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# Richard Barbe's (1380 †) philosophical profile through the lens of Etienne Gaudet

Monica Brinzei

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Monica Brinzei. Richard Barbe's (1380 †) philosophical profile through the lens of Etienne Gaudet. The art of taking notes at the university: the case study of Etienne Gaudet, inPress. hal-04986727

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Submitted on 11 Mar 2025

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Richard Barbe’s (1380†) philosophical profile through the lens of Etienne
Gaudet

Monica Brinzei
(IRHT, CNRS)*

At the beginning of the fifteenth century, a reference to a so-called Richard Barbe circulates in the group of Viennese theologians. In Book IV, q. 1 of many *Sentences* commentaries stemming from the Faculty of Theology at Vienna, one can read the name of the totally unknown Richard Barbe, who apparently was a bachelor in theology in Paris in 1363–1364.<fnref n="1" /> His name is referenced in a joint quote with the German Cistercian Godescalc of Nepomuk, who also read his set of *Sentences* questions in Paris in 1366–1367. Richard Barbe and Godescalc of Nepomuk are connected by the Viennese theologies, such as Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and Peter of Pirchenwart, in the context of discussions about the moment of the instauration of the sacraments, as one can read in this recycled or transgenerational passage:

Nicholaus de Dinkelsbühl:

Secundo infero quod ante lapsum angelorum non fuit necessarium seu congruum institui aut esse aliquod /143vb/ sacramentum. Patet plane ex prima parte conclusionis et eius probatione. Ex quo patet minus probabilem esse opinionem **magistri Richibarbe** (!) quam etiam sequitur **dominus Gotschalcus** qui dicit quod congruum fuit invisibilem sanctificationem adornari aliquo sacramento praevio merito salvatoris instituto.<fnref n="2" /> (“Secondly, I infer that before the fall of the angels it was not necessary or appropriate for any sacrament to exist or to be instituted. This is plainly clear from the first part of the conclusion and its proof. From this it is clear that the opinion of Master Richibarbe (!) is less probable, which opinion lord Gottschalk also follows, saying that it was appropriate for the invisible sanctification to be adorned by some sacrament previous to the one instituted on the merit of the Savior.”)

Petrus Pirchenwart:

Secundo infero quod ante lapsum angelorum non fuit necessarium seu congruum institui aut esse aliquod sacramentum. Patet plane ex prima parte conclusionis et eius probatione. Ex quo patet minus probabilem esse opinionem **magistri Richardi Barbe** quam etiam sequitur **dominus Gotschalcus** qui dicit quod congruum fuit [invisibilem] angelorum sanctificationem adornari aliquo sacramento praevio merito salvatoris instituto.<fnref n="3" />

Vienna Group (levels IV and V):

<footnote>* This paper has received funding from the ERC under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (Grant agreement N° 771589-DEBATE) and the Horizon 2020 program (Grant agreement no. 101132781-Restory). I am grateful to Chris Schabel and Guy Guldentops for their assistance with some gibberich Latin passages discussed in this paper, and Alexandra Baneu and Florina Hariga for providing me with a useful transcription from Etienne Gaudet's texts.</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹ For some examples of this reference, see Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl's list of quotations in BRINZEI, SCHABEL 2014: 304, 309. Another relevant example is the *Sentences* of Peter of Pirchenwart, COURTENAY 2015: 304, 309, 314. The list of authorities from Pirchenwart made based on the manuscript Città del Vaticano, vat. lat. 1120 in BRINZEI 2021: 248, 269. About the *Sentences* of Pirchenwart see ESU 2024: 239–279.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Nicolaus de Dinkelsbühl: *Questiones communes*, Book IV, q. 1, ff. 143va–b.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Petrus Pirchenwart: *Questiones in IV libros Sententiarum*, Q. 1, art. 1, concl.1, cor. 2, ms. G: Göttweig, Benediktinerstift, cod. 261 (272), f. 3rb; K: Klosterneuburg, Augustiner-Chorherrenstift, CCI 340, f. 19va; V: Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 1120, f. 2vb. These are the manuscripts used by Matteo Esu in his project of a complete edition of Pirchenwart’s text as part of his ongoing PhD under the title: *Individual and Society in Late-Medieval Theology. Study and critical edition of the ‘Questiones in IV Sententiarum’ by Peter of Pirchenwart* (d. 1436).</footnote>
Secundo infero quod ante lapsum angelorum non fuit necessarium seu congruum institui aut esse aliquod sacramentum. Patet plane ex prima parte conclusionis et eius probatione. Ex quo patet minus probabilem esse opinionem **magistri Richardi Barbe** quam etiam sequitur **dominus Gotschalcus** qui dicit quod congruum fuit [invisibilem] angelorum sanctificationem adornari aliquo sacramento praevio merito salvatoris instituto.<fnref n="4" />

But who is Richard Barbe and how did this unknown Parisian master come to be known in Vienna? In fact, almost nothing is known about Richard Barbe. Therefore, this paper aims to explore the biography and doctrinal portrait of this yet unknown author. I will take as a point of departure this reference disseminated among theologians at the Faculty of Theology at Vienna and try to reconstruct the intellectual portrait of this mysterious author. The only surviving texts that are attributed to him are to be found among the notes gathered in Paris by Etienne Gaudet, the hero of this volume.<fnref n="5" /> I will use his scripts as a complementary source in order to investigate the doctrinal interest of Richard Barbe.

One of the first modern scholars who mentions Richard Barbe is Zenon Kaluza in his pioneering book dedicated to the notebooks of Etienne Gaudet.<fnref n="6" /> William J. Courtenay lists Richard Barbe among the “leading figures in the faculty in the 1373–1380” in Paris,<fnref n="7" /> although it appears that, in this period, more precisely from 1369–1380, Richard Barbe was actually active as a provisor at the Collège Harcourt.<fnref n="8" /> In a recent magisterial paper, Chris Schabel<fnref n="9" /> corrects many of the mistakes disseminated by Glorieux concerning the notebooks of Etienne Gaudet.<fnref n="10" /> Glorieux’s inaccuracies sometimes confused Zenon Kaluza, who was the first to point out the misattribution of the notes of Etienne Gaudet to Falisca by Glorieux.<fnref n="11" /> Clearing up this confusing situation, Schabel sets off a ripple effect with a significant impact on a lot of authors from the list of Gaudet, launching the hypothesis that Gaudet lectured in Paris in 1359–1360. As a result of this domino effect, Schabel also more clearly established the timetable of the education of Richard Barbe in Paris. It is worth citing his demonstration here:

> As master of arts and former rector of the University of Paris, on 13 November 1353 Richard was said to have long studied in the Faculty of Theology. A member of the college d'Autun, Richard was labelled a bachelor of theology in a supplication of 10 February 1363, and by 3 April 1367 he was master of theology. According to a letter of Pope Urban V dated 8 November 1362, Richard had resigned a benefice at some point before 24 December 1361, but unfortunately his title is not given in the 1362 letter and I have not been able to locate the 1361 letter. There is nothing preventing us from placing Richard Barbe as *sententiarius* in the 1359–1360 academic year.<fnref n="12" />

The same Chris Schabel made me remark that the ecclesiastical sources, such as the papal letters, allowed us to list all the ecclesiastical benefices that Richard enjoyed during his career. Being a cleric from the diocese of Rouen,<fnref n="13" /> he was probably born by the spring of 1322, since he was a master of arts at the University of Paris by 17 June 1342. In the *rotulus* from Pope Clement VI, it appears that Richard requested a benefice in the collation of the abbot and monks of the Benedictine monastery of

<footnote n="4">⁴ For an explanation of levels IV and V of the Vienna Group Commentary, see ZAHND 2015: 218 and 226 for the edition of the text.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Kaluza 1984: 231–251.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ One of the first was probably HAUREAU 1895: 358. KALUZA 1978: 137–138. About a biography of Etienne Gaudet, see KALUZA 2002: 1119–1122.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ COURTENAY 2011: 951.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ BOUQUET 1891: *passim*.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ SCHABEL 2024: 293, 294, 296, 297.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ GLORIEUX, 1966: 23–104.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ KALUZA 1978: 69–72.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² SCHABEL 2024: 297.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Apparently, this information was ignored during the sixteenth century when we find the following testimony of the provisor Turgot at the College of Harcourt from 1620 in BOUQUET 1891: 98–99: Quo quidem anno (1369) provisoris munere fungebatur M. Richardus Barbe, *cuius dioecesis ignoratur*; ideo hic M. Richardus Barbe, ab anno 1369 ad annum 1380. (Indeed, in that year (1369), M. Richardus Barbe, whose diocese is unknown, was acting as a provisor; therefore, here M. Richard Barbe was acting from the year 1369 to the year 1380.)</footnote>
Saint-Wandrille in the diocese of Rouen.<fnref n="14" /> He must have received the parish church of Bosc-Mesnil, the property of Saint-Wandrille because, in a supplication dated 13 November 1353 and submitted to the new Pope Innocent VI, Richard was allowed to keep his benefice there, while his request was granted for a benefice in the collation either of the dean and chapter of Paris or of the abbot and monks of the Benedictine monastery of Fécamp in diocese of Rouen.

At that point Richard was still a master of arts, but he had served as rector of the University of Paris and had been studying theology for a while in the *Collège d'Autun*, according to the supplication, that is, the house of students founded in 1343 by the late Cardinal Pierre Bertrand the senior, cardinal of Autun.<fnref n="15" /> In fact, the supplication was made by the cardinal's nephew and namesake, Pierre Bertrand the junior,<fnref n="16" /> cardinal-bishop of Ostia, presented by Johannes Ogeri.

A later supplication dated 10 February 1363 informs us that Richard had received the parish church of Hattenville in the diocese of Rouen, owned by Fécamp, as a result of the 1353 supplication. At some time before 24 December 1361, in the time of Pope Innocent VI, through a proxy in Avignon, Richard had resigned his post as rector of the parish church of Bosc-Mesnil, which we only learn from a letter of Pope Urban V dated 8 November 1362. Unfortunately, that letter does not inform us about Richard's status at the time, but in the supplication of 10 February 1363 he is called a bachelor of theology. In this supplication Richard asked for a canonry and prebend in the cathedral of Beauvais, along with the post of cantor, for which he was in litigation. One plausible explanation is that Pope Innocent VI had granted the post of cantor in Beauvais in late 1361 on the condition that Richard resign his living in Bosc-Mesnil, but that letter and the one of 24 December 1361 have not been identified, if they survive.

Pope Urban granted Richard's request for the canonry and prebend in Beauvais Cathedral, but for some reason these are not mentioned in the next known letter concerning Richard's benefices, that of 3 April 1367, when Richard is said to possess only the parish church of Hattenville. By this point, Richard is finally described as a master of theology, while he informed the pope that he was also a master of arts and priest. In the letter Pope Urban grants Richard a canonry and prebend in the Church of Liège, but the pope cancelled the grants of the canonries with expectations of prebends in Paris and Rouen Cathedrals, for which the letters had not yet been drawn up.

Richard Barbe spends the last years of his life as a provisor at the College d'Hartcourt, more precisely from 1363 until 1380. According to the statute of this college, the provisor was in charge of scholars' matters. He corrected students' works or controlled their behavior but also took care of their financial situations and got involved in defending their interests.<fnref n="17" />

From the period as provisor at Collège d'Hartcourt, a significant event can be reconstituted here. Richard is investigated in the fall of 1375 for the suspicion of participating to disseminate the translation in vernacular of condemned writings of Marsilius of Padua and Jean of Jundan. This episode witnessed in the *Charturalium*<fnref n="18" /> is extremely remarkable because it allows us to find Richard Barbe again in the company of some old acquaintances that he probably met as a student in Paris. The reunion took place in the chamber of the cloistered house (*congregate in camera domus claustralis*) of the chancellor of the university, Jean of Calore. Fellows Geoffroy Le Marhec (bishop of Cornouaille, Finisterre),<fnref n="19" /> Master Symon Freron,<fnref n="20" /> the dean of Rouen, the today well-known Nicolas Oresme, and

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ No trances of him at this monastery can be found. About the beginning of the monastery, see VAN HOUTS 1990: 233–251.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ About this college, see SANDERLIN 1971: *passim*.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Educated in law, he died in Avignon on 13 July 1361 as a plague victim. MATZ, COMTE 2003: n° 220, 308–309.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ See for example the description from the statute of the college in BOUQUET 1891: n° 72, 79: “L’office de Proviseur consistera à recevoir les écoliers, à les corriger, à les renvoyer s’il y a lieu, et lorsqu’il lui paraîtra raisonnable à employer au soutien des plus pauvres une partie des bourses de plus riches. Il suivra fidèlement par lui-même ou par un fondé de pouvoir les procès qui intéresseront les écoliers et les affaires des deux maisons devant quelques juges que ce soit, et veillera soigneusement à tous leurs intérêts.” About this statute, see VERGER, VULLIEZ 1993: 445.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ CUP III, n° 1406 (1 September–31 December 1375): 223–227.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Glorieux 1966a: 307.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ About Symon Freron: HAUREAU 1895: 358; GLORIEUX 1939: 429–482, at 475; LUSIGNAN 1999: 39; GOROCHOV 1997: 636–637.</footnote>
Richard Barbe are interrogated about their implication concerning the diffusion of such translations.<fnref n="21" /> The aim of the meeting is to discuss in front of a *jurista* some rumors about the circulation of these condemned texts, which propagated heretical ideas in favor of a worldly power of the prince and interrogated the limits of the pontifical absolute power.<fnref n="22" /> To this event others theologians are invited, but not all the names are recorded (*nonnulli alii in theologia magistri*).

Apparently a *cedula* with some heretical thesis of Marsilius and Jandun circulated and, therefore, some representatives of the Faculty of Theology, named above, were invited to make an oath and swear on the Bible that they did not translate the aforesaid texts from Latin to French; they did not know anyone, or hear anyone speak about anyone, who could spread such texts; and that they had no suspicions of anyone who did so. They are questioned and examined and they swear of not having translated these writings. Geoffroy is the first who swears that they were not involved in this dissemination of the vernacular translation of heretical texts. Another reunion on the same topic is again organized in December of the same year, this time at the *Matutain*, but in the absence of these masters. This time Guillermus de Salvarvilla and Johannes Pontecrucis<fnref n="23" /> are named, but also the Carmelite John Goulin. It is worth adding here that these three names are also mentioned by Gaudet in his notebook. The same Gaudet later on, around 1383, summarized Marsilius’s treatise *Defensor pacis* and attacked Marsilius’s political theory using the *Dialogues* of Ockham.<fnref n="24" />

Richard Barbe probably died in 1380 and this date can be conjectured from a few sources. First, it appears from the statute of Harcourt College that the mandate of provisor was a perpetual responsibility that could end only by death or absence from Paris for more than six months.<fnref n="25" /> Second, we have the testimony of the provisor Target from 1620 that Richard was indeed provisor until 1380.<fnref n="26" /> In support of this date, a letter of Marsilius of Ingen can be invoked where Barbe is referred as *mortuo Richardo Barbe vel saltem absente*.<fnref n="27" /> After 1380, no other information about him is yet known. We can therefore conclude that this might be the year of his death.

