Mikhail Gorbachev set in motion a radical nuclear arms reduction process. On a platform of mutual trust, the two men concluded 'that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" and began at Reykjavik to seek nuclear disarmament'.¹⁴ What followed was a 'golden age' for nuclear arms control and disarmament.¹⁵ The third and still ongoing act sees the disarmament project stymied by senseless individuals and unforeseen events. As argued by the authors of a 2017 report by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 'international consensus over a common path for the elimination of nuclear weapons has been strained'.¹⁶ Popular explanations for what is typically presented as a temporary 'setback', 'slowdown', or 'impasse' in progress towards abolition include the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014,¹⁷ North Korea's continuing missile and nuclear development,¹⁸ the use of impassioned rhetoric and an attendant 'polarization of the global debate' between nuclear and non-nuclear powers,¹⁹ and 'not simply Trump' but also 'rising geopolitical tensions, a resurgent Russia, arms modernization, and a hawkish Republican Congress'.²⁰

The conventional narrative offers an obvious solution to the predicament: Proponents of disarmament must spur a 'return' to the international community's erstwhile consensus on 'a common path towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons',²¹ 'rebuild habits of cooperation',²² and 'restore multilateral dialogue'.²³ Yet, on closer inspection, the various diplomatic efforts carried out after and towards the end of the Cold War never amounted to a blueprint for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In fact, looking at indicators beyond the sheer number of nuclear warheads in the world – investments, modernisation programmes, actors in possession of nuclear armories, and the way in which key defence establishments view nuclear arms – it is not clear that the world was significantly closer to nuclear abolition in 2010 than it was in 1985.

First, although the overall number of nuclear warheads in the world declined, the number of arsenals went the other way. While the period in question admittedly did see a sharp reduction in the overall number of states hosting foreign-owned nuclear arms, the list of states in sovereign custody of nuclear weapons grew from seven to nine (see Figure 1). And in contrast to what appeared to be the case during much of the Cold War, when international bloc politics afforded enormous managerial power to the executives of the two leading states, the current, more fragmented, geopolitical situation offers few prospects that the nuclear predicament can be solved by two states, let alone two individuals, alone.

Second, quantitative reductions have in large measure been offset by qualitative improvements in nuclear-weapon systems. Measuring nuclear 'lethality' as a product of precision and explosive power, Lynn Eden finds that the US nuclear arsenal was not at its most potent in the 1980s, as the conventional narrative has it, but in the early 2000s.²⁴ Critical scholars have also pointed out that most of the nuclear warheads dismantled since the 1980s were outdated and due for retirement anyway. According to Keith Krause, the
practice of nuclear arms control was always intimately 'linked to deterrence theory and practice, and to the entire functioning of the so-called military-industrial complex, and not something distinct and in opposition to it'²⁵ For David Mutimer, the arms control paradigm 'has produced nuclear weapons as a means to security, a bulwark against what is risky and inconvenient'.²⁶

Third, the overall nuclear plans and postures maintained by the major nuclear powers have been argued to remain 'largely unchanged from the Cold War'.²⁷ That being said, the 1990s saw the entrenchment of a new and arguably more robust justification for the possession of nuclear weapons. While during the Cold War nuclear arsenals were invariably justified as tools to deter a specific enemy from undertaking specific actions, in the 1990s, the justification for nuclear armament was liberated from the constraints of time and geopolitical circumstance, recast as a hedge against unknown threats that might materialise in the future.²⁸ As put by the then US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in the 1992 unclassified report 'Defense Strategy for the 1990s', nuclear weapons could provide a 'hedge against the possibility of an unforeseen global threat emerging'.²⁹ 'At no time during the life of the NPT', argues Steven E. Miller, have the defence establishments of the nuclear-weapon states conceived nuclear weapons as anything other than 'central and integral' to their countries' military postures.³⁰

Finally, the quantitative reductions carried out since the mid-1980s are of somewhat limited significance so long as the world continues to hold more than enough nuclear firepower to destroy human civilisation. Recent research indicates that a war between India and Pakistan, involving just 100 nuclear warheads of the Hiroshima-bomb size, could throw enough soot into the atmosphere to trigger a significant reduction of global surface temperatures and, in turn, a major decline in staple food production worldwide.³¹ In one estimation, such a scenario could leave two billion people, almost 30 per cent of the world's population, at risk of starvation.³²

The challenges outlined above have in recent years prompted several scholars to question the mainstream, incrementalist approach to disarmament. Campbell Craig and Jan Ruzicka, for example, have contended that the dominant approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament is bound to fail.³³ 'To deal effectively with nuclear danger, more radical answers are needed, but it is these kinds of answers that have been marginalized by the dominant discourse'.³⁴ The 'only logical means of permanently ending the possibility of interstate nuclear war', they go on, is to create a world in which nuclear technology is strictly controlled by a superior body: 'the advent of a world government'.³⁵

> If the inherent instability of anarchy undermines all other attempts to prevent nuclear war, then the obvious conclusion is to eliminate anarchy by developing an entity that can acquire and control all nuclear technologies, an act that would mean the end of sovereign nation-states. This solution, of course, was the natural one envisioned by politicians,
scientists, scholars, and writers at the outset of the atomic age, recognizing that less ambitious projects would invariably fail.³⁶

In the grand scheme of things, the period of sovereign nation-states may turn out to be a short blip in human history. The 'Westphalian' system of formally equal political units interacting through common institutions was only globalised in the 1960s, when the process of decolonisation gained momentum. This is not to say that there are no powerful forces working against world integration; there are many obstacles to the emergence of world government, including nationalism, the political ambitions of local leaders, and ideological and cultural conflicts. Robert Jervis has added the ironic observation that nuclear weapons may themselves pose significant obstacles to transcending anarchy. Writing in 2016, Jervis maintained that 'one may argue that it is only nuclear weapons that stand between the United States and world domination'.³⁷ Another ironic observation, flowing from the pages above, is that diplomatic advocacy for multilateral nuclear disarmament has often functioned as a practice of sovereignty affirmation, to wit, as a countervailing force against the formation of world government.

Craig and Ruzicka's pessimism is easy to understand. But it is possible to imagine models and scenarios for nuclear disarmament short of world government.³⁸ It is crucial to acknowledge that nuclear desire is neither immovable nor inevitable, even in an anarchic system. 184 of the world's 193 UN member states do not possess nuclear arms. Only a minority of the world's states have ever demanded, let alone pursued, nuclear protection.³⁹ South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have given up nuclear weapons, and many more have abandoned nuclear-weapon programmes. Nuclear roll-back and relinquishment are possible, and so are non-proliferation and disarmament verification.⁴⁰ And while the security environment clearly plays an important role in the politics of arms control and disarmament, the common contention that nuclear choices are epiphenomenal to 'objective' international security dynamics does not stand up to scrutiny. It has been irrefutably established that nuclear weapons 'are more than tools of national security; they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity'.⁴¹ It is also clear that states have found it difficult to give up their nuclear arsenals 'even if the strategic security threats that motivated their original acquisition have diminished or faded altogether'.⁴² 'Threats' and 'security conditions' are not altogether objective facts but perceptions shaped partly by political and social factors.⁴³

Short of a major shock that somehow rendered nuclear weapons obsolete, progress towards nuclear abolition would require smart diplomacy, resolute organising on local, national, and international levels, and determined efforts at identifying, illuminating, and unsettling the assumptions, actor-networks, and political-economic incentive-structures that sustain the nuclear status quo.⁴⁴ Multilateral diplomacy can only do so much. Yet global nuclear
disarmament would undoubtedly require the creation of new international institutions and practices – what Nick Ritchie calls ‘inventing nuclear disarmament’⁴⁵ – and the creative leveraging of external events. On the latter point, the War in Ukraine offers a challenge and an opportunity. Will the conflict be remembered as an event that showcased the necessity and utility of nuclear armament – or the opposite? Will the increase in nuclear tension spur action towards arms control and disarmament – or a doubling down on deterrence? The answers to these questions are not preordained. They can be influenced by human actions and leadership.

