# Chronomorphosyntaxe: une analyse de la forme en -re et en -se dans les hypothèses en si dans les Siete Partidas

Mary Catherine Lavissière

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Mary Catherine Lavissière. Chronomorphosyntaxe: une analyse de la forme en -re et en -se dans les hypothèses en si dans les Siete Partidas. Signifiances (Signifying), 2019, 2 (1), 10.52497/signifiances.v2i1.201. hal-05099165

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# Chronomorphosyntax: an analysis of the -re form and -se forms in si clauses in the *Siete Partidas*

Mary Catherine Lavissière<fnref n="1" />

## Abstract

The results of recent studies indicate that the Spanish -re form has specific uses in written Spanish legal texts. More specifically, when found in si clauses, the -re form and its alternatives are used as rhetorical or discourse tools. These results contradict the findings of the Comisión para la modernización del lenguaje jurídico which recommends the suppression of the -re form. However, in order to understand the use of this form, a dynamic model of legal syntax is needed. In this article, we address this gap by applying Macchi's theory of chronosyntax, especially as applied to poetry. Indeed, we find that written legal texts and poetry put a similar importance on the signifiers of the text. However, legal texts specifically exploit morphosyntax to structure law articles. For these reasons, we recommend that not only the chronosyntactic information, but also chronomorphosyntactic information be taken into account when analyzing written legal texts.

**Keywords:** legal linguistics; subjunctive; morphosyntax; chronosyntax; coherence relations.

## Résumé

Les résultats des études récentes indiquent que la forme en -re en espagnol a des emplois spécifiques dans les textes juridiques espagnols écrits. En particulier, quand cette forme est observée dans des hypothèses en si, la forme en -re et ses alternatives sont utilisées comme des outils rhétoriques ou des stratégies de cohérence de discours. Ces résultats contredisent les recommandations de la Comisión para la modernización del lenguaje jurídico, qui préconisent la suppression de la forme en -re. Cependant, pour comprendre l'emploi de cette forme, un modèle dynamique de syntaxe légale est nécessaire. Dans le présent article, nous tentons de combler cette lacune. Nous appliquons aux textes juridiques la théorie de la chronosyntaxe et plus particulièrement son application à la poésie. En effet, les genres juridique et poétique attribuent une valeur importante aux signifiants qui les composent. Cependant, nous trouvons que les textes juridiques espagnols exploitent particulièrement la morphosyntaxe pour structurer leurs articles. Pour ces raisons, nous recommandons la prise en compte de l'information morphosyntaxique dans l'analyse chronologique des textes juridiques espagnols.

**Mots-clés** : jurilinguistique ; subjontif ; morphosyntaxe ; chronosyntaxe ; cohérence.

<footnote n="1">¹ École de Management de Normandie. Laboratoire Métis</footnote>
Introduction

Understanding the historical role of subjunctive forms in legal texts is important, given the recommendations of the *Comisión para la modernización del lenguaje jurídico's* final report (2011a). Indeed, the report recommends the suppression of the *-re* form<sup>2</sup>, *cantare*, (from the verb *cantar*, to sing) from legal language (2011a: 11). Recent studies, however, have shown that the *-re* form and its alternatives, the present indicative and the *-se* form, the imperfect subjunctive, *cantase*, may have a specific use in written legal texts (Lavissière 2013; 2017a; in press). For example, it has been shown that the *-re* and the *-se* forms are used in a variety of ways in the Constitutions of Latin America that date from the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Lavissière 2012). In other studies, there seems to be a variation of the way that these forms are used in different genres of Spanish legal texts. There is, however, an important gap in this research: a dynamic theoretical model is needed to understand why the jurist chooses these forms and how the reader processes them in the context of his experience of the larger legal text.

This paper will explore how Macchi’s theory of chronosyntax, (1998, 2005b, 2008) especially his analysis of poetry (2005a), can be applied to Spanish law texts in order to shed light on the role of certain verbal morphologies in Medieval Spanish legal texts. While it may seem surprising to apply the model of poetic analysis to legal literature, we argue below that these two genres have several characteristics in common. Throughout this analysis, we focus on *si* clauses in legal texts as these are one of the major syntactic structures containing the *-re* form and the *-se* form. Medieval texts, especially the *Siete Partidas*, have been chosen for this paper as it is important to first understand the uses of these forms in the history of Spanish to compare them with the uses in modern and contemporary Spanish.

This article will be structured in the following way. First, we will briefly review the roles of
the -re form and the -se form in the Spanish verb system. In this section, we propose an updated
version of Delport’s 2011 model of the subjunctive system. Second, we will summarize the
chronosyntactic theory as explained by Macchi and his findings concerning Spanish poetry.
Third, we will explain the characteristics which the legal genre and poetry have in common.
Fourth, we will analyze several characteristics of legal language as well as law articles with the
insights of the chronosyntactic theory.

1. History and models of the Spanish subjunctive system

In order to understand the use of the -re form and the -se form in legal texts, we explain their history and their place in the Spanish modal system today. In fact, Spanish, as its Iberian neighbor, Portuguese, has the particularity of having several grammatical forms that descend from the Latin perfect system, three of which are part of the subjunctive system<fnref n="3" />: the -se form, the -ra form, and the -re form. Spanish also includes one subjunctive form that descends from the infectum, the -e/-a form. In the following paragraphs, we provide the Latin form from which these contemporary forms descended, examples of syntactic structures where these forms appeared and the interaction that each of these forms had with the -re form.

<footnote n="2">² We will call these forms the *-re* form and the *-se* form, as did Molho, to avoid pre-imposing temporal capacities on these forms (1975).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ While we use the terms *indicative* and *subjunctive* in this paper, there is evidence that they do not accurately describe the verbal paradigms and morphosyntactic behavior of the Spanish modal system. (Luquet 1988; Luquet 2004; Macchi 2005b).</footnote>
1.1. The -re form

First, as stated above, the -re form appears in Spanish legal literature, set expressions, and certain dialects. It descends from a double Latin paradigm:

<table><caption>Table 1. Latin future perfect active indicative, Latin perfect active subjunctive and Spanish -re form.</caption><thead><tr><th>Latin future perfect active indicative</th><th>Latin perfect active subjunctive</th><th>Spanish -re form</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>cantāverō</td><td>cantāverim</td><td>cantare<br>I will have sung</td></tr><tr><td>cantāveris</td><td>cantāveris</td><td>cantares<br>you will have sung</td></tr><tr><td>cantāverit</td><td>cantāverit</td><td>cantare<br>he/she/it/you (sing. pl.) will have sung</td></tr><tr><td>cantāverīmus</td><td>cantāverīmus</td><td>cantáremos<br>we will have sung</td></tr><tr><td>cantāverītis</td><td>cantāverītis</td><td>cantareis<br>you (pl. informal) will have sung</td></tr><tr><td>cantāverint</td><td>cantāverint</td><td>cantaren<br>they/you (pl.) will have sung</td></tr></tbody></table>

