# Introduction: Surviving Egypt's Foreclosed Revolution

Marie Vannetzel, Marine Poirier

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Marie Vannetzel, Marine Poirier. Introduction: Surviving Egypt's Foreclosed Revolution. Middle East Critique, 2025, Surviving Egypt's Foreclosed Revolution, 34 (3), pp.377-387. 10.1080/19436149.2025.2503600. hal-05507756

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**Special Issue Middle East Critique**

**Introduction. Surviving Egypt's Foreclosed Revolution**

Marie Vannetzel and Marine Poirier

Aix Marseille Université, CNRS, IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence, France

marie.vannetzel@gmail.com

poiriermarine@gmail.com

What happens in the wake of a revolution? How do various social actors navigate life after the revolutionary moment and its myriad possibilities have waned? How do the transformative events of a revolution continue to reverberate in its aftermath? How, also, do these reverberations combine with coexisting strivings for an orderly return to daily life, security, and perhaps, normality?

While extensive literature exists on how to conceptualize revolutions,<fnref n="1" /> less focus has been placed on understanding what transpires when revolutions conclude and authoritarian regimes re-emerge. Notable exceptions include special issues published by Middle East Critique since 2017, which explore topics like the ‘ends of Revolution’ (Haugbolle and Bandak, 2017), the shaping of ‘new everyday s in conflict-ridden environments’ (Capasso, 2018), and ‘the politics of time’ post-uprising (Roccu and Salem, 2019). The present special issue aspires to deepen this line of inquiry by offering a substantive theory on the aftermath of revolutionary events, an area we believe remains underexplored.<fnref n="2" />

<footnote n="1">¹ Among these, and about the Egyptian case: (De Smet, 2016; Ketchley, 2017; Volpi and Jasper, 2018; Armbrust, 2019; Barbary, 2019; El Chazli, 2020; El-Ghobashy, 2021; Rommel, 2021; Said, 2022).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² This special issue is based on a conversation that started with a panel at the MESA Congress in New Orleans in 2019, and later developed throughout long term exchanges among authors. We have all spent several years living in Egypt during the last two decades, conducting various immersive</footnote>
In the case of Egypt, where the post-2013 regime has been described as a forerunner in
the ‘global emergence of new authoritarianism’ (Armbrust, 2017) scholarship has largely
examined the regime's repressive and neoliberal characteristics (Abdelrahman, 2017; Joya,
2018; Khalil and Dill, 2018; Adly, 2021), counter-revolutionary dynamics, or the reasons
behind the Revolution’s failure (Said, 2021; Del Panta, 2022). Some work has focused on
activists’ emotional and psychological toll due to this perceived failure (Matthies-Boon, 2017;
Allam, 2018; Amin, 2021; Malmström, 2021), while other studies are investigating the subtle
forms of political dissent that are quietly arising (El Nour, Elaydi and Hussein, 2021; Marchi,
2021; Grimm, 2022). However, the nuanced consequences and experiential dimensions of life
after the revolution have often been overlooked.<fnref n="3" />

To address this gap, this special issue leans on the concept of *foreclosure*, a term we
adopt from Allal and Vannetzel (Allal and Vannetzel, 2017) and expand further. The concept
of *foreclosure* varies in meaning depending on the field in which it is used. We are primarily
using *foreclosure* in a sense derivative of its legal and economic definition, but applied to the
sociopolitical realm. In legal and economic contexts, foreclosure generally refers to the
process by which a lender takes control of a property after the borrower has failed to meet the
requirements of their mortgage or loan agreement. It designates the process by which the
lender immediately terminates any future use by the borrower of the right to redeem their
property. Therefore, foreclosure signals the end of one’s claim to a property, the clearance of
any ‘cloud on title’ or uncertainty about the status of this property, and the final repossession

fieldwork in which our conceptual approach is grounded. By the time of writing the final version of this introduction, new compelling articles have addressed similar questions (Al-Khalili, 2023; Kreil and Schielke, 2023; Naeff, 2023; Wilson, 2023; Aly, 2024; Hassabo and Ruiz de Elvira, 2025; Mittermaier, 2025).

