Minow, Martha. 1999. *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Mitchell, Matthew. 2012. "Migration, citizenship and autochthony: strategies and challenges for state-building in Côte d'Ivoire." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 30 (2): 267-287.

—. 2014. "Land tenure reform and politics in post-conflict Cote d'Ivoire: a precarious peace in the western cocoa regions." *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines* 48: 203–221.

Mouffe, Chantal. 1999. "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?" *Social Research* 66 (3): 745-758.

Moyn, Samuel. 2012. "Judith Shklar versus the International Criminal Court." *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights and Development* 4 (3): 473-500.

Naimi, Abdessamad. 2017. "Le Maroc n'est plus le premier investisseur étranger en Côte d'Ivoire." *Huffington Post Maroc*. January 23. http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2017/01/23/maroc-plus-premier-investisseur-etranger-cote-ivoire_n_14331914.html.

Narkunas, Paul. 2010. "Policing the Human: Lawfare and Humanitarianism." In *International Criminal Justice: Critical Perspectives and New Challenges*, by G. Andreopoulos, Levine James and Rosemary Barberet. New York: Springer.

National Commission for Social Action NaCSA. 2017. *Annual Report*. Government of Sierra Leone. http://www.nacsa.gov.sl/archives.html.

Ndungú, Christopher Gitari. 2014. "Lessons to Be Learned: An Analysis of the Final Report of Kenya's Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission." *ICTJ*. May. Accessed Feburary 2020. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Briefing-Kenya-TJRC-2014.pdf.

Nesiah, Vasuki. 2016. *Transitional Justice Practice: Looking Back, Moving Forward*. Scoping Study, Impunity Watch.
Niekerk, Robert van. 2012. "Revisiting History: The Creation of Provinces and the Politics of Social Policy in a Democratic South Africa." *Social Policy & Administration* 46 (6): 619-635.

Notin, Jean-Christophe. 2013. *Le crocodile et le scorpion: La France et la Cote d'Ivoire 1999-2013*. Paris: Rocher.

Nouwen, Sarah, and Wouter G. Werner. 2010. " Doing justice to the political: The international criminal court in Uganda and Sudan." *The European Journal of International Law* 941–996.

O'Brien, Kevin. 2003. "A blunted spear: the failure of the African National Congress/South African Communist Party revolutionary war strategy 1961–1990." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 14 (2): 27-70.

Office of UN Secretary-General. 2017. "Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the closure of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire." June 28. Accessed May 2020. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-06-28/statement-attributable-spokesman-secretary-gen.

OHCHR. 2006. "Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions." *Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights*. Accessed August 2019. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RuleoflawTruthCommissionsen.pdf.

—. 2014. *Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*. New York: United Nations.

Okafor, Obiora Chinedu, and Uchechukwu Ngwaba. 2015. " The International Criminal Court as a ‘Transitional Justice’ Mechanism in Africa: Some Critical Reflections. " *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 90-108.

Okello, Christina. 2019. "Gbagbo release casts doubt on future of international justice." *RFI*. 2 15. Accessed Feburary 2020. http://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20190115-Gbagbo-release-cotedivoire-doubt-future-international-justice.
Okereke, Godpower O., Peter Racheotes, and Karen Linstrum. 2012. " Crime and punishment in Cote d'Ivoire ." *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 36 (1): 61–73.

Olsen, Tricia, Leigh Payne, Andrew Reiter, and Eric Wielbelhaus-Brahm. 2010. "When Truth Commissions Improve Human Rights." *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 4: 457-476.

Onana, Charles. 2011. *Cote d'Ivoire: le coup d'Etat*. France: Dubois.

ONUCI. 2011. "Post-Election Violence Claims more than 1000 lives in Western Cote d'Ivoire." *United Nations ONUCI*. May 26. https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/documents/unoci_pr_elections26052011.pdf.

—. 2017. *Disarment, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Côte d'Ivoire*. June 30. Accessed Feburary 2020. https://onuci.unmissions.org/en/disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration-ex-combatants-côte-d’ivoire.

