recurrence for a majority of the 15 areas of non-compliance is greatly minimized and the effectiveness review is closed satisfactorily.

The Safeguards and Security Program (S&S) has demonstrated a desire to address identified findings/recommendations/guidance from DOE, however the laboratory remains challenged in terms of S&S program elements integration and organization. The laboratory submitted a revised draft of the Site Security Plan (SSP) as the S&S program and program elements continue to evolve, with a specific emphasis on protecting restricted areas and facilitating public engagement on-site. The laboratory should continue to evaluate the S&S needs for the site and evaluate whether opportunities for efficiencies may be lost with managing a decentralized organization.

The laboratory has continued to make improvements in the Physical Security posture. Replacement of obsolete or ineffective Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) with highly efficient and scalable systems continues. Additionally, the laboratory has employed a technology-focused solution to effectively secure the site and integrate emerging security technologies and systems. The laboratory has obtained initial approval for the eventual use of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) to aid in both Safeguards and Security and Emergency Management purposes. This has the potential to provide coverage of the 6800-acre site significantly and more effectively. The laboratory should continue efforts to evaluate the site boundaries and optimize security measures to prevent trespassing. The laboratory has continued to be effective with FS-10 requests and justifications and responsive to "shovel ready opportunities" as offered by DOE.

Conversely, the Foreign Visits and Assignments (FV&A) functional area has lagged in the drafting of specific FV&A procedures which support the Site Security Plan. These include lab procedures to address specific processing of Foreign Nationals, the entry and use of the FACTS system and integration with the Site Access and Badging process. Contributing to this weakness is the recent release of DOE O 142.3B midway through the calendar year. Laboratory compliance with their approved Site Security Plan (SSP) remains unclear as it relates to Property Protection Area (PPA) and General Access Areas (GAA), as full implementation of the SSP, including Wilson Hall controls, was required by March 31, 2021. Progress is ongoing, but FRA has not yet completed actions necessary to facilitate a Facility Clearance License (FCL). The FCL is required in order to appropriately begin the HSPD-12 transition project and ultimately the Access Authorization/Security Clearance process.

The laboratory has implemented a Site Access and Badging (SAB) project to standardize the process and simultaneously ensure required site training is tracked. This project will incorporate Real ID Act compliance, and eventually communicate with the systems used for personnel/employee management. The laboratory has been working towards full Real ID compliance.

**The Information Security program continues to evolve; however, it still needs improvement.**

The program is cyber-focused while not adequately addressing the non-cyber areas of Information Security such as proper document marking, handling, transmission, and storage. The August 2021 DOE Corrective Action Effectiveness Review identified Information Security weaknesses, primarily involving document reviews which uncovered incorrectly marked documents. The overarching Information Security program is underway and must identify all forms of information, both physical and electronic, and properly mark, handle, and store respective records. Subsequent to the Corrective Action Effectiveness Review, a draft framework of a new Information Security Plan has been created to include more robust mediums of information.

The Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) Program continues to be a laboratory strength. The MC&A Program is well implemented and is effectively working in collaboration with DOE experts. This collaboration was highlighted during the initiative to address the
vessels of Deuterium (D2) currently stored on-site. DOE is working with the laboratory to help identify the scope of the D2 issue and determine courses of action to properly dispose of the gas. This effort is on-going but will require laboratory involvement and effort to complete successfully.

**(Objective 8.3) Notable 1:** Promptly implement a revised Site Security Plan (SSP) and any additional required updates as approved by DOE. Complete directed security actions per DOE approved timelines.

**Outcome:** The laboratory's SSP was approved by the FSO Site Office Manager in December 2020 and implemented by the laboratory. This approval was contingent upon actions and deliverables which were adequately addressed by the laboratory.

**(Objective 8.3) Notable 2:** Develop a revised comprehensive ATO package(s) (based on an updated set of risk assessments, security plans and security control assessments) to align Fermilab systems as directed by DOE to the new CSPP and DOE risk expectations. Complete actions per DOE approved timelines.

**Outcome:** The laboratory submitted an ATO package on August 31 which was returned to due to quality and compliance standards not being met. When the package was reviewed by the Site Office, numerous misspellings existed, reference NIST documents, OMB memos, and DOE orders were not updated, inconsistent terms and old data were used, and some areas needed stronger language to match the SC CSPP requirements. As a result, FSO requested an updated version by September 24, 2021. The laboratory resubmitted the package by the requested date, though work is still needed to clearly document implementation of NIST 800-53r5 controls.
Analysis of 2023 PEMP (B-/C+ Equivalent Grade when including $1M fine)

<table><thead><tr><td>ITEM</td><td>DESCRIPTION</td><td>OWNER</td><td>RATING</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Goal 1.0</td><td>Provide for Efficient and Effective Mission Accomplishment (30%)</td><td>Director</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 1.1</td><td>Provide Science and Technology Results with Meaningful Impact on the Field</td><td>CRO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>By July 2023, develop and submit a plan to increase the involvement of Fermilab scientific staff on LBNF/DUNE including timelines of when increases will occur and activities that will receive the increases.</td><td></td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 1.2</td><td>Provide Quality Leadership in Science and Technology Results that Advances Community Goals and DOE Mission Goals</td><td>CRO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>Contribute to establishing the synergistic research program and deliver impactful science from the FNAL-led QIS Center, as measured by the FY 2023 trimester reports, annual report, common goals and milestones report, research publications and highlights, and participation in periodic conference calls.</td><td></td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 2.0</td><td>Provide for Efficient and Effective Design, Fabrication, Construction and Operations of Research Facilities (45%)</td><td>Director</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 2.1</td><td>Provide Effective Facility Design(s) as Required to Support Laboratory Programs (i.e., activities leading up to CD-2)</td><td>CPO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>Effectively manage and safely execute the assigned LCLS-II-HE project scope in accordance with DOE Order 413.3B. Performance will be assessed based on the assigned project management responsibilities and cryomodule work planned and accomplished during FY 2023.</td><td></td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 2.2</td><td>Provide for the Effective and Efficient Construction of Facilities and/or Fabrication of Components (execution phase, post CD-2 to CD-4).</td><td>CPO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>Effectively manage and execute the assigned PPU project scope for magnet fabrication in accordance with DOE Order 413.3B to safely accomplish the planned work per the approved Performance Baseline. Performance will be assessed based on the work planned and accomplished during FY 2023. Deliver chicane magnets 1 and 2, and injection dump dipole to ORNL by June 30, 2023.</td><td></td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 2.3</td><td>Provide Efficient and Effective Operation of Facilities</td><td>Director</td><td>B+</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>Develop a needs assessment on future housing in South Dakota for FRA employees, subcontractors, and collaborators. Based on the identified need, options should be evaluated and documented regarding methods for accomplishing housing near SURF. Coordinate the development of these options with SDSTA to integrate their local knowledge and their unique flexibilities. Submit the report by July 2023.</td><td></td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 3.0</td><td>Provide for Efficient and Effective Science and Technology Program Management (25%)</td><td>Director</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 3.1</td><td>Provide Effective and Efficient Strategic Planning and Stewardship of Scientific Capabilities and Program Vision</td><td>Director</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>Submit a staffing analysis of the technical, engineering, computing, scientific, and project management skills of the current staff and the outyear needs for that staff for the next 5 years.</td><td></td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 3.2</td><td>Provide Effective and Efficient Science and Technology Project/Program/Facilities Management</td><td>Director</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 3.3</td><td>Provide Efficient and Effective Communications and Responsiveness to Headquarter's Needs</td><td>Office of Communication</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 4.0</td><td>Provide Sound and Competent Leadership and Stewardship of the Laboratory</td><td>Director</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.1</td><td>Leadership and Stewardship of the Laboratory</td><td>Director</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.2</td><td>Management and Operation of the Laboratory</td><td>COO</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.3</td><td>Advancing Laboratory Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility</td><td>COO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO: In order to position Fermilab to meet future success and deliver on mission, FY 2023 must be a year of cultural and functional change. Implement an agreed to set of facility and systems changes in FY 2023 that assure fundamental change in the Laboratory footing for FY 2024.</td><td></td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.4</td><td>Leadership of External Engagements and Partnerships</td><td>COO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.5</td><td>Contractor Value-added</td><td>COO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 5.0</td><td>Sustain Excellence and Enhance Effectiveness of Integrated Safety, Health, and Environmental Protection (30%)</td><td>CSO</td><td>B-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 5.1</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Worker Health and Safety Program</td><td>CSO</td><td>C+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 5.2</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Environmental Management System</td><td>CSO</td><td>B+</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>Goal 6.0</td><td>Deliver Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Business Systems and Resources that Enable the Successful Achievement of the Laboratory Mission(s) [30%]</td><td>COO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.1</td><td>Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Financial Management System</td><td>CFO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.2</td><td>Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Acquisition Management System and Property Management System</td><td>CSO</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>6.2 Part 1</td><td>Acquisition Management System</td><td>CFO</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>6.2 Part 2</td><td>Property Management System</td><td>Facilities Eng. Services</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.3</td><td>Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive HR and Talent Management Systems</td><td>WDRS</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.4</td><td>Provide Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Contractor Assurance Systems, including internal Audit and Quality</td><td>WDRS</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>6.4 Part 1</td><td>Contractor Assurance Systems and Quality</td><td>COO</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>6.4 Part 2</td><td>Internal Audit</td><td>FRA Internal Audit</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.5</td><td>Demonstrate Effective Transfer of Knowledge and Technology and the Commercialization of Intellectual Assets</td><td>OPPT</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 7.0</td><td>Sustain Excellence in Operating, Maintaining, and Renewing the Facility and Infrastructure Portfolio to Meet Laboratory Needs [25%]</td><td>COO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 7.1</td><td>Manage Facilities and Infrastructure in an Efficient and Effective Manner that Optimizes Usage, Minimizes Life Cycle Costs and Ensures Site Capability to Meet Mission Needs</td><td>Facilities Eng. Services</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 7.2</td><td>Provide Planning for and Acquire the Facilities and Infrastructure Required to Support the Continuation and Growth of Laboratory Missions and Programs</td><td>Office of Campus Strategy & Readiness</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 8.0</td><td>Sustain and Enhance the Effectiveness of Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) and Emergency Management Systems [15%]</td><td>Director</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 8.1</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Emergency Management System</td><td>CSO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 8.2</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Cyber Security System for the Protection of Classified and Unclassified Information</td><td>CIO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 8.3</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Physical Security Program for the Protection of Special Nuclear Materials, Classified Matter, Classified Information, Sensitive Information, and Property</td><td>CSO</td><td></td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>8.3 Part 1</td><td>Part 1: Physical Security Program for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material and Property</td><td>CSO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>8.3 Part 2</td><td>Part 2: Classified Matter, Classified Information, and Sensitive Information</td><td>CIO</td><td></td></tr></table>

NOTE: Whereas the overall rating for the 2013 PEMP was B+, based on clauses B.3 Performance and Other Incentive Fees and Clause I.94-DEAR 970.5213-3 Conditional Payment of Fee, Profit and Other Incentives - Facility Management Contracts, DOE reduced the fee for FRA's performance by ~$1M, i.e. from the "earned fee" of $4,491,123.00 to $3,491,848.00,

## Goal 4.0 Provide Sound and Competent Leadership and Stewardship of the Laboratory

This Goal evaluates the Contractor's Leadership capabilities in leading the direction of the overall Laboratory, the responsiveness of the Contractor to issues and opportunities for continuous improvement, and corporate office involvement/commitment to the overall success of the Laboratory.

### Office of Science (SC)

* FRA has continued to deliver important physics results while building major new projects. The biggest highlight of the year was the new results on Muon g-2 experiment, which delivered a more precise measurement of the anomalous muon magnet moment that continues to be in tension with the Standard Model of Particle Physics.

* [...]