After this excursus into Richard Barbe’s life, it is now time to explore his ideas. It appears that some textual evidence led to different topics that can be connected to his name. Besides the reference disseminated by the Viennese theologians to a question about sacraments extracted from his Book IV, other sources allow us to reconstruct his doctrinal profile. The first cause is given by the notes of

<footnote n="21">²¹ See CUP III: 225; D’ARGENTRÉ 1728: 397–400. We already encountered among Gaudet’s notes the name of Symon Fréron, who was in charge of the College de Navarre from 1361 until the death of Charles V. See the Paris, BnF, lat. 16409, ff. 176r–v. Concerning Oresme see the *Dubium est an penitens tantum de actu interior tantum quantum de interior simul cum ipso actu exteriori*. Magister Nicolaus de Navarra respondit de hoc, in Paris, BnF, lat. 14608, 137r. The *resumpta* of Nicole Oresme is also copied by Gaudet; this text confused A. Boureau in dating the text of Oresme. See the introduction of the recent edition Oresme 2021: cxiii.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² QUILLET 1966: 43–54.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ About this see the resent SCHABEL 2024:</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ See on this the recent work of MAGA 2025: 891–900 and KALUZA 2002: 1128, 1138–1142.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ BOUQUET 1891: n° 72, 79: “Le proviseur élu ou approuvé; restera en charge jusqu’à ce qu’il se démette, qu’il meure, qu’il soir 4ispose pour cause raisonnable ou qu’il ait cru devoir se transporter ailleurs qu’à Paris pour quelques motif. Dans ce dernier cas, la charge sera vacante et l’on procédera à l’élection d’un autre proviseur, selon la forme déterminée lorsque l’ancien aura demeuré plus de six mois de suite hors de Paris pour quelques causes que ce soit.”</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ For the testimony of provisor Turgot, see here *supra* n. XX.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ It is worth quoting here the whole passage from Ingen’s letter, transmitted by the ms Wolfenbüttel 76. 14, ff. 180–182 and edited in the *CUP* III: 587–588, at 588, and in HATWIG 1891: 39: Secundum, quod per duorum annorum primorum spatium numquam rex Francie minis, promissis sive promotionibus tantum facere potuit, quod Universitas Parisiensis infra illud spatium rotulum vellet mittere ad Robertum antipapam, donec elapse dicto termino, **mortuo Richardo Barbe vel saltem absente**, fugientibus valentioribus suppositis Parisiensis Universitatis, sicud cantore Parisiensi, domino Johanne Egidii, magistri Johane Ruysch, doctoribus in theologia vel legibus, de regno Francie existentibus, et aliisque remanentibus, primo ad antipapam, renitente natione nostra, rotuluis est conclusus. (Secondly, that during the first two years, the king of France could never do so much by threats, promises, or promotions, that the University of Paris wished to send the scrolls to Robert the antipope during that period, until the said term had passed, Richard Barbe being dead, or at least absent, fleeing the stronger suppositions of the University of Paris, as the cantor of Paris, lord John Gilles, master John Ruysch, doctors in theology or laws, existing in the kingdom of France, and others remaining, was concluded by the rolls, first to the antipope, resisting our nation).</footnote>
Etienne Gaudet (A), the second is to be found in cercle of readers of Richard Barbe (Francis Bacon, John Hiltalingen of Basel, Angelus Dobelinus) that help to establish his legacy in Paris (B), and the third is given by Barbe's reception in Vienna that I will explain in the last part of this paper (C).

### A. Etienne Gaudet's notebooks and Richard Barbe's textual evidence

Etienne Gaudet's notes, which survived in a few manuscripts conserved today at the BnF in Paris, can be explored as a virtual laboratory where one can find reports of ongoing discussions between authors active in Paris in the 1360s. His notebooks are an esquisse and complex source of material. There is a high level of difficulty in understanding the algorithm of these minutes of debates from the University of Paris. In time, this became a source of extreme frustration for modern scholars because there is no information about what is the logic behind these notes: when, how, and why they were collected. Besides this chaotic situation, the material status of these documents again explains why they were not yet deeply studied. Given this situation, these notes remain a mine of valuable data about how philosophy was performed in Paris at a crucial moment when the Oxonian philosophy started to be influential.

Gaudet collects summaries of debates, minuities on *principal* debates, synopses of Sorbonic exercises, fragments of *vesperiis*, traces of *resumpte*, *aulae* or testimonies of condemned theses at the University of Paris. His attitude concerning the authorship of the texts amassed in his notes is variable: either he is extremely neutral and gives no information about the source, or he limits them to a conventional formula like the Augustinian, the Carmelite, the Franciscan, etc. In conjunction with this there are some more fortunate cases, maybe because of the relevance of the authority, when he reproduces the name of his fellows. This is the case with Richard Barbe who is named a few times in Gaudet's notes. This chart allows us to identify the references where Gaudet collects Richard Barbe's ideas or where Gaudet names him:

<table><thead><tr><th>Paris, BnF, lat. 16408</th><th>Paris, BnF, lat. 16409</th><th>Paris, BnF, lat. 16535</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ff. 16v-17r: Utrum ineffabile primum pesse possit facere latitudinem perfectionis rerum infinitam terminatam ad primum gradum entis.</td><td>ff. 33v-35v: Utrum ineffabile primum pesse possit facere latitudinem perfectionis rerum infinitam terminatam ad primum gradum entis.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ff. 25r-v: Utrum primum necesse esse per suum agree possit unam rem in aliam convertere.</td><td>ff. 52v-54v: Utrum primum necesse esse per suum agree possit unam rem in aliam convertere.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>T 1: f. 94r<br>T 2: f. 117r (12 lines, summary of T1)<br>T 3: f. 123v (Tabula)<br>Septima responsio de quodlibet magistro Ricardo Barbe<sup>28</sup></td><td>T 1: f. 153r-v<br>T 2: f. 178v (Summary of T1)<br>Septima responsio de quolibet magistro Ricardo Barbe<br>Utrum divina essentia sit omnium aliorum a se modis omnibus, id est omni gradu cause simpliciter causa prima</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Utrum divina essentia sit omnium aliorum a se modis omnibus, id est omni gradu cause simpliciter causa prima.</td><td>T1: f. 154r-v<br>T2: f. 178v (Summary of T1)<br>Utrum divina voluntas sit cuiuslibet nostre actionis prima regula.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>T1: f. 94v<br>T2: f. 117v<br>T3: 123v<br>Utrum divina voluntas sit cuiuslibet nostre actionis prima regula.</td><td></td><td>f. 196v: marginal note: Barbe in Augustinensem</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote n="28">28 This question is mentioned by MARCOLINO 1990: 357, f.: 21.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_2.png" /></figure>

In fact, the first two questions of Richard Barbe can be read in two manuscripts: in the Paris, BnF, lat. 16408 and its copy the BnF, lat. 16409, which Thomas of Krakow donated to the College de Sorbonne.<fnref n="29" /> Philosophically speaking, the questions are anchored into the trend of the Parisian discussions on the intensity of forms, which was extremely animated in the 1350s–1360s. Concerning the genre of these questions, they might be disputed questions or what appear in Paris at that time as *sorbonica*—a kind of disputed question performed as a form of training during the summer and without the supervision of a magister a (*magister studentium*) but probably in the presence of the college’s prior.<fnref n="30" /> It is also possible that they result from Barbe’s principal disputes, but no other piece of evidence can be found in support of this hypothesis, unless the content of the argumentation is in line with what was usually considered in *principia*.

The structure of these questions is tripartite. In the case of the first one, *Whether the ineffable first being can make the infinite latitude of the perfection of things limited at the first degree of being (Utrum ineffabile primum esse possit facere latitudinem perfectionis rerum infinitam terminatam ad primum gradum entis)*, the first section dedicated to *declaratio terminorum* is in Barbe’s case expanded in two: three *dicta* (three statements, see the Latin text in the Appendix 1: Q. 1: §§ 2–4) and three *notabilia* (notable statements: Q. 1: §§ 5–10); because of this bifid division, Barbe announces at the beginning of his question that he will focus on four ideas: “concerning this difficulty four things are posited” (*Circa istam difficultatem ponuntur quattuor*).

The three *dicta* introduce the explanation of what is the ineffable first being (*primum ineffabile esse*). Such a being cannot be defined by a created being [Q. 1: § 2]; it is known by a created being only through the medium of a representation such a concept, word, or name [Q. 1: § 3]; and, in the current course of nature, it cannot be known by a human being without miraculous divine influence, such as in the case of the beatific vision [Q. 1: § 4]. The second part of what should be understood as a *declaratio terminorum* includes three *notabilia* that focus on the definition of what is the quality of the perfection of things (*latitudo perfectio rerum*).<fnref n="31" /> The quality of the perfection of things can be found in different modes of things, as in the substance, the accidents, or in some that are neither substances nor accidents [Q. 1: § 6]. It can also be inside of individuals of the same species, in between species or genres, or inside of the aggregate of all species and genres [Q. 1: §§ 7–10].

The discussion is expanded in the further section where three propositions are introduced to shed light on the property of the perfections of things, such as that, in reality, the quality of the perfection of things is not uniform [Q. 1: § 11]; that in fact the quality of the perfections of things is uniformly deformed because it is connected to numerical ascension and there is the possibility of increasing [Q. 1: § 13]; and that there is no *vacuum* inside a degree of perfection [Q. 1: § 15]. The last part of the question is articulated around three *conclusiones* (theses): the first ineffable being can terminate the infinite quality of perfection at the first degree of being [Q. 1: § 17]; the quality of the perfection of things must be measured by the highest degree of being [Q. 1: § 19]; and in such quality of perfection there is no intensity or remission [Q. 1: § 21].

At the end of the question, Gaudet adds that *de hac longa positione* and one deduces that what we just read must be an abbreviated version of the real discussion originally displayed by Barbe. No explicit authorities are mentioned and the reader has the impression that Gaudet reduced Barbe’s exposition to the essentials of the argumentation.

The second question in Paris, BnF, lat. 16408 and 16409 attributed to Richard Barbe (*positio Barbe*) is: Whether the first necessary being through its actions can turn one thing into another (*Utrum primum necesse esse per suum agere possit unam rem in aliam convertere*), and is reproduced by

<footnote n="29">²⁹ About the relation between the two manuscripts, see KALUZA 1978: 231; MARCOLINO 1990: 353, 356–357.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ About the *sorbonica* in Paris, see ANGOTTI 2023: 151–158. Traces of a similar practice can be recognized in Vienna; see COMAN 2022: 606–612; SCHABEL 2022: 334; BANEU 2022: 247; or in Cologne, see HOENEN 2010: 88–144.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ About the theory of latitude of form, see MURDOCH 1969: 215–254, SYLLA 1973: 223–283, more recently MARINCA 2020: 179–200, and the more extensive panorama in ROUDAUT 2020: *passim*.</footnote>
Gaudet following the same synthetic style. Although this time Gaudet reproduces the reference to an authority, which is Henry of Ghent, the question mimics only the skeleton of what was probably disputed publicly. The tripartite division can be easily repeated and the three articles focus on: (1) the definition of the first necessary being [Q. 2: § 2–4]; (2) the actions of the first natural being [Q. 2: § 4–8]; and (3) the power of the first natural being [Q. 2: § 9–13]. Each article also reproduces a tripartite structure via a *divisio* in three propositions. Accordingly, the first article states that the first necessary being is defined as the being that has no negation of its opposite. If such an assessment would not be accepted, then treatments like “Deum non esse” would necessarily be “Deum esse” [Q. 2: § 2]. Here we recognize that the rhetoric of the discussion on “Deum non esse” is extremely widely disseminated among theologians at the College de Navarre or at the Sorbonne, especially in the cohort of authors active around Gaudet.<fnref n="32" />

In order to better highlight the nature of the first necessary being, Barbe claims that the first necessary being is the model for the degree of being of other beings. It is like the number that cannot be conceived outside of the idea of unity; “it is impossible for any level of being to exist unless it is necessary through the replication of the first necessary being” [Q. 2: § 3]. The third characteristic announced by the third proposition of the first article is that the first necessary being entirely excludes any latitude of possible contingency and excludes the idea of the first equal necessarily being [Q. 2: § 4].

Barbe analyzes the divine actions in the second article of the question. The first proposition states that through its actions the first necessary being cannot intrinsically constitute the form of a thing [Q. 2: § 5]. But Richard Barbe infers that each form that is a constitutive form is also dependent of its model, since every subsisting form is not its own subsistence. The second proposition announces that the first necessary being cannot communicate through its mode of action the accidental form to a subject or to matter [Q. 2: § 6]. The third proposition stands that the first necessary being communicates the substantial created form to the other being and this form is the cause of the aggregate or the composition of matter and form (*ex materia et forma*) [Q. 2: § 7].

The third article considers the possibility of God transferring to the secondary causes the capacity to change one thing into another. This perspective seems to be acceptable, but only when the movement to transform one thing into another is infinite. At the same time the principle of identity inflicts a limitation because, when one degree of perfection is added to another degree, the initial thing is no longer identical with itself [Q. 2: § 9-13].

Richard Barbe concludes that the first necessary being has this capacity to change, but he does not say anything about whether this first being really does perform the kinds of actions that will drive a substantial change in the created being. The example with the transformation of Christ’s body that Barbe inserts leads us to understand that the philosophical motivation of this discussion is the theological subtilty of understanding the eucharist and how bread can be turned into Christ’s body.<fnref n="33" /> Unfortunately no other textual evidence exists to see how Barbe would continue to develop this topic.

### Richard Barbe’s *principia*?

Besides these two questions, two others can be attributed to Richard Barbe based on Etienne Gaudet’s testimony. In the manuscript Paris, BnF, lat. 16408, the quire that runs from ff. 110r–124v is introduced by the title f. 110r: *Infra scripta pro exemplo et forma* (written below for examples and formatting) and ends with a *tabula* that lists all the items that are to be found in this quire.<fnref n="34" /> This is a collection of excerpts from questions dealing with academic exercises customarily performed in Paris in Gaudet’s time: a fragment of *vesperiis* of John Calore,<fnref n="35" /> a question disputed in the *aula* of the

<footnote n="32">³² See KALUZA 2013: 37–52.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ For large discussion on this topic during the 14th century see BAKKER 1999: *passim*.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ This table is incompletely transcribed by GLORIEUX 1966: 25–26, completed by KALUZA 1979: 79, and rediscussed by Baneu in this volume.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ Discussing this fragment, Cioca established that this is the *expectativa* of Calore’s vesperiis. See CIOCA 2022: 126–131. Cioca clearly explains: “*expectativa magistrorum* is a question disputed between the *magister tenens vesperias* and the bachelors in the absence of senior masters, in a symbolic recreation of professional involvement and status, and a reenactment of the magisterial classroom represented by the interaction of the master with his pupils.” CIOCA 2022: 50–51.</footnote>
Bishop, a question disputed in the Sorbonne's *aula*, an ordinary question of James of Moreto (*Jacobus de Moreto*),<fnref n="36" /> another of master William of Fontefrigido (*Guillelmus de Fontefrigido*), and the seven in this list are what is introduced under the title "the seven responsio of Richard Barbe" (*septima responsio Richardo Barbe*). Globally speaking, this is a collection of seven short items (from four lines in the case of Calore to 18 lines in the case of Fontefrigido), five of them being connected with the name of an author. The *terminus ante quem* for one of these questions is 1358. In the *tabula* at f. 124v there is an insertion about the third item indicating that this question dates from the time of the prior Franciscus Christophori. This information is repeated, but incompletely, on f. 116r (*in aula Sorbone priori* <*Christophori*>). In fact, Franciscus Christofori was prior at the College of Sorbonne between 1350–1358,<fnref n="37" /> so the terminus *ante quem* of this question is 1358. The name of our Richard is present in this table in association with the title of two questions:

f. 124v: Prima questio: Multa collecta pro quolibetis tuis et duabus questionibus principalibus ad magistrum Richardum Barbe: Utrum divina voluntas sit cuiuslibet actionis nostre regula directiva, De apparentia honorum et de necessitate divini auxilii ad quodlibet nostrum bene agere vel iudicare ubi multa contra pelagium etc.

