# Moralized authoritarian governance: Theory, measurement, and empirical evidence from comparative case studies

Etienne Fakaba Sissoko

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Etienne Fakaba Sissoko. Moralized authoritarian governance: Theory, measurement, and empirical evidence from comparative case studies. 2026. hal-05537303

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Moralized authoritarian governance:

*Theory, measurement, and empirical evidence from comparative case studies*

Étienne Fakaba Sissoko

Centre de Recherche et d'Analyses Politiques, Économiques et Sociales (CRAPES)
Université des Sciences Sociales et de Gestion de Bamako (USSGB)
Bamako, Mali

Email : etienne@crapes.net

https://cv.hal.science/etienne-fakaba-sissoko

Sissoko, É. F. (2026). *Moralized authoritarian governance: Theory, measurement, and empirical evidence from comparative case studies*. CRAPES Working Paper Series.
Université des Sciences Sociales et de Gestion de Bamako.
**Abstract**

This article proposes an empirical instrument designed to measure a dimension of authoritarian stabilization that has often been overlooked: the institutional moralization of civic norms. Existing indices of democracy and governance primarily focus on the procedural, legal, or performance-based dimensions of political power, and therefore capture only imperfectly those configurations in which moral loyalty to the official narrative tends to supersede factual verification as a criterion of citizenship.

To render this phenomenon empirically observable, the study develops the **Moral Inversion Index (MII)**, a composite indicator based on four analytical dimensions—cognitive, normative, emotional, and symbolic—and constructed exclusively from observable institutional traces such as legal norms, official speeches, and symbolic political devices. The construction of the index follows an explicit methodological procedure including the operationalization of indicators, their normalization, and robustness tests ensuring the reproducibility of the measurement.

The results show that the MII captures an analytical dimension distinct from the dominant indices of democracy and governance, providing complementary information on forms of authoritarian legitimation grounded in the moralization of civic expectations. The article thus contributes to the comparative analysis of authoritarianism by proposing an empirical instrument that makes it possible to study institutional configurations in which morality becomes an infrastructure of government.

**Keywords**: moralized authoritarianism; moral inversion; political legitimation; authoritarian governance; comparative measurement; composite index

**JEL Codes**

D72 — Political processes

D73 — Corruption, rent-seeking, and governance

H11 — Structure of government

Z13 — Social norms and social capital

P16 — Political economy
# 1. Introduction

## Measurement Problem and Methodological Contribution

Contemporary analyses of authoritarian regimes have progressively moved away from a strictly coercive conception of power toward the examination of more diffuse and durable forms of political stabilization, notably those based on formal legality, controlled competition, or information manipulation (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Scheppele, 2013). This shift has led to a proliferation of comparative indicators designed to measure democratic quality, the rule of law, and civil liberties. However, these instruments capture only imperfectly a configuration that is increasingly observable in several contemporary contexts: forms of authoritarian governance in which morality becomes a central resource of political legitimation, to the extent that moral conformity to the official narrative tends to supersede factual verification as a criterion of civic virtue.

The difficulty does not lie in the absence of references to morality in existing analyses, but rather in the fact that it rarely appears as an autonomous and measurable object. Most governance indices rely primarily on institutional, procedural, or behavioral dimensions and treat moral normativity either as a cultural background variable or as a discursive register that is difficult to quantify (Freedom House, 2024; V-Dem Institute, 2023; World Bank, 2022). Within these frameworks, domination is mainly analyzed through restrictions on rights, the capture of institutions, or asymmetries in political competition. Such approaches struggle to account for situations in which political adherence is produced neither primarily by fear nor by persuasion, but by a normative requalification of civic expectations that transforms loyalty to the official narrative into a prescribed civic virtue.

This difficulty reflects a recurring epistemological tension in political science. Morality is often either excluded from measurement frameworks in the name of analytical neutrality or incorporated implicitly and without clear control, thereby risking a conflation of empirical description and value judgment. In both cases, morality escapes rigorous empirical operationalization, opening the door to conceptual inflation and interpretive arbitrariness (Stanley, 2015; Rosenblum & Muirhead, 2019).

It is precisely this methodological gap that the present article seeks to address. Rather than proposing a new general theory of authoritarianism or offering a normative evaluation of political narratives, the article adopts a more circumscribed objective: to construct and test an empirical instrument capable of measuring a specific form of authoritarian legitimation
grounded in the moralization of civic norms. To this end, the article draws—strictly as an
analytical instrument—on the **Theory of State Moral Inversion (TSMI)** developed in
previous work, without revisiting its conceptual foundations here.

The central question is therefore methodological: **how can we empirically measure authoritarian governance structured by moral and symbolic mechanisms without sliding into normative judgment or reducing these mechanisms to mere discursive effects?** To address this question, the article introduces the **Moral Inversion Index (MII)**, a composite indicator based on four analytical dimensions—cognitive, normative, emotional, and symbolic—conceived as observable institutional facts rather than as axiological judgments. The MII therefore seeks to measure not the sincerity of beliefs or the intentions of political actors, but the **institutionalized density of the moralization of power**.

The contribution of this article is explicitly methodological. First, it demonstrates that moral and symbolic dimensions can be measured rigorously through the use of indirect indicators, transparent data-processing procedures, and explicit weighting and validation methods (Abdi & Williams, 2010). Second, it shows that the MII does not replace existing indices of democracy and governance, but instead captures a **specific analytical blind spot**: authoritarian stabilization through the prescription of civic virtue—a phenomenon that indicators of electoral pluralism or institutional performance only partially capture.

The article also explicitly acknowledges its limitations. It does not assume the universality of moral inversion, nor the relevance of the MII in contexts where domination relies primarily on brute coercion or, conversely, on robust institutional pluralism. The validity of the index is therefore **conditional**, and the conditions under which it may fail are incorporated into the methodological framework in accordance with a principle of falsifiability.

The structure of the article reflects this orientation. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and clarifies the measurement challenge. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework of moral inversion. Section 4 details the operationalization and construction of the Moral Inversion Index. Section 5 describes the data and research design. Section 6 presents the configurational analysis. Section 7 proposes a typology of moralized authoritarian regimes. The final discussion revisits the article's contributions, limitations, and implications for future research.

By proposing a rigorous and falsifiable measurement instrument, this article aims to
contribute to the comparative analysis of contemporary authoritarian governance not by
adding another normative indicator, but by making empirically observable a dimension that
has until now been largely treated implicitly: **the transformation of morality into an**
**institutional infrastructure of government.**

**2. Literature review and the measurement Challenge**

**2.1 Authoritarian durability beyond coercion and performance**

The durability of contemporary authoritarian regimes has generated a vast body of research in comparative politics. Early explanations emphasized material performance, redistribution, or strategies of selective cooptation as key sources of political loyalty (Geddes et al., 2018). Other approaches highlighted the central role of repression, surveillance, and coercive capacities in neutralizing opposition and increasing the costs of political contestation (Schedler, 2013).

