# Cooperative work relations as a (re)source for organising the enterprise

## Summary

The chapter presents an organisational rationality that differs from the prevailing managerial rationality. Exploring the possibility for non-hierarchical organising, it advances arguments in support of the capacity of a social order grounded in cooperative work relations to achieve collective performance. Based on sociological research in worker cooperatives where high levels of worker agency are maintained, the chapter describes a commons rationality for organising that helps worker-members develop mechanisms that sustain a We-relation at project, organisational and activity level. In this organisational rationality, the quality of the relational network that exists between worker-members is seen as central to efficient task division, coordination and motivation. The We-relation, which implies a mutual obligation, leads to an engagement to do one's best and facilitates alignment between peers as well as respect for collectively determined norms.

## Key words/phrases

Agency, non-hierarchical organising, organisational design, organisational rationality, worker-organised enterprises, sociology of organisations

## 1. Can an enterprise function on the basis of cooperation between workers?

While it can be said that humans are a cooperative species, it is also true that human societies have developed cultures and structures to sustain and encourage cooperation and limit domination of some over others. Two broad ways can be distinguished: accountable hierarchies vs non-hierarchical organising.

With regard to the enterprise, many people consider an accountable hierarchy the highest achievable option. Because workers are the subjects being directed hierarchically, accountability is to be oriented to them in the first place (Ferreras et al., 2022). However, in many enterprises, management is formally only partly accountable to
workers, through work legislation and trade union relations. Only in worker cooperatives, management, if there is one, is fully accountable to workers.

While a hierarchy accountable to workers is already a great achievement, it is still a trade-off. Workers give up agency over their everyday work practice in exchange for the achievement of collective performance. Responsibility for this collective performance lies with management, who develops and implements the tools to orient workers' behaviours towards their collective goal. If agency is to be maintained at the level of work practices, the social order of the enterprise needs to build on everyday cooperation in all dimensions of the enterprise. This chapter, therefore, examines the conditions for non-hierarchical organising.

The intellectual debate on the possibility of non-hierarchical organising in enterprises is more than a century old. Friedberg (1997) notes that the central problem of collective action is the integration of behaviour which is not spontaneously converging. Organising, then, is the activity that seeks to regulate – in the sense of arriving at a certain regularity – the cooperation between people. At a minimum, it is about orienting the freedoms of each person and aligning their activities by facilitating certain behaviours and discouraging other behaviours. Mancur Olson (1971) claimed that even when individuals share a common goal, if they were to act in a rational way and are part of a large group, they wouldn't voluntarily act to realise the common goal. He illustrated this by many examples of cooperation where coercive institutions, a sense of duty, or individual incentives are used to solve a free-rider problem.

The Webbs stated already at the end of the 19th century that cooperative enterprises have to conform to the conventional enterprise model or will fail economically (Jones, 1975; Webb, 1891). Albert Meister, in the 1970s, affirmed that associations and self-organised enterprises were subject to the 'iron law of oligarchy', originally formulated by Robert Michels (1911) to theorise degeneration processes in political parties, which he saw as inevitable (Meister, 1974). According to Michels, "Who says organisation, says oligarchy" (Michels, 1911, p. 241). Over time, this theory has been criticised for assimilating 'organisation' with 'increase of power inequality' and the latter with 'abuse of power', while this is not necessarily the case (Leach, 2005). Many authors also draw attention to ongoing regeneration processes in cooperative enterprises (Cornforth, 1995; Estrin & Jones, 1992; Gand & Béjean, 2013; Hernandez, 2006; Langmead, 2017; Soetens &
Huybrechts, 2022; Storey et al., 2014). Elinor Ostrom, for her part, was widely lauded for demonstrating that interdependent and communicating individuals can organise and govern themselves to obtain continuing joint benefits (Ostrom, 1990; Wilson et al., 2013). She won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 for her work showing how ordinary persons can overcome the free-rider problem or the so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’ theorised by Hardin (1968).

