7-8/2014 L'Europe Unie

Simion Costea

► To cite this version:

Simion Costea. 7-8/2014 L'Europe Unie. L'EUROPE UNIE, 7-8, 2014, 7-8/2014 L'Europe Unie /UNITED EUROPE, PARIS, Nr.7-8 2014, Print ISSN: 0248-2851 Print ISSN: 2780-8173 On line ISSN: 2743-4052 Linking ISSN (ISSN-L): 2743-4052, EAN: 99782749700519, DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.24473.33127, https://www.ceeol.com/search/journal-detail?id=1955, 10.13140/RG.2.2.24473.33127. hal-05044948

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Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
L'EUROPE UNIE

UNITED EUROPE

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No. 7-8 /
2013-2014

Revue d'études européennes
PARIS
Editorial

DR. MICHEL LABORI

CHEVALIER DE LA LEGION D'HONNEUR, FRANCE

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e numéro **7-8/2013-2014** de la revue l'EUROPE UNIE paraît à la veille des élections européennes qui seront déterminantes face à l'euroscepticisme et à la montée des populismes antieuropéens.

L'année 2013 a permis certaines avancées avec l'entrée de la Croatie dans l'Union européenne, l'accord sur le budget européen pour la période 2014-2020 grâce à la pugnacité de la Présidence lituanienne et les accords d'association signés avec la Géorgie et la Moldavie. Ce bilan doit cependant être nuancé avec l'échec du Conseil européen de défense de décembre 2013 et les crises ukrainiennes de 2013-2014.

Ce numéro renforce le caractère international de la revue avec la participation d'universitaires d'Ukraine, d'Estonie, de Géorgie, de Roumanie, d'Albanie, du Portugal, du Vietnam, du Chine et de France. Les articles sont écrits en anglais et en français, ce qui leur donne davantage d'intérêt pour les étudiants et chercheurs de nombreux pays.

Son contenu traite des relations extérieures, de la défense, des affaires intérieures et de la justice, des questions liées à l'énergie, à l'environnement et au climat, de l'identité européenne et de la globalisation.

Tous les articles présentent une haute tenue et sont facilement accessibles. J'en citerai plusieurs pour leur originalité et leur actualité : « The EU efforts in combating internal fraud and corruption » du Dr Alfred Kellermann, « Non refoulement and Dublin rules » du Dr Lehte Roots, « La gouvernance de l'eau et les changements climatiques en Roumanie » du Dr Flore Pop, « Promoting and Sustaining Security in Europe : The EU and its Neighbours» du Dr Licinia Simao, et les problèmes de la défense européenne par le Général Eric Dell'Aria.

Je suis certain qu'un nombreux public lira avec intérêt la revue en particulier dans les différents pays des auteurs et qu'ils ne manquera pas de faire connaître ses réactions.

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A. The EU Foreign Affairs, ENP, Enlargement
and Legislative Harmonisation

La politique mediterranéenne de l'Union Européenne

DR MICHEL LABORI

ANCIEN PROFESSEUR JEAN MONNET (FRANCE)

CHEVALIER DE LA LÉGION D'HONNEUR

**Abstract:** *The Mediterranean policy of the European Union.* The European Union has a Mediterranean policy since her creation. It is characterized by its permanent adaptation and is more and more global (Process of Barcelona in 1995, Neighbourhood Policy in 2003 and Union for the Mediterranean in 2008). The “Arab Spring” has changed drastically the political institutions of the region in 2011, especially in Tunisia, in Libya and in Egypt. Syria is experiencing civil war over the last three years. The “Arab Spring” is the revolt of the youth against the dictatorship (Ben Ali in Tunisia, Khadafi in Libya and Moubarak in Egypt) to build Democracy. The result is disappointing and the revolutions are in general stalled. In Tunisia the Ennhada party has won the elections, but it has Islamic tendencies. Its policy is conservative and controversial. Libya has a liberal government without authority against the militia. In Egypt the “Muslim brothers” have won the presidential election with Mohamed Morsi but the army has taken the power and President Morsi is in jail (2013). In Syria President Bashar-al-Assad fights a coalition dominated by the Islamic tendency. The European Union has not managed the “Arab Spring”. EU has reacted and has not anticipated the events. EU has not found a response and must define a new Mediterranean policy. The difficulty is that the European Union is not a state and has not an effective foreign policy.

**Keywords:** European Union, Process of Barcelona, Neighbourhood Policy, Union for the Mediterranean, Arabe Spring, Democracy, Muslim Brothers, Salafism, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria.

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a communauté économique européenne, puis l'Union européenne ont toujours mené une politique méditerranéenne qui s'inscrit dans le contexte historique des relations entre l'Europe et le Maghreb et le Proche Orient.

Les pays du Sud et de l'Est méditerranéen forment la frontière méridionale du continent européen. La Méditerranée est le lien entre les pays développés du Nord et les pays émergents ou en développement du Sud. Les Etats du Sud et de l'Est de la Méditerranée se caractérisent par leur instabilité géopolitique (conflit israélo-palestinien, guerre civile syrienne, déstabilisation du Liban, Printemps arabe et ses conséquences). Ils sont confrontés à une démographie dynamique et à des difficultés économiques et au chômage, à l'exception de la Turquie.

Le fossé continue de se creuser entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée, malgré une complémentarité qui a du mal à se concrétiser, La politique euro-méditerranéenne a évolué vers davantage de rationalité et une approche globale.

LE CONTEXTE MEDITERRANEEN

a) Une proximité géographique<fnref n="1" />

Elle a influencé une histoire commune (Croisades, invasions ottomanes, crise de Suez, guerre d'Algérie, etc.). Les conflits n'ont pas existé qu'entre le monde chrétien et le monde musulman, mais ils ont été également internes de la Chrétienté (guerre d'Italie au 16ème siècle, guerre entre l'Espagne et la France).

<footnote n="1">¹ Distance entre l'Europe et les pays méditerranéens : Détroit de Gibraltar : 14 kilomètres entre le Maroc et l'Espagne. La Sicile est à 148 kilomètres de la Tunisie. Détroit turc : 1,6 kilomètres.</footnote>
b) La démographie.

Il y a une nette opposition entre le Nord et le Sud. La population stagne en Europe et ne se renouvelle pas à l'exception e la France. La population est en forte croissance dans les pays méditerranéens du Sud et de l'Est. Elle était en 2006 de 264 millions d'habitants et devrait atteindre 360 millions d'habitants en 2030. L'Egypte connaitra la plus forte croissance, tandis que la Turquie et le Maghreb<fnref n="1" /> sont engagés dans la transition démographique. L'urbanisation s'accélère et tend à se rapprocher des taux européens<fnref n="2" />.

c) L'économie

Le monde arabe semble pétrifié par rapport à la mondialisation. Il semble incapable d'imaginer un mode de développement lui permettant de se rapprocher des pays du Nord ; Le découplage développement économique/croissance démographique va s'accentuer vers 2030-2035 avec l'arrivée sur le marché du travail des générations pléthoriques formées dans l'enseignement supérieur et qui ne trouveront pas suffisamment de débouchés. Ce phénomène est déjà présent comme l'a montré le Printemps arabe particulièrement en Tunisie. La libéralisation des économies accentue l'inégalité sociale entre les secteurs innovants localisés dans les villes et les secteurs traditionnels présents dans les campagnes. Les IDE (Investissements étrangers directs) sont négligeables. Ceux du Maroc sont trois fois inférieurs à ceux de la Hongrie qui est trois fois moins peuplée. Le commerce extérieur est dominé par les relations avec l'Union européenne <fnref n="3" />(5) qui est bénéficiaire. La récente crie financière, économique et sociale a des conséquences négatives mais elles sont atténuées par la marginalisation de ces pays par rapport aux grands centres décisionnels mondiaux.

d) Le contexte géopolitique

La Méditerranée devient de plus en plus une zone convoitée par les puissances extérieures de la région. Elle est une zone stratégique majeure. 2500 navires y transitent journellement. Le trafic pétrolier représente un tiers du trafic mondial ; 60% des réserves de pétrole sont présentes au Moyen Orient. La Chine et l'Inde sont de plus en plus intéressées à cause de leurs besoins énergétiques. La Russie aspire à rejouer un rôle important comme le montre son soutien au gouvernement syrien de Bachar El Assad. La région est appelée à voir perdurer les conflits actuels qui risquent de prendre une autre envergure avec l'internationalisation du conflit syrien, la crise interne égyptienne ou l'instabilité de la Tunisie et de la Libye.

# LE PARTINARIAT MEDITERRANEEN

## Le processus de Barcelone (1995)

Les relations euro-méditerranéennes ont été tout d'abord bilatérales comme l'accord d'association avec la Turquie en 1963. A partir de 1992, elles prennent une dimension régionale avec des accords de coopération bilatéraux. Elles sont réorientées par l'effondrement du bloc soviétique (1989-1991) et les accords d'Oslo de 1993⁴. L'Union européenne se rend compte qu'elle a délaissé la Méditerranée au profit de l'Est européen et que la région est très instable (prolifération de l'armement, légitimité des régimes politiques, conflits frontaliers ou montée de l'intégrisme islamique). Elle s'engage résolument en faveur des pays méditerranéens avec le Processus de Barcelone (27-28 novembre 1995).

Il concerne les quinze Etats membres de l'Union européenne et des dix pays méditerranéens (Maroc, Algérie, Tunisie, Egypte, Autorité palestinienne, Israël, Jordanie, Syrie, Liban et Turquie). Il comporte trois volets politique, économique et culturel.

Un volet politique qui est caractérisé par un Partenariat politique et de sécurité qui traite des questions politiques et stratégiques.

<footnote n="1">¹ Questions internationales numéro 10, le Maghreb page 39, la documentation française 2004.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Taux d'urbanisation : Libye : 86% ; Tunisie : 64%.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Le commerce extérieur de l'Union européenne vers les pays du Sud méditerranéen: Tunisie et Libye: 80% des échanges commerciaux, Maroc: 70%, l'Algérie: 65%, l'Egypte: 60%.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ L'accord d'Oslo du 9septembre 1993 entre Yasser Arafat, président de l'Autorité palestinienne et Yitzhak Rabin, Premier Ministre israélien pour la solution du conflit palestinien.</footnote>
Un volet économique qui est basé sur un Partenariat économique et financier. Il vise à la libéralisation des économies de la région et à l'instauration d'une zone de libre échange à l'horizon 2010 qui s'appuiera sur des accords bilatéraux entre l'Union européenne et chacun des pays.

Un volet culturel qui repose sur un Partenariat culturel qui repose sur un partenariat dans les domaines social, culturel et humain qui traite de thèmes très variés (maîtrise des migrations, lutte contre la criminalité, trafic de drogues, dialogue interculturel).

Le programme MEDA assure le financement du Processus de Barcelone. Son montant est de 4, 6 milliards d'euros de 1995 à 1999 pour MEDA I et 5,3 milliards d'euros de 2000 à 2006 pour MEDA II. La Banque européenne d'investissement (BEI) participe également au financement avec la Facilité euro-méditerranéenne d'investissement de partenariat (FEMIP).

Le bilan en 2010 est décevant. Le volet politique est un échec à cause du conflit israélo-palestinien. 2004 voit la création de l'Assemblée parlementaire euro-méditerranéenne. Le volet économique a échoué en grande partie. La zone de libre échange ne sera pas réalisée malgré la signature de huit accords d'association. Les échanges ont progressé et l'harmonisation de la législation a été réalisée dans les domaines de la concurrence et des mouvements de capitaux. Les accords d'Agadir créent une zone de libre échange entre le Maroc, la Tunisie, l'Egypte et la Jordanie. L'éloignement géographique des pays est un obstacle, mais c'est le premier exemple de coopération régionale, mais leur impact est difficilement mesurable. Le dixième anniversaire du Processus de Barcelone a été commémoré par une conférence tenue à Barcelone. La plupart des dirigeants arabes étaient absents et il n'y a pas eu de déclaration finale.

## La politique européenne de voisinage

Elle est une initiative unilatérale de l'Union européenne qui éprouve la nécessité de fixer des limites géographiques à l'Europe et qui veut faire des pays voisins des amis qui ne menacent ni sa sécurité, ni sa prospérité. Les pays concernés sont le Belarus, la Moldavie, l'Ukraine, l'Arménie, la Géorgie, l'Azerbaïdjan et les pays méditerranéens du processus de Barcelone. A l'exception de la Turquie reconnue comme pays candidat à l'Union européenne. Il s'agit d'une seule politique pour l'ensemble des pays, mais la spécificité de chacun est préservée par les plans d'action. Les plans d'action ont une durée de trois à cinq ans et remplacent les accords précédents. Ils concernent quatre domaines : politique, développement économique et social, commercial (adoption des règles de l'organisation du commerce mondial) et justice et affaires intérieures (terrorisme, immigration et gestion des frontières). Elle est financée par l'instrument de voisinage et de partenariat (IVEP) qui est doté de 12 milliards d'euros dont 8 pour les pays méditerranéens et 4 pour les pays de l'Est européen.

## L'Union pour la Méditerranée (2008)

Elle a été créée lors de la conférence de Paris du 13 juillet 2008. Elle concerne 43 pays et 765millions d'habitants (Union européenne, pays méditerranéens du Processus de Barcelone, Mauritanie et Balkans occidentaux à l'exception de la Serbie). Les points les plus discutés ont été la condamnation des racines du terrorisme, la lutte contre la prolifération des armes et le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient. Un texte de 14 pages a été signé et le conflit israélo-palestinien n'est mentionné qu'à la fin du document. La Ligue arabe passe du statut d'observateur à celui d'invité, puis sera reconnue membre. La coprésidence est franco-égyptienne et le siège du Secrétariat général sera fixé en novembre 2008. L'Assemblée parlementaire s'est réunie les 12-13 octobre 2008. Six projets de coopération ont été retenus. Quatre sont en rapport avec l'environnement : la dépollution, les ressources de la mer, la protection civile et l'énergie solaire. Les deux autres sont la création d'une université pour les PME en Slovénie et une initiative en faveur des PME. Le financement est assuré par les fonds structurels, le FEMIP et des partenaires comme le Qatar. La Syrie a fait un geste envers le Liban avec un échange d'ambassadeurs et s'engage à mener des négociations avec Israël. L'accord de Marseille (novembre 2008) décide que le Secrétaire général sera choisi dans les pays de la rive sud. Le premier fut e marocain Fatallah Sijilmassi.
La crise de Gaza (janvier 2009) a bloqué le fonctionnement de l'Union pour la Méditerranée. Le second sommet prévu à Barcelone ne sera jamais réuni. L'Union pour la Méditerranée reste une coquille vide à cause du conflit israélo-palestinien, des Printemps arabes et de la crise.

Quelques réalisations sont cependant à signaler comme l'université euro-méditerranéenne de Slovénie, 130 projets pour la dépollution de la Méditerranée, une université euro-méditerranéenne à Fès, la constructions des tronçons manquants de l'autoroute du Maghreb Rabat-Tunis ou le programme « Med for Jobs » pour la formation et le soutien à la création d'entreprises pour lutter contre le chômage des jeunes avec un premier projet lancé en Tunisie. Il faut signaler également la conférence sur le projet Anna Lindh<fnref n="1" /> qui s'est tenue les 4-7avril 2013 à Marseille. Elle a réuni plus de mille participants de la société civile ; Son but est de partager les idées pour l'élaboration d'une feuille de route pour la promotion du dialogue interculturel en Méditerranée.

## LES PRINTEMPS ARABES ET LES CONSEQUENCES

Les Printemps arabes ont touché le Maghreb, la ibye et l'Egypte à des degrés divers et chaque Printemps a sa spécificité.

### Les évènements déclencheurs

#### TUNISIE

Le mouvement a débuté en Tunisie le 17 décembre 2010 avec l'immolation par le feu de Mohamed Bouazizi à Sidi Bouzid après la confiscation de son outil de travail (une charrette et une balance). Il se rendit alors auprès des autorités locales pour solliciter une autorisation pour exercer au marché et la restitution de son stock, mais il fut violemment éconduit humilié publiquement. Il s'immola devant le siège du Gouvernorat. Son acte en Tunisie et en particulier à Tunis le 27décembre 2010. La répression fut sanglante, mais ne calma pas le mouvement. Le Président Ben Ali dut quitter le pays le 14 janvier 2011.

#### ALGERIE

L'Algérie connue le début d'un mouvement contestataire le 28 décembre 2011. Il fut brutalement réprimé. Le 24 février 2011, le gouvernement leva l'état d'urgence instauré en 1991. La poursuite des manifestations obligea le Président Bouteflika à annoncer une réforme constitutionnelle.

#### MAROC

Le Maroc a été l'objet des premières manifestations le 20 février 2011. Le Roi Mohammed VI en a tenu compte en annonçant le 9 mars 2011 la création d'une Commission chargée de rédiger une Constitution.

Elle fut ratifiée par un Référendum tenu le 1er juillet 2011. 75% des électeurs se déplacèrent et approuvèrent le Référendum à 97, 58%. Les élections législatives du 25 novembre 2011 virent le succès du Parti de la Justice et du Développement économique qui est de tendance islamique modérée.

#### LIBYE

La Libye a connu des manifestations à Benghazi qui furent violemment réprimées. La révolte se propagea à toute la Cyrénaïque et les insurgés s'emparèrent de Benghazi les 19-21 février 2011. Un Conseil national de transition (CNT) fut formé le 27 février 2011 et la France le reconnut aussitôt ; l'ONU vota la résolution 1973 le 17 mars 2011 qui autorisait la création d'une zone d'exclusion aérienne pour protéger la population. Les raids aériens débutèrent le 19 mars 2011 avec les forces aériennes de la « coalition internationale » (Etats-Unis, France, Royaume-Uni, Italie, Belgique, Pays-Bas, Norvège, Danemark et Qatar). L'OTAN prit le commandement des opérations le 31 mars 2011. Les forces aériennes, surtout britanniques et françaises appuyèrent les rebelles au sol contre l'armée de Khadafi. Tripoli fut prise le 23 août 2011 et Khadafi capturé et abattu à Syrte, le 20 octobre 2011. L'OTAN mit fin à son mandat le 31 octobre 2011.

<footnote n="1">¹ Anna Lindh, ancienne Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Norvège (1998-2003) assassinée en septembre 2003. La fondation Anna Lindh a pour objectif le rapprochement des populations des deux rives de Méditerranée.</footnote>
### EGYPTE

« La première journée de la colère » eut lieu le 25 janvier 2011 aux cris de « Pains, Liberté et Justice ». Elle fut suivie le 2 janvier 2012 par l'occupation de la place Tahrir. Le 1er février 2012, « la marche du million » réunit 8 millions de manifestants au Caire et dans le pays. Le Président Hosni Moubarak déclara qu'il ne se représenterait pas et promit une nouvelle constitution ; La répression échoua et Hosni Moubarak quitta le pouvoir, le 11 février 2012.

