cancun urging Me mbers to keep the Doha negotiations on track 
because they were the best way to reap the benefits of trade liberalization.  He also urged Members to 
show greater respect for one another's positions and find creative ways to accommodate different 
interests, a message worth keeping in mind as efforts were made to pull togeth er a package for July. 
43. Further improvements could be made, including in intellectual property rights enforcement 
and liberalization of specific services.  Singapore was making progress on some of these and she applauded actions taken to further liberalize serv ices, including by easing ownership limits in key 
sectors like telecommunications.  The U.S. delegati on welcomed efforts to enact an economy-wide 
competition law and to reduce the influence of GLCs, initiatives that could go a long way in 
promoting the flexibility and competitiveness of th e economy.  She noted that a period of public 
comment on the draft competition law had just ende d and asked about the process to be followed from 
this point, as well as plans to further divest  the Government from corporate activities. 
44. Given the enormous volume of imports, exports, re-exports a nd trans-shipped cargo handled 
by Singapore, the U.S. was interested in learni ng more about its experience with trade facilitation – 
specifically the extent to which Singapore had been able to capture efficiencies from streamlined and 
modernized customs procedures.  Members were approaching an important decision on trade facilitation and there would be benefits from he aring Singapore's experiences in this regard. 
45. Having noted Singapore's openness to trade and de ep integration into the global economy, 
which made it an attractive partner in regional a nd multilateral agreements, the U.S. believed that 
bilateral and regional initiatives coul d be building blocks for multilateral liberalization;  she asked for  
an update on progress in other FTAs, including tho se being negotiated jointly with ASEAN partners. 
46. The United States considered Singapore to be a dynamic, open economy and a strong and 
dedicated supporter of the multilateral trading system.  Its openness to trade and deep integration in 
the global economy had helped to make it an important  trading partner and the questions posed by the WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 14  
 
U.S. reflected the scope and depth of this relations hip.  As a close friend and ally of Singapore, the 
U.S. shared a common interest in expanding global  economic growth and prosperity through trade.  
As part of this effort, the U.S. looked forw ard to working with Singapore on strengthening the 
multilateral trading system, expanding and improving bilateral trade, and proactively solving trade 
problems when they arose.  
47. The representative of Argentina
 noted that the importance of external demand for Singapore’s 
economy was an obvious sign that the external envir onment had an effect on the evolution of total 
factor productivity, but the accompanying fall in capital productivity raised questions about 
Singapore’s industrial policy and its fu ture orientation.  In this context, it was interesting that the 
authorities had queried the role of the State in the economy, noting that significant improvements in 
the functioning of product and factor markets requi red less state intervention and participation in non-
strategic sectors.  Argentina also noted the E RC's recommendations on long-term strategy and the 
need to promote structural reform in order to improve competitiveness, entrepreneurial capacity and 
economic diversification. 
48. Argentina recognized Singapore’s efforts to ma intain an open trading system and its support 
for the multilateral trading system, especially its  commitment to, and participation in, the Doha 
Development Round.  Since its last TPR Singapore had concluded several FTAs.  While this might 
satisfy the concept of open regionalism and, in gene ral, was compatible with rights and obligations 
under the WTO, she was interested to know Sing apore's opinion about the interrelationship, both 
positive and negative, between its multilateral, regional, and bilateral trading relationships. 
49. Argentina maintained excellent and cordial relations with Singapore and shared a common 
will to increase bilateral links, in particular thr ough trade.  Argentina had recently received the 
Singapore Trade and Industry Minister Mr. Yeo;  Argen tina considered this visit to be important as it 
was a concrete means to explore alternatives and in struments permitting greater dynamism in bilateral 
relations, and also between Singa pore and Latin America in genera l.  Argentina attached great 
importance to FOCALAE (Framework for a Forum fo r Dialogue and Co-operation between East Asia 
and Latin America), created in 2001 on the initiativ e of the Prime Minister of Singapore, for dialogue 
between Latin American and Asian countries.  He noted , that as bilateral trade levels had not attained 
their potential, Argentina intended to give this special  priority both bilaterally and sub-regionally as 
expansion would be of mutual  benefit to all concerned. 
50. The representative of Australia  welcomed recent signs of stronger economic growth in 
Singapore for 2004, forecast at around 5%.  During the period late 2000 to late 2003, Singapore's 
economy was beset by weak conditions in key markets, and a sharp fall in global electronics demand, 
due to a range of external factors.  GDP gr owth in 2003 was only 1.1%, so the rebound in 2004 was 
significant.  Australia also welcomed Singapor e’s continued support for an open, rules-based, 
multilateral trading system under the WTO.  Si ngapore had concluded a number of free-trade 
agreements (FTAs), including with Australia, sinc e its last Review.  The Singapore-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement (SAFTA), which entered into force in July 2003, would contribute towards a 
stronger bilateral economic partnership.  Singapor e was Australia’s eighth largest trading partner 
overall.  In 2003, Australian merchandise exports to Singapore were A$3.5 billion and imports from 
Singapore were valued at A$4.46 billion.  Services were an important part of bilateral trade. 
51. Given continued uncertainty in the global ec onomic environment, Australia encouraged 
Singapore to continue its reforms to increase comp etitiveness and transparency .  He welcomed plans 
to introduce a competition law and to establish th e Competition Commission of Singapore (CCS).  To 
further enhance the effectiveness of the proposed legislative regime, Singapore was encouraged to 
apply the law to all business entities, regardless of ow nership, industry, or f unction, to establish a 
stronger culture of competition in the economy.  Australia shared common interests with Singapore across a range of areas, including non-agricultural ma rket access, services and trade facilitation.  He  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 15 
 
