IULIA-MARIA BÂRZĂ<fnref n="1" />
VERONICA CÂMPIAN<fnref n="2" />

ECHOES OF NATIONALISM:
THE PARTY FOR THE ALLIANCE OF ROMANIA
(AUR) POLITICAL NARRATIVE ON ROMANIA'S
SCHENGEN INTEGRATION

**Abstract.** By using the public's general dissatisfaction and negative feelings regarding the political class, far-right parties have succeeded in gaining the favour of the people all over Europe. They have reached success by criticising the status quo and by often promoting nationalist and Eurosceptic ideologies. The Party for the Alliance of Romania (AUR), founded in 2019, also followed this trend, shaping itself around ultra-nationalist and anti-establishment rhetoric and a strong social media presence. This paper looks into how AUR weaponised the potential Schengen ascension to further their Eurosceptic discourse and to fabricate a depiction of 'the people' pitted against 'the corrupt political elite'. A qualitative content analysis was conducted on Facebook posts from key AUR members and official party statements over a six-month period, respectively, three months before and after the Schengen decision. The paper looks into the narrative techniques by which the AUR party paints Romania as a victim of both external and internal forces. Results show that AUR intentionally frames the Schengen rejection to mobilise its supporters. It does so by targeting other EU states and depicting them as national enemies, and by criticising

<footnote n="1">¹ https://orcid.org/0009-0007-0224-7591, Babeş-Bolyai University, Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, iulia.barza@stud.ubbcluj.ro</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1647-9250, Babeş-Bolyai University, Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, veronica.campian@fspac.ro</footnote>
the Romanian government. With this framing, the party can position itself as the sole defender of national interests. This paper highlights how AUR uses the Schengen issue to deepen societal divisions and promote Euroscepticism, contributing to the broader understanding of political discourse and far-right dynamics in Romania.

**Keywords:** far right party, populism, euroscepticism, content analysis

# 1. Introduction

The growing prominence of radical right-wing movements and parties has caused significant concern in liberal democracies. Once dismissed as a temporary phenomenon, the radical right has risen to become a formidable force in the Western world (Betz & Johnson, 2004). As Golder (2016) asserts, a significant number of far-right parties are distinguished by a common ideological framework that integrates elements of nationalism, radicalism, and populism.

A defining feature of populist discourse is the appeal to resentment – an emotion tied to power, injustice, and blame – that projects an outward sense of outrage (Salomon, 1994). Populism's emphasis on inequality and injustice makes it an effective strategy for challenging the status quo. Modern radical right-wing populism, according to Betz & Johnson (2004), appeals to mobilisers by addressing both grievances and solutions.

Griffin (2000) argues that the modern radical right, unlike its predecessors, embraces democracy while holding dissenting views and different moral standards (Griffin, 1999). Thus, strategies like exclusion and marginalisation have proven ineffective. As Betz and Johnson (2004) argue, extreme right-wing parties now position themselves as guardians of the public interests of ordinary people and champions of democracy.

Given the radical right's adaptability, a deeper understanding of this phenomenon is necessary to mitigate its anti-democratic impact. This paper analyses the discourse of the far-right party, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), through content analysis to explore how nationalism and populism underpin its communication strategies.

The focus is on the AUR party's nationalist and populist discourse in response to Romania's potential Schengen accession in December 2022. Both official party statements and Facebook posts from members
will be analysed to address two research questions: (1) Does AUR exploit this event to propagate Euroscepticism and mistrust of the EU? (2) Does AUR frame the issue as a divergence between a 'morally flawless people' and a 'corrupt political elite'?

The findings aim to identify trends in far-right politics at both European and national levels. The analysis of AUR's discourse provides insights into the party's rhetoric and goals, which, in turn, can help reduce its influence and promote democratic values to combat it. This research contributes to the political literature about Romania's EU integration. It also contributes to the understanding of the European far-right.

The chosen method for the analysis of AUR's discourse is the content analysis. Both official statements and unofficial materials (social media posts) were analysed. The interdisciplinary perspective on political communication and far-right parties of this paper is given by a blend of political science, communication, and sociology.

Its originality lies in the diverse materials used in the analysis, which provide a comprehensive understanding of AUR's public discourse and its stance on Schengen ascension.

The rise of the AUR party is a well-documented phenomenon in the literature on nationalist parties, but there is a research gap regarding the party's response and communication following Romania's Schengen rejection in 2022. This event represents a pivotal moment for the party, because it allowed them to gain visibility and support by criticising other European countries and the Romanian leadership. This type of situation is particularly significant in Eastern Europe, where the rise of the far right remains a recurring phenomenon. AUR's rise in Romania is relevant in the view of Stoica (2021), who argues that populism thrives in crisis situations and that Eastern Europe provides the perfect environment for the growth of this ideology. The analysis of Romania's accession attempt is of great significance, particularly given the attention it received in the media and public eye three years ago. AUR employs various strategies to popularise its discourse and uses the Schengen discourse to gain popularity. This approach positioned AUR as anti-system; a position the party also adopted regarding the Covid-19 pandemic. (Doiciara & Crețana, 2021; Radoiu, 2024).

The decision regarding Romania's possible Schengen accession presents an opportunity to analyse AUR's formal and informal discourse and to
examine its communicative and narrative strategies. The Schengen issue had been deeply polarizing within the Romanian civil society and held considerable relevance for citizens (Mişcoiu, 2023), highlighting its societal and political implications. The discourse surrounding Romania's possible Schengen accession offers evidence of how AUR constructs its political agenda by shaping its rhetoric and articulating its broader vision through this event, just as the party has done with the discourse surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic (Doiciara & Crețana, 2021).

This analysis contributes to the understanding of the party's communication strategies and provides valuable insights into its role in shaping contemporary political and social debates in Romania.

## 2. Literature review

Economic instability, marked by high job losses, declining labor force participation, and reduced per capita income, has fueled widespread public discontent, leading to diminished trust in mainstream politics and growing skepticism toward the political elite (Ferrante & Pontarollo, 2019). This climate of dissatisfaction has created fertile ground for populist movements, which, as Mudde (2004) explains, thrive on anti-elite rhetoric. Populist parties strategically employ anti-elite and anti-European narratives to present themselves as defenders of the 'common people' against a 'corrupt ruling class', according to Acemoğlu et al. (2013).

Radical right-wing populist parties further reinforce this dynamic by blending authoritarianism, populism, and nationalism (Mudde, 2007). Their authoritarian stance advocates for a strong state that enforces order through strict policing, harsh punishments, and discipline in education (Mudde, 2004). Populism deepens societal divides by framing politics as a battle between 'the morally righteous people' and 'the unethical, immoral elite', reducing political discourse to emotional binaries where compromise becomes impossible (Mudde, 2007). This strategy has proven effective; as Kitschelt and McGann (1997) observe, early far-right electoral successes were driven by a mix of neoliberal economic policies and nationalist, authoritarian socio-cultural agendas.
A key element of this agenda is Euroscepticism, which manifests in varying degrees. While some far-right parties criticize specific EU policies but support the broader concept of European integration, others reject the EU entirely (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008; Szöcsik & Polyakova, 2018). Alongside political mistrust and perceived ethnic threats, Euroscepticism significantly influences far-right voting behavior (Szöcsik & Polyakova, 2018). These parties politicize European integration, casting the EU as a threat to national identity, sovereignty, and cultural traditions, often using religion and customs to emphasize this divide (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Stoica & Voina, 2023).

This fear of cultural erosion is especially prominent in Eastern Europe, where concerns about being overshadowed by Western European values intensify nationalist sentiments. Nationalism, in this context, offers a sense of security and belonging, providing comfort in a rapidly globalizing world (Kinnvall, 2004). By fostering a direct emotional connection to a *homeland*, nationalism eases existential anxiety and strengthens ontological security.

