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# Problem of performativity generalized

Jean Rakotomalala

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Jean Rakotomalala. Problem of performativity generalized. 2017. hal-01546746

HAL Id: hal-01546746

https://hal.science/hal-01546746

Preprint submitted on 26 Jun 2017

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Abstract

In this short paper, we want to explain a fundamental principle about the language with the aim to apply it on performativity. At his first time, the father of pragmatic, AUSTIN, thought that there was in the one hand the constative utterance, and in the other the performative utterance.

When his disciple John Opie URMSON shows that constative utterance is an implicit performative, he concludes to the generalization of the performativity at all utterance. However, this assumption has a problem. For converting a constative utterance into a performative one, it needs a performative verb, called prefix performative; but for some constative utterance, it's not possible to find the prefix performative.

Key words: performativity, addressee, logic temporal, utterance, generalization.

Résumé

Dans cet article, nous voulons expliquer un principe fondamental du langage et l'appliquer à la performativité. Dans un premier temps, le père de la pragmatique, AUSTIN, pensait qu'il y a d'un côté les énoncés constatifs et de l'autre les énoncés performatifs.

Quand son disciple John Opie URMSON montre que les énoncés constatifs sont des performatifs implicites, il conclue à la généralisation de la performativité à tous les énoncés. Cependant, cette assomption a un problème. Pour convertir un énoncé constatif en un performatif, il est nécessaire d'avoir un verbe performatif, appelé préfixe performatif. Mais dans certains énoncés constatifs, il n'est pas possible de trouver le préfixe performatif.

Mots clés : performativité, destinataire, logique temporelle, énoncé, généralisation.

Problem of performativity generalized

The reproach against the pragmatic at his debut is the fact that speech act concerns limited utterances. It seems that the generalization of performativity at all utterances has as consequence to sweep this reproach and makes the discipline to appear with a scientific solidity.

Enforces this new status of pragmatic the following statement:

> Appelons *sui-référentiel* un énoncé qui fait référence à sa propre énonciation : toute énonciation ayant valeur illocutoire produit de ce fait un énoncé sui-référentiel. La thèse d'Austin selon laquelle toute énonciation effectue au moins un acte illocutoire entraîne donc que tout énoncé est sui-référentiel.

(ANSCOMBRE, 1980, p. 66)
Indeed, we can't have a doubt about the generalization of performativity at all utterances without putting in danger the pragmatic, as it is shown by the quotation above. Let's continue in reminding a fundamental principle in the language. This principle consists to say that in the language there is nothing than language.

Unfortunately, the treatment of the performative extension over all the utterances doesn't respect this principle. Although it's admitted that all utterance realizes at least an illocutionary act. There is often an overlap between illocutionary act and perlocutionary act.

We can conceive the perlocutionary act as the effect of the speech on the addressee, and the illocutionary act is determinate by the form of the utterance produced by the enunciation. For distinguishing the difference, we need two steps.

The first way is global. It means that the perlocutionary is out of the linguistic and the illocutionary is internal in the linguistic. The text below confirms this statement:

> L'opposition entre illocutionnaire et perlocutionnaire est introduite par Austin, mais elle fonctionne dans l'analyse du discours depuis bien plus longtemps (Freud, entre autres, s'en servait). C'est opposer la structure interne d'une action aux résultats, particuliers qu'elle provoque. La force illocutionnaire d'une phrase impérative, par exemple, consiste dans le fait que je donne un ordre à quelqu'un ; sa force perlocutionnaire, dans le fait qu'elle est suivie par une action. La relation des deux est évidente, néanmoins seule la force illocutionnaire reste à l'intérieur de l'analyse linguistique de l'énonciation.
> (TODOROV, 1970, p. 9)

Though, ten years later of this remark, the number 32 of communications periodic devoted to the discourse act (DUCROT, et al., 1980) continues the confusion. Thus, when DUCROT defines the illocutionary act, he claims that the interpretation of an utterance is a lecture of the description of his enunciation (1980, p. 30). Describe the enunciation is, in our opinion, analyzing the form of the utterance, in application of the principle that the language is a form and not a substance (SAUSSURE, 1982 [1972], p. 157) et (HJLEMSLEV, 1968-1971, p. 70). In others words, it means: in the language, there is nothing than language.

