# "Infoxicated" Feelings? How Affective Polarization and Misinformation Reinforce Each Other in the US and France

Mickael Temporão

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Mickael Temporão. "Infoxicated" Feelings? How Affective Polarization and Misinformation Reinforce Each Other in the US and France. French Politics, 2026, 10.1057/s41253-026-00314-w. halshs-05532502

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# “Infoxicated” Feelings? How Affective Polarization and Misinformation Reinforce Each Other in the US and France

Mickael Temporão<sup>a,b*</sup>

## Abstract

This review suggests that affective polarization and mis-/disinformation do not simply unfold side by side but often reinforce one another within a saturated information environment, forming what has been described as a polarization loop. We highlight research distinguishing affective from ideological polarization, alongside increasingly prominent concepts of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation. We argue that this interaction is exacerbated in “infoxicated” environments, characterized by information overload and the pervasive circulation of false, misleading, or ambiguous political content, which undermines citizens’ discernment. We then outline the main mechanisms that connect these phenomena, including social identity and in-group norms, cognitive biases amplified by emotion, incentives for elites and media, and platform designs that reward engagement. Using examples from the United States and France, we identify common psychological and technological dynamics playing out under different political conditions. In the United States, two-party competition and a highly partisan media ecosystem dominate, whereas France features multiparty dynamics withing a centre-periphery media structure. Three themes stand out: the influence of perceived in-group norms, the paradox that greater political sophistication can strengthen partisan-consistent belief, and the way online narratives translate into offline conflict. We conclude by discussing potential interventions. While cross-partisan contact, media literacy, and platform reforms may mitigate these dynamics, isolated measures are unlikely to be sufficient. Breaking the polarisation loop requires identity-aware communication strategies and adjustments to recommendation systems capable of reducing informational saturation and gradually rebuilding trust.

**Keywords:** Affective Polarization; Misinformation; Disinformation; Malinformation; Infoxication.

<footnote><sup>a</sup>Centre Émile Durkheim, 11 allée Ausone, 33600 Pessac, France</footnote>

<footnote><sup>b</sup>Sciences Po Bordeaux</footnote>

<footnote>* Corresponding author. Address: Centre Émile Durkheim, 11 allée Ausone, 33600 Pessac, France. Email: m.temporao@sciencespobordeaux.fr</footnote>
# Introduction

Over the past years, the World Economic Forum has consistently ranked misinformation, disinformation, and societal polarization among the most severe global risks (Elsner and Zahidi 2025). These dynamics are no longer merely theoretical but are actively influencing citizens’ dialogue and everyday conversations. They have become common in contemporary discourse, from friends questioning a viral post to family members reacting emotionally to political headlines. In academia, these such phenomena are often considered separately, potentially missing the bigger picture. However, existing evidence indicates that misinformation and affective polarization are mutually reinforcing.

The last ten years have been marked by growing divides, manifested in the rapid diffusion of misleading content and declining trust in established institutions. Some scholars characterize contemporary political communication as occurring within a “post-truth” environment, where facts seem to matter less than feelings or loyalty (Denniss and Lindberg 2025). We argue, however, that these dynamics reflect a deeper structural condition we term “infoxication,” understood as a state of cognitive and emotional saturation that not only overwhelms discernment but also actively fuels the polarization loop and renders citizens vulnerable to manipulative narratives. Unlike the notion of "post-truth," infoxication captures the specific mechanism by which information overload and affective drivers converge. This is evident in the contestation of the 2020 US election results and the proliferation of conspiratorial narratives in French politics, which have become defining features of political competition. This pattern signals an increasing divide in how citizens perceive one another and their shared political reality.

In an environment where truth itself is contested, the mechanisms by which false information propagates and gains acceptance become even more powerful. Such dynamics are evident not only in a highly candidate-centric two-party system, but also in more fragmented multiparty systems. For instance, in the United States, events such as the attack on the Capitol attack and the politicisation of COVID-19 illustrate how elite cues and disinformation can translate into identity-aligned hostility with institutional consequences. In France, the rising vote share of the *Rassemblement National* (RN) witnessed during 2017 and 2022 elections, and the 2024 snap dissolution show how a multiparty context can still evolve toward personalized antagonism and institutional strain, with digital media that seem to amplify divisions. In this context, affective polarization seems to grow, fuelled more by feelings than logic.
Consequently, addressing the interplay between these phenomena requires not only factual corrections but also a comprehensive insight into the function of emotions in political discourse.

This review is not intended to be exhaustive. It argues that the relationship between affective polarization and information disorders has received limited scholarly attention relative to the extensive research on each phenomenon in isolation. It explores the conceptual foundations, theoretical underpinnings, mechanisms of propagation, and consequences, with a focus on pieces of empirical evidence drawn from the United States and France. The concepts of misinformation, disinformation, malinformation and the new concept of infoxication are also introduced and explained. These concepts have gained traction in the last decade in the academic literature and beyond. By synthesising existing scholarship, this review seeks to shed light on the relationships between these phenomena, identify key areas for further investigation, and propose avenues forward.

The review is organized as follows. We begin by defining core concepts, distinguishing affective polarization from ideological disagreement, and differentiating misinformation, disinformation, malinformation according to intent and veracity, before sketching their social-political relevance. We then trace the main theoretical roots of affective polarization, from social identity dynamics and elite/institutional incentives to policy-based and socio-demographic drivers, and explain why falsehoods tend to stick by reviewing cognitive biases, emotional triggers, and the role of platform architectures and declining institutional trust. On that basis, we map the reciprocal feedback between polarization and (mis)information, and illustrate these mechanisms with targeted evidence from the United States and France. Next, we survey methods and measurement strategies, noting strengths and recurring pitfalls, and identify open questions and a comparative research agenda beyond two-party systems. We then assess what is known about interventions, from cross-partisan contact to media and algorithmic literacy and platform governance, as well as the conditions under which they appear to help. Finally, the implications for democratic resilience and the potential for maintaining a moderate polarization equilibrium are discussed.

