# Does Gender Diversity and Experience Moderate the Impact of Tax Aggressiveness on Corporate Social Responsibility: A Study of UAE Listed Companies

Nadia Ben Njima Elouaer, Rida Waheed, Suleman Sarwar, Ghazala Aziz

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Nadia Ben Njima Elouaer, Rida Waheed, Suleman Sarwar, Ghazala Aziz. Does Gender Diversity and Experience Moderate the Impact of Tax Aggressiveness on Corporate Social Responsibility: A Study of UAE Listed Companies. Sustainability, 2022, 14 (21), pp.14348. 10.3390/su142114348. hal-05443159

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# Does Gender Diversity and Experience Moderate the Impact of Tax Aggressiveness on Corporate Social Responsibility: A Study of UAE Listed Companies

Nadia Elouaer <fnref n="1" />,<fnref n="2" />, Rida Waheed <fnref n="3" />,* ID, Suleman Sarwar <fnref n="3" /> and Ghazala Aziz <fnref n="4" /> ID

**Abstract:** The purpose of this paper is to explore the moderating role of gender diversity in corporate board and CEO experience in terms of the relationship between tax aggressiveness and corporate social responsibility of UAE-listed companies. By applying correlation and regression analysis on a data set of 55 firms from 2014 to 2020, it is found that board gender diversity does not moderate the relationship between tax aggressiveness and CSR. However, a female CEO positively moderates this relationship. It is also found that CEO experience negatively moderates the relationship between tax aggressiveness and CSR. It is recommended that policymakers improve checks and balances so that male dominance can be reduced to give women opportunities to be involved in decision-making.

**Keywords:** corporate social responsibility; gender diversification; experience; UAE; tax aggression

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**Citation:** Elouaer, N.; Waheed, R.; Sarwar, S.; Aziz, G. Does Gender Diversity and Experience Moderate the Impact of Tax Aggressiveness on Corporate Social Responsibility: A Study of UAE Listed Companies. *Sustainability* **2022**, *14*, 14348. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142114348

Academic Editor: Sooksan Kantabutra

Received: 12 September 2022

Accepted: 25 October 2022

Published: 2 November 2022

**Publisher's Note:** MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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**Copyright:** © 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

## 1. Introduction

The surge regarding the importance of tax planning by firms for different aspects of businesses has increased significantly, and many studies document it, including [1–3]. Managers of companies usually try to reduce the tax burden to minimize tax liability through different strategies, and tax aggressiveness is one of these strategies [4]. According to [5], when managers are involved in tax planning activities in order to move taxable income downwards through legal as well as illegal ways or the ways which fall in the grey area, it is called tax aggressiveness. Indeed, ref. [6] mentioned that businesses in today’s world mostly adopt these tax strategies because, in decision-making, taxes play a crucial part due to their impact on various outcomes of the business. However, it is noted that the main impact of tax strategy or tax aggressiveness can be on the firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) [3,7]. As far as CSR is concerned, it is a practice by which managers involve social and environmental concerns in the basic operations of the firm and voluntarily involve these concerns in their interaction with various stakeholders. According to [8,9], long-term survival of firms is now highly dependent on their involvement in these ethical practices.

The relationship between tax aggressiveness and the CSR of the firm is valid because both concepts affect the overall social welfare and because the management of any firm is not possible without giving both these factors central importance [10]. This can be explained as taxes provide the necessary government resources to provide essential services to society. However, when firms become involved in aggressive tax policies, fewer resources are available to the government, and social welfare is affected [11]. Hence, tax aggressiveness negatively affects corporate reputation [12].

Let us take a closer look at the strategic decisions of the firms. It can be deduced that most of these decisions are made by the company’s board of directors (BOD), and the

<footnote n="1">¹ Department of Accounting, College of Business, University of Jeddah, Jeddah 23445, Saudi Arabia</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Centre de Recherche en Finances et Fiscalité (CERFF), University Jean Moulin Lyon 3, 69008 Lyon, France</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Department of Finance and Economics, College of Business, University of Jeddah, Jeddah 23445, Saudi Arabia</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Department of Business Administration, College of Administrative and Financial Sciences, Saudi Electronic University, Jeddah 23442, Saudi Arabia</footnote>

<footnote>* Correspondence: ridawaheed.sdu@gmail.com</footnote>
company's values are constructed on these decisions [13]. However, according to [14,15], the ethical values of females are more as compared to males, and when the BOD of the firm consists of women, there are chances that the firm would be involved in fewer tax planning activities. Additionally, [16] noted that when a firm appoints female directors, it is seen that CSR disclosure is enhanced. Hence, the government, as well as policymakers, are now reconsidering the involvement of women on boards and in decision-making due to increased scandals at the corporate level [17]. Both the European Commission as well as the United Nations are supporting the increased representation of women on boards of directors and involving them in decision-making not only in firms but also at the government level [18,19]. This proves that the gender diversity of the board affects strategic decision-making, especially in terms of social responsibility.

