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# Challenges and implementation of CBRN sensor networks in urban areas

Walter Seböck[0000-0003-3468-401X], Bettina Biron [0000-0002-2903-1527] and Bettina Pospisil [0000-0002-8854-9764]

University of Continuing Education Krems, Dr. -Karl-Dorrek-Straße 30, 3500 Krems an der Donau, Austria

walter.seboeck@donau-uni.ac.at
bettina.biron@donau-uni.ac.at
bettina.pospisil@donau-uni.ac.at

**Summary.** The threat posed by chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents is considered greater than ever before. Technological advances offer new opportunities for prevention and decontamination in the fight against terrorism, but also pose new challenges for affected areas, companies, and forces. This article is based on the project "CBRN - City Sensor Network". The aim was to use stationary sensor networks to achieve early, automatic detection, identification, and protection against attacks with CBRN substances in public enclosed spaces with a focus on transport companies. In this paper, special attention is given to the challenges and factors that need to be considered when implementing sensor networks for emergency plans from a social science perspective. In doing so, processes and factors were defined to enable blue light organisations to limit damages faster, increase the safety of their own employees and improve the reconstruction of accidents. With a mix of methods, social science developed a phase model that depict the process of detecting and determining CBRN and extracted the challenges of implementation and deployment into a theme map.

**Keywords:** CBRN, Counterterrorism, Technology Implementation, Emergency Management

## 1 Introduction

The prospect of non-state actors, including terrorists and their supporters, gaining access to, and using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)/Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials is a serious threat to international peace and security. Over the years, terrorist groups have tested new ways and means to acquire and use more dangerous weapons to maximize damage and incite terror, including weapons incorporating CBRN materials. With advancements being made in technology and the expansion of legal and illegal
commercial channels, including on the dark web, some of these weapons have become con-
tinuously more accessible. In addition, the United Nation Office of Counter-Terrorism
(UNOCT) has observed an increasing frequency of terrorist attacks on so-called "soft
targets" such as urban centres [1, 2]. As much as the topic is increasingly coming into
the focus of security organisations, practical experiences of the emergency forces and
data situation, especially as far as accidents and terrorist attacks are concerned, are still
relatively manageable at present: the sarin attack on the Tokyo underground in 1995
and a similar incident in Matsumoto a year earlier were fortunately so far the only use
of nerve agents in a large-scale terrorist attack, some experiments with anthrax letters
(Antrax) in the USA also remained basically one of the few incidents of bioterrorism
that remains in the public perception [3]. The same applies to deliberate criminal use of
polonium-210 in the Litvinenko case [4].

Since it must be assumed, that attacks of this kind are likely to occur more fre-
quently, governments and international organisations have launched comprehensive
programmes in recent years to accelerate the development of effective counterstrate-
gies. For example, fifty heads of state and government from around the world took part
in a crisis simulation of a radiological terrorist attack as part of a nuclear security sum-
mit in 2016 [5]. In 2018, the UN Secretary-General launched the UN Global Counter-
Terrorism Coordination Compact, a coordination framework that synchronize 38 UN
agencies as well as INTERPOL and the World Customs Organisation. [6, 7]. National
programmes, for example the civil security research programme KIRAS and the defence
research programme FORTE in Austria, are also dedicated to this important topic with
funding programmes for security research. The aim of the project "CBRN - City Sensor
Network"<fnref n="1" />, on which this paper is based, was to minimize hazards from CBRN sub-
stances in public spaces, especially in traffic stations, by developing technical measures
for prevention, detection, and assessment, of the hazard potential and for intervention,
evacuation and recovery in CBRN situations. The primary focus was to find efficient
approaches to significantly increase the safety of both the emergency services and the
population in the event of threats from weapons of mass destruction and to develop and
refine the necessary processes and information technology resources (sensor networks,
visualisations) together with those responsible.

