# Verifiable information in truthful statements: do interview context and language proficiency matter?

Irena Boskovic, Hugues Delmas, Alina Andretzky, Myriam Hocini, Eric Rassin

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Irena Boskovic, Hugues Delmas, Alina Andretzky, Myriam Hocini, Eric Rassin. Verifiable information in truthful statements: do interview context and language proficiency matter?. Psychology, Crime and Law, 2025, pp.1 - 17. 10.1080/1068316x.2025.2540382. hal-05246696

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# Verifiable information in truthful statements: do interview context and language proficiency matter?

Irena Boskovic, Hugues Delmas, Alina Andretzky, Myriam Hocini & Eric Rassin

**To cite this article:** Irena Boskovic, Hugues Delmas, Alina Andretzky, Myriam Hocini & Eric Rassin (06 Aug 2025): Verifiable information in truthful statements: do interview context and language proficiency matter?, Psychology, Crime & Law, DOI: 10.1080/1068316X.2025.2540382

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# Verifiable information in truthful statements: do interview context and language proficiency matter?

Irena Boskovic ID a, Hugues Delmas ID b,c, Alina Andretzky a, Myriam Hocini c and Eric Rassin ID a

aErasmus School of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Department of Psychology, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, the Netherlands; bUnité transversale de recherche en psychogénèse et psychopathologie, Université Sorbonne Paris Nord, Villetaneuse, France; cLaboratoire de Recherche de l'Ecole Nationale Supérieure de la Police, Saint-Cyr-au-Mont-d'Or, France

## ABSTRACT

We investigated the frequency of verifiable information in people's truthful accounts of recent life events and whether its frequency varies within the interview context and language proficiency. Participants reported their activities from 2 pm to 6 pm the previous day and were randomly assigned to either neutral (n₁ = 50, n₂ = 47) or alibi interview conditions (n₁ = 48, n₂ = 48). In Study 1 (N = 98), participants wrote their accounts in their second language, English, while in Study 2 (N = 95), participants wrote their statements in their native language, French. On average, truthful accounts contained 42 (95% CI [37.2, 46.84]) and 43 (95% CI [35.99, 50.03]) verifiable details, as well as 34 (95% CI [28.3, 40.62]) and 35 (95% CI [31.41, 40.13]) non-verifiable details, respectively. Participants included proportionally more verifiable than non-verifiable information in English (M = .56, 95% CI [.51, .61]) and French reports (M = .54, 95% CI [.49, .58]). No significant differences were found between the neutral and alibi interview groups in either study (tsStudy1 < 1.04, ps > .31; tsStudy2 < 1.14, ps > .26). Additionally, no significant differences were observed between the non-native (Study 1) and native (Study 2) speakers in terms of (non-)verifiability (ts < .78, ps > .44). These findings suggest that the verifiability of truthful reports is not influenced by the interview context or language proficiency.

## ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 29 June 2023
Accepted 19 July 2025

## KEYWORDS

The verifiability approach;
details; alibi; language;
interview

Research on deception detection has shown that specific coding frameworks for verbal cues, such as the Verifiability Approach (VA), can effectively distinguish between true and false statements (Nahari, 2019; Nahari et al., 2014a, 2014b; Vrij et al., 2016). The rationale behind VA is based on the theory that genuine and fabricated claims differ in terms of content and quality (Undeutsch, 1967). Specifically, truthful statements, derived from external memory, are expected to be more detailed and richer in quality than fabricated

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memories (Johnson & Raye, 1981). One quality aspect that has drawn researchers' attention was whether the reported information is verifiable (Nahari et al., 2014a, 2014b). Verifiable details are those that fall into one of the following categories: (i) The information was observed or performed with another identifiable individual whom the investigator can contact; (ii) Existing video evidence, such as security camera footage, can be used to verify the information; (iii) There is another reliable record of the information, such as phone records or autopsy/hospital reports (Vrij & Nahari, 2019).

According to the Verifiability Approach (VA), liars are less likely to include verifiable details than truth-tellers (Nahari et al., 2014a). However, there are differing predictions regarding the presence of non-verifiable details. Some authors suggest no difference in the inclusion of non-verifiable details between liars and truth-tellers (Nahari, 2019), while others propose that liars include more unverifiable information than genuine participants (e.g. Boskovic et al., 2017; Nahari et al., 2014a). These assumptions can be explained by two main factors: First, liars are expected to include as much information as possible in their claims, as detailed statements are generally perceived as more credible (Nahari et al., 2014b). Second, liars tend to avoid providing verifiable details that they know are likely to be found false. As a result, liars provide detailed statements that cannot be verified (Nahari et al., 2014a).

Indeed, this reporting style of liars versus truth-tellers has been consistently supported by meta-analyses on the VA (Delmas et al., 2020; Palena et al., 2021; Verschuere et al., 2021a), which showed moderate effect sizes for the number and proportion of verifiable details (for a review of these three meta-analyses, see Delmas et al., 2022). In addition, although Nahari (2019) did not make any explicit theoretical predictions about non-verifiable details, this indicator has been thoroughly tested in some studies (Verschuere et al., 2021a; see also Verschuere et al., 2021b). No meta-analysis has found any difference between liars and truth tellers regarding non-verifiable details (Delmas et al., 2020; Palena et al., 2021; Verschuere et al., 2021a).