Bigger global trends that could plausibly reconfigure the prospects for nuclear disarmament include biodiversity loss and global warming. These are truly mammoth challenges that have the potential to fundamentally alter the conditions for life on earth; in the words of UN Special Rapporteur Ian Fry, climate change is ‘the greatest threat the world has ever faced’.⁴⁶ The harms and dislocations these trends are likely to produce or deepen over the next century, as well as the measures that are taken to address them, could conceivably set in motion metamorphic political shifts, institutional disruptions, and technological innovations that in turn generate unpredictable consequences for the practice of nuclear deterrence. It is possible, for example, that future technological advances will reduce the attractiveness of nuclear weapons or that humanity’s capacity to solve collective problems will increase.⁴⁷ Writing in 2003, Alexander Wendt argued that struggles for recognition and the tendency for military technology and war to become increasingly destructive had rendered the emergence of world government ‘inevitable’.⁴⁸ Catastrophic climate change or a breakdown in ecosystem services might hypothetically hasten the process. On the flip side, it is also possible that the crises mentioned above will merely fuel interstate enmities and nuclearism.

According to the long-serving US arms control official Thomas Graham, the ‘basic problem’ of disarmament is not a lack of technical solutions, but that ‘the prestige value of nuclear weapons, made high during the Cold War, remains very high’.⁴⁹ Robbing nuclear weapons of their value as status symbols, in this view, is a *sine qua non* for abolition. As long as nuclear weapons are seen within the nuclear-armed states’ defence establishments as necessary, legitimate, and even prestigious instruments of statecraft, disarmament will not stand much of a chance. Advocates of disarmament, then, would be obliged to further contest the legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons, aiming to shift the nuclear-political Overton window in their direction. Perhaps the most important task for NGOs and non-nuclear-weapon states eager to advance nuclear disarmament, in this perspective, is to push the boundaries of the debate, giving progressive voices within the nuclear-armed states’ defence establishments the opportunity to seize the political middle ground and win debates against their more pro-nuclear colleagues. The underlying theory of change would be that a more forceful anti-nuclear political pole would offer proponents of incremental arms control and disarmament steps
more propitious conditions. Positions that are currently perceived as radical, be it the adoption of no-first-use policies or the renunciation of specific classes of nuclear weapons, might appear more mainstream. Tackling the influence of arms contractors within the major nuclear powers, 'starving the beast' as Richard Ned Lebow has called it,⁵⁰ would also be a necessity. Slimming down the wider nuclear weapons enterprise could significantly aid the cause of abolition by reducing the weight and influence of the actor-networks that sustain the status quo.

Some have warned against the strategy outlined above, asserting that normative pressure is likely to affect only the liberal, democratic nuclear-armed states while letting authoritarian powers off the hook.⁵¹ Yet it is far from clear that authoritarian states are immune to political pressure or, indeed, the politics of recognition. It has been persuasively argued that Russia, for example, values nuclear arms in part because it offers Moscow a form of prestige. Further, if the international community is to be serious about abolition, there is likely no way around the creation of a political-normative environment more conducive to change – however difficult it may be. It also appears somewhat implausible that increased pressure for denuclearisation in democratic nuclear-armed states would necessarily lead to unilateral disarmament by the relevant governments. It would appear more likely that such pressure would translate into a greater willingness to engage other nuclear-armed states in negotiations. In the 1960s, for example, anti-nuclear popular mobilisation helped stimulate the negotiation of the Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) and NPT. In the 1980s, the upsurge of public pressure for disarmament found resolution in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the strategic arms reductions process, and, ultimately, the CTBT.

Commentators sceptical of the position articulated above typically argue that the non-nuclear-weapon states should eschew maximalist positions and instead aim to find common ground with the nuclear-weapon states. In the words of the former Australian foreign minister, Julie Bishop, the challenge should be to 'engage, not enrage'.⁵² The findings of this study suggest that such recommendations are unlikely to yield significant progress. Consider the process that led to the 1996 adoption of the CTBT. At the 1985 NPT review conference, the neutral and non-aligned states consciously sought to avoid 'polarisation' by agreeing to a watered-down declaration that acknowledged that 'certain states' disagreed with the imperative of prohibiting all nuclear tests. Unsurprisingly, this resulted in stasis and effectively shielded the nuclear powers from diplomatic pressure. By contrast, at the 1990 NPT review conference, non-aligned states caused serious 'polarisation' by refusing to accept watered-down compromise language merely for the sake of an appearance of consensus. A year later, they also convened a PTBT amendment conference in protest and indicated that they would continue to convene such conferences until serious CTBT negotiations were underway. The negotiating process that culminated in the adoption of the CTBT was initiated in 1993.⁵³ Admittedly, the mechanism of change was not one of straightforward
persuasion, but rather the fact that a new US administration, that of Bill
Clinton, came in and changed the American position. Yet the people who
made up that administration, including Clinton himself, had undoubtedly
been influenced by the increasingly confrontational diplomatic and popular
campaign to end nuclear testing. As Max Planck put it with regards to sci-
entific paradigm shifts, a new paradigm ‘does not triumph by convincing its
opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents
eventually die’ – or in this case are replaced through political renewal – ‘and
a new generation grows up that is familiar with it’.⁵⁴

The global nuclear order is polarised. Glossing over this fact will hardly
aid the cause of disarmament. While nuclear-armed leaders often, and plaus-
sibly quite sincerely, talk about their aspirations for a world free of nuclear
weapons, the actions of the states they represent invariably tell a different
story. Nuclear-armed leaders’ abolitionist rhetoric has persistently been
belied by their governments’ continued investments in nuclear-weapon tech-
nology, refusal to implement ‘consensus’ disarmament commitments, and
repeated statements about the necessity and legitimacy of nuclear deterrence.
In 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, threatening third
parties with nuclear violence should they dare to intervene in Kyiv’s favour.
In this context, pleas to concentrate on the international community’s sup-
posed shared vision of a world without nuclear weapons risks playing into
the hands of those keen to retain, modernise, and politically or economically
profit from nuclear arms. Since the 1960s or arguably earlier, most politically
literate defenders of nuclear armament have elected to oppose disarmament
at the level of process, acquiescing to the long-term vision of a nuclear-
weapon-free future while quietly opposing measures that might make such a
future a reality.⁵⁵ Pro-nuclear actors have consistently sought to depoliticise
nuclear weapons issues by framing the elimination of nuclear arsenals as a
technical and, ultimately, boring question of implementation that ordinary
citizens, civil society organisations, and non-nuclear-weapon states ought not
to worry too much about.⁵⁶ To be sure, some questions *are* technical and
should of course be approached in that way, be it seismic test-ban monitor-
ing or dismantlement verification. But disarmament more generally remains
intensely political.

The various chapters of this book invite several policy recommenda-
tions pertaining to multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy. First, in the
absence of meaningful political will to relinquish nuclear weapons on the
part of the present nuclear powers, those eager to advance the multilateral
nuclear disarmament agenda should focus on the big picture. Advocates of
nuclear disarmament and restraint should aim to create a strong political
pole that might, over time, create the conditions for transformative practic-
cal initiatives.⁵⁷To that end, actors in favour of disarmament should seek
to build as broad a base of support as possible.⁵⁸ That being said, for those
interested in aiding the cause of abolition, the imperative of building a broad
base of support must be balanced against the equally important imperative
of drawing back the ‘veil of good intentions’ and pinpointing the political disagreements at the heart of the global nuclear order.⁵⁹ Perpetuating the narrative that all states agree on the goal of abolition, and that disarmament is first and foremost a matter of technical implementation, plays into the hands of those eager to depoliticise nuclear diplomacy and stay the current course.⁶⁰

Second, in the interest of effecting the move articulated above, those involved in multilateral processes should intensify their efforts to reach out from the diplomatic silo and connect more effectively with media organisations, social movements, and wider society. After all, norms, discourses, and political imaginaries are only effective insofar as they bleed into broader social practices and conversations.⁶¹ As discussed throughout this book, the goings-on in the grand chambers of the Palais des Nations in Geneva and UN headquarters in New York have often been disconnected from the ‘real world’ of national and international politics.

