# EU climate diplomacy and the geopolitics of the Anthropocene

Niklas Bremberg, Joseph Earsom, Franziska Petri

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Niklas Bremberg, Joseph Earsom, Franziska Petri. EU climate diplomacy and the geopolitics of the Anthropocene. European Politics and Society, 2025, pp.1-15. 10.1080/23745118.2025.2576710. hal-05345739

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# EU climate diplomacy and the geopolitics of the Anthropocene

Niklas Bremberg, Joseph Earsom & Franziska Petri

**To cite this article:** Niklas Bremberg, Joseph Earsom & Franziska Petri (26 Oct 2025): EU climate diplomacy and the geopolitics of the Anthropocene, European Politics and Society, DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2025.2576710

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# EU climate diplomacy and the geopolitics of the Anthropocene*

Niklas Bremberg IDª, Joseph Earsom IDᵇ and Franziska Petri IDᶜ

ªDept. of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden; ᵇESPOL - Université Catholique de Lille, Lille, France; ᶜLINES, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

**ABSTRACT**

The EU is often portrayed as an important international actor in global climate politics. Yet, a 'return of geopolitics' is said to undermine the EU's climate diplomacy efforts to achieve effective multilateral cooperation to reduce global GHG emissions. We argue there is more nuance to understanding the impact of geopolitics on global climate politics and the EU's role in global climate governance. In this paper, we devise a framework that seeks to analyze EU climate diplomacy in the context of the geopolitics of the Anthropocene. Assessing the EU's response to the geopolitics of the Anthropocene allows us to make two contributions to existing scholarship. First, we provide insight into the EU as a climate actor in an increasingly destabilized, complex, and interconnected world. Second, considering the EU's position in the global climate governance landscape, we offer a preliminary 'reality check' of political actors' ability to respond to the challenges of a new geological era. Overall, we find that while the EU has repeatedly demonstrated an awareness of these new geopolitical challenges, it has not fundamentally altered its climate diplomacy.

**KEYWORDS**

Anthropocene; climate
change; climate diplomacy;
energy; European Union;
geopolitics

## Introduction

The European Union (EU) is often portrayed as an important international actor in global climate politics (Biedenkopf & Petri, 2021; Bremberg & Michalski, 2024; Earsom & Delreux, 2023). In climate diplomacy, the EU seeks to lead by example and foster coalitions around ambitious climate objectives. The EU's goal to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 through the European Green Deal is meant to signal a significant policy shift in climate change mitigation. Nevertheless, the prospects for multilateral cooperation to fight climate change seem increasingly pale as great power competition is currently undermining the rules-based international order (Falkner & Buzan, 2022). Moreover, the EU's share of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is shrinking which suggests that its negotiating position vis-à-vis the world's largest emitters, especially the United States (US), China, and India, is deteriorating.¹

Yet, it is not only the interests of major emitters that is making EU climate diplomacy efforts increasingly fraught. Efforts to increase the production of renewable energy have meant that the global competition over new technologies, raw materials, investment opportunities and markets has spilled over to global climate governance. For example, even before the re-election of Donald Trump as US President in 2024, policies such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the Chips and Science Act gave the impression that the US primarily sees competition in the green technology sector in the light of the great power stand-off with China rather than a means to strengthening multilateral co-operation to fight climate change (Freedman, 2025). This trend seems only likely to intensify in the years to come. Indeed, the interrelated nature of the intensifying climate crisis, shifting power dynamics, and race for green technologies fit within what scholars have referred to as the 'geopolitics of the Anthropocene' (Dalby, 2020). While human societies have always been entangled with their natural environments, the current pace and magnitude of climate change and environmental degradation suggests that these processes are fundamentally reconfiguring security, distribution of resources and relations among states and international actors.
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These factors are interrelated since climate change and environmental degradation need to be addressed in a holistic manner at the same time as efforts to reduce GHG emissions might create new types of dependencies, and some actors might actually think that they stand to gain from global warming. Thus, by geopolitics of the Anthropocene, we refer to the shifting global political system due to the interconnected relationship between humans and the natural world (Dalby, 2013; Lövbrand et al., 2020). Concretely, this manifests itself via the rethinking of individual and collective security, competition for renewable energy and 'green' resources, and changes in existing alliances and power structures. Accordingly, we contend that any understanding of the EU's position as a geopolitical actor in 2025 and onwards must take into account this new dynamic (cf. Anghel, 2025; Tonra, 2025, this issue).

In this article, we devise a framework that seeks to analyze EU climate diplomacy in the context of the geopolitics of the Anthropocene. The paper answers the research question *How and to what extent has EU climate diplomacy responded to the geopolitics of the Anthropocene?* Assessing the EU's response allows us to make two main contributions to existing scholarship. First, we provide insight into the EU as a climate actor in an increasingly destabilized, complex, and interconnected world. Second, considering the EU's position in the global climate governance landscape, we offer a preliminary 'reality check' of international actors' ability to respond to the challenges of a new geological era. As such, the paper contributes to this special issue on geopoliticization and the EU by way of providing a different perspective on the notion of 'actor-centered politicization' and its effect on EU policies as presented in the Introduction, in this case related to climate diplomacy (see Andrione-Moylan et al., this issue). Overall, we find that while the EU has repeatedly demonstrated an awareness of these new geopolitical challenges, it has not fundamentally altered its climate diplomacy. Rather than a paradigm-shifting dynamic, we find that politicization is increasingly used to motivate a stronger emphasis on strategic and defence aspects in EU climate diplomacy. While this can be said to represent a change compared to how EU climate diplomacy was motivated when it was launched, it largely seems to have a paradigm-reinforcing effect, as defined by the Introduction to this special issue (ibid).