Most studies investigating the VA have been experimental, involving two veracity conditions (liar or truth-teller) where participants received specific instructions. Six¹ of these studies used an alibi setting (Verschuere et al., 2021a), in which, for example, participants were asked to either deny stealing a USB key in an office or describe what they genuinely did for a while (Nahari et al., 2014b). The results revealed, as also reported in the meta-analyses mentioned above, that genuine accounts included higher numbers and proportions of verifiable information than fabricated alibis (see Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Vernham et al., 2020). However, little is known about the inclusion of verifiable information in reports describing everyday activities, which may often be relevant in alibi reports.

Alibi reports are often perceived with skepticism and low believability, even when physical evidence is included (Burke & Turtle, 2003; Olson & Wells, 2004; see also Olson & Charman, 2012). This skepticism might be due to the negative implicit connotations of the word 'alibi' (Burke & Turtle, 2003). However, it remains unclear whether spontaneous statements made in a neutral context align with those provided in an alibi interview context. Further investigation of the verifiability of completely genuine (alibi) reports could provide important information regarding the impact of *context* on the overall prevalence of verifiable details (i.e. baseline) in truthful statements.

Another factor that has been overlooked in alibi reporting is *language*. Research on language proficiency in legal psychology has mostly focused on lie detection, specifically
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on observers' ability to detect deception in native versus non-native speakers. These studies have produced mixed findings, ranging from null results (e.g. Cheng & Broadhurst, 2005; Evans & Michael, 2014), to better performance in detecting deception by native speakers (Leach et al., 2017; Leach & Da Silva, 2013), to more recent research, indicating a slight negative bias against non-native speakers (Elliott & Leach, 2024). Vrij et al. (2023) call for more language-based investigations, particularly concerning verbal veracity in native and second-language speakers within the field of lie detection. This call is supported by findings that non-native speakers, due to their lower language proficiency, are perceived as less truthful (Elliott & Leach, 2024). Because their statements are usually less detailed, they are more likely to be judged as deceitful (Volz et al., 2020). Similar issues have been observed with eyewitness statements (e.g. Hu & Naka, 2023), suggesting that language proficiency can significantly impact the quality of alibi reports. Therefore, it is exceptionally relevant to test whether the verifiability of genuine accounts also differs depending on the individual levels of language proficiency.

## Current studies

In this contribution, we aimed to investigate the prevalence of verifiable and non-verifiable details in unprompted truthful statements of recent life events. Our participants were randomly allocated to either a neutral or an alibi condition. Specifically, student participants in the neutral condition were required to write about their whereabouts the previous day (from 2 pm to 6 pm), whereas the participants in the alibi interview condition were asked to imagine being called into a police station to provide a statement about their whereabouts during the same period due to a robbery in their neighbourhood. By comparing these two settings, we sought to determine whether the context in which a statement is provided affects the verifiability of reports, even when the individual is being truthful.

# Study 1: method

## Participants

In this study, we initially recruited 119 bachelor students, of whom 19 participants were excluded due to poor English proficiency (see below). Additionally, two participants were removed because they did not answer the question regarding the permission to use their data or they refused it (n = 2). The final sample consisted of 98 undergraduate participants (92 females, 8 males), with an average age of 21 years (SD = 2.99, range 17-36). Overall, participants self-reported moderate English proficiency (M = 3.65, SD = 0.87; range 2-5; with 1 indicating poor and 5 indicating native speaker), although their English skills demonstrated on the official Cambridge English test (max. 25 points possible) were slightly higher (M = 21.64, SD = 1.80; range 18-25; see Materials), indicating B2 or C1 level. The two language scores were significantly correlated, Pearson's r = .41, p < .001.

Participants were randomly, but equally, allocated to one of the two contexts of the study: neutral context (n = 50) and alibi interview context (n = 48). Regarding age, participants in the neutral context (M = 20.56, SD = 2.94) did not differ from participants in the alibi interview context (M = 21.23, SD = 3.05), t(98) = 1.11, p = .272, Cohen's d = .22.
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Participants in the neutral context scored lower on the Cambridge English test (M = 21.28, SD = 1.69) than participants in the alibi interview context (M = 22.02, SD = 1.85), t(98) = 2.07, *p* = .041, Cohen's *d* = .42.

Furthermore, we asked whether our participants had any prior experience with police interviews. In the neutral context, seven participants reported having been interviewed before, while in the alibi interview context, ten subjects responded positively. These ratios did not differ significantly between contexts, $\chi^2(1) = .79, p = .372, \phi$ coefficient = .09. Among the participants, the majority (*n* = 11, 68.75%) reported being called as a witness.

## Materials

### Cambridge English Language Questionnaire

As Study 1 was conducted in English, we screened participants' level of English via the Cambridge English questionnaire (Cambridge Assessment English, 2021). The questionnaire had to be completed by each participant. Because an English proficiency level of B2 is generally accepted as the minimum proof of proficiency by most universities and institutions, we excluded all participants (*n* = 19) who obtained a score lower than 18 (indicative of lower than B2 level of proficiency) out of 25 (native speaker; C2). The questions are from Test Your English and used with permission. Test Your English is available at https://www.cambridgeenglish.org/test-your-english/general-english/ and is copyright © 2021 Cambridge University Press & Assessment.

### Instructions

Participants were randomly allocated to read one of two instruction scenarios, asking them to provide a statement about a recent memory. Half of them were given no context and merely asked to remember and report which activities they carried out the previous day between 2 pm and 6 pm. The other half was advised to imagine that a violent robbery had occurred between 2 pm and 6 pm the previous day in their neighbourhood and that they were now required to give the police a statement about their activities and whereabouts at that time (see the instructions in the *Supplementary file*).

