Olga Poetzsch and Felix zur Nieden (DESTATIS, Germany, 33) explain that in Germany, each assumption corresponds to the net migration observed during a period in the past: "Under each assumption, average net immigration over the entire projection period corresponds to a specific reference period from the past. Although there will be no repeat in the future of migratory movements from the past, such movements do show the range within which net migration might vary under different scenarios. This range is regarded as a hypothetical corridor for the future development of migration."

Some experts find that a net migration fixed from 2021 at the target level of the variants is a good solution (14, 18, 20, 22, 30). As Didier Blanchet (CSR-Retraites, 14) puts it, this is a way of showing uncertainty "une façon de montrer qu'il y a aussi de l'incertitude à court terme, ce que les transitions progressives vers les trajectoires cibles ont tendance à minimiser". Patrick Simon suggests to have a fluctuant target : "moduler les prévisions en ne maintenant pas un solde stable sur toute la période".

<table><caption>Figure 4.7 - Experts' views on net migration and its variants</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="8">Assumptions (in thousands)</th></tr><tr><th></th><th colspan="3">70</th><th colspan="3">80</th><th>130</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>baseline</th><td colspan="3"></td><td colspan="3"></td><td></td></tr><tr><th>low</th><td>no response</td><td>20</td><td>40</td><td>40</td><td>25</td><td>0</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><th>high</th><td>no response</td><td>120</td><td>120</td><td>120</td><td>150</td><td>160</td><td>200</td></tr><tr><th colspan="8">Number of responses</th></tr><tr><th>Researchers</th><td>1</td><td>1</td><td></td><td></td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td></td></tr><tr><th>OSS</th><td>1</td><td>3</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td></td><td></td><td>1</td></tr><tr><th>NSI</th><td></td><td>3</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

## PANDEMIC AND MIGRATION

The experts provided a lot of input on this complicated topic of the link between the pandemic and migration. The first question is what has happened/is happening in terms of migration in 2020¹⁸ and 2021.

Several experts expect decreases in flows (8, 18, 21, 26, 32, 36), sometimes emphasising the impact on one component, such as the outflow of non-immigrants (21). For Marie Vandresse, from the Federal Planning Bureau, Belgium, there will undoubtedly be an impact: "« À court

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Insee has published an estimate of the balance for 2020, based on the arithmetic average of the 2015, 2016 and 2017 balances (Papon, Beaumel, 2021). However, as Gwenaël Solard of INSEE reminded us, this estimate is surrounded by an even greater margin of uncertainty than usual with the health crisis (and the closure of borders).</footnote>
terme (2020 et 2021), le solde migratoire sera selon moi largement impacté par la crise sanitaire. Beaucoup de mouvements ont été interdits".

The situation in different countries is mentioned. But each situation seems different. As Helen Hughes (ONS, UK, 29) states: "This point seems to be one of the most critical ones as there are some challenges in getting a clear picture of international migration in 2020 and the scale and timings of any moves will be heavily influenced by policy in different countries (e.g. points at which borders were closed, calls for citizens to return home, etc). "

Thus Marie Vandresse (Federal Planning Bureau, Belgium, 36) cites a Dutch study " sur les flux migratoires en 2020, largement impactés par la Covid-19 (De Jong et al, 2021)". The cited publication shows that **in the Netherlands** there will be a sharp decline in the inflow of "first generation" immigrants and in the outflow of Dutch nationals to other countries. These decreases are observed from January to October 2020 compared to the same months in 2018 and 2019.

In **Sweden**, according to Lena Lundkvist (Statistics Sweden, 35): "Emigration was relatively stable in 2020, while immigration declined significantly, among other factors as a consequence of the pandemic".

Dragos Mundiru (32) rather points to an increase in flows for 2020 in **Romania**: "For 2020 we have signals that immigration flow will be increased compared with the previous years".

Philippe Louchart cites a study that shows signs of a very sharp decline in the **UK** population, estimated to be as much as 1.3 million compared to 2019 (O'Connor et al., 2021), comparing Employment surveys from both years. This decrease would be due to departures of foreigners settled in the UK returning to their country of origin, under the joint influence of the Brexit, the pandemic and the subsequent economic difficulties. In France, there have been no similar developments (at least not on a large scale) in the Employment surveys, and the British development could, on the contrary, lead to an increase in inflows into France: through the return of French expatriates to the UK <fnref n="19" />(29) or through the strengthening of France's attractiveness compared to the UK, particularly for intra-EU migration (13, 35). For Arkadiusz Wisniowski (13): "Another factor might be the aftermath of Brexit. It may make France more attractive as a destination for EU internal movers. This effect will be confounded by the impacts of the pandemic and direct economic aftermath".

In **Australia**, according to a study cited by Helen Hughes (ONS, UK, 29), the pandemic could cause a population decline of 1.4 million, or 4% of the population, by 2040 in the most severe pandemic impact scenario, i.e. a zero balance in 2020 and 2021, a gradual recovery and a

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ It is estimated that in 2019 there were 185,000 French people living in the UK (Lê, Leservot, 2021).</footnote>
return to the past average balance after 8 years (Charles-Edwards et al., 2021). The other scenarios are based on a more moderate decline in the balance.