Although board composition is an important factor in the decision-making process [13], it is a fact that CEO gender is also a major factor that can affect the important decisions of any firm [20]. The same is true for CSR decisions. In this regard, female CEOs are considered better for the CSR initiatives of any firm as they are perceived to better understand society's needs [21]. Additionally, the ethical values of females are more as compared to males [22]; hence, it can be expected that when the head of the board is female, then major decisions taken by the board would benefit society. Regardless of the gender of the CEO, an experienced CEO is considered essential for the CSR of any firm. The main reason is that it is up to a CEO's discretion to implement and disclose CSR activities or give importance to other performance measures [23]. Hence, specific characteristics of the CEO can affect the CSR activities [24], and the same is true for experience as well. It is [25] documented that a CEO's experience can enhance his cognitive ability, which can help him make decisions that are important for the firm and society overall. Hence, CSR activities are improved through experienced CEOs.

These arguments provide the basis for the major objectives of this study. Hence, the first objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between tax aggressiveness on the CSR approach of UAE firms. To check the CSR approach of the firms, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards are considered a benchmark, and the CSR reporting of the firm is checked according to these standards. The second objective of the current research is to investigate the moderating effect of gender diversity on the relationship between tax aggressiveness in UAE firms and their CSR disclosure. More specifically, it is checked whether or not the CSR approach of aggressive tax firms is affected by the presence of female directors on the board. The third objective is to investigate whether the relationship between the tax aggressiveness of UAE firms and their CSR disclosure is moderated by a female CEO. The fourth and last objective of this research is to check whether or not the CEO experience moderates the relationship between the tax aggressiveness of UAE firms and their CSR approach. The main reason to include board diversity and female CEOs in the study related to tax planning and CSR is the fact presented by [26] that the CSR approach can be represented through the involvement of females on boards and ultimately in decision-making. Additionally, recent studies documented that firms' tax planning can be influenced when females are appointed as directors and engage in strategic decisions of these firms [14,15].

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1. *Impact of Corporate Tax Planning on CSR*

It is a common practice by the firm that through compliance with the framework set by the country, they peruse tax planning strategy and reduce the tax burden [27]. In addition to other benefits, the adoption of a tax strategy ensures that shareholder remuneration and funds for investment become adequate, which is necessary for value creation [28,29]. However, firms face some issues as well when they try to comply with the tax framework. One main issue is the increased cost because there is a huge cost involved when a firm complies with tax administration [30]. Secondly, every type of decision by the firm affects
the social and political environment; hence, the reputational cost is also involved when the
decision regarding tax compliance is made [30].

The main reason for the reputational cost is that when a firm adopts an aggressive tax strategy, fewer funds will be available for the government to invest in the provision of public services [31,32]. This leads to social inequality and economic slowdown [33,34], and the overall effect of tax aggressive or tax planning strategies on the community will be negative. Hence, overall it can be assumed that firms involved in tax aggressiveness are not socially responsible. This is because, in today's world, only those firms which are actively involved in CSR practices succeed and survive [13]. Involvement in CSR practices means that the firm is not only contributing to the country's economic development but also enhancing the social and environmental standards set by the European Union and other international bodies [33]. Additionally, through these practices, agency problems can be solved between stakeholders, mainly shareholders and managers [35], and the firm's relationship with other stakeholders, including customers and supplies, can also become strong [36].

Previous studies tried to explore the nexus between CSR practices and business
decision-making regarding taxes and assert that when firms are involved in these ethical
practices, the overall business environment is affected greatly. In this regard, [37] suggests
that legitimacy can be achieved when a firm is involved in CSR practices. Additionally,
financial results can be enhanced when firms act ethically [38] along with transparency [39]
and reputation [40].

As far as tax aggressiveness is concerned, different authors found different results regarding the impact of the CSR activities of a firm. A positive relationship between tax aggressiveness and CSR is found by [41–43]. According to them, tax-aggressive firms are more involved in CSR practices. The reason behind this positive association is explained by [44] in the form of reputation enhancement. He concludes that tax paying is also a CSR activity for some firms because their overall reputation increases through tax payment, and compliance costs are also reduced as it improves the relationship between firms and tax administration.

Additionally, [45] used data from Australian firms to compare the CSR disclosure of tax-aggressive firms with non-tax aggressive firms. Results of the study suggest that CSR disclosure is high in tax-aggressive firms. A similar type of conclusion is also made by [46] regarding the relationship between tax aggressiveness and CSR disclosure. However, some authors including [29,44,47], found that tax planning negatively affects the CSR performance of firms.

