<figure><img src="image_1.png" /></figure>

HAL
open science

# Preparing Fermilab to Carry Out the P5 Plan

Giorgio Bellettini

► To cite this version:

Giorgio Bellettini. Preparing Fermilab to Carry Out the P5 Plan. 2024. hal-04652101

HAL Id: hal-04652101

https://hal.science/hal-04652101v1

Submitted on 19 Jul 2024

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.

Public Domain
Preparing Fermilab to Carry Out the P5 Plan

An independent review of Fermi Research Alliance (FRA)

by

A Group of Whistleblowers from Fermilab

July 15, 2024
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table><tr><td>Forewords</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Preface</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>Executive Summary</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>I. Introduction</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>I.A Looking to the Future</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>II. Observations</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>II.A Selection of the Leadership</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>II.A.1 – Best Practices</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>II.B The Flagship Projects</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>II.C DOE Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (PEMP)</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>II.C.1 – The Accident</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>II.C.2 – The Shutting Down of the Beam</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>II.C.3 – Site Access Safety/ Security Problems</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>II.D The Safety Matter</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>II.E Business, Financial, Accounting – Operational Support</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>II.E.1 – Procurement</td><td>30</td></tr><tr><td>II.F A More Modern HR/ General Counsel System</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>II.F.1 – The Culture of an Organization</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>III. Conclusions</td><td>36</td></tr><tr><td>Appendix A – A 360 Performance Review Process</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>Appendix B – The Lab's Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (PEMP)</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>Analysis of 2019 PEMP</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>Analysis of 2021 PEMP</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>Analysis of 2023 PEMP</td><td>68</td></tr><tr><td>Appendix C – Table of Content of Latest DOE's RFP for M&O Bidder</td><td>76</td></tr><tr><td>Appendix D – Unplanned Radiation Dose Incident</td><td>83</td></tr><tr><td>Appendix E – A Textbook Case Study in Human Rights</td><td>85</td></tr><tr><td>Appendix F – Fermilab Concern Reporting System</td><td>89</td></tr><tr><td>Appendix G – Analysis of “Fermilab Concern Reporting System”</td><td>93</td></tr><tr><td>Appendix H – A Textbook Case of Cover-up</td><td>95</td></tr></table>
# Forewords

I am happy to introduce to our scientific community this white paper. After so many years at Fermilab I have developed a deep sentimental involvement with the laboratory, and I sense a diffused lack of confidence in our future.

The data of the past 15 years show that responding to demands for a change by delaying any incisive action is not productive. It is not leading to a rousing vision for the future of HEP in the US. We must protect the well-being of our students and employees for them to thrive, and for the lab to be able to meet the P5 plans. A move in this direction is advocated by the proponents of this welcomed document.

A transparent and honest approach to the change will substantially improve a productive dialogue with DOE as our funding agency, and strengthen a much-needed mutual trust. Steady, consistent support is important to the success of large, long-term initiatives in particle physics. Trust and mutual appreciation between the lab and DOE are substantial to navigate together the challenging US government's budgeting process, which sometimes results in unforeseen changes in the level of support for projects. Historically, one extreme example of that problem was the abrupt cancellation in 1993 of the Superconducting Super Collider, the SSC, after large investments in that project had been made over several years. By default, that decision ceded leadership at the energy frontier to the Large Hadron Collider of CERN. We do not want that to happen with DUNE. There is the chance of starting a long-term program of research and development of advanced muon facilities at Fermilab, possibly leading to a 10 Tev Muon Collider in the US. The time to act is now.

<figure><img src="image_2.png" /><figcaption>Giorgio Bellettini</figcaption></figure>

I join with Giorgio Bellettini in recommending deep introspection concerning the issues raised in this document. Like Giorgio, I have had a long and productive association with Fermilab, during which period I have also witnessed a gradual erosion of trust and confidence within the Laboratory staff. In achieving the vision projected by P5, the high-energy physics community in the United States faces both profound challenges, but also great opportunities. Their successful realization demands dedicated, highly-motivated scientific, technical, and administrative professionals unburdened by past deficiencies. To repeat Giorgio's exhortation, "the time to act is now."

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>William Barletta</figcaption></figure>
# Preface

In the past several years, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) has suffered a number of troublesome setbacks. In some cases, failures to respond effectively have only made things worse, resulting in the current crisis atmosphere at the laboratory. This is reflected in part in the poorly rated performance appraisals that the DOE (Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan, or PEMP) provides to the lab every year.

Three entities are currently responsible for supporting, managing, operating, and leading the lab: the Department of Energy (DOE), Fermi Research Alliance (FRA), and the Laboratory Director's Office.

Fortunately, two recent events provide opportunities for interested parties to reverse the recent decline: the release in December 2023 of the P5 Report and the DOE's decision to rebid the Management & Operating (M&O) contract. (https://science.osti.gov/Acquisition-Management/M-and-O-Competitions/Procurement-Information/Request-for-Proposals?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery)

The P5 Report (https://www.usparticlephysics.org/2023-p5-report/), a decadal update of recommendations for US particle physics, includes an ambitious and positive roadmap for projects and activities at Fermilab. Carrying out the P5 plan successfully, however, will also require addressing many of the other problems currently besetting the lab.

The selection of a new M&O contractor is under the responsibility of the Deputy Director for Operations of the DOE Office of Science Dr. Juston Fontaine. A new M&O Contractor would replace FRA and name a new Director effective January 1, 2025. A new management team, one hopes, would be motivated to solve problems and would enjoy a “honeymoon period”, enabling them to make positive changes more easily.

Stimulated by these recent developments, the authors of this document, all present or past employees, convened confidentially in order to collect testimonials on a series of events symptomatic of the lab problems, to provide constructive criticism and offer possible solutions. This document summarizes this work.

# Executive Summary

1. We started our think tank to help Fermilab overcome its Physics and mission impasses. When surveying employees outside of our group, we found out that a large fraction of the staff at the lab are unhappy with management and are desperately looking for change. The climate at the lab, as assessed in the latest third-party survey, has worsened further since the National Business Research Institute evaluated it at the 61% percentile in a 2019 survey. The outcome of the latest climate survey points to poor communication between management and
employees and a decline of trust in management. The Lab Director's failure to respond effectively to setbacks have only made things worse.

2. However, while studying the various aspects of the lab problems, we uncovered too many deficiencies in the culture and behavioral areas. Testimonials from employees and visitors consistently pointed to a toxic work environment, where constructive criticism is most often ignored and retaliated against. Examples of reports stemming from interacting with the outdated HR/General Counsel system, under FRA purview, are as follows:

* The alleged sexual assault of the NOvA and DUNE collaborator who filed and won her 2022 lawsuit in the UK was dismissed by FNAL staff; this blunder led to a young woman missing years of her life in solving the problem herself, and she eventually left the field after her postdoc.

* A cover-up of a case of guns on site in 2023, with promotion of the perpetrator and pretextuous firing of the witness.

* A cover-up of an attempt at badly hurting with an industrial vehicle a female electrician by an obsessed male employee.

* A cover-up of Beryllium windows blasting, with subsequent promotion of the person in charge.

* Ironically, the previous case led to a successful EEOC lawsuit for retaliation against the employee who had predicted and warned management of the risk of those windows failing. Etc.

Former and current employees and visitors willing to come forward provided detailed testimonials in Appendices E and H. A most telling example of the culture of cover-ups is in the latter. We speculate that this culture of cover-ups may be specific to FRA. Their preoccupation with controlling the narrative with DOE at all costs has led to decades of unethical and sometimes illegal conduct. By now we have 15+ years of data that unequivocally prove that FRA's modus operandi is to respond to demands for change by offering just the appearance of change.

3. It is usually stated that 98% of the staff has to remain the same when replacing an M&O. *But it is the leadership of an organization that makes or breaks it because to succeed an organization requires leaders who lead, inspire and teach by example.* In the last decade, *the average seniority, i.e. knowledge, experience and maturity, as well as scientific notoriety of Fermilab's managers shrank to a fault*. Ineffective leaders are not able to focus on what is best for the organization. When incompetence is further compounded by a personal agenda, disinformation joins misinformation. Former internal committees and/or task forces of mature and prominent scientists used to have a say in the past on how operations were conducted at the lab. Because of the presently large percentage in critical committees and administrative positions of responsibility of early career members without sufficient experience, knowledge and insight, *there are no checks and balances anymore*.

4. Consistently, what could have become a rousing vision for the future of HEP in the US suffered, and has not been motivating enough for hundreds of potential PhD
students who have left our field for more inspiring endeavors. Similarly, many lab's scientists, engineers and users have already opted to transfer their expertise to activities at other facilities. The consequent loss of skills and experience has already been destructive for the lab and will jeopardize the lab's capabilities to answer to the P5 report.

5. FRA's lack of state-of-the-art processes clearly extends to business, finances and procurement. Several employees involved in these endeavors invoke the lack of modern and effective processes. In these past 15+ years, FRA has extensively demonstrated not to have the knowledge and capability to implement effective procedures for business. Such management ineffectiveness has progressively caused, among others, the following self-inflicted problems:

* Extremely long vacancies in important leadership positions, both scientific and administrative.

* Serious budget overruns and delays in LBNF/DUNE, which required a revision of the CD1 cost point estimate and range.

* PIP-II contingency overruns within one year from CD3 approval.

* Lack of knowledgeable and effective administrators in business/ finance/ procurement.

* Many administrative obstacles both in safety and general business that slow down and sometimes stop scientific productivity of the experiments.

* Lack of vision/focus in technological areas, resulting in little to no oversight.

* Lack of focus on ensuring the quality of life of employees. Etc.

6. A consequence from point 5. is budget insolvency, with the lab being very much in the red even just because of existing salaries. A major financial burden for salaries is the indirect cost, or overhead, i.e. the actual cost of an employee to the lab is approximately 3 times their salary due to this indirect cost. The overhead is correlated to the ratio of the cost of administrative employees to that of non-administrative ones. It clearly follows that the number of bureaucrats and administrators on the lab payroll has to be monitored and closely controlled. Implementation of automated processes and solutions in projects' operations is necessary also to reduce the number of redundant administrators. This is critical for the lab not to lose itself in heavy bureaucracy and forget its Physics vision!

7. While comparing Fermilab relative to the other DOE labs, we observed that there is only another lab, Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility (JLab), whose grades dropped a few years ago and currently remain below the acceptable threshold. Consistently with DOE regulations, the DOE has been rebidding JLab's M&O also. We have received testimonials on concerning events occurring at JLab too, not just to employees but also to users. Our analysis shows a correlation between a hostile environment at a lab and a poor PEMP rating at the same lab. This hit us as relevant since some managers clearly have the perception that a "toxic" environment cannot have that much impact at the business and productivity level. Our work shows that instead it does. Hence ignoring and/or covering up unethical and sometimes illegal behavior is NOT good business.
8. In June 2024, most of the above information was conveyed in separate letters to the Deputy Director for Operations of the DOE Office of Science Dr. Juston Fontaine; the DOE Under Secretary for Science and Innovation Geraldine Richmond; and Congressman Bill Foster. No response was received from any of them.

# I. Introduction

Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory is a national treasure and a valuable international resource. At Fermilab, as at other labs, the Office of Science of the Department of Energy provides resources and facilities for particle physics that are too large to locate at individual universities. Founded in 1967 as the National Accelerator Laboratory, Fermilab reached the energy frontier of particle physics via its 200 GeV Main Ring Accelerator. Following the vision of its founding Director, Robert R. Wilson, it achieved twice the Main Ring energy with its Tevatron superconducting synchrotron. After Europe's CERN laboratory established a new record center-of-mass energy with a proton-antiproton collider based on its SPS, Fermilab regained the energy frontier by transforming the Tevatron into a similar proton-antiproton collider. The collision energy at the center of mass reached 1.96 TeV in 2001. The Tevatron ceased operations on September 30, 2011, after ceding leadership at the energy frontier in 2008 to CERN's Large Hadron Collider. The lab collaborates actively with CERN on particle physics experiments and in developing accelerator technology critical to exploring the energy frontier.

Because the statistical significance of particle physics experiments depends upon the number of events detected, Fermilab aspires to lead the particle physics field at the intensity frontier. Its flagship project, in that regard, is the Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment at the Long-Baseline Neutrino Facility, or LBNF/DUNE.

In addition, Fermilab performs world-class research in astrophysics, quantum physics, superconducting technology development, and related instrumentation. In each of these endeavors, collaboration with U.S. and international laboratories and universities is key to the success of Fermilab's research activities.

Fermilab is managed by a Management & Operating contractor (M&O), currently the Fermi Research Alliance, LLC (FRA), which is a partnership between the University of Chicago and Universities Research Association (URA). Fermilab Director is the President of FRA. FRA's performance-based M&O contract requires accomplishing specified DOE missions and programs in an efficient, safe and secure environment, while effectively managing all business operations. The M&O contractor has full responsibility and accountability for total performance under the contract, including
determining the specific methods for accomplishing the work effort, performing
quality control, and assuring that all operations are consistent with DOE, EPA, OSHA,
and EEOC regulations and guidelines. DOE is responsible for the oversight of all
activities conducted under the contract and for assuring that funds are properly and
effectively utilized.

In the last 5-6 fiscal years, FRA management of Fermilab has received poor
performance reviews and has been responsible for large cost overruns in
LBNF/DUNE and its associated accelerator project PIP-II.

Due to several safety accidents, accelerator operations have been unexpectedly
closed for several months.

With respect to the management of its workforce, FRA has acquired a reputation for
developing an unsupportive work environment among many of its present and
former employees. The climate at the lab has been in decline now for over a decade,
and with recent years moving at an accelerated rate. We have gathered testimonials
to the fact that challenges have often been ignored and negative consequences
covered up. Employees and visitors who submit constructive criticism are too often
ignored, or in some cases, retaliated against.

The healing and improvement process MUST begin soon if Fermilab is ever to return
to its former glory and be the lab its employees are proud to work for.

I.A Looking to the Future

The DOE has recently published the report of the Particle Physics Project Prioritization Panel (P5), a subpanel of the High Energy Physics Advisory Panel (HEPAP). This report constitutes a ten-year strategic plan for particle physics in the U.S. (https://www.usparticlephysics.org/2023-p5-report/) It offers an aggressive, optimistic vision for the future of Fermilab, including LBNF/DUNE at the intensity frontier and a “Muon Shot” as a possible path back to the energy frontier. The following quotes exemplify P5’s expansive plans for future development of those major accelerator facilities.

"DUNE is the centerpiece of a decades-long program to reveal the mysteries of elusive neutrinos. This US-hosted international project will exploit a unique underground laboratory (now nearing completion) and neutrino beams produced at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab). The Rubin Observatory Legacy Survey of Space and Time (LSST) anchors an ongoing program of cosmic surveys. Realizing the full scientific potential of these and other ongoing projects is our highest priority."
The completion of DUNE on the projected time scale without further cost growth is
an essential DOE Goal for the Office of High Energy Physics.

"The panel recommends dedicated R&D to explore a suite of promising future projects. One of the most ambitious is a future collider concept: a 10 TeV parton
center-of-momentum (pCM) collider [...]. As part of this initiative, we recommend targeted collider R&D to establish the feasibility of a 10 TeV pCM muon collider. A key milestone on this path is to design a muon collider demonstrator facility. If favorably reviewed by the collider panel, such a facility would open the door to building facilities at Fermilab that test muon collider design elements while producing exceptionally bright muon and neutrino beams. By taking up this challenge, the US blazes a trail toward a new future by advancing critical R&D that can benefit multiple science drivers and ultimately bring an unparalleled global facility to US soil." (Ref: p xi P5)

"Although we do not know if a muon collider is ultimately feasible, the road toward it leads from current Fermilab strengths and capabilities to a series of proton beam improvements and neutrino beam facilities, each producing world-class science while performing critical R&D towards a muon collider. At the end of the path is an unparalleled global facility on US soil. This is our Muon Shot." (Ref p23 P5)

Those quotes are only a part of the comprehensive vision for Fermilab outlined in the report, as the following quote demonstrates: "DOE National Laboratories are critical research infrastructure that must be maintained and enhanced based on the needs of the particle physics community. This is particularly true for Fermilab as the only dedicated US laboratory for particle physics." (Ref: p23 P5)

The P5 Report also advocates a balanced portfolio of small, medium, and large experiments. This recommendation takes on added importance for Fermilab because the largest experiment, DUNE, is not located near the lab campus.

More than a decade ago, the DOE decided to emphasize projects over general R&D. This changed the lab's fund distribution and increased the administrative efforts needed to manage larger projects. In somewhat of a reversal, Chapter 6 of the current P5 Report, entitled "Investing in the Future of Science and Technology", emphasizes that besides projects, substantial support for R&D initiatives is essential to the health of the field.

These ambitious goals would be challenging to achieve even under ideal conditions. In reality, however, the present state of the lab is far from ideal. Articles in newspapers and scientific journals have described some of the problems. (https://www.science.org/content/article/major-shake-coming-fermilab-troubled-u-s-particle-physics-center) Recent performance appraisals of the lab by the DOE (Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan, or PEMP) have also found significant shortcomings in several areas of the lab. Poor performance in managing the lab's principal projects could be catastrophic for achieving the P5 plan.

Due to the lab's poor performance, the DOE has initiated a Request for Proposal (RFP) for bids to manage and operate (M&O) the lab starting on January 1, 2025. In response, several organizations have filed public Expressions of Interest to be Fermilab's M&O contractor. The deadline for bidding was March 4, 2024.
The P5 Report and DOE's rebidding of the M&O contract create a great opportunity to rethink how things are currently being done at Fermilab. In response, the authors of this white paper collected information about issues relevant to achieving the vision of P5 and, where possible, to mitigate potential impediments to progress toward those goals. The information and advice presented here is meant to be a call to action for those individuals and institutions that will be responsible for overseeing the success of Fermilab.

Though there are many challenges ahead, there is also plenty of discovery science happening now and planned for the future at the lab. We therefore remain optimistic for the lab's potential with the right vision, experienced management team, and responsiveness to the scientific community. However, the first order of business of this document is *identifying the lab's problems, as well as their root causes, to propose recommendations on how to do better in those areas*. The areas where instead the lab does well already can be seen in Appendix B, which summarizes in some detail the PEMP results from FY 2019 to FY 2023.

In the next section we present observations about problems and applicable solutions.

## II. Observations

"This was a tough year", said Lia Merminga, Fermilab Director, addressing Fermilab employees and users at an All-Hands Meeting on December 18, 2023, thereby acknowledging what most people in her audience already knew. At the same meeting, a member of lab management presented some results of a recent climate survey that confirmed anecdotal reports of widespread low morale at Fermilab. Morale problems are to be expected when troublesome issues proliferate. This document attempts to report the underlying root causes, identifies lessons learned, and recommends methods for improvement.

