## B.10.2 Sub-samples

<table><caption>Table B.10.2: OLS regression - Tax choices (Politicians and non-politicians)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">No-charity</th><th colspan="2">Inconsistent</th><th colspan="2">Too fast</th><th colspan="2">Tax ≠ MR</th></tr><tr><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th><th>(7)</th><th>(8)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Politician</td><td>0.785<br>(4.357)</td><td>4.324<br>(9.680)</td><td>-2.385<br>(2.656)</td><td>-2.688<br>(3.700)</td><td>-2.192<br>(3.138)</td><td>-2.686<br>(4.276)</td><td>-3.465<br>(3.490)</td><td>-3.395<br>(3.605)</td></tr><tr><td>C</td><td>-1.956<br>(2.986)</td><td>1.099<br>(3.258)</td><td>-0.793<br>(2.679)</td><td>-0.454<br>(3.122)</td><td>-0.279<br>(3.056)</td><td>-1.134<br>(3.750)</td><td>-1.370<br>(2.916)</td><td>-1.570<br>(2.891)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C</td><td>-0.0589<br>(5.810)</td><td>-0.570<br>(10.92)</td><td>2.870<br>(3.675)</td><td>0.402<br>(4.802)</td><td>3.319<br>(4.034)</td><td>0.290<br>(5.453)</td><td>0.863<br>(4.637)</td><td>1.714<br>(4.717)</td></tr><tr><td>Belief about Median</td><td>0.655***<br>(0.101)</td><td>0.441***<br>(0.106)</td><td>0.735***<br>(0.0849)</td><td>0.439***<br>(0.101)</td><td>0.795***<br>(0.0954)</td><td>0.554***<br>(0.138)</td><td>0.487***<br>(0.103)</td><td>0.490***<br>(0.105)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × Belief about Median</td><td>0.172<br>(0.218)</td><td>-0.215<br>(0.322)</td><td>-0.00842<br>(0.135)</td><td>-0.0328<br>(0.150)</td><td>-0.0580<br>(0.144)</td><td>-0.103<br>(0.187)</td><td>-0.0440<br>(0.150)</td><td>0.0320<br>(0.148)</td></tr><tr><td>C × Belief about Median</td><td>-0.136<br>(0.162)</td><td>-0.137<br>(0.131)</td><td>-0.188<br>(0.141)</td><td>-0.162<br>(0.124)</td><td>-0.0728<br>(0.133)</td><td>-0.314*<br>(0.170)</td><td>-0.213*<br>(0.124)</td><td>-0.235*<br>(0.126)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C × Belief about Median</td><td>0.219<br>(0.303)</td><td>0.769**<br>(0.354)</td><td>0.245<br>(0.190)</td><td>0.313*<br>(0.189)</td><td>0.127<br>(0.186)</td><td>0.376<br>(0.229)</td><td>0.354*<br>(0.191)</td><td>0.338*<br>(0.196)</td></tr><tr><td>Median rate</td><td></td><td>0.326***<br>(0.0453)</td><td></td><td>0.311***<br>(0.0428)</td><td></td><td>0.311***<br>(0.0515)</td><td>0.296***<br>(0.0405)</td><td>0.234***<br>(0.0382)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × Median rate</td><td></td><td>-0.0420<br>(0.105)</td><td></td><td>-0.0527<br>(0.0635)</td><td></td><td>-0.0635<br>(0.0715)</td><td>-0.0576<br>(0.0600)</td><td>-0.0736<br>(0.0583)</td></tr><tr><td>C × Median rate</td><td></td><td>-0.0395<br>(0.0578)</td><td></td><td>-0.00989<br>(0.0560)</td><td></td><td>-0.0142<br>(0.0687)</td><td>-0.0237<br>(0.0519)</td><td>-0.00805<br>(0.0493)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C × Median rate</td><td></td><td>0.0190<br>(0.141)</td><td></td><td>0.0917<br>(0.0850)</td><td></td><td>0.126<br>(0.0959)</td><td>0.107<br>(0.0795)</td><td>0.0815<br>(0.0772)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.374</td><td>0.281</td><td>0.369</td><td>0.270</td><td>0.422</td><td>0.266</td><td>0.258</td><td>0.227</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>379</td><td>3168</td><td>772</td><td>5841</td><td>640</td><td>4741</td><td>6149</td><td>5609</td></tr><tr><td>Clusters</td><td>379</td><td>288</td><td>772</td><td>531</td><td>640</td><td>431</td><td>559</td><td>559</td></tr></tbody></table>

**Notes:** C is an indicator for the *Competition* treatment. In columns (1) and (2) we exclude participants who chose to keep the gratification instead of donating it to charity. In columns (3) and (4) we exclude participants who were not consistent in the risk aversion task. In columns (5) and (6) we exclude participants who took less than 10 minutes to complete the survey. In columns (7) we exclude participants who chose always a tax rate equal to the (possible) median rate. In columns (8), we exclude all the observations where the chosen tax rate is equal to the median rate. In columns (1), (3) and (5), we run the analysis on the *No Information* treatment. In all the other columns we run the analysis on the *Information* treatment. Controls include: age, gender, income, education level, occupation, geographical area of residence, party preferences, a risk aversion index, a dummy for whether the belief elicitation task was played before/after the redistribution game, and the time taken completing the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses in column (1), (3), and (5). Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses in column (2), (4), (6), (7), and (8). \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%.
