# Cumulative Energy Demand and Global Warming Potential of metals and minerals production: Assessment, projections and mitigation options

Thibaut Feix, Emmanuel Hache

► To cite this version:

Thibaut Feix, Emmanuel Hache. Cumulative Energy Demand and Global Warming Potential of metals and minerals production: Assessment, projections and mitigation options. Resources Policy, 2025, 102, pp.105516. 10.1016/j.resourpol.2025.105516. hal-04989235

HAL Id: hal-04989235

https://ifp.hal.science/hal-04989235v1

Submitted on 13 Mar 2025

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.

<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>

Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>

# Cumulative Energy Demand and Global Warming Potential of metals and minerals production: Assessment, projections and mitigation options

Thibaut Feix<sup>a, *, b</sup>, Emmanuel Hache<sup>b, c, d</sup>

## ARTICLE INFO

JEL classification:

Q4

Q02

Q41

Q56

Keywords:

Metals

Minerals

Life cycle analysis

Energy demand

Global warming potential

Low-carbon transition

## ABSTRACT

This study estimates the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential for 50 metals and 22 non-metallic commodities, incorporating uncertainties through three distinct assessments: low, high, and median, based on the Ecoinvent 3.8 database. The results show that the cumulative energy demand of these commodities represents between 11.3% and 18.2% of global primary energy consumption in 2019, with a median estimate of 13.8%. Similarly, the global warming potential accounts for 13.4%-19.1% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the same year, with a median estimate of 17.7%. Iron and steel, aluminum, and cement production emerge as the dominant contributors, responsible for approximately 80% of cumulative energy demand and 90% of GHG emissions across all scenarios. The study also quantifies the potential environmental benefits of enhanced recycling and the accelerated adoption of electric arc furnace technology for steel production in China. These measures can potentially reduce global cumulative energy demand by up to 2.1% and 1.6% respectively and GHG emissions by up to 1.8% and 0.9%. The analysis further examines the energy and climate impacts of mining requirements for a clean energy transition, using IEA's Sustainable Development Scenario. Considering current extraction technologies, the production surplus associated with this scenario could increase global cumulative energy demand by 1.1% and global warming potential by 0.6%. However, these increases would be outweighed by the corresponding reductions in fossil fuel consumption. The paper concludes by discussing the sectors and regions most associated with the environmental burdens of metal and mineral production and highlight key strategies for mitigating these impacts.

## 1. introduction

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2022), final energy consumption for metals and minerals production almost doubled over 20 years, from 25.5 EJ in 2002 to 47.5 EJ in 2019. This surge parallels the broader rise in global final energy consumption. After a long steady trend of around 9% before 2000, metal and mineral production increased to represent 11.4% of global final energy consumption in 2019, after a peak at more than 12% in the mid-2010s (Fig. 1). Among metal and mineral production sectors, iron and steel and non-metallic minerals¹ are the largest contributors as they form the basis of the

global economy's infrastructure (Fig. S1 in the SI). This trend could be explained by the industrialization of developing countries such as China and India, which involves massive infrastructure investments for transportation and trade and to drive urbanization.

During the same period, the share of these sectors in the world's final energy consumption increased (Fig. S2). This trend could be partly explained by two main factors: the widespread use of less energy-efficient technologies in emerging countries, like China for iron and steel production, and the declining concentration of mineral ores, which increases the energy required to produce the same quantity of metals. Notably, China accounted for 79.8% of the world's increase in global

Abbreviations: RIR, Recycling Input Rate; RR, Recycling Rate; SDS, Sustainable Development Scenario; NZE, Net Zero Emission scenario; EROI, Energy Return On Investment.

* Corresponding author.

E-mail address: Thibaut.feix@minesparis.psl.eu (T. Feix).

¹ Non-metallic minerals include sand, gravel, limestone and fertilizer minerals (among others) (Eurostat; https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Non-metallic_minerals).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2025.105516

Received 18 March 2024; Received in revised form 14 February 2025; Accepted 14 February 2025

Available online 26 February 2025

0301-4207/© 2025 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

<footnote><sup>a</sup> Mines Paris, 60 Bd Saint-Michel, 75272, Paris, France</footnote>

<footnote><sup>b</sup> IFP Energies Nouvelles, 1-4 Av. de Bois Préau, F-92852, Rueil-Malmaison, France</footnote>

<footnote><sup>c</sup> The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs, (IRIS), France</footnote>

<footnote><sup>d</sup> Economix-CNRS, University of Paris Nanterre, France</footnote>
steel production from 1994 to 2019 (USGS, 2021, 1996). Yet, for iron & steel production, electric arc furnace technology – which consumes less energy and emits fewer GHG compared to the blast furnace + basic oxygen furnace route – represents only 10.6% of China’s steel production in 2021. In comparison, 49.5% of steel was produced from electric arc furnace technology in the rest of the world (Worldsteel, 2022a).

The current growth of metal and mineral production is expected to continue in the near term, driven by growth in developing countries, coupled with a double transition dynamic featuring digitalization processes and the massive deployment of low-carbon technologies such as electrified mobility, renewable energies (solar panels, wind turbines), green hydrogen, and the associated development of electricity grids (IEA, 2021a).

In the field of minerals and metals production, life cycle analysis tends to become more and more common. The life cycle assessment literature generally focuses on the environmental impacts of isolated commodities. The impacts of rare earth elements have been widely explored (Koltun and Tharumarajah, 2014; Navarro and Zhao, 2014; Schreiber et al., 2021; Weng et al., 2016; Zaimes et al., 2015). Life cycle assessments have also been conducted on natural graphite production contained in Lithium-ion batteries (Engels et al., 2022), on aluminum, gold-silver and manganese (Farjana et al., 2019a, 2019b, 2019c) and on gold (Norgate and Haque, 2012). Kelly et al. (2021) performed a life cycle assessment of lithium from different sources and assessed the effect of each on the environmental impacts of electric vehicle batteries. Some articles also take a regional approach, such as Liang et al. (2020) on iron & steel production in China, and Gao et al., 2018, who carried out a life cycle analysis of titanium sponge production using the Kroll process in China. However, a comprehensive analysis of the energy consumption and environmental impact of the global metal and mineral production market is rare in the literature. Nuss and Eckelman (2014) undertook a life cycle assessment of 63 metals using mostly the EcoInvent 2.2 database, and assessed their energy consumption and environmental impacts regarding climate change, terrestrial acidification, freshwater eutrophication, and human toxicity. Norgate and Jahanshahi (2011) calculated the global energy consumption of primary production of iron & steel, aluminum, nickel, copper, lead and zinc. They showed that the cumulative energy demand of the refining phase is far greater than that of the mining phase. Fizaine and Court (2015) estimated the cumulative energy demand of 41 metals before evaluating the effect of ore degrada-

warming potential. Huijbregts et al. (2010) show that these indicators can serve as proxies for other environmental burdens. Graedel et al. (2015) consider environmental impact a key factor in defining material criticality, alongside supply risk and vulnerability to supply disruptions. Nevertheless, the environmental dimensions remain underexplored and underassessed in comparison to the extensive literature on supply risk. Both the European and American definitions of critical material focus solely on supply risk issues, neglecting the environmental impacts of mining, refining, or trading of metal and mineral production (European Commission, 2020; Nassar and Fortier, 2021). The environmental burden of metal and mineral production should be a central consideration in decision-making, given equal weight as supply considerations. Consequently, there is a pressing need for a comprehensive, global perspective on the environmental impacts linked to metal and mineral production.