Hence, based on the arguments presented above, it can be hypothesized that:

**H1: The firm's CSR approach is significantly and positively influenced by its tax planning.**

## 2.2. *The Moderating Role of the Board Director's Gender on the Relationship between Tax Aggressiveness and CSR*

It is a fact that the composition of a company's board of directors affects different decisions and outcomes of the firm, and the same is true for CSR practices and disclosure. The same is true for gender diversity, as almost all aspects of a business are affected by gender diversity. According to [48], those firms achieve good governance, composed of a diverse board. Additionally, transparency [49] and ethical decision-making can be enhanced through gender diversity [50].

As far as the tax strategy or tax aggressiveness is concerned, it is argued that men influence the decision-making process much better than women regarding tax strategy. The main reason behind this association is that the ethical values of females are higher than men [14]. Hence, women in the company's BOD are usually less involved in tax planning and tax strategy [15]. However, [51] asserts that tax strategy and tax planning are not affected by the board's gender diversity.

Although tax strategy is affected by gender diversity to some extent, previous studies documented that CSR disclosure can be enhanced through gender diversity. It is concluded
that CSR activities and CSR reporting are significantly and positively affected by gender diversity [16,26,50,52]. These enhanced CSR activities improve the firm's reputation and make it possible for the firm to have a better relationship with almost all stakeholders. However, [53] argues that disclosure regarding the CSR activities of the firm cannot be affected by the board's gender diversity.

It is not just the diversity of the board in terms of gender that can affect strategic decision-making and CSR activities. However, a leader's gender also impacts the major components of any firm. It is found by [54] that female CEOs can enhance organizational performance due to their innovative ideas and broader vision. Additionally, it is not just financial performance that is enhanced due to the presence of a female CEO, but also the CSR performance [55], because it is noted that they do not consider other outcomes as important as social activities due to their higher receptiveness towards the needs of society and community [21]. In addition to this, as the ethical values of females are proven to be higher than males, CEO gender impacts the CSR engagement of a firm positively [22,56]. It is also noted that the female CEO affects the tax aggressiveness of the firm, as well as [57] asserts that firms with female CEOs are more tax aggressive. In contrast, [17] found no relationship between CEO gender and tax aggressiveness of Italian firms.

Based on these arguments, it can be expected and hypothesized that the gender diversity of the board and the presence of a female CEO moderate the relationship between the firm's tax aggressiveness and its CSR approach.

**H2:** *Female CEOs moderate the relationship between firm's tax aggressiveness and its CSR approach.*

## 2.3. *The Moderating Role of Board Director's Experience on Relationship between Tax Aggressiveness and CSR*

It is well documented in previous studies that different attributes of the CEO affect the various decision-making processes and outcomes of the firm, including financial performance, market performance, and social performance [58]. It is believed that corporate social responsibility is also enhanced through senior leaders' characteristics [59]. It is stated by [60] that cognitive basis as well as values, measured by the experience of a CEO, affects the strategic choices made by any organization along with the discretionary decisions. Hence, it can be predicted that the CSR activities of any firm can also be affected by the preferences and choices of its CEO. Additionally, it is argued by [61] that when the CEO of a firm has more experience, it broadens his perspective and increases his cognitive abilities because working with many organizations for a longer period, they are connected with many stakeholders in diverse contexts.

Previous literature shows that the international, as well as the functional experience of the CEO significantly and positively affects the CSR activities of a firm. In fact, [62] found that CSR activities in US firms are significantly influenced by the prior work experience of their CEO. In addition to this, [62] it was also found that the social capital of Chinese firms is highly increased due to the academic experience of the CEO. Additionally, [63] also conducted a study to check whether or not the previous functional and CSR experience of a CEO can affect the current firm's CSR initiatives because previous experience gives the CEO a proper insight regarding the importance of CSR practices for any firm. As far as tax aggressiveness is concerned, it is noted that the characteristics of the CEO affect tax-related strategies as well. In this regard, [64] found that a CEO's prior experience can negatively affect tax aggressiveness.

Based on the arguments presented above, it can be hypnotized that:

**H2c:** *The presence of CEO experience on a corporate board influences the relationship between tax aggressiveness and the CSR approach.*

While investigating the existing literature, according to our limited knowledge, the previous studies have missed two key points: (i) the investigation of the moderating effect of gender diversity and CEO experience on CSR and (ii) the moderating effect of these
variables are not examined in case of UAE firms. However, this study attempts to open a new window for researchers and authorities to plug CSR into multiple channels.

## 3. Data and Methodology

### 3.1. Data

The study data is collected from the Security and Commodity Authority's (SCA) annual reports and annual financial reports of each firm, covering 2014 to 2020. For empirical estimations, we use the fixed-effect method and random-effect method for robust estimations. The focus of this study is on public firms of UAE listed on Abu Dhabi Security Market and Dubai Financial Market. However, due to being out of the scope of MCGC applications, all financial firms are excluded from the analysis. The main sectors of the UAE economy include "Real Estate, Banks, Investment and Financial Services, Energy, Telecommunication, Insurance, Industrial, Consumer Stables, Services, Debt Instrument, Electronically Traded Fund, and Transportation." Initially, the current study included 86 firms in the sample due to the MCGC scope of application. However, few firms are excluded from the sample due to their listing after 2013. Similarly, firms owned by other countries are also excluded, leaving a final sample size of 55 firms.