* Response to incidents such as the fall at the PIP-II Linac complex have put a spotlight on Environment, Safety and Health (ES&H) challenges at the Laboratory. Leadership must ensure operations at the Laboratory are aligned with Integrated Safety Management (ISM) and safety culture principles to enable operational excellence.

* It is noted that the Contractor Assurance System (CAS) has continued to undergo change including the formation of a new office with full time leadership, however substantive benefit will only come through disciplined use and implementation throughout the Laboratory. Outside assessments have provided insightful recognition of the degree of calibration and benchmarking needed to improve execution. The Laboratory needs to emphasize and make forward progress on the Contractor Assurance System (CAS) program to enhance the robustness of laboratory programs.

* [...]

## Objective 4.2: Management and Operation of the Laboratory

### Site Office

The Contractor Assurance System (CAS) has continued to undergo change including the formation of a new office with full time leadership, however substantive benefit will only come through disciplined use and implementation throughout the Laboratory. Outside assessments have provided insightful recognition of the degree of calibration and benchmarking needed to improve execution. Realization of the value in pursuing robust extent of condition determinations and extended opportunities to learn and improve from lessons learned elsewhere and in tangential areas is improving. Business as well as operational events benefited from these initial efforts. While this feedback is repetitive from FY 2022, it is restated to ensure understanding of the current state remains the same. Forward progress must be made on CAS implementation and the leveraging of the CAS program to enhance the robustness of Laboratory programs.
Procurement and acquisition processes have continued to have operational impacts to the Laboratory, however many of those impacts are as a result of addressing compliance gaps and resetting historical norms.

Response to incidents such as the fall at the PIP-II Linac complex have put a spotlight on ES&H challenges at the Laboratory. Leadership in response to those challenges have not always aligned with an organization that embraces the principles of Integrated Safety Management (ISM), and in many instances have lacked appropriate formality and safety culture in lieu of project execution milestones. Lessons learned and extent of condition reviews continue to need additional attention should the Laboratory aspire to operational excellence and principles of a learning organization.

Creation of a taxonomy matrix in FY 2023 will enable FRA to clearly identify services provided and application of policies and procedures to individuals accessing Fermilab.

## Goal 5.0 Sustain Excellence and Enhance Effectiveness of Integrated Safety, Health, and Environmental Protection

*This Goal evaluates the Contractor's overall success in deploying, implementing, and improving integrated ES&H systems that efficiently and effectively support the mission(s) of the Laboratory.*

### Site Office

* While acknowledging that more focused attention has been placed on specific Environment Safety and Health (ES&H) challenges remained over the course of the year, including a lack of effective program implementation, informality of operations, and weaknesses in site system/process maturation and effectiveness.

* Work Planning and Control (WP&C) activities span multiple systems such as Worklist, FAMIS, and IMPACT tools, which can create confusion around approval authorities and who authorizes the final work package and reviews the hazards. In addition, operational deviations are not consistently addressed and reviewed upon discovery in the field and prior to commencement of work.

* Hazard analysis documentation has been subpar, un-signed, or missing, with troubling inconsistencies across Laboratory divisions and directorates.

* Safety assessments are not being consistently completed as scheduled with delays of years resulting in operational compliance uncertainties, additional administrative controls, and higher operational risk.

* While the Radiation Protection Program (RPP) documentation has improved, FRA continues to struggle with effective implementation of program elements as identified through the two DOE RPP Program assessments, FSO oversight observations, and operational events. FRA continues to be challenged in providing appropriate levels of radiation protection through As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principles for both personnel and members of the public.

* Continued ineffective RPP implementation and a lack of Program formality has resulted in regular status meetings between FSO and FRA staff and management to assure continued program improvements are being made.

* FRA completed significant updates and improvements to Occupational Safety and Health program documentation, including Construction Safety, Radiation Protection, Work Planning and Control, Accelerator Safety, and Event Response Program.

* Intervention and direction was necessary to address issues and risk associated with injecting tritiated water into the Industrial Cooling Water (ICW) system which is the source of fire protection water supply across the complex.

## Objective 5.1: Provide an Efficient and Effective Worker Health and Safety Program
FRA continues to identify improvements and work toward improving the quality and oversight of their subcontractor safety program. The Environment, Safety and Health (ES&H) subcontractor safety group provides oversight to construction projects throughout all phases of the work and continues to try and expand the quantity and quality of their oversight. FRA provided diligent oversight of excavation tasks for culvert repair jobs around the Laboratory which were completed on time without health and safety incidents. However, the incident at the excavation job to install ground cables and a concrete dewar foundation at IB4 highlights the need for more rigor in the Laboratory's work planning and control process. While the quality of Hazard Analysis documentation has shown some improvement early in the fiscal year, FSO is still identifying significant shortcomings with the quality of WP&C documentation. There have been numerous instances of inconsistent implementation in subcontractor expectations involving work planning and control and the flow down of contract requirements to sub-tier contractors. FRA also needs to clearly define roles and responsibilities for staff charged with subcontractor worker health and safety oversight and ensure that training and qualifications are commensurate with areas of responsibility. These concerns have been identified and communicated to the Laboratory as a result of FSO oversight as well as the DOE PIP-II Accident Investigation Report. This incident highlighted program issues with the flow-down of contractual requirements, verification of subcontractor training, inadequate implementation of hazard analyses/work planning and control, and others as identified in the accident investigation report. Efforts to restart work after the pause due to this PIP-II incident were not well coordinated or documented and resulted in substantial DOE involvement after the fact.

FSO has observed Laboratory work where the hazard analysis documentation has been subpar, un-signed, or missing. The WP&C control documents for pure hydrogen storage and use are inconsistent across various Laboratory divisions. FSO formal assessments and targeted surveillances in Laser Safety, Use and Storage Hydrogen Gas Storage and Pyrophoric Materials show that the Laboratory has well written programs to protect workers and the environment from unmitigated exposures to known hazards. However, an independent Issues Management Assessment found that institutional requirements for issues management are not uniformly implemented across the Laboratory.

At the LBNF-Far Site (FS), FRA continues to ensure that WP&C efforts of its subcontractors develop thorough plans and effectively manage work in the field. The design review process involves all stakeholders, however, as evidenced by events at LBNF, this review process has been shown to have gaps that could at times lead to deficiencies in WP&C when implementing approved designs. FRA responded to this trend by refocusing efforts and engaging their subcontractors to review build-plans and HA's for large scopes of work that have a risk of being altered sufficiently to warrant a new analysis and accurately capturing the work being done and methods being used to properly address the associated hazards properly mitigated. While the initial work planning and control documentation for the NuMI target move during July 2023 lacked a level of rigor necessary to evaluate high hazard high risk activities during off hours on a weekend, the Laboratory eventually performed a comprehensive risk analysis and appropriate work planning and control measures which resulted in a successful move of this highly radioactive NuMI component.

The Laboratory's successful transportation of the Short Baseline Near Detector (SBND) as well as the NUMI horn, and target demonstrated solid work planning and control for some high-risk activities.

FRA continues to monitor and proactively respond to the Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) sampling data obtained to ensure the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principle is maintained for exposures to personnel. This data has been utilized in identifying and resolving issues with equipment that was starting to have mechanical issues leading to
increased emissions. FRA continues their rigorous sampling and working on controlling the hazard.

FRA's Radiation Protection Program (RPP) continues to experience numerous operational challenges, identified as part of FSO's operational oversight.

The new DOE Order 0420.2D Safety of Accelerators was issued in September 2022 and was added to FRA's contract. FRA developed a comprehensive implementation plan that was approved by FSO. Working groups were formed to review all areas impacted by the revised Order, including the Accelerator Safety Envelope (ASE), Safety Assessment Document (SAD), Unreviewed Safety Issue (USI) Process, Radiation Generating Devices (RGD), Accelerator Readiness Review Process (ARR), Contractor Assurance System (CAS) and Reviews, Training, Fermilab Environmental, Safety & Health Manual (FESHM) and Fermilab Radiological Control Manual (FRCM) Updates.

During FY 2023, FRA submitted a revision to the ASE and several SAD chapters in preparation for the upcoming ARR for the Spinquest experiment and restart of the NM beamline. During the FSO document review, several items were identified that required action prior to approval of the ASE and concurrence of the SAD Chapters ahead of the Spinquest ARR. As currently written, the SAD and ASE do not have the level of detail needed to fully understand all the credited controls and authorized operating limits for the accelerator complex. The comments FSO provided to FRA addressed several issues such as the following:

1. Clearly define credited controls and required maintenance process

2. Clearly define minimum shielding requirements

3. Clearly state and define administrative credited controls

4. Inclusion of radiation monitors as credited controls

5. Inclusion of oxygen deficiency hazard (ODH) controls as credited controls

The comments provided to FRA also addressed necessary high-level changes that were needed to rework the ASE and SAD for operations of the Fermilab accelerator. FSO charged the Laboratory to develop and externally validate a new SAD and ASE.

An external ARR was conducted to validate the updated ASE and SAD documentation. The ARR team determined significant work is needed in order for the updated SAD and ASE to fully address FSO comments and to be compliant with DOE Order 0420.2D. The team identified areas of concern including the use of compensatory measures in the ASE without properly evaluating the control in the SAD, the SAD chapters did not adequately develop and identify credited controls, the USI process needed improvement, and the use of thirty-year-old outdated shielding assessments as a reference in the ASE was problematic.

## Goal 6.0 Deliver Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Business Systems and Resources that Enable the Successful Achievement of the Laboratory Mission(s)

*This Goal evaluates the Contractor's overall success in deploying, implementing, and improving integrated business systems that efficiently and effectively support the mission(s) of the Laboratory.*

### Site Office

* FRA Procurement timelines, backlog, and delays were reduced during FY 2023, resulting in notable improvements in support of the mission and site execution. Building upon this improvement, the Procurement Department should continue its renewed focus to improve documentation and compliance in the areas of acquisition strategy and planning, market research, selection of subcontract type, evaluation criteria development, source selection, exercising and incorporation of subcontract options, and subcontract administration.
* While FRA achieved some success in talent management, the effects of not having a senior director for Human Resources (HR) in place throughout the course of FY 2023 was impactful. This vacancy leads to a missed opportunity to develop a clear agenda for HR and the invaluable support that the HR organization provides to the Laboratory.

* With the establishment of a new Contractor Assurance office, contractor should be the architect of cultivating a cross cutting communication environment, ensuring responses to undesired events minimize reoccurrences, assessing corrective action effectiveness, tracking performance metrics, etc. This system should have reportable metrics across the operations and science functions that can convey the Laboratory Agenda and Enterprise Risks clearly to FRA and DOE management.

* Technology transfer activities continued to advance the relationships with industry partners with several new initiatives announced. International agreements will provide the foundation for the collaborations needed for the major international experiments.

## Objective 6.2: Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Acquisition Management System and Property Management System

### Acquisition Management System

DOE commends ongoing activities to make improvements to the Procurement organization structure, policies and procedures, and compliance. Procurement was proactively responsive to the FY 2023 Procurement Evaluation and Reengineering Team (PERT) Report demonstrating a willingness to make improvements to the procurement system that will drive compliance. This is an unprecedented level of self-reflection and desire to improve that is well received by DOE.

The Procurement Department underwent a reorganization and showed improvement through onboarding an interim Chief Procurement Officer, in addition to filling 27 positions leading to notable improvements in quality, compliance, mission support and customer needs.

The Procurement Department adopted a people, process and technology improvement strategy that is geared towards attracting, developing, and retaining a skilled workforce.

FRA was able to reduce a backlog of requisitions by ~600 in FY 2023 Quarter three and Quarter four, developed and deployed a requisition tracking report for procurement staff and customers, deployed a Buy American Act policy, implemented a Purchase Card central record repository, and initiated the development of a PERT corrective action plan (CAP) to address the FY 2023 PERT final report findings.

Twelve out of thirteen open internal audit findings were successfully closed.