Tracing the root cause and its time of origin of particular problems over the past dozen years is not always possible. However, implementation of solutions is urgent because the present cluster of unsolved problems has become a crisis. Low morale is motivating highly qualified employees to retire from the lab, or to seek employment elsewhere. The consequence is a loss of skills and experience critical to the future success of the lab. Similarly, many scientific users may opt to transfer their expertise to activities at other facilities. If these trends persist, Fermilab will not be able to achieve the bright future that P5 has envisioned for it.

We also feel that the University Research Associates (URA) and the University of Chicago (UC) as M&O might not always be in the best interest of the lab, since members of their Physics departments are involved in the research carried out at the laboratory. As the University of Chicago<fnref n="1" /> (UC) is a major scientific research

<footnote n="1">¹ First filed on January 9, 2022 in Illinois federal court, a lawsuit against the UC alleges that the University was a part of a "price-fixing cartel" that used a shared methodology for calculating financial</footnote>
institution in its own right, conflicts of interest can result from the fact that Fermilab's M&O manager is also its potential competitor. This is exacerbated by the UC being also the M&O contractor of ANL, where several Fermilab's competing groups collaborate directly with the UC. Section L.12 ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST (OCI) of the RFP specifies that "A contract shall not be awarded to any Offeror having an unresolved OCI" (Appendix C, pg. 76). We note here that our group worked on this document off site, on personal time and with our own personal devices, as we were prohibited from discussing FRA's performance based on alleged conflict of interest. Additionally, it is our opinion that voting power in any board where members have a potential OCI due to the research activity carried on at their institution should be carefully evaluated.

## II.A Selection of the Leadership

Hiring Fermilab's director is a responsibility of the M&O contractor. In December 2021, during FRA's hiring process for the lab director, one of us talked to FRA liaison Juan De Pablo and asked him questions about the training that the search committee members would receive; whether they had measurable criteria to assess the ability of the candidates; and whether they had a set of best practices, questions, role playing procedures and processes to reduce errors.

(https://collection.cloudinary.com/apsphysics/62487d369d42a47b79d67d14f9097f7f? Scroll down to "gazette-2022-Spring.") His answer was that "the search is proceeding well, with a good array of outstanding individuals having expressed interest in the position." None of our questions, which were clearly relevant to the search, were answered.

Within months from his starting date in Fall of 2013, the new Lab Director had removed former high-level managers, such as the Associate Director for Accelerators and the LBNE Director, who both left the lab. The position of Associate Director for Accelerator was eliminated from the org chart, and a former Navy Admiral, with no experience in HEP projects, was hired as LBNE Director. A few years later, the beam physics expert and academic in charge of the Accelerator Division was replaced with a particle physicist. By the end of his tenure, the Lab Director had promoted people he openly favored<fnref n="2" /> to positions of Senior Scientists as early as 5 years from hiring, and assigned them to positions of highest responsibilities. Such micro-management (i.e. do not trust and fully use the organization chart to delegate responsibilities according to professional qualifications) and lack of process extended for instance also to a tight control of who should be recipient of Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) grants.

<footnote n="2">² See all-hands presentations by N. Lockyer over the years.</footnote>
It is our opinion that in the last decade, the cronyism associated to micro-management has produced a large number of unqualified and therefore ineffective managers, *rather than better qualified ones, who sometimes never gets the chance to apply. And when they do, they get accurately excluded*. Incompetent and ineffective leaders are not able to focus on what is best for the organization. In those cases where incompetence is compounded by a personal agenda, a dire consequence is the increase of inaccurate information – both upward and downward. The new directorship has not always replaced ineffective managers inherited from the former administration, and all of the above has contributed to management ineffectiveness, lack of transparent communication, expanded disinformation, and a culture of cover up of violations, as we will amply show in this document.

Perhaps also because of the lack of expert consulting, one of the very first actions that Director Merminga took in July 2022 after becoming lab Director in April 2022, was to cancel the planned sixth μ+ run for the Muon g-2 Experiment as well as a 4-month μ- run that had been proposed to look for rare physics. She eventually reversed her decision on the positive muon run after the spokespersons of the experiment forcefully complained. Run 6 ended on July 9, 2023, with all runs producing 21.9 times the BNL original statistics, and provided the highest rating by the Office of Science for Goal 4 of the 2023 PEMP (Appendix B, pg. 64).

When discussing her intentions with mid-level DOE managers, the Lab Director found little resistance. However, when Muon g-2 experimenters informed Dr. Harriet Kung, Deputy Director for Science Programs at the Office of Science, her reaction was different and triggered a reversal of the initial lab decision. Such occurrences, including the communication issues with the FSO, indicate that *the level of understanding and investment in Fermilab's mission can be very different between top and mid-level DOE managers*.

The climate at the lab, as assessed in the latest third-party survey, has worsened further since the National Business Research Institute evaluated it at the 61% percentile in a 2019 survey. Whereas the official claim was that this was on par with the industry, Fermilab must aspire to be better than that. The outcome of the latest climate survey points to poor communication between management and employees and a decline of trust in management. This finding is not surprising, since secrecy and communication of misinformation are demoralizing for those who aspire to scientific and human integrity. Former internal committees and/or task forces of mature and prominent scientists used to have a say on how operations were conducted at the lab. Because of the presently large percentage of early career members without sufficient experience, knowledge and insight in these committees, they have become powerless in advocating and enacting positive change.

Such management ineffectiveness has progressively impacted many areas of the lab, including the following self-inflicted problems: a) For the present directorship, vacancies in important leadership positions, both scientific and administrative: the
lab has lost within a few months its Senior Director of Communications, its COO, its CFO, its Comptroller; and the LBNF/DUNE Project Director; the positions of Senior Director of HR and PIP-II Project Director have been vacant from the start and they were only recently filled; b) Serious budget overruns and delays in LBNL/DUNE (Section II.B), which required a revision of the CD1 cost point estimate and range; c) PIP-II contingency overruns within one year from CD3 approval; d) Lack of knowledgeable and effective administrators in business/ finance (Section II.E); e) Many administrative obstacles both in safety and general business that slow down and sometimes stop scientific productivity of the experiments; f) Lack of vision/focus in technological areas, resulting in little to no oversight; g) Lack of focus on ensuring the quality of life of employees.

To succeed an organization requires leaders who lead, inspire and teach by example. We note here that Contract Clause I.9 – FAR 52.203-13 CONTRACTOR CODE OF BUSINESS ETHICS AND CONDUCT is consistent with this basic concept when requiring in I.9.(c), a “Business ethics awareness and compliance program and internal control system” (pg. 13). The Internal control system section I.9.(c)(2) includes timely discovery of improper conduct, prompt corrective measures, adequate resources to endure effectiveness of the internal control system, effort not to use as managers individuals whom due diligence would have exposed as having engaged in conduct that is in conflict with the code of business ethics and conduct, periodic evaluations of the internal control system, periodic assessment of the risk of criminal conduct (i.e. such as sexual assault or bringing a lethal weapon on site as described later on), positive enforcement of reports, disciplinary action for either improper conduct or its enabling, and finally, timely disclosure to the OIG.

In our opinion, Fermilab needs a leadership team consisting of people with long term proven scientific expertise, with the highest integrity as an inspiration to others, who own their mistakes, value productivity and excellence over the appearance of it, and put facts and fair play above politics and convenience. Unfortunately, the current administration has not focused on this foundation. This deficiency includes:

1. Not replacing ineffective managers inherited from the former administration pipeline with more effective ones;

2. Sometimes even promoting these ineffective managers to increased levels of responsibility;

3. Hiring inexperienced people as managers, or people with a poor track of accomplishments;

4. Overpaying for the so-called "executive positions" and therefore attracting money hungry people and ladder climbers for high responsibility roles;

5. Not reverting executive salaries of former managers to scientific salaries when managers are done with their executive service.

For instance, the present role of the lab's multiple Associate Lab Directors (ALDs) seems to be that of secretaries to the Director and CRO. On the contrary, ALDs should be mature and distinguished leaders in their field, capable of developing and accomplishing a scientific vision in the areas of their directorates. ALDs are visible
positions, and Fermilab employees often get questioned at conferences and other
events outside of the lab about the credentials of our early career ALDs. To identify
effective leaders, searches should ideally follow best practices as developed by
Industrial-Organizational Psychology (I/O Psychology).

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1744-6570.1976.tb00404.x

Some are described in Section II.A.1 below.

II.A.1 – Best Practices

Best practices aim to match desired behavior to the values of an organization through measurable processes. To reduce hiring errors, the first step of the quantitative process is called “job analysis” that identifies the characteristics needed in the candidate for a successful performance. A rubric, based on the identified specifications should be agreed upon before examining applications, wherein characteristics are prioritized and a normalized scoring procedure is created. Only steps that add measurable value to the process should be used, sometimes iteratively. The process should be as transparent (and defensible in case of litigation) as possible with respect to the selection committee and the stakeholders. When stakeholders are invited to provide feedback, the search committee obtains valuable information that reduces the risk that unexpected and potentially embarrassing information arrives after a new leader is announced. Behavioral research shows that interviewing candidates using a structured and consistent process across applicants, including personality evaluations, integrity and reliability tests, work simulations (both situational and behavioral), is two to three times more reliable than non-structured processes.

As for performance evaluations, a majority of employees are disappointed and disillusioned about the existing Employee's Performance Review process, that is primarily used for managing raises rather than for employees' development.

RECOMMENDATIONS

* All Division leaders and their deputies, once they are given formal authority and responsibility, as well as much larger executive salaries, should be made accountable for their Division's budget vs. productivity with clear, measurable criteria that define scientific, technical and administrative accomplishments. The Division budget and spending plans should be presented regularly to the Division staff to ensure transparency and cost-effective use of the money.

* As part of their duties and responsibilities it should be required and mandatory for Division leaders and their deputies to establish non-subservient relationships with DOE mid-level managers. We note here that as part of the Goal 3 (i.e. Science and Technology Project/Program Management) evaluation by the HEP Office, the 2021 PEMP criticized the “codependent attitude” (Appendix B, pg. 45) of some project managers in their communication with DOE.
* To offset any negative bias that might exist toward Fermilab's HEP teams, Fermilab line managers should undertake as a crucial duty an effective marketing/ advertising of their team's talents and capabilities based on actual and impactful results. Prompt disciplinary action should ensue if the opposite is done.

* Clear, measurable, and explicit criteria must be defined to evaluate individuals' accomplishments and justify promotions in any category. This principle is especially urgent for promotions in the Scientific category, that are known to have been subject to pressure from top management, with cases of "Favorites" being promoted to Senior Scientists within 5-8 years from PhD compared to 15 to 20 years average at other SC laboratories. An improved Employee's Performance process should be employed and we propose a 360 review process in Appendix A.

* Membership of influential committees such as promotion committees, scientific advisory committees, LDRD committees, etc. should be selected among the most knowledgeable and accomplished scientists and engineers both inside and outside the lab, if needed. Members should be free to offer constructive criticism without fear of retaliation by superiors, to evaluate scientific proposals without pressure, and without bias due to possible conflict of interest with their own research and professional agenda.

## II.B The Flagship Projects

The 2014 P5 panel, on which both current Fermilab Director and her Deputy Lab Director served, had recommended the following major initiatives for Fermilab: the Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE), the Mu2e Experiment, the PIP-II linear accelerator, and Fermilab participation in the LHC at CERN.

DUNE, at the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) in Lead, South Dakota, was originally envisioned by DOE as a $1B project. The world's highest-intensity neutrino beam is to be produced at Fermilab with the Long Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF) and sent 800 miles away to SURF. The term "baseline" refers to the distance between the neutrino source and a neutrino detector. The farthest and largest detector is at SURF and is composed of four modules of instrumented liquid argon with a fiducial volume of 10 kilotons each. In the 2016 Conceptual Design Report, the first two modules were expected to be complete in 2024, with the beam operational in 2026. The final modules were planned to be operational in 2027. By 2022, the cost for the excavation and outfitting of the caverns in the South Dakota mine, two far detector modules, the construction of the new neutrino beamline and near detector hall and Near Detector, had risen to about $3B. DOE then decided to phase the project, with two modules in Phase I, to be completed by 2028-2029, and the beamline by 2032; with the remaining two far detector modules for a Phase II, yet to be planned. (The current P5 Report revises some of these recommendations.)
The DOE $1B budget for DUNE was originally intended just for the far and near detectors, with NSF carrying the brunt of the cost of the LBNF infrastructure. This included the construction of an underground lab, called DUSEL at the time. Unfortunately, the NSF decided not to initiate construction of the DUSEL facility in 2011. When the 2014 P5 panel pushed nevertheless for DUNE, it was apparently done with the implicit assumption of financially engaging the international community. By 2020 or so, this approach was recognized to have only partially worked, securing some international contribution, but requiring a much larger investment on the part of the U.S. to build the actual facility, i.e. LBNL. An unrealistic budget cap forced the IPT (Integrated Project Team) to make a series of ill-founded decisions between 2015 (CD1-R) and 2022 (CD-1RR).

Only by 2022 the project was split into several sub-projects, recognizing the different levels of design maturity and progression of the various components of the project: conventional facilities, including underground access, one-of-a-kind particle detectors, and a new beamline.

On FRA side, the Project Team was not up to the standard required by the execution of a DOE Order 413 project, between at least 2015 and 2022, both for the overall project and its sub-areas. This was often reported in DOE Lehman's reviews, but went unaddressed for a long time. Rigorous adherence to Order 413 requirements was downplayed with consequent lack of transparency in the interactions with all the stakeholders.

The Proton Improvement Plan-II (PIP-II) aims to deliver 1.2 MW of proton beam power from the main Injector to the LBNF production target at 120 GeV. The plan will also support the current 8 GeV experiments including Mu2e, and other short-baseline neutrino experiments that require a Linac that injects into the Booster at 800 MeV instead of 400 MeV. PIP-II received CD3 approval in 2022 and, within a year, incurred in significant cost overruns that will most likely require to re-baseline the project. This coincidentally happened after its former project director became Fermilab director, and most of the former PIP-II management team disbanded.

The Mu2e experiment was to produce results in 2020, but is now delayed until 2026.

In our opinion, it is obvious that a lack of knowledgeable leadership; familiarity with how the field and the U.S. system work; a mature, realistic and unbiased view of the problems that the field faces, have brought Fermilab and FRA to act reactively to a series of self-inflicted problems.

## RECOMMENDATIONS
* Oversight between 2014 and 2021 on the part of all stakeholders should have been stronger and more forceful in identifying the inadequacy of the proposed budget and in selecting capable person-power to support such a large enterprise. This was partially improved only starting in 2021, and has to be further improved.

* To execute the newly released P5 plan and achieve measurably excellent results, the laboratory should seek to fill leadership positions with people with proven knowledge and genuine investment and stake in solving the laboratory issues in a manner that will ensure a robust HEP future.

## II.C DOE Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (PEMP)

Since fiscal year 2006, DOE uses a homogenous appraisal process for the performance of the 11 labs and institutions under its Office of Science (SC).

(https://www.energy.gov/science/office-science-lab-appraisal-process)

These evaluations provide the basis for determining annual performance fees and the possibility of winning additional years on the contract through a 3-year "Award Term" extension. They also serve to inform the decisions that DOE makes regarding whether to extend or to compete the management and operating contracts when they expire.

The Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (PEMP) is structured around eight Performance Goals, and emphasizes the importance of delivering the science and technology necessary to meet the missions of DOE; of operating the Laboratories in a safe, secure, responsible, and cost-effective way; and of recognizing the leadership, stewardship and value-added provided by contractor managing the Laboratory. The eight Performance Goals are:

1. Mission Accomplishment (Delivery of Science & Technology), (30%)

2. Design, Construction and Operation of Research Facilities, (45%)

3. Science and Technology Project/Program Management, (25%)

4. Leadership and Stewardship of the Laboratory.

5. Integrated Environment, Safety and Health Protection, [30%]

6. Business Systems, [30%]

7. Facilities Maintenance and Infrastructure, [25%]

8. Security and Emergency Management, [15%]

Each Performance Goal is comprised of a small number of Objectives. As can be seen in more detail in Appendix B, the Objectives usually do not change much from one year to the next. Within each Objective, the SC HEP and Site Office can further identify a small number of Notable Outcomes that illustrate or amplify important features of the laboratory's performance for the coming year. The Performance Goals, Objectives, and Notable Outcomes are documented at the beginning of each year in the lab PEMP. Goals 1 to 3 are evaluated by the HEP Office and are associated to what is called the "Initial S&T Score" when using as weights the percentages shown in round parenthesis in the goal list above. Goals 5 to 8 are graded by the FSO and are associated to what is called the "Initial M&O Score" when using as weights the
percentages shown in square parenthesis in the goal list above. Goal 4 is assessed at the SC level. The final S&T and M&O scores are calculated by weighing 75% of each initial scores with 25% of the score given to Goal 4. Evaluations are performed by considering the lab's performance against the Notable Outcomes, as well as other sources of performance information that becomes available to DOE throughout the year.

Appendix B summarizes in some detail the PEMP results from FY 2019 and FY 2021. To put it in the context of other DOE labs, anything lower than a B+ (or 3.1) is considered failure. The aim is to get as many A/A- (i.e. ≥ 3.5) as possible, and several other labs manage to do that. An example is LBNL that had all (i.e. 8) A/A- for 3 years straight, or ANL and BNL that had between 6 and 7 A/A- each over the last 3 years. Fermilab has received the lowest grades among the national laboratories since at least FY2018. For the FY 2023 PEMP, Fermilab was again at the bottom, this time very close to JLAB. In addition, FRA received a $1M fine, which brought the effective rating down from B+ to C+. In 2021, a rare C grade was assigned for Goal 3.0, i.e. Science and Technology Program Management project management, reflective of the delays and cost overruns (See Appendix B). In an article in the journal Science, James Decker, who was principal deputy director of DOE's Office of Science from 1973 to 2007, stated that the performance evaluation for 2021 was "one of the most scathing I have seen." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fermilab)

As can be appreciated from the detailed tables in Appendix B, the PEMP goals encompass most of the responsibilities required in the RFP for M&O bidders. Appendix C shows the table of content of the RFP. To achieve the S&T goals, it is critical that the M&O goals be achieved. The first one of the latter, i.e. Goal 5, relies on both workers health and safety and environmental protection under the CSO. This is covered in the Section II.D on safety below. Goal 6 requires productive Finance, Procurement, HR, and Quality control systems, under the COO. Business, Financial, and Accounting for Operational Support are covered in Section II.E. Both HR and General Counsel systems are covered in Section II.F.

