same features from long before and after 1988. In the SPDC period (1997-2010), three main institutions were responsible of the implementation of agricultural policies at the village level (adapted from Thawnghmung, 2003: 303-304).

* The township People Development Council (PDC): the most powerful body, appointed with military staff, which directly supervised the civilian village PDCs' chairman.

* The Myanmar Agricultural Services (MAS), a department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation: theoretically responsible of providing extension services through subsidized agricultural inputs, it served mostly as a policy-implementing body (for example defining the quota to be sold to the government for townships and villages).

* SLRD: another department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, SLRD officers' main duties are collecting agricultural statistics, assessing land revenue and land rent, registering deeds, and dealing with other land administration duties.

* The Irrigation Department: the responsibilities of this department grew especially after 1990 and the introduction of the summer paddy policy, supported by various irrigation programs, notably in the Dry Zone.

* The Myanmar Agricultural and Rural Development Bank (MADB): serving as an instrument for rural savings and loan disbursement

Although each of these departments had extension workers to supervise their different tasks at the village level, those staffs would actually delegate most of their responsibilities to the village tract headman, from whom they would record only the information needed to report to their superiors (ibid: 312). On the other hand, the headman, who was not receiving any salary at that time, besides being involved in his full-time livelihood as a farmer, would bear the burden of receiving agricultural extension workers, providing them with lunch, etc. This peculiar situation, as the state's political broker, laid the ground for some headmen (yet not all) to find all possible ways of taking advantage of their position:

> "Village chairmen may earn money from imposing fines on law breakers, charging fees on land contracts, and on visitors' registration. He may supplement his income by taking bribes from his villagers in return for covering up their activities that are considered illegal from the central authorities (one example would be under-reporting cultivated acres when it comes to selling the procurement quota). He could also recover his expenses by passing on the costs to his villagers. He may also get subsidized consumer products or agricultural implements and inputs with the permission of the township ruling authorities. (Ibid: 309)
<figure><img src="image_82.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 44:** Roles (informal in green, official in orange) of village headman in land management under procurement policy</figcaption></figure>

Hence, village headmen – still depending on their own personality – could be tempted to take full advantage of their position, not only to earn revenues, but also to get access to local resources, including land – as seen in the case of one village headman who managed to accumulate large tracts of land through the procurement policy (Chapter VIII.4.1). This power can be explained by the central role of the village headman in organizing land management: by liaizing with the different departments, and by transforming informal practices (such as land transfers as seen in VIII.1.3) into formal ones (such as changing

the name in SLRD's registers) through different arrangements. This central role is illustrated in the figure below. The village head played a role in supporting the enforcement of the paddy procurement. In the event of farmers unable to fulfil the required quotas, the village head as chair of the village tract land committee would facilitate land sales, disguised in the form of let allocations to persons under the 'waiting list'.

<figure><img src="image_83.png" /></figure>

## 3.2 The village headman in the midst of land reform

Through the constitutional reform of 2008, tasks and responsibilities of the village tract headman (now officially called the village tract administrator) suffered little changes. It even seems that his central position has been reinforced, yet with a few changes regarding his status. Indeed, technically the village headman is still not a government employee, as he receives only subsidies from the Ministry of Home affairs through GAD (Kyì Pyar Chit Saw and Arnold, 2014: 34).

On the other hand, "village tract administrators are the anchor of the GAD's vertical role in public administration, and they effectively act as an extension of the GAD's township administrator, who supervizes them" (Ibid: 34). Yet, the same feeling of being 'caught in the middle' of the state administration on the one hand, and local legitimacy on the other, may remain even blurrier since GAD village tract clerks (direct employees of the GAD who can putatively ascend the administrative scale) act as the secretary of non-employed-village tract administrators.
Finally, the headman is the chairperson of all village tract committees (Ibid: 34). Among those committees, the Village Tract Farmland Management Body (VLMB) created after releasing the new Farmland Law 2012, is in charge of regulating land use, land transfers, registration, land use rights and related conflicts, and Scrutinizing requests for changing from prescribed crops to another, among other responsibilities (see insert below). In other words, the VLMB is in now in charge of all farmland management related matters.

Hence, when it comes to the most visible impact on local land reform, that is the titling process and the issuance of Land Use Certificates (LUCs), the role of the headman is even further enhanced. Indeed, as seen earlier, the headman had a crucial role in facilitating transfers of land use rights at a time when these transfers (apart from inheritance) were illegal. The headman was the main stakeholder linking village-based land tenure with relevant authorities, especially the SLRD. We have seen that such arrangements generated a lot of conflicts through the land registration process.

Yet, as shown in **Figure 45**, those supposed to record and redress land conflicts (notably arising from 'informal-legal' land arrangements) and those involved at the origins of those conflicts are the same people, namely the village tract administrator, the GAD clerk, and the SLRD staff. By trying to overcome challenges brought by land and agricultural policies, village headmen would provide convenient arrangements to the farmers (with the caveat that the headman had to have his interest served in such arrangements as well), but these would often turn against farmers at one point (Thawnghmung, 2003: 311).

What is problematic is that the same story continues today. For instance, when it comes to farmland rental agreements done with Chinese investors in the Dry Zone, interviews show that the headman is often acting as an agent to negotiate the rental agreements, and legitimizing these transfers in the eyes of the community. Yet, the new land law states that "*A person who has the permission*

<figure><img src="image_84.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 45:** Continuity: the role of the Village Headman under the new land framework, against historical background</figcaption></figure>
BOX 20: COMPOSITION AND TASKS OF THE WARD/VILLAGE TRACT FARMLAND MANAGEMENT BODY *

Composition

1. Ward/Village Tract Administrator Chairperson

2. Ward/Village Tract Clerk Secretary

3. Settlement and Land Record Department Clerk Member

4. Elected farmer representative Member

5. Elected influential elders yat-mi-yat-pha representative Member

Roles and Responsibilities:

1. Recommendation and application of land use right to the Township Settlement and Land Record Department within 30 days after acceptance;

2. Farmland sale, mortgage, rent, exchange and transfer has to be contracted with the evidence of village farmland management body;

3. Recording of users who have received land use rights permission and save the documents of land use right registration form (Form-11);

4. Monitor land use right users to follow the rules of land use rights and submission of reports to Township Farmland Management Body to take action;

5. Investigate and decision making of land disputes;

6. Supervise to follow the decision of Farmland Management Body decision making during farmland dispute;

7. Supervise not to transfer the land from land use right users to foreigners or foreign organizations and if found out, submit the case to Township Farmland Management Body for taking action;

8. Filtering and submission of cases which applied to change seasonal crops to perennial crops;

9. Filtering and submission of cases which applied to use farmland for other purposes;

10. Manage not to destroy pastures and common land;

11. Submission of cases of virgin land which is closest to the village to the Township Farmland Management Body;

12. Investigation and coordination of virgin land dispute with Farmland Management Body; and

13. Implement the activities assigned by Central, Nay Pyi Taw Council, State/Region, District and Township Farmland Management Body.

<footnote>* Reproduced from Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and Arnold, 2014:52</footnote>
of right for farming should not sold, pawn, lease, exchange or donate his/her land to
any foreigner or organization involving foreigner(s) without the permission of the State/
region Government". The proposed land rental prices are high and farmers are quite
tempted by such an easy source of income. Once again, village tract headmen, by
finding arrangements for the 'sake' of farmers' livelihoods (power of legitimation),
and for the sake of their own economic interest as brokers (power of market) put
the farmers in direct threat of being prosecuted for not complying with the law.
The same principle applies for village tract administrators closing their eyes on
land use changes from seasonal to perennial crops (for Thanakha trees in Dry Zone
for instance), another infringement to the new land law.

3.3 Linking the different dimensions of exclusion

We may conclude this chapter by showing how, under the new land law, village
tract administrators are more than ever installed at the crossroads of the 'powers
of exclusion'.

In conclusion, local land issues show that whatever the reforms may be
promulgated (even as part of a democratization effort), few changes will happen in
practice without greater attention to local governance. It is critical for the reforms
to be effectively implemented on the ground. The figure of the headman is central
in acting as an interface between customary and statutory systems – but also in
using his privileges to provide access to lands through his networks rather than in
a fair manner.

Furthermore, the involvement of the same members of the village elite (i.e.
elders known as *lugyi* and *yet-mi-yet-pha*) in committees directly challenges the
adequacy of government structures put in place to administrate – including but
not limited to – land issues. Indeed, such committees created to support President
Thein Sein's 'people-centered development'<fnref n="124" />, are merely deferring to the
authority of the village leader, the GAD clerk, or the SLRD officer, pointing to the
administrative irrelevance of formal state structures, regardless of the government
in power.

In short, if the government is genuinely seeking change and aiming at
improving land governance and land tenure security, it should address this critical
issue of local governance. The power of the headman would need to be regulated
through mechanisms allowing checks and balances.

Accountability to citizens by authorities in charge of land administration is
not a spontaneous process. Impact at the local level will remain a critical issue if

<footnote n="124">124. U Thein Sein, 26 December 2012. Speech in Nay Pyi Taw.</footnote>
concrete mechanisms for transparency and accountability of the actors who will be
in charge of translating the legal framework into practices on the ground are not
clearly defined in the new legal framework. Such measures would not only protect
the least politically represented stakeholders, but would provide fertile ground for
restoring citizens' faith in the state on the ground.
# IX. Conclusions and recommendations

## 1. A century and a half of uprooting Burmese agrarian society... for its own interest?

Since the annexation of Lower Burma by the British in 1852, the reforms that affected Burmese agrarian society seem to share a common rationale: helping farmers shift from tenancy to ownership. This seems paradoxical as at the beginning of British administration of the country, the 1891 census recorded that the bulk of the population was already landowning cultivators (64%), with only 1% landlords, 26% tenants, and 8% landless agricultural laborers. Indeed, in the pre-colonial period, the dominant rural stratum in Upper Burma was composed of hereditary headmen who appear to have exercised a proprietary right over all the lands in their jurisdiction and who ruled self-sufficient agricultural communities of freemen known as *athis*. Land was organized on a communal basis and access to such lands had been subject to close headman supervision (Lieberman 1991: 27). Whether freemen or bondsmen (working on royal or religious land), farmers were in fact highly integrated in a relationship to local patrons (headmen, crown officers) that would ensure their protection both in social and economic terms.

And so, in contrast to the putative British goal, the last 150 years has actually been about undoing patron-client ties for diverse reasons, the first and foremost being systemizing the collection of taxes for the state on an individual basis. What was long established as hereditary rights on land through the concept of *dama-u-gya* was interpreted and transformed into individual claims on land, and land turned into a commodity (or at least something that can be used as a collateral for loans), beginning with the British-introduced *ryotwari* system<fnref n="125" />. The country's administrative division into village tracts marked the rise of the village headman who became a local elite backed by the colonial administration. The integration of rice production into international markets and its subsequent monetization and value chain integration contributed to a fragmentation of former comprehensive patron-client relationships. As a whole, the social value of being an agriculturist faded at the profit of the economical one, with landlords and money-lenders overturning legitimate headmen and patrons. As a result, by 1930 one third of the total cultivated land had fallen into the hands of non-agriculturists and one quarter held by absentee non-agriculturists.

<footnote n="125">125. An individual based system where revenue settlement was fixed directly with individuals.</footnote>
The 1948 nationalization act and subsequent policies (Land Nationalization Act 1953; Tenancy Act and Rules 1964) aimed at reversing this situation to create a body of peasant-proprietors rather than tenants. But the Burmese agrarian society had already been uprooted from its sociocultural framework<fnref n="126" />, and the closing of the agrarian frontier (the most fertile land being already cleared and cultivated) together with the 1930s Great Depression had left many peasants without the financial capacity to undertake cultivation and cope with occasional crisis (pests, weather). Not only was the redistribution of land under the Land Nationalization Act poorly implemented (with only 17% of all cultivated lands nationalized), but harmful policies such as the compulsory procurement of a fixed quota of harvested crop – particularly paddy – (at a fixed price) also weakened small and middle farmers (under 16 acres for paddy cultivation) while benefiting bigger ones. In the studied villages, tenancy is actually low: an average 16% of landless households of both zones work land through temporary arrangements, amounting to 13.5% of total farming households (households with permanent land use rights and landless working land through temporary arrangements). More worrisome, however, is the average rate of landless households: it reaches almost 50% among the two zones (with rates as high as 80% in Pay Chaung village, Kyet Shar village tract of the southern Delta). In 150 years, if we draw on the British census of 1891, the body of landless laborers jumped from 8% to 50% of the total population<fnref n="127" />.