In terms of syntactic structures, unlike the other subjunctive forms, the -re form does not appear in complement clauses<fnref n="4" />. It appears in adjective clauses, as can be observed in example (1) below: *lo que cantare*. It appears in adverbial clauses as in example (1) below: *cuando el paje saliere de casa* (Luquet 1988: 123-134, 155-156). Finally, it appears in protases of *si* clauses, as example (2) demonstrates. In all of these syntactic structures, the subordinate clause in which the -re form appears must be subordinated to a main clause containing a verb that includes a futurizing element. In general, these include either a future simple, a present form with a modal meaning such as *querer* (*to want*) or *deber* (*to have to*) or an imperative:

(1) **DAMASIO**: *Bien has entendido, Cornelio, el aviso. A ti toca ahora estar alerta para que cuando el paje saliere de casa entiendas, sin perder un acento, lo que cantare<fnref n="5" />.*

(DAMASIO: *You have heard the warning well, Cornelio. Now it is your turn to be alert so that when the page will have come out<fnref n="6" />*/comes out of the house, you will hear, without missing an accent, what he will have sung*/sings.*)

<footnote n="4">⁴ There is one exception to this rule. The -re form can appear in a complement clause subordinated to a clause that itself contains a -re form. See Luquet for details (1988: 129-130).</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ CORDE. Velásquez de Velasco, Diego Alfonso. (2000) *El celoso Jesús Sepúlveda*. Italy. (Original work published in 1602). Unless otherwise indicated, the translations included in this paper are the author's.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ While this translation is not grammatical in English, it is the closest translation of this form's meaning in Spanish.</footnote>
(5) [...] si alguien había creído reconocer en mí al hijo de ese logroñés tan simpático y con perpleja inocencia había renegado yo de mi padre tres veces antes y después de que *cantase* el gallo, en el más irremediable de los ridículos<fnref n="10" />.

([...]) if someone had thought he saw in me the son of this kind man from Logroño and with a perplexed innocence, I had denied my father three times before and after the cock *crowed*, in the most irremediable of uncomfortable situations).

(6) Pero, si *hubiese ganado* la competición, ¿qué *habría ocurrido*?<fnref n="11" />

(But, if he had won the competition, what *would have happened*?)

In terms of interaction with the -re form, several authors claim that there is alternation between these forms in early Spanish documents, even law documents (Castillo Lluch & López Izquierdo 2010; Porcar Millares 1991). In our study on a corpus including 500 examples<fnref n="12" /> of *si* clauses taken from law texts, we observed what seemed to be some cases of alternation in the *Siete Partidas*, but other cases of alternation were found to the 19th century South American Constitutions (Lavissière 2017a):

(7) [1] Si la Sala *desechase* el

[2] Proyecto en cualesquiera estado de su examen, o *resolviere* que no debe

[3] procederse a votación no se propondrá hasta la sesión del siguiente año<fnref n="13" />.

(If the Chamber rejected the Draft in whatever state of its examination, or will have decided*/decides it must not proceed to its voting, it will not be proposed until the session of the following year.)

### 1.3. The -ra form

Third, the -ra form originally descended from the Latin pluperfect active indicative:

<table><thead><tr><td>Text</td><td>Date</td><td>Chapter or Book</td><td>Number of examples</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Fuero Juzgo</td><td>Between 1200 and 1241</td><td>Book II</td><td>100</td></tr><tr><td>Siete Partidas</td><td>1256-1265, 1295-1312, ca 1325 or 1340</td><td>Third and fourth Partida</td><td>Idem</td></tr><tr><td>Ordenamiento de Alcalá de 1348</td><td>28-02-1348</td><td>Whole text</td><td>Idem</td></tr><tr><td>Leyes de Toro</td><td>07-03-1505</td><td>Whole text</td><td>Idem</td></tr><tr><td>Constitutions (Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay)</td><td>1831,1813, 1830</td><td>Whole texts</td><td>230 total</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ CREA. Conget, José María. (1989) *Todas las mujeres*. Spain.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ CREA. *El Mundo*. (15/08/1995). Spain.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² The corpus included the following texts and examples:</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Argentina, «Proyecto de constitución, para las Provincias unidas del Rio de la Plata», *Constitutions of the World Online*. Available online at <http://www.modern-constitutions.de/nbu.php?page_id=02a1b5a86ff139471c0b1c57f23ac196&show_doc=AA-00-1813-01-27-es&viewmode=image_metadata>, Accessed on 17 February 2016.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 3. The pluperfect active indicative and the -ra paradigms.</caption><thead><tr><td>Latin pluperfect active indicative</td><td>Spanish -ra form</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>cantāveram</td><td>cantara<br/>I had sung (Old Spanish) / that I sing</td></tr><tr><td>cantāveras</td><td>cantaras<br/>you had sung (OS) / that you sing</td></tr><tr><td>cantāverat</td><td>cantara<br/>he / she / it had sung (OS) / that he / she<br/>/ it / you (formal) sing</td></tr><tr><td>cantāverāmus</td><td>cantáramos<br/>we had sung (OS) / that we sing</td></tr><tr><td>cantāverātis</td><td>cantarais<br/>you had sung (OS) / that you sing</td></tr><tr><td>cantāverant</td><td>cantaran<br/>they had sung (OS) / that they – you (pl.<br/>formal) sing</td></tr></tbody></table>

While the -ra form descended from a Latin indicative form and appeared in contexts of alternation with indicative forms in the earliest documents available in Spanish (Chevalier 1984), it expanded to syntactic structures that had originally contained the -se form (Luquet 1988). In contemporary Spanish, the two forms are interchangeable in almost all syntactic structures, except for independent clauses featuring the modals *deber* (*to have to*), *querer* (*to want to*, *to like*), *poder* (*to be able to*) (8):

(8) Si lo consigo, tendré que volver a Costa Rica, embarcarme en un avión y regresar a México para empezar de nuevo. ¿Cómo podré presentarme en México otra vez? Y, sin embargo, quisiera cantar de nuevo en... No sé dónde<fnref n="14" />.

(If I manage it, I will have to return to Costa Rica, take in an airplane and come back to Mexico to start over again. How can I show myself in Mexico again? And, yet, I would like to sing again in... I don't know where).