This knowledge gap is addressed through an evaluation of the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential associated with 72 metallic and mineral commodities. Considering the extensive range of commodities and the numerous uncertainties and variations associated with the life cycle assessment of each - burden allocation method for co-products and by-products, geographical scope considered, energy mix, extraction and refining technologies, technological and organizational evolution since calculation, yearly production uncertainties - giving a precise estimation would be subject to methodological bias. Therefore, we prefer a range assessment for the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential associated with metal and mineral production to indicate the order of magnitude for major commodities. Then, we explore different mitigation options and potential evolution in the impact of metal and mineral production. The mitigation potential of recycling and iron and steel production through electric arc furnace technology in China is evaluated. Additionally, variations in cumulative energy demand and global warming potential induced by the low-carbon transition are estimated and compared with potential reductions achievable through fossil fuel production abatement. Section 2 depicts the data and methodology used in our different analyses. Section 3 gives the corresponding results. Section 4 discusses these results and possible mitigation options before concluding.

## 2. data and methodology

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 1. Metal extraction energy consumption and share in total final energy consumption – Source (IEA, 2022).</figcaption></figure>

dation on the EROI of low-carbon power generation technologies. As mentioned in the introduction, IEA estimates the final energy consumption of metal and mineral production, differentiating 4 categories (iron & steel, non-ferrous metals, non-metallic minerals, and mining and quarrying). The latest IPCC assessment report (AR6) also contains an estimation of the global warming potential of metals and cement production (IPCC, 2022).

The present study focuses on cumulative energy demand and global

### 2.1. low, median, and high assumptions

The cumulative energy demand and global warming potential associated with metal and mineral production in 2019 are evaluated for 50
metals<fnref n="2" /> and 22 mineral commodities.<fnref n="3" /> Three estimations are performed: a low and a high assessment from our extensive literature review when data are available, and a median assessment derived from the EcoInvent 3.8 database. The use of the EcoInvent 3.8 database in energy and global warming research is supported by several critical attributes.<fnref n="4" /> This version of the database features improved documentation and broader sectoral coverage, incorporating approximately 360 new datasets and 700 updated datasets pertinent to energy systems and climate-related impacts. Readers interested in the methodological questions and limitations of the EcoInvent 3.8 database may wish to consult (Wernet et al., 2016). The EcoInvent value is also used as a low (high) assumption for commodities for which it is lower (higher) than the literature estimate. The complete list of commodities, their cumulative energy demand per ton, global warming potential per ton, and associated sources for the three estimations are available in Table S1 in the Supporting Information (SI). Material production figures per commodity for the year 2019 are taken from (USGS, 2021). The USGS provides extensive data on various metals, including production, imports, exports, stocks, and consumption statistics, some dating back to 1900. As a government agency, the USGS is recognized as an authoritative and reliable source for mineral and material commodity information. The distribution pattern of each rare earth element out of the global production given by the USGS is taken from (Goodenough et al., 2018). To streamline the analysis, sensitivity assessments are not conducted for mineral commodities. For these commodities, cumulative energy demand and global warming potential are exclusively derived from the EcoInvent 3.8 database, except for the global warming potential of cement which is taken from (IEA, 2021b) in low assessment, as it accounts for 95% of the global warming potential of nonmetallic commodities in our analysis. As neither consistent life cycle assessments nor used quantity estimates are available for sand employed in construction, this commodity is excluded from the present study. However, since it represents billions of tons of material per year, sand may have a significant cumulative energy demand and global warming potential. Lastly, biomass-based materials are excluded from consideration.

The cumulative energy demand and global warming potential are estimated in a cradle-to-gate perspective, i.e., from the extraction of the mining site to the end of the refining process including transportation to manufacturing industry gates. Depending on the data available in the references, the Lower Heating Values are preferred for cumulative energy demand when available. To aggregate various GHG emissions, the GWP100 indicator is preferred when data availability allows. It compares the global warming potential of GHGs on a 100 year timespan (see (IPCC, 2023, section 7)).

High assessment assumes that most major metals (aluminum, iron &

steel, manganese, nickel, copper, zinc and lead) are fully produced from primary production and do not consider recycling. Hence, this assessment overestimates the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential of global metal and mineral production, and can be considered an upper bound. Conversely, the lower assessment can be regarded as a lower bound, as it considers the lowest impact values found in the literature, regardless of the geographic scope and technological mix of production. The purpose of these boundary assessments is to illustrate and quantify the uncertainties associated with the present analysis.

Iron & steel production represents an important share of the metal and mineral production environmental burden: the assumptions about its energy consumption and climate impact are very significant for the results. The low and high assessment consider the impact of raw steel from EcoInvent 3.8 and the impact of primary steel production from (Van der Voet et al., 2019), respectively. In the median assessment, the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential per unit mass are considered as the average impacts of raw steel and low-alloyed steel from EcoInvent 3.8, in a similar way as in (Nuss and Eckelman, 2014).

Regarding aluminum, peat, phosphate rock and gypsum, the EcoInvent database provides cumulative energy demand and global warming potential estimations by world region. The production data for each world region from the USGS is matched with the impact factor provided in the database.

Finally the results are compared with global primary energy consumption from (Energy Institute, 2023) and with global GHG emissions from the EDGAR database (European Commission. JRC, 2023).

## 2.2. effects of actual recycling, maximum recycling, and the increase of Chinese iron & steel production from electric arc furnace

The reduction potential of both indicators is assessed by applying actual recycling rates and maximum potential recycling, and by considering the impact of increasing the share of electric arc furnaces in the Chinese iron and steel industry. The low and median assessment mainly account for recycling. As high assessment mostly assumes metal and mineral production from primary production, applying recycling in this case is the most relevant option. For the recycling scenarios, the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential given in (Van der Voet et al., 2019) are considered for aluminum, manganese, iron & steel, nickel, copper, zinc and lead secondary production, since these metals represent the biggest shares of energy consumption and climate impact. The cumulative energy demand and global warming potential assumed for secondary production are given in Table S2. The actual recycling scenario represents the actual state of metal and mineral production impact, taking into account the actual Recycling Input Rate (RIR) (i.e., the share of recycled material in the total production). For the potential recycling scenario, the potential maximum RIR for each commodity considered is estimated by multiplying the potential maximum Recycling Rate (RR) (i.e., the share of recycled material from end-of-life materials) from (Ciacci et al., 2015) and the ratio of actual RIR to actual RR, as described in equation (1). Values and sources are provided in Table S3. This ratio is mostly determined by the growth of commodity production. This methodology assumes that the ratio of Recycled Input Ratio (RIR) to Recycled Rate (RR) will remain constant with the advancement of the recycling industry, implying a stable ratio between the material reinjected into production and the materials reaching end of life. Since our assumptions are based primarily on European data, it is equivalent to considering that global metal and mineral production growth follows the same path as in Europe. Additionally, the assumed constant RR potential supposes that the share of each application by commodity will remain constant. We also emphasize the versatility of recycling indicators, depending on data availability for calculation and on the methodology used, accounting for material imports/exports or not, as described in (European Commission. Joint Research Centre, 2018) and its revision in (European Commission. Joint Research Centre, 2020). The potential RIR is given by:

<footnote n="2">² Lithium, beryllium, boron, magnesium, aluminum, silicon, titanium, chromium, manganese, iron and steel, cobalt, nickel, copper, zinc, gallium, germanium, arsenic, strontium, yttrium, zirconium, niobium, molybdenum, palladium, silver, cadmium, indium, tin, antimony, tellurium, lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium, tantalum, tungsten, rhenium, platinum, gold, mercury, lead.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Helium, asbestos, graphite, sulfur, cement, feldspar and nepheline syenite, gypsum, selenium, bromine, clays, fluorspar, barite, peat, iodine, perlite, phosphate rock, potash, pumice and pumicite, salt, sand and gravel (industrial), soda ash, vermiculite.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ The database notably incorporates the capability to calculate emissions from electricity in accordance with Scope 2 and Scope 3 Guidance of the GHG Protocol, enabling more comprehensive carbon footprint assessments. Additionally, ecoinvent 3.8 provides extensive data coverage on electricity and heat production, spanning both renewable and fossil-based sources, facilitating in-depth evaluations of energy systems and their environmental impacts. The database's strict adherence to ISO 14040 and 14044 standards further reinforces its methodological rigor, enhancing its credibility and the applicability of resulting research across diverse contexts.</footnote>
$$RIR_{potential} = RR_{potential} \cdot (RIR_{actual} / RR_{actual}) \quad (1)$$

The potential recycling scenario should be understood as an estimation of today's metal and mineral production cumulative energy demand and global warming potential, assuming that recycling industries are developed at their absolute maximum. The scenario should not be seen as a projection of the future state of the recycling industry.