### 3.2. Methodology

#### 3.2.1. The Study Variables

The dependent variable in this study is corporate social responsibility. The independent variables include the number of directors, size, leverage, return on asset, and tax. There are some moderating variables in this study, including women directors, having a woman CEO, and CEO experience. Table 1 shows the complete description of variables.

<table><caption>**Table 1.** Description of variables.</caption><thead><tr><th>Variable</th><th>Description</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="2"><em>Dependent variable</em></td></tr><tr><td>CSR</td><td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"><em>Independent variables</em></td></tr><tr><td>NOD</td><td>Number of directors</td></tr><tr><td>SIZE</td><td>Total assets</td></tr><tr><td>LEVI</td><td>Leverage (book value of debts/equity)</td></tr><tr><td>ROA</td><td>Return on asset (net profit/total assets)</td></tr><tr><td>TAX</td><td>Tax aggression—Effective tax rate (total tax expense/accounting income before tax)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"><em>Moderating variables</em></td></tr><tr><td>WOMEN</td><td>Percentage of women directors in firm</td></tr><tr><td>CROW</td><td>Women as CEO</td></tr><tr><td>EXP</td><td>Number of year experience of CEO</td></tr></tbody></table>

#### 3.2.2. The Dependent Variable

Corporate social responsibility is the dependent variable, and CSDR is used as a proxy to measure the CSR of firms under investigation. CSDR is the disclosure of CSR according to GRI standards. The CSR variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CSR report of the firm is according to GRI guidelines and takes the value of 0 otherwise. Following [65] the GRI database is consulted for checking whether or not the firm is following these guidelines or not.

#### 3.2.3. The Independent Variables

The number of directors is the first independent variable measured as the total number of board directors [49].

Size is the second independent variable measured as a firm's total assets [66].

Leverage is the third independent variable measured as the book value of debts/equity [67].
Return on asset is the fourth independent variable measured as net profit/total assets [68].

Tax aggression is the last independent variable measured as the effective tax rate (total tax expense/accounting income before tax) [17].

### 3.2.4. The Moderating Variables

The variables which are expected to moderate the relationship between tax aggression and CSR are:

“Women” are the percentage of women directors in a firm. The ratio of women on board and board size is used as a proxy for this variable [69].

CROW is a moderating variable showing that the CEO of a firm is a woman. A dummy variable takes the value 1 if CEO is a female and 0 otherwise [70].

EXP is the experience of the CEO in years or number of years the CEO served in this position [66].

### 3.3. Models

Model 1 represents the relationship between independent variables and corporate social responsibility.

$$CSR = \beta_0 + \beta_1 NOD + \beta_2 SIZE + \beta_3 LEVG + \beta_4 ROA + \beta_5 TAX + \beta_6 WOMEN + \beta_7 CEOW + \beta_8 EXP + \varepsilon_0$$

Model 2 shows the impact of independent variables, tax aggression with women percentage, as moderating variables, on corporate social responsibility.

$$CSR = \beta_0 + \beta_1 NOD + \beta_2 SIZE + \beta_3 LEVG + \beta_4 ROA + \beta_5 TAX + \beta_6 WOMEN + \beta_7 CEOW + \beta_8 EXP + \beta_9 (WOMEN \times TAX) + \varepsilon_0$$

Model 3—examines the impact of independent variables, tax aggression with a female CEO, as moderating variables, on corporate social responsibility.

$$CSR = \beta_0 + \beta_1 NOD + \beta_2 SIZE + \beta_3 LEVG + \beta_4 ROA + \beta_5 TAX + \beta_6 WOMEN + \beta_7 CEOW + \beta_8 EXP + \beta_9 (CEOW \times TAX) + \varepsilon_0$$

Model 4—investigates the influence of independent variables, tax aggression with CEO experience, as moderating variables, on corporate social responsibility.

$$CSR = \beta_0 + \beta_1 NOD + \beta_2 SIZE + \beta_3 LEVG + \beta_4 ROA + \beta_5 TAX + \beta_6 WOMEN + \beta_7 CEOW + \beta_8 EXP + \beta_9 (EXP \times TAX) + \varepsilon_0$$

Model 5—augment all the independent and moderating variables.

$$CSR = \beta_0 + \beta_1 NOD + \beta_2 SIZE + \beta_3 LEVG + \beta_4 ROA + \beta_5 TAX + \beta_6 WOMEN + \beta_7 CEOW + \beta_8 EXP + \beta_9 (WOMEN \times TAX) + \beta_{10} (CEOW \times TAX) + \beta_{11} (EXP \times TAX) + \varepsilon_0$$

## 4. Empirical Results

### 4.1. Descriptive

Table 2 presents the results regarding the descriptive statistics of study variables. Results suggest that the lowest mean value corresponds to corporate social responsibility (CSR), whereas the return on assets (ROE) has the highest mean value. However, in terms of volatility, women CEO (CEOW) is the least volatile, and return on assets has the highest volatility.

