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# How do citizens perceive centralization reforms? Evidence from the merger of French regions

Lionel Wilner

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Documents de travail

N° G2020/07

Septembre 2020

How do citizens perceive centralization reforms?
Evidence from the merger of French regions

Lionel WILNER
<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>
Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques

G2020/07

# How do citizens perceive centralization reforms? Evidence from the merger of French regions

LIONEL WILNER*

Septembre 2020

Département des Études Économiques – Timbre G201
88, avenue Verdier – CS 70 058 – 92 541 MONTROUGE CEDEX – France
Tél. : 33 (1) 87 69 59 54 – E-mail : d3e-dg@insee.fr – Site Web Insee : http://www.insee.fr

Ces documents de travail ne reflètent pas la position de l'Insee et n'engagent que leurs auteurs.
Working papers do not reflect the position of INSEE but only their author's views.

<footnote>* Insee-Crest. Email: lionel.wilner@insee.fr. Address: 88 avenue Verdier, 92120 Montrouge, France. Tel: (+33)187695917.</footnote>
# Découpage administratif et bien-être subjectif : l’exemple de la fusion des régions

## Résumé

Cette étude utilise la fusion des régions de 2016 comme une expérience naturelle ; elle évalue son impact causal sur le bien-être subjectif déclaré par les individus en s’appuyant sur une stratégie d’identification en doubles différences. En dépit de la création de nouvelles régions plus vastes, dont le centre de décision est plus éloigné des administrés, aucun effet négatif n’est détecté sur la satisfaction dans la vie des individus. Au contraire, celle-ci a même augmenté dans les régions qui ont été absorbées d’un point de vue économique ou administratif. Ces régions ont en effet bénéficié d’une dynamique économique plus favorable consécutivement à la fusion, enregistrant notamment une baisse plus prononcée du taux de chômage. Ces meilleures perspectives économiques auraient ainsi plus que compensé un éventuel attachement à l’ancien découpage administratif.

**Mots-clés** : Fusion des régions ; expérience naturelle ; doubles différences ; bien-être subjectif ; centralisation.

# How do citizens perceive centralization reforms? Evidence from the merger of French regions

## Abstract:

Using the 2016 merger of French regions as a natural experiment, this paper adopts a difference-in-difference identification strategy to recover its causal impact on individual subjective well-being. No depressing effect is found despite increased centralization; life satisfaction has even increased in regions that were absorbed from economic and political viewpoints. The empirical evidence also suggests that local economic performance improved in the concerned regions, which includes a faster decline in the unemployment rate. In this setting, economic gains have likely outweighed cultural attachment to administrative regions.

**Keywords:** Merger of regions; natural experiment; difference-in-difference; subjective well-being; centralization.

**Classification JEL** : H75; I31.
# 1 Introduction

Subnational integration is a hot topic in the EU where regions are very heterogeneous in terms of size and economic importance, due to historical reasons (Alesina et al., 2017). In such a context, France experienced a wide-scale merger of regions: in 2016, its metropolitan territory was massively reorganized from 22 to 13 administrative regions. Arguments in favor of larger jurisdictions include efficiency gains and economies of scale, i.e. fiscal considerations. However, mergers of regions are very rare in practice, mainly because local authorities are reluctant to lose autonomy and political power, but also because citizens have presumably a taste for being close to government decisions, i.e. for decentralization. In the framework of Alesina and Spolaore (1997), this trade-off between economies of scale and heterogeneity of preferences of the population determines the optimal number and size of regions. Remember Barro (1991): “a large country can spread the cost of public goods, ... over many taxpayers, but a large country is also likely to have diverse population that is difficult for the central government to satisfy”. De facto, the public opinion is frequently summoned by local governments to prevent integration, based on the argument that centralization would not make case of regional feelings. In metropolitan France, most emblematic examples of attachment to local culture, and sometimes to specific common law, include Alsace-Lorraine, the Basque Country, Brittany, and Corsica, not claiming to be exhaustive. In the rest of the EU, there are voices in Catalunya, Flanders, Scotland and Wallonia asking for further autonomy, and even independence from Belgium, Spain or the UK. To sum up, three mechanisms are likely at play consecutive to that merger: (i) the efficiency channel (economies of scale), which might improve public service delivery, reduce tax burden and increase residents’ well-being, (ii) the increased heterogeneity inside new regions (more centralized policies less tailored to local needs and characteristics of the population), which might be particularly costly for richer regions, and (iii) the loss of regional identity, which is likely to be more painful for regions that may be viewed as absorbed ones.

This paper seeks to test empirically whether citizens were hurt by the merger viewed as a unique natural experiment that allows me to recover the causal impact of reshaping subnational borders on subjective well-being as self-assessed by individuals. It also aims at disentangling among the three previous channels at stake. Interestingly, this merger of regions was not announced during the 2012
electoral campaign; it was totally unexpected and came out as a surprise to politi-
cal commentators and citizens at the time. The political debate that preceded the
voting of the *Loi numéro 2015-991 du 7 août 2015 portant sur la nouvelle organ-
isation territoriale de la République* (NOTRé law hereafter), which implemented
the merger of French regions, gave rise to much concerns about administrative
belonging and the risk of losing one's regional identity. Initially motivated by the
ambition to reach a critical size and to make efficiency gains in order to compete
with European regions, this law is the result of a subtle political process during
which the perimeter of the new regions has much evolved with respect to original
plans. For instance, Aquitaine and Nord-Pas-de-Calais were bound to remain on
their own at the beginning of the process, but turned out to be merged into two
(distinct) new regions. On top of that, the initial project planned to extend even
further the scope of regional authorities, giving them tasks and powers over roads
and lower secondary education, among others.

The identification strategy adopted in this paper relies on a difference-in-difference approach that takes advantage of the reform viewed as a natural experiment. This method is particularly well suited to isolate the effect of a change in subnational borders on individual happiness. Individuals did not move from one region to another: by contrast, and most unusually, *the regions themselves* have changed over the period considered. The control group of this experiment is composed of individuals living in the 6 regions that did not participate to the merger. Different treatment groups may be defined: either individuals living in the 16 former regions which became 7 new regions, or in the 6 former regions that can be considered as having been absorbed, since they lost executive power.<fnref n="1" /> The econometric specification is based on a linear model with individual fixed effects; the dependent variable, namely individual subjective well-being, is provided on a discrete 0-10 scale, a Cantril scale. The estimation proceeds from longitudinal survey data: I exploit the *enquête statistique sur les ressources et conditions de vie* (SRCV), where individuals are asked to report their overall satisfaction with life on top of usual information including sociodemographic characteristics and geographic location.

When the treated group is composed of individuals living in merging regions,
the merger has no significant effect on individual happiness. However, when fo-

<footnote n="1">¹Four regions have absorbed them. The six remaining regions deserve special attention since the governance seems to be shared among the concerned entities after the merger, see *infra*.</footnote>
cusing on the differential evolution of absorbed regions with respect to the control
group, a significant and positive impact is obtained: about .076 on the 0-10 scale,
equivalent to 4.4% of one standard deviation. Put differently, everything happens
roughly as if 7.6% of individuals report an annual change of +1 in their life sat-
isfaction. A number of tests are conducted in order to assess the plausibility of
the identification strategy: the above results are robust to a variety of alternative
assumptions, including different definitions of treatment or control groups, and
sensitivity checks (ordered models, attrition, sampling issues, clustering, etc.).
Simulating placebo experiments, namely fake reforms occurring before the ob-
served one, yields non significant estimates even in the absorbed regions, which
supports the identifying assumption. Though centralization is usually associated
with lower levels of life satisfaction (see, e.g., Flèche, 2020, about Switzerland),
regional belonging (if any) does not have depressing effects on individual subjec-
tive well-being here.<fnref n="2" /> Hence the French experience at stake suggests at least that
the institutional setting matters in this respect, France not being a federal state.
In the end, investigating whether previous effects are more or less pronounced
for some individuals yields to conclude that those who reported higher levels of
subjective well-being were likely to benefit from economic spillovers of the merger.

To understand the above results, I investigate the role played by economic
mechanisms. First, an unintended effect of the merger has been to *increase* invest-
ment spending. As noticed by the French Court of Auditors (Cour des Comptes,
2019), investment spending has increased more in merging regions than elsewhere,
especially as regards local public goods (trains and upper secondary education,
among others) regions are in charge of. More generally, there is empirical evidence
of an *increase* in local public spending consecutive to the merger, which might lead
to further citizen discontent if the "fiscal effect" (citizens are tax payers; if they
are forward-looking, they must anticipate higher local tax) dominates the "resi-
dential effect" (citizens are also residents of these regions and they benefit from the
provision of local public goods). Second, the economic attractiveness of merging
regions improved, in line with public incentives to promote local business develop-
ment and to enhance economic performance. In particular, the unemployment rate
experienced a faster decline in absorbed regions after 2016; the empirical evidence
at stake is hence consistent with these poorer regions benefiting from the promo-

<footnote n="2">²In France, the *département* might be the relevant layer to which citizens are attached as Boyer et al. (2020) suggest in their analysis of the Gilets jaunes movement.</footnote>
tion activities of the richer absorbing regions. This empirical finding is especially relevant when debating the possibility of grouping local authorities. Finally, this process has contributed to some income convergence within new regions: for instance, civil servants employed by local governments had the variable part of their compensation (bonuses) enhanced after the merger, according to the rules of the most advantaged regime; yet, the magnitude of this phenomenon is empirically too small to account for previous findings. Overall, these results suggest that economic spillovers which come along the creation of larger subnational jurisdictions play a substantial role in alleviating, and even outweighing citizen discontent due to further centralization. They are consistent with the relative importance of economic gains with respect to cultural norms through the example of regional belonging feelings. The positive effect obtained on absorbed regions tends to suggest that the loss of regional identity is dominated by the economic channels. Moreover, the impact on economic outcomes suggests that the efficiency channel does not play a role here given the increase in spending. Increased heterogeneity matters, but has contrasted implications depending on the regions considered: though theoretically painful for absorbing, richer ones, the residents of these regions were not significantly hurt while there is empirical evidence of a positive impact for residents of absorbed, poorer regions. This Pareto improvement is somehow reminiscent of peer effects in education (Guyon et al., 2012) where high-achieving pupils are not hurt by low-achieving roommates benefiting from interactions with the latter, and of the impact of immigration on the labor market (Card, 1990) where local workers are not hurt by newcomers.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a literature review. Section 3 presents the institutional setting and the merger. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 is devoted to the identification strategy. Section 6 presents the econometric specification. The results are exposed in section 7 while Section 8 provides some robustness checks. Section 9 investigates economic channels that help rationalize previous findings, and Section 10 concludes.

## 2 Literature

This paper lies at the intersection of two strands of literature: one devoted to theoretical and empirical effects of integration of local jurisdictions, and another
one concerned by spatial determinants of happiness.

First, the optimal number and size of countries results from a trade-off between
economies of scale and heterogeneity of preferences in the theoretical framework
built by Alesina and Spolaore (1997). Empirical investigations on mergers of local
jurisdictions like municipalities, counties, or regions include Jackson (1987) in the
USA, Mouritzen (2010) in Denmark and Lidström (2010) in Sweden. In Japan,
Weese (2015) resorts to a structural model along with an asymmetric informa-
tion problem between the national and local levels of government; he finds that
the optimal number of subnational borders is about twice smaller than the actual
one. In the French case, a recent contribution by Tricaud (2020) concludes that
local integration costs, including a rise in housing supply and higher congestion
costs in urban municipalities, combined with an increased distance to public ser-
vice facilities in rural areas, are major factors against intermunicipal cooperation.
By contrast, this paper focuses at the regional level, which is relevant from a EU
perspective. A number of papers are also devoted to explaining which factors de-
termine integration (Gordon and Knight, 2009; Di Porto et al., 2013). In contrast,
this paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of a merger of regions on
well-being, this causal effect being estimated on longitudinal survey data at the
individual level. It is natural to wonder whether such mergers have an impact on
cost reduction in the newly formed jurisdictions. The literature has concluded to
mixed results (Bel and Warner, 2015): overall efficiency gains are found in Israel
by Reingewertz (2012), but according to Blom-Hansen et al. (2016) there is no
effect in the Danish case, and at least not in jurisdictions with more than 100,000
inhabitants in Germany (Roesel, 2017). The French experience at stake appears
as an outlier in this respect since local public spending has actually increased con-
secutive to the merger; Frère et al. (2014) had already shown that intermunicipal
cooperation did not reduce public spending in that country. From a fiscal federal-
ism viewpoint, Oates et al. (1972) decentralization theorem balances heterogeneity
in citizens' preferences and externalities between jurisdictions, and states that "the
provision of public services should be located at the lowest level of government en-
compassing, in a spatial sense, the relevant benefits and costs". Analyzing tax
competition, Breuillé and Zanaj (2013) show that regional (resp. local) taxes
should increase (resp. decrease) following the merger of regions by comparing pre-
and post-merger equilibria in a two-tier territorial organization with local and
regional authorities. This result is consistent with what has been implemented in
France by the decision maker: in practice, value-added contributions have been
shifted from *départements* to regions after the merger.<fnref n="3" />

Second, this paper contributes to the identification of the impact of spatial
determinants on subjective well-being.<fnref n="4" /> This task is all the more challenging as it
requires observing individuals moving from one region to another, or seeing regions
somehow changing when looking at the same individuals over time, which sounds
even more difficult. From an econometric point of view, the former option requires
to overcome the issue of endogenous location choice, which the latter option does
not: the current paper exploits the unique 2016 merger of French regions in that
very spirit. In the USA, Oswald and Wu (2010) showed that estimated state effects
issued from subjective well-being equations were strongly correlated with objective
measures of life quality, i.e., state rankings based on air quality, traffic, etc. As a
result, these objective indicators do a fair job at capturing individual, subjective
perception of life quality. In contrast, the concept of region used in this paper
refers to an administrative region, net of all amenities that may be attached to
that area. Other papers have wondered whether life was sweeter in the countryside:
according to Easterlin et al. (2011), there is no marked difference between rural
and urban areas in developed countries, while in developing countries cities are
more frequently associated with higher reported levels of life satisfaction. Finally,
other geographic determinants matter, including the price of gasoline (Boyd-Swan
and Herbst, 2012) and housing costs (Ala-Mantila et al., 2018).

At the confluence of these two strands of literature, Frijters et al. (2004) exploit
a wide-scale natural experiment, the German reunification, as an exogenous vari-
ation of income between West and East Germany to identify its causal impact on
individual happiness. More recently, Flèche (2020) exploits an intertemporal vari-
ation of centralization reforms in Switzerland to identify their effect on subjective
well-being; in particular, she acknowledges the role played by cultural attachment
to one’s region.

<footnote n="3">³Before the NOTRé law, local authorities (*départements*) received nearly one half of revenues issued from the *cotisation sur la valeur ajoutée des entreprises* (CVAE), a value-added contribution, while regions had exactly 1/4 of these revenues, the rest being granted to municipalities or intermunicipal communities. After the NOTRé law, the share of regions increased to one half while the *départements'* share decreased to slightly less than 1/4. The CVAE must be distinguished from the French VAT, an indirect tax with a regular rate of 20%, although both of them rely on the same tax base; the CVAE is progressive, with a 1.5% top marginal rate beyond €50m.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴See a recent survey by Rentfrow (2018) on that topic.</footnote>
# 3 Institutional background

## 3.1 The administrative division of France

Contrary to the US, Germany or Switzerland, France is not a federation of states, Länder or cantons; it is unitary. Besides, it has always been a centralized country. The French territory is divided into metropolitan France and overseas.<fnref n="5" /> Metropolitan France is divided into several layers: regions, *départements* and municipalities which can gather into intermunicipal communities (EPCI). There are 96 *départements* in metropolitan France and more than 35,000 municipalities. Regions, *départements*, EPCI and municipalities constitute the administrative division of France, the so-called *mille-feuille*. This multi-level governance is often criticized for its presumed inefficiency in the public debate.

All local governments share various responsibilities in terms of education, public welfare, public transportation, economic development, youth, sports, etc. The exclusive areas of jurisdiction of regions include trains, upper secondary education as well as vocational training and apprenticeship. Regions are also bound to promote economic, social and cultural development. Finally, they are in charge of the management of European programmes, land planning, equality of territories, environmental issues, etc.

The so-called “first act” of decentralization in France dates back to the Deferre law voted in 1982. From that date onwards, the central authority transferred the executive power to the local authorities, namely the *départements*. The second part of this process occurred at the beginning of the 2000s when local authorities gained financial autonomy; regions then became responsible for upper secondary education, trains as well as vocational training and apprenticeship. The third act of decentralization is precisely the NOTRé law which included the merger of regions, and that aimed at enforcing the role played by regions: in particular, it increased the scope of their responsibilities. On the one hand, regions saw their tasks and powers widened, which indicates a higher level of decentralization. On the other hand, they were merged into larger entities, which can be seen as a trend toward centralization.

