Tracing the development of United States (US) trade law reveals its evolutionary process from early colonial policies to its role in the modern multilateral trading system. This process not only reflects the growth of the US economy and its rise in global stature but also demonstrates how its trade policy has, over time, transitioned from mercantilism toward free trade liberalism, and further on to the complex balance between free trade and protectionism seen today.

US trade protectionism can be seen as an expression of the “New World against the Old World.” As an emerging nation, the United States used high tariffs and strict import restrictions during the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries to protect its own nascent industries and resist the economic influence of powerful European nations. This economic policy against the Old World was not only intended to consolidate America’s economic independence but also to shape its own economic sovereignty amidst global competition. This protectionist tendency has, to some extent, continued to the present day, reflecting the core American value of pursuing economic independence and safeguarding national interests in the face of globalization and challenges from emerging economies.

US trade protectionism is closely linked to its early economic thought and policies. From the late 18<sup>th</sup> to the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, after gaining independence, the United States began to establish its own economic system, attempting to protect its new industries by formulating tariff and trade policies. This process embodied the clash of economic philosophies between the New World (America) and the Old World (Europe).

In the context of globalization, US protectionism can be viewed not only as a continuation of the “New World against the Old World” dynamic but also as a response to the shifts in the modern global economic system. Globalization has made national economies more interdependent, particularly deepening the economic relationship between the United States and emerging economies like China. Against this backdrop, US protectionist policies are seen as an expression of dissatisfaction with unequal competition and the distribution of economic benefits within the globalization process. Current protectionism can be regarded as a manifestation of deglobalization, reflecting policy adjustments made by nations to protect their own economic interests amidst the challenges brought by globalization. Although these policies are similar in form to the early “New World against the Old World” stance, their roots lie in the unequal competition and national security considerations of the modern global economic system.

From the perspective of national security and strategic interests, modern trade protectionism shares a certain continuity with the early “New World against the Old World” dynamic, but its motivations are more complex. Current protectionism is not solely about economic protection; it also involves national security issues. For example, US policies protecting key technologies and strategic industries reflect an emphasis on national security. The motivation behind such policies bears some resemblance to the goal of protecting nascent industries in early protectionism. Proponents of modern protectionist policies often emphasize an “America First” policy, which embodies a tide of economic nationalism. While this sentiment is fundamentally similar to the early American ideal of self-sufficiency, in practice, modern policies place a greater emphasis on national security and global strategic interests.

Tracing the historical contest between liberalism and protectionism within US trade law offers important insights for analyzing its modern form. Historically, the United States has dynamically adjusted its stance between free trade and protectionism based on its national interests, industrial structure, and political pressures across different economic cycles and international landscapes. This interplay reflects the duality of US trade policy: on one hand, promoting economic growth through open markets and multilateral cooperation; on the other, protecting domestic industries and safeguarding national security by implementing tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Understanding the internal logic of this historical evolution is crucial for deeply analyzing the principles and practical orientation of modern US trade law, especially regarding how it balances the complex relationship between external openness and internal protection in the context of globalization. This also provides a theoretical foundation and a primary focus for predicting the future direction of US policy between free trade and protectionism.
# I. From the Founding Era to the Mid-19<sup>th</sup> Century: The Rise of
        Protectionism

Coinciding with the evolution of America’s economic structure, the tension between the two major ideologies of protectionism and liberalism shaped the legal framework for the nation’s early trade laws. In the nation’s formative years, the rise of protectionism was primarily driven by the need to shield its nascent industries. In contrast, the voices supporting free trade primarily emanated from agricultural regions and their intellectual leaders.

## A. Diverging Trade Philosophies in the Early Republic

The initial divisions in US trade policy stemmed from fundamental differences in regional economic structures, political ideologies, and approaches to foreign policy. Industrialists and merchants in the North championed protectionist policies to promote domestic industrialization, whereas plantation owners in the South advocated for free trade to sustain their agricultural economic model.<fnref n="1" /> This fundamental cleavage in American society would persist throughout its history, reemerging in various forms during different periods.<fnref n="2" />

At the core of this conflict were deep-seated differences in economic structure. The American North, primarily the New England and Mid-Atlantic states, was characterized by manufacturing and small-scale commerce.<fnref n="3" /> As its industrial base was still nascent, it naturally supported protectionist policies to prevent ruinous competition from established industrial powers like Great Britain. At the time, Britain was the world’s most formidable industrial nation, and its cheap, high-quality goods posed an existential threat to America’s domestic industries.<fnref n="4" /> Northern industrialists, therefore, hoped to restrict imports and insulate the domestic market through high tariffs. The Southern economy, by contrast, was predicated on large-scale agriculture, particularly the cultivation of cotton, tobacco, and rice.<fnref n="5" /> Its economic model was dependent on exports, and it wished to freely ship its agricultural products to Europe, especially Britain, while importing cheaper manufactured goods in return. Consequently, the South fiercely opposed high tariffs, believing they would not only raise the price of imported goods but also trigger retaliatory tariffs that would jeopardize their agricultural exports.<fnref n="6" />

This economic divide was mirrored by a sharp divergence in political ideology. The Federalists, representing Northern merchants and industrialists, championed a robust central government and active state intervention in the economy—particularly through high tariffs, national subsidies, and infrastructure development—to foster rapid industrialization and reduce dependence on foreign goods.<fnref n="7" /> The Democratic-Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, championed a vision of a decentralized, agrarian republic.<fnref n="8" /> Fearing that a powerful central government and high tariffs would undermine individual liberties and states’ rights, they insisted the nation should rely on its agricultural prowess and import necessary manufactured goods rather than pursue industrialization through government intervention.<fnref n="9" />

Furthermore, diplomatic and international considerations exacerbated this ideological dispute. Following the Revolutionary War, America’s relationship with Great Britain was fraught with complexity. Although independent, the US remained highly dependent on Britain as a primary trading partner, especially as an export market for Southern agriculture.<fnref n="10" /> Therefore, any trade policy was inevitably influenced by diplomatic calculations. Protectionist policies were often seen as a direct challenge to British economic hegemony, whereas free trade was more conducive to maintaining amicable relations. This tension was starkly illustrated during the negotiation of the *Treaty of* *Amity, Commerce, and Navigation* (*Jay’s Treaty*)<fnref n="11" /> of 1794. The treaty, an attempt to resolve outstanding trade disputes with Britain, sparked widespread controversy.<fnref n="12" /> Federalists supported it as essential for preserving vital trade relations, while Democratic-Republicans denounced it as a betrayal of American sovereignty and an attack on their agricultural interests.<fnref n="13" />

## B. The Development of Protectionism

From the late 18<sup>th</sup> to the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, protectionism steadily gained ascendancy, emerging as the dominant policy to advance American industrial development. The Federalists, represented by Alexander Hamilton, championed the view that high tariffs and government intervention could foster the growth of domestic industry. Hamilton advocated for levying import tariffs to protect America’s nascent manufacturing sector and reduce its dependence on European goods, particularly imports from Great Britain.<fnref n="14" /> In stark contrast, Thomas Jefferson and his supporters were more inclined toward free trade. They envisioned the United States as an agrarian society that should engage in free trade with other nations, importing necessary industrial products rather than attempting to cultivate its own industry through protectionist policies.<fnref n="15" />

Over time, the protectionist argument prevailed. In its early days, America’s industrial base was weak and required substantial government support to survive and grow. Against this backdrop, protectionist measures were considered essential to help emerging domestic industries gain a competitive foothold. Consequently, protectionism garnered increasing support, especially in the northern states, as the process of industrialization accelerated.<fnref n="16" />

## C. Early Forms of Trade Relief: Protecting Nascent Industries and Economic
        Autonomy

Although the modern term “trade remedy” was not explicitly used in early American history, a clear tendency to provide such relief was already evident in numerous policies and legislative acts.

First was the *Tariff Act of 1789*.<fnref n="17" />.After gaining independence, the United States needed to raise government revenue through tariffs while also hoping to shield its domestic industries from the impact of foreign goods. The *Tariff Act of 1789* was America’s first comprehensive tariff law. Although its primary goal was to generate revenue for the federal government, some of its provisions already signaled an intent to protect domestic manufacturing. The act imposed higher duties on certain imported goods (such as ironware, glass, and textiles) to provide a degree of protection for American manufacturers against the shock of cheap British goods. This can be viewed as an early form of a “trade remedy”, even though its original intent was more fiscal than purely protective.<fnref n="18" />

Second was the *Tariff Act of 1816* (*Dallas Tariff*).<fnref n="19" /> After the War of 1812, American manufacturing had developed significantly. However, once peace was restored, cheap British goods flooded back into the US market, threatening the survival of these fledgling industries. To counter this threat, Congress passed the *Dallas Tariff*. This act is considered America’s first explicitly protectionist tariff law, intended to protect new domestic industrial sectors, especially the textile industry, by raising duties on imported goods.<fnref n="20" /> These high tariffs essentially provided a form of relief to American manufacturers, helping them cope with foreign competition.

