in assets, the Chinese government blocked access to the website of Blomberg.

* I have been told repeatedly that the Chinese government prohibits discussion of "Tiananmen 1989" but this claim does not square with the fact that the photographs of "China Today" are freely available in mainland China without any VPN or similar software.

## Debasement campaigns

As observed earlier in this chapter, “Tiananmen 1989” is only one of the issues involved in the current information war. Also at stake is the image of former Chinese leaders, particularly Chairman Mao and Prime minister Zhou Enlai. Books tarnishing their reputation have already been published (in both cases by Chinese persons after they immigrated to the US). By so doing the objective is of course to blacken the whole history of China since 1949.

So far, the Chinese government has shown little awareness of an ongoing information war. The means that he started to implement have been purely cultural, e.g. the “Confucius Institutes” or the “China Global Television Network” (CGTN, formerly CCTV International); one can hardly expect that they will be able to change the attitude of western people whose opinions have been shaped by decades of China bashing. Moreover, these means of information will have no effect in China itself which is of course where the main battle will take place.

### Relentless long-term debasement campaigns

In an earlier chapter we have already observed that in order to sound convincing unfavorable comments made about a country must come from one of its citizens. This condition helps to understand why such operations require long-term planning. A few examples are described in Table 6.3.

It took the United States decades to build up credible stories and “theories” able to disparage Russian or Chinese leaders. Most of these stories were written by domestic writers.

* Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was a good contributor for the Gulag story. He emigrated to the United States in 1974 shortly after the publication of the “Gulag Archipelago” in Paris.

* Li Zhisui, chairman Mao's personal physician, was a good contributor for portraying him in a disparaging way in his book entitled “The Private Life of Chairman Mao”. Li emigrated to the United States after the death of Chairman Mao and wrote his book while in the US. After the book's publication, Mao's nurse and his personal secretary wrote a book in Chinese in which they rebuted several of Li's assertions.

* Gao Wenqian, who had been a researcher at the “CPC Central Party Literature
<table><caption>Table 6.3: Examples of campaigns of disparagement</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Year</th><th>Author</th><th>Title of book</th><th>Target</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>1944</td><td>Hayek</td><td>The road to serfdom</td><td>Economic planning</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>1947</td><td>Kravchenko</td><td>I chose freedom</td><td>USSR</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>1973</td><td>Solzhenitsyn</td><td>The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1958</td><td>USSR</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>1981</td><td>Furet</td><td>Interpreting the French Revolution</td><td>French Revolution</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>1994</td><td>Li, Zhisui</td><td>The Private Life of Chairman Mao</td><td>PRC</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>1995</td><td>Hicks</td><td>The comfort women. Japan's brutal regime</td><td>Japan</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>1997</td><td>Chang, Iris</td><td>The rape of Nanking</td><td>Japan</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>2007</td><td>Leonsis</td><td>Nanking (film)</td><td>Japan</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>2007</td><td>US House of Rep.</td><td>Resolution 121 (on comfort women)</td><td>Japan</td></tr><tr><td>10</td><td>2007</td><td>Gao Wenqian</td><td>Zhou Enlai</td><td>PRC</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: Calling these operations “disparagement campaigns” does not mean that they were not based on some elements of truth but rather that they were well planned campaigns characterized by the following distinctive features: (i) Most of the authors are citizens of the country targeted in their books (ii) Most of the books were written, translated, edited and published in the US. (iii) Translations into many languages were published soon after the publication of the English version. This table gives only a few examples. Since 1945 this procedure was used many, many times and it is still in use today. A more detailed description of case (1) can be found in Roehner (2007, p.117-119). It should be noted that such planned campaigns were also waged against non-Communist countries. In France one of the targets was (and still is) the Vendée civil war. Called a genocide (which, if this word has any meaning, it certainly was not), it is used to debase the Revolution itself. Note that apart from the Nanking film cited in the table there had been 5 other films on the same topic: (i) Black Sun: The Nanking Massacre (Hong Kong 1994) (ii) Don't Cry, Nanking (Hong Kong 1995) (iii) City of Life and Death (Hong Kong 2009) (iv) John Rabe (Germany 2009) (v) The Flowers of War (Hong Kong 2011). Incidentally, Resolution 121 was based on a book by Yoshida Seiji which was in fact complete fiction.

Research Center”, emigrated to the United States in 1993. While sheltered and paid by the university of Harvard, he wrote a disparaging biography of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in which the latter is presented as a sort of slave of Chairman Mao.

One could mention many other Russian or Chinese people which were employed by the United States in similar ways. All such cases required long-term planning over periods of times of several decades. First the collaborators had to be identified, then “recruited”, then brought to the United States. After that, the writing (and editing) of their book may have taken several years. Finally, after the book’s completion it had to be translated in as many languages as possible.

Incidentally such a procedure had already been used for Friedrich Hayek's book entitled “The road to serfdom”. It was published in 1943 and was soon followed by many translations (more details can be found in Roehner 2007, p. 117-119).

## How can one fight debasement campaigns?

### Ineffective ways
<table><caption>Table 6.3: Examples of campaigns of disparagement</caption><thead><tr><td></td><td>Year</td><td>Author</td><td>Title of book</td><td>Target</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>1944</td><td>Hayek</td><td>The road to serfdom</td><td>Economic planning</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>1947</td><td>Kravchenko</td><td>I chose freedom</td><td>USSR</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>1973</td><td>Solzhenitsyn</td><td>The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1958</td><td>USSR</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>1981</td><td>Furet</td><td>Interpreting the French Revolution</td><td>French Revolution</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>1994</td><td>Li, Zhisui</td><td>The Private Life of Chairman Mao</td><td>PRC</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>1995</td><td>Hicks</td><td>The comfort women. Japan's brutal regime</td><td>Japan</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>1997</td><td>Chang, Iris</td><td>The rape of Nanking</td><td>Japan</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>2007</td><td>Leonsis</td><td>Nanking (film)</td><td>Japan</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>2007</td><td>US House of Rep.</td><td>Resolution 121 (on comfort women)</td><td>Japan</td></tr><tr><td>10</td><td>2007</td><td>Gao Wenqian</td><td>Zhou Enlai</td><td>PRC</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: Calling these operations “disparagement campaigns” does not mean that they were not based on some elements of truth but rather that they were well planned campaigns characterized by the following distinctive features: (i) Most of the authors are citizens of the country targeted in their books (ii) Most of the books were written, translated, edited and published in the US. (iii) Translations into many languages were published soon after the publication of the English version. This table gives only a few examples. Since 1945 this procedure was used many, many times and it is still in use today. A more detailed description of case (1) can be found in Roehner (2007, p.117-119). It should be noted that such planned campaigns were also waged against non-Communist countries. In France one of the targets was (and still is) the Vendée civil war. Called a genocide (which, if this word has any meaning, it certainly was not), it is used to debase the Revolution itself. Note that apart from the Nanking film cited in the table there had been 5 other films on the same topic: (i) Black Sun: The Nanking Massacre (Hong Kong 1994) (ii) Don't Cry, Nanking (Hong Kong 1995) (iii) City of Life and Death (Hong Kong 2009) (iv) John Rabe (Germany 2009) (v) The Flowers of War (Hong Kong 2011). Incidentally, Resolution 121 was based on a book by Yoshida Seiji which was in fact complete fiction.

Research Center”, emigrated to the United States in 1993. While sheltered and paid by the university of Harvard, he wrote a disparaging biography of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in which the latter is presented as a sort of slave of Chairman Mao.

One could mention many other Russian or Chinese people which were employed by the United States in similar ways. All such cases required long-term planning over periods of times of several decades. First the collaborators had to be identified, then “recruited”, then brought to the United States. After that, the writing (and editing) of their book may have taken several years. Finally, after the book’s completion it had to be translated in as many languages as possible.

Incidentally such a procedure had already been used for Friedrich Hayek's book entitled “The road to serfdom”. It was published in 1943 and was soon followed by many translations (more details can be found in Roehner 2007, p. 117-119).

## How can one fight debasement campaigns?

### Ineffective ways
In an information war between two nations A and B the nation (let's say A) without an appropriate defense system will be powerless for while its leaders (as well as its entire history) will be tarnished and misrepresented it will be unable to defend itself. Thus, the process will continue until at last the people of A renounce to their own history that is to say to their very identity and become ideological vassals of B.

As already observed, the creation of Chinese cultural centers will not be an adequate response for it can only convince people who are already in sympathy with China.

Another ineffective method is to contest the facts used in the debasement campaigns. This was shown very clearly in the Kravchenko case. In 1950 the French Communist Party tried to oppose Kravchenko's statements in court by offering numerous testimonies to the contrary. The fact that this is not a good method can be seen in two ways. (i) The court sided with Kravchenko (ii) It is a well known principle of public relations technique that one should never try to counter the arguments of side B. Doing so, would mean waging a defensive battle which in fact will popularize the arguments of B. Instead, one should make the point that these arguments are too simplistic, that the real situation is much more complicated. This will spread confusion in the minds of the public and it will give A the role of a neutral arbiter.

In the Kravchenko case, instead of trying to negate his testinomy through opposite testimonies, it may be more convincing to expose the circumstances in which his book was written<fnref n="64" />.

He defected to the US in 1944 while being in an official position in Washington and after having had contacts with FBI officers. In other words, US protection was provided as part of a deal whose conditions remained of course confidential. Kravchenko wrote his book in collaboration with Eugene Lyons, at that time an anti-communist journalist involved in “Radio Free Europe” and who was also a supporter of the “House Committee on Un-American Activities” mentioned earlier in this chapter. Although this person received 40% of the royalties, his name does not appear as an author.

## Need of a deterrence force

Once it has been agreed that the previous methods do not work what else can be tried? A little reflection suggests that one possible method is to develop and set up a “deterrence force”.

What do we mean by “deterrence force”? According to the Free online Dictionary deterrence refers to measures taken by a state A to prevent hostile action by a state B. How can it be done in the framework of public relations campaigns?

The history of all nations contains uncomfortable truths. Usually, such episodes are

<footnote n="64">⁶⁴http://spartacus-educational.com/USAlyonsE.htm</footnote>
In an information war between two nations A and B the nation (let's say A) without an appropriate defense system will be powerless for while its leaders (as well as its entire history) will be tarnished and misrepresented it will be unable to defend itself. Thus, the process will continue until at last the people of A renounce to their own history that is to say to their very identity and become ideological vassals of B.

As already observed, the creation of Chinese cultural centers will not be an adequate response for it can only convince people who are already in sympathy with China.

Another ineffective method is to contest the facts used in the debasement campaigns. This was shown very clearly in the Kravchenko case. In 1950 the French Communist Party tried to oppose Kravchenko's statements in court by offering numerous testimonies to the contrary. The fact that this is not a good method can be seen in two ways. (i) The court sided with Kravchenko (ii) It is a well known principle of public relations technique that one should never try to counter the arguments of side B. Doing so, would mean waging a defensive battle which in fact will popularize the arguments of B. Instead, one should make the point that these arguments are too simplistic, that the real situation is much more complicated. This will spread confusion in the minds of the public and it will give A the role of a neutral arbiter.

In the Kravchenko case, instead of trying to negate his testinomy through opposite testimonies, it may be more convincing to expose the circumstances in which his book was written<fnref n="64" />.

He defected to the US in 1944 while being in an official position in Washington and after having had contacts with FBI officers. In other words, US protection was provided as part of a deal whose conditions remained of course confidential. Kravchenko wrote his book in collaboration with Eugene Lyons, at that time an anti-communist journalist involved in “Radio Free Europe” and who was also a supporter of the “House Committee on Un-American Activities” mentioned earlier in this chapter. Although this person received 40% of the royalties, his name does not appear as an author.

## Need of a deterrence force

Once it has been agreed that the previous methods do not work what else can be tried? A little reflection suggests that one possible method is to develop and set up a “deterrence force”.

What do we mean by “deterrence force”? According to the Free online Dictionary deterrence refers to measures taken by a state A to prevent hostile action by a state B. How can it be done in the framework of public relations campaigns?

The history of all nations contains uncomfortable truths. Usually, such episodes are

<footnote n="64">⁶⁴http://spartacus-educational.com/USAlyonsE.htm</footnote>
either completely ignored or kept at the periphery of the collective historical memory. In this way, it becomes possible for a nation to build up a fairly decent representation of itself.

On the contrary, if, through foreign (or, even better, domestic) interventions such uncomfortable episodes are continuously replaced at the center of the stage, it will make A insecure, and this feeling will in turn disrupt its assertiveness.

A deterrence force developed by *A* will consist in a set of stories about *B* which question the representation that *B* is forming of itself. Naturally, such stories not only must be true but they must also be presented in a way which can attract public interest. This supposes good story-telling skills and also the technical means for spreading the stories worldwide. Naturally, in order to sound convincing such an operation can only be done by *B* citizens.

Let us give an illustration.

As any government, the US federal government is supposed to protect its citizens, not to harm them. Yet, in the early years of the Cold War, thousands of US soldiers were exposed to nuclear radiations without protection for the purpose of testing the reactions of armed forces in a nuclear theater of war. This is a well known fact for even today surviving veterans get financial compensations<fnref n="65" />. However, this fact (as well as similar ones which concerned US Navy personnel or civilians) is rarely mentioned. In order to use such events as a deterrence would require the following steps.

1. To convince one or several US officers who took part in such exercises to conduct research in US archives.

2. To convince them to write a book, possibly in cooperation with a writer skilled in public relations techniques.

3. The next step is to have this book published in a foreign country (e.g. France) for it would be very difficult if not altogether impossible to publish it in the US. Once published, it should be translated into many languages and widely sold in many countries (this means a cheap sale price). In this respect, it can be remembered that after being translated into French (under the title "J'ai choisi la liberté") 500,000 copies of Kravchenko's book were sold in France.

One may wonder why Japan, an even closer US ally than France, was targeted. As an illustration, one can consider Resolution 121 passed on 30 July 2007 by the US House of Representatives about the so-called "Comfort Women" issue in Japan. Why was it passed at that moment? Here is a conjecture.

Mr. Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister on 26 September 2006 and only a few days later (on 7 October 2006) he devoted his first overseas trip to visiting Beijing and to

<footnote n="65">⁶⁵Of course, as in all similar cases, the number of harmed servicemen is not well known.</footnote>
either completely ignored or kept at the periphery of the collective historical memory. In this way, it becomes possible for a nation to build up a fairly decent representation of itself.

On the contrary, if, through foreign (or, even better, domestic) interventions such uncomfortable episodes are continuously replaced at the center of the stage, it will make A insecure, and this feeling will in turn disrupt its assertiveness.

A deterrence force developed by *A* will consist in a set of stories about *B* which question the representation that *B* is forming of itself. Naturally, such stories not only must be true but they must also be presented in a way which can attract public interest. This supposes good story-telling skills and also the technical means for spreading the stories worldwide. Naturally, in order to sound convincing such an operation can only be done by *B* citizens.

Let us give an illustration.

As any government, the US federal government is supposed to protect its citizens, not to harm them. Yet, in the early years of the Cold War, thousands of US soldiers were exposed to nuclear radiations without protection for the purpose of testing the reactions of armed forces in a nuclear theater of war. This is a well known fact for even today surviving veterans get financial compensations<fnref n="65" />. However, this fact (as well as similar ones which concerned US Navy personnel or civilians) is rarely mentioned. In order to use such events as a deterrence would require the following steps.

1. To convince one or several US officers who took part in such exercises to conduct research in US archives.

2. To convince them to write a book, possibly in cooperation with a writer skilled in public relations techniques.

3. The next step is to have this book published in a foreign country (e.g. France) for it would be very difficult if not altogether impossible to publish it in the US. Once published, it should be translated into many languages and widely sold in many countries (this means a cheap sale price). In this respect, it can be remembered that after being translated into French (under the title "J'ai choisi la liberté") 500,000 copies of Kravchenko's book were sold in France.

One may wonder why Japan, an even closer US ally than France, was targeted. As an illustration, one can consider Resolution 121 passed on 30 July 2007 by the US House of Representatives about the so-called "Comfort Women" issue in Japan. Why was it passed at that moment? Here is a conjecture.

Mr. Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister on 26 September 2006 and only a few days later (on 7 October 2006) he devoted his first overseas trip to visiting Beijing and to

<footnote n="65">⁶⁵Of course, as in all similar cases, the number of harmed servicemen is not well known.</footnote>
mending ties with China with which relations had declined sharply in recent times particularly because of Mr. Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Mr. Abe told reporters that he considered his visit to China a turning point that "will lead Japan-China relations to a higher level". Such a statement was certainly welcomed by the Japanese business community but perhaps not by Washington. Mr. Abe's visit broke a tradition among Japanese prime ministers of visiting Washington on their first overseas trip. One week later Mr. Abe's second visit abroad would be to South Korea. In short, with respect to relations with China, Mr. Abe's attitude in 2006 was very different from the position he took in 2012 when he became Prime Minister for a second time. One year later, on 12 September 2007 after a string of scandals had eroded his support, he announced his resignation. Resolution 121 may not have been an important element in Mr. Abe's troubles, but it was certainly a negative element because it signaled that the relations with Japan's closest ally were not good.

As a last word on this topic, is it not a pity that one has to design and set up deterrence campaigns? If the study of history would be conducted in the spirit of comparative analysis that we propose, there would be no need for such means. However, when one sees the history of France being re-written by US historians with a well-defined agenda it is difficult to remain unconcerned. In the long term this would lead not only to the undoing of history as a field of knowledge but also to the destruction of the sense of self-confidence in France as well as in other countries.

## Assessment of public relations performance

The introduction of the book about Zhou Enlai mentioned in Table 6.3 begins with the following sentence: "Of all the myths of the Chinese leaders, that of Zhou Enlai was the hardest to crack" which clearly suggests that the outstanding goal is to tarnish and blacken the reputation of all Chinese leaders. The terms used in reference to Chairman Mao<fnref n="66" /> are shocking even for non-Chinese readers for such terms would never be used in a scholarly book about any US statesman. Yet, it can safely be said that all great statesmen<fnref n="67" /> can be held responsible for brutal policies which resulted in thousands of civilian deaths. Yet, by explaining in detail what led them to such painful decisions, US media are able to exonerate them. On the contrary, by avoiding any real explanation of the actions of Russian and Chinese leaders, they are presented as monsters and pathological characters. As emphasized in Table 6.4 it is the predominance of US media which allows such disparaging views to be spread worldwide.

Regarding the ability to be trusted by its own citizens, one can cite the attitude of Chinese students with respect to government statistics. Very often I had to convince

<footnote n="66">⁶⁶E.g. "personal cruelties", "Mao's mercurial moods", "Mao's sadism".</footnote>

<footnote n="67">⁶⁷E.g. Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson</footnote>
mending ties with China with which relations had declined sharply in recent times particularly because of Mr. Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Mr. Abe told reporters that he considered his visit to China a turning point that "will lead Japan-China relations to a higher level". Such a statement was certainly welcomed by the Japanese business community but perhaps not by Washington. Mr. Abe's visit broke a tradition among Japanese prime ministers of visiting Washington on their first overseas trip. One week later Mr. Abe's second visit abroad would be to South Korea. In short, with respect to relations with China, Mr. Abe's attitude in 2006 was very different from the position he took in 2012 when he became Prime Minister for a second time. One year later, on 12 September 2007 after a string of scandals had eroded his support, he announced his resignation. Resolution 121 may not have been an important element in Mr. Abe's troubles, but it was certainly a negative element because it signaled that the relations with Japan's closest ally were not good.