<footnote n="5">⁵Overseas are composed of five regions: French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, Réunion. The reform at stake did not require for those regions to merge.</footnote>
## 3.2 The 2016 merger of regions

On January 14, 2014, President François Hollande announced a territorial reform that would eventually result in the creation of 13 new regions in order to replace the 22 existing ones. This substantial reduction in the number of regional jurisdictions led to reshape French subnational borders. The idea dated back to the *comité Balladur*, an administrative commission presided by former Prime Minister Edouard Balladur on the request of President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008. At the time, that *comité* advocated for the creation of 15 super regions instead of the 22 current regions in metropolitan France, in order to meet European size standards (German, Italian and Spanish regions being on average larger). However, when Hollande made his announcement, it came as a surprise since the proposition was not part of his 2012 presidential campaign program. Hence the reform was completely unexpected. Hollande argued this reform would help simplify the complexity of administrative division, i.e., of the French *mille-feuille*. He wanted a swift legislative process: on June 3, 2014, he proposed the creation of 14 new regions instead of 22; two weeks later, the bill was under consideration by the Senate. However, the law was only adopted by the legislature, namely by the two chambers of the French Parliament, on July 16, 2015, because of strong opposition to the project. The Constitutional Council nonetheless indicated that the law was conform to the constitution on August 6, 2015. Finally, the #2015-991 law, also called *loi portant Nouvelle Organisation Territoriale de la République* (NOTRé law), which rules the current administrative division of France, was promulgated on August 7, 2015 and implemented from January 1st, 2016 onwards. Even though the merger was actively prepared for in 2015, in practice the new regions only became effective in the early days of 2016.

This reform is all the more unique as administrative borders had hardly changed over more than six decades in France, i.e., since their creation in 1956.<fnref n="6" /> There were many discussions from January to June 2014, a crucial phase during which those borders were still undetermined and when the government had to face many lobbyists. The public debate focused on the fear of losing one's regional identity; it opposed somehow “conservatives” and “liberals” in this respect: see, for instance, the various discussions on the borders of new regional entities and the possible

<footnote n="6">⁶The creation of regions dates back to a proposal by Serge Antoine, a magistrate at the French Court of Auditors (*Cour des Comptes*), i.e., the highest jurisdiction to audit and adjudicate accounts made by public, management, and government accountants.</footnote>
“reunification” of Brittany and Pays de la Loire called for by some but rejected by others.<fnref n="7" /> According to many, citizens’ attachment toward their regions would be strong. Other issues are related to regionalism, including the teaching of regional languages and the autonomous status of Corsica. In the end, 13 new regions were created, the borders of which coincide neither with the initial project, nor with the one announced on June 3, 2014. Table 1 yields the correspondence between the 22 old regions (Figure 1a) and the 13 new regions (Figure 1b).

Importantly, the NOTRé law enforced the role played by regions in economic development by putting an end to the one played by départements in that domain. The priority has been given to promoting regional attractiveness through simplified administrative procedures for firms, for instance. It is therefore expected that this merger encouraged the promotion of local business development, hence that is enhanced local economic performance. Following the NOTRé law, regions obtained a higher share in local fiscal tax, namely indirect value-added taxes and contributions (remember footnote 3); nevertheless, the lump-sum transfer from the state decreased accordingly so as to keep regions’ revenues nearly constant.

The reform was designed to reduce interregional gaps by merging big, wealthy regions to small, poorer ones (Jouen, 2015). The boundaries of the new regions meet administrative proximity criteria, but the risk for merging regions to be excluded in 2020 from the "transition region" category (i.e., regions whose GDP per capita is between 75% and 90% of the EU average) exists, especially in case of some change in the NUTS 2 nomenclature:<fnref n="8" /> the eligibility for European funds is tailored to that level. However, this status is unpopular with respect to other governments than France within EU. On the one hand, since poorer regions are merged with wealthier regions, the economic situation of the former is expected to improve; on the other hand, this might precisely lead to lose eligibility to European Structural Funds (European Regional Development Fund or ERDF, and European Social Fund or ESF) based on convergence indicators at the EU-25 level).<fnref n="9" /> Though the former trade-off results in an ambiguous overall effect, some economic improvement is expected in the short run.

<footnote n="7">⁷“Le sentiment d’appartenance est plus fort en Bretagne qu’ailleurs”, interview in *Libération*, 15 juillet 2014.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸NUTS is a geocode standard for referencing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes. NUTS 2 comprises areas with a population of 800,000 to 3 million people. For more details on that issue, see Antunez et al. (2017).</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹French regions, including overseas, received b€12.5 from the EU over the 2007-2013 period.</footnote>
# 4 Data

Following the recommendation of the Stiglitz et al. (2009) commission, France has started to ask individuals directly how they felt about their lives. The French institute of statistics and economic studies (Insee) is in charge of the SRCV survey targeting about 10,000 households every year. From 2010 onwards, it has included several questions related to individual life satisfaction, job satisfaction, as well as satisfaction with family and friends. On top of these measures of subjective well-being, it provides usual information at the individual level: gender, age, education, occupation, family status, labor force status and the administrative region where individuals live. Income is measured at the household level; in what follows, I consider the logarithm of the CPI-deflated annual household income, i.e., the sum of real incomes from all members in the household divided by the number of units of consumption as defined by the OECD scale.<fnref n="10" /> As another interesting feature of SRCV, in theory, this survey is able to track individuals even when they move between two waves.

According to the unit that produces the SRCV survey at Insee, the reliability of the longitudinal part related to subjective well-being casts doubts before 2013, though the survey started in 2010. Indeed, the questionnaire was modified in 2013: questions relative to life satisfaction were placed *after* those relative to income, while the reverse held before. *De facto*, a break in the time series of life satisfaction can be observed from that date. Hence I assume that there is no reliable wave before 2013 as far as life satisfaction is concerned, and I focus on the 2013-2018 period.

Table 2 contains some descriptive statistics related to the working sample, an unbalanced panel of 32,872 individuals (90,734 observations) followed from 2013 to 2018 and whose annual income exceeds €1. A measure of subjective well-being is available thanks to a question on overall satisfaction with life, the answer being provided on a discrete 0-10 scale. The answers have an average of 7.18 and are rather concentrated around levels 7 and 8 (see Figure 2), they nevertheless use the whole support of the distribution and they have a cross-sectional coefficient of variation as small as .24. Women and elders are slightly over-represented (58%

<footnote n="10">¹⁰According to this scale, the first adult in the household has weight 1, the other adults or children aged at least 14 have a weight equal to .5, and children aged less than 14 have a weight equal to .3.</footnote>
of the sample aged 53.5 on average), which is usual in French household surveys.
The average income amounts to nearly €25,000 per year; besides, income exhibits
sizeable dispersion since its coefficient of variation is roughly 1.24, and the top
1% earns more than €86,000 a year. Finally, objective indicators measuring life
quality are available in the survey, including the exposure to psycho-social haz-
ard, health problems, environment troubles, poor living conditions, (economic or
general) insecurity as well as the weakness of social ties. Between 3% and 15% of
individuals suffer from at least one of such problems.

5 Identification strategy

To identify the causal impact of regional belonging on individual subjective well-
being, two options are available to the researcher: either she may restrict her
attention to movers, i.e., to individuals who move from one region to another;
or she may exploit natural experiments that provide a region change, focusing by
contrast on stayers, i.e., individuals who stay in the same region, a priori more nu-
merous than movers. The former strategy looks fragile: first, it relies on a possibly
small sub-sample of individuals; second, there may be various, possibly endoge-
nous reasons which provide incentives for individuals to move, e.g., endogenous
spatial sorting, which might be correlated with unobserved determinants of sub-
jective well-being. For instance, the prior that “the grass is always greener on the
other side of the fence” can be strong among movers; think also of individuals who
are unsatisfied with their life because they are unemployed and who look for job
opportunities outside their region of residence. The latter source of identification
is extremely rare in practice.

The identification strategy of this paper consists in exploiting the merger de-
scribed previously as a natural experiment. Since the reform was unexpected,
strategic individual behavior is hardly at stake.<fnref n="11" /> The reform thus provides a con-
trol group made up of individuals living in the six regions that remained unaffected
by the merger: Brittany, Corsica, Île-de-France, Pays de la Loire, Provence-Alpes-
Côte d'Azur, on top of the Centre region that had only been renamed Centre-Val
de Loire on January 17, 2015. This control group is composed of individuals who

<footnote n="11">¹¹158 individuals (about .9% of the sample) are observed living in two former regions or more from 2013 to 2018. I nevertheless provide a robustness check with respect to endogenous location choice in the Online Appendix.</footnote>
constitute 45% of the working sample.

Different treatment groups shall be considered, depending on the research question: individuals living (i) in merging regions, or (ii) in absorbed regions.<fnref n="12" /> Note that merging regions and non-merging regions form a partition of metropolitan France. Besides, 16 regions merged during the process and became 7 new regions. The first identification strategy relies on a comparison of the evolution of life satisfaction in merging regions with that of non-merging regions. However, there are reasons to believe that merging regions are heterogeneous from demographic, economic, geographic and social viewpoints; in particular, they are made up of absorbed and absorbing regions which form a partition of merging regions (when defined in a broad sense, see *infra*).<fnref n="13" />

Among merging regions, some are smaller from an economic perspective and may be viewed as being absorbed. I define absorption in a conservative manner: absorption implies that administrative issues and local politics are held in a prefecture that is located in another region after the merger. Absorbed regions then include Auvergne, Champagne-Ardenne, Limousin, Lorraine, Picardy and Poitou-Charentes. According to that definition, 18 % of individuals lived in an absorbed region before the merger.<fnref n="14" /> A second identification strategy relies therefore on the comparison of the evolution of life satisfaction in regions that have been absorbed with the one that prevailed in regions that did not merge. Another 18 % of individuals live in an absorbing region (Alsace, Aquitaine, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Rhône-Alpes), i.e., in a region that has absorbed another region (and possibly other regions when the merger involved more than two regions). By definition, in such regions, not only has the old prefecture remained a prefecture, but it has also become the one of the new regional entity.

What about the other regions? Some did merge, but the governance of the new region has been split between the former regions. Burgundy and Franche-

<footnote n="12">¹²Absorbing regions may well be considered, too. The corresponding estimates are available in the supplementary Appendix, see Tables 16 and 17. Overall, no significant impact is found in those regions.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³Merging regions differ from non-merging regions in that they are significantly poorer: in 2013, individuals living in the latter report on average an annual income of €26,700 as opposed to €24,400 for residents of the former. The difference is statistically significant at 5%, allowing for unequal variances within the two groups.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴Absorbing and absorbed regions look quite similar in terms of observable characteristics but absorbed regions are significantly poorer (€23,900 on average against €24,800 in 2013). Once again, the difference is statistically significant at 5%.</footnote>
Comté, Lower Normandy and Upper Normandy as well as Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées are concerned. The leading regions are Burgundy, Upper Normandy and Midi-Pyrénées in the sense that the prefectures of the new regions correspond to these former regions'. In a conservative approach, I exclude such regions from the analysis, but I provide robustness checks with respect to that choice by including them as well in the treatment group (see section 8.1 on that issue). Under the latter empirical strategy, we are bound to consider 9 absorbed regions instead of 6 (corresponding to 7 absorbing regions instead of 4). Absorbed (resp. absorbing) regions defined under this broader sense account for 26 % (resp. 29 %) of individuals.

As usual in difference-in-difference frameworks, the identification assumption is that individuals would have experienced a similar evolution of subjective well-being in both control and treatment groups, had the merger not happened. This common trend assumption cannot be tested, but its plausibility can be assessed. To that purpose, Figures 3 and 4 depict the evolution of life satisfaction in both control and treatment groups (for the two treatment groups considered). As far as pre-trends are concerned, it is not possible to disregard any of the empirical strategies presented above (see also section 8.3 on that issue). Interestingly, while life satisfaction has remained rather stable after the reform in non-merging regions, or has even slightly increased, there is a sharp rise in self-assessed subjective well-being in absorbed regions (from about 7.12 in 2015 to 7.26 in 2017). This empirical evidence suggests that the impact of the merger on life satisfaction was positive for individuals living in absorbed regions, but not significant for those living in merging regions. The next section provides an econometric model that enables to check whether this empirical finding holds *ceteris paribus*.

Last, even if the natural experiment at stake guarantees that the timing of subnational border changes can be considered as exogenous, a remaining concern has to do with endogenous border drawing, namely the possibility that the border design was made in order to minimize discontent. Put differently, one may worry about selection into treatment. However, this would not threaten internal validity as long as the previous difference-in-difference assumptions are valid. It must be acknowledged, though, that external validity is more challenging, and that the results obtained in this particular setting would not generalize easily to other contexts.
# 6 Econometric specification

A difference-in-difference strategy to evaluate the impact of the merger viewed as a natural experiment is implemented using a linear model. Since the dependent variable, self-assessed life satisfaction, is ordinal, it is tempting to resort to ordered models, which is done in section 8.4. However, for the sake of clarity, I consider rather a linear model and obtain similar conclusions: first, the signs of coefficients are nonparametrically identified, and second, both the significance and the magnitude of average marginal effects are close regardless of the specification chosen. Moreover, the linearity makes it simpler to include individual fixed-effects, hence to control better for unobserved heterogeneity. Even though it is possible to include fixed-effects in ordinal models,<fnref n="15" /> this is a more computationally demanding task. There are serious reasons to believe that unobserved heterogeneity is a first-order issue as far as subjective well-being is concerned, which claims for controlling for individual fixed-effects.

The estimating equation as regards the subjective well-being (SWB) of individual $i$ living in region $r$ on year $t$ is:

$$ \text{SWB}_{irt} = \beta \text{Treatment}_r \times \text{Post}_t + X'_{irt}\gamma + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \mu_r + \varepsilon_{irt}. \quad (1) $$

Explanatory covariates include a number of usual determinants of life satisfaction $X_{irt}$ (objective indicators of life quality, labor force status, family status, income, age, education, gender, occupation), individual fixed-effects $\alpha_i$, year dummies $\delta_t$ and regional dummies $\mu_r$. The average treatment effect (ATE) $\beta$ is recovered by the coefficient related to the interaction of the treatment dummy $\text{Treatment}_r$, defined at the regional level, with a dummy for the post-reform period, i.e., from 2016 onwards. Idiosyncratic shocks $\varepsilon_{irt}$ follow a normal distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the region-year level: following Bertrand et al. (2004), the ideal level would be the level of intervention, namely the former region; however, this would yield a small number of clusters (less than 50), which would cast doubts in a consistent estimation of the variance-covariance matrix. Section 8.5 provides robustness checks with respect to the level of clustering.

The identification of the model is achieved by assuming strict exogeneity of the covariates conditional to the individual effects. This exogeneity follows from the

<footnote n="15">¹⁵See the Appendix on this topic.</footnote>
reform being a natural experiment.

A remaining issue is the selection of controls $X_{irt}$ in the estimating equation. First, the literature devoted to the individual determinants of subjective well-being provides some guidance (see Layard et al., 2015, on that topic). Second, statistical methods based either on the BIC, on the rigorous Lasso, or on a stepwise algorithm provide useful tools to select the most relevant variables. In practice, both the literature and statistical criteria suggest that relevant covariates include objective measures of life quality, labor force status, family status, income and age; for the sake of completeness, education, gender and occupation dummies are also added up in the model.

# 7 Results

Tables 3 and 4 show the results obtained from the main specification, i.e., estimating equation (1) for the two treatment groups: merging and absorbed regions, the latter definition being conservative. For the sake of readability, only the ATEs are reported in these tables. The other estimates $\hat{\gamma}$ are available upon request, but it is worth emphasizing that they are completely consistent with the huge empirical evidence provided by the literature devoted to subjective well-being. For instance, objective deprivation indicators related to life quality have a strong, depressing impact on life satisfaction; so does unemployment. By contrast, and even though money can't buy happiness, it definitely contributes to it: the correlation between income and life satisfaction is strong and positive. Having a partner increases life satisfaction; education, gender and occupation have hardly any effect. Moreover, due to large sample size, this vector is very precisely estimated so that there is little doubt that the previous stylized facts hold in the data.

Turning now to the causal effect of the merger, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average treatment effect is equal to zero at the 5% level. This empirical evidence suggests that the merger of regions at stake has not hurt individuals' attachment to their region, if anything, despite the presumed fear of losing one's regional identity that has been put forward in the public debate.

