# Development Aid and Migration Control through Entrepreneurship: Anatomy of a Public Action Model in the Gambia and Senegal

*Aide au développement et lutte contre la migration par l'entrepreneuriat.*

*Anatomie d'un modèle d'action publique en Gambie et au Sénégal*

*Ayuda al desarrollo y lucha contra la migración a través del emprendimiento.*

*Anatomía de un modelo de acción pública en Gambia y Senegal*

Audrey Lenoël and Christina Oelgemöller

Translator: Audrey Lenoël and Christina Oelgemöller

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**Electronic version**

URL: https://journals.openedition.org/remi/28332

DOI: 10.4000/15ara

ISSN: 1777-5418

**This article is a translation of:**

Aide au développement et lutte contre la migration par l'entrepreneuriat. Anatomie d'un modèle d'action publique en Gambie et au Sénégal - URL : https://journals.openedition.org/remi/27363 [fr]

**Publisher**

Université de Poitiers

**Printed version**

Date of publication: December 31, 2024

ISBN: 978-23-81940-28-1

ISSN: 0765-0752

**Electronic reference**

Audrey Lenoël and Christina Oelgemöller, "Development Aid and Migration Control through Entrepreneurship: Anatomy of a Public Action Model in the Gambia and Senegal", *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* [Online], vol. 40 - n°4 | 2024, Online since 01 November 2025, connection on 09 December 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/remi/28332; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/15ara

This text was automatically generated on December 9, 2025.

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The text only may be used under licence CC BY 4.0. All other elements (illustrations, imported files) may be subject to specific use terms.
# Development Aid and Migration Control through Entrepreneurship: Anatomy of a Public Action Model in the Gambia and Senegal

*Aide au développement et lutte contre la migration par l'entrepreneuriat.*

*Anatomie d'un modèle d'action publique en Gambie et au Sénégal.*

*Ayuda al desarrollo y lucha contra la migración a través del emprendimiento.*

*Anatomía de un modelo de acción pública en Gambia y Senegal.*

Audrey Lenoël and Christina Oelgemöller

Translation: Audrey Lenoël and Christina Oelgemöller

<footnote n="1">1. *"Tekki Fii - Make it here"*, "Support programme for reducing migration through rural job creation in Senegal"¹ and "Support programme for reducing rural emigration and for reintegration"² are some of the flagship programmes financed in Senegal and The Gambia by the European Union's Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) following the "migration crisis" in 2015. They reflect how the link between migration and development has been approached in recent years by European players: by promoting vocational training, local employment (particularly in agriculture), and private sector development, they aim to curb migration (to Europe). Similar to information campaigns on migration (Cassarini et al., 2024) aimed at "potential migrants" (Oelgemöller, 2023), the projects funded under the EUTF claim to "increase economic opportunities and employment prospects" in order to stabilise and sedentarise populations, in contradiction with the local culture of mobility (Bredeloup, 2017; Dimé, 2021).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2. In this article, we highlight the transformation of the meaning attributed to entrepreneurship, a concept generally associated with notions of risk-taking and innovation. More recently, this concept has been used to encourage populations deemed deviant to engage in self-employment and deter them from migrating. We</footnote>
argue that the quasi-messianic status assigned to entrepreneurial spirit is seen as a
remedy that inherently carries a fundamental contradiction: migration in many ways
represent the ultimate mechanism for innovation and risk-taking, however with these
programmes migrants are discouraged from risk-taking to remain at home and engage
their labour in a limited range of economic activities identified by European-funded
projects. We aim to explore how those in the development aid sector, who have so far
been on the fringes of migration management, have (or have not) adopted and
implemented this discourse in their activities.

3 Indeed, a plausible narrative—albeit weakly supported by empirical data (Clemens and Postel, 2018)—of a causal link between employment, local development, and reduced aspirations to migrate has taken hold in official development assistance (ODA) institutions otherwise imbued with the paradigm of private sector development, entrepreneurial rhetoric and managerial ideology (Aguillon, 2018; Bierschenk and Muñoz, 2021; Chapus et al., 2021). While the objective of fixing populations in Africa is at the origins of ODA (Bakewell, 2008), the EUTF represented a crucial step in its use for the political purposes of managing flows of people. The scale of funding devoted to addressing the “root causes of migration” through employment and training has contributed to the transformation of European and bilateral interventions, as well as to the redefinition of development priorities and their on-the-ground implementation.

4 Besides shedding light on the complex relationships between aid and migration practitioners, this article seeks to problematise the “objective reality” according to which entrepreneurship, rather than mobility, is the way to achieve this “happy life at home”, and to examine how this vision has been promoted in and by the development industry, and to what effect. Beyond a simple narrative, we question the extent to which a new “travelling model” (Olivier de Sardan, 2021) has been imposed on ODA professionals in recent years. This concept, developed by Rottenburg and colleagues (Behrends et al., 2014; Rottenburg, 2009), refers to standardised social engineering interventions typical of the development industry. Olivier de Sardan (2021: 26) explains that these models are “deliberate, purposeful, planned, formalised interventions, and not simply ideas or techniques that circulate spontaneously [...]”. According to Behrends et al. (2014: 1-2), “[a] model can be understood essentially as an analytical representation of particular aspects of reality created as an apparatus or protocol for interventions in order to shape this reality for certain purposes”. It crystallises out of circumstances situated and enacted in a specific context (Behrends et al., 2014; Olivier de Sardan, 2021). It is a way of representing particular aspects of reality that is accompanied by a prescription for intervention likely to bring about a change of order (Behrends et al., 2014). In our case, we are interested in entrepreneurship as such a model that has travelled both in time and space.