To address this challenge, scientific studies recommend not only increased aware-
ness in society, but also new approaches to faster hazard detection, training of

<footnote n="1">¹ The results of this article are based on the research project "CBRN City Sensor Network", which was funded within the framework of the security research programme KIRAS of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Regional Planning and Tourism in Austria.</footnote>
responders, and further development of existing equipment [8]. Technological tools can support employees at various stages of emergency management from gathering information to communication, decision-making and infrastructure survivability [9–12], there are several challenges emergency organizations face during the implementation of new technologies [13]. While literature suggests the implementation of technical systems, there is a lack of knowledge how to realize the recent processes for employees interacting with a new system.

Pennathur et al. [14] emphasize: "Often, decisions regarding the implementation of such technologies are made with limited foreknowledge of the degree to which such systems will alter existing work practices and impact work performance (negatively as well as positively)." Therefore, it is necessary to understand existing processes, activities, but also attitudes of potential users in order to include them in the technology development. Only in this way those functions, that are necessary for the users, can be optimally covered by the new technologies [14]. This is what makes them meaningful and increases their acceptance and useability [15]. Thus, literature highlights the importance of asking those persons, handling incidents, for their experiences and needs. The present research work is novel insofar, as it does not only ask technicians for the perfect possible solution, but asks those in operational processes for their experiences of how a technological solution would and could fit in. The main research question of the present paper is therefore, which challenges employees of mobility partners and strategic partners face in incident handling and where they see opportunities for technical support. Special consideration was given to the topic of a CBRN-city sensor network and how it could affect information flow, decision-making as well as existing manual and automated processes.

## 2 Challenges and approaches in urban areas

One of the main challenges for rapid and targeted countermeasures by the security authorities in the case of CBRN substances is the relatively lengthy process of detection and identification. More precise knowledge of the hazardous substance and its dispersion in the affected area, e.g., in underground stations, is often significantly delayed due to the lack of special detectors in an emergency. This is only possible after the arrival of emergency forces with special equipment. In the case of the attack in Tokyo, for example, it took hours to identify the chemical substance used, which led to a total of around 6,000 casualties and 13 deaths. [3]. A circumstance which, then as now, makes time one of the most important factors in countermeasures. Real-time measurement integrated into interdisciplinary response processes is therefore urgently needed to be able to support transport operators and emergency forces equipped with NBC protection measures in an efficient and targeted manner.
Reliable sensors or sensor networks for detection, identification, monitoring and preservation of evidence are considered key technologies before, during and after a CBRN incident [16]. Prior to a CBRN incident, detectors can be used for continuous monitoring to either prevent a CBRN incident (Detect-to-Protect) or to provide early warning in the event of an incident (Detect-to-Treat). During a CBRN incident, detectors are needed to determine the exact nature and extent of the CBRN agent. After a CBRN incident, detectors are essential for three main tasks: (i) to confirm the results of early identification, (ii) to collect evidence of the use of internationally prohibited substances (forensic aspects), (iii) to confirm that the area can be safely re-inhabited after decontamination. [3].

These are already used in the chemical and petrochemical industry to warn of dangerous concentrations of chemical substances. For example, the data from a fixed sensor network can be used to visualise and mathematically model a spreading gas cloud, which provides emergency services with important information, e.g., for planning evacuations. In addition, current research is increasingly addressing the challenges of CBRN threats in underground tunnels, for example, in order to be able to detect the ingress of water and explosions. [17].

