# B Sources and description of electoral data

This section describes the electoral data used throughout our analysis. Subsection B.1 lists the elections included and provides the source for the corresponding electoral data. Subsection B.2 provides additional summary statistics to those presented in section 3.

## B.1 Data sources

<table><caption>Table B1: List of parliamentary elections, electoral data sources and constituency-level shapefiles</caption><thead><tr><th>Country</th><th>Electoral data and shapefiles</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Botswana</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2009-2014: CLEA; 2004: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/b/botswana/botswana20042.txt; 2019: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/b/botswana/botswana20192.txt</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> Bowles and Marx (2023)</p></td></tr><tr><td>Gambia</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2007, 2012, 2017, 2022</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2007-2017: CLEA; 2022: https://iec.gm/download/national-assembly-final-results-9th-april-2022</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> GADM: https://gadm.org/download_country.html</p></td></tr><tr><td>Ghana</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2004-2016: CLEA; 2020: https://ghanaelections.peacefmonline.com/pages/2020/parliament</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> Amodio et al. (2024)</p></td></tr><tr><td>Guinea</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2013, 2020</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2013: CLEA; 2020: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/g/guinea/guinea2020.txt</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> GADM: https://gadm.org/download_country.html</p></td></tr><tr><td>Ivory Coast</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2011, 2016, 2021</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2011: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/c/cotedivoire/cotedivoire20111.txt; 2016: CLEA; 2021: https://www.cei.ci/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/EDAN-021_Ensemble-Resultats-avec-Nom-Prenoms-des-candidats.xlsx</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> Humdata: https://data.humdata.org/dataset/cod-ab-civ</p></td></tr><tr><td>Kenya</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2002, 2007, 2013, 2017, 2022</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2002-2013: CLEA; 2017: https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/siEABKREDq.pdf; 2022: https://archive.gazettes.africa/archive/ke/2022</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> Bowles and Marx (2023)</p></td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2002, 2007, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2022</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2002-2017: CLEA; 2022: https://www.iec.org.ls/2022-results</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> IPUMS: https://international.ipums.org/international-action/variables/GE02_LS2006#codes section</p></td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2005, 2011, 2017</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2005-2017: CLEA</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> Amodio et al. (2024)</p></td></tr><tr><td>Madagascar</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2013, 2019</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2013: CLEA; 2019: https://www.ceni-madagascar.mg/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/R%2C3%A9resultats-1%2C3%A9gislatifs-2019-par-district.pdf</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> Humdata: https://data.humdata.org/dataset/cod-ab-mdg</p></td></tr><tr><td>Malawi</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2004-2014: CLEA; 2019: https://www.eisa.org/pdf/ma12019results.pdf</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> Amodio et al. (2024)</p></td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2007: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/n/nigeria/nigeria20072.txt; 2011: https://inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HOUSE-OF-REPS-2011.pdf; 2015: https://inecnigeria.org/news-all/final-list-of-presidential-and-national-assembly-candidates-for-2015-general-elections; 2019: https://www.inecnigeria.org/2019-house-of-representative-elections-result/</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> Humdata: https://data.humdata.org/dataset/cod-ab-nga</p></td></tr><tr><td>Seychelles</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2011, 2016, 2020</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2011-2016: CLEA; 2020: http://www.ecs.sc/index.php/election/2020-elections/category/21-national-assembly</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> GADM: https://gadm.org/download_country.html</p></td></tr><tr><td>Sierra Leone</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2007, 2012, 2018</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2007-2012: CLEA; 2018: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/s/sierraleone/sierraleone20182.txt</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> Amodio et al. (2024)</p></td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2005 & 2015: CLEA; 2010: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/t/tanzania/tanzania20103.txt; 2020: https://www.nec.go.tz/uploads/documents/en/1624892417-matokeo%20final%20january%202021%20special%20gazzete.pdf</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> GADM: https://gadm.org/download_country.html</p></td></tr><tr><td>Uganda</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2011, 2016, 2021</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2011-2016: CLEA; 2021: https://www.ec.or.ug/ecresults/2021/MPS_RESULTs_2021.pdf</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> Amodio et al. (2024)</p></td></tr><tr><td>Zambia</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016, 2021</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2001-2016: CLEA; 2021: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/z/zambia/zambia20214.txt</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> CLEA: https://electiondataarchive.org/data-and-documentation/georeferenced-electoral-districts-datasets/</p></td></tr><tr><td>Zimbabwe</td><td><p><strong>Election Years:</strong> 2005, 2008, 2013, 2018</p><p><strong>Election Data Sources:</strong> 2005 & 2018: CLEA; 2008: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/z/zimbabwe/zimbabwe20083.txt; 2013: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/z/zimbabwe/zimbabwe20132.txt</p><p><strong>Shapefile Sources:</strong> Reeder and Seeberg (2018)</p></td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table presents the list of elections in our sample as well as sources for the corresponding data and constituency shapefiles.
## B.2 Additional summary statistics

<table><caption>Table B2: Additional summary statistics for the election analysis: constituency × election-year level</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Observations</th><th>Mean</th><th>Standard deviation</th><th>Min</th><th>Max</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="6"><strong>Electoral competition</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Turnout</td><td>4445</td><td>0.63</td><td>0.19</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Vote share fragmentation</td><td>8154</td><td>2.53</td><td>1.35</td><td>0.00</td><td>53.28</td></tr><tr><td>Vote share fractionalization</td><td>8154</td><td>0.54</td><td>0.16</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.92</td></tr><tr><td>Number of candidates</td><td>8814</td><td>5.96</td><td>3.84</td><td>1</td><td>39</td></tr><tr><td>... from a parliamentary party</td><td>8814</td><td>1.75</td><td>0.86</td><td>0</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>... from a minor party</td><td>8814</td><td>3.30</td><td>3.58</td><td>0</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td colspan="6"><strong>Additional electoral outcomes</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Winner is a man</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>... from a parliamentary party</td><td>8814</td><td>0.61</td><td>0.49</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>... from a minor party</td><td>8814</td><td>0.20</td><td>0.40</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>At least one man on the ballot</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>... from a parliamentary party</td><td>8814</td><td>0.90</td><td>0.30</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>... from a minor party</td><td>8814</td><td>0.87</td><td>0.34</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Number of men on the ballot</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>... from a parliamentary party</td><td>8814</td><td>1.50</td><td>0.88</td><td>0</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>... from a minor party</td><td>8814</td><td>2.67</td><td>2.77</td><td>0</td><td>31</td></tr><tr><td>Vote share of first-ranked man</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>... from a parliamentary party</td><td>8156</td><td>0.43</td><td>0.26</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>... from a minor party</td><td>7064</td><td>0.21</td><td>0.22</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Vote share of first-ranked woman</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>... from a parliamentary party</td><td>8156</td><td>0.07</td><td>0.18</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>... from a minor party</td><td>2313</td><td>0.10</td><td>0.16</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table provides constituency × election-year-level summary statistics of variables used in the election analysis.
# C Description of measures of online exposure to gender representation

In this section, we present our measure of online distance in gender representation. Subsection C.1 details how we build on the Social Connected Index (Bailey et al., 2018) to compute the measures used throughout our analysis. Subsection C.2 presents statistics on the Facebook networks in our sample.

## C.1 Social Connectedness Index and measures of online exposure

In section 7, we leverage differences in the degree to which Facebook presents users with content reflecting progressive norms towards female leadership using two data sources. To do so, we firstly use the Facebook Social Connectedness Index (SCI) (Bailey et al., 2018) in order to measure the intensity of bilateral Facebook connections across regions. Specifically, the SCI measures the relative frequency of Facebook friendship links between almost every pair of ADM1 regions across the world. Formally, the SCI is defined as :

$$SCI_{ij} \propto \frac{FacebookConnections_{i,j}}{FacebookUsers_{i} \times FacebookUsers_{j}}$$

Where *FacebookConnections*<sub>*i*,*j*</sub> is the number of Facebook connections between users in regions *i* and *j*, *FacebookUsers*<sub>*i*</sub> is the number of Facebook users in region *i* and conversely for region *j*. The obtained measure is then rescaled to range from 1 and 1,000,000. The SCI thus allows us to directly measure the concentration of a region's typical user's network. Importantly, since it is computed at the regional level, we associate to every constituency within a given region the corresponding SCI and associated statistics.

Secondly, we aim measure exposure to female leadership, and especially online distance in the female political representation, through foreign connections. To construct a metric of relative exposure to a certain type of content, we follow Bailey et al. (2024). This is done in two steps. We start by approximating the Facebook connection intensity of a user in region *i* with foreign country *k* as follows:

$$PerUserConnect_{i,k} = \sum_{j \in k} SCI_{i,j} \times Pop_{j}$$

The computed *PerUserConnect*<sub>*i*,*k*</sub> can be seen as the mean number of Facebook friendship links of the average user living in region *i* with individuals located in country *k*. For intuition, let's first consider the case of a binary trait *T*. In such case, we can then approximate the share of connections of a user in region *i* to content posted by users in countries with trait *T* as such :

$$Share of friends with trait $T_i$ = \frac{\sum_{k \in K} (PerUserConnect_{ik} \times 1(Trait = T)_k)}{\sum_{k \in K} PerUserConnect_{ik}}$$

We consider the more general case of a continuous *trait*, specifically the distance of one's Facebook feed in terms of female political representation, which we measure using the Women's Power Index (WPI) (Vogelstein and Bro, 2021).<fnref n="1" /> The WPI measures gender parity in political representation for all UN member states yearly since 2020.<fnref n="2" /> It is constructed based on data on the gender of the head of state, the proportion of women serving in governments, in national and local legislatures as well as the share of female candidates in national elections. For each *friend* country *k*, we can compute the difference in WPI between country *k* and region *i*'s *home* country *h*. We then sum these differences over *friend* countries *k*, weighting each pair by the number of connections to that country, and penalize the denominator by the number of connections to one's own country, in order to capture the effect of connections to different gender representation norms. Intuitively, this measure thus captures the distance in terms of female political representation between region *i*'s average Facebook user's online and offline environments. Formally, our measure writes as:

$$Facebook Feed Distance in Gender Representation_{i} = \frac{\sum_{k \in K} (PerUserConnect_{ik} \times (WPI_{k} - WPI_{h}))}{\sum_{k \in K} PerUserConnect_{ik} - PerUserConnect_{ih}}$$

Table 3 presents summary statistics on the average Facebook network of our sample of constituencies.

