# How platforms structure unequal access to employment opportunities in paid domestic work. A comparison of two online marketplaces in France and Brazil

Léa Lima, Nadya Araujo Guimarães, Olivier Pons

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Léa Lima, Nadya Araujo Guimarães, Olivier Pons. How platforms structure unequal access to employment opportunities in paid domestic work. A comparison of two online marketplaces in France and Brazil. International Colloquium on Care, Rights and Inequalities, Apr 2025, São Paulo, France. hal-05363870

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HOW PLATFORMS STRUCTURE UNEQUAL ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITIES IN PAID DOMESTIC WORK.

A COMPARISON OF TWO ONLINE MARKETPLACES IN FRANCE AND BRAZIL<fnref n="1" />

Léa Lima

(Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, France)

Nadya Araujo Guimarães

(Universidade de São Paulo and Cebrap, Brazil)

Olivier Pons

(Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, France)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of online labor market intermediaries in sorting the workforce and dealing with inequalities in access to employment. We assume that far from being neutral actors in the encounter between supply and demand, domestic and care work platforms organize through their design and infrastructure the criteria for selecting worker's profiles by formatting the information available on their workers. In that sense, intermediation becomes a real pre-selection process. Departing from two databases of web scraped profiles extracted from two home service platforms in France and Brazil, we aim to explore the impact of technical devices on the way workers present themselves and how clients select them. We will highlight the convergences and divergences between the two platforms in terms of selection and framing information about the profile of workers (i) who sign up and (ii) who actually work through the platform. We will suggest some possible keys to grasping these selection frameworks taking into account the special role of workforce personalization on exchanges in emotional labor markets and observing the specific forms and variations of these frames according to national institutional contexts.

<footnote n="1">¹ Paper prepared to be delivered at the International Colloquium on "Care, Rights and Inequalities", session on "Care platforms and care workers. New horizons on care provision" (University of São Pualo, 14-16 April 2025). Please do not circulate it without the author's permission. Comments are very welcome.

Authors acknowledge the support the project "Who cares? Rebuilding care in a post pandemic world" received from: Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (Fapesp) and Trans-Atlantic Platform (T-AP) Internacional Call "Recovery, Renewal and Resilience in a Post-Pandemic World" Fapesp Grant # 2021/07888-3; Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) -Call18/2021-Grant 421754/2021-4; and Fundação Arymax. This paper is also a preliminary result from the project "Digital Labour Markets Intermediaries at work in comparative perspective", supported by ANR/FAPESP-CNAM/CEBRAP (Grant 2024/04799-8).</footnote>
Since the early 2000s, labor market intermediation has undergone at least two waves of digitalization. The first wave saw the emergence of tools to automate and massively circulate information on candidates and positions to be filled on the job market on the Internet: job boards, which appeared in the mid 90’s, were the first type of online intermediaries, then came job search engines trying to aggregate all job postings (Fondeur & Tuchszirer, 2005) and finally professional social networks aiming to reach the so-called “passive candidates” (Fondeur & Lhemitte, 2006). These tools have been investigated by a large literature in economics and management aimed at measuring their effectiveness in terms of reducing the time of unemployment or prospecting candidates for companies (Fountain 2005; Gandini 2016; Kuhn 2014; McDonald et Crew 2006). The second wave of digitalization came along with the implementation of online platforms in which work in itself is mediated, organized and governed by digital devices. A sociological approach to labor market matching must move away from a naturalistic and disembodied perspective of the invisible hand of the market as it is conveyed by economics in order to analyse what this matching owes to the visible handcraft of its actors.

The research on digital labour market intermediaries (DLMI) has focused on the precariousness of low-skilled self-employed workers put to work by standardized work platforms, particularly focusing on the most visible and international of these: Uber. Analyses of this service work reveal its commodification that tears work away from forms of collective regulation and social protection (Abílio 2021; Carlos Lima and Bridi 2019; Chan and Kwok 2021; Wood et al. 2019), while being, in the Global North, backed by salaried employment (Abdelnour and Meda 2019; Beauvisage, Beuscart, and Mellet 2018).

Research on labour platforms has therefore under-invested in the function of intermediation and job matching to investigate two central dimensions of these systems: the commodification of work via the extreme division of labour and the deinstitutionalisation of the employment relationship on the one hand, and the power of platforms over workers on the other, increased tenfold by algorithmic management. These reflections on the transformations of work in the era of platforms are overdetermined by the selection of a certain type of platform that exploits the sources of profit made possible by low-skilled and highly standardized work (such as passenger transport), and for which the qualities of the workers are considered secondary, a job that is therefore not very unique. The term "uberization of work," which has been a dazzling success
in academic literature as well as in the media space on an international scale, is a good indication
of the paradigmatic character of the Uber platform, whose operation and infrastructure have
become the paragon of the transformations of work in the digital age.

In the care sector actors of the labor market have to deal with specific features as intimacy,
emotions, morality and personalities which are crucial in care relations (Abel and Nelson, 1990;
Folbre, 1995 and 2012; Zelizer, 2005 and 2010) both in “direct care” and in “indirect care”
(ILO, 2018; Duffy, 2005 and 2011). The type of information that circulates on this labour
market, both on the characteristics of job vacancies (inseparable from the characteristics of the
users of the services) and on the skills of the candidates, is of a very sensitive nature and difficult
to objectify or formalize. Moral and emotional skills are associated with a high feminization of
the low-skilled workforce and a high degree of informality in employment relations. The social
relations of gender, class and race between workers and employers are very structuring of this
labour market which is open to migrant racialized women. There is a long-term presence of
intermediation on care labour market (Cordero, 2022), in the North and the South, from
newspaper advertising to agencies local advertising and job boards to platforms (Guimarães,
2009; Lima, 2023 and 2024, Moreno, 2021, Andrada et al., 2023). DLMI in the sector must
take into account the very specific nature of the emotional work into their platform design and
their discourses about the added value of the intermediation service.

