RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/143  
 
6 October  2022 
(22-7539) Page: 1/99 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
7 AND 8  JULY  2022  
CHAIRPERSON: MR  ETIENNE OUDOT DE DAINVILLE  
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/22 and WTO/AIR/CTG/22/Rev.1; the proposed agenda for the meeting was 
circulated in document  G/C/W/811.  
 
The delegate of Australia  requested to be included as a co -sponsor of Agenda Item  11, "India – 
Restrictions on Imports of Certain Pulses". The meeting proceede d on the basis of the following 
agenda:  
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  ................................ ....................  4 
2   WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION:  
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION (G/L/1385/ADD.2)  ................................ ................................ ..... 4 
3   UNITED KINGDOM'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED 
KINGDOM (G/L/1386/ADD.2)  ................................ ................................ .........................  5 
4   MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND  
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHAD ON BEHALF OF  
THE LDC  GROUP (WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752)  ................................ ...............................  5 
5   INDIA – IMPORT POLICY ON TYRES – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU,  
KINMEN AND MATSU, AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ..............  8 
6   AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, LITHUANIA, NEW ZEALAND, 
SWITZERLAND, UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE 
RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA – REQUEST FROM  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ................................ ................................ ............................  10 
7   EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA,  
COLOMBIA,  COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, PANAMA, 
PARAGUAY, PERU, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/767/REV.1)  ..............  19 
8   CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (CSAR) – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 26 
9   INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 30 
10   INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 32 
11   INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ .........  35 G/C/M/143  
 
- 2 - 
 
  12   UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS –  
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ .........  37 
13   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS:  
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL AND URUGUAY  ................................ ... 37 
14   UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL  
AND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  39 
15   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS  
GEOGR APHICAL INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM NEW ZEALAND AND URUGUAY  ..........  40 
16   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (CBAM)  ............  41 
– STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ...........................  41 
– STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ..........................  41 
17   EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ................................ ................................ ............................  46 
18   UNITED STATES – DISCRIMINATORY QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION ON STEEL 
AND/OR ALUMINIUM IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ..............  47 
19   UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR CHINESE ENTERPRISES – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 48 
20   UNITED STATES – MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 48 
21   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION  
ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ . 48 
22   EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS  
PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ..........  49 
23   EUROPEAN UNION – BELGIUM'S LAW INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL SECURITY 
MEASURES FOR THE PROVISION OF MOBILE 5G  SERVICES –  
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 49 
24   CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE  
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ...... 50 
25   CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 53 
26   CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY 
POINT OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
AND THE UNITED STATES ................................ ................................ ...............................  59 
27   EGYPT – HALAL CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTED FOOD AND 
BEVERAGE PRODUCTS - REQUEST FROM CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  .................  62 
28   PAKISTAN – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON FOODSTUFFS AND CONSUMER GOODS – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................  65 
29   MEXICO – CONF ORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE FOR CHEESE UNDER MEXICAN 
OFFICIAL STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 – REQUEST FROM  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 66 
30   INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM FREE  
CERTIFICATE ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONSIGNMENT –  
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ .............  67 
31   PANAMA – ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING – REQUEST 
FROM CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ...... 69 G/C/M/143  
 
- 3 - 
 
  32   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES,  
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN  
IMPORTED PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM SWITZERLA ND AND THE UNITED STATES ....... 70 
33   CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  ................................ ..... 71 
34   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST  
FROM JAPAN AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ .........................  74 
35   NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – REQUEST FROM THAILAND  ...............  75 
36   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS –  
REQUEST FROM THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ............................  76 
37   INDIA – PLAIN COPIER PAPER QUALITY ORDER  2020 –  
REQUEST FROM INDONESIA ................................ ................................ ...........................  78 
38   PHILIPPINES – SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ON INSTANT COFFEE – REQUEST FROM 
INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  79 
39   UNITED KINGDOM – ENVIRONMENTAL ACT: FORESTRY COMMODITIES –  
REQUEST FROM BRAZIL AND INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ...... 80 
40   EUROPEAN UNION – COUNTERVAILING DUTIES (CVD) ON STAINLESS STEEL 
COLD -ROLLED FLAT (SSCR)  – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  ................................ ............  82 
41   EUROPEAN UNION – EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL (CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT 
MECHANISM AND DEFORESTATION FREE COMMODITIES) – REQUEST FROM  
BRAZIL AND INDONESIA ................................ ................................ ................................  84 
42   AUSTRALIA – INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW OF ANTI -DUMPING DUTIES  
ON A4  COPY PAPER – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  ................................ ........................  92 
43   PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA – EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON  
AGRICULTURAL AND HYDROBIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM PERU  ...............  93 
44   ECUADOR – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON GRAPES AND ONIONS – REQUEST  
FROM PERU  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  94 
45   PANAMA – UNDU E DELAYS AND EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON AGRICULTURAL  
AND HYDROBIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM PERU  ................................ ........  95 
46   NIGERIA – RESTRICTIVE P OLICIES ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST  
FROM BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  96 
47   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION 
(EU)  2018/825 – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ...... 97 
48   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC  NO. 1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATIO N) – 
REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .. 97 
49   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 98 
49.1   Annual Plan of Meetings  ................................ ................................ ............................. 98 
49.2   Functioning of the CTG and its Subsidiary Bodies  ................................ .......................... 98 
49.3   Date of Next Meeting  ................................ ................................ ................................ 99 
 
 
The Chairperson  observed that, given the long agenda, it would be preferable for Members to keep 
their interventions short, if possible. He invited those Members that were planning to submit longer 
written statements for incorporation into the meeting's minutes to expres sly indicate their intention 
to do so when taking the floor. To ensure transparency in the preparation of the minutes, the 
Secretariat would only reflect what had been said at the meeting, except in those cases where a 
Member had explicitly indicated that it was their intention to submit a longer statement in writing.  
 
Finally, the Chairperson informed delegations that, under agenda item "Other Business", he would 
report on the Annual Plan of Meetings (document  RD/CTG/1 6), on the functioning of the CTG and 
its subsidiary bodies, in particular regarding  his preliminary reflections concerning the G/C/M/143  
 
- 4 - 
 
  implementation of the MC12  mandate and the possible work that may need to be undertaken by the 
Council and, finally,  on the date of the Council's next meeting.  
 
The agenda was so agreed . 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and following the adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparen cy Mechanism1, the CTG was to be kept informed of Members' notifications of new 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). He informed the Council that two  RTAs had been notified to the 
CRTA , as followed:  
• Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Between the EF TA States and 
Indonesia, Goods (WT/REG464/N/1); and  
 
• Free Trade Agreement Between Nicaragua and the Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Goods – Notification of Suspension 
(WT/REG267/N/2/Rev.1).  
 
1.2.  The Council took note  of the information provided.  
2  WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (G/L/1385/ADD.2)  
2.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the  agenda at the request of the 
European Union.  
2.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
2.3.  The European Union  recall s that on 22  December  2020 it submitted 
communication  G/SECRET/42/Add.3 , which  relates to the ongoing process under Article  XXVIII of 
GATT  1994 on the apportionment of the EU's tariff -rate quota concessions following the withdrawal 
of the United Kingdom from the European Union.  The communication highlighted that the EU strives 
for the rapid and successful conclusion of the negot iations and consultations that are still ongoing.  
2.4.  The European Union  is pleased to report good progress. Agreements were formally signed with 
six partners and negotiations were finalized and are going through domestic validation procedures 
with five  other partners. In addition, there are very good prospects of closing negotiations with 
several negotiating and consultation partners with whom the EU is  advancing towards initialling  a 
draft agreement.  
2.5.  Against that background, in line with established practice in the framework of 
Article  XXVIII  negotiations (also under Article  XXIV:6), the European Union  believes that it is 
desirable to extend the timelines of Article  XXVIII:3 of GATT  1994 by six  months, that is, until 
1 January  2023. As alw ays, this is of course without prejudice to the question of whether there are 
any rights to withdraw concessions pursuant to Article  XXVIII:3(a) and (b).  On this basis, the EU 
and other Members currently engaged in these Article  XXVIII  procedures can conti nue to focus on 
bringing these negotiations and consultations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.  
2.6.  The European Union  remains fully committed to constructively and successfully conducting 
these negotiations and consultations so as to arrive at m utual agreement. It hopes to achieve this 
within this extended deadline.  Therefore, the European Union  proposes that the Council for Trade in 
Goods take note of this communication and of the extension of the deadline as indicated in 
communication  G/L/1385/ Add.2 , until 1  January  2023.  
2.7.  The Council took note  of the communication and statement made.  
 
1 Documents  WT/REG/16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 5 - 
 
  3  UNITED KINGDOM'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER 
ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 
(G/L/1386/ADD.2)  
3.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of the 
United Kingdom . 
3.2.  The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
3.3.  The United Kingdom refers Members to document  G/L/1386/A dd.2, which was circulated by 
the Secretariat on 31  May 2022. The document outlines that the UK will be extending the timelines 
under Article  XXVIII :3 of the GATT by six months , until 1  January  2023.  
3.4.  Members will be aware that the United Kingdom  has been in ong oing discussions with partners 
with respect to obligations within the UK 's goods schedule.  Those discussions have been 
predominantly positive and productive. They have resulted in significant progress with the majority 
of Members in the process.  
3.5.  The United  Kingdom has  been consistently clear at this forum and others that it is strongly 
committed to working closely with WTO  Members in discussions on its Goods Schedule with the aim 
of concluding discussions successfully with its partners.  The UK envisage s that this extension will 
facilitate this outcome, so scope for additional extensions beyond this will be limited.  
3.6.  The United Kingdom  continues to have constructive discussions with those Members remaining 
in the process. Indeed , the UK is pleased to announce that it is in the final agreement phase with 
the majority. The UK  hopes to sustain this progress over the next six months.  
3.7.  The United Kingdom  thanks all Members that have engaged constructively with it during this 
process. The UK  will further update Members following the conclusion of Article  XXVIII negotiations, 
in line with past WTO  practice.  
3.8.  The Council took note  of the communication and statement made.  
4  MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUA NT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHAD ON BEHALF OF THE LDC  GROUP 
(WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752)  
4.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of Chad 
on behalf of the LDC  Group . The Chairperson understood that the main thrust of this proposal was 
to allow graduated LDC  Members to have a similar treatment to that granted to certain developing 
countries listed in Annex  VII(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Counterv ailing Measures 
(SCM  Agreement) . Following a request at the CTG's meeting of July  2021, the Secretariat had 
updated the GNP  calculations for all Members, which had been circulated in November  2021 in 
document  G/SCM/W/585.  
4.2.  The delegate of Chad, on behalf of  the LDC  Group,  indicated the following:  
4.3.  Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group,  recall s that this proposal dates back to 2018.  The intention 
of the LDC Group with this proposal is to correct  a technical mistake in Annex VII, such that 
non-LDC developing countries can also benefit from a level of flexibility under Art icle 27.2 of the 
SCM Agreement in terms of export subsidies  where their GNP per capita falls below  USD 1,000 in 
constant 1990  dollars.  
4.4.  In this regard , Chad considers that the argum ent is clear for allowing graduated LDCs to 
benefit , as do Annex  VII developing countries , from the same conditions mentioned in Article  10.4 
of the Doha Decision  on the Implementation -Related Issues and Concerns (WT/MIN(01)/17). 2 In 
 
2 "Paragraph  10.4 of document  WT/MIN(01)/17  reads as follows:  "Agrees that if a Member has been 
excluded from the list in paragraph  (b) of Annex  VII to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, it shall be re -included in it when its GNP per capita falls back below US$  1,000."  G/C/M/143  
 
- 6 - 
 
  this provision,  if a Member has been  excluded from the list in Annex  VII(b)  because it has a  
GNP per capita higher than USD  1,000 in constant 1990  dollars , it can be re -included on that list 
when its GNP per capita falls below that threshold . Therefore, LDCs  losing that status should clearly 
be allowed to  benefit from Art icle 10.4 of the Doha Decision on Implementation -Related Issues and 
Concerns . 
4.5.  The LDC  Group requests that , in light of MC12,  a decision be taken on this issue . It looks 
forward to benefiting  from the advice of the Council  to this end, and encourages Members to focus 
on this important LDC issue.  In the  current dynamic of the lead -up to MC12, the LDC  Group hopes 
that its submission can at last be adopted by the G eneral Council.  
4.6.  In thi s regard, the LDC  Group also counts  on WTO Members ' understand ing of  the difficulties 
faced by LDCs . Again, it is an important issue. It is a purely technical issue. And the LDC  Group sees 
no differences of opinion on the issue because all that it is really proposing is to add countries back 
onto the list such that graduated LDCs should be considered equal to developing countries in the 
context of Annex  VII of the SCM  Agreement.  
4.7.  The delegate of Bangladesh  indicated the following:  
4.8.  Bangladesh aligns itself with the statement delivered by Chad on behalf of the LDC  Group . 
4.9.  According to Art icle 27.2(a) of the SCM Agreement , some Members are eligible to enjoy 
flexibilities . Those Members are specified in Annex  VII of the Agreement in two  separate categories: 
(a) the LDCs ; and (b) some developing countries, as long as their GNI  per capita remains below 
USD 1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms . The LDC  Group 's submission proposes that an LDC 
after graduation, as long as its GNI  per capita remains below the threshold of USD  1,000 in constant 
1990 US dollar terms, should be allowed to use the flexibility under Article  27.2 of the 
SCM Agreement like the Annex  VII(b) listed developing countries . 
4.10.   Bangladesh  thank s the Secretariat for its note contained in document  G/SCM/W/585 , dated 
22 November  2021, with the title "GNP per Capita Calculations for All WTO  Members Using the 
Methodology in G/SCM/38 ". The Secretariat 's calculation confirms the concerns of the LDC  Group. 
It is clear from the note that many LDCs, that is, countries listed in Annex  VII(a), may graduate 
from the LDC  category with a GNI per capita below USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar s. 
Naturally, WTO  Members collectively need to search for the respons e to the question of whether 
these LDCs , having a GNI threshold below USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms after 
graduation , can avail of the flexibility enjoyed by other developing countries with the same threshold . 
The LDC  Group believes that , if WTO Members can find the answer to this question, the concerns of 
those LDCs  can easily be addressed . Bangladesh request s that WTO  Members deliberate on this.  
4.11.   The LDC  Group is grateful to all the Members that have been supporting this proposal since 
its submission in 2018. The LDC Group also thanks the European Union  and the United States for 
opportunities to discuss bilaterally their concerns about data availability and information on export 
subsidy. The LDC  Group is not sure whether these concerns were determinant or the decisive factors 
for taking a decision on Annex  VII. In this context, the LDC  Group asks the following:  (a) while 
determining the eligibility criterion for inclusion in the Annex  VII(b) list  (that is, GNI  per capita below 
USD 1,000 in constant 1990  US dollars) , were the developing countries required to provide data ; 
and ( b) was there any condition that the flexibility  would be applicable to those developing counties 
that would only provide export subsidies ? The LDC  Group  request s WTO Members to consider these 
questions while taking a decision on the proposal.  
4.12.   Bangladesh, along with the LDC  Group, will continue working with the delegations of the 
European Union  and the United States and welcomes further suggestions from WTO Members on 
how to achieve a positive result in this regard.  
4.13.   The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
4.14.   Nepal associate s itself with the statement delivered by Chad on behalf of the LDC  Group.  
Nepal refers to its statement s delivered under this agenda item at the Council's meeting s of G/C/M/143  
 
- 7 - 
 
  1 November  2021 and 21  April 20223, and would like to reiterate that this provision needs to be 
applied in a fair manner by extending the facility to WTO Members even after graduation if the 
graduating LDC  Members are eligible as per the provision and spirit of the Agreement.  Furthermore, 
Nepal  is of the view that this matter should not be linked to o ther special and differential treatment 
provisions.  Rather, i t is just a matter of ensuring justice to those WTO Members that graduate from 
LDC status but still have a low level of GNI  per capita , thus meeting this criterion.  Finally, Nepal 
considers that this is nothing new but only a minor adjustment in the letter of the SCM Agreement 
as per the spirit and objective of the provision.  
4.15.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
4.16.   As the United States  indicated in April, it thank s the Secretariat for producing  the updated 
calculations in  document  G/CSCM/W/585.  The US has reviewed this document carefully, and 
unfortunately, the Secretariat 's calculations confirm US concerns , namely that there remain gaps in 
the information that is n eeded for this proposal to be workable from a technical perspective.  
Nevertheless, the United States is willing to consider ideas and proposals on how to address those 
gaps, or otherwise address the issue raised by this proposal.  
4.17.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
4.18.   India thank s the delegation of Chad for the inclusion of this agenda item. India has already 
supported this proposal in earlier meetings of the Council and its position remains the same.  
4.19.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the  following:  
4.20.   The European Union  thanks Chad, Bangladesh,  and Nepal for engaging informally with the EU  
as well as for the clarifications just provided. Nevertheless, the EU's position remains as expressed 
at previous meetings.  The EU supports constructive initiatives to better integrate LDCs into the 
multilateral trading system. The EU is also mindful of the challenges that graduating LDCs face.  For 
these reasons, the EU encourage s a discussion of this proposal , as any Special and Diff erential 
Treatment (SDT) proposal , on the basis of analysis that shows where specific problems lie.  
4.21.   As the European Union has repeatedly mentioned, in order to inform the examination of this 
proposal, it would be useful to have an understanding of the actu al use of export subsidies by LDCs 
in order to establish whether a transition period is needed that would allow graduated LDCs to 
continue using them.  To this end, p ossibilities for technical assistance via the WTO are available for 
support regarding notif ications or any other form of transparency.  In conclusion, the  European Union 
stands ready to engage in informal consultations with the LDC  Group on this matter.  
4.22.   The delegate of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
4.23.   Nigeria wishes to refer to its previous state ment on this proposal and reaffirms its support for 
it. 
4.24.   The delegate of Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group,  indicated the following:  
4.25.   Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, takes note of Members' interventions and thanks those 
WTO Members that have offered their s upport. In this regard, the LDC  Group remains ready to 
respond to any questions posed to it, and remains open, flexible, and constructive in spirit with the 
aim of achieving consensus on its proposal.  
4.26.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
 
3 Document  G/C/M/ 141, paragraphs  6.26-6.34, and document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  4.21-4.22. G/C/M/143  
 
- 8 - 
 
  5  INDIA – IMPORT POLICY ON TYRES – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND 
MATSU, AND THAILAND  
5.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of the 
European Union, Indonesia, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, 
and Thailand . 
5.2.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
5.3.  The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu wishes to register, once 
again, its concerns regarding India 's licensing regime on the importation of pneumatic tyres under 
Notification No.  12/2015 -2020 on "Amendment in Import Policy on T yres" of 12  June 2020. 
5.4.  Members will have noted that Chinese Taipei has brought this case to the attention of the 
Council many times. Chinese Taipei  appreciate s that it had a bilateral discussion with the delegation 
of India in May of this year and thank s India for its  written response , which Chinese Taipei received 
on 6 July. Chinese Taipei will look carefully at India's written response and revert back with its 
comments in due course.  However, Chinese Taipei  wishes to emphasize that the measure concerned 
continues to cause confusion and obstacles for exporters, and is leading to a significant negative 
impact on bilateral trade. Difficulties in obtaining import licen ces and lengthy approval processes 
have already sev erely reduced the levels of Chinese Taipei's  exports to India, which have decreased 
by 60% in 2020 and 2021, compared to the same period in 2019.  
5.5.  It appears to Chinese Taipei  that India is issuing import licen ces only for certain kinds of 
pneumatic tyres t hat are not produced domestically, and yet at the same time it is setting a limit on 
the number of such tyres that can be imported. Such a  measure clearly hampers access to India's  
market for Chinese Taipei's tyre products. Furthermore, it may constitute a n import ban or restriction 
on certain tyre s, which is clearly incompatible with WTO  rules concerning quantitative restrictions.  
5.6.  Chinese Taipei  hereby urge s India to ensure that all applications that are in full compliance 
with the relevant quality standar ds for tyre products should be granted without hindrance or undue 
delay. Chinese Taipei calls upon India to review its current practices and to engage with those 
Members concerned with a view to resolving the issue in a timely and constructive manner.  
5.7.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
5.8.  Indonesia thank s India for providing information at previous meetings of the CTG and the 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT  Committee ) in response to Indonesia 's concerns over 
India's import policy restrictions  on tyre products. However, Indonesia is  disappointed that India has 
not yet presented an adequate solution  to overcome this issue.  
5.9.  Indonesia is fully aware that India has imposed import restrictions on tyre products of certain 
types and size categories correspond ing to tyres produced by India 's domestic  tyre manufacturers.  
This policy was implemented shortly after India imposed a temporary import ban on tyre products 
for a period of six months, as stated in notification  document  No. 12/2015 -2020, dated 
12 June 2020, regarding "Changes in Tyre Import Policy ". This policy's  implementation  has the 
potential to hamper Indonesia's tyre exports to India,  considering that the range of tyre products 
that can be exported is very limited . The policy even has the potential to eliminate market access 
for imported tyre products given the various types and sizes of tyres produced by India,  which is 
one of the world's main producers of tyres.  
5.10.   Although there are no official provisions go verning the restrictions on the import of these 
tyres, importers are required to make a separate statement via email regarding import restrictions 
for certain types and size categories of tyres that could be produced domestically  in India , where 
violations  of this requirement would result in criminal sanctions  based on the FTDR  Act 1992. In 
addition , Indonesia is of the view that the aforementioned policy applies discriminatory treatment in 
its implementation . Indeed, the policy is applied selectively  by targeting certain WTO Members 
having the potential to become India 's competitors , and by hamper ing market access for domestic 
tyre products . De facto, it also  hamper s export s of Indonesia 's tyre products.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 9 - 
 
  5.11.   Moreover, Indonesia  also requests further clarification regarding the implementation of 
marking fee s on tyre products that are using the IS  mark. Indonesia is of the view that the imposition 
of the IS   marking fee on tyre products has the potential to burden businesses and create 
unnecessary barri ers to international trade. The imposition of such marking fees does not have a 
valid justification and has no relation to the protection of human health, safety, or prevention of 
fraudulent practices . 
5.12.   Indonesia request s that India immediately review its two restrictive import policies on tyres 
to ensure that the policies in question are in accordance with WTO  principles and regulations , in 
particular regarding the principle s of national treatment and non -discrimination , as well as the 
provisions in Article  2.1 and Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement . 
5.13.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
5.14.   The European Union reiterates its concerns raised several times regarding India's  licensing 
regime for  the importation of pneumatic tyres under No tification N o. 12/2015 -2020.  Despite this 
issue having been  raised on multiple occasions in this Council and in other WTO  bodies ( including 
the Market Access and TRIMs  Committee s), there has been no progress towards a possible 
resolution.  To the contrary , the EU hears from its tyre exporters regarding their concerns about the 
increasing restrictiveness of the measure. Indeed, the volume of tyres under the import licen ces 
granted by the Indian authorities is becoming smaller and smaller , which is to the detriment not 
only of foreign tyre manufacturers , but also of local customers.  
5.15.   The European Union  continues to be concerned about the effect of this measure given that  
India's import s of tyres have been decreasing since June  2020. Only a limited number of licences 
have been granted to EU  tyre manufacturers. In addition, these licen ces are limited in terms of 
duration, quantity,  and type of tyres , which  amounts to a blatant discrimination against EU tyre 
manufacturers.  
5.16.   The European Union  therefore urges Indi a to reconsider and eliminate any implicit or explicit 
quantitative or other restrictions ( for example, end-use principle) on the import of replacement tyres 
that are contrary to WTO  rules. 
5.17.   The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
5.18.   Like other Membe rs taking the floor on this issue , Thailand reiterate s its concern regarding 
India's import policies on tyres , which continue to affect Thailand 's tyre exports to India 
considerably. For example , in 2021, Thailand's tyre exports to India declined by 40.23% in value , 
or 45.23% in terms of volume , when compared to those of 2019, before the measure was 
implemented. Moreover, for  the first four  months of 2022, the exports of tyres from Thailand to 
India fell by 45.21% in value , or 53.36% in term s of volume , compared to the same period in 2019.  
5.19.   In this connection, while the situation regarding the issuance of import licen ces for tyres by 
India's  authorit ies has somewhat ameliorated, Thailand's  tyre exporters have  nevertheless been 
seeking more information about how India's authorities  determin e import quota s for tyres. 
Therefore, for the sake of transparency , Thailand requests India  to share such information at the 
earliest opportunity . 
5.20.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
5.21.   India thank s the delegations of the European Union, Indonesia, Separate Customs Territory 
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and Thailand,  for their continued interest in this issue , which 
has been discussed previously in this Council, as well as in the Committee on Market Access and the 
Committee on Import Licensing.  
5.22.   India wishes to reiterate that its non-automatic licensing requirements for tyres are 
administered in a manner consistent with the rules of the WTO  Agreement on Im port Licensing 
Procedures, including with respect to the time -frames for the grant ing of import licen ces. 
Furthermore, the  licensing procedure in question is being administered in a fair manner , as reflected 
in the fact that a number of licen ces have been granted following their approval by the Exim 
Facilitation Committee.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 10 - 
 
  5.23.   In this regard , the delegation of Chinese Taipei  had approached India for a bilateral meeting 
on its specific questions. India had  responded to th ose questions , including by providing the details 
of the licen ces granted to Chinese Taipei's exporters. Specifically , 21 of 28 applications with the 
origin mark of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu had been 
approved and only one had been rejected in the previous two years.  
5.24.   Similarly, in previous meetings, India ha d answered the questions raised by Indonesia on the 
marking fee charged by the Bureau of Indian Standards  (BIS)  in its Product Certification Scheme , 
as per the BIS (Conformity Assessment) Regulation, 2018 under the BIS  Act, 2016. India considers 
that this process is in conformity with the WTO's regulations, including the granting of national 
treatment in the way that the certification scheme is admini stered.  
5.25.   In addition, India thank s the delegation of Thailand for the specific data that it had requested , 
the details of which India had received on the previous day . This data would be shared with Capital 
for their comments.  
5.26.   India remain s committed to address ing these concerns bilaterally.  
5.27.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
6  AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, LITHUANIA, NEW ZEALAND, 
SWITZERLAND, UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE 
RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
6.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of the 
Russian Federation.  
6.2.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
6.3.  The Russian Federation had introduced its concerns under this agenda item at length during 
the Council's previous meeting. On this occasion, Russia nevertheless wishes to reiterate its deep 
concern regarding the illegal and unjustified trade restrictive me asures imposed by certain 
WTO Members in respect of Russia.  
6.4.  New unilateral trade restrictive measures have been introduced against Russia since the 
Council's previous meeting . These measures include but are not limited to the following restrictions 
on trad e in goods : (i) by Canada,  an export ban on wadding, gauze, bandages and similar articles 
impregnated or coated with pharmaceutical substances, bulldozers and angledozers, tractors, mobile 
drilling derricks, instruments and appliances used in medical, surg ical, dental or veterinary sciences, 
ozone therapy, oxygen therapy, aerosol therapy, artificial respiration or other therapeutic respiration 
apparatus, medical, surgical, dental or veterinary furniture (for example, operating tables, 
examination tables, ho spital beds with mechanical fittings, and dentists' chairs);  (ii) by the European 
Union , an import ban on Russian crude oil and petroleum products, prohibition on transfer or 
transport to third  countries of Russian crude oil and petroleum products obtained  from Russian crude 
oil, or sales to purchasers in third  countries, and a prohibition on technical assistance, brokering 
services or financing or financial assistance, related to the transport to third  countries of crude oil 
or petroleum products which ori ginate in Russia or which have been exported from Russia;  (iii) by 
Japan,  an import ban on certain machines and mechanical appliances, machinery, plant or laboratory 
equipment;  (iv) by New Zealand,  an export prohibition on aircraft and marine engines, gas turbines, 
radio navigational aid apparatus, radio -broadcast receivers, electronic integrated circuits, tractors, 
tankers, refrigerated vessels, vessels for the transport of goods and other vessels for the transport 
of both persons and goods;  (v) by Switzer land, an  import ban on lignite and coal, oil and petroleum 
products, as well as quantitative restrictions on imports of Russian fertilizers, and a prohibition to 
provide technical assistance, brokering services or financial assistance in connection with th e 
transportation outside Switzerland and the European Union of crude oil or petroleum products 
originating in or coming from Russia;  (vi) by the United Kingdom, a prohibition on export of oil 
refining goods and technology, iron and steel products; an import ban on cement, wood and articles 
of wood, mineral or chemical fertilizers, as well as the application of an additional import duty of 
35% for cereals, oil seeds,  meat, products of the milling industry, and soybean oil;  (vii) by the 
United States, the imposition of an additional import duty of 35% for certain chemical products , 
wood and wood products, iron and steel, tractors and other products . Lithuania's ban on transit to G/C/M/143  
 
- 11 - 
 
  the Russian region of Kaliningrad causes a separate bewilderment. This measure , which  aims to 
blockade Kaliningrad , contradicts not only the WTO's rules but also runs counter to the official 
position of the EU and its legal acts.  
6.5.  As mentioned du ring the Council's previous meeting , the above list represents just a fraction 
of the measures adopted by those WTO  Members listed under this agenda item . However, for the 
sake of time , Russia is not specifying all of the restrictions. Nevertheless , these measures, including 
the measures mentioned at the Council 's previous meeting , have already had an immense impact 
upon Russia's trade in goods.  Moreover, coupled with the restrictions on trade in goods, the 
restrictive measures imposed on Russia's  largest b anks, insurance agencies, transportation 
companies, export support agencies, industrial companies, Russian seaports, and legal and natural 
persons, including top management and the owners of the largest Russian companies , are provok ing 
global economic, energy , and food crises.  
6.6.  The Russia n Federation  notes that it is the third  largest oil  and second  largest natural gas 
producer in the world ; it is also  the world 's largest oil and gas exporter. Unilateral measures against 
Russian oil, petroleum p roducts and gas producers, and Russia's financial sector, as well as pressure 
on international transportation, trading companies, and foreign governments not to work with the 
Russian oil and gas sector , have led to the increases in oil and gas prices on the international market.  
In addition, high energy prices translate into higher consumer prices across the full spectrum of 
products, including food, thus fuelling expectations of inflation and slowing global economic growth.  
6.7.  As for food crises, the Russian Federation underline s that it is one of the world's major 
producers and exporters of wheat and fertilizers , thus making a vital contribution to global food 
security.  In this regard, Russia also notes that, according to the FAO's latest estimates , global wheat 
production is expected to increase in the season of 2021/22 by 6.2% compared to the level of 
production in the season of 2018/19 ( that is,  before the COVID -19 pandemic) , and by 2.2% in 
comparison to the level of 2019/20 (during the COVID -19 pandemic). Despite this positive forecast, 
the supply chain of wheat has been disrupted by the unilateral measures  imposed on Russia . 
6.8.  At the Council's previous meeting, the WTO  Members  in question stated that all essential 
goods, including agricultural products and especially wheat, as well as goods for humanitarian 
purposes , had been excluded from their unilateral trade restrictive measures. However, Russia is 
already see ing the  imposi tion of measures that directly prohibit Russia n export s of pharmaceutical 
and medical products, as well as tractors to Russia, and measures that restrict import s of Russian 
wheat and fertilizers.  
6.9.  In addition to direct restrictive measures, Russian exports and imports of the most essential 
goods are facing indirect measures, including bans on the use of foreign seaports, and measures 
against companies and individuals that include the freezing of assets and a prohibition to deal with 
such persons.  
6.10.   In view of the current and planned restrictions against Russia, international transportation, 
trading companies, foreign banks and insurance companies are being coerced into refusing to work 
with Russian exporters, including those of food, energy , and fertilizers. Fo reign governments are 
also coerced into drop ping their  dealing s with Russia, including in the area of buying energy 
resources.  
6.11.   All these measures not only contradict the WTO 's rules; they also disrupt international trade 
flows, break global supply chains , and lead to increasing energy costs and spiking food prices.  
6.12.   Considering the situation on the wheat market, which is a particularly important crop for 
developing and least developed countries, the WTO, in its recent WTO  Secretariat paper , entitled 
"The Crisis in Ukraine" , underlined that the direct effect of the special military op eration in Ukraine 
was having a limited impact on global wheat prices, whereas unilateral measures against Russia 
were projected to have a larger impact on global consumer prices of wheat. According to the 
WTO Secretariat , the unilateral measures accounted  for 66% of the projected increase in the 
consumer price of wheat globally.  
6.13.   In this regard, Russia recalls that vulnerable populations in developing,  and least developed 
countries are particularly exposed to the challenges caused by the unilateral restrict ive measures in G/C/M/143  
 
- 12 - 
 
  question, and their effect on world market s, as they dedicate a larger share of their income to food 
and energy.  
6.14.   In a report published on 28 June, UNCTAD states that : "The Russian Federation is a giant in 
the global market for fuel and fert ilizer, which are key inputs for farmers worldwide. Disruptions in 
their supply can lead to lower grain yields and higher prices, with serious consequences for global 
food security, particularly in vulnerable and food -import dependent economies.  The Russia n 
Federation is also a leading oil and gas exporter. Confronted with trade restrictions and logistical 
challenges, the cost of oil and gas has increased as alternative sources of supply, often at more 
distant locations, are called upon.  Higher energy costs  have led to higher marine bunker prices, 
increasing shipping costs for all sectors. By the end of May  2022, the global average price for very 
low sulphur fuel oil had increased by 64  per cent with respect to the start of the year.  Taken 
altogether, these increased costs imply higher prices for consumers and threaten to widen the 
poverty gap. " 
6.15.   Such a vast and outright violation of WTO  rules is a massive blow to the WTO system. It 
undermines the role of the WTO as a guarantor of international trade rules and  shows that no 
Member is safe from such unjustified and vast unlawful measures in future.  
6.16.   The Russian Federation expresses its concern over the attempt to replace the system of global 
economic governance with unilateral restrictive measures of extraterrito rial scope. Despite different 
pretexts for such destructive policies , they are in fact put ting at serious risk the prospects for global 
economic growth and disproportionally hit ting developing countries. Being of a complex nature, they 
already have systemic negative implications on global value chains, international markets , and the 
stability of pr ice level s. In this context, the Russian Federation calls upon the Members concerned 
to restore a smooth functioning of the WTO, including its dispute settlement system, and urge s those 
same WTO Members immediately to lift their unilateral trade restrictiv e measures, including those 
with extraterritorial implications, and to stop their coercive actions aimed at forcing other 
WTO Members to follow suit.  
6.17.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
6.18.   The European Union condemns Russia's illegal, barbaric , and unprovoked war against Ukraine 
that has caused and continues to cause immeasurable loss of life and suffering as well as immense 
economic harm to Ukraine. Its effects are felt around the globe, with 1.7  billion people in over 
100 countries now facing severe food, energy , and commodity supply issues and price rises . 
6.19.   It has been the European Union's  policy not to respond to the statements of the Russian 
Federation since the start of this illegal war. It is the EU's  strong belief that it  is not possible to 
continue business as usual in the face of such grave attacks on the rules -based international order.  
However, the EU cannot stay silent while the Russian Federation continues its campaign of 
disinformation within the WTO. The EU needs to set the record straight for the benefit of the 
WTO Membership.  
6.20.   The European Union  is greatly concerned about the trade impact of the illegal, unprovoked, 
unjustifiable aggression of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, in particular as regards the supply  of 
a number of commodities, notably agricultural products and fertili zers. 
6.21.   Russia 's troops occupy arable lands and block Ukraine 's ports. These ports accounted for 90% 
of export s of grain and oilseeds before the war . Around 20  million ton nes of Ukrainian grains cannot 
reach global markets. Prices for food and fertilizers have skyrocketed.  
6.22.   The western border of the European Union  is the only access that remains open for trade not 
only to the EU, but also to other countries, given the blockade of Ukraine 's Black Sea ports. The EU 
has deployed not only significant financial assistance for Ukraine, but has also taken trade 
liberali zation and facilitation measures. The EU is actively looking for ways to help Ukraine to keep 
its export channels open and find solu tions to ease the logistics challenges.  
6.23.   The European Union notes that the Russian government has also placed restrictions on 
exports of cereals and fertilizers. This puts Russian wheat, even if available, out of reach for many 
import -dependent countries.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 13 - 
 
  6.24.   The European Union  wishes to underline once again that its sanctions do not target the 
agricultural sector of the Russian Federation. For example, while the EU 's latest sanctions stop 
Russian ships from entering EU  ports, ships with agricultural commodities  and food products are 
exempted. The same approach , based on exemptions for agricultural and food products , is applied 
to freight road operators. The sanctions are primarily directed at the Russian government, Russia's 
financial sector , and Russia's econom ic élites. They target Russia's ability to finance its aggression 
against Ukraine and its people.  
6.25.   In this regard , the European Union recalls  that, with its partners, it issued in March  2022 a 
Joint Statement on Russia 's aggression against Ukraine in relation to the trade measures that the 
EU and other WTO Members have been adopting against Russia, including measures that deny the 
Russian Federation the benefits that the WTO  Agreement provides, such as the benefit of 
most-favoured -nation  treatment. The EU's response measures include export restrictions and import 
restrictions targeting the Russian Federation's  ability to finance its reprehensible war.  
6.26.   The European Union considers its measures to be fully consistent with E U WTO rights and 
obligations as actions necessary to protect its essential security interests within the meaning of the 
applicable security exceptions of the WTO  Agreement. The EU's measures have also been taken with 
due regard to Ukraine 's territorial int egrity.  
6.27.   Furthermore, the European Union  has taken all its measures in a fully transparent manner. 
All relevant EU  measures are publicly accessible, on a free -of-charge website (EU  Sanctions Map, 
and on a dedicated European Commission website) that also provides information by category of 
products and services affected by the measures that the EU has adopted.  
6.28.   All these measures are adopted at EU  level. These measures are implemented by the 
competent authorities of the EU  member States. The EU is closely moni toring the ir implementation 
in order to ensure that the measures achieve their objective , namely , to hamper the ability of the 
Russian government and military machine to sustain its illegal war.  
6.29.   The European Union calls upon Russia immediately to stop its military aggression against 
Ukraine,  which is the only way to stop the humanitarian and food security crisis.  
6.30.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
6.31.   The United States  condemn s Russia 's unjustifiable, unprovoked, and illegal agg ression against 
independent and sovereign Ukraine, and the suffering and loss of life it continues to cause . The US  
will spare no efforts to hold President Putin and the architects and supporters of this aggression 
accountable for their actions . The US is appalled by the devastating and indiscriminate attacks on 
Ukraine 's population and civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and homes . The US  
underline s its resolve to impose severe economic and financial consequences on Russia.  
6.32.   Russia has ra ised its flag to complain about a situation that it has created, and to try and shift 
the blame for the death and destruction that it has created.  But let  us be clear . Russia started this 
premeditated and unprovoked war.  Russia continues to prosecute this brutal war.  Russia continues 
to violate Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and threatens the security of all peace -loving 
nations that support the rules -based international order . Russia 's bombardments continue to kill and 
injure Ukrainian ci vilians and destroy civilian infrastructure, creating a humanitarian nightmare.  
Russia continues to block Ukraine 's seaports, jeopardizing the supply of food to some of the most 
vulnerable parts of the world.  Russia continues to damage Ukraine 's transporta tion infrastructure, 
severely impeding Ukraine 's ability to export key commodities, including agricultural and food 
products, fertilizers, sunflower oil, and critical minerals . Russia continues to destroy Ukrainian 
agricultural storage facilities and to steal Ukrainian grain and farm equipment . Russia continues to 
spread disinformation that sanctions, which exempt Russian agricultural commodities, have 
worsened global food insecurity while Russia continues to ban the import of food to feed its own 
people,  and to ban the export of certain food products as well as fertilizer to curtail food production 
in other countries . In short, Russia, with support from Belarus 's complicity, is responsible for much 
of the devastation and disruption being felt around the w orld. 
6.33.   The United States will continue to condemn Putin 's brutal, unprovoked , and unjustified war 
against Ukraine.  The United States will continue to support Ukraine 's courageous efforts to defend G/C/M/143  
 
