**B7***. Clemens Alexandrinus, *Liber logicus* (= *Stromata* VIII) 3.8.4–5.15.1 (84,24–88,33 Stählin–Havrda)

(1) περὶ παντὸς τοῦ ζητουμένου καθ'
ἔκαστον πρόβλημα διαφόρων μὲν δεῖ τῶν λημμά-
των, οἰκείων δὲ τῷ προβληθέντι, καὶ <τὸ> προβληθὲν αὐτὸ εἰς λόγον μεταλαμβάνειν
ἀναγκαῖον τόν τε λόγον τοῦτον ὁμολογούμενον ἄπασιν εἶναι προσήκει. τῶν δὲ λημμά-
των μὴ οἰκείων τῷ προβλήματι λαμβανομένων (***) οὐκ ἐνδέχεται καλῶς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν
ἔξευρεῖν ἀγνοουμένης ὄλου τοῦ προβλήματος, ὃ καὶ ζήτημα καλεῖται, τῆς φύσεως.

(2) ἐν πᾶσιν οὖν τοῖς ζητουμένοις ἔστι τι προγινωσκόμενον (ój πάντως ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πιστὸν ὃν ἀναποδείκτως πιστεύεται), ὃ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τῆς ζητήσεως αὐτῶν ὀρμητήριον καὶ τῶν εὑρῆσθαι δοκούντων κριτήριον. πᾶσα γὰρ ζήτησις ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης εὑρίσκεται γνώσεως. εἶναι δὲ τὴν γνῶσιν τὴν προϋπάρξασαν τοῦ ζητουμένου παντὸς ποτὲ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ψιλῶς, ἀγνοουμένων δὲ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς (οἰον λίθων, φυτῶν, ζώων, ὧν τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀγνοοῦμεν) ἤ παθῶν ἤ δυνάμεων ἤ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν [ἐν] τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς οὖσιν· ἐνίοτε δὲ γιγνώσκεσθαι μέν τι τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων ἤ παθῶν ἤ τινα τούτων, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τὰ πάθη, ἀγνοεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ζητεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν· ἐν πολλοῖς δέ, τῆς νοήσεως αὐτῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας ὑποτιθεμένης ἑαυτῆ ταῦτα πάντα, τὴν ζήτησιν εἶναι, τίνι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἂν τούτων ἐν ὑπάρχῃ ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ, τῆς τε οὐσίας τῆς τε ἐνεργείας, τὰς ἐπινοίας ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ λαβόντες οὕτως ἐπὶ τὴν ζήτησιν ἑρχόμεθα. ἔστιν δὲ ὧν καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας εἰδότες ἄμα ταῖς οὐσίαις ἀγνοοῦμεν τὰ παθήματα.

(3) ἔστιν οὖν ἡ μέθοδος τῆς εὑρέσεως τοιαύτη· ἀρκτέον γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ γνωρίζειν τὰ προβλήματα· πολλάκις γοῦν ἐξαπατᾶ τὸ τῆς λέξεως σχῆμα καὶ συγχεῖ καὶ ταράττει τὴν

B7*, 4–5 οὐκ... ἔξευρεῖν] Cf. Gal. *Cris*. III.5 (184,11 Alexanderson / IX.729 K): οὐκ ἐνδέχεται περὶ σωτηρίας οὐδὲν ἔξευρεῖν; *UP* IV.13 (I.226,10 Helmreich / III.308 K): οὐτ' ἐνδέχεται καλῶς εὑρεῖν χρείαν οὐδεμίαν. 7 ὀρμητήριον] Cf. *Sem*. II.5.42 (188,5 De Lacy / IV.634 K); *MM* III.1.4 (4,4 Lorusso / X.158), etc. 8–9 ἐκ... γνώσεως] Cf. Gal. *Inst*. *log*. 1.2 (3,6–8 Kalbfleisch): ἐκ προγιγνωσκομένων εἶναι τὴν εὑρεσιν. 19–20 ταράττει τὴν διάνοιαν] Cf. *SMT* III.12 (XI.569,3–4 K): ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων χρῆσις ταραχθεῖσα καὶ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιταράττει γνῶσιν.

B7*, 2 τὸ add. Bunsen αὐτὸ Bunsen : αὐτῶι ms. 4 *** lac. ind. Havrda : *post* καλῶς lac. ind. Schwartz (*post* ἔξευρεῖν *olim* Havrda) αὐτῶν Havrda : αὐτῶι ms. 5 ἀγνοουμένης Wilamowitz : ἀγνοουμένου ms. 6 ὃ Stählin : τὸ ms. 10 φυτῶν Sylburg : πάντων ms. 11 ἐν *del.* Schwartz 15 τούτων ἐν Havrda : οὐτω μέν ms.
B7*. Clemens Alexandrinus, *Liber logicus* 3.8.4–5.15.1

(1) For everything sought in the case of each problem we need premisses that are different from, but appropriate to what is set forth. What is set forth must itself be changed into an account and the account should be agreed to by all. If premisses are taken that are not appropriate to the problem, (...) it is impossible to succeed in finding any one of them, if the nature of the whole problem, also called the question, is unknown.

5

(2) In all things being sought, then, there is something known in advance (which, insofar as it is credible in virtue of itself, is necessarily believed without demonstration), and this should be taken as a base of inquiry about the thing sought and as the criterion of everything that seems to have been found. For everything sought is found on the basis of pre-existent knowledge. And sometimes pre-existent knowledge regarding everything sought concerns solely the substance, while we are ignorant of its works (as in the case of stones, plants, or animals, whose activities we do not know), affections or powers or generally speaking attributes of beings. At other times, some of these powers, affections, or other such things, like desires and affections of the soul, are known, but we are ignorant about, and seek for, the substance. In many cases, while this understanding of ours presupposes all these things, we seek to which of these substances one of these attributes belongs: having conceived in our mind the notions of both a substance and an activity, this is how we embark on inquiry. There are also cases in which we know activities and substances, but do not know affections.

10

15

20

(3) Now the method of discovery is like this. We must start by recognizing the problems. For the form of expression is often deceptive and confounds and confuses our thought, and it is, therefore, not easy to find the kind of thing it expresses, as with

<footnote>B7*, 1–2 The phrase is reminiscent of Alex. Aphr. *In An. pr.* 1.29 (317,25–28 Wallies). For appropriate premisses, see A24 and A25. 3 changed...account¹] Cf. B6*, 22; Alex. Aphr. *In An. pr.* 1.5 (75,24–26 Wallies). agreed...all] Cf. B6*, 22–23. 4 A part seems to be missing, possibly in the sense of: “the problem will not be solved; but”; cf. *PHP* II.2.14 (106,21 De Lacy / V.216 K): μὴ μέντοι μηδ’ ἐνταῦθα διαλύεσθαι τό προβληθέν. 8 credible...itself] Cf. *Diff. puls.* IV.2 (VIII.705,10 K): the first definition – i.e., the one which “clearly sets out the notion of the thing (ἐξηγούμενον σαφῶς τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἔννοιαν, 704,8f.) – is “believed by itself (ἐξ αὐτοῦ πιστεύεσθαι), as it expresses plainly manifest things”; cf. also B6*, 62–63. 10 criterion] Cf. *Diff. puls.* IV.2 (VIII.708,13–14 K), on the notional definition being the criterion of the substantial one (κριτήριον ... τοῦ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν). 10–11 found²...knowledge¹] Cf. Arist. *An. post.* I.1, 71a1–2; *EN* VI.3, 1139b26. For the notion of discovery, see Gal. *Inst. log.* 1.2 (quoted under the Greek text); Simpl. *In Phys.* VIII.5 (1250,2–4 Diels); Philoponus, *In An. post.* 1.1 (4,8–9 Wallies). 13 stones...animals] Possibly a reference to pharmacological research; for stones, cf. Gal. *SMT* IX.2 (XII.192,4–11 K); for plants, *SMT* VIII prooem. (XII.83,1–5 K); animal parts are discussed in *SMT* X–XI. 16 ignorant...substance] Cf. Arist. *De an.* I.1, 402a7–11 and 402b21–22. 21–22 recognizing the problems] Finding out what the problems are, in other words, changing them into accounts; cf. 2–3; also A25, 10–11, on the substance of the thing sought. 22 form of expression] The phrase in not used in the technical sense of Aristotle’s *Soph. el.* 4, 165b27 and 166b10–19. Rather, it refers more loosely to verbal ambiguity, as in Gal. *PHP* II.5.26–30 (132,23–134,7 De Lacy / V.245 K).</footnote>
20 διάνοιαν, ὥστε μὴ ῥαδίως εὐρίσκειν ἐκ ποίας ἐστὶ διαφορᾶς, οἶον εἰ (ζῷον ἥ) μὴ ζῷον τὸ κυούμενον· ἔχοντες γὰρ καὶ ζώου τι νόημα καὶ κυουμένου ζητοῦμεν εἰ τῷ κυουμένῳ ζῷῳ εἶναι ὑπάρχει, τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, εἰ τῇ κυουμένῃ οὐσίᾳ τὸ τε κινεῖσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ ἐτὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπάρχει· ὥστε ἐνεργειῶν ἐστὶ καὶ παθῶν ἡ ζήτησις ἐπὶ προγινωσκομένης οὐσίας.

25 (4) εὐθέως οὖν τὸν προβάλλοντα ἀντερωτητέον τί ποτε καλεῖ ζῷον· μάλιστα γὰρ τοῦτο ποιητέον, ἐπειδὰν εἰς διαφόρους χρήσεις ἡγμένον ἰδωμεν τοῦνομα· καὶ διερευνητέον εἴτε ἀμφισβητούμενον ἐστὶ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἐκ τῆς προσηγορίας εἴθ' ὀμολογούμενον ἄπασιν. εἰ γὰρ ζῷον εἴποι καλεῖν ὅτιπερ ἀν αὐξάνη καὶ τρέφηται, πάλιν αὖ προσανερωτήσομεν εἰ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ νομίζει ζῶα· κᾶπειτα φάντος μὲν οὐτως ἐπιδεικνύειν ἥδη χρὴ [τι] τὸ κυούμενον (αὐξανόμενον) τε καὶ τρεφόμενον. (5) Πλάτων γὰρ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ζῶα καλεῖ « τοῦ τρίτου τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδους », τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, μόνου μετέχοντα, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τῆς φυτικῆς τε καὶ θρεπτικῆς ψυχῆς μετέχειν οἶεται τὰ φυτά, ζῶα δ' ἤδη προσαγορεύειν οὐκ ἀξιοῖ· τὸ γὰρ δὴ τῆς ἐτέρας ψυχῆς τῆς αἰσθητικῆς μετέχον τοῦτο μόνον ἀξιοῖ καλεῖσθαι ζῷον. οὐ μὴν οἴ γε Στωϊκοὶ τὴν φυτικὴν δύναμιν ἥδη ψυχὴν ὀνομάζουσιν.

30 (6) ἀποφήσαντος δὲ τοῦ προβαλόντος εἶναι ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτά, δεῖξομεν ἑαυτῷ μαχόμενα λέγειν· τῷ γὰρ τρέφεσθαί τε καὶ αὐξάνεσθαι τὸ ζῶον ὁρισάμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ φυτὸν οὐκ εἶναι ζῶον ἀποφηνάμενος, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔοικεν λέγειν ἤ ὅτι τὸ τρεφόμενον τε καὶ αὐξανόμενον καὶ ζῶόν ἐστι καὶ οὐ ζῶον. (7) τί οὖν βούλεται μαθεῖν, εἰπάτω· ἄρα γε εἰ αὖξεται καὶ τρέφεται τὸ κατὰ γαστρὸς ἤ εἰ αἰσθήσεώς τινος ἤ καὶ τῆς καθ' ὀρμὴν κινήσεως αὐτῷ μέτεστιν; κατὰ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτωνα τὸ φυτὸν ἔμψυχόν τε καὶ ζῶον, κατὰ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλη ζῶον μὲν οὐπω, λείπει γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ἔμψυχον δὲ ἤδη ἔστι γοῦν αὐτῷ τὸ ζῶον οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς οὐτε ἔμψυχον οὐτε ζῶόν ἐστι τὸ φυτόν· ἔμψυχος γὰρ οὐσία τὸ ζῶον. εἰ τοίνυν ἔμψυχον τὸ ζῶον, ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ φύσις αἰσθητική, δῆλον ὡς αἰσθητικὸν ἤδη τὸ ζῶον.

45 (8) εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀντερωτηθεῖς ὁ ζητήσας εἰ ζῶον τὸ κατὰ γαστρὸς εἴποι καλεῖν ζῶον [ἐπὶ] τὸ τρεφόμενον καὶ αὖξον, ἔχει τὴν ἀπόκρισιν· εἰ δὲ φάσκοι τοῦτ' εἶναι ὁ ζητεῖ, πότερον

<footnote n="26">26 εἰς... ἡγμένον] Cf. Gal. Symp. diff. 1.2 (200,4–6 Gundert / VII.43 K); SMT IX.2.21 (XII.208,8 K).
30–34 Cf. PHP VI.3.7 (374,13–19 De Lacy / V.521 K); Foet. form. 6.31 (104,17–19 Nickel / IV.700 K).
35 ἑαυτῷ μαχόμενα] Cf. Gal. San. tu. II.4.34 (51,13 Koch / VI.113 K); Hipp. Vict. IV.86 (342,14 Helmreich / XV.873 K).</footnote>

<footnote n="20">20 ζῶον ἤ add. Schwartz 29 νομίζει Sylburg : νομίζοι ms. 30 τι del. Wilamowitz : ὅτι Schwartz αὐξανόμενον add. Stählin 32 φυτικῆς Potter : φυσικῆς ms. 39 εἰ Sylburg : εἰς ms. 44 ζῶον Barnes : ἔμψυχον ms. 45 εἴποι καλεῖν Stählin (cf. 28) : ἐτι καλεῖ τὸ ms. ἐπὶ del. Stählin</footnote>
the problem whether the embryo is an animal or not. Here we have a certain notion of an animal and of an embryo and we inquire whether it holds of the embryo to be an animal, i.e. whether the capacity to move and also to perceive belongs to the substance conceived in the womb. So the inquiry concerns activities and affections of a substance known in advance.

(4) Thus we should immediately respond to the person who has proposed this question by a counter question what it is he calls ‘animal’. This is particularly important when we see that the name has been applied in different uses. Next we must investigate whether the meaning expressed by the noun is disputed, or whether everyone agrees with it. If he answers that he gives the name ‘animal’ to everything that grows and is nourished, we should again respond by asking whether he considers plants to be animals, too. If he affirms this, then it is already time to show that the embryo grows and is nourished. (5) For Plato calls even plants ‘animals’, such as partake only of “the third kind of the soul”, the appetitive. Aristotle, on the other hand, thinks that plants partake of the vegetative and nutritive soul, but he does not deem it right to call them ‘animals’ yet. For he only deems it right to call ‘animals’ those beings which partake of a different soul, viz. the sentient one. As for the Stoics, they do not give the name ‘soul’ even to the vegetative capacity yet. (6) But if the person who has proposed the question denies that plants are animals too, we will show him that he contradicts himself. For if he defines the animal as that which grows and is nourished, but asserts that it is not the case that plants are also animals, he appears to be saying nothing less than this: that something which is nourished and grows is an animal and is not an animal at the same time. (7) So let him tell us what he wants to learn: whether the thing in the womb grows and is nourished, or rather whether it partakes of some sense-perception or motion by impulse? For, according to Plato, plants have souls and they are animals; whereas according to Aristotle, they are not animals yet, since they lack a capacity to perceive, but they already have souls. For, in his view, the animal is an ensouled substance having perception. But according to the Stoics, plants are neither ensouled nor animals, for the animal is an ensouled substance. Thus if the animal has a soul, and if the soul is a nature having perception, plainly the animal already has perception.

(8) So if someone who has raised the inquiry whether the embryo is an animal responds to the counter question by saying that he attaches the name ‘animal’ to that which is nourished and grows, then he has got the answer. But if he says he is seeking

<footnote n="24">24 whether...not] Cf. Aët. V.15 with Mansfeld–Runia, *Aetiana* V.3, pp. 1883–1896. 26 capacity... perceive] Cf. 47–48; 96–98. 37 Plat. *Tim*. 77b3–6; cf. Porphyry, *Gaur*. 4.7 (39,19–22 Kalbfleisch). 47–48 partakes...impulse] Cf. 26–27; Gal. *Mot. musc*. I.1 (3,15–16 Rosa / IV.372 K); *Prop. plac*. 13.7 (Garofalo–Lami); Ps.–Gal. *Def. med*. 26 (16,13–14 Kollesch); Porphyry, *Gaur*. 4.1 (38,1–2 Kalbfleisch). The definition seems to be of Stoic origin; see Gal. *PHP* II.3.4 (110,1–2 De Lacy / V.219 K); SVF II.458 and 821. 51 ensouled...perception] Not in Aristotle, but see *Top*. V.5, 135a16–19, with Alex. Aphr. *In Top*. V.5 (405,2–5 Wallies). See also Sextus, *PH* II.224; Ps.–Hippolytus, *Ref*. VII.18.4; Ps.–Gal. *Def. med*. 26 (16,13–14 Kollesch).</footnote>
αισθητικὸν ἤδη τὸ κυούμενον ἤ καὶ καθ' ὀρμήν τινά ἐστι κινητικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ἤδη σαφής
γίνεται ἡ διερεύνησις τοῦ πράγματος, οὐ μενούσης ἔτι τῆς περὶ τοῦνομα ἀπάτης. μὴ
ἀποκρινόμενος δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀντερωτηθὲν μηδὲ βουλόμενος τί ποτέ ἐστὶν εἴπεῖν ὁ νοῦν ἤ
κατὰ τίνος ἐπιφέρων πράγματος τὸ ζῷον ὄνομα τὴν πρότασιν ἐποιήσατο, κελεύων δ'
ήμᾶς αὐτοῦς διελέσθαι, ἐριστικὸς ὑπάρχων γνωρισθείη.

50

(9) εἰ δὴ δυοῖν τρόποιν ὑπαρχόντοιν, ἐτέρου μὲν τοῦ κατ' ἐρώτησίν τε καὶ ἀπόκρισιν,
ἐτέρου δὲ τοῦ κατὰ διέξοδον, ἤρνηται τὸ ἔτερον, ἐπακουσάτω πάντα τὰ εἰς τὸ πρόβλημα
διεξιόντων ἡμῶν· εἴτ' ἐπειδὰν τελεώσωμεν, ἐξέσται αὐτῷ τότε περὶ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου ἐν
μέρει διαλαμβάνειν. εἰ δὲ διακόπτειν ἐπιχειροίη τὴν ἐξέτασιν πυνθανόμενος, δῆλός
ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἀκούειν βουλόμενος.

55

(10) ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἔλοιτο, πάντων πρῶτον ἑρωτητέον αὐτὸν ἑφ' ὅ τι φέρει
πρᾶγμα τὸ ζῷον ὄνομα, κάπειδὰν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνηται, πάλιν ἑρωτητέον ὅ τι ποτὲ αὐτῷ
σημαίνει τὸ κυούμενον ἤ τὸ κατὰ γαστρός, εἰ [τὰ διαπεπλασμένα ἤδη καὶ τὰ ζῷα] καὶ τὸ
σπέρμα αὐτὸ (τὸ) καταβεβλημένον τὸ κατὰ γαστρὸς αὐτῷ σημαίνειν βούλεται ἤ μόνα
τὰ διηρθρωμένα τε καὶ ἤδη διαπεπλασμένα, τὰ ἕμβρυα καλούμενα. ἀποκριναμένου δὲ
καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο περαίνειν ἤδη τὸ προκείμενον ἑφεξῆς καὶ διδάσκειν χρή.

60

(11) εἰ δὲ ἡμᾶς λέγειν βούλοιτο αὐτὸς μὴ ἀποκρινάμενος, ἀκουσάτω· ἐπεὶ σύ μὴ βούλει
λέγειν καθ' ὅτου σημαινομένου λέγεις ὁ προϋβαλες (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐ περὶ σημαινομέ-
νων ἐγὼ ἐποιούμην τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἤδη τῶν πραγμάτων ἐσκοπούμην),
γίνωσκε τοιοῦτόν τι ποιήσας οἶον εἰ καὶ προϋβαλες εἰ ζῷον ὁ κύων. εἰκότως γὰρ ἂν
εἴποιμι· ποίου κυνός; ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τοῦ χερσαίου καὶ τοῦ θαλαττίου καὶ τοῦ κατ'
οὐρανὸν ἄστρου, ἀλλὰ καὶ Διογένους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑφεξῆς δίειμι κυνῶν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
μαντευσαίμην πότερον ὑπὲρ πάντων ἑρωτᾶς ἤ τινός. ὅπερ οὖν ἐξ ὑστέρου ποιήσεις,
τοῦτ' ἤδη μαθεῖν περὶ ποίου ζητεῖς σαφῶς εἰπέ. (12) εἰ δὲ περὶ ὀνόματα στρέφῃ, τὸ
κυούμενον αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τοῦνομα παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι μήτε ζῷον ἐστὶ μήτε φυτόν, ἀλλ'
ἰνομά τε καὶ φωνή καὶ σῶμα καὶ ὃν καὶ τὶ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἤ ζῶον. καὶ εἴπερ τοῦτο
προϋβαλες, ἔχεις τὴν ἀπόκρισιν. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἐκ τοῦ κυούμενον

65

70

<footnote n="55">55 διακόπτειν... ἐξέτασιν] Cf. Gal. *Oss. prooem.* 5 (39,14–40,1 Garofalo–Debru / II.734,1–5 K); *Cris.* III.8 (188,10–14 Alexanderson / IX.735 K). 57–58 ἐφ’... ὄνομα] Cf. Gal. *Nat. fac.* I.2 (101,18–102,3 Helmreich / II.2 K); *MM* I.4.13 (50,1–2 Lorusso / X.35–36 K); *MM* II.7.37 (196,14 Lorusso / X.144 K); *MM* IV.4.45 (150,5–6 Lorusso / X.267 K). 60–61 μόνα... διαπεπλασμένα] Cf. B.3, 1–2. 62 περαίνειν... προκείμενον] Cf. *PHP* III.8.35 (232,11–12 De Lacy / V.358 K). 67 ποίου κυνός] Cf. Gal. *MM* II.7.11 (178,11 Lorusso / X.131 K): τίνος γὰρ κυνός;</footnote>

<footnote n="47">47 σαφής Heyse : σαφῶς ms. 49 ὥ Potter : ὁ ms. 56 οὐδὲ Wilamowitz : οὐδὲν ms. 59 εἰ Bunsen : ἤ ms. τὰ¹ – ζῷα *del. Barnes* 60 αὐτὸ] αὐ τὸ Potter : τὸ Barnes τὸ¹ *add.* Bunsen</footnote>
something else, namely whether the embryo already has perception, or whether it
moves itself by some impulse, then the name is no longer misleading and it becomes
clear how the matter should be investigated. If he fails to respond to the counter
question, not wishing to explain what he had in mind or what thing he was referring to
by the name ‘animal’ when proposing the question, and tells us to decide it ourselves,
then he has shown himself to be a contentious person.

(9) So if there are two modes [of argument], one by question and answer, the other
by exposition, and [our opponent] has declined one of them, then let him listen to
everything we have to say about the problem while we present our exposition. Then,
when we have finished, he will have an opportunity to argue about each single point
in turn. If he tries to interrupt the exposition by asking questions, it is clear that he
does not even want to listen.

(10) However, if he chooses to respond, first of all we must ask him what thing he is
referring to by the name 'animal'. And when he answers this, we must ask again what
he takes to be the meaning of 'embryo' or 'the thing in the womb'. Is 'the thing in the
womb' supposed to mean even the seed deposited [in the womb], or only beings that
have been differentiated and formed already, the so-called fetuses? As soon as he
responds to this, we should already bring the proposed matter to a conclusion and
then teach.

(11) But if he fails to respond and wants us to speak, let him listen: Since you do not
want to say in what sense you mean what you have proposed – for otherwise I would
not be making an argument about meanings, but would already be looking into the
things themselves – you should realize that what you have done is similar to proposing
the question whether the dog is an animal. Of course I will say: ‘which dog?’ For I will
go through them one after the other and speak about the terrestrial dog, the dogfish,
the dog-star in the sky, even about Diogenes, and all the other ‘dogs’. I can hardly di-
vine whether you are asking about all or some one of them. So do now what you would
have to do later and tell me clearly which one is the dog you are looking to learn about.
(12) But if you are concerned with names, it is obvious to everyone that the word
‘embryo’ itself is not an animal neither a plant, but a name, a sound, a body, a being, a
‘something’, anything but an animal. So if this is the question you have proposed, then
you have got the answer. Neither, of course, is the meaning of the word ‘embryo’ an

<footnote>64–65 question...exposition] Cf. DL VII.42; Alex. Aphr. *In Top*. I.1 (5,7–13 Wallies); cf. already Plat. *Prot*. 334c–338e; Arist. *Soph. El*. 10, 171a38–b2. 74 differentiated...formed] Cf. B3, 1–2. fetuses] ‘Fetus’ translates the Greek ἔμβρυον, which is not coextensive with ‘embryo’, but refers to the embryo at its most developed stage. Cf. Gal. *Sem*. I.9.2–9 (92,21–94,11 De Lacy / IV.542–543 K). Cf. Boudon-Millot, “La naissance de la vie,” pp. 85–87. 81 which dog] A standard example of a homonym; cf. Arist. *Soph. el*. 4, 166a16; Philo Alex. *Plant*. 151; Athenaeus, *Deipn*. X.78 (II.485,3–4 Kaibel); Sextus, *M*. XI.29; Gal. *MM*. II.7.5–6, 8 and 11 (174,20–21, 176,1–6, 176,11–19, and 178,10–15 Lorusso / X.128–131 K); *Soph*. I (1,9–11 Gabler / XIV.583 K); *Diff. puls*. II.3 (VIII.573,11–15 K); *Hipp. Off. med*. III.25 (XVIIIb.869,15–870,1 K). 83 Diogenes] I.e., the Cynic. 87 a body] Cf. DL VII.55–56. 87–88 a being a something] Cf. SVF II.329.</footnote>
όνόματός έστι ζώον, άλλ' έκεινο μὲν ἀσώματόν τέ έστι καὶ λεκτὸν καὶ πρᾶγμα καὶ νόημα καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἤ ζώνον. ἄλλη δέ τις (ἀν') εἴη τοῦ ζώου φύσις· ἐναργῶς γὰρ ἑδείκνυτο τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζητουμένου, λέγω δὲ τοῦ ἐμβρύου, τῆς φύσεως ὁρποία τίς έστιν, ἔτερον ὑπάρχον πρόβλημα τὸ περὶ τῶν σημαινομένων ἐκ τοῦ ζώον ὀνόματος. (13) λέγω τοίνυν, εἰ τοῦτο λέγεις ζώον τὸ δυνάμενον αἰσθέσθαι τε καὶ κινηθῆναι καθ' ὁρμήν, ζώνον ἐστιν οὐχ ἀπλῶς τὸ κινούμενον καθ' ὁρμήν καὶ αἰσθανόμενον· δύναται γὰρ καὶ κοιμᾶσθαι ἤ μὴ παρόντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι ἤτοι ὁρμᾶν ἤ καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκὸς ζώου γνώρισμα. τοιοῦτον γὰρ τι σημαίνεται ἐκ τούτων, πρῶτον μέν, εἰ τὸ κυούμενον ἤδη αἰσθάνεσθαι ἤ καθ' ὁρμήν κινεῖσθαι δύναται, ὅπερ πρόκειται σκοπεῖσθαι, ἔτερον δέ, εἰ τὸ κυούμενον αἰσθήσεσθαι ποτὲ ἤ κινηθήσεσθαι δύναται καθ' ὁρμήν, καθ' ὁ σημαινόμενον οὐδεὶς ζητεῖ ἐναργὲς ὄν.

75

80

(14) ἐζήτητο δὲ πότερον ζώνον ἐστιν ἤδη τὸ ἔμβρυον ἤ φυτὸν ἔτι κάπειτα μετελήφθη τοῦ ζώου τοῦνομα εἰς λόγον, ἵν' ἦ σαφές. αἰσθήσει δὴ καὶ κινήσει τῇ καθ' ὁρμὴν εὐρόντες αὐτὸ διαφέρον τοῦ μὴ ζώου, πάλιν τοῦτο διωρισάμεθα τῶν παρακειμένων αὐτῷ πραγμάτων ἔτερον μὲν εἶναι φάμενοι τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, ὃ μήπω μέν ἐστιν αἰσθανόμενον τε καὶ κινούμενον, ἔσται δέ ποτε τοιοῦτον, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑπάρχον ἤδη τοιοῦτον· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἤδη ἐνεργοῦν, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργεῖν μὲν δυνάμενον, ἡσυχάζον δὲ ἤ κοιμώμενον. τοῦτο δέ έστι τὸ τζητούμενον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ τρέφεσθαι τὸ ἔμβρυον ζῶον εἶναι λεκτέον, ὃ τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἀποχωρούντων τοῦ ζητουμένου, τοῖς δ' ἄλλως συμβεβηκόσιν προσεχόντων τὸν νοῦν.