More recent contributions have drawn attention to the institutional mechanisms of authoritarian resilience. Levitsky and Way (2010), for instance, show how hybrid regimes maintain political control through competitive authoritarian institutions that formally preserve certain democratic procedures while systematically disadvantaged the opposition. Within these analytical frameworks, regime stability is explained by various combinations of performance, coercion, and institutional manipulation.

While these approaches provide important insights into authoritarian durability, they share a common analytical limitation. They focus primarily on the material, institutional, or coercive mechanisms of political control, leaving relatively little room for the normative mechanisms through which regimes shape civic expectations and redefine the criteria of political legitimacy.

**2.2 Political lies, Propaganda, and Post-Truth**

A second strand of research examines the relationship between political power and truth. Classical analyses of political lying demonstrate how governments can construct alternative narratives capable of reshaping public perceptions of reality (Arendt, 1971). More recent work on propaganda and post-truth politics highlights how political actors exploit informational asymmetries, emotional polarization, and media ecosystems in order to undermine the authority of factual verification (Stanley, 2015; McIntyre, 2018).

These perspectives shed light on the mechanisms through which political narratives may substitute for factual accuracy in the public sphere. However, they generally conceptualize
lying or disinformation as strategic instruments of persuasion or manipulation rather than as
institutionalized norms structuring civic expectations. As a result, they explain the diffusion of
disinformation without fully accounting for situations in which loyalty to the official narrative
becomes morally prescribed as a civic virtue.

**2.3 Authoritarian Legalism and the Institutionalization of Power**

A third body of scholarship emphasizes the role of law and institutions in contemporary forms
of authoritarian governance. Scheppele (2013), for example, introduces the concept
of **authoritarian legalism**, describing how governments may use legal frameworks to
consolidate their power while maintaining the formal appearance of constitutional legitimacy.
In such contexts, legal rules are strategically redefined in order to restrict opposition and
reshape the conditions of political competition.

This literature demonstrates that authoritarian regimes may institutionalize domination
through legal mechanisms rather than relying exclusively on overt repression. However, even
these approaches rarely conceptualize morality as a measurable institutional mechanism.
Moral references often appear in political discourse, yet they are generally analyzed as
rhetorical strategies rather than as a structuring principle of civic norms.

**2.4 The Analytical Gap: Measuring the Moralization of Civic Norms**

Taken together, these strands of research reveal an important analytical gap. Although studies
on authoritarian durability, propaganda, and authoritarian legalism provide powerful
explanations of regime stability, they do not offer a systematic framework for measuring
the **institutional moralization of civic expectations**.

In many contemporary political contexts, the legitimacy of power no longer relies solely on
repression, institutional manipulation, or economic performance. Regimes also tend to
valorize loyalty, sacrifice, and resilience as civic virtues, while presenting skepticism,
criticism, or factual verification as forms of moral deviance. In such configurations, the
authority of the official narrative depends less on its empirical accuracy than on its **moral
legitimacy**.

The difficulty is primarily methodological. Morality is frequently treated either as a normative
category external to empirical analysis or as a background cultural variable that is difficult to
measure. This tendency leads to three recurring methodological problems: implicit
normativity, cultural essentialization, and conceptual stretching (Adcock & Collier, 2001; Hall
& Taylor, 1996; Sartori, 1970; Collier & Mahon, 1993).
To overcome these limitations, a different perspective is required. Rather than treating
morality as a system of subjective beliefs or as a normative evaluation of political power, it
can be conceptualized as a **set of observable institutional practices** through which regimes
prescribe civic norms and structure political expectations.

**2.5 From Moral Discourse to Measurable Institutional Practices**

From this perspective, morality is not conceived as an abstract system of values but as
an **institutionalized resource of government**. Moralization becomes observable through
concrete mechanisms such as prescriptive legal categories, official narratives defining civic
virtue, symbolic rituals reinforcing political loyalty, or institutional sanctions targeting forms
of moral deviance (Foucault, 1980).

Treating morality as an institutional fact thus makes it possible to integrate it into comparative
analysis without reducing it to a normative evaluation. The objective is not to judge whether a
political discourse is morally legitimate, but rather to observe how regimes **institutionalize**
**moral expectations and transform them into mechanisms of political stabilization**.

This reconceptualization opens the possibility of empirically operationalizing moralization
through observable indicators. The following section develops this approach by proposing a
methodological framework for measuring the institutional moralization of civic norms
through the construction of the **Moral Inversion Index (MII)**.

**3. The Theory of Moral Inversion**

**3.1 Definition of Moral Inversion**

Moral inversion refers to a configuration of political legitimation in which loyalty to the
official narrative tends to replace factual verification as the central criterion of civic virtue. In
such situations, the public validity of a statement no longer depends primarily on its
correspondence with empirically verifiable facts, but rather on its alignment with the narrative
framework promoted by political authorities. Conformity to the official narrative may thus be
valorized as a civic virtue, while critical verification may be disqualified as disloyalty or
political irresponsibility.

This phenomenon cannot be reduced to the diffusion of disinformation or to the strategic use
of political lies. As classical analyses of political deception have shown, political narratives
can restructure collective perceptions of reality (Arendt, 1971). Moral inversion, however,
refers to a deeper shift: the normative redefinition of the criteria of political judgment. The
analytical issue is not to determine whether one regime lies more than another, but rather to
observe how certain authorities transform narrative loyalty into a civic obligation.

From this perspective, moral inversion corresponds to a reconfiguration of civic expectations
in which believing loyally may become socially more valued than verifying. It thus
constitutes a specific mechanism of political legitimation grounded in the moralization of the
relationship to truth.

**3.2 Moralization as a Technology of Power**

Moral inversion rests on a broader process of the moralization of power. Here, moralization
refers to the transformation of moral categories—such as loyalty, dignity, resilience, or
sacrifice—into norms regulating legitimate civic behavior.

Political authorities do not merely impose legal rules or exercise material coercion. They also
produce normative frameworks that define what is morally expected from a loyal citizen.
Political crises, economic constraints, or conflicts may then be reframed as collective trials
requiring moral discipline and national solidarity.

In such configurations, moralization functions as a **technology of power**. It enables the
transformation of objective constraints into resources of legitimation. Scarcity may be
interpreted as evidence of national resilience, isolation as an affirmation of sovereignty, and
contestation as a form of moral deviance. In this framework, political stabilization does not
rely solely on coercion or institutional performance, but also on the normative structuring of
civic expectations.

This perspective does not necessarily assume sincere adherence by individuals to the official
narrative. The analytical focus lies rather on the way public norms of civic conduct are
redefined, making certain forms of contestation morally costly or socially disqualified.