In 2012, the new Land Law, a reform "in the interest of the entire people"<fnref n="128" />, came to sanction the pre-existing system based on individual land rights by distributing Land Use Certificates (LUCs) and legalize transfers of land use rights. This reform did not much change the on-the-ground reality of land tenure and land dynamics, since farmers did not wait for formal reform to sell, rent, or mortgage their land (despite the legal ban on such transfers prior to 2012). LUCs are supposedly bringing more security by legalizing these transfers, yet many practical barriers remain, notably when it comes to divide an LUC over a plot of land into two or more pieces. But most of all, the precariousness of land tenure in Burmese lowlands lies in the system itself rather than the modalities of its implementation.

From the misconception of the British regarding the organization of Burmese agrarian society, to Burmese governance whose "policies (were) inclined toward production increase for their own sakes while paying rather less attention to farmers' income and welfare" (Fujita and Okamoto 2006), the common point is the top-down

<footnote n="126">126. Dry Zone farmers better resisted the impact of such change thanks to a greater historical depth than the Delta society that was principally developed through the British colonization.</footnote>

<footnote n="127">127. 46% nation-wide according to LIFT (2012). However this takes into account ethnic upland areas under customary land tenure where landlessness is much lower (and sometimes nonexistent) than in Burmese lowlands.</footnote>

<footnote n="128">128. According to a speech by Vice President Dr Sai Mauk Kham (2011-2015) introducing the land reform in May 2012.</footnote>
nature of reforms caring about production over welfare.. It is striking to read that
intra-village land conflicts after the advent of British rule were of two main types:
the division of land among heirs and redemption of mortgaged land (Than Myint-U
2004: 232)... In 2014, following distribution of LUCs, conflicts observed during this
study were of the same nature. Although the division of land through inheritance
did not bring that many issues under the 2012 reform, previous arrangements
on land use rights that were often done on an oral basis were challenged by
formalization. The distribution of LUCs indeed rekindled old conflicts (such as land
transfers forced by farmers' incapacity to deliver the compulsory quota of crop
to the government) and created new ones (notably between parties involved in
mortgage arrangements). In other words, both British and 2012 reforms brought
into light the complexity of formalizing - allegedly in order to secure - land tenure
with top-down policies, especially when little is done to understand local realities.
In fact, one may question the actual contribution of LUCs to land security. Farmers
in Burmese lowlands were not lacking documents formalizing their claims. Yet,
farmers have always been at threat of arbitrary land confiscations by the state. In that
sense, LUCs do not seem to provide more security than the previous documents.
However, it will surely lead to more insecurity to the farmers who have not received
LUCs. Hence the very purpose of this study: to provide a better understanding of
land dynamics at the local level and propose, on this basis, a new reading of issues
faced by agrarian households (farmers and landless) in these days of reform.

2. Land access and livelihoods' security: does the problem lie in land tenure?

As explained above, Burmese agrarian society sustained a radical change
through 150 years of 'battle against tenancy' that ultimately produced a large
body of landless households (46% nationally<fnref n="129" />; 62% among Delta studied villages,
41% in Dry Zone villages). Tenancy is often considered a precarious state of land
tenure, to which permanent individual ownership, and later on land titles, are
often opposed as the paramount of land tenure security. However, Lavigne-Delville
(2006) warns us against confusing land tenure security and private ownership, or
against thinking that the nature of the rights (e.g. formal or informal, permanent
or temporary) defines land security. Land tenure security means that legitimately
held rights on land cannot be questioned without a sound rationale and proper
conflict resolution mechanism. If this definition is accepted, then land tenure
precariousness land tenure precariousness relates to whether households having
claims on land have fear that those rights will not be sustained in the long term.
Based on this, what does the current study tell us?

<footnote n="129">129. LIFT 2012.</footnote>
## 2.1 Access to land and livelihoods security: a different relationship in Delta and Dry Zone

In both the Delta and the Dry Zone, agriculture and access to land are a crucial part of most rural livelihoods. However the study reveals that strategies and trajectories over land access are different between the two areas.

Building on the discussions in Chapter VII.6 and VII.7, the overall picture tends to show that access to land in the Delta is a basic requirement to secure households' livelihoods. This is well illustrated, on the one hand, by those households having permanent land use rights on small surfaces (less than 10 acres and more often between 2.5 and 5 acres) that do not rely on agriculture for their primary income but for whom land acts as capital (and a guarantee in the perspective of contracting loans) enabling them to diversify, notably into animal husbandry. On the other, there is a clear distinction in terms of incomes and savings between landless farming households (27% of surveyed landless households in the Delta) accessing land through temporary arrangements and the rest of landless households. In other words, access to land, even through temporary arrangements (sharecropping, rent) is a way to foster mobility towards the upper stairs of the Delta's socioeconomic ladder.

In the Dry Zone, socioeconomic mobility is much rarer, with those in the well-established farming households category owning large surfaces (over 10 acres) when reaching the age of 40 to 50 years old – although the study indicates that they start their agricultural trajectory with small holdings (around 5 acres) that they expand with capital derived from income diversification (notably in off-farm activities). The most vulnerable are those struggling to make the best out of low quality lands (less fertile, no access to irrigation). Interestingly, landless households accessing farmlands through temporary arrangements represent only 6% of the total surveyed landless households (against 27% in Delta).

This first shows that the situation regarding access to land and livelihoods security in the two areas is not the same. In the Delta, temporary arrangements (a form of tenancy) are an important way to secure later access to permanent land use rights<fnref n="130" />. Besides, the study also tells that farmers not able to cultivate their entire paddy lands in summer contract closely-linked landless households to work part of their land. Hence in the case of the Delta, temporary arrangements that are often considered 'insecure' are actually an important component of an agricultural trajectory towards access to permanent land use and in a wider sense to livelihoods security. In the Dry Zone, the situation tends to support the fact that access to permanent land use rights is a *sine qua non* condition to secure land access. Yet, the quality of land is a major factor in terms of livelihoods security.

<footnote n="130">130. This is especially true for landless households working land under familial sharecropping arrangements.</footnote>
Therefore, in all cases, the land tenure framework seems to be effective in securing one's land use rights, even derived rights (temporary arrangements), at least at the village level (and for intra-village arrangements). Land tenure insecurity over the past 60 years mostly pertains to other fields than land tenure itself. In the Delta, the continuous control exerted by the government on rice production, accompanied by predatory policies such as compulsory rice procurement, created a highly unstable situation in terms of tenure. A great part of the land market was created by smallholders opting to sell their land when they anticipated foreclosure due to the fact they were unable to procure the fixed quota of rice. According to the quantitative survey, an average 9% of current landless households once had access to permanent land use rights that they lost over the last 25 years in the Delta, against 3% in the Dry Zone. The Dry Zone seems to suffer from livelihoods' insecurity with causes that are not related to land tenure insecurity. Indeed, the high unpredictability of rainfalls leads farmers to diversify while 'bidding on weather' (ya thi u thu laung kasa) notably thanks to intercropping and relay cropping: such that in the case of expected rainfalls, high value cash-crops bring extra incomes, while part of their land devoted to lower-value yet resistant crops such as sesame or sorghum guarantee a minimum income and/or contribution to self-consumption needs from their land. The low availability of fertile lands and uneven access to irrigation – and where irrigation is available, poor maintenance of systems and over-exploitation of available water sources dominates – contribute to undermining the potential of the region's agriculture. On the other hand, demographic pressure in the absence of an agricultural frontier seems to be leading to land fragmentation and shrinking landholdings.

<figure><img src="image_85.png" /></figure>

## 2.2 The need for deeper reforms for improved access to land?

If land use rights – in lowland areas at least – are considered secure under the current land framework, then land access is probably the main cause of concern for many households. Discussion in **Chapter VII.6** reveals a struggle between different socioeconomic classes for accessing and retaining access to land. Exclusion processes among the two zones are again different. In the Dry Zone, stronger social organization implies that farmers have long developed strategies to keep and reproduce their socioeconomic situations, including intra-class marriages, differential inheritance patterns directed at reducing land fragmentation<fnref n="131" />, and the tendency to secure non-farm livelihoods for part of their children. In the Delta, the capacity to access and accumulate land mostly pertains to the households' connectedness with authorities (village tract headman, Farmland Management Committee, or SLRD officer) although socioeconomic mobility (the capacity to make one's path to permanent land use right ownership and to, conversely, lose

<footnote n="131">131. Inheritance involves a differential distribution among siblings of the families' capital between agricultural and non-agricultural assets, rather than an equitable repartition of land between heirs (see Chapter VIII.1.1).</footnote>
such ownership) is overall higher than in the Dry Zone, a fact reinforced by a past
of predatory policies. However, not all agricultural landless households are in a
precarious livelihoods situation, and not all are necessarily excluded from accessing
land. According to the analysis and with the precautions stated in Chapter VII.7,
we may consider that about 27% of total households surveyed in the Delta need
to access agricultural land, against 18% in the Dry Zone. These figures take into
account the households' life trajectory (the fact that currently young landless
households may access land later<fnref n="132" />) and that not all landless households rely on
on-farm work for securing their livelihoods.

Yet, how to provide land for those households excluded from accessing
agricultural land? The current reform already provides for the restitution of land
unjustly confiscated under previous governments. However, the redistribution
process itself is proving cumbersome, since confiscated land is often currently
being cultivated by other farmers who have made contracts with current
landholders. Indeed, several transactions may have happened between the first
case of confiscation and current land users, so determining the rightful owner or
beneficiary would necessarily be difficult and conflict-ridden without a broader
and robust compensation scheme. Providing landless households with vacant
lands classified under VFV is an option, theoretically. However, in the Delta, those
are generally areas with less productive lands (deep water paddy areas, salt
water in dry season, prone to flooding, etc.) and their actual vacancy may also be
questionable in many cases: in other words, what appears on a map as VFV in reality
is land on which people are currently living and working. Therefore, an agrarian
reform including that places a ceiling on agricultural holdings determined for each
land type and associated potential productivity may be the only way to even the
situation regarding land access. However, this seems unlikely to be feasible without
building strong public consensus on wealth redistribution and without reforming
land governance institutions down to the village level.

3. Improving the current land reform

In regards to Myanmar's lowland areas<fnref n="133" />, the current Farmland Law (enacted
in 2012) comes with two major changes which are, on the one hand, the right to
sell, exchange, mortgage, and lease the land and, on the other, the provision of –
supposedly – updated Land Use Certificates (LUCs). The rationale underlying this
reform is thus deeply grounded in the perceived necessity to formalize land use
rights under an individual property framework so as to secure individual land use

<footnote n="132">132. See this chapter, part 5.3.</footnote>

<footnote n="133">133. The current Farmland</footnote>
rights. To support the reform's implementation, different administrative bodies have been put in place in order to regulate the land titling process, i.e. by clarifying claims and resolving conflicts. Although the overall idea of securing land use rights is highly welcomed, many shortfalls lie in the process, beginning with the very idea of formalizing. Many debates at international level already long taken place surrounding the idea that land tenure security can and must be secured through the formalization of land use rights. In this regards, a very well-grounded study warns us against the fact that "there is no mechanical link between formalizing land rights, security of tenure, economic development and social peace" ('Land Tenure and Development' Technical Committee, 2015: 12). In addition, if land tenure is to be secured through formalization of land use rights, then some key principles should be followed:

Written titles can help secure tenure if:

## KEY PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND FORMALISATION OF LAND RIGHTS

1. The formalization procedure matches with the reality of land rights,

2. Responds effectively to the problems and needs encountered by different land users,

3. Enables the state to recognize land users' legitimate rights or authenticate their agreements,

4. The formalization procedure is accessible and effective,

5. Is part of an institutional environment that is sufficiently interconnected and reliable to deal effectively with the plurality of norms and authorities,

6. Land information is kept up to date, so that people benefit from using the legal mechanisms,

7. And the institutions responsible for administering rights fulfil their responsibilities.

Source: 'Land Tenure and Development' Technical Committee (2015: 33)

Bearing these principles in mind, discussion and recommendations are provided below for improving the current land reform.

### 3.1 A formalization process adapted to the reality of land rights

Approximately nine million LUCs were delivered throughout Myanmar within a very short time frame. This pace of implementation was only made possible because the land registration was done based on existing land administration documents such as land tax receipts, farmers' booklets, Form 105, and cadastral maps which were not necessarily updated. The haste of the process led to some breaches in the procedure and very limited field surveying and verification. Consistency between actual landholders and those receiving the titles, and registered surface areas
remains an issue. In addition, the study shows that papers are often less important
than the legitimacy acquired by the testifying local 'authorities' (headman, elders,
and sometimes only relatives or neighbors of the same village). Arrangements
made at the local level, according to a proto-customary land tenure system (where
local arrangements with local representatives of the authority significantly bypass
the legal system), generally run smoothly.