## 2.1 Relevant technical concepts

In addition to operational sensor networks, this field is also advancing secure wireless data transmission, sensor data compression, and data interpolation and dispersion calculation. A good example is the wireless sensor network for monitoring the port of Brisbane in Australia, which can detect liquid gas, radioactive radiation, wind direction and speed, and dust concentrations, and is based on wireless communication modules. [18]. A similar approach to wireless data transmission is emerging from a combination of fixed and mobile sensors, specifically designed for monitoring the transport of dangerous goods over long distances. [19]

Another step against terror is the use of drones to safely detect clouds of poison gas, etc. Drone swarms - multiple unmanned systems capable of coordinating their actions to achieve common goals - have significant implications for the future of warfare, including enabling more effective CBRN countermeasures through prevention and detection. At the same time, many CBRN-related applications of drone swarm technology pose significant technical challenges even for sophisticated states, and even more so for non-state actors whose capabilities are far more limited, so there is considerable uncertainty about whether, to what extent and when drone swarm technology will complement, challenge or replace CBRN weapons. The main advantages are that both heavy and light gas scenarios can be covered, environmental models provide direct indications of potentially vulnerable regions, gas samples can be taken almost free of downwind and levitation effects, and contamination is actively countered [20].
Even though these approaches show very practical and implementable technological developments, challenges remain in monitoring transport infrastructure for potentially catastrophic, including terrorist, events involving chemical or nuclear agents. Due to the location of monitoring sites, as well as not least the maintenance intensity, costs and space requirements, concrete information for emergency forces in CBRN situations can often only be provided in a cumbersome manner in traffic stations. An essential factor of measures also concerns the implementation and communication of the emergency forces and their different emergency management [21].

Therefore, the core idea in the project "CBRN - City Sensor Network" was to link early warning systems with the deployment procedures of the emergency services and infrastructure providers to inform the emergency services as quickly as possible about the threat situation to increase their safety by selecting the appropriate equipment and to evacuate the affected civilian population effectively and quickly out of a possible danger zone.

# 3 Methodology

## 3.1 Technical approaches

Since the paper concentrates on the socio-scientific aspects, the technical implementation and test runs of the sensor technology will be briefly discussed at this point. Three identical sensor boxes were constructed, two of which were mounted in underground stations and the third used for laboratory tests. Each sensor box consists of several actively ventilated chemical sensors and one sensor for radioactive radiation.

The selection of gases to be detected was based on international lists of hazardous substances and threat analysis. Due to the required tests for commissioning and also tests in the underground area, only substances for which test gases were available were selected. Outside the laboratories in the public area, the choice for testing purposes fell on a non-toxic, odourless, non-explosive gas. For communication with the control system, LTE mobile modems were used which communicate in an encrypted and secured VPN (Virtual Private Network) due to the sensitivity of the sensor data. It was important to the person in charge to use real data for this simulation to establish the greatest possible reference to reality.

The chemical gas dispersion tests involved the vaporisation of a simulated warfare agent that had been deployed. The scientific closer examination of the dispersion of a gas and its effects on people and material in a closed system, such as an underground set and the underground system, was possible by means of air samples and their analysis and was recorded quantitatively.

Another requirement was the possibility of quantitative proof of the simulation agent using analytical methods to be able to describe the effects on people and material and
to determine air flows in the system of the underground and on train stations. The movement of the trains also contributes to the dynamics in the system. The strength and direction of the air flow depend on a variety of parameters, which is why there is still a need for further research in modelling the formation of different hazardous substances. One finding was that a sensor system on the platforms is sufficient to trigger a gas alarm. This information is sufficient for the emergency services to initiate appropriate evacuation measures and to enter the area only with appropriate safety equipment. The spatial and physical conditions are far too complex to automatically certify an area-wide decontamination. For the final clearance or all-clear, it is imperative that a specialist from the emergency services be present.

When positioning the sensor systems, it is also important to ensure that the largest possible air volume is monitored. Shielding by pillars, wall projections etc. should be avoided to increase the catchment area of the sensor system. During installation, it is also important to ensure that the air can flow freely in the vicinity of the sensor system or the intake points.