As a last word on this topic, is it not a pity that one has to design and set up deterrence campaigns? If the study of history would be conducted in the spirit of comparative analysis that we propose, there would be no need for such means. However, when one sees the history of France being re-written by US historians with a well-defined agenda it is difficult to remain unconcerned. In the long term this would lead not only to the undoing of history as a field of knowledge but also to the destruction of the sense of self-confidence in France as well as in other countries.

## Assessment of public relations performance

The introduction of the book about Zhou Enlai mentioned in Table 6.3 begins with the following sentence: "Of all the myths of the Chinese leaders, that of Zhou Enlai was the hardest to crack" which clearly suggests that the outstanding goal is to tarnish and blacken the reputation of all Chinese leaders. The terms used in reference to Chairman Mao<fnref n="66" /> are shocking even for non-Chinese readers for such terms would never be used in a scholarly book about any US statesman. Yet, it can safely be said that all great statesmen<fnref n="67" /> can be held responsible for brutal policies which resulted in thousands of civilian deaths. Yet, by explaining in detail what led them to such painful decisions, US media are able to exonerate them. On the contrary, by avoiding any real explanation of the actions of Russian and Chinese leaders, they are presented as monsters and pathological characters. As emphasized in Table 6.4 it is the predominance of US media which allows such disparaging views to be spread worldwide.

Regarding the ability to be trusted by its own citizens, one can cite the attitude of Chinese students with respect to government statistics. Very often I had to convince

<footnote n="66">⁶⁶E.g. "personal cruelties", "Mao's mercurial moods", "Mao's sadism".</footnote>

<footnote n="67">⁶⁷E.g. Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 6.4: Comparison of the public relations performance of different states</caption><thead><tr><th>Class</th><th>Countries</th><th>1. Ability to convince its citizens that it is thrustworthy</th><th>2. Ability to fight off debasement campaigns</th><th>3. Ability to reshape the history of other countries</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>First</td><td>United States</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Second</td><td>Western countries, Japan</td><td>Yes</td><td>Very limited</td><td>No</td></tr><tr><td>Third</td><td>Eastern Europe, USSR, PRC</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>No</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: The table assesses the ability to conduct successful public relations campaigns either domestically or worldwide. In this respect one should remember that, in contrast to advertisement campaigns which are done openly, public relations campaigns must leave the public unaware of their very existence. In this sense it can be said that all political campaigns conducted in China

(see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_campaigns_of_the_Comunist_Party_of_China) were advertisement (in other words propaganda) campaigns, not public relations campaigns. As an example, one can mention the “Learn from Lei Feng” campaigns which started in 1963. As a matter of fact, at present time (2017) it can be said that there is no public relations industry in China. Whereas in many technical fields China was able to catch up with the west with remarkable success, in the public relations sphere it has remained powerless. With the advice of US professionals and for the cost of a few J-20 fighter aircraft, it would probably be possible to develop a fairly effective public relations industry. However, complete success would also require a worldwide media industry. Incidentally, Table 6.3 shows that, despite its extensive contacts with the US, Japan is in the same vulnerable situation as China with respect to debasement campaigns. By the way, the Wikipedia article cited above can be seen as an element in such a campaign in particular by its use of “estimated” [how and by whom?] death numbers. The term “Eastern Europe” refers to the formerly Communist European states outside the Soviet Union.

them that official data were in fact quite reliable. For instance, in the 2000s the growth rate data published in China were questioned not only by Chinese students but also by many western economists. Apparently, however, they did not care to analyze the data of imports from China published by the US Department of Commerce. Had they done so, they would have found that the GDP growth figures were in fact quite plausible.

## Destabilization and removal of foreign leaders

For the State Department the ability to remove unfriendly foreign leaders through public relations campaigns gives the guarantee that vassal states will remain faithful vassals. Actually, it even happens that leaders who are friendly to the US are removed in the same way, for instance because they had been in power for too long. A spectacular illustration was the removal of Egyptian President Mubarak.

### President Mubarak

For about 30 years Mubarak had been a close and faithful ally of the US but suddenly, in 2011, US media labelled him a dictator and President Obama decreed that he should leave. It is remarkable that the Wikipedia article entitled “Hosni Mubarak”
<table><caption>Table 6.4: Comparison of the public relations performance of different states</caption><thead><tr><th>Class</th><th>Countries</th><th>1. Ability to convince its citizens that it is thrustworthy</th><th>2. Ability to fight off debasement campaigns</th><th>3. Ability to reshape the history of other countries</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>First</td><td>United States</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Second</td><td>Western countries, Japan</td><td>Yes</td><td>Very limited</td><td>No</td></tr><tr><td>Third</td><td>Eastern Europe, USSR, PRC</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>No</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: The table assesses the ability to conduct successful public relations campaigns either domestically or worldwide. In this respect one should remember that, in contrast to advertisement campaigns which are done openly, public relations campaigns must leave the public unaware of their very existence. In this sense it can be said that all political campaigns conducted in China

(see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_campaigns_of_the_Comunist_Party_of_China) were advertisement (in other words propaganda) campaigns, not public relations campaigns. As an example, one can mention the “Learn from Lei Feng” campaigns which started in 1963. As a matter of fact, at present time (2017) it can be said that there is no public relations industry in China. Whereas in many technical fields China was able to catch up with the west with remarkable success, in the public relations sphere it has remained powerless. With the advice of US professionals and for the cost of a few J-20 fighter aircraft, it would probably be possible to develop a fairly effective public relations industry. However, complete success would also require a worldwide media industry. Incidentally, Table 6.3 shows that, despite its extensive contacts with the US, Japan is in the same vulnerable situation as China with respect to debasement campaigns. By the way, the Wikipedia article cited above can be seen as an element in such a campaign in particular by its use of “estimated” [how and by whom?] death numbers. The term “Eastern Europe” refers to the formerly Communist European states outside the Soviet Union.

them that official data were in fact quite reliable. For instance, in the 2000s the growth rate data published in China were questioned not only by Chinese students but also by many western economists. Apparently, however, they did not care to analyze the data of imports from China published by the US Department of Commerce. Had they done so, they would have found that the GDP growth figures were in fact quite plausible.

## Destabilization and removal of foreign leaders

For the State Department the ability to remove unfriendly foreign leaders through public relations campaigns gives the guarantee that vassal states will remain faithful vassals. Actually, it even happens that leaders who are friendly to the US are removed in the same way, for instance because they had been in power for too long. A spectacular illustration was the removal of Egyptian President Mubarak.

### President Mubarak

For about 30 years Mubarak had been a close and faithful ally of the US but suddenly, in 2011, US media labelled him a dictator and President Obama decreed that he should leave. It is remarkable that the Wikipedia article entitled “Hosni Mubarak”
does not say a single word about the public interventions of President Obama who literally asked him to resign<fnref n="68" />.

This was an impressive case of foreign interference but also an unusual one for most often such interference is channeled discreetly through (controlled) domestic media. A case in point was the removal of Prime minister Hatoyama in Japan.

## The Hatoyama-Ozawa case

<figure><img src="image_55.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 6.6 10 December 2009 in Beijing. Chinese President Hu Jintao shaking hands with members of a Japanese delegation led by Ichiro Ozawa which comprised 140 lawmakers. On the visit each of them was accorded a personal photo opportunity with Chinese President Hu Jintao. In 2010 Ozawa was indicted for falsification of political funding reports of campaign donations before being acquitted in 2011. Source: http://www.china.org.cn</figcaption></figure>

In December 2009, while Yukio Hatoyama was Prime Minister, the Secretary General of the “Democratic Party of Japan” (DPJ), Ichiro Ozawa, led a delegation of 600 Japanese, including 146 DPJ lawmakers from the upper and lower houses of the Japanese Diet, for a four-day visit in Beijing. President Hu Jintao called Ozawa “an old friend of the Chinese people”. During the visit President Hu said he and Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama improved their strategic relationship and opened a new era.

However, this ray of sunshine did not last. The reason is easy to understand. Japan is by far the most important US ally in East Asia. Therefore a close strategic relationship between China and Japan is seen as a disaster by the US State Department and simply cannot be tolerated. The easiest way to get rid of unwanted leaders is through financial scandals, real or fabricated.

In 2009 Ozawa was accused of falsification of political funding reports.

In January 2010 two of Ozawa's aides were arrested.

In April 2010 a prosecution inquest panel concluded that “it is highly likely that

<footnote n="68">⁶⁸Sometimes the French version of a Wikipedia article gives a more objective view but in the present case it is just a translation of the English article.</footnote>
does not say a single word about the public interventions of President Obama who literally asked him to resign<fnref n="68" />.

This was an impressive case of foreign interference but also an unusual one for most often such interference is channeled discreetly through (controlled) domestic media. A case in point was the removal of Prime minister Hatoyama in Japan.

## The Hatoyama-Ozawa case

<figure><img src="image_57.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 6.6 10 December 2009 in Beijing. Chinese President Hu Jintao shaking hands with members of a Japanese delegation led by Ichiro Ozawa which comprised 140 lawmakers. On the visit each of them was accorded a personal photo opportunity with Chinese President Hu Jintao. In 2010 Ozawa was indicted for falsification of political funding reports of campaign donations before being acquitted in 2011. Source: http://www.china.org.cn</figcaption></figure>

In December 2009, while Yukio Hatoyama was Prime Minister, the Secretary General of the “Democratic Party of Japan” (DPJ), Ichiro Ozawa, led a delegation of 600 Japanese, including 146 DPJ lawmakers from the upper and lower houses of the Japanese Diet, for a four-day visit in Beijing. President Hu Jintao called Ozawa “an old friend of the Chinese people”. During the visit President Hu said he and Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama improved their strategic relationship and opened a new era.

However, this ray of sunshine did not last. The reason is easy to understand. Japan is by far the most important US ally in East Asia. Therefore a close strategic relationship between China and Japan is seen as a disaster by the US State Department and simply cannot be tolerated. The easiest way to get rid of unwanted leaders is through financial scandals, real or fabricated.

In 2009 Ozawa was accused of falsification of political funding reports.

In January 2010 two of Ozawa's aides were arrested.

In April 2010 a prosecution inquest panel concluded that “it is highly likely that

<footnote n="68">⁶⁸Sometimes the French version of a Wikipedia article gives a more objective view but in the present case it is just a translation of the English article.</footnote>
Ozawa is an accomplice”.

In June 2010 Ozawa announced his resignation as secretary general of the DPJ.

Yet, in April 2011 he was acquitted by the Tokyo District Court.

In December 2009, it was revealed that Hatoyama received $4 million in donations from his mother that were improperly reported. As President of the DPJ, he was also affected by the investigation concerning Ozawa.

Then, on 2 June 2010, after several months of harassment by the media, he announced his resignation as Prime Minister. He had been in power for less than 9 months. He was replaced as Prime Minister by someone of the same party but who was much less friendly to China. He was never indicted with respect to the $4 million donation.

Obviously, both for Ozawa and Hatoyama the allegations rested on little hard evidence, but this was in fact unimportant. What counted was their amplification by the media. It is at this point that the role of the “Mighty Wurlitzer” is essential.

In such affairs the scenario is always the same: misbehavior allegations followed by harassment by the media until eventually the target is compelled to resign. Although in each individual affair it is almost impossible to know who really pulled the strings, the comparative analysis of their repetitions is usually more revealing. An example of such an analysis was given in Roehner (2007, p. 147-148).

In April 2012, less than two years after Hatoyama's resignation, the right-wing governor of Tokyo opened the Diaoyu-Senkaku affair. However, the dispute with China really started only in September 2012 when the DPJ government (that is to say of the same party as Hatoyama) nationalized three of the islands.

Then, in the general election of December 2012 the “Liberal Democratic Party” (LDP) came back to power through a landslide victory. This is the party who had been in power almost without interruption since 1946. Thus, for the US State Department the situation was back to “normal”. In fact, the situation was even “better” than before the Hatoyama episode because the Diaoyu-Senkaku dispute guaranteed a lasting rift.

## Conclusion

The hallmark of analytical history is to lead to testable predictions. But what kind of predictions can we expect? It is important to realize that there is a difference between what we may wish and what scientific exploration can provide.

### Analytical history is not astrology

For centuries it has been the wish of people to know what will happen in the future.
Ozawa is an accomplice”.

In June 2010 Ozawa announced his resignation as secretary general of the DPJ.

Yet, in April 2011 he was acquitted by the Tokyo District Court.

In December 2009, it was revealed that Hatoyama received $4 million in donations from his mother that were improperly reported. As President of the DPJ, he was also affected by the investigation concerning Ozawa.

Then, on 2 June 2010, after several months of harassment by the media, he announced his resignation as Prime Minister. He had been in power for less than 9 months. He was replaced as Prime Minister by someone of the same party but who was much less friendly to China. He was never indicted with respect to the $4 million donation.

Obviously, both for Ozawa and Hatoyama the allegations rested on little hard evidence, but this was in fact unimportant. What counted was their amplification by the media. It is at this point that the role of the “Mighty Wurlitzer” is essential.

In such affairs the scenario is always the same: misbehavior allegations followed by harassment by the media until eventually the target is compelled to resign. Although in each individual affair it is almost impossible to know who really pulled the strings, the comparative analysis of their repetitions is usually more revealing. An example of such an analysis was given in Roehner (2007, p. 147-148).

In April 2012, less than two years after Hatoyama's resignation, the right-wing governor of Tokyo opened the Diaoyu-Senkaku affair. However, the dispute with China really started only in September 2012 when the DPJ government (that is to say of the same party as Hatoyama) nationalized three of the islands.

Then, in the general election of December 2012 the “Liberal Democratic Party” (LDP) came back to power through a landslide victory. This is the party who had been in power almost without interruption since 1946. Thus, for the US State Department the situation was back to “normal”. In fact, the situation was even “better” than before the Hatoyama episode because the Diaoyu-Senkaku dispute guaranteed a lasting rift.

## Conclusion

The hallmark of analytical history is to lead to testable predictions. But what kind of predictions can we expect? It is important to realize that there is a difference between what we may wish and what scientific exploration can provide.

### Analytical history is not astrology

For centuries it has been the wish of people to know what will happen in the future.
The fact that elaborate astrological “models” were developed in all major civiliza-
tions shows that the wish to know the future existed in all times and on all continents.
In other words, it is quite natural that many of our readers would like to know what
the future will be. They are not really interested in some narrow facets of the future
that may possibly be predicted; instead they wish to know the global picture. Will
the future be good or bad? Will there be disasters or not, and so on? This is the kind
of information that astrology claims to be able to provide.

Those of our readers who have understood the way analytical history works know
that it can provide reliable predictions only for events which happened repeatedly in
the past. The larger the number recurrences and the more similar they are, the more
accurate the prediction will be. As, clearly, the global story has never occurred in
same form in the past it is outside the scope of analytical history.

Unless it is planned, the future is stochastic

Actually, there is good reason to think that there will never be a method permitting to
predict the future in the global sense that astrology promises. The reason is simple.
By definition the “future” consists in a succession of events. Even if at each step we
can make a prediction with a high reliability $p \approx 1$, for the whole story the reliability
will be poor. The more steps there are, the poorer the prediction will become. For
instance, if $p = 0.95$ after 30 steps, the end reliability will be $p^{30} = 0.21$ and after
50 steps it will be $p^{50} = 0.077$.

Probably the only way to “predict” the future with some certainty is to plan it. This
is what the psychohistorians of Isaac Asimov’s “Foundation” trilogy (Asimov 1951,
1952, 1953) were doing. They were manipulating the population and the leaders of
the Galaxy according to their own plans and through channels which did not allow
the persons to realize that they were manipulated. In such a way a stochastic system
becomes deterministic which means that *p* becomes equal to 1.
You can apply the same distinction to your own life. You may not be able to say with
certainty where you will be on the next day at noon because many unexpected things
may happen: a friend may call you or you may have lunch in your office because
you are too busy. On the contrary, if you are *planning* to take a flight from Beijing to
Paris you can say with quasi-certainty (unless the flight is canceled or there is some
other problem) that on the next day at noon you will be in Paris.

What did we learn which translates into predictions?

What did we learn in this chapter which can be formulated in terms of predictions?
It was shown that all well known features of cold war situations are already present
and will of course *continue in the future*.

1. The renminbi-dollar competition in trade and especially in oil trade.
The fact that elaborate astrological “models” were developed in all major civiliza-
tions shows that the wish to know the future existed in all times and on all continents.
In other words, it is quite natural that many of our readers would like to know what
the future will be. They are not really interested in some narrow facets of the future
that may possibly be predicted; instead they wish to know the global picture. Will
the future be good or bad? Will there be disasters or not, and so on? This is the kind
of information that astrology claims to be able to provide.

Those of our readers who have understood the way analytical history works know
that it can provide reliable predictions only for events which happened repeatedly in
the past. The larger the number recurrences and the more similar they are, the more
accurate the prediction will be. As, clearly, the global story has never occurred in
same form in the past it is outside the scope of analytical history.

Unless it is planned, the future is stochastic

Actually, there is good reason to think that there will never be a method permitting to
predict the future in the global sense that astrology promises. The reason is simple.
By definition the “future” consists in a succession of events. Even if at each step we
can make a prediction with a high reliability $p \approx 1$, for the whole story the reliability
will be poor. The more steps there are, the poorer the prediction will become. For
instance, if $p = 0.95$ after 30 steps, the end reliability will be $p^{30} = 0.21$ and after
50 steps it will be $p^{50} = 0.077$.

Probably the only way to “predict” the future with some certainty is to plan it. This
is what the psychohistorians of Isaac Asimov’s “Foundation” trilogy (Asimov 1951,
1952, 1953) were doing. They were manipulating the population and the leaders of
the Galaxy according to their own plans and through channels which did not allow
the persons to realize that they were manipulated. In such a way a stochastic system
becomes deterministic which means that *p* becomes equal to 1.
You can apply the same distinction to your own life. You may not be able to say with
certainty where you will be on the next day at noon because many unexpected things
may happen: a friend may call you or you may have lunch in your office because
you are too busy. On the contrary, if you are *planning* to take a flight from Beijing to
Paris you can say with quasi-certainty (unless the flight is canceled or there is some
other problem) that on the next day at noon you will be in Paris.

What did we learn which translates into predictions?

What did we learn in this chapter which can be formulated in terms of predictions?
It was shown that all well known features of cold war situations are already present
and will of course *continue in the future*.

1. The renminbi-dollar competition in trade and especially in oil trade.
2 The competition for high-value product markets.

3 The influence struggle in key countries as in Thailand.

4 Implementation of a containment policy through encirclement by vassal states (see also the chapter on containment).

5 The instrumentation of separatist groups in vital areas for the Silk Road project.

6 It was shown that the information war is already under way and is likely to intensify in coming years.

7 It was shown how the US dominance in the media industry can be used to shape public opinion worldwide. For instance Chinese economic objectives may be presented as a threat or the strength of Chinese armed forces may be overstated.