# 1. Online labour market intermediaries as actors in the sorting of the workforce

A first economic tradition tends to consider employment intermediaries as simple accelerators
of the circulation of information on the supply and demand of labor by reifying information. In
this naturalistic approach to information, information on vacancies merges with the vacant post,
and intermediaries have no effect on supply or demand, the latter being considered in their
abstraction. In this respect, labour economics does not consider intermediaries as actors but as
devices or channels of transmission that leave both sides of the labour market intact. It is
revealing that Mark Granovetter's (1974) sociology of networks deals with only one type of
economic information: available jobs. The "job information" that occupies Mr. Granovetter in
response to the standard theory of Georges Stigler (1962) boils down here to the knowledge of
a job opportunity. The same is true for all the authors who work on "information networks"
(Rees, 1966; Ionnides and Loury, 2004). In this paradigm of "job information", employment
intermediaries are neutral and transparent mediators whose effectiveness can be quantified by
the number of matches they make possible.

However, numerous sociological studies on labour market intermediaries, employment
counsellors, professional recruiters, or placement agencies have made it possible to reassess
their role. The role of labor market intermediaries in the social structuring of access to
employment and the distribution of work opportunities no longer needs to be demonstrated.
The three functions of intermediaries (Nesheim et Jesnes 2022) are the allocation of labor
(circulation of information on jobs and selection), the function of contracting with the worker
and the organization and management of work.

In France, sociological studies have approached them as social actors in the labour market in
their own right. They then focused heavily on their logics of action (Meyer, 1998) and the
selectivity that stems from their activity. The theme of rationalization of activity, sorting
(Benarrosh, 2000) and activation (Divay, 2009; Lavitry, 2009), so that the mobilization of
knowledge in the labour market has remained invisible. This knowledge is taken for granted
and is not questioned. Studies that have examined the relationship between ANPE agents and
companies have insisted on the characterization of "intermediation logics" (Delfini and
Demazière, 2000) that are more or less aggressive or commercial towards employers and that
lead to the constitution of more or less extensive portfolios of job offers, thereby operating this
form of reductionism of the activity of intermediaries as underwriters.

The development of matching algorithms became a reality only in the second half of the
twentieth century, in the United States, in response to practical problems (Roth, 2003).
Although the modern study of algorithmic matching began with the seminal paper by David
Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962) who developed a technique of "delayed acceptance", this
approach was taken up by Alvin Roth who not only explored the mathematics of matching, but
developed his idea of an "economic engineering", based not on price but on "fitness", about
being selected. Nevertheless, matching for economic sociology was to deal with the allocation
of resources, processes that took place in social arenas of which markets are only a subset
(Simioni & Steiner, 2024). Indeed, job advertisement platforms are the subject of a socio-
economic literature that examines them in the light of the process of coordination on the labour
market that they enable (Marchal, Bureau, 2009). From this perspective, it is a question of
studying them as matching devices (Mellet, 2006) which, through the definition of information
formats and standardized matching procedures, are likely to circumscribe the uncertainty that
weighs on the encounter between a singular supply of work and a demand for work (Marchal,
Mellet, Rieucau, 2007). The analyses focus on the specificity of the labour market, whose coordination is based much more on qualities than on prices, as in other singular goods markets (Karpik, 2010). These analyses focus on the artefact "job advertisement" which builds (along with other material elements of the "market") a power relationship between employers and candidates. What is at stake is the power of choice in each of the aspects of the labour market and how the proposed choice techniques (Schwartz, 2018) will strengthen one or the other of the parties, as well as the way in which they contribute to the mechanisms of exclusion from the labour market through the excessive closure of recruitment processes (Eymard-Duvernay, 2012).

The Internet has played an ambiguous role from this point of view by increasing the informative value of advertisements on employment compared to those appearing in the press, which works in favour of candidates in general, but also by encouraging recruiters to make greater demands on the candidates' profile at an early stage of the selection process and at a distance from candidates (Marchal, Mellet, Rieucau, 2007), they would have accentuated unemployment of exclusion. In addition, the transparency of the labour market, driven by internet players who boast of the greater fluidity of the labour market made possible by the centralisation of labour supply and demand and matching techniques, is somewhat reduced to the status of utopia by socio-economists who, on the contrary, point to the segmentation effects linked to the development of niche sites and the limit to the development of this project due to the fact that of the disparity of employment languages (Fondeur, 2017). This conventionalist literature is in line with the work that, in the course of platform studies, invites us to describe the "technocultural logic" deployed by platforms, and the way in which, both in their code and in the narratives they construct, they structure the activities that take place there (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013; Helmond, 2015).