<footnote n="1">¹The data can be accessed at: https://www.cfr.org/article/womens-power-index</footnote>

<footnote n="2">²It is measure on January 1st of each year. We use the initial measure for years up to 2020 and the 2021 and 2022 measures for the corresponding years.</footnote>
C.2 Online exposure to female politicians

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>Figure C1: Distribution of Facebook feed distance in gender representation</figcaption></figure>

Notes: This figure presents the distribution of Facebook feed distance in gender representation in the section 7 estimation samples. Panel A presents the share of Afrobarometer respondents residing in regions (ADM1) where the standardized distance in terms of female political representation of the average Facebook feed falls in the corresponding bin. Panel B presents the share for constituencies located in regions (ADM1) where the standardized distance in terms of female political representation of the average Facebook feed falls in the corresponding bin. The width of each bin is equal to 0.02 unit of the Facebook gender representation distance variable.
# D Connectivity shock: robustness checks and additional results

This section provides complementary results to the analysis of the connectivity shock generated by Free Basics described in section 4. Subsection D.1 presents results for a series of robustness exercises. Subsection D.2 provides the estimation results for the analysis of “compliers” mentioned in subsection 4.2, describing the effect of Free Basics on the connectivity of different subsamples of the population.

## D.1 Robustness checks to results on the connectivity shock

<table><caption>Table D1: Free Basics availability and connectivity - Robustness to larger reception buffers</caption><thead><tr><th>Dependent variable</th><th>Gets news from social media (1)</th><th>Uses internet (2)</th><th>Owns mobile phone (3)</th><th>Heard about social media (4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel A: Buffers + 2 km</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.040***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.038***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.033***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.031***<br>(0.010)</td></tr><tr><td>3G/4G</td><td>0.007<br>(0.014)</td><td>0.012<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.011<br>(0.014)</td><td>0.027**<br>(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td>2G</td><td>0.001<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.000<br>(0.006)</td><td>-0.006<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.019**<br>(0.008)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel B: Buffers + 4 km</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.040***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.036***<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.031***<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.031***<br>(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td>3G/4G</td><td>0.004<br>(0.013)</td><td>0.008<br>(0.011)</td><td>0.005<br>(0.013)</td><td>0.027**<br>(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td>2G</td><td>0.001<br>(0.007)</td><td>-0.001<br>(0.006)</td><td>-0.010<br>(0.006)</td><td>0.014<br>(0.008)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel C: Buffers + 8 km</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.028***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.026***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.023***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.017<br>(0.012)</td></tr><tr><td>3G/4G</td><td>-0.005<br>(0.011)</td><td>-0.003<br>(0.010)</td><td>-0.008<br>(0.011)</td><td>0.024**<br>(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td>2G</td><td>-0.001<br>(0.007)</td><td>-0.004<br>(0.006)</td><td>-0.016**<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.009<br>(0.009)</td></tr></tbody></table><p><strong>All panels</strong></p><table><tbody><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Country-year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>85117</td><td>85117</td><td>85117</td><td>85117</td><td>19177</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.296</td><td>0.275</td><td>0.273</td><td>0.783</td><td>0.698</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote>Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability on online behaviors. It documents the robustness of the results presented in Table 4 to alternate measures of internet coverage. Panel A, B and C report estimates when increasing the radius of the coverage zone around towers by respectively 2, 4 and 8 kilometers. The unit of observation is a survey respondent. Columns 1 to 4 include respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6-9), while Column 5 uses only those surveyed between 2019 and 2021 (round 8). The dependent variables are binary indicators set to 1 if the respondent reported adopting the specified online behavior. “Free Basics” is a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile operator providing access to Free Basics. “3G/4G” and “2G” are dummies set to 1 if covered by an operator providing access to 3G/4G but not Free Basics, and 2G but not Free Basics, respectively. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, and religious affiliation, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Observations are weighted using Afrobarometer within-country survey weights. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country-year and enumeration area levels and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table D2: Free Basics availability and connectivity - Robustness to spatial autocorrelation</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Dependent variable</th><th colspan="2">Gets news from social media</th><th>Uses internet frequently</th><th>Owns mobile phone</th><th>Heard about social media</th></tr><tr><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.049<br>(0.008)***<br>[0.008]***<br>{0.009}***</td><td>0.044<br>(0.007)***<br>[0.008]***<br>{0.009}***</td><td>0.040<br>(0.007)***<br>[0.008]***<br>{0.007}***</td><td>0.038<br>(0.008)***<br>[0.008]***<br>{0.008}***</td><td>0.057<br>(0.015)***<br>[0.015]***<br>{0.015}***</td></tr><tr><td>3G/4G</td><td>0.019<br>(0.012)<br>[0.015]<br>{0.017}</td><td>0.022<br>(0.011)*<br>[0.013]*<br>{0.016}</td><td>0.022<br>(0.012)*<br>[0.014]<br>{0.016}</td><td>0.031<br>(0.011)***<br>[0.012]**<br>{0.015}**</td><td>0.078<br>(0.025)***<br>[0.026]***<br>{0.029}***</td></tr><tr><td>2G</td><td>0.000<br>(0.008)<br>[0.008]<br>{0.008}</td><td>0.002<br>(0.006)<br>[0.006]<br>{0.007}</td><td>-0.007<br>(0.007)<br>[0.007]<br>{0.007}</td><td>0.021<br>(0.009)**<br>[0.009]**<br>{0.008}***</td><td>0.043<br>(0.021)**<br>[0.022]*<br>{0.017}**</td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Country-year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>85117</td><td>85117</td><td>85117</td><td>85117</td><td>19177</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.296</td><td>0.275</td><td>0.273</td><td>0.783</td><td>0.698</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.296</td><td>0.274</td><td>0.277</td><td>0.242</td><td>0.237</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability on online behaviors. The unit of observation is a survey respondent. Columns 1 to 4 include respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6-9), while Column 5 uses only those surveyed between 2019 and 2021 (round 8). The dependent variables are binary indicators set to 1 if the respondent reported adopting the specified online behavior. “Free Basics” is a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile operator providing access to Free Basics. “3G/4G” and “2G” are dummies set to 1 if covered by an operator providing access to 3G/4G but not Free Basics, and 2G but not Free Basics, respectively. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, and religious affiliation, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Observations are weighted using Afrobarometer within-country survey weights. Standard errors corrected for spatial autocorrelation up to 50km are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors corrected for spatial autocorrelation up to 100km are reported in square brackets. Standard errors corrected for spatial autocorrelation up to 250km are reported in curly brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
## D.2 Analysis of the compliers to the connectivity shock

<table><caption>Table D3: Free Basics availability and connectivity - Compliers</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Dependent variable</th><th colspan="10">Gets news from social media</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">Education</th><th colspan="2">Age</th><th colspan="2">Gender</th><th colspan="2">Residence</th><th colspan="2">Nightlight</th></tr><tr><th>None (1)</th><th>Primary (2)</th><th>&gt; med. (3)</th><th>&le; med. (4)</th><th>Male (5)</th><th>Female (6)</th><th>Urban (7)</th><th>Rural (8)</th><th>&gt; 2<sup>nd</sup> ter. (9)</th><th>&le; 2<sup>nd</sup> ter. (10)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.020***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.057***<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.027***<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.064***<br>(0.011)</td><td>0.046***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.046***<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.069***<br>(0.015)</td><td>0.036***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.068***<br>(0.022)</td><td>0.042***<br>(0.007)</td></tr><tr><td>3G/4G</td><td>0.012<br>(0.014)</td><td>0.032*<br>(0.016)</td><td>-0.000<br>(0.018)</td><td>0.031**<br>(0.014)</td><td>0.022<br>(0.015)</td><td>0.007<br>(0.015)</td><td>0.016<br>(0.017)</td><td>0.056***<br>(0.017)</td><td>0.039<br>(0.025)</td><td>0.055***<br>(0.016)</td></tr><tr><td>2G</td><td>0.001<br>(0.006)</td><td>0.012<br>(0.010)</td><td>-0.010<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.016<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.011<br>(0.008)</td><td>-0.007<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.003<br>(0.013)</td><td>0.018**<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.036<br>(0.027)</td><td>0.016**<br>(0.007)</td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Country-year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>27437</td><td>57680</td><td>42530</td><td>42587</td><td>42629</td><td>42488</td><td>34652</td><td>50465</td><td>28190</td><td>56927</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.079</td><td>0.400</td><td>0.204</td><td>0.388</td><td>0.342</td><td>0.251</td><td>0.482</td><td>0.169</td><td>0.491</td><td>0.200</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.156</td><td>0.254</td><td>0.258</td><td>0.302</td><td>0.309</td><td>0.280</td><td>0.257</td><td>0.195</td><td>0.258</td><td>0.235</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability on social media consumption for different subsamples. The sample is restricted successively to individuals with no primary education (column 1), individuals with at least primary education (column 2), individuals aged below (or equal to) the sample median (i.e. 34 y.o.) (column 3), individuals aged above the sample median (i.e. 34 y.o.) (column 4), men (column 5), women (column 6), individuals living in an urban area (column 7), individuals living in a rural area (column 8), individuals living in a constituency with a population-density-weighted mean nighttime light above the sample second tertile (column 9) and individuals living in a constituency with a population-density-weighted mean nighttime light below (or equal to) the sample second tertile (column 10). Respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6-9) are included. The dependent variables are binary indicators set to 1 if the respondent reports getting news from social media. “Free Basics” is a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile operator providing access to Free Basics. “3G/4G” and “2G” are dummies set to 1 if covered by an operator providing access to 3G/4G but not Free Basics, and 2G but not Free Basics, respectively. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, and religious affiliation, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country-year and enumeration area levels and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
<table><caption>Table D4: Free Basics availability and connectivity - Heterogeneities by religion</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Dependent variable</th><th colspan="4">Gets news from social media</th></tr><tr><th>Christian<br>Catholic</th><th>Christian<br>Non-catholic</th><th>Muslim</th><th>Agnostic /<br>Atheist</th></tr><tr><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.045***<br>(0.011)</td><td>0.053***<br>(0.013)</td><td>0.040***<br>(0.013)</td><td>0.034*<br>(0.020)</td></tr><tr><td>3G/4G</td><td>0.021<br>(0.017)</td><td>0.003<br>(0.014)</td><td>0.038<br>(0.024)</td><td>0.011<br>(0.039)</td></tr><tr><td>2G</td><td>0.003<br>(0.010)</td><td>-0.006<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.020<br>(0.015)</td><td>-0.002<br>(0.024)</td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Country-year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>30850</td><td>27885</td><td>21567</td><td>4807</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.334</td><td>0.271</td><td>0.293</td><td>0.215</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.318</td><td>0.279</td><td>0.302</td><td>0.329</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability on social media consumption for different subsamples. The sample is restricted successively to christian catholic individuals (column 1), christian non-catholic individuals (column 2); muslim individuals (column 3); individuals self-declaring no religion, agnostic or atheist (column 4). Respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6-9) are included. The dependent variables are binary indicators set to 1 if the respondent reports getting news from social media. “Free Basics” is a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile operator providing access to Free Basics. “3G/4G” and “2G” are dummies set to 1 if covered by an operator providing access to 3G/4G but not Free Basics, and 2G but not Free Basics, respectively. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, and religious affiliation, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country-year and enumeration area levels and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
# E Electoral consequences of Free Basics: robustness checks and additional results

This section provides complementary results to the analysis of the impact of Free Basics on electoral outcomes. Subsection E.1 presents results for a series of validity and the robustness exercises. Subsection E.2 provides a series of results complementing the constituency-level electoral analysis presented in section 6. Subsection E.3 details the methodology used to compute bounds to the conditional estimates reported in Table 7.

