# The Migration-Development Relationship through the Prism of Localities: A Retrospective of an Ongoing Tension between Politicisation and Depoliticisation in Mali

> La relation migration-développement au prisme des localités : rétrospective d'une tension continue entre politisation et dépolitisation au Mali

> El nexo entre migración y desarrollo a través del prisma de las localidades: retrospectiva de una tensión permanente entre politización y despolitización en Malí

Stéphanie Lima

Translator: Alexandra Poméon O'Neill and Katherine Booth

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URL: https://journals.openedition.org/remi/28352

DOI: 10.4000/15arb

ISSN: 1777-5418

**This article is a translation of:**

La relation migration-développement au prisme des localités : rétrospective d'une tension continue entre politisation et dépolitisation au Mali - URL : https://journals.openedition.org/remi/25344 [fr]

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Université de Poitiers

**Printed version**

Date of publication: March 1, 2024

ISBN: 978-23-81940-26-7

ISSN: 0765-0752

**Electronic reference**

Stéphanie Lima, "The Migration-Development Relationship through the Prism of Localities: A Retrospective of an Ongoing Tension between Politicisation and Depoliticisation in Mali", *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* [Online], vol. 40 - n°1 | 2024, Online since 01 November 2025, connection on 09 December 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/remi/28352; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/15arb
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# The Migration-Development Relationship through the Prism of Localities: A Retrospective of an Ongoing Tension between Politicisation and Depoliticisation in Mali

La relation migration-développement au prisme des localités : rétrospective d'une tension continue entre politisation et dépolitisation au Mali

El nexo entre migración y desarrollo a través del prisma de las localidades: retrospectiva de una tensión permanente entre politización y despolitización en Malí

Stéphanie Lima

Translation : Alexandra Poméon O'Neill and Katherine Booth

<footnote n="1">1 Since the 1960s, when global migratory flows began to reverse (Simon, 2008), the relationship between international migration and development has been rested on the oversimplified assumption that poverty is a determining factor in migration (Kayser, 1977). Supporting development in spaces of origin is framed as enabling would-be exiles to stay, whereas all the studies show that poverty is not an isolated reason for departure and that development itself can foster further migration (de Haas, 2015; Gubert, 2019). In the early 2000s, when transnational dynamics were being scrutinised both from the perspectives of security and the reduction of inequalities, the financial remittances of diasporas came to the centre of world attention (Monsutti, 2008). These staggering amounts, made visible by the use of more formal channels, stirred interest and were designated as instruments for combating poverty. Yet this unity of vision at all levels of governance cannot hide the contradiction that is constantly being</footnote>
reiterated: “to reduce the risks that migratory flows entail for people on the move and for states, while at the same time supporting the positive effects of international migration on the development of countries in the Global South” (Monsutti, 2008: 24). This myth, which has become global, fuels increasingly diffuse depoliticisation, using every possible device to establish “migration management” that purports to serve development (Pécoud, 2014 and 2017).

2. Coined by the West in the aftermath of the Second World War, the term “development” is rooted in a belief system shaped by modernity, capitalism and coloniality of power (Rist, 1996; Latouche, 1998; Le Petitcorps and Desille, 2020). While migration is recognised as a vector of social change and a means of individual self-realisation, other aspects have been less documented, such as how individuals migrating themselves conceptualise development, the interplay between individual commitment and collective dynamics, and the temporal and spatial scales involved. The label “development actors”, long applied to migrant workers, has been extended to today’s globalised diasporas by a growing number of institutions with interests that can be pragmatic or ideological. This article seeks to understand how the individuals concerned neutralise or politicise this designation, depending on their spatialities, as they are transformed over time by the migratory experience.

3. In the 2010s, the tension between politicisation and depoliticisation of the migration-development relationship became more complex with the promotion of national migration policies in so-called “departure” countries. In response to demands for good governance of migration, these states were expected to implement public policies encouraging their nationals to invest in their region of origin. While a catch-up effect could be seen for these states, asserting an apolitical view of the migration-development relationship, long-term experiments continued in village localities, led by migrant collectives, that were far from politically neutral (Bakewell, 2008). The politicisation-depoliticisation of the migration-development relationship takes place at all spatial scales, in a shifting dynamic, with migrant-actors and territorial actors (state and local elected representatives in particular) finding in this nexus a source of variable legitimacy (Leclerc-Olive, 2006).

4. This contribution focuses on a case study, using a diachronic approach, to review the migration-development relationship through the prism of local spaces in the Kayes region of Mali. Villages are neither isolated receptacles nor neutral settings; they play a structural role in the migration-development relationship, through the practices of individuals whose spatialities are marked by a desire for both rootedness and mobility. These “network-spaces” or “transnational villages” (Lacroix, 2021) opened up to the world, and continue to try to find a balance between opposing forces.

5. Taking the local level as its starting point, this article examines how the migration-development relationship is constructed through innovative practices, that become normalised with hindsight. It focuses on how this relationship, through the actors it brings together, shapes fragile and incomplete “network-spaces”. It shows how these spaces are sometimes strengthened by territorialisation from below, and at other times weakened by processes of deterritorialisation, in the wake of territorial reforms imposed by the states of origin. How, in these localities, does the migration-development relationship, simultaneously reveal and conceal power dynamics—power that circulates and plays out in places, far from the depoliticisation which seems to be imposed from above? In these distinctive “localities”, what insights can a diachronic
perspective offer on the evolving forms of this relationship and the dynamics of politicisation and depoliticisation at local and national scales?

Adopting a social and political geography approach, this contribution revisits the migration-development nexus through the lens of “locality”, an empirical prism through which “globalisation interweaves multiple forms of mobility and interconnection, producing places characterised by multiple and complex dynamics” (Appadurai, 2001). The first part looks at the genesis of migration networks in the Kayes region, where the archipelagic social fabric of Sahelian societies influenced relations between emigrants and their space of origin, shaping a migratory system in which the migration-development relationship found fertile ground. The second part, on the village association movement of the 1980s-90s, shows how migrant-actors, while united in their belief in development through collective investment, contributed to the depoliticisation of this relationship. Finally, the third part looks at the forms and scales of this contemporary politicisation-depoliticisation dynamic in relation to the migration-development nexus, as the interplay of actors has grown more complex within a global context that both overshadows and revives the alliances and strategies of migrant-actors.