**3.3 Dimensions of Moralized Authoritarian Governance**

In order to render this phenomenon empirically observable, moralized authoritarian
governance can be decomposed into four complementary analytical dimensions: **cognitive,**
**normative, emotional, and symbolic.**

The **cognitive dimension** concerns the reconfiguration of the criteria of truth in the public
sphere. It refers to situations in which the moral coherence of the official narrative is
prioritized over empirical verification. The credibility of a statement then depends less on its
correspondence with facts than on its conformity with the dominant narrative.
The **normative dimension** concerns the integration of moral categories into legal and regulatory frameworks. Concepts such as loyalty, national cohesion, or civic responsibility may be mobilized to regulate legitimate political behavior, thereby transforming certain moral expectations into institutional obligations.

The **emotional dimension** refers to the mobilization of collective affects as a resource of legitimation. Political authorities may valorize emotions such as pride, resilience, or moral indignation in order to reinforce adherence to the official narrative. Emotions thus become instruments for structuring civic loyalty.

Finally, the **symbolic dimension** concerns the ritualization of power through performative devices. Public ceremonies, political symbols, and staged representations of national unity contribute to making expected civic loyalty visible and socially recognizable.

By combining these four dimensions, the theory of moral inversion provides an analytical framework for understanding how certain regimes stabilize their power by transforming moral expectations into **institutional infrastructures of government**.

The following section builds on this conceptual framework to propose an empirical operationalization of moral inversion through the construction of the **Moral Inversion Index (MII)**.

# 4. Measuring Moralized Authoritarian Governance

## 4.1 Conceptual Logic of Measurement

Measuring moralized authoritarian governance presents a particular methodological challenge. Unlike conventional institutional dimensions—such as electoral rules, legal constraints, or coercive capacities—the moralization of power does not appear in the form of a directly observable indicator. Rather, it emerges through a set of institutional, discursive, and symbolic practices that structure civic expectations and redefine the public criteria of legitimacy.

To render this phenomenon measurable, the approach adopted here translates the conceptual dimensions of moral inversion into **indirect empirical indicators**, based exclusively on observable institutional traces. This operationalization strategy draws on methodological literature on measurement validity in political science, which emphasizes the importance of explicitly linking theoretical concepts to reproducible empirical indicators (Adcock & Collier, 2001; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002).
Within this perspective, moralization is not treated as a subjective state of belief but as a set of **institutional devices** through which political authorities prescribe civic norms and structure the public criteria of legitimacy. The aim of the measurement is therefore to capture the **institutional density of the moralization of power**, rather than the individual adherence of citizens to political narratives.

## 4.2 Construction of the Moral Inversion Index

To operationalize this approach, the article proposes the **Moral Inversion Index (MII)**, a composite indicator designed to measure the institutional moralization of civic norms across different political contexts.

The MII relies on a multidimensional structure corresponding to the four analytical dimensions identified in the previous section: **cognitive, normative, emotional, and symbolic**. Each dimension reflects a specific mechanism through which moralization may become institutionalized in the exercise of power.

The construction of the index follows a standard methodological sequence composed of four stages:

1. **Selection of empirical indicators**

2. **Normalization of variables**

3. **Aggregation of analytical dimensions**

4. **Production of a composite score comparable across cases**

This approach makes it possible to translate complex conceptual mechanisms into a synthetic measurement while preserving the multidimensional structure of the phenomenon under study. The MII does not aim to produce a normative ranking of political regimes but rather to identify the **presence and relative intensity of mechanisms of institutional moralization**.

## 4.3 Indicators and Data Sources

The indicators used in the construction of the MII are selected according to a central criterion: **institutional observability**. The analysis relies exclusively on stabilized empirical materials that allow for comparison across political contexts.

Four main categories of sources are used.

The first concerns **legal and regulatory texts**. The analysis focuses in particular on provisions invoking moral categories such as loyalty, national cohesion, or civic
responsibility. These norms make it possible to observe how certain moral expectations are translated into institutional obligations.

The second category corresponds to **official speeches and governmental communications**. Political addresses, institutional statements, and public declarations constitute important sources for identifying the explicit prescription of civic norms, especially when these emphasize behaviors such as sacrifice, resilience, or political loyalty.

The third category concerns **symbolic devices and political rituals**. Public ceremonies, national commemorations, and staged representations of political unity contribute to making expected civic loyalty visible and reinforcing the performative dimension of the official narrative.

Finally, the fourth category corresponds to **media and informational systems**. The analysis of the media environment allows the observation of how certain political narratives are institutionally privileged and how some forms of contestation may be morally delegitimized.

The combination of these different sources makes it possible to empirically capture the **cognitive, normative, emotional, and symbolic dimensions** of the moralization of power.

To operationalize the measurement of moral inversion, each analytical dimension identified in the previous section is translated into a set of empirical indicators based on **observable institutional traces**. This operationalization strategy ensures coherence between the conceptual framework and the empirical data used. Rather than inferring the beliefs or intentions of political actors, the analysis focuses exclusively on institutional devices through which authorities prescribe civic norms.

The following table presents the correspondence between the theoretical dimensions of the **Moral Inversion Index (MII)**, the political mechanisms they capture, the empirical indicators used, and the principal data sources mobilized.

<table><caption>**Table 1. Operationalization of the Moral Inversion Index (MII)**</caption><thead><tr><td>Dimension</td><td>Mechanism of Moralization</td><td>Empirical Indicators</td><td>Data Sources</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Cognitive</td><td>Hierarchization of truth and narrative</td><td>Centrality of official narratives; absence of institutional</td><td>Official speeches; government</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><thead><tr><td>Dimension</td><td>Mechanism of Moralization</td><td>Empirical Indicators</td><td>Data Sources</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td>conformity</td><td>rectification of factual inconsistencies; delegitimization of verification practices</td><td>communications; state media</td></tr><tr><td>Normative</td><td>Juridification of moral expectations in civic obligations</td><td>Legal provisions invoking loyalty, cohesion, dignity, or national responsibility; sanctions for moral deviance</td><td>Constitutions; laws; decrees; legal corpus</td></tr><tr><td>Emotional</td><td>Institutional mobilization of collective affects</td><td>Political rhetoric emphasizing sacrifice, resilience, pride, or indignation; emotional framing of political crises</td><td>Presidential speeches; official statements; political communication</td></tr><tr><td>Symbolic</td><td>Ritualization and performative display of civic loyalty</td><td>Patriotic ceremonies, commemorations, symbolic events, and state iconography reinforcing national unity</td><td>State media coverage; official ceremonies; visual political communication</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Author, 2026.

This operationalization framework explicitly connects the conceptual dimensions of moral inversion with the empirical indicators used in the analysis. Each dimension corresponds to a distinct mechanism of moralization of power observed through specific institutional devices. This strategy ensures the **measurement validity** of the index by avoiding inferences about individual beliefs and by privileging observable institutional manifestations. It also guarantees comparability across cases by grounding the analysis in stabilized empirical sources such as legal texts, official speeches, and symbolic devices of political legitimation.