## B.10.3 Order of the tasks

<table><caption>Table B.10.3: Tax choice - Before and after (Politicians and non-politicians)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Treat:NI</th><th colspan="2">Treat:I</th></tr><tr><th>(1)<br>Before</th><th>(2)<br>After</th><th>(3)<br>Before</th><th>(4)<br>After</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>C</td><td>-2.368<br>(3.319)</td><td>-3.182<br>(3.531)</td><td>4.145<br>(4.782)</td><td>-2.642<br>(3.816)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician</td><td>-11.83*<br>(7.030)</td><td>-4.410<br>(7.943)</td><td>3.862<br>(10.11)</td><td>-14.69*<br>(7.720)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C</td><td>8.297<br>(7.900)</td><td>-5.999<br>(8.501)</td><td>-18.45<br>(11.57)</td><td>2.094<br>(9.505)</td></tr><tr><td>Belief about Median</td><td>0.584***<br>(0.107)</td><td>0.629***<br>(0.0925)</td><td>0.306***<br>(0.0771)</td><td>0.353***<br>(0.0753)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × Belief about Median</td><td>0.208<br>(0.161)</td><td>0.00831<br>(0.173)</td><td>-0.0279<br>(0.173)</td><td>0.185<br>(0.179)</td></tr><tr><td>C × Belief about Median</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Politician × Belief about Median × C</td><td>-0.145<br>(0.162)</td><td>0.317*<br>(0.171)</td><td>0.259<br>(0.204)</td><td>0.0747<br>(0.224)</td></tr><tr><td>Median rate</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.312***<br>(0.0652)</td><td>0.345***<br>(0.0534)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × Median rate</td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.116<br>(0.0883)</td><td>-0.0405<br>(0.0828)</td></tr><tr><td>C × Median rate</td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.0999<br>(0.0811)</td><td>-0.00180<br>(0.0680)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C × Median rate</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.240*<br>(0.122)</td><td>0.0360<br>(0.107)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.416</td><td>0.363</td><td>0.251</td><td>0.313</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>393</td><td>449</td><td>2750</td><td>3553</td></tr></tbody></table>

**Notes:** NI refers to *No Information* treatment and I to *Information* treatment. Controls include: age, gender, income, education level, occupation, geographical area of residence, party preferences, a risk aversion index, and the time taken completing the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses in column (1), (2), (5), and (6). Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses in column (3), (4), (7), and (8). \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%.