85

90

(15) κοινὴ δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς εὑρίσκεσθαι λεγομένοις τέτακται ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἤτις ἐστὶ λόγος ἐξ ἐτέρων ἔτερόν τι πιστούμενος. ἐξ ὧν δὲ χρὴ πιστοῦσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον, ὁμολογεῖσθαί τε καὶ γινώσκεσθαι δεῖ τῷ μανθάνοντι. ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτων ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς αἰσθησίν τε καὶ νόησιν ἐναργές. (16) ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τούτων [ἀπάντων] σύγκειται, ἡ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἤδη φθασάντων ἀποδεδεῖχθαι διὰ τῆσδε πάλιν ἔτερόν τι περαίνουσα πιστὴ μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐστὶ τῆς προτέρας, οὐ μὴν καὶ πρώτη ὀνομάζεσθαι δύναται, διότι μηδ' ἐκ πρώτων περαίνεται προτάσεων.

100

(17) τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἶδος τῆς τῶν ζητουμένων διαφορᾶς, τριῶν ὄντων, ἐδείχθη, λέγω δὲ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας γινωσκομένης ἀγνοεῖσθαί τι τῶν ἔργων ἤ παθῶν αὐτῆς. δευτέρα

<footnote n="81">81 ὁρμᾶν] Sc. κινεῖσθαι καθ' ὁρμήν, cf. PHP III.7.25 (216,26 De Lacy / V.341 K); IV.2.17 (242,6 De Lacy / V.370 K); IV.6.37 (278,6 De Lacy / V.413 K); Loc. aff. VI.4.2 (398,14 Brunschön / VIII.402,16–17 K); Hipp. Aph. IV.1 (XVIIb.654,5). **92–93** ἄλλως συμβεβηκόσιν] Cf. MM II.3.20 (126,1 Lorusso / X.92 K); II.4.6 (130,3 Lorusso / X.95 K).</footnote>

<footnote n="74">74 λεκτὸν Stählin : λεκτέον ms. 75 ἄν add. Bunsen 76 τοῦ ἐμβρύου Heinse : τῶι ἐμβρύωι ms.</footnote>

<footnote n="80">80 δύνασθαι Stählin : δυνάμενον ms. 82 ἤδη – ὁρμὴν Stählin : καθ' ὁρμήν μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἤ ms.</footnote>

<footnote n="83">83 αἰσθήσεσθαι Havrda : αἰσθέσθαι ms. 84 ἐναργὲς Stählin : ἐναργῶς ms. 97 ἀπάντων del. Stählin</footnote>
animal, since this is incorporeal, a ‘sayable’, a ‘thing’, a notion, anything but an animal. 90
The nature of an animal is surely something else. For, as regards the nature of the very
thing we are seeking (I mean the fetus), we have evidently shown what it is like. But
there is a different problem concerning the meaning of the name ‘animal’. (13) Thus if
you say an animal is that which can perceive and move by impulse, I say an animal is
not that which moves by impulse and perceives without qualification. It may also be
asleep or it may not be perceiving because no perceptible objects are present; but the
mark by which we recognize something as an animal is that it is capable by nature
either of being moved by impulse or of perceiving. For the meaning conveyed by these
words is, roughly, this: first, whether the embryo can already perceive or move by
impulse (which is the problem we must explore); and another one, whether the
embryo can perceive or move by impulse in the future, a meaning according to which
nobody inquires, as the matter is evident.

(14) An inquiry was raised whether the embryo is already an animal, or still a plant. The name 'animal' was then changed into an account in order to make it clear. We have discovered that it differs from non-animals in perception and movement by impulse. We again distinguished it from similar things by pointing out the difference between, on the one hand, something that is such potentially, i.e. when something does not yet perceive and move, but will at some point; and, on the other hand, something that is already such in actuality. The latter is either something active at this moment, or something capable of being active, but at rest or sleeping. And this is what we are seeking. It is wrong to say that the fetus is an animal because it is nourished: those who say this are missing the essence of what is sought, while turning attention to attributes incidental to it in another way.

(15) Demonstration, which is an argument confirming one thing on the basis of others, has been applied in common to everything said to have been discovered. Those items on whose basis the thing sought is supposed to be confirmed must be agreed to and known by the student. The principle of all of them is that which is evident to sense-perception and intellection. (16) The primary demonstration is composed of these items; the one composed of the items previously demonstrated by the primary demonstration and producing yet another conclusion is no less credible, but it cannot be called the primary demonstration, because it does not draw its conclusion from the primary propositions.

(17) Well, then, of the kinds distinguished among things we seek (there being three such kinds), the first one has been exhibited: I mean, when the substance is known, but

<footnote n="90">90 incorporeal...thing] Cf. Sextus, *M* VIII.12; for sayables, see LS §33. notion] Cf. Arist. *Int*. 1, 16a10 and 14. 92 what it is like] Cf. 73–74. 96 asleep] Cf. Ps.-Gal. *Def. med*. 498 (162.1 Kollesch), on Asclepiades; Porphyry, *Gaur*. 1.2 (33,14–18 Kalbfleisch). 99–101 whether...future] Cf. Porphyry, *Gaur*. 1.2 and 13.1–16.9 (33,14–18 and 52,3–58,16 Kalbfleisch), possibly responding to Galen’s argument. 110–111 what we are seeking] Cf. 26–27. 111 fetus] Cf. 73–74. 118 primary demonstration] Cf. Alex. Aphr. *In Top*. I.1 and VIII.12 (16,30–18,5 and 574,6–7 Wallies), *In Met*. Δ.3 (356,29–34 Hayduck). 123–124 three such kinds] Cf. 11–19.</footnote>
105

δ' ἦν διαφορὰ προβλημάτων ἑφ' οὖ τὰ μὲν ἔργα καὶ πάθη γινώσκομεν ἄπαντες, ἀγνοοῦ-
μεν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν, οἶον ἐν τίνι τοῦ σώματος μορίῳ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἑστι τῆς ψυχῆς. ἡ δὲ
αὐτὴ ἐπιχείρησις τῆς ἀποδείξεως κάπι τούτου τοῦ προβλήματος.

(18) φασίν οὖν τινες μὴ ἐγχωρεῖν πλείους ἀρχὰς ἐνὸς εἶναι ζώου. ὁμογενεῖς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ πλείους ὑπάρχειν ἐνὸς ζώου, διαφερούσας δὲ τοῖς γένεσιν οὐδὲν ἄτοπον.

<footnote n="105">105 τούτου τοῦ] τοῦ τρίτου Stählin : lect. ms. def. Barnes</footnote>
some of its works or affections are not. The second kind of problems was the one concerning things whose works and affections we all know, but do not know the substance, like 'In which part of the body is the ruling faculty of the soul?'. The reasoning of demonstration is the same in the case of this problem, too.

(18) Now some people say that it is impossible for one animal to have more than one principle. It is surely impossible for one animal to have more than one principle of the same genus, but if the principles are of different genera, there is nothing absurd about it. (H)

<footnote n="127">127 In...soul] Cf. Aët. IV.5, with Mansfeld–Runia, *Aëtiana* V.3, pp. 1473–1494. Galen discusses the issue at length in *PHP* II–III and VI (with the summary in *PHP* VIII.1.1–24 (480,4–486,9 De Lacy / V.648–655 K).</footnote>

<footnote>129–132 Probably the beginning of a discussion of the ἡγεμονικόν problem; cf. *PHP* VI.1.1 (360,4–7 De Lacy / V.505 K), trans. De Lacy, modified: “It was my purpose at the beginning to inquire about the powers that govern us, whether they have the heart as their only principle, as Aristotle and Theophrastus supposed, or whether it is better to posit three principles (τρεῖς ἀρχάς) for them.” Cf. Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus*, p. 30 n. 94.</footnote>
### C1. Galenus, *De marcore* 2 (VII.671–672 K)

τὸ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ γεννητὸν πᾶν φθαρήσεται πάντως οἴτ’ ἐπιστημονικὴν οἴτ’ ἀναγκαίαν ἔχει τὴν ἀκολουθίαν, ἀλλ’ ἄχρι τοῦ πιθανοῦ προϊοῦσαν, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀποδείξεως ἀποδέδεικται, καίτοι γε τούτῳ χρῶνται τῷ λόγῳ σχεδὸν ἄπαντες, ὅσοι τὸ γηράσκειν ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιδεικνύουσι τοῖς ζώοις, ὁδὸν εἶναι φάσκοντες αὐτὸ πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπομένην φθορὰν τοῖς γεννητοῖς ἄπασιν.

5

### C2. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 20.27 (216,4–7 Koetschet)

ثم قال: “والقول بأنَّ كلَّ متكون يفسد، ليس هو حقاً لا محالة لكن مقنعاً”. وهذا يناقض النتيجة التي إليها يجري في كتابه في البرهان، التي هي أنَّ كلَّ ما لا يفسد فليس بمكون لَأنَّه، إن كان يمكن أن يكون متكونٌ لا يفسد، جاز أن يكون العالم وإن لا يفسد متكوناً.

### C3. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 95.2–3, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 72b, I. 27–fol. 73a, I. 9 (Koetschet-Rajab)

(1) وأما قول جالينوس إنَّ القول بأنَّ كلَّ متكون يفسد ليس هو حقاً لا محالة لكن <مقنعاً> قول صحيح وقد بين ذلك في المقالة الرابعة من كتاب البرهان وذلك أنه ممكن أن يكون متكونٌ لا يفسد لأنه أهل للبقاء باصلاحه دائماً ومنعه عن قبول الموت. (2) وأما قول السوفسطائي إنَّ قول جالينوس بأنَّ القول إنَّ كلَّ متكون لا يفسد ليس حقاً لا محالة لكنه مقنع يناقض النتيجة التي يجري إليها في كتاب البرهان التي هي: كلَّ ما لا يفسد <فليس> بمكون فكذب منه. (3) وكذلك أنَّ جالينوس لا يقول ذلك، بل قال: “وأما قولنا في كل ما كان غير قابل للفساد أنه يجب ضرورة أن يكون غير متكون فيحتاج إلى تحديد وتمييز حتى يسهل قبوله وتمييز ذلك وتحديده يكون بالنظر إلى الجهة التي اتفق فيها أنه غير قابل للفساد فإنه لا يخلو من أن يكون كذلك إما

5

<figure><img src="image_17.png" /></figure>

<footnote>C3, 1 [متكون] MS Rıḍawī مكتوب [حق] MS Rıḍawī مكونا [متكون] MS Rıḍawī يخلو [متكون] MS Rıḍawī يخوا</footnote>
Section C: Book IV

C1. Galen, *On decay* 2

For the [proposition] that every generated [thing] will by all means be corrupted does not involve a scientific or necessary consequence. Rather, as was demonstrated in *On demonstration*, it goes as far as the persuasive, even though nearly everyone who points out that aging happens necessarily to animals uses precisely this reason, claiming that aging is the path to corruption following of necessity to all generated [things]. (H)

C2. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 20.27

Then [Galen] says: “The proposition that every generated thing will be corrupted is not true by all means but it is (persuasive).” This contradicts the result that he obtained in his treatise *On demonstration*, that is: everything that is not subject to corruption is ungenerated. Because if it were possible for a generated being to be corrupted, it would be possible for the world, even if it is not subject to corruption, to be generated. (Ko)

C3. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 95.2–3

(1) What Galen says – that the proposition that every generated thing will be corrupted is not true by all means but it is (persuasive) – is correct. He explained it clearly in the fourth book of his treatise *On demonstration*: It is possible that there is a generated being that is not subject to corruption, because it obtained immortality by way of restoration and was forbidden to receive death. (2) In turn, what the Sophist claims, [namely,] that what Galen says – the proposition that every generated thing will be corrupted is not true by all means but is persuasive – contradicts the result that he obtained in his treatise *On demonstration*, that is, that everything that is not subject to corruption is ungenerated, it is a lie. (3) Indeed, Galen does not say that, but he says: “What we said about everything incorruptible, that it must necessarily be ungenerated, requires determinations and distinctions for us to readily accept it. The distinction and the determination consist in considering the ways in which a particular thing is conceded to be incorruptible, because it can be [incorruptible] either because it does (not) admit corruption at all, like what it is unique, perfectly simple and unaffected, or

<footnote>C1, 1 every...corrupted] Cf. Arist. *Cael*. I.10, 279b21. C2, 1 Galen] I.e., in C1. 3-4 everything... ungenerated] Not Galen's view; cf. below, C3, 3-5 and C4, 41. C3, 1 Galen] I.e., in C1. 4-5 immortality... restoration] Cf. C4, 26-27. 5 the Sophist] I.e., al-Rāzī. 10-16 Cf. C4, 22-27.</footnote>
10

لأنه <لا> يدخله من الفساد <شيء> إذا كان شيئاً واحداً مفرداً بسيطًا لا يقبل التأثير وإما لأنه
أهل للبقاء بإصلاحه دائماً أو منعه من قبول الموت«.

C4. Philoponus, *De aeternitate mundi* XVII.5 (599,17–601,20 Rabe)

5

10

15

20

(1) ἱκανῶς μὲν οὖν οἶμαι τοῖς μὴ πάντη φιλονείκοις καὶ ἀπηρυθριακόσιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὁ λόγος ἀπέδειξεν, ὡς οὕτε πᾶν ἀπλῶς τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀγένητον, ἀλλ', εἴπερ ἄρα, τὸ φύσει, ο Πλάτων φύσει ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον οἴεται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἀγένητον. (2) εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ μαρτυρίαις ἀξιοπίστων ἀνδρῶν βεβαιῶσαι τὸν λόγον, εἴ τρω δοκεῖ Γαληνὸς ἀξιόπιστος εἶναι τούτων μάρτυς, ἀνὴρ φυσικώτατός τε καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιστήμης τὰ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἡκριβωκὼς θεωρήματα, παρίτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ λόγῳ συνήγορος. (3) οὖτος οὖν ἐν τῷ δ' λόγῳ ἧς αὐτὸς συνέγραψεν ἀποδεικτικῆς πραγματείας φησὶν ἐπὶ λέξεως ταῦτα ἔσυνθετός ἐστιν ἡ νόησις τοῦ ἀιδίου· καὶ γὰρ ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος ἔπεται δὲ ἐκατέρω θάτερον.» (4) δηλονότι κανταῦθα δείξας ὀπότερον αὐτῶν εἶναι ᾧ ἔπεται θάτερον, ἐκεῖνο προλαβὼν ἀποδέδειχεν πῶς ἂν εἶη τὸ προκείμενον· «εἰ τοίνυν καλῶς ὑπὸ πάντων ὡμολόγηται τῷ ἀγενήτῳ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἔπεσθαι σκοποῦντες, ἄμα μὲν ἀναποδεικτόν τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πιστὸν εἶναι ἀξίωμα κατενοήσαμεν, ἄμα δὲ ὑφ' ἐτέρου τινὸς ἑναργοῦς μαρτυρούμενον ἀξιώματος, ὃ μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηται, τοιοῦτο ὑπάρχειν· εἴ τι λόγον οὐδ' ὅλως ἔχει γενέσεως, οὐδὲ φθορᾶς ἔξει τὸ τοιοῦτο λόγον. (5) ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄπαν ἀγένητον εὐθὺς καὶ ἄφθαρτον ἐστιν, ἐτοίμως ἡ διάνοια δέχεται καὶ εἶπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν πρὸς νόησιν ἑναργῶν πρῶτον ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀξίωμα. (6) τὸ μέντοι πᾶν ὅσον ἄφθαρτον ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο καὶ ἀγένητον εἶναι διορισμοῦ δεῖταί τινος, ἵν' ἐτοίμως αὐτὸ δεχώμεθα. τίς οὖν ὁ διορισμός; ἐν τῷ διελέσθαι, πῶς ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τόδε τι συγχωρεῖται, πότερον ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν λόγον ὅλως ἐπιδεχόμενον τῆς φθορᾶς, οἶον τὸ τελείως ἀπλοῦν ἐστιν καὶ ἀπαθές, ἥ ὡς ἐπισκευαστῆς τῆς ἀθανασίας τετυχηκός, οἰόν τι δοκεῖ καὶ περὶ τῶν θεῶν ἐν Τιμαίῳ λέγειν ὁ Πλάτων, ἐν οἷς πεποίηκεν τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον. (7) ἔστιν δ' ἡ ῥῆσις ἥδε· «ἐπείπερ γεγόνατε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν· ο μὲν δὴ

<footnote>C4, 20–21 ἐπισκευαστῆς τῆς ἀθανασίας] Cf. Plat. Polit. 270a4. 23–25 Plat. Tim. 41b.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 [ειχηλα] MS Rıḍawī [διχηλα] MS Rıḍawī : εἶθ' ὡς mss. πῶς Havrda : ὡς Paris. 2058 : om. Marc. 236 : Rabe: “locum corruptum non expeditum”</footnote>
because it obtained immortality by way of restoration and was forbidden to receive 15 death”. (Ko)

C4. Philoponus, *The eternity of the world* XVII.5

(1) And so I think the argument has sufficiently demonstrated to those who are not completely contentious and shameless towards the truth, that neither is it the case that everything incorruptible without qualification is ungenerated; rather, if anything, it is what is [incorruptible] by nature; nor does Plato think the cosmos to be incorruptible by nature and for this reason ungenerated. (2) If, however, one also needs the testimony of trustworthy men to confirm the argument, and if anyone thinks Galen is a trustworthy witness concerning these things, a man who is both an exceptional natural philosopher and someone who has treated philosophical speculations with precision no less than his own science, let him come forward as an advocate for our argument. (3) So, in the fourth book of the treatise he wrote about demonstration, he says literally the following: “The thought of the eternal is composite. For it is ungenerated and incorruptible, and each of the two entails the other.” (4) That is to say, having shown at this point that either of the two [predicates] entails the other, he took up the former first and demonstrated how the issue in hand might be: “Now exploring whether it has been correctly agreed by everyone that being ungenerated entails being incorruptible, we have realized that it is an undemonstrated and primary axiom credible by itself and, at the same time, that it is confirmed by another evident axiom, which was discussed a little earlier and which is this: if something has no account of generation at all, then such a thing will have no account of corruption either. (5) Therefore, thought readily accepts that everything ungenerated is immediately also incorruptible, and if anything else is the first among things evident to intellection, so is also such an axiom. (6) Nevertheless, [the proposition] that everything that is incorruptible is also necessarily ungenerated requires a distinction for us to readily accept it. What distinction is it? [It consists] in setting apart the ways in which a particular thing is conceded to be incorruptible, whether in the sense of not admitting the account of corruption at all, like what is perfectly simple and unaffected, or in the sense of having obtained immortality by restoration, like something Plato, too, seems to say about the gods in the *Timaeus*, in which he makes the first god discourse with them. (7) The speech goes as follows: ‘Since you have been generated, you are not immortal nor completely indissoluble. And yet you will not be dissolved nor will you meet a fate of death, having

<footnote>C4, 11–12 ungenerated and incorruptible] Cf. Arist. *Cael*. I.9, 277b28–29. 12 each…other] Cf. Arist. *Cael*. I.12, 282a23–283a3. 13 either of the two] I.e., “ungenerated” and “incorruptible”. 21 evident to intellection] Cf. A16, 3–4 and B6*, 71–72. [axiom] Cf. A15, 3–12 and F6, 1–2. 26 simple and unaffected] I.e., the aether; cf. Arist. *Cael*. I.2–3; C15, 6; E7, 2. 27 restoration] Cf. Plat. *Polit*. 270a4. 29–32 Plat. *Tim*. 41b.</footnote>
25

30

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λυθήσεσθε οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι καὶ κυριω-
τέρου δεσμοῦ λαχόντες ἐκείνων, οἷς ὅτε ἐγίνεσθε συνεδεῖσθε..(8) ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο κὰν τῷ
Πολιτικῷ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ διεξέρχεται ἐπινοεῖται γάρ τι, κᾶν εἰ γέγονεν, ὅμως
οὐ φθαρησόμενον· οἶον ἡ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις εἰ τύχοι· ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ αὐτὴν φθαρῆ-
ναι μηδέποτε, καίτοι τῶν κατὰ μέρος οἰκιῶν ἀπασῶν φθείρεσθαι φύσιν ἐχουσῶν, ἀλλὰ
τῷ δύνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ γίνεσθαι τὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν ἐνδέχεται μὴ φθαρῆναι τὸ σύμπαν·
οὐ μόνον δὲ πόλιν οὐτως δυνατὸν ἄφθαρτον ἐπινοεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ μίαν οἰκίαν, εἰ τὸ
πονῆσαν αὐτῆς ἐπανορθώσεως ἐκάστοτε τυγχάνοι. (9) κατὰ λόγον οὖν, εἰ μὲν ἀγένητόν
τι, πάντως καὶ ἄφθαρτον, εἰ δὲ ἄφθαρτον, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένητον ». (10) σαφῶς ἄρα
καὶ οὐτος ὁ ἀνὴρ οὐτε τῷ ὁπωσοῦν ἀφθάρτῳ τὸ ἀγένητον εἶπεν ἔπεσθαι ἀλλὰ τῷ μηδὲ
τὸν λόγον τῆς φθορᾶς ἔχοντι καὶ Πλάτωνα (οὐχ) οὐτω τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν διδόναι ὡμολόγη-
κεν τῷ οὐρανῷ. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλις κάνταῦθα.

C5. Al-Ṭabarī, *Hippocratic treatments*, MS British Library, IO Islamic 1296, fol. 29b (Koetschet)

فلمَا بحثَ، رجع عن هذا الرأي ومما يدلَّ على أنَّ هذا صحيح أنه يقول في كتاب البرهان: "ما لا يفسد كجوهر النفس"، فلو لا أنه عرف جوهر النفس لما ذكر هذا الذي ذكره.

C6. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 2.1 (8,3–6 Koetschet)

وذلك أنه قال: "لو فسد العالم لكانَت لا تلَبِث الأَجسام التي فيه بحال واحدة بعينها ولا الأبعاد التي فيما بينها والمقادير والحركات. وكان ينبغي أيضاً أن يفنى ماء البحر الذي قَبْلَنا. وليس شيء من هذه الأشياء زائلاً عن حاله أو تغيَّر وقد رصدها المنجمون أَلوفاً من السنين كثيرة. فيجب إذن أن يكون العالم لا يهزم فهو إذن غير قابل للفساد."

<footnote>25–26 τῷ Πολιτικῷ] Cf. Plat. *Polit*. 269d–270a.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 οὐχ *add*. Havrda</footnote>
obtained a bond of my will that is even greater and more authoritative than those by
which you were bound together when you came to be.' (8) In the *Statesman*, too, [Plato]
explains exactly the same point concerning the whole heaven. For we can conceive of
something that, although it has come to be, it is nevertheless not to be corrupted, like
the city of the Spartans, for instance. For it is possible that it will never be corrupted:
even though all the particular houses have a corruptible nature, it is still possible for
the whole not to be corrupted, as reparation can take place little by little. Not only is it
possible to conceive of a city being incorruptible in this sense, but also of a single
house, if its parts get repaired each time they have suffered damage. (9) It is therefore
in accordance with reason that if something is ungenerated, it is by all means also
incorruptible, but if it is incorruptible, it is not necessarily ungenerated." (10) So, this
man also clearly said that being ungenerated is not entailed by being incorruptible in
just any sense, but rather by not even having the account of corruption, and he
acknowledged that Plato did <small>not</small> attribute incorruptibility to the heaven in this sense.
But this is enough about these things for now. (C-H)

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40

45

**C5.** Al-Ṭabarī, *Hippocratic treatments*, MS British Library, IO Islamic 1296, fol. 29b

When he [Galen] made further research, he reconsidered this opinion. Among the
signs that this is true, [you may find] what he says in *On demonstration* : "What is not
subject to corruption, like the substance of the soul." If he did not know the substance
of the soul, he would not have said this. (Ko)

**C6.** Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 2.1

[Galen] says: "If the cosmos could be corrupted, the [celestial] bodies it contains would not remain in one and the same state, nor would the distances between them, or their sizes, or their movements. The water of the sea that existed before us would also have to disappear. But none of these things have ever departed from their initial state or changed, even though astronomers have been observing them for many thousands of years. It follows, therefore, that the world does not age, and therefore is not subject to corruption." (Ko [C-H])

5

<footnote>32–33 Plat. *Polit*. 269d–270a. C5, 1 this opinion] i.e., that he does not know the nature of the soul.
2–3 What...soul] This is in conflict with B5 and probably does not represent Galen’s own position. It is
possibly a dialectical concession to Plato’s view, made in the context of the discussion reported in C4.
C6, 5–6 astronomers...years] Cf. Arist. *Cael*. I.3, 270b13–17. Cf. C7, 11–12; C8, 5–7; C13, 4–9; C15, 13.</footnote>
C7. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 1.1–2, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 3a, ll. 1–13 (Koetschet–Rajab)

> (...) (1) أفلاطن وأوجدنا ما ليس بفاسد ولا بمتكون على مذهب أرسطاطاليس وهو الفلك.

وهذا نص لفظ جالينوس من كتاب البرهان: (2) “وقد يقال في الشيء أنه غير كائن على جهة أخرى بمنزلة قول أرسطاطاليس في الفلك والكواكب أنها كذلك بسبب شكلها وحركتها إذ كان لا يوجد لها ضدّ، (3) وأما غير فاسد فلأن أشكالها وحركاتها وأبعادها بعضها من بعض لم

تُوجد تغييرات في ألفم من السنين، وقد كان ينبغي لو كانت جميعها تستحيل إلى طبيعة النار إذا انحلَّ جوهرها كما ظنَّ زينن ألا تثبت أجسامها بحال واحدة بعينها، ولا الأبعاد التي فيما بينها وكان ينبغي أن يفنى هذا البحر الذي قَبِّلَنا وليس من هذه الأشياء واحد زال عن حاله أو تغيّر عما رصده المنجمون أَلِفًا من السنين كثيرةً فيجب إذا أن يكون العالم لا يهرم. (4) وكذلك لو كان شيء بارد يحيط به من خارج يجمدُه ويجمّعه ويضغطه، لَوْ جَبَّ لهذا السبب أن تتغيّر

مقادير الأجسام التي فيه وأبعادها وحركاتها وعظم الشمس والقمر وسائر الكواكب فلا نراه.“ (5) حكى ذلك عن أرسطاطاليس تاركًا آراءه كلها ليفرد لها كتاباً كما فعل في كتاب اعتقاداتِه.

C8. Ps.-Ğābir ibn Hayyān, *The book of morphology* (420,16–421,4 Kraus)

(1) وقد استعمل هذا أيضاً في كتابه المسمى <البرهان> فإنه قال هناك مغالطاً أو على سبيل أنه خاف عليه. فإنه قال: (2) وقد ينبغي لنا أن نعلم أنَّ هذا الجزء الشريف – يعني جزء السماء – غير مكؤن من أنَّ آباءنا وجميع القدماء لم يزالوا يرونوه على مثال واحد، وقد رصده المنجمون قبل ألف السنين فوجدوه على مثال واحد في أعظامه وحركاته. (3) ومدّ في هذا الكلام وتوسّع فقد تعلق بهذا الاستدلال وما يأتِيه.

