# LEARNING FROM THE COVID-19 CRISIS

Since March 2020, OECD countries, and EU countries in particular, have realised that certain skills and professions are particularly critical during a pandemic: doctors, nurses, care staff, logistics, teachers, etc. While not all of these occupations are filled by migrant workers, it is now recognised that circular migration patterns between EU countries (destination countries) and North African countries (sending countries) have helped – and are helping in particular today – to solve labour shortage problems in some key sectors of the economy. And this at a lower cost, without having to pay for education, training or long-term social integration. Finally, in return, countries of origin receive the skills of labour migrants and the investments of returning migrants. Such a 'triple win narrative' between the migrant, the host country and the country of origin has however been challenged. As ILO points out, particularly since the outbreak of COVID-19, 'many migrants had to return home to ensure receipt of proper health coverage, and those who could still cross borders are at an increased risk, notably of insufficient safety and health at work. There have been numerous cases of exploiting migrant workers and not respecting their rights at work.'<sup>79</sup> Questioning this narrative also provides an opportunity to critique the existing model and promote a more economically sustainable and socially just mobility paradigm.

## Migrant workers contribution to the European COVID-19 response

The COVID-19 crisis has brought a new emphasis on the critical role of migrants in the global workforce. Migrant workers 'were key to our economies and societies before the pandemic and are likely to become even more essential in the recovery to sustain our weakened economies and exhausted societies'.<sup>80</sup> According to a JRC analysis, in the EU, migrants (i.e. defined in this report as both non-EU born and mobile EU workers) account for the 13% of workers that are deemed 'essential' to keep the

EU economies running. In particular, the share of foreign-born workers constitutes up to a third of the total in essential low skilled professions, including cleaners and helpers, and labourers in mining and construction. According to the same report, despite natives making up the majority of key workers (which constitute approximately 31% of employed working-age individuals), non-EU born migrants and EU mobile citizens are essential in filling vital roles.<sup>81</sup>

Faced with a shortage of essential workers due to mobility restrictions, many EU Member States implemented measures to facilitate access to the labour market for third-country nationals already residing in their territory in order to address labour shortages in essential sectors, especially agriculture and healthcare. A few of them granted or extended the right to work in essential sectors to asylum seekers; allowed seasonal workers to extend their residence status; facilitated changes in status (for example from student to work status); or introduced flexibilities to improve access to work in key sectors. Regularisation of third-country nationals who had been employed in certain key sectors was also permitted in a limited number of cases. Finally, as pointed out by the European Commission, 'low skilled workers from third-countries are especially over-represented in a number of key occupations that are vital in the fight against COVID-19, underscoring their often-neglected value within European economies.'<sup>82</sup>

The contribution of the migrant workforce to Europe's effort in keeping vital sections of the economy operational is heterogeneous across Member States, mainly reflecting existing differences in the share of migrant workers over the total workforce. Moreover, as shown in the Figure below, in most Member States, Extra-EU migrants are overrepresented among the key workers, this is especially true for low skilled Extra-EU migrants (e.g. personal care workers in health service, drivers,

<footnote n="79">79 https://www.ilo.org/budapest/whats-new/WCMS_757579/lang--en/index.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="80">80 Foresti, M. (2020) Less gratitude, please. How COVID-19 reveals the need for migration reform. Brookings Institute. May 22, 2020.</footnote>

<footnote n="81">81 Fasani, F. and Mazza, J. (2020) Immigrant Key Workers: Their</footnote>

<footnote>Contribution to Europe's COVID-19 Response. IZA Policy Paper No. 155. 82 https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/inform-3-maintaining-labour-migration-in-essential-sectors-in-times-of-pandemic-covid-19</footnote>
# LEARNING FROM THE COVID-19 CRISIS

Since March 2020, OECD countries, and EU countries in particular, have realised that certain skills and professions are particularly critical during a pandemic: doctors, nurses, care staff, logistics, teachers, etc. While not all of these occupations are filled by migrant workers, it is now recognised that circular migration patterns between EU countries (destination countries) and North African countries (sending countries) have helped – and are helping in particular today – to solve labour shortage problems in some key sectors of the economy. And this at a lower cost, without having to pay for education, training or long-term social integration. Finally, in return, countries of origin receive the skills of labour migrants and the investments of returning migrants. Such a 'triple win narrative' between the migrant, the host country and the country of origin has however been challenged. As ILO points out, particularly since the outbreak of COVID-19, 'many migrants had to return home to ensure receipt of proper health coverage, and those who could still cross borders are at an increased risk, notably of insufficient safety and health at work. There have been numerous cases of exploiting migrant workers and not respecting their rights at work.'<sup>79</sup> Questioning this narrative also provides an opportunity to critique the existing model and promote a more economically sustainable and socially just mobility paradigm.

## Migrant workers contribution to the European COVID-19 response

The COVID-19 crisis has brought a new emphasis on the critical role of migrants in the global workforce. Migrant workers 'were key to our economies and societies before the pandemic and are likely to become even more essential in the recovery to sustain our weakened economies and exhausted societies'.<sup>80</sup> According to a JRC analysis, in the EU, migrants (i.e. defined in this report as both non-EU born and mobile EU workers) account for the 13% of workers that are deemed 'essential' to keep the

EU economies running. In particular, the share of foreign-born workers constitutes up to a third of the total in essential low skilled professions, including cleaners and helpers, and labourers in mining and construction. According to the same report, despite natives making up the majority of key workers (which constitute approximately 31% of employed working-age individuals), non-EU born migrants and EU mobile citizens are essential in filling vital roles.<sup>81</sup>

Faced with a shortage of essential workers due to mobility restrictions, many EU Member States implemented measures to facilitate access to the labour market for third-country nationals already residing in their territory in order to address labour shortages in essential sectors, especially agriculture and healthcare. A few of them granted or extended the right to work in essential sectors to asylum seekers; allowed seasonal workers to extend their residence status; facilitated changes in status (for example from student to work status); or introduced flexibilities to improve access to work in key sectors. Regularisation of third-country nationals who had been employed in certain key sectors was also permitted in a limited number of cases. Finally, as pointed out by the European Commission, 'low skilled workers from third-countries are especially over-represented in a number of key occupations that are vital in the fight against COVID-19, underscoring their often-neglected value within European economies.'<sup>82</sup>

The contribution of the migrant workforce to Europe's effort in keeping vital sections of the economy operational is heterogeneous across Member States, mainly reflecting existing differences in the share of migrant workers over the total workforce. Moreover, as shown in the Figure below, in most Member States, Extra-EU migrants are overrepresented among the key workers, this is especially true for low skilled Extra-EU migrants (e.g. personal care workers in health service, drivers,

<footnote n="79">79 https://www.ilo.org/budapest/whats-new/WCMS_757579/lang--en/index.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="80">80 Foresti, M. (2020) Less gratitude, please. How COVID-19 reveals the need for migration reform. Brookings Institute. May 22, 2020.</footnote>

<footnote n="81">81 Fasani, F. and Mazza, J. (2020) Immigrant Key Workers: Their</footnote>

<footnote>Contribution to Europe's COVID-19 Response. IZA Policy Paper No. 155. 82 https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/inform-3-maintaining-labour-migration-in-essential-sectors-in-times-of-pandemic-covid-19</footnote>
transport and storage labourers, food processing workers).<fnref n="83" />

<figure><img src="image_37.png" /><figcaption>Figure 25: Share of (extra-EU) immigrant women working in each of the key occupations – EUFL 2018</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_38.png" /></figure>

Broken down by gender, the EUFL (2018) data analysed by Fasani and Mazza, shows that six categories of key occupations (personal care workers, cleaners and helpers, health associated professionals, teaching professionals, health professionals and personal service workers) are clearly female dominated, displaying shares of women above 50%, while all the other occupations have a majority of male workers. This pattern is similar for both native (EU) and immigrant workers.

## Impact of COVID on migrant workers

The COVID-19 pandemic has refocused the attention on the challenging working conditions of migrants in some sectors, in particular the agricultural sector. Despite their essential roles in most EU countries, seasonal workers and key workers from Morocco, Tunisia, and to a lower extent Algeria still suffer from very low wages, as well as poor living and working conditions. Similarly, many migrants from North Africa, regardless of their profession and qualifications, found themselves without work, income or social protection overnight. Egyptian migrant workers were also directly impacted as the pandemic coincided with the collapse in oil prices in GCC countries and consequently in oil revenues, which drives the demand for migrant labour in UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. As noted by Ibrahim Awad, 'The combined impact of the pandemic and of the drop in oil prices on Egyptian

<footnote n="83">83 Graph from Fasani, F. and Mazza, J. (2020) Immigrant Key Workers: Their Contribution to Europe's COVID-19 Response. IZA Policy Paper No. 155: 'For each occupation, the bars report the percentage of immigrants over total key workers for each occupation. EU mobile citizens are all those</footnote>

<footnote>workers who are born in a Member State other than the one where they currently work and reside. Extra-EU migrants are all those workers who are born outside of the Union.'</footnote>
transport and storage labourers, food processing workers).<fnref n="83" />

<figure><img src="image_38.png" /><figcaption>Figure 25: Share of (extra-EU) immigrant women working in each of the key occupations – EUFL 2018</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_39.png" /></figure>

Broken down by gender, the EUFL (2018) data analysed by Fasani and Mazza, shows that six categories of key occupations (personal care workers, cleaners and helpers, health associated professionals, teaching professionals, health professionals and personal service workers) are clearly female dominated, displaying shares of women above 50%, while all the other occupations have a majority of male workers. This pattern is similar for both native (EU) and immigrant workers.

## Impact of COVID on migrant workers

The COVID-19 pandemic has refocused the attention on the challenging working conditions of migrants in some sectors, in particular the agricultural sector. Despite their essential roles in most EU countries, seasonal workers and key workers from Morocco, Tunisia, and to a lower extent Algeria still suffer from very low wages, as well as poor living and working conditions. Similarly, many migrants from North Africa, regardless of their profession and qualifications, found themselves without work, income or social protection overnight. Egyptian migrant workers were also directly impacted as the pandemic coincided with the collapse in oil prices in GCC countries and consequently in oil revenues, which drives the demand for migrant labour in UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. As noted by Ibrahim Awad, 'The combined impact of the pandemic and of the drop in oil prices on Egyptian

<footnote n="83">83 Graph from Fasani, F. and Mazza, J. (2020) Immigrant Key Workers: Their Contribution to Europe's COVID-19 Response. IZA Policy Paper No. 155: 'For each occupation, the bars report the percentage of immigrants over total key workers for each occupation. EU mobile citizens are all those</footnote>

<footnote>workers who are born in a Member State other than the one where they currently work and reside. Extra-EU migrants are all those workers who are born outside of the Union.'</footnote>
migrant workers extended to Jordan, their second
destination at present behind Saudi Arabia.<fnref n="84" /> This
section focuses on the specific vulnerabilities that have
particularly affected and continue to affect migrant
workers during the pandemic.

Stranded between two countries

In the first few months of the crisis, North African
migrants who were on temporary visa or residence
holders – including seasonal workers and international
students – were faced with uncertainty related to their
migratory status. This situation impacted their ability to
stay and/or return to their countries of origin or residence
respectively, until bilateral agreements were concluded
between European countries and their country of origin.
When borders reopen and labour markets go back to a
relative normalcy, many Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan
migrant workers and students may not return
immediately because of a lack of resources to travel or
family constraints, such as the need to provide care to
family members. For other migrants still in countries of
destination, there may no longer be job opportunities
available, especially for those employed in the services
sector, like tourism, whereas agriculture is expected to
remain the main sector for hiring in the short and long
term.