- 14 - 
 
  itself, uphold its territorial integrity and protect its pop ulation.  The United States will continue to 
work with its partners and allies to sustain and intensify international pressure on President Putin 's 
regime, and its enablers in Belarus, for as long as necessary . The United States , and its partners 
and allies , will continue to take all appropriate measures in defence of the rules -based international 
order that Russia has so egregiously violated.  
6.34.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
6.35.   New Zealand condemns, unequivocally, the unprovoked and unjusti fied attack by Russia on 
Ukraine.  The actions of President Putin are a grave breach of international rules; and the use of force 
to change borders is strictly prohibited under international law, as is targeting of civilians.  
New Zealand is appalled by repo rts of the devastating and indiscriminate attacks on Ukraine 's 
population by Russian troops, including evidence of crimes against humanity and war crimes, as well 
as the destruction of civilian infrastructure , including hospitals, schools, and homes. New Z ealand  
support s and will spare no effort in holding those responsible for this aggression to account.  
6.36.   New Zealand  also condemn s and refute s the harmful and inaccurate narratives that Putin 's 
regime has been communicating, and the campaign of destructive cy ber activity that has disrupted 
Ukrainian government and private sector networks and systems over 2022.  New Zealand has 
repeatedly called for President Putin to act consistently with Russia's international obligations, to 
cease Russia 's invasion of Ukraine, and to withdraw Russia's troops and return to diplomatic 
negotiations as a pathway to resolution of the conflict.  
6.37.   Let us be clear . It is Russia 's invasion of Ukraine that has created serious implications for 
global peace, security, a nd economic stability. Russia has also placed restrictions on its own exports, 
such as for grain, adding yet another level of volatility to world food prices.  
6.38.   New Zealand has joined the international community in applying sanctions in a transparent 
manner to severely limit the Putin regime 's ability to finance and equip the war in Ukraine, as well 
as to influence people with power in Russia to break their support for the war.  Information on the 
Russia Sanctions Act that was passed by the New Zealand Governm ent on 8  March  2022 is publicly  
available on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs website.  Sanctions under the Act are a direct response 
to Russia 's illegal act of aggression, and are not intended to disrupt trade in essential goods. They 
include asset freezes  and travel bans on individuals from entering New Zealand, tariff increases on 
imports of Russian origin, as well as prohibition of certain goods intended for use by military or 
security forces from being exported to Russia and Belarus.  
6.39.   New Zealand remains  united with the international community to maintain pressure on Russia 
and hold those responsible for violations of humanitarian and international law to account. Imposing 
sanctions on Russia is a means to bring an end to this war.  New Zealand  stand s in full solidarity with 
Ukraine and its people and reaffirm s its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity of Ukraine.  
6.40.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
6.41.   The United Kingdom wishes to note that it has now been 134  days since Russia 's illegal 
invasion of Ukraine began. In every one of those 134  days Russia 's actions have demonstrated their 
complete contempt for international law. Every day they undermine the fundamental principles of 
international pe ace and security, and cause indescribable pain upon the people of Ukraine.  
6.42.   As the United Kingdom  and many other WTO Members have set out , Russia 's indiscriminate 
attacks have repercussions for us all. Infrastructure bombed, fields mined, grain looted. Attacks on 
Ukraine 's civilian infrastructure and blockades of Ukraine 's seaports have fallen upon supply chains 
already under strain. As such, 1.7  billion people in over 100  countries are now paying the price for 
Putin's actions every time they buy  food or fuel.  
6.43.   The United Kingdom's  sanctions are specifically targeted at areas that will have most impact 
on Putin and those around him, and will limit his ability to fund his war machine and prosecute his 
aggression in Ukraine.  The United Kingdom has not targeted its financial sanctions on the Russian 
exports of food supplies that are important to global need.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 15 - 
 
  6.44.   Instead , the United Kingdom, working with international partners, is determined to support 
countries to mitigate the impact of Putin 's war. The UK  has agreed with the World Bank the largest 
ever commitment to developing countries, USD 170 billion over the next 15  months.  Such 
commitments, alongside others, show how countries must come together to protect the most 
vulnerable across the globe from the  effects of Russia 's attack and its repercussions.  
6.45.   But whil e the United Kingdom  and others work to support the international system, protect 
those in need and work with countries around the world , Russia 's barbaric actions continue.  As such, 
the solution t o these crises lies clearly before us : Russia must immediately withdraw its troops and 
cease its military aggression against Ukraine.  
6.46.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
6.47.   Switzerland reiterates its condemnation of Russia's military aggressi on against Ukraine in the 
strongest terms. Switzerland  calls upon Russia to take military de -escalation measures, end 
hostilities , and immediately withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory.  Switzerland considers that 
the continuation of this military attack blatantly violates international law, most notably the 
prohibition on the use of force and the principle of the territorial integrity of States.  
6.48.   In response to the Russian military aggression, Switzerland has taken a number of economic 
meas ures. These are exceptional measures that have been taken because of Russia's violation of 
international law and are published on the website of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs. Furthermore, Switzerland has taken these measures in accordan ce with international law, 
including WTO  law. 
6.49.   The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
6.50.   As mentioned at the Council's previous meeting, Norway implements the same restrictive 
measures as several of the WTO Members mentioned under this agenda item . These measures have 
been taken as a reaction to Russia 's unprovoked actions and are fully consistent with Norway's  
WTO rights and obligations.  
6.51.   Norway joins others in again condemning in the strongest possible terms the military 
aggression of the Russian Fede ration against Ukraine.  Norway also wishes to express its  concern for 
the severe destruction and human suffering this illegal act of military aggression is causing, and the 
ensuing global food crisis, particularly impacting developing and least developed c ountries. These 
are all results of Russia' s actions.  
6.52.   By its unprovoked, unjustified, and premeditated military actions, the Russian Federation is 
grossly violating international law, on whose core principles the international rule s-based order is 
built, including the fundamental principles of the UN  Charter that has prevailed since World War  II. 
They are a clear violation of Ukraine 's independence, sovereignty , and territorial integrity.  
6.53.   In conclusion, Norway reiterates that it stand s in solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian 
people.  
6.54.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
6.55.   Canada stands in solidarity with the people of Ukraine and strongly condemns President 
Putin's unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine.  This illegal and unprovo ked war has had catastrophic effects 
on Ukraine, its neighbours, and people across the globe.  
6.56.   As a recent FAO  report warns, Russia 's invasion has exacerbated the already steadily rising 
food and energy prices worldwide, affecting economic stability across all regions.  The effects of 
Russia 's indiscriminate attacks on Ukraine 's infrastructure, and blockades of Ukraine 's seaports will 
be most severe for those already vulnerable . The Russian government must stop weaponizing food 
and allow Ukraine to safely shi p out its grain so that millions of hungry people can be fed.  
6.57.   And no amount of misinformation can hide Russia 's culpability; it is solely responsible for this 
crisis, not the sanctions designed to stop Russia 's unjust and brutal war in Ukraine.  It is Russi a that 
has destroyed Ukraine 's ability to supply the world with food, and it is Russia that has cut itself off G/C/M/143  
 
- 16 - 
 
  from the global trading system.  Canada continues to reject any suggestion that measures applied 
by it to Russia prevent any other Member, includi ng Russia, from exporting or importing agricultural 
products or fertilizers.  
6.58.   The solution for this crisis is for the Russian leadership to abandon this path of war, 
immediately withdraw its troops back to Russia, and live up to its responsibility to restor e and 
maintain international peace and security.  Canada will continue to take actions that it consider s 
necessary to protect its essential security interests, and will work closely with like -minded partners 
to promote peace and security for all states and their citizens.  
6.59.   Canada 's support for Ukraine and its people is unwavering, and Canada  will work to find ways 
to use trade to support Ukraine in rebuild ing its economy and its society.  
6.60.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
6.61.   First of all, Ukraine wishes to express its sincerest gratitude to all WTO  Members mentioned 
in Russia 's request and to other Members  that support Ukraine in this difficult time of Russia 's 
aggression , which has brought death, destruction , and human suffering to Ukrainian soil.  Ukraine 
appreciate s all the support, including sanctions imposed in response to Russia 's unilateral invasion 
of Ukraine.  
6.62.   Russia 's military aggression against Ukraine is a gross violation of international law and the 
rules-based international order.  Russia 's war has produced adverse effects far beyond Ukraine 's 
borders.  Russia 's war has not only seriously undermined Ukraine 's ability to participate in global 
trade and to benefit from the rules -based multilateral tradin g system, but has also caused trade 
disruptions and aggravated food insecurity in the world.  Russia alone is responsible for the war 
launched against Ukraine and its repercussions for the world.  
6.63.   Despite the indisputable facts, Russia continues its disinfor mation campaign and keeps 
pushing false narratives in an attempt to shift the blame for the food crisis on countries that have 
imposed sanctions against it, although these sanctions do not target food.  It is Russia 's Navy that 
blocks Ukrainian ports in the  Black Sea and prevents export s of Ukrainian agricultural products to 
international markets.  It is Russian troops that continue to destroy Ukraine's  agricultural enterprises, 
food distribution centres , agricultural equipment , and fuel depots.  Moreover, Rus sia is stealing 
Ukrainian grain and other agricultural products, and is trying to sell the plundered grain to other 
countries. According to Ukraine's  estimates, Russia has already stolen about 500 ,000 tonnes of 
grain.  
6.64.   Ukraine considers it worth noting that , before the war, it exported around 6  million ton nes of 
agricultural products a month and over 90% of that volume was exported by sea.  Despite the war 
and Russia 's blockade of Ukraine's  ports, Ukraine is making every effort to fulfil its international 
obligations and to supply grain and other agricultural products to the global market.  In March this 
year, Ukraine supplied just 350 ,000 tonnes of agricultural products to the global market.  In April, 
exports grew to 1  million ton nes, and in June, this volume amounted to 2.1  million  tonnes as a result 
of the work done together with Ukraine's  partners in order to establish new routes of supply.  
However, Ukraine still has over 20  million ton nes of agricultural products that can be exported to 
international markets.  Besides, Ukraine  estimate s this year 's harvest to be at around 
50 million  tonnes of grain, including about 30  million ton nes of grain that are expected to be 
available for exports.  
6.65.   But the availability of Ukrainian agricultural products on the global market will depend not 
only on the efforts of Ukrainian farmers, traders , and government, but also on the whole 
international community.  
6.66.   Ukraine  reiterate s its gratitude to its partners fo r their valuable support and call s on other 
WTO Members to make every effort in order to limit Russia 's ability to wage war, to kill Ukrainians , 
and to undermine the rules -based multilateral trading system.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 17 - 
 
  6.67.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
6.68.   As other Members have done before it , Australia again condemns in the strongest possible 
terms Russia 's unilateral, illegal , and immoral invasion of Ukraine.  This invasion is a gross violation 
of international law, including the C harter of the United Nations.  Australia strongly supports Ukraine 's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and again call s upon Russia to cease its attacks on Ukraine and 
withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory.  Russia 's war on Ukraine is exacting a c atastrophic 
humanitarian toll in addition to trade disruptions and a food crisis.  
6.69.   Australia supports the collective action by the international community and has imposed 
far-reaching sanctions to inflict heavy costs on Russia and those responsible. In addi tion, Australia 
has implemented trade measures , including  the following : (i) the ban on imports of Russian oil, 
refined petroleum products, coal and gas (effective from 25  April); (ii) the ban on exports of alumina 
and bauxite to Russia (effective from 20  March ); (iii) the ban on the export of luxury goods to Russia 
(effective from 7  April); and (iv) denying Russia access to most -favoured -nation tariff treatment and 
imposing an additional tariff of 35 % on goods that are the produce or manufacture of Russia 
(effective from 25  April). Australia has recently notified these trade measures to the General Council 
and the Committee on Market Access, consistent with its commitment to WTO  transparency.  
Australia has also just announced that it will join with like -minded partners to prohibit the 
importation of Russian gold to reduce Russia 's ability to fund its war. Further details will be notified 
in due course.  These measures are justified given Russia 's unprecedented attack, and are justified 
under WTO  rules, in particular Article  XXI of the GATT . 
6.70.   Russia 's actions violate Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial integrity and undermine the 
rules-based international order. Australia is committed to upholdin g these principles, which are 
essential to international, regional , and domestic stability and security.  
6.71.   Russia claims that sanctions are largely to blame for rising food prices are an attempt to shift 
blame away from its illegal invasion of Ukraine. In fa ct, it is Russia 's invasion that is exacerbating 
global hunger, disrupting food exports, increasing energy prices , and raising fertili zer costs, leaving 
many millions of people around the world food insecure.  Ukraine is a major staple food and feed 
grain p roducer and exporter, supplying numerous vulnerable and import -dependent countries in 
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The invasion by Russia and its destruction of agricultural resources 
and infrastructure have disrupted global food supplies by not only  impeding these exports of wheat, 
barley, corn , and sunflower oil, but also by compromising the planting of this season 's crop, 
effectively prolonging the food crisis.  
6.72.   Russian withdrawal from Ukraine is the best means of restoring Ukraine 's ability to part icipate 
in the global trading system, and in so doing help alleviate the related food crisis and trade 
disruptions.  Moreover, the responses to global food crises such as this should not involve the 
imposition of trade restrictive measures or the stockpilin g of foods. Such policies only exacerbate 
food shortage issues by denying access to vulnerable and net food -importing countries. Long -term 
food security is best assured through open, transparent , and predictable agricultural trade. Australia 
supports the M inisterial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity adopted at MC12 
and will remain a reliable, open supplier of food products to the world.  
6.73.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
6.74.   Russia 's aggression of Ukraine clearly infringes upo n Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and constitutes a grave breach of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of 
force. Japan will never accept this unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force , which is an 
extremely serious situat ion that shakes the very foundation s of the international order. Japan 
condemns Russia 's actions in the strongest terms.  In such a context, it is to be expected that the 
international community, including Japan, would impose sanctions on Russia in response  to its 
aggression against  Ukraine.  
6.75.   Japan  continue s to work with its partners, including international organizations, to proactively 
address the impact of Russia's aggression against  Ukraine in areas such as energy and food, among 
others, across many count ries. Japan and other WTO Members have been carefully addressing the 
situation by imposing sanctions in a manner that does not hinder the provision of humanitarian 
assistance or the operation of global agricultural trade.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 18 - 
 
  6.76.   Together with other WTO Member s, Japan insists that the Russian Federation must urgently 
stop its military aggression against Ukraine and immediately  withdraw its troops. Japan is firmly 
convinced that the Russian Federation must be held accountable and must cease its actions, which 
underm ine peace, security , and international law.  
6.77.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
6.78.   On this agenda item, Costa Rica wishes to join in the expressions of support and solidarity 
with the people of Ukraine, and condemns in the strongest terms Russ ia's unjustified aggression. 
The cruel human tragedy that millions of Ukrainian families are suffering is unthinkable for a country 
like Costa Rica, a democracy without an army and with a pacifist tradition. Costa Rica has been, and 
will always be, a ferve nt defender of multilateralism and of an international architecture at the 
service of peace, security, sustainable development, and the protection of human rights. Costa Rica 
firmly believes that trade can and should contribute to the stability and peace o f nations. In this 
context, Costa Rica is concerned about the impact that Russia's aggression against Ukraine is having 
on international trade in agricultural products and inputs critical to global food security. Costa Rica 
urges Russia to cease hostilitie s as soon as possible, and to embark on a path that restores 
international peace and security.  
6.79.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
6.80.   The Republic of Korea has been strongly condemning Russia 's armed invasion of Ukraine. On 
the current topic, Korea believes that it is essential to focus on the very origin of the sharply 
aggravating situation regarding the global supply chain in many areas, posing a significant threat to 
the rules-based global trade order under the WTO. The wa y to end all this is obvious, that is, for 
Russia to stop its military action in Ukraine.  
6.81.   The delegate of  the Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela  indicated the following:  
6.82.   The Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela wishes to thank the Russian Federation for bringing a 
highly sensitive issue to this meeting. Venezuela has been warning for years about the proliferation 
of unilateral coercive measures. Since at least 2015, that is, for seven  years, Venezuela h as been 
suffering a multidimensional, financial, trade -related, economic , and patrimonial attack, with 
multi-million -dollar  losses, which have caused the reduction of 99% of Venezuela's income, with a 
negative impact that has spread to all areas, especiall y the food, health, transport, communications 
and technology sectors.  
6.83.   The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has witnessed at first  hand the collateral damage that 
such measures cause, not only to the population of the affected country, but also to other eco nomies, 
thereby causing disruptions of all kinds, including trade distortions.  
6.84.   The WTO has proven to be an organi zation that is guided primarily by economic considerations 
and sound legal rules. Unilateralism by its very definition  entails a violation of its principles and 
rules. In this regard, the Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela calls for a return to multilateralis m as the 
best way to settle differences and advocate a multilateral trading system that is predictable, 
transparent, inclusive , and based on rules agreed by consensus.  
6.85.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
6.86.   The Separate Customs Territory o f Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu condemns the Russian 
Federation 's military attack in Ukraine.  It has jeopardized regional and global peace and stability 
and continues to cause a devastating loss of human life. This is absolutely not acceptable from any 
perspective . It is a clear violation of human rights and an obvious breach of rule s-based international 
norm s. Chinese Taipei calls upon the Russian Federation to end its acts of aggression immediately. 
Chinese Taipei stand s in solidarity with Ukraine and its people.  
6.87.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 19 - 
 
  7  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, PANAMA, PARAGU AY, PERU, THE UNITED 
STATES, AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/767/REV.1)  
7.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay . 
7.2.  The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
7.3.  Colombia wishes to thank the European Union and its delegates in Geneva for their willingness 
to discuss this issue. Colombia finds it regrettable that, since  this item was first  placed on the 
agenda, no progress has been made. Colombia wishes to express the frustration of its producers, 
who continue to face restrictions and the fact that no progress has been made.  
7.4.  On this occasion, Colombia wishes to refer to the notification, presented on the day prior to 
this Council meeting, by the EU  Commission to the TBT  Committee, in document  G/TBT/N/EU/908, 
of a proposed draft Regulation that seeks to reduce to zero the maximum residue limits  (MRLs)  of 
clothianidin and t hiamethoxam. Colombia reviewed the notification with great concern and, by way 
of preliminary statement, considers that it may be in violation of the EU's WTO  obligations under the 
covered agreements.  
7.5.  Colombia remains concerned about the European Union's o verall hazard regime, which is 
evident mainly in the pesticides policy that establishes regulations that are more restrictive than 
necessary. Colombia has also stated that the measure may be discriminatory when selecting the 
substances to be reviewed, when  allowing the involvement of stakeholders, when establishing 
criteria such as how a food product is consumed, and in disregarding the different geographical and 
climatic conditions of countries, especially in tropical areas, and, last but not least, when e stablishing 
different exemption regimes for European and foreign producers. On this occasion , Colombia wishes 
to reiterate all of these arguments and its previous statements.  
7.6.  Colombia wishes to express its agreement with the legitimate objective pursued by  the 
European pesticides regime. However, Colombia wishes to ask the European Union the following  
questions : why not establish longer transition periods for substances that are in the process of 
approval? Why not avoid regulatory action during production i f the pesticide residue does not exceed 
the authorized level at the time of application? Why not maintain existing MRLs while import 
tolerance applications are being reviewed and until a full risk assessment has been completed, or 
why not consider third  country data earlier in the EU's process for renewals and approvals? Is it not 
possible to work together to give Colombia's producers of goods imported into the EU an outlet? 
Colombia's producers are running out of solutions, and these are avenues that do no t involve a 
change of policy , but offer a way out.  
7.7.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
7.8.  Once again, Paraguay  regret s having to bring this trade concern back onto the agenda of this 
Council . However, Paraguay has unfortunately failed to make progress to date in resolving the issue 
despite all the years that have passed since it was first introduced.  
7.9.  Paraguay  regret s that the European Union continues to delay providing replies to its questions, 
including not only by submitting some of thes e replies at very short notice to the June meeting of 
the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS  Committee) , despite having received 
them as early as March, but also by avoiding the substance in the replies. For example , when the 
Commission states that there are issues that fall within the competence of member States, such as 
emergency authorizations, and that it therefore cannot provide replies to the questions. Paraguay  
recall s that all 27  EU member States are members of the European Union in their own right.  
7.10.   European producers continue to systematically benefit from emergency authorizations and 
generous subsidies to maintain production methods that are incompatible with different climatic and 
geographical conditions, like those of Paraguay . The arguments put forward by European farmers in 
requesting these authorizations for their countries are similar to those that EU  trading partners put G/C/M/143  
 
- 20 - 
 
  forward in this forum, such as the lack of viable alternatives, the potential for resistance generation,  
safe use in accordance with good agricultural practices, and the certain losses that would arise from 
not having such a tool for production. The difference  is that the complaints of European producers 
are being heard and a solution is being provided, whil e those of Paraguay and other countries in its 
region continue to be ignored. This is not about protecting health, because there is no proven benefit 
from these policies or any scientific evidence to justify them; rather, it is simply about protectionism.  
7.11.   In addition to its systemic concern, Paraguay , like Colombia, draws the Council's attention to 
the recent notification by the European Union,  circulated one day prior to this meeting , that seeks 
to impose European standards on third  countries, without taki ng into account the principles of 
"shared but differentiated responsibilities ", different climatic conditions and production systems, and 
the enormous financial support that European producers receive to comply with these standards, 
which is highly problem atic. Such an approach also presumes that other Members are incapable of 
setting their own environmental standards.  
7.12.   It is ironic that, even in cases where the application of the precautionary principle has led to 
the renewal and approval of the substance, other relevant factors that have nothing to do with the 
health of humans, plants or animals are taken into account for the setting of MRLs. Moreover, the 
intention is to regulate environmental practices in non-EU countries, but without sacrificing the righ t 
to emergency authorizations that are reserved for EU  member States to continue using products 
that cannot be used by third countries seeking to trade with the EU, and this with only two  productive 
cycles by way of transition period for a regulation that has not yet been notified.  
7.13.   Paraguay  once again  reiterates that the European Union has made commitments to this 
Organization , and to other international organizations, which must be adhered to and honoured, and 
that u nilateralism is not the way to lead by example. Paraguay  again urge s the EU to have a 
constructive dialogue with all the parties involved and interested in order to move forward with a 
mutually acceptable solution to this very important trade concern for c ountries exporting agricultural 
products, especially developing countries with economies and livelihoods that depend primarily on 
the agricultural sector, like Paraguay.  
7.14.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
7.15.   Ecuador  once again deems it necessary  to reiterate its views on this issue, in line with the 
trade concerns that it has been raising for some years in the SPS and TBT  Committees.  Ecuador  
would prefer not to have to do so . However, the persistence of an issue that has an impact on a long 
list of Members, in addition to Ecuador, obliges it to renew its serious concern before this Council 
and to regret that Members have fallen into the ongoing and fruitless repetition of complaints that 
fail to find an y effective solution.  
7.16.   In line with  its previous  statements in this Council, Ecuador must once again urge the 
European Union:  (i) to avoid adopting restrictive and discriminatory measures without conclusive 
scientific evidence or contrasting them with other opinions;  (ii) to observe, and therefore adhere to, 
the globally recognized standards on human, plant and animal health protection;  (iii) to comply with 
the requirements established in the SPS  Agreement, including the requirement to base any 
SPS measures on a risk assessmen t approach, rather than only on the continued application of a 
precautionary principle;  (iv) to consider suspending the entry into force of measures being 
implemented to reduce maximum residue limits (MRLs) that are beyond the levels recommended by 
Codex, and which may be the Codex parameters used in regulations to set MRLs;  and (v)  to grant 
a reasonable adjustment period to other countries where the measures may give rise to obligations, 
so that those countries can deal with them effectively in cases where  the reduction of MRLs is shown 
to be essential.  
7.17.   Specialized bodies such as the Codex Alimentarius offer the appropriate space for discussions 
on issues such as the definition of MRLs based on scientific arguments.  At the same time, in these 
specialized ar eas, the effects of the technological and economic asymmetries among Members can 
be analysed and outlined. Tropical developing countries like Ecuador face different challenges to 
those faced by producers in temperate or semi -arid climates.  
7.18.   Ecuador reiterat es its commitment to protecting human health and the environment. This is 
a commitment to making appropriate use of the multilateral instruments governing relations G/C/M/143  
 
- 21 - 
 
  between nations. It is a commitment seeking to ensure that the principles that we all value  are 
applied in an orderly, reasonable , and coordinated manner in technical multilateral forums, and not 
simply unilaterally.  
7.19.   Non-tariff barriers such as MRLs, which are adopted outside international standards without 
proper technical assessment and withou t transition periods for the countries affected by the MRLs, 
not only have a negative impact on other Members in a broad institutional sense , but also at a 
day-to-day practical level  in the impact on farmers, many of whom run small and medium -sized 
busines ses, and in the case of developing countries, are the mainstay of their agricultural export 
sector. This negative impact reduces market access opportunities and prevents Members from being 
able to take advantage of the benefits offered by trade liberalizat ion agreements and the 
WTO multilateral system itself. A significant part of the Ecuadorian economy, for example, relies on 
income from agricultural exports, from the production of small and medium -sized farmers, and from 
their competitiveness and efficien cy, without the safety net of extensive subsidy programmes.  
7.20.   Ecuador  hopes to continue exchanging information on this issue with other delegations and 
the European Union. Ecuador also encourage s the use of all available channels of dialogue to resolve 
this long-standing trade concern.  
7.21.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
7.22.   Uruguay wishes to reiterate its trade and systemic concern regarding the European Union's 
use of a hazard -based approach  in its regulatory decisions linked to SPS  matters , rather than full 
risk assessments.  Uruguay would like to make it clear that any determination of maximum residue 
levels ( MRLs), particularly when that determination deviates from internationally accepted standards 
and harmonization efforts in multilateral forums such as the Codex, must be based on a full scientific 
risk assessment and conclusive scientific evidence, in accordance with the SPS  Agreement. This is 
essential to maintain the effective balance t hat must exist between the right of Members to pursue 
their legitimate objectives and the need to avoid creating unnecessary barriers to trade.  
7.23.   Uruguay  agree s with other Members that the issue of derogation regimes, including the 
emergency authorizations g ranted by European Union member States to their domestic producers, 
can lead to tensions regarding the consistency of policies adopted at national level by those States 
with the aim of protecting health at the Community level, as well as trade -related disc riminatory 
situations vis-à-vis third parties in their trade sphere.  
7.24.   Uruguay is also concern ed that provision is not being made for sufficient transition periods 
(not less than two  years, or two  harvests) to make the necessary adjustments to production and  to 
ensure that the products concerned comply with the amended MRLs, taking into account harvesting 
periods and the stages at which plant protection products are applied, as well as the time required 
to develop and register alternative substances.  
7.25.   Regard ing announcements on the consideration of environmental impacts when setting import 
tolerances, Uruguay  takes note of the EU's notification in document  G/TBT/N/EU/908 , presented 
one day prior to the Council's meeting , regarding the MRLs of clothianidin and t hiamethoxam.  
7.26.   Uruguay reiterates its willingness to work with other WTO Members, including the European 
Union, in mechanisms that help to achieve their legitimate objectives by fully recognizing the ability 
of the authorities of third  countries to adopt suc h measures as they deem appropriate or necessary 
in their territory to balance the objective of ensuring food production with other legitimate goals, 
such as environmental protection and human, animal or plant health. Uruguay also reiterates its call 
for the EU to take due account of all of its obligations as a WTO  Member when considering these 
measures.  
7.27.   Lastly, Uruguay once again urges the European Union, as one of the largest agricultural 
markets, to reconsider the direction of its regulatory approach wit h a view to avoiding the unjustified 
proliferation of barriers to international trade in agricultural products, bearing in mind the severe 
socio-economic consequences that these policies may have for developing and least developed 
countries whose economies  are based on the production of , and trade in , agricultural and 
agro-industrial products.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 22 - 
 
  7.28.   The delegate of Peru indicated the following:  
7.29.   Peru considers that the European Union's measures are unjustified and affecting agricultural 
trade. In this regard, the issue has been reiterated on numerous occasions in the framework of the 
SPS Committee. The EU's hazard -based  approach for the evaluation of maximum residue levels 
(MRLs) for pesticides makes these limits more restrictive than necessary and, in turn, does not take 
into account the provisions of the SPS  Agreement, which establishes the need for measures to be 
based on a risk analysis. Such a situation could become even more worrying given  that the EU will 
start considering  environmental aspects as  a factor for upcoming pesticide risk assessments, even 
though there is no technical basis for such a policy. Indeed, Peru has  identified that non -tariff barriers 
not only refer to maximum pesticide limits  given that the EU is also establishing maximum lev els of 
contaminants that deviate from those established by the Codex Alimentarius, and are substantially 
lower, as in the case of cocoa derivatives.  
7.30.   Regard ing other foods, Peru has also requested the European Union, during bilateral 
exchanges,  to indicate the process for the adoption of maximum limits for contaminants and to 
provide adequate time -frames for their implementation, since mitigation measures vary and are 
effective for a prolonged period of time after their application.  
7.31.   Peru requests the Europea n Union to take into consideration the concerns presented in this 
Council and in the SPS  Committee, so that its policies are aligned with the SPS  Agreement.  
7.32.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
7.33.   Brazil regrets that , since this issue was first  raised, nearly two years ago, not only has the 
European Union not provided adequate answers to the many concerns raised by a large number of 
WTO Members, but it has also continued to adopt non-tariff barriers ( NTBs) that lack scientific 
evidence and further imbalance trade in agricultural goods.  
7.34.   Brazil therefore make s reference to its previous statements on this topic, as all Brazil's 
concerns remain valid.4 Additionally, Brazil wishes to address what has been the European Union's 
frequent answer on this topic.  
7.35.   The European Union  has claimed that the measures being questioned have not prevented it 
from being a large importer of agricultural goods. First ly, WTO Members should note that nowhere 
in the GATT does it say that being a large importer of agricultural goods enables a WTO Member to 
adopt discriminatory policies or to go against the basic principles of the SPS  Agreement. Secondly, 
such imports simply reflect  the reality that other regions of the world can produc e more effectively 
and more sustainably than the EU without the thousands of euros of subsidies per farmer. But while 
enabling a more efficient allocation of production and promoting the rise of living standards through 
trade are key goals of this Organiza tion, WTO Members  have never had a level playing field in the 
trade in agricultural goods, and the reform mandated by Art icle 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA) is a clear indication of that. Besides, the scientific principle, enshrined in the SPS  Agreement 
and materialized through risk analysis , exists for a reason, namely,  to establish a balance between 
the principle of protection of life and human and animal health and the guarantee that the market 
access conditions negotiated multilaterally are no t undermined by unjustified NTBs.  
7.36.   However, a fter nearly 30  years, the European Union has not engaged meaningfully in 
redressing the imbalance in its favo ur in the AoA and is constantly imposing prohibitions based on 
the hazard approach and/or recourse to A rticle 5.7 of the SPS  Agreement, despite contrary technical 
advice from renowned institutions. This not only tilts the balance towards protectionism, but also 
undermines the capacity of developing countries to raise living standards in rural areas. Reducing 
the subsidies that make EU  agriculture artificially competitive and simply respecting the norms of 
the SPS  Agreement would thus support agriculture in developing countries, yielding benefits in the 
three  pillars of sustainable development, includi ng by reducing the number of migrants to large 
urban centres and to high -income countries such as those EU  members.  
7.37.   Additionally, Brazil would like to note that it is still waiting for adequate answers regarding 
the compatibility with WTO  law of the publication by the European Union  of more than 
 
4 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  6.56-6.60. G/C/M/143  
 
- 23 - 
 
  2,600 emergency authorizations by its member States of substances under review since 2017, many 
of which presented the same arguments as delegations from other WTO Members in the SPS and 
TBT Committ ees, while others simply do not offer any justification and yet were approved.  This 
identification of such authorizations resulted from the hard work of small delegations, where usually 
one person covers many topics, in contrast with the large number of de legates, interns and experts 
that the EU has at its disposal. Therefore, Brazil believes  that it is a matter of respect for other 
delegations and for the good functioning of this Organization that the EU should provide due 
clarifications on this matter.  
7.38.   As a final comment, Brazil stress es that the world is facing an acute food security crisis, which 
will become even more challenging in the next decades as the world 's population grows. It is thus 
imperative to have in place incentives and policies that suppo rt agriculture in those areas that, 
blessed with a favourable  climate for agriculture, can increase output in a sustainable manner.  
Unfortunately, EU  policies in this area are not pulling in the direction WTO Members  need in order 
to support the poorest in  developing countries and increase food security worldwide.  
7.39.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
7.40.   Australia has raised or supported a number of specific trade concerns relating to the EU 's 
implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products, including at the most recent SPS and 
TBT Committee meetings. Australia remains concerned that the EU 's application of its health and 
environmental standards to imported agriculture and agri -food products is , in many aspects , not 
conducive to achieving productive and sustainable outcomes in the agriculture sector.  
7.41.   For imported agricultural products, the EU 's regulatory approach to agricultural inputs, 
production requirements, and specific measures targeted at protecting the environment  has 
impacted the ability of third -country producers to meet EU  requirements. These concerns include 
the EU 's recent attempts to set maximum residue levels (MRLs) for certain pesticides in order to 
achieve environmental outcomes in third  countries.  
7.42.   Austral ia also remains concern ed over the unfair competitive advantage provided to 
EU producers in applying EU  domestic production requirements to imports. EU  producers are 
subsidi zed to implement the EU  production requirements , but if they are unable to maintain  
productivity and profitability , then only EU  producers can access EU  exemptions from certain 
regulatory requirements, such as emergency authori zations for the use of Plant Protection Products 
(PPPs). This creates a two -tiered system, with imported product s subject to more stringent 
regulatory conditions than domestically -produced products.  
7.43.   Australia recogni zes the right of WTO  Members to regulate agricultural imports in a manner 
that protects animal, plant and human health and the environment. However, Mem bers are also 
bound by WTO  obligations, particularly in relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments 
and ensuring that measures are no more trade -restrictive than necessary. In order to ensure the 
free flow of agricultural trade without unnecessa ry regulatory burden, Australia maintains its request 
that the European Union  apply international standards and best practice for regulating imported 
agricultural products.  
7.44.   Australia thank s the European Union for its engagement with Australia on these long -running 
issues.  
7.45.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
7.46.   The United States joins Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay in raising concerns regarding 
the European Union 's implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products.  
7.47.   Increasingly, the European Union  is developing rigid polices with extraterritorial implications 
that have the impact of forcing third  countries into making the choice between adopting European 
production practices or abandon ing trade with the EU.  The EU continues to lower many maximum 
residue levels (MRLs) to trade -restrictive levels without clear scientific justification or measurable 
benefit to human health . The EU's hazard -based approach to pesticide regulation may lead to trade 
barriers that threaten the security of global food systems . Further, the EU enforces newly reduced G/C/M/143  
 
- 24 - 
 
  MRLs at the point of production for domestic goods, but at the point of importation for  imported 
goods . This causes trade inefficiencies and disruptions for products destined for the EU  market 
depending on when a new reduced MRL is enforced and results in an unfair advantage for 
EU producers, especially for products with long shelf lives.  
7.48.   The United States remain s concerned that it appears as though the European Union is 
following a similar approach through its new veterinary drug legislation that could prohibit producers 
from using antimicrobials that are not considered medically important.  The US recall s its concerns 
as raised in the SPS  Committee that these prescriptive restrictions, which do not appear to be based 
on completed risk assessments, will apply to foreign producers exporting animals and animal 
products to the European Union . 
7.49.   The United States requests that any EU  measure allow flexibility to trading partners to meet 
the EU  level of protection in a manner that is appropriate to the needs of farmers and producers 
within the exporting countries ' own domestic context.  
7.50.   In light of recent calls for coordinated action to ensure predictable trade flow and support 
international food security, the international community should be working together to support 
science -based measures that promote a safe an d sustainable food supply, and the United States 
calls upon the European Union to join with its trading partners in identifying such mutually beneficial 
approaches.  
7.51.   The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
7.52.   Panama wishes to reiterate the high importa nce that it attaches to this issue . Maximum 
residue levels (MRLs) are being reduced without having sufficient scientific evidence, restricting 
access to essential substances for agri -food production, particularly for countries with a tropical 
climate , such as Panama. Panama considers that the European Union's policies and practices as a 
whole run the risk of nullifying and undermining the legitimate rights of WTO  Members  under  the 
AoA and the SPS  Agreement. Panama shares the EU's objective of supporting the  global transition 
towards more sustainable world agri -food systems, but these must be based on the construction of 
solutions designed and implemented through the mechanism of dialogue and multilateral 
cooperation schemes. Panama  regret s that no progress h as been observed to date. Panama  once 
again urge s the EU to listen to the legitimate concerns of a number of WTO  Members. In Panama's 
view, a constructive, serious , and permanent dialogue, together with mutually agreed technical 
assistance, will lead to so lutions that benefit all sides.  
7.53.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
7.54.   Costa Rica shares the concerns raised by other Members and notes that  these are concerns 
that have also been raised in the Council on other occasions. Costa Rica continues to co -sponsor and 
support this item on the Council's agenda , as well as document  G/C/W/ 767/Rev.1. Costa Rica 
believes that the concerns raised about the regulatory approach of the EU on maximum residue 
levels (MRLs) continu e to be relevant . Indee d, these  concerns are urgent, and certainly urgent for 
exporters and producers in the agri -food sector in tropical countries such as Costa Rica. Therefore, 
Costa Rica  urges the EU to continue its dialogue with stakeholders with the aim of responding to the  
concerns raised by Members at this Council and other WTO Committees.  
7.55.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
7.56.   As noted in its previous interventions on this subject, Canada wishes to reiterate the need for 
transparency and predictability in interna tional trade, achieved through regulatory frameworks that 
are based on scientific data and risk analysis and that are discussed in close cooperation with trading 
partners, where feasible and appropriate, to achieve optimal outcomes while facilitating trade . With 
this in mind, and in accordance with WTO  obligations, Canada continues to recognize Members' right 
to regulate in the public interest and to apply the food safety measures deemed necessary to protect 
human health. However, such measures must be impl emented in a transparent manner that does 
not unjustifiably restrict international trade and favour domestic goods.  
7.57.   In a context where global food security and food supply is of utmost importance, Canada 
urges the European Union  to reconsider its current a pproach to the setting of maximum residue G/C/M/143  
 
- 25 - 
 
  levels (MRLs) for crop protection tools authorized in various jurisdictions, in order to allow for 
solutions that are appropriate to their particular circumstances and needs and ensure the global food 
supply.  In pa rticular, Canada again  wishes to register its concerns regarding the European Union 's 
hazard -based regulation for active substances in Plant Protection Products (PPPs) and the 
consequential impacts this may have on the setting of import tolerances. Canada continues to urge 
the EU to consider both hazards and exposure for all active substances in its regulatory 
decision -making. This would bring the EU's regulatory framework back in line with internationally 
recognized approaches while cont inuing to protect users and consumers, as well as enhancing global 
food security.  
7.58.   Canada recalls that the European Union  has stated that it will be changing how requests for 
import tolerances are established in the context where the hazard -based cut -off criteria are involved, 
including taking into account certain environmental impacts in the country of origin. Canadian 
growers and exporters have yet to be convinced of the real -world feasibility, commercial viability , 
and compliance with international obliga tions of the EU 's proposed approach . Consequently, Canada 
once again requests that the European Union  consider maintaining MRLs for substances that do not 
pose unacceptable dietary risks to European consumers, which would avoid the need for import 
toleranc es in many cases.  
7.59.   Canada would also appreciate receiving further information in this regard, including who would 
determine what environmental factors would be considered and how these would relate to the 
consumer dietary risk assessment, which is the scientific basis for the specification of import 
tolerances.  
7.60.   Canada also continues to request that  all regulatory changes arising from new EU  policies 
impacting trade be commensurate with the level of risk involved, taking into account important 
differences between countries , such as pest pressures, pesticide use patterns, and good agricultural 
practic es. 
7.61.   Lastly, Canada requests the European Union  to take into account the timelines necessary for 
practical decision -making by farmers and producers, as well as the time and effort required to bring 
products to market, particularly for commodities with long shelf lives. Transition periods should 
therefore be appropriate to the circumstances and should allow commodities to clear channels of 
trade where no dietary risks of concern to consumers have been identified.  
7.62.   In conclusion, Canada hopes that reiterating i ts concerns to the Council serves as a clear 
indication of the importance that Canada, and many WTO  Members, attribute to seeking enhanced 
transparency and predictability for trade, particularly in a context where such trade can contribute 
to global food s ecurity and supply.  
7.63.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
7.64.   India thank s the proponents of this communication  and shares the concerns raised over the 
European Union 's application of SPS  standards on agriculture products.  In implementing its 
SPS measures, the EU seems to impose its own domestic regulatory approach onto its trading 
partners. India observe s with concern that this is becoming a wider trend , as also seen under the 
European Green Deal -related regulations. India continue s to study this evolving issue keenly and 
remain s concerned , as a matter of principle , over the way in which the EU is erecting new non -tariff 
barriers.  
7.65.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
7.66.   The European Union takes note of and acknowledges the conce rns expressed by 
WTO Members.  The EU provided detailed replies to these concerns in previous CTG  meetings. 
Therefore, the EU would like to refer once again to its previous statements as they remain valid in 
their entirety.5 
7.67.   The European Union is one of th e biggest importers of agri -food products in the world. The 
EU has developed a highly trusted, transparent and predictable system based on its high level of 
 