## 4.4 Coding and Normalization of Indicators

To ensure the comparability of observations, the identified indicators are coded according to explicit rules defined in a methodological **codebook** presented in the appendix. The coding
procedure relies exclusively on observable manifestations of institutional moralization and
excludes any inference regarding the intentions or beliefs of political actors.

Each indicator is subsequently **normalized on a common scale**, allowing variables derived
from different empirical sources to be compared. This normalization procedure reduces scale
disparities between indicators and ensures the internal coherence of the composite index.

The aggregation of indicators ultimately produces a **synthetic score** reflecting the institutional
density of the moralization of power in each case studied. The following section examines the
robustness of this measurement by presenting the data used, the calibration procedures, and
the validity tests of the index.

# 5. Data and Research Design

## 5.1 Case Selection

The empirical analysis relies on six national cases: **Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Russia, Egypt, and China**. The unit of analysis is the **national political regime** during a contemporary period characterized by an intensification of authoritarian governance practices and transformations in the sources of political legitimacy.

The selection of cases follows a **most-different systems design**. This strategy aims to
examine whether comparable mechanisms of moralization of power may emerge in
institutional and historical contexts that are otherwise highly distinct. The cases under study
indeed display contrasting levels of state capacity, institutional structures, and political
trajectories.

The first three cases—**Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger**—correspond to contexts of recent
military transitions in which political legitimacy relies heavily on moral registers such as
sovereignty, national dignity, and collective sacrifice. These contexts provide a particularly
relevant setting for observing the emergence of institutional forms of the moralization of civic
norms.

The other three cases—**Russia, Egypt, and China**—represent more consolidated
authoritarian regimes with higher levels of institutional capacity and distinct political
trajectories. Their inclusion makes it possible to assess whether mechanisms of moralization
observed in contexts of state fragility can also be identified in more stabilized authoritarian
regimes.
This comparative strategy therefore allows the analytical scope of the **Moral Inversion Index (MII)** to be tested beyond a single regional context.

## 5.2 Data Sources

The empirical construction of the index relies on a combination of **comparative datasets and primary institutional sources**.

Comparative data are drawn primarily from widely used datasets in comparative politics. Indicators from the **Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)** project provide information on political institutions, legal constraints, and the space of political contestation. Data from **Freedom House** allow the assessment of restrictions on civil liberties and the informational environment. Data from **ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project)** provide information on contexts of conflict and political instability.

These datasets are complemented by the analysis of **primary institutional sources**. Legal texts—including constitutions, laws, and decrees—are examined in order to identify provisions explicitly mobilizing moral categories such as national cohesion, civic loyalty, or collective responsibility. **Official speeches and governmental communications** are also analyzed in order to observe the explicit prescription of civic norms valorizing loyalty, resilience, or collective sacrifice.

Finally, the analysis incorporates certain **symbolic and media devices**, including political ceremonies, national commemorations, and official media narratives that contribute to making expected civic loyalty publicly visible.

The combination of these sources makes it possible to empirically capture the **cognitive, normative, emotional, and symbolic dimensions** of the moralization of power.

## 5.3 Calibration of Conditions

In order to make the different dimensions of the index comparable, the indicators used are calibrated through a **standardized normalization procedure**. This calibration transforms heterogeneous empirical observations into variables comparable on a common scale.

The calibration follows a logic of **graduated institutional intensity of the moralization of power**. Higher values correspond to contexts in which moral norms occupy a central place in the legal, discursive, or symbolic devices of government. Conversely, lower values correspond to contexts where political legitimation relies primarily on institutional, coercive, or procedural mechanisms independent of the moralization of civic norms.
This calibration procedure makes it possible to compare the cases under study while preserving the **multidimensional nature** of the phenomenon analyzed. It constitutes an essential step in the construction of the **Moral Inversion Index (MII)** by preparing the aggregation of the different analytical dimensions into a composite indicator.

The following section examines how these calibrated data are mobilized to test the internal coherence of the index and to analyze empirically the configurations of **moralized authoritarian governance**.

**6. Configurational Analysis**

Configurational analysis aims to identify the combinations of conditions associated with the emergence of **moralized authoritarian governance**. Unlike statistical approaches based on linear causal relationships, configurational analysis relies on a **set-theoretic logic** that makes it possible to examine how different institutional combinations may produce the same political outcome (Ragin, 2008). This approach is particularly well suited to the study of authoritarian regimes, whose political trajectories often result from complex causal configurations that are strongly context-dependent.

The analysis examines the relationship between several analytical conditions— namely **moralization of power, information control, authoritarian legalism, militarization of power, and crisis contexts**—and the emergence of configurations of moralized authoritarian governance. The objective is not to identify a single cause of political stabilization, but rather to understand how different combinations of institutional mechanisms may produce comparable trajectories of authoritarian legitimation.

**6.1 Analysis of Necessary Conditions**

The first step consists of testing the existence of **necessary conditions** for the emergence of moralized authoritarian governance. A condition is considered necessary when it is systematically present in cases where the phenomenon under study occurs.

The results indicate that none of the conditions analyzed constitutes a strictly necessary condition in the set-theoretic sense. Moralized authoritarian governance may emerge in different institutional contexts characterized by varying levels of political crisis, militarization, or authoritarian legalism.

However, two conditions display particularly high consistency: **the moralization of power and information control**. In the majority of cases studied, these two mechanisms appear
jointly when forms of moralized authoritarian governance are observed. Their absence tends to be associated with configurations of domination relying more heavily on direct coercion or on forms of institutional legitimacy that are not grounded in moralization.

These findings suggest that the **moralization of civic norms and the structuring of the informational space** function as **quasi-necessary conditions** in several trajectories of authoritarian stabilization.

## 6.2 Sufficient Configurations

The second step consists of identifying the **sufficient configurations** associated with the emergence of moralized authoritarian governance. A configuration is considered sufficient when a specific combination of conditions is consistently associated with the observed outcome.

The analysis reveals several **equifinal configurations**, confirming that moralized authoritarian stabilization may emerge from different institutional combinations.

A first configuration combines **moralization of power, authoritarian legalism, and information control**. In these contexts, political stabilization relies primarily on the juridical translation of moral norms and on the institutional structuring of the informational space, which limits contestation of the official narrative.

A second configuration corresponds to contexts characterized by **moralization of power, prolonged political crisis, and militarization of power**. In such situations, moralization functions as a mechanism of legitimation that transforms political or economic constraints into valorized civic trials.

A third configuration highlights cases in which the **combination of moralization of power and information control** is sufficient to stabilize the regime, even in the absence of particularly strong militarization. This configuration suggests that the normative structuring of civic expectations may constitute a relatively autonomous mechanism of authoritarian stabilization.

