# Revisiting the EU's Democratic Deficit: Archival Insights From Maximalist Federalists

Jessy Bailly

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Jessy Bailly. Revisiting the EU's Democratic Deficit: Archival Insights From Maximalist Federalists. Journal of Common Market Studies, 2025, 10.1111/jcms.70046. hal-05344341

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Revisiting the EU's Democratic Deficit:

Archival Insights from Maximalist Federalists

Abstract

This article explores the history of democratic problematisation of European integration, rather than taking part in the normative debate on the European Union's democratic legitimacy deficit that emerged in the 1990s. We focus on the narratives of non-institutional actors who have considered that European integration should be a democratic political entity since the 1950s. We draw on historical archives of constitutionalist/maximalist federalists, highlighting two ways of understanding what European democracy should be: a political union centred around a parliament directly elected by citizens and endowed with constitutional power, and a union with social prerogatives.

We argue that studying the early narratives of maximalist federalists can shed light on the state of the posterior debate on the EU's democratic legitimacy deficit. Indeed, some academic positions from the 1990s were already well established in the federalist discourses of the 1950s.

To quote: Jessy Bailly (2025). Revisiting the EU's Democratic Deficit: Archival Insights From Maximalist Federalists. *Journal of Common Market studies*. Online version: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jcms.70046
# 1. Introduction

The literature exploring the relationship between European integration and democracy is substantial (e.g., Anderssen & Eliassen, 1995; Eriksen & Fossum, 2001; Schmitter, 2000; for recent contributions, see Alemanno & Organ, 2021; Oleart, 2023). This vast body of work includes the canonical debate on the democratic legitimacy deficit of the European Union (EU),<fnref n="1" /> which primarily fuelled academic discussions between 1990 and 2000 (Eriksen & Fossum, 2001; Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Héritier, 1999; Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2002; Nicolaïdis, 2013; Scharpf, 1997) and led to the European Commission adopting the term “democratic deficit”.<fnref n="2" />

This article does not primarily aim to directly engage with the debate on whether the EU is democratic, but rather focuses on examining how European integration has been framed as democratic through early “counter narratives” (Sternberg, 2013), in contrast to dominant narratives emphasising the EU as a technocracy or an intergovernmental organisation.

The abundant debate about the EU’s democratic deficit—as well as studies on certain European institutions’ initiatives, such as Citizens’ Europe (Sternberg, 2013) and the Tindemans Report (1976), or democracy in European law (Aldrin & Hubé, 2018)—overlooks the fact that democratic problematisation has been present from the very beginning, and even before the start of European integration, specifically the idea of equating European integration with a political entity that must be “democratic”. Indeed, the prominence of this intellectual and political debate from the 1990s onwards (Rittberger, 2005; Sternberg, 2013) has led to the scholarly perception that European institutions have only recently begun to take an interest in European citizens and democracy as such. For instance, Saurugger (2014: 318) argues that “what role citizen participation should play in the political process” is an issue that emerged “since the emergence of the debate on the EU’s democratic deficit in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992”. Furthermore, Van Ingelgom (2014: 18) highlights that from the 1950s to the 1980s, “citizens were largely absent from the European legitimation process”, and that only from the 1980s were they “gradually constructed from mere spectators to key actors in attempts to legitimise European integration” (Van Ingelgom, 2014: 12). This common scientific sense would like European institutions to (finally) look to the citizens to counter what has been theorised as the shift from indifference to negative politicisation (Hooghe & Marks, 2008) towards the EU.

However, such a perspective disregards a significant part of the intellectual history of European integration, given that the concern for citizens in the name of “European democracy” is nothing new. Indeed, works such as Rittberger (2005, 2009), Bee (2008), and Sternberg (2013) clearly demonstrate the prior existence of these concerns among European institutions. We complement these studies by analysing the narratives of non-institutional actors, namely maximalist federalists since the end of the 1940s, who have undoubtedly influenced European institutions in their “democratisation” agendas. Maximalist federalists (sometimes referred to as “constitutionalists”, Pistone, 2008: 51) advocated for the inclusion

<footnote n="1">¹ The expression was first used by the Young European Federalists in their 1977 Manifesto (if we disregard Altiero Spinelli’s 1949 reference to the need for “democratic legitimacy” in European integration).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/democratic-deficit.html</footnote>
of the “European people” in the process of European integration through the establishment of an assembly elected by direct universal suffrage (Ballangé, 2022) endowed with genuine legislative powers and tasked with drafting a project for a European Constitution. At the time, they opposed other federalists described as “moderate” or functionalist (Bitsch, 1999: 79), who instead aimed to “promote the development of the customs union into an economic and political union” (Pistone, 2008), applying the spillover theory dear to Jean Monnet — a strategy criticized by the prominent maximalist representative Altiero Spinelli (1907–1986). Maximalists are represented by supporters of Spinelli, such as Mario Albertini, and more broadly by Italian federalists, while the more moderate functionalists are represented by Hendrik Brugmans and some European parliamentarians (studied by Bee, 2008: 438–439; Sternberg, 2013: 51) who believe that it is more realistic not to demand that parliament possesses constituent power.

Analysing these narratives enables tracing the democratic problematisation of European integration back to 1949, when Spinelli raised the issue of the “democratic legitimacy” of what—in his view—the European federation should become.<fnref n="3" />

Beyond revisiting the history of the democratic problematisation of European integration, the main objective of our article is to examine what these maximalist federalists meant by “European democracy”. In doing so, we will explore how their interpretation of “European democracy” partially frames the later debate on the EU’s democratic deficit.

We first present the state of the art on the EU’s democratic deficit and how the EU’s democratisation has been conceptualised, followed by a review of socio-historical studies on competing visions—including “democratic” ones—of European integration. After this literature review, we outline our methodology (an analysis of archival collections totaling 1895 pages at the Historical Archives of the EU in Florence, focusing on occurrences of the keywords “European democracy”, “citizens” and “citizen participation”) and unique approach to contribute to the debate on the democratic problematisation of European integration. The following sections are dedicated to analysing what the maximalist federalists refer to as “European democracy”. Finally, we conclude by highlighting how these narratives on democracy at the European level partially resemble positions held by EU scholars in debates on the EU’s democratic legitimacy deficit.