## II.C.1 – The Accident

On May 25, 2023, a contractor fell 23 ft while attempting to secure reinforcing bars on a wall for the new PIP II project site.
(https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-fermilab-proton-construction-accident-investigation-20230914-yj5c6gnhfnejtaixtm4qsktla4-story.html).

The PIP-II Project had been led by current lab director Lia Merminga until April 2022. The contractor was air-lifted to the hospital after an accident considered the worst on site in decades.
(https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/aurora-beacon-news/ct-abn-fermilab-injury-st-0526-20230525-fhcqfqi4b5arzcknvy57y4iu2u-story.html)
The DOE- Accident Investigation Board concluded that the incident was preventable and "recommended a long list of managerial and safety controls needed to prevent a recurrence of such an accident."

(https://www.energy.gov/ehss/articles/accident-investigation-may-25-2023-ironworker-fall-injury-fermi-national-accelerator)

Some conclusions included:

1. Unclear and non-specific definition of work activities/responsibilities.

2. No methodology to communicate a clear flow down of requirements.

3. Oversight failures at multiple management levels.

4. Systemic lack of attention; etc.

As a result of the accident, the $1B PIP II project that is crucial for the success of the DUNE Experiment has been delayed. The DOE report on the May 2023 PIP-II accident is very much representative of the way that business is generally conducted at the lab.

## II.C.2 – The Shutting Down of the Beam

On Sept. 1, 2023, the Chief Research Officer announced that the Fermilab accelerator system was temporarily shut down for safety reasons. On Sept. 9, 2022, DOE had issued order DOE O 420.2D entitled "Safety of Accelerators". This document establishes the accelerator-specific safety requirements for DOE-funded accelerators and their operations. When pressed for answers by one of us, Douglas Glenzinski wrote in a December 2023 email that "the criteria for restarting the beam operations are captured in DOE O 420.2D

https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives-browse#b_start=0."

He also stated that "There are a series of readiness reviews planned. As each of those is successfully completed, we'll be able to restart a portion of the complex." The current earliest estimate for resuming the beam is March, 2024. However, no answer was provided to the question "Where can one find info on why the beam was stopped in the first place?".

In the following we expound on the results of our investigations. In the fall of 2021, two chapters of the Safety Assessment Document (SAD) were modified to include any changes to the neutrino muon beamline and the experimental enclosure to support a new experiment, E1039/SpinQuest. Review of the chapters were delayed for nearly a year as the chair of the SAD committee wished to review and comment before another review committee sent it to the Lab Director for approval. In the fall of 2022, the new chapters were approved by the Director and sent to the DOE Site Office. That document was rejected with 39 comments just before the Christmas holiday. In the meantime, DOE order 420.2D was approved requiring external reviews of the SAD and Accelerator Safety Envelope (ASE)<fnref n="3" />. Response to the Site Office comments were

<footnote n="3">³ The SAD is a general overarching document summarizing the safety systems and protocols implemented at a DOE laboratory. This document is approved by the director of the laboratory and</footnote>
submitted in April of 2023 and roughly half of the responses accepted. Whereas responses to the comments were discussed in meetings which were attended by members of the DOE Site Office, little/no useful input was available about how best to word the document.

In early 2023, a committee of over 50 people was formed to re-write the SAD and ASE. Such a large committee made it difficult to obtain consensus on how best to proceed based on the little guidance obtained on what was required in a new version of the document. The group was disbanded in the late Spring of 2023. Outside contractors were hired to assist in re-writing the SAD similarly to other national labs. An intense effort over several weeks ensued to prepare both documents for review in September of 2023. The hastily compiled documents were reviewed with comments from the external reviewers that indicated that whereas the requirements of DOE 420.2D were satisfied, there was still some work to be done. Further comments from the DOE Site Office pointed to additional concerns about the wording of the documents. At this time the Director decided to postpone accelerator startup until a new document could be written. We note that other labs were running while re-working the 420.2D requirements. Since then, a program to rewrite chapters of the SAD/ASE and turn on the main accelerator complex has been underway with the LINAC recently having their chapter approved and granted approval to run<fnref n="4" />.

## II.C.3 - Site Access Safety/ Security Problems

Fermilab was founded in 1967 as an open-access laboratory, and, to this day, does not host classified research. For 50 years, both scientists and the public could easily access the site for research, educational activities, arts programs, and recreation.

In the late 2010s and early 2020s, the management of Fermilab began to introduce severe restrictions on access to the Fermilab site by the public and by scientists. By spring 2023, the restrictions had become so onerous that more than 2500 physicists and visitors to the laboratory signed an “open petition to elected representatives to reopen Fermilab.” (https://www.reopenfermilab.com/) The petition stated that: “The access policy changes undermine critical aspects of the scientific process as well as the basic functioning of Fermilab. Hosting research meetings, interviewing prospective employees, collaborating with scientists outside the lab, and enacting our famously impactful education programs have all been hindered.” With respect to the general public, the petition stated: “Today, the general public is only permitted to access the main road, and with ID requirements that are becoming increasingly stringent, soon its doors will be closed to tourists and even to some immigrants. We can no longer drive or bike around the premises freely. The dog park, Wilson Hall with its exhibits on the top floor, and other areas are no longer generally accessible.

<footnote>sent to the DOE Site Office but does not require their approval. However, the ASE summarizes key components of the SAD and does require approval of the DOE Site Office.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ We note that the test accelerators FAST/IOTA have been allowed to continue running under their existing safety chapters.</footnote>
Fishing and other activities open to the public have been canceled." The petition emphatically requested that access policies be reverted to the open laboratory model that governed the laboratory prior to 2020.

In May 2023, the Lab Director posted a response to the petition on the Fermilab website, (https://news.fnal.gov/2023/05/from-director-lia-merminga-accessing-fermilabs-batavia-site/) noting that some areas on site remain open to the public during specific hours with ID access requirements. Merminga's response justifies the new restrictions because the lab "manage[s] a large amount of non-public information", which conflicts with the petition that points out that the lab is fully tax-payer funded, does no classified research, and has a government mandate to publish all of its scientific results. Further coverage of the petition and the management response appeared in the magazines Physics Today (https://pubs.aip.org/physicstoday/online/42386/) and Physics World (https://physicsworld.com/a/fermilab-faces-protest-over-visitor-restrictions/).

The FSO decided that service buildings' doors have to be locked at all times. In the Accelerator Directorate building managers have to check 200 doors, three times a week to make sure that they are locked. Access gates at the Linac, Tevatron A0, and Tevatron C0 roads were installed at the FSO request. Interim COO Marc Clay was heard stating that he worked at Los Alamos for 20 years and Fermilab is far worse as far as what is being required by its Site Office.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

* Negotiate with the DOE the opportunity for Fermilab to be assigned an ODSA, similarly to other DOE labs. Some DOE labs have an ODSA, which is the Officially Designated Security Authority for the site and is a position appointed by DOE, and specifically by Operations under the Office of Science. For instance, at LBL the ODSA developed the system they now have in place by which everyone badges onto the site and again to most buildings. It had to satisfy both the Site Office's requirements for control of everybody on site and maintaining secure areas at the Lab, like the Joint Genome Institute and NERSC. Conversely, at labs that do have an ODSA, the FSO is the site ODFSA (Federal added). As much as formally the ODFSA might have 51% of the authority with respect to the ODSA at 49%, a FNAL employee covering this latter role would presumably improve mutual communication.

* In reference to security, the lab needs an effective Research Compliance Office on the related issue of research security, which is also getting new oversight from Washington. This office would be in charge of research integrity, conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment, research security and export control. The office head has to have good connections and communication with the research ALDs and the other Directors to help them manage through the new research environment, with special attention on international aspects.
## II.D The Safety Matter

The physical and psychological safety of an organization's workforce is of paramount importance. Organizations lacking in one or both of these areas will have difficulty succeeding in their missions. In this section, we will analyze Fermilab's recent performance when it comes to physical safety, and attempt to determine possible solutions to the problems discussed.

The following definitions apply:

https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/OPEX%20Awareness%20- %20Understanding%20TRC%20and%20DART%20Rates%20- %20FINAL%2002.06.2024_0.pdf

* Total Recordable Cases (TRC) is the total number of work-related injuries or illnesses that result in death; days away from work; job transfer or restrictions; or other recordable cases as identified in columns G, H, I and J of the OSHA Form 300.

* Days Away, Restricted or Transferred (DART) is a subset of the TRC events and is the total number of work-related injuries or illnesses that result in the most serious outcome of the cases involving days away from work, or days of restricted work activity or job transfer, or both.

* Occurrences are events or conditions that adversely affect, or may adversely affect, DOE or contractor personnel, the public, property, the environment, or the DOE mission. Occurrences are to be reported into the Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) database.
  https://www.energy.gov/ehss/occurrence-reporting-and-processing-system

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>Fig. 1. ORPS events per year from 2012 to 2023.</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2.** Total TRC and DART counts, including employees, users and subcontractors, from FY20 to FY24 (ongoing).</figcaption></figure>

Reportable occurrences at the lab are plotted per year in Fig. 1 (https://cdv-fdashp.fnal.gov/Reports/mobilereport/Management%20Systems%20%20MS/ESH/Reports/ORPS%20NTS).

The total TRC and DART counts from FY20 to FY24 are shown in Fig. 2 (https://cdv-fdashp.fnal.gov/Reports/mobilereport/Management%20Systems%20%20MS/ESH/Reports/Injury%20Illness%20Charts).

As can be seen, safety incidents increased significantly over the last few years. More extensive and detailed information on safety problems can be found in Appendix B in the FY 2021 and FY 2023 PEMPs.

In an attempt to solicit feedback on its performance, Fermilab's Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) Division conducted a Customer Satisfaction Survey in 2022. About half of the respondents classified their overall satisfaction with support received from ES&H as “moderate” or worse. Similarly, about half also reported their confidence in the expertise provided by ES&H personnel as “moderate” or below. These results strongly suggest that Fermilab staff do not have an adequate level of confidence and trust in ES&H.

The origins of this lack of confidence can, in part, be traced to the centralization of ES&H in 2016, as alluded to in several comments from the survey and in discussions leading to the writing of this document. Prior to 2016, each Division at Fermilab had its own embedded Safety organization, encompassing both industrial and radiation safety. These Division-level Safety departments were separate from the ES&H Division (then the ES&H Section), and their personnel reported directly to the head of the Division that their department was embedded within. This direct-report
organizational structure empowered each Division Safety Officer (DSO), who had the
advantage of having the same priorities and goals as the Division Head. People within
the Division knew this and took the role of the DSO more seriously. An additional
advantage to this arrangement was that there was little to no confusion on whom to
speak with about a particular safety issue in one's Division. Long-standing
relationships were developed, which in turn led to increased trust.

In the time leading up to the reorganization, it was felt by ES&H Section management that some of the Division Safety organizations were not being adequately cooperative with the Section-level management. To address this concern, it was decided by Senior Management to centralize all of the Division Safety departments into the ES&H Section, including the physical relocation of personnel away from their former Divisions. While it is true that communication and cooperation between these Division-level Safety organizations, and between them and the ES&H Section, could have been improved, this could have been accomplished without a complete reorganization, which soon proved to be disruptive to operations and damaging to the lab's safety culture.

The reorganization resulted in confusion over responsibilities, leaving people unsure of whom to contact about a given issue. Exacerbating the situation, some people were moved around to other groups or departments in a seemingly haphazard fashion. As a result, at times even members of ES&H were unaware who was responsible for what. Like other ill-conceived management decisions, the reorganization led to some key personnel leaving the laboratory, retiring or finding work elsewhere. *Perceptions of cronyism and age discrimination within ES&H became abundant, with many wondering why management positions were handed to early-career employees with little or no experience and with fewer professional qualifications than others.* To date, little effort has been made by ES&H management to transfer institutional knowledge between new and existing staff and to foster a common ES&H vision.

The centralization of safety personnel was a large-scale example of a problem that frequently occurs within ES&H: *management repeatedly makes decisions without first discussing them with personnel who will be affected by those decisions*. A smaller-scale example of this phenomenon is the attempted movement of people into other job positions without first consulting them—this has happened numerous times and has resulted in the affected employees, who were not interested in the position, leaving the lab. In other cases, employees felt pressured into taking the offered position, leading to increased stress and decreased job satisfaction. Despite repeated feedback from staff, management has continued this pattern of decision-making without discussion.

*Another major issue pointed to by the 2022 Customer Satisfaction Survey (but well-known to ES&H staff prior to it) is the ongoing understaffing of the Division.* Again, this may be also true in other parts of the laboratory, but it has been particularly acute in certain areas of ES&H. For example, the Radiation Physics Operations (RPO) Department has been almost continuously understaffed since the 2016
reorganization—this department in particular was called out quite often in the survey results, likely because it interfaces with other Divisions more regularly than other parts of ES&H. In this case, Senior Management under the current Director responded to the issue and gave the go-ahead for RPO to hire a large number of additional staff members. However, other areas of ES&H remain understaffed, and promised new job positions have been put on hold.

Meanwhile, additional demands made by the Fermilab Site Office (FSO) have continued to increase the workload of an ES&H staff already spread too thin. For example, it is well understood that ionizing radiation exposures above natural background levels are unavoidable in certain areas at the lab. Historically, signs and fences have been used to keep unauthorized persons away, thus keeping doses As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). A key assumption in these controls is the maximum amount of time that members of the public are presumed to potentially be exposed to such sources. A common conservative assumption at the lab since its inception has been one hour per day per working week, or 250 hours per year. FSO has recently insisted on assuming continuous occupancy (24 hours per day for 365 days per year, or 8,760 hours per year) for members of the public; being the highest possible value, this directly conflicts with the “reasonable” part of the ALARA concept. As a consequence, Radiation Safety personnel had to divert significant time and attention away from their daily work to devise additional controls to limit these inflated potential dose rates to members of the public. Over the past few years, numerous ES&H staff hours have been diverted to meeting similar new requirements from FSO, a situation that cannot be described as ideal when it comes to oversight of actual safety.

While the significant expansion of RPO has helped alleviate the delays in getting work accomplished as well as the lack of communication described in the survey results, there is a concern that it may introduce new issues, and these concerns also apply to any department which gains a large number of new employees. All of the new hires, including all but one of the new managers, came from outside Fermilab, meaning only a small fraction of RPO staff have any knowledge about the department's operational history and practices. Outside hires who don't have experience with accelerators, may bring with them preconceived notions about how to address issues, which could lead to a reactionary management style and further friction between departments. This is even more of a risk if new managers and/or staff already knew each other prior to being hired into a particular department.

Another finding of the Customer Satisfaction Survey was that many at Fermilab no longer think that ES&H staff are knowledgeable or helpful. To quote a typical comment provided to the authors of this paper, "ES&H people have no idea of the bigger picture and fail to understand how to apply safety in the context of physics. They are just blindly applying what they have been taught is safe without knowing how things work in practice." Many survey comments suggest that ES&H is perceived as being overly focused on compliance, poor at communication, reactionary rather than proactive, and just there to hinder one's work. Similar to the other findings, this
is a situation that can lead an organization to failure. When one looks at the results of
the survey, it is not surprising that the lab has had accidents like the serious injury at
the PIP-II construction site, for which management failures were identified as a major
contributing factor.

Similarly, management shortcomings were also found to be partially responsible for
the Proton Source Test Stand unplanned dose event that took place in May 2022. The
lab's investigation of this incident found that several communications and oversight
failures within the Radiological Control Organization contributed to a worker
apparently receiving a significant unplanned dose as measured by their dosimetry
 badge. This event could have been avoided or mitigated had there been oversight by
more qualified and knowledgeable staff. Additional details of this event are included
in Appendix D.

Psychological safety is another area where Fermilab comes up short, despite
proclamations of its importance. Section II.F and Appendices E and H provide
sobering examples of the laboratory's disregard for the psychological well-being of
its staff. Similar stories seem to abound; many concerned employees have been
horrified to hear of the unwillingness of HR to do anything about the perpetrators of
terrible acts, whether physical, verbal, or otherwise. This issue is further addressed
in Section II.F, but it is important to note here that a psychologically toxic
environment is conducive to potential safety violations of all kinds. Certainly, when
one is in a state of heightened stress and fear at work due to the actions and behaviors
of a fellow employee, that person is not going to be able to pay as close attention to
their work as someone who feels psychologically safe on the job, a situation that can
and will lead to mistakes and possibly accidents and injuries.

RECOMMENDATIONS

* An obvious potential solution to the issues described above may be to once again decentralize portions of the ES&H Division. There is precedence for this, as early in the lab's history the Safety Section was centralized, and Senior Management at the time made the decision to decentralize it. However, concerns are valid that such a major move could further exacerbate certain issues rather than alleviate them, especially if the other management issues are not addressed in parallel.

Furthermore, in the past year or so, improvements have been noted in ES&H. The
Division Safety Officers have gotten more integrated into their assigned Divisions, and
although their teams are still smaller than they were prior to the centralization,
Division Safety Specialists continue to be added to assist the DSOs. The improvements
to RPO were already noted above. These positive changes must persist and be built
upon, bringing us to our next point:

* An alternate solution is to make ES&H a major area of accountability for ALL line managers. A central ES&H division can supply Division Safety Coordinators as
experts matrixed to line managers of relevant operations. Employees need to feel
that they have real authority to STOP WORK. Employees need to be able to stop
work without being subject to retaliation.

* Additional ES&H staff is desperately needed to reduce workloads. Job positions that have been put on hold should be reviewed and reopened. Particular focus needs to be on hiring for non-management positions, as the Division (and the lab as a whole) is perceived to be top-heavy, with too many managers and too few non-managerial workers.

* Workers should not be shuffled around from position to position as they were after the centralization. This has improved recently but must continue if trust in ES&H is to be rebuilt. Rebuilding trust will take time, and breaking relationships with personnel in other Divisions by moving staff to different positions will only serve to reset that clock.

* Until ES&H understaffing is not solved, Senior Management has to have the capabilities to negotiate priorities for the demands made by the Fermilab Site Office (FSO).

* Since the centralization, various ES&H departments have been relocated to isolated "islands" at the Training Center, Feynman Computing Center, the Linac Loft, etc. This has had the effect of reducing interaction between staff members. Serious consideration should be given to co-location or devising methods to increase interdepartmental interaction, cooperation, knowledge transfer, etc.

