RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTCP/M/17
26 June 2002
(02-3552)
Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition Policy
REPORT ON THE MEETING OF 23-24 APRIL 2002
1. The seventeenth meeting of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy took place on 23-24 April 2002, under the Chairmanship of
Professor Frédéric Jenny.
2. As had been agreed at the informal meeting of the Working Group on 27 February 2002, the
agenda for the Working Group’s meeting consisted of the following items:
- elements contained in paragraph 25 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  In
particular, focused attention was given to support for progressive reinforcement of
competition institutions in developing countries through capacity building;
- technical assistance and capacity building, as called for by paragraph 24 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration;  and
- other business, including stocktaking of national experience and legislation.
3. At the outset of the meeting, the Chairman shared his understanding regarding the
relationship between the first and second agenda items.  He stressed that this was a personal view only
and was not binding on delegations in any way.  The first item, which was based on paragraph 25 of
the Doha Ministerial Declaration, dealt with the issue of support for progressive reinforcement of
competition institutions in developing countries through capacity building as an element to be
clarified by the Working Group, as part of its work programme in the period leading up to the Fifth
Ministerial.  In respect of this item, the Working Group's task was to reflect further on and clarify the
issues associated with reinforcing the role of comp etition agencies in developing countries, something
which had already been under consideration in the Group for the past couple of years.  The seconditem, on the other hand, was based on paragraph 24 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
Paragraph 24 indicated that Ministers recognized the needs of developing and least-developed
countries for enhanced support for technical assistance and capacity building in this area, including
policy analysis and development so that they might better evaluate the implications of closer
multilateral cooperation for their development policies and objectives, and human and institutionaldevelopment.  To this end, it called for work to be undertaken in cooperation with other relevant
intergovernmental organizations, including UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral
channels, to provide strengthened and adequately resourced assistance to respond to these needs.
Thus, in paragraph 24, the issue of capacity building was dealt with not as an item for clarification by
the Working Group with reference to reinforcement of  the role of competition agencies in developing
countries but with a particular focus on activities to be undertaken for the purpose of assisting
developing and least-developed countries to "better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral
cooperation for their development policies and objectives", as well as on human and institutional
development.  He noted, as well, that this item was not framed solely as a task for the WTO
Secretariat to undertake on its own.  Rather, paragraph 24 referred specifically to work to beundertaken "through appropriate regional and bilateral channels", and in cooperation with other
relevant intergovernmental organizations.  As he understood it, therefore, agenda item B provided theWT/WGTCP/M/17
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Working Group with the opportunity to monitor progress on activities undertaken pursuant to
paragraph 24 of the Declaration, whether undertaken by the WTO Secretariat, other
intergovernmental organizations and/or by Members acting through bilateral and regional channels.
I. ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 25 OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL
DECLARATION, WITH FOCUSED ATTENTION ON SUPPORT FORPROGRESSIVE REINFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION INSTITUTIONS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THROUGH CAPACITY BUILDING
4. The representatives of Romania, Canada
, the European Community and its member States ,
the United States, Japan , Egypt , Thailand , Korea  and Australia  introduced written contributions
relevant to this item (documents WT/WGTCP/W/181/Rev.1, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189 and
190, respectively).  In addition, as had been requested by the Working Group at its informal meetingon 26 February, the Working Group had before it a background note by the Secretariat (document
WT/WGTCP/W/182) on the topic, which aimed to provide a synthesis of the issues raised and points
made by Members on the subject of support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions
in developing countries in previous meetings of the Working Group.  The representatives of
the Czech Republic; Costa Rica
; Ecuador ; Guatemala ; Honduras ; Hong Kong, China ; India ; Jamaica ;
Jordan; Malaysia ; Morocco ; Norway ; Pakistan ; the Philippines ; South Africa ; Switzerland ; and
Trinidad and Tobago made oral statements or posed questions on this item and representatives of the
OECD provided an update on relevant activities of that organization.
5. With regard to capacity-building needs and the challenges and difficulties encountered in
implementing competition policy in developing and transition countries,  the representative of
Romania, introducing document WT/WGTCP/W/181/Rev.1, said that in the twenty-first century, both
rich and poor countries faced a new challenge of globalization, including a changing economic
environment in which know-how and information had replaced labour and even capital as key sources
of competitiveness.   The current environment was simultaneously competitive and cooperative.  To
answer the challenge, a system was needed that could both regulate and liberalize, a system thatfacilitated fair and sustainable development and that provided for interconnections between
governments, markets and civil society.  In order to protect the benefits that had been gained in terms
of opening markets, it was essential that companies not be allowed to enter into restrictive agreements
or abuse their market power.  Moreover, increasingly, the work of competition authorities was
transnational in scope.  During investigations, there was the problem of obtaining information from
other jurisdictions and after a decision had been made, there was the problem of enforcing the
decision.  International agreements included subs tantive competition rules and/or provided for
cooperation between competition authorities.  Such agreements enabled coordination of enforcement
activities and an exchange of views on issues such as markets and possible remedies.  Cooperation
had worked well in merger cases but in non-merger cases, there had been less cooperation.  In the
current environment, there was a valid case for the WTO to negotiate and conclude a multilateral
agreement on trade and competition policy.  Effective competition policies and regulatorymechanisms were an important part of the governance framework of States.  In the absence of an
explicit competition policy, there was a risk that the competition process might be obstructed or
distorted by the actions of private parties or by the State itself.  Furthermore, competition policy
contributed greatly to advancing not only the national economy but also the global economy as a
whole.  It was a necessity for all, including developing countries.  Accordingly, his delegationwelcomed and affirmed two results of the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference:  placing the needs and
interests of developing countries at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in the Ministerial
Declaration and recognizing the need for a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of
competition policy to international trade and development.  An essential related element was
recognition of the need for enhanced technical as sistance and capacity building in this area as was
done in the Doha Declaration.  Building trust in market forces and promoting understanding of the
contribution of competition policy to sustainable economic development were major challenges.
However, when countries with successful experience s in competition law joined these efforts, theWT/WGTCP/M/17
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prospects for success were much greater.  The same held true for designing a framework of
competition policy that was suitable for each country’s specific economic situation.  Technical
assistance was only one of various interrelated forms of international cooperation that were
contemplated in the Doha Declaration.  Furthermore, it was important to note that programmes were
more efficient if they were based on effective partnerships between the donor and the beneficiary.The diversity of companies’ behaviour and the complexity of relations established on international
markets were raising new challenges for international cooperation in the competition area.  The
elaboration of common approaches to competition policy and cooperation between competition
authorities on real cases would enhance the contribution of competition policy to international trade
and development.  The elaboration of a multilateral framework on competition policy in the WTO had
been widely discussed.  The fundamental objective of technical cooperation was to assist recipient
countries in their understanding and implementation of agreed international economic rules, ensuringtheir full participation in the multilateral tradin g system and a lasting beneficial impact on the
recipient country.  In sum, there was a growing n eed for access to information, transfer of competition
policy know-how, competition advocacy, removal of barriers to entry, elimination of bottlenecks in
key network sectors, etc., which could only be met through increased cooperation including in the
WTO.
6. The representative of Thailand, introducing document WT/WGTCP/W/188, indicated that her
delegation considered that the reinforcement of competition institutions was indeed vital for the
effective implementation of competition law.  Thailand had passed a competition law in 1999 which
replaced the former Price Fixing and Antimonopoly Act 1979.  It had already established an office of
Trade Competition Commission which currently reside d in the Department of Internal Trade and the
Ministry of Commerce.  It was a new body with a rather unfamiliar mandate.  Two cases had been
considered by the Commission since it had been established, one involving alleged excessive pricing
by a cable television monopoly and another involving tied selling of beer by a whisky monopolist.
Four types of obstacles were faced by her country in the implementation of competition law, namely
obstacles relating to human resources, financial, legal and procedural matters.  With regard to humanresources, most agency staff members were lawyers rather than economists, were unfamiliar with
investigative work and were often dealing with a number of different areas simultaneously.
Regarding financial constraints, the agency had access only to limited financial resources, despite the
significant volume and intensity of work, such as data collection.  Concerning legal matters, the
absence of definitions of key concepts such as, for example, abuse of market dominance, and the lack
of implementing rules and regulations meant that the application of the law was often unclear.
Further, the existence of criminal rather than civil sanctions in countries such as Thailand meant that a
higher burden of proof applied in establishing an infringement of the relevant competition provisions,
which was often difficult given the limited human resources.  The fourth obstacle, which was
particularly serious in the case of Thailand, concerned the lack of case handling procedures.  For
example, procedures had not yet been established to collect facts and prepare fact-finding reports,
without which the credibility of the authority could be called into question.  Procedures were alsoneeded with respect to information-gathering, public hearings, conflicts of interest and the
classification and disclosure of documents, and were vital to ensuring the transparency, legitimacy
and integrity of the competition authority.  Meeting these needs would require long-term assistance,
over a period of years, in the local language.
7. The representative of Egypt, introducing document WT/WGTCP/W/187, said that developing
countries faced the following key challenges in the development and implementation of competition
law and policy.  First, with respect to the drafting of legislation, many countries, particularly
developing and least-developed countries, lacked qualified personnel that had the skills and
experience necessary to enable them to draft national competition legislation.  Secondly, in relation to
the establishment of a competition authority responsible for the implementation and enforcement ofnational competition legislation, problems encountered included scarcity of resources, difficulty in
developing and maintaining the necessary expertise, and the lack of the necessary infrastructure,
including financial and physical infrastructure.  Thirdly, for many countries, the costs associated withWT/WGTCP/M/17
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the implementation and enforcement of a domestic co mpetition law were considered to outweigh the
economic benefits.  Fourthly, many developing countries faced an absence of competition advocacy
and a competition culture.  In order to address such difficulties, the scope of the required technical
assistance could range from assistance with the drafting of a competition law and the establishment of
competent authorities and training of their staff through to the implementation and enforcement ofsuch law.  Developing countries should have acce ss to capacity building activities that would result in
a skilled pool of staff who were able to draft the national competition legislation.  Technical advice,
training, assistance and cooperation from international organizations and countries that had mature,
experienced competition authorities were useful resources.  In particular, assistance could take the
form of exchange of national competition legislation and assistance with respect to the identification
of major elements that should be included in the legislation, including administrative, criminal and
civil actions and penalties; identification of the administrative and judicial forums of legal actions;and procedures for information exchange.  Means should be explored to ensure that the benefits of
implementing a national competition law were hi gher than the costs associated with such
implementation.  This would require educating the relevant stakeholders about the benefits and
drawbacks of a national competition law.  Two principles should be considered in the course of
providing support for the progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developingcountries through capacity building:  first, flexibilit y in the sense that a "one size fits all approach"
was not appropriate since each country should be free to choose how to apply a competition regime in
a way that would reflect its economic situation and achieve its development objectives.  Second,
progressivity by allowing developing countries to undertake a phased approach to the discussion,
introduction and implementation of competition legislation.
8. The representative of the Philippines said that his country's situation illustrated the limitations
of human capacity in developing countries in the area of competition policy and the need for capacity
building in this area.  The Philippines did not have a competition authority, nor did it have a
competition culture or a body of relevant analysis.  He agreed that, as had been articulated by Egypt, a
"one size fits all approach" was not appropriate and that progressivity was critical in this area.  Along-term commitment to on-the-job training was required.  As had been elaborated by
Dr Taimoon Stewart at the Symposium organized by the WTO Secretariat on the previous day
1, five
key issues could be identified:  the appropriateness of a country's law, implementation problems, the
lack of a competition culture, the lack of adequate attention to operational procedures and the issue of
asymmetries of power between developing countries  and transnational corporations.  The Philippines
had a competition law modelled on the US Sherman Act.  However, the country was virtually starting
from scratch due to the lack of a competition culture.  His delegation hoped that the Working Groupwould be able to gain the necessary confidence and comfort level to address its post-Doha mandate.