The increased risks of irregular migration

The closure of borders in North African countries has
affected traditional irregular migration routes, changed
strategies and increased risks and uncertainties. The
mobility constraints imposed by the pandemic have not
deterred migrants from risking their lives to reach Europe:
since the beginning of 2021, 10,000 migrants and
refugees have arrived on the Italian coast and almost
4,300 on the Canary Islands.⁸⁵ Official estimates of the
number of deaths, according to the UNHCR, are, as of
mid-May 2021, more than 550 deaths, an increase of
more than 200% compared to the previous year. While
this component is essential for understanding the
challenges of migration between Africa and Europe in
terms of protection and humanitarian aid, it is no less

essential in terms of labour market analysis. In a context
of increased precariousness of work, whether formal or
informal, partly linked to the current crisis, the abuse and
exploitation of the situation of irregular migrants
represents a legal, ethical and societal challenge. ⁸⁶

Non-existent social safety net in countries of origin and
destination

Given the sectoral composition of their jobs and their
limited ability to work from home, low-skilled migrant
workers from North Africa have been particularly hit by
the current crisis. As noted by OECD and World Bank
analysts, the important difference to previous recessions
is that the current pandemic negatively impacts sectors
that offer entry-level jobs (e.g., tourism, hotels and
restaurants, retail). In both EU and North African
countries, the sectors which used to absorb part of the
downward pressure on employment in previous
recessions are currently affected the most. In this crisis,
the lack of net safety has been particularly felt by
households in North Africa. Tunisian families with
unemployed parents received the equivalent of 80 euros
in May and again in September 2020: 160 euros for a
family for the whole year 2020. But single people or
couples without children have not received anything. In
this country, according to the World Bank, 59% of workers
who lost their jobs during the lockdown received no
salary, 30% kept their salary and 10% received only part
of it. In Morocco, 44% of low-income households received
nothing at all during the lockdown (compared to only 10%
of the better-off).⁸⁷

Poor protection and access to services in Europe

North African migrant workers (in the formal and informal
sector) face additional hardship in European countries,
compared to native workers. In addition to lack of access
to health care and information on COVID-19 prevention,
many migrant workers are at greater risk of contracting
and transmitting COVID-19. Crowded working conditions,
workers living in communal worksite housing and
continued operations of high-risk facilities have been
cited as variables contributing to spreading COVID-19 in

<footnote n="84">84 Awad, I. (2021). Ibidem.
85 https://news.un.org/fr/story/2021/04/1094972
86 https://www.unhcr.org/fr/news/briefing/2021/5/60915977a/hcr-lance-alerte-nombre-croissant-deces-refugies-migrants-</footnote>

<footnote>mediterranee.html#:~:text=By%20other%2C%20the%20HCR%20is,more%20than%20200%20per%20cent.
87 Faujas, A. (2020) « En Afrique du Nord, la Banque Mondiale craint «une reprise chaotique» », Jeune Afrique, 20 octobre 2020.</footnote>
migrant workers extended to Jordan, their second
destination at present behind Saudi Arabia.<fnref n="84" /> This
section focuses on the specific vulnerabilities that have
particularly affected and continue to affect migrant
workers during the pandemic.

Stranded between two countries

In the first few months of the crisis, North African
migrants who were on temporary visa or residence
holders – including seasonal workers and international
students – were faced with uncertainty related to their
migratory status. This situation impacted their ability to
stay and/or return to their countries of origin or residence
respectively, until bilateral agreements were concluded
between European countries and their country of origin.
When borders reopen and labour markets go back to a
relative normalcy, many Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan
migrant workers and students may not return
immediately because of a lack of resources to travel or
family constraints, such as the need to provide care to
family members. For other migrants still in countries of
destination, there may no longer be job opportunities
available, especially for those employed in the services
sector, like tourism, whereas agriculture is expected to
remain the main sector for hiring in the short and long
term.

The increased risks of irregular migration

The closure of borders in North African countries has
affected traditional irregular migration routes, changed
strategies and increased risks and uncertainties. The
mobility constraints imposed by the pandemic have not
deterred migrants from risking their lives to reach Europe:
since the beginning of 2021, 10,000 migrants and
refugees have arrived on the Italian coast and almost
4,300 on the Canary Islands.⁸⁵ Official estimates of the
number of deaths, according to the UNHCR, are, as of
mid-May 2021, more than 550 deaths, an increase of
more than 200% compared to the previous year. While
this component is essential for understanding the
challenges of migration between Africa and Europe in
terms of protection and humanitarian aid, it is no less

essential in terms of labour market analysis. In a context
of increased precariousness of work, whether formal or
informal, partly linked to the current crisis, the abuse and
exploitation of the situation of irregular migrants
represents a legal, ethical and societal challenge. ⁸⁶

Non-existent social safety net in countries of origin and
destination

Given the sectoral composition of their jobs and their
limited ability to work from home, low-skilled migrant
workers from North Africa have been particularly hit by
the current crisis. As noted by OECD and World Bank
analysts, the important difference to previous recessions
is that the current pandemic negatively impacts sectors
that offer entry-level jobs (e.g., tourism, hotels and
restaurants, retail). In both EU and North African
countries, the sectors which used to absorb part of the
downward pressure on employment in previous
recessions are currently affected the most. In this crisis,
the lack of net safety has been particularly felt by
households in North Africa. Tunisian families with
unemployed parents received the equivalent of 80 euros
in May and again in September 2020: 160 euros for a
family for the whole year 2020. But single people or
couples without children have not received anything. In
this country, according to the World Bank, 59% of workers
who lost their jobs during the lockdown received no
salary, 30% kept their salary and 10% received only part
of it. In Morocco, 44% of low-income households received
nothing at all during the lockdown (compared to only 10%
of the better-off).⁸⁷

Poor protection and access to services in Europe

North African migrant workers (in the formal and informal
sector) face additional hardship in European countries,
compared to native workers. In addition to lack of access
to health care and information on COVID-19 prevention,
many migrant workers are at greater risk of contracting
and transmitting COVID-19. Crowded working conditions,
workers living in communal worksite housing and
continued operations of high-risk facilities have been
cited as variables contributing to spreading COVID-19 in

<footnote n="84">84 Awad, I. (2021). Ibidem.
85 https://news.un.org/fr/story/2021/04/1094972
86 https://www.unhcr.org/fr/news/briefing/2021/5/60915977a/hcr-lance-alerte-nombre-croissant-deces-refugies-migrants-</footnote>

<footnote>mediterranee.html#:~:text=By%20other%2C%20the%20HCR%20is,more%20than%20200%20per%20cent.
87 Faujas, A. (2020) « En Afrique du Nord, la Banque Mondiale craint «une reprise chaotique» », Jeune Afrique, 20 octobre 2020.</footnote>
many essential lines of work and confirm that migrants in high-income countries are at increased risk of infection and death due to COVID-19.<fnref n="88" /> This situation is compounded by inadequate access to health care and social security services. And finally, while the current crisis has raised awareness on the fact that short-sighted and discriminatory policies were affecting migrants, evidence confirms that unequal access to health care, bad housing conditions and crowded workplaces imply risks for the society at large and not only for migrant workers who are directly affected.<fnref n="89" />

## Gender as a compounding factor

The situation of the 7,200 Moroccan women hired to pick strawberries in Huelva received some mediatic attention and shows that the disruption to the informal economy disproportionately affected women. For many, compliance with COVID-19 restrictions is not an option, as their households are dependent on daily earnings for survival. In these conditions, the lack of access to social safety nets places migrants at increased risk of contracting the virus, human trafficking, and labour exploitation, as women migrants try to find ways to continue making a living. The case of the province of Huelva, which was in the news during the pandemic, is emblematic in this respect: 'It is a concerted policy of migration between Morocco and Spain... And these policies are clearly gendered.<fnref n="90" /> It is however important to distinguish between women who benefitted from the GECCO programme between Morocco and Spain and had access to basic social protection safety nets (albeit in ways which may not be fully satisfactory) and those who were in almost completely irregular situations.<fnref n="91" />

## Box 5: Collective Management of Hiring in Origin' programme (GECCO) - Spain

In bilateral collaboration with Morocco, Spain publishes an annual 'Collective Management of Hiring in Origin' (GECCO) programme, whose objective is to regulate the conditions, requirements and characteristics of a temporary contracting regime applicable to

third-country nationals - and in particular with Morocco. For Spain, the central issue is of course the agricultural question, whether it is the grape harvest or the Huelva strawberries. Most temporary workers are hired in spring and summer for red fruit collection campaigns, primarily from Morocco, and are women. These workers are critical to fill open positions, which are advertised at the national level and only when they cannot be filled in this way, are opened to third-country nationals. Most of the seasonal workers have been employed repeatedly for several years, so the GECCO programme implemented in cooperation with Morocco is being regarded as a good practice of circular migration. Given the recurrent scandals about the working conditions of North African, Romanian and Albanian seasonal workers in Spain, Italy and France, it is now urgent to ensure that the law is respected: 'beyond the effects of announcements and websites, if these programs have something positive to contribute, this must be discussed, put into practice, controlled and possibly extended'.<fnref n="92" />
(Source: EMN Spain and EMN 2020)

## Remittances: counter-intuitive resilience?

Remittances play a vital social and economic role,<fnref n="93" /> especially in Egypt, as Awad further points out: 'They help the families receiving them meet their subsistence needs [and contribute] to the current account balance, which helps to bridge the gap resulting from Egypt's chronic trade deficit'.<fnref n="94" /> Egypt receives the largest inflows in North Africa and the sixth largest of any country in the world, totalling $26 billion in 2019. Inflows to other countries are much lower, with $7 billion to Morocco, $2 billion to Tunisia and $1.8 billion to Algeria. These remittances from both diaspora and migrant workers to Egypt in 2019 were equal to 9% of the country's GDP, 6% for Morocco, 5% for Tunisia and 1% for Algeria.

At the household level, at a time of crisis, remittances are an essential safety net for the population, as emphasised by Kalantaryan and McMahon, who note that 'people who receive remittances in the MENA countries studied tend to be less economically active than those who do not receive remittances. Two-thirds (65 per cent) of those who receive remittances are economically inactive (48 per cent) or

<footnote n="88">88 Gagnon, J. (2020) COVID-19: consequences for international migration and development (Paris: OECD).</footnote>

<footnote n="89">89 Milan, A. and Cunnoosamy, R. (2020) COVID-19 and migration governance: A holistic perspective. Migration Policy Practice, Vol. 10, Number 2, April-June 2020.</footnote>

<footnote n="90">90 Zeneidi, D. (2011) Worksite Camps for Seasonal Female Moroccan Workers in Huelva (Spain): Invisibilization and Identity Assignment. ADES, Université Bordeaux-Montaigne.</footnote>

<footnote n="91">91 European Migration Network (2020). Attracting and protecting the rights of seasonal workers in the EU and the United Kingdom – Synthesis Report. Brussels: European Migration Network.</footnote>

<footnote n="92">92 Key informant interview with RSMMS network.</footnote>

<footnote n="93">93 Chaabita, R. International migration, remittances and socio-economic development in Morocco: An empirical analysis, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="94">94 Awad, I. (2021). Ibidem.</footnote>
many essential lines of work and confirm that migrants in high-income countries are at increased risk of infection and death due to COVID-19.<fnref n="88" /> This situation is compounded by inadequate access to health care and social security services. And finally, while the current crisis has raised awareness on the fact that short-sighted and discriminatory policies were affecting migrants, evidence confirms that unequal access to health care, bad housing conditions and crowded workplaces imply risks for the society at large and not only for migrant workers who are directly affected.<fnref n="89" />

## Gender as a compounding factor

The situation of the 7,200 Moroccan women hired to pick strawberries in Huelva received some mediatic attention and shows that the disruption to the informal economy disproportionately affected women. For many, compliance with COVID-19 restrictions is not an option, as their households are dependent on daily earnings for survival. In these conditions, the lack of access to social safety nets places migrants at increased risk of contracting the virus, human trafficking, and labour exploitation, as women migrants try to find ways to continue making a living. The case of the province of Huelva, which was in the news during the pandemic, is emblematic in this respect: 'It is a concerted policy of migration between Morocco and Spain... And these policies are clearly gendered.'<fnref n="90" /> It is however important to distinguish between women who benefitted from the GECCO programme between Morocco and Spain and had access to basic social protection safety nets (albeit in ways which may not be fully satisfactory) and those who were in almost completely irregular situations.<fnref n="91" />

## Box 5: Collective Management of Hiring in Origin' programme (GECCO) - Spain

In bilateral collaboration with Morocco, Spain publishes an annual 'Collective Management of Hiring in Origin' (GECCO) programme, whose objective is to regulate the conditions, requirements and characteristics of a temporary contracting regime applicable to

third-country nationals - and in particular with Morocco. For Spain, the central issue is of course the agricultural question, whether it is the grape harvest or the Huelva strawberries. Most temporary workers are hired in spring and summer for red fruit collection campaigns, primarily from Morocco, and are women. These workers are critical to fill open positions, which are advertised at the national level and only when they cannot be filled in this way, are opened to third-country nationals. Most of the seasonal workers have been employed repeatedly for several years, so the GECCO programme implemented in cooperation with Morocco is being regarded as a good practice of circular migration. Given the recurrent scandals about the working conditions of North African, Romanian and Albanian seasonal workers in Spain, Italy and France, it is now urgent to ensure that the law is respected: 'beyond the effects of announcements and websites, if these programs have something positive to contribute, this must be discussed, put into practice, controlled and possibly extended'.<fnref n="92" />
(Source: EMN Spain and EMN 2020)

## Remittances: counter-intuitive resilience?

Remittances play a vital social and economic role,<fnref n="93" /> especially in Egypt, as Awad further points out: 'They help the families receiving them meet their subsistence needs [and contribute] to the current account balance, which helps to bridge the gap resulting from Egypt's chronic trade deficit'.<fnref n="94" /> Egypt receives the largest inflows in North Africa and the sixth largest of any country in the world, totalling $26 billion in 2019. Inflows to other countries are much lower, with $7 billion to Morocco, $2 billion to Tunisia and $1.8 billion to Algeria. These remittances from both diaspora and migrant workers to Egypt in 2019 were equal to 9% of the country's GDP, 6% for Morocco, 5% for Tunisia and 1% for Algeria.

