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# Challenges for a just energy transition in Andean economies

Simón Ladino Cano

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Simón Ladino Cano. Challenges for a just energy transition in Andean economies: A comparative case study of La Guajira (Colombia) and Antofagasta (Chile). Humanities and Social Sciences. 2021. dumas-04136491

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# Challenges for a just energy transition in Andean economies

## A comparative case study of La Guajira (Colombia) and Antofagasta (Chile)

Présenté par **Simón Ladino Cano**

Sous la direction de **Sébastien Velut**

Mémoire de **Master 2** mention Sciences Sociales, Coopération et Développement en Amérique Latine/Latinamerican Studies.

Parcours-type **Master Erasmus Mundus Latin America and Europe in a Global World (LAGLOBE)**, avec les universités de Salamanque et Stockholm.

Mémoire présenté le 20 septembre 2021 à l'université Sorbonne Nouvelle

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Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Sébastien
Velut for patiently orienting me throughout this research. His
guidance and great interest were invaluable to me in this process of
academic and personal discovery. I would also like to acknowledge
the European Union for the funding that allowed me to devote myself
entirely to my studies over the past two years. To the participants of
this research, whose openness, kindness, and experience inspired me
to enter a fascinating field of studies. To my family, my parents and
my sister, in whose affection I find the best refuge. Today and
always, you are my compass in life. And last but not least, to Karen
Curiel whose relentless support has been indispensable to making the
most of this never-ending journey.
<table><tr><td>3.1.1.</td><td>Towards a large-scale and rapid transformation of the energy landscape</td><td>71</td></tr><tr><td>3.1.2.</td><td>Territorial impacts of renewable energies</td><td>76</td></tr><tr><td>3.1.3.</td><td>Renewable energy landscapes: revisiting the resource curse?</td><td>83</td></tr><tr><td>3.2.</td><td>Climate justice challenges: unexpected connections through coal value chain</td><td>86</td></tr><tr><td>3.2.1.</td><td>The indelible stain of coal in the 'sacrifice zones'</td><td>86</td></tr><tr><td>3.2.2.</td><td>Phasing out coal: contradictions across multiple scales</td><td>91</td></tr><tr><td>3.2.3.</td><td>The challenge of path dependence: addressing energy incumbency</td><td>101</td></tr><tr><td>3.3.</td><td>Energy justice challenges: lights and shadows of energy policies</td><td>104</td></tr><tr><td>3.3.1.</td><td>The various faces of energy poverty</td><td>104</td></tr><tr><td>3.3.2.</td><td>On winners and losers: uneven benefits of sustainable energy</td><td>109</td></tr><tr><td>3.3.3.</td><td>Renewable energy dilemmas</td><td>121</td></tr><tr><td>4.</td><td>Conclusions</td><td>125</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">ANNEX 1. Table of informants</td><td>132</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">ANNEX 2. Semi-structured interview protocol</td><td>134</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">REFERENCES</td><td>136</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">Tables & Figures Index</td><td>153</td></tr></table>
List of Acronyms

**AFOLU** Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses

**BCCh** Banco Central de Chile

**BP** British Petroleum Company

**CAC** Comité Asesor de Comercialización

**CASEN** Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional

**CCS** Comparative Case Study

**CEN** Coordinador Eléctrico Nacional

**CENSAT** Asociación Centro Nacional Salud, Ambiente y Trabajo

**CLP** Chilean pesos

**CNE** Comisión Nacional de Energía

**CO2** Carbon dioxide

**CODELCO** Compañía Nacional del Cobre

**CON** Consejo Nacional de Operación

**COP** UNFCCC Conference of the Parties

**COP** Colombian pesos

**CORFO** Corporación de Fomento de la Producción

**CREG** Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas

**CSP** Concentrated Solar Power

**DANE** Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística

**ECLAC** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

**EDF** Electricité de France

**EPM** Encuestas Públicas de Medellín

**ERE** Estado de Reserva Estratégica

**EU** European Union

**ETI** Energy Transition Index

**FEO** Firm Energy Obligations

**GDP** Gross Domestic Product

**GHG** Greenhouse Gas

**GIZ** Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit

**GPE** Geographical Political Economy

**GW** Gigawatt

**GWh** Gigawatt hour

**HDI** Human Development Index

**HVDC** High Voltage Direct Current

**ICEE** Índice de Cobertura de Energía Eléctrica

**IDB** Interamerican Development Bank

**IDEAM** Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales

**IEA** International Energy Agency

**ILO** International Labour Organization

**INDEPAZ** Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz

**INE** Instituto Nacional de Estadística
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IPPU Industrial Processes and Product Use

IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency

JTRC Just Transition Research Collaborative

LCOE Levelized Cost of Energy

MTE Misión de Transformación Energética

MW Megawatt

NCRE Non Conventional Renewable Energies

NDC Nationally Determined Contribution

NEC Net Effective Capacity

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OLADE Organización Latinoamericana de Energía

OPEX Operational expenditures

PELP Planificación Energética a Largo Plazo

PIEC Plan Indicativo de Expansión de Cobertura de Energía

PIEC Eléctrica

PPA Power Purchase Agreement

PV Photovoltaic

QCA Qualitative Comparative Analysis

RCA Resolución de Calificación Ambiental

REDPE Red de Pobreza Energética

RELAC Renewable Energy for Latin America

SDG Sustainable Development Goals

SDL Sistema de Distribución Local

SEC Sistema Interconectado Central

SEIA Sistema de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental

SEN Sistema Eléctrico Nacional

SIEL Sistema de Información Eléctrico Colombiano

SIN Sistema Interconectado Nacional

SING Sistema Interconectado Norte Grande

SNICHile Sistema Nacional de Inventario de Gases de Efecto

SNICHile Invernadero de Chile

SSP Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos

STN Sistema de Transmisión Nacional

STR Sistema de Transmisión Regional

TEBSA Termoeléctrica de Barranquilla S.A

TJ Terajoule

UBN Unsatisfied Basic Needs

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UPME Unidad de Planeación Minero-Energética

USD United State dollars

WEF World Economic Forum

WRI World Resources Institute
# 1. Introductory Chapter

This investigation aims to provide a comparative input to the still incipient field of social studies on energy transitions in Latin America. Beyond the realm of techno-managerial visions exclusively focused on the technical aspects of energy technologies and policies, the core reflection is linked to the tremendous challenges that the region must face to be part of the global energy transition under a perspective of justice, equity, and sustainability.

Through the implementation of a comparative case study and from the approach of geographic political economy, the objective of this research is to describe and understand the socio-spatial transformations operated by the transitions towards renewable energies in Colombia and Chile. Therefore, I seek to identify the justice-related challenges posed by the accelerated development of renewables in both countries by examining the trajectory of two strategic energy-producing regions: La Guajira in Colombia and Antofagasta in Chile.

## 1.1. **Researching energy transitions: insights for entering a burgeoning field of study**

### 1.1.1. A complex yet ambiguous global challenge

A global energy transition is underway. A transition unlike any previous one. One that seeks to address the destabilizing effects caused by the exorbitant consumption of fossil fuels on the Earth systems, which has even given rise to a new geological era: the Anthropocene (Le Gall et al., 2017; Steffen et al., 2011; Zalasiewicz et al., 2011). Mainly due to the rapidly growing unsustainability of our way of life, to that ‘Great Acceleration’ of certain socioeconomic trends linked to human activity, the planet is already hitting its tipping points. And the anthropogenic climate change, one of its manifestations, is intrinsically related to energy and its different uses. More than 70% of annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions come from the energy sector and, notably, from electricity and heating (accounting for almost one third of all GHG emissions) (Figure 1.1). In prospective, ensuring the sustainability of energy systems is indeed a crucial issue to guarantee a safe operating space for humanity within planetary boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015).
<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.1. World GHG emissions by sector, end use/activity and type of gas in 2016. Source: WRI (2021).</figcaption></figure>

Moving towards a low-carbon future has thus become a matter of urgency for a wide range of political and economic actors on a global scale. In this regard, the Paris Agreement <fnref n="1" /> Signed in 2015 at the 21st UN Climate Change Conference (COP21), the agreement was adopted by 193 signatory countries. Since then, it has had a multiplier effect on the implementation of national policies around the transformation of energy production and consumption to move towards the realization of climate change mitigation goals. In terms of energy policies, there is a *before* and an *after* COP21 (Yergin, 2020).

Such renewed interest in the long-term sustainability of energy systems has a correlate in academia. Energy transitions studies are an emerging field in academic research (Araújo, 2014). The number of indexed publications covering this topic doubled during the 2010s<fnref n="2" />.

<footnote n="1">¹ On December 12, 2015, the parties to the UNFCCC signed the Paris Agreement. It requires all parties to do their utmost through Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to keep the global temperature increase this century far below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, as well as to pursue efforts to further limit this increase to 1.5°C.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² A search in the Scopus database reveals how the number of publications per year regarding energy transitions skyrocketed throughout the 2010s. This figure jumped from an average of about 10,000 publications per year at the beginning of the decade (10,402 in 2010) to surpassing the threshold of 20,000 publications in a single year (20,715 in 2020).</footnote>
Indeed, the frequency of occurrence of the n-gram “Energy Transition” (Figure 1.2) in Google’s text corpora, which gathers millions of written documents of all kinds, skyrocketed after 2015—presumably due to the Paris agreement. Yet, despite being a relevant and topical issue, there is no universally accepted definition of ‘energy transition’. This term carries instead a plurality of contradictory meanings given by a wide range of actors outside and inside academia.

<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.2. N-gram “Energy Transition” frequency of occurrence in written sources (1969-2019).
Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer (2021).</figcaption></figure>

Although the topic of energy transitions is already compelling for a great diversity of institutions, governments, movements, companies, and so on, it is not entirely clear whether everyone confers the same meaning to this process. As Theys (2017) points out, at least two downsides are noticeable with respect to this mounting but ambiguous attention to this process: First, it poses a problem of operationalization, as there is a risk that the notion will not really have a grip on anything concrete inasmuch as it tries to encompass everything or a wide range of challenging socioecological issues at least; second, behind a facade of unanimity, it masks the coexistence of very different logics that do not interact and even refuse to recognize each other. As stressed by him: « *Plusieurs « mondes » de la transition coexistent qui s’ignorent en large partie et ont tendance à se séparer de plus en plus* » (Theys, 2017). Therefore, to adequately immerse oneself in its study without losing depth, it is necessary to limit the scope of the research to a limited set of transition components.
1.1.2. The centrality of renewable energies

Notwithstanding this ambiguity of transition narratives, two constituent aspects of this global energy transition stand out. The first refers to the pace at which the transformation of energy systems is sought to be advanced on a global scale. In a nutshell, the term energy transition is generically used to refer to “*the change in the composition (structure) of primary energy supply, the gradual shift from a specific pattern of energy provision to a new state of an energy system*” (Smil, 2010). To that extent, a significant difference in this contemporary transition is the sense of urgency and haste posed by the challenges to cope with accelerated climate change. The critical threat that current energy consumption patterns imply for the stability of life on Earth means that the gradual change towards a ‘new state’ of energy systems must be accelerated through bold policies and innovative technologies (Araujo, 2017)—which are meant to progressively structure a sustainable *socio-technical regime* (Geels, 2010; Rohracher, 2008).

The core question of the current low-carbon transition about the speed of substitution of the most polluting energy sources from the energy mix generates important discussions. In particular, the issue of *fossil fuel phase-out* brings a manifest urgency, but the terms and timing of this shift are still subject to a powerful uncertainty that fuels academic debates (Grubler et al., 2016; Smil, 2016; Benjamin K. Sovacool, 2016)<fnref n="3" />. Contrary to expectations with the decarbonization trajectories set in international commitments such as the Paris Agreement, the decarbonization of the electricity sector and, even more so, the *deep decarbonization* (Geels et al., 2017) of the economy has no fixed time horizon—least of all, single contents, modalities and/or direction. It is, in short, a race against the clock in which urgency goes hand in hand with uncertainty.

The second key feature of the global energy transition is thereby the widespread deployment of renewable energy sources to move away from fossil fuels. Unlike socio-technical transitions through which coal and oil spread, the current energy transition as a sustainability

<footnote n="3">³ In this regard, while there are pessimistic views such as that of Smil (who, based on the experience of historical transitions, mentions that no promise of accelerated transition on a large scale can be fulfilled), there are also visions of such as that of Sovacool (who claims that the experiences of rapid transitions on a national scale can set the path to accelerate the transformation at a global scale). Both positions reveal a cross-cutting concern about the required pace of the current transition and, therefore, about the instruments needed to accelerate it.</footnote>
transition is not driven primarily by the convenience, practicality, or affordability of an energy source, but by the urgency of curbing the perils brought about by fossil fuels’ massive use. While transition pathways diverge between countries and regions of the world and depending on the strategic priorities of different stakeholders, a cross-cutting feature is the massive penetration of renewable energies.

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.3. Selected global milestones for policies, infrastructure, and technology deployment in the Net Zero Emissions scenario. Source: IEA (2021b).</figcaption></figure>

The centrality of renewables and, especially, of non-conventional renewable energies (hereinafter, NCRE)<fnref n="4" /> is embedded in the agenda of governments, energy companies, international organizations, among others. An example of the latter is the place assigned to

<footnote n="4">⁴ Whereas in certain contexts renewable energies and non-conventional energies are often used as synonyms, the term NCRE seeks to designate variable renewable energies (particularly wind and solar) as well as other renewable sources that are not massively deployed (such as geothermal, tidal, and so on). Without going into details, in the Latin American context it is relevant to differentiate hydropower and, even more so, large-scale dam hydroelectricity from other renewable energy sources. In any case, the normative distinction between conventional and non-conventional energy sources varies from one country to another.</footnote>
the expansion of renewables by specialized agencies that are benchmarks in energy issues, such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) or the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). In its roadmap to achieve net-zero emissions in the energy sector by 2050, the IEA (2021b) proposes a drastic reduction in the use of fossil fuels (90% reduction in total coal use, 75% reduction in oil demand and 55% reduction in gas demand) accompanied by a complete transformation of energy systems through the massive deployment of renewables (Figure 1.3). This includes some key milestones such as:

* Deploying 1,020 GW annual solar and wind additions by 2030

* Reaching worldwide net-zero emissions electricity by 2040

* Jumping to near 70% of power generation globally from solar PV and wind sources by 2050

## SIX COMPONENTS OF THE GLOBAL ENERGY TRANSITION STRATEGY

Renewables

Energy efficiency

Electrification

Hydrogen

Fossil-based CO2 removals

Biomass-based CO2 removals

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.4. Six components of IRENA's Energy Transition Strategy to achieve total mitigation of energy-related emissions by 2050 in a <1.5°C pathway. Source: Author's elaboration based on IRENA (2021).</figcaption></figure>

For its part, IRENA (2021b) highlights that more than 90% of the solutions required to reduce emissions related to the energy sector by 2050, under a 1.5°C maximum temperature rise pathway, involve renewables in several ways. In fact, among the six components of IRENA's global energy transition strategy (Figure 1.4), renewables are at the top of the list (accounting for 25% of emission reductions through direct energy supply). However, they are also
connected to other key components such as electrification, energy efficiency, green hydrogen production, etc. Investment in the energy transition should hit thereby a colossal USD$131 trillion by 2050 and a cumulative payback of at least USD$61 trillion by 2050. As stated by IRENA, such a level of deployment is necessary to achieve a transformation speed compatible with a 1.5°C scenario. This will require then specific policies and measures aligned with this objective. Nevertheless, such urgency clashes with the diverging interests of the different stakeholders of the energy system, which leads to various types of obstacles for the development of policies and technologies (Laird, 2013). And this is especially true in highly conflictive contexts such as Latin America.

### 1.1.3. Energy transitions in Latin America: between challenges and opportunities

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.5. CO₂ Emissions per capita in selected countries/regions of the world. Source: Author's elaboration with data from IEA (2021).</figcaption></figure>

Studying energy transitions in Latin America through the transformation of the electricity sector towards renewables must first of all confront a salient reality. Unlike advanced economies in Europe or North America, Latin America as a whole is a relatively low-carbon emissions region (Figure 1.5). Moreover, unlike the emerging economies of Asia, the level of emissions per capita has remained stable over time and has even tended to decline.
This is reflected in its share of total annual emissions, which reached just 3.6% in 2020 - the lowest in the world, even below Africa (3.9%) (BP, 2021).

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.6. GHG emissions by region and sector in 2018.
Source: Author's adaptation from OECD et al. (2019) based on WRI (2017) and World Bank (2018).</figcaption></figure>

This situation is due, in the first place, to the higher share of agriculture and land-use change and forestry in total GHG emissions. Unlike the pattern of emissions in advanced economies and the world total, in which the energy sector accounts for more than 70% of total emissions, in Latin America this figure was barely 47% in 2019 (Figure 1.6). Nonetheless, this finding does not suggest that the prevailing economic model in the region is environmentally sustainable. On the contrary, the region is caught in an *environmental trap* (OECD et al., 2019) associated with low productivity, high environmental degradation and a tendency to
depletion of natural resources. Widespread high-carbon development paths based on hydrocarbon and mineral extraction are increasingly unsustainable. This is compounded by, on the one hand, the large-scale transformation of land use driven by deforestation through cattle ranching, mining, and agribusiness (which puts immense pressure on fragile ecosystems such as the Amazon) and, on the other hand, the high vulnerability to extreme climate events. This accidental combination of low emissions, low productivity, high extractivism and high environmental degradation is what ECLAC has called “*la tragedia ambiental de América Latina*” (Gligo et al., 2020).

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.7. Energy consumption pattern by region of the world in 2020.
Source: Author's elaboration with data from BP Statistical Review (2021).</figcaption></figure>

The second factor contributing to this low emissions profile is the relatively high percentage of renewable resources in the energy supply (Figure 1.7). In Latin America, the share of fossil fuels in the primary energy matrix is predominant (with a singularly high share of oil, comparable to that of the Middle East). However, unlike other regions of the world, there is a large percentage of the regional energy consumption that comes from renewable sources such as hydroelectricity and biofuels (OLADE, 2020a). This factual reality has given rise to the notion that the region has a clean and even sustainable energy matrix, which is inscribed in the discourse of international organizations, development banks and governments in the region. Despite the above, the high renewability of the electricity matrix contrasts with the
high dependence of the external sector of the countries of the region on mining-energy
exports, which has generated fossil fuel-dependent *patterns of productive specialization*
(Ocampo, 2017; Phillips, 2015). This structural situation sets the big picture of the energy
transition in Latin America, despite being a heterogeneous reality at the intra-regional level.

Ostensible differences in development strategies and transition paths among the countries of the region do not hinder the fact that the global energy transition is making headway in Latin America through the development of NCRE—which, by the way, are identified as the prime transitional pathway (Pérez Urdialez et al., 2021; Pistonesi et al., 2019; UERN CEPAL México, 2017). As noted by the IDB Energy Division (2021), the region has at least three comparative advantages for the development of renewable energy sources: 1) Natural resource endowment and energy potential with biomass, wind and solar; 2) Experience using auctions as a market mechanism for the allocation of new energy capacity; 3) Investor confidence among renewable energy international developers and lenders. The report also highlights the following: “*La abundancia de recursos naturales y los bajos precios de la generación de energía renovable en América Latina y el Caribe significan que la región está bien posicionada para promover políticas que al mismo tiempo generen empleos y construyan una infraestructura energética baja en carbono.*” (Pérez Urdialez et al., 2021).