* Train scientists to impress on them that safety is real and necessary for their work to succeed. For example, a 'Safety for Managers' course aimed specifically at scientists, engineers, and project managers could be developed to help them inspect field work in which they are engaged for well-known error precursors and to identify and abate problems before they occur.

## II.E Business, Financial, Accounting – Operational Support

The business/financial side of the laboratory is beset with a large chaotic mix of problems involving personnel issues, severe lack of depth in subject matter expertise in many mission critical functions, accounting system software deficiencies, government accounting complexities, frequent invasive audits, etc.

Personnel problems start at the top, where the COO, CFO, and Comptroller departed in early 2024 with no qualified replacements promptly available to replace them. The stress is so intense that personnel retention is a challenge from top to bottom; stressful situations result from the many issues on the operations side of the lab.

Government accounting rules and regulations are unique and quite complicated, so that accountants need specialized skills and experience to function effectively out of
the gate. That in turn means that departing long-time employees/subject matter experts are hard to replace, and the temptation is to replace them with people who are not fully qualified – either by education and/or by experience. Additionally, the government pay scale and recent events/changes negatively impacting the lab's overall reputation have also contributed to the inability to compete with the current job market. The lab has reacted recently by recruiting candidates from other national labs to fill senior leadership positions. Though that is a partial solution, the newcomers still take time to familiarize themselves with the Fermilab culture, DOE Site Office, policies and procedures. The compensation packages offered of late have created extreme inequity among existing/long time employees, resulting in further decline in morale and desire to stay. In addition, despite the lucrative compensation packages offered, the lack of transparency, communication, and growing toxic environment have resulted in considerable loss to the lab and FRA upon their choice to leave soon after being brought on board.

Investments to maintain accounting software systems up-to-date have been inadequate for a long time, resulting in inefficient workflow and the ensuing need for extensive and time-consuming manual intervention. Investment in automation solutions is desperately needed to improve productivity, efficiency, accuracy, and ensure overall compliance with all federally imposed regulations (e.g. DOE, OIG, DCAA, DEAR, FAR, FTR, etc.). These infrastructure problems were exacerbated when the lab was appointed host of the international LBNF/DUNE project. Although the scientific side of the lab was prepared for such a complex endeavor and role, there was inadequate consideration and assessment made of the state of the operational support side of the lab to accommodate and support the increased and complex needs of such a dramatic change in mission focus.

As already expounded on, a main problem for FNAL is budget insolvency, with the lab being very much in the red even just because of existing salaries. A major financial burden for salaries is the indirect cost, or overhead, i.e. the actual cost of an employee to the lab is approximately 3 times their salary due to this indirect cost. The overhead is correlated to the ratio of the cost of administrative employees to that of non-administrative ones. It clearly follows that the number of bureaucrats and administrators on the lab payroll has to be optimized and closely controlled. Implementation of automated processes and solutions in Operations is necessary also to reduce the number of redundant administrators. This is critical for the lab not to lose itself in heavy bureaucracy and forget its Physics vision! In the meantime, this year the lab is forcing nearly everybody to take a 2-week mandatory vacation in a specific period before the end of the fiscal year.

In addition to administrators, the overhead includes the cost of scientists in management positions over the whole lab. Very often these employees are ballast and are not managing anything. Another example of waste is establishing so many ALD positions and other directorates, which has introduced a supplementary layer in the org chart. This has resulted in a much larger number of employees in so-called "Executive positions" with "executive", i.e. much higher, salaries. For instance,
whereas before we had a dozen of Division Heads and Deputies (the threshold for an executive salary is Deputy Division Head), now we have about 5 times this number.

Another dire example of managerial cost ineffectiveness is for the Chief of Equity, Diversity & Inclusion to currently have 178 direct reports! In the Summer season this number includes several interns, students and teachers. However, dozens are staff. One of their tasks is to closely monitor the meetings of so-called resource groups, which splits people into the African-American/Black Association, the Fermilab Asian Pacific Association, the Hispanic/Latino Forum, the Spectrum (LGBTQ+) Community, the Veterans Group, the Women's Initiative, the Fermilab Young Professionals, the Fermi Accessibility Communities, the Inclusivity Journal Club, the Fermilab Society of Women Engineers, the Fermilab Society of Hispanic Prof. Engineers. Each group has meetings where the scope is very specific and narrowly defined. When attending these meetings, bringing up themes of ampler interest is often discouraged. Clearly, *with this divide and conquer approach, the lab reduces the risk of people effectively communicating with each other, and therefore educating each other on what is going on at a larger scale.* For instance, even the chairs of the Fermilab Society of Women Engineers did not know anything about the legal troubles of the lab associated with their own female engineer constituent! On par with the above, several of the sponsors for these groups are known, from testimonials, to have been key players in cover-ups. See more in Section II.F and Appendices E and H.

The DOE subjects the lab to frequent financial audits. As a result of the recent OIG decision to transition from a cooperative audit strategy to an independent audit strategy, the Department of Defense Contracting Audit Agency (DCAA), whose auditors are experienced at assessing the allowability, allocability and reasonableness of costs associated with the manufacture of ships and weapons, but not necessarily high energy particle beam targets, has assumed responsibility of conducting the lab's annual cost allowability audits. The resulting need to educate another federal agency to the ways and means of DOE has been extremely time consuming and has negatively impacted the overall productivity and efficiency of an already overstretched staff. Additionally, the need to respond to audits of prior years has also resulted in time-consuming examinations of past history. (As in "We think we may have found a small problem in 2018; please examine your records to find out whether a similar problem occurred in 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, or 2023.") Time wasted on such efforts would be much better spent on forward-looking activities.

DOE imposed site access restrictions and changes to the lab's long standing onsite housing policy for users, affiliates and guests have caused considerable hardship for this group and another bureaucratic morass for employees. It has also resulted in users, affiliates and guests seeking out participation at other sister labs as opposed to Fermilab thereby further impacting the lab's overall national and international reputation.

There are deficiencies also in basic hiring processes. An example is the following. A few months after the start of her tenure in 2022, the present Director's team had
completed the search for a PIP-II Project Director, which is the position that Lia Merminga had left vacant when she became Fermilab's Director. A candidate had been selected for the job. However, two months later, their hiring had not been finalized (we do not know what was the bottleneck.) When the lab was finally ready to finalize it, the candidate rejected the position.

Another example of basic deficiency is the signature by the Director or a designated official of standard commitment letters for grant applications. This used to be a non-automated process, with the applicant sending a request to an appropriate office, including a letter draft containing required information. The letter would come back edited as required and signed in less than a month. A recent attempt at using a new portal for the same purpose had us wait nearly 3 months because of micromanagement. This does not help the lab's participation as a partner of European projects and all its associated benefits.

## II.E.1 – Procurement

Procurement is part of PEMP Objective 6.2, i.e. Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Acquisition Management System and Property Management System. As can be appreciated in Appendix B, this is an area that has consistently underperformed since at least FY 2019. Cost-effective and timely procurement of quality packages is key to abide by deadlines and milestones of Projects and Programs. Procurement deficiencies therefore hinder the lab's ability to deliver and enable its Science Mission.

Procurement encompasses goods, works and services. According to Fermilab's FSO Roger Snyder, all National Labs are operated under the same basic set of terms and regulations for Procurement (in the contract, in regulations, in Orders, etc.), but each lab defines its own system/procedures. There are substantive differences in implementing processes – for example, most labs have pre-negotiated subcontracts in place allowing for quick task orders for facility repairs – FNAL does not yet; most labs do not have as much university subcontracting as FNAL so that is a greater focus/challenge. Pre-negotiated contracts for facility repairs are sorely needed at the lab, as well-known.

Most labs have greater internal authority without DOE review – but that level is set based on system maturity, etc. For instance, ANL has also had procurement issues resulting in unallowable costs but is substantially more mature than FRA's. Still according to Fermilab's FSO, FRA's procurement system has not been approved without contingencies or conditions for years – issue haves been cited in IG reviews, HQ assessments, field assessments, legal proceedings, etc.

The lab incurs in losses for its mission due to vendors that are reluctant to keep doing business with Fermilab because of lack of responsiveness for offers; delayed awards; delayed payments; and more, such as the following:
1. Lack of effective communication between both the Procurement and Accounts Payable sides with the scientists/engineers invested in the process. Personal relationships and warm communication are key to getting productive business done and should not be sacrificed in the name of automation either.

2. High turn-over rate in Procurement. This could include non-clear/unreasonable procedures, responsibility and ownership non-aligned with management levels, lack of customer service, etc.

3. Some unique high-tech companies, such as Avnet, that produce highly engineered and customized products, have been banned from the lab's list of allowed vendors. The alleged reason invoked by the bureaucrats is that Avnet does not follow the buying terms and regulations established in the DOE contract. Avnet has had a productive 30+ years relationship with the lab. For instance, the electronic QICK system for QIS, that has become a world standard, is based on specialized hardware developed by Avnet. No other company offers the same cost effectiveness and quality. Avnet is 100% American, has a $5B net worth, with multiple offices in 25 states, Canada and South America, produces its own R&D and sells to Universities, the DoD and NASA. Because the same company can sell their products to other DOE labs too, such as Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), clearly there must be a way to use this company for Fermilab too.

4. Some companies that had productive business with Fermilab for decades do not bid anymore when jobs are offered because sometimes Accounts Payable "does not pay their bills".

5. Some Divisions use web requisition systems for approvals, but then the information has to be entered into a different Fermi REQ system by hand. Such approach is time consuming and prone to errors.

Consistently with the above, the 2021 PEMP criticized the acquisition strategy/planning, the engagement, market research, the selection of subcontract type, the evaluation criteria, subcontract options, and subcontract administration, as well as the quality and substance of procurement packages (more details are in Appendix B). The 2021 PEMP also states that "the laboratory has had difficulties complying with their DOE approved procurement policies/procedures and DOE requirements". Despite a B grade, for Objective 6.2 the 2023 PEMP mentions a FY 2023 Procurement Evaluation and Reengineering Team (PERT) Report to which the lab was responsive. The hiring of 27 new Procurement employees, thanks to whom a backlog of requisitions was greatly reduced, was praised. However, with implementation of automated processes and solutions, the number of new hires could have been presumably reduced accordingly.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

* An out-of-the-box potential solution to some of these financial problems would be for the lab to request that the DOE send an experienced team of their own accountants to assume responsibility for reorganizing the operational support side of the lab, at least until the major issues are resolved. Alternately, the DOE
could select an M&O contractor who is experienced, knowledgeable, motivated and capable of investing in solutions to these current accounting challenges and deficiencies.

* One root cause for the Procurement issues is efficient handling of the complex regulations. A legal review by an outside party of the lab Procurement's boiler plate materials, policies, and procedures could be performed. The review panel should include experts from other labs, business systems consultants, contract writing experts, etc. The purpose of the review should be to establish cost-effective processes within the present DOE rules and regulations.

* Vendors do not just interact with the Procurement teams in the Procurement Office, but apparently also with the Office of General Counsel. This is the same Office that continues to show ineffectiveness in handling serious complaints (see Section II.F), which sometimes escalate in lawsuits. They are presently doing a similarly ineffective job when interpreting regulations, and negotiating terms and conditions with vendors. <u>The former General Counsel left the lab a year ago and there is still time to replace him with an effective leader.</u>

* It may be instructive to check out the Procurement protocols and models followed within the European Union, as described here
  https://acer.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/en/The_agency/Public_Procurement/OLAF_DOCS/Doc%2014%20Vademecum-public-procurement-Nov%202015-11_updated%20Feb%202016.pdf

* To reduce the rate of indirect cost, the number of bureaucrats and administrators on the lab payroll has to be optimized and closely controlled through implementation of automated processes and solutions in Operations. This is critical for the lab not to lose itself in heavy bureaucracy and lose track of its Physics vision!

* Also, <u>the number of management positions have to be reduced over the whole lab</u> to reduce the indirect cost. For instance, the costly extra layer of ALDs should be replaced with a maximum of two Associate Lab Directors, one combining "Accelerators and APS-TD" and the other encompassing "Particle Physics", "Computational Science/AI" and "Emerging Technologies".

## II.F A More Modern HR/ General Counsel System

As mentioned above, climate at the lab was assessed as extremely poor by the latest survey conducted by an independent organization. Effective leadership would recognize the problem quickly and move beyond legal compliance to address the culture of the lab. <u>The "culture" of any given group or organization is defined by the set of human values that the group selects as a foundation for their behavior.</u>
A progressive decrease of knowledge, experience and human quality of managers is associated in part to not using state-of-the-art hiring processes, as described in Section II.A. In addition, when ineffective management is compounded with old-school HR partisanship to the institution, this is conducive to harassment/abuse of power and retaliation, as well as complaints filed with the EEOC. Some of these result in lawsuits. As succinctly quoted in the testimonial from Appendix E, "FRA actions have left the impression on myself and others that they prioritize maintaining a positive "reputation" by trying to make problems go away at the expense of victims over cultivating a safe working environment for Fermilab employees and Users."

We expound in the following on how to reform the whole HR/ General Counsel system towards more modern processes that reduce lawsuit risk while improving the culture and climate of the organization.

## II.F.1 – The Culture of an Organization

An equitable and just community does not spontaneously occur without effort. (https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2209/2209.06755.pdf) In order to implement ethical procedures, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms by which discrimination occurs. The most prevalent form of discrimination is gender discrimination and retaliation. Since 2008, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has reported that retaliation is the most common discrimination finding in federal sector cases (https://www.eeoc.gov/retaliation-making-it-personal). The most powerful deterrent of discrimination is organizational climate—the degree to which those in the organization perceive that misconduct of any form is or is not tolerated.

Institutions can take concrete steps to reduce discrimination of any sort by making systemic changes that demonstrate how seriously they take this issue and that reflect that they are listening to those who speak up. This is in contrast with the policies and procedures that aim (and often ineffectively) to protect the liability of the institution but are not effective in preventing misconduct. Hierarchical power structures with strong dependencies on those at higher levels are more likely to foster and sustain sexual harassment, bullying, and other forms of discrimination. This is exacerbated in the aforementioned "rigid organizational structures," where power is concentrated in single individuals. "Organizations that foster a climate of aggression and bullying are more likely to have managers who abuse power and retaliate when claims are made. Other organizational factors that influence retaliation are: a lack of administrative policies discouraging retaliation; an authoritarian management culture; overly hierarchical organizations, where rank or organizational level is prized; high levels of task-related conflicts; reward systems and structures that promote competition; and the ability to isolate the accuser."

A textbook case study of all of the above is provided by the 2021 lawsuit described in (https://www.theguardian.com/education/2022/oct/12/former-ucl-academic-to-pay-damages-after-harassing-colleague-for-months), which was settled in favor of
the plaintiff by a high UK court. The U.S. female academic had reported an alleged sexual assault by a former UK collaborator to Fermilab HR, since the lab is the U.S. host lab of their joint international collaborations NOVA and DUNE. After no finding of fact was made against him by Fermilab, a long series of retaliatory events occurred, which produced significant distress on the victim that has affected all aspects of her personal and professional life, including leaving the field. The story told by the plaintiff herself is in Appendix E. Her case includes a majority of textbook factors that make retaliation thrive in organizations that have insufficient oversight, such as described above.

Another representative example of the flaws of the current system was exposed in the 2021 lab settlement with the EEOC on a claim that it had "denied promotion to a female engineer in retaliation for complaining about discrimination". The plaintiff had applied for an internal position that was given to a less qualified (even if female) individual. During the multi-year duration of this process, the former General Counsel et al. were not able to de-escalate the process through productive negotiation before the victim filed with the EEOC in 2016. They were unable to do so also after the EEOC successfully filed suit on her behalf. It is worth noting that the same employee who was discriminated against had also been one of the experts warning her division management of the risk of Beryllium windows blasting, due to poor engineering calculations and poor reviews. Through a convoluted process, a new policy was put in place for Beryllium windows' safety, and transferred to the newly promoted manager. When the failure of a Beryllium window indeed occurred shortly thereafter, the new policy was made to disappear. The person in charge was later further promoted, whereas the expert who tried to help the lab is still at the same engineering level.

When approached on these topics in February 2023, the former lab's COO Scott Tingey replied: "I can tell you that the laboratory takes concerns seriously and has worked diligently to improve and enhance its processes and to communicate those to the laboratory community." Merely verbally advocating for a cause or issue to gain attention, support, or profit rather than caring about making a difference in the cause is deleterious to any organization (https://mocostudent.org/2021/11/why-is-performative-activism-a-problem/; https://tulanehullabaloo.com/58978/intersections/opinion-performative-dei-initiatives-are-far-from-productive/).

On December 9, 2022, within an all-hands presentation, Deputy Director Bonnie Fleming presented slides (reported in Appendix F) on an allegedly new "Fermilab Concern Reporting System". On March 3, 2023 a critical analysis (reported in Appendix G) of that system was emailed to her. No answer was ever obtained.

Since then, we have gathered dozens of testimonials that attest to the contrary of most of those performative statements and promises. Some of these testimonials are in Appendix H. In Appendix I we relate recent events associated to a series of cover-ups
in the Infrastructure Services Division (ISD). These cover-ups encompass, among
others, guns on site and serious attempts at hurting female employees.

At the end of calendar year 2023, the lab established a new policy by which any employee, including scientists, can be given a disciplinary leave of absence without pay that most of the time ends in firing. That we know of, this policy was applied to half a dozen people in the first couple of months from its inception. Our first reaction when we learned of this new policy was that of hope, finally, for positive change. Unfortunately, it does not seem that this policy was created to discipline bad actors, as it was used to fire witnesses of cover-ups, as we will show in Appendix I.

RECOMMENDATIONS

* The culture of an organization can be changed. To be effective, the lab has to move beyond legal compliance, and improve transparency and accountability. When institutions do not have the means or neglect to enforce disciplinary sanctions as necessary, it is called “institutional betrayal,” because it causes additional harm to the victims [Carly Parnitzke Smith and Jennifer J. Freyd. “Dangerous safe havens: Institutional betrayal exacerbates sexual trauma. Journal of Traumatic Stress”, 26:119–124, 2013], as in the case of Appendix E. To effect positive change, policies have to be written in such a way that the process of dealing with violations/imposing sanctions is clearly defined and enforceable.