Orentlicher, Diane. 1994. "Addressing Gross Huamn Rights Abuses: Punishment and Victim Compensation." In *Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century*, by Louis Henkin and John Hargrove.

—. 2005. "Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Impunity. Report of the independent expert to update eth Set of Principlesto combat impunity." Commission on Human Rights, United Nations.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1995. *Participatory Development and Good Governance*. Guidelines Series, Development Cooperation.

Osiel, Mark. 2008. "In Defense of Liberal Show Trials - Nuremberg and Beyond." In *Perspectives on the Nuremburg Trial*, by Guénaël Mattraux, 704-726. New York: Oxford University Press.

Oskar, Thoms, James Ron, and Roland Paris. 2010. "State-Level Effects of Transitional Justice: What do we Know?" *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 4: 329-354.
Ottendörfer, Eva. 2014. *The Fortunate Ones and the Ones Still Waiting: Reparations for War Victims in Sierra Leone*. PRIF Report No. 129, Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute.

Panaite, Antoine. 2016a. "Le process Gbabgo-Blé Goudé a un rapport fondamental avec la France." *Ivoire Justice*. March 16. https://ivoirejustice.net/article/le-proces-gbagbo-ble-goude-un-rapport-fondamental-avec-la-france-selon-emmanuel-altit.

—. 2016b. "Selon la défense de Gbabgo, le recit de l'accusation est un histore tronquée." *Ivoire Justice*. Feburary 1. https://ivoirejustice.net/article/selon-la-defense-de-gbagbo-le-recit-de-laccusation-est-une-histoire-tronquee.

—. 2016c. "Selon le témoin P-97, Blé Goudé engendrait la jalousie parmi les jeunes leaders." *Ivoire Justice*. June 8. Accessed August 29, 2017.

Pape, Marc Le, and Claudine Vidal. 2002. *Côte d'Ivoire l'année terrible 1999-2000*. Paris: Karthala.

Papic, Marko. 2011. "UN Troops take Abidjan airport, firing across town." *Wikileaks*. March 31. https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/17/1745076_re-s3-g3-cote-d-ivoire-un-troops-take-abidjan-airport-firing.html.

Paris, Roland. 1997. "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism." *International Security* 22 (2): 54-89.

—. 2002. "Mission Civilisatrice." *Review of International Studies* 28 (4).

Pasipanodya, Tafadzwa. 2008. "A deeper justice: economic and social justice as transitional justice in Nepal." *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 2 (3).

Pemunta, Vitalis. 2012. "Neoliberal peace and the development deficit in post-conflict Sierra Leone." *International Journal of Development Issues* 11 (3): 192-207.

Peniguet, Maxence. 2015. "Blé Goudé: 184 meurtres, 5 incidents, 2 425 éléments de preuve, 468 victimes." *Ivoire Justice*. September 29. Accessed August 29, 2017. https://ivoirejustice.net/article/ble-goude-184-meurtres-5-incidents-2-425-elements-de-preuve-468-victimes.
—. Sept 17, 2019. *Why The ICC Aquitted Laurent Gbagbo and Blé Goudé*'. Justiceinfo.net.

Pensky, Max. 2008. "Transitions, Amnesty and Social Trust: Lessons from South Africa." In *Trust and Transitions: Social Capital in a Changing World*, by Lwandowski and Znoj. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. 1998. "My Paradigm of Yours? Alternative Development ." *Development and Change* 29 (2): 343-373.

Pigeaud, Fanny. 2015. *France Cote d'Ivoire: un histoire tronquée*. Paris: Vent d'Ailleurs.

Popkin, Margaret, and Noami Roht-Arriaza. 1995. "Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin America." *Law and Social Inquiry* 20 (1): 79-116.

Portail officiel du gouvernement de Côte d'Ivoire. 2006. *Historique des gouvernements*. Accessed November 2013. http://www.gouv.ci/_historique-gouv.php.