Notwithstanding the intellectual debate, it is clear that numerous actors do organise their joint enterprise in non-hierarchical ways. Some of such enterprises today have been productive for over 40 years. Sociological research in a selection of Belgian worker cooperatives with high levels of worker agency in all dimensions of the enterprise, shows that their survival and thriving can be explained by their application of a commons rationality for achieving collective performance (Maasen, 2023).

The following sections successively describe the characteristics of the commons rationality and the social order it produces, the ways in which cooperative work relations are a source for collective performance, and the concrete implications for organising an enterprise.
## 2. A commons rationality for organising

As the activities of multiple workers don't converge spontaneously, a permanent work of organisation is needed to ensure the organisational functions (Friedberg, 1997). At least four functions need to be fulfilled: the division of work, the coordination of work, the stimulation of individual effort (motivation) and a continuous adaptation to a changing environment. Inherent in organising is the exercise, structuring and limiting of power (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977). While the aim of organising is to create a social order that facilitates collective performance, individuals and collectives may rely on one of several organisational rationalities to achieve the goals of the enterprise, each producing a distinct social order.

An organisational rationality, or institutional logic, is a socially constructed pattern of representations and principles of judgment and action by which actors orient their organisational practices (Thornton et al., 2012). Neither necessarily truthful, nor scientific or objective, an organisational rationality provides a conceptual coherence to the way of conceiving the organisation. It takes the form of a “mental scheme which integrates multiple representations and principles into a coherent whole” (Le Texier, 2016). An organisational rationality doesn't determine the precise practices of organisational actors, but helps them maintain a certain coherence in the face of numerous and changing characteristics of the structural and relational contexts of the enterprise (Zilber, 2016). Within a single enterprise, there may be tensions between organisational rationalities used by different actors.

The commons rationality for organising will be presented here, and contrasted with the managerial rationality that has come to be dominant in enterprises, in the public administration, and even in many voluntary associations.

### 2.1. Managerial rationality

While the managerial methods and tools have evolved greatly since their origins in the large capitalist enterprise in the 19th century, many authors in critical management studies position the diversity of managerial approaches in the continuity of a certain way
of thinking about organisation. With the introduction of 'scientific' management (Taylor, 1911), the direction of the enterprise became a distinct expertise in the service of the realisation of the project of the enterprise, to be applied by persons with a political, social and economic status different from the owners and the other workers (Grey, 1999).

The managerial sciences lean principally on systems thinking (Stacey, 2011). At the core of the managerial rationality is the conception that worker behaviour integration is best served by hierarchical integration of their tasks. The role of the manager, then, is to design a rational task system and to create action situations that prod workers to execute the allotted tasks. While the main tenets of management are rationalisation, organisation, control and efficacy, its ideal way of exercising power is not through supervision and disciplining, but through a form of conditioning of workers by the manipulation of their action situation (Le Texier, 2016), thereby circumventing their capacity to reflect and to act. Management predetermines the goals to achieve, the possible choices, the tools at hand, the time, the communication channels, the imaginable preferences, the acceptable behaviours and even the reflexions that can be shared; yet without direct imposition.

Even with a high level of worker participation and positive relations between managers and other workers, the managerial rationality still hinges on the asymmetrical exercise of power by management on the workers. The legitimacy of this exercise of power rests on the efficient achievement of the goal of the enterprise. From this follows that "autonomous individuals are required to participate in, submit themselves to some larger whole or greater good" (Stacey, 2011, p. 385).

The social order that is produced takes a hierarchical form, between goal and means, strategy and operation, decision and execution, and between management and workers.

While this hierarchy can be an accountable hierarchy, the social order based on a managerial rationality relies on a division into three distinct roles: owners/members who govern, managers who organise and workers who execute. In worker cooperatives, despite the same persons taking on the role of owner/member and worker, these roles are to be exercised at different times (regular moments during the year versus daily), in different places (governance meetings versus the work floor) and taking into consideration different concerns (owner and investor concerns versus work conditions).