## Procedure

This project was conducted online using Qualtrics. The study took 30 minutes to fill out, and participants of Study 1 were rewarded with research credits for their participation. Additionally, all participants were entered into a lottery for a €10 prize.

Once participants provided informed consent, demographic questions (e.g. age, gender, English proficiency and the level of studies) were presented. Then, students were randomly assigned to one of the contexts and were administered the instructions before providing the statements. The space intended for the statements only allowed a minimum of 1000 characters. We did so to ensure that participants would provide enough information in their reports. Next, a series of questions regarding their motivation and clarity of instructions were displayed, to which participants needed to respond using a 5-point Likert scale (higher values indicating higher levels and
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lower values indicating lower levels). We also asked our participants whether they pro-
vided verifiable information, how likely they believe that such information might be
checked, and how truthful their statement was. Finally, a debriefing form was pre-
sented, after which participants were asked if they permitted the use of their data.
Studies were conducted in accordance with applicable national ethical guidelines for
ethical research.

Coding of statements

All details were coded into two categories: verifiable and non-verifiable. The coding criteria for verifiable details were taken from the original publication of Nahari and Vrij (2014), meaning that detail was considered checkable if it was (a) either reliably documented, (b) carried out with or witnessed by another identifiable person that can be interviewed, (c) recorded by available video evidence, involving traceable technology (e.g. credit card use) (Nahari & Vrij, 2014). Further, considering the context of the global pandemic and potential reporting about participants’ health concerns, we also employed the criterion from Boskovic et al. (2019) (d) confirmable through a medical examination. The coding guidelines we followed are available on the Open Science Framework platform: https://osf.io/462rv/?view_only=e146b464a1fc4bc8bb897d55b0ff5fc4.

To ensure appropriate interrater reliability, all statements were coded by one first coder and 25% of the statements were additionally coded by a second coder. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was excellent for verifiable (ICC = .998) and non-verifiable details (ICC = .991) according to Cicchetti (1994).

Data analyses

The data were first analysed using descriptive statistics, after which we compared the two context groups using the chi-square (χ²), independent t-tests and Cohen's *d* for the effect size calculations. We also performed Bayesian analyses to further test the reliability of our findings. Bayes factors (*BF*₁₀) were interpreted following the thresholds proposed by Jeffreys (1961) and Lee and Wagenmakers (2013), with values between three and ten, indicating moderate evidence and those above 10, indicating strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis. For the null hypothesis, values between 0.1 and 0.33 indicate moderate evidence, while values below 0.1 indicate strong evidence.

The statistical analyses were performed with Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (Version 26), and JASP (Version 0.16.3; JASP Team, 2022). The figures were computed using the programming language Python (codes, data, coding guidelines and the outputs are available on the open science framework repository platform via an anonymised view link: https://osf.io/462rv/?view_only=e146b464a1fc4bc8bb897d55b0ff5fc4).

Study 1: results

Clarity, difficulty, motivation and confidence levels

Overall, participants reported high clarity of the instructions (M = 4.16, SD = 0.86; 95% CI [3.99; 4.33]), moderate difficulty of the task (M = 3.46, SD = 1.01, 95% CI [3.26; 3.66]) and moderate motivation to participate in our study (M = 3.16, SD = 0.89; 95% CI [2.99;
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3.34]). The neutral and alibi interview contexts did not differ in their scores on these variables, with $t_s(96) < 1.01, p_s > .314, BF_{10s} < 0.34, Cohen's d < .21$.

Further, we asked participants to rate their confidence in the memory reports provided. Overall, participants reported high confidence ($M = 4.15, SD = 0.85, 95\% CI$ [3.98; 4.32]), and the neutral ($M = 4.16, SD = 0.77; 95\% CI$ [3.94; 4.38]) and alibi interview context ($M = 4.15, SD = 0.95; 95\% CI$ [3.87; 4.42]) groups provided similar confidence levels, with $t(98) = .082, p = .935, BF_{10} = 0.21, Cohen's d = .02$.

## Number and emotionality of the reported events

Participants were asked to indicate how many events their statements included. The provided options were one, two or three plus events. In total, 14% ($n = 14$) of participants wrote about one event, 17% ($n = 17$) about two and 69% ($n = 67$) described three or more events in their reports, with $\chi^2(2) = 54.26, p < .001$.

The emotionality of the reported events was also rated on a 5-point scale. Participants mainly reported the events of low emotional valence ($M = 1.68, SD = 0.89; 95\% CI$ [1.51; 1.86]), in the neutral ($M = 1.70, SD = 0.89; 95\% CI$ [1.45; 1.95]) and alibi interview context ($M = 1.67, SD = 0.91, 95\% CI$ [1.4; 1.93]), $t(98) = .18, p = .854, BF_{10} = 0.22, Cohen's d = .04$.

## Length, truthfulness and potential check of the provided information

On average, the provided reports included 259 words ($SD = 134.5$), 95% CI [232; 286]. We asked participants to indicate a level of truthfulness in their statements (from 0% to 100%), and they indicated high truthfulness levels ($M = 93.34%, SD = 15.61, 95\% CI$ [90.25; 96.43]). Using a 5-point Likert scale (1–5), we also required that participants specify how likely they believe the possibility is that we will check the provided information. Their responses indicated a moderate possibility that we will do so ($M = 2.99, SD = 1.24, 95\% CI$ [2.74; 3.24]).