C9. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 2.2 (8,7–15 Koetschet)

أول ما أقول في هذا أنه يناقض ما قاله في كتابه الذي يسميه ما يعتقد جالينوس رأياً فإنه قال
> هناك إنه ليس له علم يثق به هل العالم قديم أو محدث وما قاله < في كتابه الموسوم بالتجربة
**C7. Abū al-'Alā' ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 1.1–2**

〈...〉 (1) Plato, and he presented us what is incorruptible and is not generated according to Aristotle, that is the celestial sphere. This is literally what Galen says in the treatise *On demonstration*: (2) “One can say of a thing that it is ungenerated in another way, equivalent to the argument Aristotle gives about spheres and planets, namely that they are such (i.e. ungenerated) because of their shape and movement, because they have no contrary. (3) As for [saying] that it is incorruptible, it is because their shapes, their movements and the distance separating them from each other have not undergone any change over thousands of years. In fact, if all these things transformed into the nature of fire when their substance dissolved, as Zeno thinks, their bodies should not remain in one and the same state, nor the distances between them, and this sea that was there before us should have disappeared. But not one of these things is going to change or be removed from what astronomers have observed over thousands of years. So, it necessarily follows that the world is not aging. (4) Likewise, if a cold thing were to surround it from the outside, condense it, gather it together, and compress it, it would be necessary for this reason that the sizes of the bodies in [the world] change, as well as the distance between them, their movement, the size of the sun, the moon, and all the planets. But we don't see that.” (5) He takes this from Aristotle, and leaves out his own opinions, and puts them in a separate book, as he did in the treatise *On his own opinions*. (Ko [C-H])

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10

15

**C8. Ps.-Ğābir ibn Hayyān, *The book of morphology***

(1) [Galen] also uses this (i.e. the inference based on induction) in his book entitled *<u>On demonstration</u>*. Indeed, what he says is misleading, even if he is unaware of it. He says: (2) “We must come to know that this noble part – I mean the part that corresponds to the heaven – is not generated from the fact that our fathers and all the ancients have always observed it to be one and the same, and astronomers have made observations for thousands of years, and have seen that its dimensions and movements are one and the same.” (3) He spent time on this and expanded his remarks, and he established a connection based on this sign and what results from it. (Ko [C-H])

5

**C9. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 2.2**

The first thing I want to say on this [topic] is that [Galen] contradicts what he said in his book *On his own opinions*, where he says he does not have secure knowledge whether the world is eternal or whether it has come into being, and what he said in his

C7, 5–6 because²...contrary] Cf. Arist. *Cael*. I.3, 270a13–23. 6 shapes] I.e., those of spheres and planets. 9 as Zeno thinks] Cf. SVF I.107–109; Koetschet, “Galien, al-Rāzī, et l’éternité du monde,” p. 185 n. 40. 13–14 Cf. SVF II.804–806. C8, 5–6 observations...years] Cf. C6, 5. C9, 1–3 Gal. *Prop. plac*. 2.1 (Garofalo–Lami). 3–5 Cf. Gal. *Med. exp*. 19 (47,2–18 Walzer).
الطبية. فإنه يروم هناك أن يبرهن البرهان أنه لا يمكن أن يُعلم أقدمِ العالم أم محدثٌ، وقد أقرَّ
في الرابعة من كتاب البرهان فأطلق القول في غير موضع بأنَّ ما لا يفسد فليس بمكَّون.

5

ومعلوم عند من قرأ جميع كتب جالينوس أنَّ هذا الكتاب الموسوم بما يعتقده جالينوس رأياً لم
يؤلَّفه إلا بعد استحكامه وثبات آرائه وأنَّه آخر كتبه وآخر تأليفاته. فإن كان ما ذكره في كتاب
البرهان حقاً، فليس لتوقفه عن إطلاق القول يقدم العالم وجهة البتة، إذ كانت النتيجة عن هاتين
المقدمتين - أعني القائلة بأنَّ العالم لا يفسد، والقائلة إنَّ ما لا يفسد فليس بمكَّون - أنَّ العالم ليس
بمكَّون وقد ناقض قوله إنه لا يمكن أن يُعلم أقدمِ العالم أم محدث.

C10. Abū al-'Alā' ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 1.6, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 3b, ll. 9-13 (Koetschet-Rajab)

وأما قوله: أنَّ جالينوس قد أطلق القضية في كتاب البرهان على أنَّ ما لا يفسد فليس بمكَّون
فكذب منه، إذ جالينوس قد قال في كتاب البرهان وبين أنَّ هذه القضية لا تصحَّ إلا بعد تحديد
وتمييز، وسأذكر ذلك التحديد والتمييز عند تقسيم شكوك كتاب الذبول إذ أحسب الضرورة
تدعوني إلى ذلك.

C11. Abū al-'Alā' ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 1.3-4, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 3a, ll. 13-25 (Koetschet-Rajab)

(1) وأما الفصل الذي حكاه عن جالينوس من كتاب اعتقاداتِه فليس الذي يذكره السوفسطائي لفظ جالينوس، الذي ذكره جالينوس فيه، على ما تراه، أنَّه ليس له علم يثق به هل العالم مكَّون من شيء أو مكَّون من غير شيء. فليس إذا ما توهَّمه هذا السوفسطائي متناقضاً في جالينوس.

(2) ولو حفظ شروط التقيض لم يأتِ بهذا الجهل لأنَّ جالينوس ذكر في كتاب البرهان طرق البرهان جاعلاً مثل ذلك أقوال أربابه كافلاطون وأرسطاطاليس فيما لم يجد سبيلاً إلى تيقَّنه التيقَّن التام لأنَّ أقوالهم أولى أنْ يُقْتَدَى بها وأيضاً فإذا علمنا كيف تؤخذ المقدمات البرهانية وكيف نَظَّمَ القياسات الصحيحة النتج فله أنْ يأتِي بأي مثال اتفق له، ولحافظ ذلك الطريق العام أنْ ينظرَ هل ذلك المثال جارٍ على ما يوجهه القانون أم فيه شك، وأما في كتاب اعتقاد رأيه فإنه

5
book *On medical experience*, where he sets out to demonstrate apodictically that it is impossible to know whether the world is eternal or created. Now he admits in the fourth [book] of the treatise *On demonstration* and makes the same argument in several places that what is incorruptible is also ungenerated. Now it is known to anyone who has read all the books of Galen that the book *On my own opinions* was composed only after he had consolidated and firmly established his opinions, and that it is the last of his books and treatises. Thus, if what he says in *On demonstration* is true, then there is no reason to suspend his judgment about the eternity of the world. Indeed, the conclusion of these two premisses, I mean [the premiss] that “the world is incorruptible” and the premise that “that which is incorruptible is ungenerated” is the following: “the world is ungenerated”. [This conclusion] contradicts what he says: that it is impossible to know whether the world is created or not. (Ko 15)

**C10.** Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 1.6

When [al-Rāzī] says: “Galen, in the treatise *On demonstration*, states the opinion that what is not corrupted is not generated”, it is a lie on his part, since Galen explicitly says in *On demonstration* that this assertion can only be correct after we have made determinations and distinctions. I will recall these determinations and distinctions when I examine the doubts against the work *On decay*, if I decide necessity obliges me to do so. (Ko [C-H]) 5

**C11.** Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 1.3–4

(1) As for what [al-Rāzī] quotes from Galen and the treatise *On his own opinions*, what the Sophist mentions does not correspond to Galen's text. What Galen's text says here, as we can see, is that he does not have a secure knowledge that would allow him to affirm that the world is generated from something or that it is generated from nothing. This is therefore not the contradiction on Galen's part imagined by this Sophist. (2) If he had kept in mind the conditions under which a contradiction would arise, he would not have shown such ignorance. For Galen mentions in the treatise *On demonstration* methods of demonstration, using as examples what his predecessors Plato and Aristotle said on topics where a path to perfect certainty has not been found, because it is reasonable to be guided by what they have said. Moreover, since he taught us how demonstrative premisses should be acquired and how to construct syllogisms that draw their conclusion correctly, it is up to him to start from any example that suits him, and it is up to the one who learns this general method to contemplate if this example conforms to the rules or whether it is open to doubt. In his book *On my own*

<footnote>C10, 4 determinations and distinctions¹] Cf. C3, 11; C4, 22–27. 5 when...decay] See C2. C11, 1 On his own opinions] Cf. C9, 7–10. 4 the...nothing] This alternative is not found in *Prop. plac.*</footnote>
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ذكر فيه ما رضي به وصحّ عنده مما لم يرضَه وشكَّ فيه فإِمَّا كان يكون القولان متناقضان لو كانت اعتقادات أرسطاطاليس كلَّها يصححها جالينوس ويتفقدها.

C12. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 2.3 (10,1–13 Koetschet)

5

ثمَّ أقول من بعد إِنَّهُ قد فارق الوصية التي لا يزال يوصينا بها من التحفَّظ في أخذ المقدمات واكتسابها من المواضع اللازمة للأمر المطلوب ضرورة. وليس في أن تكونَ أعظام الكواكب والأرض ومقدار ماء البحر وسائر أجزاء العالم محفوظة بأعيانها وجوبُ امتناع العالم من الفساد، إذ كان ليس سبيل كل فاسد أن يكون ذلك يقع به على سبيل التناقص والذبول بل قد يكون يمكن أن يفسد الشيء وهو أعظم ما كان وأكمله كالبيت المُبني على عُمد إذا خَرَّت عُمده من تحته وكالشجرة التي تُقلَّل والنار التي تُطفَّأ ونحو ذلك. فلم يكن ينبغي له أن يُثْبِت الحكم بما أثبت به دون أن يبْتَنِ أنَّ العالم من الأشياء التي <لا> يمكن فسادها إلا على جهة الذبول، ولم يعرَّض لهذا بَتَّة، بل ضمَّ إلى هذا المقدم وهو قوله <لو فسد العالم> هذا التالي وهو قوله <لكانت لا تلبث الأجسام التي فيه بحالة واحدة بعينها>، كأنَّه لا يمكن أن يكون فساد إلا على هذه الجهة فقط. وإنَّما يصحَّ لزوم هذا التالي لهذا المقدم بزيادة شرطٍ فيه - حتى يكون على هذه الصفة: <لو فسد العالم فساداً ذبلياً لكانَت الأجسام التي فيه لا تلبث بحالة واحدة بعينها> - أو مقدمٍ فتَبَيَّنَ أنَّ الفساد لا يعرض لشيء بَتَّة إلا على جهة الذبول فقط.

10

C13. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, Solution to the Doubts about Galen 1.7, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 3b, ll. 13–21 (Koetschet–Rajab)

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(1) وأما قوله: إِنَّه لو زاد في جرم الشمس أو نقص منه أعظم ما يكون من الجبال، لما لحق بصرنا منه إلا مثل ما يلحق بصرنا منه قبل الزيادة. (2) فليس لهذا القول معنى، إذ جالينوس إنَّما قال : وقد رصدها المنجمون وليس رصد المنجمين لها بالبصر بل بالآلات المحقَّقة التي لا يدخلها خطأ وأيضاً لو زاد الفلك أو نقص لظهر ذلك النقصان أو الزيادة في المركز ولكنَّت أحواله لا نجذُها اليوم على ما حكاها من كان قبلينا بألوف من السنين. (3) وجالينوس لا يرضى بما يقوم من البراهين على أمثال هذه المطالب لشدة تحقيقه إذ كل رأي منها مقارب فمن بعضها
opinions, however, he mentions what he accepts and deems correct, not what he does 15 not accept and what he doubts. Thus, there would be a contradiction between these two propositions, only if he had deemed all Aristotle's doctrines to be correct after having examined them. (Ko [C-H])

**C12.** Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 2.3

Next, I note that he goes against the recommendation he keeps giving us all the time, namely to be cautious when adopting our premisses and to acquire them from the attributes that necessarily follow the thing under inquiry. Now, that the sizes of the heavenly bodies and the earth, the quantity of water in the sea and all the world's parts remain as they are does not necessarily imply that it is impossible for the world to be corruptible. For, not all corruption is brought about by diminution and decay, but it is also possible for something to be corrupted when it is as large and perfect as it can be, like the house built on columns when its columns collapse, or like the tree that is uprooted, or like the fire that is put out, and other similar cases. Thus he should not assert this proposition based on the [premisses] from which he started without explaining that the world is one of those things that are corrupted only by decay. Not only did he not allude to this at all, but he also added to this antecedent clause, namely "if the world were corruptible", the following consequent, "then the bodies would not remain in one and the same state", as if it were impossible for anything else to be corruptible except in this way. Now, the implication of the consequent from the antecedent is valid if one adds a condition to [the antecedent], so that [this implication] reads as follows: "if the world were corruptible by decay, then the bodies in it would not remain in one and the same state", or [by the addition of] an antecedent which makes it clear that nothing is ever corrupted except by the decay. (Ko [C-H])

**C13.** Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 1.7

(1) [Al-Rāzī] says: If the volume of the sun were to increase or decrease [by an equivalent amount] to [the size of] the highest mountain, our vision could not perceive the [sun] as anything other than what it perceived before the increase. (2) This argument makes no sense, since Galen only says: astronomers have observed [the sun]; but the observation [of the sun] by astronomers does not operate by vision [alone], but by instruments of exploration where no error is made. Moreover, if the celestial sphere were to increase or decrease, this decrease or increase would appear in the centre, and we would not find the sun on a given day to be in the same state as what an observer who lived several thousand years before us recorded. (3) Moreover, Galen is not satisfied with demonstrations based on such statements because of his rigorous approach to this issue, since every opinion that would result from them is approxim-

<footnote>C13, 4 astronomers] Cf. C6, 5.</footnote>
يحصل على الشيء المقارب لليقين وذلك تصديق جدلي، ومن بعضها على الشيء الذي تسكن إليه النفس وذلك تصديق بلاغي، والبرهان غير هذين.

C14. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 1.8, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 3b, ll. 21–23 (Koetschet-Rajab)

ويجب أن يحمد جالينوس إذ قال فيما تقصر أفهام البشر عنه إنه لم يدر ولم يقلد أحداً من الفلاسفة فيخدع عقله.

C15. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 2.1–4, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 3b, l. 26–fol. 4a, l. 15 (Koetschet-Rajab)

(1) قال السوفسطائي: "قال جالينوس إنه يمكن في مثل دائرة البروج أن نبين أنَّها سبب كون الحيوان والنبات وما يوجد فيها من الصنائع، وذلك موجود في كتب أرسطاطاليس الموضوعة في أعضاء الحيوان، وفي كتب ثاوفرسطس في النبات، ومع ذلك في كتابنا في منافع الأعضاء.

(2) [...] قال أبو العلاء بن زهر إنَّ جالينوس قصد في هذا الموضوع من كتابه النظر في أربعة

5 أشياء أحدهما: هل يوجد في العالم جوهر أزلي؟ والثاني: هل ذلك الجوهر حسَّاس؟ والثالث: هل هو خبير؟ والرابع: هل هو حكيم؟ (3) فقال إنَّ الثاني من هذه الأربعة يشتبه ألا يمكن استخراج المقدمات الملائمة منه، وأما الأول والثالث والرابع فيمكن ذلك فيها كثيراً، أما الأول فبالقياسات التي وصفناها فيما تقدم، وأما الثالث والرابع فبالصناعات الموجودة في العالم والأجرام السماوية. واستخراج هذه المقدمات يدخل في صناعة النجوم وفي الأشياء التي على وجه الأرض من تركيب الحيوان، وذلك أنه يمكن في مثل دائرة البروج أن نبين أنها سبب كون الحيوان والنبات، فجالينوس لم يخرجه بعد عن عنصر الإمكان، وهذا السوفسطائي أجرى عنصر الإمكان مجراً عنصر الإيجاب.
ate: some [statements] produce something approximating certainty, and this is dialectical credence, and some [produce] something which persuades the soul, and this is rhetorical credence. Demonstration, however, corresponds to neither. (Ko [C-H])

**C14.** Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 1.8

Galen should be praised, since he says, regarding that which human intellect fails to grasp, that he does not know, and he does not follow any of the philosophers who would mislead him. (Ko [C])

**C15.** Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 2.1–4

(1) The Sophist says: “Galen says: ‘It is possible, concerning something like the circle of the zodiac, to show that it is the cause of the generation of animals, plants, and of the arts found in them’ and [he says that] ‘this is present in the books of Aristotle *On the parts of animals*, and in the books of Theophrastus *On plants*, and in addition to this, in our book *On the use of parts*.’” (2) [...] Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr says: Galen, at this point in his treatise, aims to examine four questions. The first: Is there an eternal substance in the world? The second: is this substance sentient? The third: is it knowledgeable? The fourth: Is it skillful? (3) He [Galen] says: “It is likely impossible to discover the appropriate premisses for the second of these four [questions]. On the other hand, with regard to the first, third and fourth, it is very well possible to [achieve] this. In the case of the first [question], it is [achieved] by the arguments described above, and in the case of the third and fourth, it is [achieved] through the arts found in the world and in the heavenly bodies. Discovering these premisses belongs to astronomy and, as far as the things that are on the surface of the earth are concerned, [to the study of] the composition of the animals. For it is possible, in the case of the circle of the zodiac, to show that it is the cause of the generation of animals and plants.” Galen does not take this [inference] beyond the realm of the possible. Now, this Sophist transforms [the course of] the possible into the course of the necessary. (Ko [C-H])

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<footnote>C15, 1–5 Cf. C15a, 1–5. 3–4 On the parts of animals] It is not clear which passage Galen refers to. Cf. Arist. GA IV.10, 777b18–778a5. 5 On the use of parts] Cf. Gal. *UP* XVII.1 (II.447,7–448,15 Helmreich / IV.359–361 K). 6 [questions] Lit. ‘things’. 6–15 See comments above, pp. 44 and 75–77. 6 eternal substance] Cf. C4, 26. 10 this] I.e., to find the appropriate premisses. 13 astronomy] Cf. C6, 5. 16–18 Galen…necessary] See comments above, pp. 85–86.</footnote>
C15a. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 2.7 (14,11–14 Koetschet)

وقال جالينوس في هذه المقالة أيضاً إنه يمكن في مثل دائرة البروج أن يبينن أنّها سبب كون الحيوان والنبات وما يوجد فيها من الصنائع والجكم وقال: وذلك يتبين في كتب أرسطاطاليس الموضوعة في أعضاء الحيوان وفي كتب ثاوفرسطس في النبات ومع ذلك في كتابنا في منافع الأعضاء.

C16. Ibn Rušd, *Averrois Cordubensis commentum magnum super libro De caelo et mundo Aristotelis* (44,83–45,91 Carmody–Arnzen)

Deinde dixit et ratio testatur visui et visus rationi etc., tales propositiones in eis dixit Albunacir quod fides est propinquissima veritati certe; et cum Galienus estimavit quod nullus potest scire mundum esse eternum nisi per has propositiones quarum origo est a sensu et testimonio vetustatis, dixit in suo libro quem posuit in eis que credidit quod nullum certum habebat de mundi utrum esset novus aut antiquus; et manifestum est quod ipse non utitur in antiquitate mundi nisi talibus propositionibus ex verbis suis in libro suo quem appellavit *Demonstrationem*.

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**C15a.** Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 2.7

In the same book, Galen explains that it is possible, in the case of the circle of the zodiac, to show that it is the cause of the generation of animals, plants, and what is found in them of art and wisdom. He states that [this proposition] becomes clear in Aristotle's books *On the parts of animals*, in Theophrastus' books on plants, and in addition to these, in his book *On the use of parts*. (Ko [C])

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**C16.** Ibn Rušd, *Commentary on Aristotle's De caelo*

Then Aristotle says: "And reason testifies in favour of evidence and evidence in favour of reason" etc. Of such propositions, Abū Naṣr [al-Fārābī] said about them that belief is very close to certain truth. And since Galen was of the opinion that no one could know whether the world was eternal except by means of these propositions that originate in sensation and in the testimony of the past, he said in his book *On his own opinions* that he had no certain knowledge on the question of whether the world was created or eternal *a parte ante*; and it is clear from what he said in his book *On demonstration* that he himself only uses this kind of propositions about the eternity of the world. (Rashed [Ko])

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<footnote>C16, 1-2 Arist. *Cael.* I.3, 270b4-5. 4-5 except ...past] Cf. C6; C7, 6-17; C8, 3-7. 8 he...propositions] Cf. C13, 9-14.</footnote>
D1. Galenus, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* VII.5.33–40 (460,4–33 De Lacy / V.625–627 K)

(1) τὸ δ' οἰκεῖνοι αἰσθητὸν ὅψεως, ὅπερ καὶ πρῶτον αὐτῆς αἰσθητὸν ὡνόμασα, τὸ τῶν χρωμάτων ἐστὶ γένος. ἐκείνου μὲν γὰρ πρώτου τε καὶ καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ μόνη τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθάνεται, καθάπερ ἡ γεῦσις τῶν χυμῶν. (2) συνδιαγιγνώσκει δ' αὐτῷ τὸ κεχρωσμένον σῶμα, καθάπερ ἡ γεῦσις τὸ τοὺς χυμοὺς ἔχον· (3) ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν γεῦσις ὁμοίως ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ ζώου σῶμα περιμένει παραγενέσθαι τὸ αἰσθητόν, ἡ δ' ὅψις ἐκτείνεται διὰ μέσου τοῦ ἀέρος ἐπὶ τὸ κεχρωσμένον. ὅθεν αὐτῇ μόνη συνδιαγιγνώσκειν ὑπάρχει τῇ χροιᾳ τοῦ βλεπομένου τὸ τε μέγεθος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ σχῆμα μηδὲ τούτου δυναμένης αἰσθάνεσθαι αἰσθήσεως ἄλλης, ὅτι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνίοτε τῆς ἀφῆς. ἐξείργασται γοῦν τῶν τοιούτων ὁ λόγος ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ περὶ ἀποδείξεως.

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(4) τῇ δ' οὖν ὅψει πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ θέσιν καὶ διάστημα συνδιαγιγνώσκειν τοῦ κεχρωσμένου σώματος οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθέσθαι δυναμένου. (5) ὅσοι δ' ἐπιχειροῦσι καὶ ὀσφρήσει καὶ ἀκοῇ τῆς θέσεως τοῦ τὸν ἀτμὸν ἀποπέμποντος σώματος ἤ τοῦ πλήξαντος τὸν ἀέρα μεταδιδόναι τῆς διαγνώσεως ὅπως ἀμαρτάνουσι οὐ νῦν καιρὸς ἐρεῖν. εἶρηται γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων τῶν κατὰ τὰς δύο αἰσθήσεις φαινομένων

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(7) φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτ' ἐναργῶς καὶ δι αὐτῆς τῆς αἰσθήσεως· ὅθεν οὐδ' οἱ γεωμετρικοὶ μετ' ἀποδείξεως ἄλλ' αὐτόθεν ὡς ἐναργès αὐτὸ τιθέασι, καίτοι τοῦ γε κατ' εὐθείας ὁρᾶν

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D1, 9 τῶν τοιούτων Einarson : τὸ τοιοῦτον Ham. 270 12 τῆς θέσεως von Müller : τὴν θέσιν Ham. 270
D1. Galen, *The doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* VII.5.33–40

(1) The proper sensible of sight, which I have also called its primary sensible, is the genus of colours. For colour is what sight senses primarily, in itself, and alone among the other senses, just as taste does flavours. (2) Along with colour, it also discerns the coloured body, just as the body having flavour is also discerned by taste. (3) Taste, however, and likewise the other senses, waits for the sensible object to come to the body of the animal, while sight extends through the medium of the air to the coloured body. For this reason, it belongs to it alone to discern, along with the colour of the object seen, also its size and shape, and this none of the other senses are able to sense, except sometimes touch accidentally. At any rate, an argument concerning these matters has been elaborated in the fifth book *On demonstration*.

(4) And so it belongs to sight to discern, in addition to other things, also the position and distance of a coloured body, something that none of the other [senses] are able to sense. (5) Now is not the right time to point out how those go wrong who attempt to attribute to the sense of smell and hearing the discernment of the position of the body emitting the vapour or striking the air. For all phenomena relating to the two senses have been discussed at length in the fifth book *On demonstration*, just as we said. Someone trained in that treatise will be more prepared to follow the present discourse.

(6) For in that treatise I presented all the [evidence] testifying to [the fact] that the observed body is seen in the place where it is. (7) But this is also evidently manifest from perception itself. That is why geometers posit it as something evident by itself, without demonstration, although some people do provide demonstrations at least of the fact that we see in straight lines, or that sight, when it falls on something perfectly smooth and bright, is reflected at an equal angle to which it fell. (C-H)

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<footnote>D1, 1–3 proper...flavours] Cf. Arist. *De an*. II.6 and 7, 418a7–16 and 418a26–b2; III.2, 425b18–20. 8 size and shape] Unlike Arist. *De an*. II.6, 418a17–19, Galen regards size and shape (just as motion, position, and distance) as the proper sensibles of sight. See D2, 13–31 and Gal. *UP* XVI.3 (II.383,7–8 Helmreich / IV.273 K). 9 touch accidentally] For accidental perception, cf. Arist. *De an*. II.6, 418a20–24; III.1, 425a14–16; for touch see D3, 14–16, with note. 13–15 who...air] Cf. D2, 15–17. 22 straight lines] Cf. e.g. *UP* X.12 (II.96,12–22 Helmreich / IV.817 K), probably based on Euclid’s *Optics*. 22–23 Cf. Hunayn, *Ten treatises on the eye*, ed. Meyerhof, Ar. p. 109 (Engl. pp. 36–37): “When [sight] falls on a fully polished and bright body, it returns reflected to the pupil from which it went forth, with reflection of the images and their return at the same angles as those at which the visual rays proceeded from the eyes. Therefore, when we look into a mirror or at another polished and bright body, we sometimes see ourselves and sometimes others who are at our right or left behind us” (trans. Meyerhof). See also D2, 18–24.</footnote>
D2. Galenus, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* VII.7.1–9 (470,3–472,2 De Lacy / V.637–639 K)

(1) αὐτίκα γέ τοι τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ὄργανον, ἐπειδὴ χρωμάτων ἐχρήν αὐτὸ διαγνωστικὸν ὑπάρχειν, αὐγοειδὲς ἐγένετο, μόνων τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων ἀλλοιοῦσθαι πεφυκότων ὑπὸ χρωμάτων, ὡς δηλοῖ καὶ ὁ περιέχων ἀήρ, ἡνίκα (ἀν) μάλιστα καθαρὸς ὑπάρχη, τηνικαῦθ' ὑπὸ χρωμάτων ἀλλοιούμενος. (2) ἰδεῖν γοῦν ἐστιν ὅταν ἐν ἀέρι τοιούτῳ τις ὑπὸ δένδρω κατακείμενος ᾗ, τὸ τοῦ δένδρου χρῶμα περιχεόμενον αὐτῷ. καὶ τὸ τοῦ τοίχου δὲ χρῶμα πολλάκις ἀήρ λαμπρὸς ψαύσας ἐδέξατο τε καὶ διεκόμισεν ἐφ' ἔτερον σῶμα, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅταν ᾗ τὸ χρῶμα κυανοῦν ἤ ξανθὸν ἤ ὁπωσοῦν ἐτέρως εὐανθές. (3) καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλιακῆς αὐγῆς αὐτῷ τῷ ψαῦσαι μόνον ὁ πᾶς ἀήρ ἀθρό- ως ὁμοιοῦται, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑπὸ τοῦ χρώματος αὐτίκα μεταβάλλεται. (4) ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν ὁρότότατα καὶ πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλους εἴρηται περί τε τῆς παραχρῆμα μεταβολῆς τῶν οὕτως ἀλλοιουμένων, ὡς κινδυνεύειν ἄχρονον εἶναι, καὶ περὶ ταύτην καὶ διότι πέφυκεν ὑπὸ χρωμάτων ὁ λαμπρὸς ἀήρ ἀλλοιούμενος ἄχρι τοῦ τῆς ὄψεως ὁργάνου διαπέμπειν τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν. (5) οὐ μὴν ὅπως γε τὴν θέσιν ἤ τὸ μέγεθος ἤ τὸ διάστημα γνωρίζομεν ἐκάστου τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἶπεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης. (6) ἀλλὰ καὶ συλλογιζόμενοι περὶ τὸ δόγμα πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κατάφωροι γίγνονται ψευδόμενοι μήτ' ὀσμῶν μήτε φωνῶν συνενδεικνυμένων τὸν τόπον ὅθεν ἦκουσιν, ὡς ἐν τῷ πέμπτω δέδεικται περὶ ἀποδείξεως. (7) καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ διὰ τῶν κατόπτρων ὅσα τε ἄλλα στιλπνὰ σώματα ποτὲ μὲν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς θεᾶσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ ἄλλους τινὰς ἐκ πλαγίων ἤ ὅπισθεν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄπασι πλὴν Πλάτωνος, οὕτω καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει μάχεται, μόνου τοῦ χρώματος δυναμένου κατ' ἀνάκλασιν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρωμένων ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ὄψιν ἀφικέσθαι, μορφῆς δ' ἤ μεγέθους οὐκέτι. (8) μορφὴν μὲν γὰρ τῆς ποικιλίας τῶν περὶ τὰ μόρια σχημάτων ἐργαζομένης οὕτ' ἐπινοῆσαι δυνατὸν ἀπ' αὐτῶν τινα γενέσθαι προσβολὴν τοῖς κατόπτροις οὕτ' εἰ καὶ γένοιτο, χωρὶς τοῦ κλασθῆναι τὴν ἀνάκλασιν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἀφικέσθαι· πιθανώτερα γὰρ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷδε τὰ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον εἶδωλα· τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἔτ' ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγκαταβαίνειν τῇ κόρῃ. (9) καίτοι τοῦτό γε τὰς περὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων

<footnote>D2, 3 ἦν *add.* von Müller ὑπάρχῃ Chartier : ὑπάρχει Marc. 284, Aldina 5 αὐτῷ Cornarius : αὐτῷ Ham. 270 7 ξανθὸν Chartier : ξανθοῦν Ham. 270 16 πέμπτω *coni.* Laur. 74,12 (*excerpta ex saec.* XV); Mosq. 467 (*corr.*); Cornarius : τόπω Ham. 270 25 περὶ πάντων Einarson : ἀπάντων Ham. 270</footnote>
**D2. Galen, *The doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* VII.7.1–9**

(1) Take, for example, the instrument of sight. Since it was supposed to be capable of discerning colours, it came to be luminous, because only such bodies are naturally able to be altered by colours. We can see it also in the surrounding air: whenever it is particularly clear, it is altered by colours. (2) For instance, if someone is lying under a tree in such an air, we can see the colour of the tree enveloping him. Also, the bright air touching the colour of a wall often receives it and transmits it to another body, especially when the colour is blue or yellow or in any other way flowery. (3) Moreover, just as the air, merely by touching the sun's light, is assimilated to it all at once, in the same manner it is changed by colour immediately. (4) Therefore, what Aristotle said in this case was entirely correct concerning both the sudden change of things altered in this way, namely, that it happens in almost no time, and regarding this [particular] change, namely, that because bright air is naturally able to be changed by colours, it transmits the alteration to the organ of sight. (5) Nevertheless, Aristotle did not say precisely how we recognize the position, size, or distance of each of the sensible objects. (6) And even if many of his followers do make deductions about this tenet, they are caught making false claims, since neither scents nor sounds bring with them an indication of their place of origin, as I have shown in the fifth book *On demonstration*.
(7) Moreover, the fact that through mirrors and any other shiny objects we sometimes observe ourselves, sometimes other things to our sides or behind us, contradicts Aristotle, just as everyone else except Plato, since the only thing able to reach our sight by reflection from the objects seen is colour, whereas shape or size cannot do so. (8) For the form is produced by the variety of shapes belonging to the parts, and it is inconceivable that any impact on the mirror would arise from these shapes, and even if it did, that the reflection would reach us without distortion. For as far as this is concerned, the images of Epicurus are more persuasive. And it is even more impossible for the size to enter the pupil. (9) Yet, although it tears down their views about all the rest,

<footnote>**D2, 2–3** luminous...colours] Cf. Gal. *Inst. od.* 2.10 and 3.4 (38,24 and 40,25 Kollesch / II.862 and 863–864 K); *UP VIII.6* (464,14–15 and 464,24–465,4 Helmreich / III.640–641 K). For the luminosity of eyes, see also Plat. *Tim.* 45b2–c2, quoted in Gal. *PHP VII.6.5–6* (464,1–7 De Lacy / V.629–630 K). **3–7** Cf. Alex. Aphr. *De an.* 42,16–19 Bruns; *Mantissa* 15 (145,27–30 Bruns–Sharples) with Sharples, *Alexander Aphrodisiensis*, p. 201. **8** air...once] Cf. Gal. *PHP VII.4.2* (448,16–18 De Lacy / V.612 K) = G27; *PHP VII.5.7* (454,11–12 De Lacy / V.619 K). **9** Aristotle] Cf. Arist. *De sensu* 6, 446b27–447a3; 447a8–11; Alex. Aphr. *De an.* 43,10–11 Bruns; *Mantissa* 15 (143,29–30 Bruns–Sharples). **11** almost no time] Cf. Arist. *De sensu* 6, 446b27–447a11; *De an.* II.7, 418b20–26; Alex. Aphr. *De an.* 43,10–11 Bruns; *Mantissa* 15 (143,29–30 Bruns–Sharples). **12–13** because...sight] Cf. Arist. *De an.* II.7, 418a31–b13. **13–15** Aristotle...objects] For big and distant objects (τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πόρρω) cf. Arist. *Mem.* 2, 452b9–13. For size and distance see Alex. Aphr. *Mantissa* 15 (146,17–147,5 Bruns–Sharples), possibly responding to Galen’s critique; cf. De Lacy, *Galeni De placitis*, III, p. 681 *ad* 470,17–18; Sharples, *Alexander Aphrodisiensis*, pp. 197–198. **16–17** neither...origin] The criticized view could be based on Arist. *GA V.2*, 781b6–16 (De Lacy, *Galeni De placitis*, III, p. 681 *ad* 470,18–21). **18** mirrors...objects] Cf. D1, 22–23. **23** mirror] For arguments based on mirror reflections, cf. Alex. Aphr. *Mantissa* 11 (135,24–32 Bruns–Sharples).</footnote>
καταβάλλον δόξας ὥσπερ τι σμικρὸν παρέρχονται, περὶ μὲν τοῦ διαστήματός τε καὶ τῆς θέσεως ἐπιχειροῦντες σοφίζεσθαι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μεγέθους διάγνωσιν ὅπως γίγνεται παρερχόμενοι, καίπερ διαρρήδην αὐτῶν ἀνατρέπουσαν τὰς δόξας. (10) ἀδύνατον γὰρ αἰσθέσθαι τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ὁρατῶν ἄνευ τοῦ θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ βλεπόμενον ἐν ὥπερ ἂν ὑπάρχη τόπω.

D3. Galenus, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* VII.6.22-24 (466,14-30 De Lacy / V.633-634 K)

(1) ἕν τε οὖν τούτοις ὁ Πλάτων ὥσπερ οὖν κάν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς ἐν ἄλλοις τέ τισι διαλόγοις ἐδίδαξεν ἡμᾶς ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς δυνάμεως, ἥτις ἐξ ἐγκεφάλου διὰ τῶν νεύρων εἰς ἔκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἀφικνουμένη τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀλλοιώσεων αἰσθάνεται· (2) ὡς εἴ γε δυνατὸν ἦν τοῖς ιδίοις παθήμασιν αὐγῆς ἄλλο τι συναλλοιωθῆναι παρὰ τὸ φωτοειδὲς ὅργανον ἤ τοῖς τῶν ἀτμῶν ἔτερόν τι τοῦ ἀτμοειδοῦς ἤ τοῖς τοῦ ἀέρος ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ ἀεροειδὲς ἤ τοῖς τῶν ὑγρῶν ἔτερόν τι παρὰ τὸ γευστικόν τε καὶ πλῆρες χυμῶν, οὐκ ἂν ἐγεγόνει τὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ὅργανα· (3) νυνὶ δ' οὐχ οὐτως ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀντιβαίνουσι σώμασιν ὅσαπερ ἦν ἵδια τῆς οἰκείας διαφορᾶς (οὐχ) ἄπαντι μορίῳ νεύρων μεταλαβόντι δυνατὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι, διότι μηδὲ παθεῖν ἄπαν ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γηῖνου σώματος προσβολῆς ἐπιτήδειον ἑστιν. (4) ἦν δ' αὐτῶν πρώτη μὲν ἡ κατ' ὁξύτητα καὶ ἀμβλύτητα, δευτέρα δ' ἡ κατὰ θερμότητα καὶ ψυχρότητα, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' αἰ λοιπαί, μέγεθός τε καὶ σχῆμα καὶ κίνησις καὶ ἀριθμός, αἰ καὶ μετὰ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ μνήμης, οὐ μόνης αἰσθήσεως ἑδείχθησαν γιγνόμεναι κατά γε τὴν ἀφήν καὶ τὴν ὅψιν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς

<footnote n="26">26 τι σμικρὸν von Müller : τις μικρὸν Ham. 270 28 αὐτῶν Cornarius : αὐτῶ Ham. 270 D3, 4 αὐγῆς Cornarius : αὐτῆς Ham. 270 8 οὐχ add. Cornarius 13 μόνης Cornarius : μόνον ἦς Ham. 270</footnote>
they pass over it as if it were something minor, trying to come up with sophisms about distance and position, while passing over how the discernment of size comes about, even though it unambiguously overturns their views. (10) For it is impossible to sense the size of visible objects without seeing the object observed right in that place where it is. (C-H)

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### D3. Galen, *The doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* VII.6.22–24

(1) And so here, as in the passages that come next and in certain other dialogues, Plato taught us about the common capacity which, arriving from the brain through the nerves to each of the sense organs, perceives the alterations in them. (2) So if it were possible for anything else than the luminous organ to undergo alterations along with the affections peculiar to light; or for anything else than the vaporous organ to undergo those peculiar to vapours; or for anything besides the aeriform organ to undergo those peculiar to air; or for anything other than the organ of taste, full of flavours, to undergo alterations peculiar to moist things; then the instruments of the senses would not have come into being. (3) But in fact it is not like that. For the properties of resistant bodies which are peculiar to their own distinct [character] cannot be sensed with every part connected to the nerves, because not every part is suited to being affected by impact from an earthy body. (4) The first among these [properties] correspond to sharpness and bluntness, the second to hotness and coldness, and the rest are accidental: size, shape, motion, and number. These [accidental properties] also require deduction and memory, not merely sensation, to become [perceived], namely in the case of touch and sight, as I have shown in the treatise *On demonstration*. And if

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<footnote>D3, 1 here] I.e. in Plat. *Tht*. 184d1–5 and 184e4–185c8, quoted in Gal. *PHP* VII.6.12–21 (464,24–466,13 De Lacy / V.631–633 K). **3–9** Cf. *PHP* VII.5.43 (462,1–3 De Lacy / V.627 K); *UP VIII.6* (I.464,11–465,4 Helmreich / III.640–641 K). **12** impact...body] I.e., by tactile properties; cf. Plat. *Tim*. 31b4–8. **14** size...number] Cf. Arist. *De an*. II.6, 418a16–19; III.1, 425a14–16; above, D1, 7–12. **15–16** For touch, cf. D1, 9 and G17, 14–15. See also *Hunayn, Ten treatises on the eye*, ed. Meyerhof, Ar. p. 109 (Engl. p. 36), on the perception of size, shape, distance, and motion based on touch: “For it results either from deduction or from comparison with something which the individual has estimated by previous knowledge. The following is an example: If a person is walking in the dark and holds a stick in his hand and stretches it out full length before him, and the stick encounters an object which prevents it from advancing further, he knows immediately by analogy that the object preventing the stick from advancing is a solid body which resists anything that comes up against it. What leads him to this judgement is that he knows from former experience that movement and walking in the air is without any obstacle, whilst movement and walking against a solid body is not possible” (trans. Meyerhof). This passage is probably based on a lost section of Galen’s account, which perhaps followed immediately after *PHP* VII.5.35 (460,13 De Lacy / V.626 K) = D1, 9. For the role of deduction in the perception of motion, see also *Dig. puls*. III.1 (VIII.883,5–885,7 K). For sight, cf. *Nemesius, Nat. hom*. 7 (60,11–61,5 Morani), who distinguishes between cases in which sight needs memory and thought to discern size and number, and those in which it does not.</footnote>
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άποδείξεως πραγματεία, καθ' ἤν πρώτην ἀξιῶ γεγυμνάσθαι τὸν ἀκριβῶς ἔπεσθαι τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις ἐφιέμενον.
anyone wishes to follow the present discourse precisely I ask them to get trained in that first. (C-H)
E1. Themistius, *In Aristotelis Physica paraphrasis* IV.11 (144,21–145,2 Schenkl)

(1) ἐκ δὴ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὡς τῇ τῆς κινήσεως αἰσθήσει συνυφίστα-
ται καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ συνέζευκται ἐκείνη καὶ συνήρτηται ἀκριβῶς. (2) δῆλον οὖν, ὡς
οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος ἄνευ κινήσεως, ἄνευ κινήσεως δὲ οὐχ ὃν τρόπον οἶεται Γαληνός,
ἐπειδὴ κινούμενοι νοοῦμεν τὸν χρόνον (οὕτω γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνει λέγειν Ἀριστοτέλην),
ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἐννοίᾳ συνήρτηται ἡ τοῦ χρόνου. (3) τί οὖν μάτην ἦθλει
πρὸς τοῦτο δῆθεν ἀντιλέγειν ἐπιχειρῶν; « καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἀκίνητα », φησί, « νοοῦμεν
κινούμενοι, οἶον τοὺς πόλους τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὸ κέντρον τῆς γῆς, καὶ ὄμως οὐκ ἔστι
ταῦτα μετὰ κινήσεως». (4) ἐχρῆν γὰρ καὶ ἀκοῦσαι διαρρήδην λέγοντος Ἀριστοτέλους
« ἄμα γὰρ κινήσεως αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ χρόνου » ἐπλεῖστον δὲ δήπου διαφέρει ἤ διὰ τοῦτο
κινήσεώς τι τὸν χρόνον ὑπολαμβάνειν, διότι τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἐπινοίᾳ συνήρτηται, ἤ διὰ
τοῦτο, ὅτι κινούμενοι νοοῦμεν τὸν χρόνον. ἀλλ' οὕτος μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς τοιοῦτος.

E1a. Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physicorum libros commentaria* IV.11 (708,22–34 Diels)

(1) εἰ οὖν ὅταν μὲν μηδεμίαν νομίσωμεν εἶναι μεταβολὴν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νῦν ἐστάναι, τότε συμβαίνει μηδὲ χρόνον οἶεσθαί εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ αἰσθώμεθα κινήσεως καὶ πλείω τὰ νῦν ὁρίσωμεν, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἀρχὴν τὸ δὲ ὡς πέρας τὸ μὲν ὡς πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὡς ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦ μεταξὺ χρόνου συναισθανόμεθα, δῆλον ὅτι « οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς χρόνος ». (2) ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ῥηθέντων ὁ θαυμάσιος Γαληνὸς ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀποδεικτικῆς ὑπονοεῖ λέγειν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην διὰ τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι χρόνον ἄνευ κινήσεως, ὅτι κινούμενοι νοοῦμεν αὐτόν, καὶ ἐπάγει τι τῷ λόγῳ ἄτοπον ὅτι καὶ τὰ παντάπασιν ἀκίνητα μετὰ κινήσεως ἀνάγκη εἶναι, εἶπερ καὶ τούτων ἡ νόησις ἡμῖν μετὰ κινήσεως ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἀκινήτω νοήσει νοοῦμεν. (3) εἶποι δ' ἂν ὅτι οὐδὲ διαστάσεως χωρὶς ἂν εἴη τὰ ἀδιάστατα, εἰ μετὰ διαστάσεως αὐτὰ νοοῦμεν ἡμεῖς τὰ πολλὰ φανταστικῶς ἐνεργοῦντες.

<footnote>E1, 9 Arist. *Phys*. IV.11, 219a3–4. E1a, 4–5 Arist. *Phys*. IV.11, 218b33–219a1.</footnote>

<footnote>E1a, 7 κινούμενοι Vettori, Kalbfleisch, von Müller (“Über Galens Werk,” p. 469); cf. Simpl. *In Phys*. IV.11 (708,36 Diels) : κινούμενον mss.</footnote>
# Section E: Books VIII–IXa and Related Testimonia

## Time

**E1. Themistius, *On Aristotle's Physics* IV.11**

(1) From everything that has been said it is clear that the perception of time co-subsists with the perception of motion, and that it is coupled and completely interwoven with it. (2) It is clear, therefore, that time cannot exist without motion, although not “without motion” in the way that Galen takes it, because we conceive of time while moving (for he understands Aristotle to speak in this sense), but rather because the notion of time is interwoven with the notion of motion. (3) Why then did he contest this in vain by allegedly arguing against it? “For it is also true of motionless things,” he says, “like the poles of the cosmos and the centre of the earth, that we conceive of them while moving, and yet they do not involve motion.” (4) For he should have also heard Aristotle’s explicit statement that “we perceive time simultaneously with motion”. Surely it makes an enormous difference whether we understand time to be something belonging to motion for one reason: because it is interwoven with the notion of motion, or for another: because we conceive of time while moving. But this man is often like this. (C-H)

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**E1a. Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* IV.11**

(1) Suppose, then, that when we believe there is no motion and we have been standing in the same ‘now’, then it follows that we do not believe there is time; but when we perceive motion and distinguish many ‘nows’ (one as the beginning, another as the end, one as earlier, another as later), then we also simultaneously perceive the interwening time. If so, then it is clear that “time does not exist without motion.” (2) Based on what is said here, the marvellous Galen, in the eighth book of his *Apodeictics*, supposes Aristotle is saying that time does not exist without motion because we conceive of time while moving, and he further supplies his argument with something absurd, namely, that even things that are utterly without motion necessarily involve motion, since our conceiving of them involves motion too. For we do not conceive anything with a thought that does not move. (3) He might as well say that things without extension are not unextended, since we often conceive them as involving extension, using our imagination. (C-H)

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<footnote>E1, 8 poles... earth] Cf. E11*, 7. 10 Arist. Phys. IV.11, 219a3–4. E1a, 5 Arist. Phys. IV.11, 218b33–219a1.</footnote>
**E1b.** Ibn Rušd, *In Aristotelis Physica IV*, comm. 97 (248 Jeck)

Non sicut aestimavit Galenus. Galenus enim credidit, quod Aristoteles intendebat, quod nos non comprehendimus tempus, nisi cum movemur, idest, quoniam per imaginationem comprehendimus motum. Et quod hoc est signum, quod tempus non est extra motum. Et cum Galenus aestimavit hoc, contradixit Aristoteli. Et dixit, quod multotiens comprehendimus res quiescentes et movemur, cum omnis imaginatio sit motus, ut quando comprehendimus polos mundi et centrum.

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**E1c (dub.).** Albertus Magnus, *Physica* IV.3 (264,18–25 Hossfeld / 247 Jeck)

Adhuc autem, est obiectio Galieni, quia si tempus non est nisi in caelo per motum caeli, tunc illi qui nihil percipiunt de motu caeli, nihil percipiunt de tempore. Sunt ergo aliqui incarcerati nati sub terrae claustris, qui nunquam motum caeli viderunt nec perceperunt; illi ergo nihil perceperunt de tempore, quod falsum est, quia percipiunt tempus per motus animae; ergo tempus est in anima per motus animae.

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**E2.** Themistius, *In Aristotelis Physica paraphrasis* IV.11 (149,4–19 Schenkl)

(1) Γαληνῷ δὲ οὐ προσεκτέον οἰομένῳ τὸν χρόνον ἀφορίζεσθαι δι' αὐτοῦ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐξαριθμησάμενος σημαινόμενα τοῦ προτέρου τε καὶ ὑστέρου τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐκ ἐφαρμόζειν φησὶ τῷ ὁρισμῷ, τὸ κατὰ χρόνον δὲ μόνον, ὥστε εἶναι τὸν χρόνον ἀριθμὸν τῆς κινήσεως κατὰ χρόνον. (2) ἀλλ' ἱστέον, ὅτι τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὑστερον ἐν κινήσει οὐ διὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ὑστερον, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον, γίνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν θέσιν, παρ' οὐ καὶ τὸ συνεχές ἔχει· καὶ τοῦτο διαρρήδην φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης· « τὸ δὴ πρότερον τε καὶ ὑστερον ἐν τόπω πρῶτον ἐστιν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν τῇ θέσει· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν κινήσει. » (3) ἀλλὰ καὶ δεδόσθω μηδὲ ἄλλο σημαίνειν τὸ πρότερόν τε καὶ ὑστερον ἐν κινήσει ἤ τὸ κατὰ χρόνον, ὡς οἴεται· τί δὲ ἄτοπον ἐκ τοῦδε συμβαίνει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἄλλο τι λέγομεν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον ἤ τὸ πρότερον τε καὶ ὑστερον ἐν κινήσει, πᾶσα δὲ ἀνάγκη ταὐτὸν σημαίνειν τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὥστε λανθάνει τοῦτο μεμφόμενος τοῦ λόγου, δι' ὃ μᾶλλον ἐχρῆν αὐτὸν ἀποδέχεσθαι.

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**E1b.** Ibn Rušd, *Long commentary on the Physics IV*, comm. 97

But Galen thought otherwise. For Galen believed that Aristotle meant that we grasp time only insofar as we move, that is to say, inasmuch as we grasp motion through imagination; and that this is a sign that there is no time without motion. And because Galen thought this, he opposed Aristotle, saying that we often grasp things that are at rest while we are moving, since all imagination is motion, for instance when we grasp the poles and center of the cosmos. (H)

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**E1c (dub.).** Albertus Magnus, *Physics* IV.3.3

However, Galen objects, if time does not exist unless it is in heaven through the motion of the heaven, then those who perceive no motion of the heaven perceive no time. Now there are people born imprisoned under the confines of the earth, who have never seen or perceived the motion of the heaven; these therefore would have perceived no time, which is false, because they perceive time in virtue of the motion of the soul; therefore time is in the soul in virtue of the motion of the soul. (H)

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**E2.** Themistius, *On Aristotle's Physics* IV.11

(1) We should not pay attention to Galen, who believes that time is defined by means of itself. For, having given a long list of meanings of the 'before and after', he says that none of them are well suited to [Aristotle's] definition except the one with respect to time. Therefore, time is the number of motion with respect to time. (2) But, regarding the before and after in motion, we should realize that it is not because of time that one is before and the other after; rather, the [before and after in motion] itself produces the before and after in time, but comes into being from [the before and after] with respect to magnitude and position, from which it also acquires continuity. And Aristotle says this explicitly: "Indeed, the before and after is first of all in place, and there it is in position; but since [there is before and after] in magnitude, necessarily, [there is] also [before and after] in motion". (3) But let us even concede that, as [Galen] believes, the 'before and after' in motion signifies no other than that with respect to time. What absurdity results from it? For we also say that time is nothing other than the before and after in motion. But it is absolutely necessary that definitions signify the same thing as the names. And so, without noticing, he censures the argument for the very thing on account of which he should have rather accepted it. (C-H)

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<footnote>E2, 9–11 Arist. *Phys*. IV.11, 219a14–17.</footnote>
**E2a.** Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physicorum libros commentaria* IV.11 (718,13–719,18 Diels)

(1) ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ πρός τινα τῶν ἐνταῦθα λεγομένων ὁ πολυμαθέστατος ἐνέστη Γαληνὸς λέγων τὸν χρόνον δι' ἑαυτοῦ δηλοῦσθαι, φέρε καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἔνστασιν προβαλλώμεθα· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐξαριθμησάμενος σημαινόμενα τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐκ ἑφαρμόζειν φησὶ τῷ ὁρισμῷ, τὸ κατὰ χρόνον δὲ μόνον· ὥστε εἶναι τὸν χρόνον ὁριθμὸν τῆς κινήσεως κατὰ χρόνον. (2) ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἔνστασιν διὰ δυεῖν ἐπιχειρημάτων λύειν προθέμενος ὁ Θεμίστιος· « ἰστέον, » φησὶν, « ὅτι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον ἐν κινήσει οὐ διὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ πρότερον τε καὶ ὑστερον. γίνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν θέσιν, παρ' οὖ καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς ἔχει. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διαρρήδην φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης· « τὸ δὴ πρότερον τε καὶ ὑστερον ἐν τόπω πρῶτον ἐστιν. ἐνταῦθα μὲν δὴ τῇ θέσει, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν κινήσει. » (3) πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα εἶποι ἂν ὁ Γαληνός, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῇ κινήσει πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν τῷ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει ἐφ' οὖ ἡ κίνησις προτέρω καὶ ὑστέρω κατὰ τὴν θέσιν μάλιστά ἐστι· τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἦν καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον· ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, ὡς εἶρηται, πρότερον (καί ὑστερον), συνυπάρχον μὲν τῷ ἐν τῇ κινήσει προτέρω καὶ ὑστέρω, οὐ κατὰ τὴν θέσιν δὲ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον ἔχον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι παράτασιν, ἄλλο τοῦτο ὃν παρὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν θέσιν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγέθους ἐγγενομένην τῇ κινήσει. (4) δευτέραν δὲ λύσιν ἐπάγων φησίν· « ἀλλὰ καὶ δεδόσθω μηδὲν ἄλλο σημαίνειν τὸ πρότερον τε καὶ ὑστερον (ἐν κινήσει) ἤ τὸ κατὰ χρόνον, ὡς οἶεται. τί οὖν ἄτοπον ἐκ τοῦδε συμβαίνει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἄλλο τι λέγομεν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον ἤ τὸ πρότερον τε καὶ ὑστερον ἐν κινήσει· πᾶσα δὲ ἀνάγκη ταύτον σημαίνειν τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. ὥστε λανθάνει τοῦτο μεμφόμενος τοῦ λόγου, δι' ὁ μᾶλλον ἐχρῆν αὐτὸν ἀποδέχεσθαι. » (5) καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὲ ἂν ὁ Γαληνὸς εἶποι, ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἐν ἦν τὸ ἐν τῇ κινήσει πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον τῷ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγετο τοῦτο εἶναι χρόνος τὸ ἐν τῇ κινήσει πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἦν δι' ἑαυτοῦ δεικνύμενος ὁ χρόνος· εἰ δὲ ἄλλο μὲν τὸ κατὰ τὴν θέσιν οὐκ ὃν χρονικόν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, ἀνάγκη λέγειν, ὅτι χρόνος ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ κινήσει πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον τὸ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον. (6) μήποτε οὖν, εἴ τις τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον λάβῃ τὸ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι παράτασιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ κατὰ τὴν θέσιν, καὶ σημαίνεται ὁ χρόνος καὶ οὐ δι' ἑαυτοῦ σημαίνεται. καὶ τὸ ὅνομα αὐτοῦ (οὐ) τῷ προτέρῳ καὶ ὑστέρω ἀπλῶς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιῷδε προτέρω καὶ ὑστέρω, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμός.

<footnote>Ε2a, 3–5 Cf. 2, 1–4. 6–11 Cf. 2, 4–9. 17 ἐπάγων] Sc. ὁ Θεμίστιος, cf. 2, 9–13. 30 τοιῷδε] Sc. τῷ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι παράτασιν.</footnote>

<footnote>**Ε2a, 14** καί ὑστερον *add*. Havrda **18–19** ἐν κινήσει *add*. Havrda *ex Themistio* (Ε2, 9–10) **29** οὐ² *add*. Diels (post ὑστέρω *add*. Aldina)</footnote>
**E2a.** Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* IV.11

(1) However, since Galen, a man of exceptional learning, objected also to some of the things said in this passage, arguing that time is elucidated by means of itself, let us put forward this objection as well. For, having given a long list of meanings of the ‘before and after’, he says that none of them are well suited to [Aristotle’s] definition except the one with respect to time. Therefore, time is the number of motion with respect to time. (2) Themistius proposes to solve this objection with two arguments. He says: “But, regarding the before and after in motion, we should realize that it is not because of time that one is before and the other after; rather, the [before and after in motion] itself produces the before and after in time, but comes into being from [the before and after] with respect to magnitude and position, from which it also acquires continuity. And Aristotle says this explicitly: “Indeed, the before and after is first of all in place, and there it is in position; but since [there is before and after] in magnitude, necessarily, [there is] also [before and after] in motion.” (3) Galen would respond to this by saying that the before and after in motion, which follows the before and after in the magnitude whose motion it is, is especially the one with respect to position. For such was also the before and after in magnitude. But the before (and after) with respect to time is different, as has been said, co-existing as it does with the before and after in motion, but rather than having the before and after with respect to position, [it has before and after] with respect to the duration of its being. And this is different from the before and after with respect to the position engendered by the magnitude which came to be in motion. (4) Adducing the second solution, he says: “But let us even concede that, as [Galen] believes, the ‘before and after’ in motion signifies no other than that with respect to time. What absurdity results from it? For we also say that time is nothing other than the before and after in motion. But it is absolutely necessary that definitions signify the same thing as the names. And so, without noticing, he censures the argument for the very thing on account of which he should have rather accepted it.” (5) But to this, Galen would also respond that, if the before and after in motion were one and the same as the before and after with respect to time, then it would be rightly said that time is this, namely, the before and after in motion, and time would not be shown by means of itself. But if there is a difference between the before and after with respect to position, which is not temporal, and the one with respect to time, then it is necessary to say that time is the before and after in motion with respect to time. (6) Perhaps, then, if one takes the ‘before and after’ with respect to the duration of being, but not with respect to position, then time will be signified and not signified by means of itself. And its name will not be the same as the ‘before and after’ without qualification, but as the ‘before and after’ qualified in this way, which is its definition. (C-H)

<footnote>E2a, 2 in this passage] I.e., Arist. *Phys*. IV.11, 219a14-b2. 3-6 Cf. E2, 2-4. 6-13 Cf. E2, 4-11.</footnote>

<footnote>11-13 Arist. *Phys*. IV.11, 219a14-17. 15 such] I.e., with respect to position. 21 he] I.e., Themistius.</footnote>

<footnote>21-27 Cf. E2, 11-16. 36 in this way] Namely, with respect to the duration of being.</footnote>
E3. Ibn Abī Saʿīd al-Mawṣīlī, in Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī, *Philosophical treatises* (318,6–319,3 Khalifat)

وعرَّفني أيضاً هل ترى أن الزمان تابع للحركة ضرورة حتى أنه لا يمكن أن يكون زمان إلا بحركة، وهي سبب وجوده؟ فإنَّ أرسطوطاليس هكذا يرى، أو ترى أن الزمان له طبيعة موجودة، وهو جوهر قائم بنفسه، وإنما الحركة تمسحه وتقدرها، كما يمسح الماسح الأرض بالذراع؟ فإن جالينوس قد حكى عنه الإسكندر - في المقالة التي ناقضه فيها في أمر المكان والزمان - أنه يرى هذا الرأي، وردَّ ذلك عليه الإسكندر. وذلك أنَّ جالينوس يرى أن الزمان قائم بنفسه ليس يحتاج في وجوده إلى الحركة، ويقول إن فلاطن على مثل رأيه في ذلك، أعني أنه كان يرى أن الزمان جوهر - يريد بذلك المدَّة - وإنما الحركة تمسحها وتقدرها، فقال جالينوس: إنه ليس إنما تعمل لنا الحركة زماناً، بل إنما تعمل لنا يوماً وشهرأ وسنة، فأما الزمان فهو موجود بنفسه، وهو <بال> عرض تابع لها.