 
looked forward to continuing to work closely with  Singapore and other trading partners to fully 
realize the potential economic and deve lopment gains inherent in the DDA. 
52. The representative of Hong Kong, China  noted many common features between Singapore 
and Hong Kong, China, including being city-based economies in east Asia and among the most open 
trading economies in the world.  Both also pursued liberal trade and investment policies and promoted 
trade liberalization in the WTO and in APEC.  Close economic relations were therefore natural.  In 
terms of trade, both ranked fifth with regard to each  other, with bilateral trade growing by over 17% 
in 2003.  In 2002, Singapore was the seventh larg est source of inward FDI in Hong Kong, China and 
the eighth largest destination of outward FDI from Hong Kong, China.  
53. Singapore's tariff was remarkably liberal with zero tariffs on all but six lines, relating to 
alcoholic products.  It had bound 69% of its tari ff and the simple average bound rate was 7.5% in 
2003.  Nevertheless, bound rates for agriculture were  relatively high, with some above 11%.  Hong 
Kong, China was encouraged by Singapore's proposal in the WTO NAMA negotiations to 
substantially reduce or eliminate its bound tariff ra tes.  Singapore's sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
policy was stringent, with "high risk" products (m ainly dairy products, livestock, poultry, fish and 
shellfish) imported only from accredited establishm ents from a limited number of countries.  While 
recognizing Singapore's rights and needs to protect  human, animal, and plant life and health, he 
encouraged it to review SPS controls wherever possi ble to facilitate a freer flow of these products. 
54. Hong Kong, China appreciated Singapore's efforts to introduce full competition in 
telecommunications in April 2000, two years ahead of sch edule.  All direct and indirect foreign equity 
limits on public telecommunications services had been  lifted.  However, these improvements were not 
yet reflected in Singapore's initial services offer and he encouraged Singapore, one of the advocates of 
trade liberalization in telecommuni cations, to commit this autonomous  liberalization in its improved 
offer.  In maritime transport, Singapore did not ha ve restrictions on foreign participation in shipping 
and port services;  and he hoped that it would broaden its GATS commitments, especially in 
passenger and auxiliary services, not included in exis ting commitments, to reflect its liberal regime. 
55. He was pleased to note the establishment of the Government Electronic Business System 
website, on which government procur ement tenders and pre-qualificati on information was published.  
Hong Kong, China shared Singapore's view on the importance of using electronic technology to 
enhance transparency and efficien cy in government procurement.  He noted Singapore's vigorous 
pursuit of bilateral FTAs, having concluded six since its last Review, in 2000, and currently 
negotiating others.  Some of its FTA commitment s went beyond those undertaken in the WTO, 
notably in GATS and TRIPS.  While congratulatin g Singapore on its successful FTA negotiations, he 
hoped that Singapore would continue to actively suppo rt the multilateral trading system and to ensure 
that its FTAs would be used as building blocks for further multilateral trade liberalization.  
56. The representative of the European Communities  said that Singapore had shown that strong 
willingness to succeed was an important ingredient  towards increasing growth and prosperity.  
Singapore had obtained a strong global reputation for its commitment to the multilateral trading 
system and the general openness and success of its ec onomy.  Events since its last TPR confirmed that 
that reputation remained well deserved.  The EC  continued to regard Singapore not only as an 
important trading partner but as a country with whom it shared a number of important views, 
including on the benefits from further market ope ning and strengthening of rules governing trade.  
The close cooperation in the context of inter regi onal cooperation between the EC and ASEAN and in 
ASEM, was another reflection of their c onstructive and positive trading relations. 
57. Singapore had progressively liberalized and opened its markets to trade over a relatively short 
period of time, while fostering democracy, respect for the rule of law, and putting in place a strong, 
transparent and predictable regulatory framework.  Through the turbulence of the Asian crisis, 
international terrorism and SARS, the Singapore Government had shown that a stable political WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 16  
 
situation and continued reliance on market opening could make an im portant contribution to stability 
and economic recovery, also in such extraordinar y circumstances.  While Singapore had long been 
regarded as an economic success story, it nonetheless,  faced several policy challenges including to 
maintain its recovery and address competitive pressur es to restructure and develop new industries.  
The EC was encouraged by the new strategy introduced to meet this  challenge.  Measures to improve 
competitiveness, encourage private initiative and en trepreneurship, strengthen the service economy, 
promote investment, and further attract and retain  foreign workers with the required skills were 
important elements of reform and continued efforts would be vital for meeting the challenge. 
58. Recent liberalization in telecommunications appear ed to have brought benefits for the wider 
economy, with consumers and i ndustry benefiting from greater competition among suppliers and 
lower prices.  Liberalization in banking and insura nce had also occurred and he was interested in 
learning more about their effects and plans to take  these reforms forward.  The EC also welcomed 
Singapore's intention to enact a generic competitio n law and establish an independent competition 
authority, and was interested in plans in this ar ea.  This gap had been among the concerns expressed 
by the EC at the last TPR of Singapore. 
59. The EC agreed with Singapore that a number of issues in the DDA would be beneficial for 
developed and developing WTO Members, and success should be a top priority.  While liberalization 
of industrial and non-industrial products, and services, would increase growth and prosperity to a 
degree, the full benefits could only be derived by strengthening the rules and regulatory framework in 
parallel.  It could be argued that what Singa pore was advocating in the WTO was the pursuit of 
sustainable development, economic growth, and pros perity in a similar manner to its own successful 
national approach.  While market opening would have  taken it further down the road of growth and 
prosperity, the combination of market opening with strengthening of governance, the rule of law, and 
the regulatory framework had ensured that Singapore had gone even further. 
60. Singapore had signed a number of bilateral FTAs since its last TPR.  To the EC, bilateral and 
regional trade arrangements, compatible with th e rules and obligations of the WTO, could be 
important tools for promoting trade.  While bilate ral FTAs yielded some bene fits, greater benefits 
could be derived from deeper re gional economic integration and c ooperation, although these could not 
replace the benefits of global trade, given that multilateralism remained the most certain way to 
promote the interests of Singapore and of other c ountries.  From this perspective, the EC was 
interested in understanding Singapore’s pursuit of regional integration and recently concluded FTAs, 
and how Singapore proposed to ensure that its re gional agreements were genuinely "WTO-plus" in 
content and supportive of efforts to advance libera lization and rule making at the multilateral level. 
61. Many developing countries might require greater preferences and assistance to preserve or 
even obtain, for some, a relatively limited share in the benefits of global trade.  The EC looked 
forward to working with Singapore to provide the necessary structural framework for these weaker 
and more vulnerable countries to follow the same pa th and enjoy some of the prosperity achieved by 
Singapore, by giving them a stronger chance to e ngage in global trade.  The EC was pleased by 
Singapore's progress;  per capita GDP in recent years had been close to or even higher than that of the 
EU's 25 members.  This sustained success made Singapore an interesting case in terms of achievement of growth and prosperity, from whic h other countries could learn.  While Singapore’s 
achievement was based on several ingredients, th e combination of market-opening and strengthening 
of rules seemed to have been part of the founding mixture. 
62. The representative of Switzerland
 noted Singapore's constructive contribution to the variety of 
views and opinions expressed in the WTO, thus enri ching the discussion in order to find a balanced 
outcome.  Singapore's principle priority, despite recently signing a number of FTAs, remained the 
WTO and the DDA.  Singapore's active pursuit of bilateral, regional, and multilateral economic 
agreements reflected its integration in the worl d economy and its openness to international trade and 
foreign investment.  Switzerland shared Singapore's view that trade liberalization allowing additional  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 17 
 
