WT/GC/W/819  
 
19 February 2021  
(21-1421) Page: 1/8 
General Council  
1-2 March 2021  Original: English  
 
THE LEGAL STATUS OF 'JOINT STATEMENT INITIATIVES ' AND THEIR NEGOTIATED 
OUTCOMES  
The following communication, dated 18 February 2021, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegations of India and South Africa.  
 
_______________  
 
 
Introduction  
1. The WTO was established as forum concerning multilateral trade relations in matters dealt 
with under the agreements in the Annexes to the Marrakesh Agreement. The WTO may also provide 
a forum for further negotiations among it s Members concerning their multilateral trade relations, 
and a framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by 
the Ministerial Conference. The Joint Statement Initiatives (e.g. e -commerce1, domestic regulation2, 
investment facilitation3 etc.) have to be assessed on the basis of the provisions of the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the WTO.  
2. The Marrakesh Agreement defines 'Plurilateral Agreements ' as the agreements and associated 
legal instruments that are incl uded in Annex 4 to the Agreement.  The Ministerial Conference, upon 
the request of the Members party to a trade agreement, decides exclusively by consensus  to add 
that agreement to the said Annex 4.  
3. Any group of Members may discuss any issue informally. How ever, when discussions under 
Joint Statement Initiatives turn into negotiations, and their outcomes are sought to be formali zed 
into the WTO framework of rules, it can only be done in accordance with the rules of procedure for 
amendments as well as decisio n-making as set out in the Marrakesh Agreement.  
Contradiction Between JSIs and the Fundamental Principles at the WTO  
4. There have been suggestions that, if the negotiated JSI  outcomes are offered on an MFN basis, 
no multilateral consensus is required for bringing in such results under the umbrella of the WTO, 
especially if these new rules are appended to schedules.4 According to this proposition, this would 
require only a mod ification of schedules procedure.  
5. Such a proposition would be contrary to the following fundamental principles and objectives 
of the multilateral system, enshrined in the Marrakesh Agreement:  
• The multilateral  underpinnings of the WTO, including,  
 
1 WTO,  Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, Ministerial Conference, Eleventh Session, 
WT/MIN(17)/60 (dated Dec. 13, 2017) . 
2 WTO,  Joint Statement on Services Domestic Regulations, Ministerial Conference, Eleventh Session, 
WT/MIN(17)/61 (dated Dec. 13, 2017) . 
3 WTO,  Joint Statement on Investment Facilitation For  Development, Ministerial Conference, Eleventh 
Session, WT/MIN(17)/59 (dated Dec. 13, 2017) . 
4 INF/SDR/W/1/Rev.2 'Members shall inscribe the disciplines in Section II in their Schedules as additional 
commitments under Article XVIII of the Agreement ', Section I, para . 7 (dated Dec.18, 2020) . WT/GC/W/819  
 