E4. Ibn Bāġġa, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* (694,13–19 Lettinck)

ومن الناس من رأى أنَّ الزمان أمر إلاهي كما يقول جالينوس إنه ينبغي أن يُكتفى من معرفته بما يعرفه الناس وأنَّ جوهره يفوت العقل. وإذا تأملت ما قاله في الزمان في هذا الفصل ظهر أنه ذهب عليه أن يعقل هو تصور شيء من أنواع الموجودات والأمر في نظر جالينوس في هذه الأمور على ما يقوله الإسكندر إنه يتكلم في أمور ولا يشعر أنه لا يتكلم فيما لا يتكلم فيه في السر من نفسه.
## Related Testimonia

**E3.** Ibn Abī Sa'tīd al-Mawṣīlī, in Yahyā ibn 'Adī, *Philosophical treatises*

Also, let me know whether you hold that time necessarily depends on motion, such that there can be no time except through motion, and the latter is the cause of the former's existence. For Aristotle does hold this. Or, do you rather hold that time has an existent nature [of its own], and is a substance subsisting through itself, which motion merely measures and determines, the way a surveyor measures the earth with a cubit? 5
For according to the testimony of Alexander in his treatise refuting Galen on the subject of place and time, Galen held this opinion, but Alexander refuted him on this point. For Galen held that time is subsistent through itself and has no need for motion in its existence, and he said that Plato was of the same opinion on this topic, that is, that he held that time is a substance, by which he meant duration, and motion merely measures and determines it. So Galen says that motion does not produce time for us, but rather produces only day, month, and year for us. Time, though, is existent in itself, and it is related to [motion] accidentally. (Adamson-Ko) 10

**E4.** Ibn Bāğğa, *Commentary on the Physics*

Some people hold that time is something divine. For instance Galen says that one must content oneself with what people know about it, and that its substance eludes the mind. If you consider what he says about time in this section, it is obvious that he fails to understand [time], conceiving it as some thing or other among the types of existents. Galen's situation in this case is as Alexander says: that he speaks of things without realizing that he is not saying anything about them. (Adamson) 5

<footnote>E3, 6–7 For Alexander’s treatise cf. Ibn al-Nadim, *Kitāb al-Fihrist* 7.1 (253 Flügel); see above, p. 5. For the context of E3, see above, p. 12. 8–9 time...existence] Cf. G6, 6–7 and G7, 5, referring to *Dem*. XIII. For the view that the present testimonium pertains to *Dem*. VIII, however, see above, p. 54. 10–11 Cf. G6, 3–4. 10 he[^2] I.e., Plato. 13 accidentally] The text in Khalifat’s edition would translate: “and it is an accident consequent upon [motion]” (*wa huwa ‘araḍ ṭābi‘ lahā*). This, however, contradicts what precedes immediately. Therefore, a modification is necessary. Pines, “A Tenth-Century Philosophical Correspondence,” p. 112, followed by Sharples, “Alexander of Aphodisias, *On Time*”, p. 73, Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, p. 82, and Adamson, “Galen and Rāzī on Time”, p. 5, added a negation, so that the text reads: “Time, though, is existent in itself, and is *not* an accident dependent upon [motion]”. This makes sense of course, but the construction of the sentence in Arabic is clumsy. Therefore we follow a different reading based on an emendation proposed by M. Rashed, “Alexandre d’Aphrodise et la Magna Quaestio”, p. 325 (reprinted in Rashed, *L’héritage aristotélicien*, p. 115). According to Rashed, the sentence results in the Newtonian distinction between absolute time (that exists in itself) and relative time, produced by motion. E4, 5 Alexander] Probably in the (lost) *Against Galen about place and time*; see E3, 6–7. For commentary, see above, p. 56.</footnote>
**E5.** Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 14.3, MS Rīḍawī 13997 (fol 13b, ll. 18–23 Koetschet–Rajab)

قال أبو العلاء بن زهر: قد يثبت في تقصي الشك الأول من كتاب الشكك أنّ جالينوس إنما يبني كلامه في هذا الكتاب أعني كتاب البرهان على مذهب الفلاسفة المنطقيين، فيما تجد له آلة يمتحن بها وجه الصواب فيه كما فعل في ازدواج القضايا في التاسعة، إذ بين خطأ أرسطاطاليس بياناً لا شك فيه، وفي مواضع أخر كثيرة مما بان له فيه وجه الصواب بياناً لا شك فيه.

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**E6.** Themistius, *In Aristotelis Physica paraphrasis* IV.4 (114,7–115,12 Schenkl)

(1) «Αλλ' ὑποθώμεθα ἐξαιρεθέντος τοῦ ὕδατος μηδὲν ἔτερον εἰσρυῆναι σῶμα· μένει τοίνυν μεταξύ τῆς ἐπιφανείας διάστημα κεχωρισμένον.» (2) ἀλλ' ἄλογος ἡ ὑπόθεσις, ὦ σοφώτατε Γαληνέ· αὐτὸ γὰρ ὑποτίθεται ὁ ζητοῦμεν· ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν εἰ δύναται εἶναι διάστημα κεχωρισμένον, πλάττεις σεαυτῷ καὶ ἀναζωγραφεῖς ὁ βούλει εἶναι διάστημα κεχωρισμένον, οὐχ ὅτι ὑπάρχει δεικνύς. (3) ὅλως δὲ οὐδε δυνατὸν ἐννοεῖς· τὸ γὰρ ἀναιρεῖν τὴν ἀντιμετάστασιν τῶν σωμάτων τοῦ παντάπασιν ἀναιρεῖν σῶμα οὐδὲν διαφέρει, οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ λέγειν, ὡς εἴ τις ὑποθοῖτο μήτε οὐρανὸν ἔσεσθαί ποτε μήτε γῆν μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων σωμάτων, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἔτερον ἂν τούτων γενέσθαι σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ οὖτως μόνον καταλιπεῖν βουλήσεται διάστημα, ἐν ᾧ τὰ σώματα νῦν ἐστι, τηνικαῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἔσται. (4) ἀλλ' οὖτε τοῦτο δυνατὸν οὖτε ὁ βούλεται ὁ Γαληνός· διάστημα γὰρ ἄνευ σώματος ἀμήχανον ὑποστῆναί ποτε, ἀλλὰ θᾶττον ἂν ὁ χαλκὸς συμπέσοι τῆς κοίλης ἐπιφανείας ἡ δίχα σώματος μείνειεν· τὸ γὰρ κενὸν ὅτι κενὸν ὄντως ἐστίν, εὐθὺς ἐπιδειχθήσεται. (5) τί δὲ δήποτε; ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ τοίχου οὐκ ἂν ὑπολάβοις, ὅτι οὐ δύναται ποτε αὐτοῦ μηδὲν σῶμα ἄπτεσθαι παντελῶς, εἴγε μὴ τὸ κενὸν οὖτως προσίεσθε, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κρατῆρος οὐκέτι; καὶ γὰρ τούτου παραπλησίως ἀεί τι ἄπτεται, ἡ διαφορὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ σχήματι μόνον ἐστί. (6) «πῶς οὖν,» φησίν, «ἐπινοοῦμεν τὸ διάστημα ὡς ἄλλο τι τῶν σωμάτων;» (7) πῶς δὲ λευκότητα, πῶς δὲ μελανίαν; ἔκαστον γὰρ τούτων

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<footnote>Ε6, 1–2 Ἀλλ'... κεχωρισμένον] Cf. Arist. Phys. IV.4, 211b14–19.</footnote>

<footnote>Ε5, 3 [ازدواج] MS Rıḍawī</footnote>
## Book IXa

**E5. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen*

It has been established, when examining the first doubt of the *Doubts*, that Galen based his discussion in this book – I mean *On demonstration* – solely on the teachings of the logician philosophers concerning that for which there is a clear tool, by which we can examine what is correct. This is how he proceeded with regard to the conjunction of propositions in the ninth [book], since [there] he very clearly, beyond any doubt, showed Aristotle's error, as well as in many other places, where it became very clear to him, beyond any doubt, what is correct. (Ko [C-H])

5

## Further Testimonia on Issues in Aristotle’s Physics

### Place

**E6. Themistius, *On Aristotle’s Physics* IV.4**

(1) “But let us suppose that when water is removed, no other body flows in. There remains, therefore, separate extension in between the surface.” (2) But the supposition is unreasonable, most wise Galen, for it supposes that which we are seeking for. For while we are seeking whether it is possible for a separate extension to exist, you mould and picture to yourself what you want to be separate extension, without showing that it exists. (3) But what you conceive of is not even possible at all. For doing away with the mutual replacement of bodies differs in no way from doing away with body completely, nor even in speech, as if someone were to suppose that neither heaven, nor earth, nor any of the other bodies now existing will exist at some point in the future, but no body other than them will come into existence. For indeed, in this way the only thing he will want to remain will be the extension in which bodies now exist, but will no longer exist at that point. (4) But this is neither possible nor what Galen wants. For there is no way that extension can exist at some point without body; rather, the bronze of the hollow surface would sooner collapse than remain apart from body. For that the void is really void will be shown presently. (5) What then? In the case of a wall, you would not assume that a body is incapable of ever coming into complete contact with it (unless you thus admit the void), but no longer assume it in the case of a jar? For in this case too, something is likewise always in contact with it, and the difference is only in the shape. (6) “How come, then,” he says, “that we conceive of extension as something

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<footnote>E5, 1-4 Cf. C 11,7-14. 3 tool] Cf. Galen, *Opt. doct.* 4.3 (104,9-10 Barigazzi / 1.50 K), on “the tools and criteria” (δργανά τε και κριτήρια) for assessing arguments. 4 conjunction] izdiwāğ translates the Greek συζυγία, referring to the pairs of premisses in categorical syllogisms. Cf. Galen, *Inst. log.* 11.2. E6, 1-2 Probably an objection against Arist. *Phys.* IV.4, 211b14-19.</footnote>
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ἀφαιροῦντες τοῦ σώματος καθ' αὐτὸ νοοῦμεν, οὐχ ὡς καθ' αὐτὸ ὑφεστώς καὶ τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον, ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ μόνον χωρίζοντες. (8) ἐπεὶ γὰρ μὴ ταὐτὸ τῷδε τῷ ὕδατι τοσοῦτόν τι διεστάναι καὶ ὕδατι εἶναι, ὁμοίως καὶ τῷ οἶνῳ, ὁμοίως καὶ τῷ ἀέρι, ἀφαιροῦντες τῷ νῷ τὰς ποιότητας, καθ' ἃς τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ, τὸ δὲ οἶνός ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἄήρ, οὕτω νοοῦμεν τὸ διάστημα μόνον καθ' ἑαυτό. (9) εἶτα ἐπειδὴ συμβαίνει τὰ τρία σώματα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ παρὰ μέρος ἀγγείῳ γίνεσθαι, ἀ ταῖς μὲν ἄλλαις ποιότησι διαφέρει, ἰσα δέ ἐστι τῷ διαστήματι αὐτῷ, καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπονοοῦμεν ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ διάστημα παρὰ τὰ σώματα ὁρῶντες ὅτι εἰσρυεὶς ὁ ἀὴρ μετὰ τὸν οἶνον τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ποιότητας οὐκ ἔχει τοῦ οἶνου, τὸ διάστημα δὲ μόνον ταὐτὸ φυλάττει τῷ οἶνῳ· καὶ ἐπειδὴ κατὰ μὲν τὰς ἄλλας ποιότητας οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ τὰ σώματα οἰον θερμότητα ἤ ψυχρότητα, κατὰ δὲ τὸ διάστημα μόνον, οὕτω τὸ διάστημα τὸν τόπον ὑπολαμβάνομεν, οὐ καλῶς· οὐ γὰρ εἰ κατὰ διάστημα ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ, ὁ τόπος ἐστὶ τὸ διάστημα ἤ καὶ ἡ κίνησίς ἐστιν ὁρμή, ἐπειδὴ κινούμεθα καθ' ὁρμήν. (10) τὰ μὲν οὖν αἰτία τῆς πλάνης τοῖς ἐπὶ ταύτην ἐλθοῦσιν τὴν δόξαν ταὐτά ἐστιν.

**E6a. Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physicorum libros commentaria IV.4** (573,19–29 Diels)

5

(1) « ἀλλ' ὑποθώμεθα, » φησὶν ὁ Γαληνός, « ἐξαιρεθέντος τοῦ ὕδατος ἐκ τοῦ κεράμου μηδὲν ἔτερον εἰσρυῆναι σῶμα· μένει τοίνυν τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς ἐπιφανείας τοῦ ἀγγείου διάστημα κεχωρισμένον. » (2) ἀλλὰ ἄλγοος ἡ ὑπόθεσις· τὸ γὰρ ζητούμενον ὑποτίθεται· ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν εἰ δύναται εἶναι διάστημα κεχωρισμένον, ὑποτίθεται εἶναι διάστη- μα κεχωρισμένον, οὐχ ὅτι ἔστι δεικνύς, ἀλλ' ἑαυτῷ πλάττων καὶ ἀναζωγραφῶν. (3) ὅλως δὲ ἀδύνατα ὑποτίθεται ὁ ταῦτα λέγων· ὡς γὰρ ἀδύνατον σώματος ὄντος μὴ εἶναι διάστημα, οὕτως ἀδύνατον διαστήματος ὄντος μὴ εἶναι σῶμα· τὸ γὰρ διάστημα ἐν τούτῳ. διὸ καὶ ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος μὴ εἶναι μὲν σῶμα ἐν τῷ ἀγγείῳ, εἶναι δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ διάστημα ὑποτίθεται καὶ μὴ εἶναι σῶμα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ εἶναι.

**E7. Ġābir ibn Ḥayyān, The book of research** (517 Kraus)

وأما القائلون بأن الحركتين يتقابلان لأن الفلك الأثير أيضاً يتحرك فإن هذا غلط عظيم. وأول من ابتدع هذا الشك وحير الناس فيه جالينوس وردَّ على أرسطاطاليس في مواضع من كتبه
other than bodies?” (7) How come that we conceive of whiteness or darkness in this way? For, by abstracting each of these from the body, we conceive it in itself, not as existing in itself and separate from the body, but separating it only by reason. (8) For since what it is for water to exist is not the same as what it is for water to be extended a certain amount, and likewise for wine and likewise for air, when we abstract with the mind the qualities according to which one thing is water, another wine, another air, in this way we conceive the extension alone in itself. (9) Then, when it happens that three bodies, which differ in their other qualities but are equal in extension, come to be in the same vessel one after the other, then we suspect even more that extension is something else besides these bodies. For we observe that the air that flowed into the vessel after wine does not have any other qualities of the wine but retains only the same extension as the wine. And since bodies are not in place by any other qualities, like hot and cold, but only by extension, so we assume – incorrectly – that place is extension. For it does not follow that if something is in place by extension, then place is extension, just as it is not the case that motion is impulse, because we move by impulse. (10) The reasons for the error of those who came to this opinion are the same. (C-H)

**E6a.** Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* IV.4

(1) “But let us suppose,” Galen says, “that when water is removed from the jar, no other body flows in. There remains, therefore, separate extension in between the surface.” (2) But the supposition is unreasonable: it supposes the thing sought. For while we are seeking whether it is possible for a separate extension to exist, he supposes that separate extension exists, without showing that it exists, but moulding and picturing it to himself. (3) But one who says this supposes something entirely impossible. Just as it is impossible for extension not to exist when body exists, so it is impossible for body not to exist when extension exists. For extension is in body. And for this reason, too, by supposing that there is no body in the vessel but that there is extension in it, he supposes both that there is and that there is not a body in the vessel. (C-H)

## The First Mover

**E7.** Ġābir ibn Hayyān, *The book of research*

As for those who say that these two movements are opposed to each other and that for this reason the aetherial sphere also moves, there is a large error. The first to introduce this objection and mislead people by it was Galen who refuted Aristotle in many places

<footnote>E7, 1 these two movements] I.e., the planetary movement from west to east and the diurnal movement from east to west.</footnote>
5

وفي كتابه في المحرك الأول وفي كتابه في البرهان، وذلك أني أعتقد في جالينوس أنه ما علم
ما قال البَتَة في هذه المواضع والشكوك. وأقول: إن ذلك إنما اعترض جالينوس من قِبْلَ أَنَ
المحَرَّكَ الأوَّل لا بدَّ أن يكون متحركاً إذا حرك ما حركه، وقد قلنا مراراً كثيرة أنَّ هذا يجرَّ
ويقود إلى وجود ما لا نهاية له بالفعل، وهذا خلف لا يمكن.

E8. Gābir ibn Hayyān, *The book of research* (521 Kraus)

5

وقد ردَّ هذه جالينوس في هذا وقال فيه وقدَّر أنه أتى بفائدة حيث أخذ يشرح في كتابه في
البرهان أنَّ الفلك حيَّ بأن له حركة النقلة، وأخذ في هذا أن يقول: إنَّ الفلك يتحرَّك إلى الوجوه
الستة من اليمين والشمال والأمام والخلف وسائر الباقية وذهب عنه أنه لا يحتاج إلى ذلك في
إثبات الحياة للفلك إذ ثبت له أنه منتقل بذاته ومن ذاته وإن لم ينتقل إلا دوراً، وذلك أنه ليس لأن
الجسم ينتقل إلى الوجوه الستة وفيها ما كان حيَّاً لأن الموات أيضاً قد يمكن أن يتحرَّك إلى هذه
الوجوه كلها، وإنما الحيَّ المنتقل بذاته في الجهات الست كان أو في بعضها. ولكن أغليط هذا
الرجل كثيرة في جميع كتبه.

E9*. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On time* 5 (20,3–11 Badawī)

(1) فأما من زعم أنَّ الزمان ليس هو جميع ذلك، ولا عدد حركة الفلك، فإنهم زعموا أنه واحد يلقى الأشياء، فقالوا: لأنَّ لو توهمنا الفلك واقفًا لكان وقوفه في زمان، وإذا كان وقوفه في زمان فحركته في زمان ؛ وإذا كانت حركته في زمان فما تبع حركته من عددها في زمان.

(2) وليس ما قالوا حقاً، لأنَّ لو توهمنا الفلك واقفًا لبطل الزمان، (3) وإذا الزمان موجود - وهو

<footnote>E9*, 3 [وإذا — زمان] Omitted from the Latin.</footnote>
in his works, [notably] in his book *On the first mover* and in his book *On demonstration*. Now, I have become convinced that Galen did not know what he was talking about at all in these passages [by expressing] such doubts. And I say: this objection was formulated by Galen because according to him the first mover, in moving what it moves, should necessarily be endowed with a movement of its own. Yet we have repeatedly stated that this would drive and lead us to admit the existence of an actual infinity, which would be an inadmissible contradiction. (Ko [C-H])

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**E8. Ğābir ibn Hayyān, *The book of research***

[The theory that the first mover is unmoved] was refuted by Galen. He discussed this and alleged to make a useful contribution [to this problem] when, in the book *On demonstration*, he began to explain that the sphere is alive because it possesses the movement of locomotion. And he began to declare that the sphere moves in all six directions, namely to the right, to the left, forward, backward and in the other [directions]. It escaped him, however, that there is no need for this argument to affirm that the sphere is alive, as long as it is established that it is moved in itself and by itself and that it is only moved in a circular manner. For it is not because it moves in all six directions that the body must be considered alive. For a dead [body] can equally be moved in these six directions. A living [body] is one that moves itself, whether in all six directions or only in some of them. However, the errors of this man [i.e., Galen] are frequent in all his works. (Ko [C-H])

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**Presumed Testimonia**

**E9***. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On time* 5

(1) Some however think that time is not any of these, nor is it the number of the motion of the heavenly sphere; they think it is one [thing] that encounters [other] things. For they say that if we were to think of the sphere standing still, its standing still would be in time; and since its standing still would be in time, its motion would be in time; and if its motion is in time, the number that follows its motion is in time too. (2) What they say is not true; for if we were to think of the sphere standing still, time would be abolished. (3) And if time exists and is the number of the motion of the sphere, what

5

<footnote n="4">4 On the first mover] This treatise was translated into Arabic by Ḩunayn under the title *That the first mover is unmoved* (*Kitāb ft anna al-muḥarrik al-awwal lā yataḥarrak*). See Ḩunayn ibn Isḥāq, *Epistle on what was translated* 125 (51 Bergsträsser). It is lost both in Greek and in Arabic but fragments can be found in the Arabic translation of Alexander's polemic against Galen regarding the first mover (see Rescher and Marmura, *The Refutation by Alexander of Aphrodisias*). These fragments do not contain any discussion about the movement of the ninth sphere. E8, 1 When discussing the Aristotelian doctrine of the first mover, Ḥābir refers to Galen's thesis which attributes movement to the first mover, interpreted by Ḥābir as the ninth sphere or aether.</footnote>
5
الذي هو عدد حركة الفلك، فما يضرّ من الوهم بخلاف ذلك، فقد تتوهم كرة القمر ماسة لكرة
الأرض، ولا يضرّ ذلك في كونه وجوهره عالياً عليها ومسايناً لها. (4) ويسألون عن ماهية
الزمان ولأي شيء صار زماناً، بل ما البرهان على آنيته؟ وهلا توهم ورآه زمان آخر هو
غيره؟

E10*. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On time* 17 (22,4–8 Badawī)

فإن عَرَضَ شكَّ لبعض الناظرين وقال : كيف يعد الزمان الحركة، وليست من جنسه ؟ قلنا :
إن الزمان قد يعد الحركة وإن لم تكن الحركة من جنسه، كما يعد الذراع الخشبة وإن لم تكن
الخشبة من جنسه. ونقول إن الزمان قد يعد كل حركة من نشوء وبَلاء وتوغُّير، فإن تلك
الحركات كلها تعد، لا لأنها نشوء وبَلاء وتوغَّير.

E11*. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On time* 23 (23,5–11 Badawī)

وليس ينبغي أن يتوهم علينا متواهم إذا قلنا إن الزمان عدد سكون كما أنه عدد حركة، إذ يجب
علينا أن نقول إن قطر الكل ساكن، وإن المراكز ساكنة فيجب أن تكون في زمان؛ فلسنا نزعم
أن كل ما ليس بمتحرك هو في زمان، إذ كان السكون عندنا ليس هو الذي <لم> يتحرك قط ولا
يتحرك، بل هو الذي له بطبيعته أن يتحرك. إنما عرض له أن يسكن وهو الذي قلنا هاهنا <
> وإذ كانت الأقطاب والمراكز نقول إنها لا تتحرك، فليس نقول إنها ساكنة لأنه ليس في طبعها
التحرك؛ فليس يجب إذن أن تكون في زمان.

5

<footnote>E11*, 3-4 ،يتحرك، We follow the emendation by F. Zimmermann; see Sharples, "Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Time*," p. 65. Without this emendation, the sentence would read: "... for rest is not only [the state of] that which might move but does not move."</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 [كونه] ed. Badawī؛ وجهه Lat. et sua essencia. E10*, 2
[وجوهره] ed. Badawī. Lat. in esse suo.
[لا] ed. Badawī. [لأنها] إلا ed. Badawī. Omitted from the Latin. 4
وبلى [وبَلاءِ] 3
emendation is based on the Latin: *non per hoc quod ipsi sunt*. E11*, 3 [فقط] فقط.
E11*, 3 [وبلى] وبَلاءِ
The
passage is corrupted in Arabic. Lat. et hoc est illud quod diximus illic expellens hanc ambiguitatem.</footnote>
harm does it do to think of it in another way? For if the globe of the Moon was thought of as touching the globe of the Earth, that would not do any harm to its existence and its substance and to the fact that it is above the Earth and that they are separated from one another. (4) And they ask about what time is, and what made it to be time, and even more, what demonstration there is of its essence, and whether it is not to be thought that there is some other time existing after it. (Sharples-Ko)

**E10***. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On time* 17

But if some, considering these things, have felt doubt, asking how time numbers motion, since it is not in the same genus as it, we say that time numbers motion even though motion is not in the same genus, just as the cubit measures the wood, even though the wood is not in the same genus. In this way time numbers every motion, of growth and of ageing and of change; for all these motions are numbered, but not in so far as they are growth and ageing and change. (Sharples-Ko)

**E11***. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On time* 23

No one should think that, when we say that time is the number of rest just as it is of motion, then it is necessary for us to say that the diameter of the whole is at rest and that the centres are at rest, and so it is necessary for [them] to be in time. For we do not claim that whatever does not move is in time, since rest according to us is not [the state] of what has never moved and never will ; rather, it is [the state of] that which has in its nature to move and it is at rest only accidentally. This is what we said there (to remove this uncertainty). And when we say of the poles and of the centres that they do not move, we do not say that they are at rest; because it is not in their nature to move. So it is not necessary for them to be in time. (Sharples-Ko)

<footnote>E10*, 5–6 not...change] Here the Latin version reads “non per hoc quod ipsi sunt augmentum et vetustas et mutacio” (ed. Thery, in *Autour du décret de 1210*, p. 95). Sharples translates by “but not qua growth or ageing and change”. This version is close to Aristotle's argument in *Phys*. IV.14, 223a29–224a2. E11*, 5–6 rather...accidentally] Arist. *Phys*. IV.12, 221b12.</footnote>
F1. Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, *On the fourth figure of the categorical syllogism* (76 Rescher)

وكذلك وجدنا جالينوس فعل في المقالة التاسعة من كتاب البرهان فإنه قسم الأشكال الحملية إلى ثلاثة فقط وجزم القول بأنه لا رابع لها وكذلك فعل في كتابه في إحصاء القياسات.

F2. Galen, *Institutio logica* 12.1 (26,13–20 Kalbfleisch)

οὐτοι μὲν οἱ συλλογισμοὶ κατηγορικοὶ καλοῦνται, καθάπερ ἔφην, οὐτε κατὰ πλείω
σχήματα δυνάμενοι συστῆναι τῶν εἰρημένων τριῶν οὐτε κατ’ ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν <ἐν>
ἐκάστω· δέδεικται γὰρ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀποδείξεως ὑπομνήμασι χρώμεθα 8' αὐτοῖς
ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν ἐν αἷς ὑπὲρ ἐνὸς τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ ζήτησις ὁπηλίκον ἐστὶν ἢ ὁποῖον ἢ
ποῦ κείμενόν ἐστιν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας.

5

F3. Ibn Buḥtīšū', *On healing the diseases of the soul and the body* (48,11–21 Klein-Franke)

وقد ذكر هذا جالينوس في المقالة الحادية عشرة من كتاب البرهان بعد ذكره ما استعمله
أرسطاطاليس في قياسات الشكل الثالث، قال: وليس نجد <...> فلاطن في الغرض الذي قصد
إليه لأنه إنما أراد أن يمنع العشاق من استعمال الهليجة والقمم وكل ما أشبه ذلك ولهذا فإنه وإن
كان قد يُطلَق لبعض الناس استعمال الجماع الذي يجري المجرى الطبيعي فإنما يُطلَق لهم
استعمال المعتدل منه لأن الخارج عن الطبع هو المستعمل عند العشق وإنما يستعمل المعتدل
من الجماع الجاري مجرى الطبع من كان عفيفاً فقط لطلب النسل ولبعض اللذات، فهذا قول
جالينوس شاهد بأن اسم العشق عند اليونانيين واقع على اللذة المفرطة واستعمال الجماع بالشره
والشبق.