 
commitments to those undertaken in the WTO st rengthened the multilateral trading system.  He 
thanked the head of Singapore's delegation for the comprehensive overview on Singapore's economic 
recovery after the difficulties of the previous tw o years, underlined by the Government's positive 
growth forecast of 3.5%-5.5% in 2004.   
63. Economic relations between Switzer land and Singapore were excell ent and had prospered.  In 
merchandise trade Singapore was Switzerland's most im portant trading partner in south-east Asia.  
Singapore represented Switzerland's most important destination for FDI in Asia, with accumulated 
FDI of Sw F 14.3 billion (3.5% of total Swiss FDI).   Switzerland regularly ranked among the top ten 
sources of FDI in Singapore.  Bilateral economic re lations, in general, a nd predictability in law 
enforcement would be further improved by the FTA signed between Switzerland (as a member of 
EFTA) and Singapore on 26 June 2002,  which entered into force in the beginning of 2003.  The FTA 
stipulated trade liberalization in industrial goods, rules on market access for services, protection for 
investors and investment as well as of intellectual property rights. 
64. Switzerland attached importance to adequate  and effective intellectual property rights 
protection, which was a prerequisite for attr acting investment and encouraging research and 
development.  The Report suggested that Singapo re's regime protected undisclosed information 
among private parties only.  Switzer land wondered how the legislati on ensured that undisclosed test 
or other data submitted to the responsible state ag ency for marketing authorization of pharmaceuticals 
or agricultural chemical products was protected ag ainst disclosure and unfair commercial use.    
65. The representative of the Philippines, on behalf of ASEAN,  noted Singapore’s status as an 
important trading partner in the ASEAN region.  In 2003, ASEAN absorbed 25% of Singapore’s 
exports compared to 19% in 1999, and this interdep endence would continue to grow.  Together with 
Singapore, ASEAN had begun to look beyond its frontie rs and was pursuing trade agreements with 
China, Japan, and India.  Since its last TPR, Si ngapore had experienced str ong economic recovery due 
to its sound macroeconomic  policies and openness to international trade.  While the global economic 
slowdown had affected its performance so that GDP  fell by almost 2% in 2001, and despite the 
negative effects of SARS and events in the Mi ddle East in 2003, the immediate and medium-term 
prospects appeared to be more promising.  Grow th was expected to pick up to around 3.5%-5.5% in 
2004;  he was confident that this favourable pe rformance would continue well into the future. 
66. Singapore had already fully bound 69% and par tially bound 1.55% of its tariff lines.  
However, since its last Review, Singapore had bound 100% of its tariff lines in agriculture and 63.8% 
for non-agricultural products including petroleum;   ASEAN applauded this unilateral initiative.  
ASEAN also commended Singapore for lifting its only  anti-dumping measures, on steel reinforcement 
bars, and its restraint in using trade remedies.  Singapore did not have safeguards legislation. 
67. The importance of services was evident from the growth of Singapore's services exports from 
32.4% of GDP in 1999 to 33.6% in 2003.  Liberali zation had also taken place in several services.  In 
banking, the domestic retail banking sector had been  opened and restrictions were removed on FDI 
and entry into the insurance sector.  ASEAN comm ended Singapore for these efforts.  ASEAN was 
also pleased that liberalization had taken pl ace in other sectors since the last Review.  
Telecommunications had been liberalized in 2000, two years ahead of schedule.  Reforms had also 
taken place in electricity generation and distribution,  which had resulted in lower electricity prices. 
68. Singapore had made changes to its in tellectual property regime including, inter alia,  
extending copyright protection to the life of the author plus 70 years, measures against the 
circumvention of technologies protecting copyright wo rks, and had acceded to the Madrid Protocol on 
the registration of marks.  Based on its experience in sector-specific competition policy, Singapore was now planning to implement a wide ranging competition law by 2005.  ASEAN saw a positive outlook for Singapore in the coming years although there were a number of challenges ahead.  For 
example, Singapore would need to address slow T FP growth, mainly due to a decline in capital WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 18  
 
productivity.  In this regard, Singa pore would need to continue and accelerate its move towards 
higher-value-added activities. 
69. The representative of New Zealand
 noted that Singapore, like New Zealand, had been 
disappointed by the slow pace of world trade libera lization at the multilateral level and had sought to 
maintain growth and liberalizati on through bilateral and regional tr ade initiatives.  New Zealand was 
the first country to sign a bilateral FTA with Si ngapore.  The Closer Economic Partnership Agreement 
came into effect in January 2001 and covered a comprehensive range of goods and services.   In 
July 2004, the second review of the agreement would be looking to deepen its scope and 
effectiveness.  Since 2001, Singapore had signed  several other bilateral FTAs and was currently 
negotiating new FTAs with eight countries.  In addi tion to its bilateral FTA agenda, Singapore was 
party to a number of regional negotiations under the rubrics of ASEAN, APEC, and ASEM, making 
Singapore a strong contender for the title of current FTA champion.  New Zealand commended Singapore’s active role in ASEAN in pressing for enhanced regional trade and economic linkages 
with the group’s closest trading partners, such as China, Japan, and India, and with ASEAN’s other 
Dialogue Partners.  New Zealand welcomed the pr ospect of ASEAN commencing negotiations with 
New Zealand and Australia to secure an AFTA/CER FTA. 
70. Singapore’s high level of dependence on external trade made it a natural ally of the WTO’s 
rules-based multilateral trading system.  New Zeal and shared the Singapore Government's assessment 
that its principle priority remained the WTO a nd the DDA.  Despite this, there were sectors of 
Singapore's economy and the labour market that would benefit from further international competition.  
As the Secretariat had pointed out, several services ha d yet to be liberalized and restrictions remained 
on the registration of foreign professionals such as medi cal staff, lawyers, and architects.  As one of 
Singapore’s FTA partners, New Zealand took a particul arly close interest in this.  New Zealand was 
studying the draft Competition Bill, which the Gove rnment of Singapore had recently made available 
for consultation.  In principle, New Zealand welc omed its introduction and especially the fact that 
GLCs like the Temasek conglomerate would be s ubject to the proposed new legislation.  New 
Zealand looked forward to working further with Si ngapore, bilaterally, in regional fora and in the 
WTO, to help it achieve its objective of becoming "a leading global hub of talent, enterprise and 
innovation".  It was important to have models such as Singapore, wh ich showed that a small country 
without a natural resource base could turn gl obalization into a strategic opportunity.  
71. The representative of Chinese Taipei
 noted that Singapore had been promoting a competitive 
economy through a combination of prudent macroec onomic policies and a well targeted programme 
of restructuring and autonomous liberalization, mu ch of it designed to encourage entrepreneurship.  
According to some recent evaluations Singapore was the world's most competitive economy in its 
population category and the world's second freest economy, both achievements well deserving of 
congratulations.  Singapore was Chinese Taipei's sev enth largest trading partner with average annual 
two-way trade in 2003 close to US$8.8 billion.  Th e structures and trade regimes of Singapore and 
Chinese Taipei were quite similar and complimented each other in many ways, and there was 
potential for further strengtheni ng bilateral economic relations. 
72. Chinese Taipei was interested in two specific areas.   First, he wished to learn more about the 
operations of GLCs.  These companies were active in a wide range of sectors and represented a major feature of Singapore's dynamic economy.  Howeve r, Chinese Taipei had concerns about the 
Government's role in GLCs and whether this coul d have an adverse effects on the competitiveness of 
the market.  Second, on services, he asked about th e rationale of certain requirements that appeared 
more restrictive for foreign suppliers, and th e possibilities of relaxing some of them.  
73. The representative of Indonesia
 said that Indonesia's relations with its neighbour and ASEAN 
partner, Singapore, were good, particularly with respect to trade and investment.  Indonesia was happy that both countries had su ccessfully increased their bilateral relations and that Indonesia was 
one of Singapore's ten biggest trading partners.  Singapore, with its open trade and macroeconomic  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 19 
 
