# How much is the Source Mismatch an Important Problem for Deepfake Detection? *

Antoine Mallet, Rémi Cogranne, Minoru Kuribayashi, Arthur Méreur

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Antoine Mallet, Rémi Cogranne, Minoru Kuribayashi, Arthur Méreur. How much is the Source Mismatch an Important Problem for Deepfake Detection? *. APSIPA Transactions on Signal and Information Processing, In press, pp.18. hal-05016500

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# How much is the Source Mismatch an Important Problem for Deepfake Detection ? *

Antoine Mallet

Troyes University of Technology – Troyes, France

antoine.mallet@utt.fr

Rémi Cogranne

Troyes University of Technology – Troyes, France

remi.cogranne@utt.fr

ORCID: 0000-0002-4205-4694

Minoru Kuribayashi

Center for Data-driven Science and Artificial Intelligence, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan

kminoru@tohoku.ac.jp

Arthur Méreur

Troyes University of Technology – Troyes, France

arthur.mereur@utt.fr

April 2, 2025

## Abstract

Over the past few decades, AI generative methods have advanced significantly, making it increasingly challenging to distinguish genuine photographs from AI-generated images, sometimes also referred to as deepfakes. In response, numerous deepfake detection methods and models have been developed, achieving high accuracy. However, the evaluation of these detection methods is often limited to a single dataset, which is typically created by generating multiple images using a specific deepfake generation methods and a fixed set of hyperparameters. This dataset is then randomly split into training and testing sets, but such an approach cannot take into account the variations of hyperparameters on deepfake detection performance. This paper addresses the fundamental question of source mismatch, where a model is trained on a specific deepfake generation source (including hyperparameters) and tested on a different one, highlighting the need to investigate the causes and impacts of such a mismatch as well as to develop solutions to this critical issue.

## keywords

Deepfake, Diffusion Model, Generative AI, Source Mismatch, Detection, Distribution-shift, Empirical evaluation, Experimental methods.

## 1 Introduction

The recent advances in the development of artificial intelligence, and especially in the field of computer vision, have made possible the creation of highly realistic images and videos that can deceive naked eyes, even when carefully inspecting such media. In addition, such tools for audio, image or video generation or modifications have also been made available to a very wide audience without specific knowledge [1]. With generative-AI powered tools readily available, it is possible, for instance, to use the latest text-to-image and image-to-image models to generate photorealistic images, or modify an existing photograph. The results are almost indistinguishable from their real-world counterparts, which raised fundamental concerns about their potential misuse, especially to spread disinformation. This concern is now widely shared by political decision-makers, following public reports such as the one from the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) [2]. This awareness among the general public and policymakers is partly explained because, as noted in [3]: “innovations in AI have enabled foreign influence actors to produce seemingly authentic and tailored messaging [...] In fact, we have already seen generative AI being used in the context of foreign elections.”

In response to this growing threat of the use of so-called deepfakes<fnref n="1" />, researchers have been actively developing detection methods and models. These methods aim at distinguishing between genuine photographs from AI-generated content.

<footnote>*This work has been funded by the French ANR PACeS project No. ANR-21-CE39-0002, by the EIG CONCERT-Japan call to the project Detection of fake newS on Social Media pLATfoRms “DISSIMILAR” through grants JPMJSC20C3 (Japan Science and Technology Agency) and by the JSPS KAKENHI (22K19777). Part of the work presented in this paper was conducted while R. Cogranne and A. Mallet were invited at Tohoku University, by Prof. Kuribayashi.</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹the term “deepfakes” refers to a media (sound/image/video) modified or generated by deep learning methods and while the term “fake” can imply a malicious purpose the terms is nowadays used in a broader context. For simplificy, in the present paper we will use the term deepfake for content modified or created by generative AI models regardless of the aim of its creator. However, the work presented in this paper focus on text-to-image diffusion-based generative AI models.</footnote>
Many such detection methods already achieve very high accu-
racy [4–6]. However, the evaluation of these detection methods
is often limited to a specific dataset, which is typically created
by generating multiple images using a specific deepfake gener-
ation method and a fixed set of hyperparameters. This dataset
is then randomly split into training and testing sets. While
such an approach has merits, for instance, it is reproducible
and allows a fair comparison ; it also has some fundamental
limitations. First, such a practical assessment assumes that
the generative AI models are known. Second, it also makes
comparisons difficult because, even for the same generative AI
models, the dataset used in one study can be generated us-
ing specific hyperparameter values, which are often not clearly
precise, making a global benchmarking process almost impossi-
ble. More problematic, this approach hides the possible impact
of intra-model hyperparameter variation on deepfake detection
performance and, in fact, does not allow studying this effect.
Furthermore, a vast majority of deepfake detection methods are
based on advanced deep learning models. While this approach
is generally very efficient, it generally lacks explainability and
interpretability [7], and it depends very much on the training
dataset, which, even in the case of deepfake detection, may be
biased, as pointed out in [8]. Additionally, deep learning meth-
ods are generally facing issues with overfitting of the training
data. This problem has already been identified in [9] which ex-
plored the related challenge of deepfake attribution as a simple
yet effective tool to improve deepfake detection. As pointed
in [10], this tends to increase reproducibility issues and at least
partially explains why, generally, performances under labora-
tory conditions do not reflect the actual accuracy observed by
forensic practitioners in real-life applications.

This *source mismatch* problem was identified in machine
learning and is referred to as covariance shift [11] dataset
shift [12] or, more generally, distribution shift [13]. However,
the aforementioned elements show that in media forensic anal-
ysis one deals with a slightly different problem of both cross-
model generalization as well as intra-model variations which
makes the definition of classes uneasy.

This limitation is closely related to the so-called problem of
Cover source mismatch (CSM) in hidden information detec-
tion [14]. While it has been long recognized as a major barrier
for moving hidden information detection from laboratories into
the real world [15], only recently the origin of the CSM has
been clearly identified and comprehensively evaluated [16, 17].
Deepfake content identification and hidden information detec-
tion also share the common characteristics that it is aimed at
detecting a rather very weak signal in a complex media. It is
known that, in such a context, a small change in the dataset
can lead to a very important loss in terms of detection accuracy
or can simply make the evaluations of detection algorithms ir-
relevant. In steganalysis, source mismatch occurs when the
training set is created using a specific steganographic algorithm
and a very specific source of images, which is characterized by
acquisition settings, such as the camera model and the ISO ex-
posure/sensitivity, and the image processing process, including
demosaicking, denoising, sharpening, etc. Generally speaking,

the problem of hidden information is much easier when the
*source of media* is known and hence the training and the test-
ing set are from the same source. On the opposite, it is hardly
possible to detect advanced data hiding methods when *image
sources* are unknown, in which case the training set is neces-
sary from a different source than the (unknown) one used in
the testing set.