Secunda questio: Alia questio: Utrum Deus sit omnium aliorum a se primum principium sive causa, ubi *multa* de divinis influxibus et terminis actionum suarum; Hugolinus et nonulli alii et de aliis *habitudinibus* causalibus materia et forma, toto et partibus iuxta ymaginationem de Ripa, in speciali de incarnatione, postquam de requisitis ad recte operari et de duplici ire post pelagium etc.

This *tabula*'s entry contains some precious indications. First of all, the questions of Barbe are introduced as *questiones principalibus*, which could lead us to think that these two questions stem from Barbe's *principia*—until further information, counter-arguments, or alternative sources emerge. More evidence is the connection that Gaudet made between Barbe and Hugolino of Orvieto, but also his acknowledgement concerning the fact that Barbe is a follower of John de Ripa, especially on discussions about the trinity.<fnref n="38" /> Another testimony, that of John Hiltalingen of Basel, which I will discuss later, equally confirms Barbe's familiarity with Ripa's doctrine. In fact, many of Ripa's ideas were nourishing principal debates in Gaudet's time.

The two questions that are mentioned in this table are to be read inside of this quire at folio 117r–v. Because of their short form (12 and 17 lines), we can conclude that this is just a summary of the initial questions. This remark is actually confirmed by other notes of Etienne Gaudet, since the same two questions are found in the same manuscript, Paris, BnF, lat. 16408 at ff. 94r–v, where we can read a more detailed variant (27 and 31 lines, respectively). Another manuscript, the Paris, BnF, lat. 16409, also reproduces these two questions.<fnref n="39" /> In fact, at f. 117r–v one finds only the title of the questions and a summary of each argument, while at f. 94r–v one can read the list of *conclusiones*, all the proving arguments, and some corollaries. Yet even this version seems to be a shortened version of the initial one—why does Gaudet repeat these questions? It is hard to find an answer to this inquiry. If the questions are really *principal* questions, we can add that the practice of the circulation of different copies of the same question in the same manuscript can be found in the case of other *principia*. There is, for example, the similar case of the *principia* of John Regis from Paris 1369–1370, who repeats the positions of all his *socii* from *principia* inside of the same notebook that is at the beginning of manuscript Paris, BnF, lat. 15156.<fnref n="40" /> This might be a current practice and maybe Gaudet makes double copies of them to serve for his own practice.

In the second appendix of this paper, I propose to read in parallel the transcription of these two variants where Barbe discusses the nature of divine causality. The first one transcribed by Florina Hariga (within the framework of the ERC-NOTA project) reproduced the extensive version of both questions; one can again recognize the tripartite division in three *conclusiones*, with three arguments, and three corollaries, as well as explicit references to some authorities, such as a quote from

<footnote n="36">³⁶ W. J. Courtenay mentions a Jacobus de Moreto at the University of Paris active in 1329–1330, but we have no evidence to indicate that this is the same person. COURTENAY 2014: 234.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">³⁷ BRINZEI 2018: 45, 66. BRINZEI (forthcoming).</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸ About John of Ripa’s trinitarian thinking, see BORCHERT 1974: *passim*.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">³⁹ See supra the indication on the table and KALUZA 1979: 81.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ About this material situation, see BRINZEI 2018: 46–50.</footnote>
Bradwardine, which leads us to understand that Richard Barbe refutes the position of Bradwardine concerning the will of God as the first production of God. The second column reproduces the abbreviated version of the question as it is reproduced by Gaudet at folio 117r–v where the explicit references (no name of Bradwardine), and even some arguments and corollaries, are skipped.

The repetition of these two questions is a remarkable situation that provides access to some ideas of Richard Barbe, but equally sheds light on Etienne Gaudet’s manner of taking notes. In fact, it appears that he probably gathered together each piece of text that circulated among the bachelors in theology, even when this meant repeating material that he already collected. His notes are extremely precious since they let us discover the doctrinal portrait of a totally unknown author today such as Richard Barbe, but very well known in the context of Parisian debates from the 1360–1370s. This is also the reason that on the f. 196v, in the margins of his own *principia*, Etienne Gaudet inserts a reference to Barbe.<fnref n="41" /> In order to bring more evidence to this statement, I propose to investigate a cercle or readers that refer to Richard Barbe in their own *Sentences* commentaries, since this cercle is a precious source in establishing the legacy of Richard Barbe.

## B. *The Cercle of Readers of Richard Barbe in Paris*

It is likely that Richard Barbe enjoyed a certain legacy among theologians from the second decade of the fourteenth century. The example of Viennese theologians is significant and it can be completed by the testimonies of Francis Bacon, John Hiltalingen of Basel, and Augustinus Dobelinus.

### 1. *Francis Bacon OCarm.*

The Carmelite Francis Bacon read his *Sentences* in Paris in 1364-1365 and two manuscripts transmit today his text: Paris, BnF, lat. 15374 and Rome, Archivum Ordinis Carmelitarum, ms. II pers. 4. The great historian of the Carmelite order, Bartomeu Xiberta was the first one who pointed out in 1925 that Bacon quotes Richard Barbe as a disciple of Jean de Ripa.<fnref n="42" /> Xiberta was followed by Hermanno Schwamm, who identified these quotations and interpreted also the polemic attitude of Franciscus against Barbe concerning the possibility of the divine essence to know the future contingents.<fnref n="43" /> This topic was explored by Chris Schabel in his PhD finished in 1994,<fnref n="44" /> who analyze the issue of God’s intrinsic will and its primacy, according to Schabel, for Bacon “what God knows to be future He contingently knows to be future”, and he also remarks that Bacon is more tolerant than Ripa concerning the possibility of the past to be able not to have been.<fnref n="45" /> In the line of this discussion, Francis Bacon witnesses the deep influence of Ripa on Richard Barbe and claims that Barbe position about the cognitive reason of future contingents as an intrinsic determination of divine will reinforces in fact the position of Jean de Ripa.<fnref n="46" /> Francis Bacon seems to be very familiar with Barbe’s text and he

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ The *Principia* of Etienne Gaudet can be read in Paris, BnF, lat. 16535, ff. 195r–229v. For a new discussion about this attribution, see SCHABEL 2024: 293–297. Alexandra Anisie is currently editing and investigating this text within the framework of the ERC-NOTA project.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">⁴² XIBERTA 1925: 190.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³ SCHWAMM 1930: 158–160.</footnote>

<footnote n="44">⁴⁴ SCHABEL 194: 315–318.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵ SCHABEL 194: 316–317.</footnote>

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶ Once can read hear apud Schwamm the texts where Bacon refers to Barbe. Schwamm 1930: 159-160: “Ex istis omnibus sequitur *cum reverencia magistri Richardi Barbe*, quod non est verum, quod ipse dicit libro primo 3a questione, qua querit, *utrum divina essencia sit respectu futurorum contingentium evidens notitia*. Dicit ibi contrarium in prima conclusione, secundum quod inveni in reportatibus suis, que conclusio est ista, quod *divina essencia secundum rationem suppositalem non potest esse futuri contingentis evidens noticia*. ... Tertia conclusio *contra eundem* est hec: Ideo, quia divina essencia est universaliter perfecta, ideo est racio cognoscendi evidenter futura contingencia. ... (f. 95ra) ... Sed omne absolutum est perfeccio simpliciter <in Deo>, secundum quod *ipse <Richardus Barba>* habet concedere ex dictis suis et *sui magistri Johannis de Ripa*. Ergo divina essencia sub racione, qua est universaliter perfecta, est racio cognoscendi evidenter futura contingentia. ... Per *ipsum <Richardum>* in questione, ubi petit, an divina essencia respectu futuri sit causa, in corellario 3º conclusionis dicit, quod *racio cognitiva cuiuslibet contingentis ad extra est determinacio divine voluntatis*. ... Iste ponit istas conclusiones, ut descendat ad ponendum *contingenciam intrinsece in Deo*, quia postquam divina essencia sub</footnote>
tries to quote him as precise as possible. Given this accuracy, we can identify the title of the third question of the book I of the *Sentences* of Richard Barbe, since Francis explicitly says: "as he himself says in Book I, questio 3; where he inquires: *whether the divine essence is, with respect to future contingents, an evident knowledge*". (quod ipse dicit libro primo 3a questione, qua querit, utrum divina essencia sit respectu futurorum contingentium evidens notitia). Therefore, the testimony of Francis Bacon is significant not only because clarifies us about the tide doctrinal relation between Richard Barbe and John of Ripa, but also because it provide us with the title of a question of his lost *Sentences's* commentary.

## 2. John Hiltalingen of Basel OSEA

of the Augustinian John Hiltalingen of Basel, who read the *Sentences* in Paris in 1368–1369. Hiltalingen is well known for the accuracy of his references that he used in his set the questions on the *Sentences*.<fnref n="47" /> This Augustinian friar mentions Richard Barbe eight times in Book I, and once in book IV of his *Sentences* that can be listed as it follows:

1. Book I: *Prologus*, Q. 1, art. 4: p. 203⁴⁸

2. Book I: *Prologus*, Q. 1, art. 5: p. 217⁴⁹

3. Book I: *Prologus*, Q. 1, art. 5: p. 286⁵⁰

4. Book I: *Distinctio* 1, Q. 2, art. 5: p. 309, 315, 317, 318, 319⁵¹

5. Book IV: *Distinctio* 49, 2a pars, Q. 39: ms. Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale, 248 [I 158], f. 110ra<fnref n="52" />

> nulla racione intrinseca necessaria est sufficiens noticia respectu futuri contingentis, sequitur, quod secundum racionem intrinsecam contingentem, quam reputo falsam, ut patet per superiora dicta.”

<footnote n="47">⁴⁷ See BRINZEI, SCHABEL 2019: 247 and for reference to Barbe 251.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">⁴⁸ Iohannis de Basilea, OESA: *Lectura super IV l. Sententiarum, Prologus*, Q. 1, art. 4, 203: "Et hoc consequens reputat etiam falsum Richardus Barbe quaestione 1 Lecturae suae, et Iohannes de Marchia 2 quaestione Determinationum articulo 2, ubi etiam tractat materiam, qualiter ars est ipsa anima, circa medium istius articuli."</footnote>

<footnote n="49">⁴⁹ Iohannis de Basilea, OESA: *Lectura super IV l. Sententiarum, Prologus*, Q. 1, art. 5, 217: "Et in hoc Bonsemblans sequitur ipsum. Sed secundum opinionem Iohannis de Marchia, quem Barbe sequitur quaestione sua prima, diceretur, quod non ab obiecto, sed solum a specie intelligibili. Sed, sive sic sive non, semper erit aliquis actus causatus per talem motum, et hoc sufficit mihi."</footnote>

<footnote n="50">⁵⁰ Iohannis de Basilea, OESA: *Lectura super IV l. Sententiarum, Prologus*, Q. 1, art. 5, 286: "Ex quo patet, quod plura dicta Iohannis de Marchia et Richardi Barbe fundantur super falso, ut videbitur infra distinctione 1. Et sic patet ad totum tertium principale."</footnote>

<footnote n="51">⁵¹ Iohannis de Basilea, OESA: *Lectura super IV l. Sententiarum, Prologus*, Q. 2, art. 5, 309: "Tertio ratione speciei informantis vel immutantis, quae numquam est habitualis, sed semper actualis. Igitur sequitur tota pars vera. Quae etiam est contra Richardum Barbe in quadam responsione ad quaestionem hanc: *Utrum voluntas iam elevata et beata in dilectione omnimoda sit ex lege certo gradu limitata*, in qua ponitur, quod memoria creata per prius beatificatur in patria quam ipsa potentia intellectiva, cuius oppositum hic probatur. Secunda pars etiam est contra Richardum Barbe libro 1 quaestione 4, qui sequitur Iohannem de Ripa in hac parte."; 315: "Contra primam partem istius corollarii est Richardus Barbe libro 1quaestione 1 conclusione 4 dicens: Causalitas obiectiva non est libera, sed naturalis. Patet hoc, quia secundum intensionem talis causalitatis sequitur intensio actus; quod non foret, si foret libera. Igitur etc. Concordat cum eo Iohanne de Ripa in pluribus locis."; 317: "Nam Iohannes de Ripa in actuatione mentis in patria beatifica ponit duas necessitates et unam libertatem sive liberalitatem. Similiter habet dicere Barbe."; 318: "Ex quo patet, quod non dicit verum Richardus Barbe quaestione 1 prope finem, quod, si obiective concurreret obiectum infinitum, infinite causaret sive infinitam perceptionem. De his prolixe habetur per Hermicanum in Summa de quaestionibus Ermenorum libro 14 pluribus capitulis."; 319: "Ex quo patet, quod ratio Richardi Barbe non concludit, nec verum est, quod dicit quaestione 1 Primi in materia ista, scilicet quod semper causa contineat effectum causaliter et perfectionaliter, extendendo hoc nomen 'causa' ad concausam sive causam partialem."</footnote>

<footnote n="52">⁵² Iohannis de Basilea, OESA: *Lectura super IV l. Sententiarum, lib. IV*, Q. 39, Dist. 49, 2a pars, ms. Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale, 248 [I 158], f. 110ra: "Primum corollarium contra Barbe in questione *utrum voluntas iam elevata et beata sit ex lege certo gradu limitata...* Secundum corollarium contra Iohannem de Marchia quaestione 1 *Determinationum*, conclusione 1, corollario 4 et Barbe ubi supra."</footnote>
What brings to light these quotations mentioning Barbe’s name? Hiltalingen quotes Barbe in the context of the discussion of the beatific vision, and lets us discover that Richard Barbe was extremely familiar with John of Ripa, whom it seems he followed closely (*qui sequitur Iohannes de Ripa in hac parte*; *concordat cum eo Iohanne de Ripa in pluribus locis*, page 315). This is an interesting detail that that also confirms Gaudet’s remark about the relation of Barbe and Ripa and lets us integrate Barbe into the so-called *école ripienne*, apparently very trendy in Paris in the 1360–1370s.<fnref n="53" /> The Augustinian Friar adds that another theologian, from whom we have today only the *principia*,<fnref n="54" /> Bonsemblans Badoar of Padua, also *recitat* Barbe’s ideas in his Book I, Q. 2, and Ripa’s ideas.<fnref n="55" /> Since Bonsemblans read his *Sentences* in Paris in 1358–1359,<fnref n="56" /> his references to Barbe might be extracted from a disputed question of the same genre of those in which probably also Gaudet also participated.