From this perspective of renewable energy development as a business opportunity, some
countries have consolidated their leadership by promoting strategies such as the RELAC
initiative<fnref n="5" />— which aims for at least 70% of installed electricity generation capacity to come
from renewable sources by 2030 (compared to a 55% baseline in 2019) The increasingly
ambitious goals of incorporating utility-scale renewables (mainly variable NCREs such as
solar PV and wind) make it pertinent to take a detailed look at the impacts of this transition
on these countries, which have become ‘role models’ for the sector investors. Based on a
geographic political economy approach, this research aims to interrogate the effects of the
transition to NCRE in Latin America by studying the territorial trajectory of energy-
producing regions in some of the countries that are pushing this transformation forward.

<footnote n="5">⁵ Launched by Colombia and co-led by Chile and Costa Rica, the RELAC initiative was presented at COP25 with the support of specialized agencies, international organizations, and recognized NGOs such as WWF. It was also welcomed at the OLADE Ministerial Meeting of November 14, 2020 in Lima (OLADE, 2020b) attended by the 27 member states.</footnote>
## 1.2. Problem statement

The façade of unanimity about NCRE's importance for climate change mitigation strategies does not equate to agreement about the policies and measures needed to achieve their deployment at the required scale and speed. On this point, Vaclav Smil stresses the following: "*Public acceptance and environmental considerations have become critical components in the conquest of new markets. New energy sources and techniques now face unprecedented public scrutiny and must comply with many environmental laws and restrictive regulations*" (WEF & IHS CERA, 2013). In contrast to the transition narratives diffused by international organizations, large-scale development of renewables is not universally accepted. Policies and technological solutions rather face multiple resistances across places and scales, from different stakeholders of the energy system. Here, the relevance of studying energy transitions through the development of renewables in power generation meets the analysis of the inevitably political nature –in terms of conflict and negotiation– of socio-technical transitions (Geels, 2014a; Marquardt & Delina, 2021; Meadowcroft, 2009, 2011).

Hence, given that a wide range of socio-environmental conflicts characterizes Latin America's development model, this axis of analysis constitutes an indispensable focus for analyzing the justice-related issues derived from the transformation of national energy systems within the region For this purpose, I decided to adopt a comparative perspective to analyze two cases of regional leadership in the transition to renewables—which, in turn, share certain macroeconomic and political commonalities. These are: Colombia and Chile, the main Andean economies. In this sense, from a geographical political economy approach, it is pertinent to interrogate the discourses of success and leadership that in recent years have made both countries stand out on the international scene. Such narratives risk projecting a post-political image (Flores-Fernández, 2020; Kenis et al., 2016) of absence of contradictions, divergence of interests and/or localized resistances that does not correspond to the materiality of the energy transformation processes.

Accordingly, in an effort to better understand the challenges facing the implementation of energy transition policies using social science tools, I aim to answer the following question and meet the following research objectives:
### 1.2.1. Research question and objectives

**Research question:**

*Under the just transition framework, how are the energy transition processes in Colombia and Chile similar and different at the territorial scale?*

**Overall objective:**

*With special regard to the justice-related challenges, compare the energy transition processes in Chile and Colombia through the territorial trajectory of La Guajira and Antofagasta, their main NCRE producing regions.*

**Specific objective 1:** *To describe the enabling conditions and triggering factors for the development of NCREs in Colombia and Chile.*

**Specific objective 2:** *To identify the socio-spatial transformations being produced by utility-scale renewable energy deployment in two strategic energy producing regions (La Guajira in Colombia and Antofagasta in Chile).*

**Specific objective 3:** *To interpret the main environmental, climate and energy justice challenges of energy transitions in Colombia and Chile at the territorial scale.*

### 1.2.2. Hypotheses

Since the research problem is eminently qualitative, the following working hypotheses do not constitute propositions to be confirmed. In fact, they were used to guide the inquiry through the different research phases in order to inductively uncover the findings presented in later sections. These are as follows:

1. The rhetoric of environmental sustainability and climate action that frames energy transition policies veils prevailing economic interests that, ultimately, are the determinants of the speed and scale at which NCRE technologies are being developed in Colombia and Chile.

2. Spatial reconfigurations operated by the massive deployment of utility-scale NCRE generating capacity can create patterns of injustice and inequality disproportionately affecting host communities in the energy-producing regions.
3. Power sector transition to NCREs does not imply overcoming pre-existing environmental conflicts associated with the exploitation of conventional energy sources and with fossil fuels production—instead, it may engender cross-scale tensions between different stakeholders of the energy system.

4. From a just transition perspective, energy policies in Chile and Colombia face formidable challenges to connect the creation of favorable market conditions for renewables with considerations of fairness and equity about the distribution of the social, economic, and environmental benefits of NCREs.

It should be clarified that, although some observations are of a technical nature, my purpose is to address issues linked to the specifically *social dimensions* (Miller et al., 2013) of energy transitions, using the methodological and theoretical tools of social sciences.

**1.3. Literature review**

This section is devoted to the literature review, which was conducted in two stages: first, a review of theoretical literature; second, a review of empirical literature. Three subsections are presented below: the first refers to the framing of the inquiry within the field of social sciences; the second contains the theoretical literature exploration; the third presents the empirical references that provided a better understanding of the relevance of this research.

Above all, a preliminary twofold clarification is needed. On the one hand, regarding the time frame. Although some backward-looking perspectives focus on the so-called *historical energy transitions* (Fouquet, 2016b; Grubler, 2012)<fnref n="6" />, only the literature on the contemporary problem of the transition to a low-carbon energy system is of interest here. On the other hand, regarding the epistemological framing. Although energy studies are often considered *multidisciplinary* (Araújo, 2014) or even *transdisciplinary* (Max-Neef, 2005; Spreng, 2014), only the specific contributions of the social sciences are relevant to this research (Benjamin K. Sovacool, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; Benjamin K. Sovacool et al., 2015). This becomes meaningful inasmuch as these disciplines can support the understanding of energy transitions

<footnote n="6">⁶ The term historical energy transitions is used to refer to past processes of transformation of energy systems after the Industrial Revolution. Most notably, it is used to refer to the replacement of traditional biomass by coal at the end of the 19th century and its subsequent replacement by oil around the mid-20th century.</footnote>
in a reflexive, analytical and projective manner (Rohracher, 2008)—i.e., beyond the realm of applied techno-scientific knowledge linked to the natural sciences.

### 1.3.1. From the transitions literature to the just transition approach

The literature on socio-technical transitions (also called sustainability transitions studies, transition management approach, etc.) constitutes an unavoidable first entry point. In short, this approach provides a comprehensive framework to understand the challenges of transitions from a ‘multi-level perspective’<fnref n="7" />. From this point of view, multiple actors (whose societal values and beliefs may or may not be encompassed) are involved in the deployment of innovative practices and technologies that break new ground towards sustainable socio-technical systems (Geels, 2011; Geels et al., 2016; Köhler et al., 2019; Markard et al., 2012). By developing a complex set of insights on the directionality, pace, speed, and scales of structural changes, this approach allows to interpret the required reconfigurations towards a horizon of sustainability—transformations not only in terms of technology, infrastructure and scientific knowledge, but also in terms of socio-cultural practices and political settings (Geels, 2014b; Roberts et al., 2018; B. K. Sovacool & Geels, 2016).

However, a persistent criticism of this perspective is the lack of solid framing of two key features of energy transitions: vested interests and conflicts (i.e., politics rather than policies) as well as context and place dependence across different scales (Kern & Markard, 2016; Newell, 2020a). Therefore, as my interests deal with the social dimensions of energy transitions (Miller et al., 2013) more than with the role of technologies, I incorporated another major input to the theoretical literature review: the political economy approach. I'm not going to drill into the specifics of that here, but political economy allows to explore power relations between and within countries, their changes and dynamics across social groups, political actors, and geographical scales (Arndt et al., 2017; Moe, 2016; Newell & Paterson, 2010).

<footnote n="7">⁷ In a nutshell, the *Multi-Level Perspective* (MLP) is a theoretical model for understanding socio-technical transition processes in sequential phases and at multiple levels based on the interaction of many actors and innovations. As Duruisseau (2014). summarizes : « *Cet outil d'analyse, utilisé dans le cadre de l'Histoire des Techniques et des Sciences de l'innovation, propose « une organisation des univers sociotechniques en trois niveaux »* (Jaglin et Verdeil, 2013). *Le niveau micro – « Technological niches » – est formé de niches technologiques qui sont de véritables lieux d'innovation placés à l'abri de la pression des marchés.* Le niveau meso – « *Socio-technical regime* » – est constitué par le régime socio-technique défini plus haut. Le niveau macro – « *Landscape* » – correspond à l'environnement le plus large affectant les évolutions du régime socio-technique (mondialisation, problèmes environnementaux, changements de mentalités). »</footnote>
Moreover, to the extent that insights from the *international political economy* (IPE) (Kuzemko, 2019; Kuzemko et al., 2019) and the *global political economy* (Newell, 2019, 2021) are useful for exploring international relations and their interplay with domestic politics, my review rather focused on combining them with the so-called *geographical political economy* (Bridge et al., 2013; Bridge & Gailing, 2020) perspective. Through this approach, the foundations of energy policies and technologies as well as the (sometimes diverging) interaction of political and economic actors can be understood in deep connection with the production of energy spaces. I thus sought to connect this disciplinary focus with a thematic frame to address the comparison of energy transitions in Chile and Colombia.

Hence, I decided to delve into the aspects of equity and justice, since these are the most specifically social and naturally conflictive aspects of transitions. Accordingly, the heterogeneous idea<fnref n="8" /> of a *just transition* (García-García et al., 2020) emerged as a plausible alternative to bridge the aforementioned approaches and provide the research with a more solid thematic structure. This framework encompasses a growing literature that seeks to account for the extremely challenging political tradeoffs that characterize attempts to enact and realize a transition that integrates justice in substantive terms rather than as a rhetorical device (Jasanoff, 2018; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). Ultimately, by bringing together environmental, climate and energy justice scholarships (McCauley & Heffron, 2018), just transition provides the lens to read the underlying tensions that a truly transformative transition ought to tackle (Heffron, 2020; Heffron & McCauley, 2018; K. Jenkins et al., 2018).

### 1.3.2. Studying energy transitions in and from Latin America

The empirical literature review was a two-stage process. First, I conducted an overview of the literature on approaches for studying energy transition policies and dynamics

<footnote n="8">⁸ The Just Transition Research Collaborative (JTRC) (2018) identifies four major groups of just transition approaches:1) *Status Quo* approaches, consisting of voluntary greening of the private sector and job creation for workers in the affected sectors, without altering the economic model; 2) *Managerial Reform* approaches, involving modification and/or creation of rules, including investment processes linked to employment but without changing neither the economic nor the political model; 3) Structural Reform approaches, which imply structural change of the system and its institutions both at the level of governance and social ownership of assets; 4) *Transformative* approaches, involving a substantial systemic change which modifies the structures that reproduce and aggravate environmental issues and social injustices.</footnote>
in Latin America, paying special attention to references to just transition issues. As a result, I was able to observe a fragmentation of the field into two main visions—broadly speaking:

First, there is a mostly *normative approach* oriented to the implementation of renewable energy policies and technologies, as well as towards the assessment of their effectiveness (Bersalli et al., 2020). Within this view, in which economists tend to prevail, an emphasis on the idea of the energy transition as a market-driven solution to the region's environmental and energy concerns can be identified (Ebeling, 2020; Jakob et al., 2019; Nasirov et al., 2018; Viana, 2020). Most of these studies roughly coincide with the interests of energy players and tend to assume the neutrality and desirability of renewable energy technologies in the path of climate change mitigation, while focusing on regulatory or technical issues of energy system transformation (Aghahosseini et al., 2019; Noura Guimarães, 2020; Santos & Sabbatella, 2020). In addition, further concern is expressed regarding the alignment of national energy transition policies with the agenda promoted by international organizations and development banks at the international level (Pistonesi et al., 2019; Rivera Albarracín, 2019). In this field, comparisons at the macro level predominate—with regard to national policies; however, few works are framed in terms of just transition.

Second, there is a set of *critical perspectives* —oscillating between strong and super-strong sustainability—that place energy transition related issues within a horizon of overcoming extractivism and even capitalism (Bertinat, 2016; Fornillo, 2017; Gudynas, 2011). Insofar as it relies on the activity of environmental NGOs and grassroots movements, most of this literature pursues a militant appropriation of the just transition discourse as part of a rhetorical apparatus that advocates a long-term transition to a new energy and societal model. Whether adjacent to or directly connected with *political ecology*, these critical perspectives warn about the limits of renewable energies, their long-term unsustainability, and their socio-environmental impacts at a territorial scale (Avila-Calero, 2017; Dunlap, 2018; Honty, 2014). Similarly, they contest the idea of universal acceptance of renewable energies and, more broadly, the dominant narratives of the transition (Gudynas, 2019). In this field, regional case studies predominate—with a politically engaged understanding of just transition; however, there is a gap of comparative work at the local level.
Still, this typology does not mean these two frameworks are poles apart. Quite the opposite, in fact. The contraposition fulfills only the schematic purpose of indicating that, at their intersection, innovative points of view could emerge so that novel avenues of research can thrive. In this respect, some studies that tackle energy justice issues (Tornel, 2020; Velasco-Herrejon & Bauwens, 2020) are similar to the heterodox approach I want to explore here: a perspective that address the actually existing transformation processes in order to enhance the understanding of their possibilities—neither by fully assimilating a normative thought pattern nor by plunging into the depths of the critical stream of thought.

### 1.3.3. Social studies of energy in Colombia and Chile

Finally, in a second stage, I fragmented the search for relevant empirical literature around four analytical units that constitute the case studies: on the one hand, at the macro level, Chile and Colombia as national entities; on the other hand, at the meso level, Antofagasta and La Guajira as strategic regions/territories of the energy transition.

On the one hand, the available literature on Chile's trajectory and outlook is more abundant and diverse than the one on Colombia, which indicates greater public awareness about this subject. Research on Chile ranges from studies that exalt the country as a role model for its successful development of the NCRE sector (P. E. V. López et al., 2020; Simsek et al., 2019, 2020) to those that apply the socio-technical transitions framework to analyze the energy transformations in the country (Blanco-Wells, 2019; Karjalainen et al., 2020) and those that highlight the grey aspects of the Chilean process, primarily regarding the tensions underlying the neoliberal model for promoting renewable energies (Flores-Fernández, 2020; Furnaro, 2020). In turn, research on Colombia points either to the prospective analysis of the country's macroeconomic and institutional readiness for transition (Corredor, 2018; Delgado et al., 2020; Martínez Ortiz, 2021) or to the controversial aspects of energy sector planning—such as dependence on fossil fuels or the targets for expanding the electric power industry (Martínez & Castillo, 2019; Torres, 2019).

On the other hand, when replicating this exercise with Antofagasta and La Guajira, the outcome is different. Concerning Antofagasta, few studies have this region as their unit of analysis. Yet, some have inquired about the formation of sacrifice zones for coal-based thermal power generation (P. E. V. López et al., 2020) while others focus rather on the
territorial impacts of mining and its role in shaping the regional energy system (Bustos-Gallardo & Prieto, 2019; Carrizo et al., 2011). Regarding La Guajira, there is a vast literature on the multiple impacts of thermal coal extraction, its value chain and the economic implications of its phase-out (Cardoso, 2016; Cardoso & Turhan, 2018; Martínez Ortiz, 2019; Navas et al., 2018). In both cases, however, work on the impacts of NCRE projects is still scarce (González Posso & Barney, 2019; Pradenas Canales, 2018)—above and beyond prospective studies regarding their natural resource potential for power generation.

What becomes clear from the above is that there is a wide-open space for the study of the transition to renewable energies in both regions and countries within the scope of social sciences. Therefore, my objective of implementing a geographical political economy approach to analyze two case studies in Latin America with a comparative and multi-scalar perspective may constitute an innovative contribution to an expanding field of study.

**1.4. Theoretical framework**

This research falls within the approach of the *geographical political economy* (GPE) (Sheppard, 2011, 2018) applied to the study of energy transitions. Therefore, the conceptual tools proposed by Bridge & Gailing (2020) to analyze the so-called *new energy spaces* constitute the basis of the theoretical framework implemented. Likewise, the ‘*just transition*’ framework (Heffron & McCauley, 2018) is used to set a thematic frame to control the comparison between the units of analysis—which were selected according to geographic criteria that will be further specified in the methodological section.

**1.4.1. New energy spaces**

While studying energy from a social science perspective is not something new, public debate on energy issues is largely dominated by engineering or economics-related approaches. Yet, a growing interest in the socio-spatial context of energy systems has led to a repositioning of other disciplines (among which geography stands out). In this regard, since early 2010s, a spatial turn has been underway, drawing special attention to the crucial role of energy in the social production of space—particularly at a regional scale (Bridge, 2018; Coenen et al., 2021; Huber, 2015). Considering that energy systems are produced above all by a constellation of social, cultural and political relations that define the specific
appropriation of energy resources in a given spatiality, the geographies of energy are useful
to support the planning and implementation of technologies but also, primarily, to understand
the energy-society relationship in its complexity (Calvert, 2016). Given this scenario, the
application of a GPE approach to the study of emerging energy transition processes in Latin
America becomes relevant.

To that extent, Bridge & Gailing (2020) point out three key contributions of the GPE
perspective on energy transition:

1. Explaining how new energy spaces are part of uneven and combined geographical development, which emphasizes the continuous production and reproduction of new energy landscapes as a contingent combination of new and old energy systems.

2. Placing the changing spatiality of energy production and consumption within a broader account of the contemporary dynamics of accumulation.

3. Analyzing how the places, scales and spatialities of energy systems are key current sites of struggle through which broader issues of political and economic governance come into play.

This perspective aims to overcome a shortcoming of research on energy transitions, which is
to fail to account for the importance of different spatial contexts and to treat places as merely
sites where transitions occur. The relationships between spaces and energy transitions, as
well as the multiple ways in which space and energy infrastructures shape each other, indicate
the importance of conceiving of energy transitions as a geographic issue and not solely as a
techno-managerial matter of technologies and policies. Thus, I highlight three key concepts
correlated with the three main contributions of the GPE. These are presented below, aiming
to provide a conceptual basis for analyzing the unfolding of the energy transitions in Chile
and Colombia through the lens of the new energy spaces theory:

• **Landscape**

The term *landscape* is the first useful conceptual tool for transcending a techno-centric
approach to energy systems. It describes “*the assemblage of natural and cultural features
across a broad space and the history of their production and interaction*” (Bridge et al.,
2013). It has not only the descriptive function of alluding to the biophysical characteristics
of a place. The concept of *energy landscape* refers, instead, to the material expressions of the
social, political and institutional relations bound to the extraction, conversion, distribution
and consumption of energy (Kirshner et al., 2019). It is the visual record of the political
economy of an energy system, the product of multiple contingent practices linked to the
historicity of its spatial differentiation processes. Still, energy spaces do not evolve in a linear
way but, in turn, they reflect the dialectical interaction between differentiation and
equalization tendencies: they are the outcome of the *uneven and combined geographic
development* of capitalism. (Bridge & Gailing, 2020; Sheppard, 2018).

Such linkage with the socio-materiality of energy consumption and production in concrete
places provides an understanding on how the articulation and recombination of energy
infrastructures from different eras of production gives rise to conflicts and negotiations
around the processes of energy infrastructuring and resource-making (Bridge & Gailing,
2020). In other words, the energy landscape does not evolve following a unique and linear
pattern. On the contrary, its configuration process results from diverse articulations between
old and new elements that of themselves produce meaning, identity and imaginaries around
energy (Kuchler & Bridge, 2018). These articulations attest then that –although energy
planning is produced in accordance to an instrumental rationality– the development of energy
infrastructure is also connected to emotional phenomena of *place-attachment* (Devine-
Wright, 2011) that contribute to slow down or accelerate the pace of low-carbon transitions.

