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# Autism and Aphantasia: Investigating the Presence of a Specific Cognitive Profile through Case Studies

Clara Bled, Isabelle Soulières, Lucie Bouvet

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Clara Bled, Isabelle Soulières, Lucie Bouvet. Autism and Aphantasia: Investigating the Presence of a Specific Cognitive Profile through Case Studies. 2025. hal-05365955

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Autism and Aphantasia: Investigating the Presence of a Specific Cognitive Profile

through Case Studies

Autisme & Aphantasie : d'un profil cognitif spécifique à travers des études de cas

C. BLED*, I. SOULIERES**, L. BOUVET*

*Université Toulouse Jean Jaurès, Laboratoire CERPPS-E.A. 7411, Toulouse, France.

** Psychology Department, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, Canada.

**Corresponding Author:** Dr Clara Bled, Teaching and research associate, Jean Jaurès University, Toulouse, France. CERPPS Laboratory (EA 7411). 5, allée Antonio Machado, 31058 Toulouse, FRANCE. E-mail: clara.bled@univ-tlse2.fr. Tel : +33 (0)646 840 569.
Autism is often associated with "thinking in pictures," involving a more frequent use of men-
tal imagery compared to neurotypical individuals. However, aphantasia—the absence of vol-
untary mental imagery—has also been reported as more prevalent in autism. To further inves-
tigate this apparent paradox, the present study aims to assess the presence of aphantasia and
its specific characteristics in two groups: autistic and non-autistic individuals.

A total of 85 adults (43 autistic, 42 non-autistic) completed the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ), the Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire (OSIVQ), the Mental Rotation Test, and the Visual Pattern Test. The autistic group reported lower verbal abilities and demonstrated superior performance in visual pattern retention. No significant differences were observed between groups regarding imagery vividness. Within the sample, six participants (three autistic, three non-autistic) met the criteria for aphantasia, defined as a VVIQ score below 32. The cognitive profiles of the 6 individuals with aphantasia were analyzed across tasks. While spatial imagery abilities were preserved in some aphantasic participants, this was not consistent across all cases. Non-autistic individuals with aphantasia exhibited enhanced verbal abilities relative to their reference group—a pattern not observed among autistic participants with aphantasia.

Our study did not replicate previous findings indicating a higher prevalence of aphantasia
among autistic individuals, nor did it reveal a distinct cognitive profile within the autistic
group. Nevertheless, this exploratory work suggests that different types of compensatory
mechanisms may be involved in response to the absence of mental imagery in autistic versus
non-autistic individuals.

**Key words:** Aphantasia, autism, mental imagery, object and spatial imagery, verbal strategy
L'autisme est souvent associé à une « pensée en images », caractérisée par un usage plus fré-
quent de l'imagerie mentale que chez les individus neurotypiques. Toutefois, l'aphantasie —
définie comme l'absence d'imagerie mentale volontaire — a également été décrite comme
plus fréquente dans les populations autistes. Afin d'explorer davantage ce paradoxe apparent,
la présente étude vise à évaluer la présence de l'aphantasie ainsi que ses spécificités au sein de
deux groupes : des individus autistes et non autistes.

Un total de 85 adultes (43 autistes et 42 non autistes) ont complété le Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ), le Object-Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire (OSIVQ), le Mental Rotation Test et le Visual Pattern Test. Le groupe autiste a rapporté des compétences verbales plus faibles, tout en montrant une performance supérieure en mémoire visuelle de formes. Aucune différence significative n'a été observée entre les groupes concernant la vivacité de l'imagerie mentale. Dans l'échantillon, six participants (trois autistes, trois non autistes) répondaient aux critères d'aphantasie, définie par un score VVIQ inférieur à 32. Les profils cognitifs de ces six individus ont été analysés à travers les différentes tâches. Bien que certaines personnes aphantasiques aient conservé des capacités d'imagerie spatiale, cela n'a pas été systématique. Les individus non autistes avec aphantasie présentaient de meilleures compétences verbales que leur groupe de référence — un schéma non retrouvé chez les participants autistes aphantasiques.