The article is structured as follows. The first section offers a review of the literature, reflecting on the geopolitics of the Anthropocene and the EU's role therein. The following section presents the analytical framework that allows us to analyze how the EU has responded to the geopolitics of the Anthropocene. The third section presents the findings of the empirical analysis, focusing on changes in framing of the three themes of climate security, energy and resource dependency, and multipolarity in Council conclusions on climate diplomacy. The concluding section summarizes the main findings and offers avenues for future research.

## The geopolitics of the Anthropocene

In current discussions on the EU's role in a world that is said to become more conflictual and less rules-based, 'geopolitics' is often used as little more than a short-hand for power politics. As such, it adds little to standard realist notions in IR of self-interested state actors structurally determined to fend for themselves under conditions of international anarchy (Guzzini, 1998). But in its classic conception, the concept of geopolitics stipulates that geography has a structuring effect on international politics, albeit it might be offset by technological development (hence the early focus on naval power and the later focus on air power and nuclear weapons) (Atkinson & Dodds, 2002; Schmidt, 1998; Specter, 2022). More recently, the concept of critical geopolitics has been developed to capture how practices of categorizing and visualizing the world are shaping various political dynamics, including the US war on terror and the rise of China (Agnew, 2003; Dodds et al., 2013; Tuathail, 1996). At the same time, scholars have largely approached geopolitics from the perspective of relative environmental stability and consistency (Harrington, 2016). In other words, the natural environment has been viewed as a space in which geographically delineated states interact and as a supplier of natural resources to fuel the increasingly interconnected global economy (Dalby, 2020). This is also seen in more recent attempts in IR and Foreign Policy Analysis to theorize the role of great powers in global environmental politics (Falkner & Buzan, 2022) and 'the geopolitics of oil' (Kim, 2020; Lee, 2019).

However, such perspectives are increasingly at odds with the geophysical reality of our planetary system in the era of the Anthropocene. We have entered a new era of planetary history in which humans now rival geophysical processes (Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000; Edgeworth et al., 2024; Steffen et al., 2011). The dependence on fossil fuels has placed our planetary system under pressure to the extent it may no longer be
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able to provide the stability that has allowed human societies to flourish over the past 12 000 years. The Anthropocene thus represents a potential paradigm shift for the international system and for our thinking about the role that geography and geophysical processes play in shaping geopolitical dynamics among states and international actors. A growing literature has attempted to grapple with the consequences of the Anthropocene on international conflict and cooperation (see e.g. Crawford, 2022; Johnstone & McLeish, 2020; Mukoyama, 2024; Salter, 2024). This literature can be broken down into two interrelated groupings: identifying concrete impacts on issues of cooperation and security and a more critical and theoretical exercise of rethinking international politics (Simangan, 2021).

The first group of scholarship has sought to bring to the forefront the consequences of an increasingly unstable and unpredictable planet on human societies through the lenses of cooperation and security. Decisions made today, especially concerning fossil fuels and alternative energy sources, will have a direct impact on the livelihoods of future generations (Dalby, 2013). Furthermore, the nature of GHG emissions means that the impacts will not be felt evenly. In that sense, scholars argue that existent global inequalities will likely be exacerbated (Biermann et al., 2016). Work on the geopolitics of energy has underscored the impact of the shift away from fossil fuels and towards renewable energy on existing power structures and alliances (Blondeel et al., 2021). Finally, there is increasing consensus on the interrelated and shared future of states around the world. Considering the unpredictability and potential catastrophe of the Anthropocene, states have a common interest in protecting the biosphere (Dalby, 2020; Harrington, 2016). In that sense, ensuring collective action and accountability on addressing climate change will become a political imperative, despite the strong weight of the current fossil-fuel driven status quo. Given the omnipresence of the Anthropocene, a second and related theme emerges in the literature: rethinking international cooperation in an era of instability, crisis, and shared fate (Lövbrand et al., 2020). Indeed, scholars of critical geopolitics have grappled with how our contemporary liberal understanding of both the state and the earth system has perpetuated our current understanding of geography and security and thereby limited our ability to respond to the planetary crisis (Dalby, 2013; 2020; Harrington, 2016). Accordingly, there is a growing call for rethinking both political boundaries and our understanding of security itself (Dalby, 2020; Daoudy, 2021).

We contend that while insightful, these works have mostly neglected the agency of states and international actors in responding to the Anthropocene. This literature, which is largely theoretical, has mainly been focused on systems-level aspects of international politics. What is missing is an understanding of how states and international actors have attempted to respond (or not) to this impending tectonic shift and its consequences as outlined above. This is what we mean by the geopolitics of the Anthropocene, and this is particularly interesting in the case of the EU, which the existing literature shows has attempted to position itself as a leader in the green transformation. Indeed, some scholars have attempted to unpack the EU's response to the Anthropocene. Schunz (2023) underscores the EU's interest in protecting global atmospheric spaces in recent international climate negotiations. Proedrou (2020) emphasizes the importance of studying the EU as an actor in the Anthropocene, while showing the limits of what they view as the EU's conventional foreign policy. However, these studies do not provide a longitudinal assessment of whether or not the imperatives of the Anthropocene have actually penetrated the practices through which the EU engages with other actors on climate and other environmental issues. This is important to study since the growing realization of humans' impact on the planetary system does not necessarily come with ready-made policy solutions, and there is thus a need to better understand how an international actor such as the EU is responding to the challenges brought about by the Anthropocene.