FRA increased eMarketplace purchases by $2.2M in FY 2023, increasing customer service with embedded compliance and efficiencies. Allowing the procurement staff to focus on more complex procurement actions and the customer to perform self-service requests has aided in reducing wait time and increasing customer satisfaction.

Going forward, the Procurement Department should strive to improve documentation and compliance. Procurement will need to emphasize deploying new procedures through a coherent change management process. Change management must include training for the affected audience. DOE is anticipating progress in the areas of acquisition strategy and planning, market research, selection of subcontract type, evaluation criteria development, source selection, exercising and incorporation of subcontract options, subcontract administration, and the development of a policy on oral presentations for DOE review.

### Property Management System

FRA's property management continues to execute all corrective actions identified from the FY 2022 triennial audit, and all work is scheduled to be completed on schedule to meet the required CAP deadlines. There has been increased training and development of property staff
(e.g., ten employees completed a High-Risk Property Workshop led by DOE's Export Compliance Assistance Program (ECAP)). Collaboration and coordination with the Radiation Safety team to create new processes and establish new e-waste and scrap metal sales contracts to allow for release of scrap after a two-year hold. FRA has coordinated with DOE Consolidated Service Center (CSC) and FSO to develop new contracting mechanisms for equipment sales (e.g., GovDeals). Projects have been executed for removal of hazardous materials that have been stored at the Laboratory for decades (e.g., removal of Deuterium and Nevis Blocks).

# Appendix C – Table of Content of the DOE’s RFP for M&O Bidder

We have extracted here below a Table of Content of the REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS (RFP) NO. 89243123RSC000083 FOR THE SELECTION OF A MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING CONTRACTOR FOR THE FERMI NATIONAL ACCELERATOR LABORATORY (FNAL) announced by DOE on January 3, 2024.

https://science.osti.gov/Acquisition-Management/M-and-O-Competitions/Procurement-Information/Request-for-Proposals?utm_mediumacific&utm_source=govdelivery

This contract shall be effective up to and including December 31, 2029, unless sooner terminated according to its terms. The contract transition period is from the award date through December 31, 2024. The Contractor will assume full operational control of the Laboratory on January 1, 2025. The contract's maximum period of performance shall not exceed 20 years and 3 months.

For the first three evaluation years, the Contractor must receive at least a “B+” for both Science and Technology and Management and Operations in year 1, and at least an “A-” for Science and Technology and a “B+” for Management and Operations for years 2 and 3. Beyond year 3, in addition to the latter requirement, the Contractor must also obtain a minimum rating of at least a “B+” for each individual Science and Technology goal and a “B-” for each individual Management and Operations goal.

## PART I

### SECTION A – SOLICITATION, OFFER AND AWARD

### SECTION B – SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS

### SECTION C – DESCRIPTION/ SPECIFICATIONS/ STATEMENT OF WORK (25 pp)

#### C.1 INTRODUCTION

#### C.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF DOE’S MISSION FOR FNAL

#### C.3 CORE EXPECTATIONS
(a) General

(b) Program Development and Mission Accomplishment

(c) Laboratory Stewardship

(d) Operational and Business Management

## C.4 STATEMENT OF WORK

(a) General

(b) Research and Development (R&D)

1. Mission Accomplishment

(i) SC High Energy Physics (HEP)

(ii) SC Basic Energy Sciences (BES)

(iii) Other Programs

(A) Providing of facilities to Users

(B) R&D for non-DOE sponsors consistent and complementary to DOE's mission

(C) Dissemination/publication of unclassified scientific and technical data and operating experience

(D) Training

2. Research Facilities and Major Scientific User Facilities

(i) HEP User Facility: Booster Neutrino Beam; Muon Campus; Neutrino at the Main Injector (NuMI); PIP-II

(ii) HEP Scientific Areas and Experiments: MicroBooNE; ICARUS; SBND; Muon g-2; Mu2e; NOvA; DUNE; Quantum Science; MAGIS-100.

(iii) HEP International Collaborations

(iv) Accelerator Research and Development: 1. Accelerator and beam physics; 2. Advanced accelerator concepts; 3. Particle sources and targetry; 4. Radio-frequency acceleration technology; and 5. Superconducting magnets and materials; FAST/IOTA.

3. Scientific Program Management

(c) Protection of Workers, the Public, and the Environment

The safety and health of workers and the public and the protection and restoration of the environment are fundamental responsibilities of the Contractor. The Contractor shall establish an environment, safety and health (ES&H) program operated as an integral, but visible, part of how the organization conducts business, including prioritizing work and allocating resources based on risk reduction. A key element is implementation and sustainment of an Integrated Safety Management System to ensure all work activities are performed in a manner that prevents disruption of the Laboratory's missions by preventing fatalities, minimizing injuries and illnesses, minimizing exposures to hazardous substances and materials, preventing environmental releases in excess of established limits, implements as-low-as-reasonably-achievable releases and exposures, and preventing property loss.

The Contractor shall maintain an organization that supports effective ES&H management by ensuring appropriate levels of ES&H staffing and competence at
every level within FNAL. Specifically, the Contractor shall assure that employees are trained, qualified, and involved in aspects of the organization's activities, including providing input to the planning and execution of work, and identification, mitigation, or elimination of workplace hazards. The Contractor shall, similarly, assure that subcontractor employees are trained and qualified on job tasks, hazards, DOE and FNAL safety policies, expectations, and requirements, and shall flow down applicable ES&H requirements down to subcontractors. The Contractor shall, as appropriate, consider ES&H performance in selection of its subcontractors and incorporate ES&H requirements into subcontracts.

The Contractor shall perform all activities in compliance with applicable health, safety, and environmental laws, orders, regulations, national consensus standards, governing agreements and permits executed with regulatory and oversight government organizations.

Incorporating integrated line management, the Contractor shall put in place a system that clearly communicates the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of line managers. The Contractor shall hold line managers, including direct reports, accountable for implementing necessary controls for safe performance of work in their respective area of responsibility. The Contractor shall establish effective management systems to identify deficiencies, resolve them in a timely manner, ensure that corrective actions are implemented, (addressing the extent of conditions, root causes, and measures to prevent recurrence) and prioritize and track commitments and actions.

**(d) Management and Operation of the Laboratory**

1. Strategic Planning

2. Business Management

(i) Human Resources Management (HR)

(ii) Financial Management

(iii) Purchasing Management

(iv) Property Management

(v) Legal Services

(vi) Information Technology Management

(vii) Other Services

3. Project Management

4. Environmental Management

(i) Environmental remediation and facility deactivation

(ii) Construction and maintenance of facilities and infrastructure

(iii) Tritium management

5. Community Involvement

6. Safeguards and Security (S&S)

7. Cyber Security

8. Emergency Management

9. Waste Management

10. Laboratory Facilities and Infrastructure

11. Sustainability
(e) University and Science Education Program for Workforce Development

1. Operation of the U.S. Particle Accelerator School

2. Joint experimental programs with colleges, universities, and nonprofit research institutions

3. Interchange of college and university faculty and Laboratory staff

4. Student/teacher educational research programs at the pre-collegiate and collegiate level

5. Post-doctoral programs

6. Arrangement of regional, national, or international professional, meetings or symposia

7. Use of special Laboratory facilities by colleges, universities, and nonprofit research institutes, or

8. Provision of unique experimental materials to colleges, universities, or nonprofit research institutions or to qualified members of their staff.

C.5 PLANS AND REPORTS

SECTION D – PACKAGING AND MARKING

SECTION E – INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

SECTION F – DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

SECTION G – CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA

SECTION H – SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS (67 pp)

PART II

SECTION I – CONTRACT CLAUSES (302 pp)

PART III

SECTION J – LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

Appendix A – Advance Understanding on HR

Appendix B – Performance Evaluation and Measurement plan

Appendix C – Special Financial Institution Agreement

Appendix D – Contractor's Commitments

Appendix E – Key Personnel

Appendix F – Reserved

Appendix G – Purchasing System Requirements

Appendix H – Small Business Subcontracting Plan

Appendix I – DOE Directives/ List B

Appendix J – Treaties and International Agreements/Waived Inventions

Appendix K – Reserved

Appendix L – Performance Guarantee
# PART IV

SECTION K - REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS, AND OTHER STATEMENTS OF
OFFERORS (44 pp)

SECTION L - INSTRUCTIONS, CONDITIONS, AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS (65 pp)

## L.1 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SUBMISSION OF PROPOSALS AND UNIFORM CONTRACT

(c) Offerors shall submit three separate volumes as follows:

(1) Volume I (no page limitations) - Consists of the Uniform Contract. Any contract awarded as a result of this RFP shall contain Part I - The Schedule, consisting of Section A and Sections B through H; Part II - Contract Clauses, consisting of Section I; and Part III - List of Documents, Exhibits, Attachments, consisting of Section J. Volume I shall also contain Part IV - Section K.

(2) Volume II (150 pp maximum) - Capabilities and Approach Proposal. The Capabilities and Approach Proposal, along with the oral presentation, shall clearly demonstrate the Offeror's understanding of the Government's requirements and the Offeror's capability to perform the prospective contract. The Offeror must provide the written information, required by Provisions L.2 through L.6 of this RFP, in Volume II, which fully demonstrates the Offeror's capability, knowledge, experience, and understanding with respect to the evaluation factors described in Section M Provision entitled "Capabilities and Approach Evaluation Factors" of this RFP. Provisions L.2 through L.6 of this RFP are designed to provide information so that the non-cost evaluation factors specified in Section M Provision entitled "Capabilities and Approach Evaluation Factors" can be evaluated.

(3) Volume III (no page limitations) - Cost, Fee, Financial and Other Information Proposal. All cost information is to be included in this volume. Requirements for submission of cost information are contained in Section L Provision entitled "Volume III - Cost, Fee, Financial and Other Information Proposal - Instructions" of this RFP. Pursuant to paragraph (b) of Section L Provision entitled "FAR 52.215.1 - Instructions to Offerors-Competitive Acquisition", Offerors shall acknowledge receipt of amendments to this solicitation. In addition to completing Block 14 of the SF 33 to be included in Volume I, Offerors are to provide a written acknowledgement that the Offeror received each amendment to this RFP in Volume III. The written acknowledgement should include identification of each amendment number and the date each amendment was received.

## L.2 SCIENCE VISION AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

(a) Science Vision

The Offeror shall provide documentation that describes its vision for the Laboratory that creates the conditions to enable achievement of the DOE mission, transformational and breakthrough science, and the delivery and optimization of FNAL's world class scientific facilities; enhances the Laboratory's leadership in the national and international arena for research and development; fosters its central role in the international research ecosystem to deliver breakthrough science results; attracts, develops and retains a highly skilled workforce; cultivates and sustains a
diverse, equitable, inclusive, and accessible Laboratory culture; and, effectively coordinates activities within the DOE complex, nationally, and internationally.

### (b) Implementation Plan

The Offeror shall describe its approach for the implementation of its Science Vision. The proposed approach should demonstrate an understanding of the Laboratory's current major research programs, identify any new directions that the Laboratory might take, and discuss how the Laboratory could most effectively contribute to meeting the challenges facing the major programs in **Section C** entitled "Description/Specifications/Statement of Work". The Offeror shall describe its overall approach to implementing its Science Vision, and shall, at a minimum, include a discussion of its:

* Planned approach to enable achievement of the DOE mission and leverage programs to foster transformational and breakthrough science;

* Planned approach to bring on-line a robust implementation of the LBNF/DUNE and PIP II projects and approach for their future operations and possible upgrades;
* Planned approach for maintaining, enhancing and developing cooperative and collaborative partnerships with universities and industry, including emerging research institutions, to enhance the Laboratory's leadership in the national and international arena for research and development;

* Planned approach for fostering the Laboratory's central role in the international research ecosystem to deliver breakthrough science results;

* Planned approach for attracting, developing, and retaining a highly skilled workforce of existing and new scientific personnel with high stature in their disciplines; plan for joint appointments (if applicable); and how it would use the resources of the Laboratory to help develop and educate the next generation of scientists and engineers;

* Planned approach for cultivating and sustaining a diverse, equitable, inclusive, and accessible Laboratory culture;

* Planned approach to support technology transfer and enhance the Strategic Partnership Projects portfolio; and

* Planned approach to leading and coordinating scientific activities at FNAL and within DOE, nationally and internationally; and the Offeror's approach to maintain engagement and positive relations and communications with DOE and other interested stakeholders.

