# Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean

Yoann Doignon, Isabelle Blöss-Widmer, Elena Ambrosetti, Sébastien Oliveau

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Yoann Doignon, Isabelle Blöss-Widmer, Elena Ambrosetti, Sébastien Oliveau. Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean: A Demographic Convergence?. Springer International Publishing, 2023, Springer-Briefs in Population Studies, 978-3-031-37759-4. 10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4 halshs-04416026

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# Population Dynamics
in the Mediterranean
A Demographic
Convergence?

OPEN ACCESS

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Springer
SpringerBriefs in Population Studies

**Advisory Editors**

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Yoann Doignon · Isabelle Blöss-Widmer ·

Elena Ambrosetti · Sébastien Oliveau

# Population Dynamics
in the Mediterranean

A Demographic Convergence?

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Springer
Yoann Doignon
IDEES UMR 6266, CNRS
Mont-Saint-Aignan, France

Elena Ambrosetti
MEMOTEF Department
Sapienza University of Rome
Rome, Italy

Isabelle Blöss-Widmer
MESOPOLHIS UMR 7064, CNRS
Aix-Marseille University
Aix-en-Provence, France

Sébastien Oliveau
MESOPOLHIS UMR 7064, CNRS
Aix-Marseille University
Aix-en-Provence, France

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /></figure>

ISSN 2211-3215

ISSN 2211-3223 (electronic)

SpringerBriefs in Population Studies

ISBN 978-3-031-37758-7

ISBN 978-3-031-37759-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37759-4

© The Author(s) 2023. This book is an open access publication.

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Preface

“La démographie en Méditerranée: situation et projections” (*Economica*, 2001) has been released more than 20 years for Plan Bleu. I am delighted to see a new publication on the topic, delighted for several reasons. First of all, it was a much needed and highly anticipated work on a part of the world that concentrates number of issues that are highlighted by demography. I am also delighted as this publication adopts a holistic approach, successfully achieving the difficult feat of producing a complex and changing territory. Finally, I am delighted as I know the team that has been working on this publication for several years and because this publication is a result of a long-term project carried out by the *Mediterranean Demographic Observatory—DemoMed*, which is attached to the University of Aix-Marseille.

The Mediterranean is a region experiencing global challenges. While some may have seen it as a “clash of civilisations” and others as a “convergence of civilisations”, it is, in fact, a place of meetings and exchanges dating back thousands of years. Throughout the publication, the authors demonstrate the convergence of demographic trends in the various Mediterranean countries. The most recent statistics were used, although national statistics were not used as frequently, this was the only realistic option for conducting a harmonised analysis of the phenomena for the Mediterranean as a whole. The publication makes sure, however, to look at developments over more than half a century and does not shy away from projecting the possible future of the region.

The authors, in a rather novel way, sometimes propose sub-national analyses, which remind us that countries are not homogeneous blocks, and that certain regions on one shore are more similar to regions on another shore than to regions in neighbouring countries. The choice of conducting a global analysis, as opposed to focusing on certain specific places, has the virtue of offering a truly comparative vision and of putting each situation into context. The desire to go beyond the irreducible uniqueness of places runs through all the chapters. At the same time, however, the reading of the phenomena focuses on the particularity of certain countries or regions of the Mediterranean.

In a very fluid manner, the four authors begin by describing the settlement of the region as a favourable, but restrictive, geographical setting that welcomes a variety of
populations with diverse, but ultimately convergent trajectories, with the exception
of those where the political situation is particularly difficult (Israel, Palestine). This is
followed by analyses of fertility, mortality and migration, classic themes in population
analysis, which they use as a driving force to understand the transformations of the
societies studied, both in terms of habitat (coastalisation, urbanisation) and social
(gender relations, elderly care) or economical (windows of opportunity, demographic
dividends) dimensions. These elements are all challenges that are fuelled by transition
processes and population dynamics.

To fully understand the will that motivated this group of researchers and the
originality of the angle chosen to produce this work, it is worth recalling that out
of the four colleagues who wrote it, two are demographers, one a geographer and
one (the first author) a disciplinary hybrid, which his doctoral thesis on ageing in
the Mediterranean has already demonstrated. For more than 10 years now, the four
of them have been in charge of the *Mediterranean Demographic Observatory— DemoMed* at the Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l'Homme in Aix-en-Provence (France). This observatory brings together a network of colleagues from
teaching and research institutions around the Mediterranean driven by the same
desire to understand the changes taking place in this geographical area in the field of
population studies. This publication brings together their expertise from the different
scientific fields of demography, geography, statistics and sociology. It is just like
them: diverse in its approaches, demanding in its methods, but also richly documented
and illustrated.

It is therefore without hesitation that I recommend reading this publication, as
its contribution to the knowledge of this part of the world is as essential for those
who live there as for the rest of the world. The Mediterranean is a concentration
of humanity where many phenomena that are in fact universal are played out and
thwarted: declining fertility, declining mortality, changing family structures, ageing
and also migration and development.

Demographer, Former Senior Researcher at the French Institute for Demographic Studies (INED)

Paris, France

Youssef Courbage
Acknowledgements

This publication would not have been possible in its present form without the help of various individuals and institutions, whom we would like to thank now. It is the result of work carried out since 2010 by the *Mediterranean Demographic Observatory*—*DemoMed*—within the Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l'Homme (MMSH) at Aix-Marseille University.

We would like to thank its directors, Brigitte Marin and Sophie Bouffier, for all their support from the very beginning of the project.

We would also like to thank the staff of our parent institutions for their help and understanding, especially those from the MESOPOLHIS laboratory, IACCHOS (UCLouvain), the MMSH and La Sapienza.

We would like to thank all our colleagues and the students and trainees who worked with us over the years, particularly for their help with data collection and analysis, and with the logistics of the final drafting of the manuscript, especially Elise Lévêque, Quentin Godoye, Clément De Belsunce, Jean-Baptiste Cortese, Florent Kuntzmann, Marc Soler, Thomas Finiels and Claire Vandemoortele.

We would like to thank Ami Saji for her careful review of the final manuscript.

We would like to thank Youssef Courbage who has honoured us by writing the preface for this work. It is a testimony of which we are very proud.

We would like to thank La Sapienza University of Rome, the Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l'Homme (MMSH, UAR 3125) of the University of Aix-Marseille, the Institute for the Analysis of Change in Contemporary and Historical Societies (IACCHOS) of the University of Leuven, and the MESOPOLHIS laboratory (UMR 7064) for their financial support, which has allowed us to publish this book as open access and, in turn, make it accessible to the largest possible number of people.

We sincerely thank Evelien Bakker, Corina van der Giessen, Aarthi Padmanabhan, Bernadette Deelen-Mans and Prashanth Ravichandran from Springer for their trust, patience and professionalism.

Last, but not least, we would like to thank our loved ones for all their support.
# Contents

<table><tr><td>1</td><td>General Introduction: A Study of Mediterranean Populations</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>1.1</td><td>A Book Addressing the Lack of Pan-Mediterranean Demographic Studies</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>1.1.1</td><td>In Search of Human Unity in the Mediterranean</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>1.1.2</td><td>The Mediterranean and Population Sciences</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>1.1.3</td><td>A Lack of Pan-Mediterranean Demographic Studies</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>1.2</td><td>Approach and Commitment</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>1.2.1</td><td>What Do We Mean by the Mediterranean?</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>1.2.2</td><td>International Comparisons Over Time</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>1.2.3</td><td>Grid Convergence to Analyse Demographic Phenomena</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>1.2.4</td><td>Data Used</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>1.3</td><td>Structure of the Book</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>References</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>Spatial Distribution of Population and Urbanisation</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>2.1</td><td>Introduction</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>2.2</td><td>Uneven Distribution of the Population</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>2.3</td><td>Far from Determinism: Opportunities and Constraints of Mediterranean Areas</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>2.4</td><td>A Very Coastal and Increasing Urbanisation</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>2.5</td><td>Settlement Challenges in the Mediterranean</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>References</td><td>30</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>Sex Ratio, Age Structure and Population Ageing</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>3.1</td><td>Introduction</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>3.2</td><td>Gender Inequalities in the Mediterranean</td><td>34</td></tr><tr><td>3.3</td><td>An Ageing Population</td><td>36</td></tr><tr><td>3.4</td><td>Ongoing Significant Differences in Age Structure Between Regions</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>3.5</td><td>Implications and Consequences of Age Structure Differences</td><td>40</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>References</td><td>41</td></tr><tr><td><b>4</b> <b>The Various of Demographic Transitions</b></td><td><b>43</b></td></tr><tr><td>4.1 Introduction</td><td>43</td></tr><tr><td>4.2 Demographic Transition “Models”</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>4.2.1 Type 1: Ancient Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium in the 1970s (Spain, France)</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>4.2.2 Type 2: Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium in the Late 1990s (Cyprus, Montenegro, Malta)</td><td>47</td></tr><tr><td>4.2.3 Type 3: Rapid Transition with Late Pseudo-Equilibrium from the 2000s Onwards (Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo)</td><td>47</td></tr><tr><td>4.3 Completed Demographic Transition with a Post-Transitional Decline Regime</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>4.3.1 Type 4: Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium in the 1980s–1990s (Italy, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria)</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td>4.3.2 Type 5: Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium in the 2000s (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina)</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td>4.4 Completed Demographic Transition with a Post-Transitional Regime with Sustained Population Growth (Type 6: Israel)</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td>4.5 Recent and Rapid Demographic Transition, Now Being Finalised</td><td>52</td></tr><tr><td>4.5.1 Type 7: Transition Already Underway in 1950 (Lebanon, Turkey)</td><td>53</td></tr><tr><td>4.5.2 Type 8: More Recent Transition (Libya, Morocco, Tunisia)</td><td>54</td></tr><tr><td>4.6 Possible Demographic Counter-Transitions (Type 9: Egypt, Algeria)</td><td>56</td></tr><tr><td>4.7 Recent and Ongoing Transition, Slower Decline in Birth Rate (Type 10: Jordan, Palestine, Syria)</td><td>58</td></tr><tr><td>4.8 A Diversity of Demographic Transitions Despite a General Convergence</td><td>58</td></tr><tr><td>References</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td><b>5</b> <b>Fertility Intensity and Timing</b></td><td><b>63</b></td></tr><tr><td>5.1 Introduction</td><td>63</td></tr><tr><td>5.2 A Global Fertility Convergence</td><td>64</td></tr><tr><td>5.3 The Intersection of Birth Timing and Fertility Intensity</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td>5.3.1 Mean Age at Childbearing</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td>5.3.2 Fertility by Age Group</td><td>69</td></tr><tr><td>5.4 Specific Contributions of Age Groups</td><td>72</td></tr><tr><td>5.5 (Un)certainties for the Future of Mediterranean Fertility</td><td>75</td></tr><tr><td>References</td><td>78</td></tr></table>
<table><tbody><tr><td>6</td><td>Family Formation and Dissolution</td><td>81</td></tr><tr><td>6.1</td><td>Introduction</td><td>82</td></tr><tr><td>6.2</td><td>Major Marriage and Divorce Trends</td><td>82</td></tr><tr><td>6.2.1</td><td>Marriage</td><td>82</td></tr><tr><td>6.2.2</td><td>Divorce</td><td>85</td></tr><tr><td>6.3</td><td>Changes in Marriage</td><td>88</td></tr><tr><td>6.3.1</td><td>An Increase in Age at Marriage</td><td>88</td></tr><tr><td>6.3.2</td><td>Permanent Celibacy</td><td>92</td></tr><tr><td>6.3.3</td><td>Summary of Family Models</td><td>94</td></tr><tr><td>6.4</td><td>Conclusion</td><td>96</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>References</td><td>97</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>Mortality Profiles</td><td>99</td></tr><tr><td>7.1</td><td>Introduction</td><td>99</td></tr><tr><td>7.2</td><td>Mortality at All Ages: Life Expectancy at Birth</td><td>100</td></tr><tr><td>7.2.1</td><td>A Very Heterogeneous Picture in 1950</td><td>100</td></tr><tr><td>7.2.2</td><td>General Convergence Since 1950</td><td>102</td></tr><tr><td>7.2.3</td><td>Decreases in Life Expectancy at Birth</td><td>103</td></tr><tr><td>7.2.4</td><td>Gender Inequalities</td><td>104</td></tr><tr><td>7.3</td><td>The Different Mortality Profiles</td><td>105</td></tr><tr><td>7.3.1</td><td>Infant and Child Mortality (Under 5 Years Old)</td><td>106</td></tr><tr><td>7.3.2</td><td>Adult Mortality (15–64 Years Old)</td><td>108</td></tr><tr><td>7.3.3</td><td>Mortality at Advanced Ages (65 Years Old or Older)</td><td>109</td></tr><tr><td>7.4</td><td>The Health Transition</td><td>111</td></tr><tr><td>7.5</td><td>Conclusion</td><td>113</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>References</td><td>114</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>The Mediterranean Migration System</td><td>117</td></tr><tr><td>8.1</td><td>Introduction</td><td>117</td></tr><tr><td>8.2</td><td>Migration in the Mediterranean (1950–1995)</td><td>119</td></tr><tr><td>8.3</td><td>Migration in the Mediterranean in the XXI Century</td><td>121</td></tr><tr><td>8.4</td><td>Two Emerging Phenomena: High Skilled and Irregular Migration</td><td>125</td></tr><tr><td>8.5</td><td>Conclusions</td><td>127</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>References</td><td>128</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>Population Dynamics and Their Components</td><td>131</td></tr><tr><td>9.1</td><td>Introduction</td><td>131</td></tr><tr><td>9.2</td><td>Evolving Power Relations</td><td>132</td></tr><tr><td>9.3</td><td>Natural and Migration Dynamics: Which Combinations Exist in the Mediterranean?</td><td>135</td></tr><tr><td>9.3.1</td><td>Natural Dynamics: South and East</td><td>135</td></tr><tr><td>9.3.2</td><td>Migration Dynamics: Sending Versus Receiving Countries</td><td>137</td></tr><tr><td>9.4</td><td>Growth Outlook to 2060: What Can We Expect?</td><td>138</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>References</td><td>142</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td>10 Conclusions. An Overview of Population Dynamics in the Mediterranean</td><td>145</td></tr><tr><td>10.1 Major Demographic Developments Since 1950</td><td>145</td></tr><tr><td>10.2 An Assessment of the Book's Overall Approach</td><td>148</td></tr><tr><td>References</td><td>151</td></tr><tr><td>References</td><td>153</td></tr></table>
## About the Authors

**Yoann Doignon** holds a Ph.D. in population geography from the Aix-Marseille University, France. He is Researcher with the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), affiliated with the UMR 6266 IDEES (Rouen, France). He is too an Associated Researcher at the Center for Demographic Research (UCLouvain, Belgium) and at the UMR 7363 SAGE (Strasbourg, France). He has been a collaborator of the *Mediterranean Demographic Observatory* (DemoMed) for several years. He specialises in Mediterranean populations. His Ph.D. focused on territorial and spatial convergence of the ageing population in the Mediterranean. Additionally, he has been studying population decline in France and Southern Europe, and on spatial diffusion processes of demographic phenomena, especially family changes in Europe and fertility decline.

**Isabelle Blöss-Widmer** holds a Ph.D. in demography from University Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne. She is Associate Professor at Aix-Marseille University, and a researcher at the UMR 7064 MESOPOLHIS. She is the head of the *Mediterranean Demographic Observatory* at the Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l'Homme. Her current research is mainly on the demography of Mediterranean countries, in particular, the causes and consequences of demographic ageing examined at different administrative scales of the territories.

**Elena Ambrosetti** holds a Ph.D. in demography from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, France. She is Associate Professor of Demography at the Faculty of Economics and affiliated to the Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance—Sapienza University of Rome, Italy. Since October 2022 she is research fellow of Mesopolhis, Aix-Marseille University, Sciences Po Aix & National Centre for Scientific Research (France). She is member of the *Mediterranean Demographic Observatory* (DemoMed). She has extensively worked on the demography of the Mediterranean countries with special attention to the demographic transition in Egypt and in Northern African countries and to population ageing and its consequences in Italy and in the Southern European Mediterranean countries. Additionally, she is
an expert on international migration, with particular focus on migrants’ integration, migration policies and demographic behaviour of migrant populations.

**Sébastien Oliveau** holds a Ph.D. in geography from University Paris I, France (2004) and a Habilitation from Aix-Marseille University (2011). He is the director of the Large Research Infrastructure PROGEDO (https://progedo.fr) and researcher at MESOPOLHIS, Mediterranean centre in Sociology, political science and history, France (UMR 7064, CNRS). As Assistant Professor at Aix-Marseille University, he has supervised several PhDs since 2010. His research focuses on the spatial analysis of populations. He is currently working in the *Observatoire démographique de la Méditerranée* (DemoMed).
# Chapter 1
## General Introduction: A Study of Mediterranean Populations

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /></figure>

Check for
updates

**Abstract** The Mediterranean region has been much studied by human and social sciences. The length of its written history, and the variety of civilisations sharing a common history (going back to the Roman *mare nostrum*), of course, go some way to explaining this wealth of studies. However, the Mediterranean has only recently been studied as a global study area, rather than as separate sub-regions. We note that there is a lack of recent general publications, or writings in general, providing a synthesis or inventory of the various demographic phenomena on a pan-Mediterranean scale. The aim of this publication is to provide an overview and detailed description of the demographic trends of the last 70 years for the populations of the Mediterranean as a whole.