Third, the NPT review cycle has clearly produced more heat than light and should be rethought. As alluded to above, those eager to further the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda might be well advised to spend less time and energy chasing technocratic consensus declarations and more time and energy creating an environment – material and normative – in which such declarations stand a chance of being implemented. Perhaps the parties would be better off abandoning the pursuit of comprehensive, all-or-nothing final declarations altogether, opting instead for a more flexible approach.⁶² Several non-nuclear-weapon states currently oppose reforms along these lines as they believe the all-or-nothing approach gives them the power to hold consensus on non-proliferation issues hostage to concessions on disarmament or civilian nuclear cooperation. The trouble is that the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT largely eliminated the non-nuclear-weapon states’ bargaining leverage – and without leverage there can be no meaningful bargaining. At this point, resisting the further strengthening of the non-proliferation framework defeats any broader strategy of delegitimising nuclear weapons and provides political cover for any state that might want to keep its nuclear options open.

Fourth, some of the activity that goes into the multilateral nuclear disarmament framework might sensibly be scaled down to save human and material resources. The Conference on Disarmament, in particular, is not fit for purpose and should be either disbanded or fundamentally reconfigured. The combination of strict, consensus-based rules of procedure and a large though far from universal membership with endlessly recurring fixed sessions is a recipe for unproductive buck-passing. Any future multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations could be carried out either under the auspices of the UN General Assembly (like the negotiations that brought about the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change), through ad hoc multilateral negotiating conferences convened outside the UN system (like the negotiations that brought about the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions), or via smaller initiatives with limited participation
(like the negotiations that brought about the agreement between Iran and the P5+1 on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).

Fifth, states that support abolition as a long-term goal but are uncomfort-
able renouncing nuclear deterrence in the near term should resist the temp-
tation to disparage abolitionist initiatives and instead focus their efforts on
creating the conditions for moving beyond nuclear deterrence in the future.
Such efforts might involve fresh attempts at resolving conflicts and improv-
ing the security environment, providing funding for capacity building and
relevant knowledge production, or further investments into the develop-
ment of nuclear disarmament verification techniques. To the extent that
they are interested in pursuing disarmament as a long-term objective, the
Western nuclear powers should consider adopting less defensive diplomatic
postures, placing the onus on the other nuclear-armed states to resist dip-
lomatic overtures. Any opposition by authoritarian nuclear-armed states
such as Russia to serious arms control and disarmament proposals should
be exposed and brought visibly into the light. The US government could,
for example, have made much more of the rejection by Russia in the mid-
2010s of the Obama administration's suggestion that the two states reduce
their deployed strategic nuclear weapons by another third relative to New
START numbers.⁶³

Any successful approach to the elimination of nuclear weapons must be based on a realistic assessment of relevant stakeholders' interests and motives, as well as an accurate understanding of the power structures underpinning the status quo. At the same time, it is crucial to acknowledge that currently held norms, preferences, and assumptions are not immutable but shaped by political, historical, and material processes. The historical record carries many important lessons about how and when progressive change might occur. That said, there exists no lost formula or recipe that can be unlocked by repeating the past; the truth is that, even during the supposed 'golden age' of nuclear disarmament during the 1990s, there was never consensus on a path to abolition within the US or Russian defence establishments, let alone in the international community more broadly. Global nuclear disarmament is an enormously difficult, perhaps unattainable, goal. But so is the perpetual avoidance of disaster in a world filled with nuclear weapons; we have already been obliged to rely on luck. There are no easy options. There is no escape from utopia.⁶⁴

Notes

1 Ian Clark et al., ‘Crisis in the laws of war? Beyond compliance and effectiveness’, *European Journal of International Relations* 42: 2, 2018, p. 12.

2 See Charles D. Brockett, ‘The repression/popular-protest paradox’, in Mark Traugott, ed., *Repertoires and cycles of collective action* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

3 Marianne Hanson, *Challenging nuclearism: a humanitarian approach to reshape the global nuclear order* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022), p. 14.
4 Shannon Bugos, 'U.S. testing interest triggers backlash', *Arms Control Today*, July/Aug. 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-07/news/us-testing-interest-triggers-backlash.

5 Stephen Herzog, Benoît Pelopidas, and Fabrício Fialho, 'Donald Trump could lose the election by authorizing a new nuclear weapons test', *The National Interest*, 23 Jun. 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trump-could-lose-election-authorizing-new-nuclear-weapons-test-163328.

6 See, e.g., AFP, 'Ukraine one year on: the specter of nuclear war', *France 24*, 15 Feb. 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230215-ukraine-one-year-on-the-specter-of-nuclear-war; Nina Tannenwald, 'The bomb in the background', *Foreign Affairs*, 24 Feb. 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/bomb-background-nuclear-weapons.

7 See, e.g., Robert Ayson, 'If Russia breaks the nuclear taboo', *The Interpreter*, 12 Oct. 2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/if-russia-breaks-nuclear-taboo.

8 Donald J. Trump (@ Donald Trump), Twitter, 11 Oct. 2017, https://twitter.com/ Donald Trump/status/918110279367643137.

9 See, e.g, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms control and nonproliferation, 'Memorandum from the director of the arms control and disarmament agency (Earle) to president Carter', Washington, 12 Sept. 1980, doc. 391; FRUS 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms control and nonproliferation, 'Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones)', Washington, 10 Jul. 1978, doc. 211.

10 See Benoît Pelopidas and Sanne Cornelia J. Verschuren, 'Writing IR after COVID-19', *Global Studies Quarterly* 3: 1, 2023, p. 6.

11 See, e.g., Serhii Plokhy, *Nuclear folly: a history of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Co, 2021); Benoît Pelopidas, 'Power, luck, and scholarly responsibility at the end of the world(s)', *International Theory* 12: 3, 2020, pp. 459–70; Eric Schlosser, *Command and control: nuclear weapons, the Damascus incident, and the illusion of safety* (New York, NY: Penguin, 2013); Richard Ned Lebow and Benoît Pelopidas, 'Facing nuclear war: luck, learning, and the Cuban Missile Crisis', in Mlada Bukovansku et al., eds, *The Oxford handbook of history and international relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. 705–20.

12 For a lucid example, see Nik Hynek and Michal Smetana, 'Nuclear disarmament', in Nik Hynek and Michal Smetana, eds, *Global nuclear disarmament* (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 1–12.

13 Graham T. Allison, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis', in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadenfield, and Timothy Dunne, eds, *Foreign policy*, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 256.

14 Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, 'Nuclear deterrence in a changed world', *Arms Control Today* 42: 5, 2012, p. 8.

15 Kjølv Egeland, 'Who stole disarmament? History and nostalgia in nuclear abolition discourse', *International Affairs* 96: 5, 2020, pp. 1387–403.

16 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, *Securing our common future* (New York: United Nations, 2018), p. 17.

17 See, e.g., Götz Neuneck, 'The deep crisis of nuclear arms control and disarmament', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 2: 2, 2019, p. 435.

18 See, e.g., Moshe Kantor, 'We live in more dangerous times than the Cold War', *The Independent*, 10 Dec. 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/nuclear-weapons-russia-america-vladimir-putin-donald-trump-cold-war-a7467166.html.

19 See Kjølv Egeland, 'How I learned to stop worrying and embrace diplomatic “polarization”', *Peace Review* 29: 4, 2017, p. 483.
20 Nina Tannenwald, 'The vanishing nuclear taboo? How disarmament fell apart', *Foreign Affairs* 97: 6, 2018, p. 17.

21 António Guterres, 'UN chief pays tribute to Hiroshima victims and renews call for nuclear disarmament', speech at the Hiroshima memorial ceremony, 6 Aug. 2018, https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1866.

22 Paul Ingram and Maxwell Downman, *Stepping stones to disarmament* (London: British American Security Information Council, 2019), p. 7.

23 Lewis A. Dunn, *Perspectives on a nuclear-weapon-free world* (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2019), p. 6.

24 Lynn Eden, 'The U.S. nuclear arsenal and zero', in Catherine M. Kelleher and Judith Reppy, eds, *Getting to zero: the path to nuclear disarmament* (Stanford, CL: Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 72.

