# Diamond artisanal mining and trafficking in the South Kasaï region of the Congo during the decolonization period (1957–1964)

Véronique Pouillard, Kristin Ranestad

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Véronique Pouillard, Kristin Ranestad. Diamond artisanal mining and trafficking in the South Kasaï region of the Congo during the decolonization period (1957–1964). Resources Policy, 2026, 112, 10.1016/j.resourpol.2025.105763. hal-05521275

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# Diamond artisanal mining and trafficking in the South Kasaï region of the Congo during the decolonization period (1957–1964)

Véronique Pouillard*

<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>

Kristin Ranestad

University of Oslo, Department of Archeology, Conservation and History, Norway

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>

## ARTICLE INFO

### Keywords:

- Diamond mining

- Trafficking

- Trade

- Congo

- Decolonization

## ABSTRACT

This paper examines the diamond extraction and commerce in South Kasaï, a key diamond-producing region in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Focusing on the late colonial years through the post-independence militarization of the province in 1964, the article examines the role of the multinational firms Forminière and Bécéka in consolidating control over diamond resources. Drawing on archival materials from both firms, held in the Sibeka archives (after the postcolonial renaming of these operations), we analyze how these firms exploited Congo's extractive institutions, contributing to violence and state fragility. Shortly after the Congo gained independence on June 30, 1960, South Kasaï declared secession from the new republic and remained a semi-autonomous entity until 1962. Despite the ban on artisanal mining by the multinationals present in the region and by the South Kasaï provincial authorities, clandestine mining increased and started fostering the cross-border trade in diamonds, creating alternative circuits of commerce outside the monopoly of the De Beers international cartel. Against this backdrop, our findings show a 'cycle of repression', in which multinational management employed corruption, local exploitation, and violent measures to suppress artisanal mining and maintain dominance. We argue that the transition to independence intensified legal pluralism and informal mining cultures, undermining state authority and reinforcing the 'resource curse' framework. The paper contributes to debates on natural resources, extractive institutions, and conflict, offering a microhistorical perspective on diamond mining and its implications for Congolese governance.

## 1. Introduction

Despite decades of reform initiatives and international interventions, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continues to grapple with widespread challenges in mineral governance. The DRC's largest exports are minerals and metals, such as diamond, copper, cobalt and uranium, which accounted for 80% of exports in 2023 (General Profile, 2023). The DRC is the second-largest diamond-producing country in the world after Russia, and artisanal and small-scale mining accounts for most of the diamond production. The Kasaï-based company MIBA, formed during the postcolonial era to take over the exploitations previously managed by Forminière and Bécéka, still operates today, but on a more limited basis than during the colonial period. Yet much of the mineral production remains informal, poorly regulated, and vulnerable to corruption, smuggling, repression and violence (Ranking, 2013). Weak state institutions and the persistence of illicit trade have undermined efforts to formalize the industry and to ensure that mineral wealth contributes to local development and national stability. These dynamics are not unique

to the DRC: across resource-rich regions, policymakers face the dilemma of how to establish control over high-value mineral resources without encouraging conflict or marginalizing local communities. What explains the persistence of such extractive patterns, and how can historical analysis help us better understand the institutional and political conditions that enable them to persist?

This paper examines the extraction and commerce of diamond, a stone that concentrates the highest value in the smallest volume, in the province of South Kasaï in the Congo (today's DRC), and the relations of the regional actors with the former colonial authority and the neighboring regions. Today, artisanal diamond mining is an important additional source of revenue for farmers in the DRC. In eastern DRC, rural households often combine mining with farming, and those that do typically enjoy greater food security than non-mining households (Ladewig et al., 2025). Studies on recent diamond exploitation point to the importance of artisanal mining activity in South Kasaï (Nkongolo Kazadi et al., 2024). Research in this paper brings new evidence about the causes of the present state of the industry based on historical

<footnote>* Corresponding author.</footnote>

<footnote>E-mail addresses: v.i.c.pouillard@iakh.uio.no (V. Pouillard), kristin.ranestad@iakh.uio.no (K. Ranestad).</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>**Picture 1.** Sibeka 1523, Clandestine mining on the Katoka river, aerial photography marked in ink by the Sibeka security team, ca. 1960.</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>**Picture 2.** Sibeka 1523, Clandestine mining in South Kasaï: aerial photography marked in ink by the Sibeka security team, ca. 1960.</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>**Picture 3.** Sibeka 1523, Clandestine diamond mining in South Kasaï, close-up photography by the Sibeka security team, ca. 1960.</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>**Picture 4.** Sibeka 1523, Glass bottle filled with illegally trafficked diamonds; seized in the Kasaï region by the Sibeka security service, 1962.</figcaption></figure>

material from the late colonial and the early decolonization periods. The aftermath of independence, gained on 30 June 1960, was characterized by greater political instability, which culminated, in South Kasaï, in episodes of violence against the backdrop of United Nations peace-keeping interventions. South Kasaï seceded, declaring itself an independent state from the Republic of Congo (modern-day Democratic Republic of the Congo) from 8 August 1960 to 5 October 1962. During this interval it was governed by an emperor, the Mulopwe Albert Kalondji. Even after South Kasaï was reintegrated into the Republic of Congo in 1962, the province remained subject to endemic episodes of violence. Among the most dramatic of them was the repression that President Mobutu ordered in 1979–1984, sending his troops against the artisanal miners in South Kasaï.

The administration of the Congo Free State, under the authority of the king of the Belgians Leopold II, initiated diamond prospection, sending international experts to the region. In 1906, Forminière was founded with the goal of financing concessions in South Kasaï (De Bruyn, 2006). After Leopold II retroceded the Congo to Belgium in 1908, making it a Belgian colony, Forminière and Bécéka started the exploitation of the diamond mining sites. The archives of these firms are kept in the Sibeka fund at the Archives Générales du Royaume de Belgique in Brussels, Belgium, Sibeka (later on MIBA) being the name taken by Bécéka during the postcolonial era. Both firms were part of the South Africa-based De Beers cartel that held monopolistic control over the extraction and commerce of diamonds for most of the twentieth century. This paper focuses on reactions to industrialized mineral exploitation
and repression of artisanal mining during the final years of colonial rule. The management of Forminière and Bécéka increased the repression of illicit exploitations, while the local mining culture changed, and newer political regimes reinterpreted the mining laws. The broader framework of this research seeks to evaluate the tensions around the South Kasai secession in relation to the volatility of mining practices (Archives Générales du Royaume de Belgique, 1954).

Studies have examined the relationship between diamond extraction and conflict zones (Le Billon, 2008; Orogun, 2003). The definition of illicit activity is conceptually problematic in historical contexts in which the status of ownership is challenged. Thus, the sources used in the study of diamond exploitation need to be historically situated. The Sibeka archives, produced by their managers, document Bécéka and Forminière's mining activity. Documents show how reactions to industrialized mineral exploitation emerged in the Congo, then the world's largest producer of industrial diamonds. The points of view in the Sibeka archives reflect primarily the firms' management. Correspondence includes information about Congolese managers and political leaders both before and after Congo obtained independence on 30 June 1960. The clergy, composed of Europeans and of Congolese was a social actor in South Kasai, and documents include exchanges between priests and local managers of international firms. Based on the available archival material, our research assesses the consequences of the exploitation of minerals.

The paper engages with the 'resource curse' debate by examining the link between natural resources, violence, and extractive institutions. We frame diamonds as 'lootable resources', particularly vulnerable to plunder and conflict, and analyze the role of both formal and informal institutions in shaping their exploitation and governance. Drawing on the theories of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, the research fills gaps in the historical literature by conducting an empirical analysis of multinational diamond operations during the Congo's turbulent path to independence. It focuses on the sequence of events shaping the interactions and negotiations between corporations, government institutions, and the church. We find that Forminière and Bécéka exploited the Congo's extractive institutions. Diamond mining in South Kasai, with its high value and portability, weakened legal and institutional structures, stimulating violence and state fragility. We introduce the concept of a 'cycle of repression' to illustrate how multinational management maintained control through corruption, local exploitation, and violent measures.