 
policy, had made a tremendous achievement in incr easing its external trade by 9.6% in 2003 as well 
as services exports, which grew from 32.4% of GDP in 1999 to 33.6% in 2003.  Singapore's binding of 100% of its tariff for agriculture and 63.8% for non-agriculture showed its strong commitment to 
the multilateral trading system. 
74. Indonesia noted on page 6 of the Government Report, regarding growth in merchandise and 
services, and page 12 of the Secretariat Report, th at Singapore's exports rose by 4.8% and imports by 
7%.  The total value of Singapore's exports and imports in 1999 through 2003 were given in tables in 
both reports.  Indonesia asked for clarification whet her these data included merchandise trade between 
Singapore and Indonesia, and if so, how Singapo re reconciled these data with data from other 
countries, since data on merchandise trade between I ndonesia and Singapore were not reported in HS 
Codes and IDB format.  On page 112 of the Secr etariat Report, regarding the status of selected 
notifications to the WTO, Singapore's notification to the IDB in 2002 and 2003 were not included.  
Indonesia wished to know why and whether Singapor e had already notified bilateral trade data for 
2002 and 2003 to the Market Access Committee under its obligations to the IDB.  If not, Indonesia 
strongly urged Singapore to do so in its next notification, for the purposes of transparency.  
75. The representative of Brazil
 noted that Singapore's heavy dependence on export markets had 
made it vulnerable to the global economic slowdown, and by the emergence of SARS and the events 
in the Middle East in 2003.  This had had a nega tive impact on the country's ability to continue its 
process of rapid recovery between 2000 and 2003.  R ecent improvements in the external environment 
now seemed to suggest favourable prospects for the Singaporean economy, whose expected growth 
for 2004 was between 5.5% and 7.5%.  This recovery  was also evident from bilateral trade flows, 
which dropped in 2003 by almost 30% but seemed to have  recovered in the first four months of 2004.  
Brazil would follow with interest Singapore's efforts to  deal with the longer run challenge of a lack of 
TFP growth, and competition from low-cost regional co mpetitors.  Singapore, one of the world's most 
competitive economies, was on the cutting edge, r eassessing its development strategy and making 
necessary structural changes to r ecover stable economic growth.  He noted the high proportion of 
unbound tariff lines, which seemed at odds with  its generally liberal trading regime. 
76. The representative of Venezuela  congratulated Singapore for its policy and reforms to ensure 
greater competitiveness and efficiency in a global economy, which provided many challenges.  Venezuela and Singapore shared excellent bilate ral trade relations.  In the period 1990-2003 
Venezuela enjoyed a positive credit balance, its main  exports being minerals  and fishery products.  
Venezuela hoped to increase and diversify its exports further. 
77. The representative of Turkey
 noted that since its previous Review, Singapore had maintained 
sound macroeconomic policies, with prudent fiscal, monetary and wage policies, resulting in high 
savings and strong external indicators.  Singapore had further liberalized FDI policy in services in 
addition to its liberal regime in manufacturing.  The implementation of a general competition policy 
had been one of its major policy reforms and improve ments had been made in IPRs and standards.  
While there was strong potential in economic and commercial relations with Singapore, there had 
been a recent decline in bila teral trade, from US$468 million in 1997 to US$230 million in 2003.  
Trade and FDI between the two countries was curren tly negligible and he hoped it would increase.  
Turkey had received reports from Turkish companies a bout rising transportation and logistical costs, 
and fees levied on some services.  Turkey was pleased, however, that anti-dumping measures on steel reinforcement bar exports to Singapore had been te rminated.  By further reducing the role of the 
public sector through GLCs, and by increasing its logi stical infrastructure, Singapore could maintain 
its successful record as a dynamic east Asian ec onomy.  He asked how Singapore viewed its policies 
on FTAs with regard to the multilateral trading system.  
78. The representative of India
 noted that the period under review had been challenging for 
Singapore and it welcomed the marked acceleration in Singapore's recent growth, which was 
indicative of a renewed surge in its long-term co mpetitive economic strength.  This success followed WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 20  
 
a period of economic restructuring and the launching of major long-term policy initiatives.  India and 
Singapore were close neighbours and shared a ri ch and diverse relationship.  The economic 
relationship was a small part of a wider relationshi p based on a shared regional history and geography.  
Singapore was one of India's most valued economic partners and accounted for some 30% of its trade 
with ASEAN.  Bilateral trade of around US$3 b illion in 2002/03, represented a 25% growth over 
2001/02.  Singapore had also been a growing source of FDI for India, especially in high growth 
sectors such as telecommunications services. In May 2003, India and Singapore had begun negotiations on establishing a comprehensive economic  co-operation agreement, including trade in 
goods and services, investment, and other areas of ec onomic cooperation.  The negotiations were at an 
advanced stage and India was hopeful of conc luding the agreement in the near future.  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 21 
 