These findings illustrate the principle of **equifinality**, according to which several distinct causal pathways may lead to the same political outcome.

## 6.3 Deviant Cases and the Limits of Moral Stabilization
Configurational analysis also makes it possible to identify **deviant cases**, that is, situations in which certain conditions theoretically favorable to the moralization of power are present without producing durable political stabilization.

These cases generally appear when the moralization of civic norms is mobilized at the discursive level but is not accompanied by sufficient institutionalization in legal or informational frameworks. In such contexts, moralization remains a **rhetorical register** rather than a structuring institutional mechanism.

The examination of these deviant cases also introduces a central dimension of configurational analysis: **causal asymmetry**. The conditions associated with the presence of moralized authoritarian governance do not simply correspond to the inverse of the conditions associated with its absence. In other words, the presence of moralization does not automatically guarantee political stabilization.

These findings confirm that moralized authoritarian governance constitutes a **conditional and configurational phenomenon**. The moralization of civic norms may reinforce political stability, but only when it is embedded within a coherent institutional architecture combining legal norms, informational structuring, and symbolic devices.

To clarify the results of the configurational analysis, **Figure X** presents the main causal pathways associated with moralized authoritarian stabilization. Rather than following a linear causal logic, the analysis shows that several distinct institutional combinations may lead to the same political outcome. The figure synthesizes these configurations by highlighting the relationships between the analytical conditions—**political crisis**, **authoritarian legalism**, **information control**, **moralization of power**, and **militarization**—and the emergence of forms of moralized authoritarian governance.

<caption>**Figure 1. Configurational pathways to moralized authoritarian stabilization**</caption>

The figure illustrates the principal configurational pathways identified in the analysis. Each pathway represents a distinct combination of institutional conditions associated with the emergence of moralized authoritarian stabilization. The configurations correspond to the **intermediate solutions obtained through fsQCA analysis** and highlight the equifinal nature of the phenomenon.
<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>

Source: Author, 2026

The figure highlights three principal configurations leading to moralized authoritarian stabilization. The first corresponds to a combination of **moralization of power, authoritarian legalism, and information control**, in which political stabilization relies on the legal and informational institutionalization of the dominant moral narrative. The second configuration emerges in contexts of **prolonged crisis and militarization of power**, where moralization functions as a mechanism of sacrificial legitimation that transforms political constraints into civic trials. Finally, the third configuration shows that the **moralization of civic norms may stabilize a regime when combined with relatively strong information control**, even in the absence of dominant militarization.

These findings illustrate the principle of **equifinality** characteristic of configurational analyses: several distinct institutional pathways may lead to comparable forms of authoritarian stabilization.

The following section examines the **theoretical implications** of these findings for the comparative analysis of contemporary authoritarian governance.

## 7. Varieties of Moralized Authoritarianism

The results of the configurational analysis indicate that **moralized authoritarian governance does not correspond to a single form of political stabilization**. Rather, it appears in the form of distinct institutional configurations in which the moralization of civic norms combines in different ways with other mechanisms of power. Based on the empirical
configurations identified in the previous section, it is possible to propose an analytical typology distinguishing **three main varieties of moralized authoritarianism**.

This typology does not aim to classify regimes according to their degree of authoritarianism, but rather to identify **different mechanisms of political legitimation** in which the moralization of civic norms plays a central role. It should therefore be understood as an analytical synthesis of the empirical configurations observed rather than as an exhaustive classification of political regimes.

**7.1 Juridico-Moralized Authoritarianism**

The first variety corresponds to a configuration in which the moralization of power is primarily institutionalized through **law**. In these contexts, moral categories such as loyalty, national cohesion, or civic responsibility are progressively integrated into legal frameworks regulating political life.

Regime stabilization then relies on the **legal translation of moral norms**, which transforms certain civic expectations into institutional obligations. Law does not merely regulate political behavior; it also becomes a **vector of civic moralization**. This mechanism fits within the logic of **authoritarian legalism**, in which legal rules are mobilized to consolidate political power while maintaining the appearance of institutional legitimacy (Scheppele, 2013).

Within this configuration, political contestation may be reclassified as **moral deviance** or as a threat to national unity. Juridico-moralized authoritarianism is therefore characterized by a strong interweaving of legal norms and the moral prescription of civic conduct.

However, this configuration presents a structural vulnerability. When legal norms appear excessively instrumentalized or lose their institutional credibility, the moralization of power may cease to produce its legitimating effects and instead generate increased political contestation.

**7.2 Sacrificial Crisis Authoritarianism**

The second variety corresponds to contexts characterized by a combination of **moralization of power, prolonged political crisis, and militarization of political authority**.

In such configurations, the legitimation of power relies largely on the **sacralization of collective hardship**. Political, economic, or security crises are interpreted as moments requiring moral discipline, sacrifice, and national solidarity. Loyalty to the regime is presented as a contribution to collective salvation.
Here, moralization functions as a mechanism that transforms structural constraints into **symbolic resources of legitimation**. Political or economic difficulties may be reframed as evidence of national resilience or as necessary sacrifices for the defense of sovereignty. This form of legitimation is consistent with a broader logic of **emotional and moral mobilization of political authority** (Nussbaum, 2013; Stanley, 2015).

Nevertheless, this configuration also presents a specific fragility. When crises persist without producing tangible improvement, the moral register of sacrifice may gradually lose its mobilizing capacity and open the way for broader contestation of political authority.

## 7.3 Moralized Informational Authoritarianism

The third variety corresponds to a configuration in which political stabilization relies primarily on the combination of **moralization of power and control of the informational space**.

In these contexts, political authorities structure the media environment in ways that privilege certain political narratives while morally disqualifying forms of contestation. Information control therefore goes beyond the restriction of freedom of expression; it involves a **normative requalification of public discourse**, in which certain positions are presented as morally legitimate while others are associated with disloyalty or subversion.

Authoritarian stabilization thus relies on the production of an informational environment in which **loyalty to the official narrative appears as the civically appropriate position**. This configuration resembles what some scholars have described as forms of **informational authoritarianism**, in which control over public narratives constitutes a central mechanism of political legitimation (Guriev & Treisman, 2019).

However, this type of stabilization remains strongly dependent on the authorities' capacity to maintain relatively stable control over the informational environment. The emergence of alternative sources of information or the fragmentation of media systems may weaken this mechanism of legitimation.

## 7.4 A Configurational Typology

These three varieties of moralized authoritarianism should not be interpreted as mutually exclusive categories. In practice, many regimes combine several of these mechanisms of legitimation.
The typology proposed here should therefore be understood as an **analytical generalization of the empirical configurations identified in the configurational analysis**. It clarifies the different ways in which the moralization of civic norms may be institutionalized and mobilized to stabilize political authority.