The electric arc furnace scenario assumes an increase in Chinese iron and steel production by this technology from 10.6% to 49.5%, corresponding to the alignment of the country's production technologies with global standards (Worldsteel, 2022a). Cumulative energy demand and global warming potential intensity for this technology in China are taken from (Liang et al., 2020).

As our estimations are based on the high assessment, the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential reduction potentials represent an upper bound. A lower environmental burden would be mitigated based on scenarios already including recycling.

## 2.3. estimation of the additional environmental impact of metal and mineral production for the clean energy transition

The impact of the clean energy transition on the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential of metal and mineral production is estimated. To this end, the surplus of materials required, taken from the IEA Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS) in 2040 (IEA, 2021a), is added to the 2020 production. Iron & steel, cement and aluminum productions to 2040 are extrapolated from the IEA Net Zero Emission (NZE) scenario. As the rare earth elements production surplus is provided as a total, it is evenly divided between each of them. The production variations for each commodity are presented in Tables S4 and S5. The aluminum production surplus is distributed among producing countries according to current production shares. It is assumed that the production levels of all other commodities remain unchanged. Given the uncertainty over whether improvements in mining efficiency or decreases in ore concentration will be dominant in the future, cumulative energy demand and global warming potential are assumed to remain constant across all commodities. Van der Voet et al. (2019) proposed long-term projections for the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential of major metals per mass. However, to ensure clarity and due to major uncertainties about these projections,<fnref n="5" /> it is assumed that these factors remain constant over time. This estimation is not a projection of metal and mineral production energy consumption and climate impact in 2040. Its purpose is to grasp the energy needs and climate costs associated with metal and mineral production in the low-carbon transition.

## 2.4. estimation of the reduction in environmental impact of fossil fuel production

Finally, a comparison is made between the cumulative energy demand of metal and mineral production and the energy associated with fossil fuel production. To maintain consistency with the metal and mineral production variation in 2.3, global fossil fuel production data in 2019 and 2040 in SDS are sourced from (IEA, 2021c). The energy consumed for their production is estimated using Energy Return On Investment (EROI) values from (Murphy et al., 2022). Global fuel

consumption is divided by the corresponding EROI to obtain cumulative energy demand for its production. As for materials, the cumulative energy demand of fossil fuel production is subject to a significant variations depending on the scope considered. These differences are assessed for three distinct scopes: at the extraction site using EROIext, after the refining stage using EROIref, and at point of use using EROIpou. We conduct our analysis with the EROIref, as it tends to correspond better to the scope used for metal and mineral production. The reduction of cumulative energy demand from fossil fuel phase-out is compared to the additional energy required for mining, as calculated in the previous section. EROI values of fossil fuels are supposed constant, despite extensive literature suggesting a future decline (Delannoy et al., 2021a, 2021b, 2023). This makes our assumption conservative regarding cumulative energy demand reduction, as a declining EROI would imply a higher energy consumption for fossil fuel production. Again, this estimation does not project fossil fuel production energy consumption in 2040, it only intends to capture underlying tendencies.

## 3. results

First, our results are provided for low, median and high assumptions. Then, our estimations of energy consumption and GHG emissions are presented for three case studies: with actual recycling rates, by maximizing actual recycling possibilities, and by increasing Chinese iron & steel production by electric arc furnace to 49.5%. The energy consumption associated with the increase in metal and mineral production and the decrease in fossil fuel production is assessed according to the IEA's SDS and NZE scenario.

### 3.1. massively produced commodities outweigh the others

The cumulative energy demand and global warming potential of metal and mineral production in 2019 were estimated to be between 11.3% and 18.2% of global primary energy consumption and between 11.9% and 17.0% of global GHG emissions. The median assessment gives a cumulative energy demand of 13.8% of global primary energy consumption, and a global warming potential of 15.8% of total GHG emissions.

presents the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential of metal and mineral production calculated in our three assessments.

Table 1 presents the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential for low, median and high assessment. For the three assessments, the impacts of iron & steel, cement, and aluminum production represent respectively around 80% of the global cumulative energy demand of metal and mineral production, and almost 90% of its global warming potential, as shown in Fig. 2 and Table 2. A notably higher share of cement is observed for global warming potential compared to

<caption>Table 1</caption>

Results of low, median and high assessments of Cumulative Energy Demand and Global Warming Potential of metals and minerals production in 2019.

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Low Assessment</th><th>Median Assessment</th><th>High Assessment</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>Cumulative energy demand (EJ)</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Cumulative energy demand of metal and mineral production</td><td>66.1</td><td>80.8</td><td>106.4</td></tr><tr><td>Global energy consumption in 2019</td><td></td><td>587.4</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of world energy production</td><td>11,3%</td><td>13,8%</td><td>18,1%</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>Global warming potential (GtCO2-e)</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Global warming potential of metal and mineral production</td><td>7.0</td><td>9.3</td><td>10.1</td></tr><tr><td>GHG emissions in 2019</td><td></td><td>52.6</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of world global warming potential</td><td>13.4%</td><td>17.7%</td><td>19.1%</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote n="5">⁵ The influence of technical progress versus the decline in ore concentration on variations in cumulative energy demand and global warming potential intensities remains uncertain. While technical advancements typically lead to reductions in these intensities, a decrease in ore concentration tends to increase them. Vidal et al. (2022) suggests that, after a prolonged period in which technological improvements reduced environmental impact intensities, the prevailing trend may now be an increase in energy requirements for material production due to declining ore concentration. However, for the purposes of our analysis, we adopt a neutral hypothesis.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2.** – Cumulative energy demand (above) and global warming potential (below) of iron & steel, cement, aluminum, and other commodities for low, median and high assessment.</figcaption></figure>

**Table 2**

Share of iron & steel, cement, aluminum, and other commodities in cumulative energy demand and global warming potential of metal and mineral production for low, median and high assessments.

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Cumulative energy demand</th><th colspan="3">Global warming potential</th></tr><tr><th>Low</th><th>Median</th><th>High</th><th>Low</th><th>Median</th><th>High</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Iron & steel</td><td>46,1%</td><td>43,1%</td><td>53,8%</td><td>48,4%</td><td>40,9%</td><td>38,7%</td></tr><tr><td>Cement</td><td>23,7%</td><td>19,4%</td><td>14,7%</td><td>33,8%</td><td>34,2%</td><td>31,6%</td></tr><tr><td>Aluminum</td><td>12,0%</td><td>16,3%</td><td>12,4%</td><td>7,4%</td><td>14,1%</td><td>19,3%</td></tr><tr><td>I&S + Cement + Al</td><td>81,8%</td><td>78,8%</td><td>80,9%</td><td>89,6%</td><td>89,2%</td><td>89,6%</td></tr><tr><td>Other commodities</td><td>18,2%</td><td>21,2%</td><td>19,1%</td><td>10,4%</td><td>10,7%</td><td>10,4%</td></tr></tbody></table>

cumulative energy demand.