 
V. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE AND ADDITIONAL 
COMMENTS 
79. The representative of Singapore  thanked the Chairperson, the discussant, and Members for 
their comments and questions.  Singapore appreciat ed the discussant's complimentary description of 
Singapore's trade policy as ‘dull’, and New Zealand’ s struggle to find questions.  The discussant had 
noted that the TPR was a good opportunity to reflect and learn.  In that regard, Singapore appreciated 
Members' questions, as these had prompted Singapore to think more deeply about the issues. He had grouped his responses under the themes of economic e nvironment, trade and investment policies, and 
sectoral policies.  The responses to Members' questions were being circulated. 
Economic environment  
80. He thanked Members for expressing confidence in Singapore's policies to respond to the 
changing environment.  The United States and the EC  had been very kind to describe Singapore as a 
model of open trade, effective governance and the rule  of law.  This was what Singapore was striving 
towards because it believed it would bring prosperity . He agreed with Canada's characterization of 
Singapore's policy as a combination of free spirit an d pragmatism.  Singapore's test of a policy was 
whether it worked and not whether it fitted well with  theory.  While academic theories were examined 
in considering policy options, real world outcomes de pended on a more complex interplay of factors.  
Hence Singapore looked constantly at the actual be haviour of economic players and what actually 
worked. 
81. On total factor productivity (TFP), the S ecretariat Report had highlighted Singapore's 
declining TFP, positing a link with the need for structural reform and raising questions about 
Singapore's industrial policy.  During preparations fo r the TPR report, Singapore had explained why it 
did not see this as a core issue.  In response to questions raised by Members he said that TFP was an 
important concept and critical to long-term economi c growth.  But its measurement was fraught with 
difficulties and depended on what and how it was me asured.  While some had written about declining 
TFP, used by the Secretariat as a central point, an IMF study in 2004 showed that if investment in 
education and training of its workforce were acc ounted for, previous studies had underestimated TFP 
growth in Singapore.  Properly adjusted, TFP grew  by about 1.6% between 1990 and 2003.  Similarly, 
Singapore's own study showed that if housing w as discounted (which, given the high home-ownership 
levels, accounted for a significant share of the stoc k of capital), TFP growth would have been 1.6%.  
He cited these to caution against judging a country 's economic policy on the basis of a few academic 
studies.  As policymakers it was their respons ibility to examine other evidence and realities. 
82. He highlighted two further points.  First, the Singapore economy, as many had noted, was 
very open.  Singapore was virtually tariff free and sel dom used contingency measures.  Investment in  
manufacturing, where most of the capital stocks were accumulated, was open.  Companies in 
Singapore therefore faced strong international competi tion, which kept them efficient and productive.  
If they had misused the capital, they would have b een driven out of business sooner or later.  Second, 
in today's world, capital was highly mobile, with i nvestors free to move to earn the highest return, a 
key lesson from the Asian financial crisis.  Declini ng capital productivity did not square with the fact 
that many investors, both local and multinational, we re continuing to invest in Singapore in a wide 
range of sectors.  Singapore was host to over 6,000 MNCs. 
83. Nevertheless, Singapore's commitment to struct ural reform was strong, not because of the 
TFP debate but because it believed globalization w ould accelerate and competition would intensify.  
So the sooner Singapore made adjustments and moved in to a different niche, the more likely it would 
succeed.  For that reason, the ERC had sought the active participation and expertise of over 1,000 people, principally from the private sector. WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 22  
 
84. Several Members had questions on GLCs.  It was useful to look at the historical context in 
relation to what was happening today.  Unlike th e major world economies, where industrialization 
began over 200 years ago, Singapore started late, only in the 1960s, as a trading post.  To jump-start 
industrialization, the Government had created co mmercial entities in sect ors that were key to 
Singapore's economic development.  But unlike many  state-owned enterprise s elsewhere, the GLCs 
were subject to full commercial disciplines from the beginning.  While the Government had a share in 
their capital, it did not interfere in their daily ope rations.  The companies ha d to meet obligations 
under the Companies Act and were fully subject to th e operations of the market.  Many of them were 
listed on the Stock Exchange and their shares were held  by international investors.  They were subject 
to strict reporting requirements and detailed investor scrutiny.  Over the last year, Temasek had 
divested 12 companies and had made a commitment to divest non-strategic GLCs.  But it would not 
make sense to set an artificial d eadline to dispose of these GLCs as this would simply depress prices 
and destroy value.  Singapore did not thi nk this would be responsible public policy. 
85. He thanked Members for their interest in  the Competition Bill.  The first round of 
consultations had been concluded, with the second r ound expected to be held in the coming weeks.  
The Bill was expected to be introduced in Parliament  before the end of 2004 and to come into force in 
early 2005.  Singapore's basic position on competition remained unchanged, and it believed there was 
strong competitive pressure as the market was open.   Where there had been significant absence of 
competitive pressure, for example, in the former telecommunications monopoly, sectoral policies to 
deregulate and liberalize had been adopted and a regime to regulate competition put in place.  Some Members also found it significant that GLCs woul d be subject to competition law.  This was 
consistent with Singapore's governance philosophy for the GLCs. 
86. The discussant
 commended Singapore’s pragmatic approach to its successful economic 
policy.  He asked about Singapore's approach to lab our market reforms.  This was also an area of 
great interest to others trying to find a solution to the same problem.  He noted that wage reform had 
been ongoing for several years in Singapore in orde r to introduce flexibility.  It was a bold policy 
which he hoped would be successful.  Encouragi ng workers to make a transition by acquiring new 
skills and targeting assistance to the needy withou t undermining the incentive to work was of great 
importance and seen by many as appropriate.  Howeve r, it was a very challenging task and one that a 
number of developed countries were trying to solve.  He was interested in hearing more about how the 
policy was being implemented, how far Singa pore had come and what challenges it saw. 
87. The representative of Singapore  said that the labour market re forms took two forms.  One was 
wage flexibility, because it was important for wages to adjust quickly to changing economic 
circumstances and to the performance of individual co mpanies.  So the less rigid the labour market 
was, the more wages could respond to changes and the more easily people could move between jobs, 
the easier it would be to make adjustments to cha nges.  Singapore expected more changes because it 
was much more linked to the global economy.  As part of the ERC’s recommendations, Singapore had 
cut contributions to the central provident fund from 40% to 33%, allowing companies to set wages 
according to market conditions.  Maintaining the 40% c ontribution rate created rigidity in the system.  
Efforts were also being made to increase the variable component of wages.  Of Singapore's 
employers, the Government had probably one of the largest variable wage components.  Of his own 
salary, for example, about 50% was variable a nd dependent on his performance and that of the 
economy.  He hoped this component c ould be increased across the economy. 
88. The second part of the reforms related to labour force skills.  In an economy facing 
accelerating globalization, it was important for workers to be able to acquire new skills and to adapt 
and learn.  The first aspect focused on people still at school.  In this "pre-employment" education 
there had been a number of reforms in the school system.  The Ministry of Education had launched a 
programme called "thinking school, learning nation" a bout 3-4 years ago, the idea being to reduce the 
'learning of content' and to move towards the 'l earning of learning'.  In other words it encouraged 
critical thinking, creativity, and the use of IT, to  encourage individuals to become self-motivated  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 23 
 
