The **issue of the EU budget** will come up again. Additional funding will be needed. The New Member States will be net beneficiaries because of their economic backwardness and the EU is expected to fund new policies such as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) or the fight against global warming. Allocation of green taxes (carbon tax, sale of greenhouse gas emission allowances, etc.) would provide the budget with additional resources without extra taxation of new European citizens.

Cohesion policy based on financial solidarity and support to the regions and less developed countries may be totally affected to new Member States while the members of the former **EU-15 have their own disadvantaged areas.** It may need an additional funding. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as it currently stands will be the most inappropriate European policy to those new memberships. It must be completely reformed but how? It is at risk of being renationalized as a result.

Furthermore, it will be increasingly difficult to cope with **social dumping** along with relocations. Transitional arrangements for the **free movement of workers** should be amended from current 7 years for a longer period for all EU New Member States.

The adoption of the Euro as the single currency within the EU will require much more time because of differences in GDP that will increase significantly.

## CONCLUSION

The European Union has 28 members since Croatia became a member in July 1st, 2013. The enlargement to Iceland is delayed by the suspension of negotiations decided by the Icelandic government.

The enlargement of the **EU to the Western Balkans is positive** because it will stabilize the region. It will provide a solution to the problems of minorities such as the Roma. Recognition of Serbia as a candidate state and the **EU accession negotiation with Serbia** are very positive achievements resulting from the agreement with Kosovo. The enlargements to those countries will need from 10 to 15 years.

The issue of Turkish membership is very complex. It is not progressing much **because of both sides.** The EU delays the negotiations because of Cyprus, France and Germany unfavorable for Turkish membership but left the negotiations to continue. On the other hand Turkey does not respect the Ankara Agreement, appears reticent with regard to Armenia, slows down reforms and demonstrated undemocratic attitude during the demonstrations in June 2013. The membership of Turkey to the EU will have several advantages: demographic, geopolitical, geostrategic and economic. By shifting the borders to Iraq, Iran, the Caucasus and Syria, the EU would have many new responsibilities it could not take on without becoming a real political power.

The issue of the Eastern borders of the EU can be addressed by the Neighbourhood Policy through the Association Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. The EU should also provide a new policy to Russia by offering to join the internal EU market. The Euro would gradually become the exchange currency to be then adopted in the internal EU market.

## Bibliographie:

* Godelieve, Masuy Strobant (sous la direction de), *L'élargissement de l'Union européenne. Enjeux et implications socio-économiques*, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2012.

* Beurdeley, Laurent, L'élargissement de l'Union européenne aux pays d'Europe centrale et orientale et aux îles du Bassin méditerranéen, Questions contemporaines, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2003.

* Delorme, Philippe, *L'Europe des 30 en marche*, Gualino éditeur Paris 2007

* Drevet, Jean-François, *L'élargissement de l'Union européenne jusqu'ou ? 2e édition*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2004.

* Drouet, Michel, *Vers l'élargissement de l'Union européenne à l'Europe du Sud-Est*, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2007.

* Hernandez Sandra, *Comprendre l'élargissement de l'Union européenne dans ses dimensions multiples*, Université Laval Québec, 2004.

* Krifa-Schneider Hadjila (sous la direction de), *L'élargissement de l'Union européenne. Quels enjeux et défis majeurs ?* Série Le Monde en questions, collection L'esprit économique Paris, l'Harmattan 2007.

* Labori Michel et Costea, *Simion, Le management des politiques européennes*, Paris, Prodifmultimedia, 2011.

* Saidi, Hyna, *L'élargissement de l'Union européenne aux Etats postcommunistes d'Europe centrale et orientale*, Paris, 2005.

<figure><img src="image_18.png" /></figure>
# United Kingdom Attitudes to European Union Enlargement

DR. COLIN SWATRIDGE

Visiting Lecturer at Miskolc University, and Pazmany Peter Catholic University (Hungary); former Head of General Studies at Reigate College and Chief Examiner for General Studies for one of the main awarding bodies (UK)

**Abstract:** The UK was an enthusiastic advocate of EU enlargement up until 2004. In 2001, 8.3 per cent of the UK population was foreign-born; by the beginning of 2014, it was 13 per cent. In the decade between 2004 and 2014, the immigration issue rose up the list of concerns voiced by the general public, and in consequence it grew in political importance. EU enlargement came to be associated with mass immigration, in spite of the fact that immigrants from EU countries account for only one third of the total. In consequence, the UK now sets a slow-down in the enlargement process as a condition of continued membership of the EU.

**Keywords:** enlargement, immigration, employment.

The writing of this paper commenced on 31 December 2013 and it was completed in the early part of January 2014. From this perspective, a survey of UK attitudes to EU enlargement seems to fall (like much else) into three parts. In the first place, a warm welcome was given to the accession of eight ex-Soviet satellites in Central/Eastern Europe, in 2004. This positive attitude, though, must be set against the long-standing scepticism of a rather large section of the British population that never had quite reconciled itself to membership of the European Community, let alone of the Union. Secondly, following the influx of large numbers of Poles, in particular, into the UK in 2004 and subsequently there was both a feeling on the right of the political centre that immigration had had largely negative effects, and a left-of-centre confidence in the positive pay-off from enlargement and from the fact the UK had received the lion's share of immigrants. As 1 January 2014 approached with the lifting of controls on immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria, the right-of-centre voices grew more strident. The third part of this survey can only be undertaken and understood in consideration of these first two parts since it concerns UK attitudes (to the extent that these can be generalized) towards further enlargement in the medium to long term.

## PART 1: BEFORE 2004

Former Social Democrat Chancellor (1974-82) of what was then West Germany, Helmut Schmidt, had this to say in an interview just before Christmas 2013:

> I had been very disappointed by Harold Wilson and Margaret Thatcher. I had thought it was absolutely necessary to include Britain into the European Community. It happened in the end under Ted Heath. He was the only British leader who believed in Europe. The others only paid lip service. Neither Harold Wilson nor Margaret Thatcher wanted the EC to be a success; they only wanted a thumb in the pie.

When he was asked whether he thought Britain would ever adopt the common currency, he replied:

> I don't know. I don't know whether I would like Britain to join. The British are very stubborn. The Queen, the Commonwealth and the special relationship with the US is much more important than Europe. Britain still believes in the old values and it has every right to do so. Britain is less European-minded than Greece.<fnref n="1" />

Helmut Schmidt was right: Britain never has been 'European-minded', and he put his finger on the reasons for British scepticism. He was looking rather far back, though: in talking about Wilson, Heath, and

<footnote n="1">¹ Helmut Schmidt, 'Britain has a problem; you can be hurt', in an interview with Larry Elliott, London: *The Guardian*, 23 December 2013.</footnote>
Thatcher, he neglected to mention the genuine delight in Britain at the events of 1989. This delight is reflected in the measured tones of journalist Peter Jenkins writing on Valentine's Day, 1989:

> Caught up in the heady excitement of history-making, the talk is of crossing Rubicons. Perhaps that fatal crossing took place this weekend when the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party opted for 'the pluralisation of the political system...in the context of a multi-party system'. Whatever that turns out to be exactly, it would seem to mean the end of one-party rule in the classic communist manner.<fnref n="1" />

It meant precisely that: within a year, the 'iron curtain' was no more. From that time until 2004, Britons shared Prime Minister John Major's positive attitude towards the eventual EU membership of the eight newly-free states. He expressed himself thus in his autobiography: 'I was a convinced advocate of enlargement as a historic obligation to nations we had left on the wrong side of the iron Curtain.' Then he went on to say: 'But I did not relish changes that diminished the prerogative of the British Parliament.'<fnref n="2" /> Major's Euro-enthusiasm always was tempered by his alertness to scepticism on his own back benches, and it justifies Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary in the 1997-2001 government of Tony Blair, in his estimate of Blair as 'arguably the most pro-European Prime Minister in modern times, certainly since Edward Heath...It is to Tony Blair's credit that in his first term of office he transformed Britain's relations with Europe.'<fnref n="3" />

Meanwhile, though, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) had been established in 1993, 'dedicated to Britain's withdrawal from the European Union'. The party in Reigate, Surrey, cited in a 1997 election communication a Daily Telegraph poll in which (unsurprisingly) 'only 10% voted for a European Superstate'.<fnref n="4" /> In the same election year, and in the same Reigate constituency, Conservative MP, Sir George Gardiner, stood for Parliament in the name of the newly-established Referendum Party. His fear was that whichever government was returned in the general election of 1997, the pound would be 'scrapped', and Britain would 'stay trapped on this escalator to a European Super-State, our fishermen betrayed, our farmers sacrificed, diktats flowing from Brussels and the European Court negating our democratic laws.'<fnref n="5" />

The Referendum Party sank without trace, and, though UKIP was the beneficiary, and though it won three seats in the 1999 European Elections, UKIP was still some years from being a serious influence on politics at a national level. The Conservative Party under William Hague (1997-2001) was itself more 'eurosaptic' than ever, pledging to oppose adoption of the single currency 'during the next parliament', and to 'reject a federal United States of Europe'. At the same time, it was acknowledged that: 'Conservatives are committed to British membership of the European Union. We will make the EU work for Britain's interests. Conservatives will: create a flexible Europe of Nation States; [and] bring the new democracies into the European Union'; indeed, 'We will press for the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, Cyprus and Malta, to be allowed to join the European Union as a top priority'.<fnref n="6" />

It may be that the enthusiasm for enlargement on the right and the left of politics at the turn of the millennium was not unconnected with the concurrent anxiety about European federalism: 'The larger the European Union, the less likely it is to develop into a true political union.' This might well have been the thinking. 'It's no coincidence that the British, whose vision of the EU is little more than a free-trade zone, are the biggest apologists for enlargement'.<fnref n="7" /> So wrote a contributor to an EU online debate. After all, surely, countries that had laboured for so long under the yoke of Moscow would not tolerate direction from Brussels; on the contrary, they would be allies in the right-of-centre campaign for a 'Europe of nation states'. Be that as it may, it is worth adding as a tailpiece to this section some further supporting evidence for Schmidt's contention that Britain has never been very 'European-minded'. In a 1999

<footnote n="1">¹ Peter Jenkins, 'Hungary's new tomorrow', London: *The Independent*, 14 February 1989</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² John Major, *John Major: The Autobiography*, HarperCollins Publishers, 1999, page 581</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Robin Cook, *The Point of Departure*, London: Simon & Schuster, 2003, pages 130,131</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ UKIP, in an 'Election Communication – Reigate Constituency', Redhill, Surrey, 1997</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Referendum Party, 'Alert to the British People', London: The Referendum Party, 1997</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Conservative Party, 'In Europe, not run by Europe', Election Communication, South East Region, 1999</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ 'Arguments for and against enlargement', www.debatingeurope.eu, 2014</footnote>
Eurobarometer survey of feelings of identity with one's home country, or with Europe, 67 per cent of respondents in the UK ticked the 'nationality only' box, and only 24 per cent ticked the 'nationality and European' box; in so doing, the UK was the highest among EU countries in the former category, and lowest in the latter.<fnref n="1" />

## PART 2: FROM 2004 UNTIL 2013

It is hazardous to predict trends in patterns of migration, nevertheless, in 2003 the Blair government commissioned research into the likely inflow of immigrants following the accession of ten countries to the EU in May 2004. The prediction offered by economist Christian Dustmann<fnref n="2" /> and his research team was that perhaps between 5,000 and 13,000 nationals from the E10 would arrive in each year after enlargement. In fact, according to Jill Rutter, 540,000 accession-state nationals had migrated to the UK by 2008. Although ministers did not endorse Dustmann's findings, Rutter says, 'the then government did not listen to other advice',<fnref n="3" /> and, in consequence, the UK, along with Sweden and Ireland, did not impose entry restrictions.

A Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) was introduced in the UK, however, and, according to Home Office estimates, some 600,000 migrants from the new member states applied to join the scheme within the first two years after accession. <fnref n="4" /> If it was difficult to predict migrant numbers, it was equally difficult to count net inflow in and after 2004. This is amply demonstrated on a European Citizen Action Service (ECAS) website, where it is variously stated that 'there were, by the end of 2006, 685,000 EU8 nationals employed in the EU15, of which 34 per cent were in the UK'; 'between May 2004 and December 2006 around 487,000 EU8 nationals entered the UK labour market'; and 'in summer 2006 it was reported that the UK had received over 1million citizens from the new member states since the 2004 enlargement'.<fnref n="5" /> This last suspiciously round number was a media over-statement following reports of strains on local services, and the voluntary repatriation of destitute Poles on the streets of London (Poles accounted for something like two thirds of all immigrants in 2004) – but it might not have been a wild over-statement. In addition to data from the WRS, we have the numbers of employees and of the self-employed who were obliged to register for a National Insurance number. Blanchflower and Lawton give us figures up to 31 March 2008, which include migrants from new members Romania and Bulgaria: 812,000 applicants were approved on the WRS from the E10 countries, and 38,620 from the new E2, giving us a total of 844,620; from all twelve countries, 879,168 applied for, and received, NI numbers – so the authors are justified in saying that 'since 2004, nearly 900,000 workers from these countries registered to work in the UK'.<fnref n="6" /> The British National Party put the figure of 'illegal immigrants and “asylum seekers” in Britain' at 2 million<fnref n="7" />; UKIP went further, and claimed that 'under the last Labour government over 3,000,000 immigrants were allowed to enter this country'.<fnref n="8" />

Responsible commentators noted that migrants from EU countries only accounted for around one third of the total net inward, non-British, migration to the UK, and that the evidence was that migrants from Eastern Europe entered the UK in search of work, not in order to claim welfare benefits.<fnref n="9" /> Such

<footnote n="1">¹ Alexander B. Murphy, 'The May Enlargement of the European Union: view from two years out' www.colorado.edu/geography/class_homepages, 2007</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Christian Dustmann et al. 'The impact of EU enlargement on migration flows', London: Home Office Online Report 25/03</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Jill Rutter 'Bulgaria, Romania, concerns about immigration and attitudes to EU membership', www.leftfootforward.org, February 2013</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ House of Lords: European Union Committee, 'The Further Enlargement of the EU: threat or opportunity?', London: The Stationery Office Ltd., November 2006</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ ECAS, 'Who's afraid of the EU's latest enlargement? The impact of Bulgaria and Romania joining the Union on the free movement of persons', www.ecas-citizens.eu, 2008</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ David G. Blanchflower and Helen Lawton, 'The Impact of the Recent Expansion of the EU on the UK Labour Market', Kiel: Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3695 page 2</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ BNP Election Communication, England North West Region, Welshpool: British National Party, June 2004</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ UKIP publicity in the North West, 2011, www.ukip.org</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Open Europe, 'Open Europe submission to the UK Government's Balance of Competence Review: Free Movement of Persons', www.openeurope.org.uk, July 2013</footnote>
evidence was provided by a Department of Work and Pensions finding of February 2011 to the effect that just 6.6 per cent of non-UK citizens were claiming benefits, compared with 16.6 per cent of UK nationals – and EU citizens barely figured even among the 6.6 per cent: the majority of claimants were from India, Pakistan, Somalia, and Bangladesh. Migrant workers from the EU8 countries were net contributors to the public purse.<fnref n="1" />

Blanchflower and Lawton pointed out that the average age of EU migrants was 20.1 years; that they were generally 'highly educated'; and that only 7 per cent had dependants. They came to this glowing conclusion, in 2008:

> The fact that the UK opened its borders to a flow of highly-skilled, motivated, educated, low-cost mobile workers upon EU enlargement was a stroke of genius for which the UK government should be given credit... Contrary to the fears of some, these recent post-enlargement arrivals from Eastern Europe appear to have had no difficulty in assimilating into the native population who have welcomed them with open arms.<fnref n="2" />

This overstates the case: the House of Lords European Union Committee came to the more realistic conclusion that 'there is a sharp contrast between public perceptions (and some political rhetoric) about the impact of the last round of enlargement and the assessment of it by most experts'.<fnref n="3" /> The Committee cited the results of a Eurobarometer survey ('The Future of Europe'), undertaken in May 2006: 49 per cent of UK respondents agreed that 'enlargement has been a positive thing', whilst 64 per cent felt that 'it increases problems in the job market'. The UK Government was so disturbed by signs of public unease about the free movement policy that, though it had been among the first to grant free access to workers from the E10 in 2004, it announced in October 2006 that restrictions would be applied for the maximum permissible seven years for workers from Romania and Bulgaria.

It has become the accepted narrative that the government of Tony Blair grossly under-estimated the number of migrants who would choose to register for employment in the UK in 2004. Ed Miliband, leader of the present-day Labour opposition, said this, in a speech to the Institute for Public Policy Research in June 2012:

> When I was running for the Labour Party leadership, I said that one of the areas where we had got things wrong and needed to change was immigration....The truth is that the public were ahead of us in seeing some of the problems caused by the rapid pace of migration, especially from the expanded EU.<fnref n="4" />

Of course, the coalition government was not slow to agree that Labour had 'got it wrong'. Such is the consensus, that, as 1 January 2014 approached, Cameron announced that extra controls would be placed on welfare benefits for new arrivals. Even Peter Dominiczak in the Daily Telegraph admitted that these new rules were 'rushed out' to 'make the UK a less attractive place for EU migrants'.<fnref n="5" /> Others mocked Cameron for dressing up in UKIP's clothes. If this was, indeed, his motive it was well judged since recent 'polls have suggested that the rise in popularity of UKIP is due to the growing unease over the impact of migration on Britain, more than dislike of the European Union as a whole'.<fnref n="6" />

In a recent BBC Panorama programme it was estimated that 100,000 Romanians and 57,000 Bulgarians would seek work in the UK. Nigel Garage of UKIP was quoted as saying that London was experiencing a 'Romanian crime wave'; the London district of Cricklewood was singled out as one where Romanians, many of them Roma, form 'an underclass'; and Slough, west of London, was featured as a borough 58 per cent of whose residents are non-native, 'and the people of Slough are sick of it. There are Sloughs up and down the land', it was said.<fnref n="7" />

<footnote n="1">¹ Tim Harford 'A "simple rule" about migrants and benefits', www.ft.com, March 2013</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² David G. Blanchflower and Helen Lawton, op. cit., pages 16,17</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ House of Lords: European Union Committee, op. cit.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Ed Miliband, 'Ed Miliband's immigration speech in full', 22 June 2012, www.politics.co.uk</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Peter Dominiczak, 'Vince Cable compares David Cameron to Enoch Powell', London: Daily Telegraph, 22 December 2013</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Tim Ross, 'Ed Miliband: Labour will cut immigration if we win next election', London: The Daily Telegraph, 22 September 2013</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ 'The Romanians are coming?', London: BBC Panorama, 16 December 2013.</footnote>
There can be no question but that what Business Secretary Vince Cable has called ‘immigration panic’ conditions much UK thinking about the EU in general, and about EU enlargement in particular.

## PART 3: AFTER 2014

The UK was one of the most outspoken advocates of EU enlargement under Labour and Conservative governments before 2004. In the 1990s, Conservative Prime Minister John Major looked ahead to an EU that would stretch as far as the Urals. ‘No-one could explain how he proposed to persuade the Russians that their country should be divided,’ Julie Smith observes, ‘but the message was clear: a wider Europe would inevitably mean a looser Europe and should therefore be encouraged.’<fnref n="1" /> In 1999, Tony Blair championed the cause of Romania and Bulgaria; and perhaps the one product of the UK’s presidency of the Council, in the second half of 2004, was that negotiations with Turkey on its possible accession to the EU were begun as planned on 3 October 2004.