### 4.2. Correlation

The results regarding the correlation analysis are presented in Table 3. According to the results, none of the variables is correlated with the CSR approach of UAE firms.
<table><caption>**Table 2.** Descriptive of studied variables.</caption><thead><tr><th>Variable</th><th>CSR</th><th>NOD</th><th>SIZE</th><th>LEVI</th><th>ROA</th><th>TAX</th><th>WOMEN</th><th>CROW</th><th>EXP</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Mean</td><td>2.521</td><td>14.416</td><td>12.955</td><td>4.253</td><td>73.444</td><td>25.365</td><td>14.953</td><td>6.079</td><td>6.669</td></tr><tr><td>Median</td><td>2.464</td><td>11.746</td><td>13.019</td><td>4.382</td><td>80.000</td><td>25.401</td><td>15.071</td><td>7.011</td><td>7.005</td></tr><tr><td>Maximum</td><td>9.192</td><td>29.361</td><td>18.686</td><td>5.136</td><td>170.000</td><td>36.014</td><td>20.484</td><td>7.133</td><td>7.012</td></tr><tr><td>Minimum</td><td>-3.044</td><td>0.048</td><td>7.380</td><td>1.668</td><td>5.300</td><td>16.514</td><td>9.512</td><td>7.707</td><td>6.462</td></tr><tr><td>Std. Dev.</td><td>2.384</td><td>13.643</td><td>1.952</td><td>0.328</td><td>18.322</td><td>3.277</td><td>1.856</td><td>0.062</td><td>0.145</td></tr></tbody></table>

*Notes*: CSR represents the corporate social responsibility of firms. NOD, SIZE, LEVG, ROA, and TAX are independent variables: number of directors, firm size, leverage of firm, return on asset, and tax aggression, respectively. WOMEN, CEOW, and EXP, are used for moderating that reflects the percentage of women directors, women acting as CEO, and CEO experience, respectively.

<table><caption>**Table 3.** Correlation.</caption><thead><tr><th>Variable</th><th>CSR</th><th>NOD</th><th>SIZE</th><th>LEVI</th><th>ROA</th><th>TAX</th><th>WOMEN</th><th>CROW</th><th>EXP</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>CSR</td><td>1.000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>NOD</td><td>0.263</td><td>1.000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>SIZE</td><td>0.969</td><td>0.286</td><td>1.000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>LEVI</td><td>0.972</td><td>0.379</td><td>0.958</td><td>1.000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ROA</td><td>-0.052</td><td>-0.116</td><td>-0.064</td><td>-0.057</td><td>1.000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>TAX</td><td>0.951</td><td>0.425</td><td>0.969</td><td>0.954</td><td>-0.093</td><td>1.000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>WOMEN</td><td>0.216</td><td>0.046</td><td>0.217</td><td>0.221</td><td>-0.151</td><td>0.204</td><td>1.000</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>CEOW</td><td>0.984</td><td>0.233</td><td>0.978</td><td>0.975</td><td>-0.044</td><td>0.952</td><td>0.227</td><td>1.000</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>EXP</td><td>0.048</td><td>0.076</td><td>0.058</td><td>0.049</td><td>-0.108</td><td>0.080</td><td>0.342</td><td>0.041</td><td>1.000</td></tr></tbody></table>

*Notes*: CSR represents the corporate social responsibility of firms. NOD, SIZE, LEVG, ROA, and TAX are independent variables: number of directors, firm size, leverage of firm, return on asset, and tax aggression, respectively. WOMEN, CEOW, and EXP, are used for moderating that reflects the percentage of women directors, women acting as CEOs, and CEO experience, respectively.

### 4.3. Regression Estimation

The current study uses regression analysis to estimate the OLS coefficients and find the relationship between study variables. The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 4. In Model 1, where all independent variables are added to the equation, only the firm's size is significantly related to the CSR approach at a 1% significance level. The value of the coefficient is -0.192 suggesting the 1% increment in firm size reduces CSR by 0.192%. All other variables are not showing any impact on CSR. As far as Model 2 is concerned, the percentage of women directors (WOMEN) is added in Model 1 as a moderating variable. In this model again, firm size is significantly and negatively related to CSR at a 1% significance level. The coefficient value is -0.086, suggesting that a 1% increase in firm size reduces CSR by 0.086%. The magnitude of impact is reduced as compared to Model 1. Additionally, tax aggression is significantly and negatively related to CSR at a 5% significance level. The value of the coefficient is -0.345 showing that a 1% increase in tax aggressiveness reduces CSR by 0.345%. This result is consistent with the results of [34]. The moderating variable, women directors, shows an insignificant effect on the CSR approach, showing no role of women as directors in the relationship between tax planning and the CSR approach. This result contrasts with previous studies [14,26].