5

<figure><img src="image_18.png" /></figure>

<footnote>F2, 1 οὖτοι Kalbfleisch : οὖτοι Paris. suppl. gr. 635 οὖτε Kalbfleisch : oi δέ ms 2 ἐν add. Kalbfleisch : lect. ms. def. Barnes–Morison 4 αἷς Mynas : ταῖς ms 5 ἐστιν ἢ suppl. Mynas : situ deleta ms τοιοῦτον Kalbfleisch : τοσοῦτον ms. F3, 3 وقمط [و] والقمم</footnote>
# Section F: Books IXb, XI–XII, and Related Testimonia

## Book IXb

**F1. Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, *On the fourth figure of the categorical syllogism***

And we have found Galen [himself] doing likewise in the ninth book of *On demonstration*, for he divided the categorical figures into three only and concluded with the statement that they have no fourth; and he does likewise in his book *On the number of syllogisms*. (Rescher, modified)

**F2. Galen, *Introduction to logic* 12.1**

These syllogisms are called categorical, as I said, and they cannot be composed in more than the three figures mentioned or in any other number within each [figure]. For this has been shown in the books *On demonstration*. We use these in demonstrations in which it is inquired about one of the existing things of what quantity or quality it is or where it is located or something of this sort belonging to the other categories. (C-H)

5

## Book XI

**F3. Ibn Buhṭišū', *On healing the diseases of the soul and the body***

Galen, in the eleventh book of the treatise *On demonstration*, having explained [the propositions] used by Aristotle in syllogisms of the third figure, says: "We do not think (that) Plato (was wrong) regarding the aim he set himself, because he only wanted to forbid love-sick people from indulging in carnal lust and anything like that. Indeed, while he imposes no constraints on most people as to the use of sex which follows its natural course, in their case he only allows them a moderate use [of sex]. This is because a love-sick person uses it in a way that exceeds what is natural. The continent person makes moderate use of sex that follows its natural course only for procreation and to obtain some pleasure." This is what Galen says, and it shows that the word "love-sickness" indicates among the Greeks a state of excessive pleasure and the use of sex in a vicious and licentious manner. (Ko [C-H])

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10

<footnote>F1, 3–4 On the number of syllogisms] Not extant. The treatise was translated into Arabic in Ḩunayn ibn Isḥāq's circle. See Ḩunayn ibn Isḥāq, *Epistle on what was translated* 127 (51 Bergsträsser). F3, 3 was wrong] We follow the construction of Felix Klein-Franke in his German translation of the treatise: "Wir glauben nicht, daß Platon bei dem Ziel, das er verfolgte, Unrecht hatte". See Klein-Franke, *Abū Saʿīd ʿUbaydallah ibn Buhṭišūʾ, p. 81. 5–6 It is unclear which passage in Plato is being referred to. For the distinction between natural and unnatural sex, see e.g. Plat. *Leg*. I, 636c3–5. 6 in their case] I.e., of the love-sick people. moderate use of sex] Cf. e.g. Plat. *Leg*. V, 733e6–734a8.</footnote>
F4. Anonymus, *De omnibus generibus syllogismorum* (ix,23–30 Wallies)

τρία εἶδη ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀπλῶς συλλογισμοῦ· τὸ κατηγορικόν, τὸ ὑποθετικόν, τὸ κατὰ πρόσλη-
ψιν. τοῦ δὲ κατηγορικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἶδη· ἀπλοῦν, σύνθετον. καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀπλοῦ τρία ἐστὶν
εἶδη· πρῶτον σχῆμα, δεῦτερον σχῆμα, τρίτον σχῆμα· τοῦ δὲ συνθέτου τέσσαρα ἐστὶν
εἶδη· πρῶτον σχῆμα, δεῦτερον σχῆμα, τρίτον <σχῆμα>, τέταρτον σχῆμα. Ἀριστοτέλης
μὲν γὰρ τρία τὰ σχῆματά φησιν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπλοῦς συλλογισμοῦς ἀποβλέπων τοὺς ἐκ
τριῶν ὄρων συγκειμένους· Γαληνὸς δ' ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ Ἀποδεικτικῇ τέσσαρα τὰ σχήματα
λέγει πρὸς τοῦς συνθέτους συλλογισμοὺς ἀποβλέπων τοὺς ἐκ τεσσάρων ὄρων συγκει-
μένους, πολλοὺς τοιοῦτους εὑρών ἐν τοῖς Πλάτωνος διαλόγοις.

5

F5. Galenus, *Institutio logica* 19.1 (47,18–22 Kalbfleisch)

ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ <περὶ> τῶν κατὰ πρόσληψιν ὀνομαζομένων συλλογισμῶν οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Περιπά-
του γεγράφασιν ὡς χρησίμων, ἐμοὶ δὲ περιπτοὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καθότι δέδεικταί μοι κάν
τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως πραγματείᾳ, προσῆκον εἴη ἂν τι καὶ περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν.

F6. Galenus, *Institutio logica* 17.1–2 (42,7–14 Kalbfleisch)

καὶ σχεδὸν ἄπαντες οἱ συλλογισμοὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐπιτεταγμένων αὐτοῖς καθολικῶν ἀξιωμάτων πίστιν ἔχουσι τὴν σύστασιν, (δ̄) ὕστερόν ποτέ μοι νοηθὲν οὐτε ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀποδείξεως ὑπομνήμασιν οὐτε (ἐν τῷ) περὶ τοῦ τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἀριθμοῦ γέγραπται· καίτοι τοὐτ' εἰς τοὺς πρός τι συλλογισμοὺς ἦδη μὲν οὖντ' καὶ κατ' ἑκείνας τὰς πραγμα-
τείας εὑρηκότες τὸν τῆς συστάσεως τρόπον αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πίστεως.

5

<footnote>F5, 1 κατὰ πρόσληψιν] Cf. Theophrastus, fr. 110A–D Fortenbaugh *et al.*</footnote>

<footnote>F4, 1 ἀπλῶς Barnes–Morison : ἀπλοῦ Paris. gr. 2064 4 σχῆμα³ add. Barnes–Morison F5, 1 περὶ add. Prantl 3 εἴη ἂν Kalbfleisch : εἶναί Paris. Suppl. gr. 635 F6, 1 καθολικῶν add. *supra lineam* Paris. Suppl. gr. 635; cf. *Inst. log.* 16.12 (41,14–15 Kalbfleisch): γενικῷ ἀξιώματι, 17.7 (44,8 Kalbfleisch): ἀξιώματι καθόλου 2 ποτέ add. Kalbfleisch οὐτε] οὐτε δ' Paris. Suppl. gr. 635 : δ' *del.* Kalbfleisch 3 τῷ περὶ τοῦ add. Mynas 4 τοὐτ' Paris. Suppl. gr. 635 (*ut vid.* Barnes–Morison) : τοὺς Mynas τοὺς Barnes–Morison : τ
*add. supra lineam* Paris. Suppl. gr. 635 (*ut vid.* Barnes–Morison) : τὸ Mynas ἦδη – οὖν] ἦδειμεν οὖν Kalbfleisch : ἦδη [μὲν οὖν] Barnes–Morison : ἦδη ἦμεν [οὖν] *coniecit* (cf. Gal. *UP VIII.1*, 442,19 Helmreich / III.610 K; *Morb. diff.* I.2, VI.838,4–5 K: εὑρηκότες ἂν εἴημεν) *et verbum deesse* (ἀναφέροντες vel sim.) *susp.* Havrda</footnote>
Related Testimonia

F4. Anonymus, *All the kinds of syllogism*

Of syllogisms as such there are three kinds: the predicative, the hypothetical, the prosleptic. Of the predicative there are two kinds: simple, compound. And of the simple there are three kinds: first figure, second figure, third figure, whereas of the compound there are four kinds: first figure, second figure, third figure, fourth figure. For Aristotle says that the figures are three – he is looking to simple syllogisms, those composed of three terms, whereas Galen, in his own *Apodeictic*, says that the figures are four – he is looking to compound syllogism, those composed of four terms, of which he found many in Plato’s dialogues. (Barnes–Morison, slightly modified)

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F5. Galen, *Introduction to logic* 19.1

Since the followers of Peripatos have further described the syllogisms called
'prosleptic' as useful (even though to me they seem superfluous, as I have also shown
in the treatise *On demonstration*), it is fitting to say something about them too. (C-H)

F6. Galen, *Introduction to logic* 17.1–2

And pretty much all syllogisms owe their confirmation to the credence of the general
axioms under which they fall. This had been written neither in the books *On demon-
stration* nor in *The number of syllogisms*, since I did not realize it until sometime later.
Nonetheless, we had already ⟨applied?⟩ this to relational syllogisms, having discovered
the manner of their confirmation and credence in those works. (H)

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<footnote>F4, 8 Plato's dialogues] Five examples of compound syllogisms are rehearsed in *All the kinds of syllogism*, some of which are taken from Plato's dialogues, namely, *Alcibiades* and *Republic* (*Omn. syllog*. x,10–22 Wallies); see further above, pp. 61–62, for the possiblity that some of these examples go back to *Dem*. F5, 2 prosleptic] According to Alex. Aphr. *In An. pr*. 1.41 (378,14–20 Wallies), prosleptic syllogisms were discussed by Theophrastus in his treatise *On affirmation* (περὶ καταφάσεως); this is probably identical with Theophrastus’ *On affirmation and denial*, to which Galen wrote a commentary; see *Lib. prop*. 14.14 (166,19–21 Boudon-Millot / 11, XIX.42 K). F6, 4 The text is corrupt and the translation uncertain. 5 confirmation and credence] Propositions are confirmed by the transference of credence (πίστις); see above, B6*, 77–79. “Axioms” are defined as propositions “credible by virtue of themselves” (ἔξ αὐτοῦ πιστὸς λόγος); *Inst. log*. 17.7 (44,13 Kalbfleisch); cf. above, B6*, 62–69. For the translation of σύστασις as “confirmation” (or perhaps “guarantee”), cf. Alex. Aphr. *In Met*. Γ.3, 271,17–20 Hayduck; LSJ, s.v. συνίστημι, IV.2 and V.</footnote>
F7. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 2.8 (16,12–16 Koetschet)

وقال جالينوس في الثانية عشرة من هذا الكتاب حيث ذكر التوالي الضرورية اللازمة للمقدم
هذا القول : “أما في أوقات السنة فالاتصال على الوجهين جميعاً واجب ضرورة. وذلك أنه
متى كان الوقت شتاء فإنه كان لا محالة بعقِب خريف قد تقدَّمه وكان الخريف بعقب الصيف
وأنَّ هذا الصيف إذا كان في وقت من الأوقات تبعه لا محالة خريف وتبع الخريف شتاء.“ هذا
نص قوله.

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F8. Ps.-Ğābir ibn Hayyān, *The book of morphology* (420,7–15 Kraus)

فإِنَّ جالينوس مع تمكَّنه من العلم وتدربه في النظر قد أخذ مقدمات من هذا الباب على أنها
أوائل وتمثل بها حتى أنه قال في كتابه البرهان: إِنَّ من المقدمات الأولى في العقل أنه إذا كان
الصيف يتبعه الخريف لا محالة فإنه لم يكن إلا بعد خروج الربيع. وأنا أحسب أنَّ هذه المقدمات
ليست بصحيحة دون أن يصحَّ أنَّ الأزمان لم تزل ولا تزال على مثل ما هي عليه. فإذا لم
يصحَّ ذلك فإنه لا يؤمن أن يكون صيف لا يعقبه خريف ولم يتقدَّمه ربيع. فقد استقصيت هذا
المعنى في كتابي المسمَّى كيفية الاستدلال بغية البيان على مذهب المنطق والنطق.

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F9. Galenus, *De simplicium medicamentorum facultatibus* III.25 (XI.612–613 K)

βούλομαι δὲ, ἐπεὶ κατὰ τούτου τοῦ λόγου γέγονα, καί τινος θεωρήματος ἀναμνήσαι
λογικοῦ, δεδειγμένου κάν τοῖς περὶ ἀποδείξεων ὑπομνήμασιν, εἰς τὰ παρόντα χρησίμου.
ἔστι δὲ τὸ θεώρημα τοιόνδε· τῶν ἀποδείξεων αἱ μὲν ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει τόδε τῷ δε
περαίνουσιν, αἱ δὲ ὡς ὑπάρχειν ἐνδέχεται· τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν μεταπίπτουσί τινες εἰς τὸ
ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν, ὅταν ἀναγκαίαις ἀρχαῖς ἔπωνται, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ
νῦν ἡμῖν ἀποδεδειγμένῳ· ἐν γὰρ τῷ κόκκῳ καὶ τῷ κνίκῳ τὸν φλεγματώδη περιεχόμε-

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# Book XII

## F7. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen*

In the twelfth book of this treatise, while speaking of the consequents that necessarily follow the antecedent, he states: "As far as the seasons are concerned, continuity in both directions together is necessarily implied. Indeed, winter necessarily follows autumn, which preceded it, and autumn necessarily follows summer. Similarly, if it is summer, then fall necessarily follows, and after fall winter." That is literally what he says. (Ko [C])

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## F8. Ps.-Ġābir ibn Hayyān, *The book of morphology*

This is why, despite his capacity for science and his experience in theoretical matters, Galen adopted such premisses as if they were [first] principles and he used them to illustrate [his thesis], so much so that he says in his book *On demonstration*: "One of the first premisses in the mind is the following: if it is true that summer must undoubtedly be followed by autumn, this can only take place after spring has passed." For my part, I am of the opinion that this premiss is not correct, unless it has been [previously] established that [the alternation] of the seasons has always taken place and will always take place in the same way as it is taking place [now]. If this is not established, the possibility is not excluded that [in the future] there may be a summer that is not followed by an autumn and not preceded by a spring. I have studied this example well in my book *On sign inference*, thoroughly and according to the doctrines of the logicians. (Ko [C])

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## Related Testimonia

### F9. Galen, *The power of simple drugs* III.25

Since we have reached this point of the argument, I also want to recall a certain logical theorem pointed out in the books *On demonstration* that is useful for the present discussion. The theorem is this: of demonstrations, some conclude that this holds of that of necessity, whereas others that it is possible [for this] to hold [of that]. Some of these latter change into [this] holding [of that] of necessity, whenever they follow necessary principles, just as also in the very case that we have demonstrated now. For it cannot be shown evidently that phlegm-like humour is contained in the Cnidian

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<footnote>F8, 11 On sign inference] A treatise with this title was attributed to Abū Bakr al-Rāzī. See Bīrūnī, *Epistle on Abū Bakr al-Rāzī's Writings*, p. 14 Kraus.</footnote>
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νον χυμὸν ἑναργῶς μὲν οὐκ ἔστι δεῖξαι, τὸ δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ εἰκὸς καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον ὑπάρχει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰς ὁλκὰς ταῖς τῶν οὐσιῶν ὁμοιότησιν ἐδείξαμεν γίγνεσθαι (...) ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοιότητά τινα ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπάρχειν ἀμφοτέραις, τῇ τε τοῦ καθαίροντος καὶ τῇ τοῦ καθαιρομένου. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὸ καθαιρόμενον ἐστι φλέγμα, πάντως δή που καὶ τὸ ἔλκον ἀνάγκη φλεγματῶδες ὑπάρχειν.

**F10.** Al-Fārābī, *Short commentary on Aristotle's De interpretatione* 13 (192,16–193,7 Kutsch–Marrow)

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(1) إذ كانت الموجودات تنقسم ثلاثة أقسام : ضرورية فقط، وممكنة فقط، وممكنة حيناً وضرورية حيناً. فالتي هي ممكنة حيناً وضرورية حيناً هي التي من طبيعة الممكن، إلا أنها قد حصلت بالفعل. وهي التي يسميها الوجودية. (2) وقصد بقسمته الموجودات إلى هذه الأقسام الثلاثة ليعزَّف أَنَّ المقدمات، والنتائج والمطلوبات تنقسم هذه القسمة. فإذا كان كذلك، كانت المطلوبات والنتائج الكائنة في الأشياء الأزلية الضرورية عن مقدمات ضرورية وأزلية، والمطلوبات والنتائج الكائنة في الأمور الممكنة عن مقدمات ممكنة. وكذلك النتائج والمطلوبات الوجودية إنما هي عن قياسات مقدماتها الوجودية. ويبين بها أنَّ الصنائع القياسية تنقسم هذه الثلاثة الأقسام. وأنَّ جميع الأشياء المنظور فيها المفحوص عنها هي هذه الثلاثة. (3) فلذلك يزول ما قاله جالينوس الطبيب في كتابه في البرهان، إن أرسطوطاليس كثر في كتابه في القياس في الممكنات والوجودية فيما لا ينتفع به.

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**F11.** Al-Fārābī, *Short treatise on Aristotle's De interpretatione* (I.111,21–112,9 Daneshpajuh)

والإمكان في الاضطرارية إنما يرتفع بعلمنا بها، من غير أن تتغيَّر هي في أنفسها عَمَّا كانت عليه. والإمكان في التي هي بالطبع ممكنة إنما يرتفع عنها بتغيَّرها في أنفسها بأن تصير موجودة بعد أن كانت غير موجودة، وبأن تتغيَّر من العدم إلى الوجود، وعند ذلك تصير معرضة للعلم، ولأن يتحصل عندنا الصادق منها، وتدخل في حدّ الأشياء المجهولة من الاضطرارية. فإذا علمناه، ارتفع الإمكان عنها من الجهتين: من جهتها هي بتغييرها من العدم.

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berry and safflower; rather, the possible, likely, or contingent holds of the argument. But since we have also shown that attractions arise in consequence of the similarities of substances (...) it is necessary that some similarity holds of both substances, the purging one and the purged. Now since the purged substance is phlegm, by all means, then, that which attracts it is necessarily phlegm-like. (C-H)

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**F10.** Al-Fārābī, *Short commentary on Aristotle's De interpretatione* 13

(1) There are three classes of entities: those that are never anything but necessary, those that are never anything but possible, and those that are sometimes possible and sometimes necessary. Those that are sometimes possible and sometimes necessary are of the nature of the possible, even though they have become actual. They are the ones he calls 'hyparctic'. (2) By dividing entities into these three classes, Aristotle wants to make us realize that premisses, conclusions, and things under inquiry are subject to the same division. If so, things under inquiry and conclusions about eternal necessities arise from necessary and eternal premisses, things under inquiry and conclusions about possibilities from possible premisses and, similarly, hyparctic conclusions and things under inquiry from syllogisms from hyparctic premisses. Thus he makes it clear both that the syllogistic disciplines are subject to this threefold division and that all objects of speculation and investigation are in these three classes. (3) This defeats the criticism made by the doctor Galen in his book *On demonstration*: that Aristotle, in talking at length about possible and hyparctic entities in his book on the syllogism, has wasted his time on useless things. (Zimmermann, modified)

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**F11.** Al-Fārābī, *Short treatise on Aristotle's De interpretatione*

(1) It is not unless we gain knowledge of them that possibility is eliminated from matters of necessity, though they themselves have remained, without change, as they used to be. But with matters that are possibilities by nature, it is by an intrinsic change that possibility is eliminated from them, namely, if they become existent after having been non-existent. In this case, they change from non-existence to existence, thereby becoming knowable and enabling us to determine which of the alternatives is true. Thus they become like unknown necessities. For as soon as we know, the element of possibilities is eliminated from both sides: on their own side, by their having changed

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<footnote>F10, 5 hyparctic] Lit. ‘existential’, *wuğūdiyya*. As F. Zimmermann explains, a *muqqadima wuğūdiyya* (πρότασις ὑπάρχουσα in Greek) is not an existential premiss but one expressing mere *wuğūd*, existence, without specifying possibility or necessity. See Zimmermann, “Introduction,” p. lx. 6 things under inquiry] Arabic *małūb*. See also C12, 3. F. Zimmermann translates “*quaesita*” and points to the dialectial context of this term, which indicates a thesis to be chosen from a pair of contradictory alternatives (Zimmermann, “Introduction,” p. lii).</footnote>
إلى الوجود، ومن جهتنا نحن بتغيرنا من الجهل بها إلى العلم بها. وأما في الاضطرارية فإنَّ
الإمكان فيها إنما يرتفع بتغيرنا نحن من الجهل إلى العلم.

فذلك ليس ينبغي، لأجل اشتراك الاسم في الممكن، أن يظنَّ بما هو ممكن في طبيعته أنَّ هو
الممكن عندنا، بمعنى أنه مجهول عندنا، كما ظنَّ ذلك جالينوس الطبيب، على ما قاله في كتابه
الذي سماه البرهان.

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F12. Maimonides, *Medical aphorisms, Treatise* 25 (172 Bos)

(1) كلَّ ذلك بيَّنه أبو نصر الفارابي وذلك أنه حذف المقاييس الممكنة والمقاييس المختلفة واقتصر على المقاييس المطلقة وهي الوجودية ولم يأبه إلى أنَّ المقاييس البرهانية هي ضرورية لا وجودية وأنَّ الشيء النافع في الطبِّ وفي أكثر الصنائع هي المقاييس الممكنة والمختلطة واسمعْ نصوص أبي نصر في ذلك. (2) قال في شرحه للقياس الكبير لمَا أخذ أن

يشرح تلك التوطئة وطَّأها للممكن وللمقاييس الممكنة. قال أبو نصر : "وليس الأمر في ذلك
على ما ظنَّه جالينوس المتطَّبَّب لَأَنَّه ذكر في كتابه الذي سماه كتاب البرهان أنَّ النظر في
الممكن وفي القياسات الكائنة عنه فضل. وأولى الناس بالنظر في القياسات الممكنة جالينوس
المتطَّبَّب بل يلزمه أن يكون قد صرف أكثر عنايته في كتابه الذي قد سماه كتاب البرهان إلى
المقاييس الممكنة فإنه زعم أنه صنف كتابه في البرهان لينتفع به في الطبِّ. (3) والقياسات التي

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يستعملها الطبيب في استنباط أجزاء صناعة الطبِّ والقياسات التي يستعملها في تعرَّف
الأمراض الباطنة وأسبابها في واحد واحد من الذين يقصدون علاجهم فكلها قياسات ممكنة
وليس في شيء منها ضروري إلا أن يكون الشاذ الذي يكاد أن يكون خارجا عن صناعة الطبِّ.

فذلك يلزمه ألا يكون يَتَّكلَّم في كتابه الذي سماه كتاب البرهان إلا في أشكال المقاييس الممكنة
فقط دون الوجودية وعلى أنه إن كان إنَّما اقتصر في كتابه على الأشكال الوجودية ليكون قد

اقتصر من المقاييس على ما ينتفع به في البراهين فإنَّ الأشكال الوجودية ليست هي معدَّة نحو
البراهين لأنَّ البراهين ليست تُعمل من هذه المادة بل إنَّما تعمل من الأشكال الاضطرارية
فقط."

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from non-existence to existence; on our side, by our having changed from ignorance to knowledge. In connexion with necessities, on the other hand, one can only speak of an elimination of possibility in the sense that we change from ignorance to knowledge.

(2) One therefore must not be misled by the homonymy of the word ‘possible’ into thinking that what is possible by nature is the same as what is possible to our minds, i.e. unknown to us, as has happened to the doctor Galen, judging by what he says in the book he has called *On demonstration*. (Zimmermann)

**F12.** Maimonides, *Medical aphorisms, Treatise 25*

(1) All this has been explained by Abū Nasr al-Fārābī, namely that he [Galen] rejected possible syllogisms and mixed syllogisms and limited himself to non-modal syllogisms, which are called hyperarctic [syllogisms], and did not pay attention to the fact that demonstrative syllogisms are necessary and not hyperarctic and [he did not pay attention to the fact] that what is useful in medicine and in the majority of the arts are possible syllogisms and mixed [syllogisms]. Listen, then, to the words of Abū Nasr on the subject. (2) In his long commentary on the *Book of syllogisms*, at the beginning of his commentary to [Aristotle’s] introduction to the possible and possible syllogisms, Abū Nasr says: “Matters do not stand here as Galen the doctor thought. In the book which he entitled *On demonstration* he remarks that the study of the possible and of the syllogisms generated from it is superfluous. But if there is anyone who ought to have studied possible syllogisms, it is Galen, the doctor: in the book entitled *On demonstration*, he ought to have concentrated all his attention on possible syllogisms, inasmuch as he claims that he composed his book *On demonstration* to be of use in medicine. (3) The syllogisms that a doctor uses in his account of the parts of the art of medicine and the syllogisms that he uses to grasp the hidden diseases and their causes in each case in which he seeks a cure – all these are possible syllogisms, and there is no necessity at all them (same in some cases which are pretty well extraneous to the art of medicine). For that reason, in his book which he entitled *On demonstration* he ought to have spoken above all else about possible syllogisms alone, and not about hyperarctic syllogisms. (4) For if in the book he restricted himself to hyperarctic syllogisms on the grounds that they would be useful for proofs, in fact the hyperarctic forms are not appropriate to proofs; for proofs do not come about in matter of that sort but only in necessary forms.” (Ko and Rashed [Barnes])

<footnote>F12, 2 non-modal] Lit. ‘absolute’, *mutlaq*. 3 hyperarctic] Lit. ‘existential’, *wuğūdiyya*. Cf. F10, 5.</footnote>
G1. Galenus, *De curandi ratione per venae sectionem* 3 (XI.257 K)

διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ Ἀσκληπιάδου μνημονεύσομεν ἔτι κατὰ τόνδε τὸν λόγον ἀποδεδεικότες αὐτοῦ τὰ στοιχεῖα ψευδῆ, κατά γε τὸ τρισκαιδέκατον ὑπόμνημα τῶν περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀσκληπιάδου δογμάτων πραγματείαν, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πέμπτον τε καὶ ἔκτον ἔλεγχον ἔχει τῶν στοιχείων αὐτοῦ.

G2. Galenus, *De ordine librorum suorum* 2.8 (93,9–15 Boudon-Millot / XIX.55 K)

καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως τῶν στοιχείων οὐ πάντ’ εἴρηται κατὰ τὸ βιβλίον ἀλλ’ ὅσοις αὐτὸς ὁ Ἱπποκράτης ἐχρήσατο· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τελεώτατον τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῶν τοῦ σώματος στοιχείων ἀναλέξασθαι προσήκει τὰ τ’ ἐν τῷ τρισκαιδεκάτῳ περὶ ἀποδείξεως εἰρημένα καὶ κατὰ τὸ πέμπτον καὶ ἔκτον περὶ τῶν Ἀσκληπιάδου δογμάτων.

G3. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 3.1 (18,9–16 Koetschet)

وقد قال في الثالثة عشرة إن الجوهر هو الجسم الأول الموضوع لكلّ كون وفساد الذي هو بذاته
غير مكَيّف. فأطلق أن الهيولى جسم من غير أن يبين ذلك في هذا الكتاب ولا دلّ على موضع
قد بين ذلك فيه كأن ذلك من العلوم الأوائل. وكيف يكون كذلك وقد كثر اختلاف الفلاسفة في
الموضوع للكون والفساد أجسم هو أم غير جسم؟ وناقض أيضاً في قوله ”جسم غير مكّيف“،

<figure><img src="image_19.png" /></figure>
# Section G: Books XIII–XIV

## Book XIII

### The Elements

**G1. Galen, *Treatment by venesection* 3**

For this reason we will no longer mention Asclepiades in this account, having demonstrated that his elements are false, namely in the thirteenth book of *On demonstration* and in the treatise on *The doctrines of Asclepiades*, in which the fifth and sixth book contain refutations of his elements. (C-H)

**G2. Galen, *The order of his own books* 2.8**

And not all of these things concerning the demonstration of the elements are discussed in the book [*The elements according to Hippocrates*]; rather, those which Hippocrates himself used. For the most complete scientific knowledge about the elements of the body, one should read the discussion in the thirteenth book *On demonstration* and in the fifth and sixth book of *The doctrines of Asclepiades*. (C-H)

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**G3. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 3.1**

[Galen] says in the thirteenth book [of *On demonstration*] that substance is the primary body and substratum of all generation and all corruption, which is in itself devoid of quality. He therefore states that matter is a body without making [the statement] clear in this work or referring to a passage where he had already made it clear, as if it were a part of primary knowledge. How could this be the case when there was already so much disagreement among philosophers on the subject of whether the substratum of generation and corruption is a body or not? Moreover, he contradicts himself when he says “a body devoid of quality”: a body necessarily has a shape and shape is a quality.