## E.1 Validity and robustness checks to results on the electoral consequences of Free Basics

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>Figure E1: Effects of 3G availability on female MP election</figcaption></figure>

Notes: This figure presents the LP-DID estimates of the effect of 3G mobile internet availability on the likelihood of electing a female MP. The unit of observation is an electoral race, i.e. a constituency × election year. The dependent variable is a binary indicator set to 1 if a woman wins the election. All specifications include country × election-year fixed effects, and the following controls: logarithm of population density and nighttime light. Standard errors are two-way clustered at constituency and country-year level. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

## E.2 Additional results on the electoral consequences of Free Basics
Figure E2: Effects of Free Basics availability on female MP election, controlling for local 2G and 3G/4G availability

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /></figure>

Notes: This figure presents the LP-DiD estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability on the likelihood of electing a female MP. The unit of observation is an electoral race, i.e. a constituency × election year. The dependent variable is a binary indicator set to 1 if a woman wins the election. All specifications include country × election-year fixed effects, and the following controls: logarithm of population density and nighttime light, a binary indicator set to 1 if 2G internet is available in the constituency and a binary indicator set to 1 if 3G or 4G internet is available in the constituency. Standard errors are two-way clustered at constituency and country-year level. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure E3: Effects of Free Basics availability on female MP election, by bins of covered population

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /></figure>

Notes: This figure presents the LP-DiD estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability on the likelihood of electing a female MP, for different population coverage levels. The unit of observation is an electoral race, i.e. a constituency × election year. The dependent variable is a binary indicator set to 1 if a woman wins the election. The explanatory variables of interest are the interactions between our treatment indicator “Free Basics” and binary indicators for whether constituencies’ population covered by Free Basics falls in the specified bins. All specifications include country × election-year fixed effects, and the following controls: logarithm of population density and nighttime light. Standard errors are two-way clustered at constituency and country-year level. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
<table><caption>Table E1: Effects of Free Basics availability on female MP election – event-study table</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Dependent variable</th><th colspan="4">Election of female MPs</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">Elections before<br>Free Basics entry</th><th colspan="2">Elections after<br>Free Basics entry</th></tr><tr><th>Third-prior<br>election<br>(1)</th><th>Second-prior<br>election<br>(2)</th><th>First<br>election<br>(3)</th><th>Second<br>election<br>(4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Panel A: Baseline sample</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.036<br>(0.026)</td><td>-0.018<br>(0.015)</td><td>-0.021<br>(0.022)</td><td>0.102**<br>(0.049)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.092</td><td>0.104</td><td>0.104</td><td>0.110</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1359</td><td>3159</td><td>5547</td><td>2592</td></tr><tr><td>National-election pairs</td><td>24</td><td>52</td><td>86</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>Countries</td><td>10</td><td>14</td><td>16</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Panel B: Constant sample of countries</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.036<br>(0.026)</td><td>-0.025<br>(0.015)</td><td>-0.034<br>(0.028)</td><td>0.103**<br>(0.049)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.092</td><td>0.106</td><td>0.105</td><td>0.113</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>1359</td><td>2804</td><td>4518</td><td>2334</td></tr><tr><td>National-election pairs</td><td>24</td><td>44</td><td>66</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>Countries</td><td>10</td><td>10</td><td>10</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>All panels</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Country × election-year FEs</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table presents the LP-DiD estimates of the event-study estimation of the effects of Free Basics availability on the likelihood of electing a female MP. The unit of observation is an electoral race, i.e. a constituency × election year. Panel A uses all available observations, while Panel B restricts the sample to countries present in each estimation. The dependent variable is a binary indicator set to 1 if a woman wins the election. All specifications include country × election-year fixed effects, and the following controls: logarithm of population density and nighttime light. Standard errors are two-way clustered at constituency and country-year level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
<table><caption>Table E2: Effects of Free Basics availability on electoral competition and turnout</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Dependent variable</th><th colspan="2">Number of candidates</th><th colspan="2">Vote share fragmentation</th><th colspan="2">Vote share fractionalization</th><th colspan="2">Turnout</th></tr><tr><th>First election</th><th>Second election</th><th>First election</th><th>Second election</th><th>First election</th><th>Second election</th><th>First election</th><th>Second election</th></tr><tr><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th><th>(7)</th><th>(8)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Election after Free Basics entry</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.247<br>(0.401)</td><td>-0.559<br>(0.533)</td><td>0.327<br>(0.347)</td><td>0.258<br>(0.200)</td><td>0.003<br>(0.014)</td><td>-0.005<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.011<br>(0.014)</td><td>-0.061***<br>(0.009)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>6.649</td><td>6.363</td><td>2.572</td><td>2.540</td><td>0.550</td><td>0.551</td><td>0.642</td><td>0.657</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>5547</td><td>2592</td><td>4867</td><td>1964</td><td>4867</td><td>1964</td><td>2210</td><td>926</td></tr><tr><td>Country × election-year FEs</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table presents the LP-DiD estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability on measures of electoral competition. The unit of observation is an electoral race, i.e. a constituency × election year. The dependent variable is respectively the number of candidates running (columns 1-2), vote share fragmentation computed as $\frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} v_i^2}$ (columns 3-4), vote share fractionalization computed as $\sum_{i=1}^{N} v_i(1-v_i)$ (columns 5-6) and turnout (columns 7-8). All specifications include country × election-year fixed effects, and the following controls: logarithm of population density and nighttime light. Standard errors are clustered two-way at constituency and country-year level. The mean dependent variable is computed in the reference election-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

<table><caption>Table E3: Effects of Free Basics availability on the number of candidates on the ballot, by endorsement type</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Dependent variable</th><th colspan="6">Number of candidates</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">a parliamentary party</th><th colspan="2">a non-parliamentary party</th><th colspan="2">Running as independent</th></tr><tr><th>First election</th><th>Second election</th><th>First election</th><th>Second election</th><th>First election</th><th>Second election</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Election after Free Basics entry</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>-0.018<br>(0.034)</td><td>-0.067<br>(0.144)</td><td>0.201<br>(0.376)</td><td>-0.789<br>(0.567)</td><td>0.064<br>(0.129)</td><td>0.296<br>(0.216)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>2.040</td><td>2.016</td><td>3.643</td><td>3.407</td><td>0.965</td><td>0.941</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>5547</td><td>2592</td><td>5547</td><td>2592</td><td>5547</td><td>2592</td></tr><tr><td>Country × election-year FEs</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table presents the LP-DiD estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability on the number of candidates running, by endorsement type. The unit of observation is an electoral race, i.e. a constituency × election year. The dependent variable is respectively the number of candidates running with a parliamentary party (columns 1-2), a non-parliamentary party (columns 3-4) and running as independents (columns 5-6). All specifications include country × election-year fixed effects, and the following controls: logarithm of population density and nighttime light. Standard errors are clustered two-way at constituency and country-year level. The mean dependent variable is computed in the reference election-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
<table><caption>Table E4: Effects of Free Basics availability on candidacies, by gender and endorsement type</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Election after Free Basics entry</th><th colspan="6">Candidates on the ballot</th></tr><tr><th colspan="6">endorsed by:</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">a parliamentary party</th><th colspan="2">a non-parliamentary party</th><th colspan="2">running as independent</th></tr><tr><th>First election</th><th>Second election</th><th>First election</th><th>Second election</th><th>First election</th><th>Second election</th></tr><tr><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th colspan="6">Panel A: Number of female candidates</th></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>-0.001<br>(0.038)</td><td>0.230***<br>(0.065)</td><td>-0.233*<br>(0.125)</td><td>-0.183<br>(0.196)</td><td>0.005<br>(0.022)</td><td>-0.022<br>(0.025)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.180</td><td>0.151</td><td>0.439</td><td>0.427</td><td>0.094</td><td>0.062</td></tr><tr><th colspan="6">Panel B: Number of male candidates</th></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>-0.055<br>(0.057)</td><td>-0.359***<br>(0.126)</td><td>0.427<br>(0.341)</td><td>-0.583<br>(0.684)</td><td>0.088<br>(0.105)</td><td>0.279<br>(0.203)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>1.362</td><td>1.158</td><td>2.644</td><td>2.739</td><td>0.611</td><td>0.453</td></tr><tr><th colspan="6">Panel C: At least one female candidate</th></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.011<br>(0.028)</td><td>0.184**<br>(0.081)</td><td>-0.120**<br>(0.053)</td><td>-0.017<br>(0.104)</td><td>-0.008<br>(0.016)</td><td>-0.019<br>(0.022)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.165</td><td>0.142</td><td>0.292</td><td>0.289</td><td>0.083</td><td>0.059</td></tr><tr><th colspan="6">Panel D: At least one male candidate</th></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.009<br>(0.020)</td><td>-0.041<br>(0.037)</td><td>0.053<br>(0.032)</td><td>-0.056<br>(0.138)</td><td>0.043<br>(0.037)</td><td>0.218*<br>(0.108)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.872</td><td>0.842</td><td>0.893</td><td>0.945</td><td>0.330</td><td>0.287</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><th colspan="7">All panels</th></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>5547</td><td>2592</td><td>5547</td><td>2592</td><td>5547</td><td>2592</td></tr><tr><td>Country × election-year FEs</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr></tfoot></table>

Notes: This table presents the LP-DiD estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability on the number of candidates running, by gender and endorsement type. The unit of observation is an electoral race, i.e. a constituency × election year. For each type of candidacy (ensored by a parliamentary party, by a non-parliamentary party and running as independent), the dependent variable is respectively the number of female candidates of that type (panel A), the number of male candidates of that type (panel B), a binary indicator set to one if at least one female candidate of that type is present on the ballot (panel C) or if at least one male candidate of that type is present on the ballot (panel D). All specifications include country × election-year fixed effects, and the following controls: logarithm of population density and nighttime light. Standard errors are clustered two-way at constituency and country-year level. The mean dependent variable is computed in the reference election-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
<figure><img src="image_15.png" /><figcaption>Figure E4: Heterogeneities in the effect of Free Basics availability on female MP election</figcaption></figure>