For the other commodities, energy consumption and GHG emissions are subject to large variations between assumptions, as shown in Fig. 3. For rare earth elements, the energy consumption and emission factor can vary by a factor of 1000 (see Table S1). Nevertheless, as depicted in Table 3, their contribution to global metal and mineral production

impacts is minimal, so these variations do not significantly impact the final results. The case of silver emphasizes the substantial variations associated with the different life cycle assessment methodologies and assumptions: its cumulative energy demand is 2.9 GJ/kg under a combined production assumption - with gold, lead, zinc and copper - and rises to 120 GJ/kg under a coupled production assumption - only with gold (Farjana et al., 2019b). This gap makes silver the fifth most energy-consuming commodity in high assessment, and the twentieth in low assessment. This highlights the challenge of calculating a single figure for global metal and mineral production, as it would require comprehensive knowledge of the by/coproducts and technologies used for each mine worldwide, advocating for the range assessment methodology.

There is also a difference between commodities carrying the highest cumulative energy demand and global warming potential intensities and their global impacts. Platinum group metals, gold, silver and rare earths have the highest energy demand and global warming potential per unit mass, but their global impact is limited due to their relatively small production volumes. Table 3 compares the rankings of platinoids, gold, silver and rare earth elements for both indicators per mass and in terms of global impacts. Despite this fact, public awareness and media coverage regarding the environmental impacts of metal and mineral production tend to focus on commodities with high impact per unit mass.

### 3.2. supply based solutions show significant opportunities, but are not a panacea

Fig. 4 shows that applying the actual RIR in the actual recycling scenario brings estimations closer to the median assessment, but still higher. This is consistent with the fact that the latter considers recycling for most commodities, while the actual recycling scenario only considers aluminum, manganese, iron & steel, copper, nickel, zinc and lead. Applying actual RIR to these materials reduces global cumulative energy demand and global warming potential by 19.4 EJ and 1.62 GtCO₂e, equivalent to a 24.0% and 17.4% reduction of the high assessment. The potential recycling scenario shows that enhancing recycling rates to their maximum for considered commodities would decrease the energy and climate impacts by 12.5 EJ and 0.97 GtCO₂e compared to the actual recycling scenario, which represent 14.3% and 11.5% of the impacts in high assessment, respectively. These estimations are based on current practices and do not represent a projection of future recycling development. They do not account for recycling technology and industry developments, neither for the evolution of consumption and material scrap availability. Gorman et al. (2022) estimate maximum GHG emissions reductions from metal recycling at 1.04 Gt in 2030 and 2.23 Gt in 2050, considering only available feedstocks and not possible development of the recycling industry. Our figures are consistent with this estimation.

Switching Chinese iron & steel production to 49.5% electric arc furnace (the average rate for the rest of the world) would reduce iron & steel cumulative energy demand by 9.6 EJ and its global warming potential by 470 MtCO₂e, equivalent to 9.0% and 4.7% of the global impacts of the sector. The emission factor is taken from the Chinese electric mix, which explains the lower GHG emissions reduction compared to avoided energy consumption. These results are therefore conservative and highlight the importance of decarbonization of the electric mix, as exposed in the discussion section.

Recycling policies represent a pivotal mechanism for reducing energy consumption and delivering environmental benefits. Furthermore, although this aspect is not addressed in our study, recycling also mitigates the risk of metal scarcity, as demonstrated by Seck et al. (2020) in the case of copper. Recycling thus contributes to enhancing sovereignty over critical materials. The issue of technological transformation within the iron and steel sector is equally crucial. China currently produces over one billion tonnes of steel annually, accounting for 54% of global
<figure><img src="image_5.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 3. – Cumulative energy demand of minor commodities for low (left) and high (right) assessments.</figcaption></figure>

<table><caption>**Table 3**
Comparison of per mass and global ranks of platinoids, gold, silver and rare earth elements for cumulative energy demand and global warming potential.</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Rank</th><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Cumulative energy demand</th><th colspan="3">Global warming potential</th></tr><tr><th>Low</th><th>Median</th><th>High</th><th>Low</th><th>Median</th><th>High</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="2">Platinum</td><td>Per mass</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Global</td><td>27</td><td>26</td><td>26</td><td>17</td><td>16</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Rhenium</td><td>Per mass</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>3</td><td>2</td><td>2</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Global</td><td>38</td><td>44</td><td>44</td><td>27</td><td>28</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Palladium</td><td>Per mass</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>4</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Global</td><td>24</td><td>18</td><td>19</td><td>26</td><td>27</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Gold</td><td>Per mass</td><td>4</td><td>2</td><td>2</td><td>4</td><td>3</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>Global</td><td>13</td><td>5</td><td>6</td><td>13</td><td>5</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Silver</td><td>Per mass</td><td>7</td><td>9</td><td>5</td><td>12</td><td>9</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>Global</td><td>20</td><td>19</td><td>5</td><td>21</td><td>15</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Rare earth elements</td><td>Per mass</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>Global</td><td>39</td><td>21</td><td>21</td><td>29</td><td>20</td><td>18</td></tr></tbody></table>

production and outpacing India, the world's second-largest producer, by a factor of seven. In other words, China's steel production exceeds the combined output of all other countries. The immense scale of China's steel industry positions the country's economic dynamics as the primary determinant of global market trends, pricing, energy consumption within the sector, and its environmental impact.

### 3.3. materials required for the clean energy transition represent a small increase in impacts

As outlined in (IEA, 2021a), achieving the clean energy transition will require a substantial increase in metal production. It will be primarily driven by the development of electrical networks (copper and aluminum) and electrified mobility (nickel, cobalt, manganese, lithium, graphite). However, as depicted in Figure 8, the production surplus associated with the low-carbon transition – in other commodities – would result in an additional energy consumption of 6.3 EJ and emissions of 283 MtCO₂e in median assessment with current production methods. These figures rise to 6.4 EJ and 336 MtCO₂e under the high assessment. This represents respectively 7.8% and 3.0% in the median

assessment and 6.0% and 3.3% for high assessment of the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential of today's metal and mineral production. In IEA's NZE scenario, iron & steel, cement, and aluminum production surplus would account for 3.5%, 0.6% and 2.8% of the actual cumulative energy demand of metal and mineral production, and 3.3%, 1.1% and 2.4% of its global warming potential in median assessment. The high assessment gives respectively 4.4%, 0.5% and 2.2% for cumulative energy demand, and 3.2%, 1.0% and 3.4% for global warming potential, assuming current production technologies. Fig. 5 and Table 4 show the shares of each part of metal and mineral production and their evolution under the SDS.

Overall, commodities associated with the low-carbon transition would account for 51% and 45% of the cumulative energy demand increase in median and high assessments, and for 29% of the global warming potential increase in both scenarios. In other words, the production surge of low-carbon transition materials would contribute to half of the increase in energy consumption of metal and mineral production, and approximately a third of the rise in GHG emissions. On a global scale, this represents a potential cumulative energy demand increase of 1.1%, and of 0.6% in global GHG emissions. Furthermore, this scenario supposes a high augmentation of the production of energy transition metals (taken from SDS), and a conservative variation of the production of iron & steel, cement and aluminum (from IEA's NZE scenario). The results therefore present a high estimate of the share of the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential associated with energy transition commodities.

### 3.4. mitigation from decreasing fossil fuel production outweighs the impacts of mining for the clean energy transition

Fig. 6 shows the cumulative energy demand of metal and mineral production and fossil fuel production. Significant differences are observed between the EROI scopes, from 18.0 EJ, to 55.3 EJ, to 80.9 EJ at extraction, refining, and point of use, respectively. The cumulative energy demand associated with fossil fuel production in refining and point of use scopes is of similar magnitude to that of metal and mineral production. Considering the EROI at refining scope, the cumulative energy demand of fossil fuel production decreases by 20.8 EJ in SDS, with 7.9 EJ from coal, 9.5 EJ from oil, and 3.4 EJ from gas. Fig. 7 presents the cumulative energy demand variation for commodity extraction in the IEA's SDS scenario. The decrease in cumulative energy demand from fossil fuel production more than compensate the increase of metal and mineral production, saving respectively 8.5 and 6.6 EJ in the median and high assessment scenarios. This result should be interpreted
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.** Cumulative energy demand and global warming potential of iron & steel, cement, aluminum, and other commodities for high assessment, actual recycling, potential recycling and installation of electric arc furnaces in China scenarios.</figcaption></figure>

cautiously, as it assumes a constant cumulative energy demand intensity for both metal and mineral production and fossil fuel production. However, it remains conservative, given that the EROI of fossil fuels is expected to decline, which would further increase the mitigation of cumulative energy demand associated with their production. More results are available in SI.