By distinguishing these different trajectories of the moralization of power, this typology contributes to a better understanding of how certain authoritarian regimes succeed in transforming moral expectations into **institutional infrastructures of political legitimation**. From this perspective, the moralization of civic norms may be interpreted as a specific form of political legitimacy, in the sense that it redefines the socially recognized criteria of loyalty and authority (Weber, 1991).

The following section discusses the **analytical implications** of these findings for the comparative study of contemporary authoritarian regimes.

# 8. Discussion

## 8.1 Theoretical Implications: Moralization as Normative Conversion

The findings of this study contribute to the literature on authoritarian durability by highlighting the role of the **moralization of civic norms** as a mechanism of political legitimation. Classical approaches generally explain authoritarian stability through the combination of three main factors: economic performance, coercion, and institutional engineering (Geddes et al., 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013). The results presented here suggest that a **fourth mechanism** deserves particular attention: the **normative conversion of civic expectations**.

In the configurations analyzed, political stabilization does not rely solely on coercion or institutional manipulation, but also on the **redefinition of public norms of civic conduct**. Political authorities may transform certain moral categories—such as loyalty, resilience, or sacrifice—into criteria of legitimate civic behavior. Within this framework, political contestation or critical verification may be reclassified as forms of **moral deviance**.

This perspective complements existing analyses of propaganda and political deception. While the literature on propaganda primarily emphasizes mechanisms of persuasion or information manipulation (Stanley, 2015), the results of this study suggest that the moralization of civic norms may **more deeply restructure the criteria of political judgment**. The authority of the official narrative therefore depends not only on its diffusion, but also on its capacity to be recognized as **morally legitimate**.
From this perspective, the moralization of civic norms may be interpreted as a **specific form of political legitimacy**, in the sense that it redefines the socially recognized standards of loyalty and authority (Weber, 1991).

## 8.2 Methodological Implications: The Contribution of Configurational Analysis

This study also provides a methodological contribution by employing a **configurational approach** to analyze the mechanisms of moralized authoritarian governance. Classical quantitative approaches generally rely on the estimation of average effects and on the assumption of linear causal relationships. Yet authoritarian political trajectories often result from **complex causal configurations**, in which several institutional mechanisms interact.

The configurational approach makes it possible to capture precisely this complexity. It highlights the principle of **equifinality**, according to which multiple combinations of conditions may lead to the same political outcome (Ragin, 2008). The results show that moralized authoritarian governance may emerge from different institutional configurations combining, among other factors, **moralization of power, information control, authoritarian legalism, and contexts of crisis**.

This approach also makes it possible to identify **causal asymmetry** between the conditions associated with the presence and the absence of the phenomenon under study. The presence of moralization of civic norms does not automatically guarantee authoritarian stabilization; however, its absence tends to limit the possibilities for political legitimation in certain institutional configurations.

## 8.3 Comparative Scope

The typology proposed in this article contributes to expanding the **comparative analysis of authoritarian regimes** by identifying different trajectories of the moralization of power. It suggests that the moralization of civic norms may take diverse institutional forms, ranging from **juridico-moralized configurations** to **informational or sacrificial forms of authoritarianism**.

The comparison between the cases studied notably shows that similar forms of moralization may appear in contexts characterized by very different levels of **state capacity, economic development, or institutional structure**. This observation invites scholars to move beyond interpretations that associate authoritarian stability exclusively with structural factors such as economic performance or institutional coercion.
However, the comparative scope of these results should be interpreted with caution. The moralization of civic norms constitutes **neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition** for authoritarian stabilization. Rather, it functions as a **complementary mechanism** that may reinforce political legitimacy when combined with other institutional devices, particularly the structuring of the informational space and the juridification of certain civic norms.

## 8.4 Limitations of the Study

Several limitations should be acknowledged.

First, the number of cases examined remains relatively limited, which constrains the statistical scope of the results. Configurational analysis allows the examination of complex causal combinations, but it does not aim to produce **probabilistic generalization**.

Second, the measurement of the moralization of civic norms relies partly on **indirect indicators based on observable institutional traces**. Although this strategy avoids subjective inferences about individual beliefs, it may also underestimate certain **informal dimensions of political moralization**.

These limitations nonetheless open avenues for future research. Subsequent studies could extend the analysis to a larger number of cases and more systematically explore the interactions between the **moralization of civic norms**, **transformations of informational regimes**, and **the evolution of contemporary forms of authoritarianism**.

## 9. Conclusion

This article sought to address a central methodological question: **how can we empirically measure a form of authoritarian governance grounded in the institutional moralization of civic norms?** While existing comparative indicators primarily focus on the institutional, procedural, or performance-based dimensions of political power, they capture less effectively those configurations in which political legitimacy relies on the **normative transformation of civic expectations**.

To address this analytical gap, the study proposed the **Moral Inversion Index (MII)**, an empirical instrument designed to measure the institutional density of the moralization of power. Drawing on four analytical dimensions—**cognitive**, **normative**, **emotional**, and **symbolic**—the index operationalizes a phenomenon that is frequently discussed in qualitative analyses of authoritarianism but rarely measured in a systematic way.
The empirical results show that **moralized authoritarian governance does not correspond to a single model of political stabilization**. Instead, it emerges in the form of distinct institutional configurations in which the moralization of civic norms interacts with other mechanisms of power, notably **information control**, **authoritarian legalism**, and the **militarization of political authority**. This diversity of configurations confirms that authoritarian stabilization relies on **complex institutional combinations rather than on a single causal factor**.

Several limitations must nevertheless be acknowledged. First, the number of cases examined remains limited, which constrains the comparative scope of the findings. Second, the measurement of the moralization of civic norms relies partly on **indirect indicators based on observable institutional traces**. Although this strategy helps avoid subjective inferences about individual beliefs, it may also underestimate certain **informal dimensions of political moralization**.

These limitations open several avenues for future research. One direction concerns the study of **processes of moral deinversion**, that is, situations in which the moralization of power ceases to produce stabilizing effects and civic norms reorganize around alternative criteria of political legitimacy. A second avenue concerns the analysis of **trajectories of authoritarian fragilization**, in which the moral registers mobilized by political authorities may gradually lose their legitimating capacity when the normative expectations they generate come into tension with the lived experiences of citizens.

By proposing an empirical instrument capable of measuring the **institutional moralization of civic norms**, this article contributes to enriching the comparative analysis of contemporary authoritarian regimes. It suggests that political stability depends not only on the material or institutional resources of power, but also on the capacity of political authorities to transform certain moral norms into **durable infrastructures of political legitimation**.
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# APPENDICES

## Appendix A — Qualitative Coding Codebook

*(Moral Inversion Index – MII)*

### A.1 Objective and General Principles

This appendix presents the **qualitative coding codebook** used for the extraction of empirical indicators constituting the Moral Inversion Index (MII).