**Keywords** Mediterranean · Population studies · International comparison · Demographic convergence

### 1.1 A Book Addressing the Lack of Pan-Mediterranean Demographic Studies

The Mediterranean region has been much studied by human and social sciences. The length of its written history, and the variety of civilisations sharing a common history (going back to the Roman *mare nostrum*), of course, go some way to explaining this wealth of studies. However, the Mediterranean has only recently been studied as a global study area, rather than as separate sub-regions.
1.1.1 In Search of Human Unity in the Mediterranean

The very word “Mediterranean” was coined in the eighteenth century and refers only to the fact of “being inland”<fnref n="1" /> (Bourguet et al., 1998). The Mediterranean was little studied before the nineteenth century, owing to its lack of scientific significance. It was thought of rather as a space of division and separation between very different populations. It was not until three French scientific expeditions to Egypt (1798–1799), the Morea (1829–1831) and Algeria (1839–1842) that the Mediterranean became an object of study in itself. The research thus carried out attempted to give consistency to the Mediterranean area by seeking to identify common elements on both sides of this geographical area, which would make it possible to affirm the unity and homogeneity of the region.

The botanists on the Egyptian expedition discovered species common to Syria, the Barbary Coast and Southern France. Pyramus de Candolle (1820) considered the Mediterranean to be one of the world's 20 botanical regions. This led to the notion of a Mediterranean region, although it was not recognised as having any specific character. The Mediterranean was said to be a transitional botanical region between the three continents, along a north-south and east-west gradient.

It was not until the 1830s that a scientific discourse developed on the cultural unity of the Mediterranean, based in particular on ancient history (Roman and Philhellenic legacies). Thus, this geographical area is less and less perceived as a barrier or a space of division between civilisations, but as an interface linking the different shores, where the sea facilitates the exchange of ideas and trade more than the land (Reclus, 1876).

The Vidalian approach, prominent at the end of the nineteenth century, broke with tradition by positing that the physical homogeneity (climate and landscape) of the Mediterranean had an influence on the lifestyles of its populations. The sea is becoming less important than the land (Sorre & Sion, 1934). This idea of the Mediterranean as a human unit cumulates with the work of Braudel (1949). He was one of the first to articulate the concept of a Mediterranean world. He viewed the Mediterranean as a permanent place of maritime and land exchanges, which changes its meaning throughout history (Roncayolo, 2002). In particular, he emphasised the continuity throughout history, but also the homogeneity of the societies surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. Landscapes are considered as major elements of this homogeneity, in accordance with a certain geographical determinism of the Vidalian approach, which has been vigorously criticised (Péguy, 1986). However, Braudel deserves credit for taking on the Mediterranean and establishing it as an object of study in the human and social sciences.

<footnote n="1">¹ This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: "ce qui est au milieu des terres".</footnote>
Other scientific fields have been involved in this question of the geographical, historical and cultural unity of Mediterranean societies. In particular, anthropologists have researched the common characteristics of social life, marking a coherence of the Mediterranean world. For example, Peristiany (1968, 1976) proposed the concept of “Mediterranean modes of thought”. Pitt-Rivers (1963) compared the social structures of rural communities in several Mediterranean countries across the different shores. He argued that Mediterranean unity stems from geomorphological and climatic characteristics. Continuities over time would therefore be little affected by political or religious changes. Others identified concepts and values characteristic of social relations on both sides, such as honour and shame, the male virility complex and patronage (Albera, 2006; Peristiany, 1966; Tolosana, 2001).

These aspects can also be found in the field of history of the family. Peter Laslett (1983) proposed four patterns of family and household formation in historical Europe, one of which was explicitly identified as Mediterranean. Subsequently, the testing of this “Mediterranean model” quickly became one of the objectives of family and marriage historians in Southern Europe and the Middle East (Sacchi & Viazzo, 2014). Historians of the family have tended to dismiss the possibility of commonalities between Mediterranean marriage and family patterns (Sacchi & Viazzo, 2014). On the other hand, some have hypothesised a long-standing regional contrast between Mediterranean Europe and the rest of the continent, and a very long-term continuity of the different shores of the Mediterranean (Smith, 1990).

The human and cultural unity of the Mediterranean has been widely debated since the 1960s. Anthropologists criticise, for example, the relevance of human unity as an anthropological mirage and a sum of stereotypes of northern researchers, especially of British anthropology (Herzfeld, 1987; Pina-Cabral, 1989). Some researchers reject the category of the Mediterranean (Horden & Purcell, 2000) and question the very existence of the object (Kayser, 1996).

At present, there is a growing consensus that rejects the vision of the Mediterranean as a culturally homogenous area (Huebner, 2016). The human unity of the Mediterranean no longer structures the frames of reference (Deprest, 2002). Nevertheless, it is possible to recognise a certain scientific coherence to the Mediterranean without denying its heterogeneity. Bromberger and Durand (2001) believe, for example, that it would be a mistake to present the Mediterranean as the ultimate place of mixing and blending. Exchange, migration and spatial proximity do not necessarily imply merging. However, without speaking of homogeneity, they recognise a “family resemblance”<fnref n="2" /> between Mediterranean societies and cultures. This can be explained by the circulation of ideas, human migration, a similar ecological context and monotheism. Bromberger and Durand (2001) noted that the Mediterranean is defined more by its differences than by its similarities. The specificity of the Mediterranean space would be defined precisely by these differences, neither too close nor too far away. The Mediterranean would then constitute a stimulating study area for “understanding the whole range of possible relations with the other

<footnote n="2">² This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: "air de famille".</footnote>
which is neither too close nor too far, neither too small nor too big”<fnref n="3" /> (Bromberger and Durand, 2001), and would ultimately be an implicit tension between unity and diversity of its characteristics (Von Kondratowitz, 2013).

### 1.1.2 The Mediterranean and Population Sciences

This overview, which is deliberately not exhaustive, reveals the extent to which the Mediterranean area has been the subject of much research and intense debate since the nineteenth century. Thus, in several social sciences disciplines (geography, history, anthropology, etc.), the Mediterranean continue to constitute a relevant study area. A specific field of research has emerged (*Mediterranean studies*), and there are research structures dedicated to it, such as the Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l'Homme (MMSH) of the University of Aix-Marseille in France.

However, we note that this liveliness of studies and debates on the Mediterranean is almost absent from the population sciences, the scientific field under which this publication falls. The Mediterranean does not seem to be a geographical frame of reference for population studies. The latter are largely concentrated on portions of the Mediterranean area of varying size, but much less so on the Mediterranean as a whole (on a pan-Mediterranean scale). The national scale remains the most commonly adopted, with many monographs on a particular Mediterranean country or sub-national regions. There are also regional studies which deal with a specific region (in the broad sense) of the Mediterranean, such as the Maghreb (Fargues, 1990; Le Bris, 2021; Ouadah-Bedidi et al., 2012; Sebti et al., 2009), the Near East (Courbage, 2008; Fargues, 1995), the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean (Courbage, 1997, 1999, 2015; Fargues, 2000a; Rashad, 2015; Tabutin & Schoumaker, 2005), the Balkans (Deslondes, 2004; Lerch, 2018; Sardon, 2001), and the countries of Southern Europe (Avdeev et al., 2011; Doignon et al., 2016; Pfirsch, 2011).

Thus, compared with the numerous national and macro-regional monographs, there are relatively few pan-Mediterranean demographic studies (Anastasiou et al., 2020; Attané & Courbage, 2004; Carella & Parant, 2016; D'Addato, 2010; Doignon, 2019, 2020; Doignon et al., 2016; Fargues, 2000b; Fargues and Salinari, 2011; ITAN, 2015; Matthijs et al., 2016; Oliveau and Doignon, 2014; Salvini, 2023; Troisi & Von Kondratowitz, 2013; Wilson, 2005; Zagaglia, 2013). This is probably due to the demographic contrasts across the Mediterranean, which many researchers in the population sciences consider to be too great to constitute a coherent study area. Indeed, the shores of the Mediterranean are generally presented in terms of contrast: a declining, low-fertility and ageing Northern shore facing a fast-growing, highly fertile and young Southern and Eastern shore. However, this dichotomy does not take

<footnote n="3">³ This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: "appréhender toute la gamme des relations possibles avec l'autre qui n'est ni trop proche ni trop lointain, ni trop petit ni trop grand".</footnote>
into account the dynamic nature of demographic phenomena in terms of time and space. Mediterranean demography is in a state of flux, whether in terms of structures, dynamics or demographic behaviour: the rapid spread of declining mortality and fertility rates, the deceleration of population growth, the circulation of sociocultural or family models and ideas, etc. Consequently, the disparities that so well characterised the populations of the Mediterranean in the past are not necessarily of the same intensity today. By shedding light on the spatial dichotomy between the shores in light of recent demographic changes, it becomes possible to rethink the Mediterranean not just as a space of contrasts, but as an area in the process of homogenisation.<fnref n="4" />

### 1.1.3 A Lack of Pan-Mediterranean Demographic Studies

In light of these various elements, we note that there is a lack of recent general publications, or writings in general, providing a synthesis or inventory of the various demographic phenomena on a pan-Mediterranean scale. For instance, the few existing demographic studies on the Mediterranean as a whole often focus on a particular demographic aspect. At this level, international migration remains perhaps the most studied demographic phenomenon at the scale of the Mediterranean as a whole, as the latter is conceptualised as a coherent migration system (Ambrosetti et al., 2016; Wihtol de Wenden, 2019).

From a certain perspective, this lack of analysis of the demography of Mediterranean populations as a whole is harmful. Population is the foundation of many other socio-economic phenomena. Studying the population allows us to understand the intimate aspects of a society, such as the fact of dying, giving birth, marrying, migrating, etc. Often considered as basic, these phenomena are nevertheless essential for a detailed understanding of contemporary societies and their evolution. This understanding would be more than welcome in the case of the Mediterranean, at a time when there are various initiatives for regional integration and cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean region: Plan Bleu, the 5 + 5 Dialogue, the recent 2019 Summit of the Two Shores of the Mediterranean, the Union for the Mediterranean, the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, the Centre for Mediterranean Integration, and the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed). By updating our knowledge of population dynamics in the Mediterranean, we would be able to generate interest and fuel discussions in several fields, such as the social sciences, geopolitics, political sciences, etc. This is all the more important when demography is used to study international relations. The clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1993) for example conceptualises the youthfulness of Arab-Muslim societies (against the ageing societies of Europe) as a determining cause of a war between civilisations. Today's demography is thought to be timeless, making political unrest and conflict in the Mediterranean inevitable at

<footnote n="4">⁴ By the term “homogenisation” we mean a reduction of contrasts, not a perfectly similar situation shared by all Mediterranean populations.</footnote>
the same time. The reduction of demographic contrasts is therefore a strong argument against the clash of civilisations and its conflicting predictions.

The aim of this publication is to provide an overview and detailed description of the demographic trends of the last 70 years for the populations of the Mediterranean as a whole. From this point of view, we are in line with the approach taken some 20 years ago by Attané and Courbage (2004) in their publication *Demography in the Mediterranean region: situation and projections*.

## 1.2 Approach and Commitment

### 1.2.1 What Do We Mean by the Mediterranean?

Firstly, we need to define the project's study area. The delimitation of the Mediterranean has been the subject of much debate, with no real consensus having been reached. First of all, it is pertinent to consider the Mediterranean Sea as the essential element of the Mediterranean area, especially as it is easy to circumscribe. On the other hand, the task becomes more complicated when it comes to delimiting the Mediterranean land: we know where to start, from the Mediterranean shore, but we do not know a priori where to stop. Thus, there are several delimitations of the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean has a characteristic climate with the concomitance of the dry period and the hot period, and a very marked seasonal alternation. However, with a width of 3,800 km, there are great climatic differences, both in terms of rainfall and temperature. Indeed, the summer drought lasts between 2 and 3 months on the Northern Shore of the Western Mediterranean, compared to 6 to 7 months on the Eastern Shore (Clément, 2002).

Geographers of the nineteenth century choose to use the olive tree as the boundary of the Mediterranean. This tree is said to be a shared symbol in the Mediterranean as it is a gift from Athena to the Athenians, an idealised image of Abraham in the Old Testament, the tree that introduces the Light in the Qur’an, and a representation of justice and peace in many Mediterranean societies. However, the biogeographical and bioclimatic limits would be insufficient and too stringent (Roncayolo, 2002). They have the disadvantage of “revealing only one facet of the Mediterranean environment and would always be an imperfect approximation”<fnref n="5" /> (Clément, 2002, 37).

Yves Lacoste (2001) proposed a geopolitical delimitation of the Mediterranean from Morocco to Turkmenistan and Iran, passing through the Caucasus region and the Gulf countries, and including the countries that are part of NATO (for example the United Kingdom).

<footnote n="5">⁵ This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: "de ne révéler qu'une facette du milieu méditerranéen et constituent toujours une approximation parfaite".</footnote>
Finally, other researchers, such as Robert Ilbert (2006), considered that there is no fixed limit between the Mediterranean and the non-Mediterranean. The Mediterranean would be characterised precisely by an absence of limits, since it would be a territorial space limited by edge and not by a limit.

In this publication, we will delimit the Mediterranean in the following way. A first simple geographical criterion is to choose the countries with direct access to the Mediterranean Sea. However, national borders changed during the twentieth century and problematic cases easily emerged, for example in the Balkans. At the end of the First World War, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, i.e. today's Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was created and later called Yugoslavia. Until the period between 1991 and 1995, this country had access to the sea and could be considered Mediterranean. However, it is currently divided into several different countries. Thus, what are now Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia would no longer belong to the Mediterranean region due to their lack of access to the sea. However, we believe that the Mediterranean character is not lost in the course of political change. Some countries do not have direct access to the sea, but are nevertheless extremely close: regions of Portugal, the West Bank, Jordan, Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria are often located less than 250 kms from the sea (Fig. 1.1).

For example, France and Algeria are considered Mediterranean. However, regions in the north of France are as close to the Mediterranean Sea as some regions of the Caucasian countries, Russia, Poland and Ukraine. Without extending the scope so far, we chose to include countries with at least a portion of their territory within 250 kms of the Mediterranean Sea. We made an exception with Austria, Switzerland and

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.1** Distance to the Mediterranean Sea</figcaption></figure>
<table><caption>**Table 1.1** Composition of the geographical categories used in the publication</caption><thead><tr><th>SOUTHERN SHORE</th><th>EASTERN SHORE</th><th colspan="2">NORTHERN SHORE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>North Africa</td><td>Near East</td><td>Balkans</td><td>Southern Europe</td></tr><tr><td>Algeria</td><td>Cyprus</td><td>Bulgaria</td><td>Portugal</td></tr><tr><td>Egypt</td><td>Lebanon</td><td>Croatia</td><td>Spain</td></tr><tr><td>Libya</td><td>Turkey</td><td>Montenegro</td><td>France</td></tr><tr><td>Morocco</td><td>Israel</td><td>Albania</td><td>Italy</td></tr><tr><td>Tunisia</td><td>Jordan</td><td>Serbia</td><td>Malta</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Syria</td><td>Bosnia-Herzegovina<sup>a</sup></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>Slovenia</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>Macedonia</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>Greece</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>Kosovo</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Hungary, which are not oriented towards the Mediterranean. Thus, our study area consists of all countries with direct access to the sea, plus Portugal, Jordan, Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria. Andorra, Monaco and San Marino, located less than 250 km from the Mediterranean Sea, are not included in the study area as their populations are too small.

Mediterranean countries are commonly classified according to the shore to which they belong: the Southern Shore (African shore), the Eastern Shore (Asian shore) and the Northern Shore (European shore). We will use this categorisation for the representation of the data, to which we will add four regional clusters, an intermediate categorisation between countries and shores: North Africa, the Near East, the Balkans and Southern Europe (Table 1.1, Fig. 1.2).

### 1.2.2 International Comparisons Over Time

The general approach of this publication is to give a global vision of the demographic phenomena of the Mediterranean region. To this end, we have five commitments that we try to maintain throughout the different chapters.

First, we will not limit ourselves to describing the current demographic situation. Indeed, focusing only on recent developments would run the risk of losing the global perspective. Instead, we choose to place them in the long term, thus making it possible to put recent trends into perspective or, on the contrary, to underline their unprecedented character compared to past trends. Depending on the data available, our study will cover the period from 1950 to present day.

<footnote><sup>a</sup> For ease of reading, we use “BiH” in this book to mean “Bosnia-Herzegovina”</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 1.2 Location map of the Mediterranean</figcaption></figure>
Secondly, we will carry out a global international comparison of the Mediterranean. Our unit of comparison is the country, not preconceived regional categories. We will not compare the Balkans with North Africa for example, but all Mediterranean countries with each other simultaneously.<fnref n="6" /> The interest of this approach is to go beyond a vision of the Mediterranean in terms of regional blocks that oppose each other, just like the three shores. The Mediterranean is a maritime basin in which the shores move closer together and further apart (Brunet, 1995). Contrasts and disparities therefore change over time. By using existing regional categories, we would perpetuate differences that are perhaps less alive today. It is true that there is no longer a consensus on the human unity of the Mediterranean, but refusing to compare all the Mediterranean countries is tantamount to refusing to consider possible trans-Mediterranean formations and their dynamics (Deprest, 2002). Refusing a priori to compare would not allow the discovery of new differences and new regionalisations, or the emergence of unexpected scenarios. We believe that there is a need to update our analytical frameworks, particularly the regional categories, to ensure that they are currently consistent.