In the previous day's Symposium, it had been said that there were at least 80 WTO Members that had
some kind of competition laws.  However, even amongst those 80, there was a huge disparity in terms
of their understanding, capability and the implementation of the vital and essential functions of a
competition policy authority.  The dearth of experience was even more critical among WTO Membersthat lacked legislation altogether.  Given this, the issue of reinforcing competition institutions was and
would remain central to the WTO's work programme in this area.  His delegation wished, in this
regard, to express its desire to receive focused and individualized technical assistance and capacity
building support, on a long term basis.  With in the context of APEC, there was a non-binding
agreement on competition and regulatory reforms which had become a cornerstone for thedevelopment and understanding for competition policy work.  In the current environment, the need for
progressivity and the issue of special and differential treatment required particular attention.
UNCTAD had an important role to play in the ongoi ng exploratory process and addressing the issue
of avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach.
                                                     
1 Symposium on Trade and Competition Policy:  Looking Ahead After Doha (Organized by WTO
Secretariat, 22 April 2002).WT/WGTCP/M/17
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9. The representative of Jamaica noted that Jamaica's competition agency, the Fair Trade
Commission, also faced important institutional, procedural, legal and financial constraints.  A key
challenge concerned the strengthening of capacity and promotion of a culture of competition in the
domestic market.  In addition, the shortage of skilled personnel and the lack of practical experience
was a concern.  Assistance was required, in particular, in building expertise in relation to competitionissues arising in the telecommunications sector, including with respect to access pricing, inter-
connection and call-termination charges.  He agreed that to be truly meaningful, assistance had to be
long term, tailor-made to local needs and focused on building in-house knowledge.
10. The representative of South Africa said that the discussion of technical assistance and
capacity building activities under this item was, appropriately, focused on the strengthening of
national competition agencies.  Cooperation on competition policy at the multilateral level would only
be as effective as the national competition institutions that would constitute its foundation.  He offeredthe following suggestions as to how the goal of st rengthening competition institutions might best be
advanced:  first, it was necessary to continually advocate and emphasize the positive contribution of
competition policy and law to economic development since this relationship was not yet well
understood.  Secondly, it was necessary to reinforce the capacity of agencies in a country or region to
train the staff of competition authorities on a continuous basis.  The existing technical assistancemodel according to which foreign experts were sent to a country or region for short seminars was
insufficient.   They were too brief and, frequently, the expert was not sufficiently familiar with the
legal and economic system and with the policy priorities of the country or region in question.  To
meet the need, it was necessary to involve professional training institutions in the field of law and
economics that were based in the region or country in question.  Such institutions would not only beable to provide training on a regular and continuous basis but they would also assist in building an
intellectual climate that was supportive of competit ion policy; would bring students into contact with
competition law and economics, many of whom migh t eventually come to consider employment with
the competition authority; and would provide institutional capacity for research and expert testimony
in the field of competition policy.  Thirdly, it was necessary to reinforce linkages between competitionauthorities.  The most effective learning took place as a result of contact between practitioners from
different competition jurisdictions.  For example, in relation to long-term secondment programmes,
apart from the obvious benefits of having an experienced antitrust official on site, it ensured that the
"capacity builder" developed an understanding of the country which he or she was assisting and it
ensured a long-standing connection between competition authorities in the respective countries which,
in turn, meant that assistance could continue to be sought long after the capacity builder had returned
to his or her home country.
11. The representative of Costa Rica said that, since the establishment of the Commission for the
Promotion of Competition in Costa Rica in 1995, attempts had been made to consolidate the
Commission while implementing the law.  The Commission had also sought to foster a culture of
competition through transparent processes, providing media coverage of competition issues as well as
technical training of bureaucrats.  Three priority areas were identified with respect to Costa Rica'scapacity building and technical assistance needs.  First, the methods for ensuring accountability had to
be strengthened.  In that regard, the fostering of a culture of competition among market actors as well
as all groups that were involved with the applica tion of the law was critical.  This reinforced the
legitimacy and credibility of the institution, which was of critical importance from the perspective of
those that reviewed the Commission's decisions, such as magistrates and the press.  Othergovernmental institutions also needed to be aware of competition principles so that they ensured that
all laws were in harmony with such principles.  Secondly, while it was important for a country to
create its own standards, experiences of countries that had longer-standing competition regimes were
a valuable point of reference for newly established agencies.  Nevertheless, such experience was not
always relevant to the reality of other countries, particularly those with small agencies.  Thirdly,improvements were needed in relation to the national legislation, implementation of that legislation
and also the underlying institutions.  It was only through the process of implementing and analysing
the weak aspects of the law that it was possible to identify those aspects that needed to be changed soWT/WGTCP/M/17
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as to ensure that the law had its intended effect.  Experiences of other countries might be useful in that
respect.
12. The representative of  Ecuador said that over the past three years, Ecuador had been in the
process of drafting a basic law to promote competition.  The text was now ready to be submitted to
Congress.  The main areas in which technical assistance was required were the establishment of acompetition law;  the improvement of the legislative and judicial administrative framework;  the
strengthening of the national competition authority;  a national plan for creating a competitive
environment;  and the promotion of a competition culture.  A problem associated with negotiations on
a multilateral framework on competition policy concerned the differences that existed between, on the
one hand, countries with competition legislation or lengthy experience in the competition policy area
and, on the other hand, countries that had no such experience. For this reason, commitments on
special and differential treatment and technical assistance were essential.  Technical assistance wasneeded to assist with the drafting of legislation, the establishment of competition authorities and for
training the staff members.  From Ecuador's experience, the best programmes were those where
donors and recipient countries shared a mutual commitment to move forward.  More successful
technical assistance programmes were those that enabled countries to increase and multiply
knowledge through, for example, the training of trainers.  Workshops analysing actual cases were alsouseful in that they demonstrated the best way to  proceed through explaining how other countries had
applied their competition laws and through experience-sharing.
13. The representative of Guatemala said that in order for competition policy to yield the desired
benefits, a flexible and progressive approach was needed, particularly for countries that had not yet
established a competition agency.  The representative of Honduras noted that Honduras did not, as
yet, have competition legislation.  However, this did not mean that Honduras was uninterested in the
topic.  On the contrary, in recent years, Honduras had been analysing the topic and various bills had
been drafted.  However, limited knowledge and experience in the area had delayed the passage and
implementation of such a regulatory framework.  The main obstacle faced in Honduras was the
complexity and difficulty in designing a competiti on law and establishing an agency to implement the
law.
14. The representative of Morocco noted that his country had adopted a national competition law,
which was currently being implemented.  In regard  to Morocco's needs in the area of technical
assistance, it was first necessary to train and improve the capacity of civil servants working in the
area.  Studies were needed in relation to market behaviour of economic actors .  Communication
campaigns were needed, especially those that targeted enterprises and consumers.  Assistance was
required with respect to information-gathering re garding the types of anti-competitive practices that
were prevalent and the negative impact they could have on developing countries' economies.  It was
also important to clarify the role of competition in the development process and the minimum
conditions that were necessary in order for competition policy to operate efficiently.  The
representative of Malaysia said that his country was in the process of establishing a fair trade practices
bill.  Once the legislation was enacted, a commi ssion would be established to administer the law.
Consequently, Malaysia, too, would have substantial requirements for technical assistance and
capacity building in this area.  The dimensions of the need would become clear when the legislation
had passed.  There was also a need to develop a culture of competition.  However, such a culture of
competition did not necessarily require the adoption of a multilateral framework on competition
policy in the WTO (see related comments, below).
15. The representative of Trinidad and Tobago noted that an important point that had been
highlighted in the course of the WTO Symposium on Trade and Competition Policy that had taken
place the previous day related to the power asymmetry that existed between multinational
corporations and developing country governments, many of which had limited experience in the
enforcement of competition law.  In these circumstances, assistance from mature competitionauthorities in the investigatory process could be particularly helpful.  She recalled some specificWT/WGTCP/M/17
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technical assistance and capacity building needs of small developing counties that had been
highlighted in a previous contribution by her delegation (WT/WGTCP/W/143), including the
following:  (i) scholarships for academic/professional training;  (ii) internships at competition
authorities to gain experience;  (iii) the need for vi siting staff from experienced agencies to guide and
assist, particularly in procedural matters in the early years of newly established competition agencies;(iv) resource persons and financial assistance for training workshops targeted at specific groups, such
as lawyers, economists and judges;  (v) assistance with the organization of workshops for producer
and consumer groups;  and (vi) guidance for the development of an information database in new
competition agencies.  However, it was also clear, especially given the problem of high staff turnover
in many developing countries, that a more sustainabl e approach to training was needed.  She reiterated
the call made during the WTO Symposium on Trade and Competition Policy that had taken place the
previous day for the establishment of an institution that would be staffed by competition experts frommature regimes.  Such experts would only need be  adjunct to the institution, lecturing on specific
topics from time to time.  Such an institution could organize compressed module courses on a
revolving basis, targeting discrete audiences: the legal fraternity, economists and trade experts,
government technocrats, and others.  Such an institution need not be open only to government-
sponsored participants benefiting from technical assistance.  Private-sector sponsored participantscould also be given access to such a training facility for a fee.  It was also suggested that colleges and
universities in developing countries introduce courses in competition law and policy with assistance
from competition experts from countries with more mature competition regimes.  In this way, the
capacity to provide training internally would be developed.
16. With regard to existing capacity building programmes and the design and delivery of future
programmes, the representative of Japan, introducing document WT/WGTCP/W/186, said that
capacity building was indispensable for progress in the area of trade and competition policy leading toan eventual multilateral framework on competition policy on which his government hoped
negotiations would be commenced following the Fifth Ministerial.  To facilitate this, it was
appropriate that technical assistance and capacity building was the first element to be discussed in theWorking Group.  Capacity building was an integral part of the work programme on trade and
competition policy which had been agreed to at Doha.  By "integral part" it was meant that capacity
building was indispensable for any progress of the work programme and that it should be an element
of any multilateral framework that might be agreed upon in the future but also that there was an
interrelationship between capacity building and other elements such as the clarification of core
principles.  His country's experience had shown that effective technical assistance and capacity
building programmes required a certain degree of common understanding about the core principlesthat were involved, and that technical assistance and capacity building programmes themselves
facilitated clarification of the core principles through exchanges of experiences and mutual
understanding among the participants.
17. Another representative of Japan said that, based on his country's experiences to date, the
following three issues should be recognized in rela tion to technical assistance and capacity building
activities at the WTO.  First, the different approaches and steps undertaken by each country for the
common purpose of promoting competition policy should be respected.  Second, the provision of
adequate technical assistance programmes and tools, especially those reflecting the needs of
developing countries, was of utmost importance.   Third, in implementing technical assistance and
capacity building, it was desirable to share common principles and approaches for cooperation.  Hedescribed various training courses and related initiatives which Japan had undertaken on a regional or
bilateral basis, mainly for developing countries in the Asia and Pacific regions.  What had become
clear through such activities was that all of the countries shared an awareness of the importance of
promoting competition and prohibiting anti-competitive activities to ensure free and fair markets.  On
the other hand, the approaches and means used to materialize these policy objectives varied accordingto differences in countries’ economic and developmental conditions and their legal institutions.  Japan
planned to organize, in partnership with Thaila nd and Vietnam, a series of training programmes
within the auspices of APEC that would aim to promote capacity building in the context ofWT/WGTCP/M/17
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competition and regulatory reform.  It was also consulting with the WTO with respect to a seminar
targeted at capital-based officials from developing countries.  Japan would continue to provide
effective technical assistance to developing countries for the progressive reinforcement of competition
institutions and to contribute to capacity building in the future both independently and in partnership
with the WTO, UNCTAD, OECD, APEC and within the context of other international frameworks.