In the corpus used for this study and for our 2017 study, there were very few -ra forms observed in any syntactic structures and no examples of alternation between the -ra form and the -re form<fnref n="15" />.

1.4. The -e/-a form

Fourth, this system includes the -e/-a form, which is generally called the «present subjunctive», the only subjunctive form in modern Spanish to descend from the infectum in Latin:

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ CREA.Vargas, Chavela. (2002). *Y si quieres saber de mi pasado*. Spain.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Molho, however, provides examples of a three way alternance of the -re, -se, and -ra form in the *Código Civil* (Molho 1975). Several grammarians and linguists also argue that the -ra form may legitimately be used to replace the -re form in protases (Alcina Franch & Blecua 1983) and Lamíquiz sees the -ra form as the heir of the -re form (Lamíquiz 1987: 165). Finally, the Commission recommends that the -re form be replaced by the -ra form in the protases of si clauses (2011). As we shall argue throughout this paper, this replacement would contradict the historical use of these forms, as well as the text coherence use of the -re form.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 3. Latin present active subjunctive and -e/-a form</caption><thead><tr><th>Latin present active subjunctive</th><th>Spanish -e/-a form</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>cantem</td><td>cante<br/>that I sing</td></tr><tr><td>cantēs</td><td>cantes<br/>that you sing (informal sing.)</td></tr><tr><td>cantet</td><td>cante<br/>that he / she / it / you (formal sing.) sing</td></tr><tr><td>cantēmos</td><td>cantemos<br/>that we sing</td></tr><tr><td>cantētis</td><td>cantéis<br/>that you sing (informal pl.)</td></tr><tr><td>cantent</td><td>canten<br/>that they / you (formal pl.) sing</td></tr></tbody></table>

The -e/-a form appears in a wide range of adjective clauses, adverbial clauses and complement clauses which contain a modalizing element such as a negated antecedent or a verb of desire, doubt, etc. However, the -e/-a form has never appeared with any frequency in the protasis of si clauses in Spanish. For this reason, we do not treat its morphosyntactic structures here<fnref n="16" />.

1.5. Model of the Spanish modal system

For this article, we adopt the model of the modal of the Spanish proposed by Delport (2011).

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ In terms of alternation with the -re form, this was restricted to adverbial and adjective clauses see Luquet (1988) for a historical analysis and for an analysis including modern Spanish, see (Bergareche 1990) and (Eberenz 1990). For a complete analysis of the Spanish modal system, see Luquet (1988; 2004). For a list of the different uses and syntactic structures of the -al-e form, see Sastre Ruano (2004).</footnote>
<table><caption>Figure 1. Model of modal system proposed by Delport (2011).</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Before</th><th>Reference Point</th><th>After</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Dependent form</th><td>CANTASE<br>[-se form]</td><td>CANTE<br>[-e/-a form]</td><td>CANTARE<br>[-re form]</td></tr><tr><th>Form with relative autonomy</th><td>CANTARA<br>[-ra form,<br>Medieval use:<br>synthetic<br>pluperfect form;<br>Modern uses are<br>mainly considered<br>subjunctive]</td><td>CANTABA<br>[imperfect indicative]</td><td>CANTARÍA<br>[conditional]</td></tr><tr><th>Form with absolute autonomy</th><td>CANTÉ –<br>CANTÓ [preterit]</td><td>CANTO – CANTA<br>[present indicative]</td><td>CANTARÉ –<br>CANTARÁ<br>[future indicative]</td></tr></tbody></table>

This model is based on the neo-Reichenbachian schema of the Spanish and French verb indicative forms initially proposed by Chevalier (1992). Chevalier identifies four time points, as opposed to Reichenbach’s model which includes three points (1947: 288), whose relationships make up the tense or aspect of the verb. Chevalier defines these time points as the following:

1) time point where the utterer is located (T LOC *temps du locuteur*). This point is always located in the present as the utterer always speaks from the present;

2) time point where the observer (T OBS *temps de l'observateur*), the mental image that the utterer creates of himself;

3) time point where event takes place (T EV);

4) time point where the actor is engaged in the event (T ACT).

Delport’s model (2011) differs from that proposed by Luquet in his later work, which rejects the *indicative / subjunctive* dichotomy in Spanish (2004). In its place, Luquet proposes a dichotomy based on the distinction of grammatically *actualized* forms – those connected to the present of the utterer – and *inactualized* forms – verb forms which are not directly connected to the utterer (2004: 34-36). Citing temporal and syntactical reasons, Delport does not class the imperfect, *cantaba*, and the conditional, *cantaría*, in the same category as the traditionally called subjunctive, forms *cante*, *cantase*, *cantara*, *cantare*. However, she integrates several of Luquet’s observations about the virtualizing capacities of the imperfect and conditional into her model above (2011), including the lack of distinction between the 1st and 3rd person in paradigms which have virtualizing capacities (Molho 1980; Luquet 2004; Macchi 2005b).

We adopt Delport’s model because we agree with her observation that syntactical information, such as the capacity of the imperfect and the conditional to appear in independent clauses, should not be ignored. However, there seems to be two major problems with her model. The distinctions in the columns *before*, *reference point* and *after* are not completely clear. In other
words, which of the time points T LOC, T OBS, T EV and T ACT, is *before*, *reference point*, or *after*? We propose, therefore, an amended version of her model:

<table><caption>Figure 1. Amended version of Delport's 2011 model.</caption><tr><td><strong>Dependent configuration:</strong></td><td><strong>T. OBS<sub>2</sub> before</strong><br>T. EV<sub>2</sub> and<br>T. ACT<sub>2</sub> and<br>T. LOC<sub>1</sub> of main verb</td><td><strong>T. OBS<sub>2</sub> can be</strong><br>located at <strong>same point</strong><br>as T. EV<sub>2</sub> and T. ACT<sub>2</sub><br>and T. LOC<sub>1</sub> of main verb</td><td><strong>T. OBS<sub>2</sub> after</strong> T. EV<sub>2</sub><br>and T. ACT<sub>2</sub> and<br>T. LOC<sub>1</sub> of main verb</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Dependent forms</strong></td><td>QUISIESE</td><td>QUIERA</td><td>QUISIERE</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Relative autonomy<br>configuration:</strong></td><td><strong>T. EV and T. ACT<br>before T. OBS,<br>which is before<br>T. LOC</strong></td><td><strong>T. EV and T. ACT at<br>the same point as<br>T. OBS, which is<br>before T. LOC</strong></td><td><strong>T. EV and T. ACT at<br>the after T. OBS,<br>which is before<br>T. LOC</strong></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Form with relative<br>autonomy</strong></td><td>QUISIERA<br>(Medieval<br>indicative uses)<sup>17</sup></td><td>QUERÍA</td><td>QUERRÍA</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Absolute autonomy<br>configuration:</strong></td><td><strong>T. EV and T. ACT<br>before T. OBS,<br>which is at the<br>same point at<br>T. LOC</strong></td><td><strong>T. EV and T. ACT at<br>the same point as<br>T. OBS, which is also<br>at the same point at<br>T. LOC</strong></td><td><strong>T. EV and T. ACT<br>after T. OBS, which<br>is also at the same<br>point at T. LOC</strong></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Forms with absolute<br>autonomy</strong></td><td>QUISE – QUISO</td><td>QUIERO – QUIERE</td><td>QUERRÉ – QUERRÁ</td></tr></table>