On the work floor, it is expected that workers respect the 'rules of the game' developed and implemented by management. Participation, then, is not so much taking part in a
group of persons linked by cooperative relations, but becomes "participating in the leadership of the leaders » (Stacey, 2011, p. 386). In this conception, a strong managerial power on the everyday lives of workers can be compatible with democratic governance, as governance by the workers leaves intact the demand for their submission to the organisational activities for which management is mandated.

Although the managerial rationality is widely criticised for its negative impact on worker agency, this criticism rarely leads to a fundamental questioning of its application. There's a continuous research for new forms of organisation that allow for more worker autonomy, peer-to-peer coordination, personal development and the like. However, the series of innovations since the 1950s, such as management by objectives, total quality management, lean production, agile management, management by culture and by values, remain at most forms of participatory management, steeped in the managerial rationality (Argyris, 1998; Daudigeos et al., 2021; Le Texier, 2016; Picard & Islam, 2020; Rothschild & Ollilainen, 1999).

The difficulty of our society to envision collective performance from an organisational rationality other than the managerial rationality may be explained by the reproduction of dominant structures but can at least partly be attributed to the latter's perceived efficiency gains by the general population. This may help to understand why a number of worker cooperatives apply a managerial rationality despite struggling with its negative effects on worker engagement and the vitality of democratic processes (Stohl & Cheney, 2001). Authors like Grey (1999, p. 579) invite their readers to recognize that the equation of management with any form of social coordination is a construct, "which closes off alternative conceptions of coordination, most notably those of community".

## 2.2. Commons rationality

The commons rationality, in contrast, refers to the activity of 'commoning', in which multiple persons engage in organisational activities to produce and reproduce the collective and 'make things common' (Bollier & Helfrich, 2019; De Angelis, 2017; Fournier, 2013; Nicolas-Le Strat, 2016). Conceiving the enterprise's organisation as a common task and a joint commitment, worker-members pool their resources, competences and time to produce goods and services. As a result, the enterprise, run by
a collective (co-munus), becomes a shared, or common, good (Guttmann, 2021; Peuter & Dyer-Witheford, 2010).

The commons rationality for organising produces a social order based on a We-relation. The We-relation is a particular type of relation that we know from friend groups, voluntary associations and citizen initiatives, but that can also exist within the enterprise (Donati & Archer, 2015). Interestingly, the We-relation is perceived not in opposition, but as an extension of the ‘I’. It is characterised by tendentially symmetrical (not hierarchical), free (founded on an associational constitution), responsible (not constrained by authoritative norms or power) and not mercantile (not dictated by the pursuit of individual profit) relations between persons (Donati & Archer, 2015). Moreover, the way participants in a We-relation relate to each other is characterised by personal recognition, generosity, reciprocity and relational reflexivity. It is clear that for the We-relation to exist within the enterprise, it needs to extend beyond the association around a joint project and be integrated in all dimensions of the enterprise.

In the commons rationality, the creation of a We-relation among all the actors in the enterprise is not only value-driven. It is perceived as producing a social order capable of realising the organisational functions without requiring the submission of some to others, nor the submission of one's daily activities to a higher goal. Instead of relying on hierarchies, integration of the various activities and behaviours of worker-members relies on mutual obligation. In fact, their association around a joint project reflects a double intention: an engagement to work around a common goal and an engagement for cooperation. Worker-members engagement for the project and for the others, implying an abandonment of autonomous agency, supposes an agreement on a process of co-construction of its ends as well as its means. This process of co-construction is not limited to a level of 'governance', but finds its logical extension in the organisational and work activities. Applying a commons rationality, according to which the We-relation is seen as functional to the success of the joint project, helps worker-members develop organisational structures and cultures that create and sustain cooperative relations in the face of organisational challenges.
### 3. Cooperative work relations as a resource

The organisational choices made in the selected enterprises, and their justifications, demonstrate that much attention is given to the We-relation. Worker-members believe that they obtain a collective performance, not so much *while* maintaining cooperative work relations between them, but precisely *because* of it. The arguments advanced indicate that a social order based on a We-relation facilitates efficient task division, coordination, motivation and adaptation to a changing environment.