## 2. Literature review: From examining the EU’s democratic deficit to exploring the democratic problematisation of European integration

### 2.1. *The EU's democratic deficit*

The debate on the EU’s democratic deficit is intriguing for several reasons, particularly because it is normative and reveals competing visions of what European integration should entail (Mény, 1992). Before delving into these plural visions, it is worth questioning why academic debate only began to focus on the democratic quality of the EU in the 1990s, and not earlier. Although the democratic dimension of European integration was briefly mentioned

<footnote n="3">³ Spinelli, A. (1949). Thèses pour l'élaboration d'une politique de l'UEF. HAEU: UEF95.</footnote>
by Scheingold and Lindberg in 1970, pp. 267-268, the original data presented in this article show that maximalist federalists were already speaking of “European democracy” as early as the late 1940s, and especially from the 1950s onward. This temporal gap — spanning four decades — between the federalist discourse and the academic field reveals much about the underlying intellectual and political hierarchies that structure the field of European studies, in which the democratic question was not considered a worthy issue (at least prior to the Maastricht Treaty). "This suggests that scholarship in European studies often emerges only after European institutions themselves begin to adopt certain terms, concepts, or policy programs (Aldrin & Hubé, 2016: 141–144). This highlights the strong tendency toward legitimism within the field and underscores the potential significant influence of EU institutions in shaping academic research agendas on EU.

First, some authors advocate that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit, with several among them arguing that the democratic deficit is due to the European Parliament's overly limited powers (Habermas, 2001a; Vaubel, 1995), in comparison with the Commission or the Council of the EU. Others deplore the absence of a proper European welfare state while highlighting that European integration has contributed to the deregulation of national welfare states (Habermas, 2001b; Scharpf, 1997).

Further authors emphasise that the EU is insufficiently politicised. In response to the dominance of non-majoritarian institutions, they highlight the need to foster more “left-right politics” (Hix, 2006) and introduce a form of majoritarianism within the European Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European Parliament. In this view, European politics becomes more politicised—and less consensus-oriented—when there is a government for which European citizens have voted and a clearly identifiable opposition, enabling the clear attribution of political responsibility (Hix, 2006).

In contrast to such top-down politicisation—which authors such as Grimm (1995) argue remains inadequate—scholars advocate for the need for bottom-up politicisation to address the EU democratic legitimacy deficit. While European integration could not rely on a *demos* in the classical sense (Grimm, 1995; Nicolaïdis, 2013; Weiler, 1995) or an existing collective identity (Jachtenfuchs, 1997), certain academics assert that European public spheres are emerging, albeit insufficiently (Risse, 2010). Habermas (1992) supports the necessary development of this (these) public sphere(s), whether it (they) already exist(s) or is (are) lacking, depending on the perspective. This position is also approved by transactionalist theories (Fligstein, 2008; Nicolaïdis, 2013), which believe that a European consciousness and collective identity more strongly emerge the more that European peoples and citizens interact. In this line of reasoning, Oleart (2021) contends that the EU's democratic legitimacy deficit stems from a lack of politicisation by dissensus at the EU level (see also: Crespy, 2014). The EU does not provide sufficient political opportunities for civil society participation or social movements to freely and openly criticise European institutions that are unequally unresponsive to them.

Among those who acknowledge the EU's democratic deficit, Majone (1998) presents a distinctive perspective by arguing that this is linked to the power of non-majoritarian institutions at the EU level. While he does not fundamentally criticise these institutions,
Majone (1998: 15) contends that they are insufficiently held accountable by voters or their elected representatives. According to him, there is a need for greater public justification and accountability, whether to the European Parliament or through judicial means, aligning with certain theorists' views advocating for European democratisation through high-level and elite deliberation (Eriksen & Fossum, 2001). Vauchez (2016) also highlights the critique regarding the lack of European democracy due to the presence of such "unaccountable" institutions.

Several authors assert that there is no true deficit of democratic legitimacy, including Schmitter (2001), who rejects the term "democratic deficit" while still considering it desirable to democratise European integration. Moravcsik (2002) claims that there is no democratic legitimacy deficit as the EU has sufficient checks and balances, a directly elected Parliament, and that EU is also democratically legitimised through democratically elected states represented in the Council of the EU, which—for example—appoints representatives to the Court of Justice of the EU.

Finally, a group of authors argue that the EU cannot be evaluated using national democratic criteria (Grimm, 1995; Héritier, 1999; Majone, 1998; Nicolaïdis, 2013), with some asserting that the EU is democratic but in a different way. Héritier (1999) refers to this when discussing a system of mutual control, although she describes it as needing improvement among the various policy networks and European institutions. This position is echoed by Costa et al. (2003), who refer to "diffuse democracy", and criticised by Mény (2002: 9). On the other hand, Nicolaïdis (2013) claims that the EU is "demoi-cratic", while acknowledging the need to further develop interactions among European peoples.

In sum, the criteria used to assess a democratic Europe are generally divided among the following concerns: insufficient parliamentarisation, a lack of majority government (and hence politicisation), an underdeveloped public sphere (not sufficiently "popular"), a weak sense of European identity, a deficit in welfare state provisions, the need for more checks and balances, and an excessive role played by non-majoritarian institutions, the latter being particularly characteristic of the EU style of government (Vauchez, 2016).

## 2.2. How to democratise the EU?

Beyond the debate on the democratic deficit, many authors have identified that the EU has some "structural problems of democracy" (Jachtenfuchs, 1997; Scheingold & Lindberg, 1970: 267).