Similarly, in the context of deepfake detection, source mis-
match can occur when a model is trained on a specific deepfake
generation source (including hyperparameters) and tested on
a different one. As discussed in the next section 2 generaliza-
tion over different generation model has been pointed out in
the literature. However, intra-model hyperparameter effects on
detection performance has been seldom studied in the field of
deepfake detection. This is even more surprising considering
that, in a real-world scenario, it is hardly possible to assume
that the potential source of deepfake (the generative AI models
and all its hyperparameters) is perfectly known. While assum-
ing that the source is known can be justified in the field of
hidden information by Kerchoffs' principle [18] that one wants
to evaluate the security of data hiding algorithms, such an anal-
ogy does not hold in deepfake detection. As a consequence, the
study of causes, impacts and potential solutions to the problem
of source mismatch in deepfake detection is urgently needed.

This paper aims to address this knowledge gap by investigat-
ing the problem of source mismatch in deepfake detection. The
main contribution of our study is to propose a thorough and sys-
tematic assessment of all possible causes of source mismatch on
deepfake detection. As a second contribution, we present a few
solutions to prevent the source mismatch and evaluate their rel-
evance throughout numerical experiments. Our study is based
on the largest dataset collected for deepfake detection, which,
upon acceptance of the paper, we will make available to the
scientific community. We strongly believe that our work pro-
vides a solid and comprehensive study of the source mismatch
problem in deepfake detection and will contribute to further
development in this direction. Last but not least, the present
paper focuses on digital images and diffusion-based generative
AI models but the issues we study also hold true for other types
of media, such as video and audio deepfakes.
However, we shall also acknowledge that the present paper focus
on the state-of-the-art diffusion-based text-to-image generative
AI model all that the findings presented in this paper may not
generalize to other forms of deepfakes.

The present paper is organized as follows. First Section 2 briefly surveys the state of the art on deepfake detection and presents the cover-source mismatch in steganalysis. We especially point out the limitations of prior works in terms of the lack of consideration for the source mismatch problem in deep-fake detection. This section also proposes an introductory example to emphasize the potential impact of the source mismatch problem in deepfake detection and the needs for the present study. Section 3 briefly recalls the principle of diffusion-based generative-AI models in order to explain the role of the hyperparameters included in the present analysis of the causes of the source mismatch problems in deepfake detection. Section 4
presents the setup of the methodology used in the present empirical study. We detail the list of generative AI models used, the different hyperparameters considered in this study as well as the deepfake detection approaches used. The numerical results are presented and discussed in Section 5. In this section the impact on deepfake detection performance of each parameter of a diffusion-based text-to-image generative AI model is empirically analysed. Each subsection of Section 5 focus on one specific component or parameters of generative AI models. Then section 6 presents three solutions to mitigate the source-mismatch problem and improve the detection performance in the cases of potentially multiple different sources of deepfakes. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper by summarizing the lesson of the present study and drawing potential future research directions.

## 2 State-of-the-art and Position of the Present Paper

The existing literature on deepfake detection has seen significant advancements in recent years.

The paper presented by Rössler [19] marked one of the first milestones: it presents a large dataset of collected deepfake face images and evaluated several methods from the image forensics community, including models for steganography signal detection and CNN-based face swapping and replacement methods. This paper showed that simple classifiers could detect deepfakes generated by the same model. Similarly, it has been shown in [20] that simple classifiers can detect images created by an image translation network [21],

Alternatively, DeepfakeHop [22, 23] proposed an improved facial landmark detection method using an effective unsupervised feature selection method based on DFT for the detection of upsampling artefacts. However, their study was limited to examples of GAN-based detectors directly available from reference codes.

A majority of prior works on deepfake detection rely on deep learning methods; Mandelli et al. [24], for instance, proposed an ensemble of five "orthogonally trained" EfficientNet-B4 networks, each trained on different datasets that include content, postprocessing, and GAN-based generative-AI images. The authors developed a patch aggregation strategy that classifies an image as a deepfake if at least one of the orthogonal classifiers labels it as such. However, it is worth noting that their study only examined the robustness of their detector to JPEG compression, which was later addressed in a follow-up paper [25].

Other notable studies include PatchForensics [26], which developed a fully convolutional classifier based on local patches with limited receptive fields over an XceptionNet backbone. Liu et al. [27] proposed a detector that exploits the inconsistency between real and fake images in the representations of learned noise patterns, combining spatial and frequency information to improve classification. While interesting, this work typically does not consider the generalizations of the detection and presents results over similar training and testing datasets.

LGrad [28] worked on extracting gradients through a pretrained CNN model to filter out image content and transform a data-dependent problem into a transformation-model dependent problem. Their study focused on explainable detection using a gradient Class Activation Map (gradCAM), but did not address the source mismatch problem.

Ojha et al. [29] proposed a simple classifier working on pretrained Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP) features, trained on a large dataset of real and synthetic images. Interestingly, their study showed that most existing methods for detecting fake images from generative models are ineffective against newer breeds of models, and that the resulting classifiers are biased towards detecting fake patterns rather than distinguishing between real and fake images.

While these examples show promising results for deepfake detection, they did not consider the transferability of the detection across different generative AI models, database or image content: their generalization has not been studied. However, the problem of generalization has long been identified as a main issue for the detection of deepfakes.

One of the first work pointing out this problem was carried out by Cozzolino et al. in [30]; they found that forensics classifiers transferred poorly between models. However, the authors also proposed a new representation learning method, based on autoencoders, to improve transfer performance between different generative models.

Similarly, it has been shown in [31] that classifiers often generalize poorly between GAN models. To address this issue, it has been proposed an empirical method called AutoGAN for simulating upsampling artefacts that are commonly found in GAN-based generated images. The authors tested the resulting detection technique on two types of GANs, which limits the study of transferability.

Wang et al. [32] introduced a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) detector for identification of deepfake images based on ResNet50, which has become a reference point in the research community. Their work also introduced a large dataset of images generated by various GAN-based generative AI models (often referred to as LSUN/ProGAN datasets) that has been extensively adopted for model training in subsequent studies. Interestingly, their work also addresses the problem of transferability across different generative models and they proposed a data-augmentation technique to improve the generalization of the proposed deep-learning based detector. While this work marks an important milestone for the study of deepfake detection transferability, it only considers generative models as a whole and ignores all other aspects, such as cross-database transfer, image content and tuning of the generative models, which typically limit significantly the study of the source mismatch problem in deepfake detection.

Building upon this work, Gragnaniello et al. [33] proposed a simple modification to the ResNet50 architecture to preserve better low-level forensic traces. Their approach was also trained and tested on the same dataset used in Wang et al.'s work, showcasing the importance of using the same dataset for model evaluation.
Corvi et al. [34] performed strong augmentation to gain robustness and increase generalization, training their detector on a large dataset of latent diffusion models. Their study included the detection of “image fusion” by averaging the outputs of AI-generative networks, but this was a rather limited exploration of the source mismatch problem.

Last but not least, NPR [35] worked on residual images computed as the difference between the original image and its interpolated version. Their classifier was trained on only 4 classes of the ProGAN dataset and tested on the merging of 5 datasets encompassing 28 generative-AI models, which is an interesting study on source mismatch. However, their paper only presented results on the testing dataset with limited interpretation of the impact and solution for the source mismatch problem.

From the previous brief review of the literature, it seems clear that while the problem of generalization across different generative AI models has long been recognized, it has seldom been studied and generally focused on cross-model transferability. In addition a vast majority of the works that study the problem of generalization in deepfake detection only focus on practical solutions.