Posner, E, and A Vermeule. 2004. "Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice." *Harvard Law Review* 76 (1): 117.

Pugh, Michael. 2005. "The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 23-24.

Ramirez-Barat, Clara, and Roger Duthie. 2015. *Education and Transitional Justice*. November. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-UNICEF-Report-EducationTJ-2015.pdf.

Rawls, John. 1999. *A Theory of Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rigby, Andrew. 2001. *Justice and Reconciliation. After the Violence*. Boulder, CO.

Robins, Simon. 2011. "Towards Victim-Centred Transitional Justice: Understanding the needs of the families of the disappeared on post conflict Nepal." *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 5: 75-98.

—. 2012. "Transitional Justice as an Elite Discourse." *Critical Asian Studies* 44 (1): 3-30.
Rodrik, Dani. 2006. "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hellow Washington Confusion?"
*Journal of Economic Literature* 44 (4): 1-19.

—. 2016. "An African Growth Miracle?" *Journal of African Economies* 1-18.

Roht-Arriaza, Naomi. 1995. *Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice*.

Roman, David, and Susanne Choi. 2009. "Getting Even or Getting Equal? Restributive Desires and Transitional Justice." *Political Psychology* 30 (3): 161-192.

Rubli, Sandra. 2013. "(Re)making the Social World: The Politics of Transitional Justice in Burundi." *Africa Spectrum* 48 (1): 3-24.

Russet, Bruce, and John Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace*. New York: Norton.

Sagan, Ann. 2010. "African Criminals/African Victims: The Institutionalised Production of Cultural Narratives." *International Criminal Law Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39 (1): 3-21.

Salseth, Tanya. 2009. "Purported provisional electoral list delivered to Prime Minister." *Wikileaks*. October 5. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABIDJAN576_a.html.

Sambanis, and Elbadawi. 2000. "Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing violent conflict." *Journal of African Economies*.

Sarkin, Jeremy, and Erin Daly. 2004. "Too Many Questions, too Few Answers: Reconciliation in Transitional Societies." *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 35 (3): 661-728.

Sassen, Saskia. 2014. *Explusion*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Secretary-General, Office of United Nations. 2019. *Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform*. July 26. Accessed August 2019. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16.

Security Council. 2010. "Letter dated 23 September 2010 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council." *Security Council Reports*. September 24.
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cote%20d%27Ivoire%20S%202010%20493.pdf.

Shklar, Judith. 1986. *Legalism: Laws, Morals and Political Trials*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Sikkink, Kathryn. 2011. *The Justice Cascade*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Silverman, Jon. 2012. "Ten years, $900m, one verdict: Does the ICC cost too much?" *BBC*. March 14. Accessed Feburary 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17351946.

Smith, David. 2011. *The Ivory Coast strongman is forced to bow to the inevitable four months after losing elections*. April 11. Accessed Feburary 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/laurent-gbagbo-humiliating-fall.

Smith, Stephen. 2003. "La politique d'engagement de la France à l'épreuve de la Côte d'Ivoire'." *Politique Africaine* (89): 112-126.

Snyder, Jack, and Leslie Vinjamuri. 2003. "Trials and Errors: Principles and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice." *International Security* 28 (3): 5-44.

Soro, Guillaume. 2005. *Pourquoi je suis devenu un rebelle*. Hacette.

Sriram, Chandra Lekha. 2007. "Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies." *Global Society* 21 (4): 759-591.

Starken, Brian. 1999. *Handbook Working for Reconciliation a Tool Box for Keeping a Cultural Perspective in Reconciliation Work*. Vatican City: Caritas Internationalis.

US State Department. 2009. *Peace and Zen Man: An Insider's Take on President Gbabgo*. March 31. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABIDJAN214_a.html.

Steffek, J. 2003. "The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach'." *European Journal of International Relations* 9: 249-275.

