# A Survey of Australian Attitudes Towards Privacy:
Some Preliminary Results

Leah Shanley, Michael N. Johnstone, Patryk Szewczyk, Michael Crowley

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Leah Shanley, Michael N. Johnstone, Patryk Szewczyk, Michael Crowley. A Survey of Australian Attitudes Towards Privacy: Some Preliminary Results. 16th International Symposium on Human Aspects of Information Security and Assurance (HAISA), Jul 2022, Mytilene, Lesbos, Greece. pp.228-239, 10.1007/978-3-031-12172-2_18. hal-05324922

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# A Survey of Australian Attitudes Towards Privacy: Some Preliminary Results

Leah Shanley✉, Michael N. Johnstone✉, Patryk Szewczyk✉, and Michael Crowley

Edith Cowan University, Perth, WA, Australia

{a.shanley,m.johnstone,p.szewczyk,m.crowley}@ecu.edu.au

**Abstract.** The challenge of meeting security requirements (of a nation-state) and the privacy needs of citizens is perhaps a political goal, but it is enabled by technology. Attacks on citizens tend to move the balance towards security, whilst civil liberties groups often act as a counter to not over-correct security, so as to guarantee privacy. This paper explores Australian attitudes towards privacy and surveillance during the pandemic. We consider a fundamental question: Has the pandemic changed the perception of Australian citizens with regard to their fundamental right to privacy? We surveyed Australian attitudes to privacy in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic and report on some interesting results.

**Keywords:** Privacy · Surveillance · Security · Public attitudes · COVID-19

## 1 Introduction

The notion of justifiably using privacy-invasive technologies to counteract crime, terrorism or cyber threats has evolved in line with the challenge of predicting increasing numbers of unlawful acts. Terrorism incidents such as the attacks in the United States of America on September 11, 2001 and the Bali bombings in 2002, among others, have highlighted the requirements for surveillance technologies to be used in private and public sectors (Mann and Smith 2017). Surveillance technologies, whilst perceived as beneficial in counteracting unlawful acts, raise questions regarding privacy of individuals and data protection. The advent of smart cities (Baig et al. 2017) with their plethora of devices (including, for example, CCTV cameras) all transmitting or sharing data, has not improved the situation. This is not a new issue. In 1928, Associate Justice Louis Brandeis (Supreme Court of the United States) highlighted his concerns with technology enabling governments to covertly invade one's privacy "by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack to obtain disclosure in court what is whispered in the closet" (Skala 1977). This concern is particularly evident in the circumstances brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in an abundance of active and archived tracking technologies created and deployed by governments and private entities (Ahmed et al. 2020). The use of tracking technologies raises the question of how health authorities and
governments can balance the need for privacy and efficient tracking during a pandemic (Amann et al. 2021). Highly transmissible strains of COVID-19, i.e., Omicron, prompted concerns as to whether it is feasible to track and trace people (Hannam 2021). Effective contact tracing is reliant upon the uptake of a technology and the willingness of citizens to proactively engage in a registration process at venues visited. When concern for civil liberties and privacy intersect, this combination will result in a lack of confidence that undoubtedly impacts attitudes towards privacy.

The freedom to move and travel within Australia has been regulated and restricted since 2020 as a result of the pandemic. Restrictions have curtailed civil liberties and encroached upon privacy supported by advancements in surveillance activities promoted by governments. Domestic and international vaccine passports have implications for freedom of association, privacy autonomy and access to goods and services (Australian Human Rights Commission 2021).

This paper examines the attitudes and perceptions of citizens who undertook a national survey to evaluate the changing nature of privacy in a pandemic world. First, we explore tolerance towards pandemic-related surveillance practices and whether public trust has eroded. Second, we test awareness of surveillance and whether citizens have adopted different behavior. Finally, we explore perceived control surrounding information collected and surveillance. According to a report by Australia's Chief Scientist, people have become less trusting of institutions over the last decade. Any major data breach that involves COVID-19 tracking data could see Australians lose confidence in government that will be extremely difficult to recover (Finkel 2020).