<footnote n="3">³ Rommel explores this aspect in (Rommel, 2021, pp. 165–210, 219–235). Also (Kreil and Schielke, 2023; Mittermaier, 2025)</footnote>
of it by someone else. Essentially, then, foreclosure describes a ‘too late’ moment for
reversing course, and the apparent resettling of an orderly state of affairs (repaid debt and
clear title). Yet, foreclosure may also be the very mechanism by which a crisis accentuates:
the repossession of the property leads to it being put up for sale and ends up accelerating the
fall in property prices – hence furthering unsettling processes.

While it sounds specific and technical, the concept of foreclosure enables to
metaphorically grasp the complex, bi-directional dynamic at play in post-revolutionary
contexts. Foreclosure implies the shutting down of possible options, the closing off of future
potentialities—again, a ‘point of no return’ or a ‘too late’ moment – while it claims to
reinstate a clear control of affairs. But the latter, in itself, paves the way for further
destabilization. Here, lender and borrower identities are not fixed and more intricated than in
the context of a property claim, as is the object of the dispossession/repossession process. But
the crux of the metaphor lies in the paradox that the concept of foreclosure articulates: the
simultaneous yet contradictory feelings of ‘nothing can change anymore’ and ‘everything is
changing in a destabilizing way.’ This creates a unique tension and constrains agency, as
people perceive themselves caught in a state where transformative potential seems frozen,
even while the ground beneath them is shifting.

The aim of this special issue is to delve into this paradox, by first theorizing it (in this
introduction) and then exploring its lived experiences in various social contexts in Egypt, such
as activists' homes, families of martyrs, literary clubs, football stadiums, or within the circles
of purged Mubarak-era officials. Rooting the analysis at the micro-level, the articles herein
scrutinize diverse cross-sections of Egyptian society and furnish an innovative conceptual
framework for understanding the lingering impact of what we term a foreclosed revolution.

The Dual Faces of Foreclosure: Fading Illusio and Unstable Order

Moments of revolution are characterized by heightened expectations and increased
engagement from various stakeholders. These actors believe in their ability to harness new
avenues of change and share a collective conviction that their united actions can alter the
political landscape. These situations can be described as 'fluid conjunctures' (Dobry, 2009)
where there is a pervasive sense of collective confidence in the possibility of meaningful
change. This collective sentiment aligns closely with Pierre Bourdieu's concept of 'illusio'
(Bourdieu, 1991) which refers to the shared faith in the importance and potential outcomes of
a particular social game. In other words, in revolutionary situations, social actors are deeply
invested in the political 'game', and believe that their participation can yield significant
change. However, in the wake of revolutions, this illusio often dissipates, causing social
actors to question the potential for real, lasting change.

Foreclosure captures a pivotal moment in revolutionary dynamics: the fading of the
revolutionary *illusio*. This concept operates primarily at the perceptual level. Whereas
previously everything seemed within reach, suddenly all doors seem shut. Social actors' faith
in their capacity to drive change dwindles. The initial belief in the possibility of revolutionary
change is supplanted by a pervasive sentiment that the window for change or action has
definitively closed. The revolutionary fervor that once made systemic change seem possible
has now been quelled and replaced by the perception that the re-emergent authoritarian order
might reign indefinitely. Foreclosure denotes a 'missed-the-moment' sentiment, where
individuals feel they have let their *illusio* slip away. This realization is elusive; it manifests at
different moments for various actors, many of whom only come to terms with their
disillusionment in hindsight. When the perceived 'expiry date' for change has passed, there is
a looming sense of perpetual stagnation—a belief that change has become an unreachable
ideal. For those invested in the revolution, this is a bitter pill of perceived failure. Yet, for
others, it is a welcome return to the semblance of stability lost in the revolutionary tumult.
In this context, the metaphorical ‘borrowers’ are indeed far from united. The object they had acquired, during the revolution, was the margin for transformative action which temporarily emerged from the rapid de-institutionalisation triggered by the ‘within-crisis dynamics’ (Volpi and Gerschewski, 2020). The president was dismissed, police stations were attacked, the hegemonic National Democratic Party was in flames, and the military appeared to support – for a limited time – the people’s regained agency. A parliament was elected then dissolved, as was the constituent assembly; a president won a transparent election then was overthrown. For two years, most institutions lacked the power of ruling. As diverse as they were, revolutionary participants, political parties, former incumbent elites and their supporters, made variegated uses of the mutual uncertainty (Ermakoff, 2015) they were experiencing. Following different situational logics, they all benefited, in some way or another, from the new margin for action opened by de-institutionalisation – at least, for example, to break rules (trespassing, building without permit, selling goods in the street, etc.) and increase small parcels of power in the absence of government controls.