<table><caption>Table B.10.4: Summary table for 1001 OLS regressions - Distance to median rate (Politicians and non-politicians)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="8">Both</th><th colspan="8">Before</th><th colspan="8">After</th></tr><tr><th>P</th><th>P</th><th>P</th><th>N-P</th><th>N-P</th><th>N-P</th><th>N-P</th><th>P</th><th>P</th><th>P</th><th>P</th><th>P</th><th>P</th><th>N-P</th><th>N-P</th><th>N-P</th><th>N-P</th><th>N-P</th><th>N-P</th><th>N-P</th><th>N-P</th><th>N-P</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>I</td><td>-7.43**<br>(2.95)</td><td>1.51<br>(3.45)</td><td>0.53<br>(4.35)</td><td>1.29<br>(4.94)</td><td>-0.92***<br>(2.73)</td><td>-2.94<br>(3.00)</td><td>-3.85<br>(4.39)</td><td>-4.26<br>(3.94)</td><td>-5.67<br>(4.66)</td><td>3.91<br>(6.83)</td><td>3.47<br>(6.14)</td><td>3.31<br>(5.88)</td><td>-10.05**<br>(4.45)</td><td>-3.64<br>(4.40)</td><td>-5.14<br>(5.54)</td><td>-0.44<br>(4.66)</td><td>-8.96*<br>(4.73)</td><td>-2.26<br>(5.93)</td><td>-2.24<br>(5.09)</td><td>-4.35<br>(5.60)</td><td>-4.35<br>(5.16)</td><td>-4.34<br>(5.91)</td></tr><tr><td>C</td><td>0.21<br>(2.70)</td><td>-0.93<br>(3.24)</td><td>-1.66<br>(3.46)</td><td>-1.21<br>(3.53)</td><td>-0.40<br>(2.92)</td><td>0.72<br>(2.85)</td><td>-0.33<br>(3.51)</td><td>-0.44<br>(4.80)</td><td>-1.44<br>(3.47)</td><td>-0.61<br>(4.15)</td><td>-0.96<br>(3.43)</td><td>-0.26<br>(4.41)</td><td>-2.29<br>(3.36)</td><td>2.50<br>(4.56)</td><td>1.08<br>(4.80)</td><td>0.44<br>(5.71)</td><td>1.10<br>(3.81)</td><td>-1.33<br>(4.92)</td><td>-2.18<br>(5.09)</td><td>-2.37<br>(3.84)</td><td>1.31<br>(4.69)</td><td>-0.86<br>(4.78)</td></tr><tr><td>I × C</td><td>-2.34<br>(4.41)</td><td>-2.02<br>(3.38)</td><td>-0.08<br>(5.80)</td><td>-1.18<br>(5.65)</td><td>2.03<br>(3.68)</td><td>1.75<br>(3.39)</td><td>3.63<br>(5.28)</td><td>3.95<br>(5.15)</td><td>-3.25<br>(6.27)</td><td>-3.46<br>(6.26)</td><td>-2.79<br>(7.58)</td><td>-3.31<br>(8.90)</td><td>4.92<br>(5.81)</td><td>3.69<br>(5.38)</td><td>6.89<br>(7.23)</td><td>7.61<br>(6.46)</td><td>-1.30<br>(5.46)</td><td>-0.89<br>(10.09)</td><td>2.26<br>(8.53)</td><td>2.34<br>(5.21)</td><td>-0.15<br>(4.48)</td><td>3.47<br>(7.90)</td><td>3.90<br>(7.58)</td></tr><tr><td>[Belief about Median - Median rate]</td><td></td><td>0.74***<br>(0.07)</td><td>0.73***<br>(0.08)</td><td>0.73***<br>(0.07)</td><td>0.65***<br>(0.06)</td><td>0.64***<br>(0.08)</td><td>0.63***<br>(0.06)</td><td>0.77***<br>(0.08)</td><td>0.76***<br>(0.11)</td><td>0.77***<br>(0.09)</td><td>0.70***<br>(0.13)</td><td>0.68***<br>(0.11)</td><td>0.67***<br>(0.08)</td><td>0.67***<br>(0.11)</td><td>0.73***<br>(0.10)</td><td>0.71***<br>(0.10)</td><td>0.72***<br>(0.10)</td><td>0.61***<br>(0.11)</td><td>0.58***<br>(0.10)</td><td>0.58***<br>(0.15)</td><td>0.61***<br>(0.10)</td><td>0.58***<br>(0.15)</td></tr><tr><td>I × [Belief about Median - Median rate]</td><td>-0.28**<br>(0.12)</td><td>-0.25**<br>(0.12)</td><td>-0.24**<br>(0.11)</td><td>-0.22**<br>(0.10)</td><td>-0.19<br>(0.13)</td><td>-0.18<br>(0.15)</td><td>-0.27<br>(0.17)</td><td>-0.28<br>(0.23)</td><td>-0.27<br>(0.19)</td><td>-0.28<br>(0.23)</td><td>-0.19<br>(0.14)</td><td>-0.12<br>(0.20)</td><td>-0.27<br>(0.14)</td><td>-0.21<br>(0.20)</td><td>-0.27<br>(0.14)</td><td>-0.21<br>(0.20)</td><td>-0.26**<br>(0.12)</td><td>-0.20<br>(0.12)</td><td>-0.26**<br>(0.12)</td><td>-0.18<br>(0.17)</td><td>-0.26**<br>(0.12)</td><td>-0.18<br>(0.17)</td></tr><tr><td>C × [Belief about Median - Median rate]</td><td>0.02<br>(0.08)</td><td>0.05<br>(0.08)</td><td>0.05<br>(0.09)</td><td>-0.04<br>(0.08)</td><td>-0.01<br>(0.13)</td><td>0.00<br>(0.11)</td><td>-0.02<br>(0.11)</td><td>-0.02<br>(0.14)</td><td>-0.02<br>(0.10)</td><td>-0.15<br>(0.11)</td><td>-0.15<br>(0.11)</td><td>-0.09<br>(0.15)</td><td>-0.11<br>(0.15)</td><td>-0.09<br>(0.15)</td><td>0.07<br>(0.11)</td><td>0.10<br>(0.12)</td><td>0.10<br>(0.12)</td><td>0.06<br>(0.13)</td><td>0.12<br>(0.16)</td><td>0.12<br>(0.15)</td><td>0.12<br>(0.15)</td></tr><tr><td>I × C × [Belief about Median - Median