At the household level, at a time of crisis, remittances are an essential safety net for the population, as emphasised by Kalantaryan and McMahon, who note that 'people who receive remittances in the MENA countries studied tend to be less economically active than those who do not receive remittances. Two-thirds (65 per cent) of those who receive remittances are economically inactive (48 per cent) or

<footnote n="88">88 Gagnon, J. (2020) COVID-19: consequences for international migration and development (Paris: OECD).</footnote>

<footnote n="89">89 Milan, A. and Cunnoosamy, R. (2020) COVID-19 and migration governance: A holistic perspective. Migration Policy Practice, Vol. 10, Number 2, April-June 2020.</footnote>

<footnote n="90">90 Zeneidi, D. (2011) Worksite Camps for Seasonal Female Moroccan Workers in Huelva (Spain): Invisibilization and Identity Assignment. ADES, Université Bordeaux-Montaigne.</footnote>

<footnote n="91">91 European Migration Network (2020). Attracting and protecting the rights of seasonal workers in the EU and the United Kingdom – Synthesis Report. Brussels: European Migration Network.</footnote>

<footnote n="92">92 Key informant interview with RSMMS network.</footnote>

<footnote n="93">93 Chaabita, R. International migration, remittances and socio-economic development in Morocco: An empirical analysis, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="94">94 Awad, I. (2021). Ibidem.</footnote>
unemployed (17 per cent). But those who receive remittances also tend to have a stronger economic standing, as frequently receiving remittances is associated with a greater tendency to be able to save money, especially if we focus on those with the most frequent and stable source of inflows: whereas 31 per cent of those who receive remittances monthly are able to save, only 10 per cent of those who never receive remittances are.<fnref n="95" /> In addition to the direct economic effects of lost remittances, studies show that international remittances from migrants to their families reduce child labour and keep children at school.<fnref n="96" />

<figure><img src="image_39.png" /><figcaption>Figure 26: Volumes of remittances per country (2000-2020)
Source WB-KNOMAD</figcaption></figure>

Preliminary World Bank analysis in 2020 predicted a decline in remittances for all low- and middle-income countries of 7% in 2020, followed by a further decline of 7.5% in 2021.<fnref n="97" /> At the global level, Ratha et al. had estimated that remittances to North African countries would fall by 20% in 2020, compared to 2019, due to the global slowdown<fnref n="98" /> By contrast, according to the latest revised World Bank estimates, remittances to Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia grew in 2020 relative to 2019 by 6.5%, 6.5% and 2.5% consecutively, while remittances to Algeria remained virtually unchanged. As Gagnon

suggests, such a surprising trend may result from the 'counter-cyclical nature' of remittances, with migrants tending to increase remittances during economic downturns, regardless of their own circumstances, in order to contribute to the well-being of their families or communities.<fnref n="99" /> For policymakers on both sides of the Mediterranean, this unexpected news in today's chaotic and uncertain environment calls for targeted support linked to the development of digital means of payment as well as better financial inclusion in both destination and origin countries – throughout the migration cycle and in relation to diasporas. And the potential is huge. The figure below provides a rapid picture of the percentages of women and men aged 15 or over who have a financial institution account, debit card account, or credit card account. Of particular note are: 1) the low access to banking services (savings, cards, in particular); 2) the confirmation of the lower financial inclusion of women. The recent OECD summit on post-COVID strategies in the MENA countries particularly addressed this issue.<fnref n="100" />

<figure><img src="image_40.png" /><figcaption>Figure 27: Access to institutional financial instruments in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt (by gender)</figcaption></figure>

Data from the MENA-OECD Government Business Summit (30-31 March 2021). As percentages are cumulative, totals can exceed 100% (up to 300% in theory), based on World Bank Group (2018).

<footnote n="95">95 Kalantaryan, S. and McMahon, S., Covid-19 and Remittances in Africa, EUR 30262 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020.</footnote>

<footnote n="96">96 Ebeke, C. H. (2010) ‘The Effect of Remittances on Child Labour: Cross-country evidence’, Economics Bulletin, vol. 30, no. 1, 2010, pp. 351–364.</footnote>

<footnote n="97">97 World Bank (2020) Migration and Development Brief 32: COVID-19 World Bank (2020) Crisis Through a Migration Lens (Washington DC: World Bank Group and KNOMAD.</footnote>

<footnote n="98">98 World Bank (2020) Migration and Development Brief 32: COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens (Washington DC: World Bank Group and KNOMAD, available online at https://www.knomad.org/publication/migration-and-development-brief-32-covid-19-crisis-through-migration-lens/);</footnote>

<footnote n="99">99 Gagnon, Jason (2020) COVID-19: Implications for International Migration and Development. Paris: OECD.</footnote>

<footnote n="100">100 MENA-OECD Government Business Summit (30-31 March 2021) - Session 3: An eco-system for youth economic empowerment.</footnote>
unemployed (17 per cent). But those who receive remittances also tend to have a stronger economic standing, as frequently receiving remittances is associated with a greater tendency to be able to save money, especially if we focus on those with the most frequent and stable source of inflows: whereas 31 per cent of those who receive remittances monthly are able to save, only 10 per cent of those who never receive remittances are.<fnref n="95" /> In addition to the direct economic effects of lost remittances, studies show that international remittances from migrants to their families reduce child labour and keep children at school.<fnref n="96" />

<figure><img src="image_40.png" /><figcaption>Figure 26: Volumes of remittances per country (2000-2020)
Source WB-KNOMAD</figcaption></figure>

Preliminary World Bank analysis in 2020 predicted a decline in remittances for all low- and middle-income countries of 7% in 2020, followed by a further decline of 7.5% in 2021.<fnref n="97" /> At the global level, Ratha et al. had estimated that remittances to North African countries would fall by 20% in 2020, compared to 2019, due to the global slowdown<fnref n="98" /> By contrast, according to the latest revised World Bank estimates, remittances to Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia grew in 2020 relative to 2019 by 6.5%, 6.5% and 2.5% consecutively, while remittances to Algeria remained virtually unchanged. As Gagnon

suggests, such a surprising trend may result from the 'counter-cyclical nature' of remittances, with migrants tending to increase remittances during economic downturns, regardless of their own circumstances, in order to contribute to the well-being of their families or communities.<fnref n="99" /> For policymakers on both sides of the Mediterranean, this unexpected news in today's chaotic and uncertain environment calls for targeted support linked to the development of digital means of payment as well as better financial inclusion in both destination and origin countries – throughout the migration cycle and in relation to diasporas. And the potential is huge. The figure below provides a rapid picture of the percentages of women and men aged 15 or over who have a financial institution account, debit card account, or credit card account. Of particular note are: 1) the low access to banking services (savings, cards, in particular); 2) the confirmation of the lower financial inclusion of women. The recent OECD summit on post-COVID strategies in the MENA countries particularly addressed this issue.<fnref n="100" />

<figure><img src="image_41.png" /><figcaption>Figure 27: Access to institutional financial instruments in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt (by gender)</figcaption></figure>

Data from the MENA-OECD Government Business Summit (30-31 March 2021). As percentages are cumulative, totals can exceed 100% (up to 300% in theory), based on World Bank Group (2018).

<footnote n="95">95 Kalantaryan, S. and McMahon, S., Covid-19 and Remittances in Africa, EUR 30262 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020.</footnote>

<footnote n="96">96 Ebeke, C. H. (2010) ‘The Effect of Remittances on Child Labour: Cross-country evidence’, Economics Bulletin, vol. 30, no. 1, 2010, pp. 351–364.</footnote>

<footnote n="97">97 World Bank (2020) Migration and Development Brief 32: COVID-19 World Bank (2020) Crisis Through a Migration Lens (Washington DC: World Bank Group and KNOMAD.</footnote>

<footnote n="98">98 World Bank (2020) Migration and Development Brief 32: COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens (Washington DC: World Bank Group and KNOMAD, available online at https://www.knomad.org/publication/migration-and-development-brief-32-covid-19-crisis-through-migration-lens/);</footnote>

<footnote n="99">99 Gagnon, Jason (2020) COVID-19: Implications for International Migration and Development. Paris: OECD.</footnote>

<footnote n="100">100 MENA-OECD Government Business Summit (30-31 March 2021) - Session 3: An eco-system for youth economic empowerment.</footnote>
KEY POLICY TRADEOFFS

Analyses of the pandemic situation at regional and transnational levels have emphasised the lack of a concerted and multilateral approach. Labour migration is already a key priority for the African Union Commission (AUC) and its Member States on the African continent, as reflected in the Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) and its Plan of Action (2018-30), and the Joint Labour Migration Governance Program (JLMP).<fnref n="101" /> But at a time when there are many uncertainties about the health situation – globally and nationally – it is probably time to take the next step, by responding to current emergencies while reforming for the longer term. Failure to do so could well affect the political reading of migration between the two shores of the Mediterranean. In the words of Schöfberger and Rango (2020), COVID-19 and migration require transnational approaches, however, 'diversified impacts of the pandemic on national societies and economies may lead to wider divergence in migration related priorities for States within regions, and further hinder the identification of shared approaches on migration that are currently being discussed at the level of the African Union, ECOWAS, Arab Maghreb Union and European Union. In this way, it may reinforce current trends towards tightening border controls'.<fnref n="102" />

In this regard, a common and alternative policy goal seems appropriate, with a shift from politicised 'migration management' to a more collaborative socio-economic paradigm focusing on protection, skills, jobs and legal channels. As highlighted by Kumar et al. (2021), the questions are: 'How do we sustain these reforms beyond the pandemic? How do we go beyond the usual emergency/crisis narrative that so often taints migration debates and leaves us with little space for a balanced, rational, and politically viable approach to reform?'<fnref n="103" /> This last section presents perspectives to feed future dialogues between actors on both sides of the Mediterranean on the issue of mobility and labour migration.

Existing labour migration frameworks:
questioning the strategy and narratives

What do we learn from current confirmed COVID-19 related labour migration policy decisions in Europe and North African countries? What role will skills-based migration play in future labour mobility schemes (both North South and South South) in view of the EU Migration Pact?

Trade-off #1: From politicised to political dialogues

The current solutions of restricting movement of Africans, securitisation of migration and conditionality-based migration cooperation are costly to both governments and migrants and have mixed results. Moving forward, migration policies and cooperation between European and North African countries should be designed in a comprehensive and consultative way to ensure that states, migrants and other relevant stakeholders, including the private sector, contribute to finding and developing better mobility outcomes.<fnref n="104" /> In this respect, what legal, administrative and formal modalities could facilitate the mobility and integration of North African migrant workers in the EU? How can social partners and stakeholders (including the RSMMS network, as well as civil society organisations) be better involved in this dialogue?

