# Land tenure in rural lowland Myanmar: From historical perspectives to contemporary realities in the Dry zone and the Delta

Maxime Boutry, Céline Allaverdian, Marie Mellac, Stephen Huard, San Thein, Tin Myo Win, Khin Pyae Sone

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## To cite this version:

Maxime Boutry, Céline Allaverdian, Marie Mellac, Stephen Huard, San Thein, et al., Land tenure in rural lowland Myanmar: From historical perspectives to contemporary realities in the Dry zone and the Delta: Of lives of land Myanmar research series., [Research Report] GRET. 2017. halshs-02372225

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Submitted on 20 Nov 2019

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Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - ShareAlike 4.0 International License
LAND
TENURE
IN RURAL
LOWLAND
MYANMAR

From historical perspectives to contemporary realities
in the Dry zone and the Delta

M. Boutry, C. Allaverdian, M. Mellac,
S. Huard, U San Thein, Tin Myo Win, Khin Pyae Sone

Of Lives and Land Myanmar research series

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<figure><img src="image_4.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /></figure>
LAND
TENURE
IN RURAL
LOWLAND
MYANMAR

From historical perspectives to contemporary realities
in the Dry zone and the Delta

M. Boutry, C. Allaverdian, M. Mellac,
S. Huard, U San Thein, Tin Myo Win, Khin Pyae Sone

Of Lives and Land Myanmar research series
Published by GRET © 2017

**Suggested citation:**

Boutry, M., Allaverdian, C., Mellac, M., Huard, S., San Thein, Tin Myo Win, Khin Pyae Sone. (2017). Land tenure in rural lowland Myanmar: From historical perspectives to contemporary realities in the Dry zone and the Delta. Of lives of land Myanmar research series. Gret: Yangon.

**Written by:**

Maxime Boutry and Celine Allaverdian, with contributions of Marie Mellac, Stephen Huard, U San Thein, Tin Myo Win, and Khin Pyae Sone

**Reviewed by:**

Jean-Christophe Diepart, Jean-Philippe Lavigne Delville, Elliott Prasse Freeman, Tania Murray Li, Aurore Mansion and Kevin Woods

**Coordinated by:** Celine Allaverdian and Maxime Boutry

**Design and layout:** Katherine Gibney | www.accurateyak.carbonmade.com

**Of Lives and Land Myanmar research series**

The Of Lives and Land series emanates from in-depth socio-anthropological research on land and livelihoods dynamics. Through various thematic focuses – urban, peri-urban and rural land issues, migration, conflict and resettlement – the series presents a rigorous analysis of how people from various regions of Myanmar shape land relations in a rapidly changing social, economic and political context. From the exploration of grounded realities, the series aims to address some of the challenges that Myanmar people, the state and other stakeholders are facing in managing land and associated resources and seeks to provide insights to inform policy dialogue and law formulation processes. The series is peer reviewed by a committee of professionals and academics.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:** We thank the European Union and governments of Australia, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America for their kind contributions to improving the livelihoods and food security of rural people in Myanmar. We would also like to thank the Mitsubishi Corporation, as a private sector donor.

**DISCLAIMER:** This document is supported with financial assistance from Australia, Denmark, the European Union, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Mitsubishi Corporation. The views expressed herein are not to be taken to reflect the official opinion of any of the LIFT donors.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License

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# Table of contents

<table><tr><td>Acronyms</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Burmese terminology terms</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Lists of boxes, figures and tables</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>Acknowledgements</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Executive summary</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>I. Introduction</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>1. Towards a new land framework</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>2. A study to improve understanding on land issues</td><td>35</td></tr><tr><td>3. Brief overview of the contents</td><td>36</td></tr><tr><td>II. Methodology</td><td>39</td></tr><tr><td>1. Analytical framework and starting assumptions</td><td>39</td></tr><tr><td>2. Site selection</td><td>42</td></tr><tr><td>3. Architecture of the study and data collection methods</td><td>44</td></tr><tr><td>3.1 Phase 1: Descriptive approach</td><td>44</td></tr><tr><td>3.2 Phase 2: Qualitative approach</td><td>45</td></tr><tr><td>3.3 Phase 3: Quantitative approach</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>4. Limitations of the research</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>III. The making of contemporary land tenure in lowland Myanmar</td><td>51</td></tr><tr><td>1. The making of modern land tenure (1800s to 1948)</td><td>51</td></tr><tr><td>1.1 From subjects to tenants</td><td>51</td></tr><tr><td>1.2 Dispossession: from state's tenants to the state of tenancy</td><td>54</td></tr><tr><td>1.3 Ayeyarwaddy Delta: the rice frontier</td><td>58</td></tr><tr><td>1.4 Upper Burma: the rise of a land owning class</td><td>61</td></tr><tr><td>1.5 Impacts of colonization on landlordism</td><td>63</td></tr><tr><td>2. The post-independence Burmese agrarian society: State policies as a factor of land insecurity (1949 onwards)</td><td>65</td></tr><tr><td>3. A brief overview of institutions involved in current land management</td><td>69</td></tr><tr><td>IV. Overview of the areas under study: History, policies and land</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>1. Ayeyarwaddy Delta (Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun townships): a world of water and paddy, and a changing agricultural frontier</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>2. Dry Zone (Monywa and Yinmabin townships): a diversified and resilient agriculture, in the cradle of Burmese culture</td><td>78</td></tr><tr><td>3. Land uses</td><td>82</td></tr><tr><td>3.1 Village lands</td><td>82</td></tr><tr><td>3.2 Forestlands</td><td>84</td></tr><tr><td>3.3 Communal lands</td><td>86</td></tr><tr><td>3.4 Farmland</td><td>88</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>5</td></tr></table>
**4. Delta and Dry Zone households' demographic and social profile** 95

4.1 Household life cycle 95

4.2 Migration 96

**V. Transfers of land use rights** 98

**1. Land use rights transfers and papers** 98

1.1 The ban on land use right transfers 98

1.2 Farmer booklets 99

1.3 Tax receipts 100

**2. Inheritance and land fragmentation** 101

2.1 Customary principles of farm succession (Dry Zone) 101

2.2 Delta: more unequal inheritance patterns among siblings 104

2.3 Current issues concerning land inheritance 105

2.4 Land fragmentation 106

**3. Land sales since 1988** 106

3.1 Government policies as a driver of land use rights transfers (Delta) 107

3.2 Contracting a land sale before 2012 108

3.3 Is there a 'land market'? 111

**4. Land arrangements and "derived rights"** 112

4.1 Different types of agrarian contracts 112

4.2 Qualitative and quantitative analysis on contracting in 119

4.3 Making numbers meaningful: how discrepancies between in and out temporary arrangements shed light on unsecure land tenure framework 123

4.4 Quantitative analysis on contracting out 125

**VI. The new land framework: impact, issues and land disputes** 127

**1. The hasty land registration process** 128

1.1 Disparities in LUC delivery rates 128

1.2 Top down process and exclusion of the smallest farming households 129

1.3 Errors in LUCs and objections 131

1.4 The land registration process on the ground 132

1.5 Gender and land registration 134

**2. Land Use Certificates: new opportunities or more problems to come?** 134

2.1 New opportunities, for whom? 134

2.2 The continued issue of restrictions over land use rights 136

2.3 What improvements brought by the LUCs? 138

**3. Land use disputes under the 2012 land reform** 142

3.1 The result of legal pluralism and stacked laws 142

3.2 Land reforms and the creation of a new arena: the case of Tet Tet Ku plowing contestation 143

3.3 The limited capacities of local institutions in conflict resolution 146
<table><tbody><tr><td><strong>VII. Land tenure and livelihood security</strong></td><td><strong>148</strong></td></tr><tr><td><strong>1. Land ownership in Dry Zone and Delta</strong></td><td><strong>148</strong></td></tr><tr><td>1.1 Historical roots of landlessness</td><td>150</td></tr><tr><td>1.2 Major disparities among villages in each area</td><td>151</td></tr><tr><td><strong>2. Other key differentiation factors in access to farmlands</strong></td><td><strong>153</strong></td></tr><tr><td>2.1 Age and the household life cycle</td><td>155</td></tr><tr><td>2.2 Household size and link with landholding size</td><td>156</td></tr><tr><td>2.3 Landlessness and recent migration</td><td>157</td></tr><tr><td>2.4 Access to land and social position</td><td>158</td></tr><tr><td>2.5 Gender, access to land and land security</td><td>161</td></tr><tr><td><strong>3. Farming capital and household labor</strong></td><td><strong>161</strong></td></tr><tr><td>3.1 Livestock</td><td>161</td></tr><tr><td>3.2 Farm equipment</td><td>166</td></tr><tr><td>3.3 Agricultural credit</td><td>167</td></tr><tr><td>3.4 Labor</td><td>168</td></tr><tr><td><strong>4. Farming systems and agricultural income</strong></td><td><strong>170</strong></td></tr><tr><td>4.1 The Delta farming systems: high level of specialization in paddy</td><td>170</td></tr><tr><td>4.2 Dry Zone: a diversified and resilient agriculture</td><td>175</td></tr><tr><td>4.3 Comparing land productivity in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>178</td></tr><tr><td><strong>5. Income diversification</strong></td><td><strong>180</strong></td></tr><tr><td>5.1 On-farm wage labor</td><td>180</td></tr><tr><td>5.2 Fishing: an essential Delta activity</td><td>182</td></tr><tr><td>5.3 Off farm activities</td><td>185</td></tr><tr><td><strong>6. Discussion: Land distribution, access and livelihood strategies</strong></td><td><strong>187</strong></td></tr><tr><td>6.1 Categorising farmers</td><td>187</td></tr><tr><td>6.2 Land access</td><td>192</td></tr><tr><td>6.3 Farmers strategies and socioeconomic mobility</td><td>196</td></tr><tr><td>6.4 Discussion on the two zones</td><td>205</td></tr><tr><td><strong>7. Who are the rural landless households? Discussing the concepts of landlessness and 'land-exclusion'</strong></td><td><strong>209</strong></td></tr><tr><td>7.1 Landlessness in Delta</td><td>213</td></tr><tr><td>7.2 Landlessness in Dry Zone</td><td>217</td></tr><tr><td>7.3 A changing agrarian landscape?</td><td>222</td></tr><tr><td><strong>VIII. Landlessness as a result of intimate exclusion</strong></td><td><strong>225</strong></td></tr><tr><td><strong>1. Village-based class division and exclusion</strong></td><td><strong>226</strong></td></tr><tr><td>1.1 Dry Zone: intimate exclusion through power of legitimation</td><td>226</td></tr><tr><td>1.2 Delta: intimate exclusion through force and market</td><td>229</td></tr><tr><td><strong>2. Credit, indebtedness, and intimate exclusion</strong></td><td><strong>232</strong></td></tr><tr><td>2.1 Credit and dispossession, a historical constant: the example of the Delta</td><td>233</td></tr><tr><td>2.2 MADB, credit and indebtedness</td><td>234</td></tr><tr><td>2.3 Delta: a stronger dependency on loans</td><td>238</td></tr></tbody></table>
2.4 Land exclusion due to indebtedness 245

**3. The village headman, cornerstone of exclusion processes?** 247

3.1 The village headman in pre-2012 land management 247

3.2 The village headman in the midst of land reform 249

3.3 Linking the different dimensions of exclusion 252

**IX. Conclusions and recommendations** 254

1. A century and a half of uprooting Burmese agrarian society... for its own interest? 254

2. Land access and livelihoods' security: does the problem lie in land tenure? 256

2.1 Access to land and livelihoods security: a different relationship in Delta and Dry Zone 257

2.2 The need for deeper reforms for improved access to land? 258

**3. Improving the current land reform** 259

3.1 A formalization process adapted to the reality of land rights 260

3.2 Mapping and zoning: reflecting land use practices on the ground 262

3.3 Empowering land users through full disposal rights 263

3.4 Land conflict resolution 264

3.5 LUCs: individualized (and gendered) vs. familial land management 266

**4. Building a conducive context for securing agricultural livelihoods** 268

4.1 Improving access to institutional credit schemes 268

4.2 Increasing sustainable intensification, diversification and resilience 269

4.3 Mechanization versus farm-labor opportunities 271

**5. Taking into account the diversity of rural households for effective targeting of policy and action** 272

5.1 Smallholders are not one uniform category 272

5.2 Targeting "young" households: life cycle and land patrimony's trajectories 273

5.3 Better understand and tackle the issue of 'landlessness' 274

**X. References** 276

**XI. Annexes** 282

1. Basic demography data (Delta and Dry Zone combined) 282

2. Key figures on contracting out lands for farming by others 285

3. Livestock 287

4. Farm gate paddy prices at Bogale-Malamyinegun area - for 4 different varieties (2012-2014) 289

5. Profit and loss statement of paddy production (monsoon and summer) in Delta 291

6. Supporting data for income generation (on farm wage labor, fishing, off farm activities) 294

7. Total income per farmers categories 299

8. Methodology for quantitative survey 300
Acronyms

**ARDC** Agriculture and Rural Development Corporation

**CNRS** Centre National de Recherche Scientifique (France)

**CSO** Civil Society Organization

**DALMS** DALMS Department of Agricultural Land Management and Statistics (former SLRD)

**DoA** Department of Agriculture

**DZGD** Dry Zone Greening Department

**FAB** Farmland Administration Body

**FAO** Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

**FD** Forest Department

**GAD** General Administration Department

**GDP** Gross Domestic Product

**HH** Household

**HHH** Household Head/ Head of Household

**IFAD** International Fund for Agricultural Development

**INGO** International Non-Governmental Organisation

**IRRI** International Rice Research Institute

**LIFT** Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund

**LUC** Land Use Certificate

**MADB** Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank

**MAS** Myanmar Agricultural Service (former DoA)

**MFI** Micro Finance Institution

**MMK** Myanmar Kyat

**MOAI** Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (former name before May 2016)

**MOALI** Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation (name after May 2016)

**MOECAF** Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry

**MONREC** Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation

**NGO** Non-Governmental Organization

**NLD** National League for Democracy

**NLUP** National Land Use Policy

**PRF** Protected Public Forest

**RF** Reserve Forest

**SEE** State Economic Enterprise
**SHG** Self Help Group

**SLORC** State Law and Order Restoration Council

**SLRD** Settlement and Land Records Department

**SPDC** State Peace and Development Council

**USDP** Union Solidarity and Development Party

**UN** United Nations

**UNCCD** United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification

**UNDP** United Nations Development Programme

**VFV** Virgin, Fallow and Vacant

**VTFMC** Village Tract Farmland Management Committee

**VT** Village Tract

**VTA** Village Tract Administrator

**WRUD** Water Resource Utilisation Department
Burmese terminology terms

The Burmese words are rendered in this report using the conventional transcription with raised comma tones as in Okell, 1971 (Okell, John. 1971, *A guide to the romanisation of Burmese*, Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland: London.)

<table><thead><tr><td>Correct transliteration</td><td>Definition</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>amwei</td><td>Inheritance</td></tr><tr><td>a-nu-gan-myei</td><td>See le-pyan-ngwei-pyan</td></tr><tr><td>apyin pyis-si"</td><td>'Outside property' (inheritance): includes money, gold, gems</td></tr><tr><td>atwin pys-si"</td><td>'Inside property' (inheritance): includes farmlands, cattle, farm tools</td></tr><tr><td>athis</td><td>Freemen</td></tr><tr><td>bauk-thama'</td><td>As opposed to le-thama', general worker</td></tr><tr><td>bei gya lei</td><td>Variety of monsoon paddy</td></tr><tr><td>bo"bapaing</td><td>Land transferred through generation, generally after being reclaimed through clearing (see dama-u-gya)</td></tr><tr><td>da"ma'-u-khja</td><td>'first (to) wield the machete', designates the right of the first person clearing a piece of land to put under cultivation / a term applied to land which has become the property of the owner, by right of his having been the first to clear it of jungle, or by right of his having cleared it of jungle after its owner had deserted it. (Judson dic: p. 518)</td></tr><tr><td>dokkhita</td><td>Destituted' people exempted from the Thathameda tax under King Mindon (1853-1878)</td></tr><tr><td>eim khyan</td><td>Home garden</td></tr><tr><td>kaing-kjun"</td><td>Alluvial land</td></tr><tr><td>khayaing-wun</td><td>District officer (pre-colonial Burma)</td></tr><tr><td>kwat</td><td>Unit for measuring cultivation plots, equal to 1.25 acres</td></tr><tr><td>kwat-pyat</td><td>Task based arrangement between a landowner and a worker (based on the number of kwat to be worked)</td></tr><tr><td>kwet-pyauk</td><td>Plots escaping cadastral maps</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td>kwin</td><td>Field, cadastral unit</td></tr><tr><td>kyauk-lok</td><td>Stonewalls built across water ways in Dry Zone to transform hill slopes into arable lands</td></tr><tr><td>kyei"zu"shin</td><td>Master of gratitude</td></tr><tr><td>kjun</td><td>Slave, servant-tenant</td></tr><tr><td>le</td><td>Paddy land</td></tr><tr><td>le-pyan-ngwei-pya</td><td>Mortgage (litt. the paddy land against the money)</td></tr><tr><td>le-thama'</td><td>Farmer</td></tr><tr><td>le-ya-myei lok-paing-khwin</td><td>Right to cultivate the land</td></tr><tr><td>lon-khji"</td><td>The Burmese sarong</td></tr><tr><td>lu-kyi"</td><td>Important / repsectable person / authorities</td></tr><tr><td>lu-mu-yei"</td><td>Social (practice)</td></tr><tr><td>lwe-pyaung"</td><td>To transfer</td></tr><tr><td>mahalwari</td><td>(Hindi) a village based system in which village bodies which jointly owned the village were responsible for the land revenue</td></tr><tr><td>myo'</td><td>Town</td></tr><tr><td>myosa</td><td>Town's governor (pre-colonial times)</td></tr><tr><td>myo'-thukyi"</td><td>Town's administrator</td></tr><tr><td>nga"pi</td><td>Shrimp/fish paste</td></tr><tr><td>ok-thukyi"</td><td>Person in charge of cooking the meal during social events, donations</td></tr><tr><td>paing sain-tho</td><td>Ownership</td></tr><tr><td>Patta (system)</td><td>(Hindi) system, aimed at encouraging cultivators to cultivate state land that had previously not been under cultivation. This system granted tenure before the cultivator cleared the land without collecting revenue during a period varying according to the difficulty to transform the land into productive farmland. Such land could not be mortgaged and cultivators had to show sufficient means to cultivate the land without resorting to money-lenders</td></tr><tr><td>phaya taka"</td><td>Lay individual actively involved (including financially supporting) in monastery's activities</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>ryotwari</td><td>(Hindi) an individual based system where revenue settlement was fixed directly with individuals (colonial period)</td></tr><tr><td>shin-pyu'</td><td>Buddhist noviciate</td></tr><tr><td>taik</td><td>Pre-colonial administration unit corresponding to a grouping of villages</td></tr><tr><td>tawak-sa"</td><td>'eat half', name of a sharecropping arrangement</td></tr><tr><td>thanaka</td><td>Perennial tree (Limonia acidissima)</td></tr><tr><td>thathameda</td><td>Tax introduced under King Mindon (1853-1878), of tenth of the household's income and replacing all other existing taxes and fees as known under previous monarchs.</td></tr><tr><td>Thi"- sa"-khja'</td><td>Sharecropping</td></tr><tr><td>thon"-su'-thasu'</td><td>'1 measure-3 measures (of crop)', name of a sharecropping arrangement:</td></tr><tr><td>thu-kyi"</td><td>Headman</td></tr><tr><td>u-yin</td><td>Garden/orchard land</td></tr><tr><td>u-paing</td><td>Individual landholding</td></tr><tr><td>ya</td><td>Dry land</td></tr><tr><td>ya-eim-hmu</td><td>100 households' leader, himself referring to the village tract administrator</td></tr><tr><td>yap-mi'-yap-pha'</td><td>'traditional' elders</td></tr><tr><td>ye"-mye" shin</td><td>Lord of water and earth'</td></tr><tr><td>ywa myay</td><td>Village land</td></tr><tr><td>ywa-thukyi"</td><td>Village headman</td></tr><tr><td>zamindari</td><td>(Hindi) the landlord based system (zamindari) where landlords established the tax to be collected for themselves, from which they would pay the requested amount to the British administration</td></tr><tr><td>zin"gama" myei</td><td>Temporary alluvial areas that are created in river beds through the accumulation of alluviums during rainy seasons, managed communaly by the village</td></tr></table>
# Short guidance note for interpretation of tables (cross-tabulations)

The quantitative analysis used a French software, Modalisa®, for interpreting the relationship between different modalities. This program has been created in the objective of reuniting both quantitative and qualitative statistical tools in a single software.