Antonio Argueso (INE, Spain, 26) said that **Spain** assumed zero flows in the second half of 2020 and reproduced the 2020 assumptions for 2021.

However, these exceptional variations in flows are only significant if they do not offset each other, i.e. if the drop in inflows is not made up for by a drop in outflows, or even if the return of additional expatriates to France is not offset by the departure of immigrants to their country of origin (22, 35). This compensation is observed in **Norway** as reported by Astri Syse and Michael Thomas (Statistics Norway, 35): "I believe one alternative should acknowledge that net migration could become negative, although not very likely. In Norway we have observed little effect on net migration, but our immigration and emigration rates have dropped significantly during Covid (thus cancelling each other out in terms of net migration). "

Moreover, the reductions in flows observed in 2020 and 2021 could be offset in the medium term. This is what Marie Vandresse (Federal Planning Bureau, Belgium, 36) says: "On pourrait d'ailleurs assister un effet de récupération à moyen terme. En effet, une partie des projets migratoires non réalisés durant la crise pourrait être reportée (et non définitivement abandonnés) ". Patrick Simon (10) shares this opinion on the possibility of a catch-up: "Il me semble que la contraction des migrations liées à la pandémie risque de provoquer un rattrapage dans les premières années de réouverture des circulations internationales. Il serait mieux d'intégrer ces fluctuations avec plusieurs hypothèses dans les projections".

On the long-term effect of the pandemic, Astri Syse and Michael Thomas (Statistics Norway) suggest drawing on the 2008 crisis: "In terms of any lasting effects of COVID, it could be worth considering the patterns that were observed in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. There may be a reduction in immigration and emigration, even once things open up, but international migration did recover after a few years".

All in all, all these elements indicate that the years 2020 and 2021 will undoubtedly be totally atypical in terms of migratory flows in France. But it is not clear if net migration will be affected in the long term. Moreover, as Sylvain Papon of Insee points out, the net migration for 2020 and 2021 and their precise breakdown by category of flow will never be known precisely: "L'année 2021 sera a priori une année marquée par la faiblesse des arrivées d'immigrés comme 2020, de retour d'expatriés (?) et de moindre départ (notamment d'étudiants, mais pas seulement). Entre un effet à la baisse et deux effets à la hausse, difficile de conclure sur son niveau. Mais le problème est ailleurs : l'estimation du solde de l'année 2021 ne sera de toute façon jamais mesurable ni mesuré. Le fait de se baser sur les données du recensement (RP), qui « lisse » ce genre d'événements et du bilan démographique, qui moyenne ces événements lissés sur les dernières années observées, ne permet pas d'étudier une (seule) année donnée. Ce solde migratoire n'a de sens que sur un intervalle de temps long : le RP précise bien d'ailleurs qu'il ne faut comparer deux points qu'éloignés d'au moins 5 ans. Ainsi,
élaborer un solde migratoire spécifique pour l'année 2021 me paraît inutile et relève de la divination. Porter le solde à chacune de ces hypothèses dès l'année 2021 paraît plus prudent".

BREAK DOWN THE BALANCE BY CATEGORY AND BY INFLOW AND OUTFLOW

Several experts suggest **projecting inflows and outflows separately** (14, 19, 26, 27, 31, 37) and by category, according to place of birth (distinguishing between immigrants and non-immigrants). For Livia Varga and Zoltan Csanyi (KSH, Hungary, 37), projecting the net migration can only be a last resort. Antonio Argueso (INE, Spain, 26) explained that in Spain, inflows and outflows are projected separately, with a further distinction between people born in Spain and people born abroad. Gautier Maigne (France Stratégie, 19) suggests breaking down inflows and outflows, and within inflows distinguishing between family, humanitarian and economic immigration. Didier Blanchet (CSR-Retraites, 14) stresses expatriates return flows : "l'intérêt d'une modélisation plus fine d'éventuels phénomènes de retour des expatriés, qui nécessiterait d'en projeter le stock". Astri Syse and Michael Thomas (Statistics Norway, 35) stress the opposite phenomenon: immigrants have a higher propensity to leave than non-immigrants. For Arkadiusz Wisniowski (13), "studying the evolution of the specific sub-populations, such as immigrants and non-immigrants as you name them, and their emi- and immigration patterns, is more insightful than looking at net migration of all of them". The article he cites to support his point (Bijak et al., 2020) shows that analysis of the different flows in the UK and modelling tailored to each component can improve the projection: "There is no single forecasting approach that would be well suited for different flows. We therefore recommend adopting a tailored approach to forecasts, and applying a risk management framework to their results, taking into account the levels of uncertainty of the individual flows, as well as the differences in their potential societal impact.

The separate projection of the different flows would even have practical applications: it would be useful for the spatial declination of the projections (Philippe Louchart, 6), for projecting pension expenditure, because people born in France are likely to have contributed even if they live abroad (Pascale Breuil, Cnav, 15). Moreover, in Sweden, Lena Lundkvist (Statistics Sweden) explains that the projections distinguish different populations according to place of birth (Sweden, other Scandinavian or EU countries, Africa, Asia, others) "because there is a demand for this statistics from different governmental agencies."