Box 1: Methodology

This article draws on long-term research, combining direct sources (interviews) and indirect sources (literature review). It is based mainly on studies carried out in Mali, in the Kayes region, over the past twenty years, as part of a doctoral project (Lima, 2003), a post-doctoral project (Lima, 2015), and a more recent joint research project (Feldman et al., 2020). Most of the interviews were conducted both in the migrant-actors’ villages of origin and in hostels in the Paris region. It was therefore a multi-site study between Mali and France, involving regular follow-up with migrant-actors and associations (observation of meetings, individual and group interviews) in both spaces. Association leaders, returnees and local elected representatives made up most of the profiles. The combination of older and more recent data makes it possible to revisit the migration-development relationship, given that over the past two decades the actors involved in this dynamic in the Kayes region remain unchanged, describing themselves as a generation that has been “sacrificed” in the name of development.

This article presents a renewed interpretation that takes account of the increasingly obvious tension between the local and national levels, in the context of Mali's multidimensional crisis. The NIMIK project,¹ conducted in 2018-2019, provided an opportunity to deploy a multiscalar approach (Kayes, Bamako, Paris region). Fieldwork was conducted both in the communes of the Kayes region and in migrants' destinations, mainly in the Paris region, where Malian migrant associations are particularly well-structured and active. Additional research was conducted in Bamako, home to national associations representing the diaspora that act as intermediaries and play a significant role in current debates on the Malian government's migration policy. Throughout these years of research, a qualitative methodology rooted in social and political geography was employed, focusing on the practices, discourses and representations of the actors involved.
From Colonisation to Independence: Migratory
Networks Tested by Borders Closures in the Sahel

7 The distinctive socio-spatial configuration of the West African migration-development relationship is rooted in historical migratory systems, shaped by original settlement dynamics and later redefined by forced circulation practices in the context of French West Africa (Afrique-Occidentale française - AOF) (Raynaut, 1997; Gary-Tounkara, 2023). The strength of the region's reticular spatialities—the role of discontinuous configurations in social ties and power relations—shape tensions between the local and national levels. Since independence, the politicisation and depoliticisation of the migration-development relationship has been based on mistrust between the state and migrant-villagers, depending on the context, in an antagonistic dynamic in which each seeks legitimacy, sometimes politicising migration and other times depoliticising development.

Circulation, Forced Migration and New Migrant Worker Figures

8 In the Sahel, pre-colonial empires structured a social and political space configured by reticularity,² combining sedentarism and circulation, with power over individuals based more on links than on places. In these spaces of discontinuous settlements, the worlds of merchants and farmers were enmeshed (Retaillé, 2011; OECD-SWAC, 2014), and a relational geography, woven from family networks and political alliances, developed. Communities were mobile across vast territories, depending on available water resources and external threats (including raids). Throughout the pre-colonial period, and particularly after the fall of the Mali Empire in the 15th century, the upper and middle stretches of the Senegal River Valley were characterised by major population movements. The work of Pollet and Winter (1971) highlighted the mobility of the Soninke, the majority group in this space,³ known for their trading practices. It was up to the authorities to maintain control, despite the distances travelled by individuals, over this mobility and the resources generated. This system of allegiance to local authorities can still be seen in the contemporary spatialities of international migrants from this region.

9 This circulation, synonymous with prosperity, was valued but controlled, contributing to the power of pre-colonial kingdoms (such as the Kingdom of Ghana, one of the most famous in the region). Many oral epics have recounted the achievements of these empire builders, leaving a lasting imprint on the imaginaries of these societies. At the end of the 18th century, the conquest and subsequent colonial domination led to profound disruptions in these practices. New forms of migratory circulation were imposed by the French colonial administration within the boundaries of the AOF territory. Far from the common misconception that contemporary Sahelian migration is solely the result of poverty and the violence introduced by colonial rule, it is also a continuation of seasonal migratory practices that contributed to the wealth of these societies (Manchuelle, 2004).

10 As the colonial enterprise⁴ produced increasingly delineated local territories, which became institutionalised with the creation of cantons and cercles, mobility was reshaped at all levels: at the local level, with settlement movements triggered by the “liberation” of slaves (Keita, 1972; Lavigne-Delville, 1994); then forced regional mobility
linked to forced labour,⁵ for example for the construction of the Dakar to Bamako
railway (1880-1905); and within the broader AOF territory, with the deployment of
seasonal agricultural migration to the coastal plantations (now Côte d'Ivoire).

11 In this new territorial system organised by the colonial power, the Senegal River Valley quickly became economically marginalised. The combination of the railway and the Groundnut Basin in eastern Senegal (Copans, 1980) undermined economic activity, while in Sudan (now Mali), the development of the *Office du Niger* irrigation scheme concentrated flows of workers from across the area. The trade routes that once criss-crossed the Senegal River Valley disappeared, crippling development efforts and forcing populations to participate in seasonal agricultural migration (Kane and Lericollais, 1975). This migration was directed towards several territories, including Senegambia (groundnuts), Côte d'Ivoire (cocoa) and Congo⁶ (agricultural plantations). Accustomed to moving within an increasingly open space, and benefiting from the liberalisation of the movement of people within the AOF since 1946,⁷ the Senegalese and Sudanese developed a federal consciousness and “it was as if these workers, aware of the challenges posed to the federal space by the rise of nationalism across Africa, resisted the territorialisation of their migratory field” (Gary-Tounkara, 2009: 20).

12 In addition to the “navétanat”,⁸ the most widely known and quantitatively significant form of temporary agricultural migration, several other migrant-worker figures emerged in the changing economic and social landscape of the final decades of colonisation. These included *laptots* (river and later maritime navigation), dockworkers, demobilised infantrymen and even diamond merchants (Bredeloup, 2007). Whether farmers, sailors or soldiers, the migrants from the upper stretch of the Senegal River Valley had forged historical and social networks over time that enabled them to seize economic opportunities, synonymous with enrichment, in a society where the accumulation of wealth made it possible for individuals to secure social status and influence in their locality of origin, beyond the necessary payment of taxes imposed by the colonial administration. As Manchuelle (2004: 327-328) notes: “Pre-colonial migration, links with French trade, religious networks, family alliances, etc., enabled the Soninke to be informed of opportunities for well-paid work abroad before other groups, and were therefore an intrinsic cause of migration.”

13 Gradually, the geographical direction of these migrations changed, with urban centres becoming the preferred destinations, firstly on the Atlantic coast, especially Dakar, and then the port and industrial cities of the colonial metropolis. By the eve of independence, the figure of the migrant-worker had gained prominence, and Soninke farmers moved to the banks of the Seine, its factories and immigrant hostels.

