litigated aspects of article 56,<fnref n="18" /> and has generated rich jurisprudence by
the Commission.<fnref n="19" />

5 DECISION ON MERITS

While the Commission’s reasoning on admissibility is progressive, the decision on the merits departs fundamentally from the prior jurisprudence of the Commission and established standards on socio-economic rights, adopts a restrictive approach to interpretation, is rather pedantic on the arguments of the complainants, and seems to absolve the respondent of responsibility even in respect of obligations already established in the African Charter.<fnref n="20" /> This is despite the fact that Nigeria did not participate to counter any of the arguments or evidence filed. <fnref n="21" /> Indeed, the Commission went out of its way to absolve Nigeria of its duty to prevent maternal deaths. The general tone of the decision is adversarial, often seemingly reprimanding the applicants’ case, and overplaying interpretative technicalities. The approach is out of character with the Commission’s prior approach, and misses the chance to address issues that have resonance in a majority of states parties to the Charter, and to break new ground in jurisprudence. The upshot is that the Commission found that Nigeria did not violate any of the rights alleged by the complainants.

We limit our analysis to four areas out of the several canvassed in the Communication. The featured areas are the rights to health, non-discrimination, life, and to be free from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.

**5.1 The right to health**

The World Health Organisation (WHO) has noted that the direct causes of maternal injury and death are excessive blood loss, infection, high blood pressure, unsafe abortion, and obstructed labour, while the

<footnote n="18">18 See GM Musila 'The right to an effective remedy under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (2008) 2 *African Human Rights Law Journal* 442, 445; see also International Justice Resource Centre *Exhaustion of domestic remedies under the African human rights system* (2017).</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 For a detailed discussion on this, see H Onoria 'The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the exhaustion of local remedies under the African Charter' (2003) 3 *African Human Rights Law Journal* 1; and L Chenwi 'Exhaustion of local remedies rule in the jurisprudence of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights' (2019) 41(2) *Human Rights Quarterly* 374-398.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">20 See for instance para 104 where the Commission observes that evidence is not produced to show that Nigeria has sufficient resources to prevent maternal deaths in the country. See also para 109, where the Commission made the argument that the implementation of the right to health is a long-term process, and that poverty and lack of resources is the reason why the right to an adequate standard of health is not realised.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">21 *Nigerian Maternal Mortality*, para 42.</footnote>
indirect causes include anaemia, malaria, and heart disease.<fnref n="22" /> It further notes that maternal mortality is preventable with timely management by a skilled health professional working in a supportive environment. According to WHO, states are to ensure that healthcare providers deliver maternal healthcare services in the most respectful manner to pregnant women.<fnref n="23" />

In the case at hand, the complainants argued that the failure by the government of Nigeria to address preventable maternal deaths and morbidities constituted a violation of the right of health. Furthermore, they argued that most Nigerians pay for healthcare services out-of-pocket thereby making it difficult for a large number of the population, particularly women in rural areas, to access health services in general and maternal healthcare services in particular. They relied on norms and standards on the right to health under international law, including General Comments 14 and 22 of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comments 6 and 35 of the Human Rights Committee, General Recommendation 24 of the CEDAW Committee, and the Resolutions and General Comments of the African Commission. However, the Commission found that the complainants had not proven that Nigeria had adequate resources to realise the right to health.

The approach of the Commission to the right to health is retrogressive. According to the Commission, the realisation of the right to health like other socio-economic rights is ‘problematic in Africa’ due to economic challenges and high poverty levels, thereby making it difficult to provide infrastructure and facilities to realise it.<fnref n="24" /> The Commission noted that a state is only required to take ‘positive and selective steps’ under article 16 of the Charter to realise the right to health. The Commission concluded that the 15 per cent allocation to the health sector agreed during the Abuja Declaration is not binding on states and therefore cannot be enforced. Furthermore, the Commission noted that there wasn’t enough evidence to show that Nigeria was not meeting its obligations as envisaged under article 14(2)(a). This conclusion is confusing, given that in the admissibility consideration, the Commission acknowledged its own prior jurisprudence that preventable maternal mortality was a violation of the rights to life, health and dignity of women in Africa. The complainants’ argument was simply that the cost of health services in Nigeria is prohibitive and not in tune with the economic realities in the country. The Commission was not convinced by this argument, and therefore found no violations of the right to health against Nigeria. This outcome is retrogressive because it lowers the threshold of state responsibilities from settled standards, including those in the jurisprudence of the Commission itself.

<footnote n="22">22 WHO *Maternal Health* available at https://www.who.int/health-topics/maternal-health#tab=tab_1 (accessed on 2 November 2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23 See WHO *Recommendations on maternal health* (2017) 8.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">24 *Nigerian Maternal Mortality*, para 109.</footnote>
For instance, while it is true that the implementation of socio-economic rights, including the right to health, requires adequate resources, states are required to take concrete, positive and progressive steps towards realising this right.<fnref n="25" /> One of the steps or measures that the government of Nigeria would be expected to take in this regard is to invest in primary healthcare services to facilitate access to healthcare for those in rural or disadvantaged communities. Even in the most literal sense, the term progressive implies incremental and measurable, as guided by a well-articulated and accountable plan. It cannot be interpreted, as the Commission seems to suggest, to mean that the state has absolutely no responsibility simply because it does not have resources.<fnref n="26" />

Furthermore, while the right to health as part of socio-economic rights is to be realised progressively, the minimum core content of the right is not subject to progressive realisation, but must rather be realised immediately.<fnref n="27" /> The CESCR in its explanation of the minimum core in relation to the right to health, has referred to the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, and the Alma-Ata Declaration as instruments reflecting an international consensus on the core obligations arising under article 12.<fnref n="28" /> Furthermore, the Committee has recognised as part of the minimum core, the obligation '[t]o ensure reproductive, maternal (prenatal as well as postnatal) and child health care'.<fnref n="29" /> In 2016, the CESCR adopted General Comment 22 on the right to sexual and reproductive health<fnref n="30" /> and acknowledged as guidance for the purposes of specifying the minimum core 'contemporary human rights instruments and jurisprudence, as well as the most current international guidelines and protocols established by United Nations agencies, in particular WHO and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)'.<fnref n="31" /> It therefore seems that the Commission backtracked on well-established and generally-accepted standards. Furthermore, the argument of the Commission in this regard shifts the burden of proof of resources to the complainants, and yet such duty is already established by treaty to rest upon the state. Indeed, the state is presumed to have resources, unless it can demonstrate the lack of resources and corresponding failure to obtain assistance to fulfil its obligations. In its

<footnote n="25">25 See and UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee General comments 3 Nature of states obligations under the Covenant and UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art 12 of the Covenant) 11 August 2000, E/C12/2000/4 (General Comment 14).</footnote>

<footnote n="26">26 See for instance para 109 of the decision.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">27 General Comment 14 (n 25).</footnote>

<footnote n="28">28 General Comment 14 (n 25) para 43.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">29 General Comment 14 (n 25) para 44(a).</footnote>

<footnote n="30">30 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment 22 (2016) on the right to sexual and reproductive health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 2 May 2016, E/C.12/GC/22.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">31 General Comment 22 (n 14) para 49.</footnote>
current iteration, the Commission seems to absolve the respondent state of its duties.

Rather than consolidate its position on the basis of the jurisprudence of the CESCR with regard to the nature of the state's obligation to realise the right to health, the decision refers to the state's duty to take 'positive and selective steps'<fnref n="32" /> to realise socio-economic rights. This is a departure from the language of the CESCR's 'concrete and targeted' measures,<fnref n="33" /> which has also previously been co-opted by the Commission.<fnref n="34" /> The choice of terminology can be interpreted as introducing new parameters of interpretation. But this would be tantamount to lowering the standard. It is more plausible to assume a poor choice of terminology as opposed to a purposive redirection. The latter conclusion dents the credibility of the Commission's reasoning in the current decision, but may serve to discredit the influence of this line of reasoning in subsequent jurisprudence.

It is a settled standard that states ought not to take retrogressive steps in the realisation of the right to health. It is also generally established that beyond the question of the volume of resources, it is also about how judicious the state is in utilising the resources it has. The complainants had argued both that Nigeria had the resources as a result of its oil wealth, and established that the Nigerian government had allocated more resources to military and defence at the expense of the health sector, as a testament to the lack of political will to address maternal mortality in the country. Indeed, Nigeria is one of Africa's largest economies.<fnref n="35" /> In the circumstances, and without a rebuttal of these representations by the state, the Commission ought to have assumed sufficiency of resources.

The concept of progressive realisation, implies incremental allocation to the health sector with a view to realising the right to health.<fnref n="36" /> It is endorsed by the African Commission's Guidelines and Principles for the Implementation of the Socio-economic Rights in the Charter.<fnref n="37" /> Based on an analysis of Nigeria's budgets for three years, the complainants had illustrated that the allocation to the health sector hovered between 5 and 6 per cent, while allocation to military and defence exceeded 10 per cent. This information was however not factored in the decision, thereby missing an opportunity to expound on the responsibilities of state parties in respect of resourcing the

<footnote n="32">32 *Nigerian Maternal Mortality*, para 110.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">33 See General Comment 3 of the CESCR.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 See Guidelines and Principles for the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter '(2011) para 14.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">35 The World Bank Group 'World Bank in Nigeria' available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview (accessed 25 September 2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="36">36 L Chenwi 'Unpacking "progressive realisation" its relation to resources, minimum core and reasonableness, and some methodological considerations for assessing compliance' (2013) *De Jure* 39.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">37 Guidelines and Principles for the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter (2011).</footnote>
implementation of women's rights, as required under article 10(3) of
the African Women's Protocol.<fnref n="38" />

In the *Treatment Action Campaign* case, the Constitutional Court of South Africa rejected a similar argument of a lack of resources by the South African government on the basis that it did not provide evidence to support a lack of resources to roll out programmes for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV in the country.<fnref n="39" /> In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Commission could have found the Nigerian state to be in breach of its obligation to realise the right to health under the Charter and the African Women's Protocol. This is significant because article 14(2)(a) of the African Women's Protocol is a codification of the reasoning of the CESCR in its General Comment 14 where it is stated that states are obligated to ensure available, accessible, acceptable and quality healthcare services to all.<fnref n="40" /> In a country where the majority of women, particularly those in rural areas do not have adequate access to maternal healthcare services, it cannot be said that the government is meeting its obligations under the African Charter and African Women's Protocol.

Furthermore, the Commission held that there was no connection
between access to safe abortion (article 14(2)(c)), and maternal
mortality,<fnref n="41" /> or between lack of family planning education and maternal
mortality.<fnref n="42" /> It is a settled fact that deaths from unsafe abortion
contribute to maternal mortality. For instance, it has been noted that 77
per cent of abortions in sub-Saharan Africa are unsafe and about 6.2
million incidences of abortion take place each year,<fnref n="43" /> thereby affecting
the health of women and girls and contributing significantly to the high
rates of maternal mortality in the region.<fnref n="44" /> It is reported that an
estimated 1.2 to 2 million abortions occur in Nigeria every year.<fnref n="45" />
Coupled with restrictive abortion laws, it is not surprising that unsafe
abortion contributes to the high rates of maternal mortality in Nigeria.
There is an apparent break in logic, since the decision both

<footnote n="38">38 See A Budoo-Scholtz 'The right to peace' in A Rudman and others (eds) *The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa: a commentary* (2023) 223.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">39 *Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others* (No 2) (CCT8/02) [2002] ZACC 15.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">40 See E Durojaye 'An analysis of the contribution of the African human rights system to understanding of the right to health' (2021) 21 *African Human Rights Law Journal* 751. See also E Durojaye 'Article 14' in A Rudman and others (eds) *The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa: a commentary* (2023) 308.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">41 *Nigerian Maternal Mortality*, para 121.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">42 *Nigerian Maternal Mortality*, para 149.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">43 A Bankole and others *From unsafe to safe abortion in sub-Saharan Africa: slow but steady progress* (2020).</footnote>

<footnote n="44">44 As above.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">45 PMA 2020 Abortion Survey Results (2018) available at https://www.pma
data.org/sites/default/files/data_product_results/NG-AbortionModule-Brief-v2
-2020-03-18.pdf (accessed 28 November 2024).</footnote>
acknowledges in the admissibility consideration that there was ‘a
significant number of victims involved in the respondent state’<fnref n="46" /> and
relies on this to waive the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies,
but finds this immaterial to the responsibility of the state.

In terms of article 60 of the African Charter, the Commission should have drawn inspiration from decisions of UN treaty bodies and national courts in the region to affirm the links between lack of access to safe abortion, increased maternal mortality and violation of the right to health. For instance, in *Alyne da Silva Pimental v Brazil*,<fnref n="47" /> the CEDAW Committee found the Brazilian government in violation of its obligation to realise the right to health and maternal healthcare of a woman from a disadvantaged and Afro-Brazilian community as guaranteed in article 12 of the Convention. The Committee affirmed that denial of maternal healthcare services violated Alyne’s right to healthcare services. The Committee found that the state did not comply with its obligation under article 12(2) of the Convention to ‘ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the postnatal period’ because of its failure to meet Alyne’s ‘specific, distinctive health needs and interests’ during pregnancy.<fnref n="48" /> Cook has argued that the decision in the *Alyne* case has aided our understanding of maternal mortality as a violation of women’s human rights and the articulation of collective obligations to ensure women’s equal rights in the field of healthcare.<fnref n="49" />

Also, the Ugandan Constitutional Court held that the Ugandan government was in violation of the right to health of two women for failing to provide quality maternal healthcare services.<fnref n="50" /> The Court found that the right to healthcare, including maternal healthcare services, guaranteed under the Ugandan Constitution, constituted a minimum core obligation which the government had to implement immediately.<fnref n="51" /> More importantly, the Court held that maximum available resources include internal and external resources the state could mobilise in order to ensure effective delivery of maternal healthcare services thereby avoiding preventable deaths.<fnref n="52" /> The Court invoked the indivisibility and interrelated approach to find that failure of the Ugandan government to prevent maternal deaths constituted violations of the rights to life, dignity, and health.

The Commission’s views on the weight of the Abuja Declarations on
HIV/AIDS, Malaria, Tuberculosis and other infectious Diseases (Abuja
Declaration) for state responsibilities also raises concern. It noted that

<footnote n="46">46 *Nigerian Maternal Mortality*, para 54.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">47 *Alyne Da Silva Pimentel v Brazil*, CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008, 10 August 2011, para 7.7.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">48 As above.</footnote>

<footnote n="49">49 See RJ Cook 'Human rights and maternal health: exploring the effectiveness of the *Alyne* decision' (2013) 41(1) *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics* 103-123.</footnote>

<footnote n="50">50 Centre for Health, Human Rights and Development (CEHURD) & 3 Others v Attorney General (Constitutional Petition 16 of 2011) [2020] UGCC 12 (19 August 2020) (CEHURD case).</footnote>

<footnote n="51">51 CEHURD case (n 50) p 52.</footnote>

<footnote n="52">52 CEHURD case (n 50) p 49-53.</footnote>
the Abuja Declaration is not a binding instrument and that, as such, the
Nigerian government could not be held accountable for not meeting the
commitments in the Declaration.<fnref n="53" /> It is true that the Abuja Declaration
is a soft law norm and therefore not binding on states. However, it
remains an important normative standard to gauge governments'
commitments to realise the right to health in the region. The fact that a
state is not complying with the Declaration is an indication of lack of
political will to ensure the enjoyment of the right to health. The
Declaration was made by the Assembly of Heads of State of African
governments, the highest decision making organ of the AU. Therefore,
even if it does not have binding force, it remains an important
document to assess progress made by states towards resourcing health.

Nolan argues that ‘soft law can include ‘mechanisms [that] provide guidelines and principles which, while not legally binding, have force by virtue of the consent that governments, companies, and other civil society actors accord them’.<fnref n="54" /> The author further notes as follows:<fnref n="55" />

Thus to argue that soft law is simply not-law is perhaps too simplistic. The evolution of soft law instruments in the business and human rights sector has created at minimum, standards of expected conduct that, while not setting out to be legally binding, may have normative value that is intended to prescribe expected standards of behaviour.

According to Shelton non-binding normative instruments may do one
or more of the following:<fnref n="56" />

(1) codify pre-existing customary international law, helping to provide greater precision through the written text;

(2) crystallize a trend towards a particular norm, overriding the views of dissenters and persuading those who have little or no relevant state practice to acquiesce in the development of the norm;

(3) precede and help form new customary international law;

(4) consolidate political opinion around the need for action on a new problem, fostering consensus that may lead to treaty negotiations or further soft law;

(5) fill in gaps in existing treaties in force;

(6) form part of the subsequent state practice that can be utilized to interpret treaties;

(7) provide guidance or a model for domestic laws, without international obligation, and,

(8) substitute for legal obligation when on-going relations make formal treaties too costly and time-consuming or otherwise unnecessary or politically unacceptable.

<footnote n="53">53 *Nigerian Maternal Mortality*, para 111.</footnote>

<footnote n="54">54 J Nolan ‘The corporate responsibility to respect rights: soft law or not law?’ in S Deva & D Bilchitz (eds) *Human rights obligations of business: beyond the corporate responsibility respect?* (2013) 8.</footnote>

<footnote n="55">55 As above.</footnote>

<footnote n="56">56 DL Shelton ‘Soft law’ in D Amstrong (ed) *Handbook of international law* (2008) 8.</footnote>
From the above it is clear that while soft law is not necessarily
binding on states, it is an important consideration in measuring a
government's commitments to realizing human rights. In any case, the
Abuja Declaration is not an isolated document, but rather part of a
regular approach of the African Union to express shared policy
commitments consistent with its agenda. In a cumulative sense, the soft
law of the African Union has been a basis for momentous political and
policy actions, as in the case of the African Union Agenda 2063. It is
difficult to reconcile the weight of such instruments with the apparent
position that such instruments have no bearing on the actions of AU
member states.

In making its argument on the weight of declarations, the Commission stated that a declaration has ‘symbolic scope and is essentially the expression of the political will ... a declaration has only a recommendatory value ... cannot be used as a legal basis to argue that rights therein have been violated’.<fnref n="57" /> The choice of words discounts the value of declarations altogether, not only in relation to their lack of binding force. This is at odds with the fact that binding force is not the only measure of value of an instrument.

In any case, the African Commission has cited soft law to buttress
its points in numerous past decisions. For instance, in the *Egypt
Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Egypt*,<fnref n="58" /> the
Commission relied on the Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition
of Torture, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment in
Africa and the ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against
Women’ in arriving at its decision. Relying on this ‘soft law’ as a tool for
interpretative guidance, the Commission found that the Egyptian
government was in violation of article 5 of the African Charter on the
right to dignity. Also, in *Huri-Law v Nigeria*, the African Commission
relied on the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons
under any form of Detention or Imprisonment to hold that the Nigeria
government had failed in its obligations under the Charter to treat
prisoners with respect and dignity.<fnref n="59" /> In a nutshell, the Commission’s
approach to the weight of soft law as irrelevant in holding states
accountable in its decisions is contradictory in as far as it considers
them weighty in some instances and of little weight in other cases.

5.2 The right to life

Maternal deaths underscore failure on the part of the state to prevent loss of life. The complainants argued that since the deaths were preventable, the respondent state had failed to take positive steps to prevent loss of life. They relied on global and regional norms, including the jurisprudence of the Commission to support the argument.

<footnote n="57">57 *Nigerian Maternal Mortality*, para 111 (emphasis added).</footnote>

<footnote n="58">58 Communication 323/06 of 2011.</footnote>

<footnote n="59">59 *Huri-Law v Nigeria* Communication 225/98 of 2000, para 41.</footnote>
For instance, the complainants referred to General Comments 6⁶⁰ and 36⁶¹ of the Human Rights Committee on the Right to life, General Comment 3⁶² of the Commission, and case law of the Commission.<fnref n="63" /> However, the Commission found that no evidence had been presented to the effect that maternal deaths in the country were the result of the failure on the part of the Nigerian state to prevent such deaths. In particular, that there was no evidence that the respondent state had sufficient resources to prevent maternal deaths.