## 2.2 Social Science Methodology

It is important to survey the respective processes in the event of an incident and to obtain and evaluate assessments from the respective responsible organisations. For this reason, the social sciences partners in the project "CBRN City Sensor Network" conducted a qualitative data collection using guided expert interviews (Lamnek 2005). Ten experts of all relevant institutions in the Austrian field of mobility and all necessary operational organisations which are responsible from the CBRN emergency to the evacuation were interviewed between April 2019 and March 2020. The insights of procedures of the mobility partners "Österreichischen Bundesbahnen (ÖBB)" - the Austrian national train service - and "Wiener Linien (WL)" - the public transport service of the capital city of Vienna-, of the strategic partner Federal Ministry of the Interior for procedures of police and army in this context and experts for hazardous goods of the Vienna Fire Brigade were covered in this process. These persons were chosen due to their responsibility, knowledge and experiences in the coordination of the respective procedure and operational plan in the event of an incident in the transport companies (railway and underground). This made it possible to gain important insights into the respective steps and sequences, challenges and needs.

The results obtained were supported and deepened in the context of ongoing workshops with the experts and the project consortium, as well as with an open, non-participatory observation of the incident practice game testing the function and usability of the sensor boxes and procedures of the operation in railway stations and subways according to Lueger (2000).

In the context of the workshops the findings of the interviews were discussed and developed further. The aim of those workshops was, to incorporate different disciplines
and ask how the consortium could face the needs of those employees responsible for incident handling. Finally, all emergency organizations – police, fire brigade and rescue service – and mobility partners took part in an incident practice game, where the processes of a CBRN-incident as well as the interaction with a sensor-interface got trained. As a result, it was possible to see, where the organizations faced difficulties in working with a sensor-interface and where there was a need for further adaptations. The interviews as well as the workshops and the incident practice game where recorded, transcribed and finally interpreted by drawing on the context analysis of Mayring (2000).

Operational procedures are defined differently depending on the organisation (military, blue-light organisations, etc.). The most differentiated aspect exists in the military sector, in that every soldier is provided with personal NBC protective equipment and, depending on the degree of specialisation, corresponding tasks are assigned in the event of CBRN. Crisis teams are set up to deal with major incidents or catastrophes (support for the head of operations; coordination of emergency forces such as the fire brigade, rescue services, police, armed forces and third parties). Typical security control systems in military and civilian operations therefore focus on creating a common level of information. These are usually fed by their own reporting lines, automated status recording (resources, task forces, etc.) and externally supplied data. The exchange of information between security control systems is necessary as soon as several forces are involved in a crisis. (Federal Ministry of the Interior Austria 2022).

# 4 Results

## 4.1 Process of an operation in the context of a CBRN incident

In the following, the tasks regarding deployment and evacuation procedures as well as the development of an emergency plan will be discussed in more detail, as this is one of the most essential points in the introduction of new technologies. In the interviews and discussions with the stakeholders, the existing deployment and evacuation procedures and, among other things, the importance of emergency management in the participating companies were identified. The emergency management must grow with the experiences of the employees and the institution and should always be oriented towards the doctrine of uniformity. Because only an emergency management that is as comprehensible and uncomplicated to implement as possible is a good emergency management. Based on the knowledge acquired, it did not seem to make much sense to develop a completely new concept, as this would be a plan handed down to those concerned and not one that had emerged from practice. For this reason, and based on the existing plans, the focus was placed on possible adaptations of the emergency plans regarding CBRN situations.
Since the processing of a CBRN scenario involves working through an emergency in successive steps, a phase model was created to make the procedure clearer (see Figure 1). However, the linear procedure illustrated here is a simplified representation of the processes that take place. Due to the involvement of many different actors, they often work on different tasks at the same time, or the boundaries between the individual phases become increasingly blurred in practice. Furthermore, the diagram - like other incident diagrams - can be understood as a cycle. Thus, after each successful follow-up, there is again the possibility of an incident, which must always be expected. Nevertheless, the graphic representation helps both with an initial orientation for approaching the topic and with the theoretical representation of the individual phases.