Interestingly, the main lesson from Table 4 is that the merger has significantly increased the life satisfaction of individuals living in absorbed regions. This result is robust to the inclusion of controls and still holds after taking unobserved
heterogeneity into account thanks to individual fixed-effects. The point estimates of the ATE, which are all positive and significantly different from 0, correspond to an increase in self-assessed life satisfaction that lies slightly below .1 on the 0-10 scale, more precisely near .076 in the preferred specification from column (6) that includes both individual fixed-effects and controls. In other words, everything happens roughly as if 7.6% of individuals report an annual change in their life satisfaction of +1. Put differently, this effect amounts to 4.4% of one standard deviation. It also contributes to attenuate the depressing impact of poor health conditions by 7.5%; equivalently, individuals are better off as if they received about .3% more income.

It is worth emphasizing that the source of identifying variability is at the regional level (as opposed to the individual level). Aggregating the data at that level leads to an estimated ATE of .084 which is still significant at 5%.

Last, I investigate whether the effects documented previously are heterogeneous across individuals. In a triple difference approach, I specify now $\beta = \beta_0 + \beta_X X_{irt}$ in equation (1). Table 5 tests whether some individual characteristics tend to amplify or attenuate the previous effects, i.e., $H_0: \beta_X = 0$. It turns out that blue collars saw their self-assessed happiness increase most in the absorbed regions: the estimated effect for them amounts to three times the ATE; the same holds for singles and individuals holding a vocational degree with an estimated effect that is about twice the ATE. Finally, the effect is also more pronounced for individuals belonging to the third decile of the income distribution. On the whole, all these individuals may be more mobile on the job market; the heterogeneity depicted here sounds rather consistent with economic gains in absorbed regions (see section 9 on that issue) provided that low-qualified workers' mobility is higher.

# 8 Robustness checks

This section provides several robustness tests in order to check that previous results are truly causal and do not stem from statistical artifacts. First, both alternative treatment and control groups are considered, which helps determine the sensitivity to different common trend assumptions. Second, falsification tests are performed: placebo experiments taking the form of fake reforms occurring before the actual reform are simulated. Third, the sensitivity of the results is assessed with respect
to the parametric specification. Finally, from a statistical viewpoint, these results
seem to be driven neither by attrition, nor by survey sampling issues, and they
are robust to the clustering level.

**8.1 Alternative treatment group**

A less conservative definition of "absorbed regions" is considered here. It now
includes the former regions that share some governance within new regional en-
tities, e.g., Franche-Comté, Lower Normandy and Languedoc-Roussillon. On top
of providing with a sensitivity analysis, this empirical strategy relies on a larger
sample size and yields even more precise estimates. Table 7 shows that the merger
has still a positive effect on absorbed regions defined in a broader sense, though
slightly attenuated with respect to previous estimates.

In the remainder of that section, an individual belongs to the treatment group
if she lives in a region that has been absorbed in the most conservative sense.

8.2 Alternative control groups

Another robustness check consists in verifying that the ATE does not depend too
much on the definition of the control group. A potential concern is related to the
effect being driven by the Île-de-France region which remained unaffected by the
merger, and which looks somehow like an outlier with respect to the other regions
(because it is both the richest and the most crowded region due to the Paris area).
To address this concern, I exclude Île-de-France from the control group. The
results are displayed by Table 8: reassuringly, the estimated ATE turns out to be
very close to the one found in Table 4.

Another concern could be that the control group, including Île-de-France or not,
is not comparable with the treatment group in the sense that both the outcome
and its predictors might not be similar before the reform. A standard solution
to fix this potential problem consists in resorting to a synthetic control approach
(Abadie et al., 2010), which yields Figure 8. According to that method, the short-
run effect documented above would amount to .06 in 2016, to .135 in 2017 but
would vanish in 2018.
## 8.3 Placebo experiments

Two placebo experiments, namely fake mergers in 2014 and 2015, are simulated. These counterfactual reforms must take place before the actual reform in 2016. If the common trend assumption holds with the actual merger, it should also be verified under these falsification tests. The results are provided by Tables 9 and 10. No significant effect is found, which is consistent with an absence of differential pre-trend in subjective well-being across control and treatment groups. Hence it gives further credit to the idea that the slight improvement in self-assessed life satisfaction reflects a causal effect of the merger. If anything, the estimated ATE under a fake 2015 merger is higher than the one corresponding to a fake 2014 merger (none of these effects being significant at usual levels), which could be consistent with some anticipation of the merger during the year 2015.

A remaining concern is related to possible endogenous selection into treatment: non-merging regions like Brittany, Corsica, but also Île-de-France, Pays de la Loire and Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur to a lesser extent would be precisely the ones in which regional attachment is higher. Importantly, this would not be a problem for internal validity as long as the common trend assumption is valid.<fnref n="16" />

## 8.4 Parametric specification

Due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, it is worth investigating how the estimated ATEs depend on the choice of the functional form relating life satisfaction to observed covariates. Two nonlinear models are thus estimated: an ordered Probit (Table 11) and an ordered Logit (Table 12).<fnref n="17" /> Results hardly vary from a qualitative point of view: the effect in absorbed regions remains positive and significant at usual levels. The average partial effects (APE), available upon request, are consistent with the ATE obtained under the linear specification, nearly .08: the probabilities of reporting a level of life satisfaction higher than 8 (resp. comprised between 5 and 7) increase (resp. decrease) by roughly .1 pp.

<footnote n="16">¹⁶On top of that, the estimations based on a control group composed of individuals living in Centre-Val de Loire yield an ATE that does not differ much from previously.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷The Appendix contains a discussion with respect to the inclusion of individual fixed-effects in such models.</footnote>
## 8.5 Statistical issues, clustering and survey sampling

Finally, I investigate whether my results are robust to statistical concerns, essentially: (i) endogenous attrition, (ii) panel balancing, and (iii) clustering.

To test for endogenous attrition, I resort to the method suggested by Verbeek and Nijman (1992) which consists in considering further explanatory covariates (the number of times an individual is present in the panel and a dummy that indicates whether the individual belongs to the balanced panel) in the model estimated on the unbalanced panel, and in testing for their significance. Table 13 indicates that endogenous attrition is not too much of a concern here: these variables are not significant at usual levels and thus the corresponding null hypotheses cannot be rejected.

Table 14 provides estimates on the balanced panel composed of a much smaller number of individuals (1,417 instead of 18,187) who are always present in the survey from 2013 to 2018. The estimated ATE turns out to be close to the one estimated previously, and even higher: about 0.1.

Last, I wonder whether the above empirical findings are robust to alternative levels of clustering: individual, individual-year, (former) region, (new) region and (new) region-year. The baseline specification is issued from clustering at the former region-year level: even though standard practice suggests to opt for the level of policy intervention, i.e., former regions, a small number of corresponding clusters (namely, 22) challenges that empirical choice in this setting. Table 15 shows that the estimated standard errors vary from .02 to .04 depending on the considered level of clustering, but the significance of the estimated ATE at usual levels remains, provided that the usual condition of disposing of at least 50 clusters (see, e.g., Cameron and Miller, 2015) is fulfilled in order to estimate consistently the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix.

## 9 Interpretation

This section is devoted to an empirical investigation of the mechanisms underlying previous results. In particular, I try to find out which regional attributes might have changed consecutive to the merger that help rationalize, first, why there is no negative impact; second, why there is even an improvement in absorbed regions,
especially for the subpopulation described at the end of section 7. By construction, official statistics are available in former regions before the merger, in new regions after the merger, but not in former regions after the merger. An exception is the unemployment rate since Insee provides series at the *département* level; these figures can easily be aggregated to the former region level -or not. In the other cases, the absence of data prevents me from determining whether some features have evolved differently in absorbed and in absorbing regions; I focus therefore on a comparison between merging and non-merging regions only, which is already sufficient to provide some explanations about the absence of negative impact of the merger.

A first clue to understand the impact of that merger is provided by the unemployment rate measured at the *département* level. Column (1) of Table 6 shows that the policy change would have lowered it significantly by .19pp (about 2%); this decline in the unemployment rate is observed whatever the level of aggregation considered, i.e., either at the former region or at the new region levels. This empirical evidence suggests that the merger has created new economic opportunities which led to better prospects on local job markets. This is especially the case in absorbed regions: according to Column (2) of Table 6, the unemployment rate has decreased in those regions by .18pp consecutive to the merger and with respect to the regions that did not merge. Interestingly, the impact is null in absorbing regions (column (3)). Since absorbed regions are poorer, this improvement of the economic climate has likely concerned the subpopulation described above (singles, blue collars, with some vocational degree, located in the bottom of the income distribution) who may move more easily and may be more prone to benefit from these new prospects. Indeed, a plausible channel for this improvement of local labor market conditions is the facilitation of commuting within the new regional boundaries; in particular, regions' scope includes trains, hence commuting could have been made easier thanks to better rail transportation. Remember that the new regions were bound to promote local economic performance, especially by simplifying administrative procedures for firms, which might have favored local business development; as a plausible spillover of that merger, poorer, absorbed regions might have benefited from the promotion activities of the richer, absorbing regions. This empirical evidence of a decline in the unemployment rate is also consistent with Wolfschuetz (2020) who finds some improvement in local economic performance as measured by the unemployment rate, which she relates to further
promoting of local business development in municipalities entering intermunicipal cooperation in Germany.

A second point has to do with unintended effects of the merger on public spending. The French Supreme Court of Auditors, the Cour des Comptes, in charge of an audit of public funds, worries about pecuniary costs consecutive to the merger. According to Cour des Comptes (2019), efficiency gains have not been visible so far: on the contrary, and by comparison with non-merging regions, pecuniary costs have increased due to a convergence in civil servants' bonuses based on the rule of the most favorable cases, an update of IT systems, etc. Moreover, merging regions raised their investment spending while non-merging regions hardly increased them at all over the post-merger period from 2016 to 2018. From data issued by the DGCL, the bureau in charge of statistics on local authorities, Figure 5 can be obtained, which replicates Figure 9 p133 of the report established by Cour des Comptes (2019) –except that the perimeter of non-merging regions does not include overseas in my sample. Not only did the merger generate no economies of scale, but it resulted in an *increase* of public spending: see Figure 6, which is also confirmed by Column (4) of Table 6. Part of that money might have translated into higher subsidies granted to the French railroad monopoly (SNCF) since regions are in charge of train transportation, but Column (5) of Table 6 concludes to no significant impact in this respect. It is therefore striking that, in a theoretical vision à la Alesina and Spolaore (1997), two different forces push in the same direction: (i) reinforced centralization, which should increase citizen discontent, and (ii) the unexpected increase in local public spending, hence in future local taxes, which should also be disliked by a population of tax payers: the "fiscal effect" –a wealth effect. In contrast, benefits from the merger can be mostly found in the economic spillovers documented previously, and in a "residential effect" related to the fact that citizens are not only tax payers, but also residents: hence they may benefit from an extended provision of local public goods following the previous increase in public spending.

Related to the latter point, I wonder whether local tax revenues have changed consecutive to the merger. Indeed, some increase in local public spending should come along with (at least future) higher tax pressure. However, I find no empirical evidence of significant variation in this respect (see Column (6), Table 6). As a consequence of the rise in public spending and the stagnation of fiscal revenue,
financial debt ratios have increased.

Last, another explanation could have trait to some income convergence in the same spirit as what occurred after the German reunification (Frijters et al., 2004). However, consistent with the rationale, the merger at stake does not involve regions which were as heterogeneous in terms of GDP per capita as were West and East Germany. On top of that, Figure 7 suggests that the common trend assumption does not hold for individual income, and that the effect, if any, would be small. In other words, using an instrumental variable strategy here to identify the causal effect of income on happiness based on the merger as an exogenous source of variation of the former would require to overcome a weak instruments problem.

# 10 Conclusion

This paper has assessed the causal impact of the 2016 merger of French regions on individual subjective well-being. I exploit the NOTRé law as a natural experiment: this reform reduced the number of regions from 22 to 13. Contrary to what the public debate suggested at the time by putting much emphasis on citizens’ regional attachment, and contrary to other empirical findings on the relationship between centralization and life satisfaction, I find no significantly depressing impact of that merger. The merger had even a positive effect in the economically smaller (and poorer) regions that were likely to benefit most from attractiveness gains; in particular, the unemployment rate declined more rapidly in merging regions, which might have benefited to a subpopulation of mobile workers.

This empirical evidence suggests therefore that economic spillovers help explain citizen's attitude towards changes in subnational borders on top of the expected trade-off between economies of scale and heterogeneity of preferences. Indeed, in the current context, the reduction in the number of regions was synonymous of both stronger centralization and higher integration costs. Besides, this analysis proves fruitful in answering concerns related to the presumed "loss of regional identity": the data at stake does not favor such a hypothesis. Regional belonging might be oversold in the public debate; at the very least, economics is likely to outweigh such a cultural norm. More precisely, given the three theoretical mechanisms following the merger (efficiency, increased heterogeneity and loss of identity), this paper has shown that there was no evidence of economies of scale, that the latter
channel was not likely to prevail and that the increased heterogeneity has not been detrimental to absorbing (richer) regions while benefiting to absorbed (poorer) regions, converging to the richer ones.

Given that the results obtained here look somehow different from those obtained in other settings (e.g., federal states), this research provides empirical evidence of the role played by the institutional context in this matter. It is also of some guidance to the policy-maker about mergers of other local authorities, including municipalities. Further research is however needed in order to quantify the redistributive effects at stake between losers and winners of such a policy change within absorbing and absorbed regions.

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Figures

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>(a) Old regions (before the merger)</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>(b) New regions (after the merger)</figcaption></figure>

Figure 1: Administrative division of France
<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Evolution of life satisfaction</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Evolution of life satisfaction across regions</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4: Evolution of life satisfaction across regions</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5: Evolution of investment spending across regions</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>Figure 6: Evolution of total public spending across regions</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>Figure 7: Evolution of income across regions</figcaption></figure>
# Tables

<table><caption>Table 1: Correspondence between old and new French regions</caption><thead><tr><th>New region</th><th>Old region</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes</td><td>Auvergne<br>Rhône-Alpes</td></tr><tr><td>Bourgogne-Franche-Comté</td><td>Burgundy<br>Franche-Comté</td></tr><tr><td>Brittany</td><td>Brittany</td></tr><tr><td>Centre-Val de Loire</td><td>Centre</td></tr><tr><td>Corsica</td><td>Corsica</td></tr><tr><td>Grand Est</td><td>Alsace<br>Champagne-Ardenne<br>Lorraine</td></tr><tr><td>Hauts-de-France</td><td>Nord-Pas de Calais<br>Picardy</td></tr><tr><td>Normandy</td><td>Lower Normandy<br>Upper Normandy</td></tr><tr><td>Nouvelle-Aquitaine</td><td>Aquitaine<br>Limousin<br>Poitou-Charentes</td></tr><tr><td>Île-de-France</td><td>Île-de-France</td></tr><tr><td>Occitanie</td><td>Languedoc-Roussillon<br>Midi-Pyrénées</td></tr><tr><td>Pays de la Loire</td><td>Pays de la Loire</td></tr><tr><td>Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur</td><td>Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><caption>Table 2: Summary statistics</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>mean</th><th>sd</th><th>min</th><th>max</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Life satisfaction</td><td>7.18</td><td>1.72</td><td>0</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>Female</td><td>0.58</td><td>0.49</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Age</td><td>53.5</td><td>17.6</td><td>16</td><td>101</td></tr><tr><td>Income</td><td>25,495</td><td>31,585</td><td>4</td><td>4,468,733</td></tr><tr><td>Status of the region wrt merger</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Absorbed</td><td>0.26</td><td>0.44</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Absorbed (conservative)</td><td>0.18</td><td>0.38</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Absorbing</td><td>0.29</td><td>0.45</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Absorbing (conservative)</td><td>0.18</td><td>0.39</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>No merger</td><td>0.44</td><td>0.50</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Education</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>No degree</td><td>0.20</td><td>0.40</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>High-school</td><td>0.29</td><td>0.45</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Vocational</td><td>0.31</td><td>0.46</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>College</td><td>0.16</td><td>0.37</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Other degree</td><td>0.04</td><td>0.19</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Labor force status</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Employed</td><td>0.47</td><td>0.50</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Unemployed</td><td>0.06</td><td>0.24</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Student</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.18</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Inactive</td><td>0.05</td><td>0.23</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Retired</td><td>0.36</td><td>0.48</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Undetermined</td><td>0.02</td><td>0.12</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Occupation</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Clerk</td><td>0.27</td><td>0.44</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Farmer</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.16</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>White collar</td><td>0.13</td><td>0.34</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Self-employed</td><td>0.06</td><td>0.23</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Intermediate</td><td>0.22</td><td>0.41</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Blue collar</td><td>0.18</td><td>0.38</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Other</td><td>0.11</td><td>0.32</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Undetermined</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.07</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Family status</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Single</td><td>0.22</td><td>0.41</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Two adults, w/o child</td><td>0.38</td><td>0.49</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Two adults, 1 child</td><td>0.09</td><td>0.29</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Two adults, 2 children</td><td>0.12</td><td>0.32</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Two adults, 3+ children</td><td>0.05</td><td>0.23</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Single parent</td><td>0.05</td><td>0.21</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Others w/o child</td><td>0.05</td><td>0.22</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Others with children</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.18</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Undetermined</td><td>0.01</td><td>0.09</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Quality of life</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Poor living conditions</td><td>0.11</td><td>0.31</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Environmental troubles</td><td>0.04</td><td>0.18</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Psycho-social hazard</td><td>0.12</td><td>0.33</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Economic insecurity</td><td>0.03</td><td>0.16</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Poor health</td><td>0.09</td><td>0.29</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Insecurity</td><td>0.15</td><td>0.35</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Weak social ties</td><td>0.14</td><td>0.35</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td colspan="4">90,734</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source. French SRCV survey, 2013-2018.

