13/ 2018-L'EUROPE UNIE

Simion Costea

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L'EUROPE UNIE
UNITED EUROPE

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No. 13 /
2018

Revue d'études européennes
PARIS
SUMMARY

<table><tr><td>MARKO SUSI: European Union Security and Defence Relations with ASEAN</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>FRANCESCA COLOTTA: EU-Israel Relations: an Analysis of the Most Challenging EU Foreign Relations</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>ALEKSANDR STEMPITSKII: European Union and Japan: Past, Present and Future of External Relations</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>JULIETTE GUITTARD: The Influence of the European Union towards its Eastern Partnership Policy</td><td>39</td></tr><tr><td>TUULI DUNDER: The Influence of Creating a Common Defence System to EU's Foreign Policies</td><td>51</td></tr><tr><td>HELI MEKLIN: Anti-Money Laundering Risks and Challenges at the Time of Crypto Currencies</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>SHAMAISE PETERS: Should the United Kingdom discard the Wednesbury Unreasonableness test in the National Court and apply the Proportionality test?</td><td>68</td></tr><tr><td>JAANA SILD: Legal Capacity of Artificial Intelligence</td><td>74</td></tr><tr><td>ELLIOTT J. GRIMM: Estonian Russian Relations</td><td>79</td></tr><tr><td>YUSEF WARD: An Analysis of The Applicability of GDPR to Blockchain Technologies</td><td>86</td></tr><tr><td>NICOLETA VASILCOVSKI, MIHAELA AFANASOV: A Short Presentation of Romanian Economy, Business Ethics and Economic Growth</td><td>91</td></tr><tr><td>OLIMPIU SABAU-POP: The Evolution of the European Legislation in regard to the Transplantation of Organs, Tissues and Cells of Human Origin, and its Implementation by the Romanian State</td><td>96</td></tr></table>
European Union Security and Defence Relations with
ASEAN

MARKO SUSI

TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, ESTONIA

**Abstract:** The European Union has developed from a purely economic organization to the one that aims to integrate its Member States in a variety of fields, including security and defence policy and foreign policy. To achieve the objectives of those policies, cooperation with third countries and international organizations is vital as such issues can have a global impact. In its security and defence-related relations with ASEAN, it can be seen that despite emphasising the importance of such cooperation, both sides have demonstrated a lack of commitment, which can be partly explained by the fundamental difference of the natures of the two organizations, with ASEAN countries unwilling to subject themselves to a foreign intitution's power. This individualist approach can severely hamper the cooperation of ASEAN members within the organization and with the EU.

**Keywords:** EU, ASEAN, CSDP, cooperation

INTRODUCTION

The beginning of the European Union is directly related to war. The Union was envisaged on the aftermath of the Second World War. The devastation of the conflict made leaders of post-war Europe think how future wars could be avoided. The experience had shown that methods used after the First World War actually played a large part in the occurrence of the Second World War. The harsh punishment imposed on Germany increased economic troubles during the Great Depression, creating discontention with democratic government and the humiliation of imposed conditions were used by the extremist parties to gain popular support. After the end of the war, it became clear that mere punishment does not work. Although Germany was occupied by allies, its industry was rebuilt. It was found important that no country in Europe should be able to secretly develop its military capability and switch to wartime economy under the cover of secrecy. Therefore, it was decided to pool together the main resources used for war effort – steel and coal. Coal as the major source of energy in Continental Europe, with oil having to be imported from elsewhere, is essential for any motorized conflict. Steel as the main construction component of weapons and vehicles used in combat is essential for building armies. Pooling the resources together allows to keep track on the production rates of these two essential materials and would reveal any efforts of increasing military power. On the basis of this logic, Robert Schumann held his famous speech in 1950 where he proposed the unision of French and German coal and steel production while submitting it under common High Authority control<fnref n="1" />. Inspired by this speech, the European Coal and Steel Community was created in 1951. This Community later became the European Economic Community after the Treaty of Rome in 1957. After the creation of the Single Market, the Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union. Further treaties, especially the Lisbon Treaty, expanded the role of the Union, adding defence, foreign policy, political, diplomatic, humanitarian and security dimensions to the Union's actions, both internal and external.

In parallel to the European Union, defence cooperation developed between the European states which led, after the failure of Western European Union, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The cooperation within the EEC, however, did not include defence

<footnote n="1">¹The Schuman declaration – 9 May 1950. URL: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en, Accessed: July 13th, 2018.</footnote>
cooperation. This cooperation did not occur because Member States wished to keep control over their defence policy and state secrets. In addition, the defence alliance of NATO functioned well and duplication would have been seen as unnecessary. Additionally, the EEC was seen as an economic union and defence issues were seen as topics falling out of the scope of the union, its purpose. For this reason, cooperation was not extended to the field of defence and security. NATO cooperation has remained a fundamental defence alliance in Europe and although European Union has taken steps towards greater security and defence cohesion, NATO has remained as a main security platform in the continent. Although recently, EU peacekeeping forces as well as fast-responding units have been created, defence policy coordination has not been in EU's focus. Recently, though, a new cooperation on a voluntary basis, PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) Agreement<fnref n="2" />, was initiated that would facilitate cooperation between the EU Member States in the provision of the ability to have greater joint decision in defence matters.

Seeing that the European Union developed as a means of avoiding a new world war and that the developing Union has included ever more defence-related cooperation, despite being secondary to NATO and UN-related cooperation and hindered by the individual interests of the Member States, it can be seen that the defence cooperation is a further developing field in the EU's process of development. For this reason, it is important to assess how these developments are reflected in the external actions of the EU, namely, in the EU's cooperation with other States and international organizations in this field.

Association of South East Asian Nations (hereafter referred to as ASEAN) is a community of ten nations in Southeast Asia. It is one of the largest importers from the EU as well as one of the largest exporters to EU. The relations between EU and ASEAN are of great importance. For this reason, the discussion relating to EU's external actions in terms of security and defence focus on the cooperation with ASEAN. Followingly, the legal basis for security and defence cooperation of the EU as well as existence and character of these relations between the EU and ASEAN will be discussed.

LEGAL BASIS FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION

Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives, especially those of the Common Security and Defence Policy were already brought out in the Constitutional Treaty of the EU<fnref n="3" />. After the Lisbon Treaty, the main agreements governing the affairs of the EU are the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article 3 paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (hereafter referred to as TEU) obliges the EU to provide for the area of freedom, justice and security<fnref n="4" />. Paragraph 5 further provides for the external actions of the EU for the provision of security and promoting peace throughout the world<fnref n="5" />. Nevertheless, Art. 4 maintains that the national security issues of the Member States exclusively fall under the Member State jurisdiction<fnref n="6" />. Title V of TEU deals with the Union's external action. Article 21(1) aims to develop

<footnote n="2">² *Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – Factsheet.* URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en, Accessed: May 23rd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Naert, F., "European Security and Defence in the EU Constitutional Treaty" Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2005, pp 187-207, pp 190-198. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jcs110&collection=journals&id=191&startid=&endid=212, Accessed: May 20th 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, in *The Official Journal of the European Union*, C 326/13, 2012, Art 3(2), p 17. Accessed at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF, Accessed: March 18th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ *Ibidem*, Art 3(5), p 17.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ *Ibidem*, Art 4, p 18.</footnote>
relations to other states and other entities to promote the values of the Union throughout the world<fnref n="7" />. Paragraph 2, subparagraph (a) puts one of the aims for cooperation between Member States to promoting the security of the Union<fnref n="8" />. Subsection (b) can also be connected to defence as it aims to promote democracy and human rights throughout the world<fnref n="9" />, the purpose which can be brought up in the case of external conflicts and can result in the involvement of the European Union. Subparagraph (c) puts the emphasis on the preservation of peace in the world and to the prevention of military conflicts<fnref n="10" />. Article 22 of the TEU gives the EU competence in foreign policy areas relating to the Union's security and to the possible development of the common defence policy of the Union<fnref n="11" />. The second subparagraph of the Article puts the definition and implementation of provisions relating to common foreign and security policy on the shoulders of the European Council and the Council of the European Union (hereafter referred to as the Council), while giving the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy implementing powers together with the Member States<fnref n="12" />. Article 26 determines the European Council to put in place strategy of the Union in these matters, including in matters related to defence<fnref n="13" />. The Article also gives implementing powers to the High Representative and the Member States<fnref n="14" />. This is further strengthened by Article 27 of TEU<fnref n="15" />. The third paragraph of the Article provides for the European External Action Service to assist the High Representative<fnref n="16" />. Article 28 allows the Council to adopt decisions arising from rapid international developments in an urgent way<fnref n="17" />. Article 31 requires military or defence decisions taken by the Council or the European Council to have unanimity by excluding the application of qualified majority voting in the area<fnref n="18" />. It is also important to consider the last paragraph of TEU Article 34 that Member States that are members of the United Nations Security Council defend Union interests and if necessary, invite the High Representative to explain the Union's position<fnref n="19" />. Article 36 gives consultational authority to the European Parliament<fnref n="20" />. Article 37 allows the Union to conclude international agreements related to the field<fnref n="21" />. Article 38 provides for the Political and Security Committee that has the task of observing the developments in this field in the international arena<fnref n="22" />. Article 41 excludes the implementation of military or defence actions on the basis of the Union budget but requires the creation of a specialized fund by the participating Member States where they contribute based on their GDP, excluding dissenting Member States<fnref n="23" />. The first paragraph of Article 42 gives the Union the ability to conduct operations to further peace and prevent conflicts<fnref n="24" />. The second paragraph sees the establishment of the common defence policy of the Union, communicated by the Council in the form of a

<footnote n="7">⁷ *Ibidem*, Art 21(1), p 28.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ *Ibidem*, Art 21(2)(a), p 28.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ *Ibidem*, Art 21(2)(b), p 29.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ *Ibidem*, Art 21(2)(c), p 29.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ *Ibidem*, Art 22, p 30.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² *Ibidem*, Art 22, p 30.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ *Ibidem*, Art 26, p 31.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ *Ibidem*, Art 26, p 31.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ *Ibidem*, Art 27, p 32.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ *Ibidem*, Art 27(3), p 32.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ *Ibidem*, Art 28, p 32.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ *Ibidem*, Art 31, pp 33-34.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ *Ibidem*, Art 34, p 35.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ *Ibidem*, Art 36, pp 35-36.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ *Ibidem*, Art 37, p 36.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² *Ibidem*, Art 38, p 36.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ *Ibidem*, Art 41, p 37.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ *Ibidem*, Art 42(1), p 38.</footnote>
recommendation to the Member States<fnref n="25" /> that can then adopt it on a voluntary basis. The second subparagraph allows the members to retain their own defence policy nevertheless and specifically excludes any influence on the relations of members to NATO<fnref n="26" />. The third paragraph obliges the Member States to provide their military and civilian capabilities for the implementation of the common security and defence policy<fnref n="27" />. It also provides the Member States establishing joint forces amongst themselves the opportunity of allowing their use under the policy, also obliging Member States to increase their military capabilities, setting the European Defence Agency responsible for the development of technological and operational capabilities as well as research and development, acquisition of armaments<fnref n="28" />. Paragraph 6 obliges Member States entered into binding agreements and having higher standards than required to establish a more permanent form of cooperation<fnref n="29" />. The seventh paragraph obliges the Member States to assist a Member State under aggression, in line with United Nations Charter and NATO policies<fnref n="30" />. Article 43(1) further specifies that the scope of such military action is related to peacekeeping, conflict prevention, stabilization, prevention of terrorism, disarmament and humanitarian actions, also crisis management<fnref n="31" />. Article 45 sets the principles for the European Defence Agency<fnref n="32" />. Article 46 provides for the creation of a permanent structured cooperation between willing Member States that fulfill necessary criteria<fnref n="33" />. It can be seen that the Articles setting rules of Common Foreign and Security Policy can be thought of as general in nature, with some specifics. It has been noted that the CFSP appears to be separated from other areas of cooperation and policies of the Union, at least legislatively, with main objectives laid out in the TEU instead of TFEU<fnref n="34" />. At the same time, it appears that the CFSP should be integrated with other areas, raising notions that the role of CFSP is rather ambivalent, unclear, in the Union's system<fnref n="35" />. In terms of one subarea of CFSP, namely, the Common Security and Defence policy, it has also been seen that the decision-making in this area is nation-specific and any common actions in the community level need Council unanimity that is difficult to achieve, especially in relation to national defence spending of Member States as well as different understandings of the role of the military in Member States<fnref n="36" />, same applies for CFSP in general, with individual Member States able to block initiatives for national interests reasons<fnref n="37" />,<fnref n="38" />. In the defence matters, it is seen that there is a lack of unity deriving from lack of political will, united command and strategy, public procurement

<footnote n="25">²⁵ *Ibidem*, Art 42(2), p 38.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ *Ibidem*, Art 42(2), p 38.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ *Ibidem*, Art 42(3), p 38.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ *Ibidem*, Art 42(3), p 38.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ *Ibidem*, Art 42(6), p 39.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ *Ibidem*, Art 42(7), p 39.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ *Ibidem*, Art 43(1), p 39.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² *Ibidem*, Art 45, p 40.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ *Ibidem*, Art 46, pp 40-41.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ Koutrakos, P., "Judicial Review in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy" International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 67, 2018, pp 3-4. Accessed through https://www.cambridge.org/core.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ *Ibidem*, pp 4-5.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Constantinescu, M., "Economic Challenges for European Defence" Europolity: Continuity and Change in European Governance, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2016, pp 77-79. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/eurpol10&collection=journals&id=223&startid=&endid=256, Accessed: May 22nd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">³⁷ Leal-Arcas, R., "EU Legal Personality in Foreign Policy" Boston University International Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2006, p 181. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/builj24&collection=journals&id=169&startid=&endid=216, Accessed: May 22nd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸ Staridis, S., Hutchence, J., "Mediterranean Challenges to the EU's Foreign Policy" European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 5, 2000, p 42. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.kluwer/eurofa0005&collection=kluwer&id=37&startid=&endid=64, Accessed: May 22nd, 2018.</footnote>
in this area, among others<fnref n="39" />,<fnref n="40" />. It has been found that there are also questions regarding the nature of the competences for CFSP and CSDP, whether they should exclusively belong to the EU, to be shared or should they belong to the Member States as the legislation does not appear to make absolutely clear distinctions<fnref n="41" />. It has been opined that the EU does not always apply its principles in external sphere and merely attempts to achieve stability<fnref n="42" />.

Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter referred to as TFEU) gives competence to the EU to implement common security and defence policy and work towards establishing a common defence policy<fnref n="43" />. Article 73 of TFEU allows Member States to cooperate in terms of national security<fnref n="44" />. Part V of TFEU concerns the EU's external action. Enhanced cooperation in the field of security and military fields are permitted under Article 329(2)<fnref n="45" /> and Article 331(2)<fnref n="46" />. Budgetary issues related to military and defence are covered in Article 333(3)<fnref n="47" />. Article 346 gives the Member States the opportunity not to publish sensitive data related to national security issues nor does it oblige to follow community rules in terms of military trade<fnref n="48" />.

As can be seen from the Treaties, the security cooperation has been thoroughly regulated. Despite the inclusion of security and defence cooperation in the Treaties, there are several key points to be made. Firstly, the objectives and procedures mentioned are highly vague and general. This likely results from the necessity to arrive to an agreement that would satisfy all Member States and ensure the approval of Lisbon Treaty. This generality can be viewed as both positive and negative from the Union's point of view. The negative view would suggest that the Member States are able to block any integration and enhanced cooperation in the field, thus maintaining their own supremacy over the area. This would prevent any further cooperation and would mean halting to the common security and defence policy. On the other hand, the vagueness allows the Union and its willing Member States to progress with such integration much more rapidly than would be possible with strict, narrow definition of the specific rules. The willing members can become more integrated in the field whereas dissenting members can at first, remain outside of the cooperation, with likely chance that they will join in the future. Some of the rules, especially purposes of enhanced cooperation for this field are narrow nevertheless. Peacekeeping, conflict prevention, humanitarian measures and stabilization, maintenance of security are main reasons for which this policy can be implemented. On first sight, they might seem narrow. On the other hand, they can, in the realities of the international diplomacy, be interpreted widely and most military actions can be and often are, defined through providing assistance to abused groups, reducing security threats or preventing larger conflicts in areas. If viewed from this angle, it can be seen that the possibilities of

<footnote n="39">³⁹ Constantinescu, op. cit., pp 87-88.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ Salmon, T., "The European Security and Defence Policy: Built on Rocks or Sand?" European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, 2005, p 379. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.kluwer/eurofa0010&collection=kluwer&id=367&startid=&endid=388, Accessed: May 22nd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ Wessel, R. A., "Division of International Responsibility between the EU and Its Member States in the Area of Foreign, Security and Defence Policy" Amsterdam Law Forum, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011, pp 34-48. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/amslawf3&collection=journals&id=422&startid=&endid=436, Accessed: May 22nd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">⁴² Staridis, S., Hutchence, J., op. cit., pp 61-62.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in *The Official Journal of the European Union*, C 326/47, 2012, Art 2(4), p 50. Accessed at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_2&format=PDF, Accessed: March 18th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="44">⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, Art 73, p 74.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, Art 329(2), p 190.</footnote>

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, Art 331(2), p 191.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, Art 333(3), p 192.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, Art 346, p 194.</footnote>
action for the EU are actually quite large. Therefore, this area appears to be developing within the EU. In addition, the PESCO Agreement showed that the majority of Member States are supportive of greater cooperation in defence matters. This agreement shows that the field of defence is rapidly developing in the EU and will become a major part of the Union's policies as the questions regarding the functioning of NATO become more pressing in the current political climate.

## EU'S EXTENSION ABROAD

Common Foreign and Security Policy covers EU's external action in the world and allows the EU to act as a single power in the world arena. Before continuing towards analyzing the specific agreements and other measures of cooperation between EU and ASEAN, it is necessary to review EU's role in the world.

It can be seen that most, if not all, policy areas also have an external dimension that necessitates EU's action beyond its territorial limits. In terms of internal affairs such as police investigations, there is the external dimension of extradition as well as aspects of national jurisdictions, international cooperation and international crime. Likewise, a policy area that has received great attention and development in the EU in recent years, cybersecurity, also has these two dimensions – internal and external. Therefore, cybersecurity legislation requires actions also on international level<fnref n="49" />, such as that of the EU's cooperation in that area with the US<fnref n="50" />. Several objectives in the EU's Cyber Security Strategy have an external dimension, including cooperation with the US specifically and with organizations such as NATO, OECD, ASEAN<fnref n="51" />. However, the EU nevertheless relies on providing a model for national authorities as the cybercrime does not stop at borders but is a worldwide issue<fnref n="52" />. In this light, the EU and US cooperation on cybercrime issues has a global dimension<fnref n="53" />.

In terms of outwards dimension of security, the difficulties imposed by EU's complex institutional system can make it tedious to coordinate foreign policy actions in security aspects<fnref n="54" />. Despite the EU being one of the largest markets in the world and one of the largest traders, there are concerns that in reality, trade forms one of the foreign policy implementation instruments in theory but there is lack of concrete objectives and measures, despite general understanding of conditional trade<fnref n="55" />. Also, it appears that new agreements that the EU signs with partners such as ASEAN are mainly of economic nature rather than security and foreign policy-related<fnref n="56" />. It has also been noted that the EU appears to be reluctant in using trade sanctions against states<fnref n="57" />.

<footnote n="49">⁴⁹ Fahey, E., "The EU's Cybercrime and Cyber-Security Rulemaking: Mapping the Internal and External Dimensions of EU Security" European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2014, p. 46. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ejrr2014&collection=journals&id=51&startid=&endid=65, Accessed: May 20th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="50">⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p 47.</footnote>

<footnote n="51">⁵¹ *Ibidem*, pp 49-50.</footnote>

<footnote n="52">⁵² *Ibidem*, pp 49-50.</footnote>

<footnote n="53">⁵³ *Ibidem*, p 56.</footnote>

<footnote n="54">⁵⁴ Bossuyt, F., Drieghe, L., Orbie, J., "Living Apart Together: EU Comprehensive Security from a Trade Perspective" European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 18, Special Issue, 2013, p. 64. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.kluwer/eurofa0018&collection=kluwer&id=543&startid=&endid=562, Accessed: May 20th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="55">⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, pp 69-71</footnote>

<footnote n="56">⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, pp 73-74.</footnote>

<footnote n="57">⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, pp 78-79.</footnote>
The EU has strong relations to partners such as US and Canada, in addition, it has developed a category of strategic partnerships with other countries such as those in Latin America as well as with Japan and China, amongst others, supplemented by other regional cooperation attempts<fnref n="58" />. It has been noted that despite the EU's understanding of its economic weight and the adoption of strategies in external sphere, the EU remains rather weak in actual policymaking and as such is often not as noticeable in the international sphere as it could be<fnref n="59" />. There exists a view that despite the existence of general strategies, there is no clear policy objective present as well as no clear goals with deadlines and necessary measures<fnref n="60" />. The beginnings of external relations of the EU with other areas began from economic and development cooperation<fnref n="61" />. There is also an issue with different interests of members of regions that the Union wishes to cooperate with, such as differences in the North African or Latin American regions<fnref n="62" />. In terms of strategic partnerships, even widespread security concerns such as terrorism prevention have rarely become detailed cooperation instruments<fnref n="63" />. There also appears to be ambiguity relating to the interaction between bilateral instruments in regions such as the African Union, ASEAN and Mercosur and the instruments on the regional levels, with ASEAN having made progress in both economic and political integration despite concerns of implementation and African Union having differentiating interests amongst its members, while Latin America struggles to implement policies in that heterogenous region<fnref n="64" />. In terms of the definition of EU in the international arena, it can be viewed as a civilian power despite using troops in various missions throughout the world<fnref n="65" />. In the Asian context, it has been pointed out that the EU is rather inactive in the region due to its lack of political power and military presence for the main part<fnref n="66" />. The EU is also often seen as employing a hegemonial style, using different hard and soft measures to further the interests of the Union as a whole and also individual Member States<fnref n="67" />. It appears also that the EU often creates individual partnerships with countries in wider regions, inducing multiple bilateralism<fnref n="68" />. It appears that the EU's foreign relations suffer from a multitude of issues. The lack of clear objectives, the diverse nature of different regions and differing interests of states involved as well as the questions regarding the EU's motivations in pursuing cooperation schemes appear to inflict damage on the ambitions of the EU in being a relevant global actor. Its practice of concluding bilateral deals with states more easily than with regions can also be seen as a damaging practice towards regional agreements.

## SECURITY AND DEFENCE MATTERS COOPERATION BETWEEN EU AND ASEAN AND ISSUES THEREOF

EU-ASEAN cooperation involves several fields, from trade and development aid to security and defence cooperation. Due to economical aspects, EU is interested in maintaining stability in the

<footnote n="58">⁵⁸ Bendiek, A., Kramer, H., "EU as a Strategic International Actor: Substantial and Analytical Ambiguities" European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 15, 2010, p 453. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.kluwer/eurofa0015&collection=kluwer&id=461&startid=&endid=482, Accessed: May 20th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="59">⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p 455.</footnote>

<footnote n="60">⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p 456.</footnote>

<footnote n="61">⁶¹ *Ibidem*, p 458.</footnote>

<footnote n="62">⁶² *Ibidem*, p 459.</footnote>

<footnote n="63">⁶³ *Ibidem*, p 460.</footnote>

<footnote n="64">⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, pp 461-462.</footnote>

<footnote n="65">⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p 465.</footnote>

<footnote n="66">⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, p 466.</footnote>

<footnote n="67">⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, p 470.</footnote>

<footnote n="68">⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, p 471.</footnote>
region<fnref n="69" />. It appears that security cooperation also reflects the growing role of EU in global affairs<fnref n="70" />. The EU has participated in several meetings and conferences in the region such as ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial meetings<fnref n="71" />. The High Representative participated in the 2013 Shangri La dialogue that consists of discussion of military personnel, defence ministeries and other defence-related entities in the region<fnref n="72" />. In her address at the dialogue, the High Representative laid out the means the EU uses for fulfilling its security cooperation objectives, these are diplomacy, economy, humanitarian aid, development and security instruments<fnref n="73" />. In 2015, the High Representative Frederica Mogherini confirmed the military, strategic, security dimension of the EU in its cooperation with Asia-Pacific region<fnref n="74" />. The High Representative noted some areas of concern, including maritime disputes between the Asian powers, security as a means of ensuring supply chain operation, with the emphasis on cooperation and rule of law, including international law<fnref n="75" />. The EU High Representative also exposed EU's commitments towards ASEAN, including cooperation in maritime surveillance, prevention of piracy and maintaining security of ports as well as focus on preventive diplomacy<fnref n="76" />. Terrorism was also named as one of the major security challenges that has a military dimension<fnref n="77" />. It was also confirmed that the EU maintains five military missions and also eleven civilian missions throughout the world<fnref n="78" />. Maritime security is also high on the agendas of EU cooperation in military and security matters. In 2013, the ASEAN-EU High Level Dialogue on Maritime Cooperation in Jakarta took place<fnref n="79" />. Security aspects brought out were trafficking in weapons and people, terrorism and piracy<fnref n="80" />. In 2015, another conference on the topic was held<fnref n="81" />. The dialogue focused on developing inter-agency cooperation, investigations, continuing to provide security for ports and sharing experiences of EU in the area<fnref n="82" />. Measures against organized crime were also discussed and it was agreed that international legal framework for ensuring security must be used<fnref n="83" />. Similar dialogues occurred also in 2016 and 2017⁸⁴. In the meeting of 2017, two of the four main topics were related to security and defence – maritime law enforcement and prevention of conflicts<fnref n="85" />. The dialogue discussed mutual cooperation in law

<footnote n="69">⁶⁹ EU-ASEAN relations, factsheet. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_lv/30722/EU-ASEAN%20relations,%20factsheet, Accessed: May 14th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="70">⁷⁰ *Ibidem*</footnote>

<footnote n="71">⁷¹ *Ibidem*</footnote>

<footnote n="72">⁷² European Commission, Press Release: *Catherine Ashton travels so Singapore for Asia Security dialogue*. URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-489_en.htm, Accessed: May 14th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="73">⁷³ *Ibidem*</footnote>

<footnote n="74">⁷⁴ Statement: Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Frederica Mogherini at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2015. URL: http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150531_02_en.htm, Accessed: May 14th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="75">⁷⁵ *Ibidem*</footnote>

<footnote n="76">⁷⁶ *Ibidem*</footnote>

<footnote n="77">⁷⁷ *Ibidem*</footnote>

<footnote n="78">⁷⁸ *Ibidem*</footnote>

<footnote n="79">⁷⁹ Press release: *ASEAN and the EU hold talks on Maritime Cooperation (18/11/2013)*. URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/indonesia/pressCorner/all_news/news/2013/20131118_01_en.htm, Accessed: May 14th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="80">⁸⁰ *Ibidem*</footnote>

<footnote n="81">⁸¹ Joint media release: *The 2nd ASEAN-EU High Level Dialogue on Maritime Security Cooperation (06/05/2015)*. URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/indonesia/pressCorner/all_news/news/2015/20150506_02_en.htm, Accessed: May 14th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="82">⁸² *Ibidem*</footnote>

<footnote n="83">⁸³ *Ibidem*</footnote>

<footnote n="84">⁸⁴ European Union, EU-ASEAN relations, factsheet. op. cit.</footnote>

<footnote n="85">⁸⁵ Press release: *ASEAN-EU Co-Chairs Joint Press Release on the 4th ASEAN-EU High-Level Dialogue on Maritime Security Cooperation*. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/association-southeast-asian-nations-asean/33406/asean-eu-co-chairs-joint-press-release-4th-asean-eu-high-level-dialogue-maritime-security_en, Accessed: May 14th, 2018.</footnote>
enforcement and sharing of information and surveillance activities as well as prevention of conflicts<fnref n="86" />. The European Union has also held training courses on preventive diplomacy and mediation in relation to ASEAN Regional Forum<fnref n="87" />. The EU has also organized an ASEAN Regional Forum workshop related to the prevention of extremism in Brussels<fnref n="88" />. In 2016, EU also held a workshop regarding cyber security where several measures were discussed, especially in relation to cyber incidents and the necessity to avoid the escalation of tensions, miscalculations in cyber matters as well as the opportunities for cooperation between public and private sectors in cyber security matters, also practical cooperation in this field between ASEAN Regional Forum participants<fnref n="89" />. In addition, Intersessional Meetings on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime have been held as well as the Defence Officials' Dialogue and Disaster Relief Exercises<fnref n="90" />. EU also plans to continue cooperation in maritime security issues via intersessional meetings and workshops<fnref n="91" />.

Viewing the multitude of different instruments that the EU employs in security and defence-related cooperation with ASEAN countries, it is possible to make a few observations. Firstly, the focus of this cooperation appears to rest on the topics of diplomatic means of preventing conflicts, maritime security, terrorism and trade of illicit nature. As Southeast Asian terrorist cells appear to have significant contacts with the cells operating in Europe, the counter-terrorism cooperation between the EU and ASEAN is in a special focus<fnref n="92" />. EU and ASEAN cooperate especially in the framework of the UN Security Council resolution in the field of terrorism prevention<fnref n="93" />. In addition, there have also been commitments regarding information sharing between law enforcement and cooperation between Europol and ASEAN law enforcement agency ASEANAPOL<fnref n="94" />. The EU has added provisions regarding cooperation in terrorism prevention and weapons of mass destruction into the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements that have been signed with several states that belong to ASEAN<fnref n="95" />. The EU contributes to JCLEC antiterrorism centre in Indonesia that gives expertise to police force and strengthens regional cooperation of law enforcement<fnref n="96" />. The EU has also developed monitoring mechanisms for several problematic regions in the area, together with governments – monitoring programmes for Aceh, Mindanao and Southern Thailand<fnref n="97" />. Aid from the EU in terms of terrorism prevention also has a financial element<fnref n="98" />. EU actively participates in ASEAN Regional Forum where several security and defence-related matters are discussed such as non-proliferation, terrorism prevention, power balances, international crime<fnref n="99" />. In terrorism prevention, the ASEAN Regional Forum deals mainly with capacity building, promoting cooperation between countries and intelligence sharing<fnref n="100" />. Asia-Europe Dialogue has been actively

<footnote n="86">⁸⁶ *Ibidem*</footnote>

<footnote n="87">⁸⁷ European Union, EU-ASEAN relations, factsheet. *op. cit.*</footnote>

<footnote n="88">⁸⁸ European Union, EU-ASEAN relations, factsheet. *op. cit.*</footnote>

<footnote n="89">⁸⁹ *ARF Cybersecurity Workshop, Press corner*. URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/malaysia/press_corner/all_news/news/2016/short_content_en.htm, Accessed: May 18th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="90">⁹⁰ European Union, EU-ASEAN relations, factsheet. *op. cit.*</footnote>

<footnote n="91">⁹¹ European Union, EU-ASEAN relations, factsheet. *op. cit.*</footnote>

<footnote n="92">⁹² Chevallier-Govers, C., "Antiterrorism Cooperation between the EU and ASEAN" European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2012, p 135. Accessed at HeinOnline: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.kluwer/eurofa0017&div=11&start_page=133&collection=kluwer&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults, Accessed: May 18th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="93">⁹³ *Ibidem*, p 148.</footnote>

<footnote n="94">⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, p 148.</footnote>

<footnote n="95">⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, p 149.</footnote>

<footnote n="96">⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, p 150.</footnote>

<footnote n="97">⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, p 151.</footnote>

<footnote n="98">⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp 151-152.</footnote>

<footnote n="99">⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, p 152.</footnote>

<footnote n="100">¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, p 153.</footnote>
organizing conferences on security issues such as exchange of knowledge and experience as well as possible links between organized crime and terrorism<fnref n="101" />. However, it has been noted that these measures have, in effect, no operational cooperation dimension<fnref n="102" />. As can be seen, the cooperation between EU and ASEAN countries occurs on several levels and in more than one security and defence-related topics. More specifically, the cooperation between the EU and ASEAN has been especially interactive in maritime security and terrorism areas. Terrorism-related cooperation appears to be especially fruitful, with some actual progress in the cooperation instrument creation through workshops, training programmes, financing and buildup of capacities. However, it can also be seen that in general, the security-related cooperation offers rather generalized viewpoints and soft commitments through joint ventures rather than hard deals with precisely pinpointed legal basis. Such generalized approach has been rather apparent<fnref n="103" />. This can potentially make the actual cooperation rather illusionary, or at least, inconsistent as the future cooperation would rely on the goodwill of the participators, rather than on fixed legal commitments that could not be ignored without the possibility of sanctions. Nevertheless, it can be difficult to achieve a greater cohesion and legal security in this matter, as the ASEAN is a group of sovereign states that can have different interests in this field and that might not wish to have interference from outside. In addition, the ASEAN is not as integrated as the EU which makes it difficult to negotiate an overall agreement. Therefore, it might not be possible, at least in the present stage of ASEAN integration, that any agreement with more concrete steps in the subject matter will be concluded soon.

In a more general view, also touching upon the EU's main cooperation elements in the region, it can also be argued that the economic cooperation in the area can also serve a security and defence-related objectives. These objectives can be viewed as the general presence and influence of EU in the region. More precisely, it can be viewed as the EU's position in Southeast Asia in relation to the positions of other powers. In this sense, increased presence of EU in the region can potentially serve as a counterbalance to the increasing influence of China and the US<fnref n="104" />. The EU, with increased political influence in the global sphere arising from its economic influence and necessity to become a more relevant economic player in Asia, has decided to increase its economic presence as well as its visibility<fnref n="105" />. In its communication in 2003, the Commission recognized the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region in world economy and the interests of the EU related to such developments<fnref n="106" />. It has been viewed that as the EU's trading partners are also increasing economic ties with ASEAN member countries, this could have a negative impact on the economic interests of the EU in the region, with the necessity of the EU to use both defensive and offensive economic strategies to increase its presence in Southeast Asia<fnref n="107" />.

<footnote n="101">¹⁰¹ *Ibidem*, p 154.</footnote>

<footnote n="102">¹⁰² Heiduk, F., "In it Together Yet Apart? EU-ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Cooperation After the Bali Bombings" Journal of European Integration, Vol. 36, No. 7, 2014, pp 703-704. Accessed through Tandfonline: https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.935361, Accessed: May 21st, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="103">¹⁰³ *Ibidem*, p 702.</footnote>

<footnote n="104">¹⁰⁴ Wu, C.-H., "The Evolution of EU-ASEAN Relations: Legal Framework and Policy Change" National Taiwan University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2013, p 333. Accessed through HeinOnline: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ntulr8&div=14&start_page=329&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=12&men_tab=srchresults, Accessed: May 19th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="105">¹⁰⁵ *Ibidem*, p 355.</footnote>

<footnote n="106">¹⁰⁶ *Communication from the Commission: A new partnership with South East Asia*, COM (2003) 399/4, 2003, p 6. URL: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc_116277.pdf, Accessed: May 19th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="107">¹⁰⁷ *Ibidem*, p 8.</footnote>
It is viewed that the EU wishes to become a major player in Southeast Asia with the help of partnership and cooperation agreements with individual ASEAN member states<fnref n="108" />. An interesting phenomenon is that even though initially, the EU signed the 1980 Cooperation Agreement with ASEAN, with the opportunity for the EU Member States to bilaterally sign agreements with ASEAN members, it has become the EU as a whole that signs agreements with individual ASEAN states<fnref n="109" />. Especially Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia have signed separate agreements with the EU<fnref n="110" />. These agreements tend to have more integration and deeper commitments than the general treaties with ASEAN as a whole<fnref n="111" />. On the basis of the partnership agreement with Vietnam, there is, nevertheless, issues with enforceability, especially in terms of human rights clauses, as no enforcement organs have been put into place<fnref n="112" />. This could also potentially prove relevant in terms of security and defence cooperation. The purpose of any agreement rests on the effect of such agreement, not merely on the declarations made. However, the difference between general ASEAN agreements and partnership agreements with individual members is the existence of legally binding provisions in the partnership agreements, especially in terms of counter-terrorism and also regarding the weapons of mass destruction and in addition, organized crime<fnref n="113" />. More narrowly, the EU has also engaged in bilateral cooperation with ASEAN members such as Vietnam and Indonesia<fnref n="114" />. Through such cooperation, it would be possible for the EU to gain greater role in this region as of now, this area is dominated by influence from the People's Republic of China and the United States<fnref n="115" />. Especially, when looking at the practice of the United States, it is apparent that the US also values and emphasizes bilateral agreements with ASEAN members more than with the organization in its entirety<fnref n="116" />,<fnref n="117" />. In terms of security and defence, these partnership agreements with individual states can be a useful way of progressing in this policy area. The partnership agreement signed with Indonesia puts a high emphasis on security cooperation<fnref n="118" />. In the sphere of security, the partnership agreement with Indonesia involves itself with issues regarding weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, organized crime and cooperation between authorities, among others<fnref n="119" />. In terms of weapons of mass destruction, the agreement obliges the parties to honour the existing agreements and obligations under those agreements as well as implement their commitments in internal level policies, also controlling export on the related products, with the sanctions being a possibility in case of a breach of those provisions<fnref n="120" />. The agreement also concerns cooperation in legal matters, with emphasis on legal effectiveness, extradition and signing of relevant international treaties as well as cooperation in counter-terrorism, featuring increased cooperation, border control and also information exchange<fnref n="121" />. The agreement further puts

<footnote n="108">¹⁰⁸ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., p 334.</footnote>

<footnote n="109">¹⁰⁹ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., p 337.</footnote>

<footnote n="110">¹¹⁰ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., pp 338-339.</footnote>

<footnote n="111">¹¹¹ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., p 339.</footnote>

<footnote n="112">¹¹² Wu, C.-H., op. cit., p 339.</footnote>

<footnote n="113">¹¹³ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., p 344.</footnote>

<footnote n="114">¹¹⁴ Reiterer, M., "The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Security in Asia" European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2014, pp 18-19. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.kluwer/eurofa0019&collection=kluwer&id=5&startid=&endid=26, Accessed: May 22nd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="115">¹¹⁵ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., p 344.</footnote>

<footnote n="116">¹¹⁶ Camroux, D., "Interregionalism or Merely a Fourth-Level Game? An Examination of the EU-ASEAN Relationship" East Asia, Vol. 27, 2010, p 60. Accessed through Springer.</footnote>

<footnote n="117">¹¹⁷ Reiterer, M., op. cit., p 5.</footnote>

<footnote n="118">¹¹⁸ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., p 345.</footnote>

<footnote n="119">¹¹⁹ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., p 345.</footnote>

<footnote n="120">¹²⁰ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., pp 345-346.</footnote>

<footnote n="121">¹²¹ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., p 346.</footnote>
commitments on parties to fight organized crime and corruption as well as money laundering<fnref n="122" />. Even though it may seem that the latter types of crimes are removed from the security and defence sphere, they have a high relevance to these policies. Organized crime can have significant connections to terrorism, both through facilitating trade of weapons as well as smuggling in terrorists and through direct financing. Corruption has a two-way negative influence on EU's objectives. Firstly, it can hamper EU's interests in the region by allowing other powers to gain leverage through endemic corruption in the region. Secondly, corruption at a lower level can lead to lax security standards that can threaten the security of EU territory, especially in relation to terrorism. Money laundering has relevance in terms of terrorism, with the possibility to hide money flows to terror organizations. Therefore, these topics are also highly relevant in the field of security and defence. The ability to counter those issues effectively can potentially allow the EU to safeguard its own security as well as the security of its citizens in Indonesia as well as to gain increased position in the Southeast Asia through combatting covered means of influence through corruptive practices. The inclusion of a large amount of specific fields of cooperation in economy, trade, environment and health matters<fnref n="123" /> can also have a role in increasing the EU's relevance in the region, through attaching the health of the Indonesian economy to a large degree to the EU market accessibility. The agreement also emphasizes the diversification of energy supply<fnref n="124" />. This can be an important tool that can potentially decrease the power of energy suppliers in the region and allow the greater presence of other powers such as the EU. The disputes in these areas are solved by a joint committee of the parties<fnref n="125" />. However, there might be issues regarding enforceability and dispute resolution.

Despite the increased cooperation, the enforcement measures in ASEAN can still raise questions<fnref n="126" />. Such consultative approach to dispute resolution can paralyze the organization's operative actions<fnref n="127" />. The differences between "Asian values" and the values of western states can have a large bearing on any increasing efforts to introduce binding and enforceable commitments as the ASEAN states appear to value non-interference to internal matters<fnref n="128" />,<fnref n="129" />. Insistence on sovereignty within ASEAN is a key characteristic of the organization<fnref n="130" />,<fnref n="131" />,<fnref n="132" />,<fnref n="133" />. Therefore, it

<footnote n="122">¹²² Wu, C.-H., op. cit., pp 346-347.</footnote>

<footnote n="123">¹²³ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., p 348.</footnote>

<footnote n="124">¹²⁴ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., p 348.</footnote>

<footnote n="125">¹²⁵ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., p 349.</footnote>

<footnote n="126">¹²⁶ Brown, R. C., "ASEAN: Harmonizing Labor Standards for Global Integration" UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, Vol. 33, 2016, p 63. Accessed through HeinOnline: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/uclapblj 33&div=6&start_page=27&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=54&men_tab=srchresults#, Accessed: May 23rd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="127">¹²⁷ Williams, M. R., "Asean: Do Progress and Effectiveness Require a Judiciary?" Suffolk Transnational Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2007, p 441. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/sujtnlr30&collection=journals&id=437&startid=&endid=462, Accessed: May 21st, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="128">¹²⁸ Wu, C.-H., op. cit., pp 358-359.</footnote>

<footnote n="129">¹²⁹ Tan, S. S., Nasu, H., "ASEAN and the Development of Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy in Southeast Asia" UNSW Law Journal, Vol. 39, Iss. 3, 2016, pp 1233-1237. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/swales39&collection=journals&id=1235&startid=&endid=1254, Accessed: May 22nd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="130">¹³⁰ Cocq, C., "Development of Regional Legal Frameworks for Intelligence and Information Sharing in the EU and ASEAN" Tilburg Law Review, Vol. 20, 2015, pp 64-65. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/tiflr20&collection=journals&id=62&startid=&endid=81, Accessed: May 20th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="131">¹³¹ Heiduk, F., op. cit., p 698.</footnote>

<footnote n="132">¹³² Camroux, D., op. cit., p 60.</footnote>

<footnote n="133">¹³³ Ewing-Chow, M., "Culture Club or Chameleon: Should ASEAN Adopt Legalization for Economic Integration?" Singapore Year Book of International Law and Contributors, Vol. 12, 2008, p 226. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/singa12&collection=journals&id=235&startid=&endid=248, Accessed: May 21st, 2018.</footnote>
appears that the enforcement of the provisions could still rely on the parties' wish to cooperate with each other, as the dispute resolution would be dependent on an action of the joint committee. It has been proposed that ASEAN should create its own judiciary to resolve disputes<fnref n="134" />,<fnref n="135" /> and that it should develop more legalistic nature<fnref n="136" />,<fnref n="137" />, measures that have not yet been taken, at least in any extensive way. Although there exists the Vientiane Protocol that allows for a more coherent dispute resolution, it has not been invoked<fnref n="138" />. It has been noted that the ASEAN practice has involved frequent disputes and avoidance of issues due to consensus policies<fnref n="139" />. The drafting of the ASEAN Charter was meant to alleviate this issue, but due to political differences between ASEAN members, it nevertheless does not contain any concrete and binding measures on implementation nor dispute resolution<fnref n="140" />,<fnref n="141" />. Yet, it is also viewed that with the recent attempts at intellectual property rules harmonization across ASEAN that establish a common goal but allow members to move towards that goal with their own pace, the ASEAN might be able to balance sovereignty issues with regional cooperation<fnref n="142" />. It is unlikely that the viewpoints of the ASEAN countries towards integration will change in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the separate agreements with individual member states of the region might seem to be a more effective solution for achieving EU's policy agendas in Southeast Asia.

Looking at instruments of ASEAN where the EU has not been the major actor, it is necessary to turn to the analysis of the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism. This Convention was adopted in 2007 as a rules-based approach towards the problem of terrorism<fnref n="143" />. The Convention was rapidly adopted as a way of tightening cooperation threatening the regional stability and perhaps making legal systems more consistent, with a view that cooperation is

<footnote n="134">¹³⁴ Williams, M. R., *op. cit.*, pp 456-457.</footnote>

<footnote n="135">¹³⁵ Koh, P. M. C., "*Foreign Judgments in Asean – A Proposal*" International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 45, Iss. 4, 1996, pp 854-856. Accessed through HeinOnline: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/incolq45&div=44&start_page=844&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=87&men_tab=srchresults#, Accessed: May 23rd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="136">¹³⁶ Ewing-Chow, M., *op. cit.*, p 226.</footnote>

<footnote n="137">¹³⁷ Davidson, P. J., "*The Asean Way and the Role of Law in Asean Economic Cooperation*" Singapore Year Book of International Law and Contributors, Vol. 8, 2004, pp 174-175. Accessed through HeinOnline: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/singa8&div=14&start_page=165&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=102&men_tab=srchresults#, Accessed: May 23rd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="138">¹³⁸ Woon, W., "*Dispute Settlement in ASEAN*" Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 1, 2013, pp 97-99. Accessed through HeinOnline: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/kjicl1&div=12&start_page=92&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=12&men_tab=srchresults#, Accessed: May 23rd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="139">¹³⁹ Khoo, N., "*Rhetoric vs. Reality – ASEAN's Clouded Future*" Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 5, Iss 2, 2004, pp 52-54. Accessed through HeinOnline: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/geojaf5&div=32&start_page=49&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=65&men_tab=srchresults#, Accessed: May 23rd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="140">¹⁴⁰ Leviter, L., "*The ASEAN Charter: ASEAN Failure or Member Failure*" New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 43, 2010, pp 193-199. Accessed through HeinOnline: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/nyuilp43&div=8&start_page=159&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=24&men_tab=srchresults#, Accessed: May 23rd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="141">¹⁴¹ Phan, H. D., "*Promoting Compliance: An Assessment of Asean Instruments since the Asean Charter*" Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, Iss. 2, 2014, pp 408-411. Accessed through HeinOnline: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/sjilc41&div=13&start_page=379&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=95&men cursor=srchresults, Accessed: May 23rd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="142">¹⁴² Ng, E. S.-K., "*ASEAN IP Harmonization: Striking the Delicate Balance*" Pace International Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1, 2013, p 159. Accessed through HeinOnline: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/pacinlwr25&div=9&start_page=129&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=69&men_tab=srchresults, Accessed: May 23rd, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="143">¹⁴³ Ahmad, A. R., "*The ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism 2007*" Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law (1 & 2), 2013, p 93. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/apjur14&collection=journals&id=97&startid=&endid=152, Accessed: May 20th, 2018.</footnote>
necessary<fnref n="144" />. However, it has been noted that instead of a community-wide approach, there has been more success in the adoption of bilateral measures individually between different ASEAN members such as a cooperation agreement between Malaysia and Thailand which has expanded from border control issues to military cooperation and agreement between Malaysia and Indonesia where cooperation has also expanded from combatting communist insurgencies to more extended border security cooperation, with both agreements having considerable actual implementation through joint operations and sharing information on intelligence matters, among others<fnref n="145" />. A question has been how such a bilateral approach adapts to the regional essence of a community such as ASEAN, with views that bilateral measures need to complement the general association measures<fnref n="146" />. Extensive attacks in 2001 and 2002 forced the international community and in that light ASEAN to take terrorism into focus and treat it differently from other forms of international crime<fnref n="147" />,<fnref n="148" />. It is seen that terrorism has significant international dimensions and attacks can potentially be planned and carried out in different countries<fnref n="149" />. However, the provisions regarding preparedness and state-sponsored attacks have been left out of the Convention<fnref n="150" />. As often the case in international conventions, the definitions appear to cause issues between governments. For this reason, the Convention merely claims the offences to be those covered in other international instruments on the matter<fnref n="151" />,<fnref n="152" />, despite the attention brought by some researchers on the necessity of clear definitions and effective cooperation, expressed before the Convention came into effect<fnref n="153" />. However, the Convention does specify some offences that fall under the Convention's effect, due to members of ASEAN agreeing with their terrorist nature<fnref n="154" />. Instruments adopted in ASEAN symbolize in their content the ASEAN's intergovernmental nature<fnref n="155" />. As already mentioned, the Convention appears to focus more on the punishment for offences rather than on preventing them<fnref n="156" />. There appears to be a lack of regulation on offences related to preparing the attacks in the scope of the Convention<fnref n="157" />. In that sense, a significant weakness is seen regarding the international conventions adaptation model of ASEAN's Convention, through the ban of these instruments to prosecute for terror attack planning that has not come to reality which can damage preventive measures and render them ineffective<fnref n="158" />. Recruitment by terror organizations was not added to the Convention<fnref n="159" />. Similarly, incitement for committing terror attacks was not added into the Convention<fnref n="160" />. One reason for the lack of such approach could be seen as the reluctance to affect

<footnote n="144">¹⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, pp 94-97.</footnote>

<footnote n="145">¹⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, pp 97-99.</footnote>

<footnote n="146">¹⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p 99.</footnote>

<footnote n="147">¹⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p 100.</footnote>

<footnote n="148">¹⁴⁸ Cocq, C., *op. cit.*, p 70.</footnote>

<footnote n="149">¹⁴⁹ Ahmad, A. R., *op. cit.*, p 103.</footnote>

<footnote n="150">¹⁵⁰ Ahmad, A. R., *op. cit.*, pp 103-104.</footnote>

<footnote n="151">¹⁵¹ Ahmad, A. R., *op. cit.*, pp 104-105.</footnote>

<footnote n="152">¹⁵² Cocq, C., *op. cit.*, p 60.</footnote>

<footnote n="153">¹⁵³ Rose, G., Nestorovska, D., "Towards an Asean Counter-Terrorism Treaty" Singapore Year Book of International Law and Contributors, Vol. 9, 2005, pp 157-189. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/singa9&collection=journals&id=165&startid=&endid=198, Accessed: May 20th, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="154">¹⁵⁴ Tofangsaz, H., "Confiscation of Terrorist Funds: Can the EU Be a Useful Model for ASEAN?" UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, Vol. 34, 2017, p 169. Accessed through HeinOnline: https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/uclapbj34&collection=journals&id=157&startid=&endid=222, Accessed: May 21st, 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="155">¹⁵⁵ Cocq, C., *op. cit.*, pp 60-61.</footnote>

<footnote n="156">¹⁵⁶ Ahmad, A. R., *op. cit.*, p 106.</footnote>

<footnote n="157">¹⁵⁷ Ahmad, A. R., *op. cit.*, p 109.</footnote>

<footnote n="158">¹⁵⁸ Ahmad, A. R., *op. cit.*, p 111.</footnote>

<footnote n="159">¹⁵⁹ Ahmad, A. R., *op. cit.*, p 115.</footnote>

<footnote n="160">¹⁶⁰ Ahmad, A. R., *op. cit.*, p 112.</footnote>
any existing measures taken in ASEAN states in the national level<fnref n="161" />. Indeed, some members have enacted their own specific legislation on terrorism and financing of terrorism<fnref n="162" />. It might be true that if the existing measures at the national level are sufficient and well-established, highly effective then new Convention norms to be introduced could potentially jeopardize the effectiveness of existing measures or introduce new and less effective measures. However, it has been noted that due to the international character of terrorism and related offences, it is important to have an international cooperation framework in place that would enable cooperation between the states to take place<fnref n="163" />. The resulting emphasis on the sovereignty of ASEAN members and their ability to control their own response to terrorism issues can cause considerable difficulties for the operational aspects of the Convention<fnref n="164" />. It has been noted that the application of the Convention can be difficult, demonstrating such difficulties through the example of Singaporean and Indonesian quarrel over antiterrorist measures<fnref n="165" />. However, it has also been noted that the attitude in ASEAN is beginning to change and the insistence of sovereignty and not interfering into national issues is nothing more than rhetoric<fnref n="166" />.

Looking at the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism, it is apparent that the Convention represents a new effort to regulate security-related matters in a community-based approach. However, the generalized nature of the Convention as well as lack of enforcement mechanisms as well as the omission of several key areas from the text of the Convention in an effort to maintain the rigid separation of sovereign powers has had a significant effect on the application of the Convention, both in theory and in practice. The diverse interests of different involved states and the lack of uniform measures could render attempts at achieving success in fight against terrorism rather non-existent. The inability of ASEAN itself to come up with a comprehensive regulation of a binding nature due to the unwillingnes of the parties to commit themselves to such agreements could be one of the leading causes of a cooled down cooperation in security and defence matters between ASEAN and the EU. This characteristic of Southeast Asian states could be the reason why separate agreements with participating countries have been more fruitful for both the EU and countries involved than any cooperation in the regional level. Considering this, it might be a good strategy to continue bilateral relations development which can become highly effective in achieving the intended security-related objectives in reality. Due to the economic power of the EU, it is possible for the Union to exert far greater political and economic pressure on a single willing ASEAN member state than on ASEAN as a whole, which has several members with diverse interests that are not always adaptable with those of the European Union.

## CONCLUSION

EU and ASEAN maintain relations within several areas, cooperating on a variety of policies. Through this cooperation, EU is attempting to fulfill its external objectives. External cooperation in security and defence matters is highly relevant for the Union, as it allows to forge alliances as well as increase the safety of European citizens by preventing transnational crime from entering into EU. As EU and ASEAN share some of their main concerns, especially regarding piracy and terrorism, the cooperation between these two entities has a special value.

<footnote n="161">¹⁶¹ Ahmad, A. R., op. cit., p 113.</footnote>

<footnote n="162">¹⁶² Tofangsaz, H., op. cit., pp 170-180.</footnote>

<footnote n="163">¹⁶³ Ahmad, A. R., op. cit., p 114.</footnote>

<footnote n="164">¹⁶⁴ Tan, S. S., Nasu, H., op. cit., p 1220.</footnote>

<footnote n="165">¹⁶⁵ Ahmad, A. R., op. cit., p 117.</footnote>

<footnote n="166">¹⁶⁶ Ahmad, A. R., op. cit., pp 118-119.</footnote>
The analysis of the existing cooperation, however, shows that the cooperation has mainly involved soft measures such as forums and workshops where EU authorities share their experiences with their ASEAN counterparts while any concrete measures in legally binding agreements are scarce, if any.

It appears that both the EU and ASEAN could be blamed for the appearance of such situation. Firstly, it is still not clear which competences does EU have in CFSP area. Secondly, it appears that the EU tends to lack clear foreign policy strategies with concrete objectives, which can perhaps partly be blamed on the conflicting interests of the Member States. Thirdly, it has been seen that the EU tends to favor bilateral, rather than regional, agreements, despite opposite rhetoric.

ASEAN, on the other hand, has issues relative to its essence and operating methods. The ASEAN way that focuses on consensus and dialogue rather than on legal framework prevents any deeper integration of the region as well as hampers the conclusion of more concrete agreements with enforceable measures with ASEAN's partners. This method of operation provides difficulties for the enforcement of any agreements as well as a lack of proper dispute resolution that would produce binding results.

In this context, it becomes clear that perhaps the EU's practice on focusing on bilateral agreements with ASEAN members is the correct path for as long as ASEAN has not become more deeply integrated that would allow concrete, legalized actions to be proceeded with.

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# EU-Israel Relations: an Analysis of the Most Challenging EU Foreign Relations

FRANCESCA COLOTTA

UNIVERSITY OF SIENA, ITALY

**Abstract:** The purpose of this research paper is to identify, through the study of the historical profile, the contemporary reasons which, over the years, have led to the alternation of criticism and support between the European Union and Israel. This analysis is then developed in the economic, political and diplomatic fields in order to clarify the conflictual aspects of this relation, with a focus on the most recent times. All is revised in light of the Neighbourhood Policy, implemented by the European Union, first treated with a general overview and then identified in relations with the Middle East, in which Israel plays an essential role.

**Keywords:** EU's Neighbourhood Policy, Middle East, Kippur War, Six Day War, Normative Power;

## INTRODUCTION

In a scenario of profound change as well as expansion of diplomatic relations, which there fore take on fundamental importance, it is crucial for one of the major political actors such as the European Union to forge closer and closer links with the other interlocutors. And this idea becomes decisively if we refer to relations with nations geographically close to the European Union, linked with it because of historical and cultural roots.<fnref n="1" /> In this context the main role is reserved to the European Union's Neighbourhood Policy with the aim of creating a single strategic framework integrated by the ENP action plans agreed with eleven of its partners, in which concrete mutual commitments are made, and by an intensified and constructive dialogue with almost all the partners. However, the set of partners participating in this political program is extremely heterogeneous, composing nations with very different backgrounds, and which determine more problematic and less linear relationships. And this problematicity becomes more acute if we consider countries involved in long-term conflicts, such as Israel that even though owner of a common heritage (compared to the European one), is in a controversial position due to its criticisable action in foreign policy. In this sense, this research paper aims to analyze the historical and contemporary trend of relations between the European Union and Israel in order to investigate the reasons that make, and have made in the past, the definitive association between the two countries hard to reach.

## A GENERAL OVERVIEW ON EUROPEAN UNION'S NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

The basic premise of relations between European Union and Israel can be found in the European Union's Neighbourhood Policy. It has as main goal to bring EU and its neighbours closer. Indeed "Through its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which has been revised in November 2015, the EU works with its Southern and Eastern Neighbours to foster stabilization, security and prosperity, in line with the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy" (European External Action web site: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en). The roots of the European neighborhood policy must be identified in the Barcelona process launched in 1995 with regard to the

<footnote n="1">¹ Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.</footnote>
Mediterranean countries and in all Community policies aimed at the countries of Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership created in Barcelona in 1995 established a stable framework of political, economic, social and cultural relations between the European Union and all other Mediterranean-facing countries, with the exception of Libya, admitted as an observer in the 1999. The initiative proceeded rather slowly, without very satisfactory results. The European Neighborhood Policy was outlined in 2003, in line with the preparation of the great enlargement of the European Union to the east and to the south in 2004. The objective of the neighborhood policy was to tighten relations with neighboring countries to the Union for which the possibility of joining the Union was not foreseen, at least in a near future. In 2008, the neighborhood policy was strengthened by the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean, which was supposed to relaunch the Barcelona process. However, the political events that have affected North Africa and the Middle East in the first months of 2011 require a profound revision of the European policies addressed to those countries.<fnref n="2" />

The countries to which the neighborhood policy is addressed are largely emerging or developing countries. They receive financial assistance from the European Union, but they are conditioned by compliance with certain requirements for respect for human rights and for the promotion of economic and political reforms. In addition to providing technical or financial assistance, the neighborhood policy often provides commercial agreements.<fnref n="3" />

The neighborhood policy is mainly implemented through bilateral agreements concluded between the European Union and the individual countries of Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean (Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Syria, Tunisia. Eastern European and Caucasus<fnref n="4" /> countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,<fnref n="5" /> Moldova, Ukraine). After the conclusion of an association agreement, the European Union prepares the draft for an action plan to be implemented over a period of three to five years, which is then approved together with the government of the country concerned. In addition to the bilateral action plans, the European Neighborhood Policy also takes place in two multilateral frameworks based on a regional basis: the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean.<fnref n="6" /> To the partners is guaranteed an easily access to the European internal market, better commercial conditions and financial assistance. European financial assistance is ensured by the "European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument", which has been operational since 2007. It is a cooperation instrument managed by EuropeAid – Cooperation Office.<fnref n="7" /> The European Neighborhood Policy was re-examined in 2015 to respond to new challenges related to the evolution of the situation in the EU's neighboring countries. The new European neighborhood policy has relaunched relations between the European Union and its eastern and southern neighbors, focusing more on stabilization, resilience and security. The long-term crises and geopolitical relevance of EU-neighboring countries underline the importance of having a solid political framework that strengthens political and economic relations with these countries. The review has reoriented the ENP in order to ensure a differentiated approach to the partners that takes note of the

<footnote n="2">² E. Wesselink, R. Boschma – “European Neighbourhood Policy: History, Structure, and Implemented Policy Measures”, 15 July 2016;</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ S. Gstöhl, S. Schunz – “Theorizing the European Neighbourhood Policy”, 16 December 2016;</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ For Caucasus, please see Chochia, A. (2012). The European Union and its policy towards the neighbors from South Caucasus. L'Europe unie/United Europe, 6, 27-35.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">5 For Georgia, please see Chochia, A.; Popjanevski, J. (2016). Change of Power and Its Influence on Country's Europeanization Process. Case Study: Georgia. In: Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Ed.). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy (197-210). Springer International Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Communication from the Commission – European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy paper (COM/2004/0373 final)</footnote>

<footnote n="7">7 Evaluation of the European Union's Support to two European Neighbourhood Policy Regions (East and South) – FINAL REPORT, Volume 2: Annexes 1-10, June 2013</footnote>
different level of aspirations of each country, a joint ownership based on both the needs of the partners and the interests of the European Union and greater flexibility in use of EU instruments. The new approach has been instrumental in relaunching the EU's relations with ENP partner countries, including through the negotiation and adoption of new partnership priorities and the constant updating of association agendas, focusing each time on the reports for coming years on areas of mutual agreement and mutual interest.<fnref n="8" /> Looking more closely at relations with Israel under this policy, what immediately emerges is the substantial difference with the other states taking part in it. In fact, it must not engage in political and economic reforms that improve the post-Soviet crisis. And at the same time it is much more developed than the other Mediterranean countries. This determines a very similar economic and social level between the two political actors that could potentially result in a closer relationship. However, it is precisely this parity that causes Israel not to rely on the EU in such a profound manner as the other nations that are part of the ENP. Indeed, Israel is very jealous of its autonomy and therefore does not allow the EU to arbitrarily apply its own conditionality.<fnref n="9" />

## HISTORICAL PROFILE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ISRAEL

Within the framework of this broader neighborhood policy, that is the instrument proposing stability and security objectives, as well as prosperity, for the regions adjoining its borders, the European Union has been engaged for some years in a process of collaboration with Lebanon, with Israel and with the Palestinian Authority. With the ambition therefore to contribute – encouraging the processes of democratization and economic growth in countries that were already or have become "our neighbors" – to pacify a conflict that for decades has divided the Middle East. And this ambition is justified by the close historical and cultural relationship between European and Israeli-Palestinian territories. The history of the Jewish people and the history of Europe have indeed been intertwined for many centuries. The Jewish culture has in fact laid the foundations for the establishment of the European identity itself through the important influences that it has had in the theological, philosophical and historical fields but also artistic and literary, in fact constituting the external culture more factually close to the European one.<fnref n="10" /> The Arab-Israeli conflict is in fact one of the most important issues addressed through political cooperation (EPC) by the European Union and for about two decades has been one of the fundamental themes for the newborn community. However, the first significant developments came in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when with the end of the Cold War, member states took the decision to deepen their partnership through a political union and a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and have therefore suggested a more active involvement of Europe in international affairs and Middle Eastern problems. The change was indeed extremely gradual and manifested itself through an increasing spread of awareness of the Palestinian reality, and consequently of the willingness to play a role in the resolution of the conflict through different instruments of intervention. The trend of this evolution was however far from constant and linear: the involvement was for a long time sporadic and occasional, alternated by some avant-garde positions that have paved the way for what is today the state of relations between the two actors.<fnref n="11" /> And these positions are taken on the basis of a pluralistic approach through the implementation of democracy, civil society and human rights as

<footnote n="8">⁸ European Commission – Press Release : The revised European neighborhood policy: support stabilization, resilience and security, Brussels 18 May 2017 – Url http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1334_en.htm ;</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ T. Schumacher, A. Marchetti, T. Demmelhuber – “The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy”, 2017</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ F. Terpan – “EU-Israel Relations: in Search of Coherent and Consistent EU Foreign Policy”, 22-24 April 2010;</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Aoun E. – “European Foreign Policy and the Arab Israeli Dispute: Much Ado about nothing”, 2003.</footnote>
well as pleading the incompatibility between the West and the South.<fnref n="12" /> Furthermore from the strict diplomatic point of view, however, this proximity has always been rather controversial. The diplomatic relations between the State of Israel and the European Union in particular – established in 1959 – were characterized by their movement on a wavering path that alternated moments of rapprochement and mutual understanding with moments of more or less intense dissension. Despite the overall trend, indeed, this relation has been oriented towards a constant strengthening of economic and cultural ties between the two actors this has not helped to settle certain divergences on the political level that, indeed, just after the deepening of the relationship, have always become more divisive. The first wide-ranging agreement – after two minors on trade dating back to 1964 and 1970 – signed on 11 May 1975, has been developed around three main objectives: 1) establishment of a free trade area on industrial products; 2) reduction of tariffs on imports of agricultural products from Israel; 3) cooperation between the signatories on the circulation of capital and transmission of technological, scientific and industrial knowledge.<fnref n="13" /> The deepening of the relations continued in the following years and led, on 20 November 1995, to the signing of the Association Agreement (in force since 1 June 2000) – at the same time as the start of the Barcelona process aimed at creating a partnership for the Mediterranean. The agreement replaced the previous one (1975) and prepared a strong strengthening of relations between the two actors because – besides having the aim of further expanding the areas of economic exchange and cooperation – it devotes much more space to the need for a active political dialogue aimed at better mutual understanding and stability of the Mediterranean area. The agreement includes, among others, the following objectives: 1) to set up an appropriate framework for political dialogue; 2) to expand the exchange of goods, services and capital by promoting a harmonious development of economic relations between the two countries and by intensifying cooperation in research and development; 3) to encourage regional stability by supporting peaceful coexistence and economic stability; 4) to promote cooperation in the remaining areas of mutual interest.<fnref n="14" />

Subsequently, the reports deepened further with the signing of numerous other agreements, including the one in 2009 for greater liberalization in the agricultural sector and the one that allowed the entry of Jerusalem into Horizon 2020, the largest EU program dedicated to research and innovation.<fnref n="15" />

The inclusion of Israel in the European Neighborhood Policy has allowed the further strengthening of relations between the two actors. Despite the progressive strengthening of bilateral relations, however, the tone of political confrontation between Israel and the European Community / European Union has not followed an equally positive line. On the contrary, frictions have persisted or grown over time. It is possible to try to explain these difficulties by dividing the scenario into three fundamental areas: the economic one, the political one and the one about the perception of the reciprocal operation between Israel and European institutions (as well as member countries that compose them).

## ECONOMIC FIELD

The incompatibility that animates the confrontation between Israel and Arab countries has also affected the relations between Israel and the European Union. Europe (especially the southern

<footnote n="12">¹² S. Panebianco – “A New Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Identity”, 2003.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ EU Rapid Press Release – Url: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-93-3_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Israel-EU Trade Agreement – November 1995 – Url : http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1990-1995/pages/israel-eu%20trade%20agreement%20-%20november%201995.aspx</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Israel and European Union sign agricultural agreement – Url: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/Israel_and_European_Union_sign_agricultural_agreement_4-Nov-2009.aspx</footnote>
part), indeed, is historically closely linked with the countries of the southern shores of the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf: first of all a substantial part of the energetic sources imported into Europe comes from there; secondly they represent one of the most relevant destinations for European (again mostly Southern) exports. Furthermore in these last years – they are one of the main duct through which migratory flows reaches European shores; The set of these areas and situations has constituted a battleground between Israel and the Arab countries to obtain the favor of European nations while seeing an almost total prevalence of the latter due to the decidedly lower economic weight of Israel (individually considered) and compared to the North African block.<fnref n="16" /> <fnref n="17" />

Emblematic to explain the concrete influence of this everlasting conflict on the economic field is the War of the Kippur, happened in 1973. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, backed by the support of the Arab world and in collaboration with Abu Sulayman Hafez al-Assad, President of Syria, decided to take advantage of the precious moment of religious fasting (for both Jewish and Muslims) to attack and reconquer the territories lost during the previous Arab-Israeli wars. However, the success of the Arab forces did not continue beyond October 11 and the war was officially declared ended by UN resolution 388, advocated by Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, which was followed by two other resolutions of the Security Council.

During the war, the Arab countries associated with OPEC (the "Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries") decided to support the military effort of Egypt and Syria by increasing the price of oil. They also increased the price of embargo of oil to the countries that had openly supported Israel (United States, Holland, Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia). In regard to countries that had limited themselves to taking anti-Arab positions, instead, the distribution of oil was recalculated with the effect that states could no longer import the amount of oil they really needed, but a different quantity, decided by the countries Arabs from OPEC and sold at a higher price than before the Yom Kippur war. This measure was applied to all European countries, with the exception of France, due to its pro-Arab alignment maintained during the conflict.<fnref n="18" />

In spite of the fact that the war did not register serious human losses, it had a heavy economic impact on the supply of energy sources that lasted until the end of the seventies. However, despite the economic threat, the attempt by the Arab countries to isolate Israel has failed and int the following years, the relations between Israel and European nations were immediately resold thanks to the signing of innumerable bilateral agreements.<fnref n="19" />

## DIFFERENT POLITICAL VIEWS WITHIN THE EU

The second area to be considered is deeply connected to the nature of the European Union itself. As a matter of facts, although not covering a geographically significant extent, the European Union consists of states with extremely heterogeneous backgrounds due to historical, cultural and geographical reasons. Due to the above mentioned reasons, it is determined a variable orientation of foreign strategies and policies already considering two different States. Therefore, although there are similarities and common aims within the European Union, it is impossible to even think to a common political and strategic vision to make agree all the twenty-eight member states until a new single sovereign entity will be created (as it was hoped by some of the founding fathers of the

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ EU-African Economic Relations: GIGA WP 82/2008;</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Embassy of Israel's Trade Affairs Report – Url: http://embassies.gov.il/eu/Departments/Pages/Trade%20affairs.aspx</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ A. Rabinovich – “The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East”, 4 October 2005.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ F. Terpan – “EU-Israel Relations: in Search of Coherent and Consistent EU Foreign Policy”, 22-24 April 2010</footnote>
European community itself). This is reflected – and has been reflected – in the overall position of the EU itself in regards to Israel.<fnref n="20" /> <fnref n="21" />

Indeed, the relations of the European states with Israel have followed an irregular trend, alternating moments of support and moments of deep criticism. Until the mid-1960s, Israel enjoyed the support of the main European countries – even if, for example, the United Kingdom did not recognize it de jure until 1950. However, since the Six Day War (1967) onwards, political relations have been animated by greater conflict. The "Six Day War" was a conflict that saw Israel as the protagonists on one side, and Syria, Egypt and Jordan on the other. Called so for its duration, it began on June 5, 1967, and contributed with its implications to define, in many aspects, the Middle East that we know today. In 1964 Palestine was reborn politically thanks to the creation of the PLO and in Damascus came to power the Ba'Th party, a party in favor of the armed Palestinian guerrillas. In late Syria and Jordan entered into an agreement to create a dam on the Jordan River, which would have reduced the water resources of Israel. The air raids implemented by Israel in response to these measures initiated the conflict.<fnref n="22" />

France and The United Kingdom found complex to support Israel due to the strong economic and historical relations between them and countries with a Muslim majority. In particular France, although it had a crucial role of supporting Israel during The Crisis of Suez Canal. As a matter of fact, the previous Suez Crisis of 1956 – which had its reason on the fight for the control of the homonymous canal – had left a strong climate of tension, not helped by the great political and military ambitions of Gamal Abd-El Nasser, the Egyptian president of that time, who after the failed attempt to nationalize the Suez Canal had nevertheless managed to consolidate its position in the Arab world, a position that prevented the friction between Israel and Egypt to subside. In this scenario, as mentioned, France strongly supported the Israeli part. However, in the intervening years between the Crisis of the Suez Canal and the Six Day War, this support gradually waned to concretize then in the position taken by France of strong condemnation of the actions of Israeli troops during the Six Day War.<fnref n="23" />

In addition to those States whose positions with regard to Israel are highly irregular, there are others that historically have shown a very strong support towards this nation. This is the case of Germany, which represents for Israel the main European ally. We must not forget the historical reasons that link these two nations and the obvious sense of guilt that the entire Germany has towards Jewish people. <fnref n="24" /> It is also true that, considered the restrictive German policies on immigration, there is no similar bond between this government and the North African block. Bond which we easily find with countries such as France and The United Kingdom.

Other European States were instead able to maintain a goos level of diplomatic and political relations with both the actors of this conflict. In one hand they supported the struggle of Israel on affirming its cultural heritage in a mostly Muslim surrounding but at the same time the advocated the Palestinian cause within the International Community. However, it is also primary to underline how these positions are gradually changing because of the latest political events.

The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union, therefore, and the assumption by Theresa May of the role of prime minister determined, besides a clear departure from Brussels Institutions, also a considerable rapprochement of the United Kingdom towards the policies

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Jewish Telegraphic Agency – Britain Grants De Jure Recognition to Israel, 28 April 1950.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ N. Tocci, “Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?”, 2008.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² R. B. Parker – “The Six-Day War: A Retrospective, University Press of Florida”, 1996;</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ The New York Times – When Israel and France Broke Up, 31 March 2010 – Url: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/opinion/01bass.html;</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Moment – Inside the Germany/Israel Relationship, 10 June 2014 – Url: https://www.momentmag.com/inside-germanyisrael-relationship/;</footnote>
implemented by the presidency of the United States, historical partner of Israel and a consequent rebirth relations between the two parties.<fnref n="25" /> In conclusion, what comes out from this brief analysis is that the different positions are reflected in the absence of a univocal European position and the clear difficulty for the Union to develop effective and non-contradictory policies towards Israel.

MUTUAL PERCEPTION

It is crucial, to deepen the relation between the two actors, to analyze the mutual perception. In this sense we should start this analysis from the base on which the European Union develops its external relations. This base is the concept of "normative power". This concept is chosen, due to the conviction according to which Brussels embodies a new type of international actor, able to deal with the International interlocutors through its objectives of peace, freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the principle of legality, which can be reached in the absence of coercive force. These values, together with other norms such as social solidarity or the principle of non-discrimination and sustainable development, expressed in the so-called Copenhagen Criteria of 1993, demonstrate the willingness to transpose at the regional level global values and make them become the object fundamental part of European action. The methods of dissemination of such parameters are numerous: from the use of informal means to those of identity, or to more classical methods that alternate the use of rewards or punishments (usually economic) to influence the other parts.<fnref n="26" /> With regard to Israel, she has moved exactly following this idea.

Demonstration of this is given by the various pressures made by Brussels in order to reach a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A concrete and decisive intervention is represented by the Venice Declaration (1980) in which the then EEC began to present itself as a privileged interlocutor in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The content of the declaration – recognition of the right of self-determination of the Palestinians and the request of Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories after the 1967 war – has, however, led to deterioration of Israeli positions towards the EU.<fnref n="27" />

In recent years, the issue has become increasingly divisive as the EU's political and economic pressure has not achieved the desired results and rather conflicts on issues such as settlements in the West Bank or Gaza have increased. But the struggle between the two parties manifests itself, once again, especially on an economic and commercial level. As an example we take the recent clash on the labeling of goods from Israeli settlements in disputed territories. The European Union, indeed, has stated that they can not be labeled as Made in Israel. Instead the label is requested with the words "product from West Bank (Israeli Settlement)". While the Union justified the measure as "technical and not political". Israel interpreted the decision as an attempt to boycott Israeli businesses.<fnref n="28" />

However, the difficulties that the European Union encounters in dealing with Israel has a much deeper origin.

First of all, the historical and political environments within which the European Union and Israel move are different. As a matter of fact, at least until the last few years, Europe has been

<footnote n="25">²⁵ The Times of Israel – Brexit will bring closer Israel-UK ties: https://www.timesofisrael.com/brexit-will-bring-closer-israel-uk-ties-british-envoy-says/</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ H. Larsen – The EU as a Normative Power and the Research on External Perceptions: The Missing Link, 11 December 2013.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ A. Persson – The EU and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict 1971–2013: In Pursuit of a Just Peace, 2015.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ BBC News – EU sets guidelines on labelling Israeli settlement goods: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34786607</footnote>
immersed in an historical scenario dominated by stability, absence of war and rampant development of economy and law. On the other hand we find instead a State that is the protagonist of one of the few still persistent conflicts of the modern age and therefore considers that impulses of security field can not be set aside in order to obtain economic benefits. The security-economy trade off is easy to solve for Israeli policy makers. Furthermore, Europeans struggle to understand Israeli perception. Indeed, Israel is historically and geographically the only non-Muslim country in the North African area. And this fact has led to an open hostility implemented by all the neighboring states that, as already mentioned above, have tried to isolate it politically and economically. Furthermore it is necessary to consider the permanent danger that such hostilities determine in that area and therefore the consequence consists in the security issue considered as a priority. For these reasons and to avoid becoming a victim of history again, Israel has also developed a vigorous position.

Therefore, while the European Union uses mainly soft power tools as to interact with the international community, Israel is definitely more oriented towards hard power. Moreover, hard power is the only means of survival for a state that, like Israel, has to deal with powerful international players.<fnref n="29" />

This conviction does not facilitate the development of a relationship based on mutual trust that is essential for successful negotiations. The use of "normative power", therefore, not only did not lead to relationship based on mutual trust that is essential for successful negotiations, but on the contrary, seems produce exactly the opposite effect.<fnref n="30" />

## CONCLUSIONS

The current relations between Israel and the European Union are well summarized in the speech by Lars Faaborg-Andersen – EU Ambassador in Israel – to the Jerusalem Post Diplomatic Conference: «Let me start by saying that the EU and Israel might have some disagreements on this or that political issue [...] But this should not overshadow the deep and close relations we have developed over the decades on economic and trade matters». In the statement are listed important results of cooperation between Israel and the European Union, from economic to technological exchange. It is useful, however, to try to analyze the evolution of relationships in the other way round. Rather than being satisfied with the growth reached in economic-scientific fields in spite of the disagreements in the political sphere, we should start to wonder why this process did not bring the desired results in this last field. The answer could be contained precisely in the analysis of use of "normative power": indeed, it seems to fit adequately in situations of stability and absence of threats but becomes less and less expendable if the conditions that are reversed. It is logical, therefore, to expect that as long as the EU tries to interface with Israel by adopting this framework, the results will continue to be scarce – as the Israelis have a sort of political and historical obligation to place the challenges of their security in a priority position, as it has already said. All the various challenges with which the European Union has had to act in the last years – migration crisis, the Ukrainian crisis and the breakdown of the internal unity – has reported it, however, fully within a frame of historical changes and this could bring the two actors also on the political level to a narrower bond. Moreover, Israel represents an indispensable partner for the European foreign policy that must therefore be kept within the most privileged ones also for its essential role in the relation with today's US Presidency. Therefore if the European Union wants to adapt to the new scenario in which it is now inserted, it will necessarily have to replace, at least partially, the

<footnote n="29">²⁹ S. Pardo, J. Peters – “Israel and the European Union: A Documentary History”, 2012</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Harpaz G., Shamis A., “Normative Power Europe and the State of Israel: An Illegitimate Eutopia”, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies.</footnote>
innovative idea of "normative power" with a more classical – and pragmatic – vision of international relations.<fnref n="31" /> Likewise, the European Union can not completely overlook the Palestinian question, which has become even more severe in the last few months after the latter's deny to alignment with the recognition provided by the United States. Indeed, this would mean not only disregarding a path of pacification and mediation that lasted decades, and above all, recognize the intrinsic superiority of the US-Israel axis. The most reasonable solution therefore seems to be to concentrate the efforts of both parties in the directions in which the common visions are more solid, just as economic and commercial ones. In order to create bonds that allow a subsequent (and necessary) open dialogue on the most controversial issues.

If this scenario should materialize, Israel and the European Union could find a way to understand themselves on the political level and, consequently, undertake a process of improvement of their relations in this sense similar to that undertaken on the economic, scientific and technological level.

## REFERENCES

Aoun, E. (2003) *European Foreign Policy and the Arab Israeli Dispute: Much Ado about nothing*

Asseburg, M. (2003) *The EU and the Middle East Conflict: Tackling the Main Obstacle to Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*

Chochia, A. (2012). *The European Union and its policy towards the neighbors from South Caucasus. L'Europe unie/United Europe, 6, 27–35.*

Chochia, A.; Popjanevski, J. (2016). *Change of Power and Its Influence on Country's Europeanization Process. Case Study: Georgia*. In: Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Ed.). *Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy* (197–210). Springer International Publishing.

Gerstenfeld, M. (2006) *European-Israeli relations: between confusion and change?*

Gstöhl, S., Schunz, S. (2016) *Theorizing the European Neighborhood Policy*.

Haïm, Y., Newman, D. (2008) *The EU in the Israel-Palestine Conflict*.

Harpaz, G., Shamis, A. *Normative Power Europe and the State of Israel: An Illegitimate Utopia, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*.

Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). *Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy*. Springer International Publishing.

Larsen, H. (2013) *The EU as a Normative Power and the Research on External Perceptions: The Missing Link*.

Panebianco, S. (2003) *A New Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Identity*.

Pardo, S., Peters, J. (2012) *Israel and the European Union: A Documentary History*.

Persson, A. (2015) *The EU and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict 1971–2013: In Pursuit of a Just Peace*

Rabinovich, A. (2005) *The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East*

Schumacher, T., Marchetti, A., Demmelhuber, T. (2017) *The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy*.

Terpan, F. (2010) *EU-Israel Relations: in Search of Coherent and Consistent EU Foreign Policy, 22-24 April 2010*

Tocci, N. (2008) *Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?*

Wesselink, E., Boschma, R. (2016) *European Neighbourhood Policy: History, Structure, and Implemented Policy Measures*

<footnote n="31">³¹ M. Gerstenfeld, “European-Israeli relations: between confusion and change?”, 2006.</footnote>
# European Union and Japan: Past, Present and Future of External Relations

ALEKSANDR STEMPITSKII

TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, ESTONIA

## Abstract:

### INTRODUCTION

The next year will mark the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of external relations between Japan and the European Union. However, despite this anniversary, relations between Japan and Europe have a much bigger age, since they began to take shape over several centuries before the creation of the European Union, and before the two world wars that preceded it.

In this scientific work, the established goal is to study the external relations of Europe and Japan that took place in the history of these two regions since the XVI century, as well as their relations in the modern period. Then, based on this, possible way of developing external relations between the European Union and Japan in the foreseeable future will also be analyzed.

The primary research question of this paper is 'will the future of the Euro-Japanese external relations be positive?' The current research paper will answer this question. The primary research method for this work is analytical research. The research object are academic book articles, which cover relevant topics connected with external relations between Europe and Japan.

The first chapter of this work will focus on the history of the external relations between Europe and Japan, covering almost five hundred years of history (from the XVI century to the end of the XX century), starting with the first contacts between Europeans and Japanese, modernization of Japan, rise of the Japanese imperialism, Japanese defeat in WWII, and the post-war period of external relations between the European Community and Japan. The second chapter will focus on external relations between Japan and the European Union today. It will take into account economic and political challenges of the today's world. Summary of the research paper will give the answer on the research question.

### RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND EUROPE IN THE PAST

#### *First Contacts Between Japanese and Europeans*

This chapter will describe the very first contacts that occurred between the inhabitants of the Japanese islands and the Europeans who first visited these territories. Particular attention will be paid to the technical inventions and innovations that the Japanese were able to adopt and adapt to their own needs, making the first steps to modernisation of their country and the emergence of Japan as a global power.

The first Europeans to visit Japan were the Portuguese sailors who landed in 1542 on the island of Tanegashima, lying to the south of Kyushu. This island was the first place where the Japanese were able to get acquainted for the first time with firearms, which played a noticeable, although not decisive, role in future battles for the unification of the country. These guns were the very first technical borrowing from Europe. The Japanese managed to establish their production in a quick way, while calling them "tanegashima," by the name of the island, where the Portuguese landed. In addition, Portuguese sailors paved the way for traders and Catholic missionaries, who
soon began to arrive in Japan. However, as a result of the actions of Europeans, a revolt broke out
in Japan in Shimabara, which led to the closure of the country.<fnref n="1" />

For almost a century, until 1636, when the decree of the shogun was proclaimed, which prohibited the Japanese from leaving their homeland under pain of death, and the access of foreigners to the country was practically closed, relations with Europe developed quite intensively. The Japanese fellowship with European civilization had an ambiguous impact on the country, which was exhausted by the continuous internal turmoil. The horizons of geography and cognition moved apart. The Japanese began to quickly learn all the new inventions and ideas that they could get from Europe. One of the first European books, translated into Japanese, which was published in 1593, was the book of fables of Aesop. Prohibited during the period of the isolation of Japan, the fables were preserved by the people in the form of folklore and fairy tales, and many of them are still considered popular now. The Japanese showed great interest in technology and in the exact sciences and, above all, in firearms and the art of navigation. Although, after the closure of the country, the rifles continued to be used in the widest possible way, the art of navigation was soon placed under strict prohibition.<fnref n="2" />

The closure of the country was primarily due to the internal political struggle – the central government looked with suspicion at the rise of southern clans, which became rich because of trade with Europe. As for the lack of religious tolerance, the pragmatic Japanese were concerned not so much with the dogmas of Catholicism that placed Rome above loyalty to the master, but rather the possibility that Christianity could become an instrument of the colonization of the country by European powers. The Japanese knew well that the Spanish soldiers followed the missionaries to the Philippines. In 1565, they turned the country into a colony of King Philip II.<fnref n="3" />

In the Europeans' views about Asia, Japan usually was in the shadow of China. In the XVIII century, European philosophers attracted the ancient history of China, and mention of this country can be found in the works of Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Leibniz. Japan remained an absolutely closed country, information about which was extremely scarce. Only Germanic physicians Philipp Franz von Siebold and Engelbert Kaempfer, who visited the Dutch trading post of Decima in Nagasaki, wrote about the history and nature of Japan. In the first edition of the British Encyclopaedia in 1771, it was only said "Japan is an island lying between 130 degrees and 144 east longitude and 30 and 40 degrees north latitude." At the same time, the Encyclopaedia has given eight pages to China.<fnref n="4" />

***The Role of Europeans in Modernisation of Japan***

Japan's self-isolation for 300 years has not been able to completely break off contacts with Western countries. After a while, representatives of Western civilization again arrived in Japan, interrupting the policy of isolation and, thus, opening the country for new technologies and ideas.

Priority of the second discovery of Japan in the middle of the XIX century belongs to the Americans, but Europeans immediately took advantage of the opportunity to return to Japan. The system of so-called "unequal treaties", which were imposed on the Japanese by the Americans and Europeans, who actually copied the agreements they concluded with China, did not last too long. The rapid development of Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century not only made Europeans and Americans to abandon their plans for colonization of Japan, but also placed Japan on a par with the leading imperialist powers. Already in 1894, when Japan began a war with China for control of Korea, the British, and after them other countries, including the United States, agreed

<footnote n="1">¹ Nosov M.G. (2008). EU and Japan: Relations Without Conflicts. Modern Europe, Vol.2 (34), Mironenko V.I. (Ed.), Moscow. Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, pp 8-9</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Ibidem, p. 9</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Ibidem, pp. 9-10</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Ibidem, p. 10</footnote>
with the Japanese demand to abandon the system of extraterritoriality that they received in the context of "unequal" treaties with Japan.<fnref n="5" />

The ties between Japan and the world's leading countries were becoming very intense. At the shipyards of England and France until the beginning of the 1890s, the Japanese navy was built. British naval officers trained Japanese sailors, and German instructors trained army officers. Americans have helped in the creation of the banking system, the first livestock farms, contributed to the formation of a modern education system, and taught Japanese the arts of engineering. The Japanese first learned the European shipbuilding system in 1854, participating in the construction of the ship in Shimoda, together with the crew of the shipwrecked shipyard Diana from the coast of Japan. All this led to a sharp increase in interest in Japan, relations with which at that time were seen as contacts between a "benevolent teacher" and "diligent student," and the Japanese were seen by the world as a nation of "hardworking people who are very capable of modernization."<fnref n="6" />

The formation of mutual representations about each other was to no small extent facilitated by visits by the Japanese to the United States and Europe. The Japanese government at the end of the XIX century adopted an extensive program of sending students to overseas colleges and universities. Due to a fairly careful selection of the students sent, their diligence and perseverance in obtaining knowledge produced the most positive impression on hospitable hosts. After the "discovery" of the country in the middle of the XIX century, Japan found itself in a difficult situation. To say that all the years of isolation the country remained at the level of the Middle Ages would be unfair. By the beginning of the XVIII century, Kyoto and Osaka were among the largest cities in the world, while Edo, with a population exceeding one million people, was the largest city in the world. Half the population of Japan was literate, which, at that time was the highest level in the world. Handicrafts and trade flourished, and the political system was constantly in the process of modernization. However, the contacts that began with the West clearly convinced the Japanese that in two and a half centuries of isolation from the rest of the world, the country lagged far behind the technical level of Europe and America.<fnref n="7" />

Nevertheless, despite the huge backlog from the colonial powers in almost all economic indicators, Japan quickly entered modern civilization, mastered new technologies and a new ideology. The first silk factory in Japan was opened in 1873 using entirely French equipment. In 1910, Japan came out on top in the world for the export of silk yarn. In 1882, the first cotton spinning mill was built in Japan, and in 40 years Japan became the world's largest seller of cotton goods. The Western way of life entered the country with the first 197 telephone numbers in 1890, the first long-distance telephone connection between Tokyo and Osaka in 1899, with the import of the first car in 1900, and with the construction of a tram line between the Tokyo districts of Shimbashi and Shinagawa in 1903. October 14, 1872 in the presence of the Emperor, the first railway between Tokyo and Yokohama was opened.<fnref n="8" />

Even after the "discovery" of Japan in the middle of the XIX century, Europe paid much less attention to it than to China, which seemed to Europeans an immense market for the sale of goods. Japan was smaller and, which is more important, was building its own industry, which reduced its import potential. The West, who helped the Japanese in modernization, looked at Tokyo as a junior partner, whose development was still much inferior to Europe. Only after its war with China in 1894-1895 and Russia in 1904-1905, West started looking on Japan seriously and with caution. Japan, on the one hand, was perceived as a "yellow danger", on the other – still as an exotic country of geishas, chrysanthemums and samurai. Rapid militarization of the country, its aggressive

<footnote n="5">⁵ Ibid., p 10</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Ibid., p 11</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Ibid., p 11</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Ibid., p 12</footnote>
policy in China and in Asia strengthened the notion of Japan in Europe as an insidious and unpredictable country that does not fit into the European notions of law and democracy.<fnref n="9" />

As for Japan, its attitude towards Europe after the country's opening also changed. Mistrust and fear of foreigners were superimposed on the desire to borrow from them what determined their strength and power. The Japanese were ready to learn from Europe and America, and that became part of state policy. Between 1868 and 1900, Japan hosted about 2,400 foreign experts, mostly from the UK, who worked as advisers in state institutions. The Japanese not only copied Western manners, clothes, and culinary recipes, but also systematically and persistently studied the Western economy, science, industry, and military affairs. As a result, Japan not only won military victories over China and Russia, but also became one with the world's biggest powers. However, Westernization was accompanied by the growth of Japanese nationalism and chauvinism in the 1930s, which eventually led to the war of Japan with the West.<fnref n="10" />

The principle ‘Fukoku Kyōhei’ (Enrich the state, strengthen the military) was proclaimed as the official ideology. By creating a powerful military machine, Japan very soon rose to the path of colonial conquests, which was traditional for the Western powers. However, not a long time ago, Japan itself almost became a victim of Western colonialism. In 1874, Japan captured Taiwan. In 1876, Japan sent a naval squadron to Korea, and under the fear of guns, Korean authorities were forced to "open" the country and concluded Ganghwa Treaty with Japan.<fnref n="11" /> In 1879, Japan annexed the Ryukyu Islands. In 1894, Japan started a war with China, the continuation of which was the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905. In 1910, Korea was turned into a Japanese colony. The aggression, which was launched in 1931 against China eventually led to the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 and resulted in Japan's defeat in World War II.<fnref n="12" />

## Japan and Europe after World War II

For Japan, the beginning of the second half of the XX century turned out to be a difficult period. The country experienced a period of occupation, which contributed to the formation of special relations with the United States. This was the time of the first steps in the international arena, and the overcoming of the general malevolence toward the countries that suffered defeat in the war. Thus, despite the application for accession to the GATT in 1952, in 1953, because of stubborn resistance from European countries, especially Great Britain, only temporary membership was granted to Japan. Even a temporary membership for Japan was possible only because of the strong pressure on the organization by the United States. However, already in 1956, Japan received permanent membership in the GATT.<fnref n="13" />

After the end of World War II, Japan did not take too much of the minds of Europeans, who were absorbed in their own problems. Only in the late 1950s the Japanese "economic miracle" made Europe think about the future of its relations with this country. In 1956, Japan built ships more than the Great Britain, which was the world's shipbuilding leader of the past. Next year, Japan came in first place in the world for steel production. Later, in the 1960s, it overtook Italy, Great Britain, France and Germany in terms of GDP. In the late 1970s, Japan became the second largest economy in the world after the United States of America. The chain of these events lead to creation of the

<footnote n="9">⁹ Ibid., p 10</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Ibid., pp 10-11</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Afonin B.M. (2015). Japan and formerly opposing states upon end of World War II. Russia and Asia-Pacific Region, Vol.3 (89), Larin V.L. (Ed.), Vladivostok. Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, p 23</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Nosov M.G. (2008). EU and Japan: Relations Without Conflicts. Modern Europe, Vol.2 (34), Mironenko V.I. (Ed.), Moscow. Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, p 12</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Karenin D.M. (2009). Modern relations between Japan and Great Britain. Yearbook of Japan, Vol.38, Strel'tsov D.V. (Ed.), Moscow. Interregional public organization "Association of Japaneseologists", p 39</footnote>
image of Japan in Western countries as an "economic beast", irrepressible and ruthless in its quest to conquer new markets. These ideas were based on the real economic successes of Japan, and still alive memories of the aggressiveness of the Japanese militarists in the 1930s and 40s. At the same time, post-war Japan became the closest ally of the United States and an important part of Western democratic world, which required the strengthening of political relations between Europe and Japan. The growing volume of economic ties and the intensification of trade competition also dictated the need for dialogue.<fnref n="14" />

The active development of economic relations between Western Europe and Japan began in the second half of the 1960s. It was associated, on the one hand, with the Japanese "economic miracle" and the processes of liberalization of its economy and foreign trade, and on the other – the weakening of customs barriers within the established in 1957 of the European Economic Community (EEC). Over the decade from 1966 to 1977, the volume of Japanese-West European trade increased more than six-fold, while the EEC in 1977 accounted for 68% of Japan's export to Western Europe and 75.8% of imports from this region. The main partners of Japan in Western Europe were the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain. A characteristic feature of bilateral trade in the 1970s was a significant negative balance of Western Europe in trade and an asymmetric role of partners in the trade turnover between Europe and Japan. If in the 1960s, Europe had a positive balance in trade with Japan, Japan's surplus with the Old World increased from $ 926.5 million in 1970 to $ 21.4 billion in 1980, more than half of which accounted for the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and France. At the same time, despite the fact that from 1970 to 1980 the volume of bilateral trade increased from $ 2.9 billion to $ 21.4 billion, Western Europe accounted for 12-13% of Japan's turnover, while the Japanese share in European trade in the late 1970s remained below 2%. This was explained, first of all, by a high place of interregional trade in the European commodity turnover.<fnref n="15" />

The problem of trade imbalance has become a key point of negotiations between Western Europe and Japan at the level of representatives of business circles and at the highest level. In 1969 negotiations began between Japan and the EEC. The first attempt to reach an agreement was unsuccessful. Japan categorically refused to include in the agreement with the EEC contained in its bilateral agreements with France and the UK items that limit its exports. Starting from 1973, regular consultations started twice in a year, alternately in Brussels and Tokyo. In 1974, the parties exchanged official representations. In November 1977, the Commission of the European Communities issued an ultimatum requirement to Japan in order to make it to reduce its exports to the EEC countries, threatening otherwise to allow member countries to take the protective measures they deem necessary, based on their own interests. Yielding to the pressure, Japan announced some easing of the import legislation and limiting the supply of steel products and cars to the Western European markets. Under pressure from Brussels and Washington, Japan was forced to liberalize the capital market, which resulted in a significant appreciation of the yen. However, all these measures did not lead to a reduction in the West European trade deficit with Japan, which throughout the 1980s was at the level of $ 20 billion.<fnref n="16" />

During the period after the Second World War, Japan paid attention primarily to the United States in its foreign policy, while Europe remained on the periphery of Japanese interests. From 1945 to 1955, Japan's political institutions were rebuilt according to American models, and America before the so-called "Nixon shocks" in 1971 remained at the top of the popularity ratings of opinion polls in Japan. At the same time, cooling in American-Japanese relations was one of the reasons for

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Nosov M.G. (2008). EU and Japan: Relations Without Conflicts. Modern Europe, Vol.2 (34), Mironenko V.I. (Ed.), Moscow. Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, pp 13-14</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Ibid., pp 12-13</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ Ibid., p 13</footnote>
the creation of the Tripartite Commission on the basis of the "New Atlantic Charter", proclaimed in 1973 by the US Secretary of State, G. Kissinger, designed to coordinate the policy of the United States, Western Europe and Japan. In many respects, the increase in the level of relations between Tokyo and Brussels was due to the recognition of Japan as an equal partner.<fnref n="17" />

Until 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed and the European Union was established, Japan did not perceive Western Europe as a single political and economic space, although every year it expanded its exports to European countries. For the countries of Western Europe, Japan's economic role grew with the strengthening of its economic potential, and in terms of politics they were also brought together by the fact that in their foreign policy they were primarily oriented towards the United States.<fnref n="18" />

With the end of the Second World War and the defeat of the Japanese Empire, the Japanese government radically changed the political course of the country. Militarism and nationalism were replaced by institutions created in accordance with the American model. A new, democratic model of society was adopted. At the same time, there was a great need for post-war reconstruction of the country. Thanks to the efforts made, the phenomenon of the "economic miracle" took place, which became one of the reasons for establishing links between the European Economic Community and Japan. On the one hand, of course, there were various disagreements, but on the other hand, this did not prevent the strengthening of relations between the two geopolitical players.

## RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND EUROPE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The institutional basis for relations between the EU and Japan remains the "Joint Declaration of the EU and Japan", which was adopted in Hague in 1991 and the Ten-Year Plan of Action for 2001 "Shaping Our Common Future."<fnref n="19" /> This was the first attempt to establish the goals and scope of the political dialogue between the EU and Japan and build a comprehensive relationship between the two partners, which was for a long time dominated mainly by economic or trade disputes.<fnref n="20" /> The regular EU-Japan summits, created in the framework of the 1991 Joint Declaration on the Relationship between the European Community and its Member States and Japan, became more significant after 1996, when the first joint statement for the press was discussed.<fnref n="21" /> The Hague Declaration calls for an all-out expansion of relations. The end of the confrontation between the USSR and the US gave rise to a certain euphoria in both Europe and Japan in questions about moving away from the block structure and reducing the binding of the economy and politics to the position of the United States.<fnref n="22" />

As Japanese Foreign Minister Yōhei Kōno said in 2000, "the new decade of the 21st century will be the decade of European-Japanese cooperation." However, the development of international relations after September 11, 2001, confirmed the preservation of American leadership in the context of the fight against terrorism. The leadership, which extended to virtually all spheres of politics and economy. The Hague Declaration was supplemented by the more specific "Joint Plan of Cooperation between the EU and Japan" adopted in December 2001. This vast document

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Ibid., p 14</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ Ibid., p 12</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ Karenin D.M. (2007). Japan and Germany: cooperation in the format of the European Union. Yearbook of Japan, Vol.36, Strel'tsov D.V. (Ed.), Moscow. Interregional public organization "Association of Japaneseologists", p 103</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Reiterer M. (2004). Japan-EU relations after EU enlargement. Asia Europe Journal, Vol.2, Heidelberg. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, p 33</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Keck J. (2006). Renewed strength of the Japanese economy and Japan-EU relations. Accessible: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10308-006-0080-4.pdf (22.05.2018), Springer-Verlag, p 328</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Nosov M.G. (2008). EU and Japan: Relations Without Conflicts. Modern Europe, Vol.2 (34), Mironenko V.I. (Ed.), Moscow. Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, p 22</footnote>
identified over a hundred areas of possible cooperation from peacekeeping to scientific exchange, which were divided into four sections: maintaining peace and security, strengthening economic and trade partnerships, focusing on global and social change, rapprochement of peoples and cultures. The document, which lacked any specific program of cooperation, was comprehensive and therefore sufficiently declarative.<fnref n="23" />

The parties annually hold high-level meetings in which the Chairman of the Commission of the European Communities, the President of the European Council and the Prime Minister of Japan participate. In addition to the summits, the parties held political meetings twice a year, in which the Japanese Foreign Minister and the EU Three took part at the level of representatives of the Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Regular consultations have been also held between senior officials of the European Commission and the Government of Japan at the level of the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Monitoring Group for the implementation of arrangements under the Action Plan and various joint commissions and groups with the participation of experts. The parties hold annual parliamentary meetings. In 2004, a strategic dialogue on the problems of Asia was launched, and in 2005 – on the problems of Central Asia.<fnref n="24" />

As for the political relations between the EU and Japan, then, as the 15th EU-Japan summit held in Tokyo in April 2006 demonstrated, their points of view on the problems of international relations practically coincide. They fully agreed on common positions on resolving the situation in Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, North Korea, Sri Lanka, and the Balkans. They demonstrated a common approach to Russia and Belarus. The only thing that they dispersed is the question of the abolition of the EU embargo on the export of arms to China, against which Tokyo sharply objected. When the EU and China began talking about "strategic partnership" in September 2003, Japan began to show serious concern over the development of relations between Brussels and Beijing. This made the EU raise the status of bilateral partnership with Japan. In December of the same year, the European Security Strategy included Japan as one of the "strategic partners of the EU", and in April 2006 Barroso, speaking at the Japanese University of Keio, said that "Japan and the EU are natural strategic partners sharing common values and approaches to the problems of international relations."<fnref n="25" />

Regarding the international security policy, Japan is moving towards the export of security, but relations between Japan and the United States are still connected with the principle of burden sharing and security import, which is dictated by potential threats from North Korea, China and, possibly, Russia.<fnref n="26" /> At the same time, officials in Japan constantly emphasize that Japan is not a militaristic state, despite having enormous economic potential. In the 1990s, the term "civilian power" appeared among Japanese foreigners. The authors of the above report, dedicated to the goals of Japan in the 21st century, finally decided to give this term a doctrinal form, which resulted in the emergence of the concept of a "civil power". (In the Japanese press, it is more often referred to as the "Global Civil Power".)<fnref n="27" />

The annual EU-Japan summits, on the one hand, analyze the achievements in the development of bilateral relations, and, on the other, set new tasks for the future. Although the joint communiqué is full of general declarations and the statement of quite obvious considerations – "the need to preserve peace and security," "the continuation of the dialogue in the sphere of development

<footnote n="23">²³ Ibid., p 22</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Ibid., p 22</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Ibid., pp 22-23</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Zimmermann H. (2008). Trading Security in Alliances: Japanese and German Security Policy in the New Millennium. Current Politics and Economics of Asia, Vol.17(1), Amy Verdun (Ed.), Victoria, The University of Victoria, p 147</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Arin O.A. (2014). Japan and the Theory of International Relations. Yearbook of Japan, Vol.43, Strel'tsov D.V. (Ed.), Moscow. Interregional public organization "Association of Japaneseologists", p 64</footnote>
of cooperation," "the development of cooperation in the sphere of culture," etc., the communiqué to some extent reflects unresolved problems of relations between Brussels and Tokyo.<fnref n="28" />

Despite the fact that relations with the EU take an increasingly important place in Japanese politics on an official level, the perception of the Union is still rather ambiguous. The inertia of giving traditional importance to relations with large countries of Europe, like Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, is maintained. In Tokyo, probably until now, there is no complete clarity about the mechanism for making all-European decisions, which is to no small extent facilitated by the complexity of the bureaucratic system of the Union. The shift of Japan's attention to the EU on bilateral relations was stimulated by the failure of the constitutional referendum. Although Japan also speaks of the EU as a "strong partner", relations with Brussels are not a political priority comparable to relations with the US or China. On the one hand, this is determined by the "well-being" of relations with the EU and the absence of serious problems in them, on the other – the preservation of close ties of Japanese policy to the United States and the special attention that Japan pays to relations with neighboring China. To this, one can add that the differences in the policies of the EU countries on the issue of the US invasion of Iraq have largely undermined Japan's willingness to deal with the EU as a representative of a united Europe.<fnref n="29" />

At the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, relations between Japan and the European Union were developing in a rather difficult economic conditions for Japan. In the period from 1990 to 2002, Japan experienced an economic crisis, later called the "Lost Decade". In 2008, the Japanese economy experienced two strong external impacts: a shock from the dynamics of world prices for raw materials and fuel, and a shock from panic in the world financial markets.<fnref n="30" /> In terms of economic growth rates in 2011-2012, Japan was significantly inferior to other developed countries and Asian neighboring countries.<fnref n="31" /> However, despite this, relations with Europe continued to develop. Moreover, the period, which started from 1991, could be marked as the most efficient period in the history of relations between Japan and the European Union.

## SUMMARY

The primary aim of this research paper was to give the reader an overview of external relations between the European Union and Japan through different historical periods. It started with the first contacts between Japanese and Europeans; it continued with modernization of Japan and its defeat in World War II; the last chapter of this paper was focused on relations between Japan and the European Union in the 21st century. Now, based on the results, which were achieved with this research, it is possible to give an answer on the primary research question:

For more than five hundred years of history, relations between Japan and Europe have gone through many trials. These were wars, trade disagreements and many other political and economic obstacles. The biggest challenge was Japan's participation in the Second World War, which became the result of Japanese militarism and led to numerous casualties and the defeat of Japan. However, since the second half of the 20th century, Japan and the countries of Europe are getting closer and

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Nosov M.G. (2008). EU and Japan: Relations Without Conflicts. Modern Europe, Vol.2 (34), Mironenko V.I. (Ed.), Moscow. Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, p 24</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Ibid., p 24</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Leontyeva E.L. (2009). The economy of Japan in the conditions of the global crisis (2008 – the first quarter of 2009). Yearbook of Japan, Vol.38, Strel'tsov D.V. (Ed.), Moscow. Interregional public organization "Association of Japaneseologists", pp 57-58</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Timonina I.L. (2014). The level of Japan's socio-economic development in international comparisons and a new vector of economic strategy. Eastern Analytics, Vol.4, Naumkin V.V. (Ed.), Moscow. Institution of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, p 88</footnote>
closer to each other. New contracts are concluded; joint conferences and summits are held. Despite different challenges of the present, whether economic crises or international security problems, European Union develops ties with its partners in several regions<fnref n="32" /> and relations with Japan is one of those that have been successfully developing in political, economic and cultural ways, despite the complicated environment. Moreover, this creates a fertile ground for the development of bilateral relations in the foreseeable future. As a conclusion, it is possible to say that external relations between the European Union and Japan have a future and this future will be positive both for European countries and for Japan.

It means that the answer for the question ‘will the future of the Euro-Japanese external relations be positive?’ is found and this answer is ‘yes’.

REFERENCES

Afonin B.M. (2015). Japan and formerly opposing states upon end of World War II. Russia and Asia-Pacific Region, Vol.3 (89), Larin V.L. (Ed.), Vladivostok. Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, pp 21-33

Arin O.A. (2014). Japan and the Theory of International Relations. Yearbook of Japan, Vol.43, Strel'tsov D.V. (Ed.), Moscow. Interregional public organization "Association of Japaneseologists", pp 44-70

Chochia, A. (2012). The European Union and its policy towards the neighbors from South Caucasus. L'Europe unie/United Europe, 6, 27-35.

Karenin D.M. (2007). Japan and Germany: cooperation in the format of the European Union. Yearbook of Japan, Vol.36, Strel'tsov D.V. (Ed.), Moscow. Interregional public organization "Association of Japaneseologists", pp 102-115

Karenin D.M. (2009). Modern relations between Japan and Great Britain. Yearbook of Japan, Vol.38, Strel'tsov D.V. (Ed.), Moscow. Interregional public organization "Association of Japaneseologists", pp 39-56

Keck J. (2006). Renewed strength of the Japanese economy and Japan-EU relations. Accessible: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10308-006-0080-4.pdf (22.05.2018), Springer-Verlag, pp 323-331

Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.

Leontyeva E.L. (2009). The economy of Japan in the conditions of the global crisis (2008 – the first quarter of 2009). Yearbook of Japan, Vol.38, Strel'tsov D.V. (Ed.), Moscow. Interregional public organization "Association of Japaneseologists", pp 57-64

Nosov M.G. (2008). EU and Japan: Relations Without Conflicts. Modern Europe, Vol.2 (34), Mironenko V.I. (Ed.), Moscow. Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, pp 8-24

Reiterer M. (2004). Japan-EU relations after EU enlargement. Asia Europe Journal, Vol.2, Heidelberg. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp 33-42

Timonina I.L. (2014). The level of Japan's socio-economic development in international comparisons and a new vector of economic strategy. Eastern Analytics, Vol.4, Naumkin V.V. (Ed.), Moscow. Institution of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, pp 87-105

Zimmermann H. (2008). Trading Security in Alliances: Japanese and German Security Policy in the New Millennium. Current Politics and Economics of Asia, Vol.17(1), Amy Verdun (Ed.), Victoria, The University of Victoria, pp 127-153

<footnote n="32">³² See also Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing; and Chochia, A. (2012). The European Union and its policy towards the neighbors from South Caucasus. L'Europe unie/United Europe, 6, 27-35.</footnote>
# The Influence of the European Union towards its Eastern Partnership Policy

JULIETTE GUITTARD

FACULTE DE DROIT ET SCIENCE POLITIQUE, UNIVERSITE DE BORDEAUX, FRANCE

**Abstract:** With the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, the European Union has aimed for an expansion of its values with a wide range of its neighbouring countries. This paper deals with the European Eastern Partnership, a branch of this neighbourhood policy, which seems to be divided between different influences within the participating countries. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus appear to be strongly linked to Russia, whereas Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine tend to a more European ideology. Nevertheless, the EU keeps a major role within the whole area. The goals set during an important Summit in 2017 reveal further actions that undoubtedly will help to achieve the process of a true and effective partnership with the neighbouring countries from the region of South Caucasus. This optimistic vision based itself on the fact that the EU will thrive if such relationships between different regions reach a concrete mutual support.

**Keywords:** Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, Association Agreements, Cooperation, Rule of Law

## INTRODUCTION

The first paragraph of the Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union states that “The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.” That is why the European Union (EU) tries to establish through its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In fact, when it comes to the external action of the EU, it can be affirmed that the neighboring countries are part of its main target. In this regard, the EU fixed the ENP in order to ensure its neighbours a privileged relationship, building on a mutual commitment to common values and common interests.<fnref n="1" />

Launched in 2004, based on a Communication entitled "Wider Europe – Neighbourhood" adopted by the European Commission one year earlier, the ENP was set to widen the EU's relations, particularly with sixteen of the EU's Eastern and Southern Neighbours. The main goal through this framework is still today to achieve a close political association and a great degree of economic integration.<fnref n="2" /> The European Union was therefore anticipating the new geostrategic reality resulting from its great eastward enlargement. It sought to create a "ring of security and prosperity" around it, although avoiding to promise new memberships beyond the already agreed membership prospects (Western Balkans and Turkey).<fnref n="3" /> Such a project of closer cooperation established by the EU includes key priorities based on the values of democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights and social cohesion.<fnref n="4" /> Already the EU made several revisions of the ENP. In fact, in 2011, following the Arab uprisings and thus responding to developments in Arab countries, the EU reinforced its focus on promoting deep and sustainable democracy, as well as an inclusive economic development (“Deep and sustainable democracy includes in particular free and fair elections, efforts to combat corruption, judicial independence, democratic control over the armed forces, and the freedoms of expression, assembly and association.”). Moreover, the “more for more” principle was

<footnote n="1">¹ K. B. / K. Jongberg, «The European Neighbourhood Policy», European Parliament, January 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² S. Communications, «European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),» European Union External Action, 21 December 2016.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ M. Lefebvre, «diploweb.com La revue géopolitique,» La politique étrangère européenne : quel bilan ?, 2 June 2016.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Kerikmäe, T.; Nyman-Metcalf, K. (2012). Less is more or more is more? Revisiting universality of human rights. International and Comparative Law Review, 12 (1), 35–51.</footnote>
introduced in order to underline that the civil society has a dominant role through the process. The principle consists for the Union to develop stronger partnerships with the neighbours that make great progress towards democratic reform. Furthermore, it was in March 2015 that the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) called for a new review of the ENP. Adapting the ENP tools was an important aim, as a result, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on 9 July 2015 stressing the need for a more strategic, focused, flexible and coherent ENP.<fnref n="5" />

It can be added that several of the EU neighbouring countries face social and economic changes due to globalisation and internal pressure form reforms. In that sense, security can be affirmed as a precondition for economic development in the medium to longer term. Another priority for the EU's neighbouring countries facing threats and pressures, including the challenges associated with migration and mobility, is to maintain the state and societal flexibility. As a matter of fact, through the ENP, the EU offers its partner countries an access to the European, as well as standards and internal agencies and programmes. Besides, the EU provides its support to the Neighbourhood region through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), with over EUR 15 billion for 2014-2020.<fnref n="6" />

The neighbourhood is considered as an ultimate challenge for the European foreign policy. Indeed, if Europe does not show itself able to influence the future of its immediate geographical environment, it cannot claim to be anything more than a mere regional power among others. However, the European neighbourhood cannot be really qualified as homogeneous. Diversity exists to a large extent in the East and South regions. Similarly, the preferences and interests of states towards the two regions are not the same, especially between France and Germany, which leads to frequent rebalancing. In the 1990s, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of Barcelona was the French response to Berlin's policy of enlargement. This same equilibrium between East and South was evident in the early 2000s, when the ENP started to appear, which was to be restricted to Eastern Europe, and finally included the South Caucasus, especially the Mediterranean countries. Finally, the creation of the Eastern Partnership (EaP)<fnref n="7" /> in May 2009 was a strategic response of the Polish-Swedish initiative to the French Union for the Mediterranean project launched the previous year. In this context, the European institutions clearly had a role of mediator seeking to reconcile the different perspectives existing at Member States' level.<fnref n="8" /> The ENP, aiming for stabilisation, political, economic and security terms, is thus related to sixteen countries, they are the closest southern and eastern neighbours and are divided into two groups. First, to the south with the Union for Mediterranean, composed of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. Secondly, to the east with the EaP composed of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

In the East, the EU sought to reconcile the strengthening of ties with the "new neighbours" of the East (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, joined in 2005 by the three South Caucasus states)<fnref n="9" /> and the consolidation of the partnership with the Russian Federation. Thus, in 2006 the EU decided to launch the negotiation of two new agreements to strengthen its relations with Russia and Ukraine. This policy has however slipped twice, a first time because of the Georgian crisis in 2008¹⁰, a second

<footnote n="5">⁵ K. B. / K. Jongberg, «The European Neighbourhood Policy»,» European Parliament, January 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ S. Communications, «European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),» European Union External Action, 21 December 2016.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Eds.) (2016). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy. Springer International Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ F. Parmentier, *L'UE À L'ÉPREUVE DU PARTENARIAT ORIENTAL*, Institut Jacques Delors, 2013.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Chochia, A. (2012). The European Union and its policy towards the neighbors from South Caucasus. L'Europe unie/United Europe, 6, 27-35.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Chochia, A.; Popjanevski, J. (2016). Change of Power and Its Influence on Country's Europeanization Process. Case Study: Georgia. In: Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Ed.). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy (197-210). Springer International Publishing.</footnote>
time with the Ukrainian crisis in 2014¹¹. Concerning the Georgian case, the Russian military intervention responded to a Georgian riot (aimed at recovering secessionist South Ossetia); the EU was a mediating force, obtaining a partial Russian military withdrawal from Georgia, but not avoiding a consolidation of the strategic influence of Russia in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the Ukrainian case, the starting point of the crisis was the negotiation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Russian opposition, causing internal divisions in the country. Indeed, with the evasion of President Yanukovich giving in to the bidding of Vladimir Putin (financial offer, reduction of the price of gas), the Maidan revolt, the fall of Yanukovych and the coming to power of a pro-Western coalition. Russia reacted brutally, annexing Crimea and supporting a military rebellion in Donbass. In this last conflict, the EU adopted sanctions against Russia, largely based on US sanctions, and supported the new Ukrainian regime with which the association agreement was confirmed. The European Commission, however, remained a mediating force in the energy field, a symbol of EU-Russia interdependence, helping to settle Russian-Ukrainian disputes over the price of gas.<fnref n="12" />

The EaP, is defined by the EEAS as “a joint initiative of the EU and its Eastern European partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Launched in 2009 at the EU Prague Summit, it brings our Eastern European partners closer to the EU. The Eastern Partnership supports and encourages reforms in the EaP countries for the benefit of their citizens.”<fnref n="13" /> The EU faced both the internal fragilities of neighbouring countries, corruption, poor governance, economic weakness, democratic and human rights deficiencies, and Russian power willing to reaffirm a sphere of influence.<fnref n="14" /> The EU has been able to conclude Association Agreements with deep free-trade commitments, including regulatory alignment on the single market with Georgia and Moldova at the Vilnius Summit (2013), and then with Ukraine (2014), but Armenia, Belarus and Azerbaijan are far from having made the European choice in terms of economics, politics and values. It cannot be said that the stability and security of Eastern Europe has been achieved so far.<fnref n="15" /> This paper will thus particularly focus on the framework of the EU in the region of the EaP, analyzing the situation and the evolution in order to understand the influence of the EU within this complex area.

## AN AMBITIOUS FRAMEWORK FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION WITHIN ITS EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

Thanks to biannual summits, the EU's policy towards the EaP can be newly reflected and refreshed. After the EaP summit in autumn 2013 for example, that took place in Vilnius, it could be affirmed that the EU has developed a sophisticated framework, within which the EU's bilateral and multilateral relations with its Eastern neighbours were, and still are, conducted.<fnref n="16" /> However, achievements have been more modest than innovative. It can be stated that the performance of the

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Tsybulenko, E.; Pakhomenko, S. (2016). The Ukrainian Crisis As A Challenge For The Eastern Partnership. In: Kerikmäe, T.; Chochia, A. (Ed.). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy (167–179). Springer International Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² M. Lefebvre, «diploweb.com La revue géopolitique,» La politique étrangère européenne : quel bilan ?, 2 June 2016.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ European Union External Action, «Eastern Partnership,» European Union External Action, 19 October 2016.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Hoffmann, T.; Chochia, A. (2018). The Institution of Citizenship and Practices of Passportization in Russia's European Neighborhood Policies. In: A. Makarychev, T. Hoffmann (Ed.). Russia and the EU Spaces of Interaction (223–237). Routledge, Taylor&Francis Group.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ M. Lefebvre, «diploweb.com La revue géopolitique,» La politique étrangère européenne : quel bilan ?, 2 June 2016.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ E. A. K. R. G. W. Tom Casier, *Building a Stronger Eastern Partnership: Towards an EaP 2.0*, Global Europe Centre University of Kent, 2014.</footnote>
EaP is set in a difficult context, that is why the EU is considerably invested toward its Eastern partners. Plus, to evaluate the ambitious framework with a strategic vision and implementation practises, the concretisation of such a program for the conduct of an effective and credible policy in the eastern region, has to be studied.

### A considerable European implication

"We want to reinforce Eastern Partnership cooperation in a number of specific areas such as small and medium-sized enterprises, digital economy, broadband investments, and investments in transport, energy and infrastructure projects. The list is long. But above all, we want to strengthen links between our citizens and give more support to civil society." claimed the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, at a press conference of the Eastern Partnership summit in 2017.<fnref n="17" />

It can be compared to the summit of 2015, throughout which he EU observed how it and its eastern partners could build a more effective partnership. In this regard, the EU showed the will to improve the implementation of its neighbourhood policy. This approach of questioning the effectiveness was underlined by the refugee crisis that many European countries were knowing.<fnref n="18" /> Moreover, the EaP is first and foremost a European attempt to export its normative and political model in a region considered unstable and as a potential source of destabilization. To fulfil this objective, Europeans are banking on a deeper political relationship through the signing of the Association Agreement, the strengthening of economic integration with the signing of a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement, and greater freedom of movement. Cooperation concerns both the high level with Eastern Partnership Summits, meetings of Foreign Ministers and Ministers, working groups, the European Parliament, or civil society.<fnref n="19" />

For example, the official in Brussels sought to create a framework that would contain the complicated set of relationships within the neighbourhood. Undoubtedly, the EU invested in this regard "a considerable political capital and financial, and bureaucratic resources in the development of relations with neighbouring states and regions".<fnref n="20" />

Furthermore, the countries of the EaP represent for the EU an important issue as they could lead, in the future, to act as major actors in the eastern region. Indeed, far from constituting a homogeneous region, the EaP countries which share a Tsarist and Soviet past, are in fact very diverse, and this diversity is growing stronger. In fact, regarding the geography, the security matters, as well as political and socio-economic transformations, the six states all know different situations. As a consequence, this is in the interest of the EU to become an influent part through the region. Yet, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova seem to be more advanced than others in terms of democratic pluralism.<fnref n="21" /> Besides, these three states have known what have been called "coloured revolutions": the rose revolution in Georgia (2003), the orange revolution in Ukraine (2004) and the Twitter revolution in Moldova (2009).<fnref n="22" /> These events may have led today to the situation that they feel closer to the EU and are willing to expand the cooperation within the partnership program.

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ European Council, Council of the European Union, «Eastern Partnership summit, 24/11/2017,» 24 November 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ E. Commission, «Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy,» chez JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, Brussels, 2015.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ F. Parmentier, L'UE À L'ÉPREUVE DU PARTENARIAT ORIENTAL, Institut Jacques Delors, 2013.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ Vernygora, V.; Troitino, D. R.; Västra, S. (2016). The Eastern Partnership Programme: is pragmatic regional functionalism working for a contemporary political empire? In: T. Kerikmäe and A. Chochia (Ed.). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy (7–22). Germany: Springer International Publishing. p. 7.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Kerikmäe, T; Nyman-Metcalf, K; Gabelaia, D; Chochia, A (2014). Cooperation of Post Soviets with the Aim of not being "Post" and "Soviets". In: N. Šišková (Ed.). From Eastern Partnership to the Association. The Legal and Political Analysis (144–159). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² F. Parmentier, L'UE À L'ÉPREUVE DU PARTENARIAT ORIENTAL, Institut Jacques Delors, 2013.</footnote>
In addition, the EU has for now well influenced the region despite lots of critics before 2015. In fact, the creation of the Association Agreements (AAs) was a new generation of bilateral agreement to deepen political and economic relations between the EU and its Eastern partners, covering a wide range of issues including trade liberalization. Besides, in the absence of a guarantee on EU membership, which some Member States are not ready to offer, the signature of an Association Agreement is probably the most effective European political lever in the eastern neighbourhood. Indeed, the EU has only exceptionally resorted to the principle of sanctions, as it did to the Belarusian authorities after the 2010 elections. The signature of an Association Agreement makes possible to introduce a certain differentiation between heterogeneous partners, faithful to the principle of "more for more".<fnref n="23" /> The Association Agreements between the EU and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are the largest and most ambitious among all the other European association agreements with third countries. Based on Article 217 of the TFEU and Articles 31(1) and 37 of the TEU, they often enabled third countries to implement national laws.<fnref n="24" /> This is thus a legal and concrete way to implement the policy of stability that the EU aims for toward the EaP. In this regard, the EU can have a sort of control over its partnership and keeps influencing the states that, in spite of tense political contexts such as Ukraine, tend to go toward a European ideology.

On top of that, the conclusion of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), a main foundation of the EaP, aims to bring neighbouring states closer to European norms and standards. In other words, European actors seek to export what is a basis through the EU in the political, economic or administrative contexts of the Eastern neighbours. This system, deeply bound to the Association Agreement, was set in order to integrate them into the European geo-economic space. This objective was again more specifically toward Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Besides, the establishment of the CAFTA is meant to enable the countries to have better access to the European internal market and to find a place in the European division of labour, mainly in the industrial, agricultural and service sectors. This adaptation effort obviously involves significant adaptation effort and many costs for the EU that softly enforces a dominant influence through its framework.<fnref n="25" />

## The long way to a concrete implementation of the Eastern Partnership

Even though it can be argued that the European policy concerning its Eastern Partnership is knowing a consequent influence, politically, economically etc., it can also be affirmed that this is still not a complete framework, especially through the Eastern countries own division. Indeed, some are more toward a European influence, others stay under the Russian one. In terms of geostrategic orientation, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova have shown signs of rapprochement with the EU, declaring to want membership. Nevertheless, the changes are contrasted over time, depending on political changes and the success of ambitious domestic reforms. Armenia has for instance undertaken a number of negotiated reforms with the EU but has expressed interest in joining the Eurasian Union. Belarus and Azerbaijan are using the European actors mainly to have more autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow.<fnref n="26" />

The bilateral action plans, drawn up between the EU and twelve of its neighbouring partners, are interesting to show the European interests. Indeed, by setting an action plan, the EU aims for establishing political and economic reform agendas, with short and medium-term

<footnote n="23">²³ F. Parmentier, *L'UE À L'ÉPREUVE DU PARTENARIAT ORIENTAL*, Institut Jacques Delors, 2013.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ R. Petrov, «Implementation of Association Agreements Between the EU and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia: Legal and Constitutional Challenges,» chez *Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy*, Springer, 2016, p. 154.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ F. Parmentier, *L'UE À L'ÉPREUVE DU PARTENARIAT ORIENTAL*, Institut Jacques Delors, 2013.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ M. Lefebvre, «diploweb.com La revue géopolitique,» La politique étrangère européenne : quel bilan ?, 2 June 2016.</footnote>
priorities, between three and five years. It thus reflects the needs and interests of the EU with each partner country. As a consequence, the policy of the EaP is a process that still needs time to be completely implemented. The countries, in between the EU and their ongoing development, without speaking of the Russia that keeps a major influence on them, are partners that need to enforce such action or programmes in order to cooperate in a politically and economically stable system.

As a matter of fact, the EaP countries are able to be participants to EU programmes, such as Erasmus+ or the Asylum and Migration Fund for example. In this way, it is a mean to promote reform and modernisation in the EU's neighbourhood, as well as strengthen administrative and regulatory convergence of the partner countries.<fnref n="27" /> It is thus without doubts that the four priorities set out in the Joint Declaration of the EaP Summit in Riga in May 2015 and reaffirmed after the Summit in 2017 to reinforce stability, are part of a long process. Indeed, the economic development and market opportunities, the strengthening of institutions and good governance, the connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate change and finally the mobility and people-to-people contacts, are issues that are part of any action within the EaP. In this sense, time will be needed to set these goals through the region but it is necessary for the long term of the Partnership to take action on those, and even to a universal aspect.<fnref n="28" />

Furthermore, this seems a long process to a concrete implementation of the EaP but some elements are proving that the Eastern Neighbouring countries tend to a large and fast evolution thanks to a major European influence. In fact, the creation of strong legal instruments, the Association Agreements, in the policy toolbox, was a major turning point for the Eastern Partnership. Yet, not a long time after, it is considered that the interests and the initiatives of the Eastern Partnership partners, in particular the Harmonization of Digital Markets initiative, have been an opportunity for the Juncker Commission's political priorities. Indeed, the Digital Single Market (DSM) is one of the top ten priorities on the Commission's agenda. This is mainly because cooperation with third countries is seen as a necessary dimension of the DSM strategy if the EU wishes to keep its influence on the region and more precisely, the first position as an exporter of digital service.<fnref n="29" />

It can be affirmed that the EU has already established a massive work when it comes to the Eastern Partnership Program. In fact, after numerous critics following the Summit of 2015 in Riga, the EU still set many objectives and is trying to improve the implementation of its ENP in general. Moreover, it has to be reminded that the launching of the EaP was not such a long time ago, besides, the situations like revolutions in countries fast-growing did not facilitate the EU's framework in the eastern region. Surely, it is a long process and it requires many actions and programmes because the issues are central. However, since 2017, a new perspective of the EaP is visible, and it can be wondered if the EU could foresee in a near future a better implementation of its Eastern Neighbourhood Policy with an effective implementation of the Rule of Law, the respect for Human Rights, a stable security etc.

## TOWARDS A BETTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

When it comes to such a partnership, with different contexts and diverse ideologies within the countries, the main points that have theoretically to be focused on are politics, democracy and

<footnote n="27">²⁷ European Union External Action, «Participation of ENP countries in EU programmes,» 8 January 2016.</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ K. B. / K. Jongberg, «The European Neighbourhood Policy,» European Parliament, January 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ Evas, T.; Batura, O. (2016). Eastern Partnership and ICT. In: Kerikmae, T and Chochia, A (Ed.). Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy (35–57). Springer-Verlag Heidelberg. p. 39.</footnote>
economy. Yet, from an overall view, if the countries do not take part of the cohesion to facilitate these fields through their system, it is pointless. That is why, the idea of cooperation is necessary through the EaP. To go further, it will also be observed that the Eastern European region is not only influenced by the EU.

## The cooperation: a necessary dimension for the European Union

When it comes to cooperation, specific sectors are concerned. Indeed, the ENP in general promotes the respect for the basic principles of dignity and equality, human rights, and social and economic justice. They should be guaranteed in democratic legal systems with the rule of law, by independent courts. In general, an arbitrary justice for all is fundamental. Moreover, to spread efficient cooperation, the ENP links partner countries with the EU's internal market and its social and economic model. The essence of a good implementation of the economy with fair competition, consumer protection etc. is thus based on possibilities for all citizens. Finally, the ENP connects the EU with its neighbours, promoting trade, the building of networks in energy and transport, or fostering tourism. A partnership has to know exchange and mobility of persons, not only economically but also culturally, in order to foster the human capital development and responsible societies. Furthermore, it is understandable that the EU is willing to promote its values and human rights through the partnership. Indeed, the European ideas are often based on cooperation at the end. If those criteria are respected, it is to better increase the cooperation regarding security matters.<fnref n="30" />

To illustrate the engagement of the EU to favorize an efficient cooperation, reference can be made to the EaP Panel on Security, Common Security and Defense Policy and Civil Protection meeting in May 2018. It gathered over sixty representatives from the EU's Eastern neighbours countries, as well as EU Member States representatives, the European institutions and the Civil Society Forum. The main topic of the discussion was the outcomes of the latest EaP Summit, followed by the Panel's work to realise the "20 deliverables for 2020".<fnref n="31" /> This latter is a project that has many goals of strengthening cooperation between the EU and the Eastern partners countries. In fact, it is based on four main priorities, a stronger economy with for example the aim of Addressing gaps in access to finance and financial infrastructure, a stronger governance with for example the aim of Strengthening the rule of law and anti-corruption mechanisms, a stronger connectivity with for example the aim of Enhancing energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy, and finally, a stronger society, with for instance the aim of Progressing on Visa Liberalisation Dialogues and Mobility Partnerships. As a matter of fact, the focus on environmental policy was important. Indeed, for a better future, the cooperation has to be based on environmental norms. In this regard, the EU has already the necessary basis to strengthen the issue: Article 191(1) TFEU determines the objectives of the EU environmental policy as "promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change". These objectives cannot thus be complete without a strong cooperation. That is why forming regional agreements between the EU and its partner countries and then following the goal of environmental protection at regional level in the framework of similar initiatives of the Eastern Partnership Program is more and more taken into account. Another major point, and relatively recent, is the harmonisation of digital markets. Nowadays, Internet has become more than a new technology, but a real virtual public space. Indeed, the technologies that helped to launch the social media have a major role since they are now part of the public discourse through which any citizen of the partnership can participate. This led to the development of many e-Participation tools, and

<footnote n="30">³⁰ S. Communications, «European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),» European Union External Action, 21 December 2016.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ EU Neighbours East, «Eastern Partnership: Panel on security, defence policy and civil protection meets in Brussels,» 18 May 2018.</footnote>
going further, it is thinking in a new way the political participation for the people in order to revitalize the democracy.<fnref n="32" />

The whole program for the years to come is thus ambitious because it involves the adoption of a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement, as well as greater mobility for neighbours. In practice, beyond the adoption of an appropriate legal framework, the real key to success lies in the implementation of reforms, by administrations whose interests often reside in the absence of transparency and realities. For example, the adoption and implementation of the third energy, as a matter of fact, climate is causing strong opposition in the countries concerned.<fnref n="33" /> Cooperation is essential for the future of the EaP.

Furthermore, it has to be underlined that during the Summit in 2017, the EU and Armenia have signed a comprehensive and strengthened partnership agreement and concluded an air services agreement.<fnref n="34" /> This was a big step in the cooperation between the East and the EU as Armenia is still a controversial country regarding the Russian influence. Moreover, as to show examples of a more and more efficient cooperation through communication and relations, Tallinn hosted in 2017 many forums and conferences to discuss issues of the EaP. Indeed, the Eastern Partnership Business Forum, the EU conference on youth, or also the Eastern Partnership civil society conference, were held to bring closer countries of the EaP and the new European vision based on an efficient and future cooperation.<fnref n="35" />

During the EaP Summit Press Conference in 2017, Donald Tusk firmly affirmed that "There should be no doubt that our common future lies in the EU's determination to open up its policies to its partners, and I can confirm once again that we are ready." This confirms the vision of a better implementation of the neighbourhood policy from the EU, particularly when it comes to its Eastern neighbours countries. Yet, the EU is not alone facing the will of cooperate with these.

## The impact of major influences within the Eastern Europe Countries

An important focus can be made on Transnistria in order to illustrate the predominance of the Russian influence within the European Eastern neighbours' region. Transnistria is part of Moldova and is actually a non-recognised state, claiming its independence. First of all, Transnistria is a strategic point for Moscow. Indeed, Russian forces in the region enable Russia to counter NATO on the shores of the Black Sea that Russia considers its military space. Moreover, Transnistria allows Russia to counter the EU's progress in Moldova. In May 2018, it was still only three partner countries that have signed the association agreements, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Yet, Moldova sees its action bit restrained by the region of Transnistria and its way to support the Russian Federation. In addition to that, Belarus and Armenia preferred to join the Russian project of competing economic integration launched in 2015, named after the Eurasian Economic Union, which also includes Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Other separatist states supported militarily by Russia, located on the borders of the former USSR, also allow to counter the influence of Brussels and NATO, on what Moscow considers its area of influence. In Azerbaijan with Nagorno-Karabakh, which proclaimed itself independent in 1991, in Georgia with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which proclaimed themselves independent in 2008, but also in Ukraine with the Donbass republics, self-proclaimed in 2014, without forgetting the annexation of Crimea by Russia the same year.

<footnote n="32">³² Y. Misnikov, «Democratisating the Eastern Partnership in the Digital Age: Challenges and Opportunities of Political Association Beyond the Language of Official Texts,» chez *Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy*, Springer, 2016, p. 59.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ F. Parmentier, *L'UE À L'EPREUVE DU PARTENARIAT ORIENTAL*, Institut Jacques Delors, 2013.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ European Council, Council of the European Union, «Eastern Partnership summit, 24/11/2017,» 24 November 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ European Council, Council of the European Union, «Eastern Partnership summit, 24/11/2017,» 24 November 2017.</footnote>
Thus, Russia is willing to connect these areas to counter the progress of the EU-NATO bloc in the Black Sea. Yet, the advance of Europe, especially in Moldova, can be seen since 2016. In fact, this latter, one of the poorest countries in Europe has found better access to the European market thanks to the EaP in place and an efficient stabilization of the region as well as cooperation. There is as well a free trade agreement that also extends to Transnistria, which now exports more to the European market than to the Russian market. At the end of 2018, Transnistria will have to confirm its rapprochement with Europe, including its membership of the free-trade zone. It is unknown on this point the position of Moscow and how far it will let this happen.

Transnistria is therefore serving Russia's interests in central Europe. Since the conflict in Ukraine, Transnistria allows Putin to take the Ukrainians in a vise, maintain its dominance in the region and remains a great power in the eyes of the world. Transnistria exists today only by the goodwill of a Russia that has not given up its grip on the former Soviet space, and which saw the enlargement of NATO and the EU as a loss of influence and encirclement of his former empire.<fnref n="36" />

The professor Cyrille Bret described the future of the EaP after the Summit of 2017. He qualifies it as unsure, with many possibilities mainly generated by influences of important powers on the region. First the countries of the central and eastern Europe are tempted by the extreme East, fully knowing a diplomatic diversification. Central and Eastern European countries were under the influence of two of the world's largest economic entities. First, by the EU with the summit of the EaP, and then by China with the China-CEEC Economic and Trade Forum in Budapest in 2017. China observes in the wider set of these Eastern European countries a transit area or ideal outlets for its New One Belt One Road Silk Roads, besides, China has recently offered 3 billion of investment in the region. From Azerbaijan to Hungary, it already built harbor and rail infrastructures. Consequently, countries of the European Eastern neighbourhood emerging from the Soviet orbit but not from geopolitical tensions. Especially among the strongest European growth, now in the heart of three areas of influence, EU, Eurasian Economic Union for Russia, and Chinese Silk Road.

There is a trend towards the EU for some of the EaP countries, but another important influence is towards Russia for the other part. Indeed, since 2009, two groups were formed, one composed of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, "the countries of the Association Agreements", which have long called for a membership perspective, and the other with Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, which, because of geography, of military alliances, of inclusion in the Russian economy, are closer to the Russian Federation and more included in the Eurasian Customs Union and then in the Eurasian Economic Union for Armenia and Belarus.

Therefore, the geopolitical and economic competition is between the Russian Federation and the EU. Belarus is between the two rivals and moving away from this confrontation does not seem envisaged yet. During the Forum in China, this latter foresaw an outlet. Traditionally, the Belarussian is between these three influences. For China, Belarus is considered as the ideal outlet to the EU, since it is the way to Poland, and therefore the entire transit of all its road transport, railways, as well as the Internet, etc. This country is an essential device for Chinese. It is also a major challenge for the next few years, until 2020, for the EaP, since it is the furthest from the standards in terms of good governance and the defense of human rights. The EaP regularly expresses concerns about the situation of Human Rights in Belarus. The geopolitical reasons and the values of the EU are coming into tension with regard to this country. For the EU, it is important to take into consideration that soon it will rather be a Chinese governance over the region than a

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Le dessous des cartes, «Transnistrie: le pays qui n'existe pas.» Arte, 19 May 2018.</footnote>