8 Another feature of cold wars is the multiplication of espionage cases on each side. Although we did not study this point in the chapter it can be observed that this has already started. In recent times several Chinese persons have been arrested in the US. For instance, Lieutenant Commander Edward Lin, a US Navy officer born in Taiwan, was charged in 2016 of passing military secrets to China and (more surprisingly) to Taiwan. Symmetrically, there have also been arrests of US citizens in China. Li Kai, a US citizen was arrested in the fall of 2016 for spying for the FBI. Another US citizen, Sandy Phan-Gillis, had been arrested in March 2015 and sentenced to three and a half years in prison.

As already said, in order to transform these general predictions into more specific statements one should analyze each case in detail. Thus, for the Gwadar case one would need to find information about previous separatist actions; one needs to know which form they took: bombing, shooting, stabbing, taking hostages and so on. Clearly such an analysis would go beyond the framework of the present book.

However, such a study would be quite useful for the Chinese companies which plan to do work in this area. That is why it might be a good idea to spend some time and efforts on such investigations. Such a study would tell the companies how to avoid serious incidents, including incidents which may result in the death of workers.
2 The competition for high-value product markets.

3 The influence struggle in key countries as in Thailand.

4 Implementation of a containment policy through encirclement by vassal states (see also the chapter on containment).

5 The instrumentation of separatist groups in vital areas for the Silk Road project.

6 It was shown that the information war is already under way and is likely to intensify in coming years.

7 It was shown how the US dominance in the media industry can be used to shape public opinion worldwide. For instance Chinese economic objectives may be presented as a threat or the strength of Chinese armed forces may be overstated.

8 Another feature of cold wars is the multiplication of espionage cases on each side. Although we did not study this point in the chapter it can be observed that this has already started. In recent times several Chinese persons have been arrested in the US. For instance, Lieutenant Commander Edward Lin, a US Navy officer born in Taiwan, was charged in 2016 of passing military secrets to China and (more surprisingly) to Taiwan. Symmetrically, there have also been arrests of US citizens in China. Li Kai, a US citizen was arrested in the fall of 2016 for spying for the FBI. Another US citizen, Sandy Phan-Gillis, had been arrested in March 2015 and sentenced to three and a half years in prison.

As already said, in order to transform these general predictions into more specific statements one should analyze each case in detail. Thus, for the Gwadar case one would need to find information about previous separatist actions; one needs to know which form they took: bombing, shooting, stabbing, taking hostages and so on. Clearly such an analysis would go beyond the framework of the present book.

However, such a study would be quite useful for the Chinese companies which plan to do work in this area. That is why it might be a good idea to spend some time and efforts on such investigations. Such a study would tell the companies how to avoid serious incidents, including incidents which may result in the death of workers.
# Chapter 7
## China-US confrontation, a scientific investigation
### What is to be expected in the years 2018–2025?

*The present investigation is an extended version of lectures given in the fall of 2018 in Beijing, Seoul, Kobe and Tokyo. It uses some of the figures already presented in previous chapters.*

## Introduction

Clearly, the most important word in the title is the adjective “scientific”. Presently, history can hardly be considered as a science (in the sense of being able to produce testable predictions). Actually, many historians may even disagree with the very notion that history can be made into a science.

The present attempt is based on the fact that the defining condition of any scientific investigation is replicability. Do the fall of apples and drops of water have something in common? If yes, can that help us to make a prediction for the fall of hailstones? This protocol is, in a nutshell, the approach of experimental physics when a new phenomenon is explored. The decisive requirement is replicability; otherwise, when the standard deviation of a set of observations happens to exceed the mean one observes nothing but noise. Actually, even in physics replicability is never perfect<fnref n="69" />. Thus, when we handle a cluster of similar historical events we must be prepared to see fluctuations that are substantially larger than in most physical observations.

### Precedents in the move toward science

In order to give credence to the possibility of establishing a “science of history” (which in what follows will be called “analytical history”), it may be useful to describe briefly how the transition to science status was achieved in two other fields, namely astronomy and medicine. Such transitions are summarized in Table 7.1.

It is mainly for the purpose of giving advice on key-decisions that astrology was developed. In a sense it was a “rationalization” of the activities of oracles and shamans

<footnote n="69">⁶⁹This point is discussed on a specific example in the conclusion part of the paper. A broader analysis of the key importance of the signal to noise ratio can be found in Roehner (2007) in the chapter entitled “The battle against noise in the social sciences”.</footnote>
# Chapter 7
## China-US confrontation, a scientific investigation
### What is to be expected in the years 2018–2025?

*The present investigation is an extended version of lectures given in the fall of 2018 in Beijing, Seoul, Kobe and Tokyo. It uses some of the figures already presented in previous chapters.*

## Introduction

Clearly, the most important word in the title is the adjective “scientific”. Presently, history can hardly be considered as a science (in the sense of being able to produce testable predictions). Actually, many historians may even disagree with the very notion that history can be made into a science.

The present attempt is based on the fact that the defining condition of any scientific investigation is replicability. Do the fall of apples and drops of water have something in common? If yes, can that help us to make a prediction for the fall of hailstones? This protocol is, in a nutshell, the approach of experimental physics when a new phenomenon is explored. The decisive requirement is replicability; otherwise, when the standard deviation of a set of observations happens to exceed the mean one observes nothing but noise. Actually, even in physics replicability is never perfect<fnref n="69" />. Thus, when we handle a cluster of similar historical events we must be prepared to see fluctuations that are substantially larger than in most physical observations.

### Precedents in the move toward science

In order to give credence to the possibility of establishing a “science of history” (which in what follows will be called “analytical history”), it may be useful to describe briefly how the transition to science status was achieved in two other fields, namely astronomy and medicine. Such transitions are summarized in Table 7.1.

It is mainly for the purpose of giving advice on key-decisions that astrology was developed. In a sense it was a “rationalization” of the activities of oracles and shamans

<footnote n="69">⁶⁹This point is discussed on a specific example in the conclusion part of the paper. A broader analysis of the key importance of the signal to noise ratio can be found in Roehner (2007) in the chapter entitled “The battle against noise in the social sciences”.</footnote>
who were intermediates between the humans and the world of spirits and gods. From China to Mesopotamia, to Greece and western Europe the practice of astrology was widespread. We call it a neo-science because it has some characteristics of a real science. It is based on the relative positions of celestial objects which in turn necessitated accurate observations of the positions of stars and planets. In the evolutionary perspective schematized in Table 1, we preferred to use the expression neo-science (one could also call it pre-science) rather than pseudo-science because the later conveys a derogatory meaning. Initially, astrology marked certainly a progress with respect to divination, if not in itself at least in the kind of data that it is handling.

In the history of mankind the transition from astrology to astronomy took place only a few times: first in Greece, basically before the Roman invasion, then in the Islamic world and finally in Western Europe around 1600. Regarding the last case, one should remember that both the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) and Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) were astrologists at the service of the German Emperor Rudolf II. The present-day consensus is that the astrologists' claim of predicting terrestrial events based on celestial observations is not justified<sup>70</sup>. Describing astrology as a “pseudo-science” emphasizes the point that its claims are not justified.

The transition from astrology to astronomy was gradual. So was also the transition from alchemy to chemistry. The same observation holds for medicine. Even though based on weird conceptions such as relief by bloodletting, the neo-scientific stage had some solid assets such as anatomy or herbal remedies.

Coming now to the case of history, the succession of the three stages is less clear. One obvious reason is of course the lack of consensus (so far) regarding the scientific stage referred to as “analytic history” in Table 1. Another reason is that the transition from the divination stage to the factual stage was not only gradual but also marked by many regressions. Whereas, the accounts written by Herodotus (circa -484 to circa -425) or Thucydides (-460 to-400) are fairly factual, when one reads contemporary accounts of the Great London Fire of 1666 one learns more about the sins of people and the intentions of God than about the circumstances of the conflagration.

Presently, there is no science of historical events but some sub-fields of history, e.g. demography, already function as sciences. The main obstacle to the development of analytical history is probably the fact that many historians consider that historical events are unique and therefore cannot be subjected to scientific analysis. We come back to this point later on.

<footnote n="70"><sup>70</sup>Yet, very few really scientific tests have been conducted. One of them is a paper in “Nature” by Shawn Carlson (1985). The paper comes to the conclusion that predictions based on so-called natal charts are not better than pure chance predictions but it also emphasizes that such a test involves many methodological difficulties. It would be much clearer to do such tests on animal populations. If planets have an influence on humans they must also have an influence on animals.</footnote>
who were intermediates between the humans and the world of spirits and gods. From China to Mesopotamia, to Greece and western Europe the practice of astrology was widespread. We call it a neo-science because it has some characteristics of a real science. It is based on the relative positions of celestial objects which in turn necessitated accurate observations of the positions of stars and planets. In the evolutionary perspective schematized in Table 1, we preferred to use the expression neo-science (one could also call it pre-science) rather than pseudo-science because the later conveys a derogatory meaning. Initially, astrology marked certainly a progress with respect to divination, if not in itself at least in the kind of data that it is handling.

In the history of mankind the transition from astrology to astronomy took place only a few times: first in Greece, basically before the Roman invasion, then in the Islamic world and finally in Western Europe around 1600. Regarding the last case, one should remember that both the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) and Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) were astrologists at the service of the German Emperor Rudolf II. The present-day consensus is that the astrologists' claim of predicting terrestrial events based on celestial observations is not justified<sup>70</sup>. Describing astrology as a “pseudo-science” emphasizes the point that its claims are not justified.

The transition from astrology to astronomy was gradual. So was also the transition from alchemy to chemistry. The same observation holds for medicine. Even though based on weird conceptions such as relief by bloodletting, the neo-scientific stage had some solid assets such as anatomy or herbal remedies.

Coming now to the case of history, the succession of the three stages is less clear. One obvious reason is of course the lack of consensus (so far) regarding the scientific stage referred to as “analytic history” in Table 1. Another reason is that the transition from the divination stage to the factual stage was not only gradual but also marked by many regressions. Whereas, the accounts written by Herodotus (circa -484 to circa -425) or Thucydides (-460 to-400) are fairly factual, when one reads contemporary accounts of the Great London Fire of 1666 one learns more about the sins of people and the intentions of God than about the circumstances of the conflagration.

Presently, there is no science of historical events but some sub-fields of history, e.g. demography, already function as sciences. The main obstacle to the development of analytical history is probably the fact that many historians consider that historical events are unique and therefore cannot be subjected to scientific analysis. We come back to this point later on.

<footnote n="70"><sup>70</sup>Yet, very few really scientific tests have been conducted. One of them is a paper in “Nature” by Shawn Carlson (1985). The paper comes to the conclusion that predictions based on so-called natal charts are not better than pure chance predictions but it also emphasizes that such a test involves many methodological difficulties. It would be much clearer to do such tests on animal populations. If planets have an influence on humans they must also have an influence on animals.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 7.1: Transitions from divination stage to neo-science and to science.</caption><thead><tr><th>Divination stage</th><th>Neo-scientific factual stage</th><th>Scientific stage</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><em>Processes already completed</em></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Prophecies by oracles</td><td>Astrology</td><td>Astronomy</td></tr><tr><td>Shamanism (vital spirit, soul)</td><td>Humoralism, bloodletting</td><td>Medicine</td></tr><tr><td><em>Process yet to be completed</em></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Founding myths, legends</td><td>Factual historical narratives</td><td>Analytical history</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes:

"Humoralism" was a conception based on 4 humors whose equilibrium was necessary for a healthy life. Introduced by Hippocrates (-460 to -370), this conception remained in force for over 2,000 years. The methods in the second column differ from those in the first in two main ways: (i) They make little reference to gods or supernatural notions. (ii) They were formalized into well defined protocols. Thus, following Galen (129-200) location and volume of blood lettings were defined by a complex set of rules based on disease, age, season, weather.

In each field the transition from the neo-scientific stage to the scientific stage did not occur en bloc. For instance, although Galen was wrong on humoralism, many of his anatomical observations were correct and proved useful over many centuries. Moreover, one may observe that even in present-time, treatments without real medical justification continue to be performed, as explained in Baugh et al. (2011) for the case of tonsillectomy, i.e. removal of the tonsils on both sides of the pharynx (for more details see the Wikipedia section entitled "Tonsillectomy industry").

## Outline of the investigation

The investigation will proceed through the following steps

* First, we define the mechanism on which we will focus.

* Secondly, we identify historical episodes showcasing this mechanism.

* Thirdly, we compare their outcomes and weigh to what extent they can help us to predict the future of China-US relations.

* Finally, we examine if recent events confirm and foreshadow increased confrontation.

The explanations that rely on historical facts and accounts will be given in Appendix A and B. The reason for not including them in the text itself is because not all readers may need or wish to know the details of our arguments. Yet, it must be realized that such "details" are often of crucial importance. For instance, our belief (used in Table 2) that in 1900 the United States had already an hegemonic position in the Pacific must be substantiated by showing that China had lost its power, that Japan was still in a development stage and that Britain had accepted US ascendancy in return for a free hand in Hong Kong and Malaysia.

# Investigation of challenges to US hegemony in the Pacific
<table><caption>Table 7.1: Transitions from divination stage to neo-science and to science.</caption><thead><tr><th>Divination stage</th><th>Neo-scientific factual stage</th><th>Scientific stage</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><em>Processes already completed</em></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Prophecies by oracles</td><td>Astrology</td><td>Astronomy</td></tr><tr><td>Shamanism (vital spirit, soul)</td><td>Humoralism, bloodletting</td><td>Medicine</td></tr><tr><td><em>Process yet to be completed</em></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Founding myths, legends</td><td>Factual historical narratives</td><td>Analytical history</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes:

"Humoralism" was a conception based on 4 humors whose equilibrium was necessary for a healthy life. Introduced by Hippocrates (-460 to -370), this conception remained in force for over 2,000 years. The methods in the second column differ from those in the first in two main ways: (i) They make little reference to gods or supernatural notions. (ii) They were formalized into well defined protocols. Thus, following Galen (129-200) location and volume of blood lettings were defined by a complex set of rules based on disease, age, season, weather.

In each field the transition from the neo-scientific stage to the scientific stage did not occur en bloc. For instance, although Galen was wrong on humoralism, many of his anatomical observations were correct and proved useful over many centuries. Moreover, one may observe that even in present-time, treatments without real medical justification continue to be performed, as explained in Baugh et al. (2011) for the case of tonsillectomy, i.e. removal of the tonsils on both sides of the pharynx (for more details see the Wikipedia section entitled "Tonsillectomy industry").

## Outline of the investigation

The investigation will proceed through the following steps

* First, we define the mechanism on which we will focus.

* Secondly, we identify historical episodes showcasing this mechanism.

* Thirdly, we compare their outcomes and weigh to what extent they can help us to predict the future of China-US relations.

* Finally, we examine if recent events confirm and foreshadow increased confrontation.

The explanations that rely on historical facts and accounts will be given in Appendix A and B. The reason for not including them in the text itself is because not all readers may need or wish to know the details of our arguments. Yet, it must be realized that such "details" are often of crucial importance. For instance, our belief (used in Table 2) that in 1900 the United States had already an hegemonic position in the Pacific must be substantiated by showing that China had lost its power, that Japan was still in a development stage and that Britain had accepted US ascendancy in return for a free hand in Hong Kong and Malaysia.

# Investigation of challenges to US hegemony in the Pacific
# Definition of the mechanism

The mechanism investigated in this paper can be stated as follows.

> *Reactions to actions challenging hegemony.* We posit that any country (or company or organization), A, who holds a dominant position will try to keep it. If challenged by another country, B, it will oppose it with the purpose of eliminating the threat.

We will not in this paper try to give an empirical justification of this proposition. Firstly because it seems a fairly “natural” behavior and secondly because such a proof would require a separate study which may rather be left to a forthcoming paper.

To say that a historical episode involving two countries A, B can be described by this mechanism one must show two things: (i) That A holds an hegemonic position<fnref n="71" />. (ii) That, at least in the minds of the leaders of A, the action of B is challenging this position<fnref n="72" />.

In the present paper we analyze the dominant position of the United States in the Pacific.

## US hegemony in the Pacific: general view

*Why do we limit the study to the Pacific?*

Historically there have been many cases marked by recurrent conflicts between regional contenders. For instance, one can mention the series of conflicts between Venice and Genoa from 1250 to 1400, the four Anglo-Dutch wars fought on sea from 1650 to 1780, the many wars between Russia and the Ottoman empire. However, all these cases were rather imperfect examples of challenges to hegemony. They were rather conflicts between two powers of similar strength.

The position of the United States in the Pacific is a much clearer case of hegemony.

Nowadays (in 2018) what is at stake is not only hegemony in the Pacific rim but world hegemony. However, the question of world hegemony came on the table only after the demise of the Soviet Union as a global contender. In contrast US hegemony claims in the Pacific are much older.

On 2 June 1954 at a White House Security Conference, President Eisenhower declared: “We have got to keep the Pacific as an American lake”.

In contrast to a sea, a lake is most often included within the territory of a country. Naturally, here this sentence does not mean that all the countries around the Pacific should be American but it implies that they should be part of the US zone of influ-

<footnote n="71">⁷¹“Hegemonic in a given area” is defined here as meaning that A is more powerful in terms of GDP, technology, army and navy than all other countries in this area.</footnote>

<footnote n="72">⁷²Because it relies not only on objective facts but also on their perception, this notion is not always easy to define precisely.</footnote>
# Definition of the mechanism

The mechanism investigated in this paper can be stated as follows.

> *Reactions to actions challenging hegemony.* We posit that any country (or company or organization), A, who holds a dominant position will try to keep it. If challenged by another country, B, it will oppose it with the purpose of eliminating the threat.

We will not in this paper try to give an empirical justification of this proposition. Firstly because it seems a fairly “natural” behavior and secondly because such a proof would require a separate study which may rather be left to a forthcoming paper.

To say that a historical episode involving two countries A, B can be described by this mechanism one must show two things: (i) That A holds an hegemonic position<sup>71</sup>. (ii) That, at least in the minds of the leaders of A, the action of B is challenging this position<sup>72</sup>.

In the present paper we analyze the dominant position of the United States in the Pacific.

## US hegemony in the Pacific: general view

*Why do we limit the study to the Pacific?*

Historically there have been many cases marked by recurrent conflicts between regional contenders. For instance, one can mention the series of conflicts between Venice and Genoa from 1250 to 1400, the four Anglo-Dutch wars fought on sea from 1650 to 1780, the many wars between Russia and the Ottoman empire. However, all these cases were rather imperfect examples of challenges to hegemony. They were rather conflicts between two powers of similar strength.

The position of the United States in the Pacific is a much clearer case of hegemony.

Nowadays (in 2018) what is at stake is not only hegemony in the Pacific rim but world hegemony. However, the question of world hegemony came on the table only after the demise of the Soviet Union as a global contender. In contrast US hegemony claims in the Pacific are much older.

On 2 June 1954 at a White House Security Conference, President Eisenhower declared: “We have got to keep the Pacific as an American lake”.

In contrast to a sea, a lake is most often included within the territory of a country. Naturally, here this sentence does not mean that all the countries around the Pacific should be American but it implies that they should be part of the US zone of influ-

<footnote n="71"><sup>71</sup>“Hegemonic in a given area” is defined here as meaning that A is more powerful in terms of GDP, technology, army and navy than all other countries in this area.</footnote>

<footnote n="72"><sup>72</sup>Because it relies not only on objective facts but also on their perception, this notion is not always easy to define precisely.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_56.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7.1 Rim of the Pacific** A number of historical circumstances (explained in the text) explain that the United States gained an hegemonic position in the Pacific as early as the end of the 19th century through the Spanish American war of 1898.</figcaption></figure>

ence<sup>73</sup> that is to say should be neither contenders nor opponents.