5 Indeed, the entrepreneurial rhetoric is accompanied by a prescription for a profound change in the social order. Entrepreneurship is a model, a guide to being in the world and to how individuals relate to it. This model, significant in European thought since the Middle Ages, was disseminated worldwide with the advent of capitalism. As Landström (1999) demonstrates, the concept of entrepreneurship and its defining ethos have evolved over time. Associated with risk-taking until the eighteenth century, the entrepreneurial spirit evolved towards managing uncertainty. Schumpeter (1947) reconceptualised the entrepreneur as a person capable of innovating and breaking down barriers through innovations. Today, entrepreneurship is celebrated as a means
of upward social mobility, a driver of innovation, and a vehicle for job creation and economic growth, while also being seen as a response to the integration of “deviant” populations and the problems of unemployment and economic stagnation. The travelling model considered here also sees it as a solution for settling populations. For most practitioners, including politicians and other decision-makers, entrepreneurship primarily refers to private enterprise and self-employment. Criticised as a “new catechism” (Mbembe, 2022), entrepreneurship is now taught from primary school (Huber et al., 2014) to higher education (Oosterbeek et al., 2010), through to specific labour market programmes (Fairlie et al., 2015), all over the world.

6 Landström (1999) observes that much current research and practice reduces the idea of entrepreneurship to something simplistic and devoid of complexity. This is precisely what happens to travelling models and what makes them so attractive and useful across places and spaces of practice. They are malleable and adaptable. How entrepreneurship is utilised, at least according to our observations in Senegal and The Gambia, is limited to short interventions in the form of training in writing CVs or drafting business plans, possibly accompanied by brief courses in financial management and local legal requirements, and occasionally financial support. These courses are designed for individuals who were sent back from European countries or those considered on the path to Europe, as well as “potential migrants” (i.e., unskilled young men) (Oelgemöller, 2023). What the slogans and glossy communications do not say is that Europe is spending millions via the EUTF to keep people in Africa.

7 The EUTF has been the subject of numerous studies, notably concerning its significance in terms of the governance of migration at European level (Spijkerboer, 2022; Welfens and Bonjour, 2023; Zaun and Nantermoz, 2023) or its role in securing borders in Africa (Boyer et al., 2020; Norman and Micinski, 2023). Interventions in the field of employment and training have also been subject of various studies, some of which have sought to find out how they affect their beneficiaries' aspirations to migrate (Bah et al., 2023), while others have shown that they can be perceived as exacerbating inequalities, benefiting only those with “long arms” and inserted in specific networks (Zingari et al., 2023). We propose here to contribute to the literature questioning the significance of the EUTF in the evolution of the complex relationships between the development and migration industries, both of which are heavily dependent on European funding, by highlighting its role in formalising a travelling model at the crossroads of the two worlds. Through the study of these interventions, we aim to demonstrate how Africa is transformed into a laboratory for this type of model, not in a directly oppressive manner, but rather in the sense described by Tilley (2013) as an ambivalent imposition, fraught with weaknesses and contradictions.

8 To explore these issues, we adopt a “bottom-up” perspective (“par le bas”) (Boyer et al., 2020; Olivier de Sardan, 2021) exploring the views of actors midway between policymakers and programme beneficiaries, namely development industry actors responsible for implementing EUTF-funded training and employment programmes in Senegal and The Gambia. Geographically and culturally intertwined, these countries present an interesting case study due to their high financial dependence on international migration and, to a lesser extent, on Official Development Assistance (ODA).³ Methodologically, we will draw on approximately forty interviews conducted between July 2020 and February 2021⁴ by the authors and two local research assistants⁵ as part of the MIGCHOICE project,⁶ involving representatives of European cooperation
agencies, international organisations (IOs), European delegations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and some Gambian and Senegalese government officials. The staff of the development agencies included international employees and a few locals, many of whom moved back and forth between development agencies and NGOs, often with extensive experience working in Africa and some insight into the evolution of the development world. Here, we focus our analysis on how the “developers” perceived and reacted to the introduction of migration into their traditional fields of action. A documentary analysis of the programmes implemented under the EUTF’s economic development objective, along with their evaluations, as well as the communication tools (press releases, videos) developed by the European Commission, is also used to understand the contours of the model better.

9

In the first part, we review how vocational training and support for entrepreneurship have been incorporated into cooperation policies since the 1960s, as well as the gradual inclusion of ODA in European migration management strategies. The characteristics of the training and employment interventions implemented under the EUTF in Senegal and The Gambia, as well as the ‘travelling model’ they promote, are then examined. Finally, we examine the discourses and practices of field actors regarding the EUTF, specifically their level of adherence to the underlying principles and the discrepancies between official objectives and actual implementation.

# Stabilising Populations through Training and Employment: The Beginnings of a Travelling Model

## Strengthening the Private Sector, Entrepreneurship and Training since Independence

10

Since its beginnings in the 1960s, the world of ODA has been characterised by travelling models and various “buzzwords”—expressions popular at a given time—which play a crucial role in formulating problems and defining solutions (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). Support for the private sector, and more specifically the promotion of self-employment and entrepreneurship (and its various sectoral variations, such as innovative, digital or social entrepreneurship), has gradually become an integral part of the rhetoric and programmes of the main ODA donors since the 1980s, particularly in Africa (Chapus et al., 2021).

11

During the post-independence period (1960-1970), the state emerged as the primary player in implementing structural and sectoral policies aimed at achieving economic independence for countries. During this period, collective rather than individual projects were favoured (Tiquet, 2019). However, it was with the Washington Consensus and structural adjustment policies (1980-1990) that the concept of entrepreneurship truly gained prominence. From that time onwards, there was talk of profoundly transforming individuals by instilling in them an entrepreneurial ethos, a rhetoric that remains prevalent today among many development actors. This led to a proliferation of initiatives, particularly by NGOs, aimed at promoting self-employment and private enterprise.

