handloom business started to migrate to Manipura, India border sites. Recently, the weaving industry resumed thanks to tourism and the renewed popularity of the *longyi* traditionally woven in the area. Most of the surveyed villages in Yinmabin township were founded recently, soon after the imposition of British rule. Some households moved out from local densely populated and 'saturated' villages and settled in new hamlets in Yinmabin's periphery areas, which were then consolidated and established as villages under the Village Act of the colonial government. Some settlements also moved due to scarcity of water or landslides. Contrary to the Delta, the areas under study in Dry Zone have not been a strategic area for paddy production, and as such, farmers have been less affected by government policies, both during colonial and postcolonial times. The irrigation development policies that formed part of the summer paddy program and the greening projects are probably the most important initiatives that have affected farmers.

## 3. Land uses

In Myanmar land tenure is defined in relation to specific land use categories. From a legal point of view, there are nine main categories<fnref n="53" /> of land use: Agricultural Land, Garden Land, Grazing Land, Fallow Land and Waste Land, Forestland, Town Land, Village Land, Cantonments, and Religious Land. Various laws define the extent of the rights the users may enjoy under each category.

From a most practical 'non-legalist' picture, the most important land use categories as observed in surveyed villages have been defined as follows: 1) village lands, 2) forestlands, 3) other types of lands under communal use, 4) farmlands (including paddy lands and garden lands). For this latter category, more information is provided under Chapter VI and Chapter VIII.2.

### 3.1 Village lands

Village lands (*ywa myay*) fall under 'Urban and Rural lands' category. In Delta, settlement areas are mainly linearly arranged along the banks of waterways. Behind the village areas lay first a fringe of garden lands (*u yin*) and further inland the paddy lands (see **Figure 7**). In the Dry Zone, settlement areas are more 'classical', growing from the oldest settlement in a more or less concentric expansion, progressively encroaching on farmlands cultivated around the village's periphery (see **Figure 8**). In theory, official transfer of farmland into village land requires approval at the Union level for paddy lands and approval at the regional government level for other farmland categories.

<footnote n="53">53. Actually, if sub-categories are also counted, there are even up to 22 different land use categories.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 7:** Map of Aye Ywar, a 'typical' Delta village</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 8:** Example of the concentric pattern of village expansion in Dry Zone (Zee Phyu Pin village)</figcaption></figure>
However, in practice, such land use transfers and village lands are never registered as such and village settlement areas increase informally with the increase of inhabitants, encroaching on farmlands. Therefore, there is no register of, and no revenue collection from, such lands. However informally, switching land use from farming to housing is requested to the village head. In the Delta, an intermediate strategy to extend village land is often to convert adjacent paddy land into garden land, plant trees, and build a shelter for animals, before requesting to build a house.

House compounds can often include additional surrounding space for storage, livestock shelters, ponds, latrines, and home gardens. However, the poorest households, particularly in the salt-water areas, may often only have a very basic shelter, with no adjacent space. Home gardens (ein chan) are two times more frequent among farmland owning households (40%) than among landless households (21.6%). In the Delta, 39% of respondents have a home garden, out of which 70% exclusively produce for home consumption. In the Dry Zone, home gardens are less common, notably due to water scarcity. 23.6% of surveyed households have a home garden, out of which 87% exclusively produce for food.

## 3.2 Forestlands

Both the Delta and the Dry Zone have forestlands. In the Delta, the forests are mainly natural mangrove forests along water ways. In the studied villages of the Dry Zone, forests mainly consist of planted watershed protection forests and Eucalyptus plantations in protected forest areas, the latter being the result of 'greening' projects mostly implemented in the late 1970s and 1980s (for more information on Dry Zone greening projects, see Box 5).

In both areas, significant acreage of cultivated land happens to be in areas which are officially designated as 'forestlands'. In the Delta, this is mainly due to progressive encroachment into forests by landless people in search of lands along the agricultural frontier. In fact, in many 'southern' villages in brackish and salt water areas (such as Tet Tet Ku and Pay Chaung), a large proportion of cultivated lands were still under forestland status. Cultivators pay annual fines to the forest department and even have 'u paing' registration, but cannot access MADB loans, as this requires formal farmland ownership.

In the Dry Zone, forest areas and protected areas have often been demarcated in a very top-down manner in areas which were already cultivated and occupied by farmers. Indeed, boundaries of protected forest areas and tree plantations were extended into cultivated areas. In some cases (e.g. Minzu village), farmers were forced to give up their lands, while in other cases farmers are only allowed to cultivate these lands by performing alley-cropping between the planted trees.
BOX 5: GOVERNMENT GREENING PROJECTS IN THE DRY ZONE

Land degradation issues in the Dry Zone were identified as early as the 1950s, when a Dry Zone rehabilitation project was initiated by the Agriculture and Rural Development Corporation (ARDC) with the Forest Department (FD). This comprised tree planting on degraded lands. Under the UNDP HDI program, watershed management programs were instituted in the 1990s (Community Multi-purpose fuelwood woodlots and Watershed Management) to attempt to reduce deforestation and related erosion and degradation of land and water resources (Cools, 1995). In 1995, Myanmar set a Forest Policy objective to increase the area of Reserved Forest (RF) and Protected Public Forest (PPF) to 30% of total land area by 2010. In 1994, the FD implemented a special 'Greening Project' for nine districts of the Dry Zone. In 1997, the Dry Zone Greening Department (DZGD) was instituted to establish forest plantations on degraded land, conserve the remaining natural forests, promote fuelwood substitutes, and develop water resources (UNCCD 2005).

The greening policies and the creation of protected forest areas under these different greening projects affected farmers' land use practices in many villages. Indeed, grazing, agriculture, and the extraction of fuelwood and rocks are prohibited in these areas, some of which were previously cultivated. In addition, because these projects were implemented in a top down manner, with little information provided to farmers, tensions between authorities and communities emerged. In Hledar, about half of the cultivated lands fell into the protected forest area. In Kyauk Kwe, most farmlands fell in the protected area. Often, the affected villagers had cultivated these lands for a significant amount of time (eg: more than 5 or 10 years) before they were designated as protected forestland.

To cope with these greening projects, villagers adopted different strategies, including special arrangements with forest authorities. In some cases, the FD allowed farmers to continue farming in the protected forest area but restricted expansion of farm size. If the land was ever left fallow, the greening project would take the land to plant trees. Farmers thus plowed their fields every year to prove the land was cultivated and hence prevent land confiscation by the FD. In other cases, farmers were allowed to perform alley cropping between the rows of planted trees. This led to a new 'agro-forestry' system, with Eucalyptus trees combined with crops. It seems that the yields gradually declined in these plots. As such, the motto "You can grow crops as long as you don't hurt the Eucalyptus trees" became the consensus between farmers and the Dry Zone Greening Project.

Similar arrangements also occurred on lands which were encroached upon after being designated as protected forest areas. Villagers developed new farmland there during times of weak governance. Farmlands which were outside of the forest area were registered with *u' paing*, while those inside were not. But exceptions are found with farming households who managed to obtain *u' paing* titles for plots which fell within protected forest. Yet kwet-pyauk (scattered plots which escaped from cadastral mapping) were not included in the registration process.
A clear indicator of perceived land insecurity is the fact farmers avoid fallows to prevent any potential claims from authorities, although fallows could be helpful to renew soil fertility and improve land productivity. SLRD staff register these lands as *u paing*. In forest protected areas, local inhabitants may collect fuelwood from the areas, despite the official regulation against this practice.

In the Delta, these major discrepancies between registered farmland and forestland areas have been recently addressed by the government. In a nationwide initiative announced in early 2013 through a Presidential instruction, it was decided that land would be reclassified in order to reflect current realities on the ground. The main objective has been to collect accurate village and household data on those who have illegally settled in reserved areas and public forests for a certain length of years, so a to designate new villages for them. The pre-instructions which took effect in April 2013 include key actions such as: i) a permission mechanism by which reserved and public forestland areas where groups of villages and houses with a number of houses greater than 50 have settled for a long length of years are to be reclassified as new villages, ii) conducting allocations and designations of land as farmland for the people there. Through this policy, the Forestry Department has said that 1,681,667.62 acres have been converted to farmlands.

In 2014, such lands in the surveyed Delta villages seem to have been regazetted from forestland to farmland category, with formal administration transferred from the Department of Forestry to the Settlement and Land Records Department. In the concerned surveyed villages, forest department officers (forest ranger of Nyi Naung forest reserve and the usual fine collector) visited the villages and collected data on ownership of plots in July 2014. They also updated the names on fine receipts, taking into account land transfers. Following this, SLRD officers visited the villages in November 2014 to collect information on landowners and holdings, and to collect fees in ways that were not consistent across the villages<fnref n="54" />.

Although SLRD had promised farmers the delivery of LUCs in 2015, so that they would also be able to access 2015 monsoon MADB agricultural loans, the process has been slow and farmers had not yet received official documents, nor had accessed the loans in July 2015.

### 3.3 Communal lands

In both the Delta and the Dry Zone, communal grazing lands used to exist in the past but have largely been absorbed by village expansion. Only very small

<footnote n="54">54. In one of the village, SRLD also checked with adjacent landowners and took pictures of landowners standing in their plots. Also the fee collected for the registration was of 5,000 MMK per farmers. In the other village, SRLD only listed the landowners and their holdings, but collected 5,000 MMK/acre for the concerned cultivated areas.</footnote>
Dry Zone forests

<figure><img src="image_15.png" /><figcaption>Forest on a hill.</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_16.png" /><figcaption>Natural regeneration of Dry Zone forests.</figcaption></figure>

Delta "forests"?... or forested river banks

<figure><img src="image_17.png" /><figcaption>Forested river banks in a settlement area (and a bridge for villagers).</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_18.png" /><figcaption>In southern areas, only a fringe of 'dani lands' with Nippa palm trees (also collected to make roofs) remains on riversides. Behind, the forest has long ago been cleared for paddy cultivation, including under official 'forestlands'.</figcaption></figure>

<caption>**Figure 9: Delta and Dry Zone forestlands**</caption>

communal areas remain, such as communal threshing floors. In the Dry Zone, other land resources that fall under communal management are the zin ga ma myae, which are temporary alluvial areas that are created in river beds through the accumulation of alluviums during rainy seasons. They mostly occur along the Chindwin River, Yama River (Yinmabin), and Mu River. The alluvial islands appear annually during the dry season but their location changes from year to year. These fertile lands are excellent for growing counter-season high value vegetables such as onion, garlic, chilli, etc. The lands are managed by the village head and village elders and more or less equally shared among farming households, including the landless, so everyone can produce these highly profitable cash crops during
the dry season. The communal arrangements focus on equality in let allocation: land division is carefully made by demarcating plots with bamboo poles and lands are allotted to applying villagers through a lottery system. Inter-village land conflicts may arise, however, when these lands are formed in areas that overlap often vaguely defined inter-village or inter-township boundaries. In the surveyed villages in the Delta, there are no communal lands. Even riverbanks and their resources such as *Nipa* palm (commonly used for making roofs) and other trees fall under the ownership of the adjacent paddy lands or housing compounds. If it is not the case, those riverbanks fall under forestlands. However, there are cases of village-managed farmlands. For example, in one of the surveyed villages, lands that were seized under the forced paddy procurement system are rented out and the generated income is used for community investments for the school, the monastery, etc.

### 3.4 Farmlands

#### Farmlands in Delta

In Delta, farming systems are highly specialized in paddy. The majority of farmlands are paddy lands (lé) (97.8% among the total 1,914 acres cultivated in the surveyed villages). Uyin ('garden lands') is a much more limited category (see Chapter VII.3) and barely exist in saltwater areas (see Figure 10).

<figure><img src="image_19.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 10:** Transect diagrams of Delta villages in fresh water and salt water areas</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_20.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 11:** Delta seasonal calendar in 2 seasons-paddy areas</figcaption></figure>
*   **Garden lands:** this category mostly designates alluvial areas which are favorable for horticultural cash crops. They are mostly found in freshwater and brackish areas and quite rare in saltwater areas. They are also often located near the local towns (Bogale, Mawlamyinegyun) where marketing is easier. These have very limited acreage but can bring considerable income with cash crops such as betel leaves, vegetables, and flowers. Only 8.5% of surveyed households cultivate such lands.

*   **Paddy lands:** In freshwater areas and some brackish water areas, these lands have been under the double cropping system since the introduction of summer paddy in 1992. During monsoon (June to October), all paddy varieties can be grown, for grain and seed production. However in summer paddy season (December to April), only short cycle and non-photo-periodic varieties can be grown. These are mainly high yielding varieties that have been introduced through the agricultural extension services provided by MAS, DoA, and various NGOs. The introduction of paddy double cropping in the 1990s came at the expense of leguminous plants<sup>55</sup> in the rotation, and has resulted both in a major increase in the use of chemical fertilizers and a gradual decline in soil fertility and yields.

*   **Perennial crops** such as banana or other fruit trees or betel vines are cultivated by only 10.5% of respondents (17.7% of landowners and 5.7% of landless) in Delta. It represents a marginal source of income.

In the Delta, irrigation is only practiced in the summer season, essentially for paddy production through private-owned motor pumps withdrawing water from the waterways and canals. In the Dry Zone, irrigation may be practiced throughout the year, on a wide variety of crops, including paddy and horticultural cash crops.

<figure><img src="image_21.png" /></figure>

Paddy fields in Delta are relatively large and often prone to flooding due to heavy rains or high tides.

<figure><img src="image_22.png" /></figure>

Paddy straw is often burnt or throw in rivers as cattle is not common.

<caption>**Figure 12.1:** Delta main farmland uses – paddy lands</caption>

<footnote n="55">55. Which contributed to soil fertility by fixing nitrogen from the atmosphere and through crop residues incorporated as a green manure into the soil.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_23.png" /></figure>

Fertile alluvial soils allow intensive gardening for local urban markets.

Credit: Allaverdian

<figure><img src="image_24.png" /></figure>

Landless or very smallholders generate extra income on small plots of lands for small scale commercial horticulture.

Credit: Allaverdian

<caption>**Figure 12.2:** Delta main farmland uses – garden lands</caption>

**Farmlands in Dry Zone**

In the Dry Zone, the main farmland categories are by far ya (dry or non-paddy) lands, followed by le (paddy lands) (see **Figure 14: Dry Zone major farmland uses**).

**Paddy lands** (le) for heavy clay soils are located in flat lower areas where irrigation is possible. Both monsoon and summer paddy are cultivated (or another crop in the dry season, such as oilseeds and pulses). Irrigation is required in both seasons as rainfall is insufficient. Some paddy lands may be rainfed by monsoon (see **Figure 12.1**).

<table><caption>**Table 6:** Paddy cultivation in studied villages in Dry Zone<fnref n="56" /></caption><thead><tr><th>Dry Zone paddy land crops</th><th>Total cultivated acres</th><th>% irrigated land/total land</th><th>% of total cultivators</th><th>Average acreage/HH</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Monsoon paddy</td><td>410</td><td>100%</td><td>30%</td><td>3.83</td></tr><tr><td>Summer paddy</td><td>170</td><td>100%</td><td>22%</td><td>2.21</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote n="56">56. Data from quantitative study: 351 respondents who are cultivators out of 598 total respondents.</footnote>
Cropping calendar of a farmer in Khoe Than, Monywa

<figure><img src="image_25.png" /></figure>

Example of a cropping calendar of a farmer in Yinmabin

<figure><img src="image_26.png" /></figure>

Source: Gret Monywa MAFF team (Myat Myat Swe)

<caption>**Figure 13:** Dry Zone farmers' cropping calendars, Monywa and Yinmabin townships</caption>
**Dry lands** (ya) designate open fields, without dikes or bunds, otherwise unsuitable for paddy cultivation. With or without access to irrigation, 'ya' lands cover a more diverse types of soils, from alluvial soils, sandy soils, and rich black cotton soils. Ya lands allow for significantly diversified cropping systems. The main crops are summarized in **Table 7**.

<table><caption>**Table 7:** Cultivated areas of main Dry Zone crops (ya lands) in study villages<fnref n="57" /></caption><thead><tr><th>Dry Zone main 'Ya' land crops</th><th>Total cultivated acres</th><th>% irrigated land/total land</th><th>% rainfed land/total land</th><th>% of total cultivators</th><th>Average acreage/ HH</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Chickpea</td><td>618</td><td>26%</td><td>74%</td><td>46%</td><td>3.84</td></tr><tr><td>Pigeon pea</td><td>416</td><td>0%</td><td>100%</td><td>53%</td><td>2.25</td></tr><tr><td>Sesame</td><td>359</td><td>4%</td><td>96%</td><td>37%</td><td>2.78</td></tr><tr><td>Sorghum</td><td>319</td><td>0%</td><td>100%</td><td>53%</td><td>1.72</td></tr><tr><td>Sunflower</td><td>256</td><td>5%</td><td>95%</td><td>23%</td><td>3.16</td></tr><tr><td>Lima bean</td><td>236</td><td>0%</td><td>100%</td><td>44%</td><td>1.53</td></tr><tr><td>Onion</td><td>203</td><td>99%</td><td>1%</td><td>23%</td><td>2.57</td></tr><tr><td>Tomato</td><td>38</td><td>93%</td><td>7%</td><td>19%</td><td>0.55</td></tr></tbody></table>

**Alluvial lands** (kaing-kyung) designate land on riverbanks which are flooded during the rainy season but are cropped during the dry seasons. There soils are generally very fertile and highly conducive for growing counter-season horticultural crops. In the Dry Zone, a key criterion for the value and quality of lands is its level of access to irrigation.

The main source of irrigation is underground water, essentially artesian wells (public or private) and tube wells (mainly private-owned). Some of these infrastructures have been built with the support of the ministry of agriculture (in the 1990s) or the World Bank (in the 1970s) (see **Box 4**). Most tube wells are generally built for individual purposes and require the use of motor pumps. Other irrigation sources include diversion of water from perennial water streams and use of rainwater harvesting reservoir tanks. As opposed to the Delta, Dry Zone farming systems are extremely diversified. Farmers adopt resilience strategies, with plots combining different crops, at different planting periods (see **Chapter VII.3** and **Figure 13**).

<footnote n="57">57. Data from quantitative study: 351 respondents who are cultivators out of 598 total respondents</footnote>
14.1 Dry Zone 'ya' lands

<figure><img src="image_27.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_28.png" /></figure>

'Ya' land with sesame (under harvest) and young sorghum.

14.2 Dry Zone garden lands

<figure><img src="image_29.png" /></figure>

Commercial betel leaf garden.

<figure><img src="image_30.png" /></figure>

Thanaka tree garden.

<figure><img src="image_31.png" /></figure>

Tomato growing in a commercial garden.

<figure><img src="image_32.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 14:** Dry Zone major farmland uses</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_33.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 15:** Dry Zone paddy lands</figcaption></figure>
# 4. Delta and Dry Zone households' demographic and social profile

The 'average'<fnref n="58" /> surveyed household is headed by a 47-year-old Burmese (99.6%) male (85.7%) who was born in the same village or village tract (81%) in which he now resides. The household comprizes in average 4.33 members. 76% are 'adults' (14 years old or more)<fnref n="59" /> with an average age of 29.6 years. 68.3% of households have a maximum of one member who received higher education level<fnref n="60" />, and 14% of all members have attained this level of education (62.3% of household members have a primary education level).