The usefulness of this concept thereby lies in revealing how material landscapes contain the
traces of successive evolutions of energy systems, depicting them as part of complex and
non-linear social processes that contain different forms of *carbon lock in* (Seto et al., 2016).
Addressing the energy-society relationship through a comparative approach (that is, by
exploring the constitution of energy spaces and landscapes by comparing regional case
studies) can then open up a field of study that broadens the understanding of the different
types of outcomes being currently produced by regional energy transitions and
decarbonization processes (Coenen et al., 2021). This is of particular interest in Latin
America due to the limited availability of energy research with a comparative geographic
perspective.
• Territory

Now, space and its transformations are not only linked to the deployment innovative
technologies and bold policies, but also to how power is organized and exercised over space,
This is called territory; in short, it refers to “the organization of social and political power
over space in and through energy systems” (Bridge & Gailing, 2020). This concept provides
a way of thinking about the configuration of energy systems as a problem of spatial
differentiation, which implies their connectivity and integration across space as well as their
boundedness and separation. The foregoing makes it possible to acknowledge that territorial
form is not a given but an area of strategy in which several alternative territorial formations
are in play at any one time (Bridge, 2018). Energy infrastructures are hence not relevant only
as constituted spaces but as a manifestation of a vision of territoriality embedded in a larger
political and/or economic project. The allied concept of territoriality is useful as well, as it
refers to the strategic processes ‘behind territory’ and applies to the geographical partition
and integration strategies employed by the state and/or other powerful stakeholders in the
exercise of their authority or position of power (Bridge et al., 2013).

To that extent, such concepts contribute to thinking about the changing ways in which energy
systems are (re)territorialized over time and their intimate relationship with power strategies
that interact at a variety of scales (local, national, international). This approach is extremely
useful for grasping regional dynamics of accumulation not in a localized manner but as
profoundly multi-scalar phenomena. In this sense, the long-standing questions about path
dependency (Fouquet, 2016a; Stein, 2017) and path creation (MacKinnon et al., 2019) as
well as the problem of incumbent energy regimes (Turnheim & Geels, 2012) make sense for
a relational understanding of the intricate links between low-carbon economies and prior
regional forms of industrial organization (Bridge & Gailing, 2020; Gailing et al., 2020). This
type of analysis also puts into perspective the scales and actors in which the necessary shifts
to achieve an energy transition that dismantles the entrenched high-carbon sectors and
transforms the carbonscapes (Haarstad & Wanvik, 2017) must operate. Therefore, it is highly
relevant to analyze the territorial trajectory of Antofagasta and La Guajira using this
framework, as they are regions in which energy transitions generate some tensions between
the incumbent coal energy regimes and renewable energy landscapes.
• *Governance*

Finally, these forms of (re)organization of space are not only related to a certain set of regulations and legal frames that rule energy systems (i.e., policies) but to a broader spectrum of relationships between actors and institutions that determine the modes of social organization of energy (i.e., politics). Politics indeed occupies a central place in socio-technical transition processes (Meadowcroft, 2009, 2011). However, what derives from the political fact is how human beings make decisions and create institutions that craft rules shaping individual behavior: that is, *governance* (Benjamin K. Sovacool, 2011). In short, governance is a multilevel process that shapes the relationship of human beings to the management of the commons and, specifically, of energy resources (Ostrom, 2007). It concerns then who can do what, who will monitor it, and how rules are modified and changed over time.

Regardless of the discussions about its background in the process of liberalization and
financial globalization at the end of the 20th century (Van de Graaf & Colgan, 2016), the
concept of governance applied to research on energy systems underscores the existence of a
plurality of relevant actors with often divergent political and economic interests at different
scales. From the study of *global energy governance* (Florini & Sovacool, 2009) through its
interaction with country-specific domestic politics (Kuzemko et al., 2016) to its centrality in
the configuration of *energy regions* (Späth & Rohracher, 2010), inquiries into energy
governance illustrate the relevance of a non-statist-centric approach to politics in energy
transitions. Hence, the GPE approach is useful to consider the multi-scalar and multilevel
nature of politics in energy transitions, as well as to capture the contentious dimension of
new energy spaces—which constitute key contemporary sites of struggle where issues
directly linked to energy governance are at stake (Bridge & Gailing, 2020). This raises
awareness about issues related to the dimensions of equity and justice in the transformation
of energy systems, as we shall see.

**1.4.2. Just transition framework**

The concept of *just transition* refers, first and foremost, to a term that arose within U.S. labor
environmentalism in the 1970s and 1980s. It was originally based on the recognition of the
environmental impact generated by the fossil fuel industry (particularly coal mining) and
called for a transition whose costs should not be borne by the working class. Having this
trade union origin, it thus became a mobilizing term to promote green jobs as a necessary
component of the transition away from fossil fuels (Abraham, 2017). Notably since the
2000s, it has become a mainstream discourse of labor organizations in North America and
Europe, forming communicating vessels with environmental, social and political movements
in the Global North (Henry et al., 2020).

Likewise, the concept took on a global dimension from the turn of the 21st century. On the
one hand, it has reached the agenda of global governance organizations and has become a
recurring topic in meetings such as the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—to such an extent that it has been
included in final agreements since COP16 in Cancun in 2010 and even in the Paris
Agreement’s preamble (Glynn et al., 2020). Just transition frameworks have also been
integrated into the political discourse of the European Union (EU) and international
organizations such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) at least since the early
2000s (Henry et al., 2020). On the other hand, it has also been appropriated by social and
political movements in the Global South to demand redistributive policies within their claim
for climate and environmental justice in the context of the global energy transition. In Latin
America, the idea of a just transition is often advocated as a strategic bet for implementing
an economic and societal alternative to the widespread development model based on
extractivism<fnref n="9" /> (Bertinat, 2016; Fuentes et al., 2020; Rivera Albarracín, 2020).

Such massification of its use has caused the concept to lose its original specificity. The
different meanings attributed to it by different groups according to their backgrounds and
interests therefore make its content and scope vary—which generates potential contradictions
between the dimensions of justice it seeks to integrate (Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). Still, this
possibility of transcending its original strategic purpose is what makes the concept of just
transition attractive, as Healy & Barry (2017) point out when proposing fossil fuel divestment

<footnote n="9">⁹ For a first-hand approach to the just transition narratives in Latin America, from the standpoint of social and environmental activism, see: Soler Villamizar, J. P. (Ed.). (2019). *Transición energética en América Latina. Propuestas de transición energética: agua y energía para nuestra soberanía*. CENSAT Agua Viva - Movimiento Ríos Vivos. https://areaslivresdepetroleo.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/transicio-n-energetica-en-america-latina-digital.pdf</footnote>
as a way to enhance and repoliticize energy justice. Through the political economy approach, the notion has been elaborated that a just transition –beyond protecting workers in fossil industries– needs to address critical issues such as energy access and poverty as well as must adopt climate justice goals to ensure an equitable energy transition (Jasanoff, 2018). Just transition frameworks are useful, in short, for grasping the value of implementing policies and developing technologies without losing sight of social equity issues in the sustainable design of a low-carbon future.

To that extent, I opted to implement the *just transition framework* proposed by Heffron & McCauley (2018a 2018b, 2019) to operationalize a concept with a strong normative content. This approach is used as a thematic frame for the comparison of case studies and not as an aspirational category that designates the ought-to-be of energy transitions, in the manner of narratives linked to activism. By including several justice scholarships in a comprehensive and interdisciplinary framework, this reframing of just transition can be used to direct the research towards identifying issues of equity and justice in the Chilean and Colombian energy transitions at the local scale. In this sense, its relevance consists in establishing common dimensions of analysis to address the regional formation of Antofagasta and La Guajira as new energy spaces. All of this is based on the assumption that the concept of just transition “enables researchers to more explicitly reflect upon the intersectionality of environment, climate and energy, assess justice issues from a truly interdisciplinary perspective and ultimately contribute to meaningful long-term solutions” (McCauley & Heffron, 2018).

The three dimensions associated with this just transition framework and the emerging issues they allow to analyze are:

* Environmental justice

*Environmental justice* has developed over the past four decades to both identify and account for the disproportionate effects of environmental burdens on marginalized communities. Since its emergence as a field in the late 1980s, the environmental justice movement and accompanying academic studies have held a joint commitment to demonstrate and call for solutions to the fact that burdens are “inequitably distributed both spatially and socially” (Bickerstaff & Agyeman, 2009). This focus on the emergence of patterns of distributional injustice has meant that, when applied to the study of the transition to a low-carbon energy
system, environmental justice refers in a primarily critical way to the following questions:
how is the transition taking place, by whom and for whom, within the setting of what political
economy, how spatiality, dynamics of accumulation and land grab are interlinked, and so on
(Levenda et al., 2021; McCarthy, 2015; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013).

Appealing to the responsibility of powerful stakeholders in view of the possible emergence
of new social and environmental inequalities (and/or reinforcement of old ones) in the
transition to low-carbon economies, this critical lens warns against the risk of pure
technological fixes to solve the climate-energy crisis (Avila, 2018; Mulvaney, 2013). This is
the case, for instance, of the impacts of large-scale windfarms in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec
in Mexico (Avila-Calero, 2017; Dunlap, 2017, 2018; Mejía-Montero et al., 2020). This
dimension of just transition contributes to detract from the notion of neutrality of energy
technologies and to think about the risks of massive transformation of landscapes and
ecosystems by the accelerated development of renewable energies in energy-producing
regions. Furthermore, its emphasis on the distribution of costs and benefits of economic
activities across space also contributes to identify emerging and potential socio-
environmental conflicts that may affect the overall pace of transformation of national energy
systems.

* Climate justice

*Climate justice* has the same starting point as environmental justice: the acknowledgement that climate change this time can have disproportionate social, economic, public health, and other adverse impacts on disadvantaged groups. Nonetheless, it provides a less localized approach with a greater temporal and spatial scope, through which it seeks to emphasize the equitable sharing of the unavoidable burdens of accelerated climate change (Caney, 2014). While also having strong activist roots, climate justice holds a call for the recognition of uneven risks and asymmetric responsibilities with regard to the generation of public policies for climate change mitigation and adaptation between countries in the Global North and Global South (McCauley & Heffron, 2018). By addressing justice issues in a multi-scalar way, it takes into consideration the inequalities and inequities arising along the value chain of fossil fuels and energy commodities, more broadly speaking—which is useful, for example, to better understand the political, economic, and cultural challenges for the phase-
out of coal and fossil industries in general (Billon & Kristoffersen, 2019; Brown & Spiegel, 2019).

In the same direction, this dimension of just transition focuses the analysis on the causes of climate change and the systemic transformations required to confront it, raising the need to establish criteria of equity and justice in the process of decarbonization of economies. It thus allows addressing the uncertainties for energy exporting countries such as Colombia in the face of global decarbonization (Armstrong, 2020) as well as the impacts of the low-carbon energy transition in the regions where extraction and/or transformation of energy commodities take place (Bainton et al., 2021; Fisher, 2015; Fuentes et al., 2020). Ultimately, climate justice offers an interesting angle to observe the permanencies of incumbent energy regimes and their relevant actors, and so understand the challenging landscape that must be faced by climate policies in connection with energy policies in order to avoid creating unfair outcomes or further exacerbating, maintaining or ignoring inequalities (Williams & Doyon, 2019).

## *Energy justice*

*Energy justice* has a different origin and trajectory than the two previous dimensions of the just transition framework. Unlike climate and environmental justice, energy justice does not have an activist origin and emerges from a more scholarly environment as an alternative to try to influence energy policy-making at different levels and, therefore, to have incidence in the transformation of energy systems (K. Jenkins et al., 2016, 2017). It envisages at least a ‘triumvirate of tenets’ which are *distributional, procedural and recognition justice* through which justice-based concerns within energy systems, from production to consumption, can be addressed (Mccauley et al., 2013). Similarly, it enables thoughtful reflection on the challenges and paradoxes that arise from the transformation of energy systems when justice and sustainability issues are taken into consideration altogether (Monyei et al., 2019; Benjamin K. Sovacool et al., 2017). From such rationale, one can infer, among other things, that the pursuit of sustainability through the transformation of energy systems can create or recreate various patterns of injustice.

Finally, energy justice aims to address disputes and threats to policy implementation by identifying procedural and recognition shortcomings in the aforementioned policies. Just as
it advocates for the inclusion of the issues of energy efficiency, modern energy access and
consumption, ensuring reliable energy supply, and, in a broader sense, overcoming energy
poverty (Heffron & McCauley, 2019; McCauley & Heffron, 2018; Newell & Mulvaney,
2013), it also points to the question of equitable inclusion of the most disadvantaged
stakeholders (such as residential users, local communities, ethnic groups, among others) in
policy design. Procedural and recognition issues can thereby be expressed in their deeply
political nature that involves not only formal but substantial recognition of these actors in
policy instruments, which implies, to some extent, thinking energy-related uses and visions
outside the horizons of Western reason (Healy & Barry, 2017; K. Jenkins et al., 2018;
Benjamin K. Sovacool et al., 2017). This approach has been little explored in Latin America
and moreover there is very scarce literature with a geographical comparative case study
perspective (K. E. H. Jenkins et al., 2021). Given the governance problems that energy
policies have faced and may face in the studied countries, energy justice is a relevant
dimension of the just transition framework that provides useful conceptual tools to consider.

**1.5. Methodology**

This investigation is framed by the principles of qualitative research (Becker, 2009) and,
more specifically, implements an emergent design, one of its hallmarks. According to Becker
(2009), “not fully pre-specifying (research) ideas and procedures, as well as being ready to
change them when their findings require it, are not flaws, but rather two of the great strengths
of qualitative research.” Unlike traditional data-oriented approaches, which are more
commonly employed in energy studies, applying a process-oriented methodology allows for
systematic theory building from inductive analysis processes (Bendassolli, 2013). By doing
so, non-obvious connections between differing contexts can be brought to the fore
empirically, allowing to think out of the box and make innovative observations.

Nevertheless, the aforementioned does not mean that the use of numbers is disdainful; on the
contrary, due to the nature of the object of research, quantitative data have special relevance.
Here, descriptive statistics play a major illustrative role, as they allow to obtain “*a richer
picture or enhanced representation, in which to examine the phenomenon of interest*”
(Schreiber, 2008). This tool is, however, under permanent critical inspection. Numbers are
meaningful insofar as they capture the way in which the actors who collect and use them give
them meaning (Peneff, 1995), not as hard or neutral indicators that transparently reflect the
“reality” of a given phenomenon.

Therefore, I seek to set up a qualitative approach to the comparison of two case studies on
the implementation of energy transition policies and their territorial impacts in Latin
America. In this section, I proceed to summarize the implemented methodological strategy,
justify the case selection and describe the various phases of the research:

**1.5.1. A Comparative Case Study (CCS) approach**

One of the main approaches to qualitative research is the *case study* (Stake, 1995). This method is useful for in-depth research as it allows empirical conclusions to be drawn on the analysis of a given phenomenon in its natural context, which is especially important when the boundary between a case and its context cannot be unequivocally defined. Moreover, for in-depth research, the use of the case study method makes sense in the search for answers to questions of an exploratory nature (Yin, 1998, 2009). Unlike other approaches, the case study is not purely qualitative in nature. Because of its in-depth study of contexts, actors, and places, it can also rely on quantitative data and techniques to gather detailed information on a particular case. Besides, one of its advantages is that it has a comparative strand.

Now then, traditional case study methodology has a problem related to the ‘bounding’ of
cases. Bartlett & Vavrus (2017a, 2017b) point out that cases tend to be obsessively bounded
with fixed notions of culture and context when using this method—limiting their potential to
capture reality as a complex process. In contrast, Bartlett & Vavrus propose to extend the
value of the case study approach by iteratively building and comparing models. Designed to
rethink the case study as an effective qualitative tool for researching the impact of policy and
practice in various fields of social research, this approach is referred to as *Comparative Case
Studies* (CCS). Therefore, CCS is oriented to explore with a comparative perspective the
processes that have produced a common sense of place, purpose, directionality, or identity.

An advantage of the CCS is that it allows for an in-depth description of the cases on a limited
number of variables which, during the analytical phase, offers the opportunity to identify
patterns in the data that add to or extend the application of theory, or enrich and refine the
theoretical framework. It thus constitutes a method that needs to be methodologically skillful
in using and combining a range of qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques<fnref n="10" />.
This mixed methods reliance provides a methodological flexibility that is useful, especially
when the exploration of cases is not previously based on fixed criteria of similarity or
difference. To that extent, the researcher seeks to understand and explain patterns and
establish plausible explanations as to why they have occurred. The aim of comparison is to
question and explore configurations between cases through CCS, and not merely to compare
them in a static way (Goodrick, 2019). Consequently, the challenge is to return to the
comparative level to draw the final conclusions and ensure that the comparative framework
is theoretically sound (Mills et al., 2010).

The intellectual dexterity and methodological flexibility required by CCS are coupled with
the contingencies of an emergent design. It demands periodic review of the data collected so
far and an analysis of emerging findings throughout the course of the research. As we shall
see, the phases of the research are not followed sequentially, but tend to provide feedback to
each other. So, "*one phase can inform methodological decisions for the next phase*" (Bartlett
& Vavrus, 2017a). Triangulation constitutes the cornerstone of CCS, as it relates to strategies
for surmounting potential weaknesses that may arise from using a single method, a single
data source, a single observer, or a single theoretical basis. In this sense, triangulation is not
only about seeking convergence but also about addressing underlying reasons for divergent
conclusions. It is the tool to give robustness to both the methodological procedure and the
research findings. The researcher is thus not limited to focusing on the technical aspects of
the method, although these are important "*but makes thoughtful inquiries into converging
and diverging patterns*" (Goodrick, 2019).

In this way, the CCS relies on three axes of comparison (Bartlett & Vavrus, 2017b):

* a *horizontal axis*, which compares how similar policies or phenomena develop in different places that are socially produced and complexly connected

* a *vertical axis*, which insists on paying simultaneous attention to and across scales

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ CCS has the peculiarity of being an appropriate method both for research and for impact evaluation of public policies. It results as well from a combination of data collection techniques such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), Process Tracing and Pattern Matching.</footnote>
* a *transversal / longitudinal axis*, which situates the analyzed processes historically

These three axes of comparison illustrate that the processual approach of CCS is well suited to the theoretical framework provided by GPE, as it allows us to compare processes across a variety of spatial and temporal scales and levels of analysis. This rethinking of the case study research process has important implications for comparison, as it urges us to pay close attention to changing social relations and networks of relations that provide the empirical setting to the research and to how these relations and networks have been shaped over space and time. The above represents the possibility of establishing a plausible comparative framework between two regional case studies whose structural differences would otherwise constrain the application of the classical logic of comparative analysis (Lijphart, 1971)—given the importance accorded to the *a priori* bounding of the study and, consequently, to the pre-established criteria and variables required to control the comparison.

**1.5.2. Presentation of the case studies**

In accordance with CCS logic, cases were not strictly bounded a priori, but rather chosen on the basis of a theory-led selection. This procedure is, therefore, iterative. “*This means that case selection and conditions for case comparison cannot often be fully specified at the beginning of a study*” (Goodrick, 2019). Colombia and Chile constitute the starting point as entities where market-driven energy transition policies have been implemented and which share a macroeconomic profile and a strategy of international insertion that has allowed them, for example, to promote a common free market-based regional integration scheme such as the Pacific Alliance (Pastrana Buelvas & Castro Alegría, 2020) as well as to be part of organizations such as the OECD. Based on this statement of country-level similarities and considering their structural differences, I proceeded to case selection at the regional scale with a mostly geographic perspective.