Soon enough, however, many were those ‘borrowers’ of agency who longed for a return of ordinary routines. As Aymon Kreil and Samuli Schielke rightly point out, to many people, ‘a restoration of the power of institutions was a necessary condition for a secure existence’, as the ‘security vacuum (al-infilat al-amni) more than politics was the overt concern’ for them (Kreil and Schielke, 2023, pp. 48, 46). It could be argued that the revolutionary illusio – the belief in collective change – arose among large segments of the population who did not engage in politics, even if in the tenuous form of ‘accepting [change] as a fact once it happens’ (Ibid., p. 48). Although there are only scarce accounts of how the revolution was lived far away from big cities, they tend to show much more than mere indifference, as people there ‘[felt] themselves to be in a national space despite a history of
marginalization' (Abu-Lughod, 2012).<fnref n="4" /> However, this *illusio* rapidly dissipated and gave way
to the 'conservative utopia of a good life that supposedly already exists' – that is, of ‘an
ordinary and orderly, safe life devoid of surprises' (Kreil and Schielke, 2023, p. 49). This
desire motivated demonstrators on 30 June 2013 and was, at the time, successfully addressed
by the 'promise of stability under a military leader' (Ibid., p. 51), epitomized by the person of
Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi. 'Lenders' – new and not-so-new ruling elites – took back any parcel of
agency or margin for action, and foreclosed the revolution. They were joined in this
foreclosure process by former disillusioned 'borrowers' who not only backed the military
coup,<fnref n="5" /> but 'worked to maintain or restore a degree of normality' (Ibid., p. 46) by performing
ordinary routines in spite of the violent events which were taking place at the time – 'as if
everything was all right' (Ibid., p. 53).

However, Kreil and Schielke also reach to the conclusion that stability, or normality,
'has a utopian aspect when the here and now is presented as something that supposedly
already exists and is simultaneously evoked as an ideal to be achieved or restored – yet it may
remain unachieved in the here and now' (Ibid., p. 51). By this they mean that, in post-2013
Egypt, the striving for normality is mostly faced with a 'constant process of unsettling' (Ibid.,
p. 56), to the extent that normality has become the paradoxical aspiration for a stable reality,
which, on the grounds proves uncertain and changing. For if Sisi 'embod[ied] normality as a
political project' (Ibid., p. 47) in the eyes of those who supported him, he has also 'promised
to change Egypt beyond recognition through spectacular development projects' (Ibid., p. 56).

This conclusion resonates with our own hypothesis about the second inherent dynamic
of foreclosure: the constant unsettling of norms and routines. Whilst it purports to reinstate

<footnote n="4">⁴ See also Anna Roussillon’s film “Je suis le people” (2016) and (Ahmed, no date)</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ It is important to note that many other ‘borrowers’ of agency felt a surge of revolutionary *illusio* on 30 June 2013, as they perceived it as a new phase in the course of revolution, and believed that military intervention would only be temporary.</footnote>
unambiguous oversight, foreclosure per se engenders additional destabilization. This stands in
stark contrast to the internalized belief in a return to stability. Objectively, there has been no
immediate resumption of a stable political order, as the emergent authoritarian regime has
kept disrupting established social and political frameworks. This should not downplay the
regime's heavy use of repression and its unmistakably dictatorial character. Still, Sisi's regime
stands out, driven by a deeper intent: not just to erase revolution, but to fundamentally
remodel the fabric of Egyptian state and society.