By documenting how multinationals shaped and benefited from weak and extractive institutions during the Congo's transition to independence, the paper offers a historical context for present-day challenges in mineral policy and governance. The analysis demonstrates that current regulatory failures - such as the inability to effectively formalize artisanal and small-scale mining and the persistence of smuggling networks and conflict - are not new phenomena, but rather rooted in longstanding patterns of institutional exploitation and exclusion. The analysis contributes to contemporary debates on mineral governance and illicit mining by illustrating the long-term institutional legacies that continue to shape diamond extraction and trade in the DRC. In particular, the extractive institutional practices - formally illegal but sustained after independence - established by multinational companies in collaboration with the colonial state and the church - mirror contemporary challenges in regulating artisanal and small-scale mining and reducing illicit mineral trade. The legacy of legal pluralism, where practices and norms clashed with colonial laws, laid the basis for today's fragmented and weak governance in the Congolese mining industry. Presently, MIBA is considering restarting its activities on a broader, more industrial scale again in South Kasai. As part of this process, experts from Botswana, a country that has managed its diamond exploitation remarkably well and is currently one of the most stable democracies in Africa, have recently visited MIBA to offer technical support to the reorganization of diamond extraction in the Congo, without any economic participation expected for the time being (Botswana Experts, 2025). We return to this

discussion at the end of the paper, where historical insights speak to present questions about how extractive models from the colonial period continue to structure contemporary extractive institutions, and how historical analysis can inform initiatives to create more inclusive and effective governance regimes for the mining industry.

The next sections of the paper, firstly, outline the literature on the resource curse, institutions and conflicts; secondly, outline evidence of the root causes of the present-day regime based on the history of the transition between colonial and postcolonial regimes in South Kasai; thirdly, examine the political responses in the province and at the national level of the Republic of the Congo; and fourthly, examine the international repercussions of the crisis and what we can learn about the present state of the industry from historical evidence.

## 2. Theoretical framework and contextualizing the Congo in the resource curse, institutions and conflict literature

Diamonds, often found near the surface, are considered 'lootable' due to their accessibility, ease of extraction, and small size, making them especially prone to smuggling and corruption (Adesola, 2015). Their high value and unique characteristics could worsen institutional fragility and foster corruption. Research shows a strong link between the availability of alluvial diamonds and the outbreak of civil wars. Easily accessible secondary deposits, found in rivers or on the surface, are particularly associated with increased conflict in ethnically divided societies (Lujala et al., 2005). In the DRC, such resources have prolonged wars by sustaining rebel activity (Bredesen, 2009). While lootable commodities like diamonds may not directly cause conflict, they often intensify and extend it by financing armed groups (Ross, 2004). Diamonds did not cause the wars in the DRC in the 1990s, but they financed rebel movements, prolonging and intensifying the conflicts (Smillie, 2010).

Within the resource curse debate, it is widely recognized that African countries with an abundance of natural resources, including in the DRC, have been a catalyst for conflict, directly or indirectly. Resource wealth, particularly from oil and minerals, has often generated substantial but volatile revenues that destabilize governments, weaken institutions, and foster corruption and rent-seeking (Karl, 1997; Andrade and Morales, 2007). While debates about causality persist, evidence suggests that resource wealth often worsens ongoing challenges, intensifying conflict and undermining political and economic stability. While the former French Congo experienced little violent conflict before the 1990s, its resource wealth - especially oil - has fueled unrest in fragile political systems but not in more stable ones (Englebert and James, 2002). Resource abundance also tends to heighten corruption where institutions are weak, a pattern evident in how international demand for coltan has driven violence and graft in eastern Congo (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010; Lalji, 2007). More broadly, the country's instability is shown to be closely tied to its natural resources, colonial legacies, and persistent governance failures (Nichols, 2018). However, not all African experiences confirm the resource curse. Evidence from Zambia shows that natural resources can generate short-term growth under different political regimes and sustain long-term growth in democracies (Nondo et al., 2025). These results suggest that the outcomes of resource extraction depend on institutional strength, resource type, geopolitical conditions, and development level - factors that can turn a potential curse into a blessing (Chung and Jin, 2025).

We situate the analysis within broader debates on resource governance - the formal and informal rules and actors shaping access to natural resources. In contexts of weak state authority, governance functions are often performed through negotiated arrangements among state agents, private firms, and local actors. Efforts to formalize artisanal and small-scale mining in West Africa have proven highly challenging, and in the DRC, top-down approaches have failed to address underlying problems of conflict, informality, poverty, illegality, and weak state control (Maconachie and Hilson, 2011). Such conditions are typical of
resource-dependent economies structured around mineral exports and organized through 'enclave'-style production systems (Ferguson, 2005). These problems, we argue, were no less acute in the historical context examined here.

The conflicts and violence in the Congo are closely linked to institutional changes. According to Acemoglu and Robinson, the Congo's institutions exemplify 'extractive institutions', characterized by elite concentration of power, rent-seeking, inadequate property rights, and limited economic growth, leading to inequality and exploitation. Conversely, 'inclusive institutions' distribute political power broadly; effectively enforce property rights; and promote investment in education, technology, and innovation; encouraging democracy and sustained development. The Congo is a prime example of the detrimental effects of extractive institutions, tracing its historical trajectory back to the fifteenth century (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Due to its heavy reliance on extractive industries, the Congo exemplifies the resource curse and can be considered one of its earliest examples. Early European travelers from Portugal and the Netherlands in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries already noted the severe poverty among Congolese communities, emphasizing their limited technological development. Acemoglu and Robinson understand this persistent poverty and reluctance to adopt new technologies stemming directly from the Congo's extractive economic institutions. Wealth accumulation among elites depended largely on slave plantations and heavy taxation, preventing the broader population from accumulating resources, investing in innovation, or improving productivity. Instead of promoting public welfare, securing property rights, or ensuring basic safety, the Congo's rulers themselves became the primary threat to both property and human rights. These extractive patterns persisted across centuries, continuing through both colonial and postcolonial periods. Belgian colonial rule, particularly under King Leopold II, intensified these exploitative practices by institutionalizing insecurity regarding human and property rights. After independence in 1960, these economic structures and their corresponding political systems were largely maintained by Congolese elites, notably under Joseph-Désiré Mobutu's regime (1965–1997). Mobutu created and expanded institutions primarily designed to enrich himself and a select elite, while systematically impoverishing the wider population. European colonialism had created the Congolese state by merging diverse precolonial states and groups into a single polity, over which the central government in Kinshasa exerted little control (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).

Considering the above, our analysis is based on literature on institutional legacies, which emphasizes how governance structures and regulatory practices formed during colonial rule tend to persist through path-dependent processes, even as political regimes change (North, 1991). The continuities help explain the resilience of extractive institutions in postcolonial settings, where new actors inherited and adapted colonial-period models of repression, exclusion, and legal fragmentation. Furthermore, the analysis draws on institutional and resource curse theories to examine how multinational diamond mining companies exploited Congo's weak and extractive institutions during its transition to independence. While Acemoglu and Robinson's framework distinguishes broadly between extractive and inclusive institutions, it often oversimplifies the complexities of specific regions, resources, historical events, and the participation of key actors. To address this gap, we use unique company archives to examine how extractive institutions developed through interactions between the Congolese government, multinational corporations, and the church. Focusing on South Kasaï, we trace the sequence of events and how these actors collectively exploited artisanal miners and reinforced institutional weaknesses to sustain extractive systems. We hypothesize that looting and illicit diamond mining arose as reactions to exploitation and exclusion, motivating the multinationals to implement increasingly repressive and violent measures (Press, 2021). Our analysis centers on three key aspects: first, how multinationals managed to export diamonds with minimal benefit to the Congolese population; second, how their exploitative practices fueled

illicit trafficking and repression; and third, how extractive, but also weak, state institutions, particularly after independence, intensified these tendencies. We argue that the operations of Forminière and Bécéka illustrate severe exploitation of natural resources and weak state institutions, supported by the church. These companies used weak governance to preserve pre-independence practices while enforcing stricter measures to suppress illicit diamond collection and trafficking.