It is common to find authors advocating for the parliamentarisation of European integration as a democratic solution (Price, 1962; Rittberger, 2005), while some also emphasise that national parliaments should be more prominent in European discussions (Mény, 2002; Nicolaïdis, 2013; Sacriste, 2024; Weiler, 1995).

However, democratisation through parliamentarisation is viewed as insufficient (Grimm, 1995; Jachtenfuchs, 1997; Scharpf, 1997), with claims that alternative avenues should be explored. Some advocate establishing a European welfare state (De Swaan, 1992; Eriksen &
Fossum, 2001; Habermas, 2001b), while others more modestly propose creating a European regulatory state that prescribes social standards (Scharpf, 1997).

Another approach to the EU's top-down democratisation involves advocating for establishing a European constitution (Habermas, 2001a), with the ultimate goal of fostering constitutional patriotism and a genuine European public space (a method criticised by Grimm, 1995). One can also cite Weiler, who argues that: "It is only a combination of the national and transnational which could make a real impact on the problem of democracy" (Weiler, 1995: 235).

Other authors emphasise the need to make the EU more democratic by increasing institutional transparency and ensuring that European institutions publicly justify their positions and are held accountable (Eriksen & Fossum, 2001; Beetham & Lord, 2001) in European public spheres. This anticipates the literature on the democratic legitimation of the EU through values (Fossum, 2001; Foret & Calligaro, 2018).

There are also studies arguing that it is essential to politicise European issues to foster the emergence of one or more European public spheres, whether through political parties (Hix, 2006; Jachtenfuchs, 1997), the media (Risse, 2010), social movements (Crespy, 2014; Oleart, 2021), or by holding citizens' assemblies (Alemanno & Organ, 2021; Bauböck & Nicolaïdis, 2025). Some advocate for institutions to consult civil society groups (Kohler-Koch & Quittkat, 2013; Saurugger, 2014). The common aim is to create "dispersed forms of communication in civil society" (Eriksen, 2001) at the EU level.

Others assert that there are already sufficient democratic mechanisms at the EU level, highlighting that citizens only minimally engage with the available opportunities (Alemanno, 2015), although Mény (2002) would respond to this assertion by claiming that the popular pillar of EU democracy remains too weak. Consequently, there is a need to further simplify and publicise these avenues for citizens to participate in European affairs. In this article, the aim is not to take a position between the variety of these viewpoints. Indeed, despite the evident ambiguity in what these authors mean by "European democracy", most agree that the EU is—or should be—democratic.

It is important not to confine ourselves to this relatively recent academic literature as the democratic problematisation of European integration has a much longer history, pre-dating academics in the 1990s and 2000s who contributed to framing European integration as something that should be democratic. By tracing back the democratic problematisation of European integration, we can see how non-academic actors—specifically federalist activists—have shaped the debate on European democratisation. Indeed, it is precisely because they defined the European project as needing to be democratic that the subsequent academic and political discussions about the democratic deficit and the democratisation of the EU became possible.
## 2.3. *Early counter-narratives on EU democracy*

Sternberg's (2013) work is enlightening in illustrating the competing visions of what European integration should be at its inception, whereby technocratic and intergovernmental visions prevail (as also shown by Ballangé, 2022; Cohen, 2012; Rittberger, 2005), in contrast to minority counter-narratives about European democracy (see also: Cohen, 2012; Rittberger, 2009).

In this article, we propose further delving into studying these early counter-narratives. Unlike Sternberg (2013), we base our work on historical archives reflecting the positions of non-institutional actors. Indeed, the history of the democratic problematisation of European integration should not be limited to official positions or media coverage of European affairs. In this sense, our work builds on Ballangé's (2022) research on maximalist federalists, which primarily focuses on how these federalists invoke the "European people" in their discourses to legitimise the idea of European federation. For our part, as detailed in the methodology section, we focus on the way these federalists use the terms "democracy", "citizens", and "citizen participation", which reveals a democratic perspective (for instance on social Europe) that was not identified by Ballangé (2022) who overall focuses on the Constituent project of maximalist federalists.

Nonetheless, we find the idea that federalists (institutional in Sternberg, 2013; non-institutional in Ballangé, 2022) advocate for the democratisation of European integration through parliamentarisation. By investigating how maximalist federalists use "democracy" as a narrative, we demonstrate that the universe of meaning associated with democracy is not limited to parliamentarisation alone.

## 3. Data and method

In order to analyse the history of the democratic problematisation of European integration, we base our analysis on a stay at the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) at the European University Institute in Florence in September 2023, during which we reviewed and synthesised all archival materials containing the keywords "citizen participation", "European citizens", and "democracy". This led us to work with archival material (1895 pages of documents), the oldest of which dates back to 1949 and the most recent to 2011 (see Table 1).

This led us to explore the European Movement (ME), Union of European Federalists (UEF), European Young Federalists (EYF), Young European Federalists (JEF), Pier Virgilio Dastoli (PVF), John Pinder (JP), and Helmut Goetz (HG) collections (consider table 1):

<table><caption>Table 1: Studied archival holdings</caption><thead><tr><td>Collection (covered period)</td><td>ME (1995-2011)</td><td>UEF (1949-1990)</td><td>EYF/JEF (1975-2001)</td><td>PVF (1985-2003)</td><td>JP (1966-1992)</td><td>HG (1956-1966)</td></tr></thead></table>
<table><tr><td>Number of documents (pages reviewed) N= 1895</td><td>475</td><td>346</td><td>123</td><td>447</td><td>272</td><td>232</td></tr></table>

This corpus, focused on the discourses and representations of maximalist federalists, was not initially selected consciously. In fact, we consulted a wide range of continuous archives at the HAEU, where the targeted keywords mostly pointed to documents produced by maximalist federalists. Their overrepresentation in the archival material referring to “European democracy” was only identified retrospectively.

These resources allowed us to trace back to the late 1940s, distancing ourselves from the scientific common sense (even if some scholarship is an exception, such as Sternberg, 2013) suggesting that citizens only became a subject of political consideration at the community level from the end of the 1970s (Bee, 2008) or 1980s (Van Ingelgom, 2014).