Since President Sisi institutionalized his power in 2014, a strong governing direction
has been established. Yet, this post-revolutionary era is marked by a widespread sense of
destabilization that resonates among various social actors. The fading of *illusio* didn't return
them to a familiar state of affairs. They have lost faith in the possibilities of the present and
future, yet they cannot revert to their pre-revolutionary ways of living. A barrage of new laws,
regulations, and rules have been introduced, overhauling multiple sectors of institutional,
social, and economic life. Administrative purges and the unpredictable actions of the security
state add to the sentiment that the boundaries of what is permissible remain in flux. At the
same time, ordinary routines —both formal and informal—that once regulated the social
fabric are under threat, such as the ‘quiet encroachments’ outlined by Asef Bayat (Bayat,
2013), which are increasingly being constrained. For example, new strict regulations targeting
informal housing, electricity theft or alleged undue access to food subsidies suggest a regime
intent on eradicating these previously widespread forms of autonomous activity (Allal and
Chazli, 2022; Vannetzel, 2024). In this volume, we posit that the combination between the
emptying of hope for change (the erosion of *illusio*) and the permanent experiencing of
change (destabilization without agency) impacts not just the potential for collective
subversion, but also individual pursuits of ordinary life.
For Kreil and Schielke, these unsettling processes are the hallmarks of a global condition, characterized by globalization, mobility and the growth-based economy (Kreil and Schielke, 2023, p. 56). However here, we argue that there is something more specific to the foreclosure process and the temporal limbo which it generates.

## Post-revolutionary Liminality and the Social Scenes of ‘Devenir’

Drawing on the insights of Lucie Ryzova (Ryzova, 2020) and Walter Armbrust (Armbrust, 2019), who offered a compelling framework for understanding the Egyptian revolution as ‘a liminal crisis,’ we propose that the foreclosure of the revolution creates a unique form of liminality.

Ryzova and Armbrust build on the traditional anthropological notion of liminality as a ‘ritual process’ from which there is ‘no known exit’ (Armbrust, 2017, p. 226), a temporal limbo characterized by the quality of being in-between. In this perspective, revolution is analyzed as a transition that involves ‘breaking away from social norms, and entering into a liminal phase in which normative social conventions are expected to be overturned’ (Idem). Still, nobody knows in advance how this transition is supposed to end. Although both authors agree that the Egyptian revolution ended during the summer of 2013, they differ in their assessment of the closure of liminality. Ryzova argues that liminality has distinctly ended with the Rab‘a massacre, which ‘was a clear temporal ending (even if often realized retrospectively) [that] added to the strength of this experience a complete temporal bracket’ (Ryzova, 2020, p. 8). While recognizing that the liminality of the revolution ended there, Armbrust identifies a more global, long-term, and ‘structured liminality of precarious neoliberalism’ (Armbrust, 2017, p. 235) a core condition of modern capitalism that, in his
view, is still ongoing. His argument concurs with Kreil and Schielke’s suggestion that instability is now a global condition.<fnref n="6" />

Taking these foundational ideas further, we ask two overlooked questions. First, if the bracket of the liminal crisis is closed, does this mean that its effects have been completely eradicated? The revolutionary *illusio* may have dissipated, but its haunting residue continues to shape political subjectivities, social activities and everyday life.<fnref n="7" /> How does the liminal crisis continue to exert influence beyond its ‘expiry date’? Second, how is the pervasive structural liminality of precarious neoliberalism manifested in the Egyptian *foreclosure* context?

