At the global level, migration is approached as a matter of international relations. There are a number of universal declarations and international treaties relating to migration: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 says that every human being has the right to leave a country, including one's own. The Geneva Convention of 1951 protects refugees and defines the necessary criteria for being granted this status. While refugees have universal protection from the Geneva Convention of 1951, which was first written to apply only to Europeans, then enlarged in 1967 and 1969 to extend to the whole world, migrants lack such general and universal rights, because they are governed by the laws of immigration states, which define rights of entry, work, and settlement at the national level. Most countries in the Global South do not have any immigration nor refugee policies, and few of them are signatories of the International Convention on Refugees (1951), or of those on statelessness (1954), equality of social rights at work with nationals (ILO resolutions N° 97 and 143), or children's rights (1989). In 1990, after ten years of work, the United Nations invited Member States to sign the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW). This convention, now signed by 56 countries – all from the Global South except for Kosovo and Montenegro – does not provide any innovations or access to new rights. It simply refers to all rights already existing in the world for migrant workers, while granting some minimum rights to irregular migrants. For this reason, no immigration country of the Global North has signed the Convention. However, Southern countries who signed this convention with the aim of protecting their nationals abroad often encounter difficulties when they are themselves confronted with immigrants, as new immigration countries.

### 5.2.1 Towards an International Governance of Migration

Since 2003, the idea that migration would be better managed at a larger level than the nation state began to emerge in Geneva, with the Geneva Migration Group of experts.

The project to develop a system for the global governance of migration was launched by Kofi Annan, General Secretary of the United Nations in 2006 (Badie et al., 2008). He was interested in a process undertaken in Geneva in 2003 by several international organisations and NGOs, which aimed to open up a broader reflection on migration (the GMG, “Geneva Migration Group”, and later “Global Migration Group”, established in 2003, which rapidly gathered 17 participant organisations). In 2016 Kofi Annan undertook to create a High Level Dialogue at the United Nations headquarters in New York, followed by annual meetings of the Global Forum on Migration and Development in Brussels (2007), Manilla (2008), Athens (2009), Puerto Vallarta (2010), Geneva (2011), Mauritius (2012), Stockholm (2014), Istanbul (2015), and Berlin (2017). The United Nations organised a second High level Dialogue in New York in 2013.

The main idea behind this project is to draw on a larger body of expertise and to create space for multilateralism as a decision-making process. The ineffectiveness
of national border controls, in spite of security-based discourses and practices and the violation of human rights in virtually every operation, progressively led to the idea that a supranational level of decision-making would be capable of taking account of more contradictory factors and ethical principles than decision-making at the national level, which is embroiled in national politics and public opinion, and therefore tends towards security-based discourses. The Global Forum on Migration and Development is a work in progress, whose reflections are based principally on the ICRMW. However, the Forum has only limited legitimacy on the international scene, as the High Level Dialogue itself does not belong to the sphere of international diplomacy, but rather to that of parallel practices.

In 2015, after the refugee crisis, the UN National Assembly decided to launch a Global Compact for Migration and a Global Compact on Refugees, with the aim of establishing (through the multilateral decision-making process of global governance) a non-binding text that most countries could agree on, to be followed as a framework. The topic had never been placed on the agenda of any world conference of the United Nations before (the issue of “population” was debated in Cairo in 1994, “women” in Beijing in 1998, and “discrimination” in Durban in 2002). The topic of migration had not even been debated at G8 meetings or at the UN National Assembly before 2015. The reason for this is a lack of transnational mobilisation on issues of migration and refugees. Those who are in favour of opening borders are emigration states (mostly signatories of the UN Convention of 1990), associations of migrants involved in the development of their countries of origin, human rights organisations, and large companies seeking sources of labour force. These actors have no tradition of fighting in transnational mobilisations together – a fact which weakens the project to develop a global governance of migration. Aristide Zolberg names the actors in such mobilisations “strange bedfellows” (Zolberg, 2006): for example, while employers may share the goals of leftist or charity activists who support the opening of borders, they otherwise have little in common. Similarly, defenders of welfare provisions may share the goals of nationalists who support the closure of borders, but are otherwise very different in their views.

The Global Compact was opened to signatories at the end of 2018, with the aim of facilitating “safe, orderly, and regular migration”. It defines a roadmap to be followed for migrants and refugees respectively. However, immigration states continue to be reluctant to implement the Global Compact, which specifies 23 objectives (with regard to migration) to be followed by the General Assembly of the UN and 4 main points (with regard to refugees) to be followed by UNHCR.

The global governance of migration involves immigration and emigration states from the Global North and Global South, IGOs, NGOs, the EU, and many actors from civil society: trade unions, migrants' associations, human rights organisations, churches, associations for local development, experts, and all other such actors involved in migration and refugee issues. Southern countries are now active participants in the debate. Some of them are emerging immigration and transit states (such as Turkey, Morocco, and Mexico). These states are developing forms of soft diplomacy that capitalise on this new position and establish diasporic policies towards their emigrants, demanding rights for them in their immigration states. Through
these new kinds of soft diplomacy they are beginning to have a voice in World
Social Forums, FMMD annual meetings, and in the Global Compact.

Some small states are gaining a voice thanks to their advocacy on environmental issues or regarding the treatment of their nationals abroad (“indigenous work”). For example, Bangladesh has developed these sorts of “soft diplomacy” thanks to the support of experts. Meanwhile, a number of issues that have a strong impact on migration and which could more effectively be debated at the global level have not yet been put on the agenda, such as the price of cotton, extensive fishing in African waters by Asian countries, open markets in raw materials, and demography.

However, in the future, the disorder of the world will be addressed by new forms
of international relations, which will be more socially-orientated, with a larger role
for the Global South, and less dependent on nation states of the Global North as the
main actors of international relations. As Bertrand Badie observes: “We are analyz-
ing migration questions in terms of inter-state relations, whereas the world system
no longer works this way” (Badie, 2022). At the global level, social issues are
becoming more important than strategic ones. At the international level, the social
question is becoming the foremost factor in the destabilisation of the world, owing
to inequalities in human development, poverty, civil wars, environmental crises, and
demography. The forces of globalisation are creating relations of interdependency,
which contradict the principles of sovereignty. The pressures associated with societ-
ies are often stronger than those associated with states, and this reality is highlighted
by the patterns of migration flows. International relations are also being shaped by
the effects of global pandemics, whereas they would previously have been domi-
nated by relations of military power. Migration flows are a manifestation of the
changing dynamics of societies, as they emerge in ways that seek to limit inequali-
ties, fill gaps, and reciprocally satisfy new needs. The project to establish the rules
of this new global order requires the recognition of migration as a legitimate factor
in the debate, which has not yet been accomplished.