Third was the *Tariff Act of 1828* (*Tariff of Abominations*).<fnref n="21" /> By 1828, protectionist sentiment had intensified, leading Congress to pass a tariff law with a strong protectionist bent. Its aim was to further shield domestic industry, particularly manufacturing in the North. However, the act’s high tariffs on specific imports, such as woolen textiles and raw iron, led to fierce opposition from the southern states, which dubbed it the “Tariff of Abominations.” This tariff was clearly enacted with remedial intent—to insulate the domestic market from cheap imports—even though it ignited a severe conflict between the North and South, ultimately precipitating the Nullification Crisis in South Carolina in 1832.<fnref n="22" />

Fourth was the *Tariff Act of 1842* (*Black Tariff*).<fnref n="23" /> The crisis sparked by the 1828 Tariff led to the *Compromise Tariff of 1833*, which gradually lowered duties. By the early 1840s, however, an economic recession had reduced government revenue, and domestic manufacturing once again felt the pressure of foreign competition, especially after the Panic of 1837. In response, Congress reverted to protectionism. The *Black Tariff* sharply increased duties, restoring protectionist levels to shield American industry from foreign competition. This move clearly demonstrated the government’s intent to use tariff policy as a relief measure for domestic industries during times of economic hardship.<fnref n="24" />

In essence, while the formal legal and policy concept of a “trade remedy” had not yet crystallized in early American history, several tariff acts clearly demonstrated this tendency. By raising tariffs and restricting imports, these acts protected nascent domestic industries from foreign goods. These policies can be viewed as primitive forms of trade remedies, and they laid the foundation for the more systematic tools (such as anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws) that would follow.<fnref n="25" />

## D. The Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act: The Apex of Protectionism in the Great
        Depression

The *Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930*<fnref n="26" /> represents the culmination of America’s early protectionist traditions, taken to a radical extreme during the Great Depression. While it continued the established practice of protecting domestic industries through tariffs, the *Smoot-Hawley Act* did so with unprecedented scope and severity, raising import duties to a new historical high.<fnref n="27" />

Unlike earlier forms of protectionism, the *Smoot-Hawley Act* was not merely intended to shield certain key industries; rather, it imposed prohibitive tariffs on nearly all imported goods,<fnref n="28" /> reflecting a sweeping and radical strategy of comprehensive economic insulation. Whereas earlier trade protection had been concentrated on specific sectors like textiles and steel, the Act’s relief function was far more extensive, covering virtually all areas of agriculture and manufacturing. This broad-based relief was designed to combat the nationwide economic devastation of the Great Depression, rather than to foster the development of particular industries.

America’s early protectionist measures provided the conceptual precedent and political playbook for the *Smoot-Hawley Act*. The perceived success of high-tariff policies had demonstrated their potential as a protective tool, and the *1930 Act* was a drastic intensification of this approach. While early protectionism gradually evolved into a systematic trade remedy strategy, the *Smoot-Hawley Act* represented a desperate, extreme application of this strategy. A key difference, however, lay in motivation: early policies were primarily focused on long-term domestic development and fiscal revenue, whereas the *Smoot-Hawley Act* was fundamentally a short-term, emergency reaction to the perceived threats of global competition.<fnref n="29" />

## E. The Catalyst for America’s Shift Toward Trade Liberalism

The enactment of the *Smoot-Hawley Act* immediately triggered devastating international retaliation. Major US trading partners, including Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, responded by imposing their own punitive tariffs on American goods, sparking a global trade war.<fnref n="30" /> As a result of this tariff spiral, global trade volume collapsed. International trade plummeted from approximately $3.6 billion in 1929 to less than $1.2 billion by 1932,<fnref n="31" /> a decline that catastrophically deepened the global economic slump.

Domestically, the *Act* was equally disastrous. It not only failed to protect American farmers and industries but instead led to the collapse of their export markets. US exports were decimated, and many export-dependent industries were pushed to the brink of ruin, further intensifying the Great Depression. As the United States was the world’s largest economy, the trade war it initiated had a profoundly negative and far-reaching impact. The breakdown of the global trading system aggravated economic hardship in all countries, contributing directly to the further deterioration of the global economy in the 1930s.

The spectacular failure of the *Smoot-Hawley Act* forced a fundamental rethinking of trade policy in the United States and abroad. It was a stark demonstration that the protectionist ideas of a previous era were ill-suited for an interdependent global economy. The Act’s disastrous consequences discredited the protectionist model itself, which had previously been credited with successfully nurturing America’s industrial base. This painful lesson became a primary impetus for America’s post-World War II pivot toward free trade and its leadership in establishing a new order of multilateral cooperation to reduce trade barriers.

The *Smoot-Hawley Act* thus stands as the high-water mark of extreme protectionism in American history, a monument to the nation’s fear of the external economic environment and its flawed strategy for confronting the Great Depression. The Act symbolizes the perilous global consequences of protectionism, and for this reason, it is universally regarded as a powerful cautionary tale in the history of trade policy.<fnref n="32" />

<footnote n="1">See Douglas A Irwin, *Clashing Over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2019).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">See Michael Lind, *Land of promise: an economic history of the United States*(New York: Broadside Books, 2012); Michael Lind, *The New Class War: Saving Democracy from the Managerial Elite* (New York: Portfolio, 2020).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">Douglass C North, *The economic growth of the United States: 1790*—*1860* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1966) at 81—86.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">See Irwin, *supra* note 1 at 126.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">See James M McPherson, *Battle cry of freedom: the civil war era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) at 291—92.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">See Irwin, *supra* note 1 at 22.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">Alexander Hamilton, “Alexander Hamilton’s Final Version of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures” in Harold C Syrett, ed, *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) 230.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">See Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*, ed by William Peden (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955) at 164—65.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">See e.g. Ron Chernow, *Alexander hamilton* (East Rutherford: Penguin Books, 2005).</footnote>

<footnote n="10">See Gordon S Wood, *Empire of liberty: a history of the early republic, 1789*—*1815* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 151—52.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">*Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation*, GB and US, 19 November 1974, 12 UST 13.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">See e,g, Todd Estes, *The jay treaty debate, public opinion, and the evolution of early american political culture* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006).</footnote>

<footnote n="13">See Irwin, *supra* note 1 at 105.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">Hamilton, *supra*note 7.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">See e.g. Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on the State of Virginia” in Adrienne Koch & William Peden, ed, *The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: The Modern Library, 1944) 187 at 258—60; Thomas Jefferson, “To Jean Baptiste Say” (1 February 1804) via letter.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">See e.g. Bruce H Mann, *Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002) at 210—15.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">*Tariff Act of 1789*, ch 2, 1 Stat 24 at 24 (1789).</footnote>

<footnote n="18">See Irwin, *supra* note 1 at 70—74.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">*Tariff Act of 1816*, ch 104, 107, 3 Stat 189 at 310 (1816).</footnote>

<footnote n="20">See Frank William Taussig, *The tariff history of the United States* (Adamant Media Corporation) at 68—70.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">*Tariff Act of 1828*, ch 55, 4 Stat 498 at 270 (1828).</footnote>

<footnote n="22">See William W Freehling, *Prelude to civil war: the nullification controversy in south carolina, 1816*—*1836* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 135—48.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">*Tariff Act of 1842*, ch 270, 5 Stat 548 at 548 (1842).</footnote>

<footnote n="24">See Daniel Walker Howe, *What hath god wrought: the transformation of america, 1815*—*1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 596—600.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">See William J Novak, *The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996) at 15—18.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">*Smooth-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930*, ch 497, 46 Stat 590 at 590 (1930) [*1930 Act*].</footnote>

<footnote n="27">See US, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, Bureau of the Census (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975) at 888.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">See Barry Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919*—*1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 537—38.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">David M Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929*—*1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 47—49.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">See Douglas A Irwin, “The smoot-hawley tariff: a quantitative assessment” (1998) 80:2 R Econ & Stat 326.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">League of Nations, *World Economic Survey 1932—33* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1933) at 148.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">See Douglas A Irwin, *Peddling protectionism: smoot-hawley and the great depression* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011) at 1—10.</footnote>
# II. From World War II to the 1990s: The Establishment of Reciprocal Trade and the Rise
        of Fair Trade Ideology

Before and after World War II, in response to the impact of the Great Depression, American trade law philosophy underwent a significant transformation, gradually shifting from the traditional protectionism characterized by high tariffs to reciprocalism emphasizing free trade. This transformation profoundly influenced the establishment of the post-World War II global economic order, particularly exerting a strong shaping effect on the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (*GATT 1947*)<fnref n="33" /> and later the WTO system. However, the emergence of reciprocal trade philosophy did not signify the decline of protectionist trade ideology in the United States. The emergence of the “fair trade” concept beginning in the 1970s marked the resurgence of American protectionist trade thinking. It should be noted that the evolution of American trade law concepts is itself quite complex, requiring attention not only to the international situation and global economic conditions faced by the United States, but also to the struggles and competition among various domestic forces within the United States. Therefore, this section will focus on the key turning points in the transformation of American trade law thinking from the post-World War II period through the 1990s, examining the succession of American trade law philosophies during this period.