Betz (1994) argues that the upward trend of the radical populist right is an outcome of deeper socio-economic and cultural transformations within advanced democracies, where evolving societal structures have weakened traditional political loyalties and created opportunities for nationalist, populist movements to flourish.

The Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) was founded on 1 December 2019, Romania's national day, by activists George Simion and Claudiu Târziu. Târziu's close ties to the Romanian Orthodox Church and role in the 2018 referendum on the traditional family in Romania reflect the party's conservative orientation. AUR promotes Christian and nationalist values, structured around four core pillars: freedom, faith, family, and homeland, as stated by Ilie (2022).

AUR's rapid political rise was evident in the December 2020 parliamentary elections, where it secured 9.1% of the vote, translating into 33 deputies and 14 senators (Doiciara & Crețana, 2021). This success was partly attributed to the demographic shift during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly the decline in the number of older voters. Data shows that about 40% of AUR's supporters are under 35, and only 8% hold a university degree (Doiciara & Crețana, 2021). Euroscepticism also
played a role in shaping voter preferences, as many AUR supporters perceived Romania's EU membership as disadvantageous and believed the country faced unequal treatment within the Union (Stoica, Krouwel, & Cristea, 2021).

Ideologically, AUR aligns with the core features of right-wing populist movements: an ultra-nationalist agenda, hostility toward certain religious, ethnic, and sexual minorities, and a populist rhetoric centered on anti-establishment narratives, authoritarian tendencies, and Euroscepticism. The party's charismatic leadership and strategic use of social media have, as Ilie (2022) stated, further amplified its message.

AUR's digital presence, particularly on Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, has been instrumental in mobilizing supporters. George Simion's Facebook posts quickly gain widespread traction through mass sharing. Additionally, the party livestreams dramatic, and at times violent, events to engage its online audience (Doiciara & Crețana, 2021). By consistently participating in protests and maintaining a daily presence across the country, AUR leaders have fostered a strong connection with their base.

Their viral content – ranging from speeches and images to videos – has, according to Ilie (2022), reached hundreds of thousands of users, solidifying their influence. The party's communication style is polarizing, often framing diverse issues in black-and-white terms. Some narratives often used are the claims that Romania is being used as a dumping ground by other European countries, accusations of corruption towards mainstream politicians, and the assertion that Christian family values would be under threat. As highlighted by Doiciara and Crețana (2021), this type of message frequently portrays international alliances and liberal policies as harmful to national interests.

AUR also strategically cultivates online echo chambers, meant to reinforce the party's viewpoints. Within these digital spaces, users are not exposed to opposing perspectives, which leads them to strengthen their beliefs (Despa & Albu, 2021). By presenting itself as a political force outside of the mainstream political offer, AUR positions itself as an alternative to the establishment.

The parties' campaign rhetoric involved simplistic solutions that exceeded democratic principles, targeting issues relevant only to a specific segment of the population (Ilie, 2022). This approach reflects the party's
broader strategy of appealing to discontented voters through emotionally charged, exclusionary narratives.

### 3. Methodology

To better understand AUR's discourse and narrative surrounding Romania's failed Schengen attempt, this paper employed a qualitative research method. This approach was important for capturing the complexity and nuance of their political communication, particularly in the analysis of how language, rhetoric, and symbolism were used to construct Eurosceptic and populist narratives. The content analysis was particularly well-suited to identify the recurring themes, rhetorical patterns, and the ways in which the AUR party framed the Schengen issue to mobilize public sentiment and reinforce its political agenda.

The theoretical model employed in this study is discourse analysis, a concept closely linked to political analysis. Van Dijk (1997) asserts that the analysis of public discourse is inextricably linked to its influence on shaping public opinion.

According to Van Dijk (1997), political discourse analysis focuses on the analysis of political discourse. Therefore, it should be able to address issues in political science and provide meaningful answers to relevant political questions.

In addition to the compliance with official discourse norms, discourse structures can, according to Van Dijk (1997), also fulfil persuasion and efficacy criteria. Thus, lexical items may be selected not only in accordance with official norms of decorum but also for their ability to legitimately exert political power, gain support, manipulate public opinion, generate political consent, and effectively emphasise or diminish political views and opinions (Van Dijk, 1997). Based on the particularities of the discourse analysis, it was found to be the most relevant theoretical model for the research purposes of this paper.

The article's first research question aims to determine whether the AUR party uses this political event to propagate Euroscepticism and distrust of European institutions. The second research question addresses whether AUR is attempting to frame this event as an us-versus-them,
the morally sound people against the corrupt political class, narrative inherent in the ideology of far-right parties.

All articles on the Schengen area on the website of the AUR party and official statements on the website of the Chamber of Deputies were used as the party's official means of communication. Selected as unofficial means of communication were the posts on the Schengen area on the personal Facebook pages of George Simion (party president), Claudiu Târziu (president of the National Leadership Council of the party), Dan Tanasă (vice president of AUR), Robert Alecu (vice president of AUR), and Gianina Șerban (member of the Chamber of Deputies of the Romanian Parliament), who are all visible members of the party.

The selected timeframe spans six months, specifically three months prior to the European Parliament's decision on December 8, 2022, and three months thereafter. During this period, an analysis was conducted on six official statements and 36 Facebook posts regarding Romania's accession to the Schengen area.

Overall, these two research questions could provide a general view of the AUR party's nationalist discourse and Romania's political landscape in the context of Schengen accession.

The rise of the AUR party is well documented in the literature on nationalist far-right parties. However, there is a research gap regarding the party's reaction to Romania's rejection from the Schengen area at the end of 2022 and its communication on this event. This event is significant because it offers the far-right party an opportunity to criticise other European countries and the Romanian leadership to gain voter support. This research topic is significant in the Eastern European space as the rise of far-right parties is a constant phenomenon, and the rise of the AUR in the Romanian political space is recent as, according to Stoica (2021), populism flourishes particularly well in crisis situations, meaning that the current geopolitical situation is a perfect environment for its development, especially in Eastern Europe.

The codes used in the content analysis were developed using an inductive method based on the existing literature on far-right political parties in Europe and their typical ideologies and communication styles. Euroscepticism was the main element considered when developing the codes. Euroscepticism manifests in Eastern Europe through the fear of
being overshadowed by Western European values (Kinnvall, 2004). The literature about far-right parties (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Stoica & Voina, 2023) affirms that they often use the topic of European integration to their advantage. They do so by portraying the EU as a threat to national identity, sovereignty, and culture.

To avoid individual biases, we applied collaborative coding to establish the final list of codes to be used in the analysis.

<table><caption>Table 1
Table of codes</caption><thead><tr><td>Code</td><td>Description</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>C1</td><td>Trivialising the benefits of Schengen accession: statements or activities that downplay or deny the potential benefits or opportunities of Romania's Schengen accession.</td></tr><tr><td>C2</td><td>Portraying Romania as a victim of the EU: Portraying Romania as a victim of unfair or unequal treatment by the EU or other Member States in the context of the Schengen accession.</td></tr><tr><td>C3</td><td>Criticising the EU: Directly or indirectly criticising the European Union or its institutions in the context of Schengen accession.</td></tr><tr><td>C4</td><td>Criticism of other EU countries: Statements in which the AUR party criticises other EU countries or highlights negative examples from other countries in order to promote eurosepticism.</td></tr><tr><td>C5</td><td>Accusations against other political actors: Direct or indirect accusations or finger-pointing against other political actors or parties in connection with the possible Schengen accession.</td></tr><tr><td>C6</td><td>Positioning of AUR as saviour: Statements or activities in which the AUR party presents itself as a saviour or protector from the supposed dangers of other political actors.</td></tr><tr><td>C7</td><td>Appeal to citizens to mobilise: Calls or appeals to citizens to position themselves against national or international political actors in connection with Schengen accession or to join the AUR party.</td></tr></tbody></table>

The codes for the content analysis were developed based on the findings of Mudde (2007) and Stoica and Voina (2023) regarding the ideology and communication strategy of the far right and adapted to fit the scope of the study.