rate]</td><td></td><td>-0.06<br>(0.23)</td><td>-0.06<br>(0.24)</td><td></td><td>-0.07<br>(0.18)</td><td>-0.08<br>(0.18)</td><td></td><td>-0.03<br>(0.23)</td><td>-0.03<br>(0.26)</td><td></td><td>-0.11<br>(0.27)</td><td>-0.08<br>(0.30)</td><td></td><td>-0.11<br>(0.27)</td><td>-0.08<br>(0.30)</td><td></td><td>-0.10<br>(0.28)</td><td>-0.12<br>(0.21)</td><td></td><td>-0.10<br>(0.22)</td><td>-0.12<br>(0.20)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Mean deviation (NANC)</td><td>33.69</td><td>33.69</td><td>33.69</td><td>33.69</td><td>32.75</td><td>32.75</td><td>32.75</td><td>32.75</td><td>32.75</td><td>32.75</td><td>33.11</td><td>33.11</td><td>33.11</td><td>33.11</td><td>33.11</td><td>33.11</td><td>33.11</td><td>33.11</td><td>33.11</td><td>33.11</td><td>33.11</td><td>33.11</td></tr><tr><td>Mean deviation (NC-C)</td><td>33.22</td><td>33.22</td><td>33.22</td><td>33.22</td><td>32.26</td><td>32.26</td><td>32.26</td><td>32.26</td><td>32.26</td><td>32.26</td><td>32.21</td><td>32.21</td><td>32.21</td><td>32.21</td><td>32.21</td><td>32.21</td><td>32.21</td><td>32.21</td><td>32.21</td><td>32.21</td><td>32.21</td><td>32.21</td></tr><tr><td>Mean deviation (INC)</td><td>25.81</td><td>25.81</td><td>25.81</td><td>25.81</td><td>23.52</td><td>23.52</td><td>23.52</td><td>23.52</td><td>23.52</td><td>23.52</td><td>27.21</td><td>27.21</td><td>27.21</td><td>27.21</td><td>27.21</td><td>27.21</td><td>27.21</td><td>27.21</td><td>27.21</td><td>27.21</td><td>27.21</td><td>27.21</td></tr><tr><td>Mean deviation (LC)</td><td>24.73</td><td>24.73</td><td>24.73</td><td>24.73</td><td>24.14</td><td>24.14</td><td>24.14</td><td>24.14</td><td>24.14</td><td>24.14</td><td>22.68</td><td>22.68</td><td>22.68</td><td>22.68</td><td>22.68</td><td>22.68</td><td>22.68</td><td>22.68</td><td>22.68</td><td>22.68</td><td>22.68</td><td>22.68</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>760</td><td>760</td><td>760</td><td>760</td><td>655</td><td>655</td><td>655</td><td>655</td><td>655</td><td>655</td><td>334</td><td>334</td><td>334</td><td>334</td><td>334</td><td>334</td><td>334</td><td>334</td><td>334</td><td>334</td><td>334</td><td>334</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>All</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td><td>None</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: I is an indicator for the Information treatment and C for the Competition treatment. For each sample, we run separate regressions for the two possible orders of the experiment as well as for the full sample. This table is not to be confused with a standard regression table. Each column summarizes the results from 1001 similar regressions based on 1001 random draws of the median rate for each participant (see Section 3). Each coefficient corresponds to the median coefficient over all regressions for the corresponding variable. Coefficients for different variables are thus likely to originate from different regressions. Standard errors and p-values associated with one coefficient are computed from the regression from which this coefficient originates. For each regression, we apply post-stratification weights to account for differences observables between our politicians sample and the sample of all French politicians. Controls include: age, gender, income, education level, occupation, geographical area of residence, party preferences, a risk aversion index, a dummy for whether the belief elicitation task was played before/after the redistribution game, and the time taken completing the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
## B.10.4 Inverse-probability weighting (IPW) regressions

<table><caption>Table B.10.5: IPW regressions - Tax choice</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="2">Treat:NI</th><th colspan="2">Treat:I</th><th colspan="2">Treat:NI</th><th colspan="2">Treat:I</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th><th>(7)</th><th>(8)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>C</td><td>3.543<br>(2.310)</td><td>3.547<br>(2.225)</td><td>-2.289<br>(3.799)</td><td>-1.788<br>(3.578)</td><td>-2.266<br>(2.600)</td><td>-1.565<br>(2.464)</td><td>0.431<br>(3.099)</td><td>0.197<br>(3.026)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-3.413<br>(2.365)</td><td>-2.408<br>(2.459)</td><td>1.389<br>(3.729)</td><td>-0.683<br>(3.678)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>5.809*<br>(3.477)</td><td>4.913<br>(3.342)</td><td>-2.721<br>(4.900)</td><td>-2.027<br>(4.697)</td></tr><tr><td>Belief