25 See Keith Krause, 'Leashing the dogs of war', *Contemporary Security Policy* 32: 1, 2011, p. 25.

26 David Mutimer, 'From arms control to denuclearization', *Contemporary Security Policy* 32: 1, 2011, p. 72.

27 Zia Mian and Benoît Pelopidas, 'Producing collapse: nuclear weapons as preparation to end civilization', in Miguel A. Centeno et al., *How worlds collapse: what history, systems, and complexity can teach us about our modern world and fragile future* (London: Routledge, 2023), p. 319.

28 Egeland, 'Who stole disarmament?'.

29 Dick Cheney, *Defense strategy for the 1990s* (Arlington, VA: US Department of Defense, 1993).

30 Steven E. Miller, 'Proliferation, disarmament and the future of the non-proliferation treaty', in Sverre Lodgaard and Morten B. Mærli, eds, *Nuclear proliferation and international security* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 53.

31 Lili Xia et al., 'Global food insecurity and famine from reduced crop, marine fishery and livestock production due to climate disruption from nuclear war soot injection', *Nature: Food* 3: 8, 2022, pp. 586-96; Michael J. Mills et al., 'Multidecadal global cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict', *Earth's Future* 2: 4, 2014, pp. 161-76; Alan Robock et al., 'Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts', *Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics* 7: 8, 2007, pp. 2003-12.

32 Ira Helfand, *Nuclear famine: two billion people at risk?* (Boston, MA: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 2013).

33 See Jan Ruzicka, 'Behind the veil of good intentions: power analysis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime', *International Politics* 55: 3-4, 2018, pp. 369-85.

34 Campbell Craig and Jan Ruzicka, 'The nonproliferation complex', *Ethics & International Affairs* 27: 3, 2013, p. 344.

35 Craig and Ruzicka, 'The nonproliferation complex', p. 345.

36 Craig and Ruzicka, 'The nonproliferation complex', pp. 345-6.

37 Robert Jervis, 'Foreword', pp. xv-xx in Nik Hynek and Michal Smetana, eds, *Global nuclear disarmament* (London: Routledge, 2016), p. xix.

38 Cf. Daniel Deudney, 'Going critical: toward a modified nuclear one worldism', *Journal of International Political Theory* 15: 3, 2018, pp. 367-85.

39 See Benoît Pelopidas, 'The oracles of proliferation: how experts maintain a biased historical reading that limits policy innovation', *The Nonproliferation Review* 18: 1, 2011, pp. 297-314; Benoît Pelopidas, 'Renunciation: restraint and rollback', in Joseph F. Pilat and Nathan E. Bush, eds, *Routledge handbook of nuclear proliferation and policy* (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 337-48.

40 See Harald Müller, 'Icons off the mark: Waltz and Schelling on a perpetual brave nuclear world', *The Nonproliferation Review* 20: 3, 2013, pp. 545-65; Wyn Bowen et al., *Trust in nuclear disarmament verification* (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2018); Thomas E. Shea, *Verifying nuclear disarmament* (London: Routledge, 2018); Moritz Kütt and Zia Mian, ‘Setting the deadline for nuclear weapon destruction under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 2: 2, 2019, pp. 410–30; Pavel Podvig, ed., *Menzingen verification experiment: verifying the absence of nuclear weapons in the field* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2023).

41 Scott Sagan, ‘Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in Search of a bomb’, *International Security* 21: 3, 1996/1997, p. 55. See also Pelopidas, ‘Renunciation’.

42 Nick Ritchie, ‘Relinquishing nuclear weapons’, *International Affairs* 86: 2, 2010, p. 466.

43 The consensus extends from self-declared realists to postmodernists, via liberals and constructivists. See, e.g., Stephen M. Walt, *The origins of alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy’, *World Politics* 51: 1, 1998, pp. 144–72; Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is anybody still a realist?’, *International Security* 24: 2, 1999, pp. 5–55; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: a new framework for analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, *International/intertextual relations: postmodern readings of world politics* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1998).

44 See Ray Acheson, *Banning the bomb, smashing the patriarchy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021); Tim Street, *The politics of nuclear disarmament: obstacles to and opportunities for eliminating nuclear weapons* (London: Routledge, 2021); Nick Ritchie, *A nuclear weapons-free world? Britain, Trident and the challenges ahead* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Kjølv Egeland, ‘A theory of nuclear disarmament: cases, analogies, and the role of the non-proliferation regime’, *Contemporary Security Policy* 43: 1, 2022, pp. 106–33.

45 Nick Ritchie, ‘Inventing nuclear disarmament’, *Critical Studies on Security* 7: 1, 2019, pp. 73–7.

46 United Nations Media Center, ‘Climate change the greatest threat the world has ever faced, UN expert warns’, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 21 Oct. 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/10/climate-change-greatest-threat-world-has-ever-faced-un-expert-warns.

47 See Kjølv Egeland and Benoît Pelopidas, ‘European nuclear weapons? Zombie debates and nuclear realities’, *European Security* 30: 2, 2021, p. 244.

48 Alexander Wendt, “Why a world state is inevitable,” *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 4 (2003): 491–542.

49 Thomas Graham Jr, *Disarmament sketches: three decades of arms control and international law* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002), p. 314.

50 Richard Ned Lebow, *A democratic foreign policy: regaining American influence* abroad (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), p. 61.

51 Michael Rühle, ‘The nuclear weapons ban treaty: Reasons for scepticism’, *NATO Review*, 19 May 2017, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/also-in-2017/nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-scepticism-abolition/en/index.htm.

52 Julie Bishop, ‘We must engage, not enrage nuclear countries’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 Feb. 2014, https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/we-must-engage-not-enrage-nuclear-countries-20140213-32n1s.html.

53 See Rebecca Johnson, *Unfinished business: the negotiation of the CTBT and the end of nuclear testing* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2009).

54 Max Planck, *Scientific autobiography and other papers* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1950), pp. 33–4.
55 Benoît Pelopidas, 'The birth of nuclear eternity', in Sandra Kemp and Jenny Andersson, eds, *Futures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 484–500. See also David S. Meyer, 'Protest cycles and political process', *Political Research Quarterly* 46: 3, 1993, p. 462.

56 See William Epstein, *The last chance: nuclear proliferation and arms control* (London: The Free Press, 1976), p. 246; Gabrielle Hecht, 'Negotiating global nuclearities', *Osiris* 21: 1, 2006, p. 31; Anna Weichselbraun, *Constituting the international nuclear order: bureaucratic objectivity at the IAEA*, PhD thesis (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2016); Lawrence S. Wittner, *Confronting the bomb: a short history of the world nuclear disarmament movement* (Stanford, CL: Stanford University Press, 2009).

57 Nick Ritchie, 'Waiting for Kant: devaluing and delegitimising nuclear weapons', *International Affairs* 90: 3, 2014, pp. 601–23.

58 See Zia Mian, 'After the nuclear weapons ban treaty: a new disarmament politics', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 7 Jul. 2017, https://thebulletin.org/2017/07/after-the-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-a-new-disarmament-politics/; Mian, 'After the nuclear weapons ban treaty'.

59 Ruzicka, 'Behind the veil of good intentions'.

60 Robert A. Dahl, *Controlling nuclear weapons: democracy versus guardianship* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985).

61 See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International norms dynamics and political change', *International Organization* 52: 4, 1998, p. 900.

62 See Robert Einhorn, *The NPT review process: time to try something new* (Monterey, CL: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2016).