The House of Lords EU Committee, back in 2006, had been large-minded:

> We believe that it would be politically undesirable for the EU to attempt to define its final boundaries and also that it would be a mistake for the EU to impose an artificial “pause” on enlargement. We urge Member States to keep their commitments to offer full membership to both Turkey and the countries of the Western Balkans if and when they are ready to assume the obligations of membership.<fnref n="2" />

It noted ruefully, though, that only Poles and Lithuanians supported Ukrainian membership, and no member was a conspicuous advocate of the accession of any of the countries of the Caucasus region. Furthermore, whilst some acknowledged the benefits of Turkish accession, ‘these seem to count for little at the level of the general public’.

EU leaders had promised the countries of the Western Balkans that they would join the Union on the condition that they fulfilled the Copenhagen accession criteria; this was at the EU-Balkan ‘summit’ meeting in **Thessaloniki in 2003**. Macedonia was accepted as a candidate country at the end of 2005; Stabilisation and Association Agreements were signed with Albania in June 2006, and with Serbia and with Bosnia-Herzegovina in April and June 2008, respectively. Croatia, the second of the nations of former Yugoslavia to accede, was admitted as a full member of the EU in July 2013. It was observed on the BBC ‘News Europe’ website on accession day, that: ‘The welcome for Croatia was somewhat muted as surveys suggested that **“enlargement fatigue” and anxiety about migrant workers were widespread in Europe”**.<fnref n="3" /> On the same site, outstanding issues inhibiting EU membership were listed for each of the ‘next seven’ accession countries (including ‘corruption’, ‘human trafficking’, the ‘need to consolidate the rule of law’, and ‘organized crime’).

It was reported by the BBC that: ‘The UK Foreign Office says it expects Turkey to be ready for membership “in a decade or so”’. Even that distant date may be in jeopardy: Egenem Bagis, Turkish minister for EU affairs in 2013, has said that his country must accept that ‘its long-cherished goal of joining the EU was likely to end in disappointment’.<fnref n="4" /> Among other reasons given for this pessimism (**Iceland’s withdrawal** from accession negotiations, rising anti-EU sentiment among existing members) was cited the forthcoming **referendum on EU membership promised by David Cameron**, following a Conservative Party majority in the General Election in 2015. The promise was given in response to a fairly constant noise from the Conservative Party back-benches, **UKIP success** in local council elections in May 2013 (when the party won, on average, 25 per cent of the vote), and incendiary stories about immigrant numbers in the right-of-centre press. Cameron has undertaken to re-negotiate EU treaties, in such a way as that he will be able to campaign for an ‘In’ vote in the ‘in-out’ referendum – and it is

<footnote n="1">¹ Julie Smith, ‘How to lose friends and influence – the UK and the new EU member states’, The Federal Trust, www.fedtrust.co.uk, January 2006</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² House of Lords: European Union Committee, op.cit.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ BBC ‘EU Enlargement: The next seven’, www.bbc.co.uk, 1 July 2013</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Alex Spillins, ‘Turkey “will probably never be EU member”’, London: The Daily Telegraph, 21 September 2013</footnote>
becoming clear what at least one of the conditions for his positive vote will be. According to Ian Traynor, the Guardian's correspondent in Brussels, Cameron hinted at an EU 'summit' on 20 December 2013 that **Britain might veto the admission of new member states unless curbs on 'mass population movements' were introduced, although, Traynor adds, 'there is no prospect of any further countries joining the EU over the next decade'**.<fnref n="1" /> Apparently, Cameron envisages slowing down access to the labour markets of 'old' member-states until the wage levels and GDP of 'new' countries is at a level that would obviate large-scale 'economic migration'.

‘It’s a big reversal of Britain’s [EU] enlargement policy,’ one EU official is quoted as having said. ‘The UK has always been the champion of enlargement. That’s changed’.<fnref n="2" />

Indeed it has: it is ironical that it should have changed at a time when it was feared there would be an influx of Romanians and Bulgarians into the UK, when the fact is that there were already 160,000 Romanians and Bulgarians in the UK before 1 January 2014. What has changed is that we are now talking about it. In a BBC programme entitled ‘The Truth About Immigration’, Gus O’Donnell, Cabinet Secretary 2005-2011 admitted to presenter Nick Robinson: ‘There wasn’t a lot of discussion about what enlargement would mean for immigration’.<fnref n="3" /> **Enlargement has come to be synonymous with immigration, and that has dulled what enthusiasm for enlargement the UK once showed.** If the UK had reasons of its own for this enthusiasm, it is not now alone in its wish to slow the enlargement process; as Cameron rather pointedly reminded ministers at that same Brussels meeting, before a candidate country is admitted to the EU, the unanimous agreement of all 28 member countries is required. None of the ‘next seven’ can count upon that level of support.

**Bibliography:**

Blanchflower David G. and Helen Lawton, 'The Impact of the Recent Expansion of the EU on the UK Labour Market' (IZA Discussion Paper No. 3695 page 2), Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel

BBC, 'EU Enlargement: The next seven', www.bbc.co.uk, 1 July 2013

BBC, 'The Romanians are coming?', BBC Panorama, 16 December 2013.

British National Party, Election Communication, England North West Region,

British National Party, Welshpool, June 2004

Conservative Party, 'In Europe, not run by Europe', Election Communication, South East Region, 1999

Cook Robin, *The Point of Departure*, (pages 130,131) Simon & Schuster, London, 2003

Dominiczak Peter, 'Vince Cable compares David Cameron to Enoch Powell', *Daily Telegraph*, London, 22 December 2013

Dustmann Christian et al., 'The impact of EU enlargement on migration flows', (Online Report 25/03) Home Office, London, 2003

ECAS, 'Who's afraid of the EU's latest enlargement? The impact of Bulgaria and Romania joining the Union on the free movement of persons', www.ecas-citizens.eu, 2008

Harford Tim, 'A “simple rule” about migrants and benefits', www.ft.com, March 2013

House of Lords: European Union Committee, 'The Further Enlargement of the EU: threat or opportunity?', The Stationery Office Ltd., London, November 2006

Jenkins Peter, 'Hungary's new tomorrow', *The Independent*, London, 14 February 1989

Labori Michel et Costea, Simion, *Le management des politiques européennes*, Paris, Prodifmultimedia, 2011.

Major John, *John Major: The Autobiography* (page 581) HarperCollins, London, 1999

Miliband Ed, 'Ed Miliband's immigration speech in full', www.politics.co.uk, 22 June 2012

Murphy Alexander, 'The May Enlargement of the European Union: view from two years out' www.colorado.edu/geography/class_homepages, 2007

Nyman Adam, 'Arguments for and against enlargement', www.debatingeurope.eu, 2014

Open Europe, 'Open Europe submission to the UK Government's Balance of Competence Review: Free Movement of Persons', www.openeurope.org.uk, July 2013

Referendum Party, 'Alert to the British People', The Referendum Party, London, 1997

Robinson Nick, 'The Truth About Immigration', BBC, 7 January 2014

<footnote n="1">¹ Ian Traynor, 'Cameron urges curb on EU freedom of movement', London: The Guardian, 21 December 2013</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Ian Traynor, ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Nick Robinson, 'The Truth About Immigration', BBC, 7 January 2014</footnote>
Ross Tim, ‘Ed Miliband: Labour will cut immigration if we win next election’, *The Daily Telegraph*, London, 22 September 2013

Rutter Jill, ‘Bulgaria, Romania, concerns about immigration and attitudes to EU membership’, www.leftfootforward.org, February 2013

Schmidt Helmut, ‘Britain has a problem; you can be hurt’, *The Guardian*, London, 23 December 2013.

Smith Julie, ‘How to lose friends and influence – the UK and the new EU member states’, The Federal Trust, www.fedtrust.co.uk, January 2006

Spillins Alex, ‘Turkey “will probably never be EU member”’, *The Daily Telegraph*, London, 21 September 2013

Traynor Ian, ‘Cameron urges curb on EU freedom of movement’, *The Guardian*, London, 21 December 2013

United Kingdom Independence Party, ‘Election Communication – Reigate Constituency’, UKIP, Redhill, 1997

UKIP publicity in the North West, 2011, www.ukip.org

<figure><img src="image_19.png" /></figure>
# Le concept européen d'un système de justice adaptée aux enfants et ses développements en Albanie, en perspective d'adhésion à l'Union Européenne

DR.ANILA NEPRAVISHTA

Commissaire, Avocat du Peuple, Albanie

**Abstract:** The purpose of the juvenile justice system is to develop a suitable answer to crime and offenses committed by minors, which must be unique and special just for them, compared to adults. Ensuring the best interests of the child is essential. In many European countries, the main objectives of the juvenile justice system are: to make the minor accountable for their actions, to promote effective prevention, balanced attention to the offender, the victim and the community, to make effective decisions based on the risk of crime, for a better rehabilitation and reintegration of children into society.

**Keywords:** EU enlargement, juvenile justice, children's rights.

Dans la plupart des pays européens, les objectifs principaux du système de justice pour mineurs sont les suivantes: faire les mineurs responsables de leurs actes; prévenir efficacement; protéger le public contre tous les actes et les comportements criminels; faire attention au délinquant, la victime et la collectivité; imposer des sanctions en proportion de la gravité de l'infraction.

La 28e Conférence des Ministres européens de la Justice tenue à Lanzarote, a adopté la Résolution nr. 2 sur la justice des mineurs. Ceci a été précédé par le Conseil de l'Europe pour préparer des lignes base sur la justice des mineurs. Le Parlement européen a adopté une résolution sur la base de la Charte européenne des droits de l'enfant<fnref n="1" />. Puis, en 1996, il a été complété par une série de mesures relatives à la protection des enfants et pour la lutte contre l'exploitation sexuelle, par les institutions européennes. Le développement de la justice des mineurs en Europe est associé à la réception des responsabilités par les enfants et leurs familles, les parents dans les cas d'enfants qui commettent des crimes et dans le même temps par le développement de la justice réparatrice comme l'un des moyens alternative à la justice pénale, qui donne une place particulière pour la victime, la communauté et toute la société. Entreprendre des politiques communes en matière de prévention et de traitement de la délinquance juvénile est important. Aujourd'hui, en Europe, on trouve de nombreux exemples de la justice pour les mineurs. Chaque jour, résultent de nombreux formes de criminalité et de la délinquance juvénile et que ce phénomène a augmenté. Selon l'UNICEF, 1,1 millions d'enfants dans le monde sont aujourd'hui en prison. De nombreux pays ont mis en place des tribunaux pour mineurs, des unités spéciales de la police ou des procureurs pour les affaires de mineurs, il y a des procédures spéciales pour le traitement des mineurs, etc. Les éléments principaux du système de la justice pour mineurs sont: prévenir la délinquance juvénile; procéder judiciairement et quand il ya de l'espace la possibilité de régler par la médiation des conflits, l'âge minimum pour la responsabilité pénale; les garanties d'un procès équitable; la restriction et la privation de liberté, y compris la saisie, la détention et la peine d'emprisonnement. L'âge minimum de la responsabilité pénale en fonction des rapports que les États parties de la Convention des Nations Unies relative aux droits de l'enfant soumissent au Comité des Nations Unies, varie d'âge 7-8 ans à 14-16 ans. Fixer un âge minimum pour la responsabilité pénale, veut dire que les mineurs qui ont commis l'infraction prévue à cet âge ne peuvent être tenus responsables selon la législation et la procédure pénale. Mais pour le meilleur intérêt du cette catégorie des mineurs, on peut prendre des mesures spéciales de protection. Alors que pour les enfants au minimum ou au-dessus de la responsabilité pénale mais moins de 18 ans, ils sont susceptibles de sujets de droit et de la procédure pénale<fnref n="2" />. Il est également considérées totalement

<footnote n="1">¹ Résolution du 8 Juillet 1992, nr. C 241</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Le paragraphe 31 de l'Observation générale no 10 (2007) du Comité des Nations Unies sur les droits de l'enfant.</footnote>
inacceptable sur le plan international, la détermination de l'âge minimum de la responsabilité pénale de 12 ans<fnref n="1" />. Parmi les garanties d'un procès équitable on comprend l'absence de la rétroactivité de la justice pour mineurs, la présomption d'innocence, le droit à l'information au cours de leur détention ainsi que lors de l'interrogatoire par l'officier de police, le procureur ou le juge. Cela signifie que l'enfant, pour participer efficacement à la procédure, doit être informé non seulement de la charge, mais aussi avec l'ensemble du processus et les mesures punitifs. Des autres garanties sont: le droit à la participation effective à la procédure, le droit à l'information le plus rapidement et directement dans la procédure, le droit à une assistance juridique au cours de sa défense et le droit à la protection de sa vie privée et la correspondance. Pour les enfants en conflit avec la loi, il est largement reconnu que le calendrier et le temps du procès doit être effectuée le plus court possible, en raison de non-stigmatisation. Le principe de l'égalité des armes<fnref n="2" /> revêt une importance particulière dans l'administration de la justice pour mineurs. Au cours de la privation de liberté des mineurs, il devrait fournir une assistance éducative, psychologique et médicale, s'il est nécessaire pour faciliter sa réhabilitation. La détention des mineurs par la police s'ordonne comme un dernier recours pour le temps et le plus court possible. Mais l'arrestation provisoire ou la détention d'un mineur ne peut excéder une période de 24 heures.

Lors de sa réunion nr. 1134 (15 Février 2012) le Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe, a adopté une nouvelle stratégie sur les droits de l'enfant de 2012 à 2015, où l'un des objectifs était de promouvoir un système de justice plus adaptée aux enfants. Dans le plan d'action de la stratégie pour "les enfants qui souffrent de la peine d'emprisonnement" est déterminé "à promouvoir et à évaluer la mise en œuvre par tous les États membres du Comité des Ministres la Recommandation 11(2008) sur les Règles européennes pour les délinquants mineurs<fnref n="3" /> aux sanctions et mesures punitives".

Aujourd'hui, en dépit du fait que de nombreux documents internationaux importants sont adoptés au niveau mondial pour les droits des enfants et leur accès à la justice internationale, encore une fois, ils ne sont pas correctement reconnus et que les enfants n'ont pas la même protection dans tous les pays. L'accès à la justice internationale des jeunes et des enfants, n'est pas une chose si simple perçu à se développer. Les lignes du Conseil de l'Europe pour une justice adaptée aux enfants sont basées sur cinq principes fondamentaux: la participation, le meilleur intérêt de l'enfant, la dignité, la protection contre la discrimination et la priorité du droit.

## ACCES AU SYSTEME JUDICIAIRE POUR LES ENFANTS

Même si elle est acceptée que les enfants sont légalement détenteur des droits, le fait est que, pour beaucoup d'entre eux efficacement cette approche est absent, pour des raisons telles que l'âge, des coûts financiers qui nécessitent des procédures judiciaires, les conflits d'intérêts avec les parents, le manque d'information, les obstacles de la législation nationale, etc. L'accès à la justice et la consultation juridique aux mineurs, sont étroitement liées les unes aux autres, et elles sont très importants dans cette démarche<fnref n="4" />. Il est également important que l'enfant soit traité en tenant pleinement compte de l'âge, la maturité et la capacité émotionnelle et intellectuelle, afin de comprendre les procédures, il est impliqué et participer à eux. Comme le jugement de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (CEDH), les États devraient prêter attention aux cours d'un processus, que les intérêts du témoin mineur et de la victime ne sont pas menacés. Par exemple, lorsqu'il s'agit de juger la violence sexuelle contre un mineur, les mesures pour protéger la victime doivent être tel qu'il convient également de garantir une protection efficace. L'interrogatoire des mineurs doit être effectué en présence d'un psychologue afin d'éviter la victimisation des mineurs par processus de préjugés. Les exemples de la jurisprudence de Strasbourg, ont mis en évidence la nécessité de la formation des professionnels et des personnes qui s'occupent des mineurs, dans différentes situations et problèmes. De même, l'éducation des enfants avec l'idée d'être actif, de participer

<footnote n="1">¹ Expressément spécifié dans le paragraphe 32 de l'Observation générale no 10 (2007) du Comité des Nations Unies sur les droits de l'enfant.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Article 40/2 paragraphe 'b' de la CDE</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1367113&Site=CM</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Voir le cas Salduz contre la Turqie, du 27 novembre 2008, CEDH.</footnote>
et d'être informé qu'il a des droits, constitue une étape importante dans le processus de la sécurisation multilatéraux des droits humains. L'idée d'un médiateur spécial pour les enfants et le rôle précieux des ONG va multiplier la voix de milliers d'enfants afin de s'assurer qu'ils ont des droits. Un tribunal ou des juges qui ne traitent que des questions des mineurs, ainsi que les garanties d'impartialité et de la présomption d'innocence de l'enfant, sont d'une importance primordiale. La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme protège l'anonymat des mineurs, par leur application et sur sa propre initiative, les audiences peuvent être menées à huis clos. Les changements récents dans les règles de procédure de la Cour européenne<fnref n="1" /> ont établies le concept de donner la priorité aux questions qui ne changent en fonction de l'ordre chronologique, mais en fonction de la gravité de l'application. La première catégorie de priorité, parmi les autres sont celles qui remettent en question le bien-être des enfants. Le problème de la spécialisation des juges des mineurs, doit être un objectif pour l'État lui-même. En CEDH peuvent gérer leurs applications les personnes physiques, les ONG et tous les groupes d'individus qui se prétendent d'avoir été la victime d'une violation de la CEDH et de ses protocoles. Donc, du point de vue de l'intérêt commun de la société, il est possible d'améliorer la détermination du moment 'quand' et 'qui' peut adresser l'application à la CEDH, dans le but d'une meilleure justice adaptée aux enfants, et pas seulement en termes de procédures.