Notre étude n'a pas reproduit les résultats précédents indiquant une prévalence plus élevée de
l'aphantasie chez les personnes autistes, ni mis en évidence un profil cognitif distinct au sein
de ce groupe. Néanmoins, ce travail exploratoire suggère que des mécanismes compensatoires
différents pourraient être mobilisés face à l'absence d'imagerie mentale, selon que l'on soit
autiste ou non.

**Mots-clefs** : Aphantasie, autisme, imagerie objet et spatiale, mémoire de travail visuelle.
Mental imagery is defined as the evocation of a representation and its associated sensory information without a direct external stimulus (Pearson et al., 2015). Manifestations of mental imagery can be heterogenous from one individual to another. For some, visual mental imagery is exceptionally strong and almost as vivid as real perception (i.e. hyperphantasia), while for others, it is very blurry or even completely absent (i.e. aphantasia) (Zeman et al., 2015, 2016, 2020). Autism is a condition in which a superior use of visual representation has been reported compared to typical individuals (Bled et al., 2021), thus suggesting a hyperphantasic profile. However, a recent study has suggested a link between aphantasia and autistic traits (Dance et al., 2021; King et al., 2024). The aim of this exploratory study was to evaluate more precisely the presence and the characteristics of aphantasia in autistic individuals.

While visual mental imagery has long been considered unitary, some studies have described two distinct types of visual mental imagery, 'object' imagery and 'spatial' imagery (Kozhevnikov et al., 2002; Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2009; Kolloffel, 2012). Object mental imagery enables the creation of detailed and vivid representations of objects and scenes, including colors, shapes, and intricate details (Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006). In contrast, spatial imagery involves schematic representations of objects, patterns, and their spatial relationships, allowing the visualization of spatial relationships and dynamic transformations of elements (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2009). These two types of imagery are supported by distinct visual neural pathways: the ventral pathway, linked to visual object abilities, and the dorsal pathway, associated with visuospatial tasks (Goodale & Milner, 2018; Lamm et al., 2007; Motes et al., 2008).

Research on aphantasia has confirmed that spatial imagery and object imagery rely on different cognitive processes. Aphantasia is often identified by low scores on the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) and aphantasic individuals typically report an inability to visualize detailed features of objects, such as colors, shapes, and textures. Using the Object
and spatial imagery questionnaire, most studies find a difference on the object dimension but not on the spatial dimension of the questionnaire between aphantasic and non aphantasic groups (Bainbridge et al., 2021; Dawes et al., 2020; Keogh & Pearson, 2018 but see also Purkart et al., 2025). This difference is also observed with behavioural experiments. Indeed, visuospatial working memory is found to be intact in aphantasia (Keogh & Pearson, 2018). Moreover, aphantasic individuals performed similarly to controls on tasks involving the retention and manipulation of visuospatial information (Zeman et al., 2015; Zeman et al., 2016). Furthermore, aphantasics were able to navigate familiar environments and solve spatial problems effectively (Zeman et al., 2016). However, during a mental rotation task, aphantasic individuals exhibited slower response times compared to individuals with typical visual imagery (Zeman et al., 2015). Group differences in response time were apparent in the subgroup of aphantasic participants with severe deficits in visual imagery (VVIQ score ≤ 16) even if they performed equally. This indicates that aphantasic individuals may employ different cognitive processes than those with typical visual imagery to hold and manipulate spatial information in short-term memory (Zeman et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2022).