## 2 Related Work

Goggin et al. (2017) surveyed 1,600 Australians, exploring the nature of digital rights. The survey focused on four key issues, (1) privacy surrounding data profiling and analytics, (2) government data matching and surveillance, (3) digital privacy relating to the workplace, and (4) freedom of expression (speech) in online digital platforms. Goggin found that Australians are concerned about online privacy. The survey revealed 65% of participants felt they had nothing to hide, 67% took steps to protect their privacy online, 57% agreed that corporations are an ongoing threat to privacy.

Turning to government data matching and surveillance, 47% indicated concerns regarding government violations of privacy. However, 47% are in favour of law enforcement or security agencies accessing metadata, when framed as an anti-terrorism measure (Goggin et al. 2017). The change in attitudes suggests that personal views towards privacy vary depending on the context, highlighting the complexity of the issue. In a later survey on Australian attitudes towards privacy conducted by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), 92% of respondents reported that they do not want their personal data sent and stored overseas (Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 2020).

More extensive studies relating to public perceptions of privacy and surveillance have been undertaken in the European Union. For example, the Privacy and Security Mirrors (PRISMS) project, analysed the trade-off model between privacy and security. Broek et al. pointed out that an increase in security often comes at the expense of privacy (Broek
et al. 2017). The project found that attitudes towards privacy depend on the security issue presented, in other words, citizens are more likely to accept security practices when they understand the reasons and are convinced that a security measure is necessary for the safety and benefit of the public, consistent with Goggin et al. (2017), that context is a determining factor. Privacy, security, and liberty are concepts that undergo continuous change (Büscher et al. 2014), consequently, governments are confronted with managing the delicate balance that must exist for society to remain free and democratic. In late 2020, the Rapid Research Information Forum, chaired by Australia's Chief Scientist Dr Alan Finkel, was tasked by government to answer the question:

"Has COVID-19 had an impact on public sentiment in relation to privacy and the widespread use of data and technology by government in responding to the public health crisis, be it through tracing, compliance or enforcement?" (Australian Chief Scientist 2020).

The findings highlight the dynamic nature of opinion associated with privacy and the widespread use of surveillance. They found that trust towards government agencies increased during early stages of the pandemic; however, the majority (50%) remained concerned about management of personal data. Australians indicated strong concern surrounding opt-in arrangements, consent and the reasons for data and technology surveillance. In addition to voluntary data collection activities, i.e., contact tracing, involuntary data collection present indirect but significant risk to public sentiment towards government (Finkel 2020).

## 3 Method

Data collection occurred between February and September, 2021 using a cross-sectional, 40-question survey, containing a number of self-assessment questions. Solicitation first occurred via a University Facebook campaign, LinkedIn posts and word of mouth. To maximize responses a survey recruitment service provider was engaged resulting in 1135 responses and a sample size of 915 post-cleaning. Australian citizenship and age (18+) were the screening criteria. Information relating to the purpose and research objectives was provided together with informed consent prior to commencement of the survey. Survey questions were derived from past research and literature. The questions examined here are: (1) What are Australian's attitudes to privacy through the lens of trust? and (2) Has this attitude been affected by the impact of COVID-19?

Attitudes were explored from three perspectives, (1) trust in institutions, (2) control over surveillance in society and, (3) knowledge pertaining to information collection. Response categories were primarily 5-point Likert scales in combination with binary-response questions. Two important design considerations were factored into the survey. First, contextual framing of privacy and security concepts in attitudinal surveys and second, interpretation of survey data. To support the design objectives, anchoring vignettes were introduced, Anchoring vignettes are a psychometric approach used when dealing with complex concepts to be examined, such as privacy and security, or when there is a risk that respondents may unintentionally interpret questions differently. Anchoring vignettes translate theoretical concepts into hypothetical, authentic scenarios and the short narratives or storylines help position respondents in an unbiased way.
The theory of reasoned action that underpins this research, seeks to understand the relationship between attitudes and behaviours within human action (Fishbein and Ajzen 2009). The theory suggests that attitudes are event based (attitude-to-behaviour), or reasonably deliberated based on existing knowledge of the topic (reasoned action). Knowledge and awareness constitute what people assume they know and understand about surveillance devices, and knowledge relating to integrated data collection and handling practices. The research sought to investigate whether knowledge and awareness, perceived or otherwise, plays a role in the acceptance of said practices. Hypothetically, the more knowledge and awareness citizens possess relating to surveillance and associated data management practices, the less likely they are to support surveillance programs unless they can rationalise the necessity for it. Porcedda (2017) asserts that citizens are more concerned about the application of the technology and not the technology itself.