Our examination of these archives uncovered a significant number of written documents (declarations, letters, congress motions and articles) produced by maximalist federalists. The data analysis involved examining several categories for each document mentioning “European democracy” and its citizens. First, we questioned the basis on which the actors studied criticised the lack of democracy (which the sociology of social movements calls the “diagnostic framing”; Benford & Snow, 1988). Why would the European Community be deemed insufficiently or non-democratic? From this perspective, our findings align with those of Ballangé (2022) and Sternberg (2013), which is why we will not dwell extensively on the mechanisms of this critical diagnosis. Indeed, maximalist federalists legitimise the idea of a democratic Europe against the militaristic tendencies of the Europe nation-state, as well as against the manifestations of a technocratic Europe that is close to interest groups.

Next, we examined the “prognostic framing” (Benford & Snow, 1998), namely what “democracy” or “citizen participation” referred to in the maximalist federalists’ discourse. In other words, this “prognostic framing” allows us to code each occurrence of “democracy” / “European citizens” / “citizen participation” into categories that emerged inductively from the coding process and that concretely refer to different ways of envisioning “European democracy.” Among these categories, we identified a redundant framing centered on a democratic Europe with a Parliament endowed with strong powers (building on Ballangé’s work, 2022 but based on archival sources she did not directly exploit), a Europe that should have more pronounced social policy prerogatives, and a democratic Europe revitalized by European civil society (this last vision has been well addressed by Smismans, 2004, which is why we do not discuss it here).

The originality of our data is manifold. First, it enables us to capture a glimpse of a democratic vision for European integration as early as 1949. Second, we provide complementary insights into the democratic counter-narratives at the outset of European
integration (in relation to Ballangé, 2022; Sternberg, 2013) by demonstrating how these maximalist federalists link “direct citizen participation”, parliamentarisation, constitution, and European democracy in their narratives. Finally, we aim to show that the narrative surrounding democratic Europe not only pertains to procedural matters but also the ultimate goals of European action (a social Europe). In conclusion, we highlight how these federalist positions foreshadow the ongoing debate about the EU’s democratic deficit.

4. Promoting a democratic Europe (1): An elected parliament, a constitution, and a federation

As previously mentioned, the question of the democratic legitimacy of European integration
not only dates back to the 1970s (as is commonly assumed—for example—by Mény, 2002: 8,
or Sternberg, 2013: 49), but rather to 1949 with Spinelli. Beyond this starting point, in
maximalist federalist discourse the most central meaning associated with democracy is
enhancing the prerogatives of the parliamentary institution within the European institutional
complex that must be formed as a federation.<fnref n="4" />

Although the assembly appears to be the neglected component of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) Treaty (Cohen, 2012), its very existence was far from guaranteed.
Rittberger (2009: 51) emphasises that the dominant political conception at the time of early
European integration under the ECSC was technocracy, centred around the High Authority,
“composed of independent experts, empowered by the governments of the future member
states to regulate the coal and steel market”, rather than a political system based on the central
role of a community parliament. However, Rittberger (2009: 55) also highlights that during
the Schuman Plan negotiations, German state representatives proposed the idea of a
parliamentary assembly to counterbalance the powers of the High Authority and hold it
accountable. Although the assembly was only granted consultative powers, it was accepted in
principle, largely because the “German delegates were strongly influenced by ‘federalist’
ideas”, as Rittberger (2009: 54) notes. This makes it particularly interesting to explore these
“federalist ideas” and how they reflect the desire to democratise European integration through
the empowerment of a parliamentary body.

It is necessary to study how maximalist federalists see the establishment of a common
assembly with strong prerogatives—and above all, the duty to draft a constituent treaty
establishing a European federation—as the cornerstone of integration tied to democratic
quality. This element is crucial since Sternberg (2013) overlooks the constituent dimension of
the federalist project, given her main focus on the discourses of functionalist federalists.
Indeed, the analysis of archival materials highlights the pervasive association made by the
federalists studied between European integration and democracy, indicating that it must have
an assembly elected by universal suffrage, tasked with drafting a constituent project to
establish the democratic European community.

<footnote n="4">⁴ Nord, H. R. (1949). Draft report on a European Federal Pact. HAEU: UEF 95.</footnote>
In the maximalist federalist discourse under scrutiny, the defence of an elected European assembly is framed by a narrative emphasising the necessity of “directly involving” European citizens. Even prior to the existence of the ECSC, Altiero Spinelli asserted in 1944 that the federation “must have a legislative body as well as organs based on the direct participation of citizens”.<fnref n="5" /> Five years later, in March 1949, the Italian resistant elaborated on the following reflection:

> Wanting the European Federation means wanting the democratic states of Europe to irrevocably bind themselves through a Pact [...]. This Pact implies that certain sovereign powers are removed from the jurisdiction of national states and transferred to a democratic federal European authority.<fnref n="6" />

Further along, Spinelli clarified the meaning of the term “democracy”. He advocated for what he called “a European right of citizenship (droit de cité)”, which essentially refers to a right to vote:

> European citizens will have the right to control and choose the governors of the Federation in the ways established by law, and the duty to obey federal laws and pay federal taxes.