 
learners and to allow them to acquire new skills al ong the way.  The education system had also been 
improved considerably over the years so that out of every cohort of babies born today, about 25%-
30% would have university edu cation and above 40% would have  polytechnic education, which 
focused on technical and other skills.  Thus, over 65% of new entrants to the labour force would have 
completed their higher education.  In addition, 20%  attended technical institutes for specific technical 
and vocational skills.  Post employment training was given to those already in the labour force. 
89. Singapore had also been working to change  its labour force profile.  Despite rapid 
industrialization, and an increase in per capita GD P, there remained about 400,000 workers with less 
than primary education and it was a big challenge to  retrain this group.  Re training had occurred for 
some over the years through cooperation between the unions, technical institutes, etc. but this was a 
constant struggle.  Singapore had therefore never re garded itself as "having arrived" because of this 
profile, which was not as good as that of develope d economies.  The Workforce Development Agency 
was set up to coordinate post-employment training,  to increase skill levels and enable the workforce 
to move between jobs easily if they were retren ched.  Some of the training schemes were tied to 
looking for jobs and others tried to match training  with demand in the industry.  Thus, these were two 
complementary approaches, one to make sure the labour market and wages were flexible, and the 
second to upgrade skills and capabilities to prepare t hose at school for the future and to make the 
workforce employable and enhance their skills. 
90. The discussant  asked whether the current strength in o il prices created inflationary pressures.  
Noting that inflation had been quite low for some  time, he said that high oil prices may fuel 
inflationary expectations. 
Trade and investment policies 
91. The representative of Singapore  remarked that many Members had asked how Singapore 
reconciled its bilateral and multilateral policies.  Th is was also a theme that had emerged during its 
previous TPR.  Singapore saw the bilateral, regi onal, and multilateral tracks as complementary and 
synergistic.  The top priority was the WTO and Singapore was fully committed to the multilateral 
process because it was highly dependent on trade.  The rules-based multilateral trading system 
provided a predictable environment for all economi es.  This was especially important for a small 
economy like Singapore's, which saw no substitute fo r the multilateral system.  Thus, Singapore did 
its best to be a constructive player at the WTO, a fact noted by many Members.   
92. Four years ago Members had asked if FTAs were  building blocks or stumbling blocks for the 
multilateral process.  He was struck by how the di scussion had moved forward since then.  Many in 
the WTO, as well as at APEC and ASEAN, believed that FTAs could be complementary, and serve as 
building blocks, to the multilateral process.  Singa pore believed that FTAs could be building blocks if 
they were WTO-plus (going beyond WTO commitments ), WTO-consistent (cove ring substantially all 
trade) and open to others prepared to make the same commitments.  Singapore's experience in 
negotiating FTAs had taught it a few lessons.  First,  FTAs could set high benchmarks, and served as a 
controlled experiment, allowing deeper liberalization with a willing partner.  Both could learn in the 
process, and as they got used to a higher level of  liberalization, this could serve in multilateral 
negotiations.  Second, the process of negotia ting FTAs strengthened Singapore's capacity to 
participate in multilateral negotiations.  In doing one's "homework" on each others' internal positions, 
and in seeking to understand the FTA partner's re gime and sensitivities, one gained a deeper 
appreciation of the complexities faced by one's partners  and the trade-offs that needed to be made.   
93. Singapore was glad that its FTAs served to s timulate broader regional integration within 
ASEAN and between ASEAN and its major partners .  ASEAN was working on an ASEAN Economic 
Community.  It was negotiating FTAs with China, Japan, and India, and undertaking joint studies with South Korea.  The U.S. had an Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI), while the EU had a Trans-
Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative or TREATI.  FTAs also permitted one to explore new areas WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 24  
 
involving the strengthening of rules.  As the EC had said, strengthening the rules and regulatory framework allowed fuller benefits from liberalizatio n and the EC would be heartened to learn that 
Singapore's FTAs sought to provide such a framewo rk.  Finally, many of Singapore's FTAs also 
encompassed many areas of economic cooperation.  The FTA with Japan, for example, was a new-age 
partnership involving co-operation in  IT, education, and other areas.  So too was the comprehensive 
closer economic cooperation agreement cu rrently being negotiated with India. 
94. On tariffs, several Members had noted th e discrepancies between Singapore's bound and 
applied tariffs and wondered if it in tended to narrow the gap in terms of scope and depth.  Others had 
also asked if Singapore would be extending its FTA services commitments to the rest of the WTO 
Membership.  The short reply was yes.  In the hope that multilateral negotiations yielded the most 
ambitious outcomes possible, Singapore would be pr epared to consider new commitments under the 
GATT and the GATS within the current round of negotiations, if others would do the same.  
Singapore had proposed that Members bind 100% of tariff lines in the NAMA negotiations.  This would be equivalent to the 100% binding for ag ricultural products during the Uruguay Round.  The 
actual rates would have to depe nd on the modalities for tariff reductions agreed by Members.  
Singapore would continue its activ e and constructive participation in the DDA services negotiations.  
It was among the few countries to have tabled an initial offer in response to requests made, and he 
looked forward to offers by Members to reach a su ccessful outcome to the negotiations on services. 
95. On the question of increasing the percentage of st andards aligned with in ternational standards, 
he said this was in Singapore's interest especially in  light of its small domestic market.  The policy 
was to adopt international standards, where possible.   If no international standard existed or if it was 
inappropriate, Singapore would adopt an overseas  standard.  A Singapore standard would be 
developed only if even overseas standards were in appropriate.  On the stringency of its SPS measures, 
he noted that Singapore imported nearly all its food  and a diversified supply provided it with greater 
variety.  It even imported chicken wings from as far away as Brazil.  SPS st andards were therefore 
constantly being reviewed and as long as health  concerns were met, Singapore encouraged food 
imports from as many sources as possible. 
96. The discussant,
 noting New Zealand’s remark that Si ngapore was the current FTA champion, 
said that this was impressive, especi ally if its FTAs were really WTO-plus.  Looking at Singapore's 
economic performance over the last 3-4 years, there had been ups and downs but no resort to protectionist measures.  On the contrary, steps ha d been taken to liberalize several service and other 
sectors and he invited Singapore to share its expe riences in this regard.  He believed it extremely 
important for the development of the multilateral tr ading system that Singapore was able to pursue 
such a policy.  Singapore had been commended for st eps taken on intellectual property but questions 
had been raised regarding the authorities' enforc ement powers.  He invited Singapore to share its 
views on this.  He also commended Singapore's active and creative role in the ongoing DDA 
negotiations and noted that Singapore was willing to ma ke new commitments if others did so.  He was 
impressed by the system of obtaining export perm its through the TradeNet system from Singapore 
Customs and that such a declaration could be comp leted within ten minutes in 90% of cases.  He 
asked how Singapore achieved this a nd why the permits were required. 
97. The representative of Singapore
 said that Singapore had continued to liberalize despite recent 
weaker economic performance because liberalizatio n and competition were the way to proceed and 
that the greater the competition, the more firms would have to compete to be efficient, productive, and 
innovative whether in manufacturing or services.  T hus, during the Asian financial crisis and after, 
Singapore had undertaken studies to determine which areas to inject greater competition in.  As the 
economy was relatively open, this effort had been  easier, because economic players knew that they 
would not be protected and would have to face international competition. 
98. To enforce IPRs, Singapore had introduced a number of new pieces of legislation because it 
believed that IPR protection was the key to being i nnovative.  However, legislation in itself was of  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 25 
 
