host competitions outside the city or country. This first and very important rec-
ommendation refers to some of our recommendations to reduce cost overruns. In
our first recommendation, we advise giving earlier orientation about the required
capital investments. Similarly, the host cities should avoid unnecessary investments
(recommendation 5) and maximise the utilisation of legacy (recommendation 13).

The second recommendation of Olympic Agenda 2020 concerns the budget in
general, and in particular the two budgets for long-term investment in infrastructure
and return on such investment on the one hand, and the operational budget on
the other hand. The IOC wants to clarify the elements (accounting systems). This
directly relates to our recommendations 8, 11 and 16, which refer to the estimate
of the budget. It is necessary to calculate the costs and revenues of the Games in
Games-time value by taking inflation into account (recommendation 8). Even though
our recommendation has already been included in the IOC bidding process since
2016, the host cities often communicate the cost and revenue only in the value of
the bidding time. Further, the workforce and administration categories should be
budgeted with higher contingencies or planned more realistically, because they
proved to have high cost overruns (our recommendation 11). A last recommen-
dation regarding budget is number 16. We suggest that the IOC should develop a
consistent, standardised category accounting system, which should be used from
the first budget estimate to the final budget. This increases transparency for the
IOC, planners, politicians and citizens regarding cost and revenue developments.

Strengthening of the IOC advocacy capacity is addressed in recommendation 21 of Olympic Agenda 2020. This reflects the avoidance of unnecessary investments in our 5th recommendation. The IOC should have the sovereignty to select the sites specified in the candidature file as the actual sports venues for the Games. Then a city cannot easily change locations and venues based on national stakeholder interests.

The 27th recommendation of Olympic Agenda 2020 is related to compliance
with the basic principles of good governance. Therefore we suggest that the OCOG
and delivery authority should have to provide an annual financial report to the
government (our recommendation 10). Further, the IOC and the host government
should implement measures to increase transparency around the budget, costs and
revenue changes (our recommendation 14). Our two suggestions can also be found
in recommendation 29 of Olympic Agenda 2020. Here the IOC demands increased
transparency by providing financial statements, annual activities, etc.

Olympic Agenda 2020 is a good step forward to reform the Olympic Movement. Hence the IOC could consider our recommendations, because they can help to significantly reduce cost overruns or at least reduce the risk of cost overruns. Many of our recommendations increase transparency. This is an important step to increase the desire of politicians, industry and population to host future Olympic Games.
**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made.

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