The goal here is not to engage in a debate on the comparative efficiency of different organisational rationalities. One reason for this is that each organisational rationality, in interaction with the workers' preferences and the specific context of the enterprise, can lead to various organisational structures with different advantages and disadvantages. Another reason is that efficiency, in contrast with the managerial rationality, does not constitute a key value in the commons rationality. Worker-members don't necessarily value efficiency as a goal or as a means for the realisation of their joint project. Therefore, in so far as worker-members realise their joint project, their organisational structures can be considered to demonstrate adequate collective performance. Rather than looking at efficiency, the ways in which the We-relation makes collective performance possible within the context of an enterprise are presented.

Apart from avoiding a number of costs and dysfunctions linked to hierarchy and role compartmentalisation associated with the managerial rationality, the analysis of the arguments put forward by worker-members reveal three effects of the We-relation. These three effects contribute to the fulfilment of the organisational functions: an interest to do one's best, a smoother alignment between peers, and the respect of norms. First, through the constitution of a We-relationship around a shared project, each worker-member has an interest in the project, in the organisation and in the activity. Although workers in conventional enterprises may also have an interest in the performance of the company and be interested in the societal objective of the project, the We-relation induces worker-members to perceive the company as their own. In addition, the cooperation is constructed in such a way that it is unlikely that a participant will achieve its interests without others also achieving theirs. The enterprise's success implies the realisation of one's own interests.
Second, the We-relationship provides a space in which complex processes of alignment between people can succeed. Because worker-members understand that the success of the enterprise depends on their capacity to cooperate, they have an interest in taking others into account. They therefore seek to align their activities with the activities of their colleagues, and to find consensual solutions in case of conflict. Indeed, it should not be a surprise that worker-members who are linked by a common long-term goal show more flexibility and a willingness to make mutual concessions.

Third, the We-relationship ensures the alignment of individual behaviours with collectively created norms. In addition to the active participation in the development of norms, the We-relationship brings about a sense of responsibility towards colleagues as well as a mutual expectation of compliance with these norms. Disciplinary activities exercised by peers, such as in self-organising teams, are also in the managerial literature recognised as effective: "The mechanisms whereby the free-rider problem is effectively suppressed or mitigated in these situations are well known" (Puranam et al., 2014, p. 171).

In fact, these effects can be explained by theories that affirm that the We-relation produces a mutual obligation (Donati & Archer, 2015). It is important to emphasize that an obligation, in the true sense of the term, is rooted in a person's desire to maintain the relationship between himself and other people. Urfalino (2021) states that individuals who consider themselves to be parts of a whole, decide of their own volition to give precedence to the ends determined collectively. Bollier and Helfrich (2019, p. 15) speak of "freedom-in-connectedness". The obligation produced by a We-relationship is mutual, that is, each participant takes into account the others. This ensures that his or her own interests, preferences and feelings are also taken into account by others. Moreover, the mutual obligation implied in the We-relation helps to overcome time lags between contribution and retribution, and supports the continuity of activities during difficult times.
## 4. Organisational design for cooperative work relations

Both the organisational structures and the statements of the majority of interviewed workers-members reveal that the creation and sustaining of a We-relation is a central guiding principle in all organisational activities. Unlike in the managerial rationality, divisions between people and submission to a project are to be minimised. To that effect, multiple mechanisms are developed that aim at creating and sustaining cooperative relations at project, organisational and activity level. They can be grouped around four broad axes. It should be noted that these axes are operationalised in a unique way in each enterprise.