## A. The Initial Turn Toward Free Trade Liberalism

The 1922 *United States—United Kingdom Trade Agreement*(*US—UK Trade Agreement*)<fnref n="34" />, negotiated while high tariffs still dominated US legislation, offered only limited reciprocal reductions. Although not a full-blown free-trade instrument, it signalled Washington’s first tentative tilt away from blanket protectionism and sought to revive post-war commerce. Yet its implementation remained tightly circumscribed by domestic protectionist pressures, foreshadowing the difficult liberal turn that lay ahead. The *Smoot-Hawley Act* marked the pinnacle of protectionist policy, and US government and business leaders recognized the need to ease postwar economic recovery pressures through certain trade agreements to promote the restoration of international trade.

The primary objective of the *US—UK Trade Agreement* was to promote trade between the United States and Britain through tariff reduction. This aligned with the core principle of free trade liberalism—reducing trade barriers to increase trade. The agreement embodied the principle of reciprocity, whereby both parties reached mutually beneficial trade agreements through mutual concessions. This reciprocal principle reflected the spirit of free trade liberalism, though its implementation remained constrained by the protectionist policies of the time. Therefore, although the *US—UK Trade Agreement* promoted partial tariff reductions, it was formulated within an overall protectionist atmosphere. The legacy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff ensured that protectionist instincts never fully left US trade legislation.<fnref n="35" /> The agreement temporarily eased trade tensions between the United States and Britain, but failed to fundamentally change the protectionist trends in the global economy at that time, nor could it effectively contain the spread of the Great Depression.

The *US—UK Trade Agreement* embodied the ideals of free trade liberalism—promoting trade through tariff reduction—but protectionist influences remained significant during implementation. Its signing and implementation reflected a policy orientation seeking balance between protectionism and free trade, and laid the foundation for more systematic free trade policy reforms that would follow.

## B. The Establishment of Reciprocal Trade Policy: The Transformation of US Trade Policy
        Before and After World War II and the Birth of GATT

The United States’ policy shift from protectionism to reciprocalism can be traced back to 1934, before World War II. Under the impact of the Great Depression, the high-tariff trade protection policies implemented by the United States were considered an obstacle to economic development, and the newly inaugurated President Franklin D Roosevelt decided to turn toward reciprocal trade policies. With the introduction of the *Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934*,<fnref n="36" /> the United States thereby initiated its trade liberalization process, primarily guided by economic liberalism in formulating and implementing its trade policies, with the main objective of ensuring the maximization of American interests in the construction of an international free trade system.<fnref n="37" /> During the 1930s—940s, US government trade policymakers began to gradually weaken and lower American tariff barriers.<fnref n="38" /> The 1934 trade policy transformation (also referred to by some scholars as the 1934 regime) transferred the power to reduce tariffs to the President and eliminated the requirement for an absolute majority of Congress to approve tariff agreements,<fnref n="39" /> laying the foundation for the later establishment of the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (*GATT 1947*) trade regime.<fnref n="40" />

After World War II, the US government began attempting to construct three major economic organizations with the starting point of building a prosperous world without trade barriers, aiming to achieve dominance over the international economic order: these three international economic organizations included the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the predecessor of the World Bank), and the International Trade Organization (ITO). The establishment of the first two proceeded relatively smoothly, and they continue to play important roles in the world economic order to this day, but the establishment process of the envisioned ITO proved quite tumultuous. GATT was originally established as a temporary arrangement, and in the American conception, the ITO charter would become a “more authoritative” international trade institutional arrangement than *GATT 1947*, with its coverage even including detailed provisions on competition policy, employment, investment, and economic development. However, due to divided opinions among negotiating parties on decision-making mechanisms,<fnref n="41" /> coupled with widespread domestic concerns in the United States that the ITO would undermine American sovereignty, the “internal and external difficulties” impasse led the Truman administration to finally withdraw its proposal to promote the ITO in 1951.<fnref n="42" /> The first round of GATT negotiations began in April 1947 and concluded at the end of October, with 23 contracting parties concluding *GATT 1947*. In a legal sense, *GATT 1947* remained a temporary agreement throughout its operational period, but it was indeed the earliest international multilateral mechanism promoting global economic and trade liberalization.<fnref n="43" /> From the establishment of GATT through the Kennedy Round negotiations in the 1960s, although there were some fluctuations in the process, the overall tone of US government trade policy emphasized liberalization. The *Trade Expansion Act*<fnref n="44" /> passed in 1962 elevated the degree of liberalization in US trade policy to an unprecedented level and provided the basis for launching the Kennedy Round negotiations.<fnref n="45" /> Although Section 232 of this 1962 Trade Expansion Act included authorization for the US Department of Commerce to investigate whether imports of specific products threaten US national security and allowed the President to decide whether to take measures, during the seven investigations initiated from the Act’s enactment in 1962 through 1973, none found that the imports of products under investigation affected national security.<fnref n="46" />

While strengthening trade liberalization policies, it is worth noting that the United States did not relax its control over GATT or its attempts to shape an international trade order favorable to itself. The United States consistently attempted to strengthen and control GATT, and the institutional operation of *GATT 1947* itself bore a strong American imprint, primarily reflected in the following two aspects: First, the rule text of *GATT 1947* itself exhibited strong American characteristics, with a considerable number of its general provisions originating from principles in trade agreements previously concluded by the United States, to the extent that all countries with trade agreements with the United States were thoroughly familiar with the wording and intent of the relevant provisions. Second, GATT negotiations were often strongly influenced by changes in the US domestic political situation; for example, the Torquay Round negotiations reached an impasse due to difficulties in extending the *Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951*.<fnref n="47" /> This influence continued through the Uruguay Round negotiations in the 1990s, during which the draft of the *Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures*<fnref n="48" /> underwent numerous substantial adjustments, and the non-actionable subsidies rules (mainly covering subsidies for environmental protection, disadvantaged regions, and scientific research) were ultimately retained only because of personnel changes in negotiators following the Clinton administration’s assumption of power.<fnref n="49" /> This demonstrates that throughout the entire process of establishing and operating the GATT/WTO system, the United States consistently played a considerably strong leading role.

## C. The Turn to “Fair Trade”: The Establishment of USTR in the 1970s and the Rise of
        Protectionism

The world economic order led by the United States enabled the US to maintain its status as a super trade power for a long period after World War II. However, beginning in the mid-1970s, America’s leading advantage as a trade powerhouse fell into a precarious position: on one hand, to rapidly strengthen the capitalist camp’s power to counter communist countries, particularly from after World War II through the mid-1960s, the United States implemented non-reciprocal tariff concessions to Western Europe, Japan, and other developing countries, which enabled Japan and Western Europe’s economic strength to grow rapidly, gradually forming a threat to the United States,<fnref n="50" /> on the other hand, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the Vietnam War, and the successive oil crises disrupted the existing development order and pattern, causing the import competition pressure faced by the United States to continuously intensify.<fnref n="51" /> These new circumstances shook the trade reciprocalism and trade liberalism policy positions that the United States had consistently maintained from before World War II through the Kennedy Round negotiations in the 1960s. It should be noted that American trade protectionist views did not completely disappear due to the 1934 trade policy transformation, but rather continued to exist within American political circles, with scholars and politicians holding protectionist views both before and after World War II.<fnref n="52" /> Conservatives in the US Congress attributed responsibility for the trade deficit to “unfair trade” and “unfair trade measures” implemented against the United States by foreign governments and foreign enterprises, arguing that these unfair practices distorted the free trade order and therefore caused America’s economic and trade difficulties.

The transformation of American trade policy concepts was prominently reflected in the enactment of the *Trade Act of 1974*: the *Trade Act of 1974*, on one hand, authorized the President with “fast track negotiating authority” to strengthen the efficiency of trade legislation, while on the other hand, it strengthened trade protection measures. Two aspects of reform are most noteworthy: first, the establishment of the famous “Section 301,” which gave the US President greater power to address “unjustifiable, unreasonable, and discriminatory” trade practices that burden or obstruct American commerce. Second, it formally established the position of United States Trade Representative, with the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) becoming the negotiating body of the US executive branch. USTR is primarily responsible for formulating and coordinating trade policy among executive departments, while also being responsible for investigations under Sections 301, 302, and other provisions.<fnref n="53" /> Additionally, the Act also stipulated Section 201, which allows for the implementation of safeguard measures. In essence, the *Trade Act of 1974* elevated trade remedy rules, which the United States had previously not emphasized, to an unprecedented level. Furthermore, following the enactment of the *Trade Act of 1974*, the United States issued the *International Emergency Economic Powers Act*<fnref n="54" /> in 1977, which authorized the President to control and regulate various economic matters after declaring a national emergency.<fnref n="55" />