<figure><img src="image_2.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1.** Process of a CBRN scenario</figcaption></figure>
The process diagram shows the need for decisions before the arrival of the emergency forces and thus for technical support at the beginning of the CBRN incident. The phase model clearly explains that currently, after detection, alerting and initial response, detection and determination is often not defined until the arrival of the emergency forces and from that point on the specific measures can be defined. This also proves the relevance of automated procedures in the detection of CBRN substances. An effective sensor network quickly detects the release of hazardous substances and transmits all information in real time to all forces involved. In this way

- first measures can be initiated immediately (e.g. evacuations),

- the emergency organisations are fully informed from the time of the alert, and

- the required equipment is already known at the time of deployment, which significantly increases safety.

In addition, it was possible to specify more precisely what role the demonstrator of a future technical system to be developed can take on in cooperation with specialised human personnel. Insights into current emergency management, for example regarding the delineation of areas of responsibility in terms of space, type of emergency and time, as well as existing communication and workflow processes, therefore, prove to be particularly relevant in similar research approaches. The direct connection to the information and control systems of infrastructure operators and security authorities to enable rapid alerting and display of all relevant information is another essential point for integrating a complex technical system and its usable data efficiently and practically into the already existing deployment and emergency management process. This sensor-based data fusion triggers predefined processes, this sensor-based early detection enables adapted initial measures (before the arrival of the emergency services). [24] These measures help the emergency services to move out quickly with the right equipment, protect people and improve the reconstruction of accidents.

## 4.2 Recognition, adaptation, connectivity and acceptance

In this way, topics can be formulated that the emergency services are confronted with to integrate a complex technical system or its action-guiding information into the existing operation and emergency management process in a meaningful way. Drawing on the interviews as well as discussions and observation, five areas are formulated here in which different challenges arise in dealing with a CBRN sensor.

Evaluated challenges and factors in implementing sensor networks for emergency plans:
<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 2: Representation of the challenges in the form of a theme map</figcaption></figure>

The five areas are: (1) the detection and appropriate response to CBRN incidents, (2) the adaptation of the sensor to the existing emergency management framework, (3) the connectivity of the sensor to people and situations, (4) the acceptance of the sensor by users, and (5) the further development of emergency management. The results of the present study prove that a technology development does not only have to meet technical standards and thus impressively demonstrate the necessity and importance of involving future technology users in complementary and critical areas of work to be able to integrate their experiences and points of criticism.

## Detect CBRN incidents and respond efficiently

In addition to sensitivity to the issue, it is also important to know that emergency plans have been developed and responsibilities have been clarified in detail. The challenge here is primarily to create the necessary awareness of CBRN situations among employees of the affected companies and the emergency services to be able to perceive the situation appropriately. Since CBRN substances are usually not visible, hazardous situations often only become recognisable through their effects. If a suspicion arises, the appropriate equipment is needed to detect and prove the presence of the hazardous substance. This challenge could be solved by a technical sensor that triggers an alarm when CBRN substances are detected. However, when this occurs, adequate and predefined measures are also needed for the correct handling of this additional information.

## Requirements for the technical sensor

A sensor as part of an emergency management system requires plannability, flexibility regarding different events, intuitive operability, and of course reliable results. To
be a player in emergency management, a technical sensor must fulfil certain framework conditions. For example, the tool should be oriented towards usability by users and the principles of consistency and flexibility. The sensor should not be considered as a single component, but as part of a system or a network and should adapt to the given framework conditions. This means, on the one hand, that the integration of a sensor into the application process should be regulated in advance in terms of plannability and, on the other hand, that the information provided by the sensor should be used flexibly.

