<table><caption>**Table A13.** Summary of the regression results including trust in parliament and the quality of political institutions simultaneously</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Pooled OLS</th><th>OLS FE</th><th>OLS FD</th><th>2SLS FE</th><th>2SLS FD</th><th>S-GMM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Quality of political institutions</th><td>-1.308<br>(0.802)</td><td>-0.369<br>(0.436)</td><td>-0.433<br>(0.631)</td><td>-1.821<br>(2.747)</td><td>-3.227<br>(3.183)</td><td>-0.811<br>(1.307)</td></tr><tr><th>Trust in parliament</th><td>2.341***<br>(0.797)</td><td>1.736***<br>(0.571)</td><td>1.726***<br>(0.503)</td><td>-0.0418<br>(0.958)</td><td>2.428***<br>(0.724)</td><td>1.877**<br>(0.876)</td></tr></tbody></table>

The reported coefficients come from six separate regressions. For each regression, only the coefficients of interest are reported. Controls (GDPI per capita, GDPI growth rate, real deposit rate, terms of trade, inflation, flow of private sector credit, old-age dependency ratio, urban population ratio, public saving) and time fixed-effects are included in all specifications (the coefficients are not reported here but are available on request from the authors). Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

<table><caption>**Table A14.** Summary of the regression results including trust in politicians and the quality of political institutions simultaneously</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Pooled OLS</th><th>OLS FE</th><th>OLS FD</th><th>2SLS FE</th><th>2SLS FD</th><th>S-GMM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Quality of political institutions</th><td>-1.712**<br>(0.716)</td><td>-0.542<br>(0.508)</td><td>-0.591<br>(0.652)</td><td>-0.0657<br>(2.949)</td><td>-2.766<br>(2.479)</td><td>-0.416<br>(1.169)</td></tr><tr><th>Trust in politicians</th><td>3.996***<br>(0.865)</td><td>1.966***<br>(0.733)</td><td>1.901***<br>(0.619)</td><td>1.133<br>(1.503)</td><td>4.001***<br>(1.024)</td><td>1.435<br>(1.091)</td></tr></tbody></table>

The reported coefficients come from six separate regressions. For each regression, only the coefficients of interest are reported. Controls (GDPI per capita, GDPI growth rate, real deposit rate, terms of trade, inflation, flow of private sector credit, old-age dependency ratio, urban population ratio, public saving) and time fixed-effects are included in all specifications (the coefficients are not reported here but are available on request from the authors). Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

<footnote>Cite this article: Facchini F, Massin S, Brookes K (2024). The relationship between institutional quality, trust and private savings. *Journal of Institutional Economics* 20, e8, 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137423000346</footnote>