However, the concept of “unfair trade” does not actually exist in *GATT 1947* or other international treaties, and even US domestic regulations have never provided a clear definition. In USTR’s 1986 annual report, unfair trade measures were defined as: a government’s laws, regulations, policies, and measures intended to protect its domestic producers from foreign competition, or intended to artificially stimulate exports of particular domestic products. Some scholars have evaluated this definition as quite abstract and hollow, and the concept of “fairness” itself is difficult to define objectively, with judgments involving “fairness” often “belonging to subjective determinations.”<fnref n="56" /> Therefore, Section 301 is often considered an “aggressive unilateralist” trade tool.<fnref n="57" />

The *Trade Act of 1974* also influenced GATT’s Tokyo Round negotiations. The Tokyo Round negotiations began in 1973 and lasted for six years, officially concluding only in 1979. Under the impact of economic stagflation in the United States and Western Europe, as well as the oil crisis, industrialized nations experienced the most severe economic recession since World War II beginning in 1975, making the Tokyo Round negotiations far more difficult than previous trade negotiation rounds. While earlier rounds of negotiations in the United States had primarily focused on tariff issues, addressing only tariff matters could no longer satisfy the expectations of various parties for the multilateral trade system. Therefore, the Tokyo Round negotiation agenda encompassed non-tariff barriers, export controls and licensing, investment, subsidies, technical barriers to trade, and customs procedures, among other issues.<fnref n="58" />

The most conspicuous example of how the Tokyo Round negotiations were influenced by US domestic law was undoubtedly America’s influence and intervention on subsidies and countervailing measures issues during the Tokyo Round. During the Tokyo Round, the United States argued that the large-scale improper subsidy measures implemented by Western Europe and Japan disrupted the trade order, and thus attempted to tighten subsidy disciplines. To pressure negotiating counterparts and accelerate the negotiation process, the United States adopted a typical “carrot and stick” negotiation strategy: *the Trade Act of 1974* stipulated that the US government should impose countervailing duties on subsidized foreign imported products, while simultaneously establishing a four-year exemption period for these countervailing duties (until January 1979).<fnref n="59" /> Concurrently, the US government also strengthened countervailing investigation and enforcement procedures to stimulate other countries to engage in negotiations with the United States on subsidy disciplines.<fnref n="60" /> Thus, it is evident that whether in agenda-setting or negotiation processes, the Tokyo Round negotiations were profoundly influenced by the United States. Through the outcomes of the Tokyo Round negotiations, the United States successfully incorporated its concerns into the scope of trade negotiations and flexibly utilized its domestic legislation and enforcement practices as bargaining chips to advance the agenda in directions favorable to its interests.

The enactment of the *Trade Act of 1974* and the outcomes of the Tokyo Round enabled the United States to gradually evolve its trade policy orientation from “free” and “reciprocal” toward “fair” and “protective.” In 1985, President Reagan formally proposed the so-called “free but fair” trade policy principle, while also requiring USTR to actively utilize Section 301 to safeguard and promote American trade under the principle of free and fair trade. This marked the formal shift of US trade policy’s center of gravity from “freedom” to “fairness.” This point can be corroborated by the increased frequency of Section 301 investigations. From the creation of Section 301 investigations in 1975 through 1980, an average of 3.5 investigations were initiated annually; whereas President Reagan not only authorized USTR to initiate Section 301 investigations independently in 1985, but during his presidency from 1981 to 1989, an average of 5.56 investigations were initiated annually.<fnref n="61" />

During President Reagan’s administration, the US—Japan semiconductor friction that erupted between the United States and Japan exemplified the typical manifestation of spreading American protectionist sentiment: as the US domestic semiconductor industry faced severe competitive threats from Japan’s semiconductor industry in market share, the United States simultaneously coerced Japan into signing the *US—Japan Semiconductor Agreement*<fnref n="62" /> requiring voluntary export restrictions and expansion of foreign semiconductor market share in Japan, while imposing severe punitive tariffs on Japanese products. While accusing Japan of improperly subsidizing its semiconductor industry, the United States itself emulated Japan by supporting semiconductor industry development through state power (such as establishing technology alliances like SEMATECH). These measures not only protected the US semiconductor industry and provided opportunities for rapid development, but also severely damaged Japan’s semiconductor industry, causing its lasting decline. To this day, Japan’s semiconductor industry has never recovered from the US—Japan semiconductor friction.<fnref n="63" />

Examining the transformation of US trade policy positions since the 1970s, it is not difficult to observe that protectionist ideology has actually remained concealed within American trade policy throughout. Whether promoting trade liberalism, establishing trade multilateralism under GATT, or implementing trade reciprocalism, the prerequisite has always been that the United States, as the hegemon, must maintain sufficient control over this order. When the United States perceives that its hegemonic leadership position is being influenced and challenged by other emerging economies, domestic protectionist sentiments may resurface and rapidly play a significant role in trade policy. As will be analyzed later, similar changes have actually emerged following President Trump’s assumption of office.

<footnote n="33">*General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*, 30 October 1947, 58 UNTS 187 [*GATT 1947*].</footnote>

<footnote n="34">*United States—United Kingdom Trade Agreement*, 1922.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">See Kris James Mitchener, Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke & Kirsten Wandschneider, “The Smoot-Hawley Trade War” (2022) 132:647 Econ J 2500—33.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">*Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934*, ch 473, 474, 48 Stat 943 at 943 (1934).</footnote>

<footnote n="37">Yang Weidong & Huang Xuemin, “From Economic Liberalism to Economic Nationalism: An Analysis of U.S. Trade Policy from the Perspective of Capability and Willingness” (2024) 38:4 Chinese J Am Studies 38—39.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">William A Lovett et al, *U.S. Trade Policy: History, Theory, and the WTO*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed (New York: Routledge, 2015) at 55—56.</footnote>

<footnote n="39">He Yongjiang, *United States Trade Policy Case Study* (Tianjin: Nankai University Press, 2019) at 94.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">John H Barton et al, *The evolution of the trade regime: politics, law, and economics of the GATT and the WTO* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) at 32.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">*Ibid* at 33—34.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">See e.g. Diebold William, *The End of the ITO* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1952).</footnote>

<footnote n="43">Yongjiang, *supra* note 39 at 68.</footnote>

<footnote n="44">*Trade Expansion Act of 1962*, Pub L No 87—794, 76 Stat 872 at 872 (1962).</footnote>

<footnote n="45">Irwin, *supra*note 1; *ibid* at 521—24.</footnote>

<footnote n="46">Rachel F Fefer et al, The relevant data was referenced from: *Section 232 investigations: overview and issues for congress*, R45249 (Congressional Research Service Report—R45249, 18 May 2021) at 60.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">*Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951*, Pub L No 82—50, 65 Stat 72 at 72 (1951); Barton et al, *supra* note 40 at 43—44.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">*Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures*</footnote>

<footnote n="49">See Sadeq Z Bigdeli, “Resurrecting the Dead—The Expired Non-Actionable Subsidies and the Lingering Question of Green Space” (2011) 8:2 Manchester J Intl Econ L 2 at 10—11; see also Mark Wu, “Re-examining ‘Green Light’ Subsidies in the Wake of New Green Industrial Policies” (2015) E15 Expert Group on Reinvigorating Manufacturing: New Industrial Policy and the Trade System, Think Piece.</footnote>

<footnote n="50">Lovett et al, *supra* note 38 at 62.</footnote>

<footnote n="51">Zhang Lijuan, *The political economy of U.S. trade policy* (Beijing: Economic Science Press, 2017) at 168—69.</footnote>

<footnote n="52">Irwin, *supra* note 1 at 411—54.</footnote>

<footnote n="53">*Ibid* at 554.</footnote>

<footnote n="54">*International Emergency Economic Powers Act*, Pub L No 95—223, 91 Stat 1626 at 1625 (1977).</footnote>

<footnote n="55">See Yang Rongzhen & Luo Hui, “The Application and Influence of International Emergency Economic Powers Act of the United States” (2020) 9 Intertrade 83.</footnote>

<footnote n="56">Wu Chia-Sheng, *Analysis of Section 301 in US Trade Law* (Taipei: Angle Publishing Co Ltd, 2001) at 29—30.</footnote>

<footnote n="57">Lijuan, *supra* note 51 at 204.</footnote>

<footnote n="58">See e.g. Thomas Graham, “Reforming the International Trading System: The Tokyo Round Trade Negotiations in the Final Stage” (1979) 12:1 Cornell Intl LJ 1—42; Ria Kemper, “The Tokyo Round: Results and Implications for Developing Countries” (1980) World Bank Staff, Working Paper No 372.</footnote>

<footnote n="59">Gilbert R Winham, *International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986) at 214.</footnote>

<footnote n="60">Graham, *supra* note 58 at 137.</footnote>

<footnote n="61">Andres B Schwarzenberg, *Section 301 of the trade act of 1974: origin, evolution, and use*, R46604 (Congressional Research Service, 4 December 2020).</footnote>

<footnote n="62">*US—Japan Semiconductor Agreement*, 6 November 1986.</footnote>

<footnote n="63">Ing-Shane Yung & Yoshitaka Abe, “Establishing inter-organizational relationship in the semiconductor industry” (2019) 11:2 Bus LJ [Japan] 49; Soichiro Higashi, “An empirical study of the capital investment in japanese semiconductor corporations: the impact of the U.S.—japan semiconductor arrangement” (2015) 69 Kwansei Gakuin Shogaku Kenkyu 37 at 37.</footnote>
# III. From the End of the Cold War to the Post-Financial Crisis Era: Shocks to the
        Globalization Process

