# Post-COVID-19 World Politics and Conservative-Progressive Competition: Why Africa Might Find Itself in a Complex Dilemma?

Benjamin Mwadi Makengo, Koleayo Omoyajowo

► To cite this version:

Benjamin Mwadi Makengo, Koleayo Omoyajowo. Post-COVID-19 World Politics and Conservative-Progressive Competition: Why Africa Might Find Itself in a Complex Dilemma?. Academia Letters, 2021, 10.20935/al3283. hal-03652659

HAL Id: hal-03652659

https://hal.science/hal-03652659

Submitted on 26 Apr 2022

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.

<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>

Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
*Post-COVID-19 World Politics and*
*Conservative-Progressive Competition: Why Africa Might*
*Find Itself in a Complex Dilemma?*

Benjamin Mwadi Makengo, University Of Kinshasa
Koleayo Omoyajowo, University of Lagos

**Abstract**

This paper intends to briefly present the most possible scenario of the post-COVID-19 world politics situation, and then to explain why the latter with the “conservative-progressive competition” is more likely to place Africa in a “complex dilemma”. After a short debate and discussion, our result shows that, we are moving towards a more complex world politics than those of before and during COVID-19. A world that is going to be dominated by “conservative-progressive competition”. Projected as: a more suspicion and uncertainty, and a more competitive and clearly divided world, is more likely to place Africa in a “complex dilemma”. Just because the various Africa’s weaknesses and problems—its “complex dependence” on the “conservatives” and “progressives”, its lack of unity or fragile unity, and its political governance and leadership’s problems, make the costs of all its possible choices complex. It is up to Africa to be well prepared for its best survival.

**Keywords:** Complex Dilemma, Conservative-Progressive Competition, Post-COVID-19 World Politics, Africa's Fragile and Weak States
# 1. Introduction

Since the early 21st century, world politics is becoming more and more complex due to a num-
ber of events' succession that have taken place in the international arena. Among those events,
the attacks of September 11, 2001, the subprime crisis, the relative decline of Western power,
the rise of China and the increasing resurrection of Russian power in the international arena
cannot be overemphasized (Fukuyama, 2020; Makengo, 2021b; Makengo, 2020e). With the
recent COVID-19 pandemic added to the list of these events, the increasing complexity of the
world politics has just received a greater impact and intention (Makengo, 2021a). The pre-
COVID-19 world politics is no longer equal to that of during COVID-19 wind, nor will it be
equal to that of the post-COVID-19 era. Because COVID-19, itself—as an event, has come to
play an accelerator role of other events in the international arena—by reshaping geopolitics
and public policy. Events that are expected to occur over time, COVID-19 has just come to
accelerate them. And the most important of them is the rise of the “conservative-progressive
competition” to a higher level than of before COVID-19. It is Competition between those who
want to maintain their dominance, power and influence around the world, in such in a region,
activity or field—the “conservatives”, and those who push for change—the “progressives”—
competition of older against newer influences (Makengo, 2020b; Makengo, 2020c; Makengo,
2020d; Makengo, 2021b). Of course, this competition is well dominated respectively by the
United States and China, both accompanied by their allies and/or relatives. It can be seen
in different creeks around the world, considered strategic by each other—to mention only
the fields of high technology, energy and digital, and the corners of the South China Sea,
the Middle East...(Petsinger, Wang, Jie, & Crabtree, 2019, Makengo, 2020c). The African
continent is not an exception; it is also one of the corners where this competition is taking
place. Why is this competition also taking place in Africa? Is its market of more than a bil-
lion inhabitants, its raw materials, its fifty-four reliable allies or friends and its geostrategic
[geopolitical] value, that matter? But this “conservative-progressive competition” in the post-
COVID-19 world politics may well place Africa in a “complex dilemma”. More importantly,
it is very imperative to understand the direct impact of “conservative-progressive competi-
tion” in on Africa and why is Africa likely to face a “complex dilemma” with this competition
in the post-COVID-19 world politics?

Based on the existing literature, a good number of scholars are already projecting the great
power competition paradigm, a scenario that can be referred to as the new “US-China cold
war”, drawing insights from the case of US-USSR cold war (Christopher, L. 2020; Wenzhao
& Shengwei 2020; Gregory, 2011). Others did not consider the fact that Xi Jinping’s China
differs from Stalin’s USSR in ideology, strategy and economy levels [unlike to the USSR,
China is not really interested in ideological issues, nor the pronounced interference in the internal affairs of other states—its pledges to the famous principles of peaceful coexistence, but rather it is well interested in economic issues, despite the fact that its gross domestic product (GDP) is still ostensibly below 80% of US’s GDP] (Makengo, 2020c; Makengo, 2020e). Some recent studies pinpointed that we are gradually moving into a phase where each state would deliberately choose sides against the other—either close to the United States or close to China — [which would not be easy for many states having both strong relations with China and the Western world—US, to mention here only the case of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)] (Makengo, 2020c). However, a well-heralded opinion suggests neutralism to a number of states—playing along with the United States and China—which would be a difficult task for weak and fragile states, once again, DRC can also serve as an example here (Makengo, 2020c). The important observation here is that these existing trends did not analyze in depth the cases of the fragile and weak states that are mostly found on the African continent. States where not only the choice of one side against another does not seem to be easy for them, but also the game of neutralism. The gap that this paper wants to cover, by rising the conception of the “complex dilemma”.