As far as Model 3 is concerned, it is the extension of Model 1 by adding a moderating variable "tax aggression with woman CEO" to check whether or not a woman CEO moderates the relationship between a firm's tax approach and its CSR approach. In this model, the firm's size is significantly and negatively associated with the CSR approach at a 5% level of significance. The coefficient value is -0.024, which means a 1% enhancement in firm size reduces CSR by 0.024%. Additionally, having women as CEOs is significantly and positively related to the CSR approach at a 5% level of significance. The coefficient value is 0.812, which shows that a 1% increase in women CEO enhances CSR by 0.812%. [71] also found that women CEO enhances CSR practices of the firm. As far as the moderation variable is concerned, it can be seen that its coefficient is significant and positive at a 5%
level of significance. This suggests that woman CEO positively moderates the relationship between the tax approach and CSR of firms. More specifically, reduction in CSR due to tax aggression is enhanced when the firm's CEO is a woman. The value of the coefficient is 1.799. Hence, a 1% increase in women CEOs increases the impact of tax aggressiveness on CSR by 1.799%. Additionally, [57] also found that women CEOs are involved in tax aggressiveness more than men.

<table><caption>**Table 4.** Regression estimation (fixed effect method).</caption><thead><tr><th>Variable</th><th>Model 1</th><th>Model 2</th><th>Model 3</th><th>Model 4</th><th>Model 5</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>NOD</td><td>-0.017</td><td>-0.263</td><td>-0.114</td><td>-0.425</td><td>-0.066</td></tr><tr><td>SIZE</td><td>-0.192 ***</td><td>-0.086 ***</td><td>-0.024 **</td><td>-0.783 **</td><td>-1.502 ***</td></tr><tr><td>LEVI</td><td>0.286</td><td>0.854</td><td>0.685</td><td>0.136</td><td>-0.106 *</td></tr><tr><td>ROA</td><td>0.019</td><td>0.051</td><td>0.032</td><td>1.049</td><td>0.253</td></tr><tr><td>TAX</td><td>-0.111</td><td>-0.345 **</td><td>-0.237</td><td>-0.141</td><td>-2.013 ***</td></tr><tr><td>WOMEN</td><td>0.023</td><td>1.633</td><td>0.905</td><td>0.348</td><td>0.801</td></tr><tr><td>CROW</td><td>-1.745</td><td>3.934</td><td>0.812 **</td><td>-0.537</td><td>0.563 *</td></tr><tr><td>EXP</td><td>1.387</td><td>-2.097</td><td>0.656</td><td>-0.992 ***</td><td>-0.143 **</td></tr><tr><td>WOMEN × TAX</td><td></td><td>1.039</td><td></td><td></td><td>2.958</td></tr><tr><td>CEOW × TAX</td><td></td><td></td><td>1.799 **</td><td></td><td>2.563 *</td></tr><tr><td>EXP × TAX</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.447 ***</td><td>-0.018 ***</td></tr><tr><td>Constant</td><td>12.483 ***</td><td>14.754 **</td><td>11.638 ***</td><td>9.642 ***</td><td>15.326 ***</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: CSR represents the corporate social responsibility of firms. NOD, SIZE, LEVG, ROA, and TAX are independent variables: number of directors, size of the firm, leverage of firm, return on asset, and tax aggression, respectively. WOMEN, CEOW, and EXP, are used for moderating that reflects the percentage of women directors, women acting as CEO, and CEO experience, respectively. Model 1 regresses the independent variables. Model 2 incorporates the WOMEN as moderating variables. Model 3 uses CEOW as a moderating variable. Model 4 is about the moderating role of EXP. Model 5 combines all the independent and moderating variables. ***, **, * represents the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.