18. The representative of the European Community and its member States, introducing relevant
parts of document WT/WGTCP/W/184), said that, up until the present, the European Commission had
been focusing technical assistance on candidates for EC enlargement.  However, in the light of the
Doha Ministerial Declaration and negotiations of bilateral partnership agreements with ACP countries
under the Cotonou, the European Community was developing a more general framework for technical
assistance, in respect of which competition policy was at the forefront.  The programme would be
based on five individual activities.  The first would address countries that did not already have acompetition law.  Such countries would have to review their respective economies, including
consideration of market structures and sectors.  They would have to identify problems and concerns
and conduct research in order to evaluate the n eed for competition policies and laws.  They would
then need to determine what type of laws and policies were needed, including what type of
exemptions and exceptions should be included in the law.  For countries at that phase, the EuropeanCommunity would be ready to finance or co-finan ce studies and assist those countries in drawing
conclusions regarding the type of competition policies  they were interested in putting in place. The
second activity was targeted at countries and regions that were in the process of putting in place an
authority or an enforcement system to apply the law.  An example of such an activity was a
programme instituted by COMESA funded by the Eu ropean Community, the objective of which was
to enable COMESA to put in place a framework fo r the application of competition policy in the
region. The third activity was the European Competition Academy, which was not to be a bricks and
mortar institution. Rather, it would be a network of well-known European institutes and universities
which had particular knowledge in relation to the development/competition policy interface.  The
various institutes and universities would organize the Academy under their responsibility but withEuropean Community financing and assistance.  The fourth activity took the form of residential
seminars primarily involving officials from competitio n authorities in developing countries.  The main
aim of the third and fourth activities would be to raise awareness among students, the general public,
students and also businessmen.  The fifth activity was the long-term secondment of officials.  In the
past, the European Community had received l ong-term secondments primarily from enlargement
candidates and other countries, such as Russia, with whom the European Community had a
partnership and cooperation programme.  The European Community was in the process of makingsuch arrangements two-way, meaning that officials would be exchanged.  Such programmes would be
extended to developing and other countries with which the European Community did not have an
enlargement relationship.
19. The representative of Canada, introducing document WT/WGTCP/W/183, indicated that the
technical assistance activities of its Competition Bureau were focused on the following elements and
objectives:  developing accountability; ensuring transparency through public participation,
dissemination of information among media and business groups with a view to enhancing public
credibility of the national competition institution;  administrative efficiency, particularly relating to
due process;  seeking to achieve predictability based on the belief that competition policy must be
translated into rule of law;  and developing expertise.  Relevant activities sought, in particular, tobuild human skills, especially in relation to economic issues, so that competition agencies were able to
analyse cases and deal with issues that arose in relation to the administration of a competition law,
such as public pressure.  A key point that the Bureau attempted to convey to other national institutions
was that competition law was rooted in applied economics.  Accordingly, the Bureau sought to
encourage the development of that discipline in national enforcement agencies.  The Bureau wasconvinced that, in relation to every case, the competition agency needed to focus on facts and data
rather than making qualitative assessments of a particular situation.  In other words, the Bureau sought
to train agency officials and to transmit skills so that rigorous analyses would occur that were basedWT/WGTCP/M/17
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on economic theory.  In particular, emphasis was placed, first, upon the concept of economic
efficiency and, second, upon the protection of the competitive process.  With regard to economic
efficiency, the Bureau attempted to develop skills so that agencies could deal with problems with a
view to ensuring that national resources, including human resources, were put to the most productive
use.  The Bureau also sought to encourage national agencies to be prepared to deal with the fact thatthey would face opposition from those that did not consider issues from an economic efficiency
perspective but, rather, from a fairness perspective or on the basis of other public policy
considerations.  It was believed that agencies themselves needed to develop a formula to determine
how to trade off or balance economic efficiency and fairness considerations.   The Bureau did not
attempt to impose its approach in considering such i ssues.  Rather, the Bureau simply tried to transmit
its values so that each agency could come to grips on its own with the compromises that needed to be
made.  In relation to protection of the competitive process, national agencies were encouraged tobecome guardians of the competitive process in their respective market-places.  The Bureau
discouraged industrial policy or an approach that promoted national champions on the assumption that
such an approach would distort certain processes within the national economy.  Again, in relation to
this aspect, it was assumed that opposition would exist.  The Bureau attempted to buttress agencies'
capacity for analysing situations so that they were able to make trade-offs between the variouspolicies concerned, including industrial policies, and were able to distinguish between those that
might lead to efficiency gains such as R&D joint ventures and others that would drain resources.  It
recognized that the problems that confronted agencies would need to be resolved at the national level
and that the choices that were made needed to be informed by and anchored in economics, facts and
knowledge about the local economy so that sensible trade-offs could be made.
20. The representative of Korea, introducing the relevant aspects of document
WT/WGTCP/W/189, said that his delegation had realized the importance of technical assistance in
the area of competition law and policy as it had been transformed from a recipient to a provider of
technical assistance.  In Korea's view, technical assistance efforts should be aimed at building a bridge
between developing and developed countries.  Acco rdingly, Korea's technical assistance activities had
included:  organizing national forums that involved participation by numerous high-ranking officers
and competition law experts, the aim of which had been to discuss problems faced by developing and
transitional economies during the process of introducing and enforcing competition law;  hosting
international workshops on competition policy to assist developing and transitional countries to deal
with some important issues in competition policy, namely cartels and mergers and acquisitions;
conducting courses regarding the experience of the Korean competition authority (the Korean Fair
Trade Commission or KFTC) in implementing Korea's competition law and policy that wereprimarily aimed at training competition officials in developing and transition countries.   Korea also
had a capacity building programme for KFTC staff, including professional courses on the Korean
Code on Competition, which was open to all employees and sought to inform participants about the
enforcement of competition law;  weekly internal competition forums at which discussions were
conducted on current competition policy issues;  case study review sessions, during which selectedcases were discussed among staff;  programmes for enhancing skills to investigate anti-competitive
cases that were usually conducted by experienced personnel;  secondments of staff to foreign
educational institutions such as universities to provide staff with enhanced and more in-depth
knowledge of competition law and policy;  and secondments to international organizations and
relevant agencies in other advanced countries.  With regard to KFTC's technical assistance andcapacity-building plan, emphasis would be placed on providing technical assistance that was
commensurate with the stage of economic development of the recipient country.  Secondly, technical
assistance programmes would be diversified and dispatched directly to the recipient countries.
Thirdly, the range of countries to which technical assistance was provided would be diversified, since
in the past, technical assistance programmes had been limited to Asian developing countries andtransitional economies in Eastern Europe.  In the future, technical assistance activities would be
extended to Africa and South America.  Relevant activities would be conducted in cooperation with
international organizations, namely the WTO, UNCTAD and the OECD.WT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 10
21. The representative of the United States, introducing document WT/WGTCP/W/185, noted
that it summarized what the United States considered had worked best based on the basis of its
12 years of experience offering technical assistance on competition policy throughout the world.
While the United States experience had been informative, in many ways, the recipient countries were
in the best position to provide information on what worked best for them.  Recognizing that "one sizedoes not fit all", the United States had attempted to adapt its technical assistance programme to the
different legal, economic and political environments that existed in different countries.  It was
believed that the first step was to conduct an assessment mission.  Such missions enabled the country
that was offering assistance to engage with the reci pient country to determine that country's needs and
to help target long-term assistance accordingly.  Assessment missions appeared to work best when
representatives from the donor agency visited representatives from the recipient agency and discussed
the political and economic environment in which the recipient agency operated and other issues suchas organizational problems faced by the recipient agency.  For example, assessment missions had
sometimes revealed that the recipient agency was st affed solely with lawyers.  In such cases, the
technical assistance programme would be designed  to offer assistance in the form of providing
economists from the donor agency to work at the recipient agency for a certain period of time.  The
United States technical assistance activities focused on three different areas.  First, assistance wasaimed at helping countries to develop framework antitrust laws and implementing relevant regulations
by, for example, commenting on draft laws and regulations.  Secondly, advice was provided regarding
the creation of an effective antitrust authority, including training of personnel once the competition
authority had been established.  This had been the main focus of United States technical assistance
efforts given that, this was the most significant stage of development for a new antitrust authority -that is, learning to implement and enforce the law.  This had been achieved by offering either
individually or in combination long-term advisors, short-term missions, conferences or internships in
the United States for foreign antitrust authority representatives.  Long-term residence advisory
programmes involved sending experienced United States economists or attorneys to the host authority
for a period of six to nine months.  Those advi sors reviewed and commented on the substance of
matters under investigation.  They helped the recipient antitrust authority use the investigative tools
that were available to that antitrust authority to effectively enforce and investigate cases arising under
their law.  Short-term missions were usually one to two weeks in duration and involved lawyers or
economists being sent from the United States to the recipient antitrust authority to help on specific
matters or to conduct seminars regarding investigative techniques.  Technical assistance had also been
delivered in the form of conferences that had either been hosted by the United States or in which the
United States had participated.  Internships for foreign staff at the United States antitrust agencieswere a less common form of technical assistance.  Due to confidentiality concerns, interns could
normally only be hosted for a period of a couple of weeks.  In the experience of the United States,
placing advisors in new antitrust agencies for a period of more than six weeks was the most effective
way to achieve the goals of technical assistance.  Such assistance was particularly effective when the
advisors were experienced economists or attorneys from experienced antitrust authorities.  Over time,such long-term advisors became familiar with a country's antitrust law, its institutions, markets and
the unique challenges that were faced by that particular antitrust authority.  Further, over the course of
time, long-term resident advisors were more effective because they were able to earn the respect, trust
and confidence of the new antitrust authority.  However, in some countries, budgetary limitations or
the desires of the host country were such that the use of long-term advisors had not been possible.Instead, short-term missions had been exclusively relied upon.  While not as effective as long-term
assistance, short-term assistance could be effective in a few key areas.  In particular, short-term
advisors could be effective during the legislative drafting stage and the institutional design stage of an
antitrust authority.  Further, short-term missions conducted by lawyers and economists on interactive
investigative skill seminars and workshops had also been effective particularly when they involvedsending an expert from a certain industry to a newly established antitrust authority when a case had
arisen in the same industry.  In general, the United States delegation had found that conferences had
not been as effective as the long-term or short-term assistance that had been offered, particularly
where they used a lecture format that focused on broad theory as opposed to real-world application
and the lecturers tended not to be familiar with the recipient country's legal system.  One-stop shopWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 11
programmes that lasted several days were normally ineffective since they presented major concepts or
ideas that were not easily practised in different environments to which different constraints applied.
However, there were a few situations where conferences were considered to be particularly effective,
including case analysis seminars such as those offered by the OECD in Vienna, where members of
agencies were present and analysed actual cases th at they were dealing with or had dealt with and
received feedback and conferences at the national level during the pre-legislative stage of a country at
which local and foreign experts were able to get together in a constructive environment and discuss
the pros and cons of antitrust legislation or the particular details of proposed legislation.  Regarding
the hosting of foreign interns in the United States, this was considered to be the least cost effective of
the various forms of technical assistance.  In sum, a WTO Member's decision to enact an antitrust law
was only the beginning of a long and complex process of resolving the policy and practical issues that
arose in drafting a competition law and creating an effective antitrust regime.  Technical assistancewas frequently needed but not all forms of technical assistance were equal.