At the first glance, autism and aphantasia do not seem to be related. Indeed, superior visuospatial abilities have been reported in autism (Bertone et al., 2005; Muth et al., 2014). Additionally, a distinctive 'way of thinking,' such as 'thinking in pictures,' has often been described in autism (Grandin, 2009; Kunda & Goel, 2011). This visual cognitive style is often proposed in individuals with autism, both as a general trait and in connection with language difficulties. Indeed, communication challenges are a core feature of autism (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and delays in language development are common (Tager-Flusberg et al., 2005). Some results support the hypothesis of a visual cognitive style. Indeed, autistic individuals report using visual mental representations more frequently than typical individuals (Bled et al., 2021; Hurlburt et al., 1994; Hare et al., 2015) and exhibit enhanced mental im-
agery (Falter et al., 2008; Hamilton et al., 2009; Pearson et al., 2016; Soulières et al., 2011; Bled et al., 2024a). A predominantly 'hyperphantasic' profile can thus be expected in autism. However, recent studies also evidenced a possible link between autism and aphantasia. Aphantasic individuals exhibit significant autistic traits such as weaknesses in imagination and social skills, even if they do not show higher attention to detail or difficulties in attention shifting and communication (Dance et al., 2021). Moreover, in an online study, the autistic group reported significantly lower imagery vividness scores compared to the non-autistic group, and a higher proportion of them met the criteria for aphantasia (King et al., 2024). These results may appear contradictory, but an explanation might be found in the particular sensory processing in autism. There is, in fact, a high prevalence of hypo- and/or hypersensitivity in autistic individuals across all sensory modalities (Robertson & Baron-Cohen, 2017; Tomchek & Dunn, 2007; Van Etten et al., 2017). Moreover, correlations have been found between the vividness of mental images and sensory sensitivity reported through questionnaires in both aphantasic and typical populations (Dance et al., 2021). This was confirmed through behavioral tests evaluating sensory reactivity (e.g., the pattern glare task) in aphantasic individuals (Dance et al., 2021). Hence, atypicalities in cortical excitability and sensory processing provide a potential neurological basis for some of the similarities observed between autism and hyperphantasia or aphantasia.

Questions then arise regarding the possible co-occurrence of aphantasia and autism and the specificities of aphantasia in autistic individuals. The aim of this exploratory study is therefore to evaluate more precisely the presence of aphantasia in autistic individuals and to explore its possible peculiarities. Our first objective was to assess whether our autistic group differed in imagery vividness and whether a higher prevalence of aphantasia could be observed, as reported in the study by King et al. (2024). Second, we explored cognitive specificities of participant with aphantasia and autism regarding the use of different types of mental
imagery: “object” imagery and “spatial” imagery as well as the verbal dimension. We also
explored their performance in visual memory and spatial manipulation tasks.

**Material and method**

**1. Participants**

Forty-three adults (46.5 % of women; age range 18 to 50, Mean = 30.67, SD = 8.59) with a clinical diagnosis of autism based on DSM criteria (either DSM-IV or DSM 5) were included in the analyses. Forty-two typical participants without any diagnosis of neurodevelopmental disorder were also included (52 % of women; age range 21 to 47, Mean = 27.95, SD = 5.70).

Four of the initial 46 typical participants had a score above the cut-off score of 14 in the Ritvo Autism and Asperger's Diagnostic Scale (RAADS 14; Eriksson et al., 2013), a 14-item self-report questionnaire, and were excluded. For details on the autistic participants and diagnostic information, see Bled et al. (2024b).

The two groups did not significantly differ in terms of age (mean difference = 2.72; t(83) = -1.75, *p* = .091, *d* = -0.37), education level (χ²(5) = 8.78, *p* = .118) or gender (χ²(1) = .01, *p* = .919). Groups were also matched on scores in Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM; Raven & Raven, 2003), which assess fluid reasoning and are a robust indicator of intellectual capacities in autistic individuals (Dawson et al., 2007), [Mean APM score for the Typical group = 26.24, SD = 5.94, Mean Autistic group = 25.23, SD = 6.86, mean difference = 1.01, t(83) = 0.72, *p* = .472, *d* = 0.16].

Recruitment was conducted simultaneously in Toulouse (France) and Montreal (Canada).
Participants were recruited by posting an advertisement in local clinical centers and
associations for autistic adults (Centre Ressource Autisme (CRA) Midi Pyrénées, Toulouse,
France, and Rivière-des-Prairies Hospital, Montreal, Canada), on social networks and forums about autism. Typical participants were recruited from the general population in both Toulouse and Montreal.

Exclusion criteria were the presence of an associated neurological disorder (epilepsy, severe head injury or other), IQ less than 80, uncorrected vision or the daily use of pharmacological treatment affecting mental functioning (other than antidepressants and anxiolytics).