L'ensemble de l'appareil de justice pénale en 'réponse' donnée à l'auteur de la victime, doit tenir en compte l'âge de la personne, tandis que les établissements pénitentiaires doivent garantir les droits des mineurs contre les traitements inhumains et dégradants. Les mineurs ne sont pas de simples statistiques ou des preuves sur la balance de la justice, il faut aborder le plus grand en termes des alternatives de l'emprisonnement pour les délinquants mineurs. Les procédures légales sont plus évasifes sur les enfants et ils ont besoin de plus de conseils pour mieux comprendre le système juridique et leurs droits. Une étape importante pour le système de justice pénale en Albanie est la création d'un nouveau service de probation comme un organe de l'Etat chargé de superviser la mise en œuvre des peines alternatives par le tribunal, en aidant le condamné à remplir les obligations découlant des peines alternative et favoriser leur réinsertion sociale. Le Conseil de l'Europe joue un rôle particulier dans l'évolution de la protection des droits des victimes, à travers le développement de programmes d'indemnisation et d'assistance pour eux, et pour amener la 'lumière' aux problèmes des victimes. Un premier pas dans cette direction a marqué l'adoption de la Convention européenne relative au dédommagement des victimes d'infractions violente<fnref n="2" />. Ce document contient la rémunération de base, minimum que l'Etat doit donner aux victimes, et encourage d'autres Etats à réglementer la question de l'indemnisation des victimes. Deux ans plus tard, le Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe a rédigé la Recommandation R(85) 11 sur le renforcement de la position de la victime dans le droit pénal et de procédure<fnref n="3" />, ainsi que la résolution des Nations Unies sur les principes fondamentaux de la justice pour les victimes de la criminalité et abus de pouvoir<fnref n="4" />. En outre, le Conseil de l'Europe a adopté une recommandation sur l'assistance aux victimes et la prévention de la victimisation<fnref n="5" />. Tous les documents, déclarations internationales et les recommandations, se concentrent principalement sur ces droits et principes: le droit à un traitement juste et équitable, le droit à l'information sur les procédures judiciaires et la décision rendue, le droit à l'assistance et la protection juridique, l'indemnisation (qui peut être matériel, physique, social et mental). Le phénomène de la victimisation est tout aussi complexe que le problème lui-même de la délinquance juvénile, et la réponse ne peut donner que la solution ou la décision judiciaire. Le but principal serait l'augmentation et le renforcement des services et de l'assistance aux victimes, permettant aux modes alternatifs de résolution des conflits et de la médiation. Le système juridique en général et en particulier la justice pénale, constituent l'épine dorsale de la démocratie et de l'Etat de droit en Albanie. Les droits des enfants en Albanie, après la ratification de la CDE, sont de plus en plus partie de l'agenda dans l'élaboration des politiques nationales et du cadre

<footnote n="1">¹ En juin 2009.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent crimes, Strasburg, 24 novembre 1983.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Recommendation (1985)11 on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure, adoptee en 28 juin 1985.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, GA Res. 40/34, 29 novembre 1985</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Recommandation R(87)21 sur l'assistance aux victimes et la prévention de la victimisation, 17 septembre 1987</footnote>
juridique et institutionnel. Des changements ont eu lieu à la perception des droits de l'enfant par le législateur et la société. On souligne que l'inclusion des enfants dans les clauses des lois ou des lois spéciales est une indication de 'l'inclusion' des droits de l'enfant dans la législation nationale. La base de la justice pénale en Albanie est la Constitution albanaise, le Code pénal, le Code de procédure pénale, les lois spéciales judiciaires, du ministère public, de la police et de l'exécution des jugements. L'objectif de l'approche de la législation avec l'acquis du communauté, a amélioré le Code pénal par les réformes juridiques dans les années 2001 - 2003, 2004, 2007 et 2008 et enfin en 2013. En fait, ces réformes sont venues à la suite de la ratification de l'État albanais des actes juridiques internationaux. Seulement avec la réforme de 2008¹ sont augmenté 22 articles pour des nouvelles infractions. Mais le problème de la dépénalisation reste controversé. Lorsque nous parlons de la réforme du droit pénal, nous considérons non seulement l'amélioration de la réforme de la législation dans notre pays, mais aussi dans le système judiciaire, tout en préservant l'indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire, l'amélioration de la performance de la police et des poursuites judiciaires. Le problème principal est la formation professionnelle des juges, des procureurs et des officiers de police judiciaire pour surmonter les défis qui se présentent à eux. La lutte contre la corruption dans le système de justice pénale, en évitant le retard des enquêtes préliminaires sont des autres défis objectives en Albanie.

“La politique pénale doit être guidée par les principes fondamentaux des Etats démocratiques. 1. Protéger les intérêts de la victime doit être l'une des fonctions de base de la justice pénale. 2 Chaque État membre adopte une politique pénale cohérente et rationnelle, basée sur la prévention de la criminalité, l'individualisation des comportements criminels, la promotion des alternatives aux peines privatives de liberté, le redressement social des détenus et l'aide pour les victimes ”<fnref n="2" />. Une expression claire de l'humanité de la politique criminelle dans notre pays est la réduction des sanctions pénales impliquant des mineurs, la mise en place de peines alternatives à l'emprisonnement et la création de probation un mécanisme juridique pour le contrôle de leur mise en œuvre. La Criminologie doit être développée en termes d'analyse de l'activité pénale des mineurs, ainsi que la politique et le droit pénal peuvent avoir des stratégies efficaces de prévention et de lutte contre la criminalité. Les amendements du 2013³ au Code pénal commencent par la définition dans le premier article de la défense du principe de l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant. De même, l'article 5 prévoit une meilleure protection des enfants, en fournissant la non-atténuation de la peine pour la personne qui a commis une infraction contre un enfant, ou qui a commis la violence conjugale. Également en faveur de la protection de la vie et de la santé de l'enfant, est ajoutée la condamnation pénale pour des infractions de nature sexuelle de la violence sexuelle à l'article 107/a, l'article 117 sur la pornographie des mineurs, l'amendement à l'article 124/b sur les peines plus sévères à quiconque oblige un mineur à travailler et à prier, endommageant son développement mental et physique. Ainsi, le nouvel article 117 est lié non seulement en termes de punition pour la pornographie, mais que tous les matériaux pornographiques produites, quelle que soit la forme ou le mode de distribution, doivent être saisis et détruits. Dans certains pays européens, comme le Royaume-Uni, sont établi des records nationaux pour des infractions sexuelles, comme une bonne base pour les familles et les enfants, et les familles sont informées sur les personnes pédophiles qui ont commis des crimes contre les mineurs. Grâce à un registre national, notamment les enfants atteints d'une protection internationale. L'ajout du terme "exploitation" des mineurs au travail et à la génération de revenus, est un pas en avant pour les droits des enfants. La justice pénale doit avoir un agenda social et pas seulement punitive. Il serait conforme à l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant, s'il serait ajouté à l'article 51 que la détention des mineurs qu'en dernier ressort pour le mineur. L'augmentation des peines minimales et maximales aura un impact positif sur la prévention de la criminalité. L'efficacité dans la lutte contre la criminalité, rend nécessaire des peines plus sévères pour certaines infractions. Les changements récents du Code pénal résultent:

Tout d'abord, la sévérité des sanctions pour certaines infractions, en raison de l'augmentation du taux de criminalité et de violence contre les enfants, ainsi que pour les employés qui ont l'autorité de l'Etat.

<footnote n="1">¹ Loi nr.9859 du 21 janvier 2008 et Loi nr.10023 du 27 novembre 2008.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Recommandation nr.96/8 "Sur la politique criminelle en Europe en transformation" du Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Loi 144/2013 du 05/02/2013, JO nr.83/2013</footnote>
Par conséquent, il est d'une importance cruciale pour la protection de la violence familiale, la protection de la vie et la santé des enfants, en particulier la santé sexuelle comme un élément fondamental non seulement pour le développement physique normal de l'enfant, mais aussi sur le développement de la personnalité et de l'identité enfant. Deuxièmement, une meilleure individualisation des peines dans des cas particuliers aidera le travail des procureurs et des juges, et permettrait d'éviter plus de minimiser la subjectivité dans la détermination de la peine. Ce sera le meilleur moyen d'unifier la pratique judiciaire en Albanie, donnée par les tribunaux du pays. Les juges ou les procureurs vont mettre en œuvre ces dispositions dans la pratique, devenant ainsi la garantie d'une procédure régulière, sur la base des principes constitutionnels de l'Etat de droit, l'égalité devant la loi, l'équité dans la peine, la présomption d'innocence de l'humanité. Maintenant, la prochaine étape est de lancer la meilleure information pour tous les publics, en particulier tout ce qui concerne les infractions contre les mineurs, la croissance de l'information permettra d'accroître la sensibilisation des citoyens, en réduisant les infractions. Le but de la punition n'est pas une punition, mais la réadaptation et l'intégration du condamné dans la société. En raison de conditions socio-économiques et politiques, le Code de la procédure pénale a été élaboré et est entré en vigueur avant la rédaction et l'adoption de la Constitution. Alors il a changé de parfaire en stricte conformité avec la Constitution, qui est entrée en vigueur en 1998. Le Code de la procédure pénale contient le terme "endommagé par l'infraction". Le terme "victime" est de plus en plus utilisé dans le vocabulaire de tous les jours, et dans certaines lois a utilisé ce terme pour indiquer les personnes qui ont subi un préjudice de plusieurs infractions pénales<fnref n="1" />. Dans la partie générale du Code de la procédure pénale, devrait être la définition du terme "victime" par l'approche des actes internationaux. Et il y a place pour des notions telles que le traitement des victimes dans la justice et le respect de la dignité humaine, pour éviter la re-victimisation des raisons différentes et le droit de demander la poursuite de l'agresseur et la réparation des dommages. Aussi, je pense qu'il serait augmentation très juste que les victimes ont le droit d'être entendu par le tribunal, même si aucune des parties ne l'a pas convoqué comme témoin. En comparant les codes de la procédure pénale de la France et de l'Italie, respectivement, pour le premier il ya un chapitre distinct sur les droits des victimes et les états généraux de dispositions que les autorités judiciaires veillent à ce que les victimes soient informées et que leurs droits soient respectés lors de toute procédure pénale<fnref n="2" />. Les victimes d'actes criminels ont droit à une indemnisation de l'Etat si ne soit recevu pas au contrevenant. Quant à l'Italie il ya un chapitre distinct sur les droits des victimes, mais sont définies deux catégories de personnes: la personne offensée par le délit (victime) et la personne lésée par l'infraction (la victime). Souvent, la personne a les deux qualités en même temps. La victime a de plus le droit d'intervenir dans la procédure pénale que la personne blessée. Ils peuvent coopérer avec le procureur pour faire appel d'une décision de justice, mais la victime joue un rôle important au cours de l'enquête préliminaire.

Selon le rapport du Département d'Etat Américain sur la traite des êtres humains, l'Albanie a pris des mesures concrètes pour améliorer la stratégie de la lutte contre la traite, mais "la corruption généralisée, en particulier dans le système judiciaire continue d'entraver la mise en œuvre globale de la loi anti-traite et les efforts visant à protéger les victimes"<fnref n="3" />.

Le statut de l'enfant dans le système judiciaire (pénal), est considéré comme à la position du délinquant, de la victime ou d'un témoin. Nous pouvons dire que, malgré les efforts d'aborder la pratique de la législation communautaire, le droit pénal reste essentiellement punitive. La compilation et la publication de données sur la justice des mineurs aideront à soutenir le processus de réforme du système judiciaire. Le droit à un procès équitable implique également le respect du principe constitutionnel d'être jugé dans un délai raisonnable par un tribunal indépendant et impartial établi par la loi<fnref n="4" />.

<footnote n="1">¹ Loi nr. 9669 du 18.12.2006 "Sur les mesures contre la violence dans les relations familiales", Loi nr. 10192 du 3.12.2009 "Sur la prévention et la lutte contre le crime organisé et le trafic par des mesures préventives contre la propriété", Loi nr 10494 du 22.12.2011 "Sur la surveillance électronique des personnes, dont le mouvement a été limité par décision judiciaire"</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Article 1 du Code de procédure pénale français</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Information sur le website: www.files.amnesty.org/air12/air_2012_full_en.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ L'article 6 de la CEDH dispose: "Toute personne a droit à ce que sa cause soit entendue équitablement, publiquement et dans un délai raisonnable par un tribunal indépendant et impartial, établi par la loi"</footnote>
Une procédure rapide devrait s'appliquer à tous les types de procédures impliquant des mineurs - de la nature pénale, civile ou administrative. La mise en place de tribunaux pour mineurs est un impératif de l'époque. L'égalité d'accès à la justice est une dimension essentielle de l'égalité devant la loi et implique nécessairement l'accès à l'information, ce qui signifie la procédure et une justice plus adaptée aux enfants. La création d'un ombudsman indépendant ou un commissaire aux enfants, aide les enfants à améliorer la communication avec les organismes nationaux et internationaux. Pour recevoir le témoignage des enfants victimes d'abus sexuels, il devrait être entendu à l'audience sans y être présent, notamment à travers l'utilisation des technologies de communication approprié<fnref n="1" />. Une politique de la justice des mineurs sans une série de mesures visant à prévenir la délinquance juvénile souffre de graves lacunes. L'accent devrait être mis sur les politiques de prévention facilitant la socialisation et l'intégration réussie de tous les enfants. La société civile doit être considérée comme une partie intégrante du cadre institutionnel, et tous les acteurs concernés, tels que les ONG et les réseaux professionnels, devrait être inclus dans la conception de la mise en œuvre intégrée de la stratégie. L'objectif de tous les professionnels de la justice mettrait en évidence la concurrence supposée entre les deux systèmes de protection des droits de l'homme, et donc des droits de l'enfant, se référant au Conseil de l'Europe et l'Union européenne. Si des mineurs sont considérés comme pénalement responsables, ils ne doivent pas nécessairement être jugés, et que conformément à l'article 40/3 de la CDE prévoit que les États parties doivent promouvoir des mesures pour traiter les enfants qui ont enfreint la loi pénale sans recourir à la procédure judiciaire, chaque fois qui semble appropriée. Lorsque des poursuites judiciaires sont engagées, les mineurs font face à des accusations criminelles et les procès doivent être équitables et efficaces ainsi que pour les adultes, pour répondre à toutes les exigences de l'article 6 de la Convention à un procès équitable. T'outefois, la procédure de jugement ordinaire ne serait pas appropriée si l'enfant est trop immature pour une telle procédure, pour s'assurer qu'un procès équitable. Un enfant accusé d'une infraction criminelle doit être traitée en tenant compte de son âge, de sa maturité et de ses capacités intellectuelles et émotionnelles. Les difficultés provenant du traitement des jeunes délinquants du système de justice pénale sont confrontés, dans de nombreux systèmes pénitentiaires, la création de tribunaux pour mineurs, avec des règles de procédure spécifiques pour l'application de mesures de protection ou pénale visant à corriger ou de rééducation des mineurs.

Aspects éducatifs et psychologiques de traitement et de formation pour les juges pour mineurs doivent être considérés pour atteindre ces objectifs. La CEDH ne voit pas l'exercice cumulé de ces fonctions (la détention, le procès et l'exécution de la décision) par le même juge pour mineurs comme une violation de l'article 6/1 de la CEDH. Certains systèmes pénaux nationaux n'ont pas mis en place des tribunaux pour mineurs. La formalité des tribunaux pour adultes peut-être incompréhensible pour un enfant. Selon la Cour, l'article 6/1 n'exige pas un enfant à un procès pénal, comprendra ou sera capable de comprendre tous les points de droit ou de détails de la preuve. C'est pourquoi l'article 6/3 (c) souligne l'importance du droit à la représentation juridique. Par conséquent, le mineur devrait être, en tout cas, représentés par des avocats compétents et expérimentés, sinon il ya une possibilité d'une violation de l'article 6/1 de la CEDH. Les procédures judiciaires peuvent être non seulement déraisonnables, mais aussi effrayant pour un enfant. Le Code de procédure pénale a défini une série de garanties pour la protection des mineurs et de leur personnalité, à savoir: l'interrogatoire des mineurs à huis clos, le droit à la représentation légale des mineurs pour protéger ses intérêts dans la qualité de blessé accusateur; la protection professionnelle requise pour le mineur de moins de 18 ans interdiction de publication sur les détails et les photos des prévenus et des témoins accusé mineur ou lésés par l'infraction. Ceux-ci répondent aux garanties de procédure judiciaire en matière pénale, et donnent les dispositifs de protection des mineurs appartenant nécessaires en raison de l'âge. Sur la base de toutes les normatives nationales, les initiatives de l'UE, on peut conclure de multiples efforts pour l'intégration européenne au sein de la justice pour mineurs. Aujourd'hui, il est difficile de parler d'un modèle unique dans le domaine de la justice pour mineurs, au niveau européen. Donc, chacun des États membres a son propre droit pénal et son approche aux mineurs.

<footnote n="1">¹ Voir l'article 36/2 de la Convention pour la protection des enfants contre l'exploitation et les abus sexuelle, du Conseil de l'Europe</footnote>
LES DEFIS:

1. La sensibilisation des jeunes sur les normes morales et les valeurs de la société, ainsi que la réévaluation de la peine de privation de liberté, à cet égard. L'amélioration des lieux de détention pour les jeunes et d'augmenter les peines alternatives et des politiques de la médiation.
2. Renforcer les droits des mineurs délinquants, comme objet de poursuites pénales et non comme un sujet de droit.
3. Une plus grande sensibilisation de toute la société et de sa volonté croissante du jeune délinquant, ou qui sont à risque d'ajouter le travail sur la prévention.
4. Les procédures judiciaires rapides, pas de traitement si bureaucratique de la délinquance juvénile. Les dispositions des accords internationaux et des contenus européens ont un caractère général. Le défi est d'équilibrer les processus d'enseignement-temps de pénalité, et de mettre la responsabilité des jeunes en conflit avec la loi, en éduquant les meilleures valeurs de la société, mais également la réévaluation de la privation de liberté à cet égard. Le terme "justice des mineurs", veut dire la législation, les normes, les procédures, les institutions, les mécanismes et les acteurs qui traiteront de mineurs délinquants. Mais les enfants en conflit avec la loi constituent un aspect du problème. Voir l'autre côté du travail de prévention pour lutter contre le phénomène "de la délinquance juvénile". La prévention vise à éviter que les enfants en conflit avec la loi et éviter davantage de contact direct d'un enfant du système formel de justice pénale. Nous avons donc affaire à la justice réparatrice, qui comprend la communauté, qui développe des stratégies et des moyens de prévenir la récidive. La protection des enfants en conflit avec la loi est la meilleure façon qu'il ne devienne catégories proies de violations des droits de l'homme et victime. Le système de la justice pour mineurs peut être développé au sein du système de justice pénale pour les adultes, et peut se développer en dehors de ses groupes de travail spécialisés. Le principe de base d'un système de justice pour mineurs est et doit être le traitement des enfants atteints de l'humanité. Comme le Convention des Droits de l'Enfant de l'ONU définit clairement que la peine de privation de liberté pour les mineurs devrait être accordée pour une période aussi courte que possible, selon le cas, et doit être considérée comme une sorte de dernier recours. L'ensemble du système devrait se concentrer sur l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant qui fait l'objet de droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales, et c'est son guide dans le traitement de quelque "rôle" dans le processus, la victime, délinquant ou auteur, témoin. Après les années 90, le nombre d'infractions commises par des mineurs en Albanie a augmenté, il est donc important de connaître toutes les raisons et les besoins d'intervenir à un stade précoce pour les prévenir, et pour éviter le récidive. Ainsi, la pauvreté, le manque de moyens de subsistance de la famille, l'abandon scolaire, les problèmes familiaux, la toxicomanie, etc, sont quelques-uns des problèmes qui ont conduit à une augmentation des taux de délinquance juvénile. Développements positifs dans la législation albanaise et pratiques pour les droits des enfants comprennent: la création de divisions spécialisées dans les tribunaux de district, des procureurs spécialisés et de l'unité de police spécialisée, de rénovation et d'éliminer la surpopulation dans certains établissements de détention, l'accès à grandes détenus mineurs à l'éducation, des travailleurs sociaux, des psychologues et des conseillers religieux, des projets d'aide juridique et psycho-social, peines alternatives et de la médiation. Quand on parle du mineur, il est important de parler de la prévention du crime, à laquelle peut inclure le suivi de la fréquentation scolaire, l'intégration économique des jeunes, des programmes de soutien aux enfants des rues, la création d'environnements et de divertissement pour enfants, la prévention l'abus d'alcool et de drogues, la création d'installations sportives comme un outil d'intégration sociale, la création de services sociaux, y compris le soutien de la famille. Il est nécessaire d'élaborer une politique pénale fondée sur l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant, avec la contribution de tous les acteurs au sein du système de justice pour mineurs. On doit mieux faire appliquer la législation relative à la probation, d'éliminer les retards dans l'enquête et le jugement des affaires impliquant des mineurs, en réduisant le recours à la détention et l'utilisation accrue de solutions de rechange sont très importants. L'impact du crime sur les victimes enfant est différent, mais il affecte le bien-être de ses conséquences physiques, psychologiques et sociales peuvent être immédiats et à long terme. Donc, pour rendre les procédures judiciaires plus convivial pour les enfants victimes, les juges doivent faire preuve de souplesse, en évitant les questions préjudielles, de sorte que l'ensemble du processus pour répondre à ses besoins.
**Bibliographie:**

Convention pour la protection des enfants contre l'exploitation et les abus sexuelles, du Conseil de l'Europe

Loi nr. 9669 du 18.12.2006 "Sur les mesures contre la violence dans les relations familiales",

Loi nr. 10192 du 3.12.2009 "Sur la prévention et la lutte contre le crime organisé et le trafic par des mesures préventives contre la propriété",

Loi nr 10494 du 22.12.2011 "Sur la surveillance électronique des personnes, dont le mouvement a été limité par décision judiciaire"

Loi 144/2013 du 05/02/2013, JO nr.83/2013

Recommendation (1985)11 on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure, adoptee en 28 juin 1985.