Most conflicts happen due to individuals who take advantage of the existing
discrepancies between the law and local, informal practices for their own benefit<fnref n="134" />.
This is well illustrated by the LUC issuance process, which, performed hastily,
created a new arena for people to revive old grudges created by past policies, but
also gave room for many intra-village conflicts. Conflicts arose notably over local
arrangements (le pyan ngwe pyan for example) caught in the middle of 'stacked'
contradicting laws: LUCs now legalize temporary arrangements (such as mortgage
or sharecropping) although Act 64/1 still provides a cultivator with a claim on land if
the latter has been working that land for more than five consecutive years. As shown
throughout this report, land transfers were already actively taking place despite the
legal ban under the previous land framework. That said, the LUCs issuance process,
which proved particularly challenging to implement within the set time frame,
may be considered as a snapshot of an on-going process of land consolidation and
fragmentation processes. Although the current law states that any changes in the
status of a land use right, such as when it is encumbered with debt, transferred,
or inherited, must be properly registered, evidences on the ground indicate that
the cadastral maps may be already greatly outdated. Access to land administration
bodies in charge of formalizing land use rights transfers are not accessible for
most farmers who, besides, have a very limited knowledge of the legal framework.

Recommendations

One general and essential recommendation is to conduct a review
of existing laws in order to identify contradictions potentially weakening
security of land use rights in order to produce a comprehensive and
consistent land framework. This review should not only be a desk based
legal review but should include fieldwork to compare with the actual
practices on the ground. This would then enable to provide the insights to
formulate an umbrella land law.

More specifically on land administration issues, it is proposed to:

* Conduct a review of the 2012 land registration process in order to identify gaps and prioritize how those gaps will be addressed so that public confidence can be improved.

<footnote n="134">134. See for example the case of 'Chinese watermelon' rental contracts, arranged by the village administrator but putting farmers directly in illegality (see VI.3.1).</footnote>
* Accessible and affordable deed registration procedures need to be set in place in order to record land transfers and update land records properly. This means simplifying modalities for registering land use rights transfers. A single administration body accessible at the village level should endorse the process of registering land use rights transfers, land use rights subdivision and consolidation, and land use change, with a set process and non-prohibitive fees.

* A land taxation system (including annual tax, transfer tax, betterment tax<fnref n="135" />) is probably the most efficient way to secure land rights, have updated registers, and reduce speculation while raising revenue to sustain sound land administration services.

* Capacity building of government institutions that are involved with land at local levels (DALMS, DoF/MONREC and GAD) is also necessary so as to improve their understanding of land-related laws.

* Provide farmers with knowledge and clear messages (rights and duties) about the Farmland Law. Land registration needs to be accompanied with legal awareness information campaigns in order to improve communities' understanding of land laws and related procedures.

* Set a clear procedure for subdivision (and consolidation) of land use rights.

## 3.2 Mapping and zoning: reflecting land use practices on the ground

There are many discrepancies between the actual use of lands and their official classification under the legal land categories. Much cultivated land in lowland areas – not to mention upland *taungya* and shifting cultivation areas – remains classified as other land uses, often as forestland or fallow, vacant, and virgin (VFV) land. In many cases, this is not due to recent illegal encroachment. In the case of the Delta, non-registered farmlands were cleared along the agricultural front at latest 10 to 20 years ago and are currently cultivated by long-established farmers. In the case of the Dry Zone, greening projects led to classifying previously cultivated lands as forestlands. In both cases, farmers have often managed to maintain their use rights informally through various arrangements.

<footnote n="135">135. Annual tax on land could be defined so as to discourage speculation, while not being a burden for smallholders. However, it still needs to be an amount sufficient enough to encourage previous owners to declare their transfers so to avoid paying the taxes. Annual taxes on farmland are still derived from the British colonial framework with a set 6 MMK/acre tax. In many instances, GAD clerks prefer to pay tax themselves rather than bearing the cost of traveling to collect taxes. Transfer tax for permanent transfers (inheritance, sale) is to be small so as to encourage people to register their deeds. Finally, betterment tax is a tax on the added value from the sale of lands would need to be relatively high. This would help to mobilize revenue from speculative actions.</footnote>
The previous government launched a nationwide initiative announced in early 2013 through a Presidential instruction to reclassify land in order to reflect current realities on the ground. The main objective has been to collect accurate data of villages and households that have settled and occupied reserved and public forest areas for a certain length of years and designating them as new villages. Through this policy, the forestry department has said that 1,681,667 acres have been converted into farmland. Despite these announced measures, concerned farmers have not received LUCs yet and many households in the Delta and the Dry Zone still cultivate land classified under forests and are therefore facing land tenure insecurity. The lack of coordination between the different institutions in charge of, respectively, farmlands, forestlands, and vacant, virgin, and fallow lands is evidently part of the issue. This issue highlights the need to move from a system in which each government agency is perceived as the 'owner' of respective land categories to a custodianship model in which there would be a single land-agency for administration of lands<fnref n="136" />.

## Recommendations

* Establish a clear mechanism for reclassifying areas of land to match with their actual uses and protect existing land tenure claims of rural farmers.

* Explore options for a nationwide system of land classification/zoning based on participatory land use planning at national, state/regional, district, and township levels, and more importantly at the Ward/village tract level.

* Explore the option of establishing a single land agency for the administration of lands so as to reduce duplication and to improve efficiency of land administration and management.

## 3.3 Empowering land users through full disposal rights

As shown throughout the report, there are several discrepancies between farmers' needs, their practices, and the legal restrictions on land use. In many cases, these discrepancies hinder farm productivity and farmers' resilience to shocks. The former restrictions on land use rights actually remain, highlighting the contradiction between the progressive opening of the land tenure framework and the broadening of land use rights, on one hand, and the government's enduring focus on paddy - the staple crop constituting Myanmar's national identity - and its tendency to control land use for paddy production, on the other.

As such, crop choice is still highly hindered in Myanmar by the current Farmland Law, constraining farmers' disposal land use rights. Some of the prescriptions on land use mentioned in the LUC (Form 7) are inadequate and

<footnote n="136">136. This does not exclude the involvement of concerned line ministries in land use related issues.</footnote>
lead farmers to unenthusiastically but deliberately 'break the law'. For example,
while many Dry Zone smallholders are highly interested to diversify with
drought resistant cash crops such as *Thanaka* trees, they must officially request
authorization to central level for planting perennials on ya and paddy lands, as
per the law. In addition, restrictions on fallow periods<fnref n="137" /> are not always relevant.
For example, in the Dry Zone, improved fallow systems with multi-purpose trees
could help increase soil fertility and agriculture productivity while delivering
other benefits (soil and water conservation, production of fire wood, income
generation through commercial species etc.). If farmers follow these legal
restrictions they negatively impact their livelihoods; but if they violate them,
opportunities for corruption and abuse of power from village leaders and village
tract authorities towards the 'incompliant' farmers emerge. In addition, some
of the adherence conditions are prohibitive in terms of transactions costs (such
as the high costs attending the requirement to submit crop change requests to
Union level), further increasing opportunities for corrupt practices. Finally, the
sanctions for non-compliance of these restrictions may generate land insecurity
as some (fines, prison sentences) are excessive and can even result in loss of lands.

Recommendations

* It is urgent that farmers be given full disposal rights on the choice of crops, including for perennial crops. They are the most suited to make optimal decisions to enhance their livelihoods and land productivity, and respond to market dynamics.

* Extend the land use categories over which tenure can be secured by simplifying the land use classification system and integrating into the farmland category uses such as agroforestry and aquaculture.

* Ensure accessibility and affordability of legal procedures through simplified and decentralized processes for changing land use, in case some restrictions do remain in place.

* Review sanctions in case of non-compliance of restrictions of land use such that they do not result in livelihood insecurity.

3.4 Land conflict resolution

Land tenure security requires the provision of effective conflict resolution
mechanisms. However, during the past decades, land governance has been highly
concentrated in the hands of village tract headmen, who were acting as political
brokers<fnref n="138" /> between government and villagers. In the absence of checks and
balances, corrupt practices have prevailed at the expenses of the weakest. The study
provided ample number of cases where dispute arbitration decisions were done

<footnote n="137">137. In the latest Farmland Law mentions that 'land shall not be fallow without a sound reason'.</footnote>

<footnote n="138">138. Bierschenk et al., 2000.</footnote>
in favor of the 'highest bidder' in terms of bribes. The involvement of traditional village elites (i.e. the village tract headman, GAD clerks, village tract SLRD officers, elders known as *lugyi* and *yet-mi-yet-pha*) in Village Tract Farmland Management Committees directly questions the adequacy of government structures put in place to administrate – for instance, but not only – land issues. The multiplicity of legal and customary systems that dominated land tenure in the lowlands over the past 50 years is also a consequence of the wider distrust of villagers towards the state and its predatory policies. It created a conducive ground for defying legal justice and, taking advantage of the opportunity of the recent change in governance, for seeking social justice: in similar rates in both the Delta and the Dry Zone, an average of 7% of farmland owning households (excluding cultivated forestland 'owners') have contested some points of the LUC. Land objections are twice more frequent in households which have not received the LUCs. The qualitative survey's many case studies indicate that there are actually more cases, but the low report rate in the quantitative survey is due again to a particularly strong survey bias against reporting issues concerning land disputes.

The impact of the state on local elites, incentivizing them or threatening them to effectively become state's brokers, generates a lack of trust within the community towards the village tract administrator and the diverse forms of local land committees that have existed through time. In addition, the social capital at the village level has often been crippled in the past decades. Most local community leaders are not neutral as they have been involved as village tract/village headmen or in one way or another in the different local land committees that have existed through history. Informal institutions lack capacity to deal with land conflicts. This is particularly strong in the Delta, which is characterized by more mobility, strong patron-client relationships and weak horizontal links, even among households of the same 'class'. In addition, there are strong competing claims between farmers, tenants, and landless households in the Delta. Finally, there is a lack of independent conflict resolution mechanisms. These are particularly needed in the case of conflicts pitting powerful actors against the socially marginalized. When reviewing the experience of the first 'Parliamentary Land Investigation Commission in relation to confiscation of farmland and other land' (created under President Thein Sein) and observing the current 'Review committees on confiscated land and other lands' (newly formed under the NLD government), one can conclude that both attempts face the same governance shortfalls: at the lower level bodies at village tract and township levels, members are the same stakeholders who have concentrated power over land and natural resources in the past.

To address this, the National Land Use Policy (NLUP) proposes relevant actions such as establishing independent monitoring bodies with participation
of all stakeholders, and appointing monitors that have no direct interest, to
observe settlement of land disputes. It also proposes to establish an independent
tripartite arbitration process to settle land disputes, comprised of government
departments, organizations, farmers, and the private sector. In order to improve
access to justice, it proposed to allow civil society to provide legal aid and acquire
necessary information for use in land disputes. It also mentions establishing
clear procedural processes to improve easy access to, and use of, independent
arbitration tribunals, courts and other dispute resolution mechanisms by farmers
and other land users. However, the Commission for the Assessment of Legal
Affairs and Special Issues wrote a memo in November 2016 to the President Office
suggesting some elements of the NLUP to be deleted, notably provisions for
new special courts and independent arbitration mechanisms for land disputes<fnref n="139" />.

Recommendations

* The government needs to enact a close review of the Farmland Management Body – particularly its village tract level representation – in order to address its very limited capacity in resolving intra-villages conflicts.

* Maintain and promote the establishment of independent monitoring bodies with participation of all stakeholders, and by appointing monitors that have no direct interest, to observe settlement of land disputes. Sound processes for selection of community representatives need to be defined as part of this.

* Promote conflict resolution mechanisms which are able to take into account lands' history and trajectories.

* Implement concrete mechanisms for transparency and accountability of the actors in charge of translating the legal framework into practice on the ground.

* Promote legal awareness capacity building at local level, both for communities and authorities.