The third commitment is to describe the main demographic trends. It is clear that there are specific challenges for each country and region cluster. However, our aim is neither to analyse the specificity of each country nor to comment on short-term developments. On the contrary, we want to study the major movements that have characterised the demographic evolution in the Mediterranean over the last 70 years. Our aim is not to demonstrate that the Mediterranean is homogenous from a demographic point of view. Studying the Mediterranean countries as a whole will perhaps highlight the structural contrasts between the different shores. But it is also possible that it will show contrasts between unexpected groups of countries, thus renewing the demography of the Mediterranean. However, it is difficult to know until this global international comparison exercise has been carried out.

Moreover, we have chosen not to carry out any systematic forward-looking reflection, as the objective is above all to offer a synthetic vision of the major past and current demographic trends. However, we will look to the future and present forward-looking reflections where we consider it useful.

Finally, most of our analysis is done at the country level. Of course, we are aware that there are large disparities within countries, and that a sub-national analysis would reveal these. However, we have made this choice because we believe that there is already enough to comment on by staying at the level of the Mediterranean countries. Again, however, sub-national analyses will be offered where necessary to clarify a more specific point. In fact, comparison on a sub-national scale requires *ad hoc* data that are not available everywhere for all subjects and at administrative levels that can be harmonised on the Mediterranean scale.

<footnote n="6">⁶ Except for some graphs, where countries will be grouped by regional clusters. Indeed, a graph with 27 countries is difficult to read. However, the interpretation of these graphs will not be based on regional clusters, but on the countries as a whole.</footnote>
### 1.2.3 Grid Convergence to Analyse Demographic Phenomena

To analyse the major trends of the Mediterranean countries as a whole in the long term,<fnref n="7" /> we used the concept of convergence, i.e. the reduction of disparities and inequalities within a study area. We wanted to measure the evolution of disparities between Mediterranean countries. Have the gaps between these countries narrowed or increased? Are Mediterranean countries more similar today than in the past? However, lower disparities between countries do not imply an absence of disparities. Thus, observing convergence should not be interpreted as a deterministic process where all populations are destined to be perfectly similar in the short or long term. Converging trends should simply be interpreted as a reduction in disparities, not as a sign of continued convergence in the future.

The spread of the demographic transition in the world has led to a convergence of several demographic phenomena, such as birth rate and mortality (Wilson, 2001, 2011). It will come as no surprise that it is expected that there will be a convergence in the Mediterranean. However, our aim is not to demonstrate demographic convergence in the Mediterranean, but to analyse the extent to which this convergence is or is not taking place, and even to envisage cases of divergence. If there is convergence, our aim is then to analyse its intensity, pace, persistent disparities, etc.

Similarly, through the analysis of a possible convergence, our aim is not to prove any kind of demographic homogeneity (or unity) of the Mediterranean. We simply wish to highlight the converging and diverging areas, to provide elements for reflection on the fact that the Mediterranean is a more integrated demographic area today than in the past.

### 1.2.4 Data Used

In the absence of an integrated statistical system specific to the Mediterranean (Blöss-Widmer, 2019), we choose to use major international databases. Conventional demographic indicators are reliable for international comparisons as their definition is fairly widely shared. When analysing indicators such as birth rate, mortality or life expectancy at birth, we are not comparing incomparable things.

The main source of data for our publication is the *World Population Prospects* 2022⁸ of the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. This database provides a wide range of demographic indicators for all countries around the world. Unlike a national statistical office, the UN does not collect data. It produces population estimates from existing data sources, such as surveys (national and international), population censuses, civil registration data, etc. A specific section

<footnote n="7">⁷ See Doignon (2016) for a discussion of the concept of convergence and an application to demographic ageing in the Mediterranean.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ https://population.un.org/wpp/.</footnote>
of the *World Population Prospects*<fnref n="9" /> lists the sources used by the UN for each country. The quality data sources in some countries are scarce or incomplete, which makes demographic estimation even more difficult. In these countries, the data should therefore be interpreted with caution. The *World Population Prospects* thus consists of two parts: retrospective data since 1950, which includes UN population estimates, and population projections up to 2100. Moreover, UN estimates and projections have sometimes been criticised, in particular in relation to Mediterranean countries (Courbage, 1999). However, it should be stated that they have the undeniable advantage in providing good quality international comparative data over a long period of time, which is very useful when it comes to analysing major demographic trends, which is the objective of this publication.

In terms of territorial boundaries, the *World Population Prospects* considers current and UN-recognised states or territorial entities. The UN has therefore reconstructed the retrospective data so that it corresponds to the States (or territorial entities) in their current borders. This requires several clarifications in the case of the Mediterranean:

* Western Sahara has been considered as a non-self-governing territory by the UN since 1963. For this reason, estimates for this territory are made from Moroccan data sources, such as the population census.

* For the countries of the former Yugoslavia, the UN has reconstructed the demographic data of the Yugoslav period for each country within their current borders, using in particular the Yugoslav censuses which made it possible to distinguish the different territorial entities that made up Yugoslavia.

* Kosovo refers to the United Nations administered region under security council resolution 1244. For statistical purposes, the data for Serbia do not include this area.

* The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not recognised by the UN. Therefore, the data refer to the population of the whole island of Cyprus, without distinguishing between the two political entities.

* The UN considers Palestine within its 1967 borders. Referred to as the “State of Palestine” in the data, Palestine thus comprises Gaza and the West Bank, including the Arab populations of East Jerusalem and excluding Israeli citizens residing in the occupied Palestinian territories. Population estimates are based, among other things, on data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

In this publication, for the sake of clarity, we use “Macedonia” for “North Macedonia”, “Palestine” for “State of Palestine”, and “Syria” for the “Syrian Arab Republic”. Similarly, for convenience, we use the term “country” to refer indiscriminately to the countries or territorial entities of the UN. These two choices are in no way an expression of opinion regarding the legal status of a country, its authorities or the delimitation of its borders.

When the *World Population Prospects* 2022 is not sufficient to study a subject, we use other international data providers to complement it. These are other UN

<footnote n="9">⁹ https://population.un.org/wpp/DataSources.</footnote>
databases (UNdata,<fnref n="10" /> International Migrant Stock,<fnref n="11" /> World Marriage Data,<fnref n="12" /> etc.), and data from other international institutions (International Organization for Migration, WorldPop,<fnref n="13" /> etc.), along with international surveys (DHS,<fnref n="14" /> MICS,<fnref n="15" /> etc.). The additional sources used are always indicated below the figures or in the text.

## 1.3 Structure of the Book

For a publication that aims to provide a global perspective of the population in the Mediterranean, we felt it was important to start by recalling how this population has been distributed in the area concerned. The second chapter therefore deals with settlement and urbanisation in the Mediterranean.

The third chapter focuses on the age and gender composition of the population, analysing the sex ratio of the population and the age pyramids of the Mediterranean sub-national regions.

The fourth chapter deals with demographic transitions, i.e. the evolution of birth and death rates. It proposes a typology of Mediterranean countries according to several characteristics of the process. It highlights the great diversity of demographic transitions in the Mediterranean.

Secondly, we wanted to take a closer look at each of the phenomena that make up the demographic transition. Thus, the fifth and sixth chapters analyse fertility and the formation and dissolution of unions respectively. The seventh chapter deals with mortality, with the evolution of life expectancy at birth, the decomposition of age-specific mortality, and an overview of the health transition.

The eighth chapter deals with international migration, where the Mediterranean is a migration system, which has undergone major changes since the 1950s.

Finally, the ninth chapter concludes the publication with an analysis of population dynamics, i.e. the evolution of the number of inhabitants in each country, and its components (natural and migration). It will also take UN projections to consider the future distribution of the population around the Mediterranean.

There will be a general summary conclusion, the main objective of which will be to take stock of the analysis of the demography of the Mediterranean countries as a whole and of the question of the convergence of this area over the last 70 years.

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ https://data.un.org/.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² https://population.un.org/MarriageData/Index.html#/home.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ https://www.worldpop.org/.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ https://dhsprogram.com/.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ https://mics.unicef.org/surveys.</footnote>
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<figure><img src="image_8.png" /></figure>

**Chapter 2**

**Spatial Distribution of Population**
**and Urbanisation**

**Abstract** Populations are not randomly distributed across the Earth's surface. Some regions are almost empty, while others concentrate with a large proportion of the human population. Analysing the spatial distribution of a population is an exercise involving geography and demography. It takes place on different scales, both global and local, as given the striking uneven distribution of populations in the Mediterranean and all over the world. This chapter will begin by describing the Mediterranean settlement, emphasising the contrasts that exist at different scales, and then identifying regularities and explanatory factors. We will end by looking at the phenomena structuring the contemporary distribution of the population: metropolisation and coastalisation.

**Keywords** Urbanisation · Settlement · Spatial distribution of the population · Coastline · Mediterranean

**2.1 Introduction**

Populations are not randomly distributed across the Earth’s surface. Some regions are almost empty, while others concentrate with a large proportion of the human population. Analysing the spatial distribution of a population is an exercise involving geography and demography. It takes place on different scales, both global and local, as given the striking uneven distribution of populations in the Mediterranean and all over the world.

These spatial contrasts in population distribution are an important element in the functioning of societies, i.e. in their organisation and their future. While the spatial distribution of a population provides an image of societies at a given time, it is also the result of phenomena that characterise human time: the short-time duration of individuals and generations, population dynamics and the long-term duration of societies. It is also the consequence of populations adapting, more or less, to their environmental constraints (accessibility of places, available resources, quality, etc.), i.e. their capacity to take advantage of the latter to settle and live there.
We will begin by describing the Mediterranean settlement, emphasising the contrasts that exist at different scales, and then identifying regularities and explanatory factors. We will end by looking at the phenomena structuring the contemporary distribution of the population: metropolisation and coastalisation.

## 2.2 Uneven Distribution of the Population

Spatial distribution of populations is quite heterogeneous throughout the world. Differences according to the chosen scale or the level of observation are always important. To describe this uneven distribution, it is customary to use population density, an interesting indicator since it relates a population to a given area.

The population density in the Mediterranean is 65 hbts/km² in 2020, which is slightly higher than at the world level (60 hbts/km²). However, this average value hides great disparities (Oliveau & Doignon, 2014). There are marked inequalities between the two shores: the Southern Shore is much less populated than the Northern Shore (35 hbts/km² and 125 hbts/km² respectively), and if we look at the Eastern Shore, the population concentration is similar to that of the Northern Shore (125 hbts/km²). Two out of three Mediterranean countries have a density between 60 and 130 inhabitants/km². However, Libya has only 4 hbts/km² and Algeria 15 hbts/km², as the extent of the desert regions is considerable in each of these countries. In contrast, the four most densely populated Mediterranean countries in 2020, apart from the city-states<fnref n="1" /> (Monaco, Vatican, San Marino), are Israel (400 hbts/km²), Lebanon (550 hbts/km²), Palestine (830 hbts/km²) and Malta (1640 hbts/km²). This shows the extent to which the Near East, and especially its coastal strip, is one of the world's settlement centres.

If we look at the evolution of population densities since the middle of the twentieth century (Fig. 2.1), we see a general upward trend. The Mediterranean countries have seen their density multiply by an average of 2.5 between 1950 and 2020. The countries on the Northern Shore have generally experienced a weaker evolution: their density has been multiplied by less than 1.8, excluding Kosovo and Albania, where the multiplication coefficient is 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. On the other hand, the densities of the countries on the Southern and Eastern shores have been multiplied by at least 3, sometimes by more than 5 (Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Libya, Israel), and by 25 for Jordan. This sustained evolution is the result of later and faster demographic transitions than on the Northern shore, resulting in high rate of natural change (see Chap. 4). Migration can sometimes accentuate this population growth, as in Israel and Jordan (Chap. 9), but also occasionally, as in Lebanon in 2013–2015 with the arrival of Syrian refugees.

<footnote n="1">¹ In 2020, the population density is 24,780 hbts/km² in Monaco, 2,000 hbts/km² in the Vatican and 557 hbts/km² in San Marino.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2.1** Evolution of the population density in the Mediterranean (1950–2020) (Source World Population Prospects 2022. Note the most densely populated countries (Israel, Lebanon, Malta, Palestine) are placed in a separate graph so that the evolution of the other countries can be seen more clearly)</figcaption></figure>

Although the general trend over the period 1950–2020 is towards an increase, we nevertheless observe decreases in population density in certain countries, as envisaged 20 years ago by Attané and Courbage (2004). This concerns a large part of the Balkan countries since the 1990s (Albania, Croatia, Serbia), or the 2000s (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Greece). These downward trends are mainly due to a declining demographic regime (Chap. 4). Kosovo and Bulgaria show interesting trajectories. The
former saw a sharp drop in population density following the Kosovo war (1998–1999), from 200 hbts/km<fnref n="2" /> in 1997 to 170 hbts/km<fnref n="2" /> in 2000. The country then experienced significant emigration, leading to a continuous decrease in population density, which reached 150 hbts/km<fnref n="2" /> in 2020, the level of the early 1980s. Bulgaria’s population density has been decreasing since the early 1980s, and in 2020 it returned to the same level as in 1950, a unique case in the Mediterranean (Doignon, 2023). Very recently, some Southern European countries are starting to see their population density decrease as well, such as Portugal and Italy.

An analysis of population densities at the country level provides a general overview of the situation. Nevertheless, strong disparities in population density are generally visible at the sub-national level. France has an average density of 115 hbts/ km<fnref n="2" />, but this masks the wide variations that exist: the least dense communes have less than 5 hbts/km<fnref n="2" /> and the densest ones exceed 20,000 hbts/km<fnref n="2" />. Similarly, a country like Egypt has an average density comparable to France (of 110 inhabitants/km<fnref n="2" />), but due to the size of the Saharan regions, it is actually mostly empty. In contrast, the Nile, and more particularly its delta, has very high densities. Rural areas can exceed 1,000 hbts/km<fnref n="2" />, which is unusual outside monsoon South and East Asia, and Cairo reaches 40,000 hbts/km<fnref n="2" /> (Oliveau et al., 2023).

Thus, the contrasts are reinforced when the Mediterranean settlement is mapped at a finer level (Fig. 2.2). Two main spatial structures can be observed. Firstly, there is the contrast between large, densely populated urban areas and less populated rural areas. This division is clearly visible in Spain with Madrid and Barcelona, in Turkey with Istanbul and Ankara, in Bulgaria with Sofia and in France with Paris. The second spatial structure is the contrast between the coast and inland. Of those living within 200 km of the Mediterranean,<fnref n="2" /> about half are less than 50 km away, and 30% less than 10 km. This shows the extent to which the Mediterranean population is concentrated on the coast. On the Southern and Eastern shores, this difference is very marked between the large concentrations of populations on the urbanised coastlines and the much less dense desert inland region. This phenomenon is particularly striking in North Africa (from Morocco to Benghazi in Libya) and in the Near East (from the northern Sinai Peninsula to the Cilicia plain in Turkey). Egypt is a unique case in the Mediterranean. Indeed, unlike other regions, its settlement is not structured by the contrast between the coast and the inland region, but by a general contrast between the Nile and the rest of the country, even if some parts of its coastline are densely populated.

This coastal-inland spatial structure is also visible in Southern Europe, but with a less dense coastal strip. On the other hand, it is hardly found in the Balkans, where the densely populated areas are not located on the coast, but rather in the inland plains or valleys of the mountain ranges.

In general, and for several decades, the inland regions of the various shores of the Mediterranean have been marked by a population decline (Coudert, 2013; Liziard, 2013).

<footnote n="2">² Only the population of the countries we have defined as Mediterranean is included in this calculation (see introduction of this book).</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2.2** Population density in the Mediterranean (2020) (*Source* WorldPop [2018] [Population Density, Unconstrained UN adjusted, 3, 1 km resolution])</figcaption></figure>

<footnote n="3">³ Only the population densities of Kosovo are not adjusted by those of the UN. Indeed, WorldPop used the World Population Prospects 2019 data, in which Kosovo's data were still aggregated with Serbia's.</footnote>
## 2.3 Far from Determinism: Opportunities and Constraints of Mediterranean Areas

It is always tempting to look for determinants of observed density inequalities in physical conditions, but “simplistic attempts to justify densities by physical constraints have failed. The distribution of people seems, a priori, remarkably poorly correlated with climate, or even with vegetation”<fnref n="4" /> (Dubresson et al., 2011). This observation made for Sub-Saharan Africa also applies to the Mediterranean area, which is characterised by a typical climate bearing its name, with hot, dry summers and mild, wet winters.

Nevertheless, the dominant role of water remains visible. The sea is the structuring element of this area, where the coastlines are generally densely populated regions. Rainfall is a major constraint on agriculture, while rivers offer opportunities. However, situations cannot easily be fitted into standard models, and it is necessary to consider the various combinations of factors, always with possible retroaction.