Recent crises (the Syrian civil war, COVID-19, and war in Afghanistan) have
revealed a large gap between, on the one hand, the objectives of multilateral meth-
ods of governance connected with the Marrakech Global Compact, and on the other
hand, European and national solutions to new migration and refugee flows. The only
way to resolve these questions is by establishing legal channels of mobility for
greater numbers of migrants.

## 5.3 III – From Local to Global: Cities as New Actors in International Migration

Other transnational mobilisations are also entering the field of international advo-
cacy and questioning the role of nation states. Owing to the increasing urbanisation
of the planet, cities are becoming important territories of departure and arrival.
During the past thirty years, some major cities have hosted informal markets for
newcomers, such as Berlin and Vienna after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, and
Istanbul, with its informal markets for circular migration. There is a diverse range
of actors involved in the management of cities in relation to migration: the EU, with its regulation of circulation, municipalities, humanitarian NGOs, associations, and citizens involved in receiving migrants and lobbying public decision-makers. The cases of Palermo, Barcelona, Strasburg, and other cities are well-known. Small cities are also involved, but citizens who decide to provide hospitality to irregular migrants or help them cross borders often find themselves in contravention of the law. There has been an increase in these “crimes of solidarity”. One such high profile case was that of Cédric Herrou, a farmer in the French Alps, who was prosecuted and found guilty for his role in assisting irregular migrants, before the cases against him were overturned by the Constitutional Council, the Highest Court in France, on the basis that such actions of “fraternity” (one of the founding values of the French Republic, alongside freedom and equality) are protected by the Constitution. This story was documented in a film, *Libre*, produced after the successful resolution of Herrou’s court cases. The legal cases involving Domenico Lucano, the mayor of Riace in Italy, and those of the inhabitants of Briançon, are bringing to light contradictions between legal justice and ethics.

In some places, the work of receiving migrants with the help of NGOs, and sometimes with European funds, can be an opportunity to create jobs in solidarity management. This work combines the public and private sectors, and often takes place in regions of unemployment or rural depopulation, such as in Sicily (Bassi, 2015), the Nord-Pas de Calais region in France, or on Greek islands. Cities are also initiating civil society solidarity networks with migrants, involving mobilisation at the local, grass-roots level, aimed at supporting unaccompanied minors, irregular migrants, asylum seekers, and families.

Cities may also develop networks on an international scale when they are involved in environmental crises, such as Dacca in Bangladesh and others located at sea level, such as Mumbai, Kolkata, or New Orleans in the wake of Storm Katrina (Gemenne et al., 2016). Some international agreements between Northern and Southern cities involved in immigration and emigration respectively have also aimed at developing better forms of management in Southern societies confronted with the challenges of rapid urbanisation. These co-development agreements address issues such as waste treatment, access to clean water, urban social housing, uses of remittances, and the improvement of daily life in urban areas as well as in rural ones.

The forces of both globalisation and localism are therefore revealing new facets of cities and migration, in ways that bring to mind Immanuel Kant's emphasis on hospitality as a universal duty of a citizen in a cosmopolitan world, followed by Zygmunt Bauman's concept of liquid modernity (Wihtol de Wenden, 2013, referring to Kant, 2006; Bauman, 2000).

### 5.3.1 Cities as International Networks

In the mid-1990s, Saskia Sassen's (1996a) work on the “global city” drew attention to the weakening of nation states and the strengthening of transnational networks in economics, finance, and trade, using the examples of London, New York, and
Tokyo. This “local turn” was also examined by authors including Peter Scholten (2015) and Bianca Garces-Mascarenas and Rinus Penninx (2015) in the Netherlands, focusing on the role of cities in implementing migration and integration policies and processes in Europe. These works raise the question of the role of cities in migrations flows and the construction of networks beyond the level of nation states, and thus their role in integration policies and global governance at all levels of scale. In their book on city networks, Thomas Lacroix and Sarah Spencer (2022) ask the question: will cities come to govern the world with regard to integration policies and the global governance of migration, in place of national and international policies? The perspective of governance from below, studied at the meso-level of city networks, is a good place to observe the large diversity of situations, thanks to the emergence of new actors and new fields in connection with cities.

Little research has been devoted to cities in relation to migration policies, either as actors involved in the reception of migrants, or as experts in governance from below (at multi-scale levels) in reaction to national and international policies imposed from above. In her work on multilevel decision-making processes, Tiziana Caponio (2022) emphasises the ambiguous, horizontal dimension of meso-level governance. She writes that the horizontal level of towns as new actors of migration policies at the local, national, and international level has been “poorly conceptualized” and effectively considered as being subordinated to vertical, intergovernmen tal relations of only secondary relevance. The collaborative, multilevel, and inter-sectorial governance found in connection with cities can be analysed from several perspectives, including those of networks, activists, and the structuring role of the political context on cities in their migration strategy.

5.3.2 *Smart Cities and Cities of Marginalisation*

While some global cities have been termed “smart cities”, attracting highly quali-
fied migrants from all over the world, they are also creating cosmopolitan forms of
citizenship beyond nation states by receiving newcomers from poor countries and
lower social categories. In his work on the reception of migrants, Michel Agier
quotes Jacques Derrida (2019, p. 84):

If we refer to the city rather than the state, is it because we hope to receive from a new figure
of the city that which we have almost given up expecting from the state. [...] What we call
(calling it what we would wish it to be) the “city of refuge” is no longer simply a set of new
attributes or new powers added to a classic and unchanged concept of the city. It is no longer
just a question of new predicates to enhance the old subject called “the city”. No, we are
dreaming of another concept, another law, another policy for the city.

In France, urban policy has been at the centre of integration policies since the 1990s,
but this situation was conceived as the implementation of national policy at the local
level, with few international outputs, and without cities being actors of these poli-
cies. The arrival of large numbers of refugees, first in 2011 and then with the so
called “refugee crisis” of 2015, brought about a significant shift. The questions then
arose of the role of cities in affecting the reception of migrants, and of the effects of
migrants on the city. These cities have witnessed the emergence of informal prac-
tices, significant numbers of residents of irregular status, many cases of passage
without settlement, and the continuation of provisional ways of life, together with
practices of hospitality from below.