## 4.1 Household life cycle

Data analysis shows that household composition and social profile vary mainly according to the household life cycle. Amongst households, the youngest and oldest ones have very characterized profiles in both study areas. Household size logically varies according to the age of household head (w). Household size gradually increases as the household head goes from 20 to 50 years of age (as children are born), and decreases after age 50 when children get married or leave. As a result, households of more than five members are relatively concentrated in those whose head is aged between 40 to 50 years (Table 1 in Annex 1). Among this latter age category, 31% of households are composed of five and six members, and 37.5% of seven or more members. Only 28 households are singled-membered (designated hereafter as 'single-member household'). These mainly concern widows or widowers. Young households are formed when household heads are approximately 25 years old and get married. Below 30 years (9.2% of households), household heads are only male (except for one case) (Table 2 in Annex 1) and their households are composed of two or three members who are not working outside the village tract (more than 50%). Between ages 30 and 40, household heads are still mainly males (96%), households' size increases to four members, and inactive members are relatively more numerous because there are more young children in the household. Adults still barely work outside the village tract and still have no social position within the village or village tract.

The younger the household head is, the less he has a chance to know somebody in the Village Tract Farmland Management Committee (16.5% of under-30-year-olds know somebody in the committee compared with 22.2% for all households). And yet, the younger they are, the more frequently household heads have reached a high education level (Table 3 in Annex 1), which tends to show that the average educational level has increased in the two areas over the two past generations.

<footnote n="58">58. Throughout the report, the term 'average' designates the mean.</footnote>

<footnote n="59">59. Amongst the 4887 individuals, 3707 are 14 years-old or more, 1180 are younger than 14.</footnote>

<footnote n="60">60. Higher education level comprizes high school and university.</footnote>
There are two different types of households headed by ‘elderly’ people (aged 50 and above):

* One type corresponds to a household headed by a man of 60 or more, who has attained a social position within the village or VT, mainly in the administration sector<fnref n="61" />, and who knows somebody in the VTFMC. Their households are composed of more than five members (often seven or more) amongst whom more than a third has a higher education level. These households are often made of three generations.

* The second type is a household headed by a woman of 50 and more, with only one or two members. The household head has a low education level (none or primary) and household members rarely accessed higher education. Household members are rarely in socially advantageous positions.

Age structures – in line with household size – are very similar in the two areas. It can be noted that the population is a little bit older in Dry Zone with an average household head age of 48.5 years against only 45 years in the Delta, and with higher rates of household heads above 60 in the Dry Zone and of household heads under 30 years in the Delta. This can be linked to the fact that a higher proportion of household heads were born outside of their current village tract in the Delta than in the Dry Zone (see point below).

## 4.2 Migration

According to the data, permanent in-migration to the studied areas since 1988 is very limited: 81% of household heads were born in the same Village tract<fnref n="62" /> and an additional 13.6% were born in the same township. Among the 213 in-migrant households (whose head was born outside the VT), the great majority (64.3%) is found in the Delta, and in particularly in the two most recently-settled villages<fnref n="63" /> – the ones further south and/or in brackish water areas. This characterizes the lasting characteristic of the Delta as a frontier area, from north to south. The Dry Zone in comparison is much more stable in terms of inter-village mobility, and the rates of in-migration tend mostly to reflect village size (with more in-migration to the biggest villages of Zee Phyu Pin and Gaw Gyi).

Amongst the 213 in-migrating households, 28% arrived in the last 10 years. Half of them declared that they migrated to get married, a third came to find work. Yet, according to qualitative interviews, these two answers cannot be significantly

<footnote n="61">61. The term ‘administrative position’ designates positions such as village head, village tract head, village clerk (chief assistant), land management committee member, village administration committee member, etc...</footnote>

<footnote n="62">62. There is no important difference between men and women: women household heads are 84% to be born in the same VT.</footnote>

<footnote n="63">63. Pay Chaung (22.5%) and Tet Tet Ku (17.8%)</footnote>
distinguished from one another as they generally overlap through the following continuum: individuals move for work, then find a mate, and finally decide to settle in their spouse's village. Respondents tend to differentiate their answers in the following way: most household heads who migrated more than 10 years ago said they did so to get married, while most of those who migrated more recently said they did so for work.

In line with this fact, household heads who settled in the last 50 years migrated to get married. But it must be noted that for the households who settled in the village a very long time ago (more than 100 years), representatives declared that their 'first coming elder' migrated in search for work. This corresponds mainly to work migration in the Delta. Information concerning these oldest migrations is not precise: 60% of informants declared that their elders came from the same township and 30% did not know where they came from.

Current out-migration among households' members concerns about one quarter of households<fnref n="64" /> (Table 4 in Annex 1). Work migrations increase rapidly when household heads reach 40 years old, reach their peak when they are between 40 and 50 years old, and slowly decrease after. This corresponds to the period when households' members need money to pay for their education, marriage, novitiate, etc. and the household has more workforce available. As we will see in Chapter VII 2, it also corresponds to the period when many households buy land.

<footnote n="64">64. 24% of total households have at least one member working outside the VT more than 50% of the year.</footnote>
# V. Transfers of land use rights

## 1. Land use rights transfers and papers

### 1.1 The ban on land use right transfers

The colonial period had a deep influence on land governance as it established the territorial basis for land and population administration, in both the Delta and the Dry Zone. This colonial framework has been used since then by the Burmese government. The independent government nationalized all land and resources with the 1948 Land Nationalization Act. This policy aimed at fighting landlordism i.e. to redistribute land held by foreigner and indigenous landlords to the tenants who cultivated it. The government then declared itself as the ultimate owner of all land and resources. This orientation changed the state's conception of its role regarding resource governance, at least in principle. From a legal point of view, farmers became the 'state's tenants'. This shift became even more real with the 1962 military coup and the 1964 Tenancy Act enacted by the Revolutionary Council. From 1962 onwards, land was legally transferable for the sake of continuing cultivation on it. In other words, arable lands left vacant should be (re-) allocated by, and solely by, the Village Tract Farmland Management Committees. Accordingly, definitive land use transfers such as sales or temporary arrangements (mortgage, rent, etc.) were all forbidden by the state, with the only exception being inheritance. However, it has been demonstrated in comparative contexts that banning such transfers tended to foster a black market for land rather than eliminating it (Lavigne Delvigne et al., 2002: 105). In Myanmar as well, it is not surprising to observe that transfers of land use rights existed prior to 2012 and were also quite dynamic (see *infra*). Indeed, banning land transfers under the previous governments was thought to be consistent with the 'land to the tiller' reform pursued in the 1950s, supposedly sustaining more equitable access to land for all. However, facing an ineffective land reform<fnref n="65" />, individuals had to respond by 'recreating' a land tenure framework that would respond to their needs for accessing land, through the permanent transfer of land use rights or through 'derived rights'. While permanent transfers essentially cover inheritance and land sales, derived rights cover all the procedures in which the rights to cultivate retained by an individual (or family) are delegated to a third party on a temporary basis and according to specific rules. The main types of 'derived rights' encountered in Delta and Dry Zone during this study – renting, sharecropping, and mortgage – are described below. We shall see hereafter that derived rights are often a starting point for smallholders and the landless to get access to land.

<footnote n="65">65. We may recall here that by 1958, when the government halted the implementation of the Land Nationalization Act, only 17% of all cultivated lands had been nationalized.</footnote>
Farmers had to develop different strategies to get around the legal ban on land transfers. The multiplicity of 'papers' related to land use in Myanmar illustrates quite well these strategies and the blurry framework in-between customary norms and statutory laws. 'Papers' are defined here as all the sorts of written paper documents used in land arrangements at the local level. These include farmer booklets (see below) and land sale contracts (see Chapter V.3 and Box 12).

<figure><img src="image_34.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 16:** Translated extract from a farmer booklet (produced in 2005) collected in a village in Dry Zone in 2013</figcaption></figure>

## 1.2 Farmer booklets

While the farmer booklet is, with the tax receipt (see **Figure 17**) another document produced by the government for farmland management. While it dates
back also to the colonial period, its purpose and composition were redefined under socialist-military rule, principally in order to provide a local record to assess 1) what each farmer must grow on each plot according to government policies, i.e. how they can contribute to the procurement system; and 2) what are the family livelihood needs, i.e. how the cooperatives can provide for each household (e.g. for rice distribution). These farmer booklets had previously defined land use. These also defined land tax payments and forced procurement quotas. Finally these documents forbade any kind of transfer and thus defined farmers as tenants receiving only the 'authority/right to cultivate the land' (leiya-myei lok-paing-hkwin). This simple legal framework ruled (in principle) land relations from 1962 to 2012.

### 1.3 Tax receipts

Annual tax receipts were provided to farmers on farmlands by the SRLD officers upon payment of the land tax (which was set to 6 Kyats per acre in the British times and has never been increased since, despite inflation). This enabled SLRD to match holdings with individual names. Surprisingly, Forest department officers provided similar tax receipts to farmers unofficially cultivating farmlands on forestlands. Although the tax rates were considerably higher than those of official farmlands, it enabled

<figure><img src="image_35.png" /><figcaption>Figure 17: Tax receipt</figcaption></figure>

farmers to 'legalize' their occupation of such lands, as their land use rights and transfers on these lands were recognized by local authorities. See as well Figure 16, Chapter VI.1.4 and Box 12: Tax receipts: the ultimate 'proof' of land use?
## 2. Inheritance and land fragmentation

Land inheritance (since 1988⁶⁶) concerns more than 43% of landowning households in the Delta for an average inherited area of 6.89 acres (among those who have inherited lands), and 51% of landowning households in Dry Zone for an average inherited area of 6.11 acres (among those who have inherited lands). In both areas, the average area inherited per household decreased – by 20% in Delta and by 32% in Dry Zone (see **Table 8**) – which may be explained by land fragmentation. It also should be noted that inheritance is not a guarantee for permanent landownership, particularly in Delta where 14% of those who inherited lands later lost their lands in some way or another.

<table><caption>**Table 8:** Land inheritance in Delta and Dry Zone since 1988</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th>Delta</th><th>Dry Zone</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">Inherited lands after 2003</td><td>Nb HH</td><td>42</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>Average area inherited (acres)</td><td>5.86</td><td>4.26</td></tr><tr><td>% of Land-owning HH</td><td>19%</td><td>17%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Inherited lands from 88-2003</td><td>Nb HH</td><td>68</td><td>142</td></tr><tr><td>Average area inherited (acres)</td><td>7.32</td><td>6.27</td></tr><tr><td>% of Land-owning HH</td><td>25%</td><td>39%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Inherited lands 88 up to now</td><td>Nb HH</td><td>108</td><td>187</td></tr><tr><td>Average area inherited (acres)</td><td>6.89</td><td>6.11</td></tr><tr><td>% of Land-owning HH</td><td>43%</td><td>51%</td></tr><tr><td>% who have become landless since</td><td>14%</td><td>3%</td></tr></tbody></table>

### 2.1 Customary principles of farm succession (Dry Zone)

All surveyed villages in the Dry Zone have been established over the last century. All arable lands are occupied. Different patterns of land inheritance exist in Monywa and Yinmabin townships. Despite some differences in practices between villages, there are many common points:

* Every sibling in a farm family is entitled to inherit parents' properties. There is no gender bias in succession of properties including farmlands. Women can inherit farmlands in the same way as men.

* These assets are distinguished in 2 types: 'inside' properties (*atwin pyis si*) –

<footnote n="66">66. The survey did not enquire about inheritance before 1988 so the rate of households who inherited lands might be higher, particularly in the older age categories.</footnote>
money, gold, gems – and ‘outside’ properties (*apyin pyis sì*) – farmlands, cattle, farm tools. The parent’s house and its compound are excluded from both groups and are intended to be transferred to the child which has remained with the parents until they passed away.

* Inheritance of assets is guided by the principle of equal distribution among siblings. The inheritance equity is balanced between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ property. Those who receive no land may in compensation receive gold or money, etc. For lands, the principle of equitable distribution also takes into account the soil fertility of the different holdings. When landholdings are too small, they are not equally divided among siblings but adjustments are made with the other types of assets (money, gold, etc.). This allows an equal sharing of inheritance and at the same time helps keep landholdings a viable farm size. Draught animals are generally also transferred to those who inherit the lands.

In the Dry Zone's surveyed villages, parents of the farming households let their children access the lands at marriage. Parents may allot some plots of their farm to sons or daughters to work as sharecroppers, which then pay one third of the farm's harvest. After parents die, the ownership of the farm is transferred to the son or daughter who cultivated it.

BOX 6: A PROBLEMATIC LAND INHERITANCE CASE FOR A YOUNG WIDOW IN MINBU TOWNSHIP (DRY ZONE)

A young couple got married and the parents of the boy gave the couple farmlands as inheritance. Three years later, the young husband died. It happened at the time of land use registration for Form No. 7. The widow applied for the allotted land to be registered in the Form No.7 with her name. The parents of the dead son did not want to transfer the land to the widow because they thought that as she was young and attractive, she would get married again to another man within a few months. The parents came to SLRD to object to the transfer of the entitlement of their land to the widow. The SLRD office staff wished to leave the farmland to the widow. But in order to avoid dealing with this social issue, the SLRD office said that the case resolution was only within the jurisdiction of the civil court. The case was thus referred to the civil court and was not yet solved at the time of the study.

When farmlands are distributed equally among siblings, those who can afford to accumulate the plots 'buy out' their siblings' shares. When farmlands are distributed in unequal shares among siblings, those who inherited more farmlands may purchase the small plots from others. Purchase or sale is not the rule but it is possible when the sibling agrees to sell his or her share. Generally, purchase or sale of inherited plots is made between siblings because they do not want to sell their
parents' land to non-family members. It is a preference but not a rule as such. When farm size is too small to share among siblings, the elder siblings or the wealthier siblings may leave their shares to the weaker ones.

The sibling who gets married before both parents pass away sometimes has the opportunity to access farmland through his or her marital partner. In such cases, he or she may be less favored to inherit farmland from his/her own parents. In that case and especially if the person is a man, his wife will not be satisfied with such an arrangement, as bride-price ideally requires some land provided by the husband as a basis to establish a new household. In cases where one sibling gets married before the parents pass away and if the newlywed couple has no farmland, parents from either one or both sides may provide them some plots of farmland as part of the marriage arrangement. The provision of farmland in that case remains informal, as long as parents are alive; only at their death should the landowner's name be changed in official registers. The newlywed couple may live together in one of the parents' houses and work together with parents and other siblings. It does not need to bear food costs, and can save money from the sale of crops produced from their farm plots. When they have saved enough money to buy a house, they separate from their parents. It may take several years for newlywed couples to get enough savings to establish their own home.

Traditionally, succession of parental properties is made on the day of 'yak le' (the third or fifth day following burial of the last parent), a commemoration ceremony to which all relatives come to gather. The elders amongst the relatives usually manage the division and distribution of the properties to the siblings. The village chief does not interfere in this process. Local authorities (e.g. Village Tract Farmland Management Committee) only interfere to mediate in cases of complaints and conflicts (see V.2.3).

<figure><img src="image_36.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 18:** Example of succession in Dry Zone</figcaption></figure>
**Figure 18** shows that land inheritance can take place in 2 steps: one part of the lands may be accessed through informal land arrangements by children before the death of the parents, in the event of marriage (especially when no lands are accessed via the spouse's side), and another part will be inherited after death of parents. It also shows that lands are equally divided, except for the child who stayed with the parents until their death who has special inheritance rights (house and more farmlands). Finally, as lands are inherited by both males and females, married couples may inherit lands from both sides.

In the majority of villages of the Dry Zone, toddy palm trees have been planted on farmlands. In the sharing of lands among heirs, it may occur that some members inherit the land but not the toddy trees and vice versa. It leads to the overlap of different operational rights (cultivation use right for one, toddy collection right for the other) owned by different siblings, over the same plot. Such rights are not recognized in the current legal framework, yet they are still socially legitimate rights in the eyes of the villagers and are still applied locally.

## 2.2 Delta: more unequal inheritance patterns among siblings

In Delta, the same general principles apply regarding inheritance as in the Dry Zone. However, qualitative interviews tend to indicate more unequal patterns of inheritance in the Delta compared to the Dry Zone, as illustrated in **Figure 18** and **Figure 19**. One explanation is that inheritance patterns were disrupted by harmful policies such as the state's compulsory paddy procurement policy. Another factor impacting inheritance is the agricultural frontier, which closed recently in Delta. Fragmenting family land into small plots had not been a relevant concern given the opportunities to clear new lands by moving further south. Lastly, with less historicity than in Dry Zone, land patrimony has less value, financially in terms of generational investments, and symbolically due to the high mobility characterizing farming households in this region. This lack of 'patrimonial value' may also have a positive, strategic, counterpart. Indeed, in the highly unstable context for agriculture in the post-socialist period in the Delta, land transfers done through inheritance may have served to secure beneficial alliances between families, instead of securing consolidated (contiguous) areas as Dry Zone households were aiming to. In the Delta, transferring land to more distant (geographically and socially) families may have served to extend households' social capital; an asset whose importance we already underlined for accessing land.

**Figure 19** illustrates the relatively unequal inheritance patterns in the Delta as well as the fact that inheritance may skip a generation, with lands transferred to grandchildren. The first family (U Tin Maung and Daw Nyein) cleared 20 acres along the agricultural frontier. They transferred 15 acres to their eldest daughter
who remained with them until their death. The second child (U Khin Soe) received 5 acres while the last son was not allocated any land as he had married with Daw Khin Hla, who was to inherit 10 acres from her parents. In the last generation (children of U Aung Cho and Daw Khin Hla), two children remain landless, while one son received all of the parents' lands and the last son received (5 acres) lands from the grandparents U Tin Maung and Daw Nyein.

<figure><img src="image_37.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 19:** A case of unequal inheritance in the Delta</figcaption></figure>

## 2.3 Current issues concerning land inheritance

### Impacts of the 2012 land law on inheritance patterns

The impact of the 2012 farmland policy could be seen as a driver for changes in land inheritance patterns among siblings. Before the 2012 land law, a sibling who was not engaged in farming was not entitled to land inheritance. If he or she appealed to inherit land, the Village Tract Farmland Management Committee would prioritize siblings who have continued working as farmers. If there was conflict in inheritance among siblings, most of those employed in the formal sector (such as civil servants) who worked outside the village and could not cultivate their parents' farmland had to surrender their claim to land inheritance. After the 2012 Farmland Law enactment, there is no such prohibition and each sibling is entitled to his or her land inheritance right. This study took place too early to observe consequences of the new Farmland Law. It has been said that traditionally, land given to the newlywed couple may fall under the name of the inheriting son or daughter after the death of his/her parents. However, the land titling process which took place after the 2012 Farmland Law may create some conflicts concerning who, at the very moment of the registration, is to be entitled. Finally, under the new land law, farming families deploy strategies to increase the loan amounts they can access from the MADB, especially for paddy land. Though these loans are based on farm size (100,000 MMK/acre for paddy), MADB applies a maximum threshold of 10 acres
per farmer. The distribution of Land Use Certificates (Form 7) with the new land law thus hastened the fragmentation of familial estates amongst different family members. In other words, many pieces of land of 10 (or under) acres have been distributed (as a kind of advanced inheritance), so that every single acre of land be entitled to MADB loans. Whether this will interfere with more 'opportunistic' inheritance patterns common in the Delta and/or bring new types of conflicts remains to be observed.

## 2.4 Land fragmentation

As seen in previous chapters, land fragmentation is occurring in both regions of Dry Zone and Delta. However, the phenomenon is particularly pronounced in the Dry Zone where the closing of the agricultural frontier and land saturation occurred much earlier. This is confirmed by the decrease of the average area inherited per household (see V.2.1), which is greater in the Dry Zone than in the Delta. As such, it is an increasing challenge for young households who have inherited smallholdings to create viable farms.