12

During the “post-Washington Consensus” period (late 1990s and early 2000s), entrepreneurs were given greater prominence, both as agents of development that
went beyond the purely economic dimension and for their own sake. (Micro)Entrepreneurship has come to be seen as a universal model for addressing a range of social problems (Chapus *et al.*, 2021), including “irregular” emigration (Pian, 2014). Under the presidency of Abdoulaye Wade (2000-2012), Senegal established various programmes to support the creation and consolidation of microenterprises (Baumann, 2016: 220, citing World Bank, 2007), particularly through youth funds such as the *Fonds national de promotion de la jeunesse* (FNPJ).

13 In the current period of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and adaptation to the challenges of the 21st century, youth entrepreneurship is seen as a method of stimulating economic development and reducing poverty in contexts of weakly industrialised and poorly diversified economies, labour markets dominated by informality, self-employment, and high rates of unemployment and underemployment (Boyer and Guénard, 2014). A heroisation of the entrepreneur is at work, particularly in its most visible categories, such as so-called “innovative” entrepreneurs (development of “African tech”) (Chapus *et al.*, 2021) or “agri-preneurs”.⁷

14 While development interventions have historically been underpinned by a sedentary bias (Bakewell, 2008), this has not been a conscious and stated objective of ODA, and the primary aim of these employment programmes has been to reduce unemployment and poverty. It is only relatively recently that they have become a central tool of migration governance, and the EUTF has played a decisive role in this respect.

## Towards Using ODA for Migration Governance of the European Union

15 In the wake of independence in Africa, former colonies maintained close exchange and mobility relations with their colonial powers (Fall, 2016; Kebbeh, 2013), until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when European countries began formulating and subsequently implementing migration management (Oelgemöller, 2017). Later, neighbourhood policies replaced the previous relatively open agreements with a mix of incentives, aimed at the diaspora (Dedieu, 2018), and dissuasive measures, intended to curb emigration and encourage returns (Aguillon, 2018). Thus, while the early 2000s witnessed the active securitisation of migration in Europe, it was at this time that the connection between migration management and development aid was affirmed, especially in response to widespread criticism of a European approach based solely on control and repression, which was deemed both ineffective and inconsistent with European values (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008). In 2002, following the Seville Summit, European countries explicitly made ODA conditional on the cooperation of third countries in combating irregular immigration (Aguillon, 2018). In 2005, the Global Approach to Migration, adopted by the European Council, proposed strengthening the partnership between countries of origin, transit and destination on “the management of legal migration, the prevention and reduction of illegal migration, and the relationship between migration and development” (EUROPA, 2008: 1, quoted by Kabbanji, 2013: 417). In 2006, the Euro-African dialogue on migration and development (Rabat Process) recognised the limits of a purely security-based approach to migration management and referred to the need for concerted action on the root causes of migration, in particular through the implementation of development projects (Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, 2006: 2, cited by Kabbanji 2013: 417). This was followed by the Joint Declaration on Migration and
Development of the ACP-EU Council in June 2010, and the subsequent adoption by the European Commission of a new framework for migration partnerships aimed at concluding agreements linking migration policies with other areas of EU competence, including development aid, trade, energy and security (Zanker, 2019).

16 In November 2015, a new stage was reached at the Africa-EU Summit in Valletta, held in response to the “migration crisis” that affected Europe that same year and caused multiple legitimacy crises for the EU (Welfens and Bonjour, 2023). The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (EUTF) was then established. Endowed with €4.9 billion in 2020 (compared with only €1.9 billion when it was launched), the framework was extended until the end of 2021, with programmes financed under this framework continuing until 2025. The creation of this fund represents a key step in the process of externalisation of EU migration policy in several respects. Firstly, it confirms the political use of a large proportion of EU ODA (Boyer et al., 2023; La Cimade, 2020; Welfens and Bonjour, 2023). Around 80% of the European funds contributing to the EUTF originated from the European Development Fund and the Development Cooperation Instrument (Welfens and Bonjour, 2023). The EUTF has enabled European states to utilise international organisations (IOs) and development agencies to implement the objectives of European migration policy in Africa and the Middle East (Spijkerboer, 2022). Indeed, only these organisations—UN agencies, national cooperation agencies, and international NGOs—could apply for and receive these funds, using them for projects on the ground. National actors were merely partners or subcontractors of these organisations (Boyer et al., 2020). By delegating the implementation of these activities in this way, the EU uses these organisations to legitimise its external migration policy through the respectability of the UN system and the legitimacy of development (Spijkerboer, 2022).

17 The EUTF also represents a significant milestone in the relationship between the EU and the development sector, due to the substantial amounts allocated and the competitive award procedures. Having been designed as a flexible instrument to respond to crisis situations, it has been exempted from the standard public procurement procedures to which development actors are accustomed, allowing projects to be launched quickly (Spijkerboer, 2022; Zardo, 2020). In this context, opaque allocation and lobbying practices on the part of potential partners have been reported (Spijkerboer, 2022), and funds have often been distributed to the same partners, namely international organisations (IOs) and cooperation agencies, which have then subcontracted certain activities to NGOs.⁸

18 The funds allocated in countries such as Senegal and The Gambia were mainly allocated under the EUTF's objective of increasing economic opportunities and employment prospects to support skills development and job creation, particularly for young people and vulnerable groups. Of the approximately €170 million committed under the EUTF in Senegal, more than half (54%, or €92.4 million) was for projects under this objective (four out of the ten projects in Senegal), while in The Gambia nearly all the budget (90%) was devoted to this objective, i.e. €34.6 million out of the €38.5 million committed (three out of four projects).⁹

19 Many ODA actors have benefited from EUTF funding through programmes financed by this objective and have thus played a key role in implementing European policy in The Gambia and Senegal. For many of them, this objective—along with strengthening
community resilience—was the most compatible with their missions and past activities, and therefore the one that entailed the least reputational risk, particularly for NGOs (Szent-Ivanyi, 2021). Moreover, as previously mentioned, this objective is consistent with the paradigm of private sector development and entrepreneurial rhetoric that has characterised ODA for several years (Bierschenk and Muñoz, 2021), and its implementation has helped to promote the travelling model at the intersection of development aid and migration management.