63 Of course, it is far from certain that Obama would have won support for such an agreement in the US Senate.

64 Pelopidas, 'Power, luck, and scholarly responsibility at the end of the world(s)', p. 467.

65 Graph compiled on the basis of Hans M. Kristensen et al., 'Nuclear notebook', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/; Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, Appendices for 'Signaling alliance commitments: hand-tying and sunk costs in extended nuclear deterrence', *American Journal of Political Science* 58: 4, 2014, pp. 919–35, http://www.matthewfuhrmann.com/uploads/2/5/8/2/25820564/fuhrmann-sechser-ajpsAppendices.pdf; Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, 'Where they were', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55: 6, 1999, pp. 26–35.
<figure><img src="image_12.png" /></figure>

Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

http://taylorandfrancis.com
Index

11 September 2001 attacks 124

12 June 1978 rally 72

ABM Treaty *see* Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

Abolition 2000 101

Abraham, I. 88

ACDA *see* Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (US)

Acheson, R. 144, 159

Afghanistan: invasion of 35, 70

African Group 164–5

Ahmadinejad, M. 128

Albania: reaction to SALT 33–4

Albright, D. 76–7

Albright, M. 90

Algeria: in the Geneva Conference
53, 140; and the NPT 22, 101; on
nuclear modernisation 138

Amis, M. 1

Andropov, Y. 74

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 32,
105, 124–5, 166

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
95, 135, 150, 153

Arab League 100, 157

Argentina: in the Geneva Conference 36; and non-proliferation sanctions 129; and the NPT 22, 101; and UNSSOD I 50, 52

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(US) (ACDA) 55, 70, 96

ASEAN *see* Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) 164

Australia: and ANZUS 78; and the
Canberra Commission 102; and the
CTBT 104; and disarmament strategy
192; and French nuclear testing in the

Pacific 86; in the Geneva Conference
53; and the humanitarian initiative
150, 156; and the International
Commission on Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament 133;
and the NPT 45

Austria: in the Geneva Conference 103,
140; and the humanitarian initiative
143, 147–8, 150–3, 156, 166; and
New START 134; and the NPT 76,
137, 139, 152, 158; and the OEWGs
on nuclear disarmament 140, 143,
159; and the TPNW 160, 164; on the
TTBT 41

Austrian Pledge *see* Humanitarian Pledge

B61 nuclear bombs 138

Bangladesh: and UNSSOD I 56

Bargman, A. 51

Barnaby, F. 56

Baruch Plan 136

Beaumont, P. 130

Bebler, A. 59

Belarus: denuclearisation of 96–7, 190;
in the Geneva Conference 159; and
the NPT 100–1; on ‘topless women’
throwing mayonnaise 159

Belgium: in the Geneva Conference 53;
and human security 153; and nuclear
modernisation 138

Bharatiya Janata 88

Bhutto, Z. A. 89

Bildt, C. 134, 154

biodiversity loss 191

Biological Weapons Convention 39–40

bipolarity 22, 83

Bishop, J. 192

Blair, T. 12, 130

Blanc, E. 140
Blix Commission *see* Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission

Blix, H. 130, 133, 162

Bloomfield, B. 34

Bloomfield, L. 5

Boeing 98–9

Bolton, J. 130, 185

Borei ballistic missile submarines 138

Bourantonis, D. 33, 40, 54–5, 79

Bowen, W. 142

Bradley brothers 70

Brazil: in the Geneva Conference
17, 19–20, 129; and the IAEA
Additional Protocol 157; and
multilateralism 80; and the NAC
104, 146; and non-proliferation
sanctions 142; and the NPT 22,
101, 125, 135–7, 139; as a regional/
emerging power 87, 104, 128; and
SALT 33, 38; and the TPNW 160,
164; and UN Security Council
reform 94

Brezhnev, L. 74, 82

Brocket, C. 95

Browne, J. 72

Brownlie, I. 5

Budapest Memorandum 97

Bull, H. 5, 34, 163

Burma *see* Myanmar

Bush, G. H. W. 82

Bush, G. W. 123–7, 137, 185

Butler, G. 102

Butler, R. 104–5, 107

Canada: and human security 154; and
the humanitarian initiative 150; and
the ICJ advisory opinion 94; and the
NPT 106, 141, 157; and proposed
ad hoc committees under the UNGA
129

Canberra Commission on the
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
102

Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 164

CARICOM *see* Caribbean Community

Carothers, A. 76–7

Carter, J. 35, 49–50, 55, 70, 74, 132

Carter, L. 32

CCD *see* Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament

CD *see* Conference on Disarmament

CELAC *see* Community of Latin
American and Caribbean States

Chile: in the Cold War 101; and French
nuclear testing in the Pacific 86; in
the Geneva Conference 19; and the
NPT 101; and the TPNW 161, 162,
165

China: acquisition of nuclear weapons
16; in the Geneva Conference 53;
and great power rivalry 137, 165;
and ‘great power’ status 90; and
the ICJ advisory opinion 95; and
the NPT 16, 22, 35, 75, 100, 104;
and nuclear armament 82, 126; and
nuclear testing 83, 86; and security
assurances 99; and the TPNW 160–1

Choubey, D. 134

climate change 5, 138, 144, 191

Clinton, H. R. 134

Clinton, W. J. 90, 92, 98, 123, 193

co-chair arrangement (Geneva
Conference) 37–8, 58

Cold War 21–2, 34, 39, 147, 188–9,
191; and détente 35, 51–2; end of
78, 82–3, 94, 98, 101, 133; history
4; post-Cold War world 126; second
Cold War 69–70, 74

Committee on Disarmament *see*
Conference on Disarmament

common security 72

Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELAC) 151

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT) 2–3, 108, 162,
186, 192; adoption of 104, 184;
demands for 36, 39–40, 44, 75–6,
83–4, 91–2, 103, 105, 147; drive
for US ratification of 123, 133, 136;
negotiation of 94, 98, 103–4; and the
proposed satellite monitoring agency
73, 185; Russian de-ratification of
123; Russian ratification of 123

Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament (CCD) (Geneva
Conference 1970–8) 36–41, 43,
50, 53, 56, 58; establishment 36;
membership expansion of 50

Conference on Disarmament (CD)
(Geneva Conference 1979): deadlock
of 129, 140; establishment of 53;
membership expansion of 103; NAM
commitment to 129

Cook, R. 127
Costa Rica: and the Model Nuclear
Weapons Convention 101–2; and the
NPT 125; and the TPNW 165–6

Craig, C. 139, 189–90

CTBT *see* Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty

Cuba: Geneva Conference
membership 53

Cuban Missile Crisis 70–1, 187

Cyprus: issue in the UNGA First
Committee 53

Daase, C. 70

de Gaulle, C. 12

de Rivero, O. 82

de Vattel, E. 14

delegitimisation of nuclear weapons
159, 162, 194

Democratic People's Republic of Korea
*see* North Korea

Denmark: and the NPT 124

détente *see* Cold War

Dhanapala, J. 102, 133

divestment 159, 165

Doyle, T. 132

Dunn, L. 156

Eagleburger, L. 132

Earle, R. 70

East Germany: Geneva Conference
membership 50; relations with West
Germany 78

Ecuador: on compliance with
disarmament commitments 139; on
SALT 33

Edmonds, J. 41

Egypt: and the humanitarian initiative
153; and the IAEA Additional
Protocol 128, 157; and the NAC
106; and non-proliferation sanctions
142; and the NPT 18–19, 57, 76,
106, 124, 127, 130, 164; and the
proposed WMD-free zone in the
Middle East 141, 157; as a regional/
emerging power 87, 104; and status
diplomacy 57; and UNSSOD I 52,
106

Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Disarmament (ENDC) (Geneva
Conference, 1963–9) 16, 21, 36–7

end of history moment 109, 164

ENDC *see* Eighteen Nation Committee
on Disarmament

ENMOD *see* Environmental
Modification Convention

Environmental Modification Convention
(ENMOD) 40

Epstein, W. 5, 45, 47, 92

Erlander, T. 13

Esfandiary, D. 142

Ethiopia: and UNSSOD I 52

European Union 142

Falk, R. 5

Federal Republic of Germany *see* West
Germany

Fihn, B. 144, 149, 152, 159

financial crisis 137

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty 100, 105,
129, 136

Foster, W. 22

Fox, L. 131

France: and ‘great power’ status 12,
92, 108; and the humanitarian
initiative 141, 143; and the ICJ
advisory opinion 95; and military
threats 137; and the NPT 16, 22,
35, 75, 92, 100, 104, 126–7, 166;
and nuclear armament 82, 126; and
nuclear testing 85–6, 95; and the
TPNW 160