## 2. General procedure

The protocol was carried out over two sessions of about 2 hours. Participants were tested individually. Three questionnaires, two mental imagery tasks and the Matrices task were completed by all participants in the same order as follows: Advanced Progressive Matrices, Ritvo Autism, Asperger's Diagnostic Scale (RAADS 14), Object Spatial Imagery and Verbal Questionnaire (OSIVQ), Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ), Visual pattern test and Mental Rotation Test. This protocol was included in a larger project, in which participants also completed other tasks and questionnaires.

The questionnaires were administered online using LimeSurvey© software (software linked to the secure network of the University of Toulouse). The Visual Pattern test, a computerized task, was created using the PsychoPy© software and was displayed on a 22" screen placed approximately 60 centimeters from the participant. All participants read an information sheet with explanations concerning the study and indicated their consent before beginning. A 50-euro gift voucher was offered to French participants and 80$ to Canadian participants. This study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of Toulouse University (#2019-139), by the Ethics Committee of Rivière-des-Prairies Hospital (Montreal, Canada) and is in accordance with the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
**The Visual pattern test** (Della Sala et al., 1999) is a computerized test assessing the maintenance (retention) of mental images. Participants were asked to memorize a sequence of increasingly complex checkerboard patterns (with half of the boxes filled), starting with a 2 × 2 grid (with two boxes filled) and progressing to the largest 5 × 6 grid (with 15 boxes filled).

The test consisted of two trials per level of difficulty, making 28 trials overall. Each pattern was shown to the participant for 3 seconds on the screen and then disappeared. A visual mask was then displayed for 500 ms. Participants then had to reproduce the pattern from memory by marking the correct boxes in an empty grid of the same size on a paper notebook (with no time limit). The maximum number of boxes that the participant correctly recalled at least twice was recorded.

**Mental Rotation Test** (MRT; Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978 French adaptation by Albaret & Aubert, 1996): The MRT is a paper and pencil test that assesses the manipulation of mental images. Participants compared drawings of three-dimensional geometric shapes with cubes.

Each item consisted of a target shape and four comparison shapes. Two of the comparison shapes were rotated versions of the target shape, and the other two comparison shapes were rotated mirror images of the target shape. Participants were to indicate which two of the four shapes were identical to the target shape. There were two parts with 10 items each and participants had 3 minutes to complete each part of the test. Two points were awarded for each item with 2 correct answers, 1 point if only one of the shapes was chosen and it was correct, 0 points if at least one of the two choices was incorrect.

**4. Data analyses**

We started with descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for both the autistic and typical groups. The comparisons statistics between the autistic group and the typical group on each task is performed with a T-test. Further analysis is presented elsewhere (Bled et al.,
2024b).

We then identified participants with “weak imagery” (16 < VVIQ score ≤ 31) and “aphantasia” (VVIQ score ≤ 16).

For all participants with weak imagery or aphantasia, and for each mental imagery score, we calculated the Z-scores using the formula:

$$Z = (X - \bar{X})/s$$

where Z is the Z-score, X is the participant's score, X̄ is the sample mean, and s is the sample standard deviation. Sample refers to the Typical group for non-autistic participants and the Autistic group for autistic participants. A Z-score value of 1.5 was considered as significantly different from the comparison group. To verify the significance of some results, modified T-tests were also performed using the SINGLIMS software, following the Crawford procedure for single-case studies (Crawford, Garthwaite, and Ryan, 2011).

Due to the small sample sizes, we were unable to perform statistical comparison analyses between typical individuals with weak imagery (n = 3) and autistic individuals with weak imagery (n = 3).

Analyses were performed using JASP software (JASP Team, 2023, JASP Version 0.17.3, https://jasp-stats.org).