Turning our attention to Model 4, the role of experience is added as an independent variable. Here, firm size is significantly and negatively related to the CSR approach at a 1% level of significance. The value of the coefficient for firm size in this model is 0.783; hence, if firm size increases by 1%, CSR reduces by 0.783%. All other independent variables are insignificantly related to CSR. However, CEO experience significantly and negatively moderates the relationship between tax aggressiveness and CSR at a 1% level of significance. The value of the coefficient is -0.447; hence, if CEO experience increases by 1%, the impact of tax aggressiveness on CSR reduces by 0.447%. This result is aligned with the results of [63,64]. Model 5 is the final model where all independent and moderating variables are added to the equation simultaneously. Here the majority of the variables are significantly related to CSR. In this regard, firm size is significantly and negatively rated to CSR at a 1% significance level. The coefficient value is -1.502, suggesting that a 1% increment in firm size reduces CSR by 1.502%. Additionally, leverage is significantly and negatively related to CSR at a 10% significance level. The coefficient for leverage is -0.106%; hence, if leverage increases by 1%, CSR decreases by 0.106%. Tax aggression is also significantly and negatively related to CSR at a 1% significance level, suggesting that a 1% improvement in tax aggression reduces CSR by 2.013%. For female CEO directors, it is significantly and positively related to CSR at a 10% significance level. Its coefficient value is 0.563. Hence, a 1% increase in female CSO enhances CSR by 0.563%. However, the experience of the CEO is significantly and negatively related to CSR at a 5% level of significance. This shows that a 1% improvement in CEO experience reduces CSR by 0.143%. When a woman CEO is added as a moderating variable, its coefficient is significant and positive at a 10% significance level. Hence, a female CEO positively moderates the relationship between tax aggressiveness and CSR. The coefficient value is 2.563; hence, if the chances of a woman acting as CEO increase by 1%, the strength of the relationship between tax aggressiveness and CSR increases by 2.563%. In the case of the experience of the CEO as a moderating variable, the coefficient is significant and negative at a 1% level of significance. This shows that CEO experience negatively moderates the relationship between tax aggressiveness and CSR. The coefficient
value is −0.018, which predicts that a 1% improvement in CEO experience reduces the strength of the relationship between tax aggressiveness and CSR by 0.018%.

In terms of the study's hypothesis, H1 is accepted because two models show that their tax planning significantly influences the CSR approach of firms in the UAE. However, H2a is rejected, stating that "Female directors play a moderating role in the relationship between a firm's tax aggressiveness and its CSR approach". Because regression results do not show any significance to having female directors in this relationship, as far as H2b, the "Female CEO moderates the relationship between the firm's tax aggressiveness and its CSR approach" is concerned, it is fully accepted. The same is true for H2c because regression results prove that CEO experience on a corporate board influences the relationship between tax aggressiveness and the CSR approach. Hence H2c is also accepted.

### 4.4. Robust Estimation

In order to check the robustness of results, OLS regression with random effect is also used, and results are reported in Table 5. Like the fixed effect, firm size is significantly related to the CSR approach. However, in most of the models, a significant positive relation is found, suggesting that firm size enhances the CSR approach. The firm's leverage does not significantly affect the CSR approach, and one model suggests that leverage reduces CSR. In the case of tax aggressiveness, four out of five models suggest that it significantly and negatively affects the CSR approach, and increased tax planning reduces CSR. Having a female CEO is significantly and positively related to the CSR approach. Hence, it can be said that female CEOs can enhance CSR. However, the experience of the CEO is significantly and positively related to CSR in Model 4 but significantly and negatively related to CSR in Model 5. It can be seen that female directors do not show any moderating effect on the relationship between the firm's tax aggressiveness and its CSR approach.

<table><caption>**Table 5.** Regression estimation (random effect method).</caption><thead><tr><th>Variable</th><th>Model 1</th><th>Model 2</th><th>Model 3</th><th>Model 4</th><th>Model 5</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>NOD</td><td>0.282</td><td>0.086</td><td>0.914</td><td>0.003</td><td>-0.128</td></tr><tr><td>SIZE</td><td>-0.305 ***</td><td>0.744 ***</td><td>0.719 **</td><td>0.437 **</td><td>-0.021 *</td></tr><tr><td>LEVI</td><td>-0.239</td><td>0.057</td><td>0.071</td><td>0.957</td><td>-0.776 **</td></tr><tr><td>ROA</td><td>0.025</td><td>0.028</td><td>0.135</td><td>-0.584</td><td>-0.210</td></tr><tr><td>TAX</td><td>0.097</td><td>-2.543 **</td><td>-4.525 **</td><td>-0.234 *</td><td>-0.008 **</td></tr><tr><td>WOMEN</td><td>0.041</td><td>0.078</td><td>0.125</td><td>0.004</td><td>0.052</td></tr><tr><td>CROW</td><td>0.572</td><td>0.027</td><td>0.102 **</td><td>0.132 **</td><td>0.046 ***</td></tr><tr><td>EXP</td><td>-0.157</td><td>0.152</td><td>0.262</td><td>0.519 ***</td><td>-0.232 **</td></tr><tr><td>WOMEN × TAX</td><td></td><td>-0.013</td><td></td><td></td><td>2.154</td></tr><tr><td>CEOW × TAX</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.698 **</td><td></td><td>2.347 **</td></tr><tr><td>EXP × TAX</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.351 **</td><td>-0.154 ***</td></tr><tr><td>Constant</td><td>9.346 ***</td><td>11.842 *</td><td>19.233 ***</td><td>17.095 ***</td><td>6.206 **</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: CSR represents the corporate social responsibility of firms. NOD, SIZE, LEVG, ROA, and TAX are independent variables which are the number of directors, size of firm, leverage of firm, return on asset, and tax aggression, respectively. WOMEN, CEOW, and EXP are used for moderating that reflects the percentage of women directors, women acting as CEOs, and the experience of CEOs, respectively. Model 1 regresses the independent variables. Model 2 incorporates the WOMEN as moderating variables. Model 3 uses CEOW as a moderating variable. Model 4 is about the moderating role of EXP. Model 5 combines all the independent and moderating variables. ***, **, * represents the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.