5 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  6.80-6.86. G/C/M/143  
 
- 26 - 
 
  consumer health protection, to which some other countries defer in the absence of their national 
MRLs. The EU has an open market and its high level of consumer protection has never been an 
impediment to the import of agricultural commodities, including fro m the Members raising this trade 
concern, whose large exports of agricultural products to the EU during these five  years have 
remained stable.  
7.68.   As announced in the European Green Deal and the Farm to Fork Strategy, the European Union  
will take environmental  aspects into account when deciding about requests for import tolerances for 
substances no longer approved in the EU, while respecting WTO  standards and other international 
obligations. The EU intends to address this matter on an incremental basis, conside ring and 
reviewing the position of each particular active substance on a case -by-case basis, based on the 
best available scientific evidence and ensuring that its measures are not more trade restrictive than 
necessary to achieve their objective.  
7.69.   The Europe an Union provides technical assistance to developing countries and LDCs, directly 
or through other international organi zations, such as the FAO, to support a smooth transition towards 
new products or production systems.  The EU remains committed to continui ng an open dialogue on 
its policies and measures  and stands ready to further engage and explain EU policies to its trading 
partners.  
7.70.   Finally, based on the outcome of the UN  Food Systems Summit convened in September  2021, 
the European Union believe s that WTO Members have a shared interest in making our food systems 
sustainable by tackling the issue of toxic active substances and protecting our citizens ' health with 
appropriate measures.  
7.71.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
8  CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVIS ION AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (CSAR) – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES  
8.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Australia, the European Union, Japan, and the United States . 
8.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
8.3.  Australia respects the right of WTO Members to implement technical measures for legitimate 
policy purposes and in accordance with WTO  obligations. However, Australia remains concerned that 
measures under China 's Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulations ( CSAR) and various 
implementing regulations, which entered into force on 1  May 2021, are more stringent than 
necessary for low -risk cosmetics. In that context, Australia asks that C hina pursue its objective of 
ensuring the safety and quality of imported cosmetics using less trade -restrictive measures.  
8.4.  Australia requests that China provide a transition period until at least January  2023 for 
cosmetics manufacturers to consider the regu lation 's requirements and make adjustments to their 
processes. Australia  also request s that China clarify why it has maintained its requirement for 
mandatory animal testing of cosmetics products to be used on children, regardless of the level of 
risk prese nted by individual products.  
8.5.  Australian exporters are concerned about stringent and inflexible measures under the 
CSAR  framework, particularly regarding testing, registration requirements , and requirements to 
provide detailed information on production proc esses and other aspects of their intellectual property. 
Australia also seek s clarification as to why "Good Manufacturing Practice " certification is deemed 
necessary for low -risk general cosmetics , and why governments need to provide such certification 
when  commercial providers are equally capable of doing so.  
8.6.  Australia  reiterate s that it is a reliable supplier of high -quality and safe cosmetics products 
domestically, and to international markets. As Australia has said on previous occasions, the 
Australian Government stands ready to work with China and to discuss the CSAR and our respective 
systems for cosmetics regulati on. G/C/M/143  
 
- 27 - 
 
  8.7.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
8.8.  It is unfortunate that the United States must continue to reiterate its serious concerns.  It is 
imperative that the US find a resolution to its concerns with China 's development of the CSAR and 
its implementing measures . Despite continued multilateral and bilateral engagement from the US, 
US industry, and other WTO  Members and stakeholders, significant trade concerns remain.  
8.9.  First, the United States has significant c oncerns that the only means for importers to establish 
conformity with good manufacturing practices in China involves animal testing if their respective 
governments do not issue G ood Manufacturing Practice (GMP)  export certificates . Providing a means 
for companies to establish conformity with the ISO  22716  Guidelines for Cosmetics G MP would be a 
far more effective means of determining that a company follows GMPs than animal testing . The US 
question s China 's response to the comments of several WTO  Members that its GMP  requirements 
for imports and domestic products are equivalent.  The US reiterates its request that China consider 
less trade disruptive means for US importers to meet its animal testing exemption requirements, 
such as second - and third -party certificates to the ISO  GMP cosmetics standard. And the  US also 
again ask s that China be flexible and transparent with respect to which government or other 
GMP certificates or production licen ces it will accept as demonstrating conformity.  
8.10.   Second, the  United States remains concerned that CSAR and its implementing measures 
require overly extensive information to assess conformity . The US is disappointed that China has 
not pared back these highly burdensome requirements . The US asks China 's National Medi cal 
Products Administration to reconsider the extent of the information requirements.  
8.11.   Third, the United States consider s that China has failed to address concerns that exceptions 
to the provisions protecting confidential business information (CBI) and refe rence to China 's 
Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information may undermine protections for trade 
secrets and other CBI. The US  asks that China clarify whether it will develop a specific mechanism 
for companies to indicate to the National Medical  Products Administration ( NMPA ) when information 
provided should be treated as trade secrets or otherwise as CBI, to protect from unauthorized 
disclosure . The US  request s that NMPA provide a mechanism to ensure that the treatment of trade 
secrets and other  CBI is monitored and legally enforceable within China.  
8.12.   Fourth, the United States requests that China not require duplicative testing at laboratories 
that have Chinese Metrological Accreditation, if companies provide test results from other 
laboratories th at are in conformity with China 's requirements . The US request s that China consider 
accepting test results from laboratories certified to Good Laboratory Practices or Good Clinical 
Practices, as per the International Council for Harmonization of Technical Requirements for 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH)  Guidelines.  In a related matter , the US is concerned that 
China continues its reliance on animal testing to assess safety for imported special cosmetics and 
children 's cosmetics products even when companies are able to demonstrate safety via other 
internationally recognized methods.  
8.13.   Fifth, the United States continues to have serious concerns over the potential trade impact of 
the new cosmetics labelling requirements . As explained previously, the US request s that China not 
require companies to disclose the product manufacturer on the product label and that China allow 
for foreign packaging and labelling, so long as the foreign product safety and claims information 
does not conflict with the Chinese la bel. 
8.14.   Sixth, the United States is concerned  that, given the magnitude of some of the new 
CSAR  requirements , China has not consistently notified its transition periods for the new 
CSAR  requirements so as to allow for public comment.  The US asks that China al low importers and 
manufacturers at least two to three  years to update existing registrations and to sell through existing 
inventory for products already on the market.  
8.15.   The United States request s that China delay finalization of additional measures until th ese 
trade concerns expressed by the US and many other WTO  Members are addressed.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 28 - 
 
  8.16.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
8.17.   Since the meeting of the TBT Committee that took place in March  2019, Japan has continued 
to express its concerns regarding  China 's CSARs, as well as the related Implementing Regulations.  
8.18.   Japan wishes to point out that , in terms of the safety and efficacy evaluation of cosmetics, 
one problem is that China only approves the  results verified by domestic Chinese testing 
laboratories, and another is that materials proving efficacy are required more than is necessary.  
8.19.   Furthermore, when a cosmetics manufacturer registers cosmetics with the authorities, it is 
required to provide i nformation about the manufacturer of the raw material s used in the cosmetics. 
This practice places  a heavy burden on the manufacturers of both the cosmetics and the raw 
material s. If manufacturers cannot provide the required information, there may be a ris k that the 
cosmetics cannot be sold.  In line with international practice, Japan request s that China present 
information about raw material manufacturers following requests from the relevant authority only 
after the products have been made commercially avai lable, rather than at the time of registration.  
In addition , Japan request s that, when imposing new demands on  them, manufacturers are provided 
a sufficient grace period before enforcement so that they may adapt their products in accordance 
with the new re quirements.  
8.20.   Japan  calls upon China to formulate and enforce regulations on cosmetics that are consistent 
with international practice and are not unnecessarily trade -restrictive.  
8.21.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
8.22.   The European Union  wishes to reiterate the concerns it already shared in the Council's 
meetings of July and November  2021 and April  2022 with regard to the Cosmetic Supervision and 
Administration Regulation  (CSAR)  in force since 1  May 2021. The EU's concerns relate in particular 
to the following : (i) the mandatory disclosure of commercially sensitive information, touching on the  
intellectual property rights  (IPR) of the companies involved, in the registration process. The EU 
reques ts China to consider the possibility of requir ing continuous access to inspect sensitive 
information in companies ' files but without imposing the obligation to submit that information to an 
external database ; (ii) the amount of information required for the  notification of new ingredients, as 
well as potential issues over the disclosure of such information after a certain period of time. In 
particular, the Chinese legislation requires both the specification issued by the raw materials 
manufacturer and the in gredient composition reported by the cosmetic companies in their product 
application to be exact matching figures , with  any mismatch between the information provided by 
the raw material producer and the cosmetic companies making the latter's application in valid. Given 
that the exact composition of raw materials is never completely stable but may vary  and evolve 
within certain limits over time , it is almost impossible to guarantee a complete consistency between 
these sets of figures. Furthermore, access to t his database would reveal cosmetics ' formulation. The 
EU encourages China to accept a range of values instead of exact matching figures ; and (iii)  the 
need to publish a detailed summary of efficacy evaluation, which may damage business secrets.  In 
this regard, the EU believes that these requirements are unnecessarily stringent to ensure consumer 
safety and traceability of the ingredients used in cosmetics, diverging from international practice. 
This extensive level of information is not required  elsewhere in the world for notification and 
registration purposes, and the safety of consumers is always ensured.  Finally, the European Union  
wishes to reiterate its comment that a differentiated approach is needed between new products and 
products on the  market. This would avoid a situation where  product supply could be interrupted for 
an extended period of time due to insufficient preparation time for both industry and supervision 
authorities.  
8.23.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
8.24.   New Zeal and welcomes China 's endeavours to moderni ze its regulatory system for cosmetics 
and appreciates the opportunity to comment on specific elements of China 's Regulations.  While 
New Zealand  welcome s the intention to improve safety and quality assurance, it would like to 
encourage China to ensure that facilitation of trade is considered in the implementation of the 
regulations.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 29 - 
 
  8.25.   New Zealand notes that , under the measures, non -animal tested cosmetics are able to enter 
China 's market only if a government regulator y authority -issued GMP  certification is provided. Yet 
non-special use cosmetics are considered to be low -risk products in many countries, including 
New Zealand, and for this reason are not subject to regulator -issued GMP  certification.  
8.26.   New Zealand  warmly w elcome s the introduction of alternatives to mandatory animal testing 
for imported cosmetics. Yet New Zealand, like others, is disappointed that the measures do not 
provide for non -government regulatory authority -issued GMP  certification or other trade faci litative 
mechanisms for providing product assurances, meaning that significant and unnecessary barriers to 
trade for imported cosmetics products still apply for Members that cannot offer regulator -issued 
GMP certification.  
8.27.   New Zealand  encourage s China to engage directly with affected Members, including 
New Zealand, to identify a trade -facilitative mechanism to demonstrate GMP  conformity, without 
imposing animal -testing requirements. Specifically, and following China 's response to New Zealand 's 
question submitted during its recent WTO  Trade Policy Review, New Zealand seeks clarification 
whether the requirement for a regulatory authority -issued GMP  certificate as an alternative to animal 
testing requirements can be exempted on the basis that:  (i) the manufacture of the product fully 
conforms with the relevant ISO  22716 standard or higher, assuring the safety of the product ; or 
(ii) a product safety risk assessment result is provided from a laboratory accredited by a National 
Accreditation Body that c onfirms the safety of the product.  
8.28.   Additionally, New Zealand requests that China also provide flexibility in respect of product 
testing requirements. In particular, New Zealand  encourage s China to accept test reports from 
laboratories situated outside of C hina that have been accredited. Otherwise, this is a burdensome 
and unnecessary trade barrier for exporters that send products to China as well as multiple other 
markets. Building in such flexibility would be trade facilitative and in accordance with inter national 
best practice.  
8.29.   New Zealand also holds concerns, which it notes are shared by a number of WTO Members, 
that China requires more detailed disclosure of product formulas than is required in other markets, 
including specific sources of each ingredient . New Zealand encourages China to limit such disclosure 
requirements, particularly in relation to sensitive information, to that which is required to assure 
product safety in China 's domestic market, so as not to compromise intellectual property.  
8.30.   New Zeala nd appreciates its recent constructive bilateral engagement with China on cosmetics 
issues and looks forward to engaging further with China on its CSAR  measures to address these 
issues. New Zealand  would welcome China 's response to the concerns raised by it and other 
Members in this and other for ums. 
8.31.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
8.32.   The Republic of Korea welcomes China 's continuous cooperation through bilateral channels, 
especially on cosmetic regulations. However, taking into consideration that the cosmetic industry is 
important to both countries, Korea echoes the concerns raised by other WTO Members and would 
like to r equest China to swiftly address this issue.  
8.33.   With regard to China 's CSAR, and as expressed in previous TBT  Committee meetings, it is the 
Republic of Korea 's view that China 's requirements are more rigorous than necessary to fulfil the 
objectives of ensuring  product safety and compliance with China 's domestic market norms.  For 
instance, under the regulation, exporters to China are required to specify the sources and quality 
data of all ingredients in their applications, which the Korea believe s is demanding m ore information 
than that of any other countries. Such information in fact may contain trade secrets that are critical 
to businesses. Similarly, Korea considers China 's labelling  requirements to be more excessive than 
necessary, compared to internationally  recognized practices.  
8.34.   Accordingly, the Republic of Korea request s China to provide further details and rationale 
regarding the requirements stipulated in the regulation , while hoping that China will harmonize its 
regulation with international practices so  as not to raise unnecessary barriers to trade.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 30 - 
 
  8.35.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
8.36.   China refer s to its statements made at previous meetings of the TBT Committee and the C TG. 
Capital -based officials are still working  on the technical issues raised by the relevant WTO Members. 
China  will provide its feedback to Members at the following week's meeting of the TBT Committee , 
beginning on 12 July. 
8.37.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
9  INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION  PROGRAMME – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
9.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of the 
European Union . 
9.2.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
9.3.  As the European Union  will also highlight under the next agenda item, Indonesia 's import 
restrictive policies and practices are a long -standing source of concern , as previously  raised in 
several WTO  bodies.  Recent developments are worrisome considering Indonesia 's increased fo cus 
on import substitution , including the objective of advancing to 2022 a reduction of imports equivalent 
to 35% of the value of its 2019  import potential. This objective was originally set for 2035.  
9.4.  This approach appears to be already at an advanced stag e of implementation, with the adoption 
of a broad range of measures , including expanding local content requirements and the mandatory 
use of Indonesian National Standards ( "SNI" standards ), as well as the further promulgation of 
cumbersome import licensing  procedures.  
9.5.  Despite Indonesia 's reassurances in previous meetings of this Council that the import 
substitution programme did not have protectionist purposes, EU  operators across a variety of sectors 
are already negatively affected by the many import restr ictive measures implemented by Indonesia . 
They include , for example, the adoption of import restrictions on medical devices through the 
"freezing " of several foreign devices in the Indonesian e -catalogue for public procurement, 
preventing their purchase by  government health institutions.  
9.6.  The European Union  would also like to stress that imports remain necessary as a part of 
Indonesia 's ambition to develop its domestic industry, also in terms of the country 's government 
procurement process. Raising barriers to trade, in particular on technologically sophisticated 
products, would hamper the post -pandemic economic recovery of the country, which cannot be 
achieved through export promotion alone.  
9.7.  The European Union  seeks from Indonesia clarifications as to its underlying rationale for 
expanding import substitution policies  and the introduction of the "commodity balance " system as 
the basis for issuing import and export approvals. The EU would also welcome Indonesia 's 
explanations as to what implementing measures i t intends to take and how Indonesia will ensure 
that its practices are compliant with its WTO  obligations.  
9.8.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
9.9.  The United States  continue s to share the European Union 's concerns regarding the Indonesian 
government 's statements that it will suppress imports with the goal of "substituting 35  percent of 
imported products " in 2022 . The US request s that Indonesia provide an update on this item and the 
specific policies it is implementing, or intends  to implement, to achieve its import substitution goals . 
If Indonesia is proceeding with an import substitution program me, will it make the draft measures 
that it is developing publicly available and hold a notice and comment period to ensure that affected  
parties have the opportunity to provide input?  
9.10.   At the CTG 's previous  meeting, Indonesia stated that this policy "has no element of 
protectionism " and "is not intended to hinder imports from other [WTO]  Members. " It is difficult to 
see how that is possible . Can Indonesia provide further clarity on the intent and scope of its import G/C/M/143  
 
- 31 - 
 
  substitution program me? The United States again strongly urge s Indonesia to rethink this 
counter -productive and trade -disruptive goal . 
9.11.   The delegate of India, addressing Agenda Items  9 and 10, indicated the following:  
9.12.   India remains concerned about Indonesia's  import substitution program me and its import and 
export policies, which are intended to reduce access to the Indonesian market.  
9.13.   Indonesia is maintaining a number of restrictions on its imports  and these restrictions are 
affecting Indian businesses in terms both of exports as well as supply chain disruptions , as follows: 
(i) Indonesia has been applying an annual quota system on importation of bovine meat. I ndonesia 
reduced the quota in 2021. Apart from the quota system, there are port restrictions on imports that 
have led not only to difficulties , but also to cost increase s for Indian exports ; (ii) there is a quota 
system on importation of sugar ; (iii) there has been a sudden delay in the issuance of Horticultural 
Products Import Recommendation s (RIPH s) in respect of agricultural products, such as for onion s 
and potato es, without assigning any reason for the same. There have also been cases of 
RIPH non-issuance. This is having an impact upon India's exports of the horticultural products  
concerned; (iv)  Indonesia has also put dry red chillies in its horticulture category , thus subjecting 
their import to RIPH  requirements ; (v) Indonesia imposes quantitativ e restrictions on imports of 
automobile and components thereof. There have also been instances of delay s in issuance of 
TPT import permits for import s of commercial vehicles from India; and (vi) these policies remain a 
concern for Indian chemicals and phar maceutical products.  
9.14.   India has discussed all  of these issues bilaterally with Indonesia.  However , no clear response 
from Indonesia  has so far been received . India urges Indonesia to constructively and transparently 
engage on these proposals and not to adopt trade restrictive measures.  
9.15.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
9.16.   Switzerland shares the concerns raised by the European Union , in particular regarding  
Indonesia's  import substitution program me aimed at reducing the value of imports by 35%  
compared to its 2019  level by the end of 2022.  Switzerland calls upon Indonesia to modify its plans 
and remains highly interested in receiving Indonesia's clarifications in this regard, especially 
concerning possible changes.  
9.17.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
9.18.   Regarding the so-called P3DN  program me, in which Indonesia stipulates that the purchase 
and use of domestic products should be prioritized on the basis of Decree No. 29/2018, Japan is 
concerned about the possi bility of domestic and foreign discrimination as a means of promoting 
import substitution with domestic products. Japan also share s the concerns about Indonesia's plan 
to introduce domestic SNI  standards as pointed out by the European Union . 
9.19.   Japan has repe atedly expressed its concerns about the fact that Indonesia has introduced and 
maintained Local Content Requirements (LCR)  measures in various fields. Japan is concerned that 
this program me will exacerbate such situations.  
9.20.   Japan requests Indonesia's clarification of how it implements the P3DN  program me if it does 
not intend to guarantee trade protections. Japan also asks Indonesia to explain how it aims to ensure 
WTO consistency with these measures that it is working to implement in order to realize its pla n. 
9.21.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
9.22.   Indonesia reiterate s its statement delivered at previous meetings of the Committee on Market 
Access (CMA)  and this Council that its import substitution  program me was never aimed at impeding 
imports from other WTO  Members.  The issuance of import licen ces and the technical regulations of 
the Indonesian National Standard (SNI) are , in principle, not related to the import substitution 
program me. In addition , the provi sions of SNI s are intended to ensure that all products distributed 
on the Indonesian market meet the safety, security, and health standards necessary to protect 
Indonesian consumers. The provisions themselves are applied in a non -discriminatory manner for 
both domestic and imported products.  In this regard, Indonesia always strives to fulfil the WTO's G/C/M/143  
 
- 32 - 
 
  transparency principle by notifying every implementation of mandatory SNI  and other technical 
regulations to the WTO.  
9.23.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
10  INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES  
10.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States . 
10.2.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
10.3.   New Zealand believes that Indonesia 's restrictions on agricultural imports continue to 
undermine c ore WTO  principles.  The frequent changes to import requirements reduce commercial 
certainty, which in turn hampers returns for farmers and can lead to increased costs of production. 
Moreover, this uncertainty also contributes to the ongoing increas e in the  cost of food, which can 
have a particularly negative effect on people on low incomes.  
10.4.   New Zealand is particularly concerned about the inconsistent issuance of import licen ces. 
Delays in import licen ces lead to commercially significant market access issues  for trading partners 
and can lead to importers having greater difficulty in sourcing food products for local consumers.  
10.5.   New Zealand  request s that Indonesia also provide further information to trading partners on 
its commodity balance mechanism, including how the mechanism is calculated, the process 
exporters have to go through to get import licen ces, and what moves Indonesia is undertaking to 
make the mechanism more transparent.  
10.6.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
10.7.   In past meetings of the CTG and  the TRIMs  Committee , Japan has continuously expressed its 
concerns over the consistency with the WTO  Agreement s of Indonesia's various Local Content 
Requirement (LCR)  measures relat ing to 4G  LTE equipment, TV  equipment, and the retail industry.  
10.8.   Indonesia has repeatedly explained that the LCR  measures in general are based on its 
government procurement policy, but the content of its government procurement policy is unclear. 
It does not appear that all LCR  measures are being implemented as part of g overnment 
procurement, and nor are they immediately justified because of government procurement policies. 
As far as Japan  understand s, a comprehensive review is currently under  way. Therefore , Japan 
requests details of the review schedule and consultations . 
10.9.   Japan is also concerned about the increase in Indonesia's import restricti ng measures relating 
to its import registration and approval system for textile products and air conditioners, including 
concerns over their consistency with Article  XI:1 of the GA TT. Japan appreciate s that there has been 
an improvement in the level of permitted quantities ; however, Japan hopes that the criteria will be 
clarified in depth and that operational transparency will be improved.  
10.10.   Moreover, Japan continues to express its co ncerns regard ing Indonesia's import licensing 
system for steel products, which has been implemented in accordance with the Minister of Trade 
Regulation No.  20 of 2021. After the introduction of the measure, the number of approved licen ce 
applications reduc ed significantly compared to the actual number of applications submitted, 
regardless of the type of licen ce. Japan is concerned that, as a measure that has a trade -restricting 
effect on imports, it may not be consistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT , among others. Indonesia 
suggests that these are technical standards regarding safety . However,  the permit standards are 
not specified by Indonesia's  law. Japan considers that the volume of applications should not be 
significantly reduced, and  that the reasons and criteria for such a reduction in applications should 
be clarified.  
10.11.   Furthermore, with regard to textile products, Japan considers that it was truly regrettable 
that Indonesia's safeguard measure on carpets was introduced on 17  February  2021, even though 
Japan ha d been raising this measure in various discussions, including at the Committee on G/C/M/143  
 
- 33 - 
 
  Safeguards, as well as at the consultations. It is regrettable that no improvement has been seen.  In 
this regard, Japan considers that t here are tw o main problems: one is that the tariff is as high as 
150-200% in terms of ad valorem  tax conversion, and the other is that the tariff has been introduced 
in a situation in which carpet imports have dropped sharply.  
10.12.   Japan is concerned about the increasing number of Indonesia's  trade restrictive measures, 
which are thought to be inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement s. Accordingly, Japan request s a 
concrete explanation regarding the background of the introduction of these systems and their 
consistency with the WTO Agreement s. 
10.13.   In particular, Japan notes that,  regard ing three  measures , namely the import regulation on 
air conditioners, the import licen ces on steel, and the import regulation s for textiles, Japan had 
submitted written questions to Indonesia in the Import Licensing and TRIMs  Committee s, to which  
Japan expect s Indonesia's prompt response. Japan hopes that Indonesia's import regulations on air 
conditioners will be operated so as not to fall under import r estrictions, that its permit standards and 
procedures will be stipulated with more transparency, and that its other measures will be corrected 
or abolished as soon as possible.  
10.14.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
10.15.   Under this agenda i tem, the European Union  reiterates more broadly its deep and 
long-standing concerns over Indonesia 's import and export restricting policies and practices as no 
real progress has been registered. Rather, the number and scope of Indonesian restrictions seems  
to have further expanded over time.  In particular, the EU reiterates its serious preoccupation with 
Indonesia 's burdensome and lengthy SPS  import authori zation procedures, its complex rules on halal 
labelling, its mandatory use of and limited possibilities for audits on domestic SNI  standards, its 
wider use of local content requirements, and its restrictive import licensing requirements or other 
import control measures.  
10.16.   In this respect, the European Union welcomes t hat Regulation s No.  77/2019 and 
No. 68/2020 have now been repealed, thereby revoking the de facto prohibition to imports in to 
Indonesia of EU  finished textile items, notably carpets , and providing new rules to import finished 
footwear, electronics, and bic ycles and tricycles. However, the EU considers that details on 
Indonesia's current  and future import regimes remain unclear, and that new restrictive import 
measures appear to have been introduced for some of the same products , such as the new regime 
of import quotas in place since January  2022 for textiles and footwear.  
10.17.   Therefore, the  European Union requests Indonesia's clarification of its current and future 
import regimes. The EU  would also be grateful for further details on the expected timeline and 
arrangements for the application to different groups of products of the commodity balance system 
established under Government Regulation No. 5/2021 and Ministry of Trade Regulations 
No. 19/2021 and No. 20/2021.  On the latter, the EU welcom es Indonesia 's state d intention of 
establishing the commodity balance as a tool to streamline the issuing of import/export  licences, 
although the EU is concerned that the commodity balance system might actually result in further 
unintended restrictions to trade flows.  
10.18.   The European Union also notes the introduction of a new export regime under Regulation 
No. 18/2021, which appears to significantly expand the scope of goods subject to export prohibitions 
(from 39 to 275  tariff posts). This new export regime will further hinde r trade flows and the EU has 
doubts as to its compliance with WTO  obligations.  
10.19.   In conclusion, the European Union reiterate s its call to ensure that all of Indonesia's relevant 
measures are notified to the WTO in order to allow Members to comment on them. T he EU urges 
Indonesia to reduce its high number of trade barriers , which have been affecting EU  trade flows for 
too long , and to refrain from issuing new ones.  
10.20.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
10.21.   The United States wishes to take this  opportunity to again underscore its concerns with 
Indonesia 's import and export restricting policies and practices.  The US notes the growing number 
of Members that are intervening on this agenda item, as well as the increasing number of Indonesian G/C/M/143  
 
- 34 - 
 
  policie s that Members are raising as concerns . The US  hopes that Indonesia takes heed of this 
worrying trend.  The US has raised concerns with specific Indonesian policies in past meetings of the 
Council, as well as in the TRIMs, TBT, ITA, and Market Access Committees, and regret s that it must 
raise them again on this occasion . 
10.22.   First, the United States notes that, at the Council's previous meeting, Indonesia stated that 
it had "begun several reviews " of its local content policies and that consultations were ongoing.  The 
US request s that Indonesia provide the Council with an update on these reviews and underscore s 
the impor tance of ensuring that its consultations allow for broad public input.  
10.23.   Second, the United States continue s to have concerns regarding Indonesia 's application of 
tariffs on certain ICT  products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff commitments.  And w hile 
there were some positive developments with the new HS2022  schedule, Indonesia continues to 
maintain tariffs on ICT  products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff commitments . The US 
has raised this issue several times with Indonesia over the past t hree years, without a substantive 
response to its concerns . The US has been patient and constructive , including by  providing concrete 
examples that clearly illustrate its concerns as well as preparing specific questions that were 
circulated to the ITA  Committee in April  2021. Unfortunately, Indonesia has yet to provide a 
substantive response to the US' repeated attempts at engagement . At the Council's previous 
meeting, Indo nesia said it was coordinating with relevant Ministries and Agencies . Therefore, the US  
hopes that Indonesia is in a position to provide an update , especially now that it has finalized its 
HS2022  schedule , as well as a response to the US  questions from Apr il 2021.  The US believe s these 
tariffs on certain ICT  products are to Indonesia 's own detriment as they limit access for Indonesian 
consumers and firms to important high -tech products that form the backbone of the digital economy . 
US traders have also been  actively noting the disincentives to investment that result from these 
tariffs.  
10.24.   Third, the United States is concerned by Indonesia 's continued practice of finalizing 
trade -related measures without sufficient opportunities for stakeholder input . Indonesia has 
demonstrated a pattern of issuing into effect final measures connected to its halal product assurance 
law, without sufficient notification and with little, if any, opportunities for public input.  These 
measures have the potential to impact a significan t proportion of global goods trade with Indonesia, 
including US  exports . By finalizing measures in this manner, Indonesia misses an opportunity to 
receive valuable feedback from stakeholders regarding the trade impact of its measures.  
Additionally, the US remain s concerned that Indonesia has yet to respond to important questions on 
its halal measures that the US had circulated at the TBT  Committee.  Going forward, the United 
States strongly encourage s Indonesia to adopt a more transparent and consultative po licymaking 
process.  
10.25.   In closing, the United States urges Indonesia: ( i) to provide a response to the US'  April 2021 
questions in the ITA  Committee ; (ii) to provide a response to questions on Indonesia 's halal 
measures previously submitted to the TBT  Committ ee; and ( iii) to provide an update on its ongoing 
review of its local content policies.  The US believes that Indonesia 's trade -restricting policies run 
counter to its broader economic recovery goals as well as the interest s of Indonesian consumers, 
workers , and businesses, and the US  strongly encourage s Indonesia to reconsider such policies . The 
United States  is hopeful that Indonesia can respond to its concerns and stand s ready to engage.  
10.26.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
10.27.   Canada considers Indonesia 's application of tariffs above its bound rates on ICT  products to 
be inconsistent with Indonesia 's WTO  commitments and contrary to the objectives of multilateral 
tariff liberalization.  Canada is pleased that Indonesia is working with its relevant Ministries and 
agencies to bring its application of tariffs on ICT  products into compliance with its 
WTO commitments.  Finally, Canada calls upon Indonesia to expedite this work and eliminate tariffs 
on these ICT  products in a timely manner.  
10.28.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
10.29.   In responding to some of the concerns  raised by WTO  Members , Indonesia wishes to 
reiterate its statement s delivered at previous meetings of several relevant WTO  bodies, as follow s. G/C/M/143  
 
- 35 - 
 
  10.30.   With regard to the Domestic Component Level (TKDN), it is intended for policies relat ing to 
government procurement, fulfilling the needs to maintain the welfare and needs of the Indonesian 
people, and concerning the handling of strategic resources managed by the government. A 
comprehensive review of localization measures has been initiated several times and the process is 
still ongoing.  
10.31.   On the import duties for telecommunications products, it is now under technical discussion 
among the relevant Ministries. Indonesia will continue to strive to comply with all WTO  Agreements, 
including the ITA.  
10.32.   Regarding the import licensing procedures relat ing to SPS, Indonesia wish es to reiterate that 
what has been described as undue delay over the past two years is no longer relevant. Indonesia 
has made progress, improvement s, and introduced transparency in it s approval s mechanism . For 
example, Indonesia has issued Minister of Agriculture Regulation No. 15 of 2021 , which regulates 
business permits in agriculture , including animals and animal products, based on a risk -based 
analysis. This decision was submitted  to the SPS  Committee  in document  G/SPS/N/ID N/143.  The 
stages and time-frame for the approval procedure were communicated to the European Union's  
SPS Enquiry Point on 14 November  2021. The list of stages for approval of business units for imports 
into Indonesia must begin with  the following : (i) application from WTO Members; (ii) assessment 
for all required documents ; (iii) scheduling for on -site inspection , for which invitation will be issued 
by the WTO Member's competent authority or from the Embassy ; (iv) on-site inspection ; and 
(v) approval.  
10.33.   Indonesia also intends to suggest to the European Union  that the EU  SPS National Enquiry 
Point in Brussels could carry out be tter internal coordination with the EU  representative in Geneva 
so that the progress t hat has been conveyed and made in Brussels can be properly conveyed to 
Geneva. Indonesia understands the EU's request to ensure one  entity in the approval procedure 
mechanism. For WTO Members that have a health protocol for animal products, such as meat, d airy 
products, poultry, and animal by -products, and that wish to apply for approval to establish another 
unit for the same product, the on-site inspection may not be required if the results of the review 
have been completed, approved, and found to be according to the requirements. This procedure is 
in accordance with Article  5 and Article  6 of the SPS  Agreement.  
10.34.   On safeguards for carpet products, Indonesia wishes to reiterate its statement delivered at 
the Council's previous meeting , namely that Indonesia has also taken Japan's concerns seriously , as 
expressed in various bilateral and multilateral meetings . However, after seriously considering all the 
relevan t aspects , and to prevent or remedy the serious harm faced by Indonesia's domestic industry, 
the Indonesian government decided to impose necessary but temporary measures.  
10.35.   With regard to halal regulations , Indonesia intends to reaffirm its openness and tran sparency 
for international cooperation in the Halal Assurance System in Indonesia, based on the principles of 
cooperation, recognition , and acceptance, in accordance with international practice and regulations . 
10.36.   Regarding the Indonesian National Standard (S NI), the purpose of the SNI  policy is to ensure 
that relevant products can meet the safety, security, and health aspects necessary for the protection 
of Indonesian consumers, and that SNI is applied both for domestic products and imported products.  
10.37.   In prin ciple, Indonesia has no intention to impede the flow of international trade through its 
import and export policies, especially those related to the government's procurement policy , which 
concerns the fulfilment  of the needs and welfare of the Indonesian pe ople. Indonesia always pursues 
simplification , transparency, and efficiency to make its exports and imports easier to implement.  
10.38.   Indonesia stands ready to engage bilaterally with WTO  Members on their concerns . 
10.39.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
11  INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM CANADA, 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  
11.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Canada, the European Union , and the United States . G/C/M/143  
 
- 36 - 
 
  11.2.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
11.3.   The United States shares the concerns raised by Canada and the European Union regarding 
India's quantitative restrictions for select varieties of pulses.  Similar to its previous statements in 
the Import Licensing Committee , the Committee on Agriculture , and the C ommittee on Market 
Access , the United States repeat s its requests for information on how the measures reflect India 's 
WTO commitments, and when and how the measures will be ended.  Taking note that earlier this 
year India reinstated restrictions on certain pulses, the United States  continue s to urge India to 
consider less trade restrictive requirements and to notify future relevant measures and regulations 
in a timely manner.  
11.4.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
11.5.   As previously noted in this and in other committees, Canada continues to be concerned with 
India's trade restrictive measures , including quantitative restrictions, minimum import prices, 
restricting imports to one  seaport , and uncertainty introduced by frequent changes to tariffs on 
imports of pulses, in particular for dried peas.  Canada continues to question India 's justifications for 
these trade restrictive measures and calls upon India to i mmediately implement alternative trade 
facilitative measures for the import of pulses.  
11.6.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
11.7.   The European Union  fully supports the previous interventions.  As mentioned previously , the 
European Union remains concerned by India's import restrictions for certain pulses and urges India 
to provide certainty and stability when it comes to its import regime for pulses.  
11.8.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
11.9.   Argentina wishes to thank Canada, the United States, and the European Union for including 
this item on the agenda. As Argentina has stated on previous occasions, this measure affects two of 
the main pulses exported from Argentina to India. Argentina, like those that have taken the floor 
before  it, reiterates its concern over the uncertainty that this measure creates for its exporters.  
11.10.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
11.11.   Australia appreciates the clarification provided by India at the Council 's previous meeting 
regarding the status of its treatment of pulses. Australia notes India 's advice in its response that its 
process for reviewing its import restrictions on pulses is "agile, dynamic, and continuous ". In this 
context, Australia requests India 's advice on whether India inte nds to use these measures on an 
ongoing basis. Australia further requests India 's advice on its objectives and rationale for using these 
measures. Is the intent, for example, to manage imports in response to changing domestic 
circumstances?  
11.12.   Could India ple ase outline what other less trade -distorting measures could be adopted to 
address the underlying objectives of India 's decision to implement import restrictions on pulses? Did 
India consider such alternative measures? If so, on what basis were such measure s rejected ? 
11.13.   India's measures matter in the global pulses market. India 's current suite of measures on 
pulses, including significant levels of market price support, high tariffs , and quantitative restrictions, 
continue to negatively impact the stability and  predictability of the global pulses market, to the 
detriment of all producers and consumers, including those in India, as well as exporters and traders.  
11.14.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
11.15.   As addressed at previous meetings of this Council  and the Committee on Market Access , the 
measures adopted by India remain temporary and are undertaken for the purpose of maintaining 
food and nutritional security. This is an area of great importance to India's  economy and the policies 
on imports are regularly reviewed and updated.  India's  Notification No. 63/2015 -2020, made by the 
Directorate General of Foreign Trade on 29 March  2022, states that the free import policy of urad , 
HS code 0713.31.10, and tur or pigeon peas , HS code 0713.60.00, has been extended until 
31 March  2023.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 37 - 
 
  11.16.   India's  import measure on Moong has already been notified to the Committee on Import 
Licensing , under Article  5.1-5.4 notifications , in document  G/LIC/N/2/IND/22.  Therefore, India is 
fully compliant with the notifica tion obligations for this specific trade concern . In fact, some of the 
products referred to in this specific trade concern are not restricted for import at all.  As such, India 
urges the proponents of this agenda item specifically to state what problems the ir exporters are 
facing and the quantification thereof. In the absence of such information , it would be unfortunate if 
this specific trade concern continued being carried forward in to other meetings of WTO  regular 
bodies.  
11.17.   The Council took note  of the state ments made.  
12  UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
12.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the European Union . 
12.2.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
12.3.   Unfortunately, the United States ha s still not resolved this long -standing issue and continue s 
to refuse to take the final  and purely administrative step necessary to complete the approval of 
imports of apples and pears from the European Union . Such a step is needed for a so -called "systems 
approach " to replace the current costly pre -clearance system imposed by the United States.  
12.4.   The initial application from the European Union  dates back to 2008  and all technical work had 
already b een finalized in 2017. But despite raising this issue on multiple occasions with the United 
States in biannual bilateral  dialogues, sending multiple letters to the US and already raising this 
issue 13 times as a specific trade concern in the SPS  Committee, the US continues to fall short of 
meeting its WTO obligations on this issue. Indeed , the US keeps it s markets closed for apples and 
pears from the EU under a systems approach and without any scientific grounds.  
12.5.   The European Union  urges the Unite d States to base its import conditions on science and to 
resolve this important matter without further delay. The EU  calls upon the US to play its part in 
supporting a constructive  and mutually beneficial cooperation.  
12.6.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
12.7.   The United States thanks the European Union  for its continued interest in the status of the 
request from eight  EU member States to export apples and pears under a systems approach to the 
United States.  The US  Department of Agriculture continues to work through its administrative 
procedures on this request.  The United States  would again note that the European Union is able to 
export apples and pears to the US under the existing pre -clearance program me. 
12.8.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
13  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC 
CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL AND URUGUAY  
13.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Brazil and Uruguay . 
13.2.   The delega te of Brazil , addressing Agenda Items  13 and 14,  indicated the following:  
13.3.   Brazil wishes to reiterate its disappointment with the fact that, as a result of Brexit, the 
European Union  and the United Kingdom are reducing Members ' access to their markets.  And a s the 
Council know s, according to the Agreements, a WTO Member cannot unilaterally reduce their market 
access concessions without granting compensation.  Brazil therefore urge s both the EU and the UK 
to duly take into consideration the concerns that Brazil has  expressed in their bilateral discussions.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 38 - 
 