## Analytical framework and research design

To evaluate the extent to which EU climate diplomacy has responded to the geopolitics of the Anthropocene and trace possible paradigm shifts in EU policy-making, we start from the observation that the Anthropocene has destabilized the traditional framings and constructions of international politics. The Anthropocene has upended notions of territoriality, security, and cooperation – the typical building blocks of statecraft and diplomacy in the twentieth century (Dalby, 2020; Tuathail, 1996). Concretely, as the literature review demonstrates, the Anthropocene concept carries significant implications for how we should seek to understand existing alliances and power structures, competition for renewable energy and resources, and fundamental questions of individual and collective security in terms not only of changing threat landscapes but also of our interrelated future.
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The question thus remains to what extent international actors like the EU are transforming their diplomatic practices in response to these tectonic shifts. As an established international climate actor with leadership ambitions and a strong economic interest in the green transition, the EU could be expected to be very responsive to the geopolitics of the Anthropocene. Indeed, in terms of response, we would expect a shift in its diplomatic priorities and practices (Bremberg & Michalski, 2024). Existing research has shown that the EU has somewhat successfully pivoted to a changing international context (Earsom & Delreux, 2021; Oberthür & Dupont, 2021). At the same time, the embeddedness of existing practices and power structures, as well as the fundamental conflicts between traditional notions of geopolitics could also hamper the EU's response to the challenges of the Anthropocene. Therefore, our focus on the geopolitics of the Anthropocene adds important analytical leverage to on-going attempts to theorize how geopoliticization is impacting EU politics, policies and polity (see Andrione-Moylan et al.; Damro, this issue).

In this article, we look at the extent to which the EU has responded to three key changes brought about by the Anthropocene, studying whether paradigm shifts can be traced. First, the Anthropocene breaks down barriers between security and the environment (Dalby, 2013; Daoudy, 2021). At a superficial level, this entails an acknowledgement of climate change as a potential threat multiplier and potential driver of conflict and migratory pressures (Daoudy, 2021). In that sense, actors would be expected to increasingly develop security and defense policies that integrate climate risks. Furthermore, they are likely to realize the importance of collective mitigation for their own long-term security interests (Dalby, 2020). However, changing climate conditions might also be understood to affect military alliances in unforeseen ways. Considering the EU's historically limited emphasis on security and defense measures (at least until the Russian invasion of Ukraine), we would expect that the EU would be less engaged in such foresight practices regarding the implications of the Anthropocene on security and defense (Bremberg et al., 2019).

Second, and relatedly, the global energy transition increases competition for raw materials and renewable energy technology (Blondeel et al., 2021; Blondeel et al., 2024; Goldthau & Youngs, 2023; Hafner & Tagliapietra, 2020; Herranz-Surralles, 2024; Kuzemko et al., 2025). Actors' interests no longer necessarily lie with a secure supply of fossil fuels but instead in alternative resources and tools to support society in a low-carbon environment (Dalby, 2020). This logically entails prioritizing diplomatic relationships that offer avenues out of fossil fuel dependency, enable access to raw materials, provide renewable energy sources, and support new technologies and innovation. The EU has a long-demonstrated commitment to renewable energy and technologies, most recently in the context of the European Green Deal. Hence, we expect a relatively robust anticipation of the need to look for alternative resources, especially in recent years.

Third, the Anthropocene has the potential to restructure political interactions around the world more broadly (Dalby, 2013; 2020; Harrington, 2016; Lövbrand et al., 2020). Nonetheless, critical differences emerge with respect to existing geopolitical framings and practices. First and foremost, the literature suggests a move towards multipolarity. Challenges to typical understandings of the boundaries, borders, and authorities likely entails a move away from traditional alliances and great powers that have characterized the past decades (Harrington, 2016). New actors, both state and non-state, will likely take increased importance, with respect to value chains and resources (Dalby, 2020). This is reinforced by the common interest of all actors in a relatively stable earth system. The EU has a long-established preference for multilateral cooperation within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). At the same time, the changing global climate governance landscape is increasingly diverse, with new actors and partnerships (Earsom & Delreux, 2021). In that vein, we expect that the EU will acknowledge new forms of cooperation while emphasizing the central role of the existing governance architecture.

When taken together, these elements suggest that the EU will be somewhat responsive to the geopolitics of the Anthropocene, with a strong bias to existing functions. In other words, despite the EU's established climate leadership and priorities, it is difficult to envision a radical reorganization of its climate diplomacy that would entail a paradigm shift in ideas and strategies. This is why paradigm-reinforcing dynamics might be expected, even as actors shaping EU climate diplomacy might seek to instrumentalize geopolitics as a way to strengthen its position vis-à-vis other EU policy fields (see Andrione-Moylan et al., this issue). To capture the extent to which these shifting imperatives are reflected in the EU's approach to climate diplomacy, we focus here on Council conclusions adopted by the EU's Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). These conclusions offer valuable insights into key priorities of EU climate diplomacy. Since they are the results of often lengthy negotiations and coordination processes among EU Member States, they tend to reflect a shared
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understanding of policymakers and EU officials within and/or across institutions, including the European Commission (EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). This understanding includes insights on what the main problems are that EU climate diplomacy should address and what the EU as an international actor can do to address them. Council conclusions also recurrently refer to actions the EU has recently conducted, which means that they can be used as a source to trace the evolution of EU diplomatic practices over time (see e.g. Biedenkopf & Petri, 2021; Bremberg et al., 2019; Earsom & Delreux, 2021). As such, these publicly available documents offer a rich source for qualitatively tracing changes as to how the EU responds to the challenges of the Anthropocene. The Council conclusions cover the timeframe 2011–2024, spanning the period after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the COP21 in Paris, which both provided a strong impetus for EU climate diplomacy, and up until 2024, i.e. covering the launch of the European Green Deal and the first von der Leyen Commission mandate. More specifically, our dataset includes twelve Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) outcome documents (with a specific focus on the annual climate diplomacy conclusions and the climate diplomacy action plans). In more recent years, the Council conclusions have become longer and regularly cover some fifteen to twenty pages (partly because they sometimes are combined with Council conclusions on EU energy diplomacy).