This is a restrictive approach by the Commission, particularly in light of plenty of evidence and reports including those of WHO, UNFPA, and the respondent state itself, indicating the high rates of maternal mortality in the country. The Commission did not reference its own jurisprudence such as General Comment 3 on the right to life, where it explains that states have the positive obligation to prevent loss of life, including preventable maternal deaths.<fnref n="64" /> Furthermore, in *International Pen and Others v Nigeria*, the Commission affirmed that a violation of the right to health of a prisoner will result in the violation of the right to life.<fnref n="65" /> Moreover, in Resolution 135 on Maternal Mortality, the Commission had declared maternal deaths in Africa a state of emergency and called on African governments to take decisive measures to address this.<fnref n="66" /> The Commission further noted that maternal death is a violation of several rights of women, including the rights to life, dignity, non-discrimination and health.<fnref n="67" />

The approach of the Commission shows material inconsistencies in the approach to the link between the right to health and life. Needless to say, other human rights bodies<fnref n="68" /> and national courts<fnref n="69" /> have

<footnote n="60">60 Human Rights Committee General Comment 6 on the right to life in art 6 of the ICCPR.</footnote>

<footnote n="61">61 Human Rights Committee General Comment 36 on the right to life in art 6 of the ICCPR.</footnote>

<footnote n="62">62 General Comment 3 (n 18).</footnote>

<footnote n="63">63 See, for instance, *Free Legal Assistance Group & Others v Zaire* (2000) AHRLR 74 (ACHPR 1995, *Sudan Human Rights Organization & Another v Sudan* (2009) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2009) and *Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) & Another v Nigeria* (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001).</footnote>

<footnote n="64">64 See General Comment 3, para 3.</footnote>

<footnote n="65">65 *International Pen & Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria* (2000) AHRLR 212 (ACHPR 1998).</footnote>

<footnote n="66">66 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Resolution 135 of 2008 available at http://www.achpr.org/sessions/44th/resolutions/135/ (accessed 5 September 2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="67">67 For more on this, see, see E Durojaye 'The approaches of the African Commission to the right to health under the African Charter' (2013) 17 *Law Democracy and Development* 393.</footnote>

<footnote n="68">68 See for instance, Human Rights Council *Preventable maternal mortality and morbidity and human rights A/HRC/11/L.16/Rev 1, 16 June 2009.*, see also, Human Rights Council, *Practices in adopting a human rights-based approach to eliminate preventable maternal mortality and human rights* 18th Session A/HRC/18/27; 8 July 2011.</footnote>

<footnote n="69">69 See for instance, the decision of the Indian High Court in *Laxmi Mandal v Deen Dayal Haringar Hospital*; and *Jaitun v Maternity Home, MCD, MANU/DE/1268/2010*, cases WP(C) 8853/2008 and 10700/2009 (High Court of Delhi) judgment on 4 June 2010.</footnote>
affirmed that maternal death constitutes a violation of the right to life. For instance, in the *Alyne* case of Brazil, the central question was whether the failure by the Brazilian government to prevent death during childbirth constituted a violation of the right to life, and the CEDAW Committee agreed that it did. Scholars also support this view. For instance, Cook and others argue that when women die during pregnancy and childbirth, it is an indication of failure on the part of the state to guarantee the right to life.<fnref n="70" /> They further argue that the effective protection of the right to life requires states to take measures that will ensure access to healthcare services for women and guarantee safe delivery.<fnref n="71" /> Echoing Cook and others, Yamin has argued that states must be held accountable for the death of women during pregnancy and childbirth as these deaths constitute a violation of the right to life.<fnref n="72" />

## 5.3 The right to non-discrimination

The CEDAW Committee affirmed in its General Recommendation 24 that failure by the state to provide healthcare services specifically needed by women constitute an act of discrimination prohibited under the Convention.<fnref n="73" /> Maternal healthcare services are peculiar to women’s needs, and when a state fails to ensure access to these services, it violates the right to equality and non-discrimination. Similarly, the disparities in healthcare services between women based on geographic location, rurality or socioeconomic status constitute an act of discrimination. The reasoning of the Commission seems blind to the impact of such intersectionality on maternal health, and therefore fails to appreciate the discriminatory nuances in the maternal health outcomes. The glaring structural inequalities compounded by discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, age, disabilities and marital status could have informed the Commission’s analysis of equality and non-discrimination in the current context.

A woman-centred approach or ‘asking the woman question’,<fnref n="74" /> was imperative in the analysis since gender inequality and cultural practices aggravate maternal mortality. By asking the woman question the Commission could have analysed the laws, policies and practices that perpetuate the low status of women and prevent them from exercising their agency. In particular, the Commission ought to have considered the existing legal and social-cultural barriers that hinder access to maternal healthcare services for women in Nigeria. This would have

<footnote n="70">70 RJ Cook and others *Reproductive health and human rights integrating medicine, ethics and law* (2003) 159.</footnote>

<footnote n="71">71 As above.</footnote>

<footnote n="72">72 A Yamin ‘From ideals to tolls: Applying human rights to maternal health (2013) 10(11) *Plos Medicine* e1001546, see also P Hunt & JB de Mesquita *Reducing maternal mortality: the contribution of the right to the highest attainable standard of health* (2010) 6.</footnote>

<footnote n="73">73 CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 24 on women and health (1999).</footnote>

<footnote n="74">74 E Durojaye & O Oluduro ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the woman question’ (2016) 24 *Feminist Legal Studies* 315-336.</footnote>
provided a more purposive interpretation of article 2 of the African Women's Protocol and yielded a substantive approach to equality.

The interpretation of the Commission that differential treatment in article 2 of the African Women's Protocol, must be 'based solely on the ground of sex', does not align with feminist scholars' reasoning. The African Women's Protocol itself already lists grounds of discrimination beyond sex, including grounds yielding intersectional vulnerabilities such as rurality and disability. It is inconceivable to interpret it to mean that the 'sole' purpose of the Protocol is to eliminate discrimination between men and women. Even if that were the case, the Protocol is more aligned with fostering gender equality more generally, which subsumes sex equality.<fnref n="75" /> The treatment of women, particularly in the context of reproductive health, is largely influenced and driven by social gender norms.

The right to non-discrimination is an integral part of the principle of equality, and has been described as the right of everyone not to be denied their rights on the grounds of sex, race, religion, language, political affiliation or other status.<fnref n="76" /> In *Purohit and Moore v The Gambia*, the Commission noted that articles 2 and 3 are some of the most important provisions of the Charter<fnref n="77" /> and that the enjoyment of all other rights in the Charter depend on them. Against this background, the Commission's restrictive interpretation of the discrimination provision in the African Women's Protocol as 'solely based on sex' is absurd. Comparatively, the CEDAW Committee in the *Alyne case* noted that since maternal health is peculiar to women, the Brazilian government was violating the right to non-discrimination of women by failing to provide maternal healthcare services. The CEDAW Committee has also noted in General Recommendation 24 that failure by the state to ensure healthcare services peculiar to the needs of women will amount to discrimination under the CEDAW.<fnref n="78" />

A formal approach to equality ignores the existing differences and historical disadvantages which require the adoption of corrective measures to address.<fnref n="79" /> The disparity necessitates a substantive equality approach to close the gap. There is no doubt that a response based on the narrow interpretation preferred by the Commission ignores the suffering of these women, and would result in injustice. With over 40,000 maternal deaths annually, the majority of which occur in disadvantaged communities, the need for urgent and corrective

<footnote n="75">75 See generally E Lubaale 'Elimination of discriminations against women' and M Kamunyu 'Definitions' in A Rudman and others (eds) *The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa: a commentary* (2023).</footnote>

<footnote n="76">76 See CESCR General Comment 20 Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art 2, para 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) July 2009.</footnote>

<footnote n="77">77 *Purohit & Another v The Gambia* (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003).</footnote>

<footnote n="78">78 General Recommendation 24 of CEDAW Committee.</footnote>

<footnote n="79">79 See M Kamunyu 'Definition' in A Rudman and others (eds) *The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa: a commentary* (2023) 42.</footnote>
measures to address the situation based on a substantive equality approach cannot be overstated.

5.4 The right to dignity and to be free from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment

The complainants argued that mistreatment of women and the negative attitudes of healthcare providers towards maternity patients contribute to the high maternal deaths in Nigeria. They argued that the mistreatment of women during childbirth constitutes a violation of the right to dignity and amounts to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment in line with the reasoning of human rights bodies.<fnref n="80" /> The complainants had relied on the jurisprudence of the Commission and other human rights bodies in this regard, as well as decisions of national courts.<fnref n="81" /> In its decision, the Commission ignored its own General Comment No. 4, where it stated that acts such as involuntary sterilisation and other mistreatment of women in health facilities constitutes torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.<fnref n="82" />

Instead, the Commission relied on the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee to argue that the mistreatment of women during pregnancy and childbirth does not constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.<fnref n="83" /> It is not clear why the Commission would cite a decision of the Human Rights Committee and depart from its own norms on the same issue. For instance, while explaining the meaning of the right to dignity in the *Purohit* case, the Commission stated that

> the term ‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment and treatment’ is to be interpreted so as to extend to the widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical or mental and that ‘exposing victims to personal suffering and indignity violates the right to human dignity. Personal suffering and indignity can take many forms and will depend on the particular circumstances of each communication brought before the African Commission’.<fnref n="84" />

Until the present decision, the Commission had consistently followed this reasoning. For instance, in *Doebbler v Sudan*, the Commission noted that ‘the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment is to be interpreted as widely as possible to

<footnote n="80">80 *Nigerian Maternal Mortality*, paras 67-73.</footnote>

<footnote n="81">81 For instance, General Comment 4 of the African Commission, Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and decision of High Court of Kenya.</footnote>

<footnote n="82">82 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights General Comment 4 on the right to redress for victims of Torture and other Cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment (art 5).</footnote>

<footnote n="83">83 *Nigerian Maternal Mortality*, para 126.</footnote>

<footnote n="84">84 *Purohit and Moore v The Gambia*, 29 May 2003, Communication 241/01 (emphasis in original).</footnote>
encompass the widest possible array of physical and mental abuses'.<fnref n="85" />
In the *Equality Now* case,<fnref n="86" /> which related to child and forced
marriages, the Commission adopted a similarly progressive and
purposive interpretation of the right to dignity as follows:

At the core of human dignity is the idea and recognition that a human
being has unique worth, value and significance that is innate, and not
acquired. It also entails that a human being is a moral agent possessed
with the conscience and personal volition to decide what happens to his or
her body. The right to respect of dignity is a guarantee that a human being
should not be subjected to acts or omissions that degrade or humiliate him
or her. The worth, value and significance of a human being may not and
need not be conceptualised with scientific precision.

In Resolution 260, the Commission declares that all forms of involuntary sterilisation violate, in particular; the right to equality and non-discrimination, dignity, liberty and security of person, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and the right to the best attainable state of physical and mental health as enshrined in regional human rights instruments such as the African Charter and the African Women's protocol.<fnref n="87" /> Some studies have shown that abuse and mistreatment of pregnant women in health facilities contribute to high maternal mortality.<fnref n="88" />

The foregoing jurisprudence is consistent with the trend of human
rights bodies, special mechanisms and national courts to frame
mistreatment, forced sterilisation and other coercive treatment as
constituting torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. For instance,
the Human Rights Committee has noted that forced sterilisation
contravenes article 7 of the ICCPR which prohibits torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, and article 17 on right to privacy.<fnref n="89" /> In
*VC v Slovakia*, the European Court on Human Rights found that
sterilisation was carried out with gross disregard to the right to
autonomy and choice of the Applicant, and was therefore a violation of
articles 3 on the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, and
8 on the right to family life, of the European Convention.<fnref n="90" />

Also, the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with
disabilities has condemned forced sterilisation of women with
disabilities calling on states to guarantee healthcare services to persons

<footnote n="85">85 See Curtis Francis Doebbler v Sudan, 4 May 2003, Communication 236/00. For a detailed analysis of this case, see E Durojaye & O Oluduro 'The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the woman question' (2016) 24 *Feminist Legal Studies* 315.</footnote>

<footnote n="86">86 *Equality Now and Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association v Federal Republic of Ethiopia*, Communication 341/2007, para 118.</footnote>

<footnote n="87">87 See *Resolution* on Involuntary Sterilisation and the Protection of Human Rights in Access to HIV Services - ACHPR/Res. 260(LIV)2013.</footnote>

<footnote n="88">88 For instance, see Human Rights Watch 'Stop Making Excuses" Accountability for Maternal Health Care in South Africa' (2011) 8., see also, Amnesty International 'South Africa: Struggle for maternal health: Barriers to antenatal care in South Africa' (2014) 9.</footnote>

<footnote n="89">89 See General Comment 28: Equality of rights between men and women, paras 11 and 20.</footnote>

<footnote n="90">90 *VC v Slovakia* (no 18968/07), para 119.</footnote>
with disabilities that are grounded in human rights, including respect for their autonomy, privacy, dignity, and to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.<fnref n="91" /> Other human rights bodies such as the CEDAW Committee and the Special Rapporteur on violence against women have sometimes referred to the mistreatment of pregnant women in health facilities as obstetric violence. For instance, in NAE v Spain the CEDAW Committee found that mistreatment of a pregnant woman during delivery such as induced labour and separation from the new baby constituted obstetric violence. Echoing General Recommendation 24 on women and health, the Committee notes that

quality health-care services are those that are delivered in a way that ensures that a woman gives her fully informed consent, respects her dignity, guarantees her confidentiality and is sensitive to her needs and perspectives.<fnref n="92" />

The Committee cited the definition of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women and its consequences as:

> as the violence against women experienced during facility-based childbirth and affirms that this form of violence has been shown to be widespread and systematic in nature or engrained in the health system.<fnref n="93" />

At the national level, the High Court of Kenya in *Millicent Awuor Omuya alias Maimuna Awuor & Another v The Attorney General & 4 Others* found that the detention and mistreatment of the petitioners, including being made to sleep on the floors due to inability to pay medical fees after delivery, constituted ill-treatment and undermined the right to dignity and to be free from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.<fnref n="94" />

These developments point to the fact that coercion, abuse and mistreatment of women seeking maternal health services in health facilities is a form of torture, cruel inhuman and degrading treatment under international law. The Commission's departure from its own rights affirming reasoning to a restrictive interpretation of the right to dignity is therefore retrogressive.

## 6 IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION FOR THE REALISATION OF SRHR IN AFRICA

The present decision is a clear departure from some of the earlier decisions of the Commission, such as the *SERAC, Free Legal Assistance Group v Zaire* and *Sudan* cases.<fnref n="95" /> In these decisions, the Commission demonstrated willingness to advance socio-economic

<footnote n="91">91 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="92">92 CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 24 on women and health.</footnote>

<footnote n="93">93 A/74/137, paras 4, 12 and 15.</footnote>

<footnote n="94">94 *Millicent Awuor Omuya alias Maimuna Awuor & Another v The Attorney General & 4 Others* (2015), Petition No 562 of 2012.</footnote>

<footnote n="95">95 See n 63.</footnote>
rights, including the right to health, robustly engaged with the issues,
clarified state obligations, and elaborated on the nature of the rights.
These decisions provide guidance and direction for states regarding
their obligations to implement socio-economic rights at the national
level.

Another concern with the decision relates to the length of time it
took for the Communication to be finalised, given the nature of the
underlying violations. The Communication was filed in late 2014 and
the decision on the merits was only adopted in 2023, a period of nearly
a decade. This is a major concern for a regional human rights body
whose jurisdiction is only triggered after the exhaustion of local
remedies. Delay in finalizing communication by regional human rights
bodies does not inspire trust and confidence in the system. It
undermines the goal of redressing injustice speedily. In the long-run,
such delays would discourage victims of human rights violations,
especially sexual and reproductive rights, from seeking redress with
regional human rights bodies.

This decision is a missed opportunity by the Commission to clarify
the nature of states obligations regarding the SRHR provisions of the
African Women's Protocol. As the first Communication on maternal
health under the African Women's Protocol, the Commission had an
ideal opportunity to articulate a purposive and substantive position on
the scope and content of sexual and reproductive rights, including the
prospect of expansion beyond the scope of health. Instead, the
Commission adopted a rigid approach, relying on technicalities
peripheral to the subject, and seemed to ignore the human impact of
avoidable and preventable maternal deaths and morbidities in the
region. The Commission missed the opportunity to exert pressure on
African governments to take urgent and decisive measures to address
the high maternal mortality in the region.

The decision sets the clock back on the gains already recorded in
advancing SRHR in the region through the progressive provisions of
the African Women's Protocol and years of sustained advocacy for
norms and standards on SRHR.

7 CONCLUSION

As the first decision of the Commission on the protection of SRHR
under the African Women’s Protocol, the current decision is
disappointing. The Commission did not find any violation of the
African Charter and the African Women’s Protocol arising from the
complaints made, even where the allegations were not contested. Our
discussion is not nearly exhaustive of the issues emanating from the
decision. Issues such as the apparent gender blindness in the reasoning
of the Commission; the failure to appreciate and respond to the scourge
of obstetric violence; the stance of the Commission that it cannot, of its
own motion, address issues not directly raised by the applicants; the
argument that violations must be specifically pleaded on the basis of
specific articles; the approach that abandons the tenets of judicial
notice especially in respect of widespread violations; the clear
departure from settled jurisprudence; the approach to the
interpretation of what ‘benefiting from scientific advancement’ would
entail; the question of reparations for SRHR violations; or the attempt
to move the goalposts on the burden of proof in cases alleging violation
of rights. Furthermore, some of the more obscure and peculiar issues
highlighted in the complaint such as the question of mandated blood
donation as a precondition for maternity care were overshadowed by
the generally restrictive interpretation of the extent of state obligations.
This is despite the fact that such practices resonate in a majority of the
state parties to the Charter and would have benefited from clear
pronouncement on related duties.

From the foregoing, the decision seems to have undone years of
progressive jurisprudence on socio-economic rights including the right
to health, and halted the momentum gathered towards upholding the
reproductive rights of women and girls in Africa on an equal basis with
the rest of the world. For a region plagued with high maternal deaths
and lack of political will on the part of the governments, the
Commission’s position is utterly unresponsive on the subject matter,
and contradicts its promotional mandate and prior commitments.
There is an urgent need for the Commission to redeem itself from the
aftermath of this decision, and for stakeholders to strategise towards
containing the fallout from the decision.
Case discussion of *Mornah v Benin and 7 Others*: is the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights prevented from implementing the right of self-determination?

Ozioma Izuora*

https://orcid.org/0001-6815-9726

**ABSTRACT:** The applicant, Mornah, approached the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights to hold the eight respondent states responsible for the violations of the human rights of the Sahrawi people of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. He alleged that the respondents failed to 'safeguard the territorial integrity and independence' of that country; and that their right to the enjoyment of their natural resources had been violated. According to him, the respondents were complicit in the alleged violations, in that they voted in favour of Morocco's readmission as a member of the African Union. The Court held that the respondents had exercised their right to vote as a prerogative of membership, which could not be interpreted as support for the alleged rights violations. This case discussion critiques the Court's judgment, which even though thoroughly analysing all arising issues, ended up with unsatisfactory conclusions. It examines the concept of the 'right to self-determination' and 'territorial integrity', as formulated in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Union Constitutive Act. It also considers the works of learned authors, juxtaposing them with the objectives of the Charter. It finds that the conclusions drawn by the Court appear to favour a particular political stance, mirroring the precedents set by the Commission in similar matters. It finally recommends that the Court should boldly play its role as the supranational human rights court for the continent, by setting clear precedents in developing the jurisprudence of the African human rights system.

TITRE ET RÉSUMÉ EN FRANÇAIS

Analyse de l'arrêt *Mornah c. Bénin et 7 autres* : la Cour africaine entravée
dans la mise en œuvre du droit à l'autodétermination ?