The Migratory Space of the River Valley Tested by National Territories

14 The migration networks established during the colonial period in the Kayes region and the neighbouring regions of Bakel (Senegal) and Sélibaby (Mauritania), enabled men from the villages to migrate to France after independence, although Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire remained the primary destinations, largely due to the strength of family networks. However, the dissolution of the Mali Federation⁹ in 1962 and the closure of the Senegal-Mali border isolated the Kayes region, hindering the movement of workers towards the Groundnut Basin (Senegal). From then on, migration to France took over,
as demand for labour reached its peak and borders were opened to immigration.¹⁰ The states concerned disapproved of the departure of their nationals, branding them “traitors” and framing their migration as an “escape” at a time when major national construction and development efforts were underway. These efforts depended on the active population, especially in Mali where Modibo Keita, the father of independence, had chosen the path of socialism.

15 While the positions of the newly independent states on migration varied, marked by an ambivalent combination of outward rejection and implicit acceptance, the rural populations, whose sense of national belonging was still new, responded positively to calls for recruitment, because maintaining the migratory system was a core concern. In these regions, which had become peripheral within their respective national territories, migration was a condition of social and economic equilibrium, while the authorities focused on their “useful” region,¹¹ such as the inland delta of the Niger in the case of Mali (Raynaut, 1997). It was therefore without initially thinking about the “development” of their locality of origin, that emigrants from the upper Senegal River Valley sought to preserve their migratory networks, both longstanding ones within the continent (Côte d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, Gabon, Congo) and more recent ones towards France, in order to maintain decent living conditions for their families. The coexistence of these two migratory systems—one intra-African, the other Franco-European—helped them navigate crises of many kinds (droughts, political unrest), until France closed its borders and introduced visa requirements in 1974.

16 Between 1960 and 1974, France was an accessible destination, offering the prospect of paid employment. “Faire la France” (literally, “doing France”) appealed to cadets sociaux, socially disadvantaged groups¹² seeking to escape rural labour and earn money for a few years. In this configuration, migration was not permanent; rather it was a stage in a life trajectory, allowing individuals to move from one status to another, marry, and return to their villages with the prestige of having undertaken a migratory adventure. As Manchuelle (2004: 307) explains:

> “The migrants’ main ambition was to become village leaders; they had no intention of challenging traditional societal norms. Through migration, a young man could liberate himself from traditional society by living abroad, financially independent, but his financial resources also enabled him to gradually gain influence within his society of origin. When he grew old, he would return to his village where he would become a respected elder.”

17 These migrants were mainly men of working age, travelling alone, single or married.¹³ Beyond family and social obligations, their primary motivation for saving was personal gain. This migration was therefore a form of circulation where the migrant prepared for his return to his village (Adams, 1977), far from focusing on the village's "development".

18 This migratory model, based on saving and returning, described by Quimiral (2005) as a “land-money” system, had significant effects on the villages to which monetary and material transfers flowed, accompanying the comings and goings of migrants. Money became a means of individual advancement, and the practice of migration disrupted both local production activities and social organisation. Until the mid-1970s, these localities enjoyed a degree of prosperity, despite minimal investment by the Malian state. The turning point came when two events converged: the introduction of visa requirements for immigrant workers in France, in response to the first oil crisis of 1974, and cycles of drought in the Sahel. For these emigrants, “trapped” in their
circulation, the challenge was to build an alternative, to imagine a different relationship with the village, as well as with the state of origin.

19 This initial period ended with the emergence of a duality in the migration-development relationship that was to intensify. While the young independent state of Mali politicised migration, migrants depoliticised development. After the 1968 coup d'état, which brought General Moussa Traoré to power, an increasingly ambiguous dynamic played out: faced with an authoritarian state whose desire for control penalised migrants' projects, migrants drew their legitimacy from the local sphere, mindful of existing hierarchies and alliances, trying to avoid the politicisation of their commitment.

## The Village Association Movement and the Silent Politicisation of the Migration-Development Relationship

20 The severe droughts of the 1970s and 1980s triggered mass mobilisation of migrants from the Senegal River Valley. As implementation of the Structural Adjustment Plans (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank plunged Mali into a chronic economic slump, emigrants' money took on a different hue in the eyes of the central state, the village authorities and the main people concerned. The latter, with an increasingly distanced view, situated themselves in a shifting balance of power. From the village to Bamako, levels of politicisation of the migration-development relationship multiplied and became more complex, as did attempts at depoliticisation, driven by actors with conflicting interests.

## Development Associations: An Apolitical Commitment to the Localities

21 Having grown accustomed to relying on their own resources while living in hostels in France, migrants from the River Valley drew on their experience, and tried and tested organisational capacities. The system of “caisses de solidarité” (solidarity funds), which dates back to the “navétanat”, was transposed to worker hostels in large French industrial towns (Quiminal, 1991; Timéra, 1996; Daum, 1998). These systems were based on village membership and were intended to provide for the needs of their members in the event of unemployment, illness or death. Monthly mandatory individual contributions, overseen by representatives of village chiefs, were “both the material and symbolic mark of village membership” (Lavigne-Delville, 1994:132). However, the introduction of visas and the closure of France’s borders¹⁴ upset the balance of the “land-money” system. For these men, the prospect of returning to the village receded, and migration went from being a personal experience to a collective necessity. Maintaining financial transfers had become structural, and those already in France had to stay, while preserving a relationship with their family and their village, undiminished by distance and time. A different kind of circulation developed, and migrants’ relationship with their country of origin was transformed into a “dynamic continuum between sedentarism and nomadism, between individualism and
communitarianism, between localism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism” (Sindjoun, 2005: 7).

22

During this period, the migrants' views of their village and the Malian state changed irrevocably and became unwittingly politicised. The deficiencies were glaringly obvious, particularly in terms of essential public infrastructure. Two decades after independence, migrants were asking themselves: “Where is the state? What has it done for the villages?” Now settled in France, as salaried workers, taking evening classes and, in some cases, joining the trade union movement, one thing was clear: the state was absent, and their villages had been forgotten. Who else but these migrants could prevent famine and disease, build wells and schools, and stop the depopulation of their villages? Although it was not formalised, this questioning of the role of the Malian state was expressed indirectly through the multiplication of projects aimed at the village community, which extended well beyond ordinary family support.