For each of the three changes identified above we conduct a detailed manual coding to explore the occurrence of specific themes as well as changes in framing over time. We follow a mixed coding strategy: In a deductive step, we identify the specific themes from our analytical framework (security, resources, multipolarity), revealing changes in occurrence over time overall. In an inductive step, we developed subcodes to capture the different framings of the three key themes, allowing to interpret the evolution of framings (thus going beyond an analysis of quantitative occurrences). Taken together, the qualitative analysis of the documents offers nuanced insights into the EU's response to the geopolitics of the Anthropocene, as will be presented in the following empirical section.

# EU climate diplomacy and Anthropocene geopolitics: security, resources and multipolarity

## EU climate diplomacy and climate change as a threat multiplier

In this section we look at how the security implications of climate change are framed in EU climate diplomacy. It should be mentioned that the EU was among the first major international actors to acknowledge the nexus between climate change and security already in the early 2000s, and it has developed actions to address ‘climate security’ within its foreign and security policy ever since (Bremberg et al., 2019; Zwolski & Kaunert, 2011). Climate security is not a specific policy field within the EU but should rather be seen as an expanding cluster of actions and policies brought together by the EU’s declared ambition to address the multifaceted security implications of climate change. EEAS and EC officials, together with diplomats from EU member states, are contributing to developing EU climate security policy, and it has gradually been incorporated as a key feature of EU climate diplomacy as well. In fact, the link between climate change and security has been recognized in all FAC council conclusions on climate diplomacy since 2011, albeit the framing has shifted over time.

It should be noted that the majority of occurrences of the theme of security (80 out of 128) were found in the 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 Council conclusions (see Figure 1). In the period between COP15 in Copenhagen and COP21 in Paris, the conclusions only covered two or three pages each but despite their limited word count, the theme of climate change as a security ‘threat multiplier’ occurred constantly. In 2011, it is stated that climate change ‘has important security implications since it acts as a ‘threat multiplier’, exacerbating tensions over land, water, food and energy prices, and creating migratory pressures and desertification. It is a threat to global growth, prosperity and stability’ (Council of the EU, 2011, p. 1). This framing is more or less repeated in 2013, recognizing that ‘Addressing the risk-multiplying threats of a changing climate, including potential conflict and instability, related to reliable access to food, water and energy, requires effective foreign policy responses at the global and EU level’ as well as a ‘a more pro-active and targeted EU climate diplomacy agenda’ (Council of the EU, 2013, p. 2). The notion that climate change acts as a security ‘threat multiplier’ in relation to the themes of risks and conflicts is then repeated in basically all Council conclusions included in this analysis (see Figure 1).
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<figure><img src="image_18.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 1.** Occurrences of diverse framings of climate change as a threat multiplier.</figcaption></figure>

After the Paris Agreement had been signed, the 2016 Council conclusions hailed it as 'a landmark achievement' and underlined that the EU and its member states needed 'to keep working to address the direct and indirect international security impacts of climate change' (Council of the EU, 2016, p. 5). The FAC underlined that the 'potentially destabilising effects of climate change (including on migration, food security, reliable access to resources, water and energy, spread of epidemic disease, and social and economic instability) should be addressed by the EU, its Member States and partner countries, including through climate risk assessments and support to capacity building' (ibid).

The focus on the need to raise awareness about the nexus between climate change and security among the EU's international partners as well as enhancing the capacity to anticipate and analyze climate risks is kept in the subsequent Council conclusions in the post-Paris period, with certain variations and nuances in framing. For instance, the EU and its member states are encouraged to 'better understand, integrate, anticipate and manage the impacts of climate change on domestic stability, international security and the displacement of people' (Council of the EU, 2017, p. 4), while recognizing that 'climate change has direct and indirect implications for international security and stability, chiefly affecting those in most fragile and vulnerable situations, contributing to the loss of livelihoods, reinforcing environmental pressures and disaster risk, forcing the displacement of people and exacerbating the threat of social and political unrest' (Council of the EU, 2018, p. 3). Interestingly, in 2019 the Council conclusions repeated the message of the need to raise 'global ambition' and recognize the 'severe implications that climate change poses to international security and stability' but this time it also acknowledged that climate change should be seen as 'a threat in its own right' and not only a threat multiplier exacerbating other already existing security threats (Council of the EU, 2019, p. 4). However, in 2020 the Council conclusions reiterated that 'climate change multiplies threats to international stability and security in particular affecting those in most fragile and vulnerable situations, reinforcing environmental pressures and disaster risk, contributing to the loss of livelihoods and forcing the displacement of people' (Council of the EU, 2020, p. 6).