In this literature, the for-profit nature of these meeting arrangements on the labour market is therefore generally ignored. Public and free job sites and paid sites are treated indiscriminately and more broadly, the commercial construction of the platform is thought of as independent of its content, i.e. job advertisements. It is only recalled that the cost of producing an advertisement on the Internet is infinitely lower than an advertisement in newspapers and that it is independent of the length of the advertisement, which leads to a lengthening of job advertisements and quality specifications (Marchal, Rieucau, Torny, 2003). More broadly, these online intermediaries, even more than traditional employment intermediaries, are the great unknowns of the sociology of employment in Brazil (Guimarães, 2008) as elsewhere.
What happens when we look at the particularities of a labour market? This type of market is a space of competition between workers in which they are put in competition for access to the same job. The "market professionals" have the task of organizing this competition by making it possible to compare workers from the point of view of the recruiter or the client. Market infrastructures are artefacts that create a space for women workers to compete by bringing them closer to each other. In the same way that the supermarket is a market infrastructure by materializing in space categories of products that are made comparable side by side. Since the disappearance of slave markets and "place de grève", the rapprochement of workers with a view to recruitment has lost some of its materiality. Recruiters organize a mini marketplace for each position by gathering candidates' CVs whose edition is standard enough for them to compare. Then they can deepen the comparison on some profiles they will see in interviews.

Digital market infrastructures or "marketplaces" play the same role in bringing together products or services designed to meet the same need or demand. Online labour marketplaces differ from labour platforms in that they have little influence on matching, and they are not very prescriptive. They are above all a support for the free choice of customers. They aim to expand the pool of available candidates that clients are free to explore to select the worker of their choice. Based on a job name and locality entered by the customer in the search bar, the algorithm extracts an orderly assortment of profiles from the candidate bank that is presented to the customer in such a way that it can be seen at a glance on a page. This logic is a radical departure from work platforms such as Uber, which control the matching between the customer and the worker through an algorithm that directly selects a worker for a given ride (the worker being theoretically free to refuse the ride, in which case it is offered to the next one).

Competitive bidding is therefore the subject of work by online marketplaces, or rather by the professionals who ensure its operation by formatting a space for the comparability of female workers, an equivalence between them (Eymard-Duvernay, Marchal, 1997). In addition to the instant reconciliation of service offerings, market professionals work to make them comparable in aspects that they have selected themselves. The manufacturers of the platforms therefore have control over the selection of the criteria according to which the workers will be able to be compared by customers. Market tools aim to reduce uncertainties about the quality of future work, but not in all respects: they determine what information will be visible and accessible to customers and what will be silenced, in particular because it does not seem relevant to them to assess the quality of work. In addition to the work of selecting the information deemed relevant, online employment intermediaries can prioritize this information by playing with the graphic
design, the infrastructure of the pages, which is similar to the packaging of material products: some information is highlighted while others are stored in the depths of the platform and must be the subject of patient and meticulous research by the customer. Finally, they set up the ordering of the lists of candidates on the page.

# 1. Overview of the two marketplaces and data

This text is structured around the analysis of two private domestic service platforms, one in France (Eiffel) and the other in Brazil (Sampa). These two players belong to the category of online intermediaries of the "marketplace" type that bring together in the same virtual place different providers of the same service by intervening weakly in the final reciprocal choice. They do not decide for customers and workers which pair is best fitted, but aim to centralise requests and offers to broaden the possible choice. The sorting algorithm is not very discriminatory: it is used less to discard applications than to expand the collection to allow a real choice among a simultaneous offer.

Eiffel is a French home services platform created in 2012 initially specialising in the babysitting offer. The Covid crisis has seen a significant reorientation of the platform's activities, with its leaders partnering with large companies and strategic ministries to ensure privileged access to the platform and its childcare services. Initially focused on individuals, and the connection of individuals with self-employed people, the COVID crisis has led to a repositioning of the firm, which now sells companies a payment solution for services whose employees are the final recipients: a payment card whose account can be topped up by companies with various social benefits and as a tool for quality of life at work: meal vouchers, sustainable mobility package, teleworking allowance, and payment for personal services can be centralized on a single application. Employees of client companies can use the credits paid by the companies on the platforms developed by the W. group, in particular the Eiffel home services platform.

On the Eiffel website, individuals and employees of W. client companies can search for home care workers. It offers families registered on the platform methods for automating the payment of interventions, administrative procedures related to the employer function (creation of the contract, payment of salary) or requests for financial aid to reduce the cost of work for the user (Pajemploi, Universal Service Employment Cheque - CESU, Union for the Collection of Social Security Contributions and Family Allowances - URSSAF, aid, tax credit, etc.).
Sampa claims to be the largest platform in Brazil with regard to the allocation of indirect care workers, recruited for one-day work shifts (day laborers). Created in 2020, to solve a personal problem of the creator, as stated on its website, over the years it has experienced considerable growth in its database. It acts as a digital ad platform or, according to the company's manager, « a LinkedIn for cleaners » (Ferreira et al, 2025). On the Sampa platform, customers and cleaners create profiles, but only those of the cleaners are visible when accessing the Platform's website. The maids pay a monthly fee so that the profiles are available to customers. Customers, in turn, do not pay a monthly fee and can release the contact of the maids by purchasing credits. Although customers have the possibility to access the maids' WhatsApp in this way, Ferreira et al recorded that it is more common for customers to post service offers – which is done for free. The ads are sent to the maids via WhatsApp and email. With this, they access the contacts of the customers who posted the offers and all the negotiation is done between them via WhatsApp. The Platform does not directly interfere in the negotiation of the terms of the services or the provision thereof. Sampa also works with a scoring system in which the worker receives points based on certain tasks and ways of operating on the Platform itself (when she does training available on the website, when she receives evaluations, when she guarantees "seals" acquired by confirming data such as the contact telephone number)