### SYRIE

Le mouvement de contestation débuta le « vendredi de la dignité » à Damas, Alep, Homs et Deraa. La répression fut violente avec l'utilisation de balles réelles. Le mouvement s'amplifia et le gouvernement promit des hausses de salaires et la libération des contestataires arrêtés. La nomination d'un nouveau gouvernement ne calma pas le mouvement de révolte qui gagna plusieurs villes. La répression fut violente comme à Deraa, le 25 avril 2012. « L'Armée syrienne libre » fut créée le 31 juillet 2012 et le 2 octobre 2012 fut constitué « le Conseil national syrien » qui regroupa les principaux courants de l'opposition. Il devint le 15 novembre 2012, la « Coalition nationale unifiée ».

## L'ÉVOLUTION DES PRINTEMPS ARABES

### TUNISIE

La Tunisie est en pleine crie politique, économique et sociale ; L'élection de l'Assemblée constituante a vu le succès du parti Ennahda largement majoritaire qui constitua un gouvernement de coalition. Les opposants considèrent que la Révolution a été confisquée et que le gouvernement crée les conditions d'une islamisation rampante et se montre trop tolérant vis-à-vis des salafistes et de leurs exactions. Le parti Ennahda a dilapidé le capital de confiance et de popularité qu'il avait acquis à l'automne 2011. Les assassinats de l'avocat Chokri Belaïd, le 6 février 2013 et du député de gauche le laïc Mohamed Brahmi, le 25 juillet 2013 sont imputés par l'opposition au parti Ennahda. Elle a manifesté avec le soutien des syndicats et accuse le parti Ennahda qui rejette ces allégations et affirme que ces assassinats sont le fait d'un groupe de djihadiste Ansar Al Charia. Soixante députés ont quitté l'Assemblée constituante dont les travaux sont arrêtés. L'opposition réclame la démission du gouvernement et son remplacement par un gouvernement de techniciens. Le chef du gouvernement Ali Larayech refuse et propose un gouvernement d'union nationale dont l'opposition ne veut pas. La sortie de crise n'est possible que si l'Assemblée constituante achève rapidement ses travaux et que des élections législatives suivent rapidement la concrétisation de la Constitution.

### LIBYE

La transition est laborieuse, mais le calendrier établi est relativement respecté. Deux faits importants sont à signaler :

* La direction révolutionnaire du Conseil national de transition devenu Conseil général national (CNG) s'est effacée dès les premières élections libres. Le CNG a désigné le gouvernement provisoire.

* Les élections libres du 7 juillet 2012 ont vu l'échec des frères musulmans qui n'ont eu que 17 des 200 sièges de la nouvelle assemblée dominée par les libéraux, ce qui est un fait unique dans les Printemps arabes. Les nouvelles autorités ont du mal à s'imposer face aux milices héritières de la révolution et un très grand nombre d'armes circulent. Le sud de la Libye devient une base de repli des djihadistes du Mali repoussés par l'armée française. Les milices s'en prennent aux autorités tirant sur la voiture du Président du Conseil général et les djihadistes libyens ont assassinés l'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Benghazi en septembre 2012. Des troubles ont lieu avec le texte d'une loi qui exclut de la vie politique les anciens responsables du régime khadafiste. L'élaboration de la future constitution sera confiée à une Commission constitutionnelle désignée par un vote populaire. L'Assemblée nationale doit gérer la représentation tribale qui freine son fonctionnement. 100 députés représentent la Tripolitaine, 60 la Cyrénaïque et 40 de Fezzan. Elle souffre également des invalidations de députés.
EGYPTE

Les élections législatives de 2011 ont vu le succès du Parti de la Liberté et de la Justice avec 38% des suffrages et 49% des sièges. C'est le succès des Frères musulmans. Ils présentent à l'élection présidentielle Mohamed Morsi qui est élu au second tour le 24 juin 2011 avec 51,73% des voix grâce en partie aux voix des libéraux et des gauchistes qui ne voulaient pas d'Ahmed Shafik, ancien Général d'aviation qui avait été le denier Premier Ministre d'Hosni Moubarak.

Les Islamistes ont établi un contrôle très strict du pays jusqu'à l'arrestation du Président Mohamed Morsi, le 3 juillet 2013, auquel l'opposition reprochait de gouverner de manière absolue. Mohamed Morsi s'était attribué des pouvoirs exorbitants par le décret du 22 novembre 2011 et avait imposé un référendum sur la Constitution. Il annula le décret, mais maintient le référendum qui eu lieu du 15 au 22 décembre 2011. La participation fut seulement de 32,8% et il fut adopté par 63,82% des votants. Le Front de salut national avait appelé à boycotter le référendum et refusa de participer aux élections législatives prévues en avril 2013 que la Commission électorale finit par annuler. Le Front du salut national reprochait aux Frères musulmans un redécoupage électoral en faveur et la nomination de gouverneurs de leur couleur politique sans tenir compte des compétences. L'armée n'aspirait plus à jouer un rôle politique. La situation économique est devenue catastrophique avec l'effondrement du tourisme et le gouvernement a demandé un rpêt de 4,8 milliards de dollars au FMI.

L'opposition au Président Morsi réussit à rassembler, le 30 juin 2013, entre 14 et 17 millions de manifestants. Des heurts firent plusieurs morts, cinq ministres et un porte-parole de Mohamed Morsi démissionnèrent. L'armée somma le Président Morsi de renoncer à la politique dans les deux jours. Son refus provoqua sa chute. Le Général Abdel Fatah Al Sisi, chef d'état-major de l'armée égyptienne, annonça sa destitution et son remplacement par le Président de la Cour constitutionnelle, Adli Mansour, la suppression de la Constitution de la formation d'un gouvernement de transition jusqu'à la tenue d'une élection présidentielle anticipée. L'armée est garante du nouveau régime. Mohamed Morsi est accusé d'espionnage, d'incitation à la violence et de destruction de l'économie.

Les partisans de l'ancien Président se regroupèrent au sein de « l'Alliance pour le progrès » et manifestèrent violemment au mois d'août. Ils parvinrent à réunir plusieurs millions de personnes. La répression fut sanglante. Plus de mille personnes furent tuées au cours de la troisième semaine du mois d'août. L'état d'urgence a été instauré ainsi que le couvre feu. Le guide suprême des Frères musulmans Mohamed Badie a été arrêté le 20 août 20113 et immédiatement remplace par Mahmoud Ezzat. Les manifestations se sont calmées par crainte de la répression et de la désaffection de l'opinion publique. Le Premier Ministre est favorable à leur dissolution. Un calme précaire s'est installé, mais les manifestations pro Morsi peuvent reprendre.

SYRIE

La situation est bloquée militairement et diplomatiquement. Le régime de Bachar El Assad est soutenu par la Russie, la Chine et l'Iran. Aucune résolution n'a pu être votée par le Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU. Le Conseil national syrien est reconnu par plus de soixante pays, dont les Etats-Unis, la ligue arabe, l'Union européenne et la Turquie. Le médiateur de l'ONU, l'algérien Lakhdar Brahimi n'arrive pas à trouver une solution. Il y a deux millions de réfugiés en Turquie, au Liban et en Jordanie. Des millions de personnes sont déplacées dans le pays et la guerre civile a fait cent mille morts. L'Armée libre de Syrie manque de moyens pour l'emporter et elle est divisée entre libéraux d'une part et djihadistes et membres d'Al Qaïda d'autre part qui n'hésitent pas à se combattre.

L'emploi d'armes chimiques, le 21 août 2013, dans la région de Damas risque d'internationaliser le conflit. Le régime et l'opposition s'accusent mutuellement. Les enquêteurs peuvent authentifier l'attaque chimique, mais ne peuvent révéler l'auteur<fnref n="1" />.

<footnote n="1">¹ L'ONU cherche des preuves de l'attaque chimique de Damas « La Croix », du mardi 27 août 2013.</footnote>
## LES CONSEQUENCES DES PRINTEMPS ARABES SUR LA POLITIQUE EURO-MEDITERRANENNE

L'Union européenne n'a pas eu de véritable réaction politique homogène face aux Printemps arabes, en dehors de la nomination d'un Représentant spécial pour le Sud méditerranéen. Elle a été absente des évènements de Tunisie au moment du départ de Ben Ali. Elle a essayé de se rattraper avec la visite de Catherine Ashton à Tunis, le 28 septembre 2011. L'Union européenne accorda une aide de 157 millions d'euros pour dynamiser l'économie et développer l'agriculture. Elle accorda à la Tunisie le statut de partenaire privilégié avec le plan d'action 2014-2017 dans les domaines politique, scientifique, l'enseignement supérieur, les affaires sociales et la libre circulation des personnes. Une approche globale est envisagée pour la question migratoire, la promotion de l'emploi dans les zones déshéritées et le renforcement de l'appui financier. L'Union européenne va aussi apporter son aide à la transition démocratique et à la promotion des droits de l'homme. Il est aussi prévu d'examiner les différents volets de la coopération bilatérale et les perspectives de développement dans le cadre d'un Partenariat privilégié dans les domaines de l'agriculture, du transport aérien et du libre échange. Le 19 novembre 2012, la Tunisie reçut une aide de 68millions d'euros.

La stabilité politique du Maroc avec la prise en compte des revendications politiques de la population par le Roi Mohamed VI explique le statut de Partenaire Avancé que l'Union européenne a octroyé au pays le 13 octobre 2010.

Il se caractérise sur le plan politique par des sommets réguliers et sur le plan économique par la mise en place d'un Espace économique commun s'inspirant de l'Espace économique européen, (exemples : baisse des droits de douane, adaptation de la législation marocaine aux règles européennes). Le Maroc participe aux agences européennes (Europol, Eurojust, Sécurité aérienne, Observatoire européen des drogues et des toxicomanies). Le Maroc sera dans la situation d'un candidat à l'adhésion parce qu'il est appelé à se rapprocher des critères de Copenhague. La visite de Monsieur Barroso, Président de la Commission européenne, le 1er mars 2013 au souverain chérifien traduit l'excellence des relations par l'annonce de l'ouverture de négociations pour un nouvel accord de libre échange approfondi (ALECA) pour réaliser le processus d'intégration économique et commercial prévu dans le statut de Partenaire Avancé. Le Président Barroso a évoqué l'idée de la relance du projet d'intégration du Maghreb. Un nouvel accord de pêche a été signé le 31 juillet 2013 pour quatre ans pour l'accès de navires européens aux eaux territoriales marocaines. 126 navires sont concernés au lieu de 137 navires durant la période précédente. Six catégories de pêche ont été définies. Le Maroc reçoit une aide de 40 millions d'euros, dont 14 millions pour le plan halieutique destiné au renforcement de son secteur de pêche pour une gestion durable et responsable des ressources halieutiques.

L'Egypte a reçu une aide de l'Union européenne de 5 milliards d'euros le 14 janvier 2013 pour aider la transition démocratique. L'Union européenne s'est engagée dans la coopération touristique. Elle a vainement tenté une médiation dans le conflit interne égyptien, a demandé la libération de l'ancien Président Morsi et la répression violente de l'armée. Elle hésite à prendre des sanctions et s'est contentée d'interdire les exportations d'armes. Elle a peu d'influence par rapport aux Etats-Unis et surtout à l'Arabie Saoudite qui a octroyé une aide de 12 milliards de dollars.

## CONCLUSION GENERALE

La politique euro-méditerranéenne a été la victime des Printemps arabes qui lui ont porté un coup fatal. L'Union européenne n'a pas su anticiper sur les évènements du fait de l'absence d'une politique étrangère européenne. Cette situation est un obstacle à une action efficace. Elle a réagi tardivement en Tunisie ; Elle n'a pas eu de réaction commune pour la Libye et a été pratiquement absente de l'Egypte. Le seul apport de l'Union européenne est une aide financière dans le cadre du programme SPRING (Support, Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) adopté le 20 septembre 2011. Il est la réponse de l'Union européenne aux Printemps arabes et est doté de 350 millions d'euros. L'objectif est de faire face aux défis socio-économiques de ces pays et de les accompagner dans leur processus démocratique. Le soutien est adapté aux besoins de chaque pays. L'aide sera plus importante lorsque le pays sera plus avancé dans ses réformes démocratiques et dans la mise en place de ses institutions. Les initiatives SPRING complètent le
soutien aux activités actuellement menées dans les pays partenaires et soutenues par l'Union européenne. L'Union européenne s'est aussi engagée dans la Facilité pour la société civile adoptée le 20 septembre 2011. Elle soutient le Conseil de l'Europe qui a pris l'initiative le 22 septembre 2011 d'un programme de soutien à la réforme politique et démocratique dans le sud de la Méditerranée. L'Union européenne a également renforcé le programme Erasmus Mundus adopté le 16 décembre 2011.

En attendant la stabilisation des pays des Printemps arabes la politique euro-méditerranéenne devra s'appuyer sur des organisations régionales comme l'Union du Maghreb arabe ou le Processus d'Agadir. Elle devra également coopérer avec la Turquie et le Qatar et bâtir sa stratégie en tenant compte de l'intérêt porté par la Chine à la région.

**Bibliographie:**

*Le Maghreb, Questions internationales, numéro 10, La Documentation française, Paris novembre-décembre 2004.*

*La Méditerranée : Un avenir en question.* Questions internationales, numéro 36, La Documentation française, Paris, mars-avril 2009.

Allemand F. (directeur), *L'Union pour la Méditerranée pourquoi, comment*, Paris, Fondation pour l'innovation politique, 2006.

Guidère M., *Le choc des révolutions arabes, de l'Algérie au Yémen*, Paris, Autrement, 2012.

Khadem B. & al., *Le Printemps arabe, un premier bilan*, Altitude sud, 2012.

Lacoste Y., *Géopolitique de la Méditerranée*, Paris, A.Collin, 2008.

Labori, Michel et Costea, Simion, *Le management des politiques européennes*, Paris, Prodifmultimedia, 2011.

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /></figure>
# Promoting and Sustaining Security in Europe: the EU and its Neighbours

DR. LICÍNIA SIMÃO

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF COIMBRA (PORTUGAL)

**Abstract:** Through continuous processes of enlargement, the European Union (EU) has extended the benefits of accession to new regions in Europe and has eroded the division lines of the Cold War. Through its emergent Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) it is now looking for ways to continue this process of positive spill over towards its direct neighbours. The success of the EU's security policies at this regional level is particularly relevant for its claims of being a relevant international security actor, and the ENP sponsors a multifaceted approach to security, combining all policy instruments available to the EU, with a vision of increased political association and economic integration between the EU and its neighbours. In this context, is there a role for the EU to play as a promoter of security in its neighborhood? What vision does it sponsor and promote? There are several problems with the EU's approach, which explain why the EU has had limited success in promoting security. The first problem is the lack of a long-term vision of how relations with the neighbours will look like and the second is the ability of the EU to make use of its diplomatic tools to be a central interlocutor among other regional and global powers.

**Keywords:** European Union, European Neighbourhood Policy, security actorness, capabilities, political vision.

<figure><img src="image_7.png" /></figure>

The provision of security has been a central goal of European integration. The project designed by Jean Monnet saw the seeds of reconciliation and peace in Europe in the daily cooperation and economic integration among formal rivals. In a continent deeply divided by ethnic, national, linguistic and economic fault-lines, the vision behind the European project is strikingly bold and audacious: to unite the rivals of war in a project of peace and prosperity, which would have positive and long-term spillover effects in Europe and in the world. More than 60 years after the signing of the Rome Treaties, which established the European Communities, we can say that Monnet's and Schuman's dreams have been vindicated and proved to be among the most outstanding of our times.

Considering this heritage, the assumption of more visible security tasks by the new political actor established with the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Union (EU) is quite reasonable. In fact, not only did the internal institutional context of European integration reinforce the political vision of the European project; the regional and global context marked by the end of the Cold War and the explosion of violent conflicts in the Balkan region made the EU's contribution to regional and global security more urgent and needed. This contribution would come both through an active participation in the debates animating the 1990s about international security in a post-Cold War context (concepts such as human security, humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect had important contributions by the European leaders and institutions), but also through the undertaking of an increased number of security missions. By bringing together the ability to think strategically about international security (the European Security Strategy of 2003 is the most important contribution in this regard) and the ability to act operationally on the ground, the EU has proved its relevance as a security actor.

However, in a fast changing context, the principled and optimistic reflections on global security of the 1990s soon gave way to the nightmares of global terrorism and unsanctioned military interventions in “failed states” in the name of humanitarian objectives. Coalitions of the willing replaced UN-sanctioned missions and in that process EU contributions have been mainly focusing on post-conflict reconstruction and policing. Torn by the contradictions of this new context and divided by the different positions of its member states, the Union's most significant contribution to international security still remains at the regional level, in Europe. Through continuous processes of enlargement the Union has extended the benefits of accession to new regions in Europe and has eroded the division lines of the Cold War. Through its emergent Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) it is now looking for ways to continue this process of positive spill over towards its direct neighbours.
The challenges are nevertheless significant. In 2008, the influent European Council on Foreign Relations published an analytical piece, underlining the difficulties of the Union in consolidating its presence and influence among the Eastern neighbours. According to the authors, Popescu and Wilson (2008: 1), the EU failed to impress across the board. In their words "The EU has not succeeded in turning this presence into power. In security and democracy terms, it has failed not only to achieve most of its objectives, but also to prevent a deterioration of trends on the ground". Also, on the Southern dimension, the EU has been mainly reactive to the events of the so-called Arab Spring and has had limited successes in conflict management in the Middle East and North Africa. In this context, is there a role for the EU to play as a promoter of security in its neighborhood? What vision does it sponsor and promote? This short piece looks at the ability of the ENP to contribute to peace and security in Europe and what that means for global security more broadly and for EU claims of being a relevant security provider.

## THE EU'S SECURITY ROLE<fnref n="1" />

The EU's security actorness has mainly been built on soft security mechanisms, such as enlargement, stabilisation and neighbourhood policies, its normative *acquis*, and more recently, the deployment of CSDP missions (which have been largely civilian missions). The deepening and widening of the security agenda after the end of the Cold War, to areas not fitting the most conservative understandings of hard security, allowed the EU to develop and consolidate its role as a security actor in a non-traditional way. The EU's *sui generis* nature has challenged traditional conceptualisations of security (Bretherton and Vogler, 2007) based on realist assumptions about military power, with the EU using non-security instruments to address security issues (Brandão, 2013).