Over time, the framing of the nexus between climate change and security is also broadened. In 2021, the conclusions stated that 'climate change and environmental degradation, including biodiversity and forest loss, are a threat to international stability and security, reinforcing disaster risks and pressures on ecosystems, posing challenges to food and water security, provoking local and regional conflicts while exacerbating the risk of the displacement of people, thereby constituting a major driver of humanitarian needs and threatening the effective enjoyment of human rights' (Council of the EU, 2021, p. 4). The references made to environmental degradation and human rights are interesting as they suggest a broader understanding of the nexus, and so does the acknowledgement of the work by the UN Climate Security Mechanism (ibid). Moreover, the Council also highlighted 'the importance environmental issues and climate change have for security and defence' (ibid, p. 5). Occurrences of the defense theme first appeared in 2019 (see Figure 1), and this is a
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noticeable expansion of the EU's framing of the nexus between climate change and security as it can be said to recognize that not only is climate change a threat multiplier in developing countries, but it also involves issues relating to 'maintaining operational effectiveness' and 'technological challenges' while addressing 'waste prevention and recycling' in relation to military and civilian capabilities within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Council also started to call for closer cooperation with NATO, OSCE, the African Union and the UN in this context (ibid).

The emphasis on military and defense aspects in EU climate diplomacy is reinforced in the period after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The 2023 Council conclusions acknowledge that the EU needs to enhance its ability to 'prevent and manage the comprehensive security and defence implications of climate change and environmental degradation', while declaring that 'Russia's illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine [...] has created untold human suffering, massive environmental damage and increased risks to nuclear safety in Ukraine. It has precipitated an energy security and food crisis with global impacts' (Council of the EU, 2023, p. 2, p. 5). Furthermore, the conclusions recognize that 'the energy transition toward climate neutrality, pursued at the requisite pace, will have a significant impact on societies, economies and geopolitics globally' which means that 'EU foreign policy will continue to strengthen foresight capability to anticipate new security and geopolitical challenges' (ibid, p. 17). Again, this is a further expansion of the framing of the climate change and security nexus, as the majority of the occurrences of theme of geopolitics were found in the Council conclusions from 2019 onwards (11 out of 13) albeit the more established notions that climate change, environmental degradation and biodiversity loss represent growing 'risks to human, state and regional security and may aggravate conflict drivers and dynamics, as well as dimensions of fragility' are still present in 2023 Council conclusions, as well as the by now constant call for strengthening the EU's 'analytical, early-warning and strategic foresight capacities [vis-à-vis] climate related risks' (Council of the EU, 2023, p. 11).

## EU climate diplomacy and the geopolitics of the energy transition

Various studies have explored the geopolitics of the energy transition, both at global level and at EU level specifically (Blondeel et al., 2024; Goldthau & Youngs, 2023; Hafner & Tagliapietra, 2020; Herranz-Surralles, 2024; IRENA, 2024; Kuzemko et al., 2022; 2025). This section shows how the geopolitics of the energy transition have shifted from playing a marginal to a central role in the formulation of EU climate diplomacy between 2011 and 2024.

Before delving into the specific themes, it is important to note that overall, energy topics and the energy transition do not feature highly in climate diplomacy until the 2020s. The majority of occurrences of this theme (67 out of 97) were found in the 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 conclusions (see Figure 2). While the conclusions of the 2010s include references to energy (transition) issues, these are usually related to the destabilizing effects of climate change (e.g. affecting energy prices) or questions of access to energy (mostly in developing country contexts). The 2017 conclusions on 'synergies between EU climate and energy diplomas', unexpectedly, stand out as the first with a more nuanced framing of how climate diplomacy includes energy transition considerations (e.g. 'calls for Europe to become the world leader in renewable energy'

<figure><img src="image_20.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 2.** Occurrence of energy (transition) related topics.</figcaption></figure>
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(Council of the EU, 2017, p. 2) or ‘the clean energy transition fosters economic opportunities’ (ibid, p. 4)). Yet, most attention to energy (transition) topics is found in the 2020s.

To trace the impact of geopolitics, the following analysis studies the evolution of how the energy transition was framed in climate diplomacy by focusing on three main aspects: debates surrounding energy security and dependencies on other actors, the role of renewable energies and related technologies, and the role of fossil fuels.

A first key theme are debates of energy security, including the (in)dependence of the EU's energy supply and the quest to diversify sources (total: 37 occurrences, see shades of blue in Figure 3). Considerations about energy security are not new in EU policy-making (Kustova, 2017; Schubert et al., 2016), yet it is noteworthy that the link to climate diplomacy is made as early as 2013: ‘energy security should be part of EU climate outreach’ (Council of the EU, 2013, p. 2). The theme doesn’t occur again until 2017 (including calls to ‘ensure sustainable, competitive, secure, safe, affordable energy’ (Council of the EU, 2017, p. 3)), yet has been a key theme since the 2021 conclusions and reaches its highpoint in 2023. The 2023 conclusions show a strong impact of geopolitical developments on the framing of climate diplomacy, since the conclusions state, among others, that the Russian invasion in Ukraine has ‘precipitated an energy security and food crisis with global impacts’ (Council of the EU, 2023, p. 2). Beyond the global dimension, the conclusions also explicitly speak about the EU’s (decreasing) energy imports from Russia, calling for ‘urgent efforts to reinforce and safeguard the EU’s energy security while avoiding new dependencies’ (ibid, p. 15).