Hiltalingen places Barbe in the company of other contemporary theologians such as Hugolino of Orvieto, Bonsemblans, and again Ripa, and this suggests the high esteem that Barbe inspired among his Parisian fellows.<fnref n="57" /> Hiltalingen refers (see page 309) to Richard Barbe’s solution of the following question: *Utrum voluntas iam elevata et beata in dilectione omnimoda sit ex lege certo gradu limitata.* This seems to be the title of a question from the *Sentences* of Richard Barbe and therefore proves that Hiltalingen had access to Barbe’s text—a writing that is today lost. Hiltalingen points out a disagreement with Barbe about memory and the intellective power being equally beatific during the beatific vision.

The entire eight references to Richard Barbe gathered by Hiltalingen are only in the Augustinian Friar’s first book of his *Sentences* and are used to mark the divergence in opinion between the two authors. When it comes to elucidate on the cause of the beatific vision and to explain the epistemological process of having a representation (or *illustratio*), Hiltalingen rejects Barbe’s position, which seems to defend that the illustration is the mental art of the soul, and knowledge in the process of the beatific vision is not produced by the object, but only by intelligent species. Richard Barbe appears to defend a very intellectualist position that accepts the determinant role of intellective power in producing knowledge and the beatific illustration.

### 3. Angelus Dobelinus OESA

Before reading his *Sentences* in Paris during 1374-1375, Angelus Dobelinus studied in Prague under John Klenkok in the *studium generalium* of the Augustinian order in Prague.<fnref n="58" /> This is an interesting detail, since it appears that although he did not spend much time in Paris he got extremely familiar with the Parisian academic life. He acts like a *connoisseur* of the venerable masters from the universities, and this might justify his reference to Richard Barbe. In the first question of his prologue, while Dobelinus addresses the question about the capacity of the human intellect to investigates the truth of the divine matters (*Utrum investigare veritates rerum divinarum traditas in libro Sententiarum sit ultra facultatem virium humanarum* (q. 1, Jena, 47, ff. 2ra-8v), Dobelin lists three conclusions to display his conception concerning the possibility for the human mind to approach rationally the divine realities. He engages in a discussion with many Augustinians authorities (Johannes Braculis, John Klenkok, John Hiltalingen of Basel) to reinforce his position and abundantly refers to Augustin. The third conclusion of this first question of his prologue is the place where Dobelinus cites Barbe. This conclusion discusses that although the sacred theological truths cannot be proven for any *viator* (the

<footnote n="53">⁵³ About the *école ripienne* see BRINZEI 2020: 426–429; BRINZEI-SCHABEL 2025: 361–423.</footnote>

<footnote n="54">⁵⁴ For an edition of this text, see the unpublished MA of UTAMURA 2014.</footnote>

<footnote n="55">⁵⁵ See *infra* footnote 51.</footnote>

<footnote n="56">⁵⁶ See about this TACHAU 1992: 303–307, COURTENAY 2024: 447–449, and SCHABEL 2024: 279, 284–258, 292–294.</footnote>

<footnote n="57">⁵⁷ This text runs as follows in Iohannis de Basilea, OESA: *Lectura super IV l. Sententiarum, Prologus*, Q. 2, art. 5, 217: “Ad tertium ibidem dicetur secundum opinionem Hugolini libro 2 distinctione 17 quaestione 2 articulo 2, quod talis actus sic elicitus vel derelictus procederet tam a potentia quam ab obiecto. Et in hoc Bonsemblans sequitur ipsum. Sed secundum opinionem Iohannis de Marchia, quem Barbe sequitur quaestione sua prima, diceretur, quod non ab obiecto, sed solum a specie intelligibili. Sed, sive sic sive non, semper erit aliquis actus causatus per talem motum, et hoc sufficit mihi.”</footnote>

<footnote n="58">⁵⁸ KITANOV 2014: 253–254; KITANOV 2015: 320.</footnote>
human in their earthly life- in via), some divine truths that we know through faith are known by
experimental knowledge. The point of interest is to claim that some divine truths, which the human
mind come to know merely by faith, can also be the object of some experimental knowledge.
Dobelinus repeats Augustin's position about the fact that the proper object of faith are unseen and
therefore they are accepted through beliefs. They are actually known based on trust on divine
revelation and on the authority of the Sacred Scripture, since the primary source of divine truth is the
Bible. To reinforce this position, Dobelinus introduces the authority of a master of the university who
in an aula debate stands that from the beginning until the end the Bible is one article of faith. The
master that claims this rather radical evidence is Richard Barbe, and by this quote it appears that
Dobelinus praises the authority of this master. Contrary to Hiltalingen of Basel or Franciscus Baconis,
we note a positive attitude of Dobelinus regarding Barbe. Although Trapp sustains that Dobelinus took
many of his explicit quotation from Hiltalingen, it appears that this reference to Richard Barbe is not
in Hiltalingen and therefore Dobelinus used an alternative source to rich Richard Barbe.<fnref n="59" />

We can reproduce here the content of the entire third conclusion to follow how Dobelin builds
his arguments and plays with the authorities:

Conclusio teria est ista: quamvis Sacre veritates theologice not sint demonstrabiles ab aliquo viatore tamen alique veritates divine, que sola cognoscemus fide, cognite sunt experimentali cognitione. Probatur prima pars istius conclusionis. Nam omnes veritates prefate sunt obiectam fidei proprie dicte, ergo nulla talis veritas est demonstrabilis. Consequentia patet ex eo quia nullum credibile fide proprie dicta est scibile vel demonstrabile, dicente Augustino 13 *De Trinitate*, capitulo primo: “Ideo credere iubemur quia id quod credere iubemur videre non possumus”. Et omelia ??? (sic !) super Johannem: “Quid est fides nisi credere quod non vides ? » Item Apostolus Ad. Hebr. XI: *Fides est substantia rerum sperandarum, non apparentium argumentum*. Super quibus verbis dicit Augustinus: “Recte fides dicitur ‘argumentum’ vel cognitio non apparentis, quia si fides est, ex eo communicatur”. Et probatur non esse aliqua apparentia, cum fides non sit nisi de non apparentibus. Et antecedens patet per Damascenum, libro primo, capitulo primo, dicentem: “Omnia que tradita sunt nobis et per legem et prophetas et apostolos et ewangelistas suscipimus, et veneramur et cognoscimus, nichil ultra inquirentes”, scilicet per rationem, ergo ex fide omnia talia suscipimus, et per consequens sunt obiecta fidei. Istud etiam patet per Augustinum, et allegatur in Decreto 9, ubi Augustinus dicit quod istam reverentiam facit libris canonis Biblie, quod nichil de eis negare audeat, ergo omnia ibi assertive contenta sunt fidei obiecta. Aliis quibuscumque libris non sic facit Augustinus nisi assit ratio vel Ecclesie determinatio. Et ergo in **responsione aule deduxit Magister Richardus Barbey** quod tota Biblia a principio usque ad finem esset articulus fidei. Secunda pars conclusionis patet, quia anima Christi et beate Virginis multa sciunt vel sciverunt experimentali cognitione que nos tenemus fide. (ms. Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, El. f. 47, f. 4va).

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, El. f. 47, f. 4va</figcaption></figure>

C. *Richard Barbe's legacy in Vienna*

As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the Viennese theologians refer to Richard while they are
dealing with the problem of the institution of sacraments in their commentaries on Book IV of Peter
Lombard's *Sentences*.<fnref n="60" /> In fact, in the first version of Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl's *Sentences*
commentaries, transmitted by the autograph manuscript Vienna, Schottenstift, MS 269,<fnref n="61" /> there is no

<footnote n="59">⁵⁹ TRAPP 1956: 261-262. Kitanov demonstrates that his alternative source is Hugolino de Orvieto, but Orvieto does not refer explicitly to Barbe, see KITANOV 2015: 323, 325-336.</footnote>

<footnote n="60">⁶⁰ For a general view on this topic, see ZAHND 2014: *passim*.</footnote>

<footnote n="61">⁶¹ About this manuscript, see BRINZEI, SCHABEL 2014 and, more recently on Dinkelsbühl's autograph, see BRINZEI 2022: 657–659, 665–666.</footnote>
mention of Richard Barbe.<fnref n="62" /> This one appears in other variants of sets of *Sentences* questions attributed to Dinkelsbühl and then later on in other commentaries from what we call today the Vienna Group commentaries.<fnref n="63" /> In his magisterial study on the efficacy of the sacrament discussed within the Vienna Group's commentaries, Ueli Zahnd clearly identifies the existence of five different levels in the composition and transformation of this consortium of texts.<fnref n="64" /> It is by what he called Level Two that the reference to Richard Barbe emerged in the Viennese context. From this level on, identified by Zahnd in the *Sentences* of Arnold of Seehausen, all the other commentaries reproduce the quotes of Richard Barbe and Godescalc of Nepomuk. Still, the question remains: when and how did this reference reach the Viennese milieu?

I already suggested that the potential source might be the *Sentences* commentaries of the Cistercian James of Eltville,<fnref n="65" /> who read *Sentences* in Paris in the academic year 1369–1370,<fnref n="66" /> and who was apparently very influential among Viennese theologians.<fnref n="67" /> As a German student in Paris, he frequented what at that time was called the Anglo-German Nation at the University of Paris.<fnref n="68" /> This nation became the German nation once Henry of Langenstein was acting as vice-chancellor of the university under Jean of Calore in Paris during 1371–1381.<fnref n="69" /> The German Nation was the perfect milieu for German students to gather in Paris.<fnref n="70" /> Eltville probably encountered Godescalc of Nepomuk in Paris at the College of St. Bernard, and connected with other German students from the German Nation. His friendship with Henry of Langenstein is well documented.<fnref n="71" /> Therefore, the historical context suggests a filiation between these authors who themselves probably frequented in Paris during their student years. The fact that Eltville can be connected with Godescalc of Nepomuk is equally proven on a doctrinal level, since Eltville recycles many of Godescalc of Nepomuk’s ideas in his own *Sentences*,<fnref n="72" /> as has been recently proven. James of Eltville should therefore be considered the principal candidate for the source of this reference in Vienna. Thus, when one looks to James of Eltville’s text, as one can read it in the majority of the manuscripts transmitting Book IV of his *Sentences*, the following appears:

<table><tr><td>Jacobus de Altavilla:<br/>Questiones super Sententias, Book IV, d. I<br/>Mss: A, f. 232va; B, f. 199v; C, f. 209rb; E 153vb;<br/>K, f. 273va-b; M, f. 321va; N, f. 183va; O, f.<br/>140vb; P, Ø; S, f. 281ra; T, f. 199ra; W, f. 266rb;<br/>wb, Ø<sup>73</sup></td><td>Vienna Group Commentaries,<br/>Questiones super Sententias, Book IV, d. I<br/>ed. Zahnd 2014</td></tr><tr><td>Quarto infero quod ante lapsum angelorum<br/>non fuit necessarium nec congruum aliquod</td><td>Secundo infero quod ante lapsum angelorum non<br/>fuit necessarium seu congruum institui aut esse</td></tr></table>

<footnote n="62">⁶² Contrary to what I suggested in BRINZEI 2021: 248.</footnote>

<footnote n="63">⁶³ For the Vienna Group, see BRINZEI, SCHABEL 2014: 174 and *passim*.</footnote>

<footnote n="64">⁶⁴ ZAHND 2014: 99–157.</footnote>

<footnote n="65">⁶⁵ See BRINZEI 2021: 248.</footnote>

<footnote n="66">⁶⁶ About his *Sentences* commentary, see the volume edited in 2018 by Brinzei and Schabel where many of the contributors of this present volume also analyzed different aspects of James of Eltville’s doctrine.</footnote>

<footnote n="67">⁶⁷ See the demonstration of BRINZEI, CURUT 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="68">⁶⁸ TANAKA 1990: 150. About Langenstein as vice-chancellor of the Church in Paris under Jean de Calore, see DUHEM 1956: 573 and BRINZEI (forthcoming).</footnote>

<footnote n="69">⁶⁹ About James of Calore’s reception in Vienna, see CIOCA 2022: 130–153.</footnote>

<footnote n="70">⁷⁰ See the episode when Marsilius of Inghen pays for Paul of Gelria’s buffet, who could not afford it while he was a student in Paris. See BANEU 2022: 225 and GABRIEL 1974: *passim*.</footnote>

<footnote n="71">⁷¹ See SCHABEL 2018: 5–11.</footnote>

<footnote n="72">⁷² About Godescalc’s influence on Eltville, see BAUMGARTEN 2018: 105–116, 122–148; ANISIE 2018: 182–188.</footnote>

<footnote n="73">⁷³ Here are the sigla of the manuscripts: A = Besançon, Bibliothèque Municipal d’étude et de conservation, 198; Brugge, Hoofdbibliothek Biekorf, 181; Cambrai, Médiathèque d’agglomération, 570; Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA F.118; H = Wertheim, Evangelische Kirchenbibliothek, 608; K = Koblenz, Landeshauptarchiv, Best. 701 Nr. 208; M = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 11591; O = Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.106 inf; P = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15896; S = Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque d’agglomération, 158; W = Wolfenbüttel, Herzog August Bibliothek, Helmst. 230. For a first description of these manuscripts, see BRINZEI 2014: 249–257 and the more detailed one in the BRINZEI, SCHABEL (eds): XXIV–LXVI.</footnote>
esse sacramentum aut institui. Patet ex
precedentibus. Ex quo patet minus probabilem
esse opinionem quam dicit quod congruum fuit
inefabile angelorum sanctificationem adornari
aliquo sacramento primo merito salvatoris
instituto.

aliquod sacramentum. Patet plane ex prima parte
conclusionis et eius probatione. Ex quo patet
minus probabilem esse opinionem **magistri
Richardi Barbe** quam etiam sequitur **dominus
Gotschalcus** qui dicit quod congruum fuit
[invisibilem] angelorum sanctificationem adornari
aliquo sacramento praevio merito salvatoris
instituto.