Throughout the report, the reader will come across cross-tabulations tables consisting in confronting the different modalities of two variables in a single table. Modalisa® offers a graphical reading of the ties existing between the modalities of 2 variables, based on the calculation of PEM (percentage from maximum deviation), that is an index of ties between modalities of a contingency table.

The local PEM allows the relevant cross-tabulations to be filtered according to whether they have at least one box with a significant local PEM. For a PEM to be chosen the number must be sufficient and the Chi-Square must be significant. For the PEM to be considered significant it is necessary that the test of Chi-Square over the whole table is greater than 90% (value of p less than or equal to 0.1).

The colorimetric index reflects the strength of ties between modalities (the darker the stronger): positive ties are shown in green and negative ties in blue. As shown in the table below, the “Capitalized family farmers” category in positively correlated to the fact of having enough rice throughout the year (dark green) and negatively correlated to having not enough rice (dark blue). The “Agri-specialized small farmers” category is positively correlated, yet with a less stronger tie (light green), of lacking rice throughout the year.

<table><caption>**Table 59:** Distribution of households declaring lacking rice at least once in the year, among the 3 farmers categories (Dry Zone)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Capitalised family farmers</th><th colspan="2">Multi-active farmers</th><th colspan="2">Farm-specialised small farmers</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th><th>Nb HH</th><th>%C</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Not enough rice</td><td>2</td><td>1.8</td><td>17</td><td>15.3</td><td>22</td><td>17.2</td><td>41</td><td>11.6</td></tr><tr><td>Enough rice</td><td>112</td><td>98.2</td><td>94</td><td>84.7</td><td>106</td><td>82.8</td><td>312</td><td>88.4</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>114</td><td>100.0</td><td>111</td><td>100.0</td><td>128</td><td>100.0</td><td>353</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Chi-Square=16.1 dof=2 p=0.001 (Very significant) Cramer's V=0.214
Effectives in each cell can be shown as per the number of households concerned (eff. (or Nb HH)), in percentage of a column (%C) and percentage of a row (%R).

Dof designated the Degree of Freedom which refers to the number of random variables that can not be determined or fixed by the statistical test.

For more details see: https://www.modalisa.com/pdf/CiboisPEM.pdf
# Conversion of Units

## AREA

<table><thead><tr><th>Unit</th><th>Square feet</th><th>Kwat</th><th>Hectare</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1 Acre (standard)</td><td>43,551</td><td>0.8</td><td>0.4046</td></tr></tbody></table>

## VOLUMES AND WEIGHTS

Standardized measurements in Myanmar:

<table><thead><tr><th>Government basket (GB)</th><th>Imperial Gallon</th><th>Pound (lbs)</th><th>Kilogram (Kg)</th><th>Item</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>9</td><td>46</td><td>20.861</td><td>Paddy</td></tr></tbody></table>

(Source: Bernot, 1974)

1 GB = 16 pyi = 128 condensed milk cans (128 x 11.25 fluid ounce = 9 imp gal)

<table><thead><tr><th>Units</th><th>KG</th><th>Viss</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1 GB =</td><td>20.86*</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>1 Kg =</td><td>1</td><td>0.612</td></tr><tr><td>1 Viss =</td><td>1.633</td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>

*For paddy

(Source: Bernot, 1974)

## PADDY YIELDS

<table><thead><tr><th>GB / Acre</th><th>KG/hectare</th><th>KG/hectare</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>10</td><td>209</td><td>522.5</td></tr><tr><td>20</td><td>418</td><td>1,045 ~ 1 ton</td></tr><tr><td>40</td><td>836</td><td>2,090 ~ 2 tons</td></tr><tr><td>50</td><td>1,045</td><td>2,612.5</td></tr><tr><td>60</td><td>1,254</td><td>3,135 ~ 3 tons</td></tr><tr><td>100</td><td>2,090</td><td>5,225 ~ 5 tons</td></tr></tbody></table>
# Lists of boxes, figures and tables

## LIST OF BOXES

<table><tr><td>Box 1: Introduction of summer paddy</td><td>71</td></tr><tr><td>Box 2: Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun through the 'Compulsory Delivery Quota'</td><td>76</td></tr><tr><td>Box 3: Monywa, cradle of Burmese culture?</td><td>79</td></tr><tr><td>Box 4: Government irrigation projects in Sagaing region</td><td>81</td></tr><tr><td>Box 5: Government greening projects in the Dry Zone</td><td>85</td></tr><tr><td>Box 6: A problematic land inheritance case for a young widow in Minbu township (Dry Zone)</td><td>102</td></tr><tr><td>Box 7: Analysing a contract's terminology: playing with pluralism</td><td>110</td></tr><tr><td>Box 8: Description of multiple arrangements to access lands: a case of thi"-sa"-khja' and mortgage in Bogale township</td><td>115</td></tr><tr><td>Box 9: A case of mortgage in Delta, between friends</td><td>117</td></tr><tr><td>Box 10: Different versions of the land registration process among stakeholders</td><td>130</td></tr><tr><td>Box 11: Tax receipts: the ultimate "proof" of land use?</td><td>133</td></tr><tr><td>Box 12: Ministries responsible for land administration</td><td>135</td></tr><tr><td>Box 13: Land dispute case study with le pyan nge pyan arrangements</td><td>144</td></tr><tr><td>Box 14: On-farm labor: supply and demand in Delta</td><td>183</td></tr><tr><td>Box 15: Retaining access to land over generations</td><td>227</td></tr><tr><td>Box 16: The struggle of a small scale farming family to maintain access to land</td><td>228</td></tr><tr><td>Box 17: Legitimation vs. market? Contradicting claims over land</td><td>229</td></tr><tr><td>Box 18: Study cases: land accumulation and contested rights in Delta</td><td>230</td></tr><tr><td>Box 19: Governmental loans, mortgage, and exclusion (Aye Ywar, Delta)</td><td>246</td></tr><tr><td>Box 20: Composition and tasks of the Ward/Village Tract Farmland Management Body</td><td>251</td></tr></table>

## LIST OF FIGURES

<table><tr><td>Figure 1: Maps of the study areas in Myanmar</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 2: The three key phases of the study</td><td>44</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 3: Location of the studied townships in Ayeyarwaddy</td><td>70</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>Figure 4: Iso salinity map of Delta (source: unknown)</td><td>72</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 5: Land cover map of Mawlamyinegyun township (source: IRRI, 2013)</td><td>73</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 6: Location of studied townships in Sagaing</td><td>79</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 7: Map of Aye Ywar, a 'typical' Deltaic village</td><td>83</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 8: Example of the concentric pattern of village expansion in Dry Zone (Zee Phyu Pin village)</td><td>83</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 9: Delta and Dry Zone forestlands</td><td>87</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 10: Transect diagrams of Delta villages in fresh water and salt water areas</td><td>88</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 11: Delta seasonal calendar in two seasons paddy areas</td><td>89</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 12.1: Delta paddy lands</td><td>90</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 12.2: Delta garden lands</td><td>91</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 13: Dry Zone farmers' cropping calendars in Monywa and Yinmabin townships</td><td>92</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 14.1: Dry Zone major farmland uses - 'ya' lands</td><td>94</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 14.2: Dry Zone major farmland uses - Dry Zone garden lands</td><td>94</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 15: Dry Zone paddy lands</td><td>94</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 16: Translation of contents of the form 7 (LUC) and conditions of land use rights</td><td>99</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 17: Tax receipt</td><td>100</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 18: Example of succession in Dry Zone</td><td>103</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 19: A case of unequal inheritance in the Delta</td><td>105</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 20: Diversity of land sale contracts</td><td>109</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 21: Stakeholders involved in 'Chinese watermelon' rental contracts</td><td>118</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 22: Form 105 (attached to Form 7)</td><td>131</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 23: Land Use Certificate (LUC), commonly called 'Form 7'</td><td>131</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 24: Translation of contents of the form 7 (LUC) and conditions of land use rights</td><td>138</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 25: Distribution of landownership and landholding size among HH (in% of HH) in the two areas</td><td>149</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 26: Distribution of farmland holding sizes among land owning households in Dry Zone and Delta</td><td>149</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 27: Landlessness rates among household head age categories in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>153</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>Figure 28: Two tables showing average landholding size among household head age categories in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>154</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 29.1: Pictures of key livestock in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>162</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 29.1: Pictures of livestock feed in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>163</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 30: Frequency of livestock ownership among different landholding categories in Dry Zone</td><td>164</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 31: Frequency of livestock ownership among different landholding categories in Delta</td><td>165</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 32: Farm equipment</td><td>166</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 33: Paddy transplanting represents a peak period for farm labor needs</td><td>171</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 34: Average yield per acre (baskets) according to farmland holding classes in Delta areas where double cropping is possible</td><td>174</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 35: Dry Zone land productivity (MMK/acre) according to farmland holding classes</td><td>177</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 36: Pictures reflecting the high diversity of technologies used for fishing, and adapted to the varied species fished and the scales of fishing.</td><td>184</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 37: Pictures of some off-farm activities</td><td>185</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 38: Distribution of main categories of farmers in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>188</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 39: Bar chart representing land acquisition modalities (inheritance, purchase) for Delta and Dry Zone different types of farmers</td><td>193</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 40: Delta and Dry Zone landless' involvement in the primary sector</td><td>212</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 41: Distribution of different types of landless in Delta</td><td>213</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 42: Distribution of different types of landless in the Dry Zone</td><td>219</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 43: Ratio of landless households/landowners' households according to the age of household head, in each zone and deviation between the two zones</td><td>223</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 44: Roles (informal in green, official in light brown) of the village headman in land management under the procurement policy</td><td>249</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 45: Continuity: the role of the Village Headman under the new land framework, against historical background</td><td>203</td></tr></table>
LIST OF TABLES

<table><tr><td>Table 1: Selected villages for the survey phase 1</td><td>45</td></tr><tr><td>Table 2: Selected villages for the survey phase 2</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>Table 3: Number of interviews and quantitative survey coverage per village</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>Table 4: Key information of Delta surveyed villages (source: village statistics)</td><td>74</td></tr><tr><td>Table 5: Key information of Dry Zone surveyed villages (village statistics)</td><td>80</td></tr><tr><td>Table 6: Paddy cultivation in studied villages in Dry Zone</td><td>91</td></tr><tr><td>Table 7: Cultivated areas of main Dry Zone crops (ya lands) in study villages</td><td>93</td></tr><tr><td>Table 8: Land inheritance in Delta and Dry Zone since 1988</td><td>101</td></tr><tr><td>Table 9: Some figures on land sales in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>107</td></tr><tr><td>Table 10: Examples of land transactions recorded in Khoe Tan, village close to Monywa town (Dry Zone)</td><td>111</td></tr><tr><td>Table 11: Example of land transactions recorded in Pay Chaung, isolated village in saltwater area (Delta)</td><td>112</td></tr><tr><td>Table 12: Number of households, % of total households contracting in (over total households), and average acreage of lands for cultivation by households on non-owned lands, in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>113</td></tr><tr><td>Table 13: Distribution of Delta households cultivating land they do not own, among categories of landownership categories (area in acres)</td><td>119</td></tr><tr><td>Table 14: Distribution of households in Dry Zone cultivating land they do not own among categories of landownership categories (area in acres)</td><td>120</td></tr><tr><td>Table 15: Share of Delta households (landless or landowner) cultivating land they do not own</td><td>122</td></tr><tr><td>Table 16: Distribution of Delta households cultivating land they do not own by household head age category</td><td>122</td></tr><tr><td>Table 17: Share of Dry Zone households (landless or landowner) cultivating land they do not own</td><td>122</td></tr><tr><td>Table 18: Numerical gaps between households contracting in and contracting out lands</td><td>124</td></tr><tr><td>Table 19: Number of households engaged in different types of temporary land arrangements (in and out) in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>124</td></tr><tr><td>Table 20: Summary data on contract out households for Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>125</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>Table 21: Distribution of owned acreages and number of landowners in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>149</td></tr><tr><td>Table 22: Land tenure disparities among Delta villages</td><td>152</td></tr><tr><td>Table 23: Dry Zone labor force in households and owned farmland size</td><td>156</td></tr><tr><td>Table 24: Delta statistical relationship between household head sex and landownership</td><td>159</td></tr><tr><td>Table 25: Dry Zone statistical relationship between household head sex and landownership</td><td>159</td></tr><tr><td>Table 26: Animal husbandry in Dry Zone and Delta</td><td>164</td></tr><tr><td>Table 27: Frequency of ownership of farm equipment among landholding size categories in Delta</td><td>167</td></tr><tr><td>Table 28: Frequency of ownership of farm equipment among landholding size categories in Dry Zone</td><td>167</td></tr><tr><td>Table 29: Frequency of households taking loans for agriculture among landholding categories in the Delta and the Dry Zone</td><td>168</td></tr><tr><td>Table 30: Recourse to hired farm labor among households with farming activities</td><td>169</td></tr><tr><td>Table 31: Recourse to farm labor and its association with cultivated land area in Delta</td><td>169</td></tr><tr><td>Table 32: Recourse to farm labor and relation with cultivated land area in Dry Zone</td><td>169</td></tr><tr><td>Table 33: Delta paddy crops: average area per household and frequency of crops</td><td>170</td></tr><tr><td>Table 34: Average paddy yields in Delta different agroecological zones</td><td>172</td></tr><tr><td>Table 35: Basic data on paddy yields and prices for main varieties in the Delta</td><td>172</td></tr><tr><td>Table 36: Key information on average cultivated acreage and yields in Delta brackish and fresh water areas where double cropping is possible</td><td>173</td></tr><tr><td>Table 37: Acreage and number of cultivating households per season – Dry Zone</td><td>175</td></tr><tr><td>Table 38: Average income per acre (for sale) for main Dry Zone crops</td><td>176</td></tr><tr><td>Table 39: Dry Zone key information on average cultivated acreage and land productivity</td><td>177</td></tr><tr><td>Table 40: Average paddy yields in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>178</td></tr><tr><td>Table 41: Percentage of households with members engaged in agricultural labor per landholdings categories and per area</td><td>179</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>Table 42: Labor arrangements among households providing agricultural labor</td><td>181</td></tr><tr><td>Table 43: Average income per household and per area for farm-work</td><td>181</td></tr><tr><td>Table 44: Relation between practicing fishing and landownership in Delta</td><td>182</td></tr><tr><td>Table 45: Distribution of households in each zone per type of off-farm activity</td><td>185</td></tr><tr><td>Table 46: Summary of key criteria of Delta farm typology</td><td>188</td></tr><tr><td>Table 47: Delta distribution of different farmers categories (%) according to land area owned (in acres)</td><td>189</td></tr><tr><td>Table 48: Summary of key criteria of Delta farm typology</td><td>190</td></tr><tr><td>Table 49: Dry Zone distribution of different farmers' categories (%) according to land area owned (in acres)</td><td>191</td></tr><tr><td>Table 50: Distribution of the different farmer categories in age groups (age of the household head) in Dry Zone</td><td>192</td></tr><tr><td>Table 51: Average area (in acres) acquired through inheritance and purchase for each category of farmers before and after 2003</td><td>194</td></tr><tr><td>Table 52: Proportion of households for each categories of farmers concerned by land inheritance and sales</td><td>195</td></tr><tr><td>Table 53: Distribution of Delta farmers' categories per size of the household</td><td>196</td></tr><tr><td>Table 54: Correlation between farmers' categories and total incomes (TI)</td><td>197</td></tr><tr><td>Table 55: Correlation between farmers categories and the fact of lacking rice (Food Insecure) or not</td><td>199</td></tr><tr><td>Table 56: Food consumption score* for each farmers category in Delta</td><td>199</td></tr><tr><td>Table 57: Frequency of households having at least one member working outside the township among the 3 farmer categories in Dry Zone</td><td>202</td></tr><tr><td>Table 58: Total incomes (in MMK) of the different farm categories in Dry Zone</td><td>203</td></tr><tr><td>Table 59: Distribution of households declaring lacking rice at least once in the year, among the 3 farmers categories in Dry Zone</td><td>204</td></tr><tr><td>Table 60: Relationship with landholdings (acres) and the fact of having a household member in local administrative bodies in Dry Zone</td><td>206</td></tr><tr><td>Table 61: Relationship with landholdings (acres) and the fact of knowing persons from local administrative bodies in Delta</td><td>207</td></tr><tr><td>Table 62: Share of landowners declaring having (or not) enough rice throughout the year for their own consumption in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>208</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>Table 63: Share of landowners having to borrow (or not) money for health purposes in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>209</td></tr><tr><td>Table 64: Distribution of landowning and landless households according to annual total incomes</td><td>210</td></tr><tr><td>Table 65: Distribution of landless households per annual total incomes and per area</td><td>211</td></tr><tr><td>Table 66: Distribution of Delta landless households in each category according to the age of the household head</td><td>214</td></tr><tr><td>Table 67: Distribution of Delta landless categories per total annual incomes</td><td>215</td></tr><tr><td>Table 68: Household heads' level of education in the different landless categories in the Dry Zone</td><td>220</td></tr><tr><td>Table 69: Share of household's members attending higher education per landless categories in the Dry Zone</td><td>220</td></tr><tr><td>Table 70: Distribution of Dry Zone landless households per categories and total yearly incomes</td><td>221</td></tr><tr><td>Table 71: Frequency of borrowing of landowners and landless in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>239</td></tr><tr><td>Table 72: Dry Zone landowners households contracting loans (formal and informal) with regard to landholding sizes</td><td>240</td></tr><tr><td>Table 73: Distribution of households contracting loans per loans' amount and total annual incomes (TI) in Dry Zone and Delta</td><td>240</td></tr><tr><td>Table 74: Distribution of Dry Zone households per loans' amounts and landholding sizes</td><td>241</td></tr><tr><td>Table 75: Delta: Main sources of credit (both formal and informal) for landowning and landless borrowers in Delta</td><td>242</td></tr><tr><td>Table 76: Dry Zone's main sources of credit (formal and informal) for borrowers</td><td>243</td></tr><tr><td>Table 77: Purpose of contracting loans (formal and informal) among Delta households</td><td>245</td></tr><tr><td>Table 78: Purpose of contracting loans (formal and informal) among Dry Zone households</td><td>245</td></tr><tr><td>Table 79: Landlessness among those who lost lands due to indebtedness in Delta and Dry Zone</td><td>246</td></tr></table>
Acknowledgements

The objective for this research has been to produce a reference on land and livelihoods issues of Myanmar lowlands. The Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) has supported this project financially, through a learning and innovation funding window aiming at increasing the body of knowledge available on livelihoods issues.

This research piece is the fruit of a lengthy process initiated in June 2013: it was
an intellectual adventure that engaged highly committed persons from various
disciplinary areas. The field research started in November 2013 and ended in
December 2014. Then followed months of data processing, writing, and rewriting,
with intensive discussions and exchanges.

The overall coordination of the research and of this publication was ensured
by Maxime Boutry (lead researcher) and Celine Allaverdian (project coordinator). In
the Delta, the field research team, led by Tin Myo Win, involved Khin Pyae Sone and
Saw Eh Htoo. In the Dry Zone, the team was led by U San Thein and involved U Thit
Sinn, U Than Htun, and U Naing Htike.