Each analysed Facebook post is labelled with the letter P followed by a number, while each official statement is marked with the letter S and a corresponding number.
4. Analysis of results

Regarding the first code, trivialising the benefits of the Schengen accession, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) argue that Euroscepticism does not imply outright rejection of the European Union or its integration process. This aligns with AUR's communication regarding Romania's Schengen accession. Although their discourse is rooted in nationalism and populism, AUR members frequently support Schengen accession and highlight its importance for Romania's economy. They even make promises regarding a future secure Schengen membership through an AUR-led government (P34: Gianina Șerban, 2022).

Although populist parties often use opposition and protest as strategies (Sitter, 2001), AUR directs criticism toward politicians and countries that are blocking Romania's Schengen entry, rather than opposing the accession itself. Sørensen (2008) identifies four types of Euroscepticism: democratic, economic, sovereign, and social. AUR aligns with sovereignty-based Euroscepticism. They acknowledge the economic benefits of EU aid while accusing the Union of undermining national sovereignty. Their rhetoric aims to frame the Schengen accession as submission to EU dominance, describing it as a lack of backbone and the perfection of the art of submission (S2: AUR, 2022).

None of the 36 Facebook posts or 6 official statements analysed reject the importance of the possible Schengen membership or its benefits. This adaptability to current events and voters' wishes may reflect political strategy, as parties often shift ideologies to compete effectively (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). For AUR, Schengen is a significant economic milestone, and as a young party, it can more easily adjust its ideology than established parties with entrenched positions (Downs, 1957).

Regarding the second code that was analysed, far-right parties across Europe often exhibit scepticism toward the EU, reflecting nationalist ideologies that frame politics as a conflict between 'pure people' and 'immoral elites' (Mudde, 2004). AUR's discourse echoes this sentiment, portraying the EU as actively exploiting Romania's resources and treating Romanians as second-class citizens (P11: George Simion, 2023). Positioning itself as the voice of the Romanian people, AUR condemns what the party perceives as the West's unjust treatment of Romania through official statements and social media.
The December 2022 Schengen discussions provided AUR with an opportunity to amplify Euroscepticism. They vilify the EU by blaming it for Romania's struggles, claiming that it restricts people's mobility (P35: Gianina Șerban, 2022) in response to the EU's 2035 ban on internal combustion engine vehicles, which aims to reduce pollution. Party members tie such measures to economic harm for Romania, portraying the EU as stifling the country's development and keeping its citizens in perpetual poverty. Statements like 'The Romanian economy is losing enormously due to the decision not to be accepted' [into Schengen] (S3: Tanasă, 2022) are prevalent in AUR's discourse. A dichotomy arises between affirming the importance of Romania's possible Schengen accession and the benefits of EU membership while simultaneously portraying the Union as responsible for Romania's shortcomings. This dual narrative aligns with Stoica and Voina's (2023) observation that Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe often stems from fears of being absorbed by more developed Western nations.

AUR members argue that Romania will always be viewed as the 'poor relative' within the Union (P20: Claudiu Târziu, 2022) unless the current political dynamics change. They claim that other countries exploit Romania's resources but don't respect it as a nation. This rhetoric appears designed to manipulate individuals with insecurities and low self-esteem who strongly identify with national pride (Dunn, 2013; Kinnvall, 2004), fostering resentment toward Western nations and, consequently, reinforcing nationalist sentiment.

A possible motivation for this strategy is AUR's highly conservative values, including Christian faith and traditional family structures. More progressive Western ideologies may therefore be perceived as a threat to AUR's ideological foundation.

Additionally, AUR's discourse suggests that Romania is being forced to sacrifice its integrity to gain Schengen membership. Statements like 'If the endless hypocrisy, lack of backbone, and constant improvement of the art of flattery open the way to Schengen, then allow me to reject this prospect' (S2: AUR, 2022) reveal mistrust toward both Romanian political actors, accused of betraying their country, and international entities, seen as imposing unjust demands.
This populist stance criticizes the national politicians for allegedly prioritizing international interests over Romania's security and welfare, reflecting broader patterns of populist rhetoric (Rydgren, 2007).

The party's overarching goal of inciting public outrage becomes evident when its discourse is analysed through a pragmatic lens. According to Mazzoleni (2008), populist parties often use media as a tool, mobilizing the population through aggressive language. AUR members employ slogans such as 'second-class citizens in Europe' (P11: George Simion, 2023), 'poor relatives of the West' (P20: Claudiu Târziu, 2022), and 'We are not a second-class people!' (P30: Gianina Șerban, 2022) in an attempt to frame the European Union as an adversary. These expressions leverage patriotism and personal or national pride to foster distrust toward the EU.

Of the 36 Facebook posts by high-ranking AUR members, eight portray Romania as a victim of unfair or unequal treatment by the EU or its member states regarding Schengen accession. Similarly, five out of six official statements deliver the same message.

A central theme in AUR's rhetoric is Romania's sacrifices over the years, which they claim remain unacknowledged internationally. They assert that Western countries have exploited Romania for their own interests, offering nothing substantial in return. While acknowledging the EU's significance, AUR simultaneously accuses it of mistreating Romania and its citizens.

Despite their support for Romania's Schengen accession, AUR members extensively criticize the EU institutions, an aspect analysed using the third code. Before the critical vote on the possible accession, party leader George Simion referred to the European Parliament as the 'Tower of Babel' (P1: George Simion, 2022), highlighting the EU's perceived inability to reach meaningful decisions. This biblical reference aligns with AUR's broader communication strategy, which often emphasizes Christian values.

AUR also accuses the EU of prioritizing the interests of other member states, suggesting that the Schengen vote was a mere formality, devoid of meaningful follow-up (S1: AUR, 2022). This stance reinforces the narrative that Romania holds less importance than Western countries within the Union. Furthermore, AUR claims that members of the European Parliament lack resolve and are easily swayed by Dutch interests.
Another recurring criticism from AUR is that, while Romania is deemed adequate to take on risks and finance NATO and EU initiatives, it is not considered good enough for Schengen membership (S6: AUR, 2023).

Out of the 36 Facebook posts and 6 official statements analysed, only 2 were explicitly accusatory of the European Union or its institutions. Given the ideological framework of populist parties, this relatively reserved critique suggests that AUR adopts an atypical approach for far-right parties. According to Heinisch et al. (2020), this reflects a strategy named equivocal Euroscepticism.

Equivocal Euroscepticism, as described by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001), occupies a middle point between hard and soft Euroscepticism. Political actors employing this strategy will adopt an ambivalent position by fusing elements of both moderate and hard Euroscepticism while deliberately avoiding any extreme positions, such as advocating EU withdrawal or endorsing unconditional support for the Union in its current form.

This approach allows parties to appeal to a broader audience, including both soft and hard Eurosceptics, whether they are voters or potential political allies. Heinisch et al. (2020) highlight the intentionality of the ambiguity, simultaneously denying a negative stance while presenting arguments that align with hard Eurosceptic rhetoric to attract as many voters as possible.

After the European Parliament vote in December 2022 that denied Romania's entry into the Schengen area, AUR attempted to position Austria and the Netherlands as common adversaries of the Romanian people, aligning with the fourth analysed code. Betz (2007) observes that right-wing populist parties often weaponize public disappointment to further their own agenda, a tactic evident in AUR's efforts to demonize these two EU countries. For instance, party members suggested that Romania's exclusion from Schengen was tied to corruption and bribery demands, posing provocative questions such as, 'What bribe does the Netherlands want for Schengen?' (P2: George Simion, 2022). This rhetoric aims to stoke public anger and foster resentment against the other EU member states.