Looking between the groups, the two contexts significantly differed only on the ratings for the probability of check, with the alibi interview context providing higher scores. The BF<sub>10</sub> weakly supported the null hypothesis for the statement length, and moderately supported the truthfulness of the statement. It also weakly supported the alternative hypothesis for potential checking. For the means and standard deviations, for more details, see Table 1.

We also checked how many participants indicated that the truthfulness of their statements is below 50%. Three participants indicated < 50% truthfulness, all allocated to the

<table><caption>**Table 1.** Length of the statement, truthfulness levels and potential check ratings between the neutral and alibi interview groups.</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3"></th><th colspan="2">Contexts</th><th rowspan="3">t(96)</th><th rowspan="3">p</th><th rowspan="3">BF<sub>10</sub></th><th rowspan="3">Cohen's d</th></tr><tr><th>Neutral (n = 50)</th><th>Alibi Interview (n = 48)</th></tr><tr><th>M (SD) [95% CI]</th><th>M (SD) [95% CI]</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Statement Length<br>(word count)</td><td>263.76 (147.68)<br>[221.79; 305.73]</td><td>255.0 (120.63)<br>[219.97; 290.03]</td><td>.32</td><td>.749</td><td>0.22</td><td>.06</td></tr><tr><td>Truthfulness<br>(0–100%)</td><td>94.76 (9.30)<br>[92.12; 97.41]</td><td>91.85 (20.20)<br>[85.99; 97.72]</td><td>0.92</td><td>.36</td><td>0.31</td><td>.18</td></tr><tr><td>Potential Check<br>(1–5)</td><td>2.74 (1.23)<br>[2.39; 3.09]</td><td>3.25 (1.21)<br>[2.1; 3.6]</td><td>-2.07</td><td>.041</td><td>1.4</td><td>-.42</td></tr></tbody></table>
<figure><img src="image_22.png" /><figcaption>**Table 2.** Prevalence of verifiable and non-verifiable details, proportion of verifiable information for neutral and alibi interview contexts.</figcaption></figure>

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Contexts</th><th rowspan="2">t(96)</th><th rowspan="2">p</th><th rowspan="2">BF<sub>10</sub></th><th rowspan="2">Cohen's d</th></tr><tr><th>Neutral (n = 50)<br>M (SD) [95% CI]</th><th>Alibi Interview (n = 48)<br>M (SD) [95% CI]</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Verifiable details</td><td>40.88 (20)<br>[35.2; 46.57]</td><td>43.21 (28.37)<br>[34.97; 51.45]</td><td>-0.47</td><td>.639</td><td>0.24</td><td>-0.09</td></tr><tr><td>Non-verifiable details</td><td>37.62 (36.21)<br>[27.33; 47.91]</td><td>31.17 (24.72)<br>[23.99; 38.35]</td><td>1.02</td><td>.307</td><td>0.34</td><td>.21</td></tr><tr><td>Proportion of verifiable details</td><td>.54 (.26)<br>[.47; .61]</td><td>.59 (.25)<br>[.52; .66]</td><td>-0.95</td><td>.343</td><td>0.32</td><td>-0.19</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: The analyses were run excluding the < 50% truthful participants (n = 3), but the results did not differ with ts(93) < .88, ps > .38.

alibi interview context. Therefore, the main analyses presented below were conducted with and without these subjects (N = 95).

## Prevalence of key VA indicators

First, we asked participants whether they included any verifiable information in their statements. The vast majority, 89.8% (n = 88), indicated that they did, whereas ten participants said they did not provide checkable details (10.2%).

Interestingly, when statements were checked, only one participant gave no verifiable details but still provided 62 non-verifiable details. On average, participants reported 42.02 (SD = 24.36) verifiable details, 95% CI [37.2; 46.84].

Regarding non-verifiable details, participants reported, on average, 34.46 (SD = 31.13), 95% CI [28.3; 40.62]. One participant did not report any non-verifiable details but gave 65 verifiable ones.

The average proportion of verifiable information (verifiable details/verifiable + non-verifiable details) was .56 (SD = .25), 95% CI [.51; .61]. Interestingly, 61% of participants gave more verifiable details than non-verifiable details (i.e. proportion > .50). Finally, the neutral and the alibi interview groups did not differ in these statement qualities, and the Bayes factors (BF<sub>10</sub>) provided moderate evidence for the null hypotheses (see, Table 2 for more details).

We ran the correlations between the participants' self-reported truthfulness scores and the number of verifiable (Spearman's rho = .24, p = .019) and non-verifiable information (Spearman's rho = -.25, p = .015) and the proportion of verifiable details (Spearman's rho = .26, p = .012). We repeated the same analyses using the confidence in memory and all measurements, and no correlations reached significance, Spearman's rho's < .19, ps > .067.

## Language proficiency and statement quality

Finally, to test whether language proficiency influences the statements' quality, we ran the correlations between the participants' self-reported proficiency, their Cambridge test scores, statement length, and the number of verifiable and non-verifiable information. Interestingly, when looking at the self-reported proficiency in English, a significant (weak) positive correlation appeared only with the number of non-verifiable
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details, Spearman's rho = .24, *p* = .017, while other correlations were not significant (Spearman's rho < .13, *p* > .19). Using the Cambridge English score led to only one significant (positive) correlation and that was with the statement length (word count), Spearman's rho = .21, *p* = .041, whereas other correlations did not reach significance, Spearman's rho's < .06, *p* > .559.