## 4. discussion

Table 5 compares the results of the present study with other global assessments in the literature. The differences can be explained by numerous factors, particularly the number of commodities considered (Fizaine and Court, 2015; Norgate and Jahanshahi, 2011; Nuss and Eckelman, 2014). do not account for non-metallic materials production, notably cement. This phenomenon is even more pronounced in Norgate and Jahanshahi's study, which focuses exclusively on iron & steel, aluminum, copper, nickel, zinc and lead, estimating a cumulative energy demand equivalent to 6.2% of the global energy consumption. In

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5.** Cumulative energy demand (above) and global warming potential (below) of iron and steel, cement, aluminum, and other commodities in median and high assessments of material production surplus associated with SDS and NZE scenarios.</figcaption></figure>

contrast, when considering only these five commodities in our analysis, we observe significantly higher values: 7.3% in low, 9.2% in median and 13.1% in high assessment. A notable divergence is observed between our assessments and those of the IPCC. The latter only accounts for clinker direct emissions for cement production, while our study adopts a life cycle perspective. The differences in global warming potential from cement production between IPCC's assessment and ours amount to 0.83 GtCO₂e for the low assessment and 1.63 Gt for the median and high assessment. Additionally, the IPCC's estimate also differs from ours as it uses nonspecific emissions factors for all metallic commodities except iron & steel, aluminum, ferroalloys, magnesium, lead and zinc. These methodological differences can explain the gap between both evaluations. Bajżelj et al. (2013) estimate cement GHG emissions at approximately 2.8 GtCO₂e in 2010, accounting for emissions from both energy consumption and processes, which is consistent with our assessments.

Despite the large amount of material it will require, the energy transition will reduce the global cumulated energy demand for material production by substituting demand for fossil fuels. This conclusion is
<caption>**Table 4**</caption>

Share of iron & steel, cement, aluminum and other commodities in the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential of metal and mineral production with and without SDS.

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="4">Cumulative energy demand (EJ)</th><th colspan="4">Global warming potential (Gt CO2e)</th></tr><tr><th>Median assmt</th><th>Median + SDS</th><th>High assmt</th><th>High + SDS</th><th>Median assmt</th><th>Median + SDS</th><th>High assmt</th><th>High + SDS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Iron & steel</td><td>43,1%</td><td>40,4%</td><td>53,8%</td><td>51,4%</td><td>40,9%</td><td>40,0%</td><td>38,7%</td><td>37,5%</td></tr><tr><td>Cement</td><td>19,4%</td><td>17,7%</td><td>14,7%</td><td>13,7%</td><td>34,2%</td><td>32,6%</td><td>31,6%</td><td>29,9%</td></tr><tr><td>Aluminum</td><td>16,3%</td><td>16,6%</td><td>12,4%</td><td>12,8%</td><td>14,1%</td><td>15,0%</td><td>19,3%</td><td>20,3%</td></tr><tr><td>Other commodities</td><td>21,2%</td><td>25,2%</td><td>19,1%</td><td>22,1%</td><td>10,7%</td><td>12,4%</td><td>10,4%</td><td>12,4%</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>80,8</td><td>93,1</td><td>106,4</td><td>120,7</td><td>9,3</td><td>10,3</td><td>10,1</td><td>11,2</td></tr></tbody></table>

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 6.** Cumulative energy demand of metal and mineral production in low, median and high assessment, and of fossil fuel production at extraction, refining and Point of Use scopes.</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7.** Cumulative energy demand of metal and mineral production in median and high assessment, and net energy balance including abatement from fossil fuel production decrease.</figcaption></figure>

consistent with (Nijnens et al., 2023), who estimate that the energy transition will require a smaller net quantity of material compared to the current fossil system.

We emphasize that cumulative energy demand and global warming potential are used as proxies for the total environmental impacts and remind the reader that metal and mineral production involves enormous environmental and social burdens such as water consumption, land use, and soil acidification. To build a sustainable extractive industry, the question of ecological impacts should be given as much consideration as supply risk.

Regarding the production regions of iron & steel, cement and

aluminum, Table 6 clearly shows the predominance of China, which produces over 50% of the global production for all three. The country is also positioned strategically on the production chain of essential metals for the energy transition (Bonnet et al., 2022; Bucciarelli et al., 2024; Hache, 2024; IEA, 2021a). As a result, China bears significant responsibility for the global cumulative energy demand and global warming potential of metal and mineral production and thus the greatest potential to reduce them. The analysis estimates that elevating electric arc furnace iron and steel production in China to the global average proportion—49.5%, compared to the current 10.6%—would save 9.6 EJ per year and prevent the annual emission of 471 MtCO2e.
<table><caption>**Table 5**
Comparison between the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential of our study with the literature.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Low</th><th>Median</th><th>High</th><th>Nuss and Eckelman, 2014</th><th>Fizaine and Court (2015)</th><th>Norgate and Jahanshahi (2011)</th><th>IEA Sankey (final energy)</th><th>IPCC (2022)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Number of commodities</td><td></td><td>72</td><td></td><td>63</td><td>41</td><td>6</td><td>N/A</td><td>N/A</td></tr><tr><td>Reference year</td><td></td><td>2019</td><td></td><td>2008</td><td>2012</td><td>2011</td><td>2019</td><td>2019</td></tr><tr><td colspan="9">Cumulative energy demand (EJ)</td></tr><tr><td>cumulative energy demand of metal and mineral production</td><td>66.1</td><td>80.8</td><td>106.4</td><td>49.0</td><td>52.2</td><td>32.1</td><td>47.5</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Global energy production in reference year</td><td></td><td>587.4</td><td></td><td>492.5</td><td>528.2</td><td>520.9</td><td>418.0</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Share of world energy production</td><td>11,3%</td><td>13,8%</td><td>18,1%</td><td>9,9%</td><td>9,9%</td><td>6,2%</td><td>11,4%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="9">Global warming potential (GtCO2-e)</td></tr><tr><td>Global warming potential of metal and mineral production</td><td>7.0</td><td>9.3</td><td>10.1</td><td>3.4</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>6.1</td></tr><tr><td>Global GHG emissions in reference year</td><td></td><td>52.6</td><td></td><td>45.2</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>52.6</td></tr><tr><td>Share of world global warming potential</td><td>13.4%</td><td>17.7%</td><td>19.1%</td><td>7.5%</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>11.6%</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>**Table 6**
World production of iron & steel in 2021 and cement and aluminum in 2020 by region. *: Whole America.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Iron & Steel</th><th>Cement</th><th>Aluminum</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>North America</td><td>6.0%</td><td>6.5%*</td><td>14.7%</td></tr><tr><td>EU27</td><td>7.8%</td><td>4.0%</td><td>13.3%</td></tr><tr><td>China</td><td>52.8%</td><td>57.2%</td><td>50.8%</td></tr><tr><td>Russia and other CIS</td><td>4.1%</td><td>2.6%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>India</td><td>6.0%</td><td>7.0%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Other Asia</td><td>12.5%</td><td>15.2%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Middle East</td><td>5.1%</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Other countries</td><td>5.6%</td><td>7.5%</td><td>21.1%</td></tr><tr><td>Total production (Mt/y)</td><td>1953</td><td>4170</td><td>86.2</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Worldsteel (2022b)</td><td>CEMBUREAU (2022)</td><td>CRU (2022)</td></tr></tbody></table>