In fact, being a security actor does not imply being militarised. Additionally, the EU conceptualised security in innovative ways, bringing together the deepening of integration, which led to the establishment of a security community and the development of tools to act outside its borders. The European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2003), as well as the Report on its Implementation (Council of the European Union, 2008), clearly identify these two dimensions, acknowledging the fundamental contribution of the EU to regional peace and stability in Europe and the challenges that its success poses to its nature as a global actor, with increasingly global responsibilities. This reasoning implies a deep and comprehensive approach to stabilisation processes, promoting democratic reforms and economic growth, in line with the security-building mechanisms agreed among the member states, but also further involvement in hard security issues, where the deployment of CSDP missions and the involvement of the EU in crisis management in its neighbourhood but also globally is central.

As a security actor, the EU faces endogenous and external constraints. The multilevel decision-making process of a collective of 27 member states and different intergovernmental and supranational institutions constrains the finding of common ground for decision shaping, making and implementation (Smith, 2004; Sjürsen, 2012). Also, EU institutions do not share the same understandings about security issues (Brandão, 2013), rendering inter-institutional cooperation sometimes cumbersome. The institutional design, the allocation of resources and the political will to act are, thus, major aspects constraining or potentiating EU action. This poses important challenges to the promotion of peace and stability outside the EU's borders, to where the security community is only reluctantly being extended (Simão, 2010). Hard security challenges, such as the South Caucasus' protracted conflicts and increased militarisation efforts by these governments, require adequate security tools from the EU, to be able to respond to the security risks associated to these developments, both at the EU and the regional levels.

The development of military capabilities, even if limited, alongside the deployment of civilian CSDP missions from 2003, rendered more coherence to this actor, since the most traditionalist understandings of security were somehow accounted for (Smith, 2000). However, it should be highlighted that these new instruments sought to reinforce the normative and civilian dimensions of the EU's security actorness (Stavridis, 2001: 9). This is pursued through the fostering of democratisation processes and the consolidation of peaceful paths towards development, complemented by the deployment of rule of law,

<footnote n="1">¹ This section builds on Freire, M. Raquel and Simão, Licinia (2013) "The EU in Georgia: Building Security?", Oficina do CES nº 396, January.</footnote>
police training and border monitoring missions. Reflecting the self-image of the EU as mainly a civilian actor, the mixed nature of CSDP missions, combining civilian and military aspects and performing activities of prevention, assurance, protection and compulsion (Kirschner and Sperling, 2007), contributed decisively to make the EU a more complete and coherent security actor. It is in this comprehensive approach of EU action as a security actor that lye its strengths.

After the 2004 enlargement, the consolidation of a region of peace and stability at the EU borders became a fundamental security goal, prompting a more proactive approach from the EU based on principles of legitimacy, and geographical and cultural proximity, which became explicit in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and later on the Eastern Partnership (EaP) (Gänzle, 2007; Christou, 2010). In this sense, the EU has been consolidating its role as a regional security actor, with its neighbouring areas becoming a priority in its foreign policy agenda, though revealing limited capabilities to project security globally (Larsen, 2002). The relation with other security actors, in particular the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the United States, but especially the Russian Federation, is of relevance here (DeBardeleben, 2008; Gower and Timmins, 2010). Additionally, the interplays that result from EU member states' distinct memberships in international organisations and how these intertwine with regard to their commitment to regional peace and stability are central to the performance of the EU. In this same line, the differentiated relations of EU member states with Russia and the weakness of the EU-Russia strategic partnership also contribute to the limits the EU faces, reinforcing the idea that the context is a fundamental element for understanding the EU's possibilities as a security actor.

EU's external relations are a fundamental element in the definition of the Union's international actorness, both in terms of how the EU designs its goals and actions beyond its borders and of how it is perceived by its partners, especially in the neighbourhood. This means that the EU's political will and operational capacity to act as a force for peace and stability are relevant not only to the effective management of the crises and conflicts in its neighbourhood, but also to the ability of the EU to be recognised as a legitimate security actor. The EU has been acting mainly through the promotion of cohesive governance structures (Lavenex, 2004) and approaches rooted on shared norms and principles, with important significance for regional security (Smith, 2005; Browning and Joenniemi, 2008; Tonra, 2010). Coherence between the rhetorical promotion of these norms and the effective translation of these into political action is the second element in this equation, calling for the careful management of expectations and the sustainable taking on of new commitments.

However, this has proved hard as the perceived normative imposition of EU standards and values have contributed to discontent in its vicinity regarding its normative credentials (Haukkala, 2011). A process that has been criticised for assuming co-ownership and co-responsibility between the EU and its partners (Korosteleva, 2012), but which has mainly been driven by the EU, as the drafting of the Action Plans with the countries covered by the ENP demonstrated. Moreover, at a time of economic and financial crisis, the lack of funding is an added concern, only reinforced by the EU's self-imposed limitations regarding future enlargements and the lack of strategic clarity and capabilities, which the multi-level governance structure reinforces. This integrated whole, which is more than the sum of its parts, renders the security actorness a dynamic reality.

## THE ENP AND THE PROVISION OF REGIONAL SECURITY

As mentioned above, the ENP is one of the EU's most ambitious policies of regional stabilisation, short of enlargement. In the European Security Strategy of 2003, the role of the ENP as a central operationalizing policy of the security goals of the EU is rather explicit (Lynch 2005; Biscop 2008). The Strategy underlines the importance of proximity and interdependence for the EU, as well as the fact that “[t]he credibility of [EU] foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements [in the neighbourhood]” (Council of the EU 2003: 8). Reflecting this priority, EU institutions have invested considerable political capital in this policy of proximity. After 2008, some EU member states pushed the EU agenda to include a process of deepening political relations with the Eastern neighbours. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) was established during the Prague summit, in 2009, and included important aspects such as bilateral Association Agreements with those partners to the East, which would be more
committed to advancing EU values and reform. Under this principle of "More for More", the European Commission and EU member states also agreed to visa facilitation processes and economic integration measures. Finally a multilateral dimension was established to facilitate horizontal dialogue among the partner countries, including on issues relevant for regional cooperation and the sharing of best practices. Conflict resolution however, has been kept at the bilateral level, despite the clear regional implications of existing conflicts.

This short overview of the EaP serves to illustrate the importance attributed to the Eastern neighbours in the post-Georgian-Russian war context. It became a turning moment for relations with the former-Soviet countries, leading to important breakthroughs such as the acknowledgement by the EU of the European aspirations of some of the countries in the EaP, the inclusion of incentives on visa facilitation and trade, which had been two areas where the EU member states had proved to be very conservative on, and finally, the EU was also more willing to muster the political consensus for undertaking a greater security role, namely by deploying a Monitoring Mission to Georgia (EUMM), to monitor the cease-fire brokered between Georgia and Russia by then-President of the Council of the EU, French President Nicholas Sarkozy. Thus, the EU was engaging in many multifaceted aspects of regional security in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, making relations with Russia a particularly delicate area of its external relations. This encompassing vision of security, centred around reforms of the state and the gradual shifting of principles and approaches from a post-Soviet mentality, to a EU-like approach, focusing on the fundamental principles of rule of law, democracy and human rights, is seen by European leaders as a major contribution to regional peace and stability. Moreover, as these principles are reinforced by increased operational and financial resources, the EaP is proving to be quite a robust approach to promoting regional security to the EU's East.

Before we move on to look at the southern dimension, it is worth trying to reconcile this narrative of robustness and gradual success with the analysis of Popescu and Wilson, which underlines the severe limitations of this policy. According to the authors, "[b]ehind the EU's failure to turn presence into power in the eastern neighbourhood lie three structural trends: the increasingly authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in most of the neighbourhood states; the emergence of a multi-polar world that allows countries in the eastern neighbourhood to play "neo-Titoist" games of balancing between external actors; and the EU's own limited commitment to the ENP" (Popescu and Wilson 2008: 1). What becomes clear is that although the EU has invested more time and resources in its relations with its Eastern neighbours, there are both structural limitations in the ENP approach, such as the lack of an accession perspectives, and external factors of competition that undermine its approach. Eventually, the lack of a strategic vision for the region, which the member states of the EU should develop, is the missing element to power through the bureaucratic machine managed by the European Commission and the European External Action Service with the goal of anchoring these states onto the Union. The problems experienced in the Eurozone since the financial crisis began in 2008 and the political divisions among EU member states, which have been furthered since, have only contributed to this lack of vision on external relations and on the role of the EU as a security provider at the regional level.

On the Southern dimension of the ENP, in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, it was the popular uprisings in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, first, followed by the violent aftermath of these transitions in power, which posed added levels of complexity for the EU's foreign and security policy. As the Southern dimension was being readjusted in 2008, with the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), and political dialogue with the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern partners was upgraded, through the realisation of the Summit for the Mediterranean, in Paris, in 2008, the instability that swept the region as of late 2010 exposed the inadequacy of some of the EU's policies towards the region and required new adjustments. The process of revision of the ENP, which took place during 2010 and 2011, was largely driven by this realisation. A new focus on democratic standards and human rights was adopted by the EU, in order to disburse assistance, and the principle of "More for More", to which we have referred, was also introduced in order to provide additional incentives for reforms. In the joint communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, of 2011, the EU underlines the importance of "strengthen[ing] the partnership between the EU and the
countries and *societies* of the neighbourhood: to build and consolidate healthy democracies, pursue sustainable economic growth and manage cross-border links" (European Commission and High Representative 2011: 1. emphasis added). Also, a new concept of deep democracy is introduced. It is defined as "the kind that lasts because the right to vote is accompanied by rights to exercise free speech, form competing political parties, receive impartial justice from independent judges, security from accountable police and army forces, access to a competent and non-corrupt civil service" (European Commission and High Representative 2011: 2).

Following the setting of these new priorities, the Southern dimension of the ENP was also reinforced through four new programmes, aimed at addressing the underlying causes of social conflict and political instability in the Middle East and Mediterranean. The SPRING programme focused on democracy, reforms and growth; a package of special measures for Tunisia focused on employment and job creation, namely through access to microfinance; The Erasmus Mundus programme for academic exchanges was reinforced for the Mediterranean; and finally, a Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility was established in order to support non-state actors in their work towards reform and public accountability (see information on EU Neighbourhood Information Centre webpage). This set of measures promoted under the ENP show that the EU privileges structural prevention approaches, which focus on the root causes of conflict and seek to change the conditions for peace. In that sense, the EU's approach is much welcomed, even if only a late reactive response to long-standing problems in this region, to which the political management has been oblivious for many decades. It is thus not surprising that the criticism voiced by the southern partners has focused on the incoherence of European foreign policy towards the region, which simultaneously provided political legitimacy to the corrupt and authoritarian political regimes and now is quickly focusing on civil society partners as the solution (Youngs 2011).

On the issue of conflict resolution, the track record of the EU is also problematic. The EU has taken a leading role in the Quartet on the Middle East, dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but no significant breakthroughs have been secured, and it is once more the White House, under the leadership of State Secretary John Kerry, which is leading the way. In the case of the intervention in Libya, the EU was sidestepped by its own member states, the UK, France, Italy and Spain, which took part in the NATO-led multinational coalition mandated to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1973. The EU's role has become more significant in the post-conflict stage (Pawlak, 2011) although the ENP is here of limited relevance, as Libya only participates in the multilateral dimension of this policy. 2011 was also the year of the Egyptian uprisings. The EU has faced important problems in dealing with Egypt, despite the fact that there is a ENP Action Plan in place to guide reforms. One of the most important challenges for the EU is the issue of dialogue with political Islam, which in the case of Egypt is right at the core of the country's current tensions (Eriksson and Zetterlund 2013). The CFSP has been largely absent, despite the efforts of the High Representative to be a constant presence in Cairo. The lack of strategic vision makes interaction with all the EU interlocutors tiresome and confusing (Statements by Egyptian Ambassador to Portugal, 2013).

The final challenge to the EU's ability to be a relevant security actor in its neighbourhood has come from the civil war in Syria, on-going since 2011. The EU has managed to agree on the adoption of restrictive measures against the Syrian regime, but besides this, very little has been agreed among EU member states. A joint communication by the High Representative and the European Commission, of June 2013, underlines a set of measures which the EU should adopt in order to develop a comprehensive approach to the Syrian crisis (European Commission and High Representative 2013). The focus is placed on political dialogue towards the settlement of the conflict in the framework of the so-called "Geneva II" conference, humanitarian assistance, and the rebuilding of the country and of the Syrian society. These are sensible proposals, but which have lost momentum with the escalation of tensions and the announced US desire to pursue a military intervention against the Assad regime. In such a context, a scenario like Libya is expected, when EU member states might take the lead in supporting the US, and the EU will be relegated to a second plan. Overall, the ENP is again a very limited framework for peace and security, as its structural and comprehensive long-term approach is ill-suited to respond to the immediate challenges of violence and war on-going in Syria.
## CONCLUSION

Our analysis of the EU's role as a security provider has focused on the ENP and the challenges the EU faces in the regional context, where it expects to have a more visible and relevant role. As we have underlined, the success of the EU's security policies at this regional level is particularly relevant for its claims of being a relevant international security actor. Not only it is at the regional level that political agreement among EU member states is more likely, it is also the area where the EU has greater legitimacy for action, considering the issues of proximity and interdependence. In this context, the ENP sponsors a multifaceted approach to security, combining all policy instruments available to the EU, with a vision of increased political association and economic integration between the EU and its neighbours. The ENP in itself is not a policy or mechanism, which the EU can use, but rather a framework for these relations, aiming to establish a region of peace and prosperity around the Union.

There are however several problems with this approach, which explain why the EU has had limited success in promoting security. The first problem is the lack of a long-term vision of how relations with the neighbours will look like. Whereas for the Eastern neighbours this question is closely linked to their identity and to the possibility of being recognised as potential candidates for EU accession in a distant future; for the southern neighbours, the issue of the long-term configuration of the ENP relates more to the level of commitment of the Union with regional problems and the nature of the partnership they are establishing, in some cases, with former colonial powers. Thus, the ENP needs to clarify these issues if its conditionality is to become effective.

Another important issue related to this one is the ability of the EU to make use of its diplomatic tools to be a central interlocutor among other regional and global powers. If the EU is to give substance to its claim to be a normative power in international affairs, than it needs to puts its mechanism to work in the promotion and defence of a norm-based and just international order. EU member states have been reluctant to close ranks behind the Union and often, when it comes to areas of strategic interest, such as energy and conflicts, the EU is sidestepped in exchange for more expedient goals. Even in the neighbourhood, EU institutions have failed to develop a common vision of shared interests among EU member states, as was the case around enlargement processes.

Thus, we can expect more EU engagement in many of the regional security challenges, but also the maintenance of old patterns of decision-making, which remind us of the long way ahead, when it comes to relinquishing power in the name of common goals. In that regard, the EU still suffers from a rhetoric-action gap, which has important consequences for regional security.

## References:

* Biscop, Sven (2008) "The ENP, Security and Democracy in the Context of the European Security Strategy", *Global Europe Papers* 2008/3

* Brandão, Ana P. (2013, forthcoming), "A UE e o terrorismo transnacional: securitizing move e ator normativo, uma contradição nos termos?", in André Barrinha and Maria R. Freire (eds.), *Segurança, liberdade e política: A Escola de Copenhaga em português*. Coimbra: Almedina.

* Bretherton, Charlotte; Vogler, John (2007), *The European Union as a Global Actor*. London: Routledge [2nd ed.].

* Browning Christopher S.; Joenniemi, Pertti (2008), "Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy", *European Journal of International Relations*, 14(3), 519-555.

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* Council of the European Union (2003), *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council of Brussels, 13 December.

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<figure><img src="image_8.png" /></figure>
# The Security Management of the Neighborhood Borders Through the European Neighborhood Policy

VIRA RATSIBORYNSKA

Institute of Political Studies, Strasbourg (France)

**Abstract:** This article provides an overview of the measures with which the EU is managing its external borders since launching the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. In the case under consideration the ENP is represented by a complicated matrix policy of the neighborhood border's management that addresses external insecurities connected to the EU's neighborhood in different ways. The ENP is offering different economic and political incentives to its ENP partners. In all of them security and stability concerns of the EU constitute the most important EU policy objectives.

**Keywords:** ENP, borders, EU, ENP partner country, neighborhood, incentives, integration.

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /></figure>

or the past 50 years the EU has pursued integration and enlargement processes which saw its union increasing from 6 to 28 Member States. The rationale for continuing with the enlargement of the EU was most recently brought to mind again in the Council conclusions of 14 December 2010: "Enlargement reinforces peace, democracy and stability in Europe, serves the EU's strategic interests, and helps the EU to better achieve its policy objectives in important areas which are key to economic recovery and sustainable growth<fnref n="1" />,<fnref n="2" />. The Council conclusions reiterated that with the sixth enlargement the EU relations with its Eastern and Southern neighbors have improved; new ways of developing initiatives in the Black Sea and the Baltic regions have been initiated as well. With the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was able to pursue at the same time its enlargement agenda and deepen its integration. As noted in the Commission document of 2008, the benefits of enlarging for the actual candidate countries but also for potential candidates derive from the expansion of the internal market, legislative approximation, increase of financial support, promotion of cultural, educational, technical and scientific links, cross-border cooperation, reduced risks of political instability, improved security and leverage on fighting organized crime, reduced migration pressures, cultural enrichment and reduced negative environmental externalities<fnref n="2" />.

With the sixth enlargement and the implementation of the European neighborhood Policy (ENP) the new external borders of the EU became the new border areas between the members of the EU and the neighborhood countries. And the European Neighborhood Policy itself became the test ground for a transformation of the neighborhood borders into frontier zones promoting security, inclusiveness, prosperity, openness and integration.

The ENP as finalized by the European Commission in May 2004 was clearly modeled on the enlargement process and was influenced by security concerns raised by the EU such as fears of increased migration, cross-border crime and economic globalization. The ENP was also perceived as an attempt to modify the borders with the neighborhood to create an area of shared prosperity and stability outside the actual boundaries of the EU<fnref n="3" />. The European Security Strategy stated that "the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order<fnref n="4" />,⁵. The ENP thus became an

<footnote n="1">¹ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/118487.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² European Commission (2008), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2008-2009, COM (2008) 674, Brussels, 5 November, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/strategy_paper_incl_country_conclu_en.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52003DC0104:EN:HTML</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ European Security Strategy, A secure Europe in a better world, 12 December 2003.</footnote>
attempt to address external insecurities with its neighborhood which was realized in the concept of the ENP transition toolbox presented to the ENP partners<fnref n="1" />.