Notes: This figure presents the results of the LP-DID estimates of the heterogeneous effects of Free Basics availability on the likelihood of electing a female MP in the second election after the introduction of Free Basics. The unit of observation is an electoral race, i.e. a constituency × election year. The dependent variable is a binary indicator set to 1 if the winner is a woman. The independent variables of interest are the interactions of “Free Basics” with binary indicators for the specified heterogeneity dimension. Each pair of coefficients is estimated separately. All specifications include country × election-year fixed effects, and the following controls: logarithm of population density and nighttime light. Standard errors are clustered two-way at constituency and country-year level. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
<table><caption>Table E5: Effects of Free Basics availability on electoral outcomes - Robustness to serial autocorrelation and alternate coverage definitions</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Robustness exercise:</th><th colspan="4">Spatial autocorrelation</th><th colspan="4">Alternate Free Basics population coverage threshold</th><th colspan="2">Alternate buffer size around towers</th></tr><tr><th>200km</th><th>400km</th><th>600km</th><th>800km</th><th>20%</th><th>40%</th><th>60%</th><th>80%</th><th>+4km</th><th>+8km</th></tr><tr><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th><th>(7)</th><th>(8)</th><th>(9)</th><th>(10)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="11" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel A: Winner is a woman</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.102<br>(0.065)</td><td>0.102*<br>(0.057)</td><td>0.102*<br>(0.058)</td><td>0.102*<br>(0.057)</td><td>0.109**<br>(0.047)</td><td>0.117**<br>(0.055)</td><td>0.129**<br>(0.060)</td><td>0.145**<br>(0.061)</td><td>0.151**<br>(0.068)</td><td>0.177**<br>(0.079)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>2593</td><td>2593</td><td>2593</td><td>2593</td><td>2525</td><td>2472</td><td>2410</td><td>2337</td><td>2568</td><td>2554</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.108</td><td>0.108</td><td>0.108</td><td>0.108</td><td>0.109</td><td>0.108</td><td>0.109</td><td>0.107</td><td>0.109</td><td>0.110</td></tr><tr><td colspan="11" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel B: Winner is a woman from parliamentary party</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.119*<br>(0.065)</td><td>0.119**<br>(0.055)</td><td>0.119**<br>(0.052)</td><td>0.119**<br>(0.049)</td><td>0.128**<br>(0.052)</td><td>0.139**<br>(0.061)</td><td>0.150**<br>(0.070)</td><td>0.172**<br>(0.075)</td><td>0.248***<br>(0.069)</td><td>0.298***<br>(0.068)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>2593</td><td>2593</td><td>2593</td><td>2593</td><td>2525</td><td>2472</td><td>2410</td><td>2337</td><td>2568</td><td>2554</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.073</td><td>0.073</td><td>0.073</td><td>0.073</td><td>0.073</td><td>0.071</td><td>0.072</td><td>0.069</td><td>0.073</td><td>0.075</td></tr><tr><td colspan="11" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel C: At least one woman from parliamentary party on the ballot</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.184<br>(0.124)</td><td>0.184**<br>(0.080)</td><td>0.184**<br>(0.076)</td><td>0.184***<br>(0.052)</td><td>0.187**<br>(0.091)</td><td>0.211**<br>(0.088)</td><td>0.235***<br>(0.078)</td><td>0.238***<br>(0.079)</td><td>0.135**<br>(0.063)</td><td>0.129<br>(0.080)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>2593</td><td>2593</td><td>2593</td><td>2593</td><td>2525</td><td>2472</td><td>2410</td><td>2337</td><td>2568</td><td>2554</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.142</td><td>0.142</td><td>0.142</td><td>0.142</td><td>0.142</td><td>0.140</td><td>0.140</td><td>0.137</td><td>0.142</td><td>0.144</td></tr><tr><td colspan="11" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel D: At least one woman from parliamentary party - role of online content exposure</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.225*<br>(0.129)</td><td>0.225***<br>(0.077)</td><td>0.225***<br>(0.059)</td><td>0.225***<br>(0.037)</td><td>0.258***<br>(0.069)</td><td>0.287***<br>(0.063)</td><td>0.315***<br>(0.048)</td><td>0.334***<br>(0.053)</td><td>0.137***<br>(0.049)</td><td>0.138**<br>(0.060)</td></tr><tr><td>... × Facebook gender representation distance</td><td>0.130<br>(0.102)</td><td>0.130**<br>(0.054)</td><td>0.130*<br>(0.069)</td><td>0.130***<br>(0.030)</td><td>0.201***<br>(0.051)</td><td>0.214***<br>(0.046)</td><td>0.219***<br>(0.036)</td><td>0.256***<br>(0.034)</td><td>0.095*<br>(0.050)</td><td>0.094*<br>(0.053)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>2565</td><td>2565</td><td>2565</td><td>2565</td><td>2498</td><td>2445</td><td>2383</td><td>2311</td><td>2522</td><td>2491</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.139</td><td>0.139</td><td>0.139</td><td>0.139</td><td>0.139</td><td>0.137</td><td>0.137</td><td>0.134</td><td>0.140</td><td>0.140</td></tr><tr><td colspan="11" style="text-align: left; font-weight: bold;">All panels</td></tr><tr><td>Country × election-year FEs</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table presents the LP-DID estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability and online content exposure on a series of electoral outcomes in various robustness exercises. The dependent variable is respectively a binary indicator set to 1 if a woman wins the election (panel A), a binary indicator set to 1 if a woman from a parliamentary party wins the election (panels B) and a binary indicator set to 1 if at least one woman from a parliamentary party is present on the ballot (panels C and D). Columns 1 to 4 test the robustness of estimates to spatial autocorrelation, up to 800km. In columns 5 to 8, we restrict the sample of treated constituencies to those where the population covered by Free Basics is greater than the specified threshold. Constituencies with a positive but smaller covered population are excluded from the analysis. Columns 9 and 10 increase the radius of the internet coverage area around cellular towers by 4 and 8 kilometers, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for spatial autocorrelation up to the specified cutoff in columns 1 to 4 and are two-way clustered at constituency and country-year level in columns 5 to 10. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
### E.3 Description of the methodology used to estimate the Free Basics effects on winning conditional on running: derivation of the bounds

We outline the procedure used to derive the bounds of Free Basics' estimated effect on candidates running with a parliamentary party, as presented in Table 7. We do so in the spirit of Cantoni and Pons (2022)'s adaptation to an electoral setting of the bounding methodology proposed by Lee (2009). Our focus is on the election of female MPs, conditional on at least one female candidate running, in the second election with Free Basics (column 3 of Table 7). The same procedure applies to estimating bounds for vote share effects (column 4) and for male candidates in the first election with Free Basics (columns 1 and 2).

Let $T = 1$ indicate constituencies covered by Free Basics for a second election and $T = 0$ if Free Basics does not cover (yet) the constituency. We further define $R_0$ and $R_1$ as potential outcome indicators for the presence of a female candidate when $T = 0$ or $T = 1$, respectively. Since observed data only reveal $R = TR_1 + (1-T)R_0$, we know whether a female candidate runs in Free Basics constituencies but cannot determine if she would have run in the same constituency without Free Basics, and vice versa.

Similarly, let $W_0$ and $W_1$ denote potential outcomes for winning the election, conditional on running. The observed outcome is $W = R[TW_1 + (1-T)W_0]$. If no female candidate is on the ballot ($R = 0$), she cannot win ($W = 0$), and her counterfactual outcome remains unknown. Conversely, if a female candidate runs in a Free Basics constituency, we observe whether she wins but cannot determine if she would have won without Free Basics, and vice versa.

We classify races into four categories. “Always takers” are races that always have a female candidate, regardless of $T$. “Never takers” are races that never have a female candidate. “Compliers” are races where a female candidate runs only if the constituency has Free Basics in this second election, either because (i) Free Basics increases the likelihood of a woman entering the candidate pool and/or (ii) parties expect a female candidate has a higher chance of winning with Free Basics. Finally, “defiers” are races where a female candidate would have run without Free Basics but does not when Free Basics is available. We need to assume that there are no defiers to be able to derive bounds on our estimates: races that have a female candidate in the “no Free Basics” case would also have a female candidate in the “Free Basics” case.

We focus on races where the constituency is either experiencing its second election with Free Basics or is in the control group of constituencies not (yet) treated at the time of the election. We define $S$ as an indicator for races that are either treated for a second election or part of the clean control group, setting it to zero otherwise.

Under the assumption of no defiers, we establish the following decomposition:

$$E(W_1 - W_0 | R_1 = 1, S = 1) = E[W_1 | R_1 = 1, S = 1] - E[W_0 | R_1 = 1, S = 1]$$

The first term on the right side can be expressed as:

$$\frac{P[(W_1 = 1) \cap (R_1 = 1) | S = 1]}{P(R_1 = 1 | S = 1)} = \frac{E[W_1 R_1 | S = 1]}{E[R_1 | S = 1]}$$

The second term can be expressed similarly and further arranged, using the no defier assumption:

$$\frac{P[(W_0 = 1) \cap (R_1 = 1) | S = 1]}{P(R_1 = 1 | S = 1)} = \frac{E[W_0 R_0 | S = 1] + P[(W_0 = 1) \cap (R_0 = 0; R_1 = 1) | S = 1]}{E[R_1 | S = 1]}$$

Note that $P[(W_0 = 1) \cap (R_0 = 0; R_1 = 1) | S = 1] = E[W_0 | R_1 > R_0, S = 1] \times P[R_1 > R_0 | S = 1]$
Combining these expressions, we obtain:

$$E(W_1 - W_0|R_1 = 1, S = 1) = \frac{(E(W_1 R_1 - W_0 R_0|S = 1) - P[R_1 > R_0|S = 1].E[W_0|R_1 > R_0, S = 1])}{E(R_1|S = 1)}$$

This yields the following decomposition for Facebook's Free Basics effect on the election of female MPs in the second election, conditional on being always-taker or complier :

$$E[W_1 - W_0|R_1 = 1, S = 1] = \frac{1}{E(R_1, S = 1)} \times [E(W_1 R_1 - W_0 R_0) \rightarrow \text{DiD effect on woman winning} \\ -P(R_1 > R_0) \rightarrow \text{DiD effect on woman running} \\ \times E(W_0|R_1 > R_0)] \rightarrow \text{unobservable}$$

The only unobservable term is $E(W_0|R_1 > R_0)$, the probability that a female candidate complier would win if Free Basics was not in the constituency, an outcome we cannot observe, by definition. Since all the other terms of the equation are observable, we simply need to make assumptions about this term to derive lower and upper bounds on the effects on winning conditional on running.

Intuitively, the largest possible effect (i.e. the upper bound in the case where we estimate the effect on the election of a female MP) occurs under the assumption that female compliers would never win in constituencies without Free Basics, had they chosen to run in it (i.e., $E(W_0|R_1 > R_0) = 0$). To derive a lower bound and obtain the lowest possible impact of Free Basics on the probability of a female candidate winning, we assume that compliers would, at most, have the same probability of winning as female candidates running in constituencies without Free Basics.
# F Party-race analysis of electoral outcomes

This section provides data construction, summary statistics and additional results for the analysis of the effects of Free Basics on electoral outcomes across candidate types, at the party-race level.