The two platforms have developed different business models. Eiffel charges a commission of 1 euro for each hour of work paid by the customer. Additional revenue is earned from customers opening paid premium accounts. But it can be assumed that the platform alone is not very profitable and that the company's positioning in the social security market is a way to ensure higher and more stable revenues. Sampa has changed its marketing practices from a free model to a monthly, quarterly or annual subscription formula charged to the worker, in an attempt very recently to impose a commission on customer feedback on registered workers. This last monetization system is similar to the one practiced by Eiffel in that the cost of using the platform becomes proportional to the amount of work done on the platform, but it differs radically in that it is applied to workers and not to customers. This article is based on the exploitation of two databases of profiles of female workers obtained by the scraping technique. Scraping is a programming technique that allows online data to be collected structured in an automated way<fnref n="2" />. We applied this technique to Eiffel and Sampa.

<footnote n="2">² For the search for profiles, the Eiffel site requires registration and imposes a CAPTCHA (Turing test) in order to detect automated users. However, each profile consists of a static HTML/CSS page that is freely accessible as soon as the URL is known. Each page references other profiles; Thus, knowing the URL of a single profile allows, by recursively following these references, to automatically retrieve a</footnote>
Scraping makes it possible to obtain databases that are structured but have the disadvantage of being pre-formatted by the categories of the platform itself. The researcher therefore does not have autonomy in the construction of the descriptive variables of his population.

To ensure the comparability of the data between the two cases, we restricted the sample of profiles scraped on Eiffel to female workers offering themselves as "domestic help in Paris", which brings the database down to 1454 profiles, 89.4% of which are women. Some of these domestic helpers can also offer themselves as a carer. The gender of the profiles was manually recoded by cross-referencing the first name and the photo. In parallel with this operation of vacuuming up the site's data, we created two accounts: one as a customer and the other as a worker. With the customer account that we located in Amiens to limit the amount of data, we were able to simulate a search for home help by manually collecting the profiles offered each day between October 17 and December 19, 2024 while noting the order in which these profiles were presented. We also recorded the different steps of creating a worker profile in order to analyze the interactions between the workers and the platform in the formatting of information about oneself. On the Sampa platform, we collected 200 profiles registered in the city of São Paulo, 98% of whom were women, which viewed an average of 13 proposals and received an average of 4 service offers

Collecting data on the characteristics of platform workers by scraping has a number of advantages over disseminating a questionnaire. Scraping allows the exhaustive collection of profiles that at any given time have created an account on the platform, whereas the data by questionnaires is partial and it only relates to the population of workers who responded to the questionnaire, often in small numbers. The questionnaire method applied to a volatile and very poorly organized population therefore involves several selection biases to be attributed to the channels through which the researchers disseminate the questionnaire. However, unlike the questionnaire, the structuring of the database resulting from scraping is dependent on the choices of information that the platform wished to collect on the workers and among them that

large number of profiles. Each retrieved HTML page is then analyzed in JavaScript or Python (with the DOMParser orBeautifulSoup libraries respectively) in order to extract the characteristics and save them in an Excel file. For Sampa, access to the first profiles of applicants is free and, again, each profile refers to others, so it is easy to recursively retrieve all the profiles. However, the pages are dynamically populated HTML templates in JavaScript. The information is therefore not directly accessible in the retrieved HTML code. A more detailed analysis made it possible to extract the JSON objects (JavaScript Object Notation is a textual data format derived from the object notation of the JavaScript language) used to populate the models. It was these JSON objects that were then used to extract the features and save them to an Excel file.
is deemed good to be made public. The researcher does not have control over the information
he or she seeks. As each platform makes its own configuration choices, the comparison between
databases is made complex by the use of scraping. It requires a sociological analysis of the
construction of these categories.

## 2. Marketing emotional labour

Mechanisms for matching the supply and demand of domestic services have become essential
elements in the commodification of emotions (Hochschild 1983), i.e. the marketing of
emotional labour. Care work has several dimensions: a technical dimension with a certain
number of gestures and productive tasks to be accomplished (sweeping or vacuuming,
preparing a meal, taking out the garbage, washing windows, carrying a person from an armchair
to their bed, etc.) and an emotional dimension that associates, according to Arlie Hochschild's
definition, the body has an image, a thought or an idea. The norm of care work requires that
technical tasks be carried out with an extra soul, that of human qualities that will make the client
feel treated as a unique and singular person and not as an object. The concept of emotional work
aims to emphasize the effort of individuals to manage an emotion, either by inhibiting feelings,
controlling them, or, on the contrary, by working to produce it.

The two platforms we investigated agree on the preponderant place given to the staging of
emotional skills, through two communication and self-marketing media: the photo-portrait and
the free text of self-presentation. These two elements make it possible to very strongly
distinguish the candidates and aim to give access to the expression of the personality of the
workers.

For each search for female workers, the pool of candidates will be in the form of a collection
of tiles placed side by side with a very homogeneous structure. In both platforms, photos of the
workers occupy a central place, even more so on Eiffel than on Sampa.

**Figure 1-Screenshot Eiffel of the search results with keywords "Aide à domicile + Amiens" on Eiffel, 24-11-07 at 15.48**
<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>
<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2-Screenshot Sampa of the search results with keywords "São Paulo"</figcaption></figure>

When the worker registers, the Eiffel website strongly encourages her to upload a photo, even if this step is not mandatory:

> "Benefits of adding a photo:
> 
> A photo is essential for employers;
> 
> Adding a photo to your profile increases your chances to be contacted"

On the day of the test carried out on the platform, only 3 out of 11 profiles had not uploaded personal photos. On the Eiffel website, the photos are of such a format that it is possible for the workers to inscribe their portrait in a setting. This is not the case on Sampa who, with inset images, frames the faces without a good representation of the environment. The personalization of the profile by image is therefore less obvious on Sampa.