Language is a form and not a substance will be understood by explanation of his analogy of the first tool invented by the humanity. We want to talk about the bi-face flint. When the Paleolithic hunter modifies the piece of rock, he has in his mind a temporality: before the bi-face flint, hunting the big game is very difficult and dangerous, after, it is less difficult and less dangerous. This temporality in which, the time knows a dichotomy: before vs after, is called narrative transformation in semiotic.

If we add, following Robert LAFONT in this aspect, that in this modification of the stone, it doesn't not matter the absence of game animals. That to say, the tool is defined by his form which determines his use.
It is the same way in the language, the enunciation who products the utterance gives form to this utterance; and we can read the use of the utterance through his form regardless of addressee.

So, it is not admitted to make reference to the addressee for the determination of illocutionary act as has done DUCROT. Indeed, to characterize the illocutionary act, DUCROT takes as a proof the addressee response who belongs to the perlocutionary act. He says that an order presents his enunciation as having the exorbitant power to oblige someone to act in a certain way (DUCROT, 1980, p. 30).

The issue is clear with the example below. When someone wrote on his gateway "naughty dog", he performs at least two illocutionary acts: the first is that he makes a statement, and, the second he accomplishes a warning; although people around can't read. In the same way, we can't argue that there is no an "illocutionary act" on the manufactured products because the warning is written in Chinese language that we aren't able to read.

In addition, it is frequent that in the report man and machine, we accomplish an order to the machine which is unable to obey or to disobey, like "start, start" when we are at the wheel and the engine don't work. This last example shows us that the illocutionary act is in and by the speech and doesn't need the addressee's response for be accomplished. Thus, illocutionary act is absolutely independent of addressee's behavior.

If this first step concerns the manner to describe the illocutionary act, let us remind it: any utterance draws a temporality in which a change defines the speech act; the second step is about generalization of performativity.

The amazing is the statement who asserts that the performative verb only accomplishes for an utterance the performativity. It is a thesis defended by ANSCOMBRE (1980, p. 80). Uphold that thesis means opposition against the generalization because when the performative verb doesn't exist, the utterance is rejected into the perlocutionary act. So, there is in one hand the illocutionary act and in the other the perlocutionary act.

In consequence, the generalization of performativity can't be maintained. Indeed, act like "insult" is qualified by ANSCOMBRE (Ibid.) to be a perlocutionary. RECANATI is less categorical, he states that the problem of insult may be put between brackets, for the moment (1979, p. 131)

The first solution enters in contradiction against the performativity generalized. The second answer attempts to save the generalization but it fails in front of the principle of empiricism in sciences which recommends the exhaustivity.

Our own solution consists to apply in the debate the principle which says that in the language, there is only the language. It means exactly that once the world is converted into the language the category of real falls into a faint as a useless issue. This positioning matches perfectly to the notion of reflexivity (sui-référentiel) in pragmatic.
Thus, the insult doesn't get a performative verb as a marker. But it realizes an illocutionary act by change in the logic temporal which refuses a quality (humanity) and allocates an other (animality), for example, if you treat someone to be a donkey.

Toliara, June 26, 2017

## Travaux cités

ANSCOMBRE, J.-C. (1980). "Voulez-vous dérivez avec moi? *Communications*, **32**, *Les actes de Discours*, pp. 61-124.

DUCROT, O. (1980). Analyses pragmatiques. *Communications*, pp. 11-60. Récupéré sur Persée.

DUCROT, O., ANSCOMBRE, J.-C., CORNULIER, B., NEF, F., RECANATI, F., ROULET, E., ... PARRET, H. (1980). *Les actes de Discours*. Paris: Seuil.

HJLEMSLEV, L. (1968-1971). *Prolégomènes à une théorie du langage*. Paris: éditions de Minuit.

RECANATI, F. (1979). *La transparence et énonciation. Pour introduire à la pragmatique*. Paris: Seuil.

SAUSSURE, d. F. (1982 [1972]). *Cours de Linguistique Générale*. Paris: Payot.

TODOROV, T. (1970). Problèmes de l'énonciation. *Langages*, **17**, pp. 3-11.