### 3. Surveillance in the diamond mining regions during the late colonial period

Throughout its activity in the region of Bakwanga, Forminière closely watched the relations between its personnel, and between the firms and local populations. The management participated in this task, as did members of the clergy, most of them Belgians. In a letter dated 12 September 1957, Catholic bishop Jean Jadot wrote to Forminière's Belgian management that

> I think we need to be only the more vigilant that the Bakwa Kalondji – the heart of the Baluba people – are becoming quite restless (clandestine exploitations, para-Christian religious cults; the members of one of them, ‘St Michel’ have just been publicly excommunicated by Mgr. Kettel) and that the layoffs taking place in the Katanga risk bringing some of them back to the villages, where they will not be the easiest people to handle (Sibeka 523, 1957a).

A few months later Jadot wrote to the headquarters that the situation had improved in Léopoldville, where the organization of the communal elections in which the Congolese people voted for the first time retained everyone's attention. But the South Kasaï situation kept worrying the priest, who noted the influence of local Protestant- and Catholic-inspired cults favoring clandestine mining. The local authority was trying to get everyone into the fold of the Catholic Church to better control the local populations (Sibeka 523, 1957b). In September 1958, Jadot pointed to drinking habits in South Kasaï. Due to the remote location, boredom and lack of shops, workers spent their pay on drinks. The priest observed that where the locals could inhabit proper houses and furnish them, alcoholism receded. The actions of the mining guards and the territorial police, who used spies, created frictions. Tensions mounted between the Europeans and the Congolese because of the repression of diamond theft. Jadot noted that the distribution of plots of land, including to Congolese people resettling from various mining exploitations, generated resentment. The situation in 1958 contained enough elements to become explosive (Sibeka 523, 1958a).

As for the situation at the Bakwanga mines, Jadot continued his observations on the service of the mining guards, arguing that they should marry within their customary milieu and should have children, as this would promote stability. Jadot also advised the firm to offer better housing to the Force Publique soldiers posted in the region, to reduce status differences with the mining guards (who were not armed with guns at that time). Jadot discussed the status of Forminière's concession, Bakwanga's Zone A, which was expanding, while the firm urgently needed to explain to the local population that the concession's extension would not result in expropriation from their villages (Sibeka 523, 1958b).

Jadot's correspondence is informative, but needs to be read between the lines. Jadot's reporting shows mounting tensions between population groups in South Kasaï, some of whom had been relocated by the Belgian administration and felt disregarded, which led to sporadic outbursts of violence. The local populations had started to contest colonial control over the mining concessions, which were subject to ongoing prospecting. The concession system meant that the extraction rights were granted through formal agreements controlled by the colonial authority. Unlike the 'finders keepers' principle seen in other historical contexts, such as the California gold rush (Sæther, 2024), Congolese diamond exploitation centralized control through the colonial authority. While formalized, it was deeply exploitative and excluded the broader
population, a situation reproduced by the postcolonial rulers including Mobutu. The De Beers cartel tried to monitor networks of clandestine diamond sales internationally, surveilling dealers who had no link with the cartel. The firm was not able to take concrete measures to negotiate with the dealers at that time (Sibeka 526, 1958a).

## 4. Control and repression during the last months of the colonial period

In October 1959, Eugène Wasilewski, chief engineer for Forminière in Bakwanga (present-day Mbuji-Mayi), sent a note to the head manager, Gérard Cravatte, in Belgium about a jewelry diamond theft that had taken place in Tshikapa. The mining court (Parquet minier) was on the case. Other examples included the head of the mining sector being accused of stone theft, and issues related to the circulation of stones on the black market (Sibeka 526, 1959c). These incidents were enough to raise the alarm in Bakwanga. Less than a month later, Wasilewski sent a report to Cravatte about the security at the mining grounds. In 1947, Forminière had purchased a small airplane to monitor the expanse of its concessions. The pilot and copilot scrutinized the fields in search of clandestine mining. Traces of exploitations were photographed as evidence (see Pictures 1–4). Reports include information about indigenous people running away and hiding when they heard the airplane. The firm pursued similar operations during decolonization (Sibeka 1423, 1960).

During the fall of 1959, aerial surveillance showed three clandestine exploitations on riverbanks near Bakwanga. One of the pilots photographed these artisanal mines. The firm sent guards to chase away the diggers and seal the holes. What this report did not disclose was the potential for the discovery of illicit mines to assist the firm's own prospecting efforts (Sibeka 526, 1959). Another report, dated 1958, outlined these methods in more detail. The Forminière staff had found a clandestine mining site at the juncture of the Bushimae and Kamisangi rivers, on the left bank, where the average diamond content was nineteen carats per cubic meter – mostly boart (industrial quality stones). The man who operated this artisanal mine was a ferryman who was found in possession of thirty-three carats of stones at his home. The Forminière management commented that the mining in this zone could be undertaken at once, but that this required providing housing for the workers and establishing a regular ferry line across the Bushimae river. The firm decided to shelve such plans for the time being, intending to exploit this new part of the terrain, and for the moment to monitor the area to make sure that artisanal mining ceased (Sibeka 526, 1958b). This confirms that Forminière used surveillance of clandestine mining in order to identify new prospecting zones. Using illicit mining as a method of prospecting shows that the company operated far beyond its proper limits as a firm. By using clandestine diamond extraction for its own purposes, the firm violated both its geographical and ethical limits. Geographically, it exploited the labor of local people to identify potential new concessions and expand its mining operations. Ethically, it took advantage of local Congolese labour by profiting from their efforts without compensation, while at the same time adopting repressive methods against unauthorized diamond collection. In line with Ace moglu and Robinson's notion of extractive institutions, the company's actions reinforced a system in which economic gains were channeled to external or elite actors, while local communities were excluded from property rights, profit sharing, and participation in decision-making (Geenen, 2012).

Simultaneously, Forminière's management used its mining guards to monitor what they called local political propaganda. In another report, Wasilewski noted that the second peloton of guards 'went for a walk to Bwa Kalongi, where the MNC leads intense propaganda' (Sibeka 526, 1959d), rebel activity thus being already in place before the end of the colony, which corroborates the length of conflicts highlighted, for instance, by Bredesen (Autesserre, 2010; Bredesen, 2009). The Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) split in two factions: one led by Patrice Emery Lumumba, who was assassinated on 17 January 1961, and the

other by Albert Kalondji, who became emperor of the secessionist South Kasaï in 1961.

A proposal was subsequently made for the organization of a voluntary corps in Bakwanga (Sibeka 526, 1959d), led by three Belgians. The firm planned to have a group of 150 men under their command, of which 132 were already at work, half of them Congolese, the other half Europeans. So far, mining guards had not been heavily weaponized, but the new report showed an order for 15 Mauser guns, 150 bayonets and carriers, 56 weapons kits, and additional material, with ammunition stocks already in place (Sibeka 526, 1959d). Forminière sought to acquire 14 short-distance radio posts, to cover 10 km, and 3 longer-distance posts, to cover 40 km. In addition, Forminière aimed to establish a safe room near the central installations within the mining zones, in which a reserve of two dozen guns and ammunition would be kept. There was already a safe room on the firm's grounds, but, Wasilewski noted, it was too far away (Sibeka 526, 1959d).

Control measures intensified in Bakwanga. At the end of 1959, the firm fenced its concession areas, and began controlling all entries and exits from 1 January 1960. The management tasked the gendarmes (the colonial armed police forces) with 'combing' (ratissages) the Bushimae and Katoka valleys. The word denotes a coercive approach. Any discovery of clandestine mining ought to be registered with a special local court (the Parquet minier) (Sibeka 526, 1959e). The Forminière headquarters monitored the security operations and decisions that entailed costs. Wasilewski received the authorization to buy two speedboats to monitor the river areas. The firm had asked the King's representative (Procureur du Roi) in Luluabourg (present-day Kananga) to extend the authority of the firm's security agents to include repressive powers, and to extend their jurisdiction to the entire locality of Bakwanga and Tshikapa – beyond the mining areas as well. As far as documentation shows, it seems that this was approved by the King's representative. Another decision from the Belgian headquarters was to hire Louis Piron and send him to Bakwanga in 1961, as an employee responsible for security supervision. Piron was tasked with planning security for the mining site. The timing of the decision suggests that Forminière and Bécéka were investing to retain control in the postcolonial period. In his report, Wasilewski noted that action should be taken to claim (dénoncer) the unexploited mining areas in Zone A of Bakwanga (Sibeka 526, 1959e). Further reports specified that surveillance ought to be based on prevention, and that the judiciary system should be mobilized to prevent trafficking. The reports included concerns about the refugees' situation, which did indeed contribute to the outbreak of riots between the Baluba and the Lulua (Sibeka 526, 1959a). In December 1959, Wasilewski wrote to General Director Gérard Cravatte to ask for a reinforcement of twelve new mining guards (Sibeka 526, 1959b). Instability and violence as pointed out in the works of Lalji, and Nichols, for instance, were already well under way before the colonization reached a formal end.