The codebook aims to ensure:

* **inter-coder replicability,**

* **cross-contextual comparability,**

* **the absence of inferences regarding the intentions of political actors.**

Coding relies exclusively on **observable institutional traces,** including:

* legal texts,

* official speeches,

* symbolic devices,

* institutional communications.

The **unit of analysis** consists of institutional devices that produce or prescribe civic norms.

### A.2 Coding Units

<table><thead><tr><td>Type of Material</td><td>Coding Unit</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Legal corpus</td><td>Article of law / decree / legal provision</td></tr><tr><td>Official speeches</td><td>Address / communiqué / official statement</td></tr><tr><td>Symbolic devices</td><td>Ceremony / ritual / official event</td></tr><tr><td>Iconography</td><td>Official image / state staging</td></tr></tbody></table>

The analyzed corpus covers the period **2010–2025** and includes the principal legal texts, governmental communications, and symbolic devices mobilized in the cases under study.
## A.3 Codebook by Dimension

### A.3.1 Cognitive Dimension

<table><thead><tr><td>Element</td><td>Description</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Analytical definition</td><td>Institutional hierarchization of truth in favor of the moral coherence of the official narrative</td></tr><tr><td>Coded indicators</td><td>Absence of official rectification; delegitimization of verification; centrality of the official narrative</td></tr><tr><td>Inclusion criteria</td><td>Discourses denying or relativizing established facts without corrective mechanisms</td></tr><tr><td>Exclusion criteria</td><td>Isolated factual errors publicly corrected</td></tr><tr><td>Coding mode</td><td>Presence (1) / absence (0); normalized frequency</td></tr><tr><td>Examples</td><td>Speeches affirming the moral validity of the official narrative despite factual refutations</td></tr></tbody></table>

### A.3.2 Normative Dimension

<table><thead><tr><td>Element</td><td>Description</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Analytical definition</td><td>Integration of moral categories into the legal obligations of citizenship</td></tr><tr><td>Coded indicators</td><td>Vague civic obligations; juridified moral sanctions</td></tr><tr><td>Inclusion criteria</td><td>Legal texts referring to loyalty, cohesion, or dignity as civic duties</td></tr><tr><td>Exclusion criteria</td><td>Strictly technical or procedural norms</td></tr><tr><td>Coding mode</td><td>Normative counting; moral density of the text</td></tr><tr><td>Examples</td><td>Laws criminalizing “disloyalty” or “attacks against national unity”</td></tr></tbody></table>

### A.3.3 Emotional Dimension
<table><thead><tr><td>Element</td><td>Description</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Analytical definition</td><td>Institutionalized mobilization of collective affects as a resource of legitimation</td></tr><tr><td>Coded indicators</td><td>Registers of sacrifice, endurance, pride, or indignation</td></tr><tr><td>Inclusion criteria</td><td>Speeches explicitly prescribing civic emotions</td></tr><tr><td>Exclusion criteria</td><td>Spontaneous emotions not institutionally framed</td></tr><tr><td>Coding mode</td><td>Weighted lexical frequency</td></tr><tr><td>Examples</td><td>Recurrent calls for moral sacrifice for the nation</td></tr></tbody></table>

### A.3.4 Symbolic Dimension

<table><thead><tr><td>Element</td><td>Description</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Analytical definition</td><td>Ritualization and public performativity of civic loyalty</td></tr><tr><td>Coded indicators</td><td>Recurrent ceremonies; sacred iconography of power</td></tr><tr><td>Inclusion criteria</td><td>Institutionalized symbolic devices</td></tr><tr><td>Exclusion criteria</td><td>Non-official or autonomous cultural symbols</td></tr><tr><td>Coding mode</td><td>Event counting / iconographic centrality</td></tr><tr><td>Examples</td><td>Patriotic rituals or ceremonies affirming national loyalty</td></tr></tbody></table>

### A.4 Inter-Coder Reliability

Coding was conducted by **two independent analysts**.

* **Inter-coder agreement rate:** > 0.80 (Cohen's Kappa)

* **Disagreements resolved through joint review of the corpus.**
# Appendix B — Detailed Results of the Principal Component Analysis (PCA)

## B.1 Objective of the PCA

Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used to estimate the empirical weights of the different dimensions composing the Moral Inversion Index (MII). The objective is not to interpret substantively the latent factors, but rather to verify the structural coherence of the index and to identify empirical weights that allow the aggregation of the analytical dimensions.

Prior to the PCA, the indicators were normalized using min-max standardization in order to ensure comparability across variables derived from different empirical sources.

## B.2 Eigenvalues and Explained Variance

<table><thead><tr><td>Component</td><td>Eigenvalue</td><td>Explained Variance (%)</td><td>Cumulative Variance (%)</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>PC1</td><td>2.41</td><td>60.3</td><td>60.3</td></tr><tr><td>PC2</td><td>0.78</td><td>19.5</td><td>79.8</td></tr><tr><td>PC3</td><td>0.46</td><td>11.4</td><td>91.2</td></tr><tr><td>PC4</td><td>0.35</td><td>8.8</td><td>100.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

The selection criterion adopted corresponds to a cumulative explained variance above 80%, which is achieved with the first two components (PC1 + PC2). This result indicates that the structure of the index can be satisfactorily explained by a limited number of principal dimensions.

## B.3 Factor Loadings (PC1)

<table><thead><tr><td>Dimension</td><td>Factor Loading</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Cognitive</td><td>0.79</td></tr><tr><td>Normative</td><td>0.83</td></tr><tr><td>Emotional</td><td>0.75</td></tr><tr><td>Symbolic</td><td>0.77</td></tr></tbody></table>

The observed factor loadings indicate a relatively balanced contribution of the different dimensions of the index. No single dimension structurally dominates the principal component,
suggesting that the MII captures a multidimensional phenomenon in which the cognitive, normative, emotional, and symbolic dimensions contribute jointly to the **institutional moralization of civic norms**.

## B.4 Final Weights Used for the MII

The empirical weights used for aggregating the dimensions are derived from the **normalized factor loadings**.

<table><thead><tr><td>Dimension</td><td>Weight (w<sub>i</sub>)</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Cognitive</td><td>0.26</td></tr><tr><td>Normative</td><td>0.28</td></tr><tr><td>Emotional</td><td>0.23</td></tr><tr><td>Symbolic</td><td>0.23</td></tr></tbody></table>

The weights are normalized so that the following condition holds:

$$ \sum w_i = 1 $$

This procedure incorporates the relative contribution of each dimension while maintaining a balanced structure of the composite index.

## B.5 Robustness Tests

Several statistical tests were conducted to evaluate the **robustness of the index structure**.

* **Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test** > 0.70, indicating satisfactory sampling adequacy for factor analysis.

* **Bartlett's test of sphericity significance** (p < 0.01), confirming the presence of sufficient correlations between variables to justify PCA.

* **Uniform weighting test:** the use of equal weights does not substantially modify the relative ranking of cases.