The research team also involved Marie Mellac (professor-researcher of
University of Bordeaux, France) and Charles-Antoine Arnaud (senior statistician,
CNRS) who provided crucial support in the research methodology and quantitative
data analysis. This research team was also supported by Aurore Mansion (Gret),
who provided regular advice and encouragements throughout the process.

In addition, university students Stephen Huard (EHESS), Laurie Bellevillaire (University of Aix en Provence-Marseille), Ma Kay Thwe Aung, and Ma Htet Htet Lin (University of Dagon) contributed to this research piece. Thanks to the University of Dagon and the professor Dr Khin Htay Htay from the Department of Anthropology.

We would like to thank Jean-Christophe Diepart, Jean-Philippe Lavigne Delville, Tania Murray Li, Elliott Prasse-Freeman, and Kevin Woods for their peer review. Their excellent advice has been instrumental in improving the text.

We would also like to express our most sincere thanks to the Delta and Dry
Zone villagers where this research took place, to whom this report is dedicated.
# Land tenure in rural lowland Myanmar

From historical perspectives to contemporary realities in the Dry zone and the Delta Maxime Boutry, Celine Allaverdian, Marie Mellac, Stephen Huard, U San Thein, Tin Myo Win, Pyae Sone GRET - Myanmar / Land tenure research May 2017

## Executive summary

During the critical years following the 2012 land reforms undertaken in the midst of Myanmar's political transition, Gret conducted an in-depth study combining qualitative and quantitative surveys in nine villages of Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun townships (Delta) and nine villages in Monywa and Yinmabin townships (Dry Zone). The full report and the synthesis are the result of more than two years in-depth research and 13 months of fieldwork that involved an inter-disciplinary team of 11 international and Myanmar researchers. It provides a better understanding of land dynamics at the local level and proposes a new reading of issues faced by rural households in these days of reform.

### A historical perspective on land policies in Myanmar

In precolonial times, farmers were in fact highly integrated in a relationship to local patrons (headmen, crown officers) that would ensure their protection both in social and economic terms. In contrast to the supposed British goal, the last 150 years have actually been about undoing patron-client ties for diverse reasons, the first and foremost being systemizing the collection of taxes for the State on an individual basis. What was long established as hereditary rights on land was transformed into individual claims on land, and land turned into a commodity. The country's administrative division into village tracts marked the rise of the village headman who became a local elite backed by the colonial administration. The integration of rice production into international markets and its subsequent monetization and value chain integration contributed to a fragmentation of former comprehensive patron-client relationships. As a whole, rural society changed with landlords and money-lenders overturning legitimate headmen and patrons. The 1948 nationalization act and subsequent policies (Land Nationalization Act 1953; Tenancy Act and Rules 1964) aimed at reversing this situation to create a body of peasant-proprietors rather than tenants. But the Burmese agrarian society had already been uprooted from its sociocultural framework<fnref n="1" />, and the closing of the agrarian frontier together with the 1930s Great Depression left many

<footnote n="1">1. Dry Zone farmers better resisted the impact of such change thanks to a greater historical depth than the Delta society that was principally developed through the British colonization.</footnote>
peasants without the financial capacity to undertake cultivation. Not only was the redistribution of land under the Land Nationalization Act poorly implemented (with only 17% of all cultivated lands nationalized), but harmful policies such as the compulsory procurement of a fixed quota of harvested crop – particularly for paddy – (at a fixed low prices) also severely affected small holders while benefitting the bigger farmers.

## The 2012 land reforms and their challenges

In 2012, the new Land Law, a reform "in the interest of the entire people"<fnref n="2" />, came to sanction the pre-existing system based on individual land rights by distributing Land Use Certificates (LUCs) and legalize transfers of land use rights. This reform did not much change the on-the-ground reality of land tenure and land dynamics, since farmers did not wait for formal reform to sell, rent, or mortgage their land (despite the legal ban on such transfers prior to 2012). LUCs are supposedly bringing more security by legalizing these transfers, yet many practical barriers remain, notably when it comes to dividing an LUC over a plot of land into two or more pieces. But most of all, the precariousness of land tenure in Burmese lowlands lies in the system itself rather than the modalities of its implementation.

Although the division of land through inheritance did not bring many issues under the 2012 reform, previous arrangements on land use rights that were often done on an oral basis were challenged by formalization. The distribution of LUCs rekindled old conflicts (such as land transfers forced by farmers' incapacity to deliver the compulsory paddy quota to the government) and created new ones (notably between parties involved in mortgage arrangements). In other words, both British and 2012 reforms brought into light the complexity of formalizing – allegedly in order to secure – land tenure with top-down policies, especially when little is done to understand local realities. Farmers in Burmese lowlands were not lacking documents formalizing their claims. Yet, farmers have always been at threat of arbitrary land confiscations by the State. In that sense, LUCs do not seem to provide more security than the previous documents. However, it will surely lead to more insecurity to the farmers who have not received LUCs. Key recommendations are to conduct a review of the 2012 land registration process in order to identify gaps and prioritize how those gaps will be addressed so that public confidence can be improved. Also, accessible and affordable deed registration procedures need to be set in place in order to record land transfers and update land records properly. A proper land taxation system may also improve land administration. Capacity building of authorities involved in land governance is also crucial in the process.

<footnote n="2">2. According to a speech by Vice President Dr Sai Mauk Kham (2011-2015) introducing the land reform in May 2012.</footnote>
There are many discrepancies between the actual use of lands and their official classification under the legal land categories. The lack of coordination between the different institutions in charge of, respectively, farmlands, forestlands, and vacant, virgin, and fallow lands is evidently part of the issue. This issue highlights the need for more systematic land use planning processes and to move from a system in which each government agency is perceived as the “owner” of respective land categories to a custodianship model in which there would be a single land-agency for administration of lands<fnref n="3" />.

In addition, farmers' needs and agricultural practices do not match with the legal restrictions on land use which have remained with the 2012 land reform, highlighting the contradiction between the broadening of land use rights, on one hand, and the government's enduring tendency to control land on paddy production (the staple crop constituting Myanmar's national identity) on the other. In many cases, these discrepancies hinder farm productivity and farmers' resilience to shocks. It also generates land insecurity and opportunities for local corruption and abuse of power towards incompliant farmers. It is urgent that farmers be given full disposal rights on the choice of crops and review restrictions on fallows as farmers are the best suited to make optimal decisions to enhance their livelihoods and land productivity, and respond to market dynamics. This also entails extending the land use categories over which tenure can be secured by simplifying the land use classification system and integrating into the farmland category uses such as agroforestry and aquaculture. Legal procedures for land use changes and transfers must be affordable and accessible through simplified and decentralized processes. Finally, sanctions in case of non-compliance with restrictions of land use should not result in livelihood insecurity (eg: in case of heavy sanctions such as land confiscations and high fine amounts).

During the past decades, land governance has been highly concentrated in the hands of Village tract headmen, who were acting as political brokers<fnref n="4" /> between government and villagers. In the absence of checks and balances, corrupt practices have prevailed at the expenses of the weakest and dispute arbitration decisions were often done in favor of the “highest bidder”. This generated a lack of trust within the community towards the Village tract administrator and the members of the diverse forms of local land committees that have existed through time. In addition, the social capital at the village level has often been crippled in the past decades and informal institutions lack capacity to deal with land conflict. Finally, there is a lack of independent conflict resolution mechanisms. To handle these major issues, the government needs to enact a close review of the Farmland Management Body –

<footnote n="3">3. This does not exclude the involvement of concerned line ministries in land use related issues.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4. Bierschenk & al. 2000.</footnote>
particularly its Village tract level representation – in order to address its very limited capacity in resolving intra-villages conflicts. Despite the recommendations of the Commission for the Assessment of Legal Affairs and Special Issues, it is suggested to maintain and promote the establishment of independent monitoring bodies- as proposed in the National Land Use policy, with participation of all stakeholders, and by appointing monitors that have no direct interest, to observe settlement of land disputes. Sound processes for selection of community representatives need to be defined as part of this. These conflict resolution mechanisms need to take into account lands' history and trajectories. Concrete mechanisms for transparency and accountability of the actors in charge of translating the legal framework into practice on the ground and promote legal awareness capacity building at local level, both for communities and authorities.

From a gender perspective, it is necessary to encourage women's representation in land administration bodies and provide gender sensitive information about the current land framework at ground level. Measures should be taken to reduce vulnerability of women in case of divorce or separation or death of the husband, something that can be accomplished whether through joint registration of spouses on LUCs or through other complementary laws relating to family and social protection issues.

## Building a conducive context for securing agricultural livelihoods

Policies to support agriculture and rural livelihoods in a broader sense need a comprehensive cross-sectoral approach that obviously goes far beyond the land question. Transport and water management infrastructure, rural finance, access to markets, research, agricultural education and extension services, and structuring of farmers' organizations are crucial issues to address. In addition, further strategic thinking is needed to formulate consistent trade policies on agricultural products.

## Improving rural finance

Rural finance is a crucial key for rural development. While the MADB's loan scheme seems to be the most effective at the moment in terms of high geographic coverage and very low interest rates, the poor quality of services, limited human resource capacity, and issues in relaying MADB policies at the village level hinder much of its potential benefits. A deep reform of MADB is needed to improve the quality of services: adapt the timing of loans (disbursement, repayments, etc.) so they appropriately align with crop cycles and farmers' cash flow constraints, increase MADB loan amounts, especially for non-paddy crops, train and appoint professional MADB staff employees at the village tract level to facilitate application,
management, disbursement, and reimbursement of loans. As indebtedness is still a strong driver of land exclusion, it is also recommended to reduce rural cultivators' dependency on private money-lenders by promoting access to affordable credit schemes, simultaneously with financial education aiming at improving households' financial management skills so as to reduce indebtedness. In this process, it is also important to ensure coordination among the publicly funded initiatives<fnref n="5" /> and microfinance institutions to avoid indebtedness of those who contract multiple loans.

## Investing in sustainable agriculture and promoting resilience

Dry zone rainfed land crop systems are rather extensive in order to cope with the scarce and unpredictable rainfall while in the Delta, agriculture is highly specialised in paddy. Despite these differences, state-led investment in irrigation and water management is crucial, combined with the promotion of context-specific sustainable agricultural practices, in both those areas. This requires adapted extension services to provide technical knowledge on crops (investment, profitability, suitability according to agro-ecological regions) for farmers so that they can make efficient choices.

Rural livelihoods' sustainability also relies on households' capacity to absorb shocks. Land insecurity is often an impact of such shocks. Resilience of rural households could be strengthened through social protection schemes, notably to cover health expenses. Sustainability of such schemes may be achieved through their structuring beyond the village level. Interesting initiatives through the federation of village groups have been conducted in Myanmar that would be important to build on. Exploring options to cover crop-related risks through national level crop insurance schemes would be useful.

## The issue of farm labor

Small scale agriculture is a huge source of employment. The majority of Delta and Dry Zone farming households (over 80%) must employ agricultural labor to work on their farms. 42% of households have at least one member of the family earning some income as an agricultural wage laborer. As a consequence, pushing mechanization through large farm machines<fnref n="6" />, such as big combined harvesters, needs very careful thought to avoid driving away families depending on farm labor, keeping in mind that options for other livelihoods and jobs in urban areas

<footnote n="5">5. There are multiple publicly funded initiatives, namely from MADB, Cooperative Department (Tha Ma), Rural development department (Mya Sein Yaung), and some other smaller scale initiatives.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6. Access to small scale machinery (such as power tillers for paddy lands) is however essential.</footnote>
are still relatively limited. This risk may be particularly strong for those in the Delta, where working as a farm laborer is very specific to the landless and to very small landowners (owning less than three acres)<fnref n="7" />. On the other hand, the qualitative study found that in the Delta, finding farm laborers during peak periods (such as for transplanting and harvesting) can prove to be very challenging and partly explains why many farmers are unable to cultivate the entirety of their lands in summer. However this constraint allows temporary access to lands to landless or very small farmers in summer. As such, the recourse to farm laborers can somewhat be interpreted as a wealth redistribution mechanism, not only by the fact that it provides jobs but also because constraints promote temporary land access to the landless. New forms of win-win arrangements between laborers and farmers need to be experimented.

## Taking into account the diversity of rural households for effective targeting of policy and action

Policies and rural livelihood support actions need to take into consideration the fact that “smallholders” are not one uniform category. Indeed, based on the life cycle, landholding size and livelihood strategies, different types of smallholders can be distinguished. For example, “farm-specialized small farmers” rely mostly on agriculture (and on-farm labor) while “multi-active small farmers” are much more diversified in their activities, including in the off-farm sector. The former are generally more precarious in terms of livelihood security than the latter regardless of the cultivated surfaces.

Likewise, a closer look at landless households’ livelihoods can provide with more nuanced features regarding the precariousness of land access in the studied regions. Indeed, the “landless” categories covers a wide range of households who have very different levels of dependency to agriculture-related activities: from the “farming landless” who cultivate lands accessed through temporary arrangements (rent, sharecropping...), those depending heavily on farm wage labor, those characterized by multi-activity to those depending exclusively on off-farm activities outside of the primary sector.

The household's life cycle is recognized as one of the major factors differentiating whether a given household has access to agricultural land. The study shows that landlessness can often be a temporary state for younger households who will inherit and are saving to buy land, while landlessness becomes a permanent form of land exclusion for households headed by a person over 40-50 years old. Policies and livelihood support actions should address the specific needs of different age

<footnote n="7">7. In the Dry Zone this activity is more evenly practiced by different landholding categories.</footnote>
groups. "Young" small holders and landless households need to get priority for specific support for their farming projects, such as for example access to cattle for "young" Dry Zone households and access to vacant lands through temporary arrangements, for "young" smallholders and landless households of the delta.

The occurrence of landlessness has much to do with historical and agricultural features of the studied zones. For instance, the Dry Zone is the cradle of Burmese society, with long-established villages and stronger social organization, while the Delta is a frontier society and has been more impacted by predatory policies such as the 'Compulsory Paddy Quota'. For these reasons, landlessness rates are often higher in the Delta than in Dry Zone villages. In addition, there are strong disparities between villages of the same region, highlighting the complexity and intertwinement of different factors – such as agro-ecological conditions and the importance of power relations at the local level – for determining land access. These disparities demonstrate that large scale surveys and uniform "one size fits all" solutions on land tenure bear risks as they are not able to effectively address local and context-specific problems. Land redistribution projects should for instance prioritize older agrarian landless households (whose head is more than 40 years old) and landless households relying mainly on farm-labor.
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 1:** Maps of the study areas in Myanmar</figcaption></figure>
# I. Introduction

## 1. Towards a new land framework

Myanmar has an area of 670,000 square kilometers and a population of almost 51,486,253⁸. The large majority of the population (70%) is rural<fnref n="9" /> and the average household size is 4.4 persons. Myanmar is a low-income country with a high poverty rate. Accounting for 36% of GDP, the agriculture sector (including livestock and fisheries) is considered to be the backbone of the economy. More than two thirds of the labor force is engaged in agriculture or depends to a great extent on agriculture for income<fnref n="10" />. Rice is the most important crop, accounting for about 60 per cent of the net sown area and 80 per cent of the value of agricultural production. Despite its potential for growth, the agriculture sector has suffered from poor and sometimes predatory state policies, deficient infrastructure, insufficient extension services, as well as financing and value chain constraints.

Myanmar's rural society is characterized by landlessness rates (46% of landless households in average<fnref n="11" />) that are the highest in the whole Mekong region. Indeed, in Cambodia, landless farmers now make up 28% of the rural population (Phann et al., 2015) while in Vietnam, landlessness rates among rural households are estimated at 12%<fnref n="12" />. Among the reforms engaged by the new quasi-civilian government, the return of lands confiscated under the military regime retains most of attention from observers (UN, NGOs, and CSOs). Yet, despite millions of acres<fnref n="13" /> implicated in these past – and in some cases, very recent<fnref n="14" /> – exactions, landlessness in the country cannot be solely explained and resolved by tackling direct land-grab cases. Socio-economic features of Myanmar lowland societies, specific exclusion processes, and livelihoods dynamics are often overlooked factors shaping the current agrarian landscape that require specific attention.

Myanmar inherited in great part its contemporary land tenure framework from British colonial legacies. While the British system put emphasis on individual holdings (*u-paing* in Burmese), distributed in *kwin* (the basic territorial division),

<footnote n="8">8. *Myanmar population and housing census, 2014:* The population figure includes 1,206,353 persons estimated not to have been counted during the census in parts of Rakhine State, Kachin State and Kayin State.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9. *Myanmar population and housing census, 2014.*</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10. IFAD, 2010: 1.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11. LIFT, 2012.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12. Mellac and Castellanet, 2015.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13. There is no precise figures on the extent of land which has been confiscated under the previous government. Yet, by 2001, more than one million acres of large scale agricultural concessions had been allocated to nearly 100 Burmese private companies, and surface doubled by 2011 (Woods, 2013: 15).</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14. See for example Htusan, 2013.</footnote>
but where agriculturists receive land use rights, the state remaining the ultimate owner of all lands. With the 1953 Land Nationalization Act and a series of land reforms through the 1960s, the post-colonial Myanmar government sought to break up the landowner-tenant relationship, granting agriculturists land use rights while retaining for the state the ultimate ownership of all lands. The objective here was both to create a government/owner-cultivator relationship and, at the same time, to strengthen government control over farmers.

However, the situation in the first half of the twentieth century – with a growing class of absentee landowners and tenants being impoverished by high rents – could still be observed in the latter post-1953 days. In these very days of political transition toward more democratic governance, the success and failures of such reforms still need to be analysed so as to improve access to land and land security for Myanmar farmers. Issues may not only lie in weak governance or abusive practices, but also in more deeply rooted socio-cultural features, such as inter-individual, hierarchized (vertical), relationships often prevailing over intra-class (horizontal) ties.

The latest series of reforms came into force on 31st August 2012¹⁵ under the Farmland Law 2012, followed by the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law, both of which took a view to developing business opportunities and the country's economy through the improved utilization of these lands. These two laws represent the most substantial change to the legal framework for land since the early 1960s. The main impacts have been a massive delivery of land use certificates to farmers<fnref n="16" /> and the reintroduction of the concept of private property with land use rights that can be sold, mortgaged, rented, pawned, and inherited. These changes may however be more formal than substantive. While the new land framework brings greater freedom and visibility for farmers to dispose of their land use rights, not only does the state still remain the sole landowner, but we must not ignore the development of practices among farmers and local authorities that have over the past decades effectively circumvented restrictions.

Reforming Myanmar's agricultural sector and rural economy was a strong component in the agenda of the first quasi-civilian government under President Thein Sein and is probably one of the major stakes for the newly elected NLD<fnref n="17" /> government. If such reforms were undertaken "in the interest of the entire people, not in the interest of a handful of people", as Dr Sai Mauk Kham, Vice President of

<footnote n="15">15. For more details on the different laws enacted on land tenure in the country since the British rule, see Chapter III.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16. Strong disparities seem to exist between Myanmar low lands and the ethnic states where LUC delivery rates have been much lower.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17. National League for Democracy.</footnote>
Myanmar (2011-2015), put it in May 2012, this entails addressing important issues such as land tenure security, landlessness, and repairing the scars of the abusive actions (such as arbitrary confiscations) that have been implemented by the past military regimes. A vibrant and diverse civil society is also bringing these issues to the front lines, so that they can be taken into account by future policies – for instance the recently promulgated National Land Use Policy that has become the over-arching framework that is supposed to shape land and natural resource governance for the years to come. Hence, in this decisive moment of change, the necessity to understand land tenure and land governance issues in Myanmar in their complexity (including historical, economic, social, and political dimensions) is highly critical.