 
little value if improperly enforced and therefore Si ngapore took enforcement very seriously.  One very 
positive factor was that by enlarging its enforcemen t agencies, Singapore had had a very clean record 
on enforcement.  He believed that Singapore ha d been ranked high in its enforcement against 
corruption etc. making enforcement more effective th an it would otherwise have been.  Singapore had 
an intellectual property enforcement branch in the police force.  A number of offences carried 
criminal sanctions and the police had full investig ative powers.  There were others with civil 
sanctions.  By and large the police took its job ser iously, and because it was en forced by the police, 
everyone took it seriously. 
99. On trade facilitation, Singapore believed that an efficient system reduced business costs and 
improved the predictability and efficiency of the logistics industry, a key industry in Singapore.  
Efficiency was achieved through the use of IT and all traders were linked to the central system.  Good 
inter-agency cooperation ensured that informatio n requested was transmitted simultaneously to 
13 agencies;  any objection by these agencies would be  transmitted back within a second.  Except in a 
small number of cases requiring additional investiga tion, the response was based on risk profiling that 
allowed a quick response.  He hoped that the system could be improved. 
Selected sectoral policies  
100. On sectoral policies, the representative concentrated on professional and financial services, 
which had attracted significant attention.  Severa l Members had asked about legal services using the 
word "restriction", which Singapore believed was not accurate.  Singapore had a relatively liberal policy for home-country, third-country, and interna tional law, with 63 foreign law firms and more 
than 500 foreign lawyers in Singapore – a significant presence, considering there were only 
3,500 local lawyers.  Foreign lawyers were also  permitted in joint law ventures and formal law 
alliances between local and foreign firms to give advice on Singapore law relating to banking, 
finance, and corporate law.  This allowed law firms to provide "one-stop" services.  Australia felt that 
this scheme had not delivered benefits but those par ticipating in it did not agree.  Singapore welcomed 
Australian firms to form joint law ventures or formal law alliances with Singapore law firms. 
101. With regard to financial services, liberaliza tion had been conducted in the context of a sound 
regulatory framework, with rigorous supervision by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS).  
Despite the financial crisis, Singapore had pressed ahead, as competitive pressure was important for stimulating progress.  It was also important to br oaden and deepen Singapore's capital markets and to 
use competition to promote innovation and efficiency in its financial institutions.  Singapore also 
moved from prescriptive regulation to a risk-focused supervisory approach, wh ich was particularly 
significant in encouraging a more innovative financ ial services sector.  The programme, announced in 
1999, was implemented over five years.  Singapore had increased foreign pa rticipation in domestic 
banking progressively, bearing in mind that sound prudential supervision and strong domestic banks 
were critical to the financial system's resilienc e and stability.  Progress would be reviewed before 
deciding on further liberalization. 
102. With regard to broader sectoral liberalizati on, the liberalization of telecommunications, 
energy, and financial services was based on the expe riences of other jurisdictions to which Singapore 
was grateful for sharing their experiences.  In energy, vertically integrated monopolies were broken 
into their competitive segments – electricity genera tion and retailing.  The transmission grid was a 
natural monopoly and had to be tightly regulated.  Less ons were learnt from regulators in the U.S., the 
U.K., Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, and Sing apore appreciated their sharing their experiences 
generously and warning Singapore of any pitfalls .  One key lesson was to ensure a good regulator 
who understood the market's complexity a nd was firm in enforcing competition. 
103. The discussant
 noted and commended the number of cha nges that had taken place in sectoral 
policies since the last Review.  Nevertheless, this  was probably the area where the largest number of 
questions had been raised.  Singapore's reforms had aimed to increase efficiency in the economy and WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 26  
 
in individual sectors, which was commendable.  Ho wever, a comparison of sectors showed different 
degrees of liberalization.  He asked about ideas on how to liberalize other sectors of the economy as 
well, for instance tourism, which was an important sect or also regionally.  He also asked about further 
liberalization in banking and other sectors, and he  sought confirmation that the Government was 
reducing its involvement in the economy. 
104. The representative of Canada
 said that in response to a question on tax incentives, Singapore 
had clarified that a financial institu tion had to carry out a substantive level of activity in Singapore to 
be eligible.  He asked for a defin ition of "substantive level of activity".  He assumed that the intention 
was to avoid a mail-box company but would appreciate clarification. 
105. The representative of Indonesia  appreciated the responses to questions raised by Indonesia.  
However, since Singapore did not include bilateral me rchandise trade data in its trade statistics, and 
since Indonesia was one of Singapore's ten largest tr ading partners, the stat istics appeared to be 
incorrect.  Correct data were needed not only by  the two countries concerned, as a basis for trade 
policy making, but also by other WTO Members.  Indonesia also believed that the two years required 
for publishing the data was too long and requested clarification on this delay. 
106. The representative of the European Communities  recognized the mutual benefit of proceeding 
in parallel on market access liberalization and the st rengthening of rules.  Singapore's response to the 
EC's question on the Integrated Sourcing Initiative (ISI) under the U.S.-Singapore FTA, gave rise to 
an additional question on how the Government or the Customs authorities ensured that the products 
concerned actually originated from the specifi c Indonesian islands and not from elsewhere in 
Indonesia, since there appeared to be no specific orig in criteria other than that the products had to be 
shipped out of the port of Singapore.  He also asked what actions Singapore was taking to assist 
LDCs.  Singapore had mentioned in its response that  it provided technical assistance to LDCs.  The 
EC believed that Singapore's experiences had lessons for both developed and less developed 
countries.  Finally, he asked how it was possibl e to use information technology to disseminate 
customs information within 10 minutes to 13 or  more government agen cies and how Singapore 
ensured that a response would be provided within  10 minutes.  In his experience of dealing with 
bureaucracy, he would be very pleased in some case s to get a response within ten days and perhaps 
other administrations, including those of de veloped countries, could learn from Singapore. 
107. The representative of Australia  said that from Singapore's responses it appeared that, on 
average, licence applicants received facilities-ba sed licences within eight weeks and their services-
based licences within four weeks.  He wondere d whether the authorities published in advance any 
time periods within which applicants could expect to  receive their licence.  On Singapore's response 
that interconnection was based on a referen ce interconnection offer and access was based on 
interconnection related services, he asked how prescrip tive these rules were and to what extent there 
was discretion for the incumbent to negotiate terms of access.  This affected the extent to which 
foreign applicants could negotiate access on reasona ble cost-oriented and non-discriminatory terms. 
108. The representative of Singapore  confirmed that the time period within which applicants could 
expect to receive their telecommunications licence s was published in advance as were interconnection 
access details.  All consultation documents affecting the players were also put on the IDA website for 
comment.  He recalled reading in the newspape rs in 2003 many occasions when these documents 
were put up for consultation.   
109. On the EC's question about the ISI, Singapore w ould provide a written response.  On why and 
how Singapore got its officers to respond in 10 minutes,  he noted that a number of the processes were 
automated and certain procedures had already been worked out in advance.  For those requiring 
urgent manual intervention, these could be address ed by telephone.  On training and assistance to 
LDCs, Singapore was a very small economy and its resources limited;  but within these limits it did its best to share the lessons it had learned in differe nt fora.  ASEAN integra tion had been initiated for  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 27 
 