Against this backdrop, this paper intends to explain succinctly, the most possible scenario of the post-COVID-19 world politics situation, to explain why the post-COVID-19 world politics with the “conservative-progressive competition” is more likely to place Africa in a “complex dilemma”.

**2. How Would the Post-COVID-19 World Politics be like?**

We believe that the post-COVID-19 world politics is going to be a more complex following the rise of “conservative-progressive competition” in the international arena (Makengo, 2021b). We project it as: a more suspicious and uncertain, and a more competitive and clearly divided world. A world where it would not be easy to manage not only the relations of the great powers among themselves, but also those of the great powers and the rest of the categories of states, and likewise for those of the rest of the categories of states among themselves. For it is suspicion, uncertainty, competition and division that will take over in these relations (Makengo, 2020e).

**2.1. A More Suspicion and Uncertainty World**

Mutual “conservative-progressive” suspicions and uncertainties are literally going to increase in the post-COVID-19 world politics. Although negotiations and discussions are going on,
but we project that mutual distrust, suspicion, mistrust and accusations will further dominate
“conservative-progressive relations” in the post-COVID-19 world. Just because the mutual
“conservative-progressive” accusations, suspicions and uncertainties during this COVID-19
period have served precisely to reinforce mistrust and diminish mutual trust between the two
blocs — “conservative” and “progressive” (Makengo, 2021b). This will serve as a spring-
board for further mutual suspicions and uncertainties between these two blocs in the post-
COVID-19 world. It is deducible that with the mutual accusations and suspicions of these
two blocs during this COVID-19 period, the credit level of their mutual trust before COVID-
19 will just ostensibly regress in the post-COVID-19 political world.

## 2.2. A More Competitive and Clearly Divided World

The “conservative-progressive competition” is likely going to increase further in the post-
COVID-19 world politics. That will strengthen the ink in the world polar lines of before
and during COVID-19, for a clearer world politics’ division. Emerging from the fact that
COVID-19 has played well its accelerator role of this “conservative-progressive competition”
— respectively dominated by the United States and China, for its rise to a higher level than
before COVID-19. The rivalries and divisions between these two blocs have been steadily in-
creasing, and can be seen during this COVID-19 period (Makengo, 2020c; Makengo, 2021b).
The pre-COVID-19 strategic balances in the different areas and corners of the world between
these two blocks continue to shift with the COVID-19’s impacts. And each block is trying to
hold its own. Although de-escalations will be seen, this trend of increasing competition and
division will well dominate “conservative-progressive relations” in the post-COVID-19 world
politics. This is already evident with the emergence of the Build Back Better World (BBBW)
vision, challenging China’s mega-project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

# 3. Africa in a Complex Dilemma?

By “complex dilemma”, this paper alludes to a situation in which, for a choice in front of two
paths to follow, it appears not only difficult to go from one side against another, but also to
manage to balance both sides at the same time, staying right in the middle without taking a
position, playing neutralism—to make the third path. Just because of the possible costs of
one choice to another, the consequences that should follow the day after one’s choice or deci-
sion. Thus, making a decision among these three options requires careful navigation, which
also may ultimately require a big price to pay in the long run. Sadly, such is the situation
that Africa is likely to find itself in the post-COVID-19 world politics [situation that it is al-
ready starting to occur; we are also thinking here to BBBW versus BRI.]. Because it is quite
clear that the African is no exception to this “conservative-progressive competition” that is
taking place in different areas and world’s corners desired by both sides — “conservatives”
and “progressives”. The African market of more than a billion inhabitants, its raw materials,
its fifty-four reliable allies or friends and its geostrategic [geopolitical] value are important to
the eyes of these two blocs — “conservative” and “progressive” (Makengo, 2021b). Should
Africa choose one bloc against other or should it seek to balance the two blocs at the same
time? Is this not a “complex dilemma” for Africa? It is increasingly difficult for any country
in Africa to exercise its will, and multiple poles to compete and cooperate—with a few ex-
ceptions. Because it is an open secret that the “conservatives” have the upper hand in African
politics [ostensibly, starting from the colonial ties and their interference in their internal af-
fairs of the continent], and the “progressives” also control much of Africa’s economies [China
alone accounts for about 25% of the total investment in Africa] (Makengo, 2020a; Makengo,
2020b) — a complex puzzle for the continent’s political and economic stability. The possi-
ble costs of choosing one bloc over another may well be apparent here. Rather, seeking to
balance these two blocs is the best strategy for Africa—by playing neutralism, the third way.
However, the major problems here are the possible costs of choosing this third way and its
capacity to do so. Its various weaknesses and problems—its complex dependence on these
two blocks, its lack of unity or fragile unity, and its political governance and leadership’s
problems, weigh heavily on it—to seek to balance these two blocks, once again appears to be
a complex puzzle for Africa. But also this situation of complex dilemma can differ well from
one state to another on the continent—also taking into account the strategic assets of the state
in question. While Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) may ostensibly be in this complex
dilemma situation (Makengo, 2020b), this may not be the same for Malawi or South Africa,
for example because of their differences in strengths, weaknesses, capacities and capabilities.

