# Cyberthreats in Modern Cars: Responsibility and Readiness of Auto Workshops

David Hedberg, Martin Lundgren, Marcus Nohlberg

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David Hedberg, Martin Lundgren, Marcus Nohlberg. Cyberthreats in Modern Cars: Responsibility and Readiness of Auto Workshops. 17th International Symposium on Human Aspects of Information Security and Assurance (HAISA), Jul 2023, Kent, United Kingdom. pp.275-284, 10.1007/978-3-031-38530-8_22. hal-05462110

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# Cyberthreats in Modern Cars: Responsibility and Readiness of Auto Workshops

David Hedberg<fnref n="1" />(✉), Martin Lundgren<fnref n="2" />(✉), and Marcus Nohlberg<fnref n="2" />(✉)

**Abstract.** Modern cars are becoming increasingly smarter and connected. Today, cars often contain features ranging from controlling service functions through a mobile application to remote road assistance. However, as cars become smarter, they also become potential targets for cyberattacks, and a potential threat to human safety. Traditionally, handing in a car to an auto workshop for repairs and maintenance have ensured that the car is road safe. But, to what extent are auto mechanics aware of repairs and maintenance related to the car's cybersecurity? Based on interviews with eight auto workshop specialists in Sweden, using the capability maturity model as lens to capture the readiness maturity, the following study looks at experiences with cybersecurity related to cars, what current tools are used, and procedures to deal with a cyberattack against cars in their workshop. It was found that auto workshops are potential targets, with limited solutions existing today, and that cyber security is not a part of the current culture. It was also found that there is a gap between independent workshops and branded workshops in how they function and in what manner they approach problems and issues. Specifically, for new issues (i.e., previously unencountered issues), branded workshops relied more on the manufacturer than independent workshops who were left to use whatever solution they could figure out by their own means, which sometimes may be akin to hacking the car's systems.

**Keywords:** Connected car · vehicle cyber security · auto workshop security

## 1 Introduction

Cars have been at the forefront of human society for the last century, enabling people to travel across vast distances. But cars have evolved into something much more than means of transportation. Each year, new features are added. Modern cars can be described as a distributed computer network on four wheels [19], handling everything from anti-lock braking system (ABS) to adaptive cruise control (ACC). Lately, communication between

D. Hedberg—Independent Researcher.

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2023

Published by Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023

S. Furnell and N. Clarke (Eds.): HAISA 2023, IFIP AICT 674, pp. 275–284, 2023.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38530-8_22

<footnote n="1">¹ Minneapolis, USA</footnote>

<footnote>davidhedberg@hotmail.com</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² University of Skövde, Skövde, Sweden</footnote>

<footnote>{martin.lundgren,marcus.nohlberg}@his.se</footnote>
these computer systems have extended outside the car itself. Ring [19] explains vehicle-
to-vehicle communication which is a tool where cars communicate with each other. One
purpose for such a tool is crash avoidance, as cars can relay their positions to each other
and thus stay away from each other. However, this extended communication can also be
exploited. Cars have been shown to be a legitimate target for cyberattacks [15]. In one
famous example, two security researchers were able to hijack and take remote control
of a Jeep Cherokee's breaks and steering and in another example, security researchers
managed to take control of a Ford Escape [8].

While security in cars is discussed and studied by researchers and car manufacturers, one seemingly overlooked area is the auto workshop. There are, however, indicators that more research tied to auto workshops in cybersecurity is needed. For example, Martínez-Cruz et al. [16] mention car repair as a requirement for new systems to increase cybersecurity in cars. Eiza et al. [7] mentions how a modern car has between 30 and 100 electrical control units, and they all deal with different subsections of the car's different systems. If an auto workshops mechanic were to accidentally disable the communication to any of the subsystems, the car may be more vulnerable to cyberattacks. Cars should therefore not only be seen as means of transportation, but rather as cyber assets in need of protection. This has been identified to some extent by manufacturers, as modern cars contain several security functions integrated into their internal computer systems. However, a security feature only works as well as the person utilizing it. The auto mechanics working in auto workshops are not educated IT professionals – and this may open up vulnerabilities and possibilities for cyberattacks if improper actions are taken during car repair and maintenance. Every car needs to go to a workshop at some point. The auto workshop mechanics face unique challenges and issues tied to cybersecurity of cars and keeping up-to-date on every car model and their latest features. While auto workshop mechanics are well versed in traditional car security and safety, the question remains to what extent cybersecurity is considered.