Another strategy used by the party AUR casts doubt on the reasons stated by Austria and the Netherlands for opposing Romani's Schengen ascension. For example, Austria's claim regarding a high influx of illegal
immigrants was dismissed as a 'shameful excuse' (P14: Claudiu Târziu, 2022; P16: Claudiu Târziu, 2022). AUR's narrative promotes feelings of hatred, insecurity, and disdain by portraying Western countries as exploitative imperialists. They claim that Romania's exclusion from Schengen represents an international humiliation, one that Romanian citizens are unfairly expected to endure in silence.

In order to try to further highlight perceived injustices, members of AUR accused Western countries of hypocrisy and corruption. The Netherlands was described as a 'narco-state' (P24: Dan Tanasă, 2022), plagued by high levels of crime, bribery scandals, and child exploitation. They emphasized the irony of the situation, suggesting that living conditions in the Netherlands are less secure than those in Romania (P24: Dan Tanasă, 2022; S2: AUR, 2022). Such statements are designed to foster animosity and deepen nationalist sentiments among Romanian citizens.

According to Minkenberg (2000), feelings of vulnerability do not stem from actual victimization but rather from the perceived loss of social and cultural capital. Salmela and Von Scheve (2017) emphasize the role of emotions in shaping subjective perceptions of vulnerability and threat, linking these feelings to predispositions that drive support for right-wing populist parties. In this context, AUR's strategy of portraying Austria and the Netherlands as deceitful toward Romania and Romania as unfairly treated aligns with its political goals. By fostering radical contempt for these nations, the party leverages nationalist sentiments to attract voters.

This contempt is particularly evident in official statements. For instance, former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte was accused of behaving with a 'superior attitude of a head of state visiting a colony' during his visit to Romania (S1: AUR, 2022). Austria's resolution to block Romania's entry into the Schengen area was labelled 'malicious' (S4: Tanasă, 2023), with comparisons highlighting that other Schengen countries face greater corruption and illegal immigration problems than Romania (S6: AUR, 2023). Such narratives emphasize the perceived injustice against Romania, fuelling indignation and rallying public support.

From the analysed materials, 11 Facebook posts and 4 official statements criticized other EU member states. AUR's discourse seeks to underscore the shortcomings of these countries, accusing them of hypocrisy and insinuating that they view Romania as inferior. This approach appeals
to nationalist sentiments, fostering a sense of victimization and using it
as a tool to galvanize voter support.

In the broader discourse surrounding the Schengen area, AUR
positions itself as an opposition force, sharply criticizing Romania's
leadership. An aspect was analysed using the fifth code of the content
analysis. Betz and Johnson (2004) note that populist parties often depict
the elite as a 'parasitic class' that enriches itself while neglecting the
discontent of the ordinary citizens. This motif is central in AUR's rhetoric,
with leadership accused of inaction and moral corruption. For example,
President Klaus Iohannis is blamed for failing to improve Romanians'
living conditions during his two terms (P1: George Simion, 2022). Similarly,
former Minister of Justice Cătălin Predoiu was accused of betraying the
country if failing to address Romania's Schengen rejection (P1: George
Simion, 2022).

AUR also criticizes the lack of accountability among Romania's
leadership, claiming they failed to act decisively at critical moments (P4:
Tanasă, 2023). Insults such as 'lackey' (P9: George Simion, 2023; P12:
George Simion, 2023; P26: Dan Tanasă, 2022) are frequently directed at
political figures, including the President, to portray them as submissive
to Austria and unwilling to defend Romania's interests. This rhetoric
aims to undermine their authority and paint them as weak and cowardly.

A hallmark of populism is inciting public hostility toward the
current power structure (Betz, 1994). For AUR, the constant criticism of
ruling politicians aligns with this tactic. Statements such as 'Romanian
politicians have gone down on their knees' (P11: George Simion, 2023)
attribute Romania's exclusion from Schengen to a lack of dignity and
resolve among its leaders.

The AUR party asserts that the Parliament is neglecting measures
related to Romania's Schengen accession. For example, a Facebook post
by Claudiu Târziu, chairman of the party's National Leadership Council,
criticizes the Parliament for addressing topics like gender identity, which
Târziu dismisses as part of a 'neo-Marxist handbook' (P19: Claudiu Târziu,
2022). This post appears to target AUR's conservative supporters, who
generally oppose progressive issues, aiming to cast the leadership in a
negative light.
Additionally, the party condemns President Klaus Iohannis' refusal to boycott both Austrian products and services. From AUR's perspective, this decision represents a betrayal of his country (P4: Tanasă, 2023), as it prioritizes diplomacy and foreign relations over the interests and desires of the Romanian citizens. This rhetoric aligns with Golder's (2016) characterization of populist parties, which often accuse liberal political actors of promoting internationalism and consequently marginalizing the public. According to Golder (2016), such actors are scapegoated for societal problems and portrayed as conspirators against the populace.

Populist narratives also elevate the public as morally superior to the ruling political elite (Golder, 2016). This sentiment is evident in AUR's discourse, which accuses politicians of betraying the supremacy of the Romanian Constitution (P15: Claudiu Târziu, 2022), neglecting Romania's future (P27: Dan Tanasă, 2022), attacking national sovereignty (S5: Tanasă, 2022), and deceiving Romanian citizens (P34: Gianina Șerban, 2022). This criticism lays the groundwork for an aggressive rhetoric aimed at discrediting the political class and amplifying public distrust.

Of the 36 Facebook posts and 6 official statements analysed, 23 posts and 5 statements directly or indirectly criticised political actors or ruling parties regarding Schengen accession. Critique dominates the examined material. AUR aims to position itself as the opposition, attacking political leaders and their response to Romania's rejection from the Schengen area. This binary framing aligns with Eatwell's (2004) observation that populist strategies present issues in stark black-and-white terms, leaving no space for nuance or interpretation. By deliberately ignoring diplomatic complexities, AUR simplifies the narrative to fuel anger and contempt toward political actors, portraying them as corrupt.

By framing themselves as the authentic agents of the people, far-right political actors like AUR aim to distance themselves from the political elites they deem unreliable. Their discourse follows a populist formula of scandal, provocation, transgression, and emotional appeal (Sauer et al., 2017; Wodak, 2019). This strategy allows them to present themselves as informed crisis managers, problem solvers, and saviours – traits that may bolster voter confidence in their capabilities (Katsourides & Pachita, 2021).

AUR's portrayal of the political class as incompetent and untrustworthy prepares the electorate to view the party as the saviour of Romania and
the champion of national interests, as analysed through the sixth code. They promise, for instance, that under AUR governance, they will 'send Sweighoffer where it belongs' (P6: George Simion, 2022). By capitalizing on public dissatisfaction with Romania's exclusion from the Schengen area and outrage toward Austria, the party builds its political strategy on nationalist and populist appeals.

AUR also promises that under its governance, Romania will gain membership in the Schengen area (P34: Gianina Șerban, 2022), positioning itself as more competent than the current political actors. Despite this claim, only four Facebook posts in the analysed materials explicitly portray AUR as the saviour of the Romanian people.

According to Gattinara et al. (2021), far-right protests can be analysed using three heuristic models: opportunities, grievances, and resource mobilization. These elements – discontent, political environment, and organizational strength – should not be viewed as mutually exclusive explanations but as interconnected factors that drive popular activism.

Gattinara et al. (2021) further classify mobilization resources into two categories: symbolic resources, such as ideology, visibility, networks, and material resources, such as institutional presence and access to public office. Ideology serves as a crucial symbolic resource for organizing far-right activities.

In the context examined in the last code, AUR vehemently opposes Austria and the Netherlands following Romania's rejection of Schengen membership in December 2022. According to Canovan (1999), populist rhetoric seeks to mobilize ordinary people against the established power structure.