In the first line of this model, the *dependent forms*, it is the position of the observer that is the determining factor. In the second line, *forms with relative autonomy*, the observer is always located in the anteriority of the utterer (thus, before the utterer's present). In the third line, *forms with absolute autonomy*, the relationship between the T OBS and T LOC remains stable: they are found in the same epoch. Here, what varies is the relationship between the event and the actor, on the one hand, and the utterer and the observer, on the other hand. Because this fact will be essential our morphosyntactic analysis, we emphasize that *the observer is the essential factor in determining the -re form's difference from the -se form*.

A second weakness of Delport's model, and this extends to all of the models mentioned in this literature review, is that the verb is spacialized rather than represented as a temporal entity. This is Macchi's criticism of models such as Reichenbach's (1947) and one of the foundations of his chronosyntax theory (Macchi 2008: 176). In his 2005 article, Macchi elaborates a model that takes into account the linear and temporal nature of how verb forms are formed (2005b). He proposes a model of the Spanish verbal paradigm that is not directly spacialized. Concerning

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ We do not propose a model for the contemporary uses of the *-ra* form, which alternates with the *-se* form in all uses except for certain uses of the *-ra* form with modal verbs and the renaissance of “indicative” uses of the *-ra* form in journalistic genres (Molho 1988). A preliminary hypothesis would be that in contemporary Spanish, while there is still a separation of the T OBS from the pair T EV-T ACT, the position of the T OBS has become blurry. This would account for the diverse and sometimes contradictory effects attributable to the form, many of which seem to be based on the mere separation one time point from the present and from the event (Molho 1988: 630-633). This remains, however, a simple hypothesis to be developed in our future research.</footnote>
the -re, -se, and -ra forms, however, he points back to the work of Luquet and Chevalier (2005b: 184).

2. Chronosyntax and legal texts

2.1. The theory of chronosyntax and its application to poetry

While Macchi’s model does not include a new vision of the -re and the -se forms, his analysis of the sentence as an essentially temporal phenomenon allows a new perspective of analysis for the role of these forms in legal texts. Macchi’s chronosyntactic studies show that the syntax of a sentence unfolds linearly during the process of uttering, causing the signification<fnref n="18" /> of certain words to be ambiguous for the receiver until the other words have been added or until the sentence is finished (2005a: 46). In addition, he emphasizes that a certain length of time is necessary both for the utterance of the sentence and for its reconstruction in the mind of the receiver (2008b: 152-153). Building on these two observations, the theory of chronosyntax highlights and explains the following three points:

1) the signification of a sentence, while directly communicated by its signifiers, is not clear to the receiver until the final constituent is uttered;

2) the signification of the signifiers may be equally undetermined until the final constituent is
uttered (Macchi 2008b);

3) the receiver may actually misinterpret the signification of a signifier before the end of the sentence (Macchi 2005a).

Macchi compares the reconstruction of the sentence by the receiver to the chemical reactions that take place during the making of a recipe rather than to the construction of a wall with stones (2008b: 145). Each new ingredient binds with those added earlier, forming a whole whose signification is more than a simple sum of its elements. For this reason, the signifiers included in a sentence may even change significations as the instants of time unfold (2008b: 161).

In his article about poetic texts, Macchi argues that poets take particular advantage of the nature of the time-sensitive nature of the sentence, even to the point of engaging in «mental manipulation» to create a singular experience for their readers (Macchi 2005a: 50). The receivers are obliged to question or to revise what they thought was the signification of the sentence as new elements are added and an alternative syntactic structure of the sentence is revealed (Macchi 2005a).

**2.2. Common characteristics of poetry and legal literature**

While at first they may seem fundamentally opposed, the legal genre<fnref n="19" /> and poetry share three characteristics. First, both have an essentially linguistic and conceptual existence, although this existence has a clear impact on the phenomenal world when legal language is interpreted by legal professionals or poetry is experienced by a reader or a listener. Nevertheless, law, especially in civil law countries, refers to a set of cultural norms, which do not have an existence

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ The term *signification* is defined by Macchi as the momentary conception of the referent which the speaker aims to evoke (2000: 180). This definition is clearly based on the utterer’s point of view. From the receiver’s point of view it is the momentary conception of the particular referent that the speaker aims to evoke.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ It would be more accurate to speak of «legal genres» as Gotti called the different types of legal texts (2012). However, to simplify, we speak of the «legal genre» generally in this article.</footnote>
in the phenomenal world. Mattila (2012: 28) underlines this non-concrete nature of law when he writes, «law does not exist in the physical world but has been created by human beings».

Second, legal language, like poetic language, does not, «dissolve in the final silence to which all words, barely born, know they are condemned<fnref n="20" />» (Macchi 2005a: 38). The words of law must remain, at least partially, in the mind of the receiver because the interpretation of the legal sentence must be attached to the signifiers used to evoke it<fnref n="21" />. In this way, as opposed to non legal prose, which «[...] aspires only to abolish itself and to dissolve entirely in reference to the world<fnref n="22" />», poetry (Macchi 2005a: 38) and legal language aspire to remain in the mind of the receiver, albeit through different linguistic mechanisms and with different goals. Macchi asserts that poetic language resists annihilation through the poet's choice of unique signifiers and syntactic structures, which inseparately bind the meaning of the sentence to its linguistic unicity. The receiver of poetic language, therefore, remembers and contemplates the words and sentences of poetry, which, despite his greatest efforts, remain a partial mystery (Macchi 2005a: 38). Because legal language also seeks to have its signifiers remain in the mind, legal language, like poetic language, violates standard language norms<fnref n="23" />. Gotti highlights this in his article about the legal genre, «The avoidance of the use of standard textual norms in favour of “deviant” options is not at all arbitrary, but derives from the main pragmatic principales typical of the legal field» (Gotti 2012: 52).