  13.4.   The delegate of Uruguay , addressing Agenda Items  13 and 14, indicated the following:  
13.5.   Uruguay wishes to reiterate its trade and systemic concerns over the unilateral modifications 
of concessions of the  European Union tariff rate quotas under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 
following Brexit, in particular with respect to the fact that they are not necessary and lack any legal 
basis under the WTO  Agreements.  
13.6.   Uruguay  regret s that, even though it participated actively and constructively in the process 
from the beginning, taking into account the importance and sensitivity of the market access 
conditions and concessions at stake, and demonstrating the injury that its agricultural sector, and 
its economy as a whole, would suffer as a result of the apportionment, the European Union rejected 
even the most modest and reasonable requests for compensation submitted by Uruguay.  
13.7.   This is why Uruguay wishes once again to rei terate its profound disappointment and 
dissatisfaction with this situation, while reaffirming its willingness to find a mutually agreed solution  
insofar as the European Union recognizes Uruguay's specific conditions and needs, and demonstrates 
the necessar y political will to reach an agreement.  
13.8.   Lastly, without prejudice to the bilaterally agreed commitments between them, Uruguay once 
again requests that the European Union remove the United Kingdom from the potential users of its 
tariff rate quotas in its WT O Schedule of concessions. At the same time, as a year and a half has 
now passed since the end of the transition period of the Withdrawal Agreement and the completion 
of the UK's withdrawal from the EU, Uruguay reiterates its query about when and how the EU intends 
to adjust downwards its final bound aggregate measurement of support (AMS) entitlements in its 
Schedule of concessions, in line with the announcements made.  
13.9.   With respect to Agenda Item 14, Uruguay would like to express concern over the United 
Kingdom's proposed AMS entitlement of GBP  4,949  million and its practical implications, as well as 
the UK's intention to retain the agricultural special safeguard (SSG)  rights under Article  5 of the  AoA, 
for all products and under the same criteria and conditions as set out in the European Union's 
Schedule.  With respect to the Article  XXVIII procedures, Uruguay would like to reaffirm its 
willingness to work together with the UK with a view to reach ing a mutually agreeable solution that 
allows the UK to have an independent Schedule of concessions at the WTO.  
13.10.   The delegate of India, addressing Agenda Items  13 and 14,  indicated the following:  
13.11.   India continues to discuss the issue of tariff rate quota (TRQ) commitments with the 
European Union and share s some of the concerns raised by this agenda item's proponents. India will 
continue to work bilaterally with the EU towards resolving these issues.  At the same time, India 
continues to discuss bilaterally w ith the United Kingdom the issue of the UK's modified goods 
schedule post -Brexit.  
13.12.   The delegate of Paraguay , addressing Agenda Items  13 and 14, indicated the following:  
13.13.   Paraguay wishes to reiterate its systemic concern over the approach adopted for the 
apportionment of the tariff rate quota s, as well as the establishment of a broad AMS for the 
United  Kingdom, without, so far, having an equivalent reduction in the European Union's entitlement . 
Paraguay also associates itself with the concerns raised by Urugua y regarding the UK's intention to 
reserve special safeguard rights that would not meet the market access requirements necessary for 
its existence.  
13.14.   The delegate of Canada , addressing Agenda Items  13 and 14, i ndicated the following:  
13.15.   Negotiations with the European Union  on modifications to its TRQ commitments as the result 
of Brexit are ongoing.  Canada notes the extension of these negotiations to 1 January  2023.  On a 
related matter, Canada would be interested in the EU 's timeline to modify its domestic support 
commitment to reflect its apportionment to the United Kingdom . G/C/M/143  
 
- 39 - 
 
  13.16.   The delegate of Mexico , addressing Agenda Items  13 and 14, indicated the following:  
13.17.   Mexico wishes to place on record its systemic concerns, as it has done in other meetings, 
and request s that its previous statements be noted for the record.6 Mexico also wishes to echo the 
concerns of other Members regarding the European Union's AMS, and particularly on the question 
of when Members can expect the EU to make the necessary change to establ ish the United Kingdom's 
exit, with the data that the UK intends to have on its list, and when that subtraction would be 
reflected in the EU's list from its consolidated AMS?  
13.18.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
13.19.   The European Union takes careful note of the comments made.  As the EU mentioned under 
Agenda I tem 2, good progress has been achieved with agreements formally signed with six  of the 
EU's partners, initialled with three  other partne rs, and negotiations progressing well with several 
other partners . The EU welcomes the increased engagement of many WTO  Members. The European 
Union remains fully committed to continu ing these negotiations and consultations and to bring ing 
them to a success ful close in the coming months.  
13.20.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
14  UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL AND URUGUAY  
14.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Brazil and Uruguay . 
14.2.   The delegates of Brazil , Canada , India, Mexico , Paraguay , and Uruguay  addressed this item 
in their respective interventions under Agenda Item  13. 7 
14.3.   The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
14.4.   The Russian Federation is concerned about the United Kingdom 's approach and methodology 
in respect of its TRQ renegotiations.  In particular, Russia cannot agree with the UK's proposed 
schedule modifications without receiving compensation as provided for under Article  XXVIII of the 
GATT.  
14.5.   The Russian Federation wishes to recall that it was recognized by the United Kingdom as a 
principal  supplier of certain products. However, to date Russia did not receive any compensation  
proposal from the UK. In this regard, Russia  urges the UK to continue its negotiations and to provide 
Russia with ade quate compensation in order to complete the establishment of its proper schedule of 
tariff commitments in the WTO under the Brexit  process.  
14.6.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
14.7.   The United Kingdom wishes to thank WTO Members for engag ing with the UK in  discussions 
in Geneva  that week . The UK hopes to continue its constructive dialogue with the WTO  Members 
concerned in the upcoming months with the hope that this process will soon be concluded . 
14.8.   As the United Kingdom  set out under Agenda Item 3, it remain s committed to resolving all 
discussions relating to its Goods Schedule , including through the process under Article  XXVIII  of the 
GATT . It is expected that the extension of timelines under Article  XXVIII:3 will allow further 
necessary engagement and a conclusion of the discussions.  
14.9.   On the statement s concerning the AMS, special safeguards, and currency conversion, the 
United Kingdom wishes to refer Members to its previous statements made in this Coun cil, and at the 
CMA, which set out the UK's  position on these issues as it still stand s. The UK wishes to note that , 
following engagement at a technical level, many WTO Members that held initial concerns over this 
 
6 Document  G/C/M/14 1, paragraphs  13.29 -13.32.  
7 Paragraphs  13.2-13.3 (Brazil), 13.14 -13.15 (Canada), 13.10 -13.11 (India), 13.16 -13.17 (Mexico), 
13.12 -13.13 (Paraguay), and 13.4 -13.9 (Uruguay).  G/C/M/143  
 
- 40 - 
 
  matter have since been satisfied to remove  their objections. The UK remains open to holding similar 
discussions with those WTO Members that continue to express their concerns.  
14.10.   The United Kingdom  reiterates its thanks to those WTO Members that have engaged 
constructively on all matters relating to its goods schedule so far, including for the recent in -person 
engagement.  The UK continue s to welcome constructive bilateral dialogue towards resolving those 
concerns voiced by WTO  Members on this occasion . 
14.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
15  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM NEW ZEALAND AND URUGUAY  
15.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
New Zealand and Uruguay . 
15.2.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the follo wing:  
15.3.   New Zealand  continue s to raise this item in the Goods Council and refer s the European Union 
to its previous statements.  New Zealand has considered the European Union's response on this 
matter. However, New Zealand  still see s a conflict in the Europea n Commission 's approach to 
protecting the cheese names "Danbo " and "Havarti ", for which there are existing Codex  standards, 
and the integrity of the standards setting system that promotes reliability and consistency in 
international trade rules, which New Zealand  would expect the EU to support.  
15.4.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
15.5.   Uruguay regrets having t o place this item on the agenda once again and wishes to refer to its 
previous statements8 while reaffirming its concern at the European Union's decision to register the 
term Danbo as a protected geographical indication (PGI), despite objections by severa l Members.  
15.6.   As Uruguay has noted for a long time, Danbo refers to a cheese manufacturing technique; it 
does not correspond to any known geographical location. This manufacturing technique is covered 
by Codex Alimentarius Standard  264, which lays down the ch aracteristics, form of production, and 
labelling of this type of cheese. This standard has been amended several times, most recently in 
2007, with the approval and participation of the European Union. However, the EU subsequently 
decided to include Danbo c heese as a PGI. It was also included in its free trade agreements, thereby 
indirectly excluding from third  markets producers of this type of cheese, which, in Uruguay's view, 
constitutes a limitation on trade.  
15.7.   Therefore, Uruguay considers that the registra tion by the European Union  of the term Danbo 
as a PGI is not only contradictory , but also amounts to establishing a de facto monopoly on a Codex 
standard, which creates legal uncertainty, because Members cannot choose which international rules 
to comply wi th and which to ignore.  For these reasons, despite the time that has elapsed, Uruguay  
will continue to maintain this trade concern.  
15.8.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
15.9.   The European Union  takes note of the concerns expressed by New Zealand and Uruguay.  The 
EU has provided detailed replies to these concerns at previous CTG  meetings. There has been no 
new development since the CTG 's previous meeting. The EU therefore refer s to its statement 
delivered at the CTG 's previous  meeting , which remains valid in its entirety.9 
15.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
 
8 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  13.2-13.5. 
9 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  13.10 -13.13.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 41 - 
 
  16  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (CBAM)  
– STATEMENT BY CHINA  
– STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
16.1.   The Chairper son recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China and the Russian Federation . 
16.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
16.3.   China reiterates its statements made in previous meetings of this Council  and the Committee 
on Market Access, and wishes to continue to express its deep concern over the European Union's 
proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism ( CBAM). China fully suppo rts international efforts 
to fight against climate change. However, China believe s that to effectively combat climate change , 
we need to take collective action among all Members, rather than implement ing unilateral measures 
by individual WTO Members. WTO Members  also need to fully respect the basic principles of 
"common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" and "nationally determined 
contributions" under the U nited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  and 
the Pa ris Agreement, and the WTO rules.  
16.4.   China take note that , on 22 June 2022, the EU  Parliament adopted its position on the CBAM. 
The adopted position of the EU  Parliament appears to be derived from the previously released 
version . Nevertheless , there are some changes , a few of which China wishes  to mention here , as 
follows: (i)  the CBAM transitional period is still to start on 1  January  2023, but is to end on 
1 January  2027 (instead of 1  January  2025, as proposed by the ENVI  Committee , and 
1 January  2026, as previously proposed by the EU  Commission) ; (ii) the scope of CBAM  products 
will be extended to include organic chemicals, plastics, hydrogen , and ammonia ; (iii) in addition to 
direct emissions, the calculation of embedded emissions of CBAM in -scope prod ucts should also 
include "indirect emissions " (being emissions of the electricity used during the production process of 
the in -scope products) ; (iv) the full implementation of CBAM by 2032 , which is  three  years earlier 
than proposed by the EU  Commission.  
16.5.   In addition to its questions raised in previous Council meetings, China has a new question 
with regard to the amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 22  June 2022.  These 
amendments mention that the European Commission shall draft a legislative prop osal providing for 
a protection against the risk of carbon leakage that equali zes carbon pricing for the production in 
the European Union of products listed in Annex  I that are produced for export to third  countries 
without carbon pricing mechanisms similar to the EU  Emissions Trading System ( ETS), in particular 
for installations belonging to the 10% most efficient installations as laid down in Article  10(a) of 
Directive No. 2003/87/EC. China wishes to know how the EU can ensure that such a practice will be 
consistent with WTO  rules.  
16.6.   China  also note s that the European Union stated many times , on various occasions , that the 
CBAM will be consistent with WTO  rules, but unfortunately China has not seen any pragmatic actions 
taken by the EU under  the WTO. China does not wish to argue over whether the CBAM is a climate 
or a trade measure, but it is true that the CBAM will have restrictive rather than facilitating effects 
on international trade. If the EU really wishes  to ensure that its CBAM will be in line with WTO  rules, 
it should first fully discus all the controversial details of the CBAM with all interested WTO Members, 
and answer the technical questions raised by various of those M embers , including China. China will 
continue to raise its conce rn on the CBAM and expect s the EU to respond directly to all the questions 
that it has raised in previous meetings.  
16.7.   The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
16.8.   The Russian Federation reiterates its statements made during previous meetings of the C MA 
and the C TG, and expresses its deep concern regard ing the EU's proposed CBAM.  Russia supports 
international efforts aimed at combating climate change and considers specialized international 
organizations to be the main platform s to address this challenge.  
16.9.   Climate change can be tackled only in cooperation between all members of the global 
community. The Russian Federation is convinced that current provisions of international climate G/C/M/143  
 
- 42 - 
 
  agreements have not yet been exhausted.  However , the European Union has  made a decision to act 
unilaterally by developing its own trade restrictive measures, in particular the CBAM.  Russia believe s 
that this measure contradicts the basic principles and rules of the WTO , as well as hampering the 
archite cture of global trade.  
16.10.   The Russian Federation  draws the attention of WTO  Members to the fact that the institutions 
of the European Union , namely the Council and the Parliament, have been working on amending the 
provisions of the draft regulation prepared b y the Commission last July. Russia stress es that their 
proposals are aimed at tightening already trade -restrictive provisions of the current version of the 
draft regulation on the CBAM. For example , the European Parliament propose s to extend the scope 
of products subject to the measure by including hydrogen, organic chemicals, polymers , and 
ammonia.  Moreover, the Parliament suggested an extension of the CBAM on both direct and indirect 
greenhouse gas emissions that would  increase the charges on imported products and create 
additional barriers , including fiscal, administrative , and technical barriers . In addition , the Parliament 
proposes not to take into account the decarbonization practices of manufacturing process es in the 
EU's trading partners in order to decrease CBAM  charges.  
16.11.   The EU Council also proposes not to take into account the practices of decarbonization of 
manufacturing process es in third  countries while calculating the CBAM  rate, regardless of whether 
those pr actices are effective or not. Instead, the European Union  will take into account only the ETS 
similar to its own. Apparently, such an approach is purely economic and aimed at imposing additional 
costs on exporters of covered products to the EU. At the same  time, the Russian Federation  remind s 
the EU that the UNFCCC, as well as the Paris Agreement, allow their Parties to decide on their own 
way of achieving climate goals that are most effective for them. According to Article  3 of the UNFCCC, 
for example, "policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost -effective so as to 
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should 
take into account different socio -economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, 
sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. " 
16.12.   Another issue is the proposal of the Council according to which an accredited verifier under 
the CBAM may be a person accredited in accordance with Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) No. 2018/2067 . In other words , the European Union 's appointees only. This makes mutual 
recognition of verification between the EU and its trading partners, even in theory, impossible.  
16.13.   Bearing all these proposals in mind one can only conclude that the final version of the CBAM 
will lead to a disruption in supply chains, increasing prices for basic products and aggravating  the 
current global economic situation.  
16.14.   In October  2021, the Russian Federation circulated questions to the European Union in 
document  G/MA/W/172 -G/C/W/800. However, the EU has failed to pr ovide answers. Russia  urges 
the EU to provide its responses accordingly.  Finally, Russia also urge s the EU to respect current 
trade rules and international climate agreements in order to avoid negative economic and social 
consequences.  
16.15.   The delegate of Türkiye indicated the following:  
16.16.   At this Council and in other relevant committees , Türkiye has communicated its expectations 
from the European Union  on the drafting and future implementation of the CBAM. These comments 
have been and are being shared with the E uropean Commission bilaterally and in  other for ums. As 
always, Türkiye thank s the EU for its transparent approach and constant information -sharing efforts 
on the ongoing design of the CBAM.  
16.17.   Türkiye understand s and share s the European Union's objectives and rationale in designing 
such response measures aimed at protecting the environment and tackling climate change.  However , 
Türkiye consider s that measures targeted for this purpose should prioritize  international cooperation 
and collective action, should take into account the different circumstances and historical 
responsibilities of countries, should respect the social and economic development needs of others , 
and furthermore , should not constitute arbitrary or disguised restri ction and unjustifiable 
discrimination in international trade.  At this juncture , Türkiye reiterat es that the design of the CBAM 
appears not to be taking some of its concerns into account.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 43 - 
 
  16.18.   Since the Council 's previous  meeting, discussions within the EU  Parliament have been 
concluded in a process that seems to bring possible additions to the design of the CBAM. While 
Türkiye would appreciate receiving detailed information and update s from the European Union , at 
this stage it sees that certain new aspects that  are being mentioned, such as inclusion of indirect 
emissions to the mechanism and the possibility of free allowances for EU  exports to countries without 
similar carbon pricing , further increases Türkiye's concerns with regard to the WTO  consistency of 
these possible additions, as well as the additional burden they may create on manufacturers in other 
countries.  
16.19.   Türkiye looks forward to receiving further update s from the European Union in this regard . 
16.20.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
16.21.   Climate change is one of the most important issues. Countries must raise their ambitions 
and policy efforts to achieve carbon neutrality worldwide by 2050, while at the same time ensuring 
a level  playing field and preventing carbo n leakage. Therefore, policy coordination is important for 
the production and introduction of products with low carbon intensity.  When discussing policy 
coordination, each country has been making reduction efforts in the past according to their own 
circums tances, such as energy source constraints and the industrial environment, and , in principle , 
the focus should be on "carbon intensity " as the "result " of such reduction efforts.  
16.22.   In other words, if the "carbon intensity " of a country or sector is low, this would be the result 
of said country or sector having taken sufficient measures , such that there would be no problems in 
terms of the level playing field or carbon leakage. In this regard, the European Union 's CBAM is 
designed to calculate the explicit carb on price at the present time by specific environmental 
measures, and to charge based on this manner at the border. In this case, even if the product has 
the same actual carbon intensity and does not cause any carbon leakage, taxation will occur due to 
the explicit difference in carbon price.  In this respect, the environmental objective itself cannot be 
justified from the viewpoint of preventing carbon leakage, but sufficient consideration is required 
from the viewpoint of ensuring fair  and competitive condi tions. In addition to the above -mentioned 
institutional design issues, it is a prerequisite that this measure be designed consistently with the 
WTO rules, as has been repeatedly stated.  
16.23.   Japan is closely following the development of the EU  CBAM. As far as Japan understand s, 
the CBAM was approved for re -amendment at the European Parliament 's plenary session of 22  June, 
and the trialogue discussions are under  way between the European Council, the European 
Parliament , and the European Commission. Meanwhile, the amendment of the European Parliament 
includes the refund of emission credits at the time of export from the EU, and there are more issues, 
such as subsidies agreements, that need to be considered. In the future,  Japan considers that the 
EU must avoid rushed and arbitrary decisions and to continue to fully discuss this matter 
internationally.  
16.24.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
16.25.   The Republic of Korea appreciates the European Union's  leading role and efforts in tackling 
ongoing climate change. Korea  understand s that the EU has introduced its CBAM framework in an 
attempt to address the issue of possible carbon leakage . Korea wishes to reiterate that trade -related 
measures, such as the CBAM, should be consistent with the WTO rules, while also being carefully 
designed so as not to function as unnecessary trade barrier s or to create an excessive administrative 
burden.  
16.26.   The Republic of Korea thus believes that it is essential to provide sufficient information and 
opportunities to submit its opinions to those that will be affected by the measure. Moreover, with a 
view to reaching a common understanding on this issue among WTO Members, the reby avoiding an 
unexpected negative result, it is important to have sufficient discussion and to build a common 
understanding among international communities , including the WTO , before its actual 
implementation.  
16.27.   The Republic of Korea hopes that the Europe an Union's CBAM will be implemented in a 
manner that fulfils  the WTO objectives of ensuring sustainable development and facilitating free 
trade. Korea will continue to follow the process of the CBAM 's introduction closely . G/C/M/143  
 
- 44 - 
 
  16.28.   The delegate of  the Kingdom of Sa udi Arabia  indicated the following:  
16.29.   From the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's  perspective, while the European Union has stated that 
its proposed mechanism will be in conformity with WTO  rules and its other international obligations, 
the EU has yet to provide expl anations of how it intends to achieve this objective . While the EU 's 
stated intention  is to address the risk of investment leakage from the EU to other countries , 
Saudi  Arabia in fact considers that the EU's main objective is to maintain the competitiveness of 
EU industries. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia's very preliminary review of the EU's proposed CBAM 
indicates that it raises very serious concerns due to its potential medium and long -term negative 
implications  on global trade.  
16.30.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia considers that the consistency of the European Union's CBAM 
with the fundamental rules of the WTO is questionable. Therefore, the burden of proof to confirm 
that this mechanism is consistent with the EU's obligations and commitments regarding MFN, 
national treatment, rules of origin , and NTBs , falls on the EU  itself. Furthermore, monitoring and 
calculating the carbon emissions embedded in the products covered by the CBAM is not a 
straightforward task and many de tails of the calculation methodology are not yet  clear. Saudi Arabia 
requests the EU to provide further clarification in this regard . 
16.31.   In addition, the  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia kindly requests the European Union  to specify the 
articles in the WTO  Agreements that allow it to adopt this unnecessar ily complicated mechanism. 
Saudi Arabia also urge s the EU to further engage in consultations with WTO Members in order to 
ensure the CBAM's full compliance with the WTO's rules and Agreements , including  by ensuring that 
the proposed mechanism would not create any unnecessary barriers to trade, or be used as the 
means of an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restriction on international trade, 
or be applied in a manner that constitutes prote ction to EU  domestic industries.  
16.32.   Finally, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  looks forward to receiving  further details and reflections 
from the European Union on its proposed mechanism . The Kingdom also stands ready to engage  on 
this issue  with the EU and intere sted Members.  
16.33.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
16.34.   The United States wishes to reiterate its encouragement to the European Union to further 
consult with WTO Members, in the spirit of transparency and minimizing any disruption to trade , as 
it finalizes the CBAM  legislation and the associated delegated acts which will provide necessary detail 
to implement the mechanism.  The US urges the EU to ensure that the CBAM  will not unnecessarily 
penalize goods that are produced in countries without an explicit price on carbon, and create 
loopholes for goods originating in jurisdictions with weak carbon pricing mechanisms regardless of 
actual emissions intensity.  
16.35.   The United States believes that it is essential that WTO Members focus on the outcomes of 
our overall climate objectives to achieve net zero by 2050, including by addressing the embedded 
emissions associated with traded goods.  The US does not believe that it is neces sary for all 
WTO Members to adopt the same domestic policy approach to addressing climate change . Therefore , 
the US  encourage s the EU to consider ways to account for the full range of climate mitigation 
measures taken by trading partners in the CBAM.  
16.36.   Focus ing on embedded emissions in trade is a concrete and measurable approach to 
addressing climate change objectives through trade.  By focusing on embedded emissions in traded 
goods, and reducing those emissions over time, WTO Members can consider how to emplo y trade 
policies , through whatever policy tools Members have chosen , to achieve our shared objective , which 
is incentivizing industrial decarbonization . With this objective in mind, the United States welcome s 
additional, detailed information and fulsome en gagement by the European Union on the CBAM . 
16.37.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
16.38.   Brazil refers to its previous statements on the topic and wishes to highlight two  particular 
aspects of this measure.  First, the European Union  has recently clarifi ed that its CBAM will be phased 
in while free allowances of ETS will be phased out. With this, the EU will be imposing a tax on foreign 
imports while exempting some of its own producers of the very same tax. The fact that the EU, G/C/M/143  
 
- 45 - 
 
  which is the largest trad ing partner of several WTO  Members, could make such a blatant violation of 
a core WTO  principle, compounded with the discriminatory policies for agricultural products that 
were discussed earlier, is extremely worrying for the future of this Organization. W hile in the context 
of MC12 Members have seen strong signals of flexibility and commitment to the WTO coming from 
China, the United States , India,  and several other Members, these policies by the EU lead us to 
question to what extent the EU is willing to p lay a constructive role at a time of great challenges to 
the multilateral trading system.  
16.39.   Second, the CBAM represents an attempt by the European Union to shift the burden of 
adjustment costs to other countries, while at the same time it is backtracking on its own 
commitments. For instance, by labelling investments in natural gas and nuclear energy as "green". 
Furthermore, it is in clear violation of the principles, norms , and commitments assumed by the EU 
in international environmental agreements.  
16.40.   Many stak eholders have called for trade negotiators to work closely with environment 
experts, as these topics cannot be addressed in silos. Brazil  notes, in this context, that if the Climate 
Coalition of Trade Ministers  that is being proposed by the European Union  and a few other Members 
is true and serious in its purposes , the EU will find  in Brazil  a strong partner to promote sustainable 
development . It was under Brazil's auspices that the international community achieved the main 
agreements and principles in International Environmental Law ( IEL), as well as the core framework 
for both the Sustainable Development Goals ( SDGs ) and the Paris Agreement  (much of which was 
achieved in Rio a f ew years before) . Therefore , Brazil has  much to contribute in terms of how to 
bridge divergences and build consensus on this matter.  However, Brazil fears that the EU is 
consistently seeking to water down any reference to its commitments in environmental a greements 
and their principles , and instead seeks to legitimize unilateral actions that do not contribute to 
common global challenges, violate core rules and principles of both the trade and environmental 
regimes , and weaken the capacity of th ose regimes t o provide global solutions to global problems.  
16.41.   Brazil is very proud of the very constructive role it played in both the trade and 
environmental regimes and urges the European Union  to reconsider the systemic impact of its 
unilateral actions . 
16.42.   The delegate o f Paraguay  indicated the following:  
16.43.   Paraguay wishes to reiterate its interest in this trade concern and requests that its previous 
statements be placed on record.10 In addition, Paraguay again requests information from the 
European Union on whether it plan s a tariff reduction for imported products with a lower carbon 
footprint, and how it plans an increase for those with a higher footprint. Paraguay believes that 
incentives are just as important as penalties in measures such as these, and that common but 
differentiated responsibilities should also be taken into account.  
16.44.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
16.45.   Indonesia wishes to reiterate its statement delivered at the CTG's  previous meeting on its 
concerns on the European Green Deal policy, mainly the proposed CBAM and Deforestation Free 
Commodities (DFC).11 Indonesia is of the view that such proposals have the potential to create 
unnecessary barriers to international trade and create different treatment between products 
produced within the European Union and imported products. On the CBAM, Indonesia requests the 
EU to provide clear and reasonable justification regarding the expansion of CBAM  product coverage, 
which now inclu des organic chemicals, plastics, hydrogen, and ammonia, as well as the expansion 
in the scope of its emission coverage, which now includes indirect emissions. Regarding the DFC, 
although the EU has stated that the policy is only aimed at importers in the E U, Indonesia emphasizes 
that, in the end, the proposed legislation would have an impact on producing countries, including 
Indonesia. Indonesia is of the view that, in addressing environmental challenges, Members should 
act in accordance with WTO  rules and principles, including the principles of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Indonesia is also of the view that the EU, 
instead of applying a carbon mechanism that could hinder international trade, should have carried 
out its obligations as stated in the Paris Agreement, and its related agreements, including to provide 
technical assistance. In the context of the current and developing geopolitical tensions in Europe, 
 
10 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  36.24 -36.25.  
11 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  41.2-41.7. G/C/M/143  
 
- 46 - 
 
  Indonesia realizes the significance of joint efforts by all WTO  Members to maintain global supply 
chain stability by prioritizing trade cooperation that is non -unilateral and non -discriminatory. 
Therefore, Indonesia urges the EU to review the European Green Deal policy, especially the CBAM 
and DFC  proposals, so  as to bring it into line with WTO  law and principles, and avoid hindering 
international trade.  
16.46.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
16.47.   The European Union  takes careful note of Members' statement s. For the sake of efficiency , 
and since the issues covered under  this agenda item will also be raised under Agenda I tem 41, the 
EU intends to provide one  single intervention under that other agenda item. 
16.48.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
17  EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  
17.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the Russian Federation . 
17.2.   The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
17.3.   The Russian Federation reiterates its statements made during the Council's previous meetings 
and expresses deep concern in respect of the European Green Deal and its implementation.  The 
European Union continues to develop and impose new trade -restrictive m easures under the pretext 
of environmental and climate protection.  
17.4.   The Council has just discussed the European Union's CBAM. And it is no secret that the 
imposition of this mechanism is closely related to the EU's desire to substitute imported energy 
produ cts by their own energy sources. Such substitution has already caused a rise in production 
costs on the EU  market and a transfer of production from the EU to other countries, or what the EU 
describes as "carbon leakage ". 
17.5.   Obviously, the European Union's Green Deal does not include its CBAM  only. It covers all 
sectors of the economy. Currently , WTO Members are raising specific trade concerns with regard to 
certain elements of the Green Deal during the meetings of specialized WTO  working bodies.  One 
such measure that causes deep concern to the Russian Federation is the Draft EU  Batteries 
Regulation. This measure sets out product requirements for new batteries as a condition for access 
to the EU  market ; it also sets out material recovery targets fo r waste batteries.  This regulation 
specifically sets requirements on the maximum level of carbon footprint over the life cycle of 
batteries , and on the minimum level of recycled materials such as cobalt, lithium, lead , and nickel.  
Apparently, the requireme nts for the minimum level of recycled materials in batteries are aimed at 
reducing the use of primary metals in the EU. The requirements of this draft Regulation are not 
based on science nor on international standards or guidelines that specify the content  of recycled 
materials in batteries, material recovery targets , and the levels and methodologies for the calculation 
of carbon footprint over the life cycle of batteries . 
17.6.   Of course, the European Green Deal is not limited to the listed measures. It also pro vides for 
the promotion of EU  energy standards and technologies at the global level, the diversification of 
energy sources of supply, the adoption of new technical regulations, and the revision of competition 
rules, among others . Most of these projects are , or will be , heavily subsidized, and their 
implementation would lead to the elimination of traditional foreign supplies from the EU  market.  
Russia already see s the compensation of costs for reduction of indirect emissions in accordance with 
the EU  ETS State Aid Guidelines , for example . 
17.7.   In sum , the Russian Federation underline s that, whatever activities WTO Members plan within 
the framework of environment and climate change, they should be carried out in accordance with 
the fundamental principles and rules  of the WTO,  and should not result in any kind of discrimination 
or disguised restrictions on trade. Russia expect s that current trade rules will be fully respected.  
17.8.   The Council took note  of the statement made.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 47 - 
 
  18  UNITED STATES – DISCRIMINATORY QUANTITATIVE R ESTRICTION ON STEEL 
AND/OR ALUMINIUM IMPORTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
18.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China . 
18.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
18.3.   China reiterates its statements made at previo us meetings of the C TG and C MA, and express es 
its deep concern with regard to the United States Section  232 tariffs on steel and/or aluminium . 
China is of the view that any measures that introduce new quotas, maintain tariffs above the bound 
ceiling, or di scriminate between WTO  Members , seem difficult to reconcile with the WTO 's rules, 
including Article  I, Article  XI, and Article  XIII of the GATT . 
18.4.   The United States stated in the Council's meeting of April  2022 that it had invoked 
Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  as justification for its action ; however, the US had not elaborated why 
these discriminatory measures were necessary for the protection of its essential security interests. 
Therefore, China  believe s that the Section  232 tariff is inconsistent with the United  States ' 
obligations under the WTO.  
18.5.   China also wishes to express its opposition to the practice adopted by the United States of 
first raising tariffs under the pretext of national security and then lifting the additional tariffs only 
for certain WTO Members , based on their bilateral arrangements with the US. This has created a 
dangerous precedent that does not compl y with the letter and spirit of the WTO nor with the history 
of the multilateral trading system.  
18.6.   In addition, and as already stated in April 's Council meeting, China requests the United States 
to indicate whether and when it intends to notify to the WTO its S ection  232 quotas for the 
European  Union , Japan,  and the United Kingdom . 
18.7.   Finally, China  urges the United States to remove all Section  232 tariffs and quotas as soon as 
possible.  
18.8.   The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
18.9.   As Türkiye did at the Council's previous meeting, it wishes on this occasion to reiterate  its 
concerns with  regard to Section  232 tariffs that have been imposed by the United States on imports 
of steel and aluminium  products since 2018. Türkiye once again notes its concern over the 
compatibility of the measures with the WTO  Agreement on Safeguards and the GATT  1994.  Türkiye 
is of the view that the recent developments towards the exclusion of some WTO Members from 
Section  232 tariffs , on a selective basis , further complicate s the problem by violating the WTO's 
most-favoured -nation ( MFN) principle.  Türkiye hopes that the United States will soon abide by its 
WTO commitments , meaning the removal and total elimination of all additional duties and 
quantitative restrictions , including discriminatory tariff rate quotas , applied to imports of steel and 
aluminium  products.  
18.10.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
18.11.   The United States  takes note of the comments and questions raised by China regarding the 
WTO consistency of its Section  232 measures.  The United States has invoked Article  XXI(b) of the 
GATT 1994 and its actions are therefore wholly consistent with the WTO.  Regarding questions 
relating to the operation of the Section  232 quotas, the United States  refers Members to the 
proclamations issued by the President of the United States under Section  232, and to quota 
implementation information published on the website of US  Customs and Border Protection.  
18.12.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 48 - 
 
  19  UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR CHINESE ENTERPRISES – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
19.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China . 
19.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
19.3.   China must raise this issue again as the United States continues to abuse the concept of 
national security and to impose export control measures against various Chinese companies.  China 
believes that the measures taken by the US disregard basic WTO  rules, un dermine the market 
principle and the principle of fair competition , and endanger the security of global supply chain s. 
China urges the United States immediately to eliminate its unjust and unfair export control measures 
against China 's companies in order to create favourable  conditions for normal US-China  bilateral 
trade while avoid ing negative effect s on global supply chain s. 
19.4.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
19.5.   As stated previously, the United States does not be lieve that the WTO  Council for Trade in 
Goods is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
19.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
20  UNITED STATES – MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FRO M CHINA  
20.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China . 
20.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
20.3.   China wishes to reiterate its statements made at previous meetings of the C TG12 and to 
continue to express its deep concern over measures taken by the United States restricting Chinese 
companies from providing communication products and services on the US  market.  In this regard, 
China  urges the US to abide by the WTO 's rules and to stop abus ing the national security concept.  
20.4.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
20.5.   As stated previously, the United States does not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade in 
Goods is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national se curity.  
20.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
21  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
21.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China . 
21.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
21.3.   China continue s to express its deep concern over the discriminatory measures taken by 
Australia prohibiting Chinese companies from participating in its 5G  netwo rk construction. In 
addition, China  is serious ly concern ed that Australia's prohibition has been extended to include its 
existing 4G  network.  China urges Australia to review the regulatory policies in its 
telecommunication s sector  and to provide fair marke t access to Chinese companies , thereby allowing 
 
12 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  32.2-32.3. G/C/M/143  
 
- 49 - 
 
  them to participate in Australia's construction of its 5G  network. China urges Australia to align  its 
measures with the WTO's rules.  
21.4.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
21.5.   Australia again notes China's statement. China first  raised this issue in the WTO in late  2018. 
Since then, Australia has engaged constructively with China to explain the rationale for its position 
on 5G  networks. Australia also notes that other WTO  Members have made simi lar decisions in their 
national interest on equipment for national 5G  networks. As previously stated, Australia's position 
on 5G  networks is country agnostic, transparent, risk -based, non -discriminatory, and fully 
WTO consistent.  
21.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
22  EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
22.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China . 
22.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
22.3.   China regrets having to raise this issue again. However,  to date, despite its repeated requests, 
China has not seen any assessments and relevant evidence provided by Sweden indicating that 
Chinese companies ' products pose security  risks to Sweden. In this regard, China considers that  it 
is inappropriate to assume that Chinese companies ' products cause harm to Sweden 's security 
without producing any credible evidence.  Therefore, China is of the view that Sweden 's measure is 
non-transparent, groundless, discriminatory , and inconsistent with WTO  rules.  In conclusion, China 
requests Sweden to provide a fair, transparent , and non -discriminatory environment for Chinese 
companies operating in Sweden.  
22.4.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
22.5.   The European Union  notes that the matter raised by China in relation to the recent Swedish 
5G spectrum auction is still under legal proceedings under the bilateral investment agreement 
between Sweden and China.  In light of those  ongoing legal proceedings, the EU will not enter into 
any of the details of this issue in the context of the Council 's current meeting . 
22.6.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
23  EUROPEAN UNION – BELGIUM'S LAW INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL SECURITY 
MEASURES FOR THE PROVISION OF MOBILE 5G  SERVICES – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
23.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
China . 
23.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
23.3.   China reiterates its statements made in previous meetings of the C TG and the TBT Committee.  
China  thank s the European Union for its updates given at the Council's April meeting but notes with 
concern that Belgium's  law introducing addi tional security measures for the provision of mobile 
5G service s has been adopted.  China reiterate s that its main concerns over the adopted law remain, 
in particular its concerns over Article  105, Section  4. China recognize s that WTO  Members are 
legitimately entitled to protect the security of their 5G  network s. Nevertheless, relevant risk 
assessment s on vendors ' products should be based on objective technical criteria and be consistent 
with the TBT  Agreement.  On the draft Royal Decree on the secu red roll -out of 5G  services , China 
requests the EU to take the opportunity of the current meeting to provide updates on the re -drafted 
text. Finally, China calls upon the European Union to review the adopted law and to ensure that it is 
aligned with the WT O's rules.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 50 - 
 
  23.4.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
23.5.   The European Union  takes note of China 's continued interest in the "Draft Law Introducing 
Additional Security Measures for the Provision of Mobile 5G  Services" and the draft "Royal Decree 
for the Secured Rollout of 5G", notified by Belgium to the WTO in documents  G/TBT/N/BEL/44 and 
G/TBT/N/BEL/45.  
23.6.   China submitted written comments d uring the comment period for these notifications (for 
which the initial c omment period of 60 days was extended by an addendum , at China's request) . 
The European Union  replied to China's comments on 8 November  2021. In addition , in a detailed 
oral exchange at the March  2022 TBT Committee meeting, the EU responded to further conc erns 
raised by China.  In this regard, the EU  notes that China has again included this issue on the agenda 
of the following week's TBT Committee meeting , which will provide an opportunity for experts to 
have a further exchange of views on its substance.  
23.7.   As the European Union already noted at the CTG's April meeting, the notified draft law was 
adopted on 10  February  2022 and no revision is foreseen in the near future.  
23.8.   As to the concerns raised by China, the European Union  refers to its detailed statement s 
delivered at the TBT  Committee 's meeting of March  2022 and the CTG 's meeting of April 2022. 
Moreover, the EU will provide a new statement that will be introduced in the eAgenda and presented 
to the following week's TBT Committee.  
23.9.   Finally, the European Union wishes  to note that the draft Royal Decree , notified in 
document  G/TBT/N/BEL/45 , will be replaced by two  new Royal Decrees. In accordance with the 
TBT Agreement, the EU expect s that these Decrees will be notified before  the end of the year , and 
with a new comment period, thereby scrupulously respecting the recommendations made by the 
TBT Agreement and the TBT  Committee.  
23.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
24  CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTI VE MEASURES – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  
24.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Australia . 
24.2.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
24.3.   China has been, and will remain, an important trading partner for Australia for the foreseeable 
future. The Chinese and Australian  economies are highly complementary and the sustained strong 
bilateral trade flows continue to be mutually beneficial.  Austral ia and China have also both made it 
clear that they value the rules -based multilateral trading system and want to ensure that it works 
in a way that benefits all WTO Members. A stable and open global trading system is a key driver of 
prosperity for all.  
24.4.   However, China 's continued implementation of trade disruptive and restrictive measures 
against Australia, some of which have been in place since 2020, is not consistent with the value that 
China and Australia  place on the rules -based multilateral trading s ystem. Indeed, Australia  continue s 
to be very concerned about these measures, particularly as many of them have not been 
implemented transparent ly. To remind WTO Members, no fewer than nine  commodities, ranging 
from coal, to copper ores and concentrates, t o rock lobsters, and to barley, have been subject to 
the following measures:  (i) quantitative restrictions such as de facto import bans;  (ii) the imposition 
of unjustified anti -dumping and countervailing duties;  (iii) increased and arbitrary border testing 
and inspections, including delays, applied without prior notification; or  (iv) unwarranted delays in 
listing and re -listing export establishments, and issuing import licences.  
24.5.   Australia  cannot ignore the unusual breadth and duration of China 's trad e disruptions against 
Australian goods, which have severely reduced or, in some cases, completely stopped trade of 
affected commodities. China has previously committed to practise multilateralism by "safeguarding 
a rules -based multilateral trading system t hat is transparent, non -discriminatory, open and G/C/M/143  
 