**Table 7** shows the different sectors consuming these commodities. The highest consumption share is by far the construction sector, which is deemed to consume all cement, 52% of iron & steel production, and 25% of aluminum. According to our results, the construction sector is therefore responsible for the consumption of 33.5 EJ, 37.0 EJ and up to 48.7 EJ and of 4.3 GtCO₂e, 5.5 GtCO₂e to 5.7 GtCO₂e in low, median and high assessment, for these three commodities alone. These figures represent respectively 50.7%, 45.9% and 45.8% of the cumulative energy demand of metal and mineral production, and 60.9%, 59.1% and 56.6% of its global warming potential. Reducing construction volumes is therefore an important lever to reduce environmental impact. Construction growth is positively correlated to GDP per capita. However, as countries develop, the associated construction share in GDP and volume grow more slowly. At a certain development stage, there could be an absolute decoupling of the indicators, meaning that beyond a certain wealth per capita, further economic development is achieved with an absolute decrease of activity in the construction sector, forming an inverted U-shape curve (Bon, 1992). However (Lopes, 2008; Ruddock and Lopes, 2006), do not argue in favor of a possible absolute decoupling. They observe that construction continues to grow in developed countries but at a slower pace. Giang and Sui Pheng (2011) review 40

<table><caption>**Table 7**
World use of iron & steel, cement and aluminum per sector in 2020.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Iron & steel</th><th>Cement</th><th>Aluminum</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Construction</td><td>52%</td><td>~100%</td><td>25%</td></tr><tr><td>Transport</td><td>17%</td><td></td><td>23%</td></tr><tr><td>Machinery and equipment</td><td>16%</td><td></td><td>11%</td></tr><tr><td>Consumer goods</td><td>12%</td><td></td><td>6%</td></tr><tr><td>Electrical sector</td><td>3%</td><td></td><td>12%</td></tr><tr><td>Packaging</td><td></td><td></td><td>8%</td></tr><tr><td>Other</td><td></td><td></td><td>15%</td></tr><tr><td>Sources</td><td>Worldsteel (2022c)</td><td>-</td><td>CRU (2022)</td></tr></tbody></table>

years of academic research on the topic and find no clear literature consensus on the question. They argue that construction and economic development create a reinforcing feedback loop: construction enables economic growth, which in turn promotes more construction. Logically, the same reasoning applies to cement production, as it is a major constituent of the construction sector. An empirical analysis also shows no clear evidence of a predefined relation between cement consumption per capita and GDP per capita (GlobBulk, 2020). It also notes much higher economic intensity for cement in China than for other economies, suggesting China's development induces considerable construction activity. However, if we stick to the absolute decoupling hypothesis, accelerating the development of emerging countries could accelerate the cement consumption peak. This perspective could potentially suppose the same cement consumption, but over a shorter period, which would be of no help regarding GHG emissions. Hence, as development mechanisms will increase construction anyway in the coming years, it is mandatory to develop cleaner construction standards.

Recycling is sometimes put forward as a comprehensive solution to environmental implications and resource depletion associated with metal and mineral production. This approach should first be mitigated by its limited impact reduction potential as demonstrated by our results. The delayed release of material to end-of-life also hinders the ability of recycling to meet actual growing demand. This effect is amplified for long-term uses, such as construction and the electrical network, which are both locking a large quantity of material. Circularity must be considered in a holistic approach, covering the whole lifecycle of the material, starting from the design phase in order to favor not only recycling, but also reuse or remanufacturing. This integrated circular system requires collaboration between the different stakeholders from primary producers to second hand users.

(OECD, 2024) identify four major types of barriers and challenges for circular economy, using steel as a case study. The first is economic: although advanced recycling technologies are available, the low value of recycled materials currently fails to justify the investment costs needed to compete with primary metals. This issue is exacerbated by government policies that tend to favor the primary metals sector, providing subsidies that lower the competitiveness of secondary metals. Additionally, unpriced environmental externalities in primary production make it difficult for recycled materials to be priced competitively.

Another significant challenge is the lack of policy incentives, particularly in terms of stakeholder interaction and the absence of clear circular economy targets. Enhanced collaboration among stakeholders could drive innovations like better scrap standards and improved sorting technologies, while clear policy targets would align industry goals and guide the transition to circularity.

Furthermore, the lack of a lifecycle approach to design and production hinders circularity, as many producers fail to incorporate end-of-life considerations during the design phase (Martínez Leal et al., 2020). Producers also lack incentives to take responsibility for their products'
environmental impact once they reach the end of life, with this burden often shifted to consumers and governments.

Finally, recycling itself faces additional barriers, such as the low quality of recycled materials, which limits their use in high-end applications. Inadequate infrastructure for sorting, collection, and transportation of recyclables requires significant investment to improve, while poor traceability of materials complicates the assurance of quality and consistency in recycled products.

In addition to enhancing circularity, which represents a key aspect of mitigating environmental burdens of metal and mineral production, other technological and production opportunities are available.

For iron and steel, Kim et al. (2022) review several decarbonization options for different production steps. Beyond the improvement of circularity, the integration of renewable energy for power generation and the adoption of low-carbon emission production technologies, such as direct reduction and electric arc furnace, are also an important reduction lever, as observed in our results. Moreover, the implementation of Carbon Capture, Utilization & Storage (CCUS) for the blast furnace combined with the basic oxygen furnace route is also an interesting option. The use of alternative materials, particularly in construction, where more than 50% of global iron and steel consumption occurs, could contribute to a reduction in iron and steel use, using wood or bio-sourced materials when possible.

Regarding cement production, Habert et al. (2020) discuss medium and long-term solutions for mitigating CO₂ emissions, such as reducing the clinker-to-cement and cement-to-concrete ratios. A more diluted cement mix would reduce global clinker requirements, which constitutes most of the cement's global warming potential. Substituting up to 60% of coal or biomass fly ash could reduce the global warming potential of concrete by up to 47%. The use of CCUS for cement production, or increasing CO₂ uptake through recarbonation could also help reduce emissions. Optimizing structure and cement use, and adopting alternative construction materials like alternative cement, wood, or other bio-sourced materials are additional strategies when possible. However, the progress of developing countries presents a challenge to mid-term cement production mitigation, and the potential for biomass substitution in construction materials, particularly wood, remains uncertain, as noted by Howard et al. (2021).

For aluminum, alternative strategies to recycling focus on decarbonizing electricity usage in primary production. The Hall-Heroult process, which is highly electro-intensive, currently consumes 14 to 16 MWh per ton of aluminum (IES, 2019). Adopting inert anodes would also eliminate direct CO₂ emissions from the carbon cathodes used for alumina electrolysis in the process.

For other commodities, actions to reduce cumulative energy demand and global warming potential should be evaluated based on the specific production process, geographic region, and material substitution potential. Nevertheless, general guidelines include enhancing metal recovery from slag and residues, decarbonizing the power sector, electrifying production processes, improving energy efficiency, using hydrogen as a reducing agent, and implementing CCUS technologies.

Furthermore, the policy levers for the implementation of these different technical options have synergies with those required for circular economy. Internalising environmental damages to production costs can improve the competitiveness of these technologies, together with policy incentives and investments. In addition to addressing the economic challenges, the technical and social feasibility of these mitigation options should also be regarded. For instance, CCS requires not only a favourable economic and policy context, but also the location of sufficient of storage site capacity, as well as public acceptance for their exploitation (Budinis et al., 2018). More generally, the important implementation of new mitigation options requires long term perspective and a stable and supportive regulatory framework.

In addition to considering these technological and organizational measures, which are widely discussed in the literature, special attention should be paid to sufficiency measures. The question of our needs must

be extensively questioned, as it represents a major lever to act on metal and mineral production demand, and consequently, on its cumulative energy demand and global warming potential. For instance, jewelry is responsible for 47% of gold consumption (USGS, 2022). The benefits of these commodities and their uses should be carefully weighed against the associated energy consumption and environmental burdens.