Friedman, M. 2

Fry, I. 191

G77 *see* Group of 77

Galtung, J. 32

Gandhi, I. 42

Gandhi, R. 79

Gavin, F. 33

general and complete disarmament
17–18, 20, 106

Geneva summit 83

Georgia: invasion of 137

German Democratic Republic *see* East
Germany

Germany: and the humanitarian
initiative 141, 150, 153; and nuclear
modernisation 138

Ghana: and involvement in multilateral
negotiations 19

global warming *see* climate change

Global Zero campaign 132, 145

Goldblat, J. 69

Gorbachev, M. 77–8, 83, 132, 187–8

Gould, S. J. 10–11

Graham, T. 191
grand bargain (NPT) 21, 54, 58, 134, 142, 154, 166

Grotius, H. 14

Group of 77 (G77) 39, 47–8, 69–70

Group of Scientific Experts 50

Hall, T. 14

Halsted, T. 5

Hegel, G. W. F. 4, 12–13

Heins, V. 13

Helms, J. 96

Hiroshima 189

Hirschman, A. O. 23–4

Hobbes, T. 14

Högsta, D. 155

Hoinkes, M. 92

Honduras: and the TPNW 163

Honneth, A. 3, 73

Hughey, C. 71

human security 13, 152–3

humanitarian initiative 140, 143–5, 147–57, 159–61, 166

Humanitarian Pledge 140, 151, 154

Hungary: Geneva Conference
membership 36

Huntley, W. 132

Hurrell, A. 128

hydraulic model 23

IAEA *see* International Atomic Energy
Agency

ICAN *see* International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Iceland: Reykjavik summit 77–8, 83, 188

Independent Commission on
Disarmament and Security Issues 72

India: acquisition of nuclear weapons
86–91, 104; and the CTBT 104;
and diplomatic leadership 20; in the
Geneva Conference 37; in the global
nuclear order 22, 73, 77; and the
humanitarian initiative 151; and the
NPT 17, 22, 77, 109; and nuclear
armament 136; and nuclear testing
108; and the ‘peaceful’ nuclear
explosion 42–3, 49; and the proposed
prohibition treaty 77; and regional
nuclear war 189; and SALT 31; and
UNSSOD III 79; and the US–India
agreement 127–8

Indonesia: Geneva Conference
membership 53; and the

humanitarian initiative 153; and
the NAM working group on
dismarmament 107–8; and the NPT
76, 99; and nuclear export controls
75–6; and the PTBT amendment
conference 91–2; as a regional/
emerging power 87, 104; and SALT
33; and SORT 131; and UN Security
Council reform 94

INF Treaty *see* Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty 78, 81, 192

International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) 42–3, 84, 86–7, 105, 109,
128, 130, 139, 141–3, 156–7, 162

International Campaign to Abolish
Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) 144–5,
149, 151–3, 155, 161

International Commission on
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament 133

International Criminal Court 96

International Partnership for Nuclear
Disarmament Verification (IPNDV)
155–6, 184

International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)
93, 101, 165

IPNDV *see* International Partnership
for Nuclear Disarmament
Verification

IPPNW *see* International Physicians for
the Prevention of Nuclear War

Iran Deal *see* Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action

Iran: and the CTBT 44; Geneva
Conference membership 50; and
the IAEA Additional Protocol 142;
and the JCPOA 143; and non-
compliance with non-proliferation
safeguards and UN Security Council
resolutions 126, 139, 141–3; and
non-proliferation sanctions 128–9,
141–2; and the NPT 128–9; nuclear
programme of 126–7, 142–3; and
UNSSOD II 73

Iraq: and disarmament diplomacy 38;
invasion of 127, 130

Ireland: and the humanitarian initiative
153, 166; and the NAC 104; and
the NPT 15; and the stigmatisation
of nuclear arms 147; and the TPNW
160; and UNSSOD II 72
irreversibility 105, 124, 131, 134–5

Israel: acquisition of nuclear weapons
100; and the humanitarian initiative
151; and the NPT 22; and nuclear
armament 82; and the proposed
WMD-free zone in the Middle East
100, 157

Italy: and the indefinite extension of
the NPT 101; and nuclear
modernisation 138; potential
proliferation of 16

Japan: and Chinese nuclear testing 86;
Geneva Conference membership 36;
and the humanitarian initiative 153;
and the International Commission
on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament 133

JCPOA *see* Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action

Johnson, L. B. 22, 31

Johnson, R. 84, 125, 134

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) 143, 195

joint statements on the humanitarian
dimension of nuclear disarmament
151–2

Kane, A. 164

Kazakhstan: denuclearisation of 96–7,
161, 190; and the NPT 100–1, 106;
and nuclear modernisation 138;
and nuclear testing 161; and the
TPNW 154

Keating, P. 102

Keeny, S. 21

Kenya: Geneva Conference membership
54; and the Indian and Pakistani
nuclear tests 89; and the NPT 76;
and proposed ad hoc committees
under the UNGA 129; and UNSSOD
II 72–3

Keohane, R. 4, 11

Khan, S. 132

Kim, J. 87

Kimball, D. 149

Kissinger, H. 21, 132

Kmentt, A. 137, 147–8, 150, 164

Kongstad, S. 106

Krasner, S. 11

Labour Party (New Zealand) 78

Labour Party (UK) 34, 82

Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear
Policy 101

Lebow, R. N. 192

levels-of-analysis problem 13–14

Liechtenstein: and the Geneva
Conference 140; and the TPNW 163

Lockheed Martin 98–9

Lodgaard, S. 44, 69, 128

Long, F. 32

Løvold, M. 149

luck 4, 138, 187, 195

M51 submarine-launched ballistic
missiles 126

Malaysia: and criticism of lacking
progress towards disarmament 102;
and the humanitarian initiative 153;
and the ICJ advisory opinion 94;
and the US nuclear posture review of
2002 124

Marín-Bosch, M. 84, 89, 93, 95, 107

Markell, P. 14, 136

Marshall Islands: ICJ lawsuits 141, 167

Mathers, J. 125

Mauritius: and involvement in
multilateral negotiations 56

McKinnon, D. 85

McNamara, R. 102

Mearsheimer, J. 90

Medvedev, D. 136–7

Mexico: and the Conference on
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones 126;
and the CTBT 84, 89; and diplomatic
leadership 20, 45–8, 74–5, 84; and
the Geneva Conference 140; and
the humanitarian initiative 153,
166; and the ICJ advisory opinion
107; and the NAC 104; and the
Nayarit Conference 149–50; and
the NPT 43–4, 46–8, 74–5, 84,
87, 89, 123; and the OEWGs on
nuclear disarmament 140, 143, 159;
and *pacta sunt servanda* 154–5;
and proposed ad hoc committees
under the UNGA 129; and the
PTBT amendment conference 91;
and reform of the disarmament
machinery 37; as a regional/emerging
power 87, 94, 104; and the TPNW
160; and the UN Security Council
94; and UNSSOD I 50; views on
multilateralism 34

Meyer, P. 149
Minty, S. 158

Miranda, L. C. 166

Model Nuclear Weapons Convention
101, 135, 152, 184

modernisation of nuclear weapons 35,
93, 131, 136-9, 160, 163-4, 186-8

Mohamad, M. 102

Mohr, M. 94

Mojsov, L. 52, 57

Mongolia: Geneva Conference
membership 36-7; as a state enjoying
'nuclear-weapon-free status' 126

Moran, M. 142

Morgenthau, H. 14-15

Morocco: Geneva Conference
membership 36-7

Moscow summit 83

Mousavian, H. 142

Mozambique: and the NPT 101

Müller, H. 127, 134, 156

Muppidi, H. 88-9

Myanmar: and the NPT 106

Myrdal, A. 17, 33, 35, 37, 39-41, 45,
48, 80, 165

NAC *see* New Agenda Coalition

NAM *see* Non-Aligned Movement

National Association of Evangelicalists 74

Nayarit Conference on the
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear
Weapons 149-50

negative security assurances 46, 58, 69

Netherlands: Geneva Conference
membership 36-7; and nuclear
c modernisation 138; and the TPNW
161

Neumann, I. B. 14, 152

New Agenda Coalition (NAC) 104-7,
123-5, 128, 139, 146-7, 152-4,
165, 184

New International Economic Order 39

New START *see* New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
134, 136, 155, 166, 195