## Results

### At the group level

The description of the Mean scores and Standard errors for the different tasks for both groups is presented in Table 1. No difference is found regarding the imagery vividness, (t(83= -1.01, p > .3), the spatial imagery (t(83) = -0.1, p > .9), the object imagery (t(83) = -1.23, p > .2), or
the performance at mental rotation task (t(83) = -0.37, p >.7). The only difference found concerns the verbal dimension of the OSVIQ, autistic participants reported lower abilities than typical (t(83) = 2.53, p = .013). Moreover autistic participants performed higher in the visual pattern, suggesting higher retention abilities (t(83) = 2.16, p = .034).

<table><caption>Table 1. Results of mental imagery tests for the Autistic and Typical groups.</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Typical group</th><th colspan="2">Autistic group</th><th rowspan="2">Between-group comparison</th></tr><tr><th>Mean</th><th>SD</th><th>Mean</th><th>SD</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>VVIQ Score</td><td>53.75</td><td>14.24</td><td>56.59</td><td>13.22</td><td>t(83) = -1.01, p = .320, d = -0.16</td></tr><tr><td>OSIVQ Spatial Score</td><td>63.67</td><td>18.38</td><td>63.96</td><td>16.54</td><td>t(83) = -0.10, p = .921, d = -0.04</td></tr><tr><td>OSIVQ Object Score</td><td>65.33</td><td>13.98</td><td>69.35</td><td>17.06</td><td>t(83) = -1.23, p = .221, d = -0.21</td></tr><tr><td>OSIVQ Verbal Score</td><td>70.08</td><td>14.42</td><td>60.9</td><td>17.28</td><td><b>t(83) = 2.53, p = .013*, d = 0.58</b></td></tr><tr><td>Visual Pattern Score</td><td>10.2</td><td>1.6</td><td>10.9</td><td>1.2</td><td><b>t(83) = -2.16, p = .034*, d = -0.47</b></td></tr><tr><td>Mental Rotation Score</td><td>18.4</td><td>8.5</td><td>19</td><td>8.3</td><td>t(83) = -0.37, p = .714, d = -0.12</td></tr></tbody></table>

(Significant differences are indicated with an *)

## Focus on participants with aphantasia

Among our 85 participants, we found that 6 participants, 3 autistic (6.9% of group) and 3 non-autistic (7.14% of the group), had score below the cut-off (VVIQ score < 32). Thus, the ratio of individuals with aphantasia is not higher in the autistic group ($\chi^2=0.0008, p >.9$) than in non-autistic group. When implementing a stricter cut-off for aphantasia (VVIQ < 16) we found that only one participant (T16, a non-autistic participant) possesses aphantasia and 5 possess weak imagery (VVIQ between 16 and 32).

In the following we provide characteristics of each individual as well as a short description of their way of thinking (extracted from an interview): Scores obtained by all 6 participants on the different tasks are detailed in Table 2.

- A02 (25-year-old autistic man, VVIQ = 25): "When I think about my thought patterns, it's like, like diagrams. Not so much images like photos, but flowcharts.".

- A18 (30-year-old autistic woman, VVIQ = 25): "I think in words [...] most of the time they
(i.e., mental images) are very blurry, like multiple images overlapping.".

- A27 (20-year-old autistic man, VVIQ = 27): "There are times when I can have images in my head and other times not... But before, at the beginning of my life, I never, ever had them.".

- T05 (25-year-old non-autistic woman, VVIQ = 19): "If I had to look for images, I can bring them back but with difficulty [...] I hear myself speaking in my head instead.".

- T16 (22-year-old non-autistic man, VVIQ = 31): experimenter: "If someone asks you to remind that you have to buy carrots, how would you remind it?" T16: "With my memory [...] I would probably see the word carrot.".

- T10 (23-year-old non-autistic woman, VVIQ = 16): "Well, I think I think more in words than in images because, let's say, if I make a grocery list, well, I'll remember that I wrote the word 'potato,' but I won't make an image of a potato in my head.".