First and foremost, I must point out that the multi-scalar and multi-level nature of the methodological and theoretical approach implemented makes it necessary to constantly jump between spatial scales and levels of analysis. Here, the structural differences of the Colombian and Chilean energy systems allow to anticipate temporally divergent transition trajectories and, consequently, differentiated patterns of spatial transformation—albeit their
political economic similarities lead to infer the possible emergence of common issues in light of the just transition framework. To that extent, in the GPE understanding that policy and regulatory changes in energy systems are always spatially constituted, the analysis of energy transition policies makes more sense by focusing on the conjunction of regional and local scales. This geographical reasoning drove me to choose regional case studies following a logic of selection by exemplarity (Goodrick, 2019): the places where the largest flows of investment in renewable energy and large-scale energy infrastructure projects are concentrated may best capture the arising challenges and dilemmas of energy transition processes.

<table><caption>Table 1. Case selection criteria. Source: Author's elaboration</caption><thead><tr><th>Units of analysis</th><th>Colombia</th><th>Chile</th><th>La Guajira</th><th>Antofagasta</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Scale (Level of analysis)</th><td>International-National (Macro-Meso)</td><td></td><td>Regional-Local (Meso-Micro)</td><td></td></tr><tr><th>Similarity criteria</th><td><ul><li>Macroeconomic profile</li><li>Market-driven energy transition</li><li>International insertion and regional leadership</li></ul></td><td></td><td><ul><li>Energy-producing regions</li><li>Mining-based regional economies</li><li>Natural resource endowment</li></ul></td><td></td></tr><tr><th>Differentiation criteria</th><td><ul><li>Energy profile (energy exporter vs. energy importer)</li><li>Level of human development (High vs. Very High)</li></ul></td><td></td><td><ul><li>Regional energy systems (energy extraction vs. power generation)</li><li>Uneven economic development (Regional 'failure' vs. Regional 'success')</li></ul></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Case studies were selected according to qualitative criteria of both similarity and difference (Table 1). The regional case studies to be compared are, on the one side, the department of La Guajira in Colombia and, on the other side, the region of Antofagasta in Chile. In summary, the reasons to select them among other regional entities were as follows: in terms of similarities, it should be noted that they are energy-producing regions, their regional economies are based on mining and they have an enormous potential of renewable natural resources in desert areas; in terms of differences, mention should be made of their regional energy systems (one based on electricity generation and the other on energy extraction - coal mining) and their uneven development (as the one has a comparatively high level of income
and human development within Chile, while the other has a comparatively low level of income and human development within Colombia).

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.8. Political and administrative map of La Guajira. Source: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi - IGAC (2012)</figcaption></figure>

In that sense, La Guajira is a territorial entity located in the extreme north of Colombia's and South America's continental surface, in the northern part of the border with Venezuela and facing the Caribbean Sea. Its landscape, comprising primarily the homonymous peninsula, is predominantly flat and desert-like. Inwards, it is divided into three sub-regions that encompass fourteen municipalities and a special district, Riohacha, the capital (Figure 1.8): the *Alta Guajira*, constituted by the desert in the northern area of the municipality of Uribia; then, the *Media Guajira*, where there are sandy and silty soils created from the strong winds during the dry season; finally, there is the *Baja Guajira*, bordering the departments of Cesar and Magdalena, along the foothills of the *Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta* and the *Serranía del Perijá* in the south, where altitudes of up to 4,000 meters above sea level are reached (Meisel Roca & Perez, 2006).
Nevertheless, beyond its physical characteristics or its political and administrative division, what is striking about La Guajira is its condition as a *backward periphery*. La Guajira is one of the departments with the most precarious socio-demographic and socio-economic indicators in the country. In terms of poverty, it has the second highest incidence of monetary poverty and the fourth greatest rate of multidimensional poverty among the 32 Colombian departments; in both measurements, more than half of the population falls into this category (DANE, 2020). Likewise, according to DANE's 2018 National Population and Housing Census, a distinctive demographic feature is the majority proportion of indigenous communities—reaching 394,683 people in 2018 (i.e., almost half of the entire departmental population). Within this group, 94.1% corresponded to the *Wayúu* indigenous people (which, moreover, are mostly located in rural desert-like areas, in the municipalities of Uribia, Manaure and Maicao, where they exceed 50% of the municipal population).

In line with the above, precariousness is manifested in two other significant aspects. On the one hand, there is a low coverage of public services and a high presence of household deprivation, especially in the Alta Guajira (where the percentage of households with Unsatisfied Basic Needs - UBN or in misery exceeds 50%). On the other hand, it is worth noting the low complexity of the regional economy, which is reflected in a strong dependence on export-based extractive mining of coal and, to a lesser extent, natural gas. In fact, the economic activity with the largest share in the departmental GDP has traditionally been mining, in a much higher proportion than sectors that make considerable contributions to the GDP, such as social, communal, and personal services (mostly tourism) or traditional activities like agriculture, cattle ranching and fishing. Without going into detail, this mining exploitation has been purely *extractivist* (Gudynas, 2011), namely, driven by a logic of extraction without regard for territorial development.

However, a progressive reduction in mining's contribution to La Guajira's regional GDP can be observed since the early 2000's. This trend provides a first axis of comparison with the second regional case study: Chile's Second Region, Antofagasta. As shown in Figure 1.9, Antofagasta's mining sector has a weight in regional GDP similar to that of La Guajira. As a matter of fact, the Chilean region's economic reliance on the mining industry also tended to decrease throughout the 2010s, but at a slower pace than in its Colombian counterpart.
Activities related to mineral extraction (copper and its derivatives) continued to account for more than 50% of value-added region wide. Yet, this similarity contrasts with their divergent socio-economic trajectories and socio-demographic profiles.

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.9. Contribution of mining to regional GDP in Antofagasta and La Guajira (2008-2019).
Source: Author's elaboration with data from DANE (2021) and BCCh (2021).</figcaption></figure>

On the one hand, the scale of the mining industry in Antofagasta is much larger than that of La Guajira, which is evidence of deep structural asymmetries between the two regions. The annual volume of exports (essentially from mining) of the Chilean region is equivalent to almost fourteen times the total amount of annual exports from the Colombian department. The so-called Second Region has therefore the highest economic growth as well as the highest GDP per capita in Chile (Lardé et al., 2008), a fact that is correlated with other economic and social indicators. As can be appreciated in the BCCh database (2021), the dynamism of the regional economy of Antofagasta is also reflected in the relevance of other areas of economic activity (among which construction, financial services and, with singular importance, the electricity sector stand out). In this case, productive specialization does not conflict with economic diversification.

On the other hand, social conditions of the regional population excel among Chile's regions. According to the National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey (CASEN) made by INE in 2017 and based on data from the National Population and Housing Census of that same
year, only 5.1% of the population was characterized as income poor while this figure stood
at 16.4% in relation to multidimensional poverty. This makes it one of the three regions with
the lowest incidence of poverty at the national level. Similarly, the profile of Antofagasta's
population is markedly urban (94.1% of all households, above the Chilean national average)
and accounts for a significant percentage self-identified as belonging to an indigenous
community<fnref n="11" />. The main deficiencies identified among the region's households are: first, lack
of schooling (in 20 out of every 100 households); second, lack of social security (in 23 out
of every 100 households); and third, lack of habitability (which refers to a qualitative deficit
in the housing conditions and affects 17 out of every 100 households in the region)
(Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia de Chile, 2017).

In addition to the previously mentioned socio-demographic and economic features, there is
a second axis of comparison: regional geography. Antofagasta is located in the north of Chile,
in a vast area that extends from the Andean highlands border with Bolivia and Argentina in
the east to an extensive strip of coastline facing the Pacific Ocean in the west. Despite the
similarity of its relief with the rest of the country, Antofagasta has the particularity of an
extreme aridity, scarcity of water and little vegetation. This is because the desert extends
along the intermediate zone of the region, where the maritime influence loses importance and
where the steep slopes of the *Cordillera de Los Andes* do not yet rise. Combining aridity,
sparse rainfall and great temperature range, such a situation defines, broadly speaking, a
natural landscape known as the *Desierto de Atacama* (BCN, 2021). In turn, the region is
subdivided into three provinces comprising nine communes (Figure 1.10). These are:
Antofagasta (made up of the communes of Antofagasta, Mejillones, Sierra Gorda and Taltal);
Tocopilla (which groups the communes of Tocopilla and Maria Elena); and El Loa (including
Calama, Ollagüe and San Pedro de Atacama). Although it is a peripheral region distant from
Chile's main consumption centers, Antofagasta represents the case an *integrated periphery*

<footnote n="11">¹¹ According to the 2017 National Census, the population self-recognized as belonging to one of the indigenous peoples recognized by Chilean law reached 13.57%, slightly above the national average (12.44%).</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_15.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.10. Political and administrative map of Antofagasta. Source: BCN (2008)</figcaption></figure>

Even though they are two different types of peripheries (one “failing” and one “successful”), La Guajira and Antofagasta share the geographic similarity of having a desert landscape connected both to the coast and to the mountain. As will be discussed, this particularity makes both regions resemble each other in something even more significant: their availability of renewable natural resources. This situation gives them a central place in the transformation processes of the Chilean and Colombian energy systems and, therefore, within the clean energy transition on a global scale. Given their trajectories as extractive territories, the comparative perspective can contribute to form an overview of the present and future challenges of energy transitions in Andean economies. The conceptual apparatus of the new energy spaces will thereby allow me to explore the issues that must be addressed in light of
developing renewable energies according to some minimum criteria of justice, equity and sustainability.

<table><caption>Table 2. Key characteristics of the regional case studies.
Source: Author's elaboration with data from DANE (2021) & INE (2021)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>La Guajira</th><th>Antofagasta</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Country</th><td>Colombia</td><td>Chile</td></tr><tr><th>Population</th><td>880,560 (2018)</td><td>607,534 (2017)</td></tr><tr><th>Area</th><td>20,848 km²</td><td>126,049,1 km²</td></tr><tr><th>Density</th><td>42.24/km²</td><td>4.82/km²</td></tr><tr><th>Monetary Poverty</th><td>53.7% (2018) (31/32)</td><td>5.1% (2017) (3/16)</td></tr><tr><th>HDI</th><td>0.695 – Medium (2019) (30/32)</td><td>0.875 – Very High (2019) (3/16)</td></tr><tr><th>Indigenous Population (%)</th><td>44.82% (2018)</td><td>13.57% (2017)</td></tr><tr><th>Main Economic Activity</th><td>Mining (coal)</td><td>Mining (copper)</td></tr><tr><th>Total Exports (USD$MM)</th><td>$1.526,86 (2019)</td><td>$22.365,0 (2019)</td></tr><tr><th>Prevailing NCRE Source</th><td>Wind</td><td>Solar PV</td></tr></tbody></table>

### 1.5.3. Research phases

<figure><img src="image_16.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.11¹². Diagram of the research phases. Source: Author's elaboration.</figcaption></figure>

<footnote n="12">¹² The planning and development of the research phases were constrained by the health emergency caused by the Covid 19 pandemic. In this regard, due to persistent mobility restrictions, fieldwork was carried out</footnote>
The stages of the investigation were not developed sequentially, given the emergent
design of the investigation. The research process was, instead, planned with flexible
boundaries between phases as well as allowing the presence of circularity among them. As a
result, the phases tended to coincide over time, providing constant feedback and redefinition
of the research problem towards the elaboration of the final report (Figure 1.11). In this
section, a presentation of how these phases were conducted is given:

Phase 1: *Data collection*

The first phase consisted of the collection of information through the implementation of an
empirical strategy based on the use of three research techniques:

Chronologically, the first was *documentary research* (Scott, 1990), which I carried out in two
stages. On the one hand, I employed it as a means to overview the research's main topics and
issues, primarily through the assessment of a broad set of policy documents, reports from
international organizations (such as IRENA, IEA, World Economic Forum, OLADE, etc.)
and, given their growing relevance, webinars and podcasts involving different stakeholders
of the energy transition processes in Chile and Colombia. Identifying key actors at each level
of analysis as well as discovering the phenomena to be traced and compared at each scale
was then rendered possible. On the other hand, after conducting the interviews, I utilized this
technique to gather specific information. This was done to further enhance the coverage of
the main dimensions of analysis and, above all, to fill some gaps in the emerging themes
discussed with the interviewees.

The second, and most important, was the *in-depth semi-structured interview*<fnref n="13" /> (Longhurst,
2009). For this purpose, I carried out a *purposive sampling* (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018),

<footnote>remotely. It should be noted that both access to some potential informants and the feasibility of conducting on-site observation were affected by this circumstance. Hence, the empirical strategy had to be flexible enough to adapt the methods, while ensuring the soundness of the research design.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ The use of the semi-structured in-depth interview had the purpose of making the researcher positionality explicit and stimulating reflexivity in the development of the interviews. These were conceived both as a way of gathering information and as a means of learning about the topic. Thus, they unfolded in a conversational manner offering informants the chance to explore issues that they considered important, in addition to those initially proposed at the time of contacting them. This allowed me to overcome communicative barriers linked to distance and virtuality, as well as to attenuate the asymmetries in the relationship between informant and researcher due to the informant's greater knowledge, experience or symbolic power.</footnote>
in order to identify and select individuals who were proficient and well-informed about the phenomenon of interest. At first, I clustered the key stakeholders of the energy system (WEF, 2018) in three broad categories ('public sector', 'private sector' and 'civil society'). I then contacted participants who could fulfill the profile of key informants (Parsons, 2008), i.e., experts non-randomly selected who could act as a proxy for their group's or organization's perspective. Afterwards, guided by an interview protocol (Annex 2) containing the issues to cover, I conducted the interviews either via Zoom or Google Meet. A constraint of this methodological choice was the limited accessibility to a certain profile of informants<fnref n="14" />. One of the advantages, in turn, was to use a tool that allowed me to involve participants in different locations around the world while establishing a more horizontal and less intimidating communication than face-to-face dialogue.

The third was descriptive statistics (Frey, 2018). I opted to employ this technique to give more robustness to the arguments concerning technical aspects of energy systems - and to track their evolution over time. Exploring energy-related databases (such as those of IRENA, IEA, BP, and OLADE) was done for two reasons: on the one hand, to harmonize the sources of quantitative data used in the comparison; on the other hand, to improve the soundness of qualitative analyses by using reliable quantitative inputs to illustrate them.

<figure><img src="image_17.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.12. Triangulation between methods. Source: Author's elaboration.</figcaption></figure>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Key informants were selected following a criterion of cultural rather than statistical representativeness. That is to say that the informants accessed represented organizations, institutions, or stakeholder groups relevant to the energy transformation in Chile and Colombia, from the local/territorial to the international scale.</footnote>
## Phase 2: Data processing

The second phase concerned the processing of different kinds of data. *Triangulation* was the common thread that linked the activities carried out. Following McFee (1992), this may refer to two types of procedure, in the explication of research methods: *triangulation between methods* (Figure 1.12), which involves mutual validation, and *triangulation within a method* (Figure 1.13), in which the interplay between inputs from different perspectives is sought. Throughout this phase, I applied this logic when organizing the gathered information; that is, to contrast informants’ discourses, locate the gaps in each level of analysis and recalibrate data collection. However, it should be clarified that triangulation operates here as a metaphor in the search for methodological robustness and, therefore, does not imply an alignment of interests and narratives. Contrariwise, it acts as a revelatory mechanism for exposing the tensions *between* and *within* the three stakeholder clusters.

<figure><img src="image_18.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1.13. Triangulation within a method. Source: Author's elaboration based on WEF (2018).</figcaption></figure>

Clusters of relevant stakeholders fulfill, then, the schematic purpose of organizing the analysis according to the affinities perceived during the data collection, especially in the interviews. In no way is homogeneity within the clusters presupposed, nor is a unidirectionality of relationships between presumably close or presumably distant stakeholders taken for granted. The overflowing complexity of reality imply that clusters are
porous and coincidences between stakeholders are not fixed. Likewise, stakeholders' visions tend to adapt to the uniqueness of the context. Accordingly, it should not be assumed neither that the relative alignment of interests and discourses in Colombia is the same as in Chile. The metaphor of triangulation only functions as a methodological mechanism to overcome prejudices of the researcher and to disdain the temptations of unilateralism.

## Phase 3: Data analysis

<table><caption>Table 3. Thematic Content Analysis Matrix. Source: Author's elaboration.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Theoretical Concepts</th><th>Main Themes</th><th>Objectives</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">New Energy Spaces</td><td>Landscape</td><td>Places and scales<br>NCRE sites of production<br>Socio-materiality of energy production and consumption<br>Land-use changes</td><td>Identify material expressions of the social, political and institutional relations bound to the extraction, conversion, distribution and consumption of energy.</td></tr><tr><td>Territory</td><td>Territorial transformations<br>Energy infrastructure<br>Energy planning</td><td rowspan="2">Describe the enabling conditions and triggers for the development of renewable energies in Colombia and Chile.</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Governance</td><td>Energy Transition Policy<br>Actors and Institutions:<br>Role of electricity companies<br>Local communities</td></tr><tr><td>Climate Justice</td><td>Actors and Institutions (Regional and Global)<br>Value Chain-Fossil fuels<br>Decarbonization of Economies<br>Incumbent energy regimes</td><td>- Identify the territorial impacts of the penetration of renewable energies in two strategic energy producing regions.</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Just Transition</td><td>Energy Justice</td><td>Energy Poverty<br>Employment / Creative destruction<br>Governance and participation in energy planning</td><td>- Analyze the challenges for energy transition policies from a just transition perspective.</td></tr><tr><td>Environmental Justice</td><td>NCRE Project's Environmental Impact<br>Social acceptance of NCRE projects<br>Local Communities and Social Inequalities</td><td>- Interpret the dilemmas of the transitions to renewable energies in Colombia and Chile.</td></tr></tbody></table>

The third phase comprised the analysis of the data previously collected and processed. It is critical to understand that *qualitative data analysis* (Mihas, 2019) is a continuous, dynamic, and cyclical process that starts as early as the data collection phase begins and continues throughout the data processing stage. In this sense, the analysis took place in two stages, due to the empirical strategy followed: one *deductive*, in which quantitative and qualitative data were addressed with preconceived themes stemming from the theoretical framework; and one *inductive*, in which themes were generated and reviewed based on identifying patterns in the textual data mainly produced by the interviews. The analytical cycle led to an interpretation of the results, which in turn concluded in a selection of the comparable themes that were included in the final report (Table 3).
## 2. Unraveling Leadership: Chile and Colombia's pathways to renewables

In recent years, Chile and Colombia have been building regional leadership towards the global energy transition. Along with the adoption of ambitious climate commitments in the international arena<fnref n="15" />, both countries have established robust policy and regulatory frameworks that provide the market conditions to enable a thriving renewable energy industry—which is one of the main components of national strategies towards bringing carbon emissions closer to net-zero by 2050. Thus, despite being at different stages of transformation of their national energy systems, these countries have been spotlighted internationally for their progress and prospects for non-conventional renewable energy (NCRE) development.

Several recent events are indicative of the emergence of such regional leadership. In 2021, Colombia announced its entry into the International Energy Agency (IEA) and Chile served as host of the 12th Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM12), two high-level fora to promote policies and programs that advance clean energy sources. Furthermore, both were selected to take part as ‘global champions’ in the 2021 UN High-level Dialogue on Energy. Likewise, according to the World Economic Forum’s *Energy Transition Index* (ETI) (2021) and BloombergNEF’s *Climatescope* (2020), Colombia and Chile appear at the top of the regional rankings, along with Uruguay, Costa Rica and Brazil. Indeed, in the latter ranking, Chile appears classified as the number one country for investment in renewables worldwide.

Therefore, this short chapter aims to provide an overview of the energy profiles and recent trajectories of Colombia and Chile to frame the background for the rest of the research. It also presents a brief description of the triggering factors and enabling conditions for the massive integration of NCRE into the electricity matrices of both countries as a central component of their energy transition strategies.