## 2. A study to improve understanding on land issues

Despite a variety of studies that have recently been produced on Myanmar tenure and governance of land-based resources, there remains a strong need for studies which document social processes leading to land insecurity, and those leading to investment and sustainable use of lands by rural populations. Land markets and their impact on equity, the dynamic of landlessness, the interplay between state intervention and local authorities in current regulations regarding land tenure in different social and socioeconomic contexts, access to natural resources as a base for livelihoods, etc. are issues that have to be analysed. Indeed, addressing land insecurity in general does not enable a full understanding of the key issues and challenges to be examined, nor the actions and policies to implement. This emphasizes again on the importance to provide in-depth studies that characterize the diversity of situations, and that enable the formulation of accurate projects, policy and legislation, for effective and efficient support for the country's rural population.

The final purpose of the study is to improve understanding on how land tenure links with livelihood security for enhanced and comprehensive policy dialogue. Its objective is to provide accurate and documented material on land dynamics, focusing on two issues: access to land and land tenure security. It documents forms of land access, land markets, land tenure insecurity and processes of securing land tenure. It also analyses interrelations of such aspects with farming practices, natural resources harvesting, and livelihoods security.

Indeed, relations between land and livelihoods security are complex as they simultaneously embrace cultural, social, economic, legal, and political realities.
There are clear cause and effect links between food security, livelihoods, and land, the latter of which is an essential productive asset for rural households. Access to land can enable food production. The area of cultivated land per household is often a key factor determining a household's food security and its socioeconomic status. Land tenure security encourages sustainable farming practices and long term agricultural investments (such as trees, irrigation canals, drains...) which can enhance productivity. Securing land rights may also facilitate access to credit, which can help secure improved production means (inputs, tools, etc.), which in turn can lead to increased productivity. Beyond these general observations and 'mechanical' links, situations are sometimes more complex than they may appear and need in depth research for proper understanding.

However, this study does not intend to be representative of the country, nor of the entire Delta and Dry Zone regions. Its methodology – focused on in-depth studies of 18 villages across the Delta (Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun townships) and Dry Zone (Monywa and Yinmabin townships), was not designed as such. However, it provides detailed information on daily issues and key dynamics that are currently occurring at the local level in lowland Myanmar. It also provides useful insights into rural households' livelihood trajectories. These encompass forms of access to land as well as paths to losing or accumulating land over the past decades. Finally, it explores the links between livelihood security and land in Myanmar's specific political-economic context.

## 3. Brief overview of the contents

The three first chapters are introductory chapters which are critical for the readers' understanding:

* **I. Chapter One** introduces the study's background, its objectives, and the overall structure of the report.

* **II. Chapter Two** presents the study's methodology in detail in all of its 3 different phases. It also provides some key concepts concerning the study's conceptual framework. Finally, it also sheds light on the study's limitations and the constraints faced.

* **III. Chapter Three** links the introductory chapters and the following ones – which are essentially the study's own 'first hand' research findings. Essentially based on an extensive bibliographic review in light of the study's own findings, chapter three provides in-depth analysis of the historical events that have
shaped Myanmar's current land governance system. As such, it provides keys to understanding the findings of the following chapters. It sheds light on the fact that despite major changes in socio-political context, the main issues concerning land governance and livelihoods security have remained very much the same.

The following chapters (four to nine) are based on the analysis and combination of both qualitative findings (based on more than one year of field research) and quantitative survey results (based on surveys with 1,129 households).

* **IV. Chapter Four** provides a general overview of the 2 study areas, including the environmental context, historical background, main livelihoods, land use, and demography. The latter part on demography is based on the study survey results.

* **V. Chapter Five** presents the diversity and varying intensities of land transactions and transfers of land-use rights that exist in the study areas. It analyses inheritance patterns as well as features of land sales, particularly in the informal market preceding the 2012 land law. It also highlights the prevalence of the diverse agrarian arrangements, which allow different actors (from local to foreign, landless to investors) to access lands through temporary contracts. Finally, it provides a detailed analysis of the diversity of documents (both informal and formal) that have been used to 'formalize' rights on land, and whether these documents have operated within or outside of the legal frameworks of the last decades.

* **VI. Chapter Six** focuses on the implementation of the 2012 land law. It looks into the land registration process (which took place during the study) and its most recent impacts. It presents the different forms of land conflicts and contestations that currently exist, from individual claims on specific land use rights to collective contestations on a broader dimension – such as past state actions which are perceived as illegitimate by rural communities. It sheds light on the complexity of the current context and the challenges for effective conflict resolution at the local level.

* **VII. Chapter Seven** presents the main findings concerning livelihoods. It describes households' main features and provides a detailed analysis of the main livelihoods sources, such as on-farm and off-farm activities. Taking household and livelihoods features together, the chapter proposes a typology of households, outlining how livelihood and household features are associated with land access and landownership, and how in turn those patterns can
predict levels of social mobility. Finally, it explores the over-used and unspecific concept of landlessness, which obscures different levels of vulnerability and opportunities. As such, it aims to drill down on the landlessness issue to reveal the critical points that should urgently be addressed by policies.

* **VIII. Chapter Eight** presents key findings on the process of 'intimate exclusion', that is the processes through which social intimates, neighbors and kin, exclude each other from access to agricultural land. To bring up these issues, we proceed by analysing first how class division between large landholders and landless or smallholders shapes exclusion at the village level. The second entry point is access to credit, that is how the power of the market – yet one highly connected to regulation and force – shapes exclusion again at the village level. We conclude by analysing more particularly the role of the headman in land management, both in history and during this era of reform, as a particularly important stakeholder at the village level, a figure who concentrates most of the powers at work in exclusion processes: regulation, force, market access, and legitimation (these notions are expanded in **Chapter III.**).

* **IX. Chapter Nine** is the conclusion. It provides a synthesis of the most important findings and recommendations for land-related and agriculture-related policies and laws, in order to improve land governance and create a more conducive context for smallholder farmers.
II. Methodology

1. Analytical framework and starting assumptions

Land as a research field encompasses different disciplines. Obviously,
the most visible in Myanmar has been agricultural sciences, pushed by every
successive Myanmar government so as to improve agricultural production for
this predominantly rural country. However, land tenure also highly relates to
social sciences. In this latter field, political ecology and political economy studies
are by far the most developed approaches in studying land issues in Myanmar<fnref n="18" />.
Yet, these studies often remain at a macro-level, and focus on interventions of
agro-companies, large investors, and government policies. Far from undervaluing
such studies and their contribution to understanding factors impacting farmers'
livelihoods (land grabbing issues, agricultural policies, non-pro-poor investment
policies, etc.), ethnographic descriptions of land tenure and land rights at the village
level can provide critical insights that macro studies neglect. And yet, these are
still lacking in the contemporary literature on land tenure in Myanmar<fnref n="19" />. With **land
tenure** being defined as "*the full range of relationships between humans with regard
to access to and control over land and natural resource management*" (Lavigne, 2008),
the study had an anthropological focus. An ethnographic approach was used to
understand land rights – how they are defined, enforced, negotiated, contested,
transformed, and transferred – as well as the power relations that condition these
processes. Social scientists have addressed land tenure issues through various
entry points: conflicts, agrarian arrangements, exclusion, etc. These conceptual
entry points have also been mobilized in this study whenever relevant. The study
also drew upon expertise and concepts from other disciplines such as geography
and agrarian studies. By doing so, it has adopted a pluri-disciplinary and system
approach which enables to address complex issues such as agrarian change by
considering the different components that constitute a system and how changes
in one component can affect the other components and the whole system. Here
below are some of the key concepts that have been considered:

*   **Land security:** Despite the overall consensus of the importance of land tenure security in land policy debates, the lack of clarity on the terms of ‘land security’ and ‘land insecurity’ reveals divergent views and perceptions on what is land insecurity, what are its causes, and what possible solutions may address it. As such, the conceptual framework produced by Philippe Lavigne

<footnote n="18">18. Among the most recent, see for example, Woods 2013, TNI working papers.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19. Some ethnographical studies have been done earlier, like for example Thawnghmung, 2001.</footnote>
Delville<fnref n="20" /> helps clarify these notions: "Land tenure security should not be confused with private ownership, nor should the nature of the rights (e.g. formal or informal, permanent or temporary) be confused with the notion of whether or not these are secure. Land tenure security signifies that legitimately held rights, whatever their contents, will not be questioned without foundation, and if questioned, will be settled with sound dispute settlement mechanisms". As such, Lavigne distinguishes the term of 'land insecurity' from 'land precariousness' which is defined as a household's lack of certainty over short, medium, and long terms regarding its land use rights (eg: a farm tenant who does not know whether his/her tenancy contract will be renewed).

* **Livelihoods security** refers to adequate and sustainable access to income and resources to meet basic needs, including adequate access to food, potable water, health facilities, educational opportunities, housing, time for community participation, and social integration (Frankenberger, 1996). A livelihood "comprizes the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims, and access) and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation." (Chambers and Conway, 1992).

* **Land conflicts:** Each society has its own kinds of conflicts and its own ways to resolve them<fnref n="21" />. While a conflict can be generally defined as an open clash between at least two groups, the term also expresses the way politico-legal institutions and new stakes and interests negotiate divergent goals or objectives<fnref n="22" />. Furthermore, conflicts stand at the articulation between illegal or/and illegitimate mechanisms for access to land rights and mechanisms defined by law, custom, or convention. Conflicts bring together multiples actors, including a 'third' party, and participate in the framing of everyday land governance systems<fnref n="23" />. Conflict arbitrations are processes that can reconfigure, reproduce, and/or recognize rights, rules, and positions. As such, conflicts can produce legitimacy.

* **Land transfers** are complex and must be understood as land rights transfer. This does not only concern private landownership (with its full set of rights including the right to sell), but also with various forms of delegation of 'derived rights' such as, for instance, the right of access to the land or the

<footnote n="20">20. Lavigne Delville, Ph. 2006. A conceptual framework for land tenure security, insecurity and securement. Land reform 2006/2. FAO.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">21. Chauveau and Mathieu, 1998: 243.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22. Lavigne-Delville and Hochet, 2005: 102.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23. Le Meur and Lund, 2001.</footnote>
right to use the land. Derived rights are mainly granted on a non-permanent
basis and delegation can take the form of 'agrarian contracts' (i.e institutional
arrangements between actors involving various political-legal authorities)
or 'agrarian arrangements' which are informal contracts between actors
(for example landlords and landless) made in order to cultivate a plot of
land or to value a resource (trees, cattle...) (Sokha, Lemeur et al., 2007)

*   **Land exclusion:** "Exclusion is not a random process, nor does it occur on a level playing field. It is structured by power relations. Across rural Southeast Asia and elsewhere, exclusion from land can be understood in terms of the interaction between regulation, force, the market and legitimation." (Hall et al., 2011). In "Powers of exclusion, Land Dilemmas in Southeast Asia"<fnref n="24" />, the authors identify different forms of exclusion which exist at different levels: "Regulation, often but not exclusively associated with the state and legal instruments, sets the rules regarding access to land and conditions of use. Force excludes by violence or the threat of violence, and is brought to bear by both state and non-state actors. The market is a power of exclusion as it limits access through price and through the creation of incentives to lay more individualized claims to land. Legitimation establishes the moral basis for exclusive claims, and indeed for entrenching regulation, the market and force as politically and socially acceptable bases for exclusion."

Finally, the methodology took into account the following assumptions:

* Land tenure is an evolving system that, despite reforms and successive policies, presents forms of continuity, especially at the local level. From this point of view, historical review of the regions concerned for this study has explanatory power for understanding land dynamics in their present form.

* Sociocultural features of Myanmar lowland societies also shape land tenure. The Dry Zone, a historical location in which former Burmese kingdoms reigned, may have more stable socioeconomic categories than the Delta, which was put into cultivation only under the British colonial occupation of the country (1824-1947). Moreover, the recent devastation wrought by Cyclone Nargis (May 2008) may have kept Delta society in (or even driven it back to) a more 'pioneering' frontier context than in the established settlements of the Dry Zone.

* In most situations, the village level is the most relevant scale through which to understand the links between land and livelihoods and to gain deeper understanding of the way policies and laws implemented throughout history have shaped on-the-ground realities.

<footnote n="24">24. Derek Hall, Philip Hirsch and Tania Murray Li, 2011.</footnote>
* Land transfers under their various forms – inheritance, sales, and agrarian arrangements of derived rights (rent, sharecropping...) – are an essential entry point to understand modalities of access to land, and the processes leading to land accumulation or land exclusion.

* Another important entry point for understanding land dynamics are land conflicts and their resolution mechanisms. Especially during a transition period, land conflicts can better reveal the relationships to land of each category of stakeholders, both at local and national levels, and what influence new policies have on these relationships.

* Villagers, regardless of whether they have access to land or not, are not passive. On the contrary, they actively shape the land tenure framework at the local level in its social, economic, and even legal dimensions. Indeed, they actively circumvent legal restrictions and find extralegal arrangements as per their livelihoods needs.

* There is not one single category of farming households. Not all socioeconomic categories of farmers have the same relationship to land, to livelihoods, or to assets. We may be able to disaggregate different livelihood strategies, as well as different strategies regarding either pursuing access to land or securing this access.

* Finally, the term 'landless' encompasses a wide diversity of situations. As such, it needs to be considered with much care, as it does not necessarily find an equivalent term in the Burmese conception of access to farmland. In addition, not all landless households may aspire to work farmland, nor are all landless households 'condemned' to remain in this category. As for farmers, different livelihood and land-access strategies may be deciphered through a careful study.

## 2. Site selection

The study has been implemented in the Ayeyarwaddy Delta (Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun townships), and in the Dry Zone (Monywa and Yinmabin townships). The areas were selected through the following criteria. Prior knowledge of the area was a key criteria. Existing grassroots links with farmers, local organizations, and authorities were important conditions for successful implementation of the study, as it addressed highly sensitive issues<fnref n="25" />. However, while the existing development projects constituted a useful entry point for implementing research, the study also selected villages out of GRET's intervention villages, in order to take into account potential biases. In addition, the research study targeted

<footnote n="25">25. Especially in Dry Zone due to the proximity of Wun Paung Copper mining project at Let Pa Daung Hill (Salin Gyi township).</footnote>
Myanmar lowlands areas, essentially populated by *Bamars* and that have been the closest to state interventions. They are in the country's most rural states<fnref n="26" />, and the Dry Zone and Ayeyarwaddy constitute an important part of the territory. Sagaing and Ayeyarwaddy regions account for more than 43% of the country's population. In addition, as the study explores linkages between food security and land tenure, it appeared relevant to select the country's main rice bowl areas.

Furthermore, these two areas offer a diachronic perspective. Burmese kingdoms created their states in Upper Myanmar (the Dry Zone) and flourished by mastering irrigation and cultivating paddy – but leaving the southern Burma of the Ayeyarwaddy Delta mostly ungoverned. The British colonial administration annexed these two areas at different times (Lower Burma in 1952 and Upper Burma in 1886) and governed *Upper Burma* and *Lower Burma* in different ways, transforming the latter into Myanmar's rice granary. Hence, exploring land tenure in these two zones that share a common history, yet have been affected by different policies, aims to offer a deeper understanding of what 'land' means in Burmese society and how the Burmese relationship to land shaped and continues to shape the agricultural landscapes of lowland Myanmar in these days of reform. In each area, nine villages were selected so as to cover a high range of agro-ecological characteristics and the key land tenure issues that were identified during initial exploratory missions. Part of the survey also focused on the village tracts<fnref n="27" /> (VT) level to understand spatial and social dynamics of settlements.

In the Delta area, nine villages distributed across four VTs have been chosen to cover: a wide range of situations along a north/south ecological gradient as per water salinity (freshwater, brackish water and salt water areas); various types of land categories (farmland and forestland); and village accessibility/remoteness from the closest towns of Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun.

In the Dry Zone, nine villages in seven VTs have been studied. They were chosen to cover a diversity of agro-ecological conditions (mainly soil and access to water for irrigation), accessibility/remoteness from Monywa and Yinmabin, and key land issues (disputes, land use, and transactions dynamics).

<footnote n="26">26. Ayeyarwaddy (total pop: 12 million) and Sagaing (total pol: 10.3 million) have the lowest urbanization rates (14% and 17% respectively). 2014 Census.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">27. The village tract unit has been introduced by the British as the lowest minimum unit of administration, with the primary objective of levying taxes (see Chapter History III.1.1). It is generally constituted of several villages.</footnote>
### 3. Architecture of the study and data collection methods

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 2:** The three key phases of the study</figcaption></figure>

As presented in the **Figure 2** above, the study's architecture was structured around three phases. The survey used both qualitative and qualitative approaches in order to produce 'meaningful data' (information). These approaches were implemented in separate phases so the quantitative survey could be designed in the light of the qualitative data collected in the first place. The qualitative approach was central to the survey as it allowed building meaningful indicators and hypotheses that would be statistically described and confirmed (or not) by the following quantitative survey. The quantitative data were analysed in the light of findings from the first descriptive phase and the second in-depth qualitative one.

#### 3.1 Phase 1: Descriptive approach

The first phase was designed to produce a base set of information necessary for the design of the two following phases. It was based on open interviews of key informants (mainly local stakeholders involved in land governance and administration, and persons such as elders and former local officials with significant knowledge of local land tenure issues), focus group discussions, as well as individual household semi-structured interviews (six to nine per village).

The key indicators used for interviews with these informants and for focus groups discussions addressed the following aspects:

* **Context:** history of settlement, agri-ecological constraints and zoning, main sources of income, and key holders of power positions

* **Social organization:** local history of land tenure and policy, identifying local and external stakeholder groups with interests in land issues (including landless groups), formal and informal politico-legal institutions involved in land issues and conflict-resolution, indebtedness processes, and stakeholders involved in land transactions.
*   **Land dynamics and transactions:** cases of land conflicts, land use certificate allocation process, modalities of access to land and resources, main public interventions affecting land tenure, processes concerning land sales and purchases, and other types of temporary or permanent land transfers.

The household semi-structured interviews documented the main characteristics of the household (including social status of its members), land patrimony and other assets, and on-farm and off-farm activities.

<table><caption>Table 1: Selected villages for the survey phase 1</caption><thead><tr><th>Zone</th><th>Township</th><th>Village tract</th><th>Village</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="7">Delta</td><td>Bogale</td><td>Magu</td><td>Magu</td></tr><tr><td>Bogale</td><td>Magu</td><td>Poe Laung</td></tr><tr><td>Bogale</td><td>Magu</td><td>Pay Chaung Lay</td></tr><tr><td>Bogale</td><td>Mya Thein Tan</td><td>Aye</td></tr><tr><td>Bogale</td><td>Tha Byu Gone VT</td><td>Tha Byu Gone</td></tr><tr><td>Mawlamyinegyun</td><td>Kyet Shar</td><td>Pay Chaung</td></tr><tr><td>Mawlamyinegyun</td><td>Pyar Mut Shaw Chaung</td><td>Ah Lel Chaung</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="7">Dry Zone</td><td>Mawlamyinegyun</td><td>Kyar Hone</td><td>Tet Tet Ku</td></tr><tr><td>Mawlamyinegyun</td><td>Kyar Hone</td><td>Kyar Hone</td></tr><tr><td>Monywa</td><td>In Taing</td><td>Hnaw Pin</td></tr><tr><td>Monywa</td><td>Kha Tet Kan North</td><td>Nyaung Pin Thar</td></tr><tr><td>Monywa</td><td>Kha Tet Kan South</td><td>Farmland</td></tr><tr><td>Monywa</td><td>Khoe Than</td><td>Khoe Than</td></tr><tr><td>Monywa</td><td>Myin Mee Laung</td><td>Gaw Gyi</td></tr><tr><td>Yinmabin</td><td>Min Zu</td><td>Min Zu</td></tr><tr><td>Yinmabin</td><td>Si Laung</td><td>Aung Chan Thar</td></tr><tr><td>Yinmabin</td><td>Si Laung</td><td>Si Laung</td></tr><tr><td>Yinmabin</td><td>Zee Phyu Pin</td><td>Zee Phyu Pin</td></tr></tbody></table>

## 3.2 Phase 2: Qualitative approach

The second qualitative phase focused on land rights transfer and agrarian arrangements in a long term perspective with the final objective to understand the process of land and resource access differentiation amongst villages and villagers. Due to the in-depth nature of the qualitative phase, only three villages in each zone were selected for exhaustive household interviews; selection was based on their
representativeness (in terms of agro-ecological features, settlement processes, conflicts, etc.).