The party has sought to mobilize public sentiment by advocating a boycott of these countries, claiming such actions will yield long-term benefits (P4: George Simion, 2022). Specifically, AUR calls on citizens to: boycott Austrian and Dutch products, brands, and services; close Romanian accounts in Austrian and Dutch banks, transferring funds to 'friendlier' institutions, and cancel leisure or holiday trips to Austria and the Netherlands (P17: Claudiu Târziu, 2022). This hostile stance stems from nationalist sentiment and a wounded sense of Romanian pride.

The Schengen vote provided AUR with an opportunity to amplify its nationalist agenda and express dissatisfaction with the current government.
The party organized protests targeting the Austrian and Dutch embassies as well as Romanian political leaders. Supporters were urged to participate through Facebook posts (P7: George Simion, 2022; P22: Claudiu Târziu, 2022; P30: Gianina Șerban, 2022; P31: Gianina Șerban, 2023).

Of the analysed materials, eight Facebook posts and one official statement call for mobilization through protests or boycotts in response to the EU's refusal to grant Romania Schengen membership. These efforts reflect AUR's broader strategy of leveraging nationalistic rhetoric to galvanize public action.

Table 2 summarizes the most relevant results identified during the analysis.

<caption>Table 2</caption>

Summary of the analysis

<table><thead><tr><td>Key concept derived from literature</td><td>Code</td><td>Quote</td><td>Source</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Euroscepticism does not imply outright rejection of the European Union or its integration process (Szczerbiak &amp; Taggart, 2008).</td><td>Trivialising the benefits of Schengen accession.</td><td>'If unmitigated hypocrisy, spinelessness and continued perfection in the art of the underdog will pave the way to Schengen, then allow me to reject that prospect.'</td><td>S2: AUR, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Conflict between 'pure people' [Romanian people] and 'immoral elites' [European Union] (Mudde, 2004).</td><td>Portraying Romania as a victim of the EU</td><td>'[...] we are second-class citizens of Europe.'</td><td>P11: George Simion, 2023</td></tr><tr><td>Equivocal Euroscepticism lies between soft and hard Euroscepticism (Taggart &amp; Szczerbiak, 2001).</td><td>Criticising the EU</td><td>We are full members of the European Union, but it seems we are only good at taking risks and contributing to the costs of financing the NATO Alliance and the European Union!</td><td>S6: AUR, 2023</td></tr><tr><td>Weaponizing public disappointment to further their own agenda (Betz, 2007).</td><td>Criticism of other EU countries</td><td>'What bribe does the Netherlands want for Schengen?'</td><td>P2: George Simion, 2022</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td>Populist parties often depict the elite as a 'parasitic class' that enriches itself while neglecting the discontent of ordinary citizens (Betz & Johnson, 2004).</td><td>Accusations against other political actors</td><td>Mister Predoiu, who told us to give up the national constitution, it's time for him to do something; otherwise, he will be listed in the black book of traitors of the Romanian nation.</td><td>P1: George Simion, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Far-right parties present themselves as saviours (Katsourides & Pachita, 2021).</td><td>Positioning of AUR as a saviour</td><td>'When AUR will govern [...] we will send Sweighoffer where it belongs.'</td><td>P6: George Simion, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Populist rhetoric seeks to mobilize ordinary people against the established power structure (Canovan, 1999).</td><td>Appeal to citizens to mobilise</td><td>'Protest in front of the Austrian Embassy at 6 pm today. Come as many as you can!'</td><td>P22: Claudiu Târziu, 2022</td></tr></table>

The content analysis concludes that the Party for the Alliance of Romania uses public space discussions about Schengen accession to propagate euroscepticism and to incite disdain towards the European Union and Western EU countries. AUR portrays the European Union and its members as taking advantage of Romania and its resources, without providing any substantial benefit in return.

The AUR party also positions itself as the opposition of the ruling political class and the voice of the Romanian people. It does so by harshly criticising the ruling politicians for their perceived failures. They use aggressive discourse to build the narrative of the lazy or corrupt politicians who not only failed their country but are actively trying to sell or betray it. The aim of this communication strategy is to push the voters to a binary way of thinking, where all the politicians are corrupt, and the population is without fault.

## 5. Discussion

In recent years, concern about radical right-wing movements and parties has grown significantly within liberal capitalist democratic systems. Once considered a fleeting phenomenon, the radical right has emerged as one of the most formidable political forces challenging liberal democracy in
the West (Betz & Johnson, 2004). This rise is underpinned by an ideology that merges nationalism, radicalism, and populism, a combination that unites many far-right parties (Golder, 2016).

A key feature of far-right populism is its appeal to ressentiment – a complex emotion associated with power-seeking, internal outrage, a sense of injustice, and outward blame projection (Salomon, 1994). By addressing both perceived injustices and inequality, contemporary radical right-wing populism resonates strongly with activists, offering both a critique of the status quo and a call to action (Betz & Johnson, 2004).

Traditional strategies, which rely on their inability to adapt to the shifting political contexts, are becoming increasingly ineffective in containing the far-right. As Betz and Johnson (2004) argue, a deeper understanding of the radical right's social and political dimensions is indispensable to develop effective measures to counter their anti-democratic influence.

This article contributes to this understanding by analysing the discourse of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) party. Through content analysis, this study concludes that nationalism and populism are core elements in the parties' communication.

The research fills a gap in the academic literature. It does so by examining the strategies and narratives of far-right parties through the lens of discourse analysis. Recognizing far-right populism as a threat to democracy (Daly & Jones, 2020), this work provides an overview of this discourse, offering a deeper, clearer understanding of far-right political communication strategies.

The discourse analysis centres around the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) and its communication surrounding Romania's unsuccessful bid to join the Schengen area at the end of 2022. In order to gain a thorough understanding of the parties' approach, both formal and informal communication methods were analysed. Official communications included statements from the party's website and the Chamber of Deputies' website. Unofficial communications consisted of Facebook posts from the personal accounts of prominent party members.

Two research questions guided the study. Based on these, it was revealed that AUR used the Schengen rejection as leverage to amplify Eurosceptic rhetoric, portraying the EU and its institutions as unfair and dismissive of Romanis's interests. The paper also demonstrated that AUR
employed populist narratives by framing a perceived duality between the virtuous Romanian populace and the deceitful, immoral political elite (Mudde, 2004), thereby positioning itself as the sole defender of national interests.

The analysis reveals that the AUR party strategically employs nationalist and populist narratives to fuel Euroscepticism and position itself as the voice of the Romanian people. The main point of their argument is that Romania faces systemic disadvantages within the EU compared to other EU members. This framing emphasizes Romania's alleged victimhood and aims to foster solidarity and national pride among voters. By highlighting these perceived injustices, the AUR party seeks to mobilize support through a strongly presented opposition to the external forces it claims 'oppress' Romania.

The strategic adoption of ambivalent Euroscepticism is a key element of AUR's strategy (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001). On the one hand, the party highlights the potential benefits of Schengen accession to appeal to voters who favour closer EU integration, and on the other hand, it simultaneously critiques EU institutions to cater to its base of hard Eurosceptics. This dual approach allows AUR to target a broader voter base by positioning itself as a pragmatic yet critical political force capable of addressing both the advantages and disadvantages of EU membership.

A very prominent aspect of the party's communication is its construction of enemy images. Their tactic consists of targeting countries such as Austria and the Netherlands, which have blocked Romania's Schengen accession. AUR stokes hostility and strengthens nationalist sentiments through aggressive rhetoric and through the dissemination of negative stereotypes (Mazzoleni, 2008). These enemy images serve to polarize the electorate, underlining the rejection of the blocking nations and thus consolidating support for the party.

The purpose of the party is to solidify its role as the defender of Romanian interests in voters' minds. A part of the strategy for achieving this consists of propagating Euroscepticism and mistrust in European institutions. The party's portrayal of Romania as a victim of systemic injustices within the EU enables it to attract a diverse group of voters, from hard Eurosceptics to those cautiously optimistic about the EU's benefits. By painting nations like Austria and the Netherlands as villains, the party can further nurture nationalistic sentiments and hostility, and as such, reinforce the party's narrative of external oppression.
The AUR party effectively uses Romania's Schengen accession and the national and international political context to advance its own agenda and popularity. By intertwining nationalist and populist rhetoric with ambivalent Euroscepticism, the party consolidates its position as a political force in Romania while deepening scepticism and mistrust toward the European Union.