## F.1 Construction of the data used in the analysis at party-race level

In this party-race level analysis, our goal is to track the endorsement strategies and electoral success of parties across constituencies and multiple electoral cycles. A key limitation of this analysis is the challenge of tracking political parties over time in the sub-Saharan African context. To address this, we focus on the parties of the main presidential candidates in each country within our sample. This approach results in the following party-election list:

<table><caption>Table F1: List of major parties included in the party-race analysis 1/3</caption><thead><tr><th>Country</th><th>Party</th><th>Election-year</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Botswana</td><td>Botswana Democratic Party</td><td>2004, 2009, 2014, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Botswana</td><td>Umbrella For Democratic Change</td><td>2014, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Botswana</td><td>Botswana Congress Party</td><td>2004, 2009, 2014</td></tr><tr><td>Botswana</td><td>Botswana National Front</td><td>2004, 2009</td></tr><tr><td>Gambia</td><td>Alliance For Patriotic Reorientation and Construction</td><td>2007, 2012, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Gambia</td><td>United Democratic Party</td><td>2007, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Gambia</td><td>National Reconciliation Party</td><td>2007, 2012</td></tr><tr><td>Gambia</td><td>Gambia Democratic Congress</td><td>2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Gambia</td><td>People's Democratic Organisation For Independence and Socialism</td><td>2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Ghana</td><td>National Democratic Congress</td><td>2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Ghana</td><td>New Patriotic Party</td><td>2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Ghana</td><td>Progressive People's Party</td><td>2012, 2016, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Ghana</td><td>Convention People's Party</td><td>2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Ghana</td><td>People's National Convention</td><td>2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Ghana</td><td>Democratic People's Party</td><td>2004, 2008, 2012, 2016</td></tr><tr><td>Ghana</td><td>National Democratic Party</td><td>2012, 2016, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Guinea</td><td>Rassemblement Du Peuple De Guinee Arc-En-Ciel</td><td>2013, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Ivory Coast</td><td>Rassemblement des Republicains / Rhdp</td><td>2011, 2016, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Ivory Coast</td><td>Parti Democratique de Cote d'Ivoire</td><td>2011, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Ivory Coast</td><td>Front Populaire Ivoirien</td><td>2016, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Kenya</td><td>Kenya African National Union / The National Alliance Kenya / Jubilee Party Kenya / United Democratic Alliance</td><td>2002, 2007, 2013, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Kenya</td><td>Kenya National Rainbow Coalition / Party of National Unity</td><td>2002, 2013, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Kenya</td><td>Orange Democratic Movement</td><td>2007, 2013, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Kenya</td><td>Democratic Party</td><td>2007, 2013, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Kenya</td><td>Forum For the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya</td><td>2002, 2007, 2013, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Kenya</td><td>National Rainbow Coalition-Kenya (Narc-K)</td><td>2007, 2013, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Kenya</td><td>Wiper Democratic Movement Kenya</td><td>2013, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Kenya</td><td>Kenya National Congress</td><td>2002, 2007, 2013, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Kenya</td><td>Safina</td><td>2002, 2007, 2013, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Lesotho Congress For Democracy / Democratic Congress Lesotho</td><td>2002, 2007, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>All Basotho Convention</td><td>2007, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Basotho Congress Party</td><td>2002, 2007, 2012, 2017</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Basotho National Party</td><td>2002, 2007, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Lesotho People's Congress</td><td>2002, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Marematlou Freedom Party</td><td>2002, 2007, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Popular Front For Democracy</td><td>2002, 2007, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>African Unity Movement</td><td>2012, 2015, 2017</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>All Democratic Corporation</td><td>2012, 2015, 2017</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Basotho Batho Democratic Party</td><td>2007, 2012, 2015</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Basotho Democratic National Party</td><td>2007, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Basotholand African National Congress</td><td>2015, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Basutoland Congress Party</td><td>2007, 2015, 2022</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table lists the major parties included in the party-race analysis, along with the election years in which their endorsements and electoral outcomes are tracked.
<table><caption>Table F2: List of major parties included in the party-race analysis 2/3</caption><thead><tr><th>Country</th><th>Party</th><th>Election-year</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Lekhotla La Mekhoa Le Moetlo</td><td>2012, 2015, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Lesotho Workers Party</td><td>2002, 2012, 2015, 2017</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Movement For Economic Change</td><td>2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Lesotho</td><td>Reformed Congress of Lesotho</td><td>2015, 2017, 2022</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>Unity Party</td><td>2005, 2011, 2017</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>Congress for Democratic Change</td><td>2005, 2011, 2017</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>Liberty Party</td><td>2005, 2011, 2017</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>All Liberian Coalition Party</td><td>2005, 2011</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>Alliance For Peace and Democracy</td><td>2005, 2011</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>Freedom Alliance Party of Liberia</td><td>2005, 2011</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>Liberia Destiny Party</td><td>2005, 2011</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>Liberia Reconstruction Party</td><td>2011, 2017</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>National Democratic Party of Liberia</td><td>2005, 2011</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>National Patriotic Party</td><td>2005, 2011</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>Progressive Democratic Party</td><td>2005, 2011</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>Grassroots Democratic Party of Liberia</td><td>2011, 2017</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>Liberia Transformation Party</td><td>2011, 2017</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>Movement For Progressive Change</td><td>2011, 2017</td></tr><tr><td>Liberia</td><td>Victory For Change Party</td><td>2011, 2017</td></tr><tr><td>Madagascar</td><td>IRD</td><td>2013, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Madagascar</td><td>Arema</td><td>2013, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Madagascar</td><td>Leader Fanilo</td><td>2013, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Malawi</td><td>Democratic Progressive Party</td><td>2009, 2014, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Malawi</td><td>Malawi Congress Party</td><td>2004, 2009, 2014, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Malawi</td><td>United Democratic Front</td><td>2004, 2009, 2014, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Malawi</td><td>Alliance For Democracy</td><td>2004, 2009, 2014, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Malawi</td><td>People's Progressive Movement</td><td>2004, 2009</td></tr><tr><td>Malawi</td><td>People's Transformation Party</td><td>2004, 2009, 2014, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>People's Democratic Party</td><td>2007, 2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>All Nigeria People's Party / Congress For Democratic Change</td><td>2007, 2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>All Progressives Congress</td><td>2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Advanced Congress Of Democrats</td><td>2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>African Democratic Congress</td><td>2011, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>All Progressives Grand Alliance</td><td>2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Alliance For Democracy</td><td>2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Allied Congress Party of Nigeria</td><td>2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Change Advocacy Party</td><td>2011, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Citizens Popular Party</td><td>2011, 2015</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Democratic Peoples Party</td><td>2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Kowa Party</td><td>2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Labour Party</td><td>2007, 2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Mega Progressives People's Party</td><td>2011, 2015</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>National Conscience Party</td><td>2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>New Nigeria People's Party</td><td>2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>People For Democratic Change</td><td>2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>People's Party Of Nigeria</td><td>2011, 2015</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Peoples Democratic Movement</td><td>2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Progressive People's Alliance</td><td>2007, 2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Social Democratic Party</td><td>2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>United Democratic Party</td><td>2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>United Progressive Party</td><td>2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Action Democratic Party</td><td>2015, 2019</td></tr><tr><td>Nigeria</td><td>Accord</td><td>2011, 2015, 2019</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table lists the major parties included in the party-race analysis, along with the election years in which their endorsements and electoral outcomes are tracked.
<table><caption>Table F3: List of major parties included in the party-race analysis 3/3</caption><thead><tr><th>Country</th><th>Party</th><th>Election-year</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Seychelles</td><td>People's Party / United Seychelles</td><td>2011, 2016, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Seychelles</td><td>Lalyans Demokratik Seselwa</td><td>2016, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Sierra Leone</td><td>Sierra Leone People's Party (Slpp)</td><td>2007, 2012, 2018</td></tr><tr><td>Sierra Leone</td><td>All People's Congress (Apc)</td><td>2007, 2012, 2018</td></tr><tr><td>Sierra Leone</td><td>National Democratic Alliance (Nda)</td><td>2007, 2012, 2018</td></tr><tr><td>Sierra Leone</td><td>People's Movement For Democratic Change (Pmdc)</td><td>2007, 2012</td></tr><tr><td>Sierra Leone</td><td>United National People's Party (Unpp)</td><td>2007, 2012</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Ccm</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Chadema</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Civic United Front</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Act-Wazalendo</td><td>2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Ada-Tadea</td><td>2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Adc</td><td>2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Chausta</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Democratic Party</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Demokrasia Makini</td><td>2005, 2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Jahazi Asilia</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>National Convention for Construction And Reform-Mageuzi</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>National Reconstruction Alliance</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Progressive Party of Tanzania-Maendeleo</td><td>2005, 2015</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Sauti Ya Umma</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Tanzania Labour Party</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>Union for Multiparty Democracy</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>United Democratic Party</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Tanzania</td><td>United People's Democratic Party</td><td>2005, 2010, 2015, 2020</td></tr><tr><td>Uganda</td><td>National Resistance Movement</td><td>2011, 2016, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Uganda</td><td>Forum For Democratic Change</td><td>2011, 2016, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Uganda</td><td>Democratic Party</td><td>2011, 2016, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Uganda</td><td>Jeema</td><td>2011, 2016, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Uganda</td><td>Ugandan People's Congress</td><td>2011, 2016, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Zambia</td><td>Patriotic Front</td><td>2001, 2006, 2011, 2016, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Zambia</td><td>United Party For National Development / United Democratic Alliance</td><td>2001, 2006, 2011, 2016, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Zambia</td><td>Movement for Multiparty Democracy</td><td>2001, 2006, 2011, 2016, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Zambia</td><td>Forum for Democracy And Development</td><td>2001, 2006, 2011, 2016, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Zambia</td><td>Heritage Party</td><td>2001, 2006, 2011</td></tr><tr><td>Zambia</td><td>United National Independence Party</td><td>2001, 2011, 2016, 2021</td></tr><tr><td>Zimbabwe</td><td>Zanu-Pf</td><td>2005, 2008, 2013, 2018</td></tr><tr><td>Zimbabwe</td><td>Movement for Democratic Change Zimbabwe</td><td>2005, 2008, 2013</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table lists the major parties included in the party-race analysis, along with the election years in which their endorsements and electoral outcomes are tracked.
## F.2 Summary statistics at party-race level