While attachment to signifiers is important to the legal genre, it has very different objectives and strategies from poetry. Its objective is not to render legal meaning mysterious, but, on the contrary, to leave no doubt about the logic and the correctness of the principales unlying the law and the details about its application and procedures (Gotti 2012: 52). Legal language seeks to impose its order, both notional and procedural, as the logical and correct order to be applied to the phenomenal world. Indeed, confronted with a phenomenal world that may or may not correspond to the order it constructs linguistically, legal langauge seeks to maintain its terms, and the relationships it imposes among terms through syntax in the mind of the reader of the law. The goal of legal language is then the opposite of that of poetic language. In legal language, the margin for interpretation must be reduced and possibility for ambiguity or misinterpretation minimized. In order to attain these goals, the legal sentence, seen as the basic syntactic unit, tends 1) to be longer and 2) to contain more subordinated clauses (Hiltunen 2012: 41).

Third, like poetry, «legislative texts are not in the first place intended to be read like more
ordinary texts» (Hiltunen 2012: 42). Indeed, legal texts are written, «[...] for professionals and
for reference. The texts are likely to be consulted selectively, often with just one particular
detail in mind. [...] They constitute works of reference, where information can be looked up,
checked, and if necessary followed up in other acts, including those of other domains within
the network of legislation» (Hiltunen 2012: 42). Legal texts’ status as works of reference is

<footnote n="20">²⁰ « [...] se dissoudre dans le silence final auquel toute parole, à peine née, se sait par avance condamnée. »</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ This is not to say that the law is strictly contained in the legal language, as interpretation plays an important part of legal culture. Legal interpretation is a highly complicated phenomenon as many legal scholars and linguistics have shown (Solan 2012; Bennett 2012; Bix 2012). However, linguists agree that the aim of legal language, and even the aims of its deviations from the standard language norm, have the objective of limiting the range of interpretations possible (Gotti 2012: 54).</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² « [...] n'aspire qu'à s'abolir et à se dissoudre entièrement dans la référence du monde. »</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ Like Gotti, we point out that the unicity of the wording of certain law texts has historically been an important characteristic of the legal genre, for example, legal oaths (2012: 52). Gotti also cites a dialogue in which the defendant admits to committing the illegal act four times, but does not use the correct terminology, «I plead guilty». The legal clerk and magistrate try to explain that the exact wording must to used, to no avail (2012: 57-58). Tiersma cites a case in 2009, during which US Chief Justice Roberts did not perfectly administer the oath of office to President Obama and repeated the ceremony the following day to ensure its validity (2012: 20).</footnote>
essential to understanding their structure. Macchi’s analysis highlights the temporal reception
of the text and provides insight into the nature of this structure.

3. Structure in legal texts

**3.1. Macrostructure of legal texts**

As pointed out above, legal texts are texts of reference and are not meant to be read like other
texts. For this reason, legal texts provide a specific physical format in order to guide its readers.
In this way, the text must do two things. First, it must have coherent divisions that allow the
reader to quickly access information without reading the entire document, especially in longer
documents. Such divisions vary according to the legal culture and the epoch, but in the corpus
used here, for example, they can include books, subsections, laws, titles, articles, paragraphs,
etc. For example, in the Spanish Medieval code of law, *Siete Partidas*, the first division is into
*partida* (*part* or *book*) and the second division is called *título* (*title*):

(9) Aqui comienc'a<n> los *titulos* dela ter-
c'era partida.

(Here start the *titles* of the third *book*.)
the third division is called *ley* (*law*):

(10) *Ley* quinzena[.] en quales cosas deue
ser auisado el d<e>mandador en fazer
la demanda

(Fifteenth *law* [...] what details the plaintiff should
know when deciding to file
a lawsuit)

This is not the only possible hierarchy of divisions in a text. However, the hierarchization of
legal texts allows for their exploitation as reference texts.
Secondly, it must be possible to move from cases that are more specific to cases that are more
general or to other specific cases. This second type of referencing often takes place in the text
of the article following the law above (15th law of the second title):

(11) % Catar deue el demandador no tan sola mente
aquien faze su demanda en iuyzio assi como en
estas leyes diximos mas avn que cosa es aquel-
la que quiere demandar

(The plaintiff should not only know
with whom he should file his lawsuit,
as we have stipulated in these laws, but also
for what he wants to sue)

In other texts, the number of the law or the article is sometimes mentioned:
(12) Las decisiones de las Cortes Generales previstas en los artículos 94, 1, 145, 2, y 158, 2, se adoptarán por mayoría de cada una de las Cámaras. [...]<fnref n="24" />

(Article 74: The decisions of the Parliament specified in *Articles 94 (1), 145 (2), and 158 (2)* shall be adopted by the majority of each of the Chambers. [...] <fnref n="25" />)

The format and the embedded reference information allow the reader to quickly access information without reading the entire law document. In this way, these references allow the reader to escape the process of chronosyntax by gaining access to material which is not fully integrated into the chronosyntactic process that Macchi describes. Physical macrostructure of law texts, for example, books or volumes, laws, direct references to other laws or articles within the text of the articles themselves, is one strategy that the jurist uses to inform, but also to impose a certain classification of the phenomenal world on his reader. This strategy allows the reader to escape, to a certain extent, the flow of time that chronosyntax would impose on him, because references to other parts of the document or to other law documents allow the reader to exit the temporal process imposed by syntax in his search for information.

## 3.2. Microstructure of law articles

The jurist also creates a microstructure in his text. We define microstructure as the structure *within* the articles of law. Legal linguists include four strategies for creating this microstructure. First, strategic physical formatting remains one of the jurists’ tools. For example, the prose of the article may be organized into numbered lists or into paragraphs. Gotti calls this *textual schematization* (2012: 59-60). Second, the jurist uses discourse markers to show semantic relationships between paragraphs and sentences (Alcaraz Varó & Hughes 2009: 128-129). Gotti uses Bhatia’s term *textual mapping* (1987) to refer to certain adverbials found in English law texts, such as *hereto*, *herein*, *hereof* and *thereto* (2012: 56). Third, Gotti, like Alcaraz Varó & Hughes (2009), highlights the importance of conjunctions in creating coherence and structure in law texts (2012: 56-57). Fourth, the jurist’s syntactic choices also create microstructure.

In fact, syntactic choices largely participate in the coherence of a law article. In contrast to other types of discourse for special purposes, in legal texts there is a clear preference for hypotaxes rather than parataxes (Hiltunen 2012: 43; Alcaraz Varó & Hughes 2009: 115-118). Hypotaxes are preferred for two reasons. First, the sentence is considered an independent unit in statutory texts (Hiltunen 2012: 42), Second, hypotaxes impose a relationship between clauses, therefore limiting the interpretation of the relationship, one of the prime objectives of legal language. However, complex sentences involving subordinate clauses often «interrupt the linear flow of information» for the reader (Hiltunen 2012: 42). Their complexity often makes several readings necessary and can lead to the same effects of «double signification» as Macchi identifies in his chronosyntactic analyses.