The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. Section 1.1 discusses related research on the topic of cybersecurity in connected cars and relations to auto workshops, followed by Sect. 2 which presents the research approach. Section 3 presents an overview of the identified themes and empirical insights gained, and Sect. 4 discusses the result of the study and highlights its conclusion and future work.

**1.1 Related Research**

In their article, Amin and Tariq [2] discuss the issue of ‘glue code’ present in the computer
systems of modern cars. The concept refers to when suppliers outsource the develop-
ment of tools and software that are then integrate using glue code to make them work
together since the components were all made by different outsourced companies. The
manufacturer then integrates these tools and software into the car. This type of integra-
tion paves the way for cybersecurity-related issues between the car and the implemented
module [2]. Glue code has been responsible for numerous well published hacks against
cars [20].

The solution to the issues caused by glue code is a more intrusive approach by
the manufacturer, in which they oversee the development [20]. Procedures, such as
information sharing, progress checkups, and meetings to make sure whatever is being
developed through outsourcing will fit in with the other outsourced programs and tools.

While the Amin and Tariq [2] do not elaborate on auto workshops, the structure of the
issue is similar for workshops. Communication and information from the manufacturer
create a better aftermarket, as the issue of glue code may occur with reparations as well.

Mousavian et al. [18] discuss the possible implications when integrating connected
cars, especially electronic vehicles, into infrastructure. They mention how the smart grid
may be vulnerable to cyberattacks from cars and between cars and smart grids. Smart
grids are already working at a high capacity with automation protocols and systems that
face security challenges of their own. When connected vehicles are added to the smart
grid, security will become even more complex. Mousavian et al. [18] note how connected
cars are being pushed onto the market in the race to beat competitors [12]. Instead of
carefully considering how each feature and how more connections might create more
vulnerabilities, new updates and features are pushed with each new model.

Connected and smarter vehicles have brought cybersecurity issues along with it. Dibaei et al. [6] cover several such examples, where cars have been hacked through several different means. BMW, Tesla, Chrysler, Toyota, and Ford are all examples of manufacturers with exploited models, which shows how the issues are industry-wide and not tied to a specific manufacturer or model of car. Dibaei et al. [6] show different potential attack vectors for connected cars, both direct attacks and via proxies such as infrastructure – such as an auto workshop, even though the study does not explicitly mention it.

Most software devices eventually need updates. Phones, computers, smart TVs. The
difference between such devices and a car is that the car was not created with constant
updates being sent across the internet in mind. The area of over-the-air software updates
for cars is covered by Halder et al. [9]. In their study, they discuss the importance of
updates as the dependency on electrical components and software increases in cars. This
has led to an increase in cybersecurity issues as well and increased the number of recalls
by manufacturers. Over-the-air updates can help alleviate this issue. Halder et al. [9]
give examples with several benefits, such as lower cost as recalls are expensive, and
better safety as patches can be sent at a more regular interval. However, the solution
is not without its issues – such as a need for connectivity, and a new attack vector for
hackers. This relates to auto workshops as well, since the computer systems that handle
the updates and the hardware which receives the connection still need occasional repairs.
If cars start relying more on wireless updates, the need for these to function correctly
increases.

Morris et al. [17] did a study where they focused on digital communications capa-
bilities in connected cars, and how cybersecurity is inadequate in its current state within
the car industry. Digital communication issues can lead to cybersecurity issues when
different components are integrated that are not cyber-resilient, in a fashion similar to
the concept of glue code that mainly exist to combine incompatible software compo-
nents [2]. The study also covers how the heavier reliance on electrical components and
the introduction of connected cars have led to a decrease in communication such as
software and updates between different manufacturers and other actors, such as inde-
pendent workshops. This, in turn, means less collaboration with secondary companies
such as those who create spare parts, after-market components, and auto workshops. The study put forth that this might originate in a lack of trust between manufacturers and suppliers as things are seen as more secure if as few people as possible know how they function. Manufacturers keeping knowledge for themselves only increases the chance that a cyberattack happens against a workshop. While this problem is mainly attributed to the manufacturers themselves, workshops also have their part to play in integrating secure ways to share information and utilize security systems correctly.