In both cases, however, the customer is led by the platform to compare first and foremost faces that are the place where emotions are expressed par excellence. The Sampa website does not allow full-length photos that could show other qualities useful for the tasks for which the workers are intended, such as robustness or strength. The Eiffel website allows it, but the focus on the face is the rule, so that there is little way to judge the constitution of the person, his physical strength.

The second element of framing applications that is very visible on the Eiffel website is the text presenting the services, what the site calls an "announcement". The penultimate step of registering as a home help on the site is to add this ad: a title and the content of the ad. A text is then proposed as a model, thus training the workers in the basics of "self-branding". This text
tends to favor a personalized presentation that begins with the enunciation of the first name:

> "Hello, my name is Maria".

The ad template then highlights age and professional experience. The worker is encouraged to personalize it and to sell himself:

> "Show your personality in your ad by describing your elder care skills, your hobbies with seniors, and what you have to offer. Show them why you're their perfect next caregiver! ».

It is not only a question of declaring what one can do but who one is, one's dispositions, one's tastes, "showing one's personality". The workers willingly lend themselves to this expressive style:

> "Hello, I want to make your home as pleasant as possible when you come home in the evening. Your interior will be pampered [sic] as I do at home. Dust and other mites will not spend the week with me. »

Knowing how to perform tasks is one thing, performing them with love meets normative expectations in home care. More specifically, people put forward a form of selfless altruism at the basis of their service offer (Delpierre, 2021).

The self-presentation text is also a must for registration on the Sampa website. The size of the text, as in the case of Eiffel, is free and the structure of these self-portraits is quite similar to that found on the French side, which reproduces the structure of an exchange with a presumed employer: one may identify oneself by one's first name, and one presents one's human qualities as moral skills ("I am a person + adjective"). However, the Sampa site does not make the text a primary sorting information. It only appears after the customer clicks on a tile. The vocational register is regularly activated through the use of dispositional verbs and verbs related to the expression of personal tastes, as here: " eu amo o que eu faço e tenho um orgulho muito grande em ser profissional " or "gosto das coisas certas". Sampa also allows workers to submit a video to introduce themselves personally.

### 3. Eiffel: a market of know-how and price competition

The French platform stands out from the Brazilian marketplace by the attention paid to objectification and the reporting of know-how in a standardized and conventional format. Each profile summary thumbnail presents 3 pieces of information that are not listed on the Sampa
website: age, number of years of experience and the hourly rate at which the worker offers her services. The latter information stands out because the font is larger than the rest of the text and its color. Unlike Sampa, the platform integrates the price of the service into the comparison of offers by giving it a central place. It promotes competition through the price of labour.

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /></figure>

On Eiffel, the 5th step of registering as a worker consists of entering "Experience and price" by inducing a link between the two.

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2-Screenshot Worker's registration on Eiffel, 2024-10-04 "Experience and rates"</figcaption></figure>
The duration of the experience is expressed in the number of years in a scrolling menu, ranging from less than one year of experience to more than 10. The "rate" becomes an "hourly wage" and the net minimum wage of the Collective Agreement for the sector of private employers and home employment (IDCC 3239) is proposed by default (€10.32/h), with the worker being able to increase it. The indication of the hourly wage therefore has a paradoxical function: on the one hand, it makes the platform an agent of the regulation of the labour market because it technically forces individual employers to apply the legislation on the minimum wage of the sector, on the other hand it establishes price competition above the minimum wage. The "default" minimum rate system seems to be very effective since a third of the active profiles in our Parisian sample offer the minimum rate.

Although the languages spoken are not a primary qualification stated on the summary vignette, the language skills are still accurately indicated: the mother tongue must be filled in and the person who registers has the option of adding several languages with a very complete language library. The place of birth is also mandatory, but it is not displayed on the worker's presentation sheet.

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /></figure>

The languages spoken are displayed in the full profile, the one that appears when the customer clicks on the tile. The mother tongue appears first.
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /></figure>

In the French case, the importance of language as a selection criterion can be explained by the
strong presence of foreigners in the domestic labour market. In fact, according to our
calculations, only 35% of the profiles registered on Eiffel-Paris as a domestic helper have
French as their mother tongue and a quarter speak French without it being their mother tongue.
Mastery of French appears in absolute terms to be a useful skill in the professions of the link
but also relatively as a distinctive and discriminating criterion because more than 4 out of 10
workers registered as domestic helpers in Paris do not say they speak French.
4. Sampa and the organization of a self-referential and reputational job market

On the Sampa platform, the setting of the rate and method of remuneration as well as the payment are left outside the platform at the negotiation stage between the two parties. The workers enter an indicative daily rate on the platform, but this is not visible to customers and the rate finally negotiated may be different from the one that was originally provided.