3.5 LUCS: individualized (and gendered) vs. familial land management

Although 'individual property' (u' paing) was set as the dominant framework
for administrating land in lowlands since the time of the British, individualization of
land management did not necessarily accompany this framework. The often-used
term of bobapaing myay (ancestral land) covers a trans-generational and familial
dimension of managing land. Yet under the current titling process, relationship
to land management may undergo some changes. In the first place, while the

<footnote n="139">139. Extract from unofficial translation: "In part (6) it is mentioned to form special courts and use of independent tripartite arbitration process for land dispute resolution. The land use rights and tenure have been managed and resolved by respective departments and the landownership and heritage have been resolved by the court. Therefore, these special courts and independent tripartite arbitration processes should not be included."</footnote>
new land law is gender-neutral, distribution of land titles is based on household heads – who are generally male. As noted in Shivakumar Srinivas and U Saw Hlaing (2015: 36), “*little information was provided to women on the option of joint titling (registering land parcels collectively under the names of husbands and wives)*”. Beyond gender issues in failing to provide women equitable access to land use rights, it poses the question of the appropriateness of entrusting LUCs to one individual for land that is in most cases managed by the household. As shown in this study, decisions regarding land use are made at least by the leading couple, and often in consultation with children.

The fact that LUCs were provided as the only legitimate document to prove one's land use rights already creates discrepancies between official land registers and the reality of land use on the ground. This process could even entail deeper changes in terms of land management. One indication is the fact that LUCs must be presented for obtaining loans from the government Agricultural Bank (MADB) and that loans are provided for a maximum of 10 acres. To bypass this limitation, many families divided their land at the time of titling into 10-acre holdings amongst different members of the household, often children. As these are intra-familial arrangements, in most cases the land is still worked by the household – as long as the children are not married and continue to live within their parents. In that case, the registered number of farming households (a list kept by village tract administrators), which is based on the number of LUCs within the village tract, is inflated compared to the reality. This obviously creates an issue for ground-based policymaking or development projects, as the figures on the number of farming households in village tracts are becoming unreliable<fnref n="140" />.

## Recommendations

* Encourage women's representation in land administration bodies.

* Provide gender sensitive information and sharing places about the current land framework.

* Centralize information in the hands of a single land administration body at the village tract level and consolidate lists to reduce discrepancies between LUCs and farming households.

* Measures should be taken to reduce vulnerability of women in case of divorce or separation or death of the husband, something that can be accomplished whether through joint registration of spouses on LUCs or through other complementary laws relating to family and social protection issues.

<footnote n="140">140. As an example, GRET Myanmar recently undertook a quantitative study on land dynamics in lowlands and faced the situation where the reported number of farming households obtained at the village tract level (for sampling purpose) was largely inflated compared to the actual situation on the ground.</footnote>
4. Building a conducive context for securing agricultural livelihoods

Livelihoods' security for farmers means the ability to reproduce (and possibly improve) their livelihoods while meeting basic household's needs (food, potable water, health facilities, educational opportunities, housing, community participation, and social integration). It also means the ability to cope with and recover from stress and shocks. Apart from a conducive legal framework, already discussed above, securing agricultural livelihoods depends on many other factors (i.e. on those not directly linked to the land tenure framework).

Policies to support agriculture and rural livelihoods in a broader sense need a comprehensive cross-sectoral approach that obviously goes far beyond the land question. Transport and water management infrastructure, rural finance, access to markets, research, agricultural education and extension services, and structuring of farmers' organizations are crucial issues to address. In addition, further strategic thinking is needed to formulate consistent trade policies on agricultural products. It is still missing from the latest draft of the Agricultural development strategy despite this being a powerful lever on markets and prices.

4.1 Improving access to institutional credit schemes

As stated in the introduction of this chapter, indebtedness is still a strong driver of land exclusion. 5.1% of Delta and 5.4% of Dry Zone households surveyed claim having lost lands due to indebtedness, either by mortgage closure, or by selling their lands to urgently repay loans. The reality of exclusion because of indebtedness may be even higher, since quantitative studies can only provide limited information on such a complex, and sensitive, issue (see Chapter VIII.2).

Whether in the Delta or the Dry Zone, access to credit is available through a great diversity of stakeholders. While the MADB's loan scheme seems to be the most effective at the moment in terms of coverage and interest rates (which are much lower than those proposed by any other stakeholder), the low quality of services (inadequate loan amounts and timing of disbursements and repayments), limited human resource capacity, and issues in relaying MADB policies at the village level (see **Chapter VIII.2**) hinder much of its potential benefits. Loan amounts are too low for non-paddy lands. Untimely disbursement of loans often requires farmers to fill the gap between the period of investment and the time of delivery by relying on private, high interest, loans.

Further, the MADB scheme's effectiveness is hampered by weak regulations and power struggles at the village level. Indeed, MADB village tract representatives
– normally elected by the village tract administrator together with 10 Households leaders – are in practice directly appointed by the village tract administrator. **Chapter VIII.2.2** shows that these representatives operate at different levels to differentiate access to MADB loans, from the application process to the repayment time. Eventually, farmers failing to reimburse the MADB loan in time may fall either into the hands of money-lenders (higher interests, 10%/month) or into informal borrowing arrangements organized by the MADB representative (lower interest, 7%/month), hardly improving the farmers’ financial situation (if not worsening it) but benefiting mostly the same wealthier local individuals. And yet, despite the multiplication of micro-finance institutions and cash transfer projects (especially in the Delta), the study shows that those arrive only in third position in loans’ frequency and amount, after MADB and private money-lenders. MADB, because of its ability to provide credit subsidized at below market price, allows it to remain the most sought after credit source, despite its clear shortfalls.

## Recommendations

* A deep reform of MADB is needed to improve the quality of services. Below are some of the proposed measures:

* Improve the timing of loans (disbursement, repayments, etc.) so they appropriately align with crop cycles and farmers’ cash flow constraints.

* Increase MADB loan amounts, especially for non-paddy crops

* Train and appoint professional MADB staff employees at the village tract level to facilitate application, management, disbursement, and reimbursement of loans.

* Reduce rural cultivator dependency on private money-lenders through micro-finance. Supporting rural finance should also allow the development of new financial products such as inventory credit and support for farm equipment hire or purchase.

* Improving access to affordable credit needs to take place simultaneously with financial education aiming at improving households’ financial management skills so as to reduce indebtedness.

* Ensure coordination among these publicly funded initiatives<fnref n="141" /> and with microfinance institutions to avoid indebtedness of those who contract multiple loans.

## 4.2 Increasing sustainable intensification, diversification and resilience

Improving rural livelihoods and land access can be partly achieved by improving agricultural productivity. Increasing demographic pressure and the disappearance of agricultural frontiers (at least for fertile lands) worsens land fragmentation,

<footnote n="141">141. There are multiple publicly funded initiatives, namely from MADB, Cooperative Department (Tha Ma), Rural development department (Mya Sein Yaung), and some other smaller scale initiatives.</footnote>
which is particularly damaging given the ramifications of economies of scale. Indeed, contrary to many studies showing that economies of scale do not exist in agriculture (Johnson and Ruttan 1994), a recent report by the World Bank indicates its existence in rice production in Myanmar:

> "Profits tend to increase along with increased farm size. Small farms had higher yields but failed to translate higher yields into higher profits. Economies of scale allowed large farms to adopt more modern technologies and save on costs."

(World Bank 2016: xviii)

However, some studies show that demographic pressure is not necessarily an undermining factor, as farmers often find viable alternatives such as agricultural intensification, changes in crop patterns, as well as more systematic investments in agricultural and non-agricultural practices (see for example Boserup 1965, Tiffen et al., 1994).

This is illustrated by the off-farm diversification of Dry Zone farmers, even for those having large surfaces, and by the existence of a non-agrarian landless category, which relies only little (if not at all) on agriculture for their livelihood. Changes in crop patterns can be noticed as part of this adaptation, such as the switch to perennial crops, especially *Thanakha*. The above cited report also highlights that paddy is less profitable than other crops, especially in some regions including Ayeyarwaddy and Sagaing (where green grams are most profitable) (World Bank 2016).

Rural livelihoods' sustainability also relies on households' capacity to absorb shocks. The study shows that borrowing for health accounts for an average of 9% of contracted loans. Moreover, farmers are highly vulnerable to pests and climatic accidents. There is therefore a need to improve rural households' resilience. Protection against these risks has to be designed and implemented beyond the village level notably because of the lack of horizontal bonds and the dominance of vertical (patron-client like) relationships.

<figure><img src="image_86.png" /></figure>

## Recommendations

Dry Zone rainfed land crop systems are rather extensive in order to cope with the scarce and unpredictable rainfall. Irrigation is thus a key opportunity for the intensification of agriculture, in a context of land fragmentation. But large scale pump-irrigation schemes would have a negative impact on underground water sources and on soil salinization. Hence:

* Promoting rainwater harvesting and storage, combined with soil and water conservation, may be a more sustainable option. Government-
supported construction of water tanks could provide consequent water to complement irrigation for established crops and provide new opportunities during the winter season to cultivate higher value crops. Complementing this, extension services promoting afforestation or reforestation, water and soil conservation, agro ecological modern techniques and access to good planting materials from MoALI and DoA services could have significant impact on agriculture in this challenging agro-ecological zone.

* In the Delta, agriculture is highly specialized in paddy. Options exist there for sustainable intensification:

* Promote modern agro-ecological practices using local resources to simultaneously boost yields and reduce on-farm expenses and dependency on inputs.

* Diversification of crops with pulses and other seasonal crops in suitable areas could be an option to increase income, could reduce farm constraints on labor at paddy-peak labor period, and may also improve soil management.

* Government investments in water management infrastructure (dikes, drainage) would be crucial in the Delta to improve farming conditions and strongly reduce recurrent crop losses due to regular floods.

* In summary, in both areas, state-led investment in irrigation and water management is crucial, combined with the promotion of context-specific agricultural practices. This requires adapted extension services to provide technical knowledge on crops (investment, profitability, suitability according to agro-ecological regions) for farmers so that they can make efficient choices.

* Resilience of rural households could be strengthened through social protection schemes, notably to cover health expenses. Sustainability of such schemes may be achieved through their structuring beyond the village level. Interesting initiatives<fnref n="142" /> through the federation of village groups have been conducted in Myanmar.

* It would be worthwhile to explore options to cover crop-related risks through national level crop insurance schemes.

## 4.3 Mechanization versus farm labor opportunities

Farm labor is a very important source of income for many rural households. The study shows that 41.8% of Dry Zone and Delta households have at least one member of the family earning some income as an agricultural laborer. Among these agricultural laborers, 87.4% are landless in the Delta against 52.4% in the Dry

<footnote n="142">142. See for example the work of Welt Hunger Hilfe (WHH) in Htantabin township (Yangon region).</footnote>
Zone. As a consequence, pushing mechanization through large farm machines<sup>143</sup>, such as big combined harvesters, needs very careful thought to avoid driving away families depending on farm labor, keeping in mind that options for other livelihoods and jobs in urban areas are still relatively limited (Boutry *et al.*, 2015). This risk may be particularly strong for those in the Delta, where working as a farm labor is very specific to the landless and to very small landowners (owning less than three acres<sup>144</sup>). On the other hand, the qualitative study found that in the Delta, finding farm laborers during peak periods (such as for transplanting and harvesting) can prove to be very challenging and partly explains why many farmers are unable to cultivate the entirety of their lands in summer. However this constraint allows temporary access to lands to landless or very small farmers in summer. As such, the recourse to farm laborers can somewhat be interpreted as a wealth redistribution mechanism, not only by the fact that it provides jobs but also because constraints promote temporary land access to the landless.

Interestingly, discussions addressing the labor shortage in Bogale have led farmers to spontaneously recommend arrangements with laborers, such as temporarily providing a plot of lands in exchange for the guarantee that the laborers would provide farm labor.

**5. Taking into account the diversity of rural households for effective targeting of policy and action**

There are different types of farming households – in terms of life cycle, landholding size, as well as in terms of multi-activity (on-farm, off farm activities) – and each type has their own constraints and specificities. This section aims to look into how policies and rural livelihood support actions can better take into consideration the fact that ‘smallholders’ are not one uniform category.

<figure><img src="image_87.png" /></figure>

**5.1 Smallholders are not one uniform category**

Putting this more specifically in the context of the study findings, it means creating and/or enforcing a context where those accessing land are not at risk of losing it because of foreclosure, and where those having no access to land yet may observe improved possibilities to do so. It also means improving access to non-farm livelihoods, both for farming and non-farming households. Indeed, the study shows that in the Delta, apart from the ‘Capitalized farmers’ who are largely specialized in agriculture, small farmers (under 5 acres) are generally more secure in terms of livelihoods by relying on other activities such as husbandry or fishing

<footnote n="143">143. Access to small scale machinery (such as power tillers for paddy lands) is however essential.</footnote>

<footnote n="144">144. In the Dry Zone this activity is more evenly practiced by different landholding categories.</footnote>
as their primary or secondary source of income. Agri-specialized small farmers who rely mostly on agriculture (and on-farm labor) are more precarious than other categories, regardless of the surface they cultivate (between 2.5 and 10 acres). In the Dry Zone, the high variability and unpredictability of rainfall make access to irrigation a crucial differentiating factor amongst farming households, but overall, they all need to rely on other – generally off-farm – activities. In both regions, the households specialized in small farming are the most at threat of food scarcity and livelihood precariousness.