Actually, we will show that the US hegemony in the Pacific did not start after World War II but in fact several decades before, around 1900. Therefore, by restricting our study to the Pacific rim (see Fig.7.1) we can draw on more cases than by considering world hegemony after 1990.

Before closing this subsection we wish to draw attention on an important distinction.

*Similar historical episodes or similar mechanisms?*

The starting point of our comparative analysis must be a *mechanism*, it cannot merely be an historical fact or episode.

For instance, in China there have been successive dynasties and various mechanisms could be at work in their falls (e.g. see Ferguson 2010) For instance, some collapses may be due to military factors, others to a contraction of tax income or some other factors. In other words, a first step must be to make sure that the falls under consideration belong to the same category. Incidentally, one faces exactly the same problem in medicine in the sense that a comparative analysis of symptoms will be meaningless only once the disease has been clearly defined. For instance, there must be a clear distinction between tuberculosis and influenza for, although the two diseases attack the lungs, they affect them in different ways. Similarly, an analysis of dy-

<footnote n="73"><sup>73</sup>Before World War II the notion of “zone of influence” was well accepted and duly used in diplomatic language. Nowadays, in contrast, it has been replaced by the delusion that UN membership makes even the smallest countries (e.g. “Saint Kitts and Nevis” or Kiribati) fully independent in all and every respects.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_58.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7.1 Rim of the Pacific** A number of historical circumstances (explained in the text) explain that the United States gained an hegemonic position in the Pacific as early as the end of the 19th century through the Spanish American war of 1898.</figcaption></figure>

ence<sup>73</sup> that is to say should be neither contenders nor opponents.

Actually, we will show that the US hegemony in the Pacific did not start after World
War II but in fact several decades before, around 1900. Therefore, by restricting our
study to the Pacific rim (see Fig.7.1) we can draw on more cases than by considering
world hegemony after 1990.

Before closing this subsection we wish to draw attention on an important distinction.

*Similar historical episodes or similar mechanisms?*

The starting point of our comparative analysis must be a *mechanism*, it cannot merely
be an historical fact or episode.

For instance, in China there have been successive dynasties and various mechanisms
could be at work in their falls (e.g. see Ferguson 2010) For instance, some collapses
may be due to military factors, others to a contraction of tax income or some other
factors. In other words, a first step must be to make sure that the falls under consider-
ation belong to the same category. Incidentally, one faces exactly the same problem
in medicine in the sense that a comparative analysis of symptoms will be meaning-
full only once the disease has been clearly defined. For instance, there must be a
clear distinction between tuberculosis and influenza for, although the two diseases
attack the lungs, they affect them in different ways. Similarly, an analysis of dy-

<footnote n="73"><sup>73</sup>Before World War II the notion of “zone of influence” was well accepted and duly used in diplomatic language. Nowadays, in contrast, it has been replaced by the delusion that UN membership makes even the smallest countries (e.g. “Saint Kitts and Nevis” or Kiribati) fully independent in all and every respects.</footnote>
nasty falls will be all the more fruitful that the set under consideration will be more homogeneous.

**Historical realizations of this mechanism**

As already said, for each of the cases included in Table 2 we must examine two points. (i) Whether there was indeed a hegemonic position. (ii) Whether there was a real challenge

*Hegemonic position*

Everybody would certainly agree that after World War II the United States enjoyed a hegemonic position in the Pacific. However, case number 1 of Table 2 assumes that the US had already such a position around 1900 which is less obvious and requires some explanations. In Appendix A we explain the factors which account for the fact that US dominance started at the end of the 19th century.

*Actions perceived as challenges to hegemony*

Once we agree that as early as 1900 the United States had a dominant position in the Pacific, we need to understand why the actions of other countries listed in Table 2 were perceived by the US as challenges to this position.

For most of the cases (namely Pacific War, Korea and Vietnam War) this is fairly clear but there are two cases, namely Russia and Indonesia, for which additional explanations may be helpful. A historical discussion can be found in Appendix B.

In the last three decades of the 19th century the situation in the Pacific can be described as follows.

* China, once the dominant power in East Asia, had become very weak. The two Opium Wars of 1842 and 1856-1860 had shown that a relatively small western army supported by the guns of a naval squadron could defeat fairly easily the armies of the Qing Empire. After this demonstration, China became a prey for western countries just as the decaying Ottoman Empire was in the Mediterranean area.

* Through its success in the First Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), Japan had shown that it was on the way of replacing China as a regional power. But, as shown in Appendix A, economically it was still far behind the US and even substantially behind Russia. In 1900 its total trade was 2.6 times smaller than the trade of Russia<fnref n="74" />.

* Until 1898 Spain was present in the Philippines but its quick defeat in the Spanish American War showed it out.

* It is true that other western powers, particularly Britain, France and Germany were interested in occupying Pacific islands. However, the rapid acceptance by

<footnote n="74">⁷⁴The numbers were 1,340 million rubles for Russia and 500 million yen for Japan; the ruble:yen exchange was almost 1:1 (Mitchell 1978,p.306).</footnote>
nasty falls will be all the more fruitful that the set under consideration will be more homogeneous.

## Historical realizations of this mechanism

As already said, for each of the cases included in Table 2 we must examine two points. (i) Whether there was indeed a hegemonic position. (ii) Whether there was a real challenge

### Hegemonic position

Everybody would certainly agree that after World War II the United States enjoyed a hegemonic position in the Pacific. However, case number 1 of Table 2 assumes that the US had already such a position around 1900 which is less obvious and requires some explanations. In Appendix A we explain the factors which account for the fact that US dominance started at the end of the 19th century.

### Actions perceived as challenges to hegemony

Once we agree that as early as 1900 the United States had a dominant position in the Pacific, we need to understand why the actions of other countries listed in Table 2 were perceived by the US as challenges to this position.

For most of the cases (namely Pacific War, Korea and Vietnam War) this is fairly clear but there are two cases, namely Russia and Indonesia, for which additional explanations may be helpful. A historical discussion can be found in Appendix B.

In the last three decades of the 19th century the situation in the Pacific can be described as follows.

* China, once the dominant power in East Asia, had become very weak. The two Opium Wars of 1842 and 1856–1860 had shown that a relatively small western army supported by the guns of a naval squadron could defeat fairly easily the armies of the Qing Empire. After this demonstration, China became a prey for western countries just as the decaying Ottoman Empire was in the Mediterranean area.

* Through its success in the First Sino-Japanese war (1894–1895), Japan had shown that it was on the way of replacing China as a regional power. But, as shown in Appendix A, economically it was still far behind the US and even substantially behind Russia. In 1900 its total trade was 2.6 times smaller than the trade of Russia<fnref n="74" />.

* Until 1898 Spain was present in the Philippines but its quick defeat in the Spanish American War showed it out.

* It is true that other western powers, particularly Britain, France and Germany were interested in occupying Pacific islands. However, the rapid acceptance by

<footnote n="74">⁷⁴The numbers were 1,340 million rubles for Russia and 500 million yen for Japan; the ruble:yen exchange was almost 1:1 (Mitchell 1978,p.306).</footnote>
Britain of the US annexation of Hawaii showed that British interests were confined to the Indian ocean and that it did not wish to challenge US influence in the Pacific.

In other words, the only real possible contender was Russia.

*US hostility toward Russian expansion*

In Appendix B we explain some of the steps in the Russian expansion toward Manchuria, Korea and the shores of the Pacific.

Actually, apart from the geopolitical situation, there was another factor which am-
plified the US *perception* of Russia as an unpleasant contender. It was the fact that
between 1880 and 1905 there were in Russia recurrent waves of anti-Jewish pogroms
which attracted great international attention especially in the United States. These
events amplified US hostility toward Russia in a way somewhat similar to present
day US perception of China as a threat is amplified because China is not only a
contender but is ruled by the Communist party.

The only other cases to require some more explanations (given in Appendix B) are
Indonesia and Chile.

Analysis of a cluster of challenges

Now we put together the information collected and described previously for the dif-
ferent cases of challenges. This leads to the cluster of challenges displayed in Table
2. What conclusions can one draw?

The challenges listed in Table 7.2 are not all of same kind. Some like Japan, Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan were military challenges from the very start, others were ideological and political challenges. It is the case of Russia which comes closest to the present situation of China as an expanding economic power. On the other hand the struggle for world hegemony is best described by cases 3-5 corresponding to indirect military confrontations with the Soviet Union.

For the human mind it is a natural tendency to wish a *detailed* view of the future.
Table 7.2 only allows us to say that the challenge will be suppressed but this will
certainly be found unsatisfactory by many readers. One would like to know the
whole story. As this cannot be derived from Table 7.2 it is tempting to indulge in an
exercise of politics-fiction. We will refrain from that. However it is likely that some
of the means used in previous episodes will be employed again, e.g. relying on allies
for containing the contender and testing its strength.

Overall regularities

In the regularities displayed by Table 7.2 we wish first of all to list the regulari-
ties deriving from cases 1-8. These are valid for any challenger irrespective of its
Britain of the US annexation of Hawaii showed that British interests were confined to the Indian ocean and that it did not wish to challenge US influence in the Pacific.

In other words, the only real possible contender was Russia.

*US hostility toward Russian expansion*

In Appendix B we explain some of the steps in the Russian expansion toward Manchuria, Korea and the shores of the Pacific.

Actually, apart from the geopolitical situation, there was another factor which am-
plified the US *perception* of Russia as an unpleasant contender. It was the fact that
between 1880 and 1905 there were in Russia recurrent waves of anti-Jewish pogroms
which attracted great international attention especially in the United States. These
events amplified US hostility toward Russia in a way somewhat similar to present
day US perception of China as a threat is amplified because China is not only a
contender but is ruled by the Communist party.

The only other cases to require some more explanations (given in Appendix B) are
Indonesia and Chile.

Analysis of a cluster of challenges

Now we put together the information collected and described previously for the dif-
ferent cases of challenges. This leads to the cluster of challenges displayed in Table
2. What conclusions can one draw?

The challenges listed in Table 7.2 are not all of same kind. Some like Japan, Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan were military challenges from the very start, others were ideological and political challenges. It is the case of Russia which comes closest to the present situation of China as an expanding economic power. On the other hand the struggle for world hegemony is best described by cases 3-5 corresponding to indirect military confrontations with the Soviet Union.

For the human mind it is a natural tendency to wish a *detailed* view of the future.
Table 7.2 only allows us to say that the challenge will be suppressed but this will
certainly be found unsatisfactory by many readers. One would like to know the
whole story. As this cannot be derived from Table 7.2 it is tempting to indulge in an
exercise of politics-fiction. We will refrain from that. However it is likely that some
of the means used in previous episodes will be employed again, e.g. relying on allies
for containing the contender and testing its strength.

Overall regularities

In the regularities displayed by Table 7.2 we wish first of all to list the regulari-
ties deriving from cases 1-8. These are valid for any challenger irrespective of its
<table><caption>Table 7.2: Cluster of recurrent challenges to US hegemony in the Pacific</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Beginning of challenge</th><th>Challenger</th><th>Country acting for challenger</th><th>Country acting for US</th><th>Conflict</th><th>Direct US action (no/yes)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>1890</td><td>Russia</td><td>None</td><td>Japan</td><td>Russo-Japan War: 1904-1905</td><td>no</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>1938</td><td>Japan</td><td>None</td><td>Several</td><td>Pacific War: 1941-1945</td><td>yes</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>1949</td><td>USSR</td><td>North Korea</td><td>Several</td><td>Korea War: 1950-1953</td><td>yes</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>1948</td><td>USSR</td><td>North Vietnam</td><td>France</td><td>Indochina War: 1949-1954</td><td>no</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>1962</td><td>USSR</td><td>North Vietnam</td><td>Several</td><td>Vietnam War: 1960-1978</td><td>yes</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>1957</td><td>USSR</td><td>Indonesia</td><td>Indon.army</td><td>Mass murders: 1965-1966</td><td>no</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>1970</td><td>USSR</td><td>Chile</td><td>Chile army</td><td>Near civil war: 1970-1973</td><td>no</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>1979</td><td>USSR</td><td>Afghanistan</td><td>Mujahideen</td><td>1st Afghan War: 1979-1988</td><td>no</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>2010</td><td>China</td><td>?</td><td>Several</td><td>?</td><td>?</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes:

Because cases 1-8 all led to the elimination of the challenge, they suggest that the emergence of a contender will simply not be tolerated. This is even more likely when the contender is a major power occupying a vast area of the Pacific rim as is China. As this has occurred several times in the past, it is likely to be repeated again. Despite the interrogation marks left in the row for China⁷⁵, one can draw the conclusion that *the US-China tension will not abate but (most probably) will rather wax*.

Below we give a number of additional comments.

* Direct US action means that US troops were involved.

* “Mujahideen” does not refer to a country but to Muslim people waging a “jihad” that is to say warfare against unbelievers. Although Afghanistan is not on the Pacific rim, the fact that it has been fiercely disputed for almost four decades suggests that, for some reason, it is considered of high strategic value.

* It is often said that the US is a declining power. Whatever the truth, for the moment (Nov. 2018) one sees rather the opposite. In the Vietnam War the US had 5 allies, namely Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand whereas in the war in Afghanistan (2001–Dec 2014) the US has been leading a coalition of 44 countries.

* France waged the “Indochina War” on behalf of the US in the sense that, along with weapons and funding, the US side gave strategic and tactical advice.

* It can be noted that every time the US took directly part in a war it had several allies; for instance, Australia, Britain, China, New Zealand and the Netherlands in the war against Japan.

* Note that the Indochina and Vietnam wars were not challenges to US hegemony by themselves but because of the “domino effect” theory which speculated that if a state came under Communist control, then all surrounding countries would also fall one by one. Despite eventually being proved wrong (indeed after the Communist victory in Vietnam no other country changed side), this theory was used as a justification for massive US intervention by successive US administrations.

* The case of Chile was different from the others in the sense that the two sides belonged to the Chilean society which is why the confrontation took the form of a low intensity civil war.

Sources:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Indonesia; Di et al. (2017), Chapter 5: “The Pacific as an American lake”.

specific identity. Then in the next subsection we give some comments which apply specifically to China.
<table><caption>Table 7.2: Cluster of recurrent challenges to US hegemony in the Pacific</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Beginning of challenge</th><th>Challenger</th><th>Country acting for challenger</th><th>Country acting for US</th><th>Conflict</th><th>Direct US action (no/yes)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>1890</td><td>Russia</td><td>None</td><td>Japan</td><td>Russo-Japan War: 1904-1905</td><td>no</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>1938</td><td>Japan</td><td>None</td><td>Several</td><td>Pacific War: 1941-1945</td><td>yes</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>1949</td><td>USSR</td><td>North Korea</td><td>Several</td><td>Korea War: 1950-1953</td><td>yes</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>1948</td><td>USSR</td><td>North Vietnam</td><td>France</td><td>Indochina War: 1949-1954</td><td>no</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>1962</td><td>USSR</td><td>North Vietnam</td><td>Several</td><td>Vietnam War: 1960-1978</td><td>yes</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>1957</td><td>USSR</td><td>Indonesia</td><td>Indon.army</td><td>Mass murders: 1965-1966</td><td>no</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>1970</td><td>USSR</td><td>Chile</td><td>Chile army</td><td>Near civil war: 1970-1973</td><td>no</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>1979</td><td>USSR</td><td>Afghanistan</td><td>Mujahideen</td><td>1st Afghan War: 1979-1988</td><td>no</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>2010</td><td>China</td><td>?</td><td>Several</td><td>?</td><td>?</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes:

Because cases 1-8 all led to the elimination of the challenge, they suggest that the emergence of a contender will simply not be tolerated. This is even more likely when the contender is a major power occupying a vast area of the Pacific rim as is China. As this has occurred several times in the past, it is likely to be repeated again. Despite the interrogation marks left in the row for China⁷⁵, one can draw the conclusion that *the US-China tension will not abate but (most probably) will rather wax*.

Below we give a number of additional comments.

* Direct US action means that US troops were involved.

* “Mujahideen” does not refer to a country but to Muslim people waging a “jihad” that is to say warfare against unbelievers. Although Afghanistan is not on the Pacific rim, the fact that it has been fiercely disputed for almost four decades suggests that, for some reason, it is considered of high strategic value.

* It is often said that the US is a declining power. Whatever the truth, for the moment (Nov. 2018) one sees rather the opposite. In the Vietnam War the US had 5 allies, namely Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand whereas in the war in Afghanistan (2001–Dec 2014) the US has been leading a coalition of 44 countries.

* France waged the “Indochina War” on behalf of the US in the sense that, along with weapons and funding, the US side gave strategic and tactical advice.

* It can be noted that every time the US took directly part in a war it had several allies; for instance, Australia, Britain, China, New Zealand and the Netherlands in the war against Japan.

* Note that the Indochina and Vietnam wars were not challenges to US hegemony by themselves but because of the “domino effect” theory which speculated that if a state came under Communist control, then all surrounding countries would also fall one by one. Despite eventually being proved wrong (indeed after the Communist victory in Vietnam no other country changed side), this theory was used as a justification for massive US intervention by successive US administrations.

* The case of Chile was different from the others in the sense that the two sides belonged to the Chilean society which is why the confrontation took the form of a low intensity civil war.

Sources:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Indonesia; Di et al. (2017), Chapter 5: “The Pacific as an American lake”.

specific identity. Then in the next subsection we give some comments which apply specifically to China.
1 The main conclusion is that in the past no challenges have been tolerated. All possible challengers were targeted and countered.

2 The challengers were defeated in all but one case, namely Vietnam. Note that regularity (1) holds even in this case. It is only after a bitter struggle and in the face of domestic protests that defeat was accepted.

3 In all cases, the United States first relied on local forces supported by US military advisers and delivery of weapons. US troops were sent in only when local forces turned out unable to defeat the challenger.

4 Whenever the US intervened directly it was always together with several allies. In the Pacific War it had 5 major allies namely Britain, China, France, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union. It is in the second Vietnam War that the number of major allies was smallest: neither Britain nor France took part.

5 In all cases where it occurred, direct US interventions were in response to an aggression. This is of course clear for cases 2,3 and 8. The US administration wanted a similar pretext for Vietnam. Before sending reinforcements the Department of Defense wished to show that it was responding to an aggression. This led to the two so-called “USS Maddox incidents” in the Gulf of Tonkin (2 and 4 August 1964). Later on, it was recognized by US authorities that the second incident did not take place. Even the first was quite unimpressive in the sense that not a single American was injured<sup>76</sup>. Within hours President Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam and announced them to the nation in a TV address broadcast on all channels at 23:30 on 4 August. In response, on 7 August 1964, the US Congress passed the “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution” which authorized President Johnson to use US armed forces to assist any state in Southeast Asia requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. The vote was 476-0 in the “House of Representatives” and 88-2 in the Senate.

On 9 August 1964, China said that the US was trying to create a United Nations force to turn Vietnam into a second Korea and pledged to aid North Vietnam. A massive anti-US demonstration took place in Beijing. Less than two months later China tested its first atomic bomb.