European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent crimes, Strasbourg, 24 novembre 1983.

Labori Michel et Costea, Simion, *Le management des politiques européennes*, Paris, Prodifmultimedia, 2011.

Observation générale no 10 (2007) du Comité des Nations Unies sur les droits de l'enfant.

Code pénal et le Code de procédure pénale Albanais.

<figure><img src="image_20.png" /></figure>
# La politique de securite et de defense commune : bilan et perspectives

## LE GENERAL (2S) ERIC DELL'ARIA

chargé de mission de l'Institut des hautes études de défense nationale pour les relations avec les institutions européennes (France)

**Abstract:** This article brings arguments in favour of an effective EU Security and Defence Policy. "It is necessary to make a balance and think the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy (PCSD) to inform the European Council. Taking into consideration the international tensions; the publication of the French White Book on National Defense and Security; the permanence of the economic and financial crisis, which affects the European Union and its defense structures; at a moment when the US pivot to Asia gives it more responsibilities in security, it is convenient that all actors who can propose concrete action to the relaunching of the CSDP do so.

Moreover, the concept of European identity, essential to know what we want to defend, covers very different realities, depending on the people it is addressed to, European citizenship remains a largely abstract concept for many. The following reflections are articulated in four parts: after a review of the context, we try to identify the reasons for the apparent failure of the Europe of Defence and open the analytical perspectives before suggesting concrete ways of recovery."

**Keywords:** EU Security and Defence Policy

### I. LE CONTEXTE

<figure><img src="image_21.png" /></figure>

On peut retenir plusieurs évolutions majeures du contexte stratégique depuis 2008, date de publication du rapport de mise en œuvre de la stratégie européenne de sécurité élaborée en 2003 sous l'impulsion de Javier Solana, alors haut représentant de l'UE et ancien SECGEN de l'OTAN, mais aussi de diffusion du précédent Livre Blanc français sur la Défense et la sécurité. A l'examen, six éléments de contexte paraissent dominer :

1. En premier lieu **la crise économique et financière**, partie des Etats-Unis, a durement frappé l'Europe, avec pour conséquence au plan de la défense une baisse significative des budgets, tandis que les dépenses militaires s'accroissaient en revanche dans les pays émergents, particulièrement en Chine et en Russie. Ainsi la Chine aura-t-elle doublé son budget de défense en 8 ans (2007/2015) pour l'amener à 180 Md de dollars et la Russie aura atteint les 100 Md de dollars (77 Mds d'Euros) en 2015. Ajoutons que s'agissant des BRICS et plus particulièrement de la Chine et de la Russie, le PIB brésilien a désormais dépassé celui du Royaume Uni tandis que la Russie talonne l'Italie.

2. **En Asie** les choses pourraient dégénérer rapidement, en Corée comme on l'a vu récemment, mais aussi en mer de Chine. Que veut la Chine ? Continuer à être traitée comme un « grand » au plan mondial, alors qu'elle porte un intérêt toujours plus marqué pour les ressources géologiques en Afrique, dont elle a un impérieux besoin pour sa propre croissance. Simultanément elle n'en conforte pas moins une influence régionale exclusive. S'agissant de l'économie de marché, au prix de quelques concessions obligées, le parti communiste chinois n'entend pas pour autant lui sacrifier un système auquel il doit sa survie. Sa politique de grandeur et de retour à l'identité se traduit de manière visible par une remise à l'honneur du confucianisme en ce qu'il est chinois, tout comme par le rapatriement des œuvres d'art pillées par les étrangers notamment au 19ème siècle.

En Chine, le mode de pensée reste fondamentalement chinois : on aurait tendance à vouloir penser que Pékin ne commettra pas l'irréparable car, considéré d'un œil occidental, il n'est pas dans son intérêt de mettre la région à feu et à sang. Mais souvenons-nous seulement de l'actualité en mai 1989 : la plupart des observateurs s'accordaient alors pour dire que la Chine était sur la voie inéluctable du libéralisme
économique inspiré par le « réformateur » Deng Tsiao Ping: pourtant, le même Deng, un mois plus tard, donnait l'ordre de tirer sur les manifestants place Tien an Men.

Quant à la Russie, les choses apparaissent à la fois plus claires et plus complexes. Vladimir Poutine réarme, comme les données disponibles l'attestent. Si l'on peut souhaiter le développement de relations harmonieuses entre l'UE et la Russie, tant au regard de l'économie que de la culture et d'une part d'histoire commune, il faut rester lucide, car pour valser, il faut être deux, ce qui actuellement n'est pas le cas. Malraux, auquel un journaliste demandait si la Russie se situait en Europe ou en Asie, avait alors répondu : « *la Russie... est en Russie...* », traduisant bien par des mots l'originalité de ce pays. Et tant le chassé-croisé Poutine-Medvedev, que les relations ambiguës entre les capitaines d'industrie et le Kremlin, la mise à l'écart des contestataires ou de rivaux potentiels tels que Kodorkovsky, mais aussi l'omniprésence du FSB ex KGB et l'attitude russe sur le dossier syrien ou sur la défense anti-missile, conduisent à observer que pour l'heure, presque rien n'a changé dans ce pays en matière de gouvernance.

3. L'autre phénomène significatif porte sur les **révolutions arabes** du début 2011, qui, il faut le relever, n'ont pas touché l'Afrique subsaharienne, ce qui mériterait une autre réflexion. Ce mouvement n'est pas achevé, comme en témoignent la situation en Syrie ou en Egypte, alors qu'au Proche et au Moyen-Orient, les relations demeurent conflictuelles entre chiites et sunnites, les relations israélo-palestiniennes sont au point mort et les récents développements politiques en Iran restent fort peu lisibles.

4. **L'OTAN perdure**, et même plutôt bien pour une structure dont on prédit régulièrement la disparition depuis 1991. Elle a ainsi survécu au Pacte de Varsovie, voyant ses capacités renforcées avec le retour de la France en 2009 et mène encore à cette heure cinq opérations: en Afghanistan, au Kosovo, en Méditerranée (Active Endeavour), au large de la Corne de l'Afrique (Ocean Shield) et un soutien à la mission de l'Union africaine en Somalie (AMISOM). Au-delà, elle se trouve engagée dans une nouvelle réflexion sur son existence-même, avec la fin annoncée de son engagement en AFG. Nul doute que la Division « Défis émergents » de son secrétariat international n'ait déjà dégagé des pistes pour la faire rebondir : au nombre de celles-ci, la « SMART defense » et le déjà ancien concept de gestion globale des crises intégrant une dimension civilo-militaire.

5. C'est aussi **le retour de l'Afrique**, que beaucoup d'Européens étaient en train « d'oublier » sous l'effet de la crise financière: comme en Libye, l'opération au Mali est assez exemplaire du type de crises à gérer sur ce continent, nécessitant de solides moyens de projection et des capacités stratégiques durcies, notamment en matière de logistique et de renseignement; on y affronte des adversaires, dans le cas du Mali, techniquement plus proches du Hezbollah que des Talibans, comme en témoignent les découvertes faites immédiatement après les affrontements majeurs du printemps 2013. Enfin, les actions strictement militaires ne suffisent plus : « nation building », « building integrity » et réforme du secteur de la sécurité sont autant de nouvelles tâches qui doivent systématiquement être prises en compte dès la phase initiale de planification.

6. Enfin, le dernier paramètre mais non le moindre est la réorientation (« le pivot ») des Etats-Unis vers l'Asie et notamment vers la Chine, adversaire pour l'heure économique et demain, pour certains géopoliticiens, peut-être également militaire ; mais cela n'en signifie pas pour autant, comme on a pu le dire trop rapidement, que l'Amérique se désintéresserait du continent européen. L'Union européenne reste pour elle un partenaire stratégique, comme le prouve le besoin d'« écoute » technique de Washington sur ce continent. En revanche, la condition est que les Européens prennent davantage en charge leur propre sécurité, ce qui n'a rien de choquant et ce que France particulièrement réclamait depuis longtemps ; la difficulté tient à ce que cette opportunité survient à un moment où ces mêmes Européens, quoique très conscients de la dangerosité croissante du contexte international due à l'imprévisibilité de certains acteurs, révèle un déficit de volonté et de moyens pour la satisfaire.

## II. LES DIFFICULTES DU MOMENT POUR LA POLITIQUE DE SECURITE ET DE DEFENSE COMMUNE (PSDC)
Dans ce climat, l'Europe peine à se définir, si ce n'est au travers de valeurs périodiquement réaffirmées en une antienne convenue, et donne le sentiment d'être finalement assez peu concernée par l'aspect militaire de sa défense, d'autant que le processus décisionnel en apparence simple, se révèle dans les faits beaucoup plus complexe.

## 1. Première difficulté : la relation demeure ambiguë entre l'UE et l'OTAN.

En premier lieu, on évoque toujours, de manière simpliste, la relation UE-OTAN. De fait, ces deux organisations n'étant pas de même nature, il faut alors préciser qu'en matière de défense et sécurité, il s'agit d'une relation de l'UE conduite dans le cadre spécifique de la PSDC : l'Union reste en effet un projet politique global, tandis que l'OTAN est une organisation de sécurité (dotée de moyens militaires conséquents où le Conseil atlantique, de nature politique, a la prééminence).

- Tous les membres de l'OTAN n'appartiennent pas à l'UE, dont les Etats Unis, le Canada, la Turquie et la Norvège, et inversement pour les « neutres » que sont la Finlande, la Suède, l'Autriche, l'Irlande.

- Au plan conceptuel/opérationnel, l'OTAN a eu longtemps privilégié une défense à l'intérieur de ses « frontières », le concept hors-zone n'ayant disparu qu'à sa prise en charge de l'ISAF en 2003, tandis que l'UE, avec la PESC et la PESD, s'interrogeait davantage sur son action hors de ses frontières.

Dans l'état actuel des choses, il ne saurait y avoir de concurrence mais une nécessaire complémentarité entre les deux organisations précisément due à leur différence de nature, permettant à l'UE d'intervenir avec toute la gamme de ses capacités dans des régions où l'OTAN serait moins bien perçue.

La seconde réflexion est que l'Union européenne d'aujourd'hui doit beaucoup à l'OTAN :

- parce que c'est bien l'OTAN, et non l'UEO, qui a très concrètement assuré sa protection durant la Guerre froide,

- parce que sa géographie actuelle est largement due aux effets du Partenariat pour la Paix élaboré à l'OTAN à partir de 1994, qui a peu à peu su intégrer les pays d'Europe centrale et Orientale. S'agissant de cette démarche, contrairement à l'idée communément reçue qui ne considérerait l'OTAN que comme une structure exclusivement militaire, le plan d'adhésion (MAP) qu'elle propose comporte des volets très « civils » : politique, économique, financier/budgétaire, sécuritaire et juridique.

En conséquence, pour leur sécurité, les Etats-membres de l'Union issus du défunt Pacte de Varsovie se sentent redevables d'abord à l'OTAN, qui reste aussi pour ses membres fondateurs de taille modeste l'instrument le plus fiable avoir rempli avec succès sa mission face à l'Est ; ils se prononcent généralement en faveur d'un mode de « financement en commun », avantageux pour eux en ce qu'il leur évite de financer nationalement certaines capacités stratégiques coûteuses. Pour eux, une contribution à un budget militaire renforcé dans le cadre de l'UE reviendrait donc à dupliquer un effort qu'ils mènent déjà pour l'Alliance ; à cet égard, on se souviendra qu'en cumulé, les 5 premiers contributeurs de l'Alliance (Etats Unis, Royaume Uni, Allemagne, France, Italie) fournissent 70% de son budget global. D'où la nécessité d'un dialogue précis et permanent entre les deux organisations pour ne pas développer de programmes identiques.

En troisième lieu, les Etats-Unis dominent certes l'Alliance ne serait-ce qu'au regard des moyens fournis<fnref n="1" />, mais la règle du consensus fait que chaque pays a une voix théoriquement égale. Ainsi des **coalitions d'occasion peuvent parfois venir équilibrer la puissance américaine** : en 2003, plusieurs alliés ont à l'occasion de la guerre en Irak, bloqué certaines initiatives poussées par les Etats Unis et les nouveaux membres Centre et Est européens, tandis que la **France et l'Allemagne s'opposaient en 2008 au projet américain d'inviter l'Ukraine et la Géorgie à entamer les négociations d'adhésion à l'OTAN.**

Cette dernière a de fait su, depuis 1991, s'adapter à un environnement international en perpétuelle évolution, alors que certains plaidaient pour une dissolution homothétique à celle du Pacte de Varsovie:

<footnote n="1">¹ 55% des ressources et 75% des capacités militaires.</footnote>
avec le Partenariat pour la paix (PfP) elle a transformé les rapports dans l'aire euro-atlantique, puis elle est
intervenue avec détermination dans les Balkans avec l'IFOR puis la KFOR, avant que les attentats du 11
septembre ne déclenchent la première invocation de l'article V de son histoire, puis n'entraînent les
première projections de grande envergure « hors zone », terrestres, aériennes et maritimes. Ce furent alors
l'ISAF en Afghanistan, mais aussi sur mer *Active Endeavour* en mode contre-terroriste et *Ocean Shield* pour la
contre-piraterie, puis le soutien à une organisation tierce comme l'AMISOM.

Depuis 2005 l'OTAN souhaite élargir la palette de ses activités à la dimension civilo-militaire sur la base du concept « d'approche globale » (Comprehensive Approach), ce qui tend à la faire évoluer d'une alliance militaire traitant de défense collective vers une organisation de sécurité régionale à caractère politique.

En conclusion, la différence de perception de cette organisation par les Européens et les Américains ressort clairement des propos de Kurt Volker, ancien ambassadeur US à l'OTAN, pour qui « lorsque l'on parle de l'OTAN aux Européens, ils comprennent « les Américains », et lorsque l'on parle d'OTAN aux Etats-Unis, les Américains comprennent « les Européens »... ».

L'OTAN reste capitale pour l'UE, lieu d'expression du lien transatlantique autorisant la coopération militaire avec les Etats Unis mais aussi l'interopérabilité entre Alliés (STANAGs, procédures, l'entraînement) et disposant de structures de commandement et de planification éprouvées. D'ailleurs, le Traité de Lisbonne ne dit pas autre chose, à savoir que la défense de l'Europe repose sur l'Alliance atlantique<fnref n="1" />.

## 2. Un dossier stratégique: l'industrie de défense

Si le Sommet de l'OTAN à Chicago en 2012 a reconnu l'importance d'une défense européenne y compris dans sa dimension industrielle, il a également lancé le concept de « SMART defence », en miroir de l'initiative « Pooling & Sharing » portée par l'Agence européenne de Défense (AED), ainsi que le programme de défense anti-missiles, auquel la France ne s'est pas opposée mais qui reste un problème pour beaucoup d'observateurs. En effet, malgré les conditions très encadrantes que nous avons mises pour y participer (contrôle politique, adéquation entre la capacité et la menace, maîtrise des coûts, financement commun limité aux capacités de « Command & Control »/C2, garantie d'élévation du niveau de sécurité, dialogue avec la Russie), aucune d'entre elles n'apparaît à ce jour remplie: pour l'essentiel, c'est peu dire que la Russie ne considère pas l'initiative positivement, les coûts s'avèrent colossaux pour une efficacité à 100% non garantie, le dynamisme industriel américain risque fort de ne laisser que des miettes aux opérateurs européens.

L'un des dangers pour l'UE réside donc bien là: dans une période de budgets militaires contraints, le risque est de se laisser entraîner dans des programmes coûteux qui assècheraient nos disponibilités, sans garanties de contrats pour nos industries.

Par ailleurs, s'agissant des capacités critiques, l'autre difficulté tient au choix à opérer entre la préservation d'une base industrielle technologique de défense (BITD) et l'achat sur étagère pour parer au plus pressé. C'est le cas aujourd'hui pour la capacité « drones », pour laquelle Français et Allemands sont en négociation avec les Etats Unis.

D'où l'exercice délicat en matière de BITD(E) : identifier les capacités industrielles clés, en déterminant celles qui doivent être préservées et développées en Europe et quelles autres peuvent l'être sans trop de dommages auprès d'un acteur tiers.

Or, en période de crise, la priorité de chacun reste subordonnée à la préservation de ses emplois nationaux. Le projet de fusion avorté en octobre 2012 entre EADS-BAE reste un parfait exemple de la difficulté à mettre le discours en pratique : cette fusion aurait pu conduire à la création d'un bloc industriel européen de taille critique, mais les trois Etats concernés, pour des raisons diverses, n'ont pu porter le projet à son terme, certains observateurs croyant pouvoir relever en la circonstance un déficit de soutien résolu de la Commission.

<footnote n="1">¹ Traité de Lisbonne, PSDC, section 2, 49, alinéa 7 : « Les engagements et la coopération dans ce domaine demeurent conformes aux engagements souscrits au sein de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord, qui reste, pour les États qui en sont membres, le fondement de leur défense collective et l'instance de sa mise en oeuvre. »</footnote>
Le 3ème point, en apparence iconoclaste, tient en une question: **une Europe de la Défense, pour quoi faire ?** Beaucoup d'acteurs ne ménagent pas leurs efforts depuis des années pour la faire éclore, et pourtant, au-delà des discours, les choses ne progressent que très lentement.

Il y a pour commencer une vraie difficulté à circonscrire l'Europe, où se côtoient désormais plusieurs espaces auxquels les 28 n'adhèrent pas de manière identique :

-la Norvège appartient à l'espace Schengen mais pas à l'Union, le Royaume Uni n'est ni dans Schengen ni dans l'Eurozone, tandis que le Danemark bénéficie d'une clause d'exclusion pour la défense tout en étant très actif dans l'OTAN.

-L'espace géographique pose également question. Sans même qu'il soit besoin d'évoquer le dossier turc, on recense côte à côte l'espace de l'UE en tant que telle à 28, Schengen à 26 (22 UE + 4 associés), l'Eurozone à 18, le Conseil de l'Europe à 47 avec Azerbaïdjan, Turquie ou Ukraine... La géographie pré-oriente en outre naturellement certains Etats membres : les Britanniques et les Scandinaves vers l'Atlantique et la Baltique, l'Allemagne et les pays d'Europe centrale vers l'Est, la France et les Etats du Sud vers la Méditerranée et l'Afrique.

En fait, l'Europe de la Défense qui apparaît jusqu'ici en panne, connaît tout autant un problème de moyens que de volonté politique. La France s'estimant parfois être assez seule à la promouvoir et ses deux partenaires majeurs que sont l'Allemagne et le Royaume Uni ayant chacun leurs raisons pour ne pas s'impliquer davantage, n'est-il alors pas illusoire de vouloir à toute force faire coïncider des intérêts nationaux extrêmement divergents, dès lors qu'il s'agit d'aller au-delà des propos convenus ?