<table><caption>Table 2. Summary table for the results of the different participants with Weak Imagery or Aphantasia.</caption><thead><tr><th>Participant</th><th>Group</th><th>Imagery</th><th>VVIQ</th><th>OSIVQ Spatial</th><th>OSIVQ Object</th><th>OSIVQ Verbal</th><th>Visual Pattern</th><th>MRT</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>A02</td><td>Autistic</td><td>Weak</td><td>25</td><td>72.72</td><td><strong>24.28*</strong></td><td>60</td><td>12</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>A18</td><td>Autistic</td><td>Weak</td><td>25</td><td>58.18</td><td>70</td><td>53.33</td><td>9</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>A27</td><td>Autistic</td><td>Weak</td><td>27</td><td>43.63</td><td><strong>34.28*</strong></td><td>46.66</td><td>9</td><td><strong>5*</strong></td></tr><tr><td>T16</td><td>Typical</td><td>Weak</td><td>19</td><td>56.36</td><td>51.42</td><td>77.77</td><td>12</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>T05</td><td>Typical</td><td>Weak</td><td>31</td><td>69.09</td><td>51.42</td><td>80</td><td>14</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>T10</td><td>Typical</td><td>Aphantasia</td><td>16</td><td><strong>25.45*</strong></td><td><strong>40*</strong></td><td><strong>97.77*</strong></td><td>11</td><td><strong>6*</strong></td></tr></tbody></table>

(Scores that differ significantly from the comparison group mean are indicated with an *)

For each participant, we compared their performance to that of their corresponding comparison group (autistic or non-autistic) using Z-scores. We present results of participants with weak imagery and aphantasia separately.

For participants with weak imagery (VVIQ between 16 and 32) and their different types of imagery (Object and Spatial Imagery), we found that two participants reported lower OSIVQ object imagery scores compared to their comparison group (Z scores between -2.64 and -1.05; ps < .05). However, all five participants had average OSIVQ spatial imagery scores (Z scores
between -1.22 and +0.52) and average OSIVQ verbal scores (Z scores between -0.82 and
+1.10).

As for *visual working memory*, four participants did not differ from their comparison group, showing average Visual Pattern scores (Z scores between -0.75 and +0.91). One participant even had a significantly higher Visual Pattern score: T05 (Z score = +2.58; t = 3.95, *p* < .001).

Regarding the *manipulation abilities of mental images*, four participants did not differ from control participants, displaying average MRT scores (Z scores between -1.20 and +0.48). However, one participant had a significantly lower MRT score: A27 (Z score = -1.68; t = -1.74, *p* = .043).

The aphantasic individual, T10, reported a significantly lower OSIVQ object imagery score (Z score = -1.72; t = -1.84, *p* = .048) and OSIVQ spatial imagery score (Z score = -2.32; t = -2.15, *p* = .034), but a significantly higher OSIVQ verbal score (Z score = +2.13; t = 1.90, *p* = .032) compared to control participants. This participant had preserved visual working memory with an average Visual Pattern score (Z score = +0.08). However, she exhibited significantly lower manipulation abilities with a lower MRT score compared to control participants (Z score = -1.56; t = -1.61, *p* = .052).

Z scores of all six participants for the different tasks are presented in Figure 1 et 2.

<caption>Figure 1. Z scores for the OSIVQ scores for the six participants compared to their respective comparison groups.</caption>
<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2. Z-scores for the Visual Pattern test and the Mental Rotation Test (MRT) for the six participants compared to their respective comparison groups.</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /></figure>
Finally, autistic and non-autistic individuals with "weak imagery" did not seem to differ from one another. The only score that appears to differ between autistic and non-autistic participants with "weak imagery" was the OSIVQ verbal score. Non-autistic participants with "weak imagery" had higher verbal scores (Mean = 85.18, SD = 10.96) than autistic participants with "weak imagery" (Mean = 53.33, SD = 6.67). Additionally, for non-autistic participants with "weak imagery", verbal scores were the highest compared to their spatial imagery (Mean = 50.31, SD = 24.44) and object imagery (Mean = 47.61, SD = 6.59) scores. Furthermore, the non-autistic aphantasic participant (C10) had a significantly higher verbal score than the Typical group (Z score = +2.13; t = 1.90, p = .032). This pattern was not observed in autistic participants with "weak imagery", who had low verbal scores equivalent to their spatial imagery (Mean = 58.18, SD = 17.54) and object imagery (Mean = 42.85, SD = 24.03) scores (see Figure 3). However, due to the small number of individuals with weak imagery or aphantasia in each group (n = 3), we were unable to stastically test this. However, the limited number of individuals with weak imagery or aphantasia in each group (n = 3) precluded any meaningful statistical analysis.