Several interesting phrases can be found here. For instance, there is already mention of “European citizens” in 1949, whose primary prerogative is to designate the “governors” responsible for formulating and enforcing the laws. In Spinelli’s view, the governors refer to the “legislative power”, whose democratic legitimacy does not derive from national states but rather the European peoples.<fnref n="7" />

Beyond Spinelli, the maximalist federalist discourse reveals a conflation of “direct participation of citizens”, “right of control,” and advocacy for a strong common assembly:

> All European citizens will have the democratic right to control and criticise the European federal authority (1956).<fnref n="8" />

> There is a right for Europeans to constitute themselves as European people; the right of the European people to establish its own Constitution (1957).<fnref n="9" />

> A European federal policy led by a government controlled by a European Parliament, composed of two chambers: a popular chamber whose members would be directly elected by universal suffrage, and a chamber of states, whose members would be appointed by national parliaments (1956).<fnref n="10" />

<footnote n="5">⁵ Spinelli, A. (1944) Gli Stati Uniti d’Europa e les varia tendenze politiche. In A. Spinelli, & E. Rossi (Eds.), *Problemi della federazione europea*. Eugenio Colorni (quoted by Ballangé, 2002: 128). All translations (from French archives) are our own.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Spinelli, A. (1949). *Thèses pour l’élaboration d’une politique de l’UEF*. HAEU: UEF95.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Politische Erklärung des Initiativ-Komitees für den Kongress des Europäischen Volkes, 1956. HAEU: HG2.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Political declaration of the Congress of the European People. HAEU: UEF206.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ UEF (1956). Ce que veulent les fédéralistes européens (political declaration by the Executive Committee of the European Federalist Movement). HAEU: UEF95.</footnote>
Thus, the power of the “European people” is conceived as necessarily being mediated by the principle of political representation. These forms of argumentation—and confusion—continue well after the ratification of the Treaties of Rome, which formally mention the principle of an assembly elected by direct universal suffrage. Federalist archives<fnref n="11" /> as well as Raymond Rifflet contended that these treaties are insufficient in establishing “strong European democratic institutions”.<fnref n="12" /> In 1959, the association between elections and “direct participation” was still evident: “[it is necessary to] prepare the federalist forces for direct and massive participation in European political elections, the day they take place”.<fnref n="13" />

The association of direct participation with the electoral method—invalidated by some political theorists, such as Dupuis-Déri (2018) or Lefort (1994: 28-29 & 42)—is evident in the federalist discourses of the 1960s and 1970s, with only a few examples provided here:

> [It is necessary to] engage all actions that will allow public opinion to understand the issues arising for the establishment of a political Federation and a federal European society through the means and ways of democracy (1965; our additions in bracket).<fnref n="14" />

> [...] direct election is the only way to obtain the participation of the European people in the construction of European unity (1975).<fnref n="15" />

> Democracy requires participation. Europe, the cradle of democracy, will not be a democracy at all if citizens do not have the opportunity to participate directly in the development of the European Community [...] the newly elected Parliament must serve as a bastion of democracy by creating an executive that implements the decisions of the European Union.<fnref n="16" />

> [...] elections to the European Parliament will represent an important step in this direction. They will provide citizens with a direct link to the institutions and policies of the Community; They will be an essential element of the comprehensive democratic control that citizens must exercise over Community affairs (1977).<fnref n="17" />

These elements clearly illustrate that the federalists’ “democratic” vision is embodied in a connection between “European citizens” and their directly elected representatives: in other words, through a representative conception of democracy.

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Draft appeal for the UEF petitions campaign. 1957. HAEU: UEF99.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Document dated 2 April 1958. HAEU: UEF99.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Third session of the Standing Committee of the Permanent Congress of the European People, 6 December 1959. HAEU: UEF206.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Statutes of the Front Démocratique pour une Europe Fédérale. 1965. HAEU: UEF208.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Draft manifesto from the Young European Federalists. 1975. HAEU: JEF135.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Document called “What does UEF?”. HAEU: JP04.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Manifesto for a united and democratic Europe. July 8th, 1977. HAEU: JP3.</footnote>
While federalists believe that “the European people have until now [1969] been excluded from participation in the process of building Europe”,<fnref n="18" /> they see the condition of this voting right as crucial for integrating the “European people” as a political subject at the heart of the European communities. However, the right to vote is insufficient, as beyond the principle of an assembly elected by universal suffrage by European citizens, the elected parliamentarians need to be tasked with drafting a “European Constitution”, laying the foundations for institutional federalism: “Only the people, represented by a constituent assembly, can effect the transfer of power from sovereign national states to a federal state.”<fnref n="19" />

Thus, we have elements that extend beyond the analysis offered by Sternberg (2013: 149), who argues that federalists “largely treated democracy as “synonymous” with electoral democracy, and more specifically as synonymous with direct elections for the European Parliament”. In our archives, federalists argue that the principle of electing the assembly is necessary but not sufficient to legitimise “European democracy”, which also depends on the power of this assembly—elected by the citizens—to initiate a constitutional process.

**5. Promoting a democratic Europe (2): The foundations of a social Europe**

While the federalists’ narrative regarding the necessary democratisation of European integration through parliamentarisation (Ballangé, 2022; Sternberg, 2013)—accompanied by a constitutional process—is well known, the “European democracy” claimed by maximalist federalists simultaneously reflects other aspirations, namely of a social Europe. As highlighted in the Manifesto of Young European Federalists in 1977, the federalists studied also equate democracy with certain values, stating in particular that “democracy and social justice go hand in hand”.<fnref n="20" />

This section argues that an analysis of what such federalists mean by “democracy”—or at least the political imagination that they associate with “European democracy”—reveals that democracy is not merely a procedural matter. Accordingly, it not only refers to the methods related to decision-making (“How do we make a decision democratically”?) but is also connected to certain values that should guide the normative framework of European decisions (“How can we make decisions that embody democratic values”?). The epistemic importance of values in political legitimation is well documented in Weberian sociology and the more recent framework on European values (Foret & Calligaro, 2018).

Analysing the values that maximalist federalists deem legitimate from a democratic standpoint enables placing into perspective claims that “social Europe was not on the agenda” at the beginning of European integration (Jorges & Rödl, 2004: 126). In the remainder of this section, we examine how constitutionalist federalists discuss the idea of a social Europe in relation to democracy, and more specifically, how they understand the social dimension of

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Resolution of the Conference of the European Federal Movement: Voluntary census of the European federal people. December 1969. HAEU: JEF202.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Draft manifesto from the Young European Federalists. 1975. HAEU: JEF135.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Young European Federalists’ Manifesto, chapter 6. 1977. HAEU: JP4.</footnote>
European integration. As we will see, their references are somewhat eclectic, drawing on elements from diverse intellectual traditions. However, our aim is to demonstrate that, despite this eclecticism, federalists advocate for a vision of social Europe that remains closely aligned with the market imperatives, a perspective on social Europe which is not particularly radical (Warlouzet, 2022)<fnref n="21" />.