In the Dry Zone, lack of land tenure security is associated with lack of draught cattle. It is observed that getting access to farm let alone is not enough for a young farmer. An equally important asset is the draught cattle. Better-off farmers prefer to have a cow in addition to their pair of draught cattle so that its calves can be one-by-one assigned to each child as the calf's caregiver (see Chapter VII.3.1). Giving heirs access to both farmland and draught cattle is convenient and easy for better-off farmers but it is very difficult for small ones.

## 3. Land sales since 1988

As shown in Table 9, land sales (done after 1988⁶⁷) concern more than one third of households: 36% of households from the Delta (with an average 9.02 acres bought among households who have bought lands), and from the Dry Zone (with an average 6.05 acres bought among households who have bought lands). The average amount of land bought among those who bought land is considerably higher in the Delta. Another interesting trend is that throughout the two periods (1988-2003 and 2003 to now), the average plot size bought among those who bought has increased by 6% in the Delta while it has decreased by 24% in the Dry Zone. This suggests a land accumulation trend in Delta and a land fragmentation trend in Dry Zone. In addition, frequency of land sales among landowning households significantly decreased (by 43%) in the Delta in the two periods, while it is stable in Dry Zone: this can be explained by the end of the

<footnote n="67">67. The survey did not enquire about land sales before 1988.</footnote>
forced paddy procurement policy which was a strong driver of land sales in Delta (see below) and land loss (eg: 6% of those who bought lands lost it later and became landless).

<table><caption>**Table 9:** Some figures on land sales in Delta and Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th>Delta</th><th>Dry Zone</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">Bought lands after 2003</td><td>Nb HH</td><td>30</td><td>73</td></tr><tr><td>Average area bought (acres)</td><td>9.03</td><td>4.59</td></tr><tr><td>% of Land-owning HH</td><td>13%</td><td>21%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Bought lands from 88-2003</td><td>Nb HH</td><td>55</td><td>72</td></tr><tr><td>Average area bought (acres)</td><td>8.52</td><td>6.04</td></tr><tr><td>% of Land-owning HH</td><td>24%</td><td>20%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Bought lands 88 up to now</td><td>Nb HH</td><td>82</td><td>128</td></tr><tr><td>Average area bought (acres)</td><td>9.02</td><td>6.02</td></tr><tr><td>% of Land-owning HH</td><td>36%</td><td>36%</td></tr><tr><td>% who have become landless since</td><td>6%</td><td>0%</td></tr></tbody></table>

### 3.1 Government policies as a driver of land use rights transfers (Delta)

To summarize what has been explained in **Chapter III**, much of previous Myanmar governments' efforts focused on controlling paddy production for the state's interests, often against those of farmers. Therefore, Delta villages were much more affected than Dry Zone villages by these policies, among which the Compulsory Quota policy was probably the main cause of land sales and purchases (despite the legal ban on such transfers) conducted in the Delta between 1964 and 2003. In the Dry Zone, land sales and purchases were therefore mostly linked to farmers' own economic and household characteristics, rather than being driven by state policies.

In the Delta, the Compulsory Quota Policy (which ceased in 2003) created an artificial market. Indeed, most households who were about to lose their land because they were unable to provide the due quota to the government would try to sell it all or part of it before having it confiscated. The transaction generally consisted in finding a better-off farmer ready to buy the right to cultivate the land, with the price of the paddy quota due deducted from the land price. In order to get around the ban of land use rights transfers, farmers managed with the help of the Village Tract Farmland Management Committee (chaired by the appointed village tract headman) and the village tract SLRD staff to retroactively put the name of the purchaser on the farmers' waiting list – which in theory was designed to prioritize
Handwritten sale contract of ya land plot (specifying that it includes rights over toddy palms) - undated

<figure><img src="image_38.png" /></figure>

Handwritten "transfer of all rights" contract with township authority stamp, with no explicit mention of sale - undated

<figure><img src="image_39.png" /></figure>

Sale contract on official 5 kyat stamp paper - but no mention of authorities - 2007

<figure><img src="image_40.png" /></figure>

"Land transfer" contract on official 25 kyat stamp paper with stamp and signature of VT administrator-2001

<figure><img src="image_41.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 20: Diversity of land sale contracts**</figcaption></figure>
(see Box 7). When the transfer's legitimacy is acknowledged, the two contracting parties have to wait for the SLRD agent to come and record the transfer. He too has to be paid; the rate is stabilized in some areas and largely variable in others.

The paper bearing the agreement may vary from plain paper, school book pages, or proper contract templates produced by the Ministry of Internal Revenue, known as 5 Kyats (or 10 or 25 Kyats) Stamped Contracts. While some contracts are carefully designed to secure the land use right transfer despite the legal ban (see after), others only put the agreement on paper without even mentioning the area or the *kwin* number (see Figure 20, Table 10 and Table 11).

BOX 7: ANALYSING A CONTRACT'S TERMINOLOGY: PLAYING WITH PLURALISM

The form of the contract illustrates well the strategy developed by villagers at the crossroads between administrative and local levels, to accomplish land transfers according to customary rules while navigating around the legal ban on transfers. Most contracts indeed gather all the data necessary to set up a legal act: an official form (with governmental stamp), dated, where people are named and located, the land situated, witnesses' presence often testified by their signature, and most importantly, where the headman affixed stamp and signature. Second, the document directly invokes a sense of 'ownership' (*paing sain-tho*) on the land and the transfer (*lwe-pyaung*) of these rights to other people. The document is thus fundamentally in contradiction with the legal framework.

However, the purpose of the transfer – to provide land as a means for daily subsistence – is here legitimating the transfer by fitting into the only legal justification for transferring land: that land must be kept under cultivation. Papers, mediating regulations that exist at village and government levels, are thus adapted to solve the tension local versus legal. Also, they identify legality as an intermittent rule and question the state's capacity to enforce it.

Interestingly, securing land transfers through contracts written at village level involve representatives of domains both legal (SLRD representative, administrator) and customary (witnesses, often 'elders' – *yap-mi'-yap-pha'* – and again the headman). In fact, the village headman, nominated until 2011 by the military government, acted as the state's 'political broker' at the village level and the conveyor of customs within the legal framework. But at the same time, the administrator puts himself into illegality by acknowledging transfers banned by the government. And for this reason, this headman figure (across all successive Burmese governments, including the current one) combines the different forms of power (legal and customary) to provide access to and distribute resources at the local level, due in most part to his knowledge of the laws and ways to bypass them.
For more analysis on the village administrator's role, see **Chapter VIII.3**. Let us stress that whatever the degree of (in)formality of the sale transaction – with name changed in the SLRD records or not, with the administrator signing or not – we did not encounter any conflicts related to land sale transactions during the study. Of course, it must be said that land sales in studied villages occur mostly within the village community or with households from nearby villages.

### 3.3 Is there a 'land market'?

While we have noted that land use rights were sold and purchased under the previous land framework, we can hardly speak of a land market in which land is considered a commodity. Naturally, having access to land means having better chances in securing a family's livelihood (see **Chapter VII.6**), and would also mean access to credit (see **Chapter VIII.2**). However, in the studied areas, which remain profoundly rural if not to say remote, land has never – or rarely – been subject to speculation. In the villages under study, the main exceptions are for the Delta areas close to Bogale or Mawlamyinegyun towns affected by the on-going road construction projects. In the Dry Zone, the main exception observed was Khoe Than village, for its proximity to Monywa (see **Table 10**), where the few tracts situated along the road to Monywa have recently been coveted by real estate projects and gasoline stations. Even in Aye Ywar (Bogale township), where some lands are situated by the new road coming from Bogale, the most expensive plots (taking into account accessibility, fertility, and irrigation) were priced at a maximum of 1,200,000 MMK/acre in 2014.

<table><caption>**Table 10:** Examples of land transactions<fnref n="69" /> recorded in Khoe Tan, village close to Monywa town (Dry Zone)</caption><thead><tr><td>Year</td><td>Total area (acres)</td><td>Price/acre (MMK)</td><td>Type of agreement</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1997</td><td>0.87</td><td>115,000</td><td>Sheet from school book, one witness involved</td></tr><tr><td>1997</td><td>1.11</td><td>122,000</td><td>10MMK stamp paper</td></tr><tr><td>1998</td><td>0.55</td><td>127,000</td><td>6 MMK stamp paper</td></tr><tr><td>2010-11</td><td>1.13</td><td>620,000</td><td>10 MMK stamped paper; 2 witness involved</td></tr><tr><td>2013 (after Farmland Law)</td><td>2.09 (close to Poultry Zone of Monywa)</td><td>3,350,000</td><td>Contract (in the name of land use right for watermelon. In reality, residential land)</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote n="69">69. The survey measured “current prices”. We have not been able to calculate the ‘constant prices’ prices taking into account inflation as no data was found on inflation rates from 1988 to 2003.</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 11:** Examples of land transactions⁶² recorded in Pay Chaung, isolated village in saltwater area (Delta)</caption><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>Total area (acres)</th><th>Price/acre (MMK)</th><th>Type of agreement</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1988</td><td>12</td><td>1,000</td><td>Verbally</td></tr><tr><td>1997</td><td>6</td><td>35,000</td><td>Contract (village administrator as witness)</td></tr><tr><td>1998</td><td>15</td><td>50,000</td><td>Contract (two villagers as witness), done in presence of village administrator</td></tr></tbody></table>

# 4. Land arrangements and 'derived rights'

## 4.1 Different types of agrarian contracts

Four main temporary land arrangements exist for accessing derived rights of cultivation: free land loan, rent (in crop or money), sharecropping (thi"- sa"-khja'), and mortgage (le-pyan-ngwei-pyan or a-nu-gan-myei). There can be oral and written contracts, made between one person which contracts in the concerned plot of lands (for free, against cash or in kind payments, or in exchange for a loan) and another person who provides and contracts out the lands.

As observed in **Table 12**, 'Contracting in' households represent 18.5% of Delta surveyed households and 9% of Dry Zone households. This is mainly due to the much higher frequency of sharecropping arrangements in the Delta (9.6% of all surveyed households in Delta access lands with sharecropping arrangements, against only 1.2% in the Dry Zone). In the Dry Zone, the most common arrangement is 'free loan', while sharecropping is the predominant arrangement in the Delta. Only 3% of the 'contracting-in' households cumulate more than one type of arrangements (more quantitative data in following pages). As for land sales, the average size of lands contracted in for cultivation is almost two times greater in Delta (4.3 acres/ contract) than in Dry Zone.
<table><caption>**Table 12:** Number of households, % of total households contracting in (over total households), and average acreage of lands for cultivation by households on non-owned lands, in Delta and Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Area</th><th colspan="3">TOTAL contracted in lands</th><th colspan="2">Free loan</th><th colspan="2">Rent in</th><th colspan="2">Thi"- sa"-khja"/Share-cropping in</th><th colspan="2">Mortgage in</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%</th><th>Average acres</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Dry Zone</td><td>54</td><td>9.0</td><td>2.0</td><td>22</td><td>3.7</td><td>15</td><td>2.5</td><td>7</td><td>1.2</td><td>11</td><td>1.8</td></tr><tr><td>Delta</td><td>98</td><td>18.5</td><td>4.3</td><td>27</td><td>5.1</td><td>6</td><td>1.1</td><td>54</td><td>10.2</td><td>14</td><td>2.6</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>152</td><td>13.5</td><td></td><td>49</td><td>4.3</td><td>21</td><td>1.9</td><td>61</td><td>5.4</td><td>25</td><td>2.2</td></tr></tbody></table>

## Free land loan

Lands may be lent for free for a season. This arrangement is mainly done among close relatives and through oral agreement. It is slightly more common in the Delta and for summer paddy cultivation, which can be explained by the higher costs required to cultivate summer paddy (more inputs, irrigation, and motor pumps, etc.). When lacking the financial capacity to put all land under summer paddy, a household may lend the remaining land for free to close relatives.

## Thi"- sa"-khja": sharecropping or rent?

The Burmese term *thi"- sa"-khja'* can be ambiguous as it encompasses different kind of arrangements, some purely sharecropping ones (i.e. a fixed proportion of the harvest is due to the land owner) and others more looking like rent, that is a fixed quantity of harvest (independently from the harvested quantity) against the right to cultivate the land. We however stick to the Burmese terminology here in recounting the diversity of practices covered by this term literally meaning 'fruit-eat-lay-down'. Hence, the term essentially reflects a temporary arrangement from which payment is made in kind (harvest).

In some regions (such as the Dry Zone), this term is used for different sharecropping arrangements. The fixed rent payment in crop applies predominates in the Delta, especially to paddy cultivation. The difference between the two zones can be explained by the history of contracting practices between landowners and tenants. As to be expected, payment in the form of a fixed amount of crop is preferred by contracting out households. Competition among potential tenants (which has always been high in the Delta due to the high rate of landlessness) for access to lands strengthened the bargaining power of landowners and led to the
deterioration of tenancy conditions. The scarcity of available let allows landowners
to set the rent's conditions and choose the most beneficial arrangements for them.

The difference between the Delta and the Dry Zone can also be understood
in terms of agricultural conditions and the risks pertaining to different contexts.
While paddy cultivation in Delta can be considered relatively secure in terms of
production (if we omit pests and natural disasters), much of Dry Zone's agriculture
(including paddy in the studied area), can be considered highly risky since it
depends on unpredictable rainfalls and often on non-irrigated lands (which
constitute the majority of its arable lands). In 'stable' conditions - the Delta - those
accessing land through temporary arrangements are more likely to contract rent-
in-crop arrangements (with a fixed amount of crop), while the higher risk in the Dry
Zone means most arrangements are done with different sharecropping principles
(see below).

Sharecropping arrangements are made on a seasonal or annual basis. The annual arrangement is preferred in areas where double paddy cropping is possible. This agrarian contract is much more common in the Delta and is renewable without limit if each of the contract parties wishes and has fulfilled his or her part of the contract. In the Delta the in-kind payment can vary from 20 to 30 baskets of paddy per acre (and per season)<fnref n="70" />. If the tenant works with his/her own cattle, the rent is around 20 baskets per acre. If the owner provides the tenant with cattle, the rent increases to 25 baskets per acre. If the owner wishes to obtain the rent ex ante, he will receive only half of it.

The quantity of baskets due also depends on the relationship between the
two contractors. Close relatives may set a rate sometimes as low as 15 baskets per
acre. In some villages, sharecropping arrangements can include additional duties
for tenants, such as feeding and taking care of the landowners' buffaloes (in the
Delta), etc. Most agreements are oral except for large farmers that have several
tenants which may even use a special register with a list of tenants (this is also
more common in the Delta). In many cases, access to the entitled MADB loans is
also transferred to the tenants.

In the past, it seems that sharecropping contracts were mostly done between
landowners while they are now more often made between landowners and landless
tenants, some of whom reside outside of the village. The quantitative survey indicates
that 73% of sharecropping contracts are made with landless people.

<footnote n="70">70. Average yields vary generally from 40 to 100 baskets depending on soil type, season, water salinity, and farming practices. The landowners' take in sharecropping arrangement represents generally around half to one third of total production.</footnote>
**Le pyan ngwe pyan ('give back the paddy land, give back the money'):**

Le pyan ngwe pyan defines a credit arrangement in which the creditor gets a temporary land use right (they can cultivate the lands and dispose of the harvest as they wish) against a loan of a fixed cash amount to the landowner, usually corresponding to half up to two thirds of the land's market price. This arrangement is for a duration of several years (three years is the most common basis<fnref n="71" />). It may be renewed if the creditor agrees to extend the loan. The amount is to be repaid within the fixed period. If not, and in absence of a renegotiation of the arrangement, land falls to the hands of the lender. Most arrangements are oral and witnessed by adjacent neighbors and the village headman, except when dealing with outsiders from the village, in which case written contracts tend to be more common. It is mostly used by landowners as an immediate source of cash. It is equally common in Delta and Dry Zone (contracting in households are 2.2% of total households).

Creditors can be landowners seeking to acquire land or landless entrepreneurs, who despite being unable to buy land at high prices can invest in temporary land use rights. For the landless creditor, the 'interest' from this kind of loan derives from working the land (now in the creditor's hands) before the borrowed amount is paid back. le pyan ngwe pyan agreements are often done between a small landowner in need of liquidity and a landless person in search of land. Tenants under le pyan ngwe pyan agreements are often previous landowners who became landless.

For the landowner creditor (for example in Pay Chaung in the Delta), often large landowners bet on the fact that debtors will not be able to repay the loan, perceiving these arrangements as an accumulation strategy. The loss of land by its original owner seems to be quite rare when the contract was signed between relatives or friends, probably due to its sensitivity and social proximity between the contractors. However, qualitative interviews also show that mortgage is a recurrent factor in land loss, especially when embedded in a more vertical relationship between different 'social classes': i.e. between larger and smaller landholders (see Chapter VIII.1 and VIII.2.4). It is also a source of contestation under the registration process started under the new land law.

<footnote n="71">71. While some contracts last five years, there is the risk that the creditor, working the land under this contract, can claim ownership after this period, under the Act 1/64, stipulating that a land cultivated by a tenant for more than five years consecutively may go to the tenant. This does not apply to sharecropping arrangements which are generally contracted on a seasonal basis.</footnote>
BOX 9: A CASE OF MORTGAGE IN DELTA, BETWEEN FRIENDS

Daw Myint lent 2.5 lakhs to her friend Daw Tin in 2012 and obtained the right to use Daw Tin's two acres since. Daw Tin mortgaged her land to compensate for the loss of her crops due to pests in 2012. Her son was still in school at that time and she had to pay the registration fees. She was also ill and did not have enough to pay for her health expenses. She opted for mortgaging her land rather than seeking informal credit from other villagers because she was afraid to take on more debt since local interest rates are high - between 10 and 20%.

Initially she agreed with Daw Myint to repay the loan after two years to recover her 2 acres but she failed to raise enough capital for it. Daw Myint agreed to then extend the contract for an additional year and continue to cultivate the land. Daw Tin and her daughter now live on the proceeds from their small store and from their wages as laborers during the agricultural season. They also get money regularly from the younger son who went to work in a factory in Yangon. They are also thinking about breeding a pig to repay their debt and reclaim their land.

Daw Myint and her husband do not have land, they also work in other farmers' fields as wage laborers. Daw Myint also started, with her sister, a mobile shopping activity. They also make meals and soap that they then sell in their village and neighboring ones. Daw Myint's family used to 'own' land in the past but it was confiscated during the Compulsory Paddy Procurement system. Daw Myint needs cash today because she is indebted to her in-laws and waits for Daw Tin's refund. They have not established any written contract, nor requested the presence of a third party to testify to their agreements since, as they say: 'we're friends, just like sisters so it is arranged between us.'