23

The solidarity funds in the hostels in the Paris region were immediately reactivated and the first outlines of collective projects for the villages began to take shape. Water towers were erected, despite costs of several million CFA francs. Agricultural cooperatives were established to store food supplies. Many other projects were launched, all without the support of the local Malian authorities. How should this mobilisation be described? The shift from ordinary family support to a community commitment that surpassed the ordinary was not on the agenda of the weekly meetings of the *villages-bis* (extended villages).¹⁵ The need to react collectively in the face of an emergency had never been so keenly felt. Emigrants and villagers alike were surprised by this demonstration, which sparked critical awareness. As emigrants and villagers realised their financial power, other forms of mobilisation began to emerge in the host country.

24

Between 1973 and 1980, the “great hostel strike” mobilised numerous West African migrant collectives, denouncing unacceptable housing conditions. Their actions in the public space, supported and amplified by trade unions and left-wing political parties, raised public awareness of their presence, even in France (Gary-Tounkara, 2023). During these alliances between migrants and activists, hostels were identified as central places in the immigrants’ commitment to their region of origin. In 1981, the victory of the Socialist Party in the French presidential elections led to the adoption of a significant measure for these collectives: the extension of the 1901 Law on associations to foreign nationals, enabling them to formally establish associations. Although the informal village funds remained in place, there was a rush to set up formal associations. Within just a few months, several hundred associations had filed applications with the prefecture,¹⁶ adopting the “development” banner. The advent of Village Development Associations (VDAs), run by cadets sociaux, while the village-bis leaders retained control of solidarity funds, created an imbalance that the migrant-villagers worked to contain (Daum, 1998; Ba, 2007). The desire to remain in the field of development, synonymous with social transformation and the restructuring of links and spaces, was countered by a growing loyalty to the village and its social hierarchies (Timéra, 1996). This form of accepted debt enabled migrants to reaffirm their individual and collective sense of belonging, and the first development projects were therefore bound to respect these boundaries (Quiminal, 2005).

25

Established at village level, VDAs immediately asserted political neutrality, emphasising local harmony and putting aside criticism of the state of origin. At the
hostels where these new VDAs were headquartered, the end of the week was dedicated to “project” meetings, involving increasing numbers of external partners, linked to the burgeoning international solidarity movement, concerned with the future of the “post-drought” Sahel. The nature of the first projects reflected this functional perspective, closely aligned with the “needs of the populations”, in the terms used by the development sector. Wells, water towers, schools and health centres succeeded mosques, transforming village landscapes, creating new centralities and shaking up relations between emigrants, villagers and the state.

## New Territorialities Through Development to Escape Politics

As Sayad (1999) has shown, migrants' involvement in associations takes place in a relational space marked by tension, at both local and national level. Beyond the economic factors that partly explained the desire of individuals from the Kayes region to improve the living conditions of the local population, it was also a means to maintain a place in the village, despite prolonged absence. Quimiral (1991: 148) outlines the alternatives available:

> "Three systems of representation were available to Soninke immigrants, around which three main tendencies, three options, emerged: loyalty to the system that formed them, adherence to the host system, and the hope of achieving positive collective syncretism between the two reference spaces. The third option was a recent one, the result of a long stay."

In the face of widespread social adversity, combining admiration and jealousy, which migrants experienced both from their families and from local government representatives, collective commitment in the name of development also became a strategy enabling them to demonstrate their allegiance to the community and derive legitimacy from it (Gonin et al., 2013a).

Navigating the delicate balance of depoliticisation—at local level, by considering return, and at national level, by avoiding direct criticism of an authoritarian state wary of the political power of their commitment—was a complex exercise that migrant-development actors pursued with determination. They drew on a resource from their homeland: the inter-village links and pre-colonial political alliances that gave them considerable room for manoeuvre. By changing scale, migrant association projects sidestepped the risk of politicisation. In experimenting with modes of action based on the expertise of development professionals, they became key public actors, both for the village chiefs and for the local administrative authorities.

These were the years of development utopia and dispassionate depoliticisation for migrants, at the height of their commitment to their region of origin.¹⁷ The proliferation of inter-village development associations (IVDAs) reconfigured local territories, combining the strengths of the VDAs, while avoiding the pitfalls of local isolation. Firstly, they took over in the field of local development by covering broader territories, constructed on the basis of two logics: “federative” in line with preexisting administrative divisions (arrondissement, cercle); or “historical” based on pre-colonial countries, the *diamana*.¹⁸ Secondly, by breaking with the overly “localist” approach of the VDAs, the IVDAs sought to change the populations’ relationship to migration income. They innovated in organisational terms by no longer appointing leaders of the *village-bis*, from the families of the village traditional leaders, but rather men with the training and skills needed to take on responsibilities in associations (Lima, 2015). Some
of these men were encouraged to return home to head the associations, which split into
two bases, one in France and the other in the villages. This local presence created a new
dynamic, as the leaders gained a high level of recognition from both the village
traditional leaders and external partners.

30 At the end of the 1980s, the Kayes region had fourteen IVDAs. Drawing their social and political legitimacy from this unprecedented territorial configuration, they gradually replaced the arrondissements, which were headed by administrators subordinate to the central state and the one-party system, who were not in a position to lead the development enterprise.

"We're tired of development": From Utopia to Disillusionment

31 Amid severe budget restrictions in Bamako, migrants' remittances were seen as a national resource, and the state's critical stance towards expatriates shifted to one of benevolent attention, though not without political calculation by a dictatorship which increasingly lacked legitimacy at the end of the 1980s. The state encouraged migrants' remittances but was unable to support their investments. Post offices suffered cash shortages, leading to systematic delays in payments of postal orders to recipient families. Similarly, while emigrant associations financed collective infrastructure, the state was virtually absent from these projects, passively allowing them to proceed. Despite rhetoric claiming proactive engagement and acknowledging migrants' role in the country's development, central government showed little commitment to a migration policy that would enable "Malians living abroad"¹⁹ to find support within state spheres (Gary-Tounkara, 2010). Thanks to collective savings, which amounted to substantial sums, projects for village facilities multiplied during this period. Through this unprecedented commitment, the migrant-actors from the River Valley expressed their faith in the truth of this Western belief: if the main cause of migration is poverty, the remedy is development.