Among the archives studied, both the German branch of the UEF and the Italian branch (the European Federalist Movement) attest to a vision of a social Europe, particularly starting in the 1950s:

> The federation will integrate existing social laws into European social legislation that is based on a richer, more dynamic, and more modern economy.<fnref n="22" />

> What European federalists want is: [...] to open up for the world of labor and youth a perspective of progress, social justice, and the assumption of new responsibilities.<fnref n="23" />

The year before, in a 1949 document titled “From the Powerless Consultative Assembly to a European Pact” by the UEF—which serves as a federalist programme—its members detailed the economic coordination functions of European integration:

> The goal of the federalization of Europe is not only to establish a global balance but also to ensure that Europe, as well as associated countries and overseas dependent territories, has a favorable position in the global economy [...]. To achieve this new development, Europe must coordinate its production methods, particularly in basic industries, harmonize its various economic and social policies, and increase its productivity in all areas.<fnref n="24" />

In this excerpt, we see how federalists linked the objective of economic growth—mentioning productivity and resource development—with improving living standards for European populations. It is also possible to see how social policy is largely conceived as needing to be linked to economic policy: social Europe is envisioned as supporting market development, but not as referring to forms of "decommodified" interventions (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The latter, which typically characterize what is known as the welfare state, are not genuinely addressed by these federalists, who neither consider nor meaningfully explore the role that European integration can play in taxation and redistribution for the most vulnerable segments of its population.

<footnote n="21">²¹ Warlouzet (2022) distinguishes several approaches to the defense of a social Europe: on the one hand, the advocates of a "radical social Europe," and on the other, the more moderate currents that promote a "social-oriented market economy" (in French: "accompagnement social du marché"). Maximalist federalists draw on elements from both of these trends. However, their position remains largely compatible with the market economy, rather than advocating for an extensive social policy that grants extensive social rights and significantly reduces market dependence for the population, thereby influencing economic policies.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Document dated 1956. HAEU: HG2.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ European Federalist Movement (Italian). HAEU: UEF99.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ From the powerless consultative assembly to a European pact. 1949. HAEU: UEF95.</footnote>
The advocacy for the defence of social Europe—made possible by economic prosperity, or a sustained growth model—prompted disappointment regarding the Treaty of Rome (EEC), as Sergio Pistone (2008: 99) asserted when elaborating on the history of the UEF:

> [O]nly vague commitments were foreseen to harmonise the economic and social policies of the member states which remained under the exclusive control of the national governments and therefore, in moments of serious crisis, would risk becoming strongly divergent with inevitable restrictive consequences.

The transition from the ECSC Treaty (1951) to the Economic European Community Treaty (1957) has already been described by several researchers as a weakening of the supranational logic of the first institutional architecture of European integration, as well as the logic of social Europe, mirroring the establishment of the market logic of integration (Varsori, 2007: 441-442; Vauchez, 2013: 31–37; Warlouzet, 2022: 110–111). The maximalist federalist discourse subsequently developed the idea of a democracy that should exist within enterprises, not only from a political standpoint. In February 1962, Altiero Spinelli advocated for “the increasing participation of workers in the management responsibilities of enterprises”<fnref n="25" /> to oppose “monopolistic concentrations, agricultural protectionism, and the resurgence of nationalism”.<fnref n="26" /> This statement illustrates a critique of the belief of the market’s invisible hand, distinguishing constitutionalist federalists from purely economic liberals— and a critique of national protectionism. The advocacy for democracy in the company may bring to mind the tradition of Councilism (Lefort, 1994). This reference to worker participation coexists with the defense of planning. Indeed, planning in certain strategic economic sectors such as steel, textiles, and shipbuilding is legitimised in the declaration of the Federalist Congress in Montreux in 1964. The defence of planning frequently resurfaced, even prior to 1964: “Joint control of basic industries will be established. This will particularly apply to the Ruhr..”.<fnref n="27" /> “Democratic planning” also appears in the discourse of Raymond Rifflet from 1963, while citing Robert Marjolin<fnref n="28" />, while there are also references to “collective social planning” in the 1977 Manifesto of Young European Federalists.<fnref n="29" />

Furthermore, the limits of property rights were acknowledged in the declaration from the Montreux Congress of 1964, even if they were not condemned in principle. More importantly, the principle of “social progress” was legitimised, associated here with reducing the arduousness of certain tasks at work. These elements allow us to situate the federalists in question somewhat to the left of the political spectrum. This is evident from the leftist discursive markers already mentioned, as well as the elements discussed in the following.

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Spinelli, A. Federalisti Europei per il Rinnovamento democratico. Tesi per il IX Congreso del MFE et per la V sesione del CPE. HAEU: HG2.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Request for a federal pact to be submitted to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 1949. HAEU: UEF95.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ 1963 document. HAEU: UEF207.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ HAEU: JP4.</footnote>
For example, during the European People's Congress in Lyon in February 1962, federalists asserted that "the crisis of the left is the crisis of all European democracy".<fnref n="30" /> To some extent, this demonstrates that "European democracy" could come to fruition through the electoral successes of the political "left". At the same congress, Andrea Chiti-Batelli emphasised a motion from a "European left" perspective—an unwavering democratic alternative that is anti-nationalist, anti-fascist, anti-neocolonialist, and decentralising—regarding the necessity to “[create] a European welfare state that definitively eliminates the regime of ‘sottogoverno’ in Italy, Gaullist Bonapartism, or economic concentrations and monopolies, especially in Germany”.<fnref n="31" /> While the notion of a "European welfare state" is mentioned here, constitutionalist federalists are far from advocating for a redistributive Europe.