The analysis also suggests that the AUR party deliberately frames Romania's Schengen accession within an 'us versus them' narrative (Mudde, 2007). This dichotomy positions the morally upright Romanian people against an immoral political class. The party seeks to mobilize its base and present itself as the authentic voice of the Romanian people through nationalist and populist rhetoric.

An important part of this strategy is a harsh critique of the political elite, encompassing both the government and other established political actors (Grapă & Mogoș, 2023). By portraying these figures as inept and complicit in Romania's failure to achieve Schengen accession, AUR positions itself as the sole legitimate alternative. The party assumes an oppositional stance by vocally condemning the government's perceived mishandling of the Schengen rejection. By avoiding any diplomatic subtleties, AUR stirs contempt and distrust toward the Romanian political figures involved in the possible ascension, portraying them as emblematic of the corrupt system.

The simplification of complex political realities into a binary division between a corrupt establishment and morally impeccable citizens reinforces the party's 'us versus them' narrative (Mudde, 2007). AUR aims to grow a sense of solidarity and shared purpose among the voters by leveraging this dichotomic view.

The creation of enemy images remains an indispensable in their strategy. AUR targets EU nations like Austria and the Netherlands, which blocked the country's Schengen accession, as well as various EU institutions. These narratives emphasize Romania's perceived disadvantages within the Union and alleged systemic injustices (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Stoica & Voina, 2023). By focusing on external threats and internal betrayal, AUR reinforces nationalist sentiments and cultivates a narrative of collective victimhood of the Romanian people.

This strategy aims to convince voters that the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) is the only defender of the people's interests, thereby
contrasting with corrupt political elites and foreign entities that pose
a threat to Romania's sovereignty. As a result, the political discourse
surrounding Romania's potential Schengen accession is reframed to promote
AUR's agenda.

## 6. Conclusions & limitations

In conclusion, the AUR party uses the Schengen ascension as a pretext to deepen its populist appeal, mobilise its supporters, and solidify its position as the voice of the people. Through its narrative, it transforms political discourse to further its political goals.

This study focuses on the AUR party's communication strategies
in the context of possible Schengen accession. This narrow focus does
not encompass other far-right parties or their dynamics within Romania
or beyond. Including a wider range of parties could have provided a
more comprehensive perspective on regional far-right movements.

While the findings offer valuable insights into the AUR parties'
communication strategies, they may not apply to other far-right groups,
as each operates within unique historical and political contexts. The study
relied on a specific set of sources (official party statements and Facebook posts
from AUR party members), which may limit its representativeness.
Broader data sources or different methodologies might have yielded a
more comprehensive understanding of the far-right phenomenon.

Additionally, the study was carried out within a specific time frame,
which may not fully account for the ever-evolving far-right strategies. A
longer observation period would have provided a more comprehensive
view of these movements' adaptations over time.

The rise of the far-right poses a significant threat to democratic
societies. This paper has provided insights into the communication strategies
used by far-right parties, but it did not cover certain aspects of the subject.
Future research might focus on a comparative analysis of far-right
strategies across regions to uncover common patterns and develop
counterstrategies. Investigating the effectiveness of educational initiatives
aimed at addressing far-right ideology could yield valuable insights into
promoting political awareness and democratic engagement.
Furthermore, investigating far-right propaganda in media outlets may reveal strategies that facilitate the dissemination of extremist ideologies. As such, counterefforts can be developed. These research avenues can enhance our comprehension of right-wing extremism and fortify democratic societies.

## REFERENCES

Acemoğlu, D., Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2013). A political theory of populism. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(2), 771–805. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs077

Betz, H. (1994). *Radical Right-Wing populism in Western Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Betz, H.G. (2007). The new politics of resentment - Radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. In C. Mudde (Ed.), *The populist radical right* (pp. 356-369). Routledge.

Betz, H. G., & Johnson, C. (2004). Against the current-stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), 311–327. https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931042000263546

Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. *Political studies*, 47(1), 2-16. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184

Daly, T.G., & Jones, B.C. (2020). Parties versus democracy: Addressing today's political party threats to democratic rule. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 18(2), 509–538. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moa025

Despa, O., & Albu, B. (2021). In 'echo-chambers' of nationalist Romanian party, Russia's favourite narratives. *Balkan Insight*, 8. https://balkaninsight.com/2021/10/08/in-echo-chambers-of-nationalist-romanian-party-russias-favourite-narratives/ (accessed on 1/2025).

Doiciara, C., & Crețana, R. (2021). Pandemic populism: COVID-19 and the rise of the Nationalist AUR party in Romania. *Geographica Pannonica*, 25(4), 243–259. https://doi.org/10.5937/gp25-33782
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. *Journal of Political Economy*, 65(2), 135–150. https://doi.org/10.1086/257897

Dunn, K. (2013). Preference for radical right-wing populist parties among exclusive-nationalists and authoritarians. *Party Politics*, 21(3), 367–380. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812472587

Eatwell, R. (2004). Introduction: The new Extreme Right challenge. In R. Eatwell & C. Mudde (Eds.), *Western democracies and the New Extreme Right challenge* (pp. 1–15). Routledge.

Ferrante, C., & Pontarollo, N. (2019). Regional voting dynamics in Europe: The rise of anti-elite and anti-European parties. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 52(6), 1019–1022. https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518x19884942

Gattinara, P.C., Froio, C., & Pirro, A. L. (2021). Far-right protest mobilisation in Europe: Grievances, opportunities and resources. *European Journal of Political Research*, 61(4), 1019-1041. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12484

Golder, M. (2016). Far right parties in Europe. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19(1), 477–497. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042 814-012441

Grapă, T.E., & Mogoş, A.A. (2023). The spectacle of “patriotic violence” in Romania: Populist leader George Simion’s mediated performance. *Media and Communication*, 11(2), 148-162. https://doi.org/10.17645/ mac.v11i2.6367

Griffin, R. (1999). Afterword: Last rights? In S. P. Ramet (Ed.), *The radical right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989* (pp. 297–321). Pennsylvania State University Press.

Griffin, R. (2000). Interregnum or endgame? The radical right in the 'post-fascist' era. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 5(2), 163–178. https://doi.org/10.1080/713682938

Halikiopoulou, D., Nanou, K., & Vasilopoulou, S. (2012). The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left Euroscepticism. *European Journal of Political Research*, 51(4), 504–539. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.02050.x

Heinisch, R., McDonnell, D., & Werner, A. (2020). Equivocal Euroscepticism: How populist radical right parties can have their EU cake and eat it. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 59(2), 189–205. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13055
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123408000409

Ilie, M. (2022). The rise of a nationalist-populist party in Romania – The Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). *Serbian Political Thought*, 78(4), 143–174. https://doi.org/10.22182/spm.7842022.9

Katsourides, Y., & Pachita, E.K. (2021). Normalizing far-right party rhetoric: the impact of media populist frames and coverage on the electoral prospects of far-right parties in the case of Cyprus. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 31(1), 132–150. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2021.1951184

Kinnvall, C. (2004). Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity and the Search for Ontological Security. *Political Psychology*, 25(5), 741–767. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00396.x

Kitschelt, H., & McGann, A.J. (1997). *The radical right in Western Europe*. University of Michigan Press. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.14501

Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Mediated Populism. In W. Donsbach (Ed.), *The International Encyclopedia of Communication* (pp. 3031–3033). Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Minkenberg, M. (2000). The renewal of the radical right: Between modernity and anti-modernity. *Government and Opposition*, 35(2), 170–188. https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-7053.00022

Mişcoiu, S. (2023). Romania: Between Europeanisation and De-Europeanisation. In: Akande, A. (eds) Politics Between Nations. Contributions to International Relations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24896-2_28

Mudde, C. (2004). The populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511492037

Radoiu, R.D. (2024). Towards a new common sense? A Gramscian analysis of the discursive strategies of Romania's Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). *Perspective Politice*, 17, 177–187. https://doi.org/10.25019/perspol/24.17.0.17
Rydgren, J. (2007). The sociology of the radical right. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33(1), 241–262. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040607131752

Salmela, M., & Von Scheve, C. (2017). Emotional roots of right-wing political populism. *Information Sur Les Sciences Sociales/Social Science Information, 56*(4), 567–595. https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018417734419

Salomon, R.C. (1994). One hundred years of ressentiment: Nietzsche's Geneality of Morals. In R. Schacht (Ed.), *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality* (pp. 95–127). University of California Press.