* An enforcement policy that includes equitable standards of fact-finding, clear-cut consequences, and adjudication that is unbiased and equal for all is necessary. The recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences (https://doi.org/10.17226/24994) and the EEOC include:

1. Creating diverse, inclusive, and respectful environments.

2. Addressing the most common form of sexual harassment: gender harassment.

3. Moving beyond legal compliance to address culture and climate.

4. Improving transparency and accountability.

5. Diffusing the hierarchical and dependent relationship between employees and managers.

6. Providing support for the victim.

7. Striving for strong and diverse leadership.

8. Making the entire community responsible for reducing and preventing harassment and discrimination.

* Because of the demonstrated conflict of interest by the lab HR/General Counsel system, we propose that complaints to HR about abuses by supervisors (as defined by the NLRD) not be handled by HR, but by an independent entity paid by the DOE Site Office and the cost of which would be deducted from the M&O management fee. This should be a law firm with labor lawyers, with FNAL lawyers to be EXCLUDED from any investigation. The Site Office is DOE's management tool. Money and issues concerning complaints against the lab legally have to pass
through the DOE Site Office to take the lab directorate out of the loop until DOE
has had independent, third-party fact-finding.

* Alternately, the DOE could select an M&O contractor who is experienced, knowledgeable, motivated and capable of investing in solutions to these current HR and legal challenges and deficiencies.

### III. Conclusions

Our main conclusion is that without a complete renewal of its human and professional values, the HEP community is destined to die out because hiding problems under the rug has brought our lab to a level of ineffectiveness bordering extinction. It is unlikely that an unethical entity become all of a sudden interested in principles. This kind of failings made us realize that no field of science is more important than human dignity and rights, i.e. NOTHING should be worth unethical and/or degrading behavior within a civilized community. *Only by exposing the truth Fermilab has a chance to heal and ideally reprise its former glory.* The latter is the main reason why we decided to come forward to the taxpayers, against the opposite view that exposing the truth would instead kill the lab. This is a call for action by those in charge now and in the future.
# Appendix A – A 360 Performance Review Process

The current yearly Performance Review process is based on the performance evaluation of each employee by his/her direct supervisor followed by the approval of the supervisor's supervisor. This approach cannot be objective for the following reasons:

1. With a matrix system, the direct supervisor may not be aware of a person's real role and contribution to the program/project if the former is not part of it. They are supposed to ask the program leader but they may not be interested to do it for various reasons;

2. The performance rating is usually averaged within each group and if the group is small and consists of various categories (scientists, engineers, techs, etc.), the rating is even less objective;

3. The performance rating depends significantly on the personal relationship between employee and direct supervisor, and between the two supervisors. It is the weakest point of the present system;

4. A useful case study is described in the following. Upper managers can downgrade, in retaliation, the rating of a yearly performance review against the will of one's direct supervisor. When one of us presented this inconsistency to the general counsel in 2019, "Those are our procedures" was the answer. There is currently no provision to prevent the same people who abuse an employee be in charge of their rating. One has to accept the downgrading of their rating, and then go through an alleged "grievance" process. Those of us who have used this process know that it is a charade, as all the managers responsible at each of the four review steps of the process side with each other.

The new system should include instead the following:

1. The evaluation should be done at 360 degree, i.e. not just by the supervisors but also by peers and subordinates. Each would answer a specific set of questions, such as ability to communicate, greatest contributions, best qualities, any blunders, weakest points, etc.

2. The evaluation of group leaders, department heads, etc., including division directors and their deputies, should include the opinion of their employees, using a separate set of questions or table.

3. The performance should be reviewed, evaluated and compared for the specific job category (Scientist, ENG, TECH, etc.) within each division.

4. For the scientific category, a special lab committee with the most experienced members should be considered for evaluation of the employee's performance report and supervisor's recommendation. Then, the result has to be approved by the division (directorate) head.

5. The final results of the performance review should be public.

6. All promotions should be based on the results of the performance reviews. The proposed promotion list with brief justifications should also be public and available before any promotion for comments from the community.
# Appendix B – The Lab’s Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (PEMP)

Areas with insufficient grades are highlighted in yellow below.

## Analysis of 2019 PEMP (B+ Grade)

<table><thead><tr><td>ITEM</td><td>DESCRIPTION</td><td>OWNER</td><td>RATING</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Goal 1.0</td><td>Provide for Efficient and Effective Mission Accomplishment (30%)</td><td>Director</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 1.1</td><td>Provide Science and Technology Results with Meaningful Impact on the Field</td><td>CRO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>HEP: By Feb. 2019, the lab should provide specific responses (including action plans as appropriate) to the lab-specific recommendations provided in the 2018 HEP comparative reviews of the General Accelerator R&D, Intensity Frontier, and Theoretical Research programs.</td><td>Lykken</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 1.2</td><td>Provide Quality Leadership in Science and Technology Results that Advances Community Goals and DOE Mission Goals</td><td>CRO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 2.0</td><td>Provide for Efficient and Effective Design, Fabrication, Construction and Operations of Research Facilities (45%)</td><td>Director</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 2.1</td><td>Provide Effective Facility Design(s) as Required to Support Laboratory Programs (i.e., activities leading up to CD-2)</td><td>CPO</td><td>A</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>HEP: Complete final design for LBNL Far-Site Conventional Facilities, including all drawings, models, and specifications.</td><td>Mossey</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>HEP: Submit a completed international contributions plan for PIP-II to HEP before the CD-2 review.</td><td>Merminga</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>HEP: By Dec. 2018, have a viable plan for the inclusion of the MIP Timing Detector (MTD) in the HL-LHC CMS project, within the funding constraints provided by the program, consistent with the larger international plan for the final design choice, and have the subproject fully staffed with people who have demonstrated both project management and technical expertise or drop the MTD from the project baseline.</td><td>Tschirhart</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 2.2</td><td>Provide for the Effective and Efficient Construction of Facilities and/or Fabrication of Components (execution phase, post CD-2 to CD-4).</td><td>CPO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>BES: Execute the assigned LCLS-II project scope in compliance with the technical performance</td><td>Tschirhart</td><td>Achieved</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td></td><td>specifications and within the established DOE performance goals for cost and schedule. Performance will be assessed based on the work planned and accomplished during FY 2019, not on the cumulative performance of the project.</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Objective 2.3</td><td>Provide Efficient and Effective Operation of Facilities</td><td>Director</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>HEP: By Jan. 2019, submit transition to operations plans, including externally vetted operations budgets, for Mu2e and SBN.</td><td>Frieman/Brice</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>HEP: By July 2019, complete the Accelerator and Detector Modernization Reviews and submit the completed reports to DOE.</td><td>Lindgren</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 2.4</td><td>Utilization of Facilities to provide impactful S&T Results and Benefits to External User Communities</td><td>CRO</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Goal 3.0</td><td>Provide for Efficient and Effective Science and Technology Program Management (25%)</td><td>Director</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 3.1</td><td>Provide Effective and Efficient Strategic Planning and Stewardship of Scientific Capabilities and Program Vision</td><td>Director</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>HEP: Working with OHEP, and taking into account Laboratory Optimization guidance, deliver and begin to implement a Cosmic Frontier Strategic Plan by March 2019 that builds on the laboratory's core capabilities in this area.</td><td>Frieman</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 3.2</td><td>Provide Effective and Efficient Science and Technology Project/Program/Facilities Management</td><td>Director</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>HEP: By June 2019, develop a documented process for determining and prioritizing long-term investments in infrastructure in Batavia and at SURF that provides OHEP with an appropriate long-term and all-inclusive view of coming investments needs. Identify a labwide point of contact to communicate lab priorities for investments to OHEP and SLI.</td><td>Meyer</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>HEP: By Nov. 2018, submit a fully integrated installation and commissioning plan, including a revised budget estimate, for the SBN program.</td><td>Brice</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 3.3</td><td>Provide Efficient and Effective Communications and Responsiveness to Headquarter's Needs</td><td>Office of Communication</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 4.0</td><td>Provide Sound and Competent Leadership and Stewardship of the Laboratory</td><td>Director</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.1</td><td>Leadership and Stewardship of the Laboratory</td><td>Director</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.2</td><td>Management and Operation of the Laboratory</td><td>COO</td><td>B+</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO/SC: FRA must rebuild the FNAL procurement team to support successful project execution, in particular for LBNF/DUNE and PIP-II.</td><td>Peoples</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO/SC: FRA must ensure successful project and procurement management for all projects, in particular LBNF/DUNE and PIP-II.</td><td>Tschirhart</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO/SC: Implement any updated DOE foreign visits and assignments (FV&A) policy requirements, when issued.</td><td>Meyer</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.3</td><td>Leadership of External Engagements and Partnerships</td><td>COO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.4</td><td>Contractor Value-added</td><td>COO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 5.0</td><td>Sustain Excellence and Enhance Effectiveness of Integrated Safety, Health, and Environmental Protection [30%]</td><td>CSO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 5.1</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Worker Health and Safety Program</td><td>CSO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO: Establish the process map and framework for the Work Planning and Control (WPC) tool and complete development of a functional replacement for the current, hazard-analysis process.</td><td>Michels</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO: Evaluate the implementation of the Human Performance Improvement (HPI) program by assessing how supervisors set expectations for their teams with respect to avoiding critical mistakes through work planning and controls. Include the level of supervisory engagement, recommendations for improvements, and an implementation plan.</td><td>Michels</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO: FRA will develop and implement an assurance plan that demonstrates its ability to assure corrective actions from the 2018 DOE Reviews at SURF, as well as reviews of other high hazard and critical activities and operations at the site, are completed and effective.</td><td>Weber</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 5.2</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Environmental Management System</td><td>CSO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 6.0</td><td>Deliver Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Business Systems and Resources that Enable the Successful Achievement of the Laboratory Mission(s) [30%]</td><td>COO</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.1</td><td>Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Financial Management System</td><td>CFO</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.2</td><td>Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Acquisition Management System and Property Management System</td><td>CSO</td><td>B-</td></tr><tr><td>6.2 Part 1</td><td>Acquisition Management System</td><td>CFO</td><td></td></tr></table>
<table><thead><tr><th>Notable Outcome</th><th>FSO: Respond to the recommendations identified in the FRA and DOE Procurement Surveys, and perform an effectiveness evaluation of corrective actions.</th><th>Peoples</th><th>Achieved</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>6.2 Part 2</td><td>Property Management System</td><td>Facilities Eng. Services</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.3</td><td>Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive HR Management System and Diversity Program</td><td>WDRS</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.4</td><td>Provide Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Contractor Assurance Systems, including internal Audit and Quality</td><td>WDRS</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>6.4 Part 1</td><td>Contractor Assurance Systems and Quality</td><td>COO</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>6.4 Part 2</td><td>Internal Audit</td><td>FRA Internal Audit</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.5</td><td>Demonstrate Effective Transfer of Knowledge and Technology and the Commercialization of Intellectual Assets</td><td>OPPT</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 7.0</td><td>Sustain Excellence in Operating, Maintaining, and Renewing the Facility and Infrastructure Portfolio to Meet Laboratory Needs [25%]</td><td>COO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 7.1</td><td>Manage Facilities and Infrastructure in an Efficient and Effective Manner that Optimizes Usage, Minimizes Life Cycle Costs and Ensures Site Capability to Meet Mission Needs</td><td>Facilities Eng. Services</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO: Modify current strategic budget and program interface processes to address emerging infrastructure and operational needs, including development and documentation of appropriate Earned Value Management and oversight procedures for General Plant Projects and Accelerator Improvement Projects.</td><td>Tschirhart</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO/SC-33: Develop a plan with sufficient detail including options and cost to address the over 80 buildings identified as excess.</td><td>Ortgiesen</td><td>???</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 7.2</td><td>Provide Planning for and Acquire the Facilities and Infrastructure Required to Support the Continuation and Growth of Laboratory Missions and Programs</td><td>Office of Campus Strategy & Readiness</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 8.0</td><td>Sustain and Enhance the Effectiveness of Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) and Emergency Management Systems [15%]</td><td>Director</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 8.1</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Emergency Management System</td><td>CSO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO: Identify necessary enhancements in the Emergency Operation Center that will improve the</td><td>Michels</td><td>Achieved</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td></td><td>room's ease of use, reliability and functionality, and implement solutions.</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Objective 8.2</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Cyber Security System for the Protection of Classified and Unclassified Information</td><td>CIO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 8.3</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Physical Security Program for the Protection of Special Nuclear Materials, Classified Matter, Classified Information, Sensitive Information, and Property</td><td>CSO</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>8.3 Part 1</td><td>Part 1: Physical Security Program for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material and Property</td><td>CSO</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO/SC-33: Develop an effective and actionable implementation plan addressing the new design basis threat requirements that is approved by DOE by March 31, 2019.</td><td>Meyer/ Michels</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>8.3 Part 2</td><td>Part 2: Classified Matter, Classified Information, and Sensitive Information</td><td>CIO</td><td></td></tr></table>

## Goal 6.0: Deliver Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Business Systems and Resources that Enable the Successful Achievement of the Laboratory Mission(s)

*This Goal evaluates the Contractor's overall success in deploying, implementing, and improving integrated business systems that efficiently and effectively support the mission(s) of the Laboratory.*

### Site Office

Score: 3.0 Grade: B

### Goal Evaluation:

[...] continued focus is essential to consistently deliver quality products which are aligned with all Federal acquisition requirements and address strategic needs.

[...]

Human resources actions to develop and promulgate the climate survey to support management efforts to better understand opportunities for staff needs and to develop Diversity and Inclusion activities to build this program are both laudable initiatives.

[...]

## Objective 6.1: Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Financial Management System

Weight: 20.0%

Score: 3.0 Grade: B

### Objective Evaluation:

Overall, FRA had mixed performance against aspects of this objective. The financial management controls were determined to be satisfactory, however, assessments conducted during the year indicated that some weaknesses still exist. Several deficiencies in FRA's financial systems were identified by the 2019 Financial Management Assessment conducted by an independent review team, which exposed several risks in the Financial Management System. The audit findings identified control weaknesses associated with accounting not consistently adhering to the published General Payables and Disbursements Policies and
Accounting procedures to ensure all payments have authorized support and documentation prior to payment. Corrective actions are underway to address the audit findings and efforts should include verification that that goods and services purchased and delivered match the actual contract requirements, invoices are approved in a timely manner as to not violate Prompt Payment Act, and that authorized approval of invoices occurs.

[...]

**Objective 6.2: Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Acquisition Management System and Property Management System**

**Weight:** 30.0%

**Score:** 2.5 **Grade:** B-

**Objective Evaluation:**

FRA has spent an inordinate amount of management capital to address deficiencies on the acquisition management system to drive improved performance. Improvement plans have been developed, implemented and tracked by all levels of management. FRA is progressing and is about halfway through completion of nearly 100 identified improvement items. Completion and verification of these items should result in improvements. The improvements to date have focused on the fundamental building blocks; personnel, training, processes, procedures, metrics and roles and responsibilities in the procurement organization. These foundational elements are beginning to reap benefits and will be important as a robust acquisition program is put in place. The progress is substantial, but there is a long way to go. The level of complexity of the procurement work and the continued legacy of existing actions that were initiated prior to corrective actions being put in place, continues to result in products that require significant Site Office involvement to meet product quality and project schedule requirements.

**Site Office**

**(Objective 6.2) Notable 1:** Respond to the recommendations identified in the FRA and DOE Procurement Surveys, and perform an effectiveness evaluation of corrective actions.

**Outcome:** This notable was addressed by a series of actions and corrective action reviews by the Chief Financial Officer. Monthly Status meetings with the Site Office provided reviews of all action categories and documentation of completion for corrective actions. Independent evaluation of the effectiveness of initial actions was conducted by a variety of actions and series of review teams. Actions to close out follow-on actions continue, but actions to date meet the recommendations in the initial Procurement.

**Objective 6.3: Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Human Resources Management System and Diversity Program**

**Weight:** 20.0%

**Score:** 3.4 **Grade:** B+

**Objective Evaluation:**

[...] One area that has the greatest need for improvement is representation of women in the area of Technical Research Staff.

[...]

FRA's current representation of women in the area of Technical Research Staff is abysmal. FRA needs to make a concerted effort to focus on this as part of its broader efforts.

**Goal 8.0: Sustain and Enhance the Effectiveness of Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) and Emergency Management Systems**
*This Goal evaluates the Contractor's overall success in safeguarding and securing Laboratory assets that supports the mission(s) of the Laboratory in an efficient and effective manner and provides an effective emergency management program.*

**Site Office**

Score: 3.2 Grade: B+

**Goal Evaluation:**

FNAL continues to struggle with a number of legacy weaknesses in security related compliance despite significant improvements in the organization, operation and improved responsiveness of the security section and plans to utilize technology and data analysis to make the most of limited S&S funding.

[...]

**Objective 8.1: Provide an Efficient and Effective Emergency Management System**

Weight: 30.0%

Score: 3.2 Grade: B+

**Objective Evaluation:**

The Emergency Management program strives for continuous improvement to ensure emergency prevention practices are in place and emergency response capabilities are adequate. [...]

The Emergency Management team conducted a number of drills to ensure adequate response preparedness. Those efforts included three tabletop EOC personnel training and drills and participation in DOE's quarterly accountability drills. FRA also utilizes real events, such as the recent Tornado warning to activate the EOC as a proactive response to a possible emergency situation. This approach not only allows for the evaluation of EOC capabilities and shortcomings, but also other emergency shelter areas. As a result of this activation, deficiencies were noted within several shelter areas. These deficiencies were documented in an after action report for resolution of those deficiencies.

[...]

Facility conditions in some legacy areas remain a concern for emergency planning and response. ES&H will continue to work with FESS to evaluate facility conditions and identify required improvements.

**Site Office**

**(Objective 8.1) Notable 1:** Identify necessary enhancements in the Emergency Operations Center that will improve the room's ease of use, reliability and functionality, and implement solutions.

**Outcome:** FRA finished an evaluation of enhancements necessary to ensure the Emergency Operations Center is able to provide leadership an environment that is reliable, functional and supports on-scene personnel, and completed numerous upgrades to improve conditions including equipment relocation communication system upgrades and modification of process documents and job aids. These efforts included benchmarking three other EOC sites to evaluate observe and understand best practices, lessons learned and the physical layout of other facilities. The actions taken were derived from a combination of the best practices from the other facilities and self-assessment of gaps and needs at the Fermilab EOC.

**Objective 8.2: Provide an Efficient and Effective Cyber Security System for the Protection of Classified and Unclassified Information**

Weight: 35.0%

Score: 3.4 Grade: B+

**Objective Evaluation:**
FRA has worked with DOE to develop needed cyber security infrastructure to allow for the
safe transmission and storage of critical scientific data.

[...]

The FRA management continues to be open to advancing the cyber security posture; ensuring employees, visitors and users are able to do their work while not impacting the security of the site. FRA is carefully approaching DOE mandated requirements to add specific cyber technologies to the portfolio. The FRA reputation would benefit from recognizing where risks of noncompliance outweigh other considerations. Legacy systems retirement plans should be developed.