The leftist positioning is far from being incompatible with a market economy, and it fits within the legitimisation of a market order, even if it is adjusted by the implementation of social policies. For example, Altiero Spinelli asserted at the UEF Congress in Brussels in April 1975:

> We want to replace man in the service of growth with growth in the service of man [and] introduce a new growth model while establishing and maintaining the measure of discipline without which significant change would be impossible.<fnref n="32" />

Similarly, the need to ensure a “qualitative and selective growth” rather than an “uncontrolled growth” emerged in 1977.<fnref n="33" /> Upon closer examination, the “social justice” programme of the federalists—which they associate with democracy—is reminiscent of what Gayon (2022) analysed in the “Keynesian synthesis” prevalent within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the 1970s, where the goal was to simultaneously advocate for price control and employment growth. This is evident in the following example from 1977 UEF documentation:

> The Community must build an economic union in which these common problems (inflation, unemployment, and industrial dislocation) are addressed through joint action. Only in this way can member countries achieve their common goals of full employment, price stability, social justice, and regional prosperity.<fnref n="34" />

For example, a relatively Keynesian discourse is apparent when the federalists legitimise reforms aimed at “full employment by restructuring the European economy, providing sufficient opportunities for professional training, lowering the minimum retirement age, and

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Lyon Congress. Per una politica federalista di sinistra. February 1962. HAEU: HG2.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Motion by Andrea Chiti-Batelli at the Lyon Congress, February 1962. HAEU: HG2.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² UEF Congress in Brussels (1975). Outline of the political report presented by Altiero Spinelli. HAEU: JP3. In the same document, he emphasises that "the community's increased financial power would not necessarily lead to more public spending". Spinelli is not defending an expansive (budgetary) vision of a possible European welfare state.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ 1977 Manifesto from the Young European Federalists. HAEU: JP4.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Manifesto for a united and democratic Europe. 1977. HAEU: JP3.</footnote>
reducing the length of the workweek”.<fnref n="35" /> What is important to grasp is that Keynesian elements are present alongside a strong focus on monetary issues.

The federalists’ interest in monetary issues—and specifically controlling inflation—can be traced back to a document written by the UEF for the consultative assembly of the Council of Europe in December 1949: “[...] in monetary matters, the ultimate objective of the European Federation is the creation of a single European currency issued by a federal central bank”.<fnref n="36" /> Altiero Spinelli also advocated the implementation of a common monetary policy in the same year: “the immediate goal is the abolition of the right of national states to conduct autonomous monetary policy, and this right must be transferred to a European government”.<fnref n="37" /> This focus remained a persistent concern, even after the Werner Report (1970) on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)<fnref n="38" />—“[...] we reaffirm that the common currency is our ultimate objective”—alongside the recommendation for a European Monetary Fund from 1977 where national central banks would deposit their reserves to counterbalance the value of the dollar.<fnref n="39" />

In general, the demand for a European framework for price stabilisation through the lens of a single currency was more common among maximalist federalists than calls for a redistributive function for the European community, through mechanisms such as the European Social Fund<fnref n="40" /> or taxation. These elements demonstrate that the maximalist federalists discussed here align perfectly with the vision of a social Europe, more regulatory and market-corrective in Crespy and Menz's (2015: 3) sense, than a truly redistribute social Europe and a Welfare-Europe. Furthermore, a 1989 UEF document emphasises the need for the “democratisation of European institutions”, which should necessarily include “the integration of a social dimension into the realisation of Economic and Monetary Union.”<fnref n="41" /> However, accepting the EMU also implies accepting a fundamentally monetarist framework.

All of these elements allow us to affirm that the social Europe valued and the “social justice” assimilated to European democracy by maximalist federalists is compatible with the market economy. We did not find substantial elements to defend a decommodified vision of social policy (that is to say, a social policy not entirely tied to the logic of the market-correction). Instead, we found heterogeneous references for constitutionalist federalists when discussing a social Europe: democracy in the workplace, the logic of decentralised planning, the defense of

<footnote n="35">³⁵ 1977 Manifesto from the Young European Federalists, chapter 6: “A Socially Just Europe”. HAEU: JP4. The latter elements may even evoke the positions of André Gorz, who explores ways to organize social life beyond professional employment (Gorz André. 2020. *Leur écologie et la nôtre*. Paris: Le Seuil). However, Gorz expresses much more criticism towards the role of markets in society.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Request for a federal pact to be submitted to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 1949. HAEU: UEF95.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">³⁷ Spinelli, A. (1949). Thèses pour l’élaboration d’une politique de l’UEF. HAEU: UEF95.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸ Manifesto for a united and democratic Europe. 1977. HAEU: JP3.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">³⁹ *Ibidem*. At the UEF Congress in Milan (3–5 December 1982), maximalist federalists called for the creation of a European Monetary Fund, while advocating an increase in the community’s own resources (HAEU: JP3).</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ The federalist archives provide several references to resource redistribution aimed at ensuring equalisation between less and more developed regions in Europe (intervention by Pier Virgilio Dastoli, 11 June 2002. HAEU: ME2624), or between different social groups (Manifesto for a United and Democratic Europe. 1977. HAEU: JP3). However, when federalists refer to the necessity of federal taxes, they do not specify the precise modalities of their implementation, e.g., whether this would involve progressive taxation.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ Les fédéralistes se donnent rendez-vous à Strasbourg le 8 décembre 1989. 1989. HAEU: UEF465.</footnote>
full employment, a reduction in working hours, and a focus on a European currency. For constitutionalist federalists—little recognised as actors or thinkers of social Europe (Crespy, 2022; Warlouzet, 2022)—the overall perspective on social Europe is to correct the harmful effects of the market through implementing certain social and economic rights, without placing excessive emphasis on redistribution.