Trade-off #2: Assessing the reality of brain drain phenomena

The challenges of North Africa's development require a singular effort to train and maintain its human resources on its soil – in particular its most highly skilled workers. Pre-COVID-19 increasing brain drain suggests that 'it will take more than an incentive to patriotism to bring back the executives settled abroad or to dissuade those

<footnote n="101">101 The latter was developed by the AUC in close collaboration with the ILO, IOM, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and adopted by African Union member states in January 2015.</footnote>

<footnote n="102">102 Fargues, P., Rango, M., Borgnas, E. and Schöfgerger, I. editors (2020) Migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean : trends, risks, development and governance, IOM Geneva.</footnote>

<footnote n="103">103 Kumar, C., Oommen, E., Fragapane, F. and Foresti, M. (2021) Beyond gratitude: Lessons learned from migrants’ contribution to the Covid-19 response, ODI, London.</footnote>

<footnote n="104">104 O’Brien, M.L. and Eger, M.A. (2020) Suppression, Spikes, and Stigma: How COVID-19 Will Shape International Migration and Hostilities toward It. International Migration Review, November 2020.</footnote>
KEY POLICY TRADEOFFS

Analyses of the pandemic situation at regional and transnational levels have emphasised the lack of a concerted and multilateral approach. Labour migration is already a key priority for the African Union Commission (AUC) and its Member States on the African continent, as reflected in the Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) and its Plan of Action (2018-30), and the Joint Labour Migration Governance Program (JLMP).<fnref n="101" /> But at a time when there are many uncertainties about the health situation – globally and nationally – it is probably time to take the next step, by responding to current emergencies while reforming for the longer term. Failure to do so could well affect the political reading of migration between the two shores of the Mediterranean. In the words of Schöfberger and Rango (2020), COVID-19 and migration require transnational approaches, however, 'diversified impacts of the pandemic on national societies and economies may lead to wider divergence in migration related priorities for States within regions, and further hinder the identification of shared approaches on migration that are currently being discussed at the level of the African Union, ECOWAS, Arab Maghreb Union and European Union. In this way, it may reinforce current trends towards tightening border controls'.<fnref n="102" />

In this regard, a common and alternative policy goal seems appropriate, with a shift from politicised 'migration management' to a more collaborative socio-economic paradigm focusing on protection, skills, jobs and legal channels. As highlighted by Kumar et al. (2021), the questions are: 'How do we sustain these reforms beyond the pandemic? How do we go beyond the usual emergency/crisis narrative that so often taints migration debates and leaves us with little space for a balanced, rational, and politically viable approach to reform?'<fnref n="103" /> This last section presents perspectives to feed future dialogues between actors on both sides of the Mediterranean on the issue of mobility and labour migration.

Existing labour migration frameworks:
questioning the strategy and narratives

What do we learn from current confirmed COVID-19 related labour migration policy decisions in Europe and North African countries? What role will skills-based migration play in future labour mobility schemes (both North South and South South) in view of the EU Migration Pact?

Trade-off #1: From politicised to political dialogues

The current solutions of restricting movement of Africans, securitisation of migration and conditionality-based migration cooperation are costly to both governments and migrants and have mixed results. Moving forward, migration policies and cooperation between European and North African countries should be designed in a comprehensive and consultative way to ensure that states, migrants and other relevant stakeholders, including the private sector, contribute to finding and developing better mobility outcomes.<fnref n="104" /> In this respect, what legal, administrative and formal modalities could facilitate the mobility and integration of North African migrant workers in the EU? How can social partners and stakeholders (including the RSMMS network, as well as civil society organisations) be better involved in this dialogue?

Trade-off #2: Assessing the reality of brain drain phenomena

The challenges of North Africa's development require a singular effort to train and maintain its human resources on its soil – in particular its most highly skilled workers. Pre-COVID-19 increasing brain drain suggests that 'it will take more than an incentive to patriotism to bring back the executives settled abroad or to dissuade those

<footnote n="101">101 The latter was developed by the AUC in close collaboration with the ILO, IOM, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and adopted by African Union member states in January 2015.</footnote>

<footnote n="102">102 Fargues, P., Rango, M., Borgnas, E. and Schöfgerger, I. editors (2020) Migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean : trends, risks, development and governance, IOM Geneva.</footnote>

<footnote n="103">103 Kumar, C., Oommen, E., Fragapane, F. and Foresti, M. (2021) Beyond gratitude: Lessons learned from migrants’ contribution to the Covid-19 response, ODI, London.</footnote>

<footnote n="104">104 O’Brien, M.L. and Eger, M.A. (2020) Suppression, Spikes, and Stigma: How COVID-19 Will Shape International Migration and Hostilities toward It. International Migration Review, November 2020.</footnote>
tempted by an extraterritorial professional adventure'.<fnref n="105" />
Perhaps it would be more judicious for EU countries to
partner with North African countries in their evolution by
exchanging their respective workers within the
framework of fixed-term work contracts?<fnref n="106" /> How can EU
countries avoid triggering a de facto brain drain and help
highly skilled North African better contribute or return to
their countries of origin? How could sending North
African countries improve the living and working
conditions of academics and researchers, facilitate the
movement of students and researchers, encourage the
return of graduates, and help them form a diaspora?

Box 6: Collecting and Analyzing Socio-Economic Data to Inform Policy Dialogue in North Africa

The statistical capacity score is an index assessing the capacity of countries statistical systems: ability to collect, analyse and disseminate high-quality data about its population and economy. It is an important socio-economic indicator to guide private investment and inform realistic programme and policy formulation. This chart shows the significant backlog in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia in the areas of statistical data collection and analysis. The lack of significant progress in this area remains a handicap for informing national or regional strategies in the field of mobility because 'the issue of migration is not just about flows, routes, or hubs – which is a useful but rather politicised and basically incomplete approach.'<fnref n="107" /> Other socio-economic variables need to be integrated to get a good understanding of the phenomena, whether it is labour migration or other forms of mobility.

<figure><img src="image_41.png" /><figcaption>Figure 28: Statistical capacity score (WB - ILOSTAT - 2020)</figcaption></figure>

Trade-off #3: A broader understanding of mobility in the Mediterranean

North African and European countries need to devise responsive policies that promote safe and legal migration pathways as alternatives for migrants – often coming from West and Central African countries – who make the perilous and often deadliest journey across the Mediterranean.<fnref n="108" /> Current schemes can be reviewed to include broader categories of migrants and thus contribute to mitigating the tragic situation in the Mediterranean. Beyond the existing and traditional focus on criminal networks and migrants’ use of smugglers, what formal mechanisms could enable these migrants to contribute – according to their qualifications and skills – to local labour markets on a temporary or regular basis?

Trade-off #4: Rethinking the understanding of ‘key workers’ in the EU

For both skilled and low-skilled migrant workers, labour market access barriers for migrants and poor employment conditions, such as inadequate recognition of skills and lack of social assistance, stifle migrants' economic contributions in countries of transit and destination, and limit their ability to support their communities in countries of origin. Elaborating on existing pilot skills mobility partnerships, African and EU countries may seek to expand access to legal migration pathways for different types of skilled workers from Africa and North Africa in particular. While the new Pact on Migration and Asylum proposes to pilot talent partnerships, including with African countries, a key lesson learned from COVID-19 is that 'immigration policies must go beyond inflexible 'low' and 'high' skills classifications. The response to the Covid-19 emergency has demonstrated the need for essential workers at all skill levels, who will be even more essential now in the long path to recovery for our health, economies and societies.'<fnref n="109" /> How do we move from a narrow understanding of chosen migration (highly skilled) to a more sustainable and balanced notion of skills? What legal pathways to migration and mechanisms should be designed – for various categories of skills and

<footnote n="105">105 Maingari, D. (2011). Exode des cerveaux en Afrique : réalités et déconstruction du discours sur un phénomène social. Éducation et sociétés, 2(2), 131-147.</footnote>

<footnote n="106">106 Almalki, R. (2011). Vous avez dit : immigration choisie ? Cités, 2(2), 113-118.</footnote>

<footnote n="107">107 Interview with the World Bank, June 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="108">108 Awad, I. (2017). Towards a Joint Approach to Migration and Asylum in the Euro-Mediterranean Space,” in Beyond the Migration and Asylum Crisis, edited by Ferruccio Pastore (Aspen Institute Italia)</footnote>

<footnote n="109">109 Kumar, C., Oommen, E., Fragapane, F. and Foresti, M. (2021) Beyond gratitude: Lessons learned from migrants’ contribution to the Covid-19 response, ODI, London.</footnote>
tempted by an extraterritorial professional adventure'.<fnref n="105" />
Perhaps it would be more judicious for EU countries to
partner with North African countries in their evolution by
exchanging their respective workers within the
framework of fixed-term work contracts?<fnref n="106" /> How can EU
countries avoid triggering a de facto brain drain and help
highly skilled North African better contribute or return to
their countries of origin? How could sending North
African countries improve the living and working
conditions of academics and researchers, facilitate the
movement of students and researchers, encourage the
return of graduates, and help them form a diaspora?

Box 6: Collecting and Analyzing Socio-Economic Data to Inform Policy Dialogue in North Africa

The statistical capacity score is an index assessing the capacity of countries statistical systems: ability to collect, analyse and disseminate high-quality data about its population and economy. It is an important socio-economic indicator to guide private investment and inform realistic programme and policy formulation. This chart shows the significant backlog in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia in the areas of statistical data collection and analysis. The lack of significant progress in this area remains a handicap for informing national or regional strategies in the field of mobility because 'the issue of migration is not just about flows, routes, or hubs – which is a useful but rather politicised and basically incomplete approach.'<fnref n="107" /> Other socio-economic variables need to be integrated to get a good understanding of the phenomena, whether it is labour migration or other forms of mobility.

<figure><img src="image_42.png" /><figcaption>Figure 28: Statistical capacity score (WB - ILOSTAT - 2020)</figcaption></figure>

Trade-off #3: A broader understanding of mobility in the Mediterranean

North African and European countries need to devise responsive policies that promote safe and legal migration pathways as alternatives for migrants – often coming from West and Central African countries – who make the perilous and often deadliest journey across the Mediterranean.<fnref n="108" /> Current schemes can be reviewed to include broader categories of migrants and thus contribute to mitigating the tragic situation in the Mediterranean. Beyond the existing and traditional focus on criminal networks and migrants’ use of smugglers, what formal mechanisms could enable these migrants to contribute – according to their qualifications and skills – to local labour markets on a temporary or regular basis?

Trade-off #4: Rethinking the understanding of ‘key workers’ in the EU

For both skilled and low-skilled migrant workers, labour market access barriers for migrants and poor employment conditions, such as inadequate recognition of skills and lack of social assistance, stifle migrants' economic contributions in countries of transit and destination, and limit their ability to support their communities in countries of origin. Elaborating on existing pilot skills mobility partnerships, African and EU countries may seek to expand access to legal migration pathways for different types of skilled workers from Africa and North Africa in particular. While the new Pact on Migration and Asylum proposes to pilot talent partnerships, including with African countries, a key lesson learned from COVID-19 is that 'immigration policies must go beyond inflexible 'low' and 'high' skills classifications. The response to the Covid-19 emergency has demonstrated the need for essential workers at all skill levels, who will be even more essential now in the long path to recovery for our health, economies and societies.'<fnref n="109" /> How do we move from a narrow understanding of chosen migration (highly skilled) to a more sustainable and balanced notion of skills? What legal pathways to migration and mechanisms should be designed – for various categories of skills and

<footnote n="105">105 Maingari, D. (2011). Exode des cerveaux en Afrique : réalités et déconstruction du discours sur un phénomène social. Éducation et sociétés, 2(2), 131-147.</footnote>

<footnote n="106">106 Almalki, R. (2011). Vous avez dit : immigration choisie ? Cités, 2(2), 113-118.</footnote>

<footnote n="107">107 Interview with the World Bank, June 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="108">108 Awad, I. (2017). Towards a Joint Approach to Migration and Asylum in the Euro-Mediterranean Space,” in Beyond the Migration and Asylum Crisis, edited by Ferruccio Pastore (Aspen Institute Italia)</footnote>

<footnote n="109">109 Kumar, C., Oommen, E., Fragapane, F. and Foresti, M. (2021) Beyond gratitude: Lessons learned from migrants’ contribution to the Covid-19 response, ODI, London.</footnote>
qualifications, including both low and highly skilled professionals – to optimize a mutually beneficial labour mobility process?