## What Are Affective Polarization and Information Disorders?

Before examining the interplay between affective polarization and mis-/disinformation, we need to understand these concepts individually.
On the one hand, affective polarization may be defined as dislike, distrust, loathing, and, in some cases, hatred that individuals can feel towards out-groups (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). This phenomenon is distinct from ideological polarization, which primarily concerns disagreements over policy positions (Horne, Adams, and Gidron 2023). The core of affective polarization lies in people's *feelings* towards others, who do not belong to their group, commonly referred to as in-group. There is an individual identification to a group or community. More specifically, this concept aims to capture the animosity towards opposing political parties, that is, citizens with a different political identity (Iyengar et al. 2019).

The measurement of affective polarization commonly uses several approaches. The most common is the feeling thermometer, scaling questions that are widely used, asking respondents to rate their warmth or coldness towards political parties or leaders on a numerical scale (Horne, Adams, and Gidron 2023). Beyond direct emotional ratings, researchers also use social distance indicators, which measure individuals' willingness to engage in social interactions across party lines (Levendusky and Stecula 2021). Additionally, trait ratings are used, where respondents attribute negative characteristics such as hypocrisy, selfishness, or closed-mindedness to members of the out-group (Iyengar et al. 2019).

The manifestations and consequences of affective polarization extend beyond politics.

Researchers have observed increased social distance, leading citizens from different or opposing parties to be unwilling to date, befriend, engage in civic or economic cooperation, or even live near one another (Iyengar et al. 2019). Furthermore, evidence suggests that this animosity may lead to discrimination in hiring practices, for instance, in the job market (Gift and Gift 2015). More broadly, higher levels of affective polarization could be linked with democratic backsliding (Orhan 2022). When individuals perceive opposing parties not merely as rivals but as enemies, this mindset can lead voters to accept violations of democratic norms by their own party if it helps defeat their opponents (Gidengil, Stolle, and Bergeron-Boutin 2022). That can also contribute to a general erosion of social trust (Holliday, Lelkes, and Westwood 2024) and fosters political intolerance (Erdoğan and Uyan-Semerci 2025). The pervasive nature of affective polarization thus represents a significant threat to the stability and functionality of democratic systems. Such a pervasive influence suggests that affective polarization is not merely a symptom of political division but an active force capable of dismantling democratic norms and institutions, making its study vital for understanding political stability. These consequences are
observable empirically. In the US, the intense polarization surrounding the Kavanaugh Supreme Court confirmation hearings and the Dobbs decision overturning abortion rights transformed legal debates into conflicts between opposing moral worldviews. This fusion of partisanship and morality has entrenched distinct perceptions of reality and significantly eroded the legitimacy of judicial institutions (Cassady 2025). In France, repeated recourse to Article 49.3, a constitutional provision allowing the government to bypass a parliamentary vote, combined with the absence of a clear majority in the 2024 Parliament, turned procedural manoeuvres into sources of intense frustration. These dynamics fueled cross-bloc animosity and reinforced the perception that democratic norms were being ignored (Roussellier 2024).

On the other hand, misinformation and disinformation are frequently conflated in public discourse, but academic literature maintains a distinction based on intent. Misinformation is defined as false or inaccurate information that is spread without the deliberate intent to mislead or cause harm (Guess and Lyons 2020). It can be accidentally produced, often due to a lack of thorough fact-checking. In contrast, disinformation refers to false information that is deliberately created and disseminated with the explicit intent to deceive, mislead, or cause harm (Guess and Lyons 2020).

Another related concept, malinformation, involves the deliberate spread of truthful information but with the intent to cause harm, such as doxing (Carmi et al. 2020). While the term is sometimes conflated with other forms of information disorder, it is distinguished by the presence of malicious intent ("malintent") rather than the falsity of the content itself. This distinction has become common in the last decade, emphasizing how even accurate information can be weaponized to undermine individuals or institutions. The term fake news is also often conflated with both misinformation and disinformation. It is a subset of disinformation which has also been instrumentalized by political actors to discredit opponents (Pérez-Escolar, Lilleker, and Tapia-Frade 2023).

Finally, we introduce the concept of "infoxication." The term "infoxication" is used here as a portmanteau of "information" and "intoxication" to capture the cognitive and emotional saturation characteristic of the current media environment. It also echoes the term "infox," commonly used in Francophone contexts to refer to fake news. Unlike mere information overload, this concept highlights how the emotional intensity and velocity of content can overwhelm citizens' capacity for discernment, creating a fertile ground for affective polarization.
The impact of mis-/disinformation is pervasive and far-reaching. It had severe effects on political trust and public health, as seen in issues like vaccine hesitancy, or efforts to address climate change, and undermines the capacity to maintain stable democracies (Denniss and Lindberg 2025). Fundamentally, mis-/disinformation erodes trust in science, experts, elites, and politicians (Denniss and Lindberg 2025). This institutional cynicism is a critical concern, as it can lead to knowledge resistance and bias public opinion, making it exceedingly difficult to bridge gaps in arguments, solve societal issues, and uphold the legitimacy of democratic processes (Broda and Strömbäck 2024). The academic literature highlights that disinformation serves as a major attack on the integrity of knowledge itself, eroding the very notion of truth (Pérez-Escolar, Lilleker, and Tapia-Frade 2023).

This moves beyond simply false information to a deeper epistemological problem where objective and scientific knowledge is challenged by subjective assertions of truth, leading to fragmented understandings of reality. This implies that the impact of mis-/disinformation extends beyond individual beliefs to the very foundation of shared societal understanding, complicating collective problem-solving and democratic deliberation.

## Drivers of Affective Polarization

Understanding the origins and drivers of affective polarization requires examining different theoretical frameworks that take into account individual psychological processes and broader systemic factors.

## Social Identity Theory and Partisan Animosity

Social Identity Theory (SIT) offers a fundamental framework to grasp affective polarization. SIT posits that individuals derive a significant portion of their self-esteem from their membership in social groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Within politics, partisanship or party identification has progressively become a primary social identity marker for many citizens (Iyengar et al. 2019).