New Zealand: adoption of anti-nuclear
policy 78; and French nuclear testing
in the Pacific 85-6; Geneva Conference
membership 103; and the humanitarian
initiative 153, 166; and the NAC 104;
and the NPT 76, 127; and the Prague
agenda 133; and proposed ad hoc
committees under the UNGA 129; and
the World Court Project 94

Nigeria: and the humanitarian initiative
153; and the NPT 48, 50, 87, 99; and
SALT 34; and the TPNW 160, 164-5

Nobel Peace Prize 55

Noel-Baker, P. 55, 102, 133, 144, 148

no-first use of nuclear weapons 82, 192

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 7,
33-4, 38-9, 50, 57, 75, 129, 135,
137, 157; as a 'golden bridge'
between East and West 39; and
the ICJ advisory opinion initiative
93-4; and the Iranian nuclear
programme 142-3; working group
on disarmament 107-8

Non-Proliferation Treaty *see* Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 16,
72, 154, 161

North Korea: acquisition of nuclear
weapons 128; and non-proliferation
sanctions 129; and the NPT 22, 86-
7, 126-7, 129; and nuclear armament
136; nuclear programme of 128, 136,
188; and nuclear testing 3, 108, 128;
and prestige 13, 87

Northrop Grumman 98-9

Norway: Geneva Conference
membership 103; and the
humanitarian initiative 135, 150,
153; and the idea of banning
nuclear weapons 135, 145; and the
NPT 106, 135, 139; and nuclear
disarmament verification 156; and
the OEWG on nuclear disarmament
140; and the Oslo Conference on
the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear
Weapons 143, 145-6, 149

NPT *see* Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
nuclear apartheid 94, 102, 108, 141

Nuclear Freeze movement 72, 75

Nuclear Threat Initiative 156

nuclear winter 138, 144

nuclear-weapon-free zones 126

Nunn, S. 97, 132

Nye, J. 56

Obama, B. 21, 137, 166, 185, 199;
and the CTBT 133, 136; and
New START 134; and the Nobel
Peace Prize 133, 148; and nuclear
c modernisation 136; and the Prague
agenda 132-5
Office of Technology Assessments
(US) 96

Office of Technology Assessments
*see* Office of Technology
Assessments (US)

Ogilvie-White, T. 98

Olin, J. 70

Olsson, C. 13

Oman: and the NPT 76

Orwell, G. 71

Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian
Impact of Nuclear Weapons 143–9

Overton window 191

P5: boycott of the humanitarian
initiative 146–9, 151, 160; glossary
155; process 134, 148, 155

Pakistan: acquisition of nuclear weapons
86–90; and competition with India
43; Geneva Conference membership
36–7; and the humanitarian initiative
151; and the NPT 22, 90; and
nuclear arms buildup 136; and
nuclear testing 86, 108, 109; and the
proposed FMCT 136; as a regional/
emerging power 104; and regional
nuclear war 189

Palme Commission *see* Independent
Commission on Disarmament and
Security Issues

Palme, O. 72

Papua New Guinea: and French nuclear
testing in the Pacific 85–6

Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT)
36, 40, 75, 91, 187, 192

Patrikarakos, D. 142

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(PNET) 40

Pelopidas, B. 5

Perkovich, G. 42, 89

Perle, R. 124

Perry, W. 132–3

Peru: and Article VI of the NPT 77;
Geneva Conference membership
50; presidency of the 1990 NPT
review conference 82; and the PTBT
amendment conference 91; and
UNSSOD I 52

Philippines: and French nuclear
testing in the Pacific 85; and the
humanitarian initiative 153; and the
TPNW 154, 162; and UNSSOD I
55, 57

Pierre, A. 32

Planck, M. 193

PNET *see* Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty

Podvig, P. 186

Pope Francis 155

Pope John Paul II 71
positive security assurances 46

Potter, W. 127, 149

Prague agenda *see* Obama
proliferation paradigm 5

Proliferation Security Initiative 127

PTBT *see* Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty

Pugwash 102

Punctuated equilibrium 10–11, 184

Putin, V. 12, 125, 136–7, 186

Quinlan, M. 162

Rabinowitz, O. 50

Rademaker, S. 126

Rajan, M. S. 42

Reagan, R. 70–1, 74, 77–8, 82–3, 187

recognition theory 4, 6, 13–14, 20, 39,
72–3, 84, 90, 104, 163–4, 185–6

Reliable Replacement Warhead
programme 125–6

Republic of Korea *see* South Korea

Republic of the Congo: in the global
nuclear order 73, 129

Republican Party (USA) 70, 82, 96, 188

Reykjavik summit 77–8, 83

Rhodes, B. 132

Richards, S. K. 166

Ringmar, R. 12

Ritchie, N. 159, 164, 191

Robledo, J. G. 150

Robles, A. G. 34, 37, 45

Rocard, M. 102

Roche, D. 106

Romania: association with the non-
aligned bloc 17; and the NPT 17, 19,
47; and reform of the disarmament
machinery 57; and UNSSOD II 72

Rotblat, J. 102, 133

Russell, B. 102

Russia: and the ABM Treaty 124;
annexation of Crimea 188; and the
Budapest Memorandum 97; and the
CTBT 123; and the denuclearisation
of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
96–7; and ‘great power’ status 12,
134, 136, 192; and the ICJ advisory
opinion 95; invasion of Georgia 137;
invasion of Ukraine 97, 165, 186, 193; and New START 134, 166; and no-first use 82; and the norm against use 186; and the NPT 160, 164; and nuclear armament 125–6, 138; and the OEWG on nuclear disarmament 144; opposition to disarmament 195; relations with the United States 125, 137; and SORT 124–5, 131; and START II 124, 166; and the TPNW 160

Ruzicka, J. 139, 189–90

Salander, H. 106–7, 123

SALT I *see* Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I

SALT II *see* Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II

Santoro, D. 98

Sarney, J. 80

Saudi Arabia: and the Iran nuclear issue 142; on SALT 33

Scaife, R. 70

Schelling, T. 33

Schlosser, E. 138

security assurances 16–17, 45–6, 58, 69, 84, 99, 126, 156

Sending, O. J. 152

Senegal: and the 1985 NPT review conference 75

Sharif, N. 89

Shultz, G. 132

Singapore: and the TPNW 161

Singh, J. 88, 90, 103

Smith, G. 5

Smith, J. 84

South Africa: denuclearisation of 101, 190; and diplomatic leadership 166; and the ‘ethical imperatives’ resolution 159–60; Geneva Conference membership 103; and the NAC 104; and the NPT 13, 100–1, 158; as a regional/ emerging power 87, 104; and the TPNW 160

South Korea: 1983 air disaster 74

Soviet Union: and the ABM Treaty 32; and arms reductions 82, 187; attack on South Korean airliner 74; authoritarianism 34, 74, 79, 195; and the Biological Weapons Convention 40; breakup of 96, 101, 125; and ‘collusion’ with the United

States 34, 40, 58; and the CTBT 50, 74–5, 83, 91–2; and diplomatic strategy 46, 79, 149; and general and complete disarmament 17; in the Geneva Conference 36–8, 46, 53, 59; and Gorbachev’s ‘new approach’ 77–8; and the INF Treaty 77–8, 192; invasion of Afghanistan 35, 70; and no-first use 82; and the NPT 31, 43, 45–7, 49, 76–7, 192; and nuclear armament 35, 53–4, 74, 97, 126; and the Nunn–Lugar programme 97; and propaganda 79; and SALT 31–2, 34; and the Second Cold War 70, 74; and summit diplomacy 77–8, 83; and Tlatelolco 45; and the TTBT 40–1

Spain: and the NPT 22; and reform of the disarmament machinery 56

Spector, L. 84

Springsteen, B. 72

Sri Lanka: dissatisfaction with lacking progress towards disarmament 80; Geneva Conference membership 53; and the Indian ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion 43; and the NPT 76, 102; and the PTBT amendment conference 91