RÉSUMÉ: Dans l'affaire *Mornah c. Bénin et 7 autres*, Bernard Anbataayela Mornah, homme politique ghanéen, a saisi la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples pour tenir huit États défendeurs responsables de violations des droits de l'homme en République arabe sahraouie démocratique (RASD). Le requérant alléguait que les défendeurs avaient manqué à leur obligation de « sauvegarder l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance» de la RASD et que le droit des peuples à disposer librement de leurs ressources naturelles avait été violé. Il accusait également les États défendeurs de complicité dans ces violations pour avoir voté en faveur de la réadmission du Maroc au sein de l'Union africaine. La Cour, dans sa décision, a conclu que le vote des défendeurs relevait de leur prérogative en tant que membres de l'Union africaine et ne pouvait être interprété comme un soutien aux violations alléguées. Ce commentaire critique cette approche, jugeant les conclusions de la Cour insatisfaisantes malgré une analyse approfondie des questions soulevées. L'article

<footnote>* BA (Hons) (Eng), (Nigeria), M ED (Exeter, England), LLB (Hons), LLM BL (Nigeria), PhD Student (Public International Law), Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Nasarawa State, Nigeria; Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Baze University, Abuja; oziomaizuora919@gmail.com</footnote>
explore les notions de «droit à l'autodétermination» et d'«intégrité territoriale» telles qu'énoncées dans la Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples et dans l'Acte constitutif de l'Union africaine. Il juxtapose ces concepts avec la doctrine pertinente et les objectifs de la Charte pour évaluer la pertinence de l'interprétation retenue par la Cour. L'analyse souligne que la décision semble refléter une position politique plutôt qu'une interprétation rigoureuse des normes juridiques applicables, perpétuant ainsi les précédents établis par la Commission dans des affaires similaires. En conclusion, le commentaire appelle la Cour à affirmer son rôle de juridiction supranationale des droits de l'homme en Afrique. Il recommande l'établissement de précédents audacieux pour renforcer la jurisprudence du système africain des droits de l'homme, en particulier dans les affaires touchant au droit à l'autodétermination et à l'intégrité territoriale.

**KEY WORDS:** self-determination; sovereignty; territorial integrity; independence; Sahrawi; African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights

**CONTENT:**

1 Introduction: self-determination and territorial integrity 506

2 Background and facts presented by Mornah 511

3 The Court's decision on jurisdiction and admissibility 513

3.1 Jurisdiction 513

3.2 Court dismissed objections to admissibility 515

4 The Court's decision on the merits 515

4.1 The issues 515

5 Critique and recommendations 518

# 1 INTRODUCTION: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

The right to self-determination is provided for in articles 1(2) and 55 of the United Nations (UN) Charter of 1945. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)¹ and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)² in their common article 1 ascribe to 'all peoples' the right to self-determination, equal 'political status', and a guarantee of 'economic, social and cultural development'.³ Instruments setting up various UN entities also echo these rights. They are usually linked with the concept of 'sovereignty' and 'territorial integrity'. Once self-determination, sovereignty and territorial integrity co-occur, a state is said to have achieved 'independence'. An independent entity enjoys unfettered control of its territory. Such a territory is defined as a 'state' in international law because it can boast of a permanent population; a defined territory; a government, and has capacity to enter into relations with other states.⁴

1 United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force on 23 March 1976 (in accordance with art 49 of the UN Charter).

2 United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force on 3 January 1976 (in accordance with art 27 of the UN Charter).

3 Art 1(1), ICCPR and ICESCR, 1966.

4 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933, art 1.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter) provides for the right to self-determination in article 20, along with other rights and freedoms associated with it, in subsequent articles. The right to self-determination 'has two interconnected aspects: internal and external',<fnref n="5" /> and is concerned with the plight of dependent people seeking to break away from the boundaries set by erstwhile colonial entities. Anyangwe aptly elaborates on the internal and external elements, where he states that self-determination 'is an enabling, collective human right for asserting claim to political autonomy within a state or to sovereign statehood'.<fnref n="6" />

By reaffirming the pledge to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa in its preamble, the African Charter must be read as implicitly including the eradication of similar acts of colonialism between African Union (AU) member states. The preamble emphasises that African states would honour the pledge

solemnly made in Article 2 of the said Charter to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa and to promote international cooperation having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<fnref n="7" />

The right to self-determination guaranteed in articles 20 to 22 of the African Charter are not feasible without the assurance of sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is for this reason that political claims tend to be brought along with the right to enjoy the natural resources in the territory, as clarified by Anyangwe.

In view of these provisions of the African Charter, could the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (Cour) be barred from interrogating questions touching on self-determination, sovereignty and territorial integrity? This question arose in the context of the Court's decision in *Mornah v Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Tunisia, Tanzania*. These states have ratified the African Court Protocol and made declarations under article 34(6) of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human Peoples' Rights (Court Protocol). Mornah brought a case against these states, alleging that when they, as sitting members of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in 2017 took the decision to admit Morocco to the AU, they failed to safeguard the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and violated the rights of the Sahrawi people to self-determination.

<footnote n="5">5 C Anyangwe 'The normative power of the right to self-determination under the African Charter and the principle of territorial integrity: competing values of human dignity and system stability' (2018) 2 *African Human Rights Yearbook* 47, 48.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 As above.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">7 Preamble to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, para 4.</footnote>
Answering this question, the Court rightly asserted that as long as there were commissions or omissions that also evinced violations of human rights, it has jurisdiction to determine them.<fnref n="8" /> In fact, article 20(2) of the Charter provides that ‘colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community’. The right to self-determination is a fundamental right, without which there can be no dignity for a people who have a rightful claim to it. In addition, article 21(1) of the African Charter declares as follows:<fnref n="9" /> ‘All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it.’ Under article 21(3), states are exhorted to ‘exercise the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening African unity and solidarity’. Article 22 goes on to assure that ‘all peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development, with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind’. It further states that ‘States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development’. It follows, therefore, that the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) voluntarily contracted with Morocco to exploit its natural resources, even though doing so breaches the sovereign rights of the SADR.

The rights to self-determination, development and to a clean environment are interconnected, and have been portrayed as the pride of Africa and evidence of the progressive stance of Africa towards human rights development. In fact, Okafor and Dzah extol the African human rights system for bequeathing to the world the norms enshrined in the rights to self-determination, to environment and to development.<fnref n="10" /> To them, the African human rights system

has equipped diverse actors and rights systems with an enhanced toolbox, well beyond what usually is available in mainstream human rights praxis, for evolving norms and strategies for, and intervening in, contentious politico-legal affairs. The transformative force of the African human rights system thus is visible across key aspects of human rights law, especially in the way in which norms emerging from Africa socialise actors and their legal and policy choices and actions. Comprising treaty texts, protocols, declarations and resolutions as well as judicial and non-judicial processes, the African human rights system has enunciated, promoted and practised a significantly (even if only partly) organic African vision of rights, while still being responsive to the necessity for broader approaches to human rights.<fnref n="11" />

Robertson and Megrills reflect the above view with regards to the African Charter, stating that ‘the creation of this specifically African

<footnote n="8">8 Bernard Anbataayela Mornah v Benin and 7 Others (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and Mauritius (Intervening)), Application 28/2018, Judgment, 22 September 2022.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 Art 21(4), African Charter.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 OC Okafor & GEK Dzah ‘The African human rights system as ‘norm leader’: three case studies’ (2021) 21 *African Human Rights Law Journal* 669-698.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 As above.</footnote>
machinery represents an attempt to settle disputes on a regional basis without referring them to the Security Council, which is ... consistent with Articles 52 and 53 of the UN Charter'.<fnref n="12" /> For Africa to deserve such accolades, each organ of the system must maintain a steady tempo of engagements that dispel any shadow of doubt in the precedents they set. There can be no arbitrariness attributable to the decision-making process of the Court, nor should conclusions reached not become applicable to similar scenarios.

The Court Protocol spells out its jurisdiction in article 3, as follows:

The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned. ... In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide.

It bears emphasizing that the right to self-determination is a Charter right and should not be made inferior to the general objectives of the AU. The Court must be able to pronounce on a right once parties approach it to do so. In exercising such a wide jurisdiction and in view of the above provisions, which were exhaustively argued before the Court in *Mornah*, and which the Court scrutinised in detail, the conclusions finally reached by the Court left some questions unanswered.

Even before the Court started operating, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (Commission) has recognised that different forms of infringement of the right to self-determination persists in parts of Africa.<fnref n="13" /> In a case concerning the Anglophone Cameroonians, it stated that 'post-colonial Africa has not been free of domination', but added that contemporary domination does not constitute colonialism 'in the classic sense'.<fnref n="14" /> This interpretation raises the query as to whether, if slavery currently occurs within a state, it should be ignored for not corresponding with the forms as slavery that used to be practised.<fnref n="15" /> Anyangwe decries the Commission's interpretive approach on this issue:<fnref n="16" />

The exercise of the right of self-determination under the African Charter is constrained first by the equally important principle of territorial integrity, and second by the conservative and timorous interpretation of that norm by the African Commission.

In several cases, the Commission has refused to accede to claims for self-determination for fear of conflicting with the principle of territorial integrity, even though 'in all these cases, political, (cultural as well, in *Gumne*), social and economic oppression or domination is additionally

<footnote n="12">12 AH Robertson & JG Merrills *Human rights in the world – an introduction to the study of the international protection of human rights* (2005) 242.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13 *Kevin Mgwang Gunme et al v Cameroon* (2009) AHRLR 9 (ACHPR 2009) (Gunme).</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 Gunme (n 13) para 181.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 Gunme (n 13) 55, footnote 22.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 Anyangwe (n 5) 55.</footnote>
alleged'.<fnref n="17" /> The Commission has not through its pronouncements advanced political solutions, to placate the yearning of the peoples of Africa who were promised that right under the Charter, even as the right is 'intertwined' with the struggle for 'decolonization' and 'independence'.<fnref n="18" /> Anyangwe maintains that the 'territorial integrity' which the Commission prefers to defer to, exists merely as a policy or directive 'principle' of the AU Constitutive Act, which it vows to protect in its article 3.<fnref n="19" /> It is not one of the AU's central goals. For the purpose of this case discussion, it is taken as trite that an objective does not override an assured right.

For avoidance of doubt, article 3(b) of the AU Constitutive Act provides that the Union would ‘defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states’. That is noble in itself, but the Constitutive Act also vows in article 3(h) to ‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter ... and other relevant human rights instruments’. As between the SADR and Morocco, in the case under consideration, there are two sovereign states whose dispute on sovereignty and territorial integrity should not be allowed to continue to fester without a solution, making the AU appear to be a toothless bulldog. In playing its complementary role alongside the Commission, the Court must do better to fully achieve the objective of the Charter to ensure the self-determination of Africa’s peoples, something that the Commission has continuously failed to do. Besides, the Court has its work cut out for it as the supranational regional court on human rights. It must be seen to give proper directions that create clear precedents to deter future violations by states. Membership of the AU comes with a mutual duty to make concerted efforts towards achieving African unity. The situation in SADR is still continuing, long after foreign occupation of African states has become a matter of history. The Court should not, like the Commission, fail to face the thorny issue of self-determination head on. It should also align itself with the Commission’s decisions and appear to defer to the dominant power in that conflict.

### Zewudie makes the point that

the AU has been heavily criticised for not living up to its promises as far as human rights are concerned. Despite the establishment of human rights mechanisms, the AU, as a collective of States, has played an inadequate role in supporting and encouraging them. Discrepancies between AU's decisions and actions concerning its relation with the Commission led some scholars to conclude that the AU 'does not wish to see the

<footnote n="17">17 Anyangwe (n 5) 56 (footnotes 27-29): *Sir Dawda Jawara v Gambia* (2000) AHRLR 107 (ACHPR 2000); *DRC v Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda*, Communication 227/99, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 20th Annual Activity Report (2006) (*DRC* case); *Cabinda v Angola, Katanga v Zaire*, Communication 24/89, *Union National de Liberation de Cabinda v Angola*, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 7th Annual Activity Report.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 B Gawanas ‘The African Union: concepts and implementation mechanisms relating to human rights’ in A Bösl & J Diescho (eds) *Human Rights in Africa: legal perspectives on their protection and promotion* (2009) 135.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 Anyangwe (n 5) 67-8.</footnote>
Commission to become more effective and forceful'. The AU has put inadequate effort in liberalising and democratising its members and in promoting human rights on the domestic level. It has also been observed to focus more on protecting leaders than the human rights of ordinary people. Constantly placing 'key policy issues' such as integration, peace and security and development at the centre of their discussions, leaders occasionally ignore grave human rights issues that warrant their special attention.<fnref n="20" />

## 2 BACKGROUND AND FACTS PRESENTED BY MORNAH

The applicant in this case is Bernard Anbataayela Mornah, a Ghanaian national and the national chairperson of a political party registered in Ghana. Mornah approached the Court to determine the international responsibility of the eight respondent states, who by their action of voting in favour of AU membership of Morocco, allegedly made themselves complicit in the violations of the rights of the Sahrawi people. The main violation of rights he complained of, is the continued occupation of the territory of the SADR by Morocco, which amounted to 'violations of the human rights of the Sahrawi people' and an 'erosion of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Western Sahara'.<fnref n="21" /> The other alleged violation is that Morocco continues to exploit the natural resources of those areas under its occupation, against the rights and interests of the Sahrawi people.

The SADR had been colonised by Spain until February 1976, after which Morocco and Mauritania took over parts of its territory. The Sahrawi people resisted the occupation by the two states, resulting in Mauritania giving up its claim to any part of the country. However, Morocco remained an occupying power.<fnref n="22" /> Different from Morocco, the SADR was a founding member of the AU. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in 1984 after the SADR had been admitted as a member of the OAU.<fnref n="23" /> In 1992, the United Nations supervised a referendum on the independence of the SADR. Morocco scuttled that effort, by claiming that the electoral process was tantamount to secession. The bad blood between the two states continues to reverberate in international politics to this day. They remain pitted against each other, competing for the natural resources available in the territory of the SADR. As an erstwhile

<footnote n="20">20 TA Zewudie 'Human rights in the African Union decision-making processes: an empirical analysis of states' reaction to the Activity Reports of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights' (2018) 2 *African Human Rights Yearbook* 295-320, 298 http://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2018/v2n1a13 (accessed 12 April 2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="21">21 Para 8 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 Para 9 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23 Para 10 of the Judgment.</footnote>
colonial power, Spain has in furtherance of its own economic interests maintained close ties with Morocco.<fnref n="24" />

The allegation that Morocco continues to exploit the abundant natural resources of the territory to the detriment of the Sahrawi people is an important aspect of the applicant's case. Mornah also stated that in spite of Morocco being admitted to membership of the AU in 2017, the state had not shown any intention of relinquishing its occupation of the Sahrawi territory. He alleged that in spite of the AU's recognition of Sahrawi as 'the legitimate government in exile' and the fact that 'no less than eighty-four ... countries have accorded it diplomatic recognition', parts of the country remained under Moroccan occupation.<fnref n="25" /> The applicant categorically called into question the act of the AU in unconditionally admitting Morocco as a member, stating that the action contradicted 'the established practice with regard to admission of members' to the AU (previously, the OAU). He recalled that apart from condemning illegal and unconstitutional change of governments, the OAU and AU had in the past, refused to admit colonial powers as members. Examples of these were South Africa, which only joined the OAU after the demise of the apartheid regime, and in recent times, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Burkina Faso and Egypt, which were sanctioned for the unconstitutional change of government through coups d'état.

All the respondents have ratified the African Court Protocol and made declarations under article 34(6) of the Protocol, giving access to NGOs enjoying observer status with the Commission and individuals to bring cases against them directly to the Court.<fnref n="26" /> While some of the respondent states had withdrawn their declaration, the Court held that such withdrawal did not have retroactive effect or bearing on matters submitted to it prior to the withdrawal of the declarations. Such withdrawal would only come into effect after one year from the date the document for withdrawal had been deposited.<fnref n="27" /> The withdrawal of these declarations therefore had no effect on the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. SADR and Mauritius applied to and were granted the right to join in the suit as interveners, and the African Union of Lawyers (PALU) joined as amicus curiae.<fnref n="28" />

<footnote n="24">24 EuroNews, 'Algeria suspends friendship treaty with Spain over Western Sahara', Published on 9 June 2022, https://www.euronews.com/2022/06/09/algeria-suspends-friendship-treaty-with-spain-over-western-sahara (accessed 14 April 2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="25">25 Paras 11-13 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">26 Paras 3-5 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">27 Para 6 of the Judgment; see footnotes 1 to 3: *Andrew Ambrose Cheusi v Tanzania*, ACtHPR, Application 4/2015, Judgment of 26 June 2020 (merits and reparations), §§ 37-39. *Houngue Éric Noudehouenou v Benin*, ACtHPR, Application 3/2020, Order of 5 May 2020 (provisional measures), paras 4-5 and corrigendum of 29 July 2020; *Suy Bi Gohore Émile and Others v Côte d'Ivoire*, ACtHPR, Application 44/2019, Judgment of 15 July 2020 (Merits and reparations), para 67; *Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v Rwanda* (Jurisdiction) (3 July 2016) 1 AfCLR 562, para 69.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">28 Para 7 of the Judgment.</footnote>
# 3 THE COURT'S DECISION ON JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY

## 3.1 Jurisdiction

The respondents argued against the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the matter. According to them, the matter raised political issues, which the Court had no power to entertain, because of the constraints of 'international relations and diplomacy and the principle of non-intervention' in the affairs of sovereign entities.<fnref n="29" /> States like Mali and Ghana, in addition to the above, threw in the palliative that the best the Court could do would be to issue an advisory opinion on the matter.<fnref n="30" /> The interveners and the *amicus curiae* supported the case of the applicant, by insisting that by voting in favour of Morocco's membership, the respondents acquiesced to the alleged violations of the rights of Sahrawi people by Morocco.<fnref n="31" />

The Court started with the following general observation:<fnref n="32" />

[A]n application may raise issues of a political or diplomatic nature or may seek reliefs that may require political decisions or diplomatic solutions. An application may also contain allegations that relate to a state's conduct in the arena of international relations, including its commitments or undertakings in international organisations. However, the mere fact that an application contains issues relating to State sovereignty or that it touches on political or diplomatic issues does not automatically remove the Court's competence to consider an application.... in general terms... international law is essentially a product of the consensual undertaking of States and its consensual nature is the highest manifestation of their sovereignty and independence. Nevertheless, once States have willingly ceded their consent to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal to interpret and apply specific instruments, they cannot raise sovereignty as a defence or justification to preclude the tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction over a dispute insofar as the dispute relates to issues that fall within the scope of the tribunal's statutory competence.

The Court thus justified its power to exercise jurisdiction on the matter by emphasising aspects of the application that disclosed that the Sahrawi people had been denied their right to self-determination by Morocco with impunity from the AU, as evidenced in Morocco being admitted to become an AU member.<fnref n="33" /> The Court also established its competence to determine whether the respondent states were responsible for the alleged violations of the rights and freedoms of the peoples of SADR, even though 'territorial disputes' also arose from the scenarios.<fnref n="34" /> The Court vehemently countered the contention by Tunisia at the AU Conference of 2018, it was agreed that the AU would

<footnote n="29">29 Para 57 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">30 Paras 58 & 59 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">31 Paras 62 & 63 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">32 Paras 64 & 65 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">33 Paras 86 & 87 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 Para 93 of the Judgment.</footnote>
leave the matter of SADR to be decided by the UN. It cited the AU document in extenso, and from the text, pointed out that the AU never agreed to adopt a 'hands off' approach to all matters relating to SADR. It concluded that operating under the AU, the Court remained bound by the Charter, its Protocols, and other international human rights instruments ratified by the parties before it. The Court therefore confirmed its material jurisdiction in the case.<fnref n="35" />

Having reviewed the submissions of the parties and the *amicus curiae* on each head, the Court also claimed both personal and temporal jurisdiction over the matter.<fnref n="36" />

On the challenge to its territorial jurisdiction, the Court noted that, unlike the treaties on which the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights are founded, neither the Charter nor the Protocol delineated the 'territorial scope of its application'. It noted that, in practice, the Court habitually examined that aspect of jurisdiction, sometimes, *suo motu*.<fnref n="37" /> The Court further noted as follows:<fnref n="38" />

> ... in recent times, with the increasing extra-territorial undertakings of States and the erosion of the defence of sovereignty with respect to violations of human rights, the classical notion of territorial jurisdiction has seen some changes. International human rights jurisprudence has also continuously expanded the territorial application of international human rights conventions beyond the physical national boundaries to areas where States have effective control and to acts and omissions committed by their agents or persons under their military, political, and economic influence.