The American protectionist trade sentiment that persisted from the 1970s through the 1980s began to recede by the 1990s, which can be attributed to changes in America’s internal and external environment. Regarding the internal environment, dollar depreciation stimulated the development of import-competing producers and promoted the revival of American domestic manufacturing, driving employment rates to recover and stabilize. Concerning the external environment, the end of the Cold War and the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy caused dramatic changes in the international situation facing the United States, rendering traditional trade protection concepts unable to adapt to the realities of American trade. We can still glimpse the “cooling down” of American trade protectionist views through the frequency of Section 301 invocations: although the United States occasionally initiated Section 301 investigations into so-called unfair trade measures during the early period of President Clinton’s administration, the number of Section 301 investigations began to decline sharply starting in 1997. During thae subsequent administrations of Presidents George W Bush and Obama, the United States rarely initiated Section 301 investigations; indeed, from 2000 until President Trump’s election in 2017, only six were implemented in total, with twelve years during which no Section 301 investigations were initiated at all.<fnref n="64" />

After the mid-1980s, US trade policy priorities began emphasizing the construction of bilateral and regional economic partnerships.<fnref n="65" /> This section is divided into two parts: the first subsection will analyze how US trade policy shifted from a “single-track system” primarily promoting multilateral trade to a “dual-track system” giving equal weight to multilateral and regional approaches; the second subsection will summarize the underlying motivations behind changes in US trade law’s guiding philosophy by reviewing the trade policy transformations during the Trump and Biden administrations.

## A. Regionalization and Fragmentation: The Rapid Expansion of Bilateral or Regional
        Economic and Trade Agreements

The birth of the WTO following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1995 signified that the GATT, which had operated for nearly half a century, finally transformed from a temporary institutional arrangement into a formal international organization. The WTO was invested with high expectations, as it not only encompassed unprecedented breadth in trade domain rules but also established an entirely new mechanism for peaceful resolution of international disputes, representing an important achievement in the progress of human institutional civilization<fnref n="66" /> and marking a new stage in the development of the multilateral trade system. However, the Doha Round negotiations following the WTO’s establishment have become the most difficult round of trade negotiations to date, failing to achieve any breakthrough results throughout more than twenty years of negotiations and having fallen into a stalemate. Of course, why the development of the multilateral trade system has stagnated is a rather complex question with many causes for its developmental impasse, which is certainly not the focus of this report’s commentary. Among the numerous factors contributing to this situation, the United States’ shift from vigorously supporting the multilateral trade system to emphasizing the construction of high-level bilateral/regional economic and trade relationships should be inextricably linked to the difficulties facing the WTO.

The typical manifestation of the US trade policy shift from multilateral to regional focus was the establishment of the *North American Free Trade Agreement* (*NAFTA*).<fnref n="67" /> For a considerable period after the end of the Cold War, the United States maintained a negative attitude toward regional economic integration, having established a free trade agreement only with Israel.<fnref n="68" /> After the 1980s, the United States began to reassess the value of FTAs. The reasons for this American transformation can be broadly attributed to two aspects: first, the rapid progress of European integration. During the 1980s, the European Community achieved rapid internal economic integration, with EC membership expanding from nine to twelve countries. European nations’ establishment of a common market through economic integration processes and subsequent creation of external tariff barriers generated a severe sense of crisis in the US government.<fnref n="69" /> Second, the quite limited achievements of multilateral trade negotiations in the 1980s—as other GATT members at that time were unwilling to reduce tariff barriers or abandon various economic intervention measures including subsidies, the United States felt “frustration” in its engagement process with other major trading partners.<fnref n="70" /> After intense and complex negotiations and debates, *NAFTA* was finally approved by the US Congress at the end of 1993 and formally took effect in 1994.

Although *NAFTA*’s negotiation and approval process experienced numerous twists and turns, its ultimate successful implementation enabled the United States to initiate a process of rapidly advancing bilateral and regional economic integration. After entering the twenty-first century, the United States spared no effort in actively expanding the coverage and quantity of free trade agreements. For example, the George W Bush administration launched the ASEAN negotiation plan in 2002, proposing on the basis of encouraging ASEAN countries to implement economic reforms that as long as WTO members concluded trade and investment agreements with the United States, the US would engage in FTA negotiations with ASEAN countries. From 2001 to 2008, the Bush administration signed 24 trade and investment agreements and 17 free trade agreements, with countries in Asia, Africa, and South America all concluding relevant agreements with the United States—progress that could be described as remarkably swift. The United States leveraged the external effects generated by extensively signing FTAs with various countries to prompt other nations to implement trade barrier reforms or increase their degree of market openness, thereby establishing and consolidating America’s stable position in regional trade arrangements. In US economic and trade agreement negotiations with other countries, topics often encompassed service trade, e-commerce, intellectual property, transparency, environmental and labor standards, and other domains not comprehensively covered or temporarily unaddressed by the multilateral trade system, intending to create discourse power advantages for the United States in future negotiation processes.<fnref n="71" />

It can thus be said that since entering the twenty-first century, regional trade agreements have become an important channel for the development of international economic and trade rules. Several important regional trade agreements—including *NAFTA* and subsequently the *United States—Mexico—Canada Agreement* (*USMCA*)<fnref n="72" />, the *Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership* (*CPTPP*)<fnref n="73" />, among others—have all involved US participation.<fnref n="74" /> Compared to multilateral trade systems like the WTO, the United States can achieve its objectives more rapidly through regional trade agreements. Under the multilateral trade system, developing member states can still enhance their bargaining power by joining forces and building alliances, allowing the common demands of developing member states to be raised more effectively and directly. However, in regional trade agreements or bilateral trade agreements, developed member states like the United States can employ “divide and conquer” tactics to achieve “defeat in detail” against developing member states,<fnref n="75" /> effectively suppressing the negotiating space of developing member states. Some scholars have pointedly observed that the economic benefits America’s efforts to construct free trade agreement networks during this period could bring were actually quite minimal, thus it “signed these trade agreements primarily for foreign policy purposes.”<fnref n="76" /> Overall, although the formal establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995 represented another important development in trade multilateralism and American trade protectionist sentiment had somewhat receded, the globalization process during this period was not as smooth as imagined. While regional economic integration might strengthen economic integration among certain WTO members in the short term, from a long-term perspective it may produce erosive or even negative effects on multilateralism.

## B. Old Motivations and New Orientations: US Trade Protectionism and Hegemonism in the
        Post-Trump Era

During President Obama’s first term, although the United States exhibited some hesitation regarding free trade agreements, from his second term onward, the US began to continue promoting the construction of large-scale regional trade agreements: the *Trans-Pacific Partnership* (*TPP*) negotiations initiated in November 2011 were precisely the project vigorously promoted during President Obama’s tenure. However, this effort to advance regional economic integration came to an abrupt halt after Trump assumed office. Reviewing the trajectory of US trade policy from World War II through 2017 as discussed above, it becomes evident that despite experiencing the impact of “fair trade” policies and protectionist sentiment along the way, the overall direction of US trade policy still maintained free trade concepts as its foundation. After President Trump took office, however, this trend showed signs of near reversal: Trump not only chose to withdraw from the *TPP* but also obstructed the appointment of Appellate Body members to paralyze the WTO’s appellate mechanism, and furthermore frequently utilized domestic trade law tools such as Section 301 investigations to impose massive tariffs on China and other economies. Although Trump was succeeded by Democrat Biden, the Biden administration has actually only adjusted some of the excessively radical policies from the Trump era, while broadly continuing the economic and trade policy orientation of the Trump period. Similarly, although the Clinton administration and its predecessor George H W Bush administration belonged to the Democratic and Republican parties respectively, after taking office the Clinton administration actually continued the trade policies of the Bush Sr. and Reagan administrations. This demonstrates that partisan alternation does not necessarily signify a fundamental change in trade policy; under certain domestic and international circumstances, policies can potentially continue across party lines and presidential terms.<fnref n="77" />

Regarding the various policies with trade protectionist tendencies adopted during the Trump administration’s first term and the Biden administration period, there is now an abundance of literature providing systematic and detailed analyses, which this paper will not reiterate. Now that the Trump administration has returned to power and launched a tariff war affecting the entire world, global trade will likely remain under the shadow of tariffs for an extended period. Perhaps no one can clearly articulate what trade strategy Trump will adopt next—his trade policies are indeed exceedingly volatile. By reviewing the trade policies adopted during the Trump and Biden administrations over the past eight years, while it might have been difficult for anyone to predict at the outset the enormous changes in US trade policy over these eight years, observing from a historical perspective reveals that these changes are not without precedent. This article argues that the US trade policy changes during this period can be summarized as one “old motivation” and one “new orientation,” reflecting the deep-rooted nature of America’s trade protectionist tradition and hegemonic ideology.