A separate projection of flows would indeed make it possible to project the evolution of the proportion of people born in France and people born abroad or immigrants. Patrick Simon (10) recalls the potential political and media dimension of such projections: "Je pense qu'il est important d'affiner les paramètres relatifs aux migrations dans les projections, eu égard à la politisation du débat à ce sujet. Il me semble qu'il y aura une lecture des résultats qui ne se limitera pas à l'évolution globale de la population, mais qui s'intéressera à la part des
populations immigrées à chaque période. Ce n'est sans doute pas votre sujet d'intérêt, mais il est inévitable que cette dimension soit fortement médiatisée, donc il faut l'anticiper un peu."

In any case, such a separate projection of flows seems to us to be out of reach in the French case because it is hampered by the availability of reliable data by type of flow for the past. It is true that estimates have been available since 2006 of inflows and outflows according to whether or not people are immigrants. But they are fairly volatile and the methods of calculating estimates, particularly for outflows, mean that the variations observed may also be attributable to changes in the census protocol or in the conditions of its collection. The net migration is in fact derived from the change in population between two censuses. Inflows are estimated by counting the persons who indicate that they did not live in France the previous year in their Census questionnaire. The volume of outflows is deduced from the two previous figures. Moreover, we asked the experts for explanations for the recent volatility of outflows, particularly of non-immigrants. A few clues were suggested, such as employment prospects abroad and variations in recruitment by large international companies (10, 24b). But the analysis would require additional data (10), as Philippe Louchart (6) says: "La forte volatilité du solde migratoire des personnes non immigrées mériterait une analyse plus détaillée selon les pays et/ou par grande catégorie (étudiants, expatriés sur contrat court, ...) mais ces informations ne semblent pas disponibles ». Jérôme Lê (Insee, 17) reminds us of the uncertainty of the data: "Pour le solde migratoire de 2017, l'effet observé (chute des départs de non-immigrés) me semble être surtout un effet de questionnaire ou de protocole. Il est possible qu'il soit en partie réel mais plusieurs indicateurs semblent montrer qu'il est largement surestimé (retours de non-immigrés stables, sorties négatives au-delà de 65 ans)".

Distinguishing flows according to their main reason is also hampered by the availability of data. The reasons for immigration can be approached by the types of residence permits issued. These residence permits are only required for nationals of countries outside the European Union, which excludes persons of French or European nationality. Moreover, the issue of a residence permit does not always coincide with arrival in France (for example, for people who study in France and then settle there).

For these reasons, we proposed a less ambitious approach, already adopted in 2016, which consists in using the evolution of recent flows to give an interpretation of the net migration: which decomposition would be compatible with the baseline assumption on net migration and its variants?

Several experts support this approach more or less explicitly (14, 17, 20), such as Jérôme Lê (Insee, 17) who stresses that immigrant and non-immigrant flows are distinct phenomenon : " Oui ! la distinction entre immigrés et non-immigrés me semble très importante car ce sont deux phénomènes très différents. À moins de changements forts sur la politique migratoire, la tendance sur les immigrés devrait se poursuivre. Pour les non-immigrés, je pense que les départs vont se poursuivre car c'est une tendance mondiale de tous les pays de l'OCDE."
On the contrary, some experts find this approach risky (21, 34), such as Laurent Toulemon (12): "Je n'ai pas l'impression que la décomposition selon le lieu de naissance (très informative et utile par ailleurs) permette de réduire l'incertitude (cela justifie plutôt une augmentation de l'incertitude, puisque deux éléments opposés du solde (sortie de natifs et entrés d'immigrés) augmentent. [...] Je ne m'y risquerais pas, compte tenu des grandes incertitudes sur ces estimations issues du recensement ». Il est vrai qu'un même solde est compatible avec plusieurs évolutions des différents flux." It is true that the same balance is compatible with several changes in the various flows.

Interpretations with a different reading grid are proposed. Marie Vandresse (Federal Planning Bureau, Belgium, 36) would favour assumptions based on demographic reasoning: "davantage en faveur d'un scénario qui se justifie sur la base d'arguments « démographiques » /économiques/sociétaux plutôt que sur une hausse de x pourcent (ou unités). Par ailleurs, les implications sont différentes si cette hausse/baisse du solde s'explique par une hausse/baisse de l'immigration ou de l'émigration".

For Misha Khodabin, Hamza Zakraoui and Samuel Ménard (DG Trésor, 21), stress the importance of telling a story: "au-delà des valeurs prises, il serait intéressant de sous-tendre ces hypothèses basses et hautes par un narratif. Un solde migratoire net faible pourrait ainsi être justifié par le développement économique des pays à revenu intermédiaire, qui absorberaient davantage de flux migratoires, ou par un durcissement des politiques migratoires dans les pays avancés. Inversement la crise climatique pourrait induire une intensification des pressions migratoires (selon les hypothèses retenues sur les trappes à pauvreté)."