With the ENP having been modeled on the concept of enlargement, the same techniques and methods which had been used on the potential and actual candidate countries of the past enlargements were applied to the partner countries of the ENP: conditionality, incentives, financial and technical assistance, socialization, action plans negotiated on a bilateral basis with each partner country, types of monitoring, involvement in some community programs and agencies etc. The incentives offered to the partner countries within the scope of the ENP modified the concept of borders. They became more open when the ENP partner countries accepted the new economic incentives. This changed concept is also reflected in the three long-term objectives of the free movement of goods, capitals and services<fnref n="2" />. Nevertheless, the EU and its Member States remained reluctant to open the EU borders to travel and labor migration from these neighborhood countries due to security matters such as the risk of illegal immigrants arriving from these countries and the risk of organized crime and trafficking. The ENP reflected the border paradox: it was designed to avoid new dividing lines between the EU and its neighborhood, but instead this “fortress Europe” created new border lines - for example by imposing “strict conditionality” on the ENP partners for the conclusion of the visa facilitation agreement with the EU. While this was the way by which the ENP was aimed at better managing and controlling the European Union’s borders with the neighborhood it sometimes caused criticism from the neighborhood countries which were willing to completely dismantle the frontier barriers between themselves and the EU. Nevertheless, even with the clear dissatisfaction of some of the ENP partners, the EU never changed the core of its discourse - its intention of controlling the ENP borders: “It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbors who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems to Europe<fnref n="3" />.” With regard to this aspect the EU borders with the ENP partners were seen as spheres of security control and the aim was to protect “the EU borders against smuggling, trafficking, organized crime (including terrorist threats) and illegal immigration (including transit migration)<fnref n="4" />.”

Although the ENP exercised an influence on its ENP partners by offering them different economic and political incentives, it could not change their expectation of complete inclusiveness and openness of the EU's borders for them. The EU was offering its partner countries via the ENP a strong support to meet the EU norms and standards and also new trade possibilities by having a stake in the EU's internal market. For their part the ENP partners accepted commitments aimed at strengthening their democracy and the rule of law and common engagements related to the security of their borders and the borders of the EU that were implied in the “joint responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity<fnref n="5" />.” The ENP model of relations with partner countries became a model of interaction with the neighborhood countries that put more emphasis on the economic vector of its relations (since the ENP was proposing its partner countries a more advanced economic cooperation) which was leading to the opening of the border for the economic cooperation with partner countries followed by human interaction, socialization and networking with them.

<footnote n="1">¹ Lavenex, S., & Wichmann, N. (2009). The External Governance of EU Internal Security. Journal of European Integration, 31(1), 83-102.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² European Commission (2003a), Communication on Wider Europe-Neighborhood: A new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern neighbors, COM (2003) 104, Brussels, 11 March, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ European Council (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, presented by Javier Solana, Brussels, 12 December, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ European Commission (2003b), Communication on Paving the way for a new neighborhood instrument, COM (2003) 393, Brussels, 1 July, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_393_en.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ European Commission (2003a), Communication on Wider Europe-Neighborhood: A new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern neighbors, COM (2003) 104, Brussels, 11 March, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf</footnote>
Since launching the ENP the EU as an effective global and important regional player has also been realigning the priorities in its foreign policy in order to determine a clear picture of its borders with the ENP partners in the East as well as in the South. For the EU this was an important geopolitical and geostrategic step in order to prioritize its zones of interests in geographic terms and to govern the insecurity continuum. Different interests of the EU were leading to various geographic policy strategies and frameworks for an enhanced cooperation with the ENP partners. In general, the enhanced cooperation with the partner countries resulted in new integration boundaries formed by networking and socialization processes of political association and economic integration. For the neighborhood countries these integration processes with the EU also resulted in uncertainty and question marks concerning the definition of the EU's neighborhood borders and a lack of clear vision regarding their progressive ENP status in the relations with the EU. This caused new problems in the EU's relations with the neighborhood based on the "inside-outside" border dichotomy and "inclusion-exclusion" dynamics. The membership perspective was at the core of this complex of problems.

The ENP offered an advanced status to such Eastern neighborhood countries as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and others but it did not provide a clear picture if and when these countries would move forward from the outside neighborhood into the EU proper. The ENP management strategy of external borders was included in the concept of the ENP model of relations with its neighborhood partner countries. This ENP model of relations contains the risk evaluation of the security concerns coming from the potential opening of the EU border to the ENP partners. In that case the offer of a membership perspective represents a potential risk for the EU that the EU is not ready to take now. In general, the risk aversion and security- related motives in the ENP were embedded in the ENP discourse since the launching of the ENP in 2004.

Nowadays the EU is still facing an enlargement fatigue resulting from the previous enlargements and it also faces the challenge of an integration capacity that is in dire need for reformation before any more candidate countries can be admitted. This has a strong impact on the ENP. By being an intermediate strategy for neighborhood countries and by providing opportunities for them to develop strong ties with the EU without making promises which countries might join the EU in the future the ENP explicitly avoids giving third countries a membership perspective. Like this the EU encourages neighboring countries to undertake reforms by offering them various incentives but does not provide them with a membership perspective.

The core incentive for the neighborhood countries - the membership perspective - is missing in the ENP. That is why the main incentives and rewards remain in the individual sectors. Understandably some neighborhood countries are not satisfied with these "sector" incentives and they try to get a clear message from the EU with regard to their membership perspective and try to push the EU to allow them to benefit from a more advanced status in their relations with the EU. Such a partial application of the enlargement techniques without actually granting a membership perspective to the EU's neighbors, especially to the Eastern European neighbors who geographically are in Europe, makes the results of the ENP incomplete for these countries. For this reason it is important for the EU to dismantle the "outside-inside" border dichotomy - particularly regarding the Eastern partners of the EU - as otherwise the geographical aspect of the spheres of influence could spoil the matrix of the EU-Eastern ENP partners' relations.

In conclusion it can be stated that the EU tends to pay closer attention to its neighborhood as a way to establish and strengthen stability and security in its vicinity. The ENP in this respect provides a security toolbox for the management of external borders that promotes an Europeanization and socialization process for its neighbors without providing them with a membership perspective. So in the situation at hand the external borders of the EU become the territorial footprints of various integration processes which are leading to the closest possible approximation of the neighboring partner countries to the EU without granting them an immediate inclusiveness in the EU. This kind of management of the EU's external borders creates an enhanced political and economic interdependence in many sectors of the common framework of the EU with its neighborhood that leads to the harmonization of the periphery of the EU with the core of the EU's norms and practices. Nevertheless such enhanced interaction between
the EU and its neighbors results in high expectations amongst the ENP partners and, consequently, in their discontent with the still existing demarcation and dividing lines between “insider-members of the EU” and “outsider-neighbors of the EU” – an unsatisfactory situation that is difficult to change within the framework of the existing ENP whose main aim continues to be the pursuit of the European Union’s security goals towards its neighborhood.

**Bibliography:**

Beck, Ulrich (2005), “Inequality and recognition: pan-European Social conflicts and their political dynamics”, in Anthony Giddens and Patrick Diamond, *The New Egalitarianism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 120-42.

European Commission (2003a), Communication on Wider Europe-Neighborhood: A new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern neighbors, COM (2003) 104, Brussels, 11 March, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf

European Commission (2003b), Communication on Paving the way for a new neighborhood instrument, COM (2003) 393, Brussels, 1 July, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_393_en.pdf

European Commission (2008), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2008-2009, COM (2008) 674, Brussels, 5 November, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/strategy_paper_incl_co untry_conclu_en.pdf

European Council (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, presented by Javier Solana, Brussels, 12 December, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf

Labori Michel et Costea, Simion, *Le management des politiques européennes*, Paris, Prodifmultimedia, 2011.

Lavenex, S., & Wichmann, N. (2009). The External Governance of EU Internal Security. *Journal of European Integration*, 31(1), 83-102.

Ferrero-Waldner, B., The EU in the world, EPP “Paneuropa” Group Strasbourg, 2 February 2006.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fortress_Europe

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/118487.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taiex/abc-guide/index_en.htm

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52003DC0104:EN:HTML

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# Current Problems and Perspectives of the Cross-Border Cooperation Between Ukraine and the EU

DR. NINA DIDENKO,

Professor, Dean of the Faculty of Public Administration
at Donetsk State University of Management (Ukraine)

**Abstract.** In the article is presented a discussion over the importance of developing strong cross-border cooperation at the local government level by regional governments and the main principles for the creation of a successful policy towards its implementation. The article gives a detailed analysis of current strategy and actions of Ukraine in the area of the cross-border cooperation in regard to its collaboration with EU through EU Ukraine Association Agreement and gradual integration into the EU. Thus, the article provides suggestions regarding main principles of development of the cross-border cooperation for Ukraine and measurements for its successful implementation.

**Keywords:** cross-border cooperation, European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, partnership, Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /></figure>

Development of the cross-border cooperation at the local government level is an important and urgent problem of governance that reflects the need for closer mutual economic, political and cultural contacts between geographically close regions that historically have a common heritage. Regardless of the political systems of countries, the populations of these regions are faced with identical socio-economic, socio-cultural, political and legal problems. Thus, the development of the cross-border cooperation can mitigate the contradictions in border areas and create communication and contractual relationship that would help solve common problems. In particular, the cross-border cooperation develops the small and medium enterprises, tourism, trade, transport and accelerates the introduction of new technologies. International projects are such „points of growth” that significantly affect both the economy and the level of culture as a whole.

The Council of Europe in its paper examines the cross-border cooperation as a cooperation, which is not a foreign policy of a particular state and affects relations between authorities at local and regional levels, thus the cross-border cooperation does not threaten the territorial integrity of the state and governs the relationship between territorial unions.

According to international practice, the cross-border cooperation goes through a series of stages in its development, namely, the partners examine the border regions, converge with institutional structures within both states, determine advantages and areas of cooperation, strengths and weaknesses in the opportunities for joint activities, form an institutional structure, ensure the implementation and evaluation of projects. Thus, the cross-border co-operation involves planning, development and implementation of joint projects between governments, civil society groups and commercial entities of border areas of the neighboring countries. Cross-border cooperation may include the development of border infrastructure, tourism and recreation, ecology and environmental protection, the fight against crime, cultural exchange and so on.

Ukraine has unique geopolitical features for the cross-border cooperation, both in the west and the east, bordering the new EU members – Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and with all eastern neighbors – Russia, Belarus and Moldova. In particular, Ukraine has the longest border line with the EU among the all CIS countries – 1152 km. This ensures Ukraine a considerable potential for the cross-border cooperation in one of the directions towards the European integration.

Currently in the border areas there is an establishment of social and economic relations on a new basis of cross-border cooperation, which requires new tools of organizational and legal framework in the context of improving the competitiveness of territories and development of mutually beneficial links between border regions. This is caused by the spread on the territory of Ukraine the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which opens great prospects for economic integration as it offers a wider
range of interaction mechanisms and in the context of the preparation of the new Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. According to statistical analysis, within the overall EU budget for 2013 for the implementation of European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) is scheduled EUR 2,467,782,527.<fnref n="1" /> Some of these funds could be used to develop the cross-border cooperation between the EU and Ukraine in the case of the joint commitment to the development of political, economic and cultural ties between the neighboring countries. With help from the European Union, Ukrainian border regions can gradually become a European development centers that will make help Ukraine to integrate to the EU.

The main element in the implementation of state policy on cross-border cooperation is the local authorities and local governments as initiators of an establishment of mutually beneficial partnership relations and deepening of cross-border cooperation. Thus, the increase management efficiency in this area can be achieved by improving forms, methods and tools of related activities of local governments.

However, the analysis of the current state of development of the cross-border cooperation proves the existence of certain problems and difficulties faced by local authorities. Among them, first of all, the national legislation needs to be improved, due to the lack of uniform regulatory standards and other cross-border cooperation, close to the standards of the European Union, which slows down a pace of cross-border cooperation. In the period of the preparation for the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU should be done a harmonization of Ukrainian legislation, which allows a better use of the possibilities of cooperation in various sectors of the economy and socio-cultural sphere.

Nowadays in Ukraine has not yet established an effective model of coordination of the cross-border cooperation at the local level due to the fact that there is a lack of institutional capacity of most local governments to implement large projects (economic, social, etc.) in the field of the cross-border cooperation and the level of cross-border infrastructure is insufficient.

It is important to note that there is a lack of qualified personnel, capable of generating new ideas, attracting investment and implementing an effective management of new cross-border projects, which are offered by Ukrainian neighbors. For this purpose it is desirable to create a training program for professionals in the field of international and cross-border cooperation for local governments to be familiar with the specifics of the cross-border cooperation at the local level.

In the future should be established a comprehensive system of monitoring and analyzing the performance of local authorities in Ukraine on cross-border and international cooperation that will more accurately plan and forecast the prospects for cross-border cooperation.

Among other problems of the cross-border cooperation should be emphasized an insufficient attention to this collaboration as a practical tool of territorial and regional development and improvement of the quality of life of people, who are living in the border regions of Ukraine; limited strategic vision problems and prospects of cross-border cooperation on the part of local authorities, leading to hard administration, „protective scheme”; insufficient financial support for joint cross-border projects that could be supported by local funds on terms involving private sector partnerships.

As a result, the cross-border cooperation in Ukraine requires significant changes, improvement of the legal and institutional framework, practical integration policy, the experience of which can be borrowed from the European Union.

Today Ukraine is involved in four cross-border cooperation – three neighborhood programs for land borders: Poland – Ukraine – Belarus, Hungary – Slovakia – Romania – Ukraine, Romania – Ukraine – Moldova and multilateral Black Sea (Table 1)<fnref n="2" />.

<footnote n="1">¹ General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2013.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Kish E.B. Central Europe in the modern system of Euro regional integration / E. B. Kish – Uzhgorod: Lira, 2008. – p.5.</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 1:** Cross-border cooperation programs Ukraine-EU</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Cross-border programs and its participants</th><th colspan="3">Indicative allocations for a program, in million EUR</th></tr><tr><th>2007-2010</th><th>2010-2013</th><th>Total 2007-2013</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>The land border programs</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Poland/Belarus/ Ukraine</td><td>97.107</td><td>89.094</td><td>186.201</td></tr><tr><td>Hungary/Slovakia/Ukraine/ Romania</td><td>35.796</td><td>32.842</td><td>68.638</td></tr><tr><td>Romania/Moldova/Ukraine</td><td>66.086</td><td>60.632</td><td>126.718</td></tr><tr><td>Sea basin programs</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Black Sea</td><td>9.025</td><td>8.281</td><td>17.306</td></tr></tbody></table>

Local governments of Ukraine and their representatives take an active part in the work of leading international political organizations and associations that work in the development and strengthening of local and regional democracy: the Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, the Assembly of European Regions (AER), the Council of Europe municipalities and Regions (CCRE), International Union of local authorities (IULA), the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), Foundation to promote effective and sustainable development of the regions of Europe, the Council of Local Authorities for International cooperation (CLAIR), of the twin cities (UTO), etc.

Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU (Chapter 27, "Cross-border and regional cooperation") requires that Parties shall promote mutual understanding and bilateral cooperation in the field of regional policy formulation and methods of implementation of regional policies, including multilevel governance and partnerships, with special emphasis on the development of backward areas and territorial cooperation in order to create communication channels and intensify the exchange of information between national, regional and local authorities, socio-economic formations and civil society. The Parties shall support and strengthen local and regional authorities in the cross-border and regional cooperation and appropriate management structures to enhance cooperation through the creation of a new legal framework, support and capacity building development and strengthening of cross-border and regional economic relations and business partnerships. The Parties shall strengthen and promote the development of components of border and regional cooperation, inter alia, transport, energy, communications networks, culture, education, tourism, healthcare and other areas covered by the Agreement that include cross-border and regional cooperation. The Parties shall, in particular, contribute to the development of cross-border cooperation on the modernization of equipment and coordination of services providing assistance for emergency situations<fnref n="1" />.

In order to achieve these objectives and increase the effectiveness of the implementation of the CBC local executive bodies and local authorities should be given more autonomy in dealing with joint administrative-territorial units of the issues surrounding cross-border development, particularly in the formation of local budgets and their use. This question is closely related to the introduction of new approaches to the implementation of regional policy and administrative-territorial reform in Ukraine in accordance with the principles adopted in the European Union.

However, a partial solution to these problems will be possible in the context of a new state program, which is focused on a support and development of the cross-border cooperation for 2012-2015. It is also necessary to develop a comprehensive national program to educate and train qualified managers and management training for local governments to work in the field of cross-border cooperation. The preparation and implementation of this strategy should be done together with leading academic centers, national associations of local authorities, NGOs and international institutions dealing with the issues of local and regional development.

Based on these problems that exist in the field of the cross-border cooperation of Ukraine, it is necessary to carry out such activities as:

<footnote n="1">¹ EU – Ukraine Association Agreement, www.kmu.gov.ua.</footnote>
1) increasing the powers of local governments and local authorities, giving them greater autonomy in common with the neighboring regions of the tasks of regional and local development, including appropriate amendments to the Law of Ukraine „On the cross-border cooperation”,

„On Local State Administrations”;

2) increasing availability of local government experts on cross-border cooperation with their mandatory participation in activities Twinning and TAIEX;

3) development and implementation of effective coordination patterns of cross-border cooperation at the local level.

Implementation of these measures will improve the competitiveness of border areas through joint efforts and mobilization of natural resources and human potential of the neighboring areas. This will allow for the development of small businesses, related industries, market infrastructure, create jobs and eliminate social tensions associated with unemployment and low quality of life. As a consequence, it should lead to an increase in efficiency of local government by improving human resources and exchange experience with similar foreign institutions in the framework of cross-border projects, adapting national legislation to EU standards in terms of cross-border cooperation, personnel, infrastructure preparation regions of Ukraine to deeper forms of integration to EU.

**Bibliography:**

Kish E.B., *Central Europe in the modern system of Euro regional integration*, Uzhgorod: Lira, 2008, 438 p.

EU – *Ukraine Association Agreement*. Available online at www.kmu.gov.ua.

*General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2013.*

Labori Michel et Costea, Simion, *Le management des politiques européennes*, Paris, Prodifmultimedia, 2011.

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# Comparative analysis of some aspects of the legal status of the Secretary of the Chamber of Higher Specialized Court of Ukraine and the Chair of judicial chamber of the Supreme Court of Latvia

DR. SVITLANA V. HLUSHCHENKO

Head of the Department of Support for Judicial Chamber on Civil Cases, High Specialized Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Cases

DR. EVHEN TSYBULENKO

Head of Human Rights Centre, Tallinn Law School, Tallinn University of Technology

**Abstract:** This paper investigates the features of the legal status of the Secretary of the Chamber of higher specialized court under the law of Ukraine and the Chair of judicial chamber of the Supreme Court of Latvia. Our analysis suggests that the Secretary of the Chamber, besides performing the duties of administration of justice, acts as an organizer, controller and information provider without having administrative authority.