The so-called old motivation refers to the fact that trade protectionism has long persisted within the overall guiding philosophy of US trade policy and is closely related to the status of American hegemony. As previously discussed, the root cause of rising US trade protectionism in the 1970s was its position of being “attacked from both sides”—the rise of Western Europe and Japan caused America’s trade deficit to continuously expand, with US trade share severely threatened; internally, there were protests from affected industries and groups along with danger signals of continuously declining unemployment rates. From America’s perspective, the multilateral trade system was established and operated by its own hand, and it should naturally enjoy absolute control over it, not allowing other countries’ gains to exceed those of the United States. The impact on American industries from products from Western Europe and Japan was absolutely unacceptable to the US Indeed, the United States made substantial concessions to developing countries in trade treatment during the Tokyo Round, but these concessions were often based on geopolitical considerations—at that time, with the Soviet Union and the socialist camp in ascendance, the United States feared developing countries might align with the socialist side and therefore chose expedient measures. By the Uruguay Round negotiations, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War meant the United States no longer harbored such concerns, and developing members received even fewer preferential treatments in negotiations than during the Tokyo Round.<fnref n="78" />

The domestic and international situation facing the Trump administration bore considerable similarities to the 1970s: externally, China’s role in the multilateral trade system was becoming increasingly important, with both basic manufacturing and high-tech industries facing challenges from China; additionally, the United States discovered that the WTO’s dispute settlement body could not be controlled by it, thereby generating severe hegemonic anxiety. Internally, Trump’s rise to power actually catered to the demands of a considerable number of traditional blue-collar workers. America’s traditional manufacturing industries were gradually losing their advantages in the waves of economic globalization and trade liberalization, and these relatively conservative blue-collar workers harbored strong resistance to multilateral and free trade, with related industry groups continuously advocating for protectionist policies.<fnref n="79" /> To cater to the wave of populism and secure greater political benefits, the Trump administration chose to adopt highly aggressive trade protectionist measures, extensively launching various trade investigations against China and other trading partners, and readily imposing high punitive tariffs.<fnref n="80" /> In summary, the tide of trade protectionism has actually been lurking within America’s foreign trade policies, legislation, and practices. As time progresses, these protectionist practices continue to accumulate and sediment within US trade law concepts. Once domestic and international circumstances change, they may erupt and resurge again, with each resurgence of trade protectionist ideology potentially being more fierce than the last.

The so-called new orientation refers to US trade protectionism beginning to spread under the guise of maintaining national security, with a strong tendency toward generalization. As mentioned earlier, the rationalization basis found by US trade protectionism in the 1970s was “fair trade,” arguing that America was suffering from the effects of unfair trade measures from foreign countries and therefore needed to adopt measures to curb or even offset these unfair trade practices. What constitutes fairness has always remained abstract and subjective, with the United States intentionally retaining interpretive authority over fairness, manipulating this abstract concept to flexibly regulate the boundaries of its trade protectionist policies.

The Biden administration’s rationale for continuing trade protectionist policies is maintaining national security, and this concept of “security” shares remarkably similar qualities with “fairness.” “National security” originally referred to maintaining the nation’s military security, protecting the country from external military attacks, coercion, aggression, and control—a conception that persisted until around the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, as international social issues beyond war threats (such as energy, digital trade, finance, technology, artificial intelligence, etc.) have become increasingly prominent, the concept of security has also become increasingly vague and abstract, gradually expanding into various domains. The most typical example is the discriminatory subsidy arrangements in the *CHIPS and Science Act*.<fnref n="81" /> The United States has long harbored concerns about industrial subsidies, with this resistance to subsidy policies consistently running through US trade policy. The United States criticized Western Europe and Japan in the 1970s for implementing improper industrial subsidies that disrupted normal trade order, continuously emphasized tightening subsidy disciplines during the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, and after China’s WTO accession began accusing China’s subsidy policies of bringing many adverse effects to the trade system. However, the *CHIPS and Science Act* reverses America’s long-standing opposition to subsidies, establishing unprecedented massive subsidies for the semiconductor sector. While implementing these massive subsidies, the United States, in the name of protecting national security, not only restricts and prohibits Chinese enterprises from receiving subsidies but also requires beneficiaries to refrain from conducting large transactions or technological cooperation with China and other so-called “foreign entities of concern.” If subsidized enterprises violate these provisions, not only will their subsidies be suspended, but the subsidies they have received will also be subject to clawback by the Department of Commerce. Furthermore, the Biden administration has greatly strengthened the security review of foreign investment, with CFIUS’s review intensity and scope experiencing tremendous expansion: once a transaction involves China and sensitive industries, CFIUS tends to block the transaction, even if it has only an extremely tenuous connection to the United States.<fnref n="82" /> In summary, whether “fairness” or “security,” both are actually tools for the United States to rationalize its trade policy shift, paving the way for later legitimizing trade protectionist policies by dramatizing the severity of “fairness” and “security” issues. After the Biden administration took office, security rules have increasingly transformed from passively triggered exceptions serving as defense bases into actively applied policy tools.<fnref n="83" />

Although the establishment of the WTO in 1995 marked another major breakthrough for the multilateral trade system, the ambitious multilateral trade system has not operated as smoothly as people imagined, but instead has repeatedly encountered setbacks in negotiations and even operational obstacles after entering the twenty-first century. Reviewing the transformation process of US trade law after World War II, it is not difficult to conclude that trade powers, particularly the United States, still possess very strong control over the multilateral trade system. Although the general trajectory of American trade policy since World War II has progressively moved toward embracing principles of liberalization and reciprocal arrangements, the precise meaning and scope of core concepts like “freedom,” “reciprocity,” and “fairness” continue to suffer from significant definitional vagueness and interpretive elasticity. This persistent ambiguity transforms these ostensibly neutral principles into malleable instruments that can be readily manipulated and deployed as strategic weapons to constrain and undermine commercial rivals. Once the United States perceives this control weakening, it may adopt unconventional means to disrupt normal operations in an attempt to reclaim control. However, the global economic and social landscape has undergone significant changes since the Cold War, and the gradual growth of emerging economies such as China will inevitably lead to conflicts, collisions, and frictions with the United States. The multilateral trade system will experience new tensions and reshaping within the foreseeable future. There remains a long developmental path toward achieving the goals of genuine implementation of trade multilateralism and the actual establishment of a more fair and reasonable international trade order.

<footnote n="64">Fefer et al, *supra* note 46 at 27.</footnote>

<footnote n="65">Irwin, *supra* note 1 at 625.</footnote>

<footnote n="66">Zhao Hong, “25<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Glories, Dilemmas and the Outlets” (2021) 12 Intertrade 4 at 4.</footnote>

<footnote n="67">*North American Free Trade Agreement*, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2 (Canada, Mexico, and US) [*NAFTA*].</footnote>

<footnote n="68">Barton et al, *supra* note 40 at 174.</footnote>

<footnote n="69">Zhang Jianxin, *Power and Economic Growth: The International Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy* (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2006) at 187—230.</footnote>

<footnote n="70">Irwin, *supra* note 1 at 625.</footnote>

<footnote n="71">Yongjiang, *supra* note 39 at 148—49.</footnote>

<footnote n="72">*United States—Mexico—Canada Agreement*, 1 July 2020, Can TS 2020 No 6.</footnote>

<footnote n="73">*Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership*, 8 mars 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="74">See Zhao Hong, “A Theoretical Exploration of International Law for the Reform and Development of the International Economic and Trade Rules in a New Era” (2023) 50:2 China L R 66.</footnote>

<footnote n="75">Zeng Lingliang, “The Latest Trends in Regional Trade Agreements and Their Negative Impact on the Doha Development Agenda” (2004) 26:5 Chinese J L 117 at 123—24.</footnote>

<footnote n="76">Irwin, *supra* note 1 at 675—76.</footnote>

<footnote n="77">Kazuo Sudo, “Interaction of U.S. Trade and Foreign Tax Policy: Through the Development of U.S. Multinational Corporations” (2006) 56:1 Econ Studies [Japan] 77 at 82—83.</footnote>

<footnote n="78">Barton et al, *supra* note 40 at 65—66.</footnote>

<footnote n="79">Weidong & Xuemin, *supra* note 37.</footnote>

<footnote n="80">See Xu Chongli, “Changes in U.S. Trade Policy and Legal Strategy: Appearances and Mechanisms” (2023) 50:2 China L R 129.</footnote>

<footnote n="81">*CHIPS and Science Act*, Pub L No 117—167, 136 Stat 1366 at 1366 (2022) [*CHIPS and Science Act*].</footnote>

<footnote n="82">Winston & Strawn, “CFIUS Blocks Magnachip Semiconductor Deal” (15 December 2021), online (blog): <winston.com> [perma.cc/8VS5-RNXW]; Brandon L Van Grack & James Brower, “CFIUS’s Expanding Jurisdiction in the Magnachip Acquisition”, *Lawfare* (11 October 2021), online: <lawfaremedia> [perma.cc/5H47-XK95].</footnote>