Readers may wonder why we gave a fairly detailed account of this episode. The reason is simple. One expects that whenever the US will decide to escalate the military confrontation there will be a similar attempt to present it as a response to an aggression. For instance an incident between a Chinese warship and an Australian, Filipino or Vietnamese vessel would allow the US media to portray the US Navy as coming to the rescue of a weaker country..

<footnote n="76"><sup>76</sup>Moreover, the US government did not disclose that the incident of 2 August was preceded on 30,31 July by attacks against two North Vietnamese offshore islands.</footnote>
1 The main conclusion is that in the past no challenges have been tolerated. All possible challengers were targeted and countered.

2 The challengers were defeated in all but one case, namely Vietnam. Note that regularity (1) holds even in this case. It is only after a bitter struggle and in the face of domestic protests that defeat was accepted.

3 In all cases, the United States first relied on local forces supported by US military advisers and delivery of weapons. US troops were sent in only when local forces turned out unable to defeat the challenger.

4 Whenever the US intervened directly it was always together with several allies. In the Pacific War it had 5 major allies namely Britain, China, France, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union. It is in the second Vietnam War that the number of major allies was smallest: neither Britain nor France took part.

5 In all cases where it occurred, direct US interventions were in response to an aggression. This is of course clear for cases 2,3 and 8. The US administration wanted a similar pretext for Vietnam. Before sending reinforcements the Department of Defense wished to show that it was responding to an aggression. This led to the two so-called “USS Maddox incidents” in the Gulf of Tonkin (2 and 4 August 1964). Later on, it was recognized by US authorities that the second incident did not take place. Even the first was quite unimpressive in the sense that not a single American was injured<sup>76</sup>. Within hours President Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam and announced them to the nation in a TV address broadcast on all channels at 23:30 on 4 August. In response, on 7 August 1964, the US Congress passed the “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution” which authorized President Johnson to use US armed forces to assist any state in Southeast Asia requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. The vote was 476-0 in the “House of Representatives” and 88-2 in the Senate.

On 9 August 1964, China said that the US was trying to create a United Nations force to turn Vietnam into a second Korea and pledged to aid North Vietnam. A massive anti-US demonstration took place in Beijing. Less than two months later China tested its first atomic bomb.

Readers may wonder why we gave a fairly detailed account of this episode. The reason is simple. One expects that whenever the US will decide to escalate the military confrontation there will be a similar attempt to present it as a response to an aggression. For instance an incident between a Chinese warship and an Australian, Filipino or Vietnamese vessel would allow the US media to portray the US Navy as coming to the rescue of a weaker country..

<footnote n="76"><sup>76</sup>Moreover, the US government did not disclose that the incident of 2 August was preceded on 30,31 July by attacks against two North Vietnamese offshore islands.</footnote>
## Time schedule

Table 2 led to a testable prediction but gave no time schedule. In cases 1-8 the average time interval between the start of the challenge and its elimination was about 8 years<fnref n="77" />.

It may seem reasonable to say that economic challenges take longer. For instance, in Di et al. (2017) there is an estimate of how long it may take for the renminbi to replace the dollar as the dominant currency in the reserves of central banks. This estimate is based on only one case namely the replacement of the British pound by the US dollar. The time constant was of the order of 50 years; for the RMB-US$ replacement it may well take longer because the dollar holds a much stronger position than the pound back in the 19th century.

It is true that the composition of central bank reserves is not the only possible criterion. However, it may reflect the weight of a currency in global financial transactions. As a trading currency the weight of the renminbi may increase faster but in fact in present-day market organization trade and financial transactions are closely interconnected, particularly through the mechanisms of currency exchange, trade insurance and debt management. In short, it does not seem that the RMB is a short- or medium-term threat for the domination of the US dollar. However, what matters is not the threat itself but rather its perception in the minds of American leaders.

We now give some comments which are specific to the case of China.

## The China-US honeymoon era

In order to understand why awareness of nascent US hostility took decades to spread in the Chinese public and in the Communist Party it is necessary to remember the situation prevailing in the period 1980-2018.

Numerous statements by Chinese leaders reveal that their vision of US-China relations was a kind of condominium in which the US and China would share world leadership. It is true that between 1980 and 1990 China was considered by the US as a strategic partner in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. Whereas on the US side that perception already changed in the 1990s it remained unchanged on the side of China.

Among Chinese leaders there was a great admiration for the US. Out of numerous facts one can mention the following illustrations<fnref n="78" />.

* Leading Chinese universities provided scholarship funding to their best students to allow them to study in American universities and pay the high tuition costs.

<footnote n="77">⁷⁷Russia: 15, Japan: 4, Korea: 4, Vietnam(1): 6, Vietnam (2): 16, Indonesia: 8, Chile: 3, Afghanistan: 9. The average is: $m = 8.1 \pm 3.6$ (where 3.6 corresponds to a confidence level of 0.95). As in several cases the start of the challenge is not well defined, this estimate should be seen as a mere order of magnitude.</footnote>

<footnote n="78">⁷⁸More details can be found in Roehner (2017) particularly in chapter 4 entitled “Our constituencies”.</footnote>
## Time schedule

Table 2 led to a testable prediction but gave no time schedule. In cases 1-8 the average time interval between the start of the challenge and its elimination was about 8 years<fnref n="77" />.

It may seem reasonable to say that economic challenges take longer. For instance, in Di et al. (2017) there is an estimate of how long it may take for the renminbi to replace the dollar as the dominant currency in the reserves of central banks. This estimate is based on only one case namely the replacement of the British pound by the US dollar. The time constant was of the order of 50 years; for the RMB-US$ replacement it may well take longer because the dollar holds a much stronger position than the pound back in the 19th century.

It is true that the composition of central bank reserves is not the only possible criterion. However, it may reflect the weight of a currency in global financial transactions. As a trading currency the weight of the renminbi may increase faster but in fact in present-day market organization trade and financial transactions are closely interconnected, particularly through the mechanisms of currency exchange, trade insurance and debt management. In short, it does not seem that the RMB is a short- or medium-term threat for the domination of the US dollar. However, what matters is not the threat itself but rather its perception in the minds of American leaders.

We now give some comments which are specific to the case of China.

## The China-US honeymoon era

In order to understand why awareness of nascent US hostility took decades to spread in the Chinese public and in the Communist Party it is necessary to remember the situation prevailing in the period 1980-2018.

Numerous statements by Chinese leaders reveal that their vision of US-China relations was a kind of condominium in which the US and China would share world leadership. It is true that between 1980 and 1990 China was considered by the US as a strategic partner in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. Whereas on the US side that perception already changed in the 1990s it remained unchanged on the side of China.

Among Chinese leaders there was a great admiration for the US. Out of numerous facts one can mention the following illustrations<fnref n="78" />.

* Leading Chinese universities provided scholarship funding to their best students to allow them to study in American universities and pay the high tuition costs.

<footnote n="77">⁷⁷Russia: 15, Japan: 4, Korea: 4, Vietnam(1): 6, Vietnam (2): 16, Indonesia: 8, Chile: 3, Afghanistan: 9. The average is: $m = 8.1 \pm 3.6$ (where 3.6 corresponds to a confidence level of 0.95). As in several cases the start of the challenge is not well defined, this estimate should be seen as a mere order of magnitude.</footnote>

<footnote n="78">⁷⁸More details can be found in Roehner (2017) particularly in chapter 4 entitled “Our constituencies”.</footnote>
Naturally, a substantial percentage of them (95% in 1987, 69% in 2007 and 21% in 2017, according to the “South China Morning Post” of 8 December 2018) remained in the US which means that China accepted to lose some of its most promising students<fnref n="79" />.

• Whenever a section of the Communist Party wanted to express its satisfaction to one of its members, a common reward was in the form of a study tour in the US. In other words, the best agent for spreading US influence in China was the Communist Party itself. As an illustration, one can mention that from 2002 to 2014 the so-called “Amway Program” brought more than 500 Chinese officials to Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government in order to study public management. They were called “Amway Fellows”. Another similar program at the Kennedy School was the “China’s Leaders in Development Program” set up on the American side by Antony Saich<fnref n="80" />. Such programs were certainly an excellent method for creating a network of Chinese officials fluent in English, and sincere admirers of the American way of life. On the Chinese side such programs were supervised by the “China Development Research Foundation” under the control of the “State Council”, the chief administrative authority in China.

In short, the United States was seen by Chinese leaders and people as a well-meaning elder brother. Such a climate can probably explain why, despite clear signs of waxing US antagonism in the 2010s (e.g. massive sales of weapons to Taiwan<fnref n="81" />, more and more visits of the Dalai Lama to the White House) the official policy remained unchanged. It takes time for younger siblings to rebel against their big brother. Even in late 2018, despite the trade war and a string of actions targeting Chinese telecom companies, an article of “People’s Daily” (the official publication of the Communist Party) of 4 December 2018 was entitled<fnref n="82" />: “Jointly promote a healthy, steady China-US relationship”.

**What Table 7.2 says about the Chinese challenge**

Coming back to Table 7.2, in spite of several interrogation marks in the row about China, the clear conclusion is that challengers, including China, should be elimi-

<footnote n="79">⁷⁹It can be noted that the first batch of Chinese students was sent to the United States in 1872 that is to say by the Qing Empire. Japan had also sent its students to western countries, but it seems it was done more cleverly in the sense that they came back to Japan and greatly contributed to its scientific and technological advancement.</footnote>

<footnote n="80">⁸⁰In an article entitled “Amway bankrolls Harvard course for Chinese cadres”, Blomberg news of 24 September 2013 reported that next to Saich’s office there was a cartoon on the wall which pictured the same Chinese official some 20 years apart. In the first frame, dressed in a Mao suit, he was raising his fist before a Chinese flag saying “I staunchly oppose America’s hegemony!” In the second frame, he was addressed by a seating official in the following terms: “You are very patriotic. We will send you to Harvard for training next year!”</footnote>

<footnote n="81">⁸¹The implicit understanding of the agreement of 1979 which led to diplomatic recognition of the PRC was that such sales would gradually slow down. Instead there was an acceleration.</footnote>

<footnote n="82">⁸²To some extent, this policy may be “tactical” in the sense that as time is on the side of China, it is better to postpone any confrontation as long as possible. Naturally, the same reason may convince the US side to start it as soon as possible, yet at the same time avoiding (thanks to its hegemonic position in world media) being perceived as the aggressor.</footnote>
Naturally, a substantial percentage of them (95% in 1987, 69% in 2007 and 21% in 2017, according to the “South China Morning Post” of 8 December 2018) remained in the US which means that China accepted to lose some of its most promising students<fnref n="79" />.

• Whenever a section of the Communist Party wanted to express its satisfaction to one of its members, a common reward was in the form of a study tour in the US. In other words, the best agent for spreading US influence in China was the Communist Party itself. As an illustration, one can mention that from 2002 to 2014 the so-called “Amway Program” brought more than 500 Chinese officials to Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government in order to study public management. They were called “Amway Fellows”. Another similar program at the Kennedy School was the “China’s Leaders in Development Program” set up on the American side by Antony Saich<fnref n="80" />. Such programs were certainly an excellent method for creating a network of Chinese officials fluent in English, and sincere admirers of the American way of life. On the Chinese side such programs were supervised by the “China Development Research Foundation” under the control of the “State Council”, the chief administrative authority in China.

In short, the United States was seen by Chinese leaders and people as a well-meaning elder brother. Such a climate can probably explain why, despite clear signs of waxing US antagonism in the 2010s (e.g. massive sales of weapons to Taiwan<fnref n="81" />, more and more visits of the Dalai Lama to the White House) the official policy remained unchanged. It takes time for younger siblings to rebel against their big brother. Even in late 2018, despite the trade war and a string of actions targeting Chinese telecom companies, an article of “People’s Daily” (the official publication of the Communist Party) of 4 December 2018 was entitled<fnref n="82" />: “Jointly promote a healthy, steady China-US relationship”.

**What Table 7.2 says about the Chinese challenge**

Coming back to Table 7.2, in spite of several interrogation marks in the row about China, the clear conclusion is that challengers, including China, should be elimi-

<footnote n="79">⁷⁹It can be noted that the first batch of Chinese students was sent to the United States in 1872 that is to say by the Qing Empire. Japan had also sent its students to western countries, but it seems it was done more cleverly in the sense that they came back to Japan and greatly contributed to its scientific and technological advancement.</footnote>

<footnote n="80">⁸⁰In an article entitled “Amway bankrolls Harvard course for Chinese cadres”, Blomberg news of 24 September 2013 reported that next to Saich’s office there was a cartoon on the wall which pictured the same Chinese official some 20 years apart. In the first frame, dressed in a Mao suit, he was raising his fist before a Chinese flag saying “I staunchly oppose America’s hegemony!” In the second frame, he was addressed by a seating official in the following terms: “You are very patriotic. We will send you to Harvard for training next year!”</footnote>

<footnote n="81">⁸¹The implicit understanding of the agreement of 1979 which led to diplomatic recognition of the PRC was that such sales would gradually slow down. Instead there was an acceleration.</footnote>

<footnote n="82">⁸²To some extent, this policy may be “tactical” in the sense that as time is on the side of China, it is better to postpone any confrontation as long as possible. Naturally, the same reason may convince the US side to start it as soon as possible, yet at the same time avoiding (thanks to its hegemonic position in world media) being perceived as the aggressor.</footnote>
nated. As a matter of fact, through its mere existence and economic expansion, China
is a more serious challenger than was the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s. The
fact that it will not be tolerated means that the tension between the two countries will
not decrease but rather increase. In the next section, we examine how this prediction
can be tested.

## Events indicative of a brewing confrontation

Within five or ten years it will become easy to judge if the Chinese challenge has
indeed led to a serious confrontation. If we do not wish to wait several years, we can
try to detect in recent events indications of a brewing confrontation.

### Targeting of scientists seen as security risks

*The Cold War precedent: targeting socialists and communists*

During the first Cold War US scientists who were Communists or had some sympa-
thy for socialist ideas were kept under close surveillance by the FBI and in several
cases were blacklisted. This was true even for prominent scientists like David Bohm,
Albert Einstein or Robert Oppenheimer. Unlike Einstein, Bohm and Oppenheimer
were both born in the US. Several other colleagues of Oppenheimer at Berkeley were
blacklisted, e.g. Ross Lomanitz, Philip Morrison, Steve Nelson, Frank Oppenheimer
(Robert's younger brother), his wife Jackie Quann and Joseph Weinberg.

It should be noted that none of these physicists was accused of spying for the Soviet Union; it was only assumed that because of their *opinions* they could become security risks.

The case of Bohm can serve as an illustration. A close collaborator of Einstein at Princeton, he was called to testify by the “House Un-American Activities Committee” (HUAC) in May 1949⁸³. Following the non-compliance attitude recommended by Einstein himself, he refused to testify. As a result, he was arrested in early 1950, indicted for contempt of Congress, nevertheless freed on bail and eventually acquitted by a federal district court in May 1951. However, in the meantime Princeton University had suspended him and refused to reinstate him. He found a position at the university of Sao Paulo, but once in Brazil he had to give up his US passport which prevented him from traveling. In 1955 he was allowed to move to Israel where he spent two years before eventually joining Bristol University in the UK.

While Bohm did not collaborate with the HUAC, many others who were called to

<footnote n="83">⁸³Contrary to senator McCarthy himself, the HUAC was active over several decades (see Roehner 2007, p. 147). However, as it was not a tribunal it did not offer the usual guarantees given to defendants: most often they had no counsel and it was not uncommon that false witnesses were used against them (see Schrecker 1986, Rader 1979). The HUAC was only one of several similar committees, e.g. one can mention the Rapp-Coudert, Canwell, Tydings, Jenner, Nixon committees or the “Senate Internal Security Subcommittee” (SISS).</footnote>
nated. As a matter of fact, through its mere existence and economic expansion, China
is a more serious challenger than was the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s. The
fact that it will not be tolerated means that the tension between the two countries will
not decrease but rather increase. In the next section, we examine how this prediction
can be tested.

## Events indicative of a brewing confrontation

Within five or ten years it will become easy to judge if the Chinese challenge has
indeed led to a serious confrontation. If we do not wish to wait several years, we can
try to detect in recent events indications of a brewing confrontation.

### Targeting of scientists seen as security risks

*The Cold War precedent: targeting socialists and communists*

During the first Cold War US scientists who were Communists or had some sympa-
thy for socialist ideas were kept under close surveillance by the FBI and in several
cases were blacklisted. This was true even for prominent scientists like David Bohm,
Albert Einstein or Robert Oppenheimer. Unlike Einstein, Bohm and Oppenheimer
were both born in the US. Several other colleagues of Oppenheimer at Berkeley were
blacklisted, e.g. Ross Lomanitz, Philip Morrison, Steve Nelson, Frank Oppenheimer
(Robert's younger brother), his wife Jackie Quann and Joseph Weinberg.

It should be noted that none of these physicists was accused of spying for the Soviet Union; it was only assumed that because of their *opinions* they could become security risks.

The case of Bohm can serve as an illustration. A close collaborator of Einstein at Princeton, he was called to testify by the “House Un-American Activities Committee” (HUAC) in May 1949⁸³. Following the non-compliance attitude recommended by Einstein himself, he refused to testify. As a result, he was arrested in early 1950, indicted for contempt of Congress, nevertheless freed on bail and eventually acquitted by a federal district court in May 1951. However, in the meantime Princeton University had suspended him and refused to reinstate him. He found a position at the university of Sao Paulo, but once in Brazil he had to give up his US passport which prevented him from traveling. In 1955 he was allowed to move to Israel where he spent two years before eventually joining Bristol University in the UK.

While Bohm did not collaborate with the HUAC, many others who were called to

<footnote n="83">⁸³Contrary to senator McCarthy himself, the HUAC was active over several decades (see Roehner 2007, p. 147). However, as it was not a tribunal it did not offer the usual guarantees given to defendants: most often they had no counsel and it was not uncommon that false witnesses were used against them (see Schrecker 1986, Rader 1979). The HUAC was only one of several similar committees, e.g. one can mention the Rapp-Coudert, Canwell, Tydings, Jenner, Nixon committees or the “Senate Internal Security Subcommittee” (SISS).</footnote>
testify did. For instance, in his testimony of 25 February 1953, Mr. Robert Davis, a teacher from Massachusetts, gave at least 15 names of persons who were members of the Communist Party in 1938–1939, a time when this party in fact supported the “New Deal” policy of President Roosevelt. That is why, just like an epidemic, this hysteria spread so wildly.

### Targeting scientists who have contacts in China

Coming back to the case of China, a law was passed by the US Congress in April 2011 which reads as follows (simplified form).

> None of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the “National Aeronautics and Space Administration” (NASA) or the “Office of Science and Technology Policy” (OSTP) to develop a bilateral policy or contract of any kind with China.

In other words through this law scientists working in the US, whether US citizens or not and whether or not employed by NASA, were barred from any NASA or OSTP funding whenever they had contacts with Chinese research institutions.

In fact, the collaboration interdiction did not start in 2011 but already in 1998. Following an investigation by a congressional commission led by Christopher Cox, there was an embargo on US-Chinese cooperation in space. However, the target of the law of 2011 was much broader than a prohibition of official NASA-China cooperation. It barred cooperation not only with space science researchers but with all Chinese researchers whatever their fields.