## Connectivity

Regarding the overall operational workflow in CBRN events, one of the most important challenges is the necessary connectivity of a sensor to existing processes and information channels. This connectivity means, on the one hand, that the actors in a CBRN situation have different responsibilities that require different types of information. Accordingly, the target groups need to be differentiated and the sensor needs to be adapted to the needs of different responders, such as rescue or firefighters. In this way, each organisation would be able to access the information that helps it to fulfil its tasks and the complexity for the staff is not unnecessarily increased. On the other hand, connectivity means that the information provided by the sensor can be supplemented by additional observations. The sensor provides very meaningful information, but at the same time it is not all-encompassing. The sensor is limited to measuring quantitative key figures that can be interpreted in terms of substance, concentration, and dispersion. In an incident, however, much more information is collected in the phases of perception, reporting, assessment, and review of the situation. This qualitative information, which humans gather through observation, experience, or even gut feeling, is of great importance for situation assessment. For example, the sensor can detect a CBRN situation, but not whether it was brought about intentionally (e.g., terror) or unintentionally (e.g., accident).

## Acceptance of the technology

Even if there is awareness that CBRN incidents are a real danger, this does not automatically mean that the actors of the different organisations approve or accept a technical sensor for detection. This acceptance of the technical device is an essential prerequisite to ensure cooperation between humans and sensors. The different structures of the emergency services look back on different experiences, which, in combination with the organisational culture, influence their attitude and relationship to technologies. Scepticism about the benefits of a technology as well as fear of dependency or rationalisation through technologies are reasons for the rejection of new devices. For acceptance of new tools, especially in dangerous operations, it is necessary to find out employees' concerns, take them seriously and address them through training and education. Organisations can support staff in this by emphasising the high importance of
these devices for information gathering and thus encourage them in their tasks. Technical devices such as the CBRN sensor are thus a much-needed support for staff, not a substitute for them.

## Further development of emergency management

As a CBRN sensor leads to changes in the emergency process, its development should simultaneously address the further development of existing emergency plans, the training of staff and the clarification of framework conditions. Emergency management is largely oriented to the requirements of third parties (laws, standards) and can therefore only be designed to a certain extent. It consists of predefined essential elements but must be flexible enough to respond to the specific circumstances of an emergency. The basic tenor of the expert interviews was that emergency management must always be regulated in advance, as this is the only way to relieve the burden on individual employees in the field. For some actors, the early increase in information goes hand in hand with an increase in responsibility and necessity. Mobility partners are particularly affected by this. They need information on the most appropriate measures in such situations and further development of existing emergency plans for CBRN situations. When developing a sensor, the employees who will use the tool should always be considered. They are confronted with a new problem and new tasks that require sensitisation and training to respond appropriately. Furthermore, the handling of the CBRN sensor needs to be learned and practised. Finally, the integration of a new technical device requires the definition of legal framework conditions. Thus, already during the development, it should be considered who is responsible for the output of the sensor, the monitoring of the data, the financing and maintenance of the devices and possible false alarms.

It is crucial that the additional information is of low complexity and can be easily integrated into existing processes. For response organisations with CBRN competence (e.g., fire brigades' pollutant bases), on the other hand, a different depth of information is necessary to better understand the course, nature and spread of the incident and to be able to initiate measures. The third important perspective concerns the detailed technical evaluation of incidents, e.g., for forensic evaluations, for which detailed measurement data overviews are needed. Thus, by linking the individual sensor data, it is possible to find out from which source a measured value exceedance originated, how it spread and whether there is a danger for other locations, e.g., if a radioactive source is transported.
# 5 Conclusion

The present paper illustrates, that sensor-technology could ease and secure the job of emergency employees and those involved in incident handling. However, the developed model shows, that there are several aspects, that must be kept in mind, when thinking about implementing a technology in such complex and safety-relevant processes. From a social science perspective, technology development must fulfil far more requirements than the purely technical ones. One can conclude that the development of sensor-technology must consider the framework conditions of the current CBRN deployment processes and emergency management itself, as well as the connectivity for people and situations. Technological tools are no standalone actors, but solely offer a greater extend on information. It is the task of the emergency employee making sense of this information, incorporating it into the situation and linking it to their situational-awareness and knowledge arising from their yearlong experience. Thus, their acceptance of the new technological tool is crucial and a major component of the further development of emergency management.