### L.3 LABORATORY OPERATIONS

The Offeror shall demonstrate a thorough understanding of Laboratory Operations necessary to successfully accomplish **Sections C.4(c) and C.4(d)** of the Statement of Work. The Offeror shall describe its approach for achieving excellence in all areas of operations and business management while maintaining compliance with DOE and other applicable requirements. Areas to be addressed include, but are not limited to:

* Integrated ES&H programs and processes that demonstrate a commitment at all levels within the Laboratory to the safety and health of workers and the public, as well as the protection and restoration of the environment. [See C.4(c)].
* An integrated management system capable of producing implementation-level plans, programs and procedures for the management and operation of the Laboratory.

* A robust, broad scope contractor assurance program to self-assess overall performance and drive continuous improvement of Laboratory operations and management.

* Business management systems [see Section C.4(d)(2)] and how they will be applied to ensure efficient and effective operation, protection and maintenance of the Laboratory's assets, and ability to function as a DOE laboratory.

* Systems for the efficient and effective management of all Laboratory facilities and infrastructure, safeguards and security, cyber security, emergency operations, waste operations, sustainability, and Laboratory strategic planning.

* Involvement of small business in meaningful contract performance, including the extent, variety, and complexity of the work to be performed.

* Developing and maintaining positive community relations and communications with DOE and other interested stakeholders.

* Approach to build, develop, maintain, and encourage a diverse workforce that addresses, at a minimum, the Offeror's approach for promoting diversity through (1) the Contractor's work force, (2) educational outreach, (3) community involvement and outreach, (4) subcontracting, (5) economic development (including technology transfer), and (6) the prevention of profiling based on race or national origin.

* Approach to successfully deliver the Laboratory's project portfolio that details the resources, organization, interfaces, and other elements the Offeror considers necessary.

## L.4 OFFEROR ENGAGEMENT

Key Personnel

Organizational Structure

Governance Approach and Corporate Assurance

Offeror's Commitments

## L.5 PAST PERFORMANCE (within last 3 years)

## L.6 TRANSITION PLAN (3 months maximum)

## L.7 VOLUME III - COST, FEE, FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION PROPOSAL
- INSTRUCTIONS

[...]

## L.12 ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST (OCI)

The statement of work includes certain work activities that may present an OCI. A contract shall not be awarded to any Offeror having an unresolved OCI. (See Section K Clause entitled "DEAR 952.209-8 - Organizational Conflicts Of Interest Disclosure-Advisory and Assistance Services".) [...]
SECTION M – EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD

<table><thead><tr><td colspan="2">Capabilities and Approach Evaluation Factors</td></tr><tr><td>Factors</td><td>Description</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>A.</td><td>Science Vision and Implementation Plan</td></tr><tr><td>B.</td><td>Laboratory Operations</td></tr><tr><td>C.</td><td>Offeror Engagement</td></tr><tr><td>D.</td><td>Past Performance</td></tr><tr><td>E.</td><td>Transition Plan</td></tr></tbody></table>

Factors A and B are of equal importance to each other, and are individually of more importance than Factors C, D, and E individually. Factor C is of greater importance than Factor D. Factor D is of greater importance than Factor E. Collectively, these Capabilities and Approach Evaluation Factors are significantly more important than the total evaluated price.

Appendix D – Unplanned Radiation Dose Incident

The following is an excerpt of a draft Consent Order between the DOE and Fermilab concerning the incident in May 2022:

"In early May of 2022, as part of a research and development project, an employee modified the operating parameters of a radiation generating device (RGD) in the Proton Source Test Stand (PSTS) area of the Linac Building at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory. Subsequently, there were indications that the dose rates in the area were elevated (e.g., supplemental dosimeter readings off scale, elevated radiation surveys, and application of shielding to reduce survey readings). Despite the unexpected and unanalyzed dose rates resulting from the modified parameters, the worker and supporting radiological control technician (RCT) did not report or record the conditions and completed the work without stopping. On August 25, 2022, FRA reviewed the second quarter dosimetry results and discovered the worker had received an unplanned dose of 530 millirem. FRA's investigation concluded it was an actual exposure (as opposed to an erroneous reading) that was likely due to ionizing radiation from the RGD.
On September 13, 2022, FRA initiated an internal investigation of the unplanned radiation dose. The laboratory's investigation team focused on Human Performance Improvement and conducted a thorough review of the factors associated with the incident. The team approved and issued the Unplanned Radiation Dose Event Review Report Summary on October 18, 2022. The laboratory's investigation revealed programmatic weaknesses in work planning and control that resulted in less than adequate documentation, review, and authorization of PSTS operations. The investigation also identified weaknesses with escalating issues appropriately, following supplemental personal dosimetry monitoring and reporting expectations, and operations oversight."

FRA self-identified the following potential non-compliances, which were reported in the DOE Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS) under report NTS-SC-FSO-FRA-FERMIBOP-2022-0010490, Unplanned Radiation Dose, on October 18, 2022:

* 10 C.F.R. Part 835, Subpart E, Monitoring of Individuals and Areas:

* § 835.401, General Requirements;

* 10 C.F.R. Part 835, Subpart H, Records:

* § 835.701, General provisions;

* § 835.703, Other monitoring records;

* § 835.704, Administrative records;

* 10 C.F.R. Part 835, Subpart K, Design and Control:

* § 835.1001, Design and Control;

* § 835.1003 Workplace controls.

On February 6, 2023, the Office of Enforcement notified FRA of its decision to investigate the facts and circumstances associated with the unplanned dose and potential deficiencies in the implementation of 10 C.F.R. part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection. The Office of Enforcement conducted an onsite investigation April 24 through 27, 2023. On August 22, 2023, DOE transmitted the Investigation Summary report to FRA and an enforcement conference was held on September 20, 2023.
# Appendix E – A Textbook Case Study in Human Rights

My name is Erica Smith and from 2016-2023 I was a postdoctoral fellow at Indiana University, a Fermilab User, and a member of the NOvA and DUNE Experiments. My interactions with the Fermi Research Alliance and various members of Fermilab leadership have been frustrating at best and harmful at worst. Their actions have left the impression on myself and others that they prioritize maintaining a positive reputation by trying to make problems go away at the expense of victims over cultivating a safe working environment for Fermilab employees and Users. This is my experience.

In May 2018, I reported another Fermilab User and member of the NOvA and DUNE experiments to the Neutrino Division's Human Resources Representative, which, at that time, was the only avenue to report misconduct, including sexual misconduct. The HR representative brought in the assistant general counsel almost immediately, and they began an investigation that would continue over the next several months and was handled poorly in a number of ways.

In the month following my report, I had multiple phone calls with the HR representative and assistant general counsel, emailed them a written summary of my report, and sent pdfs of text chats with friends that had detailed descriptions of the incidents. They asked me to schedule an in-person meeting with them; when I tried, they told me they were going on vacation and they would follow up when they returned. After a month with no contact, I followed up again and they told me we no longer needed to meet. The investigators did not contact me again until scheduling our final meetings months later; I received updates only because my supervisor reached out to the person who was COO in 2018 to check the status of the investigation.

Before they stopped contacting me, the assistant general counsel and HR representative assured me they would inform me when they were going to interview the subject of the report so I would know when he became aware of the report, as we were still working on the same experiments together. They did not; I found out that they interviewed him long after the interview took place.

At no point during the investigation was I told who would know about the investigation or how much information they would receive. I found out the 2018 COO was involved only because someone I reported to at a different institution told me he had been contacted by the COO. I was not told that the general counsel would be involved until he attended our final meeting in September 2018 without ever having been mentioned to me or copied on emails with me. I heard from others that the head of the Neutrino Division, a person that I had interacted with professionally, knew of the report, but they were unsure how many details he knew. Imagine giving a professional talk and not knowing who in the room had read graphic descriptions of a traumatic experience that you shared only with close friends, never thinking that
anyone else would read them; this is the result of having investigators with no
training in trauma-informed investigations.

When the investigation ended in September 2018, they told me: “the result of our
investigation is that FRA is unable to conclude that there was a violation or threat to
the Fermilab community or site for which FRA can take personnel or site access
action, recognizing that FRA does not manage the NOvA collaboration and FRA does
not employ or contract with either you or [him].” I asked if they determined
misconduct did or did not take place and received the same statement in an email
from the 2018 COO with no further clarification.

Because FRA refused to give an actual finding from the investigation, NOvA leadership was not able to take action to protect me at work; to keep doing my job, I was forced to interact with him during our multiple weekly phone meetings, via our experiment's public Slack channels, and during in-person meetings. I had at least one panic attack at every in-person meeting that we both attended for the next year, and had sporadic panic attacks during our phone meetings. During this year, working group leadership assignments changed, and I found myself reporting directly to him for a short time. I was diagnosed with unspecified trauma disorder and saw a trauma therapist at least weekly – multiple times a week leading up to in-person meetings – just to be able to show up at work. I struggled deeply with my mental health and lost months of productivity vital to securing a permanent position in academia.

At the end of 2019, I requested that NOvA leadership find an external investigator as was allowed by the NOvA Code of Conduct, thinking that because FRA did not actually present a finding of fact as part of their investigation, I should be afforded an investigator who would. At that time, NOvA leadership agreed and in early 2020 I was told that they identified an external consultant to investigate and would contact the DOE to find funding for it. After the subject of the original report was notified that I requested an external investigator he weaponized Fermilab HR against me, reporting me for “making defamatory statements.” His report was not treated as retaliation, and the new COO as of 2020 emailed me saying that “FRA is not the ‘trier of fact’ in determining whether [my] statements are false and defamatory and FRA is the wrong forum to seek relief in your ongoing grievance with each other. Therefore, FRA declines to take up [his] complaint, and considers the matter closed.” She also stated, regarding the 2018 report, that “FRA concluded, based on the facts identified in the investigation, that no further action was warranted.” After I received this email, NOvA leadership told me the line “no further action was warranted” was enough of a finding from the original investigation and they would not move forward with an external investigator.

After FRA chose to abdicate all responsibility regarding this situation for the second
time, the subject of the report began a campaign of online harassment against me.
Over the course of several months, he impersonated me on Twitter, posted nude
pictures of other women pretending to be me, and gave my phone number to men
who contacted the fake profiles so they would send me nude pictures. He signed me
up for hundreds of websites including porn sites and Nazi-affiliated websites. He used
my home address to sign me up for subscription services and even had someone come
to my address with a baby-proofing service. He sent anonymous threats of violence
via text and Twitter DM, and threatened to deceive police into sending an armed
response to my address. I contacted my local law enforcement multiple times to
ensure they had a note to confirm any reports of violence at my address before
sending an armed response. I bought a portable lock for my door and kept a baseball
bat near my desk because I was afraid of where he might be publishing my home
address. In mid-2020 I hired a lawyer to find proof of his harassment and bring a
lawsuit against him. We won the lawsuit in October 2022; you can find the press
release from my lawyers here:

https://www.brettwilson.co.uk/blog/press-release-academic-pays-50000-damages-to-colleague-falsely-touted-online-as-a-sex-worker/ and an article in The Guardian written about the situation here:

https://www.theguardian.com/education/2022/oct/12/former-ucl-academic-to-pay-damages-after-harassing-colleague-for-months.