* **Sequential exclusion test:** removing one dimension does not produce systematic reversals in the results.

These tests confirm the **structural stability of the Moral Inversion Index** and the **robustness of the empirical weights** used in its construction.
<table><caption>Table 1: Raw Data Matrix for Moralized Authoritarian Stabilization</caption><thead><tr><td>Case</td><td>Period</td><td>CRISIS_raw</td><td>LEGALISM_raw</td><td>INFOCTRL_raw</td><td>MORAL_raw</td><td>MIL_raw</td><td>STAB_MORAL_raw</td><td>Main Sources</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Mali</td><td>2020–2025</td><td>0.85</td><td>0.78</td><td>0.82</td><td>0.88</td><td>0.91</td><td>0.83</td><td>ACLED; V-Dem; official speeches</td></tr><tr><td>Burkina Faso</td><td>2022–2025</td><td>0.90</td><td>0.62</td><td>0.79</td><td>0.87</td><td>0.93</td><td>0.79</td><td>ACLED; V-Dem; government communications</td></tr><tr><td>Niger</td><td>2023–2025</td><td>0.82</td><td>0.71</td><td>0.76</td><td>0.80</td><td>0.88</td><td>0.75</td><td>ACLED; V-Dem; official statements</td></tr><tr><td>Russia</td><td>2014–2025</td><td>0.60</td><td>0.90</td><td>0.91</td><td>0.85</td><td>0.62</td><td>0.84</td><td>V-Dem; Freedom House; legislation</td></tr><tr><td>Egypt</td><td>2013–2025</td><td>0.70</td><td>0.86</td><td>0.87</td><td>0.83</td><td>0.71</td><td>0.82</td><td>V-Dem; Reporters Without Borders; legal corpus</td></tr><tr><td>China</td><td>2012–2025</td><td>0.55</td><td>0.92</td><td>0.94</td><td>0.81</td><td>0.65</td><td>0.86</td><td>V-Dem; state media analysis</td></tr></tbody></table>

**Notes:** Raw values correspond to normalized indicators derived from legal texts, official speeches, media control indicators, and conflict datasets. Sources include **ACLED**, **V-Dem**, **Freedom House**, **Reporters Without Borders (RSF)**, and **official communications**.

*Period refers to the principal political phase analyzed for each regime.*
<table><caption>Table 2 : Calibration Thresholds for Fuzzy-Set Membership</caption><thead><tr><td>Condition</td><td>Full Membership (0.95)</td><td>Crossover (0.50)</td><td>Full Non-Membership (0.05)</td><td>Calibration Rationale</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>CRISIS</td><td>Prolonged crisis &gt;5 years with central political framing</td><td>Crisis present but contested</td><td>No structural crisis</td><td>Crisis must be politically mobilized</td></tr><tr><td>LEGALISM</td><td>Systematic constitutional and legal restrictions</td><td>Partial or unstable legal restrictions</td><td>Pluralistic legal framework</td><td>Reflects institutionalization of authoritarian law</td></tr><tr><td>INFOCTRL</td><td>Structural media domination and censorship</td><td>Partial media control</td><td>Pluralistic information space</td><td>Measures narrative dominance</td></tr><tr><td>MORAL</td><td>Strong prescriptive moral rhetoric in state discourse</td><td>Occasional moral rhetoric</td><td>Absence of moralized civic narrative</td><td>Operationalizes moral legitimation</td></tr><tr><td>MIL</td><td>Military holds central executive roles</td><td>Indirect military influence</td><td>Civilian institutional dominance</td><td>Measures militarization of authority</td></tr><tr><td>STAB_MORAL</td><td>Durable stabilization through moralized legitimation</td><td>Partial stabilization</td><td>Unstable authoritarian rule</td><td>Outcome definition</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Table 2b : Calibrated Fuzzy-Set Membership Scores</caption><thead><tr><td>Case</td><td>CRISIS</td><td>LEGALISM</td><td>INFOCTRL</td><td>MORAL</td><td>MIL</td><td>STAB_MORAL</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Mali</td><td>0.92</td><td>0.74</td><td>0.85</td><td>0.94</td><td>0.95</td><td>0.88</td></tr><tr><td>Burkina Faso</td><td>0.95</td><td>0.58</td><td>0.82</td><td>0.93</td><td>0.96</td><td>0.84</td></tr><tr><td>Niger</td><td>0.90</td><td>0.69</td><td>0.78</td><td>0.86</td><td>0.91</td><td>0.80</td></tr><tr><td>Russia</td><td>0.61</td><td>0.93</td><td>0.94</td><td>0.88</td><td>0.64</td><td>0.89</td></tr><tr><td>Egypt</td><td>0.70</td><td>0.90</td><td>0.89</td><td>0.86</td><td>0.72</td><td>0.87</td></tr><tr><td>China</td><td>0.58</td><td>0.95</td><td>0.96</td><td>0.83</td><td>0.68</td><td>0.91</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: Fuzzy-set scores were calibrated using the **direct method with three qualitative anchors** following Ragin (2008). Values range from 0 (full non-membership) to 1 (full membership).

Calibration thresholds were defined using **theoretical anchors rather than empirical optimization**.

<table><caption>Table 3 : Truth Table for Moralized Authoritarian Stabilization</caption><thead><tr><td>CRISIS</td><td>LEGALISM</td><td>INFOCTRL</td><td>MORAL</td><td>MIL</td><td>Number of Cases</td><td>Consistency</td><td>Outcome</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>2</td><td>0.91</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>3</td><td>0.88</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>0.86</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr></tbody></table>

Parameters
Consistency threshold = 0.80

Frequency threshold = 1 case

Outcome coded as **presence of moralized authoritarian stabilization**.

Truth table constructed using fsQCA procedures (Ragin, 2008).

<table><caption>**Table 4 : Configurations Leading to Moralized Authoritarian Stabilization**</caption><thead><tr><th>Configuration</th><th>CRISIS</th><th>LEGALISM</th><th>INFOCTRL</th><th>MORAL</th><th>MIL</th><th>Consistency</th><th>Raw Coverage</th><th>Unique Coverage</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>A - Juridico-informational moralization</td><td>~</td><td>●</td><td>●</td><td>●</td><td>~</td><td>0.91</td><td>0.42</td><td>0.18</td></tr><tr><td>B - Sacrificial moralization under crisis</td><td>●</td><td>~</td><td>●</td><td>●</td><td>●</td><td>0.88</td><td>0.37</td><td>0.15</td></tr><tr><td>C - Informational moral hegemony</td><td>~</td><td>~</td><td>●</td><td>●</td><td>~</td><td>0.86</td><td>0.29</td><td>0.11</td></tr></tbody></table>

**Legend**

● = presence of condition

~ = condition not required

Configurations correspond to the **intermediate solution derived from fsQCA analysis**.