22. The representative of Australia, introducing the relevant aspects of document
WT/WGTCP/W/190, said that Australia's contributi on drew upon two prior contributions made by her
delegation on the topic (documents WT/WGTCP/W/125 and WT/WGTCP/W/148).  The contribution
focused on some of the lessons learned from Australia’s experience in providing technical assistance.Assistance needed to be part of a broader pack age of cooperation and relationship-building between
agencies and governments on the topic of competition policy, that focused both on institution building
and building the capacity of developing countries to develop an understanding of the possible
implications arising from a multilateral framework on competition.  In providing technical assistance
programmes it was vital to develop strong and ongoing relationships between the donor and recipientcountry based on good personal and institutional networks.  This was important so that the donor
could develop a deep understanding and appreciat ion of the laws and culture of the developing
country and so that a high level of trust could be generated between the two countries, which was
essential in achieving a sustainable and long-term relationship.  An example where Australia had
implemented that type of detailed and ongoing relationship was in its work with Papua New Guinea.Australia’s competition enforcement agency, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(ACCC) signed a cooperation agreement with the Consumer Affairs Council (CAC) of Papua New
Guinea in 1999.  That agreement, while being useful in itself as a mechanism for cooperation, was
also used by officials within the CAC to support moves to implement competition legislation in PNG
by demonstrating the support to be provided by Aust ralia’s competition regulator. With respect to the
type of technical assistance that Australia had found to be most appropriate, that tended to vary
depending on the stage of development of the recipient country in implementing a competitionregime.  The types of assistance provided could be divided into two broad categories.  Phase 1
activities were more appropriate for countries that did not yet have a competition law or enforcement
agency.  Larger and more interactive forums involving participants from a range of developed and
developing countries were more useful at that stage.  Those types of forums exposed participants to a
range of different competition regimes, practices and procedures that they could draw upon and applyto any regime as appropriate to their individual circumstances.  It was also useful for officials to visit
Australia during this first phase so that they could observe the operations and activities of Australia’s
enforcement agency first hand to get a better idea of how regulations were applied in practice and to
see whether such practices might be appropriate or could be adapted for use in their own country.
Officials had also been encouraged to visit a range of countries to be able to compare variouscompetition regimes, to better enable officials to decide what might be appropriate for their own
domestic situation.  Phase 2 activities were more appropriate for countries that had passed a law,
established an enforcement agency and now faced the challenges associated with implementation of
their competition regime.  During this second phase, it had been found that technical assistance
needed to be country specific. It was generally prov ided in the recipient country itself so that the
assistance could be tailored to the exact needs of the recipient country.  She emphasized that technical
assistance should not be restricted to competition officials, but should be as broad as possible and
include, for example, members of the judiciary, academia, the media, business and consumer groups,
so that a culture of competition could be developed.WT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 12
23. The representative of Switzerland observed that a number of speakers and papers had made
the point that technical assistance and capacity building were not something that could be offered as a
one-off package.  Rather, they were a long-term process which was effective only if provided by
persons with experience in the specific field and if tailored to the special circumstances of the
recipient.  Relevant activities should be actively driven by authorities from the beneficiary countrythat were themselves capable of taking on a capacity building function, for instance local universities
and research institutes.  This would ensure that capacity building would have a more sustained effect
and that local know-how such as how the local legal system worked would be automatically taken
into account.  Switzerland recognized the need for long-term and more encompassing capacity
building and had made substantial financial contributions to its technical assistance programmes.
However, since it had a relatively small competition authority, available human resources to dedicate
to the training of competition law implementation were limited.  Nor did it make sense to attempt tooffer full-scale capacity building programmes if the relevant experience was not available.  Therefore,
it was necessary to rely upon international organizations.  Nevertheless, countries might be able to
provide technical assistance in specific areas.  A possible approach could be to create a pool of
experts from various countries that were experienced in implementing antitrust law and competition
policy advocacy.  The pool could then be used by international organizations and beneficiarycountries for their capacity building and coaching pr ogrammes.  For example, the OECD's experience
could be used for enlarging capacity building at a multilateral level.  Domestic institutions in
developing countries should take the lead and work in close cooperation with competition institutions
and organizations abroad that could assist with effective training.
24. The representative of the Czech Republic said that the staff of the Office for the Protection of
Competition had acquired knowledge and experience in the area of the competition law that met
European standards.  Such experience covered the range of issues arising in relation to the adoption
and enforcement of competition law and policy, incl uding the preparation of new legislation that was
compatible with EU law, competition law enforcement and the promotion of competition principles in
newly liberalized areas of the economy.  Such knowledge and experience was now ready to be passedon to staff of other newly established competition authorities.  In this respect, the Office had signed a
number of bilateral cooperation agreements with co mpetition authorities in Russia, Bulgaria, Romania
and the Ukraine.  The agreements provided primarily for the exchange of advice regarding
competition legislation, internships for competi tion authority staff, methodological support and
cooperation in respect of particular anti-competitive practices.  Recalling his country's past experience
as a recipient of technical assistance, he said that, during the immediate period following the
establishment of the Office for the Protection of Competition ("the Office"), it was necessary for theOffice staff to be properly trained and to gather knowledge and experience needed for effective
enforcement of the competition law.  During that period, significant technical assistance from and
cooperation with competition authorities of the OECD member states in the form of expert assistance
and training of the Office's staff helped the staff to gain proper understanding of the competition law
and its implementation.  In most cases, the technical assistance was provided in the form of training atthe premises of partner competition offices, seminars organized in the Czech Republic and abroad,
and expert consultations on the preparation of a modern competition law.  The effectiveness of
individual forms of the technical assistance depended to a large extent on the level of development of
the competition regime in the recipient country.  During the initial phase of the establishment of
competition policy and law, the preparation of a well-suited competition law and the establishment ofa functioning competition watchdog were a priority.  Advisors could help to determine the best
approach to competition law enforcement given the specific conditions prevailing in a particular
country.  Less formal consultations with foreign experts with regard to specific, concrete topics
associated with the practical enforcement of comp etition law and for the exchange of information in
individual cases were also important.
25. The representative of Norway said that it was not a simple task for developing countries
unfamiliar with competition policies to implement su ch policies in a coherent way and to acquire a
necessary sense of what had been termed "a culture of competition".  Such countries would needWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 13
technical assistance in order to develop a credible  competition regime with a reliable and independent
competition authority with the necessary sanctions at its disposal.  Even then, it would take time to
have a well-functioning national system in place.  The Symposium on the previous day had provided
many convincing arguments as to why competition policies should be implemented in developing
countries, as their markets gradually opened up.  At the same time, it had made clear the need for aproper economic analysis of how individual markets functioned, as a perquisite for the definition of
appropriate exclusions and exceptions from national competition law.  Capacity building activities to
upgrade human resources would, in his delegation's opinion, remain a major factor in the
establishment of a credible competition system in any country.  It was important that assistance be
provided in the local language.  The need for coordination amongst donors also had to be addressed
(see related remarks, below).
26. In the course of the above statements and related discussion, the representatives of Costa
Rica; the Czech Republic ; Ecuador ; Egypt ; the European Community and its member States ;
Guatemala; Honduras ; Hong Kong, China ; Jamaica ; Jordan ; Malaysia ; Morocco ; Pakistan ; the
Philippines; South Africa ; Switzerland ; Thailand ; Trinidad and Tobago  and the United States  said that
a "one size fits all" approach to the design and delivery of technical assistance and capacity building
was not appropriate.  Rather, technical assistance worked best when tailored to the particular needsand environments of the recipient country and, further, that no single competition model was suitable
for all circumstances.  Furthermore, it was important that capacity building be viewed as a long-term
process.  The principles of flexibility and progressivity were key considerations in this regard.  The
representative of Thailand said that long-term commitm ents with respect to the provision of technical
assistance were vital, extending from two to five years.  Another suggestion was that training be made
available in the local language.  The representative of Trinidad and Tobago recalled that the concepts
of progressivity and flexibility with regard to th e introduction and implementation of competition law
had been discussed in previous meetings of the Working Group and that her delegation had
maintained that flexibility referred to the ability of a country to choose from the menu of prohibitions
contained in competition law those aspects that were relevant for the particular economy.  However,this raised the question as to what was relevant or appropriate for a particular economy.  This could be
identified through economic analysis of the level of competition in the economy and of the types of
anti-competitive acts that were most prevalent in that economy.
27. The representatives of Costa Rica, Egypt
, the European Community and its member States ,
Honduras; Jordan ; Pakistan , the Philippines , South Africa , Thailand , Trinidad and Tobago  and the
United States said that systematic assessment of needs was critical to effective capacity building
activities.  The representative of Pakistan suggested that this would include assessment of:  (i) the
autonomous adoption of national competition legislation by individual countries and the benefits and
challenges they faced in implementing such legislation;  (ii) the extent to which existing WTO rules
already provided for competition and their contribution to the realisation of broader objectives;
(iii) identification and clarification of the various issues and concepts involved;  and (iv) the ways to
address the development dimension in the promo tion of competition.  Any legislation must be
responsive to the development needs in developing countries.  The scope of technical assistance and
capacity building should extend to all sectors of the economy, private and public and should target all
stakeholders, the media, the judiciary and other enforcement agencies.  Countries that had well-
established competition systems could play an important role in both medium and long-term capacity
building efforts undertaken in developing countries.  He reiterated that capacity building should belong term, effective, targeted and gradual.  The representatives of Thailand and Jamaica
 said, further,
that technical assistance should focus less on training individuals and more on building institutionalknowledge.  This involved training the trainers and establishing an effective information and
documentation system.  Long- and short-term internships, whether with the donor or recipient
agencies, were a useful means of building human and institutional capacity.
28. The representatives of Pakistan and the United States
 said that there appeared to be a near
consensus regarding the need for flexibility in th e evolution of each jurisdiction's competition lawsWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 14
and policies and a concomitant need for flexibility in technical assistance and capacity building
activities.  Continuing, the representative of Pakistan said that each country was the best judge of its
own needs and should have the right to have or not  to have a national competition law.  Technical
assistance and capacity building was a major, though not the most important, component of the
Group's work programme post-Doha.  Such technical assistance had to take into account the specificneeds of the beneficiary countries.  It was, therefore, important that such assistance be targeted,
effective and responsive to needs.  Sharing national experiences in the area would help Members to
identify individual needs and to assess the problems faced by countries in preparing laws.  The
representative of the United States and Guatemala
 said that the principles set out in the contribution
by Canada (WT/WGTCP/W/183) were key underpinnings of competition policy and meritedattention.  The representative of Switzerland said that the contribution by Canada
(WT/WGTCP/W/183) answered a question that had been broached by Switzerland in an earlier
submission (WT/WGTCP/W/151) insofar as it demonstrated that competition policy and industrial
policy were not necessarily in conflict and were not mutually exclusive.  Rather, it suggested that
competition policy could be supportive and beneficial for industrial policy.
29. The representative of Hong Kong, China said that international cooperation had a useful role
to play in addressing competition policy implications posed by globalization of markets.  However,
given the diversity in scope and emphases of competition policy and implementation instruments
across WTO Members, the scope and modalities of cooperation had to be carefully considered.  Full
account had to be taken of the needs of developing and least-developed country participants and
appropriate flexibility had to be provided to address them, as was mandated in paragraph 25 of the
Doha Ministerial Declaration.  This included the possibility of not having a competition law.  HongKong, China agreed that assistance was needed to help developing and least-developed countries
better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral cooperation for their development policies and
objectives.  Regarding the contribution by Canada (WT/WGTCP/W/183), his delegation shared the
importance attached to the two principles of econom ic efficiency and the protection of competition
and the competitive process rather than competitors.  Hong Kong, China had an open trade andinvestment regime as well as a strong competition culture.  It was committed to promoting
competition as a means to enhancing economic efficiency as well as ensuring a level playing field.
Nevertheless, Canada appeared to use "competition policy" and "competition law" interchangeably in
its paper.  An economy-wide competition law was not the only way to promote greater competition.
Hong Kong, China firmly believed that competition problems were context-specific; so should
solutions to such problems.  Accordingly, it was necessary to study how the two principles advanced
by Canada could best be adapted to different socio-economic contexts.