Stilwell, Frank. 2008. "Crises, Interventions and Profits: a Political Economic Perspective." *Global Change, Peace and Security* 20 (3): 263-274.
Stratfor. 2011. "Lawyer says international court "not competent" to try Ivorian ex-president."
*Wikileaks*. November 28. https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/75/756448_oman-france-cameroon-us-africa-cote-d-ivoire-lawyer-says.html.

Suhrke, A., and J. Buckmaster. 2005. "Aid, growth and peace: a comparative analysis." *Chr. Michelsen Institute*. ttp://www.cmi.no/publications/ file/?2053=aid-growth-and-peace-a-comparative-analysis.

Sulla, Victor. 2019. *Poverty and Equity Brief: South Africa*. World Bank Working Group.

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. 2009. " ‘Conflicted Outcomes and Values: (Neo)Liberal Peace in Central Asia and Afghanistan." *International Peacebuilding* 16 (5): 635-651.

—. 2010. "Human Security and Legitimisation of Peacebuilding." In *Palgrace Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*, by Oliver P. Richmond, 116-136. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Teitel, Ruti. 1997. "Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation." *Yale Law Journal* 106: 2009-2080.

—. 2000. *Transitional Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press.

—. 2008. "Transitional Justice Globalized." *The International Journal for Transitional Justice* 1 (4).

Tepperman, Jonathan. 2002. "Truth and Consequences." *Foreign Affairs* 81 (2): 128-145.

Thallinger, Gerhard. 2007. "The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Transitional Justice." *German Law Journal* 8 (7).

The World Bank. 2017. "Cote d'Ivoire Land Policy Improvement and Implementation Project."
*Project Information Document/ Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (PID/ISDS).*

—. 2015. *Justice and Law of Law*. April 28. Accessed February 2020.
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/justice-and-rule-of-law.
Thomson, Susan. 2011. "The Darker Side of Transitional Justice: The Power Dynamics Behind Rwanda's Gacaca Courts. International." *International African Institute* 81 (3): 373-390.

Torpey, John. 2003. *Politics and the Past: On Repairing Historical Injustices*. Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield.

Touré, Moriba. 2000. "Immigration en Côte d'Ivoire : la notion de « seuil tolérable » relève de la xénophobie." *Politique africaine* (78).

Trial International. 2015. *Bruno Dogbo Blé*. 18 4. Accessed February 2010.
https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/bruno-dogbo-ble/.

Tutu, Desmound. 1999. *No Future Without Forgiveness*. New York: Doubleday.

UN Security Council. 2011. "Security Council Demands End to Violence in Cote d'Ivoire, Imposing Sanctions against Former President and Urging Him to 'Step Aside' in Resolution 1975." *UN Meeting Coverage and Press Releases*. March 30.
https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10215.doc.htm.

UNHCR. 2006. *Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions*. Geneva and New York: United Nations.

—. 2018. "UNHCR Côte d'Ivoire." *Relief Web*. February. Accessed February 2020.
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/62687.pdf.

United Nations Data. 2017. *World Statistics Pocketbook: Cote d'Ivoire*. March 2.
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=côte%20d%27Ivoire#Economic.

United Nations. 2006. *Delivering as One: Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel*. New York: Secretary-General's High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2007. *Public Governance Indicators: A Literature Review*. ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/100, New York: UN DESA.
United Nations Development Programme. 2011. *Why good governance makes for better development*. May 12.

http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourperspective/ourperspectivearticles/2011/05/20/why-good-governance-makes-for-better-development.html.

United Nations. 2014. *Discussion Paper: Governance for Sustainable Development*. New York: United Nations Development Program.

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 2008. *Guidebook on Promoting good Governance in Public-Private Partnerships*. Geneva: United Nations.

United Nations Peacebuilding. 2019. *United Nations-World Bank Partnership in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations*. January. Accessed February 2010.

https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/policy-issues-and-partnerships/partnerships/un-worldbank-partnership.