During the harassment campaign and the subsequent lawsuit, he continued to
interact with me in public Slack channels and gave unprompted feedback on my work
during weekly phone meetings. I realized I could no longer tolerate being forced to
interact with him, and for my mental health, I left the working group I had been in for
nearly 4 years. I picked up a new analysis in a working group in which he was not
active, effectively abandoning all my previous work and putting me extremely behind
in terms of showing prospective search committees I was capable of a complete
physics analysis, an essential part of being hired as tenure track faculty.

After the lawsuit was public, I was contacted by the new Fermilab director and new CRO to have a meeting. In November 2022 I met with them, the same Fermilab general counsel from 2018, and my lawyer, and told them everything I've said in this testimonial. Their general counsel even agreed with me when I told them I felt I had been "ghosted" by the original investigators. During this meeting, I received a lot of promises that the system would change, but I've seen no evidence that it has.

I will note that the Fermilab reporting system has changed since I reported, and one
now makes reports through a third-party system. However, I've listened to multiple
presentations on the topic and while the reporting system itself has changed, reports
are still investigated by "subject matter experts" at Fermilab. Despite asking for
clarification on what this means, particularly in the case of sexual harassment and
assault - who at Fermilab is an "expert" in investigating that? - there has never been
a clear answer other than to say that they are employed by Fermilab, i.e., people
beholden to protecting the interests of Fermilab and FRA, not employees or Users.
This is a problem that has been pointed out, at the very least, to Fermilab's general
counsel, but to my knowledge no changes have been made to the investigative
process.

The problem starts at the top, with FRA and the Fermilab directorate. Everyone who
hears about my experience agrees that it was terrible, including the people with the
power to ensure it doesn't happen again, yet, all I've seen is leadership sitting on their
hands while claiming their hands are tied. Things will never change until Fermilab learns the meaning of institutional courage and stops prioritizing protecting bad actors to avoid legal retaliation over creating and maintaining a safe working environment.

There is no happy ending to this testimonial. I left the field in 2023 as the lost productivity through the majority of my postdoc affected my ability to get a permanent position. I've been unemployed for months, trying to recover from all that has happened to me. None of this had to happen; if FRA had acted appropriately in 2018, I might still be a physicist today. I'll never know. There is one silver lining that came from my experience, which was coauthoring a 54 page contributed paper regarding the climate of the field where my focus was experiment codes of conduct and concrete suggestions to labs and funding agencies to make the changes needed to effectively remove bad actors, which can be found here https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.03713, and support for these suggestions was included in the P5 report. I may no longer be part of the field, but perhaps my experiences will mean others in the future don't have to go through what I went through; that will have to be enough.
# Appendix F – Fermilab Concern Reporting System

As presented on December 9, 2022, within an all-hands meeting at Fermilab.

## Ways to Report Concerns at Fermilab

We encourage employees and Fermilab users/affiliates to use any of the following avenues for reporting concerns of improper conduct; harassment or discrimination; unsafe conditions; conflicts of interest; fraud, waste or abuse; violations of law or policy; or other irregularities:

* Managers or Directorate/Division/Department Leadership

* HR Partners or Human Resources Leadership

* The Office of General Counsel

* The Fermilab Security Department

* The Fermilab Concerns Reporting System, a third-party provided hotline/website hosted by Integrity Counts where reporters may either self-identify or remain anonymous.

https://app.integritycounts.ca/org/fermilab

Phone Hotline: 866.921.6714 (USA), 00-800-2002-0033 (Switzerland).

In addition, FRA employees and Fermilab users may report directly to the Department of Energy (DOE) as follows:

* DOE Employee Concerns Program at the Chicago Integrated Support Center –
  Hotline (800) 701-9966, or scfieidecp@science.doe.gov, or employeeconcernsprogram@doe.gov

* DOE Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Hotline – (800) 541-1625 or IGHotline@hq.doe.gov

* DOE Office of the Inspector General – (202) 586-4073, or IGHotline@hq.doe.gov, or https://www.energy.gov/ig/complaint-form. Individuals who contact the DOE/OIG Hotline may self-identify or remain anonymous.

**FRA policy prohibits retaliation against individuals who make a report through any of these channels.**

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /></figure>

Fermilab
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /></figure>

# Progressive Enforcement System for Users and Affiliates

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>RESPONSIBLE PARTIES</strong><br>Spokesperson/Sr. FRA Employee or Sponsor: responsible for reporting concerns brought to their attention and execution of actions<br>HR Partner, OGC, CEDI, CRO: support the Co-Spokesperson/Sr. FRA Employee or Sponsor on these procedures and their enforcement decisions</td><td><strong>CATEGORY ONE</strong><br>- Microaggressions<br>- Inappropriate or unprofessional Communications<br>Harassing or discriminatory conduct<br>Failure to comply with prior corrective actions</td><td><strong>CATEGORY TWO</strong><br>Multiple microaggressions<br>Multiple inappropriate or unprofessional communications<br>Perceived, direct, or implied threat of retaliation<br>Harassing or discriminatory conduct<br>Failure to comply with prior corrective actions</td><td><strong>CATEGORY THREE</strong><br>Serious behavior, including:<br>- Second occurrence of harassing or discriminatory conduct<br>- Failure to comply with prior corrective actions</td><td><strong>CATEGORY FOUR</strong><br>Allegations of egregious violations:<br>- Illegal acts<br>- Violence or threat of violence<br>- Retaliation or repeated direct threats of retaliation<br>- Significant safety violations</td><td><strong>CATEGORY FIVE</strong><br>- Repeat or egregious violations<br>- Serious and knowing violation of safety requirements<br>- Repeated failure to comply with prior Category 3 or 4 corrective actions</td></tr><tr><td><strong>ACTIONS</strong><br>Collaboration Leadership:<br>verbal warning; removal or muting from meeting; other action as warranted<br>HR Partner: documentation and recordkeeping of reported behavior in reporting system</td><td><strong>CATEGORY ONE</strong><br>Spokesperson/Sr. FRA Employee or Sponsor: responsible for reporting concerns brought to their attention and execution of actions<br>HR Partner, OGC, CEDI, CRO: documentation and actions, including notification to Home Institution, Collaboration</td><td><strong>CATEGORY TWO</strong><br>Spokesperson/Sr. FRA Employee or Sponsor: responsible for reporting concerns brought to their attention<br>HR Partner, OGC, CEDI, CRO: investigation, documentation and actions, including notification to Home Institution, Collaboration<br>CRO: Determination of whether suspension is warranted</td><td><strong>CATEGORY THREE</strong><br>Spokesperson/Sr. FRA Employee or Sponsor: responsible for reporting concerns brought to their attention<br>HR Partner, OGC, CEDI, CRO: investigation, documentation and actions, including notification to Home Institution, Collaboration<br>CRO: Suspension of User or Affiliate access (with support from OGC, CEDI, HR Partner); Notification to Home Institution and Collaboration<br>HR Partner: documenting action in reporting system</td><td><strong>CATEGORY FOUR</strong><br>Spokesperson/Sr. FRA Employee or Sponsor: responsible for reporting concerns brought to their attention<br>HR Partner, OGC, CEDI, CRO: investigation, documentation, and actions, including notification to Home Institution, Collaboration<br>CRO: Suspension of User or Affiliate access pending outcome of investigation; Notification to Home Institution and Collaboration<br>HR Partner: documenting action in reporting system</td><td><strong>CATEGORY FIVE</strong><br>Spokesperson/Sr. FRA Employee or Sponsor: responsible for reporting concerns brought to their attention<br>CRO, OGC, and CEDI: investigation, solely responsible for recommending termination, including notification to Home Institution, Collaboration<br>HR Partner: investigation, documentation<br>CRO, OGC, CEDI: Termination of User or Affiliate Status and rights to access Fermilab<br>HR Partner: documenting action in reporting system</td></tr><tr><td colspan="6" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">PROGRESSIVE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES FOR FERMILAB USERS AND AFFILIATES</td></tr><tr><td colspan="6" style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">PROCEDURAL REVIEW PROCESS</td></tr><tr><td colspan="6" style="text-align: center;">Procedural Review Process for Category 3 Suspensions and Category 5 Terminations</td></tr></tbody></table>
Lab-Wide – Intake Metrics

- **Integrity Counts** was implemented in October 2020

- Reported concerns at Fermilab have increased from FY 2021 (30) to FY 2022 (53)

- Concerns are reported in two ways: self-identified and anonymously

- Self-reported concerns increased by 8% from FY 21 to FY22

- Anonymous reports account for 36% of all concerns received

- 78% of concerns are reported by Employees, 18% by Users/Affiliates, and 4% unidentified

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /></figure>

Note: Proxy concerns are concerns reported into the system that have been raised through all other channels of reporting concerns. See this website for more information on these channels.

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /></figure>

Fermilab
# Lab-Wide - Concern Types and Outcomes

- The top five case types received and reviewed include:

- Hostile Work Environment,

- Equity, Diversity, or Inclusion,

- Other,

- Inappropriate / Unprofessional Conduct, and

- Harassment

- Over 50% of concerns are resolved within 40 days.

- The top outcomes for substantiated reports include:

- Guidance Provided

- Corrective / Remediation

- Written Warnings

- Suspended Without Pay

- When a concern is substantiated, action is taken by the Laboratory. In addition to addressing the matter directly with individuals involved, the Lab:

- Shares data with Senior Leadership Team

- Metrics Committees reviews for trends

- Reporting to DOE Employee Concerns Program

- Notification of substantiated concerns are made to home institutions and collaborations pursuant to the User/Affiliates Progressive Enforcement Procedures

## Average Case Closure Times

All Reports
77 days

FY 2021
106 days

FY 2022
56 days
# Appendix G –Analysis of “Fermilab Concern Reporting System”

The following analysis was provided to Fermilab deputy Director Bonnie Fleming in
March 2023 on her slides from Appendix F.

1. According to the first slide, complaints can presently be placed with half a dozen different entities. Unless these different entities transfer the information to a single responsible unit, this is not conducive to a good control of the narrative and of the context, especially for the more complex cases that occur over an extended period of time. At least until Summer 2021, HR accepted complaints by anybody, outside of any context. Some HR personnel go as far as verbatim stating in email communications that "they do not want the context."

2. It is not clear at all what is the present role/function of the so-called "third-party". Within this allegedly "new" system, Fermilab lawyers continue to be involved in "investigations". Because of the demonstrated conflict of interest by the lab HR/Legal Counsel system, complaints about abuses by supervisors (as defined by the NLRD) should be handled and investigated by an independent entity. This should be a law firm with labor lawyers.

3. A major risk of such a fragmented system is for instance that of an employee who has placed a prior complaint against a manager or who has a pending investigation with one of the various entities listed, say the General Counsel. If the manager comes back at her with made-up complaints to a yet different entity, say HR, the victim will have little recourse. HR accepting complaints by her own perpetrators against a perspective victim and the General Counsel using it to denigrate the victim allows the system to protect management or any other perpetrator, as in the case described in Appendix E, independently of their behavior. The present system inherently fosters a culture of abuse of power and harassment. The only way to monitor and control retaliation is to use the same rules for all and send any possibly fake complaints about potential victims to one single office or entity.

4. In the "Progressive Enforcement System for Users and Affiliates" shown in the second slide, the "Responsible parties" are the same half-dozen entities listed in Slide 1, and the Senior FRA employee or sponsor. It is antithetical to the definition of "responsibility" to have so many "responsible" parties. Responsibility is clearly defined when there is one entity that is responsible. Further, this is perfectly consistent with the above, i.e. complaints should be managed and controlled by one single entity, whichever that is.

5. In the assumption that the Senior FRA employee is a manager, how is the conflict of interest of their personal agenda in denigrating victims by retaliation as explained in point 3 addressed? Managers can be responsible ONLY if we have a minimal uncertainty that they do not have conflict of interest with the victim, for instance in cases of retaliation against prior accusations. Unfortunately, based on how several managers were groomed at the lab, there are still some in managerial positions that do not have the necessary ethics to put aside their own agenda. In the Table of Slide 2 there is talk of "verbal and written warnings", as well as
"documenting actions in reporting system". However, we haven't seen any
changes in practice.