Access to land for smallholders and young households – even those destined to become capitalized farming households (cf. Chapter VII.6) – is highly linked to the fact of having some capital that one can dispose of, meaning that even for those households benefiting from inherited land, available capital (money, cattle, laborers, but also social capital) will have an impact on their capacity to retain their farming livelihoods and possibly capitalize on land during their lifetime. For smallholders often starting with little investments, temporary arrangements (sharecropping, rent) on land (especially in the Delta) and off-farm activities (Dry Zone mainly) are important means of generating capital to secure permanent land use rights and productivity in the long term. Capital can also be accessed through credit, beginning with the main institutional source of loans for farmers, the Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank (MADB). Conversely, credit can also be a strong driver of exclusion. Foreclosure on land for failing to repay debts finds a strong echo in Myanmar lowlands’ history, especially at the beginning of the 20th century when large tracts of land ended up in the hands of money-lenders, such as the Indian Chettiars. But exclusion due to credit is still at work, even if at a more discrete scale, at the village level. This pertains both to institutional weaknesses (untimely delivery of MADB loans to farmers, limited loans for non-paddy crops, lack of follow-up) and resource capture to the benefit of village level elites.

In all these dimensions of rural livelihoods (multi-activity, access to capital and institutional credit schemes, and distribution of resources) there is room for improvement. Nonetheless, in front of such a huge enterprise, there is a need for prioritizing. Fortunately, a closer look at farmers' 'trajectories' (access to, accumulation of, and loss of land) helps to distinguish categories of farmers more in need of support than others. Likewise, a closer look at landless households' livelihoods can provide with more nuanced features regarding the precariousness of land access in the studied regions.

## 5.2 Targeting 'young' households: life cycle and land patrimony's trajectories

The household's life cycle is recognized as one of the major factors differentiating whether a given household has access to agricultural land. The study shows that
access to land does not have the same meaning for households at different stages
of their respective lives (Chapter VII). Indeed, it can often be a temporary state for
younger households who will inherit and are saving to buy land, while landlessness
becomes a permanent form of land exclusion for households headed by a person
over 40-50 years old. Landlessness rates are 80% in the Delta and 61.5% in the Dry
Zone among households whose head is aged under 30, while only 40% in the Delta
and 27% in the Dry Zone among household heads above 60 years old. This can be
explained mainly by inheritance of farmlands from parents or spouse's parents.
In the Dry Zone especially, access to a small plot of land through inheritance at the
beginning of the household's life cycle seems to provide financial capacity to invest
in other livelihood activities. Also in the Dry Zone, land security is highly associated
with cattle ownership. In the Delta, by contrast, the study shows that livestock
mainly serves as a saving asset or as a 'safety net' (in case of health problems,
funerals, etc.), especially for small landowners.

In addition, young households are also more prone to initiate changes
and to migrate, if necessary or in link with opportunities. It is important to
keep in mind also that the context is changing. Land is getting relatively
scarcer with time (under demographic pressure and the closing of the
agricultural frontier) and this may increase the difficulty for current young
households to access land, compared to the young ones of the past decades.
This may increase the disparities between young and old households.

Recommendations

* It is crucial to understand and to take into account households' life cycles to formulate policies and livelihood support actions that respond to the specific needs of different age groups.

* Prioritize 'young' smallholders and landless households – whose head is aged under 30 – for specific support for their farming projects

* Support 'young' Dry Zone households to access cattle.

* In the Delta, promote the use of temporarily vacant lands (especially under summer paddy) through temporary arrangements, especially for 'young' smallholders and landless households.

5.3 Better understand and tackle the issue of 'landlessness'

First and foremost, the occurrence of landlessness has much to do with historical
and agricultural features of the studied zones. For instance, the Dry Zone is the cradle
of Burmese society, with long-established villages and stronger social organization,
while the Delta is a frontier society and has been more impacted by predatory
policies such as the 'Compulsory Paddy Quota'. For these reasons, landlessness rates
are often higher in the Delta than in Dry Zone villages. In addition, there are strong
disparities between villages of the same region, highlighting the complexity and
intertwinement of different factors – such as agro-ecological conditions and the
importance of power relations at the local level – for determining land access. The
importance of differences between regions but also among villages of the same
region shows that large scale surveys and uniform ‘one size fits all’ solutions on
land tenure bear risks as they are not able to effectively address local and context-
specific problems.

We already underlined in the section above the link between the age of the household head and access to land. **Chapter VII.7** shows that careful analysis taking into account a household's livelihood trajectory, livelihood diversity (on-farm and off-farm oriented households, migrations, etc.), and a household's life cycles can help determine those households to be prioritized when considering creating access to land – in other words, which of Myanmar's landless households are in most dire need of accessing land.

Recommendations

* Undertake more systematic field research to ground analysis of landlessness and disaggregate agrarian landless from remaining categories.

* In any land redistribution project, prioritize the most vulnerable agrarian landless households:
  Households whose head is over 40 years-old who will not inherit land
  Delta specific: farm labor cum fishing households.
  Dry Zone specific: farm labor households.
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* Bernot, L. 1974. "Notes sur les mesures de capacité et de poids utilisées par les riziculteurs birmans." Études Rurales, no. 53-54-55-56: 343-55.

* Bierschenk, Thomas, Jean-Pierre Chauveau, and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan. 2000. Courtiers en développement: les villages africains en quête de projets. Paris: Karthala.

* Boelens, Rutgerd, Leontien Cremers, Margreet Zwarteveen, and Jessica R Budds. 2011. Justicia hídrica: acumulación, conflicto y acción social. Lima: Justicia Hídrica / IEP (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos) / Fondo Editorial, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

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# XI. Annexes

## 1. Basic demography data (Delta and Dry Zone combined)

<table><caption>Table 1: Number of household members (HH mb) according to the age category of the household head</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Under 30</th><th colspan="2">30 &lt; 40</th><th colspan="2">40 &lt; 50</th><th colspan="2">50 &lt; 60</th><th colspan="2">60 and over</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>33</td><td>16.6</td><td>51</td><td>25.6</td><td>37</td><td>18.6</td><td>22</td><td>11.1</td><td>56</td><td>28.1</td><td>199</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>68</td><td>15.2</td><td>181</td><td>40.5</td><td>93</td><td>20.8</td><td>55</td><td>12.3</td><td>50</td><td>11.2</td><td>447</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>2</td><td>0.9</td><td>39</td><td>17.7</td><td>73</td><td>33.2</td><td>47</td><td>21.4</td><td>59</td><td>26.8</td><td>220</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td></td><td></td><td>13</td><td>8.1</td><td>59</td><td>36.9</td><td>54</td><td>33.8</td><td>34</td><td>21.3</td><td>160</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>5 and over</td><td></td><td></td><td>2</td><td>2.0</td><td>32</td><td>31.7</td><td>41</td><td>40.6</td><td>26</td><td>25.7</td><td>101</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td>Total</td><td>103</td><td>9.1</td><td>286</td><td>25.4</td><td>294</td><td>26.1</td><td>219</td><td>19.4</td><td>225</td><td>20.0</td><td>1,127</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tfoot></table>

Chi-Square=268.2 dof=16 p=0.001 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.244

<table><caption>Table 2: Sex of household head according to age category of household head</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Sex of HHH<br>AGE<br>CATEGORY of<br>HHH</th><th colspan="2">Male</th><th colspan="2">Female</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Less than 30</td><td>103</td><td>99.0</td><td>1</td><td>1.0</td><td>104</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>30 to under<br>40</td><td>274</td><td>95.8</td><td>12</td><td>4.2</td><td>286</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>40 to under<br>50</td><td>262</td><td>89.4</td><td>31</td><td>10.6</td><td>293</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>50 to under<br>60</td><td>173</td><td>79.0</td><td>46</td><td>21.0</td><td>219</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>60 and above</td><td>155</td><td>68.6</td><td>71</td><td>31.4</td><td>226</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td>Total</td><td>967</td><td>85.7</td><td>161</td><td>14.3</td><td>1,128</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tfoot></table>

Chi-Square=104.5 dof=4 p=0.001 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.304
<table><caption>**Table 3:** Age category of Household head and HHH education level</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">AGE CATEGORY of HHH</th><th colspan="2">Primary school</th><th colspan="2">Middle school</th><th colspan="2">High school and university</th><th colspan="2">None</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Less than 30</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>30 to under 40</td><td>56</td><td>53.8</td><td>31</td><td>29.8</td><td>11</td><td>10.6</td><td>6</td><td>5.8</td><td>104</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>40 to under 50</td><td>205</td><td>71.7</td><td>48</td><td>16.8</td><td>23</td><td>8.0</td><td>10</td><td>3.5</td><td>286</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>50 to under 60</td><td>239</td><td>81.3</td><td>46</td><td>15.6</td><td>8</td><td>2.7</td><td>1</td><td>0.3</td><td>294</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>60 and above</td><td>179</td><td>81.7</td><td>30</td><td>13.7</td><td>2</td><td>0.9</td><td>8</td><td>3.7</td><td>219</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>188</td><td>83.2</td><td>18</td><td>8.0</td><td>4</td><td>1.8</td><td>16</td><td>7.1</td><td>226</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>867</td><td>76.8</td><td>173</td><td>15.3</td><td>48</td><td>4.3</td><td>41</td><td>3.6</td><td>1,129</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=78.5 dof=12 p=0.001 (Val. théoriques < 5 = 2) Cramer's V=0.152

<table><caption>**Table 4:** HHH age/ number of HH members working outside of the village tract</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">AGE CATEGORY of HHH</th><th colspan="2">None</th><th colspan="2">1 or more</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Less than 30</td><td>92</td><td>88.5</td><td>12</td><td>11.5</td><td>104</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>30 to under 40</td><td>235</td><td>82.2</td><td>51</td><td>17.8</td><td>286</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>40 to under 50</td><td>201</td><td>68.4</td><td>93</td><td>31.6</td><td>294</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>50 to under 60</td><td>158</td><td>72.1</td><td>61</td><td>27.9</td><td>219</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>60 and above</td><td>171</td><td>75.7</td><td>55</td><td>24.3</td><td>226</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>857</td><td>75.9</td><td>272</td><td>24.1</td><td>1,129</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=25.9 dof=4 p=0.001 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.152
<table><caption>Table 5 : Delta landownership and internal migration</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">HHH Born inside V or VT</th><th colspan="2">HHH born outside V or VT</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Landowners</th><td>179</td><td>83.3</td><td>36</td><td>16.7</td><td>215</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><th>Landless</th><td>215</td><td>68.0</td><td>101</td><td>32.0</td><td>316</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><th>Total</th><td>394</td><td>74.2</td><td>137</td><td>25.8</td><td>531</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=14.7 dof=1 p=0.001 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.167
## 2. Key figures on contracting out lands for farming by others

<table><caption>**Table 1:** land-owning households having land cultivated by others (yes) through temporary arrangements, by age class (in Delta and Dry Zone)<fnref n="145" /></caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">AGE category of HHH</th><th colspan="3">Yes</th><th colspan="3">No</th><th colspan="3">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Less than 30</td><td>3</td><td>4.2</td><td>10.7</td><td>25</td><td>5.0</td><td>89.3</td><td>28</td><td>4.9</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>30 to &lt; 40</td><td>9</td><td>12.5</td><td>8.3</td><td>99</td><td>20.0</td><td>91.7</td><td>108</td><td>19.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>40 to &lt; 50</td><td>16</td><td>22.2</td><td>9.8</td><td>147</td><td>29.6</td><td>90.2</td><td>163</td><td>28.7</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>50 to &lt; 60</td><td>16</td><td>22.2</td><td>13.9</td><td>99</td><td>20.0</td><td>86.1</td><td>115</td><td>20.2</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>60 and more</td><td>28</td><td>38.9</td><td>18.2</td><td>126</td><td>25.4</td><td>81.8</td><td>154</td><td>27.1</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>72</td><td>100.0</td><td>12.7</td><td>496</td><td>100.0</td><td>87.3</td><td>568</td><td>100.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=7.43 dof=4 p=0.113 (Val. théoriques < 5 = 1) Cramer's V=0.114