The city is central to the development of migration, since, at the global level,
migration is closely related to the increasing urbanisation of the planet (in particular
it is predicted that the population of Africa will change from being 70% rural in
1950 to being 70% urban in 2050). Urban residents are generally more educated,
more open to new technologies of information and communication, and also more
vulnerable to the offers of human smugglers owing to their dream of a future abroad.
They may be attracted by global cities, but then effectively come to reside at the
margins of those cities. As Saskia Sassen (2014) demonstrates, most poor migrants
are effectively excluded from cities, relegated to living in camps (Agier, 2014),
border cities, transit zones, slums, or deprived inner-city areas. This process is
accelerated by the difficulties that migrants experience in obtaining legal access and
status in the course of their travels, leading to the creation of new peripheries which
hardly look like cities (such as the camps or “jungles” described by Michel Agier).
The sorts of “transit zones” housing “transmigrants” studied by Alain Tarrius (2010)
and Anaïk Pian (2009), such as those in Morocco or Calais (the so called “jungle”),
are often dismantled but always rebuilt. Border cities such as Tijuana in Mexico or
El Paso have also seen the emergence of ghettos, in which communities reconstruct
their former ways of life.

5.3.3 Sanctuary Cities and Welcoming Cities

The growth in the role of cities in migration has also led to the emergence of “sanc-
tuary cities” and “welcoming cities”, in which hospitality is conceived in terms of
networks of solidarity. Urban actors have diversified themselves. Notable examples
include Strasburg, Barcelona, and Palermo, which was named a cosmopolitan city
by its mayor Leoluca Orlando. Another case is that of Riace, a town in Puglia in
Southern Italy, where the mayor, Domenico Lucano, was prohibited from staying in
his own town by the state, and then charged with allowing newly arrived undocu-
mented migrants to work in cooperatives in order to help them to settle and inte-
grate. Grande-Synthe, a suburb of Dunkirk, which was led by its mayor Damien
Carême until his election to the European Parliament in 2020, similarly tried to find
another way of receiving newcomers, in opposition to the behaviour of some may-
ors and local authorities. He created the association ANVITA (Association Nationale
des Villes et Territoires Accueillants, which gathers participants from 53 territories).
Meanwhile, in Belgium, the “Communes hospitalières” network includes 126 par-
ticipant towns and villages, and across Europe 747 such “welcoming cities” can be
now be found. These endeavours are helped by the emergence of civil society
solidarity networks devoted to assisting irregular migrants, focusing on pragmatic solutions to a sensitive multilevel governance issue.

In some cases, efforts to develop cities’ hospitality to newcomers are motivated not only by ethical concerns but also by the desire to create employment in the fields of expertise and the management of associations for migrants, in contexts of nation-wide unemployment. This may be funded at the local, national, or European level, and would not be possible without the arrival of newcomers. In Lyons, Nantes, and Strasburg, local authorities have been involved in the development of migration-related city networks. Strasburg was granted the status of “welcoming city” (“ville accueillante”) in 2018, partly thanks to the establishment of a council for long-term settled foreigners. Some cities faced with large refugee flows, such as Grande-Synthe, Saint-Denis (near Paris), Lyon, and Briançon have had to cope with the dismantling of settlements and conflicts between activists devoted to welcoming migrants (who may be prosecuted for “crimes of solidarity”) and the police. Meanwhile, refugees in this context face difficult decisions between staying, going back, or continuing on their journeys. The network of welcoming cities is now a world network, with a global parliament of mayors and 14 networks of refuge towns.

In Germany, some towns played a crucial role in welcoming refugees during the 2015 refugee crisis (Hinger, 2021), either as a complement or as alternatives to actions carried out by the state, with the help of citizens in their homes. These towns and the networks of social relations that they developed became a driving force for improving the governance of immigration. In this federal country, towns exercise some autonomy in implementing integration policies and European recommendations at the local level. With the help of non-profit associations such as Caritas, they participated in resettlement programs for refugees and contributed to opening the labour market to refugees and asylum seekers, in order to avoid them falling into a so-called “duldung” status (in which they are neither granted a legal status, nor expelled), thus separating social issues from the issue of migrants’ legal status. In Berlin, the city subsidised housing for each applicant at a rate of €750 per month. In the city of Halle, the town rented 700 flats for newcomers, as it made a priority of guaranteeing that there was housing for everyone. In this country, immigration was not a principal topic of debate during the elections for a new chancellor after Angela Merkel.

City networks can also include universities, which can facilitate network socialisation through knowledge exchange regarding integration and inclusion. As policy agents, city networks help to formulate and implement immigration and integration policies.

### 5.3.4 Cities Are New Actors in Transnational Projects

In the Mediterranean region, large cities have created transnational and international networks of knowledge and migration management. Ricard Zapata-Barrero et al. (2017) speak about “the local turn” in migration governance, in which
Mediterranean cities acting “from below” have created resilient regional networks. Taking the example of Barcelona, he shows that global cities’ experience of migration settlement has led to opportunities to relocate governance in the Mediterranean region from states to cities (for example, through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Charter of Palermo of 2015, and the Palermo/Izmir Partnership) but also to address the management of irregular migration, unaccompanied minors, and asylum seekers. A new way of thinking emerged, based on the construction of networks across the Mediterranean region, and in which cities can be a focus for promoting alternative forms of regional migration governance, while also taking account of the Global Compact Agenda 2030 for sustainable development.

Cities are also developing networks between the Global South and Global North, giving rise to city-based forms of diplomacy and decentralised cooperation, which can avoid the polarisation typical of national debates and conflicts between migrant associations and local elites in the South. These networks also tend to promote goals of human development in preference to the approaches favoured by Western development models. Some examples in Senegal and Mali, facilitated by their diasporas and migrant associations, are focused on achieving autonomy at the local level in preference to the national level, in order to promote local development in regions of emigration and demonstrate good practice (according to UNDP recommendations).