## 3.3. Intraphrastic chronosyntax and interphrastic coherence in law

In dealing with written law texts, the reader must take into account many subordinate clauses. These clauses push his memory to its limits and often require multiple readings. Because of the syntactic complexity of legal texts, we identify two types of chronosyntactic processes that the reader confronts. First, as in all texts, the reader deals with intraphrastic chronosyntax, the

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Spain. (1978) *La Constitución española*. Available at http://www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/titulos/articulos.jsp?ini=66&fin=96&tipo=2, Accessed on 7 March 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Spain. (1978) The Spanish Constitution (A. Tschentscher, Trans.) Available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sp00000_.html, Accessed on 7 March 2018.</footnote>
chronosyntax within a sentence. Second, however, the reader also must process the interphrastic coherence strategies, the processes in a paragraph or article of law that allow signification to become clearer as the article is developped. To illustrate the importance of this distinction for law texts, we apply Macchi’s theories to the law articles from the *Siete Partidas* (13). In order to faithfully record the chronosyntactic process and some of the resulting ambiguities, we provide a literal translation below<fnref n="26" />.

(13)[1] Enplazado seye<n>do alguno que fuese debdor
[2] de otro q<ue> viniese ante el iudgador por razo<n> de
[3] su contender q<ue>le demandaua q<ue>le refiziese carta
[4] de debda q<ue> auia co<n>tra el por q<ue>la primera auia
[5] perdida assi como diximos enla ley ante desta
[6] si este atal fuere rebelde q<ue> non queria venir o
[7] enbiar personero q<ue>la contradiga entonc'e deue
[8] el iudgador tomar la iura a aquel que pide la
[9] carta en aq<ue>lla misma manera q<ue> de suso diximos
[10] & demas deuele co<n>iurar q<ue> no es pagado de aq<ue>l-
[11] la debda de q<ue>le pide q<ue>le faga la carta.

([1] Summonned being someone who was a debtor
[2] of another who came before the judge? /that he come before the judge? because of
[3] his adversary that was asking him to remake the document
[4] about the debt that he had against him because the first he had
[5] lost as we said in the law before this one
[6] if this one aforementioned was rebellious that he did not want to come
[7] nor to send a representation to contradict it then must
[8] the judge accept the oath of that one who asked for the
[9] document in the manner that is described above
[10] & also he must swear to him concerning that
[11] debt for which he is asking that the document be edited that it is not paid.)

In this article, the legal situation involves three masculine singular animate beings, the debtor, the loaner and the judge as well as one inanimate object, the document regarding the debt that someone, either debtor or loaner, has claimed to be lost and has asked to be reedited. The signification of this sentence is affected not only by the chronosyntactic structure of the sentence, but also by sentences that follow it. If the reader only reads this sentence, the first of the article, he is confronted with several ambiguities. For example, in line [1] the role of *que* (*that, which, who*) is clearly to introduce a relative clause describing *alguno* as a debtor. However, in line [2], *que* could either subordinate a relative clause to *otro* (*other*), who is the loaner, or could be interpreted as [*para*] *que* (*so that*) that introduces an adverbial clause incident to the verb *emplazar*. The signification of the word *que* affects in turn the signification of *contendor* line [3]: does *que* in line [2] introduce a relative clause whose antecedent is *otro*

<footnote n="26">²⁶ We also propose a less literal translation here:
A debtor to another party having been summoned to come before the judge
because his adversary asked that the document regarding the debt be reedited as aforementioned adversary had
lost the first document,
loss described in the law before this one,
if this debtor refuses to come or to send a representative to contradict the document then
the judge must accept the oath of that one who asked for the document
in the same manner as we stipulated hereabove
& in addition, the loaner must swear that the debt in question has not been paid.</footnote>
(the *loaner*) the gene of the verb *venir* and who came to court because his adversary (the *debtor*) asked that the document concerning the loan be reedited? Or does *que* introduces the reason for which the debtor is summoned to court, and in this case, the gene of the verb *venir* is the debtor?

The answer to the semantico-syntactic puzzle comes several lines later. In fact, it is not until line [20] through line [23] that we can be sure that the debtor and the person who asked that the document concerning the debt be reedited are not the same person.

(13cont.) [12] E despu-

[13] es q<ue> esta iura ouiere rec'ebida del. deue ma<n>dar

[14] al escriuano q<ue>la refaga & que gela de. E el escri-

[15] ua<no> d<e>uelo fazer. Pero en<e>l logar d<e>la carta do escri-

[16] uiere su no<n>bre deue tener aq<ue>lla misma forma q<ue>

[17] diximos enla ley sobredicha saluo que faga me<n>-

[18] cion de como el debdor fue enplazado & non

[19] quiso venir nin enbiar a contradezir la carta.

[20] Mas si el debdor fuesse enplazado assi como d<e>

[21] suso diximos & viniese ante el iudgador & nega-

[22] se que non era debdor de aquel que demanda-

[23] ua la carta & contradixiese que non la refiziese.

[24] estonc'e deue el iudgador dar le plazo a q<ue> prue-

[25] ue como pago aquella debda & si no la pudie-

[26] re prouar deue rec'ebir la iura de aquel que de-

[27] mandadaua la carta enla manera que de suso dixi-

[28] mos & mandar al escriuano quela refaga & que

[29] gela de & el escriuano deuelo fazer assi como de

[30] suso es dicho.

([12] And after

[13] this oath has been received from him, he should order

[14] that the court clerk reedit it and give it to him. And the court clerk

[15] must do it. But in the location on the document where he will have written

[16] his name it must have the same form that

[17] we said in the above law except it must mention

[18] how the debtor was summoned & refused to

[19] come or to send in order to contradict the document.

[20] *But if the debtor were summoned as*

[21] we explained above & came before the judge &

[22] denied that he was a debtor of that one who was asking

[23] *for the card & contradicted that it be reedited*

[24] then the judge must give him a term that he

[25] prove how he paid that debt & if he will not have been able

[26] to prove it, he must accept the oath of that one who

[27] was asking for the document in the manner that we describe above

[28] & order the clerk to reedit it & give it to him

[29] and the court clerk must act in this way

[30] as is described above.)