Sauer, B., Krasteva, A., & Saarinen, A. (2017). Post-democracy, party politics and right-wing populist communication. In M. Pajnik & B. Sauer (Eds.), *Populism and the web* (pp. 14–35). Routledge.

Sitter, N. (2001). The politics of opposition and European integration in Scandinavia: Is Euro-scepticism a government-opposition dynamic? *West European Politics, 24*(4), 22–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380108425463

Sørensen, C. (2008). *Love Me, Love Me Not...: A Typology of Public Euroscepticism*. Sussex European Institute.

Stoica, M.S. (2021). Populist political advertising in times of pandemic: Framing elites as anti-religious. *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, 115–127*.

Stoica, M.S., & Voina, A. (2023). Measuring receptivity to eurosceptic media discourses in the vicinity of war: evidence from Romania. *Media and Communication, 11*(4), 34–46. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v11i4.7122

Stoica, M., Krouwel, A. & Cristea, V. (2021). Stealth populism: Explaining the rise of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians”. European Politics and Policy – London School of Economics and Political Science. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/02/26/stealth-populism-explaining-the-rise-of-the-alliance-for-the-unity-of-romanians/ (accessed on 1/2025).

Szczerbiak, A., & Taggart, P. (2008). *Opposing Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism: Volume 2: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives*. Oxford University Press.

Szöcsik, E., & Polyakova, A. (2018). Euroscepticism and the electoral success of the far right: the role of the strategic interaction between center and far right. *European Political Science, 18*(3), 400–420. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-018-0162-y
Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2001). *Parties, positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe*. Brighton: Sussex European Institute.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1997). What is Political Discourse Analysis? *Belgian Journal of Linguistics*, 11, 11–52. https://doi.org/10.1075/bjl.11.03dij

Wodak, R. (2019). The trajectory of far-right populism: A discourse-analytical perspective. In B. Forchtner (Ed.), *The far right and the environment* (pp. 21–37). Routledge.

## Official statements

S1: *COMUNICAT DE PRESĂ*. (2022, October 21). https://www.cdep.ro/relatii_publice/site2015.text_presa?pid=24608

S2: *DECLARAȚIE DE PRESĂ*. (2022, October 26). https://www.cdep.ro/relatii_publice/site2015.text_presa?pid=24654

S3: Dan Tanasă – Întrebare către Guvernul României – Aderarea României la spațiul Schengen. (2022, December 20). *interpelari*. https://partidulaur.ro/dan-tanasa-intrebare-catre-gvernul-romaniei-aderarea-romaniei-la-spatiul-schengen/

S4: Dan Tanasă – Întrebare către M.A.E. – România și spațiul Schengen. (2023, February 2). *interpelari*. https://partidulaur.ro/dan-tanasa-intrebare-catre-m-a-e-romania-si-spatiul-schengen/

S5: Dan Tanasă – întrebare către Guvernul României – România și spațiul Schengen. (2022, December 19). *interpelari*. https://partidulaur.ro/dan-tanasa-intrebare-catre-gvernul-romaniei-romania-si-spatiul-schengen/

S6: *COMUNICAT DE PRESĂ*. (2023, January 26). https://www.cdep.ro/relatii_publice/site2015.text_presa?pid=25124

## Facebook Posts

P1: Simion, G. (2022, December 6). *Direct de la Bruxelles: nu vom intra în Schengen. Mai sunt două zile...* Facebook. https://fb/watch/slw0WrQ3LZ/

P2: Simion, G. (2022, October 12). *Dacă pentru intrarea în UE a trebuit să dăm PETROM, ce șpagă vrea Olanda pentru Schengen?* Facebook.
https://www.facebook.com/george.simion.unire/posts/pfbid0zUtu kx3JY8cffupkotxveVSmPQXbxCUq2PCfH1wpp4DJBZnPx8UEwza Zp7YrWbCl

P3: Simion, G. (2022, December 12). *Alternative pentru brandurile Austriec*! Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/george.simion.unire/posts/ pfbid02QkwUvzYtnXxwp22hv6TghAtgf9B4buziHDFgryv75We6N wDwkBoAPetd1gJrNcB6l

P4: Simion, G. (2022, December 19). *România nu trebuie refuzata in Schengen*. Facebook. https://fb/watch/slwTvOi9XG/

P5: Simion, G. (2022, November 21). *Cozile din vămi, cazul Calafat*: Facebook. https://fb/watch/slxnp5AXY1/

P6: Simion, G. (2022, December 27). *Când AUR va guverna, nu doar că nu "privatizăm" RomSilva dar îl trimitem și pe Sweighoffer unde îi e locul*. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/george.simion.unire/posts/ pfbid0WBuJyUTyo6NJgeugDpZvJ9eHCMNQpRzmvDj1Wd4KCc d1GRHZdU8hEBrH2qsyiSDel

P7: Simion, G. (2022, December 9). *Protestul împotriva guvernului și a aliaților lor: Austria și Olanda!* Facebook. https://fb/watch/slxGyzrEy7/

P8: Simion, G. (2022, December 7). *Așteptăm ca și Gheorghe Flutur sa izgonească Sweighoffer*. Facebook. https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%3A% 2F%2Fwww.libertatea.ro%2Fstiri%2Flider-aur-bistrita-nasaud-retr age-produse-austrice-magazin-protest-schengen-4372364%2Famp &h=AT2ZQH7IGe6AW_nyFyTPju6REmavy1foeSLbGgEwZknG8rI c0eRY2RjIKsVnd5jpD16NDUFNfgwA_EjdBvT3tTB8VsIkMQYyN XREGysRUEQuEYEDhuYITs5vuG8k8_IXvGMN&s=1

P9: Simion, G. (2023, January 27). *Astăzi, premierii Olandei și Austriei au spus public că se opun în continuare extinderii Schengen*. Reacția slugilor noastre: nici una. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/george.sim ion.unire/posts/pfbid0jqZpvcYFYeEYcva4GN8xQNxoiB1A9e5ATB bDt3WYtEJLzPsszcurEG3F5XMx2fjsI

P10: Simion, G. (2023, January 27). *În Schengen nu intrăm, bani pe veceu luăm de la sărmani. Piața din Botoșani*: Facebook. https://fb/watch/slxZTCXAIR/

P11: Simion, G. (2023, February 4). *Miercurea următoare, 8 februarie, e ultima zi când guvernul Ciucă poate contesta neprimirea noastră la Schengen*. Uitați consecințele: Facebook. https://fb/watch/sly2EAB4ha/

P12: Simion, G. (2023, January 26). *Iohannis l-a trimis înapoi ambasador pe Hurezeanu la Viena, cancelarul austriac s-a dus în Bulgaria și nu*
răspunde întrebărilor românilor. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/george.simion.unire/posts/pfbid0WXT9vzCjpG91MFuJH5adVqsUAvMFrpbkpuwQvSLLAXToVsdMhUppYSoDnQNFwASXI