**Keywords:** EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, Higher Specialized Court, Latvia, Supreme Court, the effectiveness of the courts, the Secretary of the Chamber, Ukraine

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Ukraine is seeking an increasingly close relationship with the EU, going to gradual economic integration and a deepening of political co-operation. The possible signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (inc. Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement) at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013 requires from Ukraine in particular to ensure the independence of the judiciary and the effectiveness of the courts.

For three years, the Ukrainian judicial system has been functioning under updated legislation in the sphere of judicial power organization. The Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges” from 7 July 2010 # 2453-VI (hereinafter – the Law “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges”) made changes of substantial and procedural nature in the current legislative field, which encourage to search for the best ways to adapt legislative novels to established legal realities<fnref n="1" />. Having applied completely new approach to the development of the national doctrine in the sphere of judiciary and judicial proceedings legislator testified tries to construct contemporary model of judicial power in order to declare constitutional prescriptions concerning judicial defence of human and citizen rights and freedoms, as well as provision of this guarantee by means of creation of mechanism, due to which such defence would be realized reliably and comprehensively.

The Law “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges” developed general constitutional prescriptions and newly outlined system of general jurisdiction courts. Today this system consists of corresponding specialized courts authorized according to procedural legislation to solve legal conflicts in the state. There have also been changed general provisions concerning inner activity of general jurisdiction courts, including administering within judicial corps. In this article we will analyze peculiarities of legal status of a secretary of a judicial chamber of a high specialized court since this issue was not a subject of scientific investigation.

The institute of a judicial chamber secretary is new for Ukrainian legal science. This fact causes the necessity to study his legal status via understanding of the Law “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges” and perception of social role of a high specialized court as a cassation instance court. Basing on the achievements of constitutional and legislative practice in Ukraine it should be recollected that previous

<footnote n="1">¹ Про судоустрій і статус суддів: Закон України від 7 липня 2010 р. № 2453-VI // Офіційний вісник України. – 2010. – № 55/1. – Ст. 1900. (On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges from 7 July 2010 # 2453-VI // Офіційний вісник України. – 2010. – № 55/1. – Page 1900.)</footnote>
Law of Ukraine "On the Judiciary of Ukraine" has introduced organizational structure of a cassation instance court. Its authorities in the sphere of civil and criminal judicial proceedings were exercised by the Supreme Court of Ukraine. In its composition such organizational structure foresaw activity of judicial chambers headed by chairpersons of judicial chambers (article 53 of the Law). Herewith, authority, judicial chambers formation order, authority of a judicial chamber chairperson, order of his/her appointment and dismissal, term of authority were subject to detailed regulation by separate norms.

However, in the current Law "On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges" (articles 32-34) legislator regulated authority of high specialized courts, president and judges of high specialized court and avoided provisions concerning authority of judicial chambers. Therefore, to provide analysis of current legal status of a judicial chamber secretary it is necessary to compare competence workload of secretary of a judicial chamber of high specialized court and authority volume of Chairperson of Judicial Chamber of the Supreme Court of Ukraine (during period when it acted as a cassation instance court) using systemic, comparative and historical methods of studying.

Taking into account authority of the Supreme Court of Ukraine determined by article 47 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges", under article 53 of the noted Law it was assumed that judicial chambers exercise judicial proceedings concerning cases referred to their jurisdiction in the order established by procedural legislation. Judicial chambers analyze court statistics, study court practice, prepare drafts resolutions of Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of Ukraine and exercise other authority foreseen by legislation. In return, authority of a judicial chamber chairperson included:

1) activity organization of corresponding judicial chamber;

2) formation of judges panel to consider judicial cases, chairmanship in court sessions and appointment of judges for this purpose;

3) organization of court statistics conducting and analysis, studying and generalization of court practice for the jurisdiction of the chamber; right to reclaim from courts cases, concerning which judicial decisions entered into force;

4) informing the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Ukraine about activity of the chamber;

5) making proposal to the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of Ukraine concerning necessity to provide courts with clarification of separate issues of legislation application in court practice;

6) provision of lower level courts with methodological assistance for correct application of legislation;

7) performance of other statutory authority. i. e. authority of chairperson of judicial chamber consisted of widened (inexhaustible) spectrum of functional duties in solving of general issues of procedural and organizational nature of activity of corresponding chamber.

According to the article 32 of the Law "On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges" a high specialized court:

1) considers cases of corresponding judicial jurisdiction in cassation order according to procedural law;

2) in cases foreseen by procedural law the court considers cases of corresponding judicial jurisdiction as first instance court or appeal court;

3) the court analyzes court statistics, studies and generalizes court practice;

4) provides lower level courts with methodological assistance for equal application of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine in court practice on the basis of its generalization and analysis of court statistics; the court provides lower level specialized courts with recommendatory clarifications as for application of legislation concerning solving of cases of corresponding judicial jurisdiction;

5) the court exercises other authority determined by law.

Article 31 of the noted Law foresees that in a high specialized court there are chambers of separate categories of cases within corresponding judicial jurisdiction. Judicial chamber is chaired by a secretary. One of the judges of this court is appointed to this position. Decisions on establishment of judicial chamber, its staff, as well as decision on the appointment of judicial chamber secretary are taken by meeting of judges on the proposal of the court President. Secretary of judicial chamber organizes work of corresponding judicial chamber, controls performance of analysis and generalization of judicial practice on
cases referred to the chamber competence, informs meeting of judges of high specialized court about activity of the judicial chamber. It should be remarked that given legal issues are realized in all high specialized courts of Ukraine due to adoption of corresponding decisions by meeting of judges of corresponding courts.

Taking into account literal interpretation it can be concluded that authority of judicial chamber secretary consists of three basic competence blocks:

1) work organization;

2) control over performing of analysis and generalization of court practice;

3) informing of meeting of judges. This list of authority is comprehensive. Nevertheless, on analyzing the above mentioned norms it can be concluded that authority is not foreseen by the Law “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges”. However, this authority follows from legal status fixed by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine and general social significance of a high specialized court as a cassation instance court. At the same time, determination of volume of other authority of judicial chamber secretary is possible due to realizing of legislative idea, laid in basis of this institution, and revealing of features of power and management activities.

As it was mentioned, sphere of authority of judicial chamber secretary includes organization of judicial chamber activity, control over analysis and generalization of judicial practice on cases referred to competence of the chamber and informing of judges meeting of high specialized court about its activity. Disclosure of the significance of such concepts as “organization” and “control” enables to distinguish from general sphere of authority of judicial chamber secretary the separate functional duties within judicial chamber activity and combine them in a single mutually agreed system. Reference books of modern Ukrainian language determine notion ‘to organize” as commitment of following measures by a person, who is obliged with corresponding duty:

1) to create, to establish engaging others, relying on them;

2) to exercise certain measures of public importance elaborating their preparation and holding; to provide, arrange searching necessary possibilities for this;

3) to join with a specific purpose; to concentrate, to mobilize, to direct;

4) to install, to organize in a proper way. <fnref n="1" />

In return, concept “control” and “to control” in the researched context means:

1) verification of controlled object’s compliance with established requirements;

2) check, activities record, supervision;

3) control held on the basis of studying, documents analysis (documental control). <fnref n="2" />

Besides, work organization and control foresee presence of: corresponding recourse (staff, materials, finances, information, etc.); dependence on external environment (normative and legal acts, social changes, etc.); horizontal and vertical distribution of functions (highlighting of specific tasks, coordination of work, management process, etc.); subdivisions which provide activity; necessity to manage; implementation of certain type of activity, etc. Therefore, from contents of the article 31 of the Law “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges” is revealed real standardization of organization functions and control exercised by a judicial chamber secretary, which foresees realization of a range of organizational and regulatory functions. These separate directions of activity are vividly included into its competence sphere and reveal role and significance of the investigated institute of judiciary in activity of judicial chamber as well as cassation instance court. However, attention should be paid to the fact that article 20 of this Law foresees that this post is not administrative since post of the President and Deputy (Deputies) President are determined as administrative ones.

Within the context of investigation it is necessary to compare institute of a judicial chamber secretary in a high specialized court of Ukraine and chair of a judicial chamber of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia. According to the article 43 of the Law of Latvia “On Judicial Power” from 15

<footnote n="1">¹ Великий тлумачний словник сучасної української мови (з дод., допов. та CD) / Уклад. і голов. ред. В. Т. Бусел. – К.; Ірпінь: ВТФ «Перун», 2007. (Big Explanatory Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language (with amendments and CD) / Complier and chief editor V. T. Busel. – Kyiv; Irpin: Publishing and trading company “Perun”, 2007.), p. 835</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² *ibid* p. 569</footnote>
December 1992 the Supreme Court consists of the Senate, the Plenary Session and four judicial chambers: the Judicial Chamber of Civil Cases, the Judicial Chamber of Criminal Cases, the Judicial Chamber of Commercial Cases and the Judicial Chamber of Constitutional Supervision. Judicial chambers are headed by their chairs, who are elected by the Plenary Session for five years.

Taking into account the above mentioned during the comparing there is a range of essential moments which differentiate institutes of a judicial chamber secretary of a high specialized court of Ukraine and a judicial chamber chair of the Supreme Court of Latvia (secretary, chair):

1) secretary is not a judge who has administrative position and executes a range of organizational functions connected with functioning of the judicial chamber while the chair has administrative authority;

2) the law does not foresee term and amount of terms of being on the secretary position and Latvian legislator established five-year term;

3) secretary is appointed by the meeting of judges – judicial self-government body; chair is appointed by the Plenary Session, which is not such a body;

4) basic directions of secretary's activity are determined in the law; chair's authority is not determined at legislative level.

Therefore, it can be stated that Ukrainian legislator preserves more democratic approaches concerning issues on determination of status of judicial chamber secretary of a high specialized court of Ukraine and activity organization of judicial chamber at the highest judicial body level.

While Developing investigation of character of separate functions assigned to judicial chamber secretary it should be remarked that exercising of organizational and regulatory duties, which follow directly from authority provided by the Law "On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges", foresees that judicial chamber secretary: organizes, schedules activity of judicial chamber; exercises direct control over activity plans followed by the judicial chamber, compiles report documentation; deals with organization and holding of judges' meetings; controls preparation of generalizations and determines their topics in the sphere of law enforcement; determines directions of analysis exercising of judicial chamber judges' work by means of workload distribution between them (taking into account inner specialization and specifics of separate cases categories), etc. Another important function is representing of judicial chamber in judges' meeting and informing in judges' meeting about judicial chamber activity, making suggestions of organizational and law-enforcement nature. Appropriate execution of the noted duties by judicial chamber secretary is guaranteed by smaller per cent of given cases to him as a reporter-judge in comparison with other judges of judicial chamber. <fnref n="1" />

At the same time, comparing authority of chairman of a judicial chamber of the Supreme Court of Ukraine with authority of secretary of a judicial chamber of a high specialized court, such important matters for activity of judicial chamber as forming panel of judges, presidency of court sessions of judges appointment for this, etc. were left outside legislative regulating. Nevertheless, these matters are reflected within realization of prescriptions of the Law "On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges" concerning functioning of Provision on Automated System of Document Flow. They are regulated by inner acts of corresponding cassation instance court.<fnref n="2" />

It should be remarked that realization of prescriptions of articles 33, 35 of the Law "On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges" concerning authority of the President of a high specialized court foresees assignment of administrative authorities within the court. In order to provide appropriate execution of authority of corresponding judicial chamber and realization of functions and authority of a

<footnote n="1">¹ Рішення зборів суддів Вищого спеціалізованого суду України з розгляду цивільних і кримінальних справ № 7 «Про затвердження Переліку засад формування колегій суддів та особливості розподілу справ відповідно до Положення про автоматизовану систему документообігу суду» (ред. від 27.12.2010). (Resolution of judges' meeting of the High Specialized Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Cases # 7 "On approval of the List of Judges Panels Forming Principles and peculiarities of cases consideration according to the Provision on automated document flow system of the Court" (edit from 27 December 2010).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Про автоматизовану систему документообігу суду : Положення (ред. від 26.11.2010) // Закон і Бізнес. – 2010. - № 51. (On automated document flow system of the Court: Provisions (edit from 26 November 2010) // Закон і Бізнес. – 2010. - № 51.)</footnote>
high specialized court the judicial chamber secretary, whose post is not administrative, is involved in the general process of management, subjects of which in subordinate dimension are the President of a high specialized court, his deputies and secretaries of judicial chambers. Taking into account fact that administrative authority includes execution of such functions as control, management, organization, coordination, interaction, etc., which are administered in order to provide efficient court activity. Authority of a judicial chamber secretary foresees accumulating and exercising of primary analysis of current condition of organizational, informational and analytical provision of judicial chamber activity, problem issues in the sphere of law enforcement, studying and generalizing of court practice in order to provide court leadership with this information.

Besides, other moments are also important. According to the article 31 of the Law “On the judiciary and the Status of Judges” a judicial chamber secretary is appointed by meeting of judges of high specialized court on the proposal of the court President. It means that the President of high specialized court and meeting of judges are legislatively established subjects of a judge’s appointment on the position of judicial chamber secretary. At the same time, the Law does not regulate such matters as term of being in the secretary position and amount of appointments, age restrictions, professional and qualification requirements (for instance, presence of certain experience as a judge), dismissal mechanism (including pre-term one), volume of rights and duties, etc.

The current appointment procedure of judicial chamber secretary, in our opinion, does not cause separate comments since, firstly, it is democratic (foresees direct judges’ participation), secondly, it establishes legal status of court President as a leader of state institution (candidacy submission), thirdly, it eliminates the possibility of using subjective impact in activity of judicial chamber. Besides, during realization of such mechanism basic criteria of judge’s appointment on the position of a judicial chamber secretary must be his high qualification, profound knowledge in the sphere of organization of judicial power and judicial proceedings, sufficient life experience and judicial activity experience, skills in the sphere of management activity, ability to take decisions independently to solve current issues, coordination of judicial chamber judges’ potential and colleagues’ trust.

At the same time, taking into account provisions of articles 31, 32, 116 of the Law “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges” there is necessity to suggest amendments to the current Law by means of norms concerning order of a judge’s dismissal from position of judicial chamber secretary, which will procedurally correspond to the appointment mechanism. It means that judge’s dismissal from this position will be executed by meeting of judges on the proposal of the court President or not less than half of factual corps of judicial chamber under their signatures. As for determination of tenure and amount of appointments on position of judicial chamber secretary, in our opinion, this issue can be solved by means of legislation due to application of prescription of previous Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary of Ukraine” having foreseen that judicial chamber secretary is appointed by meeting of judges for five years, and he/she cannot be appointed for this position for more than two terms in sequence.

To sum up, we draw attention to one more aspect. Norms of previous Law of Ukraine “On the Judiciary of Ukraine” foresaw that chairman of judicial chamber of the Supreme Court of Ukraine had a deputy, who provided organization of cases consideration in court sessions, exercised other instructions of the chamber chairman as for organization of judicial chamber activity, as well as executed duties of the judicial chamber chairman during his absence. Due to this there is a question: is it appropriate to introduce in a high specialized court a position of Deputy Secretary of judicial chamber, if it is not fixed in law? For example, resolution of judges’ meeting of the High Commercial Court of Ukraine introduced posts of Deputies Secretary of judicial chambers.<fnref n="1" />

Taking into account workload of judges of a high specialized court (especially volume of civil jurisdiction cases), execution of functions concerning court practice analysis and generalization by judges along with the direct justice administering, and taking into account the amount of judges in corresponding judicial chamber (for example, in the High specialized Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Cases the

<footnote n="1">¹ Рішення зборів суддів Вищого господарського суду України № 3 «Про призначення заступників секретарів судових палат» (ред. від 15.12.2010). (Resolution of judges' meeting of the High Commercial Court of Ukraine # 3 "On appointment deputies secretaries of judicial chambers" (edit from 15 December 2010. - # 51.))</footnote>
amount of judges in the Judicial Chamber on Civil Cases is 70, the Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases – 50 persons) implementation of the position of Deputy Secretary of judicial chamber can promote efficiency in increase of realization of assigned cases to the judicial chamber authority. But in that case issues of inner judges' specialization must be studied (for example, creation of judicial chambers on separate categories of civil and criminal cases).

Therefore, having studied peculiarities of legal status of judicial chamber secretary of a high specialized court of Ukraine and on the assumption of authorities provided to it by the Law “On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges” it can be concluded that judicial chamber secretary is a judge, who holds the position in corresponding court. The law does not refer this position to administrative ones. Except for judge's duties, the secretary exercises duties of organizational, control and informational nature within corresponding judicial chamber.

References:

1. Про судоустрій і статус суддів: Закон України від 7 липня 2010 р. № 2453-VI // Офіційний вісник України. – 2010. - № 55/1. – Ст. 1900. (On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges from 7 July 2010 # 2453-VI // Офіційний вісник України. – 2010. - № 55/1. – Page 1900.)

2. Великий тлумачний словник сучасної української мови (з дод., допов. та CD) / Уклад. і голов. ред. В. Т. Бусел. – К.; Ірпінь: ВТФ «Перун», 2007. (Big Explanatory Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language (with amendments and CD) / Complier and chief editor V. T. Busel. – Kyiv; Irpin: Publishing and trading company “Perun”, 2007.)

3. Рішення зборів суддів Вищого спеціалізованого суду України з розгляду цивільних і кримінальних справ № 7 «Про затвердження Переліку засад формування колегій суддів та особливості розподілу справ відповідно до Положення про автоматизовану систему документообігу суду» (ред. від 27.12.2010). (Resolution of judges' meeting of the High Specialized Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Cases # 7 "On approval of the List of Judges Panels Forming Principles and peculiarities of cases consideration according to the Provision on automated document flow system of the Court" (edit from 27 December 2010).)

4. Про автоматизовану систему документообігу суду : Положення (ред. від 26.11.2010) // Закон і Бізнес. – 2010. - № 51. (On automated document flow system of the Court: Provisions (edit from 26 November 2010) // Закон і Бізнес. – 2010. - № 51.)

5. Рішення зборів суддів Вищого господарського суду України № 3 «Про призначення заступників секретарів судових палат» (ред. від 15.12.2010). (Resolution of judges' meeting of the High Commercial Court of Ukraine # 3 "On appointment deputies secretaries of judicial chambers" (edit from 15 December 2010. - # 51.))