- 2 - 
 
  • Art. II.1: 'The WTO shall provide the common  institutional framework for the conduct of 
trade relations among its Members … ';  
• Art. III.2 'The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning 
their multilateral  trade relations '. 
• Consensus based decision -making , as enshrined in Arts . III.2, IX, X, and also X.9.  
• The procedures for Amendments  of rules as articulated in Art . X.  
New Form of 'Plurilaterals ' or 'Open Agreements ' are WTO Inconsistent  
6. As stated above, the Marrakesh Agreement provid es that the agreements and associated legal 
instruments included in Annex 4 to the Agreement are "Plurilateral Trade Agreements ". The 
Ministerial Conference, upon the request of the Members party to a trade agreement, decides 
exclusively by consensus to add that agreement to Annex 4.  
7. The JSI proponents intend to create a new set of Agreements, which are neither multilateral 
agreemen ts nor Plurilateral Agreements [as defined in Article II.3 of the Marrakesh Agreement]. The 
proponents appear to suggest that when offered on MFN basis, no consensus is required for bringing 
in these new rules into the WTO. This approach, however, is legal ly inconsistent with the 
fundamental principles and procedures of Marrakesh Agreement as outlined in para . 4 above.  
Procedures for Amending Rules  
8. As stated above, a procedure for amending rules is enshrined in Article X of the Marrakesh 
Agreement. On the  other hand, the GATT and GATS contain specific provisions for modifications of 
Schedules.  Proponents of JSIs have confused amendment to rules and modifications to schedules, 
and the proposed introduction of new agreements into the WTO to bypass the requir ements of 
Article  X of the Marrakesh Agreement. However, new agreements are not amendments to schedules.  
Overriding Effect of the Marrakesh Agreement  
9. Art. XVI.3 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides that in  the event of a conflict between a 
provision of the Marrakesh Agreement and a provision of any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, 
the provision of Marrakesh Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.  
Different Challenges Posed by Individual JSIs  
10. Each of the recent Joint Statement Initiatives is likely to pose different legal challenges to 
existing WTO rules and mandates, given the differences in the nature and scope of issues covered 
under each of these initiatives.  
Systemic and Development Implications of JSIs  
11. Any attempt to introduce new ru les resulting from the JSI negotiations into the WTO without 
fulfilling the requirements of Articles IX and X of the Marrakesh Agreement, will be detrimental to 
the functioning of rule based multilateral trading system.  Such a step will:  
• erode the integrit y of the rule -based multilateral trading system by subverting established 
rules and foundational principles of the Marrakesh Agreement ;  
• create a precedent for any group of Members to bring any issue into the WTO without the 
required consensus ; 
• bypass the collective oversight of Members for bringing in any new rules or amendments to 
existing rules in the WTO ; 
• usurp limited WTO resources available for multilateral negotiations ; WT/GC/W/819  
 
- 3 - 
 
  • result in Members disregarding existing multilateral mandates arrived at through consensus 
in favour of matters without multilateral mandates ;5  
• lead to the marginalization or exclusion of issues  which are difficult but which remain critical 
for the multilateral trading system, such as agriculture, development, thereby undermi ning 
balance in agenda setting, negotiating processes and outcomes ; 
• leave Members with no option other than to choose between remaining outside the discussions 
or participating on matters that are inconsistent with their economic development priorities, 
needs, concerns and levels of economic development.  
• fragment the multilateral trading system and undermine the multilateral character of the WTO.  
Options for the JSI Proponents  
12. As per the provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement, JSI Members have the following options 
for their negotiated outcomes:  
Within the WTO Framework : 
 
i. Seek consensus amongst the whole WTO Membership, followed by acceptance by the required 
proportion of Member s according to Art . X of the Marrakesh Agreement.  
ii. Get new agreements included in Annex 4 following Art . X.9 of the Marrakesh Agreement.  
Outside the WTO Framework : 
 
iii. Pursue an agreement outside the WTO Framework as was envisaged in the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TISA), or as has been done in multiple bilateral or plurilateral Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) or Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs).  
Amendment to Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement to allow for 'Flexible Multilateral Trading 
System ' 
 
iv. Seek amendments  to the provisions of Article X to provide for the so called 'Flexible Multilateral 
Trading System '. 
13. An Explanatory note to this paper is attached as Annex.  
 
_______________  
 
 
  
 
5 For example, the GATS Art . VI.4 negotiations mandate as a result of the JSI  Domestic Regulation 
negotiations and the mandates for multilateral bodies entrusted to carry out these VI.4 negotiations (the Council 
for Trade in Services and the Working Party on Domestic Regulations).  WT/GC/W/819  
 