## 5. Change of mining culture on the eve of decolonization

The Sibeka files contain letters that show that Congolese politicians encouraged the Congolese workers to keep their spirits high. The views were fragmented along political, tribal, and village lines-divisions that the colonizers exploited to assert their authority, thereby damaging relations in the long run (Sibeka 526). Piron reported that in the last months before independence, Congolese leaders declared that diamonds were the inhabitants' property. Because the minerals were on their lands, the Congolese would be free to exploit them as they wished after independence, and all would live in abundance (Sibeka 1424, 1961a). Piron noted the bitterness of the local population toward the opulence in which the Forminière employees lived. As Inge Schneid, the wife of security service manager Charles Engels, wrote in her memoirs, three or four staff members often served each European household, and the employees enjoyed access to a club with a bar, tennis courts and a swimming pool, which created resentment among the Congolese people (Schneid, 2019).
Mining law did not change after independence; the mineral resources initially remained the same, but were nationalized in the mid-1960s. Piron did not cite any sources for his claim on the local chiefs' views about the free mining of diamonds. He noticed that clandestine mining increased after independence, and that soon the international firms were, in his own words, 'powerless' (*impuissants*) (Henriet, 2021). Piron analyzed this situation as a change in ownership culture: 'It is indeed impossible to repress a special infraction that in itself does not cause any direct prejudice or harm to private persons. It is in this case a national good that is wasted by a large part of the population that finds an advantage and immediate profit to it.' (*Sibeka 1424, 1961b*) The stones mined so far by a large international operation, and sold under the oversight of the De Beers cartel, now seemed free for all to find and sell. From then on, the reports to the management of the diamond firms became a source, although an indirect one, on the rapid rise of an informal economy in South Kasaï, based on the trade in raw diamonds. Informal practices still prevail today, which is a reason why the MIBA activity has dwindled. To reactivate the MIBA activity would demand a re-mechanization of the practices, and a formalization of labor relations, for which MIBA is currently consulting with colleagues from the Botswana diamond industry. Debswana, the main diamond mining firm in Botswana, is a state-owned firm in a partnership with De Beers. The high mechanization of diamond mining in Botswana has yielded economic profit and greater safety for the workers, but also resulted in fewer jobs (*Botswana Experts, 2025*). As discussed by Maconachie and Hilson, current attempts at regulation present a dilemma between the small revenues earned by the many involved in artisanal mining – often at huge risk – and the well-paid but scarce jobs created through mechanization, as seen in Botswana. The results in that country have recently led to technical assistance being offered from Botswana to the DRC (*Maconachie and Hilson, 2011*).

On the eve of decolonization in South Kasaï, some of the diamonds extracted in the region were stolen from the company's premises; some were found in mine rejects - which the firm considered theft; and some diamonds were artisanally mined by Congolese people. Throughout his time in Bakwanga, Piron reported on the 'waste' of the resource and the loss of control over it. Among those who bought diamonds outside the cartel's control, Forminière reported on Tunisian UN soldiers who belonged to the contingents sent to pacify the region - the ongoing conflict thus fueling illegal mining, as discussed by Michael L. Ross (2004).

Exchanges in kind became common. Reports insist that the soldiers from Lumumba's MNC did not engage in looting, but that the UN soldiers and officers did. In 1961, Senegalese merchants entered the local diamond trade. The influx of Baluba refugees added a humanitarian dimension to the changes happening in South Kasaï. Diamond trafficking reached sizable proportions in Léopoldville (present-day Kinshasa) and across the river in the former French colony of Congo in Brazzaville. The management of Forminière did not dare undertake massive repression (*Sibeka 1424, 1961b*).

Forminière's production was briefly halted due to insecurity during the early independence months (*Sibeka 1424, 1962j*). Forminière's increased reliance on mercenaries took place in this context, aggravated by intertribal violence in the region. Piron's task was to keep *business as usual* in surveilling the diamond mining and early phases of treatment. Although the archives show no evidence of UN soldiers being prosecuted for trafficking, the deployment of UN troops reflects early external efforts to address the Congo's issues. Efforts to break the cycle of violence in the Congo have frequently proved ineffective, a pattern that persists until the present day (*Kamoga and Kisekka, 2024*).

Forminière tried a variety of methods to repress illicit diamond mining during the months following independence. On 15 September 1961, Evariste Kasanda Tshipebele, head commissary of the newly created mining police (*Commissaire Principal de la Police Minière*), wrote to the Minister of the Interior about clandestine mining that, in his view, was ruining the South Kasaï economy. Tshipebele reminded the Minister

that according to the legal status of land in this post-independence period, the surface belonged to its inhabitants, but not the underground, which could only be exploited upon authorization by the South Kasaï government. Mining, Tshipebele added, was subject to specific regulations that continued from its colonial-era framework. He asked the Minister to give the population a last official warning that artisanal mining was illegal. Any diamonds held by inhabitants of South Kasaï had to be handed over to the designated authorities within two months (*Sibeka 1424, 1961c*).

South Kasaï unilaterally declared secession from the Republic on 9 August 1960. Albert Kalondji, who was on good terms with Forminière, proclaimed himself emperor of South Kasaï, Mulopwe, in the spring 1961. Kalondji had opposed Lumumba, who appeared more threatening to the international firms due to his socialist leanings. Kalondji was closely associated with foreign mining interests, mirroring colonial-era practices. But Kalondji's reign was short, as the central government in Kinshasa arrested him on 30 December 1961. Ferdinand Kazadi replaced him at the helm of South Kasaï, followed by a brief return of Kalondji, until the province was reintegrated into the Republic on 5 October 1962 (*De Witte, 2017*).

In October 1961, Piron sent a report to headquarters in which the loss of authority over the province was clearly perceptible. Piron complained that he needed at least one hundred men and asked for support to recruit the remainder. What followed was not simply a justification for those hires. Piron wrote about constant illegal incursions into the mining zones and the thefts of stones and various materials on-site. In September 1961, a group of five Congolese men was arrested for finding diamonds in the on-site tailings. This observation indicates that the recovery of the smallest discarded stones from the tailings was considered illegal by Forminière, and thus regarded as theft. Piron noted other thefts, including some involving high-quality stones, and the growing suspicions that the firm harbored toward its employees. Piron also wrote about an increase in thefts in the European and Indigenous quarters of the mining city, where housing had remained racially segregated since the colonial period. There were thefts of cars, car parts, and construction materials. Piron reinforced surveillance, establishing a permanent guard to inspect all outgoing vehicles, but the limitations of his services were evident (*Sibeka 1424, 1961d*). In the absence of effective state control, the transition to independence saw the rise of informal practices including looting, artisanal mining, and unregulated resource extraction (*Sibeka 1424, 1962b*), revealing the detrimental effects of extraction in the context of a state so weak that it was subject to secession (*Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012*).