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<footnote>G3, 1-2 the primary body] Cf. Gal. *HΝΗ* I.7 (21,13-15 Mewaldt / XV.37 K), trans. Hankinson: “Thus the primary body (τὸ πρῶτον σῶμα) is called ungenerated and indestructible, since everything derives its generation by way of composition out of it”. 2 substratum... corruption] Cf. *HΝΗ* I.10 (25,6-8 Mewaldt / XV.44-45 K), trans. Hankinson: “But if indeed there is generation of something which did not previously exist, necessarily it will come to be from some underlying substance (ἐκ τινος ὑποκειμένης οὐσίας γενέσθαι).” *Hipp. elem.* 4.12 (90,6-8 De Lacy / I.445-446 K), trans. De Lacy: “Therefore the substrate of all of them is one thing, a single substance that is common to the first bodies and underlies them (ἐν ἄρα τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄπασι καὶ οὐσία μία, ἦτις ὑποβέβληται κοινὴ τοῖς πρώτοις σώμασιν.” 2-3 devoid of quality] Cf. Gal. *Hipp. elem.* 2.11 (60,5-8 De Lacy / I.417 K), reflecting the atomist view of the first element. 8 shape is a quality] Contrast Gal. *CAM* 7.4 (74,3-8 Fortuna / I.246-247 K): according to the atomists, “there is no quality in the atom at all”, although atoms do possess shape. Cf. Leith, “The Qualitative Status of the Onkoi.”</footnote>
5 والجسم لا محالة ذو شكل والشكل كيفية فكيف يكون غير مكَيَف ؟ ثم قال بعد قليل: "الجسم
الأول هو عارِ من كيفية الشكل" وليس يمكن أن يخلو ما له طول وعرض وعمق من الشكل.

G4. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 3.2, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 5a, ll. 13–18 (Koetschet-Rajab)

وأما قول السوفسطائي: "ويناقض في قوله جسم غير مكَيَف، والجسم لا محالة ذو شكل والشكل
كيفية فكيف يكون غير مكَيَف؟" فلو فهم إرادة جالينوس بقوله – "لكن الجسم الغير مكَيَف
الأول هو المسمَّى بنفسه جسماً كما أنَّهُ معرَّى من سائر الكيفيَّات كذلك هو أيضاً معرَّى من
كيفية الشكل فإذا أزيد عليه هذه الكيفيَّة صار الجسم التعليمي" –، لما أنكر الحق فاعترض فيه.

G5. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 3.3–4, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 5a, ll. 18–29 (Koetschet-Rajab)

وأنا أقول إن الجوهر من حيث هو جوهر هو مُعرَّى من الأعراض ومن حيث هو مادة للتكون
الأجسام هو جسم ذو ثلاثة أبعاد وقد نَبَّه جالينوس على أنَّه لا يُريد في هذا الكتاب بالجوهر
الأول <الجوهر> من حيث هو معرَّى عن المحسوسات بل من حيث هو أول المحسوسات
بقول هذا نَصَّه. قال: وكذلك أيضاً كل ما تغيَّر فهو جسم فإن الجسم هو الذي تغيَّر بدءاً – ومن

5 البيتَنَّي إِنَّمَا أَعْنِي بِالتَّغَيْرِ فِي هَذَا الْمَوْضِعِ التَّغَيْرِ الَّذِي يَرَى عِيانًا مُمْتَدًا فِي كُلِّ جَزَءٍ مِنْ
أَجزَائِهِ عَندَ الْحَسَنِ فَإِنَّ التَّغَيْرَ عَندَ الطَّبيعة قَدْ وَقِعَتْ فِيهِ مَطَالِبَاتٌ –، وَأَيْضًا فَإِنَّ أَوَّلَ الْأَشْيَاء

<footnote n="4">4 هو MS Rıḍawī [بدءاً] MS Rıḍawī من [من 3 إلى 5] MS Rıḍawī [في وتناقضِ] MS Rıḍawī [ويناقض 1، G4]</footnote>
So how could it be devoid of quality? Shortly afterwards, he says: “The primary body is free of the quality of shape.” But it is not possible for that which is endowed with length, width and depth to be devoid of shape. (Ko [C-H])

### G4. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 3.2

When the Sophist says: “He contradicts himself when he speaks of a ‘body without quality’, for in any case a body has a shape, and shape is a quality. How then could it be without quality?”, if he [i.e. the Sophist] had understood Galen’s intention in what he says – “but the primary body without quality is what is called body in-itself: as it is devoid of all qualities, so it is also devoid of the quality of shape. When this quality is added to it, it becomes the mathematical body” –, then he would not have fought the truth and would not have opposed it. (Ko [C-H])

### G5. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 3.3–4

(1) And I [i.e. Abū al-‘Alā ibn Zuhr] say that substance, insofar as it is substance, is devoid of accident, and insofar as it is matter for the generation of bodies, it is a body endowed with three dimensions. Galen has already drawn attention to the fact that in this book by ‘primary substance’ he does not mean the substance as being devoid of the sensibles, but as the first sensible [thing]. This is what he says literally. (2) He says: “Likewise, in so far as it [i.e. the substance] is capable of change, it is a body. This is because a body is that which changes from the start – it is evident that by ‘change’ here I only mean the change which is clearly seen to extend to all the parts of the body when we perceive it, for natural change has raised questions. Also, [it is evident that the substance is a body] because the first sensible thing is a body. For this reason, it is

<footnote>9–10 The...shape] Galen’s own view: although the elements are not without qualities, they do not possess their own shape; see *Hipp. elem.* 9.12–17 (130,11–132,13 De Lacy / I.484–485 K). Cf. also *Loc. aff.* I.2.11 (256,11–12 Gärtner / VIII.26 K), on the homoeomerous parts: σχῆμα σύμφυτον ἔχει μηδέν. G4, 5 devoid²...shape] Cf. G3, 9–10. 5–6 When...body] A dialectical argument: if the primary body were without qualities, as the atomists believe, it would be abstract matter; if shape were added to it, it would become a mathematical body. For abstract matter “without qualities” (ὑλη ἀποιος), see *Hipp. elem.* 6.38 (114,16–17 De Lacy / I.469 K); *PHP* IX.9.44 (608,19–21 De Lacy / V.804 K); *QAM* 3 (36,23–37,2 von Müller / IV.773 K). G5, 4 this book] I.e., *On demonstration*. 5 the first sensible thing] Galen sometimes describes the common substrate of elementary bodies as “the first substance” (πρώτη οὐσία); see *Hipp. elem.* 9.7 (128,16–19 De Lacy / I.482 K); however, this substrate, when abstracted from the elementary bodies, is conceived of without qualities; see *Hipp. elem.* 6.38 (114,16–17 De Lacy / I.469); thus, when speaking of the first substance as “the first sensible [thing]” or as the first body, Galen has in mind something else: either the elementary bodies themselves – referred to as the common substrate (κοινὸν ὑποκείμενον) of every generated thing, cf. *CAM* 8.7 (80,19–23 Fortuna / I.253 K) – or the homoeomerous parts, described as “the first perceptible elements” of animal bodies, cf. *Hipp. elem.* 8.10–13 (124,19–126,12 De Lacy / I.479–480 K). 6 capable of change] Cf. e.g. *Hipp. elem.* 9.6 and 9.16 (128,12 and 132,6 De Lacy / I.482 and 485 K).</footnote>
المحسوسة الجسم، فلذلك لزم أن يكون غير ذي شكل، لأن كل ذي شكل له هيئة ما بائنة وهذا الجسم لمَا كان مادةً على ما ذكرناه وجب أن يكون كثير التقسيم إلى أصغر الأجزاء وأكثرها غير لازم بحالة واحدة إذ الكون والفساد لا يكفيان.

G6. Abū Bakr al-Rāżī, Doubts about Galen 4.1 (20,1–6 Koetschet)

وقال إن الخلاء ليس بمحسوس ولم يُبَيِّن هل هو موجود أم لا، وأما الزمان فهو موجود لا محالة، والكم غير مفارق له إلا أنه ليس بجسم. وصرح أن الزمان عنده جوهر إذ كان قد حملَ الكُم. ومعلوم أنه قد أخرج قوله ههنا الخلاء مخرج المكان، وما يسبق إلى النفس في وجود الزمان يسبق إليها في وجود المكان. وكذلك إذا لم يكن الزمان كمَا بل حاملاً الكُم فالمكان أيضاً كذلك.

5

G7. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, Solution to the Doubts about Galen 4.3–4, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 5b, ll. 7–16 (Koetschet–Rajab)

(1) في هذا الفصل الذي حكيناه عن السوفسطائي شنغ لا يأتِي بها الصبيان والرعاع، منها: أن يظنَّ أنَّ الكميَّة لا تقال إلَّا على الجوهر، لأنه بقول جالينوس أنَّ الكُمَّ غير مفارق للزمان، لزمه القولُ بأنَّه جوهر، ولو قرأ شيئاً من علم المنطق، لرأى فيه أنَّ الكميَّة تقال على أشياء كثيرة منها الزمان والقول والعدد وليس واحد منها جوهرًا ! ولمَّا قال جالينوس “وفي هذا الجوهر شيء لا يفارقه ويخصه بدءاً من بين الأشياء المحسوسة وهو الكُمّ”، أعلمنا لا شيء استثنى المحسوسة. (2) فقال: إنما فعلت ذلك بسبب الخلاء والزمان. وإن كان جالينوس لا يعتقد الخلاء لكن لمَا كان جماعة يثبتون الخلاء ويقولون إنه المكان المستعد لحركة الأجسام التي تمر فيه ولم يكن يتبَيَّن من أمره هل هو موجود أم لا كما تبيَّن أنَّ الزمان موجود بالفعل من أول وهلة، سامحهم جالينوس فيه ليصادر على أشياء يبطل بها وجوده، كما نجده فعل.

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necessary that it [i.e. the substance] does not possess a shape, for everything that possesses a shape has an aspect that is clear. Now, this body, insofar as it is matter according to what we have said, must be divided into small parts or into large ones, and it cannot remain in one and the same state, since generation and corruption never cease [to change it]." (Ko [C-H])

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**G6. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 4.1**

[Galen] says: "Void is not sensible and it is not clear whether it exists or not, whereas time exists without any doubt and quantity is inseparable from it even if it [i.e., time] is not corporeal." He [i.e., Galen] has made it clear therefore that according to him time is a substance because it is the subject of quantity. Now, it is known that by the word "void" here he means place. Now what comes to mind concerning time also comes to mind concerning place. Therefore, if time is not a quantity, but is the subject of a quantity, then the same is true of place. (Ko [C-H])

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**G7. Abū al-'Alā' ibn Zuhr, Solution to the Doubts about Galen 4.3–4**

(1) In this passage where we have transcribed [what] the Sophist [writes], we find islanders that even children and the plebeians dare not commit. These include: the assumption that quantity is predicated uniquely of a substance, since [according to him] the fact that Galen says that quantity is inseparable from time necessarily implies that he says that [time] is a substance. But, if he [i.e. the Sophist] had read a little bit of logic, he would have seen that quantity is predicated of many things, including time, speech, number, and that none of these things is a substance! Moreover, when Galen says about this substance [i.e. time] that there is something inseparable from it that characterizes it and that differentiates it from the start from other sensible things, and that this is quantity, he tells us nothing except that it is sensible. (2) He [i.e., Galen] also says: "I only did this for void and time." In spite of the fact that Galen does not believe [in the existence of] void, because a number of people admit the existence of the void and say that [void] is equivalent to place suitable for the movement of the bodies in it, although it is not obvious whether or not it exists in the same way that it is obvious that time exists, he has behaved indulgently with them and produced arguments that make the existence [of the void] moot, as we have seen. (Ko [C-H])

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<footnote n="11">11 does...shape] Cf. G3, 9–10. **G6, 1** whether it exists or not] For this traditional controversy cf. Arist. *Phys*. IV.9, 217b28; Aët. I.18 with Mansfeld–Runia, *Aëtiana* V.1, pp. 571–590. For Galen, cf. ibid., pp. 584–585. **3–4** time...quantity] The quantity in question is presumably duration; cf. E3, 10–11. **5** place] Cf. E6, 1–2. **G7, 5** time is a substance] Cf. E3, 8; G6, 3–4. **6–7** time...number] Cf. Arist. *Cat*. 6, 4b22–25.</footnote>
G8. Abū Bakr al-Rāżī, Doubts about Galen 4.2 (20,7–9 Koetschet)

وقد ذهب حيث تكلم في هذا إلى أن الهواء جسم يدفع وجود الخلاء، فكيف حكم قَبْلُ أَنَّهُ لا يمكن أن يعلم أموجود هو أم لا ؟ ولما بين أن الهواء جسم، اعتمد في أنَّه ليس في خلاله خلاء البتة بامتناع دخول عمود الزرَّاقة فيها ما لم يفتح الثقب الذي في فمها.

G9. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, Solution to the Doubts about Galen 5.7, MS Āstān Quds Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 6a, ll. 24–29 (Koetschet–Rajab)

وأما الاستدلال الذي استدلَّه السوفسطائي على أنَّ في خلال الهواء خلاء بالقارورة المنفوخ فيها وبالقارورة الممصوصة، فهذا اعتراض الصبيان الذين يبتدئون بالبحث والنظر لأن معنا دليلاً برهانياً يبطل الخلاء على كل الوجوه لا اعتراض فيه، وهو ما وصفنا من خل الzerاقة وغير ذلك ممَّا برهن جالينوس به ولولا خوف التطويل لذكرته وهو موجود في كتاب البرهان.

G10. Galenus, Compendium Timaei Platonis 7 (12 Kraus-Walzer)

فيقول إنَّ ذلك يكون لجوهر نَيْر مُضيء يخرج من الحدقة ويَتَصل بالهواء المحيط بنا ويخلاطه بمشاكلته ويتغير مثل تغييره فنُجِسَ بالأشياء التي من خارج. وقد بينتُ هذا القول في المقالة السابعة من كتابي في آراء بقراط وفلاطون وأكثر من ذلك أيضاً، وأحتجَ ببراهين حقيقية في المقالة الثالثة عشرة من كتابي في البرهان.

G11. Abū Bakr al-Rāżī, Doubts about Galen 5.1 (22,16–17 Koetschet)

ثم قال أيضاً في هذه المقالة إنه من البين عند جميع الناس أنه ليس يكون البصر بأن تماثيل تجري إليه من كل واحد من الأشياء المبصرة.
**G8. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 4.2**

Further on, he [Galen] comes to say that air is a body, which refutes the existence of void. So how could he judge in what precedes, that he cannot have knowledge of whether it exists or not? Furthermore, when he explains that air is a body, to show that there is absolutely no void between the interstices of air, he has relied on the fact that the plunger of a syringe cannot go up into [the syringe] until the orifice at the end is open. (Ko [C])

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**G9. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, Solution to the Doubts about Galen 5.7**

The sign which the Sophist uses to show that there is a void between the interstices of air, i.e., the bottle into which [air] is blown and the bottle from which [air] has been sucked, is an argument made by youngsters who are just starting out in research and theory, because we have demonstrative signs that reject the existence of the void as a whole, and which are not [simple] objections. These are the ones we have described with the example of the syringe. There are also others used by Galen in his demonstrations, which I would mention if I were not afraid of lengthening [this book] too much, and which are found in the treatise *On demonstration*. (Ko [C])

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**Vision**

**G10. Galen, Compendium of Plato's Timaeus 7**

[Plato] says: [seeing] arises by means of a fiery, luminous substance issuing from the pupils and reaching the air that surrounds us. It fuses with [the air] because it is similar to it and is altered to share the changes [of the air]. Thus we perceive the things that lie outside us. I [i.e., Galen] explained this account in the seventh book of my treatise *The doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, [where there is] more than this as well. I sought true demonstrations [of it] in the thirteenth book of my treatise *On demonstration*. (Das-Koetschet)

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**G11. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 5.1**

He also says in this book: It is clear to all people that vision does not occur by images that come to it from every visible thing. (Ko [C])

<footnote>G8, 1 air is a body] Cf. Arist. *Phys*. IV.4, 211b18–19; above, E6[1]. Cf. also Gal. *Inst. log*. 2.1 (5,4–5 Kalbfleisch); *Diff. puls*. IV.6 (VIII.671,12–17 K). G10, 1–2 Cf. Plat. *Tim*. 45c–46c, 67d–68d. 4–5 Cf. esp. Gal. *PHP* VII.6.2–10 (462,25–464,19 De Lacy / V.629–631 K).</footnote>
G12. Abū al-‘Alā' ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 6.4, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 6b, ll. 21–22 (Koetschet-Rajab)

أما قول جالينوس إِنَّهُ من البَيْن عند جميع الناس، فليس يجهل أحد أنَّهُ إنَّما أراد بذلك جميع أهل النظر لأنَّهم هم يخاطب، ومثل هذه المقالة مستعملة تعظيمًا لبيان الشيء وظهوره.

G13. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 5.2–3 (24,9–25,5 Koetschet)

(1) ثم قال جالينوس: "وقول مَن زعم أَنَّهُ يخرج من العين شعاعٌ حتى يأتِي المبصرَ محالٌ لَأَنَّهُ لا يمكن للشعاع أن يمتدَّ إلى الكواكب، بل أفضل من هذا أن يقال إنَّ صورة الكواكب والمبصرات تتَّصل بالبصر بتوسَّط المضيء". (2) قال جالينوس: "فإنَّ هذا الرأي همَّ وهذيانٌ إذ كان يُوجِبُ أَنْ تماثيل الجبال العظام تقع في الناظر. قال: وأعجب من ذلك أن تكون

تجري في وقت واحد تماثيل كثيرة بحسب عدد الأعين التي تبصر إليها". (3) فأقول إن طول الاعتياد للشيء يدعو إلى الإلف له والأنس به والاستنكار لما خالفه ولولا ذلك، لم يكن ليذهب مثل هذا الشيء القريب على جالينوس. ولكن من أجل أنَّهُ منذ صباه كان منغمساً في آراء أصحاب التعليم وكان والده منهم، مال به الهوى إلى هذه الناحية (4) فاستنكر ما ليس بمستنكر بل محسوس مشاهدٍ وهو تَأَديُّ أشباح الأشياء المبصرة. ونحن إذا أقمنا بحذاء المبصرة مراةً،

رأينا شبحه فيها، حتى أنَّهُ لو كان المبصر وراءنا والمرآة أمامنا، لأبصرناه بجميع أحواله حتى نخبر عنه كأخبارنا عنه لو كان محاذياً للبصر نفسه. ولو أقمنا حواليه وفوقه وتحته مرايا كثيرة، لرأينا شبحه في كل واحدة. (5) فكيف يكون الظاهر للحس مستنكرًا والقائل به هاذا وهامزاً، ولا تكون الأبدة التي تجب عن قول جالينوس - وهو أنَّهُ يخرج من ثقب حدقة عين
**G12.** Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 6.4

As for Galen's statement that 'it is clear to all people', no one is unaware that by this [sentence] he is only aiming at all the rationalists, because he addresses himself to them, and a book such as this one uses emphasis to explain the thing in question and make it evident. (Ko [C])

**G13.** Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 5.2–3

(1) Then, Galen says: “What is asserted by those who claim that rays emanate from the eye until they reach the thing seen is absurd, because it is impossible for rays to extend to the stars. It is better to say that the form of the stars and of the things seen is made continuous with sight by means of luminous [air].” (2) Galen continues: “This opinion is laughable and foolish chatter, for it implies that images of the highest mountains enter the pupil.” And he continues: “Even more astonishing, it implies that at the same time many images rush out, as many as the number of eyes looking at them.” (3) I say that the time spent getting used to something leads us to become familiar and accustomed to it, to accept it and to reject what is opposed to it. If this were not the case, such an obvious idea [as the one we are about to discuss] would not have escaped Galen. But, because he has been immersed in the opinions of mathematicians since childhood and his father was one of them, passion inclined him (i.e. Galen) in that direction. (4) As a result, he disputed what was not debatable but, on the contrary, is percievable and observable: that images of things seen are transmitted to sight. If we place a mirror in front of the visible thing, we will see its image in [the mirror], so that, even if the visible thing was behind us and the mirror in front of us, we would see it in all its aspects, and we could be able of communicating the same information about it that we would, were the thing in front of our sight itself. And if we were to place several mirrors all around it, above and below it, we would see its image in each of them. (5) How, then, can that which is manifest to the senses be disputed – and he who asserts it [called] a laughable and a foolish – but not the wonder implied by what

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<footnote>G13, 1–3 Cf. Arist. *De an.* II.7, 418b20–25, *De sensu* 2, 438a26. 1–2 rays...eye] Cf. *PHP* VII.5.4 (454,4–6 De Lacy / V.619 K). 2–3 extend to the stars] Cf. Arist. *De sensu* 2, 438a25–27. 4 luminous air] Cf. *PHP* VII.5.8 (454,19 De Lacy / V.619 K). 5–7 images...them] Cf. *PHP* VII.5.3 (454,1–4 De Lacy / V.618 K). See also Ḩunayn ibn Ishāq, *Ten treatises on the eye* 3, ed. Meyerhof, Ar. p. 104 (Engl. p. 32). 14 images] Rāzī uses the word ṣabḥ, “simulacrum”, “image”. It is the word commonly used in the context of the atomistic theory of vision, where it translates the Greek εἴδωλον. Rāzī considers the simulacra as non-material. In *Ten treatises on the eye*, Ḩunayn already uses ṣabḥ in a context where it seems to refer to the atomistic theory (see Ḩunayn ibn Ishāq, *Ten treatises on the eye* 3, ed. Meyerhof, Ar. p. 104/Engl. p. 32). However, the simulacra in Rāzī’s theory of vision are non-material. Ibn Sīnā, in the *Book on healing*, also uses ṣabḥ in the sense of what is emitted from the visible object and reaches the eye, and compares it to a reflection in a mirror (*Avicenna’s De Anima*, ed. Rahman, p. 118). He speaks of aṣḥab al-aṣbāḥ, the proponents of a theory of intromission dematerialized, stemming from Aristotle (*Avicenna’s De Anima*, p. 119).</footnote>
عصفور من الضوء ما يحيل ما بينه وبين فلك الكواكب الثابتة من الهواء إلى جوهره حتى يدركها؟

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G14. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 7.2–4, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 7a, ll. 1–10 (Koetschet-Rajab)

(1) قال أبو العلاء بن زهر إن جالينوس يقول: “فأمَّا أَن الضياء الذي يخرج من العين يبلغ إلى الأشياء المُبْصَرَة، فقبحه شبيهة بقبح قول أفيقورس لأنه قد طلب أنواع الحركات فلم نجد فيها نوعاً يبلغ هذا المقدار من السرعة. وأيضاً فامتداد ذلك الضياء بنفسه إلى تلك المسافة بعيد“.

(2) ويريد جالينوس بالمُضيء الهواء النيّر، فالروح الباصر يصير له هذا الهواء كالصبع لقوة الحس، فكما أن حس الروح النفسي الكائن من الدماغ بالألم العارض في إصبع القدم مثلاً يكون بتوسط العصب بينهما، كذلك أيضاً يكون حس البصر بالمرئيات التي من خارج تكون بتوسط الهواء. وكما أن العصب إن لم يكن على اعتداله المخصوص به لم يتم الحس بتوسطه، كذلك الهواء إن لم يكن نيراً والمسافة التي بينه وبين المرئي معتدلة واعترض جسم يحجب المرئي، لم يتم البصر. فهذا غرض جالينوس في هذا الفصل.

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G15. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 8.5–10, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 7a, l. 27–fol. 7b, l. 9 (Koetschet-Rajab)

(1) قصد جالينوس في هذا الموضوع من كتابه، إبطال مذهب القائلين بأن البصر يكون بجري تماثيل المرئيات إلى العين، أو بأن أجساماً صغاراً تقع في الناظر من العين. (2) فقال إن ما يراد أقاويل هذا الفريق ما بيته أن حركة النبو لا تبلغ هذا المبلغ من القوة والسرعة، وأنها لا تبقى حافظة لصورتها التي كانت عليها أولاً، إذ هذا الفريق يلجأ إلى هذه الحركة في جميع

الأشياء التي يعتقدونها، ثم رد عليهم ردًا يقبله العقل من أول وهلة فقال إن القول بأن تماثيل الجبال العظام تقع في الناظر همز وهذيان. (3) ثم قال بعد قليل: والقول أيضاً بأن التمثال وحده

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Galen says, namely that enough light emanates from the piercing in the uvea of a bird to transform the air between it and the fixed celestial stars into its own substance, in order to perceive them? (Ko [C-H])

**G14.** Abū al-‘Alā ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 7.2–4

(1) Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr says that Galen says: “As for maintaining that the light that comes out of the eye reaches visible things, the pernicious character [of this thesis] resembles [the pernicious character] of what Epicurus says,” because he (i.e. Galen) had asked: “What are the different types of movements? Yet, no movement reaches this speed. Moreover, the fact that this light travels this distance by itself is difficult.”

(2) Galen understands by “luminous [medium]” the luminous air. “Thus, this air is to the visual pneuma what the nerve is to the capacity for sensation. Therefore, just as the sensation of pain in the toe that the psychic pneuma in the brain feels is caused by the intermediary of the nerves between the two [i.e. the brain and the toe], so the sensation corresponding to the sight of visible objects outside is caused by the air. And just as, if the nerve is not in its proper well-proportioned state, sensation cannot be accomplished by means of it, so too, if the air is not luminous even if the distance that separates it from the visible object is moderate, or if a body interposes itself and conceals the visible object, vision is not accomplished.” This is what Galen says in this part. (Ko [C-H])

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**G15.** Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 8.5–10

(1) Galen's purpose in this part of his book is to do away with the belief of those who say that vision occurs through images of visible things streaming towards the eye or that small bodies enter the pupil of the eye. (2) He said that what refutes the claims of this group is what he made clear, i.e., that the movement of rebound does not reach this amount of strength and speed; also, that they [i.e., the small bodies] do not retain the configuration that they had at the beginning, since this group relies on this movement [sc. rebound] for everything they believe. Then he responded to them in a way that the mind immediately accepted from the start, saying: “To maintain that the images of high mountains penetrate the pupil is foolish and delirious.” (3) Shortly afterwards he [i.e. Galen] continued: “As for saying that only the image itself is emitted in the manner of a trace, so that atoms would be emitted from every part of the visible

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<footnote>G14, 6–7 this...sensation] Cf. *PHP* VII.5.5–10 (454,8–27 De Lacy / V.619–620 K); VII.5.32 (460,2–3 De Lacy / V.625 K). G15, 4 rebound] Gr. ἀποπαλμός, ἀποπάλλω; cf. DL X.44 (761,544 Dorandi); Gal. *Hipp. elem.* 2.16 (62,1 De Lacy / I.418 K). 6 configuration] Cf. DL X.42 and X.62 (760,526 and 770,741–743 Dorandi), on “compounds” (συγκρίσεις) and “aggregations” (ἀθροίσματα) of atoms. 8–9 To...delirious] Cf. *PHP* VII.5.3 (454,1–3 De Lacy / V.618 K). 11 trace] Probably a translation of τύπος, “imprint” or “outline”; cf. e.g. DL X.46 (761,562 Dorandi): “τύποι of the same shape as the solid bodies”.</footnote>
نفسه يخرج على مواطأة حتى تخرج من كل جزء من أجزاء الجسم المُبْصَر معاً أجسامً صغار
فتلقى البصر معاً، وتتساوى في سرعة الحركة، حتى أنها تحفظ في أبعاد ما بينها الوضع
والشكل اللذين كانت عليهما: ولا أقول تجري مجرى الهذيان؟ (4) وأنا أقول: ذلك همّ وهذيان
على ما ذكرَ، لأن تلك الأجسام الصِّغار التي تخرج عن المرئي لا تخلوا من أن يكون التمثال
الواقع منها في العين على قدر المرئي أو أكبر منه أو أصغر. فإن كان على قدر المرئي –
تخيلًا – فغايَة الشناعة أن يقع في العين قدر ذلك. وإن كان التمثال أكبر من المرئي فالشناعة
ها هنا مضاعفة. وإن يكن أصغر منه فلم يكن لتصحَّ لنا رؤية شيء على حقيقة قدره. ونحن
ندرك الأشياء على حقيقة أقدارها فليس ما توهمه من هذا الرأي حقاً. (5) وأيضاً فلا يخلو
الشيء المرئي من أن يكون الخارج منه تمثالاً واحداً، أو تماثيل كثيرة، فإن يكون واحداً ووقع
بصر الناظر إليه وبحضرته عشرة آلاف ناظر وما فوقه، فواجب ألا يراه واحد منهم إلا ذلك
الواحد الذي اتفق له أن يتأتي إلى بصره بأي حال كان ذلك الاتفاق، (و> ما دام ذلك الواحد يراه
فكان يجب ألا يراه بكلتي عينيه بل بإحدهما ونحن نجده يرى بكلتي عينيه، ونراه مع رؤيته
عشرة آلاف فصاعداً، فليس الخارج عنه تمثالاً واحداً. (6) وإن تكون تماثيل كثيرة فكان يجب
على حاله أن يرى الإنسان الواحد شيئاً شيئاًين، لأن له عينين، فكان يقع في كل عين واحد من
 تلك التماثيل الكثيرة ونحن نجده يدرك الشيء الواحد واحداً، فهذا الظن خُلف لا يمكن.
(7) وأيضاً فلو أخذنا هذا المذهب على قبجه وشناعته، لما وجب لنا أن نعلم وضع المرئي ولا
بعده ولا شكله. وأعجب من ذلك على ما أرشد إليه جالينوس أن يكون المرئي مثلاً عصفوراً
وبحضرته عشرة آلاف ناظر إليه، وقد خرج من ذلك العصفور على مذهبهم من التماثيل عدد
الأعين الناظرة إليه. أليس كان ينقص من ذلك العصفور؟ أما فمبلغ ظنّي أنه لو كان فيلاً لفنيَ
فكيف عصفوراً؟

G16. Abū Bakr al-Rāżī, Doubts about Galen 5.4 (26,9–10 Koetschet)

قال جالينوس: لو كان اللون وحده يتأتي البصر بتوسَّط الهواء المحيط، لم تتحج العين أن تتحرك
ولا كنا نعلم مقدار عظم الشيء وبعده وشكله.