32 A new way of being emerged for these individuals, who were neither emigrants nor immigrants, but fully actors in their transnational lives and bearers of a new territoriality (Institut Panos, 2001; Portes, 1999). This “multiterritoriality” approach is analysed by Leclerc-Olive (2002: 109) in the following terms:

> "The experiences of migrants in the Senegal River Basin are associated with projects that are more varied and complex than often thought. The actions undertaken are not merely about adapting to the conditions imposed on families, and the collective strategies implemented go far beyond the simple survival of the family or village community. Development actions are undertaken that reflect a stable focus, an analysis of failures and successes, and an evaluation of what needs to be done for the development of the area of origin."

33 The structural anchoring of international migration in these Sahelian localities has forged distinctive individual paths and collective projects. These unintentional development actors have transformed their villages, setting them on multiscalar relational trajectories, which some identify in hindsight as "development". While this term was used retrospectively to describe this dynamic, it has elicited mixed, even disillusioned reactions from the main stakeholders.

> "We're tired of development. We didn't leave to develop our villages, but to help our families."
34 These were the words of Samba Sylla, in his office at the Groupe de recherche et de réalisation pour le développement rural (GRDR)²⁰ in Montreuil (Paris suburb), in his room at the Lorraine hostel (Paris, 19th arrondissement), in the courtyard of his family's concession in Diataya, and in the living room of his new villa in Kayes. Wherever he was, this phrase kept coming back, like a way out. It was echoed by those around him, including returnees, migrants on holiday, members of associations, at an umpteenth project meeting. It was as if the thread of this conversation could not be broken, given the intensity of the commitment involved (Gubert, 2010).

35 This fatigue, despite the successes and recognition, can be understood in the light of the growing gap between migrants' commitment and the absence of the Malian state at the end of the 1980s. Migrant remittances compensated for the malfunctioning of state services in key areas of daily life, such as health, education, village water supply and even civil registration. Villages hosted these services and became functional hubs, even competing with the arrondissement capitals in carrying out their basic functions. The multiplication of investments and the spread of facilities from one village to another surpassed the public authorities, which remained hostile to migration departures. The IVDAs initiated reflection on the future of migratory income and the prospects for young people.

36 Should development help to slow the rate of departure? Or can it contribute to better preparing would-be exiles? These were the questions raised by the IVDAs, concerned about the future of young people: education and professional training were at the heart of their project. Beyond this, association leaders were driven by desire for democracy. Collective infrastructures were run by management committees involving all sections of the local population. Women and young adults benefited from literacy courses to prepare them to take over the reins. In interaction with the village traditional leaders, new forms of participation in local life developed, broadening the scope of public debate. This learning about development contributed to building village civil society. In this context, the politicisation of the migration-development relationship, which had been put aside for a while, returned with renewed vigour in the new era that began for Mali with the fall of the dictatorship and the start of democratisation in 1991.

## Contemporary Politicisation and Depoliticisation: Migrants' Associations as a New Form of Counter-Power?

37 While the political regimes of the first thirty years of independence openly criticised the exile of Malians, Alpha Oumar Konaré's regime (1992-2002) encouraged their return and called on their experience and participation in political decision-making, going so far as to appoint one of them as special adviser to the presidency on migration affairs (Soukouna, 2018). Over the years, the material and non-material transfers made by migrants, through associations, had conferred on them the status of development actors, transmitters of ideas and, ultimately, citizens in their own right. The new political situation in Mali, marked by the implementation of an ambitious decentralisation reform, changed the dynamics of politicisation and depoliticisation of the migration-development relationship. A reversal was observed: while the relationship was politicised at local level between newly elected officials and migrant
associations, the Malian state positioned itself in relation to the new global axiom of migration management and control. In this interplay of roles and power relationships, a political tension ran through the migrant association network in the Kayes region, at times reinforcing it, at others deconstructing it, at various levels.

## Development Associations Weakened by Politicisation of Localities

The national inter-village consultation process initiated by the *Mission de décentralisation* (Decentralisation Mission)²¹ in 1994-95 led to the creation of 126 new communes in the Kayes region.²² Local populations and migrants drew up the boundaries of these new territories based on demarcation criteria. These were grafted onto migrant associative spaces and association leaders became key mediators between the public authorities and the local population. Delegations from the *Mission de décentralisation* visited hostels in the Paris region, where the VDAs and IVDAs were directly informed of the terms and objectives of this reform. At this stage, the main response from migrant collectives to state representatives from Bamako was: “*We did decentralisation before the state*”. On the strength of this a posteriori recognition, the IVDAs initially sought to maintain their territory, but this was not without difficulty. Several approaches were adopted, including respecting community solidarity, an important principle for representatives of customary authorities. Prioritising functional criteria, the associations tried to maintain coherent territories, with some managing to incorporate additional villages, while others lost some. This restructuring contributed to a disconnect between the network of associations and the new communes, a divide that migrants continuously struggled to overcome.

This weakening factor was compounded by the prospect of the first communal elections, which sparked a heated transnational debate between villagers and the emigrant community. Who could become mayor? What powers and legitimacy would they have? What would become of the facilities financed and managed by the IVDAs? The balance and division of roles that had prevailed until then, began to unravel, with talk of entrusting local elected representatives with the tasks and responsibilities that village chiefs had delegated to migrant associations.

The stakes were so high that a specific meeting was organised in Kayes in November 1998, initiated by the *Centre d'échanges et de formation pratique* (CEFP),²³ entitled “Place and role of association leaders, farmers' organisations and migrants in decentralisation and local development. Based on case studies from the Kayes cercle.” At the end of a week of discussions, a code of conduct was drawn up and proposed to association leaders to help them navigate the murky waters of politicisation of local life. On the eve of the 1999 municipal elections, consensus had been reached, as well as a commitment by the association leaders to keep their distance from party politics. Firstly, the associations' role was redefined: “[T]he mayor shall be the initiator, and migrants shall support the communal council's action. This is a new dynamic to be created. Migrants shall also have an intermediary role between the local association and its partners in France.” Secondly, the prospect of the renewal of spheres of power called into question the legitimacy of the associations and their leaders, who were closely linked to the village authorities: “Migrant associations... only get their legitimacy and strength of mobilisation from their 'submission' to traditional power...The social hierarchy of the village is reproduced.”
41

However, local association leaders were immediately identified as potential mayoral
candidates. The advantages and disadvantages of this were assessed by both villagers in
Mali and migrant collectives in France. On the positive side, these leaders were
experienced actors who could be mobilised directly to put their experience to good use
in the communes. The drawbacks included the loss of human resources and the
weakening of the associations' financial situation, as well as the risk of politicisation of
development projects (clientelism, corruption and partisan division). Ultimately, a
mechanism was proposed to "ensure that the associative movement acts as a counter-power,
so that local authorities are properly managed and local development promoted. If leaders
become elected representatives, associations need to be stronger to ensure the proper
management by the new communes of the assets that the people have entrusted to them".
Aware of the fragile balance to be built between the association network and the
territory of the communes, migrants and association leaders tried to respect this
commitment at a time when political parties were looking for candidates and exerting
pressure to convince them to join their ranks.