- 4 - 
 
  ANNEX  
Explanatory notes to the document on the 'Legal statement of Joint Statement Initiatives 
and their negotiated outcomes '. 
The Rules in the WTO Agreement  
Scope and Functions of the WTO – Centrality of Multilateralism  
1. The multilateral character of the WTO an d its scope is articulated in the following: 'The WTO 
shall provide the common institutional framework  for the conduct of trade relations among its 
Members in matters related to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the 
Annexes to thi s Agreement .' (Art. II.1).  
2. And in Article III.2 which provides 'The WTO may also provide a forum for further negotiations 
among its Members concerning their multilateral  trade relations………… '.  
Multilateralism and Consensus Based Decision -Making  
3. The fundamental requirement for multilateralism / consensus -based decision -making is 
enshrined and reiterated at several places in the Marrakesh Agreement.  
4. Article III.2 on further negotiations states that matters other than those contained in the 
Annexes may be pursued 'The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members 
concerning their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreements in the 
Annexes to this Agreement. The WTO may also provide a forum for further negotiati ons among its 
Members concerning their multilateral trade relations, and a framework for the implementation of 
the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference '.  
5. Article IX.1 on Decision -Making says that 'The WTO shall con tinue the practice of decision -
making by consensus……… '.  
6. Article X.1 on Amendments states that any decision by the Ministerial Conference to submit 
the proposed amendment to the Members for acceptance shall be taken by consensus or voting.  
7. Even for additio n for a trade agreement into Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement [to be 
treated as Plurilateral Agreement], Article X.9 of the Agreement provides 'The Ministerial Conference, 
upon the request of the Members parties to a trade agreement, may decide exclusive ly by consensus 
to add that agreement to Annex 4. ' 
Amendments – Changes to Rules Require an Amendment Procedure i.e. Consensus and 
Acceptance  
8. Amendments include dilution, elaboration of existing rules, or addition of new  rules that may 
or may not alter the  rights and obligations of Members. Article X of Marrakesh Agreement sets out 
the procedures for amendments: (i) the requirement for consensus (or voting) (Art . X.1); (ii) a 
formal acceptance process of depositing an instrument of acceptance (Art . X.7); an d (iii) attainment 
of the quorum required before the amendment enters into force (various Art . X provisions).  
Certification Procedures for Modification or Improvements to Schedules  
9. In contrast to amendments of Agreements, the modification of Schedules of Concessions do 
not require a formal amendment procedure. The provisions in the GATT and GATS allowing Members 
to modify schedules are GATT Art . XXVIII (using the '1980 Certification Procedure ', L/4962) and 
GATS Art . XXI (using procedures as per S/L/80 or S /L/84). Other Members may object to such 
modifications, thereby exercise the right to maintain the integrity of the originally negotiated 
outcomes.   WT/GC/W/819  
 
- 5 - 
 
  The Difference between Changes to Rules and Changes to Schedules  
10. Amendments or additions to the rules are g overned by multilateral consensus based decision -
making [or voting] from the outset when a new proposal for an amendment is made.  Negotiations 
on modifications or improvements to schedules are expected to arise either as the outcomes of 
consensual multilateral negotiations pursuant to Article XXVIII of GATT or Article XXI of GATS or 
reached through a bilateral request and offer process, or as a result of a dispute. In contrast, changes 
to rules and the amendment procedures are not premise d on agreements amongst a subset of 
interested or affected Members. In fact, even changes to schedules cannot be made unilaterally, as 
other Members have the right to protect the existing balance of rights and obligations.  
Provisions of General Rules Vs Provisions on Specific Commitments Inscribed in Schedules  
11. The GATS agreement read in concert with the Marrakesh Agreement provides for different 
rules and procedures pertaining to the amendment of rules versus the modification of schedules.  
12. This is import ant to the question of how results from the JSIs, such as in Domestic Regulation, 
investment facilitation and also E -commerce, are being considered by the Proponents of concerned 
JSIs to be potentially integrated under the WTO body of law.  
13. GATS rules are governed by GATS Part II, 'General Obligations and Disciplines '. Part  III 
of the GATS contains provisions concerning Members individual 'Specific Commitments ' pertaining 
to distinctly identified services sectors , which are inscribed in schedules. The demar cation is an 
important one and was clearly enumerated in the GATS negotiating guidelines in 1993.  
Box: The Two Sorts of Provisions in the GATS  
• 'The GATS contains two sorts of provisions. The first are general obligations, some of which 
apply to all servi ce sectors (e.g. MFN, transparency) and some only to scheduled 
commitments (e.g. Article XI: Payments and Transfers). The second are specific commitments 
which are negotiated undertakings particular to each GATS signatory. Specific commitments, 
upon the co nclusion of negotiations, are to be recorded in national schedules which will be 
attached to, and form an integral part of the GATS… '. (from MTN.GNS/W/164, 3 Sept 1993, 
para. 2) 
 