Amongst the additional examples, Epstein et al. [36] collect a dataset generated by 14 well-known diffusion models and simulates a real-world learning setting with incremental data from new diffusion models. They find that the classifiers generalize to unseen models, while also observing important loss of performance when the diffusion-model architecture was considered very different.

With a different approach, Ojha & al. [29] and Cozzolino & al. [37] exploits pre-trained models, respectively Vision Transformers (ViT) and Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP), to achieve high generalization across different diffusion models. Following the example of Wang et al. [32] it has more recently also been proposed in Yan et al. [38] to address the problem of generalization using data augmentation approaches to improve detection generalization.

Last but not least, Dogoulis et al. [39] addresses the generalization of detectors in cross-concept scenarios (e.g. when training a detector on human faces and testing over synthetic animal images). They propose an original strategy to address this generalization issue with a resampling strategy that considers image quality scoring for sampling training data to learn a specific and dedicated classifier, which shows superior performance compared to random sampling.

Interestingly, one shall also note that quite a lot of datasets of deepfake media have also been proposed. However these datasets also generally consider one generative AI model as a whole and, generally, do not provide any details on how the images in the dataset were generated. For instance the paper from Wang et al. [32] was associated with a very large dataset of images generated by GAN-based models. However, the paper does not explain precisely how those images were created and how exactly the models were trained, which limits the study of the problem of source transferability in deepfake detection.

More recently, Yan et al. [40] proposed an extensive database of 15 state-of-the-art detectors and gathered 9 deepfake datasets

with the goal of addressing the problem of the lack of a standardized, unified, comprehensive benchmark in deepfake detection. This work also standardized the evaluation metrics and uniformized the data processing pipelines. While this important work facilitates benchmarking, it does not address specifically the difficult issue of generalization even though the dataset can be used for this purpose.

The work proposed by Li et al. [41] addressed the problem of generalization and source mismatch by proposing a so-called continual deepfake detection benchmark (CDDB). Their goal is to address the problem of generalization across different datasets and generative models by proposing a smooth transition between known models to datasets made with unknown generative AI models.

All these examples show that the generalization problem is a well-recognized and difficult problem in deepfake detection. However, the previous brief review of the current art also point out that this problem is not generally considered and when studied, it is with two main limitations: (1) considering generalization cross various generative AI models without and (2) assuming that a generative AI model always produces images of the same kind, ignoring all possible sources of discrepancy that causes a source mismatch. On the opposite, the present paper considers that a diffusion-based generator does not always generate homogenous data and that the detection of the resulting generated image largely depends on the hyperparameters used to generate the media.

From the brief overview of the current art, it is clear that there is an urgent need for a study that analyses how a generative AI model is set and the impact this setting may have on the ensuing detection of deepfake media it generates.

## 2.1 An Introductory Example

In order to highlight the needs for a study on the cause and the assessment of source mismatches in deepfake detection, we have conducted a small-scale introductory experience. We used the detection method as proposed in [34]<fnref n="2" /> as it is one of the recent state-of-the-art reference approaches for the detection of images generated with diffusion-based generative AI. The results are reported in Table 1. First we evaluated the detection accuracy of this method over the five diffusion-based text-to-image generative models used in the present paper, that is, Stable Diffusion XL Turbo, Stable Diffusion 3 medium, Wuerstchen, Kandinsky 2.2 and FLUX.1 Schnell, see details in the Table 3. For comparison, the first row of Table 1 also shows the “true-negative rate” over the ALASKA [42,43] dataset of real images. Then the next row shows the results of each of the text-to-image diffusion-based generative models used in the present paper along with the accuracy when one single part of the generative model is changed. The deepfake detection accuracy as reported in Section 1 corresponds to the “true-positive rate”, also referred to as the recall or the sensitivity. Unsurprisingly, it is obvious from Table 1 that the detection method proposed in [34] achieves

<footnote n="2">²The source-code of the detection method proposed in [34] is available on GitHub on the page of Naples’ University Image Processing Research Group (GRIP).</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 1: Accuracy of the diffusion generative AI model proposed in [34] ; the quantity is the Truth Negative rate for the ALASKA2 dataset [42,43] of genuine photographs and true positive rates for all other generative-AI image datasets.</caption><thead><tr><th>Source</th><th>Accuracy</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ALASKA2 real photographs</td><td>97.80%</td></tr><tr><td>Stable Diffusion XL Turbo</td><td>85.01%</td></tr><tr><td>— with Consistency Decoder VAE</td><td>7.79%</td></tr><tr><td>Stable Diffusion v3</td><td>96.07%</td></tr><tr><td>— with 2 diffusion steps</td><td>16.93%</td></tr><tr><td>Wuerstchen</td><td>85.01%</td></tr><tr><td>— with DDIM noise scheduler</td><td>96.20%</td></tr><tr><td>Kandinsky v2.2</td><td>93.85%</td></tr><tr><td>— with 64 diffusion steps</td><td>7.79%</td></tr><tr><td>FLUX.1 Schnell</td><td>53.81%</td></tr><tr><td>— with Finetuning #1</td><td>63.78%</td></tr><tr><td>— with Finetuning #2</td><td>47.76%</td></tr></tbody></table>

overall excellent results except for FLUX.1 Schnell that was released after the detection method, hence constituting a typical case of generalization cross generative AI models. While this also holds true for Stable Diffusion 3, the detection remains much higher in this latter case. However, one can note that when the generative AI model is changed, the detection accuracy can drop drastically. This is especially true when replacing the Variational AutoEncoder (VAE) from Stable Diffusion XL Turbo and when changing significantly the number of diffusion steps for Stable Diffusion 3 and for Kandinsky 2.2. Surprisingly, modifying Wuerstchen by replacing the noise variance scheduler of the diffusion process actually helps the detector by a rather important margin.

It is difficult from this single experience to draw general conclusions on the impact of each hyperparameter of the diffusion-based generative model of the detection of the resulting image. However, the present introductory example clearly confirms that, on the one hand, the setting of the generator greatly influences the ensuing problem of detection of generated images, hence showcasing that the generalization across different generative AI models is not always sufficient. On the other hand, this example also emphasizes the urgent need for a thorough study to assess the problem of source mismatches in deepfake detection as well as to study the origin of such mismatches.

## 3 Primers on AI-generative Method in Image

Because the present paper studies the impact on deepfake detection of each and every part of state-of-the-art generative AI models, we shall first start by recalling briefly how generative AI models work. To this end, the present section reviews recent advances in AI-generative image models, with a focus on state-of-the-art diffusion-based models.

The timeline of representative studies for text-to-image generation begins with AlignDRAW, released in 2015, which is often considered the first text-to-image generative AI. AlignDRAW extended the DRAW architecture by conditioning it on text sequences, achieving a significant breakthrough in creating images from text prompts, albeit with limited realism and diversity.

In 2016, text-conditional GAN emerged as the first fully end-to-end differential architecture [44], extending from character-level input to pixel-level output. However, GANs produced high-quality images only when trained on small, domain-specific datasets, such as faces [45].

The subsequent development of autoregressive models, such as DALL-E in 2021, captured widespread attention due to their ability to generate complex and realistic images from text prompts, thanks to large-scale training. These models [46, 47] are typically based on a discrete Variational Autoencoder (VAE), an autoregressive decoder-only Transformer, and a CLIP pair of image encoder and text encoder. However, their autoregressive nature leads to high computation costs and sequential error accumulation.