### 4.1. Ensuring engagement for the project of the enterprise

The project, which is defined collectively on the basis of an expression of interests, remains open to modifications. Each person's engagement in the shared project is pursued by creating a collective around a project, implying a mutual commitment between members. After recruitment follows a period during which new members receive information and participate in training activities, while existing and new members get to know each other. The acquisition of one or more shares is often an important formal and symbolic moment. Efforts are invested in integrating new people, with the aim of making them feel part of the group and sharing responsibilities. This is not easy because of the disparities between initiators and people joining at later stages. Collective decision-making procedures aiming at the active participation of everyone are used as a means of integrating interests. Remuneration policies are linked to the efforts expected of individual worker-members.

### 4.2. Maximising the sharing and distribution of organisational power

By distributing support and steering tasks among them, worker-members share organisational decision-power and set a limit to the concentration of power in the hands of one or several persons. This distribution can take three different forms: shared, equally
distributed and unequally distributed. In the first form, each worker-member
participates in all deliberation and decision organs, such as work groups, task forces,
committees, assemblies and the like. This is not the case in the second and third forms,
where persons participate in some of the parts of the enterprise's organigram. In the third
form, one or a few individuals take on a large part of support and steering tasks.
Intervention in group dynamics and the exercise of disciplinary power in specific
situations may be assigned to them. In each form, these functions are to be exercised
within a collectively agreed framework. In fact, each individual and (sub)group seeks to
align its actions, deliberations and decisions with the general consensus. Multiple spaces
for deliberation are foreseen and structured in a way to make everyone's involvement
possible and to facilitate reaching collective agreements. Differences in social status are
minimised, which requires more effort in the third form of distribution. Solutions are
sought to meet the challenge of transferring skills and responsibilities.

4.3. Starting from a work situation that allows and requires each person to think and act

Worker-members seek to divide tasks on the basis of voluntary commitment and put into
place the conditions that allow them to take meaningful decisions regarding the tasks that
they take into charge. They avoid imposing upon each other in which way tasks need to
be fulfilled. Worker-members plan, organise and take decisions regarding their activities,
if needed in dialogue with other workers. This is realised by a division of tasks that
approaches the exercise of a profession within the enterprise. This means that workers
are in charge of a set of tasks that are diverse but interrelated, and can see tangible results
of their work. They have the knowledge and means to coordinate with peers and to take
responsibility towards colleagues and customers.

4.4. Prioritising peer-to-peer communication

Direct communication between peers is placed at the heart of the organisation, as the
default mode of organisation and the principal means of coordination. Worker-members
only sporadically use other coordination mechanisms than dialogue and collective
decision-making. Unlike unilaterally restraint communication, peer-to-peer
communication implies fluid conversation, during which participants simultaneously
enable and constrain each other's actions (Cheney, 1995; Stacey, 2011; Woodilla, 1998).
The trajectory and the outcome of the conversation are co-created. This is done by an
organisational architecture that foresees peer-to-peer communication along the chain of
production activities, and by minimising centralised procedures and formal rules. Direct
communication is supported by paying attention to keep groups open, by stimulating
exchanges, and by encouraging assertiveness. Information-sharing, expression of ideas
as well as emotions, and discussion is seen as positive and useful. Tensions and conflicts
should be brought to the surface in order to restore communication processes between
persons.

4.5. Challenges

The theories affirming the impossibility of non-hierarchical organising over a longer time,
briefly presented at the beginning of the enterprise, can be charged with not taking into
account all human possibilities for coordination and communication. Still, these theories
rightly point to a number of challenges for sharing an enterprise over a longer time
(Charmettant et al 2017). Firstly, giving control to new members is not easy. Nor is it
self-evident for newcomers to take ownership and responsibility. Secondly, learning
organisational and governance skills requires effort. Thirdly, when the number of
persons is high, it is more difficult to align interests and actions. Fourthly, some necessary
social skills are poorly developed during our educational and professional trajectories.
These include taking a stand on an issue, being accountable to colleagues, and expressing
and receiving criticism.