Discussion

The outcomes of this study indicate that truthful participants provided an average of 250
words in their statements, out of which 42 details met the criteria of verifiable information
and 34 were coded as non-verifiable. More than half of the coded details were verifiable,
with a higher proportion of verifiable information overall. There were no significant differ-
ences between the neutral and alibi interview conditions, and the Bayes factor (*BF*₁₀) pro-
vided moderate evidence for the null hypotheses.

In addition, a post hoc power analysis for a sample of 98 participants, with an effect size of 0.3 and an *alpha* of 0.05, indicated a power of 0.926. That is, there is a 92.6% chance that the experiment allows for detecting an effect if there is a true effect present. Therefore, it is unlikely that the negative result obtained in Study 1 was due to a lack of statistical power (Faul et al., 2007).

Interestingly, ten per cent of the participants were unaware that they had provided verifiable information, suggesting that such quality of detail may not be intuitively obvious to all participants. Furthermore, participants' truthfulness ratings were found to be related to verifiable indicators: positively for the number and proportion of verifiable details, and negatively for the number of non-verifiable details. Although not the focus of our study, these results do provide support for VA assumptions.

Also, we found that the higher participants estimate their language proficiency to be,
the more non-verifiable information they report. Hu and Naka (2023) showed that speak-
ing in one's native language or in a second language modifies the inclusion of information
in statements. However, when proficiency was measured by a language test, it was only
significantly associated with the word count, simply indicating that the more proficient a
person was, the more words they produced. Noting that language proficiency, or even
participants' evaluation of it, may influence the quality of their statements is valuable.
However, the correlations we obtained were not particularly strong.

Although we controlled for participants' language proficiency in Study 1, it is difficult to determine the extent to which these initial findings could be applied to neutral and alibi statements made in a native language. To address this issue, we reproduced Study 1 with participants speaking in their native language (here, French). More generally, this type of replication may facilitate cross-cultural research of verbal cues, specifically verifiable details.

**Study 2: method**

Participants

Similarly, to Study 1, we recruited 100 participants, from which five had to be removed as
two participants did not respond to the questions regarding the permission to use their
data and three refused to provide it. Hence, the final sample consisted of 95 participants (70 females, 22 males, 3 non-binary), aged 33 years (SD = 8.25; range 17-64). Participants filled out the study in their native language, French. Subjects were randomly allocated to either the neutral group (n = 47) or the alibi interview group (n = 48). The neutral (M = 32.57, SD = 6.59) and the alibi interview group (M = 33.27, SD = 9.67) did not differ in terms of age, t(93) = 0.401, p = .68, Cohen's d = .08.

We asked participants if they had ever been interrogated by the police. Sixteen participants in the neutral and seventeen in the alibi condition had prior experience with a police interview, $\chi^2(1) = 0.02$, p = .89, phi coefficient = 0.01.

## Materials

### Instruction

As in Study 1, participants in Study 2 received the same instructions, but the only difference was that they were administered in participants' native language.

### Procedure

The procedure followed in Study 2 was identical to the Study 1 procedure, except that Study 2 participants did not fill out the English proficiency test and were not rewarded with research credits for their participation.

### Coding of statements

The coding scheme was identical to that followed in Study 1. In Study 2, the first coder was blinded to the study objectives, intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was also excellent for verifiable details (ICC = .985) and for non-verifiable details (ICC = .931). Note that the first coder in Study 1 was the second coder in Study 2 to ensure the same way of coding verifiable information in both studies.

## Data analyses

The Study 2 data were analysed in the same manner as in Study 1 (see above).

## Study 2: results

### Clarity, difficulty, motivation and confidence levels

Participants reported high clarity of instructions (M = 3.93, SD = 1.17, 95% CI [3.69; 4.16]), moderate difficulty of the task (M = 2.7, SD = 1.24, 95% CI [2.45; 2.94]) and moderate motivation to participate (M = 3.40, SD = 0.97, 95% CI [3.21; 3.4]). There were no significant differences between conditions on these three variables, with ts(93) < 1.27, ps > .206, BF₁₀s < 0.44, Cohen's ds < .26.

Further, subjects exhibited high confidence in their memory concerning the reported events (M = 4.20, SD = 0.72, 95% CI [4.06; 4.35]). Looking at the neutral group (M = 4.15, SD = 0.78, 95% CI [3.92; 4.38]) and the alibi group (M = 4.25, SD = 0.67, 95% CI [4.06; 4.44]), their confidence scores did not differ, t(93) = -0.68, p = .500, BF₁₀ = 0.26, Cohen's d = -0.14.
<figure><img src="image_24.png" /></figure>

## Number and emotionality of the reported events

Overall, 19% (n = 18) of participants wrote their statements describing only one event, whereas 11.5% (n = 11) included two events, and the vast majority, 69.5% (n = 66), of subjects reported about three or more events, with $\chi^2(2) = 56.61, p < .001$. We asked participants to rate the emotionality of the reported events on a 5-point scale. Overall, the emotionality of the events was moderate ($M = 2.65, SD = 1.08; 95\% CI [2.44; 2.87]$). Yet, the ratings were higher in the neutral group ($M = 2.94, SD = 0.87, 95\% CI [2.68; 3.19]$) than in the alibi group ($M = 2.38, SD = 1.2, 95\% CI [2.03; 2.72]$), $t(93) = 2.61, p = .011$, $BF_{10} = 4.14$, Cohen's d = .54.