The bill of 2011 was sponsored by Representative Frank Wolf who was well-known for his anti-Chinese positions and speeches. However it would be a mistake to think that it was a personal matter. When he retired in 2015 he was replaced in the “Science Subcommittee” by John Culberson who, like his predecessor, vowed to uphold the embargo on space cooperation with China. Actually, in the shadow of Wolf and Culberson one would expect the Pentagon to be the key factor. The fact that the US has an ongoing collaboration with Russia but refuses to cooperate with China clearly suggests that it is China that is now seen as *the* strategic opponent.

### Espionage charges

#### The Cold War precedent

Arrests on the charge of spying for the Soviet Union started right after the end of the war. The defection of Igor Gouzenko on 6 September 1945 led to the arrests of 39 persons in the US and Canada on the charge of espionage for the Soviet Union. Numerous others were to follow in subsequent years. These arrests targeted employees and civil servants of the State Department but also many scientists.

#### Chinese American scientists arrested on espionage charges
testify did. For instance, in his testimony of 25 February 1953, Mr. Robert Davis, a teacher from Massachusetts, gave at least 15 names of persons who were members of the Communist Party in 1938–1939, a time when this party in fact supported the “New Deal” policy of President Roosevelt. That is why, just like an epidemic, this hysteria spread so wildly.

### Targeting scientists who have contacts in China

Coming back to the case of China, a law was passed by the US Congress in April 2011 which reads as follows (simplified form).

> None of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the “National Aeronautics and Space Administration” (NASA) or the “Office of Science and Technology Policy” (OSTP) to develop a bilateral policy or contract of any kind with China.

In other words through this law scientists working in the US, whether US citizens or not and whether or not employed by NASA, were barred from any NASA or OSTP funding whenever they had contacts with Chinese research institutions.

In fact, the collaboration interdiction did not start in 2011 but already in 1998. Following an investigation by a congressional commission led by Christopher Cox, there was an embargo on US-Chinese cooperation in space. However, the target of the law of 2011 was much broader than a prohibition of official NASA-China cooperation. It barred cooperation not only with space science researchers but with all Chinese researchers whatever their fields.

The bill of 2011 was sponsored by Representative Frank Wolf who was well-known for his anti-Chinese positions and speeches. However it would be a mistake to think that it was a personal matter. When he retired in 2015 he was replaced in the “Science Subcommittee” by John Culberson who, like his predecessor, vowed to uphold the embargo on space cooperation with China. Actually, in the shadow of Wolf and Culberson one would expect the Pentagon to be the key factor. The fact that the US has an ongoing collaboration with Russia but refuses to cooperate with China clearly suggests that it is China that is now seen as *the* strategic opponent.

### Espionage charges

#### The Cold War precedent

Arrests on the charge of spying for the Soviet Union started right after the end of the war. The defection of Igor Gouzenko on 6 September 1945 led to the arrests of 39 persons in the US and Canada on the charge of espionage for the Soviet Union. Numerous others were to follow in subsequent years. These arrests targeted employees and civil servants of the State Department but also many scientists.

#### Chinese American scientists arrested on espionage charges
On 21 December 2018 US Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein declared that between 2012 and 2018 more than 90% of the Department of Justice cases concerning economic espionage involved China (Taipei Times 22 December 2018).

On Wikipedia there is an article entitled “List of Chinese spy cases in the United States” which describes the cases of 32 scientists, mostly of Chinese origin, who were arrested on espionage charges. Except for a few older ones, most of the cases occurred in the period 2000-2018. The list is not complete; as examples of missing cases one can mention: Gwo Bao Min, Xiaodong Meng, Billy Yui Mak, Fuk Heung Li, Xiaoqing Zheng.

The most striking fact is that in about one third of the cases the charges were dropped either completely or drastically narrowed in a way tantamount to recognizing that the accusation had collapsed<fnref n="84" />. It is of interest to understand the reason.

Most of the persons arrested were Chinese Americans (either born in the US or naturalized US citizens) working in the US and maintaining contacts in China. These contacts may have been just for the purpose of scientific cooperation or in the intention of creating Chinese start-ups. In both cases, this kind of activity involved moving scientific information from the US to China. If this information was deemed proprietary information without even being officially classified it was enough to motivate an arrest.

In most cases where the accusation had to be dropped it was because the defense side could convince the prosecution (represented at state level by a district attorney or a US attorney at federal level) that the information that was passed on was in fact freely available in scientific journals. Needless to say, for scientific or technical matters such distinctions can be difficult to make.

Although we know a number of cases in which the accusation was dropped there may also be cases in which defenders were wrongly sentenced to terms of several years. Why this is likely can be understood by considering the case of Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee. The government brought against him 59 charges, including 39 that each carried a life sentence. Fortunately, soon after his arrest a prominent law firm who had agreed to represent him sprang into action. In addition, led by Lee's daughter, a network of people and organizations started to mobilize public opinion on his behalf and contributed to cover the cost of Lee's lawyers<fnref n="85" />.

The question of what would have happened without such a support is a matter of

<footnote n="84">⁸⁴The following persons can be mentioned in this respect (more details about them can be obtained through Internet keyword searches.): Xiafen Chen, Michael Haehnel, Bo Jiang, Peter Lee, Wen Ho Lee, Katrina Leung, Tai Mak, Xiaoxing Xi, Hua Jun Zhao.</footnote>

<footnote n="85">⁸⁵In his book (Lee 2002) Lee says that the cost was of the order of one million dollars. He thanks the following organizations which supported him: (i) “Asian Law Caucus”, (ii) “Chinese for Affirmative Action”, (iii) “Organization of Asian Americans”.</footnote>
On 21 December 2018 US Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein declared that between 2012 and 2018 more than 90% of the Department of Justice cases concerning economic espionage involved China (Taipei Times 22 December 2018).

On Wikipedia there is an article entitled “List of Chinese spy cases in the United States” which describes the cases of 32 scientists, mostly of Chinese origin, who were arrested on espionage charges. Except for a few older ones, most of the cases occurred in the period 2000-2018. The list is not complete; as examples of missing cases one can mention: Gwo Bao Min, Xiaodong Meng, Billy Yui Mak, Fuk Heung Li, Xiaoqing Zheng.

The most striking fact is that in about one third of the cases the charges were dropped either completely or drastically narrowed in a way tantamount to recognizing that the accusation had collapsed<fnref n="84" />. It is of interest to understand the reason.

Most of the persons arrested were Chinese Americans (either born in the US or naturalized US citizens) working in the US and maintaining contacts in China. These contacts may have been just for the purpose of scientific cooperation or in the intention of creating Chinese start-ups. In both cases, this kind of activity involved moving scientific information from the US to China. If this information was deemed proprietary information without even being officially classified it was enough to motivate an arrest.

In most cases where the accusation had to be dropped it was because the defense side could convince the prosecution (represented at state level by a district attorney or a US attorney at federal level) that the information that was passed on was in fact freely available in scientific journals. Needless to say, for scientific or technical matters such distinctions can be difficult to make.

Although we know a number of cases in which the accusation was dropped there may also be cases in which defenders were wrongly sentenced to terms of several years. Why this is likely can be understood by considering the case of Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee. The government brought against him 59 charges, including 39 that each carried a life sentence. Fortunately, soon after his arrest a prominent law firm who had agreed to represent him sprang into action. In addition, led by Lee's daughter, a network of people and organizations started to mobilize public opinion on his behalf and contributed to cover the cost of Lee's lawyers<fnref n="85" />.

The question of what would have happened without such a support is a matter of

<footnote n="84">⁸⁴The following persons can be mentioned in this respect (more details about them can be obtained through Internet keyword searches.): Xiafen Chen, Michael Haehnel, Bo Jiang, Peter Lee, Wen Ho Lee, Katrina Leung, Tai Mak, Xiaoxing Xi, Hua Jun Zhao.</footnote>

<footnote n="85">⁸⁵In his book (Lee 2002) Lee says that the cost was of the order of one million dollars. He thanks the following organizations which supported him: (i) “Asian Law Caucus”, (ii) “Chinese for Affirmative Action”, (iii) “Organization of Asian Americans”.</footnote>
speculation, but it is clear that not all scientists who were indicted benefited from
such an effective support. In addition it can be observed that in such affairs the
political climate plays a role; in 1999 when Lee was arrested US-China relations
were certainly more friendly than 20 years later.

Cluster of industrial warfare cases

In 2018 the Chinese telecom giant Huawei was targeted by several rules issued by the US government. At first sight this may not seem of great significance regarding a looming confrontation for indeed in the past such methods have also been used against foreign companies belonging to US allies. However, the Huawei case was quite different from the previous ones. To see this point more clearly let us again use the analytical methodology employed for hegemony challenges.

This time the mechanism can be defined as follows.

*Industrial warfare How to use US federal rules to limit the penetration of foreign companies into the US market.*

A cluster of such cases is displayed in Table 3.

The cases 1-6 show that there is always a combination of three elements. (i) Technical reasons which at first sight seem reasonable. (ii) An amplification of this technical factors beyond what is reasonable. (iii) An intervention of the US government.
The weighing and timing of these elements may change but they are always present in one form or another.

The Huawei cases are different from the others in several respects.

1 It is no longer a technical reason that is given but instead a national security reason.

2 The enacted rules no longer concern a specific product but instead all Huawei products. In other words it is the company itself which is targeted.

3 The industrial warfare against Huawei is not limited to the US but instead is extended to all US allies. Worldwide there are 77 countries which host US bases.

4 From March to November 2018 there is an intensification of the offensive.

It seems that Huawei must be eliminated because its very existence and success is an intolerable challenge to US technological hegemony (just as was the Concorde some decades ago). In short, the anti-Huawei campaign can be seen as a first step in a coming confrontation with China.

Outcry in the US against Confucius Institutes

When the Confucius Institutes were set up in 2002, their main purpose was to teach
the Chinese language. In this sense they were similar to the “Goethe Institutes” for
learning German or the “Alliance Française” centers for learning French. However,
the Confucius Institutes were a more ambitious project in two respects. (i) Each
speculation, but it is clear that not all scientists who were indicted benefited from
such an effective support. In addition it can be observed that in such affairs the
political climate plays a role; in 1999 when Lee was arrested US-China relations
were certainly more friendly than 20 years later.

Cluster of industrial warfare cases

In 2018 the Chinese telecom giant Huawei was targeted by several rules issued by the US government. At first sight this may not seem of great significance regarding a looming confrontation for indeed in the past such methods have also been used against foreign companies belonging to US allies. However, the Huawei case was quite different from the previous ones. To see this point more clearly let us again use the analytical methodology employed for hegemony challenges.

This time the mechanism can be defined as follows.

*Industrial warfare How to use US federal rules to limit the penetration of foreign companies into the US market.*

A cluster of such cases is displayed in Table 3.

The cases 1-6 show that there is always a combination of three elements. (i) Technical reasons which at first sight seem reasonable. (ii) An amplification of this technical factors beyond what is reasonable. (iii) An intervention of the US government.
The weighing and timing of these elements may change but they are always present in one form or another.

The Huawei cases are different from the others in several respects.

1 It is no longer a technical reason that is given but instead a national security reason.

2 The enacted rules no longer concern a specific product but instead all Huawei products. In other words it is the company itself which is targeted.

3 The industrial warfare against Huawei is not limited to the US but instead is extended to all US allies. Worldwide there are 77 countries which host US bases.

4 From March to November 2018 there is an intensification of the offensive.

It seems that Huawei must be eliminated because its very existence and success is an intolerable challenge to US technological hegemony (just as was the Concorde some decades ago). In short, the anti-Huawei campaign can be seen as a first step in a coming confrontation with China.

Outcry in the US against Confucius Institutes

When the Confucius Institutes were set up in 2002, their main purpose was to teach
the Chinese language. In this sense they were similar to the “Goethe Institutes” for
learning German or the “Alliance Française” centers for learning French. However,
the Confucius Institutes were a more ambitious project in two respects. (i) Each
<table><caption>Table 7.3: Cluster of cases in which foreign competitors were targeted</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Year</th><th>Product</th><th>Country</th><th>Company or brand</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>1973</td><td>Supersonic airliner (Mach 2)</td><td>France-UK</td><td>Concorde</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>1982</td><td>Car</td><td>Germany</td><td>Audi/Volkswagen</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>1990</td><td>Mineral water</td><td>France</td><td>Perrier</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>2010</td><td>Car</td><td>Japan</td><td>Toyota</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>2015</td><td>Car</td><td>Germany</td><td>Volkswagen</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>2016</td><td>Cell phone</td><td>South Korea</td><td>Samsung</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>2018 (27 Mar.)</td><td>Cell phone</td><td>China</td><td>Huawei</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>2018 (15 Nov.)</td><td>5th generation smartphones</td><td>China</td><td>Huawei</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>2018 (24 Nov.)</td><td>Telecom equipment</td><td>China</td><td>Huawei</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes:

Audi is the luxury brand of Volkswagen.

* On 27 March 2018 it became known that a planned partnership between Huawei and the US telecom company ATT will not happen due to political pressure. Verizon had similarly dropped plans to sell Huawei smartphones. Thus Huawei phones could be sold only through independent retailers which represents a very small part of the US market.

* On 15 November 2018 it became known that the US and Australia have excluded Huawei from the 5th generation auction for mobile phones and that the British and German governments were being pressured to do the same.

* On 24 November 2018 it became known that the US government was trying to persuade key allies to avoid using Huawei telecom equipment. This concerned particularly the countries hosting US military bases.

* We did not include in this table the sanctions against the Chinese telecom company ZTE, nor the arrest in early December 2018 of Huawei's chief financial officer because these events were not based on technical reasons like others in this table, but on purely political reasons, namely trading with Iran.

Sources:

1: NYT (11 Jan 1978); 3: NYT (10 Feb 1990); 7: https://www.cnet.com; 8: "Taipei Times" (15 Nov 2018); 9: "Taipei Times" (24 Nov 2018).

foreign institute is located on the campus of an American University. This contrasts with the German and French institutes which have their own buildings off campus. (ii) Each American university which hosts a Confucius Institute has a partnership with a Chinese University.

To establish partnerships with foreign universities is something fairly common in many countries worldwide. However, the Confucius Institutes mixes two fairly different traditions: (i) The Goethe-Alliance Française tradition through which German or French culture is promoted abroad and funded by the respective governments. (ii) International partnerships in higher education which is supposed to be funded by the respective universities. When such partnerships are established with state universities (as are the majority of German or French universities) they are of course also indirectly funded by the state but in a less visible way.

In the present trade war climate one can hardly be surprised by manifestations of hostility directed at Confucius Institutes. On the website "The Hill" (which reports
<table><caption>Table 7.3: Cluster of cases in which foreign competitors were targeted</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Year</th><th>Product</th><th>Country</th><th>Company or brand</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>1973</td><td>Supersonic airliner (Mach 2)</td><td>France-UK</td><td>Concorde</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>1982</td><td>Car</td><td>Germany</td><td>Audi/Volkswagen</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>1990</td><td>Mineral water</td><td>France</td><td>Perrier</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>2010</td><td>Car</td><td>Japan</td><td>Toyota</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>2015</td><td>Car</td><td>Germany</td><td>Volkswagen</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>2016</td><td>Cell phone</td><td>South Korea</td><td>Samsung</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>2018 (27 Mar.)</td><td>Cell phone</td><td>China</td><td>Huawei</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>2018 (15 Nov.)</td><td>5th generation smartphones</td><td>China</td><td>Huawei</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>2018 (24 Nov.)</td><td>Telecom equipment</td><td>China</td><td>Huawei</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes:

Audi is the luxury brand of Volkswagen.

* On 27 March 2018 it became known that a planned partnership between Huawei and the US telecom company ATT will not happen due to political pressure. Verizon had similarly dropped plans to sell Huawei smartphones. Thus Huawei phones could be sold only through independent retailers which represents a very small part of the US market.

* On 15 November 2018 it became known that the US and Australia have excluded Huawei from the 5th generation auction for mobile phones and that the British and German governments were being pressured to do the same.

* On 24 November 2018 it became known that the US government was trying to persuade key allies to avoid using Huawei telecom equipment. This concerned particularly the countries hosting US military bases.

* We did not include in this table the sanctions against the Chinese telecom company ZTE, nor the arrest in early December 2018 of Huawei's chief financial officer because these events were not based on technical reasons like others in this table, but on purely political reasons, namely trading with Iran.

Sources:

1: NYT (11 Jan 1978); 3: NYT (10 Feb 1990); 7: https://www.cnet.com; 8: "Taipei Times" (15 Nov 2018); 9: "Taipei Times" (24 Nov 2018).

foreign institute is located on the campus of an American University. This contrasts with the German and French institutes which have their own buildings off campus. (ii) Each American university which hosts a Confucius Institute has a partnership with a Chinese University.

To establish partnerships with foreign universities is something fairly common in many countries worldwide. However, the Confucius Institutes mixes two fairly different traditions: (i) The Goethe-Alliance Française tradition through which German or French culture is promoted abroad and funded by the respective governments. (ii) International partnerships in higher education which is supposed to be funded by the respective universities. When such partnerships are established with state universities (as are the majority of German or French universities) they are of course also indirectly funded by the state but in a less visible way.

In the present trade war climate one can hardly be surprised by manifestations of hostility directed at Confucius Institutes. On the website "The Hill" (which reports
news from the US Congress) one can read an article of 22 February 2018 which has the following title: "Get China's pernicious Confucius Institutes out of US colleges" and which ends with the following sentence: "Confucius Institutes are an affront to intellectual freedom, national security, and American interests. It is time for them to close, and it is time for the US to act."

For the time being (December 2018), only four US universities in a total of about one hundred hosting Confucius Institutes have followed this advice.

## Effects of China-US antagonism in South East Asia

During the Cold War there was a power struggle in many countries between leftist parties often suspected of sympathy for the Soviet Union and conservative parties supported by the US. Leaders considered too friendly to the Soviet Union were usually removed through a coup led by the army. Examples are Chile in 1973, Thailand in 1976 or Pakistan in 1977. One would not be surprised to see a similar effect as a result of the China-US power struggle. This prediction seems indeed confirmed by current events in several countries of South-East Asia. However it would take too long to analyze these cases here. One must realize that in each country the antagonism between China and the US will materialize in a different form determined by domestic factors. This makes it difficult to decode local events but at the same time knowledge of the China-US antagonism gives a useful interpretation key.

## Effects of China-US antagonism in Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang

### Targeting of core interests as a thermometer of China-US antagonism

Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang are usually referred to by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of China's "core interests". Therefore, the way they are targeted by the US State Department reflects fairly well the condition of China-US relations. For instance between 1980 and 1990, the period of strategic partnership, there was not a single meeting between a US president and the Dalai Lama<fnref n="86" />.

### The case of Taiwan

Taiwan-US relations reflect China-US antagonism in a much "cleaner" way (that is to say with less noise due to local factors) than US relations with neighboring countries.

When one compares the so-called "Six Assurances" given to Taiwan in 1982 by President Reagan with the "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act" of 2000 (a bill never passed), the "Taiwan Security Act of 2017" (a bill in committee discussion since November 2017), the "Taiwan Travel Act" (signed into law in March 2018), one gets the feeling of an accelerated process through which the US encourages Taiwan's

<footnote n="86">⁸⁶The source is a Wikipedia article which lists all trips of the Dalai Lama out of India. This article also reveals that, in the same decade 1980–1990, and in contrast with the US, there were four meetings of Pope John Paul II with the Dalai Lama.</footnote>
news from the US Congress) one can read an article of 22 February 2018 which has the following title: "Get China's pernicious Confucius Institutes out of US colleges" and which ends with the following sentence: "Confucius Institutes are an affront to intellectual freedom, national security, and American interests. It is time for them to close, and it is time for the US to act."