Thus, distance to the sea (and to water in general) seems to be an important element, although not the only explanatory factor. For instance, Mediterranean populations are mainly located in direct proximity to the sea (Fig. 2.3).

The population density within 10 km of the sea exceeds 400 hbts/km² in 2020, then decreases rapidly with distance, reaching about 100 hbts/km² from 40 km of the Mediterranean. However, the situation in Libya and Egypt reminds us that this general relationship is not so simple and is not observed everywhere, as areas near the sea have very low densities. Further north, although there is no desert, the low densities of the Balkan coast of the Adriatic Sea stand in stark contrast to the high densities of the western coast in Italy. The first is characterised by a very mountainous coastline, notably with the Dinaric Alps. Only the Albanian coastal plain with high population densities seems to be an exception.

Mountains are also part of the Mediterranean landscape. It should be remembered that the Latin name for the Mediterranean, *mare Mediterraneum*, means “sea in the middle of the earth”. Mountains are present almost everywhere, but their relationship to human settlement is varied. In the Libyan desert, Jebel Akhdar offers a green space which saw the establishment of the ancient city of Cyrene and which remains today one of the rare populated areas of the country, with the region of Tripoli, at the foot of Jebel Nefoussa. Conversely, the mountains of Provence are much less populated than the plains, and the same is true in Italy and Lebanon (Verdeil et al., 2007). As for the Balkans, whose very name refers to the mountain range (Balkan Mountains/stara planina) crossing Bulgaria, the mountains are omnipresent, but do not determine human settlement. In contrast, the highest densities are found in the inland plains, such as the southern Pannonian Plain in Croatia and Serbia, or in the valleys of the mountain ranges.

<footnote n="4">⁴ This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: "les tentatives simplistes de justification des densités par des contraintes physiques ont fait long feu. La répartition des hommes paraît, a priori, remarquablement mal corrélée au climat, voire à la végétation".</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2.3** Population density according to distance from the Mediterranean in 2000 and 2020 (Source WorldPop [2018] [Population counts, Unconstrained UN adjusted, 1 km resolution])</figcaption></figure>

However, water is the only element that seems to play a dominant role everywhere. The sea coast, as we have already said, but more generally the rivers, strongly structure the Mediterranean settlement, more than any other environmental element. We could take the example of the Nile to convince ourselves of this, as it is the most visible. However, the structuring effects on the settlement of other rivers are just as obvious if we look at the Rhône, the Loire and the Seine (France), the Po and the Tiber (Italy), the Ebro and the Guadalquivir (Spain), the Jordan (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Palestine), the Euphrates and the Khabur (Syria) or the Tigris and the Gediz (Turkey). There are of course exceptions, the low densities of the Rhône Delta in France being a good counter-example to the concentrations observed in the Nile Delta.

## 2.4 A Very Coastal and Increasing Urbanisation

The Mediterranean is a place of ancient settlement and urbanisation. Mediterranean societies at the beginning of the modern era were characterised in particular by a peasant population settled in villages or small towns rather than in scattered settlements (Huebner, 2016), especially in North Africa (Tabutin et al., 2002). As an area of great circulation, the Mediterranean was very early on woven with cities and ports, the traces of which are still visible today, in a more or less visible way depending
<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2.4** Urbanisation rates in the Mediterranean (1950–2020) (Source: World Urbanization Prospects 2018)</figcaption></figure>

on the region. Nevertheless, the populations of the countries bordering it were still predominantly rural in the mid twentieth century (Fig. 2.4).

Indeed, 7 out of 10 Mediterranean countries had an urbanisation rate<fnref n="5" /> below 50%. As a regional average, 34% of the Mediterranean population lived in a city in 1950. Some countries had very low levels, such as Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Libya

<footnote n="5">⁵ The urbanisation rate measures the proportion of the population living in cities. When it is below 50%, it means that a majority of the population lives in rural areas.</footnote>
and Slovenia, where less than 20% of the population lived in urban areas. Conversely, 6 countries had a predominantly urban population, mainly in Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, France, Malta), and also in Israel and Greece.

Since 1950, there has been an increase in urbanisation in all countries without exception. In 2020, 70% of the Mediterranean population was urban (regional average). All countries have an urbanisation rate above 50%, with the exception of Egypt (43%). The least urbanised countries are mainly found in the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia), and also in Syria. Egypt's trajectory is unique, as its urbanisation rate increases between 1950 and the mid-1970s, and then stagnates until the present day. Other countries have seen their urbanisation rates stagnate, such as Macedonia and Cyprus since the mid-1980s. Malta is the most urbanised country in the Mediterranean, with an urbanisation rate of almost 95% in 2020, and already 90% in 1950.

This general increase in urbanisation indicates a progressive concentration of the population in small areas (cities). In fact, the Mediterranean population is becoming increasingly concentrated in space. As we have already noted, the coastline concentrates populations, but these populations are also attracted to the cities, and the coastal villages are becoming urbanised.

According to the World Urbanization Prospects 2018 data, there were 163 urban agglomerations in the Mediterranean with more than 300,000 inhabitants in 2018 (Fig. 2.5). Of these cities, about 1 in 4 has more than one million inhabitants, and 60% of them are on the Southern and Eastern shores. In addition, there are 3 cities with more than 10 million inhabitants: Cairo (18.8 million), Istanbul (14.1 million), and Paris (10.7 million). The first two are among the 20 largest cities in the world. Since 1950, although almost all the cities in the Mediterranean countries have seen their populations increase, they have done so at different rates. The population growth of the cities on the Northern Shore has generally been more moderate. In fact, 80% of the cities on the Southern and Eastern shores saw their population multiply by at least 5 between 1950 and 2015, while the population of those on the Northern shore multiplied by 2 on average. In some cases, the increase has been particularly significant, such as Antalya (Turkey), which has gone from 27,000 inhabitants to 1.5 million today, a 40-fold increase in population. Amman, the Jordanian capital, has seen its population increase from 100,000 to over 1.7 million (a 20-fold increase). As a result of this very rapid urbanisation on the Southern and Eastern shores, partly due to a rural exodus and demographic transition, the large cities have seen the emergence of slums (Puschmann & Matthijs, 2016). These trends partly explain the significant increase in population density in coastal areas (Fig. 2.3).

The cities of the Mediterranean countries are characterised primarily by their coastal location. Indeed, 25% are located within 5 kms of the Mediterranean Sea, and 50% within 100 kms. Thus, many of the cities with more than one million inhabitants are ports: Barcelona, Marseille, Naples, Athens, Istanbul, Antalya, Izmir, Alexandria, Port Said, Tangiers, Haifa, Beirut, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, etc. 8 countries bordering the Mediterranean have a coastal capital, thus underlining the long-standing role of this sea in international trade. Some of these cities are also very old, generally dating back to antiquity, especially in the Middle East (Reba et al., 2018). This is particularly
<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2.5** Population of agglomerations with more than 300,000 inhabitants (2015), and projected population change between 2015 and 2035 (Source World Urbanization Prospects 2018)</figcaption></figure>
evident between Istanbul and Alexandria, where there are many agglomerations with more than 300,000 inhabitants. The specific situation of the Balkans, where, with the exception of Greece, none of the countries has a coastal capital and where there are few large cities, should be recalled here.

Today, the settlement pattern is changing, and these cities are mainly taking advantage of longstanding benefits which they are converting to maintain their regional primacy. Urban settlement is spreading inland and the coastal location often becomes an asset for tourism or quality of life, rather than a necessity for the industrial or agricultural economy. From urbanisation, which concentrated inhabitants in cities, we have moved on to metropolisation, which agglomerates them in vast spaces comprising the central city, its suburbs and its outskirts sometimes over great distances. In France, for example, the urban fabric is now almost continuous along the Mediterranean coast and sometimes penetrates up to 50 km inland (Aix-Marseille metropolis). The same phenomenon can be observed in Spain, and to a lesser extent in many other countries, such as Libya, where the Tripoli conurbation now stretches almost 150 km from west to east (Moriconi-Ebrard & Pascal, 2020).

Tourism plays an important role in these settlement developments in several countries. In Western Europe, the shores of the Mediterranean attract a population of seasonal tourists, and also migrants who come to enjoy the living environment for their retirement (Doignon et al., 2017). In addition to these populations, there are also migrant populations who come to work from within the country or from abroad. These different populations can sometimes have a significant impact on the settlement. This is particularly the case in Spain, where the flow of retired foreign residents and the flow of workers to the Mediterranean coasts make it possible to maintain population growth in these regions (Oliveau et al., 2019).

Projections from the World Urbanization Prospects 2018 envisage that this urbanisation trend will continue to 2035, reinforcing both the urbanisation of all countries and the littoralisation of their population. For instance, the urbanisation rate in Mediterranean countries is expected to reach 80% by 2050. The population of agglomerations with more than 300,000 inhabitants in 2018 is expected to continue growing until 2035. This growth will again be greater in the cities of the Southern and Eastern shores, but at a lower rate than between 1950 and 2015 (Fig. 2.5).

## 2.5 Settlement Challenges in the Mediterranean

To conclude this chapter, we now turn to the settlement challenges that Mediterranean areas will face in the coming decades. Although the Mediterranean population is very heterogeneous and it is difficult to characterise it by a single trait, the populations share a common sea, a typical climate and fragile natural environments.

Although the degree to which the coasts are inhabited by humans is heterogeneous, the high level of coastal population poses real problems of pollution. The Mediterranean is one of the most polluted seas in the world, especially with plastics (Alessi & Di Carlo, 2018). Pollution of maritime waters is a real issue, too often left
to the goodwill of States. This is significantly exacerbated by the poor management of waste generated by mass tourism, and the ever-increasing concentration of the population on the coastline. Pollution of maritime waters is also dependent on pollution, particularly industrial pollution, carried by the large rivers that flow into the Mediterranean, as is the case with the heavy metals discharged by the Rhône or the nitrates transported from agricultural areas. These various forms of pollution threaten one of the Mediterranean's major reservoirs of marine and coastal biodiversity.

Human pressure on the coasts is already very strong and is expected to increase, accentuating the constraints on nature and the human beings that occupy it. In the summer of 2021, fires were exceptionally widespread along the entire Mediterranean coastline (in Italy, Greece, Algeria, Turkey and the Balkans). Fires are one of the major threats facing the Mediterranean, as are tensions over water resources, coastal flooding, etc. Human pressure is therefore felt not only by nature, but by the settlement itself. It is true that climate change increase (also of human origin) is an aggravating factor; however it is primarily the presence of humans that is to blame. These fires are perhaps only the most dramatic part of the effects of climate change. Floods and flash floods are also increasing, due to the combined effect of land artificialisation on the one hand, and changes in rainfall patterns on the other.

Ultimately, the current settlement of the Mediterranean raises the question of its effects on ecosystems. Natural hazards are a real problem for societies (Laria, 2008). They will be accentuated by the densification of the population, the significant littoralisation of the population, urbanisation and climate change. The question is therefore that of the sustainability of the settlement in these conditions, and of the adaptation of societies, since the changes brought about will be inevitable (Borderon, 2023).

## References

Alessi, E., & Di Carlo, G. (2018). *Pollution plastique en Méditerranée. Sortons du piège!* WWF. https://www.wwf.fr/sites/default/files/doc-2018-06/180608_rapport_plastiques_medite_rranee.pdf

Attané, I., & Courbage, Y. (2004). *Demography in the Mediterranean region: Situation and projections*. Économica.

Borderon, M. (2023). Migrations, changements environnementaux et climatiques. In Y. Doignon & S. Oliveau (Eds.), *Dynamique du peuplement mondial. Comment la population habite le monde. Encyclopédie Des Sciences. ISTE Editions*.

Coudert, E. (2013). Une approche régionale de la population et de l'urbanisation en Méditerranée, rétrospective et projections à 2025. In J.-P. Carrière (Ed.), *Villes et projets urbains en Méditerranée* (pp. 21-31). Perspectives Villes et Territoires. Presses universitaires François-Rabelais.

Doignon, Y. (2023). Dépeuplement et dépopulation dans un monde en croissance. In Y. Doignon & S. Oliveau (Eds.), *Dynamique du peuplement mondial. Comment la population habite le monde. Encyclopédie Des Sciences. ISTE Editions*.

Doignon, Y., Blöss-Widmer, I., & Oliveau, S. (2017). Half a century of ageing in France: Dynamics and specificities of the Mediterranean coastline. In T. Blöss (Ed.), *Ageing, lifestyles and economic crises: The new people of the Mediterranean* (pp. 82-100). Routledge Studies in the European Economy. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Dubresson, A., Moreau, S., Raison, J.-P., & Steck, J.-F. (2011). *L'Afrique subsaharienne: Une géographie du changement* (3rd ed.). Armand Colin.

Huebner, S. (2016). A Mediterranean family? A comparative approach to the ancient World. In S. Huebner & G. Nathan (Eds.), *Mediterranean families in antiquity: Households, extended families, and domestic space* (pp. 3–26). John Wiley & Sons.

Laria, S. (2008). L'avenir en Méditerranée se jouera dans les villes. *Annales Des Mines - Responsabilité Et Environnement*, 49, 56-61. https://doi.org/10.3917/re.049.0056

Liziard, S. (2013). *Littoralisation de la façade nord-méditerranéenne: analyse spatiale et prospective dans le contexte du changement climatique*. Ph.D. Thesis in Geography, Nice, Nice Sophia Antipolis University. https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00927492/document

Moriconi-Ebrard, F., & Pascal, R. (2020). Peuplement et urbanisation de la Libye: construction d'une information cartographique. *Géoconfluences*. http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/informations-scientifiques/dossiers-regionaux/la-mediterranee-une-geographie-paradoxale/articles-scientifiques/demographie-libye

Oliveau, S., & Doignon, Y. (2014). Ever closer to the water: Recent developments in Mediterranean settlement patterns. *South-East European Journal of Political Science*, II, 22–30. https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01070622

Oliveau, S., Larue, Q., Doignon, Y., & Blöss-Widmer, I. (2019). Mapping foreign nationals in Spain: An exploratory approach at local level. *Genus*, 75, 5. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41118-018-0047-5

Oliveau, S., Doignon, Y., & Blöss-Widmer, I. (2023). Population distribution: Follow the Nile. In H. Bayoumi & K. Bennafla (Eds.), *An atlas of contemporary Egypt* (pp. 56–57). CNRS éditions. https://books.openedition.org/editionscnrs/58390

Puschmann, P., & Matthijs, K. (2016). The demographic transition in the Arab world: The dual role of marriage in family dynamics and population growth. In K. Matthijs, K. Neels, C. Timmerman, J. Haers, & S. Mels (Eds.), *Population change in Europe, the Middle-East and North Africa: Beyond the demographic divide* (pp. 119–165). International Population Studies. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315601496

Reba, M., Reitsma, F., & Seto, K. C. (2018). *Historical urban population: 3700 BC-AD 2000*. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). https://doi.org/10.7927/H4ZG6QBX

Tabutin, D., Vilquin, E., & Biraben, J.-N. (2002). *L'histoire de la population de l'Afrique du Nord pendant le deuxième millénaire*. Document de Travail 15. Centre de recherche en démographie.

Verdeil, E., Faour, G., & Velut, S. (2007). Population et peuplement. In *Atlas du Liban: Territoires et société* (pp. 64–90). Contemporain Co-Éditions. Presses de l'Ifpo, CNRS Liban. https://books.openedition.org/ifpo/402?lang=en

WorldPop. (2018). WorldPop (School of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton; Department of Geography and Geosciences, University of Louisville; Department de Geographie, Universite de Namur) and Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. Global high resolution population denominators project—Funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (OPP1134076). https://www.worldpop.org/

World Population Prospects. (2022). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://population.un.org/wpp/

World Urbanization Prospects. (2018). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://population.un.org/wup/
**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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<figure><img src="image_14.png" /></figure>
Chapter 3

Sex Ratio, Age Structure and Population
Ageing

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updates

**Abstract** It is vital to examine the population composition, i.e. how the population being studied is structured. In demography, to understand the phenomena studied (firstly, births and deaths), it is common practice to examine the number of women in relation to the number of men and to distinguish the distribution of individuals by age. The most common representation of this gender and age composition is the “age pyramid”. It is important to know the age and gender composition, as this largely determines a population’s demographic dynamics. Elements relating to gender and age composition will enable better understanding of the dynamics outlined in the following chapters. In this chapter therefore, we will present the composition of the Mediterranean population from the perspective of sex ratios on the one hand, and the age distribution of populations on the other. We will also consider the implications of differences between countries at the sub-national level.

**Keywords** Age pyramid · Population ageing · Gender inequalities · Sex ratio · Mediterranean

**3.1 Introduction**

While studying the spatial distribution of a population is an important aspect to
understanding it (see Chap. 2), it is also vital to examine its composition, i.e. how
the population being studied is structured. There are several indicators to describe
a population’s composition. In demography, to understand the phenomena studied
(firstly, births and deaths), it is common practice to examine the number of women
in relation to the number of men and to distinguish the distribution of individuals
by age. The most common representation of this gender and age composition is the
“age pyramid”.