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ While it is debatable to what extent Chile's and Colombia's NDCs are in line with a global decarbonization trajectory compatible with the 2°C or 1.5°C scenario, both countries were recognized in 2020 for submitting updates with increased targets that exhibit, on the surface at least, increasing climate ambition. For a detailed analysis of these plans and their targets, the *Climate Action Tracker* project (https://climateactiontracker.org/) provides relevant insights.</footnote>
## 2.1. Energy profiles and trajectories

<figure><img src="image_19.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2.1. Energy intensity trajectories in Chile and Colombia (1990-2020).
Source: Author's elaboration with data from BP Statistical Review (2021).
Note: The size of the bubbles corresponds to the annual power generation per capita (kWh/cap).</figcaption></figure>

The energy profiles and trajectories of Colombia and Chile diverge fundamentally. Although both countries resemble each other in the reliance of their pattern of productive specialization (Ocampo, 2017) on energy-mining production<fnref n="16" />, Colombia is a net exporter of energy commodities (particularly oil and coal) while Chile is a net importer. Proof of this is that while the share of fossil fuels in Colombia’s total exports reached 54.7% in 2019, it barely reached 0.9% in the case of Chile (World Bank, 2021). This implies different dilemmas in the face of the geopolitical and economic challenges of the global energy transition (Bradshaw, 2010). Gradual substitution of fossil fuels puts pressure on Colombia’s current account balance in the long term, due to the expected decline in oil and coal revenues (Martínez Ortiz, 2021). Meanwhile, as dependence on fossil fuel imports are expected to

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ As of 2017, fossil fuels and mining accounted for 5.8% of Colombia’s GDP and 11% of Chile’s GDP. (ECLAC, 2021). But while Colombia specializes in the extraction of oil and coal, Chile produces copper and its derivatives, as well as increasingly lithium and other minerals critical to the global energy transition.</footnote>
decrease, favorable impacts on Chile’s balance of payments and greater macroeconomic sustainability are foreseen (Ebeling, 2020).

In addition to this key difference in the share of the energy sector in the two economies, it must be added that the two countries follow different energy consumption patterns (Figure 2.1). While per capita primary energy consumption has remained relatively stable in Colombia over the last 30 years, in Chile there is a clear increase in energy consumption driven, to a large extent, by the sustained growth of electricity generation. This suggests the existence of an *energivorous development model* (Carbonnier & Grinevald, 2011) in Chile, whereby the pattern of economic growth is coupled to the growth of energy consumption. Hence, the growing consumption of energy and, above all, of electricity in its various applications is a central aspect of the Chilean energy transition.

<figure><img src="image_20.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2.2. Net GHG emissions by IPCC sector in Chile and Colombia in 2012. Source: SNIC Chile (2020) & IDEAM et al. (2016). Note: Land use and forestry were excluded from the Chilean AFOLU sector because their carbon removals exceed their emissions.</figcaption></figure>

In that direction, Chile's economic growth pattern is relatively coupled to its energy intensity and, likewise, to its carbon intensity. Colombia, by contrast, is accidentally a low emitter of CO2 and is the only large economy in Latin America in which GDP growth is strongly decoupled from GHG emissions and energy consumption (OECD et al., 2019). Thus, the national GHG inventory of both countries accounts for this phenomenon (Figure 2.2): in line with the world average, 79% of Chile's annual emissions come from the energy sector while in Colombia most emissions come from the AFOLU sector. The high emissions factor of this
sector stems from the fact that the different activities linked to deforestation and forest
degradation are the main cause of emissions in Colombia, due among other things to the
destruction of natural carbon sinks (IDEAM et al., 2016).

This difference is reflected in the electricity sector as well. While in 2012 the activity with the highest level of net emissions in Chile was electricity generation (equivalent to 32.04 Mt CO2), energy industries in Colombia were barely ranked as the seventh IPCC group in terms of net emissions (equivalent to 17.3 Mt CO2) (IDEAM et al., 2016; SNICHile, 2020). Hence,

the Colombian power sector
produced annually about half
of the total emissions of its
counterpart in Chile, a country
with a population three times
smaller than that of Colombia.

In the case of Chile, this
climate challenge also
highlights the transformations
that have occurred in its
energy matrix over the last
three decades (Figure 2.3).

After having a mostly

renewable matrix in the 1990s, Chile switched to a predominance of fossil fuels after the turn of the millennium. The growth in electricity demand, one of the foundations of its economic growth, was supported first by natural gas and later by coal. Sudden jumps from one energy source to another are part of the vicissitudes of an energy-importing country. One of the promises of the transition to NCREs is to address that lack of *energy security* (Jakstas, 2020) understood as security of supply (i.e., adequate supply to meet domestic demand in order to support the growing economy needs).

<figure><img src="image_21.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2.3. Share of fossil fuels and renewables in Chile's power supply (1990-2019). Source: Author's elaboration with data from IEA (2021a).</figcaption></figure>
In the case of Colombia, the situation is the opposite. In line with the country's emissions pattern and energy consumption trajectory, the power mix has remained stable from the 1990s onwards (Figure 2.4). The Colombian electricity system has maintained a 75-25 ratio

between renewable and non-renewable sources over time. Consequently, the crucial role of hydro in electricity supply has remained with a thermal backup combining gas, coal, and biofuels.

Although the situation is unlike that of Chile, here the promise of greater energy security is also appealing as a driver of the transition to NCREs. But its meaning changes. Being a low-emitting country with high

renewability of electricity supply, energy security in that context means that the diversification of energy sources through renewables provides greater security of demand, robustness to the system and protection against extreme climate events.

Based on this overview of the energy profiles and trajectories of both countries, it is clear that the narrative of renewables as the spearhead of climate change mitigation falls short in capturing the complexity of the transition underway. Behind this rhetorical frame lie motives and interests that are not necessarily linked to environmental sustainability and climate action. Therefore, without losing sight of the differentiated challenges arising from the above-mentioned differences between the two countries, we will now take a look at the main factors that have triggered the relative leadership that Chile and Colombia have been acquiring in the field of renewable energies.

<figure><img src="image_22.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2.4. Share of fossil fuels and renewables in Colombia's power supply (1990-2019). Source: Author's elaboration with data from IEA (2021a).</figcaption></figure>
## 2.2. Beyond climate action: triggering factors of energy transitions

As made clear in the previous section, energy profiles and trajectories of the energy systems in Chile and Colombia are fundamentally different. Considering these dissimilarities, under the assumption that they shape the choices of the relevant stakeholders and most importantly those of the decision makers, in this section I will try to present the main triggering factors for the incorporation of NCRE into the electricity matrices of both countries. To this end, I will primarily present the contributions made by the informants on this topic, as they reveal the weight that different stakeholders give to the milestones, policies, technologies, institutions, and events that have marked the development of renewables in both countries.

Chile's energy transformation process began first, much earlier than in Colombia. In fact, together with Uruguay, this country is one of the pioneers in the development of NCRE sources in Latin America (KPMG, 2016). The main trigger for the search for the integration of NCRE into the electricity matrix was the energy insecurity of the system's supply. In this regard, Javier Obach Martiniello (Informant A3) – head of the Environmental Unit at the Environmental and Climate Change Division of Chile's Ministry of Energy, highlighted:

> "En Chile, la matriz históricamente ha sido renovable. En los años 1990, el 60% de la electricidad generada provenía de fuentes renovables. Sin embargo, empezamos a tener problemas hídricos desde los 90. Así fue como la matriz que era bastante hidro-térmica, como en otros países sudamericanos, empezó a disminuir la participación de hidro por cuenta del cambio climático.

(...)

> En la medida en que empieza a haber una baja del hidro, se busca diversificar matriz para suplir la demanda creciente de energía. Aquí juega un rol central el tema del gas y el abastecimiento en relación con Argentina, pues debido a la crisis económica de ese país a inicios de los 2000, decidieron cortar la llave de paso del gas.

(...)

> La solución que se encuentra es el uso de otro combustible de base que era el carbón. Se ponen en marcha así 28 unidades de generación a carbón para tener una estructura base con combustible más barato. El criterio con el que se justificó esta decisión fue la búsqueda de mayor eficiencia y seguridad del suministro para evitar intermitencias y black-outs.

(...)
Muy resumidamente, esto explica cómo el carbón modelaba el sistema por necesidad. Sin embargo, esto empezó a cambiar desde inicios de los 2010, con la caída internacional de los precios de las renovables.” (Informant A3, June 17, 2021).

Chile’s path was thereby clearly determined by its condition as an energy-importing country. As the provisioning of natural gas was jeopardized by supply shocks from Argentina since 2004, these external disruptions that threatened the robustness of the electricity system forced an urgent quest for alternatives to diversify the country’s energy mix (Ministerio de Energía de Chile, 2015). Therefore, two seemingly antagonistic solutions crystallized at the same time. On the one hand, the quick and cost-efficient solution of massively deploying coal to generate electricity was implemented—leading to a fourfold increase in the share of coal in the total electricity generated annually in Chile between 2005 and 2015 (making it the main power source) (Figure 2.5).

<figure><img src="image_23.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2.5. Evolution of power supply in Chile by source (1990-2019).
Source: Author's elaboration with data from IEA (2021a).</figcaption></figure>

On the other hand, what has been known in recent years as Chile’s “revolución energética” (Pacheco, 2018) began to take shape. Although it was not an automatic process, this energy revolution understood as the deployment of utility-scale electricity generating projects from NCRE sources started to be developed since the mid-2000s and managed to take off with a
first policy milestone in 2008: the NCRE Law N° 20.257¹⁷. Parallel to the aforementioned
increase in coal use, there was an explosion of renewable projects that led to the incorporation
of new sources to the mix (some of them even pioneers in Latin America, such as geothermal
energy and Concentrated Solar Power - CSP). Although their share is still a minority
compared to conventional sources, they are in the midst of an accelerated expansion process,
as will be seen in a later section. On this matter, Claudia Fuentes (Informant C2), researcher
at the environmental NGO Chile Sustentable, stated:

> "El pánico generado por el desabastecimiento e inseguridad energética a causa de la crisis del gas en Argentina llevó a que se formaran dos enfoques de solución: uno eran las centrales a carbón; (...) el otro era un enfoque más incipiente, proveniente del movimiento ecologista, que proponía que la crisis podía aprovecharse como un momento para incorporar renovables. En ese sentido, es muy importante la Ley de ERNC de 2008, aunque no tuvo efectos inmediatos. Su importancia radica en que, cuando se habla de esto, empieza a existir." Informant C2 (June 17, 2021).

In addition to the pursuit of energy security through a bold and robust legislation, there are
two other relevant contingent factors that triggered Chile's 'boom in renewables'. First, the
unfeasibility of large-scale dam hydroelectricity due to the failure of the *HidroAysén*<fnref n="18" />
megaproject (Agostini et al., 2017) as a result of massive public opposition. So much so that,
in June 2014, the Committee of Ministers unanimously resolved to revoke the *Resolución de
Calificación Ambiental* (RCA) that had previously been granted in May 2011 (Raineri, 2018).
The bid for diversification with a conventional renewable source came into collision with a
strong rejection from a contingent coalition of citizen pressure groups, environmental
movements and political parties. However, Chile's exceptional potential for renewable
natural resources had already been diagnosed and the country was on the radar of
international energy investors (Ministerio de Energía de Chile & GIZ, 2014).

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Enacted on March 20, 2008, this law "introduce modificaciones a la Ley General de Servicios Eléctricos respecto de la generación de energía eléctrica con fuentes de Energías Renovables No Convencionales". It obliges conventional generators with an installed capacity of more than 200 MW to commercialize 10% of their energy from non-conventional renewable sources or from hydroelectric power plants with a capacity of less than 40 MW, as from January 1, 2010.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ *HidroAysén* was a project that envisaged the construction and operation of five hydropower plants, two on the Baker River and three on the Pascua River, located in the region of Aysén, South of Chile. The complex would have had a nominal installed capacity of 2,750 MW.</footnote>
Second, the other contingent triggering factor that enabled the massification of NCRE in Chile is the drop in international renewable energy prices during the 2010s. Due to a steep drop in prices for solar PV and onshore wind projects since 2010, by 2014 the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for these NCRE sources were already "in the range of fossil fuel generation costs and are competitive not just in local terms but internationally as well" (IRENA, 2016). As noted by Paz Araya (Informant C3), researcher at the Red de Pobreza Energética (RedPE) and participant in several energy policy construction scenarios:

> "La transición energética ha sido impulsada más por dinámicas de mercado que por iniciativas de política. Lo que fundamenta todo este proceso viene en parte desde la privatización de los servicios públicos desde los ochenta, durante la dictadura. (...) Después de diversas crisis del sector energético por falta de planificación en Chile durante los noventa y 2000, llega la crisis del gas de Argentina en 2004 y ahí la preocupación por la planificación empieza a crecer hasta 2008.

(...)

Esto se vuelve un tema de interés por la intención de entrar la OCDE y demás, pero para ese entonces los precios de las renovables seguían altísimos. Al entrar a la OCDE, se sigue la recomendación de crear el Ministerio de Energía de manera independiente al de Minería y también unos organismos de planificación del sistema eléctrico.

(...)

Pero, por otro lado, llegan las protestas 2011 y empieza la judicialización de proyectos termo e hidroeléctricos hacia 2013. Había un ambiente de mucha polarización por protestas estudiantiles y oposición contra Hydroaysén. (...) Y aunque la hegemonía hasta 2013 estaba en contra de las renovables por temas de intermitencia y demás, el mercado entró porque iba a entrar. Y se da el boom de la energía solar en 2014. Desde entonces, las cuotas de energía solar fueron desbordadas y han crecido a saltos. Más que un impulso de política fue por condiciones de mercado". Informant C3 (June 22, 2021).

At this point, Chile and Colombia have similarities. Although Chile started much earlier because of its own characteristics and needs, in Colombia it is a consensus among different stakeholders that the country entered the NCRE trend late. And certainly the first milestone
in that sense was Law 1715 of 2014¹⁹. This was developed at a time when the renewables market was already thriving and Colombia was evaluating how to enter this market taking advantage of its energy potential (UPME et al., 2015). In a scenario with apparently no significant risks on the security of supply side<fnref n="20" />, the competitive LCOE of solar PV and wind energy were a key factor in driving the transformation of the regulatory framework. Abel Mauricio Gallego (Informant B2), engineer at Empresa de Energía de Pereira (a network operating company), noted the following:

> "Aquí todo inició con la Ley 1715 de 2014. Eso fue lo que le dio un push a la inclusión de las renovables. (...) Con la promulgación de la 1715, se permitió que mucha gente, sobre todo grandes industrias, se interesara en esos temas (sobre todo, proyectos solares y eólicos). Aunque ya habíamos tenido un primer proyecto en 2004, el parque Jepirachi en La Guajira, que se favoreció de incentivos tributarios, pero por ciencia. Como por temas de innovación y no de expansión del mercado eléctrico.

(...)

> Y luego llegó el Acuerdo de París. Pero según el trilema de la energía del Foro Económico Mundial, Colombia está en el top 10 de las matrices más limpias. Entonces acá hay todo un tema de inserción internacional y apuesta por ser más competitivos, por no quedarse rezagados en avances tecnológicos. Casi que se puede decir que es también por un tema de moda.

(...)

> No es un tema de necesidad para evitar el apagón como en los noventa. (...) Pero SÍ es un tema de seguridad por la búsqueda de diversificación de fuentes de generación. La solar y la eólica tienen una correlación inversa (se compensan). Eso le da complementariedad y seguridad a la red. (...) Todos los panoramas que se buscan para la descarbonización de la energía contemplan la electrificación, allí es donde está la centralidad de la generación con renovables para soportar esa electrificación." Informant B2 (June 18, 2021).

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Approved on May 13, 2014, Law 1715 is the legislation "por medio de la cual se regula la integración de las energías renovables no convencionales al Sistema Energético Nacional.". It represents the cornerstone of the regulatory framework to integrate NCRE into the country's electricity matrix, through the legal definition of the technologies and sources recognized as such and the establishment of tax incentives to favor the development of this market.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ This statement should be qualified because, as Zapata et al. (2018) show, increasing climate variability poses the risk of extreme drought scenarios in the foreseeable future jeopardizing reservoir levels and, as a result, the availability of the water resource for power generation (such as in the 1990s).</footnote>
All of the above is reflected in the evolution of the Colombian electricity generation matrix (Figure 2.6). Unlike the increasingly diversified mix in Chile, in Colombia the preponderance of hydro has remained stable over time with a minority participation of thermal sources. Largely due to the late entry into the trend of renewables, the share of NCRE sources is still marginal but is expected to expand significantly. The current energy transition policy contemplates the ambitious goal of going from less than 1% of installed generation capacity in 2018 (around 30 MW) to more than 12% in 2022 (equivalent to more than 2,400 MW) (Ministerio de Minas y Energía de Colombia & BID, 2021).

<figure><img src="image_24.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2.6. Evolution of power supply in Colombia by source (1990-2019).
Source: Author's elaboration with data from IEA (2021a).</figcaption></figure>

As in the case of Chile, another triggering factor for the adjustment of Colombia's energy policy to ambitious goals for the massive expansion of NCRE is the country's international insertion strategy. Although the energy transformation is just arriving in trickles, Colombia's active participation in global climate governance scenarios<fnref n="21" /> (Rodríguez Becerra, 2019) as well as its integration into international organizations such as OECD are consistent with its growing leadership in renewable energies. International commitments of the country play a

<footnote n="21">²¹ Colombia’s active international policy manifested, for instance, in its involvement in the roadmap that led to the design and promulgation of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).</footnote>
crucial role in driving the energy transformation policy, even if they are not well aligned with
domestic policies (as is the case in most Latin American countries) (Rivera Albarracín, 2019)

Anyway, about this convergence between international insertion and favorable conditions of
international markets, Monica Gasca (Informant A2) –advisor to the Colombian Minister of
Energy– said:

"Nosotros llegamos tarde al tema de las renovables. Y yo diría que llegamos sobre todo por moda. Fuimos a la COP25 y volvimos con unos compromisos ambientales muy ambiciosos que, además, coincidieron con el bajón de los precios internacionales. (...) En esa época empezó entonces a plantearse la subasta como mecanismo para impulsar estas inversiones en Colombia. Además, ya se venía viendo cierta dificultad con los proyectos hidro desde El Quimbo. El Quimbo casi no entra por temas de licenciamiento ambiental, oposición tenaz al embalse y, además, ya hay un copamiento geográfico de grandes proyectos hidro. Por eso yo diría que hay una combinación de cierta "moda" de la sostenibilidad después del Acuerdo de París con circunstancias nacionales e internacionales. El boom de las energías renovables coincide con el boom de empresas que buscan hacer inversiones más sostenibles y tener acceso a fuentes de energía limpia." Informant A2 (June 10, 2021).

Another unexpected coincidence in both processes comes up: in the medium term, the reliance of the power system and its projections of supply expansion in large hydro is environmentally, economically and socially unsustainable (Duarte-Abadía et al., 2015; Martínez & Castillo, 2016; Weng et al., 2020).

The above is useful to shed light on the following: although they differ in their trajectories, profiles and projections of demand and system growth, the energy transition processes in Chile and Colombia have at least four common triggering factors. The first is the decisive impact of the fall in the LCOE of NCRE in the international market and, more generally, of the favorable conditions for attracting investment flows. The second is the pursuit of energy security by strengthening their systems through the diversification of sources and technologies in the mix. The third is the exhaustion of the model based on large hydro. And finally, the last one is the deployment of international insertion strategies that allow both
countries to have a greater impact in international fora while projecting the image of democratic societies with free markets that promote sustainability.