For the time being (December 2018), only four US universities in a total of about one hundred hosting Confucius Institutes have followed this advice.

## Effects of China-US antagonism in South East Asia

During the Cold War there was a power struggle in many countries between leftist parties often suspected of sympathy for the Soviet Union and conservative parties supported by the US. Leaders considered too friendly to the Soviet Union were usually removed through a coup led by the army. Examples are Chile in 1973, Thailand in 1976 or Pakistan in 1977. One would not be surprised to see a similar effect as a result of the China-US power struggle. This prediction seems indeed confirmed by current events in several countries of South-East Asia. However it would take too long to analyze these cases here. One must realize that in each country the antagonism between China and the US will materialize in a different form determined by domestic factors. This makes it difficult to decode local events but at the same time knowledge of the China-US antagonism gives a useful interpretation key.

## Effects of China-US antagonism in Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang

### Targeting of core interests as a thermometer of China-US antagonism

Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang are usually referred to by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of China's "core interests". Therefore, the way they are targeted by the US State Department reflects fairly well the condition of China-US relations. For instance between 1980 and 1990, the period of strategic partnership, there was not a single meeting between a US president and the Dalai Lama<fnref n="86" />.

### The case of Taiwan

Taiwan-US relations reflect China-US antagonism in a much "cleaner" way (that is to say with less noise due to local factors) than US relations with neighboring countries.

When one compares the so-called "Six Assurances" given to Taiwan in 1982 by President Reagan with the "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act" of 2000 (a bill never passed), the "Taiwan Security Act of 2017" (a bill in committee discussion since November 2017), the "Taiwan Travel Act" (signed into law in March 2018), one gets the feeling of an accelerated process through which the US encourages Taiwan's

<footnote n="86">⁸⁶The source is a Wikipedia article which lists all trips of the Dalai Lama out of India. This article also reveals that, in the same decade 1980–1990, and in contrast with the US, there were four meetings of Pope John Paul II with the Dalai Lama.</footnote>
independence<fnref n="87" />.

In our comments about Table 2 we observed that US military interventions were always<fnref n="88" /> in response to an aggression (e.g. Japanese attack of 1941, attack of 11 September 2001) or to come to the help of a small country under attack (e.g. South Korea, South Vietnam, Kuweit). Pushing China to an intervention in Taiwan and then coming to Taiwan's rescue might seem an appropriate way to start a limited conflict with China; but would it remain limited?

*The case of Tibet*

The “Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act” was passed by the US Congress on 11 December 2018. It requires the US Secretary of State, within 90 days of the bill being signed into law by the president, to identify Chinese officials responsible for excluding US citizens (particularly journalists) from Tibet and then ban them from entering the United States.

*The case of Xinjiang*

In recent months there have been US decisions targeting the Chinese officials in charge of the administration of Xinjiang.

Needless to say, all these actions are of a political nature. They show that the trade war which started in the Spring of 2018 is only one aspect of a global struggle.

## Conclusions

In this paper we have defined a methodology for the scientific analysis of recurrent events and we have used it in the investigation of the relations between China and the United States and in the analysis of industrial warfare episodes. This methodology was already presented (although in a less formalized form) in a book published some 16 years ago (Roehner and Syme 2002). In the meanwhile its relevance and effectiveness were tested by using it in the investigation of various phenomena (see Roehner 2007).

Our main conclusion based on similar previous episodes is that the very existence and development of China is to be perceived as a threat by the US and will not be tolerated. We listed and described some events which are early confirmations of this prediction.

## Changes in number of Chinese graduate students in the US

So far most of our predictions were of the no/yes type, that is to say we predicted the occurrence of some new events and features. By putting together data given

<footnote n="87">⁸⁷ For instance in August 2018 Taiwan’s president Tsai was allowed to give a public speech in the US and to visit NASA’s Houston Space Center, a place closed to Chinese space scientists.</footnote>

<footnote n="88">⁸⁸The invasion of Iraq of 2003 seems to be the only exception.</footnote>
independence<fnref n="87" />.

In our comments about Table 2 we observed that US military interventions were always<fnref n="88" /> in response to an aggression (e.g. Japanese attack of 1941, attack of 11 September 2001) or to come to the help of a small country under attack (e.g. South Korea, South Vietnam, Kuweit). Pushing China to an intervention in Taiwan and then coming to Taiwan's rescue might seem an appropriate way to start a limited conflict with China; but would it remain limited?

### The case of Tibet

The "Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act" was passed by the US Congress on 11 December 2018. It requires the US Secretary of State, within 90 days of the bill being signed into law by the president, to identify Chinese officials responsible for excluding US citizens (particularly journalists) from Tibet and then ban them from entering the United States.

### The case of Xinjiang

In recent months there have been US decisions targeting the Chinese officials in charge of the administration of Xinjiang.

Needless to say, all these actions are of a political nature. They show that the trade war which started in the Spring of 2018 is only one aspect of a global struggle.

## Conclusions

In this paper we have defined a methodology for the scientific analysis of recurrent events and we have used it in the investigation of the relations between China and the United States and in the analysis of industrial warfare episodes. This methodology was already presented (although in a less formalized form) in a book published some 16 years ago (Roehner and Syme 2002). In the meanwhile its relevance and effectiveness were tested by using it in the investigation of various phenomena (see Roehner 2007).

Our main conclusion based on similar previous episodes is that the very existence and development of China is to be perceived as a threat by the US and will not be tolerated. We listed and described some events which are early confirmations of this prediction.

## Changes in number of Chinese graduate students in the US

So far most of our predictions were of the no/yes type, that is to say we predicted the occurrence of some new events and features. By putting together data given

<footnote n="87">⁸⁷ For instance in August 2018 Taiwan’s president Tsai was allowed to give a public speech in the US and to visit NASA’s Houston Space Center, a place closed to Chinese space scientists.</footnote>

<footnote n="88">⁸⁸The invasion of Iraq of 2003 seems to be the only exception.</footnote>
previously we can venture to predict that from 2017 onward the number of Chinese graduate students in the US will grow at an annual rate which will certainly remain under 3%. Actually, one would, with good likelihood, expect it to become negative. This prediction is based on the combination of two factors.

1. In the past 10 years the proportion of Chinese students staying in the US after graduation has shrunk from 69% in 2007 to 21% in 2017. This limited the brain drain and in addition when returning to China, these students brought back the skills and knowledge acquired during their studies. In a climate of technological warfare such a feature will not be seen with favor by the US government.

2. From 2007 to 2013 the number of graduate students in the US has increased at an annual rate of 20%, but from 2013 to 2017 the average increase rate fell to 3% (Mervis 2018). The inflection following 2013 was likely due to rising tuition costs combined with reduced Chinese scholarships.

As one does not expect these trends to be reversed, the increase rate should decline under 3%, perhaps even become negative. As a matter of fact, it is this last case which would best agree with the expectation of Table 2.

In the rest of our conclusion we wish to add two points.

* Firstly, we want to specify under what conditions the analytical methodology should (or should not) be used.

* As the questions of uniqueness and replication are a key issue we want to explain why between history and physics there is a continuity rather than a radical disparity.

**Can one extract events from their historical context?**

At first sight the Russo-Japanese War and the Vietnam war seem to have very little in common. As a matter of fact, the time intervals as well as the countries involved are not at all the same. However, we do not intend to compare them; the only thing in which we are interested is the fact that they took place. Similarly, from an anthropomorphic perspective an apple and the Moon seem completely different objects; what they have in common is that they are both attracted by the Earth according to the law of gravitation.

The advice to refrain from studying social phenomena from an anthropomorphic perspective was not given by an econophysicist but rather, more than one century ago, by Emile Durkheim, one of the founding fathers of sociology (Durkheim 1894). In his book about the methodology of sociology he devotes many pages to this question and insists on the fact that social effects should be studied “like things” (in the English translation), “comme des choses” in the original French text. Clearly such “things” can be extracted from their historical context for the purpose of comparison.
previously we can venture to predict that from 2017 onward the number of Chinese graduate students in the US will grow at an annual rate which will certainly remain under 3%. Actually, one would, with good likelihood, expect it to become negative. This prediction is based on the combination of two factors.

1. In the past 10 years the proportion of Chinese students staying in the US after graduation has shrunk from 69% in 2007 to 21% in 2017. This limited the brain drain and in addition when returning to China, these students brought back the skills and knowledge acquired during their studies. In a climate of technological warfare such a feature will not be seen with favor by the US government.

2. From 2007 to 2013 the number of graduate students in the US has increased at an annual rate of 20%, but from 2013 to 2017 the average increase rate fell to 3% (Mervis 2018). The inflection following 2013 was likely due to rising tuition costs combined with reduced Chinese scholarships.

As one does not expect these trends to be reversed, the increase rate should decline under 3%, perhaps even become negative. As a matter of fact, it is this last case which would best agree with the expectation of Table 2.

In the rest of our conclusion we wish to add two points.

* Firstly, we want to specify under what conditions the analytical methodology should (or should not) be used.

* As the questions of uniqueness and replication are a key issue we want to explain why between history and physics there is a continuity rather than a radical disparity.

**Can one extract events from their historical context?**

At first sight the Russo-Japanese War and the Vietnam war seem to have very little in common. As a matter of fact, the time intervals as well as the countries involved are not at all the same. However, we do not intend to compare them; the only thing in which we are interested is the fact that they took place. Similarly, from an anthropomorphic perspective an apple and the Moon seem completely different objects; what they have in common is that they are both attracted by the Earth according to the law of gravitation.

The advice to refrain from studying social phenomena from an anthropomorphic perspective was not given by an econophysicist but rather, more than one century ago, by Emile Durkheim, one of the founding fathers of sociology (Durkheim 1894). In his book about the methodology of sociology he devotes many pages to this question and insists on the fact that social effects should be studied “like things” (in the English translation), “comme des choses” in the original French text. Clearly such “things” can be extracted from their historical context for the purpose of comparison.
We wished to emphasize this point because it is often a source of misunderstandings with historians.

# Replication in physics and in history

## Semi-repetition in history

The fact that something which has happened several times is likely to happen again is a crucial step in our methodology but one must recognize that this statement must be given a fairly “elastic” meaning. What we mean is best explained by a few examples.

* If sunrise was at 6:00 three days ago, at 6:05 two days ago, at 6:10 yesterday and at 6:15 today is it not likely to occur at 6:20 tomorrow? This may seem a trivial example, but if we look at it more closely it is less obvious than it could seem. Firstly, one must assume that the person remains at the same location. If he or she moves eastward or westward the prediction will not hold. Moreover, even if the person does not move, the prediction is only approximately correct.

* A more realistic illustration is provided by influenza outbreaks. According to statistics for New York City covering a period of 31 years from 1889 to 1919, the monthly number of deaths due to influenza displayed a peak usually in December-January. This regularity allows fairly accurate forecasts, at least in “normal” years. However, it is well-known that for reasons not yet well understood, in 1918 the outbreak took place in early November and its magnitude was some 8 times higher than in normal years. This example shows that the predictions based on recurrent events are probabilistic rather than deterministic. This is related to the fact that there are parameters which are either not well known or not well controlled. This leads us to replace the notion of recurrent events by the broader notion of *paronymous events*. It is explained below.

* Everybody knows what are homonyms; they are words which have the same spelling but different meanings; an example is left (past tense of the verb “to leave”) and left (opposite of right). The notion of paronyms is less well known but is merely a generalization: paronymous words are like homonyms whose spellings are allowed to be slightly different; examples are: collision-collusion, differ-defer, continuous-contiguous. The main purpose of this change in vocabulary is to acknowledge two things (i) That historical events do not, strictly speaking, repeat themselves. (ii) That we are more interested in the form of the events than in their meaning.

Paronymous repetition is a weak form of replicability. Does this introduce a drastic difference with what we see in physics? Actually, in the next subsection we show that even in physics, strictly speaking, it is impossible to repeat an experiment.

## Semi-replication in physics

The main objection of historians to the comparative methodology is to say that his-
We wished to emphasize this point because it is often a source of misunderstandings with historians.

## Replication in physics and in history

### Semi-repetition in history

The fact that something which has happened several times is likely to happen again is a crucial step in our methodology but one must recognize that this statement must be given a fairly “elastic” meaning. What we mean is best explained by a few examples.

* If sunrise was at 6:00 three days ago, at 6:05 two days ago, at 6:10 yesterday and at 6:15 today is it not likely to occur at 6:20 tomorrow? This may seem a trivial example, but if we look at it more closely it is less obvious than it could seem. Firstly, one must assume that the person remains at the same location. If he or she moves eastward or westward the prediction will not hold. Moreover, even if the person does not move, the prediction is only approximately correct.

* A more realistic illustration is provided by influenza outbreaks. According to statistics for New York City covering a period of 31 years from 1889 to 1919, the monthly number of deaths due to influenza displayed a peak usually in December-January. This regularity allows fairly accurate forecasts, at least in “normal” years. However, it is well-known that for reasons not yet well understood, in 1918 the outbreak took place in early November and its magnitude was some 8 times higher than in normal years. This example shows that the predictions based on recurrent events are probabilistic rather than deterministic. This is related to the fact that there are parameters which are either not well known or not well controlled. This leads us to replace the notion of recurrent events by the broader notion of *paronymous events*. It is explained below.

* Everybody knows what are homonyms; they are words which have the same spelling but different meanings; an example is left (past tense of the verb “to leave”) and left (opposite of right). The notion of paronyms is less well known but is merely a generalization: paronymous words are like homonyms whose spellings are allowed to be slightly different; examples are: collision-collusion, differ-defer, continuous-contiguous. The main purpose of this change in vocabulary is to acknowledge two things (i) That historical events do not, strictly speaking, repeat themselves. (ii) That we are more interested in the form of the events than in their meaning.

Paronymous repetition is a weak form of replicability. Does this introduce a drastic difference with what we see in physics? Actually, in the next subsection we show that even in physics, strictly speaking, it is impossible to repeat an experiment.

### Semi-replication in physics

The main objection of historians to the comparative methodology is to say that his-
torical events are unique and therefore cannot be compared. Here we show that the
same objection can be made to experiments in physics. To prove this point we do
not need to consider a sophisticated experiment in quantum physics. Instead, our ar-
gument is based on one of the simplest possible experiments in classical mechanics,
namely the swing of a pendulum (Fig. 7.2).

High accuracy measurement of the period of a pendulum by two different teams

<figure><img src="image_57.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7.2 High accuracy measurements of the periods of a pendulum.** When a high accuracy is desired one must take into account many effects: amplitude of the angular deviation (the small angle approximation will no longer be sufficient), local gravity, air pressure and temperature, tidal effect due to the attraction of the Sun and Moon. As a result, the experiment becomes strictly speaking non reproducible in the sense that when performed on successive days it leads to different results. It is only when all such changing perturbations are well understood and can be corrected that successive measurements (done either by the same team or two different teams) become comparable. For over three centuries physicists have been working with patience and determination to get a full understanding of all such secondary effects. From Galileo (circa 1600) to Friedrich Bessel (circa 1840), to Thomas Mendenhall (circa 1920) the accuracy of the measurement was improved. For instance, in 1817 by using a new type of pendulum Henry Kater was able to determine the length of a seconds pendulum (i.e. a pendulum whose period is 2s) as equal to: $L = 994.137 \pm 0.003\text{mm}$. Such accurate measurements in turn led to several important discoveries for instance the measurement of the density of the earth.</figcaption></figure>

The key-point is the connection between replicability and accuracy.

* If the period of the pendulum is to be measured with a low precision of one second, then even two fairly different experiments in terms of location (which influences the gravity g), diameter and elasticity of the wire, air pressure and temperature will give the same results, provided the two pendulums are (approximately) of same length.

* On the contrary, is the period to be measured with millisecond accuracy then all previous parameters must be controlled. Moreover, it is likely that due to differences in vibrations the results on week days will differ from those obtained during weekends.
torical events are unique and therefore cannot be compared. Here we show that the
same objection can be made to experiments in physics. To prove this point we do
not need to consider a sophisticated experiment in quantum physics. Instead, our ar-
gument is based on one of the simplest possible experiments in classical mechanics,
namely the swing of a pendulum (Fig. 7.2).

High accuracy measurement of the period of a pendulum by two different teams

<figure><img src="image_59.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7.2 High accuracy measurements of the periods of a pendulum.** When a high accuracy is desired one must take into account many effects: amplitude of the angular deviation (the small angle approximation will no longer be sufficient), local gravity, air pressure and temperature, tidal effect due to the attraction of the Sun and Moon. As a result, the experiment becomes strictly speaking non reproducible in the sense that when performed on successive days it leads to different results. It is only when all such changing perturbations are well understood and can be corrected that successive measurements (done either by the same team or two different teams) become comparable. For over three centuries physicists have been working with patience and determination to get a full understanding of all such secondary effects. From Galileo (circa 1600) to Friedrich Bessel (circa 1840), to Thomas Mendenhall (circa 1920) the accuracy of the measurement was improved. For instance, in 1817 by using a new type of pendulum Henry Kater was able to determine the length of a seconds pendulum (i.e. a pendulum whose period is 2s) as equal to: $L = 994.137 \pm 0.003\text{mm}$. Such accurate measurements in turn led to several important discoveries for instance the measurement of the density of the earth.</figcaption></figure>

The key-point is the connection between replicability and accuracy.

* If the period of the pendulum is to be measured with a low precision of one second, then even two fairly different experiments in terms of location (which influences the gravity $g$), diameter and elasticity of the wire, air pressure and temperature will give the same results, provided the two pendulums are (approximately) of same length.

* On the contrary, is the period to be measured with millisecond accuracy then all previous parameters must be controlled. Moreover, it is likely that due to differences in vibrations the results on week days will differ from those obtained during weekends.
* If nanosecond accuracy is required then one must take into account the tidal force due to the combined effects of the Sun and Moon. This makes the measurements fully time-dependent, in the sense that two observations done at 12:00 and 15:00 respectively will give different results.

In summary, when only low accuracy is demanded even fairly different historical episodes can be considered as acceptable realizations of the same core mechanism. This is all the more true when the observations are of a qualitative nature<fnref n="89" />.

# Appendix A: Built up of US hegemony in the Pacific

As the annexation of Guam, Hawaii and the Philippines occurred only in 1898, one might think that there was no real US interest for the Pacific until the end of the 19th century. Thus, our argumentation will involve two steps.

* First, we explain that US naval and diplomatic activity in the Pacific and in East Asia has already started in the early and mid-19th century, that is to say decades earlier than is usually assumed.

* Secondly, we show that at the end of the 19th century the US was already far ahead of all its contenders in the Pacific in terms of national product and naval power.

## Early inroads in the 19th century

There are several facts which suggest that US involvement in the Pacific started in the early-19th century and developed considerably in the first half of this century.

* Diplomatic relations between the US and Thailand were established as early as 1818; at that time Thailand was the only country of South East Asia which was not part of the British Empire. Then, in 1833 the two countries signed a "Treaty of Amity and Commerce".