<footnote n="83">Peng Yang, “National Security Generalization in International Economic Governance: Legal Analysis and China’s Response” (2022) 5 Chinese R Intl L 87—107; Du Ming, “International Economic Law Response to National Security: Taking Huawei v. Sweden Arbitration Case as an Example” (2023) 5 Chinese R Intl L 3; Shen Wei, “The Security Dilemma of International Economic Law in the Perspective of Game Theory” (2023) 37:1 J Contemp L 28.</footnote>
# IV. The 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Resurgence of Protectionism and the
        Interplay with Free Trade

US trade protectionism evolved from a gradual ascent in its early history to a zenith in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, before shifting toward free trade principles following World War II.<fnref n="84" /> While the onset of the 21<sup>st</sup> century heralded an expansion of free trade driven by globalization, it concurrently triggered a resurgence of protectionist sentiment.<fnref n="85" />

An examination of the historical origins and contemporary manifestations of US trade law reveals a profound duality. On one hand, the United States has been a principal architect and advocate of the global free trade system, championing open markets and fair competition.<fnref n="86" /> On the other hand, it has frequently resorted to protectionist measures to safeguard its domestic economic interests and national security.<fnref n="87" /> This equilibrium between free trade and protectionism constitutes a central feature of US trade law, reflecting a strategy that simultaneously promotes international cooperation while reserving the means for self-protection.

Therefore, navigating the evolution of US trade law requires a two-pronged approach. First, it is essential to assess whether the US is likely to lean toward liberal or protectionist policies by analyzing a confluence of factors, including economic conditions, the political climate, international relations, industrial structure, and public opinion. Second, by analyzing historical patterns, current policy trends, and potential economic and geopolitical pressures, one can anticipate shifts in US legislative priorities and models. This foresight enables proactive and effective responses within both existing international frameworks and relevant domestic legal structures.

## A. Between Liberalism and Protectionism: The Future Path of US Trade Law

Historically, the United States has shown a greater inclination toward free trade during periods of economic growth and prosperity, as open markets facilitate export expansion, resource acquisition, and global competitiveness. For instance, during the economic boom of the 1990s, the US actively promoted the *NAFTA* and the GATT.<fnref n="88" /> Conversely, during economic downturns or crises, the US has often gravitated toward protectionism to shield domestic industries and employment, as exemplified by the *Smoot-Hawley Act* of the 1930s Great Depression and certain protectionist policies following the 2008 financial crisis.<fnref n="89" />

Domestic politics exert a significant influence on trade policy. Partisan divides exist between the Republican and Democratic parties on this issue. Typically, Democrats tend to place greater emphasis on labor standards and environmental protection when advancing free trade, whereas Republicans are often more focused on protecting US manufacturing and agriculture. During presidential election cycles, candidates may adopt more protectionist stances to appeal to the electorate, particularly in states experiencing manufacturing decline or significant trade deficits.<fnref n="90" />

At present, US high-technology, financial services, and intellectual property-intensive industries hold a dominant position in the global economy.<fnref n="91" /> To maintain its advantage in these sectors, the US will likely continue to advocate for free trade, especially concerning the protection of intellectual property, digital trade, and services trade.<fnref n="92" /> However, in traditional manufacturing and agricultural sectors, it may adopt more protectionist measures to counter competition from emerging markets and preserve domestic employment. Should the US government prioritize national security and strategic competition, it may implement protectionist measures even within a broader free trade framework, such as restricting exports of critical technologies or imposing sanctions on specific nations.<fnref n="93" /> Conversely, if the administration focuses more on economic growth and the dividends of globalization, it may invest greater resources in multilateral or regional trade agreements to further open markets.

The rise of emerging markets, particularly China and India, may compel the US to adopt protectionist policies in certain sectors to prevent market capture by these nations.<fnref n="94" /> Alternatively, the US may seek to integrate these markets into global supply chains through free trade agreements, thereby capitalizing on their lower production costs and expanding its own export markets. The COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions have prompted a reassessment and reconfiguration of global supply chains.<fnref n="95" /> This trend may encourage the US to implement protectionist measures in critical sectors, such as semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, to ensure the security and stability of its domestic supply chains.

In summary, the short-term outlook suggests a US inclination toward protectionism, particularly in critical industries and national security-related domains, should economic conditions worsen or global competition—especially from emerging powers like China—intensify. In the medium to long term, however, a resumption of global economic growth would likely see the United States revert to a more liberal trade posture, advancing new trade agreements and promoting global economic integration to maintain its leadership position in the global economy.<fnref n="96" />

## B. Distinctions Between Contemporary and Early US Trade Protectionism and Their
        Potential Legislative Impact

Contemporary US trade protectionism differs markedly from its earlier historical forms in terms of its context, motivations, methods of implementation, and scope of impact. These distinctions not only reflect shifts in the US economy and its global standing but also shape the direction and focus of relevant legislation.

Early protectionism was primarily aimed at fostering the development of domestic manufacturing and shielding nascent US industries from the impact of foreign competition. In the context of 21<sup>st</sup>-century globalization, however, the United States is a dominant force in the global economy, with extensive foreign trade and transnational investment. Contemporary protectionism, therefore, stems more from considerations of economic competition, national security, and geopolitics.<fnref n="97" /> Today, the US faces economic and technological competition from emerging markets, particularly China, prompting the adoption of protective measures designed to preserve its technological edge and safeguard national security.<fnref n="98" />

Consequently, the legislative disparities between these two eras are stark. Early protectionist legislation centered on tariff laws, such as the *Smooth-Hawley Act*, which directly stipulated tariff rates for specific goods. Other laws were designed to protect domestic industries by providing direct financial subsidies or tax relief to bolster specific sectors. In contrast, current legislation focuses more on non-tariff measures, encompassing areas such as intellectual property protection, investment screening, and technology export controls. For example, the *Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act* (*FIRRMA*)<fnref n="99" /> has strengthened the review of foreign investments to protect national security. Furthermore, contemporary policy relies on dynamic and flexible trade tools, such as Section 301 of the *Trade Act of 1974* and the *International Emergency Economic Powers Act* (*IEEPA*),<fnref n="100" /> which empower the executive branch to impose sanctions or restrictions on specific countries or enterprises in response to evolving international conditions.

## C. Potential Legislative Priorities Under a Renewed US Protectionist Stance

The new wave of US protectionism is not merely a tactical adjustment but represents a fundamental paradigm shift: the comprehensive “securitization” of trade policy.<fnref n="101" />

US legislative and policy efforts are increasingly aimed at reconfiguring trade from a realm of mutual economic benefit into an arena for advancing national security. This is achieved by prioritizing supply chain resilience, technological dominance, and strategic decoupling over the long-standing goals of efficiency and consumer welfare.<fnref n="102" /> An examination of the likely trajectory of US trade legislation reveals a coherent strategy to instrumentalize economic policy for geostrategic ends, a move that will profoundly reshape America’s role in the global economy.

### 1. The Securitization of Technology and Supply Chains

The core of this new protectionist paradigm lies in its intense focus on securing high-technology sectors and their associated supply chains. This represents a departure from past protectionism, which was primarily concerned with defending legacy industries like steel or textiles. The legislative agenda now targets sectors deemed critical to national security and future competitiveness, such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), pharmaceuticals, and quantum computing.

Three legislative thrusts exemplify this trend. First, there is a strong push to enhance supply chain security through measures mandating the onshoring or “friend-shoring” of production, supported by significant federal subsidies and tax incentives. This directly counters the efficiency-driven logic of globalized production networks. Second, this is complemented by a fortification of investment screening mechanisms, expanding the authority of bodies like CFIUS to scrutinize foreign capital not just for direct control but also for access to sensitive technology and data. Finally, emerging legislation on digital trade and data security aims to erect barriers to cross-border data flows and impose strict cybersecurity compliance on foreign firms, effectively treating data as a strategic national asset rather than a commercial good.<fnref n="103" /> Together, these initiatives construct a protectionist ecosystem designed to insulate America’s technological core from foreign influence and competition.

### 2. The Strategic Redeployment of Traditional Trade Tools

Alongside the emphasis on high technology sectors, established trade policy instruments are being recalibrated to align with security-oriented objectives. Rather than abandoning these mechanisms, policymakers are adapting familiar tools by incorporating strategic considerations that extend beyond their conventional economic purposes.

“Buy American” procurement policies exemplify this evolution, expanding beyond simple domestic sourcing preferences.<fnref n="104" /> These policies are increasingly positioned as instruments for developing domestic manufacturing capacity in sectors deemed strategically important, providing assured market access for domestic production across industries ranging from electric vehicles to pharmaceuticals.<fnref n="105" /> This approach effectively transforms public procurement into a mechanism of industrial policy coordination.

