<table><caption>TABLE 7—THE EFFECT OF REELECTION INCENTIVES ON CORRUPTION CONTROLLING FOR ABILITY AND EXPERIENCE</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Dependent variable</th><th colspan="5">Share of audited resources involving corruption</th></tr><tr><th>Second-term and first-term later reelected (1)</th><th>Second-term and first-term later reelected predicted (2)</th><th>Full sample (3)</th><th>Full sample (4)</th><th>Second-term and first-term that served as previous mayors (5)</th><th>Second-term and first-term that served as mayor or legislator in past (6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Mayor in first-term</td><td>-0.04 [0.013]***</td><td>-0.034 [0.018]*</td><td>-0.027 [0.012]**</td><td>-0.030 [0.012]**</td><td>-0.038 [0.014]***</td><td>-0.027 [0.017]</td></tr><tr><td>Mayor with political experience</td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.007 [0.011]</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Number of years in political office</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0.008 [0.007]</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Number of years in political office<sup>2</sup></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.002 [0.001]</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.27</td><td>0.29</td><td>0.21</td><td>0.21</td><td>0.30</td><td>0.29</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>313</td><td>294</td><td>476</td><td>476</td><td>287</td><td>311</td></tr><tr><td>Mayor characteristics</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Municipal characteristics</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Political and judicial institutions</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Lottery intercepts</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>State intercepts</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr></tbody></table>
* Evidence that reelection incentives reduce corruption.

* Electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politicians even in context of pervasive corruption.

* Allowing citizens to have better information about policy information and corruption practices is a possible reform.