What can surprisingly be noticed from this parallel is that, in the majority of Eltville's manuscripts, the references to Barbe and Godescalc are missing. Does (a) Eltville show a prudent attitude and remove the acknowledgement concerning his source because it might involve a disagreement with the opinion of his Cistercian fellow Godescalc? Or, (b) in light of the suspicions about Richard Barbe being involved in the dissemination of a polemical vernacular translation, it is more cautious to avoid his name? Or (c) is there more simply a material problem in the transmission of the texts, such as that the totality of these manuscripts is connected to a model from which this reference was missing? I am inclined to favor of Hypothesis (b), since another detail should be taken in consideration here. The only manuscript known from Paris transmitting the *Sentences* of Eltville is the codex Paris, BnF, lat. 15896, which is also the most intriguing of the witnesses. In fact, I recently proposed the hypothesis that this manuscript should be considered in connection with the royal library of King Charles VI.<fnref n="74" /> Its decoration and luxurious appearance is quite in line with other manuscripts from the royal library and, besides this, Eltville himself is a *socius* of Richard of Bellomonte, the secretary of the Queen—a bibliographical detail that could explain a link with the royal court. It is possible that, during the preparation of the manuscript for this “royal edition,” the reference to Richard Barbe was completely eliminated because, while in the other manuscripts the passage remains and only the explicit reference to Barbe is deleted, the whole passage is skipped in the Paris manuscript.<fnref n="75" />

Among all the manuscripts that transmit Book IV of James of Eltville's *Sentences*,<fnref n="76" /> the surprise comes from the codex Laon, Bibliothèque municipale Suzanne Martinet, 180, where on f. 254vb we can read the text including the reference *magistri Richardi Barbe quam etiam sequitur dominus Gotschalcus*.<fnref n="77" /> This is not one of the best manuscripts in the transmission of the text,<fnref n="78" /> but the fact that it contains this reference provides significant evidence that other manuscripts could have included the same reference. In fact, maybe the autograph or any other manuscripts that are lost to us today could also have this reference.<fnref n="79" /> This led to the conclusion that one of these manuscripts containing the explicit reference to Barbe and Godescalc could also be the model that circulated in Vienna. The ongoing project of editing the *Sentences* of James of Eltville demonstrated that there is a coherent family of German manuscripts, called the *EKLMOT* Group, but none of them contains the reference to Richard Barbe or to Godescalc. Therefore, this family could not represent the model that circulated among the Viennese theologians, and probably none of these manuscripts could be attached to the name of Henry of Langenstein either.<fnref n="80" />

Another interesting witness for this inquiry is the manuscript München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm, 3546, which contains the *Sentences* of Arnold of Seehausen who read the *Sentences* in Vienna in 1402.<fnref n="81" /> Recently, together with Ioana Curut, we noticed that the first questions from Book IV transmitted by this codex are actually the set of questions of Book IV of James of Eltville. This codex circulated among the Viennese masters, and Ueli Zahnd demonstrated that the text was used in the evolution of different levels of the Vienna Group. If this is the text of Eltville and it is

<footnote n="74">⁷⁴ See BRINZEI: forthcoming 2025.</footnote>

<footnote n="75">⁷⁵ See Q. 1 of Book IV of Eltville’s *Sentences* in manuscript Paris, BnF, lat. 15896, ff. 147ra–152ra.</footnote>

<footnote n="76">⁷⁶ See the tabula of this Book IV edited and Cambrai, Médiathèque d’agglomération, 570 discussed by BRINZEI, CURUT 2018: 453–456.</footnote>

<footnote n="77">⁷⁷ For a detailed description of this codex, see BRINZEI 2014: 253.</footnote>

<footnote n="78">⁷⁸ See the stemmatic discussion of Schabel in forthcoming edition.</footnote>

<footnote n="79">⁷⁹ Traces of at least five more destroyed manuscripts have been discussed by BRINZEI: forthcoming.</footnote>

<footnote n="80">⁸⁰ Despite the fact that these manuscripts have been wrongly attributed to Langenstein.</footnote>

<footnote n="81">⁸¹ XIBERTA 1931: 436–476; BRINZEI, SCHABEL 2014: 206–209.</footnote>
a copy that contains the explicit reference to both Parisian theologians, then this manuscript should be considered one of the channels through which Richard Barbe's ideas were embraced by the theologians from Vienna post-Dinkelsbühl. To conclude, I can add that this situation again highlights the pivotal role of James of Eltville in the transmission of materials from Paris to Vienna. Richard Barbe's text probably did not circulate in Vienna, but his name was mentioned in relation with the idea that a sacrament was not necessary before the fall of angels and that the sanctification of angels and the institution of sacraments, by the merit of the Savior, are equal.

## Conclusions

What can be concluded from this attempt to discover Richard Barbe, an unknown *magister* from the fourteenth century? He is quoted by theologians from Vienna, although they probably do not have his *Sentences* commentary in their libraries. He is introduced in the Viennese milieu as a “Parisian authority” and this echoes a genuine situation. In fact, Richard Barbe belongs to a group of scholars who dominated the scene at the Faculty of Theology from Paris from the 1360s until the 1380s when he died. From the early times of his academic instruction, he joined the cluster of bachelors and *magistri* that were trained either at the College de Navarre or the Sorbonne. These scholars perform theological and philosophical debates that were summarized and saved through the personal notes of Gaudet. These unique documents, initially probably produced for personal use and because of personal interest, become of general historical interest today, since they guide us to discover a hidden part of the iceberg: unknown authors and their doctrinal portraits. Long prior to the College of Harcourt and the tension caused by events like the 1375 dissemination of heretical texts of Marsilius of Padou and Jean of Jandun inflaming the university, Gaudet and his contemporaries, such as Francis Bacon, John Hiltalingen of Basil, or Angelus Dobelinus provided a lens through which we can discover Richard Barbe today. He is interested in metaphysical discussions about the nature and actions of the first necessary being and seems to have emerged from the trend of Parisian theologians fascinated by the theory of intensity of forms and degrees of intensity of the qualities of species. He is a devotee disciple of John of Ripa and is recognized by his contemporaries for embracing and disseminating Ripa's ideas. His portrait brings to light a new piece of the puzzle concerning the intellectual heritage of the Faculty of Theology in Paris just before the Great Schism.

In this landscape, here are the ideas that interested Richard Barbe:

1. Discussion on the institution of the sacraments (via the Viennese theologians)

2. The nature of the infinite latitude of the perfection of things (via Gaudet's notes)

3. The nature of the first necessary being (via Gaudet's notes)

4. Discussion on divine causation (Gaudet f. 117r)

5. Some ideas about the beatific vision (via Hiltalingen's quotes)

6. Some ideas about Divine will and its relation with the futures contingents (via Francis Bacon)

7. The idea concerning the integrity of the Bible as an article of faith (via Angelus Dobelinus)

These titles of questions can be attributed to Richard Barbe's name.

### Book I, Q. 3: *Utrum divina essencia sit respectu futurorum contingentium evidens notitia.*\*

\*<Q. 1> *Utrum ineffabile primum esse possit facere latitudinem perfectionis rerum infinitam terminatam ad primum gradum entis.*
<Q. 2> *Utrum primum necesse esse per suum agree possit unam rem in aliam convertere.*

<Q. 3> *Utrum divina essentia sit omnium aliorum a se modis omnibus, id est omni gradu cause simpliciter causa prima.*

<Q. 4> *Utrum divina voluntas sit cuiuslibet nostre actionis prima regula.*

<Q. 5> *Utrum voluntas iam elevata et beata in dilectione omnimoda sit ex lege certo gradu limitata.*\*

Two appendices are added to this paper. In the first one I propose a translation in English of the two first questions based on a transcription made by Alexandra Baneu who generously gave me access to the Latin text from Paris, BnF, lat. 16408, ff. 16v–17r collated with Paris, BnF, lat. 16409, ff. 33v–35v. The aims of this translation are also to give a taste of the complexity of this text and the difficulty involved in following some the ideas displayed here.

The second appendix focuses on the two other questions and reproduces the two variants of their content as can be read in manuscript Paris, BnF, lat. 16408 (f. 94v, 117r) collated with Paris, BnF, lat. 16409, f. 177v. Florina Hariga also shared with me the transcription of folia 94r–v. I present her transcription in parallel with the summary of the question that can be read in the same manuscript Paris, BnF, lat. 16408, f. 117r. This summary is also edited by Glorieux,<fnref n="82" /> but here I propose a new transcription. I add G in the apparatus showing Glorieux’s variants.

Appendix I

<Q. 1> *Utrum ineffabile primum esse possit facere latitudinem perfectionis rerum infinitam terminatam ad primum gradum entis.*

Whether the ineffable first being can make the infinite latitude of the perfection of things limited at the first degree of being.

<table><thead><tr><th>Positio Barbe de simili materia<br>[P1 16v-17r] / [P2 33v-35v]<br>Edit A. Baneu</th><th>Barbe's position on the same matter<br>Translation M. Brinzei</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>[1] Utrum ineffabile primum esse possit facere latitudinem perfectionis rerum infinitam terminatam ad primum gradum entis<sup>83</sup>.<br>Circa istam difficultatem ponuntur quattuor.<sup>84</sup><br>Primo: tria dicta. Secundo: tria notabilia. Tertio: tres propositiones. Quarto: tres conclusiones.</td><td>[1] Whether the ineffable first being can make the infinite latitude of the perfection of things limited at the first degree of being.<br>Concerning this difficulty four things are posited. First: three statements. Second: three notable things. Third: three propositions. Fourth: three theses.</td></tr><tr><td>[2] Primum dictum sit istud quod 'primum ineffabile esse' non potest nominari aliquo creato esse quin supponere possit pro se [P2]</td><td>[2] Let the first statement be this: that 'ineffable first being' cannot be called by any created being without being able to suppose it for itself</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote n="82">⁸² GLORIEUX 1966: 97–98.</footnote>

<footnote n="83">⁸³ utrum – entis] *questio add. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="84">⁸⁴ circa – quattuor] *positio add. in marg. P1*</footnote>
34r] in aliqua propositione personaliter vel materialiter<fnref n="85" />.

[3] Secundum dictum sit quod sola divina essentia potest esse nominatio propria non enigmatica de sua natura. Patet, nam omnis alia nominatio sive vox sive conceptus est immediate sui ipsius representativa seu representativus<fnref n="86" />.

[4] Tertium dictum, quod si viator possit habere conceptum proprium de divina natura, hoc tamen non est de communi lege currente, sicut apparuit de Paulo rapto usque ad tertium celum et de Moyse<fnref n="87" />.

<Secundum>

<Tria notabilia>

[5] Circa secundum, notandum est quod latitudo perfectionis rerum dupliciter<fnref n="88" /> potest accipi: uno modo in esse communiter, et sic accipitur per recessum a non gradu; alio modo in esse distinctim, et sic accipitur per replicationem divine unitatis<fnref n="89" />.

[6] Secundo notandum<fnref n="90" /> est quod quedam est latitudo perfectionis rerum que dicitur inter individua eiusdem speciei, alia inter species, alia inter genera, alia aggregata ex omnibus istis. Et in ista tota latitudine sunt tres modi rerum: quedam sunt accidentia, quedam substantie, quedam nec substantie nec accidentia.

[7] Tertio notandum<fnref n="91" /> est quod nullus gradus specificus in tali latitudine est simpliciter indivisibilis, quia signata differentia specifica hominis quam superaddit species hominis, puta esse rationale, tale esse aut<fnref n="92" /> correspondet divisibiliter speciei hominis aut indivisibiliter. Si primum, ergo gradus specificus hominis non est indivisibilis, sed divisibilis latitudinaliter. Si indivisibiliter, igitur in latitudine esse<fnref n="93" /> rationalis, que latitudo est denominatio perfectionis simpliciter, est aliquis gradus simpliciter immediatus non gradui. Consequens falsum, cum talis latitudo se habeat per modum continui. Et sic apparet quod quilibet gradus

in some proposition, personally or materially.

[3] Let the second statement be that only ‘divine essence’ can be a proper naming that is not enigmatic of its nature. This is clear, for every other naming or vocalization or concept is immediately representative of itself.

[4] The third statement: that if the wayfarer can have a proper concept of the divine nature, nevertheless this is not of the current common law, as was apparent from Paul’s rapture up to third heaven, and from Moses.

<The Second: Three >

[5] Regarding the second, it is to be noted that the latitude of the perfection of things can be taken in two ways: in one way, in being in common, and in this way it is taken according to the separation from a non-degree; in another way in being in a distinct way, and in this way it is taken according to the replication of the divine unity.

[6] Second it is to be noted that there is a certain latitude of the perfection of things which is said to be between individuals of the same species, another that is between species, another between genera, another that is combine from all of these. And in this entire latitude there are three modes of things: some are accidents, some are substances, and some are neither substances nor accidents.

[7] Third it is to be noted that no specific degree in such a latitude is indivisible without qualification, because when the specific difference of human that the species of man adds, namely rational being, is signified, such being either corresponds divisibly to the species of human or indivisibly. If the first, then the specific degre of human is not indivisible, but divisible latitudinally. If indivisibly, then in the latitude of rational being, which latitude is the denomination of perfection without qualification, there is some degree that is

<footnote n="85">⁸⁵ primum – materialiter] primum dictum *add. in marg.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="86">⁸⁶ secundum – representativus] secundum *add. in marg.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="87">⁸⁷ tertium – Moyse] tertium *add. in marg.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="88">⁸⁸ dupliciter] *om. P2*</footnote>

<footnote n="89">⁸⁹ circa secundum – unitatis] primum notabile *add. in marg.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="90">⁹⁰ secundo notandum] secundum notandum *add. in marg.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="91">⁹¹ tertio notandum] tertium notandum *add. in marg.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="92">⁹² aut] sup. lin. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="93">⁹³ esse] essentiali *add. sed del.* P2</footnote>
specificus continet in se latitudinem
intensivam. Addit<fnref n="94" />, verum est, quod quidam
moderni dicunt quod quedam est latitudo
uniformis, alia uniformiter difformis, alia
difformiter difformis.

[8] Latitudo uniformis est que tenet continue unam formam, unde ille/illo motus dicitur uniformis, quia<fnref n="95" /> continue<fnref n="96" /> tenet<fnref n="97" /> unum gradum sine alica intensione vel remissione.

[9] Latitudo uniformiter difformis motus que non continue sic retinet unam formam, sed variatur [P2 34v] velocius aut tardius intendendo vel remittendo.

[10] Latitudo difformiter difformis est que in sua
diffornitate non tenet unam formam, sed in
partibus equalibus temporis inequales latitudines
acquirit. Sic suo modo diceretur de latitudine
perfectionis rerum quod posset<fnref n="98" /> isto triplici
modo<fnref n="99" /> se habere.<fnref n="100" />

<Tertium: Tres propositiones>

[11] Circa tertium pono propositiones<fnref n="101" />.
Prima sit ista, quod claudit contradictionem in re
ponere latitudinem perfectionis rerum esse
uniformem<fnref n="102" />. Probatur sic, quia latitudo
uniformis tenet continue unam formam seu
unum gradum perfectionis equivalenter, sed hoc
est impossibile in latitudine perfectionis rerum.
Hoc enim non est possibile inter species aut
individua diversarum specierum, ut omnes
concedunt, nec inter individua eiusdem speciei.
Probatur, nam si detur oppositum, omnis ratio
essentialis que correspondet uni, et alteri, sive sit
numeralis sive specificus ille gradus, et sic idem
erit gradus secundum utramque rationem, igitur
penitus essent idem, quod est falsum<fnref n="103" />.

without qualification immediate to a non-degree.
The consequent is false, since such a latitude is
disposed in the manner of a continuum. And so
it appears that every specific degree contains in
itself an insentisive latitude. He adds, it is true,
that some moderns say that there is a uniform
latitude, another uniformly difform, another
difformly difform.