Sample. Unbalanced panel of 32,872 individuals.
<table><caption>Table 3: Effect of the merger on life satisfaction (Treatment: Merging regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Treatment × Post</td><td>0.026<br>(0.019)</td><td>0.029*<br>(0.018)</td><td>0.030<br>(0.018)</td><td>0.030<br>(0.018)</td><td>0.036*<br>(0.020)</td><td>0.037*<br>(0.019)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td><td>FE</td><td>FE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>90,734</td><td>90,734</td><td>90,734</td><td>90,734</td><td>90,734</td><td>90,734</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>32,872</td><td>32,872</td><td>32,872</td><td>32,872</td><td>32,872</td><td>32,872</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.003</td><td>0.259</td><td>0.003</td><td>0.255</td><td>0.736</td><td>0.747</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source. French SRCV survey, 2013-2018, unbalanced panel.

Model. Linear model estimated by OLS.

Dependent variable. Life satisfaction on a 0-10 Cantril scale.

Controls. Income, age, gender, education, occupation, labor force status, family status, objective quality of life indicators.

Robust standard errors clustered at the region-year level.

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

<table><caption>Table 4: Effect of the merger on life satisfaction (Treatment: Absorbed regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Treatment × Post</td><td>0.082***<br>(0.027)</td><td>0.084***<br>(0.025)</td><td>0.076***<br>(0.027)</td><td>0.072***<br>(0.026)</td><td>0.083***<br>(0.031)</td><td>0.076**<br>(0.031)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td><td>FE</td><td>FE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.004</td><td>0.266</td><td>0.004</td><td>0.262</td><td>0.743</td><td>0.753</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.
<table><caption>Table 5: Heterogeneity of effects (Treatment: Absorbed regions)</caption><tr><td>Treatment × Post × Vocational</td><td>0.163<sup>***</sup><br>(0.039)</td></tr><tr><td>Treatment × Post × Blue collar</td><td>0.215<sup>***</sup><br>(0.078)</td></tr><tr><td>Treatment × Post × 3rd decile (income)</td><td>0.127<sup>***</sup><br>(0.055)</td></tr><tr><td>Treatment × Post × Single</td><td>0.176<sup>***</sup><br>(0.051)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual FE</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>49,279</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>18,187</td></tr></table>

Same legend as Table 3.

<table><caption>Table 6: Effect of the merger on other outcomes</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th>unemployment rate<br>(in pp)<br>(1)</th><th>public spending<br>(in €b)<br>(2)</th><th>train spending<br>(in €b)<br>(3)</th><th>local tax revenue<br>(in €b)<br>(4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Merger × Post</td><td>-0.193<sup>***</sup><br>(0.024)</td><td></td><td>0.171<sup>**</sup><br>(0.068)</td><td>0.028<br>(0.017)</td><td>0.033<br>(0.047)</td></tr><tr><td>Absorbed × Post</td><td></td><td>-0.177<sup>***</sup><br>(0.029)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Absorbing × Post</td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.043<br>(0.029)</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Département FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>No</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td># of départements</td><td>96</td><td>53</td><td>48</td><td>13</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td># of new regions</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>576</td><td>318</td><td>288</td><td>78</td><td>78</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.996</td><td>0.994</td><td>0.995</td><td>0.983</td><td>0.967</td></tr></tbody></table>
# Appendix

## Ordered models with random effects

The difference-in-difference strategy adopted in this paper to evaluate the reform viewed as a natural experiment can be embedded within an ordered model. The unobserved (or latent) life satisfaction SWB<sub>irt</sub>* of individual *i* living in region *r* on year *t* can be modelled as:

$$ \text{SWB}_{irt}^* = \beta \text{Treatment}_r \times \text{Post}_t + X'_{irt} \gamma + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \mu_r + \varepsilon_{irt}. \quad (2) $$

The observed life satisfaction SWB<sub>irt</sub>, available on a discrete 0-10 scale, can be related to the latent variable through:

$$ \text{SWB}_{irt} = k \iff \text{SWB}_{irt}^* \in [s_k, s_{k+1}, \forall k \in [0, K], $$

or equivalently

$$ \text{SWB}_{irt} = \sum_{k=0}^{K} k \mathbf{1}\{s_k \le \text{SWB}_{irt}^* < s_{k+1}\}, \quad (3) $$

where $s = (s_1, \dots, s_K)$ is a vector of unknown thresholds to be estimated, $s_0 = -\infty$, $s_{K+1} = +\infty$ and $K = 10$.

The notations are the same as above, but instead of allowing for fixed-effects, I impose a supplementary parametric restriction: $\alpha_i \sim N(0, \sigma_\alpha^2)$, i.e., I allow for random effects only (see infra). Idiosyncratic shocks $\varepsilon_{irt}$ may follow either a logistic distribution with mean 0 and variance $\frac{\pi^2}{3}$ (Logit), or the standard normal distribution (Probit).

The identification of the model is achieved by assuming strict exogeneity of the covariates conditional to the individual effects. Once again, this exogeneity follows from the reform being a natural experiment. Nevertheless, two normalizations are now required for the joint identification of agents preferences and of unknown thresholds viewed as incidental parameters: (i) location: $\gamma_0 = 0$, for shifting the constant and the thresholds simultaneously by some constant yields an observationally equivalent model, and (ii) scale: $\sigma_\varepsilon^2 = \pi^2/3$ (Logit) or $\sigma_\varepsilon^2 = 1$ (Probit), for multiplying the latent and all its parameters yields the same likelihood. Under these normalizations, the vector of parameters $\theta = (\beta, \gamma, s, \sigma_\alpha)$ is identified.
The estimation is performed by maximum likelihood; the estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal (CAN) as the number of individuals grows large even for small, fixed number of observations per individual. Two ways may still be ahead as far as the idiosyncratic shocks $\varepsilon_{irt}$ are concerned, a normal distribution (Probit) or a logistic distribution (Logit). Empirically, the latter produces a better fit, i.e., yields a higher average log-likelihood (-1.61 against -1.63 in the specification including both controls and random effects), as shown by Tables 11 and 12.<fnref n="18" /> Even though point estimates cannot be compared, average partial effects (available upon request) can be: reassuringly, they turn out to be close to each other.

A last issue has to do with unobserved heterogeneity. Though identified, ordered Logits with fixed effects are not easy to estimate, since they involve a conditional approach based on an adequate sufficient statistics that requires a burdensome computation of the likelihood (see, e.g., Frijters et al., 2004, for such an estimation). As a supplementary drawback, this approach relies on a small sub-sample of individuals who have non-constant sequences of life satisfaction. Random effects are admittedly a second-best solution that requires a supplementary, parametric assumption on the form of unobserved heterogeneity, but the identification of the model is then based on the whole sample. As far as Probit models are concerned, there is no simple way to avoid the incidental parameters problem. In practice, an insight from the linear model is that fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) specifications yield close ATEs.

<footnote n="18">¹⁸Due to the fatter tails of the logistic distribution, the Logit model puts more weight on extreme events. Moreover, the Logit allows an interpretation in terms of odds ratios, which the Probit does not permit.</footnote>
# Robustness checks

## Alternative treatment group

<table><caption>Table 7: Effect of the merger on life satisfaction (Treatment: Absorbed regions, less conservative definition)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Treatment × Post</td><td>0.029<br>(0.027)</td><td>0.044*<br>(0.024)</td><td>0.051**<br>(0.024)</td><td>0.046*<br>(0.024)</td><td>0.065**<br>(0.026)</td><td>0.060**<br>(0.025)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td><td>FE</td><td>FE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>57,198</td><td>57,198</td><td>57,198</td><td>57,198</td><td>57,198</td><td>57,198</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>21,064</td><td>21,064</td><td>21,064</td><td>21,064</td><td>21,064</td><td>21,064</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.003</td><td>0.267</td><td>0.003</td><td>0.263</td><td>0.743</td><td>0.753</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.

## Alternative control groups

<table><caption>Table 8: Alternative definition of the control group (Treatment: Absorbed regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Including Île-de-France</td><td>0.082***<br>(0.027)</td><td>0.084***<br>(0.025)</td><td>0.076***<br>(0.027)</td><td>0.072***<br>(0.026)</td><td>0.083***<br>(0.031)</td><td>0.076**<br>(0.031)</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.005</td><td>0.266</td><td>0.004</td><td>0.262</td><td>0.737</td><td>0.748</td></tr><tr><td>Excluding Île-de-France</td><td>0.086***<br>(0.031)</td><td>0.088***<br>(0.029)</td><td>0.079***<br>(0.029)</td><td>0.075**<br>(0.030)</td><td>0.081**<br>(0.034)</td><td>0.073**<br>(0.034)</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>38,167</td><td>38,167</td><td>38,167</td><td>38,167</td><td>38,167</td><td>38,167</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.004</td><td>0.266</td><td>0.004</td><td>0.262</td><td>0.743</td><td>0.753</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td><td>FE</td><td>FE</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.
<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>Figure 8: Synthetic control approach</figcaption></figure>
Placebo experiments

<table><caption>Table 9: Placebo experiment: fake merger in 2014 (Treatment: Absorbed regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Treatment × Post</td><td>0.049<br>(0.039)</td><td>0.061*<br>(0.033)</td><td>0.010<br>(0.035)</td><td>0.027<br>(0.029)</td><td>-0.003<br>(0.034)</td><td>0.001<br>(0.030)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td><td>FE</td><td>FE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.004</td><td>0.266</td><td>0.004</td><td>0.262</td><td>0.743</td><td>0.753</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.

<table><caption>Table 10: Placebo experiment: fake merger in 2015 (Treatment: Absorbed regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Treatment × Post</td><td>0.058*<br>(0.029)</td><td>0.064**<br>(0.027)</td><td>0.044<br>(0.029)</td><td>0.042<br>(0.027)</td><td>0.047*<br>(0.028)</td><td>0.041<br>(0.029)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td><td>FE</td><td>FE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.004</td><td>0.266</td><td>0.004</td><td>0.262</td><td>0.743</td><td>0.753</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.
# Parametric specification

<table><caption>Table 11: Ordered Probit model (Treatment: Absorbed regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Treatment × Post</td><td>0.050<sup>**</sup><br>(0.020)</td><td>0.060<sup>***</sup><br>(0.020)</td><td>0.067<sup>**</sup><br>(0.026)</td><td>0.066<sup>***</sup><br>(0.025)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td></tr><tr><td>log(L)/N</td><td>-1.862</td><td>-1.725</td><td>-1.693</td><td>-1.625</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.

*Note.* Ordered Probit instead of linear model.

Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

<table><caption>Table 12: Ordered Logit model (Treatment: Absorbed regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Treatment × Post</td><td>0.080<sup>**</sup><br>(0.035)</td><td>0.087<sup>**</sup><br>(0.035)</td><td>0.116<sup>**</sup><br>(0.046)</td><td>0.110<sup>**</sup><br>(0.044)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td></tr><tr><td>log(L)/N</td><td>-1.862</td><td>-1.721</td><td>-1.681</td><td>-1.614</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.

*Note.* Ordered Logit instead of linear model.

Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.
Statistical issues, survey sampling and clustering

<table><caption>Table 13: Verbeek and Nijman tests for attrition (Treatment: Absorbed regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Belongs to balanced panel</td><td>-0.042<br>(0.028)</td><td>-0.006<br>(0.021)</td><td>-0.053<br>(0.052)</td><td>-0.025<br>(0.038)</td><td>.</td><td>.</td></tr><tr><td># of years in sample</td><td>-0.008<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.007<br>(0.006)</td><td>-0.006<br>(0.011)</td><td>0.014<br>(0.009)</td><td>.</td><td>.</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td><td>FE</td><td>FE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.004</td><td>0.266</td><td>0.004</td><td>0.262</td><td>0.743</td><td>0.753</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.

<table><caption>Table 14: Estimations on balanced panel (Treatment: Absorbed regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Treatment × Post</td><td>0.107**<br>(0.041)</td><td>0.118***<br>(0.043)</td><td>0.098**<br>(0.042)</td><td>0.110***<br>(0.042)</td><td>0.094**<br>(0.042)</td><td>0.101**<br>(0.042)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td><td>FE</td><td>FE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>8,502</td><td>8,502</td><td>8,502</td><td>8,502</td><td>8,502</td><td>8,502</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>1,417</td><td>1,417</td><td>1,417</td><td>1,417</td><td>1,417</td><td>1,417</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.015</td><td>0.297</td><td>0.014</td><td>0.288</td><td>0.642</td><td>0.661</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3 (balanced panel instead of unbalanced panel).
<table><caption>Table 15: Impact of the clustering level on the precision of the estimated ATE
(Treatment: Absorbed regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr><tr><th>Level of clustering</th><th>individual</th><th>individual × year</th><th>former region</th><th>former region × year (baseline)</th><th>new region</th><th>new region × year</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Treatment × Post</th><td>0.076***<br>(0.029)</td><td>0.076***<br>(0.025)</td><td>0.076*<br>(0.041)</td><td>0.076**<br>(0.031)</td><td>0.076*<br>(0.039)</td><td>0.076***<br>(0.028)</td></tr><tr><th>Controls</th><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><th>Time FE</th><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><th>Region FE</th><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><th>Individual FE</th><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><th># of observations</th><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td></tr><tr><th># of individuals</th><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td></tr><tr><th># of clusters</th><td>18,187</td><td>49,279</td><td>12</td><td>72</td><td>10</td><td>60</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.
Online Appendix

A Supplementary figures

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>Figure 9: Evolution of life satisfaction across regions</figcaption></figure>
B Supplementary robustness checks

<table><caption>Table 16: Effect of the merger on life satisfaction (Treatment: Absorbing regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Treatment × Post</td><td>-0.001<br>(0.028)</td><td>0.001<br>(0.028)</td><td>-0.024<br>(0.025)</td><td>-0.023<br>(0.025)</td><td>-0.036<br>(0.036)</td><td>-0.037<br>(0.036)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td><td>FE</td><td>FE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>49,937</td><td>49,937</td><td>49,937</td><td>49,937</td><td>49,937</td><td>49,937</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>18,466</td><td>18,466</td><td>18,466</td><td>18,466</td><td>18,466</td><td>18,466</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.261</td><td>0.262</td><td>0.699</td><td>0.699</td><td>0.755</td><td>0.756</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.

<table><caption>Table 17: Effect of regional integration on life satisfaction (Treatment: Absorbing regions, less conservative definition)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Treatment × Post</td><td>0.013<br>(0.025)</td><td>0.015<br>(0.025)</td><td>0.004<br>(0.022)</td><td>0.005<br>(0.022)</td><td>0.006<br>(0.031)</td><td>0.006<br>(0.031)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td><td>FE</td><td>FE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>59,708</td><td>59,708</td><td>59,708</td><td>59,708</td><td>59,708</td><td>59,708</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>21,958</td><td>21,958</td><td>21,958</td><td>21,958</td><td>21,958</td><td>21,958</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.256</td><td>0.257</td><td>0.693</td><td>0.693</td><td>0.750</td><td>0.750</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.
## B.1 Endogenous residential sorting

<table><caption>Table 18: Effect of the merger on life satisfaction, controlling for endogenous spatial sorting (Treatment: Absorbed regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th><th>(4)</th><th>(5)</th><th>(6)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Treatment × Post</td><td>0.082***<br>(0.027)</td><td>0.084***<br>(0.025)</td><td>0.078***<br>(0.026)</td><td>0.072***<br>(0.026)</td><td>0.085***<br>(0.031)</td><td>0.076**<br>(0.031)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual × region effects</td><td>No</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>RE</td><td>FE</td><td>FE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>18,353</td><td>18,353</td><td>18,353</td><td>18,353</td><td>18,353</td><td>18,353</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.004</td><td>0.266</td><td>0.004</td><td>0.262</td><td>0.743</td><td>0.755</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.