Rent

Land rents may be seasonal or annual, with cash payment. These arrangements are not common in the Delta. In the Dry Zone, most of the contracts are negotiated in March/April for early monsoon crops. In the Dry Zone also, land rents with Chinese businessmen for watermelon production are common. Contrary to the other arrangements, which are mostly contracted directly between households, these are made through brokers. Watermelon plantations initiated by Chinese investors and meant for the Chinese market have developed in the Dry Zone region in areas including Sagaing, Tada Oo, Myithar, Mandalay, Chaung Oo, and the east side of Monywa townships. These businessmen have never made direct contact with local farmers, but operate through technicians who travel in search of irrigable lands. Then, the technicians proceed through a local broker and a Chinese broker to rent lands from the farmers through the local village tract chief. Translators from northern Shan State may be hired for arranging the deal with local people.
Rental periods tend to be five to six months. The rate of compensation for the rented land is about 250,000 to 300,000 MMK per acre. Despite the fact that it provides significant income to contracting-out farmers, this type of contract farming also has negative impacts on both land use (land availability and fertility) and labor. These plantations employ intensive production methods, with high quantities of fertilizers and pesticides. Farmers who lease their land to Chinese businessmen must observe contractual terms: i. *Must not grow watermelon*, ii. *Must not visit the farm*, iii. *Must not use the well, if it was dug, etc.* The crops are produced in a secretive manner: farmers are not allowed to know what type of fertilizer the Chinese businessmen use, and the pesticide labels are burnt after use. Farmers say that in the season following the contracted watermelon cycle, they have observed degradation of soil quality as well as reduction of yields and increased resistance of insects to pesticides. According to some farmers, the intensive use of water in these fields also contributes to the drying up of the wells (Brillon, 2015: 56).

<figure><img src="image_42.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 21:** Stakeholders involved in 'Chinese watermelon' rental contracts</figcaption></figure>

Despite the environmental downturns, the land rental rate is quite attractive for the farmers. The role of village chiefs is neither clear nor transparent but obviously they are involved in the process (see **Chapter VIII.3**). As part of this contract farming scheme, farm laborers are employed from the Dry Zone through middlemen. These middlemen entice migrants to come from far off villages; they remain on the plantations during the whole cultivation period of about 4 months. Rates of 3,000 MMK per day for male workers, and 2500 MMK for female workers are marginally higher than those achieved by local farmers. This seems to contribute also to labor shortages that many farmers face in the Dry Zone (Brillon, 2015: 55).

This practice needs to be addressed as it is in contradiction with Section 14 of Farmland Law 2012 prescribing that "*the person who has the right to use the*
farmland shall not sell, mortgage, lease, exchange or give on the whole or part of the right to use the farmland without permission of the Government to any foreigner or any organization in which the foreigner is included."

## 4.2 Qualitative and quantitative analysis on contracting in

Among the total 1,129 surveyed households, 13.5% (152 households) cultivated lands that they do not own. As observed in the **Table 15** and **Table 17**, in the Delta, the large majority (74.5%) of these households are landless, while it is the opposite in the Dry Zone (70.4% are landowners). This suggests that the prevalent strategy in the Delta for contracting in is primarily to access farmland, while in the Dry Zone, it is to increase the farm size. Almost a third of Delta landless and 11% of Dry Zone landowners contract lands in (see **Chapter VII.6** and 7). This is confirmed by the **Table 13** and **Table 14**.

<table><caption>**Table 13:** Distribution of Delta households cultivating land they do not own, among categories of landownership categories (area in acres)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">HH contracting land in</th><th colspan="3">Not contracting lands in</th><th colspan="3">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Landless</td><td>73</td><td>74.5</td><td>23.1</td><td>243</td><td>56.1</td><td>76.9</td><td>316</td><td>59.5</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>0.3-2.5</td><td>7</td><td>7.1</td><td>24.1</td><td>22</td><td>5.1</td><td>75.9</td><td>29</td><td>5.5</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>2.5-5</td><td>3</td><td>3.1</td><td>6.5</td><td>43</td><td>9.9</td><td>93.5</td><td>46</td><td>8.7</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>5-10</td><td>6</td><td>6.1</td><td>9.1</td><td>60</td><td>13.9</td><td>90.9</td><td>66</td><td>12.4</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>10-15</td><td>6</td><td>6.1</td><td>14.3</td><td>36</td><td>8.3</td><td>85.7</td><td>42</td><td>7.9</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>>15</td><td>3</td><td>3.1</td><td>9.4</td><td>29</td><td>6.7</td><td>90.6</td><td>32</td><td>6.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>98</td><td>100.0</td><td>18.5</td><td>433</td><td>100.0</td><td>81.5</td><td>531</td><td>100.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=15.6 dof=5 p=0.008 (very significant) Cramer's V=0.171
<table><caption>**Table 14:** Distribution of households in Dry Zone cultivating land they do not own among categories of landownership categories (area in acres)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Landless</th><th colspan="3">Yes</th><th colspan="3">No</th><th colspan="3">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0.3-2.5</td><td>16</td><td>29.6</td><td>6.5</td><td>229</td><td>42.1</td><td>93.5</td><td>245</td><td>41.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>2.5-5</td><td>12</td><td>22.2</td><td>23.5</td><td>39</td><td>7.2</td><td>76.5</td><td>51</td><td>8.5</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>5-10</td><td>7</td><td>13.0</td><td>11.7</td><td>53</td><td>9.7</td><td>88.3</td><td>60</td><td>10.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>10-15</td><td>15</td><td>27.8</td><td>11.5</td><td>115</td><td>21.1</td><td>88.5</td><td>130</td><td>21.7</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>&gt;15</td><td>3</td><td>5.6</td><td>5.2</td><td>55</td><td>10.1</td><td>94.8</td><td>58</td><td>9.7</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>1</td><td>1.9</td><td>1.9</td><td>53</td><td>9.7</td><td>98.1</td><td>54</td><td>9.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>54</td><td>100.0</td><td>9.0</td><td>544</td><td>100.0</td><td>91.0</td><td>598</td><td>100.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=17.8 dof=5 p=0.003 (Val. théoriques < 5 = 2) Cramer's V=0.173

## Contracting in, in the Delta: a strategy to access lands for landless households

In the Delta, rent arrangements are seasonal (for summer paddy) and sharecropping arrangements are annual. In areas of the Delta where double cropping is possible, temporary arrangements (whether free loan, rent) are often provided for summer paddy by households<fnref n="72" /> that do not have enough resources to cultivate all the lands they own. This occurs more frequently between relatives (mainly with free land loans). Seasonal contracting in is done exclusively by landless while annual contracting-in is practiced more or less evenly by both landless and landowners.

In the Delta, these agrarian contracts are four times more frequent (24.1% of households) in villages of brackish areas that those of freshwater areas (5.5% of households). It is linked to higher landlessness rates as well as to the villages' past history, including the occurrence of quasi-feudal systems such as in Tet Tet Ku with an absentee landlord and a class of landless tenants working for him. According to the qualitative study, it seems that free land loan is the most common form of temporary land arrangement between relatives in the Delta but mainly for summer paddy, while sharecropping is preferred for year round arrangements. This is supported by the fact that among households owning no land but cultivating some through rent arrangement (36 households in total in the Delta) most occur in Aye Ywar (15 households – 41.8% of the village's landless). Aye

<footnote n="72">72. Out of 97 households contracting in lands, 56 cultivate both seasons- out of which 22 are landowners, 34 are landless, 33 cultivate exclusively during summer season. These latter households are all 100% landless. 8 cultivate only in monsoon season.</footnote>
Ywar is indeed a long-settled village which developed progressively on calling in relatives from the Upper Delta and whose land availability has saturated quickly in history.

As a whole, temporary arrangements in the Delta benefit household owning no land at all in the first place (73.5% of households engaged in such arrangements, see **Table 15**). The fact of having access or not to land for 'landless' households (especially in the Delta) seems to be a major feature in terms of livelihood security (as discussed in section V.6 and V.7). Among landowners, those holding less than 2.5 acres are the first category to contract temporary land use arrangements (34.6% of landowners cultivating land they do not own) in the Delta.

Sharecropping is practiced by 36 landless households in the Delta among whom 14 live in Tet Tet Ku and 18 live in Magu. Regarding Tet Tet Ku, such arrangements are done mostly with an absentee landlord owning 118 acres in Tet Tet Ku kwin (while the total acres cultivated under sharecropping in the village amount to only 163 acres). In Magu, these arrangements are done mostly through summer paddy cultivation for households having no means to invest in the cultivation of all their land. As confirmed in **Table 16**, these land arrangements are a way for 'younger' households (with the age of the household head less than 50) to access lands. When household heads reach over 50 years of age, contracting in lands drastically drops. It is to be linked with the increased access to lands with the maturity of the household: we have already seen previously that many households access lands (through inheritance or for other reasons) when they are in their 40s/50s.

**Contracting in lands in the Dry zone: a strategy for small landowners to expand their farms**

A feature common to both the Delta and the Dry Zone is that rent arrangements (whether free or paid) are preferably practiced among inhabitants of the same village. In the Dry Zone, in contrast with the Delta, a majority of households cultivating land they do not own are landowners (70.4%) rather than landless households. Among the former, small landowners (less than 2.5 acres) are again the main category (34.2%) engaged in temporary land use arrangements (see **Table 17**).
<table><caption>**Table 15:** Share of Delta households (landless or landowner) cultivating land they do not own</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Yes</th><th colspan="2">No</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Landowners</th><td>26</td><td>26.5</td><td>190</td><td>43.9</td><td>216</td><td>40.7</td></tr><tr><th>Landless</th><td>72</td><td>73.5</td><td>243</td><td>56.1</td><td>315</td><td>59.3</td></tr><tr><th>Total</th><td>98</td><td>100.0</td><td>433</td><td>100.0</td><td>531</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=9.29 dof=1 p=0.002 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.132

<table><caption>**Table 16:** Distribution of Delta households cultivating land they do not own by household head age category</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Age of household</th><th colspan="3">Contracting in lands for cultivation</th><th colspan="3">NO Contract in lands for cultivation</th><th colspan="3">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Less than 30</th><td>22</td><td>22.4</td><td>33.8</td><td>43</td><td>9.9</td><td>66.2</td><td>65</td><td>12.2</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><th>30 to &lt;40</th><td>34</td><td>34.7</td><td>24.3</td><td>106</td><td>24.5</td><td>75.7</td><td>140</td><td>26.4</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><th>40 to &lt;50</th><td>31</td><td>31.6</td><td>21.8</td><td>111</td><td>25.6</td><td>78.2</td><td>142</td><td>26.7</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><th>50 to &lt;60</th><td>8</td><td>8.2</td><td>8.2</td><td>89</td><td>20.6</td><td>91.8</td><td>97</td><td>18.3</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><th>60 and above</th><td>3</td><td>3.1</td><td>3.4</td><td>84</td><td>19.4</td><td>96.6</td><td>87</td><td>16.4</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><th>Total</th><td>98</td><td>100.0</td><td>18.5</td><td>433</td><td>100.0</td><td>81.5</td><td>531</td><td>100.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=34.2 dof=4 p=0.001 (very significant) Cramer's V=0.254

<table><caption>**Table 17:** Share of Dry Zone households (landless or landowner) cultivating land they do not own</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Yes</th><th colspan="2">No</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Landowners</th><td>38</td><td>70.4</td><td>315</td><td>57.9</td><td>353</td><td>59.0</td></tr><tr><th>Landless</th><td>16</td><td>29.6</td><td>229</td><td>42.1</td><td>245</td><td>41.0</td></tr><tr><th>Total</th><td>54</td><td>100.0</td><td>544</td><td>100.0</td><td>598</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=2.68 dof=1 p=0.097 (very significant) Cramer's V=0.067
As seen above, sharecropping is not widely practiced in the surveyed villages with only five arrangements in Zee Phyu Pin and two others in Gaw Gyi. In direct contrast with what has been observed in the Delta, it seems that in the Dry Zone those households engaged in sharecropping are often relatives. Sharecropping is practiced between parents and their relatives, either for children to work some land before they get married and receive their share of land through inheritance or to supplement land for newly created households. In the former case, children generally contribute one third of the crop produced to their parents. Among more distant relatives, the practice of 'tawak-sa' is common: the landowner contributes the land and the sharecropper contributes the labor while all other farm inputs are shared equally, as is the harvest yield. In Khoe Than for example (20 households renting-in land among a total of 37) the rent fee is estimated at 400,000 MMK per acre for growing early monsoon crops. In that case, the landowner has to bear the responsibility to plow the land. In case the landowner did not plow the land, rent is decreased to 300,000 MMK.

## Key findings of household strategies for contracting in lands

The prevalent strategy in the Delta for contracting in is primarily to access farmland, while in Dry Zone, it is to increase farm size. Although it is difficult to draw overall conclusions on land arrangement trends as each village has its own specificities in this regard, it still appears that in both the Dry Zone and the Delta villages that where land productivity is the highest, such arrangements are less frequent. In addition, in the Dry Zone, temporary land arrangements are more frequent in villages where landlessness rates are low and where average landholding sizes are the smallest. This clearly indicates the important role of temporary arrangements for accessing farmland areas large enough to be economically viable, especially during the transition period for young adults of working age who still lack capacity either to buy or receive a plot through inheritance.

According to qualitative surveys in the Delta, about 10% of landless households in Aye Ywar and Pay Chaung (despite being much different ecologically) managed to obtain derived land use rights (whether through mortgage or rent/sharecropping) upon which they later managed to secure permanent access to land.

### 4.3 Making numbers meaningful: how discrepancies between in and out temporary arrangements shed light on an unsecure land tenure framework

In both areas where the main social and administrative unit is the village, the first striking result is the extraordinarily low rate of landowners temporarily contracting out land to others, compared to the number of households working land they do not own through such arrangements. As shown in Table 18 and
**Table 19**, only 70 owners declared that they contracted land to others against 156 households declaring that they accessing land through temporary arrangements.

<table><caption>**Table 18:** Numerical gaps between households contracting in and contracting out lands</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Contract in</th><th colspan="2">Contract out</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>% over total HH</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>% over total HH</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Delta</th><td>98</td><td>18.5%</td><td>22</td><td>4.1%</td></tr><tr><th>Dry Zone</th><td>54</td><td>9.0%</td><td>50</td><td>8.4%</td></tr><tr><th>Total</th><td>152</td><td>13.5%</td><td>72</td><td>6.4%</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>**Table 19:** Number of households engaged in different types of temporary land arrangements (in and out) in Delta and Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Mortgage</th><th colspan="2">Sharecropping</th><th colspan="2">Rent</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>In</th><th>Out</th><th>In</th><th>Out</th><th>In</th><th>Out</th><th>In</th><th>Out</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Delta</th><td>14</td><td>3</td><td>51</td><td>17</td><td>36</td><td>2</td><td>98</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><th>Dry Zone</th><td>11</td><td>7</td><td>7</td><td>5</td><td>37</td><td>38</td><td>54</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><th>Total</th><td>25</td><td>10</td><td>58</td><td>22</td><td>73</td><td>40</td><td>152</td><td>72</td></tr></tbody></table>

In the Delta, 4.1% of households rent out, while 18.5% rent in. In the Dry Zone, 9% rent in while 8.4% rent out. Higher number of renting out in Dry Zone is due to Chinese investors (who are not part of the surveyed households). If we take into account this particular point, there are similar discrepancies in the Dry Zone and the Delta – the number of contracting out households are much less than contracting in households. Scrutinizing in and out temporary arrangements at the village level confirms this (i.e. the villages reporting high number of rent-out contracts are not those reporting higher rates of renting in land). The first plausible explanation that arises is that one landowner may contract out lands to more than one household. Yet, the figures on surface areas subject to contracting out and contracting in also reflect the same discrepancies. The second possible explanation is that contracting out landowners do not live in the surveyed villages (and thus have not been surveyed). These could concern absentee landowners. This is indeed the case in Tet Tet Ku village where 118 acres of land are owned by an absentee landowner living in Mawlamyinegyun. Yet, the other studied villages do not have absentee landowners. It could also be 'normal' households cultivating land owned by individuals from other non-surveyed villages. However, the contrary
should be true as well, hence generally balancing the rate of in and out temporary arrangements. Finally, these discrepancies are too consistent through villages and the two zones to be solely attributed to possible survey biases.

One hypothesis therefore proposed is that landowners tend to underreport land actually worked by others through temporary arrangements. This hypothesis relies on the fact that they might not have considered land arrangements with their children – prior to inheritance – as contracting out while their children may report the lands as contracted in. A second hypothesis concerns the insecure framework under which these arrangements have been contracted. On the one hand, until the Farmland Law 2012, such arrangements were illegal – despite being widely practiced. On the other, such temporary arrangements became a site of conflict during the land registration process<sup>73</sup>. In fact, landowners interviewed for this study in the middle of the titling process may have logically only reported arrangements they felt ‘secure’ about, notably those done with contracts or done with ‘reliable’ individuals. This is the case for example about Dry Zone landowners renting their lands to Chinese investors, which is done with contracts signed with the village tract administrator most of the time. The smaller gap in out arrangements in Dry Zone would also confirm this hypothesis given that villages in this region have been longer settled and are more stable than in Delta, hence providing a locally more secure tenure framework.

## 4.4 Quantitative analysis on contracting out

Bearing in mind that landowners tended to underreport temporary arrangements to have their land (or part of it) cultivated by others, characteristics of such arrangements may remain valid.

<table><caption>**Table 20: Summary data on contract out households for Delta and Dry Zone**</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Households that contract out lands</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>% over Landowning HH</th><th>Average acreage</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Delta</th><td>22</td><td>10.2%</td><td>6.31</td></tr><tr><th>Dry Zone</th><td>50</td><td>14.2%</td><td>3.44</td></tr></tbody></table>

As seen above, households accessing land through temporary arrangements are mostly ‘younger’ households (whether they are landless or already holding some land) working rented land while waiting for the opportunity to access more

<footnote n="73">73. Some tenants claimed ownership on land they had worked since a long time or reversely former owner attempted to reclaim land lost through such arrangements, principally mortgage (see Chapter V.4).</footnote>
stable land arrangements. For landowners contracting land to others, it is the
contrary, as shown in **Annex 2, Table 1**: households whose head is aged more than
60 are the most frequent (18.2%) to practice such arrangements.

Given the fact that women headed households are overrepresented in the age
classes over 50 years old, the fact of contracting land out is logically linked to the
fact of being a female headed household (see Annex 2, Table 2). The frequency
of contracting out lands is double for female household heads, compared to male
household heads across all age groups. This is also consistent with the fact that
such households generally lack the workforce to cultivate land by themselves.
More information on this issue is to be found in Chapter VII.2.5). There is also a
link between landholding size and the share of land cultivated by the household
itself. The more land people have, the less they cultivate themselves, as a general
tendency (see Annex 2, Table 3).
VI. The new land framework: impact,
issues and land disputes

A new Farmland Law came into force on 31st August 2012 under the administration of President Thein Sein, shortly followed by a 'Vacant, Fallow and Virgin lands management law'. Both were designed with a view to developing business opportunities and the country's economy through the improved utilization of these lands. These two laws represent the most substantial change to the legal framework for land since the early 1960s.

The key principles are the following: 1) the state remains the ultimate owner of all land and the government can nationalize lands if it deems it necessary. Farmers have land tenure rights for cultivation granted by Land Use Certificates (LUC), but only in accordance with the government's prescriptions; 2) the concept of private ownership of land use rights is officially reintroduced: land use rights can now be sold, mortgaged, and inherited; 3) a Central Farmland Management Body is in charge of ensuring compliance with the new regulations and can transfer or revoke the right to work farmland, and provide land evaluation for various purposes.

The research fieldwork was executed during the land registration process and as such the team was able to witness the speediness of its implementation in the field and the dynamics it created. The study team had the opportunity to observe single SLRD officers undertaking the huge task of registering lands within a whole village tract, with a very tight time frame and much political pressure to achieve their targets. The 2012 Farmland Law is an important step toward a redefinition of agrarian policies. It aims at delivering transferable land use certificates (LUC) to introduce and secure private property through a state-based system of holding records. The government body in charge of this process, the Farmland Administration Bodies (FAB), largely relies on local actors in order to implement the reform.