The theory outlines several key mechanisms through which this social identification contributes to partisan animosity. First, social categorisation involves people classifying themselves and others into groups, such as political parties, which simplifies the social world and provides a framework for understanding political dynamics (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Second, social identification occurs as individuals adopt the norms, values, and behaviours of their political group, leading to a strong
emotional attachment to their political identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979). This process can foster intense in-group identification, with partisans behaving in ways analogous to strong sporting allegiances, thereby increasing hostility towards political opponents (Mason 2018). Third, social comparison drives groups to compare themselves to others to maintain or enhance self-esteem, frequently resulting in in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination, where one's own political group is viewed as superior, and opposing groups are perceived negatively (Tajfel and Turner 1979).

A critical aspect of this framework is the role of in-group norm perception. Research indicates that affective polarization is deeply rooted in intergroup relations. Partisans' perception of their in-group's norm of negative attitudes toward the out-group is often exaggerated, and this perception strongly predicts their own polarization-related attitudes (You and Lee 2024). For instance, one study found that the variance explained by in-group norm perception in predicting affective polarization is

8.4 times greater than the variance explained by out-group meta-perception (how one perceives the out-group's negativity towards their own group) (You and Lee 2024). This observation is crucial because it suggests that an individual's negativity towards the out-group can largely emerge from dynamics within their own in-group itself, rather than being solely a response to the out-group's actual or perceived negativity (You and Lee 2024). This understanding about the internal reinforcement of out-group animosity implies that interventions solely focused on correcting misperceptions about the out-group might be less effective than those addressing in-group norms and social pressures. This has been observed in the United States, for example in episodes such as the Black Lives Matter/Blue Lives Matter cleavage and “Stop the Steal” mobilisation show identity alignment and norm enforcement within partisan communities that elevate out-group threat perceptions. In France, Islamophobic narratives after the 2015 terrorist attacks and the populist-elite divide forged during the Gilets Jaunes protests illustrate bottom-up identity consolidation beyond party lines.

## Elite Polarization and Institutional Factors

Beyond individual psychological processes, broader structural and institutional factors play a significant role in shaping affective polarization. Elite polarization refers to the divergence of political attitudes among political elites, including party organizers and elected officials. In polarized systems, political parties become internally cohesive, unified, and ideologically distinct (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz
2006; Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2012).

This elite-level polarization can operate as a top-down process, where the adoption of more ideologically distinct positions by political parties leads to, or at least precedes, polarization among the mass public. Political figures who strategically cater to more extreme factions within their party often achieve greater success, thereby pulling their constituency towards more extreme positions (Benkler, Faris, and Roberts 2018: 295–310). Partisan media outlets fuel this process, engaging in what scholars have termed outrage discourse, which promotes hostility and disdain for the opposing side (Garrett, Long, and Jeong 2019). Studies of the US media landscape reveal an asymmetry: right-wing media have become especially closed and internally echo-chambered, rewarding ideological similarity over factual accuracy (Hasell and Weeks 2016). This asymmetric ecosystem, right-leaning feedback loops as observed in recent US elections since 2016 and also during the pandemic, translate elite rhetoric into mass identity cues. In France, while overall audience polarization is lower, the ascent of CNews as a French Fox News illustrates how a partisan media niche can still exert disproportionate influence relative to its audience share, amplify fringe narratives (e.g., Zemmour’s 2022 campaign), and incentivize elites toward effectively mobilising themes.

Other institutional factors can also intensify hostility and division within a political system. Countries employing winner-take-all voting systems, for example, tend to exhibit higher levels of anger and hostility between parties (Horne, Adams, and Gidron 2023). Similarly, the politicisation of ethnic differences, where elections and representative processes are conducted along ethnic lines, is strongly associated with elevated levels of affective polarization (Bradley and Chauchard 2022).

These macro-level factors create an environment where individual-level psychological biases can flourish, amplifying societal divisions. This understanding of institutional structures as amplifiers of affective polarization moves beyond individual psychology to highlight the systemic conditions that enable or exacerbate this phenomenon. Addressing affective polarization may require not only behavioural interventions but also potentially fundamental institutional reforms to mitigate the structural incentives for division.

## Policy Disagreements and Socio-Demographic Drivers
Although identity-based accounts are influential, an alternative perspective warrants consideration. Some theories argue that affective polarization may also be driven by disagreements over policy, particularly when citizens interpret opposing policy programs as materially or morally threatening (Algara and Zur 2023). According to this take, the emotional divide between political sides might actually have more to do with reason than reflex. The argument is that hostility may arise not merely from perceived group differences, but from the belief that political opponents advocate policies that threaten one's interests or values. These suggest that there is some logic, however flawed or exaggerated, behind the dislike.

Nevertheless, this argument may be overstated. Often, citizens do not fully understand the relevant policy proposals in question, let alone the trade-offs involved. So while this alternative view offers an interesting counterpoint to identity-based explanations, the whole story could be more complex to understand.

Empirical evidence also points to several socio-demographic factors that contribute to hostility and division. For instance, income inequality and economic recession can exacerbate affective polarization (Horne, Adams, and Gidron 2023). The alignment of social and political identities further strengthens the tribal dynamic; in the US, for example, ethnic and sexual minorities predominantly favour Democrats, while white evangelicals tend to support Republicans (Pérez, Lee, and Luna 2025). Additionally, broader demographic and psychographic shifts, such as aging populations, have been observed to contribute to the growth of affective polarization (Goodwin et al. 2024).

Ultimately, affective polarization is driven by a convergence of rational policy disagreements and identity-based attachments. In the US, abortion policy after Dobbs became a zero-sum identity marker, with little movement in underlying attitudes but heightened moralized antagonism. In France, the pension reform and fuel-tax dispute (Gilets Jaunes) started as policy disagreements but quickly crystallized as class- and geography-coded conflicts with enduring affective content. Policy disagreements, while seemingly rational, can become deeply intertwined with identity markers, especially when social and political identities align. This means that even positions on critical issues can become emotionally charged and tribal, creating fertile ground for misinformation that frames these issues in “us vs. them” terms. This integrated view suggests that effective interventions must address
both the factual basis of policy debates and the underlying identity dynamics, rather than focusing solely
on one or the other.