While not being unsurmountable obstacles, it is important to pay attention to these
challenges, because the absence of an adequate solution constitutes a vulnerability
endangering the We-relation. In fact, as the relational network is created by the
behaviour and actions of all, it is fragile and may fall apart. Perceiving the We-relation as
functional helps organisational actors find organisational solutions. Additionally, such a
perception can help tolerate certain vulnerabilities and invest in a renewal of
organisational processes when the We-relation weakens. The commons rationality for
organising is therefore conducive to avoiding degeneration processes and stimulating
regeneration processes.

**5. Conclusion**

Looking at the types of organisational structures and cultures produced by the
application of a commons rationality, it is no longer inconceivable that enterprises based
on non-hierarchic organising may thrive during many years. In fact, several principles of
sociotechnical theory can be identified, such as responsible autonomy and whole tasks.
These do not only contribute to adaptability to dynamic contexts, but also to worker
motivation (Kuipers et al., 2012). The benefits of introducing self-steering teams,
adapting management processes to operational processes instead of the other way
around, and reducing the complexity of organisation by increasing the agency of workers
are acknowledged in many contemporary management manuals. In the commons
rationality, these organisational principles are combined with worker ownership and
governance of the enterprise. Some management theories also put forward the value of
pursuing psychological ownership and a feeling of community, among others through
involving workers in mission, vision and values development exercises and participation
in decision-making (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004).

The commons rationality integrates these ideas in a coherent whole. The components of
the organisational design for the creation of a We-relation encompass cooperative work
relations in all dimensions of the enterprise and are complementary. Instead of role
compartmentalisation, actions are informed by the actors' triple identity as worker,
organiser and owner/member. This contributes to the integration of multiple concerns
while taking action and coordinating with others. Involvement in the collective project
strengthens motivation and increases knowledge for a responsible exercise of production
activities. As colleagues share a common goal, coordination among them becomes easier.
Leaving decisions about production tasks to workers further reduces the need for central
mechanisms of coordination and discipline. This facilitates the sharing of organisational
tasks and power. In turn, organisational power-sharing prevents the creation of a division
in managers and other workers, which gives communication a central role to play in the
organisation itself. It is known that communication works best in the absence of barriers
such as domination or submission. Cooperative work relations in the activity,
organisation and governance dimensions are thus both a consequence of an
organisational design based on the commons rationality and a condition for it to be
functional.

It is also important to draw attention to the fact that caring for the We-relation is a shared
responsibility. It is not seen as the responsibility of one or a few persons, but as a
transversal practice in which everyone is continuously engaged. An awareness that the
realisation of the project and the success of the enterprise depend on the We-relation
prompts worker-members to take into account the impact of one's behaviours on the
relationship with others, and leads them to contribute actively to a social order that
encourages cooperative behaviour.

In the commons rationality for organising, social value and economic value go hand in
hand. The attention to the We-relation is not only a question of values like cooperation,
sociability, caring and recognition, which well may be present in a managerial rationality.
Crucially, the We-relation is seen as a way to create a social order that enables worker-
members to realise their joint project. By proposing an alternative way to achieve
collective performance within enterprises, the commons rationality can help overcome
the misconception that only the managerial rationality is fit to tackle economic
challenges.
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Author bio

Kristel Maasen has worked with organisational development during the past 20 years, in associations, NGOs and social economy enterprises. Since 2014, she has been engaged in academic research at the Université libre de Bruxelles, exploring the organisational conditions for worker agency. Starting from the centrality of work to our well-being as well as for our societal impact, and an understanding of the enterprise as a political entity, she combines insights from the sociology of work, relational sociology and sociology of organisations, and does not shy away from issues of power in organising. Based on research in worker-organised enterprises in Belgium, Kristel recently completed a PhD theorising a commons organisational rationality that is different from the managerial rationality for organising. She works in English, Dutch and French.

Contacts: kristel.maasen@ulb.ac.be ; kristel@kristelmaasen.be