At a larger scale, big cities can also become subjects of international relations when they are involved in facing huge international challenges, such as environment challenges. They take on a global dimension when they are victims of environmental crises and when they become the focus of major international problems. If sea levels continue to rise, many big cities situated at sea level, particularly in Asia, will see larger numbers of environmentally displaced persons and many deaths, primarily among the poorest, who have more limited options for internal mobility within their country (for example, in Dacca, Kolkata, and Mumbai). No internal status exists for environmentally displaced persons, and this fact led Bangladesh to develop, with the support of experts, an approach of soft diplomacy in the UN, aimed at advocating for the future needs of those large cities, even though this approach has not yet yielded obvious benefits (Baillat, 2015). The experience of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina is also emblematic in this regard: the poorest stayed in place, owing to a lack of resources, while others left for other regions of the US, although the city made efforts to move parts of its population. The policy response to this disaster involved the national (federal) state, the state of Louisiana, and the city (Gemenne et al., 2016). Multilevel analysis is particularly relevant in such a case.

Networks of large cities are also creating further mobilisations by moving policy-making to different political levels. The rising importance of cities as international actors has had an impact on the Global Compact for Migration at the global level. Cities have also organised themselves through associations and networks involved in knowledge exchange and action aimed at redefining governance, such as through the role of individual mayors as global leaders (for example, at the Mayoral Forum 2014 and the GCM 2018 in Marrakech), through city mobilisation in response to the
humanitarian needs of vulnerable migrants, and through agreements between cities as a means of providing channels for inter-state mobility. The impact of migration therefore appears at the local, national, and international level. Migration policy has an influence on various levels of governance, as can be seen, for example, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, when coalitions of towns, cities, and nation states emerged to protect the undocumented. Cities and mayors are involved in addressing climate issues, the challenges of urbanisation, the implementation of the GCM, and in facilitating cooperative localism, anti-discrimination practices, and the strengthening of networks (Thouez, 2022). In a context in which traditional actors of civil society have declined – such as trade unions, churches, and even companies – cities are now welcoming migrants, although entry policies remain the remit of nation states. Non-state actors have acquired significant, and sometimes crucial roles thanks to the practice of multilateralism, including the proliferation of partnerships with non-state actors. Thanks to city networking (including contacts between universities, activists, and migrants), horizontal forces are strengthening and developing transnationalism, multilevel forms of governance, knowledge exchange, and new abilities to work in emergency situations.

## 5.4 Conclusion

The development of migration diplomacy is drawing attention to the role of new actors: emigration countries of the Global South, city networks, transnational mobilisations, diasporic associations, and networks for supporting elites abroad. It is also producing a wide range of outputs: bilateral and multilateral agreements, development policies, dual citizenship agreements, voting rights in countries of origin and of settlement, and remittance policies. In immigration countries, most of these outputs are the result of multilevel decision-making, involving actors from the local to the global level, since migration diplomacy has also been conducted at the global level, through the development of forms of global migration governance.

Some recent examples illustrate the role that migration diplomacy has played, in situations where emigration states have influenced migration management and border policies in the Global North. Just before the closure of borders owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, in January and February 2020, Turkey decided to open its borders with Greece to refugees settled in Turkey, because it considered that, although the EU had paid the funds that it had reluctantly agreed to, the two other conditions demanded by Turkey in the EU/Turkey agreements of 2016 had not been fulfilled: the simplification of visas for Turks travelling to Europe and the re-examination of Turkey's application to join the EU. Consequently, migrants could freely travel by bus to the Greek border, until the COVID-19 crisis led to the closure of the border and the repatriation of Syrians in Turkey. Another manifestation of the struggle between emigration states and EU Member States was the disagreement between Morocco and Spain in summer 2021: as Spain had received an activist belonging to the Polisario movement (contesting Moroccan settlement of the
Western Sahara region inhabited by Sahrawi populations), Morocco retaliated by opening the borders of Ceuta and Melilla to Moroccan migrants wishing to travel to Spain. Perhaps the clearest example of such migration diplomacy is the decision of Belarus to attract Middle Eastern migrants to its border with Poland in winter 2021, as a way of applying pressure on the EU, which had been critical of the country's government. This attempt to use migrants and refugees as bargaining chips resulted in many people struggling to survive in swamps and snow in the depths of winter, while trying to cross the Polish border and seek refuge.

Another aspect of migration as diplomacy has emerged from the development of a transnational movement of religious diplomacy centred on Islam since the 1980. Although organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood are informal and asymmetric actors in relation to nation states and international geopolitics, Islamic radicalisation has proved to be an influential force in the construction of threats to security, and Islam has been used as a tool in strategies of alliances and conflicts.

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## Chapter 6
# Migration and Development

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Check for
updates

The topic of the relationship between migration and development is one of the most controversial areas in migration research and policy. For a long time, it was considered that development was an alternative to migration, because in European history, emigration flows from Southern European countries came to an end when those countries experienced economic growth and developed more democratic political systems. In Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece, migration decreased or disappeared around the time of their entry into the EU. However, the assumption that the same patterns will emerge in countries on the southern rim of the Mediterranean Sea runs into several problems. The first problem relates to the demographic situation. Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece have all experienced a rapid demographic decrease and have thus ceased to offer a reserve of labour force for Northern Europe, as they did in the 1970s. The second reason is the gradual convergence of living standards in those Southern European countries compared with those of Northern Europe, which developed around the same time as European freedom of circulation was achieved. Freedom of circulation also created opportunities for circulation without settlement, a trend which similarly increased in Eastern European countries, when citizens of new EU Member States adopted mobility as a way of life between Romania, Poland, and Western European countries. For Eastern Europe after the 1990s, circular migration became possible as a result of the opening of borders thanks to their entry into the EU. Over the last 30 years, all Southern European countries, which were formerly emigration countries, became new immigration countries.