42

During this first term (1999-2004), several independent lists were formed, initiated by leaders seeking to maintain an apolitical position.²⁴ Their concern to preserve the achievements of the IVDAs was obvious, and the first steps taken by the communes where they were elected were convincing. In the Kayes cercle in particular, these communes were marked by their dynamism, carrying out participative territorial diagnoses, drawing up local development plans within the space of just a few months, and reactivating the partnerships established by the IVDAs. Moreover, five of them applied the above-mentioned mechanism and created an inter-commune association in 2001.²⁵ This first attempt at inter-communality can be seen as a strong appropriation of decentralisation by associations with a migrant background. This experiment soon spread throughout the Kayes region and even became a model at national level (Lima, 2015). During this period, the association network was being restructured at two levels, communal and inter-communal, combining expectations that were at times complementary and at others divergent. The first was that of elected representatives, who initiated the creation of associations at the level of the commune, calling on their constituents, in both Europe and Africa. Between 2000 and 2012,²⁶ despite some reluctance, the latter agreed to create this additional level of association, because their legitimacy and the future of their locality within the territories of the communes were at stake. They accepted the new territorial and political situation brought about by decentralisation, which they had been calling for, but whose political dimension they feared. In return, they expected to relay the needs of the local populations, and even to exercise a form of control in the decision-making process. The posture of counter-power embodied by emigrant associations towards the central government was therefore applied at local level, creating tensions with elected representatives. This fragile and hesitant dialogue between migrants and elected representatives was not limited to the local level; it also took shape at other levels of government, where representative bodies were looking for contact points within the diaspora.
A Critical Diaspora Facing a Fragile State: The Deadlocks of Politicisation and Depoliticisation of the Migration-Development Nexus

43 In 2009, the creation of CADERKAF²⁷ in the Kayes region marked the culmination of ten years of reshaping the migrant association network after the introduction of communes into Mali's political landscape. This federative structure became the Kayes Regional Council's contact point on issues of development and migration. Its formalisation led to the signing of a tripartite decentralised cooperation agreement in 2011, between CADERKAF, the Regional Council and the Île-de-France region. At national level, migrant associations in the Kayes region were held up as an example, and initiatives were launched in other regions of the country to structure associations of nationals according to this mode, which combined three levels: communal, inter-communal and regional.²⁸ However, with the instability of the Malian state following the coup d'état in 2012, the recognition gained by these associations, highlighted by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and decentralised cooperation bodies (Vincent-Mory, 2021; Soukouna, 2019), was called into question. Moreover, the migration-development relationship as developed in the Kayes region was specific, and the reproducibility of this particular configuration was illusory in other regions of Mali.

44 The collapse of the Malian state ignited a profound crisis of confidence between Bamako and the Malian diaspora (Coulibaly and Lima, 2013). In the Kayes region, the network of associations fragmented, and the absence of the state and, by knock-on effect, the weakening of local elected representatives, pushed emigrants to the limits of their commitment to development. Since 2016 (when the most recent communal elections were held), new local associations have emerged, initiated by young migrants, breaking away from the communal associations founded by their fathers' generation and from local elected representatives, who were seen as prominent figures less inclined to criticise the state and its migration policy. Far from being contained within the localities, this tension was fostered at national level between the state and the diaspora, in a context of unprecedented political and security crisis in the Sahel and increased externalisation of the European Union's borders following the Valletta Summit in 2015 (Boyer et al., 2022).

45 Going back in time, the creation of the *Haut conseil des Maliens de l'extérieur* (HCME) in 1993, following the National Reconciliation Conference, after years of dictatorship and hostility from Bamako towards emigrants, marked a turning point in the relationship between the Malian state and its nationals. With the official establishment of this structure, the umbrella organisation for associations of the Malian diaspora, the state recognised and legitimised the role of migrants in the country's development. The HCME has representation in all the countries where Malian emigrants have organised, through the *Conseils de base des Maliens de l'extérieur* (Basic Councils of Malians Abroad – CBME), of which there were sixty-six in 2018. It is recognised as promoting the public interest and has been subsidised by the Malian government since 2010, but there is ambivalence about its autonomy from Koulouba.²⁹ It operated smoothly for the first few years, until interpersonal tensions within the presidency led to its break-up. In 2015, dissidents formed a parallel association, independent of the state, the *Conseil supérieur de la diaspora malienne* (Malian Diaspora High Council – CSDM). By 2019, the CSDM had representation in forty-seven countries. These two structures, which have identical
missions, seek to mobilise the Malian diaspora throughout the world. The CSDM has been more active on an issue that had been sidelined since 1993, that of the representation of Malian emigrants in the National Assembly. This issue was put back on the agenda during the 2019 national dialogue.³⁰ While the Malian state was reluctant to grant the diaspora this place within national institutions, it adopted a migration policy reflecting other ambiguities, ranging from criticism to support for its diaspora.

46

The *Politique nationale de migration du Mali* (Mali's National Migration Policy – PONAM), adopted in 2014, included as one of its priorities, the development of the diaspora's capacities to contribute to national development. Among the major actions implemented, it cites: “Efforts to leverage the experiences and practices of the Malian diaspora in the context of decentralisation in Mali; creation of tools to support public policies promoting the inclusion of diaspora actors in development; carrying out investment projects with the diaspora.” The policy emphasises that “migration stakeholders, particularly local authorities and the diaspora, are yet to appropriate PONAM and its action plan”.³¹ While the Malian state has always been attentive to the issue of migration, first with fear and then with benevolence, the ongoing major crisis in the country crystallises around this subject. As Gary-Tounkara (2013) and Soukouna (2020) point out, the Malian state’s refusal to sign agreements on the “concerted management of migratory flows” between 2006 and 2010 reflects its resistance to French and European policies on migration. This resistance was particularly driven by diaspora movements and associations both inside and outside the country.