In this context, the sub-themes of (in)dependence and diversification of supply can be identified in 2023 and 2024 (16 out of 17 occurrences, see Figure 3). The theme of (in)dependence is evoked explicitly related to Russia in both conclusions, for example: ‘The EU will phase out its dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal imports as soon as possible gas’ (Council of the EU, 2023, p. 2). In addition, the conclusions explicitly refer to fossil fuel dependence as a ‘geopolitical risk’ (ibid, p. 13). At the same time, (in)dependence is also framed in relation to evolving energy markets, where the conclusions aim to reduce strategic dependencies and to avoid new dependencies, ensuring competitiveness, technological leadership and access to critical resources. When it comes to diversification, two points are relevant: First, the EU’s post-2022 diversification efforts are closely linked to the previous dependence on Russian fossil fuel imports. Yet, the conclusions problematize the quest for alternative natural gas supplies, etc., when they ‘emphasize that EU fossil fuel diversification efforts should not undermine long term climate neutrality goals’ (ibid, p. 15). This acknowledges the difficulties of reconciling such energy security moves with decarbonization objectives. Second, the conclusions refer to diversification in access to critical materials, including an explicit reference to the ‘geopolitical dimension’ of the need to diversify global supply chains for raw materials (Council of the EU, 2023, p. 16; Council of the EU, 2024, p. 11).

<figure><img src="image_22.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 3.** Occurrence of diverse framings of energy (transition) related topics.</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_23.png" /></figure>

A second and related theme is the role of renewable energies and new technologies (see shades of green, Figure 3). In terms of evolution over time, we see – again – a stark increase in overall occurrences (e.g. 27 out of 33 in 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024). In terms of framing, the Council conclusions have become both more ambitious and more explicit: In 2013, a 'switch to greener paths of energy production' (Council of the EU, 2013, p. 3) was mentioned as a subject of '[c]onstructive dialogue and cooperation with [the EU's] partners'. In 2017, the 'clean energy transition' was framed as an avenue for technological leadership (Council of the EU, 2017, p. 2) and to 'foste[r] economic opportunities' (ibid, p. 4). Since 2021, the renewable energy related contents have increased (global hydrogen markets, energy transition partnerships with third countries, etc.). Again, the changed geopolitical and energy security landscape after the Russian invasion in Ukraine can explain highpoints for the themes of renewable energies and the energy transition in 2023 and 2024. Two relevant sub-themes in this context are new technologies and the access to raw materials. First, the role of technology is not new in the context of climate diplomacy, including: the importance of technology transfer to developing countries (2017, 2018, 2023), leadership ambitions (e.g. 'ensure the EU's green technological leadership', Council of the EU, 2021, p. 10), the deployment of new technologies (e.g. removal technologies, Council of the EU, 2024, p. 9), and international cooperation on technological innovation (e.g. 'bilateral strategic research partnerships with technology leaders and cooperation through global fora', Council of the EU, 2021, p. 10). Second, access to technology and raw materials emerges in the 2020s: 'need to secure access to the critical raw materials necessary for the energy transition' (Council of the EU, 2021, p. 9) and 'a fair access to resources and green technologies' (Council of the EU, 2021, p. 10). Over time, the framing is more urgent: The 2023 and 2024 conclusions stress the 'need to strengthen and diversify global supply chains of sustainable/critical raw materials necessary/needed for the energy transition', including a reference to their 'geopolitical dimension[s]' (Council of the EU, 2023, p. 16; Council of the EU, 2024, p. 11) (see also above).

The third and last key theme surrounding the geopolitics of the energy transition in the climate diplomacy conclusions is the move away and phase out of fossil fuels (28 occurrences, see shades of orange, Figure 3). The theme first emerged in 2019, which included the acknowledgement that 'the necessary global transition away from fossil fuels will entail potentially significant shifts in geopolitical balance' (p. 18). The close link to geopolitics is consistent throughout the years that follow, as for example the 2024 conclusions call for 'strenghtened foresight to assess and for proactive policy to rapidly address the *changing geopolitical dynamics of the global energy transition*, and engagement with partners in light of the *anticipated decline of fossil fuel demand* in the EU, in the EU's proximity and globally' (Council of the EU, 2024, p. 8, emphasis added). Another point of variance over time is the extent of explicitness in referring to types of fossil fuels: While often used in general terms, there are also explicit references to the role of coal (2021, 2022, 2024) and, related to the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the role of gas in 2023. Coal is also mentioned in relation to global events, such as COP26: 'The EU will systematically promote and call for a global move towards energy systems free of unabated fossil fuels well ahead of 2050. In this regard, the Council recalls the commitment taken at COP 26 to close the book on unabated coal power through a phase down' (ibid, p. 14). The conclusions also discuss fossil fuel subsidies, including an increasingly ambitious framing: While the 2019 conclusions recall fossil fuel subsidy reform as a key step towards low emission pathways (Council of the EU, 2019, p. 8), from 2021 onwards, the framing is firmer: 'The EU calls for a global phase-out of environmentally harmful fossil-fuel subsidies along a clear timeline' (Council of the EU, 2021, p. 5), 'the Council (...) calls for (...) an immediate end to all financing of new coal infrastructure in third countries' (Council of the EU, 2023, p. 14), '[t]he Council recalls the need for phasing out as soon as possible fossil fuel subsidies which do not address energy poverty or just transition' (Council of the EU, 2024, p. 8).

## EU climate diplomacy and the shift towards multipolarity

This section demonstrates how the EU's climate diplomacy formulation has taken on an increasingly multi-polar and multi-stakeholder nature over the period 2011–2024. We evaluate the shift in framing across three main aspects: the space dedicated to the UNFCCC in the climate diplomacy conclusions, references to non-state actors, and the ways in which the EU frames its relationship with partners and alliances on climate diplomacy.