It is important to know the age and gender composition, as this largely determines
a population’s demographic dynamics. For example, the birth rate is firstly the result
of the number of women of childbearing age (between puberty and menopause),
and secondly the intensity of fertility by age group (Chap. 5 examines to aspects of
differentials fertility). Elements relating to gender and age composition will enable better understanding of the dynamics outlined in the following chapters. The birth rate, as we have said, but also mortality (Chap. 7), migration (Chap. 8) and population dynamics (Chap. 9).

In this chapter therefore, we will present the composition of the Mediterranean population from the perspective of sex ratios on the one hand, and the age distribution of populations on the other. We will also consider the implications of differences between countries at the sub-national level.

## 3.2 Gender Inequalities in the Mediterranean

The human species is characterised by an almost equal numerical balance between the sexes. On average, 105 boys are born for every 100 girls, but as the mortality rate for boys is slightly higher than for girls, the ratio between the two sexes reaches an equilibrium around the age of 20 and is maintained today until the age of 60. Secondly, the gap tends to widen between men who die earlier on average, and women (Chap. 7). Obviously, these orders of magnitude vary from one society to another, and have evolved over time. These inequalities in mortality can be explained by natural differences, but also by differences in personal behaviour and social constraints.

The male/female ratio, also known as the sex ratio, is the consequence of biological constants that cannot be explained, but also of differentiated cultural practices. Thus, in some countries there are imbalances in the sex ratio from birth. India and China are regularly cited in this regard, with a sex ratio that favours girls (Guilmoto & Oliveau, 2007). Around the Mediterranean, most countries have sex ratios at birth that follow the norm of 105 boys per 100 girls. In the 1970s and 1980s, excess female mortality was present in some countries on the Southern and Eastern shores (Locoh & Ouadah-Bedidi, 2014; Tabutin & Schoumaker, 2005), but this is no longer visible today (according to the *World Population Prospects 2022* data at least). However, other countries did show sex ratio imbalances at birth: Albania, Montenegro, and Macedonia. All three countries show an unbalanced sex ratio at birth, indicating strong discrimination against girls (Fig. 3.1).<fnref n="1" />

These imbalances were particularly high in the past, and are now decreasing. Albania, for example, saw the sex ratio imbalance worsen in the mid-1990s, peaking at 113 boys for every 100 girls in the mid-1980s, and declining steadily since. The trends are different for these three countries, but they have all at some point had a sex ratio at birth that has exceeded 108 in the last 30 years. In 2020, they reached a level of around 107, higher than that observed in Southern Europe or the European Union.

This preference for boys is complex to explain, as it is based on cultural practices and lineage structures that are not explicit and are generally unconscious. Discriminatory practice, while there is no doubt, is not being claimed here. Nevertheless, for

<footnote n="1">¹ For at the sub-national level analysis of the sex ratio in former Yugoslavia, see Buisson (2016).</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_16.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3.1** Evolution of the sex ratio at birth in select South European countries (*Source* World Population Prospects 2022)</figcaption></figure>

the preference for boys to be expressed by the disappearance of girls, there would have to be legal and medical contexts that allow for it. Thus, the development of ultrasound scans and abortion facilitated the use of prenatal selection. The development of these practices from the 1990s onwards is, for instance, visible in regions with a large Albanian population (Guilmoto & Duthé, 2013).

Nevertheless, traces of discrimination at birth may be erased over time in the composition of the general population, through a higher mortality of boys and then men, or through sex-differentiated migration, which can ultimately change the overall sex ratio. From this perspective, international migration can severely impact the overall sex ratio. This is the case for Albanian men who leave their country in greater numbers than women, thus rebalancing the overall sex ratio.

Finally, in general, men's mortality is higher than women's, and even more so at older ages (Chap. 7). As a result, countries with ageing populations generally have a sex ratio in favour of women. Delbès et al. (2006) summed it up well about Europe when they wrote that "women grow old alone, but men grow old with a partner".
3.3 An Ageing Population

Looking at a population in terms of its age structure enables understanding of the demographic potential in terms of replacement level, ageing, development opportunities, etc. The determinants of age structure are both the births and deaths rates (which are themselves the result of a cross between the fertility/age-specific mortality rates and the structure of the population by age and sex), and the effect of inward and outward migration. In 1950, the Mediterranean's age pyramid had a broad base and a rather thin top, which is a sign of a high average birth rate and an even higher mortality rate at advanced ages (Fig. 3.2).

The higher the birth rate, the greater the number of young people and the wider the base of the pyramid. This initially creates needs (in terms of educational infrastructure in particular), but also rapidly opportunities (through the influx of workers into the labour market). In 2020, the Mediterranean pyramid evolved. Its base was narrower, with a lower weight of young people in the population. In addition, there are more age groups above 30 than in 1950, and the top of the pyramid is much fuller. The weight of older people has increased, and the population has aged, generating many socio-demographic challenges (Blöss, 2018). This change in the age pyramid between 1950 and 2020 is the result of the demographic transition (Chap. 4), with a sharp drop in fertility, which fell below the generation replacement level in several countries (Chap. 5), a significant drop in mortality and improved survival to old age (Chap. 7).

In societies in transition from a demographic regime of high births and high deaths to a demographic regime of low births and low deaths (Chap. 4), there comes a time when there are still few old people and few young people. This leaves plenty of room

<figure><img src="image_17.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 3.2 Age pyramid of the Mediterranean in 1950 and 2020 (Source World Population Prospects 2022)</figcaption></figure>
for people of working age, creating what is known as a demographic window of opportu-
nity for the economy: the number of working people is greater than the number of
people who depend on them (children and the elderly). A summary measure of this
situation is the “dependency ratio”, which relates the population aged under 20 and
those aged 65 or over to the population aged 20–64. If the ratio is above 100, then
there are more inactive than active people, and if it is below 100, then the number
of active people is higher than the number of inactive people, suggesting a greater
possibility of productivity in society.

This dependency ratio in the Mediterranean decreases significantly between 1950 and 2020, from 105 to less than 75 (Fig. 3.3). This decrease indicates a lower amount of young and old people in the population. This trend is primarily related to the falling birth rate (Chap. 4), which narrows the base of the pyramid. As the number of young people decreases, the dependency ratio decreases. However, there has been a recent increase in the dependency ratio in Balkan countries, Southern European countries and also in Israel. This is due to the ageing of the population, where more people are surviving into old age, increasing the amount of the elderly in the population. Countries on the Southern and Eastern shores retain higher dependency ratios than countries on the Northern Shore (Ambrosetti, 2020), particularly in the Near East, which is mainly due to a higher birth rate and thus a higher presence of children in the population. Two countries stand out due to their ratio trajectories. First of all, Israel has maintained a high ratio (>80%) since 1950, combining an improvement in the longevity of its elderly with a relatively high fertility rate. The second country is France, whose ratio is currently the highest on the Northern shore, due to a combination of a birth rate that has not fallen to the same extent as elsewhere in Europe, immigration that provides a steady supply of workers, and an ageing population.

## 3.4 Ongoing Significant Differences in Age Structure Between Regions

Looking at ratios at the country level is interesting and already shows remarkable
differences. It is nevertheless more pertinent to approach the subject at a finer level
in order to offer a more precise understanding of the age composition of the Mediter-
ranean area. We have therefore constructed age pyramids at a sub-national level for
each country that is as comparable as possible from one country to another in terms of
average area (Doignon, 2020; Doignon & Oliveau, 2015). In order to allow for carto-
graphic analyses, we have established a typology for age pyramids, which consists
of 7 profiles (from the youngest to the oldest) and uses a hierarchical ascending
classification (Fig. 3.4).<fnref n="2" />

The first profile type is an age pyramid with a very broad base and a narrow top.
It represents a very young population, with a high birth rate (characteristic of a fairly

<footnote n="2">² The period represented is 2010–2015 due to data availability.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_18.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3.3** Total dependency ratio in the Mediterranean (1950–2021). (Source World Population Prospects 2022. Note The total dependency ratio is the ratio of population aged 0–19 and 65 + per 100 population aged 20–64)</figcaption></figure>

high fertility rate), and a low proportion of elderly people (on average less than 3% of the population is aged 65 or over). It includes part of the Nile Valley in Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and also Turkish Kurdistan (with a higher fertility than the rest of the country) and some Saharan regions of Algeria.

The second type corresponds to a situation where the birth rate has started to decline, but is still high. People aged 65 and over still represent only 4.2% of the population. This type of age pyramid is essentially found in much of the Maghreb, and in the Nile delta in Egypt.

The third type is very similar to the second, but with the base of the pyramid showing the beginning of a recovery, indicating that a decline in fertility is taking place over time. It represents the situation in Libya, southern Morocco, the urban regions of the Maghreb (Casablanca, Rabat, Agadir, Oran, Algiers, Tunis, etc.), a large part of Tunisia, and Turkey, in the regions of Istanbul and Ankara, and on its southern border.

The fourth type represents the average characteristics of the Mediterranean area. The base of the pyramid is slightly sunken, indicating rather low fertility, and the top is fuller than the previous types. The share of elderly people in the population is about 9%. This type is found on all shores of the Mediterranean. It is characteristic
<figure><img src="image_19.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3.4** Age structure in the Mediterranean (2010–15) (Source: National Institutes of Statistics and authors’ calculations)</figcaption></figure>
of Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Lebanon and Cyprus, along with a large part of Turkey and certain localised rural areas of the Maghreb. Finally, some large urban centres have this profile, such as Paris, Lyon and Toulouse in France (as well as the departments bordering Switzerland, which attract many young workers), and Tel Aviv and Haifa in Israel.

The fifth type embodies European ageing, with a rather low birth rate. People aged 65 or over represent almost 15% of the population. This pattern is found in the Iberian Peninsula, southern Italy, and much of the Balkans, almost equal to the seventh type. The only exception is France on the Northern shore.

The French regions are represented by the sixth type which is specific to them. Despite the ageing population (15% of the population is 65 years or older), the birth rate remains high compared to other European countries (see Chap. 4), which gives the age pyramid a typical shape, still somewhat narrow at its base, but with a full top.

The seventh and last type is an even older age pyramid than the fifth type. The base of the pyramid is very narrow and the top is very wide. The proportion of people aged 65 or over in the population reaches 19% (1 in 5 people). This seventh type is found in the same regions as the fifth type, i.e. the Iberian Peninsula, Northern Italy and the eastern Balkans.

As evidenced, the model of contrasting shores between north, south and east needs to be rethought. The Mediterranean is a highly heterogeneous area. While profiles 1, 2 and 3 are not present in the north, they are differentially distributed in the south and east and are clustered locally. Type 4 is thus present everywhere, although it is over-represented in the east. Types 5 and 7 correspond only to certain countries on the Northern Shore (Bulgaria, Greece, countries of the former Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain, Portugal) and therefore do not constitute a particular model. Moreover, type 4 regions are interspersed. Finally, type 6 is a reminder of France's demographic uniqueness, even if the country is not perfectly uniform.

## 3.5 Implications and Consequences of Age Structure Differences

This heterogeneity in age composition of Mediterranean populations is above all the consequence of demographic transitions whose pace and intensity have differed and still differ between countries (Chap. 4). What interests us here are the implications of these observed differences.

Throughout Mediterranean societies, the relationship between men and women will change. The situation remains difficult to summarise. On a global scale, the sex ratio is unlikely to changes between now (98.9 males per 100 females in 2020) and the next 30 to 50 years (99.5 males per 100 females in 2050 and 2070). However, this stability hides a strong convergence of sex ratios between countries. In fact, countries where women have been in the minority (general sex ratio of the population greater than 100) are trending towards a better balance between the sexes. In fact, while in
1950 there were only 6 countries with a sex ratio greater than 105, in 2020 there was only 3 and in 50 years-time there will likely only be 2. At the same time, countries where women were in the majority (overall sex ratio of the population below 100) are also trending have been towards 100. 11 countries had a sex ratio below 95 in 1950 and 6 countries in 2020. However, in 50 years, only France is predicted to have a sex ratio below this value. The French case is once again different from the Mediterranean model, as its sex ratio will be even lower than 90! With this exception, the projections show a strong convergence of sex ratios towards a better numerical gender balance in all societies.

The reduction in the labour force could also lead to a greater demand for female labour, which, together with better education, could lead women to renegotiate their place, even within societies that some believe are still stuck in fairly traditional patriarchal forms of organisation.

## References

Ambrosetti, E. (2020). Demographic challenges in the Mediterranean. *IEMed Mediterranean yearbook 2020*. European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed). https://www.iemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Demographic-Challenges-in-the-Mediterranean.pdf

Blöss, T., (ed.) (2018). *Ageing, lifestyles and economic crises: The new people of the Mediterranean*. Routledge Studies in the European Economy. Routledge, Taylor & Francis.

Buisson, I. (2016). *Déséquilibre de sexes et conflits: une étude du territoire yougoslave entre 1981 et 2011*. Master’s Thesis in Geography, Aix-en-Provence, Aix-Marseille University. https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/DEMOMED/dumas-01383003v1

Delbès, C., Gaymu, J., & Springer, S. (2006). Women grow old alone, but men grow old with a partner. A European Overview. *Population & Societies, 419*. https://doi.org/10.3917/popsoc.419.0001

Doignon, Y. (2020). Demographic ageing in the Mediterranean: The end of the spatial dichotomy between the shores? *Spatial Demography, 8*, 85–117. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40980-019-0005-2

Doignon, Y., & Oliveau, S. (2015). Territorial grids in the Mediterranean: Space versus population. *Bollettino dell'Associazione Italiana di Cartografia, 154*, 46–63. https://doi.org/10.13137/2282-472X/11827

Guilmoto, C. Z., & Duthé, G. (2013). Masculinization of births in Eastern Europe. *Population & Societies, 506*. https://doi.org/10.3917/popsoc.506.0001

Guilmoto, C. Z., & Oliveau, S. (2007). Sex ratio imbalances among children at micro-level: China and India compared. In *Population Association of America 2007*. http://paa2007.princeton.edu/papers/71096

Locoh, T., & Ouadah-Bedidi, Z. (2014). *Familles et rapports de genre au Maghreb, Evolutions ou révolutions*. Document de travail 213. Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques. https://www.ined.fr/fichier/s_rubrique/22779/document.travail.2014.213.magreb.genre.fr.pdf

Tabutin, D., & Schoumaker, B. (2005). The demography of the Arab world and the Middle East from the 1950s to the (2000s). *Population, 60*, 611–724. https://doi.org/10.3917/popu.505.0611

World Population Prospects. (2022). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://population.un.org/wpp/
**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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<figure><img src="image_20.png" /></figure>
## Chapter 4
# The Various of Demographic Transitions

<figure><img src="image_21.png" /></figure>

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updates

**Abstract** Since the eighteenth century, and at different periods, the world's populations have been undergoing, or have undergone, a process of demographic transition. The Mediterranean countries present a great diversity of demographic transitions in terms of timing, pace, intensity, etc. The aim of this chapter is to take stock of demographic transitions in the Mediterranean by identifying the different types of demographic transition that have occurred since 1950. This typology makes it possible to place the national demographic transitions within a general model, while also highlighting the contrasting situations that exist in the Mediterranean.

**Keywords** Demographic transition · Demographic counter-transitions · Birth rate · Mortality rate · Natural change of population · Convergence · Mediterranean

## 4.1 Introduction

Since the eighteenth century, and at different periods, the world's populations have been undergoing, or have undergone, a process of demographic transition.<fnref n="1" /> The Mediterranean countries present a great diversity of demographic transitions in terms of timing, pace, intensity, etc. (Doignon, 2020). The aim of this chapter is to take stock of demographic transitions in the Mediterranean by identifying the different types of demographic transition that have occurred since 1950. This typology makes it possible to place the national demographic transitions within a general model

<footnote n="1">¹ See Box 4.1 for an overview of the demographic transition.</footnote>
(Box 4.1), while also highlighting the contrasting situations that exist in the Mediterranean. Using data from the UN's *World Population Prospects*, 2022, we will construct a classification of demographic transitions according to four criteria:

* The status of the demographic transition in 1950, to indicate whether the transition has already begun, what step it is at, or whether it is already complete (pseudo-equilibrium<fnref n="2" /> of mortality and fertility) (Fig. 4.1).

* The status of the demographic transition in the most recent period (2015–2019³).

* The type of post-transitional regime reached at the end of the transition: a zero natural change, a positive natural change or a negative natural change.

* The levels of mortality, birth rate and natural change.

By combining these four criteria, we will obtain 10 types of demographic transition, which we will then group into 6 broad types: demographic transitions that conform to the theoretical model (types 1, 2 and 3), transitions leading to a post-transitional regime of decline (types 4 and 5), the specific transition of Israel whose post-transitional regime retains strong population growth (type 6), recent and rapid transitions (types 7 and 8), cases of a sustained rise in birth rate (type 9), and recent and slow transitions (type 10).

**Box 4.1: The demographic transition model**

Demographic transition is the passage between two different demographic regimes, called “pre-transitional regime” and “post-transitional regime”, corresponding to the demographic regimes in force before and after the transition respectively (Chesnais, 1992). This transition is usually formalised by a four-step process (Fig. 4.1).