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /></figure>

Sampa's founders recently opted for a self-referential labor marketplace, in which workforce quality metrics derive solely from activity on the platform. For each profile, the platform generates and aggregates information from the activity of workers and customers on the platform itself. Much more than Eiffel, the Sampa socio-technical system exploits and transforms the traces of the platform's users to configure its marketplace in a dynamic way. Indeed, the 5 quality indicators of the workers that are displayed on the thumbnail are the number of missions carried out via the platform, the number of recommendations (not necessarily by clients who have contracted its services), the number of cleaning tips posted by the worker on the platform ("dicas"), the quality of her evaluations by clients (from 0 to 5 stars), and the number of points acquired on the platform. It is impossible for a client to access the method of calculating "points", but their mere display in evaluative semiotic codes to which the term "point" and the symbol of the trophy refer induces a certain interpretation tending to index the status of the worker on the number of points accumulated. The last piece of information highlighted by the platform on each tile is the number of customers who have viewed its phone number. This reflects the desirability of the worker in real time. The CEO of Sampa also specifies that these rating elements bring the profile back to the top of the list, giving it a better
chance of being contacted by customers. Of these five categories of evaluation, two (recommendations and stars) result from the evaluation of workers by third-party users of the platform who are in fact given a function and management power. This organization of a self-referential job marketplace is a strategy for retaining female workers, who are encouraged to have their activity registered by the platform to increase the number of assignments displayed, to make themselves available on the platform, to provide it with advice, to attract customers, and to convince them to evaluate them (positively).

The work of market professionals on Sampa focuses on creating trust in the employment relationship between the client and the worker. The Sampa platform has built a fiduciary system that requires computer programming work but also manual operations. Sampa's market professionals evaluate and certify a set of characteristics of the profiles themselves, through the stamp system, starting with the real existence of the workers behind the profiles. Sampa thus guarantees that the services offered by the worker comply with a number of standards of professionalism that the platform believes are valued by customers.

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /></figure>

Through the granting of badges, the platform arrogates to itself a very extensive power to label workers. There are 17 stamps but 15% of the MS workers registered on the platform have only one stamp and 55% have two or less. By far the most frequent stamps are the stamps for verifying email and mobile details (E-mail Verificado at 44%, Telefone Validado at 97%) because both are necessary to open an account on the platform. Nearly 10% of PS profiles had their criminal record checked. The very functional stamp indicating the possibility of paying through the Pix application is also quite sought after, because it makes monetary exchanges more fluid: it concerns 65% of the profiles registered in the city of SP.

The certification of professionalism is much less sought after by workers: workers earn a "COVID-19" stamp if they certify to the platform that they have received two doses of vaccine (3%) and if they can produce the certificate of clean criminal record (10%). Most of the stamps certify the fact that the worker has followed online "training" with partners of the platform:
"Desembala" (videos on the correct use of cleaning products from the Desembala brand, 17%), "Direitos Trabalhistos" (online training on labour law, 12%), MEI (on the status of micro-entrepreneur, 0.5%), "Casa Brasileira", Sampa profissional (10%), Sustentabilidade, Nano4You, Oleak, Gestão financeira. Finally, the last category of badges concerns the algorithmic and reputational evaluation of the worker: the Avaliações stamp is awarded when 10 clients have hired (0.3%) and evaluated, the Recomendações profile and stamp when 10 clients have recommended it (0.7%). The very low proportion of women workers thus distinguished indicates the very high selectivity of this labour market (see below).

The profusion of labels aims to reassure the customer in his approach to a worker and positions the platform as a trusted third party guaranteeing the quality of the services it offers. Badges reveal the prejudices and stereotypes about the morality of domestic workers, by demanding, for example, proof from police that there is no criminal record registered. But, on the other hand, they also reveal the Platform's effort to stimulate, in its own way, through courses and activities it offers, the professionalization of that worker who enrolls at Sampa – which was not observed in the case of Eiffel.

## Badge ownership rate

<table><thead><tr><td>Badges</td><td>Possui o selo</td><td>% possui o selo</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Seal that verifies that the maid took the Organization's professional empowerment course</td><td>0</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><td>Seal that checks that the maid had her email verified through the confirmation link!</td><td>89</td><td>44,2</td></tr><tr><td>Seal that verifies that the maid received the verification code on her cell phone</td><td>196</td><td>97,5</td></tr><tr><td>This Seal confers that the NADA CONSTA of the professional. Ensuring the criminal record and the reliability of the professional.</td><td>19</td><td>9,4</td></tr><tr><td>This stamp is to demonstrate that the person has taken at least 2 (two) doses of the vaccine against the coronavirus. She only earns this seal by sending us the PDF document that proves that there was vaccination.</td><td>9</td><td>4,5</td></tr><tr><td>Seal that checks that the maid has validated and has the possibility of receiving payments by PIX.</td><td>131</td><td>65,2</td></tr><tr><td>This seal verifies that the person has watched all the videos of the training module on how to use Desembala products correctly.</td><td>34</td><td>16,9</td></tr><tr><td>This seal verifies that more than 10 people have hired and evaluated their profile as a daily professional within the platform.</td><td>3</td><td>1,5</td></tr><tr><td>This seal confirms that more than 10 people professionally recommend your professional diarist profile within the platform.</td><td>2</td><td>1,0</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td>This seal verifies that the professional day laborer has taken the training: How the Sampa platform works! Answered all questions successfully and knows how to self-disclose in a professional way.</td><td>20</td><td>9,9</td></tr><tr><td>This seal verifies that the person recorded and sent us the video of their presentation in a correct format and was validated by the Sampa team, thus ensuring the reliability of a professional day laborer.</td><td>51</td><td>25,4</td></tr><tr><td>This seal verifies that the professional day laborer attended and carried out the sustainability training on the platform and successfully answered all questions.</td><td>12</td><td>6,0</td></tr><tr><td>This seal verifies that the person has watched all the videos of the training module on how to use Nano4You's products correctly</td><td>12</td><td>6,0</td></tr><tr><td>This badge verifies that the person has watched all the videos of Oleak's Post-Construction training module.</td><td>5</td><td>2,5</td></tr><tr><td>This badge verifies that the person has watched the series of videos produced by Dr. Lara Sanchez, a lawyer specializing in labor rights and that the person has successfully answered the questions related to the videos.</td><td>24</td><td>11,9</td></tr><tr><td>This seal confirms that the professional day laborer took the mini-course on financial management produced by the professional Jéssica Trindade and answered all questions successfully!</td><td>12</td><td>6,0</td></tr><tr><td>This stamp informs that the professional day laborer is an Individual Micro Entrepreneur (has MEI) or has attended the training modules within the platform and knows what MEI is.</td><td>9</td><td>4,5</td></tr><tr><td>This seal confirms that the professional day laborer has completed the Personal Cleaner training with Humberto Celanti - HumDiarista</td><td>1</td><td>0,5</td></tr></table>