about Median</td><td>0.725***<br>(0.0949)</td><td>0.671***<br>(0.0971)</td><td>0.424***<br>(0.148)</td><td>0.483***<br>(0.120)</td><td>0.584***<br>(0.0745)</td><td>0.597***<br>(0.0738)</td><td>0.398***<br>(0.0605)</td><td>0.380***<br>(0.0595)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × Belief about Median</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.142<br>(0.121)</td><td>0.0978<br>(0.120)</td><td>0.0265<br>(0.159)</td><td>0.0784<br>(0.135)</td></tr><tr><td>C × Belief about Median</td><td>0.0691<br>(0.119)</td><td>0.0938<br>(0.120)</td><td>0.165<br>(0.175)</td><td>0.123<br>(0.150)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Politician × Belief about Median × C</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.0691<br>(0.119)</td><td>0.0861<br>(0.117)</td><td>0.165<br>(0.174)</td><td>0.123<br>(0.150)</td></tr><tr><td>Median rate</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.244***<br>(0.0427)</td><td>0.244***<br>(0.0428)</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.326***<br>(0.0400)</td><td>0.326***<br>(0.0401)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × Median rate</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.0821<br>(0.0584)</td><td>-0.0821<br>(0.0586)</td></tr><tr><td>C × Median rate</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.0880<br>(0.0597)</td><td>0.0880<br>(0.0599)</td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.0409<br>(0.0525)</td><td>-0.0409<br>(0.0526)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C × Median rate</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.129<br>(0.0794)</td><td>0.129<br>(0.0796)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>None</td><td>All</td><td>None</td><td>All</td><td>None</td><td>All</td><td>None</td><td>All</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.394</td><td>0.441</td><td>0.228</td><td>0.307</td><td>0.326</td><td>0.367</td><td>0.233</td><td>0.274</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>475</td><td>475</td><td>3135</td><td>3135</td><td>842</td><td>842</td><td>6303</td><td>6303</td></tr><tr><td>Clusters</td><td>475</td><td>475</td><td>285</td><td>285</td><td>842</td><td>842</td><td>573</td><td>573</td></tr></tbody></table>

**Notes:** NI refers to *No Information* treatment and I to *Information* treatment. C is an indicator for the *Competition* treatment. The Belief about Median variable is normalized by subtracting its average value. We apply inverse probability weights as well as (normalized) post-stratification weights. In computing the weights, we adapted the stepwise procedure from Imbens and Rubin (2015) based on estimating a multinomial logit model for treatment assignment. We start with income to initialize the model because it likely affects both the outcome variable and treatment assignment (e.g., due to the opportunity cost of answering the survey). Then we iteratively incorporate the variable among the others that improves the most the fit of the model (using Wald tests). We repeat this step until all variables are either included or the test does not pass improve the model enough (p-value at most 0.3173, following Imbens and Rubin, 2015). We complement the model with testing improvements of the fit for quadratic and interaction terms from the selected variables (with p-value at most 0.1). Then, we predict the propensity scores from the finalized model of treatment assignment. Finally, we compute the weights as the product of the inverse of the score and the (normalized) sampling weight. Models in columns (1) to (4) are restricted to the politician sample. Models in columns (5) to (8) concerns the full sample. Controls include: age, gender, income, education level, occupation, geographical area of residence, party preferences, a risk aversion index, a dummy for whether the belief elicitation task was played before/after the redistribution game, and the time taken completing the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns 1-2 and clustered at the individual level in columns 3-4. \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%.