## Length, truthfulness, and potential check of the provided information

On average, participants' reports included 316 words ($SD = 122.45, 95\% CI [291.88; 341.13]$). Participants indicated a high level of truthfulness (measured from 0% to 100%), $M = 95.18, SD = 13.47, 95\% CI [92.47; 97.88]$, with the neutral group being marginally more truthful than the alibi group (see, Table 3). Participants rated how likely they believe the possibility is that we will check the provided information. Their ratings indicated a moderate possibility that we will check their statements ($M = 3.05, SD = 1.46; 95\% CI [2.76; 3.35]$). The groups did not differ in this regard, and the Bayes factor ($BF_{10}$) provided moderate evidence for the null hypothesis for statement length, the potential check. It provided weak support for the alternative hypothesis for the truthfulness (see Table 3).

We also checked how many participants indicated that the truthfulness of their statements is below 50%. Two participants indicated < 50% of truthfulness, all allocated to the alibi interview context. Therefore, the main analyses presented below were conducted with and without these subjects (N = 93).

## Prevalence of key VA indicators

As before, we directly asked participants whether they provided verifiable information in their statements, and the majority, 92.6% (n = 88), confirmed that they did. Only seven participants stated not including verifiable details (7.4%). Yet, when statements were coded for checkable information, all one hundred participants provided at least a few (minimum = 3) checkable details, and on average, participants reported 43 ($SD = 34.92$) verifiable details, 95% CI [35.99; 50.03].

<table><caption>**Table 3.** Length of the statement, truthfulness levels and potential check ratings between the neutral and alibi interview groups.</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Contexts</th><th rowspan="2">t(93)</th><th rowspan="2">P</th><th rowspan="2">BF<sub>10</sub></th><th rowspan="2">Cohen's d</th></tr><tr><th>Neutral (n = 47)<br>M (SD) [95% CI]</th><th>Alibi Interview (n = 48)<br>M (SD) [95% CI]</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Statement Length (word count)</td><td>321.72 (144.25)<br>[279.37; 264.08]</td><td>311.40 (97.81)<br>[283; 399.8]</td><td>0.41</td><td>.683</td><td>0.23</td><td>0.08</td></tr><tr><td>Truthfulness<br>(0–100%)</td><td>97.83 (4.33)<br>[96.56; 99.1]</td><td>92.58 (18.18)<br>[87.31; 97.86]</td><td>1.93</td><td>.057</td><td>1.1</td><td>0.39</td></tr><tr><td>Potential Check<br>(1–5)</td><td>2.96 (1.60)<br>[2.49; 3.43]</td><td>3.15 (1.32)<br>[2.76; 3.53]</td><td>-0.63</td><td>.533</td><td>0.26</td><td>0.13</td></tr></tbody></table>
<figure><img src="image_25.png" /></figure>

Regarding non-verifiable information, participants, on average, reported 35.8 (SD = 21.70) details, 95% CI [31.41; 40.13]. The average proportion of verifiable information (verifiable details/verifiable + non-verifiable details) was .54 (SD = .23), 95% CI [.49; .58]. We checked how many participants included (proportionally) more verifiable information than non-verifiable (i.e. proportion > .50), and approximately more than half of the participants did (59%, n = 56).

In addition, the neutral and the alibi interview groups did not differ in these statement qualities. The Bayes factors ($BF_{10}$) provided moderate evidence for the null hypotheses regarding the VA indicators (see, Table 4 for more details).

As in Study 1, here, we also checked whether participants' self-reported truthfulness scores and their confidence in memory correlate with the number of reported verifiable and non-verifiable information and the proportion of verifiable details. None of the correlations were significant, not for the truthfulness (Spearman's $\rho_{hs} < .04$, $p > .72$), nor for the memory confidence scores (Spearman's $\rho_{hs} < .05$, $p > .64$).

## Overview: study 2

While Study 2 was conducted in the participants' native language, unlike the first study, the findings were overall similar. Honest participants provided an average of 315 words in their statements, of which 42 details met the criteria for verifiable information and 35 were non-verifiable. More than half of the coded details were verifiable, with a higher proportion of verifiable than non-verifiable information. There were no significant differences between the neutral and alibi interview conditions, and the Bayes factors supported the null hypothesis. Furthermore, a post hoc power analysis for a sample of 95 participants, with an effect size of 0.3 and an alpha of 0.05, yielded a power of 0.919. In other words, there was a 91.9% chance of detecting an effect if a true effect was present. Therefore, it is unlikely that the negative results were due to insufficient statistical power (Faul et al., 2007).

## Language and details: explorative comparison of the results of Study 1 and Study 2

We compared the averages of each VA indicator between the English (non-native speakers; Study 1, n = 98) and the French (native speakers; Study 2, n = 95) datasets. There were no significant results for the number of verifiable details, with $t(191) = 0.229, p = .819, BF_{10} = 0.16, Cohen's d = 0.03$; for the number of non-verifiable details, with $t(191) = 0.338, p < .05$.