<table><caption>**Table 2:** distribution of land owning households involved in land temporary arrangements (contracting out) by sex of the household head (in Delta and Dry Zone)<fnref n="146" /></caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Male</th><th colspan="3">Contracting out</th><th colspan="3">No contracting out</th><th colspan="3">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Female</td><td>56</td><td>77.8</td><td>11.4</td><td>436</td><td>87.9</td><td>88.6</td><td>492</td><td>86.6</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>16</td><td>22.2</td><td>21.1</td><td>60</td><td>12.1</td><td>78.9</td><td>76</td><td>13.4</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>72</td><td>100.0</td><td>12.7</td><td>496</td><td>100.0</td><td>87.3</td><td>568</td><td>100.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=5.56 dof=2 p=0.06 (Val. théoriques < 5 = 2) Cramer's V=0.099

<footnote n="145">145. Data is presented in aggregated form for Dry Zone and Delta together as both zones have similar trends.</footnote>

<footnote n="146">146. Data is presented in aggregated form for Dry Zone and Delta together as both zones have similar trends.</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 3: Ratio Land cultivated by the household itself / owned landholding size<fnref n="147" />**</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Land owned</th><th colspan="2">0% not cultivated by HH</th><th colspan="2">Above 0%&lt;50% cultivated by HH</th><th colspan="2">50% to&lt;100% cultivated by HH</th><th colspan="2">100% and over cultivated by HH</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0.3&lt;2.5</td><td>8</td><td>10.1</td><td>1</td><td>1.3</td><td>1</td><td>1.3</td><td>69</td><td>87.3</td><td>79</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>2.5&lt;5</td><td>8</td><td>7.6</td><td>2</td><td>1.9</td><td>11</td><td>10.5</td><td>84</td><td>80.0</td><td>105</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>5&lt;10</td><td>9</td><td>4.6</td><td>7</td><td>3.6</td><td>23</td><td>11.7</td><td>157</td><td>80.1</td><td>196</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>10&lt;15</td><td>4</td><td>4.0</td><td>4</td><td>4.0</td><td>17</td><td>17.0</td><td>75</td><td>75.0</td><td>100</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>15 and above</td><td>3</td><td>3.5</td><td>1</td><td>1.2</td><td>23</td><td>26.7</td><td>59</td><td>68.6</td><td>86</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>32</td><td>5.7</td><td>15</td><td>2.7</td><td>75</td><td>13.3</td><td>444</td><td>78.4</td><td>566</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=29.8 dof=15 p=0.013 (Val. théoriques < 5 = 10) Cramer's V=0.133

<footnote n="147">147. Data is presented in aggregated form for Dry Zone and Delta together as both zones have similar trends although contracting out is more widespread among large farm owners (>15 acres) in Dry Zone (28% of these contract out in Dry Zone against only 16% in Delta).</footnote>
## 3. Livestock

<table><caption>**Table 1:** Distribution of households practicing animal husbandry among the different classes of Total Income (TI) in Delta</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">AniH</th><th colspan="2">NoAniH</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>TI &lt;750,000</td><td>84</td><td>53.5</td><td>73</td><td>46.5</td><td>157</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI 750,000 to 1,500,000</td><td>95</td><td>63.8</td><td>54</td><td>36.2</td><td>149</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI 1,500,000 to 3,000,000</td><td>76</td><td>67.9</td><td>36</td><td>32.1</td><td>112</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI &gt;3,000,000</td><td>82</td><td>72.6</td><td>31</td><td>27.4</td><td>113</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>337</td><td>63.5</td><td>194</td><td>36.5</td><td>531</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=11.7 dof=3 p=0.009 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.148

<table><caption>**Table 2:** Distribution of households practicing animal husbandry among the different classes of Total Income (TI) in Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">AniH</th><th colspan="2">NoAniH</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>TI &lt;750,000</td><td>82</td><td>60.3</td><td>54</td><td>39.7</td><td>136</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI 750,000 to 1,500,000</td><td>107</td><td>62.9</td><td>63</td><td>37.1</td><td>170</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI 1,500,000 to 3,000,000</td><td>115</td><td>69.7</td><td>50</td><td>30.3</td><td>165</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI &gt;3,000,000</td><td>83</td><td>85.6</td><td>14</td><td>14.4</td><td>97</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>387</td><td>68.1</td><td>181</td><td>31.9</td><td>568</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=19.7 dof=3 p=0.001 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.186
<table><caption>**Table 3:** Distribution of livestock income HH categories among landownership categories in Delta.</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">AH&lt;10</th><th colspan="2">AH 10-100</th><th colspan="2">AH 100-350</th><th colspan="2">AH&gt;350</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Landless</td><td>208</td><td>65.8</td><td>59</td><td>18.7</td><td>28</td><td>8.9</td><td>21</td><td>6.6</td><td>316</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>0.3-2.5</td><td>17</td><td>58.6</td><td>4</td><td>13.8</td><td>7</td><td>24.1</td><td>1</td><td>3.4</td><td>29</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>2.5-5</td><td>26</td><td>56.5</td><td>8</td><td>17.4</td><td>8</td><td>17.4</td><td>4</td><td>8.7</td><td>46</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>5-10</td><td>36</td><td>54.5</td><td>13</td><td>19.7</td><td>9</td><td>13.6</td><td>8</td><td>12.1</td><td>66</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>10-15</td><td>20</td><td>47.6</td><td>6</td><td>14.3</td><td>11</td><td>26.2</td><td>5</td><td>11.9</td><td>42</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>&gt;15</td><td>17</td><td>53.1</td><td>3</td><td>9.4</td><td>5</td><td>15.6</td><td>7</td><td>21.9</td><td>32</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>324</td><td>61.0</td><td>93</td><td>17.5</td><td>68</td><td>12.8</td><td>46</td><td>8.7</td><td>531</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=25.2 dof=15 p=0.047 (Val. théoriques < 5 = 6) Cramer's V=0.126

<table><caption>**Table 4:** Distribution of livestock income HH categories among landownership categories in Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">AH&lt;10</th><th colspan="2">AH 10-100</th><th colspan="2">AH 100-350</th><th colspan="2">AH&gt;350</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Landless</td><td>182</td><td>74.3</td><td>15</td><td>6.1</td><td>19</td><td>7.8</td><td>29</td><td>11.8</td><td>245</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>0.3-2.5</td><td>25</td><td>49.0</td><td>13</td><td>25.5</td><td>6</td><td>11.8</td><td>7</td><td>13.7</td><td>51</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>2.5-5</td><td>34</td><td>56.7</td><td>12</td><td>20.0</td><td>7</td><td>11.7</td><td>7</td><td>11.7</td><td>60</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>5-10</td><td>76</td><td>58.5</td><td>32</td><td>24.6</td><td>14</td><td>10.8</td><td>8</td><td>6.2</td><td>130</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>10-15</td><td>41</td><td>70.7</td><td>6</td><td>10.3</td><td>4</td><td>6.9</td><td>7</td><td>12.1</td><td>58</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>&gt;15</td><td>43</td><td>79.6</td><td>1</td><td>1.9</td><td>3</td><td>5.6</td><td>7</td><td>13.0</td><td>54</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>401</td><td>67.1</td><td>79</td><td>13.2</td><td>53</td><td>8.9</td><td>65</td><td>10.9</td><td>598</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=49.7 dof=15 p=0.001 (Val. théoriques < 5 = 2) Cramer's V=0.166
4. Farm gate paddy prices at Bogale-Mawlamyinegyun area – for 4 different varieties (2012-14)

<table><caption>**Table 1:** Average monthly farm gate paddy price of Bay Gyar Lay variety from March 2012-to May 2014</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Jan</th><th>Feb</th><th>Mar</th><th>Apr</th><th>May</th><th>Jun</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>2012</th><td></td><td></td><td>6,155</td><td>6,033</td><td>6,125</td><td>6,009</td></tr><tr><th>2013</th><td>4,577</td><td>4,700</td><td>4,680</td><td>4,800</td><td>5,485</td><td>5,700</td></tr><tr><th>2014</th><td>6,138</td><td>6,096</td><td>6,025</td><td>6,417</td><td>6,790</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>**Table 2:** Average monthly farm gate paddy price of Khun Ni variety from March 2012-to May 2014</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Jul</th><th>Aug</th><th>Sept</th><th>Oct</th><th>Nov</th><th>Dec</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>2012</th><td>6,105</td><td>6,242</td><td>6,661</td><td>6,195</td><td>4,667</td><td>4,330</td></tr><tr><th>2013</th><td>5,937</td><td>6,125</td><td>6,118</td><td>6,055</td><td>5,793</td><td>5,478</td></tr><tr><th>2014</th><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Jan</th><th>Feb</th><th>Mar</th><th>Apr</th><th>May</th><th>Jun</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>2012</th><td></td><td></td><td>4,781</td><td>4,675</td><td>4,636</td><td>4,669</td></tr><tr><th>2013</th><td>4,244</td><td>4,291</td><td>4,338</td><td>4,400</td><td>4,956</td><td>5,094</td></tr><tr><th>2014</th><td>5,071</td><td>5,100</td><td>4,900</td><td>5,800</td><td>5,822</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Jul</th><th>Aug</th><th>Sept</th><th>Oct</th><th>Nov</th><th>Dec</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>2012</th><td>4,714</td><td>5,052</td><td>5,800</td><td>5,300</td><td>4,488</td><td>4,000</td></tr><tr><th>2013</th><td>5,163</td><td>5,534</td><td>5,600</td><td>5,525</td><td>5,525</td><td>5,100</td></tr><tr><th>2014</th><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>**Table 3:** Average monthly farm gate paddy price of Hnan Karr variety from March 2012-to May 2014</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Jan</th><th>Feb</th><th>Mar</th><th>Apr</th><th>May</th><th>Jun</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>2012</th><td></td><td></td><td>3,388</td><td>3,125</td><td>3,370</td><td>3,386</td></tr><tr><th>2013</th><td>3,488</td><td>3,817</td><td>3,855</td><td>3,825</td><td>4,167</td><td>4,207</td></tr><tr><th>2014</th><td>4,060</td><td>4,178</td><td>4,200</td><td>4,200</td><td>4,200</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>**Table 4:** Average monthly farm gate paddy price of Htee Htut Yin variety from March 2012-to May 2014</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Jul</th><th>Aug</th><th>Sept</th><th>Oct</th><th>Nov</th><th>Dec</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>2012</th><td>3,808</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>3,629</td><td>3,573</td></tr><tr><th>2013</th><td>4,267</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>4,000</td><td>4,000</td></tr><tr><th>2014</th><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Jan</th><th>Feb</th><th>Mar</th><th>Apr</th><th>May</th><th>Jun</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>2012</th><td></td><td></td><td>3,063</td><td>2,692</td><td>2,818</td><td>3,150</td></tr><tr><th>2013</th><td></td><td></td><td>3,544</td><td>3,458</td><td>3,850</td><td>4,211</td></tr><tr><th>2014</th><td></td><td></td><td>3,925</td><td>3,800</td><td>3,880</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Jul</th><th>Aug</th><th>Sept</th><th>Oct</th><th>Nov</th><th>Dec</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>2012</th><td>3,761</td><td>3,968</td><td>4,378</td><td>4,238</td><td>4,180</td><td>4,180</td></tr><tr><th>2013</th><td>4,168</td><td>4,690</td><td>4,858</td><td>4,748</td><td>4,640</td><td></td></tr><tr><th>2014</th><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>
## 5. Profit and loss statement of paddy production (monsoon and summer) in Delta