6. Point 5 overlaps with the key concept that a **toxic environment cannot be healed without first removing the first order causes**. At Fermilab, at least those areas which have been engulfed by cronyism have to be renewed. This is the only way to eliminate the deeply grounded culture of nepotism and cronyism that has established a strong authority in the hands of a few, as well as extended unethical human treatment in some areas of the lab. And **this cannot be done without the will of the M&O**. Until employees see that cronyism is accepted, as opposed to a merit-based approach for growth, no changes will be effective because the core human and professional values are tainted and therefore have no meaning. Also, another very important concept is leaders leading by example. How can we feel safe in an organization that promotes or even just accepts bad behavior in its leaders?

7. **HR does not use the same rules for all.** So, for instance, when a manager or a crony being groomed for ascension misbehaves, they do not get an official reprimand, which ends up in one's personnel file for the duration of employment. At most they get what is called a “memo”, which has no formal consequences. Several individuals, males and females, who were promoted to high/very high positions of responsibility have received dozens of HR complaints. Using the “memo” stunt, their behavior does not constitute an obstacle to their promotion and they end up occupying leadership positions.

8. The need to reset house in an organization, when charged with its renewal, applies to any cause of ineffectiveness in the organization (not just to cronyism.) There are several factors that come into play for undue promotion of ineffective individuals who end up in charge of responsibilities well beyond their capabilities. **These ineffective individuals have to be promptly identified and replaced.**

9. Lastly, the Legal Counsel/HR system focuses on isolating the individuals submitting a complaint/ potential victims by often imposing a communication veto with any other employee. The formal justification reads like: "It is inappropriate for me or anyone in laboratory leadership to discuss any aspect of anyone else's concern or investigation with you as you are not their representative." The victim has hence no way to talk to anybody at the lab with their version of the events, with the consequence that the lab leadership has access ONLY to the version by HR/ Legal Counsel. There is no legal need for this to happen. Not only is it disrespectful to the victim, but it benefits only the General Counsel itself, as it precludes any of their action to be put under check and balances by an actual third party. The lab would do well in learning about best practices now used in hospitals. Lawsuits by patients against hospitals have dramatically decreased since hospitals' lawyers keep a dialogue open with the victims.
[one example among others is
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1071103/]

10. Disturbing examples of what can happen when the above problems persist is given in Appendices E and H.
# Appendix H–A Textbook Case of Cover-up<fnref n="5" />

We are going to describe here below a textbook case of elaborate cover-up. In the following is a summary of the story. More details of the events can be found in the documentation provided by the witnesses, shown later. In this Appendix the names of the witnesses are not shown for their own protection. However, for everybody else we decided to use actual first names and sometimes also last names for accountability. A reason is that any statement described here can be corroborated by a dozen witnesses willing to come forward in a court of law.

Sometime in 2022, former Operation Maintenance Superintendent Greg at the Infrastructure Services Division (ISD), under Mark T. Jeffers as Senior Director, assigned Randy an unofficial position of Foreman for a large group of electricians and other employees of an ISD shop. Randy, Greg and Jeffers were all former Military personnel or contractors. A few months later, Randy was officially promoted to Foreman without any interview or posting of the position. He was known for threatening/harassing people by whispering bloody and graphic scenes in their ears, and also claimed to carry a loaded gun at all times, either on his ankle or in his truck. Before the official promotion occurred, a majority of the team in the shop tried to prevent it. An electrician from this team brought Greg a petition signed by 12 employees (names available), over a total of 14 from the shop, asking to remove him from the position. After reading the petition, not only did Greg toss it back to the messenger, but he also broke confidentiality and informed Randy of that petition. Nothing changed when the original electrician brought forward a female electrician and former veteran, to another private meeting on 12/12/2022 with Greg so she could testify to all kinds of harassment from Randy and Dave, another employee from the shop. In this case too, Greg immediately informed Randy what was said in this confidential meeting before the two witnesses even left Building 38 where Greg's office was located. The witnesses were soon informed by colleagues that Randy was after them! At that point, the witnesses had no other recourse than going to HR and were told to leave the premises asap. Security and the Kane County Sheriff were called and they stopped Randy before he left the site. However, despite FNAL policies stating that Security has the right (and duty) to check a vehicle when on site, THEY DID NOT DO IT and let the guy leave.

The female witness had been repeatedly harassed also by peer electrician Dave. The latter became obsessed with her and in Spring of 2022 he backed a 25,000 pound bucket truck at her and another peer in the parking lot near Lab A. She and her peer were nearly crushed by Dave and they got out of this alive only because the peer was able to promptly back their van away from the truck coming at them! The female

<footnote n="5">⁵ We are disclosing here information received directly by the witnesses themselves outside of working hours, and therefore these are not data gained within any work agreement. In addition, we believe in reporting violations of regulations, mismanagement, abuse of authority, substantial dangers to public safety, and in general any other violation under whistleblower protection.</footnote>
victim's electrical supervisor, DJ, was present and did not do anything to discipline
the perpetrator.

With all these events happening, as noted, HR at some point became involved. The
two witnesses met and cooperated with HR, and also provided detailed statements in
writing (see also in the following). At this stage the first witness had a meeting with
ISD Senior Director Mark Jeffers too. The electrician had the signed petition with him
and handed it over to Jeffers. The latter looked at it, but would not take it. In January
of 2023, the electrician was called to a meeting with former COO Scott Tingey, current
lab Deputy Director Bonnie Fleming, current ISD Senior Director Mark Jeffers, the
entire lab legal team, and former HR interim Senior Director Jennifer Gondorchin.
While faced by this whole crowd, he was proffered some hollow statements, with no
resulting disciplinary action whatsoever for Greg breaking the confidentiality of
private meetings and putting lives in danger; and for Dave, despite his attempt at
badly hurting others. Despite the presence of several witnesses, Dave did not receive
any disciplinary action, and is still employed at the lab. For all of his misdeeds, Randy
was given one week of unpaid leave of absence as only disciplinary measure. He is
still employed at the lab and was further promoted. And Greg, Randy's abettor, was
promoted too and retired only recently.

In fact, the above facts were not the first time that Randy had misbehaved. As a Union
Steward for Local 701, the original witness kept all his confidential documents in a
locked drawer in his office in Building 39. These documents included various types of
votes for submission to the Union. In January of 2022, Randy entered his office one
night, broke into his desk and stole all of his confidential documents. He then
proceeded to transfer them to the Union. His accomplices at the Union took the
documents instead of giving them back to their rightful owner and then fired the
Union Steward from his position. He reported this theft to HR and to the ISD Head
Mark Jeffers on March 2022, but no disciplinary action was taken even then.

Because of the total lack of protection and of safety for her own life, the female witness
was forced to quit the lab sometime in 2023. Similarly, 6 other electricians from this
toxic group under Al and Greg have left the lab between January 2022 and May 2023.

In October 2023 the original witness was tasked to take care of the electrical system
for a new well pump that had been installed between the master substation and the
fire station. A few days after performing that job, the electrician was driving by the
well and saw the truck of mechanical lead Omar. He stopped and found the latter
inside a hot electrical cabinet 480 Vac 400 Amps. Omar had completely undone his
wiring. Mechanical foreman Mike was watching him undo his work while violating
most electrical safety policies. The latter did nothing to stop him. The electrician
reported the policy violations to his boss Frank and nothing was done.

At the same time, the electrician was also interviewing for the electrical foreman
position with Greg and his electrical supervisor Frank in November 2023. Frank had
repeatedly told the technician that he was his only choice for the foreman position.
On the Friday before Thanksgiving week, Frank called the electrician and requested him to postpone his vacation week to go see his family in Michigan for a very important job. The actual reason was instead to report to Greg's office to be informed that he had not been given the foreman job.

The electrician was fired when he sent out an upset phone text to his supervisor, mentioning Omar and Mike sabotaging the well, and threatening to report Greg for doing nothing about it. Greg saw the electrician's text by taking Frank's phone.

The following more detailed information was also part of written documentation provided by the original witness to Heather A. Sidman at HR on Dec. 16, 2022.

## "Events of 12/12/2022

Months ago, Randy was unofficially given a Foreman position at our shop and paid as such. Like I said when I spoke with you, I have repeatedly gone to meet with Mr. Gilbert to discuss Randy being permanently promoted into the Electrical Foreman Position. During these discussions with Mr. Gilbert, one in particular that took place in early October, I brought Mr. Gilbert a signed petition of a dozen members of our electrical shop that are fearful of Randy continuing in this position and possibly being permanently assigned to this position. Despite me stating that I had a petition with a dozen electricians' signatures, Mr. Gilbert was unconcerned. He didn't ask me to see it. When I nevertheless handed it to him, he tossed the petition back at me once he read the names. He also never indicated he would be conducting any sort of investigation. I felt Mr. Gilbert didn't take any of my accusations seriously. Upon leaving that meeting that day at 3:30 pm, Randy was somehow informed that I had brought in a petition signed by a dozen of electricians who did not want him to be assigned a permanent position of shop foreman.

During this meeting with Mr. Gilbert, I stated that "Randy is an instigator, relishes promoting drama between fellow employees, tells violent stories of hurting people, and is not very stable." In this meeting with Mr. Gilbert, I explained that the electrical group is extremely concerned about Randy being given the foreman position. Mr. Gilbert did not ask me to go into more detail about our concerns or ask any more specifics about Randy. To my knowledge, Mr. Gilbert has never subsequently interviewed anyone in our shop, nor did he remove Randy from the position of Foreman. It is my belief, that Mr. Gilbert, almost immediately after I spoke with him, violated my confidentiality and informed Randy of our meeting. Roughly one week later I had another discussion with Mr. Gilbert to relate several examples of Randy's deception, lying about several facts, and creating anger in our shop. Again, Mr. Gilbert to my knowledge did nothing about our concerns.

Roughly one month later I was interviewing with Mr. Gilbert, Rick, and John for an open position in our shop. Immediately following the interview, John stated "interview is over, now I have some questions for you." John asked why I had attacked
my fellow electrician Frank some weeks ago? When the event in question happened, I had gone to Mr. Gilbert's office that same day and explained this incident to him between Frank and myself. I explained that Randy was the catalyst of the whole misunderstanding between myself and Frank. From that day forward, Frank and I apologized to each other and realized that Randy was responsible for our misunderstanding. After relating the entire story to Mr. Gilbert weeks earlier, why would I have to sit in an interview for a job position and hear a false hostile story presented by John and be forced to repeat the incident when it was already discussed by Mr. Gilbert the day the incident happened. Mr. Gilbert said nothing about how I came to him immediately the day of this altercation, he sat there and said nothing, that forced me to defend myself and my character to a hostile John.

That character "attack" on me from John, which I believed came to them from Randy, forced me into a disagreement of how they viewed the event and caused me to explain we have terrified electricians in our shop, at which time I was FINALLY asked to give them a name. I said that our female colleague is terrified of Randy and Dave. Greg's response was "now I have to interview her." This reluctance on performing an objective investigation is consistent with the fact that Mr. Gilbert did not take the petition when it was originally presented to him which ironically contained the signature of our female colleague among others. I believe Mr. Gilbert and John had made their disdain for the electrical group clear and that **they wanted to put someone in a position of power to reinforce their intimidating, dishonest, and horrible culture regardless of the consequences.**

In the meeting on 12/12/22 between Greg, Rick, our female colleague and myself, we mentioned to Mr. Gilbert that Randy also brags about having a loaded gun on Fermilab site. Following that statement, my female colleague and I felt Mr. Gilbert viewed our concern as rumor and conjecture rather than a bona fide safety issue. I would like to know if he immediately notified HR of my female colleague and my concerns or did he say nothing and go to the Holiday party instead? I have never been as scared as when it was made clear to her and myself that Randy was aware of us meeting with Greg Gilbert and the accusations that were made. Someone once again has violated the confidentiality of myself, her, and our meetings with Mr. Gilbert. Despite our female colleague reporting to Mr. Gilbert that Randy approached her in the past and whispered in her ear something to the effect of "I'm a Marine I miss killing people," upper management has essentially placed both of our lives and our families lives in a horrible situation. Both myself and my female colleague are in fear for our lives because lab security and the Kane County sheriff's office failed to search his truck, essentially allowing a person who makes racist and violent statements on a regular basis to fellow employees exit the site with the possibility of having a loaded weapon.