The Court further noted that the UN Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment 12, has established that where the right to self-determination is concerned, 'specific obligations on states parties exist not only in relation to their own peoples but vis-à-vis all peoples' seeking the right.<fnref n="39" /> It concluded that viewed against the provisions of the African Charter, the violation may result from either commission and omission.<fnref n="40" /> However, it noted that to exercise its territorial jurisdiction, 'the Court must also establish that such alleged violations must have occurred in the territory of a State Party against which an application is filed or by persons under its control'.<fnref n="41" /> The Court went on to attribute the breach by the respondents to their omission to act in the face of the breach of the Charter in relation to the Sahrawi people, and concluded that it had territorial jurisdiction to examine the application.<fnref n="42" />

<footnote n="35">35 Paras 94-99 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">36 See paras 123 & 131 respectively.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">37 Para 146 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">38 Para 148 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">39 Para 149 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">40 Para 153 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">41 Para 155 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">42 Para 159 of the Judgment.</footnote>
## 3.2 Court dismissed objections to admissibility

The respondents raised numerous objections to the admissibility of the case, all of which the Court dismissed.<fnref n="43" /> Some of these objections had to do with the identity of the applicant and the basis for bringing the case; and reliance on matters relayed through the mass media. The Court thoroughly examined each and every head of the objections. In particular, in relation to the objection against non-exhaustion of local remedies, the Court recalled the Commission's decision in *World Organisation against Torture and Others v Zaire (Zaire Mass Violations case)*,<fnref n="44" /> in which it stated that 'when an application involves an allegation of a series of serious and massive violations of human rights, the rule of exhaustion of local remedies becomes inapplicable'. It applied to the case the exception to the rule on the exhaustion of local remedies, as the violations have gone on for years and were still ongoing. It took a similar stance with regards to the applicability of 'reasonable time' within which to bring an application to the Court. According to the Court, it did not matter whether the matter was filed in 1975 or in 2016, since 'the alleged breach of their obligation under the Charter renews itself every day and hence, an application may be filed at any time'.<fnref n="45" />

# 4 THE COURT'S DECISION ON THE MERITS

## 4.1 The issues

The issues presented to the Court for determination by the applicant include: violation of the objectives and principles of the Union enshrined in articles 3, 4 and 23 of its Constitutive Act; articles 1 and 2 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (Democracy Charter) and articles 1, 2, 7, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the Charter. The applicant called for sanction against the respondent states for not having protested against the admission of Morocco at the time the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government took the decision to admit Morocco.<fnref n="46" /> There were, as such, two main issues before the Court.

The Court noted that in addition to the provision of article 20 of the Charter,

> ... in international law, the right to self-determination has achieved the status of *jus cogens* or a peremptory norm; thereby, generating the corollary obligation *erga omnes* on all States. As such, no derogation is permitted from the right and "all States have a legal interest in protecting

<footnote n="43">43 Para 166 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="44">44 Para 211; footnote 42 of the Judgment: Communications 25/89, 47/90, 56/91 & 100/93, *World Organisation against Torture and Others v Zaire (Zaire mass violations case)*, Ninth Annual Activity Report, para 3.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">45 Paras 220 & 221 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="46">46 Paras 15 & 16 of the Judgment.</footnote>
that right". Where a peremptory norm is breached, States are also under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from such breach and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation.<fnref n="47" />

The Court established that it had already been determined that, historically, Morocco had no right to claim the territory of Western Sahara.<fnref n="48" />

With regards to the respondent states, the Court relied on established international law norms in order to decide their culpability:<fnref n="49" />

...in international law, a State incurs international responsibility where three cumulative conditions are proven to have existed: an act or omission violating international law, that is, an internationally wrongful act; the act must be attributed to a State (attribution); and the act must cause a damage or loss (causal link). In addition, there should not be circumstances precluding responsibility. These conditions are spelt out in the International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and have been generally considered as reflecting customary international law.

The Court further observed that even though article 20 of the Charter imposes an obligation on AU member states to take steps to support the self-determination efforts of the peoples generally, it does not impose specific obligations. In the instant case, it observed that the respondent states refuted the applicant's allegation that they supported Morocco's violations of the stated rights, by stressing that they were fulfilling their obligations to the Sahrawi people through the instrumentality of the AU and the UN. They submitted that they could not, therefore, be said to have omitted to fulfil their obligations to the SADR and its people. Even though it expressed concern that the respondents might not have been providing adequate support to the SADR, the Court ruled that exercising the right to vote 'by a Member State cannot in itself a priori constitute a breach of its international obligation or in the instant application, a violation of the right to self-determination' of the SADR.<fnref n="50" /> Noting that the requirements of article 29 of AU Constitutive Act for approving membership was by a simple majority, the Court concluded that the respondent states' 'individual decision to support or oppose the admission of Morocco does not alone necessarily determine the final outcome'.<fnref n="51" /> The Court further stated that states' 'individual decisions to vote in favour of Morocco's admission to the Union per se

<footnote n="47">47 Para 298; footnote 65: *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, ICJ Advisory Opinion Of 9 July 2004, § 163. See also footnotes 63 and 64: The Court also relied on the following decisions: UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment 31, para 80, The nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add.13, para 6. ICJ, *Advisory Opinion on Chagos Archipelago* (2019), para 180; see also *Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited*, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, para 33; *East Timor (Portugal v Australia)* case, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 102, para 29.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">48 Footnote 70, ICJ *Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara* (1975) para 162, among others; paras 302 & 303 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="49">49 Para 304 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="50">50 Paras 314 & 315 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="51">51 Paras 317 & 318 of the Judgment.</footnote>
cannot be taken as a recognition of Morocco's occupation of the territory of the SADR'.<fnref n="52" />

Finally, and equally disappointingly, the Court declared as follows:<fnref n="53" />

> With regard to the alleged human rights violations directly ensuing from Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara, the Court finds it unnecessary to examine or pronounce itself on them, as Morocco is not a party to this case. As far as the responsibility of Respondent States' is concerned, there is no evidence available before it to attribute these violations to them. There is also no demonstrated causal link between the complained conduct of the respondent States and such violations.

The Court dismissed the case against the respondents and rejected the application for reparation; and ordered parties to bear their own costs.

The Court rightly resisted the claim by the respondents that it could not pronounce on any matter concerning sovereignty and territorial integrity. It distinguished situations where such matters also included human rights violations, in accordance with its jurisdiction. It disagreed with the position that the most it could do would be to issue an advisory opinion on such matters. In my view, the Court arrived at the right conclusion. The right to self-determination, as has been analysed above, is a Charter right, and not merely a policy thrust of the AU. If the situation were otherwise, it would be impossible for a people to ever aspire to the right to self-determination through the Court. The Charter provisions on self-determination would be inoperable too, as would be the objective of the Charter, which aims

> to achieve the total liberation of Africa, the peoples of which are still struggling for their dignity and genuine independence, and undertaking to eliminate colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, zionism.<fnref n="54" />

The Court admitted that Morocco has been in adverse possession of parts of SADR territory since 1976. However, it was not rigorous enough in pressing the need to protect the rights assured to the SADR and its people under articles 20 to 22 of the Charter. To me, Morocco's claim that the obligation imposed on AU members by article 20 (to take steps to support the self-determination efforts of relevant peoples) does not impose specific obligations, is unconvincing. The Court fundamentally undermined the rights of the SADR by splitting hairs in the interpretative distinction it drew between 'general' and 'specific' obligations. How will the 'transformative force' that Okafor and Dzah extol burgeon from such a decision that sounds more like an extended apology for siding with the suppression of self-determination? The Court certainly did not get in the saddle as that 'African machinery' that would 'represents an attempt to settle disputes on a regional basis without referring them to the Security Council', which Robertson and Megrills envision for the Charter.

<footnote n="52">52 Para 320 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="53">53 Para 321 of the Judgment.</footnote>

<footnote n="54">54 Para 8 of the Preamble to the African Charter.</footnote>
The Court allowed the respondent states to dodge a bullet by finding that they did not encourage Morocco's violations of rights because they merely 'welcomed' them to the membership of the AU. Since the Court interpreted article 29 of the AU Constitutive Act by stating that an individual state's vote did not determine the final outcome of membership, it should not have shied away from upholding the applicant's argument on the effect of article 30 of the Act. Article 30 forbids the Union from admitting governments that come into power by unconstitutional means. The respondents should have been found in violation of article 30 for voting in favour of Morocco's membership while it was in adverse occupation of the SADR's territory. The Court, itself, had held respondents to have omitted to act in the face of continuing violations, against the spirit of the Charter. Its reasoning begs this question: What other 'specific obligation' was the Court searching for? The Court should have relied on the authority it cited regarding the 'corollary obligation erga omnes' on all States' to act in concert whenever the right of self-determination is breached. However, it did not do so.

With regards to the exploitation of natural resources of the Sahrawi people in the territories that Morocco currently occupies, the Court found that it had jurisdiction because the violations were ongoing. However, it failed to find the respondents in violation for not being mindful of 'their duty to promote and protect human and peoples' rights and freedoms taking into account the importance traditionally attached to these rights and freedoms in Africa'.⁵⁵ Unfortunately, because it was not a party to the African Charter, or to the African Court Protocol (and had of course not made a declaration under article 34(6) of the Court Protocol), Morocco could not be held in violation by the Court.

## 5 CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Court ought to have more strongly admonished the respondent states for their apparently tolerant disposition towards Morocco. The applicant was right to insist that these states should have protested by withholding their votes allowing for Morocco's admission to the AU. The Court should have found applicable in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction the customary international law precept of attribution and of acts that enabled the situation of violation. Such an approach would have captured justice as encapsulated in the preamble of the Charter, especially to the people of the SADR whose right to self-determination has been impeded for many years. Morocco might not have been a party to the case, but the evidence of the violations has long been a matter of judicial notice. In its finding in *Mornah*, the Court passed by an opportunity to contribute to the liberation of the SADR and its people from Morocco's domination.
Based on the above analysis, it is my conclusion that the African Court is not barred from determining violations of human rights in claims related to sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. The Court should in *Mornah* have adopted a more proactive stance and should have placed less 'timorous' reliance on the black letter of the law, which the judgments of the Commission has been criticised for.<fnref n="56" /> It is my firm view that the right to self-determination is a right that urgently needs to be made accessible in view of the state of agitation in various parts of Africa. The Court spoke from two sides of its mouth on the matter. On the one hand, it noted that the right was being infringed. On the other hand, it refused to accept that the actions of the respondents in welcoming into the community of African states a state at odds with their core common precepts could be interpreted as enabling violations by that state.

How did the fact that the respondent states voted in favour of Morocco not reflect their acceptance of the country's already condemned adverse occupation of the territories of the SADR? How did the Court not see a causal link between the respondents' votes (of confidence in Morocco) and the continuing exploitation of the natural resources of SADR by Morocco? Above all, how are the respondents demonstrating their adherence to the African Charter, which exhorters them in its preamble 'to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa and to promote international cooperation'?<fnref n="57" /> In spite of the heavy weather it made, dismissing the various objections to its jurisdiction, the Court's decision appears at the end of the day, to be an exercise in futility.

Hopefully, the views canvassed in this case discussion may redirect the Court with regards to its interpretative role concerning the objectives of the African Charter. In addition to the upbeat views of Okafor and Dzah, referred to above, such roles have been attributed to the African human rights system as evidenced in the views expressed by Solomon Dersso, a former Chairperson of the Commission, on the occasion of the Charter's 40 years of existence in 2021.<fnref n="58" /> He identified the primacy of 'piercing the veil of sovereignty' as the main achievement of the Charter through developing the African human rights system. According to him,

in embracing human rights and extending their scope and articulation, the African Charter ended the debate about the legitimacy of human rights in Africa. This is of particular importance as the African Charter opens further avenues for the recognition and articulation of human rights both at the continental and national levels. The Charter inspired the adoption of various human rights and democracy and governance norms within the OAU and its successor, the AU. This also accounts for the huge space given to human rights in the AU's founding treaty, the Constitutive Act. The

<footnote n="56">56 See sources cited in n 17 above.</footnote>

<footnote n="57">57 Para 3 of preamble, African Charter.</footnote>

<footnote n="58">58 S Dersso 'Forty years of the African Charter and the reform issues facing the discourse and practice of human rights' (2021) 21 *African Human Rights Law Journal* 649-668, http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2021/v21n2a26645 (accessed 15 June 2024).</footnote>
African Charter and the various other human rights instruments that succeeded it served as a source of inspiration in the elaboration of national bills of rights and various laws giving effect to specific human rights.<fnref n="59" />

The above statement communicates the need for a broader approach, rather than a restrictive one, in the Court's interpretation of the Charter rights. One of the recurring challenges in the African human rights system is the lack of state compliance. My view is that it may well be this state of affairs that accounted for the Court stepping back on holding the respondents partly responsible, thus enabling Morocco's violations against the SADR. In other words, the apprehension that the respondents would have ignored the judgment with impunity, could well have played a role in the Court arriving at the decisions it made.

Besides, this writer has noted that the demarcation of the Court's powers, relative to the other organs of the AU, is often blurred, thus chipping away at the claim to being the supranational court on human rights in Africa. The respondents relied heavily on this weakness to dare the Court to accuse them of wrongful acts enabling rights violation. This writer is of the view, further, that to liberate itself from impending obscurity, the Court must, without fear or favour, stand its ground by delivering judgments that clarify and grow its autonomous jurisprudence.

The African Court possesses unique characteristics which it must take advantage of, going by the view of Nyman-Metcalf and Papageorgiou,<fnref n="60" /> who state that in comparison with other regional courts of human rights, the African human rights system

emphasises the collective rights of peoples as well as those of individuals and it is the strongest on developing *actio popularis* to permit groups to support protection of human rights.

More individuals and CSOs like the applicant in the present case, ought to be encouraged to approach the Court on similar matters of public interest. It is bad enough that article 34(6) of the Court Protocol allows member states to opt in and opt out of the Court's jurisdiction at will. This exerts a huge restraint on seizing the Court's jurisdiction. To further burden the system with lacklustre and unconvincing reasoning portends badly for the development of the Court's jurisprudence. In fact, Trésor Makunya describes the effect of article 34(6) of the Protocol as a 'haemorrhagic trend' which if allowed to continue, would result in loss of opportunities for individuals 'to effectively engage the Court and that the ability of the latter to serve as a regional arbitrator of human rights violations will be significantly undermined'.<fnref n="61" />

<footnote n="59">59 Dersso (n 58) 654.</footnote>

<footnote n="60">60 K Nyman-Metcalf & I Papageorgiou 'Why should we obey you? Enhancing implementation of rulings by regional courts' (2017) 1 *African Human Rights Yearbook* 167-190 http://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2017/v1n1a9 (accessed 14 June 2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="61">61 TM Makunya 'Decisions of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights during 2020: trends and lessons' (2021) 21 *African Human Rights Law Journal* 1230, 1235.</footnote>
In addition, Makunya reviewed several cases in his article, and found that the Court has shown little rigour in the pronouncements it has been making. For instance, in respect of the XYZ (010) case against Benin, he criticised the Court for arriving at the conclusion that article 22(1) of the Charter was breached based on a 'single sentence-paragraph'.<fnref n="62" /> According to him, if the Court had consulted the jurisprudence of the Commission, its reasoning would have been strengthened by placing reliance on precedents such as the following:<fnref n="63" />

In *Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Democratic Republic of Congo* the Commission considered that the right to development under article 22 of the African Charter was both an individual and a collective right. In *Endorois* it held that the right to development was 'both constitutive and instrumental, or useful as both a means and an end'.

Conscious of its role in the promotion of human rights in Africa, the African Court has reached out on several occasions, to seek the collaboration of stakeholders to contribute to improving the impact of its judgments on the continent. It is in that spirit that this case discussion calls on the Court to pay attention to these reviews. The Court must aim to prove itself as a supranational body which parties may resort to for refuge against violations of rights. Africa is badly in need of an even-handed arbiter to strengthen the integration and development of members of the AU. It goes without saying that a perpetual state of conflict between states will not augur well for meaningful development.

A strong recommendation was made in the communique that came out of the Conference of the African Court in November 2021,<fnref n="64" /> namely, for an amendment to the Court Protocol to remove article 34(6), so that access to the Court would no longer be impeded at the will of state parties. It is a small gain that the Court, as already stated above, can continue to hear cases already before it, even if a state withdrew its article 34(6) declaration. Of course, the removal of the restriction will no doubt result in an influx of cases to the Court. The AU may then have to consider amending the Court's enabling instruments to increase the number of judges; and possibly, convert the tenure of judges from part time to full time, as has happened with its European counterpart. Considerations of the resulting increase in funding need not be overwhelming if member states begin to demonstrate the political will to achieve the Charter objectives. Besides, the amicable settlement option in the Protocol, if activated, should be useful in dealing with the increased load on the Court.

Whatever the anticipated difficulties, that amendment must now be seen as a *sine qua non* for the development of human rights in Africa. One must not, however, ignore the positive recorded fact that in

<footnote n="62">62 Makunya (n 61) 1262.</footnote>

<footnote n="63">63 Makunya (n 61) 1262 (footnotes omitted).</footnote>

<footnote n="64">64 African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, 'Implementation and Impact of Decisions of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: Challenges and Prospects', held at Julius Nyerere Convention Centre, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, 1-3 November 2021.</footnote>
*Mornah* two states requested to join in a matter in the interest of the public, albeit one (the SADR) with a very direct interest. However, the intervention of Mauritius was altruistic. Mauritius's intervention is in line with both the principles of the Charter and other settled international customary law that make the question of the right to self-determination the concern of all states. One hopes that with similar interventions human rights in Africa will continue to develop with the attendant benefit of developments in other areas of governance. The AU should be wary in the face of ongoing skirmishes all over the world, not least of which is the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian war, to be alert to such eventualities between its members.
L'arrêt Ligue ivoirienne des droits de l'homme (LIDHO) et autres c. Côte d'Ivoire: une mutation complexe du contentieux environnemental Trafigura

Koffi Arnaud Kpla*

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5318-7900

**RÉSUMÉ:** Dans l'intérêt des victimes des déchets toxiques déversés dans la ville d'Abidjan et sa banlieue en 2006, trois organisations non-gouvernementales demandent en 2016 à la Cour de dire et juger que la République de Côte d'Ivoire est responsable de certaines violations des droits de l'homme. L'arrêt rendu par la Cour intervient en 2023, sept longues années après le dépôt de la requête conjointe de ces organisations. Dans ses conclusions, la Cour dit que la République de Côte d'Ivoire a violé le droit à la vie, le droit à un recours effectif, le droit de jouir du meilleur état de santé physique et mentale possible, le droit à un environnement satisfaisant et global, propice au développement, et le droit à l'information, tous protégés par la Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples. La Cour répond ainsi à la question centrale posée par les requérants, celle ayant trait à l'invocation de la responsabilité étatique de l'Etat de Côte d'Ivoire pour sa négligence aussi bien dans la réalisation du dommage environnemental que dans la gestion des fonds alloués aux réparations. Mais il convient d'affirmer que derrière cette question de responsabilité étatique se cache la problématique de la responsabilité des entreprises, en matière de droits de l'homme, pour les mêmes faits d'atteinte à l'environnement. En effet, le déversement des déchets toxiques à Abidjan et sa banlieue avait connu, en dehors de celle de l'Etat, une très forte implication de quelques entreprises dont Trafigura, véritable cheffe d'orchestre. Le présent commentaire plaide pour l'édiction des normes permettant à la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples d'engager la responsabilité des entreprises. Ces normes, si elles existaient, auraient permis de sanctionner l'entreprise Trafigura au même titre que l'Etat ivoirien, voire plus. Cela étant, l'article considère que le contentieux porté devant la Cour est en réalité un contentieux contre les entreprises et l'Etat, indûment transformé (par les requérants et la Cour) en un contentieux contre l'Etat.