In terms of how this process was executed, farmers had to wait for the SLRD agent to come to their villages to collect the ticket claim of 500 MMK for each holding (however, as for the payment required to actually get the LUC, many discrepancies have been noted, see next point). Once this is done, the SLRD sends several forms (105, 107) filled with farmer land claims and village headman ratifications to the FAB in Nay Pyi Taw. This administrative process is done under close SLRD scrutiny for the areas mapped and updated. There are much more difficulties when an update is necessary and harmonization between current use and state categories (e.g. when forestlands are cultivated). Village Tract Farmland Management Committees were
created at the village level in order to regulate the land titling process, i.e. clarifying
claims and resolving conflicts (on this point, see below).

1. The hasty land registration process

The delivery of land use certificates has been done extremely quickly, relying on
the existing SLRD records without conducting updated surveys of plot boundaries.
Indeed, the verification process for land titling is based on the (i) cadastral map, (ii)
receipt of the land revenue collection, and (iii) the list of the farmers' owner book
called Document 2.

### 1.1 Disparities in LUC delivery rates

The quantitative survey was conducted from August to early November 2014.
The data indicates that while in the Dry Zone almost 80% of landowners got a Land
Use Certificate (LUC, also called Form 7), only 71% received it in the Delta. This
difference is due to the fact that there are more lands cultivated under forestland
status (which are not eligible for an LUC) in the Delta (464.8 acres for 34 households)
than in the Dry Zone (46.2 acres for 10 households).

Regarding the households owning farmlands officially registered as such,
the LUC delivery rate is thus 96.4% in the Delta (with variations between villages
from 91 to 100% of villagers attaining LUC). The higher overall LUC delivery rate
in the Delta, compared to the Dry Zone, reveals stronger state intervention in the
Delta and greater coverage by the SLRD (which is linked, as has been mentioned
throughout the report, to the important focus that was given to paddy in various
policies - from the procurement quotas to the MADB agri loans...).

The LUC delivery rates (to farmland owners) have been much lower in some
villages of the Dry Zone (22% in Hledar and 77.6% in Gaw Gyi). The main problem
(which occurred in both villages) was the loss of the cadastral maps, mainly due to
improper handover of documents from SRLD out-going staff to new ones. Without
the maps, the township SLRD office could not verify the existence of the farmers'
holdings (u' paing) on the ground. After several months of repeated requests from
the farmers, the SLRD finally came to the village and attempted to survey all the
farm boundaries. However, the task was not completed and the SLRD staff have not
returned since. The same thing is true for Gaw Gyi village.

Excluding these problematic villages, the quasi totality of farmland owners
(97.4%) declared to have received the LUC in the Dry Zone. For both Dry Zone
and Delta villagers, and excluding these two problematic village cases, 96.8% of
farmland owners confirm having received an LUC, leaving a mysterious 3.2% of
farmland owners affirming they have not received an LUC, which most probably
reveals potential exclusion and lack of social capital or underlying disputes. This
is confirmed by the fact that the large majority of these cases concern very small
landowners (less than 3 acres), none of whom provided answers to the survey
questionnaire concerning their opinion on the land registration. Furthermore,
we must also take into account survey bias which is particularly strong on issues
concerning land disputes: some households might have confirmed having received
the LUC even though they did not actually receive it, so as to conceal dispute claims.

1.2 Top down process and exclusion of the smallest farming households

By all means, the land registration was implemented quite hastily and in a
very top down manner, as the quantitative survey figures demonstrate: among
the households which have received an LUC, only one third confirmed to have
themselves applied to land registration, less than half (42.5%) said that a public
list (Form 2) was posted in the village, and only 37.6% were aware of who were
members of their Village Tract Farmland Management Committee. There was little
or no farmer participation in most cases. In some Dry Zone villages, newly issued
LUC had already arrived since the first week of the program in the village head's
house but no farmer came to collect his/her title.

One issue remaining, as always in Myanmar, is the two-tier administrative
process in which those who are able to pay actually had their plot measured and
received their LUC before those who did not pay. We already noted that the let
allocation process is not known and 'represented' by different households in the
same way, according to the farmland holdings they own. It also varies according
to the area of land they own. Amongst landowners, smallholders more frequently
declared that they don't know if the land registration process had started or
not, while large ones more frequently declared it had started. Amongst the 153
landowners who voluntarily applied for registration, large holders more frequently
applied than the smaller ones. This is explained by their stronger interest in formal
registration, their financial capacities, and also to their closer relationships with
authorities, including the local Land Management Committee members (see
Chapter VIII.3).
BOX 10: DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION PROCESS AMONG STAKEHOLDERS

The local SRLD version

There are 10 standardized Forms by which farmers could start applying to the SLRD until Form 7 is granted. Form 1, available from the village tract (VT) office, is completed and submitted through the Village Tract Farmland Management Committee (VTFMC) to the township SLRD. The township SLRD staff lists the applicants in Form 2 and post the list at the village General Administration Department office, calling for potential counter-claims within 30 days from any who object to any of the applicants. After those 30 days, the SLRD township staff scrutinize the eligibility of the applicants for the land title registration with respect to the set criteria included in section 6 of the Farmland Law. After verifying the validity of the applicant information in Form 3 through 6, the case is submitted to the District Farmland Management Committee and is finally approved. Township Committee then issues the Form 7 to respective farmers. The whole process theoretically takes 65 days from application to the issuance of certificate.

The village head's version

In one of the villages under study (Delta), the land registration process was first described by the headman as follows: After organizing the VTFMC, the village tract leader, with the help of village headmen ('100 household leaders'), called all the farmers in the village to come to register their farmland holdings with their annual land tax receipts (see box below). These papers mention the name of the owner, the holding number, the plot number, and the area of the used land in acres. After collecting these data, the SLRD officer came to the village to measure the concerned land plot areas. He documented the land profile by drawing a map and asking the farmers working on adjacent plots to witness and provide their approval. After finishing the measuring process, the VTFMC disclosed a list of landholdings and their respective holders in the village. The list was publicly displayed on a board in the village public space so that anyone could object to a land use holder or to a holding's area. Any objection of the displayed land titles could be raised within 30 days."

The villagers' version

In the same village, another version of the process was given by farmers. First, farmers complained about the money they had to pay to SLRD staff – 1,500 to 5,000 MMK per acre depending on their 'proximity' with the latter. If failing to pay, their turn was postponed and measuring was not done carefully. The larger the u'paing area, the more money one had to pay. In the SLRD officers' defense, the daily 1,500 MMK travel allowance they receive is barely enough to cover the travel expenses from one village to another, pay the extra food charges, and compensate them for the hard work they undertook. Hence, these expenses had to be shouldered by the villages. And depending on who would pay for these expenses (the village head alone or all the villagers contributing a little), delivery rates between villagers may differ as Burmese culture invites guests to honor their hosts and vice versa...
## 1.3 Errors in LUCs and objections

The quality of the titles received – in terms of consistency between actual landholders and those receiving the titles, and in terms of registered surface area – remains an issue. Indeed, giving the very tight time frame imparted to perform

this vast operation (and under much pressure from the central level), SLRD officers did not have time to survey and re-measure all field plots, nor to check all kwin boundaries, nor to take note of all changing conditions. In many cases, they used old maps which were surveyed and drawn in the colonial times (around 1889, 1890) and updated in the 1960s. They copied the individual *u'paing* plots from these old maps and put that information in the Form 105 (defining the *u'paing* on the cadastral map). SLRD staff in most places actually worked relentlessly to reach their targets and the shortcuts described in the process were taken only so they could try to attain

<figure><img src="image_43.png" /><figcaption>Figure 22: Form 105 (attached to Form 7)</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_44.png" /><figcaption>Figure 23: Land use certificate (LUC), commonly called ‘Form 7’</figcaption></figure>
the target. Many errors in designating the holder's name and field plots' area and shape have to be expected. Though the mission achieved its political objective, it remains incomplete at the technical level, and a series of follow up adjustments and corrections would be much needed. Among other cases, in Zhi Phyu Pin village of Yinmabin township, SLRD issued the Form 7 to two different farmers for the same farm plot of *u'paing*. In some cases, Form 7 was granted to the wrong person.

In similar rates in both Delta and Dry Zone, an average 7% of farmland owning households (excluding cultivated forestland 'owners') have contested some points of the LUC. Land objections are twice more frequent in households which have not received the LUCs. The qualitative survey indicates through many case studies that there are actually more cases of contestation, but the fact that they were not identified as such is due again to the survey bias, which is particularly strong on issues concerning land disputes. It is too early, and the question remains sensitive, to be able to say how much the discrepancies between LUCs and actual holdings are affecting the regions under study. However, farmers have already complained that through the LUC process they lost in some cases more than three acres. Inequities emerging within the land titling process were also recorded in other non-surveyed areas of the Delta, with farmers complaining of losing up to 70% of the landholdings in some cases through the process. Hence, overlooking the titling process - which is easily done given the pace of land reform insisted upon by the current government, and notably the great attention paid to the National Land Use Policy - may prove to undermine the whole reform process and may represent a potential source of conflict if nothing is done to redress the discrepancies.

### 1.4 The land registration process on the ground

From one village to the next, descriptions of the land registration process differ greatly. From interviews and observations, modalities of the land registration process – whether villagers had to pay the SLRD or not, whether plots were actually measured or not, the time the process took – seemed to depend much upon the commitment of the SLRD staff in charge, his relationship with the village administrator and other influential individuals, as well as the degree of interest vested by the state in the village – i.e. pretty low in remote villages of the Dry Zone such as Hledar where the cadastral map has been lost, and pretty high in Delta villages producing double season paddy. Disparities were also observed in the same village (see Box 11) depending on whether the owner could afford paying several thousands of MMK to the SLRD in order to have his plot properly measured.

In the prescribed process, SLRD with the Village Tract Farmland Management Committee (VTFMC) members shall verify the land claim by consulting the neighboring farm plot users. However, in many villages (especially in the Dry
Zone), the SLRD and VTFMC members relied on the village administrator alone and avoided going to the field. Further, even if the village administrator himself cared to go to the fields, he alone could not have the knowledge about who owns land use rights on which parcel of which land. In the old days, village elders or chief always accompanied the SLRD surveyor in the field examination for revenue assessment and they knew pretty well the owner of each parcel. But given that there has been no field examination for revenue assessment for several years, a visit at this particular moment by the village administrator would not have allowed him to garner with any assurance the true facts on the ground.

As we have seen, long before 2012 there had been transfers of farm plots among farmers in most villages. In many instances, farmers did not approach the SLRD surveyor in order to change the name on registers, so as to avoid extra cost. In other cases, the SLRD surveyor may have not changed the name of the titleholder, even though he would be aware of the transfer and names of the parties involved. Hence, at the time of land registration in 2012, Form 7 was granted to the former owner. The new one then had to rush to the SLRD officer and give extra payment to change the name of the title holder.

BOX 11: TAX RECEIPTS: THE ULTIMATE “PROOF” OF LAND USE?

The tax receipt, like the farmer booklet (see Chapter V.1.2) dates back to colonial times. While it once contained a great amount of information, nowadays tax receipts in their simplest form contain: the *kwin*" number (basic territorial division); the *u'paing* number (holding); the kind of land; its size; the tax amount; the 'name of the person cultivating the land'; its village and village tract location. Hence, along with settlement surveys, cadastral mapping, and issuance of tax receipts mainly aimed at affirming the state's territorial control and categorizing agricultural land in two dimensions – quality and size – for its benefit. To do so, the Revenue and Survey Department (later renamed the Survey and Land Record Department – SLRD) frames the territory in order to make it legible and assessable. In most cases, the tax receipt is nowadays perceived as somewhat useless by farmers, as the tax amount was fixed decades ago and given inflation does not constitute anything but a nominal sum. The document – which links farmers and SLRD – became a simple follow-up register. The production of this document was monopolized by the SLRD as a database to match holdings with individual names where *kwin*" and *u'paing* were settled. However, tax receipts found some special significance during the 2012 land titling process, and have been often used by farmers to prove their seniority as users of landholdings (*u'paing*) in case of a dispute between two (or more) potential landholders. However, in the absence of other types of documents, many having been lost in the aftermath of cyclone Nargis, the legitimacy of such papers is questionable, especially when many interviews indicate the possibility to bribe an SLRD agent to issue new 'fake old' tax receipts.
## 1.5 Gender and land registration

Being a woman or a man headed household doesn't impact on Form 7 allocation, indicating that land registration has been done systematically and with no visible gender discrimination of household heads. For the LUC, lands are systematically registered under the husband's name for couple-headed households. Even though the LUC designates an individual holder, the land use rights are clearly perceived as held collectively by the household (particularly both spouses). For example, the qualitative survey has not identified any cases of husband's selling off land without the wife's consent. However, the fact that the final LUC (Form 7) is only in the name of the husband may raise problems upon a couple's separation or divorce. Although each case may be quite different, depending on the context, the reasons of separation, and the social pressure imposed by relatives and villagers, women are undeniably more at risk of losing access to lands than men in divorce/ separation cases. As mentioned in **Chapter V.2**, inheritance of land from parents to children in Burmese society in the surveyed low land areas is not problematic with regard to gender. There can be more discreet forms of discrimination, which nevertheless remain marginal (see **Chapter V.2.3**). This may be exacerbated in critical times such as the recent land registration period, as seen in **Chapter V.2.3**. At least one conflict was recorded with a young widow regarding the titling of land her household received at her marriage from the husband's parents; as the husband died, his parents are contesting the land registration that was done in the name of their widowed daughter-in-law. Before delivery of Form 7, all the family member names and their respective relations to the household head are recorded officially. Indeed, all names of each farm household family members are recorded in Form No. 1, the first form submitted to SLRD to obtain the LUC. Besides, all documents of Form 7 issued to the farmers are recorded and summarized in Form No. 5 which takes record of all names of the family member for each Form 7 issued.

It has to be underlined here that the MADB's credit scheme that provides loans for a maximum 10 acres (see **Chapter VIII.2.2**) has an unintentional consequence on gender and registration. This is because when farmers own land use rights on more than 10 acres, those would often register 10 acres in their own name and the remaining amount in their wife's name at the moment of the registration, so as to access loans for more than 10 acres which is the official threshold. More information on gender and land can be found in **Chapter VII.2.5**.

## 2. Land Use Certificates: new opportunities or more problems to come?

### 2.1 New opportunities, for whom?

#### LUCs as collateral

A positive point of LUCs, as perceived by farmers, is that they allow farmers to be able to mortgage land, instead of using the more traditional pawning system
(le pyan ngwe pyan), where the full land use right is given to the money-lender for a determined period, leaving the farmer with a debt and less (or no) land to work. With LUCs, farmers can borrow money, using land as a collateral, and at the same time continue working and enjoying the fructus of the mortgaged land.

But, in reality, the conditions of the land use disposal rights will not legally allow farmers to capitalize on this new 'right'. Indeed, the law stipulates that mortgages can only be done with government banks or authorized banks. Yet, existing formal credit providers – even the government banks (MABD, MFIs...) in those areas do not use land as collateral and farmers have no access to such banks. But this may be a rising practice of money-lenders. Mortgage foreclosures in these cases may be concealed and formalized in the form of land sales.

## Formalization of land use rights transfers

Each farmland management level (from village tract, township, district, regional up to Union), can be involved in the scrutinizing process concerning the change of name of the u' paing's holder that results from transfers such as inheritance, sale, mortgage closure, gift, etc. The time and costs required to formalize land transfers and land use changes, as per the procedures defined by the Farmland Law, exceed the means of smallholder farmers. They only seem fit for larger farms and bigger transactions where administrative economies of scale are found to pursue the legal process.

## BOX 12: MINISTRIES RESPONSIBLE FOR LAND ADMINISTRATION

> "Administering land and its uses mainly falls under the purview of three ministries — Ministry of Home Affairs/GAD, MoAI/SLRD, and MoECAF/Forest Department (FD). These administrators are also responsible for protecting the land under their jurisdiction from encroachment and squatting and ensuring adherence to prescribed land use. Any transfer of tenancy rights (all farmers being tenants) and any request for change in land use must be initiated at the village tract or ward level and must go through successive tiers in the structure to be eventually endorsed/approved at the state level, after going through factual verification by the SLRD branch at the township and district levels. The township-level GAD branch is responsible for processing such applications. Thus, land-rights transfer or land-use change is a lengthy process, requiring considerable time and frequent visits to various offices."

Source: Shivakumar Srinivas and U Saw Hlaing, 2015: 8
What should be the proper community-level decision making processes in land use planning and land administration? What are the strengths and weaknesses of communities in dealing with such land issues that also can support state level mandates? Addressing these questions could help identify the ways and means for community capacity building in land use management.

As a whole, the lack of institutional representation and the very limited capacity of the farmland management body at the village tract level (all requests have to go through the township, district, and region/state level) represent a serious limitation to the new law's implementation. Though farmers now have the possibility to legally register land transfers, some transfers might very well remain informal (as in the times where land transfers were illegal) if the administrative processes remain as complex as they currently are. If this is the case, land records will be outdated within a few years. Legal restrictions may become an instrument for locally powerful individuals. In practical terms, farmers engage with the Village Tract Farmland Management Committee, and its Village Administrator as the Chairman, with all issues concerning land use disposal rights. The village chief may abuse of his powers at the expense of farmers, particularly the most vulnerable ones. The farmland administration processes would need to be simplified so as to become both accessible and affordable for smallholders, to strengthen the land tenure security of smallholder farmers, and avoid creating legal gaps that authorities may take advantage of for corrupt practices.

## 2.2 The continued issue of restrictions over land use rights

Before the land reform of 2012, the Tenancy Act (1963) already vested the state with the mandate to prescribe which types of crops should be grown on agricultural lands, and in case of breaches to such conditions, gave the state the freedom to confiscate the land from farmers. Unfortunately, the 2012 Farmland Law did not resolve this issue of restrictions concerning land use rights. As observed in Figure 23, many of the conditions mentioned in Form 7 are inadequate and will probably create power imbalances and corruption from village leaders and village tract authorities towards 'non-compliant' farmers. They will also generate land insecurity. In addition, some of the conditions are inapplicable in terms of transactions costs (e.g. high costs to submit crop change requests up to the Union level), further increasing opportunities for corrupt practices.

The new Farmland Law, section 12, specifies that the permission for change from seasonal crops to perennial crops needs to be requested up to the Union level, through the township, district, region/state levels for Scrutinizing by the different land management committees. The present Farmland Law clearly restricts the farmer for the disposal right in his/her farmlands. For failure to comply with
conditions as prescribed in Section 12 and repeated failure to follow Section 19 of the Farmland Law as directed by the farmland management committee, the convicted farmers could be punished with fines and imprisonment from six months minimum to two years maximum (Section 35).

The former restrictions on land use rights actually remain, highlighting the contradiction between the progressive opening of the land tenure framework, and the broadening of land use rights, and the government's enduring focus on paddy - the staple crop constituting Myanmar's national identity - and its tendency to control land use for paddy production.

This is a serious constraint, undermining farmers' capacity to make decisions and to choose the most suitable crops according to the economical context (market prices, household's cash flow), environmental conditions (weather, access to irrigation), and household situation (availability of labor). This is particularly important for the Dry Zone (where agricultural production options are wider) but is relevant for everywhere in Myanmar. While land prices tend to increase, prices of most Dry Zone key seasonal crops (except from high value cash crops such as onions, whose price nonetheless is highly variable) have been falling year after year. Assuming that a farming household wants to grow *thanakha* (*Limonia acidissima*) trees in a plot which initially produced sorghum, peas, or sesame, it has to apply for permission following the protocol stated above. It is interesting to observe that there is a perceived sense of land tenure insecurity about this issue. Indeed, in the quantitative survey, very few farmers have declared growing *thanaka* crops while the field observation and the qualitative survey clearly indicates that it is a very common crop in the Dry Zone. No farmers are applying for such permission for 'growing perennial crops'. Particularly with recurrent droughts there are clear advantages of *thanaka* in terms of resilience, income generation, limited labor, and water and input requirements; an increasing number of farmers are growing these trees. In this regard and beyond the example of thanaka, it is urgent that farmers be given full disposal rights on the choice of crops. They are the most suited to make the best decisions to enhance their livelihoods and land productivity.