A hazardous situation is always "exceptional" if the lack of knowledge, material or human resources requires central coordination to maintain the ability to cope. A particular challenge here is the separation of responsibilities and the multitude of preparedness plans to achieve congruence and optimal coping capacities with shared planning responsibilities. The diverse alliance between private companies, research institutions and (public) users provides a good basis for innovative and needs-based solutions. These remarks paint a clear picture of the need for permanent staff training to be able to use these assistive technologies competently and sensibly. At the interface between the technical system and the users or representatives of relevant stakeholders (human-machine interface), different socio-demographic as well as business needs can have a significant impact on the control, visualisation, and communication of information. In addition to the obvious disadvantage, one-sided usability also entails operational risks, as the system may not be operated optimally in difficult situations.

As a conclusion, and based on the presented findings, the following factors can be defined for successful counter-terror strategies around CBRN sensor networks - especially for transport companies:

- Cost-effective sensor technology for use in a dense, large-area CBRN sensor network.

- Robust integration and networking of sensors and IT systems.

- Connectable implementation Methods for computer-based situational awareness, decision support and information distribution.
- Sensor data fusion, preparation, and provision of initial information for the start of the crisis team's work, situation assessments and operational planning.

- Threat analysis and development of instructions for immediate action

- Adaptation of operational procedures and crisis management in case of emergency as well as for the rapid recovery of the affected area (decontamination) with safety in mind.

Overtaking the perspective of social sciences, the results of this study show once again that technology development must fulfil far more requirements than the purely technical ones. Using the example of a CBRN sensor, the interviews, and discussions with experts in incident handling showed, that there is potential for technological solutions, solely if these technologies follow certain aspects. One can conclude that the development of sensor-technology must consider the framework conditions of the current CBRN deployment processes and emergency management itself, as well as the connectivity for people and situations, the acceptance by users and the further development of emergency management. A hazardous situation is always "exceptional" if the lack of knowledge, material or human resources requires central coordination to maintain the ability to cope.

A particular challenge here is the separation of responsibilities and the multitude of preparedness plans to achieve congruence and optimal coping capacities with shared planning responsibilities.

The diverse alliance between private companies, research institutions and (public) users provides a good basis for innovative and needs-based solutions. These remarks paint a clear picture of the need for permanent staff training to be able to use these assistive technologies competently and sensibly.

At the interface between the technical system and the users or representatives of relevant stakeholders (human-machine interface), different socio-demographic as well as business needs can have a significant impact on the control, visualisation, and communication of information. In addition to the obvious disadvantage, one-sided usability also entails operational risks, as the system may not be operated optimally in difficult situations. Finally, insights gained from the study provide an ideal basis for e.g., the development of a prototype tool that would meet the requirements of the various stakeholders, be practical to implement or integrate into existing processes, and offer the hoped-for added value.

The highly integrative approach together with stakeholders created an enormous knowledge gain in the use of technology to improve stakeholder interaction in CBRN incidents. Through a broad and very in-depth involvement of relevant stakeholder groups, an optimal dispersion of knowledge in CBRN incidents in stakeholder organizations was created. Thus, the knowledge gained in CBRN processes and dispersion behavior of CBRN substances (especially CBRN specialists) can be incorporated into
follow-up projects or other CBRN settings, as well as being considered in trainings. Especially in the field of CBRN sensing there is still a considerable need for research to be able to achieve the sensitivity, specificity, flexibility, and form factor for the intended application. In this regard, the developed sensor box as well as the findings of the interdisciplinary test series can serve as a common research platform to explore further sensor solutions and conduct algorithmic research. In particular, the sensor network solution benefits from the creation of CBRN-specific forms of representation that may be relevant to stakeholders outside of the CBRN-CSN sensor network. Furthermore, it is possible to bring a similar perspective to the military domain, where Austria is a pioneer in the CBRN context regarding reconnaissance and surveillance.

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