The first aspect relates to the amount of space dedicated to the UNFCCC and its related negotiations within the climate diplomacy conclusions. While the space allotted to the UNFCCC fluctuates from year to year.
<figure><img src="image_24.png" /></figure>

year, the coding reveals a decrease in its overall position in the conclusions (see Figure 4). Indeed, it is not necessarily surprising that the share was most significant in the years leading up to the Paris Agreement (2015: 15 per cent), and the years immediately following its adoption, which also included efforts to save the regime following US President Trump's withdrawal from the agreement (2016: 19 per cent, 2017: 17 per cent, 2018: 20 per cent). However, the relatively consistent decrease in space in the years 2019–2024 (9 per cent on average), suggests a shift in emphasis away from the UNFCCC and a widening to other initiatives, actors, and institutions.

The second aspect relates to the role of non-state actors within the EU's climate diplomacy conclusions. Although non-state actors have been mentioned in every conclusion since 2016, the occurrences fluctuate significantly from year-to-year (see Figure 5). The references to non-state actors largely fall into two main categories: (1) acknowledging the importance of including non-state actors in climate action and decision making and (2) stressing the role of business and private finance in supporting climate finance objectives. For instance, in 2019, the Council stressed that 'Concerted and transformative action must therefore extend to multiple levels of governance, with an essential role for non-state actors and regional and local governments in tackling climate change and implementing ambitious solutions on the ground.' (Council of the EU, 2019, p. 3). At the same time, it noted the need to 'continue scaling up the mobilisation of international climate finance [...] from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, both public and private' (ibid, p. 8). Notably, one of the years with the most occurrences, 2018, corresponded with the Global Climate Change Action Agenda, a UN conference dedicated to transnational climate cooperation.

Overall, the framing of the role of non-state actors does not suggest an overall pivot away from the EU's traditional state-based diplomacy. Nonetheless, the 2017 and 2024 conclusions suggest an awareness of the added value of strategic engagement with non-state actors. The 2017 conclusions note 'the importance of sustained and tailor-made partnerships with third countries, as well as with non-state actors, including local and regional authorities, civil society and the private sector' (Council of the EU, 2017, p. 3). This is reinforced by the 2024 conclusion, in which the Council 'calls for enhanced cooperation with partners at all levels, and jointly with businesses and industries, to fully benefit from the opportunities the green transition offers to all.' (Council of the EU, 2024, pp. 2–3). Although not indicative of a transformation in the EU's engagement with non-state actors, the two quotes nonetheless suggest a diplomatic awareness of the need to work beyond the traditional state-based system.

The final aspect relates to the ways in which the EU identifies its partners and allies on issues related to climate diplomacy. To uncover any such shifts in the EU's climate diplomacy, the analysis looks at both the shifts in the way the EU frames 'cooperation', 'allies', 'alliances', 'partners', and 'partnerships' across the conclusions. Two main observations stand out. First, the occurrence of these partners and allies and the issues associated with them has significantly increased over the years, with the 2024 conclusions including 43

<figure><img src="image_25.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 4.** Share of conclusions dedicated to UNFCCC.</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_26.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_27.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 5.** Occurrence of non-state actors.</figcaption></figure>

unique mentions of the EU's engagement with partners and allies that covered 15 different issues (see Figure 6).

The issues to which the EU associates its work with other actors has gone from primarily focused on the UNFCCC negotiations to addressing many different climate-related problems, such as biodiversity, finance energy, security, and sustainable development. Indeed, early conclusions used terms like 'partner' to refer to efforts dedicated to push other states to act for an agreement in the UNFCCC. More recent conclusions have moved beyond the UNFCCC to focus on larger issues, such as the overall societal transition to decarbonization: 'The Council reaffirms the EU's strong commitment to work closely with partners to accelerate the global just and inclusive green transition' (Council of the EU, 2024, p. 2). The diversity and scope of themes suggest a more holistic approach to how the EU engages with other actors in its climate diplomacy. It is no longer uniquely within the context of adaptation, mitigation, and the UNFCCC process. Rather, the EU appears to be pivoting towards an approach that responds to the multi-faceted and interlinked reality of the Anthropocene.

The second observation relates to the ways in which the EU has framed the need for new types of strategic partnerships and alliances, particularly since 2018. While the Council conclusions continue to

<figure><img src="image_28.png" /><figcaption>**Figure 6.** Themes discussed in the context of partnerships and alliances.</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_29.png" /></figure>

emphasize the role of the traditional multilateral climate system, including the G7 and G20, a trend emerges beginning in 2018 in which the EU notes the importance of 'efforts to strengthen existing and seek new alliances with countries in all regions to mitigate climate change and prepare to adapt to the growing impacts and risks related to climate change' (Council of the EU, 2018, p. 5). The need for such alliances is echoed in subsequent conclusions, with three main types. First, the EU specifically emphasizes the role of such alliances in addressing the traditional 'mitigation' and 'adaptation' issues related to climate change on a yearly basis. Second, as outlined in the climate-security empirical section, in 2021, the conclusions begin to acknowledge the added value of cooperation, both formally and informally with international organizations, multilateral partnerships, and third countries, on security issues. Finally, also beginning in 2021, the conclusions repeatedly stress the importance of industrial and green alliances. These are largely framed within the context of a just transition and energy partnerships. Notably, in 2024, the Council 'invites partners to work closely with the EU to accelerate and benefit from the green transition and supports the implementation of global commitments through frameworks such as Green Alliances, Green Partnerships, Green Agendas, high-level dialogues, trade agreements and other important formats for cooperation, such as the Samoa Agreement' (Council of the EU, 2024, p. 4). The above quote is indicative of a duality in the EU's evolving approach to climate diplomacy. On the one hand, there remains a vested interest in respecting global agreements and commitments. However, on the other hand, there is an acknowledgement of the need for new forms of cooperation with other actors to respond to the changing planetary and geopolitical context.