FEMALE BALANCE, MALE BALANCE

We asked the experts whether they had any explanations for the sex ratio and the growing gap between the female and male net migrations, and how they saw this situation developing. Many experts indicated that they would have liked a more detailed analysis by country of origin and/or reason for entry in order to be able to give an opinion (30, 31, 34, 35, 36, and 2 anonymous) and mentioned family reasons, which are more female. Thus Gautier Maigne (France Stratégie, 19) mentions female shares in different types of flows: "« la part actuelle de l'immigration familiale en France, qui concerne surtout les femmes », " une féminisation des flux liés aux études », "les hommes continuent à être surreprésentés dans le cadre de la seule immigration économique, certes assez faible en France. L'immigration dite humanitaire peut aussi plutôt masculine (comme cela a été noté lors de la « crise des réfugiés"Sylvain Papon (Insee, 22) takes up the same categories and adds that women could become an important part of economic inflows : "[si les femmes] sont pour le moment minoritaires pour
les entrées sur critère professionnel, cela pourrait changer dans les années à venir compte tenu de l'augmentation générale du niveau d'éducation des filles dans le monde."

While it is true that the sex ratio could be affected by the evolution of these different categories, it seems that current inflows of **immigrant** are rather balanced, as Virginie Jourdan, Loreline Court and Florian Hatier of the DSED indicate (18): "Au niveau des entrées sur le territoire, sur la base des données sur les titres de séjour délivrés, nous n'observons pas des différences importantes par sexe les flux d'entrées sont plutôt équilibrés." Overall, according to the latest estimates from the census (Lê, 2021), immigrant entries in 2017 were also balanced (52% female), as indeed were non-immigrant entries (51%). The imbalance can therefore only come from the outflow of non-immigrants, and in particular from the fact that men are more likely to leave than women. But there is little evidence to support this estimate, which is measured indirectly, as mentioned above. Jérôme Lê (Insee, 17) adds that foreign data do not indicate such an imbalance: "C'est assez étonnant en effet. Les hommes non-immigrés quittent plus souvent la France selon les estimations mais pourtant, dans les recensements étrangers, on ne retrouve pas ce déséquilibre entre hommes et femmes nés en France et vivant à l'étranger..."

Arkadiusz Wisniowski (13) mentions factors that could affect the sex ratio of the various flows: "the duration of the phenomenon will depend on the technological development, composition of job shortages in France, and women emancipation patterns in countries of origin".

In the end, most experts do not really have an opinion on the evolution of this imbalance, but some suggest returning to a more balanced composition of net migration (12, 30, 33, 34), especially since this imbalance could affect the number of births. Misha Khadabin, Hamza Zakraoui and Samuel Ménard suggest that we quantify its impact.

Few comment on net migration by sex and age in the variants. Laurent Toulemon (12) suggests that we keep the same distribution by sex and age in the three scenarios, to keep things simple : « [garder] la même répartition par sexe et âge dans les trois scénarios, tout en expliquant que d'autres profils seraient possibles mais que des scénarios plus sophistiqués n'apporteraient que peu de changement aux résultats et les rendraient moins simples à comprendre et à utiliser."

For Sylvain Papon (Insee, 22), the sex ratio could be different in variants: "dans le cas de l'hypothèse haute, qui serait la conséquence de politiques de migration nouvelles ou de demandes d'asile (climatique ou non) en forte hausse, la part des deux sexes pourrait davantage s'équilibrer. En résumé, conserver le déséquilibre dans le cas des hypothèses basse et centrale paraît plausible, mais beaucoup moins dans le cas de l'hypothèse haute."
NET MIGRATION: CENTRAL ASSUMPTION OF +70,000/YEAR, VARIANTS AT +/- 50,000

**The baseline assumption for net migration has been maintained at 70,000.** This has many advantages, given the high uncertainty surrounding the evolution of net migration: it corresponds to the average of the last few years observed, the UN and Eurostat projections use similar assumptions, and it was the central assumption of the previous INSEE projection exercise in 2016.

Several experts have suggested that we raise the low assumption, but the update of the work of Vianney Costemalle (Box 9) suggests the possibility of negative net migration. The confidence interval obtained on the basis of the 1995-2017 trend would be [-10,000; + 138,000]. Given these somewhat contradictory arguments, the 2016 assumptions were maintained for the variants, with a low assumption of +20,000 and a high assumption of +120,000. The working scenario is also kept identical to 2016, with zero net migration at each age. It can be interpreted either as an unrealistic and counterfactual scenario: "What would happen if there were no migration at all?", or as a possible scenario, keeping in mind then that it is not a question of assuming zero migrations but flows of entries and exits of the same magnitude, which compensate each other.
<figure><img src="image_43.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4.8 - Net migration from 2000 to 2070</figcaption></figure>

Coverage: France

NET MIGRATION OF +70,000 BUT SEVERAL INTERPRETATIONS IN TERMS OF INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS

**A separate projection according to different flows is out of reach,** even if many experts suggest it and Eurostat has introduced this method. The lack of data on outflows makes their estimation dependent on methodological developments in the census, with no corroboration possible. As suggested by the experts, one can only hope for progress in the accuracy of the data and the analysis of the different flows by the next projections in 2026. **The interpretation by the different categories of flows is nevertheless instructive,** as it reminds us that net migration is the result of different migratory flows, in and out, and not simply the number of immigrants entering France in a given year. It also reminds us that the annual net migration depends on the evolution of these different flows, each influenced by different factors, and that it is therefore variable, and probably all the more so when it is the result of larger movements that offset each other, as has been the case in recent years. It therefore allows us to insist on the fact that the baseline assumption concerns the average between now and 2070 and that each year the net migration varies and will vary greatly. On the **other hand,** it **is only illustrative, since the evolution of the various flows is even more uncertain than that of the net migration.**