### III. QUELLES PERSPECTIVES ?

Malgré ces difficultés, il faut relever des raisons d'espérer:

- Pour la première fois depuis longtemps, la réunion du Conseil européen, le 20 décembre prochain, consacrera ses travaux aux questions de défense et de sécurité, pour lesquelles tant le Président du Conseil que celui de la Commission sont récemment apparus, semble-t-il, très motivés. Dans ce contexte, Hermann van Hompuy déclarait en mars 2013, lors de la réunion annuelle de l'AED : « *les Européens possèdent tous ensemble davantage de forces que les Etats Unis, mais en font moins avec elles* »......« *il ne s'agit pas tant de savoir combien on peut dépenser dans ce domaine, mais comment on dépense* ».

- L'UE reste d'une part la seule organisation globale, capable de mobiliser un ensemble très large de moyens civils mais aussi militaires, en complément de l'OTAN, par exemple dans la cadre de la lutte anti-piraterie (*ATALANTE/UE et OCEAN SHIELD/OTAN*) et dispose de moyens non négligeables : en cumulé, les dépenses militaires des Etats-membres se montent tout de même à 190 Md d'Euros, même si, selon les modes de calcul, presque plus aucun Européen désormais, à l'exception notable du Royaume Uni, ne dépense les 2% du PIB préconisés par l'OTAN pour son budget de défense.

- La PESD, puis la PSDC, ont des résultats à présenter : née de la rencontre de Saint Malo en 1998 sur le constat établi après la guerre en Bosnie que les intérêts américains ne coïncidaient pas toujours avec ceux des Européens, sa première expression opérationnelle ne date que de 2003 (*Concordia* en mars pour l'**Ancienne République Yougoslave de Macédoine** et *Artemis* en juin au Congo). Elle s'est dans l'intervalle dotée d'instruments institutionnels, a mené une vingtaine d'opérations impliquant 7000 experts, militaires et civils. Elle a créé des *battle groups*, a su réagir promptement lors de la crise géorgienne en 2008, contrairement aux atermoiements des années 90 dans les Balkans, et a bâti un programme de formation militaire de type Erasmus. Dernier succès en date, l'accord entre Serbes et Kosovars arraché de haute lutte en avril 2013.

- Les Etats Unis sont désormais tenants d'une Europe de défense forte ; en dépit de budgets encore considérables mais désormais eux aussi soumis à de sévères restrictions, ils sont eux-aussi contraints à la spécialisation, ils ne sont plus en mesure de mettre sur le terrain, partout dans le monde, l'ensemble des capacités correspondant à la palette de toutes les missions.

- La Russie reste pour sa part encore motivée sur son projet de traité pour la sécurité européenne, proposé en 2009 par l'ex président Medvedev, mais se révèle **difficilement lisible** et prévisible, mue en priorité par son rêve de grandeur.
- **A POTAN**, même si la prépondérance américaine est indéniable, **les Européens tiennent un certain nombre de postes-clés** : le secrétaire général est danois et son adjoint pour les questions politiques ainsi que le directeur de l'état-major international sont allemands. S'agissant de la France, un officier général français est placé à la tête du 2ème commandement stratégique de l'OTAN<fnref n="1" />, tandis qu'au quartier général de Bruxelles, un ingénieur de l'armement occupe le poste de secrétaire général adjoint pour les investissements de défense. Nonobstant, il est illusoire d'imaginer un retour à l'idée de pilier européen de la Défense et encore moins de « caucus» européen, idée soutenue par la France dans les années quatre-vingt-dix au travers du concept d'IESD (identité européenne de sécurité et de défense).

A l'Union européenne, la France préside le Comité militaire, détient les fonctions de Secrétaire général exécutif du Service européen d'action extérieure (SEAE) et de Directrice de l'Agence européenne de défense (AED).

On observera donc que trois Français traitent actuellement de dossiers capacitaires dans les deux organisations.

- L'instrument diplomatique qu'est **le Service européen d'action extérieure (SEAE) possède un réel potentiel.** Il n'a que deux années d'existence et son premier rapport d'évaluation sera produit à l'été. Il offre de belles potentialités, mais requiert encore quelques années pour être pleinement opérationnel (5 ans?). La difficulté tient au fait qu'il faut en un temps très court faire cohabiter trois cultures différentes: un tiers d'anciens fonctionnaires européens venus de la DG RELEX (Commission européenne), un tiers de diplomates nationaux et un tiers de contractuels. Cela dit, sa capacité d'analyse est juste: cependant, le Sahel ayant été identifié comme zone critique depuis deux ans, le paradoxe est que l'UE (en fait les Etats membres, car l'UE ce sont d'abord des nations) a dans un premier temps livré une impression de paralysie, la réactivité française l'ayant soudainement précipitée dans une aventure africaine que beaucoup redoutaient.

- Enfin et surtout, il y a désormais **une prise de conscience** que les besoins et capacités sont tels, dans le contexte de crise financière et de restrictions budgétaires, qu'aucun Etat-membre ne peut plus les produire et les acquérir toutes. Partage, mutualisation, coopération donc désormais les seules voies raisonnablement possibles.

## IV. RECOMMANDATIONS

Partant des constatations qui précèdent, on peut imaginer un « paquet » de recommandations dont certaines pourraient être mises en œuvre très rapidement après la réunion du Conseil européen de décembre. Les priorités retenues vont à des suggestions concrètes, facilement mesurables et à forte visibilité, susceptibles d'entraîner l'adhésion des opinions publiques, dans une période où il faut pouvoir justifier chaque euro dépensé. Le plus souvent, les outils existent déjà et, combinés les uns aux autres, pourraient modifier rapidement la donne.

1. Sur les exemples de Weimar ou Weimar Plus, mais aussi des coopérations nordiques ou baltiques, **recherche systématique de nouvelles coopérations structurées permanentes**, dépassant la facilité consistant à qualifier d'européennes les coopérations bilatérales, qui n'en restent pas moins très utiles.

2. **Dotation de la PSDC** d'un budget à la hauteur de ses ambitions en orientant les efforts, à commencer par une meilleure répartition des lignes budgétaires dont 20% seulement portent actuellement sur les équipements.

3. **Préservation et développement d'une industrie de défense européenne performante,** s'appuyant pleinement sur les outils existants :

a. en dotant l'AED d'un budget qui lui permette vraiment de remplir sa mission au travers de ses 4 fonctions<fnref n="2" />;

b. par un dialogue renforcé avec l'OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière

<footnote n="1">¹ Allied Command for Transformation (ACT).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Développement des capacités de défense, promotion de la R&T en matière de défense et de la coopération pour les équipements, création d'un marché européen d'équipements de défense, renforcement de la Base industrielle et technologique de défense européenne (BITDE).</footnote>
d'Armement) et les acteurs de la LoI (Letter of Intent);

c. en pressant le processus de mutualisation induit par l'initiative *Pooling & Sharing*, conjugué à une coopération équilibrée avec l'OTAN, spécialement pour les capacités manquantes révélées lors des opérations les plus récentes [*le ravitaillement en vol, le renseignement, la cyber-sécurité/défense et le transport stratégique*];

d. en s'attachant le plus possible à une dualité de programmes susceptibles d'un emploi civil/militaire, tournés vers la sécurité extérieure/intérieure.

4. Identification systématique de **programmes d'action communs**, lorsque l'initiative individuelle ne s'avère plus possible face aux enjeux et moyens requis disponibles [*criminalité/cybercriminalité, terrorisme, gestion de conflits majeurs/lointains*], et parmi ceux-ci :

* **Mise en place d'un coordonnateur européen du renseignement**, à l'image de celui placé auprès du Conseil pour la lutte contre le terrorisme. Une phase ultérieure consisterait idéalement à bâtir un **service du renseignement européen**, doté de capacités de traitement coordonnées dans les domaines intéressant la sécurité intérieure et extérieure de l'Union.

* **En matière de formation, création d'un programme européen de perfectionnement** en matière de renseignement au profit des experts du domaine dans la cadre du Collège européen de sécurité et de défense (CESD), en complément des formations nationales. A cet égard, il ne faut pas négliger les effets d'une **coopération avec l'OTAN**, à condition que les difficultés d'ordre politique affectant les relations entre certains Etats-membres des deux organisations puissent être aplanies.

* **Le niveau politique peut en décembre donner immédiatement une vigoureuse impulsion à un programme européen de drones d'observation (pour commencer)**, capables d'opérer à moyenne altitude et de longue endurance (MALE) utilisables en mode dual, avec à terme, la perspective de mise en œuvre d'une **flotte européenne**.

5. Au plan de la cyber-sécurité, l'Union n'a pas d'autre alternative qu'une **cyber-stratégie européenne** combinant cyber-défense et lutte contre la cybercriminalité. Il s'agit notamment d'inciter les acteurs publics et privés à se protéger par une meilleure information sur les risques encourus, et d'instituer un **coordonnateur à la cyber-sécurité** qui s'attacherait à la rationalisation des actions en matière de recherche, de politique industrielle et de sécurité des systèmes d'information, encore trop souvent conduites en ordre dispersé :

* en s'appuyant sur les outils juridiques existants et à venir, dont la Convention de Budapest sur la cybercriminalité (2001), instrument international contraignant et la directive sur la cybercriminalité (2012);

* en coordonnant l'action des acteurs compétents au niveau institutionnel, des Etats et l'Union mais aussi des secteurs public et privé, afin d'éviter les brèches dans le dispositif et de coûteuses duplications. Le Comité politique et de sécurité (COPS) pourrait pour sa part désigner des points de contact chargés du suivi de la cyber-sécurité/cyber-défense;

* en encourageant une politique volontariste d'échange d'informations entre Etats, en liaison avec d'autres structures pertinentes telles que le centre d'excellence (COE) de l'OTAN en matière de cyber-défense, EUROPOL ou l'ENISA;

* s'agissant des capacités, en se donnant réellement les moyens financiers et humains d'aboutir :

- au plan conceptuel;

- en matière de formation aux technologies de l'information, de la communication (TIC) et de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (SSI);

- au plan opérationnel, par la systématisation des CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team/Equipe d'intervention informatique d'urgence) et par la mise en place d'un volet Défense au Centre européen de lutte contre la cybercriminalité (EC3) récemment créé;

- en matière de recherche et développement (R&D), par un soutien plus affirmé à l'Agence Européenne de Défense (AED) dans la conduite de ses missions;

- au plan industriel, par une promotion active des secteurs de la cyber-sécurité et des CIS,
appuyée sur l'activité de la Commission dans le cadre de la « *Task Force Défense* ».

6. La création d'un centre de planification et de conduite permanent des opérations de l'UE ayant été source de difficultés, la situation internationale ne nous en presse pas moins d'**identifier des solutions plus permanentes** que celles mises en place de manière empirique et dans l'urgence, particulièrement lorsque l'OTAN ne peut ni ne souhaite s'engager.

7. **Inscription formelle de l'état-major du Corps européen** au titre des instruments de la PSDC ; associant cinq Etats-membres de l'Union, il est l'exemple même de coopération structurée permanente.

8. Recours opérationnel prioritaire aux **groupements tactiques** existants ainsi qu'à la **Brigade franco-allemande/Deutsch französische Brigade**<fnref n="1" /> (BFA-D/F Brigade)

9. **Association systématique du Parlement européen**, pour amener le débat sur les questions de défense et de sécurité à la portée des citoyens par une communication compréhensible de tous, lui conférant de ce fait une légitimité effective accrue dans ce domaine.

## CONCLUSION

Autant sinon davantage que la politique, l'économie régit aujourd'hui le secteur de la défense : selon les responsables américains, la plus grave menace pour leur sécurité, « c'est l'état de notre économie dont la dette se creuse en permanence ».

L'option la plus probable est que l'OTAN restera seule en scène (mais d'ailleurs jusqu'à quand ?) si l'UE ne fournit pas l'effort requis pour assumer ses responsabilités, sur son sol et à ses approches ; en juin 2011, quittant ses fonctions, Robert Gates déclarait que les Alliés risquaient « *une inconséquence militaire collective* ». Pour preuve la baisse du budget de défense des Européens, enregistrée entre 2009/2011, est de l'ordre de 45 Md de dollars, soit à titre comparaison plus que le budget de la défense allemand pour 2013 (33,3 Mds d'euros).

Il faut donc inventer de nouveaux schémas, au-delà des seules structures familières : les opérations en Libye ont ainsi associé deux Etats membres de l'UE, agissant dans le cadre de l'OTAN, avec un soutien américain logistique et en renseignement, sans lequel rien n'eût été possible, mettant en exergue nos forces (réactivité, planification) mais aussi nos faiblesses (capacités critiques).

Il est clair en tous les cas que les engagements militaires tels que nous les vivons dans un certain nombre d'états défaillants depuis le début des années quatre-vingt-dix doivent impérativement prendre en compte, dès la phase de planification initiale, les opérations de reconstruction et de restauration de l'Etat. En cela l'approche globale est désormais indispensable, afin d'éviter de reproduire une situation à l'irakienne, et demain, peut-être, à l'afghane...L'opération de l'Union européenne au Mali doit à cet égard être l'occasion d'une concrétisation exemplaire de cette nouvelle conception des interventions extérieures.

Cela dit, la racine des risques auxquels l'UE fait aujourd'hui face et qui doivent dimensionner son effort de défense, n'apparaît à cette heure toujours pas traitée au fond: tant que les questions capitales du développement, de l'éducation et de la bonne gouvernance des régions les plus déshéritées du globe, d'où nous viennent la plupart des problèmes du moment, ne seront pas réellement prises à bras le corps, rien ne sera réglé.

Redonner aux populations de ces régions des raisons d'espérer en leurs propres Etats, leurs propres cultures et leurs propres forces, participe pleinement de la défense des intérêts de l'Union européenne.

Au-delà, nos sociétés apparaissent comme à la recherche du temps perdu ; or, il faut bien nous convaincre que nous ne le retrouverons pas. Si nous sommes entrés dans un autre monde avec la dernière décennie du XXème siècle, nous l'avons certes intellectuellement admis, mais nous n'en avons toujours pas tiré les conséquences pratiques.

## Bibliographie politique europeenne de securite et de defense:

Deighton, Anne et Bossuat Gérard, « L'Union européenne, acteur de la sécurité mondiale, Paris, Soleb 2007.

<footnote n="1">¹ La BFA n'a jamais pu être engagée en opération tous moyens réunis depuis sa création (1989).</footnote>
Dumoulin, André (éd.), « Quel avenir pour l'OTAN ? », Problèmes économiques et sociaux, No 782, Paris, La Documentation Française, 28 mars 1997.

Girardet, Raoul, « La défense de l'Europe », Paris, Editions Complexe, 1988.

Labori Michel et Costea, Simion, *Le management des politiques européennes*, Paris, Prodifmultimedia, 2011.

Manigand Christine, Du Reau Elisabeth, Sandu Traïan (dir.), « Frontières et sécurité de l'Europe-Territoires, identités et espace européen », Paris, L'Harmattan, mars 2008.

Pirotte Olivier (dir.), « Sécurité européenne et Défense nationale » – Actes du colloque de Lille, 11 mars 1998, Travaux de la CEDECE, La Documentation française.

Roux Jean Philippe, « L'Europe de la défense-Il était une fois », Paris, Editions L'Harmattan 2007.

Türke Andras Istvan, « La Politique européenne de Sécurité et de Défense, Quel bilan après 10 ans ? Quelles nouvelles orientations ? Questions contemporaines », Paris, L'Harmattan, 2012.

Yakemtchouk, Romain, « La Politique étrangère de l'Union européenne », Paris, L'Harmattan, 2005.

Merchet, Jean-Dominique, « Défense européenne, la grande illusion », Larousse/A dire vrai, mai 2009

Ouvrage collectif/officiers CHEM, « Une stratégie de sécurité européenne : au-delà de Petersberg ? », Ed. des Riaux, février 2005.

Eric Dell'Aria, Gualtiero de Cico, Stéphane Verwaerde, « Quel avenir pour les Euroforces ? », Ed. des Riaux, décembre 2005.

Audition de Madame Claude France Arnould, directrice exécutive de l'Agence Européenne de Défense (AED) devant la Commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées du Sénat, 5 décembre 2012.

Audition du Général d'Armée Bentegeat, ancien chef d'état-major des armées, devant la Commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées du Sénat, 11 février 2013 ;

Le traité de Lisbonne, « un nouveau cadre pour l'Union européenne », Paris, La Documentation Française, 2008.

<figure><img src="image_22.png" /></figure>
B. EU area of freedom, security and justice

Non-refoulment and Dublin rules

DR. LEHTE ROOTS

Tallinn Law School, Tallinn University of Technology

**Abstract:** The article is elaborating on the *non-refoulment* principle in Dublin cases. Dublin system was created to deal with the problem of asylum seekers moving between different EU jurisdictions, the Dublin Convention<fnref n="1" /> was introduced in 1990, because there were no provisions available under the EC Treaty. Dublin II regulation was issued in 2003 nevertheless the situation of asylum seekers cannot be considered good. Cooperation was purely intergovernmental and, therefore, out of the scope of the EC Treaty. There is a tendency for some asylum seekers to reapply for asylum in another country when their asylum claim is rejected in the first country in which they apply for protection. Therefore there emerged a need to agree upon which country was responsible for the review of every asylum application. The Dublin Convention has an impact on the distribution of asylum seekers within the European Union and the general perception is that it influences border countries more than countries situated in the middle of the European Continent. In order to analyse how it really influences the access of third country nationals to Europe, it is first necessary to give an overview of what the convention contains. Non refoulment principle can be found in art 33 of the Geneva Convention on Refugees from 1951. As Dublin procedure is regulated with regulation it is directly applicable in all EU member states. Problems arise when the countries where the asylum seekers are returned do not have effective asylum procedures which might lead up to the violation of non-refoulment principle.

**Keywords:** Dublin regulation, Dublin Convention, non-refoulment, refugee, asylum seeker

DUBLIN CONVENTION AND REGULATION

<figure><img src="image_23.png" /></figure>

The “Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Community” from 15 June 1990, more commonly referred to as the Dublin Convention, was the first legally binding text agreed upon by EU Member States on asylum. According to article 63(1) no. 1 a) of the EC Treaty, the Council was obliged to create a follow-up instrument under Community law to replace the Dublin Convention by the year 2004.

The Dublin Convention came into force on 1 September 1997 for the first twelve signatories (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom); on 1 October 1997 for Austria and Sweden; and on 1 January 1998 for Finland. Agreement was also reached with two non EU Member States, Norway and Iceland, on the mechanisms determining the state responsible for examining asylum requests lodged in one of the states. Later, other EU Member States signed up to the Dublin Convention and new member states which joined the EU after 2004 were automatically obliged to follow the Dublin rules. Switzerland started to apply the Dublin II Regulation in 2008.

The provisions for determining which State is responsible for examining applications for asylum are set forth in Article 3(1). Article 3(5) stipulates that any Member State shall retain the right, pursuant to its national laws, to send or deport an applicant for asylum to a third State, in compliance with the provisions of the Refugee Convention. It is intended to ensure that one Member State will undertake responsibility to examine the application of any alien who applies at the border or in their territory for asylum.

Various technical and legal instruments have been created in order to facilitate the implementation of the Convention. The Eurodac Regulation<fnref n="2" />, a system of fingerprint comparison designed to assist

<footnote n="1">¹ In force from September 1997, OJ C 254/1</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, OJ L 316 of 15 December 2000, p.1</footnote>
decision makers identify asylum applicants and the responsibility for the examination of their applications is one important example. It was approved in 2000 when there were still no common rules for refugee recognition or reception. In 2002 another regulation to implement the Eurodac Regulation was issued<fnref n="1" />.