In countries on the southern rim of the Mediterranean Sea, the situation regarding the relationship between migration and development is different from in Southern European countries, as there is no prospect of them joining the EU and they do not benefit from European structural funds. The common trend of European countries granting more aid in exchange for a reduction in migration is essentially misguided. In particular, we must distinguish between the short-term and long-term consequences of such policies. In the long term we can presume that development (economic but also political), as well as demographic changes, will weaken the strongest pressures driving flows of low-skilled migration. However, in the short
term, migration and development are mutually dependent. Development is a factor of migration and migration is a factor of development, because in the Global South migration is closely associated with modernity. Civil wars, terrorism, corruption, unemployment, and obstacles to human mobility all contribute to shaping the socio-political landscape. We must also distinguish between the different situations in the Maghreb, Turkey, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The Maghreb and Turkey have become places of transit and immigration, like Mexico, but they also have reserves of population and labour force. On the southern rim of the Mediterranean, 50% of the population is aged less than 25 years, and the median age in Sub-Saharan Africa is 19 years, compared with a median age of 41 years in Italy (it was 28 years in Italy in 1950). The rate of unemployment has reached 30% or even 40% in some countries, and young people therefore experience great difficulty in entering the labour market, either with or without higher qualifications. The difference in GNP between European countries and those of the southern Mediterranean rim can be as much as a factor of five. Development programs often lead to increased urbanisation, which also gives rise to both internal and external migration, owing to the abandonment of agriculture. In all these cases, then, we cannot assume that development will rapidly become an alternative to migration, as it was for Southern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s.

The relationship between development and migration has become a question of international relations, because development policy is considered as a tool of international migration policy, with the goal of reducing migration. This approach has been enshrined at the international level in international policy, mostly through bilateral agreements concerning repatriation, even though most research (for example, the findings produced by the Institut de recherche sur le développement and the Association française de développement) has shown that migration facilitates development and that development encourages migration. Remittances, agreements of co-development concluded between countries of origin and countries of immigration, and local development initiatives facilitated by transnational diasporas all continue to illustrate the role of development in relation to migration, and to demonstrate ways in which migration and development work together rather than being alternatives to one another.

In the twenty-first century, more than half of all migrants live in developed countries, and 28 countries receive 75% of the world's migrants. Europe and the US alone receive half of all migrants. Among migrants living in developed countries, 54% come from developing countries, while 80% of migrants living in developing countries come from other developing countries.

Over the last 30 years, the greatest number of development policies have targeted the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa. Other major initiatives have been arranged between Germany and Turkey, and between Mexico and the US.

Several factors explain the rise of migration in places where certain gaps or inequalities can be observed: the demographic gap between poor and “young” countries in relation to rich and “old” countries, the role of mass media and other information and communication technologies in countries of departure in depicting a Western way of life, differences in salaries, remittances (now totalling $550
billion per year), the existence of transnational diasporas and cultural links, the presence of human smugglers offering to arrange passage, the rapid urbanisation of developing countries, an absence of hope in some contexts, and the environmental challenges, civil wars, and lack of security facing certain populations, mostly in the Global South. Both countries of arrival and countries of departure try to use migrants and their activities (remittances, elite diasporas, associations of co-development) as development tools in countries of origin. This so-called “win-win” strategy is increasingly being recognised and adopted, and development is increasingly being included in discussions of migration in the context of multilateral migration governance. In short, migration is increasingly being politically linked with development.

## 6.1 I – Development by Exile

Migration and mobility are becoming a factor of development in countries of departure. The UNDP 2009 Report declared that mobility had become the most important factor of human development. Migration improves standards of living and access to consumption, it reduces risks (economic, political, social, health) in unsafe countries of origin lacking health and social welfare, it brings remittances to families (which represent a total sum that is three times greater than all public development funds), and it grants some freedom and agency to individuals, as they become the main actors shaping their own future. However, migration can also create gaps between regions of emigration and regions without emigration. Most migrants do not consider returning to settle in their country of origin, and they prefer to send their money to their families rather than to the state, which they tend not to trust. Mobility develops transnational economic networks, decreases unemployment, exports social dissent, and allows those who remain in the place to live better lives and to benefit from the receipt of remittances.

Several development policies linked with migration have been implemented by EU Member States and the US since the 1970s. The earliest such policies were focused on the return of migrants to their countries of origin, such as those in Germany in relation to Turks since 1972, those in the Netherlands in relation to Moroccans since 1975, and those in France pertaining to all migrants, but especially to those from the Maghreb, since 1977. The slogan of “leaving in order to stay” (“partir pour rester”) – that is, some members of a community emigrate in order to allow others to remain in place, possibly with the aim of themselves returning later – became popular in public policies. Funds were allocated to support migrants wishing to return to their country of origin (a policy associated with Lionel Stolera, State Secretary for Immigration and Manual Work in France in 1977), and reinsertion programs aimed to help migrants to resettle with a productive economic activity. In France these reinsertion programs were implemented in 1981 (the French-Algerian agreement of return and reinsertion), in 1983 (involving a partnership between the state and large firms), and in 1998 (the Migration and Co-Development programme led by Sami Naïr). Few of these schemes were
successful because they provided only short training programs, and also because
most migrants intended to return to their country of origin only after retirement age,
sometimes with the aim of then working as taxi drivers or shopkeepers and using
their money to build a large home in their former villages, as a symbol of their suc-
cessful emigration and return. Other obstacles to the success of these projects were
migrants' lack of inclination to run businesses, their lack of previous training, the
difficulties they faced with administration in their countries of origin, and some-
times corruption. The situation has still not changed substantially, since the profiles
of returnees, their intentions, and their level of education and training still do not
generally allow them to become managers of their own development. Most remit-
tances are sent to migrants' families in order to improve their daily lives and to miti-
gate for the lack of insurance (health, environmental, or against political or economic
risks) in countries where the future is insecure. Only relatively small sums of money
are devoted to collective investments, because migrants have little trust in the gov-
ernments of failed states.

6.1.1 Constructing Development Between Non-state Actors

In the 1980s, remittances were first considered as low-productivity investments, as they were directed towards ostentatious housing and consumption, or invested in coffee shops, grocery shops, or taxi businesses in rural and isolated regions of emigration, without any potential for economic development. However, it gradually became apparent that, in many countries of origin, remittances are the most substantial source of investment, ahead of public development funds, and that migrants abroad continue to send remittances even if they themselves do not intend to return. Public policies have therefore come to be focused on remittances.