We argue that this specific context adds another layer of instability to the global trend of precariousness, exacerbating insecurity for actors who, while they experience the strong rule of the regime, have no known way out of liminality. What we call post-revolutionary liminality results from foreclosure, and bears its defining features: the evaporating yet lingering presence of the revolutionary *illusio*, along with a deep destabilization of once-reliable routines and norms. The re-aggregation phase, in which routines and institutions crystallize once again and bring liminality to an end, seems to be hampered by the regime’s ambition to reformulate social interactions and disrupt previous ways of navigating rules, securing positions, and leading ordinary lives. Unlike Mubarak’s regime (Makram Ebeid, 2012), the current government neither seeks nor succeeds in restoring an impression of stability. Instead, it thrives on the daily disturbance of established scripts or conventional ways of behaving and interacting.

<footnote n="6">⁶ On the more general argument of modernity as ‘permanent liminality’, see (Thomassen, 2014; Szakolczai, 2016).</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ On the idea of ‘haunting’ in post-revolutionary times, see (Scott, 2014).</footnote>
This specific form of compounded liminality is encapsulated in a complex temporal limbo. As previously discussed, the process of foreclosure generates a muddled temporal experience. Transformative actions, whether collective or individual, seem to have reached their ‘expiry date,’ while the older action scripts that once guided routine behaviors are now thrown into disarray by new, unsettling orientations. In this light, foreclosure does not completely shut the door on change and movement; it defines an ambivalent moment where change seems halted yet is still unfolding everywhere.

The social actors examined in this volume articulate dual sentiments of stagnation— where efforts to induce change seem futile—and bewilderment over the pervasive disarray of norms and routines. In their quest for some semblance of daily order, they inhabit a state of ‘devenir’ (Deleuze, 1969) conflicted by opposing drives and conditions rooted in diverse temporalities.

Youssef El Chazli portrays the post-revolutionary *devenirs* of former activists, whose belief in transformative collective action has faded, but who nonetheless seek to shape the future by proxy through their children. The seemingly mundane choices they make today — such as riding a bike, becoming vegetarian or having the family vote on the evening’s TV program —are laden with the mission of empowering their children to instigate future change. His research highlights how ‘parenthood might appear as one of the possible sites to extend political commitment in times of revolutionary foreclosure.’ For these participants to the revolution who were already adults and parents of grown children when they took to the streets, the fading of *illusio* proves ambivalent as they cannot just turn their back on revolutionary values and beliefs: to do so would mean ‘losing face in front of one’s children, a harsh burden to bear’. Here, in the domestic space, *illusio* is therefore discreetly cultivated, and small but pervasive daily changes keep any return to unquestioned normality at bay.
In the same vein, Marie Vannetzel’s piece focuses, not on the children, but on the parents and siblings of revolutionary participants. She emphasizes that middle-class conventional notions of a ‘normal life’ are not just increasingly unattainable, but have also lost their allure. As her ethnography of an exiled political activist’s family illustrates, the lingering echoes of the revolutionary *illusio*, coupled with the stumbling blocks introduced by crippling austerity measures, provoke family members —who themselves were not active participants in collective actions—to ‘rethink their own normalities, defined not as conformity to the fully conventional, but as modified norms through which the subject feels s/he conforms to her/himself.’ However, unlike El Chazli’s activists who purposely choose alternative paths, this questioning of normality comes along with worries about mental well-being. Far from being isolated, individual issues, the article argues that these concerns stem from the specific governmentality of the al-Sisi regime, which is based on ‘imperilment.’

Contributions by Carl Rommel and Giedre Šabasevičiūtė also shed light on the fraught process of redefining normality amidst the complexities of post-revolutionary liminality. As it cannot be merely restored, normality must be re-imagined and reconstructed, a daunting endeavor that raises critical questions about what ‘normal’ truly means, and importantly, for whom. In his article, Rommel posits that, prior to the 2011 Revolution, football served as a potent mechanism for crafting what felt like normality. However, the restructured football industry—with its exclusive new military-led stadiums, digital ticket systems, stringent regulations, and elevated prices—fails to forge a normality that comes across as truly normal for the majority of fans. These fans, who predominantly hail from working and middle-class backgrounds, feel increasingly alienated from this reframing of football normality, which attempts to ‘stage’ the new versions of the Egyptian state and the national community. As Rommel’s ethnography shows, ‘this inability of (...) to forge a normality that resonated
widely might tell us something of value about the Egyptian counterrevolution's failure to
bring about much desired social, economic, and moral stability.'