The interviews were actually implemented in several sessions, due to their exhaustive nature. They addressed the household's history, patrimony, and livelihoods, and included an in-depth description of recent land rights transfers and arrangements. It enabled us to draw each family's trajectory. In Delta, 40 household interviews were conducted, while in the Dry Zone, 44 interviews were performed. In addition, numerous key informant interviews were done in each zone.

<table><caption>Table 2: Selected villages for the survey phase 2</caption><thead><tr><th>Township</th><th>Village tract</th><th>Village</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Bogale</td><td>Mya Thein Tan</td><td>Aye</td></tr><tr><td>Mawlamyinegyun</td><td>Kyet Shar</td><td>Pay Chaung</td></tr><tr><td>Mawlamyinegyun</td><td>Kyar Hone</td><td>Tet Tet Ku</td></tr><tr><td>Monywa</td><td>Kha Tet Kan South</td><td>Farmland</td></tr><tr><td>Monywa</td><td>Khoe Than</td><td>Khoe Than</td></tr><tr><td>Monywa</td><td>Myin Mee Laung</td><td>Gaw Gyi</td></tr><tr><td>Yinmabin</td><td>Zee Phyu Pin</td><td>Zee Phyu Pin</td></tr></tbody></table>

### 3.3 Phase 3: Quantitative approach

Finally, the third phase was a quantitative approach aiming at statistically exploring the hypothesis on relations between land access and households livelihoods. The key hypothesis used to build the quantitative survey concerned trends in household trajectories, based on specific household demographic, social and technico-economic features and strategies for land access. Through a quasi-exhaustive village-based survey covering nine villages and a total of 1,128 households (531 in Delta and 598 in Dry Zone) were interviewed following a questionnaire which was first tested twice (through a pre-pilot and a pilot) in other villages.

The choice made to conduct an exhaustive village-based survey (100% of households living in the targeted villages) was based on the following reasons:

* The lack of statistical data available at both national and local – township – levels: Without statistical data and a current census (the 2014 national census was on-going at the time), it was impossible to construct any representative
sample of any mother population. It is also difficult to determine the limits of
the mother population to be described.

* **The lack of understanding of relations between land dynamics and livelihoods security:** Such relations are still poorly described in Myanmar and it is difficult to identify the critical determinants. Thus, the sample could not be constructed on any existing reliable and verified hypotheses.

* **The 'qualitative' dimension of the survey** (even for data to be collected during phase 3). In this survey, households are not to be considered only as 'rational' and autonomous economic decision makers but also as part of social groups and networks which are important for what they are both able (in terms of position) and capable (in terms of capacity) of doing. Villages - which constitute the social basic unit in Burmese society - are then the most relevant, evident, and easy unit to study. As verified in the two first phases, the village is a social unit where most land-based social interactions take place. Most of the land transfers (including agrarian contracts) involve people from the same village. The village is thus the key unit for let allocation and land conflict resolution.

It is then logical:

* To choose surveyed villages according to their qualitative representativeness within the two areas.

* To survey the whole population in the village, so to avoid constructing a non-representative sample and to better understand land-based social relations within the social unit where those are more intense and potentially more significant.

Due to differences in the size of villages between Delta (generally smaller) and Dry Zone, the same number of villages in both zones could not provide equivalent samples of population. For this reason – added to the expected difficulties in covering all 100% households in Dry Zone villages<fnref n="28" /> – five villages were surveyed in Delta and four in Dry Zone, altogether producing 1,129 entries corresponding to 1,129 households, for a total of 4,887 individuals.

<footnote n="28">28. These expectations were based on the highly sensitive nature of land tenure issues in the region (close the Lapetdaung copper mine) rendering this kind of systematic interviews delicate and subject to confusions in the midst of the national census implemented in 2014.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 3: Number of interviews and quantitative survey coverage per village</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="7">Delta</th></tr><tr><th>Villages</th><th>Pay Chaung</th><th>Aye Ywar</th><th>Tet Tet Ku</th><th>Tha Byu Gone</th><th>Magu</th><th>TOTAL</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Surveyed HH</th><td>55</td><td>78</td><td>113</td><td>127</td><td>158</td><td>531</td></tr><tr><th>Total POP (HH)</th><td>55</td><td>85</td><td>148</td><td>150</td><td>166</td><td>604</td></tr><tr><th>% Surveyed HH /total Pop</th><td>100%</td><td>92%</td><td>76%</td><td>85%</td><td>95%</td><td>88%</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th colspan="6">Dry Zone</th></tr><tr><th>Villages</th><th>Hledar</th><th>Zee Phyu Pin</th><th>Khoe Than</th><th>Gaw Gyi</th><th>TOTAL</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Surveyed HH</th><td>130</td><td>138</td><td>210</td><td>120</td><td>598</td></tr><tr><th>Total POP (HH)</th><td>143</td><td>167</td><td>250</td><td>122</td><td>682</td></tr><tr><th>% Surveyed HH /total Pop</th><td>91%</td><td>83%</td><td>84%</td><td>98%</td><td>88%</td></tr></tbody></table>

## Design of the questionnaire

On the basis of the hypothesis defined under phase 1 and phase 2, the survey questions were listed and organized in five main sections:

* **General household information:** demographic information on household members, and settlement history

* **Land patrimony:** landownership, land use, status of lands, land transactions and transfers since 1988, perceptions on land registration

* **Agrarian activities:** crops, income and costs incurred for each crop, details on other agrarian activities such as livestock raising, fishing, and agricultural wage labor

* **Other activities and income:** details on off-farm activities, remittances, current savings and loans, household main sources of income, and expenditures

* **Food security and wealth:** nutrition indicators, empirical wealth indicators.

The questionnaire was translated into Myanmar and was first tested twice (through a pre-pilot and a pilot) in other villages and adapted after each of the two pilots. Each questionnaire contained more than a 1,000 entries. Data entry was then ensured by the enumerators, with a data checking system. Data processing and analysis was then performed with statistics software by the research coordination team, supported by the external land tenure expert and senior statistician.
## 4. Limitations of the research

Similarly, the ethnographic approach is far from being well understood in Myanmar (let alone academic ethnographic studies), thus gathering and training apprentice ethnographers remains a challenge. We tried and mostly succeeded in recruiting and training local social science researchers for this study, though a few limitations remained.

The first limitation was in terms of reporting and in terms of translating a mass of information, impressions, and hunches into written, documented, analysed findings. Qualitative data takes time to collect. However, it takes even more time to analyse it and to write findings. Going beyond a list of facts and anecdotes to formulate new questions and hypotheses, to identify inter-relations between issues, to define trends and typologies requires very specific skills. Here again, there were disparities within the field survey team but overall, the difficulties in analysis, writing (especially in English language, but not only) and reporting on a regular basis the information collected, led to some data loss.

Another issue, this time faced by local researchers themselves, was the reliability of the information they collected. Indeed, land issues may rapidly become sensitive ones, especially if one is enquiring into land acquisition processes while talking to a farmer who owns hundreds of acres.

At such a moment, looking for the truth can turn into something akin to a criminal investigation. Although the team practiced triangulation techniques in order to cross-check information, it proved difficult for the team to account for the informative value of people's discourses over the 'facts' they attempt to display. Clearly, the interpretation of discourses remained an important challenge during the survey work. Quantitative research would prove also to be full of pitfalls. The first one was the research coordination team's desire to test 'everything'. This was also aggravated by the necessity to take into account the specificities of each of two very different contexts (Delta and Dry Zone) in one single questionnaire.

As a result, the questionnaire was too detailed and too long (up to two and a half hours needed to complete the questionnaire for large landowners). The excessive precision of some questions led to difficulties in data processing and analysis, and in some instances having figures too small to be properly analysed and/or to be statistically significant. In addition, the quantitative survey did not allow to collect the information necessary to analyse properly farm's agricultural labor constraints, nor did it allow to assess fluctuations of income and farm production across years.
Then, enumerators' understanding of the questionnaire, despite intensive trainings and multiple pilots before implementing the study, retained bias in some cases. Finally, some information was doomed to be approximate, exemplified by income and expense related questions, whether because rural households most often don't record incomes and expenditures throughout the year, or because of differences in units (some farmers measuring surfaces in kwat, others in acres for example), and sometimes simply by indolence (yet understandable when summarising with the interviewee during a two hour interview).

We should nonetheless conclude that high quality information was gathered during this study, and the team worked hard and developed unique skills, which altogether led to producing what we believe is a critical work on land tenure in lowland Myanmar.
III. The making of contemporary
land tenure in lowland Myanmar

1. The making of modern land tenure (1800s to 1948)

1.1 From subjects to tenants

An important part of contemporary Myanmar land tenure framework derives from the British colonial period (1824 to 1948²⁹). But before the British, land was already central in supporting the crown's administration (Lieberman, 1980), though taxation and tenure were shaped to fit governance based on people's allegiances to powerful individuals (including the 'charismatic monarch'³⁰), rather than decentralized administration. Basically, lands were divided into two categories: crown lands and private lands.

* Crown lands were situated within the royal sphere of influence and generally composed of the best irrigated and more fertile lands of the Dry Zone (Aung Thwin, 1984: 224). Islands and alluvial formations on rivers, that is, land liable to periodic change due to the action of the river, were also royal land (Siok Hwa, 1965a: 106). These crown lands were administered by temporary and permanent clients of the king in return for certain rights and privileges (*appanages*).

* Private lands encompassed communal and ancestral lands worked by individuals non-bonded to the king. While produce from crown lands supplied royal granaries, individuals working 'private land' were taxed per capita based on their wealth (including lands) (Aung Thwin, 1984: 224). Rights on such lands were acquired by clearing and cultivating plots (*dama-u-gya* – 'the first clearing (of land) by knife'). These lands then became the property of the cultivator (*u-paing*), including the right to mortgage, sell or pass them to their descendants (Siok Hwa, 1965a: 107).

Between the annexation of Lower Burma (1852) and Upper Burma (1885-
1886), the taxation system faced a profound reform under King Mindon (1853-
1878). The new system intended to compensate the loss of revenue coming from
*appanages* in Lower Burma which had passed under British administration. For

<footnote n="29">29. The first Anglo-Burmese war (1824-1826), led to the annexation of Assam, Manipur, and Arakan. The British also took the region of Tenasserim. The second Anglo-Burmese war (1852) led to the annexation of Pegu Province (later renamed Lower Burma and including the Ayeyarwaddy Delta), before annexing Upper Burma in 1885-56 after the third Anglo-Burmese war, leading the last Burmese king, Thibaw (1859-1916), to exile.
30. Leach, 1960.</footnote>
this reason, King Mindon introduced the *thathameda* tax, theoretically collected from each household, supposedly at a tenth of their income. This system was supposed to replace all other existing taxes and fees as known under previous monarchs<fnref n="31" />. However, in practice it was much more a property tax, which local patrons were expected to collect, based on the number of households they took charge of. Revenue was collected in kind or in cash within villages, based mainly on the property wealth of the particular household. Under this system, destitute households or individuals were not expected to pay any tax (Than Myint-U, 2004: 122). Despite the reform, it seems that the previous social organization and associated feudal-like tax system endured until the British annexation of Upper Burma in 1885-1886 (ibid.: 34).

Despite careful thoughts on the most appropriate taxation system (at least on land and agricultural taxes) the new rulers would apply first on the annexed territories (Furnivall, 1939), the British had only little time to learn carefully about the practices already in place prior to their coming to administer the country. The colonial administration believed they inherited the *thathameda* tax as an effective one, which was only partly true, as other taxes and fees collected by local village heads and 'governors' (*myo-thu-gyi, myo-sa*) tended to remain and overlap with the *thathameda*. British rulers decided after several years of discussions that this 'household' tax would remain and its amount would vary according to the wealth of the area, but not to the same extent as under Burmese rule:

> "Local community leaders would actively participate in ascribing individual household shares. Once the annual *thathameda* for a given township was decided (normally at ten rupees per household), rates on individual households would depend on income, ranging from just one rupee to over fifteen. This was another departure from the Burmese method, in which assessment was based on wealth or property rather than income. Some exemptions were allowed. But the system whereby an entire 'destitute' class of people (dokkhita) was recognized and exempted, was not continued." (Than Myint-U, 2004: 229)

Consequently, prior to the British rule, Burmese subjects already knew about 'household' tax, as they knew about 'private tenure' of the land (Furnivall, 1939: 102, Lieberman, 2003: 148, 185, 298, 421) under the practice of *dama-u-gya*. Under *dama-u-gya*, customary rights were acquired through clearing and cultivating any vacant land, after which the cultivator could sell, mortgage, or pass to his descendants. The main difference actually introduced by the British regarding land tenure and the whole governance of the region was that the taxation system would

<footnote n="31">31. That is an appanage system based on royal let allocation, tax collection on crown land and taxes payable in kind and in cash for people non-bounded to the king.</footnote>
no longer be based on individuals (hence on social groups organized along vertical patron-client relationships), but on territorial boundaries and, for our purpose, on agricultural land size. This territorialization process was efficiently implemented through the new administrative concept of village tract, borrowed from British administration in India. Charles Crosthwaithe, Chief Commissioner of Upper Burma, would finalize the transition to the village tract administration by introducing the figure of the village headman (ywa-thugyi") through the Village Act (1887). This Village Act was implemented in order to break former administrative structures (such as those based on myo and taik) as well as counter Burmese resistance in the first years of British rule, "thus further enhancing the role of new-style township and placing greater responsibilities on the village headman" (Taylor, 2009: 82).

In planning land tenure in colonized Burma, colonial rulers would have logically drawn on their previous experiences in British-India. There, three main systems dominated: a) the landlord based system (zamindari) where landlords established the tax to be collected for themselves, from which they would pay the requested amount to the British administration; b) a village based system (mahalwari) in which village bodies which jointly owned the village were responsible for the land revenue; and c) an individual based system (ryotwari) where revenue settlement was fixed directly with individuals (Banerjee and Lyer, 2005: 1193-1194). The fact that different systems coexisted throughout British India derived from the same rationale: sustaining maximum land revenue for the British administration. In some situations, landlords – able to invest more – served this purpose; in others, individuals – having more incentives than landlords to improve their own productivity – delivered better outcomes. In Burma, local commissioners (such as Maingy in Tenasserim region), would argue for years with the British-Indian government about the most appropriate system to apply to Burma. The arguments that would lead to the implementation of an individual based – ryotwari – system in Burma were that since "there was not a well-established landed group in Lower Burma, it appeared possible to develop a rural economy in which the small proprietor received the profits of his labors and the rent surplus went to the state rather than to intermediaries" (Adas, 2011: 32). This vision was grounded in the political-ecological realities of administrating Lower Burma, ones not prevailing in Upper Burma where the best-irrigated tracks of land were already cultivated and where "easily cleared and fertile land was very difficult to get" (Siok Hwa, 1965a: 120). Indeed, this very situation had already led to massive migration (mostly from Upper Burma) toward the newly opened grounds of the Delta. By 1881, "more than 300,000 people living in Lower Burma were recorded as having been born outside of the region, the vast majority being cultivators from the Ava kingdom" (Thant Myint-U, 2004: 107).

Various land tenure systems were introduced under British rule, all relying on the same rationale: developing land as quickly as possible "to help defray the costs of
administration and, at the same time, to establish a body of peasant proprietors" (Siok Hwa, 1965a: 107). As noted earlier, Burmese were already familiar with individual use rights. In 1889, the Upper Burma Land and Revenue Regulation would appropriate the former land categorization of 'crown' or 'private' dividing land into 'state' and 'non-state' respectively (Thant Myint-U, 2004: 228). Another major change was that under royal administration, "there was very little if any direct taxation on agricultural production other than rent on land constituting crown estates" (ibid: 37). Most taxes were in the form of fees for judicial and other services performed, licenses, local tariffs on trade, transport and virtually every kind of economic activity. Colonial authorities, on the other hand, decided to impose a tax on 'non-state' land in addition to the rent on 'state land' and the *thathameda*. This was made "*in line with the long-standing British Indian concept of the state being the ultimate owner of the land or was justified in part by citing the Burmese notion of the king as the 'lord of water and earth' (ye'-mye" shin*. Thus, what had been an abstract Burmese theory of government, never practiced, in this way became a codified and enforced reality under the British administration" (ibid.: 230).

Implementation of this *ryotwari* system would require costly and time consuming surveys to record individual holdings. Moreover, the classification of land between 'state' and 'non-state' would prove a source of conflicts and tensions between the British government and the Burmese cultivators from Upper Burma, where a long tradition of tenure under the crown already existed (Mizuno, 2000: 122). Indeed, occupants of 'state land' had to pay a tax on land, besides the already collected *thathameda* tax. For this reason, some British officers were tempted to declare as much land as possible as 'state land', while farmers tended to "*conceal so far as possible the customs relating to tenures (to British officers), lest any information might be used against them as an argument for demanding rent*"<fnref n="32" /> (Furnivall, 1931: 89). Due to many difficulties in determining whether a parcel would fall into 'state' or 'non-state' classification, as well as the gradual 'privatization' of land through increasing claims brought to courts by individuals, the entire distinction was abandoned by the end of the 19th century so that all land were finally considered equally taxable under the land revenue tax.

## 1.2 Dispossession: from state's tenants to the state of tenancy

The state experimented with several land tenure policies in order to secure land revenue collection and foster land development, especially in Lower Burma. During the decades of rapid expansion of cultivated lands, two coexisting tenure systems dominated:

<footnote n="32">32. To establish if a land should fall into one or the other category, officers would notably look at tenure rights: occupants of 'crown-land' (classified as state land by the British) didn't have the right to transfer, mortgage or sell the land.</footnote>
* The squatter system resembled the traditional *dama-u-gya*, in which any person was able to clear and settle on any vacant land. By paying land revenue tax continuously over a 12 years period, the cultivator received a permanent, inheritable, and transferable right of use and occupancy of the land provided he continued to pay the tax regularly. Before this period, the cultivator was liable to eviction if he failed to pay the annual land revenue. This system prevailed in more-established areas (i.e. Dry Zone and upper part of Delta) where cultivators were expanding their long-settled holdings by clearing adjacent land (Siok Hwa, 1965a: 107-108).

* The second system was the *patta* (i.e. a small piece of land) system, aimed at encouraging cultivators to cultivate state land that had previously not been under cultivation. This system granted tenure before the cultivator cleared the land without collecting revenue during a period varying according to the difficulty to transform the land into productive farmland. Such land could not be mortgaged and cultivators had to show sufficient means to cultivate the land without resorting to money-lenders (ibid.: 108).

In both systems, however, money-lenders became crucial stakeholders in expanding land under British rule, particularly in Lower Burma. Indeed, it was found that even the *patta* system could not prevent landholders from mortgaging or exchanging land to money-lenders, traders and landlords as collateral. By 1900, the *patta* system was found to be inefficient in constituting a large body of peasant-proprietors and was abandoned. Other systems would be introduced, such as a lease of state land for five to ten-year periods with the possibility for cultivators to cultivate any adjacent vacant land without paying extra revenue, and a grant system through which the government offered large tracts of land to investors, hoping these would bring laborers to work their estate. However, it appeared that most of the successful investors in these schemes were chiefly speculators, administrative officers, etc., rather than proper cultivators (ibid.: 110).