[8] A uniform latitude is that which maintains
continously one form, hence its movement is
called uniform because it continuosly maintains
one degree without any intension or remission.

[9] A uniformly difform latitude of motion is
that which does not continuously maintain one
form, but varies [P2 34v] faster or slower by
intensifying or remitting.

[10] A difformly difform latitude is that which
does not maintain one form in its difformity, but
acquires unequal latitudes in equal parts of time.
Thus in its own way it would be said of the
latitude of the perfection of things that it could
be disposed in this threefold manner.

<The Third: Three propositions>

[11] Concerning the third I posit propositions.
Let the first be this: it includes contradiction to
posit in reality that the latitude of perfection of
things is uniform. This is proved in this way,
because a uniform latitude continually maintains
one form or one degree of perfection
equivalently, but this is impossible in the latitude
of perfection of things. For this is not possible
between species or individuals of different
species, as all agree, nor between individuals of
the same species. This is proved, for if the
opposite is granted, every essential ratio that

<footnote n="94">⁹⁴ addit] add. in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="95">⁹⁵ quia] quo sup. lin. p. c. P2</footnote>

<footnote n="96">⁹⁶ continue] continet a. c. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="97">⁹⁷ continue tenet] continet P2</footnote>

<footnote n="98">⁹⁸ posset] se add. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="99">⁹⁹ modo] posset add. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="100">¹⁰⁰ verum – se habere] non proprie dicuntur hec add. in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="101">¹⁰¹ propositiones] propositiones iter. in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="102">¹⁰² prima – uniformem] sequitur igitur quod non sunt comparabiles linee add. in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="103">¹⁰³ prima sit – falsum] prima add. in marg. P1</footnote>
[12] Corollarium:<fnref n="104" /> ex hoc sequitur quod, sicut impossibile est ponere latitudinem uniformem perfectionis rerum, ita impossibile est ponere latitudinem uniformem negationum. Patet, quia sicut due res non sunt equaliter perfecte, ita due negationes correspondentes non sunt equaliter imperfecte.

[13] [P1 17r] Secunda propositio sit ista: quod latitudo perfectionis rerum est uniformiter difformis<fnref n="105" />. Patet satis ex prima. Sed ulterius probatur sic, quia latitudo perfectionis rerum se habet ad modum numeri ascendendo; sed talis latitudo est uniformiter difformis<fnref n="106" />. Patet intuenti in numero binario, ternario, et sic de aliis. [1]

[14] Corollarium:<fnref n="107" /> ex hoc sequitur quod latitudo negationum est uniformiter difformis, quia per oppositum se habent<fnref n="108" /> ad latitudinem suarum affirmationum sic quod negatio perfectioris rei est imperfectionis.

[15] Tertia propositio<fnref n="109" /> est<fnref n="110" /> quod claudit contradictionem in re quod inter quoscumque gradus illius latitudinis sit dare vacuum alicuius perfectionis. Probatur, quia tales perfectiones inferiores eminenter sunt et perfectiori modo in suo superiori continentur quam<fnref n="111" /> in se ipsis, igitur species superior continet totam latitudinem uniformiter difformem usque ad non gradum, igitur non est possibile ponere vacuum in<fnref n="112" /> tali latitudine.

[16] Corollarium:<fnref n="113" /> ex hoc sequitur quod, si per ymaginationem asinus et leo annichilarentur perfectione hominis remanente, non minus tota latitudo illius perfectionis terminaretur [P2 35r] equivalenter ad non gradum quam si de facto ille species inferiores<fnref n="114" /> ponerentur<fnref n="115" />.

corresponds to one, [corresponds] to the other, whether that degree be numerical or specific, and so the degree will be the same according to both ratios, therefore they would be completely the same [degree], which is false.

[12] Corollary: it follows from this that, just as it is impossible to posit a uniform latitude of the perfection of things, so also it is impossible to posit a uniform latitude of negations. This is clear, because just as two things are not equally perfect, so also the two corresponding negations are not equally imperfect.

[13] Let the second proposition be this: that the latitude of the perfection of things is uniformly difform. This is clear enough from the first proposition. But this is further proven in this way: because the latitude of the perfection of things is disposed in the way of number in ascending; but such a latitude is uniformly difform. This is clear to the observer in number which is binary, ternary, and so on.

[14] Corollary: from this it follows that the latitude of negations is uniformly difform, because they are disposed in a opposite way to the latitude of their affirmations, such that the negation of a more perfect thing is more imperfect.

[15] The third proposition is that it includes a contradiction in reality that between any degrees of that latitude there is a vacuum of some perfection. This is proven, because such inferior perfections exist eminently and are contained in a more perfect way in their superior than in themselves; therefore, the superior species contains the whole uniformly difform latitude up until a non-degree; therefore it is not possible to posit a vacuum in such a latitude.

[16] Corollary: it follows from this that if through the imagination an ass and a lion were annihilated with the perfection of man

<footnote n="104">¹⁰⁴ corollarium] *in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="105">¹⁰⁵ latitudo – difformis] non est latitudo *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="106">¹⁰⁶ latitudo – uniformiter difformis] nec uniformiter difformis igitur etc. *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="107">¹⁰⁷ corollarium] *in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="108">¹⁰⁸ habent] sup. lin. p. c., habet a. c. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="109">¹⁰⁹ tertia propositio] *iter. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="110">¹¹⁰ est] sup. lin. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="111">¹¹¹ quam] quod *P2*</footnote>

<footnote n="112">¹¹² in] latitudine add. sed del. P2</footnote>

<footnote n="113">¹¹³ corollarium] *in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="114">¹¹⁴ inferiores] inflorenter P1P2</footnote>

<footnote n="115">¹¹⁵ ex hoc – ponerentur] *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>
<Quartum: Tres conclusiones>

[17] Circa quartum<sup>116</sup> sit prima conclusio,<sup>117</sup> quod ineffabile primum esse potest facere latitudinem perfectionis infinitam exclusive terminatam ad primum gradum entis. Probatur sic: non magis repugnanter se habet talis latitudo infinita quam aliquis gradus finitus illius latitudinis; sed ipse potest ponere gradum finitum in illa latitudine; igitur et infinitum. Probatur consequentia, nam ita continet ineffabile primum esse gradum infinitum sicut finitum<sup>118</sup>, nec talis gradus repugnanter se habet ad esse propter propinquitatem ad primum gradum entis quod dicitur centrum unitivum cuiuslibet perfectionis.

[18] Corollarium:<sup>119</sup> ex hoc sequitur quod potest facere infinitam perfectionem intensive, quamvis non possit facere infinite remissam, et sic patet in forma ad titulum<sup>120</sup> questionis quod potest facere infinitam latitudinem perfectionis rerum exclusive terminatam ad primum gradum entis, et non solum talem latitudinem potest facere,<sup>121</sup> sed<sup>122</sup> impossibile<sup>123</sup> aliquo genere factionis.

Ex hoc ulterius infert quod magis est potens
super impossibile quam super posse esse
 creature.

[

19] Secunda conclusio<sup>124</sup> est quod latitudo
perfectionis rerum debet mensurari penes
summum gradum entis. Probatur: ab illo debet
denominari talis latitudo in quod concurrit
unitive tota latitudo perfectionis rerum vel in
quod super immense eminenter relucet, sed hoc
est in tali supremo gradu.

[20] Corollarium:<fnref n="125" /> ex hoc infero quod non omnis latitudo uniformiter difformis debet mensurari penes gradum medium, sed penes

remaining, the whole latitude of that perfection
would no less be terminated [P2 35r]
equivalently to a non-degree than if the facto
those lower species were posited.

<The fourth: three conclusions>

[17] Concerning the fourth let the first conclusion be that the ineffable first being can make an infinite latitude of perfection exclusively terminated at the first degree of being. This is proven thus: such an infinite latitude is not more contradictorily disposed than any finite degree of that latitude; but he can posit a finite degree in that latitude; therefore <he can also posit> an infinite degree. The consequence is proven, for the ineffable first being contains an infinite degree just as a finite one, nor is such a degree contradictorily disposed towards being because of the proximity to the first degree of being, which is called the unitive center of any perfection.

[18] Corollary: it follows from this that <God>
can make an infinite perfection intensively,
although He cannot make an infinitely remiss
one, and thus is clear in form with respect to
the title of the question that He can make an
infinite latitude of perfection of things
exclusively terminated at the first degree of
being, and not only can He make such a latitude,
but also an impossible for any genus of making.
From this he further infers that he is more
powerful over the impossible than over the
creatures being able to be.

[19] The second conclusion is that the latitude of the perfection of things must be measured by the highest degree of being. This is proved: such a latitude must be denominated from that in which into which the entire latitude of perfection of things concurs as a unit, or in which it is reflected superimmensely and eminently; but this is in such a supreme degree.

[20] Corollary: from this I infer that not every
uniformly deform latitude should be measured

<footnote n="116">¹¹⁶ quartum] tertium ms. P1P2</footnote>

<footnote n="117">¹¹⁷ circa - conclusio] circa tertiam tertiam prima conclusio *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="118">¹¹⁸ finitum] infinitum a. c. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="119">¹¹⁹ corollarium] *in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="120">¹²⁰ titulum] que sunt *add. sed del. P2*</footnote>

<footnote n="121">¹²¹ potest facere] *in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="122">¹²² sed] in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="123">¹²³ impossibile] est facere *add. sed del. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="124">¹²⁴ secunda conclusio] *iter. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="125">¹²⁵ corollarium] *in marg. P1*</footnote>
summum.

[21] Tertia conclusio<fnref n="126" /> est quod impossibile est quod in tali latitudine aliquis gradus sit ita intensus sicut remissus. Probatur, quia aliter sequeretur quod in latitudine infinita gradus infinite intensus esset infinite remissus, et motus infinite velocitatis esset infinite tarditatis, et quantitas infinite magnitudinis esset infinite parvitatis. Consequens est absurdum. Et consequentia probatur, quia ex quo idem esset esse intensum sicut esse remissum, sicut aliquis acquireret gradum intenssum, ita remissum.

[22] Corollarium:<fnref n="127" /> ex quo sequitur quod intensissio et remissio quodam modo privative se habent, unum per recessum a non [P2 35v] gradu, aliud per accessum<fnref n="128" /> ad non gradum. Et hec sufficiat de hac longua positione.

by the middle degree, but by the highest one.

[21] The third conclusion is that it is impossible for any degree in such a latitude to be as intense as it is remiss. This is proven, because otherwise it would follow that in an infinite latitude an infinitely intense degree would be infinitely remiss, and a motion of infinite velocity would be of infinitely slowness, and a quantity of infinite magnitude would be of infinite smallness. The consequent is absurd. And the consequence is proven, because from the fact that it would be the same thing to be intense as to be remiss, just as someone would acquire an intense degree, so also a remiss degree.

[22] Corollary: from which it follows that intension and remission are in some ways disposed privatively, one through withdrawing from a non [P2 35v] degree, the other through approaching a non-degree. And let this suffice concerning this long position.

<Q. 2> *Utrum primum necesse esse per suum agere possit unam rem in aliam convertere.*
Whether the first necessarily being through its actions can turn one thing into another.

Positio Barbe
[P1 25r-v]/[P2 52v-54v]
Edit A. Baneu

[1] Utrum primum necesse esse per suum agere possit unam rem in aliam convertere. In hoc dubio videndum est primo de primo necesse esse; secundo de ipsius agere; tertio<fnref n="129" /> de ipsius posse<fnref n="130" />.

<De primo necesse esse>

[2] Circa primum<fnref n="131" /> pono tres propositiones. Prima propositio<fnref n="132" /> sit ista: claudit contradictionem in re primum necesse esse habere negationem sibi oppositam. Probatur, quia, si sic, hoc esset Deum non esse, sed hoc claudit repugnantiam in re, cum sit impossibile implicans utramque partem, et sic poneret

Barbe's Position
Translation M. Brinzei

[1] Whether the first necessarily being through its actions can turn one thing into another. In this question it must be seen first about the first necessary being; second about its actions; third about its power.

[2] Concerning the first I posit three propositions. Let the first proposition be this: it includes a contradiction in reality for the first necessarily existing being to have a negation opposite to it. This is proven, because, if it did, this would be God's not existing, but this includes a contradiction in reality, since it is

<footnote n="126">¹²⁶ tertia conclusio] *iter. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="127">¹²⁷ corollarium] *in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="128">¹²⁸ accessum] recessum *P2*</footnote>

<footnote n="129">¹²⁹ tertio] tertius *P2*</footnote>

<footnote n="130">¹³⁰ posse] passo *P2*</footnote>

<footnote n="131">¹³¹ circa primum] primus articulus *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="132">¹³² prima propositio] prima propositio *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>
affirmationem sibi oppositam. Confirmatur et
quero a quo esset ‘Deum non esse’. Vel ex se
vel ab alio. Si ex se, igitur Deum non esse esset
ita necesse esse sicut Deum esse. Si ab alio, et
non potest esse nisi a primo necesse esse,
igitur<sup>133</sup> primum necesse esse faceret<sup>134</sup> quod
‘necesse esse’ esset [P2 53r] impossibile esse.
Ex hoc sequitur<sup>135</sup> quod claudit contradictionem
in re ponere negationem immensam, ymo
negatio totalis entitatis foret maior<sup>136</sup>, cum nulla
possit esse nisi illa que opponeretur primo
necesse esse.

[3] Secunda propositio<sup>137</sup>: ex quolibet gradu
essendi futuro sequitur primum necesse esse<sup>138</sup>.
Probatur sic: sicut<sup>139</sup> impossibile est numerum
esse quin sit unitas et replicetur numerus per
unitatem, ita impossibile est aliquem gradum
entis esse nisi per replicationem primi necesse
esse. Constat autem quod quilibet numerus infert
replicari unitatem, igitur quilibet gradus essendi
infert primum necesse esse. Hec apparet per
Linconensem in *De angelica ierarchia*, capitulo
secundo, ubi declarat quomodo nedum entia
ymo non entia clamant Deum esse naturali
evidentia, sicut effectus infert suam causam. Ex
hoc infero quod<sup>140</sup> falsa et erronea clamant
Deum esse, sicut antecedens infert suum
consequens, et quod necessaria consecutive
sequitur.

[4] Tertia propositio<sup>141</sup>: primum necesse <esse>
excludit totam latitudinem contingentis
possibilis. Probatur consequentia, quia si
includit intrinsece latitudinem entis possibilis,
ipsum posset non esse, quod claudit
contraditionem per primam propositionem.
Infero quod<sup>142</sup> claudit<sup>143</sup> contradictionem plura

something impossible implying both sides, and
in thus it would posit the affirmation opposed to
it.