 
new members.  On a broader level, the Si ngapore Cooperation Programme had trained some 
200,000 officials from various parts of the world over the last ten years.  Singapore also participated in other fora, such as APEC and ASEM, which also provided training assistance. 
110. On Indonesia's question, the agreement on bilate ral trade data was signed by leaders from the 
two countries in 1974 and it was only in 2003 that th e Indonesian Government indicated that it would 
like the data to be published.  The intervening period was some 30 years.  Singapore had also decided 
to accede to the World Customs Organization and a lot of work was required to prepare the data.  He 
therefore did not believe that two years was unreasonable but if there were specific questions, they could be raised separately.  On Canada's question,  the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) would 
provide a written response. 
111. Responding to the discussant's question on sectoral liberalization, he confirmed the intention 
to move to greater openness, to liberalize as many sect ors as possible and to deepen this liberalization.  
For banking and financial services, the key concern was prudential because of its systemic impact on 
the economy and the regulator had to be satisfied  that prudential requirements had been met.  
Singapore had also undertaken a number of studies and a review was ongoing.  Other sectors such as 
tourism and IT were almost completely open, but each sector would be looked at  systematically.  
Singapore's FTAs allowed it to examine concerns a nd what needed to be done to stimulate greater 
openness and competition.  In the process, a number of other sectors had been liberalized.  These 
efforts would be continued as Singapore be lieved it was the way to move forward. 
112. He confirmed that Government involvement in  the economy would be reduced for the simple 
reason that the economy had developed over the years,  and there was a bigger pool of better educated 
Singaporeans, many of whom were starting busi nesses and providing entrepreneurial drive.  
Singapore was therefore promoting entrepreneurship and he hoped it was succeeding in its efforts.  
An inevitable part of the process was that the Gove rnment's role in the economy would be reduced.  
The Government was actively encouraging companies from all the over the world, both big and small, 
to operate and compete in Singapore and he believed the policy direction was quite clear. 
Conclusion  
113. To conclude, the representative of Singapore
 expressed his appreciation for remarks by Japan, 
Canada, the U.S., Australia, the EC, and India c oncerning Singapore's contribution to the WTO and 
the DDA.  Given the importance of the WTO, he reiterated that Singapore was fully committed to playing its part.  He also thanked his ASEAN colleagues for their positive comments.  He also 
thanked the representatives of Colombia, Argentina,  Venezuela, Brazil, Chinese Taipei, Switzerland, 
and Turkey for their warm comments and for expressi ng the desire to develop closer economic links 
with Singapore.  Singapore looked forward to e xpanding economic relations with these countries. WT/TPR/M/130 
Page 28  
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
114. We have had a most informative and construc tive discussion of Singapore's trade policies and 
practices.  The discussion benefited greatly from the valuable contributions made by Permanent 
Secretary Heng Swee Keat, and his delegation, by our discussant, Ambassador Eirik Glenne in leading the discussion today, and by Members of the TPRB.  Several Members have also thanked 
Singapore for its efforts in facilitating multilateral trade discussions, especially in the areas of TRIPS 
and agriculture.  
115. This, Singapore's Fourth Trade Policy Review , has demonstrated that its economy remains 
one of the most open to international trade and inve stment.  This openness, in great part, has helped 
Singapore weather recent economic s hocks, such as the Asian financial crisis and more recently the 
global economic slowdown, which was compounded by the SARS crisis and events in the Middle 
East.  Members commended Singapore's continuing reforms aimed at promoting a competitive economy that is globalized, entrepreneurial and di versified in the face of these shocks.  Some 
Members sought further details on the nature of th ese reforms, especially efforts to enhance wage 
flexibility, employment and training, and to address th e challenge of an apparent  recent decline in 
total factor productivity although I have noted Singapore's comments in this regards. 
116. Members noted that with international trade amounting to about three times GDP, Singapore 
remains committed to a rules based multilateral trad ing system.  Several Members, however, noted the 
number of bilateral free-trade agreements Singapore has signed since its previous Review and asked how it reconciled this trend with its participation in the multilateral trading system.  Members urged 
Singapore to maintain its participation in current  WTO negotiations.  The representative of Singapore 
stressed his country's commitment to the multilatera l trading system and responded that its bilateral 
FTAs are "WTO-plus" and could contribute to furthe r multilateral trade liberalization.  Singapore was 
also actively participating in the current WTO negot iations and would do its utmost to ensure their 
success. 
117. Members raised questions about certain aspect s of Singapore's trade policy, including:  
customs procedures and trade facilitation;  the diffe rence between bound and app lied tariff rates;  the 
use of specific duties;  import licensing policies, par ticularly with regard to rice;  standards;  and 
Singapore's relatively stringent SPS policy.  Questions  were also raised about Singapore's government 
procurement procedures and the enforcement of in tellectual property rights.  It was noted that 
Singapore's use of contingency measures is relatively limited.   
118. Since restrictions to international trade are rela tively few, Members were mostly interested in 
Singapore's recent and ongoing domestic reforms.   Several Members welcomed Singapore's 
announcement of an economy-wide competition policy to  be put in place over the next few years.  
While noting that some reforms ha d been carried out with regard to government linked corporations 
(GLCs) held by the Government holding comp any, Temasek, Members sought further details on inter 
alia "demystifying Temasek", GLCs and their furt her disinvestment, measures to ensure fair 
competition between them and other private sector co mpanies, as well as efforts to reduce government 
involvement in the economy.  Questions were also raised with regard to tax and non-tax incentives 
and the sectors in which they are  currently concentrated. 
119. With regard to services, Members noted majo r reforms, especially in telecommunications, 
and banking and insurance services.  They noted that liberalization of telecommunications services in particular, has resulted in benefits for consumer s and encouraged Singapore to continue further 
reforms in other sectors as well.  Further details we re requested on banking a nd insurance, transport, 
audio visual services, professional services, and tour ism.  Some Members also requested information 
on Singapore's GATS Schedule.  WT/TPR/M/130 
 Page 29 
 
 
120. To conclude, I would like to thank the Singapor e delegation on its oral  and written responses 
provided during the meeting and once again to congratulate Singapore on being an exemplary Member of the WTO and for its efforts in helping us to better understand its trade-related policies.  
Our discussions have also helped us to appreciat e the significant challenges facing Singapore today 
and the Government's measures to address these challenges. 
__________