14. WTO jurisprudence recogni zes the 'Principle of Effectiveness ' - the 'interpr etation must give 
meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that 
would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility… '.6 Taking 
the example of the JSI on Domestic Regulation, the GATS Art . XVIII, therefore, cannot be used to 
undermine the objectives and processes established by GATS Article VI:4 and Art . X of the Marrakesh 
Agreement, and effectively amend GATS Article VI:57 for a number of Members, bypassing Art . X.  
Overriding effect of the Marrakesh Agreement in the event of a conflict  
15. If there is any conflict between Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement and provisions of any of 
the Multilateral Trade Agreements as listed  in Annexes of the Marrakesh Agreement Article XVI.3 of 
the Marrakesh Agreement would be applicable. Article XVI.3 provides, "[i]n the event of a conflict 
 
6 In US – Gasoline  (WT/DS2/AB/R, page 23, DSR 1996 :I, page 3 at 2), the WTO Appellate Body (AB) 
stated that "… One of the corollaries of the 'general rule of interpretation ' in the Vienna Convention is that 
interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not f ree to adopt a 
reading that would result in reducing whole clauses  
or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility… ". 
7 The language  used is th e GATS Art. VI:4 and VI:5 is that  domestic regulatory requirements are 'based 
on objective  and transparent c riteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the service '. The JSI DR text 
has added to this language: 'including to do so in a manner consistent with a Member 's regulatory requirements . 
Competent authorities may assess the weight to be given to each criterion. ’ (See INF/SDR/W/1/Rev.2 , para . 19a 
and footnote 32).  WT/GC/W/819  
 
- 6 - 
 
  between provisions of this Agreement and a provision of any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
the provision of the Marrakesh Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict ".8 
Plurilateral Agreements in the WTO  
16. As per the Art.  II.3 of the Marrakesh Agreement 'The agreements and associated legal 
instruments included in Annex 4  are referred to as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements ". Proponents of 
JSIs are, however, using the phrase 'Plurilateral Agreements ' not as per these provisions. For 
example, the JSI on E -Commerce discussions are being referred to as a Plurilateral Agreement being 
negotiated at t he WTO, and even the consolidated negotiating text of these discussions is titled as 
'WTO E -Commerce negotiations ' to mislead the policy makers.  
17. Art. III.1 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides that  the WTO shall also provide the framework 
for the implementation, administration and operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements [i.e. trade 
agreements included in Annex. 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement] ' Article III.2 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement provides th at the WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members 
concerning their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreements in the 
Annexes to this Agreement. The WTO may also provide a forum for further negotiations among  its 
Members concerning their multilateral trade relations, and a framework for the implementation of 
the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference. The Marrakesh 
Agreement does not provide for the WTO to provide any for um for negotiations other than such 
multilateral negotiations.  
18. Art. X.9 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides that trade agreements [other than multilateral 
trade agreements] upon requests of Member parties to the agreement can be added to Annex  4 of 
the Marrakesh Agreement only by Ministerial Conference exclusively by cons ensus.  
WTO Inconsistency of  'Open Agreements ' Containing New Rules Offered on MFN Basis 
Bypassing Consensus  
19. In line with the desire to bring in the negotiated outcomes of JSIs into the WTO framework of 
rules, there have been suggestions that there should be a more 'flexible multilateral trading 
system '9or 'open agreements ' where the benefits are extended on an MFN basis if critical mass 
coverage is achieved '10.  
20. Use of such terminology deliberately confuses two different categories of negotiations and 
their outcomes: Sectoral negotiations changing schedules vs rules negotiations. An example of the 
former, the Information Technology Agreement [ITA] which did not amend GATT rules. Hence, ITA 
was given legal effect by amendment to Schedules through a certific ation procedure, after 
negotiations with Members, and offered on an MFN basis.  
21. However, amendment to rules must follow Art . X of Marrakesh Agreement on amendments.  
22. It has also been suggested that consensus to formalize legal outcomes of these open 
agreem ents under the WTO framework is not required.11 However, when it comes to rule -making or 
rules amendment, such an approach is not in accordance with the provisions of the Marrakesh 
Agreement.  
 