The Dublin Convention must be seen first and foremost against the backdrop of the freedom of movement of persons and the abolition of internal border controls within the Schengen area. The abolishment of internal borders by art. 17 of the Schengen Agreement allows for free and uncontrolled cross-border traffic. In addition to the various benefits this created, it also caused certain problems. Three particular problems were encountered in the field of asylum. Dublin was designed to stop so called *secondary migratory movements*. These related to cases when asylum applicants entered Member State A. Instead of lodging an asylum application, they travelled to State B or C through state B, where they then applied for asylum. The reasons for such conduct varied. The existence of certain social benefits in one country and the presence of ethnic communities in certain countries were just some of the reasons behind such movements. Member States agreed that such migratory movements needed to be prevented because they would lead to unequal burdens being placed on some Member States. The general principle is that since an asylum application is a request for protection in an emergency situation, protection should be sought and secured primarily in the first safe country entered. One can also argue that the 1951 Refugee Convention does not state that the asylum applicants have a right to lodge an application for asylum in the country of their choice.

The Dublin provisions place a significant burden on the EU's external border states, especially at the EU's southern border where most irregular immigrants arrive. Dublin provisions create a contemporary need for a different kind of burden sharing between southern EU countries and northern EU countries.

The second problem involves the *multiple applications* the Dublin Convention focuses upon. Once the asylum application has been rejected in state A, a person moves to state B where he or she files another application for asylum and if the state B rejects the application he or she can then move to state C to file another application for asylum. It can be claimed that these multiple applications are unfounded because all EU member states apply and recognize the 1951 Refugee Convention and thus the same standards should be applied in each state where the asylum application is assessed.

UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions from 2 October 1983 address the issue of manifestly unfounded or abusive applications and note that this type of application is burdensome to the affected countries and detrimental to the interests of those applicants who have good grounds for requesting recognition as refugees.<fnref n="2" />

This paper does not specifically address the issue of the first country of asylum etc. but in its further statements UNHCR also mentions that states may consider an accelerated procedure for those applicants who clearly have made false statements and are „clearly fraudulent“. UNHCR also mentions that „where applicants have already had their claim for asylum rejected in another country upon examination of the substance of their claim, UNHCR agrees that such applications could appropriately be considered in the procedure for manifestly unfounded applications“.<fnref n="3" /> The aim of the Dublin provisions was to limit these kinds of emerging problems. The provisions stated that only one single contracting state shall be responsible for examining the asylum application that is lodged on the borders of or in the territory of a Member State.

The Dublin Convention dealt insufficiently with certain related problems. Therefore, Council Regulation 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 was adopted to deal with responsibility for the application of

<footnote n="1">¹ Council Regulation (EC) No 407/2002 of 28 February 2002 laying down certain rules to implement Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, OJ L 62 of 5 March 2002, p. 1</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *The Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum*, 20 October 1983, No. 30 (XXXIV) - 1983</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR's Position on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum, 1 December 1992, 3 European Series 2, p. 397, This "another country" can be the other EU country where the applicant has applied for asylum.</footnote>
asylum in Member States (Dublin II Regulation)<fnref n="1" />. It provided criteria to establish which Member State was responsible for the examination of an asylum application submitted in one Member State. It was based on the so called 'single application' principle, prohibiting a person from applying for asylum in more than one country. Member States may refuse an asylum application with a reasoned decision and refer the asylum applicant to the authorities of another Member State. The system was set up to prevent refugees from 'shopping around' for the best destination and to cut down on the expenses caused by more than one country processing the same application.

Although the Dublin Convention and the subsequent regulation dealt with asylum applicants, the consequences of their application have deeper impacts. Countries of first entry have become responsible for determining the status of persons. When persons are granted refugee status or another type of protection, the burden falls entirely on that state. The Dublin provisions have created disproportionate burdens on southern EU member states, such as Italy, Greece, Malta and Spain, which lie closest to northern Africa and the Middle East and through which most asylum seekers must pass in order to reach central and northern Europe. Those who are not granted any status in these countries and, as a consequence, have to be returned to their countries of origin now become the burden of those southern EU states.

The negative impact of the Dublin Regulation has been heavily criticised by ECRE<fnref n="2" />, which states that the burden has been firmly placed on EU border states and on new Member States.

“Far from promoting inter-state solidarity, a long-standing EU goal, the Dublin system shifts responsibility for refugee protection towards the newer Member States in Europe's southern and eastern regions. In 2005, every border state except Estonia reported more incoming than outgoing transfers, and of the non-border Member States, only Austria reported more incoming than outgoing transfers.”<fnref n="3" />

The EU has tried to solve the problem by increasing burden sharing by establishing different funds such as the European Return Fund<fnref n="4" />, the European Refugee Fund<fnref n="5" /> and the External Borders Fund<fnref n="6" /> to support Member States. The Dublin provisions definitely limit the access of third country nationals to certain countries. But, as can be seen from the Maltese case, funds are not always enough to ensure asylum seekers receive access to fair treatment and certain rights.

In late 2008, the European Commission proposed amendments to the Dublin Regulation<fnref n="7" />, creating an opportunity for urgently needed reform. The Dublin system that was initially created for the six countries has turned out to be a time and resources consuming procedure with a heavy administrative burden of communication between the member states. Besides, the current case of Greece has shown that there are cases when asylum seekers cannot be sent back to the first country of entry to EU.<fnref n="8" />

ECREs position is that the determination of the country responsible for a claim should not result in transfers to Member States that cannot guarantee a full and fair hearing of asylum claims and provide reception conditions that at the very least comply with the EU Reception Conditions Directive. The Commission should be empowered to instigate a process to suspend such transfers. Applicants must have a right of judicial appeal against transfer, with suspensive effect. The Dublin Regulation should explicitly

<footnote n="1">¹ 2003 OJ L 50/1</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² European Council of Refugees and Exiles</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ ECRE (2008). Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered, ECRE. ECRE, P 4</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Decision No 575/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 establishing the European Return Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the General Programme Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows, OJ L 144, 6.6.2007, p. 45–65</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Decision No 573/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the General programme Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows and repealing Council Decision 2004/904/EC, OJ L 144, 6.6.2007, p. 1–21</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Decision No 574/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows, OJ L 144, 6 June.2007, p. 22–44</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ COM (2008) 820 final, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ ECtHR, Case M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Strasbourg, hearing done in September 1, 2010</footnote>
require that all transferred cases be examined fully on their merits so that all claimants subject to Dublin procedures receive the same reception conditions as are required for other asylum seekers, and that detention may be used only as an extraordinary measure of last resort where non-custodial measures demonstrably fail.<fnref n="1" />

ECRE's position is reasonable in the light of events occurring in Europe. For example, Greece has been repeatedly criticized for not efficiently managing its asylum applications and sending people back to their country of origin or pushing them back to Turkey without ensuring their rights are protected according to EU standards. This can lead to violation of the 1951 Refugee Convention which says that no one should be sent back to the country where he or she might face persecution. Here is the evidence that while using the legitimate Dublin system a state can violate another important principle of non-refoulment.

The most important role in determination of the responsible state for the examination of the application, set out in the Dublin II Regulation, is on the Member State where the asylum seeker already has legally residing family members. Article 5 of the Dublin II Regulation states that the criteria it set out was to be applied in the order in which they were set out in Chapter III of the Regulation. The hierarchy criteria set out that the responsible Member State to examine the application was thus in the following order the one where:

1. a family member of an unaccompanied minor was legally present, or if there was no such state, where the unaccompanied minor made his or her application.<fnref n="2" />

2. a family member had been granted Geneva Convention refugee status or had an outstanding asylum application.<fnref n="3" />

3. a visa or residence permit had been issued.<fnref n="4" />

4. the country of “default”, meaning the state where the asylum seeker first entered illegally, unless the applicant had been living in the current State over 6 months.<fnref n="5" />

5. the State where the application was first lodged.<fnref n="6" />

Although the family ties should be at the first place in the allocation hierarchy, the family provisions only contributed to a small percentage of actual transfers to other Member States.<fnref n="7" /> The majority of outgoing requests given in the Member States according to the Dublin II Regulation have been conducted on the basis of Article 10 based on the Eurodac data tracing. The Member State which played the biggest part in the applicant's entry into or residence in the Union territory i.e. the default Member State is the state where the applications are actually examined. According to a research made by ECRE, it was over a half of the Member States which used the Article 10 referring to irregular border crossing as the most used criterion for the allocation.<fnref n="8" />

In the Dublin recast the provision of irregular border crossing maintained the same meaning<fnref n="9" />.

So there is a great chance that the hierarchy criteria is not expected to be changed in the future either. The second most frequently used criteria of the Dublin II Regulation, the Article 13, sets out that if it is not possible to allocate which Member State is responsible for the examination of the application, the state where the application was first lodged was responsible for the examination.<fnref n="10" /> This is a clear evidence

<footnote n="1">¹ ECRE (2008). *Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered*, ECRE. ECRE, p5</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003, Art 6</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003, Art 7-8 and Art 14</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 Art 9</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 Art 10</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 Art 13</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, European Comparative report, February 2013, p. 41</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Ibid., p.26</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Recast compromise text Article 13 entry and/or stay, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (Recast), COM(2008) 820 final, 2008/0243 (COD)</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation: Lives on Hold, p 26</footnote>
that Member States do not follow the hierarchy criteria laid down in the Regulation, as was planned, but
rather lay the responsibility on the state which is easy to allocate. It has been argued that that the allocation
criteria of the Dublin II Regulation is “unworkable and dysfunctional”<fnref n="1" /> but it can be thus argued that the
presented malfunctions can be also targeted by the Member States and their poor application of the
system.

Furthermore, the Regulation included provisions of the general principles, “taking charge and taking back”. This chapter gives instructions to the states of the obligations to examine the application and to complete the procedure, or to claim the other State to take back the person if the responsibility was wrongly adjusted.

The Regulation also includes the chapter describing the administrative cooperation between the Member State concerning the transfer of asylum seekers and their applications. The member states were also left with some discretion in addition to the hierarchy criteria; in addition to the provisions of hierarchy criteria the Dublin II Regulation contained two important discretionary provisions, namely the sovereignty clause and the humanitarian clause. According to the sovereignty clause in Article 3(2) the Member States have „free choice” to consider which state was responsible for the application process.

Another Member State, which was not the one primarily responsible for examination, had
according to the Regulation always the possibility to take the asylum application under its response
irrespective of the other rules in the Regulation. **The humanitarian clause (in Article 15) provided that**
regardless of the criteria set out in Articles 5–14, any Member State could bring together family members
under certain circumstances based on family or cultural considerations not addressed in the previously
mentioned articles with the consent of the concerned person. These discretion clauses reduced the
obligatory nature of the Regulation, especially the first articles of the Regulation on the criteria for
responsibility<fnref n="2" />.

The Dublin system was established in order to give guidance to the Member States on how they should deal with the multiple asylum applications.<fnref n="3" /> All the 5 operative Chapters of the Dublin II Regulation gave instructions to the Member States on how to deal with the applications; which member state is responsible for the examination of the application and how the transfers between the states should be conducted. The provisions of the Regulation thus seemed to be directed solely to the Member States and not to asylum seekers as such meaning that the human rights considerations came only after the state convenience. The fact that the system was targeted most importantly to Member States seemed to serve the interest of the states rather than individuals leaving the responsibility of the protection of the asylum seekers for only little attention and the responsibility for looking after the rights and well-being of the asylum seekers to other instrument and courts.

However, a closer examination of the provisions of the Regulation reveals that the Regulation
targets the individuals as well. The most important and fundamental provision of the Dublin II Regulation
is the Article 3(1) ruling that the examination of an asylum claim should be conducted by only one
Member State. The Article stated that “Member States shall examine the application of any third country
national who applies at the border or their territory to any one of them for asylum. The application shall
be examined by a single member state, which shall be the one which the criteria set out in Chapter III
indicate is responsible”.<fnref n="4" /> The wording of the article thus provided that the Member States guaranteed that
only one Member State would be responsible for the examination but they also undertook that the
application would be examined *at least* by one of the Member State. It was a guarantee which presented a
legitimate compensation for the loss of the asylum seekers to no longer be able to lodge an asylum
application in several states inside the EU territory.<fnref n="5" /> Therefore, it can be argued that the Regulation was

<footnote n="1">¹ Costello, C., p 314</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation: Lives on Hold, supra note 51, p 6</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ European Council on Refugees and Exiles Report, Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered, Executive Summary, March 2008, p 9</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Dublin II Regulation, Article 3(1)</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Da Lomba, S., p 131</footnote>
not only directed to the Member States, but was also established to secure better the examination of the
asylum applications and therefor also protecting the rights of third country nationals in European Union.

CRITICS OF THE DUBLIN SYSTEM

In 2008 the European Parliament presented proposals for better system and called for the
"fairness" of the system in regards of the asylum seekers and the Member States as it did not agree with
the positive findings of the Commission .<fnref n="1" /> It stated that "unless a satisfactory and consistent level of
protection is achieved across the European Union, the Dublin system will always produce unsatisfactory
results from both the technical and the human viewpoints" and that "in the absence of a genuine
common European asylum system and a single procedure the Dublin system will continue to be unfair
both to asylum seekers and to certain Member States". The UNCHR and several other NGO's and
human rights experts had presented their concerns and criticism regarding the realization of human rights
protection under the system and argued that the system was not fair and did not respect the human rights
obligations set out in the Geneva Refugee Convention 1951, UNDHR or ECHR.

One problem with the Dublin Regulation is that it divides families if, for example, some family
members are already residing in one member state. This occurs because, according to the Dublin rules, an
asylum seeker has to be sent back to the country where he first landed or a country which issued him a
visa.

ECRE argues that family support can benefit both asylum seekers and their host states but the
Dublin Regulation gives insufficient consideration to the interests of families, as well as children and other
vulnerable groups. The definition of a family – currently limited to spouses, minor children and their
parents or guardians – should be extended, and refugees should be able to join any family member holding
legal residence status in the EU. The Regulation's humanitarian clause should not be limited to uniting
families. It should also allow Member States to prevent the transfer of vulnerable persons, such as torture
victims or those with health problems that may require specialised treatment. Determination of
responsibility for the applications of children and other vulnerable people should follow a separate process
that focuses on their best interests and particular needs. <fnref n="2" /> ECRE records that “the Commission’s 2007
evaluation asserts that it appears that the overall allocation between border and non-border Member States
is actually rather balanced. In 2005, the total number of all transfers to EU external border Member States
was 3 055, while there were 5 161 transfers to non-border Member States.”<fnref n="3" /> According to ECRE,
however, the Commission’s view is questionable, as it is based only on reports of incoming Dublin
transfers and does not reveal how many of people concerned were transferred from external to internal
Member States. Looking only at outgoing transfers would lead to the opposite conclusion: 7,040 people
were transferred from non-border Member states versus 307 from border Member States, a ratio of nearly
23:1”. <fnref n="4" /> ECRE’s comparison shows that every border state except Estonia reported more incoming than
outgoing transfers, and of the non-border Member States, only Austria reported more incoming than
outgoing transfers.

When Member States are ranked by order of net Dublin transfers (incoming minus outgoing)
compared to the total number of asylum applications received in 2005, the 13 border states occupy the top
11 positions, and 13 of the top 14. Net-Dublin transfers represented a particularly significant proportion
of total asylum applications received in Poland (19.28%), Slovakia (12.06%), and Hungary (9.56%). <fnref n="5" />

ECRE claims that the Dublin system, combined with significant differences in the handling of
asylum applications by different Member States, produces an ‘asylum lottery’ in the EU. For example, in

<footnote n="1">¹ European Union: European Parliament, European Parliament resolution on the evaluation of the Dublin system, 2 September 2008,(2008)0385, para 1-2</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² ECRE (2008). Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered, ECRE.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ European Commission (2007). Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration, European Commission., p. 12. It appears that the ‘border’ Member States are Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain, as these states reported a combined 5,161 incoming transfers.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ ECRE (2008). Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered, ECRE.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ ECRE (2008). Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered, ECRE.</footnote>
2005 recognition rates for Chechens varied from approximately 0% in Slovakia to approximately 90% in Austria, and several Member States are reported to have *refouled* Chechens to Russia and treated many aspects of their asylum cases differently, including their status as internally displaced persons prior to seeking asylum and access to reception facilities.<fnref n="1" /> Iraqi asylum seekers also face widely divergent treatment depending upon where their claims are considered. In 2007, recognition rates at first instance were 87.5% in Cyprus, 85% in Germany, 82% in Sweden, 30% in Denmark, 13% in the UK, and 0% in Slovenia and Greece. ECRE also criticises how the fates of protection seekers often depends on which state is allocated responsibility for assessing their claims.<fnref n="2" />

As Kloth<fnref n="3" /> argues, the Dublin Convention has only partly managed to accomplish the goal of halting secondary movements. He claims that “*Applicants for asylum who are not seeking protection but are merely interested in entering the territory of the Member States were very quick to find ways of circumventing the Convention, either by deliberately giving false information about the routes they have travelled or by destroying their documents*”.

Indeed, most applicants claim not to have documents. These claims cannot be rejected on the basis of not providing any written proof of the origin or the route of escape. Kloth even declares that the requirement that the “first State in which an application for asylum was filled” should be responsible for reviewing the claim will not accomplish this goal because this criterion would promote secondary migratory movements and would lead to one-sided burdens being placed on Member States that are the preferred destinations for asylum seekers.<fnref n="4" />

Dublin has created more work for Member States' administration and its outcomes are often disputed but as it is a valid regulation it has to be followed in the way it has been designed. A lot of paper work is required and enquiries have to be answered as persons might need to be transferred to another member state if it is found responsible for the asylum procedure. The Dublin Regulation is definitely one of the instruments that limits the access of third country nationals to a particular state. It makes asylum shopping harder and limits asylum seekers' possibility to select their country of asylum.

Due to the founded malfunctions the European Commission proposed to recast the Dublin II Regulation in 2008 and admitted that there were well-founded concerns in the level of international protection of the asylum seekers in the current form of the Dublin II Regulation.<fnref n="5" /> The recast of the current Dublin II Regulation will thus be created for better human rights protection and to strengthen safeguards of the asylum seekers and to ease the transfer and responsibility procedures. However, the Member states have been reluctant to accept many of the Commission's proposals including the proposal to enforce temporary suspension of transfers and legal provisions that would narrow member states' ability to detain asylum seekers.<fnref n="6" /> Because of this lack of willingness of the Member States to change the foundational principles of the Dublin system the Courts, both at the national and European level, have increasingly been required to intervene to protect the fundamental rights of the asylum seekers with regard to the application of the Dublin II Regulation.<fnref n="7" />

Also, the Dublin Regulation recast will not change the most essential provision of the Dublin II Regulation namely the Article 3 providing that an asylum application should be considered only by one and at least one Member State. This main Article has been argued to fail in three ways.<fnref n="8" /> Firstly, the creation of the Dublin system and its main Article 3 caused a loss of the right to lodge an application in several member states which again meant that person's possibilities to submit his asylum claim at all in EU was jeopardized because the Member States had been unwilling to agree on the asylum procedures or the

<footnote n="1">¹The article on the EU Commission webpage confirms the different treatment of asylum seekers and the example of Chechens and Iraqis is mentioned. Some EU countries would agree to give them asylum others not.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² ECRE (2008). Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered, ECRE. P 15</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Faria, C. (2001). The Dublin Convention on Asylum, European Institute of Public Administration. pg 23</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Ibid pg 24</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Commission evaluation report, Recast, supra note 39, p 3</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Jesuit Refugee Service Europe: Dublin Regulation, Background and Context</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ European Council on Refugees and Exiles, "Dublin II Regulation: Lives on hold" - European Comparative Report, February 2013, p 16</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Da Lomba, S., p 132</footnote>
definition of “refugee” in harmonized manner.<fnref n="1" /> Secondly, there existed deficiencies in the provision and the application of family unity and thirdly, there was a problem with the third country-practices and the consequent phenomena of “refugees in orbit”. In the following sub-chapters it will be examined whether there can be found grounds for the presented criticisms.