United Nations Secretary-General. 2010. *Guidance Note of the Secretary-General United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice*. Guidance materials, New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. 2010. "Statement on the certification of the final voters list by Choi Young-Jin, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Côte d'Ivoire."

*Security Council Report*. September 24.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cote%20d%27Ivoire%20S%202010%20493.pdf.

UNMIL. 2015. "Closure of UNMIL." *United Nations Mission in Liberia*. December 18.

Accessed February 2020. https://unmil.unmissions.org/liberia-cote-d'ivoire-unhcr-facilitate-voluntary-repatriation-ivorian-refugees-after-interruption.

UNOCHA. 2014. *The New Humanitarian*. January 13. Accessed 2019.

https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2014/01/13/cote-d-ivoire-truth-panel-seen-faltering.
Uprimmy, Rodrigo, and Maria Paula Saffon. 2006. "Transitional Justice without Transition? Truth, Justice and Reparations for Colombia." *DeJusticia*.

US Secretary of State in Cote d'Ivoire. 2007. *President Gbabgo wants to reduce UN political role in Cote d'Ivoire*. April 17.
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ABIDJAN391_a.html.

Uvin, Peter. 2004. *Human Rights and Development*. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.

Valdés, Juan Gabriel. 1995. *Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile*. Cambridge University Press.

Varenne, Leslie. 2012. *Abobo-la-guerre: Cote d'Ivoire, terrain de jeu de la France et de l'ONU*. France: Mille et une nuits.

Vinck, Patrick, and Phuong Pham. 2008. "Ownership and Participation in Transitional Justice Mechanisms:A Sustainable Human Development Perspective from Eastern DRC." *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 2: 398-411.

Waldorf, Lars. 2012. "Anticipating the Past: Transitional justice and Socio-economic Wrongs." *Social and Legal Studies* 21 (2): 171-186.

Whyte, Jessica. 2014. "Humanizing Militarism: Amnesty International and the Tactical Polyvalence of Human Rights Discourse." In *The Aporia of Right: Explorations in Citizenship in the era of Human Rights*, by Anna Yeatman and Peg Birmingham. Bloomsbury.

Wilson, Richard. 2001. *The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa*. Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Woods, Dwayne. 1996. "The Politicization of Teachers' Associations in Cote d'Ivoire." *African Studies Review* 39 (3): 113-129.

Working Group on Transitional Justice and SDG+, 2019. *On Solid Ground: Building Sustainable Peace and Development after Massive Human Rights Violations*. New York: International Center for Transitional Justice.
World Bank / Trading Economics. 2020. *Ivory Coast - Public Spending On Education, Total (% Of GDP)*. March. Accessed February 2020. https://tradingeconomics.com/cote-d-ivoire/public-spending-on-education-total-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html.

World Bank. 2017. *Cote d'Ivoire Data*. March 1. https://data.worldbank.org/country/cote-ivoire.

—. 2015. "Economic situation in Cote d'Ivoire (Vol. 2) : La force de l'elephant : pour que sa croissance génère plus d'emplois de qualité." December 1. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/437971468194941284/La-force-de-l-elephant-pour-que-sa-croissance-génère-plus-d-emplois-de-qualité.

—. 2017. *Governance Overview*. April 17. http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/overview#1.

—. 2017. "Worldwide Governance Indicators." September 22. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.

World Bank Group. 2019. "*Regulatory Quality*". https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf.

—. 2020. *DataBank*. Accessed February 2020. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/education-statistics^-all-indicators/preview/on.

Zalaquett, Jose. 1989 reprinted 1990. "Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in State Crimes: Punishment and Pardon." *Hamline Law Review* 13 (623).

Zyl, Paul Van. 2005. "Promoting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies." In *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. Geneva: Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
# Appendices

## Appendix 1: Research Methods

### Participant Recruitment

Interview participants were identified through the network of victim leaders, NGO workers and youth leaders I established during the year and a half I worked for an international organization as a consultant for the CDVR and civil society groups. I recruited participants by calling members of this network and explaining my research project. These contacts also assisted in identifying other individuals interested in participating.