**Objective 8.3: Provide an Efficient and Effective Physical Security Program for the Protection of Special Nuclear Materials, Classified Matter, Classified Information, Sensitive Information, and Property**

**Weight:** 35.0%

**Score:** 3.0 **Grade:** B

**Objective Evaluation:**

FRA continued to take a more proactive, disciplined and reasonable approach to improving security operations in FY19. Continuing modifications to organization and personnel within security operations, FRA continues to improve communications with DOE on security matters. FRA has made incremental improvements; especially through the use of enhanced visual coverage of remote sites and areas of high personnel concentrations and traffic. However, incremental improvement was not enough to make up for significant challenges identified by the DOE S&S Survey. Several issues with DOE Order compliance were identified that will require advancing the improvement process. Additional expansion of the ShotSpotter system is underway enabling security operations to assess and observe areas identified by the ShotSpotter system. Security management continues to optimize and better integrate numerous security, monitoring, and alarm systems to improve efficiency in the communications center.

FRA has continued to demonstrate ineffective oversight of the security subcontract, which has also resulted in the lack of fulfillment of all security requirements. FRA has initiated actions to re-compete the subcontract.

[...]

**Site Office**

**(Objective 8.3) Notable 1:** Develop an effective and actionable implementation plan addressing the new design basis threat requirements and submit to DOE by March 31, 2019.

**Outcome:** The Fermi Site Office reviewed the submittal of the Design Basis Threat Implementation Plan and determined it met the intent of the Department's requirements specifically the Plan directly or indirectly; provides a current listing of Departmental assets based on Protection Level (PL) 1 through PL-7 assets, Provides the current status of protective measures; Identifies and addresses potential changes in site missions; Identifies tasks necessary to achieve full implementation; and Establishes realistic and measurable milestones. The strategy defined in the Plan builds on multiple assessments and a comprehensive Hazard Analysis to identify and mitigate risk and ensure continual program improvement. This approach addresses the unique challenges presented by the open nature of the site, the sheer size and location of the laboratory, and the highly cooperative and supportive of the local community, through innovative and technology-based solutions.
Analysis of 2021 PEMP (B Grade)

<table><thead><tr><td>ITEM</td><td>DESCRIPTION</td><td>OWNER</td><td>RATING</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Goal 1.0</td><td>Provide for Efficient and Effective Mission Accomplishment (30%)</td><td>Director</td><td>A</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 1.1</td><td>Provide Science and Technology Results with Meaningful Impact on the Field</td><td>CRO</td><td>A</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>HEP: Contribute to establishing the synergistic research program and deliver impactful science from the Fermilab-led QIS Center, as measured by the FY 2021 annual report, research publications and highlights, and participation in periodic conference calls.</td><td>Lykken</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 1.2</td><td>Provide Quality Leadership in Science and Technology Results that Advances Community Goals and DOE Mission Goals</td><td>CRO</td><td>A</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 2.0</td><td>Provide for Efficient and Effective Design, Fabrication, Construction and Operations of Research Facilities (45%)</td><td>Director</td><td>B-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 2.1</td><td>Provide Effective Facility Design(s) as Required to Support Laboratory Programs (i.e., activities leading up to CD-2)</td><td>CPO</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>HEP: Complete the Option 1A scope of work and start the LBNF Excavation work by July 31, 2021.</td><td>Mossey</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>HEP: Pass an Independent Project Review for the LBNF/DUNE Project in the second half of FY 2021 with all charge questions satisfactorily answered and a clear set of recommendations to address for CD-2 readiness.</td><td>Mossey</td><td>Not Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>BES: Effectively manage and execute the assigned LCLS-II project scope in accordance with DOE Order 413.3B, in compliance with the technical performance specifications, and within the established DOE performance goals for cost and schedule. Performance will be assessed based on the work planned and accomplished during FY 2021, not on the cumulative performance of the project.</td><td>?</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 2.2</td><td>Provide for the Effective and Efficient Construction of Facilities and/or Fabrication of Components (execution phase, post CD-2 to CD-4).</td><td>CPO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>BES: Effectively manage and execute the assigned LCLS-II project scope in accordance with DOE Order 413.3B, in compliance with the technical performance specifications, and within the established DOE performance goals for cost and schedule. Performance will be assessed based on the work planned and accomplished during FY 2021, not on the cumulative performance of the project.</td><td>?</td><td>Achieved</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><tr><td></td><td>2021, not on the cumulative performance of the project.</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Objective 2.3</td><td>Provide Efficient and Effective Operation of Facilities</td><td>Director</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 2.4</td><td>Utilization of Facilities to provide impactful S&T Results and Benefits to External User Communities</td><td>CRO</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Goal 3.0</td><td>Provide for Efficient and Effective Science and Technology Program Management (25%)</td><td>Director</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 3.1</td><td>Provide Effective and Efficient Strategic Planning and Stewardship of Scientific Capabilities and Program Vision</td><td>Director</td><td>C+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 3.2</td><td>Provide Effective and Efficient Science and Technology Project/Program/Facilities Management</td><td>Director</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 3.3</td><td>Provide Efficient and Effective Communications and Responsiveness to Headquarter's Needs</td><td>Office of Communication</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 4.0</td><td>Provide Sound and Competent Leadership and Stewardship of the Laboratory</td><td>Director</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.1</td><td>Leadership and Stewardship of the Laboratory</td><td>Director</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>Effectively and efficiently administer the PIP2/LBNF/IERC subcontracts (including KAJV and TMI).</td><td>?</td><td>Not Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.2</td><td>Management and Operation of the Laboratory</td><td>COO</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>The Laboratory must keep senior SC leadership informed of key events (e.g., VIP/protocol visits, news releases, media requests) through timely population of the Science News Dashboard with all the relevant information on such activities and/or through other appropriate mechanisms.</td><td>?</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.3</td><td>Leadership of External Engagements and Partnerships</td><td>COO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>Benchmark key FRA business systems/tools and business processes against an agreed set of labs to identify and apply best practices/implementation improvements. Develop and submit 5-year strategic improvement plans (FY2022-2026) for the lab's business support systems (including workforce, infrastructure, business software/tools, and major equipment). Develop and position for initial FY2022 funding and investment required for implementation.</td><td>?</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 4.4</td><td>Contractor Value-added</td><td>COO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>The Laboratory and contractor leadership must ensure that all communication with interested stakeholders on DOE/SC program</td><td></td><td>Achieved</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td></td><td>priorities/objectives are communicated in advance to DOE and aligned with DOE/SC goals, strategies, and guidance.</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Goal 5.0</td><td>Sustain Excellence and Enhance Effectiveness of Integrated Safety, Health, and Environmental Protection [30%]</td><td>CSO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 5.1</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Worker Health and Safety Program</td><td>CSO</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO: Complete the implementation review of the Accelerator Division (AD) Control Rooms Formality of Operations Tripartite to include the AD Operations Self-Assessment and field work activities to assure actual accelerator control room operations align with internal procedures and requirements.</td><td>?</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 5.2</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Environmental Management System</td><td>CSO</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO: Assure Tritium source migration is identified, and corrective measures analyzed and implemented as agreed.</td><td>?</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 6.0</td><td>Deliver Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Business Systems and Resources that Enable the Successful Achievement of the Laboratory Mission(s) [30%]</td><td>COO</td><td>B-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.1</td><td>Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Financial Management System</td><td>CFO</td><td>C+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.2</td><td>Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Acquisition Management System and Property Management System</td><td>CSO</td><td>C-</td></tr><tr><td>6.2 Part 1</td><td>Acquisition Management System</td><td>CFO</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>6.2 Part 2</td><td>Property Management System</td><td>Facilities Eng. Services</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO: Develop and implement a comprehensive property stewardship program that includes an accurate inventory of deployed and stored personal property and expectations for accountability around the stewardship by divisions and sections of this personal property.</td><td>?</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.3</td><td>Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive HR Management System and Diversity Program</td><td>WDRS</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 6.4</td><td>Provide Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Contractor Assurance Systems, including internal Audit and Quality</td><td>WDRS</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>6.4 Part 1</td><td>Contractor Assurance Systems and Quality</td><td>COO</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>6.4 Part 2</td><td>Internal Audit</td><td>FRA Internal Audit</td><td></td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>Objective 6.5</td><td>Demonstrate Effective Transfer of Knowledge and Technology and the Commercialization of Intellectual Assets</td><td>OPPT</td><td>A</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 7.0</td><td>Sustain Excellence in Operating, Maintaining, and Renewing the Facility and Infrastructure Portfolio to Meet Laboratory Needs [25%]</td><td>COO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 7.1</td><td>Manage Facilities and Infrastructure in an Efficient and Effective Manner that Optimizes Usage, Minimizes Life Cycle Costs and Ensures Site Capability to Meet Mission Needs</td><td>Facilities Eng. Services</td><td>B+</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO: Create, deliver, and implement a three-year plan and budget that defines how the laboratory will increase investment in maintenance each year to stabilize deferred maintenance and reach DOE target levels by FY2024.</td><td>?</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 7.2</td><td>Provide Planning for and Acquire the Facilities and Infrastructure Required to Support the Continuation and Growth of Laboratory Missions and Programs</td><td>Office of Campus Strategy &amp; Readiness</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO: Re-evaluate GPP processes (including requirement identification, pre-planning, acquisition strategies, status and issues tracking, dependency identification, and communication) with the goal of improving transparency, accountability, and expedited delivery. Leverage this insight to expedite the Sanitary Sewer GPP as practical.</td><td>?</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Goal 8.0</td><td>Sustain and Enhance the Effectiveness of Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) and Emergency Management Systems [15%]</td><td>Director</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 8.1</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Emergency Management System</td><td>CSO</td><td>A-</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO: Promptly implement a revised Site Security Plan (SSP) and any additional required updates as approved by DOE. Complete directed security actions per DOE approved timelines.</td><td>?</td><td>Achieved</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 8.2</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Cyber Security System for the Protection of Classified and Unclassified Information</td><td>CIO</td><td>C+</td></tr><tr><td>Objective 8.3</td><td>Provide an Efficient and Effective Physical Security Program for the Protection of Special Nuclear Materials, Classified Matter, Classified Information, Sensitive Information, and Property</td><td>CSO</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>Notable Outcome</td><td>FSO/SC-33: Develop a revised comprehensive ATO package(s) (based on an updated set of risk assessments, security plans and security control assessments) to align Fermilab systems as directed by DOE to the new CSPP and DOE risk</td><td>?</td><td>Achieved</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td></td><td>expectations. Complete actions per DOE approved timelines.</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>8.3 Part 1</td><td>Part 1: Physical Security Program for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material and Property</td><td>CSO</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>8.3 Part 2</td><td>Part 2: Classified Matter, Classified Information, and Sensitive Information</td><td>CIO</td><td></td></tr></table>

## Goal 2.0 Provide for Efficient and Effective Design, Fabrication, Construction and Operations of Research Facilities

*The Laboratory provides effective and efficient strategic planning; fabrication, construction and/or operations of Laboratory research facilities; and are responsive to the user community.*

### SC High Energy Physics

Score: 2.7 Grade: B

#### Goal Evaluation:

The excellent performance of the PIP II, HL-LHC CMS, and HL-LHC Accelerator Upgrade projects was countered by problems on Mu2e and the Long Baseline Neutrino Facility/Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (LBNF/DUNE). The very large size of LBNF/DUNE weighs down the performance in this goal.

The accelerator complex returned to operation after the COVID-19 shutdown and performed well including set a new beam intensity record.

### Objective 2.1: Provide Effective Facility Design(s) as Required to Support Laboratory Programs (i.e., activities leading up to CD-2)

Weight: 40.00% Score: 1.8 Grade: C

#### Objective Evaluation:

The HL-LHC CMS and LBNF/DUNE projects are both at CD-1, although LBNF/DUNE has a CD-3a that will be graded under 2.2. COVID 19 has continued to impact the HL-LHC project both directly and indirectly. The workforce has not yet fully returned to the labs. There have been increased costs to components due to supply change issues. [...]

At the January 2021 review LBNF/DUNE project presented their plans to the review committee. The committee found that the project would likely not stay within 150 percent of the top of the CD-1R cost range and recommended preparing for a CD-1R reaffirmation (CD-1RR). At a follow-up review, the committee found the goal of having a CD-1RR review in October to be unrealistic. The committee called for strengthening the project team and adjustments to how the cost range would be developed. The committee also recommended that the planned Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) reorganization be executed prior to the CD-1RR review. The project is addressing all of these recommendations, but concerns with staffing progress, contingency allocation, and lack of clarity in the Near Detector (ND) scope raises concern with the ability to be ready for the Project's stated goal of a CD-1RR review in April 2022. The liquid nitrogen cryogenic system procurement is behind schedule, and the design deliverable from that contract may no longer be delivered prior to the CD-1RR review which would add additional uncertainty to the cost range.

The large cost of LBNF/DUNE clearly weighs heavily on the overall grade and pull it down despite the good performance of HL-LHC CMS.

### SC High Energy Physics
**(Objective 2.1) Notable 1:** Complete the Option 1A scope of work and start the LBNF Excavation work by July 31, 2021.

Outcome: Satisfactorily achieved

**(Objective 2.1) Notable 2:** Pass an Independent Project Review for the LBNF/DUNE Project in the second half of FY 2021 with all charge questions satisfactorily answered and a clear set of recommendations to address for CD-2 readiness.

Outcome: The project did not pass the review and will have to undergo a CD-1 reaffirmation review in CY2022 – Not Achieved

## Goal 3.0 Provide Effective and Efficient Science and Technology Program Management

The Laboratory provides effective program vision and leadership; strategic planning and development of initiatives; recruits and retains a quality scientific workforce; and provides outstanding research processes, which improve research productivity.

### SC High Energy Physics

Score: 2.0 Grade: C

#### Goal Evaluation:

Fermilab is the primary HEP lab in the nation leading several flagship domestic projects that are in serious trouble in terms of performance, staffing plans and deliverables. Laboratory management should immediately consider balancing resources to the core mission of the laboratory to allow for the flagship HEP programs and projects to thrive and to benefit at the same time the entire HEP community.

## Objective 3.1: Provide Effective and Efficient Strategic Planning and Stewardship of Scientific Capabilities and Program Vision

Weight: 30.00% Score: 2.2 Grade: C+

#### Objective Evaluation:

There are a few areas that need attention.

Fermilab is the lead U.S. laboratory for the nationally coordinated CMS program at the Energy Frontier. The program continues to effectively plan and align research and operations activities with the international CMS collaboration at CERN. Proper awareness to the CMS program, particularly by Fermilab upper management, however, is lacking and needs to strengthen at a level commensurate of a host laboratory for the U.S. program.

Core HEP capabilities and commitments seem to be often neglected in favor of new initiatives where the leadership of a High Energy Physics lab is going to take some time to build up. The laboratory deserves credit for responding rapidly to new opportunities to participate in DOE priority areas and initiatives such as QIS and AI/ML. Very recently they supported an LDRD to collaborate with an ARPA-E project on muon catalyzed fusion that allows the Lab to be part of a clean energy project. However, while being open to new research avenues is commendable, the laboratory is also the primary HEP lab in the nation leading several flagship domestic projects that are in serious trouble in terms of performance, staffing plans and deliverables. Laboratory management should immediately consider balancing resources to the core mission of the laboratory to allow for the flagship HEP programs and projects to thrive and to benefit at the same time the entire HEP community.

At the Cosmic Frontier the lab is actively involved in the Snowmass planning process. The laboratory needs to develop a plan for the DES dark energy group to complete their data processing and analysis in a timely manner in order to be able to participate fully and take on leadership roles in DESC collaboration efforts as well as data analysis, to ensure a strong
program going forward. They need to ensure the CMB group stays focused on efforts aligned with the HEP portfolio to ensure leading participation in CMB-S4.

**Objective 3.2: Provide Effective and Efficient Science and Technology Project/Program/Facilities Management**

**Weight:** 45.00%

**Score:** 1.9

**Grade:** C

**Objective Evaluation:**

As for Objective 3.2, there are some areas of concern.

Although improved from prior years, additional care is needed by both Fermilab staff and lab's legal counsel in preparing high-quality written instruments such as international Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), including the supporting annexes to these agreements, which are subsequently sent to DOE for processing. Oftentimes provisions in such instruments appear to be copied and pasted from other project or technical documents, leading to structural format and language inconsistencies contemplated for an agreement.

At the Cosmic Frontier, individual experiments are responsive to needs and questions by Cosmic Frontier program manager. There is concern however in how the lab management is developing the Cosmic Frontier efforts for the future to ensure the lab's program makes strong contributions and carries out leadership roles for LSST DESC and on CMB-S4. This is also the case for planning the dark matter experiments for the future and for the lab's role on DarkSide.

**Objective 3.3: Provide Efficient and Effective Communications and Responsiveness to Headquarters Needs**

**Weight:** 25.00%

**Score:** 1.9

**Grade:** C

**Objective Evaluation:**

As for Goal 3.3, there are some serious areas of concern.

The Cosmic Frontier, program manager at HEP has regular meetings with the laboratory Cosmic Frontier and Physics Department management. However, there is some disconnect. The laboratory needs to be more proactive in reporting on how they're carrying out current roles as well as planning for the future. Regular presentations or writeup to the Cosmic Frontier program manager would help (as is done by the other labs). The laboratory program doesn't seem to have an overall Cosmic Frontier plan that is presented to HEP. In addition, although there are biweekly HEP and Fermilab calls, it is unclear the importance or priority of the Cosmic Frontier efforts are within the overall laboratory management since even when a presentation is made in the HEP call, it is left with waiting for HEP to respond and make decisions rather than lay out what the laboratory plans to do. It is not up to HEP to lay out the laboratory's program. HEP has also had to do a lot of the legwork in developing the DarkSide plan and iCRADA, which should be done by the laboratory.

In the area of projects, with the exception of HL-LHC AUP and HL-LHC CMS, other projects carried out at the laboratory show a worrisome lack of transparency in their communication with DOE and often assume an antagonistic and/or codependent attitude. As mentioned above for the Cosmic Frontier program, here too HEP often finds itself observing the projects waiting for HEP to respond to arising issues and make decisions rather than lay out what the laboratory and/or the project plans to do. This often results in lack of pro-activity and unexpected surprises to the stakeholders, particularly international collaborators, and funding agencies. This seems to be a cultural issue common to several projects management teams and the laboratory directorate.

The Chief Project Officer doesn't seem to be empowered enough to oversee some of the most complex projects. Where he is actively overseeing (ex: CMS or AUP) his contribution is very
good. This is an issue that needs immediate attention to be resolved in order for flagship projects to be able to deliver successfully on their commitments.

[...]