<table><caption>Table F4: Additional summary statistics for the election analysis: party × constituency × election-year level</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Observations</th><th>Mean</th><th>Standard deviation</th><th>Min</th><th>Max</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Candidate is a woman</td><td>19067</td><td>0.13</td><td>0.33</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Winner is a woman</td><td>19067</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.17</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Vote share of female candidate</td><td>15496</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.12</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.95</td></tr><tr><td>Candidate is a woman running for the first time</td><td>18448</td><td>0.09</td><td>0.29</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Winner is a woman running for the first time</td><td>18448</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.12</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Vote share of female candidate running for the first time</td><td>14433</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.09</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.94</td></tr><tr><td>Candidate is a woman running for the second+ time</td><td>18448</td><td>0.04</td><td>0.19</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Winner is a woman running for the second+ time</td><td>18448</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.12</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Vote share of female candidate running for the second+ time</td><td>14433</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.08</td><td>0.00</td><td>0.95</td></tr><tr><td>Candidate is a man running for the first time</td><td>18448</td><td>0.49</td><td>0.50</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Winner is a man running for the first time</td><td>18448</td><td>0.11</td><td>0.31</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Vote share of male candidate running for the first time</td><td>14433</td><td>0.10</td><td>0.20</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Candidate is a man running for the second+ time</td><td>18448</td><td>0.26</td><td>0.44</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Winner is a man running for the second+ time</td><td>18448</td><td>0.12</td><td>0.32</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr><tr><td>Vote share of male candidate running for the second+ time</td><td>14433</td><td>0.10</td><td>0.20</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table provides party × constituency × election-year-level summary statistics of variables used in the election analysis. It focuses on the subsample of races included in the estimations of the effects of Free Basics in the first and second election following its introduction.
## F.3 Effects of Free Basics on electoral outcomes at party-race level

<table><caption>Table F5: Effects of Free Basics availability on candidacy, election and vote-share at party-race level</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Dependent variable<br>Election after Free Basics entry</th><th colspan="2">Run</th><th colspan="2">Win</th><th colspan="2">Vote share</th></tr><tr><th>First<br>election<br>(1)</th><th>Second<br>election<br>(2)</th><th>First<br>election<br>(3)</th><th>Second<br>election<br>(4)</th><th>First<br>election<br>(5)</th><th>Second<br>election<br>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="7" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel A: Female candidates</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>-0.013<br>(0.015)</td><td>0.071<br>(0.043)</td><td>-0.007<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.045*<br>(0.024)</td><td>0.002<br>(0.005)</td><td>0.046***<br>(0.007)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.102</td><td>0.145</td><td>0.028</td><td>0.033</td><td>0.027</td><td>0.033</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>17018</td><td>6683</td><td>17018</td><td>6683</td><td>14233</td><td>5209</td></tr><tr><td colspan="7" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel B: Female candidates running for the 1st time</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>-0.001<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.056**<br>(0.023)</td><td>-0.001<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.040<br>(0.027)</td><td>0.002<br>(0.006)</td><td>0.034**<br>(0.016)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.066</td><td>0.103</td><td>0.014</td><td>0.016</td><td>0.014</td><td>0.018</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>15868</td><td>6366</td><td>15868</td><td>6366</td><td>13083</td><td>4892</td></tr><tr><td colspan="7" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel C: Female candidates running for the 2nd+ time</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>-0.001<br>(0.016)</td><td>0.010<br>(0.037)</td><td>-0.006<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.005<br>(0.011)</td><td>-0.000<br>(0.004)</td><td>0.011<br>(0.018)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.039</td><td>0.047</td><td>0.014</td><td>0.017</td><td>0.013</td><td>0.016</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>15868</td><td>6366</td><td>15868</td><td>6366</td><td>13083</td><td>4892</td></tr><tr><td colspan="7" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel D: Male candidates running for the 1st time</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>-0.000<br>(0.027)</td><td>-0.101<br>(0.071)</td><td>-0.011<br>(0.017)</td><td>-0.092<br>(0.079)</td><td>0.003<br>(0.011)</td><td>-0.087<br>(0.057)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.340</td><td>0.540</td><td>0.097</td><td>0.127</td><td>0.085</td><td>0.116</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>15868</td><td>6366</td><td>15868</td><td>6366</td><td>13083</td><td>4892</td></tr><tr><td colspan="7" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel E: Male candidates running for the 2nd+ time</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>-0.025<br>(0.022)</td><td>0.008<br>(0.107)</td><td>-0.011<br>(0.024)</td><td>0.072*<br>(0.035)</td><td>-0.025**<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.019<br>(0.043)</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.236</td><td>0.311</td><td>0.110</td><td>0.141</td><td>0.089</td><td>0.108</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>15868</td><td>6366</td><td>15868</td><td>6366</td><td>13083</td><td>4892</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td colspan="7" style="text-align: left; font-weight: bold;">All panels</td></tr><tr><td>Party × election-year FEs</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr></tfoot></table>

<footnote>Notes: This table presents the LP-DiD estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability on candidacy, election and vote shares by candidates profile at the party × race level. The unit of observation is a party × race, i.e. a party × constituency × election year. For each type of candidacy (female candidates, female candidates running for the first time, female candidates running for the second time or more, male candidates running for the first time and male candidates running for the second time or more), the dependent variable is respectively a binary indicator set to 1 if the party endorses that type of candidate (columns 1-2), if a party's candidate of that type wins (columns 3-4) and the vote share received by the party's candidate of that type (columns 5-6). All specifications include country × election-year fixed effects, and the following controls: logarithm of population density and nighttime light. Standard errors are clustered two-way at constituency and country-year level. The mean dependent variable is computed in the reference election-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.</footnote>
G Aggregates effects of Free Basics on female MP election

This section presents results on the aggregate effects of Free Basics at the regional and party-region levels.

<table><caption>Table G1: Effects of Free Basics availability on female MP election at party × region × election-year level</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Dependent variable<br>Specification</th><th colspan="4">Share of female party candidates<br>elected at the party × region (ADM1) level</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">Elections before<br>Free Basics entry</th><th colspan="2">Elections after<br>Free Basics entry</th></tr><tr><th>Third-prior<br>election<br>(1)</th><th>Second-prior<br>election<br>(2)</th><th>First<br>election<br>(3)</th><th>Second<br>election<br>(4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Share of constituencies with Free Basics</td><td>-0.003<br>(0.016)</td><td>-0.001<br>(0.010)</td><td>-0.004<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.012*<br>(0.007)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>897</td><td>2892</td><td>4476</td><td>1397</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.018</td><td>0.013</td><td>0.010</td><td>0.013</td></tr><tr><td>Treated observations</td><td>672</td><td>1568</td><td>1901</td><td>620</td></tr><tr><td>Regions</td><td>172</td><td>274</td><td>219</td><td>183</td></tr><tr><td>Political parties</td><td>49</td><td>83</td><td>125</td><td>71</td></tr><tr><td>Countries</td><td>10</td><td>14</td><td>16</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Party × election-year FEs</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr></tbody></table>

This table presents the LP-DID estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability on parties' share of female candidates elected at the regional (ADM1) level. The unit of observation is a party × region × election year. The dependent variable is the fraction of female candidates endorsed by the party elected among all elected MPs in the region. The explanatory variable of interest is the share of constituencies covered by Free Basics in the region. All specifications include country × election-year fixed effects, and the following controls: logarithm of population density and nighttime light. Standard errors are clustered two-way at constituency and country-year level. The mean dependent variable is computed in the reference election-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
<table><caption>Table G2: Effects of Free Basics availability on female MP election at region × election-year level</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="4">Dependent variable<br>Specification</th><th colspan="4">Share of female candidates<br>elected at the regional (ADM1) level</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">Elections before<br>Free Basics entry</th><th colspan="2">Elections after<br>Free Basics entry</th></tr><tr><th>Third-prior<br>election</th><th>Second-prior<br>election</th><th>First<br>election</th><th>Second<br>election</th></tr><tr><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Share of constituencies with Free Basics</td><td>-0.163*<br>(0.084)</td><td>-0.109<br>(0.078)</td><td>-0.022<br>(0.050)</td><td>0.098**<br>(0.046)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>153</td><td>362</td><td>574</td><td>250</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.105</td><td>0.097</td><td>0.103</td><td>0.102</td></tr><tr><td>Treated observations</td><td>119</td><td>158</td><td>189</td><td>74</td></tr><tr><td>Regions</td><td>140</td><td>209</td><td>222</td><td>188</td></tr><tr><td>Countries</td><td>10</td><td>14</td><td>16</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Country × election-year FEs</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr></tbody></table>

This table presents the LP-DiD estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability on the share of female candidates elected at the regional (ADM1) level. The unit of observation is a region × election year. The dependent variable is the fraction of female candidates elected among all elected MPs in the region. The explanatory variable of interest is the share of constituencies covered by Free Basics in the region. All specifications include country × election-year fixed effects, and the following controls: logarithm of population density and nighttime light. Standard errors are clustered two-way at constituency and country-year level. The mean dependent variable is computed in the reference election-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
# H Free Basics availability, social media usage and gender norms: additional results and robustness checks

This section presents additional results on the relationship between Facebook availability, social media usage, and attitudes toward women in politics. Specifically, we report: (i) estimates based on the subsample of individuals interviewed prior to a second election with access to Free Basics; (ii) heterogeneity analyses of the association between access to Free Basics or social media use and gender attitudes across population subgroups; (iii) robustness checks under alternative assumptions about the variance-covariance matrix, including spatial correlation; and (iv) heterogeneity based on online content, as proxied by the Facebook feed distance in female political representation relative to the local population.

## H.1 Free Basics availability, social media usage and gender norms: pre-second election with Free Basics

<table><caption>Table H1: Free Basics availability, social media usage and gender attitudes - Sub-sample analysis prior to the second post-Free Basics election</caption><thead><tr><th>Dependent variable</th><th>Equal chance<br>for women<br>in politics<br>(1)</th><th>Men should<br>be prioritized<br>in labor market<br>(2)</th><th>Equal<br>land rights<br>for women<br>(3)</th><th>Women<br>should take<br>care of HH<br>(4)</th><th>Beating<br>wife never<br>justified<br>(5)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="6" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel A: Free Basics availability</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.026**<br>(0.012)</td><td>-0.016<br>(0.011)</td><td>0.002<br>(0.009)</td><td>-0.017<br>(0.014)</td><td>0.018<br>(0.015)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="6" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel B: Social media usage</td></tr><tr><td>Social media</td><td>0.051***<br>(0.007)</td><td>-0.073***<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.023***<br>(0.008)</td><td>-0.029**<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.015<br>(0.009)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="6" style="text-align: left; font-weight: bold;">All panels</td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Country-year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>59168</td><td>33596</td><td>33596</td><td>16323</td><td>33596</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.719</td><td>0.404</td><td>0.777</td><td>0.522</td><td>0.763</td></tr><tr><td>Sample period</td><td>2014-2022</td><td>2016-2022</td><td>2016-2022</td><td>2016-2018</td><td>2016-2022</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability (Panel A) and social media usage (Panel B) on gender attitudes. The unit of observation is a respondent surveyed prior to the second election following Free Basics' introduction. Column 1 includes respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6, 7 and 9), Columns 2, 3 and 5 use only those surveyed between 2016 and 2022 (round 7 and 9), Column 4 includes respondents surveyed between 2016 and 2018 (Afrobarometer round 7). The dependent variables are binary indicators set to 1 if the respondent reports the specified gender attitude. “Free Basics” if a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile phone operator providing access to Free Basics. “Social Media” is a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent declares using social media. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, religious affiliation as well as interviewer's gender, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). In Panel A, they also contain dummy variables controlling for the availability of 2G and 3G/4G internet but not Free Basics. Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Observations are weighted using Afrobarometer within-country survey weights. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country-year and enumeration area levels and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
## H.2 Free Basics availability, social media usage and attitudes towards women in politics: heterogeneities and robustness checks