## NON REFOULMENT PRINCIPLE

It is a presumption, also stated in the Dublin II Regulation recital 8, that all the European Member States meet the satisfactory basic standards for fair asylum procedures. However, despite the harmonization attempts, there exist big differences between the member states regarding the binding criteria and the discretionary provisions, application procedures, standards for the examinations and the decision making regarding the asylum application.<fnref n="2" /> But in fact the states seem to have different views on how the Dublin procedures should be conducted and disparities exist between the procedural safeguards even if the Regulation was established in order to harmonize the common European asylum legislation. For example the time given for the procedures and for the interviews varies between the states. Despite the recommendation of the NGO's some states have been unwilling to offer longer appeal times. For example Hungary gives an asylum seeker only 3 days for submitting the appeal whereas France and Spain give 2 months.<fnref n="3" /> These differences between the member states are often in relation to the rights of the asylum seekers as in the countries where the time for submitting appeal is short and the decision is quickly put in force the asylum seekers have less procedural rights and possibilities to have correction to a wrong decision.

At the same time Art 33 of the Geneva Convention on Refugees from 1951 is stating a *non-refoulement* principle that should be taken into account while assessing the asylum application. The first paragraph of the article 33 of the Convention states that:

> "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has used Article 3 in order to deal with the non-refoulement issue, which is not itself specifically mentioned in the Convention. Also, the right which the Convention creates (to be protected from torture) is absolute and non-derogable. So the protection given by the ECHR is broader than that of art. 33 of the Geneva Convention. All European states are part of the UN Refugee Convention and also implement the Dublin regulation.

One of the main reasons for initially establishing a common allocation mechanism (Dublin procedure) for determining the responsible member state was to secure the principle of international law called non-refoulement- This principle of international law prohibits rendering victims of persecution to the state, where their lives or freedoms could be threatened. The mechanism was also to make an end to the phenomena of “refugees in orbit” or “asylum shopping”. Even if stated in the preamble (2) of the Dublin II Regulation that the Regulation was aiming to ensure the maintaining the principle of non-refoulement,<fnref n="4" /> a real danger under the Dublin procedure exists for a person to be transferred to a country where life or freedom of the person can be threatened and it has been argued that especially the “third safe country” principle with regard to the Dublin system is endangering the principle of non-refoulement.<fnref n="5" />

<footnote n="1">¹ Ibid. p 132</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, p 6</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Ibid., p 61</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Goodwin-Gill, p 202 "The term refouler derives from French and means to drive back or to repel and is usually referring to those who illegally entered the state territory and to summary refusal of admission of those without valid papers. Refoulement is thus to be distinguished from a more formally conducted expulsion or deportation whereby a lawfully resident alien is required to leave the country".</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Rodger, J., Defining the parameters of the non-refoulement principle, 2001 LLM Research paper International law (Laws 509), Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, Chapter 4. B. 1, para 41</footnote>
The third country practice was already debated during the Dublin Convention but was nevertheless passed to the Dublin II Regulation. The failure of the Dublin system is that it gives priority to sending asylum seekers to "third countries", meaning that the system allows the Member States under the article 3(3) of the Dublin II Regulation, which states that "Member States shall retain the right, according to its national laws, to send an asylum seeker to a third country, in compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention", to prefer external transfers over internal transfers.<fnref n="1" /> This is a practice unfortunately often used by the member states even if the principle should be applied in the Dublin system as a last resort only if none of the other criterion is found. The member states refer to the *non-refoulement* principle and send the asylum seekers to "safe third countries" referring to states other than the one where the individual claims to be at risk to treatment threatening his or her life, for example to a neighbour country of the country of origin.<fnref n="2" /> Member states may then resort to the *non-refoulement*-principle because the principle only precludes states from transferring the asylum seeker to a country of origin where they might face persecution but does not preclude the state returning the person elsewhere.<fnref n="3" /> These "safe" third countries often expel the seeker onwards to the country where the possible ill-treatment might take place.<fnref n="4" /> In most cases the receiving state does not make any efforts to examine whether the third country will be willing to substantively examine the case after receiving the person and that the asylum procedures in the country can provide adequate protection.<fnref n="5" /> The principle of the third safe country gives therefore a convenient escape way of the obligation of the states to conduct a full and substantive examination of the asylum application.

The allocation procedure created by the Dublin system also reinforced a trend among the European member states to speed up the national procedures whereby only two or three days are allowed for the preparation of the case or appeal. Member States have been argued to restrict the asylum permits by claiming the applications "manifestly unfounded" by "fast-tracking" the asylum seekers or by denying the access of the asylum seekers to the full asylum procedures completely.<fnref n="6" /> Fast-tracking procedures reduce substantially the chance of the asylum seeker to be granted a positive decision for their claim since not enough time is provided to them to gather evidence which would be needed for positive decision required by the state authorities such as birth and marriage certificates, required DNA-testing which also in some states must even be provided by own expenses.<fnref n="7" />

The asylum seekers are also often required to provide proof of the claimed thread of persecution or conducted ill-treatment such as arrest warrants and/or medical reports even if it is acknowledged by the UNCHR guidelines regarding the refugees that persons fleeing from persecution "often arrive with the barest necessities and frequently without personal documents".<fnref n="8" /> The speedy procedures are creating another possible violation of the non-refoulment principle as there is not enough time to review the cases in depth which is one of the basic requirements of the asylum procedure.

## FAMILY UNITY PRINCIPLE AND DUBLIN

Articles 7, 8 and 14 of the Dublin II Regulation are provisions that were established in order to preserve family unity as laid down in Recital 6 of the Regulation and are based on the protection of fundamental rights of the individuals regarding the family unity provided in the Article 8 ECHR and

<footnote n="1">¹ Costello, C., p 310</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Ibid., p 310</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³Ibid., p 310</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Mole, N., Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights, 2007, Council of Europe Publishing, Fourth Edition, November 2007, Strasbourg, p 46</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Wallace, Rebecca, p 74</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Mole, N., Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights, 2007, Council of Europe Publishing, Fourth Edition, November 2007, Strasbourg, p 61-62</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, supra 51, p 97</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*, January 1992, para. 196</footnote>
Article 7 Charter of Fundamental Rights.¹According to these Dublin II Regulation Articles, the Member State where the applicant has a specified family member, who has already been granted a refugee status under the Geneva Convention, is primarily the responsible state for the examination of the asylum. However, ECRE claims that the member states have been argued to not to provide full consideration concerning families in the current form of the Dublin II Regulation.<fnref n="2" />

The provisions concerning family unity has been one of the things criticized to be weakly composed in the original Dublin Convention. The Commission has noted that the provision regarding the family unity in the original Convention Article 4 was easy to apply comparing to some other provisions of the Convention, but it was also easier to find its restrictive scope as the article reflected western concept of families, namely including to the scope of family only the nuclear family members. The provisions were thus argued to fail to meet the factual situations when dealing with the asylum seekers who, in their culture consider the family unit more comprehensive.<fnref n="3" /> In the Dublin II Regulation the family-related criteria was therefore reformed and also the specific needs of unaccompanied minors were added to the criteria. Also, the provisions were extended to include also siblings and married children who were present in the territories of Member States without their spouse and to include relatives who could take care of a minor to the category of family members.<fnref n="4" /> Some of the member states<fnref n="5" /> even included unmarried partners in stable relationships as well as same sex partnerships to the definition of family <fnref n="6" /> as well as families that had not existed originally in the country of origin.<fnref n="7" />

According to ECRE in many cases the national authorities ignore the presence of a close family member in another Member State and instead applied Article 10(1) of the Regulation on basis of Eurodac tracking and thus sent the request for examination to the state of illegal entry of the asylum seeker or based on the Article 13 to the state where the asylum application was previously lodged.<fnref n="8" /> The weak application of the transfers conducted by the member states according to family unity reasons can be visualized from the small percentages of average numbers presenting the requests and actual transfers conducted between the member states. For example, in 2010 only 0.5% of outgoing requests to another Member State under the Dublin Regulation were on the basis of family reasons.<fnref n="9" /> The state specific statistics reveal the scarcity of the number of actual transfers conducted as for example the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees statistics showed that in 2011 there was only one outgoing transfer conducted on the ground of family reasons and was one out of only nine requests sent under the family provisions.<fnref n="10" /> Many cases end up breaking families which happened also in case where the Austrian authorities separated a Chechen father from his baby. Even if the child had refugee status in Austria, his father was sent to Poland under according to Eurodac-tracking under the Dublin system in spite of his requests for reunification under the family unification provisions of the Dublin system.<fnref n="11" />

Also, the Article 14 has been often applied instead of the Article 8¹<fnref n="2" /> meaning that if several members of a family cast their asylum applications simultaneously the Member states send the applicants

<footnote n="1">¹ ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, supra note 51, p 32-33</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² European Council on Refugees and Exiles: Report, The application of the Dublin II Regulation in Europe, AD3/3/2006/EXT/MH, on March 2006, p 6</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Da Lomba, Silvia, p 134</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, p 26</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ The Netherlands included also same sex marriages, Ibid., p. 26</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ i.e. Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, Switzerland and the Netherlands, ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, p 33-34</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Hungary was one of such states, ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, p.33-34</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, p 26</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Ibid., p 22</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Ibid., p 35</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Press release: Little to celebrate on Dublin's 10th anniversary - New research shows that the system continues to violate the rights of refugees, Dublin transnational project, 18 February 2013</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation: Lives on hold, supra 51, p 26</footnote>
to the Member State where the biggest part of the family is residing/ to the state where the oldest person of the family is<fnref n="1" /> rather than to examine the application by themselves.

The humanitarian clause in the Dublin II Regulation provided that any Member State may accept to examine, at the request of another Member State, an asylum application for **humanitarian reasons** based on family or cultural considerations. Also the consent of the persons concerned is needed. However the humanitarian clause, as articles 7, 8 and 14, of the Dublin II Regulation have been argued to be applied in a restrictive manner by the member states often leading to separation of families. <fnref n="2" /> Also, the humanitarian clause has received lot of criticism as it was created in order to better protect the asylum seekers but have rarely applied by the Member States even if the applicant would have been with vulnerabilities.<fnref n="3" /> The Jesuit Refugee Service, European Regional Office has noted that for example where a woman in her 6th month of pregnancy was transferred on her own back to Greece, despite loud protests from NGOs and church groups<fnref n="4" /> and therefore there existed little to no use of the humanitarian clause in the Regulation.<fnref n="5" /> The new discretionary clauses in the Dublin recast will however improve the current Regulation as they will include a “family dependency link” to the criteria which enables the Member States to allocate the responsibility for humanitarian reasons better<fnref n="6" /> and might thus make their use more common.

According to the Article 6 of the Dublin II Regulation the responsible Member State for the examination of the asylum application of an unaccompanied child is the one where a member of his or her family is legally present, provided that it is in the best interest of the child. In case there is no family members present in Europe, then the Member State where the child lodged his/her asylum application is responsible. However, the interpretation of the member states of the article 6 of the Dublin II Regulation differs largely depending of the priority given by the state to either guardian, family tracing, assessment of the best interest of a child or age making the determining a responsible state resemble lottery.<fnref n="7" /> The best interest of a child is given rather strong importance on the allocation and the Advocate General acknowledged in his opinion in Case C-648/11 that even if the practice of determining the responsible state of an asylum seeker according to the criteria allocating the responsible state basing on the state where the child of a person had lodged his/her asylum might increase the risk of so called ‘forum shopping’, the risk would be justified by the fact that the procedure would be the only way for the sufficient attention to the minor’s best interests.<fnref n="8" />

However, diverging practice exists with respect to the application of the principles of the best interests of the child within the Dublin procedure and to the interpretation of Art. 6. The best interest of the child is in some Member States secured by national law provisions. The importance of considering the cases on their facts was visible in the Federal Administrative Court case E-8648/2010 given on the 21st September 2011 where an asylum application of a Somali child in the Netherlands was determined to be examined by Malta according to Dublin system. The child had a sister in the Netherlands and the Dutch Council of State thus decided finally that it was the best interest of the child that his application was examined in the Netherlands.<fnref n="9" /> However, in the national law of many Member States the best interest of the child is not considered as an integral element when applying the Dublin Regulation and thus there

<footnote n="1">¹ UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *The Dublin II Regulation. A UNHCR Discussion Paper*, April 2006, p 34 available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4445fe344.html [accessed 10 May 2013]</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Ibid. p 33-34</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Caritas Europa, CCME – Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe, COMECE – Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community, ICMC – International Catholic Migration Commission, JRS-Europe – Jesuit Refugee Service, European Regional Office, QCEA – Quaker Council for European Affairs, Comments on the European Commission’s Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection in one of the Member States by a third-county national or stateless person (COM 2008/820/COD), p 8</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Jesuit Refugee Service Europe: Dublin II: A summary of JRS experiences in Europe, October 2008, p 5</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Jesuit Refugee Service: Comments, p 8</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Ibid., p 8</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, p 6</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Court of Justice of the European Union - Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in the case C-648/11 MA, BT, DA v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 21 February 2013, para 76-78.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, p 28</footnote>
does not exist any explicit criteria for practical meaning of the best interest of the child<fnref n="1" /> which makes the consideration of the child's interest difficult. Some of the European member states do not even have a family member tracing procedures related to the Dublin system, which means that the Article 6(1) on applications of children is rarely applied.<fnref n="2" />

**The Dublin II Regulation neither includes a specific provision that would take the group of vulnerable people into consideration diminishing the proper protection of the asylum seeker. Also the humanitarian clause in Article 15 has been argued to be applied by the Member States in too restrictive manner leaving out from the scope other vulnerable groups namely, torture victims, persons with health problems in need of special treatment.<fnref n="3" /> The article 15 (2) does however make a reference to persons who may be dependent** on the assistance of another “*on account of pregnancy or a new born child, serious illness, severe handicap or old age*”. Even if the family provisions in the Dublin II Regulation were a bit improved from the original Convention, the vulnerable groups could be better taken into consideration by creating a separate determination process especially focusing on their interest and particular needs<fnref n="4" /> and therefore, the group of vulnerable people was taken into consideration in the Dublin recast obliging Member States to transmit health data between themselves regarding the medical care or treatment of disabled persons, elderly people, pregnant women, minors and persons that have been subject to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical and sexual violence.<fnref n="5" />

The transfers outside the borders of the Union are not the only problem related to the third country transfers according to the system but the transfers inside the borders of the Union might be problematic as well. Under the Dublin II Regulation all the European Member States are considered as “safe countries” and thus, the transfers to another Member State cannot be regarded as a breach of principle of *non-refoulement*. The Contracting States can thus rely on a certain extent to the fact that the other contracting state is bound by the same international legal instrument than itself and is thus considered as safe.<fnref n="6" /> This assumption was also confirmed by the ECtHR in *Amuur v. France*<fnref n="7" /> as well as in the CJEU's ruling in case *N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department*<fnref n="8" /> where it was held that the presumption that Member States are observing the fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights must be rebuttable.

The mutual recognition is based on trust between the Member States and is applied in spite of diversity regarding the Member States' adapting of the EU legislation.<fnref n="9" /> Many of the persons seeking for international protection have however been unlawfully returned first to another state even if it was known that this state could not be able to provide sufficient procedures for the examination or even proper reception conditions and which again send the asylum seeker onward breaching the obligation of *non-refoulement*. The problem of the mutual recognition can be discovered in the case *T.I v. U.K*<fnref n="10" />, in which ECtHR made an important ruling relating to the third country practice and the state responsibility in regards to the Dublin system.

T.I was a Sri Lankan asylum seeker whose asylum application was refused in Germany on the basis that his claim was not considered credible and the fear of persecution was caused by the non-state agents. The applicant was thus returned first to UK and from there to Sri Lanka. The ECtHR found that the State responsibility arose also in cases where the State sent back the asylum seeker to a third “safe” countries according to the Dublin system if there was a risk that the person might face treatment contrary to article

<footnote n="1">¹ Ibid, p 28</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Ibid., p 28</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, p 53</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ ECRE Report: Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered, Executive Summary, May 2008</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ ECRE Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, p 74</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Battjes, H. 2006, Immigration and asylum law and Policy in Europe, European Asylum Law And International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 411</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Amuur v. France, 17/1995/523/609, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 25 June 1996</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ N. S. (C 411/10) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E. (C 493/10) and others v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, C-411/10 and C-493/10</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Costello, C., p 316</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ T.I. v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 43844/98, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 7 March 2000</footnote>
3 ECHR, meaning that the states should not disregard the asylum application by resorting to the safe third country practice. It stated that the assigning the risk of torture to another Member State, did not take away the responsibility from the first Member State, but rather just increased it in the receiving state. <fnref n="1" /> The Court did not, however, condemn the Dublin Convention per se. <fnref n="2" /> Therefore, even if the Dublin system is a tool to make an end to the phenomenon of “refugee in orbit” inside the borders of Europe, the Article 3(3) enables the externalization of the asylum seekers making the phenomenon aggravated elsewhere in the world. <fnref n="3" /> Also the CJEU has ruled in the joined cases NS/ME, <fnref n="4" /> that the EU human rights law does sometimes require Member States to refuse to transfer the asylum seeker according to the Dublin system. The CJEU held that this obligation is triggered if the authorities in the transferring Member State have substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 4 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 3 ECHR). <fnref n="5" />

In January 2011 the ECtHR gave a fundamental judgment in **M.S.S v Belgium and Greece**<fnref n="6" /> which changed the direction of the responsibility of states in regards to the asylum application examinations. The case concerned an Afghan refugee who entered Europe through Greece where he was fingerprinted. From Greece he continued to Belgium where he applied for asylum where according to the Dublin II Regulation it was allocated that Greece was the country responsible for determining his asylum application and he was sent back there. In Greece he was first shut in a detention in degrading conditions in a center which was overcrowded and insalubrious and left to live in Athens without food or any protection or rights what so ever. Finally he was transferred to the Turkish border by the Greek authorities in order to be irregularly pushed across the border without any procedures but which was prevented only because of the Turkish border guards challenged the attempt of the Greek. Complicated question in the case was whether the Belgium was culpable breaching its human rights obligations as it had relied on the Dublin II Regulation. The ECtHR ruled that Belgium did breach its obligation under the article 3 ECHR (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment)<fnref n="7" /> because of the applicant's detention conditions and living conditions in Greece and it had thus not fulfilled its obligations to protect M.S.S from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment because at the time of the applicant's expulsion the Belgian authorities knew or ought to have known as confirmed by the given Rule 39 that M.S.S had no guarantee that his asylum application would be seriously examined by the Greek authorities and they would have had the means to refuse the transfer. <fnref n="8" /> The two countries were given fines of some €6,000 and €30,000⁹ and thus, despite the fact that Greece had ratified the common European asylum directives the Court ruled that it did not comply with international and European human rights standards and thus condemned the transfers to Greece. As a result, the contracting states of the Dublin system suspended transfers of asylum seekers to Greece. These actions thus showed that the Dublin II Regulation remained far away from its goal to harmonize of asylum policies in Europe.<fnref n="10" />

<footnote n="1">¹ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Guild, E., The European geography of refugee protection - exclusions, limitations and exceptions from the 1967 Protocol to the present, European Human Rights Law Review E.H.R.L.R. 2012, 4, 413-426,</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³Da Lomba, S., p 133</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. and others v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Judgment of 21 December 2011</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Costello, C., p 314-315</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Case M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 21 January 2011</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ European Court on Human Rights Press Release, Forthcoming Grand Chamber Judgment in case M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece, issued by the Registrar of the Court, no. 25, 17.01.2011</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹EU Observer.com: Human Rights Court Deals Blow to EU Asylum System, 21.01.11</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰Vink, M. (2012). Dublin System. In I. Ness, ed. (2012). Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration. ,Wiley Blackwell Publishing. p. 3</footnote>
CONCLUSION

There are conflicting ideas of how to resolve the problem. UNHCR and NGO-s promote the change. Majority of the EU Member States would like to maintain the present principles of the Dublin Regulation. The EU Commission has made a proposal in 2008 to create a more effective system that would also take into account the rights of asylum seekers.¹ The new Dublin regulation draft is still under consideration and under discussion at the EU level.