TITLE AND ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH

The LIDHO and others v Côte d'Ivoire Judgment: reframing the Trafigura environmental liability dispute

**ABSTRACT:** In 2016, three non-governmental organisations petitioned the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, seeking a ruling that the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire was responsible for human rights violations arising from the 2006 toxic waste dumping in Abidjan and its suburbs. The Court delivered its judgment in 2023, seven

<footnote>* Doctorant au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN, Université Paris Nanterre). Master en droit international public, 2017, Université de Strasbourg / Diplôme universitaire Clinique des droits de l'homme, 2018, Université de Strasbourg et Institut international des droits de l'homme/Fondation René Cassin; arnaudkkpla@gmail.com</footnote>
years after the petition was filed. It found that Côte d'Ivoire violated multiple rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, including the right to life, the right to an effective remedy, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right to a healthy environment, and the right to information. The Court addressed the central issue of whether Côte d'Ivoire should be held liable for both the environmental harm and the mismanagement of reparations funds. However, the case also implicates corporate accountability. The toxic waste dumping involved several entities, notably Trafigura, which played a key role. This commentary argues that international human rights law should be developed to enable the African Court to hold corporations accountable for human rights violations. Such standards would allow for Trafigura to be sanctioned alongside, or even more severely than, the Ivorian state. The article contends that the dispute before the Court should have been framed as one involving both the state and the corporations, rather than solely the state.

**MOTS-CLÉS:** Probo Koala ; Trafigura ; Etat ; entreprises ; environnement ; responsabilité ; déchets toxiques ; Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples

**SOMMAIRE:**

<table><tr><td>1</td><td>Introduction</td><td>524</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>Les interactions entre les procédures judiciaires internes et internationales</td><td>528</td></tr><tr><td>2.1</td><td>De l'assimilation des procédures internes aux procédures internationales</td><td>529</td></tr><tr><td>2.2</td><td>De l'existence d'une décision internationale préalable sur le fond</td><td>531</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>Les interactions entre les droits de l'homme et le droit de l'environnement</td><td>532</td></tr><tr><td>3.1</td><td>L'entité étatique: l'entière responsabilité</td><td>533</td></tr><tr><td>3.2</td><td>La responsabilité de l'entité privée: au stade de l'espoir</td><td>536</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>Conclusion</td><td>539</td></tr></table>

# 1 INTRODUCTION

Dans l'arrêt *Ligue ivoirienne des droits de l'homme (LIDHO) et autres c. République de Côte d'Ivoire* (ci-après l'arrêt), les juges se prononcèrent à l'encontre de la République de Côte d'Ivoire «à la majorité de dix (10) voix pour, et une (1) voix contre (...).»<fnref n="1" /> A l'occasion de cette longue affaire relative à l'atteinte à l'environnement et aux droits de l'homme, l'absence d'unanimité parmi les juges montre bien l'intérêt et la pertinence d'un débat doctrinal sur la responsabilité des entreprises en matière des droits de l'homme.

<footnote n="1">1 *Ligue ivoirienne des droits de l'homme (LIDHO) et autres c. Côte d'Ivoire*, Fond et réparations, 5 septembre 2023, Req. 041/2016, para 265, disponible sur https://www.african-court.org/cpmt/storage/app/uploads/public/64f/ebe/001/64febe001b94f995908074.pdf (consulté 14 septembre 2024).</footnote>
L'affaire est principalement marquée par l'intoxication, en août 2006, de populations victimes² du déversement de 528 m³ de déchets toxiques³ à Abidjan et banlieues. En provenance du port d'Amsterdam (Pays-Bas) via les ports de Paldiski (Estonie), de Lomé (Togo) et de Lagos (Nigéria) où l'on a observé des tentatives infructueuses de déversement,⁴ ces déchets avaient été transportés jusqu'à Abidjan par le navire vraquier *Probo Koala*.⁵ Ce dernier, battant pavillon panaméen,⁶ et appartenant au moment des faits à la compagnie grecque *Prime Marine Management*⁷ est affrété par l'entreprise suisse⁸ et néerlandaise⁹ *Trafigura*, laquelle dispose de son centre opérationnel à Londres (Royaume-Unis).¹⁰ Le déversement des déchets toxiques dans la capitale ivoirienne, suite à ce long parcours effectué par le *Probo Koala*, a lieu à partir du 19 août 2006, date d'arrivée du navire au port d'Abidjan. Ce déversement relève de

2. Selon les informations officielles, 17 personnes sont décédées après avoir inhalé les gaz toxiques. Des centaines de milliers d'autres ont été infectées du fait des gaz et de la contamination de la nappe phréatique. Le chiffre exact de personnes infectées est incertain, et varie selon les sources. Le Rapporteur Spécial de l'ONU sur les déchets toxiques avait de son côté annoncé un total de plus de 100.000 personnes intoxiquées ; voir Amnesty international et Greenpeace Pays Bas *Rapport à propos de Trafigura, du Probo Koala et du déversement de déchets toxiques en Côte d'Ivoire: une vérité toxique* (septembre 2012) 54 ; voir aussi FIDH, LIDHO, MIDH *Rapport sur l'affaire du 'Probo Koala' ou la catastrophe du déversement des déchets toxiques en Côte d'Ivoire* (avril 2011) 9.

3. Les déchets toxiques résultent du processus de 'lavage à la soude caustique', utilisé par *Trafigura* pour 'nettoyer' un produit pétrolier extrêmement sulfureux mais bon marché, le naphta de cokéfaction. Selon Amnesty international, *Trafigura* comptait mélanger le naphta de cokéfaction avec de l'essence puis le vendre à bas prix sur le marché ouest-africain dans l'optique de récolter un bénéfice de 7 millions de dollars par cargaison. Les déchets produits par le lavage à la soude caustique ont été entreposés dans les réservoirs de stockage des déchets du navire *Probo Koala*. *Trafigura* a voulu s'en débarrasser à Gibraltar, en Italie, à Malte, et en France. Aucun de ces États n'ayant la capacité de traiter ces déchets, la multinationale s'est dirigée vers les Pays-Bas. Elle a fait conduire le *Probo Koala* à Amsterdam, présentant les déchets comme des substances moins dangereuses. Un début de déchargement a lieu au port d'Amsterdam, lorsque des analyses approfondies effectuées par l'entreprise néerlandaise *Amsterdam Port Services (APS)* permettent d'évaluer la véritable charge polluante des déchets. *APS* hausse donc les prix du traitement spécial de ces déchets hautement toxiques. Jugeant le coût du traitement trop élevé, *Trafigura* choisit de faire décharger la cargaison du *Probo Koala*, à moindre coût, en dehors d'Amsterdam, cette fois en prenant la direction de l'Afrique de l'Ouest avec une escale en Estonie ; voir Amnesty (n 2) 11 ; voir aussi https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2016/04/trafigura-a-toxic-journey/ (consulté 14 septembre 2024).

4. Amnesty (n 2) 11.

5. M Bourrel 'La complaisance du droit face aux trafics illicites de déchets dangereux: l'affaire du Probo Koala' (2012) 1 *Revue Juridique de l'environnement* 25.

6. Bourrel (n 5).

7. Bourrel (n 5).

8. L'entreprise possède son siège social à Lucerne (Suisse) ; voir Bourrel (n 5).

9. L'entreprise possède son adresse fiscale à Amsterdam (Pays-Bays) ; voir Bourrel (n 5).

10. Bourrel (n 5).
l'initiative de *Trafigura*, grâce au soutien de sa filiale ivoirienne *Puma Energy CI* et de la société abidjanaise *Tommy*.<fnref n="11" /> *Tommy*, qui visiblement fut créée dans le seul but de ce déversement de déchets toxiques,<fnref n="12" /> a sous-traité les déchets à des camionneurs qui les ont ensuite librement déversés dans des endroits non adaptés de la capitale ivoirienne.<fnref n="13" /> Les premières plaintes des riverains, dues à l'odeur suffocante des déchets, ont immédiatement provoqué la réaction de l'administration ivoirienne. Le Centre ivoirien anti-pollution conduit une première enquête soldée par une injonction de bloquer le *Probo Koala* aux fins d'enquêtes supplémentaires.<fnref n="14" /> Malgré cette injonction, les autorités portuaires laissent partir le vraquier du port d'Abidjan le 22 août 2006.<fnref n="15" /> Le *Probo Koala* sera bloqué un mois plus tard au port de Paldiski par des militants de l'ONG *Greenpeace*<fnref n="16" /> et par une décision du Procureur estonien à la demande du ministère ivoirien de l'environnement.<fnref n="17" />

Dans l'intervalle, l'Etat ivoirien crée une commission interministérielle, une commission nationale et une commission internationale d'enquête<fnref n="18" /> qui adoptent à l'encontre de certaines autorités quelques mesures administratives disciplinaires. En outre, la police ivoirienne procède à l'arrestation de deux hauts dirigeants de *Trafigura* et un dirigeant de *Puma Energy CI*.<fnref n="19" /> Toutefois la conclusion d'un protocole d'accord cinq mois plus tard, entre *Trafigura* et l'Etat ivoirien, change la donne. Comme l'exigent les termes du protocole d'accord, *Trafigura* verse la somme de 95 milliards de francs cfa à l'Etat de Côte d'Ivoire, pour indemniser les victimes et mener les opérations de dépollution. Réciproquement, l'Etat de Côte d'Ivoire libère les trois cadres de la multinationale qui quittent aussitôt le territoire ivoirien.<fnref n="20" /> Dans la foulée, ce qui peut sembler paradoxal, le Tribunal d'Abidjan-Plateau condamne le gérant de *Tommy* et un agent maritime de la société *WAIBS* impliqué dans l'affaire, respectivement à

<footnote n="11">11 Bourrel (n 5).</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 C'est ce que constate la Cour à la page 5 de l'arrêt, npb 7 ; la compagnie *Tommy* est enregistrée le 12 juillet 2006 en Côte d'Ivoire. Un mois plus tard, un agent maritime de la société *West African international Business Services (WAIBS)* présente *Tommy* au Directeur de *Puma Energy CI*. Aussitôt, *Tommy* est chargée par *Trafigura* de décharger les déchets à Abidjan, avant même l'arrivée du *Probo Koala* en Côte d'Ivoire. C'est donc *Tommy* qui engage les conducteurs de camions à déverser les déchets sur les différents sites d'Abidjan ; voir Amnesty (n 2) 12 ; voir aussi FIDH (n 2) 9.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13 Près d'une dizaine de sites, à forte densité de population, sont concernés par le déversement. Le site principal de déversement des déchets est la décharge d'Akouédo située dans la ville d'Abidjan.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 Amnesty (n 2) 12.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 Amnesty (n 2) 12.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 Amnesty (n 2) 12.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 FIDH (n 2) 11.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 Amnesty (n 2) 12.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 Amnesty (n 2) 12.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">20 Amnesty (n 2) 13.</footnote>
20 et 5 ans de détention.<fnref n="21" /> Plus tard en juin 2007 le gouvernement ivoirien commence la distribution des indemnisations aux victimes.<fnref n="22" />

Toutes ces manœuvres politiques et judiciaires traduisent une
apparente réaction de l'Etat ivoirien, mais contestée par les victimes, ce
qui entraîne de longues années de procédures judiciaires tant en Côte
d'Ivoire qu'en Europe, à l'encontre de *Trafigura* et l'Etat ivoirien.<fnref n="23" /> De
tels événements reflètent la complexité et la spécificité de ce
contentieux porté devant la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des
peuples (la Cour) par la LIDHO, la FIDH et le MIDH (les ONG
requérantes) dans l'intérêt public des victimes des déchets toxiques.
D'abord ce contentieux soulève la problématique des droits collectifs
d'un groupe d'individus dans le système particulier africain de
protection des droits de l'homme.<fnref n="24" /> Ensuite, il traite de la
responsabilité de protéger les droits de l'homme, laquelle en matière de
protection de l'environnement suscite des réflexions sur la manière
dont la Cour pourrait appréhender, outre les Etats, les entreprises
responsables. Enfin, le contentieux implique une multitude de
personnes physiques et morales, toutes relevant de la compétence
d'Etats différents, parfois en dehors du continent africain.

Dans la requête introductive d'instance, les ONG requérantes<fnref n="25" /> allèguent la violation du droit à un recours effectif et le droit de demander réparation du préjudice subi, du droit au respect de la vie et à l'intégrité physique et morale de la personne, du droit de jouir d'un meilleur état de santé physique et mentale, du droit des peuples à un environnement satisfaisant et global, propice à leur développement, et des droits protégés par la Convention africaine sur la conservation de la nature et des ressources naturelles de 1968, révisée en 2003 (la Convention d'Alger).<fnref n="26" /> Elles demandent, en outre, à la Cour d'ordonner

<footnote n="21">21 Amnesty (n 2) 13.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 Amnesty (n 2) 13.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23 Voir ci-dessous, partie 2.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">24 Le système africain de protection des droits de l'homme est à l'égard des groupes d'individus un système très particulier et inédit. Outre la recherche active de l'intérêt collectif régulièrement prônée par la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples et la Commission du même nom (ci-après la Commission), le système africain accorde une importance particulière aux notions sœurs de population, communauté et peuple, en étendant parfois son action à la 'collectivisation des droits individuels'; Lire ainsi avec intérêt M Marnet Les figurations du sujet 'peuple' dans la Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples: examen contextualiste d'une subjectivité collective (2022) Thèse de doctorat de droit public, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne 1-528; voir aussi L Paiola 'La jurisprudence de la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples relative aux droits des peuples' in G Le Floch (Dir.) La Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples (2023) 297-300.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">25 Dotées du statut d'observateur auprès de la Commission, ces ONG peuvent valablement saisir la Cour d'une requête directe au nom des victimes dans l'hypothèse d'une déclaration préalable de l'Etat mis en cause ; voir en sens art 34(6) du Protocole à la Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples, portant création d'une Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples; Comme la Cour a eu à le rappeler, le retrait de la déclaration par la Côte d'Ivoire le 29 avril 2020 n'a pas d'effet rétroactif sur la requête déposée en 2016, voir ainsi LIDHO (n 1) para 2.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">26 LIDHO (n 1) para 16.</footnote>
à l'Etat ivoirien de mettre en œuvre un certain nombre d'actions réparatrices.<fnref n="27" /> Toutes ces allégations sont réfutées par l'Etat défendeur, qui pour l'occasion demande à la Cour de se déclarer incompétente et de déclarer la requête irrecevable.<fnref n="28" /> La Cour, après avoir rejeté les exceptions d'incompétence et d'irrecevabilité,<fnref n="29" /> fait sienne la quasi-totalité des demandes des ONG requérantes.<fnref n="30" /> En conséquence, elle condamne l'Etat ivoirien à réparer le dommage causé aux victimes des déchets toxiques en Côte d'Ivoire.<fnref n="31" /> En agissant de la sorte, la Cour tranche en faveur d'une responsabilité principale de l'Etat en l'affaire, affichant ainsi sa position sur la problématique générale de la responsabilité partagée des entités privée et étatique dans le contentieux environnemental. Pourtant, l'avènement superflu de l'affaire aurait pu empêcher son règlement par la Cour; et pour cause, la particularité affichée par les interactions entre les procédures judiciaires internes et internationales (2). Les observations sur l'arrêt au fond concernent, quant à elles, les interactions entre les droits de l'homme et le droit de l'environnement (3).

## 2 LES INTERACTIONS ENTRE LES PROCÉDURES JUDICIAIRES INTERNES ET INTERNATIONALES

Il est vrai qu'en pratique, les commentaires de décisions de justice se focalisent sur le fond. Les éléments relatifs à la procédure se restreignent généralement à figurer dans les propos introductifs. Mais l'espèce étant jugée particulière, quelques observations importantes relatives à la procédure doivent être émises. En fait, vu l'origine externe du contentieux vis-à-vis de la Côte d'Ivoire, les victimes ont saisi certaines juridictions internes d'Etats européens (ci-après les juridictions étrangères) parallèlement aux actions judiciaires intentées en interne.<fnref n="32" />

Comme l'exigent les règles relatives à la recevabilité du litige devant la Cour de céans, celle-ci est tenue de veiller à ce que d'éventuelles circonstances entourant les procédures judiciaires internes à l'Etat défendeur ne l'empêchent pas de statuer au fond. Il appert que, dans le cas d'espèce, l'existence de procédures internationales – celles menées par les juridictions étrangères – est intervenue comme une difficulté supplémentaire que la Cour devait surmonter. Dans une analyse comparative de la procédure devant la Cour (cette procédure naissant

<footnote n="27">27 LIDHO (n 1) paras 21-22.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">28 LIDHO (n 1) para 23.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">29 LIDHO (n 1) paras 24-122.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">30 LIDHO (n 1) para 265.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">31 LIDHO (n 1) para 265.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">32 La chronologie des évènements exposée par le rapport d'Amnesty et *Greenpeace* montre que les juridictions néerlandaise, britannique et française ont été saisies en faveur des victimes des déchets toxiques en Côte d'Ivoire, aussi bien par *Greenpeace* que par la Coordination nationale des victimes des déchets toxiques de Côte d'Ivoire (CNVDT) entre 2009 et 2012.</footnote>
du fait de l'existence de procédures internes ivoiriennes) et des
procédures internationales susvisées, les honorables juges majoritaires
ont considéré que les procédures internationales ne constituent pas un
«règlement international de l'affaire».<fnref n="33" /> Notamment, ils s'alignent sur
la jurisprudence interprétative de la Cour concernant l'article 56(7) de
la Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples (la Charte). En
vertu de cette jurisprudence, la comparaison d'une procédure devant la
Cour avec une autre procédure internationale ne permet de qualifier la
seconde de «règlement» qu'à la réunion cumulative de trois conditions:
premièrement l'identité des parties, deuxièmement la similitude des
requêtes ou leur nature alternative, complémentaire ou consécutive.
Ces deux premières conditions relèvent de la question de l'assimilation
des procédures internes et internationales (2.1). Troisièmement, la
jurisprudence de la Cour impose la condition de l'existence d'une
décision internationale sur le fond (2.2).

## 2.1 De l'assimilation des procédures internes aux procédures internationales

Il n'y a pas de doute que le contentieux *Trafigura* présenté à la Cour est une affaire comportant des procédures internes et internationales vis-à-vis de la Côte d'Ivoire. En vertu du principe *ne bis in idem*, la Cour fut contrainte de s'assurer de la non-existence d'un «règlement international» préalable de l'affaire. C'est une démarche complexe que la Cour a tant bien que mal tenté de contourner en utilisant les trois critères jurisprudentiels suscités. En particulier, il est objectivement difficile de prétendre que les procédures internes (*mutatis mutandis* la procédure devant la Cour) et les procédures internationales préalables dans cette affaire du *Probo Koala* ne concernent pas le même et unique contentieux. A ce titre, l'analyse de la Cour peut être fortement relativisée.

En ce qui concerne l'identité des parties, la Cour estime qu'il n'est
nullement prouvé que les requérants de part et d'autre sont les mêmes.
S'agissant des défendeurs, elle affirme qu'en la présente affaire, le
défendeur est l'Etat ivoirien tandis que les défendeurs dans les
procédures devant les juridictions étrangères sont *Trafigura* et l'Etat
ivoirien. Pourtant, la jurisprudence de la Cour, mentionnée à bon
escient dans l'arrêt, aurait pu l'amener à émettre un avis contraire. Par
exemple, dans son propos formulé dans l'arrêt *Tike Mwambipile et
Equality Now c. Tanzanie*, la Cour avait affirmé que «l'identité des
parties dans différentes requêtes peut être considérée similaire dans la
mesure où elles visent toutes deux à protéger l'intérêt du public dans
son ensemble, plutôt que seulement des intérêts privés spécifiques».<fnref n="34" />
Il semble ici perceptible que les actions judiciaires concurrentes de la
Coordination nationale des victimes des déchets toxiques de Côte
d'Ivoire (CNVDT) et *Greenpeace* devant les juridictions étrangères, et

<footnote n="33">33 *LIDHO* (n 1) para 117.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 *Tike Mwambipile et Equality Now c. Tanzanie*, Compétence et recevabilité, 1er décembre 2022, Réq. 042/2020, para 50.</footnote>
l'action judiciaire collective des ONG requérantes devant la Cour, visent
les mêmes objectifs à savoir protéger l'intérêt des victimes de déchets
toxiques en Côte d'Ivoire. La Cour aurait pu, en outre, analyser
l'identité des défendeurs à l'aune de la condition tenant à la similitude
des requêtes ou à leur nature alternative, complémentaire ou
consécutive.