<footnote n="2">² By pseudo-equilibrium we mean a situation where there are fluctuations in the mortality and birth rates, but where the overall trend is balanced.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ The graphs in this chapter will represent the period 1950–2022. However, the typology did not take into account the 2020–2022 period to avoid bias from cyclically differentiated effect of the Covid-19 pandemic.</footnote>
THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

<figure><img src="image_22.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.1** Descriptive model of demographic transition (Figure created by Doignon Y.)</figcaption></figure>

The first step is the pre-transitional regime, i.e. a demographic pseudo-
equilibrium over the long term, resulting from a high birth rate (measured by
the Crude Birth Rate⁴ (CBR)) and a high death rate (measured by the Crude
Death Rate⁵ (CDR)). The second step is a reduction in mortality. This phase is
initiated when a decline in mortality begins while the birth rate remains high.
During this step, the natural balance (measured by the Rate of Natural Change
(RNC⁶)) increases. The third step is a decline in the birth rate. It begins when the
birth rate starts to fall. The natural balance then also decreases. The second and
third steps constitute a period of strong demographic imbalance caused by the
difference in timing between the decrease in mortality and the decrease in birth
rate. The last step, the post-transitional demographic regime, is characterised
by a low birth rate, low mortality and consequently a low natural balance.

Through the specific characteristics of each transition, this descriptive model
makes it possible to identify different forms of demographic transitions. We
can observe variations in the duration of the transition as a function of the
time lag between the two declines and their pace, original phasing, such as a
birth rate that decreases before mortality, or different types of post-transitional
regime. In this respect, three types of post-transitional regimes can be distin-
guished according to the RNC: a surplus regime (regime a in Fig. 4.1), a deficit
regime (regime b) and a balanced regime (regime c). As this is a model, not
all populations have the same demographic transition, but they all experience
a convergence of their mortality and fertility towards lower levels than in the
pre-transitional regime.
We will now present the different types of the typology obtained, starting with the demographic transition “models”.

## 4.2 Demographic Transition “Models”

This group of demographic transitions is consistent with the theoretical model: the process results in a low pseudo-equilibrium of mortality and births, and a positive, but very low natural dynamic. The transitions corresponding to this case are already in the third step<fnref n="7" /> of the demographic transition in 1950, i.e. both the birth rate and the death rate are already falling. We distinguished three types of demographic transition according to the progress made in the second step in 1950, and the date at which pseudo-equilibrium is reached: an early transition with third step tending to end in 1950 and a pseudo-equilibrium reached from the 1970s onwards (Spain, France) (type 1); a transition in the middle of third step in 1950, and a pseudo-equilibrium reached in the 1990s (Cyprus, Montenegro, Malta) (type 2); and a rapid transition at the very beginning of third step in 1950, with a pseudo-equilibrium reached in the middle of the 2000s (Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo) (type 3).

### 4.2.1 Type 1: Ancient Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium in the 1970s (Spain, France)

This type is characterised by a demographic transition that is almost completed by 1950: mortality and birth rates are balanced, and the RNC is already around 10%. In 1950, the transition was clearly at the end of the third step of the process. A low pseudo-equilibrium has been observed since the mid-1970s for France and since the beginning of the 1990s for Spain (Fig. 4.2). The RNC tends to become very low. It has even become negative very recently in Spain. If the trend were to continue in the future, this country would have to be classified in another category of the typology, as the low pseudo-equilibrium would then be negative.

<footnote n="4">⁴ The Crude Birth Rate (CBR) is calculated by dividing the number of live births in a year by the average population in that year.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ The Crude Death Rate (CDR) is calculated by dividing the number of deaths in a year by the average population in that year.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ The Rate of Natural Change (RNC) is calculated by subtracting the CDR from the CBR. For ease of reading, we use the annotations “CBR”, “CDR” and “RNC” in this chapter instead of “Crude Birth Rate”, “Crude Death Rate” and “Rate of Natural Change” respectively.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ In this chapter, the word “step” refers to the different stages of the demographic transition outlined in Fig. 4.1.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_23.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.2** Demographic transition in Spain and France (1950–2022) (Source World Population Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year periods)</figcaption></figure>

### 4.2.2 Type 2: Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium in the Late 1990s (Cyprus, Montenegro, Malta)

In 1950, countries experiencing this type of transition were in the middle of the third step, with a relatively high CBR (≈ 30%) and a balanced mortality around 10% (Fig. 4.3). The RNC became quasi-stable and weak starting at the end of the 1990s: the process ends later than the previous type.

### 4.2.3 Type 3: Rapid Transition with Late Pseudo-Equilibrium from the 2000s Onwards (Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo)

In 1950, this type of transition occurred at the end of second step (Albania) or at the beginning of third step (Macedonia) (Fig. 4.4). This is a demographic transition that is in line with the theoretical model, one that is also occurring rapidly. The decline in mortality reached a pseudo-equilibrium in the late 1970s. The birth rate has been rapidly converging to very low rates (≈ 10% in 2015–2019). The pseudo-equilibrium of these countries has been achieved late, from the 2000s onwards, except for Kosovo where the CBR has continued to decrease since the 2010s.

Out of 26 countries, 8 have experienced a transition in line with theoretical model. The other 18 countries have thus shown different transitions. We will begin with those with a post-transitional decline regime.
<figure><img src="image_24.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.3** Demographic transition of Cyprus, Montenegro, Malta (1950–2022) (*Source* World Population Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. *Note* The time units used are five-year periods)</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_25.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.4** Demographic transition in Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo (1950–2022) (Source World Population Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year periods)</figcaption></figure>

## 4.3 Completed Demographic Transition with a Post-Transitional Decline Regime

This group of transitions is distinguished from the previous one by a post-transitional demographic regime of slight decline, i.e. one with a slightly negative natural balance (number of deaths exceeding the number of births). We differentiate two types of transition: those occurring early, at the end of third step in 1950 with a pseudo-equilibrium reached in the 1980s–1990s (Italy, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria) (**type 4**); and those occurring later, in the middle of third step in 1950 and reaching a pseudo-equilibrium only in the 2000s (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) (**type 5**).
### 4.3.1 Type 4: Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium in the 1980s–1990s (Italy, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria)

In 1950, demographic transitions of this type occurred at the end of third: mortality stabilised at 10% and fertility at around 20% (Fig. 4.5). Over the 1950–2019 period, the CBR gradually decreased to reach the CDR in the 1990s (1980s for Italy and Bulgaria), resulting in a near-zero RNC. Thereafter, the CDR exceeded the CBR, and the RNC became negative. In 2019, the demographic regime of these countries corresponds to Adolphe Landry’s “contemporary regime” (1934) or Frank Notestein’s “incipient decline” (1945), i.e. regimes characterised by a negative natural balance (regime b in Fig. 4.1).

### 4.3.2 Type 5: Transition with Pseudo-Equilibrium in the 2000s (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina)

Such demographic transitions were in the middle of third step in 1950, with a still relatively high CBR (28–38‰). The inversion of the CDR and CBR and their pseudo-equilibrium can be observed in the 2000s (Fig. 4.6). These transitions differ from those of the previous type in two respects: a post-transitional regime of decline reached somewhat later, and a generally lower RNC. The temporary increase in the CDR in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s was due to the war in Yugoslavia.

## 4.4 Completed Demographic Transition with a Post-Transitional Regime with Sustained Population Growth (Type 6: Israel)

Israel’s demographic transition is very specific. In 1950, the country was at the very end of third step, i.e. mortality was already low and the birth rate was about to stabilise (Fig. 4.7). The transition ended with an early pseudo-equilibrium in the early 1960s. However, the birth rate has been balanced at above 20% for 30 years now; mortality has also been stable at around 6% throughout this period. The post-transitional demographic regime is thus balanced, but with a high RNC (15–20%). This sustained birth rate is often explained by the implications of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the demographic patterns of these two territorial entities. Indeed, the preoccupation with being in the majority numerically has led to a “cradle war”<fnref n="8" /> between the two populations. Youssef Courbage (2008) describes the very high fertility (more than 7

<footnote n="8">⁸ This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: "guerre des berceaux".</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_26.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.5** Demographic transition in Italy, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia, Croatia and Bulgaria (1950–2022) (Source World Population Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year periods)</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_27.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.6** Demographic transition in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina (1950–2022) (*Source* World Population Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. *Note* The time units used are five-year periods)</figcaption></figure>

children per woman in the 2000s) of ultra-Orthodox Jews and religious nationalists as “combat fertility”.<fnref n="9" /> Palestinians also engaged in “militant natalism”<fnref n="10" /> (more than 8 children per woman in the mid-1980s), during which time Yasser Arafat is said to have advocated that each family should have 12 children, 2 for the couple and 10 for the cause (Courbage, 2006).

## 4.5 Recent and Rapid Demographic Transition, Now Being Finalised

This group brings together demographic transitions that have started late but have been occurring at a faster pace than the European transitions. They are also currently being finalised. However, their post-transitional demographic regime could be characterised by a more sustained natural dynamic (RNC above 10%) than that of the Northern shore countries, whose RNC is below 5%. Among this group, we distinguish transitions according to timeframe: transitional processes with declines in the CBR and CDR already underway in 1950 (Lebanon, Turkey) (**type 7**) and later transitions (Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) (**type 8**).

<footnote n="9">⁹ This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: "fécondité de combat".</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: "natalisme militant".</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_28.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.7** Demographic transition in Israel (1950–2022) (Source World Population Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year periods)</figcaption></figure>

**4.5.1 Type 7: Transition Already Underway in 1950**
**(Lebanon, Turkey)**

In 1950, the demographic transition of these countries was at the beginning of third step, i.e. both births and deaths had started to decline (Fig. 4.8).

<figure><img src="image_29.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.8** Demographic transition in Lebanon and Turkey (1950–2022) (Source World Population Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year periods)</figcaption></figure>
The CBR however still remains high. The CDR balances out at around 4–5% in the 1990s in Lebanon,<fnref n="11" /> and in the 2000s in Turkey. The rate of decline in the CBR has been slowing down since the 2000s, and seems to be levelling off in Lebanon, as in Turkey despite a downward trend. The demographic transition thus appears to be in the process of being finalised. On the other hand, the RNC is close to 10%, i.e. a higher level than in the Northern shore countries. The next 10–20 years will certainly reveal whether the post-transitional demographic regime of these countries will have almost no or low natural dynamics (like type 1 countries) or will be more sustained.

Note that the current level of mortality in these two countries (≈ 4–5%) is lower than that of the countries on the Northern shore, whose CDR is generally above 8%. This may seem counter-intuitive, but it is not. This difference should not be interpreted as better sanitary conditions in Lebanon and Turkey compared to the countries on the Northern shore. This is because the CDR (and CBR) do not take into account the age structure of the population. These two indicators reflect both the health conditions and fertility of the populations, but also the age structure of countries. Thus, under equal health conditions, fewer deaths will occur in a younger population than in an older population. The fact that the countries on the Southern and Eastern shores are on average younger than those on the Northern shore partly explains their lower CDR.

### 4.5.2 Type 8: More Recent Transition (Libya, Morocco, Tunisia)

These are demographic transitions that have occurred relatively late. In 1950, the process seems to be in the middle of second step, i.e. the decline in mortality has started, but not yet for the birth rate (Fig. 4.9).

Libya is unique in that it is the only Mediterranean country where virtually all the step of the demographic transition can be observed over the period 1950–2019. The decline in the birth rate began in the 1960s, thus later than in most Mediterranean countries. The decline in the CBR was very rapid, from almost 50% to 20% in about 30 years in Tunisia and Libya, and in 45 years in Morocco. In the 2000s, the birth rate stabilised at around 20%, a level higher than those of the Northern shore countries. A pseudo-equilibrium of mortality and birth rate seems to have been found, and one could conclude that the transition was over. However, the birth rate has resumed its decline since the 2010s for all three countries, and it is difficult to say what kind of post-transitional demographic regime these countries are heading towards.

<footnote n="11">¹¹ The increase in the CDR in Lebanon in the mid-1970s was due to the war (1975–1982).</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_30.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.9** Demographic transition in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia (1950–2022) (Source: World Population Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note: The time units used are five-year periods)</figcaption></figure>

Indeed, the RNC in the 2000s was quite high (between 10 and 20%), but it has been continuously decreasing to now around 10%.
## 4.6 Possible Demographic Counter-Transitions (Type 9: Egypt, Algeria)

This type of demographic transition is an exceptional case which, like the previous one, is found only in North Africa. Like the countries of type 8, the transition was late, since 1950 the transition was at the beginning of third step (Egypt) or in the middle of second step (Algeria) (Fig. 4.10). The demographic transition of Egypt and Algeria are singular, but currently share a sustained natural dynamic, as the RNC remains around 20%.

Egypt is considered a “demographic exception” (Ambrosetti, 2011). The process seems rather slow and hesitant in the sense that the decline in the birth rate has been disjointed. The demographic transition was interrupted between 1970 and 1985, during which time the CBR even increased, before picking up again in the late 1980s (Doignon et al., 2021). By the end of the 1990s, the CBR stabilised at a high rate (≈ 25‰) before increasing again from the late 2000s (Al Zalak & Goujon, 2017; Goujon & Al Zalak, 2018). During this period, the CDR remained at a low level. Between 1995 and 2010, a pseudo-equilibrium was reached for mortality and birth rates. This would seem to be a pause in the downward movement of the birth rate, and not a post-transitional equilibrium with a more sustained natural dynamic, since the birth rate had been falling again since the beginning of the 2010s.

Algeria shows a later, but less hesitant and more rapid decline in the birth rate. The CBR started to fall sharply in the 1970s. At present, there is no equilibrium in the birth rate, unlike for the death rate. The CBR reached the 20% threshold in 2000–2005, but then increases to 25% in 2010–2015, only to decrease again since the late 2010s.

<figure><img src="image_31.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.10** Demographic transition in Egypt and Algeria (1950–2022) (Source World Population Prospects [2022] Calculations made by the authors. Note The time units used are five-year periods)</figcaption></figure>
These particular trajectories, whether a hesitant decline or a significant increase in the birth rate,<fnref n="12" /> raise questions about the process of demographic transition. Are these erratic trends, i.e. a temporary rise before a future fall, as was the case for Egypt in the 1970s? Or is it rather a real increase, where the post-transitional birth rate is stabilising at a higher level than theoretically expected? As this rise in the birth rate calls into question the possible equilibrium of the CBR, it is difficult to make a statement on the status of the demographic transition in Algeria, for example.

Moreover, this increase in the birth rate is not only explained by a greater proportion of women of childbearing age (structural effect), but also by an increase in fertility (see Chap. 5). Youssef Courbage (2015a, 2015b) calls it a “counter-transition”.<fnref n="13" /> Many recent increases in fertility have been observed in some European countries where fertility levels have fallen very low, for example Sweden in the 2000s. Nevertheless, it is atypical that fertility above 2 children per woman would rise significantly. From this point of view, Algeria and Egypt are not global exceptions. Let us not forget the *baby boom* in Europe, for example. In France, the total fertility rate rose from 1.85 (1941) to 3.03 (1947), before falling back to 1.82 in 1976. However, at the time, the *baby boom* was not seen as a ‘counter-transition’ because it calmed fears about the population’s decline. For Egypt, it is difficult to conclude on the significance of the rise in birth rate, as it is very recent and only cover a relatively short period of time before falling again. In the case of Algeria, the trend has lasted longer. Is this increase in fertility comparable to the European *baby boom*, in a post- “Black Decade”<fnref n="14" /> context? Could this be a data-related effect? Did the latter underestimate fertility until the early 2000s due to poor recording quality? The current increase would then be a consequence of improved civil registration. Zahia Ouadah-Bedidi et al. (2012) believe that a decrease in the age at marriage is partly responsible for the rise in fertility (see Chap. 6), that also suggest that couples may be moving towards a three-child model rather than the two-child model of Morocco and Tunisia. One could also envisage that Algerian fertility reached a minimum in 2000–2005. The rise would then constitute an adjustment towards the post-transitional level, in the same way as in Eastern Europe where some countries are currently seeing a rise in fertility.

<footnote n="12">¹² Increases in fertility are also observed in other Mediterranean countries, such as Kosovo and Tunisia in the 2000s. However, the intensity of the increase and its duration are not of the same order of magnitude as in Algeria.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: “contre-transition”.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ The “Black Decade” is a term used to describe the Algerian civil war (1991–2002).</footnote>
## 4.7 Recent and Ongoing Transition, Slower Decline in Birth Rate (Type 10: Jordan, Palestine, Syria)

These demographic transitions have started late and have only occurred in the Near East (Fig. 4.11). In 1950, these transitions were at second step, i.e. falling mortality, but note for the birth rate. The latter was high (≈ 50%) and the decline was less rapid than the other late transitions (types 8 and 9). In fact, the CBR was still strong in 2015–2019 (≈ 20–30%), producing an even higher RNC (between 20 and 30%) as the CDR is very low (4–5%). Only mortality reached a balance in the 1990s. The demographic transition is therefore still underway, as the birth rate continues to fall. Palestine’s demographic transition has been disrupted by the political situation and continued to be characterised by a high birth rate (although it has been declining since the early 1990s), despite a significant level of female education. The birth rate in Syria had slowed in the 1990s and stabilised at around 30% in the 2000s. This development is similar to that of Egypt or Libya in the same period. However, given the political situation in Syria, UN data after 2010 should be interpreted with great caution. The decline in birth rate, for example, from 30‰ to 20‰ in less than 10 years, should be attributed more to the Syrian conflict than to any possible rapid progress in the demographic transition.