## Training and Entrepreneurship to Prevent Migration: The Development of a Travelling Model

20

Like campaigns aimed at raising awareness of the risks associated with irregular migration (Cassarini et al., 2024; Dimé, 2021), which are often organised alongside training and entrepreneurship support initiatives, the projects we are examining here seek to establish a new model of social success that is not reliant on emigration. Yet, this imposed model contradicts the local culture, which values mobility and the often-embellished tales of ‘adventurers’ who have faced dangers to seek a better life elsewhere. (Louis, 2013; Bredeloup, 2017). Furthermore, the institutional promotion of the concept of success at home must align with the portrayal of the migrant as a driver of development in their community of origin, which the governments of both the countries of departure and destination, as well as cooperation agencies and NGOs, have been advocating for decades. (Naudé et al., 2017). Indeed, since the 1980s, governments have introduced diaspora policies and supported migrant or development organisations whose activities tend to strengthen a model of development through emigration. (Dedieu, 2018). In France, for example, various initiatives have encouraged basic and vocational training for immigrants to enhance their integration since the 1960s and to facilitate their return to their countries of origin from the 1970s (Ibid.). The migrant entrepreneur occupies a central role in diaspora policies, both because of their potential for investment at home, job creation, and knowledge transfer, as well as the supposedly more effective managerial practices acquired in so-called “developed” countries. Interventions aimed at influencing the decision not to migrate are largely based on this rhetoric, but they now serve an ideal of success “at home”, which risks appearing to contradict past policies. The characteristics of this new hero can be observed in the official communication of international actors, specifically.

## EUTF Projects and their Theories of Change

21

A travelling model is always based on a mechanism (or operating theory), namely, “a system of causality on which experts base the postulated effectiveness of the model” (Olivier de Sardan, 2021: 33-34). This often straightforward mechanism is implemented through social engineering utilising several devices, specifically the fundamental technical and organisational components that make it operational. Analysing action sheets that guide programmes—i.e., their general descriptions of how they propose to achieve the objectives of the EUTF—provides insight into the contours of this mechanism. Action sheets, presented in narrative form rather than as logical framework matrices, vary in detail and include the context, intervention logic, lessons learned from similar activities, stakeholders, mechanisms, and expected results. The
schemes range from vocational training (ARCHIPELAGO) to capacity building and facilitating access to finance for self-employment (Développer l'emploi, PASPED, Youth Empowerment Project), as well as the development of agricultural farms (PACERSEN) and the construction of hydro-agricultural works and facilities (PARERBA). Most programmes offer a combination of these schemes. Ultimately, the proposed activities are often very similar in Senegal and The Gambia.¹⁰ An analysis of these descriptions reveals common features.

22 These projects share common targets. The aim is to intervene in geographical areas viewed as particularly susceptible to irregular migratory flows, even if these are not necessarily the regions with the highest rates of youth unemployment (La Cimade, 2020). However, this criterion has led to a shift in activities towards areas that were previously largely overlooked by public authorities.¹¹ The main aim is to target—within a questionable operational logic—returning migrants on one hand and “potential migrants” on the other. The latter category, which, in the absence of an official definition, remains a target with uncertain boundaries (Oelgemöller, 2023), is a key category of the EUTF that permeates the discourse of all players, even when they openly reject or mock it. In practice, potential migrants are defined as all young people aged eighteen and thirty-five who lack opportunities (Ibid.), a sufficiently broad target that has allowed many organisations to expand existing youth programmes.

23 The rationale behind these EUTF programmes funded under the objective of increasing economic opportunities and employment prospects is to establish a causal link between improving young people's local socio-economic prospects and reducing their aspirations to migrate internationally. One European official describes it as follows:

> "In Senegal, we have [...] cohorts of around 300,000 young people entering the job market every year and a job market that cannot absorb all these human resources [...]. So what we're trying to do [...] is to develop vocational training, which can include support for entrepreneurship in sectors, trades or niches that seem promising for the Senegalese economy. And the link with migration is quite simply that, by creating alternatives and prospects in the regions of Senegal, we can get people who would otherwise only have the prospect of migrating irregularly to do the maths, and tell themselves that by training and having support to develop their activities, perhaps the future can be better in Senegal and there are opportunities to be seized in Senegal."¹²

24 These “alternatives”, as described by this interviewee, are primarily presented as aligned with national development policies—the *Plan Sénégal Émergent* (2014-2023) and the Gambia National Development Plan (2018-2021)—despite the fact that governments have been relegated to the role of mere partners in these projects. These interventions often aim to address the “real” needs of the labour market. They also emphasise training in technical skills and, most importantly, soft skills through short courses (lasting a few weeks or months) and the financing of infrastructure. They propose to influence people’s perceptions, particularly by raising awareness of the dangers of migration and the potential for achieving success at home. An action sheet from a programme in The Gambia outlines the profound cultural change to which it seeks to contribute:

> "The proposed action aims to improve economic development and future prospects for The Gambia's youth, including returning and/or potential migrants by promoting attractive employment and income opportunities, and to support the Government in its attempt to nurture perception shift for the Gambian population moving away from a 'future through migration' to a 'future in The New Gambia'."¹³
25

As these programmes also advocate a “return to the land” by focusing on agricultural and livestock activities, awareness-raising activities also emphasise the value of agricultural work in a context of widespread disaffection among young people for this type of work. An EUTF programme officer explains that, in addition to agricultural development activities, her organisation runs an awareness-raising campaign aimed at young people, delivering a very clear message:

> "Return to the land as a source of pride, stop seeing the land and your work as a farmer as the work of your ancestors, which is a temporary job, linked to the seasons, the rains, and so on. But to see themselves more and more as entrepreneurs."¹⁴