### Informed Consent Process

Before meeting for an interview, I first explained the research on the phone, particularly emphasizing it was not related to my former work and that participation had no foreseen benefits and brought no compensation. At the interview itself, I obtained consent verbally through a pre-scripted conversation, which I adapted as needed to ensure clarity. This script included asking permission to record, details on privacy protections, the purpose of the research, and the intended uses of the research (i.e. for my dissertation and potentially to publish). I also informed interviewees that they could stop the interview at any point or retract any or all information shared, and gave them (and in some cases a social worker known to them) my telephone number. It was also very important to re-emphasize that there were no foreseeable benefits to giving an interview and to clarify that this research had no connection with my former work. In situations where these details seemed unclear, I checked for clarity by asking follow up questions and rephrased if needed. Interviewees were invited to ask questions before beginning.
I obtained verbal rather than written consent because I felt, in the context, the legalism of a signed form gave a negative impression of wielding authority over the interviewees, particularly since I did not always know their level of literacy. I was also concerned that the perceptions of a 'signed contract' would give the impression I was conducting an official investigation and thus create expectations of some follow up or put pressure on interviewees to 'tell the whole truth'.

The verbal consent process was recorded at the beginning of each interview. With only a few exceptions, the first step in each interview was asking permission to record and take handwritten notes (all interviewees agreed to both). The exceptions were the few cases where I felt there was a risk that an audio recording, if confiscated by the authorities, could put the individual in danger. In these cases, I did not bring a recorder and asked permission to take notes by hand only, explaining that the notes included no identifying information. I therefore did not audio record interviews with persons who were minors at the time they were involved in human rights violations, with persons accused of serious crimes (i.e. former combatants or prisoners) and with direct victims who were not public figures.

Though everyone interviewed consented to written notes, I did not always take notes for the full interview. In some cases, it felt more respectful to just listen. Some individuals signaled they wanted their accounts to be recorded closely and thus seemed to appreciate that I wrote notes, however others gave the impression my writing was distracting or uncomfortable. In these cases, I paid close attention and wrote my notes immediately afterwards in my car.

## Measures to ensure confidentially

Only known public figures who consented to being interviewed in that capacity are identified by their names and job titles. In three instances interviewees participated in their capacity as public figures, but disclosed information that could put themselves or others at risk. I therefore also changed names and identifying information in these cases.

Although the victims' leaders and NGO or government staff who participated are known figures in their communities, I have also changed their names and identifying information. In most cases these individuals are identified by their locale (i.e. town or neighbourhood) and general job title.
Former combatants, former members of FESCI, direct victims, individuals accused of grave crimes, sex workers or individuals who were minors at the time they were involved in human rights violations are especially vulnerable groups. I have therefore changed all potentially identifying information related to these individuals.

## Special considerations for interviewing more vulnerable groups

In the cases I interviewed more vulnerable individuals (i.e. members rather than leaders of a victims' association, former child combatants and sex workers), I did not recruit these participants directly. Instead, these participants were identified by a social worker or other psychosocial support worker with whom the interviewee had a prior relationship. These individuals were residents or regular attendees at a community center or NGO, and were identified by support workers as people would might enjoy participating in my research and who were in a good mental state. These interviews were conducted as informal focus group discussions and accompanied by a support worker who worked regularly with the participants.
Given I was seeking information about their experiences with TJ institutions and not personal information about specific violations (though some individuals disclosed personal accounts), the presence of a support worker and of other peers did not inhibit the interview process. Moreover, in my impression, these informal group discussions were more comfortable for the participants than speaking with me one-on-one.

Involving support workers also helped ensure the consent process was voluntary and fully informed. Support workers discussed the possibility of an interview in my absence, where there was less pressure to say 'yes' to a foreign researcher. The presence of support workers also ensured interviewees had a trusted person nearby to follow up with should any negative impacts come from the process (i.e. feelings of trauma, feelings of regret about something said, or disappointment that benefits did not follow). Note that I did not provide any financial compensation to support workers, meaning there was no incentive for them to pressure participants in my absence. I had prior relationships with them and asked for their assistance in that capacity.