47

But suspicion has returned, and relations between the national authorities and Malians living abroad are increasingly strained (Feldman et al., 2020). This is illustrated by the *Cité d'accueil des Maliens de l'extérieur* (Reception centre for Malians living abroad), built in 2018 in Bamako, which is both the headquarters of the HCME and a reception and accommodation facility for returning emigrants (with a capacity of 200 places). Its aim is to promote the reintegration of returnees, with return having become a “priority for the Malian authorities, included as the third strategic focus of PONAM” (Keita and Maïga, 2022: 12). Most of these returns are forced, fuelled by mass expulsions from Algeria and Libya.

48

The gap has widened between proposals on supporting the diaspora, keeping populations in the country through local development policies, and promoting legal migration channels, which have been consigned to oblivion. The ongoing tension between politicisation and depoliticisation of the relationship between migration and development has therefore come up against a major obstacle, with the placing of “migration management” on the global agenda. In Mali, the diaspora's assessment is increasingly bleak: more controls and more forced returns, leading to less migration and less development.

Conclusion

49

This diachronic interpretation of the transformations in the migration-development relationship in Mali places at the centre of analysis an intrinsic and continuous tension between politicisation and depoliticisation, viewed through the prism of localities. It concludes with an observation of blockage, if not blockade. In an increasingly unequal global migration regime, where simplistic opposition between categories dominates – citizen diasporas versus deterritorialised “migrants” (Nouss, 2015; Streiff-Fénart, 2020)
—how can we capture the complexity of this distinctive trajectory, led by collectives of emigrants from the Kayes region who believed in this tenacious development myth, with individual migrants cast as its heroes?

50

In retrospect, this uneven relationship, defined by both mistrust and recognition, between emigrants and the Malian state, and by extension local elected representatives, highlights not only emigrants' capacity to bring about development, but also to transfer their particular spatiality to their region of origin, by opening up local territories to multiple networks (associations, NGOs, decentralised cooperation). This shared and territorialised development enabled them to position themselves as counter-powers at all levels, while asserting political neutrality.

51

Throughout this history, emigrants have witnessed the construction of the independent Malian state, its excesses under dictatorship, its successes under democratisation and its setbacks following recent coups. They imagined for themselves a return synonymous with social ascension and worked towards a better future for their village. Recognised as development actors in the 1990s, they became invaluable intermediaries for the Malian and French governments in public development and decentralised cooperation policies. However, faced with this ongoing duality of politicisation and depoliticisation of the migration-development relationship, fuelled by an ever-increasing number of actors with contradictory injunctions, migrants' associations may have run out of steam after their considerable efforts.

52

In the Kayes region, the relationship between migration and development underwent a phase of local anchoring with a particular configuration, that of “transnational villages” (Lacroix, 2021). While these localities have been reinvested by the dynamics of inter-village relations, they have nonetheless become autonomous in relation to migratory income. At the turn of the 2000s, the work of migrant associations began facing increasing criticism. This perspective largely obscured the contributions of the diaspora settled elsewhere in Africa and escaping the injunctions of French-style co-development (Vincent-Mory, 2021). Becoming a development “broker” (Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk, 1993) also means renegotiating one’s place in the village (the elder-younger relationship) and asserting the conditions for citizenship (subject-actor) in relation to the state. It seems that the mobilisation of associations has become a resource both for the Malian state and for the migrants themselves. The state seeks to use migrant groups to its political advantage, while some of these groups use the associative framework to forge a social status and a political career for themselves. These forms of competition seem to betray the efforts of migrants, who had relied on village powers to protect them from confrontation with the state.

53

In summary, the commitment of emigrants-immigrants to development unfolded in two stages. At first, they were depoliticised, withdrawing into their village spatialities. Then they became politicised, as a form of counter-power to the new communal entities, extending to the national level in a context of exacerbated political crisis. Migrants are thus citizens who take part in the creation of political space, but only if they are granted a plural, mobile territoriality, with free movement as an essential condition (Migre Europ, 2022).
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## NOTES

1. The study was conducted by a team which included Hawa Coulibaly (post-doctoral student, LISST) and Soumaïla Berthé (doctoral student, LMI MaCoTer).

2. Reticularity refers to social relations organised in networks, i.e. in discontinuous spaces: "Within the network, society is defined by the ties between its members, from place to place, at the junctions where routes cross. Networks erase the very notion of boundaries." (OECD-SWAC, 2014: 19)

3. Today this population is divided between Mali, Senegal and Mauritania.

4. The construction of the Fort of Médine in 1855, located in what is now the Kayes region of Mali, signalled the shift to military conquest. The early years of this period were marked by the resistance of El Hadj Omar Tall's fighters, from 1857 to 1860.

5. Until 1946, the *Code de l'indigénat* (Native Code) governed forced labour migration in the AOF territory.

6. Both Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa, territories characterised by very low population densities at the time.

7. In 1946, due to the abolition of forced labour, the *indigénat* (Native Code) and the *laissez-passer*, workers were able to move freely between the various AOF territories.

8. The term “*navétanat*” comes from the Wolof word “*nawett*”, meaning rainy season.

9. The Mali Federation was created in January 1959, initiated by Léopold Sédar Senghor and Modibo Keita. It included Senegal, Sudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey, though the latter two countries withdrew in March of the same year. Following independence on 20 June 1960, political tensions between Senegalese and Sudanese leaders led to the dissolution of the federation. Senegal declared independence on 20 August and Mali (formerly Sudan) on 22 September.

10. In 1963 and 1964, France signed agreements with Mali, Mauritania and Senegal allowing immigrant workers from these three countries to enter France without a visa.

11. This expression refers to the legacy of colonial geography designating agricultural uses, with space categorised according to a functional classification, favouring sedentary activities.

12. The term “cadets sociaux” refers to dominated social categories, particularly young people and women, as opposed to “aînés sociaux” whose authority is based on age, position in the lineage and possession of symbolic and material resources.

13. Kane and Lericollais (1975) estimated that there were between 60,000 and 70,000 immigrant workers from Sub-Saharan Africa in France, including 40,000 to 50,000 Soninke and 10,000 Toucouleur.

14. The Circular of 3 July 1974 confirmed the suspension of labour immigration.

15. In the host space, the “village-bis” brings together individuals from the same village.

16. For the period 1981-2012, economists Chauvet, Gubert and Mesplé-Somps recorded 565 official associations created by migrants, 68% of which operated in the Kayes region (Gary-Tounkara, 2023).