30. The representative of Honduras said that the various technical cooperation programmes that
had been outlined by Members, particularly those designed to enhance capacity and technical
cooperation over the long term, only partly met the mandate contained in paragraph 25 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration.  Paragraph 25 made it clear that the WTO and other international
organizations should be involved in technical cooperation and capacity building.  In this respect, thedesign and implementation of competition legislation, the design and establishment of the competition
agency in charge of implementing the law and the development of a competition environment should
be given priority, particularly in countries such as Honduras that did not have significant experience
in the area.  These elements should be part of a coherent technical assistance programme that
surveyed the needs of recipients, that took into account the various needs of developing countries, andthat established modalities to avoid duplication.  Finally, an element that was important both in
respect of paragraph 24 and paragraph 25 of the Ministerial Declaration was the assessment of the
impact of technical cooperation.  Such an exercise should be conducted at all levels, including the
multilateral level, and therefore should be included as an element of the modalities of cooperation and
capacity building and strengthening.  Such an element was essential since, through proper assessment,it allowed recognition of the special needs of developing countries and the fact that a "one size fits all"
approach was not appropriate.WT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 15
31. The representative of India said that the agenda for the meeting had rightly drawn a
distinction between technical assistance and capacity building aimed at enhancing the ability of
developing countries to better evaluate the implications of multilateral cooperation in this area and
support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries through
capacity building.  From the perspective of develo ping countries, there was an inter-linkage between
the two objectives sought to be achieved through technical assistance and capacity building. The
nature and quantum of obligations undertaken by Members for capacity building in developing
countries, which was aimed at reinforcing competition institutions so that they were better able to
apply their national laws and to take advantage of  international cooperation in anti-competitive cases
with international dimensions, would have an important bearing on evaluation of the implications of
closer multilateral cooperation for their development policies and objectives.  India had a number of
questions to pose to the proponents, which arose out of the ineffectiveness of competition authoritiesin developing countries due to a lack of resources and tools to find sufficient evidence of restrictive
business practices by a foreign firm or to enforce any orders they might make against such firms,
especially if such firms had no assets or subsidiaries in the national territory.  Similarly, developing
countries had great difficulty in controlling mergers occurring overseas which might affect their
national markets.  Authorities in developing countries were also not familiar with the procedures andrequirements for cooperation with developed countries in this area.  Therefore, India wanted to know:
(i) how exactly would the institutional capacity of de veloping countries be strengthened?  (ii) would
such capacity building be limited to competition po licy as related to trade or would it also cover
competition policy per se ?  Where would the line be drawn between the two?  (iii) could the resources
which would be made available for different forms of technical assistance and capacity building beadequate, timely and for a sufficient period of time so as to enable countries at different stages of
development to gain adequate experience and create adequate capacity?  (iv) would such resources be
quantified?  (v) how exactly would the needs and development objectives of developing and least-
developed country participants be taken into account, so as to avoid a donor-driven process?
(vi) would such a process include creation of an organization that would coordinate capacity buildingand technical assistance provided to developing countries on a regular basis but at the same time
maintain an "arms length" relationship with donors?  (vii) what forms of technical assistance and
capacity-building would be provided which would en able developing countries to develop the tools
and expertise and to find means of obtaining the n ecessary resources to:  (a) know which information
to obtain relating to restrictive business practices including hardcore cartels and abuses of dominance
or mergers originating from abroad and affecting thei r markets;  (b) adopt procedures to obtain such
information;  (c) interpret and eval uate such information;  (d) prove that such practices or mergers
were anti-competitive in the face of the high-pow ered legal and economic expertise that would be at
the disposal of the firms involved;  (e) benefit from voluntary international cooperation, e.g. by
obtaining investigatory assistance from a foreign competition authority regarding information
available to them or which could be obtained by them or by obtaining judicial assistance; and (f) learn
how to respond appropriately to requests for vo luntary cooperation from other countries or to
extraterritorial enforcement of the competition laws of other countries.  The above was not an
exhaustive list of questions.  Developing countries had little knowledge of what a multilateral
framework on competition policy would entail.  Therefore, it was perhaps too early to state
comprehensively what their technical assistance needs were.  An iterative exercise of training in
various aspects was unavoidable.  As technical knowledge improved, the need for understanding moreissues would correspondingly increase and it would be necessary to provide for such additional
training.
32. With regard to a perceived need for an enhanced commitment to and coordination of capacity
building activities in the area of competition policy, the representative of the  Czech Republic said
that at present, technical assistance was provided by individual competition authorities as well as by
international organizations, such as the OECD and the World Bank.  However, assistance was being
provided on an ad hoc basis, which might lead to duplication of the assistance offered.  Further, there
was no permanent basis for the provision of technical assistance that would respond to the
requirements of individual competition authorities based on the particular stage of development ofWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 16
their competition regimes and the specific economic conditions prevailing in the relevant countries.  It
was suggested that it would be wise to link tech nical assistance in the competition policy area to
discussions regarding a multilateral competition policy framework agreement.  This would assist in
ensuring the effective coordination of international cooperation of technical assistance in the area.
International coordination of technical assistance would prevent duplicity in the provision of technicalassistance, it would ensure that technical assistance projects would be tailored to the needs of each
particular country, and it would widen the range of technical assistance activities that were possible.
While it was recognized that the establishment of such international coordination would be
demanding, time-consuming and would require considerable financial support and human resources,
the associated benefits clearly outweighed these difficulties.
33. In regard to a perceived link between capacity building and other forms of cooperation
involving national competition authorities, the re presentative of the European Community and its
member States, introducing relevant parts of document WT/WGTCP/W/184, said that many tools
existed to build capacity and there were different aims that were often overlapping.  Capacity building
focused on developing and building the ability of a competition authority to enforce competition law
and policy in its jurisdiction.  This raised the question of how a competition culture could be built in
the administration as a whole - in the judiciary, in  the business community and in the public in general
- because competition law and policy could not be enforced where the community as a whole did not
have a sense of what competition rules were and what competitive behaviour was.  His delegation had
tried to focus on this more long-term aspect of capacity building.  It was not something that would end
or diminish with the end of the work of the Working Group or with the negotiation and
implementation of a multilateral agreement.  Further,  it was not something that in and of itself was
linked to multilateral rules.  In that context, his delegation believed that cooperation between
competition authorities was absolutely essential if Members were to help developing countries
establish competition authorities and build them up.  In this respect, he noted that one of the main
purposes of technical assistance  was to ensure that developing country authorities were in a position
to benefit from international cooperation. Cooperation between, on the one hand, authorities thatalready had experience in the area and, on the other hand, authorities that were building up such
experience was also crucial because solutions that had been adapted to a certain market or a certain
country were not necessarily easily transposed elsewhere.  Nevertheless, while international
cooperation was relevant to technical assistance and capacity building, it was broader than these
aspects. Cooperation was essentially voluntary and could not be the subject of an obligation.  Further,
countries and authorities had to be convinced of its usefulness.  It did not need to be linked to the
establishment of binding bilateral or multilateral ru les. Cooperation could occur in a variety of forms
and could occur in an informal manner.  In addition, cooperation did not need to be linked to the
existence of competition law and a competition authority in relation to all the parties involved.  On the
other hand, there were some obvious limitations to the usefulness of cooperation if some of the parties
did not have a competition law or authority and if there were no rules pursuant to which cooperation
took place.  Clearly, it was useful for a country to receive information and explanations aboutcompetition law and its enforcement from a country that did have an established competition
authority.  However, if such an exchange was not for the purpose of establishing a competition
authority, it was questioned whether there was any point to the exercise.  The point was made that
most cooperation so far had been undertaken at the bilateral or regional levels and that there was no
absolute need for multilateral cooperation.  However, the demand for cooperation had alreadyoutgrown its possible supply.  There was already a considerable commonality among competition
laws and underlying principles among the 90 countries that had competition laws and competition
authorities.  Much as the problems competition la w posed were varied, there were limitations to that
variety also.  Multilateral cooperation was a tool th at could help and could solve some of the problems
of supply of cooperation and establish the possibility for WTO Members to exchange views on issuesthat were of relevance to one of them.  Therefore, international cooperation in a multilateral context
added value to what cooperation could achieve at the bilateral and regional levels.  Nevertheless,
international cooperation could not substitute these other forms of cooperation; rather they were
complementary.WT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 17
34. In response, the representatives of the Philippines and Hong Kong, China  said that this aspect
of the contribution by the European Community and its member States went beyond the agenda for
the current meeting.  Rather, it appeared to be a negotiating proposal.  The Working Group was not a
negotiating forum.  Continuing, the representative  of Hong Kong, China said that his delegation
continued to believe that international cooperation modalities on competition worked best in caseswhere a common will to cooperate existed among the parties involved.   A voluntary approach could
achieve the optimum results having regard to the differences in development needs and circumstances
of Members.  He noted that the European Community's view seemed to be that the sine qua non  for
international cooperation was the existence of a domes tic competition law.  Further, the provisions on
cooperation modalities discussed in the European Community's paper were largely predicated on the
enactment of competition law in Members' economies.  While Hong Kong, China could agree that the
existence of a competition law and competition enforcement agencies would facilitate internationalcooperation, it was not considered that that was an essential precondition for such cooperation.  In the
case of Hong Kong, China, the absence of an economy-wide competition law had not prevented Hong
Kong, China from exchanging views and experiences in various international forums dealing with
competition issues, such as the APEC Competition Policy and Deregulation Group.  Hong Kong,
China had also had informal cooperation arrangements with individual competition agencies such asthe Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.  Therefore, in designing a possible
multilateral framework on competition policy, clarification was needed as to how sufficient flexibility
would be ensured for Members lacking a competition law.
35. Responding, the representative of the European Community and its member States said that
the European Community's contribution straddled the current discussion in the Working Group and
the discussion that would occur at the following meeting.  The contribution concerned voluntary
cooperation in a multilateral context, which was not linked exclusively to the question of capacity
building.  However, his delegation believed that cooperation, when considered in broad terms, was a
key instrument of capacity building.  Further, according to this broad notion of cooperation, the
enactment of a competition law and the establishment of a competition authority were notpreconditions for countries to take part and make a positive contribution to the debate and to derive
benefits therefrom. Nevertheless, it was difficult to envisage cooperation between competition
authorities occurring in cases where one of the parties to such cooperation did not have a competition
authority.  The European Community's contribution emphasized the notion of flexibility because it
was necessary to take into account different realities that existed.  The issue of flexibility would be
elaborated at future Working Group meetings.  During the current Working Group meeting, there
seemed to be an emerging consensus that, with regard to the question of whether a domesticcompetition law and a domestic competition policy were needed, a "one size fits all" approach was
not appropriate.  In other words, a single specific model could not be applied across the board to all
WTO Members.  A similar realization of the fact that there is no one size fits all seemed to exist in
relation to the provision of technical assistance.  There seemed to be agreement on the part both of the
traditional donors as well as recipients of technical assistance in the competition policy area thattechnical assistance should be demand-driven and sh ould be tailored to the specific needs of the
country in question.  The European Community agreed with that approach.
36. The representative of Japan, referring to the relevant aspects of document
WT/WGTCP/W/186, suggested that there was an interrelationship between, on the one hand, capacity
building and, on the other hand, clarification of the core principles which were also referred to inparagraph 25 of the Doha Declaration.  His delegation's experience showed that carrying out effective
technical assistance and capacity building programmes required a certain degree of common
understanding about the core principles and that technical assistance and capacity building
programmes facilitated clarification of the core principles through exchanges of experiences and
mutual understanding among the participants.  In other words, capacity building and clarification ofthe core principles were mutually supportive and should be promoted together.  The representative of
the European Community and its member States agreed that the usefulness of multilateral cooperation
was linked to the existence of common principles.  To the extent that it was possible to discernWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 18
common principles in the various competition laws that existed, the usefulness and the necessity of
consolidating those common principles in a multilateral agreement seemed desirable.
37. Referring to the note prepared by the Secretariat on support for progressive reinforcement of
competition institutions in developing countries through capacity building (document
WT/WGTCP/W/182), the representative of Australia said that Australia believed that it was important
to develop a coherent and comprehensive set of laws and procedures to deal systematically with anti-
competitive conduct.  A number of developing countries had supported this, including some countries
that still did not have competition laws.  Secondly, support was expressed for the suggestion that it
would be useful to consider looking towards the convergence of competition laws.  It was important
for Members that were developing competition law to have access to the range of options for
consideration.  The comparison of competition laws as part of a capacity building programme was,
therefore, supported.  However, such a facility might already exist.  For example, APEC had a
database of competition policy and law which perhaps could be built upon.  Australia also supported a
phased approach to capacity building.  Experience  had shown that technical assistance and other
contact between agencies enabled authorities to share experiences and lessons learned.  This
potentially reduced the time and effort required to implement effective regimes.  Finally, peer review
could be useful as a mechanism to complement and enhance the effectiveness of capacity buildingefforts.