- 51 - 
 
  inclusive ". Australia expects China to uphold this position and once again call s upon China to resolve 
all trade disruptive and restrictive measures imposed on exports from Australia and other 
WTO Members.  
24.6.   China's responses to Australia 's statements and requests for advice in this Council and in 
other relevant Committees have not provided satisfactory answers about how these measures are 
consistent with China 's WTO  commitments and obligations. There has been no substantive response 
from China 's authorities to Australia 's detailed submissions of non -compliance investigation reports, 
despite China 's claim at the Council 's previous  meeting that "relevant communication between 
government authorities from both side s is open ". There has also been no clear guidance or advice 
provided by China 's authorities on pathways for how these suspensions may be lifted or revoked, 
where possible.  
24.7.   Australia looks forward to continuing its valuable bilateral relationship with China  and is ready 
to engage with China on these matters at any time.  
24.8.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
24.9.   The United Kingdom again wishes to express its support for Australia 's concerns about  China's  
trade restrictive measures.  WTO Members must adhere to the fundamental principles and objectives 
of free and fair trade that underpin the rules -based multilateral trading system.  Actions that are 
deliberately targeted against goods of certain countries fo r political reasons risk undermining the 
integrity of, and trust in, the multilateral trading system, and lead to direct harmful consequences 
for business and citizens worldwide.  Trade measures need to be applied in a non -discriminatory, 
predictable manner , and with the necessary transparency around decision -making and 
administrative procedures, as required by the relevant WTO  Agreements.  
24.10.   It is vital that China, as a WTO  Member , ensures that their trade measures are applied in 
line with their WTO obligation s and that it adheres to the fundamental principles and objectives of 
free and fair trade underpinning the rules -based multilateral trading system.  The United Kingdom 
still continues to closely monitor reports of trade restrictive measures and encourage s China to 
engage in good faith and in a timely manner, providing clarifications to the points raised by Australia.  
24.11.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
24.12.   As Japan  commented at the Council's previous meeting, it shares the concerns expressed 
by Austra lia over China 's trade measures, including its trade remedy measures, which should be 
implemented within the framework of the WTO  Agreements and comply with the relevant 
WTO Agreements in the procedures and fact -finding.  As WTO Members pointed out during China's 
most recent Trade Policy Review ( TPR), Chinese government measures conducted in an informal or 
undisclosed manner are problematic in terms of China 's WTO  Accession Protocol , as well as in 
relation to the WTO  principle of transparency. Japan believe s that it is important that China ensure 
transparency in its relevant measures.  If, as reported, China operates its trade measures in an 
arbitrary manner , its approach would conflict with the free, fair , and rules -based internati onal trading 
system. Japan  hopes that China will respond to Australia's concerns in good faith and in a timely 
manner.  
24.13.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
24.14.   As stated at previous meetings, and as raised once again under this agenda item, the 
European Union shares Australia 's concerns over China 's implementation of trade disruptive and 
restrictive measures.  On this occasion , the EU wishes once again to reiterate the same points of 
principle a nd of law. The EU continues to be concerned by the form, number , and wide -ranging 
effects that these Chinese measures allegedly seem to have . In particular regarding the form, the 
EU considers that informal, unpublished , and non -transparent trade restricti ons are not in line with 
the rules and spirit  of the WTO . 
24.15.   The European Union also speaks out against the alleged purpose of the measures in question, 
which appears to be coercive ; if so, the alleged measures are incompatible with general international 
law. Within the EU, the legislative proposal for an anti -coercion instrument is progressing in the EU's 
legislature.  In addition, the EU is pursuing a WTO  dispute with China in relation to a range of G/C/M/143  
 
- 52 - 
 
  measures negatively affecting its trade with China, and  where China's intention also appears to be 
coercive.  
24.16.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
24.17.   The United States shares Australia 's concerns, and remains deeply troubled by the 
information provided by Australia, which it has also  heard from other, credible sources.  The United 
States again register s its systemic concern with the broad range of restrictive measures, both formal 
and inf ormal, that China has imposed on certain Australian goods in an inappropriate manner . In 
this connection, the US is concerned by reports that Chinese authorities have informally instructed 
importers not to purchase certain goods.  
24.18.   As noted previously, China 's actions are not isolated to Australia . There are many instances 
of China using these harmful non -market practices against WTO  Members in apparent retaliation for 
unconnected bilateral issues, including China 's discrimination against Lithuanian goods and  
EU products with Lithuanian content.  It is important to identify similarly coercive actions taken by 
China against other WTO Members as they demonstrate a broader pattern of behaviour . Specifically, 
China uses, or threatens to use, arbitrary or unjustifia ble trade actions to pressure or influence the 
legitimate decision -making of sovereign governments.  
24.19.   China claims to uphold the "rules-based multilateral trading system ", but its actions speak 
for themselves . China continues to exploit the rules -based system to its advantage, ignoring or 
breaking rules in order to inflict harm on others to advance its geopolitical and economic ends.  
China 's failure to adhere to global trade norms and WTO  principles threatens and undermines the 
rules-based multilateral t rading system and harms relations between its Members.  
24.20.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
24.21.   Canada continues to share the systemic concerns raised by Australia and other 
WTO Members regarding trade disruptive and restrictive measures adopted by China.  In this regard, 
Canada refers to its  previous intervention on this item, which remains valid.13 China 's repeated use 
of trade restrictions that are inconsistent with established international practices negatively impacts 
Canada 's agricultural and no n-agricultural exports.  
24.22.   In relation to agriculture, China 's lack of transparency and predictability with its application 
of SPS measures continue to restrict Canada 's exports of food, plant and animal products, which 
continue to experience significant undu e delays in China's approval procedures.  Canada also remains 
concerned with the trade disruptive impact of China 's COVID -19 measures on food imports. 
WHO/FAO  guidance has reconfirmed that neither food nor food packaging is a pathway for the spread 
of virus es causing respiratory illnesses, including COVID -19. With no scientific evidence to support 
these measures, the continued suspension of Canadian meat establishments can only be viewed 
now as a tool to block trade.  The world is facing rising food prices an d disruptions to global supply 
chains impacting food security. It is critical for all WTO  Members, including China, to take a 
science -based approach to their decisions and measures.  
24.23.   In non -agricultural trade, Canada notes new significant barriers to trade related to product 
certification requirements, such as expanding the scope of review to the point where product 
certifications that used to take several months now take several years for the same product types, 
as well as for modifications of existin g and previously certified products.  The use of trade disruptive 
and coercive measures challenges and destabilizes the rules -based international trading system from 
which China, Canada,  and all WTO  Members have benefited.  
24.24.   Canada  encourage s all WTO  Members,  including China, to abide by their WTO  commitments.  
24.25.   The dele gate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
24.26.   Chinese Taipei wishes to support the concerns raised by Australia regarding China 's 
implementation of trade disruptive and restrictive measures tar geting a broad range of Australian 
goods.  The real intention of China 's trade actions, whether imposed formally or informally, appears 
 
13 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  7.23-7.30. G/C/M/143  
 
- 53 - 
 
  to be to hamper certain Members ' trade interests based on unrelated bilateral issues. This surely 
poses a systemic risk t o the rule s-based multilateral trading system, and is likely to create a negative 
trade impact not only on Australia , but also on all other WTO Members.  
24.27.   As indicated at previous meetings, Chinese Taipei has also noticed and experienced China 's 
unconstructi ve approach in its application of unjustified SPS  requirements on the exportation of its 
fruit and fishery product s to China. Although Chinese Taipei has repeatedly requested scientific and 
technical dialogues with the Chinese authorities on the relevant m easures, there has been no 
substantive response from China. Such an approach only raise s Chinese Taipei's suspicions regarding 
China's coercive intentions , which would clearly run counter to the spirit of the rules-based 
multilateral trading system.  
24.28.   Chinese Taipei  therefore call s upon China once again to engage in a good faith and 
constructive manner to resolve these legitimate trade concerns and uphold its commitments to the 
principles and obligations of the WTO 's rules.  
24.29.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
24.30.   New Zealand shares a systemic interest in the concerns expressed on this topic.  As 
New Zealand has repeatedly noted , in a number of for ums, the multilateral rules -based trading 
system provides that all WTO Members, regardless of the ir size or trading capacity, are subject to 
the same rights and obligations.  This provides the predictability and certainty necessary to ensure 
that trade can take place efficiently and with the least friction possible.  And g iven the challenges 
that all WTO Members are facing as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic , and other disruptions, the 
certainty provided by the multilateral trading system is more important than ever.  
24.31.   If WTO Members step away from their commitments, or adopt remedies or other measures 
provided for under the WTO  Agreements in an arbitrary manner and for unassociated purposes, this 
will undermine the predictability and certainty on which the system rests. It will also reflect on 
perceptions of the WTO Member undertaking such actions.  
24.32.   The ad option of measures by WTO  Members that cause widespread disruption to trade and 
lack transparency cause serious concern to New Zealand, including actions taken by China against 
a range of exports from Australia and other WTO  Members.  New Zealand encourages  WTO Members 
to comply fully with their WTO  obligations, including in the good faith application of trade remedies.  
24.33.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
24.34.   China has already provided its explanations on this issue raised by Australia. To save time, 
China wishes to refer to its statements made at previous meetings of this Council and other relevant 
committees.14 China  reiterate s that its relevant measures taken in relation to certain Austr alian 
products are aimed at protecting the legitimate rights and interests of domestic industries and the 
safety of consumers . The measures in question are also consistent with the WTO's rules.  
24.35.   China stands ready to work with the new Australian government following the principles of 
mutual respect and mutual benefits to promote a sound and steady development of the 
China -Australia comprehensive strategic partnership.  China  hopes that the Australian government 
will work with it in a joint effort towards this  end and provide a fair, open and non -discriminatory 
investment environment for investors from all WTO Members , including China, so as to facilitate 
practical cooperation between China and Australia in the economic and trade fields.  
24.36.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
25  CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES  
25.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at  the request of 
Australia and the United States . 
 
14 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  7.50-7.55. G/C/M/143  
 
- 54 - 
 
  25.2.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
25.3.   The United States remains deeply concern ed with China 's lack of response to requests for 
scientific justification or explanation of how Decrees  No. 248 and No. 249 will address food safety 
and public health concerns.  The lack of guidance provided by China, and inconsistency in China 's 
implementation and enforcement of the measures , is causing considerable confusion for exporters 
and competent authorit ies, which is leading to negative trade impacts.  
25.4.   The United States  asks that China take the following steps to facilitate trade:  (i) the General 
Administration of Customs of China (GACC) should continue to use existing 
government -to-government facility registration processes, as outlined in Article  11 of Decree  
No. 248, and not require facilities to enter information online where such pre -established processes 
exist; (ii) allow entry of all products from registered facilities until at least 1 July 2023 without 
requiring complete registration information or competent authority intervention . This additional time 
will allow facilities to accurately enter or update product information in their online registration ; 
(iii) provide a point of contact at the GACC for facilities to directly submit concerns and feedback 
about the online registration system . Facilities should be able to communicate with this point of 
contact in English from outside of China, and the point of contact should not refer general r egistration 
questions to satellite GACC  offices at individual ports ; and (iv) hold information session(s) in Geneva 
for trading partners to learn more about GACC 's implementation of the Decrees.  
25.5.   The United States  notes that the GACC 's requests for additional detailed information from 
facilities and competent authorities, such as process -specific food safety plans and photographs on 
an establishment -by-establishment basis, are not consistent with a systems -based equivalence 
approach to food safety.  The United States  looks forward to China 's response to these specific 
requests and comments.  
25.6.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
25.7.   Australia remains concerned that China 's Regulation on Registration and Administration of 
Overseas Manufacturers of Imported Food, promulgated as Decree  No. 248, will unnecessarily 
disrupt and restrict trade and is more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil China 's food safety 
objectives . Furthermore, WTO Members were not given sufficient time and information to register, 
adjust and prepare before the measures entered into force on 1  January  2022. The regulations do 
not distinguish between food safety risk categories, nor provide the scientific justification for the 
measures or the required equi valency of foreign food safety systems.  Australia has previously raised 
its concerns on several occasions in both the SPS and the TBT Committee s. 
25.8.   Exporters are reporting delays in registration and customs clearance, adversely impacting 
their trade to China . In particular, Australia has in good faith provided information for registration 
of establishments that has not been accurately reflected in China 's registration system. This is 
causing significant industry concern. Australia reminds China that its regul ations must not be used 
to discriminate against imported goods, and that delays in processing registration renewals and new 
applications from overseas food producers may lead to imported foods being treated less favourably 
than China 's domestic product.  
25.9.   Australian food exporters are ready and willing to comply with China 's food safety 
requirements, but businesses and governments need clarity and a reasonable time -frame to make 
the necessary changes to comply with China's new measures.  In light of the above,  Australia 
requests that China 's customs authorities ad opt a flexible approach to implementation until 
1 July 2023, during which time-period they would allow entry of products in line with historical trade, 
in addition to entry under China 's new system of registration, pending completion of outstanding 
applications, corrections or updates to online registrations.  Australia urges China to address these 
issues promptly and remains willing to work collaboratively with China to ensure that food safety is 
upheld  while facilitating undisrupted trade.  
25.10.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
25.11.   Canada continues to share the concerns raised by Australia and  the United States.  Canada 
and other WTO Members have raised significant concerns and challenges with China 's administrative 
measures for the registration of overseas manufacturers of imported food.  In this regard, Canada G/C/M/143  
 
- 55 - 
 
  refers to its previous interventions on this item, which remain valid.15 Canada continues to be 
concerned that the new administrative measures are overly burdensome and unjustified , and 
remains deeply concerned about the unnecessary impact these measures are having on trade . 
25.12.   Canada notes that the implementation of the online China Import Food Enterprise 
Registration (CIFER ) system, which was not notified by China to the WTO, will create further barriers 
to trade , including significant financial and resource impacts on both industry and foreign competent 
authorities . 
25.13.   Despite repeated requests from trading partners, there rem ains limited engagement, limited 
information, and minimal guidance from China Customs regarding the implementation of the 
CIFER  system, which is resulting in continued uncertainty and concerns.  As a result, exporters are 
now encountering delayed clearance of their shipments as companies are unable to register or 
update their registration in the CIFER  system.  Furthermore, t he registration process in the 
CIFER  system is overly detailed and confusing, lacking a step -by-step guidance and defined timelines 
for both competent authorities and industry.  As many questions remain regarding the registration 
process, Canada calls upon China to create a single contact or enquiry point for both industry and 
competent authorities, or to work directly with companies for the  completion of their registration . In 
addition , Canada expects China to add to the CIFER  system, without further delay, all Canadian 
products and establishments previously approved by China, but currently not on China Customs ' 
lists of approved Canadian pr oducts and facilities eligible to export to China.  
25.14.   Canada strongly urges China to outline all timelines in a transparent manner and develop 
clear guidance documents to address the questions and concerns from both industry and competent 
authorities.  Canada remains deeply concerned about the unnecessary impact these measures are 
having on trade.  In conclusion, Canada calls upon China to provide WTO Members with additional 
information and clarification on the new measures and the CIFER  system.  
25.15.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
25.16.   The Republic of Korea share s the concern s expressed by other Members regarding China 's 
administrative measures for the registration of overseas producers of imported foods.  Korea respects 
China 's right to ensu re food safety and recognizes its efforts to accommodate the concerns raised 
by WTO Members before the measures entered into force this year. However , Korea remains 
concerned that its points conveyed over the course of previous meetings have not yet been duly 
addressed.  
25.17.   First, the Republic of Korea requests China to provide its rationale on the Administrative 
Measure, in particular, Article  7 of Decree  No. 248, which expands its coverage to lo w-risk products. 
Moreover, Korea would like to request more information from China on its scientific data or risk 
analysis having been used to select its 14  categories. Korea believes that food safety is a legitimate 
objective in accordance with relevant i nternational trade norms, but the implementation of such 
measures should not be more trade restrictive than necessary.  
25.18.   Second, the competent authorities of exporting Members have already been experiencing a 
heavy administrative burden because of having to review registration applications of overseas 
producers and track whether the producers remain compliant with China 's regulations and standards 
after their initial registrations. Therefore , Korea recommends that China work directly with overseas 
producers f or the application process . Korea  also requests China to share its relevant focal point. It 
is Korea 's belief that this will save time and resources not only for China but also for overseas 
producers and their authorities.  
25.19.   The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
25.20.   Norway remains concerned that the regulations imposed by China on 1  January  2022 are 
more trade restrictive than necessary to ensure the safety of imported food products. It remains 
unclear how China 's Decrees  No. 248 and No. 249 will contribute to achieving China 's appropriate 
level of protection.  
 
15 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  18.35 -18.40.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 56 - 
 
  25.21.   Decree s No. 248 and No. 249 have been in force for six  months. The new regulations have 
proven to impose a significant burden on both the national industry and the national competent 
authorit y. The Norwegian competent authority and the Norwegian industry have made significant 
efforts to ensure that China 's administrative requirements are met. However, insufficient information 
from the Chinese authorities, a lack of information in English, and uncertainties regarding the 
implementation of the decrees, are causing real concerns for the industry.  
25.22.   The implementation of the online C IFER system has created further barriers to trade and 
imposes a significant burden on Norway's  competent authorities. N orway questions the vast amount 
of information and documentation required to register establishments and to change company 
information in CIFER, taking into consideration that the companies are under official control by the 
national competent authority. Nu merous changes to the CIFER  system after its implementation, lack 
of guidance , and significant technical errors have caused further problems in registering companies. 
Since the CIFER  system was implemented on 1 January  2022, no new Norwegian producers have  
been able to complete the registration process.  
25.23.   In order to facilitate trade, these issues need to be resolved immediately, with the aim of 
reducing disruptions to trade. Norway asks China to review the measures and to apply them in a 
manner that is not m ore trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the appropriate level of 
protection.  Norway wishes to thank China for the ongoing dialogue on new regulations. Nevertheless, 
Norway still urge s China to engage in an open dialogue and to make the necessary up dates and 
changes to the CIFER  system in order to reduce the burden imposed on foreign competent 
authorities.  
25.24.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
25.25.   Switzerland shares and supports the concerns expressed by other WTO Members regarding 
Decrees  No. 248 and No. 249 published by the GACC. Switzerland supports China 's objective of 
ensuring that only safe food is imported.  However, Switzerland  regret s that the measures in question 
still include all food categories , irrespective of their risk  profile ; in addition, the measures seem to 
be more trade restrictive than necessary to ensure the safety of imported food products.  Switzerland 
strongly encourages  China to allow entry of all products from registered facilities until 1 July 2023. 
This additional time would enable facilities to accurately enter or update product information in their 
online registration.  
25.26.   The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the following : 
25.27.   Türkiye has stated its ongoing concerns with regard to this issue at previous meetings of the 
TBT Committee.  To briefly restate its position, Türkiye wishes first to acknowledge China 's right to 
take the measures necessary to ensure its food safety and t o prioritiz e the protection of human 
health and safety.  That said, Türkiye consider s that Decree  No. 248 covers a wide range of food 
products , that the registration process is highly complex and burdensome on both the exporters and 
the competent authorities of the exporting countries , and that the implementation of the decree 
needs further clarification.  Furthermore, Türkiye  believe s that the practice of not classify ing products 
based on a risk assessment is more trade restrictive than necessary t o ensure the safety of imported 
food products.  Therefore, Türkiye requests China to review this legislation from a risk -based 
perspective, to narrow its scope, and to extend a grace period.  
25.28.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
25.29.   The United Kingdom thank s the agenda item's co -sponsors for again raising this concern in 
relation to China 's administrative measures for registration of overseas manufacturers.  Regretfully, 
China 's Regulation on Registration and Administration of Overseas Manuf acturers of Imported Food 
entered into force on 1  January  2022 despite requests from the United Kingdom and other Members 
to delay the implementation of these new measures  in order  to allow sufficient and reasonable time 
for competent authorities and businesses to prepare.  
25.30.   Much effort has been taken to meet China 's administrative requirements so as to limit any 
disruption to trade. For "high risk " products the significant amount of documentation required is 
disproportionate and the specific requirements often change in an arbitrary manner and with no 
prior notification provided to the exporting country, or guidance provided.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 57 - 
 
  25.31.   The United Kingdom  also continue s to maintain that the blan ket application of these 
measures is incommensurate with the risk posed by many food products. In particular, the 
requirement to audit establishments exporting low -risk products places a significant and 
unnecessary administrative burden on authorities and businesses.  
25.32.   The United Kingdom urges China to review these measures, applying them in a manner that 
is commensurate with the risks, and not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the 
appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection , in line with its obligations under Article  5, 
paragraph  6, of the SPS  Agreement.  
25.33.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
25.34.   The European Union wishes to reiterate its concerns about the implementation of Decree  
No. 248 of the General Administ ration of Customs of the People's Republic of China.  The EU does 
not question China 's desire to ensure that imported food products come from legitimate sources. 
Overall , the EU  share s and support s this objective.  
25.35.   China has provided guidance information and  engaged in a dialogue with the European 
Union . However , problems persist with the lengthy and burdensome mechanism set up by China to 
register exporting businesses. The EU's  concerns are well  known and include  the following : (i) cases 
of shipments being held up at ports in China due to erroneous or missing inf ormation in CIFER ; 
(ii) cases of establishments in the meat, dairy and fishery sector that were notified to the General 
Customs Administration (GACC) before the deadline of 31  December and remain unregistered; 
(iii) lack of clarity about the scope and cate gory of products that are covered, which keep expanding; 
and ( iv) the obligation put on competent authorities and businesses to consult CIFER almost 
permanently to be able to follow all the changes made by China to the structure of the CIFER  system 
and to individual registrations, as well as to be informed about the deadlines to re -register individual 
establishments.  
25.36.   The European Union  therefore urges China:  (i) to solve implementation issues pragmatically 
and expeditiously;  (ii) to facilitate new and old r egistrations by continuing to provide supporting 
material  and guidance documents in English, including on how competent authorities have to verify 
the establishments that were registered under the fast -track procedure;  (iii) to facilitate 
amendments/correc tions to existing registrations;  and (iv)  to facilitate the management by 
competent authorities and businesses of the changes in the CIFER  system of the information 
requested by China and of the deadline to register establishments by introducing an automat ic email 
notifications system in CIFER.  
25.37.   The European Union  wishes to thank China for its openness and ongoing dialogue to resolve 
the technical issues relat ing to Decree  No. 248, in particular the replies received on 1  July, which 
the EU is currently revie wing. Important implementation issues remain and need to be resolved in 
order to eliminate all disruptions to trade as soon as possible and before 1  July 2023.  
25.38.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
25.39.   China's  registration procedure related to the "Regulations on the Registration and 
Administration of Overseas Producers of Imported Foods" imposes a significant burden on overseas 
authorities and overseas businesses. Japan  request s that the procedures for impleme ntation be 
made transparent so that these procedures do not become an excessive burden on business 
operators.  
25.40.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
25.41.   Chinese Taipei thanks Australia and the United States for tabling this agenda item. The 
measure has already been in force since 1  January  2022,  but Members' concerns remain unresolved , 
and so many exporters and competent authorities are continuously facing difficulties in following 
China 's registration mechanism.  
25.42.   While Chinese Taipei respect s the fact that the objective of the measure concerned may 
have been to protect human health and food safety, it is also of the view that the regulation and its 
implementation are far more trade restrictive than necessary. Therefore , Chinese Taipei  needs to G/C/M/143  
 
- 58 - 
 
  highlight the following problematic issues again, which are based on its own on -the-ground 
experiences.  
25.43.   First, one of the greatest difficulties is the lack of information on registration requirements 
and guidance on how to follow the requirements. This issu e is even more critical for those facilities 
that need to file their application themselves. Chinese Taipei  urges China to designate and provide 
an enquiry  point that facilities are able to engage with directly in order to deal with their concerns 
about th e online registration system.  
25.44.   Second, there are genuine concerns over the measure 's review and approval procedure. 
Standard or anticipated processing periods are not known. The same applies to the status of the 
application stage. Furthermore, some of Chine se Taipei's  facilities have received the GACC 's rejection 
without any further explanation being given, while others are finding it impossible to correct their 
applications on the registration system. Therefore , Chinese Taipei requests  the GACC  to comply with 
the requirements as set out under Article  5.2.2 of the TBT  Agreement, which include the 
transparency requirement and the requirement of the applicant to be informed in a precise and 
complete manner of all the deficiencies in its application  so as to allow for any necessary corrective 
action  to be taken . 
25.45.   Third, another difficulty Chinese Taipei  faces is in the significant ambiguity in China's HS code 
categorization and in the scope of the product that is subject to this measure. Some of Chine se 
Taipei's  facilities have reported that their products faced customs clearance suspension for no 
apparent reason.  
25.46.   Fourth, any measure of this magnitude requires far more time for relevant industries to 
implement, so Chinese Taipei  urges China to consider  offering a longer grace period for 
implementation in order to avoid yet more serious trade disruption. This additional time will then at 
least allow facilities to accurately enter or update the product information in their online registration.  
25.47.   Chinese Tai pei urges China to take Members ' concerns into consideration and bring the 
measure at issue into line with the relevant WTO  rules.  
25.48.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
25.49.   Mexico thanks Australia and the United States for placing this item on the agenda. Mexico 
has reiterated its concerns in the TBT  Committee regarding China's measure published in its 
Decree  No. 248, and share s the concerns expressed by those Members that have previously taken 
the floor regarding the implementation of this measure.  While the Government of Mexico has 
established coordinated mechanisms to ensure that the registration of Mexican companies exporting 
to China can be carried out in a satisfactory manner to avoid delays to export processes, Mexico  
consider s it impo rtant that the relevant authorities in China commit to ensuring that this new scheme 
does not lead to delays for products that fully comply with the requirements established for 
importation into China . Mexico  thank s China for taking its comments into accou nt and for any 
updates that it may provide, and Mexico  notes that it will also include this trade concern on the 
agenda of the TBT  Committee.  
25.50.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
25.51.   As Capital need s more time to work on the various technical issues raised by a number of 
Members, China will provide its feedback on this issue at the following week's meeting of the 
TBT Committee . Nevertheless, China remains available to continue to constructively engage with 
relevant WTO Members on this issue.  
25.52.   The Counc il took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 59 - 
 
  26  CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY POINT 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, 
CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED 
STAT ES 
26.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
26.2.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
26.3.   As the Council is aware, over the years, the United States and other WTO Members have had 
numerous concerns with respect to the transparency of China 's industrial subsidy regime.  In China 's 
Protocol of Accession, China agreed to p ublish all trade -related measures in a single journal, which 
China has designated as the China Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Gazette, or 
MOFCOM  Gazette.  However, China rarely publishes its subsidy measures in the MOFCOM  Gazette – 
especially what i t calls "normative documents ", as well as measures from sub -central governments. 
And sometimes these measures are not made public at all.  
26.4.   In its Protocol of Accession, China also agreed to "establish or designate an enquiry point 
where, upon request of any  individual, enterprise or WTO  Member all information relating to the 
measures required to be published … may be obtained. " 
26.5.   Several years ago, the United States  came across references to five  legal measures, two 
relating to fuel subsidies for fishers, one relating to the development of China 's distant water fishing 
fleet, and two  relating to the semiconductor industry.  Unable to find these measures in the 
MOFCOM  Gazette, or anywhere else, the US submitted a request to China 's WTO  enquiry point in 
April 2020, over two  years ago.  
26.6.   Under its Protocol of Accession, China agreed with respect to its enquiry point that "Replies 
to requests for information shall generally be provided within 30  days after receipt of a request . In 
exceptional cases, replie s may be provided within 45  days after receipt of a request . Notice of the 
delay and the reasons therefor shall be provided in writing to the interested party. " 
26.7.   Despite having submitted the initial request for the missing legal measures in April  2020, 
more than two  years ago, the United States has yet to receive the legal measures requested or any 
written response to its request, as China is obligated to provide under its Protocol of Accession.  
26.8.   In September  2020, a Ministry of Commerce representative did sp eak with the US  Embassy 
and stated that China would not be providing copies of any of the requested measures because they 
were either soon to be replaced by new measures or, in its view, were not relevant to China 's 
WTO commitments.  
26.9.   The United States views  China 's handling of the United States ' request as inadequate and not 
in keeping with China 's WTO  commitments.  
26.10.   First, China plainly should have provided copies of the requested measures that it claimed 
were soon to be replaced.  Paragraph  2(c) of China 's Protocol of Accession contains no exception for 
China to withhold measures that may be superseded  at some point in the future . The United States  
also note s that, when the new measures eventually did come out, it was nearly a year after the 
US' initial request, which is well beyond the 45 -day response time mandated in China 's Protocol of 
Accession.  
26.11.   Second, the United States disagrees with China 's refusal to provide  copies of the requested 
measures that China claims are not relevant to China 's WTO  commitments . The requested measures, 
on the face of the measures themselves, address policies and guidelines relating to the development 
of China 's fisheries and semiconduc tor sectors and therefore clearly would appear to satisfy the 
standard of "pertaining to or affecting trade in goods " in paragraph  2(c) of China 's Protocol of 
Accession.  
26.12.   The United States  notes that, while its interest in the measures at issue stems from c oncerns 
about China 's subsidy practices, China 's obligation does not depend on a determination as to whether G/C/M/143  
 
- 60 - 
 
  the requested measures provide "subsidies " within the meaning of the WTO  Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures.  China 's obligation und er paragraph  2(c) of China 's Protocol of 
Accession is not limited to providing copies of requested subsidy measures. Rather, China is to 
provide copies of "any measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods… ", which clearly includes 
all of the requeste d measures.  
26.13.   The United States  also note s that the two  new fishery support measures, like their 
predecessors, have not been published in China 's designated official journal, the MOFCOM  Gazette, 
as required by paragraph  2(c) of China 's Protocol of Accession.  
26.14.   The transparency obligations of China 's Protocol of Accession are there because 
WTO Members were concerned, in part, with the lack of transparency of China 's industrial subsidy 
regime . After 21 years, those very same concerns remain.  But more fu ndamentally, as the United 
States noted at the Council's previous meeting, beyond the legal technicalities, the US has to ask 
the obvious question: why is China refusing to make public, for example, a legal measure on its fuel 
subsidy for fishers? It  is difficult to understand.  
26.15.   Since the Council's previous  meeting there has been a new development; specifically, 
through its own further investigation, the United States has found two of the measures that the 
US had requested relating to China 's fuel subsidy pr ogram mes for its domestic and distant water 
fishers . These measures were published on unofficial Chinese news sites , and they still do not appear 
on any official government websites . Furthermore , as noted  earlier , they have not been published 
in the MOFCOM  Gazette.  
26.16.   The essence of these two  measures, which cover China 's fuel subsidy program mes from 
2015 to 2020, is that, while China is keeping the same overall level of support for its fishing industry, 
it has reduced subsidies for its fishers in its own waters, while increasing the level of subsidies for 
its distant water fleet.  These measures also provide striking new details about China 's support for 
domestic fishers . For example, the measure covering fishers in China 's domestic waters cites the 
objecti ve of renovating 14,000  fishing vessels and scrapping or converting twenty  thousand fishing 
vessels  to other uses . 
26.17.   So what exactly is it about these measures that China does not want us to see? What makes 
them so revealing that China has been willing to ig nore its obligation to publish these measures as 
required by its Protocol of Accession and to refuse to provide the measures pursuant to a legitimate 
request of another WTO  Member as required under its Protocol of Accession?  Is it the extensive 
scope of the fishing vessel renovation program me that targets 14,000  fishing vessels for renovation?  
Is it the very large number of fishing vessels that are targeted for scrapping or conversion, perhaps 
indicative of an overcapitalized domestic waters industry and overfished domestic fisheries?  Is it the 
specifics of exactly how the fuel subsidy was calculated for both domestic and distant water fishers, 
which is estimated to have provided nearly USD 3 billion annually to Chinese fishers between 2015 
and 2020 and ma y have totalled  much more?  Or is it the reference to the provinces ' ability to have 
their own program mes – that perhaps have not been notified – to supplement the central 
government 's fuel subsidy program me? And what is in the other measures that China has  refused 
to provide or to otherwise make public? Of the remaining measures, one appears to be China 's plan 
to develop its distant water fishery . The other two  measures relate to China 's semiconductor policies . 
What is it about these measures that China doe s not want us to see?  Does the distant water fishery 
measure establish a subsidy program me for the purpose of constructing or buying fishing vessels? 
Despite our efforts to encourage China to be more transparent over the years, the origins and rather 
spect acular growth of China 's distant water fleet is shrouded in mystery . 
26.18.   As to the semiconductor measures  that the United States requested under China 's Protocol 
of Accession enquiry point, what is it that China does not want us to see? Are there prohibited 
subsidy program mes involved, perhaps with local content requirements? For the various equity 
investment measures now in place for the semiconductor industry, are there Ministry of Finance 
guarantees to private sector investors, such that their losses are min imized, thereby increasing 
private participation? What is so potentially damaging to China 's interests that it is willing to ignore 
its Protocol of Accession obligations?  
26.19.   Often the first  response that the United States hears from China on these transparenc y 
issues is that China takes its WTO  transparency obligations very seriously . But to be frank, G/C/M/143  
 
- 61 - 
 
  US experience in making a very simple request to China 's enquiry point seems to demonstrate 
otherwise . And the US can only wonder what else it is that China is n ot showing us, despite its 
WTO transparency obligations . Which other WTO Member takes such overt, purposeful steps not to 
reveal the nature and extent of its subsidy program mes, and what is China 's motivation in doing so?  
26.20.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
26.21.   Australia attaches considerable importance to the WTO  notification and transparency 
obligations, particularly relating to subsidies.  These obligations stem from both the Agreements and 
the obligations made by WTO Members under the ir Protocols of Accession.  Transparency remains 
critical to the proper functioning of the WTO and underpins the Subsidies Agreement. It creates 
certainty for all our exporters in being able to compete fairly in international markets.  Australia 
therefore ur ges China to fulfil the transparency commitments made as part of its Protocol of 
Accession.  
26.22.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
26.23.   The commitment by China under its Protocol of Accession to publish all trade -related 
measures , as well a s providing information through the enquiry point , was designed to improve 
transparency.  However, in order for it to be meaningful, China must publish all its trade -related 
measures in the MOFCOM  Gazette and actually respond to requests for information und er the 
enquiry point . This is not only in the interest of transparency but also required under China 's 
obligations in its Protocol of Accession.  Therefore, t he European Union  urges China to comply fully 
with its commitments under the Protocol of Accession to the WTO by publishing all trade -related 
measures , as it agreed to do , and by respond ing to requests for information under the enquiry point 
without undue delay.  
26.24.   The delega te of Canada  indicated the following:  
26.25.   Canada echoes the concerns of others regarding China 's compliance with its 
WTO transparency obligations.  When it acceded to the WTO in 2001, China accepted comprehensive 
transparency obligations, and Canada is disappoi nted that these obligations are not being met.  The 
notification process and transparency requirements are integral aspects of the multilateral trading 
system, and it is important that these obligations are upheld for the proper functioning of the 
rules-based international system.  In order for the system to work, it is important that all 
WTO Members comply with the notification requirements and responses to enquiries in accordance 
with WTO  rules, including the transparency obligations in Protocols of Accessi on to the WTO.  This is 
all the more important as WTO  Members continue to build back from the COVID -19 crisis.  
26.26.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
26.27.   The obligations of notification and transparency represent one of the most important 
foundations of  the WTO  system, and it is in the interests of all WTO Member s to comply with them. 
If the transparency of subsidy spending is not ensured, there is concern that distorted subsidy 
delivery will be encouraged, which may lead to problems such as over product ion capacity.  This 
issue has been discussed by the Committee  on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM  Committee) , but it is difficult to say whether China has taken sufficient measures.  
26.28.   Regarding China's subsidies, various WTO Members have expressed in the SCM  Committee 
their concerns about transparency and the possibility of non -notification issues. China is the world's 
largest trading nation and is required to ensure transparency and compliance  with the WTO's 
notification obligations, especially with regard to subsidy expenditure.  Japan  also urge s China to 
fulfil its transparency obligations as agreed in its WTO Accession Protocol (as has already been 
pointed out by other s) and to ensure  the effectiveness of its mechanisms contribut ing to increased 
transparency.  
26.29.   The delegate of  the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
26.30.   The United Kingdom again wishes to show its support for the concerns raised by the United 
States  and other co -sponsors regarding China's  compli ance with its transparency obligations under 
its Accession Protocol.  The UK reiterate s its belief that transparency is central to the proper G/C/M/143  
 
- 62 - 
 
  functioning of the WTO . It is vital that China, as a WTO  Member, takes all the necessary steps to 
fulfil its obligations, including any Member -specific commitments, in a timely manner.  Therefore, the 
UK encourage s China to comply with its transparency commitments, in accordance with its 
WTO obligations.  
26.31.   The deleg ate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
26.32.   New Zealand considers transparency as critical to the proper functioning of the WTO, and 
attaches considerable importance to adherence by all WTO Members to their WTO notification and 
transparency obligations, pa rticularly in relation to subsidies, including under their Protocols of 
Accession.  It is vital that all WTO Members fulfil these obligations in a timely manner, including any 
Member -specific commitments. Adhering to these obligations helps build certainty for exporters and 
makes an important contribution to the successful functioning of the rules -based international 
trading system.  
26.33.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
26.34.   With regard to this issue, China  refers to its statements made in previous meeti ngs of the 
CTG.16 As China  stated at previous meetings, it has already provided its replies , in accordance with 
the commitments specified in China 's WTO Protocol of Accession , to the enquiry made by the United 
States . In addition, China notes that some  of the documents requested by the US do not fall under 
the scope of China's  commitments specified in its WTO  Protocol of Accession.  
26.35.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
26.36.   China has not provided a response in writing to the request by the United States, pursuant 
to China's obligations under its Protocol of Accession. The US respectfully requests China to provide 
the legal measures requested. In response to China's statement that it had already discussed with 
China through the enquiry point, the US wishe s to point out that China has only discussed the issue 
orally with personnel from the US  Embassy and has not provided a copy of the requested legal 
measures nor provided a resp onse in writing as it is obliged to do under its Protocol of Access ion. 
26.37.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
26.38.   China wishe s to respond to the comments by the United States by saying that, from its point 
of view, it has already provided the replies in accordance with China's commitments , and that some 
of the documents that have been requested by the US are in fact not covered b y the scope of China's 
commitments to the WTO.  
26.39.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
26.40.   The United States wishes to point out that this  is not a subsidy notification issue , but an 
enquiry point issue under China's Protocol of Accession . Therefore , the documents  are relevant , and 
China is obliged  to provide the requested legal measures pursuant to requests made to its Enquiry 
Point.  
26.41.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
27  EGYPT – HALAL CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTED FOOD AND 
BEVERAGE PRODUCTS - REQUEST FROM CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  
27.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this new item had been  included on the agenda at the request 
of Canada and the United States . 
27.2.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
27.3.   Canada understands Egypt 's objective to ensure that Egyptian consumers are confident that 
they are buying and consuming halal-certified products in agreement with Islamic Sharia. However, 
 
16 Document  G/C/M/14 1, paragraphs  16.40 -16.41.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 63 - 
 
  Canada  also believe s that such measures sh ould not create unnecessary barriers to international 
trade or be more trade -restrictive than necessary to fulfil that objective.  
27.4.   While Canada appreciates Egypt notifying this measure to the WTO  TBT Committee in 
December  2021, it failed to do so prior to t he implementation date of 1 October  2021. As set out in 
Article  2.9 of the TBT  Agreement, Members have an obligation to provide trading partners with 
adequate time to comment on a given measure (at least 60  days) and have those comments taken 
into consider ation prior to that measure being finalized.  In addition, as per WTO  obligations, a 
six-month period between the notification of the final measure and its entry into force is considered 
a reasonable amount of time to provide industry time to adapt to the n ew requirements . This was 
clearly not the case with this measure.  
27.5.   Although Canada appreciates Egypt 's delayed implementation of the halal certification for 
dairy products to October  2022, Canada still remains concerned with the lack of details, 
documentati on, and specificity on how these requirements will be implemented and how specific 
products will be impacted. For example, the proposed new regime only specifies one  Egyptian 
certification body that will have the authority to certify halal products for the Egyptian market. It is 
Canada's  understanding that this has already significantly raised the halal certification fee , which 
will have to be borne by exporters of hal al product s to Egypt. The new measure could result in a 
certification process that is overly burdensome, costly , and more trade restrictive than necessary to 
achieve Egypt 's stated objective.  
27.6.   Canada strongly encourages Egypt to have open and transparent di scussions with its trading 
partners to share information, further clarify the requirements under this new measure , and consider 
the impact it may have on trade. Until then, Canada respectfully request s that Egypt suspend the 
implementation of the measure.  Canada notes that Egypt did not provide a written response to 
WTO Members at previous TBT  Committee meetings and kindly requests Egypt to provide one to 
Members for this meeting.  
27.7.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
27.8.   The United States shares the concerns expressed by Canada.  While the United States 
recognizes Egypt 's objective of providing its consumers assurance with regard to the halal status of 
certain products, it is concerned with the lack of transparency provided by Egypt.  With Eg ypt 
scheduled to begin implementation of its new halal requirements in less than three  months, it has 
yet to provide the necessary information to allow exporters effectively to comply with this measure. 
These requirements could be especially devastating to  milk and dairy product exports.  
27.9.   The United States requests that Egypt provide information on any changes to its import 
requirements and to delay enforcing any new requirements until this information has been notified 
to the WTO , and WTO Members have had a  reasonable period to provide their comments and to 
comply with the measure.  This includes information related to fee schedules, audit procedures, 
labelling requirements, and facility registration requirements . The US is also requesting that Egypt 
identify the product scope by providing a comprehensive list of HS  lines covered by the future 
measure.  
27.10.   Finally, the United States seeks information about Egypt 's process and standards used to 
approve or delist certification bodies. Egypt 's move to prevent  US certifying bodies from participating 
in the halal certification process has a substantial impact on trade, and the US  request s that Egypt 
explain its rationale for having a sole halal certifying body to achieve halal assurance . The United 
States strong ly urges Egypt to immediately delay and suspend implementation of any new halal 
certification requirements until all concerns have been addressed, including those relating to changes 
regarding halal certification bodies.  
27.11.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
27.12.   Paraguay shares Egypt's interest in providing its consumers with certainty regarding the 
purchase and consumption of halal -certified products. However, as a food exporter to Egypt, 
Paraguay is closely following the development of this measur e, and regret s that, despite the fact 
that the trade concern has been repeatedly discussed in the TBT  Committee, Members have still not 
received the information  requested . Paraguay does not have details or precise information on the G/C/M/143  
 