**Various situations are compatible with a balance of +70,000.** It may correspond to an immigrant balance of +170,000 and a non-immigrant balance of -100,000, a situation close to the average observed over the decade 2006-2017. But if we continue the linear upward trend in immigrant inflows between 2006 and 2019, these inflows could reach 580,000 in 2070. The same exercise for non-immigrant outflows, extending the 2006-2017 trend, results in 750,000
in 2070. It is likely that these increases would be accompanied by return movements and therefore by an increase in the flow of outflows of immigrants and inflows of non-immigrants. A net migration of +70,000 is thus compatible with much larger flows of immigrants (580,000 inflows, 140,000 outflows, net migration of 440,000) and non-immigrants (380,000 inflows, 750,000 outflows, net migration of - 370,000). This arithmetical exercise simply shows that the same net migration is compatible with quite different, but nevertheless relatively plausible, developments: on the one hand, a stabilisation of flows at their past level, and on the other, an increase in mobility that is in line with recent trends.

THE PANDEMIC LEADS TO A HIGH DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FLOWS IN 2020 AND 2021

There is considerable uncertainty as to what has happened / will happen between the start of the **pandemic** and the end of its effects, with the first data abroad showing very contrasting developments from one country to another. In France, the Brexit and the 2008 crisis seem to have had little influence on migration flows with the UK (Lê and Leservot, 2021) and more generally on net migration. Above all, the measurement of net migration is always marked by strong uncertainties: the 'real' population movements in 2020 and 2021 will never be known.

**We therefore propose to maintain in all variants the levels of net at +87,000 in 2020 and +70,000 in 2021, and to apply the values of the variants without transition from 2021.**

In order to estimate the extent to which a revision of the migration balances for 2020-2022 could affect the situation in 2070, we have carried out **sensitivity tests in a variant of the baseline scenario**. The idea is to imagine that there are (or were) movements in 2020-2022 that are not offset by carry-over movements in subsequent years and that do not offset each other. For simplicity, since the projection starts in 2021, we propose two tests that vary the flows in 2021 and 2022²⁰ and correspond to contrasting situations:

* 1er test case :

  In 2021 and 2022, a significant flow of returning expatriates who do not leave in the following years is added to the other flows, which are not modified. To have an order of magnitude, we propose to assume the "final" return of 10% of the people who left during the past decade 2011-2020, estimated via the 2008-2017 outflow of non-immigrants<fnref n="21" />, i.e. 209,000. These returns occur in two years, so 104,500 additional entries in 2021 and the same in 2022. This makes a net migration of 174,500 in 2021 and 2022.

<footnote n="20">²⁰ It is more likely that, if there were variations, they occurred mainly in 2020 and 2021. But this does not change the impact much by 2070.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Cross-reference to site data</footnote>
* 2^nd^ test cases, symmetrical :

In 2021 and 2022, a significant flow of recent arrivals to France returning to their country of origin is added to the other flows, which are not modified. It is proposed to retain the same order of magnitude of 10% of the people who entered during the 2011-2020 decade, estimated via the 2008-2017 immigrant entries, i.e. 231,000. This makes 115,500 in 2021 and 2022, which brings the net migration in these two years to -45,500.

An estimate of the impact on the projection results is shown in **Box 10**.

NET MIGRATION IS TWO-THIRDS FEMALE, NEGATIVE BETWEEN 18 AND 26 AND POSITIVE AT OTHER AGES

Once the target net migration and its variants have been decided, the question arises of its distribution by sex and age. The increase in the share of women seems too sudden and recent to be maintained at the same level until the end of the projection period. **We assume a male net migration of +25,000 and a female net migration of +45,000, which corresponds approximately to a distribution of 1/3 men and 2/3 women.** This is slightly more unbalanced than in the 2016 projections, but slightly less unbalanced than in the latest available data.

Comparisons between the number of young children and the number of births registered in France at the civil registry suggest possible omissions in the census, particularly for newborns, but also, more generally, for young children. This deficit of young children in the census is not specific to France. It distorts net migration by age. For the projections published in 2016, a correction had been applied to spread the deficit over the 0-2 year olds. However, a correction is proposed in a report recently published on the quality of census estimates, correction that can be applied globally to the age pyramid (Solard 2020, appendix 2, pages 92 and following). **This method makes it possible to correct the net migration at young ages.** The correction, which does not change the size of the population but only its distribution by age, does not modify the results of the projection and, on the other hand, makes it possible to display net migrations by age that are easier to interpret. Compared to the 2016 method, the main change is to smooth the 0-8 year olds rather than the 0-2 year olds. Research has shown that after 6-8 years of age, the deficit of children of a generation in the census is absorbed. Smoothing over this age group makes it possible to obtain net migrations close to zero at young ages, which is more credible than a strongly negative balance at 0 years or between 0 and 2 years if we smooth over this age group alone.
<figure><img src="image_44.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4.9 - Distribution of the net migration by age in the central scenario</figcaption></figure>

Based on the assumption of a total net migration of +45,000 for women and +25,000 for men, the distribution by age is carried out for each sex according to the distribution key of the average migratory balance for 2015-2017, smoothed by moving average. The net migration of 0-8 year olds is redistributed within the age group according to a distribution key inspired by that obtained for the 2012 net migration by interpolation of the pyramids (Solard, 2020). The correction is applied progressively: the net migration remains at the same level from 2021 to 2030, but its composition by sex and age gradually approaches the target composition shown in Figure 4.9, and reaches it in 2030.