Why Falsehoods Persist and Spread

The prevalence and persuasive power of mis-/disinformation can be attributed to a combination of
cognitive biases, the amplifying effects of digital platforms, and the erosion of trust in traditional
institutions.

Cognitive Biases and Psychological Vulnerabilities

Human cognitive processes play a significant role in the acceptance and spread of false information. A core mechanism is confirmation bias, which describes the innate human propensity to favour, interpret, and remember information that confirms pre-existing beliefs and expectations, while actively counter-arguing or dismissing conflicting information (Broda and Strömbäck 2024). This bias is a primary driver of both the consumption and dissemination of misinformation (French, Storey, and Wallace 2025). In the United States, incidents such as post-election fraud claims and pandemic conspiracies show large-scale familiarity and confirmation bias, with recurring signals in partisan networks reinforcing acceptance and sharing of false or unverified claims.

Another contributing factor is the familiarity bias, often leading to an illusion of truth. Repeated
exposure to information, even if false, increases its perceived believability (Hassan and Barber 2021).
Social media platforms may foster a dynamic in which repeated exposure is misinterpreted as credibility,
inadvertently exploiting this cognitive shortcut. In France, vaccine-related misinformation on
Telegram/YouTube and cross-platform redirection during the COVID-19 pandemic exploited
availability and emotional salience to cement pro- and anti-vaccine camps (Nogara et al. 2024;
Skarzauskiene et al. 2025). Similarly, availability bias suggests that people tend to believe information
that is easiest to recall, which explains why sensational or emotionally charged stories can spread rapidly
and gain traction (Vandeberg et al. 2022).

Beyond these biases, motivated reasoning is another powerful mechanism. Individuals are not always
driven by an intrinsic motivation for accuracy. Instead, they can be influenced by directional goals, that
is a desire to arrive at a preferred conclusion that aligns with their values or identity (Broda and
Strömbäck 2024). This can lead to biased processing and evaluation of information, particularly when strong pre-existing attachments to a political party are present (Jerit and Zhao 2020).

Other psychological vulnerabilities contribute to susceptibility. Emotional engagement can also be an important factor. When people experience emotions such as fear, anger, resentment, or anxiety, the likelihood of the content being forwarded rises substantially, thus widening its reach (Zhou and Shen 2024). Misinformation often uses emotionally charged language specifically crafted to trigger deep-felt responses (Zhou and Shen 2024). Moreover, reduced cognitive reflection, that is the tendency to pause and consider before accepting information, and a reflexive open-mindedness, that is an inclination to be intrigued by unsubstantiated claims, are all linked to a higher propensity to believe misinformation (Zhu and Pechmann 2025). This reduced cognitive reflection is a hallmark of infoxication, where the speed of information processing favours emotional reaction over analytical scrutiny. Additionally, individuals who are primarily driven by emotions rather than rational thinking tend to be more inclined to accept misinformation (Martel, Pennycook, and Rand 2020). The consistent emphasis on these cognitive biases and the role of emotions reveals a critical observation: human information processing in political contexts is often not driven by a pure search for truth. Instead, it is heavily influenced by pre-existing beliefs, group identity, and emotional resonance (Broda and Strömbäck 2024). This helps explain why factual corrections frequently fail to mitigate the effects of misinformation (Zhou and Shen 2024). This challenges the information deficit model, suggesting that effective interventions must address the psychological and emotional underpinnings of belief rather than relying solely on the provision of facts.

## The Amplifying Role of Social Media Algorithms and Platforms

Social media platforms serve as powerful amplifiers of mis-/disinformation, largely due to their underlying algorithmic designs. These algorithms are designed to maximize user engagement and retention, which inadvertently prioritizes sensational and emotionally charged content (Denniss and Lindberg 2025). This configuration often privileges conspiracy theories over evidence-based facts, creating an environment where sensational misinformation can spread (Guess and Lyons 2020).

The architecture of social media enables the rapid dissemination and global reach of any kind of information. Mis-/disinformation spreads across borders at unprecedented speed and scale, far exceeding the reach of traditional media (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018; Denniss and Lindberg 2025).
We define this context as “*infoxication*”: a state of information overload in which the volume, velocity, and ambiguity of political content, often emotionally charged, overwhelm users’ cognitive capacity. This speed and intensity of circulation compress users’ attention and favour rapid, affect-driven engagement over reflective evaluation, creating conditions in which emotionally resonant narratives are more likely to dominate political discourse. This accelerated spread is further exacerbated by the formation of filter bubbles and echo chambers. Filter bubbles occur when algorithms limit users’ exposure to diverse viewpoints, reinforcing existing biases and beliefs (Pariser 2011). Echo chambers, while sometimes conflated with filter bubbles, represent a more deliberate phenomenon where social groups actively demarcate themselves, denouncing contradictory information and validating only consenting perspectives (Nguyen 2020). While some research suggests that echo chambers may be less widespread than commonly assumed, self-selection among certain user groups remains a likely factor (Kim and Lu 2020).

Easy access to social media enables malign actors to coordinate cross-platform mobilisation tactics. These technological affordances appear across contexts. In the US, for example, insular right-wing networks emerged around 2016 and during the pandemic, amplifying congenial content and shielding users from contradictory information. In France, similar mobilisation strategies fuelled pandemic controversies and the rapid amplification of radical rhetoric during the 2022 cycle, with CNews and Twitter automation boosting polarising figures (e.g., Zemmour) beyond traditional gatekeeping. Furthermore, traffic from more regulated environments like Facebook and Instagram, is often redirected to less moderated spaces such as Telegram and YouTube, where low-credibility information can be disseminated more freely (Nogara et al. 2024). This strategic exploitation of diverse digital ecosystems further complicates efforts to curb the spread of false narratives. The consistent observation that social media acts not merely as a channel but as a structural component actively facilitating and amplifying misinformation cannot be neglected (Denniss and Lindberg 2025). The algorithms are designed for engagement, which frequently prioritizes emotional and sensational content, directly feeding into the cognitive biases discussed earlier. This creates a self-reinforcing loop where underlying architectures inadvertently promote the very content that can fuel affective polarization. This implies that addressing the problem requires not only individual-level interventions but also systemic changes to platform
design, content moderation, and potentially regulatory oversight.