- 64 - 
 
  products that would ult imately be covered by the measure, the procedures for certification, costs, 
labelling requirements , and other information necessary to assess the adaptation of operators. 
Paraguay requests Egypt to suspend the application of its new halal certification req uirements until 
Members have all the information requested and commercial operators have sufficient time to adapt 
to the measures.  
27.13.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
27.14.   The European Union wishes to express its concerns over Egypt 's requirements on halal 
certification applying as of 1  October  2021 based on the Egyptian Halal standard  4249/2014. The 
EU is concerned about the negative impact of this measure on food and beverages imports into 
Egypt.  The EU welcome s the more rece nt facilitating measures notified to the TBT  Committee on 
4 April 2022 extending, until 30  September  2022, the period in which imports of milk and dairy 
products are accepted in Egypt without a halal certificate. However, facilitating measures are 
temporar y. The EU  urges Egypt to postpone the implementation of the measure and to provide for 
a reasonable adaptation period , of at least one  year, between the publication of the updated 
measures and the ir entry into force ; in this way, companies will have a reas onable period of time in 
which to adapt to the new requirements . 
27.15.   The European Union  wishes to invite Egypt to reconsider its decision to grant the right to 
certify compliance with halal requirements to a single company, IS  EG Halal, and to provide for a 
halal certification system that would allow multiple, well -established certification entities, in 
accordance with international best practice . The EU also requests  Egypt to consider keeping the halal 
certification and labelling voluntary, in order to pursue the legitimate objective of ensuring reliable 
information without unduly hindering trade flows. By these means, consumers would be able to 
decide whether to buy halal-certified food, based on c lear labelling.  
27.16.   Finally, the European Union  would welcome clarifications from Egypt about the concrete 
steps envisaged to provide comprehensive information about the new measures , as well as clear , 
written , and publicly available guidance to stakeholders, including a detailed description of the 
certification procedure, its duration, costs, and required documents, as well as the process for 
registration of suppliers, and the product coverage.  The European Union stands ready to work with 
Egypt on solutions th at would prevent the negative impact this measure would have on food and 
beverages imports to Egypt.  
27.17.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
27.18.   Australia acknowledges the ongoing bilateral communication and engagement with Egypt on 
the implementati on of new halal certification requirements for IS  EG Halal. Australia welcomes 
Egypt 's notification of details around these requirements to the TBT Committee.  Australia remains 
concerned about a number of issues , including products covered by the certifica tion requirements 
and the need to provide Members with adequate time to comment on any proposed changes to the 
measures . Australia  encourage s Egypt to meet its WTO  transparency obligations and to provide 
notifications in advance of further changes and any implementation of Egypt 's new halal certification 
measures.  Australia welcomes ongoing discussion on the halal certification requirements to ensure 
that they meet Egypt 's policy goals while not being more trade restrictive than necessary.  
27.19.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
27.20.   New Zealand welcomes the opportunity to speak in support of this trade concern raised by 
the United States and Canada. In this regard, New Zealand wishes to refer to earlier statements 
made on the parall el issue at the TBT Committee.  New Zealand  understand s that Egypt has 
implemented changes under Prime Ministerial Decree No.  35/2020 to require that certification of 
relevant halal standards shall only be undertaken by IS  EG Halal, and that certification f rom other 
halal certification bodies is no longer accepted for halal food products imported into Egypt.  
New Zealand also understands that the measures may apply to dairy products imported into Egypt, 
irrespective of whether halal labelling is applied to th ose goods, and irrespective of whether those  
goods have previously been treated as halal. 
27.21.   New Zealand still has serious concerns with these measures.  New Zealand would draw 
Egypt 's attention to its WTO  obligations, including its obligations under the TBT  Agreement G/C/M/143  
 
- 65 - 
 
  concerning the use of conformity assessments, including under Articles  5 and 6, and the requirement 
that measures not be more trade restrictive than necessary.  New Zealand wishes to better 
understand what consideration Egypt has accorded to less t rade restrictive alternatives.  
New Zealand is also interested in what factors led Egypt to introduce a measure that requires halal 
certification of products, which have commonly been treated and accepted as intrinsically halal. 
New Zealand  also understand s that the halal certification process is straying into sanitary matters; 
both during audits or inspections and in respect of additional sanitary information being required for 
registration with IS  EG Halal. Sanitary matters should remain outside the scope of IS EG's halal 
certification and be addressed by competent authorities responsible for sanitary matters , in line with 
existing agreements.  
27.22.   New Zealand wishes to thank Egypt for its WTO notification in document  G/TBT/N/EGY/313 , 
dated 1  December  2021. New Zealand  understand s that Egypt is currently developing a new halal 
standard that will clarify which products are subject to halal certification and the standard applied. 
New Zealand looks forward to this Halal Standard being provided and n otified to the TBT  Committee , 
in accordance with Article  5.6.2 of the TBT  Agreement.  
27.23.   New Zealand wishes  to thank Egypt for its ongoing bilateral engagement on this issue. 
New Zealand request s that Egypt provide clarification on the points made above and co ntinue s to 
request that any new measures be suspended until all WTO  obligations, including those requiring 
consultation with other WTO  Members, have been met.  
27.24.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
27.25.   Argentina reiterates its concern about this measure, as raised already in the TBT  Committee, 
including  the lack of detailed and complete information on it. The recent postponement by Egypt of 
the entry into force of the new regime does not allay Argentina' s concerns and worries. These 
concerns relate mainly to the lack of transparency and predictability, as Egypt has provided no 
information on the certification procedures or other regulatory details.  
27.26.   The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
27.27.   This issue  has been discussed in the TBT  Committee 's previous meetings. Through its 
TBT enquiry  point, Egypt has replied to questions sent by WTO  Members and is currently preparing 
a new set of replies with respect to the follow -up and new questions received.  
27.28.   Recogn izing the issues that have been raised by our trading partners at bilateral and 
multilateral levels, Egypt has taken a number of steps to take into account the concerns raised with 
respect to transparency, and allowing for an appropriate time-period for im plementation . 
Accordingly, i n documents  G/TBT/N/EGY/313 and G/TBT/N/EGY/313/Add.1 , the product coverage 
(meat, poultry and their products, milk and dairy products (except for crude milk)) , and timelines 
for entry into force have been clarified.  
27.29.   Egypt has also taken a number of facilitating measures , including allowing imports of milk 
and dairy products that are not accompanied by a Halal certificate to enter into Egypt until 
28 February  2022. Furthermore, this time -period has been extended until 30 Septembe r 2022 (the 
date of arrival at Egyptian ports) , as contained in document  G/TBT/N/EGY/313/Add.2.  It is also 
important to note that ES  4249/2014 is currently under review and will be duly notified to the 
TBT Committee.  Finally, Egypt wishes to stress that it is committed to continu ing its bilateral 
exchanges on the subject matter with all interested trading partners and will take their concerns 
into account , as appropriate.  
27.30.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
28  PAKISTAN – IMPORT RESTR ICTIONS ON FOODSTUFFS AND CONSUMER GOODS – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
28.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this new item had been  included on the agenda at the request 
of the European Union and the United States . G/C/M/143  
 
- 66 - 
 
  28.2.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
28.3.   The United States wishes to express its concern over SRO  598, introduced by the Government 
of Pakistan on 19 May 2022, imposing an import ban on what it deems "luxury and non -essential 
goods. " This ban was issued without transparency, consultation or notification, and is the latest in a 
series of import restrictions.  While the United States  recognize s Pakistan 's balance -of-payment 
concerns, it encourage s Pakistan to instead pursue macroeconomic policy measures to e ase its 
long-standing external pressures.  The list of banned imports, covering food products such as frozen 
meat, breakfast cereals, and pasta, as well as consumer products , ranging from tissue paper to 
sanitary pads to cell phones, includes items widely c onsidered essential.  The ban will severely impact 
companies that either export to or have operations in Pakistan, jeopardize thousands of jobs, and 
exacerbate existing supply chain disruptions.  The United States  urges Pakistan to reverse this SRO.  
The Unit ed States further encourage s Pakistan to provide ample opportunity for consultation with 
affected sectors prior to implementing any future import bans or restrictions.  
28.4.   The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
28.5.   The European Union wishes  to echo the concerns raised by the US  delegation.  Pakistan 
adopted a new regulation (SRO  598(I)/2022) on 19  May 2022 that imposes an import ban on 
38 products ( non-agricultural and processed agricultural products) . The EU understand s that the 
measur e has been taken on the ground s of the balance of payments and current account deficit 
crisis affecting Pakistan . However, Pakistan has been practicing a policy of import compression since 
2018 that is detrimental to EU  exports. The new measures will furth er impact the EU's exporters.  
28.6.   While the European Union  does not dispute the right of WTO Members to take measures to 
face a balance -of-payment crisis, such measures need to be in accordance with WTO  rules.  It is 
therefore essential that the new import ban is notified and fully WTO -compliant; that it is the least 
trade -restrictive  possible ; that it is temporary in nature; and that it is lifted as soon as possible.  
28.7.   The European Union  also has concerns over whether the restrictions imposed on the selected 
items will be effective in redressing Pakistan's  balance -of-payment situation . As a general rule , the 
EU wishes to call upon Pakistan's  authorities to notify any future changes well in advance so that 
economic operators have time to adjust  to them . The EU stands ready to continue working with 
Pakistan. At the same time, the  European Union invites Pakistan to remain committed to a long -term 
agenda of trade openness as a solid basis for its economic diversification and sustainable growth.  
28.8.   The delegate of Pakistan  indicated the following:  
28.9.   Pakistan thanks the United States and the European Union for their interest in its import 
policy. The US and EU  concerns have been noted and a response shall be shared in due course, upon 
receiving feedback from Capital.  
28.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
29  MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE FOR CHEESE UNDER MEXICAN 
OFFICIAL STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  
29.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the United States . 
29.2.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
29.3.   The United States reiterates its profound concerns regarding Mexico 's NOM -223 – Cheese 
Conformity Assessment Procedures (CAP), a measure that was re -notified to the WTO in 
February  2022.  Unfortunately, despite previous interventions, the United States  still has four key 
concerns.  
29.4.   Principa lly, NOM -223 contains a conformity assessment scheme which is highly trade 
burdensome . Providing information to consumers about cheese quality is typically a low -risk 
undertaking . The United States and industry are concerned that Mexico 's scheme may not be  G/C/M/143  
 
- 67 - 
 
  proportional to those risks, and that Mexico needs to seriously consider available alternatives to 
meet the consumer 's needs . Accordingly, t he US requests that Mexico halt the finalization of this 
measure and consider the previously proposed alternatives,  such as reverting to a voluntary scheme 
and using standards of identity, labelling, or supplier 's declaration of conformity to demonstrate the 
completion of third -party test procedures . 
29.5.   Second, cheese made from animal fat will have to undergo burdensome t esting and 
certification requirements, while cheese produced from vegetable fat will not . In this regard, t he 
United States notes that there are no internationally well -accepted biomarkers to differentiate milk 
fat from all -vegetable fat . Additionally, the re are no relevant Codex nor other international standards 
available for this type of analysis . Therefore, the  US requests that Mexico consider allowing fatty 
acid analysis to be voluntary rather than mandatory.  
29.6.   Third, the United States  remain s concerned a s to whether Mexico has seriously taken 
comments from WTO  Members and stakeholders into account . In 2020, stakeholders provided input 
into a draft and participated in good faith in the working group that concluded in September  2020, 
and the final draft is significantly different from the draft agreed to by that working group.  
29.7.   Fourth, the United States is concerned that this measure may conflict with the ongoing 
redrafting of the corresponding cheese standard . How will Mexico harmonize the 2019  update to the 
NOM-223 cheese standard, with the NOM -223 cheese CAP  versions developed through 2020 -2021, 
and an expected 2022  update to the NOM -223 cheese standard?  
29.8.   Once more, the United States asks Mexico to indefinitely suspend the cheese conformity 
assessment pro cedure (in its mandatory form) and to provide consideration to the less 
trade -restrictive alternatives presented by other WTO  Members and dairy industry stakeholders.  
29.9.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
29.10.   New Zealand welcomes the opportunity  to speak in support of this specific trade concern 
raised by the United States . New Zealand  consider s that the CAP that Mexico has set for cheese 
under NOM -223 are more trade restrictive than necessary, with some aspects of the procedure likely 
to cause d ifficulties for New Zealand's  exporters and to create unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade.  New Zealand  thank s Mexico for its notification of these measures in 
document  G/TBT/N/MEX/465/Rev.1 and look s forward to receiving a response from Mexico on its 
comments . 
29.11.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
29.12.   As mentioned to the United States at the TBT Committee 's meeting of 10 March , and at the 
Council's previous meeting, in April of this year, and again on this occasion , Mexico notified a new 
version of its Conformity Assessment Procedure on 8  February, in 
document  G/TBT/N/MEX/465/Rev.1, with a deadline for submitting comments that fell on 9 April.  
The delegations of the EU and the US subsequently requested an extension of the deadline to submi t 
their comments , to 30  April and 9  May, respectively. These requests were granted.  The comments 
received during the additional public consultation period are currently being evaluated by the 
competent standardizing authorities. Mexico reaffirms its commit ment to transparency. Any updates 
will be duly shared and notified in a timely manner.  
29.13.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
30  INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM FREE CERTIFICATE 
ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONSIGNMENT – REQUEST  FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  
30.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the United States . G/C/M/143  
 
- 68 - 
 
  30.2.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
30.3.   As it noted at the March  2022 meeting of the TBT  Committee,  and at the June  2022 meeting 
of the SPS  Committee, the United States once again reiterates its serious concerns with India 's 
measure mandating "non-GM (genetically modified) origin and GM  free certificates " for certain 
agricultural imports into  India, notified on 2 September  2020, in document  G/TBT/N/IND/168, and 
a later notified entry -into-force date of 1 March  2021.  
30.4.   The United States disagrees with India 's statements in the June  SPS Committee that the 
measure does not impede trade . Again, the US urges India to withdraw this requirement, and to 
engage with its trading partners to find a science -based, trade -facilitative alternative that does not 
increase the cost of food.  The United States  also note s the unclear nature of this Order 's 
implementa tion. Since it went into effect in March  2021, the Order has limited trade of certain 
processed products that are not listed in Annex -I of the Order, despite language which stipulates 
that the Order does not apply to processed food products in general.  
30.5.   The United States  again wishes to encourage India to accept its offer for technical cooperation 
with the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) to explore alternatives to this 
measure.  
30.6.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
30.7.   Canada thanks the United States for placing this item on the agenda.  Canada wishes to 
reiterate its concerns raised at previous meetings of the TBT  Committee, SPS  Committee , and C TG 
regarding India 's non -GM Order, which mandates that a non -genetically modi fied (non -GM) or 
GM free certificate accompany imported consignments of 24  imported food products.  
30.8.   While Canada welcomes India 's recent decision to accept its attestation for 
non-GM attestation for bean exports, Canada  remain s concerned that India 's Order could 
disproportionately impact the ability of GM -producing countries to export to India and unnecessarily 
restrict international trade.  Canada is concerned with the lack of scientific support for India 's 
measure given the broad scientific consensus that GM  products are as safe as their conventional 
counterparts , as well as the undue burden and negative commercial impact the measure creates on 
exporting countries through unjustified certification requirements.  
30.9.   Despite requests by several WTO Members, including Canada, in the aforementioned for ums, 
India has provided neither scientific justification nor a risk assessment supporting this measure.  As 
such, Canada requests once again that India suspend the implementation of this measure and permi t 
trade to continue without a GM -free certificate requirement. This would provide an opportunity for 
India to further engage with Members to discuss and consider alternate, less trade -restrictive 
approaches that would meet India 's objectives and minimize i mpacts on trade.  Canada would be 
pleased to contribute to these discussions and share its extensive experience in this area.  
30.10.   Lastly, Canada recalls its request for India to notify the non -GM Order to the SPS  Committee 
given the Order 's stated objective is "to ensure the safety and wholesomeness of articles of food 
imported into India. " Canada  notes India's assertion that the requirement to regulate imports of 
GM food was notified to the WTO as the Environment Protection Act  1986; Canada would appreciate 
provision of this notification. However, Canada  maintain s its request that, in line with India 's 
WTO commitments to notify measures that significantly impact WTO Members' trade, India notify 
the 2020  Order to the SPS  Committee.  
30.11.   Canada remain s available and wo uld welcome the opportunity to pursue further discussions 
on this issue in a bilateral setting.  
30.12.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
30.13.   With regard to this measure, Argentina reiterates its concern and again stresses that the 
measure has no scie ntific explanation to support it. Argentina is concerned that this requirement 
would set a precedent for other products or even their derivatives to be included in the future, and 
that this requirement could be a barrier to trade.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 69 - 
 
  30.14.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
30.15.   Paraguay reiterates its support for the United States in its inclusion of this item on the 
Council's agenda . Several months before , through Paraguay's  representation in New Delhi , and along 
with other Membe rs, Paraguay had already requested India to reconsider this policy, which is  
inconsistent with its obligations to this Organization. Paraguay  reiterate s that it continue s to await 
a response from India to its concerns and requests, and look s forward to receiving an update as 
soon as possible.  
30.16.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
30.17.   Japan echoes the concerns raised by the co-sponsors and other WTO Member s, and 
expresses its concern that this is a trade -restrictive measure that is not based on scientif ic evidence. 
Japan  request s that agricultural products exported from exporting countries that exercise proper 
control of their genetically modified agricultural products be excluded from this requirement.  
30.18.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
30.19.   India wishes to thank the delegations of the United States , Canada, Argentina, Paraguay,  
and Japan for their interest in this issue.  India wishes to inform WTO Members that the requirement 
to regulate import of GM  food is based on already existing provisions of the Environment Protection 
Act (1986) and is not a new requirement.  
30.20.   The F SSAI Order, dated 21 August  2020, requiring a non-GM certificate for import s of 
24 food crops is only an assurance provided by competent author ities of exporting countries that 
the food crops that are not approved by the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC) for 
genetic modification are not imported into India.  This requirement has already been notified to the 
WTO. Furthermore, it  is not  trade restrictive as it is uniformly applicable to imports from all 
WTO Members . 
30.21.   The requirement of non -GMO certificate is not applicable for import s of processed food and 
animal feed. Moreover, the non -GM attestation on phytosanitary certificate, which i s already issued 
for every consignment, is also acceptable. WTO Members may also note that several major trading 
partners are complying with this requirement and furnishing the copy of their non-GMO certificate 
in the prescribed format for their export con signments.  Nevertheless, India is open to further 
discussing this issue bilaterally with any WTO  Member.  
30.22.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
31  PANAMA – ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING – REQUEST FROM 
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  
31.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Canada and the United States . 
31.2.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the  following:  
31.3.   Canada wishes  to raise this specific trade concern regarding Panama 's new quality 
requirements for fresh potatoes established by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce on 
20 February  2020.  As a long -standing supplier of fresh potatoes to Panama,  with year -round 
exports, Canada continues to be concerned that implementing these new quality requirements could 
have a direct impact on its ability to export potatoes to Panama.  
31.4.   Canada recognizes that Panama delayed the implementation of these measures t o allow for 
further consultations with trading partners and is appreciative of Panama 's participation in a bilateral 
technical meeting that was held in September  2021 to address elements of concern on this issue.  
However, despite this positive engagement, Canada notes that its concerns were not taken into 
account by Panama in its final measure.  Canada has signalled its concern with the restrictive 
time-limits for storage and marketing, as well as the zero  tolerance for sprouting , to Panama's 
Ministry of Com merce (MICI) . G/C/M/143  
 
- 70 - 
 
  31.5.   Canada respectfully requests that Panama pause the enforcement of these requirements to 
allow for additional technical dialogue to occur and ensure that Panama 's quality standards do not 
create unintended barriers to their mutually beneficial  bilateral trade in agriculture.  
31.6.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
31.7.   The United States continues to raise its concerns on Panama 's newly implemented technical 
regulations for potatoes . Since the Council's previous meeting, the US has continued its attempts to 
constructively engage with Panama on this issue . Panama continues to be unresponsive to these 
requests and has still not provided scientific justification for these measures . The US maintain s its 
availability and commit ment to work with Panama to refine the measures so that they meet 
Panama 's legitimate objectives while not being unnecessarily restrictive . In the interim, the US 
reiterate s its request that Panama provide the scientific justification for its measures or s uspend 
implementation of both the potato and onion regulations until technical discussions have concluded.  
31.8.   The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
31.9.   Panama thanks the delegations of the United States and Canada for their comments and takes 
note of th eir concerns. Panama is aware that the concerns are not new and continues to work with 
its Capital to address them bilaterally. Panama looks forward to working together to find mutually 
satisfactory solutions  and will share with the Council any information  it receives as a result of the se 
bilateral discussions.  
31.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
32  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, THE 
STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM SWITZERLAND AND THE  UNITED STATES  
32.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Switzerland and the United States.  
32.2.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
32.3.   Since this remains a n ongoing issue, Switzerland will remain brief and refer to its previous 
statements. Switzerland also wishes to thank the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  member States 
for the meeting that they held in May, at which certain elements relating to the time -frame of the 
reform could be very usefully clarified. However, as the devil lies in the detail, Switzerland still has 
serious concerns with regard to several aspects of the selective tax reform. Therefore, Switzerland 
requests additional clarity and certainty  as concerns these details before any final decision is taken. 
Switzerland would welcome another meeting in the autumn in order to get an update on the state 
of play of the reform. Switzerland hopes that it will be possible to resolve this trade irritant i n the 
near future.  
32.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
32.5.   The United States, along with Switzerland, the European Union, and Japan, circulated 
questions in March  2021 to GCC  member State governments regarding the status of the selective 
tax on beverages. While the US appreciates the information provided during th e Council's 
April meeting, as well as separate discussions with member State officials since then, it notes that 
it still has yet to receive written responses to its questions from March  2021, and asks that these 
Members provide an update as to when such r esponses to those questions will be provided. As the 
US has previously conveyed, it requests a substantive update on revisions to the GCC  excise tax 
model and its implementation plan under the GCC  Unified Excise Tax Agreement, and notes the 
importance of t imely engagement with interested parties regarding this issue.  
32.6.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
32.7.   The European Union wishes to reiterate its previous requests made in the CTG and the Market 
Access Committee. The EU requests a subst antive update on revisions to the GCC  excise tax model 
and its implementation plan under the GCC  Unified Excise Tax Agreement. The EU notes the G/C/M/143  
 
- 71 - 
 
  importance of timely engagement with interested parties regarding this issue and stands ready to 
hold technical consultations with competent GCC  authorities from Capital and Geneva to review the 
progress.  
32.8.   The European Union provided its comments at previous meetings of the CTG and the CMA. In 
addition, on 7  June 2022, the EU submitted written comments to the notific ation in 
document  G/TBT/N/SAU/1104/Add.1 of 17  March  2022 related to the draft standard on "Energy 
drinks", in which the definition of energy drinks was modified. The EU would welcome a reply to 
those comments.  
32.9.   The European Union wishes to underline the ne ed to provide immediate relief to industry, 
until the ongoing GCC  excise taxation revision takes effect, by exempting all zero  sugar beverages 
from the tax and harmonizing the tax rate at 50% for energy drinks and all other categories of 
sugar -sweetened be verages subject to the tax. The European Union stands ready to continue 
engaging with the GCC on this important issue.  
32.10.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
32.11.   On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the K ingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and the State of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia wishes to thank 
the delegations of the United States, Switzerland, and the European Union for the interest they 
attach to the GCC  excise tax regime and  for their communication on the application of the excise 
tax on carbonated soft drinks, malt beverages, energy drinks, sport drinks, and other sweetened 
beverages.  
32.12.   As for the timeline of the ongoing process of the new GCC  excise tax model and its 
implemen tation, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recalls, once again, that the revision of the excise tax 
on beverages is a complex exercise that requires tremendous effort, extensive coordination, and 
comprehensive studies. The GCC  Working Group on Tax Issues is spari ng no effort to complete this 
exercise in order to submit to the GCC  member States appropriate results and high standards in its 
excise tax model.  
32.13.   In addition, appropriate procedures and an appropriate timeline will be adopted by the 
GCC member States for the revision of their excise tax regime. Once this process has been 
completed, the related information will be immediately shared with WTO  Members.  
32.14.   Finally, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia wishes to thank the United States, the European Union, 
and Switzerland for their constructive bilateral meeting of 18  May held with the competent 
authorities in the GCC  member States.  
32.15.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
33  CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
33.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Japan.  
33.2.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
33.3.   Japan continues to have concerns over China's Export Control Law, which entered into force 
in December  2020. Indeed, the details of China's export -controlled ite ms, including the details of its 
regulations and operations, are still unclear.  
33.4.   Taking into consideration the objective of the law, which is to safeguard national interests, 
Japan again reiterates, as it has already stated in past Council meetings, its con cerns on the following 
three  points in particular: (i)  Japan is concerned that the scope of products subject to export control 
is possibly excessive; (ii)  Japan is concerned that there may be cases that require unnecessary 
technical disclosure requests dur ing classification and end -user or usage investigations; and 
(iii) Japan is also concerned that the provisions on countermeasures against discriminatory export 
regulations by other countries have been maintained in the law. Japan believes that the 
aforemen tioned export restrictions stipulated in this law may constitute an overly stringent export G/C/M/143  
 
- 72 - 
 
  regulation or be unnecessary in light of the international export control regime; therefore, they may 
be considered export restrictions prohibited under Article  XI of the GATT, and consequently be 
inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement.  
33.5.   In April  2022, a draft ordinance for the Dual -Use Item Export Control (draft of public 
consultations) was published regarding the operation of the law concerning dual -use products. The 
opacity of the legal operation has not been resolved at all in relation to the scope of items subject 
to regulation and technical disclosure requirements, and Japan will continue to request explanations 
of the details of the regulations related to the law. In this regard, Japan wishes to reiterate the 
following two  points, as pointed out in previous meetings of the Council.  
33.6.   Firstly, Japan has concerns regarding the fact that the draft regulations on rare earths, 
published in January  2021, mentions a plan to set out strategic reserves. Japan believes that this 
plan could mean that there is a possibility that China might introduce controls on exports of rare 
earth -related products in accordance with the aforementioned Export Control Law.  
33.7.   Secondly, regarding the  "Unreliable Entity List" and export prohibition list, based on the 
external trade law, Japan is concerned by the lack of clarity in the relationship between the entity 
list in the Export Control Law and the items covered in the law and the technology list . China had 
explained previously that the regulatory list and unreliable entity list provided in Article  18 of this 
law had been constructed from different legal systems. However, Japan requests a clearer 
explanation as to the kind of legal system on which  each regulation is based, and whether or not 
they are related. In particular, with regard to the "Unreliable Entity List" measures, Japan is 
concerned about whether the fairness and transparency, in terms of the recognition of foreign 
entities and the con tent of measures taken against foreign entities, would be ensured. Japan notes 
that there is a possibility that these measures would be inconsistent with Article  X of the GATT, 
among others.  
33.8.   At the CTG's previous meeting, China had explained that it was st ill drafting the supporting 
regulations and control lists of its Export Control Law, which would provide clearer guidance for all 
parties to implement and abide by the export control law. China also said that it would welcome 
engagement from other Members and requested them to put forward comments and suggestions 
during the public consultation period. Therefore, Japan will continue to monitor the details of the 
law's implementing regulations closely and hopes that its concerns will be addressed accordingly in 
the final draft of the regulations. In addition, Japan is of the view that countermeasure provisions 
should be removed from the law. Japan requests that China, in full transparency, provide detailed 
information on its regulations and their timeline, whi le providing ample time for their consideration.  
33.9.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
33.10.   Canada reiterates its concerns previously expressed at the CTG's meeting in April  2022. 
Given the notable differences between China's Export Control Law and st andard international 
practice relating to export controls, Canada would encourage China to circumscribe the application 
of its Export Control Law through its upcoming regulations and implementation with a view to 
harmonizing its practices with internationa l standards.  
33.11.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
33.12.   The European Union continues to follow closely the developments in China's new Export 
Control Law, which took effect on 1  December  2020. The European Union takes note of the release 
for public comment in April -May 2022 of the Export Control Regulations, which enhance the 
efficiency of China's export control system.  
33.13.   The European Union reiterates its concerns regarding the policy defined in the White Paper 
of December  2021 representing a  shift towards safeguarding China's "national interests" rather than 
contributing to international peace and security. The White Paper of 2021 also seems to imply that 
existing international export control regimes jeopardize the stability of global value c hains and the 
rights of developing countries.  
33.14.   However, Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECRs) have been set up to enable the 
implementation of international treaty obligations on the non -proliferation of Weapons of Mass G/C/M/143  
 
- 73 - 
 
  Destruction and conventional we apons, and to support the implementation of UNSC  resolutions on 
the maintenance of international peace and security by preventing the diversion of sensitive 
materials, technology, and equipment to end -users of concern. They set clear guidelines and develop  
lists of sensitive items that give exporting WTO  Members the necessary assurances that exports of 
sensitive products to trusted recipients are for peaceful uses and will not undermine international 
peace and security. MECRs are a technical instrument to f ulfil WTO  Members' international 
obligations and commitments and for enabling peaceful uses of sensitive items by all WTO  Members.  
33.15.   The European Union appreciates China's efforts to increase transparency in its existing 
export control regime via the draft r egulation, such as the work towards producing unified control 
lists, regulation of new licence types, partly streamlining licensing application processes, and 
encouraging companies to develop internal compliance systems, among others.  
33.16.   The European Union re cognizes that the Chinese Export Control Law consolidates China's 
non-proliferation commitments, and that the draft regulations further modernize the export control 
system. However the EU would still like to recall its five  major concerns regarding this me asure, 
while referring to its previous statement for the full details, namely: (i)  extra-territorial application; 
(ii) rules on deemed exports and re -exports; (iii)  objectives and scope of controls; (iv)  risk 
assessment with regard to destination countries  or regions; and (v)  control lists. The EU will also 
have a number of detailed questions to which it would welcome China's feedback.  
33.17.   The European Union wishes to invite China to confirm the relationship between those 
technologies that are subject to the restrictions under the Export Control Law (for example, the lists 
formulated under the implementing administrative laws and regulations ) and the list of those 
technologies that are prohibited/restricted to be exported under the Catalogue of Technologies 
Restricted or Forbidden for Export. In the CTG's  April meeting, China referred to its answers in the 
context of the TPR  exercise. In the WTO Trade Policy Review carried out recently, China noted that 
"any technologies that are civil -military dual -use technologies shall be subject to the Export Control 
Law".  
33.18.   The European Union would therefore like to invite China to consider amending the rel evant 
legal provisions and confirm that the Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for Export 
lie in the applicable scope of the Export Control Law. In particular, the EU wishes to ask China 
whether the new control lists will include and repeal other lists of technologies subject to export 
restrictions, in particular the Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for Export. Finally, 
the European Union invites China to clarify whether corresponding references to the lists of MECRs 
will be published to provide further legal clarity.  
33.19.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
33.20.   Australia notes Japan's statement in relation to China's Export Control Law. As set out in 
Australia's submissions to China's consultations with interested parti es ahead of the adoption of this 
law in December  2020, and draft regulations published in April  2022, Australia welcome s efforts to 
codify the regulatory framework for defence export controls. Australia also welcomes China's efforts 
to clarify aspects of i ts export control regime through the publication of a White Paper in 
December  2021.  
33.21.   However, Australia still has concerns about the broad scope of China's Export Control Law. 
Australia encourages China to continue to provide greater clarity in relation to key elements of the 
law, including jurisdiction, the scope of administrator powers, and confirmation that the law is 
consistent with China's international commitments (including WTO  rules and the China -Australia 
Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA)).  
33.22.   Australia co ntinues to urge China to take account of the concerns of foreign businesses and 
WTO Members in the implementation of this law and development of future measures. Australia 
looks forward to continuing to work closely with China.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 74 - 
 
  33.23.   The delegate of China  indica ted the following:  
33.24.   China refers to its statements made at previous meetings of the CTG17, as well as its detailed 
reply provided in China's 2021  Trade Policy Review. China also wishes to update relevant 
WTO Members that, on 22  April 2022, China published t he draft China Dual Use Export Control 
Regulation for public comment. China thanks Japan and other relevant WTO  Members for submitting 
their comments and advice on the draft regulation during the commenting period. China is working 
on those comments in Cap ital and will continue to engage with relevant WTO  Members on this issue.  
33.25.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
34  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM JAPAN AND 
THAILAND  
34.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Japan and Thailand.  
34.2.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
34.3.   Japan continues to  express its concerns that India's import ban on air conditioners, including 
refrigerants, introduced in October last year by Notification No.  41/2015 -2020, is a measure that 
unreasonably imposes a restructuring of corporate supply chains. Japan is serious ly concerned that 
this measure is likely to constitute an import ban that is inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT, 
as well as Article  2.1 of the TRIMs  Agreement.  
34.4.   India had responded in its TPR and at the Council's previous meeting to state that its m easure 
was consistent with its obligations under the Montreal Protocol. However, Japan considers this import 
ban to be superfluous and irrational in that it covers a wide range of air conditioners that use 
refrigerants. Furthermore, these air conditioners are not subject to India's reduction and elimination 
obligations under the Montreal Protocol, or the regulation for freon gas causing ozone layer depletion 
under India's domestic regulation.  
34.5.   In this regard, after considering the previous answers received f rom India, Japan submitted 
written questions to the TRIMs  Committee meeting in September  2021 to request India's more 
detailed explanations, questions to which Japan expects India to provide prompt answers. India has 
said that it is open to discussing the matter with Japan bilaterally. However, in order to have a 
constructive discussion, it is important for India to respond in good faith, in writing, to Japan's 
written questions.  
34.6.   In addition, and as recently mentioned in the context of the CMA, with regard to air 
conditioners, the scheduled date for the IS  Mark certification system based on the Quality Control 
Orders for air conditioners and their parts to come into effect has been postponed from January  2022 
to January  2023. Japan appreciates India's postpo nement of the date on which the order will come 
into force. However, in order to prevent delays in the certification procedure for imported products, 
Japan requests that the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) conduct smooth overseas factory 
inspections, or i f it is difficult to travel overseas, Japan would ask India to consider alternative 
procedures for certification other than overseas factory inspection.  
34.7.   The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
34.8.   Thailand wishes to join Japan in expressing a concern , which they have jointly raised several 
times before, regarding India's import prohibition of air conditioners with refrigerant.  
34.9.   First of all, this highly restrictive import measure has had a considerable impact on Thailand's 
exports of air conditioners t o India. Exports of wall -mounted air conditioners from Thailand to India 
declined 6.21% in 2021 relative to 2019, before the measure was implemented. For the 
first four months of 2022, moreover, the exports of wall or ceiling type air conditioners from Tha iland 
to India fell 47.85% compared to the same period of 2021, which represented the greatest fall in 
the exports of air  conditioners among Thailand's top  10 export destinations of such products 
 
17 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  29.24 -29.32.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 75 - 
 
  worldwide. Furthermore, as Thailand is India's largest provi der of imported air conditioners, Thailand 
obviously experiences the greatest and the most adverse impact from such a restrictive measure.  
34.10.   Thailand respects India's determination to comply with the Montreal Protocol. However, 
Thailand does not believe that  the current measure is in compliance with the Montreal Protocol, as 
claimed by India. According to the Montreal Protocol, any measure that reduces the use of 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) shall be announced in advance and provide a sufficient transition perio d 
for affected countries. Moreover, the measure should be applied to domestic producers before it can 
be applied to foreign producers. Also, for Article  5 Parties Group  2, of which India is a part, there 
are clearly determined reduction steps on the use of  HFCs, which India should follow. However, 
although India may apply a shorter time -frame for such a reduction, it must be done in a 
non-discriminatory manner between domestic and foreign producers.  
34.11.   The above argument leads to the conclusion that this measu re is in blatant breach of the 
WTO's national treatment principle under Article  III of the GATT  1994 and Article  2.1 of the 
TRIMs  Agreement since domestic producers are allowed to inject refrigerant into domestically 
manufactured air conditioners, but impo rted producers are not. It is also a de facto violation of the 
TRIMs  Agreement, which has prohibited the use of local content requirements, such as refrigerant 
that must be filled into imported empty air conditioners in India only. Therefore, Thailand reit erates 
its request that India amend the measure as soon as possible to ensure its compliance with India's 
WTO commitments, and to notify the measure to the WTO.  
34.12.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
34.13.   India thanks the delegations of Japan and Thaila nd for their continued interest in this issue. 
Since the CTG's  previous meeting, India has shared the details of these measures with Japan, 
including on their intended purpose and ongoing developments. India also thanks Thailand for 
sharing, on this occasi on, its relevant data; this data will be transmitted to Capital. India wishes to 
draw WTO  Members' attention to its notification to the Committee on Import Licensing under 
Article  5.1-5.4 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, in document  G/LIC/N /2/IND/21. 
This notification clearly spells out the details of the restricted import policy for hydrofluorocarbons, 
which are relevant to this agenda item.  
34.14.   As per the Ozone Depleting Substances (Regulation and Control) Amendment Rules, 2014, 
import of air conditioners containing Group  VI substances (hydrochlorofluorocarbons) is prohibited 
since 1  July 2015. This measure was necessary for the application of standards and regulations in 
line with India's commitment to the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Prot ocol. India wishes to 
reiterate that this measure has been taken to reduce risk to human, animal and plant life, and for 
health reasons.  
34.15.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
35  NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – REQUEST FROM THAILAND  
35.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Thailand.  
35.2.   The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
35.3.   Thailand wishes to reiterate its concern over the Government of Nepal's measure prohibiting 
imports of caffein ated mixed energy drinks and flavoured synthetic drinks from Thailand since 2019. 
Having said that, Thailand wishes to convey its sympathy to the people of Nepal, who are facing 
some of the most difficult economic hardships, with declining foreign exchange  reserves, the chronic 
problems of trade deficits, high inflation, and aggravating food insecurity, which have 
understandably forced the Government of Nepal to adopt trade restrictive measures in a bid to 
prevent Nepal's foreign exchange reserves from furt her depleting.  
35.4.   Thailand wishes to remind Nepal that WTO  Members facing balance -of-payment difficulties 
may apply import restrictions, subject to the provisions under Article  XII of the GATT, provided that 
they do not exceed the level of restrictions which are necessary, that they are progressively relaxed, 
and they are maintained only to the extent that the conditions still justify their application. In light G/C/M/143  
 
- 76 - 
 
  of this, Thailand urges Nepal to provide an update of its balance -of-payments situation and how 
such trade restrictive measures could help to alleviate the problem. Thailand would also like to 
encourage Nepal to provide an official WTO  notification in order to further clarify the precise 
WTO legal basis that justifies to WTO  Members Nepal's temporary ad option of such measures.  
35.5.   Finally, Thailand would welcome bilateral consultations with Nepal with a view to finding a 
mutually acceptable solution.  
35.6.   The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
35.7.   Nepal thanks Thailand for its statement and continued interest  in Nepal's trade policy 
measures and notes that this concern has also been raised in the CMA. Accordingly, Nepal wishes to 
refer to its statements delivered at the meetings of the CMA held in March  2022, and at the Council's 
meeting held in April  202218, in response to the concern raised today, while noting that Nepal is still 
facing challenges in its balance of payments.  
35.8.   In addition, Nepal is pleased to inform the Council that its delegation, and the 
WTO Secretariat, have largely completed the technical w ork of notification. Indeed, Nepal hopes that 
its notification, in the appropriate format, will be circulated to WTO  Members soon. Finally, Nepal 
wishes to resolve this matter at the bilateral level and welcomes the proposal made by Thailand 
regarding bila teral consultations.  
35.9.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
36  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THAILAND  
36.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Thailand.  
36.2.   The delegate of Thaila nd indicated the following:  
36.3.   As it has done at many previous meetings of the CTG and the Committee on Market Access 
(CMA), Thailand wishes once again to raise its concern over Sri  Lanka's import measures, such as 
its temporary suspension of imports, imports  on a credit basis, and import control licences, which 
have significantly impacted Thailand's exports to Sri Lanka. This has been especially the case of 
exports of small passenger vehicles, which have virtually ground to a halt since 2021.  
36.4.   Having said that , Thailand keenly follows the economic situation in Sri Lanka and stands by 
the side of its people, who are facing some of the most difficult economic hardships in the country's 
modern history, with high and rising inflation, depleting foreign exchange res erves, rising external 
debt, and looming severe economic contraction in 2022. Moreover, Thailand welcomes Sri  Lanka's 
talks with the International Monetary Fund to secure a much -needed support and economic relief 
package, if applicable.  
36.5.   Thailand wishes to remind Sri Lanka that WTO  Members facing balance -of-payment difficulties 
may apply import restrictions subject to the provisions set out under Article  XII of the GATT, 
provided that they do not exceed the level of restrictions which are necessary, that the y are 
progressively relaxed, and they are maintained only to the extent that the conditions still justify 
their application. In light of this, Thailand requests Sri Lanka to revise the impact of its measures in 
relation to relieving its foreign exchange re serve shortage, and also urges Sri  Lanka to notify the 
above -mentioned measures to the WTO.  
36.6.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
36.7.   Japan shares the concerns expressed by Australia and Thailand. Japan believes that 
Sri Lanka's measures may constitute an import ban that does not comply with Article  XI:1 of the 
GATT. Japan understands that Sri  Lanka considers these measures necessary due  to difficulties with 
its balance of payments (BOP). At the same time, such an import restriction should not be introduced 
 