In 2016, the assumption was that the high (resp. low) variant was reached by an increase (resp. decrease) in the volume of inflows, with outflows assumed to be stable. This assumption seems less in line with the evolution of the last years, which shows a high volatility of the outflows. This is why it was chosen to distribute by age the 50,000 additional persons, allowing to switch from the baseline scenario to the high variant, according to the average of inflows and outflows observed over the period 2017-2019²². According to these data, during the 2017-2019 period, half of the inflows and seven out of ten outflows were between 18 and 34 years old. This justifies the assumption that changes in the net migration will be due mainly to changes in behaviour at these young ages, whether through immigration or emigration.

<footnote n="22">²² https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/fr/web/main/data/database</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_45.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4-10 Distribution of plus and minus persons for the net migration variants</figcaption></figure>

This distribution key is used for men and women, so as to reach the targets defined for each sex, making it possible to reach approximately one-third men and two-thirds women: 13,000 women and 7,000 men in the low variant; 80,000 women and 40,000 men in the high variant (Figure 4.10). As with the baseline assumption, the gender and age distribution of the high and low variants gradually evolves towards its target from 2021 to 2030.

<figure><img src="image_46.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4-11 Age distribution of net migration in the three variants, 2030-2070</figcaption></figure>
Box 9 - Probabilistic projection of net migration, an update of V. Costemalle's work

Vianney Costemalle carried out Bayesian probabilistic projections for France using the component method (Costemalle, 2020). For net migration, he used a first-order autoregressive model, imposing a stationary process. He explains that "this modelling reflects the fact that it is estimated that net migration will continue to be stable on average and will oscillate around a long-term trend. The amplitude of possible future oscillations is determined by past amplitudes. Furthermore, a very informative a priori is set with regard to the long-term trend by assuming, as was the case in the work of Blanpain & Buisson, that this can be estimated from the average net migration over the recent period, i.e 80,000 people. [...] To project the total net migration, the model parameters are randomly drawn 1,000 times according to their a posteriori distribution and for each set of parameters, the development of the net migration is simulated according to the first order autoregressive process".

We have reproduced his model in its entirety, thanks to the programs he sent us, for which we
thank him warmly. The only changes concern the geographical coverage and the past reference
period. The net migration projected in the initial article from the 1995-2013 data for metropolitan
France "follows a stable trajectory as this was specified in the model. The median of the 1,000
possible trajectories decreases in the first few years of projections before rapidly stabilizing at
79,000. The confidence interval also remains constant over time: at a probability of 95%, net
migration will remain at between 29,000 and 129,000 each year. This amplitude is due to the
significant fluctuations observed in the past, and slightly exceeds the minimum and maximum
observed in 1996 and 2006 respectively". If we reproduce his method for France-wide data over
the period 1995-2017, we see an increase in the 95% confidence interval by 2070 (**figure, column
3**), due to the greater fluctuations of net migration during the 2014-2017 period: the minimum
observed over the period 1995-2017 is the net migration of 2014 (+32,000) and the maximum
that of 2017 (+155,000). Furthermore, by modifying the long-term average to +70,000, the
average observed for France over the period 1995-2017, the result is that at a probability of 95%,
net migration will remain at between -10,000 and +138,000 each year.

Net migration in 2070: 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles and median of the a posteriori distributions

<figure><img src="image_47.png" /></figure>
Box 10 - Pandemic and net migration in France: sensitivity tests

In comparison with the baseline scenario, two alternative assumptions are tested:

* first test scenario: In 2021 and 2022, a large flow of **returning emigrants**, who do not leave in the following years, is added to the other flows, which are not modified. To get an order of magnitude, we propose to assume the "definitive" return of 10% of the people who left during the past decade 2011-2020, estimated via the outflow of non-immigrants 2008-2017, i.e. 209,000. These returns occur in two years, so 104,500 additional inflow in 2021 and the same in 2022. Net migration is thus of 174,500 in 2021 and 2022.

* second test scenario, symmetrical: In 2021 and 2022, a large flow of people who have recently arrived in France return to their country of origin is added to the other flows which are not modified. We speak of **returning immigrants**. We propose to retain the same order of magnitude of 10% of the people who entered during the 2011-2020 decade, estimated via the 2008-2017 immigrant entries, i.e. 231,000. This means 115,500 additional outflows in 2021 and 2022. **The balance for these two years is negative, at -45,500.**

The population is immediately affected by about +/-200,000 people, which corresponds to the change in net migration. By 2070, the effect is slightly amplified: +350,000 inhabitants in the case of the return of emigrants and - 330,000 in the case of the departure of immigrants. The effects on the ratio between people over 65 and people of working age are moderate and very much linked to the age structure of net migration: the return of immigrants worsens the ratio a little by 2050, while the return of emigrants improves it. However, the situation is reversed in 2070: the ratio between people over 65 and people of working age is 56.8 per cent in the central scenario, 56.7 per cent in the scenario of returning immigrants, and 57.0 per cent in the scenario of returning emigrants.
# PART 5 : DISSEMINATION