## Erosion of Trust in Institutions and its Consequences

The pervasive spread of mis-/disinformation fundamentally undermines public trust in institutions, including scientific bodies, health authorities, experts, mainstream media, and governmental entities (Denniss and Lindberg 2025). This erosion of trust creates a dangerous feedback loop: the very mistrust fuelled by misinformation paradoxically enables its continued spread, as individuals increasingly turn to alternative, often less credible, sources of information (Denniss and Lindberg 2025).

A primary driver behind the erosion of trust is the perceived politicisation of institutions. When institutions are seen as aligning with a particular ideology, trust in them decreases, especially among those who hold opposing ideological views (Dawson, Bista, and Wilson 2025). This phenomenon contributes to a generalized sense of distrust across all information sources, making it difficult for individuals to discern trustworthy information (Dawson, Bista, and Wilson 2025).

The consequences for democracies are alarming. While recent US elections show that declining trust does not always reduce turnout, the erosion of confidence in democratic processes can foster widespread disillusionment and diminish the credibility of elected representatives (Surjatmodjo et al. 2024). This cyclical relationship between distrust and misinformation is a concerning challenge for democracies: misinformation erodes trust, and eroded trust makes populations more vulnerable to further misinformation. This highlights one major challenge for democracies, as the very mechanisms meant to inform citizens are undermined, creating fertile ground for further polarization and instability. Interventions must therefore aim to rebuild trust alongside combating misinformation.

## The Feedback Loop Between Polarization and Misinformation

The relationship between affective polarization and mis-/disinformation does not seem to be a mere co-occurrence but more to operate as a dynamic, mutually reinforcing feedback loop that could impact citizens' attitudes and behaviours.

## Causal Pathways and Reciprocal Reinforcement

A link has been established where higher levels of affective polarization directly influence citizens' receptivity to misinformation. Individuals with elevated affective polarization are demonstrably more likely to believe misinformation that aligns with their in-party's narrative and, conversely, less likely to
accept information that favours the opposing party (Holliday, Lelkes, and Westwood 2024; Jenke 2024).

This directional effect has been validated with survey experiments, demonstrating that inducing increased affective polarization can lead to greater belief in in-party-congruent misinformation and decreased belief in out-party-congruent misinformation (Jenke 2024).

Conversely, mis-/disinformation can act as an amplifier of existing political polarization (Hodel and West 2025). It achieves this by clouding facts, heightening tensions, and fueling emotional, vengeful politics (Kurten 2025). The strategic deployment of disinformation is increasingly linked to instances of political violence in democracies, demonstrating its capacity to transform underlying divisions into tangible harm (Kurten 2025).

The path in the US from online mobilisation and elite cues to offline violence on January 6, 2021 exemplifies the loop: mistrust and identity threat foster misinformation, which then legitimizes radical behaviour. In France, the loop has escalated into different forms of violence. The far-right actors such as the RN and *Reconquête*! have weaponized social media through false or manipulated narratives, ranging from AI-generated images about immigration to misleading clips during the 2023 Nahel riots, which occurred in June 2023 following the fatal police shooting of a teenager of North African descent, to fuel identity-based threats and mistrust (Tual 2024; Dejaifve 2023). These campaigns have hardened bloc animosities, prompting large counter-mobilisations and state dissolutions of extremist groups illustrating how online disinformation continues to fuel polarization even without a January 6-style rupture (Petrequin 2025).

The relationship between affective polarization and mis-/disinformation is complex and appears cyclical (Marino, Benitez-Baleato, and Ribeiro 2024). As these dynamics saturate the information ecosystem, democratic norms begin to erode (Kurten 2025). This creates a self-perpetuating cycle where each phenomenon intensifies the other, a mechanism captured by the concept of the “polarization loop” (Marino, Benitez-Baleato, and Ribeiro 2024). Consequently, this interdependence suggests that interventions addressing either aspect in isolation are unlikely to succeed.

## Motivated Reasoning and Partisan-Congruent Belief

The psychological mechanism of motivated reasoning is central to understanding how affective
polarization influences misinformation belief. When individuals encounter misinformation that is congruent with their in-party's views, confirmation bias takes hold, leading them to more easily accept and integrate such information (Jenke 2024). Conversely, when individuals encounter out-party-congruent information, disconfirmation bias may prompt more analytical scrutiny, increasing the likelihood that they will reject it as false.

A counterintuitive yet significant finding in the literature is that political sophistication, or how much an individual knows about politics, does not temper this relationship. Instead, the link between affective polarization and misinformation belief is exacerbated by political sophistication (Jenke 2024). More politically knowledgeable individuals are, in fact, better equipped to rationalize and defend their party's misinformation, effectively using their knowledge to confirm their existing biases rather than to critically evaluate information (Jenke 2024). This observation about the perverse effect of political sophistication challenges the common assumption that more education or knowledge automatically leads to better discernment. It suggests that sophisticated individuals are more adept at employing motivated reasoning to align information with their partisan identities, making them more resilient to factual correction when it contradicts their in-group narrative. These findings imply that for educational institutions and media literacy programmes, the provision of information and the promotion of critical thinking may not suffice to counter misinformation in polarized environments. Interventions may therefore need to address identity-based commitments and emotional attachments more directly.

In practice, politically sophisticated actors frequently rationalize in-group positions. This is evidenced by survey data in the US, on Kavanaugh's testimony and abortion after Dobbs, showing that high-profile institutional controversies often trigger identity-congruent reasoning that outweighs factual adjudication (Levendusky et al. 2024). In France, voters for radical candidates in 2022 reported stronger negative affect toward out-groups than positive identification with their own, indicating reasoning by aversion rather than accuracy (Piechota 2025).

Consequently, the increased likelihood of affectively polarized citizens believing in-party-congruent misinformation means that their issue positions and candidate opinions could be more frequently based on false information (Jenke 2024). Moreover, strong partisans, who exhibit higher levels of affective polarization, tend to be more resistant to interventions specifically designed to reduce partisan animus
(Holliday, Lelkes, and Westwood 2024).