18 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  24.6-24.7. G/C/M/143  
 
- 77 - 
 
  lightly; rather, it needs to be carried out with the utmost caution and in due consideration for the 
substantive and procedural requi rements of the WTO  Agreement.  
36.8.   In addition, Japan has noted Sri  Lanka's explanation in the previous CTG and CMA  meetings 
that it has not "introduced any measures besides some on automobiles, plastic products, and 
chemicals since June  2020." Furthermore, in the CMA's most recent meeting, Sri  Lanka also 
explained that "regarding certain automobiles and chemicals, these measures were taken with 
consideration for the impact on the domestic environment."  
36.9.   In this regard, Japan asks Sri  Lanka to explain the followi ng: (i)  the specific target items for 
which import restrictions are being implemented; (ii)  the aspects of which systems that correspond 
to measures that take into consideration the impact on the domestic environment; and (iii)  which 
domestic laws and regu lations stipulate the content of these measures. Further to these points, 
Japan also wishes to request a reiteration of Sri  Lanka's measures and their consistency with the 
WTO Agreements.  
36.10.   While it is mindful of the difficult economic situation that Sri  Lanka currently faces, Japan 
nevertheless requests from Sri  Lanka an indication of when this measure will be lifted, and that it 
be withdrawn at the earliest possible opportunity.  
36.11.   With regard to the possibility that Sri  Lanka will remove the import ban once i ts economic 
situation improves, Japan welcomes the fact that Sri  Lanka is currently in discussions with the IMF 
regarding its economic crisis; nevertheless, Japan still wishes to know what the criteria and timing 
are for the lifting of these measures.  
36.12.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
36.13.   Sri Lanka is facing an unprecedented economic crisis. As the international community seeks 
to help Sri  Lanka meet that crisis, it is important that unnecessary impediments to the import of 
important products  needed by the Sri Lankan people are not maintained. New Zealand wishes to be 
reassured by Sri Lanka that the measures in place are justified and consistent with its international 
obligations. New Zealand would welcome further briefing in this regard, in G eneva or Colombo.  
36.14.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
36.15.   The European Union is aware of the serious economic and foreign debt crisis that Sri  Lanka 
is currently facing and stands ready to continue working together with Sri  Lanka in a c onstructive 
manner. While understanding Sri  Lanka's difficult context, the EU wishes to reiterate the concerns 
that it has expressed under this item in previous meetings. The EU is also concerned about the very 
high level of the recent duty surcharges intr oduced by the new government since 1  June, for a period 
of six  months, and the wide range of products targeted, among which are many agricultural and 
foodstuffs/processed agricultural products. The European Union therefore invites Sri  Lanka to 
provide furt her information in this regard, including a timetable for the lifting of its import 
restrictions.  
36.16.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
36.17.   Sri Lanka wishes to thank the delegation of Thailand for its continuous interest in Sri  Lanka's 
trade policy measures introduced to curb the adverse impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on 
Sri Lanka's economy. As Sri  Lanka informed WTO  Members at the CTG's  meeting held in April  2022, 
several positive steps have been taken by Sri  Lanka to relax most of the recen t import measures 
imposed to curb the impact of the COVID -19 pandemic in a progressive manner. In this regard, 
Sri Lanka made a detailed statement at the meeting of the Market Access Committee held on 
30 March  2022, including on the steps that it had taken  from time to time to relax its import 
measures.  
36.18.   At the CTG's  previous meeting, several WTO  Members expressed their concern with regard 
to Sri  Lanka's import measures imposed through Regulation No.  2270/18, dated 9  March  2022, 
requiring importers to obtain  import licences for importation of the 369  items identified therein. 
Sri Lanka is pleased to inform the Council that the requirement on obtaining import licences to import G/C/M/143  
 
- 78 - 
 
  those identified 369  items has now been removed, through Regulation No.  2282/21, da ted 
31 May 2022, which is a positive development.  
36.19.   As Sri Lanka has previously explained at the meetings of various committees, the 
importation of automobiles into Sri Lanka is highly dependent on the duty -free car permits issued to 
government officials fro m time to time. This duty -free permit (or duty -free vehicle permit, or motor 
vehicle permit on concessionary terms) is a permit issued by the Treasury of the Government of 
Sri Lanka that allows its holder to import a vehicle, irrespective of its engine cap acity, into Sri  Lanka 
on duty concessions or exempt from certain taxes. As previously stated, Sri  Lanka considers that 
these duty waivers and suspension of customs duties, Import Cess and excise duties in the case of 
duty-free car permits cannot be conside red as commercial activities that take place "under the 
normal course of trade" (within the meaning of the WTO  rules). Accordingly, Sri  Lanka's trading 
partners cannot presume that the trade flows taking place under a "non -normal course of trade" are 
the g eneral norm, and claim that Sri Lanka's imports of motor vehicles from its trading partners 
have been affected due to trade -restrictive measures imposed by Sri  Lanka. In the absence of duty 
car permits, the demand for such vehicles is not expected to surge  in tandem with the import 
relaxation. Furthermore, it has been estimated that Sri  Lanka has lost around LKR  94 billion annually 
from such concessionary vehicle permits in the past, which is nearly equivalent to the amount the 
government collects from taxi ng vehicle imports, making the policy more counterproductive. In view 
of this, the Government had to take certain restrictive measures, including making such permits 
inactive in order to protect the economy at the outset of the COVID -19 pandemic. Even for those 
duty-free car permit holders, who are in possession of such permits issued prior to March  2020, 
Sri Lanka is not in a position to release much needed foreign currency to import automobiles, which 
are classified as non -essential items, due to the ongo ing dire economic crisis in the country.  
36.20.   Sri Lanka is currently finding it difficult to find foreign currency even for such essential import 
items as medicine, fuel, and food items. In this context, Sri  Lanka will probably be able to release 
foreign curren cy for importation of non -essential items, such as automobiles and spare parts thereof, 
only when the economy recovers from the current economic crisis.  
36.21.   Sri Lanka understands that several WTO  Members do have concerns with regard to 
Sri Lanka's delays in no tifying its import measures introduced to curb the impact of the 
COVID -19 pandemic. As it informed WTO  Members at the CTG's previous meeting, Sri  Lanka has 
already begun its negotiations with the International Monetary Fund to get its assistance in 
address ing Sri Lanka's economic crisis, including the BOP  issues that Sri Lanka is currently 
encountering. Several rounds of negotiations with the IMF have already been concluded. In this 
context, Sri  Lanka is of the view that when its discussions with the IMF al low for greater clarity, it 
would be able to notify to the WTO the import measures that it had introduced in order to curb the 
adverse impact of the COVID -19 pandemic, including the most recent measures. Sri Lanka will 
coordinate with Capital regarding the  specific concerns raised on this occasion by several 
WTO Members, and keep the Council informed of Capital's responses.  
36.22.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
37  INDIA – PLAIN COPIER PAPER QUALITY ORDER  2020 – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
37.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Indonesia.  
37.2.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
37.3.   Indonesia wishes to thank India on its progress and efforts to resolve the issue of Indonesian 
paper export barriers to In dia due to the implementation of India's Plain Copier Paper (Quality 
Order)  2020. Indonesia wishes once again to inform India that the quarantine and PCR  test 
obligation requirements to travel to Indonesia have been removed. Based on information from 
Indon esia's business sectors, the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS), auditors will conduct their 
on-site factory inspections in Indonesia in July  2022. Indonesia hopes that it could immediately 
receive the definitive date of the BIS  auditors' on -site factory vis it. G/C/M/143  
 
- 79 - 
 
  37.4.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
37.5.   India wishes to thank Indonesia for its update and continued interest in this issue. In 
particular, Indonesia's update on changes to its quarantine rules will be communicated to Capital. 
The Bureau of Indi an Standards operates its product certification activities as per Scheme -I of the 
BIS (Conformity Assessment) Regulations, 2018. Under this Scheme, factory inspection is a 
mandatory requirement for the purpose of granting a licence. The licence to use the Standard Mark 
on a product is granted after assessment of the manufacturing and testing capabilities of the 
applicant manufacturer through factory inspection of the manufacturing premises. At present, there 
is no provision in the BIS (Conformity Assessment ) Regulations, 2018 to undertake remote (virtual) 
inspection for the purpose of conformity assessment activities.  
37.6.   Earlier, factory inspections were on hold due to restrictions on international travel because of 
the COVID -19 pandemic. This position was not discriminatory against any individual WTO  Member. 
Currently, the BIS has started physical inspections for applications received from foreign 
manufacturers, where the country to be visited is facilitating the visit of fully vaccinated BIS  officers 
or carryi ng negative RT -PCR test reports, without the requirement of quarantine or quarantine of up 
to three  days for which the applicant has to bear the charges incurred.  
37.7.   Indonesia's entry rules as mentioned by its delegate at the CTG's  previous meeting have been 
communicated to Capital. India also wishes to state that Notification No.  11/2015 -2020, dated 
25 May 2022, made by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade, explains the import policy condition 
of "free subject to compulsory registration" under the Paper I mport Monitoring System (PIMS).  
37.8.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
38  PHILIPPINES – SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ON INSTANT COFFEE – REQUEST FROM 
INDONESIA  
38.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Indonesia.  
38.2.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
38.3.   Indonesia wishes once again to express its deep concern over the Philippines' application of 
Special Agricultural Safeguards (SSG)  measures on Indonesian Instant Coffee products. Indonesia 
requests the Gover nment of the Philippines immediately to terminate the application of its SSG to 
Indonesian Instant Coffee, which has been applied for almost four  years.  
38.4.   Indonesia believes that the application of SSGs should be temporary; otherwise, they would 
undermine th e tariff commitments made by the Philippines, as well as the legitimate expectations 
of other WTO  Members on tariff liberalization. The prolonged application of the SSG in question will 
also effectively create an export restriction, trade distortions, and a threat to food security, which 
are not in line with the spirit of the MC12  outcomes in agriculture and food security. Indonesia will 
continue to oversee this matter in other relevant WTO  committees and hopes that the Government 
of the Philippines will ta ke concrete action to settle this issue as soon as possible.  
38.5.   The delegate of the Philippines  indicated the following:  
38.6.   The Philippines wishes to thank Indonesia for its continued interest in the Philippines' Special 
Safeguard (SSG)  measure on instant coffee . The Philippines notes that Indonesia had also raised 
this matter in the Committees on Agriculture and Market Access, and during the Council's meeting 
in April  2022, at which meetings the Philippines had provided its responses.  
38.7.   The Philippines reiterates that, in accordance with Article  5.1 of the AoA, SSGs may be invoked 
on an SSG -eligible product if its c.i.f.  import price falls below the trigger price. The trigger price for 
instant coffee was among those provided in 2002 in the Philippines' up -front not ification in 
document  G/AG/N/PHL/27, which is the basis for the imposition of the price -based SSG. 
Notwithstanding the up -front notification, the Philippines notified the WTO of the initial imposition of 
its price -based SSG on instant coffee through docume nt G/AG/N/PHL/53, circulated in April  2018, 
and the SSG's continued imposition has been reflected in subsequent MA:5  notifications.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 80 - 
 
  38.8.   The price -based SSG  mechanism is being implemented in the Philippines through a domestic 
law that mandates the government to  impose the SSG  measure on imports of SSG -eligible products 
that are causing or threatening to cause injury to the domestic industry, and the c.i.f.  prices of which 
are breaching their respective trigger prices.  
38.9.   The Philippines stands ready to further disc uss this issue with Indonesia and remains 
committed to addressing this matter in the appropriate forum.  
38.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
39  UNITED KINGDOM – ENVIRONMENTAL ACT: FORESTRY COMMODITIES – REQUEST 
FROM BRAZIL AND INDONESIA  
39.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Brazil and Indonesia.  
39.2.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
39.3.   Brazil shares the objective of protecting ecosystems, understanding that they will be better 
protect ed if governments cooperate with one another, and if this cooperation is based on the 
observance of local law and territoriality. Brazil particularly shares the United Kingdom's concern 
about illegal deforestation and notes that, at COP26, Brazil committed  itself to eradicating this 
activity from its national territory by 2028.  
39.4.   The Brazilian government believes that improving the sustainability of international 
agricultural trade should be a result of the dissemination of best production practices to all ru ral 
producers. In line with their common but differentiated responsibilities regarding climate change, 
developed countries ought to support developing countries to achieve this goal, implementing the 
commitments made in different multilateral environmental  agreements, particularly through 
financing, training, and technology transfer for conservation and sustainable production actions.  
39.5.   Brazil believes that the conciliation and cooperation efforts undertaken by Brazil with the 
United Kingdom in different form ats, including the Forests, Agriculture and Commodity Trade  (FACT) 
Dialogue is the way forward. Implementing trade -restrictive measures will hardly help to solve the 
problem. In Brazil's view, collaborative initiatives between producer and consumer countri es would 
be far more successful than unilateral restrictive measures in terms of promoting sustainable value 
chains, reducing deforestation associated with the illegal conversion of forests and other ecosystems 
into arable land, and generating long -lasting  advances in global agricultural trade. The collective 
action needed to support sustainable production and the trade of resulting food and agricultural 
products is only feasible through multilateral partnership, where national governments agree on 
measures  involving key stakeholders.  
39.6.   In particular, Brazil takes this opportunity to express its concerns about the following aspects 
of the UK  proposal.  
39.7.   First, the definition of the scope of application of this secondary legislation in relation to the 
impacted co untries is discriminatory, as it will require measures almost exclusively from developing 
countries with tropical climates, which have managed, in their own processes of development over 
the last few centuries, to preserve their natural forests.  
39.8.   Second, in  the case of Brazil, it should be taken into account that more than 60% of its 
territory is covered by native vegetation and that almost 80% of the Amazon rainforest is intact. 
Furthermore, Brazil notably has some of the world's most stringent environmenta l protection 
legislation, in addition to being one of the most environmentally monitored countries, due to large 
domestic investments and international partnerships, for example by means of satellite images that 
provide publicly available data on fires and  deforestation.  
39.9.   Third, among the possible consequences of such discrimination is trade diversion towards 
imports of similar products from third  countries that will receive more favourable treatment under 
British law for not having preserved their natural f orest cover to the same extent as the targeted 
countries. Furthermore, those countries would not be required to provide new information to their G/C/M/143  
 
- 81 - 
 
  supply chain to support UK  businesses in applying the regulations and not being subject to import 
bans.  
39.10.   The def inition of forest used in the Environment Act is reportedly in line with the definition 
of forest used by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). However, it 
omits an essential aspect of that multilaterally agreed definition, nam ely the minimum tree height, 
which should be above five  metres. By omitting this fundamental aspect of the definition, which is 
also included in the definition of forest used by the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), the British gover nment is distorting the concept of forest and therefore creating a 
situation of conceptual uncertainty, which could lead to arbitrariness in the implementation of the 
due diligence process.  
39.11.   The due diligence operation will be highly costly. Due diligence c ould, in practice, have the 
same effect as a prohibitive tariff on products imported from countries discriminated against under 
the scope of the secondary legislation. The increased costs will inform the decision -making process 
of UK  importers, who may sto p their imports if they deem the prices excessively high or the 
requirements overly burdensome, with possible undesirable consequences for international supply 
chains (including the production of industrial goods), for the wider international economy, and 
specifically for the food security of the population. The costs of due diligence and the technical 
difficulties of its implementation will vary greatly depending on which regulation is adopted.  
39.12.   It is not clear to what extent the additional costs incurred b y supply -side companies in the 
countries of origin of regulated products (including exporters, producers, intermediaries, and so on) 
will be taken into account, in addition to the time needed to adapt to the different scenarios in the 
markets of origin. No r is it clear whether, similar to the exemptions to be granted by the British 
government to local companies, there will be exemptions for small and medium -sized companies, 
especially producers, in exporting countries. Difficulties in complying with the req uirements to be 
adopted may entail the risk of disruption to trade flows and an uncertain scenario for commercial 
operators, who could incur costs with no guarantee that the British authorities will consider the legal 
requirements to have been met.  
39.13.   The abo ve-mentioned costs would be disproportionately higher for smaller, lower -income 
producers if the burden of due diligence were passed on to them by importers in the UK. This could 
have a negative social impact on developing countries by increasing poverty l evels and related social 
problems. These costs would increase poverty either by reducing income levels or even by driving 
small and medium -scale rural producers from the market, or because they would have a systemic 
impact on their national economies throu gh the disruption of production chains and the resulting 
decline in wealth generation.  
39.14.   It is worth remembering that, similar to developed countries, agricultural production in 
developing countries is also intrinsically linked to the service and industrial sectors, which would also 
be affected. This would obviously compromise the social pillar of the desired sustainable 
development. In addition, as shown in SDG  1, the fight against poverty has positive effects from an 
environmental and sustainability point o f view, while its opposite, the increase of poverty, clearly 
has negative impacts on sustainability goals.  
39.15.   Finally, considering that the public consultation period for the secondary legislation is over, 
Brazil asks that the contributions by the Brazilian g overnment and Brazilian associations receive a 
fair share of attention.  
39.16.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
39.17.   Indonesia wishes to reiterate its statement delivered at the Council's previous meeting19, 
and to be updated on developments in the internal discussions within the UK  government regarding 
the secondary  legislation derived from the UK  Environmental Act. Indonesia also wishes to seek the 
United Kingdom's clarification of the mechanism and inform ation on the imported forestry products 
or commodities that would be covered by the provisions in the UK  Environmental Act, especially in 
the Due Diligence on Forest Risk Commodities policy. Indonesia recognizes WTO  Members' rights 
and the importance of pr eserving the environment. Nevertheless, Indonesia is of the view that such 
 
19 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  39.2-39.4. G/C/M/143  
 
- 82 - 
 
  action should be in accordance with WTO  principles and rules, including the most -favoured -nation 
and national treatment principles.  
39.18.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
39.19.   India continues to monitor the evolving trade situation due to this UK  legislation. As a matter 
of principle, India remains opposed to unilateral environmental measures by WTO  Members that 
create new non -tariff barriers.  
39.20.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated t he following:  
39.21.   Argentina is closely monitoring the United Kingdom's legislative process, with the 
expectation that the resulting legislation will be compatible with WTO  rules. The Forestry 
Commodities Act is a unilateral measure that is likely to affect tra de and be discriminatory because 
of the high costs that it can generate in terms of enforcement, even for those countries that already 
meet strict standards in this area. Argentina wishes to reiterate that all unilateral measures pursuing 
an environmental objective must be designed and implemented with a high degree of caution and 
precaution with regard to their consequences for developing and least developed countries, and 
should, above all, be considered in the light of the principle of common but differe ntiated 
responsibilities.  
39.22.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
39.23.   Although Japan understands the vital importance of environmental conservation, it is 
interested in the consistency of due diligence, based on UK  environmental law, with the 
WTO Agreem ents. Therefore, Japan requests the United Kingdom to provide sufficient information 
in this regard.  
39.24.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
39.25.   The United Kingdom thanks the WTO  Members that have intervened on this occasion for 
their conti nued interest in the due diligence provisions in the Environment Act  2021. The UK's due 
diligence legislation is one part of a wider package of measures to improve the sustainability of 
supply chains and contribute to global, national and local efforts to protect forests and other 
ecosystems. The legislation will only apply to larger businesses operating in the UK that use 
regulated forest risk commodities, regardless of where those commodities have been produced.  
39.26.   The core of the United Kingdom's approach t o due diligence legislation is that of partnership. 
The UK's aim is to work with producer countries and support their efforts to uphold their laws and 
strengthen environmental protection. The UK held a second  consultation on this measure from 
3 December  2021 to 11  March  2022, inviting views to inform the development of the regulations 
that will implement these provisions, to ensure that they are designed effectively. The UK thanks 
those WTO  Members that contributed to the consultation. A summary of the cons ultation responses 
was published on 1  June 2022.  
39.27.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
40  EUROPEAN UNION – COUNTERVAILING DUTIES (CVD) ON STAINLESS STEEL 
COLD -ROLLED FLAT (SSCR) – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
40.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Indonesia.  
40.2.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
40.3.   As previously stated in its intervention at the Council's previous meeting, Indonesia would 
like to raise its serious concerns on the imposition of three  simultaneous trade remedy measures by 
the European Union on Stainless Steel Cold -Rolled (SSCR)  products from Indonesia, which have 
practically closed market access for Indonesian SSCR  products to the EU. Indonesia is displeased by 
the imposition of these measures.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 83 - 
 
  40.4.   In March  2022, the European Commission issued Implementing Regulation No.  2022/433 
regarding the imposition of CVD on SSCR  products imported from Indonesia, even though in 2021, 
the European Union had already imposed both safeg uards and also anti -dumping duties on 
Indonesian SSCR  products. The CVD  imposition by the EU has resulted in an increase in tariffs to 
Indonesian SSCR  products, which resulted in a decrease of Indonesia's exports value and 
competitiveness of Indonesian SSC R in the European market.  
40.5.   Regarding the European Union's statement at the previous CTG  meeting that Indonesia's 
authorities only partially cooperated in some stages of the CVD  investigation process, Indonesia 
wishes to clarify that it has always actively p articipated in the complete investigation process. 
Indonesia has also submitted to the EU all the appropriate and required information. In this context, 
the EU, in one of the stages of the investigation, requested highly confidential data and other data 
that are not directly related to the aforementioned investigation. For these reasons, the submission 
of such data could not be carried out in a timely manner.  
40.6.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
40.7.   China thanks Indonesia for adding this item to the C ouncil's agenda. China is deeply 
concerned about the European Union's so -called cross -country subsidy investigation in this case.  
40.8.   China believes that the European Union's investigation is in violation of both Article  1 and 
Article  2 of the SCM  Agreement an d the EU's Basic Regulation EU  2016/1037. It also incorrectly 
interpreted and applied the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts. 
40.9.   China also notes, with concern, that similar investigations were carried out in other ca ses. 
China believes that the European Union's practice has negatively affected the legitimate rights of 
relevant enterprises and normal economic cooperation and cross -border investments among 
WTO Members. Therefore, China urges the EU to rectify its wrong practice.  
40.10.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
40.11.   The European Union takes due note of the statements made. However, the EU has no new 
element to report since the issue was raised at the CTG's  previous meeting. The EU therefore refers 
to its previous statement in this forum as its position stands as previously expressed; in addition, 
the EU asks that its previous statement be reproduced in the minutes of the meeting, as follows.  
40.12.   As previously stated, the European Union appreciates and re spects Indonesia's right to 
develop its steel industry and exploit its considerable nickel reserves. However, this legitimate 
industrial policy aim should be carried out in line with WTO  rules. The EU recalls that it lodged a 
WTO complaint against Indonesi a's export ban on nickel ore. This EU  countervailing duty case 
targets two  key subsidies that undermine many competitive EU  industries in the emerging new 
landscape of unfair trade: first, subsidized raw materials critical for industrial value chains; and 
second, cross -border subsidies deriving from China that Indonesia accepted as its own based on the 
numerous documents found.  
40.13.   Two further features need also to be highlighted: first, the Indonesian authorities only 
partially cooperated in many aspects of th e investigation so that the European Union had to rely in 
part on so -called "facts available"; and second, this case has revealed a large number of agreements 
between the authorities of Indonesia and China for channelling cross -border subsidies.  
40.14.   The Europe an Union has acted in full compliance with the WTO  rules. The EU did not 
countervail subsidies granted outside the national jurisdiction of the exporting country. In fact, the 
Chinese subsidies are clearly attributable to the Indonesian government, as evid enced by Indonesia's 
dense web of agreements with the Chinese government in the framework of a close cooperation.  
40.15.   In sum, the European Union's investigation revealed that, by providing subsidies to exporting 
producers established in Indonesia with the expr ess acceptance and acknowledgement of the 
Indonesian authorities, China is creating additional capacity and opening new channels in order to 
export subsidized products to the EU, thereby causing injury to EU  producers.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 84 - 
 
  40.16.   As long as distortive, WTO -countervai lable subsidies continue damaging the EU  steel 
industry and jeopardizing tens of thousands of jobs, the European Union will have no choice but to 
exercise its legitimate WTO  rights to their fullest extent.  
40.17.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
41  EURO PEAN UNION – EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL (CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT 
MECHANISM AND DEFORESTATION FREE COMMODITIES) – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL AND 
INDONESIA  
41.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Brazil and Indonesia.  
41.2.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
41.3.   Brazil believes that the European Union's proposal establishes an illegitimate obstacle to 
international trade, is strongly discriminatory in nature, and will have little impact, if any, on its 
alleged goal of r educing deforestation and forest degradation.  
41.4.   First, Brazil considers that the proposed regulation does not contribute to the fight against 
deforestation. Deforestation is a multivariable problem that should be dealt with through 
comprehensive public polic ies. Illegal activities linked to deforestation must be halted. Alternative 
means of livelihood must be made available to the millions of people that live near forests. 
Sustainable production practices must be fostered and scaled -up. 
41.5.   In this sense, trade r estrictions are a very limited instrument. They unfairly punish 99.1% of 
rural producers and do not provide any other remedy for the direct and indirect drivers of 
deforestation. By acting as an obstacle to economic development, trade restrictions actually  reinforce 
some of the dynamics that lead to deforestation and reduce government capacity to deal with this 
issue.  
41.6.   Second, the proposed regulation is also heavily skewed towards punishment and 
disengagement by excluding from the EU  market any producer susp ected of having links to 
deforestation (or worse still, based on an area regarded as high risk, regardless of the specific 
sustainability credentials of each producer) with no flexibilities or margin for remedial or 
compensatory action such as reforestatio n. Once cut off, producers no longer have any incentives 
to improve their practices and will probably also lack the means for doing so.  
41.7.   Brazil is committed to the protection of its forests. In its last Nationally Determined 
Contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC  Paris Agreement, Brazil confirmed that it will strive to end illegal 
deforestation in the Amazon by 2028. Demanding that Brazil accomplishes its NDC  targets 
immediately not only violates the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC, but also opens the floodgates 
for similar initiatives by other Members. Should Brazil perhaps classify as high -risk those Members 
that label investments in natural gas as "green"? Or those that do not meet Brazil's energy grid 
based on 80% from renewable sources and ban their products ac cordingly? Just as Brazil does not 
criticize the European Union in light of the challenges it is facing in increasing its reliability on 
renewable energies despite its very high income level and the rhetoric it has employed, the EU 
should take into account  the many challenges that Brazil faces in the Amazon, an area larger than 
the EU  itself. Brazil also excels in the legal protection of its natural ecosystems, with 30% of Brazil's 
terrestrial area and 26% of its marine areas being protected. In the Amazon,  this number rises to 
50%. These figures are significantly higher than those of the EU. It is also worth noting that 
10.9 million hectares of land are going through the process of natural regeneration in Brazil.  
41.8.   Third, Brazilian agriculture is sustainable.  Brazil is the third -largest exporter of agricultural 
products in the world. This position was achieved through massive increases in productivity. In the 
last 25  years, grain production has grown 248%, in a harvested area that expanded by only 58%. 
In live stock, Brazil's cattle herd increased 49%, while areas of pastureland decreased 11%. 
Furthermore, rural landowners in Brazil actively contribute to the conservation of forests. The 
Brazilian Forest Code (Law  4.771/95) sets aside ample space for nature insi de rural properties, thus 
preserving ecosystem services that are crucial for agriculture and for human and animal wellbeing. 
Roughly 40% of all private rural land in Brazil is reserved for the protection of forests and G/C/M/143  
 
- 85 - 
 
  ecosystems, complementing the network  of protected areas mentioned above. In the Amazon biome, 
rural properties may be required to set aside up to 80% of their land for conservation. The great 
majority of Brazilian producers abide by the law and uphold their environmental obligations. Recent 
studies show that deforestation occurred in only 0.9% (52.766) of rural properties in Brazil in 2020.  
41.9.   Fourth, Brazil believes that international trade contributes to the fight against deforestation. 
Sustainable development only materializes through the sim ultaneous improvement of its three  core 
dimensions: economic; social; and environmental. It is precisely because international trade helps 
improve conditions in all three that it can be such a powerful tool in that process. International trade 
has a proven  beneficial effect by providing opportunities for small and medium -sized companies, as 
well as for families, to access new markets and improve their income, escape poverty, and improve 
their economic and social conditions. Frequently, this is also what is necessary to enable those 
stakeholders to improve their environmental practices and to abandon environmentally harmful 
production methods. These effects have been repeatedly acknowledged and demonstrated by 
several UN  agencies, the WTO, and the EU  itself, which is one of the leading providers of Aid for 
Trade.  
41.10.   Nevertheless, the European Union's proposal disregards such positive effects and instead 
proposes to restrict trade by imposing a potential ban on the trade of several commodities based on 
an unnecessarily strict concept of "deforestation -free products" that diverges from the 2030  Agenda 
for Sustainable Development and all relevant multilateral environmental agreements, including the 
UNFCCC and the CBD, which acknowledge the importance of notio ns such as sustainable use, 
ecosystem regeneration, and reforestation, among others.  
41.11.   Therefore, the European Union's proposed regulation is likely to have very little impact in 
terms of actually reducing deforestation. It lacks any provisions or pathways f or rehabilitation and 
offers no incentive for struggling producers to improve their practices. Instead, it punishes even 
those producers that may have been acting in accordance with domestic law and international 
standards of sustainability.  
41.12.   Fifth, Brazil considers that the benchmarking system is discriminatory and distorts trade. 
The proposed country benchmarking system, with its tiered classification, will not contribute to 
fighting deforestation and forest degradation. On the contrary, it will only promo te trade diversion 
in favour of highly subsidized producers.  
41.13.   Brazil considers that there are several reasons to believe that a benchmarking system in 
general, and more specifically, the benchmarking system proposed by the European Commission, is 
an entirel y inefficient tool when trying to halt deforestation and forest degradation. First, the 
benchmarking system is inherently discriminatory and will impose a different treatment to producer 
countries based on a unilateral decision by the European Commission i n light of criteria as subjective 
as the suitability of a country's environmental laws and enforcement capabilities (Article  27.2(f)). 
Second, by mandating "enhanced scrutiny" over products originating from high -risk countries, it 
stigmatizes entire countr ies and penalizes those producers that produce in a sustainable manner in 
those countries. Therefore, the benchmarking system, far from creating incentives for improving 
sustainability practices and credentials, will promote disengagement in precisely thos e areas that 
would most benefit from, and perhaps most require, cooperation and engagement. For this reason, 
it is very unlikely to have any positive effects, and may even have negative effects, on forest 
degradation and deforestation rates.  
41.14.   Sixth, in Braz il's view, the proposed regulation is incompatible with the WTO's  rules The 
proposal poses evident challenges to the spirit and letter of the multilateral trading system, and 
several of its elements are potentially inconsistent with one or more provisions of the 
WTO Agreements. For example, the proposed regulation and, more specifically, the benchmarking 
system, appear to be inherently discriminatory, with the potential to severely limit and distort trade. 
Furthermore, a significant number of other provisio ns contain elements of arbitrariness and 
discrimination, ranging from the scope of the measure to the monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms set out in it.  
41.15.   Seventh, for Brazil, the proposed regulation must be adapted to the production reality on 
the ground.  Instead, the European Union's approach is to impose a "top -down", "one  size fits all", 
very detailed and cumbersome due diligence obligation on traders and operators within the G/C/M/143  
 
- 86 - 
 
  EU market, which includes a heavy informational and documentary burden, as wel l as full 
geo-localization and traceability requirements throughout the supply chain. This system is then 
complemented by comprehensive and strict provisions on monitoring and enforcement, and by 
heavy penalties in case of non -compliance, not to mention th e possibility of transferring the costs of 
enforcement to traders and operators.  
41.16.   Such a system completely disregards the very significant differences in the ways in which 
the covered commodities are produced, and their supply chains organized. For example,  it ignores 
the fact that some of the commodities are largely produced by smallholders (like coffee), as well as 
the fact that the supply chain for several commodities (such as coffee and soya) usually include 
several links between producer and trader/oper ator. All of this means that the system of 
geo-localization and traceability envisaged by the European Commission and supposed to apply to 
all six  commodities is simply not feasible in the short or even medium term, as confirmed by several 
stakeholders, bo th Brazilian and European, across several of the affected commodities' supply 
chains.  
41.17.   Eighth, Brazil believes that the proposed regulation should foster cooperation and focus on 
the future. In this regard, it is disappointing that the European Commission h as decided to pursue 
an avenue of unilateral legislation and enforcement when it comes to an issue of such importance 
as reducing deforestation worldwide. There are several appropriate multilateral forums in which 
initiatives to reduce deforestation could have been discussed with a more significant participation 
and engagement from producing countries.  
41.18.   Ninth, Brazil considers that the proposed regulation should have objective criteria. In this 
regard, the criteria used to evaluate the risk of non -compliance  with the regulation are insufficiently 
clear and objective. For example, it contains unclear parameters, including governance criteria, 
which are not always related to deforestation risk. Furthermore, the proposed regulation's criteria 
may be applied in a  discretionary manner by the Commission, which is not required to justify country 
categorization or decisions regarding compliance or non -compliance with the regulation. In addition, 
the criteria are not internationally agreed and there is no harmonized me thodology to assess and 
evaluate them. This lack of objective criteria, besides reinforcing the perception of a unilateral and 
arbitrary piece of legislation, is an obstacle to the very participation of countries and producers in 
the evaluation process, wh ich is not guided by international and consensual values and measures.  
41.19.   Tenth, the definition of "forests" in the proposed regulation is, in Brazil's view, not objective. 
Notably, the definition of forests in the proposal conveniently excludes deforestation  that has been 
taking place within the European Union itself.  
41.20.   In addition to these remarks on specific aspects of the European Union's proposal, Brazil 
believes that the EU's initiative should be seen in a broader context. If Members were to take a 
bird's -eye view of the discussions since yesterday, Brazil, for its part, would note that, in Agriculture, 
the EU has benefited from an unbalanced playing field regarding agricultural subsidies, has not 
engaged as provided for in Article  20 of the AoA, and has co nsistently adopted policies that violate 
the SPS  Agreement and granted undue and discriminatory benefits to its own producers. In CBAM, 
similarly, Brazil sees that the EU is going against the letter and spirit of the UNFCCC and the GATT 
in granting undue b enefits to its domestic producers. And in "deforestation -free commodities", as 
Brazil has argued, there are many grounds to affirm that the proposal may violate WTO and 
UNFCCC  norms and grant undue benefits to domestic producers. This is an extremely worrying 
pattern that, if it were to persist, would weaken the capacity of both trade and environmental 
regimes to provide global solutions to Members' common challenges. And if Members are to have a 
proper rules -based international order, they c annot have such an important member of the 
international community adopting policies that depart from the principles and spirit of both regimes.  
41.21.   One final aspect that Brazil wishes to address is that of historical responsibilities, as many 
Members have ref erred to International Environmental Law (IEL) principles. First, let me address 
what it is not. Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) is not an excuse for developing 
countries to avoid environmental commitments. Members have seen large develop ing countries 
assuming ambitious net zero  commitments in line with the idea of "respective capabilities", including 
even India, with one of the lowest per  capita emission rates. And in the case of Brazil, just as it has 
declared that it can forgo special a nd differential treatment in future negotiations at the WTO, since 
it recognizes that, as a large economy, it can, on many occasions, do more, so it has also adopted 
ambitious environmental targets to the extent of its capacities. What historical responsib ilities do G/C/M/143  
 
- 87 - 
 
  mean, however, is that Members that developed for centuries on the back of dirty energy sources 
and unsustainable practices have a moral and legal obligation to do more. The consumer preferences 
of a few hundred millions should not be an excuse for shifting the transition costs to billions of rural 
producers in the developing world, especially if those consumers are only in a position to do so 
because of centuries of unsustainable practices by their countries. And, as EU  consumers are well 
aware,  the transition towards a low carbon economy must be based on the principles of justice and 
fairness.  
41.22.   It is unfortunate that Brazil has had to make such a long statement, but we do not have the 
resources to fund thinktanks and seminars to call for a change  in environmental rule books according 
to our interests or to support our narratives. However, Brazil has a legacy of constructive effort and 
building bridges in both trade and environmental regimes, making meaningful and often decisive 
contributions to ac hieving outcomes that balance the interests of all Members, thus putting Members 
on a proper path to addressing their common challenges. Therefore, Brazil reiterates that the 
European Union will find in Brazil a strong and committed partner in the promotio n of sustainable 
development, and Brazil urges the EU to duly consider the many concerns that Brazil has expressed 
and adopt a constructive approach on these issues, to the benefit of both regimes, and to the benefit, 
most especially, of small producers in  the developing world.  
41.23.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
41.24.   Indonesia wishes once again to reiterate its statement delivered at the CTG's previous 
meeting on its concerns over the European Green Deal policy, in particular regarding the propos ed 
CBAM and Deforestation -Free Commodities. Indonesia is of the view that such proposals have the 
potential to create unnecessary barriers to international trade; they may also create different 
treatment between products produced within the European Union and imported products.  
41.25.   On the CBAM, Indonesia requests the European Union to provide its clear and reasonable 
justification regarding the expansion of its CBAM  product coverage, which now includes organic 
chemicals, plastics, hydrogen, and ammonia; and als o to provide its justification regarding the 
expansion in the scope of its emissions coverage, which now includes indirect emissions.  
41.26.   Regarding the Deforestation Free Commodities (DFC), although the European Union has 
stated that the policy is only aimed a t importers in the EU, Indonesia emphasizes that, in the end, 
the proposed legislation would have an impact on producing countries as well, including Indonesia.  
41.27.   Indonesia is of the view that, in addressing environmental challenges, Members should act 
in accordance with WTO  rules and principles, including the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities  and respective capabilities. Indonesia is also of the view that the European Union, 
instead of applying a CBAM, which could hinder international t rade, should have carried out its 
obligations as stated in the Paris Agreement, and its related agreements, including to provide 
technical assistance.  
41.28.   In the context of the current and developing geopolitical tensions in Europe, Indonesia 
realizes the sign ificance of joint efforts by all WTO  Members to maintain global supply chain stability 
by prioritizing trade cooperation that is non -unilateral and non -discriminatory. Therefore, Indonesia 
urges the European Union to review the European Green Deal policy, especially the CBAM and 
DFC proposals, so as to bring the policy into line with WTO  law and principles, without hindering 
international trade.  
41.29.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
41.30.   Paraguay thanks Brazil and Indonesia for raising this trade con cern and reiterates its 
support. Paraguay notes with concern that the European Union is continuing to develop a series of 
measures designed to be implemented extra -territorially. The EU argues that the measures aim to 
level the playing field between its pr oducers and foreign competition, with a view to avoiding the 
migration of production to other Members that it considers have less ambitious standards, and to 
preventing carbon leakage or undermining the competitiveness of European production. These 
objecti ves are repeated continuously in this Council. Paraguay also notes with concern that, with 
regard to the CBAM, and with reference to the EU's statement made under Agenda Item 16, as well G/C/M/143  
 