<footnote>فليس MS Rıḍawī [فليس 19 عليه رَسُولُ اللهِ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ 9 جزء موطاهُ MS Rıḍawī [عليهما 9 رَسُولُ اللهِ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ] MS Rıḍawī [كثيرeria خارجه MS Rıḍawī [الخارج فليس</footnote>
body together and reach the sight together, and that they would have the same speed, so that they would maintain through the distances between them their [relative] position and the shape that they had: I am expected not to say this is completely delirious?" (4) For my part, I (i.e. Abū al-‘Alā) say that this is foolish and laughable, according to what he (i.e. Galen) has said, because the atoms emitted from the visible object produce an image that enters the eye, and (this image) is necessarily either the size of the visible object, or larger, or smaller. If it is the size of the visible object – let's imagine – then it would be quite infamous [to say] that it would enter the eye with that size. If the image were larger than the visible object, that would be twice as infamous. And if it were smaller [than the object], then it would not be validated that we see things according to their actual size. But we apprehend things according to their actual size. So what this doctrine leads us to suppose is not correct. (5) Similarly, what comes from the visible object is necessarily a single image, or several images. If it is a single image, and the sight of one spectator sets on it in the presence of ten thousand spectators, or even more, then none of them would see it, except the one whose sight the image would come to, in any way whatsoever. And as long as this [spectator] was seeing it, it would be necessary for him not to see it with his two eyes, but with only one of them. Now, we know that he (i.e. the spectator) sees it with his two eyes, and we know that ten thousand people and even more can see it at the same time. So what come from [the visible object] is not a single image. (6) If it is several images, then it is necessary for a man in his original state to see the thing in duplicate, for he has two eyes, and therefore, one of these several images enters each of these two eyes. But we know that he sees the thing as a single intem. Therefore, this supposition (i.e. that several images are emitted by objects) is contrary [to what is], and is not possible. (7) In the same way, if we followed the infamous and pernicious arguments of this group, we would not necessarily know the location of the visible thing, and neither its distance or shape. More astonishing than that, according to what Galen indicates, if the visible object were a bird, for example, and ten thousand spectators looked at it at the same time, there would be as many images coming from this bird, according to this group, as there are eyes looking at it. Wouldn't the bird shrink as a result? I've come to think that if it were an elephant, it would disappear, even more so a bird! (Ko [C-H])

**G16. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 5.4**

Galen says: If colour alone reached the sight through the mediation of the surrounding air, the eye would not need to move, and we would not know the size of the thing, its distance and its shape. (Ko [C])

<footnote n="12">12 the same speed] Cf. DL X.61 (770,731 Dorandi): “atoms must be of the same speed (ἰσοταχεῖς”).
13–14 relative position] Cf. DL X.48 (763,588–589 Dorandi): “preserving the position and arrangement of the atoms (τὴν ... θέσιν καὶ τάξιν τῶν ἀτόμων)”. 25–26 ten thousand spectators] Cf. PHP VII.5.3 (454,4 De Lacy / V.618 K). G16, 1–3 Cf. G17, 23–26.</footnote>
G17. Abū al-‘Alā' ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 9.4–6, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 9a, ll. 3–26 (Koetschet-Rajab)

(1) قال أبو العلاء بن زهر إن جالينوس لمَا أبطل القولين اللذين يعمَّهما أن البصر لا يكون بتوسط الهواء أصلاً، الذي أحدهما إن البصر إنما يكون بنفوذ شيء من المرئي إلى البصر والثاني إنه إنما يكون بنفوذ شيء من المُبْصر إلى المرئي. قصد هاهنا إلى النظر في الأقوال التي يعمَّها أن البصر يكون بتوسط معونة الهواء، (2) فقال إن معونته على ذلك إما بأن يتغيَّر وإما بأن لا يتغيَّر، وهو باقٍ على الحال التي كان عليها. (3) لكنه إن كان يتغيَّر فإن تغييره إما من البصر وإما من المبصر وإما منهما جميعاً. (4) وإن كان يبقى على حالته التي كان عليها، لكنه يعرض له شبيه بما يعرض للعكازة التي يميَّز بها الصلب من اللين. فأبطل أن يكون إدراك المبصر على نحو ما يدرك الصلب من اللين بالعكازة، بما نجده من أن البصر ليس يقع بعد قياس بل بأول وهلة. والعكاز إنما يعلم بها ما تلقاه بعد استعمالنا الذهن في الحالة التي نجده تلقاه؛ فإن لقينا بها جسماً ينضغط أمامها علمنا أن ذلك الانضغاط لرطوبته أو لتخلخل أجزائه، وإن لم ينضغط علمنا أنه لصلابته أو لتمدده. والبصر ليس على هذه الصفة. وأيضاً إنما نجده من رؤيتنا الأكوان والوضع والبعد والمقدار والشكل. (5) وأبطل أيضاً القول بأن البصر يكون باستحالة الهواء من المرئيات، فينفذ ذلك على الاتصال حتى يبلغ إلى آلة البصر، فبأنه لو كان ذلك، لما علمنا مقدار المبصرات ولا وضعها ولا بعدها ولا شكلها، ولم تكن تحتاج العين إلى <古文> أن <古文> تتحرَّك في وقت من الأوقات، إذ كانت إنما يصير إليها اللون وحده بتوسط
**G17. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 9.4–6**

(1) Abū al-‘Alā ibn Zuhr says: Galen, once he has done away with the two theses which have in common [the claim] that sight is not mediated by air at all – the first thesis, that sight occurs only because something travels from the visible object to the sight, and the second, that it occurs only because something travels from the viewer to the visible object –, then begins to examine the theses which have in common the claim that the sight is mediated with the assistance of the air. (2) He says that the air provides this assistance either by undergoing a change or without undergoing a change and remaining in the same state as before. (3) But if it undergoes a change, then its change is caused either by sight, or by the visible object, or by both. (4) Supposing the air remains in the same state as before but that sight occurs because of something similar to what happens with a stick by which one distinguishes the soft from the hard, [Galen] then does away with [the claim] that apprehending the visible object takes place in the same way as distinguishing the soft from the hard, for we find that sight does not occur as a result of reasoning but immediately. For by means of the stick, we know what has come into contact with it only when we have used our reason each time we find that the stick has come into contact with the object: if we encounter through it [i.e. the stick] a body that compresses in front of it, we know that this compression is due to its moisture or the fact that its parts are loosely combined. And if it does not compress, we know that it is because of its hardness or its extension. However, sight does not fit this description. Moreover, we find the existence, location, distance, size and shape through vision. (5) It equally does away with the doctrine that vision proceeds by the transformation of the air under the effect of visible things, [transformation] which is transmitted continuously until it reaches the organ of sight. In fact, if it were so, we would not know the size of the things seen, nor their location, nor their distance, nor their shape, and the eye would not need to move at any time, if colour alone reached it

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G17, 3 sight¹...sight²] Epicurean view; cf. DL X.49 (763,597–601 Dorandi); LS 15A(7): “For external objects would not imprint their own nature, of both colour and shape, by means of the air between us and them...” 4–5 something...object] Cf. DL X.49 (763,601–2 Dorandi); LS 15A(7): “...or by means of rays or of any effluences passing from us to them”; cf. Arist. *De sensu* 2, 438a25–27. See Aët. IV.13.5–6 and 10, on Hipparchus, Pythagoras, and “some Academics”; Alex. Aphr. *Mantissa* 9 (127,31–130,12 Bruns–Sharples). Galen’s actual target, however, could be Euclid; cf. Mansfeld–Runia, *Aëtiana* V.3, p. 1635; Sharples, *Alexander Aphrodisiensis*, p. 185. 7 without...change²] Stoic view; see *PHP* VII.7.20 (474,8–12 De Lacy / V.642 K). 11 with a stick] See *PHP* VII.5.41 (460,29–30 De Lacy / V.627 K); VII.7.20 (474,8–12 De Lacy / V.642 K); Hunayn, *Ten treatises of the eye* 3, ed. Meyerhof, Ar. p. 109 (Engl. p. 37). The theory goes back to Chrysippus: cf. DL VII.157 (568,1361–1366 Dorandi / LS 53N, SVF II.867). See further Alex. Aphr. *Mantissa* 10 (130,14–17 Bruns–Sharples). 15 reason] See *PHP* VII.6.24 (466,27 De Lacy / V.634 K) = above, D3, 15. 17–18 compression...combined] See *PHP* VII.6.25 (466,30–32 De Lacy / V.634 K), on touch and taste. 20–21 existence...vision¹] Cf. D1, 7–12. 21–22 vision²...things] Aristotelian doctrine; see *PHP* VII.7.22 (474,15–17 De Lacy / V.643 K); and the criticism in *PHP* VII.5.33–40 (460,4–28 De Lacy / V.625–627 K = D1 above) and *PHP* VII.7.4–15 (470,13–472,24 De Lacy / V.638–641 K), partly quoted above, D2, 9–31). See also Aët. IV.13.3–4, on Strato and Aristarchus. 23–26 Cf. G16, 1–3.
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الهواء المحيط، وذلك أنه : لم يكن ليعلم وضع الأشياء في أيّ موضع هي، لو لم يكن تعرّفنا لها إنّما يقع في الموضع الذي هي فيه. ولم يكن يمكن أن يحسّ بالبعد فيما بيننا وبين الشيء المُبْصَر، لو لم يكن بعد الروح الباصرة ذلك البعد كلّه بتوسط الهواء المنير إلى أن يبلغ إلى المرئي. و[لو] لم تكن تعرف مقادير الأشياء المبصرة من غير <أن> تغشاها حتى تحتوي عليها بكُلّيّتها.

G18. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 5.5 (28,6–7 Koetschet)

ثم أتى جالينوس بأشياء يروم أن ينتج منها أنه يخرج من العين ويبرز عنها جوهر منير. منها قوله إنّ ما كان من الحيوان كثير ضياء العين فإنه إذا نظر نحو أنفه.

G19. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 5.5 (28,10–11 Koetschet)

منها ما قال إنه يعرض له ولكثير من الناس بعقب النوم الطويل، إذا فتحوا أعينهم، أن يبصروا ما قرب منهم هنيهة ثم يفقدون ذلك.

G20. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 5.5 (30,3–4 Koetschet)

ومنها قوله إنّ البصر إذا كلّ، كان دواؤه تغميض العين.

G21. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 5.5 (30,7–8 Koetschet)

ومنها قوله إنا إذا غمضنا إحدى العينين، اتسع ثقب الناظر من الأخرى، فيعلم يقيناً أنه يملؤه جوهر جسمي.
through the surrounding air. In fact, we would not know the location where the thing
is, if we did not come to know this thing only at the place where it is. And it would be
impossible to perceive the distance that separates us from the thing seen, if the
distance of the visual pneuma was not this entire distance through the intermediary of
the luminous air until it reaches the visible object. And one would not know the sizes
of the visible things, without surrounding them to the point of containing them in their
entirety. (Ko [C-H])
30

**G18. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 5.5**

Then he comes to the [signs] from which he hopes to conclude that a luminous substance leaves the eye and emanates from it. Among these is the claim that when animals with very bright eyes look at their nose, you see a circle of light on it. (Ko [C])

**G19. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 5.5**

Another [sign]: he [i.e. Galen] says that it happens to him and many other people that when they open their eyes after a long sleep, sometimes they see what is near them for a while and then lose [the sensation]. (Ko [C])

**G20. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 5.5**

Another argument: When vision becomes fatigued, the medication consists of applying a patch to one eye. (Ko [C])

**G21. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 5.5**

Another argument: If you apply a mask to one eye, the pupil of the other eye will dilate. One thus learns with certainty that a bodily substance fills it. (Ko [C])

<footnote n="29">29 distance¹...pneuma] Cf. PHP VII.5.7 (454,11–16 / V.619 K), where Galen describes the alteration of the air caused by the impact of the pneuma as being transmitted “to the furthest distance (ἄχρι πλείστου)”. This is different from saying that the pneuma itself travels the entire distance. Perhaps Galen changed his view or his view is slightly misrepresented by Abū al-‘Alā’. G18, 2–3 Cf. PHP VII.4.18–19 (450,36–452,7 De Lacy / V.616 K). G19, 2–3 Cf. PHP VII.4.17 (450,31–36 De Lacy / V.615–616 K). G21, 1–2 Cf. PHP VII.4.11–13 (450,10–22 De Lacy / V.614 K).</footnote>
G22. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 5.7 (32,14–15 Koetschet)

وأما قوله إنَّ هاتين العصبتين لمَا كان فيهما منفذ محسوس ولمَا كانتا تنبتان من بطيبي الدماغ نفسه، يجب أن يجري فيهما جوهر جسمي، فإنَّ ذلك غير واجب.

G23. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, Solution to the Doubts about Galen 9.7–11, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 9a, I. 26–fol. 9b, I. 6 (Koetschet–Rajab)

(1) فلَمَا أبطل هذا وجب ضرورة أن يكون تعزف الأشياء إما لأنَّ الهواء كله طبيعته القوة [وإن لم يكن للهواء] الباصرة التي فينا، وإما لأنه يستعيد هذه القوة بلقاء القوة الباصرة حتى تكون «طبيعته» هذه القوة. وإن لم يكن للهواء كله فهو لا محالة للمضيء منه فقط. (2) ثمَّ بين أنَّ الهواء يتغير بخروج ضياء البصر إليه <...> (3) فإنَّ كثيراً من الناس يرون أمام العينين في الظلمة ضوءاً متى غمضوا أعينهم مدة طويلة. (4) والرابع أنَّ هذا العصب الباصر بين العصب كله الذي يخرج من الدماغ فيه منفذ محسوس. (5) والخامس أنَّ هذا العصب وحده ينبت من بطون الدماغ. فلَمَا صحَّ له نفوذ شيء من العين إلى الهواء، صحَّ أنَّ الهواء ليس طبيعته القوة الباصرة، لكنَّهُ مستعدٌّ متهيء لقبول قوتها والتَّشْبِهَ بها.

G24. Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, Solution to the Doubts about Galen 10.5, MS Rīḍawī 13997, fol. 10b, II. 10–16 (Koetschet–Rajab)

ومما يجب أن ننبه عليه ما قلناه من أنَّ جالينوس قد بين في كتاب البرهان أنَّ العين يخرج عنها ويبرز منها روح نَّير بخمسة أشياء. وهذا الذي ذكرناه آنفأ يخْتَل لمن يحدَّ النظر أنَّه ليس من الخمسة، فنكون نحن قد تناقضنا، والجواب عنه أنَّ هذا الذي ذكرناه آنفأ داخل تحت الدليل الثالث من الخمسة وهو قوله إِنَّ كثيراً من الناس يرون أمام العين في الظلمة ضوءاً متى غمضوا أعينهم مدة طويلة ثمَّ فتحوها بعد لأنه من الاستدلال على وجود الروح النيَّر بحاسة البصر.

<footnote>G24, 4-5 [من — مدة] Cf. PHP VII.4.18–19 (450,36–452,7 De Lacy / V.616 K).</footnote>

<footnote>G23, 6 [منفذ] MS Rıḍawī مبعود</footnote>
**G22.** Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 5.7

As for what he says, namely, that since there is a perceptible perforation through the two optic nerves, and since [these nerves] are implanted in the brain itself, then a bodily substance must necessarily flow through them, this is not necessarily implied. (Ko [C])

**G23.** Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 9.7–11

(1) When he (i.e. Galen) did away with [these theses], it became necessary that [we came to] recognize things occurs either because the air in its entirety is of the same nature as the [visual] power within us, or because [the air] retrieves this power when it comes in contact with the visual power, it becomes of the same nature as this power. And if this is not the case for air in its entirety, in any event it is the case for luminous air. (2) Next, he explains that the air changes when the light of sight is emitted in its direction. (...) [lacuna] (3) Many people see a light in front of their eyes in the dark when they close them for a long time. (4) The fourth [sign] is that this optic nerve, of all the nerves that leave the brain, is the only one that contains a perceptible perforation.

(5) The fifth is that this nerve alone comes from the ventricles of the brain. So, once he established that something flows from the eye to the air, he established that the air is not of the same nature as the visual power, but that the air is ready to receive the power of the eye and become like it. (Ko [C-H])

**G24.** Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Zuhr, *Solution to the Doubts about Galen* 10.5

Among the things we must draw attention to is what we have said: that Galen has already shown by means of five [signs] in the treatise *On demonstration* that a luminous pneuma leaves the eye and emanates from it. Now, if someone were not thinking correctly, he might imagine that what we reported above is not one of the five [signs], and therefore that we likely contradict ourselves. But the answer is that what we reported above belongs to the third of the five signs: namely, that many people see a light in front of their eyes when they are in the dark, when their eyes are closed for a long time and then they open them. Indeed, it is an indication of the existence of pneuma based on the sense of vision. (Ko [C-H])

<footnote>G22, 1-2 Cf. PHP VII.4.4-10 (448,26-450,9 De Lacy / V.612-614 K). 1 perceptible perforation] cf. G23, 9. G23, 5-6 it...air¹] Galen's view; cf. PHP VII.5.5-10; 5.31-32; and 5.41 (454,8-27; 460,1-4; and 460,28-33 De Lacy / V.619-620, 625, and 627 K); below, G26, 5-7. 7-8 Cf. PHP VII.4.17 (450,31-36 De Lacy / V.615-616 K). 9 perceptible perforation] Cf. G22, 1; PHP VII.4.4-10 (448,26-450,9 De Lacy / V.612-614 K), partly cited below, G27. 13 become like it] Cf. PHP VII.5.41 (460,33 De Lacy / V.627 K): συνεξομοιώσει. Cf. G26, 1-2. G24, 4 above] G23, 7-8.</footnote>
G25. Galenus, *De usu partium* XVI.3 (II.384,13–21 Helmreich / IV.275 K)

ὥστ', εἰ βουληθείης ἐπὶ σχολῆς πολλῆς βασανίσαι τὰς ἀποδείξεις, ἃς ἔπομεν ἐν ἄλλοις
τέ τισι καὶ τῷ τρισκαιδεκάτω περὶ ἀποδείξεως ὑπέρ τοῦ τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ὄργανον αὐγοει-
δὲς ἔχειν πνεῦμα διὰ παντὸς ἐπιρρέον ἐξ ἐγκεφάλου, θαυμάσεις τῶν ὀπικῶν νεύρων
τὴν κατασκευὴν κοίλων μὲν τὰνδον γενομένων ὑπέρ τοῦ δέχεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα, μέχρι δ'
αὐτῆς ἀνατεινομένων τῆς κοιλίας τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν.

5

G26. Galenus, *In Hippocratis Prognosticum commentaria* I.23 (236,10–20 Mewaldt / XVIIIb.72–73 K)

δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ὁπτικὸν αὐγοειδὲς ὃν ἑαυτῷ συνομοιοῖ τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε
κρυσταλλοειδοῦς καὶ τῆς κόρης ὑγρόν, λεπτὸν καὶ καθαρὸν ὑπάρχν, ὁμοιότατον τῷ
περιεχομένῳ κατὰ τὰ ὡά, ὦ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ὁφθαλμίας χρώμεθα. δέδεικται δ' ὅτι καὶ διὰ
τούτου τοῦ ὑγροῦ φέρεται τὸ πνεῦμα κατὰ τὸ τῆς κόρης τρῆμα πρὸς τὸν ἑκτὸς ἄέρα
συμπαγὲς αὐτῷ γινόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι τούτω τῷ άέρι συμφωτισθέντι χρῆται καθάπερ
όργάνω συμφύτω τοιούτω τὴν δύναμιν ὄντι, ὁποῖον ἐν τῷ σώματι τὸ νεῦρόν ἐστιν.
ἐπιδέδεικται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ τοὺς ἰδίους τῆς ὄψεως λόγους, ὡς ἐν τῷ τρισκαιδεκάτω
περὶ ἀποδείξεως καὶ τῷ ἑβδόμῳ περὶ τῶν Ἱπποκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος δογμάτων
ἔγραψα.

5

G27. Galenus, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* VII.4.2–4 (448,14–29 De Lacy / V.612–613 K)

(1) αἰ γὰρ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν εἰς τὰ συνεχῆ σώματα διαδόσεις τῶν ποιοτήτων ἐπιρροαὶ δυνάμεως ὑπ' αὐτῶν λέγονται, καθάπερ ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος άέρος ἐκ τῆς ἡλιακῆς αὐγῆς ὁρμηθεῖσά τις ποιότη(το)ς εἰς ἄπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος ἀφικνῆται διάδοσις, αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἡλίου μενούσης κατὰ χώραν· ἐπιδέδεικται γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως πραγματείαν. (2) οὐκουν οἶόν τε προχείρως ἀποφήνασθαι πότερον οὕτως ἐξ ἐγκεφάλου δύναμις ἐπιρρεῖ τοῖς μέλεσι διὰ νεύρων, ἤ τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος οὐσίας παραγινομένης ἄχρι τῶν αἰσθανομένων καὶ κινουμένων μορίων, ἤ μέχρι τινὸς ἐμπιπτούσης τοῖς νεύροις ὡς ἀλλοιῶσαι φορδρῶς αὐτά, κᾶπειθ' οὕτως τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως ἄχρι τῶν κινουμένων μελῶν διαδιδομένης. (3) ποιοῦτον γοῦν τι καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὁπτικὴν αἰσθησιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐδείχθη γιγνόμενον. ὅτι γὰρ ἐπ' ἑκείνων τῶν νεύρων αὐγοειδὲς φέρεται πνεῦμα τρήματα ἐχόντων σαφῆ κατά τε τὴν ἄνωθεν ἀρχὴν

5

10
**G25.** Galen, *The use of parts* XVI.3

Thus, if you wish to use a great deal of leisure time to test the demonstrations which we gave, among other places, in the thirteenth book *On demonstration*, about the fact that the instrument of sight has luminous pneuma continually flowing in from the brain, you will wonder at the structure of the optic nerves, having come to be hollow inside in order for the pneuma to be received, while extending up as far as the ventricle of the brain itself for the same reason. (C)

**G26.** Galen, *Commentary on Hippocrates’ Prognostics* I.23

For it has been shown that the optical pneuma, being luminous, assimilates to itself the fluid between the crystalline lens and the pupil, which is fine and clear, very similar to what is contained in eggs, which we also employ against ophthalmia. It has also been shown that pneuma travels through this fluid along the opening of the pupil towards the external air to which it becomes joined; but also that it uses air that is illuminated with it as if it were a connate organ having the kind of capacity that the nerve has in the body. This has also been pointed out in the arguments dealing specifically with sight, which I wrote in the thirteenth [book] *On demonstration* and the seventh [book] of *The doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*. (C-H)

**G27.** Galen, *The doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* VII.4.2–4

(1) They describe the transmission of qualities to continuous bodies by alteration as ‘effluences of power’, like in the case of the surrounding air, when the transmission of a particular quality, initiated by the light of the sun, reaches to every part of [the air], while the substance of the sun itself remains in place. For we have shown this in the treatise *On demonstration*. (2) It is certainly not possible to make an assertion offhand whether the power flows in this way from the brain to the limbs through the nerves, or the substance of the pneuma comes all the way to the sensing and moving parts or falls upon the nerves up to a certain point so as to vehemently alter them, and then in this way the alteration is transmitted as far as the moving limbs. (3) In any event, it has been shown in the [books] *On demonstration* that something like this comes to be in the case of visual sensation. For that a luminous pneuma travels in the case of those nerves, as they clearly have perforations both at the upper starting point and their

<footnote>G25, 4 the structure of the optic nerves] Cf. G22, 1; G23, 9. G26, 1–2 assimilates... pupil] Cf. G23, 13. 6–7 having...body] Cf. G23, 12–13. G27, 1 They] Galen ascribes this view to “those who say that the flow is by virtue of some power without substance”, see PHP VII.4.1 (448,13–14 De Lacy / V.611–612 K, trans. De Lacy). They are probably some Platonists; De Lacy (ad 448,15) mentions Plat. Resp. VI, 508b6–7. See further PHP VII.5.6–8 (454,10–21 De Lacy / V.619–620 K). 12 perforations] Cf. G22, 1.</footnote>
καὶ τὴν εἰς τοὺς ὁφθαλμοὺς ἔμφυσιν, ἐν ταῖς τῶν μεγάλων ζώων ἀνατομαῖς ἐστι θεάσα-
σθαι.

G28. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 6.1 (36,2–5 Koetschet)

وقال جالينوس في آخر هذه المقالة إنَّ هاتين القضيتين أوَّليتين بيَّنتين عند جميع الناس وهما أنه
لا يحدث شيء من الأشياء ممَّا ليس بموجود أصلاً وأنه لا يفسد شيء من الأشياء فيصير إلى
ما ليس بموجود، فلذلك القول عندهم أوَّل إن الجسم الأوَّل غير مكَّون وأنَّه غير قابل للفساد.

G29. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Doubts about Galen 15.17 (130,4–6 Koetschet)

وقال في كتاب طبيعة الإنسان وفي كتاب البرهان وفي غير كتاب إنَّ الجوهر الموضوع واحدٌ
لا يقبل الكون والفساد.

G30. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, The comprehensive book of medicine (5.45 Hyderabad)

من الرابعة عشر من البرهان قال: الطعام يبقى في المعدة مدة طويلة ويُعرف ذلك من الجشاء
ومن انتفخ المعدة ومن القيء قال: وقد تقيَّات مراراً طعاماً بعد أربع ساعات وسبع فكان بحاله
وسألت المصارعين متى يحسون بنزول الطعام عن معدهم فقال بعضهم : بعد خمسة عشر
ساعة وأقل وأكثر لكن غذاء هؤلاء لحم الخنازير ويخالف الأمر في ذلك بحسب الأطعمة
وبحسب حال المعدة وبحسب ما فيها من الأخلاط إلَّا أنه بالجملة قد يبطئ فيها زماناً طويلاً.

5

G31. Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, The comprehensive book of medicine (5.95 Hyderabad)

البرهان، الرابعة عشر: الحركة العنيفة بعد الطعام تدعو إلى القيء وتوجب ذلك وقد ذكرناه في
غير ما كتاب ولذلك يجب لمن يُلْزِم من يعتاده ذلك السكون بعد الطعام.
attachment into the eyes, it is possible to observe in the anatomical dissections of large animals. (C-H)

## Concluding Remarks

**G28.** Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 6.1

At the end of this book, he says: “These two propositions are two first principles evident to all people, namely that nothing is created out of that which does not exist at all, and that nothing is corrupted in such a way that it becomes that which does not exist. For this reason, the proposition that the first body is not generated and is not corruptible is a first principle for them.” (Ko [C])

5

**G29.** Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *Doubts about Galen* 15.17

In the treatise *On the nature of man*, in the treatise *On demonstration* and in other treatises, he says that the substance [that is] the substratum is one and is not subject to generation and corruption. (Ko [C-H])

## Book XIV

**G30.** Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *The comprehensive book of medicine*

In the fourteenth book of the treatise *On demonstration*, he says: “Food remains in the stomach for a long time. This is clear from belching, from the swelling of the stomach, and from vomiting.” He says: “I vomited food several times after four or seven hours and it was still intact. I asked wrestlers at which moment did they feel the food left their stomachs, and one of them said: after fifteen hours, more or less. Now these people eat pork meat, and this [lapse of time] is different depending on the type of food, on the stomach and on the humors in it. But in general, [food] remains in [the stomach] for a long time.” (Ko [C])

5

**G31.** Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *The comprehensive book of medicine*

*On demonstration*, in the fourteenth book: “Making a violent movement after [having taken] food leads to vomiting. We have already explained in another work that this is necessary. That is why whoever is used to this must remain calm after having taken food.” (Ko [C])

<footnote>G28, 2–4 nothing... exist] Cf. A15, 8–9. G29, 1 Cf. Gal. *HNH* I.7 (21,13–15 Mewaldt / XV.37 K). 2–3 Cf. G3, 1–2. G31, 3 this] I.e., vomiting.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_20.png" /></figure>
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<figure><img src="image_21.png" /></figure>

<footnote>Open Access. © 2025 Matyáš Havrda, Pauline Koetschet, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.</footnote>

<footnote>https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111571003-014</footnote>