## The Polarization Loop Framework

The polarization loop framework offers a comprehensive causal mechanism explaining the cyclical relationship between extreme messages, emotional engagement, media amplification, and affective polarization (Marino, Benitez-Baleato, and Ribeiro 2024). This framework integrates insights from psychology, political science, media studies, and system theory to provide a dynamic model of how these elements interact.

The loop unfolds in a series of interrelated stages that reinforce one another (Marino, Benitez-Baleato, and Ribeiro 2024). It begins with the circulation of highly polarising viewpoints that openly challenge established political norms or widely accepted facts. Such messages may arise organically in environments already marked by polarization, but they can also be strategically crafted by political actors or interest groups seeking to destabilize the public sphere. Their effectiveness depends heavily on the emotional reactions they provoke, since fear, anger, resentment, and outrage substantially increase the likelihood of content being shared. These emotions, intensified by mechanisms of contagion and the compressed attention spans characteristic of digital interactions, produce a state of infoxication that heightens the visibility and resonance of the message. Social media platforms play a key role at this stage by prioritizing material that generates strong engagement, a criterion that often corresponds directly with the emotionally charged character of extreme content. Algorithmic amplification ensures wide dissemination, while traditional media, often inadvertently, contribute further visibility and legitimacy by integrating these narratives into mainstream discourse. This dynamic can be observed in the United States, where “Stop the Steal” narratives circulated from fringe forums into mainstream cable networks and social media before returning to elite rhetoric and street-level mobilisation. A parallel pattern has been documented in France, where *CNews* and partisan *Twitter* clusters repeatedly provided a staging ground for immigration and so-called “great replacement” tropes, which subsequently fed into the agenda-setting strategies of the RN and into mobilisation at the street level. The consequence of these processes is the hardening of attitudes and the entrenchment of more ideological extremes. Moderate positions are gradually eroded, while divisions deepen and societal cohesion becomes increasingly fragile, creating a climate in which extremist ideologies find fertile ground.
The self-reinforcing nature of this feedback loop is an important aspect. As extreme messages become conventional and widely accepted, a growing demand for similar content arises. Political actors, recognising the effectiveness of such messages in mobilising their base, are incentivized to produce even more extreme content. This escalates the cycle, intensifying the extremity of the messages, which further polarizes society and radicalizes the political and social landscape. Every repetition pushes the boundaries of acceptable discourse, making it increasingly complicated to return to more moderate or cohesive societal discussions, which in turn allows radical ideologies to flourish and weaken democratic norms (Marino, Benitez-Baleato, and Ribeiro 2024). This framework provides a powerful diagnostic tool for understanding some of the ongoing information disorders and similarly suggests that interventions need to target multiple points within the loop simultaneously, rather than isolated symptoms.

## French and American Singularities

Examining empirical evidence from the United States and France provides crucial comparative insights into how the interplay between affective polarization and mis-/disinformation manifests in different political and societal contexts.

## Fragmented Media and the Politics of Identity in the US

Affective polarization in the United States has experienced a particularly sharp intensification since the mid-1990s, driven primarily by growing animosity towards opposing political parties (Horne, Adams, and Gidron 2023; Druckman and Levy 2022). A distinctive feature of this landscape is its strong focus on individual candidates rather than party organisations, a dynamic largely attributed to the presidential two-party system (Reiljan et al. 2024). The election of Donald Trump, for instance, significantly exacerbated existing hostilities; following the 2020 election, Democrats expressed greater dislike for Trump personally than for the Republican Party as a whole (Reiljan et al. 2024).

The interplay with misinformation is clear. Affective polarization predisposes individuals to accept misinformation that supports their in-group narrative while rejecting evidence that favours opponents (Jenke 2024). A notable example is the tendency of Republicans to believe misinformation regarding illegal voting in the 2016 election while dismissing claims of Russian interference (Jenke 2024).
Social media plays a critical role in this dynamic. Individuals with the highest polarization scores rely heavily on digital platforms and biased news sources, where political discussions are often perceived as hostile due to the amplification of aggressive commentary (Flaherty 2024). Research also indicates that in polarized contexts, a desire for in-group dominance can drive the dissemination of skewed content; during the 2016 election cycle, a disproportionate 79% of politically misinformative posts on Facebook were skewed towards conservative narratives (Zhu and Pechmann 2025).

The consequences of this interplay can be severe, potentially escalating into political violence. The US experience consistently highlights the extreme nature of affective polarization, particularly its candidate-centric focus and strong link to social identity (Zhu and Pechmann 2025). This deep emotional investment renders partisans susceptible to misinformation that flatters their in-group or demonizes the out-group, even among the politically sophisticated (Jenke 2024). This volatility is starkly illustrated by the 6 January 2021 Capitol attack, where election-related misinformation, deeply polarized identities, and inflammatory elite rhetoric culminated in organized political violence. Similar dynamics are evident in threats directed at election officials and the “Pizzagate” shooting, highlighting how online disinformation can drive domestic terrorism (Kurten 2025). The US case thus underscores the danger of highly personalized politics and the necessity for interventions that address the emotional and identity-based roots of polarization.

## Secularism, Street Politics, and Media Distinctions in France

In contrast to the US, France exhibits a pattern where political parties, as organisations, are more polarising than their leaders (Reiljan et al. 2024). Furthermore, news audience polarization tends to be lower in France, and most European countries, compared to the United States (Trilling, Van Klingeren, and Tsfati 2017). Although partisan media exists in France, they are perceived as polarized by 31% of the public (vs. 41% for the US) (Newman et al. 2022).

Despite these differences, France has experienced significant challenges related to misinformation and polarization. The COVID-19 vaccination campaigns in Europe, starting in late 2020, were accompanied by a widespread online proliferation of controversies and conspiracy theories (Nogara et al. 2024). Digital platforms played a central role in this dissemination, leading to the emergence of distinct anti-vaccine and pro-vaccine factions and an increase in polarization among users (Nogara et al. 2024).
credibility information was notably disseminated through platforms like WhatsApp, Telegram, and YouTube (Nogara et al. 2024).