<table><caption>Table H2: Free Basics availability, social media usage and gender norms - Heterogeneities</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Dependent variable</th><th colspan="10">Equal chance for women in politics</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">Education</th><th colspan="2">Age</th><th colspan="2">Gender</th><th colspan="2">Residence</th><th colspan="2">Nightlight</th></tr><tr><th>None<br>(1)</th><th>Primary<br>(2)</th><th>&gt; med.<br>(3)</th><th>&le; med.<br>(4)</th><th>Male<br>(5)</th><th>Female<br>(6)</th><th>Urban<br>(7)</th><th>Rural<br>(8)</th><th>&gt; 2<sup>nd</sup> ter.<br>(9)</th><th>&le; 2<sup>nd</sup> ter.<br>(10)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="11" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel A: Free Basics availability</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.026*<br>(0.015)</td><td>0.022**<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.011<br>(0.013)</td><td>0.038***<br>(0.013)</td><td>0.023*<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.026**<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.035<br>(0.026)</td><td>0.020**<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.006<br>(0.038)</td><td>0.023***<br>(0.008)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="11" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel B: Social media usage</td></tr><tr><td>Social media</td><td>0.013<br>(0.018)</td><td>0.060***<br>(0.006)</td><td>0.046***<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.058***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.059***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.050***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.056***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.051***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.055***<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.055***<br>(0.007)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="11" style="text-align: left; font-weight: bold;">All panels</td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Country-year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>20811</td><td>43403</td><td>32091</td><td>32123</td><td>32116</td><td>32098</td><td>25847</td><td>38367</td><td>20480</td><td>43734</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.681</td><td>0.742</td><td>0.729</td><td>0.715</td><td>0.666</td><td>0.778</td><td>0.754</td><td>0.701</td><td>0.752</td><td>0.708</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability (Panel A) and social media usage (Panel B) on attitudes towards women in politics, for different population subsamples. The sample is restricted successively to individuals with no primary education (column 1), individuals with at least primary education (column 2), individuals aged below (or equal to) the sample median (i.e. 34 y.o.) (column 3), individuals aged above the sample median (i.e. 34 y.o.) (column 4), men (column 5), women (column 6), individuals living in an urban area (column 7), individuals living in a rural area (column 8), individuals living in a constituency with a population-density-weighted mean nighttime light above the sample second tertile (column 9) and individuals living in a constituency with a population-density-weighted mean nighttime light below (or equal to) the sample second tertile (column 10). Respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6, 7 and 9) are included. The dependent variable is a binary indicator set to 1 if the respondent agrees that women should have the same chances as men to be elected. “Free Basics” if a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile phone operator providing access to Free Basics. “Social Media” is a binary indicator set to 1 if the respondent reports getting news from social media. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, religious affiliation as well as interviewer’s gender, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). In Panel A, they also contain dummy variables controlling for the availability of 2G and 3G/4G internet but not Free Basics. Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Observations are weighted using Afrobarometer within-country survey weights. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country-year and enumeration area levels and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
<table><caption>Table H3: Free Basics availability, social media usage and gender norms - Heterogeneity by religious affiliation</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Dependent variable</th><th colspan="4">Equal chance for women in politics</th></tr><tr><th>Christian<br>Catholic</th><th>Christian<br>Non-catholic</th><th>Muslim</th><th>Agnostic /<br>Atheist</th></tr><tr><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Panel A: Free Basics availability</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.030***<br>(0.011)</td><td>0.010<br>(0.014)</td><td>0.015<br>(0.022)</td><td>0.030<br>(0.026)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Panel B: Social media usage</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Social media</td><td>0.054***<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.058***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.040***<br>(0.014)</td><td>0.075***<br>(0.024)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>All panels</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Country-year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>23321</td><td>21456</td><td>15671</td><td>3761</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.743</td><td>0.741</td><td>0.669</td><td>0.704</td></tr></tbody></table>

This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability (Panel A) and social media usage (Panel B) on attitudes towards women in politics, for different population samples. The sample is restricted successively to christian catholic individuals (column 1), christian non-catholic individuals (column 2); muslim individuals (column 3); individuals self-declaring no religion, agnostic or atheist (column 4). Respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6, 7 and 9) are included. “Free Basics” if a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile phone operator providing access to Free Basics. “Social Media” is a binary indicators set to 1 if the respondent reports getting news from social media. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location as well as interviewer’s gender, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). In Panel A, they also contain dummy variables controlling for the availability of 2G and 3G/4G internet but not Free Basics. Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Observations are weighted using Afrobarometer within-country survey weights. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country-year and enumeration area levels and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
<table><caption>Table H4: Free Basics availability, social media usage and attitudes towards women in politics - Robustness to spatial autocorrelation</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Dependent variable:<br>Robustness exercise:<br>Distance cutoff:</th><th colspan="6">Equal chance for women in politics</th></tr><tr><th colspan="6">Spatial autocorrelation</th></tr><tr><th>50km<br>(1)</th><th>100km<br>(2)</th><th>250km<br>(3)</th><th>50km<br>(4)</th><th>100km<br>(5)</th><th>250km<br>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th colspan="7" style="text-align: center;">Panel A: Free Basics availability</th></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.024***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.024***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.024***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.024***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.024***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.024***<br>(0.008)</td></tr><tr><td>... × Facebook gender representation distance</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.027***<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.027***<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.027***<br>(0.010)</td></tr><tr><th colspan="7" style="text-align: center;">Panel B: Social media usage</th></tr><tr><td>Social Media</td><td>0.053***<br>(0.006)</td><td>0.053***<br>(0.006)</td><td>0.053***<br>(0.006)</td><td>0.054***<br>(0.005)</td><td>0.054***<br>(0.006)</td><td>0.054***<br>(0.006)</td></tr><tr><td>... × Facebook gender representation distance</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.014***<br>(0.005)</td><td>0.014***<br>(0.005)</td><td>0.014**<br>(0.005)</td></tr><tr><th colspan="7" style="text-align: left;">All panels</th></tr><tr><td>Country × year FEs</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>64854</td><td>64854</td><td>64854</td><td>62463</td><td>62463</td><td>62463</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.722</td><td>0.722</td><td>0.722</td><td>0.718</td><td>0.718</td><td>0.718</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability (Panel A), social media usage (Panel B) and online content exposure on attitudes towards women in politics. The unit of observation is a survey respondent. All columns include respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6-7 and 9). The dependent variable is a binary indicator set to 1 if the respondent reports agreeing with the specified statement. “Free Basics” if a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile phone operator providing access to Free Basics. “Social Media” is a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent reports using social media. “Facebook gender representation distance” denotes the Facebook-exposure-weighted average distance in WPI between respondent’s home region and all regions worldwide. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, religious affiliation as well as interviewer’s gender, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). In Panel A, they also contain dummy variables controlling for the availability of 2G and 3G/4G internet but not Free Basics. Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Observations are weighted using Afrobarometer within-country survey weights. Standard errors accounting for spatial autocorrelation up to the corresponding distance are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
<table><caption>Table H5: Free Basics availability and attitudes towards women in politics - Robustness to alternate coverage definition</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Dependent variable:<br>Robustness exercise:<br> Buffers increased by:</th><th colspan="6">Equal chance for women in politics</th></tr><tr><th colspan="6">Alternate buffer size around towers</th></tr><tr><th>2km<br>(1)</th><th>4km<br>(2)</th><th>8km<br>(3)</th><th>2km<br>(4)</th><th>4km<br>(5)</th><th>8km<br>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.024**<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.021**<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.012<br>(0.011)</td><td>0.024**<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.023**<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.015<br>(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td>... × Facebook gender representation distance</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.026**<br>(0.013)</td><td>0.029**<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.030**<br>(0.013)</td></tr><tr><td>Country × year FEs</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>64854</td><td>64854</td><td>64854</td><td>62463</td><td>62463</td><td>62463</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.722</td><td>0.722</td><td>0.722</td><td>0.718</td><td>0.718</td><td>0.718</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability and online content exposure on attitudes towards women in politics. It tests the robustness to increasing the radius of internet coverage area around cellular towers by up to 8 kilometers. The unit of observation is a survey respondent. All columns include respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6-7 and 9). The dependent variable is a binary indicator set to 1 if the respondent reports agreeing with the specified statement. “Free Basics” if a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile phone operator providing access to Free Basics. “Social Media” is a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent reports using social media. “Facebook gender representation distance” denotes the Facebook-exposure-weighted average distance in WPI between respondent’s home region and all regions worldwide. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, religious affiliation as well as interviewer’s gender, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). In Panel A, they also contain dummy variables controlling for the availability of 2G and 3G/4G internet but not Free Basics. Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Observations are weighted using Afrobarometer within-country survey weights. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country-year and enumeration area levels and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
<table><caption>Table H6: Free Basics availability, social media usage and gender norms - the role of online content exposure</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Dependent variable</th><th>Equal chance<br>for women<br>in politics</th><th>Men should<br>be prioritized<br>labor market</th><th>Equal<br>land rights<br>for women</th><th>Women<br>should take<br>care of HH</th><th>Beating<br>wife never<br>justified</th></tr><tr><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="6" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel A: Free Basics availability</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>-0.022*<br>(0.011)</td><td>-0.001<br>(0.008)</td><td>-0.018<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.019<br>(0.014)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>... × Facebook gender representation distance</td><td>-0.007<br>(0.013)</td><td>0.021***<br>(0.006)</td><td>-0.006<br>(0.014)</td><td>-0.005<br>(0.017)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="6" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel B: Social media usage</td></tr><tr><td>Social media</td><td>-0.063***<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.021***<br>(0.007)</td><td>-0.024**<br>(0.011)</td><td>0.014<br>(0.009)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>... × Facebook gender representation distance</td><td>-0.028***<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.005<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.014<br>(0.014)</td><td>0.004<br>(0.010)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="6" style="text-align: left; font-weight: bold;">All panels</td></tr><tr><td>Country × year FEs</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>39410</td><td>39543</td><td>18285</td><td>39011</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var</td><td>0.396</td><td>0.778</td><td>0.509</td><td>0.764</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability (Panel A), social media usage (Panel B) and online content exposure on gender norms. The unit of observation is a survey respondent. All columns include respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6, 7 and 9). The dependent variable is a binary indicator set to 1 if the respondent reports agreeing with the specified statement. “Free Basics” if a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile phone operator providing access to Free Basics. “Social Media” is a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent reports using social media. “Facebook gender representation distance” denotes the Facebook-exposure-weighted average distance in WPI between respondent’s home region and all regions worldwide. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, religious affiliation as well as interviewer’s gender, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). In Panel A, they also contain dummy variables controlling for the availability of 2G and 3G/4G internet but not Free Basics. Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Observations are weighted using Afrobarometer within-country survey weights. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country-year and enumeration area levels and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
<table><caption>Table H7: Free Basics availability, social media usage and attitudes towards women in politics - the role of online content exposure - Sub-sample analysis prior to the second post-Free Basics election</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Dependent variable</th><th colspan="3">Equal chance for women in politics</th></tr><tr><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>Panel A: Free Basics availability</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.024*<br>(0.014)</td><td>0.024*<br>(0.014)</td><td>0.044<br>(0.033)</td></tr><tr><td>... × Facebook gender representation distance</td><td>0.029*<br>(0.016)</td><td>0.029*<br>(0.016)</td><td>0.029*<br>(0.015)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>Panel B: Social media usage</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Social media</td><td>0.052***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.049***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.091***<br>(0.017)</td></tr><tr><td>... × Facebook gender representation distance</td><td>0.017**<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.020***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.022***<br>(0.007)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>All panels</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Country × year FEs</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Network structure controls</td><td></td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Interaction terms: nighttime light, rural</td><td></td><td></td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>56793</td><td>56793</td><td>56793</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var</td><td>0.715</td><td>0.715</td><td>0.715</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability (Panel A), social media usage (Panel B) and online content exposure on attitudes towards women in politics. The unit of observation is a respondent surveyed prior to the second election following Free Basics' introduction. Columns 1 to 4 include respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6, 7 and 9). The dependent variable is a binary indicator set to 1 if the respondent reports agreeing with the specified statement. “Free Basics” if a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile phone operator providing access to Free Basics. “Social Media” is a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent reports using social media. “Facebook gender representation distance” denotes the Facebook-exposure-weighted average distance in WPI between respondent's home region and all regions worldwide. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, religious affiliation as well as interviewer's gender, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). In Panel A, they also contain dummy variables controlling for the availability of 2G and 3G/4G internet but not Free Basics. Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light, the share of the average user's Facebook connections located in the same ADM1 region and its interaction with Free Basics or Social Media. Columns 2 and 4 also include the interactions between “Social Media” and population-density-weighted mean nighttime light as well as rural residence. Country-year fixed effects are included. Observations are weighted using Afrobarometer within-country survey weights. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country-year and enumeration area levels and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
# I Free Basics availability, social media usage and political attitudes