Taking the example of the transport sector, which will be a key driver of metal and mineral production growth for both major and minor metals, González Palencia et al., 2016 demonstrate that downsizing (i.e., reducing vehicle size) can significantly reduce light duty vehicle energy and material consumption. Wolfram et al. (2021) further show that downsizing and increasing the number of passengers per vehicle are the most significant actions to reduce emissions from light duty vehicles in a life cycle approach. In contrast, production-based solutions such as lightweighting, recycling, and remanufacturing result in lower emission reductions. The authors emphasize that major changes are driven by behavioral shifts, and that industrial adaptation can only be part of the solution.

The environmental impact associated with metal and mineral production, and more commonly a form of life cycle thinking, needs to be taken to a broader public to allow decision makers and consumers to make informed decisions about their environmental implications. The latter examples can be interpreted differently: is our goal to maintain our uses as they are and minimize environmental implications accordingly, or is it to reduce our ecological footprints to a sustainable level and maximize global well-being within these limits?

## 5. Conclusion

The study estimates the cumulative energy demand and global warming potential of producing 50 metallic and 22 non-metallic commodities in 2019. The cumulative energy demand ranges from 66.1 EJ (11.3% of the global total) to 106.4 EJ (18.1%), with a median assessment of 80.8 EJ (13.8%), and the global warming potential between 7.0 GtCO₂e (11.9%) and 10.1 GtCO₂e (17.0%), with a median assessment of 9.3 GtCO₂e (15.8%). The wide range of our results reflects the uncertainties of a global life cycle assessment of commodities. The results highlight the predominance of three major commodities - iron & steel, cement, and aluminum - accounting for approximately 80% of cumulative energy demand and 90% of the global warming potential of metal and mineral production. While the low-carbon transition will increase the production of transition materials and their associated environmental impacts, these three commodities will remain dominant contributors due to volume effects.

Although reducing the environmental impacts of all commodities is important, special attention must be given to these three key commodities. More than 50% of each are produced in China. Adopting the same iron & steel production mix in China as the rest of the world could reduce global energy need and GHG emissions by nearly 10 EJ and 500 MtCO₂-e. Regarding the use, the construction sector is the main consumer of these three key commodities. Recycling could also reduce energy consumption and GHG emissions of the sector by up to 12.4 EJ and 1.0 GtCO₂e. However, it cannot be considered a comprehensive solution due to its technological and organizational development limits and scrap availability issues exacerbated by the growing material consumption trend. In addition to numerous supply-side abatement options, demand-side solutions and sufficiency also represent important mitigation levers.

Finally, our analysis indicates that the low-carbon transition will increases energy consumption and GHG emissions of mining by approximately 6 EJ and 300 MtCO₂-e. While these figures are significant, they account for around 7% and 3% of the total impacts of metal and mineral production respectively. They should be understood within the broader context of materials production, where massively produced commodity impacts will remain dominant. Moreover, the energy transition is expected to reduce global cumulative energy demand for commodity production, as the projected rise from metals and minerals
production will be more than offset by reductions from fossil fuel production.

### CRediT authorship contribution statement

**Thibaut Feix:** Writing – original draft, Visualization, Resources, Methodology, Investigation, Conceptualization. **Emmanuel Hache:** Writing – review & editing, Supervision, Conceptualization.

### Funding sources

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

### Declaration of competing interest

None.

### Acknowledgments

The authors thank Emilie Normand, Jérôme Sabathier, Marie Codet and Lucas Desport for their proofreading and valuable comments.

## Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2025.105516.

### Data availability

Most data are available in the supplementary information file. Other data are available on request.

### References

Bajželj, B., Allwood, J.M., Cullen, J.M., 2013. Designing climate change mitigation plans that add up. Environ. Sci. Technol. 47, 8062–8069. https://doi.org/10.1021/es400399h.

Bon, R., 1992. The future of international construction: secular patterns of growth and decline. Habitat Int. 16, 119–128. https://doi.org/10.1016/0197-3975(92)90068-A.

Bonnet, T., Grekou, C., Hache, E., Mignon, V., 2022. Métaux stratégiques : la clairvoyance chinoise. La lettre du CEPII.

Bucciarelli, P., Hache, E., Mignon, V., 2024. Evaluating Criticality of Strategic Metals: Are the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and Usual Concentration Thresholds Still Relevant?.

Budinis, S., Krevor, S., Dowell, N.M., Brandon, N., Hawkes, A., 2018. An assessment of CCS costs, barriers and potential. Energy Strategy Rev. 22, 61–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2018.08.003.

CEMBUREAU, 2022. World cement production in 2020 by region [WWW Document]. URL. https://cembureau.eu/media/lnjpejs2/world-cement-production-in-2020-b-y-region.jpg, 8.4.22.

Ciacci, L., Reck, B.K., Nassar, N.T., Graedel, T.E., 2015. Lost by design. Environ. Sci. Technol. 49, 9443–9451. https://doi.org/10.1021/es505515z.

CRU, 2022. Opportunities for Aluminium in A Post-Covid Economy.

Delannoy, L., Auzanneau, M., Andrieu, B., Vidal, O., Longaretti, P.-Y., Prados, E., Murphy, D.J., Bentley, R., Carbajales-Dale, M., Raugei, M., Höök, M., Court, V., King, C., Fizaine, F., Jacques, P., Heun, M.K., Jackson, A., Guay, C., Aramendia, E., Wang, J., Le-Boulzec, H., Hall, C., 2023. Emerging consensus on net energy paves the way for improved integrated assessment modeling. SSRN Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4500020.

Delannoy, L., Longaretti, P.-Y., Murphy, D.J., Prados, E., 2021a. Assessing global long-term EROI of gas: a net-energy perspective on the energy transition. Energies 14, 5112. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14165112.

Delannoy, L., Longaretti, P.-Y., Murphy, D.J., Prados, E., 2021b. Peak oil and the low-carbon energy transition: a net-energy perspective. Appl. Energy 304, 117843. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2021.117843.

Energy Institute, 2023. Statistical Review of World Energy.

Engels, P., Cerdas, F., Dettmer, T., Frey, C., Hentschel, J., Herrmann, C., Mirfabrikikar, T., Schueler, M., 2022. Life cycle assessment of natural graphite production for lithium-ion battery anodes based on industrial primary data. J. Clean. Prod. 336, 130474. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.130474.

European Commission, 2020. Study on the EU's List of Critical Raw Materials. Publications, Office, LU.

European Commission. Joint Research Centre, 2020. Revision of the Material System Analyses Specifications. Publications, Office, LU.

European Commission. Joint Research Centre, 2018. Towards Recycling Indicators Based on EU Flows and Raw Materials System Analysis Data: Supporting the EU 28 Raw Materials and Circular Economy Policies through RMIS. Publications Office, LU.

European Commission. JRC, 2023. EDGAR (Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research) Community GHG Database, a Collaboration between the European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), the International Energy Agency (IEA), and Comprising IEA-EDGAR CO2, EDGAR CH4, EDGAR N2O, EDGAR F-GASES Version 8.0. Publications Office, LU.

Farjana, S.H., Huda, N., Mahmud, M.A.P., 2019a. Impacts of aluminum production: a cradle to gate investigation using life-cycle assessment. Sci. Total Environ. 663, 958–970. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.01.400.

Farjana, S.H., Huda, N., Mahmud, M.A.P., Lang, C., 2019b. Impact analysis of goldsilver refining processes through life-cycle assessment. J. Clean. Prod. 228, 867–881. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.04.166.

Farjana, S.H., Huda, N., Mahmud, M.A.P., Lang, C., 2019c. A global life cycle assessment of manganese mining processes based on Ecol Invent database. Sci. Total Environ. 688, 1102–1111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.06.184.