17. These years were periods of significant personal investment, particularly in property, in urban areas and in countries of emigration, far from the sight of families and villages.
18. The *diamana* are pre-colonial entities referring to groupings of villages whose links are based on the dynamics of settlement and family alliances.

19. This expression came into being in 1992 with the creation of the *Haut conseil des Maliens de l'extérieur* (High Council for Malians Living Abroad - HCME), see below.

20. GRDR is a non-governmental organisation based in Mali, Mauritania and Senegal since 1969.

21. The *Mission de décentralisation* is an ad hoc administration set up in 1993 to implement decentralisation.

22. The Kayes region has a total of 129 communes (126 new and three old communes).

23. The CEFP is based in Bakel (Senegal) and operates in Kayes and Sélibaby (Mauritania). Set up by association leaders on return to their respective countries, it offers training in local development. The quotes come from a transcribed recording (CEFP, 1998).

24. In the Kayes region, returnees made up a third of the municipal councillors in the 129 communes following the 2009 communal elections (Chauvet et al., 2013).

25. The *Comité de pilotage des communes du Diombougou* (Diombougou Communes Steering Committee - CPCD), named after a pre-colonial territory, was headed by a board made up of the mayors of the five communes. The initiative was spearheaded by the mayor of Maréna-Diombougou commune, a former migrant and association leader, with the aim of ensuring continuity between the association dynamic and commune projects. The CPCD was quick to mobilise partners and obtain funding.

26. During this period, commune elections were held regularly, in 1999, 2004 and 2009, with increasing turnouts. In 2009, turnout was 44.6%, compared with 43% in 2004 and 38.4% in 1999. These rates were higher than those for legislative and presidential elections since 1992 (between 20% and 30%). The communal elections scheduled for 2014 were not held as planned, due to the political and security crisis in Mali. They were finally held in November 2016, but not throughout the whole country.

27. *Coordination des associations de développement des cercles de la région de Kayes en France* (Coordination of development associations in the circles of the Kayes region in France).

28. In 2015, CADERKAF helped to set up the *Coordination des associations de la région de Sikasso* (CADERSIF) and *Coordination des associations de la région de Ségou* (CADERSEF) in France.

29. Koulouba Hill in Bamako is the district where the Presidency of the Republic is based.

30. Against a backdrop of post-electoral crisis (2018 presidential election), the Inclusive National Dialogue was intended to speed up implementation of the peace agreement and lead to institutional and constitutional reforms. The aim was to discuss the concerns of Malians, address institutional reforms and appropriate the 2015 peace and reconciliation agreement. It began on 7 October 2019 and ended on 20 December 2019, after a series of consultations at communal, local (cercles) and regional level. Consultations in embassies and consulates were also organised to involve the Malian diaspora.

31. Ministry of Malians Living Abroad and African Integration, General Secretariat, (2017) *Rapport d'évaluation à mi-parcours de la PONAM*, Bamako, p. 18.

ABSTRACTS

The migration-development relationship has been constructed around several myths. Although they have been deconstructed, they are continually revived. Introduced to the global agenda in
the mid-2000s, this nexus has become widely accepted, obscuring the challenging paths taken by the actors embodying this interrelationship to establish their legitimacy in the development field. Using a diachronic approach, this article revisits the migration-development relationship through the prism of local spaces, focusing on villages of departure in the Kayes region of Mali. Drawing on long-term research, it examines the evolving forms of this relationship and the dynamics of politicisation and depoliticisation at local and national levels. Migrant development associations, through their innovative practices, have shaped particular territories, earning them recognition in retrospect. Initially claiming to be apolitical, these associations have become counter-powers. The findings shed light on the complexity and political turbulence surrounding the migration-development relationship, far removed from the smooth image promoted by dominant institutions.

La relation migration-développement s'est construite sur plusieurs mythes, déconstruits mais réalimentés jusqu'à présent. Mis à l'agenda global dans le milieu des années 2000, ce *nexus s'est* banalisé, masquant les chemins rugueux empruntés par les acteurs incarnant cette interrelation, pour faire advenir leur légitimité dans le champ du développement. À travers une lecture diachronique, cet article revisite cette relation au prisme des espaces locaux, les villages de départ, dans la région Kayes au Mali. Puisant sa matière dans une longue temporalité, il interroge les formes évolutives de cette relation et les dynamiques de politisation et de dépolitisation aux échelles locale et nationale. Les pratiques originales des associations de développement des migrants ont façonné des territoires particuliers, leur conférant une reconnaissance a posteriori. Après avoir revendiqué un engagement apolitique, elles sont devenues des contre-pouvoirs. Ainsi les résultats proposés éclairent la complexité et les remous politiques de la relation migration-développement, bien éloignés du tableau lisse, mis en avant par les institutions dominantes.

El nexo entre migración y desarrollo se ha construido sobre una serie de mitos, que han sido deconstruidos. Colocado en la agenda mundial a mediados de la década del 2000, este nexo se ha convertido en un lugar común, ocultando los caminos desiguales que han seguido los principales actores que encarnan esta interrelación para establecer su legitimidad. Mediante una lectura diacrónica, este artículo revisa esta relación a través del prisma de los espacios locales, las aldeas de partida, en la región maliense de Kayes. Basándose en un largo período de tiempo, el examina las formas evolutivas de esta relación y las dinámicas de politización y despolitización a escala local y nacional. Las prácticas originales de las asociaciones de desarrollo de inmigrantes han dado forma a territorios concretos, otorgándoles reconocimiento a posteriori. Las asociaciones de inmigrantes, que se proclamaban apolíticas, se han convertido en contrapoderes. Las conclusiones arrojan luz sobre la complejidad y la agitación política de la relación migración-desarrollo, que dista mucho de la imagen lisa y llana presentada por las instituciones dominantes.

## INDEX

**Palabras claves:** asociaciones de desarrollo, contrapoder, pueblos de salida, politización-despolitización, región de Kayes, Mali

**Geographical index:** région de Kayes, Mali

**Mots-clés:** associations de développement, contre-pouvoir, villages de départ, politisation-dépolitisation

**Keywords:** development associations, counter-power, villages of departure, politicisation-depolitisation, Kayes region, Mali
## AUTHORS

### STÉPHANIE LIMA

Geographer, Senior Lecturer, INU Champollion, Toulouse - Jean Jaurès University, CNRS, LISST, Toulouse, France; stephanie.lima[at]univ-jfc.fr

## TRANSLATORS

### ALEXANDRA POMÉON O'NEILL

### KATHERINE BOOTH