26

Ultimately, the concept of empowerment through work and individual responsibility lies at the heart of these social engineering campaigns. A programme manager in The Gambia explained that the term “empowerment” had replaced “employment” in the name of the scheme he was supervising because taking charge of one’s destiny and creating opportunities for Gambian people themselves was central to what they wanted to promote in this project.¹⁵

## Seeking the Legitimacy of the Model: The Role of Storytelling and Research in the Absence of Evidence

27

The EUTF was established in response to what was presented as an emergency, i.e., to address the root causes of migration in Africa, following the Syrian crisis, and it has allocated significant resources to projects, many of which already existed.¹⁶ The deployment of these programmes was not preceded by pilot phases whose evaluation would have allowed for an assessment of their effectiveness in reducing, if not the flow of emigration, at least the aspirations to migrate. The project descriptions, especially in the EUTF Action Sheets, often failed to clearly define the connection between the provision of economic opportunities and migratory aspirations. Additionally, questions of mobility were sometimes overlooked until after the projects had commenced¹⁷. According to those tasked with implementing these programmes, the interventions relied more on prejudice than on evidence.

28

While most projects have been completed and evaluated, their results in reducing migration remain unknown, and this dimension is often not even addressed. In its global audit report on the EUTF, the European Court of Auditors notes that the EUTF “has contributed to the effort of decreasing the number of irregular migrants passing from Africa to Europe, but this contribution cannot be measured precisely”¹⁸ and that its objectives are too general to measure the impact efficiently.¹⁹ Zaun and Nanternoz (2023) refer to the EUTF’s pseudo-causal “root causes” narrative, based on unproven or even disproven causal links, which is nonetheless adopted due to its plausible and convincing nature, as well as its previous use in EU external migration policies. In many respects, the effectiveness of the EUTF’s actions regarding its stated objectives seems to be secondary. Indeed, several people we spoke to believed that the main aim was to show the European public that their governments were taking action to address the “migration crisis”.²⁰ Similar to the production of knowledge and expertise regarding migration policies in Europe, if the knowledge generated through the EUTF’s monitoring and evaluation mechanisms has not conclusively demonstrated the effectiveness of the programmes in reducing migration, it has nonetheless legitimised the policies and programmes implemented in the eyes of the EU’s partners and Member
States. This has also promoted greater integration of migration issues into its
development policies (Welfens and Bonjour, 2023). However, despite this empirical
weakness, the legitimisation of the model underlying these interventions remains
crucial and has been accomplished in various ways.

29

As noted by Olivier de Sardan (2021), the first stage in the process of creating a
travelling model generally involves crafting it into a narrative through edifying stories.
The large budgets allocated for communication within projects funded by the EUTF in
Senegal and The Gambia were used to promote the figure of the sedentary
entrepreneur. This has been extensively developed in the communication tools of the
EUTF itself, as well as in institutions such as the IOM and various cooperation agencies.
The press releases issued by these institutions contain numerous flattering portrayals
of young individuals who have abandoned their plans to emigrate (typically after one
or more unsuccessful attempts) to develop their businesses at home, thanks to the
programmes provided by the institutions that showcase them (Black et al., 2022).
However, storytelling extends far beyond these tools, as the concept of success in the
country—particularly through entrepreneurship—encapsulated in the slogan “Tekki
fii”, is promoted through various “artistic” productions (songs, visual arts) showcased
during awareness campaigns, testimonials on social networks, and even an eponymous
web series²¹ designed to reach a broad audience (Dimé, 2021). As Dimé (2021) observes,
the underlying narrative of these productions reflects a dual theme of disenchantment
with mobility (highlighted through the dramatisation of “clandestine emigration”) and
the enchantment of immobility (primarily expressed through fictions about local
success and the development of an entrepreneurial ethos).

30

While these communication products and programme evaluations play a role in
legitimising the interventions linking employment, training and the reduction of
migration, they fall short of establishing a model that can be applied to various
contexts as part of evidence-based policies. Demonstrating the effectiveness of the
various programmes in terms of the objective of reducing irregular emigration flows,
therefore, remains a priority for the EU and the institutions implementing similar
programmes. This may seem difficult given the academic consensus that a higher level
of development does not generally go hand in hand with a reduction in migration and
often, on the contrary, provides the economic and social capital needed to leave
(de Haas, 2005). Aware of this limitation, the European Commission set a new policy
objective for the EUTF in its mid-term review: to produce data and draw lessons from
its interventions (European Commission/GDSI, 2020: 9, cited by Welfens and Bonjour,
2023: 962). Academic research has been solicited by the EU and international
cooperation organisations to examine the types of interventions implemented as part
of EUTF projects through studies designed to assess their impact, particularly in the
areas of employment and training. Quantitative analysis methods are emphasised,
especially Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs), which are highly regarded in the
development field (Olivier de Sardan, 2021). These impact studies and research projects
have notably concentrated on employment-related interventions, as shown in the
study by Bah et al. (2023). Conducted in The Gambia among 3,641 young men, it
proposed an experiment designed to evaluate the effects of three approaches aimed at
reducing irregular migration: providing better information and testimonies about the
risks of travel, facilitating migration to a safer destination by offering information and
assistance for migration to Dakar, and providing vocational training to enhance
national employment opportunities. While the researchers observed a slight effect of
vocational training on reducing intentions to migrate, they also note that:

"Vocational training may broaden future employment opportunities in the country, or simply delay migration to Europe while individuals undergo training and, in the longer term, make it easier for them to find employment abroad." (Bah et al., 2023:16)

31 The effectiveness of these programmes therefore remains a matter of caution. In the field, this scepticism is paired with a pragmatic approach among professionals who are accustomed to adapting to the funding trends of the moment.