Fizaine, F., Court, V., 2015. Renewable electricity producing technologies and metal depletion: a sensitivity analysis using the EROI. Ecol. Econ. 110, 106–118. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.12.001.

Gao, F., Nie, Z., Yang, D., Sun, B., Liu, Y., Gong, X., Wang, Z., 2018. Environmental impacts analysis of titanium sponge production using Kroll process in China. J. Clean. Prod. 174, 771–779. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.09.240.

Giang, D.T.H., Sui Pheng, L., 2011. Role of construction in economic development: review of key concepts in the past 40 years. Habitat Int. 35, 118–125. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2010.06.003.

GlobBulk, 2020. World Cement Statistics Booklet.

González Palencia, J.C., Araki, M., Shiga, S., 2016. Energy, environmental and economic impact of mini-sized and zero-emission vehicle diffusion on a light-duty vehicle fleet. Appl. Energy 181, 96–109. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.08.045.

Goodenough, K.M., Wall, F., Merriman, D., 2018. The rare earth elements: demand, global resources, and challenges for resourcing future generations. Nat. Resour. Res. 27, 201–216. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11053-017-9336-5.

Gorman, M.R., Dzombak, D.A., Frischmann, C., 2022. Potential global GHG emissions reduction from increased adoption of metals recycling. Resour. Conserv. Recycl. 184, 106424. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2022.106424.

Graedel, T.E., Harper, E.M., Nassar, N.T., Nuss, P., Reck, B.K., 2015. Criticality of metals and metalloids. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 112, 4257–4262. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1500415112.

Hache, E., 2024. Prospective de l'insécurité minérale. Anticiper la nouvelle ère métallique de la transition bas-carbone. Futuribles 458, 5–24.

Huijbregts, M.A.J., Hellweg, S., Frischknecht, R., Hendriks, H.W.M., Hungerbuehler, K., Hendriks, A.J., 2010. Cumulative energy demand as predictor for the environmental burden of commodity production. Environ. Sci. Technol. 44, 2189–2196. https://doi.org/10.1021/es902870s.

IEA, 2022. IEA sankey diagram [WWW Document]. URL. https://www.iea.org/sankey/, 4.25.22.

IEA, 2021a. The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions. IEA.

IEA, 2021b. Cement [WWW Document]. IEA. URL. https://www.iea.org/reports/cement, 8.24.22.

IEA, 2021c. World Energy Outlook 2021.

IPCC, 2023. Climate Change 2021 – the Physical Science Basis: Working Group I Contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, first ed. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157896.

IPCC, 2022. AR6 climate change 2022: mitigation of climate change — IPCC. URL. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-3/, 7.29.22.

Kelly, J.C., Wang, M., Dai, Q., Winjobi, O., 2021. Energy, greenhouse gas, and water life cycle analysis of lithium carbonate and lithium hydroxide monohydrate from brine and ore resources and their use in lithium ion battery cathodes and lithium ion batteries. Resour. Conserv. Recycl. 174, 105762. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2021.105762.

Koltun, P., Tharumarajah, A., 2014. Life cycle impact of rare earth elements. ISRN Metallurgy 2014, e907536. https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/907536.

Liang, T., Wang, S., Lu, C., Jiang, N., Long, W., Zhang, M., Zhang, R., 2020. Environmental impact evaluation of an iron and steel plant in China: normalized data and direct/indirect contribution. J. Clean. Prod. 264, 121697. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.121697.

Lopes, J., 2008. Construction in construction and economic growth: a long-term perspective. In: Economics for the Modern Built Environment. Routledge.

Martínez Leal, J., Pompidou, S., Charbillet, C., Perry, N., 2020. Design for and from recycling: a circular ecodesign approach to improve the circular economy. Sustainability 12, 9861. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12239861.

Murphy, D.J., Raugei, M., Carbajales-Dale, M., Rubio Estrada, B., 2022. Energy Return on investment of major energy carriers: review and harmonization. Sustainability 14, 7098. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14127098.

Nassar, N.T., Fortier, S.M., 2021. Methodology and technical input for the 2021 review and revision of the U.S. Critical Minerals List (No. 2021–1045). Open-File Report. U. S. Geological Survey. https://doi.org/10.3133/ofr20211045.

Navarro, J., Zhao, F., 2014. Life-cycle assessment of the production of rare-earth elements for energy applications: a review. Front. Energy Res. 2.

Nijnens, J., Behrens, P., Kraan, O., Sprecher, B., Kleijn, R., 2023. Energy transition will require substantially less mining than the current fossil system. Joule 7, 2408–2413. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2023.10.005.
Norgate, T., Haque, N., 2012. Using life cycle assessment to evaluate some environmental impacts of gold production. J. Clean. Prod. 29 (30), 53–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.01.042.

Norgate, T., Jahanshahi, S., 2011. Reducing the greenhouse gas footprint of primary metal production: where should the focus be? Miner. Eng. 24, 1563–1570. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mineng.2011.08.007.

Nuss, P., Eckelman, M.J., 2014. Life cycle assessment of metals: a scientific synthesis. PLoS One 9, e101298. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0101298.

OECD, 2024. Circular economy policies for steel decarbonisation (OECD science, technology and industry policy papers), OECD science, technology and industry policy papers. https://doi.org/10.1787/4cfb485d-en.

Ruddock, L., Lopes, J., 2006. The Construction Sector and Economic Development: the ‘Bon curve.’ Construction Management and Economics, vol. 24, pp. 717–723. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190500435218.

Schreiber, A., Marx, J., Zapp, P., 2021. Life Cycle Assessment studies of rare earths production - findings from a systematic review. Sci. Total Environ. 791, 148257. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.148257.

USGS, 2022. Mineral Commodity Summaries 2022 (USGS Numbered Series No. 2022), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2022, Mineral Commodity Summaries. U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, VA. https://doi.org/10.3133/mcs2022.

USGS, 2021. Mineral Commodity Summaries 2021 (USGS Unnumbered Series), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2021, Mineral Commodity Summaries. U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, VA. https://doi.org/10.3133/mcs2021.

USGS, 1996. Mineral Commodity Summaries 1996 (USGS Numbered Series No. 1996), Mineral Commodity Summaries. U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, VA.

Van der Voet, E., Van Oers, L., Verboon, M., Kuipers, K., 2019. Environmental implications of future demand scenarios for metals: methodology and application to the case of seven major metals. J. Ind. Ecol. 23, 141–155. https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12722.

Vidal, O., Le Boulzec, H., Andrieu, B., Verzier, F., 2022. Modelling the demand and access of mineral resources in a changing world. Sustainability 14, 11. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14010011.

Weng, Z., Haque, N., Mudd, G., Jowitt, S., 2016. Assessing the energy requirements and global warming potential of the production of rare earth elements. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.JCLEPRO.2016.08.132.

Wernet, G., Bauer, C., Steubing, B., Reinhard, J., Moreno-Ruiz, E., Weidema, B., 2016. The ecoinvent database version 3 (part I): overview and methodology. Int. J. Life Cycle Assess. 21, 1218–1230. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11367-016-1087-8.

Wolfram, P., Tu, Q., Heeren, N., Pauliuk, S., Hertwich, E.G., 2021. Material efficiency and climate change mitigation of passenger vehicles. J. Ind. Ecol. 25, 494–510. https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.13067.

Worldsteel, 2022a. World Steel in Figures 2022.

Worldsteel, 2022b. Steel Staticsital Yearbook 2021 - Concise Version.

Worldsteel, 2022c. Steel markets. worldsteel.org. URL. https://worldsteel.org/steel-to-pics/steel-markets/. (Accessed 8 March 2022).

Zaimes, G.G., Hubler, B.J., Wang, S., Khanna, V., 2015. Environmental life cycle perspective on rare earth oxide production. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. 3, 237–244. https://doi.org/10.1021/sc500573b.