## 5. What are the effects on inequality of access to work?

Once registered on the two marketplaces, workers are put in competition for access to work. Among the workers who have opened an account, many have not landed any assignment, have never worked thanks to the platform. We have highlighted the efforts of each platform to "organize" the competition between women workers for access to employment by making certain information about each platform visible and making others invisible, but are these efforts bearing fruit? What is the power of platforms in the process of selecting workers by clients?

The challenge of this section is to analyze the determinants of access to work within each platform and to measure the actual structuring of the marketplace by the designers of the platform: do the selection criteria favored by the designers of each platform have a real weight on the chances of accessing employment through the platform? This question requires looking at the sub-population of people who have actually worked on each platform to understand how
it differs from those who have never worked on it. Then, for each of the two platforms, to relate
the determinants of access to employment with the selection criteria that their marketplace
professionals have put forward.

For the identification of what we call employed workers, we depend on the information
structured by each platform, so we cannot apply the same categorization criteria in Brazil and
France. On Eiffel, we isolated individuals who had at least one opinion (N=179) from
customers. Indeed, people who have no opinion are also identified as "New Profile" by the
platform, which suggests that they have never carried out an assignment through Eiffel. Also,
we estimate that out of 100 workers registered since the creation of the platform, only 12 obtain
an assignment through the platform. On the Sampa platform, the indicators of work intensity
on the platform are both more varied and allow a more detailed analysis of the work intensity.
The indicator closest to the one used in the French case is the "percentage of contractualization":
when this is zero, it can be said that the individual has never worked with the platform. We
therefore retain all individuals who have a percentage of contractualization other than zero
(N=57). They make up 28.5% of registered accounts.

Eiffel also appears to be a much more selective platform than Sampa. The chances of working
there once registered are generally lower than on Sampa. This difference reflects a undoubtedly
greater imbalance between supply and demand for services on the Eiffel platform, which has
introduced registration fees for workers that has limited access. The CEO of Sampa stresses in
an interview that justifies the introduction of registration fees in the database by a necessary
rebalancing of the market in favor of female workers, whose number he has limited as follows:

A Sampa ficou dois anos gratuito para o pessoal, aí em 2022 agora, março
de 2022 eu coloquei com 1,99, espalhei no grupo lá, gente quem quiser se
captar agora é 1,99, mas quem está na plataforma já fica já. E aí foi muito
bom porque, pararam de se cadastrar. Então tipo uma coisa que a gente tem
que fazer na plataforma é igualar as bases, não pode ter muita diarista e
pouco contratante, também não pode ter muito contratante e pouca diarista,
porque se você não tiver esse nível de igualdade um vai, isso é o básico
pessoal, aí tinha muito diarista, tinha muito diarista e pouco contratante, dez
mil diarista e sei lá, cinco mil contratantes, não encaixa, então essas
diaristas elas ficavam frustradas, elas não entendiam que a plataforma era
para ajudar a divulgar o perfil delas, elas só criticavam, então era desse
jeito, então quando começou o processo de 1,99 acabou-se as diaristas que
entravam só para entrar.
On Eiffel as on Sampa, the fact of actually accessing work through the platform and therefore being selected by customers is not the result of chance. Indeed, "employed workers" have specific characteristics that distinguish them in several respects from all registered workers. We will distinguish for each platform the characteristics pre-selected by the platform and those that are not subject to competition.

Employed workers on the Eiffel platform report more work experience overall and are slightly older than the population of registered workers. However, these two pieces of information are largely underlined by the editorial layout of the site. The fact that women are over-represented among employed workers can also be credited to the design of the platform, which, through photos, gives a lot of grip to the discrimination of gender profiles.

Other criteria that are not brought to the forefront by the platform while being relatively detailed, seem to play an important role in the practical selection of profiles by customers. Thus, although the languages spoken are not information highlighted in the profile thumbnails, the population of employed Parisian workers differs from the total population of Parisian registered workers by a greater command of French (74% compared to 60% in the general population), including as a mother tongue (38% have French as their mother tongue in the population of employed workers compared to 35% overall).