4. Conclusion

In light of the above argument, the post-COVID-19 world politics is probably going to be more
complex than the worlds before and during COVID-19. The “conservative-progressive com-
petition”, accelerated during the COVID-19 period, will indeed dominate the international
relations of the post-COVID-19 world politics. The latter—projected as: a more suspicion
and uncertainty, and a more competitive and clearly divided world, is more likely to place
Africa in a “complex dilemma”— with a few exceptions for the cases of certain states of the
continent taken individually. Just because the various Africa’s weaknesses and problems—its
“complex dependence” on the “conservatives” and “progressives”, its lack of unity or fragile
unity, and its political governance and leadership's problems, make the costs of all its possible choices complex. It is up to Africa to prepare, learn from its past mistakes, and rethink its governance and leadership for its better survival in the post-COVID-19 world politics that is projected to be more complex.

## References

Christopher, L. (2020). Preventing the China-US Cold War from Turning Hot. *Chinese Journal of International Politics*. 1-44. doi.org/10.1093/CJIP/POAA012

Fukuyama, F. (2020). The Pandemic and Political Order, It Takes a State. *Foreign Affairs*. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-06-09/pandemic-and-political-order

Gregory, K. (2011). US and China need contact, not cold war. *Nature*. 1-2. doi.org/10.1038/474444A

Köksoy, F. (eds) (2019). *Global and Regional Powers Relations, Problems and Issues in the 21st Century*, Peter Lang, 249-274. doi:https://doi.org/10.3726/b16239

Makengo, B. (2021b) Conservative-Progressive Power Games, Mutual Jostling in Africa and Resilience of Sino-African Relations under COVID-19 Wind. *Open Journal of Political Science*, 11, 439-460. doi:10.4236/ojps.2021.113030.

Makengo, B. M. (2020a). China's Increasing Engagement in Africa: Opportunity and Futurisk for DRC's Sustainable Development. *International Journal of Management Sciences and Business Research*, 5, 191-216. doi: 10.5281/zenodo.4933775

Makengo, B. M. (2020b). Competitive Globalization and Quest for Strategic Minerals: DRC's Cobalt at the Heart of New Global Stakes, towards the Resource's Trap? *International Journal of Management Sciences and Business Research*, 9, 51-75. doi: 10.5281/zenodo.4964775

Makengo, B. M. (2020c). COVID-19 and US-China Word War: What Should Africa Do? *International Journal of Innovation and Scientific Research*, 48, 188-203.

Makengo, B. M. (2020d). COVID-19 et Jeux de puissance en Afrique : Les relations Sino-Africaines Peuvent-elles résister ? *International Journal of Management Sciences and Business Research*, 9, 113-129. doi: 10.5281/zenodo.4990657

Makengo, B. M. (2020e). Globalization and Power Strategies: A Look at the US-China Trade
War. *International Journal of Management Sciences and Business Research*, 9, 117-143.
doi: 10.22459/CYRD.07.2018

Makengo, B. M. (2021a). COVID-19’s Impacts and the End of Globalization? *Open Journal of Social Sciences*, 9, 212-233. https://doi.org/10.4236/jss.2021.91015

Petsinger, M. S., Wang, J., Jie, Y. & Crabtree, J. (2019). *US-China Strategic Competition the Quest for Global Technological Leadership*. Asia-Pacific Programme and the US and the Americas Programme. 1-43.

Wenzhao, T. & Shengwei, X. (2020). The US factor in post-cold war China-Russia relations. *International Politics*. 1-23. doi.org/10.1057/S41311-020-00211-1