When interviewing all victims, my research was about their experiences with the transitional justice process and the kind of support available to them. I was not looking for highly personal
or sensitive information and did not ask questions pertaining to specific violations. There is, of course, cross over between experiences with TJ and this sensitive information, and some individuals volunteered highly personal accounts. I did not, however, actively seek such information and generally avoided topics that might cause discomfort or embarrassment.

## Managing expectations

Since I primarily interviewed victims' association leaders, NGO staff and public figures, all these actors had prior experience working with foreign actors, if not foreign researchers. As professionals in the human rights sector, these participants were in a good position to understand my explanation that my dissertation research was not related to my previous job and would bring no foreseeable benefits. On only one occasion did an individual express disappointment that I did not provide compensation, insisting 'that is how this normally works.' All other interviewees seemed to understand the principle that no compensation or benefits would follow. In the case of more vulnerable groups, working through support workers made it much easier to manage expectations of compensation. It also meant interviewees had someone nearby who could address any confusion or disappointment in the follow up.

## Language

All one-on-one interviews were conducted in French, which I speak fluently. Having lived in Abidjan and worked with the communities interviewed prior to conducting field research, I was also familiar with local slang. Focus group interviews in rural areas required a translator.

## Location of interviews

Interviews with direct victims and other more vulnerable groups were conducted in community centres or victims' association offices where the interviewee commonly went and where a foreign woman was not a conspicuous visitor.

When interviewing public officials or NGO staff, I went to their offices. Even in cases where an interview posed no foreseeable risk to the participant, I still considered it important that I go to them both out of respect and in order to avoid expectations of 'transport money' as compensation for the interview.
Focus group interviews with local chief councils and with youth organizations were conducted in public locations of the participants' choosing.

In a small number of cases, I had reason to believe the person being interviewed could potentially pose some threat to me. In these cases, interviews were conducted in a private but open-air location (i.e. in a park where help was nearby, but no one would overhear our conversation).

## Focus groups

I held focus groups instead of one-on-one interviews in cases where either the participants or my colleagues (i.e. support workers) voiced a preference for this format. For instance, at one point during an inland mission, I organised an interview with a local chief in a Western community affected by land grabs. When I arrived in the village and, in accordance with local propriety, introduced myself to the chief's council, the council explained it was inappropriate for one individual from their group to speak to me alone. I therefore did this and other similar interviews as focus groups with the full community leadership invited. Similarly, when interviewing youth leaders, some expressed a preference for meeting as a group with their colleagues.

The support workers I worked with felt group discussions were a less intimidating setting for more vulnerable groups than private interviews. Since I had an existing relationship with these support workers and had good reason to trust their judgement, I deferred to their advice.

Although speaking in a group of peers may have inhibited some individuals from sharing certain information, I do not feel this inhibited my research. This is particularly the case as I was not seeking highly sensitive information or details that would be dangerous to share. The group setting also meant I learned various perspectives on the same issues and could identify important points of disagreements. Furthermore, it was my impression that many Ivorians found a private interview setting formal and uncomfortable, whereas speaking in a focus group tended to be a fun experience where the participants took control of the conversation.

## Access to documents

All documentation quoted in this dissertation are from officially public sources. Some sources are, however, very difficult to access. Most notably, an earlier, much more detailed version of
the CDVR report as well as select transcripts from the public hearings were made public but quickly disappeared from government sites (note the 'public' hearings, in reality, were invitation-only. An edited film of some sessions was aired on state television some months later).

In my capacity as a consultant working with the CDVR, I had access to confidential information about violations that took place. This information is *not* used or quoted in the dissertation, however knowledge of it did inform my thinking and my approach to fieldwork. For example, I reference victim testimony about the Duékeué massacre but I provide no details from that testimony beyond what is available in the public domain or what was told to me directly in an interview.