Finally, Parisian employed workers do have a particular price profile, but in the opposite direction to that expected in a market that is competitive in terms of price, such as that suggested by the design of the site. In fact, only 10% of these employed workers offer a minimum hourly wage, whereas in this case they are a third in the total population of Parisian registered workers. Nearly 40% of employed women offer a rate greater than or equal to 16 hours per hour, compared to only 12% of the total, i.e. more than 3.2 times more. We therefore observe an over-selection of workers offering a high hourly rate that is much greater than on all the other characteristics observable in the database.

## Characteristics Employed persons Eiffel

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Worked<br>(N=179)</th><th>Total<br>(N=1456)</th><th>Multiplier</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Female Share (%)</td><td>92,7</td><td>89,4</td><td>1,04</td></tr><tr><td>Average age (years)</td><td>35,7</td><td>35,4</td><td>1,008</td></tr><tr><td>Average experience (months)</td><td>4,3</td><td>3,7</td><td>1,16</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td>Share of French as a mother tongue (%)</td><td>38,3</td><td>34,7</td><td>1,1</td></tr><tr><td>Share French spoken (%)</td><td>73,8</td><td>60,1</td><td>1,23</td></tr><tr><td>Share of minimum wage (%)</td><td>9,5</td><td>33,4</td><td>-1,71</td></tr><tr><td>Share hourly wage 16 euros and more (%)</td><td>38,9</td><td>12</td><td>3,24</td></tr></table>

By comparing the average characteristics of employed workers on Sampa and those of all Paulist cleaners who have opened an account on the platform, we first note that the population of employed workers has more marked specificities than their counterparts on Eiffel: the multiplying coefficients are significantly higher than on the Eiffel platform. The maximum selectivity is based on the "number of matches", with employed workers having an average of 3.48 times more selectivity than female workers who have not worked with the platform. The match count indicates the number of times the client and worker have filed a cross-review on the platform. This number of matches obviously depends on the number of missions carried out by the worker. The platform therefore presents a paradoxical selectivity profile: a low overall selectivity (more than a quarter of the registered profiles get at least one assignment) but a concentration of hiring on very specific profiles from the point of view of characteristics or, in other words, a significant overdetermination of access to employment by individual characteristics.

Among the individual characteristics observable in the database, it is the characteristics assigned by the platform itself that are the most decisive of access to employment: the average number of points and the average number of ratings are three times higher (3.10 and 3.28) among the population of employed workers than among the population of registered workers. On the contrary, the indicative daily rate, which is provided by the workers at the time of registration but which is not visible information to the customers, is not very decisive for the chances of being selected, since the average indicative rate of employed workers differs little from the total number of registered Paulist housekeepers. The average number of stamps is higher in the population of employed women workers but less decisive than all the other characteristics included in the calculation of points.

It can be deduced that the Sampa platform succeeds in better directing the selection of workers by customers by pointing out characteristics that its designer has chosen himself, which are essentially reputational characteristics and internal to the platform.
Characteristics Employed persons Sampa

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Worked<br>(N=57)</th><th>Total<br>(N=200)</th><th>Multiplier</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Female Share (%)</td><td>100</td><td>98</td><td>1,02</td></tr><tr><td>Average points</td><td>68,6</td><td>22,1</td><td>3,10</td></tr><tr><td>Average number of badges</td><td>5,2</td><td>3,1</td><td>1,68</td></tr><tr><td>Average recommendations</td><td>1,84</td><td>0,63</td><td>2,92</td></tr><tr><td>Average propositions</td><td>141,4</td><td>61,3</td><td>2,30</td></tr><tr><td>Average Matchs</td><td>4,42</td><td>1,27</td><td>3,48</td></tr><tr><td>Averag rating</td><td>2,3</td><td>0,7</td><td>3,28</td></tr><tr><td>Average daily rate (reais)</td><td>200,8</td><td>190,5</td><td>1.05</td></tr></tbody></table>

Preliminary conclusions

It is difficult to relate the results obtained only to national specificities. First of all, we read the choices of the professionals of these digital labour exchanges which, in the case of Eiffel, refers primarily to conventional signals of the unskilled labour market (price, age and experience), whereas Sampa has opted for the establishment of a self-referential and algorithmic labour exchange.

The two platforms are similar in the importance they give to the enhancement of emotional skills, through two communication and self-marketing media: the selfie and the self-presentation in free text. These two elements strongly distinguish job applications and aim to give access to the expression of a worker's personality. As far as Eiffel is concerned, there is a predominance of text and a strong incentive to follow an expressive text script; on the other hand, in Sampa self-presentation is a prerequisite for registration, but not a main selection criterion. In any case, whether at Eiffel or Sampa, women workers are led to expose their intimacy and their personality, as essential dimensions of the way in which they present themselves to the labour market, a characteristic that differentiates the intermediation market from the opportunities of work in the care sector.

At Eiffel, we observe that competition is mainly made by enunciation of skills and, at the same time, by prices. Sampa, on the other hand, seems closer to a self-referential labor market, in that
the 5 quality indicators of the "diarista" are derived from its activity on the platform. We observe, therefore, that the choice of platforms has a real impact on selection: the length of experience highlighted by Eiffel has a significant impact on the chances of finding a job on the platform, and the number of points accumulated on Sampa according to the activity on the platform is correlated in the Brazilian case with the probability of finding a job (more than the price).

But customers seem to have greater autonomy in the selection of worker profiles on Eiffel than on Sampa: the social dumping organized by Eiffel has little effect, because the profiles with the highest rates are overrepresented among those who work.Language, in Eiffel's case, is also a discriminating factor

Finally, it has been observed that online marketplaces organize job competition through the material and semiotic design of their websites.

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