Nevertheless, it is evident that having a female CEO positively moderates the relationship between a firm's tax aggressiveness and its CSR approach. The direction of impact is positive. Hence, the female CEO enhances the negative impact of tax aggressiveness on the CSR approach. Likewise, the experience of the CEO also moderates the relationship between tax aggressiveness and the CSR approach. However, CEO experience reduces the strength of the negative impact of tax aggressiveness on the CSR approach.
## 4.5. Discussion

It is found that tax planning negatively affects the CSR approach of UAE firms. A plausible explanation of this negative impact is explained by [72], who asserts that socially responsible firms usually pay their taxes fairly. Paying taxes is an important way to engage positively with society. Additionally, when firms engage in tax aggression, they avoid those payments used for public welfare. Hence, avoiding taxes makes fewer funds available for the government to use for public services. As far as gender diversity is concerned, it is noted that the gender diversity of board members or specifically women directors does not impact the negative association between tax planning and CSR. One of the most prominent reasons for this is the strong male dominance in the UAE. The same affects women's performances toward their professional goals [73]. This hinders them from acting reasonably to reduce the harmful impacts of tax planning on the CSR initiatives of UAE firms. The same is true for female CEOs because it is noted that they are also involved in tax planning resulting in lower CSR practices.

The current study has significance for companies operating in the UAE because now these firms can check which factor is leading to a decline in CSR performance. Now it is clear that tax planning plays a major role in the reduction of the CRS performance of these firms. Hence, the management will take proper steps to avoid tax planning. Additionally, due to the overall image of these firms being affected by the reduction in CSR performance, with proper measures, firms will be able to restore their image in society. Another significance of the findings of this study is that they shed light on the major problem of the reduced female presence in firms. Firms can benefit from the experience and the intellects of females by making them part of their boards. This is due to the fact that, as previously stated, females are capable of controlling tax evasion and misconduct within the firm. In addition, by reducing male dominance at the corporate level, firms can now control discrimination against females within the firm and assist them in decision-making.

## 5. Conclusions and Policy Implications

The current study is intended to explore the role of the board's gender diversity and experience in the relationship between tax planning and corporate social responsibility in UAE firms. Results of the study show that tax planning reduces the CSR of these firms. Additionally, it is noted that if a firm has a female CEO, then it enhances the negative impact of tax planning on CSR. However, a more experienced CEO can help reduce this negative impact. It is also proved that board gender diversity has no role in the relationship between tax planning and CSR. The results of the study are aligned with the findings of previous studies, except for the experience of the CEOs. The higher experiences of the CEOs will lead to minimizing the CSR of the firms, as reported in Models 4 and 5. Alongside this, existing concepts in the field also provide support for the findings. This is due to the fact that society never allows businesses to profit without considering the effects of their operations and practices on society and the environment. The same is true for tax planning because, through tax planning, firms try to reduce funds that could be otherwise used for the welfare of society.

Based on these results, some practical implications for policymakers, managers, and governments are as follows: efforts should be diverted toward the involvement of female directors in corporate decision-making. This can be done by introducing strict guidelines regarding attending meetings, and female directors should be bound to attend annual and interim meetings. Through this, they would better understand the decisions of the firm and the impact of these decisions on different stakeholders. Additionally, it should be made sure that female directors are involved in decision making so that the firm's ethical strategies can be designed with their recommendations. Additionally, it is suggested that policymakers should put forward extra efforts to discover why female CEOs are not playing a positive role in enhancing CSR practices by reducing the likelihood of tax planning. Female CEOs can help firms reduce reputational costs, and an improved relationship with different stakeholders can be achieved. However, there should be checks and balances for this
purpose, to reduce these CEOs' unethical practices. Additionally, male domination should
be discouraged so that women on the corporate board can play their essential role in
forming those types of tax strategies that are beneficial not only for internal stakeholders
but also for the community.

**Author Contributions:** N.E. designed the main idea and writing. R.W. performed the analysis and reviewed the manuscript. S.S. reviewed the draft. G.A. drafted and reviewed the manuscript. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not applicable.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Data Availability Statement:** All relevant data is included in the paper and its supporting information files are available upon request.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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