## A new deal for countries of origin, destination and migrant workers

What will be the new skills and competencies in demand post Covid-19? What will be the role of the platform economy? How can it be regulated for the benefit of countries of origin, destination and the migrant workers them-selves?

### Trade-off #5: Operational knowledge based platform

A gap still exists in terms of defining, informing, sharing and objectively analysing data on labour migration between North Africa and Europe. The development of policy approaches based on evidence gathering and regular, nuanced analyses is among the MPFA's recommendations. Beyond data collection, institutional arrangements such as THAMM can contribute to an improvement of cooperation, but it is necessary to go further, towards formalised regular collaboration on constantly evolving issues – such as the labour market but also health, social or economic crises which require a great reactivity. What regional and transnational bodies can be utilized and / or imagined to develop greater harmonization and centralization of definitions, data collection and sharing, identification of mutual data gaps? How to avoid the current under-representation of migrant workers – in the formal or informal sector of the economy – in most studies and information collections?

### Trade-off #6: Stronger ethical standards for seasonal work (decent work) involving the diaspora

The fear over a shortage of global food supplies has raised awareness about the strategic value of the agricultural sector and the crucial role of seasonal migrant workers within it. This could begin a transformative discussion about the need to understand more holistically how migrants interact with specific economic sectors and communities – in particular in the sectors of agriculture, construction, and tourism, which all generate a lot of seasonal demand but probably require a stronger inclusion of international labour standards and migrant workers’ rights. Could bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks, involving countries of origin (mainly Tunisia and Morocco) and destination of migrants

(mainly Spain, Italy and France) contribute to this effort? What could be the role of the diaspora, of diasporas - in terms of economic resilience but also of solidarity?

## Box 7: Partnerships between local authorities and diaspora organisations for local development in Morocco

‘The Moroccan sizeable diaspora estimated at 15% of its population, is concentrated in OECD countries, and mainly in Europe. It is a well-organised diaspora, with associations of Moroccans abroad increasingly concerned with the development of the areas of origin. This development has been very fast, and reflects on the one hand, a better integration into the destination country, while on the other hand it continues to reinforce a positive perception of migration in both destination and origin countries. A case of interest is that of Migrations et Developpement (M&D), an NGO established in 1986 in France as an Organisation de Solidarité Internationale Issue des Migrations (OSIM), that operates between Morocco and diaspora networks in France. M&D promotes a modality of operation that puts at the core a “Community of Solidarity Development”, which is a local development collective structured as an association including diaspora members originating from the community and members of the community of origin, nurtured through dialogues, meetings and virtual networks. The local development association provides a co-financing and in-kind (technical and labour) contribution to the implementation of development projects, especially with a focus on rural areas and contribution to revitalise the rural economy, for example through eco-tourism, or provide essential services (such as local health centres). (...) Since its establishment, the association has continued to develop its collaboration with donors and international organisations, becoming a key player at the interface of local development, diaspora and development cooperation in rural areas in Morocco. (...) Considering that an increasing number of returnees to Morocco are youth and that many of them are highly skilled and establish enterprises upon return, there is an important potential in further mobilising the diaspora developmental action towards facilitating the productive return of migrants. Based on the experience in With regards to addressing the constraints of potential migrants, households and communities, it is important to stress the importance of building on the specificities of the local context, needs and policy opportunities, through the partnership between local communities, decentralised government and diaspora associations for the identification and co-funding of development projects.’

(Source: Castagnone, E. and Termine, P. (2018). Chapitre 7 - Migration des jeunes ruraux méditerranéens : déterminants socio-économiques, défis et opportunités pour l’élaboration de politiques ciblées. Dans : CIHEAM éd., MediTERRA 2018: Migrations et développement rural inclusif en Méditerranée (pp. 145-167). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.)
qualifications, including both low and highly skilled professionals – to optimize a mutually beneficial labour mobility process?

## A new deal for countries of origin, destination and migrant workers

What will be the new skills and competencies in demand post Covid-19? What will be the role of the platform economy? How can it be regulated for the benefit of countries of origin, destination and the migrant workers them-selves?

### Trade-off #5: Operational knowledge based platform

A gap still exists in terms of defining, informing, sharing and objectively analysing data on labour migration between North Africa and Europe. The development of policy approaches based on evidence gathering and regular, nuanced analyses is among the MPFA's recommendations. Beyond data collection, institutional arrangements such as THAMM can contribute to an improvement of cooperation, but it is necessary to go further, towards formalised regular collaboration on constantly evolving issues – such as the labour market but also health, social or economic crises which require a great reactivity. What regional and transnational bodies can be utilized and / or imagined to develop greater harmonization and centralization of definitions, data collection and sharing, identification of mutual data gaps? How to avoid the current under-representation of migrant workers – in the formal or informal sector of the economy – in most studies and information collections?

### Trade-off #6: Stronger ethical standards for seasonal work (decent work) involving the diaspora

The fear over a shortage of global food supplies has raised awareness about the strategic value of the agricultural sector and the crucial role of seasonal migrant workers within it. This could begin a transformative discussion about the need to understand more holistically how migrants interact with specific economic sectors and communities – in particular in the sectors of agriculture, construction, and tourism, which all generate a lot of seasonal demand but probably require a stronger inclusion of international labour standards and migrant workers' rights. Could bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks, involving countries of origin (mainly Tunisia and Morocco) and destination of migrants

(mainly Spain, Italy and France) contribute to this effort? What could be the role of the diaspora, of diasporas - in terms of economic resilience but also of solidarity?

## Box 7: Partnerships between local authorities and diaspora organisations for local development in Morocco

‘The Moroccan sizeable diaspora estimated at 15% of its population, is concentrated in OECD countries, and mainly in Europe. It is a well-organised diaspora, with associations of Moroccans abroad increasingly concerned with the development of the areas of origin. This development has been very fast, and reflects on the one hand, a better integration into the destination country, while on the other hand it continues to reinforce a positive perception of migration in both destination and origin countries. A case of interest is that of Migrations et Developpement (M&D), an NGO established in 1986 in France as an Organisation de Solidarité Internationale Issue des Migrations (OSIM), that operates between Morocco and diaspora networks in France. M&D promotes a modality of operation that puts at the core a “Community of Solidarity Development”, which is a local development collective structured as an association including diaspora members originating from the community and members of the community of origin, nurtured through dialogues, meetings and virtual networks. The local development association provides a co-financing and in-kind (technical and labour) contribution to the implementation of development projects, especially with a focus on rural areas and contribution to revitalise the rural economy, for example through eco-tourism, or provide essential services (such as local health centres). (...) Since its establishment, the association has continued to develop its collaboration with donors and international organisations, becoming a key player at the interface of local development, diaspora and development cooperation in rural areas in Morocco. (...) Considering that an increasing number of returnees to Morocco are youth and that many of them are highly skilled and establish enterprises upon return, there is an important potential in further mobilising the diaspora developmental action towards facilitating the productive return of migrants. Based on the experience in With regards to addressing the constraints of potential migrants, households and communities, it is important to stress the importance of building on the specificities of the local context, needs and policy opportunities, through the partnership between local communities, decentralised government and diaspora associations for the identification and co-funding of development projects.’

(Source: Castagnone, E. and Termine, P. (2018). Chapitre 7 - Migration des jeunes ruraux méditerranéens : déterminants socio-économiques, défis et opportunités pour l'élaboration de politiques ciblées. Dans : CIHEAM éd., MediTERRA 2018: Migrations et développement rural inclusif en Méditerranée (pp. 145-167). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.)
Trade-off #7: Mutually beneficial exchanges in university education and vocational training

For higher education institutions and international students, the gaps created by the pandemic will need to be filled through strategic efforts. These efforts should aim to attract North African students, while understanding that the spending power and ability of internationals to pay high fees may be affected by the negative economic impact of COVID-19 in most migrant- sending countries (in particular from Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt). Therefore, how should EU Member States and their North African partners create some positive incentives that would benefit North African students, EU Universities, academic and TVET institutions? What would be the relevant mix of scholarships, flexible mobility conditions, and tailored individual mentorship?

Trade-off #8: Assessing the migration cycle

To take full advantage of the potential of the labour market, all stakeholders need to consider the entire migration cycle. It is therefore important to design not only the pre-departure orientation phase, but also the return and reintegration phase. For example, it is essential to focus on the development of relevant professional knowledge and skills to prepare workers to access foreign labor markets; symmetrically, two-way processes and modalities should be put in place to bring the skills, techniques, and technologies that migrant workers can acquire abroad back to the country and community of origin in North Africa, which can also improve their (re)integration into the local market upon their return. How can the migration cycle be better taken into account in political and programmatic decision-making? What roles employers, social partners (unions) and other market actors can play in promoting the integration and/or reintegration of labor migrants into local markets throughout the migration cycle?

Trade-off #9: Promotion of formal economies in North African countries

To take full advantage of the potential of the labour market while ensuring decent work and expanding social protection safety nets, all stakeholders need to consider

the sharp development of a formal employment and business in a post COVID-19 scenario crisis. Several areas may be considered, such as: a better communication on the benefits of formality (access to financial services and insurance services), a simplification of and incentives for formalisation, public-private dialogue, inclusion of social partners (in particular the RSMMS<fnref n="110" /> network), stronger focus on gender equality, development of digital capacity.

Protection mechanisms and decent work

Can COVID-19 help decision makers and other relevant stakeholders identify new opportunities regarding the protection of migrant workers, for instance in terms of regularisation of jobs occupied by migrants (following the realization of their essential nature) or in terms of renegotiated bilateral labour migration agreements and social security agreements?

Trade-off #10: Generalisation of social services – regardless of immigration or visa statuses

A key conclusion of the present preliminary review, is that ‘among migrants, the low skilled workers are especially over-represented in a number of key occupations that are vital in the fight against COVID-19, underscoring their often neglected value within European economies.’<fnref n="111" /> Today’s context calls for a stronger enforcement of current policies and agreements on migrant access to social protection and equal treatment. Policies could, for instance, incorporate migrants’ needs through extending work permits and providing access to healthcare and other social services, regardless of immigration or visa status. Broadening of sustainable socio-economic reintegration programmes, in particular creating pathways towards accessing income generating activities and social protection in the country of origin is another possible way forward. How should bilateral and multilateral agreements be revisited to mitigate the COVID-19-induced risks that migrant workers face?

Trade-off #11: Localised access to services, in collaboration with RSMMS and relevant social partners

The action plan provided for in the Hammamet Declaration between Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia has

<footnote n="110">110 The Mediterranean-Sub-Saharan Migration Trade Union Network (RSMMS) includes among its members: UGTT (Tunisia), CFDT (France), CGIL (Italy), CGTM (Mauritania), CNTS (Senegal), CNTS FC (Senegal), CSA</footnote>

<footnote>(Senegal), CSI Africa, UDTS (Senegal), UMT (Morocco), UNSAS (Senegal), USTN (Niger).</footnote>

<footnote n="111">111 Fasani, F. and Mazza, J. (2020) Immigrant Key Workers: Their Contribution to Europe's COVID-19 Response. IZA Policy Paper No. 155.</footnote>
Trade-off #7: Mutually beneficial exchanges in university education and vocational training

For higher education institutions and international students, the gaps created by the pandemic will need to be filled through strategic efforts. These efforts should aim to attract North African students, while understanding that the spending power and ability of internationals to pay high fees may be affected by the negative economic impact of COVID-19 in most migrant- sending countries (in particular from Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt). Therefore, how should EU Member States and their North African partners create some positive incentives that would benefit North African students, EU Universities, academic and TVET institutions? What would be the relevant mix of scholarships, flexible mobility conditions, and tailored individual mentorship?