**Goal 4.0 Provide Sound and Competent Leadership and Stewardship of the Laboratory**

This Goal evaluates the Contractor's Leadership capabilities in leading the direction of the overall Laboratory, the responsiveness of the Contractor to issues and opportunities for continuous improvement, and corporate office involvement/commitment to the overall success of the Laboratory.

Score: 3.0 Grade: B

**Goal Evaluation:**

Laboratory leadership has created an exciting vision and strategy for the future of Fermilab by expanding its expertise in neutrino science, elemental particle physics, accelerator science and moving into breakthroughs in quantum science and technology. The laboratory's leadership team should seek opportunities to add more formality and visibility into important programs to ensure ongoing actions to correct identified deficiencies are accurately captured and addressed. Causal analyses and corrective actions are not always comprehensive and require FSO direction and input to ensure issues are adequately addressed.

The challenges with LBNF/DUNE are serious and glaring and reflect poorly on laboratory management (e.g., procurement, independent project review). In addition, laboratory management has expressed strong support of the P5 plan, and that has been strongly in evidence for the LBNF/DUNE and PIP II projects. However, there seems to be relative neglect of the LHC program which is the highest priority in the field, and we almost never hear from senior management about the HL-LHC projects, and the HL-LHC Accelerator Upgrade Project has struggled to get the resources it needs.

The laboratory has put in extensive work on developing international partnerships that are a great benefit to the program, but then turns in draft agreements with a variety of problems that have to be corrected by DOE slowing the process and increasing DOE's workload.

[...]

**Objective 4.1: Leadership and Stewardship of the Laboratory**

Weight: 32.00% Score: 2.8 Grade: B

**Objective Evaluation:**

**High Energy Physics**

The laboratory management has expressed strong support of the P5 plan, and that has been strongly in evidence for the LBNF/DUNE and PIP II projects. The problem has been relative neglect of the LHC program which is the highest priority on the field. We almost never hear from senior management about the HL-LHC projects, and the HL-LHC Accelerator Upgrade Project has struggled to get the resources it needs.

**Office of Science**

[...]

Laboratory leadership participated in a revision to the strategic vision and partnership commitment approved by the Fermi Site Office (FSO), DOE High Energy Physics Program (HEP), and FRA. This vision set expectations for a commitment to foster safe, diverse, equitable and inclusive work, research, and funding environments that value mutual respect and personal integrity.

[...]

Laboratory leadership should set the expectation that deliverables to the Office of Science and FSO are of high quality and require little to no rework.
FRA's laboratory leadership team should seek opportunities to add more formality and
visibility into important programs to ensure ongoing actions to correct identified deficiencies
are accurately captured and addressed.

**(Objective 4.1) Notable 1:** Effectively and efficiently administer the PIP2/LBNF/IERC subcontracts (including KAJV and TMI).

**Outcome:** This notable required the effective and efficient administration of PIP-II, LBNF DUNE, and IERC subcontracts. To aid in this effort, DOE and the laboratory collaborated to identify a scope of procurements for reporting and evaluation. The scope of procurements included all active PIP-II, Integrated Engineering Research Center (IERC), and LBNF DUNE procurements that met or exceeded the $5 Million DOE Site Office review threshold, or any procurement on one of the project's critical paths irrespective of dollar value. The quarterly reports were submitted by the laboratory, as agreed, with few errors and required some engagement by DOE. With respect to effective and efficient subcontract management, there were no major issues with the PIP-II and IERC subcontracts. While laboratory efforts to have Kiewit-Alberici Joint Venture (KAJV) solicit, award, and administer the LBNF Far Site Excavation bid package proved unsuccessful in FY 2020, the laboratory had to assume ownership and the associated risks of administration of the Thyssen Mining, Inc (TMI) subcontract in FY 2021. Efforts to accomplish the three-party assignment required substantial involvement by DOE. In order to avoid delays in the excavation phase of the LBNF project, significant DOE involvement was required for consent to purchase Builders Risk Insurance (BRI). Systemic procurement issues (as detailed in Goal 6, Objective 6.2) also contributed to the laboratory's failure to achieve this notable in FY 2021. - Not Achieved

**Objective 4.2: Management and Operation of the Laboratory**

**Weight:** 32.00%

**Score:** 2.8

**Grade:** B

**Objective Evaluation:**

**High Energy Physics**

The laboratory's biggest initiative is struggling. There are a variety of issues such as procurement. Many procurement packages struggle to get through DOE approval. LBNF's performance on Independent Project review has been mixed, with general evidence of progress but always short of DOE expectations.

**Office of Science**

[...]

The new Services Oversight Group (SOG) forum, which includes both key laboratory and DOE members, provided for a broad view of laboratory performance issues, and has facilitated the establishment of new metrics to track performance. The new metrics have been established for all major business and operations functions and compare planned versus actual performance. To date, improvements as a result of this effort include reduction in division and section procurement errors, reduction in overdue iTrack items, redirection of effort to key facilities metrics, reduction in expired badges, and other areas, as well as in-depth discussions regarding lab risks, cyber security, and financial Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory Evaluation FY 2021 21 data. DOE is eager to see how this group can continue to drive proactive improved laboratory performance in several functional areas, while reducing risk of future activities to aid in meeting the laboratory's strategic vision.

Throughout FY 2021, numerous challenges have arisen, both new and recurring, related to project performance, procurement and safety, and cyber security. In some instance laboratory responses to Office of Science and FSO feedback on contractor performance are defensive and dismissive, resulting in repeat findings and observations.

Causal analyses and corrective actions are not always comprehensive and often require FSO direction and input to ensure issues are adequately addressed. Additionally, the analyses take
an extended time to complete and would benefit from the line organization leading the charge on the causal analyses and corrective action plans. While it is understood there is a need to balance thoroughness with timeliness, these extensive delays can result in a lack of thorough recall of events, and unchecked safety concerns which require mitigation. A lab-wide emphasis by management is needed to drive involvement, timeliness, and accountability.

**(Objective 4.2) Notable 1:** The Laboratory must keep senior SC leadership informed of key events (e.g., VIP/protocol visits, news releases, media requests) through timely population of the Science News Dashboard with all the relevant information on such activities and/or through other appropriate mechanisms.

**Outcome:** FRA provides weekly updates on laboratory activities to DOE/FSO leadership. The SC-1 dashboard is updated every Thursday/Friday and includes information on VIP/protocol visits, agreement signing, meetings/engagements with international funding agencies, news releases, and media requests.

## Goal 5.0 Sustain Excellence and Enhance Effectiveness of Integrated Safety, Health, and Environmental Protection

*This Goal evaluates the Contractor's overall success in deploying, implementing, and improving integrated ES&H systems that efficiently and effectively support the mission(s) of the Laboratory.*

### Fermi Site Office

Score: 3.2 Grade: B+

**Goal Evaluation:**

The laboratory has sustained their focus to address issues and make improvements with their Work Planning and Control (WP&C) process. While challenges in this area remain, the laboratory continues to make progress in its commitment to programmatic improvements.

[...]

The laboratory has experienced significant issues with subcontractor implementation of safe excavation measures. FSO observed numerous examples of unsafe excavations and shared these observations with FRA. A letter was transmitted to FRA directing a formal causal analysis be performed and scheduled monthly meetings with the Site Office to discuss actions and progress toward completion.

[...]

A DOE assessment was performed of the Fermilab Radiation Protection Program, resulting in two level one findings and thirteen level three findings. This review identified programmatic gaps and operational shortcomings. Due to the severity and the quantity of findings, a letter was transmitted to FRA directing a formal causal analysis be performed and scheduled monthly meetings with the Site Office to discuss actions and progress toward completion.

## Objective 5.1: Provide an Efficient and Effective Worker Health and Safety Program

Weight: 60.00% Score: 3.0 Grade: B

**Objective Evaluation:**

### COVID-19 Response

[...]

### Subcontractor/Construction Safety

The Laboratory has been challenged by numerous ES&H related activities and events this year at both the Batavia campus and the LBNF project work at the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) facility in Lead, South Dakota. FSO oversight of these activities identified improvements in the hazard analysis documentation for construction work in general; however additional efforts are needed to maintain recent improvement with hazard
analysis documentation for subcontractor construction activities. The laboratory has
implemented several actions to bolster their subcontractor safety program including:
[...]

While the laboratory continues to reinforce and maintain the subcontractor communication improvements, there are areas of the program that remain of concern. Many of the above noted improvements were initiated due to the continued FSO on-site observations as well as the occurrence of significant ES&H events. In the first half of FY 2021, various excavation deficiencies were identified on active worksites including instances of improperly classified soil, improper cave-in protection systems, the use of benching in Type C soil (not allowed by OSHA), and unsuitable access/egress into trenches/excavations. The laboratory responded to these initial incidents by discussing the issues with the task managers, construction coordinators, and subcontractors at the Batavia site. In the second half of FY 2021, there were several instances of utility strikes and one instance of wet saw work performed within a "no dig" radiation boundary.

It was noted by FSO construction safety staff that neither DOE nor the laboratory ES&H were being allowed full unencumbered access to the IERC project site due to perceived ES&H concerns. Although the issue was eventually resolved, it is FSO's expectation that unless a hazard to DOE personnel exists that is not able to be adequately controlled, access to conduct safety oversight will be allowed.

Due to frequency and severity of these events, a stand down of FESS-directed excavations was issued at the end of July requiring subcontractors to perform a safety review of their programs prior to the resumption of excavation work. The laboratory leadership reemphasized safety expectations during this time. The ES&H Section has implemented increased presence of their construction oversight personnel to assure safe excavation operations and conformance with applicable standards and best practices. During this increased laboratory oversight, another incident of a subcontractor employee working in an excavation without a proper cave-in protective system in place was identified. The work was immediately paused by a Fermilab ES&H staff member, and a formal Stop-Work Order was issued to the subcontractor.

Given the aforementioned concerns, FSO issued a letter to the laboratory directing the completion of root cause analyses of these events and a recurring monthly meeting with FSO to discuss the fundamental causes of poor contract performance in this area.

## Work Planning and Control (WP&C)

The laboratory's hazard analyses (HAs) have been stored on several platforms, each with different document formats, not allowing for consistent review and implementation across the site. To address this concern, the laboratory developed and implemented the IMPACT tool to standardize the digital location and format of the HAs. In January 2021, the laboratory decommissioned all other HA tools and in March they utilized the IMPACT tool for their first e-permit. An internal WP&C tripartite is currently assessing the rollout of the IMPACT tool by interviewing 29 different groups of employees at various levels of the organization. The IMPACT tool is a promising application that facilitates collaboration between various work groups and is an overall positive change to laboratory WP&C activities onsite.

The laboratory's HA documents for subcontractor construction work had recurring observations that did not meet expectations. While on-going construction inspections performed by FSO staff identified gradual improvements of the quality of HA documentation, observations were made noting that some HA documentation was not available on-site as required or did not adequately address specific work activities or provide for a description of the work activities being performed.

A Tripartite review of the internal subcontractor WP&C process revealed that ES&H needs to have a process to identify on-site contractor work and its locations, a threshold for when
several roles are required for projects and recognized several FES&HM chapters that require revision. The assessment highlighted the need for a follow-on review focusing on subcontractor service work. To date, the results of the assessment findings have not been fully implemented.

[...]

The Laboratory has maintained a significant focus on effective and documented work planning and control processes. While increased reporting demonstrates a mature reporting culture, the potential severity and frequency of incidents creates concern and may be an indicator of more serious programmatic issues.

## Issues Management

The laboratory continues to document construction walkthrough observations using their Predictive software. The laboratory's ES&H Section has demonstrated some improvement by being more proactive in interpreting data and recognizing health and safety trends to avoid/minimize issues. The Laboratory should look for opportunities to add more formality and visibility into important programs to ensure ongoing actions to correct identified deficiencies are accurately captured and addressed, and causal analyses and corrective actions are comprehensive and thoroughly documented.

The laboratory's iTrack system is a centralized database to capture observations and open corrective actions. iTrack items are primarily items that are significant in nature and may take longer periods of time to effectively address. This system is not being fully utilized for effective issues management and several opportunities for improvement exist to improve its usefulness. These opportunities include increasing responsibility and accountability for assuring corrective actions are completed and documented in a timely manner within the system.

## ES&H Data Analysis

For data available in FY 2021, the laboratory averaged approximately 155,255 construction hours worked per quarter showing an increase in construction hours worked per quarter by approximately 25% from the previous year's representative sample. This indicates a significant increase in construction activities in FY 2021, mostly attributable to the LBNF and PIP-II work.

There was an increase in ORPS events over FY 2021 with 33 events occurring as compared to eight in FY 2020. One reason for the large number of reports is due to the LBNF Far Site personnel nitrogen dioxide overexposures which represent 13 of the ORPS events. These numbers will be reduced in FY 2022 due to an ORPS reporting equivalency approved by DOE that will change individual exceedance to a quarterly report.

The Non-compliance Tracking System (NTS) events remained similar to the previous years with six worker safety and health events, with no nuclear events occurring this fiscal year.

The TRC and DART rates were the highest since 2016 and 2012 with rates of 1.6 and 1.1 respectively. The first aid rate stayed below the previous several years with a rate of 0.66.

## Work at Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF)

Performance during the year was generally sound with a great deal of work performed by the laboratory to assist subcontractors in effectively investigating incidents to assure causes are identified and addressed. The laboratory's work planning and control processes have been effective as the laboratory has transitioned from Reliability Projects into the main cavern excavation activities.

The Laboratory worked closely with DOE to develop a variance to OSHA 800(k)(3) ventilation requirements which was successfully submitted to the Office of Science to be forwarded to DOE-AU for approval. Additionally, an Abatement Plan and ORPS equivalency were developed to ensure worker safety due to the project's inability to meet 2016 American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) Threshold Limit Values (TLVs).
for NO2. The Laboratory worked collaboratively with DOE to effectively develop the required documentation which was successfully submitted and ultimately approved by DOE.

There were also recent incidents of Silica TLV exceedances during underground construction. The laboratory response to the Silica TLV exceedances was swift and effective with a focus on protecting worker health and limiting exposures. Sampling processes allowed the laboratory to identify the issues and refocus their response which included enacting a new sampling plan in conjunction with KAJV and TMI to ensure a proper understanding of the hazards and the ability to measure efficacy of controls.

## Radiation Safety Program Compliance

The laboratory's Radiation Protection Program (RPP) was reviewed by an external DOE team in April 2021. The review identified two Level 1 findings, thirteen Level 3 findings and one Best Practice. The Level 1 findings were associated with deficiencies in the Lab's Environmental RPP (ERPP) and overall compliance with DOE O 458.1 Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, in particular with the laboratory's radiological material release and clearance program. This assessment confirmed many of the concerns and issues identified during FSO oversight activities. The results of the RPP review, coupled with FSO oversight results identified significant gaps in the Radiation Protection Program effectiveness, primarily due to a general informality of operations with many procedures/processes not formally documented.

Several RPP related HPI reviews were performed throughout the course of the fiscal year: Main Injector-30 re-lamping incident. While interviews and root cause analysis were productive, FSO input was required to ensure the investigation focused on issues pertaining to 10 CFR 835 vice almost entirely on WP&C.

Saw cutting activities performed in a "no dig zone" in the 8GeV/Booster area while beam was present. The HPI team did a thorough job interviewing participants and discussing extent of condition, causal analysis, and root causes of the event.

Additionally, numerous events violating Fermilab's Radiation Safety Program occurred during FY 2021. DOE is concerned with the laboratory compliance in implementing two areas of radiation protection: 10CFR835 Subpart L, Radioactive Contamination Control and 10 CFR 835 Subpart F, Entry Control Program. The following events described below highlight programmatic issues in these areas of concern.

## 10 CFR 835 Subpart L Radioactive Contamination Control

In May 2021, a personnel contamination event occurred when a high frisker reading alerted Radiation Safety to respond to the MT6.1 enclosure in the Fermilab Test Beam Facility (FTBF). The affected individual's fingertips were reading about 400 cpm above background using a frisker. This corresponds to about 4,000 dpm and exceeds the 10 CFR 835 Appendix D Surface Contamination Value of 1,000 dpm for removable beta-gamma emitters.

Operations were stopped at Muon Test Area/Irradiation Test Area (MTA/ITA) and MT6.1 area while the event was investigated, and decontamination efforts were performed. Interim measures were implemented including updating the Radiation Work Permit and issuing a new procedure for handling contaminated parts, and operations resumed. A full investigation and causal analysis into the personnel contamination event remains ongoing.

In July 2021, a failure of a planned design change in the NuMI air handling unit (AHU) condensate collection system resulted in approximately 100 mL of fluid containing tritium to leak onto the floor causing contamination in the MI65 Fire Command Room. An operational readiness review of the system was completed and did not identify the potential for this event to occur. The Laboratory initiated an HPI to determine the cause of the design failure that resulted in a new contamination area.

While investigating the MI65 tritium spill, condensation was found accumulating on piping in the area and in the utility room of the service building. The condensation was sampled and
found to exceed the 100 pCi/mL limit for personnel exposure. The areas are posted as contamination areas and additional controls are needed for work in the areas.

### 10 CFR 835 Subpart F Entry Control

In July, technicians entered an area posted as a Controlled and Radioactive Materials Area to perform work. Once inside the service building, the technicians noticed an enclosure door leading to a posted Radiation Area was not fully closed or locked as required. The technicians immediately called the Main Control Room to report it.

Employees of the Facility Engineering Services Section performed work in a MI30 High Radiation Area (HRA) located in the Accelerator Division without proper authorization and coverage. A job specific Radiation Work Permit (RWP) and RCT coverage is required for work in HRAs due to the potential for individuals to be exposed to greater than 100 mrem/hr dose rates per 10 CFR 835.502 High and Very High Radiation Areas. Initial discussions with the laboratory indicated that since the individuals only received 10-15 mrem dose, and an investigation would be conducted while shutdown, work could continue as normal. After further review of the event and FSO expressing concern about the potential consequences of the incident, the laboratory's Senior Radiation Safety Officer (SRSO) issued a stop work in all high radiation areas with compensatory measures in place to release work on a cases-by-case basis until an investigation could be completed. The investigation took over 3 months to complete and a report to be issued.

### Disregard of Radiation Boundaries and Postings

FSO oversight has observed several instances where radiation boundaries, signs or postings have been moved by unauthorized personnel.

During a walkthrough at Minos, a Tritium Contamination Area posting stanchion was moved by unauthorized personnel to accommodate work.