If we return to lines [2] to [3], the critical turning point for interpretation of the signification of *contendor* and other signifiers after line [4] is the interpretation of the signification *que viniese*. Retrospectively, after reading lines [20] through [23] we know that *que viniese* is an adverbial clause describing an objective and not a relative adjective phrase describing *otro*. The theory
of chronosyntax, therefore, explains that the signification of a signifier can be ambiguous before the end of a sentence. Here, however, a chronosyntactic analysis shows that in law texts, it is necessary not only to consider the direct cotext of the sentence, but also to consider the article of law, including the title. The interconnectedness of the entire article of law, including the title, is then essential for understanding the full signification of the signifiers that make of the sentence or sentences in question.

### 3.4. Chronomorphosyntax and structure of legal texts

For this reason, we claim that legal texts not only call on syntax as a coherence tool in the creation of microstructure in law articles, but also on morphology, in particular, verbal morphology. We argue for a «chronomorphosyntax» of law texts. To illustrate the importance of this concept, we present how the -re and -se forms are used to create microstructure in the articles of law, as in Law 11 below. The article of law presents several possible outcomes of a situation that is described in the title of the law and in the first sentence of the article:

(14) Ley onze[.] Como el escriuano deue
refazer la carta quando aq<ue>l aquien
fue fecha fuese e<n>plazado & no quisi-
ese venir o si viniese la co<n>tra[+]dixiese

(Law 11 [.] How the court clerk must
reedit the document when the person about whom
it was edited was summoned & refused
to come or if he came, he contested it)

The title of Law 11 provides for two situations that are then detailed in its article. The first is when the person concerned by the document refuses to come to court. This first situation is detailed in lines [1] – [19]. The lines [20] – [30] give the details of the second situation: the person comes to court, but contests the document. Within these two situations, there are several substeps. We analyze these situations and substeps in terms of the verb forms chosen in the table below:

<table><caption>Figure 2. Analysis of form versus information structure in example (13)-(14).</caption><thead><tr><th>Situation Layout</th><th>Description</th><th>Lines</th><th>Verb forms</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Situation 1</td><td>Debtor is summoned and refuses to come</td><td>Lines [1]-[19]</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Substep 1a</td><td>Debtor is summoned because loaner has lost debt document</td><td>Lines [1]-[5]</td><td>-se form, imperfect, preterit</td></tr><tr><td>Substep 1b</td><td>Debtor refuses summons</td><td>Lines [6]-[12]</td><td>-re form, imperfect, preterit</td></tr><tr><td>Substep 1c</td><td>Document is reedited without debtor</td><td>Lines [13]-[19]</td><td>-re form, preterit</td></tr><tr><td>Situation 2</td><td>Debtor comes to court and contests the reediting</td><td>Lines [20]-[30]</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Substep 2a</td><td>Debtor comes to court and contests the reediting</td><td>Lines [20]-[25]</td><td>-se form</td></tr><tr><td>Substep 2b</td><td>Debtor cannot prove that he paid the</td><td>Lines [25]-[30]</td><td>-re form, imperfect, preterit</td></tr></tbody></table>
The alternation of the -se form and the -re form seems to add morphology to the list of microstructure strategies used by the jurist. Specifically, when one of the situations detailed in the title is mentioned in the article, the -se form is used to introduce this situation. When a new substep is added, the -re form is used. The jurist, exploiting the mobility of the observer in the -re and -se form, seems to guide his reader through the dense syntax of the article. Both forms are dependent forms according to Delport’s model presented in section 2.1.5. above, meaning that they are both semantically and syntactically subordinated. In this way, the -re form may allow the jurist to signal a move forward to new information<fnref n="27" /> and the -se form may allow a move backwards to information that has already been mentioned (the -se form). The jurist, therefore, shows an awareness of the temporal nature of syntax and guides his reader through overall structure of the information not only through syntax, but also through morphology.

While we would argue that this is true of all morphological choices, the -re form, in concert with the -se form, seem to fill a specific role in maintaining coherence in the complex syntax of a law article. Basing our reasoning on the model proposed by Delport (2011), as well as Macchi’s analysis of chronomorphogenesis (2005b), we can claim that these two forms carry the semantics of dependence in their form. Because the -se and the -re forms carry the semantics of dependence, they reinforce their place in the hierarchy of syntax while this hierarchy unfolds. In other words, they reiterate that they are syntactically and semantically dependent. They serve as vertical reminders, depth gauges, of syntax structure. These forms signal to the reader that he must remember that he is at a deeper level of syntax or at a level of semantic meaning that is dependent on another<fnref n="28" />. They signal that the reader must remember or must look for information elsewhere. They also, it may argued, guide the reader horizontally, towards a perspective placed in the «already read or already said» for the -se form or a perspective in the «yet to come» for the form in -re. It is the movement of the observer that allows them to direct the attention of the reader horizontally. For this reason, we argue that law articles should be analyzed not only chronosyntactically, but also chronomorphosyntactically.

3.4.1. The -re form and its rhetorical use

The -re form for example, seems not only to signal syntactic, but also notional dependence. It
is used to signal that information is exceptional or specific as compared to the base or
underlying case. We call this use the *rhetorical* use that can be seen in an example from the
*Fuero Juzgo*:

<footnote n="27">²⁷ It is important to note that the introduction of a -re form does not entail a shift of the entire situation to the future. On the contrary, past forms continue to appear after the -re form, as we equally observed in our 2017 study and Castillo & López observe in their study (Castillo & López 2010).</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ To use the adjective «deeper» is to fall into the trap using spatial metaphors for syntax. Perhaps a more accurate description is one of signaling incompleteness, such as a musical chord that lacks a tone or a piece of music that ends on an unexpected note and leaves the hearer wondering if the piece is finished or not, or simply with a sense of incompleteness. These signals of embeddedness seems to echo the «totem theory» presented in the film *Inception* (2010). In the film, the characters create different levels of embedded dreams in order to plant an idea in someone. As they create multiply embedded levels, they risk losing the sense of reality and becoming imprisoned in the dream. For this reason, the characters must choose an item whose behavior will show them that they are still in a dimension of imagined reality and have not reached «the top level». The main character chooses a spinning top, which never stops spinning until it reaches the top level. The -re and -se forms are perhaps the kind of «totem» for the jurist's reader. They indicate that their level of syntax or their place in the notional hierarchy is not the top level.</footnote>
(15)[1] ca si la cabec'a es sana auera razon en si por

[2] q<ue> podera sanar todos l<os> ot<r><<<o>>s menbrios. mas

[3] si la cabec'a *fuer* enferma n<on> podera dar sa-

[4] lut alos ot<r><<<o>>s menbrios q<ue> n<on> lo a<n> ensi.