Following the implementation of these systems, especially the squatter and *patta* ones, the results appeared to be contrary to the putative British objectives of creating a large body of peasant proprietors (more exactly, landholders). By 1930, one third of the total cultivated land had fallen into the hands of non-agriculturists and one quarter was held by absentee non-agriculturists (ibid.: 112). This marked a significant difference from the numbers found in the 1891 census, which "listed 1.8 per cent of the population as landlords, 64 per cent as landowning cultivators, 26 per cent as tenants and 8 per cent as agricultural laborers" (Than Myint-U, 2004: 235). This increasing state of tenancy among cultivators under British rule and until the Land Nationalization Act of 1948 (see infra) can be explained by two main factors
during this period: the entry of Burmese rice on the international market, and the introduction of a new – village tract-based – governance system. The British, as briefly mentioned above, aimed at extracting as much revenue as possible from its Burma annexation, and land was a profitable post for levying taxes. Besides, the opening of Burma to the international market, especially for rice exportation purposes, changed peasants’ lifestyles in the course of the late 19th and beginning of 20th centuries through the monetization of rural economy and introduction of imported goods. Under Burmese monarchs of the Konbaung dynasty, exporting rice outside the empire was forbidden.

Accordingly, surplus rice produced in the country and notably in Lower Burma was stored and redistributed to areas where there were food shortages. As a result, the limited domestic market was regulated and stabilized by the great quantities of rice held by the government. The price of rice was therefore quite low during this period and the "low return which the cultivator received for the extra labor required to produce a surplus provided little incentive for him to harvest more than he needed for food, seed and taxes" (Adas, 1972: 187). There were therefore few reasons for farmers to bring new areas under cultivation – maybe except for assisting children who had married and were establishing separate households. Besides, "there were many sumptuary laws in Konbaung society (so the) type and size of a man's house, the domestic implements he was permitted to use, his clothing and jewellery were all rigidly regulated by his position and social standing. The cultivator was low on the social scale and thus his options as a consumer were very limited." (ibid.: 187) By entering international trade under the British rule, surplus-production became necessary (at least for the British) and the money earned through this production offered access to a number of goods long inaccessible to the cultivators under Burmese monarchs.

However, even once this incentive was introduced, clearing new lands, especially in the malaria-infested Delta, and turning them into productive rice fields, necessitated massive labor and investments, increasing the need for cultivators to rely on money-lenders. The farmers' relationship to these money-lenders may have resembled the more 'traditional' patron-client relationship structuring most vertical bonds between farmers and elites under Burmese rule. In that system, resorting to the law and administration was barely achievable outside the dynastic power center. Hence, local patrons had to rely on locally acquired legitimacy rather than outside support. To win the loyalty of his clients, the master's duty is to redistribute part of his wealth within his social group, either in collective ritual ceremonies or by lending some money to his clients for extra-professional needs such as weddings, burials, or Buddhist initiation ceremonies (shin-pyu'). This relationship is well
conveyed by the bonds one has with his *kyei”zu”shin*<fnref n="33" /> (Boutry, 2015).

However, the change in governance, exemplified by the village tract based administration ramifying deep into the countryside, altered this system – both for the farmer and for the patron. First, it hindered the farmers’ bargaining power. As Scott puts it, “*the growth of colonial administration increased the peasant need for protection and influence, while providing the legal and coercive backing that allowed local elites to ignore local opinion and become more exploitive*” (1972: 7). On the other hand, the integration of rice production into international markets and its subsequent monetization also contributed to the fragmentation of the formerly comprehensive patron-client relationships, (which normally encompass the economic frame and project themselves into the social one). But social differentiation tended to multiply interlocutors for borrowing money, for buying inputs, etc., hence multiplying dependency bonds. Farmers’ relationships to upper socioeconomic classes was therefore divided into different sectors and their bargaining power reduced. Coupled with the relative closure of the rice frontier at the turn of the 20th century and the 1930s financial crisis, the colonial era achieved the transformation of a pre-colonial body of (majority) peasant-proprietors, into a body of peasant-tenants. While it is known that foreign money-lenders (especially Chettiars) aimed at making money rather than acquiring land, the impossibility of Burmese peasants to repay their own loans ended in the concentration of land into the hands of money-lenders and landlords, among whom a great part were absentees. The land accumulation in Delta by the Chettiars is explained by Turnell as follows:

*“The combination of the collapse of paddy prices in the Great depression, the Chettiars’ insistence on land as collateral, and the imposition of British land title land did bring a substantial transfer of Burmans’ cultivable land into their hands.”*
(2009: 13)

Indebtedness already affected farmers during the booming phase of the Delta's agricultural expansion. In the 1880s and 1890s, it was estimated that over 70% of agricultural debts could be repaid at the end of the crop season, while desperate cases of debt with farmers at risk of losing their land were estimated at 3.7 to 5.4% of borrowers. In the 1900s and 1910s, the percentage of borrowers able to repay their loans within a crop season decreased to 60%, while serious indebtedness cases had increased to 9.5% (Adas, 1974b: 68). That being said, indebtedness was

<footnote n="33">33. This literally means the ‘master of one’s good deeds’, which could be translated in a Buddhist context as ‘the master of one’s life’, given the rebirth cycle tying every living being to this world and the good deeds needed to acquire merits in order to free oneself from this cycle. There are three principal *kyei”zu”shin* in one’s life: Buddha, one’s parents and teachers. See Schober, 1989.</footnote>
still much lower than in the following decades during which the agricultural crisis, aggravated by the Great Depression, led to the deterioration of living conditions of farmers (ibid.).

The main cause of land dispossession during the British colonial period is that cultivators generally contracted debts beyond their capacity of repayment. Historian Siok Hwa's summary of the central causes of indebtedness warrants extensive quotation:

> "(...) indebtedness (could be attributed) to the inexperience and ignorance of borrowers caught in the rapid change from a subsistence to a cash economy; vicissitudes befalling the borrower like drought, flood, pests, illness and cattle disease; the use of loans for unproductive purposes such as elaborate ceremonies in connection with marriages, funerals, the entry of boys into the monastic novitiate and ear-borings for girls; the use of loans for speculative ventures which failed, and the unfavorable conditions under which loans were made such as the excessively high interest rates charged; the lack of differentiation of treatment for long term and short term loans and the practice of money-lenders to allow and even encourage borrowers to borrow amounts up to the limit of the value of the collateral offered rather than the amount which would make their loan most profitable. A less important cause of let alienation by agriculturists lies in the Buddhist inheritance customs. This operated less evidently in Lower than in Upper Burma where holdings tended to be smaller and where property was often divided among the children." (Siok Hwa, 1965a: 155-6)

We should note that most of the factors remained throughout proceeding periods and continue to characterize rural lowland societies in Myanmar, especially in Delta.

#### 1.3 Ayeyarwaddy Delta: the rice frontier

The British, by annexing Lower Burma (including the Delta from 1852 onwards), transformed large tracts of wastelands into the rice granary of the British-India Empire, making the country a leader in worldwide international paddy trade until Ne Win's military coup in 1962. It has long been asserted that Lower Burma and the Ayeyarwaddy Delta were ravaged by unsuccessful Mon uprisings against ethnic Burmans in the 18th century, reducing a once fertile and productive region into a scarcely populated and cultivated one (Harvey, 1967: 236, Siok Hwa, 1965b: 69). It is however more likely that the lower part of the Delta, in the absence of embankments, had always been perennially flooded during the annual monsoon and hence unsuited for settlement (South 2003: 21). It seems that paddy cultivation in the Delta was "concentrated around the towns of Bassein (Pathein), Myaungmya
and Ngathainggyaung in the western portion of the Ayeyarwaddy Delta; near the town of Myaunaung, north west of Henzada (Hinthada) and between Prome (Pyay) and Thayetmyo on the upper Ayeyarwaddy; and near Pyapon, Dallah, Danubyu and Toungoo in the central and east portions of Lower Burma" (Adas. 1972: 186). Yet, even these regions were not intensively cultivated until the late 18th century, following the conquest of Lower Burma by Ava in the 1750s and the arrival of migrants coming from Upper Burma (ibid.: 181). Still, it was only with the British annexation of Lower Burma that the 'rice frontier' (Adas, 2011) would appear, moving constantly south to the lowest part of the Delta.

This intensive colonization of the Ayeyarwaddy Delta happened in three stages from 1858 to 1941: i) spectacular agricultural growth (1852-1901), ii) the gradual closing of the agricultural frontier (1901-1929), and iii) the major agricultural crisis period following the Great Depression.

During the first stage, the rice economy of Lower Burma rapidly extended owing to the cultivation of large areas of virgin land. The amount of rice exported from Lower Burma rose from 162,000 tons in 1855 to two million tons in 1905-06 while rice prices tripled<fnref n="34" />. Paddy cultivation area went from 600,000 acres in 1852-53, to 6.7 million acres in 1902-03 and 8.9 million acres in 1922-23 (Mya Than, 2001: 7). This agricultural boom was linked with spectacular population growth: one million people in 1852 became more than four million by 1901 (Adas, 1974: 58). This was fueled by massive migration that came south from Upper Burma via the Ayeyarwaddy River<fnref n="35" />. Migrants were mostly poor farmers, and migration waves were strongly correlated to droughts and food shortages occurring in Upper Burma. Afterwards came the Indians and, to a lesser extent, foreign Asians, mainly Chinese. The role of these diasporas, and particularly the money-lending class of Chettiars (originating from South India), was of the utmost importance in developing the rice frontier from the 1880s until independence. Yet, as underlined by Adas (1974b: 390), the rice production growth of the first three decades after Lower Burma's annexation indicates that the advance of the rice frontier<fnref n="36" /> could have been achieved, though at a slower pace, with indigenous money-lenders – principally successful agriculturists and rice brokers. Yet, thanks to the large scale transactions they executed, Chettiars were also practicing fairer interest rates than most local money-lenders (ibid.: 389). Actually, the main role of non-European immigrants in colonization processes throughout the globe was to link 'subsistence economies' and 'global commercial networks', by conducting

<footnote n="34">34. Cheng, Rice Industry in Burma, in Adas, 1974: 58.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">35. 93% (in 1881) and 87% (in 1901) of migrants arriving to Delta originated from Dry Zone (ibid, 44).</footnote>

<footnote n="36">36. During the first three decades after annexation of Lower Burma, areas under cultivation increased by nearly two millions and exports rose from virtually zero to 850,000 tons (Adas 1974: 390).</footnote>
activities Europeans were reluctant or did not have the manpower to engage (ibid.: 385). Hence, "*perhaps the major reason for the limited involvement of the Chettiars in Lower Burma in the early decades of British rule was the low level of the demand for agricultural credit*" (Adas, 1974b: 390). After 1869 and the opening of the Suez Canal, coupled with a growing demand for rice on the European market increasingly dependent on Asian production and a workforce relying more and more on imported goods (Adas, 1974b: 390, Siok Hwa, 1965b: 79-80), need for investments and credits grew enough to overwhelm indigenous money-lenders' capacities. Therefore, by the 1880s, the Chettiars were actively involved in Delta rice economy. At that time, the *ryotwari* system of tenure that defined peasants as primary holders (the government being the ultimate owner) also made it possible for cultivators to use land as collateral for loans obtained from money-lenders and other sources. By 1930, Chettiars were providing 60% of the crop loans<fnref n="37" /> in Lower Burma districts. Adas attributes the extent of Chettiar involvement in the Lower Burma rice economy to the connections developed with Western banks – such as the Imperial Bank of India and the Indian Overseas Bank – as well as their corporate organization (Adas, 1974: 393, 395-6). Despite attempts by the colonial government to provide loans through agricultural funds and cooperatives, Chettiar and other private money-lender loans were more accessible, were available with fewer delays, were of a greater amount, and came with fewer penalties in case of delay in repaying creditors than those obtained from governmental institutions (ibid.:397).

Yet, once again, it is important to underline here the exceptional extent of loans provided by Burmese money-lenders compared to other indigenous money-lending communities elsewhere in the colonies. There seemed to be a division of clientele between Chettiars and Burmese money-lenders, the latter providing loans to less secure individuals and at higher interest rates. Besides, Burmese money-lenders were able by the end of the nineteenth century to borrow from Chettiars, who progressively supplied most of indigenous money-lenders' capital (ibid.:398).

This feature of the Delta Burmese society, in which private money-lenders play a crucial role in credit provision has remained throughout successive governments and policies until today. Indeed, as we will see later (Chapter VIII.2.2), even with agricultural loan reforms undertaken by 2011's quasi-civil government – with a sharp increase of loan amounts and reduced interest rates for farmers – private money-lenders remained key players in the Delta economy. We will also see that the Land Nationalization Act of 1948 that repossessed land held by foreigners (mainly Chettiars and Chinese), in theory for the benefit of Burmese citizens, ultimately benefited large Burmese landholders and money-lenders (see Chapter III.1.6).

<footnote n="37">37. In number of loans.</footnote>
Progressively, starting from 1900, the rapid economic growth of the Delta rice industry slowed as new fertile lands gradually became rare and the 'frontier' disappeared. Consequently land prices increased while production tended to decrease due to lower land fertility, generating more and more debts among peasants. The closing of the rice frontier also left many tenants and gangs of laborers jobless. The economic crisis of the early 1930s, linked to the Great Depression and the collapse of the international paddy market would act as a final blow, leaving most landholders so indebted they had to transfer their lands to money-lenders. Despite the fact that Chettiars were not interested in holding land, the conditions described above made it such that many small and large holders alike were unable to repay their debts, and with Chettiars' financial capacity being likewise affected by the crisis, they had little choice but to foreclose on mortgaged lands. Hence, by the late 1930s, Chettiars controlled 25% of the total cultivated land in Lower Burma and 50% of the land alienated to non-agriculturists (Adas, 1974: 400).

#### 1.4 Upper Burma: the rise of a land owning class

Contrary to the large tracts of newly conquered land in Lower Burma, much of Upper Burma's land suited to agriculture was already cultivated and under customary tenure. Yet, British officers, when drafting the 1889 Upper Burma Land and Revenue Regulation, still had little knowledge of prior tenure conditions, apart that the "primary Burmese tax was the thathameda household tax and that there existed 'royal lands' which paid rent to the state" (Than Myint-U, 2004: 228). Through the enforcement of land revenue based on a division of 'state' and 'non-state' land, British policy-makers were pushing even further the prior reforms of the Konbaung era, "creating for the first time a structure of genuinely private ownership, entirely free of gentry or aristocratic control or involvement" (ibid.: 231). As already underlined, the annexation of Upper Burma also came with a new governance system emphasizing the village territorial unit and the figure of village headman or *thu-gyi*, while dispossessing most former individuals linked to the crown of their privileges (notably prebendal land). Hence, there was increasing competition among Upper Burma cultivators to claim ownership of lands that were previously held by hereditary officials under the crown (such as *myo-thugyi*, *khayaing-wun* and other noblemen). Besides, it has been noted that gathering enough evidence to classify land (whether 'state' or 'non-state') was far from easy, such that Burmese individuals started to fight to register land as private wherever doubt existed. Hence, during the first years after annexation of Upper Burma, the amount of litigation brought to British courts raised steadily<fnref n="38" />, declining only by 1895 (Thant Myint-U 2004: 232). These litigations could be sorted into two main types. The first one was comprised of suits seeking the division among heirs of ancestral private land (*bobabaing*) that had risen in value in many areas – such as the Lower Chindwin (where Monywa

<footnote n="38">38. 7,000 in 1889 and over 9,000 in 1890, the majority being for breach of contract and over land.</footnote>
and present-day Yinmabin lie), where recent improvements in irrigation and transportation had led to economic growth and where much of the land had become classified as privately owned. The second type concerned suits for the redemption of land which had been mortgaged. Interestingly enough, these two types of land disputes also dominate today in village-level conflicts surrounding the Farmland Law 2012, as we will see in **Chapter VI**.

While, for the British officers (ibid.: 232), this litigiousness tended to denote that Burmese villagers lacked a sense of communal spirit, these disputes in the years following annexation of Upper Burma surely underlined the changes happening in the social organization of the region. Notably by cancelling most of privileges acquired by Burmese officers (once benefiting from the revenue of large tracts of land), British rule favored the rise of traders, money-lenders, and other outsiders linked to the royal court (ibid.: 234). Actually, former reforms engaged by King Mindon – theoretically replacing all prebendal estates and the system of *appanages* with cash revenues and salaries – already favored traders and money-lenders. By the early 1880s, “large scale selling and mortgaging of state lands and the growing prominence of non-local traders and money-lenders throughout the country-side” were already affecting Upper Burma (ibid.: 179). However, the British pushed the reform much further than under Mindon’s rule where the form of the organization of power prevented strict control of territories far from Mandalay.

However, colonial reforms were not uniformly implemented. For example, some local hereditary office-holders and their relatives were treated much more generously in some places than in others. The *myothugyi* of Monywa was given private ownership of over 3,000 acres. Similarly, along the Lower Chindwin most of the large landowners were found to be former or current *thugyi* (ibid.: 237). Than Myint-U summarizes three different types of social change in Upper Burma until the 1900s, “based on geographical distance from Mandalay, and the local variant in early modern social organization: the area around the capital where hereditary office-holders had largely disappeared and the economy was the most heavily commercialized and outsider dominated; the Salin area, geographically the furthest irrigated area, where the gentry had turned into a powerful landowning class; and the poorer middle area which had experienced only moderate commercialization and where some local gentry had come to benefit” (ibid.: 239-240). Most of the villages surveyed in the Dry Zone for this study would fall into the second category in which the gentry turned into a powerful landowning class.

By the 1930s, the problem of let alienation of non-agriculturists was less acute in Upper Burma than in Lower Burma. Apart from state land – non-alienable and non-transferable – this difference greatly lies in the fact that cultivators "were on
the whole more concerned about the loss of land as they had a greater degree of sentimental attachment to the land which had often been handed down through many generations and therefore were more cautious in their application for and use of land mortgage loans" (Siok Hwa, 1965a: 120). This feature of Dry Zone as a long-settled area is still an important component in the dynamics of land tenure through these days, as we will see.

## 1.5 Impacts of colonization on landlordism

The pre-colonial period did not provide any favorable ground for landlordism. Indeed, the dominant rural stratum in Upper Burma from the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries was composed of hereditary headmen ruling self-sufficient agricultural communities of freemen known as *athis*. They appear to have exercised a proprietary right over all the lands in their jurisdiction, while collecting taxes and disposing of military force subject only to sporadic supervision from the royal court, since loyalties to the center were often tenuous. *Athi* land was organized on a communal basis and access to such lands had been subject to close headman supervision (Lieberman, 1991: 27). Besides, the great availability of land and the generally loose control that central power could achieve meant that farmers had little reason to pay high rents and were most often able to flee toward the forest frontier to find new land to clear and cultivate when necessary. During the Restored Toungoo and early Konbaung periods, however, headmen gradually became involved in a web of contracts and commercial relations that substantially curtailed their economic self-sufficiency. From this period onward, some *athi* land became progressively privatized and private tenures appeared on the frontier outside the old communal system. Hence the reform engaged during the Restored Toungoo and through the Konbaung dynasties (the last before British annexation) paved the rise of a new landowning class in Burma.

"Although headmen in many instances became the largest private landowners, the fragmentation of communal holdings removed some cultivators from effective headman control, while providing wealthy officials from outside the locality with unprecedented access to local land. The crown's creation of new service lands, and their eventual partial privatization, had much the same effect. At the same time the expanding involvement of many headmen in agricultural commodity production, money-lending, land speculation, and mortgaging – all attested by a proliferation of (private commercial) contracts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – rendered them more vulnerable to market fluctuations and to pressures from wealthy traders and courtiers from whom they themselves sought to obtain credit. If wider commercial outlets enriched many headmen, the unprecedented sale and mortgaging of local offices showed that risks were also involved." (Lieberman, 1991: 27-28)
Yet, as we already underlined, the British census of 1891 in Upper Burma listed only 1.8 per cent of the population as landlords (while 64 per cent were landowning cultivators, 26 per cent tenants and 8 per cent agricultural laborers). This picture nevertheless varied from one region to another and the introduction of British governance – and the quasi abolishment of distinction between crown service and non-service – resulted in different trends. Some aristocrats managed to hold on to their new estates under colonial rule with then full and recognized rights of private property, notably on lands closer to the former capital of Mandalay (Thant Myint-U, 2004: 236-7).