Concurrently, legislative frameworks that authorize executive responses to international trade disputes through targeted sanctions or tariffs are being refined to address practices increasingly characterized through a security lens, such as intellectual property violations involving dual-use technologies.<fnref n="106" /> This represents a broadening of the criteria by which trade practices are evaluated and addressed. The incorporation of labor and environmental standards into trade frameworks, while justified on normative grounds, also serves as a regulatory mechanism that can limit market access.<fnref n="107" /> These standards provide a flexible instrument for restricting imports from competitors whose practices may not align with domestically established benchmarks.

Additionally, current efforts to review and update existing free trade agreements (FTAs) reflect objectives that extend beyond traditional liberalization goals.<fnref n="108" /> These initiatives seek to embed security considerations into international legal frameworks through mechanisms such as enhanced rules of origin requirements, strengthened intellectual property provisions for critical technologies, and provisions that accommodate trade restrictions justified on national security grounds.<fnref n="109" /> This approach represents an attempt to adapt existing international trade governance structures to accommodate evolving strategic priorities while maintaining legitimacy within established legal frameworks.

<footnote n="84">See Irwin, *supra* note 1 at 14.</footnote>

<footnote n="85">See Dani Rodrik, *The globalization paradox: democracy and the future of the world economy* (New York: W W Norton, 2012) at 420—21.</footnote>

<footnote n="86">See e.g. Charles P Kindleberger, *The world in depression, 1929*—*1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).</footnote>

<footnote n="87">See I M Destler, *American trade politics* (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2005) at 122—25.</footnote>

<footnote n="88">*Ibid* at 258.</footnote>

<footnote n="89">Chad P Bown & Douglas A Irwin, “The GATT’s starting point: tariff levels circa 1947” (December 2015) National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 21782 at 12—13, online (pdf): <nber.org> [perma.cc/9FFG-ZLLE].</footnote>

<footnote n="90">See e.g. David Autor et al, “Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure” (2020) 110:10 Am Econ R 3139 at 3139, 3169, 3175—76.</footnote>

<footnote n="91">See “BEA interactive data application”, online: <apps.bea.gov> [perma.cc/YNT6-F7ST].</footnote>

<footnote n="92">US, *The President’s* *2025 Trade Policy Agenda* (Washington, DC: USTR, 2025) at 4—5, online (pdf): <ustr.gov> [perma.cc/5SZJ-ZQ5M].</footnote>

<footnote n="93">Gregory C Allen, “Choking off china’s access to the future of AI”, *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (2022), online: <csis.org> [perma.cc/2ZY4-3NP6].</footnote>

<footnote n="94">See Chad P Bown, “The US—China Trade War and Phase One Agreement” (2021) 43:4 J Pol’y Modeling 805 at 810—15.</footnote>

<footnote n="95">The White House, Report, “Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based Growth: 100-Day Reviews under Executive Order 14017” (2021), online (pdf): <bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov> [perma.cc/WD8A-RBA2].</footnote>

<footnote n="96">See G John Ikenberry, “The end of liberal international order?” (2018) 94:1 Intl Aff 7 at 9—12.</footnote>

<footnote n="97">See Robert D Blackwill & Jennifer M Harris, *War by other means: geoeconomics and statecraft*(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016) at 23—25.</footnote>

<footnote n="98">See Chris Miller, *Chip war: the fight for the world’s most critical technology* (New York: Scribner, 2022) at 388—402.</footnote>

<footnote n="99">*Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act*, 115<sup>th</sup> Congress, Calendar No 492 (1977).</footnote>

<footnote n="100">*International Emergency Economic Powers Act*, Pub L No 95—223, 91 Stat 1625 (1962).</footnote>

<footnote n="101">See Barry Buzan, Ole Wver & Jaap De Wilde, *Security: a new framework for analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1998) at 23—26.</footnote>

<footnote n="102">See *CHIPS and Science Act*, *supra* note 81.</footnote>

<footnote n="103">See US, Bill HR 8818, *American Privacy Rights Act of 2024*, 118<sup>th</sup> Cong; *Sustaining Select Efforts To Strengthen the Nation’s Cybersecurity and Amending Executive Order 13694 and Executive Order 14144*, 90 Fed Reg 24723 (2025), online: <whitehouse.gov> [perma.cc/BXS7-W376]; US, *2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers* (Washington, DC: USTR, 2025), online (pdf): <ustr.gov> [perma.cc/VAJ2-7U8A].</footnote>

<footnote n="104">See *Ensuring the Future Is Made in All of America by All of America’s Workers*, 86 Fed Reg 7475 (2021), online: <federalregister.gov> [perma.cc/FSV4-WFZD].</footnote>

<footnote n="105">See *Catalyzing Clean Energy Industries and Jobs Through Federal Sustainability*, 86 Fed Reg 70935 (2021), online: <bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov> [https://perma.cc/TUQ6-6WLB]; The White House, Fact Sheet, “President Biden’s Economic Plan Drives America’s Electric Vehicle Manufacturing Boom” (14 September 2022), online: <bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov> [perma.cc/XRK4-83XV]; The White House, *supra* note 95.</footnote>

<footnote n="106">See generally *Trade Act of 1974*, 19 USC § 2411; *International Emergency Economic Powers Act*, 50 USC § 1701 (1977); US, Congressional Research Service, *Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use* (Washington, DC: CRS, 2024), online (pdf): <sgp.fas.org> [perma.cc/TD4C-B3CG].</footnote>

<footnote n="107">See Céline Carrère, Marcelo Olarreaga & Damian Raess, “Labor clauses in trade agreements: hidden protectionism?” (2022) 17:3 R Intl Org 453—83; Stephen S Golub, “VI international labor standards and international trade” in *Staff Studies for the World Economic Outlook* (International Monetary Fund, 1997); WTO, “Non-tariff barriers: red tape, etc”, online: <wto.org> [perma.cc/RW9D-S8LU].</footnote>

<footnote n="108">See US, “Report to the President on the America First Trade Policy Executive Summary” (2025), online: <whitehouse.gov> [perma.cc/TW7N-3U4M].</footnote>

<footnote n="109">See Petros C Mavroidis & André Sapir, “China and the World Trade Organisation: Towards a Better Fit” (2019) Bruegel, Working Paper No 2019/06; Wolfgang Alschner, “The Impact of Investment Arbitration on Investment Treaty Design: Myth Versus Reality” (2017) 42:1 Yale J Intl L 1.</footnote>
# —

The evolution of US trade law serves as a legal embodiment of the nation’s economic policy and global strategic intentions. Since the founding of the republic, US trade policy has perpetually navigated between the protection of its domestic economy and the promotion of global free trade. This fundamental duality has directly shaped the development of its legal framework.

The origins of US trade law can be traced to the nation’s earliest legislation, such as the *Tariff Act of 1789*, whose primary objective was to shield nascent domestic industries through customs duties. Throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, US trade policy was markedly protectionist, designed to secure the competitiveness of its industries. However, with the economic expansion and deepening industrial revolution of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the United States gradually pivoted toward open markets. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, through a series of legislative acts and international agreements—from the *Smooth-Hawley Act* to the post-World War II establishment of GATT—the US became the principal architect of an international economic order oriented toward free trade.

Although the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 marked another significant breakthrough for the multilateral trading system, this ambitious framework has not operated as smoothly as envisioned. Instead, since the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it has encountered major setbacks in negotiations and even operational impediments. An analysis of US trade law’s post-war trajectory reveals that major trading powers, particularly the United States, continue to wield significant control over the multilateral system. While the general tenor of post-war US policy has been toward liberty and reciprocity, the definitions of “free,” “reciprocal,” and “fair” remain sufficiently ambiguous as to be susceptible to manipulation and abuse, often functioning as tools to suppress trade rivals. When the US perceives a weakening of its control, it may resort to unconventional measures to disrupt the system’s normal functioning in an attempt to reclaim its dominance. The post-Cold War global landscape, however, has been fundamentally altered. The ascent of emerging economies like China will inevitably create conflict, collision, and friction with the United States, ensuring the multilateral trading system will continue to experience periods of contention and reshaping for the foreseeable future.

In the contemporary era, US trade law functions not only as a framework for promoting free trade but also as a protective shield for national economic security. Specifically, through instruments such as the *Trade Act of 1974*, anti-dumping laws, and intellectual property regulations, the US employs legal means to defend its interests in the global market. Its protectionist character becomes particularly salient when faced with challenges from emerging economies, as demonstrated by the use of unilateral retaliation under Section 301 against perceived unfair trade practices. Furthermore, the US continues to play the role of a primary rule-setter in the international trade system. By spearheading negotiations for regional and bilateral free trade agreements, the US codifies its economic interests into law while simultaneously shaping the global trade order and its orientation.

The interplay of history and contemporary reality demonstrates that US trade law is more than a legal expression of economic policy; it is a tangible reflection of national strategic intent. Its historical evolution is inextricably linked with the nation’s global economic standing, charting a course from protectionism to free trade and, more recently, to strategic adjustments in an era of globalization. US trade law will continue to play a critical role in addressing the challenges of globalization, maintaining international competitiveness, and defending national interests. It serves as both a tool for domestic economic security and a bargaining chip in international negotiations, confirming that a long road remains ahead before a truly multilateral and more equitable international trade order can be established.