START I *see* Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

START II *see* Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II

START III *see* Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III

step-by-step process 146

stigmatisations of nuclear weapons 140, 147, 162

Stockpile Stewardship programme 98, 126

Støre, J. G. 145

Strange, S. 11–12

STRATCOM *see* Strategic Command (US)

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT I) 31–4, 187

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II) 34–5, 41, 69

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) 95, 97, 133, 156

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) 95, 105, 124–5, 133, 166

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III (START III) 105, 124
Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
(US) 102

Sweden: and the CTBT 83, 91; and
diplomatic leadership 20, 154;
dissatisfaction with lacking progress
towards disarmament 31, 33, 73,
80; and the humanitarian initiative
154; and the ICJ advisory opinion
94; and the Independent Commission
on Disarmament and Security Issues
72; and the Indian 'peaceful' nuclear
explosion 43; and the NAC 104,
107, 123, 154; and New START
134; as a non-aligned state 39; and
the NPT 16-17, 43, 45, 48, 83, 104,
106; nuclear programme of 13, 16,
20; and proposed ad hoc committees
under the UNGA 129; and reform
of the disarmament machinery 37;
and the 'status dimension' of nuclear
disarmament 41; and UNSSOD I
50, 55

Switzerland: Geneva Conference
membership 103; and the
humanitarian initiative 151-2; and
the indefinite extension of the NPT
101; and luck 138; and the NPT 19;
and sovereign equality 48; and the
stigmatisation of nuclear arms 147
symbolic interactionism 14

Tanzania: and criticism of lacking
progress towards disarmament 31;
and the NPT 101

Thackeray, B. 88

Thailand: and the TPNW 154, 164; and
the TTBT 41

Thakur, R. 132

Thatcher, M. 71

Thorsson, I. 48, 73, 80

Threshold Test-Ban Treaty (TTBT)
40-1, 46

Togo: and UNSSOD III 80

TPNW *see* Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons

Treaty of Tlatelolco 45

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW): as the
'cornerstone' of nuclear order 2,
15; extension of 99-100, 139, 194;
legal import of 2, 18, 96; negotiation
of 16-22; first review conference
(1975) 43-8, 50-1; second review
conference (1980) 49-50; third

review conference (1985) 74-7;
fifth review conference (1990) 81,
83-5, 99; fifth review conference
(1995) 100; sixth review conference
(2000) 105-7; seventh review
conference (2005) 126-7; eight
review conference (2010) 134-6;
ninth review conference (2015)
155-9

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons: central obligations 162;
demands for 140, 145-7, 151,
159-60; meeting of states party
162; negotiation of 161; potential
to change the status quo 159, 165;
pushback against 160, 162-3; as
withdrawal of recognition 163-4

Trump, D. J. 143, 126, 186, 188

Tsygankov, A. P. 125

TTBT *see* Threshold Test-Ban Treaty

Turkey: Geneva Conference membership
103; and nuclear modernisation 138

Uganda: and involvement in multilateral
negotiations 34

Ukraine: denuclearisation of 96-7, 190;
invasion of 97, 165, 186, 193; and
the NPT 100-1; potential use of
nuclear weapons against 186

Umaña, C. 165

UN Charter *see* United Nations Charter

UN Security Council *see* United Nations
Security Council

UNDC *see* United Nations Disarmament
Commission

UNIDIR *see* United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research

unipolarity 22, 83, 86, 96, 101, 148

United Kingdom: and the Budapest
Memorandum 97; diplomatic
strategy of 46, 146, 149; and 'great
power' status 12, 15, 130-1; and the
humanitarian initiative 146, 151;
and the ICJ advisory opinion 95;
and the Indian 'peaceful' nuclear
explosion 49; military threats to
137; and the NPT 16, 43, 46, 76,
130-1, 141, 157, 192; and nuclear
disarmament verification 156; and
nuclear reductions 82; and nuclear
testing 75, 83, 92; and the OEWG
on nuclear disarmament 143; and the
P5 process 134, 148; and the PTBT
192; and reform of the disarmament
machinery 38; and SALT 34; and
test-ban negotiations 40–1, 50, 74–5,
91–2; and the TPNW 160

United Nations Charter 52, 95, 97,
99, 103

United Nations Disarmament
Commission (UNDC) 50, 52, 58, 140

United Nations General Assembly
First Committee: vs. the Geneva
Conference 36–41; reorganisation
of 53

United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
44, 53

United Nations Open Ended Working
Group on Nuclear Disarmament
(2013) 140, 143–4, 146–8, 151,
166–7

United Nations Open Ended Working
Group on Nuclear Disarmament
(2016) 159–60, 166–7

United Nations Security Council
(UNSC): link to nuclear-weapon state
status under the NPT 42, 90, 92–3,
108, 131; reform of 94, 108

United Nations Special Session on
Disarmament (UNSSOD): first
conference 52–7, 72–3, 106, 108,
129; second conference 70–3, 76;
third conference 78–80

United States: and the ABM Treaty
32, 124–5; and ANZUS 78;
and the Biological Weapons
Convention 39–40; and the Budapest
Memorandum 97; catholic bishops
71; and ‘collusion’ with the Soviet
Union 34, 40, 58; congressional
politics 96; and the CTBT 50, 92,
133, 193; diplomatic strategy of 46,
79, 149; and ENMOD 40; freeze
movement 72; and general and
complete disarmament 17; in the
Geneva Conference 37, 40; and the
humanitarian initiative 144; and the
ICJ advisory opinion 95; and India
49, 91, 127–8; INF 74, 77–8, 192;
and IPNDV 155–6, 184; and Iran
142–3; and the multilateral nuclear
force proposal 16; and New START
134; and North Korea 87; and the
NPT 16–19, 43–4, 75, 126–7, 132,
155–7; and nuclear modernisation
70, 136, 138; and nuclear reductions
123; and nuclear strategy 71, 78,

98, 123–4; and nuclear testing 46,
91; and the OEWG on nuclear
disarmament 143; and the PTBT 192;
and the PTBT amendment conference
91–2; and reform of the disarmament
machinery 36; relations with
Moscow 35, 70, 74, 78, 137; and the
relationship between disarmament
and non-proliferation 5, 47, 55, 90;
and SALT 31–3; and SORT 124–5,
131; START process 70, 74, 136;
and summit diplomacy 77–8, 83; and
test-ban negotiations 50, 75, 91–2,
193; and the TPNW 160, 162–3;
and the TTBT 40–1; and UNSSOD
I 51, 55–6; and UNSSOD II 71; and
UNSSOD III 78–9, 85; and the vision
of a world without nuclear weapons
74, 77, 82, 132–4, 165

UNSC *see* United Nations Security
Council

UNSSOD *see* United Nations Special
Session on Disarmament

Uruguay: and involvement in
multilateral negotiations 38; and
SALT 69

Vanaik, A. 90

Vance, C. 56, 72

Venezuela: Geneva Conference
membership 53; and the indefinite
extension of the NPT 100; and
nuclear modernisation 139; and the
PTBT amendment conference 91; and
UNSSOD III 80

verification 3, 39–40, 50, 79, 92, 103,
105–6, 124, 134, 152, 155–6, 162,
190, 195

Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian
Impact of Nuclear Weapons 150–1

Walker, W. 21, 32, 127, 163

Warsaw Pact 72

Washington DC summit 83

WDC *see* World Disarmament
Conference

Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission 130

Weinberger, C. 70, 74

Wesley, M. 131

West Germany: boycott of the 1980
Olympic games 70; Geneva
Conference membership 50; and the
NPT 101; potential proliferation of
16; relations with East Germany 78

Wight, M. 23

Wildfire 153

WMD-free zone in the Middle East 100,
141, 157

World Court Project 94–6

World Disarmament Conference (WDC)
38

world government 35, 189–91

Young, K. 88

Young, W. 34

Yugoslavia: Geneva Conference
membership 36–7; and
multilateralism 80; and the NPT 43,
47–8; and reform of the disarmament
machinery 37, 50, 55, 59; threat to
exit the NPT 47–8; and UNSSOD I
50–2, 55, 57

Zaire: Geneva Conference membership
50; and UNSSOD I 52

Zambia: and the indefinite extension of
the NPT 99–100

Zedillo, E. 133