Inspired by non-equilibrium thermodynamics, diffusion models have emerged as the leading method in text-to-image generation. Diffusion Probabilistic Models (DPM) emerged in 2015 [48] ; it is defined in [49] as a parameterized Markov chain trained using variational inference to produce samples matching the data after a finite time. The core of this algorithm involves a forward process that converts a complex data distribution into a simpler one, and then learns the mapping by reversing the diffusion process. Then, score-based generative models (SGM) propose perturbing data with different levels of Gaussian noise and jointly estimating the corresponding scores [50]. SGM generates samples towards decreasing noise levels and trains the model by estimating score functions for noisy data distributions.

The combination of SGM and DPM led to the development of Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Models (DDPMs), a class of Markov chain-based models that generate images from noise through a finite sequence of transformations [49]. During training, the model learns to reverse the process of adding noise to natural images by estimating the noise that was added at each step [51]. This process is illustrated in Figure 1.

As shown in Figure 1 one shall distinguish the joint distribution $p_θ(\mathbf{x}_{0:T})$, so-called the reverse process, from the distribution $q(\mathbf{x}_t|\mathbf{x}_{t-1})$, referred to as the forward process. What distinguishes diffusion models from other types of latent variable models is that the posterior $q(\mathbf{x}_T|\mathbf{x}_0)$, the forward process or diffusion process, is approximated as a Markov chain, which it-
<figure><img src="image_2.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Illustration from [49] of the diffusion process and conditional distribution probability learning during the inference step.</figcaption></figure>

eratively adds Gaussian noise, according to a variance schedule $\beta_1, \dots, \beta_T$, until the content of the input data $\mathbf{x}_0$ is completely obliterated:

$$q(\mathbf{x}_t|\mathbf{x}_{t-1}) = \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{x}_t; \sqrt{1-\beta_t}\mathbf{x}_{t-1}, \beta_t\mathbf{I}).$$

Here $\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_T$ are latents of the same dimensionality as the data $\mathbf{x}_0 \sim q(\mathbf{x}_0)$.

The entire diffusion process then satisfies:

$$q(\mathbf{x}_T|\mathbf{x}_0) = \prod_{t=1}^{T} q(\mathbf{x}_t|\mathbf{x}_{t-1}).$$

The training is carried out by optimizing the log-likelihood ratio between distributions $p$ and $q$:

$$-\sum_{t \ge 1} \log \frac{p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_{t-1}|\mathbf{x}_t)}{q(\mathbf{x}_t|\mathbf{x}_{t-1})}.$$

The reverse process, or the backward diffusion, aims at generating a possible data $p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_0)$ starting from a noisy input drawn from $p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_T)$, thank to the outcome of the training, which learn approximating the reverse process $p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_{t-1}|\mathbf{x}_t)$.

Early experiments with Generative Adversarial Models (GANs) have found that adding a label to the generated images can significantly help create more realistic images as well as improve their quality. This technique, referred to as “classifier guidance”, works by combining the model’s score with the feedback from an image classifier. However, this approach requires training an additional image classifier, whose availability can be an issue. Indeed, in practice, it’s not always easy to find a suitable image classifier, especially since the model is trained on noisy data, which prevents the use of a standard pre-trained classifier. Fortunately, research has shown that it’s possible to achieve similar results without an auxiliary classifier [52]. This novel approach, called classifier-free guidance, uses only the generative model itself to guide the image creation process, eliminating the need for an extra classifier; hence classifier-free guidance can be thought of as classifier guidance without a classifier, as pointed out in [52].

With this short and rather general description of the diffusion-based model for generative AI we can have a clear idea of the main components of such a model and the hyperparameter whose impact on deepfake detection shall be studied. As shown in the Figure 2, the first and foremost is related to the prompt, which is the text input, its tokenization and its embeddings. Then comes the guidance scale and the number of diffusion steps. The scheduler of the noise variance used during

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Illustration of a typical diffusion-model-based generative AI model highlighting the elements studied in the present paper.</figcaption></figure>
each diffusion step can also be changed to analyse its impact. Last but not least, the Variational AutoEncoder (VAE) which is the ultimate step that “decodes” the latent into a rendered image as shown in the Figure 2.

In addition to these hyperparameters of diffusion-based generative text-to-image we have also studied the impact of the more global “finetuning” which consists in retraining a model over a specific dataset with the goal of generating specific content. This, together with the overall impact of the generative model, is studied before we studied in more detail the impact of the hyperparameters.

While the description of diffusion model-based generative image approach, the main parameters which can have an impact on the detection of deepfake can be clearly identified. On one the text tokenizer and embedding method shall be analyzed. Second the diffusion process is generally defined several parameters such as the noise scheduler, the number of diffusion steps and the guidance parameter. Last but not least the last step made of autoencoder can also have an impact on deepfake detection performance. This set of parameters largely defines a generative model and hence their impact shall be studied systematically to assess the problem intra-model cover source mismatch.

# 4 Definitions and Methodology for the Study of Source-Mismatch Problem

As exposed in Section 2.1, the motivation of our study is based upon the observation that even small changes in the generative AI models can dramatically impact the ensuing problem of detection of generated images, so-called deepfakes. However, before analysing, in more detail, the impact of the source mismatch, we need to define what a source is, what exactly the problem of the source mismatch problem is and to measure its importance.

## 4.1 Definition of Concepts

First of all, even though it may seem obvious, we must start by defining the core element studied in the present paper: *deepfakes*.

As its name implies, the term “deepfake” is derived from the combination of “deep”, referring to deep learning, and “fake”.

**Definition 1** (of deepfake). *The term deepfake generally refers to the manipulation of existing media (image, video and/or audio) or generation of new (synthetic) media using deep learning-based approaches [53].*

Despite the word “fake”, which indicates a will to use manipulated or synthesized media for the purpose of disinformation, there exist quite a lot of applications in which the creator is not malicious, such as, for instance, for entertainment, illustration and arts. With this respect, the term “deep synthesis” has been proposed as a more neutral alternative [54]. This new term,

however, has not been widely adopted and in the present paper, the term deepfake is mostly used to refer to text-to-image synthesis using diffusion-based methods.

For the subsequent definitions, we will mostly rely on the prior works [14, 16, 17] that review and study the related problem of cover-source mismatch for the detection of information hidden within digital media, also referred to as steganalysis.

Based on these prior works, we can use the following definition for the source of generated images.

**Definition 2** (of a Source of generated images). *A source of images generated with generative AI models can be defined as a model, its components combined with a set of hyperparameters, including the prompt, as post-generation processing operations. The images generated from a single source can have different content, even for the same prompt; however, they shall carry similar properties, such that they can be identified as a single homogenous set.*

Note that it is not clear what are the properties that allow identifying images as a *source*. It is clear that when using a generative AI model and that all its hyperparameters are fixed, including the prompt, all the generated images come from the same *source*. However, we are aware that our definition is certainly a bit too restrictive but the goal of the present paper is, among others, to clarify what makes a source and what hyperparameters are superficial to define a consistent *source*.