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# The institute of bona fide purchase under the legislation of Georgia and its comparison in terms of the example of the countries of the European Union

NINO MESKHISHVILI

Ph.D. Candidate, Assistant Professor,
Caucasus University (Law School), Tbilisi, Georgia

**Abstract:** This research is dedicated to the problem of protection of a bona fide purchaser in modern jurisprudence. Necessity of law enforcement persistently requires theoretical development of more problematic aspects of the institute of bona fide purchaser. It became necessary to study the issues of relationship between bona fide acquisition and long-standing acquisition as well as restitution and vindication of property acquired in good faith, to identify criteria of institution of acquisition from an unauthorized person, to determine the rule of distribution of burden of proof of good faith, to establish ways and means of solution of the problem of maintenance of encumbrances over property purchased in good faith, etc. Determination of scientific-theoretical approach to the aforementioned problems is impossible without complex study of the institution of bona fide purchase of rights from an unauthorized person, all the more the significant part of the range of problems related to this institution has ultimately been left without grounded and unambiguous scientific solution while separate conceptual provisions adopted in science require thorough revision with consideration of new economic and legal realias. There is no point in studying and researching the aforementioned problem without sharing legal solutions and practice of other countries. From this viewpoint our target is to share experience of the countries of the European Union and make comparison with Georgia. The aforementioned grounds are exactly those determining significance and vitality of legal analysis of the institution of good faith purchase.

**Keywords:** Non-legal factors determining good faith; good faith as the factor excluding guilt of a purchaser; non-legal side of acquisition of property from an unauthorized person; institute of bona fide acquisition in post-Soviet area, attitude of the countries of the European Union towards the institute of bona fide purchase; harmonization – the European Union and Georgia, chain of Salomons events (continuum).

## I. INTRODUCTION

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Good faith represents one of the most inscrutable and less studied issues in Georgian legal science significance of which conditions constant growth of interest to this issue. Good faith calls attention as a regulatory construction based on moral grounds.

It has an extensive role in the private law; particularly in civil law, which is proved by numerous references to good faith in the Civil Code. Part 3 of Article 8 of the Civil Code of Georgia states that the participants in a legal relationship shall be bound to exercise their rights and duties in good faith. This is a general norm acknowledging particular significance of good faith in civil relationships. Separate parts of the Code provide for precise content and role of good faith. For instance, the lawmaker speaks about good faith of a manager and a representative of a non-commercial legal entity<fnref n="1" />, the Code requires from a party to the transaction to treat grounds for the transaction according to the principles of good faith<fnref n="2" />, the Code is aware of the concepts of bona fide owner<fnref n="3" /> and bona fide purchaser<fnref n="4" />, good faith is represented in the Code as a general principle of behavior or standard<fnref n="5" />, in respect of a particular

<footnote n="1">¹ The Civil Code of Georgia, Article 37</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² The Civil Code of Georgia, Articles 73, 81</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ The Civil Code of Georgia Articles 159-163, Article 252</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Tolstoy U. K. Content and Civil Protection of Ownership Right in the USSR, L., 1955, pg.133-134; Judelson K.S. Problem of Proof in Soviet Civil Procedure, M., Gosurizdat, 1951, p. 262</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ The Civil Code of Georgia, Articles 98, 231, 346,361</footnote>
agreement significance of good faith is highlighted<fnref n="1" />, more than that, good faith as subjective attitude of a
spouse is also emphasized in the family law<fnref n="2" />.

L.V. Shchennikova observes the requirement of good faith in a wide scope and considers that “civil science as well as legislation must be conscientious to the greatest possible extent not only when establishing separate civil norms, but in the course of construction of the whole building of civil statutory regulation”. We assume, that such a wide understanding of the concept of good faith must be a little bit overstated, since on the one hand the author tries to make a wide-scale representation of good faith as of a standard determining behavior, but on the other hand it causes intermixibility of the essence of law and law-making. If a law-maker is not conscientious and aspires to reflection of own interests in the law, then we deal not only with rejection of good faith but may even encounter a criminal offence.

Thus, good faith is interesting not as the standard of law-maker's behavior in the course of legislative activity but as the value of private law and one of the most important virtues.

## II. NON-LEGAL FACTORS DETERMINING GOOD FAITH

Intellectual properties of a person make significant influence on good faith. Information cannot be perceived and processed by all people in the same way. Therefore, the process of perception and the factors making influence on it is rather noteworthy.

There is no doubt that formation of incorrect perception is in close relationship with a purchaser's consciousness. Incorrect perception, as a psychological aspect, represents one of the components of purchaser's apprehension. According to metaphysical conception, existence of subjective phenomenon completely depends on mental perception. If we state that subjective conscientiousness is valuable and legally significant for property law, then we have to share the opinion that subjective conscientiousness is a certain product of mental perception valuable for legal phenomena and acknowledged by virtue of law.

Mental perception is related to intellectual properties of a person thus giving rise to logical connection between intellectual properties of a person and subjective conscientiousness. To be more precise the latter is somewhat conditioned by intellectual properties.

In case under our consideration, perception is a psychical process of direct reflection by the purchaser of phenomena and circumstances approving or disapproving powers of a seller which, in unity of their different peculiarities and elements, is related to understanding of entirety of reflected<fnref n="3" />.

In thinking and perception one of the attributes of consciousness – cognition is revealed and expressed. Incorrect notions of the purchaser from this point of view represent illusion of perception (as one of the forms of consciousness), i.e. “curved reflection”, the phenomenon of incorrect, inaccurate subjective reflection of objective reality by physical, physiological or psychological reasons<fnref n="4" />.

Thus, the purchaser's mistake made in the course of acquisition of property from an unauthorized person provides ground for origination of legal defect. Mistake, incorrect perceptions at their end is conditioned by non-legal factors. Formation of the purchaser's mistake is preceded by accomplishment by him of cogitative-logical, analytical, organizational and investigative activity directed to search, collection, perception, critical analysis, study, examination and grounded assessment of the circumstances proving authority of the seller<fnref n="5" />.

By making subjective analysis with the purpose of determination of the limits of authority of the seller the Purchaser makes a mistake, since he develops incorrect understanding which ultimately leads to a legal problem - conflict of rights between the bona fide purchaser and the original owner.

If the mistake is related to intellectual properties of and perception of reality by a person it leads to an opposite assumption. A person meeting minimal requirements of a rational man but still failing to realize existence of circumstances hampering acquisition of property, acts in good faith. "Rationality and

<footnote n="1">¹ The Civil Code of Georgia, Articles 609, 731, 765, 781, 785, 935, 969</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² The Civil Code of Georgia, Articles 1146, 1147</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Psychology/under the editorship of Kornilova K.N., Teplov B.M. Shvartz L.M., M., 1938, p. 94</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Platonov K.K., System of Psychology and Theory of Reflection, M., 1982, p. 106-107</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Ibid. p. 157</footnote>
conscientiousness are to be intellectual and moral properties of a person revealed in course of realization of civil rights and having legal significance in cases stipulated under the law”<fnref n="1" />.

If existence of a mistake is conditioned by wrong perception, we may assume that people of different intellectual properties would have different perceptions. We believe that in such case a very popular notion of a reasonable man<fnref n="2" /> should be applied who in legal relationship expresses will on the basis of reasonable assessment.

### III. MISTAKE AS A RESULT OF ACTION OF THE PURCHASER

Existence of a mistake should be considered within the scope of active and passive action of the bona fide purchaser. To the first instance belongs the circumstance when the bona fide purchaser is unaware that the seller is unauthorized and it is absolutely natural in that particular situation. Together with this leader there should exist a circumstance "justifying" the mistake - the purchaser does not and cannot know about ineligibility of the seller. He has expressed relevant diligence and/or deliberation with the purpose of clarification of the issue of the seller's authority however relevant information was not available to him.

In the second instance the purchaser himself is a passive subject and even does not try to find out whether the seller is authorized to dispose the property. In this case the purchaser completely relies on information provided by the seller; he does not doubt authority of the latter and acquires property.

The way the purchaser acted or to what extent the mistake was caused by his passive action is to be determined by the court in the result of assessment of all factual circumstances. The action caused by the purchaser's passive action and lack of deliberation excludes his conscientiousness. If in the first instance works the assumption that the purchaser did not know and could not have known about ineligibility of the seller, in the second instance works the following assumption – the purchaser did not know but could have known or assumed existence of defect in authority of the seller.

For example, when a person sells a stolen antique for high price, there are little grounds for doubting his authority or there are no grounds at all. But when the same antique is sold for inadequately low price, the purchaser may doubt that the seller does not act legally and consequently his “mistake” cannot be protected by law. Moreover in such case existence of “apologizing mistake” should be excluded.

Taking into consideration the aforementioned, mistake implies only the circumstance when mistake could not be prevented despite active action of the purchaser. He expressed relevant deliberation, which excludes negligence, but notwithstanding this he could not learn about ineligibility of the seller. The wording “could not have known” expresses requirement that in the purchaser's action was excluded not only particular, but a simple negligence. Thus, the purchaser does not realize existence of mistake in his own action since he acted in good faith. Mistake occurs even when a party caused incorrect understanding by accident or negligence<fnref n="3" />. Focusing on a mistake is conditioned by a circumstance that existence of non-conscious mistake gives rise to the issue of legal protection of the purchaser in legal science and existence thereof within the framework of various national legislations.

Sklovsky notes that “the purchaser acting with sufficient prudence is considered conscientious. In addition rational deliberation shall not be deemed as excessive circumspection”<fnref n="4" /> Rationality of a purchaser, as the golden mean, should be considered a compulsory element of civil turnover.

We cannot speak about existence of a mistake when the purchaser has an opportunity granted by law and factual circumstances to examine authority of a seller. Submission by the seller of an old extract from the Public Registry can exemplify such instance. Nowadays such extract cannot be referred to as an “apologizing mistake”. First of all because one of the most important principles of existence of the Public Registry is its publicity. Besides, existence of informational technologies and internet space available to

<footnote n="1">¹ The Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Part one, Scientific-practical comment/under editorship of Abova T.E., Kabalkin A.U., Mozilin V.P., M., 1996 pg.25</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² A reasonable man</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Rabinovich N.V. Invalidity of Transactions and Consequences Thereof. K., 1960, p. 64</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Sklovsky K. I., Acquisition of Property from Unauthorized Seller//Law and Economics, 1999, No.6 p.18</footnote>
almost anyone provides any person with opportunity to check the owner of property or if the owner was changed staying inside<fnref n="1" />.

A notary act authorizing seller to sell property (e.g. a power of attorney) can serve as a second example. Transparency of registration of notary acts and registration thereof in a special registry provides an opportunity to check whether the seller was indeed granted an authority to dispose the property. Thus, the purchaser can go without special skills related to determination of authenticity of notary's signature and seal.

Most of the instances of purchaser's mistakes/erroneousness arise and develop without outside influence but by reason of mislead of a seller, i.e. when the seller, firstly acts in a manner to inspire the purchaser, deliberately creates a wrong impression regarding a certain fact related to his authority which in reality does not exist. This is achieved by concealment of really existing circumstances, false representation or when the purchaser develops incorrect impression independently from the seller but the latter purposefully keeps silence and does not say anything<fnref n="2" />.

We should agree with Rene Savatie who noted that in fact the vice of expression of will caused by deception constitutes a mistake<fnref n="3" />. Thus, existence of a mistake conditions defect of the process of formation of will and expression thereof.

In so far as a mistake in the process of acquisition from an unauthorized person is concerned, it is disputable whether the mistake in transaction is obvious, creating the right of rescission pursuant to Articles XX of the Civil Code of Georgia. First of all it should be mentioned that “only essential mistake is considered by the law as the grounds for making transaction voidable”<fnref n="4" />. In the course of the dispute it should be clarified what kind of mistake should be considered as grounds for invalidation of a transaction. Legal consequences of invalidation of the transaction should also be taken into consideration: “Acknowledging the transaction to be invalid implies invalidation of legal consequences following such transaction. I.e. the status quo existing prior to making the transaction has to be restored”<fnref n="5" /> Hence, if we try to assess the transaction made by the bona fide purchaser of the property with a person unauthorized to dispose the same property as a transaction made by mistake, we will obtain reality which will serve as the grounds for making conclusion opposing to existence of voidable transaction. We will try to represent this argumentation in the form of theses:

1. Rescission in case of a transaction made by mistake causes invalidation. In case of bona fide acquisition rescission gives rise to a dispute between the original owner and the purchaser of property, rescission is initiated by the original owner and not the subjects to the transaction on the basis of which unauthorized disposal was accomplished, therefore, here subjects of relationships are represented in composition different from the one that would be in case of transaction made by mistake.

2. Raising claims by the original owner to the bona fide purchaser does not unambiguously entail invalidation of transaction. In such instance it is important how conscientiousness of the purchaser is determined and to what extent he is protected by law.

3. In case if the person acquiring property from an unauthorized person is obliged to return the property, then the picture is different than simple restoration of status quo after invalidation of the transaction. Notwithstanding good faith, the purchaser of the property will be obliged to return the property not to the person it was acquired from, as it would happen in case of invalidation of the transaction due to mistake, but he would return property to the original owner. Thus, in such case we cannot speak about classical restitution.

<footnote n="1">¹ We mean administrative proceedings accomplished in order to reflect changes to the title in the Public Registry. At the moment one of the most important elements of operation of the Public Registry is administrative proceeding status of which can be searched on internet.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Rabinovich N.V. Invalidity of Transactions and Consequences Thereof. K., 1960, p. 63</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Rabinovich N.V. Invalidity of Transactions and Consequences Thereof. K., 1960, p. 63</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Chanturia L., General Part of Civil Law, Publisher “Samartali” 2011, p. 366</footnote>

<footnote n="5">5 Chanturia L., General Part of Civil Law, Publisher “Samartali” 2011, p. 398</footnote>
Therefore, in case of bona fide acquisition of property from an unauthorized person mistake is evident only in action of a bona fide purchaser which originates due to independent, objective circumstances and consequently excludes guilt of the purchaser. This is the mistake which serves as the ground for invalidation and rescission shall be made on its basis.

It is worth mentioning that any external influence (physical or psychical influence) on the will of the purchaser is excluded, since in such case it would be impossible to say that the purchaser did not know and could not have known about ineligibility of the seller. Then we would face not the mistake of the purchaser, but transaction made by means of making physical or psychical influence on him. Such transaction shall be subject to rescission as per Article 85 of the Civil Code of Georgia<fnref n="1" />. Duress the Civil Code speaks about is represented in the form of physical influence, while in case of psychical influence we will deal with threat mentioned in the Article: "In this case fear caused by the fact of using duress in the future makes the person express the will corresponding to the will of other person"<fnref n="2" />. Under all circumstances "the purpose of duress is making transaction"<fnref n="3" />, while the bona fide purchaser makes the transaction willingly and there exists no similar interference in the process of expression of will.

#### IV. BONA FIDE ACQUISITION AS AN ILLEGAL ACTION

Bona fide acquisition of property from ineligible person can be considered from two angles: 1. Let's assume that legal protection of a bona fide purchaser conditions consideration of his action as legal. 2. Conscientiousness of a purchaser does not precondition legality of his action. It simply excludes his guilt and that is why justice strives for his protection. If it were otherwise, discussion regarding protection of a bona fide purchaser would not be important in legal science.

In our opinion consideration of an action of a bona fide purchaser to be legal just at the expense of his subjective conscientiousness would not be correct. Accepting such assumption would mean that he acts in contradiction to whatever determined by law. Considering bona fide acquisition as an illegal act (violating subjective right of ownership) obliges scientists acknowledging a purchaser acting by ordinary negligence to be a bona fide purchaser to consider his actions as infraction.

In order to exclude purchaser's guilt at the expense of determination of his good faith, he should not necessarily exhibit excessive deliberation characteristic to civil turnover. He is not required to pursue an action going beyond the boundaries of requirements of ordinary, moderate attention, care and deliberation.

We should share the opinion that bona fide acquisition of property vindication of which is statute-allowed, as "objective" violation of subjective right of ownership cannot be considered as an infraction and should be gradually isolated from it<fnref n="4" />.

#### V. CONSCIENTIOUSNESS AS A FACTOR EXCLUDING GUILT OF PURCHASER

Alienation of property by an unauthorized person is always deliberate. Speaking in terms of law the seller knows that he is not entitled to dispose property but breaches the law on purpose. Cause and effect relationship between the occurred result and his deliberate action always conditions his guilt and there would be no sense in speaking about circumstances excluding his guilt.

As for the issue of guilt of a bona fide purchaser, it should be mentioned that the whole discussion on proving or determination of conscientiousness of purchaser and searching mechanisms of his legal protection initially serves the idea to prove that the action of bona fide purchaser acquiring property from an unauthorized person does not contain elements of guilt, thus his guilt is excluded.

<footnote n="1">¹ The use of duress (violence or threats) for the purposes of making a transaction shall entitle the person subjected to the duress to demand voidance of the transaction, even when a third person exercised the duress.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Commentary to the Civil Code of Georgia, Book 1, Publisher "Samartali", Tb. 1999 p. 247</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Commentary to the Civil Code of Georgia, Book 1, Publisher "Samartali", Tb. 1999 p. 246</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Alekseev S.S. Problem of the Theory of Law. Vol.1, Sverdlovsk, 1972, p.353-354; Dontsov S.E. Civil Non-contractual Means of Protection of Socialist Property, M., 1980 p.37</footnote>
If the purchaser takes all relevant measures of precaution and does not find any circumstance providing grounds to doubt authority of contractor in the course of alienation of property, we should speak not about ordinary negligence of a purchaser but in general about non-existence of his guilty action<fnref n="1" />. Although we admit that the action of the bona fide purchaser is not legal, it should be taken into consideration that he was unaware of the grounds of his own illegal action and consequently, having breached the law he did not act deliberately or by negligence.

## VI. NON-LEGAL SIDE OF ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FROM UNAUTHORIZED PERSON

Limits of authority of a seller to dispose property are very hard to determine. For instance, in modern market relationships we cannot rely only on the title embodied in ownership, all the more if we take into account that informational technologies offer modern methods of civil turnover which, in respect of law and in particular purchaser of property is connected with origination of new risks.

In respect of acquisition of property we can distinguish factors of non-legal nature which on its part creates the risk that the seller acts illegally and does not have the right to dispose the property<fnref n="2" />. These circumstances at their end draw the purchaser's attention to ineligibility of the seller or just indirectly provide him with information on existence of risk.