# 4 Results and Discussion

## 4.1 Trust

Watson et al. (2017) found in their analysis of public opinion surveys that the impact of public trust towards surveillance technologies is not always adequately addressed. In this paper the concept of trust is operationalised using three formative constructs comprised of twelve trust indicators. In formative constructs each indicator conveys information about its relative contribution to the construct (Avila et al. 2015). Each construct focused on a particular variation of trust that shifted focus to a unique classification, namely, (1) trust institutions will follow legislative requirements, (2) trust institutions will not sell or misuse information, and (3) trust institutions will adequately protect information from cybercrime. Each classification contained the same twelve indicators (institutions) verbatim. To calculate an overall Trust Summary Score (TSS), each of the three trust classifications (trust components) were analysed using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to obtain factor scores to preserve the contribution and aspects of the indicators when measuring latent constructs (Avila et al. 2015). Trust component scores (TCS) were summed to form an overall trust summary score (TSS).

The first variation, trust institutions will follow legislative requirements, revealed that trust in federal government, state police and local council (71.8%, 73%, 70.2% respectively) is relatively high, indicating that government entities are perceived as being more trustworthy than private actors (Fig. 1). In contrast, social media (19.5%) and private business (37.9%) are perceived to be less trustworthy than most entities. The second variation, sale or misuse of information, is remarkable with only 7.8% of those surveyed, trusting social media companies to not sell or misuse information, suggesting minimal trust. With respect to the third variation, protection of information, 13.4% trust the social media industry. Private business entities show similar results. This trend is common for example, the OAIC survey on Australian attitudes toward privacy revealed 70% of Australians trust health service providers and government departments (51%) as compared to the social media industry whereby only 12% trust that personal information is adequately protected (OAIC 2020).
Hypothetically, ‘More trust in public institutions the more likely people are to accept surveillance’, In other words higher TSS means people are less concerned about surveillance.

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.** Perceived trust relationships by institution.</figcaption></figure>

Spearman’s correlation was calculated to examine the relationship between TSS and surveillance concern within public and private spaces. We found a negative correlation for both variables, public spaces ($r_s = -.41, p < .001$) and private spaces. ($r_s = -.389, p < .001$). We then performed an ANOVA to further explore the relationship between a person’s trust in institutions and concern towards surveillance or spread thereof (in public and private spaces). The higher the TSS, the less concern there should be regarding surveillance monitoring (or vice versa). The two independent variables were concern of surveillance in 1) public spaces and 2) private spaces. The variables were measured on a 5-point Likert scale (–2: Not at all concerned to +2: Very concerned).
<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2.** Trust score - concern over surveillance in public spaces</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3.** Trust score - concern over surveillance in private spaces</figcaption></figure>

Figure 2 and Fig. 3 depict the direction of the relationship. The higher the TSS the less concern there is about surveillance in public spaces. It could be postulated that trust is irrelevant with respect to private places given the trust indicators are largely trustworthy. In contrast, public spaces are perceived to be under control of the more trustworthy entities, i.e., the police and state government, consequently trust is a factor.

## 4.2 Behaviour

We sought to discover if participants alter their behaviour whilst under surveillance. To test this theory, we introduced an anchoring vignette (a small hypothetical scenario) that described two shopping precincts. One precinct operates a CCTV network, and the alternate, a precinct that does not operate CCTV surveillance. Participants were asked in which precinct they would prefer to shop, assuming equal travelling distance. 68.6%
preferred to visit the precinct that was convenient, thus surveillance did not influence their choice. We introduced the idea of the capture and upload of facial images to a national database, which would acquire images from multiple sources, including the aforementioned CCTV system. To see if behaviour would change the first vignette was reintroduced. We found that 68% of respondents would not change their original response while 27.1% would visit the precinct that does not use the CCTV system. The results suggest that participants do not mind their images being captured by CCTV, but they are concerned about being identified (which represents a change in the original use of the data).