Forminière hired mercenaries to regain control of the security in Bakwanga (*Sibeka 1424, 1961e*). In September 1961, Sibeka hired another Belgian, Frantz Loriaux, to assist with the same tasks during decolonization (*Sibeka 1424, 1962k*). According to Piron, the guards did not wish to work with the police and the military, but kept to themselves and worked internally in Congolese-only teams, which he found effective. Piron underlined the value of certain officers, suggesting an internship in Belgium for one of them (*Sibeka 1424, 1961f*). On 9 August 1961, the Ministry of the Interior of the secessionist Kasaï province issued Decision number 44/27 to create the mining police under the orders of the General Inspector of Mines, Simon Mbayabo, previously employed at the Bank of Belgian Congo in Léopoldville (*Sibekaa 1424*). Piron created a course for the new unit, and was tasked with completing 'the network of informants and informers about diamond-related issues for the Federated State of South-Kasaï' (*Sibekab 1424*). Sibeka provided these agents with housing, furniture and cars, showing the close ties between the secessionist province and the multinational (*Sibekac 1424*). The mining police added a man to guard the main door of the mining site and another at the sorting plant, and took charge of inspections at Bakwanga airport, where a woman was hired to search female passengers (*Sibekad 1424*). In principle, according to Piron, Sibeka personnel members were not subjected to searches at the airport, but random controls had started. This provoked discontent among former airport
agents, some of whom had previously received gifts in exchange for refraining from conducting searches. From 1 June to 31 August 1961, the guards and mining police seized 522 diamonds; between 1 September and 10 October 1961, they seized 454 diamonds and arrested 168 persons in connection with these cases (Sibekae 1424). During the following months, Sibeka conducted enquiries into corruption within its services and dismissed employees on the grounds that they had stayed on site after hours to steal or had helped family members enter the mining site to steal or engage in artisanal mining work (Sibeka 1424, 1962l).

## 6. Repression of broader trafficking networks and the creation of African diamond buying offices

In 1962 Sibeka inquired about local diamond sales, in hopes of mapping out trafficking networks and recovering stolen diamonds. Other operators founded diamond purchasing offices, such as the Diamond Distribution, which controlled a group of small mines and had offices in Brazzaville, Abidjan and Monrovia. Artisanal miners in South Kasaï sold their production to intermediaries from Mali, Guinea, Nigeria, and Senegal. The Republic of the Congo, in July 1961, made a first attempt to prohibit non-nationals from trading diamonds on its territory. Many African dealers then resettled in Brazzaville, Monrovia, and Abidjan. In Brazzaville Sibeka identified seven (Sibeka 1424, 1962m) trading offices open on Sundays, including Diamond Distribution, Diaz-mex, and Afrodiam. The stones they sold were considered to be uneven in quality, the best of which were sold in Monrovia. The combined business volume of these offices was estimated at around 17,000 carats per month, and they operated on a 'cash and no questions asked' basis (Sibeka 1424, 1962n), anonymously. Other diamond offices in Bangui collectively traded between 7,000 and 8,000 carats per month, mostly of industrial quality. UN civil and military agents were believed to have participated in trafficking and to have brought stones back to their home countries (Parker and Vadheim, 2017). At that point, Sibeka identified intermediaries among the regular diamond traffickers, including a former pilot of the Belgian national airline who had already been convicted of trafficking and was still maintaining contact with Bakwanga as a private pilot, and a former agent of the firm SEDEC, who had traveled to Belgium with 'a beer bottle filled with diamonds', estimated at 80,000 Belgian francs. An Indian merchant based in Léopoldville's suburb of Limete was also suspected of involvement in trafficking (Sibeka 1424, 1962o).

Frantz Loriaux's intervention in the organization of the mining police created tensions with the national government in Léopoldville, under which secessionist South Kasaï held the complex status of a semi-autonomous province. After a few months, Loriaux faced a mutiny by the Bakwanga police, who threw him in jail for a short time. The precarious status of South Kasaï aggravated instability. Hired by Sibeka, Loriaux contributed to the formation of the South Kasaï police in direct support of the local secessionist regime (Sibeka 1424, 1962p).

Facing the chaotic situation, the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo held meetings in Bakwanga on 5-6 February with Piron, several advisors to the Mine and Energy Department in Léopoldville, and Mapwata, Head of the Service of Mines in Léopoldville. Piron described the situation, including the trafficking by Belgians. Mapwata intervened, stating that the meeting was not only about diamonds, noting that gold trafficking was also widespread. The group determined that corruption among former mining police members created difficulties, and agreed on measures to regain control of the commodities trade. A challenge was to recruit officers drawn from the same groups as the local populations under their supervision. The plan was to unify the zones of Tshikapa and Luebo and to place both under the control of Sibeka's Zone A; to expel all 'suspected foreigners'; to legalize clandestine diamond mining; and to create a legally-endorsed diamond sales office in Tshikapa. The second meeting approved a state credit of four million Congolese francs to finance the operations. Piron was entrusted with the unofficial mission

of urging the central government to organize broader repression of diamond trafficking, while the South Kasaï province was reintegrated into the Republic of the Congo (Sibeka 1424, 1962a).

Complicating international diamond tracking, customs required only a declaration upon the entry and exit of rough diamonds into and out of the Belgian territory. Regular operations with the London-based Diamond Trading Company (DTC) - the intermediary acting on behalf of the De Beers cartel - were regulated by a licensing agreement pursuant to the Ministerial Decree (Arrêté Ministériel) of 12 October 1955. Unexported quantities were calculated based on the difference between the stocks and the quantities of cut stones, but, according to the Belgian authorities, those figures were only approximate. The goal of such measures, or lack thereof, was explicitly to favor the Belgian diamond industry. As a result, black market repression was nearly nonexistent, according to the Sibeka management (Sibeka 1424, 1961g).

At this point, Piron admitted that stone trafficking had become widespread. 'Everyone owns diamonds', wrote Piron to headquarters; 'To one of them, who is particularly devoted to me, I asked the question of whether he too had mined – with a broad smile he answered me: yes, since everyone does it and that our Ministers are the first ones [to do so].'(Sibeka 1424, 1962b).

Piron returned to the drawing board for another reorganization of the security services, working in closer cooperation with Léopoldville now that the South Kasaï secession was over (Sibeka 1424, 1962b). Discussions on the creation of a national diamond purchasing office took place between the Congolese government and the firms (Sibeka 1424, 1962c). This would in all likelihood influence the structure of the De Beers cartel, which officially operated exclusively with the DTC. De Beers had a history of purchasing stones on international markets and stockpiling them to stabilize prices, but this new initiative was a concerted, and still secret, plan between Léopoldville and Sibeka, aimed at benefiting the state by creating employment, attracting foreign currency, and exploiting mineral resources - preferably the ones offering the highest value per smallest volume - which would, in turn, attract other industries and commercial activity to the country. This plan resembles several measures taken in Botswana over the past decades, particularly efforts to reshore jobs and generate revenue by expanding domestic value chains. However, at the time, the plans for the Congo failed to turn the resource curse into a blessing, as discussed by van der Ploeg (van der Ploeg, 2010). The global clandestine diamond trade was estimated at an annual value of 25 million GBP, of which the Congo accounted for a large share. Eastern European countries and Russia were especially keen to acquire *boart* on the clandestine market to supply their heavy industries (Sibeka 1424, 1962d). The Republic of the Congo's plan would not be so easily realized. Concrete proposals included measures to stop the flow of diamonds leaking through Katanga and N'Dola in Zambia on their way to Brazzaville, Bangui, Pointe-Noire, Douala, and Monrovia. The creation of an official trading bureau in the Republic of the Congo was expected to turn that situation around, or so it was hoped (Sibeka 1424, 1962e).

Piron sent a report dated 10 June 1962 to Edmond Rudahindwa, the Congolese Minister of Mines and Energy, writing that artisanal miners were still present but in smaller and fewer groups. Sibeka had reinforced its control by partly renewing its staff. Rumors of beer bottles filled with diamonds being trafficked were still circulating, but the national authorities now escorted international merchants out of the country. Piron estimated that clandestine artisanal mining had been reduced by some 80% over the last two months. His suggestion was to create a circulation permit for visitors in South Kasaï (Sibeka 1424, 1962f). This echoed earlier colonial repressive measures restricting movement in the Congo.

The central government of the Republic of the Congo was divided over which measures to adopt. In July 1962, Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula made the previously secret project public when he submitted a bill to Parliament to establish a national diamond trading office, intended to create legal channels between the Republic and international trade. Adoula's draft law received four votes, while the Minister of
Mines and Energy, Rudahindwa, gathered fifty-four votes against it. The government then planned to submit a new bill to parliament (Sibeka 1424, 1962g).