Another issue is how contracts with foreigners are structured. In the current context of massive Chinese investments particularly in watermelon production in the Dry Zone, the impossibility for farmers to change to perennial crops pushes them to contract their lands for attractive rents when they face decreasing crop prices, but under highly restrictive conditions dictated by the Chinese investors (see rents in V.4.). This is also an issue that may generate land tenure insecurity and abuse of powers (see below).
<figure><img src="image_45.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 24:** Translation of contents of Form 7 (LUC) and conditions of land use rights</figcaption></figure>

## 2.3 What improvements brought by the LUCs?

Discussions about the virtues and downsides of formalizing land rights have taken place since the 1990s, with a great variety of views on the question. In the case of Myanmar, the strong political drive for private landownership and the systematic land titling of farmlands (eight million LUCs titles delivered) throughout the country in a very short time frame can be explained by the government's will to show to the international community some concrete outcomes of the country's opening and modernization process.
The first question may then be: are LUCs improving land tenure security in the case of potential land grabbing? As related previously in this report, farmers in Burmese lowlands were not totally lacking papers formalizing their rights. Among the two main documents normally held by the farmers were the farmer booklet, and the Form 105, which is still attached to the LUC and sets the plot's boundaries, plot number, kwin, type of land use, and the holder's name. We also saw that in absence of one or the other, tax receipts could be used to legitimate a right of a user to a defined plot. Yet despite having these documents, farmers have always been under threat of arbitrary land confiscations by the state throughout the previous regimes – whether it was in the name of national projects of public interest or more often for the interests of the powerful elites (for pure speculation or business). In that sense, LUCs do not seem to provide more security than the already existing documents. The source of land insecurity was not the lack of documents but rather the absence of rule of law to pre-empt or address potential abuses of power.

In addition, though land titling may aim to strengthen land security, it actually generates vulnerabilities for those who do not get access to land titles. It is what Hirsch defines as a central conundrum (Hirsch, 2011:15):

“(While) most farmers and other landholders are pleased to obtain formal title over plots of land that they hold individually under more weakly demarcated and state recognized arrangements, the process of land titling in some areas can weaken security in others and can entrench, sharpen and exacerbate existing inequalities in access to land.”

The issuance of land titles may be of more interest in upland areas where many agricultural lands are not registered as such. The problem remains that in many upland areas land tenure follows customary principles, not recognized by the 2012 land law<sup>74</sup> (Ewers Anderson 2015, GRET, forthcoming). Moreover, shifting cultivation, while still practiced in many parts of the country, is not recognized by the government. Finally, LUCs are not designed to be applied collectively, while in upland areas it is frequent to find communal lands or collective management of land use, such as in Chin, for example. There is however one context where the deliverance of LUCs could improve farmers’ land tenure security: for the agricultural lands which are still classified as forestlands. We indeed saw that some farmers in Delta (Pay Chaung and part of Tet Tet Ku village) were farming on land still under the jurisdiction of the Forest Department. As such, their land tenure is insecure as the Department could reclaim such lands, notably under the provision

<footnote n="74">74. The National Land Use Policy approved early 2016 finally takes into account the concept of 'customary tenure' and mentions its recognition. However, much is still needed to put in place in order to protect customary land tenure in upland areas from a legal point of view.</footnote>
of the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Management Law – yet this did not happen in the villages under study. Following the registration process, a presidential instruction for the reclassification of lands was enacted. Part of forestland cultivated in Delta was degazetted into farmlands and acknowledged as arable land by the Central Farmland Management Body. Following this decision, SLRD staffs came to measure farmers' plots in Tet Tet Ku and Pay Chaung, although at the time of writing this report, farmers did not receive yet LUCs. It seems the degazetting process of cultivated forestlands to farmlands has suffered some institutional complications and remained stuck.

Then, what do the new land law and LUCs provide, compared to the previous framework? We have observed that restrictions on land use rights are still in force, and that the possibility to access credit by using the LUC as collateral is too restricted to benefit small landholders.

The main addition brought by the new land framework is to finally acknowledge long-existing practices of land transactions, since farmers can now legally sell, rent, or pawn their land use rights. However, land transactions before 2012 were admittedly illegal yet formalized in many ways as we have seen: through contracts, involving witnesses, and even with the support of state representatives such as the village administrator and SLRD staff. Now that these transactions are legal, they still need to be formalized through procedures which – we saw – are lengthy and costly. These procedures are thus not applied, meaning that the same ‘black market’ practices apply and the whole land registration will be outdated within a few years.

As summarized in a document by the 'Land Tenure and Development' Technical Committee<fnref n="75" /> (2015: 33) on the formalization of land rights, "written titles can help secure tenure if:

* the formalization procedure makes sense in relation to the reality of land rights, responds effectively to the problems encountered by different land users, and enables the State to recognize their legitimate rights or authenticate their agreements;

* the formalization procedure is accessible and effective, and is part of an institutional environment that is sufficiently interconnected and reliable to deal effectively with the plurality of norms and authorities;

* land information is kept up to date, so that people benefit from using the legal mechanisms, and the institutions responsible for administering rights fulfil their responsibilities."

<footnote n="75">75. Forum for multi-disciplinary debate and sharing among researchers, decision markets, civil society stakeholders and operators of the land sector, under the auspices of the French Cooperation.</footnote>
Concerning Burmese lowland areas, LUCs match in some aspects the reality of tenure and land rights – especially through the legalization of land transactions – while it does not necessarily answer farmers’ problems – e.g. access to credit, freedom to choose the specific use of land. As for upland areas, the reality of land tenure practiced in these regions is for the most part out of reach of the current land framework (in regard, for instance, recognition of communal lands).

When it comes to the formalization of land transactions under the current framework, it is too early to show significant evidence deriving from the updating of LUCs. However, the points above all indicate that cadastral maps may soon be out of date, as is the case in Cambodia where the cost of procedures is deterring farmers from undertaking the process of changing names in land records (Diepart and Sem, 2015: 56).

Another important stance adopted by the Myanmar government is that, like Thailand and Cambodia before, it decided not to redistribute land before titling, thereby crystallizing existing inequalities between landholders and the landless, who are particularly numerous in Burmese lowlands (see Chapter VII.7).

Finally, another rationale for formalizing land rights through written titles is that it should help reduce conflicts and resolve land disputes. The main issue is that land disputes are often the result of the plurality of norms regulating land transfers, especially a set of stacked laws<fnref n="76" /> creating "gaps in institutional frameworks that are unable (or unwilling) to accommodate this plurality" ('Land Tenure and Development' Technical Committee 2015:35). In that sense, the new land framework is one more law stacked on the others, and we should see in the following sections that the land registration process revived many conflicts, while the capacity of conflict resolution bodies seems very limited.

<footnote n="76">76. Siu Sue Mark, 2015. The concept of stacked laws was defined by Roquas (2002).</footnote>
3. Land use disputes under the 2012 land reform

Myanmar's successive regimes' land policies have resulted in creating 'stacked
laws', with multiple layers of laws existing simultaneously, creating conflicts and
many legal contradictions. As such, conflicts can merely be the result of those
pluralisms and contradictions, rather than an absence of rule. The context is made
even more complex by decades of abusive power and intrusive agricultural and
land policies.

They have left significant scars and grievances and provide ground to new
claims and collective contestations over past abuses of power and actions perceived
as unjust and/or illegitimate (see section below 3.2). Finally, this is all aggravated
by the fact that in the past decades, at the local level, land governance has been
highly concentrated in the hands of government appointed village headmen, who
were acting as political brokers<fnref n="77" /> between government and villagers (see VIII.3).
In the absence of checks and balances, corruption practices have prevailed at the
expense of the weakest. The section thus explores how the recent land registration
process revived different conflicts and grudges, and presents some challenges
faced in conflict resolution (see 3.3).

### 3.1 The result of legal pluralism and stacked laws

There is a stabilized set of customary norms concerning property transfer inside the family and for extrafamilial arrangements. For instance, conflicts about inheritance (a-mwey) can express a number of tensions, including: the fact that every child may not be able to enjoy an equal share of parents' property, how properties are classified, the actual state of family relationships, and children's lives (for example concerning the degree of involvement in supporting parents and the associated share of inheritance for that labor).

Conflicts regarding extrafamilial agreements often emerge from the plurality
of norms and stacked laws. For instance, if one rents a piece of land for more than
5 years following a customary form of land arrangement, he or she may be legally
entitled to claim that land according to government rules (Act 64/1). In other
words, the context of stacked laws can facilitate appropriation claims against
fluid and practical local norms. Conflicts that have reached the jurisdiction of a
village headman can express the strategic use of a diverse set of norms (local and
governmental) in actual situations.

In a village's everyday life, a myriad of conflicts take place and they are voiced in
different places – inside a house, at the ten households' leader's house, at *yap-mi'-*

<footnote n="77">77. Bierschenk et al., 2000.</footnote>
yap-pha's, and at village headman's house, and nowadays during a land committee meeting. Bigger cases can involve institutions outside the village like courts or the township chairman. Thus they enter more formal processes for conflict resolution. *Le pyan ngwe pyan* (mortgage) used to be the main cause of land disputes at village level (i.e. outside of confiscation cases by the state or cronies). The land registration process (LUC) perceived as an opportunity to renegotiate land use rights, has revived such claims. A land dispute which has been occurring in a village of Monywa township (Dry Zone) during this study illustrates well the situation found in many parts of Myanmar lowlands (see Box 15).

## 3.2 Land reforms and the creation of a new arena: the case of Tet Tet Ku plowing contestation

The political and land reform frameworks offered a space for new stakeholders in the land tenure arena. It provided the opportunity for farmers to collectively express their resentment over past abuses and draw attention to unresolved land issues. Indeed, on the ground, the farmers still find it difficult to write proper objections letters and to be informed on the objection procedure in order to get these objections validated. Besides, as reported by some farmers, 'the VTLMC did not want to accept objection letters, they just wanted to finish the registration process quickly and successfully'. This is where the new stakeholders intervened.

The enactment of the 2012 land law led to many political actions in the Delta involving local civil society organization and farmers, including protests for those who perceived the law would only benefit wealthier individuals. Many activists also gave speeches to farmers about the new 2012 Farmland Law. Several associations, such as the Myanmar Farmers Development Party (*Taung Thu Lei Tha Mar Toe Tet Yay* Party in Myanmar), Farmer Network Association (*Taung Thu Lei Tha Mar Kun Yet* in Myanmar), but also political parties such as local NLD branches in the Delta, for example, acted in order to stand with the 'oppressed farmers' and 'speak for the farmers' rights'.

Through these actions, many former landholders (now generally landless) became more aware of the new land law and, above all, received support to claim their 'right' to land and perceived the opportunity to renegotiate the land use rights they had lost. Yet, as underlined earlier, the 'rights' to objecting to others' land claims under the 2012 land law remain ill-defined. Among the contesting stakeholders were farmers who lost their land during the forced procurement period, whose lands were confiscated under the military government; those who had lands grabbed for government projects without any compensation; and finally also some who had lost their lands through land mortgages and *le pyan ngwe pyan*.
BOX 13: LAND DISPUTE CASE STUDY WITH LE PYAN NGE PYAN ARRANGEMENTS

The case originated a decade ago. Eleven farmers from the village tract transferred at different times<fnref n="78" /> one plot of their lands to U WT living in D. K. B. village. The agreement was similar each time: *le pyan nge pyan*.

The loan amount is usually about half of the land's market price. In this case, the agreements were formalized with contracts signed by each party and the village tract headman. Loan amounts were rated according to the current land prices at transfer time. As land prices rose, the farmers wanted to get back their holding by repaying their debt to U WT. But the latter refused and claimed the lands as his own because he had been cultivating them for more than five years. Indeed, one of the agrarian reforms implemented during the military-socialist era was to 'give back' the land to the tiller (rather than the original clearer of the land).

One of the rules enacted by the government in 1964 (Act 1/64) was that the person who cultivates a piece of land for five years consecutively for the benefit of an absentee landholder becomes the one who has the 'authority to cultivate the land' (lei ya-myei lok-paing-hkwin)<fnref n="79" />. U WT asked the SLRD agent to change the name of the u' paing holdings in question but the latter did not accede to this request and U WT only received a new farmer booklet granting the temporary use right. The farmers then went to the village headman to complain about the situation but the latter did not accede to solve the case and referred it to the village tract headman who had signed the agreement.

At the same time, rumours spread that contracts might have been falsified by U WT and signed by the village tract headman. The farmers could not rely on the village tract headman, accused of forgery, and who also refused to solve the case.

Furthermore, the contracts had not been renewed since the first agreements. After these first complaints, U WT gave back plots to six out of eleven farmers – holdings of the poorest quality – and kept the five more productive plots. The five remaining farmers expected the successive headmen to handle the case but no one did until the new Farmland Law of 2012 was enacted. Indeed, one former headman, three terms of office ago, is directly involved in the case; the headman after him has an uncle involved in the case; the headman succeeding him did not last long; and the current headman has just been nominated. Two years ago, the five farmers called upon the township chairman but he, again, referred the case to the village tract headman arguing that the village tract headman was the one who knew the case well. In 2013, the implementation of the Farmland Law has opened an opportunity for the farmers to claim their land by applying for a LUC. Because five holdings are double claimed, the case entered a new process for its resolution. The SLRD who delivers the LUC asked the current headman and the newly created VTFMC to solve the case. But on the ground, it is the village tract headman who has to solve the conflict first.

<footnote n="78">78. The agreements took place along two cropping seasons.</footnote>

<footnote n="79">79. However, to our knowledge no mention is made in legal texts about the 5 years.</footnote>
Plowing protests (Hton Tone Tike Pwe)

In May 2013, a movement of landless farmers emerged in Tet Tet Ku village (Mawlamyinegyun township). Those landless farmers, being led by the new stakeholders described above, forcedly plowed in the paddy fields which they had owned in the past, now held by a landlord living in the main town of the township. In early 2013, farmers heard about plowing protests happening in the other places in the Delta. As their interest rose, they went to seek the support of local farmers associations and political parties. The latter indeed encouraged them to conduct the plowing protests, and guaranteed their help in case problems occurred. With the help of these organizations, seven villagers, five men and two women, young and old, organized a plowing protest. They had lost their lands because of the forced paddy procurement policy and through mortgage (le pyan ngwe pyan). They first sent notice letters to the village tract headman and the township police station to inform them about the protest and to specify the date and location of the paddy fields they would plow. Informed about the issue, a descendant of the landlord came to the village to negotiate with the villagers. He proposed to give them half of the paddy lands that they had owned in the past, with a legal transfer in their name. All the villagers were urged to go to Mawlamyinegyun town to sign before a lawyer. The villagers did go to Mawlamyinegyun town after a few days, but came back to Tet Tet Ku as soon as they arrived in Mawlamyinegyun. They feared the landlord was trying to trick them. Hence, the farmers proceeded with their plan.

On the seventh of June 2013, a group of villagers under the banner of the Myanmar Social Development Network used power tillers to start to plow the landlord's fields - fields that were then being used by other tenant farmers under rent. A crowd of the villagers accompanied by many other villagers who were associated or familiar with the actors marched to the targeted paddy fields. The plowing contestation was video recorded and documented. The first day, the village tract headman came and warned the people to stop plowing and to return to their homes. He also said to the people in the paddy fields that if they continued, all would be sued by law and sentenced to jail. Nevertheless, the farmers continued to plow quite happily. The next day, farmers continued to plow, hoping the authorities would come and finally decide their case. But no one came. With growing concerns, they nevertheless started to sow, investing in 22 baskets of paddy seeds. As the days passed, the fields slowly turned green, and the farmers felt satisfied. But fifteen days after they had planted the paddy, a group of men commanded by the landlord came to the paddy fields destroyed all the crops. Police came after and all farmers involved in the case were summoned to go to the Mawlamyinegyun Police station with a court order. After the case hearing at the court, the seven farmers were sentenced to jail for two months. They were accused of destroying private property (Act No.427) and trespassing on private area (Act
No. 447). They were sent to the Myaung Mya Jail. At the prison, they met with many farmers who had been sentenced to jail in similar ways. They hoped they would get support from both political and civil societies, yet they were told by the supporting associations that "they could continue the plowing protest once released." Nobody in Tet Tet Ku resumed the plowing protests in 2014. The lack of clear directives to decide on such land disputes, the weak bargaining power of local associations, and the general uncertainty in which villagers live the reform once again threatens to undermine the potential positive outcomes of the reform.

### 3.3 The limited capacities of local institutions in conflict resolution

The problem remains that the formal institutions (SLRD, VTLMC) operating locally in the Delta and the Dry Zone are not in the position to effectively adjudicate land disputes. In other words, it is either not their mandate (SRLD), or their members (VTLMC) do not want to take the responsibility of resolving land conflicts under a new legal framework that doesn't provide conflict resolution mechanisms for such cases. Hence, in most case, VTLMCs generally refer to the village tract headman or to the township LMC. Yet, the latter functions more like a mailbox, forwarding the dispute cases to the district level committee with its appraisal note.

The district committee has more scope in the decision making process, though, to our knowledge of the surveyed villages, no dispute cases have yet been resolved at the time of this report's writing. According to our observations on the ground, no objecting household has got its land back. Despite the law's lack of clarity for objection cases such as those linked to forced procurement, it seems more or less defined in the collective psyche that 'the most recent owner is the legitimate one' (see Chapter VI.4).

Local newly created bodies are not yet able to resolve the contradictions brought by a complex legal framework. The new land law and the land titling process also created space to contest some land transfers (especially *le pyan ngwe pyan*, but also sales and inheritance transfers) creating disputes within families and among siblings. And as a matter of fact, *le pyan ngwe pyan* generally stopped in 2013 (only 1.6% of the landowners surveyed mortgaged some lands, while 2.2% of the total population cultivates mortgaged lands), most farmers fearing that, by engaging in mortgage, their land would be claimed by their creditor taking the opportunity of land registration to obtain a LUC for the holdings they pawned.

In the absence of checks and balances, corrupt practices prevail in conflict resolution processes, at the expense of the weakest. When the dispute settlement is done by the village tract headman (even through the VTLMC), decisions are often done for the benefit of wealthier individuals – for instance the creditors in the *le*
pyan ngwe pyan arrangement. The qualitative survey has also provided ample number of cases where dispute arbitration decisions are done towards the 'highest bidder' (meaning the one who provides the largest bribe). This generates a lack of trust within the community towards the village headman and the VTLMC.

In addition, the social capital at village level has often been crippled in the past decades (see Chapter VIII.3). Most local community leaders are not neutral as they have been involved as village tract/village headmen or in one way or another in the local land committees that have existed through history. Religious authorities do not play an important role in resolving land disputes and in general informal institutions lack capacity to deal with land conflicts. This is particularly true in the Delta, which is characterized by more mobility, strong patron-client relationships, and weak horizontal links, even among households of the same 'class'. In addition, there are stronger competing claims between farmers, tenants, and the landless. It impacts on intra-village and intra-familial land disputes occurring under the land registration process. Finally, one key issue is the independence of conflict resolution mechanisms.
# VII. Land tenure and livelihood security

This chapter draws on the findings from the quantitative study made on a sample of 1,129 households, analysed and explained in the light of qualitative information gathered during the two first phases of the research. The main objective of this section is to describe and analyse household livelihoods, and their links with production factors (land, capital, labor, livestock), and other key demographic and basic social characteristics. Details can be found in Annex 1.