8 Also See, Claude Chase, Norm Conflict Between WTO Covered Agreement - Real, Apparent or Avoided?, 
The International  and Comparative Law Quarterly,  OCTOBER 2012, Vol. 61, No. 4 (OCTOBER  2012), pp. 791 -
821 at 792.  
9 IMF, World  Bank, WTO 2018 'Reinvigorating Trade and Inclusive Growth '. 
10 See Canada' s paper 'Strengthening and Modernizing the WTO: Discussion Paper ', JOB/GC/201, 
24 September 2018 (for short "Canada 2018 "). 
11 Canada’s submission to the WTO states that such 'open agreements ' 'do not require agreement of all 
Members ' ('Strengthening and Modernizing the WTO: Discussion Paper ', JOB/GC/201, 24 September 2018) . WT/GC/W/819  
 
- 7 - 
 
  Telecommunications Reference Paper  
23. It has also been suggested t hat the Telecommunications Reference Paper justifies why the 
consensus principle can be bypassed. However, the negotiations on  Basic Telecommunications have 
an underpinning in the consensus -based principle.  
24. Telecommunications negotiations were envisaged as  part of the package of the Uruguay Round 
outcome. i.e.  they have a legal underpinning within the Uruguay Round and its ratification, even 
though Members decided that the negotiations would be concluded after the rest of the Round had 
been completed.12 
25. The Telecoms Reference Paper, thus, arose under the very unique circumstances of the 
consensually concluded UR, which is not the situation of current JSIs.  While, in the case of Telecoms 
Reference Paper  there was a multilateral consensus and a formal manda te for the negotiations, 
including agreement on inscribing outcomes into schedules without an amendment procedure, there 
exists no such mandate in the case of current JSIs.  
26. The Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications  expressly recognized that  
"[n]egotiations shall be entered into on a voluntary basis with a view to the progressive liberalization 
of trade in telecommunications transport networks and services within the framework of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services ".13 
27. The multilateral  Decision also  established that outcomes adopted be inscribed  into the relevant 
Members ' schedules: "[a]ny commitments resulting from the negotiations, including the date of their 
entry into force, shall be inscribed in the Schedules annexed to the General  Agreement on Trade in 
Services and shall be subject to all the provisions of the Agreement ".14 
28. Importantly, these negotiations and the implementation date of the results were reinforced in 
the Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications which forms an integral part of the GATS.  
How JSIs are working against multilateral mandates  
JSI on Domestic Regulation in Services (INF/SDR/W/1/Rev.2)  
 
29. The Council for Trade in Services under GATS Art . VI.4 has been entrusted with the task of 
developing 'any necessar y disciplines ' regarding domestic regulation. The WTO 's Working Party on 
Domestic Regulation (WPDR) was multilaterally mandated to undertake this work.15 At no time has 
there been a multilateral agreement to discontinue the mandate of the WPDR, or the mand ate in 
Art. VI.4.  
30. The JSI proponents have subverted the WPDR 's multilateral mandate by not just undertaking 
exploratory discussions, but actually negotiating, such disciplines through a parallel discussion 
format designed to bypass the multilateral process.  
 
12 Decision  on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, Uruguay Round Agreement, para . 1, 
15 April 1994. 
13 Decision  on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, Uruguay Round Agreement, para . 1, 
15 April 1994. 
14 Decision  on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, Uruguay Round Agreement, para . 1, 
15 April 1994. 
See also Laura B Sherman, Introductory Note to "World Trade Organization: Agreement On Telecommunications 
Services (Fourth Protocol To General Agreement On Trade  In Services) " 36 ILM 354 (1997), at 355 -356.  
15 The Council  for Trade in Services had, on 26 April 1999 adopted a 'Decision on Domestic Regulation ' 
(S/L/70). This Decision said that:  
'The Working Party on Domestic Regulation shall be established and the Working Party on Professional Services 
shall cease to exist.  
'In accordance  with paragraph 4 of Article VI of the GATS, the Working Party shall develop any necessary 
disciplines to ensure that measures relating to licensing requirements  and procedures, technical standards and 
qualification requirements and procedures do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services.   This shall 
also encompass the tasks assigned to the Working Party on Professional Services, including the devel opment of 
general disciplines for professional services as required by paragraph 2 of the Decision on Disciplines Relating to 
the Accountancy Sector (S/L/63). ' WT/GC/W/819  
 