## 7. Return of clandestine mining and trade after the fall of Kalondji

In August, clandestine mining was back in full swing in Bakwanga, and was judged to be so extensive that it posed dangers to the workers in Tshimanga, Kamisondji, and Katoka. At the governmental level, the gendarmerie (armed forces with police authority) was in conflict with several ministers over the expulsion of the so-called Senegalese merchants, who were reputed to be involved in trafficking. In the meantime, the central government had released Kalondji, who went into exile first in Belgium and later in Spain. Piron expressed, on behalf of the firm, its wish for the return of the emperor, who seemed, in his view, the last hope for a return to order (Sibeka 1424, 1962h).

This did not happen, and after the political fall of 1962, South Kasaï remained within the Republic of the Congo. Most Sibeka personnel remained in place, and the same patterns persisted, alternating between periods of restored order and negotiations with the central government, which failed to establish an official diamond sales office. The colonial decree of 20 April 1928, which had never been abolished, was invoked to condemn artisanal mining, but the latter had by then become endemic and an integral part of the province's culture, persisting to the present day (Sibeka 680, 1962). In December 1962, Piron wrote to headquarters that he no longer wished to assume the moral responsibility for the diamond mining security service, which was, in his own words, 'sinking' (Sibeka 1424, 1962i). Piron then received additional funding, and promised another reorganization of the mining security services – such were the dynamics between Bakwanga and headquarters (Sibeka 1424, 1963a).

In early spring 1963, Piron estimated that the personnel on duty at the airport of Luluabourg (present-day Kananga) were completely corrupt. Proper controls were no longer performed at this airport. Stones could be bought at the Bakwanga market on Sunday mornings, where Senegalese merchants bought and exported them. The mining police, the State security, and the South Kasaï gendarmerie were all corrupt, wrote Piron, who believed that urgent measures were needed to avert a catastrophe. As discussed below, his own reports showed internal contradictions, revealing a culture not only of repression but also of privilege (Sibeka 1424, 1963b).

The reports offer a glimpse into the organization of artisanal miners. Although they are mediated (Mertens and Pezzarone, 2024), they offer historical information that is otherwise difficult to obtain. In the case of clandestine mining in Zone A, information came from local informants. The clandestine miners did not work in a regular or continuous manner. Some arrived in the morning, others in the afternoon, whenever it was convenient for them, and often for some days in a row, until they judged that they had found enough stones. They sold the stones, used their earnings, and then resumed artisanal mining. At that point in the region's history, consumer-goods prices had risen sharply, a common feature of enclave mining regions. One of the reports noted that a bottle of beer cost 300 Congolese francs, a pack of Belga cigarettes 90 francs, and a piece of wax fabric between 2,500 and 3,000 francs. The artisanal miners were expected to hand over a share of their stones to their customary chief. Local chiefs were known to hold stocks of stones, as they did not trust the value of money, and there were again rumors of beer bottles filled with stones (Sibeka 1424, 1963c). The rampant inflation in the region adds a perspective often absent from the archives of the large mining firms, namely that families were pressured into engaging in artisanal mining as a complementary source of income during periods of economic hardship (Stoler, 2016).

Piron, who remained with Sibeka throughout the regime changes, continued to press for a more effective mining police force and for travelers' searches at the airport. One of Piron's tasks was to instruct the mining police on how to perform searches. Two female employees were

now assigned to conduct body searches of female passengers. Piron's directives were precise, but showed the limits of enforcement and even an ongoing tolerance for fraud among certain categories of travelers. Single stones, according to Piron, did not matter as much as large caches of diamonds. While Piron aimed to search international merchants 'without distinction of race or nationality' (Sibeka 1424, 1963d), he issued the following orders to the mining police:

> Those searches should not turn into vexations toward the travelers. They are done **solely** with the purpose of halting diamond trafficking. Members of the Government, representatives, and high-placed personalities cannot be searched. They enjoy the consideration of all and cannot be placed in the category of suspect persons. The same goes for persons of good standing, examples: priests, nuns, medical doctors, magistrates, leadership personnel of MIBA, and so on. For persons other than suspected or foreign merchants, it is advised to proceed by sampling: the suitcase of one, the hand luggage of another. (...) Every now and then a quick and superficial body search. The utmost discretion is advised, and one should never forget the essential rules of politeness. (...) About body searches, that ought to be limited, the utmost discretion is required. (...) The body search, even superficial for a person of the female sex, can only be performed by a female guard, with no one else present. (Sibekaf 1424, 1963)

Despite Piron's goal of reestablishing control, documents from his service show that his methods created a sphere of immunity for certain national and international elites. Impunity for fraud committed by the leading classes was thus ensured – or even perpetuated – by the very system that Piron had established.

Cultural change in mining and the increasing exploitation of resources by local populations had a profound impact on the region's economy. Foreign merchants and cross-border trade made the region less of an enclave, but its economy was subjected to on-site inflation in consumer goods. Piron reported that in numerous villages, agricultural fields had been abandoned, apart from small vegetable patches next to the houses. Artisanal mining, initially a complementary activity that left time for other daily tasks, was rapidly becoming the locals' main occupation. Children were abandoning school. One of Piron's former informants – thus likely considered the most reliable – reported that even children in the region were selling stones. Piron reported a direct quote from this informant:

> I was in the village of Bakwa Nsumpi, and a child of 12–13 years old was selling stones to a Senegalese man. I was next to them. We were several people listening. He owned 15 stones of various sizes. After many discussions the Senegalese man took the stones and he paid 4,000 francs to the child, in four bills of 1,000 francs. This child said that he was saving up to buy a 20,000 francs bicycle. (Sibeka 1424, 1963e)

The consequences of the local economic changes extended deeply and enduringly into society, leading to school dropouts (Ranestad, 2017). Education could play a critical role in natural resource development (David and Wright, 1997). It could maximize the benefits of resource wealth and reduce negative impacts, while leaving school to collect diamonds – as in this context – has proven to be a negative consequence of resource abundance. Piron reported on a couple of transactions he had witnessed between local children or teenagers and Senegalese merchants. This was one of the few cases in which Piron was particularly careful to cite his informant, as though he sought to support his own observation with a local voice. He described the merchants using a small rudimentary scale consisting of two plates, thread, and a small weight, but he did not know whether they weighed the stones in grams or carats. There was no fixed price, and the quantity, size, and whiteness were all factors in the valuation, which was reached after lengthy discussions (Sibeka 1424, 1963f).

Tensions arose in Bakwanga over body searches at the mine exits and at the airport. Piron's reports showed that the orders up to that point had
exempted high-ranking persons from searches. However, a group of guards led by Officer Mapwata believed that the Sibeka managers and other high-ranking persons should be searched like everyone else. Piron explained to the personnel that there was a difference between suspects and persons of good standing, but this neocolonial distinction was no longer respected by everyone. On-site, this signaled that it was no longer possible to maintain the old colonial order (Sibeka 1524, 1963).

Yet, as far as the law was concerned, the authorities of the Republic and the company management adhered to the colonial rules. They cited the colonial charter as having the force of law (Sibeka 1425, 1964a). At the end of March, Sibeka, in agreement with the local South Kasaï authorities and the Republic's Ministry of Interior, invoked the mining decree of 20 April 1928 to implement repressive measures against diamond trafficking. Despite the surge in artisanal mining, such practices were still considered offenses by both the central government and Sibeka. Both underlined the continuity of regulations, in contrast to the near-complete *laissez-faire* practices in the local diamond mining and trade. One argument for the return to the older colonial order was the notion of rational exploitation. The region, argued the Sibeka leadership during its 1964 meeting with President Joseph Kasa-Vubu, had been the object of systematic prospecting and rational exploitation (*mise en valeur*) for the past half-century. According to this logic, the risks inherent in disorderly exploitation weighed heavily on the long-term viability of the mines as an economic resource (Sibeka 1425, 1964b).