En effet, en ce qui concerne cette condition, il paraît clair que la
requête des ONG requérantes devant la Cour est complémentaire et
consécutive à celles de la CNVDT et de *Greenpeace* déposées devant les
juridictions étrangères.<fnref n="35" /> En exigeant que les défendeurs soient les
mêmes dans toutes les requêtes, la Cour fait une interprétation très,
voire trop, stricte de l'article 56(7) de la Charte. Car il est évident que si
les mécanismes de la Charte et du Protocole créant la Cour
permettaient une option de saisine de la Cour, d'une requête contre les
entreprises, les ONG requérantes l'auraient utilisée aussi bien à
l'encontre de la côte d'ivoire qu'à l'encontre de *Trafigura*.<fnref n="36" /> A cet effet,
la Cour aurait pu valablement constater que la différence entre les
défendeurs dans les différentes requêtes ne tient pas à la volonté des
requérants, mais aux mécanismes existants; qu'en conséquence, les
conditions tenant à l'identité des parties et à la similitude des requêtes
peuvent être remplies.

Guidée par son interprétation trop stricte de l'article 56(7) de la
Charte, la Cour s'est focalisée sur les procédures internes ivoiriennes,<fnref n="37" />
sans véritablement s'intéresser aux décisions rendues en France, au
Pays-Bas et au Royaume-Uni.<fnref n="38" /> Ce choix de ne pas assimiler les
procédures internes et internationales de l'affaire du *Probo Koala*
conduit logiquement la Cour à affirmer qu'il n'existait pas au préalable
une décision internationale sur le fond. Cette assertion de la Cour peut
elle-aussi être relativisée.

<footnote n="35">35 Dans *LIDHO* (n 1) para 115, la Cour elle-même note que la cause principale des requérants dans l'arrêt est relative au défaut de recours (...) en faveur des victimes. Or les recours en faveur des victimes ivoiriennes n'ont pas été observées uniquement par les juridictions ivoiriennes. Ils ont existé au Royaume-Uni et au Pays-Bas. Bien que les causes exactes des différentes requêtes dans l'ensemble ne soient pas les mêmes, la cause des requérants en l'espèce constate une continuité de celles des requérants devant les juridictions étrangères européennes, ce qui fonde d'ailleurs la complémentarité des requêtes, toutes soutenant la 'cause commune' des victimes des déchets toxiques en Côte d'Ivoire.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">36 Pour preuve, dans leur requête conjointe, les ONG requérantes indexent *Trafigura* en demandant la révision du Code pénal ivoirien pour y inclure la responsabilité pénale des personnes morales, voir *LIDHO* (n 1) para 22.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">37 *LIDHO* (n 1) paras 10-13.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">38 La seule mention à ces décisions intervient lorsque la Cour rappelle l'argument de la défense, dans l'examen préliminaire de la recevabilité; voir *LIDHO* (n 1) paras 109 et suivants.</footnote>
## 2.2 De l'existence d'une décision internationale préalable sur le fond

En ce qui concerne la condition tenant à l'existence préalable d'une décision internationale sur le fond, la Cour conclut, sans s'y étendre longuement, que les affaires portées devant les juridictions étrangères n'ont pas été conduites conformément aux principes de la Charte et des autres instruments pertinents visés à l'article 56(7) de la Charte.<fnref n="39" /> Il ressort de cette troisième condition que soit les procédures internationales doivent avoir été menées conformément aux principes de la Charte et des autres instruments pertinents visés à l'article 56(7) de la Charte, soit ces procédures doivent avoir rempli ces conditions, qu'en plus, elles entrent dans le sens de l'article 56(7). Cette deuxième hypothèse impliquerait de rechercher l'esprit du texte de l'article 56(7), tout au mieux son commentaire.<fnref n="40" />

S'il faut s'en tenir uniquement à la première hypothèse, il est effectivement défendable de dire que le contentieux porté devant la Cour fut «véritablement international»<fnref n="41" /> du fait de l'existence des procédures menées devant les juridictions étrangères. Les ONG requérantes, elles-mêmes, produisent en 2011 une documentation bien fournie qui tient compte de la chronologie du contentieux et qui met un point d'orgue sur le règlement [en tout ou partie] de l'affaire par les juridictions française, néerlandaise et britannique. Ces décisions rendues par les juridictions étrangères présentent deux facettes: d'une part elles ont été rendues dans un ordre interne étatique, d'autre part elles sont internationales par rapport à la Côte d'Ivoire. S'il est clair qu'elles ne peuvent pas servir pour l'analyse de l'épuisement des voies de recours internes,<fnref n="42" /> il est en revanche possible de raisonnablement affirmer que ces décisions constituent un règlement international de l'affaire. Cette interprétation semble tenable si l'on se réfère à la «théorie des effets»<fnref n="43" /> ou encore à «la compétence universelle» des Etats. Ici, l'exigence d'une décision par une [quasi] juridiction purement internationale (créée par les soins de deux ou plusieurs Etats) n'est pas absolue. De plus, les investigations menées par la

<footnote n="39">39 LIDHO (n 1) para 116.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">40 A cet égard, F Ouguergouz 'Article 56' in M Kamto (dir) *La Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples et le Protocole y relatif portant création de la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples: commentaire article par article* (2011) 1044: 'Cette condition est formulée de manière plus satisfaisante [...] dans la mesure où elle ne fait pas de référence au règlement par des "Etats" [...], ce qui paraît logique dans le cadre d'une procédure concernant un Etat et une entité non-étatique'.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">41 LIDHO (opinion dissidente du juge Blaise Tchikaya) para 7.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">42 La règle de l'épuisement des voies de recours internes ne concernant que les recours au sein de l'Etat défendeur, voir A K Diop 'La règle de l'épuisement des voies de recours internes devant les juridictions internationales: le cas de la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples' (2021) 62 *Les cahiers de droit* 8-35.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">43 F Marrella 'Protection internationale des droits de l'homme et activités des sociétés transnationales' (2017) 385 *Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit international de la Haye* 104.</footnote>
Commission *Hulshof* et par le Rapporteur spécial des Nations unies sur les effets des déchets toxiques<sup>44</sup> peuvent par analogie soutenir l'interprétation selon laquelle l'affaire internationalement réglée l'a été «conformément aux buts et principes des Nations Unies».

La seconde hypothèse, qui peut sembler plus *droits-de-l'hommiste*,<sup>45</sup> rencontre favorablement la position de la Cour. S'il faut s'en tenir à cette hypothèse, il est impossible que la Cour tienne compte des décisions rendues par les juridictions étrangères comme entrant dans le sens de l'article 56(7) de la Charte, même si ces décisions ont été prises conformément aux buts et aux principes des Nations unies. On en vient à imaginer que les victimes des déchets toxiques saisissent la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme d'une requête contre les Pays-Bas. Théoriquement, cette Cour peut statuer sur l'affaire au fond, nonobstant l'existence des décisions ivoiriennes qui alors paraîtraient comme «internationales». C'est également ce qu'aurait pu conclure un Comité onusien s'il avait été saisi par les victimes. De ce point de vue, les décisions rendues par les juridictions dites étrangères ne relèvent que du droit international des faits. Pour ces raisons, la lecture que la Cour donne de l'article 56(7) de la Charte, en exigeant une décision au fond d'un organe [quasi] juridictionnel purement international, paraît justifiée.

Cependant, dans l'ensemble, les doutes quant à la recevabilité de la requête demeurent pertinents puisqu'il existe de motifs sérieux d'affirmer que les deux premières conditions jurisprudentielles confirmant l'existence d'un règlement international préalable de l'affaire peuvent être remplies. Devant dire le droit applicable, la Cour a fait le choix de raisonner autrement, en arrivant à un jugement sur le fond de l'affaire, faisant ainsi interagir les droits de l'homme et le droit de l'environnement.

## 3 LES INTERACTIONS ENTRE LES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET LE DROIT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT

L'arrêt au fond permet de mesurer l'ampleur de la complexité du contentieux *Trafigura* porté devant la Cour, dans la mesure où ce contentieux soulève des réflexions aussi bien sur les droits de l'homme que sur le droit de l'environnement. Principalement, la Cour est-elle juge des droits de l'homme ou juge du droit de l'environnement? Les instruments prévoyant la création et le fonctionnement de la Cour sont bien précis: bien que compétente pour se prononcer sur la violation du droit à un environnement sain, la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples est une juridiction de protection des droits de l'homme. Le droit à un environnement sain, lui-même, fait partie des droits de

<footnote n="44">44 Amnesty (n 2) 41 et suivants ; FIDH (n 2) 6 et suivants ; la Cour utilise d'ailleurs ce rapport dans le fond de l'arrêt.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">45 Du néologisme 'droits-de-l'hommisme' inventé par A Pellet. La vocation *pro victima* de la Cour sied effectivement avec cette hypothèse droits-de-l'hommiste.</footnote>
l'homme. Mais on ne peut nier que dans le cadre du contentieux environnemental *Trafigura*, les droits de l'homme et le droit de l'environnement s'entremêlent. De sorte que, face au dommage environnemental intervenu du fait de l'implication de l'Etat et de l'entreprise, il importe de s'interroger sur l'entité que la Cour peut effectivement identifier comme responsable. L'arrêt révèle, à raison, que la responsabilité est entièrement celle de l'Etat (3.1). Il est toutefois souhaité que le processus actuel de responsabilisation des entreprises atteigne prochainement le résultat espéré de la hard law (3.2).

## 3.1 L'entité étatique: l'entière responsabilité

Même si l'on peut reprocher à la Cour d'avoir été sommaire<fnref n="46" /> sur l'implication effective de l'Etat ivoirien dans la commission matérielle du dommage environnemental, la responsabilité de l'Etat est évidemment établie. La mise en œuvre de la responsabilité étatique étant à la fois prévue par les droits de l'homme et le droit de l'environnement, la Cour avait en main toutes les cartes pour désigner l'Etat ivoirien responsable du dommage environnemental, surtout lorsque les faits de l'espèce le requièrent. Tout bien considéré, l'Etat de Côte d'Ivoire a manqué à son obligation de protéger, ensuite il s'est comporté en coauteur ou en complice du dommage, enfin il n'a pas été capable d'assurer la bonne répartition des sommes allouées aux réparations.

Relativement au manquement à l'obligation de protéger, le principe est bien établi, les États territoriaux ont la responsabilité de protéger leurs populations respectives des dommages graves à l'environnement.<fnref n="47" /> En l'espèce les autorités ivoiriennes n'ont pas été capables d'empêcher *Trafigura* et les autres entreprises de commettre le dommage. D'autant plus que la réalisation du dommage ne fut pas instantanée. Les entreprises avaient eu le temps de faire stationner le *Probo Koala* au port d'Abidjan, de faire décharger les déchets toxiques dans des camions, puis de faire circuler les camions dans la ville d'Abidjan jusqu'à ce qu'ils déversent les déchets dans plusieurs sites de la capitale. L'Etat, souverain, est censé disposer d'un contrôle sur son territoire;<fnref n="48" /> l'entité privée ne peut faire un tel déversement à son insu, d'où le manquement par la Côte d'Ivoire à sa responsabilité de protéger.

Il est donc difficile d'imaginer que les agents de l'Etat n'avaient pas connaissance de tout ce parcours. Dès lors, il est difficile de prétendre qu'ils n'y avaient pas participé, ou encore que le dommage ait été commis sans eux ou sans qu'ils ne le sachent. Ainsi à défaut de formuler

<footnote n="46">46 Le même reproche avait été formulé par Sarah Cassella pour qui les décisions de la Cour sont parfois 'peu développées', voir S Cassella 'L'apport de la jurisprudence de la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples au droit international général' in G Le Floch (n 24) 263.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">47 Marrella (n 43) 105-143.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">48 Certes, la Côte d'Ivoire est victime en 2006 d'une crise militaro-politique qui dure depuis 2002, mais la zone d'Abidjan où a eu lieu le déversement était sous contrôle étatique.</footnote>
la «thèse de la coaction»<fnref n="49" /> qui engage la responsabilité de l'Etat pour les faits commis par ses agents,<fnref n="50" /> on peut affirmer que l'Etat s'est montré complice du dommage. Le comportement des plus hautes autorités politiques ivoiriennes juste après le déversement des déchets (laisser partir le navire, réintégrer au sein du gouvernement les ministres préalablement renvoyés, conclure un protocole d'accord dont les dispositions excluent toute poursuite des responsables de *Trafigura*) est une preuve difficilement contestable de la complicité de l'Etat ivoirien. En droit international des droits de l'homme, la *doctrine de la complicate*<fnref n="51" /> prévoit que lorsqu'il y a acquiescement, tolérance ou collaboration de l'Etat dans les actes constituant la violation, la responsabilité de l'Etat peut être établie. Cette doctrine est soutenue par le système interaméricain des droits de l'homme qui à travers sa Cour pose la condition selon qu'«il est nécessaire que dans le cas concret il y ait acquiescement ou collaboration de l'Etat dans les circonstances de l'affaire».<fnref n="52" /> Bien plus:

> Lorsque l'Etat a connaissance d'actes imputables à une entreprise relevant de sa juridiction qui menacent ou violent les droits de l'homme, et qu'en retour il y a une violation soutenue et prolongée de ses obligations de garantie dans le cadre de ses actes, l'omission constitutive de la responsabilité indirecte prend la forme d'une tolérance et d'un acquiescement et devient donc observable au regard du devoir de respect.<fnref n="53" />

La Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples aurait pu dans l'arrêt *LIDHO* élaborer cette doctrine de la complicité, notamment en illustrant son propos<fnref n="54" /> et en présentant de façon plus détaillée les éléments constitutifs de l'obligation étatique de «diligence absolue» attendue. Sauf à dire vaguement que l'Etat défendeur a «autorisé le déversement des déchets avec l'implication de ses fonctionnaires»,<fnref n="55" /> la Cour n'a pas été davantage plus précise; ce qui est regrettable, toutefois n'écarte pas l'affirmation de la complicité évidente de l'État ivoirien dans la réalisation du dommage ayant causé des atteintes graves à l'environnement et à la santé des populations. L'arrêt relève que dès le 20 août 2006, au lendemain du déversement des déchets dans la capitale ivoirienne, des milliers de riverains ont afflué vers les centres de santé, manifestant des symptômes alarmants. Officiellement, 17 personnes sont décédées des suites d'inhalation de gaz toxiques. Des

<footnote n="49">49 Tchikaya (n 41) para 19.</footnote>

<footnote n="50">50 M Forteau, A Miron & A Pellet *Droit international public* (2022) 1082.</footnote>

<footnote n="51">51 RM Quintero 'L'encadrement supranational des puissances privées en droit interaméricain des droits de l'homme: l'extraterritorialité et l'efficacité horizontale du droit international des droits de l'homme' in J Andriantsimbazovina Puissances privées et droits de l'homme (2024) 148.</footnote>

<footnote n="52">52 Cour interaméricaine des droits de l'homme, *Yarce et autres c. Colombie*, exception préliminaire, fond, dommages-intérêts compensatoires, arrêt du 22 novembre 2016, série C, n° 325, para 180.</footnote>

<footnote n="53">53 Commission interaméricaine des droits de l'homme- Rapporteur spécial sur les droits économiques, sociaux, culturels et environnementaux (REDESCA) [Rapport sur les entreprises et les droits de l'homme: normes interaméricaines] 1er novembre 2019 para 79.</footnote>

<footnote n="54">54 Pour le constater, voir *LIDHO* (n 1) para 139.</footnote>

<footnote n="55">55 *LIDHO* (n 1) para 210.</footnote>
centaines de milliers d'autres ont été infectées et des experts environnementaux ont signalé une grave contamination de la nappe phréatique.<fnref n="56" /> Il semble que douze ans après leur déversement à Abidjan, les déchets continuaient à impacter la vie quotidienne des riverains les plus proches des sites pollués.<fnref n="57" /> En l'absence de mécanismes pouvant engager la responsabilité des entreprises en matière de droits de l'homme, la complicité de l'Etat ivoirien traduit de fait son entière responsabilité.

Au vu de ce qui précède, la Cour a valablement déclaré l'Etat de Côte d'Ivoire responsable pour avoir violé le droit à la vie, le droit à la santé et le droit à un environnement sain des victimes.

Enfin, il existe des motifs raisonnables<fnref n="58" /> de croire que l'Etat de Côte d'Ivoire a failli à son devoir de répartir équitablement les fonds en faveur des victimes. Ces manquements confortent l'idée d'une responsabilité effective attribuable à la Côte d'Ivoire en ce qui concerne les droits, en l'espèce connexes, au recours effectif et à l'information. Le programme d'indemnisation des victimes était assurément marqué par «un manque de transparence et d'information»,<fnref n="59" /> ce qui empêchait d'une certaine manière les victimes, particulièrement mal informées, d'user des recours adéquats. Le silence de l'Etat défendeur, sur ces points, est manifeste.<fnref n="60" /> Comme la Cour a maintes fois eu à la rappeler, pour être effectif, le recours doit être *a minima* disponible, efficace et satisfaisant.<fnref n="61" /> De fait, le faible champ d'appréciation des juridictions nationales ivoiriennes quant à la prise en compte exigée de toutes les victimes<fnref n="62" /> témoigne d'une violation indéniable du droit au recours effectif (et accessoirement à l'information) par l'Etat. C'est pourquoi en guise de réparation la Cour ordonne à l'Etat de répartir équitablement les fonds remis par *Trafigura* pour l'indemnisation des victimes,<fnref n="63" /> mieux, elle ordonne à l'Etat de prévoir des ressources additionnelles suffisantes à cet effet.<fnref n="64" />

Dans l'interaction des droits de l'homme et du droit de l'environnement, la Cour, seulement juge des droits de l'homme, ne peut en théorie statuer qu'en prenant en compte les normes africaines en vigueur en matière de droits de l'homme. Au demeurant, elle ne peut sur aucun fondement normatif agir *ultra petita* en engageant la responsabilité de l'entreprise. Elle ne peut non plus la contraindre à indemniser les victimes. Limitée par sa compétence d'attribution, celle

<footnote n="56">56 *LIDHO* (n 1) para 4.</footnote>

<footnote n="57">57 Cf un reportage vidéo de la chaîne nationale de télévision ivoirienne, disponible sur https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jELAVcLYhI&t=77s (consulté 15 septembre 2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="58">58 Voir *LIDHO* (n 1) paras 211-214.</footnote>

<footnote n="59">59 *LIDHO* (n 1) para 187.</footnote>

<footnote n="60">60 *LIDHO* (n 1) paras 149 et 189.</footnote>

<footnote n="61">61 *LIDHO* (n 1) para 153 ; *Diakité c. Mali*, (recevabilité et compétence) (28 septembre 2017), 2 RJCA 122, para 41 ; *Lohé Issa Konaté c. Burkina Faso*, (fond) (5 décembre 2014), 1 RJCA 324, para 41.</footnote>

<footnote n="62">62 *LIDHO* (n 1) para 157.</footnote>

<footnote n="63">63 *LIDHO* (n 1) para 265.</footnote>

<footnote n="64">64 *LIDHO* (n 1) para 265.</footnote>
d'engager la responsabilité des Etats, la Cour ne disposait donc d'aucun moyen pour engager la responsabilité de *Trafigura*. Cela étant, on peut reprocher aux juges majoritaires de n'avoir pas exigé que l'Etat ivoirien engage les moyens de droit interne de mise en œuvre de la responsabilité des personnes morales. Cela figurait pourtant au nombre des demandes des requérants.<fnref n="65" /> De cet unique point de vue, la décision de la Cour peut sembler inefficace puisqu'elle n'empêche pas que d'autres dommages environnementaux du même ordre se reproduisent en Côte d'Ivoire. Aussi la Cour a-t-elle manqué là l'occasion de faire naître une jurisprudence relative à l'obligation étatique africaine de prévoir une législation de mise en œuvre de la responsabilité des entreprises. Prévue par le Protocole de Malabo<fnref n="66" /> applicable sur le plan régional africain, mais non encore en vigueur, la responsabilité [pénale] des entreprises aurait déjà pu le cas échéant s'affirmer progressivement comme une «norme» étatique africaine. Ce manquement dégrade le rayonnement des dispositifs nationaux proclamant le droit à l'environnement sous l'influence des instruments régionaux.<fnref n="67" /> Pis, la décision de la Cour freine les espoirs au sujet de l'achèvement du mouvement de responsabilisation des entreprises,<fnref n="68" /> en tout cas en ce qui concerne les droits de l'homme.