## Conclusions

Based on our analysis of EU climate diplomacy, three main conclusions stand out regarding how the EU is responding to the geopolitics of the Anthropocene. First, in terms of security, the EU can be said to respond by way of increasingly emphasizing how climate change and environmental degradation might lead to security threats for EU Member States over the last 10–15 years. This is a shift in the sense that the EU at the start depicted the security implications of climate change as mainly a problem for developing and vulnerable countries and only indirectly as a security concern for the EU and its Member States to be dealt with through foreign and security policies. Although the emphasis on the need to incorporate thinking on the security implications of climate change in EU security and defense policies was being articulated before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, our analysis shows that this event has led to a stronger emphasis on this need in EU climate diplomacy, not least in relation to explicit concerns about attempts by other international actors to weaponize energy supplies.

Second, in terms of resources, our analysis shows that the energy transition has increased as a theme within EU climate diplomacy since 2020s, and not just since the first integration of climate and energy diplomacy in a single set of conclusions in 2017. Over time, the geopolitical dimension of the energy transition is increasingly acknowledged in FAC conclusions, for example when it comes to the access to critical raw materials. Furthermore, the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has changed the way energy security and energy transition goals are framed in EU climate diplomacy: broader considerations of resource access and external dependencies are increasingly framed as geopolitical challenges. The EU's call for strengthening foresight analysis and for proactive policy to rapidly address the changing geopolitical dynamics of the global energy transition is the most evident example for this shift that we have been able to find.

Third, when it comes to the theme of multipolarity, our analysis of EU climate diplomacy since 2011 reflects broader shifts in global geopolitical context and the gradual pivot away from UNFCCC towards more diverse partnerships, but at the same time we cannot say that there has been any fundamental change or reconfiguration of EU climate diplomacy that would suggest a more radical embrace of the geopolitics of the Anthropocene. However, the EU does appear to have started to respond to the changing technological shifts in global cooperation in an era of climate crisis by emphasizing collaboration on more and more issues and within new formats.

Taken together, these insights suggest that the EU has not fundamentally altered its climate diplomacy to respond to the geopolitics of the Anthropocene. Although the EU seems to be able to articulate a common awareness of the magnitude of the challenges brought about by anthropogenic climate change and the need to find ways to respond to them, current depictions of geopolitics in EU climate diplomacy seem to
<figure><img src="image_30.png" /></figure>

mainly reinforce traditional zero-sum logics that seem to undermine global responses. In that sense, our analysis suggests that there is indeed an ongoing geopoliticization of EU climate diplomacy, albeit perhaps not enough to qualify it as a paradigm shift. Rather, climate diplomacy represents a case of a paradigm-reinforcing effect of geopolitics on EU policies. However, our analysis also suggests that these framings are articulated alongside calls for new collaborative formats to advance climate action which seem more attuned to the needs of responding to the challenges of the Anthropocene, such as developments following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In that sense, the EU can respond to this new dynamic, albeit incrementally. Yet, it appears constrained by existing frames and institutions. While the findings here primarily relate to climate, the EU's incremental shifts offer insights into its potential as a geopolitical actor in general.

Our analysis offers a 'reality check' of the EU's ability to respond to these challenges, as formulated in the conclusions of the Council of the EU, the EU's main foreign policy actor. These findings complement other studies of evolving climate discourse of different EU institutions (Prandin, 2025). Further studies are needed to explore whether changes in framings in Council conclusions that we have observed are also related to changes in EU diplomatic practices in other settings. Such studies can take our insights as a starting point going beyond an analysis of Council conclusions (as relatively static documents describing EU principles, past actions, and ambitions for future actions) to see whether aspiration and action align. Additionally, future research is needed to unpack what factors explain the relative staying power of existing EU framings on climate diplomacy, both internal and external. For example, it is here relevant to note the recent joint communication from the EC and EEAS on the EU's new global climate and energy vision which puts geopolitics at the forefront (European Commission, 2025). In sum, we argue that it is imperative that more attention is directed towards analyzing how the geopolitics of the Anthropocene affects the EU and other international actors to better understand the limits and opportunities of global climate politics on a rapidly warming planet.

**Note**

1. To illustrate, according to the latest data from the European Commission, global GHG emissions from anthropogenic activities have increased by nearly 1,5 per cent annually on average since 1990, and are estimated to be 65 per cent higher in 2024 than in 1990. In 2024, the eight highest emitting economies contributed to 66,2 per cent of global GHG emissions: China (29,2 per cent), US (11,1 per cent), India (8,2 per cent), EU27 (5,9 per cent), Russia (4,8 per cent), Indonesia (2,5 per cent), Brazil (2,4 per cent) and Japan (2 per cent). Only the EU and Japan decreased their emissions compared to the previous year (–1.8 per cent and –2.8 per cent respectively), while the other six either kept them stable (China: +0,8 per cent; US: +0,4 per cent; Brazil +0,2 per cent) or increased them (India: +3,9 per cent; Russia: +2.4 per cent, Indonesia: +5 per cent) (Crippa et al., 2025).

**Acknowledgements**

Research for this paper has been partly supported by Mistra: The Swedish foundation for strategic environmental research through the Mistra Geopolitics Research Programme and the Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science (SNES).

**Disclosure statement**

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

**Funding**

This work was supported by Stiftelsen för Miljöstrategisk Forskning: [Grant Number].

**ORCID**

Niklas Bremberg http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0970-3979

Joseph Earsom http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4636-788X

Franziska Petri http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9874-4336
<figure><img src="image_31.png" /></figure>

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