In 1964, Rudahindwa, the Republic of the Congo's Minister of Mines and Energy, reaffirmed the relevance of the general mining law of 20 April 1928. The decree prohibited the unlawful exploitation of mining resources. The Republic's central government, in agreement with the mining multinationals, decided to retain the legal framework dating back to the colonial era. Some of these continuities persisted after Mobutu consolidated his regime during the second half of the 1960s (Sibeka 1425, 1964c). On 4 February 1964 in Luluabourg (present day Kananga), the Republic of the Congo, following Rudahindwa's initiative, voted a law allowing for the immediate and permanent expulsion of foreigners present in the mining territories without regular employment. The law cited three other texts: the *Loi Fondamentale* of the Congo, dated 19 May 1960; the previously cited 20 April 1928 decree on the repression of the theft of precious substances; and the *Arrêté Royal* of 22 April 1958, article 19, concerning immigration police. The new law stated that the clandestine trafficking of precious materials caused an annual loss of around 40 million dollars to the Republic's treasury. Sibeka's management and the secessionist province of South Kasaï had previously supported similar measures. Correspondence on this topic included discussions of the cultural differences among the trafficking merchants, and occasionally of their affiliation with the Muslim faith. The new law confirmed a nationalist turn in Congolese politics, supported by a variety of politicians, some of whom were political adversaries (Sibeka 1425, 1964d). From 1966 onward, Mobutu initiated a process of nationalization, through which the Republic of the Congo expropriated former colonial firms, including those in the diamond industry. Before that, in the spring of 1964, Mobutu decided to militarize diamond surveillance in South Kasaï indefinitely. While Sibeka's mining guards were not initially equipped with firearms during their daily routines, Piron changed this, and the Republic's headquarters established military surveillance over South Kasaï with the goal of repressing artisanal mining and trafficking, in an attempt to regain control over mineral extraction (Sibeka 1425, 1964e).

## 8. Conclusion

This article has addressed the resource curse debate by examining the historical relationship between natural resources, violence, and weak and extractive institutions. During the postwar era, the Congo was the world's largest producer of diamonds, most of its production consisting of industrial diamonds, whose extraction and trade were strictly controlled during the colonial period. Forminière and Bécéka sold their

production under the oversight of the De Beers cartel, and South Kasaï was called 'a state in the state'. The decree of 20 April 1928 prohibited illegal mining and the sale of diamonds outside the firms' concessions. The colonial regulations remained in place after independence, but local practices in diamond mining and trade changed. The Sibeka archives provide abundant information about this period in their history, mediated by the actors involved in producing the archive. South Kasaï seceded from the central state shortly after independence and was reintegrated two years later. When read against the backdrop of the region's history, these documents attest to the loss of control over diamond production. This research contributes to our understanding of the relations between diamond mining multinationals and the fragmentation of the Congolese state (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).

Colonial legislation persisted into the postcolonial period, continuing to shape resource governance through repressive methods. Business leaders from the colonial era maintained their influence by collaborating with the local authorities in an attempt to maintain their control over the resources. Under the pretence of establishing law and order, they suppressed illicit diamond trafficking. While benefiting from the exploitation of natural resources, the companies subjected the Congolese population to systemic exclusion and abuse, including forced relocation, and were involved in what we call a cycle of repression. Forminière further consolidated inequality by ensuring immunity from fraud for the ruling elite. Moreover, Forminière used illicit mining as a prospecting strategy, extending its operations far beyond its official boundaries. This approach not only exploited local labor to identify new concessions but also allowed the company to profit from their efforts without compensation, all while enforcing repressive measures against diamond collection.

We argue that the Congo's ongoing struggle to convert its mineral wealth into broader economic development is rooted in weak and extractive institutions, external pressures, and governance failures, aligning with theories on natural resources, institutions, and economic development, notably those of Acemoglu and Robinson. The exclusion, repression, and violence during the Congo's transition to independence exemplify the resource curse, suggesting that the presence of diamonds may have caused more harm than benefit to the Congolese population. European elites maintained power and continued to marginalize the local population, even after independence. Although a formal system was in place, it was deeply exploitative and abusive, often supported implicitly by the church, excluding most of the population from its benefits. This empirical analysis shows a sequence of events that deepens our understanding of mining exploitation in the Congo up to the present day. By showing the complex interactions between the government, the church, and multinational companies, it contributes to broader discussions on how resource abundance shapes institutional development in resource-rich countries. Furthermore, it addresses gaps in the resource curse debate and Acemoglu and Robinson's theory of extractive institutions by providing a clearer and more detailed account of historical developments in an important diamond region.

We find that during the transition to independence, parallel legal and practical systems emerged. A 'finders keepers' culture developed alongside the persistence of colonial laws, resulting in a form of legal pluralism in which colonial and customary systems clashed over the management of mining resources. This informal culture flourished amid weak institutions and poor governance, where attempts to control clandestine diamond collection and trade often ended up increasing corruption. This can be seen as an attempt to undermine the oppressive system. Thus, Forminière and Bécéka, founded during the colonial period, continued their operations into the postcolonial era, fostering institutional weakness, corruption, and resource-driven conflicts in the Congo for years to come.

As noted above, experts from Botswana have, in recent months, offered advice on a possible restart of MIBA's operation. Given the numerous fatal accidents and the endemic violence at mining sites in South Kasaï over the past decades, any renewed expansion of MIBA's
dominant operations is likely to be accompanied by demands for traceability, sustainability, and ethical sourcing (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Researchers have noted that in the eastern part of the country, attempts to improve traceability in line with Section 1502 of the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act have not produced positive outcomes; rather than disappearing, the mechanisms of corruption were reshaped, and violence has persisted (Vogel, 2022). In this context, Botswana has been highlighted as a success story - a country that is one of the most stable democracies in Africa and that has recently achieved a peaceful political alternation after decades of single-party rule. The case of Botswana, however, may not apply directly to South Kasai. Indeed, the mechanization of diamond mining has resulted in high security but fewer jobs in Botswana and, as a consequence, high youth unemployment and increased inequality. A similar outcome could occur in the DRC if comparable technological choices are made there. The success story of Botswana owes much to the state-owned company Debswana, which, at its founding, entered into a partnership with De Beers. Debswana was able to negotiate an increase in its share of diamond profits and acquired a financial stake in De Beers, ensuring greater financial stability even during market fluctuations.

In the DRC, regaining state control over diamond production is an objective, and the stability of the government will be an important factor in achieving it. However, emulating the Debswana model in partnership with De Beers may also raise objections rooted in the DRC's historical experience - specifically, in the rejection and delegitimization of partnerships with the cartel. Indeed, in the case of Botswana, exploitation of diamonds was a postcolonial enterprise, and the industry therefore has not suffered the problems of delegitimization that have profoundly shaped the industry in the DRC. For these reasons, in the event of a restart of MIBA's activities, attention should be paid to grievance mechanisms both within and outside the firm, involving local, national and international actors. Benefits can be high in terms of creating greater security and stability in the region. Prosperity may follow, but with caution given the currently low prices of diamonds. The rising quality of artificial diamonds has created stiff competition that is already impacting the performance of Botswana's diamond industry. However, new factors should also be considered, including the recent decision by trading centers such as Antwerp to stop trading in Russian diamonds, which had been an important source for the global market (Flescher et al., 2024).

The historical experience of South Kasai shows how enduring institutional legacies continue to shape mineral governance in the DRC. Practices established during decolonization - the criminalization of artisanal miners, tolerance of informal trade, and selective enforcement of mining laws - still influence relations between the state, companies, and local communities. Recognizing these continuities is essential for designing policies that address corruption, violence, and exclusion in today's mining industry. Without confronting these historical roots, current efforts to formalize artisanal mining and limit smuggling risk reproducing the same extractive and coercive systems that have long undermined fair governance.

### CRediT authorship contribution statement

**Véronique Pouillard:** Writing - review & editing, Writing - original draft, Validation, Supervision, Resources, Methodology, Investigation, Funding acquisition, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization.
**Kristin Ranestad:** Writing - review & editing, Writing - original draft, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization.

### Funding

Part of this research has received support under the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, grant ERC CoG 818523 Creative IPR: The History of Intellectual Property Rights in the Creative

Industries (2019-2025).

### Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

### Acknowledgements

The authors thank the participants at the 2nd Geosciences, Knowledge and Property Rights Workshop and 3rd Winter Games in Economic History. Furthermore, we would like to thank staff at the Archives Générales du Royaume de Belgique, Dépôt Joseph Cuvelier, Brussels, for research assistance. Thanks are also due to Donna Reeder of Reeder Literary Services for her copyediting of this article.

### Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

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Sibeka 1424, Ibid., 5.

Sibekab 1424, Ibid.

Sibekac 1424, Ibid., 6–7.

Sibekad 1424, Ibid., 5.

Sibekae 1424, Ibid., 6.

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Sibeka 1423, 1960. Pictures Accompanying the Report.

Sibeka 1424, 1961a. Report from Piron. Bakwanga to Cravatte, Brussels, pp. 8–10.

Sibeka 1424, 1961b. Report from Piron, Bakwanga, to Cravatte, Brussels, 8. 'Il est en effet impossible de réprimer un délit spécial qui de sa nature ne cause aucun préjudice ou dommage direct aux particuliers. Il s'agit en l'espèce d'un bien national qui est gaspillé par une bonne partie de la population qui y trouve un avantage et un profit immédiat.' Authors' translation.

Sibeka 1424, 1961c. Evariste Kasanda Tshipebele to the Minister of Interior, pp. 1–2. Bakwanga.

Sibeka 1424, 1961d. Report from Piron, Bakwanga, to Cravatte, Brussels, 2. '1) en utilisant une carte de travailleur, perdue, volée, prétée ou vendue. Nous avons enregistré des cas de chaque espèce; 2) en passant par les canivaux qui doivent rester ouverts en période des pluies: 3) par des ouvertures faites dans la clôture pour travaux; 4) par escalade; 5) par les écoulements vers la Bushimale; 6) actuellement par les nombreux ravinements en dessous de la clôture après ces dernières pluies.' Authors' translation.

Sibeka 1424, 1961e. Note to Piron, No Place, No Date, Unsigned; Report from Piron, Bakwanga, to Cravatte, Brussels.

Sibeka 1424, 1961f. Report from Piron, Bakwanga, to Cravatte, 3. Brussels.

Sibeka 1424, 1961g. Report, Législation Belge Sur Le Diamant Brut.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Report from the Meeting of 6 February 1962; Letter from Piron to Cravatte.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Letter from Piron to Cravatte.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Document Dactylographié, Non Daté, Non Signé. demande d'autorisation, Spring.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Document Dactylographié, Non Daté, Non Signé, Demande D'Autorisation, pp. 2–4. Spring.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Document Dactylographié, Non Daté, Non Signé, Demande D'Autorisation, pp. 6–7. Spring.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Letter from Piron to Rudahindwa. Léopoldville.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Letter from Piron to Jadot.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Report from Piron to Cravatte.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Letter from Piron to the Brussels Headquarters, 5.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Note Concernant Le Trafic De Diamants À Léopoldville Et À Brazzaville.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Letter from Loriaux. Bakwanga.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Bakwanga, Proposition De Licenciement.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Résumé Du Rapport De Piron Sur Son Séjour À Léopoldville.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Note.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Letter from Piron, Léopoldville, pp. 3–5.

Sibeka 1424, 1962. Letter from Loriaux, Bakwanga, to Mibeka, pp. 1–4. Brussels.

Sibeka 1424, 1963a. Letter from Piron to the Brussels Headquarters.

Sibeka 1424, 1963b. Report from Piron.

Sibeka 1424, 1963c. Note Concernant Les Exploitations Clandestines Dans Les Zones Minières A. Bakwanga, unsigned.

Sibeka 1424, 1963d. Report from Piron, 3.

Sibeka 1424, 1963e. Anonymous Informant, Direct Quote in Report from Piron appendix.

Sibeka 1424, 1963f. Report from Piron, Bakwanga appendix.

Sibeka 1425, 1964a. Note from Cravatte to Comte Moens De Fernig.

Sibeka 1425, 1964b. Aide-mémoire En Vue De L'Entretien Du Comte Moens De Fernig Et De M. Cravatte Avec Le Président Kasavubu. JL/8/64.

Sibeka 1425, 1964c. Note by Rudahindwa. Brussels.

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Sibeka 1425, 1964e. Letter from Rudahindwa to Mobutu.

Sibeka 1524, 1963. Report from Piron to Cravatte.

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Sibeka 523, 1957a. Letter from Jean Jadot, Léopoldville, to Gaston Blaise, Brussels, 2. 'Je pense qu'il faut être d'autant plus vigilant que les Bakwa Kalondji – le Coeur des Baluba – deviennent assez remuants (exploitations clandestines, sectes religieuses parachrétiennes; les membres de l'une d'entre elles, "St Michel", viennent d'être excommuniés publiquement par Mgr Kettel) et que les licenciements au Katanga risquent d'en ramener un certain nombre dans les villages, où ils ne seront pas les éléments les plus faciles.' Authors' translation.

Sibeka 523, 1957b. Letter from Jadot to Blaise.

Sibeka 523, 1958a. Letter from Jadot to Blaise, 2. Léopoldville.

Sibeka 523, 1958b. Letter from Jadot to Blaise, 3. Léopoldville.

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Sibeka 526.

Sibeka 526, 1958a. Advertisement for the Comptoir Congolais du Brillant, 'Comment investir vos économies?'. In: Courrier D'Afrique.

Sibeka 526, 1958b. Report from Wasilewski, Bakwanga, to Cravatte, pp. 3–4.

Sibeka 526, 1959a. Document from Wasilewski and Jacqmay, and appendix dated 28 December 1959a, unsigned, pp. 3–4.

Sibeka 526, 1959b. Letter from Wasilewski to Cravatte.

Sibeka 526, 1959c. Letter from Wasilewski, 3. Bakwanga to Cravatte, Brussels.

Sibeka 526, 1959d. Rapport Sur L'Organisation Du Corps De Volontaires De Bakwanga.

Sibeka 526, 1959e. Document from Wasilewski and Jacqmay, pp. 1–2.

Sibeka 680, 1962. Note, Undated and Signed 'Gauthier', to 'Cher Ami'.

Sibekaf 1424, 1963. Report from Piron, 3 March 1963, 3-4. 'Ces visites ne doivent pas être des vexations envers les voyageurs. Elles sont faites uniquement dans le but d'enrayer le trafic de diamant. Les membres du Gouvernement, dans les parlementaires, et autres hautes personnalités ne doivent pas être visitées. Ils jouissent de la considération de tous et ils ne peuvent être placés dans la catégorie des personnes suspectes. Il en est de même des personnes honorablement connues, exemples: les prêtres, les religieuses, médecins, magistrats, personnel de maîtrise de la MIBA, etc. Pour les personnes autres que les suspectes et commerçants étrangers. Il est conseillé de pratiquer par coup de sonde, comme il a été expliqué: valise de l'un, bagages à mains pour de l'autre. Pour un autre la serviette ou un paquet. De temps à autre une rapide visite corporelle superficielle. La plus grande correction est de rigueur et il ne faut jamais se départir des règles essentielles de politesse. La visite et examens des bagages doivent être rapides mais judicieusement faite. (...) Pour les visites corporelles, qui doivent être limitées, la plus grande correction est de rigueur. (...) La visite corporelle, même superficielle d'une personne de sexe féminin, ne peut être faite que par une visiteuse, donc aucune autre présence.' Authors' translation.

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Pouillard is Professor of Modern International History at the Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History at the University of Oslo. She works at the intersection of business history and legal history. She leads the project ERC CoG 818523 Creative IPR: The History of Intellectual Property Rights in the Creative Industries (2019–2025). She has published *Paris to New York. The Transatlantic Fashion Industry in the Twentieth Century* (Harvard University Press, 2021) and is a co-editor with Pierre-Yves Donzé and Joanne Roberts of the *Oxford Handbook of Luxury Business* (Oxford University Press, 2021).

Ranestad is Professor at the Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History at the University of Oslo. Her research interests are within economic and social history and business history. She is the program leader of The value of social background, education, academic performance and work experience: "Following the life course of Scandinavian high school, technical school and university-level graduate cohorts 1880–1920" funded by Handelsbankens Forskningstifelser and member of the FRIPRO project Persistence or change? Lessons from the introduction of enhetsskolen in Denmark and Norway, where we use Scandinavian biographies as main sources.