The statistics have also revealed that Member States have not applied the Dublin II Regulation in a manner that would be in accordance with the spirit of the Dublin Convention. The consideration of the best interest of the persons have been abandoned and the Dublin system has become just a tool for „getting off the problem from ones shoulders“. It is mainly used to transport the asylum seekers back to the first country of entry or who might be held responsible of letting the person in to the European Union. The hierarchy criteria has been forgotten and is mostly theoretical. <fnref n="2" />

The lack of harmonization and inconsistent interpretation of Regulation provisions and refugee concepts might also lead to direct and indirect refoulment.<fnref n="3" />

It can be concluded that applying Dublin criteria in a mechanical and technocratic way might lead to the violation of the principle of non-refoulement, lack of respect of family unity. These practices have been condemned by the supranational courts and in the European Court also in the Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy<fnref n="4" /> the ECtHR respectively ruled that the legal obligations of the states did not limit to their territorial borders but human rights protection should extend even beyond.<fnref n="5" />

The example of Greece shows that the Dublin System doesn't grand to the individual refugee the protection and treatment that he or she deserves. Although all EU member states are signatories to the ECHR, and have thus recognized the principle of non-refoulement as an absolute right, most EU states don't respect this principle, either directly or indirectly by blindly following the Dublin Regulation. However a serious body of recent information is provided about the problems of refoulement in Greece, a lot of EU countries keep returning people to the country when it is responsible for the asylum request according to the Dublin Regulation.

In case of a possible violation of art. 3 ECHR, the ECtHR can take up the role of the member states by taking interim measures to suspend the Dublin transfer.

The ECtHR interpreted art. 3 very broadly and is in its jurisdiction clear about the responsibilities of the contracting states in transfer cases. Still it is, in the casus of Dublin transfers to Greece, very difficult to give proof that in an individual case there is a violation of art. 3 ECHR. The Dublin system impedes integration by delaying the substantive examination of asylum claims, by creating incentives for refugees to avoid the asylum system and live 'underground,' and by uprooting refugees and forcing them to have their claims determined in member states with which they may have no particular connection. In 2013 the new regulation<fnref n="6" /> was agreed upon and hopefully the application of this regulation will resolve major of the abovementioned problems.

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national or a stateless person (Recast), COM (2008) 820 final, 2008/0243(COD)</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² See also the Commission proposal for recast, p2-3</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ UN Hight Commissioner for Refugees, The Dublin II Regulation. A UNHCR Discussion Paper, April 2006</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ *Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy*, Application no. 27765/09, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 23 February 2012</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Vandvik, B., p 135-138</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ REGULATION (EU) No 604/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ L 180/31, 29.6.2013</footnote>
**Bibliography/References:**

* Amuur v. France, 17/1995/523/609, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 25 June 1996

* Battjes, H. 2006, *Immigration and asylum law and Policy in Europe, European Asylum Law And International Law*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers

* Caritas Europa, et.al, *Comments on the European Commission's Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection in one of the Member States by a third-country national or stateless person (COM 2008/820/COD)*

* C-411/10 and C-493/10, N. S. (C 411/10) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E. (C 493/10) and others v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform

* Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, OJ L 316 of 15 December 2000, p.1

* Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national

* Council Regulation (EC) No 407/2002 of 28 February 2002 laying down certain rules to implement Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, OJ L 62 of 5 March 2002, p. 1

* Costello, C., Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored, Transfer of International Protection and European Union Law, *Human Rights Law Review* 12(2), 2012

* Da Lomba, S., (2004) The Right to Seek Refugee status in the European Union, Intersentia, Antwerp, Oxford

* Decision No 573/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the General programme Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows and repealing Council Decision 2004/904/EC, OJ L 144, 6.6.2007, p. 1–21

* Decision No 574/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows, OJ L 144, 6 June.2007, p. 22–44

* Decision No 575/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 establishing the European Return Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the General Programme Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows, OJ L 144, 6.6.2007, p. 45–65

* ECRE (2008). Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin Reconsidered, ECRE.

* ECRE, (2013) Report: Dublin II Regulation - Lives on hold, European Comparative report.

* European Parliament resolution on the evaluation of the Dublin system, 2 September 2008, (2008) 0385

* European Commission (2007). Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration, European Commission.

* European Council on Refugees and Exiles: Report, The application of the Dublin II Regulation in Europe, AD3/3/2006/EXT/MH, on March 2006

* Faria, C. (2001). *The Dublin Convention on Asylum*, European Institute of Public Administration.

* Goodwin-Gill, McAdam, (2007) *The Refugee Law in International Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford

* Guild, E., The European geography of refugee protection - exclusions, limitations and exceptions from the 1967 Protocol to the present, European Human Rights Law Review E.H.R.L.R. 2012, 4, 413-426

* *Hirsi Jamaa* and *Others v. Italy*, Application no. 27765/09, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 23 February 2012

* *Human Rights Court Deals Blow to EU Asylum System*, EU Observer, accessed 21.01.11

* Jesuit Refugee Service Europe: *Dublin Regulation, Background and Context*, 2008

* Jesuit Refugee Service Europe: *Dublin II: A summary of JRS experiences in Europe*, October 2008

* Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. and others v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Judgment of 21 December 2011

* Mole, N., Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights, 2007, Council of Europe Publishing, Fourth Edition, November 2007

* M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 21 January 2011
* Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in the case C-648/11 MA, BT, DA v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 21 February 2013, para 76-78.

* Press release: Little to celebrate on Dublin's 10th anniversary - New research shows that the system continues to violate the rights of refugees, Dublin transnational project, 18 February 2013

* Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (Recast), COM(2008) 820 final, 2008/0243 (COD)

* REGULATION (EU) No 604/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ L 180/31, 29.6.2013

* Rodger, J., Defining the parameters of the non-refoulement principle, 2001 LLM Research paper International law (Laws 509), Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington

* T.I. v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 43844/98, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 7 March 2000

* UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*, January 1992

* UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *The Dublin II Regulation. A UNHCR Discussion Paper*, April 2006, p 34 available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4445fe344.html [accessed 10 May 2013]

* UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *The Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum*, 20 October 1983, No. 30 (XXXIV) - 1983

* UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR's Position on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum*, 1 December 1992, 3 European Series 2

* Vandvik, B., (2011) *The Future of Asylum in Europe? A view from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles*, Asser Press

* Vink, M., Dublin System. In Ness I., ed. (2012). *Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration*, Wiley Blackwell Publishing

* Wallace, R., (1996) *Refugee and Asylum: A community Perspective*, Butterworths Law, London

<figure><img src="image_24.png" /></figure>
# The EU efforts in combating internal fraud and corruption

DR. ALFRED KELLERMANN

Visiting Professor in EU law and Former Head of EU section of the T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague

**Abstract:** This article focuses on some of the EU experiences with combating internal fraud and corruption before and since the Lisbon Treaty. The latter Treaty creates new opportunities and provides new instruments to establish an effective area of freedom, security and justice at European level. The article also comments upon the reports on the way the Commission is handling internal fraud, as well as the performance of some Commissioners. Finally, the role of OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office), Europol and Eurojust and the potential EU Public Prosecutor are discussed.

**Keywords:** Europol, Eurojust, EU Public Prosecutor, Justice and Home Affairs, Common Foreign and Security Policy.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

<figure><img src="image_25.png" /></figure>

his paper discusses some of the EU experiences with combating internal fraud and corruption before and since the Lisbon Treaty. The latter Treaty creates new opportunities and provides new instruments to establish an effective area of freedom, security and justice at European level. The paper also comments upon the reports on the way the Commission is handling internal fraud, as well as the performance of some Commissioners. Finally, the role of OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office), Europol and Eurojust and the potential EU Public Prosecutor are discussed.

## 2. THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNAL FRAUD AND CORRUPTION BEFORE LISBON

European Parliament has consistently pushed for an EU anti-fraud policy. Such a policy was needed for the EU institutions themselves in the first place. On 14 January 1999, it adopted a resolution on improving the financial management of the Commission<fnref n="1" /> that called *inter alia* for a “Committee of Independent Experts” to report on the way the Commission was dealing with internal fraud, maladministration and nepotism.

Already on 15 March 1999, the Committee submitted its *first* report entitled *Allegations regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission*.<fnref n="2" /> Fraud was defined as “intentional acts or omissions tending to harm the financial interests of the Communities.” Mismanagement forms a broader concept and was defined as “serious or persistent infringements of the principles of sound administration and, in particular, to acts or omissions allowing or encouraging fraud or irregularities to occur or persist. Such infringements may be committed intentionally but will consist, more frequently, in negligent behaviour, or lack of care, in the exercise of public management functions.” The non-legal concept of nepotism “refers to favouritism shown to relatives or friends, especially in appointments to desirable positions which are not based on merit or justice”. As the Committee’s report found various examples of reprehensible conduct, notably from the side of French Commissioner Cresson, within one day of the presentation of the report the College of Commissioners resigned.

A *second* Committee report was issued on 10 September 1999 and was entitled *Reform of the Commission. Analysis of current practice and proposals for tackling mismanagement, irregularities and fraud*.<fnref n="3" /> It contains a long list of recommendations dealing notably with prevention<fnref n="1" />, detection and investigation<fnref n="2" />, prosecution and sanction<fnref n="3" />

<footnote n="1">¹ B-0065,0109 and 0110/99.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² http://www.europarl.europa.eu/experts/pdf/reporten.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/experts/default_en.htm.</footnote>
Effective cooperation is a key factor in the investigation and prosecution of related offences as mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 325 TFEU: "*Without prejudice to other provisions of the Treaties, the Member States shall coordinate their action aimed at protecting the financial interests of the Union against fraud. To this end they shall organize, together with the Commission, close and regular cooperation between the competent authorities.*"

The Union needs to defend taxpayer's money in the most efficient way, making use of all possibilities offered by the Treaty on European Union. The damage to the EU budget calls for action to ensure equivalent and effective protection of the Union's financial interests, including criminal law as far as this proves necessary. Despite the development of an EU acquis in this area which includes fraud and corruption, Member States have adopted diverging rules and levels of protection within their national legal systems. The Communication "Towards a European criminal policy" of September 2011 sets out a proposed general framework for the contents and structure of EU criminal law, as well as general principles of EU criminal law legislation, namely the need that EU criminal law does not go further than what is necessary and proportionate in relation to its objectives. As there are several different criminal laws in the Member States of the EU these differences do not help to ensure consistency in the fight against frauds. An obstacle for the fight against fraud is that the operations are being made transnationally since the European integration has opened national borders, making it easier to move from one country to another without border controls.

### 4. AN INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN AGENCY TO FIGHT FRAUD AND CORRUPTION (OLAF)

In addition to the herefore mentioned acts and conventions, in order to render the fight against fraud more effective, the EU also created a specialized anti-fraud office (OLAF) which has the task to conduct anti-fraud investigations. OLAF was created in 1999 by Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999¹ as an administrative independent body whose aim is to protect the financial interests of the Union, fighting fraud, corruption, professional misconducts and irregularities. Its main task is to conduct in full independence, transparent internal and external investigations. OLAF has a special status, in fact as part of the Commission, it is responsible for developing and monitoring the implementation of the EU's anti-fraud policies, but is has some of budgetary and administrative autonomy, which guarantees the total independence with which OLAF conducts investigations.

According to the last OLAF annual report over the period 2007 – 2013 the European Union budget destined to cohesion policy and aimed to cover a great number of programs and projects in the 27 member states, amounts to 347 billion Euros. Such an amount of money is often the subject of attack by fraud and irregularities! In order to render the fight against fraud more effective OLAF officials' power of investigation has been broadened and they can now carry out on-the-spot-checks in EU Member States. In addition OLAF has close links with Europol and Eurojust, the agencies set up to improve coordination of the fight against serious crime, especially when it is organized. OLAF works in close collaboration with national judicial and administrative authorities.

In order to render the fight against transnational fraud or corruption more effective OLAF had established collaboration with EUROJUST and EUROPOL. This collaboration has been regulated in TFEU Chapter 4 Articles 82-86 Judicial cooperation in criminal matters and TFEU Chapter 5, Articles 87 – 89 – Police Cooperation. The aim of EUROJUST and EUROPOL is to facilitate traditional judicial and police cooperation. While EUROPOL has been processing Member States data on crimes, including crimes against the EU budget, like fraud and corruption, EUROJUST has been coordinating Member States judicial authorities in the investigation and prosecution of similar crimes.

The Lisbon Treaty gives to EUROJUST a more active role which includes the prosecution on a common base of serious crimes, a more specific role in relation to EU fraud, even if committed just in one member state.

A novelty is the possibility to establish a European Public Prosecutor (EPP) Office according Article 86 TFEU. Paragraph 2: "The European Public Prosecutor's Office shall be responsible for

<footnote n="1">¹ Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (1999) OJ L 136.</footnote>
investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment, where appropriate in liaison with Europol, the perpetrators of and accomplices in, offences against the Union's financial interests, as determined by the regulation provided in paragraph 1. It shall exercise the functions of prosecutor in the competent courts of the Member States in relation to such offences."

In fact in Article 86 TFEU the functions of the European Public Prosecutors are described in general terms and the details will be left to secondary legislation to improve the cooperation in the fight against frauds against the EU.

### 5. OBLIGATIONS FOR EU COMMISSIONERS

The resignation of the European Commission in 1999 emerged notably because of the allegations regarding the French Commissioner Edith Cresson.

A Judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-432/04 of 11 July 2006 confirmed that she had acted in breach of the obligations as Commissioner, notably Article 213 (2) EC (now Article 245 TFEU). Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the responsibilities of the Members of the European Commission are regulated in Articles 17 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 245 TFEU. Article 17 TEU obliges the Commission to promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initatives to that end, and demands that the Members of the Commission shall be chosen on the ground of their general competence and European commitment from persons whose independence is beyond doubt, and shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties or the performance of their tasks. Article 245 TFEU stipulates that "the Members of the Commission may not during their term of office, engage in any other occupation, whether gainful or not. When entering upon their duties they shall give a solemn undertaking that both during and after their term of office, they will respect the obligations arising therefrom and in particular their duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance after they have ceased to hold office, of certain appointments or benefits. In the event of any breach of these obligations, the Court of Justice may rule that the Member concerned be, compulsorily retired or deprived of his right to a pension."

Remarkable is that in Case 432/04, the Advocate General Geelhoed advised to reduce Mrs Cresson pensionrights as a sanction for breach of obligations, by appointing a close acquaintance as a visiting scientist, although he was not actually engaged in the activities he was being paid for. The European Court of Justice did not follow the opinion of the Advocate General, but judged that the statement of the finding of the breach already constituted an appropriate penalty.

As the provisions quoted above show, Commissioners also have duties regarding their position after they ceased to hold office. An example in this respect is the *Bangemann* case. He was a Member of the European Commission since 1992 in charge of the information and telecommunications technology. Dutch parliament raised questions concerning his acceptance of a job at Telefonica with a salary of approximately 1 million Euros. He had informed by a letter his intentions to the German Chancellor Mr Schroder, who in 1999 was also chairman of the European Council and did not have objections. However, other Member States like the Netherlands had objections and declared that Mr *Bangemann* should have refused to accept the function at Telefonica. It was further considered to start the procedure of Article 213 (2) EC (now Article 245 TFEU). Mr Prodi, President of the Commission, proposed to draft additional provisions to clarify the application of that Article:

> Acting with integrity and discretion in accordance with the principles of accountability and openness to the public, which implies that, when decisions are taken, the reasons for them are made known, the processes by which they are taken are transparent and any personal conflicting interests are honestly and publicly acknowledged.

The Council of Ministers finally were satisfied with this clarification by Prodi and decided not to prosecute Bangemann according Article 213 EC and bring the case before the Court of Justice. In the mean time Bangemann decided to refuse the job at Telefopnica.

These general principles apply only to Members of the Commission, and not to Members of the Council like mr Schröder, for which according to the subsidiarity principle national administrative law applies. Otherwise he could not have accepted a job at Gazprom.
A recent example of apparently not complying with the principles of the Treaty obligations for Commissioners concerns Commissioner *John Dalli*. He resigned on 16 October 2012, after an OLAF report shed light on the allegation that a Maltese entrepreneur had used his contacts with Mr Dalli to try to gain financial advantages in return for seeking to influence a possible future legislative proposal on tobacco products, in particular on the EU export ban on snus.

**6. LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION PROPOSALS ON CRIMINAL LAW IN 2012**

The following legislative Commission proposals of 2012 are currently being considered by EU institutions and national governments.

A. On protecting EU financial interests through criminal law – Directive proposed by the Commission on 11 July 2012 aimed at establishing minimum penalties and common definitions for crimes against the EU budget in all EU countries. (COM 2012 /363 final)

Context: Member States have included definitions of this crime in many different forms of legislation, ranging from general criminal law, which may include specific or generic offences, to criminal tax codes. A similar divergence can be noted with respect to the level of sanctions, which are applicable to these forms of crime in the different Member States. Such divergences have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the Union's policies to protect its financial interests. Common offences in all Member States would reduce the risks of a divergent practice, as they would ensure uniform interpretation. They would also strengthen the deterrent effect and enforcement and reduce the incentive for potential perpetrators to move to more lenient jurisdictions within the Union to exercise illegal activities. In Article 16 of the proposal of the Directive the repeal of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities financial interests of 26 July 1995, including the Protocols thereto of 27 September 1996 and of 19 July 1997, is mentioned....

B. On freezing & confiscation of crime proceeds in the EU – Directive proposed by the Commission on 12 March 2012 (COM (2012) 85 final) aimed at facilitating it for Member States to confiscate and recover the profits derived from serious and organized cross-border crime. The current EU Legal framework on the freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime consists of four Council Framework Decisions (FD) and one Council Decision. The most relevant is Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on harmonisation of confiscation laws of Crime – Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property, which Decision the Commission proposed to replace by the above mentioned Directive.

An additional reason for proposing these new legal instruments is the need to adopt concrete measures to implement the Commission's overall strategic approach to combating fraud. The Commission will moreover continue to strengthen by these proposals the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders.

**Bibliography:**

* The White Paper on European Governance (COM (2001) 428 final, Brussels 25.7.2001)

* Judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 July 2006 in Case C-432/04 declared that the finding of the breach of the obligations as Commissioner, constitutes already an appropriate penalty for Mrs. Cresson.

* Andrew Macmullen, Fraud, mismanagement and nepotism: the Committee of Independent Experts and the fall of the European Commission, 1999 in Crime, Law & Social Change 32: 193-208,1999, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

* Marilena Verbari, European Union's Measures to combat Fraud and corruption in order to break the link between European Union's funding and organized crime, Marilena Verbari, (Ghent University, Academic year 2010-2011).

* J.A.E. Vervaele, Towards an Independent European Agency to Fight Fraud and Corruption in the EU., European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol.7/5 331-346,1999)

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