## B.2 Differential impact of controls post-merger

<table><caption>Table 19: Effect of the merger on life satisfaction, allowing for differential impact of controls post-merger (Treatment: Absorbed regions)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>(1)</th><th>(2)</th><th>(3)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Treatment × Post</td><td>0.082***<br>(0.025)</td><td>0.063**<br>(0.026)</td><td>0.064**<br>(0.030)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Controls × Post</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Time FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Region FE</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Individual effects</td><td>No</td><td>RE</td><td>FE</td></tr><tr><td># of observations</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td><td>49,279</td></tr><tr><td># of individuals</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td><td>18,187</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.267</td><td>0.263</td><td>0.754</td></tr></tbody></table>

Same legend as Table 3.
## Liste des documents de travail de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9001</td>
    <td>J. FAYOLLE et M. FLEURBAEY<br>Accumulation, profitabilité et endettement des entreprises</td>
    <td>G 9202</td>
    <td>J. OLIVEIRA-MARTINS,<br>J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br>Macro-economic import functions with imperfect competition - An application to the E.C. Trade</td>
    <td>G 9310</td>
    <td>J. BOURDIEU - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br>Les théories sur la structure optimale du capital : quelques points de repère</td>
    <td>G 9410</td>
    <td>F. ROSENWALD<br>Suivi conjoncturel de l'investissement</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9002</td>
    <td>H. ROUSSE<br>Détection et effets de la multicolinearité dans les modèles linéaires ordinaires - Un prolongement de la réflexion de BELSLEY, KUH et WELSCH</td>
    <td>G 9203</td>
    <td>I. STAPIC<br>Les échanges internationaux de services de la France dans le cadre des négociations multilatérales du GATT<br>Junin 1992 (tête version)<br>Novembre 1992 (version finale)</td>
    <td>G 9311</td>
    <td>J. BOURDIEU - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br>Les décisions de financement des entreprises françaises : une évaluation empirique des théories de la structure optimale du capital</td>
    <td>G 9411</td>
    <td>C. DEFEUILLEY - Ph. QUIRION<br>Les déchets d'emballages ménagers : une analyse économique des bagages française et allemande</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9003</td>
    <td>P. RALLE et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br>Indexation des salaires : la rupture de 1983</td>
    <td>G 9312</td>
    <td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br>Q de Tobin marginal et transmission des choos financiers</td>
    <td>G 9313</td>
    <td>Équipes Amadeus (INSEE), Banque de France, Métric (DP)<br>Présentation des propriétés des principaux modèles macroéconomiques du Service Public</td>
    <td>G 9413</td>
    <td>B. DORMONT - M. PAUCHET<br>L'évaluation de l'elasticité emploi-salaire dépend-elle des structures de qualification ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9004</td>
    <td>D. GUELEC et P. RALLE<br>Coopérativité, croissance et innovation de produit</td>
    <td>G 9204</td>
    <td>P. SEVESTRE<br>L'économie sur données individuelles-temporaires. Une note introdutive</td>
    <td>G 9313</td>
    <td>G. CREPON - E. DUGUET<br>Research &amp; Development, competition and innovation</td>
    <td>G 9414</td>
    <td>I. KABLA<br>Le Chois de breveter une invention</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9005</td>
    <td>P. RALLE et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br>Les consequences de la désindexation. Analyse dans une maquette prix-salaires</td>
    <td>G 9205</td>
    <td>H. ERKEL-ROUSSE<br>Le commerce extérieur et l'environnement international dans le modèle AMADEUS (réestimation 1992)</td>
    <td>G 9314</td>
    <td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. SEDILLOT<br>Irreversible investment and Uncertainty:<br>When is there a Value of Waiting?</td>
    <td>G 9504</td>
    <td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. SEDILLOT<br>Investissement, incertitude et irréversibilité<br>Quelques développements récents de la théorie de l'investissement</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9101</td>
    <td>Équipe AMADEUS<br>Le modèle AMADEUS - Première partie -Présentation générale</td>
    <td>G 9206</td>
    <td>N. GREENAN et D. GUELLEC<br>Coordination within the firm and endoge nous growth</td>
    <td>G 9315</td>
    <td>B. DORMONT<br>Quelle est l'influence du coût du travail sur l'emploi ?</td>
    <td>G 9502</td>
    <td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br>Impfections du marché du crédit, investissement des entreprises et cycle économique</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9102</td>
    <td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Le modèle AMADEUS - Deuxième partie -Propriétés variantielles</td>
    <td>G 9207</td>
    <td>A. MAGNIER et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br>Technology and trade: empirical evidences for the major five industrialized countries</td>
    <td>G 9316</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - C. BROUSSE<br>Deux études sur l'âge de la retraite</td>
    <td>G 9503</td>
    <td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br>The transformations de la demande de travail par qualification en France<br>Une étude sur la période 1970-1993</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9103</td>
    <td>D. GUELEC et P. RALLE<br>Endogenous growth and product innovation</td>
    <td>G 9208</td>
    <td>B. CREPON, E. DUGUET, D. ENCAOUA et P. MOHINEN<br>Le modèle AMADEUS - Troisième partie - Le commerce extérieur et l'environnement international</td>
    <td>G 9317</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET<br>Répartition du travail dans une population hétérogène : deux notes</td>
    <td>G 9503</td>
    <td>N. GREENAN<br>Technologie, changement organisationnel, qualifications et emploi : une étude empirique sur l'industrie manufacturière</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9104</td>
    <td>H. ROUSSE<br>Le modèle AMADEUS - Troisième partie - Le commerce extérieur et l'environnement international</td>
    <td>G 9209</td>
    <td>B. CREPON et E. DUGUET<br>Research and development, competition and innovation: an application of pseudo maximum likelihood methods to Poisson models with heterogeneity</td>
    <td>G 9318</td>
    <td>D. EYSSARTIER - N. PONTY<br>AMADEUS - an annual macro-economic model for the medium and long term</td>
    <td>G 9504</td>
    <td>G. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br>Persistance des hérarchies sectorielles de salaires: un réexamen sur données françaises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9105</td>
    <td>H. ROUSSE<br>Effets de demande et d'offre dans les résultats du commerce extérieur manufacturé de la France au cours des deux dernières décennies</td>
    <td>G 9301</td>
    <td>J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br>Commerce international et concurrence impartie : développements récents et implications pour la politique commerciale</td>
    <td>G 9401</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET<br>Les structures par âge importent-elles ?</td>
    <td>G 9505<br>Bis</td>
    <td>G. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br>Persistance of inter-industry wages differentials: a reexamination on matched worker-firm panel data</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9106</td>
    <td>B. CREPON<br>Innovation, taille et concentration : causalités et dynamiques</td>
    <td>G 9302</td>
    <td>Ch. CASES<br>Durées de chômage et comportements d'offre de travail : une revue de la littérature</td>
    <td>G 9402</td>
    <td>J. GAUTIÉ<br>Le chômage des jeunes en France : problème de formation ou phénomène de file d'attente ?</td>
    <td>G 9506</td>
    <td>S. JACOBZONE<br>Les liens entre RMI et chômage, une mise en perspective<br>NON PARU - article sorti dans Économie et Prévision n° 122 (1996) - pages 95 à 113</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9108</td>
    <td>M. GLAUDE et M. MOUTARDIER<br>Une évaluation du coût direct de l'enfant de 1979 à 1989</td>
    <td>G 9303</td>
    <td>H. ERKEL-ROUSSE<br>Union économique et monétaire : le débat économique</td>
    <td>G 9403</td>
    <td>P. QUIRION<br>Les déchets en France : éléments statistiques et économiques</td>
    <td>G 9507</td>
    <td>G. CETTE - S. MAHFOUZ<br>Le partage primaire du revenu<br>Constat descriptif sur longue période</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9109</td>
    <td>P. RALLE et alii<br>France - Allemagne : performances économiques comparées</td>
    <td>G 9304</td>
    <td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC / G. BROUSSAUDIER - L. MIOTTI<br>Innovation organisationnelle, dynamisme technologique et performances des entreprises</td>
    <td>G 9404</td>
    <td>D. LADIRAY - M. GRUN-REHOMME<br>Lissage par moyennes mobiles - Le problème des extrémités de série</td>
    <td>G 9601</td>
    <td>Banque de France - CEPREMAP - Direction de la Prévision - Érasme - INSEE - OFCE<br>Structures et propriétés de cinq modèles macroéconomiques français</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9110</td>
    <td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Micro-DMS<br>NON PARU</td>
    <td>G 9305</td>
    <td>P. JALLARD<br>Le traité de Maastricht : présentation juridique et historique</td>
    <td>G 9405</td>
    <td>V. MAILLARD<br>Theorie et pratique de la correction des effets de jours ouvrables</td>
    <td>G 9602</td>
    <td>Rapport d'activité de la DESE de l'année 1995<br>J. BOURDIEU - A. DRAZNIKS<br>L'octroi de crédit aux PME : une analyse à partir d'informations bancaires</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9111</td>
    <td>A. MAGNIER<br>Effets accéléré et multiplicateur en France depuis 1970 : quelques résultats empiriques</td>
    <td>G 9306</td>
    <td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Micro-DMS - présentation et propriétés</td>
    <td>G 9406</td>
    <td>F. ROSENWALD<br>La décision d'investir</td>
    <td>G 9603</td>
    <td>A. TOPIOL-BENSAID<br>Les implantations japonaises en France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9112</td>
    <td>B. CREPON et G. DUREAU<br>Investissement en recherche-developpement : analyse de causalités dans un modèle d'accélérateur généralisé</td>
    <td>G 9307</td>
    <td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Micro-DMS - variantes : les tableaux</td>
    <td>G 9407</td>
    <td>S. JACOBZONE<br>Les apports de l'économie industrielle pour de finir la stratégie économique de l'hôpital public</td>
    <td>G 9604</td>
    <td>P. GENIER - S. JACOBZONE<br>Comportements de prévention, consommation d'alcool et tabagie, peut-on paier d'une gestion globale du capital santé ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9113</td>
    <td>J.L. BRILLET, H. ERKEL-ROUSSE, J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br>"France-Allemagne Couplees" - Deux économies vues par une maquette macro-économétique</td>
    <td>G 9308</td>
    <td>S. JACOBZONE<br>Les grands réseaux publics français dans une perspective européenne</td>
    <td>G 9408</td>
    <td>L. BLOCH, J. BOURDIEU,<br>COLIN-SEDILLOT, G. LONGUEVILLE<br>Du défaut de paiement au dépôt de bilan : les banquiers face aux PME en difficulté</td>
    <td>G 9605</td>
    <td>Une modélisation microéconométrique empirique<br>Impacts macro-économiques de mesures d'aide au logement - quelques éléments d'évaluation</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G 9201</td>
    <td>W. J. ADAMS, B. CREPON, D. ENCAOUA<br>Choix technologiques et stratégies de dissuasion d'entrée</td>
    <td>G 9309</td>
    <td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br>Profitabilité de l'investissement productif et transmission des choos financiers</td>
    <td>G 9409</td>
    <td>D. EYSSARTIER, P. MAIRE<br>Les modèles macro-économiques de mesures d'aide au logement - quelques éléments d'évaluation</td>
    <td></td>
    <td></td>
  </tr>
</table>
<table><tr><td>G 9606</td><td>C. DOZ - F. LENGLART<br>Factor analysis and unobserved component models; an application to the study of French business surveys</td></tr><tr><td>G 9607</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br>La théorie coopérative de la firme</td></tr><tr><td>G 9608</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br>Technological innovation and employment reallocation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9609</td><td>Ph. COUR - F. RUPPRECHT<br>L'intégration asymptérique au sein du continent américain: un essai de modélisation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9610</td><td>S. DUCHENE - G. FORGEOT - A. JACQUOT<br>Analysis des évolutions récentes de la productivité apparente du travail</td></tr><tr><td>G 9611</td><td>X. BONNET - S. MAHFOUZ<br>The influence of different specifications of wages-prices spirals on the measure of the NAIRU: the case of France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9612</td><td>PH. COUR - E. DUBOIS, S. MAHFOUZ, J. PISANI-FERRY<br>The cost of fiscal retrenchment revisited: how strong is the evidence?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9613</td><td>A. JACQUOT<br>Les flexions des taux d'activité sont-elles seulement conjoncturielles ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9614</td><td>ZHANG Yingxiang - SONG Xueqing<br>Lexique macroéconomique Français-Chinois</td></tr><tr><td>G 9701</td><td>J.L. SCHNEIDER<br>La taxe professionnelle : éléments de cadrage économique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9702</td><td>J.L. SCHNEIDER<br>Transition et stabilité politique d'un système redistributif</td></tr><tr><td>G 9703</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br>Train or Pay: Does it Reduce Inequalities to Encourage Firms to Train their Workers?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9704</td><td>P. GENIER<br>Deux contributions sur dépendance et équité</td></tr><tr><td>G 9705</td><td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br>R & D investment, Patent Life and Patent Value</td></tr><tr><td>G 9706</td><td>M. HOUDEBINE - A. TOPIOL-BENAID<br>Les entreprises internationales en France: une analyse à partir de données individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G 9707</td><td>M. HOUDEBINE<br>Polarisation des activités et spécialisation des départements en France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9708</td><td>E. DUGUET - N. GREENAN<br>Le biais technique : une analyse sur données individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G 9709</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Analysing a small French ECM Model</td></tr><tr><td>G 9710</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Formalizing the transition process: scenarios for capital accumulation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9711</td><td>G. FORGEOT - J. GAUTIÉ<br>Insertion professionnelle des jeunes et proces-sus de déclassement</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9712</td><td>E. DUBOIS<br>High Real Interest Rates: the Consequence of a Saving Investment Disequilibrium or of an insufficient Credibility of Monetary Authorities?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9713</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br>La théorie coopérative de la firme</td></tr><tr><td>G 9714</td><td>F. LEQUILLER<br>Does the French Consumer Price Index Over-state Inflation?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9715</td><td>X. BONNET<br>Peut-on mettre en évidence les rigidités à la baisse des salaires nominale?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9716</td><td>N. IUNG - F. RUPPRECHT<br>Productivité de la recherche et rendements d'échelle dans le secteur pharmaceutique français</td></tr><tr><td>G 9717</td><td>E. DUGUET - I. KABLA<br>Appropriation strategy and the motivations to use the patent system in France - An econo metric analysis at the firm level</td></tr><tr><td>G 9718</td><td>L.P. PELÉ - P. RALLE<br>Àge de la retraite : les aspects incitatifs du ré-gime général</td></tr><tr><td>G 9719</td><td>ZHANG Yingxiang - SONG Xueqing<br>Lexique macroéconomique français-chinois, chinois-français</td></tr><tr><td>G 9720</td><td>M. HOUDEBINE - J.L. SCHNEIDER<br>Mesurer l'influence de la fiscalité sur la localisation des entreprises</td></tr><tr><td>G 9721</td><td>A. MOUROUGANE<br>Creditibilité, indépendance et politique monetaire<br>Une redevance à la littérature</td></tr><tr><td>G 9722</td><td>P. AUGERAUD - L. BRIOT<br>Les données comptables d'entreprises<br>Le système intermédiaire d'entreprises<br>Passage des données individuelles aux données sectorielles</td></tr><tr><td>G 9723</td><td>P. AUGERAUD - J.E. CHAPRON<br>Using Business Accounts for Compiling National Accounts: the French Experience</td></tr><tr><td>G 9724</td><td>P. AUGERAUD<br>Les comptes d'entreprise par activités - Le passage aux comptes - De la comptabilité nationale - A paraître</td></tr><tr><td>G 9801</td><td>H. MICHAUDON - C. PRIGENT<br>Presentation du modèle AMADEUS</td></tr><tr><td>G 9802</td><td>J. ACCARDO<br>Une étude de comptabilité générationnelle pour la France en 1996</td></tr><tr><td>G 9803</td><td>X. BONNET - S. DUCHENE<br>Apports et limites de la modélisation « Real Business Cycles »</td></tr><tr><td>G 9804</td><td>C. BARLET - C. DUGUET - D. ENCAOUA - J. PRADEL<br>The Commercial Success of Innovations<br>An econometric analysis at the firm level in French manufacturing</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9805</td><td>P. CAHUC - Ch. GIANELLA - D. GOUX - A. ZILBERBERG<br>Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining in Power - Evidence form a Panel of French Firms</td></tr><tr><td>G 9806</td><td>J. ACCARDO - M. JLASSI<br>La productivité globale des facteurs entre 1975 et 1996</td></tr><tr><td>G 9807</td><td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques - 1997</td></tr><tr><td>G 9808</td><td>X. MOUROUGANE<br>Can a Conservative Governor Conduct an Ac-commodative Monetary Policy?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9809</td><td>X. BONNET - E. DUBOIS - L. FAUVET<br>Asymétrie des inflations relatives et menus costs : tests sur l'infographique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9810</td><td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br>Sales and Advertising with Spillovers at the firm level: Estimation of a Dynamic Structural Model on Panel Data</td></tr><tr><td>G 9811</td><td>J.P. BERTHIER<br>Congestion urbaine : un modèle de trafic de pointe à courbe débît-vitesse et demande élastique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9812</td><td>C. PRIGENT<br>La part des salaires dans la valeur ajoutée : une approche macroéconomique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9813</td><td>A.Th. AERTS<br>L'évolution de la part des salaires dans la valeur ajoutée en France reflète-elle les évolutions individuelles sur la période 1979-1994 ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9814</td><td>B. SALANIÉ<br>Guide pratique des séries non-stationnaires<br>Une croissance plus riche en emplois depuis le début de la décennie ? Une analyse en compa- raison internationale</td></tr><tr><td>G 9902</td><td>Ch. COLIN<br>Modélisation des carrières dans Destine</td></tr><tr><td>G 9903</td><td>Ch. COLIN<br>Évolution de la dispersion des salaires : un essai de prospective par microsimulation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9904</td><td>B. CREPON - N. IUNG<br>Innovation, emploi et performances</td></tr><tr><td>G 9905</td><td>B. CREPON - Ch. GIANELLA<br>Wages inequalities in France 1969-1992</td></tr><tr><td>G 9906</td><td>C. BONNET - R. MAHIEU<br>Microsimulation techniques applied to inter-generational transfers - Pensions in a dynamic framework: the case of France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9907</td><td>F. ROSENWALD<br>L'impact des contraintes financières dans la dé-cision d'investissement</td></tr><tr><td>G 9908</td><td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 1998</td></tr><tr><td>G 9909</td><td>J.P. ZOYEM<br>Contrat d'insertion et sortie du RMI<br>Évaluation des effets d'une politique sociale</td></tr><tr><td>G 9910</td><td>Ch. COLIN - FI. LEGROS - R. MAHIEU<br>Bilans contribués comparés des régimes de retraite du secteur privé et de la fonction publique</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9911</td><td>G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ<br>Une décomposition du non-emploi en France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9912</td><td>B. SALANIÉ<br>Une maquette analytique de long terme du marché du travail</td></tr><tr><td>G 9912</td><td>Ch. GIANELLA<br>Une estimation de l'élasticité de l'emploi peu qualifié à son coût</td></tr><tr><td>G 9913</td><td>Division « Redistribution et Politiques Sociales »<br>Le modèle de microsimulation dynamique DESTIMIE</td></tr><tr><td>G 9914</td><td>E. DUGUET<br>Macro-commandes SAS pour l'économétrie des panels et des variables qualitatives</td></tr><tr><td>G 9915</td><td>R. DUHAUTOIS<br>Évolution des flux d'emplois en France entre 1990 et 1996 : une étude empirique à partir du fichier des bénéfices réels normaux (BRN)</td></tr><tr><td>G 9916</td><td>J.Y. FOURNIER<br>Extraction du cycle des affaires : la méthode de Baxter et King</td></tr><tr><td>G 9917</td><td>B. CRÉPON - R. DESPLATZ - J. MAIRESSE<br>Estimating price cost margins, scale economies and workers' bargaining power at the firm level</td></tr><tr><td>G 9918</td><td>Ch. GIANELLA - Ph. LAGARDE<br>Productivity of hours in the aggregate production function: an evaluation on a panel of French firms from the manufacturing sector</td></tr><tr><td>G 9919</td><td>S. AUDRIC - P. GIVORD - C. PROST<br>Évolution de l'emploi et des coûts par qualification entre 1982 et 1996</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/01</td><td>R. MAHIEU<br>Les déterminants des dépenses de santé : une approche macroéconomique</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/02</td><td>C. ALLARD-PRIGENT - H. GUILMEAU - A. QUINET<br>The real exchange rate as the relative price of nontrables in terms of tradables: theoretical investigation and empirical study on French data</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/03</td><td>J.-Y. FOURNIER<br>L'approximation du filtre passe-bande proposée par Christiano et Fitzgerald</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/04</td><td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 1999</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/05</td><td>B. CREPON - F. ROSENWALD<br>Investment et contraintes de financement : le poids du cycle<br>Une estimation sur données françaises</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/06</td><td>A. FLIPO<br>Les comportements matrimoniaux de fait</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/07</td><td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br>Microsimulations of the retirement decision: a supply side approach</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/08</td><td>C. AUDENIS - C. PROST<br>Déficit conjoncturel : une prise en compte des conjonctures passées</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/09</td><td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br>Équivalent patrimonial de la rente et souscription de retraite complémentaire</td></tr></table>
G 2000/10 R. DUHAUTOIS