<table><caption>**Table 1:** Average costs of paddy per acre, Monsoon paddy (Transplanting), 2013</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="5">Monsoon paddy (Transplanting), 2013</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>Total work hour</th><th>Cost/hour</th><th>Total Cost</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Labor charges</td><td></td><td></td><td>84,625</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Nursery preparation and seed sowing</td><td>12</td><td>375</td><td>4,500</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Seed Sowing /Broadcasting</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Transplanting</td><td>90</td><td>375</td><td>33,750</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Fertilizer Application</td><td>10</td><td>375</td><td>3,750</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Harvesting (hand)</td><td>40</td><td>625</td><td>25,000</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Assistant labor for Threshing Machine</td><td>5</td><td>375</td><td>1,875</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Transporting of paddy pile (from field to house)</td><td>20</td><td>600</td><td>12,000</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Freight (from boat to Miller)</td><td>3</td><td>1,500</td><td>3,750</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Machinary cost</td><td></td><td></td><td>24,750</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Hired Machinery (land preparation)</td><td>10</td><td>375</td><td>3,750</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Thresher Machine</td><td>5</td><td>4,200</td><td>21,000</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Amount</td><td>Unit</td><td>Unit price</td><td>Total</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Materials cost</td><td></td><td></td><td>53,760</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Seeds</td><td>6</td><td>Pyi</td><td>500</td><td>3,000</td></tr><tr><td>Urea</td><td>34</td><td>kg</td><td>400</td><td>13,600</td></tr><tr><td>T-super</td><td>25</td><td>kg</td><td>440</td><td>11,000</td></tr><tr><td>Potash</td><td>25</td><td>kg</td><td>560</td><td>14,000</td></tr><tr><td>Fuel for land preparation and Threshing</td><td>20</td><td>bottle</td><td>608</td><td>12,160</td></tr><tr><td>Fuel for Irrigation</td><td>0</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td></tr><tr><td>Hired pump for Irrigation</td><td>0</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td></tr><tr><td>TOTAL per acre</td><td></td><td></td><td>163,135</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Table 2: Average costs of paddy per acre, Monsoon Paddy (Broadcasting), 2013</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Monsoon Paddy (Broadcasting), 2013</th></tr><tr><th>Total work hour</th><th>Cost/hour</th><th>Total Cost</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Labor charges</td><td></td><td></td><td>84,625</td></tr><tr><td>Nursery preparation and seed sowing</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td><td>4,500</td></tr><tr><td>Seed Sowing /Broadcasting</td><td>4</td><td>375</td><td>-00</td></tr><tr><td>Transplanting</td><td>30</td><td>375</td><td>33,750</td></tr><tr><td>Fertilizer Application</td><td>3</td><td>375</td><td>3,750</td></tr><tr><td>Harvesting (hand)</td><td>40</td><td>625</td><td>25,000</td></tr><tr><td>Assistant labor for Threshing Machine</td><td>5</td><td>375</td><td>1,875</td></tr><tr><td>Transporting of paddy pile (from field to house)</td><td>20</td><td>600</td><td>12,000</td></tr><tr><td>Freight (from boat to Miller)</td><td>3</td><td>1,500</td><td>3,750</td></tr><tr><td>Machinary cost</td><td></td><td></td><td>30,375</td></tr><tr><td>Hired Machinery (land preparation)</td><td>25</td><td>375</td><td>9,375</td></tr><tr><td>Thresher Machine</td><td>5</td><td>4,200</td><td>21,000</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Amt</td><td>Unit</td><td>Unit price</td><td>Total</td></tr><tr><td>Materials cost</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>64,600</td></tr><tr><td>Seeds</td><td>20</td><td>pyi</td><td>500</td><td>10,000</td></tr><tr><td>Urea</td><td>34</td><td>kg</td><td>400</td><td>13,600</td></tr><tr><td>T-super</td><td>25</td><td>kg</td><td>440</td><td>11,000</td></tr><tr><td>Potash</td><td>25</td><td>kg</td><td>560</td><td>14,000</td></tr><tr><td>Fuel for land preparation and Threshing</td><td>20</td><td>bottle</td><td>800</td><td>16,000</td></tr><tr><td>Fuel for Irrigation</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td></tr><tr><td>Hired pump for Irrigation</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td></tr><tr><td>TOTAL per acre</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>151,475</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Table 3: Average costs of paddy per acre, Summer Paddy (Broadcasting), 2014</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="4">Summer paddy (Broadcasting), 2014</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>Total work hour</th><th>Cost/hour</th><th>Total Cost</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Labor charges</td><td></td><td></td><td>47,375</td></tr><tr><td>Nursery preparation and seed sowing</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td></tr><tr><td>Seed Sowing /Broadcasting</td><td>4</td><td>500</td><td>2,000</td></tr><tr><td>Transplanting</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td><td>-00</td></tr><tr><td>Fertilizer Application</td><td>15</td><td>500</td><td>7,500</td></tr><tr><td>Harvesting (hand)</td><td>35</td><td>600</td><td>21,000</td></tr><tr><td>Assistant labor for Threshing Machine</td><td>5</td><td>375</td><td>1,875</td></tr><tr><td>Transporting of paddy pile (from field to house)</td><td>20</td><td>600</td><td>12,000</td></tr><tr><td>Freight (from boat to Miller)</td><td>2</td><td>1,500</td><td>3,000</td></tr><tr><td>Machinary cost</td><td></td><td></td><td>36,600</td></tr><tr><td>Hired Machinery (land preparation)</td><td>19</td><td>600</td><td>11,400</td></tr><tr><td>Thresher Machine</td><td>6</td><td>4,200</td><td>25,200</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Amt</td><td>Unit</td><td>Unit price</td><td>Total</td></tr><tr><td>Materials cost</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>103,880</td></tr><tr><td>Seeds</td><td>20</td><td>pyi</td><td>500</td><td>10,000</td></tr><tr><td>Urea</td><td>100</td><td>kg</td><td>520</td><td>52,000</td></tr><tr><td>T-super</td><td>25</td><td>kg</td><td>460</td><td>11,500</td></tr><tr><td>Potash</td><td>13</td><td>kg</td><td>560</td><td>7,280</td></tr><tr><td>Fuel for land preparation and Threshing</td><td>16</td><td>bottle</td><td>600</td><td>9,600</td></tr><tr><td>Fuel for Irrigation</td><td>5</td><td>bottle</td><td>700</td><td>3,500</td></tr><tr><td>Hired pump for Irrigation</td><td>10</td><td>hour</td><td>1,000</td><td>10,000</td></tr><tr><td>TOTAL per acre</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>187,855</td></tr></tbody></table>
## 6. Supporting data for income generation (on farm wage labor, fishing, off farm activities)

<table><caption>Table 1: Ratio number of working HH members engaged as farm laborer/ total number of working HH members</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Delta</th><th colspan="3">Dry Zone</th><th colspan="3">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>de >=0.01 à 0.25</td><td>1</td><td>0.4</td><td>14.3</td><td>6</td><td>2.6</td><td>85.7</td><td>7</td><td>1.5</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>de >=0.25 à 0.5</td><td>26</td><td>11.0</td><td>28.9</td><td>64</td><td>27.7</td><td>71.1</td><td>90</td><td>19.2</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>de >=0.5 à 0.75</td><td>58</td><td>24.5</td><td>38.7</td><td>92</td><td>39.8</td><td>61.3</td><td>150</td><td>32.1</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>de >=0.75 à 4.001</td><td>152</td><td>64.1</td><td>68.8</td><td>69</td><td>29.9</td><td>31.2</td><td>221</td><td>47.2</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>237</td><td>100.0</td><td>50.6</td><td>231</td><td>100.0</td><td>49.4</td><td>468</td><td>100.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=57.2 dof=3 p=0.001 (Val. théoriques < 5 = 2) Cramer's V=0.349

<table><caption>Table 2: Relationship between fishing and household head age in Delta</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Age category of HHH</th><th colspan="2">Fish</th><th colspan="2">No fish</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>&lt; 30</td><td>41</td><td>63.1</td><td>24</td><td>36.9</td><td>65</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>30 &lt; 40</td><td>82</td><td>58.6</td><td>58</td><td>41.4</td><td>140</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>40 &lt; 50</td><td>65</td><td>45.8</td><td>77</td><td>54.2</td><td>142</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>50 &lt; 60</td><td>40</td><td>41.2</td><td>57</td><td>58.8</td><td>97</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>60 and over</td><td>20</td><td>23.0</td><td>67</td><td>77.0</td><td>87</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>248</td><td>46.7</td><td>283</td><td>53.3</td><td>531</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=35.8 dof=4 p=0.001 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.26
<table><caption>Table 3: Relationship between fishing income and landholding size in Delta</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">ACRES</th><th colspan="2">&lt; 70000 MMK/year</th><th colspan="2">70000 &lt;365000 MMK/year</th><th colspan="2">365000 MMK/ per year and above</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Landless</td><td>46</td><td>25.1</td><td>72</td><td>39.3</td><td>65</td><td>35.5</td><td>183</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>0.3-2.5</td><td>4</td><td>36.4</td><td>4</td><td>36.4</td><td>3</td><td>27.3</td><td>11</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>2.5-5</td><td>6</td><td>54.5</td><td>2</td><td>18.2</td><td>3</td><td>27.3</td><td>11</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>5-10</td><td>13</td><td>56.5</td><td>5</td><td>21.7</td><td>5</td><td>21.7</td><td>23</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>10-15</td><td>8</td><td>61.5</td><td>1</td><td>7.7</td><td>4</td><td>30.8</td><td>13</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>&gt;15</td><td>5</td><td>71.4</td><td></td><td></td><td>2</td><td>28.6</td><td>7</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>82</td><td>33.1</td><td>84</td><td>33.9</td><td>82</td><td>33.1</td><td>248</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=20.3 dof=10 p=0.026 (Val. théoriques < 5 = 12) Cramer's V=0.202

<table><caption>Table 4: Distribution of households engaged in different types of self-employed activities, for Delta and Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Delta<br>% of HH over total HH<br>surveyed in Delta (531)</th><th colspan="2">Dry Zone<br>% of HH over total HH<br>surveyed in Dry Zone (598)</th></tr><tr><th>Nb of HH</th><th>% of total HH<br>Delta (531)</th><th>Nb of HH</th><th>% of total<br>HH (598)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Construction</td><td>15</td><td>2.8%</td><td>7</td><td>1.2%</td></tr><tr><td>Weaving</td><td>0</td><td>0.0%</td><td>101</td><td>16.9%</td></tr><tr><td>Arts and crafts</td><td>15</td><td>2.8%</td><td>9</td><td>1.5%</td></tr><tr><td>Food processing</td><td>15</td><td>2.8%</td><td>9</td><td>1.5%</td></tr><tr><td>Small shop</td><td>39</td><td>7.3%</td><td>20</td><td>3.3%</td></tr><tr><td>Services (transport,<br>health, education)</td><td>32</td><td>6.0%</td><td>7</td><td>1.2%</td></tr><tr><td>Broker, money-lending</td><td>32</td><td>6.0%</td><td>8</td><td>1.3%</td></tr><tr><td>Other services</td><td>6</td><td>1.1%</td><td>13</td><td>2.2%</td></tr><tr><td>Total HH self<br>employed OF</td><td>126</td><td>23.7%</td><td>148</td><td>24.7%</td></tr><tr><td>Average off-farm<br>income per HH (MMK)</td><td colspan="2">674,099</td><td colspan="2">743,422</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>**Table 5:** Distribution of households having at least one member employed in off-farm activities, for Delta and Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3"></th><th colspan="2">Delta (531 HH)</th><th colspan="2">Dry Zone (598 HH)</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">% of HH over total HH surveyed in Delta (531)</th><th colspan="2">% of HH over total HH surveyed in Dry Zone (598)</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>% of HH</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>% HH</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Construction</td><td>10</td><td>1.9%</td><td>142</td><td>23.7%</td></tr><tr><td>Weaving</td><td>0</td><td>0.0%</td><td>44</td><td>7.4%</td></tr><tr><td>Arts and crafts</td><td>10</td><td>1.9%</td><td>3</td><td>0.5%</td></tr><tr><td>Food processing, shop keeping, mining)</td><td>10</td><td>1.9%</td><td>25</td><td>4.2%</td></tr><tr><td>Services</td><td>16</td><td>3.0%</td><td>6</td><td>1.0%</td></tr><tr><td>Total HH with wage income</td><td>46</td><td>8.7%</td><td>187</td><td>31.3%</td></tr><tr><td>Average off-farm income per HH (MMK)</td><td colspan="2">630,457</td><td colspan="2">973,571</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>**Table 6:** Distribution of households having off-farm activities among total annual household income categories in Delta</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">OFact</th><th colspan="3">No. OFact</th><th colspan="3">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>%R</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>TI &lt;750,000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>TI 750,000 to 1,500,000</td><td>44</td><td>23.4</td><td>28.0</td><td>113</td><td>32.9</td><td>72.0</td><td>72.0</td><td>29.6</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI 1,500,000 to 3,000,000</td><td>58</td><td>30.9</td><td>38.9</td><td>91</td><td>26.5</td><td>61.1</td><td>61.1</td><td>28.1</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI &gt;3,000,000</td><td>42</td><td>22.3</td><td>37.5</td><td>70</td><td>20.4</td><td>62.5</td><td>62.5</td><td>21.1</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>44</td><td>23.4</td><td>38.9</td><td>69</td><td>20.1</td><td>61.1</td><td>61.1</td><td>21.3</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>188</td><td>100.0</td><td>35.4</td><td>343</td><td>100.0</td><td>64.6</td><td>64.6</td><td>100.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=5.38 dof=3 p=0.144 (Peu significant) Cramer's V=0.101
<table><caption>**Table 7:** Distribution of households having off-farm activities among total annual household income categories in Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">TOTAL INCOME (TI)</th><th colspan="3">OFact</th><th colspan="3">No.OFact</th><th colspan="3">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>TI &lt;750,000</td><td>59</td><td>19.9</td><td>38.6</td><td>94</td><td>31.1</td><td>61.4</td><td>153</td><td>25.6</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI 750,000 to 1,500,000</td><td>87</td><td>29.4</td><td>49.2</td><td>90</td><td>29.8</td><td>50.8</td><td>177</td><td>29.6</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI 1500000 to 3000000</td><td>103</td><td>34.8</td><td>60.6</td><td>67</td><td>22.2</td><td>39.4</td><td>170</td><td>28.4</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI &gt;3,000,000</td><td>47</td><td>15.9</td><td>48.0</td><td>51</td><td>16.9</td><td>52.0</td><td>98</td><td>16.4</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>296</td><td>100.0</td><td>49.5</td><td>302</td><td>100.0</td><td>50.5</td><td>598</td><td>100.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=15.8 dof=3 p=0.001 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.162