Experts were also interviewed on then dissemination of the results of the projections. The first question was phrased as follows:

**Are you satisfied with the dissemination of the 2016 projection results (accessibility of data, presentation of results, publication materials)?**

**What improvements do you think could be made?**

The majority of experts are satisfied with the dissemination, but many areas for improvement are suggested:

- **Communicate more about results in the short term, rather than in 2070.**

According to Jean-Francois LÉGER (5), more attention should be given to medium term results : " La présentation des résultats devrait moins mettre l'accent sur la situation hypothétique en 2070 mais davantage sur les résultats à un horizon de plus court terme. Se focaliser sur 2070 présente selon moi un seul intérêt pour l'Insee : celui de ne pas avoir à assumer les écarts entre réalité et simulation ! Sinon, sur le plan de l'éclairage de l'action publique, quelle action est mise en œuvre à un horizon de 50 ans et supposerait une information (avec toutes les réserves inhérentes aux projections de long terme) sur la composition de la population française en 2070 ?"

→ We can indicate here that, in the 2016 projections, the emphasis in terms of studies was on the results for 2070 but not only. When presenting the projections, Insee often insisted on the different evolutions to be expected by 2030-2040, for example on the proportion of the elderly population, and those by 2070, when the large generations resulting from the baby-boom will be extinct (Blanpain and Buisson, 2016). We will reproduce this distinction in the first study carried out with the 2021 projections, because as Jean-Francois LÉGER points out, these messages are important in terms of public policy.

- **Update the projections more regularly, especially the starting point.**

According to Philippe LOUCHART (6), it would be useful to update the starting point : "Il s'agirait moins d'améliorer la diffusion selon moi que de mettre à jour plus facilement les projections réalisées, en actualisant régulièrement le point de départ, voire les hypothèses retenues, pour éviter les décalages importants qui pourraient survenir dès les premières années, en particulier dans ce contexte fortement incertain. Ces travaux sont effet utilisés à la fois pour éclairer le futur lointain dans le cadre de travaux comme les Schémas Directeurs ou les réflexions sur le ZAN (Zéro Artificialisation Nette) comme le ZEN (Zéro Emissions Nettes) mais aussi à plus court-terme dans le cadre d'études scolaires. L'alimentation des modèles de déplacements
(Antonin ou Modus) conduit aussi à mettre à jour chaque année, à une échelle géographique fine, ces travaux de projections destinées aussi bien à éclairer dans ce temps les évolutions attendues à court-terme et à long-terme".

→ We have indeed found that the gap between the 2016 projections and recent data is sometimes large. Between 2019 and 2021, we frequently advised users to rely on the scenario with the low mortality and fertility assumptions and the baseline migration assumption because it was more in line with recent trends than the baseline 2016 scenario. The large number of scenarios thus gives reason to hope that if a new gap between the new baseline projection and the latest developments were to be observed, at least one of the scenarios would be able to reflect this. The consultation of experts and the production of the projections represent a significant workload that is difficult to implement more frequently than every 5 years.

- **Disseminate results in English** (13 Arkadiusz WISNIOWSKI, 35 Astri SYSE and Michael THOMAS, Statistics Norway)

→ The Insee Première and the working paper will be translated into English. These two documents will be distributed to the experts interviewed. A translation of the web page dedicated to the projections could be envisaged.

- **Disseminate long series including older data** in the same format as the projected series in order to facilitate the use for graphics (15 Pascale BREUIL, Cnav, 12 Laurent TOULEMON)

→ Past data will be made available with projected data indicating their status (final, provisional, projected), as well as changes in geographical coverage.

- **Disseminating results at the household level** (19 Gautier MAIGNE, France Stratégie)

→ In 2006, INSEE carried out a 2005-2030 projection of the number of households for metropolitan France (Jacquot, 2006 a and b).

In 2012, the Service de l'observation et des statistiques (SOeS) updated these household projections.

For these new population projections, neither Insee nor, to our knowledge, any other organization, is planning to make a breakdown by household.

- **Disseminate data on the inflow of immigrants.**

According to Clément ROUSSET, Drees (24), it would be useful for pension models: "Pour les modèles de retraites le solde migratoire ne nous suffit pas car un immigré reparti peut encore toucher une retraite française. Ainsi la donnée du flux entrant d'immigré est primordiale. Il me semble que dans la projection 2016 seul le solde migratoire était donné. Nous aurions vraiment besoin du détail avec le flux entrant seul".

→ INSEE now regularly publishes estimates of immigrant and non-immigrant flows in recent years (Lê, 2021). We fully understand the interest of having such data for
projections, but the data on flows are partly deduced from net migration, which is itself deduced from the difference in the population stock between two censuses. It makes it difficult to use them for projections. Projected net migration data by sex and age will be made available.

- **Disseminate data at a finer geographical level** (region/township / city) even if it is over a shorter period (10 years) (24b BRET, BHD and BPS, Drees).

→ The Omphale model will be updated with the new projections. This INSEE model is used to make medium/long-term population projections for any territory with more than 50,000 inhabitants.