France has also been a target of foreign interference and disinformation campaigns. Russia, for example, used economic, cyber, and disinformation efforts to target democratic populations and polarize political opinions in France (Kondratov and Johansson-Nogués 2023). A study on French public perceptions of international conflicts revealed that frequent consumption of international and geopolitical news via social networks, YouTube, and instant messaging increased sensitivity to narratives from sources like Russia, Mali, and China (Cordonier 2024). While a majority of the French population views Russian and Chinese information attacks as dangerous, these narratives have largely failed to sway French public opinion in favour of their promoted views on the Ukraine war or Taiwan (Cordonier 2024).

Yet, the rise of far-right movements in France has been significantly amplified by social media. Polemicists such as Éric Zemmour surged during the last presidential elections, largely due to mass retweets and bot-sharing campaigns on platforms like Twitter (Carpentier et al. 2022). The increasing vote share for the RN over the past years could be resulting from the growing affective divide but also reinforcing it. Far-right actors have strategically leveraged social media to advance their agendas, employing tactics such as cross-platform sharing, promoting voter fraud narratives, and exploiting platform functionalities to foreground fringe ideas like the great replacement theory (Marino, Benitez-Baleato, and Ribeiro 2024). The trends in France, may suggest both systemic shifts and sharp surges: the RN's decade-long mainstreaming, the 2017 collapse of traditional parties, and the 2024 dissolution generated three rival blocs and increased personalisation (Macron vs. Le Pen). The pension reform law and 49.3 episodes converted procedural steps into identity-signaling events, while CNews' French Fox News role shows how even a modest partisan niche can anchor recurring waves of affective mobilisation. While France experiences affective polarization, the data suggests it is less intense at the mass media audience level compared to the US (Trilling, Van Klingeren, and Tsfati 2017). However, it highlights similar vulnerabilities to systemic disinformation, particularly foreign interference and the strategic use of social media by far-right movements to amplify conspiracy theories (Marino, Benitez-Baleato, and Ribeiro 2024).

These examples seem to indicate that even in a multi-party system with lower perceived media
polarization, specific actors and platforms can exploit existing societal divisions and emotional vulnerabilities. This implies that interventions also need to focus more on combating foreign influence operations, regulating platform functionalities that amplify extremist content, and strengthening societal resilience against targeted disinformation campaigns.

## A Different Level of Polarization

The differences between the two countries' experiences with media and polarization are structural and reveal distinct vulnerabilities. The US media landscape is characterized by a high degree of horizontal, left-vs-right polarization that is highly aligned with the political system itself. Mainstream partisan outlets like Fox News and CNN appear as opposing sides, while the media landscape feels split and asymmetric, with right-wing media leaning more toward echo chambers.

In contrast, the French media landscape appears less polarized, at least by perceptions of the public (Newman et al. 2022), and is structured around a core of traditional media outlets that frequently cite each other, creating a common information space. While a left-right divide exists, the most significant cleavage in France is a more vertical axis between this institutional core and a new class of partisan media that operates on the fringe and often expresses anti-elite sentiments. This new media class, while less prominent than the US's partisan giants, makes doubtful information more visible. Even though their structures differ, both countries seem prone to organized disinformation campaigns and the strategic use of social media by populist and far-right movements to bypass traditional media gatekeepers. The comparison highlights that the specific form of media polarization (horizontal vs. vertical) and the structure of the media environment are crucial mediating factors in the causal loop of affective polarization and mis-/disinformation.

## Studying a Moving Target: Methods, Measures, and Pitfalls

The study of affective polarization and mis-/disinformation employs a diverse range of methodological approaches, each with its strengths and limitations in capturing the complexity of these phenomena.

Quantitative methods underpin much of the research on affective polarization and misinformation, with surveys, utilising tools like feeling thermometers and social distance indicators, which offer granular, nationally representative data to assess geographic and individual-level drivers of polarization (Iyengar
et al. 2019; Wagner 2021; Holliday, Lelkes, and Westwood 2024). Experiments, including survey-based
manipulations and field interventions such as WhatsApp fact-checking campaigns, are increasingly
deployed to establish causal links, for example, between polarization and misinformation susceptibility
(Jenke 2024; Bowles et al. 2023). The field has also embraced computational methods, leveraging large-
scale digital data (e.g., social media tracking and network analysis) to study real-world information
flows, misinformation spread, and the formation of polarized online groups (Grinberg et al. 2019;
Flaherty 2024; Nogara et al. 2024). This evolution from descriptive to causal inferences marks a shift
toward more sophisticated, evidence-based inquiry.

Alongside quantitative rigour, qualitative and mixed-methods research provide essential context and
depth. Ethnographic monitoring of disinformation during French elections, as helped uncover real-time
tactics and community-specific behaviours (Simmons, Gatewood, and Fourel 2022). Mixed- methods
combine quantitative metrics (e.g., surveys, social media analytics) with qualitative insights (e.g.,
interviews, ethnography), offering a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between affective
polarization and mis-/disinformation (Marino and Iannelli 2023). This methodological pluralism
highlights the need for interdisciplinary collaboration to address the complex nature of these challenges,
moving beyond disciplinary silos to inform both theory and practice.

Despite methodological advancements, significant challenges persist in studying the interplay between
affective polarization and mis-/disinformation. One key challenge is the difficulty in directly monitoring
overall information exposure for individuals (Flaherty 2024). Furthermore, while correlations are
observed, definitively establishing direct causation, remains complex and challenging to quantify.
Moreover, the formation of false beliefs and their associated effects are complex processes, involving a
range of interdependent factors beyond just misinformation itself (Hodel and West 2025).

## Possible Avenues for Future Research

Despite the growing body of literature on affective polarization and mis-/disinformation, several critical
research gaps remain, offering avenues for future research.

A significant area requiring further investigation is the paradox of political sophistication.