Figure 3. Mean Scores for participants with weak imagery: Autistic vs. Non-autistic across all tasks.
<figure><img src="image_5.png" /></figure>

Discussion

This study set out to investigate the intersection between autism and aphantasia, two conditions that recent research suggests may share cognitive and behavioral features. Previous findings have indicated that individuals with aphantasia tend to report elevated levels of autistic traits, while autistic individuals often demonstrate reduced vividness of mental imagery. Given this emerging overlap—especially in light of the frequent, yet paradoxical, characterization of autistic individuals as predominantly visual thinkers—it was essential to clarify the nature of their co-occurrence. The primary aim of our study was therefore to assess the prevalence and intensity of aphantasic traits in individuals with autism, with particular attention to imagery vividness. A secondary objective was to explore whether aphantasia manifests distinct cognitive characteristics when it occurs within an autistic population, compared to its expression in non-autistic individuals. No higher prevalence of aphantasia was observed in our autistic sample, and no distinct cognitive profile appears to differentiate autistic from non-autistic individuals with aphantasia, although the verbal dimension emerges as a promising avenue for distinction. These results are discussed in detail below.
A higher prevalence of aphantasia and reduced imagery vividness has been reported in autistic individuals (King et al., 2024). However, in our sample, we found no significant difference in the prevalence of aphantasia or weak visual imagery between the autistic and non-autistic groups. Furthermore, when applying a stricter cut-off for aphantasia (VVIQ < 16), only one participant—who belonged to the non-autistic group—met this criterion. These findings contrast with those of King et al. and open several avenues for further reflection. First, the two studies differ substantially in their methodologies. King's study was conducted online, and participants were included in the autistic group based on self-reported diagnosis or self-identification as autistic. In contrast, our study was conducted in person, and all autistic participants were required to provide formal documentation of their diagnosis. Online studies can introduce sampling biases, such as a reversed sex ratio or a later age of diagnosis (Rodgaard et al., 2022). Therefore, these methodological differences likely led to differences in the characteristics of the participant samples, which in turn may account for the contrasting results observed between King's study and ours. Second, this conflicting result underscores the complexity—and arguably the impossibility—of characterizing the autistic mind in a unitary way (e.g., as exclusively visual thinkers or aphantasic). In a recent study, we conducted a cluster analysis and found that although our autistic sample was more frequently associated with a visual cognitive style, a subset of autistic individuals demonstrated a predominantly verbal cognitive profile (Bled et al., 2024b). This suggests that more specific descriptors are now necessary to accurately characterize autistic individuals (including gender, age at diagnosis, language profile, the presence of comorbidities...) in order to describe and understand the full breadth of the spectrum.

The second aim of this study was to identify specific cognitive characteristics associated with aphantasia within an autistic population. Our results indicate that autistic and non-autistic individuals with “weak imagery” do not differ significantly in their overall cognitive perfor-
mance. However, due to the limited number of participants with aphantasia, it remains diffi-
cult to establish a distinct cognitive profile for autistic individuals with this condition. Inter-
estingly, we observed higher OSIVQ verbal scores in non-autistic aphantasic individuals
compared to their autistic counterparts. This suggests that highly developed verbal thinking
may serve as a compensatory mechanism in non-autistic individuals with aphantasia, allowing
them to perform comparably to typical individuals on tasks requiring visual imagery by rely-
ing on alternative strategies such as inner speech, verbal rehearsal, or logical reasoning
(Keogh & Pearson, 2018; Milton et al., 2021; Zeman et al., 2015, 2016). Moreover, it has
been recently proposed the existence of two main compensatory mechanisms in non-autistic
individuals with aphantasia: a verbal one and a spatial one (Delem, et al.,

2025). Neuroimaging research has shown that aphantasic individuals engage distinct neural
pathways during mental imagery tasks, such as mental rotation, further supporting the hy-
pothesis of alternative cognitive strategies and demonstrating cognitive flexibility in the ab-
sence of visual imagery (Dawes et al., 2020).