- **Gather projection data on a single page** because the INSEE site is not always easy to access (23 Gwenaël PODESTA, DGEC)

→ The results are posted on a page dedicated to projections (https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/2546485). Users often ask us for help because this page is not easily accessible. Moreover, a different page also points to publications on projections (https://www.insee.fr/fr/metadonnees/source/serie/s1316). The ergonomics could be modified to improve accessibility.

- **Provide data on the confidence interval and/or communicate well that the different scenarios do not represent a confidence interval**, which helps users' understanding (27 Kim DUSTAN, Statistics New Zealand, 36 Marie VANDRESSE, Bureau Fédéral du Plan, Belgium)

→ Some confidence intervals on the assumptions are presented in this working paper.

- **Provide more detailed data for each scenario: population by sex and age** (34 Branislav SPROCHA, Slovakia), **life expectancy by sex** (21, Misha KHODABIN, Hamza ZAKRAOUI, Samuel MENARD, DG Treasury)

→ These results have already been released for the 2016 projections in Insee Résultats (https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2518406?sommaire=2496793) and will also be made available online for future projections. Improved accessibility would be desirable: for example, it is impossible to know before downloading the results for a given scenario that they are very detailed, and include life expectancy by sex at birth, at age 60 and at age 65 for each projection year.

- **Present the results online.** According to Lena LUNDKVIST (31), Statistics Sweden: "One thing that we received positive feedback in Sweden was online presentations (Skype/Zoom) of the results. Before corona, such seminars were often conducted in person in Stockholm. Digitally, persons from all over Sweden were able to participate at no cost."

→ At least one presentation seminar will be held.
- Compare the results of the new INSEE projections with the previous projections and those of Eurostat (anonymous)

→ Comparisons with the Eurostat assumptions and those of the old projections are available in this document.

- Provide presentation materials for the methodology to facilitate communication to local actors (anonymous)

→ A powerpoint will be posted on the seminar intranet page and on the INSEE page dedicated to projections (https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/2546485).

The second question on dissemination was phrased as follows:

**Q26. If you or your organization uses INSEE projections, for what types of work do you use them? Which scenario(s) do you use? Has this work been published?**

The uses of projections are varied:

- **Monitoring pensions or other public expenditures** (14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 24 a). Anthony MARINO and Amandine BRUN-SCHAMMÉ of the COR detailed its use of projections : "Le Conseil d'Orientation des Retraites utilise les projections de population de l'Insee dans le cadre de ses projections du système de retraite qui sont publiées dans un rapport annuel. Elles sont utiles à la fois pour projeter la situation financière du système et comparer les diverses dimensions de l'équité entre générations ou bien encore entre femmes et hommes, notamment la durée de retraite ».

- **Microsimulation models** used at Drees (24a, Clément ROUSSET, Drees, 24b, BRET, BHD and BPS, Drees) or at INSEE such as Destinie.

- **Response to politicians** (12 Laurent TOULEMON)

- **Scoping data for other projections** (5, 15, 23, 24b).

For example, as explained by Gwenaël PODESTA, DGEC (23), at the Ministry of Ecological Transition and Solidarity, INSEE projections are used to make climate and energy projections : "Ces projections permettent de dimensionner les stratégies Françaises (Stratégie nationale bas carbone, programmation pluriannuelle de l'énergie) et servent à élaborer les rapports communiqués à la Commission européenne et à la Convention climat des Nations Unies. NB : pour le dernier scénario en date (AME 2021), nous avons utilisé les projections eurostat plutôt que INSEE car
mieux calées sur les données récentes. Mais nous pensons revenir aux données INSEE pour les scénarios 2023".

Another example (BRET, BHD and BPS, DREES, 24b), the data are used in the field of health: "dans le cadre des travaux de projections d'effectifs de professionnels de santé, pour calculer d'une part des densités projetées de professionnels, d'autre part des densités standardisées selon la consommation de soins par âge. Les projections sont également déclinées par anciennes régions. Nous utilisons donc, pour chaque millésime de projection, les populations par sexe x âge (actuellement disponibles en ligne), et pour l'analyse régionale, les populations par sexe x âge x département, fournies par le PSAR Emploi-population".

- **Teaching in demography (university courses, seminars, conferences)** (5, 7, 12)

- **Studies at departmental or regional level** (5, 6, 15).

National scenarios are broken down by region, for example by Institut Paris Region, as Philippe Louchart (6) explains: " systématiquement les scénarios nationaux en Île-de-France en collaboration avec la DR Insee, la Driea, la Drihl et d'autres organismes régionaux car la déclinaison par région effectuée par l'Insee à l'échelle nationale a tendance à gommer voire à ignorer les spécificités du dynamisme démographique de la région capitale. Nous utilisons ces projections à la fois pour des travaux de long terme (Schéma directeur de la Région Île-de-France, alimentation des modèles de déplacements en Île-de-France, projections des personnes âgées dépendantes ...) et des travaux de court ou moyen-terme plus orientés vers les évolutions scolaires (primaire, collèges, lycées)".

- **Very short term** (8 Grégoire REY), **short or medium term** (5, 6, 15) or **long term** (6 Philippe LOUCHART) **studies**
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