Development Actors and the New « Model »: Between
Scepticism, Opportunism and Passive Resistance

32 The creation of the EUTF was a significant event for development actors in Africa. An NGO manager recalls:

"It was as if a beacon had been lit on this 'issue' [migration] [...] whether it was governments, NGOs or agencies, they sprang up because, with international attention, there was a lot of funding available."²²

33 The decision to apply for this funding was a hotly debated issue. While some have decided against it, others have tolerated unconvincing rhetoric that creates contradictions and perverse effects in the field.

An Unpersuasive Rhetoric

34 The EUTF's underlying narrative, which positions local development as a deterrent to emigration, contradicts scientific research on this topic. At the European level, Zaun and Nantermoz (2023) have demonstrated that the need to reconcile migration and development policy agendas, along with the contrasting views of Member States on the appropriate response to the migration "crisis", accounts for the adoption of this narrative by various political actors involved in its formulation and implementation Fund. The challenge was less about convincing people of the veracity of the link and more about securing the support of diverse stakeholders. Among these, development actors hold a central position. While they may not be specialists in migration issues, they are often experts in their respective fields and are accustomed to the influence of trends in their professional environment.

35 When asked about the connection between migration and development, our interviewees shared insights on the complex factors driving the decision to leave and how development is related to this phenomenon. Firstly, they exhibit a sophisticated understanding of the complex dimensions of migration and agree that focusing solely on economic factors to restrict departures is ineffective. In this context, the model advocated by the EUTF is regarded as simplistic.²³ Family factors, cultural influences (particularly the value attributed to travel as a rite of passage to adulthood in certain communities), structural issues (such as the challenges in accessing land), and the lack of services and infrastructure in people's places of origin, along with the allure of city life, are also recognised as elements influencing the decision to leave (again).²⁴ Regarding the possibility of retaining populations through training and employment, this is considered unrealistic. One of the development actors we spoke to remarked, for example, that the model proposed by the EUTF amounted to a significant paradox:
> "When you train people in a trade, they go and do it where it's lucrative. But if you don't train them in any trade, they have nothing to sell, so they don't move around as much."²⁵

36

Similarly, others questioned the narrative put forward by the EUTF and suggested that the phenomena were articulated in different or even opposing ways. In particular, some have noted that personal capacities and psychological dispositions to migrate are intimately connected. Migration, therefore, supports entrepreneurship capacity.²⁶ Besides enabling the accumulation of capital required to launch an economic venture, the ability to migrate highlights personal qualities that are essential to the entrepreneurial ethos. While the ability to “dare” and “take risks” is celebrated in entrepreneurial discourse, those most capable of doing so would be the women and men who have taken to the road, often risking their lives. Irregular migration is, in fact, a heroic act in the face of numerous dangers and the risk of death (Louis, 2013). The “adventurer” who has chosen to leave rather than stay possesses the qualities of courage and self-sacrifice that enable them to take up other challenges. The personal qualities essential on the road—such as the ability to bounce back from the constraints and opportunities of the moment, manage money wisely, and forge the right relationships (Pian, 2009)—are similar to those expected of an entrepreneur. Migrants who leave under these conditions should, therefore—quite logically, according to one programme manager—be more appealing to potential employers:

> "Any business owner in the world, if asked to choose a young associate between someone who crossed the Sahara on foot to catch a hypothetical boat in Libya, someone who worked in clandestine fields in Italy before eventually making their way to Stuttgart to become a dockworker, or I don't know what up there, or [...] his brother who stayed in the village cultivating his father's fields—the captain of industry, I know who he will choose as an associate, there is no mystery."²⁷

37

Thus, while many recognise that training and employment opportunities may present alternatives to migration for some young people facing limited options, their effectiveness is considered restricted if not paired with policies and programs tackling the other underlying causes of migration. These programs can just as easily offer the means to stay as they can provide the capital and motivation to leave.²⁸

## A Pragmatic Approach to Narrative

38

However, the world of ODA is shaped by trends, and its professionals demonstrate significant pragmatism, even a degree of cynicism, when it comes to securing essential funding for their activities. A manager of an EUTF programme in Senegal therefore confides:

> "I started this work thirty years ago, and for thirty years, I have seen an entire terminology evolve. When I started, it was the era of food security. Now it has become food sovereignty. It was the era of cereal banks, income-generating activities, etc. Now it's the private sector. And so [...] I see the role of interventions today as one of the countless components of the global economic system."²⁹

39

Adherence to the current discourse is also political. Some actors, once peripheral to the development sector or merely service providers, have enthusiastically adopted a narrative that serves their interests. The IOM—for whom the travelling model of migration reduction through employment has represented an opportunity to invest in a new field of action—has, for instance, developed a communication strategy that fully complements that of the FFU, largely adopting the rhetoric of the entrepreneur-hero. In its strategy for youth, employment, and migration in West and Central Africa (IOM,
2018: 14), the IOM identifies its primary objective as promoting regional integration and mobility within the labour market, aiming to support youth employment in innovative sectors related to agriculture, sustainable development, and climate change adaptation.

40

At the other end of the spectrum, we find what Cassarini (2023) describes as “entrepreneurs of immobility”, namely, representatives of returnee migrant associations who adopt the discourse of promoting immobility to gain access to resources from certain donors.³⁰ Managers of centres providing technical and entrepreneurial skills training have also shown an interest in adopting a discourse that enables them to access new markets, increase student enrolment, and enhance their training offerings.