However, British rule had a different impact on land tenure and landlordism in Upper and Lower Burma, first of all because Lower Burma lacked the historical and socio-cultural foundations to reproduce the model of Burmese society that existed in Upper Burma. With regards to Lower Burma with which British gained the longest acquaintance, administrators tended to consider Burmese as little attached to their land. "*Cultivators in this country,* writes Mr. Blundell, 'are not so much attached to the occupation, but that they frequently give it up to engage in some other which they deem more profitable'" (Furnivall, 1939: 113). For these very reasons, British administrators attempted to 'fix' cultivators on their lands through the different tenure systems explained previously.

However, in Upper Burma the situation was much different, with customary tenure either linking peasants to the land through their overlord (in the case of 'bonded' individuals, *kyun*) or directly through a system of private property giving peasants the right to sell, mortgage or pass it to their heirs (in the case of 'non-bonded' individuals, *athis*). Land revenue was of importance for the states' finance, and despite the usufruct rights cultivators theoretically benefited from, various orders and edicts were issued to confine the cultivator to his land. Besides, the lowest segments of Upper Burma's society had little chance at social mobility so that "*rather than the peasant controlling the use of his land, the state used the land to control the peasant*" (Taylor, 2009: 40). In other terms, pre-colonial and colonial states' strategies regarding the necessity to 'fix' cultivators on their lands were quite similar in substance. Nevertheless, the means of governance and social organization were conceived from nearly opposite perspectives. In the pre-colonial period social organization (and subsequently governance) was structured along vertical relationships within different segments of the society (crownsmen, *athis*, and religious order), resembling patron-client networks. British administration, on the contrary, sought to collect land revenues by administrating a body of 'peasant-proprietors' on a geographical, horizontal basis, where the "*village headman was no longer a leader with popular authority (but) a village administrator responsible for police, taxes, public works, and agricultural improvements in his area*" (Stanton, 2014:
9). To suit appropriate village size – i.e. "*to ensure that revenues from these areas provided neither too much nor too little remuneration for (the headman)*" (ibid.: 9) – boundaries were redrawn and some villages displaced or grouped with others.

Therefore, pre-colonial customary laws and social organization were shaped by two major reforms: administrative rules replaced "*personal and authoritative judgments of traditional Burmese law*" (ibid.: 9) and the transformation of a quasi-exclusive 'domestic' agriculture into a commercial, export-oriented one. These two reforms, by interacting with each other, would profoundly affect the agrarian landscape in Myanmar, and the Delta perhaps primarily, as it became heavily dependent on export-oriented paddy cultivation. While patron-client networks would not create landlordism in the context of a 'domestic' oriented agricultural economy, they tended to favor landlordism in the context of a rapid transition to a commercial agriculture system defined by 'eroding' patron-client relationships (Scott, 1972) in favor of a territorialized conception of resources and access to resources.

## 2. The post-independence Burmese agrarian society: State policies as a factor of land insecurity (1949 onwards)

U Nu, the first prime minister of independent Burma, sought to overturn the colonial legacy to win people's trust – and outflank his communist rivals<fnref n="39" />. Given the catastrophic tenure situation bequeathed by the British – with a high percentage of lands in the hands of absentee landowners, among whom were foreigners and especially Chettiars – the new government aimed at taking back control of its natural resources and especially agricultural lands. The constitution (1947) provided the following provisions regarding land tenure (latter implemented in the form of the Land Nationalization Act 1948):

"*(1) *The State is the ultimate owner of all lands.**

(2) *Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the State shall have the right to regulate, alter or abolish land tenures or resume possession of any land and distribute the same for collective or co-operative farming or to agricultural tenants.*

(3) *There can be no large landholdings on any basis whatsoever. The maximum size of private landholding shall, as soon as circumstances permit, be determined by law.*" (GuB, 1948: 7, quoted in Turnell 2009: 174)

The Land Nationalization Act 1948 (amended in 1953) aimed at taking back land owned by non-national owners and landlords (holding more than 50 acres) in order to redistribute it to farmers holding surfaces deemed too small to be profitable, to

<footnote n="39">39. Brown, 2013: 96.</footnote>
tenants, and to the households the most recently made landless (Brown, 2013: 96).
This act was poorly provisioned – no compensation scheme was established for
holders whose land was forcibly retaken – and was implemented only in Syriam
district. The latter Nationalization Act 1953 would be implemented nationally (and
included compensation<fnref n="40" />). However, by 1958, when the government halted the
implementation of the act, only 17% of all cultivated lands had been nationalized.
“Assuming most of the 3,557,000 acres eventually nationalized was paddy land,
this represented about 25 per cent of this category of land” (Taylor, 2009: 280). The
nationalization process can be considered as a failure given that in 1965, tenants
were still paying rents to 350,000 landlords, one third of whom were foreigners
(mostly Indian and Chinese). Besides, some studies suggest that the program
eventually benefited better-off farmers more than poorer ones. Tenants who had
been landowners were more likely to be granted land than were previously landless
laborers, as farmers needed to possess the means to cultivate the land in order to be
eligible (ibid.: 280, Mya Than, 2001: 10). Let us underline however that it did benefit
tenants in some places, as in one of the Dry Zone villages under study. Current
landholders from Khoe Than Village Actually benefited from a convergence of
circumstances. Indeed, wealthy farmers from the village left to Monywa during the
civil war, entrusting smaller farmers with their land to work as tenants. However, in
the midst of the nationalization process, landlordism and tenancy were abolished,
thus transforming small farmers into middle and large holders.

From the Land Nationalization Act of 1948 until the new Farmland Law of 2012, land use policy followed the rules and regulation as stated in the Land Nationalization Act 1953, Tenancy Act and Rules 1964, and Procedures Conferring the Rights to Cultivate Land 1964. Under these policies, all land belonged to the state but farmers were given land use or tillage rights on their holdings, which could not be – at least in theory<fnref n="41" /> – transferred, mortgaged, or taken in lieu of loan repayments. However, land rights were legally inheritable by family members who remained farmers and tilled the land by themselves. Tenancy and absentee ownership was illegal.

Despite these ‘socialist’ measures, government policies throughout
independence and until today would prove a major factor in land accumulation for
the benefit of wealthier farmers while curbing the socioeconomic differentiation in
rural Myanmar and even worsening the socioeconomic situation of smallholders
(under five acres) and landless households, themselves representing the bulk of

<footnote n="40">40. Chettiar landlords actually lost most of their capital. The compensation was set through the Nationalization Act 1953 at “3%, *non-negotiable, non-transferable government bonds of little genuine value unless used for investment in Burma*” (Taylor, 2009: 280).</footnote>

<footnote n="41">41. Mya Than (1987: 64), following up on Pfanner’s study (1962) in Mayin village (Bago Division), found in the year 1980 that 10 tenants were working land despite the legal ban on tenancy since 1965.</footnote>
cultivators (Myat Thein and Maung Maung Soe, 1998: 21). A few positive outcomes came from the short-lived period of democratically elected government (ending in 1962 with Ne Win's military coup), including a period of 4 to 6% economic growth, as well as new banking and credit institutions among which at least the State Agricultural Bank proved quite successful<fnref n="42" />. However, uprisings and political crises shortly after independence clearly undermined the government's efforts, and the implementation of land reform had to stop in 1958-59 due to dissatisfaction among the peasantry since the land reform did not benefit the poor small farmers as expected.

> "As a result, the socio-politico-economic position in the rural sector was not strong as in the colonial days. (...) Technology was almost the same as in pre-war days and agriculture production was achieved through land expansion. The system benefited mostly the urban and rural bourgeoisie." (Mya Than, 2001: 10-11)

For the rural population, one of the most palpable consequences of the Japanese invasion and the nationalistic post-independence transition was probably the departure of the money-lending Chettiar community. Between 1945 and 1965, the total credit provided by the government amount for around 900 million Kyats (and probably even less), while the country's seasonal needs were estimated between 100 and 200 million Kyats (Turnell, 2009: 192-193) – that is between 2 and 4 billion Kyats over a 20 years' period. Hence at least 70% of farming households<fnref n="43" /> had to rely on local money-lenders, whose interest rates were as high as in the colonial period (between 50% and 60% per year). It was also found that already during this period, wealthier farmers ('credit-worthy') tended to benefit from government credit schemes, often turning the government loans into private, high-interest, ones (ibid.: 196). This overall lack of affordable credit for smallholders also had repercussions on agricultural practices. The almost complete disappearance of broadcasting technique under the colonial rule – replaced by transplanting – was revived, as farmers did not have the resources to pay the necessary labor for transplanting. Despite the better yields obtained, interest rates practiced by money-lenders wiped out any advantage of using the transplanting method (ibid.: 194). Despite much agricultural extension efforts provided by INGOs in the post-Nargis recovery period, this situation still prevails in the Lower Delta.

Under the socialist republic – military-led 'socialist' – government (1962-1988), government intervention and controls were introduced to cover almost all activities of food grain production, procurement, distribution, milling, storage,

<footnote n="42">42. The then State Agricultural Bank was the sole successful institution with almost 99% repayment rates between 1949 and 1962 (Turnell, 2009: 195).</footnote>

<footnote n="43">43. Turnell 2009: 201.</footnote>
transportation, domestic wholesale, retail trade, etc. The 1974 Constitution maintained the state as the ultimate owner of lands, but the slogan of the agrarian reform changed from 'land to the tiller' to 'right to cultivate to the tiller' (Mya Than, 1984: 741-761). With the change in property rights, food grain growers became obligated to sell a fixed quota of their food grains, the 'Compulsory Delivery Quota', to the government at a fixed price. The socialist government emphasized consumer welfare with extensive use of food subsidies, and private marketing was prohibited.

The government subsidized the sale of rice to consumers and distributed rice through the state economic enterprise (SEE) system (Young et al., 1998: 19). As a measure for fostering rice productivity, compulsory procurement of crops was practiced from 1964 until 2003. This policy, despite being applied nationally, was particularly enforced in the Delta, aiming at restoring the paddy production and retransforming the region into the 'rice bowl of Asia'. Despite this policy, production decreased. A widespread sense of crisis forced the government to take measures such as the exclusion of rice from marketing liberalization in 1988 and the introduction of a summer paddy program, initiated in 1992/93 (see Box 1), for boosting rice production (Fujita and Okamoto, 2006: 8). The paddy procurement system was revived.

However, the state's take was reduced by 2/3 (down to 10-12 baskets per acre from 30-40) and surplus paddy could be sold freely on the market. The entry of marketing agents (traders and rice millers) was practically free. It is hence more appropriate to say that rice was only partly liberalized (ibid.). Lasting until 2003, this compulsory procurement policy severely affected farmers' livelihoods by forcing them to sell at lower prices than those set by the market, fixed quota of paddy which was calculated based on the cultivated area (12 baskets per acre after 1988, and double to triple prior to this date), and independently from yields and variations due to weather conditions, rodents, and other pests. Upon failure to comply with any of these requirements, the land use right would be withdrawn from the farmers and the local Authorized Land Committee would re-assign the land use right to prioritized candidates who met the set criteria. In practice, farmers developed different strategies in order to resist this policy (as will be described in Chapters IV.1 and VIII.1.2).
3. A brief overview of institutions involved in current land
management

Myanmar's current land administration is characterized by overlapping laws and multiple agencies with similar responsibilities (Shivakumar *et al.*, 2015). The General Administration Department (GAD) of the Ministry of Home Affairs plays a critical role in subnational governance in Myanmar. It is in charge of managing the country public structures, which are hierarchically and geographically defined from Union level, down to State/Region, District, Township and Village Tract<sup>44</sup> level. Land management is part of its historical core function. The GAD is particularly responsible for town lands and village lands. The GAD can issue grants, leases, and licenses for residential, industrial, and commercial purposes. It also secures the acquisition of lands for the public interest, such as for building schools, roads, etc.

With the 2012 farmland land law, farmland management bodies have also been
instated at the district, township, and village tract levels. However, the Farmland
Law did not define the precise roles and responsibilities of Farmland Administrative
Bodies<sup>45</sup> (FABs) at the lower levels (Shivakumar <i>et al.</i>, 2015). In theory, its mandate
is to manage and solve farmland disputes. However, in practice, these bodies act
as a ' mailbox' to refer local land conflicts to the higher administrative levels but do
not play a significant role in conflict arbitration. The Settlement and Land Records
Department (SLRD) plays a major role in all levels of non-forestland administration.
The SLRD was first the Revenue and Survey Department as created by the British to
map land and tax farmers accordingly. The SLRD has since been renamed DALMS
(Department of Agricultural Land Management and Statistics), in May 2015. It
falls under the current Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MOAI), formerly the
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation (MOALI). It is officially in charge
of land administration through surveys and records (including the cadastral –
*kwin* – maps) and has a central role in the issuance of formal documentation
concerning land use rights over farmlands. The former Ministry of Environment,
Conservation and Forestry (MoECAF) – now called Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) since the new NLD government was
instated, assumes primary responsibility in areas designated as forests. The Forest
Department is responsible for protecting the land under its jurisdiction from
encroachment and squatting and ensuring adherence to prescribed land use.

<footnote n="44">44. Village tract has been introduced by the British as the lowest minimum unit of administration, with the primary objective of levying taxes (see Chapter History III.1.1). It is generally constituted of several villages.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">45. Farmland Administrative Bodies have been formed under the 2012 Farmland Law to provide guidelines for issuance of Land Use Certificates (LUCs) for farmland areas and to oversee implementation as well as guiding and supervizing in respect of registration and conversion of farmland to other use. FABs operate at each administrative level (Central/ Naypyitaw, region/state, district, township, village tract/Ward).</footnote>
# IV. Overview of the areas under study: History, policies and land

## 1. Ayeyarwaddy Delta (Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun townships): a world of water and paddy, and a changing agricultural frontier

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 3:** Location of the studied townships in Ayeyarwaddy</figcaption></figure>

"The Ayeyarwaddy Delta of southern Myanmar is a fragile and intricate ecosystem of mangrove swamps and tidal estuaries. Non saline arable areas are limited and becoming scarce due to the erosion of riverbanks, saltwater intrusion, and increasing soil salinity. Poor water control and drainage works contribute to periodic flooding and crop losses. Most poor households cultivate a single crop of traditional monsoon paddy. Better-off farmers able to

grow early maturing, high-yielding varieties of paddy benefit from an additional winter crop such as groundnuts or soybeans. In the very few areas where irrigation facilities are available, summer paddy is grown. Marginal farm households cannot afford to use chemical fertilizer or manure and suffer from declining crop yields. In some townships such as Laputta, Bogale and Mawlamyaingyun, it is estimated that more than half of the population is landless. Many marginal farmers engage in fishing and crabbing. Those who fish typically do not own fishing gear or boats and depend on fish traders for such resources. Some households raise pigs, chickens, or ducks. Others crop during the slack growing season by borrowing from more well-off farmers; loans are paid back through labor or through a portion of paddy crop. The effective interest rate charged by fish traders, rice traders and others in these loan arrangements typically amount to 10 per cent a month."

This is how a 1999 World Bank report (in Mya Than 2006) depicted the Delta. Despite some major changes such as the generalization of summer paddy production (see **Box 1**) – at the expense of pulses – and of the use of fertilizers (see **Chapter VII.2.1**), it could very much fit the present condition of Delta. The climate is tropical humid with annual precipitations of three to four meters per year. The large majority of these rains fall during monsoon season (between May and October). The dry season (from November to February) is slightly cooler, while temperatures soar from March up to the monsoon rains.
BOX 1: INTRODUCTION OF SUMMER PADDY

Rising anxieties about rice prices led the government to exclude rice from the market liberalization of 1988. After decades of declining agricultural production, the government took measures to boost rice production with the introduction of the summer paddy program initiated in 1992/93. As described by Fujita<fnref n="46" />, it was "essentially an irrigation development program" with construction of sluice gates, draining channels, and farmers' private investment in water pumps. As an incentive to farmers, summer paddy was exempt from the procurement obligation (see Box 2).

Myanmar agricultural services also vigorously promoted the cultivation of summer paddy varieties. In just three years, the acreage under summer paddy countrywide had increased from 0.82 million in 1992/93 to nearly 4 million in 1995/96 (Myat Thein, 1997), but then followed a very sluggish phase where the declining rice price was outstripped by the additional costs of diesel for pump irrigation (Fujita and Okamoto, 2006). The authors even state that "it becomes clearly apparent that pulses generally yield a higher profit than summer paddy" and conclude that "agricultural policies in Myanmar have a strong inclination towards production increases for their own sakes while paying rather less attention to farmers' income and welfare".

As summer paddy required costs double of those of monsoon and access to farm machinery (power tillers, motor pump), the introduction of this cropping pattern may have accelerated land exclusion and land accumulation processes, and increased disparities in agricultural incomes. This hypothesis is put forward by Myat Thein (1997: 127-128) who analysed the impact on the introduction of summer paddy in Pya Phone district. He provides examples of households accumulating lands:

"(...) There were also those who either obtained land-use rights through purchase or through the land distribution program. One farm family, for example, had 23 acres in 1992/93. This farm family now has 45 acres and is planning to buy 10 more acres in the coming year. Another farm family had just 5 acres in 1992/93. Now this family has nearly 25 acres.

"On the other hand, there were also farm families who had to sell some or all of their land-use rights as they could not afford the cost of cultivating both monsoon and summer paddy. For example, one family of three cultivating 10 acres of monsoon paddy before 1992/1993 now only has 5 acres. As this small family could not afford the cost of cultivating 10 acres of summer paddy the family sold half of its land-use rights on an understanding, rather than forfeiting it (for not cultivating) to the land distribution committee."

Unfortunately, Myat Thein does not clearly analyse what are the critical factors determining who are the losers and the winners. However, our study findings seem to indicate that the **exclusion process is strongly linked to the ability of mobilizing labor or/and the ability to access machinery (tiller, thresher, and, more recently, reapers)**.

<footnote n="46">46. Fujita and Okamoto, 2006, Fujita, 2003.</footnote>
Paddy is by far the main crop grown, at both summer and monsoon seasons. In other Delta townships, pulse and groundnut are also grown in the dry season. The spatial organization of Delta livelihoods is strongly linked to the salinity of water resources. During the dry season, salinity levels progressively increase and water becomes salty further North (see **Figure 4**). The possibility of growing summer paddy is mainly determined by the availability of irrigation water, and therefore by the salinity of surrounding creeks and rivers.

**Figure 5** (on Mawlamyinegyun, and which is valid for Bogale as well) shows the predominance of double paddy cropping in the northern areas of the township, and of single paddy cropping in the southern areas, and the once abundant but now marginal areas of pulses crops. Roughly, a north-south gradient applies, confining more or less summer season paddy to the north of Magu and Pa Da Mya Gone village tracts in Bogale and from Kywe Chan Kyon La Mu village tract to the north in Mawlamyinegyun township (see **Figure 3**).

In freshwater areas, farmers can farm all year round, while in salt-water areas (further south towards the Andaman sea), only rainfed crops in monsoon season are possible. In between, there is a gradient with brackish water areas, where summer crops are more or less possible, but often with lower yields. Summer paddy crops are grown with total reliance on irrigation: water from the rivers and creeks can be withdrawn by gravity during high tides or by motor pumps.

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 4:** Iso salinity map of Delta (source: unknown)</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 5:** Land cover map of Mawlamyinegyun township (source: IRRI, 2013)</figcaption></figure>

On 2 and 3 May 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, making landfall in Ayeyarwaddy Division, crossing through the Ayeyarwaddy Delta from southwest to northeast, and directly hitting the country's largest city, Yangon. Major damage was reported in the affected areas, particularly in the low-lying agricultural Delta region where the cyclone's impact was compounded by a storm surge. Buildings, infrastructure, and communications were severely damaged, and flooding was widespread. Given the devastation of homes and infrastructure, loss of agricultural land, and loss of access to fishing grounds due to persistent flooding and the shifting of sands, many people were displaced. The estimated number of people affected is as high as 2.4 million.