([1] because if the head is healthy it will hold within it

[2] that which will be able to heal all the other members. but

[3] if the head will have been sick* it will not be

[4] to give health to the other member that it does not have itself.)

In this use, the appearance of the -re form in a sentence signals to the reader that he must search for or remember information that was already mentioned or inferred and on which relevance of the new information depends. In the example above, the -re seems to signal that the situation to *be sick* is not the natural state of the human head, but a change from the natural state of the head. The natural state is, according to the jurist, to *be healthy*, which is described in first line. This is a strategy that aims to structure the notional and hierarchical relationships behind the law, for example: *mind that is healthy* is the status quo, as opposed to *mind that is unhealthy* which is a derivation of the normal situation.

3.4.2. The -re and -se forms and their deictic use

The jurist can also choose both the -re and -se forms for discourse reason, perhaps as a strategy to counterbalance the length of the sentences and to help the reader recall where in the flow of information he is situated. As we argued in our 2017 study and 2018 article, this exploits the movement of the observer towards future time or towards the past time. We call this use the *deictic use*. It can be seen in the example (16) below:

(16) [1] Ley diezeocho[.] que derecho es si se

[2] pierde la cosa sin culpa del tenedor della.]

[3]% Aue o bestia o sieruo q<ue> algu<n>o ouiese tenido

[4] en su poder si despues sele *fuese* sin su culpa no

[5] faziendo el ay engan<n>o ni falsedad no sabiendo

[6] q<ue> gelo q<ue>rian dema<n>dar lo ouiese enbiado aorta

[7] parte tan luen<n>e q<ue> lo no pudiese auer luego que

[8] gelo dema<n>dase<n> para mostrarlo en iuyzio ental

[9] razon como esta ni en otra semeia<n>te della no es

[10] *tenudo* el dema<n>dado delo mostrar. Pero si aq<ue>l

[11] aquien demanda<n> *dixiere* q<ue> maguer q<ue> no la tiene

[12] aq<ue>lla cosa q<ue> ha derecho enella ento<n>c'e *deue* dar fiador

[13] q<ue> si *tornare* en su poderio q<ue> la demostra-

[14] ra en iuyzio. Mas si por[ ]auentura el d<e>mandado

[15] *dixiese* que aquella cosa no la tiene ni se quería

[16] trabaiar de cobrarla ni la anparar maguer la co-

[17] brase el q<ue> aq<ue>sto fiziese en tal razon d<e>zimos que

[18] si el no la desanparo engan<n>osamente por su cul-

[19] pa non es *tenudo* de responder mas por ella ni

[20] dar fiador.

(16) [1] Law eighteen[.] what law stipulates if

[2] the thing is lost by no fault of its holder

[3] Bird or beast or serf that someone held

[4] in his power if afterwards it left without his being to blame,
[5]with no trickery nor falsehood nor his knowing
[6] that they wanted to ask him for it, he sent it to another
[7] place so far away that he could not have it when
[8] they asked him to show it in the court, neither for this
[9] reason nor for another similar reason, is
[10] the defendant obligated to show it. But if he
[11] to whom they asked will have said* that even if he does not hold
[12] this that he has a right to it, then, he must guarantee
[13] that if it returns to his power that will show
[14] it to the court. But if by chance the defendant said
[15] he does not have that thing nor wants to try to recover it
[16] nor even exercise his retain to keep it if he recovers it,
[17] he who did this in the way we describe
[18] if he did not purposely retain it by trickery
[19] he does not have to answer for it anymore
[20] nor for provide a guarantee.)

In the title of this law, the different situations are not outlined. It is in the body of the article that three different possible outcomes are detailed.

<table><caption>**Figure 3. Analysis of form versus information structure in examples (16).**</caption><thead><tr><td>Situation Layout</td><td>Situation description</td><td>Lines</td><td>Verb forms</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Situation 1</td><td>If the bird, beast or serf left through no fault of the possessor, the possessor is not held accountable</td><td>Lines [3]–[10]</td><td>-se form</td></tr><tr><td>Situation 2</td><td>If the possessor will have claimed* rights to the bird, beast or serf, he must give a guarantee to the judge that he will show it if it returns</td><td>Lines [10]–[14]</td><td>-re form</td></tr><tr><td>Situation 3</td><td>If the possessor claimed that he has no interest in recovering the bird, beast or serf nor in exercising rights over it, he is not held accountable nor does he have to provide a guarantee</td><td>Lines [14] –[20]</td><td>-se form</td></tr></tbody></table>

The introduction of each alternative situation is linked with the change to a new form. We note, however, that the -re form builds on a situation that has already been introduced. The underlying situation is that someone who was formerly in possession of the animal or person lost possession of this animate being. The -re form adds new information, the former possessor claims some right to the animate being that has escaped his possession. In this way, the -re form, as we argued above, seems to build on a base situation, one that has been previously introduced. At the same time, the -re form moves the article forward by introducing new information. The -se form, at least in the *Siete Partidas*, seems to introduce hypothetical situations or to return to a base situation, as in law article in example (16).

Conclusion

In the examples above, we observe patterns of information structure that seem to be linked to morphosyntactical patterns. Through these patterns, it seems that the jurist exploits the chronological nature of syntax in the sentence. Macchi's observations about the temporal nature of syntax and the processing of syntax, therefore, provide an important framework for understanding these patterns. Using Macchi's theory, we can argue that the jurist takes into
consideration the temporal factor in creating a microstructure in a paragraph or an article of law.

While Macchi limits his analysis to chronosyntax in the articles cited here, however, we argue that the jurist also enlists morphology in his microstructure strategies. This chronomorphosyntax creates notional hierarchies (rhetorical uses of the -re form) and guides the reader through complex syntax (deictic uses of the -re and -se form). In this way, chronomorphosyntax guides the reader of legal texts through a sentence, but also across sentences and even across several articles of law in the section of law document.

However, as has been observed in previous studies (Lavissière 2012; 2013; 2017a; 2017b), it seems that the patterns of alternation between the -re form and the -se form are not strictly uniform. In diachrony, there seems to be two examples of this lack of uniformity. First, there seems to be less -se forms present in the protases of si clauses in shorter and more pragmatic texts, such as the *Ordenamientos* than in the *Siete Partidas* (2017a; 2017b). The patterns of variation are also different in synchrony. For example, in the 19th century Constitutions of Latin America, in some documents the -se form has a transcendent aspect when it appears in the protasis (2012). Other documents, as exemplified by (7) in this article, contain both the -se and the -re forms in the same protasis. To better understand the distribution of these morphosyntactical patterns, therefore, the notion of chronomorphosyntax needs to be operationalized in statistical studies of legal texts both in diachrony and in synchrony.

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