Exploring exclusionary divides further, Šabasevičiūtė centers the ‘schismogenetic normality’ that resulted from the violent summer of 2013 – a normality in which the Muslim Brothers are excommunicated and one that fundamentally rests on violence. In this context, she asks, ‘how can we understand the possibility of spaces that escaped its crushing power,’ such as the literary club that she investigates? The latter, for a few years after 2013, paradoxically brought together former supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and partisans of al-Sisi. In this peculiar space, as in other literary clubs, rituals of honoring (the code of *karam* and its organized distribution of roles) ensured that all participants were welcome, regardless of their past political choices. Spaces of literature ‘nestle within the cracks of the surrounding schismogenetic normality’ and allow participants to escape it, at least temporarily. But when rituals go awry and role distribution is disturbed, suspicions of partisan loyalties resurface, threatening this fragile sense of unity. As Šabasevičiūtė shows, the rapid macro-transformations that are reshaping the urban fabric endanger the survival of these spaces, making it increasingly exceptional to evade polarization and feelings of enmity.

Pursuing the study of groups that do not fit into the divisive and unstable normality, Sixtine Deroure looks at the very special and highly symbolic case of the families of revolutionary martyrs. Her research illuminates how these families are kept ‘in a state of uncertainty characteristic of post-revolutionary liminality.’ While they are forced out from the revolutionary past as the death of their loved ones is being erased from public memory, they are still being recognized as a specific category entitled to benefits and care. Deroure argues that beyond exerting control over the martyrdom narrative through material compensation, the continued recognition of revolutionary martyrs’ families suggests the persistence of a ‘revolutionary grip’ onto the state institutions. But she also shows how institutional
fragmentation and changing rules constantly threaten the status of these families. They are
more and more marginalized by another category, modelled on them and yet deeply
antagonistic: that of the ‘martyrs of duty’, i.e. soldiers and policemen killed in action.

Marine Poirier’s article shifts the lens to the expected winners of the revolution’s foreclosure: Mubarak’s statesmen and crony capitalists. Unlike the social actors examined elsewhere in this issue, these figures never experienced the revolutionary *illusio*. Prosecuted in highly publicized trials, they secured rapid acquittals and negotiated settlements, a process accelerated after the 2015 reform of the Illicit Gains Authority. Yet the revolution’s foreclosure, while resulting in de facto acquittals, produced neither systematic political rehabilitation, nor integration into the Sisi regime. These ‘lenders’ uneven attempts to ‘reverse the course’ reveal the persistent ‘stain’ of association with Mubarak’s former regime. Some leveraged economic capital, expertise and international networks to recover their standing and regain positions, but this never amounted to a return to the old status quo’s ‘normality’. The regime’s reconfiguration continues to reshuffle elite competition, disrupting former scripts and offering few paths for upfront political reincorporation.

In sum, this collection of articles exposes the intricate complexities of post-
revolutionary life in Egypt, unveiling a landscape where traditional scripts—be they related to
‘normality,’ power structures, or social ties—are under constant renegotiation. This Special
Issue illustrates that it is precisely this precarious, continuously disrupted liminality that
serves as a defining characteristic of the current regime. From disoriented football fans to
struggling middle-class families, and even the former power-brokers of the Mubarak era, the
elusive quest for stability is a shared ordeal. Far from restoring a sense of normalcy, the
regime seems to thrive on perpetuating daily disruptions, marking an enduring state of
liminality as not merely a residue of revolution but a structural feature of contemporary
Egyptian society. This persistent liminality not only lends insight into the intricacies of
Egypt's current social fabric, but it also raises pressing questions for future research: How sustainable is this ongoing state of collective liminality? What are the long-term implications for the social and political future of Egypt and other societies experiencing similar post-revolutionary conditions? The lived experiences of the Egyptian Revolution and its aftermath continue to reverberate through these questions, shaping not just individual fates but the collective narrative of a nation in flux.

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