# B.11 Heterogeneity analysis

## B.11.1 Politicians-specific variables

<table><caption>Table B.11.1: OLS regressions - Politician-specific variables</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Tax choice, treat:NI<br>(1)</th><th>Tax choice, treat:I<br>(2)</th><th>Belief about Median<br>(3)</th><th>Sd Belief about Median<br>(4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5"><em>Current Office (Baseline: Councillor)</em></td></tr><tr><td>Mayor</td><td>-1.405<br>(3.201)</td><td>8.218**<br>(3.298)</td><td>-1.541<br>(2.343)</td><td>0.774<br>(1.026)</td></tr><tr><td>Vice-mayor</td><td>-2.293<br>(2.324)</td><td>6.701**<br>(3.322)</td><td>0.694<br>(2.266)</td><td>0.992<br>(0.975)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><em>Municipality Pop. (Baseline: Less than 1000)</em></td></tr><tr><td>Between 1000 and 3500</td><td>1.875<br>(2.454)</td><td>-2.292<br>(2.784)</td><td>0.212<br>(1.884)</td><td>-1.709**<br>(0.864)</td></tr><tr><td>More than 3500</td><td>-1.297<br>(2.598)</td><td>-2.396<br>(3.167)</td><td>-4.170*<br>(2.183)</td><td>-0.338<br>(1.067)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><em>Former Mandates (Baseline: 0 mandates)</em></td></tr><tr><td>1 mandate</td><td>1.392<br>(2.563)</td><td>-0.517<br>(3.401)</td><td>0.378<br>(2.050)</td><td>0.375<br>(0.961)</td></tr><tr><td>More than 1 mandate</td><td>0.535<br>(3.421)</td><td>-8.556**<br>(3.813)</td><td>0.167<br>(2.482)</td><td>-0.125<br>(1.158)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.431</td><td>0.318</td><td>0.0669</td><td>0.0608</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>475</td><td>3135</td><td>760</td><td>760</td></tr></tbody></table>

**Notes:** NI refers to *No Information* treatment and I to *Information* treatment. Controls include: age, gender, income, education level, occupation, geographical area of residence, party preferences, a risk aversion index, a dummy for whether the belief elicitation task was played before/after the redistribution game, and the time taken completing the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1), (3) and (4). Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses in column (2). \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%.
## B.11.2 Party preferences

<table><caption>Table B.11.2: Heterogeneity analysis by party preferences - Tax choice (Politicians and non-politicians)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="2">Leftwing</th><th colspan="2">Rightwing</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Politician</td><td>5.700<br>(5.129)</td><td>-5.531<br>(6.726)</td><td>-4.137<br>(2.766)</td><td>5.860<br>(4.123)</td></tr><tr><td>C</td><td>3.075<br>(5.272)</td><td>-7.141<br>(7.030)</td><td>-2.936<br>(2.577)</td><td>3.665<br>(3.287)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C</td><td>-1.555<br>(6.820)</td><td>4.199<br>(10.61)</td><td>2.973<br>(3.451)</td><td>-5.509<br>(5.363)</td></tr><tr><td>Belief about Median</td><td>0.656***<br>(0.229)</td><td>0.725***<br>(0.142)</td><td>0.684***<br>(0.0833)</td><td>0.481***<br>(0.150)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × Belief about Median</td><td>0.261<br>(0.267)</td><td>-0.456*<br>(0.274)</td><td>0.1000<br>(0.139)</td><td>0.0328<br>(0.233)</td></tr><tr><td>C × Belief about Median</td><td>-0.0294<br>(0.253)</td><td>-0.413*<br>(0.242)</td><td>0.0872<br>(0.131)</td><td>-0.202<br>(0.174)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C × Belief about Median</td><td>-0.108<br>(0.323)</td><td>0.543<br>(0.425)</td><td>0.00565<br>(0.188)</td><td>0.176<br>(0.277)</td></tr><tr><td>Median rate</td><td></td><td>0.292***<br>(0.0808)</td><td></td><td>0.326***<br>(0.0466)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × Median rate</td><td></td><td>-0.000641<br>(0.116)</td><td></td><td>-0.176**<br>(0.0699)</td></tr><tr><td>C × Median rate</td><td></td><td>-0.0480<br>(0.130)</td><td></td><td>-0.0408<br>(0.0605)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C × Median rate</td><td></td><td>0.144<br>(0.169)</td><td></td><td>0.139<br>(0.0940)</td></tr><tr><td>Treatment</td><td>No Info</td><td>Info</td><td>No Info</td><td>Info</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.414</td><td>0.337</td><td>0.405</td><td>0.247</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>201</td><td>1265</td><td>470</td><td>3597</td></tr><tr><td>Clusters</td><td>201</td><td>115</td><td>470</td><td>327</td></tr></tbody></table>