## 4.8 A Diversity of Demographic Transitions Despite a General Convergence

This typology of demographic transitions in the Mediterranean highlights two essential characteristics. The first is a general convergence of births and deaths towards low rates. All Mediterranean countries are engaged in this transitional process. However, and this is the second characteristic revealed by the typology, this generalised convergence of mortality/birth rates towards low rates masks great diversity. The process does not take place in the same way in all countries: there is no single model of demographic transition in the Mediterranean, but several models. Finally, few countries have a “model” transition with almost zero population growth. The diversity of transitions is striking, whether in their form, pace, timing or the nature of the post-transitional regime.

The transitions of the Northern shore countries are those that best fit the theoretical descriptive model. Indeed, these transitions are different in terms of timing and pace, but their mortality and birth rates all stabilise at levels that result in low natural dynamics, whether positive or negative.

Countries on the Southern and Eastern shores, on the other hand, tend to have a higher RNC, due to a higher birth rate and lower mortality. This can partly be attributed to a younger age structure. With the inevitable ageing of the population, mortality is likely to increase, and the birth rate and RNC to decrease structurally. It is also possible that the countries on the Southern and Eastern shores will achieve
<figure><img src="image_32.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4.11** Demographic transition in Jordan, Palestine and Syria (1950–2022) (Source: *World Population Prospects 2022*) Calculations made by the authors. Note: The time units used are five-year periods)</figcaption></figure>

different post-transitional demographic regimes from those on the Northern shores, with, in particular, higher natural growth and an increasing population (without taking into account migration). Some of these countries, such as Israel and Tunisia, have achieved (or have nearly achieved) a pseudo-equilibrium in mortality and birth rates, but at levels that generate rather sustained natural growth. On the other hand, most of the countries on the Southern and Eastern shores have not reached a pseudo-equilibrium at present, either because the transition is ending or because the transition is still ongoing. On the other hand, there have been some rather unexpected trends, such as in Egypt or Algeria, with a recent and sometimes prolonged increase in the birth rate. It is therefore difficult to determine the type of post-transitional regime for most of the countries on the Southern and Eastern shores, i.e. whether it is a
regime with weak but positive natural dynamics, or a regime characterised by more
sustained natural growth than the Northern shore countries, as has been the case in
Israel for more than 30 years.

Finally, it should be remembered that these broad trends observed at the country
level also conceal a variety of local dynamics. Transitions can vary regionally in
timing and intensity, and differences between urban and rural areas often exist
(Coale & Watkins, 1986).

References

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Ambrosetti, E. (2011). *Égypte, l'exception démographique*. Les cahiers de l'INED 166. Institut National d'Études Démographiques. https://books.openedition.org/ined/1778?lang=en

Chesnais, J. (1992). *The demographic transition: Stages, patterns, and economic implications*. Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press.

Coale, A. J., & Watkins, S. C. (1986). *The decline of fertility in Europe*. Princeton University Press.

Courbage, Y. (2006). Les enjeux démographiques en Palestine après le retrait de Gaza. *Critique Internationale*, 31, 23–38. https://doi.org/10.3917/criii.031.0023

Courbage, Y. (2008). La guerre des berceaux. *Les collections de l'Histoire*. https://www.lhistoire.fr/%C2%AB-la-guerre-des-berceaux-%C2%BB

Courbage, Y. (2015a). Tunisie: la contre-transition démographique. Interview by Khadija Mohsen-Finan. *Orient XXI*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBxRclm8wnA

Courbage, Y. (2015b). Egypte, une transition démographique en marche arrière. *Orient XXI*. http://orientxxi.info/magazine/egypte-une-transition-demographique-en-marche-arriere,0956

Doignon, Y. (2020). Les transitions démographiques des pays méditerranéens depuis 1950. *Géoconfluences*. http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/informations-scientifiques/dossiers-region aux/la-mediterranee-une-geographie-paradoxale/articles-scientifiques/transitions-demographiques

Doignon, Y., Ambrosetti, E., & Miccoli, S. (2021). The spatial diffusion of fertility decline in Egypt (1950–2006). *Genus*, 77, 23. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41118-021-00131-9

Goujon, A., & Zalak, Z. A. (2018). Why has fertility been increasing in Egypt? *Population & Societies*, 551. https://doi.org/10.3917/popsoc.551.0001

Landry, A. (1934). *La révolution démographique: études et essais sur les problèmes de la population*. Sirey.

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Ouadah-Bedidi, Z., Vallin, J., & Bouchoucha, I. (2012). Unexpected developments in Maghrebian fertility. *Population and Societies*, 486. https://doi.org/10.3917/popsoc.486.0001

World Population Prospects. (2022). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://population.un.org/wpp/
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<figure><img src="image_33.png" /></figure>
**Chapter 5**

# Fertility Intensity and Timing

<figure><img src="image_34.png" /></figure>

Check for
updates

**Abstract** This chapter looks at the comparative evolution of fertility since 1950 through several synthetic indicators of fertility intensity (average number of children per woman) and timing (age at childbearing, all birth ranks combined). The Mediterranean area is still a fairly contrasted area in terms of fertility levels, but the reduction in the gaps between countries has been clear and rapid since the 1970s. Fertility is still relatively high in some Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries and is decreasing noticeably, while very low levels can be observed on the Northern Shore (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, etc.). The chapter also presents the most probable fertility trends in this region of the world by returning to the underlying hypotheses. Is the hypothesis of a sustainable convergence of fertility at the level of the replacement fertility rate between the shores foreseeable and, if so, over what time horizon?

**Keywords** Total fertility rate · Fertility intensity · Age-specific fertility rate · Fertility timing · Mean age at childbearing · Mediterranean

**5.1 Introduction**

This chapter looks at the comparative evolution of fertility since 1950 through several synthetic indicators of fertility intensity (average number of children per woman) and timing (age at childbearing, all birth ranks combined). The Mediterranean area is still a fairly contrasted area in terms of fertility levels, but the reduction in the gaps between countries has been clear and rapid since the 1970s. Fertility is still relatively high in some Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries and is decreasing noticeably, while very low levels can be observed on the Northern Shore (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, etc.). The chapter also presents the most probable fertility trends in this region of the world by returning to the underlying hypotheses. Is the hypothesis of a sustainable convergence of fertility at the level of the replacement fertility rate between the shores foreseeable and, if so, over what time horizon?
## 5.2 A Global Fertility Convergence

Through the process of demographic transition (see Chap. 4), the Mediterranean countries have seen their fertility decline according to different timing, currently reaching levels lower than in the past (Fig. 5.1).

The fertility gap between the most and least fertile countries has thus fallen from 5.5 children per woman in 1950 to only 2.6 children in 2020. The highest fertility

<figure><img src="image_35.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5.1** Comparative fertility evolution in the Mediterranean (1950–2022) (Source World Population Prospects, 2022)</figcaption></figure>
rates in the 1950s were over 7 children per woman, while the lowest were around 2.4 children per woman, compared to 3.8 and 1.3 children per woman respectively today. In the 1950s, none of the 27 Mediterranean countries had a fertility rate below 2.1 children per woman, a symbolic figure known as the population replacement level, whereas today there are 17. While the countries on the Northern shore were already well advanced in their transition in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s (see Chap. 4), the countries on the Southern and Eastern shores did not experience a significant or very rapid decline in their fertility until the 1970s, with the exception of Cyprus and Israel, where the decline in fertility began before 1950.

This vast movement of convergence in the fertility between the countries of the Southern and Eastern shores and those of the Northern shore is, however, incomplete, and has occurred “albeit not always smoothly”<fnref n="1" /> (Courbage, 1999). Figure 5.1 shows not only the different periods of decline, but also the fact that the majority of countries are now below the replacement level, in contrast to countries that still have relatively high fertility. This fertility rate of between 3 and 4 children per woman can be seen in highly populated countries such as Egypt and Algeria, along with more intermediate-sized states such as Palestine, Jordan and Israel.

While this decline in fertility in the countries of the Southern and Eastern shores had been cautiously envisaged (Seklani, 1960) or more so automatically been announced on account of the “universal” theory of demographic transition (see Chap. 4), other authors<fnref n="2" /> did not think that it could be observed in the Arab-Muslim countries. However, with nuances depending on the region, the delay in the age of marriage<fnref n="3" /> coupled with the spread of contraception has finally led to a decline in fertility in these countries (Fargues, 1989). At the same time, it was not rejected that this region of the world, plagued by a number of other “misidentified factors”, could deviate from the expected course.<fnref n="4" /> Although greatly attenuated today, differences between the behaviour of the populations of the Northern Shore (low fertility) compared to those of the Southern and Eastern shores (on average more fertile) are still clearly visible (Fig. 5.1) and subject to discussion. It should be noted, however, that the fertility of several countries on the Southern and Eastern shores (Cyprus, Lebanon, Turkey, Tunisia, and to a lesser extent Morocco and Libya) has reached levels close to or below the replacement level.

Will the higher fertility rates of Egypt, Morocco, Libya and Israel, which seem to have reached a pseudo-equilibrium, stabilise at a level above 2.1 children per

<footnote n="1">¹ This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: "non sans à-coups".</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² "Dudley Kirk (1966) was one of the earliest demographers to note that Muslim populations tended to have high fertility, that there was no evidence of decline, and that in a given country, Muslims tended to have higher fertility than adherents of other religions" (Jones, 2006, 250).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ See Chap. 6 for an analysis of nuptiality rates and age at marriage.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ "The demography of this region escapes, in more than one case, the paradigm of transition which has been imposed as a scheme for explaining demographic change" (Courbage, 1999, 1).</footnote>

<footnote>This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: "La démographie de cette région échappe, dans plus d'un cas, au paradigme de la transition qui s'est imposé comme schéma d'explication des évolutions démographiques".</footnote>
woman? Will fertility rates in the Palestinian Territories, Jordan and Syria fall signif-
icantly further? If so, to what level? Or will they remain above 2.1 children per
woman? Are trend reversals or sustainable recoveries to be expected, as suggested
by recent fertility trends in some countries (e.g. Egypt, Algeria) (Ouadah-Bedidi
et al., 2012)? Is it possible to observe a homogenisation of fertility behaviour of
all Mediterranean women, regardless of their nationality? Is a fertility rate of 1 or
2 children per woman a sustainable objective throughout the Mediterranean? The
Euro-Mediterranean geopolitics (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Syrian, Turkish
and Greek situation, and the Balkans, etc.), and the different traditional and/or reli-
gious models of union formation (see Chap. 6) and of attachment to the family and to
children in Mediterranean societies, lead us to reflect on these past evolutions and to
formulate hypotheses on the future evolution of fertility in a singular Mediterranean
context.

In an attempt to clarify this, an in-depth comparative analysis of indicators of
fertility timing (the age at which women have children) and fertility intensity at
different ages is carried out successively. It provides a clearer picture of the expected
trends in women's fertility in this region of the world by pinpointing the common
patterns and highlighting the exceptions.

**5.3 The Intersection of Birth Timing and Fertility Intensity**

**5.3.1 Mean Age at Childbearing**

For a given period, the mean childbearing age is an indicator of when a woman
gives birth, through it mixes the behaviour of several different generations. Like
any average, it needs to be interpreted carefully and be reconciled with fertility
levels. If, however, we describe the evolution of the mean age at childbearing in the
Mediterranean since 1950, we will be surprised to see that its value has changed
only slightly, from 29.5 years on average in the region to 30 years at present. This
overall situation can then be separated in several groups of countries (Fig. 5.2). While
some countries show a virtually stable indicator throughout the period, others have
experienced a V-shaped (sharp) or U-shaped (gentler) evolution: respectively, a rapid
decline in the mean age at childbearing until the mid-1980s, followed by a rapid rise;
or a slower decline until the 1990s, followed by a steady rise until the present.

The first group covers 7 countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria), where the mean age at childbearing has never fallen significantly over the past 70 years. Two other countries can also be added to this group (Libya, Israel). The mean age in Libya has risen steadily from 30.8 years to 31.9 years today. Stable until the mid-1970s, the increase in age accelerated and stabilised at almost 33 years between 1995 and 2005, before decreasing to what it is now. The mean age in Israel has hardly ever fallen in the last 70 years, but has increased from 27.6 years in the 1950s-1970s to 30.6 years today. The mean childbearing age for this group of
<figure><img src="image_36.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5.2** Mean age at childbearing in the Mediterranean (1950–2019) (Source: *World Population Prospects, 2022*)</figcaption></figure>

countries has remained high (between 28 and 33 years) and fairly constant since 1950 (29.6 years in 1950, 30.3 years in the 1980s, 30.4 years today). They are all located in North Africa and the Near East. In these countries, the contraceptive discontinuation has not led to a reduction in the mean childbearing age, as it has been compensated for by the concomitant postponement of the age at marriage (see Chap. 6). This could mean that contraception is mainly used in these countries once the desired number of children has been reached, as already noted by Fargues (1989). Some of
the countries in this group reach some of the highest levels in the Mediterranean, such as Algeria and Libya, where the mean age at childbearing is currently 31.5 and 31.9 years respectively. However, there is no convergence for these countries towards a single mean age. There is a clear dispersion of the childbearing ages.

The 9 other countries (Greece, France, Spain, Portugal, Slovenia, Montenegro, Italy, Cyprus, Malta) that make up the second group, shows a much earlier and more marked change in the average fertility age (V-shaped curve<fnref n="5" />). These countries are those in which contraceptive discontinuation has led to a reduction in the mean age at childbearing, as fewer unplanned births have been occurring at earlier ages. In a second phase, women in these countries have been postponing and spacing out the birth of their first (rank 1) and second (rank 2) child at increasingly advanced ages, leading to a rise in the mean age of mothers. Following this mechanism, there was a sharp fall in the mean age between the 1950s and 1980s, followed by a spectacular rise to very high levels in 2015–2019: 32 years for Spain and Italy, 31.4 years for Greece and 30.6 for France. These countries, unlike the previous ones, seem to be converging towards a similar mean childbearing age. What these countries have in common is that they have low fertility rates.

The third group consists of Bulgaria, closely followed by Croatia and Serbia. These countries had the lowest mean age at childbearing over most of the study period, never exceeding 28 years until recently. Since the early 1990s, however, the birth timing in these countries has been on the rise, reaching 28–29 years in 2020. They seem to be following suit of the previous group. Turkey can also be included in this group, as the age at childbearing has always been low, through notwithstanding its higher fertility relative to other countries in this group. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, which started out with a childbearing age two years older than their Serbian and Croatian neighbours in the 1950s, now have the same U-shaped profile and have thus caught up to them. A convergence towards higher mean ages at childbearing in this group is underway.

We conclude this section with the three countries with atypical developments: Egypt, Kosovo and Albania. In the latter, the decline in the childbearing age has been almost continuous since 1950, from 31 to 27.5 years. It has hovered around this value since the mid-1990s, but appears to be rising again in 2015–2019. Kosovo follows a similar trajectory, but its age at childbearing stagnated at a higher level (29 years) between the 1980s and the late 2000s. As for Egypt, whose demography has been defined by Ambrosetti (2011) as exceptional, it has a rather stable age which mothers give birth, with a recent slightly downward trend (28.5 in 1950, 27.7 years 2020). Unlike the other Mediterranean countries, the mean age at childbearing is not increasing, but has been decreasing since the end of the 1980s, a sign of a specific fertility regime.

These mean ages at childbearing summarise a variable fertility according to women's age group. We will therefore analyse age-specific fertility rates in order to identify different age-specific fertility profiles, which will help highlight the different

<footnote n="5">⁵ With the exception of Malta, which has a more U-shaped curve.</footnote>
ways in which age groups contribute to fertility intensity and timing in different countries.

### 5.3.2 Fertility by Age Group

A typology of fertility rates by age group for the 27 countries in 2015–2019 shows more precise age-specific fertility profiles (Fig. 5.3). The higher the curves, the higher the fertility intensity, i.e. the higher the number of children per woman. The more they are shifted to the right, the higher the mean age at childbearing.

Two countries, Egypt and Palestine, have more or less the same profile with high fertility in the younger age groups. This distinguishes them from Israel, Jordan and Syria, who have a later fertility. At the other end of the spectrum, it is striking that about one in two Mediterranean countries now belongs to the category of countries with very low fertility. So far, this very low fertility is only found on the Northern Shore (Southern Europe and the Balkans). These very low fertility Mediterranean countries have an average fertility of 1.4 children per woman in 2015–2019. These are Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Malta, Montenegro, Macedonia, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia and Spain. A third group, Bulgaria and Albania, has very low fertility like the countries in the previous group, but high fertility among young women, bringing their age-group fertility profile closer to that of Egypt and Palestine.

<figure><img src="image_37.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5.3** Typology of fertility rates in the Mediterranean (2015–2019) (Source World Population Prospects, 2022)</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_38.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5.4** Evolution of mean age at childbearing and fertility rates in Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain (1950–2019) (Source: World Population Prospects, 2022)</figcaption></figure>

Among these countries that are below the replacement level fertility, four are emblematic of a very low fertility rate that has been in place for several decades. These are Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain (Fig. 5.4).