In 1853 through the use of gunboat diplomacy, the United States obtained the opening of Japan to western trade.

* Despite the fact that annexation occurred only in 1898, from 1840 on the Hawaiian monarchy was virtually controlled by US missionaries who were so to say the Trojan Horse of the State Department. For instance, in 1874 following riots the United States landed troops to restore order.

The same can be said of Korea. Although a "Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation" was only signed with Korea in 1882 the influence of US missionaries started several decades before.

* In 1856, the US Congress passed the "Guano Island Act" which authorized US citizens to take possession of unclaimed islands containing guano deposits, that is

<footnote n="89">⁸⁹A qualitative description can be seen as made in terms of “no-yes”, i.e. 0 – 1, which corresponds to error bars of the order of 1/0.5 = 200%.</footnote>
* If nanosecond accuracy is required then one must take into account the tidal force due to the combined effects of the Sun and Moon. This makes the measurements fully time-dependent, in the sense that two observations done at 12:00 and 15:00 respectively will give different results.

In summary, when only low accuracy is demanded even fairly different historical episodes can be considered as acceptable realizations of the same core mechanism. This is all the more true when the observations are of a qualitative nature<fnref n="89" />.

# Appendix A: Built up of US hegemony in the Pacific

As the annexation of Guam, Hawaii and the Philippines occurred only in 1898, one might think that there was no real US interest for the Pacific until the end of the 19th century. Thus, our argumentation will involve two steps.

* First, we explain that US naval and diplomatic activity in the Pacific and in East Asia has already started in the early and mid-19th century, that is to say decades earlier than is usually assumed.

* Secondly, we show that at the end of the 19th century the US was already far ahead of all its contenders in the Pacific in terms of national product and naval power.

## Early inroads in the 19th century

There are several facts which suggest that US involvement in the Pacific started in the early-19th century and developed considerably in the first half of this century.

* Diplomatic relations between the US and Thailand were established as early as 1818; at that time Thailand was the only country of South East Asia which was not part of the British Empire. Then, in 1833 the two countries signed a "Treaty of Amity and Commerce".

In 1853 through the use of gunboat diplomacy, the United States obtained the opening of Japan to western trade.

* Despite the fact that annexation occurred only in 1898, from 1840 on the Hawaiian monarchy was virtually controlled by US missionaries who were so to say the Trojan Horse of the State Department. For instance, in 1874 following riots the United States landed troops to restore order.

The same can be said of Korea. Although a "Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation" was only signed with Korea in 1882 the influence of US missionaries started several decades before.

* In 1856, the US Congress passed the "Guano Island Act" which authorized US citizens to take possession of unclaimed islands containing guano deposits, that is

<footnote n="89">⁸⁹A qualitative description can be seen as made in terms of “no-yes”, i.e. 0 – 1, which corresponds to error bars of the order of 1/0.5 = 200%.</footnote>
to say accumulated excrement of seabirds. Guano was used for making gunpowder and fertilizer. In the course of the following decades at least 46 islands came under US possession. They extended all the way from the coast of Peru and Chile to the Philippines and Indonesia; nine of them are still officially US Territories.

<figure><img src="image_58.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7.A1 American guano islands.** The two pictures were separated for the sake of clarity. Altogether they show 46 islands. These islands were occupied by the United States following the "Guano Islands Act" of 1856. Although many were occupied only temporarily, others are still unincorporated US territories. The two broken lines show the equator and the division line between east (left) and west (right) of Greenwich. Source: *Wikipedia article entitled "List of Guano Island claims"*</figcaption></figure>

## US hegemony around 1900

The clearest indication of a watershed was of course the Spanish American War of 1898 through which Guam and the Philippine islands were annexed by the US. A display of the effectiveness of US naval forces was given in the Battle of Manilla Bay where the Spanish squadron was destroyed within a few hours with only 9 wounded on the American side.

What was the situation of the other contenders? At that time, the Chinese Empire was in chaos.

Was Japan a more serious competitor? It is true that in the Sino-Japanese War Japan won a resounding naval victory. However, one should remember that around 1900 most of the Japanese warships were still imported from Europe. At that time Japan had only a small industrial sector which weighed less than the agricultural sector and represented 24% of national income. In 1900 the US GDP was about 15 times the GDP of Japan. In 1940, the GDP ratio was still about 10 which means that in a war of long duration Japan was no match for the US. This was of course even more true in 1900⁹⁰.

<footnote n="90">⁹⁰The detailed figures are as follows: US GNP=$19,000 million, Japanese income=2520 million yen, exchange rate: 1US$=2 yen. A comparison based on trade data leads to a ratio which is somewhat lower but one must take into account</footnote>
to say accumulated excrement of seabirds. Guano was used for making gunpowder and fertilizer. In the course of the following decades at least 46 islands came under US possession. They extended all the way from the coast of Peru and Chile to the Philippines and Indonesia; nine of them are still officially US Territories.

<figure><img src="image_60.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7.A1 American guano islands.** The two pictures were separated for the sake of clarity. Altogether they show 46 islands. These islands were occupied by the United States following the "Guano Islands Act" of 1856. Although many were occupied only temporarily, others are still unincorporated US territories. The two broken lines show the equator and the division line between east (left) and west (right) of Greenwich. Source: *Wikipedia article entitled "List of Guano Island claims"*</figcaption></figure>

## US hegemony around 1900

The clearest indication of a watershed was of course the Spanish American War of 1898 through which Guam and the Philippine islands were annexed by the US. A display of the effectiveness of US naval forces was given in the Battle of Manilla Bay where the Spanish squadron was destroyed within a few hours with only 9 wounded on the American side.

What was the situation of the other contenders? At that time, the Chinese Empire was in chaos.

Was Japan a more serious competitor? It is true that in the Sino-Japanese War Japan won a resounding naval victory. However, one should remember that around 1900 most of the Japanese warships were still imported from Europe. At that time Japan had only a small industrial sector which weighed less than the agricultural sector and represented 24% of national income. In 1900 the US GDP was about 15 times the GDP of Japan. In 1940, the GDP ratio was still about 10 which means that in a war of long duration Japan was no match for the US. This was of course even more true in 1900⁹⁰.

<footnote n="90">⁹⁰The detailed figures are as follows: US GNP=$19,000 million, Japanese income=2520 million yen, exchange rate: 1US$=2 yen. A comparison based on trade data leads to a ratio which is somewhat lower but one must take into account</footnote>
The fact that the European powers (mainly Britain, France and Germany) did wish to challenge US hegemony in the central Pacific is well shown by the fact that the annexation of Hawaii was hardly opposed.

# Appendix B: Threats to US interests in the Pacific

## Russian expansion toward Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea

First of all, one should emphasize that the sale of Alaska to the US in 1867 does not signal a lack of interest for the Far East. Why? The main reason of the sale was because Russia realized it would be unable to defend Alaska in case of a conflict with Canada (still a British dominion) or the US. Secondly, Russian penetration in Alaska was limited to a few fur traders. Thirdly, Russian expansion was directed toward the southeast of the Pacific and for that purpose Alaska was completely out of the way.

In 1900 Outer Mongolia was still part of China but because of the weakness of the Qing Empire it was in fact controlled by Russia. From Outer Mongolia, Russian influence could spread to Inner Mongolia and from there to Tibet because of the strong cultural ties between the two countries. It was partly in order to prevent the spread of Russian influence that Britain invaded Afghanistan in 1978–1880⁹¹ and Tibet in 1904–1905.

Some of the landmark steps in Russian expansion can be summarized as follows (detailed explanations can be found on Internet)

1. **1860:** Through the treaty of Peking, Russia got Vladivostok; yet it was *not* an ice-free port.

2. **1875:** Through the Treaty of Saint Petersburg, Russia received the Sakhalin peninsula.

3. **1896:** Through the treaty Li-Lobanov, Russia was allowed occupation and administration of the Liaodong Peninsula including the ice-free port of Port Arthur (now Dalian).

4. **1900:** After the Boxer Rebellion Russia occupied the whole of Manchuria with a substantial force.

5. **1901:** The “North Manchuria Railway” was established by a Russian company.

Simultaneously, and in contrast to Alaska, there was a substantial inflow of Russian populations. Its legacy is still visible in the architecture of cities like Harbin and Dalian.

Russian expansion was all the more perceived as a threat because the US could do

<footnote>the fact that the larger a country, the smaller its GDP/trade ratio. The sources are: Hundred-year statistics of the Japanese Economy, Statistics Department of the Bank of Japan 1966, p.28 and Liesner (1989, p.74,102,270).</footnote>

<footnote n="91">⁹¹It can be noted that in its attempt to fight off the invasion the Afghan leader asked for Russian help.</footnote>
The fact that the European powers (mainly Britain, France and Germany) did wish to challenge US hegemony in the central Pacific is well shown by the fact that the annexation of Hawaii was hardly opposed.

# Appendix B: Threats to US interests in the Pacific

## Russian expansion toward Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea

First of all, one should emphasize that the sale of Alaska to the US in 1867 does not signal a lack of interest for the Far East. Why? The main reason of the sale was because Russia realized it would be unable to defend Alaska in case of a conflict with Canada (still a British dominion) or the US. Secondly, Russian penetration in Alaska was limited to a few fur traders. Thirdly, Russian expansion was directed toward the southeast of the Pacific and for that purpose Alaska was completely out of the way.

In 1900 Outer Mongolia was still part of China but because of the weakness of the Qing Empire it was in fact controlled by Russia. From Outer Mongolia, Russian influence could spread to Inner Mongolia and from there to Tibet because of the strong cultural ties between the two countries. It was partly in order to prevent the spread of Russian influence that Britain invaded Afghanistan in 1978–1880⁹¹ and Tibet in 1904–1905.

Some of the landmark steps in Russian expansion can be summarized as follows (detailed explanations can be found on Internet)

1. **1860:** Through the treaty of Peking, Russia got Vladivostok; yet it was *not* an ice-free port.

2. **1875:** Through the Treaty of Saint Petersburg, Russia received the Sakhalin peninsula.

3. **1896:** Through the treaty Li-Lobanov, Russia was allowed occupation and administration of the Liaodong Peninsula including the ice-free port of Port Arthur (now Dalian).

4. **1900:** After the Boxer Rebellion Russia occupied the whole of Manchuria with a substantial force.

5. **1901:** The “North Manchuria Railway” was established by a Russian company. Simultaneously, and in contrast to Alaska, there was a substantial inflow of Russian populations. Its legacy is still visible in the architecture of cities like Harbin and Dalian.

Russian expansion was all the more perceived as a threat because the US could do

<footnote>the fact that the larger a country, the smaller its GDP/trade ratio. The sources are: Hundred-year statistics of the Japanese Economy, Statistics Department of the Bank of Japan 1966, p.28 and Liesner (1989, p.74,102,270).</footnote>

<footnote n="91">⁹¹It can be noted that in its attempt to fight off the invasion the Afghan leader asked for Russian help.</footnote>
little to counter it. Manchuria may have been far away from Moscow but it was even more far away from Washington. At that time the US had no bases in South Korea or Japan. Thus, in order to stop Russian expansion the US administration had to convince Japan to confront Russia.

## Japan pushed to wage war against Russia

In the cartoon of Fig.7.B1 Britain is shown as trying to interpose itself; it is indeed true that Britain was much less pushing to war than the US but nevertheless, after the war had started, Britain was on the side of Japan and welcomed Japan's victory<fnref n="92" />.

<figure><img src="image_59.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7.B1 Cartoon about the respective roles of Britain and the US in the conflict between Japan and Russia.** In this Russian cartoon the USA is pushing the horse of the emperor of Japan over the brink while Britain (in red) is trying to interpose itself. At that time Britain had an alliance with France which itself was a close ally of Russia. In addition in 1902 England had signed a treaty with Japan. Thus, it was certainly not the wish of Britain to see Russia go to war against Japan. Source: Internet</figcaption></figure>

From the articles published in the “New York Times” in the years 1895–1904 it is clear that this was indeed the policy of the State Department. Whereas, Britain tried to encourage discussions between Japan and Russia, the NYT seized every occasion, not matter how small, to announce that the war was imminent. This was very clear for the public opinion as shown by cartoons of the time such as the one shown in Fig.7.B1. In order to illustrate that the US played the role of a rablerouser here are a few excerpts of the “New York Times”. Usually the NYT represents fairly well the positions of the State Department.

<footnote n="92">⁹²In contrast France was a close ally of Russia and tried to help it as far as possible for instance by permitting a refueling stop of the Russian Baltic Fleet in a port of French Indochina.</footnote>
little to counter it. Manchuria may have been far away from Moscow but it was even more far away from Washington. At that time the US had no bases in South Korea or Japan. Thus, in order to stop Russian expansion the US administration had to convince Japan to confront Russia.

## Japan pushed to wage war against Russia

In the cartoon of Fig.7.B1 Britain is shown as trying to interpose itself; it is indeed true that Britain was much less pushing to war than the US but nevertheless, after the war had started, Britain was on the side of Japan and welcomed Japan's victory<fnref n="92" />.

<figure><img src="image_61.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7.B1 Cartoon about the respective roles of Britain and the US in the conflict between Japan and Russia.** In this Russian cartoon the USA is pushing the horse of the emperor of Japan over the brink while Britain (in red) is trying to interpose itself. At that time Britain had an alliance with France which itself was a close ally of Russia. In addition in 1902 England had signed a treaty with Japan. Thus, it was certainly not the wish of Britain to see Russia go to war against Japan. Source: Internet</figcaption></figure>

From the articles published in the "New York Times" in the years 1895–1904 it is clear that this was indeed the policy of the State Department. Whereas, Britain tried to encourage discussions between Japan and Russia, the NYT seized every occasion, not matter how small, to announce that the war was imminent. This was very clear for the public opinion as shown by cartoons of the time such as the one shown in Fig.7.B1. In order to illustrate that the US played the role of a rablerouser here are a few excerpts of the "New York Times". Usually the NYT represents fairly well the positions of the State Department.

<footnote n="92">⁹²In contrast France was a close ally of Russia and tried to help it as far as possible for instance by permitting a refueling stop of the Russian Baltic Fleet in a port of French Indochina.</footnote>
* The Japanese Army is full of Russian spies disguised as Japanese. (24 Dec 1897) [A rather surprising allegation.]

* Seventeen British warships back an ultimatum against Russian domination. Japan supports the British action. Her fleet of 30 vessels is awaiting the result of the protest against the dismissal [in Korea] of an English customs officer. (27 Dec 1897) [To see three major fleets go to war for the dismissal of a customs officer would be quite surprising. Indeed, nothing happened.]

* Japan feels warlike. Captain Sakuzzi, who is in San Francisco, says Russia is treating his country shamfully. (1 Jan 1898) [Should one take great account of the declaration of a captain?]

* The Korea question is settled. England, Japan and Russia have arrived at an agreement. (10 Jan 1898)

* Japan is prepared for war. (22 Jan 1898)

* There is a war feeling in Japan. (6 April 1898)

[Coming 6 years before the war and just weeks after a partial agreement was reached such titles show that, contrary to Britain, the US did not welcome a peace agreement.]

More excerpts of that kind can be found in Roehner (2017, chapter 3).

These excerpts also show that it was Korea which was at stake. Japanese goals began to include Manchuria only after 1917 when the grip of Russia over this region was weakened as a result of the revolution. It is true that in the war of 1905 there was a battle for Mukden (present day Shenyan) a city which located in South Manchuria but in fact near the border with Korea; its control was necessary for the purpose of securing the occupation of Korea.

## The United States welcomes Japan's victory

If, as we argued, the US pushed Japan to confront Russia one expects of course that it was happy with Japan's victory. This is indeed confirmed by NYT excerpts in the days following the great Japanese naval victory of Tsushima (27-28 May 1905)

Togo and the men who helped him win his Trafalgar of the Far East shared with the heroes who fought and died for this country in both eulogy and applause at the memorial exercises held in Carnegie Hall last night. (31 May, 1905)

Japan has now free hand on land and can drive Russia from the Pacific coast of Asia (3 June, 1905)

The Russian cruisers must sail or be interned. By denying the request of [Russian] Admiral Enquist for an opportunity to repair his fugitive Russian cruisers [including injured sailors] at Manila President Roosevelt laid down a doctrine that is new. (6 June, 1905)

The last excerpt regarding Russian cruisers which found refuge in the Philippines is particularly harsh and shows very little sympathy for Russia in Washington.

## Indonesia and its powerful Communist party

The second case that requires some explanations is Indonesia.

Before its eradication in 1965 after a military coup, the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI in Indonesian) was the largest non-ruling (that is to say outside the Soviet Union and China) Communist party in the world. It had been founded in 1915 by Dutch socialists (Indonesia was at that time a Dutch colony). Although banned by the
* The Japanese Army is full of Russian spies disguised as Japanese. (24 Dec 1897) [A rather surprising allegation.]

* Seventeen British warships back an ultimatum against Russian domination. Japan supports the British action. Her fleet of 30 vessels is awaiting the result of the protest against the dismissal [in Korea] of an English customs officer. (27 Dec 1897) [To see three major fleets go to war for the dismissal of a customs officer would be quite surprising. Indeed, nothing happened.]

* Japan feels warlike. Captain Sakuzzi, who is in San Francisco, says Russia is treating his country shamfully. (1 Jan 1898) [Should one take great account of the declaration of a captain? ]

* The Korea question is settled. England, Japan and Russia have arrived at an agreement. (10 Jan 1898)

* Japan is prepared for war. (22 Jan 1898)

* There is a war feeling in Japan. (6 April 1898)

[Coming 6 years before the war and just weeks after a partial agreement was reached such titles show that, contrary to Britain, the US did not welcome a peace agreement.]

More excerpts of that kind can be found in Roehner (2017, chapter 3).

These excerpts also show that it was Korea which was at stake. Japanese goals began to include Manchuria only after 1917 when the grip of Russia over this region was weakened as a result of the revolution. It is true that in the war of 1905 there was a battle for Mukden (present day Shenyan) a city which located in South Manchuria but in fact near the border with Korea; its control was necessary for the purpose of securing the occupation of Korea.

## The United States welcomes Japan's victory

If, as we argued, the US pushed Japan to confront Russia one expects of course that it was happy with Japan's victory. This is indeed confirmed by NYT excerpts in the days following the great Japanese naval victory of Tsushima (27-28 May 1905)

Togo and the men who helped him win his Trafalgar of the Far East shared with the heroes who fought and died for this country in both eulogy and applause at the memorial exercises held in Carnegie Hall last night. (31 May, 1905)

Japan has now free hand on land and can drive Russia from the Pacific coast of Asia (3 June, 1905)

The Russian cruisers must sail or be interned. By denying the request of [Russian] Admiral Enquist for an opportunity to repair his fugitive Russian cruisers [including injured sailors] at Manila President Roosevelt laid down a doctrine that is new. (6 June, 1905)

The last excerpt regarding Russian cruisers which found refuge in the Philippines is particularly harsh and shows very little sympathy for Russia in Washington.

## Indonesia and its powerful Communist party

The second case that requires some explanations is Indonesia.

Before its eradication in 1965 after a military coup, the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI in Indonesian) was the largest non-ruling (that is to say outside the Soviet Union and China) Communist party in the world. It had been founded in 1915 by Dutch socialists (Indonesia was at that time a Dutch colony). Although banned by the