A new strategy with an emphasis on co-development began to emerge in the
mid-1990s. Faced with the relative failure of return policies, and informed by
experts' findings regarding the mutual interdependence between migration and
development in the short term (Tapinos, 1994), these policies – implemented in
immigration countries in agreement with countries or regions of departure – focused
on supporting migrants' initiatives directed towards their countries of origin through
development associations, remittances, and transnational economic diasporas. The
destination of funding is a crucial point, since, in the past, a significant proportion
of public aid and subsidies has failed to reach the population, and has been used by
governments for other purposes. The European Commission began to offer direct
assistance to development associations in the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa,
such as the MEDA programs included in the Barcelona process (1995–2005), which
are focused on collective projects of public interest and sustainable development
(water, electrification, education, health, roads, rural tourism, urban housing pro-
grammes). Some projects of decentralised cooperation were undertaken between
regions and large cities of the Global North (Europe) and the South (the Maghreb or
African cities), without the mediation of states. However, the scope of such initia-
tives remained limited and dependent on the mobility of actors. Although the long-
term residence permits attained by some migrants allowed them to come and go
freely, those who were repatriated lost their residence permits and subsequently
required visas if they wished to return to Europe. The potential of these projects was
weakened by the lack of expertise and empowerment on the part of associative
migrant leaders in economic entrepreneurship and development, as well as by the
tendency of development associations in countries of origin to become tools for
advancing political careers (Lacroix, 2005).

Policies continue to focus on remittances as one of the main factors of
development: immigration countries try to encourage remittances, for example
through tax breaks on such transfers, while private companies such as Western
Union facilitate the sending of remittances. Meanwhile, emigration countries
encourage migrants to deposit funds related to remittances in banks, which helps to
provide funds for long-term investments in collective projects. Some so-called
"co-development policies" are the counterpart to bilateral or multilateral readmission
agreements: if a country of origin accepts the responsibility to repatriate irregular
migrants or failed asylum seekers, it will in return receive money for its development
policies, as well as visas to allow the most qualified candidates to travel abroad.
These agreements are often expressed in terms of sustainability and solidarity.

Meanwhile, the phenomenon of brain drain, which is another major topic of
debate in North-South relations, has gradually come to be seen as a source of eco-
nomic dynamism in the South, and part of a “win-win-win” approach: migration
can become positive for migrants, for countries of immigration, and for countries of
emigration. Some experts observe that one-fourth of doctors trained in Africa do not
go on to practice medicine in Africa. Some European countries, such as the UK,
Germany, and France have reopened their borders to high qualified workers from all
over the world, in a context of strong competition to attract elites. These highly
qualified workers from developing countries often have low chances of finding a job
corresponding to their qualifications in their countries of origin, owing to unem-
ployment and an absence of free competition in access to senior roles or facilities
for entrepreneurship. However, qualified and highly qualified people send remit-
tances to their countries of origin, maintain diasporic transnational networks, and
contribute to development. In this context, an apparent “brain drain” can be trans-
formed into a “brain gain” (through empowerment thanks to the provision of facili-
ties to national investors abroad, and the development of sustainable projects with
less bureaucracy). Through co-development programs, immigration can contribute
to a sharing of resources rather than enlarging the gap between sending and receiv-
ing countries. However, the situation varies according to conditions in the countries
of emigration: whereas in India or China, for example, the departure of highly quali-
fied elites does not harm development, owing to the number of such elites and the
facilities they have developed in order to build networks of qualified work in these
countries of origin, for some small African countries with a strong emigration of
elites the situation poses greater problems.
6.1.2 Migration Leads to Development

Migration is a factor of development. Remittances towards countries of origin continue to increase. They represented $280 billion in 2006, $337 billion in 2007, $328 billion in 2008, and have now reached the level of $550 billion (World Bank annual reports). Meanwhile, the amount of public aid devoted to development stands at only one-fourth of the level of remittances. These remittances represent 20% of GNP in Cape Verde and Senegal, and 10% in Mali, the Philippines (where one-tenth of inhabitants are migrants), and Morocco. In some countries, remittances are not transmitted through banks but through informal networks, such as in the “trabendo” (black market) in Algeria. Transnational networks (families, economic links, and cultural exchanges) contribute to co-development policies, leading to increased well-being in regions of departure. Migration also exports unemployment and social dissent, while offering the prospect of highly qualified jobs to migrants. Migrants can become actors of development in their regions of origin through initiatives of decentralised cooperation. Some historical analyses have shown that, in the past, cases where a large proportion of the population emigrated from Northern Europe countries led to an increase in living conditions for those who remained in place, owing to shortages of land for agriculture (Bade, 1994).

However, migration can also give rise to a relationship of dependency between regions of departure and countries of immigration, as a result of the flow of remittances. Several field studies show that families of migrants are less competitive in agriculture or businesses when they receive funds from abroad, and that immigration leads to brain drain. Migrants send funds to improve educational conditions for their children, to help their families to remain in place without moving to large cities or abroad, and to reduce poverty. Migration then becomes a strategy of adaptation and development in countries of low resources that have entered a transitional economic phase. For example, in the Philippines, “care drain” (the emigration of nurses or “badanti” to care for older people in Italy) is becoming a source of brain drain, as children trained in private schools leave the country to work abroad. Is there a real will to reduce migration in countries such as these? European policies that try to enlist African states in controlling irregular migration through the use of bilateral agreements may therefore be working at cross-purposes, if migration and remittances are the main factor of development for these countries, and for the wellbeing of the families of migrants. 69% of migrants in the world do not leave the Global South, and two-thirds of refugees are received by developing countries, sometimes poorer than their country of origin. It is therefore apparent that the forms of development promoted by remittances and bilateral agreements cannot prevent migration from taking place.
6.1.3 Development Leads to Migration

Inversely, development often gives rise to migration. The rapid modernisation of agriculture, accelerated by the global development projects of the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, is producing a rural exodus, with populations moving first to the urban peripheries of large cities of the Global South, and then to international destinations. Many developing countries are now faced with a situation that resembles the situation of some European countries in the nineteenth century, when economic growth led to a rural exodus and massive urbanisation, and subsequently to large-scale emigration (for example, in Italy, Germany, Ireland, and the UK). Development can also lead to the emergence of dissent on the part of migrants towards their countries of origin, when the latter are undemocratic, corrupt, poor, or when they offer limited perspectives for either employment or political change. These conditions drive the most educated, informed, and cosmopolitan migrants to leave in order to succeed elsewhere, using migration as a tool to escape the limitations imposed by life in such countries. These elite migrants consider that, in their country of origin, they have no hope of achieving their goals, even though they are not among the poorest inhabitants. The urbanisation of developing countries leads to an increase in migration, owing to the increased access to information and transportation.

Finally, countries of departure generally consider the departure of their own nationals as a positive factor for themselves and their societies, whereas immigration countries generally consider immigrants as a negative factor for their societies.