<table><caption>**Table 4.** Prevalence of verifiable and non-verifiable details and proportion of verifiable information for neutral and alibi interview contexts.</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Contexts</th><th rowspan="2">t(93)</th><th rowspan="2">p</th><th rowspan="2">BF<sub>10</sub></th><th rowspan="2">Cohen's d</th></tr><tr><th>Neutral (n = 47)<br>M (SD) [95% CI]</th><th>Alibi Interview (n = 48)<br>M (SD) [95% CI]</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Verifiable details</td><td>45.51 (44.81)<br>[32.35; 58.67]</td><td>40.56 (21.46)<br>[34.33; 46.8]</td><td>0.69</td><td>.493</td><td>0.27</td><td>0.14</td></tr><tr><td>Non-verifiable details</td><td>38.32 (24.40)<br>[31.15; 45.49]</td><td>33.27 (18.55)<br>[27.88; 38.66]</td><td>1.14</td><td>.259</td><td>0.38</td><td>0.23</td></tr><tr><td>Proportion of verifiable details</td><td>.52 (.22)<br>[.46; .59]</td><td>.55 (.24)<br>[.48; .62]</td><td>-0.47</td><td>.636</td><td>0.24</td><td>0.10</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: The analyses were run excluding the < 50% truthful participants (n = 2), but the results did not differ with $t_{95} < 1.11, p > .27$.
<figure><img src="image_26.png" /></figure>

= .736, $BF_{10} = 0.17$, Cohen's *d* = -0.05, nor for the proportion of verifiable details $t(191) = -0.787$, $p = .433$, $BF_{10} = 0.21$, Cohen's *d* = -0.11. The Bayes factors for the VA indicators moderately support the null hypotheses over the alternative hypotheses. The only significant difference was found for the statement length, $t(191) = -3.08$, $p = .002$, $BF_{10} = 12.17$, Cohen's *d* = -0.44, with native speakers writing longer statements (Study 2, *M* = 316, *SD* = 122.45) than non-native speakers (Study 1, *M* = 259, *SD* = 134.5). The Bayes factor for statement length strongly supports the alternative hypothesis against the null hypothesis.

## General discussion

We investigated the prevalence of verifiable information in *truthful* statements within neutral and alibi interview *contexts*, and whether the amount of provided verifiable information is impacted by the level of participants' *language* proficiency (second language vs. native speakers). Below we discuss the main outcomes of our studies, as well as their limitations and implications.

### Verifiable information in truthful statements: insights from two studies

The findings from both studies indicate that statements based on people's daily lives tend to include slightly more verifiable information than those emanating from the experimental designs. Indeed, the average numbers of reported verifiable (42/43, Study 1, 95% CI [37.2; 46.84] & Study 2, 95% CI [35.99; 50.03]) and unverifiable (34/36, Study 1, 95% CI [28.3; 40.62] & Study 2, 95% CI [31.41; 40.13]) details found in our studies were slightly higher than what has been reported in truthful alibi narratives (ranging from 3 to 39 for verifiable details, and from 8 to 21 for non-verifiable details, based on data from the meta-analysis by Verschuere et al., 2021a). Similar observations were made when comparing the proportions we found (56% and 54%; Study 1, 95% CI [.51; .61]; Study 2, 95% CI [.49; .58]) to those reported in the literature (ranging from 0.22 to 0.44; Verschuere et al., 2021a). More than half of the truth tellers' reports contained proportionally more verifiable information (around 60% of participants), which is also a higher number than in the prior studies.

The discrepancies between our findings and previously published results are likely driven by the design of our studies. For instance, we included a minimum number of word requirement in our studies (1000 characters), which may have forced participants to provide more detailed responses. In addition, our participants were asked to describe their whereabouts for a longer period (4 hours) compared to previous studies. Both of these differences in the study design potentially provided more opportunities for our participants to include a higher amount of verifiable information in their statements. Still, our findings indicating the relatively high number of verifiable details in truthful reports have important practical implications. First, the number of verifiable details provides many opportunities for investigators to check the veracity of the report. This is important because, in the field, investigators rely on verifying details to assess the veracity of statements (Delmas et al., 2022; Nahari, 2019). Second, this also has implications for the potential use of VA. Indeed, truthful statements based on daily activities contain a relatively high proportion of verifiable details. This makes it easier to detect deviations, which are more likely to occur in deceptive statements (e.g.
<figure><img src="image_27.png" /></figure>

Verschuere et al., 2021a), than when the proportion of verifiable details in truthful statements is low (because the proportion is lower in deceptive statements). Finally, our data also indicated that simply asking people to provide verifiable details may not always be an effective tactic, as some individuals (approximately 8% of participants in both studies) do not intuitively recognize this quality of information, even when they are providing it.

## Verifiable information in neutral and alibi contexts

Besides indicating high verifiability of truthful statements, the findings from our two studies also suggested that the inclusion of verifiable and non-verifiable details in one's account is independent of the interview context, whether neutral or alibi. Truth-tellers assigned to either a neutral or an alibi interview context did not significantly differ in the tested quality of their statements in Study 1 or Study 2.

These results were somewhat surprising, as we assumed that instructing the alibi group to imagine reporting their whereabouts to law enforcement would lead to a higher perceived likelihood of their information being checked, and therefore, higher verifiability of their accounts. This is also one reason why the alibi context is considered most suitable for Verifiability Approach (VA) analysis (Nahari et al., 2014a; Verschuere et al., 2021a, 2021b). However, looking at the perceived likelihood of statements being further examined by us, the groups provided significantly different likelihood ratings only in Study 1. In Study 2, participants from both conditions provided similar likelihood scores. Comparing the two studies, the neutral group indicated a lower likelihood in Study 1 than in Study 2 (2.74 (SD = 1.23) vs. 2.96 (SD = 1.60), Cohen's *d* = 0.15), while the alibi group's scores remained relatively stable between the two studies (3.25 (SD = 1.21) vs. 3.15 (SD = 1.32), Cohen's *d* = 0.08). Therefore, the difference found in Study 1 was primarily driven by lower likelihood ratings in the neutral condition, rather than by particularly low scores from the alibi group.