While increased political knowledge might intuitively be expected to mitigate misinformation belief,
current findings suggest it can, counterintuitively, exacerbate the acceptance of in-party-congruent
misinformation among affectively polarized individuals (Jenke 2024). Further research is needed to fully explore why this occurs, delving into the nuanced psychological processes of motivated reasoning in highly knowledgeable partisans. Furthermore, while correlations between affective polarization and outcomes like political violence or democratic backsliding have been observed, clearer and more robust causal connections require additional empirical evidence. Future studies need to precisely delineate the pathways and thresholds through which these phenomena translate into such dire consequences. There is also a notable gap in understanding the relationship between affective polarization and misinformation among younger demographics (Flaherty 2024). Given the high social media engagement of this group, this area is crucial for developing targeted interventions. Additionally, most research has focused on two-party systems like the US. More comparative research is needed to understand how different measures of affective polarization translate into multiparty contexts and whether the observed interplay dynamics hold true in such systems (Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2021).

The identified gaps are not just about more research but about deeper research into the why and how. Understanding the mechanisms behind the political sophistication paradox or the precise pathway to violence requires more granular, process-oriented studies. This highlights the complexity of human behaviour in political contexts and the limitations of current models, urging for more nuanced theoretical development and empirical testing.

## The Role of Interventions and Their Efficacy

The observation that education alone may not resolve the issue of misinformation belief in polarized contexts (Jenke 2024) highlights a critical need for research into alternative or complementary intervention strategies. Effective approaches to break the self-reinforcing cycle of polarization and misinformation are still to be identified (Jenke 2024). That could involve developing interventions that specifically target in-group norms, promote emotional regulation, or facilitate constructive cross-partisan dialogue (Levendusky and Stecula 2021).

Research on scalable technological tools, such as AI-powered chatbots designed to reduce conspiracy beliefs, and literacy programs, particularly those focusing on algorithmic literacy to empower users against misinformation, shows promise (Chung and Wihbey 2024). However, these initiatives require further evaluation to assess their long-term effectiveness and adaptability across diverse populations.
The limitations of traditional interventions and the complexity of the polarization loop suggest that no single intervention will be a panacea. The need for strategies to break the cycle implies a requirement for multi-level interventions that address individual cognitive biases, social group dynamics, technological platforms, and institutional factors simultaneously. This calls for interdisciplinary collaboration and a willingness to experiment with novel approaches that are sensitive to the psychological, social, and technological dimensions of the problem.

## Comparative Research Beyond Western Democracies

A significant limitation in the current body of research is the disproportionate focus on the United States and other Western democracies. Future research must expand comparative studies to include diverse political systems and cultural contexts. This geographical expansion is crucial for establishing the generalisability of existing theories on the interplay between affective polarization and misinformation (Jenke 2024). Understanding how different political structures (e.g., multi-party vs. two-party systems), varied media landscapes, and distinct societal cleavages (e.g., ethnic, religious, economic) moderate this interplay is essential. The explicit mention of limited research outside the US and the call for studies in multi-party systems highlight a critical observation: the current understanding of affective polarization and mis-/disinformation is heavily biased towards Western contexts (Jenke 2024). Generalizing these findings without broader comparative research risks misdiagnosing problems and proposing ineffective solutions in other parts of the world. This emphasizes the importance of a global research agenda to develop a truly universal understanding of these phenomena and to inform effective, culturally sensitive interventions worldwide.

## Holistic Approaches for Stronger Democracies

The existing literature provides evidence that affective polarization and mis-/disinformation could be deeply intertwined phenomena, forming a mutually reinforcing feedback loop that can pose a significant threat to democratic governance and social cohesion. Affective polarization, rooted in social identity and exacerbated by elite behaviour and institutional structures, predisposes individuals to accept information congruent with their partisan identity, even if demonstrably false. In turn, mis-/disinformation, amplified by inherent cognitive biases, emotional appeals, and the architecture of social media algorithms, further deepens these partisan divides and erodes trust in foundational democratic
institutions.

Building on this interaction, the integration of recent conceptual tools opens new avenues for the study of media and politics. Beyond the typology of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation, the concept of "infoxication" offers a lens for understanding how saturated and affect-driven information environments contribute to declining trust, intensifying polarization, and mounting strain on democratic institutions. Rather than locating the problem solely in the circulation of false information, infoxication directs attention to a structural condition of cognitive and emotional saturation that weakens citizens' capacity for discernment. This shift in perspective, which moves from an emphasis on fact-checking to an analysis of the broader informational environment of the digital public sphere, can help explain why accurate information so often fails to penetrate partisan defences. Future research should further explore how these dynamics influence the long-term stability of democratic institutions and the potential for rebuilding a shared factual ground in increasingly polarized societies.

The case studies of the United States and France offer distinct yet interconnected insights. They illustrate how universal psychological and technological mechanisms manifest differently based on national political systems and unique societal contexts. The US experience highlights the dangers of highly personalized politics and identity-driven misinformation vulnerability, as exemplified by events like the January 6 insurrection. In contrast, France demonstrates a vulnerability to systemic disinformation, particularly the strategic use of social media by far-right movements, even within a multi-party system with lower perceived media polarization. Taken together both underscore that durable affective cleavages require remedies that pair identity-aware communication with platform design reforms and institutional guardrails tuned to each system's vulnerabilities.

These conclusions underscore that combating the mis-/disinformation and mitigating affective political division requires a more holistic approach that extends beyond simple factual corrections. It necessitates addressing the underlying psychological vulnerabilities that make individuals susceptible to false narratives, reforming social media environments to counteract algorithmic amplification of harmful content, rebuilding trust in institutions, and fostering civic education that promotes respectful disagreement and critical thinking (Denniss and Lindberg 2025). The concept of a sweet spot of moderate polarization, where citizens are sufficiently engaged to care about election outcomes but not
so polarized that they perceive opponents as enemies, remains an elusive yet crucial goal for maintaining
democratic health (Janssen and Turkenburg 2025). Ultimately, a comprehensive understanding of this
interplay is vital for developing robust strategies to protect democratic norms, fostering informed public
opinion, and ensuring the resilience of societies in an increasingly fractured information landscape.
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