41

For development cooperation agencies and NGOs, the reputational risk was, however, significantly higher, not only due to the EUTF's overall message but also because of the various requirements imposed by the EU, particularly regarding target populations and awareness-raising activities. Given the financial stakes involved, many organisations nevertheless believed that these apparent constraints could be managed or minimised. Regarding the substance of the message, although all stakeholders reject the notion that they serve as vehicles for a discourse intended to discourage migration, they fully accept, for instance, a narrative that emphasises the availability of alternatives and helps provide young people with the choice to stay if they desire wish.³¹ Some have also developed strategies of resistance or circumvention, such as when the EU attempted to impose quotas of returnee migrants within projects. Certain organisations with a long-standing presence in the field—more often in Senegal than in The Gambia—were able to bypass or at least limit this requirement at the start of the EUTF, when the EU faced pressure to commit funds but had not yet clearly defined its criteria and yet had not fully developed its criteria procedures.³²

42

Thus, although they opposed the political underpinnings of the EUTF, development actors recognised it as an opportunity to finance and expand activities very similar to those they were already undertaking, with only marginal modifications to their parameters. Finally, at a time when European development actors are increasingly called upon to justify the usefulness of ODA by both their countries' political leadership (Welfens and Bonjour, 2023) and their hierarchies, suggesting that the actions undertaken may impact the reduction of migration flows can serve as a valuable argument in budget negotiations.³³

## Contradictions in the Field

43

Many criticisms raised by development actors are typically directed at the training sector—specifically, the mismatch between available offerings and the actual market needs³⁴—and at the sector of support for private businesses and entrepreneurship. Development actors denounce the “white elephants” created by programmes that are well-funded but have no project support structure³⁵. They highlight intervention zones that become “project graveyards”³⁶ when short-term projects occur one after another without any follow-up, leading young people to abandon their activities as soon as the project’s end. They also point out the phenomenon of “suitcase companies” (“entreprises cartables”),³⁷ which open to attract aid and subsidies and close as soon as they have been obtained. Those responsible for implementing agricultural projects
highlight the problems associated with land, particularly noting that young people trained in farming techniques are often unable to start their own businesses due to a lack of available land to buy.³⁸ Among these criticisms, however, two contradictions directly relate to the connection between development and migration.

44 The first concerns the decision to favour return migrants in this model. In addition to the difficulty of reconciling return migrant quotas with other criteria typically imposed in ODA—such as the gender criterion—some perceive these quotas as creating a comparative advantage for migrants, which contradicts the promotion of success at home advocated elsewhere:

> "We're creating a kind of comparative advantage in being return migrants. The young person from Tambacounda who has never moved, realises that his brother who left the country and came back a 'failure' - that's how it's perceived here—suddenly gets help [...]. We're in the process of vindicating those who left on the migration routes."³⁹

45 The second, and likely more fundamental, contradiction involves the notion that entrepreneurship is perceived as a highly attractive option among the young people targeted by these initiatives. Although the communications from the organisations strongly emphasise promoting entrepreneurship, the preference for self-employment is not clearly evident in practice. For example, a manager of an agricultural project in Senegal explained the difficulty of getting beneficiaries to understand that they are responsible for the farms that have been set up as part of the project, and are not employed as they seem to prefer.⁴⁰

46 A manager of an NGO that offers opportunities in both types of employment also noted that the preferences of young people contradict what they expected:

> "According to the statistics, we thought that a lot of people would apply for self-employment. But that's not the reality. In fact, the majority ask for salaried employment because—well, this is my own interpretation of things—in their environment they don't see many people who have succeeded in self-employment, let's say, who have run their own business and succeeded in that area. So they say to themselves, it's a risky venture."⁴¹

47 The entrepreneurship-against-migration model is therefore largely undermined by the very aspirations of young people.

## Conclusion

48 In the minds of young Africans, migration governance organisations seek to replace one adventure—taking to the road—with another—establishing a business. It is ironic, given the historical significance of the entrepreneurial spirit, that young Africans are portrayed as taking risks by abandoning their “home” instead of working to earn a living for themselves and their country. Today, the idea is that they should engage in entrepreneurship, thinking that this will not put them at risk. Interventions, in the form of training, awareness-raising, and limited financial support, are invested in based on a belief, rather than evidence, that they will empower those who would otherwise choose to be mobile. Travelling models exist across time and space and adapt. However, as our interviewees have shown, in the process of adaptation, they have been stripped of any lasting potential to the point that they have little to no effect. This is even more apparent as many young people are not seeking self-employment and would simply like to live with dignity and integrate into the structures of society. The interventions aimed to change how young Africans envision
and plan their futures. In reality, what is transformed is the way development industries engage with their donors, thereby altering the institutional order rather than the social order in the countries where the intervention is imposed. This is not to say that those subject to intervention do not feel the consequences; when the opportunity arises, it is of course exploited. However, the objective of the intervention, as intended by the European funding community, is not achieved. The social engineering of “Tekki fiï” is not working quite as intended. Neither the realities faced by migrants nor those of national governments are changing significantly. More broadly, the question persists as to why donors often overlook or disregard the realities, needs, and aspirations of the people they intend to assist, despite their numerous declarations to the contrary. In many respects, Africa remains a laboratory where the intervention of the white European can be tested once again.

49

In light of Olivier de Sardan’s (2021) observation that interventions developed within travelling models are deliberate, it is interesting to note how aware everyone is of the prejudices guiding practice. This may be the primary reason why targeted programmes backfire. Proving their effectiveness remains challenging, and substantial evidence suggests they are ineffective. However, the formality of these programmes pushes the development industry in a specific direction. In this respect, entrepreneurship has successfully adapted as a travelling model, transforming the development and migration industries to the point where their frames of reference and practices have evolved significantly. With the end of the EUTF and the advent of new tools such as the Neighbourhood, Development Cooperation and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI – Global Europe), the future will tell whether this model is here to stay.

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## NOTES

1. Projet d'Appui à la réduction de la migration à travers la Création d'Emplois Ruraux au Sénégal, par la mise en place de fermes agricoles villageoises et individuelles.

2. Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Émigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués (PARERBA).

3. In 2022, amounts of migrant remittances exceeded ODA amounts in Senegal (3,1 vs 1,5 billion US Dollars) and in the Gambia (502 vs 273 million US Dollars), and these States budgets remain
highly dependant on these sources of income (sources: "personal remittances, received" and "net official development assistance and official aid received" indicators. URL: https://data.worldbank.org

4. Due to COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021, we had to conduct most interviews online rather than face-to-face.