<table><caption>**Table 8:** Relation between off-farm income and total household income in Delta</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Total Income (TI)</th><th colspan="2">Under 50,000</th><th colspan="2">from 50,000 to under 250,000</th><th colspan="2">from 250,000 to under 700,000</th><th colspan="2">from 700,000 to under 1,250,000</th><th colspan="2">More than 1,250,000</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>TI &lt;750,000</td><td>120</td><td>76.4</td><td>21</td><td>13.4</td><td>15</td><td>9.6</td><td>1</td><td>0.6</td><td></td><td></td><td>157</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI 750,000 to 1,500,000</td><td>94</td><td>63.1</td><td>20</td><td>13.4</td><td>19</td><td>12.8</td><td>15</td><td>10.1</td><td>1</td><td>0.7</td><td>149</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI 1,500,000 to 3000000</td><td>75</td><td>67.0</td><td>8</td><td>7.1</td><td>10</td><td>8.9</td><td>11</td><td>9.8</td><td>8</td><td>7.1</td><td>112</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI &gt;3,000,000</td><td>72</td><td>63.7</td><td>7</td><td>6.2</td><td>8</td><td>7.1</td><td>12</td><td>10.6</td><td>14</td><td>12.4</td><td>113</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>361</td><td>68.0</td><td>56</td><td>10.5</td><td>52</td><td>9.8</td><td>39</td><td>7.3</td><td>23</td><td>4.3</td><td>531</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=50.5 dof=12 p=0.001 (Val. théoriques < 5 = 2) Cramer's V=0.178
<table><caption>**Table 9: Relation between off-farm income and total household income in Dry Zone**</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Total Income (TI)</th><th colspan="2">Under 50,000</th><th colspan="2">from 50,000 to under 250,000</th><th colspan="2">from 250,000 to under 700,000</th><th colspan="2">from 700,000 to under 1,250,000</th><th colspan="2">More than 1,250,000</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>TI &lt;750,000</td><td>101</td><td>66.0</td><td>23</td><td>15.0</td><td>28</td><td>18.3</td><td>1</td><td>0.7</td><td></td><td></td><td>153</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI 750,000 to 1,500,000</td><td>91</td><td>51.4</td><td>9</td><td>5.1</td><td>18</td><td>10.2</td><td>43</td><td>24.3</td><td>16</td><td>9.0</td><td>177</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI 1,500,000 to 3,000,000</td><td>68</td><td>40.0</td><td>12</td><td>7.1</td><td>16</td><td>9.4</td><td>22</td><td>12.9</td><td>52</td><td>30.6</td><td>170</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>TI &gt;3,000,000</td><td>52</td><td>53.1</td><td>4</td><td>4.1</td><td>8</td><td>8.2</td><td>9</td><td>9.2</td><td>25</td><td>25.5</td><td>98</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>312</td><td>52.2</td><td>48</td><td>8.0</td><td>70</td><td>11.7</td><td>75</td><td>12.5</td><td>93</td><td>15.6</td><td>598</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=128.9 dof=12 p=0.001 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.268
## 7. Total income per farmers categories

<table><caption>Table 1: Total income categories and categories of farmers in Delta</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">multi-active<br>small farmers</th><th colspan="2">capitalized<br>farmers</th><th colspan="2">Agri-<br>specialized<br>small farmers</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Less than<br>750,000</td><td>6</td><td>16.7</td><td>1</td><td>1.1</td><td>4</td><td>4.5</td><td>11</td><td>5.1</td></tr><tr><td>From 750,000<br>to less than<br>1,500,000</td><td>9</td><td>25.0</td><td>1</td><td>1.1</td><td>31</td><td>35.2</td><td>41</td><td>19.0</td></tr><tr><td>From 1,500,000<br>to less than<br>3,000,000</td><td>11</td><td>30.6</td><td>6</td><td>6.5</td><td>48</td><td>54.5</td><td>65</td><td>30.1</td></tr><tr><td>More than<br>3,000,000</td><td>10</td><td>27.8</td><td>84</td><td>91.3</td><td>5</td><td>5.7</td><td>99</td><td>45.8</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>36</td><td>100.0</td><td>92</td><td>100.0</td><td>88</td><td>100.0</td><td>216</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=146.1 dof=6 p=0.001 (Val. théoriques < 5 = 3) Cramer's V=0.582

<table><caption>Table 2: Total income categories and categories of farmers in Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Multi-active<br>small farmers</th><th colspan="2">Capitalized<br>farmers</th><th colspan="2">Agri-<br>specialized<br>small farmers</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Less than<br>750,000</td><td>1</td><td>0.9</td><td>33</td><td>29.7</td><td>50</td><td>39.1</td><td>84</td><td>23.8</td></tr><tr><td>From 750,000<br>to less than<br>1,500,000</td><td>6</td><td>5.3</td><td>28</td><td>25.2</td><td>50</td><td>39.1</td><td>84</td><td>23.8</td></tr><tr><td>From 1,500,000<br>to less than<br>3,000,000</td><td>33</td><td>28.9</td><td>46</td><td>41.4</td><td>27</td><td>21.1</td><td>106</td><td>30.0</td></tr><tr><td>More than<br>3,000,000</td><td>74</td><td>64.9</td><td>4</td><td>3.6</td><td>1</td><td>0.8</td><td>79</td><td>22.4</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>114</td><td>100.0</td><td>111</td><td>100.0</td><td>128</td><td>100.0</td><td>353</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=213.0 dof=6 p=0.001 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.549
# 8. Methodology for quantitative survey

## Categorization for farmers

The farmers categories analysed here have been built with a Factorial Analysis of Correspondences (FAC) done on households currently having long term land use rights (landowners, in short). Trying to go further in categorizing the Delta and Dry Zone rural societies (in terms of social and economical mobility as well as regarding 'livelihood security') surveyed for this research, several FAC have been performed, taking into account different variables. After conducting flat sorting and cross sorting, variables (on demography, agricultural practices and wealth...) have been selected among all the survey questions, according to their significance in differentiating different 'groups' in a meaningful way. These variables have then been used to conduct different FACs.

As a matter of fact, treating in a same batch landless households – those not owning any land use right – with landowners systematically results in, more or less, two categories with landless on the one hand and landowners on the other (this even for FAC relying only on non-agricultural variables such as loans contracted for health, food, access to remittances, etc.). This observation speaks in itself on the crucial role that access to land plays on households' economic conditions and social status. To bypass the weight of this variable (landless vs. landowner), FACs have been performed for each of these two groups. The current FAC is based on surfaces cultivated by the farmers, profit order of different activities (agriculture, off-farm work, small business, fishing) and the total incomes households get each year. This FAC was first done on the two zones indistinctly, and then for each of them. The first FAC (without regards to location) resulted in 3 groups, quite distinct, which can be characterized in regards of the different variables available from the survey.
<table><caption>**Table 3:** Variables introduced in farmers FAC</caption><thead><tr><th>Variable</th><th>Modalities</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Total Area of farmland</td><td>Total Area of farmland</td></tr><tr><td>Total annual incomes (million MMK)</td><td>Total annual incomes (million MMK)</td></tr><tr><td>Weaving</td><td>Weaving</td></tr><tr><td>Fishing</td><td>Fishing</td></tr><tr><td>Profit order from livestock</td><td>Profit order from livestock</td></tr><tr><td>Profit order from agriculture</td><td>Profit order from agriculture</td></tr><tr><td>Profit order from on-farm wage labor</td><td>Profit order from on-farm wage labor</td></tr><tr><td>Profit order from off-farm wage labor</td><td>Profit order from off-farm wage labor</td></tr><tr><td>Profit order from business</td><td>Profit order from business</td></tr></tbody></table>

## Categorizing landless households

The differentiation between the 2 zones is predominant when performing a Factorial Analysis of Correspondences (FAC), grouping most of landless households from Dry Zone together and Delta households together. Yet, a third category can be distinguished among them. The FAC on both zones took into account the different possible activities as seen in **Table 4**.

<table><caption>**Table 4:** Variables introduced in the landless households FAC (both zones)</caption><thead><tr><th>Variable</th><th>Modalities</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Area</td><td>Dry Zone; Delta</td></tr><tr><td>Cultivated land under temporary arrangements</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Rented land</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Paddy Cultivation</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Home gardening</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Fishing</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Weaving</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Animal breeding</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Nb of ducks (breeding)</td><td>&lt; 30; 30 &lt; 110; ≥ 100</td></tr><tr><td>Owning cattle</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>On-farm wage labor</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Practicing agriculture</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr></tbody></table>
Another FAC, taking into account incomes and activities (see **Table 5**) has been performed on Delta landless households.

<table><caption>**Table 5: Variables introduced in the Delta's landless households FAC**</caption><thead><tr><td>Variable</td><td>Modalities</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Practicing agriculture</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Cultivated land under temporary arrangements</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Paddy Cultivation</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Fishing</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Animal breeding</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>On-farm wage labor</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Total incomes (million MMK)</td><td>&lt; 0.75; 0.75 to &lt; 1.5; 1.5 to &lt; 3; ≥ 3</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>**Table 6: Variables introduced in the Dry Zone's landless households FAC**</caption><thead><tr><td>Variable</td><td>Modalities</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Home Gardening</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Involved in off-farm activities</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Benefiting from migrants' remittances</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Weaving</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Animal breeding</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Owning cattle</td><td>No</td></tr><tr><td>Profit order of livestock</td><td>Yes; No</td></tr><tr><td>Profit order of on-farm wage labor</td><td>1; 2; 3</td></tr><tr><td>Profit order of off-farm wage labor</td><td>1; 2; 3</td></tr><tr><td>Profit order of small business</td><td>1; 2; 3</td></tr><tr><td>Total incomes (million MMK)</td><td>1; 2; 3<br/>&lt; 0.75; 0.75 to &lt; 1.5; 1.5 to &lt; 3; ≥ 3</td></tr></tbody></table>
Land tenure in rural lowland Myanmar

This study emerged out of an identified need to document social
processes leading to land insecurity, and those leading to investment
and sustainable use of lands by rural populations. Focusing on the
Delta and Dry Zone, the main paddy producing regions of Myanmar,
this analysis unravels the powers at play in shaping rural households'
relationship to land. From British colonization to the 2012 reforms,
many issues have remained relatively unchanged with regards to
local dynamics of landlessness, exclusion processes, local power plays,
restrictions in farmers' land rights and the State's excessive focus on
rice. In the midst of a fast evolving legal context, this work provides a
typology of farmers and the landless and argues that more attention
needs to be paid to understand the diversity of rural households and
forms of landlessness.

The Of Lives and Land series emanates from in-depth socio-anthropological research on land and livelihoods dynamics. Through various thematic focuses – urban, peri-urban and rural land issues, migration, conflict and resettlement – the series presents a rigorous analysis of how people from various regions of Myanmar shape land relations in a rapidly changing social, economic and political context. From the exploration of grounded realities, the series aims to address some of the challenges that Myanmar people, the state and other stakeholders are facing in managing land and associated resources and seeks to provide insights to inform policy dialogue and law formulation processes.

*The series is peer reviewed by a committee of professionals and academics.*

Of Lives and Land Myanmar research series

GRET

Professionals for
Fair Development