38. The representatives of Hong Kong, China and Malaysia
 expressed interest in the idea that had
been floated by Professor Matsushita at the Symposium earlier in the week for a non-binding
framework or Declaration regarding the role of co mpetition policy in the framework of the WTO, as
an alternative to a binding framework.  Such a frame work seemed capable of taking into account and
respecting the different approaches adopted by each  country regarding the promotion of competition
policy.  Along with the Declaration, a Committee might be formed which could talk about the needs
of developing countries and so forth.  Continuing, the representative of Malaysia said that, from the
perspective of his delegation, the Doha mandate on capacity building was simply to enable developing
countries and LDCs to be able to better understand this complex subject, including the elements listedin paragraph 25, to enable Members to better evaluate the pros and cons of a multilateral agreement in
this area.  As had been emphasized by Hong Kong, China, a key consideration was to study how the
different elements could best be adapted to suit local socio-economic conditions.  The decision as to
whether to adopt a competition law and with what content should be left to the national authorities
since the need for a binding WTO agreement in this area had not been established.
39. The representative of the European Community and its member States said that the argument
that had been put forward by the representative of Malaysia as to the non-necessity of a WTO
agreement to facilitate effective action by Members on competition policy at the national level could
also be made with respect to tariffs, in that these could be reduced unilaterally and this was generally
thought to be in the interest of Members.  Nonetheless, Members had found that action at the
multilateral level could be important to facilitate beneficial tariff reductions.  The same might well be
true with regard to the implementation of competition policy.
40. A representative of the OECD referred to a survey that had been conducted by his
organization in 2001.  That survey reviewed technical assistance and capacity building programmes
undertaken by the OECD and the OECD Secretariat in the area of competition policy.  The survey
sought two things: (i) information about technical assistance provided by members to non-members in
1999-2000;  and (ii) delegations' views regarding the most effective means of delivering suchassistance.  The following key points had emerged from the survey:  (i) there was a significant and
growing need for technical assistance and capacity building.  (ii) more countries and organizations
were becoming involved in such work;  (iii) the first two points raised important coordination and
funding considerations;  (iv) challenges in the funding area required a multifaceted strategy, pursuant
to which providers reinforced each others' efforts at every opportunity and increased efforts to raiseawareness of competition policy.  The strategy need ed to seize every opportunity to draw attention toWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 19
the linkages between competition and areas such as the development of SMEs, the development of
infrastructure industries, deregulation, privatization, trade policy, education, health, intellectual
property, etc.;  (v) increased coordination could significantly enhance the overall efficiency of
technical assistance delivery and reduce duplication through greater communication and cooperation.
In this regard, the outreach unit of the OECD wa s looking forward to actively exploring various
options for enhanced cooperation with the Working Group as well as with UNCTAD, the World Bank
and individual enforcement agencies;  (vi) the optimum form of technical assistance and capacity
building was a function of a number of factors including the stage of development of the recipient
country and, more specifically, in the competition policy area.  The survey had found that, at the early
stages, before a competition law had been enacted or even before there was recognition of the need
for a broad competition policy, high-profile conferences and short-term visits could be particularly
helpful.  In contrast, at the stage of drafting a competition law or regulation and establishing anagency, longer-term advisors were particularly useful as well as short-term study visits.  For those
countries at a more advanced stage of developing a competition policy that were, for example,
experiencing difficulties with enforcement due to lack of expertise or lack of a competition culture,
high-profile conferences, peer reviews and workshops were considered to be particularly valuable.
The benefits to the recipient country appeared to be  directly linked to the duration of the technical
assistance.  However, the survey identified that few providers of technical assistance had the
resources to engage in that form of assistance given that it was particularly costly.  The implication
was that more was needed to persuade funders to support that kind of assistance;  (vii) the
qualifications of technical assistance providers were important.  Enforcement experience was critical
and often not possessed by private sector technical assistance providers.  Outreach experience or, atleast, some familiarity with and experience in dealing with the unique requirements of emerging and
developing economies was important;  and (viii) the need for practical assistance in law enforcement
had been emphasized, involving assistance regarding investigative techniques, analytical skills, case
handling, etc.
41. Another representative of the OECD said that the OECD Joint Group on Trade and
Competition had recently finalized a paper examining the potential "Role of Special and Differential
Treatment at the Trade, Competition and Development Interface".  The paper built upon statements
and communications made in the Group regarding the development dimension, including calls for a
more concrete and focused discussion on flexibility, progressivity and special and differential
treatment (S&D).  It was closely aligned with paragraphs contained in the Doha Ministerial
Declaration that dealt with the area of competition policy, which mandated that "full account" be
taken of the needs of developing and least-developed country participants and that "appropriateflexibility" be provided to address such needs.  It was also aligned with related calls for a more
general consideration of how special and differen tial treatment could be incorporated into the
architecture of WTO rules.  Finally, as was reflected in discussions that had occurred in the current
Working Group's meeting as well as in the Secretariat's note (WT/WGTCP/W/182), flexibility and
progressivity were essential elements in respect of the "progressive reinforcement of competition
institutions in developing countries" as referred to in paragraph 25 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration.  Part 1 of the OECD paper examined  the origins, evolution and current S&D provisions
in the GATT and WTO Agreements.  Part 2 of the pa per explored the potential relevance of S&D in a
trade and competition policy context, noting that developing countries often faced special challenges
in establishing effective competition laws and policies.  As a result, the area of competition policywas one in which there was a wide diversity of, and asymmetries in, Members’ competition policies
and legal traditions as well as in cultural and economic circumstances.  Like many of the submissions
by Members at the present meeting, the paper expressed the view that competition policy was an area
where "one size did not fit all".  In this regard, the paper suggested that S&D might have a valuable
role to play in promoting development objectives and tentatively identified a number of options forachieving such flexibility, including the possibil ity of adopting a GATS formulation of S&D;  the
option of a broad framework agreement allowing fo r exceptions, exemptions and exclusions whether
on a sectoral or non-sectoral basis;  exploring alternative modalities beyond the multilateral paradigm;
drawing greater distinctions amongst developing countries eligible for S&D;  and potential roles ofWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 20
transitional time-periods, technical assistance and capacity building.  In conclusion, the paper
emphasized that, while S&D could al most certainly play a valuable role in promoting development at
the trade and competition interface, care should be taken to avoid the use of S&D to delay the
introduction of competition policy where it would be of benefit to developing countries.
42. Another representative from the OECD said that the inaugural meeting of the OECD Global
Forum on Competition had been held in October 2001.  Keynote speeches by Ministers and high-level
representatives of member and non-member economies had been followed by discussions on:  (i) the
role of competition authorities and the tools avai lable to them;  (ii) instruments for cooperation;
(iii) hardcore cartels;  and (iv) merger enforcement.  The second meeting of the Global Forum had
been held in February 2002.  Around 60 countries had taken part together with ten international,
regional and non-governmental organizations.  The meeting had focused primarily on the role of
competition policy in economic development, the capacity building needs of developing countries andthe best ways of ensuring that those needs were being met.  Discussion at the Forum had also focused
on cooperation in competition law enforcement with respect to transborder mergers and hardcore
cartels.
43. The Chairman drew attention, inter alia , to the following points, emphasizing that they were
not in any way implied to be comprehensive and were simply personal impressions which had no
official standing:
- There appeared to be a large and growing demand for technical assistance activities
on competition policy which outstripped the available supply.
- A large number of delegations had made the point that a one-size-fits-all approach to
the design and delivery of technical assistance in the area of competition policy wasnot appropriate.  Further, the points had been made that technical assistance should be
demand-driven, it should be provided continuously over a long period of time and it
should be made self-sustainable through, for example, the training of trainers.  An
important objective associated with the provision of technical assistance should be the
development of a culture of competition.
- The importance of systematic assessment of recipient countries' needs had also been
emphasized.  This required a continuing dialogue between the countries providing
technical assistance and countries receiving assistance, to identify the local context,
the local needs and the local possibilities.
- Suggestions had been made that the quality of technical assistance actually provided
should be assessed more systematically and that there was a need for greater
coordination in this area, something in which the WTO might play a role.
- Some delegations had also stressed the synergies that existed or were perceived to
exist between capacity building activities aimed at reinforcing the role of competition
agencies in developing countries and other elements that were included in
paragraph 25 of the Doha Declaration.  For example, reference had been made to
perceived links with case-specific cooperation between competition agencies and tocore principles such as non-discrimination and transparency.  This was an interesting
aspect of the discussion which might warrant elaboration in future discussions.
II. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING, AS CALLED FOR BY
PARAGRAPH 24 OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION
44. The representatives of Egypt, Korea
 and Australia  introduced written contributions that were
relevant, at least in part, to this item (documents WT/WGTCP/W/187, 189 and 190 respectively).  InWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 21
addition, Members had before them a note by the Secretariat entitled "Technical Cooperation
Programme:  Competition Policy" which had originally been circulated at the informal meeting of the
Working Group on 26 February 2002.  The representatives of China; the Dominican Republic ; the
European Community and its member States; India ; Jamaica ; Malaysia ; New Zealand ; Norway ;
Trinidad and Tobago and the United States  made oral statements or posed questions on this item.  The
representative of UNCTAD provided an update on relevant activities of that organization.
45. The representative of the Secretariat referred to the informal note by the Secretariat entitled
"Technical Cooperation Programme:  Competition Policy" which had originally been distributed at
the informal meeting of the Working Group on 26 February and had also been made available for the
current meeting.  The note mentioned an inter-agency meeting that had taken place pursuant to
paragraph 24 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and contained details of technical assistance events
that were planned by the various organizations.  As had been made clear in the note, the actualactivities that it committed the Secretariat to undertake were contingent on sufficient financing and
staff resources being made available.  Since the original circulation of the note, sufficient funds had
been pledged at the pledging conference for the activities contemplated.  However, the availability of
adequate staff resources was also critical.  Fortunately, it appeared that additional staff resources for
this activity might become available in the not too di stant future.  With regard to other aspects of the
note, the Geneva Symposium which had been foreseen for July had been brought back to 22 April, to
provide an input to preparations for the current meeting.  As well, a representative of the WTO
Secretariat had participated in four regional wo rkshops organized by UNCTAD in the early part of
2002, in Abu Dhabi; Panama City; Tunis and Hong-K ong, China.  A fifth such regional workshop
was planned for the week following the current meeting, in Odessa, in which the WTO Secretariatwould also participate.  As indicated in the note, later in the year the Secretariat expected to proceed
with three joint WTO-UNCTAD regional workshops for the benefit of countries in English and
French-speaking Africa and the Caribbean.  In addition, a regional workshop would be held for Latin
America, in cooperation with the Inter-American Development Bank.  The WTO had also reached
agreement with the World Bank to proceed with  two joint WTO-World Bank training courses
(organization details and the content of the courses remained to be worked out).  With respect to
national workshops and seminars, the Secretariat was still hoping to undertake all of the activities
listed in the note, assuming that resources were available.  Since the preparation of the note, additional
requests for workshops had been received from Malaysia, Egypt and Costa Rica.
46. The representative of Australia, introducing relevant parts of document WT/WGTCP/W/190,
noted that the paper referred to various international technical assistance activities undertaken by her
country in the area of  competition law and policy.  Most of these focused on institution-building.Technical assistance aimed at assisting developing countries to understand the implications of a
possible multilateral framework on competition policy was also being conducted at the bilateral,
regional and multilateral levels.  The importance of understanding how competition policy fit within
the broader framework of establishing good systems of economic governance and how it linked with
other economic policies such as trade, economic regulation and consumer protection was emphasized,particularly in light of the challenges posed by globalization and the increasing incidence of cross-
border anti-competitive conduct.