<table><caption>**Table 2: Synthesis of (early) Maximalist Federalists' Conceptions of a Democratic Europe**</caption><thead><tr><td>Visions of a Democratic Europe</td><td>Core Features</td><td>Sources</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Constitutional and Parliamentary Democracy</td><td><ul><li>Centrality of an elected European Parliament with legislative powers (and legislative initiative) within the European Federation</li><li>Citizens' right to vote for Members of the European Assembly</li><li>A constituent process carried out by an assembly elected by citizens to draft a European federal constitution</li><li>Political representation as the main form of citizen participation</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Spinelli (1944, 1949): need for a legislative body and a 'European right of citizenship' (voting rights) / democratic right to control and criticise the European federal authority (HG documents)</li><li>UEF documents (1956–1977): calls for direct elections, two-chamber parliament, and a constitutional assembly</li><li>Raymond Rifflet (1959): Treaties of Rome insufficient for democratic legitimacy</li><li>UEF documents (1957): Right of the European citizens to establish its own Constitution (through an elected Constituent assembly).</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Democratic and Social Europe / A Social Europe Compatible with the Market Economy</td><td><ul><li>Democracy associated with values such as social justice, social progress, full employment</li><li>Democratisation of the economy, including planning and some minor references to worker participation</li><li>Compatibility with market economy, with Keynesian influences; Keynesian synthesis, with a real claim for monetary integration</li><li>No real reference to a redistributive role for Social Europe</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>UEF and HGE documents (1949–1977): support for European social legislation, economic planning</li><li>Spinelli (1962, 1975): democracy in the workplace, new growth model</li><li>Montreux Congress (1964): limits to property rights and defence of “democratic planning”</li><li>Manifesto of Young Federalists (1977): link between democracy and social justice</li><li>UEF (1989): need to integrate a social dimension into Economic and Monetary Union</li></ul></td></tr></tbody></table>

**6. Conclusion**

In this article, we have adopted a perspective aimed at studying the democratic problematisation of European integration, specifically how it should be conceived by actors as a democratic entity. While this approach—still relatively rare with limited research (Ballangé, 2022; Cohen, 2012; Rittberger, 2005 & 2009; Sternberg, 2013)—is mostly deployed through
the analysis of institutional initiatives, our perspective has focused on non-institutional actors'
narratives regarding the vision of a democratic Europe, starting from the 1950s (see table 2).

We have demonstrated that maximalist federalists primarily referred to two main aspects
when discussing European democracy. First, they highlighted the need to organise the
European communities around a directly elected parliament with a constituent mission. Thus,
they did not merely call for electoral democracy (Sternberg, 2013) but for a parliamentary and
constitutional union. We have clearly demonstrated how this narrative is supported by using
the term "direct citizen participation", which refers more to the appointment of political
representatives than the actual possibility of citizens directly influencing European affairs.

Second, they were early advocates for the defence of a European social policy. No existing
studies have highlighted the advocacy for a market-correcting social policy (rather than a truly
Welfare and redistributive Europe) by constitutionalist federalists from the very beginning of
European integration.

Our findings suggest that long before the institutional initiatives of the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s, because they persistently called for “European democracy” since the 1950s, this
concept gradually became an intellectual category through which European institutional elites
could think about the EU. While Sternberg (2013) asserts that the intellectual discourse
surrounding the democratic deficit has influenced political developments within the EU, and
other studies also highlight the interplay between intellectual knowledge and knowledge-
serving political purposes at the EU level (Fligstein, 2008; Sacriste, 2024), we can assert that
the maximalist federalist positions from the 1950s have ultimately had some political
repercussions for European integration and on the ongoing debate on the EU’s deficit of
democratic legitimacy. Indeed, the federalists’ positions on the democratisation of European
integration through parliamentarisation are reminiscent of the solutions proposed in the 1990s’
academic debate on the democratic legitimacy deficit by Hix or Vaubel. Similarly, the
necessity of establishing a social Europe clearly echoes the more recent positions of Scharpf
or Habermas in the same academic debate. While causality cannot be empirically
demonstrated (these authors do not cite the federalist archives we used), the striking similarity
between the diagnoses of European democracy by the maximalists and by EU scholars
engaged in the debate on the EU’s democratic legitimacy deficit cannot be mere coincidence.
In other words, the federalists’ discourses have continued, directly or indirectly, to circulate in
the marketplace of ideas and reform projects within the EU.

Beyond the impact of maximalist federalists on European integration—in its democratic
problematisation—we wish to emphasise that the democratic visions of maximalist federalists
lean more towards elitist rather than popular conceptions of democracy. They predominantly
advocated for establishing forms of representative and liberal democracy. To use Mény’s
words (2002), they were more focused on the constitutional dimension of democracy than the
popular one. Indeed, constitutionalist federalists, as seen, predominantly advocated for
establishing forms of representative and (social)liberal democracy.

In reflecting on the limitations of this article, one may wonder whether, in light of our data,
the lack of examples among the federalists concerning a popular vision of democracy—that
is, one that advocates for the direct involvement of citizens—is in fact real, or whether it stems from the limited scope of our sources. Other archival collections, not gathered by the HAEU and located outside the circles of maximalist federalists, might reveal different voices on the democratisation of European integration.

It should nonetheless be emphasised that the data presented in this article, being based on the early discourse of maximalist federalists, does not account for how, in the 1990s, federalists used the terms “participatory democracy” and citizen participation to advocate for an associative form of democracy—that is, the establishment of regular interactions between non-market civil society and the EU institutions (Bailly, 2026). This reflects a different way of thinking about citizen representation—one that privileges the mediated involvement of citizens through organised civil society rather than direct participation. Therefore, although our data are limited by the partial nature of the sources used, there is little serious evidence to suggest that the democratisation of European integration involved direct citizen participation—at least not before the late 1990s, when references to EU-wide referenda and early discussions on sortition at the EU level began to emerge.

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