Note that in the proposed definition of a source, we also included the post-generation processing, as this may deeply influence the statistical properties of the ensuing images. For instance, two images generated by the same diffusion-based model with the same hyperparameters but compressed with different JPEG quality factors will be assumed from different sources.

Based on the work presented in [14] we propose the following definition of the source mismatch problem:

**Definition 3** (*source mismatch problem*). *The problem of source mismatch for the detection of deepfake content occurs when a classifier is trained over images from source A and tested over images from a different source B. More precisely, the problem of source mismatch is associated with the decrease in the performance of a classifier trained and tested on different sources.*

This definition of the *source mismatch problem* is much more practical, as it implies that without loss of detection performance there is no problem with *source mismatch*. This relation between the source mismatch and the practical problem it creates on the performance of the detector is fundamental in the operational context but also limits the study on the relation between the hyperparameters and the ensuing properties of generated media.

## 4.2 Methodology for Assessment of Source Mismatch

In order to further study the source mismatch problem in the detection of deepfake images, one needs to define how to measure the impact on the detection accuracy. To this end we will
use a toy example illustrated in Table 2 with two sources of generated media, respectively sources A and B.

**Definition 4** (Source Intrinsic Difficulty). The intrinsic difficulty of detecting content generated by source A is defined as the detection accuracy of a given classifier to identify content generated with source A when both the training and the testing set are generated with source A, hence in the absence of a source mismatch.

In the present paper, we will not focus on the definition of the source of genuine media, that is, digital photographs in the case of images. Therefore, we assume that the classifier is trained to distinguish deepfakes from photographs using a specific set of photographs and that the intrinsic difficulty typically corresponds to the false-negative rate. Of course, the set of genuine media used to distinguish those created by the generative AI models does impact the intrinsic difficulty but this aspect falls outside the scope of the present paper, which focuses on the definition of the source of deepfake.

The problem of source mismatch in deepfake detection can be assessed by measuring the loss of performance when the training is carried out a different dataset:

**Definition 5** (Source Inconsistency). The inconsistency between sources A and B appears when one trains a classifier over source A while it is later tested later over source. In this situation one will obtain a different detection accuracy as compared to one obtained when training on source B. Generally speaking, this can be seen as a lack of generalization of the classification rule.

The toy example reported in Table 2 shows via a practical example these notions of intrinsic difficulty and source inconsistency. The row corresponds to the detection error rate obtained when training over the sources A and B. On the opposite, columns report the detection error rate when testing over sources A and B. The elements on the diagonal correspond to the cases where both the training and testing are carried out over the same source, hence the absence of a mismatch. Therefore, the detection performance reported on the diagonal corresponds to the intrinsic difficulty. On the opposite, the out-of-diagonal elements correspond to the cases in which the source mismatch occurs. While the Table 2 is a fictional illustration, note the asymmetry of the impact of the source mismatch problem: when testing over source B, the mismatch increases the detection error rate by only 3%, compared to the intrinsic difficulty. On the opposite, when testing over source A, a mismatch creates a much higher increase of the detection error from 20%, in the matched case, hence the intrinsic difficulty, to 33% in the presence of the source mismatch problem. Such phenomena are often seen in real cases, as we shall observe in Section 5.

In practice, the present paper uses the minimal error rate under equal prior, which is defined concretely as the mean of the false positive and false-negative rates. For each experiment, the decision threshold is computed to minimize the error rate. The reason for this choice is to avoid measuring artificially high loss in terms of detection accuracy only because of a poorly chosen

<table><caption>Table 2: An illustrative example for defining qualitatively the metric that assesses both “intrinsic difficulty” (when using the same source for training and testing) and “inconsistency” (difference when using different training and testing sources), here the prediction error is measured by the average error rate.</caption><thead><tr><th>Testing / Training</th><th>Source A</th><th>Source B</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Source A</th><td>0.2</td><td>0.38</td></tr><tr><th>Source B</th><td>0.33</td><td>0.35</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 3: List of text-to-image generative AI based on diffusion used in the present paper along with their source.</caption><thead><tr><th>Name</th><th>URL / Source</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="2">Diffusion Transformer models</td></tr><tr><td>FLUX.1 schnell</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr><tr><td>Stable Diffusion 3</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">Diffusion models</td></tr><tr><td>Kandinsky v2.2</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr><tr><td>Stable Diffusion XL-Turbo</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr><tr><td>Wuerstchen</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">Finetuning from Stable XL Turbo</td></tr><tr><td>lcm-LoRa SDXL Turbo</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr><tr><td>Fire Generation</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr><tr><td>DreamBooth</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr><tr><td>SDXL Turbo DPO LoRA</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">Finetuning from FLUX.1 Schnell</td></tr><tr><td>Miniature people</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr><tr><td>Studiopellosh</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr><tr><td>flux-schnell-realism</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr><tr><td>flux-schnell-lora</td><td>HuggingFace</td></tr></tbody></table>

detection threshold. In other words, when training and testing over images from different sources, the detection threshold shall be adjusted to measure the inconsistency more precisely.

# 5 Numerical Results and Analysis

## 5.1 Common Core of All Experiences

In our experimentation we generated between 12.000 and 15.000 for each generative AI model and hyperparameter settings, among which 2.000 were used for testing and evaluation of the detection accuracy and the remaining 10,000 images were used for training. This number was large enough to train a specific classifier for all the models we used for detection and we did not observe any convergence issues with our classifiers. We generated images of size 512 × 512 pixels in colour, but all the experiments were made on grayscale images of size 128 × 128 otherwise must have results reported almost detection, which limits the analysis of the findings.

Note that the results presented in the present paper were
obtained using EfficientNetv2 and Dual Vision Transformers (DaViT) because these are interestingly representative of deep learning architecture, CNN for EfficientNetv2 and Transformers-based for DaViT, and because prior works show that they are amongst the most accurate [55]. The results we obtained were always consistent with those two models; hence our choice to limit the presentation to only one of those two models in a vast majority of the cases.

Regarding the classification, all models we used were obtained from the `timm` library [56] from which we loaded pretrained model over the imagined dataset, as it has been shown to greatly improve training convergence in hidden information detection. To further speed up the training, we used a curriculum training strategy with the following approach : first, the models were trained for 5 epochs on grayscale images of size 512 × 512 and coming from all the *source* used in the present paper. The learning rate (LR) was divided by 2 after each epoch. The resulting pretrained models were used as a starting point for all the experiments ; this second training was carried out using a decreasing learning rate following stochastic gradient descent with warm restarts (SGDR) [57–59]. Given the fact that each classifier is trained over one source of deepfake only, we used “only” 35 epochs. The initial value of the learning rate was obtained using the method initially proposed in [60]. In brief, it essentially consists of a 1-cycle training of the deep-learning method over so-called mini-batches : the learning rate is gradually increased, at each mini-batch, from a very low initial value to a final high value. Throughout this process, the loss is measured at each iteration in order to find the largest value, with a margin value before the loss begins to diverge.

The learning rate scheduler is thus based on this initial guess and then slowing decreased over one cycle to a nominal value of $10^{-5}$. The initial cycle length is set to 5, it is doubled for every cycle and the initial learning rate is divided by two after each cycle. We used three cycles for a total of 35 epochs, which has been found largely enough in our numerical experimentations.