## List of interviews

1. Victim's Affair Office, Director, Cocody (state-run)

2. Victim's association leader, Koumassi (state-run)

3. Victim's association leader, Bouaké

4. Victim's association leader, Adjamé

5. Victim's association leader, Abobo (PK 18 area)

6. Victim's association leader, Abobo (Carrefour area)

7. Victim's association leader, Gagnoa

8. Victim's association leader, Dalao

9. Victim's association leader, Bangolo

10. Victim's association leader, Toutelepleu

11. Former national radio host (target of state repression under Gbagbo)

12. FRCI former combatant from Cocody / perpetrator

13. FRCI former combatant from Man

14. FRCI former combatant from Youpougon

15. FRCI ComZone

16. FRCI/Dozo former combatant, Korhogo

17. FDS/ Liberian mercenary, Youpougon

18. 'Therese' former FESCI National Office, officer

19. Former FESCI National Office, officer (in prison)

20. Charlie Watta, former Head of Security for FESCI

21. Jole Poele, Jeune Patriots national leader at time of writing

22. Soro Alphonse, RDR youth national leader at time of writing

23. Frank Navigué former FPI negotiator / FPI politician at time of writing

24. Former election monitor / youth activist, Cocody

25. Election monitoring NGO, Head of Office

26. Human Rights NGO ICTJ, senior staff

27. Human Rights NGO Lidho, senior staff

28. Human Rights NGO Midh, senior staff

29. Coalition for the ICC, Head of Office
30. Ministry of Women's Affairs, Director

31. Ministry of Solidarity, Director

32. Former Ministry of Interior, 'Alain Diabété', Director (Gbagbo appointed)

33. Ministry of Education, senior staff

34. State Prosecutor, Gagnoa

35. Social services, local office, social worker, Trenchville

36. Social services, local office, Director, Duékuoé

37. Social services, local office, social worker, Adjamé

38. CDVR senior staff / Human Rights NGO, Director

39. CDVR Commissioner

40. CDVR Communications, senior staff

41. Head statement taker Man

42. Head statement taker Daloa

43. Head statement taker Gagnoa

44. Head statement taker Toutlepleu

45. Head statement taker Duékoué

46. Head statement taker Guiglo

47. Head statement taker Tabu

48. Head statement taker San-Pedro

49. Head statement taker Boueké

50. Red cross staff, Gagnoa,

51. Red cross staff, Duékoué

52. Red cross staff Koumassi

53. Red cross staff, San Pedro

54. Human rights International NGO, Director Youpougon,

55. Human rights International NGO, Director Grand Bassam

56. Human rights International NGO, Director Koumassi

57. GIZ International Consultant, DRR Expert

58. UNOCI mission, junior official

59. UNOCI mission, senior official

60. Local youth, Kofolo

61. Ziguehi / Community Leader, Adjamé

62. Researcher on youth movements in Côte d'Ivoire, FHB University

63. Researcher on SGBV targeting children in Côte d'Ivoire, FHB University

64. Investigator, Sierra Leone TRC

65. L. Bickford, Director International NGO Memoria

## List of Focus Group Interviews

1. Village youth leaders, Divo

2. Chief and council, Divo

3. Chiefs and council, Grand Beriby

4. Chief and council, Mama (Gbagbo's hometown)

5. Youth leaders, Mama (Gbagbo's hometown)

6. FESCI National Office leadership (in hiding)

7. NGO Réseau action justice et paix, youth leaders

8. Abobo victims' association members
9. Former child combatants / youth in conflict with the law, youth center in Youpougon

10. Youth sex workers, community centre in Koumassi

11. Youth sex workers, community centre in Grand Bassam

12. Ziguehi leaders (Ziguehi were unofficial security personnel of Houphouët-Boigny the low-income communities. They are seen as both community leaders and as a network of gangsters)
Copyright Acknowledgements