Trade-off #8: Assessing the migration cycle

To take full advantage of the potential of the labour market, all stakeholders need to consider the entire migration cycle. It is therefore important to design not only the pre-departure orientation phase, but also the return and reintegration phase. For example, it is essential to focus on the development of relevant professional knowledge and skills to prepare workers to access foreign labor markets; symmetrically, two-way processes and modalities should be put in place to bring the skills, techniques, and technologies that migrant workers can acquire abroad back to the country and community of origin in North Africa, which can also improve their (re)integration into the local market upon their return. How can the migration cycle be better taken into account in political and programmatic decision-making? What roles employers, social partners (unions) and other market actors can play in promoting the integration and/or reintegration of labor migrants into local markets throughout the migration cycle?

Trade-off #9: Promotion of formal economies in North African countries

To take full advantage of the potential of the labour market while ensuring decent work and expanding social protection safety nets, all stakeholders need to consider

the sharp development of a formal employment and business in a post COVID-19 scenario crisis. Several areas may be considered, such as: a better communication on the benefits of formality (access to financial services and insurance services), a simplification of and incentives for formalisation, public-private dialogue, inclusion of social partners (in particular the RSMMS<fnref n="110" /> network), stronger focus on gender equality, development of digital capacity.

Protection mechanisms and decent work

Can COVID-19 help decision makers and other relevant stakeholders identify new opportunities regarding the protection of migrant workers, for instance in terms of regularisation of jobs occupied by migrants (following the realization of their essential nature) or in terms of renegotiated bilateral labour migration agreements and social security agreements?

Trade-off #10: Generalisation of social services – regardless of immigration or visa statuses

A key conclusion of the present preliminary review, is that ‘among migrants, the low skilled workers are especially over-represented in a number of key occupations that are vital in the fight against COVID-19, underscoring their often neglected value within European economies.’<fnref n="111" /> Today’s context calls for a stronger enforcement of current policies and agreements on migrant access to social protection and equal treatment. Policies could, for instance, incorporate migrants’ needs through extending work permits and providing access to healthcare and other social services, regardless of immigration or visa status. Broadening of sustainable socio-economic reintegration programmes, in particular creating pathways towards accessing income generating activities and social protection in the country of origin is another possible way forward. How should bilateral and multilateral agreements be revisited to mitigate the COVID-19-induced risks that migrant workers face?

Trade-off #11: Localised access to services, in collaboration with RSMMS and relevant social partners

The action plan provided for in the Hammamet Declaration between Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia has

<footnote n="110">110 The Mediterranean-Sub-Saharan Migration Trade Union Network (RSMMS) includes among its members: UGTT (Tunisia), CFDT (France), CGIL (Italy), CGTM (Mauritania), CNTS (Senegal), CNTS FC (Senegal), CSA</footnote>

<footnote>(Senegal), CSI Africa, UDTS (Senegal), UMT (Morocco), UNSAS (Senegal), USTN (Niger).</footnote>

<footnote n="111">111 Fasani, F. and Mazza, J. (2020) Immigrant Key Workers: Their Contribution to Europe's COVID-19 Response. IZA Policy Paper No. 155.</footnote>
important objectives to strengthen the protection of migrant workers. In particular, it aims, at a regional level, to 1) support information and training activities on migrant workers' rights; 2) promote fairer recruitment systems for migrants; and 3) strengthen dialogue, coordination and cooperation between Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Such an initiative recalls that migrants, whatever their status, need access to key basic services such as health, education and social protection in both North African and EU countries. The RSMMS network of unions – on both sides of the Mediterranean – has promoted the security, safety and protection of migrant workers as a cornerstone of its action. Involving RSMMS – along with other relevant stakeholders – may contribute to securing migrants' rights and enhancing both public health and economic inclusion. How can North African and European local levels of government and leadership, such as local councils and mayors, be better resourced to implement health, education, and social protection services on the ground?

## Trade-off #12: Expansion of digital and financial infrastructure to support the resilience to crises of migrant workers and communities of origin

With the rediscovery of the essential role of migrants - regardless of their qualifications - in European economies as well as in the Mashreq region (in the case of Egypt), there is no doubt that the second major lesson of the crisis concerns the role of remittances. We know their place in the economy - greater than the FDIs in the countries under consideration - but we are still unaware of their functioning, which is often counter-intuitive because it is deeply linked to individual patterns that paradoxically resist the pure logic of *homo economicus*. As pointed out by Kalantaryan and McMahon, 'an increase in the use of digital money transfer services has been described as a possible benefit coming out of the crisis, as they are often cheaper and have less risk of spreading the Covid-19 virus than in-person ones. (...) For digital remittances to help mitigate the effects of the

*Covid-19 crisis, a significant expansion of digital and financial infrastructure will be necessary.* What research, analyses, policies, and programmes are needed to better anticipate and support contextual uses of remittances in both countries of origin and residence?

## Trade-off #13: Legal protection and decent work

There is a need for more coordinated multilevel efforts and information services for temporary and seasonal migrants. For instance, countries of origin like Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia could have the responsibility to inform about legal possibilities to migrate for work, while EU destination countries would have the legal obligation to provide information for seasonal workers and the responsibility to connect employers and service centres. In practice, the question is at least twofold: on the one hand, how to better match the supply and demand sides? On the other, how to provide services on employers' obligations and workers' rights, register complaints and help migrant workers benefit from legal protection and decent work conditions throughout the mobility cycle?

## Trade-off #14: Towards gender equality

The main sectors of integration of Tunisian or Moroccan workers, in particular, in Europe are particularly gendered. In some cases, this may be an imposition of existing socio-cultural constructs and norms (nurses, domestic workers), although some changes may have been observed with the pandemic. In other cases, it may be a matter of voluntary bilateral decisions, particularly in the agricultural sector, in order to make the workforce more flexible by hiring 'women with children, not single, in order to have a guarantee of return to their country of origin and thus avoid the presence of people in an irregular situation.'<fnref n="112" /> Given that the COVID-19 pandemic has made women particularly vulnerable - both in North Africa and in Europe - how can policy makers ensure that women's rights are respected and protected, in line with decent work standards and fundamental human rights?

<footnote n="112">112 Palumbo, L. and Sciurba, A. (2018) The vulnerability to exploitation of women migrant workers in agriculture in the EU: the need for a Human Rights and Gender based approach, European Parliament, Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate</footnote>

<footnote>General for Internal Policies of the Union.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/604966/IPO_L_STU%282018%29604966_EN.pdf</footnote>
important objectives to strengthen the protection of migrant workers. In particular, it aims, at a regional level, to 1) support information and training activities on migrant workers' rights; 2) promote fairer recruitment systems for migrants; and 3) strengthen dialogue, coordination and cooperation between Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Such an initiative recalls that migrants, whatever their status, need access to key basic services such as health, education and social protection in both North African and EU countries. The RSMMS network of unions – on both sides of the Mediterranean – has promoted the security, safety and protection of migrant workers as a cornerstone of its action. Involving RSMMS – along with other relevant stakeholders – may contribute to securing migrants' rights and enhancing both public health and economic inclusion. How can North African and European local levels of government and leadership, such as local councils and mayors, be better resourced to implement health, education, and social protection services on the ground?

## Trade-off #12: Expansion of digital and financial infrastructure to support the resilience to crises of migrant workers and communities of origin

With the rediscovery of the essential role of migrants - regardless of their qualifications - in European economies as well as in the Mashreq region (in the case of Egypt), there is no doubt that the second major lesson of the crisis concerns the role of remittances. We know their place in the economy - greater than the FDIs in the countries under consideration - but we are still unaware of their functioning, which is often counter-intuitive because it is deeply linked to individual patterns that paradoxically resist the pure logic of *homo economicus*. As pointed out by Kalantaryan and McMahon, 'an increase in the use of digital money transfer services has been described as a possible benefit coming out of the crisis, as they are often cheaper and have less risk of spreading the Covid-19 virus than in-person ones. (...) For digital remittances to help mitigate the effects of the

*Covid-19 crisis, a significant expansion of digital and financial infrastructure will be necessary.'* What research, analyses, policies, and programmes are needed to better anticipate and support contextual uses of remittances in both countries of origin and residence?

## Trade-off #13: Legal protection and decent work

There is a need for more coordinated multilevel efforts and information services for temporary and seasonal migrants. For instance, countries of origin like Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia could have the responsibility to inform about legal possibilities to migrate for work, while EU destination countries would have the legal obligation to provide information for seasonal workers and the responsibility to connect employers and service centres. In practice, the question is at least twofold: on the one hand, how to better match the supply and demand sides? On the other, how to provide services on employers' obligations and workers' rights, register complaints and help migrant workers benefit from legal protection and decent work conditions throughout the mobility cycle?

## Trade-off #14: Towards gender equality

The main sectors of integration of Tunisian or Moroccan workers, in particular, in Europe are particularly gendered. In some cases, this may be an imposition of existing socio-cultural constructs and norms (nurses, domestic workers), although some changes may have been observed with the pandemic. In other cases, it may be a matter of voluntary bilateral decisions, particularly in the agricultural sector, in order to make the workforce more flexible by hiring 'women with children, not single, in order to have a guarantee of return to their country of origin and thus avoid the presence of people in an irregular situation.'<fnref n="112" /> Given that the COVID-19 pandemic has made women particularly vulnerable - both in North Africa and in Europe - how can policy makers ensure that women's rights are respected and protected, in line with decent work standards and fundamental human rights?

<footnote n="112">112 Palumbo, L. and Sciurba, A. (2018) The vulnerability to exploitation of women migrant workers in agriculture in the EU: the need for a Human Rights and Gender based approach, European Parliament, Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate</footnote>
GLOSSARY

There is no internationally accepted statistical definition of labour migration. However, the main actors in labour migration are migrant workers, which the International Labour Organization (ILO) defines as: ‘... all international migrants who are currently employed or unemployed and seeking employment in their present country of residence.’<fnref n="113" />

The United Nations Statistics Division (UN SD) also provides a statistical definition of a **foreign migrant worker** 'foreigners admitted by the receiving State for the specific purpose of exercising an economic activity remunerated from within the receiving country. Their length of stay is usually restricted as is the type of employment they can hold. Their dependents, if admitted, are also included in this category.'<fnref n="114" />

However, the meaning of the term **international labour migration** has been considerably reworked and extended by the 20th ICLS Conference (ILO, 2018). It is now a generic term that refers, in general, to ‘concepts related to the process and outcome of international labour migration’ and, in particular, to the following three concepts: (a) international migrant workers; (b) for-work international migrants; (c) return international migrant workers.’ Moreover, the specific categories of workers that now fall under the umbrella of ‘international labour migration’ and are considered as ‘international migrant workers’ include: (a) frontier workers, (b) seasonal workers, (c) itinerant workers, (d) project-tied workers, (e) specified-employment workers, (f) self-employed workers, (g) seafarers, (h) workers employed on an offshore installation (i) foreign domestic workers; (j) foreign

students; (k) international travellers on tourism trips whose main purpose is to be employed in the country of visit (l) working or seeking work refugees and asylum-seekers, irrespective of authorization to work during processing of refugee status or sanctuary request; (m) forcibly displaced persons across borders due to natural or human-made disasters, working or seeking work in the country of displacement; (n) persons trafficked across international borders for forced labour or labour exploitation.<fnref n="115" />

Sectors such as food processing, delivery, or health care are vital for keeping the economy and vital services running. Workers in those occupations are also referred to as **key workers**. Migrants play an important role in those essential services, accounting for 14% of key workers across European regions, with 5% from EU countries and 9% from non-EU countries. Based on the most recent wave (2018) of the EU Labour Force Survey (EULFS), the largest five categories of key workers in the EU are: teaching professionals (14.5% of all the key workers), skilled agricultural workers (11.9%), science and engineering associate professionals (11.1%), personal care workers (10.3%) and cleaners and helpers (9.9%).

To designate the regional space composed of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt as a whole, the term 'North Africa' will be preferred, as it allows for the designation of a transnational space of mobility both in relation to other parts of the African continent and to the other side of the Mediterranean.