5. We are very grateful to Gafou Diop and Sait Matty Jaw who have supported in data collection in Senegal and in The Gambia. We would also like to thank all the anonymous participants who gave their time to talk to us in the framework of this study.

6. The data for this paper was collected in the context of research carried out for the "Safety, Support and Solutions: Phase 2" (SSSII) programme between 2017 and 2021, funded by the Department for International Development (now FCDO) and implemented by IOM with other partners.

7. The term "agripreneurs" is frequently used by ODA institutions, including UN agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

8. AL_SN_13.

9. Authors' own calculations, based on data provided on the EUTF website.

10. Action Sheet EUTF-SAH-GM-03.

11. AL_SN_09; AL_SN_13; AL_SN_15.

12. GD_SN_10.

13. Action document EUTF-SAH-GM-03, p. 2.

14. AL_SN_12.

15. SMJ_GM_9.

16. GD_SN_10.

17. AL_SN_17.

18. Cour des Comptes européenne, Rapport spécial n° 32/2018 : Fonds fiduciaire d'urgence de l'Union européenne pour l'Afrique : un instrument souple, mais pas assez ciblé, p. 37.

19. Ibid., p 13.

20. AL_Reg_2.

21. The series is described as follows on the FFU website: "Through the characters" stories, this committed series encourages the general public to question the notion of success and attachment to one's country. By alternating seriousness, education and humour, the Senegalese series raises awareness of the dangers of irregular migration and provides information on vocational training opportunities and support for entrepreneurship in Senegal". (URL: https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/news/tekki-fii-une-serie-senegalaise-engagee-2019-01-17_en).

22. AL_SN_16.

23. AL_SN_10.

24. AL_Reg_1; AL_SN_10; AL_SN_12.

25. AL_SN_10.

26. GD_SN_7; AL_Reg_5.

27. AL_SN_10.

28. AL_SN_15.

29. AL_SN_3.

30. SMJ_GM_1.

31. AL_SN_10.

32. AL_Reg_7; AL_SN_10.

33. AL_Reg_5.

34. SMJ_GM_9.

35. AL_SN_16.

36. GD_SN_7.
37. Field notes.

38. Eclosio (2023) *Note de capitalisation du projet DEFI*, [online]. URL: https://www.eclosio.org/publication/note-de-capitalisation-du-projet-defi-developpement-de-lemploi-par-la-formation-et-linsertion-au-senegal/

39. AL_SN_10.

40. AL_SN_09.

41. AL_SN_16.

# ABSTRACTS

Based on interviews with development and migration governance actors and documentary analysis, this article explores the evolution of the concept of entrepreneurship in the context of job creation and vocational training programmes funded by the European Union in Senegal and The Gambia. Through initiatives like the EU's Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, entrepreneurship is presented as an alternative to migration to stabilise local populations. This narrative has imposed itself on development aid institutions as a new “travelling model”, even though entrepreneurship and migration can hardly be set against each other, as they are both associated with risk-taking. This article examines how “development actors”—so far on the margins of migration management—have (or have not) adopted and implemented this discourse in their activities.

À partir d'entretiens avec des acteurs du développement et de la gouvernance migratoire et d'une analyse documentaire, cet article examine l'évolution du concept d'entrepreneuriat dans le cadre des programmes financés par l'Union européenne pour réduire la migration au Sénégal et en Gambia, via la création d'emplois et la formation professionnelle. À travers des initiatives telles que le Fonds fiduciaire d'urgence de l'UE pour l'Afrique, l'entrepreneuriat est présenté comme une alternative à la migration, visant à stabiliser les populations locales. Ce récit s'est imposé aux institutions de l'aide au développement comme un nouveau « modèle voyageur », bien qu'entrepreneuriat et migration peuvent difficilement être opposés, tant ils sont tous deux associés à la prise de risque. Cet article interroge la manière dont les « développeurs » — jusqu'ici aux marges de la gestion migratoire — se sont approprié ou non ce discours et l'ont mis en œuvre dans leurs activités.

A partir de entrevistas con actores del desarrollo y la gobernanza de la migración y de una revisión documental, este artículo examina la evolución del concepto de emprendimiento en el contexto de los programas financiados por la Unión Europea para reducir la migración en Senegal y Gambia, mediante la creación de empleo y la formación profesional. A través de iniciativas como el Fondo Fiduciario de Emergencia de la UE para África, el espíritu empresarial se presenta como una alternativa a la migración, destinada a estabilizar las poblaciones locales. Esta narrativa se ha impuesto en las instituciones de ayuda al desarrollo como un nuevo «modelo viajero», a pesar de que el espíritu empresarial y la migración difícilmente pueden contraponerse, ya que ambos están asociados a la asunción de riesgos. Este artículo examina el modo en que los actores del desarrollo —hasta ahora al margen de la gestión de la migración— se han apropiado (o no) de este discurso y lo han aplicado en sus actividades.
## INDEX

**Keywords:** migration and development nexus, migration governance, development aid, entrepreneurship, traveling models

**Mots-clés:** migration et développement, gouvernance des migrations, aide au développement, entrepreneuriat, modèle voyageur

**Palabras claves:** migración y desarrollo, gobernanza de la migración, ayuda al desarrollo, espíritu empresarial, modelo viajero

## AUTHORS

### AUDREY LENOËL

Sociologist, Postdoctoral researcher and scientific coordinator at the French Collaborative Institute on Migrations, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) and Collège de France, Paris, France; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3159-1707; alenoel[at]ehess.fr

### CHRISTINA OELGEMÖLLER

Political scientist, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Loughborough University, IRPH, Loughborough, United Kingdom; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4935-8452; E.C.Oelgemoller[at]lboro.ac.uk

## TRANSLATORS

AUDREY LENOËL

CHRISTINA OELGEMÖLLER