**I now sit at my house on administrative leave with my 21-year-old daughter scared to death knowing he still has that gun and knows exactly who spoke up about him.**

This process was filled with leaks and lies and took everything I had left as a concerned employee to keep pressing the serious nature of Randy being promoted. Our "shop culture" is such that if you bring any stated concerns to management and they're deemed inconvenient or seem unbelievable, management tends to sweep
them under the rug while simultaneously informing the accused of their accusers
resulting in either their careers or personal safety jeopardized.

Chauncey from HR brought up “culture” and why did we wait so long to bring this to the attention of our supervisors? Clearly, this is not the case. I personally, along with several others in our shop, have repeatedly brought the issue of Randy as a dangerous individual to the attention of Greg and John over a 4-month period. Given management’s lack of response to any of the previous concerns we did not feel confident in reporting what Randy said he was carrying, fearing that the lab would tell Randy and allow him to get offsite with the weapon. WHICH IN FACT IS WHAT EXACTLY HAPPENED!!! In this day an age of mass shootings I would never have anticipated such a lackluster response to the accusations of an employee possessing a weapon on site! To be clear, Randy is a very capable electrician but unfortunately, he is completely devoid of any ability to interact with his peers in a respectful manner and routinely engages in incendiary racist and other inacceptable rhetoric.”

Some additional detailed information, which was also part of written documentation provided by the female witness to Heather A. Sidman in December 2022, is presented below.

**“Randy”**

First day that I showed up to Fermilab, I met Randy, we talked about how we were both in the military and both in Afghanistan (me as a Marine and him as a contractor), and he explained to me about how he hated all Muslims and that as far as he is concerned, “they should drop a bomb on the entire middle east”.

The first time I worked with Randy we were wiring an outlet. He asked me if I knew about the color coordination in relation to the outlets, after he told me I said, “hmm, did not know that”. After working with him, he went to DJ’s office and told him that I was too dumb to work there and that the only reason I got the job was because I was a woman and I was Latina. He complained about this also at meetings with my peers present and told them that I only got the job because I knew DJ (not sure what he was implying, if it was that we had a relationship or if it was because DJ, others and I did come from Caterpillar). He said I wasn’t journeyman material so I shouldn’t have ever gotten hired.

One day that I was working with Randy, he asked me what we would say in one of our drill moves (I think it was either a left face or right face) in the military because when he was in they would say “whoosh” which is the sound that would come out of their vaginas (can’t remember if he said vagina or pussies) when they would close their legs.

One of the first times I worked with Randy, he described to me a story of a time when Doug and himself had gotten into an argument (this took place before I started at Fermilab). I had been aware of the story and Doug said that it was because Randy had said some nasty things about some of the women that had just made it into office
along with AOC (Alexandria Ocasio Cortez). Others were present at the time because it was at the morning meeting. Randy's version was that he didn't say anything wrong and that Doug flipped out on him without knowing what he really meant. Then he continued on with his story and said something about stabbing Doug in the neck with a pen if he ever tried anything... He said "I got a ball point pen and if he ever tries anything.... I'll stab him in the neck and watch him bleed out".

In passing one day I was in my cubicle, he approached and said something along the lines of "I miss killing people". I just looked at him and looked away.

He called our female maintenance planner a "stupid bitch" and a "dumb cunt."

**The following is a testimonial from a former female Maintenance Planner/Scheduler at ISD. This is a widow who raised many successful children as a single mother.**

"Randy was described to me by most as a ticking time bomb and that he was ready to go off on people. In particular, he had repeatedly expressed hate for Rob and was on the verge of wanting to hurt him. It didn't take long for me to be faced with the same. Once he told me a joke about an old woman being raped. He called people foul names and called me foul names too to my face and he didn't care who else was around. He called his own daughters bitches, as in: "I have two daughters and they can do so much better than you, those bitches... Oh, look they can't believe I'm calling my daughters bitches, well they are, women are bitches by the very nature that they are women".

The most horrific stories that he told us were about prostitutes from his time in the Marine Corps. One story that he was telling everybody was about buying a cheap watch in the Middle East and passing it as an authentic brand and then using it to pay for a prostitute so that he short-changed her. **Another story from when he was in the military was about going out one night in the Philippines to look for a prostitute with some military buddies. They apparently found one, but could not stand that she was transgender and, according to him, they all killed her!!!**

Also, we all knew that he went shooting with Dave and that he kept a gun with him at all times, either in his truck or on his ankle.

As a former maintenance manager for 25 years at a pharmaceuticals corporation first, and at a medical innovative engineering company next, I had never seen such obsolete equipment, and such lack of correct procedures. When I was hired in 2022, I was not given a working computer for 4 months! The ISD maintenance management system was incredibly antiquated. When I was there, they were replacing it with an allegedly more modern one, which did not work either! The equipment is in horrible shape also because when a work order wasn't done, they would hit "delete" and get it next year. WOW ! It's a horrible way to operate. Not effective at all. That's the norm at the lab. Electrical and mechanical systems were down, fire alarms were down, the equipment
was in shamble. Because they were not OSHA compliant, I have seen so many of their electricians operating in totally unsafe conditions. I was told that OSHA is not needed there as they are the Federal government and it doesn't apply! Even some parts of the tunnel were collapsing. It is the worst facility equipment I've ever seen in my 25 year career managing facilities. The organization is not federal, they are just funded by the government and they have to be OSHA compliant. The fact that it is not, makes it incredibly dangerous. Tax payers money to fund such a fraudulent place. No accountability for anything.

In the entire campus the leadership is nonexistent. A bunch of words to make it sound good but as we know it's the actions that matter, and Fermilab is negligent in every way. They just cover it up and keep sociopaths employed. It's the most dangerous and disgraceful place I've ever experienced. For instance, in June 2022 there was a nearly fatal accident that happened to a diver from a Chicago diving company who nearly died in a Fermilab pond. The diver had been hired to check out the water pump in the pump, and ISD had not turned that pump off! Why? Because they did not want to interfere with the fire system! It is unheard of to check or repair an OPERATING pump, especially if it is an underwater one. Fire systems are put on fire test for this kind of repairs. There was no written procedure, no safety checks. Total negligence. Also in this case an "investigation" was allegedly performed but some ISD managers are still laughing about the whole thing.

Fermilab's HR ignored the harassment by Randy, Scott, Lee and my manager Jason. Most people witnessed my harassment. But in the so-called "investigation" they did not talk to any of my peers who had witnessed all these harassing events. They just talked to managers and others who were part of the verbal assault and harassment.

I walked into a very dangerous situation, and I will not ever tolerate being bullied and talked down to with vulgar language. I decided to speak up and stand up for myself, other women and everyone in that Lab. After I did that, I was let go with the following argument: "We don't want to see any woman treated like that." Two women from ISD who contacted the Fermilab Hotline [Editor's note: see "Statement of Fermilab Community Standards" at the bottom of this Appendix] on my behalf were displaced from their jobs at ISD.

Unfortunately Fermilab keeps the sociopaths and they lose great people. Most of the Electricians have left that facility. Al condescendingly asked me "Who do you think you are?" My response was "Who do you think you are?" and I walked out."

**We are now going to provide some additional detailed information by the female electrician in reference to the troublesome man who persecuted her. This was also part of written documentation provided by the female witness to Heather A. Sidman in December 2022.**

"Dave's incidents
We had worked together at Caterpillar, he was going through a divorce at the time, a divorce in which his wife was cheating on him with a guy they knew. She and the lover were both teachers in the local area. Dave would complain about the situation with people at the Fermilab Electrical Shop, and he would show me naked pictures of his ex-wife. I did not ask to be shown. Many of the other people who were shown expressed feeling uncomfortable being shown her nude pictures.

One day I had to work with Dave on the main ring, he walked about 12-15 ft away from me, on the other side of his truck. He started talking to me about how someone peed on his equipment right before he had to clean it. Without turning around, I asked him, "are you telling me that because that is what you're doing right now?" he said "yeah, I told you I was going to", I said "no you didn't, and if I knew that I would have walked away" and when he came back to work on the AC unit with me, I told him, "and now you're touching my tools?" he said, "I used my other hand".

There was an incident where I did express some firm resistance against Dave when he was questioning why my husband got to drive a nice car when mine is not. I firmly expressed to him, to shut his questioning down that it was what we wanted and that he deserved it. He apologized a day later saying that he just meant that the car my husband has was one that he was led to believe was for older people.

One Saturday I volunteered to work from 6am to 2:30pm to work on lighting in Wilson Hall (I believe it was the 4th and 5th floor, finishing the fifth and moving on to the 4th). I was assigned to work with Rey. Our work orders only showed we were to work on the 5th floor, I didn't even have the work order number for the 4th floor in my queue. Dave showed up sometime after his shift which ended at 8am, he was to work from 12am to 8am, and then 4hrs of OT from 8am to 12pm. The fifth floor required a sign in on the Hazardous Analysis form. When we first began, we had a hard time finding it, we were just going to stay in the sides that didn't require a signature. Pretty shortly after deciding that, Rey found where it was. We signed it and continued working in that area, one person on the ladder and one handing the bulbs. Dave showed up sometime after 8 and closer to 9 on the fifth floor. He asked for the HA form and I told him that we didn't find it. He walked around for a bit (in this time Rey and I were just working and not paying too much attention to him) and said that he found it, as soon as he started to sign it I told him that we did find it but it was on the wall (because the one he was trying to sign was for the contractors). I went over to show him where, and while I was near him I smelled alcohol, and I said, "were you drinking last night?", he said maybe it was the hand sanitizer, and I said ok. I had told him twice, "we are almost done here, you can move to the 4th floor and we will pick up there after lunch". I said that because Dave hated Rey, and other weekends when the three of us were put to work together it was very awkward for me because I was in the middle with, "tell him this tell him that, what's he doing, why is he working so slow" from Dave. Dave agreed to go to the 4th floor, he took one case of bulbs that Rey and myself had brought up for the job. After he left, we realized there was a conference room with no windows that needed relamping and one other room that needed to be finished before we could leave for lunch. Rey and I had left at about
10:20 am for lunch. First we got rid of the used bulbs. Afterwards we went to site 39, Frankie was on shift and was scheduled to be the duty electrician from 08:00 to 16:00. We talked to Frankie till about 10:40, left to pick up lunch, and in that time Dave called, but the reception was lost, I tried calling him back but he didn't answer. Rey and I went to lunch as normal, when we came back Frankie told us that Dave asked where I was and Frankie told him something along the lines of, "she's not with you? She must be with him" and that Dave reacted as if he was upset and walked away.

Sunday when there was a changeover (Josh was scheduled to work on call from 4pm to midnight) between Josh and Dave, Dave went on to raise his voice, complaining and telling Josh that I had lied to him, that I had deceived him and that I was a liar and that I couldn't be trusted while using the phrases "how can I work with her if I can't trust her." "She is a liar". Josh called me early in the morning before I was even awake and said that I needed to talk to Dave, and that he is flipping out etc. I tried all weekend to call him to apologize and to explain what my side of the events were, he ignored my calls on his personal phone and his work phone, till Monday morning I messaged him and asked if we could talk. He asked me to give him a few minutes to use the bathroom (this was about 7:20am before the morning meeting). When we finally talked he explained to me that he still felt that I purposely deceived him when I told him that I didn't know where the HA form was and that I didn't answer his phone call (when the reception was lost), and that I tried acting as if I was his boss by telling him that he could go to the 4th floor and that it seemed like I was trying to get rid of him. I still apologized and told him that a lie is something told with the intention of deceit, and he said a lie is a lie and that it didn't matter. Frankie and Randy were with Dave, and I was told that when I was on the phone with him apologizing, Dave tried making a scene by standing up and raising his voice very loudly, and that the impression he was giving them was that "he was trying to put me in my place to establish his dominance over me". He also said, "she doesn't even know me, if she knew me she'd know I don't drink". How it was explained to me was that he got very irritable when telling his story to Josh and Frankie even after they had tried to explain to him that it was a misunderstanding. He also went to DJ, our former electrical supervisor, about this situation. He showed up to the meeting in sunglasses and crossed his arms and didn't move or speak.