- 88 - 
 
  as according to the latest reports from Brussels, the EU is consideri ng export subsidies, which would 
be inconsistent with the EU's WTO  obligations.  
41.31.   Paraguay echoes Brazil's words that Members must look at European policies as a whole 
because these are not isolated measures. Rather, they are complex and interconnected measu res 
that create non -tariff barriers to entry into a market that is already heavily protected by high and 
complex tariffs that the EU is reluctant to reform in the agricultural negotiations in this Organization. 
Paraguay must also mention the EU's generous subsidies to its producers.  
41.32.   In agriculture, Paraguay notes that the European Union itself, according to its latest 
notification, following the implementation of the new Green Deal policies, is providing more than 
USD 80 billion of support to its producers,  who are currently protesting against many of these 
policies, saying that, with these new adjustments and efficiencies, they will not make it through to 
the end of the month. Paraguay wonders, then, if EU  farmers are receiving USD  80 billion in 
subsidies b ut cannot make ends meet, how will farmers in developing countries fare, who do not 
receive such subsidies? In this regard, Paraguay also notes that many of these subsidies, like those 
for organic production, are granted to generate competitive conditions,  disregarding the fact that 
their producers are already compensated in their market. Other subsidies are granted for fertilizers, 
which, according to the European Union, Members should reduce; or for livestock, milk, and sugar 
production; or for some of th e commodities that would fall under this deforestation law.  
41.33.   Specifically with regard to the deforestation -free commodities mechanism, Paraguay 
reiterates the importance of taking into account the economic, social, and environmental dimensions 
of sustainabl e development, and of ensuring that measures are implemented in accordance with 
international principles and standards, in particular those of this Organization concerning measures 
with a trade impact. The transition towards sustainability in productive sy stems needs to be gradual 
and determined by countries themselves, according to their economic and social development needs. 
Local circumstances in different regions, and their specific productive, social, and environmental 
characteristics must also be resp ected.  
41.34.   As mentioned under Agenda Item 16, a combination of penalties as well as incentives must 
be put in place if Members are to achieve their common objectives in the fight against global 
environmental challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss , and pollution. However, what 
Members see is that, while only European Union producers benefit from significant subsidies, 
whether directly to comply with these measures or indirectly, which certainly reduces their costs by 
doing so, producers in countrie s such as Paraguay that provide free ecosystem and environmental 
services and produce without subsidies, are being penalized by having to comply with the same 
measures. For Paraguayan producers, the costs of complying with these measures comes from their 
profits, and not from a small fraction of the domestic support that they receive.  
41.35.   What can be seen from this is that, while some Members industrialized and achieved their 
current level of development through highly polluting and environmentally damaging met hods, and 
are responsible for climate change, in other Members, which only marginally contributed to climate 
change, those Members are being penalized and forced to comply with the same measures without 
the same degree of support. This clearly disregards t he principle enshrined in International 
Environmental Law  of common but differentiated responsibilities . 
41.36.   Paraguay therefore asks the European Union to explain how these measures are consistent 
with the principle of non -discrimination, and how the three  elements of sustainable development 
and common but differentiated responsibilities can be reconciled, bearing in mind that the countries 
that contribute the least to climate change are the most affected by it, and are at the same time the 
main target recipien ts of measures such as the one the EU is presenting to us on this occasion.  
41.37.   In addition, it is unclear from the draft measure what type of requirements will exist in 
practice when the measure is implemented in terms of the information adequacy and verifiab ility 
criteria. It is also unclear which criteria will be used for the risk assessment methodology and 
compliance management obligation, how the European Union will classify countries in its risk 
assessment system for countries of origin, and when those co untries would be notified of their 
classification. Paraguay requests the EU to provide information to the Membership on these elements 
and to submit the corresponding clarifications.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 89 - 
 
  41.38.   Before concluding, Paraguay wishes to call for reflection on the impact t hat this type of 
measure is having on European producers that, as Members have seen, are demonstrating against 
it in several EU  member States, and who consider that their interests are not being served. How 
much truer is this for Paraguayan producers, who must, under market conditions, meet the same 
requirements to access the market of the world's largest agricultural food importer.  
41.39.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
41.40.   Argentina is closely following the European Union's legislative process on deforestation and 
is concerned about the proposed single model concept that the EU seeks to impose, and which does 
not take into account the different characteristics of the production models of the WTO's various 
Members. Argentina also reiterat es that the regulation must be compatible with the WTO's  rules.  
41.41.   Regarding the CBAM, Argentina shares the concerns expressed by other delegations in 
previous meetings about the potential inconsistency with WTO  rules that could arise from the, albeit 
tempora ry, coexistence between the mechanism and the free allowances currently allocated under 
the European Union's Emissions Trading System. In this regard, Argentina is particularly interested 
in knowing whether the EU plans to maintain any system of refunds or  rebates of emission 
certificates for EU  exports to other markets, and the underlying form or methodology, if so, to ensure 
that the calculation of "embedded carbon" in the products subject to the mechanism does not 
generate distortions or discriminatory t reatment on and between products from third  countries.  
41.42.   Regarding the measures to discourage deforestation, Argentina shares Indonesia's concern 
about the classification of countries according to an alleged "risk of deforestation" (benchmarking), 
bearing in  mind the characteristics of the system envisaged for its implementation based on the 
principle of due diligence. Similarly, it is unclear by what criteria the implementing authorities of the 
regulation could determine the compliance, or non -compliance, of  third country producers with their 
own country's legislation.  
41.43.   Finally, as stated when it previously took the floor, Argentina wishes to reiterate that all 
unilateral measures pursuing an environmental objective must be designed and implemented with 
a high  degree of caution and precaution with regard to their consequences for developing and least 
developed countries, and should, above all, be considered in the light of the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities.  
41.44.   The delegate of India indica ted the following:  
41.45.   India continues to study the various provisions of the European Green Deal and, within that, 
the CBAM. India prima  facie believes that these measures encroach upon the sovereign 
policy -making rights of Members. India remains concerned wi th the recommendations on inclusion 
of organic chemicals, plastics, hydrogen, and ammonia in the purview of the CBAM.  
41.46.   On the one hand, the European Union seeks to include indirect emissions in the calculation 
towards carbon emissions; but on the other hand , the proposed rules do not have any offset for 
taxes inherent in the cost of carbon -based input commodities. These headline inconsistencies lead 
to an unfortunate conclusion, namely that the EU is not enacting these laws to solve environmental 
problems. I nstead, these laws are being designed to create a protectionist ring -fencing for the local 
industry, distorting global trade flows.  
41.47.   The proposed measures under the European Green Deal also violate the basic principles of 
International Environmental Law, na mely Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and 
Respective Capacities. Any application of International Environmental Law into International Trade 
Law should be complete, consistent, and cohesive, with no cherry -picking based on domestic policy 
conside rations. International Environmental Law predates International Trade Law by at least 
two decades. These long -enshrined principles should be reflected in the proposed European Green 
Deal if the intent is truly to solve a global problem through collective a ction.  
41.48.   India remains opposed to such externalization of domestic laws as a matter of principle and 
continues to analyse the substantive aspect of the proposed legislation.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 90 - 
 
  41.49.   India is working on environment action on many fronts. In November  2021, in Glasgow,  
Indian Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi announced India's Net Zero plans by 2070, presented 
five nectars or Panchamrit, some with near -term 2030  commitments, and stressed the importance 
of the acronym LIFE – Lifestyle For Environment. In June  2022, India  launched a Lifestyle for 
Environment Movement with global organizations like UNEP, UNDP, World Bank and others in 
attendance. India has also recently announced a ban on a range of single use plastic products.  
41.50.   India urges the European Union to take a holis tic view of this problem and not seek to push 
trade distortive and limited solutions, which create massive uncertainty for global businesses.  
41.51.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
41.52.   Uruguay echoes the statements made by Brazil, Argentina, and Para guay. Uruguay shares 
the objectives of combating climate change and protecting the environment, as reflected in the 
commitments that it has made under the multilateral agreements on the matter, including the Paris 
Agreement, and the policies adopted to com ply with those agreements. However, Uruguay remains 
concerned over the European Union's attempts to impose the view that there is only one  single 
model of production and sustainable development that should be emulated worldwide, without taking 
into account  the specific characteristics and conditions of different countries and regions, the realities 
of their production systems, and their relative contributions to the problems that need to be 
addressed. The restrictive effects that the practical implementatio n of several of the strategies and 
policies announced in the European Green Deal may have on international trade and production 
beyond EU  borders are also cause for concern.  
41.53.   Uruguay continues to follow closely the ongoing negotiations on the proposal for a  CBAM. In 
this regard, Uruguay wishes once again to stress the importance of ensuring that this measure, and 
other measures that affect trade to be adopted under the European Green Deal, are compatible with 
the European Union's commitments under the WTO  Agreements. In the case of the CBAM, it seems 
important to monitor the final measure and ensure that it does not violate Articles  I, II, and III of 
the GATT.  
41.54.   In this respect, Uruguay is still interested to know how any inconsistencies resulting from 
the poss ible simultaneous application of the CBAM for imported products and the "free allowances" 
for domestic products would be avoided. Uruguay should also like to know what steps will be taken 
to ensure the compatibility of any proposal that includes export ref unds for the sectors covered 
therein with WTO  rules on export subsidies. Moreover, Uruguay wishes to know how, in the 
respective calculations, the carbon reduction policies of third  countries will be taken into account 
separately from carbon pricing, as we ll as what criteria will be used to determine whether the carbon 
pricing regime of countries that have them is equivalent to that of the European Union. Lastly, 
Uruguay wishes to ask how the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", enshri ned 
in the Paris Agreement, will be taken into consideration in the measure.  
41.55.   With respect to the other topic addressed under this agenda item, Uruguay continues to 
follow developments in the discussions on the regulation to prevent deforestation and forest  
degradation provoked by the European Union, and hopes that the regulation will not lead to an 
unjustified increase in bilateral trade costs given the production conditions in its country.  
41.56.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
41.57.   The Russian Federation shares the concerns of other Members on the proposed European 
Commission draft regulation on making available on the EU  market, as well as EU  exports, of certain 
commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradat ion. Russia reiterates 
its statement made during the previous meeting of the CTG.  
41.58.   Russia notes that the proposed regulation is yet another example of unilateral trade -related 
climate measures under the European Green Deal umbrella. This particular measure is aimed at 
restricting the supply of agricultural products under the pretext of environmental protection. The 
proposal implies complicated market access procedures, which Russia believes do not comply with 
certain provisions of the Trade Facilitation Agre ement, in particular. It also establishes a prohibition 
on imports when supply of the products concerned is determined to be causing deforestation and G/C/M/143  
 
- 91 - 
 
  forest degradation, or where its manufacturing has been inconsistent with the national legislation of 
the country of origin.  
41.59.   It is unclear not only how the European Union intends to assess the deforestation or forest 
degradation caused by the production of each particular product, but also on what basis the EU will 
consider compliance of the production of the  product with the legislation of country of origin, that 
is, a third  country.  
41.60.   The Russian Federation stresses that this measure, as well as many other initiatives under 
the European Green Deal, may disrupt traditional trade flows, hamper supply chains, and  seems to 
contradict WTO  rules. The Russian Federation would like once again to underscore that all so -called 
"green measures" should be carried out in accordance with fundamental WTO  principles.  
41.61.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
41.62.   While Japan p laces great importance on environmental conservation, it has significant 
concerns about the consistency of the European Union's deforestation -free product regulations with 
the WTO  Agreements, for which reason it politely requests to receive from the EU a s ufficient 
explanation of this matter.  
41.63.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
41.64.   Having already thanked those Members that spoke under Agenda Item 16, the European 
Union also thanks Brazil, Indonesia, Paraguay, Argentina, India, Uruguay, a nd Japan for their 
interest in the European Green Deal. The EU takes note of the statements made. The EU's 
intervention will address, in particular, the issue of the CBAM and the proposal for a regulation on 
deforestation -free products.  
41.65.   On CBAM, the negoti ations have advanced significantly since the adoption of the proposal, 
and even faster since January  2022. The European Union wishes to take the opportunity of the 
Council's meeting to provide an update on the latest developments in the EU's domestic proce dures. 
The Council reached an agreement on the CBAM regulation on 15  March. Overall, the Council agrees 
with the objectives of the Commission's proposal. The most significant amendments suggested by 
the French Presidency concern increased centralization at  EU level of the various tasks related to the 
governance of the CBAM.  
41.66.   On its side, the European Parliament adopted its position on CBAM in a plenary vote on 
22 June. The European Parliament proposed the following: (i)  a significant extension of the product  
scope (including indirect emissions and full coverage of all ETS  sectors and downstream products; 
(ii) a longer transition period with a faster phase -out of free allowances, with the exception of 
exported goods; (iii)  a full centralization of the CBAM's  administration; (iv)  increased financial 
assistance to LDCs; and (v)  stricter anti -circumvention rules. With all institutions having adopted 
their position, the trialogue negotiations could begin before the summer break or in September. As 
per usual practic e, the Commission will keep the WTO  Members updated on the development of this 
proposal in the C ommittee on Trade and Environment (CTE) . 
41.67.   Regarding the proposal for a regulation on deforestation -free products, the measure aims at 
enhancing trade in products  from "deforestation -free" supply chains. The proposal aims at creating 
more sustainable supply chains and taking action against deforestation and forest degradation. To 
this end, the proposed measure sets due diligence obligations on operators aiming to p lace the 
products within the scope of the proposal on the EU  market, irrespective of whether they are 
domestically produced or imported. Products would thus be treated equally, in line with the principle 
of non -discrimination. The proposal also includes ot her key principles, such as transparency, 
consistency with international commitments (including halting deforestation at the level of 
end-December  2020, in line with SDG  15), and engagement with partner countries.  
41.68.   The European Green Deal proposals, like all EU  legislation, are prepared in a transparent 
and inclusive manner, including stakeholder consultations and comprehensive assessments of 
environmental, social, and economic impacts. The EU has also given regular updates on the most 
trade-relevant proposals of the European Green Deal in the C TE. Trading partners had an opportunity 
to engage and express their views in that context.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 92 - 
 
  41.69.   The Commission will continue to work with concerned producing Members to jointly address 
deforestation and forest degradation. This work will also aim to support their capacity to adapt to 
the incoming new rules and seize the opportunities they offer, building on dialogue and engagement 
with those Members. The European Union will engage in dia logue with other large importers of 
commodities considering similar measures, as well as in dialogue and cooperation with countries 
producing commodities covered by the regulation. Such cooperation could include, for example, 
supporting the establishment o f traceability systems. The EU also stands ready to provide more 
information about the regulation and its implementation in multilateral forums such as the FAO, 
UNEP, or the CTE, where the proposal was presented in February  2022. Deforestation work has als o 
been discussed at the G7 and G20  levels. Furthermore, halting deforestation is one of the main 
objectives of the Sustainable Cocoa Initiative that the Commission has launched with Ghana and 
Côte d'Ivoire, as well as stakeholders involved in the cocoa sup ply chain.  
41.70.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
42  AUSTRALIA – INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW OF ANTI -DUMPING DUTIES ON A4  COPY 
PAPER – REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
42.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Indones ia. 
42.2.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
42.3.   Indonesia wishes to raise its concern over the 2021  initial investigation and the sunset review 
of anti -dumping duties on A4  copy paper products from Indonesia by Australia. The 
two investigations and the sunset review of the anti -dumping duties are still being carried out by 
the Australian authorities, although the export volume of Indonesian A4  paper products to Australia 
has decreased drastically since the imposition of anti -dumping duties in 2017. W ith the conclusion 
of this investigation, it is very likely that Indonesian A4  paper products will lose market access and 
market share in Australia.  
42.4.   Indonesia is of the view that the two  investigations conducted by the Australian authorities 
may potentiall y violate a number of provisions in the WTO  Anti-dumping Agreement. Indonesia 
hopes that Australia can re -evaluate its investigation of A4  paper products from Indonesia in 
accordance with WTO  rules and principles, as well as in the WTO  spirit of open and t ransparent 
trade.  
42.5.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
42.6.   Australia had not been apprised of this item prior to it being placed on the Council's agenda, 
and Indonesia's statement has now clarified that it is raising two  distinct enquiries relati ng to 
A4 copy paper. Australia is currently holding an anti -dumping investigation into A4  copy paper 
imported from Indonesia specifically relating to one  Indonesian exporter not currently subject to 
measures (known as Case No.  583). This investigation was initiated on 2  June 2021 following receipt 
of a duly documented application from Australian industry. The investigation is currently ongoing. 
The Statement of Essential Facts is to be placed on the public record for comment on 29  July 2022 
and the final re commendations are due to the Minister for Industry and Science by 
26 September  2022. Separately, there is also under way a merits review of a decision on 
19 April 2022 to continue anti -dumping measures on imports of A4  copy paper, including from 
Indonesia.  This merits review does not relate to the Indonesian exporter subject to the current 
anti-dumping investigation in Case No.  583. 
42.7.   Australia is committed to ensuring that its anti -dumping system and any measures imposed 
are consistent with the rules of the WTO. In conducting Case No.  583, Australia's approach takes 
account of the findings of the WTO  dispute settlement panel in DS529 and is being conducted in 
strict conformity with Australia's WTO  obligations. Australia's anti -dumping investigations are 
initiated following applications from businesses or representatives with sufficient prima  facie 
evidence of injurious dumping. Measures will only be imposed where evidence shows that dumped 
exports have caused, or threaten to cause, material injury to Australia n industry. If the investigation 
finds an exporter is not dumping, the investigation will be terminated for that exporter, and no 
measures will apply to their goods. Australia's anti -dumping investigations are transparent, G/C/M/143  
 
- 93 - 
 
  independent, and evidence based. All affected overseas producers and exporters have a full and fair 
opportunity to provide evidence and make representations during the investigation process in line 
with Australia's WTO  obligations. Australia welcomes that the Government of Indonesia has m ade 
submissions regarding Case No.  583. 
42.8.   With respect to the separate merits review, Australia's independent merits review authority, 
the Anti -Dumping Review Panel, received an application from exporters seeking a review of the 
Minister's separate decision to continue anti -dumping measures. Australia  welcome s that the 
Government of Indonesia has also made submissions to this merits review. As both the investigation 
and the merits review are currently ongoing, it would be inappropriate for Australia to commen t 
further. Australia remains willing to meet separately with Indonesia to provide further information 
on the ongoing processes, as appropriate.  
42.9.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
43  PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA – EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON AGRICULTUR AL 
AND HYDROBIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM PERU  
43.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Peru. 
43.2.   The delegate of Peru indicated the following:  
43.3.   Peru would like to express before WTO  Members its trade concer n regarding various restrictive 
measures that the Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia has applied on Peruvian 
agricultural exports, which are restricting the entry into the Bolivian market of some of the principal 
products originating in Peru,  such as potatoes and onions, as well as the exportation of whole trout. 
It should be noted that, on 9  May 2022, the General Secretariat of the Andean Community (SGCAN) 
issued Resolution No.  2264 on the investigation requested by Peru on Bolivia, in which it qualifies 
as restrictions of any kind the set of administrative measures applied by Bolivia, which consisted of 
temporarily ceasing to issue phytosanitary import permits, temporarily suspending phytosanitary 
inspections at the Binational Border Service Centre (CEBAF) at Desaguadero, and hindering the 
import process for various Peruvian plant products.  
43.4.   In this connection, Peru reiterates its request, submitted at the previous meeting of the 
SPS Committee, asking Bolivia to comply with the provisions of th e aforementioned resolution and 
to inform Peru of the quarterly reports on the issuance of phytosanitary import permits, 
phytosanitary inspections, and the import process at the CEBAF at Desaguadero for perishable 
agricultural products from the Andean Comm unity, for a period of one  calendar year. Furthermore, 
with respect to Peru's interest in exporting whole trout, it should be noted that, despite the fact that 
the Bolivian health authority officially communicated the approval of the harmonized health 
certificate for the exportation of fresh or chilled/whole or loose trout in 2017, to date it has not 
fulfilled the corresponding commitments to enable the export of Peruvian trout.  
43.5.   It is very concerning that, in January  2022, the Bolivian National Agricultural  Health and Food 
Safety Service (SENASAG) indicated that its current regulations allowed only for the marketing of 
eviscerated animals and that other types of products could not therefore be accepted. In other 
words, five  years after approving a health cer tificate for the exportation of whole trout, Bolivia is 
unjustifiably restricting access for this product. It should be mentioned that none of the standards 
shared by the delegation of Bolivia were notified to the SPS  Committee.  
43.6.   In addition, Peru wishes to  express once again its deep concern regarding the new information 
received from Bolivia, on 10  June 2022, at a meeting held between the Peruvian National Fisheries 
Health Service (SANIPES) and SENASAG, at which the Bolivian health authority communicated t o 
Peru that a standard, according to which only eviscerated animals may be marketed, entered into 
force in April  2022. This standard was not notified either, once again violating the SPS  Agreement's 
Article  7 and Annex  B. In view of the above, and as menti oned in the SPS  Committee, Bolivia's 
actions would be in breach of the provisions of the GATT, the SPS  Agreement, and the bilateral 
agreements between both parties. Peru therefore reiterates its request to Bolivia to rescind any 
restrictions in place on Pe ruvian exports of perishable goods and whole trout.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 94 - 
 
  43.7.   The delegate of  the Plurinational State of Bolivia  indicated the following:  
43.8.   The Plurinational State of Bolivia takes note of Peru's statement, which will be conveyed to 
Capital. Likewise, given that this concern has been presented in the SPS  Committee, whose meeting 
was held less than a month ago, Bolivia refers to its intervention made on that occasion. Bolivia 
would also like to point out that this concern was the subject of a regional opinion, which als o 
established "that it is not proven that SENASAG has hindered or delayed the phytosanitary inspection 
procedures in the time used to carry them out, in the opening hours provided or in the sampling of 
the goods", and that "it is not proven that the Bolivi an government has applied restrictions under 
the figure of granting quotas of the PSI". In this context, Bolivia considers that the relevant 
time-period should be granted to comply with the provisions of the aforementioned 
Opinion  No. 2264.  
43.9.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
44  ECUADOR – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON GRAPES AND ONIONS – REQUEST FROM PERU  
44.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Peru. 
44.2.   The delegate of Peru indicated the followin g: 
44.3.   Peru would like to present its trade concern over the restrictive measures applied by Ecuador 
on the reopening of access for grapes and onions from Peru. Despite the fact that the SPS  Agreement 
provides that approval procedures must be undertaken withou t undue delay, Ecuador has provided 
replies that continue to stall access to its market for Peruvian grapes and onions beyond what is 
necessary. It should be mentioned that the Ecuadorian regulations imposing restrictions on Peruvian 
exports of grapes and onions were not duly notified to the SPS  Committee, despite the fact that this 
measure lays down additional requirements that have a direct impact on the trade of other Members.  
44.4.   Ecuador continues to require that refrigerated transport be used to export gra pes, with one 
of its arguments being that the refrigeration of fruit and vegetables is the best way of keeping such 
foods fresh and increasing their commercial life. However, it is important to note that the Ecuadorian 
Agency for Phytosanitary and Animal H ealth Regulation and Control (AGROCALIDAD) does not 
require compliance with conditions on fruit quality or refrigerated transport for the entry and exit of 
grapes from other countries that are much farther away. In addition, in the case of onions, despite 
the fact that the ban on Peruvian imports has been deemed to be a measure that restricts trade 
within the subregion, according to Resolution No.  2253 of the Andean Community20, Ecuador insisted 
on requesting a new pest risk analysis in order to provide access to its market.  
44.5.   In accordance with Ecuador's request, Peru sent all the information required for the pest risk 
analysis and, on 19  April 2022, at a bilateral technical meeting between the Peruvian National 
Agrarian Health Service (SENASA) and  AGROCALIDAD, this Ecuadorian authority committed to 
completing the aforementioned analysis in early July  2022, while also undertaking to offer a review 
period from 8 to 31  July 2022 for Peru's comments on the phytosanitary requirements. In this 
connection , Peru hopes to receive the proposed phytosanitary requirements by the end of that day 
at the latest, in order to ensure compliance with the commitments undertaken by both parties.  
44.6.   Considering that the measures applied by Ecuador contravene the provisions of the 
SPS Agreement21, Peru asks Ecuador: (i)  to avoid proposing measures that violate the provisions of 
the SPS  Agreement and the basic principles of the WTO; (ii)  to ensure that it does not disregard the 
technical agreements previously established; and (iii) to provide access for imports of Peruvian 
grapes and onions.  
 
20 Resolution available at:  
https://www.comunidadandina.org/DocOficialesFiles/ Gacetas/Gaceta%204415.pdf   
21 Concerns previously raised in the March  2022 SPS  Committee, as well as in 
documents  G/SPS/GEN/1937, G/SPS/GEN/1975 and G/SPS/GEN/1907 and in the SPS  Committee of 5, 6 and 
13 November  2020.  G/C/M/143  
 
- 95 - 
 
  44.7.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
44.8.   Ecuador refers to its previous statement in this Council and wishes to point out that the 
concern raised by Peru has already been addressed in the framework of Andean Community law. As 
a result, Ecuador took the decision to lift the measures on the importation of onions. However, 
Ecuador wishes to highlight that it is important for this type of product to comply with international 
standards an d phytosanitary regulations.  
44.9.   Ecuador is working on the technical norm for the preparation of the relevant pest risk analysis; 
in this connection, joint work should be carried out with the Peruvian authorities to fulfil the 
internationally recognized phytos anitary objectives.  
44.10.   With respect to the safety requirements for the importation into Ecuadorian territory of 
grapes, this matter has also been duly addressed at the Andean level. Ecuador is thus waiting for a 
response from Peru regarding the importation re quirements for grapes.  
44.11.   To conclude, Ecuador reiterates its readiness to continue discussions with Peru in both this 
Council and in the appropriate bodies of the Andean Integration System, in order to find a definitive 
solution to this trade concern.  
44.12.   The Co uncil took note  of the statements made.  
45  PANAMA – UNDUE DELAYS AND EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON AGRICULTURAL AND 
HYDROBIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM PERU  
45.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Peru. 
45.2.   The deleg ate of Peru indicated the following:  
45.3.   Peru would like to express its trade concern over Panama's undue delays in renewing 
authorizations or approving new authorizations for the processing plants of Peruvian fish and 
livestock enterprises, and regarding its re-establishment of trade in Peruvian onions and potatoes.  
45.4.   Peru wishes to highlight that, despite the bilateral and multilateral meetings and efforts 
undertaken, as well as the trade concerns raised repeatedly in the SPS  Committee, Panama has 
failed to ren ew authorizations or to include new enterprises authorized to export to the market 
concerned. There is also uncertainty as to the length of time that would be granted to Peruvian 
enterprises should renewal or a new authorization be secured. It should be hi ghlighted that, to date, 
over 30  Peruvian establishments lack valid authorizations. This situation is in violation of the 
provisions of the SPS  Agreement and is also discriminatory in terms of the authorization periods that 
may be granted to the enterprise s of other trading partners.  
45.5.   In the case of potatoes and onions, Panama has also implemented measures that contravene 
the provisions of the SPS  Agreement, since these measures have not been supported by proper 
scientific or technical evidence, internationa l phytosanitary reference standards have not been 
considered, less trade -restrictive measures have not been taken into account, there are still undue 
delays, and compliance with transparency provisions has been lacking. Regrettably, Panama 
continues to pro vide no sanitary or phytosanitary justification regarding the authorizations for 
Peruvian enterprises or market access for potatoes and onions, despite the fact that these types of 
measures are to be applied only when they are necessary to protect human, a nimal or plant life or 
health, and must, in addition, be based on a risk assessment. As a result, and in order to prevent a 
violation of the provisions of the SPS  Agreement, Peru requests Panama to authorize Peruvian 
enterprises to export to the market in question and to provide access to Peruvian potatoes and 
onions, as well as to avoid any other action that may unnecessarily prolong both processes, 
generating unnecessary and unjustified barriers to trade.  
45.6.   The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
45.7.   Panama takes note of Peru's concerns and will forward them to Capital. Panama wishes to 
highlight that a high -level bilateral meeting was recently held between the Minister of Trade and G/C/M/143  
 
- 96 - 
 
  Industry of Panama and the Vice -Minister of Foreign Trade of Peru. Durin g that meeting, it was 
agreed to hold a technical meeting of the Administrative Commission of the FTA with Peru in the 
second  half of 2022. Panama attaches great importance to this issue and notes that its FTA with 
Peru establishes clear rules and mutual b enefits that govern trade and ensure a predictable legal 
and commercial framework for business and investment. Panama hopes that the momentum of this 
meeting will lead to mutually satisfactory solutions and reiterates its readiness to work constructively 
with Peru and all interested Members.  
45.8.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
46  NIGERIA – RESTRICTIVE POLICIES ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
BRAZIL  
46.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
Brazil.  
46.2.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
46.3.   Brazil recognizes the importance of fostering national agricultural production, especially that 
relating to the livelihoods of small, family, and medium -sized farmers, who are the producers given 
priority in Brazil's agricultural policies. However, it is against the letter and spirit of the Covered 
Agreements for Members to pursue this goal through restrictive policies that are tantamount to 
import bans.  
46.4.   Brazil  has raised several concerns both at the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) and at the 
SPS Committee regarding a number of issues relating to Nigeria's restrictive policies. To illustrate, 
a decade ago, Brazil was contributing to Nigeria's food security throug h exports of rice, which 
increased overall supply and helped to keep prices in check. Since 2014/2015, when Nigeria banned 
the use of foreign exchange to imports, Brazil's exports have consistently decreased, reaching zero 
since 2018. And despite several e nquiries by Brazil at the CoA, no answer has been provided by 
Nigeria.  
46.5.   At the SPS  Committee, Brazil has asked Nigeria about its refusal to launch negotiations for 
the establishment of SPS  requirements for the import of several products. Likewise, no answer  has 
been provided to Brazil's  enquiries. More recently, in June, during the last SPS  Committee meeting, 
Nigeria affirmed that there would be no restrictive SPS  measures in force against Brazil. In response, 
Brazil mentioned that, failing to react to its p roposals was a clear breach against Articles  2, 5, 7, 8, 
and Annex  C of the SPS  Agreement.  
46.6.   As stated in paragraph  2 of the Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food 
Insecurity, "trade, along with domestic production, plays a vital role in i mproving global food security 
in all its dimensions and enhancing nutrition". As the World Bank has summarized, trade in both 
goods and services plays a key role in complementing local production and overcoming global shocks 
and limiting their impact in th e following ways: (i)  providing access to, reducing the cost and 
improving the availability of essential goods (including material inputs for their production) and 
services; (ii)  ensuring access to food throughout the world; (iii)  providing farmers with ne cessary 
inputs (seeds, fertilizers, equipment) for the next harvest; (iv)  supporting jobs and maintaining 
economic activity in the face of a global recession; (v)  reducing the cost of products, such as food, 
heavily consumed by the poor; and (vi)  supportin g the eventual economic recovery and building 
resilience through greater diversification of imports and exports. In other words, trade should not 
be treated as the villain, but as an ally to food security and prosperity. For these reasons, Brazil 
urges Nig eria to revisit both international law and academic evidence on the issue, and to lift the 
restrictions imposed on its imports of agricultural products.  
46.7.   The delegate of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
46.8.   Nigeria refers to its statement on this issue made at the Council's previous meeting22 and 
reaffirms that Nigeria's agricultural policies are consistent with its WTO  commitments. The import 
restrictions on some agricultural products are temporary measures taken to safeguard Nigeria's 
 
22 Document  G/C/M/142, paragraphs  28.5-28.9. G/C/M/143  
 
- 97 - 
 
  external financial pos ition, as well as to ensure a level of reserve adequate for the implementation 
of Nigeria's economic development programme. Furthermore, Nigeria's measures are consistent with 
Article  XII as well as section  B of Article  XVIII of the GATT.  
46.9.   Nigeria continues  to suffer the effects of economic shocks that have had a negative impact 
on its external reserve and exerted unprecedented pressure on its currency (Naira). These shocks 
have also significantly weakened Nigeria's ability to finance its imports, underminin g its external 
financial position and increasing its chances of defaulting on sovereign debt if timely and appropriate 
measures are not taken. Furthermore, Nigeria's extreme poverty and livelihood security difficulties, 
as well as its high rate of youth un employment (35% as of December  2021), have also triggered 
exponential increases in social vices that have further worsened Nigeria's national security situation. 
Therefore, Nigeria's temporary measures are additionally geared towards addressing its nationa l 
security difficulties pursuant to Article  XXI of the GATT. Its current difficulties notwithstanding, 
Nigeria is working assiduously to address its economic and national security difficulties with a view 
to phasing out these measures as soon as possible. In this regard, Nigeria thanks Brazil for its 
interest in its agricultural policies.  
46.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
47  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION (EU)  2018/825 
– REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
47.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the Russian Federation.  
47.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
47.3.   The Russian Federation reiterates its concerns regarding the amendments to the European 
Union 's basic regulation on protection against dumped imports introduced by Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2321 and Regulation (EU)  2018/825. At previous CTG  meetings, Russia had pointed out 
the discriminatory nature of the amendments, which can be illustrated by the fol lowing: (i)  the 
European Commission may punish the exporters twice for the same situation, labelled by the 
amendments as "significant distortions" and "raw material distortions"; and (ii)  the European 
Commission has issued only two  "reports" on so -called " significant distortions" in two  particular 
exporting countries, which clearly shows the discriminatory nature of the EU's approach regarding 
the application of anti -dumping measures. Without going into further detail, the Russian Federation 
wishes to reite rate its systemic concern about the WTO -inconsistency of the amendments. Russia 
urges the European Union to abstain from their application and not to violate its WTO  obligations.  
47.4.   The Council took note  of the statement made.  
48  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC  NO. 1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) – REQUEST 
FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
48.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of 
the Russian Federation.  
48.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
48.3.   The Russia n Federation reiterates its statements made during previous meetings of various 
WTO bodies with regard to the cobalt classification as a carcinogen  1b for all routes of exposure. 
Russia stresses that this measure was adopted in the absence of any scientifi c justification, either 
laboratory -based or epidemiological, and also without taking into account and grounding the 
measure in the comments and opinions of WTO  Members and businesses. In addition, the measure 
was adopted at a time when the global cobalt in dustry was going to launch a laboratory study on 
the carcinogenicity of cobalt via oral exposure, in accordance with the criteria fixed in the 
REACH  Regulation. At the same time, Russia appreciates the European Union's efforts on the 
adoption of the gastri c bioelution protocol at the EU and OECD  levels. However, the EU has not yet 
adopted this methodology, and nor has it incorporated its use into the CLP  Regulation as a regular 
practice for classifying between other alloys and compounds that will allow for the exclusion of many 
cobalt -containing products from the scope of further restrictions to be developed within the G/C/M/143  
 
- 98 - 
 
  framework of the implementation of this classification decision. The Russian Federation urges the 
European Union to adopt this methodology as  soon as possible.  
48.4.   The Council took note  of the statement made.  
49  OTHER BUSINESS  
49.1  Annual Plan of Meetings  
49.1.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to room document  RD/CTG/16, which contained 
the latest version of the Annual Plan of Meetings for the CTG and its  subsidiary bodies for the year 
2022, as well as the information currently available for the year 2023. This document had been 
prepared in close coordination between the CTG  team and the Secretariat officers in charge of the 
CTG's subsidiary bodies with th e aim of avoiding overlaps and ensuring an optimal scheduling of 
meetings. As noted at previous meetings, the Secretariat prepares an update of this Annual Plan for 
each CTG  meeting with a view to identifying any potential issue at an early stage, while at  the same 
time allowing Members to plan accordingly. He invited Members to comment on the Annual Plan or 
to raise any other issue relating to the functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. No Member 
requested the floor under this agenda sub -item. 
49.2  Functioning of the CTG and its Subsidiary Bodies  
49.2.   The Chairperson  then referred to the point that he had made on the previous morning, at the 
start of the meeting, about the possible work that the CTG may embark upon following the 
12th WTO Ministerial Confere nce. In this regard, he wished to make some very preliminary 
comments echoing the words of the Chairperson of the General Council, Ambassador Didier 
Chambovey, who had reminded Heads of Delegation at the previous day's meeting of the General 
Council that t he texts adopted at the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference had provided for a long list of 
implementation work to be carried out within the framework of the various WTO  Councils and 
Committees. The document that had been prepared by the Secretariat and distri buted to Members 
the previous day (document  RD/WTO/13) had attempted to list the elements in that implementation 
work, in a purely factual, informal manner, and without any order of priority, as the Director -General 
herself had reminded Heads of Delegation  at that same meeting.  For his part, the CTG's Chairperson 
had identified at least three  elements that were part of the 17  June Geneva package that could have 
an impact on the work of the Goods Council.  
49.3.   First, there could be a possible impact on the work o f the Goods Council in relation to the first 
and second  paragraphs of the "Work Programme on Electronic Commerce" and the Moratorium, 
document  WT/MIN(22)/32, which stated: "We agree to reinvigorate the work under the Work 
Programme on Electronic Commerce, based on the mandate set out in document  WT/L/274 and in 
particular with respect to its development dimension. We will intensify discussions on the Moratorium 
and instruct the General Council to conduct periodic reviews on the basis of such reports as may be 
submitted by the relevant WTO  bodies, including on the scope, definition and impact of the 
Moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions." As Members were aware, the Council 
for Trade in Goods had in the past played an important role in relat ion to these issues, as well as 
the Council for Trade in Services and the Council on Trade and Development.  
49.4.   Second, there could be a possible impact on the work of the Goods Council in relation to 
paragraph  24 of the "Ministerial Declaration on the WTO  Response to the COVID -19 Pandemic and 
Preparedness for Future Pandemics", document WT/MIN(22)/31, which stated: "The relevant 
WTO bodies, within their areas of competence and on the basis of proposals put forward by Members, 
will continue or commence work as soon as possible to analyse the lessons learned and challenges 
encountered during the COVID -19 pandemic. A review of the work undertaken by the WTO  bodies 
under this Declaration shall be made annually at the General Council until the end of 2024 on the 
basis of reports from the relevant bodies concerned." And footnote  1 stated that the relevant bodies 
included "the Council for Trade in Goods or its subsidiary bodies … ".  
49.5.   Third, there could be a possible impact on the work of the Goods Council in relation to  
paragraph  3 of the Final Document of MC12, WT/MIN(22)/24, on WTO  Reform, which concluded by 
stating: "While reaffirming the fundamental principles of the WTO, we envisage reforms to improve 
all functions of the Organization. The work will be Member -driven , open, transparent, inclusive, and G/C/M/143  
 
- 99 - 
 
  should address the interests of all Members, including development issues. The General Council and 
its subsidiary bodies shall direct the work, review progress and, as appropriate, consider decisions 
for submission to th e next Ministerial Conference." The Council for Trade in Goods is not explicitly 
mentioned in this context, but it is possible, if Members so wish, that the Council may be led to work 
on certain topics as a General Council subsidiary body.  
49.6.   The Chairperson was well aware that very little time had passed since the conclusion of MC12, 
and that Members were probably still having internal discussions on exactly how these issues should 
be implemented in practice. In addition, the Chairperson of the General Counci l had announced only 
the day before that the organization of future work would be one of the most important items on 
the agenda of the General Council at its end -July meeting. Finally, he was also very conscious of the 
fact that all the work must be "Membe r-driven" and based on Members' proposals. Nevertheless, 
given that the CTG's next formal meeting would not take place until November, he wished to inform 
Members that his door remained open, if and when they had suggestions regarding possible future 
work that they would wish to submit to the Council. With this, he opened the floor.  
49.7.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
49.8.   Canada thanks the Chairperson for placing this sub -item on the agenda. Equally, Canada is 
aware that Members are not supposed to engage in substantive discussions under "Other Business". 
For this reason, Canada would only like to propose that the Chairperson consider holding bilateral 
discussions and informal consultations with the Council in the coming weeks, or after the summer 
break. Canada would consider such bilateral discussions and informal consultations to be useful, 
especially if they could be held well before the CTG's November  meeting, in order to consider how 
the Council itself could best make some visible contribution to  the work that is undertaken first in 
the CTG's subsidiary bodies, and which then gets reported to the CTG before the end of the year. 
To this end, it would be useful to have some informal discussions within the Council on how best to 
do that, going forwar d, in terms of the work that has come out of MC12.  
49.9.   In addition, Canada considers that it would be useful for Members to have a discussion of how 
best to organize the work of the Council to examine if Members do bring forward proposals in relation 
to MC12. And as the Chairperson rightly pointed out, the Council itself is identified in a couple of 
those work items, and indirectly identified through its status as a subsidiary body of the General 
Council. For these reasons, Canada thinks that it would be useful  for the CTG to have an additional 
discussion on how its work is organized, and in particular how best to address any cross -cutting 
issues that may arise in terms of issues within the Council's mandate. Canada will actively participate 
in any such meetings . 
49.10.   The Chairperson  thanked Canada for its excellent suggestion and noted that his door was 
already open and would continue to be so.  
49.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
49.3  Date of Next Meeting  
49.12.   The Chairperson  indicated that the Council's next formal meeting had been scheduled for 
24-25 November  2022. These dates would be confirmed in due course.  
49.13.   The meeting was closed . 
__________