This is confirmed, and I ask from what it would
be that God does not exist. Either from himself
or from another. If from himself, then God's not
existing would be as necessary as God's
existing. If from another, and it cannot be except
from the first necessary being, then the first
necessary being would make that what
necessarily exists would be [P2 53r] impossible
to exist. From this it follows that it includes a
contradiction in reality to posit an immense
negation, indeed, the negation it would be the
negation of whole of existence, since there can
be no entity except that which would be opposed
to the first being necessary.

[3] The second proposition: the first necessary
being follows from every future degree of being.
This is proven thus: just as it is impossible for
number to exist without there being unity and
for number being replicated by unity, so it is
impossible for any degree of being to exist
except through the replication of the first
necessary being. But it is agreed that every
number entails that unity is replicated, therefore
every degree of being entails the first necessary
being. This is apparent through the Bishop of
Lincoln (Robert Grosseteste) in *The Angelic
Hierarchy*, chapter two, where he explains how
not only beings, but non-beings, proclaim that
God exists by natural evidence, just as the effect
entails its cause. From this I infer that false and
erroneous things proclaim that God exists, just
as the antecedent entails its consequent, and
follows necessary things consecutively.

[4] The third proposition: the first necessary <being> excludes the entire latitude of possible contingent <being>. The consequence is proven, because if it includes intrinsically the latitude of possible being, this would be able not to be, which includes a contradiction according to the first proposition. I infer that it includes a

<footnote n="133">133 igitur] Deus add. sed del. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="134">134 faceret] facere P2</footnote>

<footnote n="135">135 ex hoc sequitur] corollarium add. in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="136">136 ymo – maior] in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="137">137 secunda propositio] secunda propositio add. in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="138">138 esse] sup. lin. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="139">139 sicut] sup. lin. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="140">140 ex hoc infero quod] corollarium add. in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="141">141 tertia propositio] tertia propositio add. in marg, P1</footnote>

<footnote n="142">142 infero quod] corollarium add. in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="143">143 claudit] p. c. P1</footnote>
necesse esse eque prima. Probatur sic: sicut
impossibile est duos numeros esse eque
imperfectos, ita impossibile est duos gradus
essendi esse equaliter perfectos. Sed primum est
impossibile, igitur secundum.

Secundus articulus<sup>144</sup>

[5] Circa secundum, scilicet de divino agere prima propositio<sup>145</sup> est ista quod primum necesse esse per suum agere non potest esse forma constitutiva intrinsece alicuius rei tertie. Probatur sic, nam tunc<sup>146</sup> constitutum ex deitate et creatura esset tam perfectum sicut deitas. Haberet enim deitatem formam sui essentialem, que non potest esse remissus actus vel forma alteri, quam sit in sua natura; sed tale compositum esset realiter distinctum a deitate; ergo aliquid distinctum a deitate esset ita perfectum<sup>147</sup> essentialiter sicut deitas. Confirmatur: tale compositum esset contingens et non per se necesse esse et esset depen[P2 53v]dens a partibus componentibus, ergo non esset ens universaliter perfectum.

Infero quod<sup>148</sup> impossibile est aliquam formam
esse constitutivam et non esse simpliciter
dependentem. Probatur, nam omnis forma
subsistens non propria subsistentia, sed aliena<sup>149</sup>
est alico modo dependens; sed omnis forma
constitutiva est huiusmodi, nam ordinatur ad
ulteriorem unitatem in tertio in quo ultimate
subsistit.

[6] Secunda propositio<sup>150</sup>: primum necesse esse per suum agere non potest formam accidentalem communicare alicui subiecto vel materie per modum forme alicuius rei tertie distincte constitutive. Probatur sic: quelibet forma de genere accidentis est alicuius substantie velud proprie subsistentie, ergo si<sup>151</sup> ultra<sup>152</sup> hoc forma

contradiction for there to be more than one
equally first necessary beings. This is proven
thus: just as it is impossible for two numbers to
be equally imperfect, so it is impossible for two
degrees of being to be equally perfect. But the
first is impossible, therefore so is the second.

The Second Article

[5] Concerning the second, namely about divine
acting, the first proposition is this: the first
necessary being cannot by its own acting be an
intrinsically constitutive form of any third thing.
This is proven thus, for then something
constituted out of deity and creature would be as
perfect as deity. For it would have deity as its
essential form, which cannot be a remiss act or
form for anything else than it is in its own
nature; but such a composite would be really
distinct from deity; therefore, something distinct
from deity would be as essentially perfect deity.
This is confirmed: such a composite would be
contingent, and not per se a necessary being, and
it would be dependent on the component parts,
therefore it would not be a universally perfect
being.

I infer that it is impossible for any form to be
constitutive and not be simply dependent. This is
proven, for every subsisting form is in some way
dependent not by its own subsistence, but by an
alien subsistence; but every constitutive form is
of this kind, for it is ordered to a further unity in
the third thing in which it ultimately subsists.

[6] The second proposition: through its acting
the first necessary being cannot communicate an
accidental form to any subject or matter by way
of the form of any third distinct constitutive
thing. This is proven thus: every form of the
genus of accidental is of some substance as its
own subsistence, therefore if beyond this the
form concurs in the constitution of a third thing
together with the subject, it follows that third
thing will be the subsistence of each because the
parts are in potency in the whole and participate

<footnote n="144">144 secundus articulus] *iter. in marg.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="145">145 prima propositio] iter. in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="146">146 nam tunc] sup. lin. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="147">147 perfectum] et add. sed del. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="148">148 infero quod] corollarium *add. in marg.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="149">149 aliena] sed add. sed del. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="150">150 secunda propositio] *add. in marg.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="151">151 si] suum a. c. P1, om. P2</footnote>

<footnote n="152">152 ultra] con add. sed del. P2</footnote>
concurrat ad constitutionem tertii simul cum
subiecto, sequitur quod tale tertium erit
subsistentia utriusque eo quod partes sunt in
potentia in toto et participant esse totius. Infero
quod<fnref n="153" /> non est possibile aliquam formam de
genere accidentis esse alicuius entitatis
partialem essentiam. Probatur sic: si albedo
gratia exempli informans subiectum est partialis
forma alicuius, et non subiecti, cum non sit pars
subiecti, igitur utriusque, igitur substantia
subsisteret ultimate, per tertium dictum, et sic
substantia subsisteret per accidens.

[7] Tertia propositio<fnref n="154" /> quod primum necesse
esse per suum agere potest formam
substantialem creatam communicare alicui per
modum constitutive tertie rei distincte, quia
forma substantialis est causa formalis compositi,
ergo constituit compositum.

[8] Corollarium:<fnref n="155" /> quod compositum ex materia et forma est realiter distinctum a partibus simul sumptis, cum compositum possit corrumpiti partibus manentibus.

Hec de isto articulo. Sequitur tertius articulus.

Tertius articulus<fnref n="156" />

[9] Circa tertium de ipsius posse sit prima propositio<fnref n="157" />, quod Deus potest communicare creature causalitatem qua una res convertitur in aliam. Probatur sic: sit unus terminus datus finitus, puta A, et sit B duplus, tunc arguitur sic: A est causalitas communicata creature, et cum B non in infinitum excedat A, sequitur quod causalitas respectu B est communicabilis [P2 54r] creature ; sed motus quo una res convertitur in aliam est finitus, ut suppono, ergo<fnref n="158" /> etc.

[10] Corollarium<fnref n="159" />: respectu cuiuslibet<fnref n="160" /> termini finiti possibile est causam secundam per

in the being of the whole. I infer that it is not
possible for any form of the genus of accident to
be the partial essence of any entity. This is
proven thus: if, for example, the whiteness
informing a subject is partial form of something,
and not of the subject, since it is not a part of the
subject, therefore of both, therefore the
substance would subsist ultimately, according to
the third statement, and thus the substance
would subsist through the accident.

[7] The third proposition is that the first necessary being by its acting can communicate a created substantial form to something by way of a constitutive third distinct thing, because the substantial form is the formal cause of the composite, therefore it constitutes the composite.

[8] The corollary: that the composite out of matter and form is really distinct from the parts taken together, since the composite can be corrupted with the parts remaining. These things for this article. The third article follows.

The third article

[9] Concerning the third [article] *let* the first proposition about this possibility be this: that God can communicate to a creature the causality by which one thing is transformed into another. This is proven thus: let one given terminus be finite, say A, and let B be double; then it is argued thus: A is a causality communicated to a creature, and since B does not exceed A in infinity, it follows that the causality with respect to B is communicable [P2 54r] to the creature; but the motion by which one thing is transformed into another is finite, as I suppose; therefore, etc.

[10] Corollary: with respect to any finite terminus, it is possible for the second cause to concur effectively through essential causality,

<footnote n="153">¹⁵³ infero quod] corollarium *add. in marg. P1*, supple per modum partis xxxx *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="154">¹⁵⁴ tertia propositio] tertia propositio *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="155">¹⁵⁵ corollarium] corollarium *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="156">¹⁵⁶ tertius articulus] *in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="157">¹⁵⁷ prima propositio] *iter. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="158">¹⁵⁸ ergo] igitur P2</footnote>

<footnote n="159">¹⁵⁹ corollarium] corollarium *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="160">¹⁶⁰ cuiuslibet] rei *add. sed del. P1*</footnote>
causalitatem essentialem concurrere effective, et sic creature potest concurrere ad productionem<fnref n="161" /> prime materie. Ex conclusione et corollario potest apparere quod Deus potest convertere unam rem in aliam cum creatura data vel dabilis possit hoc facere, quamvis non convertat unam rem in aliam per additionem gradus ad gradum realiter distinctum ab alio. Probatur sic, quia si ita esset, sequitur quod quodlibet quod cognoscitur vel videtur infinitis cognitionibus vel visionibus cognosceretur vel videretur, et ita idem simul et semel cognosceretur vel videretur intensius vel remissius per cognitionem intensiorem et remissiorem partem eius, cuius oppositum quilibet experitur.

[11] Secunda propositio<fnref n="162" />, quod primum necesse esse per suum agere non potest unam latitudinem in aliam convertere per omnimodam ydemptitatem, quia si A transit in B per omnimodam ydemptitatem, sequitur quod, sicut A est idem sibi ipsi, ita erit idem ipsi B, sed hoc claudit contradictionem, quia A potest non esse B, et econverso, et A non potest non<fnref n="163" /> esse A stante A.

[12] Corollarium<fnref n="164" />, quod contradictio est aliquam replicationem unitatis divine constitutivam alicuius speciei in alteram replicationem unitatis divine ex vi talis conversionis transire in omnimodam ydemptitatem alterius. Probatur sic<fnref n="165" />, quia manifesta est distantia vel difformitas cuiuscumque replicationis divine ad aliam latitudinem alterius replicationis quasi unius gradus remissioris ad aliam intensiorem eiusdem replicationis in eadem latitudine; sed in tali non potest fieri omnimoda conversio per omnimodam ydemptitatem; ergo etc. Et sic species inferior non potest converti in superiorem per omnimodam ydemptitatem, quod patet per conclusionem et corollarium.

[13] Tertia propositio<fnref n="166" /> est quod primum necesse esse per suum agere in tali conversione agit quod terminus a quo secundum suum totum

and so the creature can concur in the production of prime matter. From the conclusion and the corollary, it is able to be apparent that God can transform one thing into another, since a given creature or one that could be given can do this, although it does not transform one thing into another through the addition of one degree to a degree really distinct from the other. This is proven thus, because if it were so, it follows that everything that is known or seen would be known or seen by an infinite number of cognitions or visions; and thus the same thing at one and the same time would be known or seen more intense or more remiss through the more intense knowledge and its more remiss part, the opposite of which everyone experiences.

[11] The second proposition, that the first necessary being through its acting cannot convert one latitude into another through complete identity, because if A passes into B through complete identity, it follows that, just as A is the same as itself, so it will be the same as B; but this includes a contradiction, because A cannot be B, and vice versa, and A cannot not be A while remaining A.

[12] The corollary, that it is a contradiction for some replication of divine unity, which constitutes a determinate species into another, to pass, by the force of such a conversion, into a complete identity with the other, is proved. This is proven thus, because the distance or deformity of any divine replication to another latitude of another replication quasi one degree more remiss to another more intense of the same replication in the same latitude, but in such a conversion of every kind cannot be done through every kind of redemption, therefore, etc. And thus a lower species cannot be transformed into a higher one through a complete identity, which is clear from the conclusion and the corollary.

[13] The third proposition is that the first necessary being through its acting in such a transformation acts in such a way that the *terminus a quo* according to its entire substantial

<footnote n="161">¹⁶¹ productionem] creature *add. sed del. P2*</footnote>

<footnote n="162">¹⁶² secunda propositio] secunda propositio *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="163">¹⁶³ non] sup. lin. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="164">¹⁶⁴ corollarium] corollarium *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="165">¹⁶⁵ probatur sic] iter P1, sed coni.</footnote>

<footnote n="166">¹⁶⁶ tertia propositio] tertia propositio *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>
esse substantiale desinit esse. Probatur, quia terminus a quo convertitur in terminum ad quem, et non per omnimodam ydemptitatem, ut dictum est, igitur.

Infero quod<fnref n="167" /> terminus a quo talis conversionis, etsi sit terminus antiquus, tamen capit substantiale esse, aliter talis conversio esset accidentalis ad aliquale vel aliqualiter esse, quod est falsum.

Secundo infero quod stat huiusmodi conversiones [P2 54v] quantumlibet variari<fnref n="168" /> <quod> sic idem terminus potest infinities capere esse substantialiter, sicut corpus Christi per diversas conversiones capit esse substantialiter. Ex omnibus infero quod primum necesse esse per suum agere potest convertere totam latitudinem<fnref n="169" /> entis creabilis in latitudinem non entis que immediate est exclusive<fnref n="170" /> iuxta Deum.

Hec de illa positione<fnref n="171" />.

being ceases to exist. This is proven, because terminus a quo is transform into the terminus ad quem, and not through complete identity, as was said, therefore.

I infer that the terminus a quo of such a transformation, even if it is the old terminus, nevertheless takes on substantial being, otherwise such a transformation would be accidental or a certain kind of or a certain way of being, which is false.

Secondly, I infer that transformations of this kind [P2 54v] can be varied to such an extent that the same terminus can take on being an infinite number of times substantially, just as the body of Christ through various transformation takes on being substantially. I infer from all these that the first necessary being through its acting can transform the entire latitude of creatable being into the latitude of non-being which is immediately exclusively next to God. These concerning that position.

## Appendix II
Richard Barbe

<Q. 3>: *Utrum divina essentia sit omnium aliorum a se modis omnibus, id est omni genere cause, simpliciter causa prima.*

Paris, BnF, lat. 16408, f. 94r
Paris, BnF, lat. 16409, f. 177v
Editit Florina Hariga

Utrum divina essentia sit omnium aliorum a se modis omnibus prima causa. Quod omnium Ioh. 1 omnia per ipsum facta sunt. Quod modis omnibus Apostolus dicens: omnia ex ipso per ipsum etc. Ad hoc videtur esse Dyonisius, De divinis nominibus, dicens omnis virtus omnis operatio etc. Alibi.