Another important factor that we noticed in the importance of data augmenting to prevent overfitting of the model and ensure a better generalization even though testing and training sets were generated in the very same manner ; they are, in fact, a random split from the same dataset. This fact has also been reported in [61, 62]. In our case we carried out data augmentation by adding the following operation : mirroring, flipping along x-axis and y-axis, Gaussian i.i.d. noise addition (with standard deviation between 0.05 and 0.15), multiplicative noise addition (with factors between 0.975 and 1.025) resizing (with rescaling factor between 0.95 and 1.05) and rotation (with angles between -5 and 5 degrees). Each operation was applied independently, using the Albumentations library, and with a probability $p = 0.25$ for each. While each operation within the overall data augmentation process does not modify the image significantly, and, from a quick search, we did not find interest in applying more important operations, we have found that these processing were enough to greatly improve the testing accuracy.

<table><caption>Table 4: Inconsistency and intrinsic difficulty of different diffusion-based generative AI models. Classification error rate and obtained with Dual Vision Transformer -DaViT- model.</caption><thead><tr><th>Testing<br>Training</th><th>FLUX.1-schnell</th><th>Stable Diffusion 3</th><th>SD XL Turbo</th><th>Wuerstchen</th><th>Kandinsky 2.2</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>FLUX.1-schnell</th><td>1.43%</td><td>5.09%</td><td>16.08%</td><td>7.09%</td><td>5.28%</td></tr><tr><th>Stable Diffusion 3</th><td>6.88%</td><td>2.35%</td><td>11.48%</td><td>5.19%</td><td>5.64%</td></tr><tr><th>SD XL Turbo</th><td>16.19%</td><td>25.47%</td><td>0.93%</td><td>18.03%</td><td>17.68%</td></tr><tr><th>Wuerstchen</th><td>12.50%</td><td>14.41%</td><td>10.41%</td><td>0.98%</td><td>13.11%</td></tr><tr><th>Kandinsky 2.2</th><td>10.70%</td><td>10.64%</td><td>19.64%</td><td>8.79%</td><td>1.78%</td></tr></tbody></table>

## 5.2 Impact of Generative-AI Models

We are now ready to study the source mismatch problem in deepfake detection. The first experience we carried out is reported in Tables 4 and 5. The former has been obtained with DaViT detection model, while the latter has been obtained with Efficient Net v2. It consists in a coarse grain assessment of source mismatch between different generative AI models. First of all, one can observe the general very low detection error rate over all the generative AI models. Second, as noted in the toy example presented in Table 2, note the asymmetry in the intrinsic difficulty. This is especially obvious for the Wuerstchen generative model. Indeed, training on this model creates a very high inconsistency when testing on all other models. In comparison, testing on Wuerstchen causes a much smaller source mismatch problem. Also, note the specificity of Stable Diffusion XL Turbo, which is always the cause of an important inconsistency.

Overall, the results presented in Tables 4 and 5 show a generally important source mismatch problem when switching from one generative model to another with rather important inconsistency as compared to the very low intrinsic difficulties. While this result is not very much surprising, as it is in the line of the observation presented in prior works, see for instance [20,31,36], it will serve as a basis for the assessment of the source-mismatch problem.

## 5.3 Impact of Finetuning

In direct line with the first experiment, the second set of results we present concerns the impact of the fine-tuning of a generative AI model. To this end, Table 6 shows the intrinsic difficulty and the inconsistencies between FLUX.1 schnell and four of the many available fine-tuning versions that are available on HuggingFace's website. Surprisingly, one can note a relatively low inconsistency, while we carefully selected fine-tuning that generates photograph-like images of very different kinds (see Table 3 and the reference therein). We observed similar results with fine-tuning versions of Stable Diffusion XL Turbo.
<table><caption>Table 5: Inconsistency and intrinsic difficulty of different diffusion-based generative AI models. Classification error rate and obtained with EfficientNetv2 small.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>FLUX.1-schnell</th><th>Stable Diffusion 3</th><th>SD XL Turbo</th><th>Wuerstchen</th><th>Kandinsky 2.2</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>FLUX.1-schnell</th><td>0.91%</td><td>4.83%</td><td>23.18%</td><td>9.09%</td><td>5.43%</td></tr><tr><th>Stable Diffusion 3</th><td>5.63%</td><td>1.51%</td><td>16.69%</td><td>4.60%</td><td>6.27%</td></tr><tr><th>SD XL Turbo</th><td>18.73%</td><td>31.76%</td><td>1.29%</td><td>23.30%</td><td>24.05%</td></tr><tr><th>Wuerstchen</th><td>16.12%</td><td>18.87%</td><td>22.21%</td><td>0.61%</td><td>16.69%</td></tr><tr><th>Kandinsky 2.2</th><td>9.13%</td><td>9.57%</td><td>21.78%</td><td>6.40%</td><td>1.26%</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 6: Inconsistency and intrinsic difficulty of different fine-tuning versions of the same generative AI, namely FLUX.1-schnell. Classification error rate and obtained with Dual Vision Transformer -DaViT- model.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>FLUX.1-schnell</th><th>Finetuning #1</th><th>Finetuning #2</th><th>Finetuning #3</th><th>Finetuning #4</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>FLUX.1-schnell</th><td>0.91%</td><td>4.44%</td><td>3.42%</td><td>2.23%</td><td>2.52%</td></tr><tr><th>Finetuning #1</th><td>2.79%</td><td>1.35%</td><td>2.21%</td><td>2.97%</td><td>3.37%</td></tr><tr><th>Finetuning #2</th><td>2.43%</td><td>2.18%</td><td>0.93%</td><td>2.90%</td><td>3.18%</td></tr><tr><th>Finetuning #3</th><td>2.61%</td><td>2.80%</td><td>3.75%</td><td>0.98%</td><td>1.81%</td></tr><tr><th>Finetuning #4</th><td>3.12%</td><td>3.51%</td><td>2.72%</td><td>1.63%</td><td>0.78%</td></tr></tbody></table>

From these results we can conclude that fine-tuning does have an impact on the source mismatch problem but a rather limited one.

## 5.4 Impact of Prompts and Text Embeddings

The first step of all generative AI models is to encode the text input by the user, so called the prompt. How the prompt is turned into embedding is the first component whose impact on the source mismatch problem can be studied. However, it is difficult to modify slightly this process and, therefore, we propose to change this part with different elements. In the results provided in Table 7 we contrast the detection error obtained when training on Wuerstchen and the inconsistency with several variations of the text to embeddings process. We first tried generating images with the same prompt to measure the impact of different prompts. Then we propose using OpenAI's CLIP tokenizer<fnref n="3" />. We replaced the original T5 encoder with T5-xxl which is supposedly close to the original one. Eventually, we re-

<table><caption>Table 7: Inconsistency and intrinsic difficulty of different versions of text embedding for Wuerstchen. Classification error rate and obtained with Dual Vision Transformer -DaViT- model.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Wuerstchen</th><th>Single prompt</th><th>with CLIP tokenizer</th><th>with T5xxl</th><th>CLIP model with projection</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Testing</th><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><th>Training</th><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><th>Wuerstchen</th><td>0.98%</td><td>0.98%</td><td>1.14%</td><td>1.35%</td><td>1.06%</td></tr></tbody></table>

place the text encoder with "CLIPTextModelWithProjection" as used in Stable Diffusion 3. Note that we have tried different experiments, but the results presented in Table 7 reflect the general results we obtained.