In contrast, our findings suggest that autistic individuals with aphantasia may not benefit from
the same verbal compensatory strategies. Autistic participants with “weak imagery” showed
low verbal thinking scores and did not differ from other autistic individuals in this regard.

This is consistent with prior evidence indicating globally lower OSIVQ verbal scores in autis-
tic populations compared to typical individuals (Bled et al., 2024b). While one might expect
that autistic individuals with reduced imagery would develop enhanced verbal abilities as a
form of compensation—similar to non-autistic aphantasic individuals—our data do not sup-
port this assumption. This absence of verbal compensation could be related to the generally
reduced use of inner speech and verbal thinking observed in autism (Bled et al., 2021; Hare et
al., 2015; Williams et al., 2016). Given previous result in aphantasia, it is also plausible that
autistic individuals with low imagery rely more heavily on spatial strategies instead. Further
research is needed on the cognitive profiles of autistic individuals with aphantasia, not only in the domain of mental imagery but also across broader cognitive domains. Indeed, it remains unclear how aphantasia may interact with broader cognitive functions within the autistic population. For instance, decision-making, which often involves weighing imagined outcomes or projecting future scenarios, may be influenced by the absence of visual imagery (Pearson et al., 2019). Similarly, social cognition—such as perspective-taking, interpreting nonverbal cues, or anticipating others’ mental states—could also be affected, given the potential reliance on internal simulation mechanisms that are compromised in aphantasia (Christian et al., 2014). Autistic individuals already exhibit distinctive cognitive profiles in these areas, and the co-occurrence of aphantasia might either exacerbate certain difficulties or lead to the development of unique compensatory strategies (Velikonja et al., 2019, Tei, S. et al., 2023). Understanding these interactions could provide valuable insights into the heterogeneity of autistic cognition and inform more tailored support strategies. Therefore, future research should investigate how the absence of imagery in autistic individuals influences complex cognitive and socio-emotional processes beyond the visual domain.

Finally, we found that most participants classified as having 'weak imagery' reported significantly lower object imagery scores, while their spatial imagery remained within the average range. These findings support the hypothesis of two distinct forms of visual mental representation: object and spatial imagery (Kozhevnikov et al., 2002; Kolloffel, 2012). Since aphantasia is typically assessed using the VVIQ, which measures the vividness of mental imagery and is primarily associated with object imagery (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2006), it is unsurprising that participants with 'weak imagery' demonstrated reduced object imagery scores. However, the participant identified as aphantasic (VVIQ = 16) also exhibited significantly reduced spatial imagery. This aligns with prior findings indicating that only individuals scoring below the VVIQ cut-off of 16 exhibit impairments in spatial
representation (Pukart et al., 2025). These results suggest that in cases of complete absence of
mental imagery, both object and spatial dimensions are compromised. This challenges the
proposed distinction between object aphantasia and spatial aphantasia, raising questions about
whether such subtypes of aphantasia genuinely exist.

Our study did not replicate previous findings suggesting a higher prevalence of aphantasia
among individuals with autism, nor did it allow us to identify a specific cognitive profile
within the autistic group. However, several limitations must be acknowledged, particularly the
small number of participants with low imagery abilities or aphantasia. This limitation hin-
dered our ability to precisely examine differences in cognitive processing between autistic and
non-autistic participants. Furthermore, only one participant met the more stringent cut-off for
aphantasia (VVIQ < 16). Despite these constraints, our findings raise important questions—
particularly concerning the potential use of compensatory mechanisms for the lack of mental
imagery, which may differ between autistic and non-autistic individuals with aphantasia. The-
se preliminary insights highlight the need for a more systematic evaluation of aphantasia with-
in the context of autism, to better understand the impact of imagery absence on this specific
cognitive profile.

Conflict of interest

The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

Funding

This work was funded by the French National Research Agency (ANR-19-CE28-0012).

Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

## Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the participants for their time and commitment.

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