Other initiatives, inspired by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico, have tried to bring about a mobility of trade without allowing for the mobility of people, but these measures have had limited success in decreasing migration, such as between Mexico and the US (which is inhabited by 12 million irregular migrants). The Euro Mediterranean programs (MEDA), integrated in the Barcelona Program (1995–2005), used the same approach, with an emphasis on improving infrastructure for the transmission of remittances (encouraging the use of banks and promoting micro-projects). These measures aimed to facilitate a direct exchange between migrants as senders and their families as receivers, without the mediation of states or institutions. They also encouraged programs of collective interest and decentralised co-development, relating, for example, to water, electricity, roads, and rural tourism. In France, Moroccans, Malians, and Senegalese are the nationalities who have invested the most in migrant development associations, some of which also receive funds from the EU. Migrants’ projects tend to be local, sometimes communitarian (for example, in the case of the Murids, a Senegalese group in the region of Tuba), and are rarely orientated towards national aims. Overall, these projects are limited in scope, and do not have an impact on broad patterns of migration. Most migrants are drawn to Europe, not by demographic pressures or extreme poverty, but by the desire to change their own life and to escape from their countries of origin, even if the border-crossing journey may lead to their death. This is why development or co-development cannot be
considered a solution to stopping migration, and why migration is not the unique
solution to the challenges of development. Whereas migration dynamics provide a
short-term solution, development is a medium- or long-term process.

6.1.4 Highly Differentiated Situations Across the World

The impact of migration on development and of development on migration differs not only in their respective short-term and long-term perspectives, but also according to the profiles of the countries of departure. In the US, the role of Latin American migrant associations on development in the country of origin was analysed by Alejandro Portes and Cristina Escobar (Princeton University). They conducted comparative field studies between several countries of Latin America, focused on the use of remittances and on the efficiency of the so-called “Tres por Uno” program (whereby, when a migrant in the US sends one dollar to their family, the government of the country of origin grants another two dollars, at either the national or local level). Their findings revealed a diversity of situations across these countries of departure.

They showed that projects led by migrants changed the way that migrants were
viewed in their own countries of origin. Whereas they had formerly been viewed as
having run away, or even as being traitors, their image improved thanks to their
sending of remittances. Mexicans, Colombians, and Dominicans created transna-
tional associations with their regions of departure. Their degree of success was
linked to their trust in the state in their country of origin, the existence of a tradition
of partnership with civil society, and with the particular profiles of migrants belong-
ing to the three nationalities, as well as the types of projects undertaken and the
tools that were used to implement them. Mexican development associations per-
formed the best, as they continued to work with the state for more than 10 years in
the “Tres por Uno” program. In the Colombian case, projects were more indepen-
dent from the state, and in the Dominican case projects were transnational.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, remittances constitute an effective tool in the fight against poverty, but also more broadly in addressing the uncertainty of the future, in the face of risks of illness, civil wars, unemployment, family disruption, and environmental crisis. Remittances are thus mainly used as a form of insurance against such risks. Countries that have developed a strong dependency on remittances, such as Burkina Faso, are intrinsically fragile. In Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, many local activities have been initiated thanks to immigrant associations that send remittances for collective purposes (international migrant solidarity organisations), such as programmes devoted to health, education, water, and electricity. In these countries, remittances are rarely invested in developing productive activities, owing to an unfavourable environment for such investments (a lack of trust towards administration and mediators, political instability, and the weakness of structures involved in providing micro-credit). More often, migration leads to further migration, but is not an alternative to development. Only an easier circulation of people between
emigration and immigration countries is likely to support the continued success of
such projects.

Morocco became a country of immigration while remaining a country of departure. Many initiatives of co-development were undertaken (Lacroix, 2005): return-reinsertion policies, banking infrastructure for remittances, the relocation of activities that required considerable amounts of labour, aid for projects of delocalised cooperation, direct foreign investment, and the pursuit of free trade as an alternative to migration. None of these initiatives produced significant results because the individual decision to migrate is often very far removed from the development policies of the country of departure, as well as from the aims of countries of immigration that wish to stop irregular migration and satisfy anti-migrant public opinion. Unemployment has given rise to the mobility of both qualified and unqualified migrants, and the subsequent existences of diasporas, which have then given rise to development associations.

In China, the rise of economic liberalism went hand in hand with the construction of new relations with Western countries, largely as a result of migration. The deregulation of the labour market in China, along with the “hukou” system dividing the population between rural and urban contexts and limiting internal migration from the countryside to cities, created a new underclass which was attracted by the prospect of informal employment in Western countries. This migration also created a significant diaspora. The professionalization of emigration from China also gradually led to Chinese migrants overseas taking jobs that were not related to their migratory origin. The distinction between desired and undesired migration remains very ambiguous in China.

In many countries of the Global South, elite Diasporas of knowledge are closely connected with development. In the mid-1970s, many researchers from Southern countries considered brain drain to be harmful to the development of countries of departure. Now, however, most research is in favour of the “diaspora option”: that is, the hypothesis that the migration of human capital may have a beneficial effect on economic development and on the level of education in countries of origin. This allows them to produce a more highly qualified labour force, and also to be viewed more positively abroad. South Korea, Colombia, India, and China are all engaged in developing these sorts of elite networks. However, the “diaspora option”, as a tool of development, often only complements existing dynamics of knowledge transfer. The development of information and communication technologies in India shows that social networks allow a better management of information and promote scientific activity in the country of origin, thereby increasing productivity. The paradigm of global circulation has therefore come to replace the model of brain drain.
### 6.1.5 The Win-Win-Win Approach

The strategy of directing international aid towards development goals and the sending of remittances may help to locate sources of subsidies for health and education. The impact of remittances is unequal because those who are able to leave a country of departure are generally not among the poorest inhabitants. Aid generally has a positive effect on indicators of human development, but it may also have a negative effect in cases where it leads to a relationship of dependency. There are winners and losers among countries who receive aid. In the Mediterranean region, migrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey send remittances on a smaller scale than migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, because there are weaker reasons driving them to transfer money. The profile of the type of migrant who sends the largest remittances is that of an older migrant, who owned a house in their country of origin, and arrived in Europe in the 1970s. The migrant's attachment to their country is very important. More recent waves of migrants are sending less money, with a diversification according to the country of immigration in question. Those settled in Quebec send less than those settled in Europe (El Mouhoub, 2017).