Ralentissement de l'investissement : petites ou grandes entreprises ? industrie ou tertiaire ?

G 2000/11 G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ

Temps partiel féminin et incitatives financières à l'emploi

G2000/12 Ch. GIANELLA

Local unemployment and wages

G2000/13 B. CREPON - Th. HECKEL

- Informalisation en France : une évaluation à partir de données individuelles

- Computerization in France: an evaluation based on individual company data

G2001/01 F. LEQUILLER

- La nouvelle économie et la mesure de la croissance du PIB

- The new economy and the measure of GDP growth

G2001/02 S. AUDRIC

La reprise de la croissance de l'emploi profite-t-elle aussi aux non-riploèmes ?

G2001/03 I. BRAJUN-LEMAIRE

Évolution et répartition du surplus de productivité

G2001/04 A. BEAUDU - Th. HECKEL

Le canal du crédit fonctionne-t-il en Europe ? Une étude de l'haproférance des comportements d'investissement à partir de données de bilan agrégées

G2001/05 C. AUDENIS - P. BISCOURP -

N. FOURCADE - O. LOISEL Testing the augmented Solow growth model: An empirical reassessment using panel data

G2001/06 R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT

Départ à la retraite, irréversibilité et incertitude

G2001/07 G. CREPON - Ch. GIANELLA

B. CREPON - Ch. GIANELLA

Fiscalité, coût d'usage du capital et demande de facteurs : une analyse sur données individuelles

G2001/09 B. CREPON - Ch. GIANELLA

Fiscalité, coût d'usage du capital et demande de facteurs : une analyse sur données individuelles

G2001/10 B. CRÉPON - R. DESPLATZ

Évaluation des effets des dispositifs d'aliègements

G2001/11 J.-Y. FOURNIER

Comparaison des salaires des secteurs public et privé

G2001/12 J.-P. BERTHIER - C. JAULENT

R. CONVENEVOLE - S. PISANI

Une méthodologie de comparaison entre consommations intermédiaires de source fiscale et de comptabilité nationale

G2001/13 P. BISCOURP - Ch. GIANELLA

Substitution and complementarity between capital, skilled and less skilled workers: an analysis at the firm level in the French manufacturing industry

G2001/14 I. ROBERT-BOBEE

Modelling demographic behaviours in the French

G2001/15 J.-P. ZOYEM

Diagnostic sur la pauvreté et calendrier de revenus : le cas du "Panel européen des ménages »

G2001/16 J.-Y. FOURNIER - P. GIVORD

Local unemployment and wages

La réduction des taux d'activité aux âges extrêmes, une spécificité française ?

G2001/17 C. AUDENIS - P. BISCOURP - N. RIEDINGER

Existe-t-il une asymétrie dans la transmission du prix du brut aux prix des carburants ?

G2002/01 F. MAGNIEN - J.-L. TAVERNIER - D. THESMAR

Les statistiques internationales de PIB par habitant en standard de pouvoir d'achat : une analyse des résultats

G2002/02 B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET

La cessation d'activité au sein des couples : y a-t-il interdépendance des choix ?

G2002/04 G. BRILHAULT

Rétrogradation des séries de FBCF et calcul du capital fixe en SEC-95 dans les comptes nationaux français

- Rétrogradation of the investment series (GCF) and estimation of fixed capital stocks on the ESA-95 basis for the French balance sheets

G2002/05 P. BISCOURP - B. CREPON - T. HECKEL - N. RIEDINGER

How do firms respond to cheaper computers? Microeconomique evidence for France based on a production function approach

G2002/06 C. AUDENIS - J. DEROYON - N. FOURCADE

L'impact des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication sur l'économie française - un bouclage macro-économique

G2002/07 J. BARDAJI - B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET

Évaluation de trois réformes du Régime Général d'assurance vieillies à l'aide du modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE

G2002/08 J. P. BERTHIER

Réflexions sur les différentes notons de volume dans les comptes nationaux : comptes aux prix d'une année fixe ou aux prix de l'année précédente, séries chaînées

G2002/09 F. HILD

Les soldes d'opinion résument-ils au mieux les réponses des entreprises aux enquêtes de conjoncture ?

G2002/10 I. ROBERT-BOBEE

Les comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE - Une comparaison des estimations issues des enquêtes Jeunes et Carrières 1997 et Histoire Famillelle 1999

G2002/11 P. O. BEFFY - X. BONNET - M. DARRACO-PARIES - B. MONFORT

G2002/12 J.-P. ZOYEM
La dynamique des bas revenus : une analyse des entrées-sorties de pauvreté

G2002/13 F. HILD

Prévisions d'inflation pour la France

G2002/13 M. LECLAIR

RÉduction du temps de travail et tensions sur les facteurs de production

G2002/14 E. WALRAET - A. VINCENT

Analyse de la redistribution intragénérationnelle dans le système de retraite des salariés du privé - Une approche par microsimulation

G2002/15 J. NAGACHE

Offre de travail féminine et garde des jeunes enfants

G2002/16 F. MAUREL - S. GREGOIR

Les indices de compétitivité des pays : inter-prétation et limités

G2003/01 N. RIEDINGER - E. HAUVY

Le coût de dépollution atmosphérique pour les entreprises françaises: Une estimation à partir de données individuelles

G2003/02 P. BISCOURP et F. KRAMARZ

Création d'emplois, destruction d'emplois et internationalisation des entreprises industrielles françaises : une analyse sur la période 1986-1992

G2003/03 Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2002

G2003/04 P.-O. BEFFY - J. DEROYON -

N. FOURCADE - S. GREGOIR - N. LAIB - B. MONFORT
Évolutions démographiques et croissance : une projection macro-économique à l'horizon 2020

G2003/05 P. AUBERT
La situation des salariés de plus de cinquante ans dans le secteur privé

G2003/06 P. AUBERT - B. CRÉPON

Age, salaire et productivité
La productivité des salariés décline-t-elle en fin de carrière ?

G2003/07 H. BARON - P.O. BEFFY - N. FOURCADE - R. MAHEU
Le renforcement de la productivité du travail au cours des années 1990

G2003/08 P. BISCOURP - N. FOURCADE

Peut-on mettre en évidence l'existence de rigidités à la baisse des salaires à partir de données individuelles ? Le cas de la France à la fin des années 90

G2003/09 P. BISCOURP - N. FOURCADE

Patrimoine des ménages, dynamique d'allocation et comportement de consommation

G2003/10 P. BISCOURP - N. FOURCADE

Peut-on mettre en évidence l'existence de rigidités à la baisse des salaires à partir de données individuelles ? Le cas de la France à la fin des années 90

G2003/10 M. LECLAIR - P. PETIT

Présence syndicale dans les firmes : quel impact sur les inégalités salariales entre les hommes et les femmes ?

G2003/11 P. O. BEFFY - X. BONNET - M. DARRACO-PARIES - B. MONFORT
MZE: a small macro-model for the euro area

G2004/01 P. AUBERT - M. LECLAIR
La compétitivité exprimée dans les enquêtes trimestrales sur la situation et les perspectives dans l'industrie

G2004/02 M. DUÈE - C. REBILLARD

La dépendance des personnes âgées : une projection à long terme

G2004/03 S. RASPILLER - N. RIEDINGER

Régulation environnementale et choix de localisation des groupes français

G2004/04 A. NABOULET - S. RASPILLER

Les déterminants de la décision d'investir : une approche par les perceptions subjectives des firmes

G2004/05 N. RAGACHE

La déclaration des enfants par les couples non mariés est-elle fiscalement optimale ?

G2004/06 M. DUÈE

L'impact du chômage des parents sur le devenir scolaire des enfants

G2004/07 P. AUBERT - E. CAROLI - M. ROGER
New Technologies, Workplace Organisation and the Age Structure of the Workforce: Firm-Level Evidence

G2004/08 E. DUGUET - C. LELARGE

Les brevets acquis-ils les incitations privées à innover ? Un examen microéconométique

G2004/09 S. RASPILLER - P. SILLARD

Affiliating versus Subcontracting: the Case of Multinationals

G2004/10 J. BOISSINOT - C. L'ANGEVIN - B. MONFORT
Public Debt Sustainability: Some Results on the French Case

G2004/11 S. ANANIAN - P. AUBERT

Travailleurs âgés, nouvelles technologies et changements organisationnels : un réexamen à partir de l'enquête « REPONSE »

G2004/12 X. BONNET - H. PONCET

Structures de revenus et propensions différentes à consommer - Vers une équation de consommation des ménages plus robuste en prévision pour la France

G2004/13 C. PICART

Évaluer la rentabilité des sociétés non financières

G2004/14 J. BARDAJI - B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET
Les retraites du secteur public : projections à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE

G2005/01 S. BUFFETEAU - P. GODEFROY

Conditions de départ en retraite selon l'âge de fin d'études : analyse prospective pour les générations 1945 à 1974

G2005/02 C. AFSA - S. BUFFETEAU

L'évolution de l'activité féminine en France : une approche par pseudo-panel

G2005/03 P. AUBERT - P. SILLARD

Délocalisations et réductions d'effectifs dans l'industrie française

G2005/04 M. LECLAIR - S. ROUX

Mesure et utilisation des emplois instables dans les entreprises

G2005/05 C. L'ANGEVIN - S. SERRAVALLE

Performances à l'exportation de la France
<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/06</td>
    <td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques - 2004</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/07</td>
    <td>S. RASPILLER<br>La concurrence fiscale : principaux enseignements de l'analyse économique</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/08</td>
    <td>C. L'ANGEVIN - N. LAIB<br>Éducation et croissance en France et dans un panel de 21 pays de l'OCDE</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/09</td>
    <td>N. FERRARI<br>Pévoir l'investissement des entreprises<br>Un indicateur des révisions dans l'enquête de conjoncture sur les investissements dans l'industrie.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/10</td>
    <td>P.O. BEFFY - C. L'ANGEVIN<br>Chromage et boucle prix-salaires :<br>apport d'un modèle « qualifiés/peu qualifiés »</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/11</td>
    <td>B. HEITZ<br>A two-states Markov-switching model of inflation in France and the USA: credible target VS inflation spiral</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/12</td>
    <td>O. BIAU - H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - N. FERRARI<br>Réponses individuelles aux enjuvés de conjoncture et prévision macroéconomiques :<br>Exemple de la prévision de la production<br>manufacturière</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/13</td>
    <td>P. AUBERT - D. BLANCHET - D. BLAU<br>The labour market after 50: some elements of a Franco-American comparison</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/14</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - T. DEBRAND -<br>P. DOUGRON - P. POLLET<br>L'enquête SHARE : présentation et premiers résultats de l'édition française</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/15</td>
    <td>M. DUÉE<br>La modélisation des comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation<br>DESTINE</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2005/16</td>
    <td>H. RAOUI - S. ROUX<br>Étude de simulation sur la participation versée aux salaires par les entreprises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/01</td>
    <td>C. BONNET - S. BUFFETEAU - P. GODEFROY<br>Disparités de retraite de droit direct entre hommes et femmes : quelles évolutions ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/02</td>
    <td>C. PICART<br>Les gazelles en France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/03</td>
    <td>P. AUBERT - B. CRÉPON - P. ZAMORA<br>Le rendement apparent de la formation continue dans les entreprises : effets sur la productivité et les salaires</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/04</td>
    <td>J.-F. OUVRARD - R. RATHELOT<br>Demographic change and unemployment:<br>what do macroeconomic models predict?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/05</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - J.-F. OUVRARD<br>Indicateurs d'engagements implicites des systèmes de retraite : chiffrages, propriétés analytiques et réactions à des chocs démographiques types</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/06</td>
    <td>G. BIAU - O. BIAU - L. ROUVIERE<br>Nonparametric Forecasting of the Manufacturing Output Growth with Firm-level Survey Data</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/07</td>
    <td>C. AFSA - P. GIVORD<br>Le rôle des conditions de travail dans les absences pour maladie</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/08</td>
    <td>P. SILLARD - C. L'ANGEVIN - S. SERRAVALLE<br>Performances comparées à l'exportation de la France et de ses principaux partenaires<br>Une analyse structurelle sur 12 ans</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/09</td>
    <td>X. BOUTIN - S. QUANTIN<br>Une méthodologie d'évaluation comptable du coût du capital des entreprises françaises : 1984-2002</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/10</td>
    <td>C. AFSA<br>L'estimation d'un coût implicite de la pénibilité du travail chez les travailleurs âgés</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/11</td>
    <td>C. LELARGE<br>Les entreprises (industrielles) françaises sont-elles à la frontière technologique ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/12</td>
    <td>O. BIAU - N. FERRARI<br>Theorie de l'opinion<br>Faut-il pondérer les réponses individuelles ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/13</td>
    <td>A. KOUBI - S. ROUX<br>Une réinterprétation de la relation entre productivité et inégalités salariales dans les entreprises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/14</td>
    <td>R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD<br>The impact of local taxes on plants location decision</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2006/15</td>
    <td>L. GONZALEZ - C. PICART<br>Diversification, recensement et poids des activités de support dans les groupes (1995-2000)</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/01</td>
    <td>D. SRAER<br>Allégrés de cotisations patronales et dynamique salariale</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/02</td>
    <td>V. ALBOUY - L. LEQUIEN<br>Les rendements non monotaires de l'éducation :<br>le cas de la santé</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/03</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - T. DEBRAND<br>Aspiration à la retraite, santé et satisfaction au travail : une comparaison européenne</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/04</td>
    <td>M. BARLET - L. CRUSSON<br>Quel impact des variations du prix du pétrole sur la croissance française ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/05</td>
    <td>C. PICART<br>Flux d'emploi et de main-d'œuvre en France : un réexamen</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/06</td>
    <td>V. ALBOUY - C. TAVAN<br>Massification et démocratisation de l'enseignement supérieur en France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/07</td>
    <td>T. LE BARBANCHON<br>The Changing response to oil price shocks in France, a DSGE type approach</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/08</td>
    <td>T. CHANEY - D. SRAER - D. THESMAR<br>Collateral Value and Corporate Investment<br>Evidence from the French Real Estate Market</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/09</td>
    <td>J. BOISSINOT<br>Consumption over the Life Cycle: Facts for France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/10</td>
    <td>C. AFSA<br>Interpréter les variables de satisfaction :<br>l'exemple de la durée du travail</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/11</td>
    <td>R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD<br>Zones Franches Urbaines : quels effets sur l'emploi salarié et les créations d'établissements ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2007/12</td>
    <td>V. ALBOUY - B. CRÉPON<br>Aléa moral en santé : une évaluation dans le cadre du modèle causal de Rubin</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/01</td>
    <td>C. PICART<br>Les PME françaises : rentables mais peu dynamiques</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/02</td>
    <td>P. BISCOURP - X. BOUTIN - T. VERGÉ<br>The Effects of Retail Regulations on Prices<br>Evidence form the Loi Galland</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/03</td>
    <td>Y. BARBESOL - A. BRIANT<br>Économies d'agglomération et productivité des entreprises : estimation sur données individuelles françaises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/04</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - F. LE GALLO<br>Les projections démographiques : principaux mécanismes et retour sur l'expérience française</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/05</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - F. TOUTLEMONDE<br>Évolutions démographiques et deformation du cycle de vie active : quelles relations ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/06</td>
    <td>M. BARLET - D. BLANCHET - L. CRUSSON<br>Internationalisation et flux d'emplois : que d'une approche comptable ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/07</td>
    <td>C. LELARGE - D. SRAER - D. THESMAR<br>Entrepreneurship and Credit Constraints - Evidence from a French Loan Guarantee Program</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/08</td>
    <td>X. BOUTIN - L. JANIN<br>Are Prices Really Affected by Mergers?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/09</td>
    <td>M. BARLET - A. BRIANT - L. CRUSSON<br>Concentration géographique dans l'industrie manufacturière et dans les services en France : une approche par un indicateur en continu</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/10</td>
    <td>M. BEFFY - É. COUDIN - R. RATHELOT<br>Who is confronted to insecure labor market histories? Some evidence based on the French labor market transition</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/11</td>
    <td>M. ROGER - E. WALRAET<br>Social Security and Well-Being of the Elderly: the Case of France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/12</td>
    <td>C. AFSA<br>Analyser les composantes du bien-être et de son évolution<br>Une approche empirique sur données individuelles</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2008/13</td>
    <td>M. BARLET - D. BLANCHET -<br>T. LE BARBANCHON<br>Microsimumer le marché du travail : un prototype</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/01</td>
    <td>P.-A. PIONNIER<br>Le partage de la valeur ajoutée en France, 1949-2007</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/02</td>
    <td>Laurent CLAVEL - Christelle MINODIER<br>A. Monthly Indicator of the French Business Climate</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/03</td>
    <td>H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - C. MINODIER<br>Do Business Tendency Surveys in Industry and Services Help in Forecasting GDP Growth?<br>A Real-Time Analysis on French Data</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/04</td>
    <td>P. GIVORD - L. WILNER<br>Les contrats temporaires : trappe ou marchéied vers l'emploi stable ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/05</td>
    <td>G. LALANNE - P.-A. PIONNIER - O. SIMON<br>Le partage des fruits de la croissance de 1950 à 2008 : une approche par les comptes de surplus</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/06</td>
    <td>L. DAVEZIES - X. D'HAULTFOUEUILLE<br>Faut-il pondérer ?... Ou l'éternelle question de l'économètre confronté à des données d'enquête</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/07</td>
    <td>S. QUANTIN - S. RASPILLER - S. SERRAVALLE<br>Commerce intragroupe, fiscalité et prix de transferts : une analyse sur données françaises</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/08</td>
    <td>M. CLERC - V. MARCUS<br>Élastiques-prix des consommations énergétiques des ménages</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/09</td>
    <td>G. LALANNE - E. POULIQUEN - O. SIMON<br>Prix du pétrole et croissance potentielle à long terme</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/10</td>
    <td>D. BLANCHET - J. LE CACHEUX - V. MARCUS<br>Adjusted net savings and other approaches to sustainability: some theoretical background</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/11</td>
    <td>V. BELAMY - G. CONSALES - M. FESSEAU -<br>S. LE LAIDÉ - É. RAYNAUD<br>Une décomposition du compte des ménages de la comptabilité nationale par catégorie de ménage en 2003</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/12</td>
    <td>J. BARDAJI - F. TALLET<br>Detecting Economic Regimes in France: a Qualitative Markov-Switching Indicator Using Mixed Frequency Data</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/13</td>
    <td>R. AEBERHARDT - D. FOUGÈRE -<br>R. RATHELOT<br>Discrimination à l'embauche : comment exploiter les procédures de testing ?</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/14</td>
    <td>Y. BARBESOL - P. GIVORD - S. QUANTIN<br>Partage de la valeur ajoutée, approche par données microéconomiques</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2009/15</td>
    <td>I. BUONO - G. LALANNE<br>The Effect of the Uruguay round on the Intensive and Extensive Margins of Trade</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2010/01</td>
    <td>C. MINODIER<br>Avantages comparés des séries des premières valeurs publiées et des séries des valeurs révisées - Un exercice de prévision en temps réel<br>de la croissance trimestrielle du PIB en France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2010/02</td>
    <td>V. ALBOUY - L. DAVEZIES - T. DEBRAND<br>Health Expenditure Models: a Comparison of Five Specifications using Panel Data</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2010/03</td>
    <td>C. KLEIN - O. SIMON<br>Le modèle MÉSANGE réestimé en base 2000<br>Tome 1 - Version avec volumes à prix constants</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2010/04</td>
    <td>M. É. CLERC - É. COUDIN<br>L'IPC, miroir de l'évolution du coût de la vie en France ? Ce qu'apporte l'analyse des courbes d'Engel</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>G2010/05</td>
    <td>N. CECI-RENAUD - P.-A. CHEVALIER<br>Les seuils de 10, 20 et 50 salariés : impact sur la taille des entreprises françaises</td>
  </tr>
</table>
G2010/06

National Origin Differences in Wages and Hierarchical Positions - Evidence on French Full-Time Male Workers from a matched Employer-Employee Dataset

G2010/07

S. BLASCO - P. GIVORD
Les trajectoires professionnelles en début de vie active : quel impact des contrats temporaires ?

G2010/08

P. GIVORD
Méthodes éconétriques pour l'évaluation de politiques publiques

G2010/09

P.-Y. CABANNES - V. LAPÈGUE - E. POULIQUEN - M. BEFFY - M. GAINI
Quelle croissance de moyen terme après la crise ?

G2010/10

I. BUONO - G. LALANNE
La réaction des entreprises françaises à la baisse des tarifs douaniers étrangers

G2010/11

R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
L'apport des méthodes à noyaux pour mesurer la concentration géographique - Application à la concentration des immigres en France de 1968 à 1999

G2010/12

M. BARATON - M. BEFFY - D. FOUGÈRE
Une évaluation de l'effet de la réforme de 2003 sur les départs en retraite - Le cas des enseignants du second degré public

G2010/13

D. BLANCHET - S. BUFFETEAU - E. CRENNER
S. LE MINEZ
Le modèle de microsimulation Destinie 2 : principales caractéristiques et premiers résultats

G2010/14

D. BLANCHET - E. CRENNER
Le bloc retraites du modèle Destinie 2 : guide de l'utilisateur

G2010/15

M. BARLET - L. CRUSSON - S. DUPUCH - F. PUECH
Des services échangés aux services échangeables : une application sur données françaises

G2010/16

M. BEFFY - T. KAMIONKA
Public-privée wage gaps : is civil-servant human capital sector-specific?

G2010/17

P.-Y. CABANNES - H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - G. LALANNE - O. MONSO - E. POULIQUEN
Le modèle Mésange réestimé en base 2000

G2010/18

R. AEBERHARDT - L. DAVEZIES
Tome 2 - Version avec volumes à prix chaînes

G2011/01

T. LE BARBANCHON - B. OURLIAC - O. SIMON
Les marchés du travail français et américain face aux chocs conjonctuels des années 1986 à 2007 : une modélisation DSGE

G2011/02

C. MARBOT
Une évaluation de la réduction d'impôt pour l'emploi des salariés à domicile

G2011/03

L. DAVEZIES
Modeles à effets fixes, à effets aléatoires, modeles mixtes ou multi-niveaux : propriétés et mises en œuvre des modélisations de l'hétérogénéité dans le cas de données groupées

G2011/04

M. ROGER - M. WASMER
Heterogeneity matters : labour productivity differentiated by age and skills

G2011/05

J.-C. BRICONGNE - J.-M. FOURNIER
V. LAPÈGUE - O. MONSO
De la crise financière à la crise économique
L'impact des perturbations financières de 2007 et 2008 sur la croissance de sept pays industrialisés

G2011/06

P. CHARNOZ - É. COUDIN - M. GAINI
Wage inequalities in France 1976-2004: a quantile regression analysis

G2011/07

M. CLERC - M. GAINI - D. BLANCHET
Recommendations of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report: A few illustrations

G2011/08

M. BACHELET - M. BEFFY - D. BLANCHET
Projet l'impact des réformes des retraites sur l'activité des 55 ans et plus : une comparaison de trol modèles

G2011/09

C. LOUVOT-RUNAVOT
L'évaluation de l'activité dissimulée des entreprises sur la base des contrôle fiscaux et son insertion dans les complexes nationaux

G2011/10

A. SCHREIBER - A. VICARD
La terlisation de l'économie française et le ralentissement de la productivité entre 1978 et 2008

G2011/11

M.-É. CLERC - O. MONSO - E. POULIQUEN
Les inégalités entre générations depuis le baby-boom

G2011/12

C. MARBOT - D. ROY
C. MARBOT - D. ROY
Évaluation de la transformation de la réduction d'impôt en crédit d'impôt pour l'emploi de salariés à domicile en 2007

G2011/13

P. GIVORD - R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
Place-based tax exemptions and displacement effects: An evaluation of the Zones Franches Urbaines program

G2011/14

X. D'HAULT-FOUEILLE - P. GIVORD - X. BOUTIN
The Environmental Effect of Green Taxation: the Case of the French "Bonus/Malus"

G2011/15

M. BARLET - M. CLERC - M. GARNEO - V. LAPÈGUE - V. MARCUS
La nouvelle version du modèle MZE, modèle macroéconométrique pour la zone euro

G2011/16

R. AEBERHARDT - I. BUONO - H. FADINGER
Learning, Incomplete Contracts and Export Dynamics: Theory and Evidence form French Firms

G2011/17

C. KERDRAIN - V. LAPÈGUE
Restrictive Fiscal Policies in Europe: What are the Fiscal Effects?

G2012/01

P. GIVORD - S. QUANTIN - C. TREVIE
A Long-Term Evaluation of the First Generation of the French Urban Enterprise Zones

G2012/02

N. CECI-RENAUD - V. COTTET
Politique salariale et performance des entreprises

G2012/03

P. FEVRIER - L. WILNER
Do Consumers Correctly Expect Price Reductions? Testing Dynamic Behavior

G2012/04

M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD
School as a shelter? School leaving-age and the business cycle in France

G2012/05

M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD
A scarred generation? French evidence on young people entering into a tough labour market

G2012/06

P. AUBERT - M. BACHELET
Disparities de montant de pension et redistribution dans le système de retraite français

G2012/07

R. AEBERHARDT - P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT
Spillover Effect of the Minimum Wage in France: An Unconditional Quantile Regression Approach

G2012/08

A. EIDELMAN - F. LANGUIMERT - A. VICARD
Prélevements obligatoires reposant sur les menages : des canaux redistributifs différents en 1990 et 2010

G2012/09

O. BARGAIN - A. VICARD
Le RMI et son successeur le RSA décuragent-ils certains jeunes de travailer ? Une analyse sur les jeunes autour de 25 ans

G2012/10

C. MARBOT - D. ROY
Projections du coût de l'APA et des caractéristiques de ses bénéficiaires à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle Destine

G2012/11

A. MAUROUX
Le crédit d'impôt dédié au développement durable : une évaluation éconétrique

G2012/12

V. COTTET - S. QUANTIN - V. RÉGNIER
Coût du travail et allégements de charges : une estimation au niveau établissement de 1996 à 2008

G2012/13

X. D'HAULT-FOUEILLE - P. FEVRIER - L. WILNER
Demand Estimation in the Presence of Revenue Management

G2012/14

D. BLANCHET - S. LE MINEZ
Joint macro/micro evaluations of accrued-to-date pension liabilities: an application to French reforms

G2013/01- F1301

T. DEROYON - A. MONTAUT - P-A PIONNIER
Utilisation rétrospective de l'enquête Emploi à une fréquence mensuelle : apport d'une modélisation espace-étab

G2013/02- F1302

C. TREVIEN
Habiter en HLM : quel avantage monétaire et quel impact sur les conditions de logement ?

G2013/03

A. POISSONNIER
Temporal disaggregation of stock variables - The Chow-Lin method extended to dynamic models

G2013/04

P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT
Does the cost of child care affect female labor market participation? An evaluation of a French reform of childcare subsidies

G2013/05

G. LAME - M. LEQUIEN - P-A. PIONNIER
Interpretation and limits of sustainability tests in public finance

G2013/06

C. BELLEGO - V. DORTET-BERNADET
La participation aux pôles de compétitivité : quelle incidence sur les dépenses de R&D et l'activité des PME et ETI ?