<footnote n="113">113 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_436343.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="114">114 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/48th-session/documents/BG-4a-Migration-Handbook-E.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="115">115 ILO (2018) ICLS Guidelines concerning statistics of international labour migration - 20th International Conference of Labour Statisticians Geneva, 10-19 October 2018 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_648922.pdf</footnote>
GLOSSARY

There is no internationally accepted statistical definition of labour migration. However, the main actors in labour migration are migrant workers, which the International Labour Organization (ILO) defines as: ‘... all international migrants who are currently employed or unemployed and seeking employment in their present country of residence.’<fnref n="113" />

The United Nations Statistics Division (UN SD) also provides a statistical definition of a **foreign migrant worker** 'foreigners admitted by the receiving State for the specific purpose of exercising an economic activity remunerated from within the receiving country. Their length of stay is usually restricted as is the type of employment they can hold. Their dependents, if admitted, are also included in this category.'<fnref n="114" />

However, the meaning of the term **international labour migration** has been considerably reworked and extended by the 20th ICLS Conference (ILO, 2018). It is now a generic term that refers, in general, to ‘concepts related to the process and outcome of international labour migration’ and, in particular, to the following three concepts: (a) international migrant workers; (b) for-work international migrants; (c) return international migrant workers.’ Moreover, the specific categories of workers that now fall under the umbrella of ‘international labour migration’ and are considered as ‘international migrant workers’ include: (a) frontier workers, (b) seasonal workers, (c) itinerant workers, (d) project-tied workers, (e) specified-employment workers, (f) self-employed workers, (g) seafarers, (h) workers employed on an offshore installation (i) foreign domestic workers; (j) foreign

students; (k) international travellers on tourism trips whose main purpose is to be employed in the country of visit (l) working or seeking work refugees and asylum-seekers, irrespective of authorization to work during processing of refugee status or sanctuary request; (m) forcibly displaced persons across borders due to natural or human-made disasters, working or seeking work in the country of displacement; (n) persons trafficked across international borders for forced labour or labour exploitation.<fnref n="115" />

Sectors such as food processing, delivery, or health care are vital for keeping the economy and vital services running. Workers in those occupations are also referred to as **key workers**. Migrants play an important role in those essential services, accounting for 14% of key workers across European regions, with 5% from EU countries and 9% from non-EU countries. Based on the most recent wave (2018) of the EU Labour Force Survey (EULFS), the largest five categories of key workers in the EU are: teaching professionals (14.5% of all the key workers), skilled agricultural workers (11.9%), science and engineering associate professionals (11.1%), personal care workers (10.3%) and cleaners and helpers (9.9%).

To designate the regional space composed of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt as a whole, the term 'North Africa' will be preferred, as it allows for the designation of a transnational space of mobility both in relation to other parts of the African continent and to the other side of the Mediterranean.

<footnote n="113">113 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_436343.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="114">114 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/48th-session/documents/BG-4a-Migration-Handbook-E.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="115">115 ILO (2018) ICLS Guidelines concerning statistics of international labour migration - 20th International Conference of Labour Statisticians Geneva, 10-19 October 2018 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_648922.pdf</footnote>
INDICATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY

- African Union, Décisions clés de la 32e session ordinaire de l'Assemblée de l'Union africaine (janvier 2019).

- Ait-Larbi, Y. (2021) *Health Without Care; A Reflexive Sociology of Human Capital Flight in Post- Colonial Algeria*

- Almalki, R. (2011). Vous avez dit : immigration choisie ?. Cités, 2(2), 113-118.

- Arezki, R., Moreno-Dodson, B., Yuting Fan, R. Gansey, R., Nguyen, H., Nguyen, M.C., Mottaghi, L., Tsakas, C., and Wood, C.A. (2020) Commercer ensemble : vers une relance de l'intégration de la région Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord à l'ère post-COVID. Bulletin d'information économique de la région MENA (Octobre), Washington, The World Bank Group.

- Âslund, O. and Rooth, D-O. (2007) Do when and where matter? initial labour market conditions and immigrant earnings, The Economic Journal, Volume 117, Issue 518.

- Awad, I. (2017). Towards a Joint Approach to Migration and Asylum in the Euro-Mediterranean Space," in Beyond the Migration and Asylum Crisis, edited by Ferruccio Pastore (Aspen Institute Italia)

- Awad, I. (2021) On occasion of the pandemic: Reflections on Egyptian labour migration, International Migration, IOM, February 2021.

- Awad, I. and Selim, H. (2017). Labour Migration Governance in Times of Political Transition: A Comparative Analysis of Egypt and Tunisia, in Migration and Development, vol 6, 2017, issue 1.

- Beine, M., Docquier, F. and Rapoport, H., (2008). Brain Drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and Losers. The Economic Journal, 118(528), pp.631-652.

- Bélanger, M., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2021). Politicization and Rebordering in EU Enlargement: Membership Discourses in European Parliaments. Journal of European Public Policy.

- Borges, A. and Huet, N. (2020) Invisible workers: Underpaid, exploited and put at risk on Europe's farms. Euronews & Lighthouse Reports.

- Borgnäs, E.; Cottone, L. and Teppert, T. (2021) Labour migration dynamics in Libya, in IOM (2021) Migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean: Trends, Risks, Development and Governance. Chapter 24. Geneva.

- Castagnone, E. and Termine, P. (2018). Chapitre 7 - Migration des jeunes ruraux méditerranéens : déterminants socio-économiques, défis et opportunités pour l'élaboration de politiques ciblées. in CIHEAM éd., MediTERRA 2018: Migrations et développement rural inclusif en Méditerranée (pp. 145-167). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

- Chaabita, R. International migration, remittances and socio-economic development in Morocco: An empirical analysis, XXVIIIe Congrès international de la population

organisé par: Union internationale pour l'étude scientifique de la population (UIESP), 2017.

- Commission Européenne (2017) Document d'action du Fonds fiduciaire d'urgence de l'Union européenne, Égypte 2017

- De la Croix, D., and F. Docquier. (2012). “Do brain drain and poverty result from coordination failures?” Journal of Economic Growth 17:1: 1–26;

- Decosse, F. and Hellio E. (2015) Migration circulaire ou canalisation utilitariste des mobilités? Les programmes de migration temporaire en agriculture intensive vus d'en bas, in Journée d'étude "La circulation et le retour à l'épreuve des contraintes migratoires?", Université Paris-Diderot, URMIS, Paris, 25 septembre 2015.

- Di Maio, M., Leone Sciabolazza, V. & Molini, V. (2020). Migration in Libya: a spatial network analysis, Policy Research Working Paper Series, 9110, The World Bank.

- Docquier, F., (2014). The brain drain from developing countries. IZA World of Labour.

- Ebeke, C. H. (2010) ‘The Effect of Remittances on Child Labour: Cross-country evidence’, Economics Bulletin, vol. 30, no. 1, 2010, pp. 351–364.

- Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2021). Re-bordering Europe? Collective Action Barriers to 'Fortress Europe'. Journal of European Public Policy.

- El Housseini, T. interviewed by Apps, Peter (26 October 2007). “EU Blue Card Scheme could drain developing world”. Reuters – 26 October 2007.

- European Migration Network (2020). Attracting and protecting the rights of seasonal workers in the EU and the United Kingdom – Synthesis Report. Brussels: European Migration Network.

- Fargues, P., Rango, M., Borgnas, E. and Schöfgerger, I. editors (2020) Migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean: trends, risks, development and governance, IOM Geneva.

- Fasani, F. and Mazza, J. (2020) *Immigrant Key Workers: Their Contribution to Europe's COVID-19 Response*. IZA Policy Paper No. 155.

- Faujas, A. (2020) « En Afrique du Nord, la Banque Mondiale craint “une reprise chaotique” », Jeune Afrique, 20 octobre 2020.

- Foresti, M. (2020) Less gratitude, please. How COVID-19 reveals the need for migration reform. Brookings Institute. May 22, 2020.

- Gagnon, J. (2020) COVID-19: consequences for international migration and development (Paris: OECD).

- Gammarano, R. (2018) Paid employment vs. Vulnerable employment - A brief study of employment patterns by status in employment – ILOSTAT, Spotlight on work statistics n°3, June 2018. ILO Geneva.
INDICATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY

- African Union, Décisions clés de la 32e session ordinaire de l'Assemblée de l'Union africaine (janvier 2019).

– Ait-Larbi, Y. (2021) *Health Without Care; A Reflexive Sociology of Human Capital Flight in Post- Colonial Algeria*

– Almalki, R. (2011). Vous avez dit : immigration choisie ?. Cités, 2(2), 113-118.

- Arezki, R., Moreno-Dodson, B., Yuting Fan, R. Gansey, R., Nguyen, H., Nguyen, M.C., Mottaghi, L., Tsakas, C., and Wood, C.A. (2020) Commercer ensemble : vers une relance de l'intégration de la région Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord à l'ère post-COVID. Bulletin d'information économique de la région MENA (Octobre), Washington, The World Bank Group.

– Âslund, O. and Rooth, D-O. (2007) Do when and where matter? initial labour market conditions and immigrant earnings, The Economic Journal, Volume 117, Issue 518.

- Awad, I. (2017). Towards a Joint Approach to Migration and Asylum in the Euro-Mediterranean Space," in Beyond the Migration and Asylum Crisis, edited by Ferruccio Pastore (Aspen Institute Italia)

- Awad, I. (2021) On occasion of the pandemic: Reflections on Egyptian labour migration, International Migration, IOM, February 2021.

- Awad, I. and Selim, H. (2017). Labour Migration Governance in Times of Political Transition: A Comparative Analysis of Egypt and Tunisia, in Migration and Development, vol 6, 2017, issue 1.

– Beine, M., Docquier, F. and Rapoport, H., (2008). Brain Drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and Losers. The Economic Journal, 118(528), pp.631-652.

- Bélanger, M., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2021). Politicization and Rebordering in EU Enlargement: Membership Discourses in European Parliaments. Journal of European Public Policy.

– Borges, A. and Huet, N. (2020) Invisible workers: Underpaid, exploited and put at risk on Europe's farms. Euronews & Lighthouse Reports.

- Borgnäs, E.; Cottone, L. and Teppert, T. (2021) Labour migration dynamics in Libya, in IOM (2021) Migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean: Trends, Risks, Development and Governance. Chapter 24. Geneva.

- Castagnone, E. and Termine, P. (2018). Chapitre 7 - Migration des jeunes ruraux méditerranéens : déterminants socio-économiques, défis et opportunités pour l'élaboration de politiques ciblées. in CIHEAM éd., MediTERRA 2018: Migrations et développement rural inclusif en Méditerranée (pp. 145-167). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

– Chaabita, R. International migration, remittances and socio-economic development in Morocco: An empirical analysis, XXVIIIe Congrès international de la population

organisé par: Union internationale pour l'étude scientifique de la population (UIESP), 2017.

- Commission Européenne (2017) Document d'action du Fonds fiduciaire d'urgence de l'Union européenne, Égypte 2017

- De la Croix, D., and F. Docquier. (2012). “Do brain drain and poverty result from coordination failures?” Journal of Economic Growth 17:1: 1–26;

- Decosse, F. and Hellio E. (2015) Migration circulaire ou canalisation utilitariste des mobilités? Les programmes de migration temporaire en agriculture intensive vus d'en bas, in Journée d'étude "La circulation et le retour à l'épreuve des contraintes migratoires?", Université Paris-Diderot, URMIS, Paris, 25 septembre 2015.

- Di Maio, M., Leone Sciabolazza, V. & Molini, V. (2020). Migration in Libya: a spatial network analysis, Policy Research Working Paper Series, 9110, The World Bank.

- Docquier, F., (2014). The brain drain from developing countries. IZA World of Labour.

- Ebeke, C. H. (2010) ‘The Effect of Remittances on Child Labour: Cross-country evidence’, Economics Bulletin, vol. 30, no. 1, 2010, pp. 351–364.

- Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2021). Re-bordering Europe? Collective Action Barriers to 'Fortress Europe'. Journal of European Public Policy.

- El Housseini, T. interviewed by Apps, Peter (26 October 2007). “EU Blue Card Scheme could drain developing world”. Reuters – 26 October 2007.