- 8 - 
 
  31. The JSI on Domestic Regulation, not having been mandated to do so either by the Ministerial 
Conference or the Council for Trade in Services, cannot legitimately purport to be pursuant to GATS 
Art. VI.4. Outcomes of these discussions c annot also directly or indirectly amount to a variation of 
any of the provisions of the GATS, including Article VI.5,16 Doing so will have serious implications 
for the rights and obligations of all Members agreed by consensus in the Uruguay Round.  
32. Art. VI.4 of the GATS on 'Domestic Regulation ' belongs to Part II of the GATS on general 
obligations (or rules), whilst Art XVIII on 'Additional Commitments ' is in Part III pertaining to specific 
commitments in schedules.17 Whilst there are some similarities betw een the issues covered under 
Art. VI.4 and Art XVIII, the differences between generalised rules (Art . VI.4) and specific 
commitments (Art XVIII) also cannot be overlooked. The Principle of Effectiveness must be observed 
in this regard.  
33. The only disciplines  that have thus far been concluded pursuant to Art . VI.4 are the 
Accountancy disciplines. The results have not entered into force, but the final decision on how to 
bring these disciplines into legal effect was taken by consensus.18  
JSI on E -Commerce and J SI on Investment Facilitation  
34. By negotiating rules on e -commerce outside the multilateral framework, the proponents of JSI 
on E-Commerce are subverting the exploratory and non -negotiating multilateral mandate of the 
1998 Work Program me on E-Commerce which has regularly been re -affirmed by all WTO Members.  
35. It is not clear how proponents intend to bring new disciplines on ecommerce or investment 
facilitation into the WTO framework.  
36. As discussions under both these JSIs contain new disciplines, these 'further  negotiations ' 
would require agreement by all WTO Members, as per the provisions of Art. III.2 and Art . X of the 
Marrakesh Agreement.  
37. Further, in the E -Commerce JSI, there are cross cutting issues, covered under GATT, TRIMS, 
TRIPS and TFA going beyond the  GATS Agreement. On this count also, outcomes of the JSI on E -
Commerce discussions cannot be inscribed into WTO rules through GATS schedules.  
38. In the area of Investment Facilitation, trade -related aspects have already been inserted into 
the WTO rules throu gh the GATS and TRIMS. In the broadest sense of the word, investment goes 
much beyond trade, and thus it is questionable whether investment is part of 'multilateral trade 
relations ' (Marrakesh Agreement Art . III.2).  Further, July Framework of 2004, as adopted by the 
General Council, also mandates that 'no work towards negotiations on any of these issues (including 
investment) will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round '. The Doha Round to date has 
not been co ncluded. '19 Discussions regarding investment facilitation under the JSI are thus contrary 
to such multilateral mandate.  
39. Negating the decisions of the Ministerial Conference or the General Council by the decision of 
a group of Ministers taken on the side -lines of Ministerial Conference or any other event20 would be 
detrimental to the very existence of rule -based multilateral trading system under the WTO.  
 
__________  
 
16 See footnote 7. 
17 It is important  to note that in the GATS, not all general disciplines in Part II apply to all services sectors. 
Some apply to scheduled commitments , nevertheless, these are categori zed as generali zed rules.  
18 WTO 1998 'Decisions on Disciplines Relating to the Accountancy Sector ', S/L/63 , 15 Decembe r. 
Members in t his Decision also chose to wait until the conclusion of multilateral negotiations under GATS Art . XIX 
to bring these disciplines into legal effect.  
19 WTO 2004 'Decision Adopted by the General Council ', WT/L/579, para . 1(g), (dated August 2 2004) . 
20 Commenc ement  of negotiations under JSI on E -Commerce were initiated based on a decision taken by 
a group of countries on the side lines of the event at the Davos in January 2019.