47. The representative of Korea, referring to the relevant aspects of document
WT/WGTCP/W/189, said that the Korean Fair Trade Commission had altered its approach in
organizing its annual workshops over time.  Whereas originally, a lecture style had been adopted,more recently a more interactive approach had been adopted involving the discussion amongst
participants and international experts of real cases that affected participants.
48. The representative of Egypt, referring to relevant aspects of document WT/WGTCP/W/187,
said that the types of technical assistance and capacity building called for under paragraphs 24 and 25
of the Doha Ministerial Declaration were interrelated and inter-linked.  Paragraph 24 indicated thattechnical assistance and capacity building were prerequisites that might lead eventually to a consensusWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 22
with respect to the adoption and effective implem entation of a multilateral framework of cooperation
in the field of competition policy.  Capacity building, which was crucial for many developing
countries, needed to be aimed at strengthening institutional human resources and institutions with the
means whereby such resources could be used in a sustainable and effective way. Egypt, like many
other developing countries, had undergone a comprehensive economic reform and structureadjustment programme since 1991, supported by the IMF and the World Bank.  The primary objective
of the reform was to create a decentralized market-based economy that would create a competitive
and stable environment that was free from government intervention.  Given that objective, the
adoption of a national competition law was considered to be an essential requirement.  Egypt had not
yet enacted a competition law, although provisions in various acts addressed certain types of anti-
competitive behaviour.  Further, a draft competition law was currently under discussion.  In order to
ensure that the competition regime that was sought to be established by the draft law functionedefficiently and effectively, Egypt sought technical assistance and capacity building with respect of
elements outlined in its contribution.  In particular, assistance was requested in relation to the training
of staff, specialists and experts responsible for enforcement of the law.  Assistance was also requested
for the supply of offices, facilities and other equipment for the competition authority.
49. The representative of the European Community and its member States agreed that there was a
degree of overlap between activities to be undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration since the kind of knowledge needed by negotiators to make a decision at the
next Ministerial Conference overlapped with the kind of knowledge needed to implement competition
rules, whether on the basis of domestic rules or of an international agreement.  Nevertheless, the
objectives and modalities of technical assistance provided under the two paragraphs could bedistinguished.  He noted that the European Community had contributed to the global trust fund and
intended to make more direct contributions to the work programme on the interface between trade and
competition policy.  Further, with respect to activities undertaken by the European Community with
ACP countries in the context of the preparation for the post-Cotonou negotiations, two separate
technical assistance programmes had been established.  The first had been designed to assist ACPcountries to participate in WTO negotiations and the second had been designed to assist them to
participate in bilateral and regional negotiations of economic partnership agreements with the
European Community.  The knowledge and skills nece ssary in the two cases were very similar and, in
some cases, overlapping.  Therefore, there would be synergy between the two programmes even
though they were being funded differently.  The Eu ropean Community was also organizing a training
programme for developing country negotiators that focused on improving the knowledge and skills of
negotiators in developing countries so as to e nhance their ability to effectively participate in
negotiations.  This programme did not exclusively deal with negotiations in the area of trade and
competition.  Rather, it covered a broad range of Do ha topics, including trade and competition.  The
emphasis would be on practical negotiation tools and on achieving a deeper understanding of the
negotiating issues.  The training programme would last four weeks and would be held in Autumn
2002 with around 35 participants from approximatel y 18 developing countries.  Another session with
around 70 participants from another 35 countries would take place at the beginning of 2003.  Some
other training programmes would also focus on practical negotiating skills, but would deal to a larger
extent with a number of Doha-related issues.  Insofar as the trade and competition component was
concerned, the workshop would aim to familiarize negotiators with the concept of competition law
and policy, drawing upon examples from domestic and regional competition regimes and illustratinghow the adoption and implementation of competition laws and policies could contribute to sustainable
economic development.  It was hoped that at the end of the programme, developing country
negotiators would be in a better position to analyse the policy issues on the negotiating table,
including analysing the implications such issues would have on domestic policy needs and assessing
how domestic competition policy could be implemented to address the impact of trade investmentliberalization and regulatory reform.
50. The representative of Trinidad and Tobago noted that paragraph 24 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration called for technical assistance and cap acity building to enable developing countries toWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 23
better evaluate the implications of a multilateral framework agreement on competition policy.
However, to enable countries to evaluate what the impact would be of a multilateral framework on
their economies, it was first necessary to know clea rly the parameters of the proposed framework.  It
was evident from the WTO Symposium on Trade and Competition Policy that had taken place earlier
in the week that there was some confusion relating to the scope and application of terms such as"national treatment" and "non-discrimination".  Ac cording to her understanding, under the current
proposals for a multilateral agreement these would apply only to competition legislation as such.  It
would mean that the law in a given country woul d apply to both foreign and domestic companies and
that both foreign and domestic companies would have access to the courts.  It did not touch upon
questions of market access, foreign investment policies nor other industrial or development policies.
Clarifying such issues, which was important particularly for developing countries, was a prerequisite
to Members being able to properly evaluate the implications of a multilateral framework agreement inthe area.
51. The representative of India said that, under paragraph 24 of the Doha Declaration, Ministers
recognized the needs of developing and least-developed countries for enhanced support for technical
assistance and capacity building in the area of trade and competition policy, including policy analysis
and development so that they might better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral cooperationfor their development policies and objectives, and human and institutional development.  This
paragraph had been included in the Declaration in response to concerns expressed by several
developing country Members since the inception of the Working Group regarding the implications of
any multilateral framework on their development policies and objectives.  While the seminars and
symposia that had been organized by the WTO and UNCTAD had helped in the exchange of,economic impact studies were also needed.  Such studies should include analysis of the costs and
benefits to the developing counties of a multilateral competition policy regime, including elaboration
of any policy options that might be ruled out as a result of such a regime.  They should also include an
analysis of the experience of developed countries when they were at similar stages of development to
the current developing countries at which time some of them had accorded precedence to industrialpolicy over competition policy to reap dynamic efficiency gains.  The studies should provide an
indication of the resources that developing countries would have to spend in order to meet the likely
obligations of adopting and effectively implementing a multilateral framework on competition
including provisions relating to hardcore cartels, transparency and procedural fairness, and the need to
respond to requests for voluntary cooperation.  Apart from this, he requested that future programmes
on technical assistance and capacity building mandated under paragraph 24 be designed so as to
enable developing countries to:  (i) identify the implications of various restrictive business practicesof a cross-border nature on development policies;  (ii) identify restrictive practices that were relevant
to but not included in the issues identified in the Doha Declaration as matters for clarification before
the Fifth Ministerial Conference;  (iii) identify the restrictive practices that are not relevant to
developing countries but which were referred to in the Doha Ministerial Declaration;  (iv) develop a
definition of hardcore cartels that would suit the development interests of developing countries andcomment on the implications of per se  prohibition as opposed to a rule of reason approach in that
regard;  (v) understand the implications of discussing merger control in the forum of WTO which is a
trade organization and to evaluate the implications for developing countries;  (vi) understand the
implications of the principles of non-discrimination and procedural fairness and the extent to which
such principles could impact on development policies and could be used to limit policy flexibility indeveloping countries;  (vii) understand the merits, if any, as well as limitations of voluntary
cooperation and evaluate the implications of binding rules in the area.  He also noted that in
paragraph 24 of the Declaration, Members undertook to provide strengthened and adequately
resourced assistance to respond to the needs mentioned therein.  Information was also requested on
how resources would be quantified and itemized for such technical assistance activities.
52. The representative of China said that the meaning of competition policy varied considerably
from one WTO Member to another, although there were some common elements.  Many developing
country Members did not yet have domestic competition law and regulations in place, nor had theyWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 24
implemented competition policy.  Even in the case of developing countries that had relevant laws,
they lacked experience in the implementation of such laws.  Therefore, technical assistance and
capacity building were extremely important for such countries.  Paragraph 24 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration required the provision of strengthened and adequately resourced technical assistance and
capacity building to developing and least-developed countries to address their needs, including policyanalysis and policy development.  In this light, China welcomed and appreciated efforts made by the
WTO and UNCTAD as well as other international organizations in assisting developing country
Members in the area of competition policy, either by holding national or international seminars or
providing legal advisory services to developing countries.  The Symposium on Trade and Competition
Policy which had been held at the WTO earlier in the week had been useful in promoting the
understanding of this subject among developing count ries.  As had been rightly pointed out during the
discussion under paragraph 25 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, technical assistance and capacitybuilding was a voluntary process.  However, technical assistance and capacity building that responded
to the various specific needs of developing country Members would assist not only in building up and
strengthening legal systems in the competition area, but would also facilitate deliberations in the
Working Group.  To maximize the usefulness of such activities, it was suggested that they focus on
the following areas in advance of any discussion of the possibility of reaching consensus on the
modalities for negotiations on a multilateral framework on competition policy within the WTO:
(i) assessment of the status quo in developing country Members with regard to the development of
competition policies and the formulation and implementation of competition laws;  (ii) helping
developing country Members to develop relevant legal systems and a competition culture by
providing training to national competition authorities and other related government agencies as wellas the private sector and academic institutions;  (iii) analysis of the interrelationship between market
development and competition policies in developing country Members;  (iv) analysis of the
implications of a possible multilateral framework agreement within the WTO on trade and
development for developing country Members with and without a mature domestic legal framework
on competition policy and the market economy;  and (v) information and experience sharing amongMembers in competition policy.
53. The representatives of the Dominican Republic, Jamaica
 and Malaysia  supported the requests
for studies/other inputs that had been made by the representatives of India and China and noted that
such studies would make a significant contribution towards meeting the mandate contained in
paragraph 24 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  In addition, the representative of the Dominican
Republic said that it would be useful for Members not to lose sight of the complementary relationship
between paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  The studies that had beenrequested by India were an important element in developing an ability to analyse and develop policies
on the part of developing countries.  However, in order to effectively address paragraph 25 of the
Declaration, the study should include an analysis of specific cases involving competition problems
that affected trade and had a detrimental impact upon developing countries.
54. The representative of New Zealand referred to the approach adopted in APEC with respect to
competition policy, which focused not just on the development of competition law but also on taking
the competition dimension into account in the development of other policy areas.  The first was
awareness building.  In particular, a programme had been developed to build understanding in relation
to the scope of competition policy in both the private and public sectors.  Considerable time had also
been spent exploring the implications of competition policy for social policy and industry policy.That discussion suggested that countries could pursue both social and industry policy objectives
within a competition framework w ithout compromising broader development objectives.  The second
element was managing globalization.  This involved  building confidence that competition policy was
not about fostering globalization but that, instead, it provided a framework to help deal with
globalization.  In relation to this element, the emphasis was on building an understanding of how theregulation of the private and public sectors interacted, one of key interest being the
telecommunications sector.  The third element was the focus on certain specific issues, namely
privatization, trade remedies, exemptions and ex ceptions and the role of competition law.  HeWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 25
emphasized the need to take a broader approach to competition policy rather than focusing merely on
competition law.