Our results show that participants' perception of the likelihood that their statements would be checked did not affect the quality of their statements. This, however, might differ if the average likelihood ratings were not mid-range (~3), but rather indicative of low or high plausibility, warranting further examination.

## Verifiable information and language proficiency

The rationale for conducting two studies using the same design was to examine how differences in language proficiency affect the (non-)verifiability of statements. The first study involved non-native English speakers, whose language proficiency was assessed through self-reports and official English test scores, the second study included native French speakers.

By comparing the results from both studies, we found that whether an interviewee is a non-native or native speaker does not influence the number of verifiable or non-verifiable details in their accounts. The only characteristic affected by language proficiency was the length of the accounts (i.e. word count). It is likely that this difference arose from French being semantically different from English, typically requiring more words in speech. However, this result was also observed among non-native speakers in Study 1. Specifically,
<figure><img src="image_28.png" /></figure>

non-native speakers with higher English test scores produced longer statements. Together, these findings suggest that language proficiency primarily affects the quantity of words rather than their quality (i.e. (non-)verifiability). Yet, the topic of VA and its language dependency should be further explored also in the context of other, less often reported languages (e.g. Scandinavian, Slavic, etc.). This type of investigation is, particularly relevant in light of elaborative research suggesting that the richness of a statement (i.e. level of detail) may be just as important a cue to deception as its verifiability (see Verschuere et al., 2023). At the same time, our findings imply that the amount of detail alone may be a statement quality strongly influenced by the speaker's language proficiency.

This finding aligns with previous research (see Elliott & Leach, 2016; Leach et al., 2017; Volz et al., 2020) and has important implications. While our findings indicate that language proficiency may not be as critical as often assumed, this likely holds only if the proficiency is already relatively high. It is important to note that the majority of the non-native participants in our study had relatively high language proficiency, and the results might differ significantly with a broader range of proficiency levels. Thus, our results do not suggest disregarding an interviewee's language proficiency when evaluating the verifiability of their statements. Rather, our findings indicate that highly proficient individuals may have an advantage in providing longer narratives. This information is crucial for legal decision-makers who believe that statement length is a reliable cue to veracity, as our findings support the argument that the *quality* of statements, not their word count, deserves more attention in such decision-making (Nahari, 2019).

## Limitations

These studies are not without limitations. First, although we tried to ensure that our participants did not differ significantly in important aspects, participants in the neutral condition of Study 1 obtained lower English test scores than those in the alibi interview group. However, this difference was of low-to-medium size (Cohen's *d* = .41) and did not affect the comparison of the groups' statements. Second, our sample sizes were potentially low, but we ran additional checks using the Bayesian approach and post hoc power analyses, which supported the findings reported above. Third, although 95% of participants reported that their statements were more than 50% accurate, the actual truthfulness rates might not have been reported accurately. As mentioned earlier, participants in the neutral condition found it less likely that their statements would be verified, which could have led them to overreport their levels of truthfulness, knowing that researchers would not check their information. Fourth, some participants in the alibi condition might not have realized the possibility of being perceived as suspects, as this was not explicitly stated in our instructions. This could have impacted their truthfulness and the quality of the information provided. Finally, all participants provided written statements using their computers and/or phones, which might have obscured differences in language proficiency (e.g. lack of accent, use of grammar tools) and affected the ecological validity of our findings. It is reasonable to assume that interviewees experience more pressure and higher stakes in real police interviews compared to imagining such a situation while using digital devices, as was the case with our alibi groups. Together, these factors could influence the types of details provided by interviewees and potentially lead to different prevalence rates and ratios of verifiable to non-verifiable details.
<figure><img src="image_29.png" /></figure>

**Conclusion**

When reporting about real-life events, truth-tellers tend to include a high amount of verifiable information in their accounts. This was a consistent finding, unaffected by the interview context (neutral vs. alibi reports) or the truth-tellers' language proficiency (non-native English speakers vs. native French speakers). Thus, our results suggest that the (non-) verifiability of statements might be robust to contextual and individual factors; however, this conclusion warrants further investigation.

**Note**

1. Verschuere et al.'s meta-analysis (2021a) included 11 samples with an alibi setting resulting in six studies.

**Open Scholarship**

<figure><img src="image_30.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_31.png" /></figure>

This article has earned the Center for Open Science badges for Open Data and Open Materials through Open Practices Disclosure. The data and materials are openly accessible at https://osf.io/462rv/ and https://osf.io/462rv/.

**Disclosure statement**

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

**Authors' contribution**

The first author created and supervised the project. The second author co-coordinated the project and co-wrote the manuscript. The third and fourth authors collected the data and co-wrote the manuscript. The fifth author reviewed and co-wrote the manuscript.

**Data availability statement**

The codes, data and the outputs are available on the *open science framework* repository platform by an anonymised view link: https://osf.io/462rv/?view_only=e146b464a1fc4bc8bb897d55b0ff5fc4.

**ORCID**

Irena Boskovic http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1675-1004

Hugues Delmas http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5217-5986

Eric Rassin http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0830-7758

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