## 4.3 Control

Control of the information environment, that is, the control (perceived or otherwise) people think they have over surveillance of themselves or their environment, is one factor often neglected in attitudinal surveys. The relevance for this research is to discover whether Australians accept surveillance practices due to an inability to opt out, or perceive they have no control or say as to whether these practices are implemented. In support of Hallinan et al. (2012) for most people data processing is invisible and likely involuntary, information processing activities are mostly not understood. Citizens feel they have lost control over their data and data collection practices.

Continuing with CCTV surveillance, the survey went on to question whether people felt they had a say in the collection of CCTV images about themselves. The majority, 69%, felt they had no say at all. Participants were asked if they would like more control over who collects the CCTV images-79.9% indicated they would like more say, control or the opportunity to opt out.

## 4.4 Awareness and Knowledge

In the context of this research, knowledge and awareness constitutes what a person assumes they know and understand about surveillance and associated activities, more importantly however, is knowledge relating to integrated data handling practices. The research sought to investigate whether knowledge and awareness, perceived or otherwise, plays a role in the acceptance of said practices. Hypothetically, the more knowledge and awareness citizens have relating to surveillance and associated data management practices, the less likely they are to support surveillance programs unless they can rationalise the necessity for it.

As part of the survey, we presented a news article informing participants of proposed legislation regarding surveillance. The news article outlined the State Government's intention to upload driver's license images to a federal government identity matching database, known as the National Facial Recognition Biometric Matching Capability (NFRBMC). The article provided reliable information relating to the associated legislation, and an application overview of the technology and its use. Notwithstanding the detail presented in the news article, 72% of participants agreed they still do not have sufficient knowledge to make an informed decision about the acceptance of the national
facial recognition database. This suggests that citizens are struggling to grasp the data relationships that are formed by these systems, the consequences of such relationships and complexity of the environment. 53.9%, say they do not know who is collecting information about them and would like to know more about who is collecting and for what reasons.

We then shifted our approach and presented a range of surveillance technologies i.e., drones, facial recognition, CCTV and asked participants how knowledgeable they are (or perceive to be) about each item. The purpose was to gain insight into perceived knowledge and awareness relating to the knowledge indicators. The 5-point Likert scale was coded as: Very knowledgeable = 2, Somewhat knowledgeable = 1, Not sure = 0, Not very knowledgeable = -1, Not at all knowledgeable = -2. Scores were summed on a continuum to form a summary knowledge score (M = 3.5, Min -22, Max 22).

Figure 4 shows a summary composition of knowledge indicators, for example 60.16% say they are very or somewhat knowledgeable about contact tracing and 46.75% say they are very or somewhat knowledgeable about GPS ankle bracelets.

A discrepancy between participants desire for more information about who is collecting information about them using surveillance devices (53.3%) vs. perceived knowledge of technology, supports Porcedda's assertion that citizens are concerned about the application of the technology rather than the technology itself. A higher knowledge score does not necessarily indicate participants are aware of data handling practices regarding a particular technology. 51.5% say they are somewhat or very knowledgeable with data mining activities but are not automatically aware of what happens to data collected about them. Perceived knowledge also begs the question whether or not citizens feel they have lost control over opinions and data. For example, citizens value privacy, and consider themselves reasonably knowledgeable with respect to the technology items presented, however, in a related question about control over surveillance, 79.9% reported they would like more control and say over the technology.
<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 4. Responses to knowledge indicators (%)</figcaption></figure>

# 5 The COVID-19 Effect

During data collection, the Australian public had undergone numerous state-specific lockdowns causing discourse over government policy. Attitudes toward contact tracing had started to shift among the population, with some becoming complacent, others felt unconvinced of the need to continue the practice while others raising concerns. In the interim, independent State COVID apps emerged, thus, the public transitioned from the Federal COVIDSafe app to state-run apps. State and Federal legislation are unique to each jurisdiction; however, knowledge of the differences is not well-understood. Media attention centered around the Federal app, Australians were for the most part, under the impression the same laws apply to the States. Participants were asked a consecutive set of statements relating to COVIDSafe apps to generalise the use of contact tracing apps rather than isolating a particular State or Federal app.