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- Mixed Migration Hub (2018) Libya Country Brief, funded by IOM and the USDOS.

- Mixed Migration Hub (2018) Libya Country Brief, funded by IOM and the USDOS.

- Musette, M.S. (2010) Algérie - Migration, marché du travail et développement, Organisation internationale du Travail (Institut international d'études sociales).

- Nassar, H. (2010) 'Migration of Skills, the Egyptian Case', CARIM – Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, EUI – Robert Schumann Center for Advanced Studies.

- Natter, K. (2014). Fifty years of Maghreb Emigration : how States Shaped Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Emigration, Oxford, UK: International Migration Institute, University of oxford.

- Natter, K. (2016). Au-delà de pays d'origine : Schémas migratoires en Algérie, au Maroc et en Tunisie ; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

- O'Brien, M.L. and Eger, M.A. (2020) Suppression, Spikes, and Stigma: How COVID-19 Will Shape International Migration and Hostilities toward It. International Migration Review, November 2020.

- OECD, CMRS and AUC (2020) How COVID-19 is affecting Egypt's migrants and refugees.

- OECD/ILO/CAWTAR (2020), Changing Laws and Breaking Barriers for Women's Economic Empowerment in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, Competitiveness and Private Sector Development, OECD Publishing, Paris.

- Palumbo, L. and Sciurba, A. (2018) The vulnerability to exploitation of women migrant workers in agriculture in the EU: the need for a Human Rights and Gender based approach, European Parliament, Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union.

- Raty, T. and Shilhav, R. (2020) The EU Trust Fund for Africa, Trapped between aid policy and migration politics, OXFAM.

- Saaïdia, O. (dir.), (2020) « Vivre au temps du coronavirus. Chroniques de confinement : regards de chercheurs depuis la Tunisie », IRMC/Éditions Nirvana.

- Schöfberger, I. and Rango, M. (2020) COVID-19 and migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean. FULL reference In final version please

- Souag, A. (2018) "Labour Market Policies and Informality in Algeria" FEMISE Research Paper 42-05.

- Start Up Square (2020) Covid-19 survey in Morocco, by Startup Square and La Startup Factory (CGEM-HCP).

- Tsourapas, G. (2018) Egypt: Migration and Diaspora Politics in an Emerging Transit Country.

- UNDESA (2020) Data for North Africa.

- Urso, G., Sermi, F., Tarchi, D., Koopmans, J. and Duta, A. (2019) Migration Profile Algeria, Bongiardo, D. editor(s), Publications Office of the European Union, JRC, Ispra.

- Urso, G., Sermi, F., Tarchi, D., Koopmans, J. and Duta, A., (2019) Migration Profile Libya, Bongiardo, D. editor(s), Publications Office of the European Union, Ispra, 2019.
- HCP (2020) Situation of the labour market in the first quarter of 2020, Haut Commissariat au Plan, Royaume du Maroc.

- ILO (2016) ILOSTAT Glossary

- ILO (2018) ICLS Guidelines concerning statistics of international labour migration - 20th International Conference of Labour Statisticians Geneva, 10-19 October 2018.

- ILO (2021) Enquête rapide sur l'impact de la COVID 19 sur les travailleurs migrants en Tunisie / Organisation internationale du Travail, Service des Principes et droits fondamentaux au travail (FUNDAMENTALS), Service de la migration de main-d'œuvre (MIGRANT), Tunis: BIT, 2021.

- ILO (2021) The Impact of COVID-19 on Employment and Wages in Egypt - Highlight June 2020 - ILO-ADWA, conducted by Baseera.

- INS (2020) The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Tunisian labour market – August 2020.

- INSEE (2012). Evolution et structure de la population, RP exploitations complémentaires. Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.

- IOM - DTM (2021) Libya — Migrant Report 35 (January—February 2021)

- Jaidi, L. and Martin, I. (2010) Comment faire advancer le statut avancé UE-Maroc ? Documents IE Med, 2ème édition,

- Kalantaryan, S. and McMahon, S., Covid-19 and Remittances in Africa, EUR 30262 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020.

- Kumar, C., Oommen, E., Fragapane, F. and Foresti, M. (2021) Beyond gratitude: Lessons learned from migrants' contribution to the Covid-19 response, ODI, London.

- Kumar, C., Oommen, E., Fragapane, F. and Foresti, M. (2021) Beyond gratitude: Lessons learned from migrants' contribution to the Covid-19 response, ODI, London.

- Lahlou, M. (2018) Morocco and Algeria in European migration policies, ECDPM Great Insights magazine, Autumn 2018 (volume 7, issue 4).

- Lutz, P., & Karstens, F. (2021). External borders and internal freedoms: How the refugee crisis shaped the bordering preferences of European citizens. Journal of European Public Policy.

- Maingari, D. (2011). Exode des cerveaux en Afrique : réalités et déconstruction du discours sur un phénomène social. Éducation et sociétés, 2(2), 131-147.

- Marois, G., Bélanger, A. and Lutz, W. (2020) Population aging, migration, and productivity in Europe, PNAS - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA.

- MENA-OECD Government Business Summit (30-31 March 2021) - Session 3: An eco-system for youth economic empowerment.

- Milan, A. and Cunnoosamy, R. (2020) COVID-19 and migration governance: A holistic perspective. Migration Policy Practice, Vol. 10, Number 2, April-June 2020.

- Mixed Migration Hub (2018) Libya Country Brief, funded by IOM and the USDOS.

- Mixed Migration Hub (2018) Libya Country Brief, funded by IOM and the USDOS.

- Musette, M.S. (2010) Algérie - Migration, marché du travail et développement, Organisation internationale du Travail (Institut international d'études sociales).

- Nassar, H. (2010) 'Migration of Skills, the Egyptian Case', CARIM – Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, EUI – Robert Schumann Center for Advanced Studies.

- Natter, K. (2014). Fifty years of Maghreb Emigration : how States Shaped Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Emigration, Oxford, UK: International Migration Institute, University of oxford.

- Natter, K. (2016). Au-delà de pays d'origine : Schémas migratoires en Algérie, au Maroc et en Tunisie ; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

- O'Brien, M.L. and Eger, M.A. (2020) Suppression, Spikes, and Stigma: How COVID-19 Will Shape International Migration and Hostilities toward It. International Migration Review, November 2020.

- OECD, CMRS and AUC (2020) How COVID-19 is affecting Egypt's migrants and refugees.

- OECD/ILO/CAWTAR (2020), Changing Laws and Breaking Barriers for Women's Economic Empowerment in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, Competitiveness and Private Sector Development, OECD Publishing, Paris.

- Palumbo, L. and Sciurba, A. (2018) The vulnerability to exploitation of women migrant workers in agriculture in the EU: the need for a Human Rights and Gender based approach, European Parliament, Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union.

- Raty, T. and Shilhav, R. (2020) The EU Trust Fund for Africa, Trapped between aid policy and migration politics, OXFAM.

- Saaïdia, O. (dir.), (2020) « Vivre au temps du coronavirus. Chroniques de confinement : regards de chercheurs depuis la Tunisie », IRMC/Éditions Nirvana.

- Schöfberger, I. and Rango, M. (2020) COVID-19 and migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean. FULL reference In final version please

- Souag, A. (2018) "Labour Market Policies and Informality in Algeria" FEMISE Research Paper 42-05.

- Start Up Square (2020) Covid-19 survey in Morocco, by Startup Square and La Startup Factory (CGEM-HCP).

- Tsourapas, G. (2018) Egypt: Migration and Diaspora Politics in an Emerging Transit Country.

- UNDESA (2020) Data for North Africa.

- Urso, G., Sermi, F., Tarchi, D., Koopmans, J. and Duta, A. (2019) Migration Profile Algeria, Bongiardo, D. editor(s), Publications Office of the European Union, JRC, Ispra.

- Urso, G., Sermi, F., Tarchi, D., Koopmans, J. and Duta, A., (2019) Migration Profile Libya, Bongiardo, D. editor(s), Publications Office of the European Union, Ispra, 2019.
– Uzelac, A. (2020) The real common interest: The converging EU and North African migration agendas – where do people’s interests come in? Oxfam International.

– Verdier, M. (2020) ‘Au Maghreb, des systèmes de santé exsangues’ in La Croix du 8 avril 2020 - https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Afrique/Au-Maghreb-systemes-sante-exsangues-2020-04-08-1201088418

– Vermeren, P. (2021). Le Maghreb assiégé par la crise du coronavirus. Hérodote, 1(1), 165-179.

– Vicente Rufí, J., Richard, Y., Feliu, J. and Berzi, M. « Editorial: Peripheral borders, soft and hard re-bordering in Europe », Belgeo.

– WHO (2016) Stratégie de coopération OMS-MAROC 2017-2021. Organisation mondiale de la Santé. Bureau régional de la Méditerranée orientale.

– World Bank (2020) Migration and Development Brief 32: COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens (Washington DC: World Bank Group and KNOMAD).

– World Bank (2020) Migration and Development Brief 32: COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens (Washington DC: World).

– World Bank (2020) Morocco Economic Monitor, Fall 2020: From relief to recovery.

– World Bank. (2021) Metadata Glossary.

– Word Bank (2021) Egypt's Economic Update, April 2021 -

– World Economic Forum (2020) How coronavirus could hit the billions migrant workers send home (Geneva: WEF).

– Zehnati, A., (2017). Medical brain drain from Maghreb to Northern countries : for a new social dialogue ?. The e-Journal of Economics & Complexity, Volume 2 (2016) Number 1 May 2017.

– Zeneidi, D. (2011) Worksite Camps for Seasonal Female Moroccan Workers in Huelva (Spain): Invisibilization and Identity Assignment. ADES, Université Bordeaux-Montaigne.

– Zenner, D. and Wickramage, K. (2020) National preparedness and response plans for COVID-19 and other diseases: Why migrants should be included. IOM – Migration Data Portal.

<figure><img src="image_42.png" /><figcaption>Picture 4: Credit Maghrebia – Creative Commons</figcaption></figure>
— Uzelac, A. (2020) The real common interest: The converging EU and North African migration agendas – where do people’s interests come in? Oxfam International.

— Verdier, M. (2020) ‘Au Maghreb, des systèmes de santé exsangues’ in La Croix du 8 avril 2020 - https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Afrique/Au-Maghreb-systemes-sante-exsangues-2020-04-08-1201088418

— Vermeren, P. (2021). Le Maghreb assiégé par la crise du coronavirus. Hérodote, 1(1), 165-179.

— Vicente Rufí, J., Richard, Y., Feliu, J. and Berzi, M. « Editorial: Peripheral borders, soft and hard re-bordering in Europe », Belgeo.

— WHO (2016) Stratégie de coopération OMS-MAROC 2017-2021. Organisation mondiale de la Santé. Bureau régional de la Méditerranée orientale.

— World Bank (2020) Migration and Development Brief 32: COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens (Washington DC: World Bank Group and KNOMAD).

— World Bank (2020) Migration and Development Brief 32: COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens (Washington DC: World).

— World Bank (2020) Morocco Economic Monitor, Fall 2020: From relief to recovery.

— World Bank. (2021) Metadata Glossary.

— Word Bank (2021) Egypt's Economic Update, April 2021 -

— World Economic Forum (2020) How coronavirus could hit the billions migrant workers send home (Geneva: WEF).

— Zehnati, A., (2017). Medical brain drain from Maghreb to Northern countries : for a new social dialogue ?. The e-Journal of Economics & Complexity, Volume 2 (2016) Number 1 May 2017.

— Zeneidi, D. (2011) Worksite Camps for Seasonal Female Moroccan Workers in Huelva (Spain): Invisibilization and Identity Assignment. ADES, Université Bordeaux-Montaigne.

— Zenner, D. and Wickramage, K. (2020) National preparedness and response plans for COVID-19 and other diseases: Why migrants should be included. IOM – Migration Data Portal.

<figure><img src="image_43.png" /><figcaption>Picture 4: Credit Maghrebia – Creative Commons</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_43.png" /></figure>

THAMM

Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration
Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa
<figure><img src="image_44.png" /></figure>

THAMM

Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration
Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa