NAVIGATING ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY:
MORAL DELIBERATION IN CICERO'S DE OFFICIIS

Bishakha Dutta

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Bishakha Dutta. NAVIGATING ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY: MORAL DELIBERATION IN CICERO'S DE OFFICIIS. 2025. hal-05240816

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# NAVIGATING ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY: MORAL DELIBERATION IN CICERO'S *DE OFFICIIS*

## ABSTRACT<fnref n="1" />

While Cicero's *De Officiis* is widely recognized as a foundational text in moral and political philosophy, its contributions to economic thought have received comparatively little attention. This paper argues that *De Officiis*, particularly Book 3, develops an early model of ethical reasoning for economic decision-making that balances legal norms with moral judgment to arrive at a truly advantageous choice. It analyses two case studies from Book 3: the merchant and the house seller case through a close textual reading. By applying Cicero's tenets—such as weighing one's relationship to another against their specific circumstances to decide which duty to discharge—the analysis shows how the most moral choice is also the most advantageous one. A key finding is that withholding information, while offering short-term profit, is ultimately disadvantageous because it undermines the trust and justice fundamental to social bonds. This paper concludes that Cicero's framework places moral deliberation at the center of economic life, offering a durable model that challenges purely profit-driven approaches by proving that true advantage is inseparable from ethical conduct.

## INTRODUCTION

While Cicero's *De Officiis* is widely interpreted as a foundational text in moral and political philosophy, its contributions to economic thought have received comparatively little attention. This paper challenges this scholarly oversight, arguing that Cicero, particularly through the practical dilemmas presented in Book 3, develops a sophisticated model of ethical reasoning for economic decision-making. This model does more than simply balance legal norms against moral duties; it advances the thesis that the truly ethical choice is, upon correct analysis, the only genuinely advantageous one.

Previous studies, such as A. A. Long's work on Cicero's political framework and Gloria Vivenza's humanist analysis of commercial ethics, have explored aspects of *De Officiis*, approaching it from moral or political perspectives, without addressing the economic dimension in depth. Long highlights Cicero's condemnation of violations of *ius humanae societatis* (laws of human society), including offenses against private property by individuals or governments<fnref n="1" /> (Long, 1995). Vivenza's work on commercial ethics in Cicero examines commentaries from the 16th century² that explored economic reasoning in *De Officiis* (Vivenza, 2004). She notes Cicero's linkage of *utilitas* and *commodum* with wealth, prosperity, and personal benefit, as well as his use of the verb *utor*³ to highlight the practical application of material possessions (*Off.* 2.1). However, her focus on Book III overlooks instances of economic reasoning throughout the text. Finally, DesJardin explores Cicero's influence on Kant, particularly in the development of moral duty and the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties (DesJardin, 1967).

The tendency to examine the text through the separate lenses of political theory or philosophical influence has created a scholarly gap⁴. This gap stems from applying modern

<footnote n="1">¹ I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Karamanolis, as well as Prof. Straumann and his Just City project team, Prof. Müller and Dr. Röttig for their valuable feedback on this paper. I would also like to thank my colleagues and my partner for reading my first drafts and providing critical feedback. I used OpenAI's ChatGPT to help rephrase and correct grammar in several sections of this paper. All intellectual content and arguments remain my own.</footnote>
disciplinary boundaries to Cicero's work, which fails to account for the interconnected nature
of philosophy, politics, and economics in ancient thought.

The philosophical groundwork for this thesis is laid across the treatise. Book 1 establishes the nature of the honorable, or *honestum*—a concept rooted in the Greek *kalon* (the morally good and beautiful) and realized by performing one’s duties (*officia*) virtuously. Book 2 then explores the meaning of the advantageous, or *utile*, which Cicero argues is best secured by gaining the genuine support of one's fellow citizens through just actions. The central problem of the work culminates in Book 3, which confronts the apparent conflict that arises between the *honestum* and the *utile*. To resolve this tension, Cicero employs several exempla, or case studies, to disprove that the honorable can ever truly come into conflict with the advantageous.

Among these, two cases concerning economic transactions stand out. The first involves an Alexandrian merchant, a good man, sailing to the famine-stricken island of Rhodes with a cargo of grain (*Off.* 1.50). He knows that other grain ships are following close behind, but he will be the first to arrive. The ethical question is whether he must disclose this information or if he may remain silent to sell at the highest possible price. Is keeping silent base in this case? Cicero presents the dilemma as a debate between two Stoic philosophers. Antipater argues for full disclosure, asserting that one ought to serve human society, where "one's own benefit is the common benefit, and the common benefit is one's own benefit" (*Off.* 1.52). To conceal that plentiful relief is imminent would be wrong and a violation of the bonds of human fellowship. Diogenes, in contrast, argues that the merchant's only duty is to "reveal defects as dictated by civil law and the rest should be carried out without deception" (*Off.* 1.51). The seller's goal is to sell, without deception, as profitably as possible, and this does not require him to disclose everything that might be in the buyer's interest; there is a crucial distinction between active concealment and merely remaining silent. Diogenes even challenges Antipater's premise about fellowship, asking if it truly means that "nothing belongs to anyone individually"? If so, he retorts, then "nothing should be sold, but everything should be given away" (*Off.* 1.53)

The second case involves a good man selling a house with defects he knows—it is not
healthful and poorly constructed—but which otherwise has a reputation for being a sound
dwelling(*Off.* 1.54). If he does not disclose these facts and sells the house for considerably
more than he expected, has he acted unjustly? Here again, Antipater holds that it is wrong for
the seller to allow a buyer to "rush headlong and through ignorance" into a bad purchase(*Off.*
1.55). He claims it is not just refusing "to set a man on the right way," but deliberately leading
him astray (*Off.* 1.55). Diogenes counters that the seller "did not force the buyer into the
purchase"; he advertised what he disliked, and the buyer purchased what he liked (*Off.* 1.55).
After all, if we do not condemn sellers who use pompous language in advertising, we should
hardly condemn one who did not praise the house at all. The buyer should exercise his own
judgment. Ultimately, Cicero sides with Antipater, concluding that in both cases, neither the
merchant nor the house-seller should have concealed the information. He argues that this is not
a case of merely remaining silent, but of wrongful concealment for one's own advantage.

These cases are particularly relevant for understanding ethical decision-making in
economic contexts because they uniquely illustrate Cicero's arguments through competing
interests and clear lines of responsibility. His approach is not merely illustrative but formative:
each *exemplum* tests and shapes ethical understanding, demonstrating a context-sensitive moral
reasoning that recognizes complexity rather than prescribing uniform solutions. By situating
these economic actions within his broader philosophy, this paper addresses the enduring
tension between self-interest and the common good. The analysis of these cases allows us to
understand where Cicero locates accountability and what precepts lie at the base of a truly
ethical economic decision—one that considers not just the agent, but how the action affects
others.
The analysis demonstrates that, for Cicero, one's responsibility extends beyond personal financial gain to include societal well-being. This exploration of how individual moral decisions contribute to the stability of the community can be extended beyond individuals to consider the ethical functioning of states and other large organizations. To develop this argument, the paper will first lay out the foundational precepts from Books 1 and 2. It will then undertake a close analysis of the Alexandrian merchant and defective house cases, revisiting the debates on legal versus moral obligations and concealment versus silence. Finally, the paper will draw conclusions from these cases, arguing that an analysis following Cicero's framework confirms that the principle of *honestum* as *utile* is applicable within economic settings.

## CICERO'S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In *De Officiis*, Cicero presents a comprehensive ethical framework that rests on three interconnected concepts: the honorable (*honestum*), the expedient (*utile*), and human society (*societas*). Following the Stoic philosopher Panaetius, Cicero distinguishes between the perfect "right action" accessible only to the wise sage and the "mean duty" (*commune officium*) achievable by ordinary individuals through adequate reason (*Off.* 1.8). This practical focus shapes his entire ethical system, which seeks to demonstrate that true advantage can only be secured through honorable conduct within the bounds of human society.

Cicero's conception of human society emerges from the Stoic theory of *oikeiosis*, which traces social bonds to natural development. While Nature endows all creatures with self-preservation instincts, it grants humans alone the capacity for reason, which "associates man with man" through speech and logic (*Off.* 1.11 – 1.12). This rational capacity generates two distinct yet related forms of community. The first is a universal "human society," a "natural fraternity" encompassing all humanity based on our shared rational nature that enables teaching, communication, and discussion (*Off.* 1.50). The second consists of particular societies formed through closer bonds of family, neighbors, culture, and language. Crucially, Cicero maintains that the principles of justice governing universal society extend equally to these local communities, creating a unified ethical framework that applies across all human relationships.

From this understanding of natural social harmony arises Cicero's concept of the *honestum*—the morally good or honorable. Drawing on Plato, he identifies four constituent elements: the perception and development of truth; the conservation of organized society through justice and faithfulness; greatness and strength of spirit; and orderliness and moderation (*Off.* 1.15). Among these, Cicero designates the preservation of human society as "most extensive in its application," placing justice and benevolence at the heart of honorable conduct (*Off.* 1.20). Justice serves as the bedrock of social harmony, maintaining the natural bonds between rational beings. Its two primary requirements are negative and positive: first, that one refrain from harming others unless provoked by wrong, and second, that one "use common things as common and private as ones own" (*Off.* 1.20). The foundation of justice is *fides*—good faith understood as truth and fidelity to promises—while benevolence (*beneficia*) operates beyond formal obligations to strengthen social cohesion (*Off.* 1.42). These principles of justice and good faith form the ethical standard against which commercial actions, such as setting a price or disclosing information, are ultimately judged.

The practical application of these principles reveals two key criteria for judgment: a 'hierarchy criteria' based on relationships and a flexible 'circumstance criteria' that requires contextual assessment. The hierarchy criteria establishes a general order of obligations—first to country and parents, then to children and immediate family, followed by kinsmen and relations (*Off.* 1.53, 1.58, 1.160). However, Cicero crucially qualifies this with the 'circumstance criteria,' emphasizing that specific situations must guide actual decisions. When duties conflict, one must consider "what is most needful in each case and what each person can or cannot
procure without our help" ((*Off.* 1.59). This contextual judgment requires continuous practice, reflection, and consultation with wise friends rather than mechanical application of rules(*Off.* 1.60). Cicero explicitly rejects the "absurd position" of those who would limit justice to their immediate circle, arguing that nothing lacking universal justice can be truly *honestum*— a standard that applies as much to a statesman as it does to a merchant in the marketplace (*Off.* 1.62).

This ethical architecture culminates in Cicero's central argument regarding the relationship between the honorable and the expedient. He forcefully critiques the "pernicious doctrine" that separates moral goodness from advantage, arguing instead for their essential unity(*Off.* 2.9). True and lasting advantage (*utile*) depends entirely on human cooperation, which in turn requires trust between individuals. Such trust can only be secured through *gloria*—not mere fame or power, but the genuine "affection, confidence, and admiration" earned through virtuous conduct (*Off.* 2.11). A leader who rules through fear or deception may achieve temporary power, but this foundation is inherently unstable because pretense eventually reveals itself. Only the steadfast practice of justice and benevolence creates durable bonds of affection and confidence (*Off.* 2.18-2.20). Through this argument, Cicero demonstrates that living according to the *honestum* constitutes the sole path to what is truly *utile*, as honorable conduct alone can secure the cooperation necessary for human flourishing.

Thus Cicero's ethical system presents an integrated vision in which the honorable, the expedient, and human society form an indissoluble unity. The *honestum* emerges from and sustains the natural bonds of *societas*, while true *utile* can only be achieved through honorable conduct that preserves these social bonds. This synthesis provides not merely an abstract philosophy but a practical guide for those seeking to live ethically within the complex relationships of human community.

## CASE STUDY – THE ALEXANDRIAN MERCHANT

The Alexandrian Merchant case represents an exploration of ethical complexity by presenting a scenario that illuminates the distinctions between natural and civil law (*Off.* 3.50-3.54). Unlike standard transactional contexts, this case introduces circumstances where an honest individual must navigate complex ethical dilemmas. A striking feature of this case is that the buyers are presented under special conditions, which creates a compelling framework for examining ethical decision-making beyond conventional legal boundaries. While the precise intention behind Cicero's selection of these two Stoic examples remains a matter of speculation, it is a reasonable expectation that a treatise on duties—one which claims that duty is present in every facet of human life—would strive for comprehensive coverage.

The passage opens with Cicero introducing the two case studies by once again asserting that nothing which is morally wrong could be expedient (3.49). An admission follows, however, that cases still arise where *honestum* and *utile* seem to be in conflict. This sets the stage for the clearly outlined intention of the case studies in Book 3: to demonstrate that the conflict is merely apparent and that only what is *honestum* can truly be *utile*. Any action that is base can not truly be *utile*, even if it is valued as such. The central question, therefore, becomes whether an action deemed *utile* is genuinely incompatible with *honestum*, or if the two can be reconciled.

The scenario presents an Alexandrian merchant, described as a good man, who has set sail with a cargo of grain for the famine-stricken island of Rhodes. While en route, the merchant learns that other grain ships are also headed for Rhodes, but that this vessel will be the first to arrive. This knowledge presents the merchant with two options: to inform the Rhodians of the impending relief or to remain silent and thereby maximize the potential profit from the sale. The central ethical consideration is whether silence in this situation constitutes an act that is
turpe (disgraceful or base). This specific dilemma naturally gives rise to the broader
philosophical question of whether silence can be considered base in all cases.

The merchant's silence presents an immediate financial advantage—the potential to earn substantial profits by selling all available grains. This economic incentive creates a compelling but morally fraught context for examining ethical decision-making, pitting personal gain against broader social responsibilities.

An evaluation of the merchant's dilemma requires identifying the groups to whom a
duty is owed and determining whether silence constitutes an act that is *honestum* or disgraceful.
While Cicero refers specifically to the Rhodians, a comprehensive ethical analysis must
recognize that duties often extend beyond the most immediate group. The merchant's decision,
while directly affecting the Rhodians, may also have significant consequences for others—such
as fellow merchants, family of the merchant, or the broader community. A consideration of
both direct and indirect impacts is essential for a full understanding of the scope and nature of
such duties. Therefore, this analysis will extend beyond the Rhodians to a wider range of
potentially affected groups.

This approach finds a parallel in modern stakeholder theory. Freeman in 1984 proposed a concept of strategic management that extends beyond traditional economic considerations by focusing on stakeholders, defined as "any group or individual who is affected by or can affect the achievement of an organization's objective" (Freeman, 1984; Freeman and McVea, 2001, pg. 4). While the theory was developed for organizations, its principles can be applied to a single merchant, who also has stakeholders: groups that are affected by and can affect the merchant's business. Cicero does not explicitly name stakeholders, yet the discussion of conflicting duties<sup>v</sup>—which forces an agent to consider obligations to various parties beyond a single transaction—points toward a similar line of reasoning that recognizes a network of responsibilities.

The performance of an *officium*, as observed in the previous section, occurs within a social context and is grounded in the idea that it involves actions owed to others. *Honestum* is not merely moral rectitude but also encompasses flourishing and well-being; it is not a one-time choice but a habit that shapes character. By consistently choosing to perform an *officium* and thereby choosing *honestum*, individuals align personal advantage with the common good, creating a form of *utile* that supports a stable and harmonious society.

Thus, the merchant's duties can be understood as extending to the following groups:

1. The merchant's family and dependents, including the merchant's own self-interest.

2. The team or workers involved in the enterprise, such as laborers who handle goods or the farmers who supply the crops.

3. The customers who are essential for the viability of the business.

4. Other merchants operating in the same market.

With these stakeholder groups to whom a duty is owed now identified, the analysis can proceed by revisiting key ideas that illuminate the consequences of the merchant's potential actions on each group.

Cicero's ethical framework extends beyond narrow self-interest, arguing that the act of caring for a family should ultimately teach broader community responsibility (Atkins, 2023). Purely self-focused behavior leads to isolation, whereas true ethical conduct recognizes fundamental human interdependence. Patriotism and familial care serve as foundational lessons in developing a more expansive sense of social obligation.

According to Cicero's hierarchy criteria, duties should be discharged first toward the country, then to family, and finally to other groups (*Off.* 1.53, 1.58, 1.160). Even upon assessing a situation<sup>vi</sup>, the natural affinity for loved ones creates an inclination to prioritize helping the family. However, this "order of the discharge of duties" alone is not a sufficient explanation to remain silent.
In evaluating ethical choices, Cicero introduces an additional set of criteria that can adjust or even override the hierarchy of relationships criteria. The circumstance criteria allows the evaluation of the situation when deciding which duty to perform (*Off.* 1.59). This is specifically relevant when there are conflicting duties. Cicero presents two examples, the first involving the choice to help a neighbor gather a harvest before helping a brother (*Off.* 1.59). Although Cicero does not clarify the reason, a likely explanation is that the neighbor's need is immediate, practical, and time-sensitive, or that the neighbor may lack other sources of aid. Conversely, a kinsman or friend should be defended in court over a neighbor. While various reasons could be posited, this particular duty likely stems from the fact that a legal case involves trust, loyalty, and personal character—obligations deeper than the practical help offered to a neighbor. This suggests that the 'circumstance criteria' evaluates not only the urgency of a need but also its nature, prioritizing duties that uphold foundational social bonds like trust and loyalty over more transient material assistance. While immediate family remains important, professional communities and broader social contexts also bear significant weight. Therefore, merchant's obligation extends not just to immediate buyers but to a broader professional community and, crucially, to those most vulnerable—in this case, the famine-stricken Rhodians.

According to Cicero, the performance of a duty requires keeping the following in mind:

1. What is needful in each case.

2. What each individual can or cannot procure without the assistance of the agent (*Off.* 1.59).

The first sub-criteria requires an assessment of the urgency and type of need. For instance, in the example Cicero gives, gathering a harvest is an immediate, time-sensitive material need, whereas a court case involves a need for loyalty and defense. The second sub-criteria requires an assessment of the person's dependency on the agent. Children, for instance, are dependent on parents for protection, which strengthens the parents' duty toward them. A neighbor, likewise, might need the agent's specific help at a specific moment because no one else is available.

The two aspects of analyzing the circumstances cannot be separated; a proper evaluation must weigh the need against the ability to assist. Thus, the process of determining to whom a duty should be discharged is a multi-step process. The agent starts with the hierarchy of the relationship criteria and then adjusts or overrides it based on the circumstance criteria. The criterias Cicero puts forth are, therefore, not a set of stringent rules that ignore context. By presenting these two criteria, Cicero demonstrates that it is not possible to simply follow a rigid formula and claim to have fulfilled a duty; a nuanced assessment is always required.

With these criterias in mind, an examination of the duties owed to each group, and the consequences of each potential action, can be undertaken. The merchant's own needs and those of the family fulfill the hierarchy of relationship criteria. By speaking out, the merchant may arguably fail in the duty to secure greater provisions for the family. If the family were in desperate need, silence might serve this duty, as it would allow the merchant to provide more for the family and for self-preservation.

If the merchant genuinely needs the extra sales—perhaps due to a critical family situation or the risk of business failure—then silence could be justifiable, provided it does not go against the principle of justicevii. In such a case, the duty to dependents could take precedence. However, if the additional profit would merely increase wealth without necessity, withholding information would not be morally justifiable. Whether picking the duty to his family over the Rhodians can be justified will be dealt with in the next section.

While determining the priority of duty between customers and workers is difficult, this analysis will first address the workers, as their livelihood is directly dependent on the merchant's actions. A successful sale ensures the survival of the merchant's business. Although
the text does not explicitly mention workers, the nature of such a commercial enterprise presupposes their existence for sourcing grain and managing logistics. The merchant has an *officium* toward these workers, which includes the responsibility to provide compensation for the labor involved in gathering and transporting the goods. By remaining silent, the merchant could secure the funds necessary to ensure all involved receive their due compensation, and perhaps a greater share than would otherwise be possible.

The merchant's next duty is toward the customers. This duty entails selling goods at a reasonable price and being truthful about their quality. A 'reasonable price' can be defined as an amount that reflects not only the quality of the goods but also the effort involved in production and transportation; it should be neither exorbitantly high nor so low that the business becomes unsustainable. Truthfulness about "quality" means, for instance, not claiming that crops are pesticide-free if they are not, nor asserting that they are fresh if they are, in fact, rotting.

The Rhodians, moreover, are not merely potential customers but a community struck by famine. The community's vulnerability is stark: a lack of basic sustenance creates a significant disadvantage that elevates the moral weight of the merchant's potential actions. It is reasonable to expect the merchant to disclose any relevant information that the customers might not otherwise possess, such as the arrival of more cargo. Withholding this information would constitute an exploitation of the Rhodians' vulnerability and the merchant's information asymmetry. During a famine, individuals are likely willing to pay as much as possible to obtain food quickly. Some, however, may not be able to afford a higher price, and others may have varying levels of urgency. Silence, in this case, could lead to a rush to purchase available goods, potentially leaving those in greatest need without supplies.

The final group to consider is other merchants, the primary competitors. Although technically competitors, these merchants form a distinct professional community bound by shared experiences—understanding the challenges of being cheated, navigating market fluctuations, and surviving difficult trading periods. This professional solidarity suggests an interconnectedness that rises above simple competitive dynamics, moving beyond a zero-sum or individualistic framework. Unfair methods should not be used to hinder the sales of competitors. While using better advertising or other legitimate strategies to improve sales is acceptable, remaining silent about incoming cargo could constitute an unfair viii advantage. This action would violate the fundamental principles of justice, as Cicero presents in 1.20ix, since it would harm other merchants without provocation.

The analysis thus reveals a complex web of duties. The duty to family and workers is tied to livelihood and dependency. The duty to the Rhodians is heightened by extreme vulnerability. Finally, the duty to other merchants is grounded in professional justice. The ethical decision, therefore, rests on how these competing duties are weighed using Cicero's criterias.

A strong case can be made for prioritizing the duty to each group. Even if the customers' situation does not meet the threshold to override the merchant's duty to the family, it is still necessary to consider whether the merchant's silence does more harm than good. The family takes priority because family members may lack the ability to be self-sufficient, a factor that places this duty high on the scale of duty. However, if the family—unlike the Rhodians—is not in desperate need (a reasonable assumption, given no textual evidence to the contrary), then remaining silent would be wrong, as it would constitute an exploitation of the Rhodians' dire situation for personal gain. Furthermore, the text does not suggest the business is on the brink of closing; therefore, any justification based on keeping the enterprise afloatx would also fail.

Given the context of a famine, if the merchant chooses to sell the goods at a usual price (rather than an exceptionally low price that might prove competitively disadvantageous) and also chooses to disclose the imminent arrival of additional cargo, no financial loss may be
incurred. As the first seller to arrive, the merchant could still expect customers to purchase more than usual to stock up, even with full disclosure. In this way, the merchant would likely sell as much as would ordinarily be sold, if not more, without resorting to the withholding of information.

The merchant's silence raises questions about opportunism and moral responsibility. By remaining silent, the merchant risks taking undue advantage of a critical situation, transforming a potential economic transaction into an ethical dilemma that goes beyond simple legal compliance. Withholding critical information constitutes harm not through direct action but through the systemic consequences of the omission. This understanding of harm as a systemic consequence clarifies why even a silence intended only to protect one's family fails the justificatory test; the act is never neutral, as it inherently risks broader societal disruption. In the merchant scenario, silence could precipitate destructive social dynamics—such as resource hoarding that leaves vulnerable populations with virtually nothing. The ethical breach lies not just in individual action but in the potential societal disruption caused by strategic omission.

## PREFORMING ONE'S LEGAL DUTY VS MORAL DUTY

The dialogue between Diogenes and Antipater presents a case study that distinguishes between two divergent archetypes of the merchant. The first archetype is the merchant who adheres strictly to legal requirements, revealing information only as mandated by law. This merchant's primary objective is profit maximization, pursued without engaging in overt deception, and conceives of moral responsibility as being coextensive with legal compliance. In contrast, the second archetype embodies a different ethical perspective, positing that transparency is a moral duty. From this standpoint, mere adherence to the law is ethically insufficient. The act of withholding pertinent information, even when legally permissible, is seen as a violation of the fundamental trust that underpins the relationship between buyer and seller. Consequently, the fundamental distinction lies in their perception of the exchange: the first merchant perceives a mere transaction, whereas the second perceives a human relationship.

The philosophical divergence on this matter is clearly articulated in the positions of Antipater and Diogenes. Antipater posits that a merchant's moral duties significantly surpass the requirements of civil law. This position is grounded in the social nature of humanity, which mandates that individuals act for the benefit of others and the broader community, necessitating the disclosure of all relevant information. Diogenes, by contrast, argues for a position in which moral obligation is aligned with legal compliance. Provided the merchant abides by civil law— which includes disclosing known defects and refraining from deception—no further moral obligation exists to reveal all information, particularly in the absence of active deceit. According to this view, silence is morally permissible once legal standards are met. To demand a higher standard of disclosure would, in Diogenes's estimation, be tantamount to abolishing the very institutions of commerce and private ownership.

As Julia Annas observes, Diogenes and Antipater approach the issue from distinct standpoints: Diogenes concentrates on whether an action is necessary or not necessary, whereas Antipater's concern is with the conduct befitting a good person (Annas, 1997). This fundamental divergence in focus, Annas argues, leads to their contradictory conclusions. It is suggested that Cicero either misinterpreted their respective positions or constructed an artificial conflict between them. Diogenes contends that the merchant is not obligated to inform others of what is in their interest. Antipater, however, insists, “*immo vero necesse est*” (on the contrary, it is necessary). The analysis shows that Diogenes, unlike Antipater, is not primarily concerned with duty in a broad sense. The focus of Diogenes's argument is instead on the commercial act of buying and selling as it exists within a framework of legal obligations
This interpretation, therefore, gives rise to several key questions for consideration:

1. Do Diogenes and Antipater address fundamentally different issues – legal versus moral, respectively?

2. What is the point of institutions and owning something, the notions which allow for the sale of goods rather than their free distribution?

3. Do the bonds of fellowship, which imply shared interests between the community and the individual, become a hindrance in such matters?xi

A preliminary analysis suggests that Diogenes focuses on actions permissible under civil law, while Antipater assesses the moral correctness of such actions. Cicero frames this conflict by noting that one perspective claims “a thing must be expedient in such a way that it is not morally wrong”, while the other maintains that an act should be avoided precisely because it is morally wrong (Off. 3.54).

This distinction between legality and morality is central to the broader Ciceronian and Stoic contrast between *naturae lege* (the law of nature) and *iure civile* (civil law), a contrast that has significant implications for social harmony and bonding. For Cicero, civil law (*ius civile*) is the mechanism through which citizens secure justice, maintain liberty, and preserve the dignity of the community (Harries, 2013; *De Legibus* 2.11). Cicero’s legal theory, however, is deeply informed by Stoicism, particularly its tradition of natural law (Schofield, 2021). This tradition holds that natural law is universal, unchanging, and eternal, applying to all rational beings. It is intrinsically connected with *recta ratio* (right reason), a faculty shared by both humans and gods alike (*De Legibus* 2.8). The essential difference, therefore, is that true law—natural law—is not contingent on custom or time and cannot be repealed by any authority. Civil law, then, in contrast, is fundamentally subject to both custom and temporal constraints.

According to Cicero's conception, civil law represents duties and functions to guide imperfect humans toward the moral virtue established by natural law (Asmis, 2008). This establishes a clear hierarchy wherein civil law is guided by, and subordinate to, natural law. The legitimacy of this relationship rests on two fundamental conditions: justice and permanence. To be valid, civil laws must not contradict natural justice and ought to be permanent and unchanging, rather than arbitrary or temporary (Asmis, 2008, *De Legibus* 1.19, 2.11). This hierarchy dictates that civil laws are legitimate only to the extent that they reflect and realize moral law. It can be argued, therefore, that a civil law failing to meet this standard calls for reform, as it cannot be considered law in the truest sense.

The primary function of civil law, then, is to specify particular duties. These laws do not prescribe perfect virtue directly; instead, they guide individuals toward it by establishing duties pertaining to citizenship, parenthood, justice, and fairness, among other social roles. Consequently, civil laws are necessarily suited to specific cultural contexts and situations, rendering them particular rather than universal. They possess limitations and must remain adaptable to reflect historical and cultural specificity.

Within this framework, society constitutes a legal partnership, and the stability of the state relies fundamentally on its citizens adhering to the moral duties implicit in this societal partnership (Harries 2013). This framework creates a crucial bridge between private morality and public law, wherein the moral conduct of individuals directly impacts the legal and political stability of the community. It follows that civil laws will often prove insufficient, as they cannot anticipate or govern every conceivable moral circumstance. As a result, it becomes essential for citizens to engage in critical self-reflection, considering whether their actions align with the broader principles of natural law, even when those actions remain within the formal bounds of civil law.

While civil law mandates the disclosure of certain information when one party exercises a right against another, moral law does not operate on the same principle of exercisable rights.
The merchant's silence, therefore, does not violate any legal rights of the buyers. This distinction raises a pivotal question: if an action does not violate civil law, can it still be in violation of moral law?

Cicero's work provides a framework for exploring this question. In *De Officiis* 2, it is noted that cities are formed through the association and cooperation of individuals, and with urban life comes the establishment of laws and customs (*Off.* 2.15). An obligation to adhere to civil law thus arises from the nature of communal living. However, Cicero also argues that human obligations extend beyond these civil statutes to the laws of nature. This point is made explicitly at 3.69:

> "Although I see this, because of the corruption of custom, it is neither considered shameful by tradition nor sanctioned by law or civil law, nevertheless it is sanctioned by the law of nature."

This passage highlights a crucial distinction: the difference between the law of nature and civil law lies in their respective scopes. While civil law serves to protect fundamental rights such as freedom, equality, and life<sup>xii</sup>, its capacity to address complex ethical dilemmas is limited (*Off.* 2.41-2.42).

Cicero's interpretation presents Diogenes as holding that the merchant's actions are expedient without being morally wrong, a position that aligns with Diogenes' legalistic focus in the dialogue. Cicero's reading of Antipater, who emphasizes moral obligation, is equally accurate. The error Annas attributes to Cicero—that he creates a contradiction between the two Stoics—misunderstands Cicero's broader aim. Far from manufacturing a false conflict, Cicero acknowledges the appearance of tension while ultimately demonstrating the complementarity of the two views. Cicero demonstrates this complementarity by positioning Diogenes' legal framework as the necessary floor for social conduct, while Antipater's appeal to natural law represents the ethical horizon toward which a just individual must strive. One defines the bare minimum, the other the moral ideal; together, they form a complete picture of civic and personal duty.

Withholding information during a famine, as previously established, not only exploits people in distress but also risks creating inequality in the distribution of goods. To strengthen the opposing claim, Diogenes removes the profit-making motive from the scenario, asking what harm the merchant does if the goods are sold at a lower price (*Off.* 3.51). While this counter-argument may appear noble, it masks a deeper issue: the merchant's withholding of crucial information fundamentally affects how the distressed Rhodians can allocate their limited resources. Within such a community, some individuals are inevitably in greater need than others, and the absence of information prevents a just prioritization. Were the merchant to disclose the impending arrival of additional shipments, the Rhodians could ensure that those in the direst need receive aid first, regardless of the price.

In scenarios of this nature, mere adherence to legal obligations is insufficient. This illustrates Cicero's central point: while laws are designed to prevent general harm to rights, they cannot account for every moral nuance. There are situations where ethical considerations demand action beyond the mere adherence to legal requirements. Cicero situates this discussion within a broader theory of justice and duty, which emphasizes that human actions should not harm others, especially those in vulnerable situations.

The distinction between concealing (*celare*) and not telling (*tacere*) raises a central ethical question: does withholding information that could benefit another and prevent harm differ morally from merely choosing not to disclose it? Cicero maintains, according to Annas, this distinction is central to understanding the debate between Diogenes and Antipater, who are once again interpreted as addressing two separate issues (Annas, 1997). From Diogenes's perspective, as presented by Annas, concealing (*celare*) constitutes the act of withholding information that an individual has a right to know, as distinct from information that is merely
in their interest. Not telling (tacere), by contrast, involves withholding information that is indeed in someone's interest but to which they have no formal right.

Two examples serve to clarify this distinction. First, a magician does not share trade secrets with an audience. While the audience may have an interest in knowing these secrets, it has no right to this information. Withholding it is therefore an instance of *tacere* (not telling). In contrast, consider a business partner who has a right to know about a significant financial loss. If the other partner withholds this information to avoid a difficult conversation and maintain a facade of success for personal benefit, this act constitutes *celare* (concealing).

These examples illustrate the distinction Diogenes likely draws between *celare*, *tacere*, and the associated concepts of rights and interests. This interpretation is supported by Diogenes's statement at 3.52: 'to conceal is not simply whatever you keep silent about, but rather when, for the sake of your own advantage, you want those whose interest it is to know what you know to remain ignorant of it.'

It can be noted here that Cicero's position reframes the debate by adding a crucial third dimension to the concepts of a 'right to know' and an 'interest to know.' Cicero's analysis emphasizes the intentions and consequences of withholding information. Specifically, his line of questioning probes whether concealment harms others—not in a strictly legal or direct sense, but by undermining their ability to act freely and rationally. In Kantian terms, this concern aligns with the formula of humanity, which mandates that humanity be treated always as an end and never merely as a means. By keeping silent for personal gain, the merchant commits two wrongs:

1. The silence is used as a means to profit.

2. Others are deliberately deprived of the freedom to make an informed choice<sup>xiii</sup>.

This interpretation contrasts with that of Diogenes, who, according to Annas, frames the issue purely in terms of rights versus interests. In that view, concealment involves withholding what someone has a right to know, while withholding something they have no right to know is a mere omission. However, this reading arguably overlooks the point Cicero makes when stating:

> "mere holding one's peace about a thing does not constitute concealment, but concealment consists in trying for your own profit to keep others from finding out something that you know when it is for their interest to know" (Off. 3.57).

When an agent possesses information to which another has both a right and an interest, and the agent hides it for personal 'advantage,' the act is morally wrong. Similarly, when an agent possesses information to which another has no right but a clear interest, withholding that information for personal 'advantage' transforms the act. It moves from a morally neutral *tacere* (not telling) to a morally problematic *celare* (concealing).

With respect to the distinction between moral and civil law, the merchant must consider whether simply adhering to civil law is sufficient to fulfill all moral requirements and duties. The theoretical framework of Carroll's model of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) provides a useful lens for analyzing this problem. Carroll's model breaks down CSR into four hierarchical conditions:

1. Economic Responsibility: The primary duty to produce goods society desires and to be profitable.

2. Legal Responsibility: The requirement to operate within the established legal framework.

3. Ethical Responsibilities: Societal expectations that extend beyond the law, encompassing activities and practices considered the "right thing to do" even if not legally mandated.

4. Philanthropic Responsibilities: Voluntary actions guided by a company's desire to be a good corporate citizen (Carroll, 1979, pg. 500).
The core of this framework's relevance lies in Carroll's explicit separation of legal and ethical responsibilities into two distinct, sequential levels. While legal responsibility is a fundamental requirement, ethical responsibilities exist as a set of societal and moral norms that operate "over and above legal requirements" (Carroll, 1979, pg. 500). This distinction means a company can be in perfect compliance with the law yet still be perceived as acting unethically. Carroll provides an illustrative example: a company that released a high-alcohol soft drink faced consumer protest not for breaking the law, but for "being socially irresponsible by making such a drink available to youth" (Carroll, 1979, p. 504).

Drawing on this framework, it can be argued that Cicero's position anticipates a similar distinction. The merchant, while adhering to civil law, clearly fails to satisfy this distinct ethical responsibility by not sharing the crucial information. The merchant's moral failure is twofold. Not only does the choice to remain silent represent a failure to recognize a clear ethical requirement, but the very intention to gain profit from that silence confirms a breach of moral responsibility. A critical question remains: while silence is unethical, is it not advantageous? According to the Ciceronian framework, the answer is no.

The bonds of fellowship are undermined when agents separate their private interests from the common good. Cicero emphasizes this point in *De Officiis* 3.26: "there ought to be one goal for all: that the interest of each individual is the same as that of the whole; but if each person seizes it for himself, all human fellowship will be destroyed." The implication is that true fellowship, far from hindering the institutions and laws that structure society, actively upholds them. Consequently, the fair implementation of exchange, rights, and freedom depends on making choices that are simultaneously legal and ethical.

As established in Book 2, true advantage (*utile*) is inseparable from *honestum* and is secured through mutual helpfulness, which requires a good reputation, or *gloria*. Cicero posits that humans are naturally social. Drawing on Panaetius, he offers historical examples supporting the argument that neither success nor failure happens without the influence and cooperation of fellow humans (*Off.* 2.16). This indicates not only that *utile* should be understood as long-term advantage secured by justice, but also that so-called "short-term advantage" is often achieved through unjust means. Any action that violates the bonds of fellowship, therefore, cannot be truly *utile* because it undermines the very system of cooperation upon which all advantage depends. The merchant's silence, viewed through this lens, is a direct assault on this principle, prioritizing an isolated, fleeting profit.

The merchant's silence, while profitable in the short term, would be ruinous to the very *gloria* upon which lasting success depends. The Rhodians would rightly feel deceived upon learning that more ships were imminent, realizing the merchant had exploited their desperation for unjust profit. By eroding the essential affection, confidence, and admiration, this act would create a deep distrust and could lead them to refuse any future business with him. Furthermore, as news of such cunning spread to other ports, the merchant would be branded untrustworthy and become an undesirable trading partner.

Beyond the loss of customer trust, the merchant's silence constitutes a violation of *fides* (good faith) that damages the entire professional community. Institutions like trade rely not only on laws but on a baseline of trust between participants. The merchant's act introduces a poison of suspicion into the marketplace, creating a "domino effect." When other merchants see that unethical behavior is rewarded, they may feel compelled to act similarly to remain competitive, which can lead to a breakdown of market integrity. A functioning market is a form of social cooperation. By violating *fides*, the merchant damages this social fabric, which in turn makes commerce more difficult and less advantageous for everyone, including the merchant.

One might object that the merchant's duty to his family or business, per the "hierarchy criteria," could justify his silence. Cicero's philosophy, however, suggests that fundamental moral duties are not voided by personal need, famously arguing that a wise man would not
steal bread even if starving (*Off.* 3.29). Recall the argument made in the previous section where family was identified as a stakeholder for the merchant. Assuming that the family also satisfied the circumstance criteria, how would the merchants *utile* be affected if he chose to remain silent?

The merchant now needs to weigh whether silence will serve to fulfil his duty towards his family. Upon assessment he might come to the conclusion that silence, even to serve the needs of his family, will still be the incorrect choice. Because silence negatively impacts the Rhodians, they would likely refuse future business with the merchant upon discovering the truth. The previously mentioned "domino effect" would still manifest among other merchants. This is because silence still triggers information asymmetry. Therefore, the only correct course of action is to share the information with the Rhodians, as silence fails as a duty to them and to the merchant's own family.

Moreover, since the merchant was the first to arrive, he could have sold his cargo at a fair price; his silence served only to secure an unjust profit. The "circumstance criteria" dictates that the Rhodians' desperate situation heightens the merchant's duty to them. His silence, therefore, is a clear case of using their vulnerability as a means to an end—a direct violation of the principles of fellowship.

## CASE STUDY – THE HOUSE SELLER

The case of the house sale shifts the readers' focus from desperation to a simple transaction. This scenario directly engages with Cicero's distinction in *De Officiis* 1 between two kinds of injustice (*Off.* 3.55 - 3.57). The first kind involves actively harming another without provocation, while the second arises from a failure to prevent an injustice when one is able to do so (*Off.* 1.23).

To recall the specifics of the case, the debate between Diogenes and Antipater moves from the merchants' situation to that of a homeowner. A seller is selling a house with defects known only to the seller, yet the property has a reputation for being of sound construction and free of vermin. The buyer, aware of this good reputation, purchases the house, and the seller receives a price for the house higher than was anticipated. The central question, therefore, is whether the seller has acted wrongly by remaining silent. After all, the seller did not falsely advertise the property, and the buyer simply failed to apply due diligence. From this perspective, it becomes difficult to establish the seller's fault.

The seller's exclusive awareness of the house's defects, contrasted with its public reputation for being sound, is a crucial detail. This suggests that the property's flaws are not superficial; rather, they are internal and not easily discovered without prior knowledge or prolonged inhabitation. This point, while not explicitly raised by the interlocutors in Cicero's text, is made apparent by the very mention of the house's reputation. The nature of these defects means that information about them would likely only be available to the inhabitants or a housing expert.

In this scenario, two primary stakeholders can be identified: the buyer and the seller. The seller has a clear interest, and arguably a duty to their dependents, to secure the best possible price for the property, whether for familial upkeep or for further investment.

Parallel to this, the seller also has a duty to the buyer, specifically a duty to transact without deception. This raises a critical question: does deception occur if the seller remains silent, relying on the property's good reputation without offering any undue praise? The situation forces an examination of what it means to sell in "good faith" and how such an ethical standard affects the institution of commerce. A distinction must be drawn between what is required by civil law—where silence may not be a violation—and what is required by natural
law. The latter, as previously discussed with respect to the two types of injustice, may indeed be broken.

On the other hand, the buyer has a corresponding duty to exercise due diligence and personal judgment before making a purchase. If a buyer acts hastily, impressed solely by a property's exterior and favorable reputation, it is reasonable to question the seller's culpability. One reason for the buyer's lack of inquiry is that the house shows no explicit signs of being unsound, giving no cause for suspicion. In this, the buyer is relying on good faith of the seller. It is plausible to expect buyers to ask questions, and if the seller were to conceal the truth upon being asked, the act would undeniably be deceptive. However, the buyer did not ask, likely trusting the property's reputation and the unstated expectation that a seller will disclose any integral faults during such a significant transaction. This expectation exists because commerce relies on a certain degree of acting in good faith, even beyond legal requirements.

This analysis contends that while the buyer failed to apply adequate judgment, the seller committed a moral failure by not correcting the buyer's mistaken belief. In this ethical framework, not preventing harm (by allowing the buyer to purchase under false pretenses) is equivalent to inflicting direct harm. Not correcting a wrongful belief is as culpable as actively misleading someone. By failing to correct the buyer's false belief, the seller allows an unjust exchange to occur—one where value is not fairly traded—thus committing the very injustice of omission that Cicero warns against. The seller did not act in good faith, an omission that disrupts the social fabric of trust and harmony essential for commerce.

The seller's concealment of critical defects is a clear violation of ethical principles, even if it falls within legal bounds. The moral correctness of the action should not be evaluated based on the nature of its advertisement, as Diogenes frames it. The purpose of advertising is inherently to make a product appear attractive. Rather, the ethical question hinges on the non-disclosure of crucial facts to the buyer.

Once again, a distinction between law and ethics is important. If the seller acts strictly according to civil law, no wrongdoing may have occurred. Yet, an ethical requirement has been failed. While the law of that time did not punish false advertising, there were procedures stipulating that any defects should be declared at the time of purchase and, if not known then, would be made good later (*Off.* 3.61). Even assuming the seller acted within the law's letter, the principle of justice was violated by failing to correct a wrong.

In this case, although the hierarchical relationship between the buyer and seller is minimal, the "circumstance criteria" is highly applicable. The sale of products like a house depends fundamentally, in addition to the rules of the institution, on trust and good faith. It is an implicit expectation in such transactions that the price reflects the item's true worth and that any non-visible or latent faults will be disclosed.

Although the seller does not actively hide a piece of information, but rather fails to correct a popular belief, the seller is still charged with concealment. This charge is justified because, in this case, the buyer had a right to know the faults of the property, a right derived not from civil law but from the principle of fairness that underpins the very institution of exchange.

The seller's calculation of advantage is similarly flawed. Although the sale is a one-time transaction, the seller's reputation (*gloria*) within his community has lasting value. By knowingly allowing the buyer to act on a mistaken judgment, the seller commits a clear violation of *fides*. News of such a deception would inevitably spread through his local community, which would brand him as selfish and untrustworthy. This damage to his character would deter neighbours and fellow citizens from bestowing favours or trusting him in other civic and commercial matters. The disadvantage could also become explicitly financial. A buyer who discovers the concealed defects could reasonably take the seller to court for acting in bad faith. In such a case, the seller would likely face legal penalties and a loss of social
standing. These consequences would far outweigh the initial dishonest profit and prove the act was not truly advantageous.

Another objection that could be raised is that the seller's action is only disadvantageous if he is caught; if the deception remains secret, he appears to suffer no ill consequence. Cicero anticipates this by arguing that the true punishment for injustice is not legal sanction but the internal damage to one's own character (*Off.* 3.36). Thus, an immoral act should be understood not as an isolated event, but as the formation of a corrupting habit. The pursuit of short-term, unjust gains ensnares the mind and leads to significant psychological burdens. These can include the constant fear of discovery and the development of a fundamentally mistrustful character.

This view can be grounded in the Stoic theory of *oikeiôsis*, which posits that human nature is fulfilled by acting in accordance with reason and virtue. For humans, choosing the *honestum* is not merely a means to an external reward but is the very expression of a well-ordered nature. To act unjustly is to act against one's own nature, regardless of external consequences. To illustrate this point, Cicero introduces the story of Gyges, a shepherd who finds a golden ring that grants him invisibility when its bezel is turned inward. Using this power, Gyges murdered his master and removed anyone who stood in his way, ultimately rising to become the king of Lydia. Cicero's story of Gyges, who could act unjustly without consequence, forces a key question: why be moral if punishment is not a threat? True justice is not about avoiding punishment; it is about building a character that values moral action for its own sake. Acting unjustly, even in secret, degrades one's character and principles. The story reinforces two ideas: 1. That what is *honestum* is always truly advantageous, regardless of external consequences, and 2. the consequences of an act committed without fear of detection is that the individual demoralizes oneself and acts against one's own nature.

The final objection is the case of the seller who moves to a new country, leaving his reputation and community behind. Even here, where all external consequences are removed, the seller suffers a deep and lasting disadvantage. He alone knows the nature of his own actions. The choice to deceive leaves the seller with the knowledge of his own untrustworthy character; consequently, he projects this same capacity for deception onto others. His own actions make him insecure and suspicious, rendering him unable to truly trust his new community, not because its members are untrustworthy, but because of his internal state. This internal state of mistrust and isolation is the ultimate, inescapable disadvantage of his immoral choice.

## COMPARING THE TWO CASES

Two parallels can be drawn between the owner selling a house and a merchant selling goods. The first is that legal compliance alone constitutes an insufficient ethical standard. In both scenarios, the seller bears a moral obligation that extends beyond mere legal requirements. For the house seller, this means actively disclosing any known defects to the potential buyer, even if non-disclosure might not lead to immediate legal consequences. Similarly, for the merchant, the ethical imperative supplements the simple act of setting a fair price or avoiding explicit deception.

By juxtaposing these cases, Cicero challenges the narrow, legalistic view of transactional ethics. It can be argued that Cicero's intent is to show that true moral responsibility demands transparency, empathy, and a commitment to the broader social good—qualities that cannot be reduced to a mere checklist of legal obligations. The seller's duty is not just to avoid breaking the law, but to act with genuine integrity by revealing potential faults, considering the buyer's interests, and maintaining the fundamental trust that underpins social and commercial interactions.

The second parallel concerns access to information. In the merchant's scenario, the ethical tension regarding information disclosure becomes especially clear because of the
extraordinary circumstances of a famine. One might be inclined to agree with Antipater, for reasons detailed in the previous section, arguing that the dire need of the Rhodians creates a heightened moral obligation for transparency. Conversely, the house sale example lacks such a dramatic context; it appears as a relatively ordinary economic transaction without immediate threats to life or well-being. At first glance, there might seem to be less urgency to disclose defects in a house compared to revealing incoming grain shipments during a famine.

Yet, both scenarios fundamentally highlight the same ethical issue: asymmetrical access to information. A key question arises: why should revealing information be considered more necessary in one scenario than the other? The ethical argument Cicero implicitly suggests, and which is argued explicitly here, is that it should not be. Ethical duties concerning access to information must be consistent across situations. While the consequences of failure differ in severity, the nature of the moral wrong—securing an unjust advantage by exploiting a knowledge gap—remains identical. It is this fundamental violation of fairness, rather than its immediate outcome, that Cicero identifies as the core ethical problem. Both the merchant and the house seller possess crucial information unknown to their counterparts, giving them unjust advantages. Both examples support the argument that an asymmetry in information distribution is ethically problematic and creates obligations for transparency that must hold true irrespective of the context or the urgency of the circumstances.

Cicero's primary concern is to emphasize that operating solely within legal boundaries is insufficient for moral conduct. Cicero's objection against Hecaton likely stems from the principle that an action bringing profit, which is not explicitly forbidden by law, is not automatically morally justified (Off. 3.63)xiv.

To illustrate this tension further, consider the following hypothetical example. A person owns a laptop purchased ten years ago for 1000 euros. After extensive use, the owner decides to upgrade and sell the old one. Given its age, it is listed for 500 euros and advertised as being in "great shape, works well, no fault." However, the seller alone knows that the laptop significantly slows down when running more than two programs and that it must be constantly connected to its charger to function.

The moral question thus arises: is it right to sell the laptop at the advertised price rather than at a lower price that would reflect this flaw? Does withholding this information override the spirit of the institution of buying and selling? Is it not in the buyer's interest and right to know about this defect?

The institutions of buying, selling, and the laws governing commerce were established to ensure fair exchange. As demonstrated by Carroll's four conditions of the first dimension, these institutions follow certain ground rules. The law protects individuals only to the extent that their rights are not violated. The institutions are set up to allow for a fair exchange within the established legal framework. What the law does not do—and cannot do—is teach individuals to be better people. One could always claim to be adhering to the letter of the law while violating its spirit.

The argument presented here is that Cicero neither misunderstood the two philosophers nor advocates for overriding laws and institutions. Instead, Cicero presents two sides of the same ethical coin. Situations arise where it must be decided whether mere adherence to the law is sufficient for moral conduct.

Under ordinary conditions, acting strictly within legal parameters may not constitute wrongdoing. However, legal compliance does not preclude individuals from looking beyond minimal requirements. On one hand, laws and institutions should be respected; on the other, moral agents must consider how their actions or inactions affect others. This may require moving beyond what the law demands, but it does not entail dismissing the law or its underlying institutions.
If Cicero had meant to advocate for overriding the institutions of buying and selling, he would likely have suggested that the merchant should provide grain for free during a famine—an argument Cicero does not make. Cicero understands the economic necessity of selling goods and earning money; the concern is with the ethical manner in which these transactions occur.

To extend the laptop example: By law, the seller must disclose any known faults. The seller might set the price at 500 euros—perhaps even 100 euros lower than the market value for a similar laptop without major damage. In doing so, a modest profit is made after ten years of use, despite the weakening battery. But is this transaction truly fair?

One might initially answer affirmatively. However, a crucial ethical test emerges if one supposes that the seller, with full knowledge of the facts, would not be willing to pay 500 euros for that same laptop. Perhaps the seller believes the device will likely stop working within another year. In such a case, would 500 euros remain a fair price, or would 200 euros better reflect the laptop's actual value? By selling at 500 euros while disclosing the legally required information, the seller complies with the law but still falls short of *honestum*. If the seller is not personally willing to pay 500 euros for the laptop, this clearly indicates that the set price is not fair and thus the action is not morally upright. Herein lies the core of what Cicero has put forth: the gap between what is legally permissible and what is truly honorable, or *honestum*.

In both the merchant and seller cases, silence is not the most advantageous choice because it ruins the trust fundamental to human society, thereby destroying the agent's credibility. Furthermore, by dealing in bad faith, such silence disrespects the foundations of commercial institutions, which are upheld not only by laws but also by good faith. Finally, even if an action remains undiscovered (as in the seller's one-time transaction), the agent's moral degradation has a psychological effect, causing the agent to distrust others in the future. Thus, while silence may bring short-term financial gain, it results in far more serious and lasting negative effects, proving that what is base cannot be truly advantageous.

The tension between natural law and civil law, between moral ideals and legal minimums, creates a space for ethical deliberation. This deliberation transcends mere rule-following while still respecting the institutions that structure social life, forcing a consideration of the stakeholders involved and the conflicting duties that arise within a given scenario.

## CONCLUSION

By applying the principles from Books 1 and 2 of *De Officiis*, this paper has demonstrated how Cicero's claim—that only the ethical choice is the truly advantageous one—can be assessed and proven. The cases examined reveal that the central question is not a simple matter of discerning right from wrong or advantage from disadvantage. Rather, the challenge lies in understanding the deliberative process: how to decide between two options and what justifies a particular choice. When the cases are interpreted through Cicero's tenets, it emerges as a challenger to the conception of economic interactions as mere contracts driven solely by advantage.

An analysis of the cases reveals a framework of conditions that guides an agent in determining to whom a duty is owed and why. While adherence to civil law and institutional rules is necessary for regulating fair exchange, these alone are insufficient for making the correct ethical and the truly *utile* choice. The decisive factor is the proper discharge of one's duties, a consideration necessitated by the fact that economic exchanges affect not only the parties directly involved but also a wider circle of stakeholders. Consequently, in deciding on a course of action, the agent must, as Cicero proposes, engage in a two-part calculation. The deliberation begins with a 'hierarchy criterion' but is then adjusted or even overridden by a 'circumstance, need, and ability criterion'. This calculation not only ensures that the correct
duty is discharged but also that agents choose long-term true advantage over short-term apparent advantage.

Cicero's verdict that silence is base in both cases is rendered against the ethical backdrop established in Books 1 and 2. This framework compels the merchant to recognize a higher duty to the buyers, particularly given the context of a famine and the significant impact this information would have on the well-being of the Rhodians. Therefore, by remaining silent, the merchant—while breaking no law—undermines the very institution of economic exchange, which is founded not merely on a set of laws but on the principles of good faith and trust. A similar duty applies to the house seller, whose obligation is not merely to sell the property in accordance with laws and regulations, but also to prevent the buyer from making a decision based on a false popular opinion.

Silence in both cases is wrong precisely because it undermines the integrity of social institutions by creating an imbalance of information. Information asymmetry, necessitates an inquiry into the nature of transparency. The requirement for transparency is not absolute; it is contingent upon the principles of justice and must be assessed in light of specific circumstances. Ultimately, asymmetrical access to information fuels distrust and erodes the bonds of fellowship, which form the very foundation of Cicero's conception of human society and community.

Cicero does not, in fact, advocate for overriding the institutions of exchange; such a position would be inconsistent with his broader philosophy, which recognizes the value of social and economic institutions. Instead, Cicero's point is that agents must consider factors beyond what laws and rules demand. This is necessary because situations inevitably arise where following the letter of the law is insufficient for an ethical outcome. In such cases, the bonds of fellowship are diminished. The erosion of these bonds, in turn, undermines respect for laws and rules themselves. This occurs because every institution operates on the tacit understanding that its agents will exercise moral judgment to determine when mere legal compliance is ethically insufficient.

While Cicero implicitly argues that sharing the information is a matter of not only fairness but also of sustaining social harmony and community integrity, this paper has sought to demonstrate that claim explicitly. In this view, transparency—whether in moments of crisis or in ordinary transactions—remains an ethical imperative precisely because it preserves social cohesion. As this paper's analysis of the long-term consequences has shown, this breach of trust is not only a moral failure but also a practical disadvantage, proving that the duty to transparency is essential for preserving both social harmony and an agent's own well-being. Through the merchant and house-sale examples, Cicero suggests that the apparent conflict between moral integrity and personal gain is resolved when economic activity is understood as a form of mutual responsibility.

This Ciceronian framework places moral reasoning at the center of economic interactions. Ethical decisions, in this view, are not abstract calculations but are instead shaped by a confluence of personal character, social expectations, and specific circumstances. The result is a practical and grounded approach focused on navigating real situations where responsibilities are not always clear-cut. Consequently, the two case studies remain relevant, challenging a modern audience to think beyond legal minimums and consider broader human responsibilities.
i *De Officiis* 2.72, 2.74, 2.78 suggests that the wealthy have a duty to assist the poor and contribute to the state's welfare, while the government should avoid overreach in redistributive policies.

ii See Vivenza 2004 for a comprehensive analysis that explores Calcagninus, Magioragius, Grifolus, and Pufendorf philosophical and economic perspectives on commerce of Cicero's work.

iii *De Officiis* 2.1 *quibus utuntur homines* – which humans use.

iv A.A. Long, Gloria Vivenza, Julia Anna, Neil Wood, Philip Mitsis, etc.

v Conflicts of duty can be categorized into two forms: the first involves choosing between duties that arise from two different situations, such as a duty arising out of a promise made to a friend and a duty arising out of care for one's sick child. The second involves choosing between duties that arise from a single situation; the merchant's case is an example of this conflict.

vi It is apparent that while the performance of a duty is a given, each situation must still be assessed on its own merits. For instance, a duty to keep a promise may be justifiably superseded by the specific circumstances of a given situation.

vii The meaning of harm can range from physical harm to obstructing ones freedom to decide something, this will be made evident with the progress of the analysis.

viii This advantage is considered unfair in the sense that the merchant uses a privileged position of knowledge to hinder others from making a sale.

ix “The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to another, unless provoked by wrong; and the next is to lead men to use common possessions for the common interests, private property for their own.”

x If the enterprise itself is inefficient or wrong in some sense, it seems plausible that not much importance should be paid to it. Given that the merchant is described as a good man it is assumed that the enterprise itself is good.

xi While questions 2 and 3 are posed here, these will, however, be answered explicitly after the analysis of the sale of the house case. The reason to pose these questions at this stage is twofold: the argument is introduced in the dialogue early on, 2. The discussion of natural and civil law acts as the basis for answering the two questions.

xii “The reason for making constitutional laws was the same as that for making kings... For rights that were not open to all alike would be no rights”

xiii As opposed to unknowingly, which according to Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethic 3,1–3) a lack of knowledge makes someone’s action involuntary.

xiv *Off.* 3.63 ‘Hecaton ... openly avows that he will abstain from doing for his own profit only what the law expressly forbids. Such a man deserves no great praise nor gratitude.’

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