G2012/04

M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD

School as a shelter? School leaving-age and the business cycle in France

G2012/05

M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD

A scarred generation? French evidence on young people entering into a tough labour market

G2012/06

P. AUBERT - M. BACHELET

Disparitions de montant de pension et redistribution dans le système de retraite français

G2012/07

R. AEBERHARDT - P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT

Spillover Effect of the Minimum Wage in France: An Unconditional Quantile Regression Approach

G2012/08

A. EIDELMAN - F. LANGUIMERT - A. VICARD

Prélevements obligatoires reposant sur les menages : des canaux redistributifs différents en 1990 et 2010

G2012/09

O. BARGAIN - A. VICARD

Le RMI et son successeur le RSA décuragent-ils certains jeunes de travailer ? Une analyse sur les jeunes autour de 25 ans

G2012/10

C. MARBOT - D. ROY

Projections du coût de l'APA et des caractéristiques de ses bénéficiaires à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle Destine

G2012/11

A. MAUROUX

Le crédit d'impôt dédié au développement durable : une évaluation éconétrique

G2012/12

V. COTTET - S. QUANTIN - V. RÉGNIER

Coût du travail et allégements de charges : une estimation au niveau établissement de 1996 à 2008

G2012/13

X. D'HAULT-FOUEILLE - P. FEVRIER - L. WILNER

Demand Estimation in the Presence of Revenue Management

G2012/14

D. BLANCHET - S. LE MINEZ

Joint macro/micro evaluations of accrued-to-date pension liabilities: an application to French reforms

G2012/15

C. MARBOT - D. ROY

C. MARBOT - D. ROY
C. MARBOT - D. ROY

A. SCHREIBER - A. VICARD

La terlisation de l'économie française et le ralentissement de la productivité entre 1978 et 2008

G2012/16

C. MARBOT

C. MARBOT
C. MARBOT

C. MARBOT

C. MARBOT

G2013/07

P.-Y. CABANNES - A. MONTAUT - P-A. PIONNIER
Évaluer la productivité globale des facteurs en France : l'apport d'une mesure de la qualité du capital et du travail

G2013/08

R. AEBERHARDT - C. MARBOT
Evolution of instability in the French Labour Market During the Last Thirty Years

G2013/09

J.-B. BERNARD - G. CLÉAUD
Oil price: the nature of the shocks and the impact on the French economy

G2013/10

G. LAME
Was there a « Greenspan Conundrum » in the Euro area?

G2013/11

P. CHONÉ - F. EVAIN - L. WILNER - E. YILMAZ
Introducing activity-based payment in the hospital industry: Evidence from French data

G2013/12

C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY
Natural Disasters: Exposure and Underinsurance

G2013/13

G. LEALDRY - V. COTTET - Y. DUBOIS - C. LEALDRY - M. SICSI - C. LEALDRY - M. SICSI

G2013/14

A. POISSONNIER - D. ROY
Households Satellite Account for France in 2010. Methodological issues on the assessment of domestic production

G2013/15

G. CLÉAUD - M. LEMOINE - P-A. PIONNIER
Which size and evolution of the government expenditure multiplier in France (1980-2010)?

G2013/16

G. CLÉAUD - M. LEMOINE - P-A. PIONNIER
Which size and evolution of the government expenditure multiplier in France (1980-2010)?

G2014/01

M. BACHELET - A. LEDUC - A. MARINO
Les biographies du modèle Destine II : rebasage et projection

G2014/02

B. GARBINTI
L'achat de la résidence principale et la création d'entreprises sont-ils favorisés par les donations et héritages ?

G2014/03

N. CECI-RENAUD - P. CHARNOZ - M. GAINI
Evolution of the volatility of the revenues salariaux du secteur privé en France depuis 1968

G2014/04

P. AUBERT
Modalités d'application des réformes des retraites et prévisibilité du montant de pension

G2014/05

C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY - A. KATOSSKY

G. LEALDRY - V. COTTET - Y. DUBOIS - C. LEALDRY - M. SICSI

G2014/06

C. TREVIEN
Habiter en HLM : quel avantage monétaire et quel impact sur les conditions de logement ?

G2014/07

A. POISSONNIER
Temporal disaggregation of stock variables - The Chow-Lin method extended to dynamic models

G2014/08

C. MARBOT - C. MARBOT

G2014/09

C. LABONNE - G. LAME
Credit Growth and Capital Requirements: Binding or Not?

G2014/08

C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY et C. TREVIE
The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector: the French Example

G2014/09

M. LEQUIEN et A. MONTAUT

Croissance potentielle en France et en zone euro: un tour d'horizon des méthodes d'estimation
<table><tr><td>G2014/10</td><td>B. GARBINTI - P. LAMARCHE<br/>Les hauts revenus epargnent-ile davantage ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/11</td><td>D. AUDENAERT - J. BARDAJI - R. LARDEUX -<br/>M. ORAND - M. SICNIC<br/>Wage Resilience in France since the Great<br/>Recession</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/12</td><td>F. ARNAUL - J. BOUSSARD - A. POISSONNIER -<br/>H. SOAL<br/>Computing additive contributions to growth and<br/>other issues for chain-linked quarterly<br/>aggregates</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/13</td><td>H. FRAISSE - F. KRAMARZ - C. PROST<br/>Labor Disputes and Job Flows</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/14</td><td>P. GIVORD - C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY<br/>- H. NAEGELE<br/>How does fuel taxation impact new car<br/>purchases? An evaluation using French<br/>consumer-level dataset</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/15</td><td>P. AUBERT - S. RABATÉ<br/>Durée passée en carrière et durée de vie en<br/>retraite : quel partage des gains d'éspérance de<br/>vie ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/01</td><td>A. POISSONNIER<br/>The walking dead Euler equation<br/>Addressing a challenge to monetary policy<br/>models</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/02</td><td>Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO<br/>Indicateurs de rendement du système de retraite<br/>français</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/03</td><td>T. MAYER - C. TREVIEN<br/>The impacts of Urban Public Transportation:<br/>Evidence from the Paris Region</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/04</td><td>S.T. LY - A. RIEGERT<br/>Measuring Social Environment Mobility</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/05</td><td>M. A. BEN HALINA - V. HYAFIL-SOLELHAC<br/>M. KOUBI - C. REGAERT<br/>Quel est l'impact du système d'indemnisation<br/>maladie sur la durée des arrêts de travail pour<br/>maladie ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/06</td><td>Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO<br/>Disparités de rendement du système de retraite<br/>dans le secteur privé, approches intergénéra-<br/>tionnelle et intragénérationnelle</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/07</td><td>B. CAMPAGNE - V. ALHENC-GELAS -<br/>J.-B. BERNARD<br/>No evidence of financial accelerator in France</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/08</td><td>Q. LAFFÉTER - M. PAK<br/>Élasticités des recettes fiscales au cycle<br/>économique : étude de trois impôts sur la<br/>période 1979-2013 en France</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/09</td><td>J.-M. DUASSIN-BENICHOU, S. IDMACHICHE,<br/>A. LEDUC et E. POULIQUEN<br/>Les déterminants de l'attractivité de la fonction<br/>publique de l'État</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/10</td><td>P. AUBERT<br/>La modulation du montant de pension selon la<br/>durée de carrière et l'âge de la retraite : quelles<br/>disparités entre assurés ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/11</td><td>V. DORTET-BERNADET - M. SICNIC<br/>Effet des aides publiques sur l'emploi en R&D<br/>dans les petites entreprises</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2015/12</td><td>S. GEORGES-KOT<br/>Annual and lifetime incidence of the value-added<br/>tax in France</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/13</td><td>M. POULHÉS<br/>Are Enterprise Zones Benefits Capitalized into<br/>Commercial Property Values? The French Case</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/14</td><td>J.-B. BERNARD - Q. LAFFÉTER<br/>Effet de l'activité et prix sur le revenu salarial<br/>des différentes catégories socioprofessionnelles</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/15</td><td>C. GEAY - M. KOUBI - G de LAGASNERIE<br/>Projections des dépenses de soins de ville,<br/>construction d'un module pour Destinie</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/16</td><td>J. BARDAJI - J.-C. BRICONGNE -<br/>B. CAMPAGNE - G. GAULIER<br/>Compared performances of French companies<br/>on the domestic and foreign markets</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/17</td><td>C. BELLÉGO - R. DE NUJ<br/>The redistributive effect of online piracy on the<br/>box office performance of American movies in<br/>foreign markets</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/18</td><td>J.-B. BERNARD - L. BERTHET<br/>French households financial wealth: which<br/>changes in 20 years?</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/19</td><td>M. POULHÉS<br/>Fenêtre sur Cour ou Chambre avec Vue ?<br/>Les prix hédoniques de l'immobilier parisien</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/01</td><td>B. GARBINTI - S. GEORGES-KOT<br/>Time to smell the roses? Risk aversion, the<br/>timing of inheritance receipt, and retirement</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/02</td><td>P. CHARNOZ - C. LELARGE - C. TREVIEN<br/>Communication Costs and the Internal<br/>Organization of Multi-Plant Businesses: Evidence<br/>from the Impact of the French High-Speed Rail</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/03</td><td>C. BONNET - B. GARBINTI - A. SOLAZ<br/>Gender inequality after Divorce: The Flip Side of<br/>Marital Specialization - Evidence from a French<br/>Administrative Database</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/04</td><td>D. BLANCHET - E. CAROLI - C. PROST -<br/>M. ROGER<br/>Health capacity to work at older ages in France</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/05</td><td>B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER<br/>MELEZE: A DSGE model for France within the<br/>Euro Area</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/06</td><td>B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER<br/>Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from<br/>Mélèze model</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/07</td><td>B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER<br/>Structural reforms in DSGE models: a case for<br/>sensitivity analyses</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/08</td><td>Y. DUBOIS et M. KOUBI<br/>Relevement de l'âge de départ à la retraite : quel<br/>impact sur l'activité des seniors de la réforme des<br/>retraites de 2010 ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/09</td><td>A. NAQUAS - M. ORAND - I. SLIMANI HOUTI<br/>Les entreprises employant des salaires au Smic:<br/>quelles caractéristiques et quelle rentabilité ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/10</td><td>T. BLANCHET - Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO -<br/>M. ROGER<br/>Patrimoine privé et retraite en France</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/11</td><td>M. PAK - A. POISSONNIER<br/>Accounting for technology, trade and final</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2017/01</td><td>D. FOUGÈRE - E. GAUTIER - S. ROUX<br/>Understanding Wage Floor Setting in Industry-<br/>Level Agreements: Evidence from France</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/02</td><td>Y. DUBOIS - M. KOUBI<br/>Règles d'indexation des pensions et sensibilité<br/>des dépenses de retraites à la croissance<br/>économique et aux chocs démographiques</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/03</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ - F. GODET<br/>L'éspérance de vie en retraite sans incapacité<br/>sèvère des générations nées entre 1960 et<br/>1990 : une projection à partir du modèle Destinie</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/04</td><td>J. BARDAJI - B. CAMPAGNE -<br/>M.-B. KHDER - Q. LAFFÉTER - O. SIMON<br/>(Insee)<br/>A-S) DUFERNEZ - C. ELEZAAR -<br/>P. LEBLANC - E. MASSON -<br/>H. PARTOUCHE (DG-Trésor)<br/>Le modèle macroéconométrique Mésange :<br/>réstellung et nouveautés</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/05</td><td>J. BOUSSARD - B. CAMPAGNE<br/>Fiscal Policy Coordination in a Monetary<br/>Union at the Zero-Lower-Bound</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/06</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ -<br/>A. GODZINSKI<br/>Effects of the one-day waiting period for sick<br/>leave on health-related absences in the<br/>French central civil service</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/07</td><td>P. CHARNOZ - M. ORAND<br/>Qualification, progess technique et marchés<br/>du travail locaux en France, 1990-2011</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/08</td><td>K. MILIN<br/>Modélisation de l'inflation en France par une<br/>approche macrosectorielle</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/09</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER - R. LARDEUX<br/>Homeownership and labor market outcomes:<br/>disentangling externality and composition<br/>effects</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/10</td><td>P. BEAUMONT<br/>Time is Money: Cash-Flow Risk and Export<br/>Market Behavior</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/01</td><td>S. ROUX - F. SAVIGNAC<br/>SMES' financing: Divergence across Euro<br/>area countries?</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/02</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER - A. LUCIANI<br/>Computerization, labor productivity and<br/>employment: impacts across industries vary<br/>with technological level</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/03</td><td>R. MONIN - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO<br/>L'effet du CICE sur les prix : une double<br/>analyse sur données sectorielles et<br/>individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/04</td><td>R. LARDEUX<br/>Who Understands The French Income Tax?<br/>Bunching Where Tax Liabilities Start</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2018/05</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER<br/>Financial constraints of innovative firms and<br/>sectoral growth</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/06</td><td>R. S.-H. LEE - M. PAK<br/>Pro-competitive effects of globalisation on<br/>prices, productivity and markups: Evidence<br/>in the Euro Area</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/07</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER<br/>Consumption inequality in France between<br/>1995 and 2011</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/08</td><td>A. BAUER - B. GARBINTI -<br/>S. GEORGES-KOT<br/>Financial Constraints and Self-Employment<br/>in France, 1945-2014</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/09</td><td>P. BEAUMONT - A. LUCIANI<br/>Prime à l'embauche dans les PME :<br/>évaluation à partir des déclarations<br/>d'embauche</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/10</td><td>C. BELLÉGO - V. DORTET-BERNADET -<br/>M. TÉPAUT<br/>Collaboration de deux dispositifs d'aide à la<br/>R&D collaborative public-privé</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/11</td><td>R. MONIN - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO<br/>Replication et rapprochement des travaux<br/>d'évaluation du effet du CICE sur l'emploi<br/>en 2013 et 2014</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/12</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ - F. GODET -<br/>V. LIN<br/>L'introduction d'un gradient social dans la<br/>mortalité au sein du modèle Destinie 2</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/01</td><td>M. ANDRÉ - A.-L. BIOTTEAU<br/>Effets de moyen terme d'une hausse de TVA<br/>sur le niveau de vie et les inégalités : une<br/>approche par microsimulation</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/02</td><td>A. BOURGEOIS - A. BRIAND<br/>Le modèle Avionic : la modélisation<br/>Input/Output des comptes nationaux</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/03</td><td>A. GODZINSKI - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO<br/>Short-term health effects of public transport<br/>disruptions: air pollution and viral spread<br/>channels</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/04<br/>F1903</td><td>L. AEBERHARDT - F. HATIER -<br/>M. LECLAIR - B. PENTINAT - J.-D. ZAFAR<br/>L'économie numérique fausse-t-elle le<br/>partage volume-prix du PIB?</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/05</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ - E. YILMAZ<br/>Dans quelle mesure les incitations tarifaires<br/>et la procédure de mise sous accord<br/>préalable ont-elles contribué au<br/>développement du chirurgie ambulatoire?</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/06</td><td>J.-P. CLING - S. EGHBAL-TEHERANI -<br/>M. ORZONI - C. PLATEAU<br/>The Differences between EU Countries for<br/>Sustainable Development Indicators:<br/>It is (mainly) the Economy!</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/07</td><td>P. CHONÉ - L. WILNER<br/>Competition on Unobserved Attributes: The<br/>Case of the Hospital Industry</td></tr></table>
G2019/08 P. PORA – L. WILNER
Child Penalties and Financial Incentives: Exploiting Variation along the Wage Distribution

G2019/09 E. GAUTIER – S. ROUX – M. SUAREZ CASTILLO
Do Minimum Wages make Wages more Rigid? Evidence from French Micro Data

G2019/10 M. ANDRÉ – A. SIREY JOL
Imposition des couples et des familles: effets budgétaires et redistributifs de l'impôt sur le revenu

G2019/11 K. MOHKAM – O. SIMON
L'empreinte matière de l'économie française: une analyse par matiŁre et catégorie de produits

G2019/12 S. BUNEL – B. HADJIBEYLI
Évaluation du crédit d'impôt innovation

G2019/13 C. BONNET – F. GODET – A. SOLAZ
Gendered economic determinants of couple formation over 50 in France

G2019/14 P. GIVORD – M. SUAREZ CASTILLO
Excellence for all? Heterogeneity in high schools' value-added

G2019/15 G. CETTE – L. KOEHL – T. PHILIPPON
Labor Share in Some Advanced Countries

G2020/01 J. SILHOL – B. VENTELOU
Les zones d'intervention prioritaire reflètent- elles des écarts de pratiques des médecins généralistes?

G2020/02 B. BOUCHTENIK – R. LARDEUX
The Take-Up of Unemployment Benefit Extensions

G2020/03 J-M. GERMAIN
A Welfare Based Estimate of "Real Feel GDP" for Europe and the USA

G2020/04 J. BOUSSARD – R. LEE
Competition, Profit Share and Concentration

G2020/05 P. PORA
Keep Working and Spend Less? Collective Childcare and Parental Earnings in France

G2020/06 R. MONIN – M. SUAREZ CASTILLO
Product Switching, market power and distance to core competency

G2020/07 L. WILNER
How do citizens perceive centralization reforms? Evidence from the merger of French regions