Unsurprisingly, the change of the prompt and its encoder have almost no impact on the source mismatch problem. This is not a surprise because this step is the very first and it is expected that changes at the very beginning of the generative process have less influence on the image produced in the end.

## 5.5 Impact of Guidance Scale and Number of Diffusion Steps

The main step in any diffusion-based generative model is the diffusion itself. As explained in Section 3, during inference there is a very small number of hyperparameters that can be changed. Table 8 and 9 present the inconsistency created when changing the number of diffusion steps and the guidance scale. In both cases the classifier was trained in the "median case", that is, a guidance scale of 3 and 12 diffusion steps for Stable Diffusion 3 and a guidance scale of 1.5 and 8 diffusion steps for Stable Diffusion XL Turbo.

The first Table 8 seems to point out that these two hyperparameters have a limited impact on the ensuing mismatch problem even in extreme cases.

On the opposite, the second Table 8 shows that the number of diffusion steps can have an important impact on the source mismatch problem. We would like to acknowledge that in our numerical results this conclusion only holds for a Stable Diffusion XL Turbo. For all the other generative models, the guidance scale and the number of diffusion jointly have a very limited impact on the source mismatch problem, even for FLUX.1 schnell, which is also able to generate images with a very small number of diffusion steps. We can only conclude from these divergent results that the hyperparameters guidance scale and number of diffusion steps can have a significant impact, although this does not seem to hold true in the majority of cases in our experiments.

<footnote n="3">³CLIPtokenizer is available on HuggingFace Hub.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 8: Inconsistency and intrinsic difficulty for different guidance scales and number of diffusion steps for Stable Diffusion 3. Classification error rate and obtained with Dual Vision Transformer -DaViT- model.</caption><thead><tr><th>Diffusion steps</th><th>2</th><th>4</th><th>8</th><th>12</th><th>16</th><th>32</th><th>64</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>0.5</th><td>3.49%</td><td>2.55%</td><td>2.38%</td><td>2.32%</td><td>2.49%</td><td>2.53%</td><td>3.33%</td></tr><tr><th>1</th><td>3.40%</td><td>2.48%</td><td>2.34%</td><td>2.31%</td><td>2.44%</td><td>2.48%</td><td>3.27%</td></tr><tr><th>2</th><td>3.33%</td><td>2.44%</td><td>2.31%</td><td>2.34%</td><td>2.41%</td><td>2.50%</td><td>3.22%</td></tr><tr><th>3</th><td>3.31%</td><td>2.44%</td><td>2.36%</td><td>2.43%</td><td>2.57%</td><td>3.27%</td><td>3.92%</td></tr><tr><th>4</th><td>3.42%</td><td>2.76%</td><td>2.57%</td><td>2.60%</td><td>2.65%</td><td>2.69%</td><td>4.12%</td></tr><tr><th>8</th><td>3.88%</td><td>3.18%</td><td>3.01%</td><td>2.98%</td><td>2.99%</td><td>3.03%</td><td>4.64%</td></tr><tr><th>16</th><td>4.55%</td><td>3.91%</td><td>3.69%</td><td>3.75%</td><td>3.80%</td><td>3.77%</td><td>4.97%</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 9: Inconsistency and intrinsic difficulty for different guidance scales and number of diffusion steps for Stable Diffusion XL Turbo. Classification error rate and obtained with Efficient Net v2.</caption><thead><tr><th>Diffusion steps</th><th>1</th><th>2</th><th>4</th><th>8</th><th>12</th><th>16</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>0</th><td>13.37%</td><td>13.14%</td><td>6.93%</td><td>2.33%</td><td>1.73%</td><td>1.37%</td><td>1.83%</td></tr><tr><th>0.5</th><td>12.84%</td><td>12.67%</td><td>6.84%</td><td>2.31%</td><td>1.80%</td><td>1.31%</td><td>1.85%</td></tr><tr><th>1</th><td>11.90%</td><td>11.46%</td><td>6.30%</td><td>2.32%</td><td>1.86%</td><td>1.30%</td><td>1.76%</td></tr><tr><th>1.5</th><td>11.61%</td><td>11.25%</td><td>6.02%</td><td>2.40%</td><td>1.87%</td><td>1.29%</td><td>1.85%</td></tr><tr><th>2</th><td>11.21%</td><td>11.15%</td><td>6.03%</td><td>2.36%</td><td>1.85%</td><td>1.26%</td><td>1.77%</td></tr><tr><th>3</th><td>11.34%</td><td>11.20%</td><td>6.13%</td><td>2.33%</td><td>1.89%</td><td>1.34%</td><td>1.76%</td></tr><tr><th>4</th><td>11.45%</td><td>11.21%</td><td>6.16%</td><td>2.36%</td><td>1.86%</td><td>1.37%</td><td>1.88%</td></tr></tbody></table>

## 5.6 Impact of Noise Scheduler

The other main hyperparameter of the diffusion process is the scheduler of the noise variance. The results presented in the Table 10 and 11 show the impact on the source mismatch problem when changing the noise variance scheduler algorithm. While it was shown in the previous Section 5.5 that the guidance scale can heavily impact the source mismatch, it seems that the noise variance scheduler has an overall limited impact. Interestingly, the case that creates the most mismatch problem is when changing the scheduler from Stable Diffusion XL Turbo to the one from Stable Diffusion 3 and vice versa. On the opposite, the other scheduler for the noise variance, name https://github.com/Jordach/comfy-consistency-vae, the Denoising Diffusion Implicit Models (DDIM) scheduler [63], Euler Scheduler [64] and the Trajectory Consistency Distillation (TCD) scheduler [65] all have a very limited effect on the mismatch problem.

## 5.7 Impact of Variational Autoencoder (VAE)

The very last element whose impact on the source mismatch problem is studied is the variational autoencoder (VAE) that is used at the end of the diffusion process to turn the latent into a digital image. Surprisingly, Table 12 shows that this last

<table><caption>Table 10: Inconsistency due to changes in the noise scheduler for Stable Diffusion 3 with Dual Vision Transformer -DaViT- model.</caption><thead><tr><th>Stable Diffusion 3</th><th>DDIM scheduler</th><th>Euler scheduler</th><th>TCD scheduler</th><th>Scheduler from Kandinsky 2.2</th><th>Scheduler from Wuerstchen</th><th>Scheduler from Stable XL Turbo</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2.35%</td><td>5.87%</td><td>2.78%</td><td>3.13%</td><td>3.20%</td><td>2.35%</td><td>2.77%</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>Table 11: Inconsistency due to changes in the noise scheduler for Stable Diffusion XL Turbo with Dual Vision Transformer 32 DaViT- model.</caption><thead><tr><th>Stable Diffusion XL Turbo</th><th>DDIM scheduler</th><th>Euler scheduler</th><th>TCD scheduler</th><th>Scheduler from Kandinsky 2.2</th><th>Scheduler from Wuerstchen</th><th>Scheduler from Stable 3</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0.93%</td><td>5.80%</td><td>1.10%</td><td>3.81%</td><td>1.06%</td><td>0.81%</td><td>4.11%</td></tr></tbody></table>

element has a limited effect on the source mismatch problem, while it is expected that the ultimate step to have the greatest impact. However, this is not always the case and Table 13, on the opposite, tends to point out that this element can have a rather important impact on the source mismatch problem. Here again it seems difficult to draw a general conclusion: we can only state that the impact of the VAE can be major is in some cases.