**Notes:** This table reports results from separate regressions based on participants' declared ideology. Leftwing participants are those who answer less than 5 on the likert-scale question about their ideology. Rightwing participants are those who answer more than 5. We do not consider participants whose answers do not allow to classify them either as leftwing or rightwing (i.e., self-ideology = 5 or No answer). Controls include: age, gender, income, education level, occupation, geographical area of residence, party preferences, a risk aversion index, a dummy for whether the belief elicitation task was played before/after the redistribution game, and the time taken completing the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1), (3) (5) and (7). Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%.
## B.11.3 Income categories

<table><caption>Table B.11.3: Heterogeneity analysis by income categories - Tax choice (Politicians and non-politicians)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Less than 20k</th><th colspan="2">Between 20k and 30k</th><th colspan="2">Between 30k and 40k</th><th colspan="2">More than 40k</th></tr><tr><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th><th>(7)</th><th>(8)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Politician</td><td>2.939<br>(4.955)</td><td>1.982<br>(7.378)</td><td>-4.117<br>(3.940)</td><td>4.359<br>(6.001)</td><td>3.312<br>(5.310)</td><td>-0.212<br>(5.953)</td><td>-8.518**<br>(4.249)</td><td>1.138<br>(4.835)</td></tr><tr><td>C</td><td>-0.692<br>(4.291)</td><td>-0.594<br>(5.485)</td><td>-0.361<br>(4.337)</td><td>-3.685<br>(4.919)</td><td>-0.664<br>(4.852)</td><td>5.884<br>(6.100)</td><td>-4.045<br>(4.827)</td><td>4.923<br>(5.075)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C</td><td>0.442<br>(6.557)</td><td>10.04<br>(9.836)</td><td>3.277<br>(5.375)</td><td>-0.722<br>(7.983)</td><td>-3.910<br>(6.474)</td><td>-6.290<br>(9.108)</td><td>8.542<br>(6.030)</td><td>-2.296<br>(7.396)</td></tr><tr><td>Belief about Median</td><td>0.598***<br>(0.118)</td><td>0.426**<br>(0.177)</td><td>0.534***<br>(0.193)</td><td>0.468***<br>(0.155)</td><td>0.853***<br>(0.167)</td><td>0.228<br>(0.225)</td><td>0.705***<br>(0.213)</td><td>0.732***<br>(0.160)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × Belief about Median</td><td>0.0524<br>(0.236)</td><td>0.301<br>(0.265)</td><td>0.356<br>(0.226)</td><td>0.0509<br>(0.250)</td><td>0.0302<br>(0.241)</td><td>0.00947<br>(0.343)</td><td>0.0000248<br>(0.308)</td><td>-0.177<br>(0.246)</td></tr><tr><td>C × Belief about Median</td><td>0.179<br>(0.185)</td><td>-0.0283<br>(0.221)</td><td>0.0871<br>(0.255)</td><td>-0.187<br>(0.196)</td><td>-0.199<br>(0.233)</td><td>0.0291<br>(0.264)</td><td>-0.233<br>(0.275)</td><td>-0.576**<br>(0.238)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C × Belief about Median</td><td>-0.542<br>(0.386)</td><td>-0.269<br>(0.375)</td><td>0.00946<br>(0.306)</td><td>0.211<br>(0.324)</td><td>0.0472<br>(0.346)</td><td>0.167<br>(0.449)</td><td>0.454<br>(0.361)</td><td>0.539<br>(0.354)</td></tr><tr><td>Median rate</td><td></td><td>0.356***<br>(0.0733)</td><td></td><td>0.339***<br>(0.0610)</td><td></td><td>0.283***<br>(0.0763)</td><td></td><td>0.327***<br>(0.0848)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × Median rate</td><td></td><td>-0.0431<br>(0.125)</td><td></td><td>-0.189*<br>(0.0981)</td><td></td><td>-0.0406<br>(0.108)</td><td></td><td>-0.0498<br>(0.108)</td></tr><tr><td>C × Median rate</td><td></td><td>-0.0507<br>(0.0961)</td><td></td><td>0.0671<br>(0.0843)</td><td></td><td>-0.0653<br>(0.116)</td><td></td><td>-0.117<br>(0.103)</td></tr><tr><td>Politician × C × Median rate</td><td></td><td>-0.0554<br>(0.160)</td><td></td><td>0.104<br>(0.128)</td><td></td><td>0.248<br>(0.165)</td><td></td><td>0.0641<br>(0.141)</td></tr><tr><td>Treatment</td><td>No Info</td><td>No Info</td><td>No Info</td><td>No Info</td><td>No Info</td><td>No Info</td><td>No Info</td><td>No Info</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td><td>All</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.239</td><td>0.276</td><td>0.401</td><td>0.262</td><td>0.379</td><td>0.197</td><td>0.387</td><td>0.214</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>195</td><td>1254</td><td>236</td><td>1694</td><td>151</td><td>1287</td><td>201</td><td>1595</td></tr><tr><td>Clusters</td><td>195</td><td>114</td><td>236</td><td>154</td><td>151</td><td>117</td><td>201</td><td>145</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table reports results from separate regressions based on participants' income categories. Controls include: age, gender, income, education level, occupation, geographical area of residence, party preferences, a risk aversion index, a dummy for whether the belief elicitation task was played before/after the redistribution game, and the time taken completing the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1), (3) (5) and (7). Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%.
## B.12 Control variables in the main regressions

<table><caption>Table B.12.1: OLS regressions - Control variables</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="2">Politicians</th><th colspan="2">Non-politicians</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5"><em>Ideology - Base: Left</em></td></tr><tr><td>Center</td><td>-8.014***<br>(3.085)</td><td>-4.779<br>(3.849)</td><td>-1.680<br>(4.258)</td><td>0.247<br>(2.933)</td></tr><tr><td>Right</td><td>-9.988***<br>(3.742)</td><td>-8.659**<br>(4.385)</td><td>-10.96***<br>(3.319)</td><td>2.284<br>(2.854)</td></tr><tr><td>None</td><td>-6.668**<br>(2.839)</td><td>-4.119<br>(3.169)</td><td>-7.233**<br>(3.081)</td><td>1.508<br>(2.201)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><em>Income - Base: &lt;20k</em></td></tr><tr><td>Between 20k and 30k</td><td>-2.801<br>(3.767)</td><td>-4.465<br>(3.791)</td><td>1.569<br>(3.409)</td><td>1.380<br>(2.573)</td></tr><tr><td>Between 30k and 40k</td><td>1.396<br>(3.857)</td><td>-6.249<br>(4.551)</td><td>4.506<br>(3.737)</td><td>-0.110<br>(2.823)</td></tr><tr><td>More than 40k</td><td>1.000<br>(3.825)</td><td>-14.69***<br>(5.146)</td><td>7.464*<br>(3.824)</td><td>-5.322*<br>(3.101)</td></tr><tr><td>Risk aversion</td><td>0.0891<br>(0.161)</td><td>-0.523**<br>(0.218)</td><td>0.175<br>(0.209)</td><td>-0.109<br>(0.170)</td></tr><tr><td>Constant</td><td>46.63***<br>(8.106)</td><td>47.28***<br>(11.22)</td><td>55.00***<br>(9.140)</td><td>5.267<br>(9.376)</td></tr><tr><td>Other controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.428</td><td>0.301</td><td>0.324</td><td>0.268</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>475</td><td>3135</td><td>367</td><td>3168</td></tr></tbody></table>

**Notes:** This table displays the coefficients on the control variables of the regression in columns (2) and (4) of Tables 2, as well as the coefficients on the control variables for similar regressions on non-politicians. To economize on space, only statistically significant coefficients are shown. Other controls include age, gender, education level, occupation and region fixed effects and the random order dummy. Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1) and (3). Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses in column (2) and (4). \* significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%.