**Ad oppositum**, quia non est causa obiective possibilitatis rerum. Item nec materialiter, nec formaliter causat.

**Secunda conclusio**:<fnref n="172" /> Omni modo causalitatis positivo non habente necessario annexam imperfectionem quo aliqua res est causalis Deus

Septima responsio de quolibet Magistro
*Ricardo Barbe*
Paris, BnF, lat. 16408, f. 117r
Editit P. Glorieux p. (corr. M. Brinzei)

Sicut probatur questio principalis¹⁸³: Utrum divina essentia sit omnium aliorum a se modis omnibus, id est omni genere cause, simpliciter causa prima.

(after concl. 1 in ms)

**Secunda conclusio**: omni modo seu omni genere calitatis positivo non habente necessario annexam imperfectionem quo

<footnote n="167">¹⁶⁷ infero quod] corollarium *add. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="168">¹⁶⁸ variari] veniari *P2*</footnote>

<footnote n="169">¹⁶⁹ latitudinem] non add. sup. lin. sed del. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="170">¹⁷⁰ exclusive] exclusiva *P2*</footnote>

<footnote n="171">¹⁷¹ positione] Gregorius *add. sed del. P2*</footnote>

<footnote n="172">¹⁷² **Secunda conclusio**: prima conclusio *add. sed del.*, secunda conclusio *add in marg. P1*</footnote>
illam causat et capitur hic ly 'omni modo' pro generibus vel speciebus singulorum non pro singulis generum. Deus enim non causat modo quo ignis agit etc. Patet, nam quidquid est perfectionis in creaturis attribuendum Deo remota¹⁷³ imperfectione vel per aliam quidquid est perfectionis simpliciter, sic quod inquolibet est melius ipsum quam non ipsum est Deo tribuendum.

Sequitur quod est cuiuslibet creati esse causa finalis. Patet, quia finis quid ultimum et optimum.

Sequitur secundo quod est efficiens cuiuslibet ad extra producti, quia melius est hoc ipsum quam non ipsum.

Sequitur tertio quod non est forma, quia quamvis dependentia sit separabilis non constitutio tertii et potentialitas, alioquin etiam posset sustineri quod causet materialiter et esset materia etc.

**Prima conclusio**<fnref n="174" />: sola actualis existentia creature est terminus divine productionis ad extra. Patet per universalem de terminis transpositis. Omne enim productum ad extra est creatura actu existens.

Sequitur contra Bredwardinem parte 3, capitulo 5, quod velle Dei solum simpliciter continens non est primum productum a divina<fnref n="175" /> voluntate<fnref n="176" />.

Sequitur contra eundem quod nec preteritio, nec possibilitas obiectiva, nec futuritio sunt terminus vel termini etc.

Sequitur idem de privationibus et non esse. Patet ex conclusione et possent aliter probari.

**Tertia conclusio**<fnref n="177" />: divina essentia anime vel humanitati Christi solum est causa finalis<fnref n="178" />, efficiens, producens ac conservans. Patet ex ultimo corollario secunde conclusionis, quia nec forma, nec materia. Et ex conclusione aliqualiter, cum anima non sit causabilis materialiter, nec formaliter essentialiter. Item vel daret esse creatum vel increatum etc.

**Primum**\* corollarium<fnref n="179" />: Sequitur primo quod huius habitudo que est<fnref n="180" /> deitatis vel Dei vel filii Dei ad humanitatem assumptam non est causalis formalis. Patet clare, quin ymo magis similis materiali quam formali, sicut enim materia est subsistentia ipsi forme sic in proposito saltem

aliqua res est causabilis, Deus est aut esse potest illius causa. Patet ex regula theologica, sequitur quod est causa finalis, sequitur quod est efficiens, sequitur quod non est formalis propter quantificare et constituere¹⁸⁴ etc. et quia eodem modo per omnia posset poni materialis.

**Prima conclusio** sola actualis existentia creature est terminus divine productionis ad extra.

Sequitur quod /118r/ velle Dei non est principium productivum¹⁸⁵ ad extra, ut in prima obiectione¹⁸⁶ dictum fuit.

Sequitur quod nec preteritio nec futuritio nec possibilitas obiectiva rerum,¹⁸⁷ nec privatio aut quodvis non esse seu pura negatio, nullo¹⁸⁸ modo sunt terminus aut termini divine productionis ad extra.

**Tertia conclusio**: propter aliquos quod divina essentia anime vel humanitatis Christi solum fuit efficiens atque finis.

Sequitur quod huius habitudo est magis similis materiali quam formali.

<footnote n="183">¹⁸³ sicut probatur questio principalis] om. P2</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷⁳ remota] omni *add. sed del.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="174">¹⁷⁴ prima conclusio] *iter. in marg.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="175">¹⁷⁵ divina] *sup. lin.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="176">¹⁷⁶ divina voluntate] *tr. P2*</footnote>

<footnote n="177">¹⁷⁷ tertia conclusio] *iter. in marg.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="178">¹⁷⁸ finalis] *sup. lin.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="179">¹⁷⁹ primum corollarium] *in marg.* P1</footnote>

<footnote n="180">¹⁸⁰ est] hec *add. sed del.* P1</footnote>
alico modo.

Secundum* corollarium¹⁸¹: Sequitur clare quod non omnis dependentia est causalis. Patet clare de dependentia humanitatis a divino supposito, dicitur enim a doctoribus dependentia etc.

Tertium* corollarium¹⁸²: Sequeretur ultimo quod huius habitudo est pure credita. Patet cum nulla filii similis appareat in lumine naturali. Et sic de ista questione faciliter.

Sequitur secunda questionia infra.

Sequitur quod non omnis dependentia<fnref n="189" /> est causalis.

Sequitur quod huius habitudo est pure credita. /117v/

<Q. 4>: *Utrum divina voluntas sit cuiuslibet nostre actionis prima regula.*

Richard Barbe,
Paris, BnF, lat. 16408, f. 94v
Paris, BnF, lat. 16409, f. 178v
Editit Florina Hariga

Paris, BnF, lat. 16408, f. 117v
*Septima responsio de quolibet Magistro Ricardo Barbe*
*Editit P. Glorieux p. (corr. M. Brinzei)*

Ista melius alibi haberentur<fnref n="190" />

Utrum divina voluntas sit cuiuslibet actionis nostre prima regula directiva. Quod sic, quia attingit a fine usque ad<fnref n="191" /> finem fortiter et disponit omnia suaviter. Item in oratione “omnipotens sempiterne Deus qui celestia simul et terrena moderaris”.

Ad oppositum, quia multa prohibet que fiunt et multa precipit que non fiunt et vult peccata, igitur. Non est prima regula, nec omnia nostra sibi conformiter fiunt iuste. Premittitur distinctio de actionibus nostris in esse nature, in esse morum, et iusti in esse meriti, et secundum hoc triplex voluntas in Deo bona, beneplacens, et perfecta.

De hiis tres conclusiones. **Prima<fnref n="192" /> conclusio<fnref n="193" />:** divina voluntas est cuiuslibet actionis nostre et cuiuslibet eius modi positivi creati prima efficiens causa, ex dictis in prima conclusione.

Sequitur primo quod quodlibet quod a nobis fit

Secunda questionia illius septime rationis de quodlibet principalis fuit²⁰³: Utrum divina voluntas sit cuiuslibet nostre actionis prima regula.

**Prima conclusio**: voluntas est cuiuslibet nostre actionis et omnis eius modi²⁰⁴ positivi causa proprie effectiva²⁰⁵.

Sequitur quod quodlibet quod a nobis **sit** et

<footnote n="184">¹⁸⁴ quantificare et constituere] quantitative et constitutive G</footnote>

<footnote n="185">¹⁸⁵ productivum] productivi Glorieux</footnote>

<footnote n="186">¹⁸⁶ obiectione ] ordina*na P1, ordinaneta P2</footnote>

<footnote n="187">¹⁸⁷ rerum] aut add sed del. P2</footnote>

<footnote n="188">¹⁸⁸ nullo] ullo G</footnote>

<footnote n="189">¹⁸⁹ secundum corollarium] in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="190">¹⁹⁰ tertium corollarium] in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="191">¹⁹¹ dependentia] (...) G</footnote>

<footnote n="192">¹⁹² ista-haberentur] om. P2; haberentur] haberet a. c. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="193">¹⁹³ ad] sup. lin. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="194">¹⁹⁴ prima] iter. in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="195">¹⁹⁵ conclusio] in marg. P1</footnote>
qualitercumque positive taliter dependenter fit a divina voluntate. Patet satis deductio.

Sequitur secundo quod non qualitercumque<fnref n="194" /> fit
privative taliter a Deo dependenter fit. Patet ex
dictis in prima conclusione, cum Deus non
causet negationes ac privationes, nec per
consequens eas velit. Et iste est modus salvandi
quod Deus non sit causa peccati. Quod non
potest salvare pars adversa, scilicet
Bredwardinus, ut clarum est, ymo habet
concedere<fnref n="195" /> Deum velle peccatum et facere
actum esse peccatum, et generaliter omnes
tenentes Deum esse causam privationum et
negationum. Patet satis<fnref n="196" />.

Sequitur quod respectu huius voluntatis efficacis non est alica permissio pura sic quod nichil est quod<fnref n="197" /> Deus pure permitat quin illud efficaciter agat. Multa alibi circa hec.

**Secunda conclusio**<fnref n="198" /> que est de actionibus nostris in esse iusti est talis: voluntas divina de iusto est cuiuslibet actionis nostre recte moralis regula directiva, ista enim voluntas Dei est lex eterna de qua Augustinus dicit quod est lex eterna ordinem naturalem servari iubens, turbari vetans.

Sequitur quod huius legis vel divine voluntatis triplex est signum: lex data temporaliter, lex nature, recta ratio. Hoc tangitur et deducitur alibi. Sunt enim hec signa alicuius divine voluntatis et non efficacis, igitur voluntatis iusti vel de iusto.

Sequitur contra Magistrum Gregorium quod licet precepta sint signum vel signa simplicis<fnref n="199" /> divine complacentie in iusto<fnref n="200" />, tamen prohibitiones non sunt signa displicentie.

Sequitur ulterius quod non sunt talia solum signa
incomplexe complacentie, sed complacentie de
complexo, scilicet quod Deus vult tale quid quod
precipit esse iustum vel debitum fieri. Et circa
hoc alibi ponitur quintuplex<fnref n="201" /> volitum divinum.
Vide ibi.

qualitercumque positive,²⁰⁶ taliter sit
dependenter a Deo.

Secundo quod non est necesse quod qualitercumque sit privative taliter fiat a Deo.

Sequitur quod respectu²⁰⁷ huius voluntatis non est in Dei²⁰⁸ voluntate proprie ponenda permissio, sed respectu voluntatis approbative, ut alibi.

**Secunda conclusio** quod divina voluntas approbativa non efficax est in esse iusti vel iniusti cuiuslibet nostre actionis prima regula.

Sequitur quod huius²⁰⁹ legis, scilicet voluntatis approbative lex nostre Moysi evangelista sunt signa quia non voluntatis efficaciter notum est.

Sequitur quod licet precepta affirmativa sunt
signa simpliciter divine complacentie in iusto
non tamen propter hoc negativa²¹⁰ divine
complacentie²¹¹, quia in Deo nulla talis est.

Ulterius infertur quod huius voluntatis quadruplex potest assignari volitum. Vult enim Deus aliqua debere fieri, aliqua debere non fieri, aliqua licere fieri minora bono permissio²¹², alia expedire sibi fieri maiori bonum consilium²¹³ et sic de aliis que circa hoc occurrere possunt.

**Tertia conclusio** quelibet transgressio vel impletio huius legis seu conformitas vel²¹⁴ difformitas ad huius Dei voluntatem exscilius²¹⁵

<footnote n="203">203 secunda questio illius septe time rationis de quodlibet principalis fuit] in marg. P2</footnote>

<footnote n="204">204 modi] ... G</footnote>

<footnote n="205">205 effectiva] effectionis G</footnote>

<footnote n="194">194 qualitercumque] positive add. sed del. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="195">195 concedere] p add. sed del. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="196">196 velle peccatum-patet satis] melius alibi add. in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="197">197 quod] circa add. sup. lin. sed del. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="198">198 secunda conclusio] iter. in marg. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="199">199 simplicis] sup. lin. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="200">200 in iusto] sup. lin. P1</footnote>

<footnote n="201">201 quintuplex] triplex a.c. P1; triplex P2</footnote>
<table><tr><td><b>Tertia conclusio</b><sup>202</sup>: quelibet transgressio legis eterne vel divine voluntatis difformitas est imputabilis ad penam et quelibet impletio ad premium, et hoc ex Dei liberrima voluntate, qua sic sit libere, imputat. Et sic hec voluntas vel Deus per tale velle vel per hoc quod sic vult est prima regula actionum nostrarum in esse meriti vel demeriti. Supremus enim legislator a nullo extrinseco movetur vel artatur, sed cuncta regit voto suo iustissimo.<br>Sequitur quod iste actiones sive conformes ad premium, difformes ad supplicium possunt quantumlibet imputari.<br>Sequitur quod quodlibet peccatum etiam veniale est imputabile ad eternum supplicium cum sit transgressio legis etc.<br>Sequitur quod nullum peccatum est ex se veniale seu ad temporalem penam imputabile.<br>Ad quesitum patet ex hiis.</td><td>Dei voluntate est meritoria vel demeritoria.<br>/178v/<br><br>Sequitur quod <b>huius</b> impletio vel transgressio ponit quantumlibet imputari<sup>216</sup>.<br>Sequitur quod non est aliud ita modicum peccatum quin possit ad penam eternam imputari.<br>Sequitur quod nullum est peccatum ex se vel aliqua sibi intrinseca circumstantia veniali, nam quodlibet est transgressio etc.</td></tr></table>

<Q. 5> *Utrum voluntas iam elevata et beata in dilectione omnimoda sit ex lege certo gradu limitata.*

Apud Johannes Hiltalingen of Basel

<footnote n="206">206 positive] sit *add. sed del.* P2</footnote>

<footnote n="207">207 respectu] causa G</footnote>

<footnote n="208">208 dei] divina G</footnote>

<footnote n="209">209 huius] huiusmodi G</footnote>

<footnote n="210">210 negativa] sunt signa *add. G*</footnote>

<footnote n="211">211 complacentie] displicentie G</footnote>

<footnote n="212">212 permissio] *sup. l. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="213">213 maiori bonum consilium] maxima bona consilia etc. G</footnote>

<footnote n="214">214 vel] add. G, om. P1P2</footnote>

<footnote n="215">215 exscilius] *lacuna P2*, ex solius G</footnote>

<footnote n="202">202 tertia conclusio] *iter. in marg. P1*</footnote>

<footnote n="216">216 imputari] imperari G</footnote>
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