As cars get more and more systems, such as GPS transmitters and radars, mechanics may need to incorporate fixing these into their work routines as they may become a staple of every car in the future [3]. This may bring more issues along with it, as parts that are more vital to the cybersecurity of a car need to be changed or swapped by mechanics. Kirk [14] speaks of how modern cars are a collection of parts from several different manufacturers, which leads to integration issues. This may also mean that computers need calibrations after repairs or when a radar, transmitter, or computer is changed. If these calibrations are done incorrectly, the car may not work properly and become an easier target for cyberattacks. Also considering that the demands to become a car mechanic are rather low with no demand for certificates, there is no pressure for mechanics to learn these new components instantly unless they break often, or if every car has them [11].

Physical access to anything increases the cybersecurity risks tied to it, which is why server halls require high security, no matter the company. Hodge et al. [10] mention two different threats tied to physical access, with the relevant one being tied to the changing of telematics devices. The report explains how after-market telematics devices can be used to hack vehicles. While getting physical access to a vehicle may be difficult, replacing a part before an unsuspecting mechanic acquires it is a possible risk. The mechanic then replaces the part without realizing it is dangerous as he sees no difference between the two, which puts the car in a vulnerable spot and susceptible to hacks. Auto workshops can also have access to specific software that, in the wrong hands, can be used for malicious intent. An example of such software is key programming software [4]. As reported by Bergström [4], a new certificate will enter the Swedish market in August of 2023. The new certificate will be required for unauthorized auto workshops to be allowed access to some software.

# 2 Study Approach

## 2.1 Data Collection

To capture the experiences with cybersecurity related to cars and any existing procedures or tools applied, a qualitative research approach was designed. A semi-structured interview was chosen to allow for richer insights gained from follow-up questions to further elaborate on points of interests [12].

The respondents included in this study were managers of auto workshops and we specifically looked for those who had a background as mechanics. The reason behind choosing managers is that they have the best overview of all parts of their workshop, and they are the ones most likely to know the administrative processes that can be utilized if a car was to be attacked, while also having some knowledge about the practicality
of it. They are also assumed to have knowledge of the broader perspective related to other workshops and thus be able to reflect upon the current landscape along with the role of a workshop and how it has evolved. The scope of the research and the research questions are more catered toward an administrative standpoint, and thus managers and administrative information are deemed to be the primary information, while any practical information or work-life experience will also be relevant.

A total of 8 respondents were interviewed. They were approached using personal contacts in the industry and through emails/phone calls (Table 1).

<table><caption>**Table 1. Respondents.**</caption><thead><tr><td>Respondent</td><td>Independent</td><td>Origin as a mechanic</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Alpha</td><td>No</td><td>No</td></tr><tr><td>Beta</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Gamma</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Delta</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Epsilon</td><td>No</td><td>Education, no work experience</td></tr><tr><td>Zeta</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Eta</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Theta</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table>

An interview guide was developed based on the Capability Maturity Model (CMM), developed by IBM [5]. This version of CMM is targeted toward cybersecurity and is a part of a larger security framework that can be applied to the cybersecurity efforts of a company to evaluate how well they have prepared and if they have processes in place to deal with different threats and attacks. The interview questions responded to the different levels (1 to 3) of the model and respondents utilized the CMM as a base for their answer to get fewer abstract judgements from the respondents and to create numerical data. This way the respondents could judge that they were on "level X out of three in this category", thus providing a kind of self-validation from the respondents (Table 2).

In order to ensure a high quality and relevance of the questions asked during the interviews, they were tested in a pilot interview on one person matching the inclusion criteria that was not used later in the actual analysis.

## 2.2 Data Analysis

The analysis was done using a thematic analysis [1], which is a good way to interpret data in a structured manner and to gain an understanding of the thoughts and experiences of several respondents. The transcripts were first read through, and reoccurring answers noted down as codes. Similar codes were then grouped together to form themes. Some codes were considered themes on their own, while others were too specific. For example, 'changing telemetry devices' and 'changing electronic control units' are similar
<table><caption>**Table 2.** CMM overview</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Optimized</th><th>Identity governance</th><th>Managing encryption keys</th><th>Vulnerability correlation</th><th>Anomaly detection</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Proficient</th><td>Access management</td><td>Data loss prevention</td><td></td><td>Source code scanning</td><td>Asset management</td></tr><tr><th>Basic</th><td>Directory management</td><td>Encryption</td><td></td><td>Application scanning</td><td>Antivirus</td></tr><tr><th></th><td>People</td><td>Data</td><td></td><td>Applications</td><td>Infrastructure</td></tr></tbody></table>

processes, and were therefore grouped together under a common theme. Some codes were simply rebranded to better reflect what they contain, such as ‘theoretical readiness’ becoming ‘response’ as that is what the respondents discuss in their answers. Initially we had 12 identified themes, and in the second phase they were compacted into seven themes.