**2.3. Building an investment ecosystem: enabling conditions for NCRE development**

Energy system trajectories in Chile and Colombia reveal important differences and similarities that provide insight into some relevant challenges for energy transitions in Latin America. While the different speeds of progress towards NCREs are conditioned by structural differences in resource endowment and energy potential, there are also a number of *enabling conditions*<fnref n="22" /> (Sareen & Haarstad, 2018) for the development of this business model that must be taken into account in the analysis. Such conditions consist of structures or institutions that enable or obstruct the progress of the transition. In relation to this topic, Alfonso Blanco Bonilla (Informant B4) - executive secretary of the *Organización Latinoamericana de Energía* (OLADE) - noted:

> "El hecho de que la transición no se da a mismas velocidades está relacionado a la dotación de recursos y aspectos estructurales de cada país. Está vinculado a una lógica de la transición energética entendida fundamentalmente a partir de la incorporación de ERNC de gran porte. Las grandes economías que han logrado que estos negocios se consoliden es porque también han logrado la consolidación de sus mercados financieros. Estos proyectos requieren de instrumentos sofisticados de deuda de largo plazo. Para que sean viables, los inversionistas tienen que tener las garantías necesarias para que sean validados por los mercados financieros.

> (...)

> Cada país debe tener, entonces, condiciones para que esto se dé: riesgo país, acceso a la tierra, condiciones regulatorias, estabilidad institucional, robustez de la infraestructura energética... En fin, todo un ecosistema para el desarrollo de este tipo de negocios.

> Los mercados que han avanzado más son: uno, mercados fuertemente condicionados por la importación de energía a partir de fósiles (...) como en el caso de Uruguay o de Chile; y dos, mercados en los que la alta penetración de renovables se da a partir de la participación del

<footnote n="22">²² As Sareen & Haarstad (2018) remark, these enabling conditions are conceptualized as facilitators of social, economic, and technical activity in the literature on sociotechnical transitions, while in the energy justice literature they tend to describe institutions that derive from stabilizing structural constraints on justice or that tend to reflect unfair social relations. In this case, the concept is used to describe the structures and actors that organize and institutionalize the transition in both countries. Its use does not, therefore, have an evaluative function, nor does it seek to interpret the effects that ongoing transitions entail.</footnote>
sector privado. Esto último requiere: un marco regulatorio establecido; reglas de largo plazo fijadas; garantes de esos contratos; marco jurídico institucional estable." Informant B4 (July 28, 2021).

A first enabling condition has been the existence of a competitive electricity market with a consolidated presence of private agents that can assume long-term debts to leverage risky investments in new technologies. As such, the power generation market in Chile is essentially dominated by four big players that together account for more than 60% of the installed generating capacity. These are: three subsidiaries of multinational electricity companies (ENEL, AES Andes and Engie) and one of Chilean origin (COLBÚN) (Figure 2.7). In the last decade, hand in hand with the expansion of the NCREs, some players have increased their market share and many new ones have arrived—reducing the market share of the four main conglomerates (-1.5% compared to 2019) (CEN, 2021). This is the case for the fifth generation company (genco) by market share, which is the Chilean subsidiary of EDF. The main conglomerates also have a diversified investment portfolio in different technologies.

<figure><img src="image_25.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2.7. Chile's power generation market share by company in 2020.
Source: Author's elaboration with data from CEN (2021).</figcaption></figure>

The generation market in Colombia is meanwhile dominated by three big players that account for more than 60% of the electricity generated annually. These are: EPM (a Colombian company with predominantly public capital), Emgesa (whose shareholding is split between ENEL and Grupo Energía de Bogotá) and ISAGEN (which went from being majority state-
owned to being controlled by a Canadian investment fund in 2016). These constitute a de facto hydropower oligopoly and share the market with 80 other gencos that, to a large extent, generate power from thermal sources or, as is the case of Celsia, are making strong inroads into the NCRE market (Morganstein et al., 2021; XM, 2021). As stated by the informant from the Ministry of Energy: "en las subastas de renovables y la subasta del cargo por confiabilidad de 2019, participaron los mismos actores pero buscando diversificación de portafolios. Sólo dos empresas que no estaban en el mercado entraron, pero de resto son los mismos actores". (Informant A2, June 10, 2021).

<figure><img src="image_26.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2.8. Colombia's power generation market share by company in 2020.
Source: Author's elaboration with data from XM (2021).</figcaption></figure>

In both cases, there is a separation of the generation, transmission and distribution segments of the electricity system, which is regulated by law to avoid vertical market concentration and distortion of competition rules. Similarly, a peculiarity highlighted by several informants was that the mechanisms for the incorporation of NCRE have been *market-driven* (Nasirov et al., 2018; Viana, 2020) and have not involved the use of preferential tariff mechanisms such as Feed-in Tariffs (FITs)<fnref n="23" /> (Simsek et al., 2019; Villada Duque et al., 2017). Instead, both countries have implemented energy auctions to promote the financing and development of NCRE projects as it has proven to be a mechanism of undoubted effectiveness—since 80%

<footnote n="23">²³ Although efficient in promoting low carbon energy sources in some European countries, in Latin America this mechanism has been questioned for introducing serious distortions in the market without significant impact on the achievement of energy policy goals (Jacobs et al., 2013)</footnote>
of the capacity allocated in renewable PPAs in Latin America has been promoted through auctions and public tenders (OLADE & GWEC, 2020; Pérez Urdialez et al., 2021; Viscidi & Yépez-García, 2019).

At this point, it is worth highlighting the technical and financial support provided by development banks and cooperation agencies to strengthen public capacities and leverage renewable energy projects. While in Chile a strategic alliance has been established with Germany through the GIZ to promote Chile’s energy transformation agenda, in Colombia the fundamental support has been provided by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). On this issue, Alvaro Mejia (Informant B5) –from the IDB Energy Division– said:

> "El BID busca proveer financiación a soluciones distribuidas y energías renovable, jalonando recursos a tasas muy bajas, que a veces los bancos comerciales no se atreven siempre a dar. (...) El BID no trabaja en la política como tal, sino en ejecutar cooperaciones técnicas en proyectos que apunten a las metas que tiene la política pública. Excepto cuando se trata de PBL, que es un tipo de préstamo que apoya directamente la financiación de la política pública, en cuyo caso el gobierno debe cumplir ciertas condiciones para asegurar los desembolsos por parte del banco

(...)

> La cooperación técnica se trabaja en dos aspectos para salvaguardar la calidad de los proyectos: 1) los términos de referencia del banco, aunque se trabajan con el gobierno, se hace revisión juiciosa con expertos y consultores del BID, se hacen observaciones y estudios necesarios para que los proyectos salgan de la mejor manera (para la revisión técnica, traemos experiencias de otras zonas para ajustar actividades y objetivos); 2) cuando empezamos a pensar en una operación, el banco nos exige que hagamos ciertos estudios que justifiquen esa operación (relación costo-beneficio, etc.), también se hacen estudios para verificar capacidad institucional para implementar un programa, etc. (...) Siempre estamos acompañando al gobierno y prestándole apoyo técnico para que las operaciones se pueden ejecutar." Informant B5 (September 1, 2021).

This means that, in addition to a competitive market, effective project financing channels and legal stability are needed. The former is ensured by the active participation of development banks, which, as in the case of the IDB, also aims to encourage commercial banks. The latter depends on the establishment of a solid and robust governance structure that can enforce
energy policy. This is the second enabling condition: a strong set of energy institutions with defined functions and responsibilities (Table 4).

<table><caption>Table 4. Key energy governance institutions in Chile and Colombia. Source: Author's elaboration with data from Ministerio de Minas y Energía de Colombia (2015) and Ministerio de Energía de Chile (2021a).</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Chile</th><th>Colombia</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Grid</th><td>Sistema Eléctrico Nacional (SEN)<sup>24</sup></td><td>Sistema Interconectado Nacional (SIN)</td></tr><tr><th>Responsibility</th><td></td><td><strong>Institution</strong></td></tr><tr><th>Direction</th><td>Ministry of Energy</td><td>Ministry of Mines and Energy</td></tr><tr><th>Planning</th><td>Comisión Nacional de Energía (CNE)</td><td>Unidad de Planeación Minero-Energética (UPME)</td></tr><tr><th>Regulation</th><td></td><td>Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG)</td></tr><tr><th>Control</th><td>Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles (SEC)</td><td>Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos (SSP)</td></tr><tr><th>Operation</th><td>Coordinador Eléctrico Nacional (CEN)</td><td>Compañía de Expertos en Mercados S.A. E.S.P. (XM)</td></tr><tr><th>Guidance</th><td>Panel de Expertos</td><td>Consejo Nacional de Operación (CON)</td></tr><tr><th>Legal</th><td>Legislative Decree N° 4/20.018 (Ley General de Servicios Eléctricos)</td><td>Comité Asesor de Comercialización (CAC)</td></tr></tbody></table>

For the case of Chile, the most relevant institutional changes mentioned by the informants were the following:

1. Creation of the Ministry of Energy in 2010, after separating from the Ministry of Mining.

2. Creation of the *Coordinador Eléctrico Nacional* (CEN) with the 2016 Transmission Law, setting up an independent technical body to operate the system and preserve supply.

3. Creation of the *Sistema Eléctrico Nacional* (SEN) from the merger of the *Sistema Interconectado Central* (SEC) and the *Sistema Interconectado del Norte Grande*.

<footnote n="24">24 Although there are two other interconnected systems in Chile, the SEN has more than 99% of the total installed capacity.</footnote>
(SING) in 2017, which created the technical conditions for a more efficient exploitation of the intermittency of NCRE sources.

On this issue, Claudia Fuentes commented:

> "El factor institucional es súper importante. Esto es algo que viene de al menos hace 20 años. No es tanto un "boom renovable". Ha habido todo un proceso y una preparación para facilitar las inversiones en coherencia con la planificación nacional. Debe haber incentivos de remuneración y legislación adecuada para facilitar los flujos de inversión. Ésa ha sido la clave del éxito de Chile. Además de la creación de una institucionalidad independiente, también se han dado avances normativos a la par." Informant C2 (June 17, 2021).

As for Colombia, institutional changes have not occurred at the same speed. In fact, the existing institutional rails precede the boom in renewable energies and were first set up by Law 143 of 1994. The Ley Eléctrica already contemplated this separation of functions since its enactment. Still, differentiated roles of the UPME and the CREG are noteworthy. As indicated by Wilman Silgado (Informant A1) - UPME consultant -: “La UPME se crea para que no vuelva a ocurrir desabastecimiento y crisis del sistema energético en Colombia. Es la entidad encargada de la previsión de la demanda de energía para anticipar todas las posibles contingencias. Es un organismo técnico y no político” (Informant A1, May 5, 2021).

Lastly, a final enabling condition identified is the existence of a flexible and constantly evolving policy and regulatory framework. In addition to an autonomous institutional structure governed with ‘technical criteria’, there is a changing energy policy to adapt to the rapid pace at which electricity generation technologies are developing and, ultimately, to create suitable conditions for attracting investment flows. To this extent, policy instruments are conceived as accelerators of investment in renewables (Hutchinson et al., 2021).

With regard to the latter, the informants outlined the following policy and regulatory milestones (Figure 2.9):

* In the case of Colombia, Law 1715 of 2014 was emphasized as well as Decrees 2143 and 849 that regulate the tax incentives contemplated in the law. Furthermore, private sector interviewees made special mention of CREG Resolution 030 as well as those regulating the auctions in which long-term PPAs are allocated. Finally, the so-called
Energy Transition Law of 2021 was outlined as the relevant update of Law 1715, inasmuch as it establishes the prospective vision for developing sources such as geothermal, biomass and hydrogen together with other regulatory adjustments to the governance of the system.

* In the case of Chile, as expected, the policy milestones mentioned were more abundant. First, Law No. 20.257 was identified as the starting point and later Law 20/25 as its enhancement, as it raises the NCRE generation target from 10% to 20% by 2025. Then, the National Energy Strategy was referred to as a bet for concerted planning solutions among the different stakeholders. And finally, the 2015 Energy Tenders Law was remarked, as it allowed tendering by hourly blocks to generate better competitive conditions for NCRE, and the 2016 Transmission Law, which sought to take a step forward towards the strengthening of the grid to ease the entry of new actors.

* In both cases, the long-term energy planning (LTEP) instrument with a 2050 vision was considered as a synthesis of the macro vision for the electricity sector in the two countries. In Chile, the ‘Política Energética de Chile – Energía 2050’ instrument is regulated by law and is periodically and participatively updated (Ministerio de Energía de Chile, 2021a). In Colombia, the ‘Plan Energético Nacional (PEN) 2050’ is kept up to date with technical criteria by the UPME and with a sense of ‘transformative planning’ that involves the opening of channels for citizen participation in the planning of the electricity sector (UPME, 2021a).

However, the existence of this investment ecosystem does not ensure that the development of projects takes place in a context of universal social acceptance. On the contrary, some of these conditions collide with the interests of other relevant stakeholders in the energy system and may even generate clashes at a territorial scale, especially with the host communities of large-scale energy infrastructure. As we have seen, the energy transitions in Colombia and Chile are not solely driven by a perspective of climate action and long-term sustainability. This rhetorical frame tends to hide the interests at stake on the part of the different actors in the energy system. It is therefore necessary to scale down to take a closer look at the implementation of energy transition policies and at the often-unintended impacts they are producing at the local-regional level.
## Key Energy Policies, Regulations & Milestones Timeline

<figure><img src="image_27.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2.9. Timeline of key policies, regulations, and milestones for NCRE integration in Chile and Colombia. Source: Author's elaboration with data from IEA & IRENA (2021), Grantham Research Institute (2021), Allotrope, NREL & WRI (2021), Ministerio de Minas y Energía de Colombia (2021a) & Ministerio de Energía de Chile (2015).</figcaption></figure>
### 3. New Energy Spaces in Andean Economies: the cases of La Guajira and Antofagasta

Energy transition processes do not occur in a spatial vacuum. On the contrary, transition-related policies and technologies always have a concrete spatial configuration. In this chapter, I will therefore focus on exploring how the transitions in the electricity sector in Chile and Colombia towards a predominantly renewable energy matrix (reliant on NCRE sources) have been producing massive transformations at the territorial scale. To this end, I adopt Bridge & Gailing’s (2020) theoretical perspective on what they call *new energy spaces*. This approach emphasizes an understanding of energy transitions as both spatially-constituted and space-making processes. The “new” is not a temporal marker referring to certain energy technologies (e.g. renewable energies); instead, the “new” addresses “*the production of novel combinations of energy systems and social relations across space*” (Bridge & Gailing, 2020). This conceptual lens is useful to analyze the process of uneven development of renewable energy landscapes as well as to interpret the transformation/emergence of conflicts around energy and identify the challenges to overcome the path dependency of high-carbon energy systems (Fouquet, 2016a).

In this regard, I focus on the two strategic regions for the transition to renewable energy systems: La Guajira in Colombia and Antofagasta in Chile. The perspective of a *geographical political economy of energy transition* is particularly striking here for three reasons, following Bridge et al. (2013). First, it offers insights into how spatial interactions in regions that are critically uneven (and that have a history of socio-environmental conflicts around energy) can either enable or frustrate transition policy objectives. Second, by delving into space and its configurations, it breaks down the belief that there is only one possible transition pathway. Instead, it provides tools to interpret the multiple coexisting energy pathways (not mechanically related to an idea of sustainability) and so to understand the relationship between energy transition trajectories and their underlying geographical conditions. Third, it highlights how the deployment of a low-carbon economy, as a simultaneously creative and destructive process, is significantly changing the way in which different places relate to each other, at a range of different scales—generating potentially contentious reconfigurations of social, economic, and cultural relations.
After completing the empirical data collection, I conducted a specific thematic analysis of justice considerations from the different textual data inputs of the research and then complemented this with the analysis of relevant quantitative data from different datasets. In order to establish a controlled and plausible comparison, the findings were systematized in three dimensions that constitute the *just transition framework* (Heffron & McCauley, 2018, 2019; McCauley & Heffron, 2018). These dimensions (*environmental justice*, *climate justice* and *energy justice*) are in turn related to well-established scholarships that address research on energy from different angles. Hence, the enquiry into justice-related issues, from this comprehensive viewpoint, interconnects the themes of energy transitions at the territorial scale and provides an understanding of how they produce a complex assemblage of interactions (not always virtuous and cooperative) between actors, policies, and scales.

**3.1. Environmental justice challenges: unwrapping the socio-ecological footprint of renewables**

The massive development of renewable energies involves a major socio-ecological footprint with many implications considering the first relevant dimension for a just transition: *environmental justice*. In that regard, Antofagasta and La Guajira have become two of the preferred destinations for investments in the electricity sector in Latin America, in line with both the consolidation of a financial ecosystem for energy companies in Chile and Colombia and their enormous potential of renewable energy sources. This scenario has triggered an outburst of large-scale NCRE projects, which have been rapidly proliferating over time. Despite contributing to climate change mitigation by reducing GHG emissions in power generation, renewables have multiple environmental impacts that must be taken into account—specially, when it comes to the burgeoning of large-scale projects (Klugmann-Radziemska, 2014; Sayed et al., 2021). Hereinafter, I will discuss this issue as follows: 1) observing the massive and accelerated transformation of the energy landscape; 2) noting the territorial impacts of NCRE expansion; and 3) analyzing the paradox of the extraction-renewable energy nexus as a possible contemporary re-edition of the *natural resource curse* (Sachs & Warner, 2001).
### 3.1.1. Towards a large-scale and rapid transformation of the energy landscape

To begin with, La Guajira and Antofagasta are regions with an extraordinary renewable energy potential, although in the former the availability of wind resources prevails while in the latter solar resources hold sway. In the specific case of La Guajira, its winds are considered among the best in South America since there the trade winds blow throughout the year with greater intensity than in the rest of Colombia (Figure 3.1a<fnref n="25" />). The average speeds of these winds are close to or higher than 9 m/s (at 80m height), from which a potential installable capacity of near 18 GW is estimated. This department plays therefore a major role in NCRE integration plans in Colombia, as is evidenced by a 2015 study by UPME, Colombia's Ministry of Mines and Energy, and IDB (UPME et al., 2015).

On the Antofagasta side, the *Desierto de Atacama* has been catalogued as the region with the highest solar radiation in the world (Zurita et al., 2018). As a result, the specific PV power output of Chile's *Norte Grande* and particularly of the Antofagasta region lies in a remarkable range of 4.82 - 6.58 kWh/kWp (Figure 3.1b). In fact, a study conducted in 2014 by the Ministry of Energy of Chile and the German cooperation agency (GIZ) calculated the available renewable energy potential of the Chilean regions regarding four types of power generation technologies (wind, solar PV, CSP and hydro). According to this estimate, Antofagasta was highlighted as having the highest available potential, with a total of 1,276,988 MW distributed in 390,476 MW of CSP potential, 883,651 MW of solar PV, and 2,622 MW of wind power (Ministerio de Energía de Chile & GIZ, 2014). Such an exorbitant figure was, in turn, equal to 68.48% of the total estimated potential for the entire Chilean territory.

<footnote n="25">²⁵ The assumed capacity density for offshore wind farms along the peninsula of La Guajira is even stronger, as depicted in the map. Yet the relatively high LCOE of this type of technology has so far hindered the exploitation of this energy carrier.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_28.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3.1. Renewable energy potential maps: (a) Mean wind energy density at 100m in the department of La Guajira; (b) PV power potential in Chile. Source: Global Wind Atlas (2021) & Global Solar Atlas (2021).</figcaption></figure>

However, utility-scale development of NCRE in La Guajira and Antofagasta began at different times. While in Antofagasta the first projects date back to 2008²⁶, as the first wind farms were registered, in La Guajira this process started belatedly in 2015²⁷. This fact is closely related to the consolidation of their respective countries’ policy and regulatory frameworks—which were established in different moments, due to a combination of internal and external factors discussed in Chapter 1. But either way, in recent years, investment flows to both regions have been steadily increasing, driving a far-reaching reconfiguration of the

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Driven by Law 20.257 of 2008 on NCRE, that year was registered the Minera Gaby Wind Farm project—built by the engineering firm Seawind S.A. on a site belonging to the Corporación Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO) in the commune of Sierra Gorda. So, the arrival of renewables in the region was done hand in hand with the mining industry, which they came to energize.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Nonetheless, La Guajira is home to Jepirachí, the country’s only wind farm in operation. With a total installed capacity of 19.5 MW nominal power, the project was built by the German firm Nordex Energy GmbH and put into operation in 2004 by Empresas Públicas de Medellín E.S.P. (EPM). It is located on a coastal strip between the villages of Cabo de la Vela and Puerto Bolívar in the municipality of Uribia (in the Alta Guajira).</footnote>
energy landscape. This trend can be noticed when looking at the growing number of NCRE projects registered between 2008 and 2021 (Figure 3.2).