Various circumstances making influence on development of the will of a purchaser can be divided into objective and subjective criteria. To the objective criteria belong the conditions of transaction including the price of alienated property, its state, quality, uniqueness, determination of the seller's authority; while the subjective criteria are the subjective peculiarities of a purchaser, his personal qualities (life experience, legal knowledge), as well as qualities of the seller. Let's consider some of them.

*Price of Property.* Amount of price can be assumed with consideration of qualities of the property. When the price is much smaller than the price of property of similar quality and peculiarities at the market, it already provides certain indirect information to the purchaser of the property and indicates that the seller might be acting illegally.

*Acquisition of property at so called "Bazrobas" (Bazaars).* It is a common knowledge that buying a thing at such places is related to the risk that the seller acts illegally.

*Acquisition of Property through Auction.* Participation at auction is often subject to the special rules established by organizers. Under such circumstances a seller might be required to present document certifying his authority to sell property. This rule is applied as an exception since the title to the property by virtue of presumption belongs to the person exercising ownership of such property.

In case of auction the biggest risk related to competition between purchasers increasing the purchase price of property and figural expression of the latter does not make any indication to authority of the seller. The risk increases even more in case the auction is conducted electronically through internet sites<fnref n="3" />.

Everybody is not required to assess events in the same manner. It would be erroneous to assume that everyone makes similar assessment of facts and circumstances. Therefore a person with average abilities should be used as a bench mark and his ability of assessment should be relied on for determination of whether the purchaser of the property could have assumed existence of circumstances excluding authority of the seller.

It is deemed that the purchaser's action should be considered in conjunction with the mentioned circumstances and on the basis of assessment thereof. Evaluation of these circumstances also provides for the precondition to determine conscientiousness of the purchaser's action. Circumstance is assessed not per se but to the extent it made or could have made influence on consciousness and will of an actor<fnref n="4" />.

<footnote n="1">¹ Eroshenko A.A. Private Property in Civil Law, M. 1973, p. 177</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Eroshenko A.A. Private Property in Civil Law, M. 1973, p. 177</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Caspar Rose, The Transfer of Property Rights by Theft – An Economic Analysis, Lefic Working Paper 2005-09, p. 4
http://openarchive.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10398/6802/wplefic092005.pdf?sequence=1(22/07/2013).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Tolstoy U.K. Content and Civil Protection of the Right of Ownership in the USSR, L. 1955, p.122</footnote>
VII. INSTITUTE OF BONA FIDE PURCHASER IN THE POST SOVIET SPACE

First of all let's consider the conception serving as grounds for Civil Codes of the states which gained independence after collapse of the Soviet Union. These conceptual grounds substantially condition the method and peculiarity of regulation from the point of view of regulation of right of ownership. Consequently, it is reflected on a bona fide purchaser acquiring property from an unauthorized person.

Historical process accompanying adoption of the Civil Codes was essentially different from longstanding and tense work process which was characteristic to Europe at the stage of great codification; in this case there was no longstanding bitter dispute covering decades like it was in case of France and Germany<fnref n="1" />. For each post-Soviet state it was an accelerated process which had to prepare grounds for development of economic relationships.

"In order to make own experience the main construction material, at least three preconditions should exist. The state drafting the Code should possess: firstly, legislative traditions at least partially reflecting principles regulated by codification; secondly, rich judicial practice demonstrating need for regulation of civil turnover in a new light and thirdly, developed doctrine reasoning necessity of codification"<fnref n="2" /> The "order" coming from the rich judicial practice and developed doctrine regarding attitude of law-maker towards a bona fide purchaser obviously could not have been relevant to the existing political regime and the approach to the right of ownership adopted by social system.

Apparently all the states had certain historical experience in regulation of acquisition of property, however the direction and nature of regulation were to some extent conditioned by non political processes. In particular, from the point of view of interference of the Civil Codes a certain part of codes came under the influence of model code of CIS and consequently Civil Code of the Russian Federation while the other part tried to escape political influence of Russia<fnref n="3" />.

In this part of the paper through the examples of several countries we will try to demonstrate the approach of the former Soviet States regarding regulation of a bona fide purchaser acquiring property from an unauthorized person.

The fact that the Civil Code of the Russian Federation could not overpass the Soviet conception of forms of property should be regarded as its defect<fnref n="4" />. While our Civil Code succeeded in this respect which is regarded as its merit<fnref n="5" />. Incorrect understanding of the concept of property is relevantly reflected in various institutes of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. In the Article 302 of the Civil Code of Russia of 1994 the law-maker calls purchaser bona fide if he did not know and could not have known about ineligibility of a seller. If we read point one of the mentioned Article literally, it will turn out that an unauthorized seller is a person not entitled to sell property to a bona fide purchaser but who despite such disentitlement accomplished alienation.

The doctrine of Russian Civil Code refers to ethical significance of conscientiousness. Presumably, when considering relationship between conscientiousness and ethics Russian scientists must be speaking about conscientiousness as subjective attitude.

The presumption by virtue of which “purchaser of property is deemed conscientious unless his unconscientiousness is proved” is applied in Russian doctrine<fnref n="6" />. Polemics regarding necessity of proving conscientiousness of a person by the court is related to acting with presumption of conscientiousness. Literature provides contradictory opinions in this regard. For instance, according to E. Bogdanov “presumption of conscientiousness is determined by law (point 3 of Article 10 CC of RF), it does not require to be acknowledged or proved by court or otherwise. It can be rejected only from the moment the decision of the court on acknowledgement of the defendant to be unconscientious comes into effect”<fnref n="7" />.

<footnote n="1">¹ Regarding civil codification see in details Tsvaigert K. Kotz H. Introduction to Legal Studies in the Sphere of Private Law, N. 1
Tb. 2000</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Zoidze B. "Reception of European Private Law in Georgia", Educational Center of Publishing, Tbilisi, 2005, p. 92</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³http://www.cis-legal-reform.org-juristische-zusammenarbeit-universalitaet-und-kontext.ru/(22/07/2013).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴http://www.cis-legal-reform.org-juristische-zusammenarbeit-universalitaet-und-kontext.ru/(22/07/2013).</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Zoidze B., Law of Property, Tb., Publisher "Metsniereba", 2003, p. 94</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Godes A. Protection of Right of Ownership in the USSR//Soviet Justice, 1938, No. 10, p.5</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Bogdanov E. Category of "Good Faith" in Civil Law//Russian Justice, 1999, No.9, p.12</footnote>
In more precise conclusions Russian scientists note that presumption of conscientiousness can be applied in case when property willfully dispossessed by the authorized person is acquired from an unauthorized person. Therefore this presumption is considered true and serving as the ground for termination of validity of presumption of guilt.

Approach of the Civil Code of Lithuania – the Civil Code of Lithuania is three years younger than our (Georgian) Civil Code<fnref n="1" />. Its main conception is protection of fair purchaser who relied on good faith of a seller and based on his conscientiousness assumed that the seller was authorized to sell property.

The Civil Code of Lithuania envisages the right of recovery of movable thing by general norm and also makes specific reference to the issue of acquisition of property from an unauthorized person by norms regulating sale-purchase agreement. It applies a “reasonable solution” and determines a special term for recovery of movable thing from an unauthorized person – a bona fide purchase by the first owner<fnref n="2" />.

The precondition for recovering a thing according to the Civil Code of Lithuania is that the thing ceased to be possessed by the initial owner against his will. Loss or theft of the thing can serve as examples of ground for deprivation of possession<fnref n="3" />. Civil Law of Lithuania admits the principle created by the Roman law –“No one has the right to assign more right than he has himself”.

In respect of movable property the Civil Code of Lithuania prefers more precise regulation. It makes stipulation against bona fide purchaser in case of occurrence of criminal offence. Particularly, if the owner was deprived of a thing by means of crime, the bona fide purchase is obliged to return the thing acquired from an unauthorized person<fnref n="4" />.

In national legal literature it is noted with pride that Lithuanian civil law does not represent exact copy of any legal system. Significant difference was not accidental. It was the result of well-considered and preplanned steps. For instance, in case of immovable things conceptual influence was made by the fact that after collapse of the Soviet Union governmental bodies were intensively selling real estate accumulated in ownership of the state⁵⁶.

It is worth mentioning that in respect of immovable property reality of Georgia significantly resembles Lithuanian. Painful problem for both countries was that due to soviet system the whole fund of immovable property was accumulated in ownership of the state.

<footnote n="1">¹ It came into effect on June 1, 2001. See Tadas Klimas, BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, VINDICATION AND THE SECURITY OF ACQUISITIONS IN LITHUANIAN LAW, LITHUANIAN QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES Volume 50, No.1 - Spring 2004, p. 66-67</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² §4.96. Recovery of Property from a Bona Fide Purchaser</footnote>

<footnote n="1">1. If a moveable thing has been acquired for value from a person who did not have the right to transfer its ownership, and if the purchaser did not know this and should not have known this (a bona fide purchaser), then the owner has the right to recover this thing only if the thing has been lost by the owner or by the person to whom he had entrusted it, or if it has been stolen from either of them, or if it has otherwise ceased to be possessed by them without their consent. These demands must be made within three years of the time of the loss of possession of the thing.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2. Immoveable things cannot be recovered from a bona fide purchaser except for those cases where the owner was deprived of possession of this thing because of the crime of another person.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3. If a thing was obtained gratuitously from a person who did not have the right to transfer its ownership, then in every case the owner has the right to recover the thing. This rule is applicable both to moveable as well as to immovable things.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4. This article is inapplicable in those instances where the thing has been sold or otherwise transferred in the manner prescribed for execution of court decisions.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ See Tadas Klimas, BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, VINDICATION AND THE SECURITY OF ACQUISITIONS IN LITHUANIAN LAW, LITHUANIAN QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES Volume 50, No.1 - Spring 2004, p. 3</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ See Tadas Klimas, BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, VINDICATION AND THE SECURITY OF ACQUISITIONS IN LITHUANIAN LAW, LITHUANIAN QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES Volume 50, No.1 - Spring 2004, p. 9</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ See Tadas Klimas, BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, VINDICATION AND THE SECURITY OF ACQUISITIONS IN LITHUANIAN LAW, LITHUANIAN QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES Volume 50, No.1 - Spring 2004, p. 12</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ This process is analogous to privatization accomplished in Georgia. Its scale today obviously is not as wide as in 90s of the past century, but it should be mentioned that privatization process related to large-scale alienation of real estate accumulated in ownership of the state is not still finished today.</footnote>
VIII. HARMONIZATION – THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GEORGIA

Study of the issue of harmonization is interesting from the point of view of study of the problem of
protection of bona fide acquisition of property from an unauthorized person. Harmonization process is
rather specific to regulation of private law relationships. The international institutes and especially the
European Union play significant role in this respect. Creation of contractual norms has been increasingly
spoken about in Europe<fnref n="1" />. Harmonization process in contractual law has turned into a kind of target in the
framework of European private law, while the same cannot be said in respect of property law. Contractual
law is more inclined to similarity within the framework of various law systems. This is conditioned by
primary significance of concordance of will which is for the most part based on general concepts and has
conceptual importance, however as soon as property law is at issue similarity between jurisdictions
instantly turns into illusion<fnref n="2" />. When talking about harmonization of norms protecting a bona fide purchaser
of property, possibility of achievement of such harmonization should be determined through the prism of
various law systems with consideration of individual nature of property law. The legislation regulating
bona fide purchase of property is different in various countries making its harmonization a priori difficult<fnref n="3" />.
Most of European countries have chosen their own way for solution of legal problem of protection of a
bona fide purchaser<fnref n="4" />. If we take a closer look at difference between them, we will find that the difference
is not only important but essential and often even opposing to each other. Various law systems differently
regulate the dispute between a bona fide purchaser of property and its initial owner (some law systems
work in favor of the initial owner while the others are beneficial for a bona fide purchaser) as well as have
differentiated approach to the case of sale of one and the same thing twice. However, different regulations
always condition specific economic results having diverse impact on intrinsic motives of parties to the
dispute<fnref n="5" />. Law systems protecting a bona fide purchaser point at special significance of trade relations and
stability of civil turnover as their “ideological” basis. While the law systems preferring protection of an
initial owner and neglecting conscientiousness of a purchaser, justify their choice by protection of the
ownership right<fnref n="6" />. And still, although protection of the initial owner and bona fide purchaser from an
unauthorized person is the subject of complicated and long-lasting discussion in the private law, there has
not been provided an acceptable answer to the question what conditions different attitude of laws when
regulating this issue<fnref n="7" />.

It can be said that level of popularity of appeal to harmonization in respect of movable property is
not very high. Legal regulation of the right to movable property is very important for trade law and at a
glance represents an attractive factor of unified regulation. However, the legal issue being so important for
trade relations is the case illustrating the circumstance that development of new Ius Commune<fnref n="8" /> as the
preparatory stage of harmonization would be vain; nevertheless, if accomplished, we would face forceful
intrusion of unknown institutes upon separate legal systems. The question raised by us might be essentially
differently regulated in various law systems but they would have one goal – occurrence of economically
effective result. However, existence of common goal should not be understood as elimination of

<footnote n="1">¹ Chechelashvili Z., “Property Law”, Publisher “Bona Causa”, 2006, pg.88</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Rahmatian A., A Comparison of German Moveable Property Law and English Personal Property Law, 2010, p.2
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1629268 (Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 197-248, 2010);</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Salomons A.F., Good Faith acquisition of movables, p. 1 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1515719;</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Salomons A.F., How to draft new rules on the bona fide acquisition of movables for Europe? Some remarks on method and content, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series, No 2007/2, p. 2,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=979458;</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Caspar Rose, The Transfer of Property Rights by Theft – An Economic Analysis, Lefic Working Paper 2005-09, p. 1-2,
http://openarchive.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10398/6802/wplefic092005.pdf?sequence=1;</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Caspar Rose, The Transfer of Property Rights by Theft – An Economic Analysis, Lefic Working Paper 2005-09, p. 8
http://openarchive.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10398/6802/wplefic092005.pdf?sequence=1;</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Zhenxing H., The Economics of Good-Faith Purchase, 2005, p.1 http://www.tinbergen.nl/files/theses/mphil082.pdf;</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸Ius Commune represented the common law of the western and middle Europe. It was Romanic canon law. For details see
Chanturia L., “Introduction to the General Part of Civil Law”, 2006, Tbl., publisher “Samartali”, pg. 12-20;</footnote>
difference between law systems. Divergence in legal technique will still remain due to difference in ideology<fnref n="1" />.

Consideration of decisions of the member countries of the European Union regarding this question is essentially important within the framework of this discussion.

## IX. CHAIN OF SALOMONS EVENTS (CONTINUUM)

While studying law-maker's attitude towards a bona fide purchaser and original owner, the Dutch professor Arthur Salomons came to the conclusion that the existing legislative diversity can still be conveyed by the scheme subjected to certain consistency. This is a table in the beginning of which is represented law systems where vitality and necessity of legal protection of bona fide purchaser is most explicitly expressed, further below this tendency weakens and the importance of granting legal protection to the owner gradually increases.

The middle part of the table covers the law of the countries characterized by more or less intermediary and more neutral regulation.

Besides, Salomons unites separate law systems in sub-groups according to homogeneity characteristic to the research issue taking into consideration non-essential (insignificant) difference. We deem it would be reasonable to demonstrate the above-described systematic wholeness in this paper.

### Continuum – protection of the owner versus protection of the bona fide purchaser

Protection of a bona fide purchaser

German Law

Italy

Austria, Slovenia

Sweden

The Netherlands

France, Belgium

* „Hand wahre Hand“, (hand covers hand) except stolen things;

* Bona fide protection of purchaser including in case of stolen or lost things.

* Exception is the things title to which is registered in special state registry.

* Bona fide protection of a purchaser and statement of defense to be satisfied in case of sale through public auction, by registered commercial seller or in case if the owner deprived of property willingly entrusted movable property to endorser.

* No exception for stolen or lost things.

* Only Slovenia: the former owner enjoys one-year personal right to redeem the property of special importance (i.e. family jewels) at market value.

* Until 2003 the same as in Italy. Currently the owner can recover stolen thing (within 6 months).

* The owner is entitled to acquire from a bona fide purchaser at market value or at purchase price paid by the purchaser.

* The same as in France but only recovery of stolen property.

* Protection of a customer buying a stolen thing in a store.

* A purchaser must provide information on location of a seller.

* Bona fide purchaser bona fide owner.

<footnote n="1">¹Rahmatian A., A Comparison of German Moveable Property Law and English Personal Property Law, 2010, p.3
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1629268 (Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 197-248, 2010)</footnote>
Protection of the owner

Switzerland

Germany Spain, Greece

Scotland

England and Wales

Finland

Czeck Republic

Portugal

Roman law

* The owner can withdraw stolen or lost things within three years.

* Refund of purchase price to the purchaser at market or by trader.

* The same as the French law, however restriction is imposed upon withdrawal of stolen and lost things after lapse of five years.

* The same as the French law, but no protection of the purchaser in respect of stolen or lost things.

* Exception for trade.

* In Spain: reimbursement of purchase price to the purchaser at auction.

* In fact no protection of a bona fide purchaser.

* Exception: bona fide protection of a purchaser and the statement of defense for satisfaction in exchange for the previous transaction (ex tunc and ex nunc) and in case of double sale. No protection in case of stolen or lost things, registered property, works of art.

* In fact no protection of a bona fide purchaser against a lawful owner.

* Exception: a bona fide purchaser of circulated movable property;

A bona fide purchaser of already transferred thing which is still held by the transferor.

A bona fide purchaser of a thing already held by the transferor but transferred to him with reservation of the title; Purchaser through trade representative.

* An owner can withdraw even from the bona fide purchaser, but only against payment provided the thing was not stolen or lost.

* Like Portugal, but the reform is being carried out and notices are made on exceptions for trading and circulating movable property.

* No protection of a bona fide purchaser, purpose of different purchase and refund of purchase price paid to a trader.

* "Ubi rem meam invenio, ibi vindico" - where can I find my lawsuit, if it does not exist.

* "Usucapio res furtivae" - No valid right for stolen property.

The above table also includes the solutions of Old German and Old Roman laws.

Austria and Slovenia, France and Belgium, Germany, Spain and Greece are united in one sub-group in this table. The basis for this union is first of all similarity of Civil Codes of these countries conditioned by the fact that some of them were used as foundation for construction of civil legislation of the rest and their reception was accomplished<fnref n="1" />. As for Georgia, according to the relevant legal solution, in the above given chart it would be placed in the middle, next to legal regulation of Germany and France.