## 6.2 Conclusion

The relationship between migration and development is a common topic in all global approaches to migration, in the programs of NGOs and IGOs, as well as in regional summits and bilateral and multilateral agreements. However, while development is an important concern in itself, it has never been a viable solution to reducing migration. All international research built on field research shows that it has no impact on migration in the short term, and that stopping migration would also stop human development, as the COVID-19 crisis showed in 2020. The success of this topic is perhaps linked with the Christian cultures of Northern countries and their attitudes towards developing countries, together with political discourses that suggest that immigration countries could reduce or even stop migration by pursuing development goals, even though this does not happen in practice. This does not mean, however, that we should abandon development work; it is worth pursuing, quite apart from the goal of reducing migration.

## References

* Bade, K. (1994). *L'Europe en mouvement. la migration de la fin du XVIIème siècle à nos jours.* Paris, Seuil, 2002.

* El Mouhoub, M. (2017). *L'immigration en France: Mythes et réalités*. Fayard.

* Lacroix, T. (2005). *Les réseaux marocains du développement: Géographie du transnational et politiques du territorial*. Presses de Sciences Po.

* Tapinos, G. (1994). *Migrations et développement*. OECD report.
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<figure><img src="image_21.png" /></figure>
Conclusion of the Book

The various relations and interdependencies between migration and international relations have led us to examine the diversity of structures (nation states, IGOs, NGOs, etc.), actors (migrants and refugees, citizens, and foreigners), and forms of contact (migration diplomacy, multilateral governance) that are involved, from the local to the global level. The globalisation of migration and its rising place in politi-cal discourses, along with the continuing poor management of migration and the difficulty of convincing public opinion that migration is a structural and interdepen-dent phenomenon at the international level, all help to explain why this topic is still important today. This book attempts to explain the main developments in the field, with an analysis of the main concepts and controversies, a historical overview, and a geographical coverage mainly focused on Europe.

It may be useful to summarise here the claims and premises of each chapter. Chapter One explains the nature of migration as a globalised, structural, and inter-dependent phenomenon across the world, since this crucially makes it an interna-tional issue which cannot be solved at the national level. The history of migration policies, discussed in Chapter Two, shows that migration played a central role in the creation of the modern world, even if many people did not move from their place of origin, and were sometimes prohibited to do so, notably in the case of slaves and feudal serfs, and in periods where a large population was a symbol of wealth and required for the purposes of war, taxation, and agriculture. Today the international visa system creates a hierarchy between those who are allowed to move and those who are not, which is polarised across the North/South divide and between the rich and the poor. Northern immigration countries define the rules of migration at the world level, using security-based approaches, even though the conclusions of efforts towards establishing a multilateral governance of migration recommend a greater opening of borders to allow through more legal migrants, for work, but also for demographic reasons and in order to respect human rights. Chapter Three, on the subject of the “refugee crisis”, analyses both older and more recent trends from the last thirty years, which broadly involve the use of refugee policies to reinforce security-based policies of immigration control, thereby undermining the rights of
asylum seekers. It also underlines the need to harmonise access to refugee status, and to provide greater transparency in the criteria used to grant refugee status. In order to extend the limits of citizenship (Chapter Four), a more inclusive model of citizenship is required, which would provide access to local political rights for all resident foreigners, as well as easier access to citizenship based either on settlement or on the place of birth (jus soli). Meanwhile, negotiations around dual citizenship between countries of origin and immigration countries would build bridges and help to integrate immigrants. This chapter emphasises the need to fight against processes that lead to irregular migrants remaining in this vulnerable state in the long term, and that tolerate the status quo regarding stateless people and other forms of denying citizenship. Chapter Five, devoted to migration diplomacy, presents the issue of migration in the international arena. Its emergence as a topic of debate has brought new legitimacy to this issue, which was formerly despised and neglected as a topic of international relations, but the ethos of multiculturalism is still not widely accepted in this field, and this diplomacy requires more transparency. As Chapter Six explains, the relations between migration and development give rise to many misunderstandings, although they are closely related, both in their short-term and medium-term horizons. Most of these conclusions, although fundamental, still need to be explained, because migration studies is a relatively new field in the domain of research in international relations.

However, in a context that features not only a growing body of knowledge, but also the growth of populism built on the hatred of migration, diversity, and multiculturalism, what can research do?

Max Weber's essays “Science as a Vocation” and “Politics as a Vocation” (1919) distinguishes between value-based, action-orientated, and evidence-based or truth-orientated frameworks for understanding the normative architecture and social practices of science and politics. In light of Weber's conclusions, the tension between, on the one hand, the dynamics of truth and scientific logic and, on the other hand, the conflicts of values or interests, the quest for power, and the security agenda that prevails in Europe, remain crucial in the policy-making debate today.

The politicisation of migration issues remains acute in the current context of extreme political tensions: populist parties' electoral successes are built on the use of xenophobic themes and anti-immigration rhetoric, and have also taken place against the backdrop of humanitarian crises at the borders of Europe and the social consequences of the economic crisis. The politicisation of migration and the use of scientific and expert knowledge in the EU are key factors in the current migration regime.

Europe is currently facing a “migration crisis”, which constitutes a significant challenge. However, attempts to “manage” the crisis, both on the part of individual Member States and of the EU collectively, through security-orientated and anti-immigration policy instruments, seem to produce ever greater controversies and limited results. As a measure of the “success” of such measures, we need only consider the thousands of deaths that have occurred in the Mediterranean Sea, the creation of both formal and informal camps, the emergence of tensions on the borders
of Europe, the violation of rights and legal provisions at the national, European, and
international level, and the proliferation of human smuggling and trafficking and
other criminal activities connected to migration and migrants.

The gap between expert knowledge on migration and the representations of migration used in policy-making arenas constitutes another gap with regard to migration and refugee policies in the EU. Why do policymakers adhere to decisions and policy options that have demonstrably failed to achieve their stated goals in the past? The answer can be found in the inability of nation states, with a focus on borders and sovereignty, to rise to the challenges of the inherently global phenomenon of migration and refugees, as well as the role of public opinion in influencing the decision-making process, which leads decision-makers to show a lack of interest in human rights and ethics in this field, and a short-term preference for path-dependent approaches at the international level.
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