## 3.2 La responsabilité de l'entité privée: au stade de l'espoir

Dans son opinion dissidente formulée en marge de l'arrêt, l'honorable juge Blaise Tchikaya appelle de ses vœux à l'affirmation effective de la responsabilité des puissances privées débitrices de la protection des droits de l'homme.<fnref n="69" /> *L'horizontalisation*,<fnref n="70" /> dérivée de la doctrine allemande de la *Drittwirkung* des droits fondamentaux,<fnref n="71" /> permet effectivement de faire naître à la charge des entreprises des obligations en matière environnementale et des droits de l'homme.

<footnote n="65">65 LIDHO (n 1) para 22.</footnote>

<footnote n="66">66 Protocole portant amendements au Protocole portant Statut de la Cour africaine de justice, des droits de l'homme et des peuples, art 46 C.</footnote>

<footnote n="67">67 Bien illustré par MA Mekouar 'Le droit à l'environnement dans le système régional africain de protection des droits humains' in L Robert (dir) *L'environnement et la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme* (2012) 160.</footnote>

<footnote n="68">68 Pour des aspects plus discutés et plus approfondis, voir H Savadogo *La responsabilité de l'entreprise transnationale en droit international: de la soft law à la hard law* (2024) Thèse de doctorat de droit public, Université de Genève, 1-421; voir aussi L Boisson de chazournes 'Changes in the balance of rights and obligations: towards investor responsabilization' in TE Ghadban, C-M Mazuy & A Senegacnik (dir.) *La protection des investissements étrangers: vers une réaffirmation de l'Etat?* (2018) 83-95.</footnote>

<footnote n="69">69 Tchikaya (n 41) paras 34-54.</footnote>

<footnote n="70">70 Tchikaya (n 41) paras 43-50; voir aussi MMM Salah 'Conclusions' in Andriantsimbazovina (n 51) 303: '(...)' un arbitrage juridictionnel est quelquefois rendu nécessaire en raison de ce que les droits fondamentaux peuvent également être mobilisés par les puissances privées à leur profit'.</footnote>

<footnote n="71">71 M-O Hamrouni 'La contribution des puissances privées à la protection des droits: approche théorique' in Andriantsimbazovina (n 51) 108.</footnote>
Malheureusement, en l'état actuel du droit, cette responsabilité des entreprises pour violation des droits de l'homme n'est que *lege ferenda*. L'arrêt rendu par la Cour le confirme. Le processus engagé de responsabilisation des entreprises, très vaste, mériterait cependant d'atteindre son achèvement.

La responsabilisation des entreprises est un sujet d'actualité important en droit international de l'environnement et des droits de l'homme.<fnref n="72" /> Les entreprises ont par ce fait l'obligation de se conformer au droit international et au droit interne.<fnref n="73" /> Il est davantage requis un principe de précaution qui demande aux entreprises «de prévenir et réduire les menaces graves pour l'environnement, la santé et la sécurité (...).»<fnref n="74" /> Son applicabilité aux contentieux similaires à l'affaire du *Probo Koala* est à l'avenir fortement souhaitée.

Les puissantes multinationales, ainsi contraintes, auront sûrement à mettre en œuvre des moyens solides de prévention des incidents causant des dommages graves à l'environnement et aux droits de l'homme. Pour l'instant, nombreuses d'entre elles se servent des règles des droits de l'homme «inhérentes à l'Etat» pour commettre des violations massives et graves des droits de l'homme en toute impunité. Dans le cas d'espèce, les éléments bien connus du contentieux montrent que, à l'origine, *Trafigura* avait été informée de la dangerosité de la soude caustique par le fournisseur américain *Univar*.<fnref n="75" /> Elle a ensuite acheté la soude caustique auprès de la société néerlandaise *WRT* qui a pris soin de lui indiquer les précautions à prendre pour éviter de nuire à l'environnement.<fnref n="76" /> La multinationale avait donc connaissance des risques potentiels du lavage et des déchets que ce lavage aurait pu produire. C'est ce que constate le Tribunal du district d'Amsterdam dans sa décision du 23 juillet 2010.<fnref n="77" /> Il aurait fallu que *Trafigura* procède au traitement spécial et adapté des déchets avant leur déversement. Abidjan ne disposant pas de structure adaptée à ce traitement spécial, *Trafigura* a manqué à son devoir de précaution en y déversant les déchets. En cela, la Commission nationale ivoirienne d'enquête avait identifié que *Tommy* était en incapacité technique de traiter les déchets et que la filiale ivoirienne de *Trafigura*, *Puma Energy CI*, avait conscience de cette incapacité.<fnref n="78" /> De manière implicite, la Cour a, au paragraphe 139 de l'arrêt, relevé cette incapacité de *Tommy* à traiter les produits concernés. Il relevait, d'ailleurs, du

<footnote n="72">72 E Decaux 'Présentation' in E Decaux (dir) *La responsabilité des entreprises multinationales en matière de droits de l'homme* (2010) 11.</footnote>

<footnote n="73">73 I Daugareilh & O Maurel 'Les droits de l'homme, socle de la responsabilité des entreprises' in Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme (CNCDH) *La responsabilité des entreprises en matière de droits de l'homme: nouveaux enjeux, nouveaux rôles* (2009) 143.</footnote>

<footnote n="74">74 Marrella (n 43) 234-235.</footnote>

<footnote n="75">75 Amnesty (n 2) 82.</footnote>

<footnote n="76">76 Amnesty (n 2) 82.</footnote>

<footnote n="77">77 Tribunal du district d'Amsterdam, *Affaire Trafigura Beheer BV*, 23 juillet 2010, Extraits de la traduction anglaise réalisée par Amnesty international, paras 8.3.3.12.</footnote>

<footnote n="78">78 Amnesty (n 2) 141. Il est de plus en plus admis que la responsabilité des entreprises mères puisse être engagée du fait des violations commises par leurs</footnote>
contrat de *Trafigura* avec la société *Tommy* que son objet consistait purement au déversement des déchets sans traitement préalable.<fnref n="79" /> Le constat est déplorable: l'attitude des entreprises affiche clairement une action de groupe,<fnref n="80" /> planifiée et organisée avant, pendant et après l'arrivée du *Probo Koala* à Abidjan. L'intention perfide et bien élaborée de *Trafigura* avait pour seul but la recherche du gain, contrevenant au bien-être des populations et à la nécessité de préserver l'environnement.

De plus, en concluant les termes du protocole d'accord avec l'Etat ivoirien, *Trafigura* a elle-même mis en œuvre le principe pollueur-payeur complémentaire au principe de précaution,<fnref n="81" /> dans une forme de réparation du préjudice «causé aux victimes et à l'Etat de Côte d'Ivoire».<fnref n="82" /> En conséquence l'entreprise a d'une certaine manière reconnu la responsabilité du collectif d'entreprises qu'elle mène.<fnref n="83" /> Compte tenu des circonstances, le contrat conclu entre *Trafigura* et *Tommy* a eu pour effets d'accorder aux parties des avantages économiques frauduleux logiquement inscrits dans les manœuvres frauduleuses effectuées depuis les Pays-Bas.<fnref n="84" /> Par ailleurs, habituellement l'auteur du dommage est celui qui le répare: «Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer».<fnref n="85" /> Inversement, si une personne répare un dommage, elle a causé ce dommage. *Trafigura* ayant réparé le dommage, ce fait constaté par la Cour,<fnref n="86" /> elle est véritablement l'auteure principale du dommage. La prépondérance de l'implication de *Trafigura* par rapport à l'Etat de Côte d'Ivoire, dans ce qui concerne la commission matérielle du dommage, est sans aucun

filiales, voir C Nicolas 'La responsabilité des société mères du fait de leurs filiales: éléments de droit positif et de droit prospectif (2009) 2 *Revue de la recherche juridique* 657-683'; voir aussi Y Queinnec, M-C Caillet 'Quels outils juridiques pour une régulation efficace des activités des sociétés transnationales?' *in* Daugareilh (dir) *Responsabilité de l'entreprise transnationale et globalisation de l'économie* (2010).

<footnote n="79">79 Amnesty (n 2) 141.</footnote>

<footnote n="80">80 C H Hermida *La notion d'action de groupe: étude de droit comparé* (2013) Thèse de doctorat de droit public, Université Paris Nanterre, 1-521.</footnote>

<footnote n="81">81 A De Raulin, G Saad 'Introduction' in A de Raulin, G Saad (dir.) *Droits fondamentaux et droit de l'environnement* (2010) 9 ; Les principes de précaution et pollueur-payeur font partie des principes directeurs de l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE) à laquelle font partie les Pays-Bas, la France et le Royaume-Uni, États 'd'accueil' de la multinationale *Trafigura*.</footnote>

<footnote n="82">82 LIDHO (n 1) paras 6 et 213.</footnote>

<footnote n="83">83 Tchikaya (n 41) para 38.</footnote>

<footnote n="84">84 Le Tribunal d'Amsterdam avait en 2010 reconnu *Trafigura* et le capitaine du *Probo Koala* 'coupables de complicité de livraisons de marchandises dont ils savaient qu'elles étaient dangereuses pour la santé des personnes et dont ils ont dissimulé la nature préjudiciable (...)' . A Abidjan, la Commission nationale d'enquête avait constaté que les deux hauts dirigeants de *Trafigura* 'ne pouvaient ignorer l'incapacité technique de la compagnie Tommy' à traiter les déchets. Amnesty international et Greenpeace ont identifié que des cadres de *Trafigura* avaient demandé à *Tommy* de falsifier sa facture (...), voir Amnesty (n 2) 83 et 132.</footnote>

<footnote n="85">85 Art 1382 (1240 nouveau) du code civil français.</footnote>

<footnote n="86">86 LIDHO (n 1) paras 6 et 213.</footnote>
doute établie. Seulement, il n'existe aucun mécanisme qui permette à la
Cour d'imputer les violations des droits de l'homme aux entreprises et
par lequel on tiendrait compte d'une quotité de responsabilité de
l'entreprise dans une éventuelle modulation de la responsabilité de
l'État défendeur, même si ce mécanisme est espéré:

Fait essentiel depuis dix ans, les entreprises reconnaissent désormais
largement la validité des normes internationales comme référentiel à leurs
activités: le débat entre volontaristes et normativistes semble
heureusement dépassé, et il importe de s'accorder sur quelques notions
essentielles qui permettront de circonscrire précisément le champ des
responsabilités respectives et concomitantes des Etats et des
entreprises.<fnref n="87" />

Si un tel mécanisme est fort souhaitable, la réticence des Etats et leur
complicité avec les entreprises risquent de maintenir l'état actuel du
droit au *statut quo*.

4 CONCLUSION

Reconnaissant certes les entreprises comme entités commettantes
principales du dommage environnemental, la Cour conçoit que «la
responsabilité des entreprises en matière de respect des droits de
l'homme est indépendante des capacités ou de la détermination des
États de remplir leur obligation de protéger les droits de l'homme».<fnref n="88" />
Pour l'instant, la responsabilité des entreprises en matière de droits de
l'homme est essentiellement de la *soft law*. Le processus de
responsabilisation des entreprises n'a malencontreuse-ment pas
encore abouti à les soumettre, par de la *hard law*, au respect des droits
de l'homme. Il aurait certainement pu, s'il existait, permettre à la Cour
d'envoyer un message fort aux entreprises, en refusant d'imputer
systématiquement leurs dommages environnementaux uniquement
aux Etats complices.

En définitive, même s'il ressort de l'arrêt que la République de Côte
d'Ivoire est seule tenue de réparer le dommage causé aux victimes, le
contentieux demeure celui qui, né en 2006, s'est produit à cause de
l'action commettante du dommage, principalement par *Trafigura* (y
compris toutes les entreprises impliquées), accessoirement par l'Etat
ivoirien.

<footnote n="87">87 Discours de Souhayr Belhassen, présidente de la FIDH au séminaire 'Entreprises et droits de l'homme' des 4 et 5 décembre 2008 à Paris ; Propos extraits de Daugareilh (n 73) 134.</footnote>

<footnote n="88">88 LIDHO (n 1) para 142 ; la Cour se réfère aux principes directeurs des Nations unies relatifs aux entreprises et aux droits de l'homme.</footnote>
Tanzania and the African Court spar over
the mandatory death penalty and hanging:
*Kambole v Attorney General (Tanzania*
Court of Appeal, 2022), Ally Rajabu v
Tanzania and fourteen other African Court
decisions*

Andrew Novak*

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7049-1015

**ABSTRACT:** In *Ally Rajabu v Tanzania*, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights in 2019 found that the mandatory imposition of the death penalty and hanging as a method of execution violate articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. In 2022, the Tanzania Court of Appeal in *Kambole v Attorney General* upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty, a shoddily reasoned decision that misinterpreted the doctrine of *res judicata* to find the constitutional claims to be barred. In the meantime, *Ally Rajabu* generated numerous follow-up complaints against Tanzania at the African Court. Although Tanzania in 2020 withdrew its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction over individual complaints submitted directly to the Court, cases filed by death row prisoners before that date continued to be heard. This case comment analyses both the *Kambole* decision by the Tanzanian Court of Appeal and the fourteen subsequent cases decided by the African Court, which all confirmed the holding in *Ally Rajabu* that the mandatory death penalty and hanging were Charter violations.

TITRE ET RÉSUMÉ EN FRANÇAIS

La Tanzanie face à la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples : divergence sur la peine de mort obligatoire et la méthode d'exécution par pendaison: *Kambole c. Procureur général* (Cour d'appel de Tanzanie, 2022), *Ally Rajabu c. Tanzanie* et quatorze autres décisions de la Cour africaine

RÉSUMÉ: Dans l'arrêt *Ally Rajabu c. Tanzanie* (2019), la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples a déclaré que l'imposition de la peine de mort obligatoire et la pendaison comme méthode d'exécution constituaient des violations des articles 4 et 5 de la Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples. Ces dispositions protègent respectivement le droit à la vie et l'intégrité physique et morale des individus. Toutefois, en 2022, la Cour d'appel de Tanzanie, dans l'affaire *Kambole c. Procureur général*, a confirmé la constitutionnalité de la peine de mort obligatoire en Tanzanie, s'appuyant sur une interprétation controversée de la doctrine de l'autorité de la chose jugée. Cette décision a exclu tout recours constitutionnel au motif que les revendications soulevées avaient déjà été traitées. Parallèlement, l'affaire *Ally Rajabu* a suscité une série de plaintes déposées contre la Tanzanie auprès de la Cour africaine. Bien que la Tanzanie ait, en 2020, retiré sa déclaration reconnaissant la compétence

<footnote>* BA (George Washington), MSc (SOAS), JD (Boston University), PhD (Middlesex); Instructional Associate Professor, Department of Criminology Law and Society, George Mason University; anovak2@gmu.edu</footnote>
de la Cour pour les requêtes individuelles, les affaires initiées avant cette date ont poursuivi leur cours. Parmi celles-ci, quatorze affaires impliquant des condamnés à mort ont confirmé la position de la Cour africaine, qui considère que la peine de mort obligatoire et la méthode d'exécution par pendaison sont incompatibles avec les principes fondamentaux de la Charte africaine. Ce commentaire examine les implications des décisions divergentes entre la Cour d'appel tanzanienne et la Cour africaine. Il analyse les fondements juridiques et institutionnels de ces arrêts, en mettant en lumière les défis posés par l'interprétation et la mise en œuvre des normes internationales des droits de l'homme dans le cadre des systèmes juridiques nationaux. Cette étude souligne également les tensions croissantes entre la souveraineté des États et leurs obligations internationales, tout en proposant des pistes pour harmoniser les approches juridiques afin de garantir une meilleure protection des droits humains en Afrique.

**KEY WORDS:** Tanzania; mandatory death penalty; hanging; African Charter; African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights; *Kambole v Attorney General*; Tanzania Court of Appeal

**CONTENT:**

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 541

2. The Tanzania Court of Appeal upholds the mandatory death penalty in *Kambole v Attorney General* (2022) .................................................................................. 544

3. The African Court's turn: fourteen Judgments against Tanzania on the mandatory death penalty and hanging .................................................................................. 546

4. Dissenting opinions by Justices Blaise Tchikaya and Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza: a minority view that the African Charter prohibits the death penalty .................................................................................................................. 550

5. Conclusion................................................................................................................................. 552

# 1 INTRODUCTION

Tanzania is a slippery target for advocates challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty. In 2019, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Court) ruled in *Ally Rajabu and Others v Tanzania* that the imposition of the mandatory death penalty violated the rights to life and human dignity at articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter).<fnref n="1" /> In that decision, the African Court additionally ruled that hanging as a method of execution violated article 5, a surprising holding that found hanging to be inherently degrading because it caused undue suffering.<fnref n="2" /> A residue of British colonial penal codes, the mandatory death penalty has been widely rejected by many national courts and regional tribunals owing to its arbitrary nature in sentencing all persons convicted of murder to death regardless of the circumstances of their offenses.<fnref n="3" /> In *Ally Rajabu*, the African Court's determination that the mandatory death penalty was inconsistent with the African Charter accorded with decisions of the Inter-American Commission on

<footnote n="1">1 *Ally Rajabu and Ors v Tanzania*, Application 7/2015, African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Judgment (28 November 2019); *Rajabu and others v Tanzania (merits and reparations)* (2019) 3 AfCLR 539.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 *Rajabu* (n 1) para 115.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3 A Novak *The global decline of the mandatory death penalty: constitutional jurisprudence and legislative reform in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean* (2014) 3-4.</footnote>
Human Rights and United Nations Human Rights Committee, which found automatic death sentences incompatible with other international human rights instruments.<fnref n="4" /> The decision in *Ally Rajabu* was the subject of an earlier case comment in the *African Human Rights Yearbook*.<fnref n="5" />

At first glance, Tanzania should be receptive to a challenge to the mandatory death penalty. In East Africa alone, the Supreme Courts of Kenya and Uganda and the Constitutional Court of Malawi had previously found the mandatory death penalty incompatible with their constitutions in coordinated challenges based on similar penal codes.<fnref n="6" /> In addition, Tanzania has a more modern constitutional framework than those countries. When the Union of Tanzania was formed in 1964, its Constitution did not originally contain a bill of rights. A bill of rights was added by a constitutional amendment enacted in 1985.<fnref n="7" /> For this reason, the Tanzanian Constitution, as amended, contains a more progressive right to life provision, without an explicit savings clause that allows for the death penalty. The Constitution provides simply that '[e]very person has the right to live and to the protection of his life by the society in accordance with law'.<fnref n="8" /> Yet, in 1993, the Tanzanian Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty *per se* in *Mbushuu v Republic*, finding that notwithstanding the expansive right to life provision, article 30 of the Tanzanian Constitution contains a broad limitations clause that allows the government to pass laws that promote or preserve 'the national interest in general'.<fnref n="9" /> Over the following three decades, this decision has been roundly criticised because its reasoning was circular, arguing that the existence of the death penalty was the justification for retaining it, and because the Court of Appeal read a right narrowly and a limitation broadly contrary to ordinary principles of constitutional interpretation.<fnref n="10" />

On 15 June 2022, the Tanzania Court of Appeal upheld the mandatory death penalty in *Kambole v Attorney General*.<fnref n="11" /> This decision cursorily dismissed the comparative jurisprudence from Kenya, Uganda, and Malawi, among other jurisdictions, and neglected

<footnote n="4">4 Thompson v Saint Vincent & the Grenadines Communication 806/1998, UNHR Committee, UN Doc CCPR/C/70/D/806/1998 (2000); Edwards v Bahamas case 12.067, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No 48/01, OEA/SerL/V/II.111, doc 20 (2000).</footnote>

<footnote n="5">5 A Novak, 'Hanging and the mandatory death penalty in Africa: the significance of Rajabu v Tanzania' (2021) 5 African Human Rights Yearbook 401-419.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 Kafantayeni v Attorney General [2007] MWHC 1 (Malawi); Attorney General v Kigula [2009] 2 EALR 1 (Uganda SC); Muruatetu v Republic (14 December 2017) Petitions 15/2015 and 16/2015 (Kenya SC).</footnote>

<footnote n="7">7 CM Peter 'Civil and political rights in Tanzania: the bill of rights of 1985' (1995) 22 African Review 45-72.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">8 Tanzania Constitution art 14.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 Tanzania Constitution art 30(2)(f); Mbushuu alias Dominic Mnyaroje and Kalai Sangula v Republic, Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, Criminal Appeal 142 of 1994; [1995] LRC 216.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 A Gaitan & B Kuschnik 'Tanzania's death penalty debate: an epilogue on Republic v Mbushuu' (2009) 9(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 459 at 474-75.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 *Kambole v Attorney General* [2022] TZCA 377 (15 June 2022).</footnote>
to interpret the Tanzanian Constitution consistently with the African
Charter. Rather, the decision relied exclusively on the faulty reasoning
of Mbushuu v Republic and misapplied the doctrine of res judicata to
find that the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty had been
previously determined to be in the national interest. This is true even
though Mbushuu was a challenge to the death penalty per se, not a
challenge to the mandatory nature of the death penalty, and therefore
was easily distinguishable from the appellants' arguments in Kambole.
The decision in Kambole was shoddily reasoned and ultimately
incompatible with Tanzania's international obligations.