<figure><img src="image_29.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3.2. NCRE projects registered in Antofagasta and La Guajira (2008-2021). Source: Author's elaboration with data from UPME (2021a) and CNE (2021). Note: In the Chilean case, only projects with RCA approved or in qualification are considered. In the Colombian case, all projects in Phase 1, 2 and 3 were included<fnref n="28" />.</figcaption></figure>

On the one hand, the surge in the number of NCRE projects in Antofagasta began in 2011, when the boom of photovoltaic plants in the region broke out. In parallel to Chile's strategic commitment to diversify its electricity matrix, the Second Region has accumulated a total of 154 NCRE generation projects registered between 2008 and 2021 (of which 29 are undergoing the Environmental Assessment Process). According to the region's outstanding solar radiation potential, around 80% (122) are solar PV projects, while the remaining 20% correspond mostly to wind projects and, to a lesser extent, to geothermal and CSP projects (Energía Abierta & CNE, 2021b)<fnref n="29" />. Most of these projects (72 out of 154) are concentrated as well in the northern communes of María Elena and Calama. This wide range of NCREs corresponded, as of July 2021, to 22.4% of the installed capacity of the regional energy

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Regardless of whether they were or will ever be built, projects that advanced to this point must have undergone a prior structuring process that is indicative of real investment interest.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Antofagasta is a pioneering region in South America in terms of implementing NCRE technologies. Two projects are milestones in this regard: First, there is *Cerro Pabellón*, a geothermal plant composed of two units with a gross installed capacity of 24 each. It was put into operation by the companies Enel and ENAP in September 2017; Second; there is *Cerro Dominador*, a 210 MW power plant combining CSP and Solar PV. It became operational in June 2021 and belongs to the company EIG Global Energy Partners.</footnote>
system (1524.66 MW of nominal power distributed in 22 operating plants with more than 10 MW of capacity—17 Solar PV, 3 wind, 1 CSP and 1 geothermal) and injected into the interconnected system, as of June 2021, 19.2% (349.02 GWh) of the electricity generated in the region each month (Energía Abierta & CNE, 2021a).

On the other hand, registered NCRE projects in La Guajira only started to appear since 2015, in compliance with the tax incentives of Law 1715 of 2014. There, the boom time comes after the Second Renewable Energy Auction in 2019, when long-term contracts were signed in line with Colombian government plans to expand the share of NCREs in this country's electricity matrix—jumping from less than 1% in 2018 to around 12% in 2022 (Ministerio de Minas y Energía de Colombia & BID, 2021). Among the 51 projects registered with UPME from 2015 to the thirty-first week of 2021, 24 are in force (7 solar PV and 17 wind). These plants have a total rated power of 4,117.45 MW, range from 10 MW to 500 MW of installed capacity and are expected to start operating from December 31, 2021 to July 1, 2026 (UPME, 2021b). While none of the projects have been fully constructed or went into operation, the unprecedented scale at which their deployment is planned makes it possible to anticipate substantial transformations in the energy landscape of the Alta and Media Guajira due to the installation of thousands of wind turbines.

Additionally, this massive integration of NCRE requires more robust electricity transmission and distribution networks to inject the power generated into each country's national interconnected system. In this regard, both Chile and Colombia are implementing ambitious plans to expand their transmission networks. Incorporating a prospective long-term vision, these technical documents are updated on an annual basis and repeatedly highlight the imperative need to improve the energy transmission infrastructure in Antofagasta and La Guajira<fnref n="30" />. So critical is it that this infrastructure is seen as a technical prerequisite to ensure the proper connection of new NCRE projects to the grid as well as a powerful source of socio-

<footnote n="30">³⁰ The generation and transmission expansion plans (GTEPs) can be found in the *Sistema de Información Eléctrico Colombiano* - SIEL (siel.gov.co/Inicio/Generación/PlanesdeExpansiónGeneraciónTransmisión/tabid/111/Default.aspx) and in the web page of the *Coordinador Eléctrico Nacional de Chile* (https://www.coordinador.cl/desarrollo/documentos/desarrollo-de-la-transmision/propuesta-de-expansion-de-transmision-del-sen-2020/propuesta-2020/informe-2020/). They are updated annually according to prospective models on the evolution of demand and involve long-term planning horizons of the electricity systems.</footnote>
environmental conflicts that, as we shall see, could delay decarbonization plans. This idea
was common to public sector, private sector, and civil society informants.

Hence, the put into operation of mega transmission lines involving the pioneering use of High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) power transmission systems is projected towards 2030. This is the case of the Kimal-Lo Aguirre line in Chile, with an extension of 1,500 km from Antofagasta to Santiago, and the second line planned from the Colectora substation in La Guajira to the inland of Colombia (Figure 3.3). It is estimated that these 500 kV high voltage lines will have between 2,000 and 3,000 MW of power, which is required to smoothly evacuate the electricity generated from renewable sources to the main consumption centers within their countries and to export the energy to neighboring countries (namely, Argentina in the case of Chile and Panama in the case of Colombia<fnref n="31" />). The massive and utility-scale development of these new electrical infrastructures is thereby tailored to the forecasts of a growing demand from populations living far away from the territories that are directly impacted by electricity generation.

<figure><img src="image_30.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3.3. Prospective expansion map of Colombia's National Transmission System (STN) and Regional Transmission Systems (STRs) with a 2033 horizon. Source: UPME (2019a). Note: The projected transmission lines in La Guajira include the 500kV high voltage lines between the Colectora 1 substation –to be constructed– and Cuestecitas –located in the vicinity of El Cerrejón mine– as well as the HVDC line projected to carry the energy generated in Alta Guajira to the Cerro Matoso substation, from where it could be transported to Panama.</figcaption></figure>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Supported by IDB, the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Colombia and the National Energy Secretariat of Panama agreed on July 21, 2021, to define the principles and general guidelines on which the Regulatory Harmonization Scheme for the electrical interconnection between the two countries will be based.</footnote>
3.1.2. Territorial impacts of renewable energies

The complex assemblage of new electricity generation technologies at a massive
scale and transmission networks spreading over space in a high-density configuration is
rapidly reshaping the energy landscape in Antofagasta and La Guajira. This transformation
is not politically neutral. On the contrary, it exposes the deployment of different projects and
contested visions of *territoriality* (Bridge et al., 2013). The way in which changes in energy
systems are territorialized brings to the surface a highly contentious dimension of energy
transitions. This aspect, referring more to *politics* than to *policies* in energy transitions
(Meadowcroft, 2009), underscores the existence of (often hidden) individual interests that
make problematic the rhetoric of a consensual, win-win transition for everyone.

Such a sprawling tangle of transmission lines and large-scale generation infrastructure brings
into play divergent conceptions of territory. In La Guajira, this situation is becoming
increasingly dangerous. As shown in Figure 3.4a, there is a conflictive overlap between
indigenous lands and energy projects. The territories of more than 200 indigenous
communities are impacted in multiple ways by the development of the energy sector's
infrastructure (which includes both power generation and transmission) (González Posso &
Barney, 2019). This scenario implies that both large-scale wind farms and critical
transmission projects, such as the Colectora substation, are put on hold, either due to slow
environmental licensing processes or to frustrated prior consultations with the department's
indigenous communities. Wind energy expansion plans in La Guajira are facing multiple
obstacles in line with the existing evidence of high conflict around wind farms in Latin
America and, specifically, in the isthmus of Tehuantepec in Mexico (Avila-Calero, 2017;
Dunlap, 2018; Mejía-Montero et al., 2020).
<figure><img src="image_31.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3.4. Maps of NCREs in the studied regions: (a) Spatial distribution of projected wind farms in La Guajira, and coincidence with the territories of Wayúu indigenous communities. Source: Energía Estratégica (2021); (b) Geo-referencing of NCREs at an advanced stage of development in Antofagasta. Source: ACERA (2021).</figcaption></figure>

As mentioned by INDEPAZ’s researcher Joanna Barney (Informant C5), in an interview of August 6, 2021:

> "Las empresas le están 'haciendo conejo' (cheating) a las consultas previas. Por ejemplo, los hatos ganaderos de caprinos y bovinos, muy importantes para la economía tradicional Wayúu, se encuentran afectados por la construcción de los parques. Es lo que está pasando desde ya, desde antes de entrar en operación, con el parque de Isagén.

(...)

> No hay consulta previa para los predios que están fuera de un radio de 80 pasos de cada aerogenerador. Esto está agravando las diferencias entre clanes, entre los Wayúu que siempre han sido bien temperamentales.

(...)

> Como no está clara la propiedad de la tierra, se hicieron "negocios" con la gente que estaba en el territorio, pero no siempre eran los dueños de esos terrenos. Es así que se han producido nuevas peleas entre clanes, a veces a bala, porque están avalando consultas previas sin las autoridades legítimas. Se están matando entre ellos y, para ellos (gobierno y empresas), es mejor" (Informant C5, August 6, 2021).
As they have been denouncing since 2019, the processes of prior consultation with the
communities are being regarded as a mere formality. These procedural injustices give rise to
the emergence of unexpected opposition to wind projects, on the one hand, and to the
emergence of violent intra-ethnic conflicts between Wayúu clans, on the other hand. Such
rising opposition is driven by environmental concerns<fnref n="32" /> but, above all, by social, political,

and cultural issues related to the
disruption of indigenous
territoriality. In addition, the
emerging struggles within
Wayúu communities reflect a
dangerous disregard for their
worldviews and cultural
practices from the energy
companies and national
government side, which is
exacerbated by the disruption of
the fragile semi-desert

ecosystems that tourism depends on. The latter, needless to say, is one of the few economic alternatives to coal mining in La Guajira. “¿Quién va a querer viajar en un futuro hasta La Guajira para ver una hilera interminable de aerogeneradores?," she wondered during the interview.

In this regard, Jessenia Villamil (Informant C4) – researcher for the environmental NGO
Asociación Centro Nacional Salud, Ambiente y Trabajo (CENSAT-Agua Viva) – stated:

“En La Guajira ya se conocen los impactos de la energía eólica por la experiencia de Jepirachi. Los wayúu ya saben cómo llegan las empresas y se apropian del terreno. Eso ya lo conocen. Y como ellos están organizados por clanes y familias, el tema de propiedad de la tierra se imbrica con la llegada de estos proyectos. (...) El desconocimiento de esto por parte de las empresas de los parques eólicos está generando rupturas familiares, de clanes, etc., que se pueden resolver incluso violentamente. (...) La energía que se piensa generar va

<figure><img src="image_32.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3.5. Wayúu women near Jeirachí wind turbines.
Source El Espectador (2021)</figcaption></figure>

<footnote n="32">³² These environmental impacts on the landscape, bird biological corridors, among others, have been extensively described in the scientific literature (Dunlap, 2020; Levenda et al., 2021; Sayed et al., 2021).</footnote>
al interior del país e incluso se va a exportar, ahora con todo esto de la interconexión con Panamá. Hay de por medio una lógica perversa de extracción de la energía. Las comunidades a los cuales les arrebatan los territorios no van a gozar de la energía eléctrica generada.” (Informant C4, July 17, 2021).

In the same vein, Informant B3 recognized that this lack of knowledge of Wayúu territoriality will inevitably delay the construction and entry into operation of wind projects. He mentioned that, on behalf of the electricity sector, more emphatic and sincere efforts are needed in order to improve the results of the consultation processes with the communities and avoid a snowball effect whereby the resolution of problems becomes increasingly challenging.

A cross-cutting idea in the testimonies of interviewees from the different clusters of stakeholders is the absence of multi-stakeholder dialogue channels as a major governance problem. Lack of dialogue jeopardizes the investments in renewables and, in turn, tends to fuel new socio-environmental conflicts in the department. Failures in the governance of the energy sector also threaten the country's credit rating in the financial markets and, consequently, endanger future investment flows in renewables. Such a doomsday scenario is even considered by the private sector. As pointed out by Informant B3:

“Esto puede hacer que se echen todas las esperanzas en saco roto: si se deja todo el peso de la descarbonización y el cambio del modelo de desarrollo en la expansión de las renovables pero no se arreglan estos problemas, no va a haber ningún toque de Midas ni posibilidad de reemplazo de las rentas y fuentes de trabajo de los fósiles. Aquí todos podemos salir afectados, si no se arreglan las cosas a tiempo.” (Informant B3, July 13, 2021).

La Guajira was already an inhospitable and ungovernable place, where illegal flows and legal actors converged in a tense territorial dynamic. The picture with the wind projects does not seem to be shifting. Instead, the accelerated pace at which these infrastructures are intended to be developed is clashing with a reality that is invisible in the most optimistic prospective studies: La Guajira is an inhabited desert and its inhabitants have so far suffered the marginalization of a development and social model that does not include them. The risk of continuing with projects at such a fast rate is that renewable energy, instead of being a vector of sustainable development, could turn into a new pattern of environmental injustice at the regional level.
In Antofagasta the experience has been drastically different. In comparison, the development of NCREs in the region has rarely been conflictive. Despite the high number of projects of different sizes and implementing different technologies, there are no major socio-environmental conflicts linked to renewable energies. This is due to the prevalence of solar energy, which, although it leaves a significant ecological footprint due to the materials used in its construction, tends to have greater social acceptance and less environmental impact than other technologies (Levenda et al., 2021; Tawalbeh et al., 2021). Nonetheless, there is a prevailing vision of territoriality that conceives the region as a place primarily specialized in the production of renewable energy.

Such a conception is reflected in the high density of generation projects, which spreads across the regional map (Figure 3.4b). This phenomenon raises questions, in turn, about the environmental sustainability of this industry in the long run. Although the Second Region has a much lower population density and greater availability of land than La Guajira, some estimates put the number of total area required on 7,582,536 ha to exploit the full solar PV and CSP potential (Ministerio de Energía de Chile & GIZ, 2014). Even if solar energy development is unlikely to reach this magnitude, the use of this data as a benchmark for framing energy policy has contributed to create and disseminate a perception that the Atacama Desert landscape can be endlessly exploited. Over the long run, the extensive transformation of the desert landscape for the development of solar energy may generate the risk of creating serious socio-environmental problems. Yet, this concern still seems very distant for relevant stakeholders (even the environmental advocacy groups) and the more immediate concern refers, first, to the layout of transmission lines and, second, to the implementation of the decarbonization plan of the electricity matrix, as we shall later discuss.

Anyway, there is indeed a tendency to transform the regional landscape in a unique direction. In the Ministry of National Assets' *Plan de Licitaciones 2018-2022*<fnref n="33" />, Most of the fiscal properties earmarked by the Chilean State for the development of energy projects with a strategic interest were in the Second Region (93 out of 174) (Figure 3.6a). Likewise, 4 of the

<footnote n="33">³³ The *Plan de Licitaciones* defines the utilization of a certain number of state-owned properties to leverage the strategic development of different productive sectors, according to the purpose of each property: tourism, conservation and heritage, industrial, agricultural, real estate, housing-commercial, and for the development of renewable energies.</footnote>
5 communes with the largest area of land available for bidding (Figure 3.6b) were located in Antofagasta (Sierra Gorda, María Elena and Calama being the first three, respectively) (Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales de Chile, 2021). In the same direction, the Chilean government announced in July 2021 the provision of 27 properties<fnref n="34" />, equivalent to 20,369 hectares, in which is projected an investment of US$ 1,775 million to build 2,037 MW of installed capacity for electricity generation. The latter would expand the regional NCRE capacity by about 30% (Ministerio de Energía de Chile, 2021c).

<figure><img src="image_33.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3.6. Plan de Licitaciones (2018-2022); (a) Map of properties earmarked for energy projects; (b) Top 10 communes with the largest surface area to be tendered.</figcaption></figure>

Source: Author's adaptation from Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales de Chile (2021).

<footnote n="34">³⁴ The lands are located in the communes of María Elena (8 properties and 6,205 hectares); Antofagasta (7 and 1,892 ha); Calama (5 and 3,320 ha); Sierra Gorda (3 and 8,146 ha); Mejillones (3 and 775 ha); and Tocopilla (1 and 30.56 ha).</footnote>
Although this vision of land use is not the subject of major socio-environmental conflicts<fnref n="35" />, this should not be interpreted to mean that there are no objections to the decision-making mechanisms being employed in the territorial planning of renewable projects. Conversely, as stated by Paz Araya:

> "El Sistema de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (SEIA) no es vinculante y además es muy asimétrico. Es lo que ocurre con la entrada e implementación de los proyectos renovables. Todo se plantea en un lenguaje técnico y engorroso que limita participación de la ciudadanía. Así, cuando hay inconformidad, a lo sumo se logra detener un proyecto. Como no hay planificación a escala local, nadie incorpora estas voces y críticas." (Informant C3, June 22, 2021).

Besides this weakness of the participatory mechanisms in power sector planning, there is also the absence of a *place attachment* (Devine-Wright, 2011) with the new places for the generation of electricity from renewable sources. As Carla Lanyon (Informant C1), researcher for the *Centro de Energía* at Universidad de Chile, told—alluding to the region and the symbolic place it occupies in the imaginary of citizens in the country’s large cities:

> "A diferencia de lo ocurrido con Hidroaysén o de lo que pasa con las zonas de sacrificio cercanas a Santiago, nadie defiende Antofagasta. La gente, y por 'la gente' me refiero a los actores influyentes en Santiago, ya la cedió. La dio por perdida." (Informant C1, June 16, 2021).

Such a lack of place attachment is enabling the monoproduction of renewable energy to expand increasingly in the Atacama Desert (Figure 3.7) without significant backlash. In this manner, concerns about environmental impacts such as landscape degradation and habitat loss (Klugmann-Radziemska, 2014) are quickly dismissed in the face of the global economic benefits derived from the blooming of this industry. Behind this conception of the desertscape, its ecosystems and inhabitants, lies a certain *environmental racism*. As pointed out by the informant of CENSAT-Agua Viva: "*Hay cierta idea de que esos indios no*

<footnote n="35">³⁵ Despite the lack of major conflicts around NCREs, there have been tensions related to the planning of some projects and their RCA process. This is the case of the claims filed by the indigenous communities of Taira and Pueblo de San Pedro against the Cerro Pabellón geothermal plant expansion project, which were admitted by the First Environmental Court of Chile.</footnote>
importan, el desierto no importa, no es un ecosistema y territorio digno de cuidar.” This is
happening in both La Guajira and Antofagasta, albeit in different ways.

<figure><img src="image_34.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3.7. Cerro Dominador solar power complex (PV+CSP plant). Source: Meteored (2021).</figcaption></figure>

The global energy transition is bringing about then a massive transformation of the landscape in Antofagasta. It is simultaneously transforming large desert ecosystems to produce electricity and increasing anthropic pressure on the Andean highlands - due to the rapid growth in demand for minerals and

rare earths to supply the global value chains of clean energy. Such freneticism raises serious
doubts about the long-term sustainability of this trend.