The official death toll on the 1st of June 2008 stands at 77,738 with 55,917 missing. Unofficial estimates are considerably higher (often around 150,000). Overall, it is estimated that almost 2 million acres of paddy fields were submerged by the cyclone, i.e. 63% of paddy land in a total of 19 townships of the two main affected Divisions, plus Bago East and Mon State (FAO, 2008: 13). In Bogale, 51% of large ruminants, and in Mawlamyinegyun 70% of draught animals, were killed (ibid.: 14, 25). Beyond the direct damages from the cyclone on crop production, the salinization of cultivable lands continues to impact agriculture in the region and even indefinitely prevented paddy cultivation in some areas – such as in Kyun Hteik village tract (Bogale township).
In townships such as Laputta, Bogale, and Mawlamyinegyun, it is estimated that more than half of the population is landless, with that rate rising as high as 70% of the households in some village tracts (Dapice, 2009: 5).

The massive migration waves during the Delta rapid expansion at the British colonial period, led Adas (1974:105) to describe the Burma Delta as a plural society, with economic actors from various cultural groups (mainly Burmese, European, Indians, Chinese) organized into "corporate sections or segments whose boundaries demarcate distinct communities and systems of social action". Nowadays, in the area of the study, the population is essentially Bamar, with Karen minorities. The nine villages under study are distributed in Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun townships over five different village tracts (see **Table 4**).

<table><caption>**Table 4:** Key information of Delta surveyed villages (source: village statistics)</caption><thead><tr><th>Township - village tract</th><th>Village</th><th>Total Population</th><th>Total House-holds</th><th>Mon- soon acres</th><th>Sum- mer acres</th><th>Land- less HH</th><th>% landless</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Bogale - Magu</td><td>Poe Laung Chaung Twin</td><td>555</td><td>138</td><td>315</td><td>301</td><td>61</td><td>44</td></tr><tr><td>Bogale - Magu</td><td>Pay Chaung Lay</td><td>435</td><td>105</td><td>390</td><td>390</td><td>69</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td>Bogale - Magu</td><td>Magu</td><td>681</td><td>166</td><td>564</td><td>564</td><td>91</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>Bogale - Mya Thein Tan</td><td>Aye Ywar</td><td>326</td><td>85</td><td>330</td><td>150</td><td>50</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>Bogale - Tha Byu Gone</td><td>Tha Byu Gone</td><td>667</td><td>150</td><td>212</td><td>211</td><td>96</td><td>64</td></tr><tr><td>Maw Gyun - Kyar Hone</td><td>Kyar Hone</td><td>472</td><td>114</td><td>449</td><td>410</td><td>75</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td>Maw Gyun - Kyet Shar</td><td>Pay Chaung</td><td>274</td><td>54</td><td>175</td><td></td><td>46</td><td>85</td></tr><tr><td>Maw Gyun - Pyar Mut Shaw Chaung</td><td>Ah Lel Chaung</td><td>272</td><td>58</td><td>157</td><td>157</td><td>34</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>Maw Gyun - Kyar Hone</td><td>Tet Tet Ku</td><td>300</td><td>148</td><td>523</td><td>327</td><td>100</td><td>68</td></tr></tbody></table>
Selected villages encompass the agrarian diversity of the north-south salinity gradient, as well as represent the diversity of settlements, which follows more or less the same pattern: more recent settlements toward the south. Finally, they convey the diversity of land statuses – farmlands and cultivated forestlands. Except from Pay Chaung in Kyet Shar village tract (Mawlamyinegyun township), all villages include lands where two seasons of paddy can be cultivated. Within the same villages, this may vary depending on the lands’ proximity to creeks and rivers. For example in Tet Tet Ku, inner lands can be cultivated two seasons while those situated by the river (hence vulnerable to saline water intrusion) can only be cultivated during monsoon.

As in other parts of the Delta, paddy cultivation is by far the main source of income for local communities. However, in villages that are close to local towns such as Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun, gardening activities (betel, flowers, vegetables, banana) are also common and procure a significant additional income for the household's livelihoods. Fishing and duck raising (mainly for egg production) are also important sources of income in the Delta. Among the nine survey villages, the oldest ones (Tha Byu Gone, Aye Ywar, A Lel Chaung) all find their origins with the migration of farmers from the Dry Zone (see **Chapter III.1.3**). This migration already induced in pre-colonial times, was boosted under British colonial rule. The history of more recent villages such as Pay Chaung or Magu illustrates the north-south agricultural frontier, motivated by the need to find new land to cultivate: for newly settled couples, for farmers having lost their land at the hands of money-lenders, and even for those trying to escape debts. Most recent villages also bear the consequences of post-independence government policies to populate areas in the Delta where anti-governmental groups (communist groups, Karen armed groups) were operating (see **Box 2**).

The livelihoods' sequence in the creation of these settlements follows the same pattern: starting with firewood and charcoal exploitation (to supply the expanding populations of towns), followed by a systematic clearing of lands that would then be transformed into irrigable paddy fields. The history of the agricultural frontier is reflected in the features of villages. In general, the most recent villages (farther south, deeper into forestlands) have higher landlessness rates, higher land concentration, and more mobility (both in terms of household mobility and in terms of intensity of land transfers) than in older settlements where land is more evenly distributed and social organization and horizontal linkages between villagers are stronger. As a matter of fact, as per the villages' data, landless households among the nine villages under study represent an average 65%<fnref n="47" />, with higher inequality rates in the most recently settled southern villages (eg: 85% of landless in Pay Chaung village).

<footnote n="47">47. See updated figures as per the quantitative study's findings in Chapter VII showing slightly lower landlessness rates.</footnote>
BOX 2: BOGALE AND MAWLAMYINEGYUN THROUGH THE 'COMPULSORY DELIVERY QUOTA'

In the agitated period following independence, Bogale and Mawlamyinegyun were considered a 'dark zone'. Local people suffered from the conflicts between the central government and anti-government organizations. Since 1962, U Ne Win's military regime aimed to clear the Delta region of rebels, notably by encouraging forest clearing and the production of firewood and charcoal. Under the Cooperative Department, groups of laborers were dispersed in order to clear forests as in Pay Chaung, one of the villages under study. According to interviews, these laborers were the first settlers to work land once the forests were cleared some 40 years ago. The unstable situation in the Delta had consequences on farmers' ability to access government credit as well. Indeed, only villages free from insurgent activity (Turnell 2009: 197) had the right to establish a village bank. Farmers had to pay different 'taxes' to each armed group (including government forces), in form of paddy, food, etc. The high diversity of rebel organizations gave its name to the 'colored rebels' (yaun sone tha bon) era. Among the insurgents armed organizations were notably the Burma Communist Party (Red flag party), White Soldier rebels, and the KNDO (Karen rebels, now known as KNU). In the same period, a considerable number of Karen ethnic people found refuge in the Delta (Thawnghmung, 2013: 112), leading to the current landscape dominated by Burmese and Karen villages, the former mainly involved in paddy cultivation and the latter in both paddy and gardening activities.

Perceived as a refuge for anti-government rebels and Myanmar's main rice bowl, the government tightly controlled the Delta. The post 1962 policies and particularly the 'Compulsory Delivery Quota' strongly impacted farmers. In all studied villages<fnref n="48" />, this policy has been an important driver of farmland transfers. In theory, farmers unable to supply prescribed paddy quotas risked to have their land confiscated by the let allocation committee which had the prerogative to reallocate the land use rights to other households recorded on a 'waiting list' (tan-si sa-yin'). In practice, according to our interviews, it was more common for cultivators to arrange their own informal transfers of land use rights before having their lands formally confiscated by the let allocation committee. Farmers unable to provide paddy quotas in full, as far as they could anticipate, would sell part or all of their lands to another farmer (generally from the same village) and then disguise the transfer through the land distribution committee involving local SLRD officers and the village tract headman.

For example, a person owning three acres of paddy land had to procure 36 baskets of paddy (12 baskets per acre). The first year, the person procures 25 baskets, remaining with a debt to the government of 11 baskets. Fortunately, the government previously gave three years to the farmers to fulfil their obligation from the first failure to procure the due quota. The second year, the same farmer thus owes 47 baskets (36 for three

<footnote n="48">48. Except from Pay Chaung village in which land is all registered as forestland. While they had to deliver paddy quotas to the village committee, being in forestland made it so they could quite easily underreport cultivated areas. For this reason, to our knowledge none of Pay Chaung household lost land because of this policy.</footnote>
acres plus the past year's debt). However, the farmer is only able to procure 30 baskets, remaining with 17 baskets as debt. The third year, despite a good harvest, the farmer is able to procure only 40 baskets and is left with a debt of 13 baskets to the government. Whenever a farmer was not able to fulfil the prescribed quantity of baskets, government broker teams would inspect all places in which paddy could potentially be hidden. If they found some paddy stored in granaries, it would be confiscated. The farmer in this case was sent to jail for some months, in addition to losing his paddy lands.

For 'minor' gaps, cultivators would borrow money or paddy to fill the quota. However, the rice market price was higher than the government price, exacerbating a farmer's indebtedness. It is unsurprising that cultivators were sometimes unable to repay and lost part of their holdings. This policy also impacted on-going arrangements, as in the case of one Aye Ywar villager, 'U K K'<fnref n="49" /> who, prior to 1964, mortgaged 13 acres in order to cover the cost of his grandmother's funeral. According to the *le pyan ngwe pyan* practice, land is given to the individual lending money for a certain period. The money-lender receives the right to use and benefit from all products of the land until the borrower is able to repay the loan (see Chapter VI). Before U K K was able to repay the loan, the quota policy had been introduced so he did not even care to take back his land. As noted by Myat Thein (1997: 131), prior to the liberalization of the paddy market after 1988, farmers had no incentive to cultivate. They even lacked incentives to retrieve mortgaged lands due to the prohibitive quota (24 baskets per acre prior to 1988). In 1971-72, when the free market price of paddy rose, farm laborers were even "better-off than small owner-cultivators because agricultural workers were usually paid in kind" (Myat Than 2001: 11). Exceptions may have occurred on cultivated forestlands, as recalled by one villager of Pay Chaung: eluding the direct control of SLRD, they would underreport their cultivated acreage so as to be required to supply less to the government, and hence profit more from the parallel market (prior to 1988) or private traders (after 1988).

However, land confiscation and reallocation varied depending on the village tract land committee – composed of the village headman and appointed elders – and a given farmer’s relationship with the committee. Good relations with the committee provided easier access to seized lands – i.e. a better position on the waiting list. Similarly, while the farmer described above lost his lands for a debt of 14 baskets, other individuals closer to the committee had no or smaller sanctions despite greater debts to the government. The waiting lists, theoretically dedicated to landless farmers, actually included large landowners. The village tract committee would indeed find justification for transferring lands to farmers (rather than the landless), generally based on their greater financial and technical capacity to successfully undertake land cultivation. Evidence from the qualitative part of the study shows that land transfers through the waiting lists under the forced procurement era served mainly land accumulation for the benefit of a narrow class of big landholders.

<footnote n="49">49. All names of individuals interviewed during the study have been modified in order to protect their anonymity.</footnote>
Pay Chaung shows higher land concentrations (63% of farmers own more than 10 acres) than in older settlements where land is better distributed (Aye Ywar, Ah Lel Chaung and Tha Byu Gone). Hence, a stronger process of land concentration is to be found in the south, which is linked with more extensive processes of mobility. This can be imputed to late exploitation of these lands, driven by government policies such as compulsory rice procurement which affected many small farmers unable to absorb the shocks linked to health issues or ‘bad’ harvests (rodent infestations, high tides, bad weather, and Cyclone Nargis) or to manage lower yields of paddy in the southern parts of the Delta.

During both colonial and postcolonial times, some issues have remained constant in Delta, such as farmers’ indebtedness (see VIII.2.3), and the strong presence of the state due to its focus on paddy production. The forced paddy procurement system, which was a major burden for Delta farmers has been a key driver of exclusion for some and of accumulation for others (see Box 2).

Throughout the previous military governments up to now, the village headman (nowadays the village administrator) and the local Settlement and Land Records Department (SLRD) officer remained the key stakeholders in land management and in defining the ‘losers and winners’ of the implemented policies (see VIII.3). All these issues have fueled the progress of the agricultural frontier, as farmers unable to repay their loans or to fulfil the procurement quotas generally lost their lands and moved south to clear forestlands and formed new settlements. Until 2014, these lands were still registered as forestlands (see this Chapter 3.2). One hypothesis to be explored further in the study is explaining the current differences in land distribution between older and recent settlements by their level of social organization and horizontal linkages – presumably stronger in older ones, thus impacting on the relative power of local authorities (village headman and SLRD officer).

## 2. Dry Zone (Monywa and Yinmabin townships): a diversified and resilient agriculture, in the cradle of Burmese culture

The Dry Zone<fnref n="50" /> is characterized by two main features: i) annual precipitations are less than 1000 mm<fnref n="51" /> (40”), and ii) the occurrence of water deficits due to the excess of annual evapo-transpiration over annual precipitation. The rainfall pattern in the Dry Zone area is bimodal: although the rainfed crop growing season in the country is normally determined by monsoon onset in May and its termination in

<footnote n="50">50. The Dry Zone is a generic term for the dry areas of the regions of Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay.</footnote>

<footnote n="51">51. The average annual rainfall is of 717 mm and 845 mm in Monywa and Yinmabin respectively.</footnote>
October, this Dry Zone area encounters a dry spell in July (often referred to as 'July drought') and higher rainfall for better crop growth occurs from August to October. The unpredictability of rainfall and frequency of droughts has led local inhabitants to increase their resilience by diversifying their crops and sources of incomes through livestock raising (cattle, sheep, goats, chicken), weaving, and other off-farm activities.

BOX 3: MONYWA, CRADLE OF BURMESE CULTURE?

The Monywa and Yinmabin area lies in the cradle of Burmese culture. As per one of the local legends, the name of Monywa derived from the name of the tree species<fnref n="52" /> which were erected as poles during monarchical era regatta festivals on the Chindwin River. During the Bagan and Ava periods of Myanmar dynastic history, Monywa was a small village. It became a large and prosperous village in the early Konbaung Period. On the other hand, Yinmabin was only a subsidiary village during monarchical times. The name of the village was derived from the *Yin Ma* tree (Chittagong wood tree, *Chukrassia tabularis*). During the period from 1714 to 1752, the monarchical administration was weak, the country was in turmoil and villages encountered dacoits, looters, and cattle theft (Dr. Yi Yi, 1973). The west bank area of the Chindwin River was bounded by north and south Yama streams and was designated as the ninety-nine villages of the Ba Gyi Taik. All of them were under the charge of Hsa-Lin-Gyi Headman as appointed by King Badon in 1802. British colonial rule in Upper Burma started in 1885-6, 33 years later than in Lower Burma. In 1887 during the colonial period the Headquarters of the Deputy Commissioner was shifted from Ahlon to Monywa. Thus Monywa developed and grew as a district town.

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 6:** Location of studied townships in Sagaing</figcaption></figure>

<footnote n="52">52. Mon Taing/ Mon pin: Lophopetalum wallichii Kurz.</footnote>
Unlike the Delta, the Dry Zone area and the situation of surveyed villages are very heterogeneous, and cannot be explained by a single variable. Differences are the result of variations in the physical environment, access to water and infrastructure, farming systems, proximity to greater towns, etc. The area displays a strong agrarian structure based on dry land agriculture – with the exception of prosperous irrigated areas near the Chindwin River and various streams. Dry land farming is characterized by highly diversified cropping, high risks for rainfed crops ('normal yields' are achieved with about 30% probability), declining soil fertility and prevailing soil erosion on slopes, and fragile soils. Major crops grown are pulses such as pigeon pea, chickpea, green gram, lima bean. Also, sesame, sorghum, sunflower, and wheat to a lesser extent are commonly grown. Tomato, onions, and chilli are grown as profitable cash crops on the most fertile soils. Cotton may also be found. *Thanaka* and betel also provide additional agricultural income. Access to water for irrigation (mainly through pumped irrigation systems moving surface water or groundwater) is a critical determinant of the options available to farmers, including whether they can get secure harvests of monsoon crops or cultivate a second crop in the dry season.

<table><caption>**Table 5: Key information of Dry Zone surveyed villages (village statistics)**</caption><thead><tr><th>Category</th><th>Aung Chan Thar</th><th>Zee Phyu Pin</th><th>Min Zu</th><th>Si Laung</th><th>Hnaw Pin</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1. Population</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Male</td><td>505</td><td>367</td><td>661</td><td>922</td><td>220</td></tr><tr><td>Female</td><td>577</td><td>376</td><td>730</td><td>1042</td><td>340</td></tr><tr><td>Households</td><td>218</td><td>167</td><td>291</td><td>372</td><td>121</td></tr><tr><td>Landowners</td><td>116</td><td>136</td><td>157</td><td>160</td><td>64</td></tr><tr><td>Landless HHs</td><td>102</td><td>31</td><td>134</td><td>212</td><td>57</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><thead><tr><th>Category</th><th>Gaw Gyi</th><th>Hledar</th><th>Khoe Than</th><th>Nyaung Pin Thar</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1. Population</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Male</td><td></td><td>326</td><td></td><td>202</td></tr><tr><td>Female</td><td></td><td>327</td><td></td><td>212</td></tr><tr><td>Households</td><td>122</td><td>143</td><td>250</td><td>85</td></tr><tr><td>Landowners</td><td>53</td><td>79</td><td>117</td><td>45</td></tr><tr><td>Landless HHs</td><td>69</td><td>64</td><td>133</td><td>40</td></tr></tbody></table>
BOX 4: GOVERNMENT IRRIGATION PROJECTS, SAGAING REGION

Irrigation development in Dry Zone took place essentially in the 1990s under the government's nation-wide irrigation development program which aimed to boost paddy production. The widespread use of groundwater for irrigation in Myanmar began in 1989, with pilot trials funded by UNDP and IDA at Monywa. The success of these trials resulted in the development of large groundwater projects in Monywa (141 wells serving 8,094 ha in the 1980s and 1990s, funded by the World Bank) and the 99 Ponds project in Yinmabin (440 wells irrigating 3,300 ha), which draws from artesian wells.

Department of Water Resources and Utilization (WRUD), Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, had launched the tank irrigation project in Yinmabin in 1994. The project was completed in 1995 and additional tanks were made in 2000, for a total cost of about 80 million MMK. About 8,200 acres are irrigated presently. Double cropping altogether with summer rice amounted to 13,361 acres of total cropping within this 99 tank irrigated area (Report of the District Office of WRUD, June 2011, Monywa).

Governmental efforts to improve access to irrigation in the Dry Zone were principally driven by the prospect of enhancing paddy production in this region (Thawnghmung 2003: 303). The state's persistent inclination towards paddy and production increases, even in areas such as the Dry Zone, was justified by the rationale that food security would be obtained by reaching paddy self-sufficiency. It indeed gave too little attention to comparative advantages of other crops which could provide more resilience and better incomes to farmers. Sticking to the socialist land tenure system, the government compelled farmers to grow the mandate crop - paddy - wherever irrigation water was made accessible. Cultivation of other staple or cash crops in the designated 'paddy' lands was prohibited. Even in sandy field plots which were not favorable to paddy, farmers were obliged to switch from dry land crops to grow paddy after the irrigation channels were constructed beside river banks.

Among the surveyed villages, Zee Hpyu Pin falls under the irrigation project's coverage. However, some villagers such as in Thet Kei Pu reported having lost access to prior underground water after the establishment of nearby tanks, which may have exhausted their water resource. Examination of the water discharge rate over nearly two decades revealed the dwindling flow of water from the artesian wells. Due to the decreasing water discharge from the existing wells, the administrative departments of Monywa district notified in the early 2010s that no new wells were to be drilled in those areas.

Apart from farm activities, weaving is a primary livelihood for daily workers in many villages (such as Khoe Than, Hnaw Pin, and Gaw Gyi). Once flourishing around Monywa under the socialist government, from 2004 onwards the indigenous weaving industry was challenged by more affordable and better quality Chinese blankets, resulting in its ultimate collapse around 2008. Workers from the village-based