These countries have low fertility at all ages (less than 100 births per 1000 women), as well as a mean age at childbearing of around 32 years (which is the same as the age at birth of the only child) which will continue to increase.<fnref n="6" /> These ageing countries have been affected by various economic crises and have been slow to introduce genuine birth policies. This prolonged low fertility explains the negative natural balances of these countries (Chap. 4). It also creates a depopulation mechanism, which at the sub-national level can be accentuated by internal migration and an increasing number of elderly people (Doignon et al., 2016).

<footnote n="6">⁶ It is possible to calculate for each age group how many women have already given birth to a child and to assess the evolution of this age-specific fertility from one period to the next. When the curves fall from one period to the next, it means that the number of children born to women of a given age group has decreased over time: girls have fewer children than their sisters, let alone their mothers at the same age. The fertility timeline reflects the mean age at which women have children. A postponement of the age at which women have their children is observed concomitantly with a decrease in fertility intensity (and vice versa). When the curves shift to the right, it means that births are occurring later on average. This decline in the age at which children are borne is a sign that the population has mastered modern contraception. This has spread throughout the population and is a sign of a transformation in the value and place of women in society. In order to analyse this evolution of the fertility timeline, in relation to intensity, it is useful to observe them simultaneously.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_39.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5.5** Evolution of mean age at childbearing and fertility rates in France, Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon (1950–2019) (Source World Population Prospects, 2022)</figcaption></figure>

Other populated Mediterranean countries (France, Turkey, Tunisia, Lebanon) are also in a situation of low fertility, but whose level makes it possible to maintain a positive natural balance. These countries, unlike the previous ones, belong to different Mediterranean shores. They have a fertility rate around the replacement level, thus well above the previous group. These countries are experiencing a postponement of the age at which women have children, but with a more sustained intensity, especially over the age of 30 (Fig. 5.5).

France, Lebanon and Tunisia now have relatively similar characteristics: fertility around the replacement level and shifting towards older ages, although the history of fertility decline in Tunisia is much more recent<fnref n="7" /> and rapid than in France. Turkey is included in this group because its fertility is at the replacement level. However, it differs in that its fertility intensity among 20–24 year-olds is much higher (almost double that of France and Tunisia). Turkey could have been in the Algeria/Morocco group, but was distinguished from these countries because of its long-standing lower fertility and its much lower fertility intensity at older ages.

<footnote n="7">⁷ The history of fertility decline in the Maghreb and Tunisia in particular, is well documented (Fargues, 1989; Gastineau, 2012). As soon as they became independent (1956 for Morocco and Tunisia, 1962 for Algeria), these countries adopted very different population policies. Tunisia resorted to a very firm policy of limiting births since the 1960s (Lévêque, 2017; Ouadah-Bedidi et al., 2012). As a result, it had the earliest and most pronounced fertility transition, which many explain by a change in the family code that recognises equal rights between men and women (Fargues, 1989).</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_40.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5.6** Evolution of mean age at childbearing and fertility rates Algeria, Morocco (1950–2019)
*(Source World Population Prospects, 2022)*</figcaption></figure>

The other three groups identified in Fig. 5.3 cover intermediate to relatively high fertility situations.<fnref n="8" /> The fertility profiles of Algeria and Morocco (Fig. 5.6), for example, differ from the previous group (Tunisia, France, Turkey, Lebanon) in that their fertility is more sustained after the age of 30. Births of rank 3 or 4 children are still very present in these societies, helping to boost fertility. Together with Libya, they are the only two countries<fnref n="9" /> with such high mean ages, above 31 years, a characteristic more commonly found in the countries of the Northern shore.

## 5.4 Specific Contributions of Age Groups

By analysing the quantiles of fertility rate distributions by age group, we are able to distinguish two large groups: one made up of 13 countries, the other of 14 (Fig. 5.7).

The first group's fertility is marked by a fairly early mean age at childbearing (below 30 years), whereas the second group's age is much older (above 30 years). Bulgaria, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Jordan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, Montenegro and Kosovo are countries where births take place earlier on average (irrespective of their fertility levels, which may be very

<footnote n="8">⁸ The difference in fertility behaviour between the Maghreb and the Near East can be explained in part by the colonial heritage and the strong influence of the diaspora, which is rather oriented towards Europe in the case of the Maghreb, and towards the Gulf countries in the case of the Near East (see Chap. 8). In the Maghreb, these factors constitute “the main and direct agent of European cultural influence” (This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: “l’agent principal et direct de l’influence culturelle européenne”) (Courbage & Todd, 2014). Libya’s behaviour is close to the Maghreb, as is Egypt’s with Near Eastern countries (Lévêque, 2017).</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Unlike Tunisia, Algeria did not have the necessary means to control its population's fertility after independence. Nevertheless, fertility fell rapidly, particularly as a result of the lowering age of marriage, before the first birth control programme in 1983 was introduced and subsequently accelerating the phenomenon among all age groups (Ouadah-Bedidi et al., 2012).</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_41.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5.7** Contribution of each age group to total fertility in % (2015–2019) (Source World Population Prospects, 2022. Calculations made by the authors)</figcaption></figure>

different<fnref n="10" />). In contrast, births are more likely on average to be due to older women in the following countries: Malta, Portugal, Croatia, Spain, Greece, Italy, Tunisia, Algeria, Israel, Libya, France, Slovenia, Morocco and Cyprus.

In the first group with early fertility, 30% of total fertility is already reached at 25 years of age on average, and about 60% at 30 years. In the second group where births are occurring later in a woman's life, only 16% of total fertility is reached at age 25 on average and 43% at age 30.<fnref n="11" /> In other words, 4 out of 10 births are to women over 30 in the first group compared to 6 out of 10 in the second.

Using this method, it is possible to identify a potential explanation for the decline in fertility in the first group with early fertility: it is due to the fertility behaviour of the youngest women. Will women aged 15–19, and especially aged 20–30, postpone the arrival of their first child and any subsequent children until later in life? Or will they continue to start their fertile life well before the age of 30? Increasing access to school and higher education, rising living standards, urbanisation and changing

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ The higher fertility level of young women can therefore be found in countries where fertility is still high (Egypt, Morocco, Palestine, Turkey, Syria, Jordan), but also, though less intuitively, in countries on the northern shores (Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia, Albania), where the low total fertility level is largely due to the fertility of young women. For example, almost 12% of Bulgaria's total fertility is accounted for by 15–19 year olds, whereas in other countries with very low fertility (Italy, Portugal, Greece, Spain, etc.) this group contributes only 2 to 3%.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ From this point of view, Morocco is an exception, because despite an age at childbearing of over 30 years, the fertility level of young women (15–24 years) remains higher than that of the other countries in this group. Similarly, the fertility of women aged 30–39 is lower.</footnote>
gender relations promote greater equality are likely to be determinants for postponing to have children plans. Several studies highlight the different places countries are in vis-à-vis school transition (Lévêque, 2017; Lévêque & Oliveau, 2019). The close correlation between urbanisation and schooling is thus highlighted after analysing fertility according to women's qualifications in the Mediterranean. This shows that the urbanisation of countries is a fundamental factor in the variations observed, since it leads to an increased spread of education accompanied by a decline in fertility. However, other "political, ideological and economic system factors, such as free-trade liberalism or dirigisme (...) can also influence the course of fertility"<fnref n="12" /> (Courbage, 1999).

In contrast, in countries with later fertility, half of total fertility on average is accounted for by women aged 30–40. Fertility in the countries of Southern Europe and the Balkans (with a few exceptions already mentioned), but also in some Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Algeria, Libya) is dominated by the contribution of 30–34 year olds. In these countries, more than one third of total fertility is accounted for by women aged 30–34 alone. The fertility of these intermediate age groups in low total intensity countries is a sign of women’s willingness to carry a pregnancy to term once a certain number of conditions are met (housing, professional situation, marital stability, etc.).

In a large number of Balkan countries (Bosnia, Albania, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia), a notable contribution to fertility is made by 25–29 year olds. This contribution of the youngest is rather singular in that it only concerns countries with very low fertility. Thus, even among low fertility countries, it is still possible to introduce distinctions. The low fertility of the Balkans is still due to young or even very young women, while the low fertility of the largest countries in Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal) and Greece is due more to older women.

Fertility in the Maghreb countries remains marked. In addition to the contribution made by younger women who nevertheless postpone their first childbirth, a significant contribution is made by the older age groups, those aged 35–39 and 40–44. Spain, Italy, Portugal and even France, which have much lower fertility, also have fertility that has been driven by women over 35, but it does not resonate in the same way. In the Maghreb, it still represents a progression margin which may make it possible to imagine a drop in total fertility once these generations have disappeared.

The fertility of women over 45 contributes little to fertility (between 0.1 and 1.8% of the total). A hierarchy of countries according to their regional affiliation is however noted. More than 1.5% of total fertility in Morocco and Libya is still accounted for by women aged 45 or over. This was followed by Algeria (1.3%), Syria (1%), Lebanon (0.9%), Greece (0.6%), Egypt and Israel (0.5%). Despite this small contribution, the late fertility in North African or Near Eastern countries is a sign that stopping fertility may not be established in all strata of society and reveals

<footnote n="12">¹² This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: "facteurs politiques, idéologiques et sur les systèmes économiques: libéralisme libre-échangiste ou dirigisme, (...) peuvent également infléchir le cours de la fécondité".</footnote>
potential differences between urban and rural areas. Higher order fertility (3 or more) has not completely disappeared and is probably due to older women.

The geographical distribution of these two groups is interesting. Indeed, it seems to extend the Hajnal line (Hajnal, 1965) into the Mediterranean. The latter divides the European continent along a north-east/south-west axis, from St Petersburg to Triest. It distinguishes two historically persistent European family patterns, with earlier fertility to the east of this demarcation than to the west. Thus, the countries in the first group are mainly found in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin, i.e. from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Egypt. In contrast, the countries in the second group are located in the western basin. This geographical demarcation also holds true for age at marriage and permanent celibacy (see Chap. 6).

In addition to the fact that these analyses make it possible to examine jointly the situation of all the Mediterranean countries with regard to the fertility timeline in 2015–2019, they make it possible to identify the age groups likely to modify their fertility behaviour from one generation to the next. By identifying the most fertile ages when it comes to fertility, it is possible to go beyond the United Nations projections and propose individualised scenarios on fertility changes.

## 5.5 (Un)certainties for the Future of Mediterranean Fertility

According to the median scenario of the *World Population Prospects* (2022), the fertility gap between the most and least fertile Mediterranean countries by 2060 will be less than 1 child per woman (0.8 children to be precise), whereas it is currently 2.5. This scenario highlights a significant reduction in fertility disparities in the Mediterranean (Fig. 5.8).

The estimated average fertility in the Mediterranean will fall from the current 2 children to 1.7 children per woman. This situation is unprecedented since this threshold, which does not allow for the level replacement of generations (one couple is replaced by less than one couple in adulthood), is foreseen in the median scenario. Figure 5.8 shows that in this median scenario,<fnref n="13" /> only 3 countries remain above 2.1 children per woman (Israel, Palestine, Egypt) to which can be added Jordan,

<footnote n="13">¹³ “Probabilistic projections are based on statistical models, mostly parametric. Uncertainty about certain components of the population can be captured by error terms, as in the case of time series, but it can also come from Bayesian inference of the model parameters. The whole point is to quantify the uncertainty about the future population. This can be done using the stochastic approach, the Bayesian approach, or even a combination of both” (Costemalle, 2021, 32).</footnote>

<footnote>This text has been translated into English by the authors. The original text in French is as follows: “Les projections probabilistes reposent sur des modèles statistiques, la plupart du temps paramétriques. L’incertitude sur certaines composantes de la population peut être captée par des termes d’erreurs, comme dans le cas des séries temporelles, mais elle peut aussi provenir d’une inférence bayésienne des paramètres du modèle. Tout l’objectif est de quantifier l’incertitude sur la population future. Pour cela, on peut utiliser l’approche stochastique, l’approche bayésienne, ou même une combinaison des deux”.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_42.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5.8** Comparative fertility perspective for the Mediterranean, by country (2015–2055, median variant) (Source World Population Prospects, 2022)</figcaption></figure>

Syria and Algeria (slightly below 2 children per woman). Of course, the fertility situation in the Mediterranean in 2060 varies according to the projection scenarios, and the confidence intervals considered for the probabilistic scenarios. For example, if we consider the upper bound of the 80% confidence interval (CI) of the median scenario, this would mean 10 countries would have a fertility rate above 2.1 children per woman instead of just 3 countries. Conversely, all countries would be below this threshold with the lower bound of the same CI. However, in all three cases,
the projections demonstrate an overall fertility convergence in the Mediterranean (Fig. 5.8): convergence towards an average fertility rate of 1.35, 1.7 or 2.1 children for the lower limit of the 80% CI, the median scenario and the upper limit of the 80% CI respectively.

In view of the findings articulated in this chapter and based on the same observation made by other demographers specialising in the Mediterranean,<fnref n="14" /> we wish to carry out a more individualised prospective reflection for the Mediterranean as a whole. Instead of a generalised convergence of the Mediterranean countries towards a single fertility level, it seems possible to envisage in the future a convergence by groups of countries (Doignon, 2020). The challenge would therefore be to take into account socio-political situations and territories on the basis of both their demographic history and recent developments so as to be able to anticipate reversals in the situation.

To contribute to this prospective exercise, we propose first of all to closely monitor the evolution of timing and fertility intensity in countries with very low fertility, in particular the countries of Southern Europe, the Balkan countries (Bosnia and Herzegovia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Albania), but also Cyprus. These countries are at the top of the list of countries with the lowest fertility in the world (along with Taiwan, Macao, Hong Kong, Singapore and Moldova), and ahead of or not far behind Japan, Germany and Italy. This very low fertility rate has been established over time and it is easy to imagine that it will remain stable or even continue to fall to historically low levels. This hypothesis is corroborated by the cumulative results of several surveys which show, despite the persistence of the two-child model, the rise in preferences for the one-child family model as well as for childless families (Sobotka & Beaujouan, 2014). In this way, the Balkans, Cyprus and Portugal could form a group in which a pattern of very low fertility (1.3–1.5 children per woman) would continue.

In Bulgaria and Albania too, surprises are to be expected from the younger generation. If the latter end up delaying their timing of fertility, the decline in fertility at younger ages will have a significant impact on overall fertility, allowing these countries to move into the group of countries with low fertility and late timing.

Israel's fertility is rather atypical in the sense that its fertility has been more or less stable since the mid-1980s at around 3 children per woman. This trend does not argue for a convergence to low levels within a 35-year time horizon. It is therefore likely that Israel's fertility will remain around 3 children per woman. It is more difficult to say for Palestine, as its fertility is still declining at present and the level at which it will stabilise is still uncertain.

Jordan and Syria are notable for the regularity and rapidity of their fertility decline, like Palestine. The latter, however, still has a fertility rate that is almost 1 child on average above Jordan and Syria. The future development of Jordan is still uncertain, as it is still decreasing at the moment, after a stagnation in the 2000s. For Syria, despite a pro-natalist policy, the political and economic crisis that affected the country from the 1980s onwards had a lasting effect on the population and led to a considerable

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ We thus support the observation of the demographer Youssef Courbage, who already in 1999 insisted on the need to supplement these indispensable United Nations projections with methods that take into account specific situations.</footnote>
drop in fertility (Lévêque, 2017), which is still ongoing. Fertility has certainly been affected by the conflict since 2011, although it is difficult to quantify this impact. When the conflict ends, fertility can follow several possible developments. Will there be catch-up fertility (and thus an increase in fertility) or will fertility rates during the Syrian conflict be maintained? There is therefore uncertainty about the future of Syrian fertility and the level at which it will stabilise.

Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Egypt are also countries whose fertility trends are uncertain given the situation observed in recent years. Their respective situations deserve to be studied separately. The Moroccan fertility rate is a source of concern since, after a sharp decline until the early 2000s, there have been periods of plateau and recovery (Ouadah-Bedidi et al., 2012). In Morocco, one interpretation given to the emergence of this resistance is the slowing down of the rate of progress of education as well as the geographical isolation of the country described as quite remote from the rest of the Arab world by Courbage and Todd (2014). Despite a very recent decline in fertility, one could imagine Morocco's fertility converging around 2.5 children. This is also true for Algeria and Egypt, which are showing signs of resistance to rejoining replacement level fertility due to early births, but which still extend into old age. It might be more likely that the threshold of 2.5 or even 3 children is a convergence threshold for the latter two countries. Turkish fertility, like Lebanese fertility, is likely to decline if younger women delay having children more. Otherwise, it could remain stable at around 2 children per woman.

The aspirations of a growing proportion of women of the new generations (see Chap. 6), which are very different from those of their sisters and mothers, will undoubtedly be factors that will weigh and argue in favour of lower fertility scenarios throughout the Mediterranean. However, different cultural models, changing gender relations and the geopolitics at work in this complex geographical area all work together to slow down these declines and reach thresholds. In the next few years, we could expect to see a decrease in the differences between countries where the fertility level amongst the most educated is already low. In countries where the fertility level of the most educated is still high, the trends will depend in part on the openness of local communities to globalisation and the openness of attitudes, as Fargues argues (2000).

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