## 1. Landownership in Dry Zone and Delta

Landlessness is initially defined here in a wide sense, as the fact of owning no lands. Such 'landless' include both households that access lands through temporary arrangements and those who are not engaged in any farming or farm labor activities. The percentage of landless households (households that do not own any agricultural land) is considerably higher in the Delta (59.5%) compared to the Dry Zone (41%). A specific discussion in section VII.7 will shed light on the different types of landless.

Considering only landowners, the distribution of land (in terms of the statistical distribution of the size of respective 'landholdings') is quite similar in the two areas. If simplified into two classes (above and under five acres), the Dry Zone shows a relative concentration of large landholdings with 70% of owners having more than five acres versus only 62% in the Delta. However, the average landholding size (among farmland owners) is slightly smaller in Dry Zone (8.73 acres per household for a total of 3083 acres in the survey sample) than in Delta area (8.9 acres per household for a total of 1915 acres in the survey sample). However the largest landholding recorded in the Dry Zone is 65 acres, while in the Delta, the largest landholdings reaches 110 acres for the biggest (and this does not take into account the hundreds of acres owned by an absentee landowner of Mawlamyinegyun, whose land is partly cultivated in tenancy by Tet Tet Ku and Pay Chaung villagers). Finally, if taking into account the whole population (landowners and landless households), landholding sizes are on average much bigger in the Dry Zone with 5.2 acres per household versus in the Delta, with 3.6 acres per household.
<table><caption>**Table 21:** Distribution of owned acreages and number of landowners in Delta and Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Delta</th><th>Dry Zone</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Total owned acreage</td><td>1915</td><td>3083</td></tr><tr><td>Total nb of landowners</td><td>215</td><td>353</td></tr><tr><td>% of landowners over total HH</td><td>40.5%</td><td>59%</td></tr><tr><td>Average landholding/HH (acres)</td><td>8.9</td><td>8.7</td></tr></tbody></table>

<figure><img src="image_46.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 25:** Distribution of landownership and landholding size among households (in % of households) in the two areas</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_47.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 26:** Distribution of farmland holding sizes among land owning households in Dry Zone and Delta</figcaption></figure>
## 1.1 Historical roots of landlessness

The important difference in landlessness rates between the Delta and the Dry Zone can be first explained by their different agrarian histories. The Dry Zone is the cradle of Burmese society, with long established villages (except from Hledar) and stronger social organization, which made the impact of colonial rule and further governmental policies less intense than in the Delta. The Delta, as we already saw, was mainly developed through British colonization and as the country's main rice bowl received greater 'interest' from post-independence national governments. Hence, it has been more significantly impacted by predatory policies such as the 'Compulsory Quota Delivery'. Besides, land concentration in the hands of moneylenders (whether alien or indigenous) under colonial rule happened to a lesser extent in the Dry Zone, for the reasons that many lands classified as 'private' (as opposed to 'crown', in the pre-colonial categorization system) were for generations cultivated within the same family, and hence cultivators already gave greater 'sentimental value' to their land (Siok Hwa 1965a: 120), representing generations of investment in, and knowledge of, the lands. This is contrary to the Delta where moving toward the south to find new lands remained the main strategy of cultivators – whether for fleeing debts, seeking more fertile lands, establishing a new household – until the closing of the 'rice frontier'. Hence these cultivators developing limited bonds with their agricultural holdings. These trajectories also explain the slightly smaller average surfaces held by cultivators in the Dry Zone where, in the absence of a land frontier, land fragmentation along generations (through inheritance) is more acute than in Delta (ibid: 116).

It is interesting to note the – somewhat logical – relationship between increasing landholdings sizes and the higher proportion of landless households, as larger tracts of land necessitate more farm labor and logically exclude a greater share of households from having access to land. Also, the fact that fertile lands are generally occupied earlier than others – here again a logical process – is a common feature shared by both the Dry Zone and the Delta. Yet, in the Dry Zone, the less fertile lands have been occupied most recently, by households which now have small holding sizes, due to the unavailability of lands. These lands were cleared last as they required much greater labor to be prepared for cultivation. The situation observed in Delta is different: less fertile lands are more frequent for large landholdings, due to the fact that land was still available in the southern frontier and that water salinity (resulting from lands at lower elevations) implies to cultivate larger surfaces in order to be economically viable (as only one crop per year is possible).
## 1.2 Major disparities among villages in each area

Differences can be observed among villages within each zone as well. This example highlights the complexity and intertwinement of the different factors determining land access, agro ecological conditions and the importance of power relations at the local level. The importance of differences between regions but also among villages in the same region shows that large scale surveys and uniform 'one size fits all' solutions on land tenure bear risks as they are not able to address effectively the local and context-specific problems.

### Dry Zone: diversity of village contexts

In the Dry Zone, there is a strong variability regarding landlessness rates between villages. While Hledar and Zee Phyu Pin present a very low landlessness rate (only 16.8%), Khoe Tan and Gaw Gyi have a much higher one (60.6%). Here again, this variability is partly due to historical events. As seen earlier<fnref n="80" />, Khoe Than farmers in the post-independence period benefited from the land nationalization process in retrieving large tracts of lands they were working as tenants in the midst of the civil war. As mentioned above in the history chapter, the nationalization process generally did not benefit all farmers and even less to the landless, as lands were mainly distributed to better-off farmers who had 'the capacity to invest and cultivate'. This explains the higher rate of large landowners (over 15 acres) in Khoe Than village<fnref n="81" />, and the more limited access to land for others. In addition, together with Gaw Gyi, these two villages revived the activity of weaving which - after collapsing in the 1960s due to Chinese competition and the unsecure context of the civil war - became again a primary source of income for landless households in the villages. Zee Phyu Pin is a more 'typical' Dry Zone village, where lands have been cultivated since the pre-colonization period and registered as *bobapaing* and *dama-u-gya* lands - that is private land transferred from generation to generation. As a consequence, land being fully occupied - the last virgin lands were turned into farmland about 40 years ago - and fragmented along generations, smallholdings occupy a larger share in the village's cultivated lands. Smaller surfaces hence need fewer farm laborers, while the few landless households in the village provide year-round labor for larger landholders. In contrast, Hledar is a quite recently settled village (founded in 1938 according to the villagers) created toward the end of the British rule. The primary livelihood of villagers at the time of the village settlement was woodcutting and manufacturing wood slippers. Only later did the villagers start cultivating land to the east of the village, and progressively transformed the hill slopes into arable lands by constructing stonewalls across the waterways (*kyauk-loke*) in order to collect alluvial soil during rainy season. These new alluvial farmlands are quite small, yet very fertile, allowing high crop yields and cultivation

<footnote n="80">80. See chapter II.2.</footnote>

<footnote n="81">81. In Khoe Tan, landowners holding more than 15 acres represent more than 25% of land-owning households.</footnote>
of high value vegetable crops. Many households cultivate these lands with very intensive manner (much labor invested to cultivate small areas and productivity per acre is high). This explains the smaller average lands holding size (five acres) in this village. In addition, off-farm work opportunities being scarce in this remote village, there is no significant in-migration apart from those marrying an individual from Hledar.

**Delta: access to lands, big men, and intra-village dynamics of exclusion and accumulation.**

**Table 22** sheds light on the fact that there are important differences in terms of power structures and resource distribution among villages, including within the same region and township. This leads to significant differences at different levels, including in terms of resource and land distribution.

For example in the Delta, on one hand, we may observe villages which still have quasi-feudal systems such as Tet Tet Ku with an absentee landlord and a class of landless tenants working for him. In the case of Pay Chaung, the strong disparities are mainly explained by the presence of a 'big man' who has accumulated lands and now owns more than 110 acres in a village where most households are very poor landless fishermen/laborers. In these two cases, landlessness rates and the standard deviation in landholding size are high. In contrast, villages such as Magu, Tha Byu Gone, and Aye Ywar, which have not been marked by such powerful actors, resources are more evenly distributed among households and landlessness rates lower.

<table><caption>**Table 22:** Land tenure disparities among Delta villages</caption><thead><tr><th>Villages</th><th>Average landholding size/ HH (including landless=0)</th><th>Standard deviation in landholding size (including landless=0)</th><th>% Landless/total HH</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Aye Ywar</td><td>3.48</td><td>6.6</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>Magu</td><td>3.70</td><td>5.1</td><td>54</td></tr><tr><td>Pay Chaung</td><td>4.47</td><td>16.4</td><td>80</td></tr><tr><td>Tha Byu Gone</td><td>2.93</td><td>5.0</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>Tet Tet Ku</td><td>3.90</td><td>9.3</td><td>66</td></tr></tbody></table>
## 2. Other key differentiation factors in access to farmlands

In this section, we will shed light on the main factors affecting landownership and landholding sizes, other than the historical background and social contexts of villages that have been presented above.

### 2.1 Age and the household life cycle

The household life cycle is recognized to be one of the major factors of change for households. In many agrarian societies, access to land is linked to the age, size, and needs of households. Landless households are represented in all age classes and their share in the class progressively decreases from young household heads to old ones for both Delta and Dry Zone (see Figure 27).

<figure><img src="image_48.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 27:** Landlessness rates among household head age categories in Delta and Dry Zone</figcaption></figure>

Landlessness rates are of 80% in the Delta and 61.5% in the Dry Zone among households with household heads under age 30, and only 40% in the Delta and 27% in the Dry Zone among household heads above age 60. Landlessness rates sharply decrease for households with household heads around age 40. This can be explained mainly by inheritance of farmlands following death of parents or spouse's parents.

Indeed, in both the Delta and the Dry Zone, the average acreage of owned farmland gradually increases with household head age. The logic of land accumulation with increasing household head age exists in both areas. Yet it is stronger in the Dry Zone: there is indeed more variation in landholding size between age categories: Dry Zone landowners of under age 30 own less than four acres in average while those over 50 own almost 12 acres. In the Delta, the variation
in average per age category is less significant (six acres for the youngest; almost 10 acres for those over 40). Landholding fragmentation is affecting the younger households.

<figure><img src="image_49.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_50.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 28:** Two tables showing average landholding size among household head age categories in Delta and Dry Zone</figcaption></figure>
However, **Figure 28** demonstrates that among farmland owners, there is a inflection point at age 50 where average landholding size stabilizes at around 10 acres in the Delta, and at 12 acres in the Dry Zone. In the Delta, it even decreases, suggesting that parts of lands are transferred to children before death more frequently there than in the Dry Zone. The second graphic in **Figure 28** represents both landless and landowners. Average land acreage increases steadily in the Dry Zone, suggesting that many landless households access lands at around age 40 to 50, while such access to land seems much more limited in Delta for those age classes, with a breaking point at age 40-50, where average farm holding size tends to stabilize at an average of 5.2 acres.

Access to land does not have the same meaning for households at different stages of their life cycle. Indeed, the qualitative survey reveals that for a household head aged around 40 or 50, landlessness is often rather a permanent form of land exclusion, while it can be only a temporary state for younger ones (see **Figure 27**). Households are able to acquire land (mainly by inheritance and purchase) as they get older. In addition, young households are also more prone to migrate, if necessary, or to link with other labor market opportunities.

It is important to keep in mind also that the context is changing. Land is getting relatively scarcer with time (under demographic pressure and the closing of agricultural frontier) and that this may increase the difficulty for current young households to access land, compared to the young ones of the past decades. This may increase the disparities between young and old households. Data also indicates that households tend to keep control on their lands as they grow older, which means that inheritance may occur relatively late (around 40-50) which is coherent with collected data. It also must be said that land scarcity may increase the age of inheritance.

## 2.2 Household size and link with landholding size

A family's active labor force is a critical factor in determining a household's agricultural livelihoods. In the Dry Zone, there is a strongly significant statistical link between owned farm size and number of active members within the household, while this trend does not appear for the Delta. This may be explained by the fact that Dry Zone farms depend essentially on the family's own labor for most agricultural operations, while in the Delta, farms use laborers much more consistently. Unfortunately, this remains only a hypothesis as the quantitative data missed out about the household members' labor contribution on their own farms.

<caption>**Table 23:** Dry Zone labor force in households and owned farmland size</caption>
<table><thead><tr><th>Owned farmland (acres)</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>landless</td><td>42</td><td>17.1</td><td>107</td><td>43.7</td><td>48</td><td>19.6</td><td>35</td><td>14.3</td><td>13</td><td>5.3</td></tr><tr><td>0.3-2.5</td><td>3</td><td>5.9</td><td>31</td><td>60.8</td><td>10</td><td>19.6</td><td>5</td><td>9.8</td><td>2</td><td>3.9</td></tr><tr><td>2.5-5</td><td>9</td><td>15.0</td><td>21</td><td>35.0</td><td>16</td><td>26.7</td><td>8</td><td>13.3</td><td>6</td><td>10.0</td></tr><tr><td>5-10</td><td>8</td><td>6.2</td><td>40</td><td>30.8</td><td>40</td><td>30.8</td><td>21</td><td>16.2</td><td>21</td><td>16.2</td></tr><tr><td>10-15</td><td>2</td><td>3.4</td><td>15</td><td>25.9</td><td>14</td><td>24.1</td><td>11</td><td>19.0</td><td>16</td><td>27.6</td></tr><tr><td>&gt;15</td><td>4</td><td>7.4</td><td>7</td><td>13.0</td><td>14</td><td>25.9</td><td>16</td><td>29.6</td><td>13</td><td>24.1</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>68</td><td>11.4</td><td>221</td><td>37.0</td><td>142</td><td>23.7</td><td>96</td><td>16.1</td><td>71</td><td>11.9</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=85.2 dof=20 p=0.001 (very significant) Cramer's V=0.189

## 2.3 Landlessness and recent migration

It appears that recent migration is driven by landlessness, particularly in the Delta. Indeed, landlessness rates are higher among households whose household head was born in another village tract than the one of current residence<fnref n="82" />. This tendency is exaggerated in the Delta where 32% of the landless are newcomers while only 16.7% of landowners are newcomers. 73.7% of household heads born outside the VT, against 54.6% of household heads born within the VT are landless (see Table 5 in Annex 1). This clearly confirms the relative attraction of the young work force (who lack access to land) to seek lands or/and labor opportunities in the Delta, which in turn increases the pressure on land.

Among the Dry Zone landowning households with heads born outside the VT, a significant proportion (67%) have settled more than 20 years ago. Such significant statistical links have not been found in the Delta. However among landowners of the two categories, there are no significant differences in terms of landholding sizes, neither in the Delta nor in the Dry Zone.

On the contrary, out migrations are not apparently linked to households' landholding sizes. The frequency of household members working outside VT more than 50% of the year is similar among landless (24.8%) and landowners (23.4%), and is not significantly affected by the size of landholding. However, qualitative interviews indicate two different strategies for smallholders (less than three acres) and landless on the one hand, and medium scale and large scale holders on the other. For the first category, finding work outside the VT is generally a strategy to cope with lack of available lands and the low diversity of off-farm work

<footnote n="82">82. The village tract is a grouping of adjacent villages. It constitutes the lowest unit in state administration.</footnote>
opportunities which are not directly related to the cultivation of land; while for
larger landholders, out-migration is not a function of exclusion but rather linked
to higher opportunity costs in cities, in a context of land fragmentation<fnref n="83" />. This
strategy is facilitated by a higher level of education and by subsequent better jobs
opportunities. It represents a combined strategy not to divide land and to give an
opportunity for some of the children to quit agriculture.

2.4 Access to land and social position<fnref n="84" />

Unsurprisingly, data analysis also shows that there is a statistical link between landholding size and social position within the village. The two basic indicators available in the database ('knowing somebody in the VTFMC' and 'having a position within the village'<fnref n="85" />) are strongly linked to each other and each of them is statistically linked with household head age and landholding area. For instance, 50% of households having at least one member occupying an administrative position in the village own more than 10 acres, which is true for only 33% of the whole population. The statistical significance is the greatest in the lowest and highest landholding size categories of landowners.

Having an administrative position is of greater impact than having a social
unofficial activity (SOR – see previous footnote ). On the contrary, households
having at least one member being an NGO informant are poorly represented in
households with landholdings above 10 acres, probably because NGOs avoid
working with the richest and vice versa.

In conclusion, as age increases, households tend to have more access to land, to be more secure, and to access better social position within the village and village tracts. But the context is changing and these trends might not continue in the same fashion. We note the existence of young landless migrating from outside the village tract of their birth, indicating that land access and land accumulation along the life cycle in this area will probably be more difficult in the coming years given the increasing pressure on lands.

## 2.5 Gender, access to land and land security

Women represent 51% (2,492 individuals) amongst the total 4,887 individuals

<footnote n="83">83. If in theory all siblings receive the same share of inheritance, practice proves that some are often favored above others notably for the reason that dividing land equally would lead to surfaces too small for viable farms.</footnote>

<footnote n="84">84. Social position is defined here with a restricted scope. In the survey, social position was defined by having family members in key official administrative positions and a role in key social affairs.</footnote>

<footnote n="85">85. Position/status within the village corresponds to 3 categories: 'administrative position' gathers village head (ya-eim-hmu) and VT administrators, village clerk (chief assistant), members of land committee, members of village administration committee; 'NGO informant/community mobilizer, etc.; 'Social Organizations and Religious activities (SOR)' comprizes leaders of young men and women groups, cooks for village events (ok tha-gyi), active religious donors (phaya taka").</footnote>
of the surveyed sample, consistent with the national score of 51.7% of women recorded in the 2014 national census (2014 census results). Whatever the age of the household head and household size, the proportion of women within the household does not change significantly. In contrast, being headed by a woman is linked with household head age and household size. In the survey sample, women only represent 14% of household head. Frequency of women as household head decreases with the household's size: 75% of households of one member are headed by a woman, while only 35% of households of two members are women-headed. Frequency of women as household head increases with household head age: they are 30% for household heads aged more than 60 which is twice as frequent as the whole household head population average<fnref n="86" />. In accordance with that, women household heads are older than men: their average age is 57.7 years while men are only 45 years in average. In summary, women household heads are old and lead a small household. As already mentioned, this type of household is very different from households headed by old men, which are larger and composed of well-educated people, having social position within village.

There are differences in the respective relationships between household head sex and landlessness in the Delta and the Dry Zone. Indeed, in the Delta, the gender of household heads has limited statistical link with landlessness or landownership. In contrast, the figures in the Dry Zone (Table 25) reveal a significant difference in the frequency of female household heads: the rate is almost two times higher in landless households. In addition, there is a significantly higher proportion of women household heads in the Dry Zone (18%) compared to the Delta (10%). Actually, women headed households in the Delta tend to remarry more often than in the Dry Zone. This can again be explained by the more dynamic nature of Delta communities – with more mobile men between villages – while in Dry Zone opportunities to remarry are fewer. These facts relate to the different socioeconomic organization between the two zones (pioneer and mobile in Delta, long-settled and more sedentary in Dry Zone).