This section presents additional results on the association between Free Basics availability, social media usage, and attitudes toward national politics and representatives. Subsection I.1 describes summary statistics of political attitudes of Afromarometer respondents, as well as the baseline results, along with estimates based on the same specifications for the subsample of individuals interviewed prior to the second election with Free Basics. Subsection I.2 explores heterogeneities in these associations, focusing on attitudes toward women in politics across population subgroups defined by their views on politics and politicians.

## I.1 Free Basics availability, social media usage and political attitudes

<table><caption>Table I1: Summary statistics for individual-level variables on political attitudes</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Observations</th><th>Mean</th><th>Standard deviation</th><th>Min</th><th>Max</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Political attitudes</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Social media informs people</td><td>18528</td><td>0.63</td><td>0.48</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Social media impacts politics</td><td>18528</td><td>0.55</td><td>0.50</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>MPs are corrupt</td><td>72200</td><td>0.41</td><td>0.49</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Trust in the parliament</td><td>72200</td><td>0.22</td><td>0.42</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Disapproval of own MP</td><td>72200</td><td>0.58</td><td>0.49</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Voted in the last national election</td><td>72200</td><td>0.74</td><td>0.44</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the individual-level variables related to political attitudes used in the following analysis.
<table><caption>Table I2: Free Basics availability, social media usage and political attitudes</caption><thead><tr><th>Dependent variable</th><th>Social media informs people (1)</th><th>Social media impacts politics (2)</th><th>MPs are corrupt (3)</th><th>Trust in the parliament (4)</th><th>Disapproval of own MP (5)</th><th>Voted in the last national election (6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="7" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel A: Free Basics availability</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.051**<br>(0.018)</td><td>0.042**<br>(0.017)</td><td>0.011<br>(0.011)</td><td>-0.013*<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.004<br>(0.013)</td><td>-0.009<br>(0.009)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="7" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel B: Social media usage</td></tr><tr><td>Social media</td><td>0.315***<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.274***<br>(0.021)</td><td>0.029***<br>(0.007)</td><td>-0.036***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.019**<br>(0.008)</td><td>-0.018***<br>(0.007)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="7" style="text-align: left; font-weight: bold;">All panels</td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Country-year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>18528</td><td>18528</td><td>72200</td><td>72200</td><td>72200</td><td>72200</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.630</td><td>0.546</td><td>0.410</td><td>0.221</td><td>0.577</td><td>0.738</td></tr><tr><td>Sample period</td><td>2019-2021</td><td>2019-2021</td><td>2014-2022</td><td>2014-2022</td><td>2014-2022</td><td>2014-2022</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability (Panel A) and social media usage (Panel B) on political attitudes. The unit of observation is a survey respondent. Columns 1 and 2 include respondents surveyed between 2019 and 2021 (Afrobarometer round 8), Columns 3-6 include respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6 to 9). The dependent variables are binary indicators set to 1 if the respondent reports the specified political attitude. “Free Basics” if a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile phone operator providing access to Free Basics. “Social Media” is a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent declares using social media. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, and religious affiliation, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). In Panel A, they also contain dummy variables controlling for the availability of 2G and 3G/4G internet but not Free Basics. Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Observations are weighted using Afrobarometer within-country survey weights. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country-year and enumeration area levels and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
<table><caption>Table I3: Free Basics availability, social media usage and political attitudes - Sub-sample analysis prior to the second post-Free Basics election</caption><thead><tr><th>Dependent variable</th><th>Social media<br>informs<br>people<br>(1)</th><th>Social media<br>impacts<br>politics<br>(2)</th><th>MPs are<br>corrupt<br>(3)</th><th>Trust<br>in the<br>parliament<br>(4)</th><th>Disapproval<br>of own<br>MP<br>(5)</th><th>Voted in the<br>last national<br>election<br>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="7" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel A: Free Basics availability</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.051**<br>(0.018)</td><td>0.042**<br>(0.017)</td><td>0.015<br>(0.012)</td><td>-0.012<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.010<br>(0.015)</td><td>-0.009<br>(0.010)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="7" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel B: Social media usage</td></tr><tr><td>Social media</td><td>0.315***<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.274***<br>(0.021)</td><td>0.029***<br>(0.008)</td><td>-0.036***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.022**<br>(0.009)</td><td>-0.019***<br>(0.007)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="7" style="text-align: left; font-weight: bold;">All panels</td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Country-year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>18528</td><td>18528</td><td>67105</td><td>67105</td><td>67105</td><td>67105</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.630</td><td>0.546</td><td>0.416</td><td>0.217</td><td>0.577</td><td>0.734</td></tr><tr><td>Sample period</td><td>2019-2021</td><td>2019-2021</td><td>2014-2022</td><td>2014-2022</td><td>2014-2022</td><td>2014-2022</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability (Panel A) and social media usage (Panel B) on political attitudes. The unit of observation is a respondent surveyed prior to the second election following Free Basics' introduction. Columns 1 and 2 include respondents surveyed between 2019 and 2021 (Afrobarometer round 8), Columns 3-6 include respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6 to 9). The dependent variables are binary indicators set to 1 if the respondent reports the specified political attitude. “Free Basics” if a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile phone operator providing access to Free Basics. “Social Media” is a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent declares using social media. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, and religious affiliation, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). In Panel A, they also contain dummy variables controlling for the availability of 2G and 3G/4G internet but not Free Basics. Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Observations are weighted using Afrobarometer within-country survey weights. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country-year and enumeration area levels and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
## I.2 Heterogeneity in the association between Free Basics availability, social media usage and attitudes towards women in politics

<table><caption>Table I4: Free Basics, social media usage and gender attitudes - Heterogeneities by political attitudes</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Dependent variable</th><th colspan="8">Equal chance for women in politics</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">MPs are corrupt</th><th colspan="2">Trust in parliament</th><th colspan="2">Disapproval of own MP</th><th colspan="2">Voted last nat. election</th></tr><tr><th>Yes (1)</th><th>No (2)</th><th>Yes (3)</th><th>No (4)</th><th>Yes (5)</th><th>No (6)</th><th>Yes (7)</th><th>No (8)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="9" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel A: Free Basics availability</td></tr><tr><td>Free Basics</td><td>0.013<br>(0.015)</td><td>0.038***<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.035***<br>(0.013)</td><td>0.028**<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.026**<br>(0.012)</td><td>0.026**<br>(0.011)</td><td>0.025**<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.039*<br>(0.021)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="9" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Panel B: Social media usage</td></tr><tr><td>Social media</td><td>0.055***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.057***<br>(0.009)</td><td>0.051***<br>(0.016)</td><td>0.057***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.058***<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.052***<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.046***<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.078***<br>(0.008)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="9" style="text-align: left; font-weight: bold;">All panels</td></tr><tr><td>Individual controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Constituency controls</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Country-year fixed effects</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td><td>✓</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>22095</td><td>31810</td><td>11860</td><td>42045</td><td>30950</td><td>22955</td><td>39754</td><td>14151</td></tr><tr><td>Mean dep. var.</td><td>0.712</td><td>0.732</td><td>0.715</td><td>0.726</td><td>0.725</td><td>0.722</td><td>0.725</td><td>0.719</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of Free Basics availability (Panel A) and social media usage (Panel B) on attitudes towards women in politics, for different population subsamples. The sample is restricted successively to individuals who think that MPs are corrupt (column 1) or who do not (column 2), individuals who trust the parliament (column 3) or who do not (column 4), individuals who disapprove the perfomance of their own MP (column 5) or who do not (column 6), individuals who voted in the last national election (column 7) or who did not (column 8). Respondents surveyed between 2014 and 2022 (Afrobarometer rounds 6, 7 and 9) are included. The dependent variable is a binary indicator set to 1 if the respondent agrees that women should have the same chances as men to be elected. “Free Basics” if a dummy variable set to 1 if the respondent is covered by a mobile phone operator providing access to Free Basics. “Social Media” is a binary indicators set to 1 if the respondent reports getting news from social media. Individual controls include age, gender, primary education completion, rural location, religious affiliation as well as interviewer’s gender, along with enumeration area-level dummies indicating the presence of facilities (post office, police station, health clinic, market stalls, bank/money services, and paid transport such as bus, taxi, or moped). In Panel A, they also contain dummy variables controlling for the availability of 2G and 3G/4G internet but not Free Basics. Constituency controls consist of the log-transformed constituency-year-level population-density-weighted mean nighttime light. Country-year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country-year and enumeration area levels and reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.