Despite trust in the Government, Table 1 indicates that Australians have concerns regarding the protection and privacy of data collected. 62.2% of those surveyed are concerned about the tracking of movements for other purposes not related to the pandemic and 70.3% are concerned the data collected will not be deleted after the COVID pandemic ends.
<table><caption>**Table 1.** COVID-19 app privacy concern</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Very or somewhat concerned</th><th>Not very or at all concerned</th><th>Undecided</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>The tracking of your movements for purposes other than COVID-19</td><td>62.2%</td><td>29.7%</td><td>8.1%</td></tr><tr><td>Monitor the movement of yourself or others in the community to ensure group gatherings are restricted (due to COVID-19)</td><td>37.8%</td><td>49.4%</td><td>13.0%</td></tr><tr><td>Share your captured information with government agencies for crime or terror related incidents</td><td>45.3%</td><td>42.1%</td><td>13.1%</td></tr><tr><td>Share your information with contractors, for example data storage providers, security companies or software providers</td><td>72.0%</td><td>16.5%</td><td>11.5%</td></tr><tr><td>Store your captured information overseas</td><td>76.3%</td><td>15.4%</td><td>8.3%</td></tr><tr><td>Share your captured information with foreign governments</td><td>74.9%</td><td>16.8%</td><td>8.3%</td></tr><tr><td>Protection of your captured information from Cyber crime</td><td>63.2%</td><td>22.1%</td><td>14.7%</td></tr><tr><td>Access to other information on your phone, for example, location information</td><td>72.4%</td><td>18.9%</td><td>8.7%</td></tr><tr><td>Your data not being deleted after the COVID-19 crisis ends</td><td>70.3%</td><td>22.0%</td><td>7.7%</td></tr><tr><td>Contact tracing surveillance becoming permanent regardless of the pandemic</td><td>68.1%</td><td>21.2%</td><td>10.7%</td></tr></tbody></table>

66.4% supported the rollout of the Federal COVIDSafe app. These findings support the OAIC report (2020) whereby 60% agreed that concessions must be made for the greater good but should not be made permanent. This suggests that Australians are somewhat hesitant with respect to data handling practices, albeit supporting the app rollout for health and safety. Trust that these measures will be rolled back after the pandemic has potential to become problematic with 40% expressing distrust. Notwithstanding earlier
data that showed 71.8% trusted the Government will follow legislative requirements and protect their information (63%).

The West Australian Police admitted accessing the COVID check-in repository nine days after its release while refusing state government requests to cease data access requests. According to the police, the information was accessed as part of an investigation into two serious crimes (Hendry 2021). Consequently, these events forced the West Australian State Government to introduce specific data protection legislation surrounding the check-in repository as it was seen as a breach of trust by the public.

Function creep and data misuse emerged as a major concern with respect to the National Facial Recognition Database. Whilst not explicitly framed in relation to COVID app data stores, 73.5% agree the technology could be repurposed and 89% are concerned about misuse. There is some evidence that the same level of concern exists in relation to COVID app data given 83% expressed concern regarding the increase of surveillance monitoring.

# 6 Conclusion

The contact tracing technologies deployed by various state governments have enabled health authorities to advise the public of the dates and times of infectious locations. Despite the perceived positive response about government actions, individuals remain cautious and concerned about the data being collected. The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that individuals have a desire to maintain their personal privacy, but are first to voice concerns, when others do not comply with contact tracing technologies.

In a state government context, the onus was placed on individuals to actively scan QR codes that were printed by all businesses and placed at store fronts, a practice that appeared to be accepted by the public. Nonetheless, the tension between security and privacy remains, even in a post-pandemic world, therefore we consider that the results presented here, whilst interesting, are preliminary, and will be analysed further.

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