55. The representative of Norway noted that Norway had provided assistance in the drafting of
national competition legislation, had held seminars and would continue to consider future requests for
such technical assistance favourably.  Neverthele ss, it was Norway's impression that, until now, many
technical assistance activities at the bilateral and multilateral levels had taken place without
coordination among the various donors.  Given that the Doha Ministerial Declaration placed a heavy
emphasis on technical cooperation and capacity building, coordination between various agencies was
becoming increasingly important.  Paragraph 24 of the Declaration specifically instructed the WTO to
work in cooperation with other relevant intergovernmental organizations, including UNCTAD, in
addition to through regional and bilateral channels.  The Secretariat note dated 25 February 2002
entitled "Technical Cooperation Programme:  Competition Policy" described contacts that had beenestablished between the WTO, UNCTAD, the OECD and the World Bank and future technical
assistance plans.  UNCTAD had significant experience in providing technical assistance in the field of
competition and would continue to play a major role .  In Norway's view, it would be important for the
various organizations to try to agree on certain basic principles regarding how the different aspects of
the work could best be divided among themselves.  In this context, it would also be important todefine in more detail the role to be played by the WTO.  Further information was sought on
cooperative activities between the WTO and the other international organizations.  Further, technical
assistance in the competition policy area should be demand-driven.  However, in practice, it was not
always easy to link countries that had specific technical assistance needs with donors that had the
necessary capacity to provide such assistance.  Therefore, it was important that developing countriesthat had recently enacted competition legislation, or were in the process of doing so, expressed their
views and identified their priorities.  In this respect, the Doha/Trade-Related Technical Assistance
Database was welcome.  This Database will be established on the basis of country files and will
contain information on Trade-Related Technical Assistance (TRTA).  The purpose of the Database
will be to improve coherence, maximize available resources, and minimize duplication.  It will alsoact as a transparency mechanism, allowing the exchange and sharing of information and would
provide accountability.  All Members were urged to actively contribute in making the Database a
success.  Information was sought from the Secretariat regarding how the Database could function in
order to help fulfil the mandate contained in the Doha Ministerial Declaration with regard to the area
of trade and competition policy.
56. The representative of the Secretariat said that note had been taken of the various comments
and suggestions that had been made regarding the optimal design and delivery of technical assistance
and capacity building programmes pursuant to paragraph 24.  These would be taken into account in
designing future technical programmes in the lead-up to the next Ministerial Conference.  With regard
to the requests that had been made for the preparation of analytical studies, he said that the Secretariat
would discuss these further with the interested delegations and attempt to assess what might be
feasible in this regard.  In attempting to respond to such requests, it might be useful to draw uponwork undertaken by other inter-governmental orga nizations including UNCTAD, the OECD and the
World Bank that were active in the field.  The matter of funding for the requested studies would also
have to be considered.
57. In response to a question from the representative of the United States as to how decisions
would be made regarding the proposed studies, the representative of the Secretariat indicated that
clarification would be sought through consultations with the relevant delegations as to whether their
intent was that the studies that had been requested would be commissioned by the Working Group and
would constitute formal inputs to the Working Group's work or whether they would be undertaken
pursuant to the Secretariat's mandate to provide technical assistance and support for capacity building
under paragraph 24 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  If the former applied, a decision of theWorking Group would presumably be needed, including with respect to the terms of reference for the
study.  The representative of the European Community and its member States said that his delegationWT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 26
was flexible on the issue of how the study would be done.  However, the approach adopted by the
Secretariat should be transparent and not overly complex or formalistic.  He supported the
Secretariat's proposal to consult with delegations that had requested the studies and to report back to
the next meeting of the Working Group.  The question of funding could be dealt with subsequently.
Apart from WTO resources, bilateral resources might be made available for this purpose.  TheWorking Group agreed that the Secretariat would consult with interested delegations and would report
back to the Working Group at its next meeting on this matter.
58. With respect to the concerns expressed by the representative of Norway regarding the need
for coordination between the various agencies and organizations, the representative of the Secretariat
recalled that during the inter-secretariat meeting that had taken place on 25 January 2002, all agencieshad agreed that cooperation between them should be viewed as an ongoing process, that they would
remain in regular contact and that they would pe riodically exchange information on upcoming events
with a view to facilitating coordination and avoiding unnecessary duplication.
59. Another representative of the Secretariat noted that, in cooperation with the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, the WTO Secretariat was in the process of establishing a
database that would contain, as a benchmark, information on technical assistance and capacity
building activities but would also refer to activities carried out during 2002.  The Secretariat plannedto survey donors by questionnaire in May 2002, including selected multilateral agencies that provided
trade-related technical assistance and capacity building, so that information could be collected on the
type of technical assistance activities that had occurred or had been planned during 2002 broken down
by country and trade category.  The trade catego ries would correspond roughly to those adopted for
the 2002 WTO technical assistance plan (WT/COMTD/W/95/Rev.3).  The success of the databasewould depend largely on the responses received to th e questionnaire.  Assuming that responses to the
questionnaire were received in July-August 2002, the WTO would make it available on-line to
Members by October 2002.  Reference was also made to the fact that paragraph 41 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration mandated the Director-General to prepare an interim report on technical
assistance, technical cooperation and capacity building to the General Council.  The representative ofthe United States expressed concern about an apparent lack of coordination in the collection of data
on technical assistance activities, noting that much information had already been collected in relationto that issue, such as a survey that had recent ly been conducted by the OECD.  In response, the
representative of the Secretariat said that the c ountry files that would be created in the WTO/DAC
database would permit identification of gaps in the provision of technical assistance and minimize any
duplication.
60. The representative of UNCTAD noted that UNCTAD had been referred to in paragraph 24 of
the Doha Declaration. Specifically, the Doha Declaration called for "work in cooperation with other
relevant organizations, including UNCTAD to provide, strengthen and adequately resource assistance
to respond to the needs of developing countries and least-developed countries, including policy
analysis and development so that they may better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral
cooperation in the field of competition law and policy for their development policies and objectives".He referred to the recent contribution of UNCTAD in the technical assistance area, particularly the
organization of a number of regional meetings in various parts of the world in full cooperation with
WTO and other relevant organizations including the OECD, regional organizations and individual
States.  With respect to the post-Doha work, UNCTAD had agreed to cooperate closely with the WTO
and other relevant organizations.  The aim of the cooperation was to help developing and least-developed countries to better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral cooperation for their
development and to safeguard their interests in possible negotiations of a multilateral competition
framework.  Cooperation had already started in that it had been agreed that UNCTAD and the WTO
would jointly participate in their respective meetings.  A representative of the WTO Secretariat in
addition to the Chairman of the Working Group had participated in the first round of regionalmeetings that had recently taken place.  The first regional meeting had taken place in Panama City on
21-23 March 2002 for Latin America and the Caribbean.   The second had taken place on 28-WT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 27
29 March in Tunis for all of Africa plus a number of Arab countries.  The third had taken place on 16-
18 April in Hong Kong for Asia and the Pacific.  The fourth would take place in Odessa, Ukraine on
23–26 April.  A draft report contained the issues discussed during the regional meetings held in
Panama, Tunis and Hong Kong.  It contained a consolidation of lessons learned and issues deserving
further clarification in relation to competition policy and multilateral negotiations.  Any furtheradditional points would be added before the final document was published.  The issues raised in the
report would not in any way prejudice decisions taken in the Fifth Ministerial Meeting in Mexico in
2003.  The objective of the meetings was educative, especially for countries and delegates unfamiliar
with competition policy issues.  They performed an exploratory function in that they explored what a
possible competition policy multilateral framework would or could cover. They also performed an
evaluative function in that the pros and cons of the possible elements to be included in a multilateral
framework were considered.  Each of the meetings had similar agendas, namely:  (a) description ofcountry, bilateral and regional experiences to determine whether common lessons could be learnt for a
possible multilateral framework;  (b) an overview of possible elements of a multilateral framework;
(c) the main issues for developing countries includ ing special and differential treatment, regulation of
hardcore cartels, control of abuses of dominance, mergers, dispute settlement mechanisms including
dispute mediation and peer reviews;  and (d) general review of proposals for further studies, researchand development.  Further information regarding the regional meetings could be accessed from the
UNCTAD website:  www.unctad.org/competition.  A CDROM of documents submitted for the Hong
Kong seminar was available.  He recalled that UNCTAD had its own multilateral competition
framework, the UN Set of Principles and Rules on Competition, that had been adopted more than 20
years ago and was still considered valid following the fourth review conference that took place inSeptember 2000.  UNCTAD was implementing the Set, which was a voluntary code, through
technical assistance and capacity building to help developing countries in understanding the issues
raised in the competition area and how to effectively implement competition legislation.
61. The Chairman drew attention, inter alia , to the following points, emphasizing that they were
not in any way implied to be comprehensive and were simply personal impressions which had no
official standing:
- Note had been taken by several delegations of the apparent complementarity between
technical assistance and capacity building undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 24 and
25 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, respectively.
- Clarification had been sought with respect to the relationship between competition
policy and economic development and, more particularly, the costs associated with
implementing competition policy in developing countries.
- The view had been expressed that the effectiveness of technical assistance would be
enhanced if, in addition to the operational requirements and modalities of competition
policy, it addressed the relationship of such policy with industrial policy.
III. OTHER BUSINESS
A. NATIONAL EXPERIENCES
62. The representative of Korea, introducing relevant parts of document WT/WGTCP/W/189,
noted that many countries that did not have competition laws in place had raised questions regarding
the relationship between competition law and economic development.  Korea had experienced a
foreign exchange crisis in 1997.  Many businesses had closed down during this period and many
workers lost their jobs.  To deal with this crisis, Korea had borrowed a significant amount of moneyfrom the international financial organizations, namely the IMF and the IBRD.  During that period, a
view was held within the business sector that to ameliorate the effects of the economic crisis, it had
been necessary to relax competition law to protec t Korean companies from international competitors.WT/WGTCP/M/17
Page 28
However, despite that view, the IMF and the IBRD had strongly recommended that Korea enforce its
competition law more intensively on the ground that one of the reasons for the Korean economic
crisis was the fact that market mechanisms had not worked effectively.  They had also advised that
many state-owned corporations should be privatized.  At the time, Korea had followed the advice
given it by the international financial organizations.  The KFTC had played a major role inrestructuring the Korean economy into a market economy.  It had spoken out with a strong voice in
support of the privatization of Korean public corporations.  It had also stressed that in the process of
privatization, competition principles should be applied.  Currently, the Korean economy was in a
significantly better state than prior to the 1997 economic crisis.  Thus, Korea's experience since the
crisis had highlighted the need for and importance of competition policy as an underpinning of and
counterbalance to industrial policy, and as a bulwark of a vigorous market economy.
B. REQUESTS FOR OBSERVER STATUS FROM INTERNATIONAL
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
S
63. The Working Group agreed to revert to requests made by SELA, the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, the South Centre and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) at its next mee ting, having regard to the ongoing consultations
on related matters in the framework of the General Council.
C. DISTRIBUTION OF DOCUMENTATION
64. The representative of Malaysia requested that Working Group documents be e-mailed to all
delegations upon their receipt by the Secretariat, in addition to their circulation in hard-copy form.  He
noted, in this respect, that while documents were available on the Documents Dissemination Facility,
the electronic formatting of documents was not ideal and Members were required to check regularlyto determine whether new documents were available.  Support for this request was expressed by the
representatives of the European Community and its member States, New Zealand
 and the Philippines.
The Chairman indicated that the Secretariat would explore what could be done in response to the
request.
D. PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP
65. The Chairman noted that the next meeting of the Working Group would take place on 1-2
July, back-to-back with the annual meeting of the UNCTAD Expert Group on Competition Law and
Policy which would take place on 3-5 July.  As had been agreed at the informal meeting of the
Working Group held on 26 February, in addition to the standing item relating to technical assistance
and capacity building as called for by paragraph 24 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the Working
Group would consider two of the specific elements set out in paragraph 25 of the Declaration, namely
provisions on hardcore cartels and modalities for voluntary cooperation.  The Working Group agreed
that Members would provide written contributions to the Secretariat not later than Friday 14 June, to
permit their translation and circulation to other delegations in advance of the meeting.  Further, as had
been agreed during the informal meeting of 26 February, the Secretariat would prepare two
background papers in advance of the meeting of 1-2 July, one on hardcore cartels and the other on
modalities for voluntary cooperation.  In response to a query from the representative of UNCTAD, the
Chairman also indicated that the summary report that UNCTAD had prepared on the basis of the
regional workshops that it had organized thus far in 2002 could be made available at the WorkingGroup's meeting in July.
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