As the days went by, he continued to badmouth me to other coworkers. While explaining to Frankie about how upset he was he had tears in his eyes (I was told by Frankie that there were visible tears in his eyes) and explained that he was crying because he was so worked up over the whole situation. Dave talked to the coworkers for months after this about how I lied to him and how I deceived him. The guys at the shop explained to me that maybe because he was cheated on by his wife and that because I am a woman, that maybe he sees me like his wife. He had been heard joking about me being his work wife.

Some time in April 2022, shortly after that we had worked overtime again on a Saturday, but this was for a shut down, Rey and I had worked together, not by choice, but DJ had paired us together. We were doing high voltage cleaning. I left for lunch
before Rey did, and in that time Rey had found something that needed to be replaced. DJ had Dave drive the bucket truck out to the site after lunch. After it was parked in the vicinity, Rey drove me out there in the work van and pulled up behind the bucket truck (and at the time I did not have a work van because mine was under repair). *Dave started to drive in reverse, slowly at first and when Rey started to go in reverse as well, then Dave "gunned it" and accelerated.* I was yelling and getting panicky at Rey telling him to hurry up. I am not sure how he did it, but Rey was able to back our van away before the truck could hit us. At some point Dave slammed the brakes and got out of the truck, and DJ told him "what's wrong buddy, need a hug?" and tried to joke about it and Dave yelled about how we weren't moving fast enough. Eric was there and said that he told him that he can't do that and explained the dangerousness of it. Dave then sat on the edge of the truck and crossed his arms with his sunglasses on and didn't respond to people for the rest of the day, as if he was the victim. Eric said that afterwards he tried talking to DJ about how he should take some action on that and also explaining how dangerous that is. However, my supervisor DJ did nothing about it."

"I can still remember the dread and anxiety that I felt every day. Despite those terrible events, not only nothing was done, but on the contrary JP and Greg went out of their way to pair people who didn't get along together. I once heard them telling each other how funny that was. Tom, Frankie and Rick instead were really good at keeping Dave away from me. Still, the latter had told me of times when he had broken people's windshields in road rage incidents. He said that the police were often called. I told HR that this kind of violence did not help my concerns. Clearly, that meant nothing to them."

**In the story above, one can tell how the guy's sickness escalates slowly and relentlessly. At the end it reads like a horror story. Some thoughtful additional words to HR from the colleague who had tried to help the victim are in the following.**

"I now want to address who are we supposed to trust at the Lab? How many times has HR come down to our shop and pulled us aside, or just made their presence known in person and said, "HR is here for you" or asked any single one of us "how are things going?" Never. I have never met anyone from HR in our shop nor have I ever seen your presence in our shop, not once in almost 5 years. That alone has left us to feel isolated. We all know we can go to HR anytime, but what about HR reaching out to us to see how things are going? I believe this is a two-way street and that would have helped to build trust between HR and our groups. *Maybe occasionally someone should pull aside a female employee in a shop filled with men and ask her "is everything ok?"* I did this repeatedly and finally that is how our female colleague was finally able to tell me the truth. *I have 4 daughters and want them to exist in a world that doesn't push them around or put their work qualifications down and intimidate them with horrible whispers.* Men and any employee for that matter should not be allowed to take "possession" of them at work like Dave did to our female colleague. He was allowed to harass her and when she pushed back, he called her a liar and a
deceiver! So, my point here is, we need to know we are safe at our place of
employment. We need to know we are safe when we come forward with an
uncomfortable situation. **Our management has failed us in that regard and not created
a culture of trust but one of fear for coming forward and speaking out!** Our good old
boys club of managers in our shop make us feel guilty, scared, and apprehensive to
ever want to come forward and have dialogue for fear of being implicated as a snitch.

> It is my serious hope that this investigation will lead to a positive change in our culture, demonstrated by our HR Department and how you handle this situation. None of us deserve to be unsafe at work, especially when as electricians we are working with the risk of injury or death from a mistake because our minds are filled with fear and worry about our job security, personal security, and we are not able to focus 100% attention on our work tasks!"

As we know by now, the lab and FRA are not interested in positive change and instead decided to cover everything up. How? Let's start with the gun holder. The official narrative by the lab was that there was just one lone paranoid guy complaining about Randy carrying a gun. They claim that an investigation was performed and successfully concluded. They call it successful because a consequence of these horrible events is a policy change on inspecting vehicles on site, i.e. now security does not have to inspect any vehicle, they just call law enforcement to do it for them (clearly without a warrant required).

For the above cover-up to be successful, and specifically to be able to claim that there was just one lone wacko complainer, EVERYBODY in the chain of command and at HR had to pretend that there was no petition signed by 12 people who knew Randy well. This is why the line managers were so terrified to even just touch that petition and why the HR representatives NEVER asked for its signatories. They knew that if they had, several of those signatories would have confirmed Randy's threats of carrying a gun.

For the cover-up to be successful, the lab also had to somehow twist the lame truth that they had not been able to inspect the vehicle. In short, they let that gun slip through their fingers. And exactly as in movies with corrupt cops covering up their own misdeeds, they decided to blame the witness.

Everybody knows that when masquerading the truth with lies, another will be needed, and then another, etc. with no end. One of these lies is that they had to convince themselves that there was no gun in that car.

Perhaps the most dire consequence of the previous fabrication is that they had to give the benefit of the doubt to the bad guy. All these deceptions completely clouded the standard approach for safety of using a cost-risk-benefits analysis. So the lab decided that it was safer to believe a troublesome individual who had been very likely carrying a gun as he had always claimed to everybody, rather than getting rid of him.
And eventually, once the loose cannon was not just kept on the job, but further promoted, what other choice was there other than cutting any loose ends? Which was done by firing the good guy some time in 2023 under some behavioral pretext.

*Compare all of the above with the "Statement of Fermilab Community Standards" at the bottom of this Appendix, and talk about leaders leading by example, or at least implementing their organization's advertised policies!*

Unless... in the same way that Security was justified in not performing their job because, poor them, they are not armed, some in upper management and at HR were scared of the bad guys. After all, what if they went after them with the gun??? That would be much different than the bad guys going after two diligent employees, wouldn't it? If this were the case, however, it would mean that the lab has become a street jungle where the strongest street gang wins. We pray that this is not the case.

Similarly, Randy's own claim to several employees of killing a transgender prostitute abroad has gone unchecked! By closing an eye on a possible murder by assuming that it cannot be true, the lab is violating any conceivable safety policy, to say the least.

And what about DOE? How much did DOE know about the gun on site? We interviewed the lab's FSO on this subject and it was clear that he had at least bought the official narrative.

Finally, how did the lab cover up what happened to the female electrician? This was an easy case (for the lab). In addition to the usual avoiding like the plague any witness' interview on the bucket truck incident when it happened, in December 2022 they told the victim that she had reported the April 2022 events too late! (The assault by the obsessed electrician was at the very least a misdemeanor, if not a felony, and the statute of limitations is at least 18 months.) Then they just waited it out for her to feel completely overwhelmed and leave. Easy peasy with all that harassment going on all the time.

*In conclusion, one wonders how this can be called a "culture of safety" and how many know about this. What is certain is that all of this happened under FRA's purview. FRA is controlled by the University of Chicago. We hope that the DOE will consider what we presented in this report to restore Fermilab as a true leader in HEP science in the US and the world. Also, we are confident that the DOE will give a good example to all stakeholders by not rehiring the responsible party in any capacity of the lab's M&O.*
# Statement of Fermilab Community Standards

Fermilab's status as a world-class, scientific-research destination and its reputation as an institution of choice requires a community that promotes professionalism, mutual respect, inclusion and that is free from discrimination. Fermilab welcomes a diverse populace with varying backgrounds and experiences including international members. Fermilab expects that all community members commit to the same high standards of ethics and behavior.

## Intention

The purpose of this Statement of Community Standards is to establish and communicate the set of expectations that all members of the Fermilab community shall follow. Disruptive or harassing behavior shall not be tolerated regardless of race, color, religion, disability, age, gender, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender identity, and/or nationality.

## Applicability

This Statement applies to all members of the Fermilab community: employees, users, subcontractors, visitors, and guests.

These expectations apply for all interactions including but not limited to: • on the Fermilab site, including the Village; • at Fermilab installations or Fermilab-supported events that are off-site, including Sanford Lab in South Dakota, CERN, and off-site conferences; • online within the Fermilab domain; and • when representing or associated with Fermilab off-site or online, including in-person interactions and on social media.

## Responsibility

The responsibility for proactively facilitating a safe and welcoming environment -- including voicing concerns -- rests with each individual member of the Fermilab community. Leading by example, line management, beginning with the lab director, shall hold themselves and their teams accountable.

The following basic principles apply to all members of the Fermilab community:

### 1. Build trust and credibility

Fermilab's success depends on the trust and confidence we develop with one another and with our stakeholders and partners including the U.S. Department of Energy, the American public, 1 and the global scientific community. As we engage in business on behalf of the Laboratory, we each are ambassadors of Fermilab. Fermilab's reputation is determined by our words and our actions. We gain credibility by fulfilling on our commitments and, when appropriate, acknowledging when we will not and taking responsibility for the consequences.

### 2. Communicate openly and honestly

Every member of the Fermilab community is welcome, and each encouraged to communicate their ideas and/or concerns. We seek to promote open communication which emphasizes listening, creativity, growth and development, collaboration, and
inclusivity. This culture encourages respectful discussion and debate for mutual
benefit.

3. Respect one another

Members of the Fermilab community shall be able to work in a safe and welcoming environment where everyone is treated with dignity and respect. Peer-to-peer or supervisory relationships that interfere with an individual's research or work performance, limit access to educational experiences and career opportunities, or adversely impact an individual's well-being are unacceptable.

Mutual respect is developed by: • Valuing others and their points of view including those who don't easily find their voice. • Being open to correction. • Recognizing the skills and expertise of others in the Fermilab community. • Sharing the credit. • Being courteous. • Welcoming new perspectives and ideas. • Continuing to grow and develop and helping others to grow and develop.

How to report concerns

All members of the Fermilab community are responsible for reporting concerns of improper conduct; harassment or discrimination; unsafe conditions; conflicts of interest; fraud; waste or abuse; violations of law or policy; or other irregularities. ethical standards, contractual requirements or laws. You are encouraged to raise concerns about any violation of this Statement of Community Standards. Confidentiality shall be maintained and reporting should proceed without fear of harassment or retribution.

Contact either of the following:

* Managers or Directorate/Division/Department Leadership

* HR partners or Human Resources Leadership

* The Office of the General Counsel

* The Fermilab Security Department

* The Fermilab Concerns Reporting System, a third-party provided hotline/website hosted by Integrity Counts where reporters may either self-identify or remain anonymous. https://app.integritycounts.ca/org/fermilab
Phone Hotline: 866.921.6714 (USA), 00-800-2002-0033 (Switzerland).

FRA policy prohibits retaliation against individuals who make a report through
any of these channels.

Fermilab leadership is committed to addressing all incidents promptly and thoroughly. Violations can result in disciplinary action up to and/or including termination of employment, contract and/or site-access privileges.