The MC7 enclosure door was removed without following proper radiation safety procedures. Non-Radiation Safety personnel removed radiological postings from the original door in order to replace the door with a new one. The original door was intended to be released for recycling but did not immediately go through required release and clearance surveys to verify the door was not activated. Radiation Safety tracked the door down in order to survey it while it was still onsite.

A second event at the MC7 area occurred that involved hand digging in an area that would have required a Joint Utility Locating Information for Excavators (JULIE) to determine the proximity of the excavation activity to required radiation shielding. Following requirements of the Accelerator Safety Program, an Unreviewed Safety Issue Determination (USID) was performed to determine if an Accelerator Safety Envelope (ASE) violation occurred as required when potential impacts to shielding are discovered. At the time of the digging, critical devices controlling the beamline were locked off and no beam was present. It was determined not to be a violation of the ASE (negative USID).

A subcontractor working on the Accelerator Campus Utility Corridor (ACUC) Project performed wet saw cutting on the existing asphalt in the South Booster Road intersection and entrance to the Central Utility Building. The saw cutting occurred while the accelerator was operating and within an established and marked "No-Dig Zone." The cutting was observed by a Fermilab Radiation Safety Technician, who notified Radiation Safety management. Upon notification of the incident, the Accelerator Division de-energized the beam to the Booster complex and all beamlines downstream. A USID was issued, and the change in shielding as a result of cutting in the "No-Dig Zone" was determined not to be a violation of the ASE.

### Eating/Drinking/Smoking/Cosmetics Policy in Radioactive Material Area

During FY 2021, cigarettes and cigarette smoke were discovered in a Radioactive Material Area (RMA) along the F Sector Service Buildings during a Highly Protective Risk Inspection. Additionally, during a walkthrough of Particle Physics Division spaces, an individual working
in an RMA was observed to have food and beverages. Eating, drinking, smoking, and applying cosmetics in an RMA presents a risk of exposure and intake through inhalation or ingestion pathways. During monthly Radiation Safety Subcommittee meetings, FSO has expressed concern that the laboratory does not have a policy forbidding personnel from eating, drinking, or applying cosmetics in an RMA. This was also noted during the recent DOE RPP Assessment.

## Laser Safety

During FY 2021, several new laser systems were installed which is indicative of a trend in the use of higher-powered lasers being used in accelerator operations. The principles of ANSI Z136.1, Safe Use of Lasers, are fully implemented in laser labs around the complex. The Laser Safety Program at the laboratory remains robust and effective at preventing unwanted outcomes. No laser safety incidents were reported in FY 2021.

## Accelerator Safety

The Accelerator Safety Program remained effective and successful at preventing unwanted outcomes during FY 2021. No violations of the ASE were reported, and the laboratory tracked multiple potential unreviewed safety issues through the USID process. Improvements and enhancements to the Accelerator Safety Program were made by continuing to develop formal processes when determining the level of Accelerator Readiness Reviews (ARRs) for a new or modified accelerator. The new process is integrated into the USID procedure and describes selecting an ARR review team and type of review based on a graded approach. Formally documenting processes such as this creates a more robust and cohesive Accelerator Safety Program.

New Safety Assessment Documents (SAD) Chapter updates were published for Minos and the Short Baseline Neutrino Experimental Areas (i.e., ICARUS, SBND, and MicroBooNe Experiments) in the Neutrino Division and the Proton Area and the Tevatron Main Ring of the Accelerator Division. Additionally, several USIDs were conducted for planned and discovered unreviewed safety issues. Some of the planned changes to shielding that required a USID include the Main Injector berm shielding reorganization for LBNF site preparation, extra shielding was added for the MC7 Nova test beam, and the Muon Campus' installation of additional shielding in the delivery ring to prepare for future Mu2e beamline. Two negative USIDs were issued during FY 2021 following unplanned excavation activities into accelerator beamline shielding at MC7 and 8GeV/Booster areas.

The laboratory completed several actions including a qualitative beam-on survey of the entire accelerator complex due to concerns from the Department. Ongoing evaluation is being performed to ensure all postings and surveys are complete.

**(Objective 5.1) Notable 1:** Complete the implementation review of the Accelerator Division (AD) Control Rooms Formality of Operations Tripartite to include the AD Operations Self-Assessment and field work activities to assure actual accelerator control room operations align with internal procedures and requirements.

**Outcome:** During FY 2021, the laboratory finished the remaining portion of FY 2020 PEMP Notable 5.1.1, Complete the implementation review of the Accelerator Division (AD) Control Rooms Formality of Operations Tripartite to include the AD Operations self-assessment and field work activities to assure actual accelerator control room operations align with internal procedures and requirements. The laboratory completed the second part of the Tripartite Assessment during FY 2021 by performing field observations of operations in the Main Control Room and the g-2 Remote Control room. The team identified six recommendations and two best practices during this assessment. Some of the recommendations focus on clarifying and establishing additional operating procedures in the g-2 Control Room. Additionally, the MCR and Remote-Control Rooms deployed strict protocols during operations to address concerns related to the COVID-19 Pandemic including limiting
capacity, requiring people to call ahead before picking up enclosure keys, and installing physical barriers inside the MCR to decrease the chances of transmitting the virus.

## Goal 6.0 Deliver Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Business Systems and Resources that Enable the Successful Achievement of the Laboratory Mission(s)

This Goal evaluates the Contractor's overall success in deploying, implementing, and improving integrated business systems that efficiently and effectively support the mission(s) of the Laboratory.

### Fermi Site Office

Score: 2.5 Grade: B

### Goal Evaluation:

The laboratory continues to have challenges in Financial Management and Acquisition Management. Audits repeatedly highlight the same deficiencies and control failures year after year. Any corrective actions implemented have resulted in little to no progress. Significant procurement issues have hindered the laboratory's ability to successfully deliver efficient and effective business systems/resources to enable the Science Mission. Substantial concerns remain regarding the ability to expend Government funds in an effective, efficient, and compliant manner.

[...]

The Laboratory organizational structure does not facilitate inclusion of key staff to resolve major operational challenges, nor has the structure provided a framework to flexibly adapt to needed staffing, mission, and project changes.

The laboratory has made great strides in strengthening its Contractor Assurance System (CAS) program by implementing recommendations/best practices and integrating performance metrics for key laboratory support areas into the oversight process. Additionally, the laboratory formed a Human Performance Improvement (HPI) Subcommittee and developed an assessment program.

Fermilab's Internal Audit (IA) activity continues to be effective and has met all contract deliverables for FY 2021 and is on track to complete the Annual Internal Audit for FY 2021. The Laboratory should continue efforts to resolve communication breakdowns between IA, management, and compliance.

[...]

## Objective 6.1: Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Financial Management System

Weight: 20.00% Score: 2.4 Grade: C+

### Objective Evaluation:

Scoring reflects the laboratory's continued challenges with financial functions related to capability, compliance, and quality. Integration with procurement is still problematic. The laboratory's financial management system has still not reached maturity. Additionally, the laboratory has failed to make adequate progress in determining the root cause of repeated audit findings and, as of the date this report was written, have yet to submit formal comprehensive corrective action plans for DOE consideration.

Results of the FY 2021 OMB Circular A-123 audit findings are concerning and highlighted repeated control failures for three consecutive years (FY 2019-FY 2021) in the areas of payables management and project cost management. Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory Evaluation FY 2021 36 Specifically, the OMB Circular No. A-123 audit resulted in 20 control failures from the Finance Section which included Accounting and Procurement. Of the 20 control failures, eight control failures are repeated failures from prior years FY 2019 and FY 2021.
2020, eight control failures are repeated failures from FY 2020, and four new controls failed in FY 2021.

Of the seven audits conducted by FRA's Internal Audit in FY 2021, there were 13 findings of which seven were related to compliance and/or internal control failures in finance and accounting. Audit report FNAL2021-02 highlighted control failures in accounting and finance related to reimbursement of travel expenses not applying costs to the related subcontract, payments being released without proper identification of labor and equipment costs, incomplete documentation to support services, expenses invoiced, and questionable travel costs practices. In addition, Accounts Payable did not assign subcontractor reimbursement invoices to the correct purchase orders. Audit report FNAL2021-03 highlighted control failures in management not consistently ensuring goods are approved by the requestor, Accounting not revising/updating General Payables and Disbursement Policies to include process changes for approvals resulting from Oracle Approval Management Engine (OAME) implementation, and Finance not consistently ensuring OAME end-users complete training prior to approving invoices using OAME.

There continues to be disconnects between the Finance Section and Internal Audit. Audit findings are not given the appropriate attention which may contribute to the lack of meaningful progress in identifying control deficiencies/weaknesses and implementing corrective actions that permanently resolve outstanding issues.

**Objective 6.2: Provide an Efficient, Effective, and Responsive Acquisition Management System and Property Management System**

**Weight:** 30.00% **Score:** 1.1 **Grade:** C

**Objective Evaluation:**

*Acquisition Management System*

Scoring reflects significant systemic deficiencies and continued challenges with acquisition strategy/planning, meaningful procurement organization engagement, market research, selection of subcontract type, evaluation criteria development, exercising/incorporation of subcontract options, and overall subcontract administration. While numerous efforts have been made by DOE to stress the importance of addressing these issues both during the mid-year and on a continuous basis, no meaningful improvement has been made by the laboratory over the course of this fiscal year. Additionally, there continues to be challenges with the quality and substance of procurement packages. Constructive feedback is often challenged, which leads to key issues not being addressed in a timely manner. Also, the laboratory has challenges with incorporating feedback and utilizing lessons learned to make improvements. In reviewing acquisition strategies, DOE continues to observe the omittance of material information, factual misstatements in documents and/or failure of the laboratory to include input from all relevant functional specialists in acquisition plans as it relates to risks, subcontract type, subcontract options, evaluation criteria, market research, and estimated cost/price. Acquisition strategies are rarely based on the full breadth of information available. The laboratory continues to struggle with using market research to support acquisition planning and decision-making processes to ensure that the most suitable approach for procuring supplies/services is pursued. DOE has observed inadequate use of market research to inform acquisition decisions, requirements, source selections, and solicitation timing. Requirements development has also been problematic, often leading to numerous subcontract change orders and/or cost overruns. The LBNF/DUNE Near Site Conventional Facilities (NSCF) Near Detector Complex acquisition plan failed to provide accurate information and omitted critical details regarding potential challenges/risks associated with meeting all applicable aspects of 10 CFR 851 [Editor's note: Worker safety and health requirements]. This issue was discovered by DOE after Head of Contracting
Activity (HCA) approval of the acquisition plan. The laboratory failed to communicate and disclose important concerns to FSO in a timely manner.

Effective contract administration has also been a challenge. There have been recurring FRA Internal Audit and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123 audit findings related to compliance with subcontract payment terms and conditions. [Editor's note: DOE complies with OMB Circular A-123, Management's Responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control, which provides guidance for internal control and risk management requirements. OMB Circular A-123 also establishes the requirement to produce an agency Risk Profile as part of the implementation of an Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) capability coordinated with strategic planning, strategic review, and internal control processes.] DOE has also observed multiple occurrences where the laboratory's failure to act in a timely manner resulted in either an adverse outcome or required intervention or action from DOE. The Mu2e Solenoid procurement has had significant issues related to subcontractor performance, quality, and cost/price control since subcontract award. Per the laboratory, these quality issues have required the implementation of additional quality assurance and oversight measures by laboratory engineers. While the Mu2e Solenoid subcontractor has failed to comply with subcontract terms and conditions, the laboratory's failure to take decisive actions to remedy subcontract non-performance and quality issues throughout the life of this subcontract has been problematic and resulted in substantial DOE involvement at all levels.

In addition, the laboratory has had difficulties complying with their DOE approved procurement policies/procedures and DOE requirements. Sole Source Justifications routinely do not adhere to laboratory Approved Procurement Policy and Procedures Manual. There is inconsistent use of the approved template (FL-57) and often insufficient rationale for other than full and open competition. Also, as a result of a September 2021 Buy American Act (BAA) exemptions data call, the laboratory informed DOE that it failed to execute or obtain BAA exemption approval for 17 procurements from FY 2018- FY 2020, prior to purchase, eight of which required DOE approval.

The laboratory has had minor issues with records management as well. It was not able to locate two Master Agreements but continued to issue task orders against those vehicles. While the Agreements were eventually located (several months later), this highlighted that procurement personnel were not always cognizant of the Master Agreement scope, ordering period of performance, max and min ordering amounts, ceiling amount, or cumulative dollar value of task orders issued to date prior to task order issuance.

## Property Management System

[...]

**(Objective 6.2) Notable 1:** Develop and implement a comprehensive property stewardship program that includes an accurate inventory of deployed and stored personal property and expectations for accountability around the stewardship by divisions and sections of this personal property.

**Outcome:** Through the utilization of the Sunflower property management system and the Self-Service Property application (SSP), the laboratory has been able to ensure an accurate inventory of all deployed and stored personal property and a comprehensive property stewardship program. The laboratory has improved property passes by transitioning to a fully electronic process and has developed an electronic storage justification form to replace the paper forms previously utilized.

## Goal 8.0 Sustain and Enhance the Effectiveness of Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) and Emergency Management Systems
*This Goal evaluates the Contractor's overall success in safeguarding and securing Laboratory assets that supports the mission(s) of the Laboratory in an efficient and effective manner and provides an effective emergency management program.*

**Fermi Site Office**

Score: 2.8 Grade: B

**Goal Evaluation:**

[...]

The laboratory submitted a Site Security Plan (SSP) in December 2020 which was approved with contingencies. The laboratory reported the implementation of corrective actions for all 27 findings and recommendations from the 2019 DOE-SC-4 Safeguards and Security Assessment, however, an August 2021 DOE Effectiveness Review of the corrective actions found six out of 15 instances of ineffective/partially ineffective corrective actions in preventing reoccurrence.

The laboratory was required to update and submit a new Authority to Operate (ATO) package; however, the document received was not of a quality level that warranted DOE review and was returned to the laboratory for additional work.

In cyber security there have been numerous projects completed and actions taken throughout the fiscal year, though the journey was difficult and highly reactive. Many of these completed projects were as a result of DOE direction to the laboratory requiring specific actions be taken. Additionally, a high level of DOE involvement was required throughout the year to ensure programs were proceeding appropriately.

**Objective 8.2: Provide an Efficient and Effective Cyber Security System for the Protection of Classified and Unclassified Information**

Weight: 40.00% Score: 2.2 Grade: C+

**Objective Evaluation:**

The laboratory has accomplished several projects over the past year. There has been a big push for Personally Identifiable Information (PII) scanning, moving resources behind authentication, and reviewing web pages that are not needed. The laboratory created a SharePoint site that allows collaboration with the site office to track items that are on their Implementation Plan. The laboratory also moved towards a new security plan that uses National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-53r5 baselines. There was a large amount of work completed in response to the Peer Review, new Office of Science Cyber Security Program Plan (CSPP), and several Letters from the Site Office to FRA.

While there have been numerous projects completed and actions taken throughout the fiscal year, the journey was difficult and highly reactive. Instead of the laboratory being proactive about Cyber Security, many of these completed projects were as a result of DOE direction to the laboratory requiring that specific actions be taken. Additionally, a high level of DOE involvement was required throughout the year to ensure programs were proceeding appropriately.

The laboratory was required to update and submit a new Authority to Operate (ATO) package to FSO. The document received was not of a quality level that warranted DOE review and was returned to the laboratory. For example, there were numerous misspellings, references to outdated NIST documentation, outdated OMB memos, and DOE orders used that were not up to date. There were also inconsistent terms used, old data that should have been revised, and some areas that needed stronger language to match the new SC Cyber Security Program Plan (CSPP) requirements.

Over the past year, numerous reviews identified additional areas for the laboratory to focus on and prioritize. As a result of these reviews, the SC CSPP release, and the Cyber Security Executive Order, there was a large list of items that needed to be completed to ensure an
effective program. The laboratory turned this list into a "Cyber Security Implementation Plan." This plan identified the task, what the laboratory needed to complete, how the task would be implemented, and evidence of implementation. The Cyber Security Implementation Plan that is now in SharePoint is of interest to other groups at the laboratory, as it has been a huge success in tracking items to completion that require DOE oversight and approval.

An area that needed additional attention was providing consistent and relevant information to ensure the Authorizing Official (AO) was aware of risks and can see progress being made in the Cyber Security Office. The laboratory is now using a "Quad-Chart" that is presented to the AO at least once a month. The "Quad-Chart" contains important information in dashboard form, such as data call submissions, cyber security incidents and events, risk assessment status, upcoming audits, task status, and vulnerability trending information.

Within the past year, there was a Cyber Security researcher that had communicated with the laboratory about a specific vulnerability over a course of time. DOE was not informed of the ongoing interaction in a timely fashion, and because of this communication, a tech blog published a story about this vulnerability and interaction. DOE issued a guidance letter to the laboratory including numerous areas that required immediate attention. The laboratory has made significant progress in scanning its websites for specific types of information and has made important modifications in policies governing information made available to the public. Only information specifically intended for the public was made available without requiring authentication.

The laboratory had a penetration testing firm called "Attack Research" evaluate internal and external systems for potential compromises. The company spent several weeks trying to enter the Fermilab network as an external user and then as a laboratory collaborator. After the assessment was complete, there were no successful entries that were gained, but the assessment did result in some observations for improvement. The laboratory is currently working on a corrective action plan using the observations and will submit the plan to the site office for review. Other areas where the laboratory had improved their security stance was moving all Lab user subnets behind a default deny firewall. The laboratory has also reduced their Internet footprint by instituting default blocks and reducing the use of high-risk protocols, such as FTP, X-Windows, SSHD, Postgres, MySQL, MariaDB, and MongoDB. To verify these results, the laboratory increased the frequency of both privileged and non-privileged vulnerability scanning.

All the work completed is a step in the right direction, risks have been reduced and security increased. However, laboratory implementation of these security upgrades has been reactionary and resulted predominantly from DOE engagement.

**Objective 8.3: Provide an Efficient and Effective Physical Security Program for the Protection of Special Nuclear Materials, Classified Matter, Classified Information, Sensitive Information, and Property**

Weight: 40.00%

Score: 3.0

Grade: B

**Objective Evaluation:**

Overall, the Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) and Emergency Management (EM) Systems continue to evolve in response to recent assessments and DOE guidance. A DOE Corrective Action Plan (CAP) Effectiveness Review was conducted in August 2021 to determine the effectiveness of corrective actions taken by the laboratory pursuant to the 2019 DOE Survey. Six (6) out of fifteen corrective actions were identified as ineffective or partially effective in preventing reoccurrence of weaknesses or findings. The assessment team concluded that while work remains for the corrective actions rated as ineffective/partially ineffective there is a high degree of assurance that the probability of