## 5.8 Impact of Post-Generation Image Processing Operations

Last but not least, we wanted to highlight the impact of the post-generation processing operation on the source mismatch problem. Indeed, images are often processed before being sent; for instance, they can be compressed or resized when posted on social networks. We have identified 10 common image processing operations and evaluated the inconsistencies they create. Those are JPEG compression with different standard quality
<table><caption>Table 12: Inconsistency due to changes in the Variational Autoencoder (VAE) for the Kandinsky diffusion model and with EfficientNet v2small model.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="2">Kandinsky 2.2</th><th colspan="2">Autoencoder with KL Loss (AKL) 1.5</th><th colspan="2">Autoencoder with KL Loss (AKL) 2</th><th colspan="2">Consistency Decoder</th><th colspan="2">VAE from Pixart-α</th><th colspan="2">VAE from SD 2.1</th><th colspan="2">VAE from SD Turbo</th><th colspan="2">SD1.4 EMA fine-tuned VAE</th><th colspan="2">SD1.4 MSE fine-tuned VAE</th><th colspan="2">SDXL fine-tuned VAE</th><th colspan="2">Tiny AutoEncoder for SD</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Kandinsky 2.2</th><td>1.26%</td><td>1.41%</td><td>1.40%</td><td>1.33%</td><td>1.39%</td><td>1.42%</td><td>1.37%</td><td>1.37%</td><td>1.37%</td><td>1.37%</td><td>1.42%</td><td>1.37%</td><td>1.37%</td><td>1.40%</td><td>1.33%</td><td>1.43%</td><td>1.44%</td><td>1.43%</td><td>1.44%</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Table 13: Inconsistency due to changes in the Variational Autoencoder (VAE) for Stable Diffusion XL Turbo model and with EfficientNet v2small model.</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Stable Diffusion XL Turbo</th><th>Autoencoder with KL Loss (AKL) 1.5</th><th>Autoencoder with KL Loss (AKL) 2</th><th>Consistency Decoder</th><th>VAE from Kandinsky 2.2</th><th>VAE from Pixart-α</th><th>VAE from SD 2.1</th><th>VAE from SD Turbo</th><th>SD1.4 EMA fine-tuned VAE</th><th>SD1.4 MSE fine-tuned VAE</th><th>SDXL fine-tuned VAE</th><th>Tiny AutoEncoder for SD</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Stable Diffusion XL Turbo</th><td>1.29%</td><td>12.91%</td><td>16.84%</td><td>24.17%</td><td>13.44%</td><td>17.84%</td><td>13.42%</td><td>13.47%</td><td>17.65%</td><td>13.32%</td><td>2.14%</td><td>21.08%</td></tr></tbody></table>
factors, Upsampling and Downsampling using Lanczos resam-
pling kernels, denoising, sharpening and a combination of de-
noising then sharpening. The results reported in the Table 14
show that, unsurprisingly, the post-processing operation can
create a major source mismatch problem with inconsistency
that can be higher than 20%. This is rather consistent with
prior works, see for instance [24, 25, 32], and rather expected,
since, as already explained, the last operations are expected to
have a larger impact on the inconsistency between sources.

6 First Steps Towards Mitigating the
Impact of Source Mismatch

Before concluding the present study, we wanted to evaluate two
common strategies for mitigating the source mismatch problem
in deepfake detection. The first one, referred to as “Holystic”,
consists in training a classifier over images generated by all pos-
sible sources. It is expected that a classifier trained over diverse
datasets will have higher robustness and, at least, can general-
ize better over the sources that are close to those included in the
training set. The second method, referred to as the “atomistic”
approach, consists in training a multi-class classifier, which is
used to identify the source with which the deepfake may have
been the most likely generated and then apply a binary clas-
sifier trained to distinguish this specific source from genuine
photographs.

Last but not least, we included a third approach proposed
in [66] and the latter used in [67] which is similar to the atom-
istic approach. First a multi-class classifier is trained to identify
the source of the inspected images. Then we used the aggregate
the results from all binary classifiers but weighted them accord-
ing to the “soft output” of the multi-class classifier. In other
words, instead of using one binary classifier, we use them all,
while giving more importance to the sources that the multi-
class classifier considers to be the most likely. While several
weighting functions are studied in [66], the finding of the best
aggregation strategy falls outside the scope of the present paper
and we simply apply a softmax function to the soft-output of the
multi-class classifier and weight the output of the binary classi-
fier accordingly. This approach is referred to as “weighted” in
Tables 15 and 16.

Interestingly, these two tables show that the three strategies
for mitigating the source mismatch problem are very efficient.
However, it shall be acknowledged that these results are some-
what obtained by eliminating the source mismatch problem, as
all sources are now included in the training set. However, we
observe a general slightly higher generalization capability when
training over various sources but when the testing of a source
that is completely absent from the training set the mismatch
problem generally remains.

One can also note that the “weighted” strategy proposed in
[66] and [67] gave the best overall results.

7 Conclusions and Possible Future Works

The present paper proposes the first study on the cause and
the impact of the source mismatch in the field of deepfake de-
tection. We first review the state-of-the-art emphasizing the
lack and understanding of the source mismatch or even its lack
of consideration in the numerical results, which are generally
presented in match conditions between testing and testing sets.

Based on prior works in the field of hidden information de-
tection, we propose definitions for the source and the source
mismatch problem. In order to assess the problem in practi-
cal cases and compare the impact of the different elements, we
adjusted the definitions for the source intrinsic difficulty and
source inconsistency.

Equipped with those definitions and focusing on the latest
diffusion-based generative AI models, we systematically assess
the impact of each element, from text tokenization to the post-
generation image processing operations.

Last but not least, we study the relevance of three methods
for mitigating the problem of source mismatch in deepfake de-
tection. We demonstrate that when including as many sources
as possible in the training set and using an adapted classifica-
tion method, this problem can be largely overcome. However,
the problem of Out-of-Distribution source inspection remains
largely open.

This leads us to acknowledge that a lot of different works are
needed and that this paper is a first study of this problem, ad-
mittedly innovative and with interesting results, but nonethe-
less a first step. For instance additional works are required
to understand the key characteristics that make deepfakes eas-
ily detectable and the impact of the source mismatch problem
with regard to these characteristics. Additional works are also
required to improve the generalization of deepfake detection
methods to Out-of-Distribution sources.

Our work also focus on image coded as grayscale and it would
be interesting to assess similarly the impact of intra-model vari-
ation of hyperparameter on deepfake detection for other format
such as text, audio and video or color images.

All in all, we believe that the present paper is a cornerstone
in the study of the source mismatch problem for the detection
of deepfakes and will undoubtedly be a source of future works.

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