* Diagnostics computers

* Traceability

* Handling of Electronic Control Units (ECU)

* Manufacturer relationship

* Responsibility

* Theoretical response

* Capability Maturity Model (CMM)

The next step of the analysis was to move relevant quotes from the transcriptions into each of the themes above. The results from this is summarized in the discussion below. We then analysed the CMM values gathered. In general, the respondents were uncertain when placing themselves. While there was an outlier on both ends of the spectrum, the majority of the respondents placed themselves in the grey area between basic (1) and proficient (2), with several saying that they were in the “1.5-zone”. The results from the interviews and the thematic coding, as well as the ratings in the CMM was then the foundation for our results.

## 3 Empirical Insights

The following section presents an overview of the empirical results with example quotes that highlights some of the points captured in each theme.

The Diagnostics Computers theme captured the need for reliable diagnostic tools. Theta explained that, “because we are an independent workshop we get nothing from any general agent, so we must rely on after-market equipment from a third party [...] it is not always reliable so we have several from different parties so we can double or even triple-check.” Delta noted that diagnostic issues could be solved easier for branded workshops. For example, when ECUs were suspected of manipulation branded workshops had access to “run an [ECU] update, and the tune-up software is overwritten.”
<table><caption>**Table 3.** Results from CMM, where 1 is low, 2 is proficient, and 3 is high capability.</caption><thead><tr><td>Respondent</td><td>Rating</td><td>Comment</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Alpha</td><td>3</td><td>Confident in their rating. The only 3</td></tr><tr><td>Beta</td><td>1</td><td>One respondent said 1, the other between 1 and 2</td></tr><tr><td>Gamma</td><td>2</td><td>The technology exists, the knowledge does not</td></tr><tr><td>Delta</td><td>1</td><td>Between 1 and 2, but more leaning towards 1</td></tr><tr><td>Epsilon</td><td>1</td><td>Cybersecurity is rarely discussed as a subject</td></tr><tr><td>Zeta</td><td>1</td><td>1 with the preface that it is on the manufacturer to protect the cars</td></tr><tr><td>Eta</td><td>2</td><td>The protection depends on the brand</td></tr><tr><td>Theta</td><td>1</td><td>Quick to say 1, sure that their security is bad</td></tr></tbody></table>

Traceability highlighted the challenges of tracking who has conducted what tasks through a work order. One reason given for the challenges is that a mechanic often logs onto a computer which is then passed around between different mechanics, or as Epsilon put it, “you can see that our workshop did the job, but saying exactly who is hard.”

Handling of ECUs presented a challenge for independent workshops. Only branded workshops can code new ECU via the diagnostics computer, “You just press a button” explained Eta “and then you go get coffee, and it does the work by itself.” As such, Manufacturer Relationship was shown to play an instrumental role. Branded workshops can, for example, discuss issues and escalate them to be solved by the car factory’s engineers, explained Alpha, “If our highest-tier technicians here cannot solve the issues, they can contact the factory through a hotline [...] which means the engineers who designed the car.” Theta noted that independent auto workshops do not have this luxury, “the issue is a cooperation between an independent workshop and a branded workshop [...] on knowledge, equipment, and a to not present competition.”

Responsibility for keeping the cars safe concerning cybersecurity was also a topic of discussion. While the respondents noted that auto workshops mechanics need continuous cybersecurity training, the consensus was captured quite well by Zeta, that the “[main responsibility] should be on the manufacturer.”

Theoretical Response captured the reaction to various fictitious scenarios. While solutions to the different scenarios were suggested by the respondents, there were also much uncertainty. The main difference between the respondents proposed solutions were that branded workshops tended to refer to assistance from the manufacturer or general agents. For example, Beta explained that, “We get the car here, connect it to the factory, and they will see if there’s anything weird [...] They can see if anything feels off in the car since all components are registered via the chassis number”.