<footnote n="1">¹ Regarding civil codification see in details Tsvaigert K. Kotz H., Introduction to Comparative Legal Studies in the Sphere of Private Law, Part 1, Tb. 2000</footnote>
X. CONCLUSION

Reference to good faith is made in law when one's right becomes dependent on the presumption of his conscientious action<fnref n="1" />. It implies that presumption of conscientious action should also be proved in case of consideration of the dispute in court. Every purchaser is deemed bona fide unless his unconscientiousness is proved<fnref n="2" />.

The process of proving is represented as follows: one party tries to prove that presumption of conscientiousness works in his favor, while the other party tries to prove that it is impossible to apply presumption of conscientiousness since the purchaser knew or should have known about ineligibility of the seller to alienate property<fnref n="3" />. Obviously on the basis of evidences presented by the parties the court will take decision either in favor of the purchaser expressed in admission of presumption of conscientiousness of a purchaser or against him and in favor of the original owner denying presumption of conscientiousness of the purchaser.

According to G.N. Amphiteatrov, good faith is “an apologizing mistake always resulting in violation of rights of owner”, good faith, in the opinion of G.N. Amphiteatrov “is characteristic only to desired degree of diligence of participants of turnover”<fnref n="4" />.

Sometimes law grants a bona fide purchaser more rights than the seller of the property had<fnref n="5" />. In this case the principle according to which the content of assigned right is determined by the nature of right the assignor possessed is violated, i.e. the principle of Roman law is violated: no one can assign more rights than he has himself. This fact may have opponents but if we oblige the law to resolve such conflict of rights, or to be more precise, to offer specific regulation, then restriction of one of the principles of private law should also be acceptable. At the same time the content of regulation should not contradict to interests of majority of subjects of trade relationship, otherwise rejection of principles would not be justified and would definitely constitute a legal defect requiring correction. Conscientiousness is subjective attitude of participant of legal relationship determination of existence of which would eliminate legal defect. This happens not per se but on the basis of will of law since legislation wishes to protect a bona fid purchaser but establishes this protection as an exception since reasonable limits of such protection guarantee stability of civil turnover.

References:

1. Chechelshvili Z., "Property Law", Publisher "Bona Causa", 2006;

2. Zoidze B., "Reception of European Private Law in Georgia", Educational Center of Publishing, Tbilisi, 2005;

3. Zoidze B., Law of Property, Tb., Publisher "Metsniereba", 2003;

4. Commentary to the Civil Code of Georgia, Book 1, Publisher "Samartali", Tbilisi, 1999;

5. Civil Code of Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012;

6. Tsvaigert K. Kotz H., Introduction to Comparative Legal Stuies in the Sphere of Private Law, Part 1, Tbilisi, 2000;

7. Chanturia L., General Part of Civil Law, Publisher "Samartali" 2011;

8. Alekseev S.S. Problem of the Theory of Law. Vol.1, Sverdlovsk, 1972, p.353-354; Dontsov S.E. Civil Non-contractual Means of Protection of Socialist Property, M., 1980;

9. Amphiteatrov G.N. War and issues of vindication// in the collection ; bulletin of All-Soviet-Union Institute of legal sciences, issue III, - M., Urizdat, 1944;

<footnote n="1">¹ Lâle Sirmen, Acquisition of Movables in Good Faith, p. 307,
http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/38/302/2842.pdf(22/07/2013)</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Godes A., Protection of Right of Ownership in the USSR// Soviet Justice, 1938, No. 10, p. 5</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³Lâle Sirmen, Acquisition of Movables in Good Faith, p. 307, http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/38/302/2842.pdf (22/07/2013)</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Amphiteatrov G.N. War and issues of vindication// in the collection ; bulletin of All-Soviet-Union Institute of legal sciences, issue III, - M., Urizdat, 1944, p. 23</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Ulph, J., 'Good Faith and Due Diligence, in Palmer, N and McKendrick, E (eds) (1998) Interests in Goods (2nd ed) LLP Reference Publishing 403,404 vuTïTeb Andreas Rahmatian, A Comparison of German Moveable Property Law and English Personal Property Law, 2010, p.29 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1629268 22/07/2013), (Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 197-248, 2010)</footnote>
10. Rahmatian A., A Comparison of German Moveable Property Law and English Personal Property Law, 2010, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1629268 (Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 3, No. 1;

11. Bogdanov E. Category of “Good Faith” in Civil Law//Russian Justice, 1999, No.9;

12. Godes A. Protection of Right of Ownership in the USSR//Soviet Justice, 1938, No. 10;

13. The Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Part one, Scientific-practical comment/under editorship of Abova T.E., Kabalkin A.U., Mozilin V.P., M., 1996;

14. Eroshenko A.A. Private Property in Civil Law, M. 1973;

15. Psychology/under the editorship of Kornilova K.N., Teplov B.M. Shvartz L.M., M., 1938

16. Platonov K.K., System of Psychology and Theory of Reflection, M., 1982;

17. Rabinovich N.V. Invalidity of Transactions and Consequences Thereof. K., 1960;

18. Sklovsky K. I., Acquisition of Property from Unauthorized Seller//Law and Economics, 1999;

19. Salomons A. F., Good Faith acquisition of movables, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1515719

20. Salomons A. F., How to draft new rules on the bona fide acquisition of movables for Europe? Some remarks on method and content, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series, No 2007/2, http://ssrn.com/abstract=979458;

21. Tolstoy U. K. Content and Civil Protection of Ownership Right in the USSR, L., 1955;

22. Judelson K.S. Problem of Proof in Soviet Civil Procedure, M., Gosurizdat, 1951;

23. Caspar Rose, The Transfer of Property Rights by Theft – An Economic Analysis, Lefic Working Paper 2005-09, p. 4 http://openarchive.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10398/6802/wplefic092005.pdf?sequence=1 (22/07/2013);

24. Lâle Sirmen, Acquisition of Movables in Good Faith, p. 307, http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/38/302/2842.pdf (22/07/2013);

25. Tadas Klimas, BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, VINDICATION AND THE SECURITY OF ACQUISITIONS IN LITHUANIAN LAW, LITHUANIAN QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES Volume 50, No.1 - Spring 2004;

26. Ulph, J., 'Good Faith and Due Diligence, in Palmer, N and McKendrick, E (eds) (1998) Interests in Goods (2nd ed) LLP Reference Publishing 403,404 vuTiTeb Andreas Rahmatian, A Comparison of German Moveable Property Law and English Personal Property Law, 2010, p.29 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1629268 22/07/2013), (Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 197-248, 2010);

27. http://www.cis-legal-reform.org-juristische-zusammenarbeit-universalitaet-und kontext.ru/(22/07/2013);

28. Zhenxing H., The Economics of Good-Faith Purchase, 2005, http://www.tinbergen.nl/files/theses/mphil082.pdf.

<figure><img src="image_16.png" /></figure>
# Future enlargements of the European Union

DR MICHEL LABORI

ancien Professeur Jean Monnet (France)
Chevalier de la légion d'honneur

<figure><img src="image_17.png" /></figure>

In July 1st, 2013 Croatia became the 28th member state of the European Union<fnref n="1" /> who had previously had 5 enlargements<fnref n="2" />. The enlargement of the European Union is expected to continue and affect most of the European continent.

The criteria of the membership were laid down at the June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen. Below are three Copenhagen criteria for candidate members to join the EU.

## 1) The political criterion

The candidate country must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities.<fnref n="3" />

## 2) The economic criteria

- the existence of a functioning market economy

- the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU.

## 3) The ability to take on the obligations of membership

That includes **legislative alignment with the acquis, implementation and administrative capacity of the candidate country.**

The leaders of the European Union agreed in December 2006 that the Copenhagen criteria should in future be combined with the **EU integration (absorption) capacity**. According to the Commission, integration capacity is a functional concept. It is measured by the ability of the EU to welcome new members at any given time or in a given period, without jeopardizing the policy objectives established by the Treaties.<fnref n="4" />

Five countries have received the **candidate status**: Turkey, Iceland, FYROM (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Montenegro and Serbia. Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania are potential candidates (in January 2014). The Thessaloniki European Council in 2003 has confirmed the European perspective of Western Balkans.<fnref n="5" />

Neighboring countries of Eastern Europe (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) were offered in December 2003 a policy of cooperation known as the European Neighbourhood Policy. Its main goal is to offer to those countries a possibility to reform themselves in order to achieve better democratic and economic performances, and to develop their relations with the EU but without a clear EU Membership perspective.<fnref n="6" />

<footnote n="1">¹ OJEU OJL 112 24/04/2012.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² EU successive enlargements:
1973: United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark</footnote>

<footnote>1981: Greece</footnote>

<footnote>1986: Spain and Portugal</footnote>

<footnote>1995: Austria, Finland and Sweden</footnote>

<footnote>2004: Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia; 2007: Romania and Bulgaria</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Labori Michel et Costea Simion, *Le management des politiques européennes* (chapitre 16 Les futurs élargissements de l'Union européenne pages 262 à 269), Prodifmultimedia Paris, 2011.Saidi Hyna, *L'élargissement de l'Union européenne aux Etats postcommunistes d'Europe centrale et orientale*, Paris, 2005.Enlargement, in http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/fyrom/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Ibidem.</footnote>
## 1) CANDIDATE COUNTRIES

### TURKEY

Turkey has a population of 74 million inhabitants and an area 784,000 km2. The fertility rate is 2.1 and it ensures the renewal of generations. The 2025 projections estimate the population to 85.4 million. The GDP per capita in purchasing power standard is 52% of that of the EU.

Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community in September 12th, 1963 which came into force in December 1st, 1964. It offers to Turkey a possibility to join the European Economic Community when it is able to fulfill the requirements of the Treaty of Rome. In May 6th, 1995 an agreement creating a Customs Union is signed and the status of candidate country is granted at the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999. An Accession Partnership was concluded in December 2000 and the European Council decided opening accession negotiations in December 2004. The negotiations are formally opened in October 2005 and are underway. In June 28th, 2005 Turkey signed an Ankara Protocol extending its Customs Union to 10 member states in 2004 but it refuses to apply it to Cyprus. Turkey also refused to open its ports and airports to Cyprus.

The negotiations have not progressed a lot because of the Turkish attitude but also because of the **reluctance of some EU Member States, especially Cyprus, France and Germany**. Nicolas Sarkozy said he was opposed to the EU-Turkey accession preferring a privileged partnership. Angela Merkel has also demonstrated hostility to Turkish EU Membership. European public opinion is generally unfavorable.

14 negotiation chapters out of 35 have been opened and among them only one chapter („Science and Research”) has been closed until January 2014. The EU suspended accession talks on 8 chapters because Turkey had refused to implement the Ankara Protocol to Cyprus. In June 30th, 2010 the chapter „Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy” was opened. In 2011 the Commission requested further efforts to guarantee fundamental human rights (freedom of expression, women’s rights, freedom of religion).

Turkey has frozen relations with the European Union in the second half of 2012 during the Cypriot Presidency and the Commission responded by emphasizing the need to respect the Presidency, so the European institutions. In May 2012 **Positive Agenda** intended to bring fresh dynamics into the EU-Turkey relations was launched. In June 25th, an agreement in principle for reopening of negotiations was reached at the European Council thanks to France's more favorite attitude.

On the 28th June 2013 Germany, the Netherlands and Austria refused further negotiations by criticizing the violent repression of demonstrations in Istanbul. Member States have decided to wait for the report of the Commission in October 2013 for the reopening of negotiations. EU and Turkey opened Chapter 22 „Regional Policy” of the accession talks in November 2013, which ended a three-year freeze mainly due to Turkey’s long-standing dispute with Cyprus.<fnref n="1" />

The **Turkish public opinion is less favorable** given the slow pace of accession negotiations. The Turkish government plays increasingly important role of a **regional power in the Middle East**. It is getting closer to the Turkic states of Central Asia and the **Shanghai Organization** (Russia, China) without, however, considering its membership at the moment.

### FYROM

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has a population of 2.1 million inhabitants and an area of 25,713 km2. Its fertility rate is 1.6 and does not allow the renewal of generations. The population will decrease in 2025. The Albanian minority represents a quarter of the population. GDP in terms of purchasing power standard per capita is 36% of that of the EU. Corruption is important.

FYROM signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union in April 9th, 2001. The problems of the Albanian minority were settled by the Ohrid Framework Agreement (August 2001) which set the groundwork for improving their rights and presence in institutions. The European

<footnote n="1">¹ EU calls for more chapters in accession talks with Turkey, in
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-11/09/c_125675332.htm</footnote>
Council of 16th December 2005 decided to grant the status of candidate country.<fnref n="1" /> The **Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations in October 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013.**<fnref n="2" /> The dispute with Greece over the name Macedonia delays the opening of accession talks despite the arbitration attempts of the UN. The Commission Reports in 2009-2013 state that the **FYROM fulfills the political criteria for membership.** The 2012-2013 report notes that the country still faces **several challenges** such as freedom of expression, rule of law, ethnic relations, electoral reform, reform of public administration, strengthening the market economy and good neighborly relations.

## MONTENEGRO

It is the least populated Balkan country with 600,000 inhabitants and an area of 13,812 km<fnref n="2" />. Fertility is 1, 9 and population growth is expected in 2025. GDP per capita in purchasing power standard is equal to 43% of that of the EU. Corruption is high. In 2006 Montenegro is declared independent from Serbia by a referendum. In October 2007 a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU was signed and had been implemented since May 2009. In December 2008 Montenegro applied for EU membership and the **candidate status was granted in December 2010. Accession negotiations started in June 29th, 2012.**

The Progress Reports of the Commission of 2012-2013 emphasized the need to make further efforts **to improve the rule of law and fight against organized crime and corruption.**<fnref n="3" /> The Commission complains about the attitude of Montenegro who enjoys the Visa liberalization granted to the Western Balkan countries to grant visas improperly in order to facilitate requests for political asylum in the EU.

## SERBIA

Serbia has a population of 7.3 million inhabitants and an area of 77 474 km<fnref n="2" />. The fertility rate is 1.4 and the population is estimated to 6.8 million in 2025. The GDP per capita in purchasing power standard is 35% and it is the weakest one among the EU candidate countries. Corruption is a major problem.

Serbia is firmly committed to joining the EU with the election of a pro-European President Boris Tadic in 2004 and the success of parties supporting the European rapprochement in parliamentary elections in 2008. Cooperation of Serbia with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was decisive with the arrests of Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Gorad Hadzik accused of genocide and crimes against humanity. Election of nationalist **Nikolic Tomislav** as the President of Serbia in March 20th, 2012 against Boris Tadic has not challenged the European orientation of Serbian politics.

Serbia applied for the candidate status in December 22nd, 2008 and was granted it in March 1st, 2012. The opening of accession negotiations is mainly due to the agreement with Kosovo signed in April 19th, 2013 and approved by the Serbian Parliament in April 26th. The 15-point agreement has seven points related to Kosovo law applicable to the whole territory. Kosovo has granted **large autonomy** to its northern part with mainly Serb population. The European Council of June 2013 authorized the opening of negotiations which really started in January 2014.<fnref n="4" />

## ICELAND

Iceland has a population of 320,000 inhabitants and an area of 103,125 km<fnref n="2" />. The fertility rate is 2.2 and the number of people is expected to grow in 2025, despite a negative net migration rate. The GDP per capita in purchasing power standard is 110 compared to the EU. This is by far the least corrupt candidate country. Iceland belongs to the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Schengen area.

<footnote n="1">¹FYROM in http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/fyrom/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="2">²Progress Reports in http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/fyrom/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³Montengro in http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/fyrom/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴Serbia in http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/fyrom/index_en.htm</footnote>
Iceland was the **victim of a major financial crisis in July 2008**. This has forced the Parliament to adopt in July 16th, 2009 a resolution supporting a candidate application for accession to the EU. The government formally applied for EU membership in July 27th, 2009 and the European Council of 16th – 17th July 2010 decided to open negotiations that started in October 2012. The 2012 report of the Commission stated that „the European Union would be enriched by the robust democratic reputation of Iceland.” The negotiations have progressed well since half of the chapters have been opened and ten are closed. The main obstacle to negotiations is the issue of fisheries. The economic and financial situation has improved after the dark 2008 and 2009 years where the GDP fell by 18.9% and 15.8% respectively. This resulted in a shift of public opinion and politicians’ vis-à-vis the European Union. The negotiations were suspended in mid-January 2013 at the initiative of Iceland. The parliamentary elections of April 27, 2013 were won by the two centre-right opposition parties with the Eurosceptic Gunnlaugsson, the leader of the Progressive Party. The negotiations were suspended permanently in June 14th by the new right-wing government. In September 12th, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson **declared** **suspension of negotiations during all legislative session.**

## 2) POTENTIAL CANDIDATE COUNTRIES

Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential candidates because of the EU commitments of the European Union towards the Western Balkans.

Albania submitted its application in April 25th, 2009. The General Affairs Council imposes meeting of 12 key priorities in the areas of democracy and the rule of law. The government has adopted with the help of the Commission an action plan addressing the 12 key priorities the achievement of which is imperative for a “candidate country” status. In June 12th, 2006, Albania signed a Stabilization and Association agreement which entered into force in April 1st, 2009.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is undermined by political instability. Therefore it requires the presence of a High Representative of the UN, an EU Military mission (EUFOR/Althea) and an EU Police Mission (EUPM). Corruption is widespread. Its symbol is the arrest of the President of the Bosniak-Croat Federation Zivko Budimir in April 26th, 2013 who has since been released by decision of the Constitutional Court. The economy is in crisis and the underground economy is booming. Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a Stabilization and Association agreement in June 2008.

Kosovo declared its independence in February 17th, 2008 and was recognized by 99 countries including 22 EU members. The country is plagued by corruption which is inside the top of the state. The protection of the Serbian minority should be ensured. The situation is getting clearer since the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo was signed in April 19th, 2013. Instability in the country requires the maintenance of KFOR (a NATO-led international peacekeeping force) and the EU Rule of law mission (EULEX) in charge of strengthening the rule of law and training of police, justice and customs staff. The Commission recommended to start negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement in June 2008, but **they have actually started only in October 28th 2013.<fnref n="1" />**

## 3) CONSEQUENCES OF FUTURE ENLARGEMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union will undergo significant enlargement with the accession of Iceland, the Western Balkans and possibly Turkey. By 2030 it could comprise more than 36 member states, including one with an 80 million population (Turkey) and seven with less than 4 million inhabitants. Its population may reach 600 million of citizens.

The questions over the EU governance will arise again. The rotation of Commissioners will be no longer appropriate given that a majority of member countries have small populations. The distribution of the number of parliamentary representatives between the Member States should be reviewed with the need to set up lower thresholds for the less populous Member States.

<footnote n="1">¹ EU starts the Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations with Kosovo
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-938_en.htm</footnote>