Shortly after *Ally Rajabu* was decided, Tanzania ousted jurisdiction
of the African Court to hear individual complaints by withdrawing the
Declaration it had filed in terms of article 34(6) of the African Court
Protocol.<fnref n="12" /> Tanzania's withdrawal became effective on 22 November
2020, one year after it deposited notice of its intention to withdraw.<fnref n="13" />
However, the African Court may still hear complaints filed against
Tanzania before its withdrawal became effective, which included
numerous similar challenges to Tanzania's mandatory death penalty.
The African Court has repeatedly reinforced its decision in *Ally Rajabu*
in its follow-up jurisprudence. In fourteen separate decisions since *Ally
Rajabu* was decided, the Court confirmed violations of articles 4 and 5
of the African Charter for the mandatory nature of the death penalty
and hanging as a method of execution, respectively. These cases were
all brought by death row prisoners who received automatic death
sentences upon conviction for murder, although the facts and prayers
varied slightly.<fnref n="14" />

This case comment will briefly summarise these decisions,
emphasising the aspects that go beyond the African Court's decision in
*Ally Rajabu* and contribute to the Court's death penalty jurisprudence.
Several other applications against Tanzania alleging similar violations
remain pending. As a result of Tanzania's withdrawal from the
individual complaints mechanism, however, the significant line of
jurisprudence that the African Court has generated on this question in
respect of Tanzania is coming to an end. Hopefully, the African Court's

<footnote n="12">12 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (1998).</footnote>

<footnote n="13">13 V Mtavangu & A Mbilinyi 'Tanzania's "withdrawal" from the African Court and its effects on the enforcement of human rights' (2023) 1(2) *Journal of Contemporary African Legal Studies* 19-36.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 Amini Juma v Tanzania, Application 24/2016 (30 September 2021); Gozbert Henerico v Tanzania, Application 56/2016 (10 January 2022); Ghati Mwita v Tanzania, Application 12/2019 (1 December 2022); Marthine Christian Msuguri v Tanzania, Application 52/2016 (1 December 2022); Chrizant John v Tanzania, Application 49/2016 (7 November 2023); Makungu Misalaba v Tanzania, Application 33/2016 (7 November 2023); John Lazaro v Tanzania, Application 3/2016 (7 November 2023); Ibrahim Yusuf Calist Bonge & Ors v Tanzania, Application 36/2016 (4 December 2023); Kachukura Nshekanabo Kakobeka v Tanzania, Application 29/2016 (4 December 2023); Deogratius Nicholaus Jeshi v Tanzania, Application 17/2016 (13 February 2024); Croşpery Gabriel & Ernest Mutakyawa, Application 50/2016 (13 February 2024); Romward William v Tanzania, Application 30/2016 (13 February 2024); Nzigiymana Zabron v Tanzania, Application 51/2016 (4 June 2024); Dominick Damian v Tanzania, Application 48/2016 (4 June 2024).</footnote>
strong and repeated statements that the mandatory death penalty violates the African Charter will increase pressure on Tanzania to resolve the conflict between its domestic law and its international obligations.

## 2 THE TANZANIA COURT OF APPEAL UPHOLDS THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY IN KAMBOLE V ATTORNEY GENERAL (2022)

In *Kambole*, the appellants challenged the mandatory nature of the death penalty on several constitutional grounds including right to a fair trial in article 13(6)(a) of Tanzania's Constitution, non-discrimination in article 13(1), human dignity in article 12(2) and article 13(6)(d), freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in article 13(6)(e), and life in article 14.<fnref n="15" /> As these provisions suggest, the appellants' arguments against the mandatory death penalty included (a) that it is arbitrary since it does not distinguish between more serious and less serious murders, hence the grounds of non-discrimination and right to human dignity; (b) that it potentially over-punishes and does not accord with the worst of the worst, and therefore is inhuman and degrading; and (c) that it deprives death row inmates of a sentencing hearing to present mitigating evidence, which is a fair trial violation.

The respondents argued that the death penalty per se had been upheld previously in *Mbushuu*. The state's attorney argued that there was 'no line of distinction between challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty and challenging the mandatory imposition of the death penalty'.<fnref n="16" /> This line of argument was accepted by the lower court decision in *Kambole* in 2019, which found the constitutionality of the death penalty had been settled in *Mbushuu* and the challenge to the mandatory death penalty presented 'nothing new'.<fnref n="17" /> The High Court in that decision found the matter was *res judicata* since it had already been pleaded and affirmed by the Court of Appeal in *Mbushuu*, writing that the petitioners were 'at liberty to move the Court of Appeal through review if he strongly feels that Mbushuu's case was determined wrongly'.<fnref n="18" />

At the Court of Appeal, the appellants in *Kambole* insisted that a challenge to the mandatory death penalty was distinct from a challenge to the death penalty per se as in *Mbushuu*. The constitutional questions were different. The appellants also argued that Tanzania's bill of rights and international human rights instruments had evolved since 1993 on the permissibility of the mandatory death penalty.<fnref n="19" /> This included the

<footnote n="15">15 *Kambole* (CA) (n 10) at 5-6.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 *Kambole* (CA) (n 10) at 6.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 *Kambole v Attorney General*, [2019] TZHC 6 (18 July 2019), at 17.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 *Kambole* (HC) (n 13) at 17.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 *Kambole* (CA) (n 10) at 8-10.</footnote>
African Court's decision in *Ally Rajabu*, as well as Commonwealth jurisprudence from India, Uganda, Kenya, and Malawi, among others, which post dated *Mbushuu*. Placing special emphasis on the Ugandan Supreme Court's decision in *Attorney General v Kigula*, the appellants clarified that replacing a mandatory death penalty with a discretionary system was not tantamount to entirely striking down the death penalty. The Court of Appeal simply needed to replace 'shall' with 'may' in the Penal Code.<fnref n="20" />

In rejecting the appellants' contentions, the Court of Appeal used a strange avoidance strategy: it found that the challenge to the mandatory death penalty was *res judicata*. According to the Court, Tanzania's Code of Criminal Procedure was designed to bar repeated lawsuits on the same matter or claims that should have been raised in earlier litigation.<fnref n="21" /> The appellants objected that the purpose of *res judicata* and collateral estoppel was to prohibit the re-litigation of settled cases where the parties and issues were substantially similar, not to prevent a final court of appeal from revisiting precedents after thirty years had passed in a case of substantial public interest.<fnref n="22" />

The appellants were objectively correct on this point: the Court of Appeal misunderstood the doctrine of *res judicata* and did violence to its core purpose. According to one particularly authoritative text, the *Restatement (Second) of Judgments* (1982) published by the American Law Institute, even if the issues at stake in *Mbushuu* and *Kambole* were substantially similar, an exception to the rule of preclusion applies when '[t]he issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context'.<fnref n="23" /> An additional and even more liberal exception applies when the parties are entirely different. *In casu*, 'the issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon which it was based'.<fnref n="24" /> In this case, the Court of Appeal foreclosed the possibility of revisiting a much-maligned precedent in a case involving different parties and raising different issues, despite *three decades* of monumental legal changes in comparable common law jurisdictions and at international tribunals. And this, even though the issues at stake are among the most important individual rights including life and dignity.

<footnote n="20">20 *Kambole* (CA) (n 10) at 15.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">21 *Kambole* (CA) (n 10) at 28-29.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 *Kambole* (CA) (n 10) at 16.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">23 American Law Institute, *Restatement (Second) of Judgments* (1982), para 28(2). See also G Hazard 'Preclusion as to issues of law: the legal system's interest' (1984) 70 *Iowa Law Review* 81-94.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">24 American Law Institute, *Restatement (Second) of Judgments* (1982) para 29(7).</footnote>
The Court gives away the ballgame in a reference to another, unreported lower court decision: *Tete Mwamtenga Kafunja*.²⁵ In that case, Kafunja had raised the possibility that the mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional, and the lower court dismissed the argument based on *Mbushuu*. However, *Kafunja* was never appealed because the defendant in that case won at the lower court level on other grounds and was released after 18 years in prison for a murder he did not commit.²⁶ The Court of Appeal was essentially saying that *res judicata* should apply because of 'the fact that the counsel in that case was the same counsel ... in the present appeal'.²⁷ To state this in different words, the Court of Appeal found the claims in *Kambole res judicata* because the lawyer for Kambole failed to appeal an earlier decision that they could have used to bar the claims in *Kambole*. The implication here is astonishing: the Court found that the claims in *Kambole* were barred because of a case that the Court never decided but wished it had. To sum up, *Kambole* was an all-around judicial disaster. It does not withstand the most superficial scrutiny.

### 3 THE AFRICAN COURT'S TURN: FOURTEEN JUDGMENTS AGAINST TANZANIA ON THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY AND HANGING

Although the Tanzanian Court of Appeal upheld the mandatory death penalty, the African Court has repeatedly reinforced its decision in *Ally Rajabu* of finding the sentence a violation of the African Charter. Since *Ally Rajabu* was decided in 2019, the African Court has issued fourteen judgments confirming that the mandatory death penalty violates article 4 of the African Charter (right to life) and hanging as a method of execution violates article 5 (right to dignity). This does not include several additional decisions, some of which are cited below, in which the Court mentioned the *Ally Rajabu* holding in *dicta*. Of the fourteen decisions, most raise other claims as well, usually alleged violations of other components of the right to a fair trial. However, they all contain the core claims of *Ally Rajabu*: first, that the mandatory death penalty arbitrarily fails to separate the worst murders from the rest and denies defendants a sentencing hearing; and additionally, that hanging as a method of execution causes excessive pain, and, therefore, constitutes cruel and degrading punishment.

25

This decision is apparently unreported and cannot be found. See *Tete Mwamtenga Kafunja & 2 Ors v Republic*, CAT Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2005, cited in *Republic v Malimi Elisha*, Case 164/2015 (Tanzania High Court, 8 June 2020).

26

'Former death row inmate shares story of pain, horror and miracles' (9 October 2022) *Daily News*, https://dailynews.co.tz/former-death-row-inmate-shares-story-of-pain-horror-and-miracles.

27

*Kambole* (CA) (n 10) at 31.
One common approach in these decisions is the reliance on
international and comparative law, for the purpose of showing a
growing consensus to move away from the mandatory death penalty in
favor of a capital sentencing system with guided discretion. In *Amini
Juma v Tanzania*, the Court explained that the arbitrariness of the
mandatory death penalty and the denial of fair trial rights were
‘affirmed by relevant international case law,’ citing the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in cases from the Commonwealth
Caribbean.<fnref n="28" /> The Court went further to observe that ‘domestic courts in
some African countries have adopted the same interpretation in finding
the mandatory imposition of the death penalty arbitrary and in
violation of due process’, specifically quoting the Supreme Court of
Kenya at length.<fnref n="29" /> In a later case, *Chrizant John v Tanzania*, the
African Court made reference to the decisions and resolutions of the
United Nations Human Rights Committee and statements from the UN
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, and Arbitrary
Executions.<fnref n="30" /> The comparative aspects became more sophisticated
over time, going beyond a counting of heads of other jurisdictions. In a
2024 case, *Nzigiyimana Zabron v Tanzania*, the African Court cited
decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Constitutional
Courts of Malawi and South Africa, Supreme Court of Uganda, and
Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal to make comparative reference at
each stage of its analysis.<fnref n="31" />

Most of the discussions on the mandatory death penalty and
hanging in these fourteen cases were brief and nearly boilerplate copies
of each other. In several cases, the Court even raised the issues of
mandatory capital sentencing and hanging *sua sponte*. For instance, in
*Kachukura Nshekanabo Kakobeka v Tanzania*, the Court observed as
follows: ‘While the Applicant did not make any submissions on the right
to dignity, the Court notes from the record that the Applicant was
sentenced to death by hanging.’<fnref n="32" /> It, therefore, found a violation of
article 5 of the African Charter. This also occurred in *Deogratius
Nicholaus Jeshi v Tanzania*, where the applicant did not make any

<footnote n="28">28 *Amini Juma v Tanzania*, Application 24/2016, African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (30 September 2021) at 30, citing *Hughes v Queen*, [2002] UKPC 12 (appeal arising from Saint Lucia).</footnote>

<footnote n="29">29 *Amini Juma* (n 28) at 31, citing *Muruatetu v Republic*, Petitions 15/2015 and 16/2015, Kenya Supreme Court, 14 December 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">30 *Chrizant John v Tanzania*, Application 49/2016, African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (7 November 2023) para 129.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">31 *Nzigiyimana Zabron v Tanzania*, Application 51/2016, African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (4 June 2024) paras 138-142, citing, inter alia, *Attorney General v Kigula*, [2009] 2 EALR 1 (Uganda SC); *State v Makwanyane*, 1995 (3) S.A. 391 (CC); *Mitcham v Director of Public Prosecutions*, Crim App Nos 10/2002, 11/2002, 12/2002 (3 November 2003) (E Carib Ct App); *Kafantayeni v Attorney General*, [2007] MWHC 1; *Boyce v Barbados*, Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C) No 1969 (20 November 2007). This analysis was substantially identical to another decision dated the same day and raising the same claims, *Dominick Damian v Tanzania*, Application 48/2016, African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (4 June 2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="32">32 *Kachukura Nshekanabo Kakobeka v Tanzania*, Application 29/2016, African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (4 December 2023) para 79.</footnote>
submissions on either the mandatory death penalty or hanging. Again, the Court found violations of articles 4 and 5.<fnref n="33" />

Occasionally in these decisions, the African Court elaborated on its reasoning. In *Romward William v Tanzania*, the Court reiterated that the mandatory death penalty was an arbitrary deprivation of life under article 4 but added an extensive analysis that sentencing a defendant to death without consideration of mitigating factors caused 'psychological and emotional distress which constitute[d] a violation of his right to dignity'.<fnref n="34" /> Even more importantly, the African Court extended *Ally Rajabu* to apply to prisoners who were originally sentenced to death but had their sentences subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. In *Nzigiyimana Zabron*, the Court rejected the state's contention that the commutation rectified the defect of the original mandatory death sentence. The Court explained that the problem with a mandatory death sentence was not the sentence itself but the lack of opportunity for a defendant to submit evidence in mitigation, which was not satisfied by a commutation to life.<fnref n="35" />

In the fourteen 'post-Rajabu' decisions finding violations against Tanzania, the African Court took care not to cast doubt on the lawfulness of the death penalty per se, but rather only collateral aspects of it. In *Ibrahim Yusuf Calist Bonge & Others v Tanzania*, the Court observed both 'global trends' and 'continent-wide developments' that have resulted in progressive abolition of the death penalty. The Court explained that the death penalty 'should, exceptionally, be reserved only for the most heinous of offences committed in seriously aggravating circumstances', but added that the circumstances in which the death penalty is appropriate 'must be left to domestic courts on a case-by-case basis'.<fnref n="36" /> This statement is consistent with the view that the death penalty is permissible currently in international law, but increasingly subject to constraint and with a view toward long-term abolition. Conceptually, this would not prevent the Court from taking a stronger position against the death penalty in a future case. Indeed, this line of jurisprudence contains nuggets that eventually could be useful in a frontal assault on the death penalty per se. One example is this statement tying together the human dignity arguments against the mandatory death penalty, hanging, and conditions of death row into a single analysis:<fnref n="37" />

The Court observes that the concept of human dignity is of profound significance in the realm of individual rights. It serves as an essential foundation upon which the edifice of human rights is constructed. The right to dignity captures the very essence of the inherent worth and value that resides within every individual, irrespective of their circumstances,

<footnote n="33">33 *Deogratius Nicholaus Jeshi v Tanzania*, Application 17/2016, African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (13 February 2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 *Romward William v Tanzania*, Application 30/2016, African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (13 February 2024).</footnote>

<footnote n="35">35 *Nzigiyimana Zabron* (n 31) paras 144-146.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">36 *Ibrahim Yusuf Calist Bonge & Ors v Tanzania*, Application 36/2016, African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (4 December 2023).</footnote>

<footnote n="37">37 *Romward William* (n 34) paras 69-71.</footnote>
background, or choices. At its core, it embodies and upholds the principle of respect for the intrinsic humanity of each person and forms the bedrock of what it means to be truly human. It is in this sense that Article 5 absolutely prohibits all forms of treatment that undermines the inherent dignity of an individual.

The Court recalls its judgment that the time spent awaiting execution can distress persons sentenced to death particularly when the duration is long. The Court emphasises that detention on death row is inherently inhuman and encroaches upon human dignity. This Court reiterates that the distress associated with detention awaiting execution of the death sentence stems from the natural fear of death and the uncertainty that a condemned prisoner has to live with. In such a case, States such as the Respondent are encouraged to determine appropriate sentences that remove the constant possibility of the enforcement of the death penalty for persons originally sentenced to death.

The Court notes, in the present case, that the situation is exacerbated by the fact that the Applicant was sentenced to death without consideration of mitigating circumstances including an alternative sentence, as the domestic court's discretion was removed by law, in contravention of the Charter. Given these circumstances, the Applicant invariably suffered psychological and emotional distress which constitutes a violation of his right to dignity.

This decision, in *Romward William*, is notable because it transforms *Ally Rajabu's* emphasis that the mandatory death penalty violated the right to a fair trial into an analysis centred on human dignity under article 5. This could be a signal for future death penalty challenges that dignity, even more than life, is foundational to the Court's reasoning.

Just as the African Court was careful to distinguish between a challenge to mandatory death penalty or hanging and death penalty per se, it also drew a line between the death penalty and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Court rejected the contention that life was tantamount to death. In *Makungu Misalaba v Tanzania*, the Court found a violation of the right to life and right to dignity due to the mandatory death sentence imposed on the Applicant and delays in executing the death penalty. However, the Court rejected the contention that the commutation of his sentence to life imprisonment without parole was also a violation of the African Charter on the same grounds, noting that nothing in Tanzanian law prevented him from receiving further commutations.38 According to the Court, 'the imposition of life imprisonment for the most serious offences, on its own, may not necessarily constitute inhuman or degrading treatment, especially where there is a possibility of parole'.39 The African Court is not closing the door here; hopefully, it will revisit the question of life imprisonment in the future as international legal developments evolve. For instance, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the

<footnote n="38">38 *Makungu Misalaba v Tanzania*, Application 33/2016, African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (7 November 2023) paras 156, 174-175.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">39 *Makungu Misalaba* (n 38) para 173.</footnote>