P13: Simion, G. (2023, January 16). Așa DA. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/george.simion.unire/posts/pfbid01CWCkSCvTcdT4WGA5gzF2tTRnL6Q3d5CLfKjgu2GxBVXCCciqw5ZAdfWMPeVvKwpl

P14: Tanasă, D. (2022, November 18). Austria se opune intrării României în Schengen. Lemnul și petrolul românesc sunt bune pentru Austria, românii nu! Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/dantanasa.ro/posts/pfbid0N5KJUBK7T6anjPQQTpQNLsjNuSC88mwc7fE7R9vNUjnNmicfcRRzz1vfYxq3bhJYl

P15: Târziu, C. (2022, October 21). Regimul Iohannis a vîndut inclusiv supremația Constituției României pentru ridicarea MCV și primirea în Schengen. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/claudiutarziuaur/posts/pfbid0RdiwQTQFuohWD5mrNGxfDjDeKR61WfU1oivKUFJw7L4miXosSFiLFK62fqc3UCCpl

P16: Târziu, C. (2022, December 13). În cele două mandate ale lui Klaus Iohannis, România a fost transformată într-un stat vasal, într-un slujitor bun al interesului european și al prietenilor prezidențiali. Facebook. https://fb/watch/slzgfI1QWz/

P17: Târziu, C. (2022, December 9). DESTUL! De peste trei decenii, ne-am obișnuit să ni se ia resursele naturale pe nimic. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/claudiutarziuaur/posts/pfbid04FeEDvkGS9hN8RyPHhFB1CiDPireNW2ZG5XdjkP1aUMfY87WehD8JqcVfgxGL2qwl

P18: Târziu, C. (2022, December 7). Dacă România nu va fi admisă mîine în Schengen, cine va fi de vină? Actuala guvernare sau cancelariile străine? Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/claudiutarziuaur/posts/pfbid0wrmJBgQa6eM7jCvyhRH7f2CDEbxkfsfj3fQauKxCsjWxvYAPLU4LdeEbBcEcnhiil

P19: Târziu, C. (2022, December 12). "Genul" este o ficțiune, instrument al neomarxismului. Facebook. https://fb/watch/slzc1jn16W/

P21: Târziu, C. (2022, December 8). Austria și Olanda au zis NU. Şi ne costă. Ce reacție trebuie să aibă guvernul român? Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/claudiutarziuaur/posts/pfbid0xpni8QwrWkCWHuz5q65Yy4Mhm2FC1iCcunt35F25ddgT23tNMHQqW5uvfndvuNapl

P22: Târziu, C. (2022, December 9). Azi, la ora 18, protest în fața Ambasadei Austriei. Veniți cît mai mulți! Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/
claudiutarziuaur/posts/pfbid02MiTSKUu6YQ5UrWeLyBZxf8qP6GabaJLmYwFBBicjX3Au9wXihykExSEwGSSr5Pqil

P23: Târziu, C. (2022, December 13). Austria şi Olanda ne-au trîntit uşă în nas, iar guvernul lui Iohannis încă “rezistă”. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/claudiutarziuaur/posts/pfbid02mutiqHBfU9otZ8Qg5Nq5eU1pH52YRJMAQ4aiuAsv8qSe1ro58rjSeTcCA217aSNl

P24: Tanasă, D. (2022, October 20). Olanda, un narco-stat în care jurnaliştii sunt împuşcaţi în cap pe stradă, se opune intrării României în Schengen. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/dantanasa.ro/posts/pfbid038BnFQ6EEmnrBYVZ9JMtb1G7UcXh9pef577EiFU8YpEqEXiJPze87p2D45ien31H4l

P25: Târziu, C. (2022, December 7). Austria se opune intrării României în Schengen, sub un pretext rușinos: că am fi sursă sau loc de tranzit pentru imigranții ilegali din Europa. Facebook. https://fb/watch/slymUE0HVz/

P26: Tanasă, D. (2022, December 14). Iohannis nu are nimic de reproșat Austriei în cazul Schengen! Sluga nu are curaj să deranjeze stăpânul! Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/dantanasa.ro/posts/pfbid02M1hSdCZz hxybVWLpnHq5Jh58oNvrhU6kQvRN9DFw4gjSp1jbJYvvFnZWcxSHNGcl

P27: Tanasă, D. (2022, December 10). Iohannis e tot la schi in Austria? Îl doare în Schengen de România! Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/dantanasa.ro/posts/pfbid02vkDi3SpWAFkZ4rpDFfkuMzuv1t2BVK27k6viqc47LARhR6B4jeoV1FEwvnMnUzYil

P28: Tanasă, D. (2022, December 9). Nu e nimeni vinovat pe Schengen. Nici PSD. Nici PNL. Nici Iohannis. Nimeni. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/dantanasa.ro/posts/pfbid0yyWvTUjFawWYa6MnTKMjUtK7QyKwSqcmdRrGTHsAgDtmh73dCdamNfFPFTpknnCKI

P29: Tanasă, D. (2022, December 8). După "România educată" Klaus Iohannis a atins astăzi un nou obiectiv de țară: România fără Schengen! Cu sprijinul PSD și PNL! Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/dantanasa.ro/posts/pfbid02F8f6bihu87Kn7My27dHMno1d9mi6hLu9U2sstrCn3qxRJcjfBDpw5fcsUms7WqTPl

P30: Şerban, G. (2022, December 9). Nu suntem un popor de mâna doua! În fața ambasadei Austriei, luptăm pentru demnitatea românilor. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/gianinaserbandeputatAUR/posts/pfbid0JRZLeSXDBYAsLPDoouZoK9X1r5nfUtCFv9xeDYB6enHsS9HGqTKkfbwxwDaBNZJ9l
P31: Șerban, G. (2023, February 6). Am atras atenția guvernanților asupra faptului că 8 februarie e termenul limită pentru ca Guvernul României să conteste neprimirea în Schengen! Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/gianinaserbandeputatAUR/posts/pfbid027R1GUz3hjdgFE6uw c6Rfoitvj9CpwWYxQRqNiayic4JwQDvohcvNvNFj6Zg2xZ9Kl

P32: Șerban, G. (2023, March 9). De România în Schengen nu e vorba. Azi și mâine, program în consiliul JAI. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/gianinaserbandeputatAUR/posts/pfbid0Mb9798EMmfDoq1aat1qWqLhxi64kbY7iERwkUU26eEGzXqj2pM6oxHVqakFVGUCCI

P33: Șerban, G. (2022, December 19). UE spune că suntem pregătiți, Iohannis ne pune din nou la coada Europei. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/gianinaserbandeputatAUR/posts/pfbid02wPMMdb4yeNYRXZRU Zv5B5dBNzJQ7BpRLxiXAZmpKM9Rf3kwY5eDwMKKbrc8PzKxml

P34: Șerban, G. (2022, December 8). Guvernul impotent PSD-PNL-UDMR o nouă trădare pentru români. Viitoarea guvernare AUR va duce România în Schengen! Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/gianinaserbandeputatAUR/posts/pfbid0c9LLnWh8EBzDwfSL85jDTGnWvjvEoV3 3b69YbykCDbaYh8gaqu67HiL1qH3YgmPtl

P35: Șerban, G. (2022, October 28). Am o curiozitate. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/gianinaserbandeputatAUR/posts/pfbid02HtDNK41jJoxYjDoYy5eKRP1j74L7Lh3sWwC7AJYbQaoSzhuh2bHVxfU8yshy6WPol

P36: Alecu, R. (2022, December 14). "Nu va exista un boicot la adresa Austriei." Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/RobertAlecu.AUR/posts/pfbid02xJeSSVNzgv2Q91wN14aiJAVggp6iBkqGfExFWkynaw4pqukWrXAtJLUgmhFtsho7l

All links were verified by the editors and found to be functioning before the publication of this text in 2025.

### DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

### FUNDING

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this paper.