<footnote n="86">86. This can be explained at least partly by the fact that women generally have a longer life-expectancy than men.</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 24:** Delta statistical relationship between household head sex and landownership</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Male HHH</th><th colspan="3">Female HHH</th><th colspan="3">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>% Column</th><th>% Row</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>% Column</th><th>% Row</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>% Column</th><th>% Row</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Land owner</th><td>188</td><td>39.4</td><td>87.4</td><td>27</td><td>50.9</td><td>12.6</td><td>215</td><td>40.6</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><th>Landless</th><td>289</td><td>60.6</td><td>91.7</td><td>26</td><td>49.1</td><td>8.3</td><td>315</td><td>59.4</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><th>Total</th><td>477</td><td>100.0</td><td>90.0</td><td>53</td><td>100.0</td><td>10.0</td><td>530</td><td>100.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=2,20 dof=1 p=0,134 (Not significant) Cramer's V=0,064

<table><caption>**Table 25:** Dry Zone statistical relationship between household head sex and landownership</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Male HHH</th><th colspan="3">Female HHH</th><th colspan="3">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>% Column</th><th>% Row</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>% Column</th><th>% Row</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>% Column</th><th>% Row</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Land owners</th><td>304</td><td>62.0</td><td>86.1</td><td>49</td><td>45.4</td><td>13.9</td><td>353</td><td>59.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><th>Landless</th><td>186</td><td>38.0</td><td>75.9</td><td>59</td><td>54.6</td><td>24.1</td><td>245</td><td>41.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><th>Total</th><td>490</td><td>100.0</td><td>81.9</td><td>108</td><td>100.0</td><td>18.1</td><td>598</td><td>100.0</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=9,47 dof=1 p=0,002 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0,126

As per evidence of the qualitative study (see **Chapter VI.1.5**), inheritance in the studied Myanmar lowlands favors men and women equally. Inheritance is generally more a matter of available lands, opportunities to get access to land through marriage (if the spouse can bring some land into the newly established household), and the willingness and capacity of the children to pursue or undertake agricultural work. For landowners with less than five acres, there is also no statistical difference between male and female household heads in terms of access to land. However, the proportion of male household heads having large holdings (above 10 acres) is significantly higher (35%) than for women household heads (20%).

As a consequence of being underrepresented in households owning larger holdings, women household heads are proportionally more represented in medium size holdings category (5-10 acres). There is effectively a ceiling (maximum holding size) at around 10 acres, above which women-headed households rarely
go beyond. However, such figures have limited meaning without qualitative analysis of the situation. Indeed, women headed households are overrepresented in the upper age class (above 50 years), due partly to the fact that men die earlier than women, and partly because women who lost their husband (whether being a widow or divorced) often do not remarry.

In addition, the qualitative study shows that woman-headed households which are lacking the workforce of their husband – but also, as stated by some of them, ‘lacking the capacity to manage their land<sup>87</sup>’ – generally transfer the land to their children either permanently (hence changing the landholding registration name) or temporarily through land arrangements (such as free loans, sharecropping, or rental) before transferring it for good. As such, large landholdings are often dismantled for children to access land when women become household heads as they get older and lose their husbands. In this case, they will still remain in the household production and consumption units.

To conclude, reflection on gender and land is particularly tricky, due to the fact that women form an integral part of the household by completing different functions – including making decisions on resource and income utilization – even when they are not the official household head. Due to the fact that land inheritance patterns are quite equal in terms of gender equity, there are little significant differences between men and women access to land. Yet, there remain some key differences, summarized as follows:

* A significant part of these women household heads are elderly and widowed, living either alone or with one or two other household members living with them.

* Women household heads seem unable to access more than 10 acres. This is often because they cannot mobilize an adequate labor force after the death of spouses.

* Women household heads are still vulnerable as they are not socially influential and have weaker relationships with authorities.

* Due to the facts above and labor constraints, women headed household may transfer their lands to their children earlier than male-headed households.

<footnote n="87"><sup>87</sup>. The qualitative study indicates that the 'lack of capacity to manage the farm' stated by women household heads is not only a labor issue. It is also strongly linked to their reduced 'access' to authorities.</footnote>
There are no major land insecurity issues linked to gender. For example, the study has not observed any cases of land sales without wives' consent, nor cases of widows being dispossessed by their children. However, as described previously (see **chapter VI.1.5** and **V.2.3**) the study has observed one conflict between a young widow and her parents-in law over the registration of land use rights of farmland plots donated by the husband's parent at marriage. In addition, upon a couple's separation and divorce, the sharing of lands does not follow systematic rules to allocate lands to both spouses. Although each case may be quite different depending on the context, reasons of separation, and the social pressure imposed by relatives and villagers, women may often be at risk of losing lands in such cases.

**3. Farming capital and household labor**

This section will examine farm capital (other than land) such as livestock, equipment, and access to credit and how this capital links with land access and livelihoods.

### 3.1 Livestock

The majority of households in both Delta (63.5%) and Dry Zone (68.1%) areas practice animal husbandry. Livestock has the following main functions: to generate income, to use as a saving asset, to provide a safety net. Consumption is a more marginal use, and only for small animals. The number of ruminant livestock (cattle, sheep, and goats) and the frequency of ruminant livestock ownership is much higher in the Dry Zone compared to the Delta. One important explanation is that cyclone Nargis decimated the majority of animals and deeply changed use practices of draught animals such as buffaloes<sup>88</sup>. Compared to Dry Zone, pigs are twice as common in the Delta and ducks are extremely common. These animals are indeed quite compatible with rice farming as they feed on crop residues such as rice bran and broken rice.

This may also be an impact of Nargis, as the disappearance of cattle gradually led households to raise other types of livestock to ensure savings and safety net functions. The greater importance of livestock in the Dry Zone must also be correlated to the higher agricultural risks linked to this region's farming conditions which necessitates reliance on livestock to increase resilience.

<footnote n="88">88. 51% of large ruminants, and in Mawlamyinegyun 70% of draught animals (FAO 2008).</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_51.png" /></figure>

Pig raising is most often a very small scale activity.

<figure><img src="image_52.png" /></figure>

Duck raising in Delta.

<figure><img src="image_53.png" /></figure>

Goat "herding" in Dry Zone.

<figure><img src="image_54.png" /></figure>

Duck "herding" in Delta paddy lands and marshes.

<figure><img src="image_55.png" /></figure>

Cattle and bullock carts are essential assets of Dry Zone farms.

<figure><img src="image_56.png" /></figure>

Plowing with buffalo became less common after the mass introduction of power tillers after cyclone Nargis.

<caption>**Figure 29.1:** Pictures of key livestock in Delta and Dry Zone</caption>
<figure><img src="image_57.png" /></figure>

Credit: Fayon

In Dry Zone, livestock feed is precious so farmers
grow fodder and collect weeds to feed animals.

<figure><img src="image_58.png" /></figure>

Credit: Allaverdian

In Delta, paddy straw is very often unused.

<caption>**Figure 29.2:** Pictures of livestock feed in Delta and Dry Zone</caption>

Looking at the Dry Zone data on livestock ownership and trend lines for each type of livestock, two main patterns are highlighted: 1) some animals (pigs, chicken, and to a lesser extent small ruminants) are used as complementary sources of income for landless and small landowners, while cattle is used for building the farm's capital and patrimony. Small livestock such as pigs, goats, sheep, and chickens are found among all different landholding categories, including landless. It thus appears to be an income generating activity that is compatible with landlessness. However, small livestock such as pigs and chicken are mostly owned by small landowners. There seems to be a breaking point at around five acres, at which point farmers can afford to invest in cattle and hence substitute away from small livestock.

Indeed, cattle ownership and the number of cattle owned (generally between one to five) is very strongly linked with landownership and landholding size. The very significant link between the age of the household head and cattle ownership confirms that this needs to be understood as linked to the household's 'life cycle'. It can also be explained by increased agricultural needs for animal draught power, in line with landholding size. For example, in the Dry Zone, a typical landowning farming household head usually assigns a young calf to each of his children: each child starts taking care of his/her assigned calf and both 'grow up' together. When the child takes independence from the household, he/she may leave with the assigned cattle, which provides a good start of his/her farming life. Interestingly, lack of land tenure security is often perceived as associated with lack of cattle, and cattle and their carts are seen as integral components of the farming system. Carts are critical tools in Dry Zone used for the transport of people, water, inputs, harvests, and animal fodder.
<table><caption>Table 26: Animal husbandry in Dry Zone and Delta</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Dry Zone</th><th colspan="2">Delta</th></tr><tr><th>Total Nb</th><th>Average per HH</th><th>Total Nb</th><th>Average per HH</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Ducks</td><td>24</td><td>0.0</td><td>9817</td><td>18.5</td></tr><tr><td>Chicken</td><td>2160</td><td>3.6</td><td>1783</td><td>3.4</td></tr><tr><td>Pigs</td><td>175</td><td>0.3</td><td>309</td><td>0.6</td></tr><tr><td>Goats</td><td>264</td><td>0.4</td><td>17</td><td>0.0</td></tr><tr><td>Sheep</td><td>677</td><td>1.1</td><td>0</td><td>0.0</td></tr><tr><td>Cattle</td><td>1060</td><td>1.8</td><td>237</td><td>0.4</td></tr></tbody></table>

<figure><img src="image_59.png" /><figcaption>Figure 30: Frequency of livestock ownership among different landholding categories (in Dry Zone)</figcaption></figure>

Similar trends on cattle exist in the Delta, but with cyclone Nargis, draught animals such as buffaloes have rapidly been replaced by power tillers. This process was accelerated through the massive aid provided by emergency and post-recovery operations. This has eroded the symbolic importance of cattle in Delta. Pigs and chicken are raised in similar frequency by all categories of cultivators, including the landless. They are raised at very small scale, feeding on food scraps, and are essentially a savings device and a way to diversify sources of protein. Duck breeding (mainly for eggs) however is mostly a commercial activity, based on intensive breeding practices. It is practiced twice more frequently by landowners than by landless, as it requires large quantities of paddy crop residues. In addition, the size of duck herds tends to increase with landholding size<fnref n="89" />. However, unlike cattle, there is no 'life cycle' effect

<footnote n="89">89. 29.4% of small landowners (less than 3 acres) have 1 to 30 ducks. 14.3% of medium landowners (3 to 9 acres) have 30 to 110 ducks while large landowners (17.7%) tend to own more than 110 ducks.</footnote>
and no significant links with the age of the household head. As seen in the **tables 1 and 2** in **Annex 3**, better-off households are more frequently involved in animal husbandry activities compared to those of the lowest income category, suggesting the important role of livestock breeding in generating incomes and in mobilizing savings. In all income categories, the majority of households (in similar proportions – average is 67%) do not earn more than 10,000 MMK from livestock, confirming again that the main function of livestock is savings/constitution of capital. 69.5% of landless peasants earn less than 10,000 MMK out of livestock. This suggests that for the landless, livestock mainly plays a role as a saving asset or as a 'safety net' (in case of health problems, funerals, etc).

<figure><img src="image_60.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 31:** Frequency of livestock ownership among different landholding categories (in Delta)</figcaption></figure>

Small landowners (less than three acres) are the most frequent category to earn 1 to 3.5 lakhs from livestock per year. Indeed, their very limited landholding size requires them to supplement agriculture activities with substantial livestock income generating activities. For the higher wealth categories (total annual income (TI) over 1.5 million), 18% earn more than 3.5 lakhs out of livestock (against 5% of the lower incomes categories with a total annual income under 1.5 million). This is mainly due to their higher investment capacities to purchase large quantities of animals and to engage in more intensive livestock-breeding systems. However, in contrast to Delta, Dry Zone where farms of over 15 acres are less inclined that other landholding size categories to generate income from livestock (see **Table 3** and **Table 4** in **Annex 3**).

There is no significant link between women household heads and ownership of different types of livestock.
<figure><img src="image_61.png" /></figure>

Paddy land preparation is mostly done through power tillers in Delta.

<figure><img src="image_62.png" /></figure>

In Delta, reapers have been recently introduced for harvests. Combined harvesters are emerging in the Delta but still very rare in study areas.

<figure><img src="image_63.png" /></figure>

Engine pump used for irrigation.

<figure><img src="image_64.png" /></figure>

Paddy thresher.

<caption>**Figure 32:** Farm equipment</caption>

## 3.2 Farm equipment

As seen in **Table 27**, farm equipment in the Delta is intrinsically linked with paddy production, and is dominated by machines such as power tillers and threshers. Unsurprisingly, larger landowners own these machines more frequently. The vast majority of landowners with holdings bigger than 15 acres own their own machines. Between five to 10 acres, only one third own such machines, ownership becomes extremely rare among smaller landholding categories; instead, these farmers have to rent machines from the owners after the latter have tilled their own lands. Farming can become particular challenging in this situation, as delays in tilling due to unavailability of power tillers can affect crop yields.
<table><caption>**Table 27:** Frequency of ownership of farm equipment among landholding size categories in Delta</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Power tiller</th><th>Threshing machine</th><th>Water pump</th><th>total HH</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0.3-&lt;2.5 acres</td><td>3.4%</td><td>3.4%</td><td>0.0%</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>2.5-&lt;5 acres</td><td>6.5%</td><td>4.3%</td><td>8.7%</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>5-&lt;10 acres</td><td>31.8%</td><td>33.3%</td><td>19.7%</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td>10-&lt;15 acres</td><td>54.8%</td><td>45.2%</td><td>40.5%</td><td>42</td></tr><tr><td>&gt;=15 acres</td><td>90.6%</td><td>59.4%</td><td>71.9%</td><td>32</td></tr></tbody></table>

Farm equipment ownership is more unequal in the Dry Zone: it does not necessarily reflect the investment capacity but the fact of owning irrigated lands or not. However, carts are an integral part of farms, particularly over farms of over 5 acres.

<table><caption>**Table 28:** Frequency of ownership of farm equipment among land holding size categories in Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Water pump</th><th>Cart</th><th>Fodder chopping machine</th><th>Power tiller</th><th>Total Nb HH</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0.3-&lt;2.5 acres</td><td>19.6%</td><td>27.5%</td><td>3.9%</td><td>2.0%</td><td>51</td></tr><tr><td>2.5-&lt;5 acres</td><td>20.0%</td><td>58.3%</td><td>1.7%</td><td>0.0%</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>5-&lt;10 acres</td><td>33.1%</td><td>83.1%</td><td>12.3%</td><td>5.4%</td><td>130</td></tr><tr><td>10-&lt;15 acres</td><td>41.4%</td><td>91.4%</td><td>13.8%</td><td>15.5%</td><td>58</td></tr><tr><td>&gt;=15 acres</td><td>57.4%</td><td>100.0%</td><td>57.4%</td><td>51.9%</td><td>54</td></tr></tbody></table>

### 3.3 Agricultural credit

As observed in the table below, agricultural credit is taken by the vast majority of landowners in Delta (from 82.8% of those with the smallest holdings up to 90.6% for the largest), as well by 11.4% of landless (who access small lands under temporary arrangements). In the Dry Zone, credit is much more unequally accessed, varying from 37.3% of the smallest holdings up to 93.1% among landowners with the largest holdings, while only 2.4% of landless attain credit for agriculture. In the Delta, this is essentially due to the higher credit needs generated by paddy production, the stronger presence of government-subsidized agricultural loans (MADB) and the larger loan size (100,000 MMK per acre of paddy lands) aiming at supporting paddy production. In the Dry Zone, MADB loans also exist but amounts
are much smaller for non-paddy crops, which can explain why farmers may be less interested in facing the red tape and challenges linked to the MADB loan application procedures.

<table><caption>**Table 29:** Frequency of households taking loans for agriculture among landholding categories in the Delta and the Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3"></th><th colspan="4">Delta</th><th colspan="4">Dry Zone</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">Loans for agriculture</th><th colspan="2">No loans for agriculture</th><th colspan="2">Loans for agriculture</th><th colspan="2">No loans for agriculture</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>% L</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>% L</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>% L</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>% L</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Landless</td><td>36</td><td>11.4%</td><td>280</td><td>88.6%</td><td>6</td><td>2.4%</td><td>239</td><td>97.6%</td></tr><tr><td>0.3-&lt;2.5 acres</td><td>24</td><td>82.8%</td><td>5</td><td>17.2%</td><td>19</td><td>37.3%</td><td>32</td><td>62.7%</td></tr><tr><td>2.5-&lt;5 acres</td><td>39</td><td>84.8%</td><td>7</td><td>15.2%</td><td>37</td><td>61.7%</td><td>23</td><td>38.3%</td></tr><tr><td>5-&lt;10 acres</td><td>59</td><td>89.4%</td><td>7</td><td>10.6%</td><td>108</td><td>83.1%</td><td>22</td><td>16.9%</td></tr><tr><td>10-&lt;15 acres</td><td>38</td><td>90.5%</td><td>4</td><td>9.5%</td><td>54</td><td>93.1%</td><td>4</td><td>6.9%</td></tr><tr><td>&gt;=15 acres</td><td>29</td><td>90.6%</td><td>3</td><td>9.4%</td><td>44</td><td>81.5%</td><td>10</td><td>18.5%</td></tr><tr><td>total</td><td>225</td><td>42.4%</td><td>306</td><td>57.6%</td><td>268</td><td>44.8%</td><td>330</td><td>55.2%</td></tr></tbody></table>

A specific sub-section is dedicated to credit in section VIII analysing the MADB loans, other formal and informal credit services, loan amounts, number of loans, main sources of credit, and main reasons for borrowing.

### 3.4 Labor

The majority of Delta and Dry Zone farming households (over 80%) must employ agricultural labor to work on their farms (Table 30). In the Delta, labor is essential for paddy field preparation, transplanting, and harvesting. There is a very significant statistical link between hired labor with those who cultivate more than three acres, while those who cultivate less than three acres work with their own family labor (Table 31). In the Dry Zone there is a very significant statistical link between hired labor for those who cultivate more than six acres of lands, while those who cultivate less than three acres than to work with their own family labor (Table 32).
<table><caption>**Table 30:** Recourse to hired farm labor among households with farming activities</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Delta</th><th colspan="2">Dry Zone</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>% C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>% C</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Hire labor</th><td>244</td><td>82.7%</td><td>279</td><td>79.5%</td></tr><tr><th>No labor</th><td>51</td><td>17.3%</td><td>72</td><td>20.5%</td></tr><tr><th>total</th><td>295</td><td>100%</td><td>351</td><td>100%</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>**Table 31:** Recourse to farm labor and its association with cultivated land area in Delta</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Cultivated area (acres)</th><th colspan="2">Hire farm labor</th><th colspan="2">Don't hire farm labor</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>under 3</td><td>36</td><td>57.1</td><td>27</td><td>42.9</td><td>63</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>3 &lt; 6</td><td>70</td><td>94.6</td><td>4</td><td>5.4</td><td>74</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>6 &lt; 11</td><td>74</td><td>100.0</td><td></td><td></td><td>74</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>11 and over</td><td>57</td><td>100.0</td><td></td><td></td><td>57</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>237</td><td>88.4</td><td>31</td><td>11.6</td><td>268</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=80.2 dof=3 p=0.001 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.547

<table><caption>**Table 32:** Recourse to farm labor and relation with cultivated land area in Dry Zone</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Cultivated area (acres)</th><th colspan="2">Hire farm labor</th><th colspan="2">Don't hire farm labor</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%R</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>under 3</td><td>47</td><td>67.1</td><td>23</td><td>32.9</td><td>70</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>3 &lt; 6</td><td>69</td><td>69.7</td><td>30</td><td>30.3</td><td>99</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>6 &lt; 11</td><td>84</td><td>84.0</td><td>16</td><td>16.0</td><td>100</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>11 and over</td><td>83</td><td>95.4</td><td>4</td><td>4.6</td><td>87</td><td>100.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>283</td><td>79.5</td><td>73</td><td>20.5</td><td>356</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=27.1 dof=3 p=0.001 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.276