After the self-evaluation (see Table 3 above), the respondents were asked what would be needed to improve their Capability Maturity Model score. The answers gravitated around the theoretical know-how, ranging from “Simply a lack of knowledge” (Theta) to “missing education” (Beta) as two examples.
# 4 Discussion and Conclusion

In this section, the results are put in perspective.

## 4.1 Connections to Existing Research

Existing research has not taken the auto workshop into account, but the way an attacker may exploit a car is mapped out in several articles. Much of the previous research was based upon experiments and utilizing the expertise of security experts to attack cars and develop security controls around them. Those research articles and the results presented in this study differ in that aspect, as this study focuses on people with little to no knowledge of cybersecurity. However, these are the people who will need to use, repair, and implement the developed security controls. Thus, their thoughts and insights are important to further this research stream on car cybersecurity. While previous research has noted knowledge and education as areas in which cybersecurity is lacking in general, solutions and specific reasons were not mentioned. According to the interviews, it seems that the auto workshop industry has an issue with not being trusted with the information. Manufacturers instead ask workshops to turn to them for expertise each time a brand-new issue presents itself. Previous research mentions both a lack of knowledge and a lack of trust, but how the two are correlated is also important, as noticed in the interviews by the respondents.

Through the interviews, it was shown that auto workshops need more attention and further research. For example, cybersecurity was said not to be discussed much in their industry, both because of a lack of trust but also a general disinterest in the field. This lack of interest does not come up much in existing literature but was discussed by all respondents as something that is developing naturally with the new generation. While interest towards cybersecurity within the car industry might be changing with the next generation of workers, waiting for the entire industry to be replaced by personnel with an interest in cybersecurity is not feasible.

## 4.2 Conclusion

When it comes to discussing cybersecurity in auto workshops, it is important to make a distinction between branded and independent auto workshops. While a lot of the classic workshop jobs – changing brakes, general service, or repairing a radiator – are the same, every job tied to the internal systems differs in some manner. Independent workshops do not have the equipment, communication, or privileges that branded workshops do. This creates two rather different work processes where one side has clear guidelines and work orders, and the other is more flexible and solves issues in whichever manner they can with whatever tools they can acquire. When an independent workshop hits a roadblock and encounters an issue that they for any reason cannot solve their only option is to refer the customer to another, branded, auto workshop. The branded auto workshop can then utilize its escalation chain to acquire assistance straight from the factory if needed. Both approaches present their unique security challenges while also having some overlap. Where branded workshops have a direct line of communication with the internal systems of the car via a computer that is connected to the internet
and are not particularly well secured in some cases, the independent workshop utilizes
third-party diagnostics equipment meant to circumvent the internal systems to acquire
error codes for the mechanic to work from.

Manufacturers are an integral part of how an auto workshop operates. All respondents discussed how cybersecurity related to cars is not an area ever really mentioned. It is not mentioned at conferences or in meetings between managers. As it is not brought up and mentioned, the general knowledge is not improved. Most respondents expressed how they have never even thought about cars being targeted and hacked. Connected cars are still a fairly new concept and attacks against them are still theoretical which probably partly explains why it is never mentioned, but the first step to knowledge is general discussions and an interest in the area.

While the path to security is a long one, auto workshops do have several precautions and general security. Secure networks for communication, placing diagnostics computers on a separate network, workshop mode in the cars, secure software for updates to electronic control units, certifications for technicians, and general traceability are some of the current solutions. While these are seemingly not enough, they are a step in the right direction. It is important to remember that auto workshops have existed for a lot longer than connected cars, and industry-wide changes do not happen overnight. However, preparing for a threat before it becomes reality creates safer environments and better cybersecurity, no matter the industry or area.

## 4.3 Future Work

The work conducted within this study highlights some of the challenges in making auto workshops ready for the connected future the world is heading towards. The next logical step would be to discuss the findings with car manufacturers. For example, important aspect to evolve is information revolving around the relationship between manufacturers, branded workshops, and independent workshops. As noticed by the study, branded and independent workshops work differently. Thus, the relationship between all three should be evaluated and studied, be it through interviews or a case study. Manufacturer have the primary responsibility to make these cars as safe as possible. Thus, the next step would be to investigate the trends and incentives in car cybersecurity development and their take on the development of transparency, education, and knowledge sharing with both independent and branded workshops.

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