**3.1.3. Renewable energy landscapes: revisiting the resource curse?**

The suggestive idea that renewable energies might be following the path of fossil
fuels (Raman, 2013) is an alarm bell about the limited transformative scope that ongoing
transformations of energy systems may have. More precisely, one of the risks involved in the
inadequate governance of these processes is the repetition of the resource curse. In other
words, a new version of the development trap in which countries with a greater abundance
of non-renewable natural resources (i.e., essentially hydrocarbons such as oil or minerals
such as gold) were unable to make the structural leap towards societies with high standards
of social welfare. In this sense, the trajectories of the new energy spaces reveal that the gears
of development do not align automatically.

Considering environmental justice issues, renewable energies can accentuate patterns of
socio-spatial inequality and leave a notorious socio-ecological footprint in the areas destined
for the installation of electricity generating capacity. Emerging socio-environmental conflicts
at the local scale are not inevitable. It is possible to avoid these conflicts if the transition to
renewables is part of a inclusive sustainable development strategy and does not threaten the
well-being of local stakeholders and especially the most vulnerable and historically
marginalized communities (Månsson, 2015). There is no relationship of consubstantiality
between renewable energies and environmental injustices, as there is with fossil industries,
but neither is there a necessary link between these energy sources and a social and
environmental sustainability perspective. Because of these changes, which involve a wide
range of actors, scales and locations, it may be useful to study the impacts of renewable
energy plans and projects from a bottom-up perspective, focused on local actors and their
territorialities, rather than from a techno-managerial perspective centered on the state and
only-technological solutions. As Spreng (2014) stresses, “*although the tools for harvesting
and using energy are technical devices, most problems we have with society’s physical
energy metabolism are non-technological problems.*”

Looking closely at the regional case studies, it is noteworthy that environmental justice issues
are not only related to the contentious aspects of transitions but to broader socioecological
concerns. Dilemmas that challenge the environmental sustainability of a burgeoning industry
also arise—questioning the high requirements for land, rare earths and minerals that threaten
to introduce anthropogenic disturbances in vast ecosystems as well as abrupt land-use
changes. The high surface requirement of renewables and its potential interactions with
agricultural systems for food production (Månsson, 2015) is a critical issue requiring more
attention from policymakers and project-developers. La Guajira is particularly critical,
because of the precarious institutional presence in areas that are gaining centrality for wind
energy development and the spatial overlap of illegal flows, traditional uses, and fragile
ecosystems. Preventing these conflicts thus requires the development of local institutional
capacities by linking the decisive participation of non-state actors in the definition of land
use planning. However, this multi-stakeholder dialogue should not consist solely of
integrating economic interests of the power sector major players into public policy
instruments. Instead, it is important to enhance the needs and voices of local communities to
co-construct energy networks with criteria of sustainability, equity, and justice.
The energy transition is therefore generating extraordinary gains for some countries, such as Chile, and increasingly for others, such as Colombia. Considering their development strategies, this poses a challenge: to avoid turning strategic regions for renewables into extractive enclaves of electric power. The absence of planning and agreement on a new territorial fit for these areas, outside the logic and narratives of *extractivism* (Gudynas, 2019), may lead to the repetition of the fossil fuels' development traps and, in this case, of the so-called resource curse. Nonetheless, the repetition of such a phenomenon at a large scale is yet evitable (Overland, 2019). What can certainly happen (and to some extent is happening) is that governance gaps in the transition processes towards clean energy become a source of new socio-environmental conflicts and, contrary to the expectations created, cannot properly address pre-existing conflicts around energy. As we will see, this is the case for the coal value chain and its transformations, both in a place of extraction (La Guajira) and in a place of transformation (Antofagasta).
**3.2. Climate justice challenges: unexpected connections through coal value chain**

A peculiarity of the new energy spaces is the uneven and geographically
differentiated development of pathways and institutions associated with a low-carbon future.
The weight of the incumbent energy regimes (with their actors and technologies) and path
dependence become thus central issues in the investigation of the *regional dynamics of
accumulation* (Bridge & Gailing, 2020) that shape renewable energy spaces. In this sense,
the prevalence of coal in the energy landscape of La Guajira and Antofagasta is a pressing
issue in light of the second relevant dimension for a just transition: *climate justice*. Despite
being the energy source most threatened by the energy transition due to its very high level of
carbon emissions, there is no absolute certainty as to its phase-out. Rather, this matter raises
several questions. Coal thereby introduces instability in the energy landscape of both regions
(as *carbonscapes* (Haarstad & Wanvik, 2017)) which produces great uncertainty with respect
to the assemblage of low-carbon spatialities. Next, I will examine this issue as follows: 1)
realizing the impacts of coal in the constitution of La Guajira and Antofagasta as “sacrifice
zones” for energy production/extraction; 2) analyzing the challenges for a coal phase-out in
the context of the ongoing renewable energy transitions in Colombia and Chile; and 3)
discussing the weight and effects of *path dependence* (Fouquet, 2016a; Stein, 2017) in both
regional energy transition processes.

**3.2.1. The indelible stain of coal in the ‘sacrifice zones’**

<figure><img src="image_35.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3.8. Hard Coal exports to Chile from La Guajira.
Source: Author's elaboration with data from UPME (2021b).</figcaption></figure>
A contingent connection between Antofagasta and La Guajira is their insertion in two different links of the thermal coal value chain. While millions of tons of coal are extracted each year in La Guajira, after being shipped, the same coal is transformed in large quantities for electricity generation in Antofagasta. Together with the mines in the north of the neighboring department of Cesar, the coal mined in La Guajira has Chile as the fourth commercial destination since 2010³⁶. In fact, due to the drop in global demand due to the Covid-19 pandemic, in 2020 Chile became the second destination for La Guajira's coal (or third if the European Union is taken as a single trading partner). Totaling 154,750,699 USD FOB of commercial exchange, this relationship was only surpassed by the one with Turkey— whose coal purchases reached a value of almost 282 million dollars FOB (UPME, 2021c). Coal exports from La Guajira to Chile has remained in the range of 3 to 4 million tons per year since 2012 (Figure 3.8).

Most of this coal was destined for the thermoelectric power plants in the Mejillones and Tocopilla communes in Antofagasta. The majority of Chile's coal consumption is concentrated there. According to 2017 National Energy Balance (Energía Abierta & CNE, 2021c), 43.35% of the national total was transformed in Antofagasta for electricity generation. As we shall see, in both places, at both ends of the value chain, the stains left by coal are indelible—to the point of making the extraction/transformation sites authentic *sacrifice zones* (P. E. V. López et al., 2020; Reinert, 2018). Following Reinert's (2018) operational definition, the concept of sacrifice zone "describes forms of environmental violence degradation and destruction that operate spatially, at the level of landscapes and regions. The term captures a relationship between destructive violence and disposability or "sacrificability"."

To begin with, the municipalities of Albania, Hatonuevo and Barrancas in La Guajira are home to El Cerrejón, one of the largest open-pit coal mines in the world. Divided into three sections (North Zone, Central Zone and South Zone), this mine has been in operation since 1981. Until June 2021, *Carbones del Cerrejón S.A.* was owned in equal parts by the

<footnote n="36">³⁶ 7% of the coal extracted in these two departments throughout the 2010s was consumed in Chile—which was only surpassed by the Netherlands (18%), Turkey (13.9%) and the United States (7.52%) (UPME, 2021c). Recently, Turkey has become the main buyer of Colombian coal while the Netherlands and the United States have decreased their volume of imports (presumably due to European decarbonization commitments and increased domestic production on the U.S. side).</footnote>
multinational mining companies BHP Billiton, Anglo American and Xstrata plc The latter was acquired in 2013 by Glencore, which, in turn, bought the remaining 66% of El Cerrejón shares in 2021, in a USD $588 million transaction. The mine produces 35 million tons (almost all of it for export purposes) and has mining titles in force until 2034. The company also has 69,000 hectares under concession, of which approximately 10,000 hectares are directly involved in coal mining projects (Figure 3.9a). Finally, it has a railroad of more than 150 km, one of the few operational in Colombia, which in turn connects the mine directly to a harbor in Bahía Portete (in the north of the department). The aforementioned is complemented by administrative and military facilities (Fundación Terram et al., 2020). To sum up, it is an extractive complex of colossal dimensions.

<figure><img src="image_36.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3.9. Satellite maps of El Cerrejón: a) Mining titles; b) Historical evolution of pits and dumps.
Source: Fierro Morales & Llorente Valbuena (2016).</figcaption></figure>

More than a mine, Cerrejón represents an extractivist idea that has radically transformed La Guajira. On the one hand, its environmental and geological impacts have been sufficiently documented. A detailed report by geologists Fierro Morales & Llorente Valbuena (2016) extensively documented the impacts of Cerrejón. These range from unintended and diffuse geological impacts to large water and material footprints. In sum: direct affectations on water
bodies (diversion and drying of streams) and air quality (high environmental concentration of particulate matter-PM10 and heavy metals) have direct effects on fauna, flora and landscape, as well as on land uses and traditional visions of the territory in areas surrounding the mine. Thus, in addition to the physical and geological instability introduced into the ecosystems, there are direct consequences on local communities.

On the other hand, coal mining in southern La Guajira has been a source of socio-environmental conflicts since the late 1970s, when Cerrejón was still in the exploratory phase. In a report published by the environmental NGO CENSAT Agua Viva, made an exhaustive account of the socio-environmental conflicts associated with Cerrejón from 1977 to 2010. Such conflicts have pitted mining companies and state institutions (including paramilitary organizations, as in the case of the Bahía Portete massacre in 2004³⁷) against local communities (mostly Wayúu indigenous people). The repercussions of these conflicts include forced displacement of populations; legal pressures for the sale of land; damage to property and cultural heritage; contamination and disintegration of the physical-social environment; persecution of social leaders; and restrictions on civil liberties. Coal has then turned La Guajira into an authentic sacrifice zone.

At the other end of the value chain is Antofagasta, where coal is transformed to convert it into electricity. Indeed, on July 2021, coal-based thermoelectric plants continued to represent 39.9% of the regional net installed capacity of electricity generation, equivalent to 2,463.9 MW of nominal power. Despite the massive incorporation of non-conventional renewable source projects, 64.4% of monthly electricity generation (1177.11 GWh) still comes from the burning of thermal coal (Energía Región, 2021). The centrality of coal in the regional energy system is such that the four largest coal-fired power plants in Chile<fnref n="38" /> are in two communes within the region: Mejillones and Tocopilla (Figure 3.10a & Figure 3.11b). Due to the

<footnote n="37">³⁷ This massacre involved the slaughtering and disappearance of 32 people as well as the subsequent murder of the witness and indigenous social leader, Liliana Epinayú, and the forced displacement of 500 people from the indigenous community. The mining company allegedly financed paramilitary groups in complicity with the mechanized infantry Battalion No. 6 of the Colombian Army (Idárraga et al., 2010).</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸ In July 2021, these plants were, ordered by their nominal power and the name of the company to which they belong: 1) Mejillones (Engie Chile) - 580 MW; 2) Angamos (AES Andes) - 558.2 MW; 3) Cochrane (AES Andes) - 549.72 MW; 4) IEM (Engie Chile) - 376.96 MW. To these are added in Antofagasta the Norgener (AES Andes) - 276.39 MW and Hornitos-Andina (Engie Chile) - 354-54 MW (Energía Abierta & CNE, 2021a).</footnote>
environmental and public health impacts, these industrial enclaves have been referred to as sacrifice zones by a wide range of actors.

<figure><img src="image_37.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3.10. Information documents for Antofagasta's sacrifice zones. Source: Fundación Terram (2019).</figcaption></figure>

Totaling five in Chile (Tocopilla, Mejillones, Coronel, Huasco and Quintero-Puchuncaví), sacrifice zones produce 88% of the carbon emissions of the national electricity system (P. E. V. López et al., 2020). In addition, there are other industrial activities that are responsible, in turn, for aggravating the environmental pollution produced by coal-based thermoelectric plants. These power plants are located in huge industrial parks and operate alongside copper and iron smelters, cement plants, chemical plants, gas and oil terminals, copper concentrate shipments and landings, explosives and cellulose plants, among others. In addition to the high levels of air, soil, and water pollution resulting from the concentration of these industries, the surrounding communities are marginalized and suffer from the absence of state institutions that guarantee their rights. At a short distance from residential areas, these plants emit high concentrations of fine dust that pollute air, soil and water, and periodically generate coal strandings on the coast, hydrocarbon spills, among other negative impacts on the environment and the health of the population (Fundación Terram et al., 2020; Sandra Cortes et al., 2019). The above configures a highly unstable and destructive *carbonscape* (Haarstad & Wanvik, 2017) that ignites contentious responses from the population.

In this sense, Mejillones and Tocopilla have also become focal points of socio-environmental conflicts. As recorded in July 2021 by the map of environmental conflicts of the National
Institute of Human Rights of Chile (INDH), 88% of the conflicts in Antofagasta were related to the energy sector and, more specifically, in the areas of Mejillones and Tocopilla (INDH, 2021). Dating back nearly three decades ago and most since the mid-2000s, these mostly involve demands by civil society organizations for the Chilean state to adopt adequate measures to protect the social and environmental rights of the inhabitants of these areas. In particular, the demand for the right to live in a pollution-free environment and the right to biodiversity, as well as the human rights to life and health, is reiterative. Such disputes usually oppose, on the one hand, civil society organizations (environmental NGOs, neighborhood councils, fishermen's unions, among others) and, on the other hand, the multinational companies operating the power plants (AES Andes, ENEL and ENGIE), which are usually protected by the regulations in force.

Finally, in both Colombia and Chile, the coal industry is not dead, and its indelible mark can be seen in the physiognomy of the sacrifice zones in both countries. Although it is the energy source most directly tackled by the global energy transition, the perspective of its substitution and exit in Colombia and Chile is still diffuse. As we shall see, its place in decarbonization plans as well as its interplay with renewable energy sources in the process of expansion, raises questions in the light of climate justice.

### 3.2.2. Phasing out coal: contradictions across multiple scales

Antofagasta and La Guajira illustrate well the economic, social, and ethical challenges that decarbonization in Latin America must face to take place within a framework of justice and equity. Despite their differences, both regions face some similar sustainability challenges. From the perspective of climate justice, they bring to the fore the complex set of scales in which interactions and exchanges between relevant actors take place (Jasanoff, 2018). They are thereby at crossroads resulting from the uneven and combined geographic development of the new energy spaces (Bridge & Gailing, 2020).

On the one hand, in Antofagasta the coal phase out corresponds directly with a plan to decarbonize Chile's electricity matrix. After declining to sign up to the *Powering Past Coal Alliance* at COP23 in 2017, which was intended to accelerate the phase-out of coal-fired power plants worldwide, Chile organized a concerted roundtable with coal-power companies to structure a decarbonization plan under the scheme of public-private partnership. The result
was that the electricity generating companies<fnref n="39" /> proposed a schedule of closure dates and the state accepted it with a target horizon of 2040 to complete the retirement and/or reconversion of all coal-fired power plants. This plan to decarbonize the electricity matrix was presented in 2019 under the premise of contributing to reduce emissions from the energy sector and to gradually replace coal-based generation with clean and renewable energy source (Ministerio de Energía de Chile, 2020a).

Likewise, the consultation process to draw this plan involved the participation of all relevant stakeholders in the national energy system. Such plurality of voices resulted from the convening of 21 institutions from 10 different categories (companies, public sector, unions, clients/consumers, NGOs, civil society, international organizations, academia, independent institutions, and municipalities). Yet, as expressed by Claudia Fuentes (Informant C2) of the NGO *Chile Sustentable*, one of the participating organizations, the plan is not exempt from criticism:

> "Las críticas desde las organizaciones de la sociedad civil se resumen en dos. Primero, está la voluntariedad de las fechas de retiro. Eso implica dejar todo en manos de las empresas y sus prioridades. Segundo, está la credibilidad misma del plan y sus objetivos. Las metas de disminución de emisiones deben incorporarse en la ley para que sean creíbles. Es cierto que este plan está al mismo nivel de importancia de la Política Energética 2050 y otros documentos de política pública y planificación estratégica, pero debe convertirse en ley para garantizar su cumplimiento por parte de las autoridades". (Informant C2, June 17, 2021).

Besides this, another controversial element of the decarbonization policy is the *Estado de Reserva Estratégica (ERE)*<fnref n="40" />. In the agreements reached in June 2019, the Ministry of Energy and the *Comisión Nacional de Energía* (CNE) committed to incorporating a new form of back up to the system: the ERE, through which inactive coal-fired plants could receive up to 60% of the usual payments for power generated for an extendable 5-year period, in order to keep them on standby (in a kind of hibernation) in the event of a supply deficit. This measure was fiercely criticized for introducing distortions in the generation market by indirectly

<footnote n="39">³⁹ Four companies concentrate the coal-fired generation park: three are multinationals (AES Andes, Engie and ENEL) and one company is Chilean (Colbún) (Figure 3.11).</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ After a modification introduced on December 26, 2020, this mechanism is regulated by Decree 62 of 2006 of the Chilean Ministry of Economy, which "aprueba reglamento de transferencias de potencia entre empresas generadoras establecidas en la Ley General de Servicios Eléctricos".</footnote>
subsidizing thermal plants, generating disincentives for investments in clean energy (Chile Sustentable, 2020).

Despite having a public policy framework, coal phase out process in Chile is still subject to market volatility and can have setbacks<fnref n="41" />. An example is that the voluntary nature of the agreements leads to a determination of the retirement deadlines according to the discretion of power companies and their investment plans. In fact, despite the progress of the first phase of the phase-out schedule, the big picture for coal-fired generation had not changed substantially by 2021, two years after the plan's approval (Figure 3.11). The market remains concentrated in four large companies as to 2017 and only one (Engie) had effectively reduced its market share. In fact, of the 1,731 MW of installed capacity to be retired in Phase 1 of the decarbonization plan (2019-2024), only 322 MW are part of AES Andes portfolio (Ministerio de Energía de Chile, 2020a). Furthermore, it is as well the only company that have expressed so far the intention of including all its units in the ERE (Chile Sustentable, 2020), and, together with Colbún, does not have a definitive date for closing the remaining plants during Phase 2 (2024-2040).

<figure><img src="image_38.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3.11. Coal-fired plants installed capacity by company (2017 vs. 2021). Source: Author's elaboration with data from Energía Abierta & CNE (2021).</figcaption></figure>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ In early August 2021, CEN proposed the reopening of the Ventanas 1 unit - which stopped operating in December 2020 - due to the drought that negatively affected hydroelectric generation in Chile and left the responsibility of supplying 70% of the total required electricity in the hands of thermal power plants.</footnote>
This lack of haste is due, to a large extent, to a lack of political pressure in its country of origin. While the headquarters of Engie and ENEL, French and Italian respectively, are subject to the political and economic situation of the EU, AES Corporation –from the U.S.– enjoys less domestic pressure to retire its coal-fired plants worldwide. This would be one of the reasons why in the Mejillones and Tocopilla sacrifice zones until mid-2021 only the two oldest units of the Engie plant had been retired and until 2024, during the first phase, only four more units of this company expect to be retired in Antofagasta (Figure 3.12). AES Andes units in the region would not be retired or reconverted during this phase.

<figure><img src="image_39.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3.12. First phase retirement schedule for the coal-fired power plants in Tocopilla and Mejillones. Source: Author's adaptation from Ministerio de Energía de Chile (2020).</figcaption></figure>

Some decisions concerning the decarbonization of the Chilean electricity matrix are taken thousands of kilometers away from the country, without much consideration of its social or environmental situation. They are not primarily related to the technical aspects of the operation of the national electricity system and its requirements to supply domestic demand, much less to the territorial realities of the sacrifice zones. Several informants mentioned this as an unfair aspect of the Chilean energy transition. In this regard, Carla Lanyon stated: