# Structural reforms in DSGE models: a case for sensitivity analyses

Benoît Campagne, Aurélien Poissonnier

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Benoît Campagne, Aurélien Poissonnier. Structural reforms in DSGE models: a case for sensitivity analyses. 2016. hal-05416697

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Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques

G 2016 / 07

Structural reforms in DSGE models:
a case for sensitivity analyses

Benoît CAMPAGNE et Aurélien POISSONNIER

Document de travail

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>

Insee
Mesurer pour comprendre

Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES

Série des documents de travail
de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques

G 2016 / 07

Structural reforms in DSGE models:
a case for sensitivity analyses

Benoît CAMPAGNE* et Aurélien POISSONNIER**

JUILLET 2016

The authors would like to thank Jean-Guillaume Sahuc for his fruitful discussion and advice on a first version of this paper. We would also like to thank Gilbert Cette, Édouard Challe, Jean-Baptiste Michau and Xavier Ragot as well as participants at the 2015 ICMAIF, EcoMod and SEM conferences. Working papers reflect the opinions of the authors and do not necessarily express the views of the Insee.

<footnote>* Département des Études Économiques - Division « Études Macroéconomiques » Timbre G220 - 15, bd Gabriel Péri - BP 100 - 92244 MALAKOFF CEDEX
Crest-LMA</footnote>

<footnote>** Commission européenne. L'auteur était en poste à l'Insee et affilié au Crest-LMA et École Polytechnique au moment de la rédaction de ce document.</footnote>
# Structural reforms in DSGE models: a case for sensitivity analyses

## Abstract

In a standard DSGE model of the Euro Area derived from the Smets and Wouters' core model and comparable to most institutional models (ECB, EC, IMF, etc.), we shed new light on a popular exercise: pro-competitive (structural) reforms evaluation. First, we provide with a detailed analysis of the underlying mechanisms, insisting on the importance of the household's consumption-leisure arbitrage. We then proceed to a quantitative sensitivity analysis. We show that the simple redefinition of households' utility can lead to additional gains or losses of a few percentage points in output following goods or labour markets pro-competitive reforms. In addition, welfare analyses show that policy recommendations for structural reforms are less clear-cut than those solely based on output gains. Introducing non Ricardian agents allows stylized yet informative inequality analyses showing that goods market reforms reduce inequalities while labour market reforms are neutral. In all, our results advocate for the extensive use of sensitivity analyses in that class of models when used for quantitative policy purposes.

**Keywords:** structural reform, DSGE model, mark-up, sensitivity, welfare

## Réformes structurelles et modèles DSGE: un plaidoyer en faveur d'analyses de sensibilité

## Résumé

À l'aide d'un modèle DSGE standard inspiré par du modèle de Smets et Wouters et comparable aux principaux modèles institutionnels (BCE, FMI, CE, etc.), nous nous concentrons sur un exercice classique: l'évaluation de réformes pro-concurrentielles (structurelles). Tout d'abord, nous mettons précisément en évidence les mécanismes sous-jacents et insistons sur l'importance de l'arbitrage consommation-loisir des ménages. Dans un deuxième temps, nous présentons une analyse de sensibilité. Nous montrons qu'une simple redéfinition de la fonction d'utilité des ménages peut conduire à des gains ou pertes d'activités supplémentaires de quelques points de pourcentage suite à des réformes pro-compétitives sur les marchés des biens ou du travail. Par ailleurs, une analyse de bien-être montre que des politiques économiques conduites sur la seule base d'une analyse des effets sur la production peuvent diverger de politiques prenant en compte le bien-être des ménages. L'introduction de ménages non-Ricardiens permet une analyse stylisée mais pertinente des inégalités entre ménages. Cette analyse montre que les réformes sur le marché des biens conduisent à une réduction des inégalités, tandis que des réformes du marché du travail sont neutres. Dans l'ensemble, nos résultats plaident en faveur d'une implémentation systématique de tests de sensibilité dans cette classe de modèles quand ceux-ci sont utilisés pour ce type d'exercice.

**Mots-clés** : réforme structurelle, modèle DSGE, taux de marge, sensibilité, bien-être

**Classification JEL** : E10, E60, E20
# 1 Introduction

The evaluation of structural reforms has become a standard exercise in the DSGE literature and in policy-making publications and reports. Institutions such as the IMF, the European Commission, the OECD, the ECB, and many central banks have now developed and refined their own tools and are capable of conducting such analyses in different contexts. All call for such reforms as a solution to the imbalances and loss of competitiveness in Europe.

Indeed, there is a large consensus on the ability of such reforms to foster output. However, in these large scale models it is difficult to disentangle the core mechanisms through which increased competition affects the economy. Furthermore, despite this consensus numerical differences remain, calling for a thorough sensitivity analysis to identify sources of divergence, as well as their quantitative influence.

These institutional models share a common core, the Smets and Wouters model. As such, these are business cycle models and the question arises of their ability to inform on structural reforms. Therefore, we study the impact of mark-up reforms in the labour and goods markets both in the long run and in the transition in this neo-Keynesian framework. In particular, we provide a detailed analysis of the underlying mechanisms showing the central role of the consumption-leisure arbitrage.

In line with the existing literature, we indeed find gains from pro-competitive reforms in the long run but losses in the transition. However, long term effects are particularly sensitive to the modelling of households, their consumption-leisure substitution elasticity, the introduction of habits on consumption and labour, and the introduction of financially constrained households. For the same reform, output gains can differ by as much as a few percentage points of output.

Besides, such output-enhancing reforms can have a negative welfare impact with standard calibrations. Also, when financially constrained households are included in the model, goods market reforms lead to a decrease in inequalities both in terms of consumption and utility, whereas inequalities stagnate following labour market reforms.

In this paper, the underlying model builds on Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2007). Within this model, firms and consumers maximize their objective (utility or profit) by interacting on the goods, labour and capital markets with both prices and wages rigidities introducing neo-Keynesian features in the model à la Erceg et al. (2000). The model also integrates risk free assets to ensure an intertemporal trade-off and real rigidities on the capital market. This model is the core of many large scale institutional models (ECB, IMF, etc.).

This article follows the wide literature on the effects of structural reforms. D'Auria et al. (2009), Roeger et al. (2008) or Varga et al. (2014) conduct evaluations for EU member states in the R&D version of the Quest III model whereas Annicchiarico et al. (2013) do the same for Italy. The IMF, the OECD or central banks have also conducted their own evaluations (Bayoumi et al., 2004; Everaert and Schule, 2006, 2008; Cacciatore et al., 2012; Forni et al., 2010). Their simulations concur to output gains of 5 to 10% following an average 15 points decrease in mark-ups. However, Jonsson (2007) and Matheron and Maury (2004) note that these long terms gains are partially offset by transitory losses.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we briefly recall the *Smets and Wouters* model and give a short presentation of its calibration. In Section 3 we analyse the mechanisms at work in mark-up reforms in the labour and goods market both in the long run and in the transition. In Section 4 we show the dependency of these mechanisms to the behaviour of households (calibration of utility, liquidity constraint), as well as their impact in terms of welfare.
## 2 Model

This section gives a short presentation of the Smets and Wouters' model. Namely, it is a neo-Keynesian model in closed economy. Households operate on goods and labour markets to maximize their utility. Firms use capital and labour to produce partially substitutable goods. Nominal rigidities are added on price and wages in a Calvo manner, and real rigidities are introduced on labour and goods with monopolistic competition, and on capital through adjustment costs.

### 2.1 Households

The Euro Area is populated by a continuum of households of size $\mathbb{N}$.

#### Consumption and investment

Households arbitrage between consumption and savings, capital and financial assets, as well as between consumption and leisure today. Each household $\tau$ maximises his intertemporal utility, non separable in private consumption and labour<fnref n="1" />.

$$ 
\begin{gathered}
\max E_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} \mathcal{U}_T(\tau) \mathcal{V}_T(\tau) \\
\text{with } \mathcal{U}_T(\tau) = \frac{1}{1-\sigma_c} \left[ C_T(\tau) \left( \frac{C_{T-1}}{\mathbb{N}} \right)^{-h_c} \right]^{1-\sigma_c} \\
\mathcal{V}_T(\tau) = \left[ 1 - \kappa(1-\sigma_c) \left( l_T(\tau) \left( \frac{L_{T-1}}{\mathbb{N}} \right)^{-h_l} \right)^{1+\sigma_l} \right]^{\sigma_c}
\end{gathered}
\quad (2.1) $$

subject to the budget constraint:

$$ 
\begin{gathered}
FA_T(\tau) = R_{T-1}FA_{T-1}(\tau) + w_T(\tau)l_T(\tau) \\
\qquad - P_T C_T(\tau) + D_T(\tau) \\
\qquad + \Phi_T(\tau) + P_T r_T^K K_{T-1}(\tau) - P_T I_T(\tau)
\end{gathered}
\quad (2.2) $$

$$ K_T(\tau) = (1 - \delta)K_{T-1}(\tau) + \epsilon_T^I \left[ 1 - S \left( \frac{I_T(\tau)}{I_{T-1}(\tau)} \right) \right] I_T(\tau) \quad (2.3) $$

where $E_t$, $\beta$ are respectively the expectation at time $t$ operator and the discount factor; $\sigma_c$ is the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution; $\kappa$ a weight assigned to labour in the utility function and $\sigma_l$ the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. $h_c$, $h_l$ are the external habit formation (on per capita level) parameters on consumption and labour. $C_t(\tau)$ and $l_t(\tau)$ are respectively the consumption and labour supply of households $\tau$ while $C_t$ and $l_t$ are the aggregate counterparts; $w_t(\tau)$ correspond to the wage. $FA_t(\tau)$ is the financial asset holdings at the end of period $t$ while $FA_t$ is its aggregate counterpart; $R_t$ is the gross interest rate set by the monetary authority. $D_t(\tau)$ are the dividends paid by the firm to its owners. $\Phi_t(\tau)$ is a lump-sum transfer to households. $P_t$ is the price level for both consumption and investment goods which are identical.

In the capital accumulation equation, $I_t(\tau)$ is the investment level with an adjustment cost<fnref n="2" /> $S(\frac{I_t(\tau)}{I_{t-1}(\tau)})$ depending on previous period level of investment, and $K_t(\tau)$ is the capital stock of households depreciating at rate $\delta$. As a result, households pay for the full investment allotment $I_t(\tau)$ and a share $S(\frac{I_t(\tau)}{I_{t-1}(\tau)})$ is

<footnote n="1">¹We follow the non-separable utility form advocated by King et al. (2002) in the presence of growth in the model. The choice of a specific non separable utility function follows Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), under this form, $\sigma_l$ is the constant inverse Frisch elasticity.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">²See Christiano et al. (2005); Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2007). We follows these authors and assume $S = 0$, $S' = 0$ and $S'' > 0$ at steady state.</footnote>
lost in the installation process. $\epsilon_t^I$ represents an exogenous shock to this cost. $r_t^K$ is the return paid on capital.

The first order conditions yield the following Euler equation, investment decision and Tobin's Q:

$$ \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{\mathcal{U}'_{t+1}(\tau) \mathcal{V}_{t+1}(\tau)}{\mathcal{U}'_t(\tau) \mathcal{V}_t(\tau)} \frac{R_t}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right\} = 1 \qquad (2.4) $$

$$ 1 = q_t(\tau) \epsilon_t^I \left( 1 - S \left( \frac{I_t(\tau)}{I_{t-1}(\tau)} \right) - S' \left( \frac{I_t(\tau)}{I_{t-1}(\tau)} \right) \frac{I_t(\tau)}{I_{t-1}(\tau)} \right) \\ + \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{\mathcal{U}'_{t+1}(\tau) \mathcal{V}_{t+1}(\tau)}{\mathcal{U}'_t(\tau) \mathcal{V}_t(\tau)} q_{t+1}(\tau) \epsilon_{t+1}^I S' \left( \frac{I_{t+1}(\tau)}{I_t(\tau)} \right) \left( \frac{I_{t+1}(\tau)}{I_t(\tau)} \right)^2 \right\} \qquad (2.5) $$

$$ q_t(\tau) = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{\mathcal{U}'_{t+1}(\tau) \mathcal{V}_{t+1}(\tau)}{\mathcal{U}'_t(\tau) \mathcal{V}_t(\tau)} \left( q_{t+1}(\tau)(1-\delta) + r_{t+1}^k \right) \right\} \qquad (2.6) $$

with $\Pi_{t+1}$ price inflation between $t$ and $t+1$.

## Labour supply and wage setting

Households provide labour on a monopolistically competitive market. An employment agency aggregates labour supplied and provides firms with an homogeneous labour bundle. The relationship between total demand for labour and each household's supply is a function of the demanded wage ($w_t(\tau)$) over aggregate wage ($W_t$, Equation 2.7). In this context, households are paid with a mark-up over their marginal disutility of labour which depends on the elasticity of substitution between workers $\theta_w$.

$$ I_t(\tau) = \left( \frac{w_t(\tau)}{W_t} \right)^{-\theta_w} \frac{L_t}{N} \qquad (2.7) $$

In addition, wage stickiness is introduced through a Calvo wage setting, each household resetting its wage with an exogenous probability $(1 - \xi_w)$.

Linearising the first order condition of households' utility maximisation on the labour market around the steady state yields the following wage Phillips curve:

$$ \begin{aligned} \widehat{RW}_t - \widehat{RW}_{t-1} + (\hat{\Pi}_t - \gamma_w \hat{\Pi}_{t-1}) = & \\ \tilde{\beta}(1+g) \left( \widehat{RW}_{t+1} - \widehat{RW}_t + (\hat{\Pi}_{t+1} - \gamma_w \hat{\Pi}_t) \right) & \\ + \frac{(1-\tilde{\beta}\xi_w(1+g))(1-\xi_w)}{\xi_w(1+\theta_w((1+\sigma_l)(1+B(\sigma_c))-1))} \left[ -\widehat{RW}_t - \hat{L}_t + (1+\sigma_l)(1+B(\sigma_c)))(\hat{L}_t - h_l\hat{L}_{t-1}) + \hat{C}_t \right] & \end{aligned} \qquad (2.8) $$

with $B(\sigma_c)$ a function of the parameters of the model, $\tilde{\beta}$ a function of $\beta$ and $g$ the exogenous growth rate of TFP.<fnref n="3" /> $RW_t$ corresponds to the real wage defined as $W_t/P_t$. $\gamma_w$ is the degree of indexation of non reset wages on past inflation.

## 2.2 Firms

### Demand for production factors

Firms (a continuum of size $P$) produce partially substitutable goods from labour and capital. They hire domestic labour at cost $W_t$. In addition, firms rent capital $K_t^d(\varepsilon)$ from households at cost $r^k$.<fnref n="4" /> We assume

<footnote n="3">³$B(\sigma_c) = \frac{\theta_w - 1}{\theta_w} \frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\sigma_c)(1-\eta)}{(1+\sigma_l)\sigma_c c y}$ and $\tilde{\beta} = \beta(1+g)^{(1-\sigma_c)(1-h_c)-1}$</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴The price of capital is by construction the same as investment, which is identical to the price of consumption as we assume that both goods are identical. This is also equivalent to assume a perfectly competitive investment good sector with a one-to-one technology from consumption goods to investment goods. This implies that in nominal terms the rental cost of capital equals $r_t^K K_t^d(\varepsilon) P_t$.</footnote>
installation delays so that at market equilibrium and on aggregate $K_t^d = K_{t-1}$.

Each firm $\varepsilon$ produces $y_t(\varepsilon)$ from a standard constant returns to scale production function :

$$y_t(\varepsilon) = (\zeta_t L_t(\varepsilon))^{1-\alpha} (K_t^d(\varepsilon))^\alpha \qquad (2.9)$$

$$\text{with cost } W_t L_t(\varepsilon) + r_t^k P_t K_t^d(\varepsilon), \qquad (2.10)$$

where $\zeta$ is the exogenous labour productivity whose deterministic trend grows at rate $g$ and $\alpha$ is the share of capital in value added. The arbitrage condition between labour and capital demand yields:

$$\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} = \frac{W_t L_t(\varepsilon)}{r_t^k K_t^d(\varepsilon) P_t} \quad \text{and on aggregate} \quad \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} = \frac{W_t L_t}{r_t^k K_{t-1} P_t} \qquad (2.11)$$

and the real marginal cost of production:

$$RMC_t = \frac{MC_t}{P_t} = \frac{1}{\alpha^\alpha (1-\alpha)^{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{RW_t}{\zeta_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} \left( r_t^k \right)^\alpha \qquad (2.12)$$

## Price setting

Partial substitutability (with elasticity $\theta$) allows firms to price a mark-up over their marginal cost. We assume a Calvo price setting. Firm $\varepsilon$ resets its price $p_t(\varepsilon)$ with an exogenous probability $(1-\zeta)$ and maximises its expected profit until the next price setting possibility, subject to the production factor optimization, the production function, as well as the demand function (Equation 2.13) and a price indexation rule (with parameter $\gamma$).<fnref n="5" />

$$y_t(\varepsilon) = \left( \frac{p_t(\varepsilon)}{P_t} \right)^{-\theta} \frac{Y_t}{\mathbb{P}} \qquad (2.13)$$

After linearisation of the first order condition, we obtain a standard new-Keynesian price Phillips curve:

$$\hat{\Pi}_t - \gamma \hat{\Pi}_{t-1} = \tilde{\beta}(1+g)(\hat{\Pi}_{t+1} - \gamma \hat{\Pi}_t) + \frac{(1-\tilde{\beta}\tilde{\zeta}(1+g))(1-\tilde{\zeta})}{\tilde{\zeta}} \widehat{RMC}_t \qquad (2.14)$$

where inflation depends positively on past inflation, future expected inflation but also on real wages, capital returns and negatively on productivity shocks through the real marginal cost of production.

## 2.3 Central bank and government

The central bank sets the nominal interest rate $R_t$ in deviation from its target $R^*$ through a Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), where it reacts smoothly to both inflation in deviation from its target $\Pi^*$ (with smoothing parameter $\rho$) and the output gap (defined as output in deviation from its steady state $\bar{Y}$).

$$R_t = R_{t-1}^{\rho} \left( R^* \left( \frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi^*} \right)^{r_{\pi}} \left( \frac{Y_t}{\bar{Y}} \right)^{r_y} \right)^{1-\rho} \qquad (2.15)$$

Public consumption $G_t$ is assumed exogenous, and financed by lump-sum taxes $\Phi$.

<footnote n="5">⁵This price indexation is necessary in a model with steady state inflation.</footnote>
## 2.4 Steady state and calibration

In the present model, growth is exogenous. In the long run, all real variables grow at the same rate as TFP. At steady state, inflation equals the central bank's target.

We calibrate the model based on Smets and Wouters (2005).<fnref n="6" /> We marginally depart from this estimation by adjusting the mark-ups to better compare our simulations with other market reform evaluations, in particular Everaert and Schule (2008). Indeed, the level of mark-ups allows to calibrate parameters $\theta$ and $\theta_w$. Everaert and Schule (2008) set mark-ups to 33% and 20% on the labour and goods markets respectively, close to values observed in the European Commission Quest III model. These values are mostly estimated by Bayesian techniques (along with the other parameters of the model) and are therefore calibrated here. Values can also be adjusted based on microeconomic studies as conducted in Everaert and Schule (2008). However, the link between those studies and actual values for the parameters is not straightforward.

Table 1 compares the model at steady state with actual data for the Euro Area (12 countries). Table 2 presents our calibration of structural parameters.

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>DATA<br>EA (12)</th><th>MODEL<br>EA</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Output in 2000 (GDP)*</td><td>6943</td><td>6943</td></tr><tr><td>Output per capita growth rate**</td><td>1.2%</td><td>1.2%</td></tr><tr><td>Working age population in 2000 ***</td><td>135.9</td><td>135.9</td></tr><tr><td>Hours worked per week and working age capita (since 2000)</td><td>34.3</td><td>34.3</td></tr><tr><td>Gross Op. Surplus to VA</td><td>46%</td><td>42%</td></tr><tr><td>Gross wages to VA</td><td>53%</td><td>58%</td></tr><tr><td>Nominal 3 month Euribor**</td><td>3.8%</td><td>4.0%</td></tr><tr><td>Inflation**</td><td>2.0%</td><td>2.0%</td></tr><tr><td>Private consumption to GDP ratio</td><td>56.3%</td><td>56.9%</td></tr><tr><td>Public consumption to GDP ratio</td><td>19.7%</td><td>19.7%</td></tr><tr><td>Investment to GDP ratio</td><td>21.9%</td><td>23.5%</td></tr></tbody></table>

Sources: Eurostat (National accounts, inflations, Euribor, population, Labour Force Survey -incl. Secondary job)

Data are averaged from 1995 to 2007 to exclude the crisis. Depending on availability, samples may start after 1995 and/or exclude some countries from the Euro Area (12).

* in billion € in current prices

** annualised

*** aged from 15 to 64, in millions

<caption>Table 1: Actual data for the Euro Area and the corresponding values at steady state with our calibration</caption>

# 3 Understanding the mechanisms of structural reforms on the goods and labour markets

## 3.1 What should we expect ?

As an introductory warning, it is important to keep in mind that the present model does not integrate effects such as endogenous growth driven by innovations. As a result, it should always be output enhancing to decrease mark-ups to zero to reach perfect competition. On the contrary, in endogenous growth models such as Romer (1990), mark-ups and monopolistic powers may be necessary to allow and stimulate innovation and growth. Such a mechanism is at play for the intermediate good sector in Roeger et al. (2008).

<footnote n="6">⁶The calibration constraints are further detailed in Campagne and Poissonnier (2016).</footnote>
<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>Technology</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Technology parameter</td><td>α</td><td>0.3</td><td>Smets and Wouters (2005)</td></tr><tr><td>Depreciation rate</td><td>δ</td><td>0.025</td><td>idem</td></tr><tr><td>Capital rigidity</td><td>S</td><td>6.17</td><td>idem</td></tr><tr><td>TFP growth rate</td><td>g</td><td>0.003</td><td>Eurostat</td></tr><tr><td>Population size</td><td>Π</td><td>135 922 100</td><td>Eurostat</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>Monetary policy</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Inflation</td><td>Π*</td><td>1.005</td><td>Consensus, ECB</td></tr><tr><td>Smoothing parameter</td><td>ρ</td><td>0.85</td><td>Smets and Wouters (2005)</td></tr><tr><td>Weight on inflation</td><td>r<sub>π</sub></td><td>1.4</td><td>idem</td></tr><tr><td>Weight on output gap</td><td>r<sub>y</sub></td><td>0.11</td><td>idem</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>Prices and Wages</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Substitutability between goods</td><td>θ</td><td>6</td><td>QUEST III, GEM, NAWM, EAGLE #</td></tr><tr><td>Substitutability between workers</td><td>θ<sub>w</sub></td><td>4</td><td>idem</td></tr><tr><td>Price rigidity</td><td>ζ</td><td>0.90</td><td>Smets and Wouters (2005)</td></tr><tr><td>Wage rigidity</td><td>ζ<sub>w</sub></td><td>0.92</td><td>idem</td></tr><tr><td>Price indexation</td><td>γ<sub>p</sub></td><td>0.29</td><td>idem</td></tr><tr><td>Wage indexation</td><td>γ<sub>w</sub></td><td>0.90</td><td>idem</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>Preferences</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Households discount factor</td><td>β</td><td>0.9983</td><td>steady state constraint</td></tr><tr><td>Risk aversion</td><td>σ<sub>c</sub></td><td>1.13</td><td>Smets and Wouters (2005)</td></tr><tr><td>Inverse Frisch elasticity</td><td>σ<sub>l</sub></td><td>2</td><td>idem</td></tr><tr><td>Consumption habits</td><td>h<sub>c</sub></td><td>0.61</td><td>idem</td></tr><tr><td>Labour habits</td><td>h<sub>l</sub></td><td>0</td><td>idem</td></tr><tr><td>Weight on labour disutility</td><td>κ</td><td>5812.38</td><td>steady state constraint on hours worked</td></tr></tbody></table>

<caption>Table 2: Structural parameters</caption>

<footnote>#Roeger et al. (2008); Bayoumi et al. (2004); Everaert and Schule (2008); Coenen et al. (2008); Gomes et al. (2013)</footnote>
In addition, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) develop a stylized model specifically designed to analyti-
cally identify the key mechanisms behind structural reforms. This two periods model is often used as a
reference to study the impact of structural reforms on the goods and labour market. Its specificities are
an endogenous determination of the number of firms (linked to goods substitutability), both monopolistic
competition and entry costs on the goods market and a reservation wage and Nash bargaining on the
labour market.

In their framework, a decrease in the bargaining power of workers leads in the short run to both an
increase in the firms' profits and a fall in real wages, but no change in unemployment. Larger profits then
attract new firms, which in turn increase labour demand and real wages. Eventually, the price mark-up
decreases as new firms stir up competition. In the end, unemployment is lowered by the reform and real
wages are back to the initial steady state. In all, labour market reforms come with a trade-off: lower real
wages in the short run in exchange for lower unemployment in the long run (Blanchard and Giavazzi,
2003).

As for goods market reforms, they consider two possibilities: a change in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption which in the short run increases real wages and employment but is eventually neutralized by new firms entry; a decrease in entry costs which is neutral in the short run but increases goods substitutability in the long run as well as real wages and employment. In the *Smets and Wouters* model the two types of reforms can not be distinguished, their combination is implemented by a permanent increase in goods substitutability.

Cacciatore et al. (2012) incorporate some ideas from Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) in a DSGE model: endogenous firms entry and Nash bargaining between workers and firms. The dynamic on the labour market is modelled by a search and matching mechanism. This feature differs from the *Smets and Wouters* model and implies in particular that following a labour market reform, there can be a short term increase in unemployment. The Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) trade-off may be even more problematic.

**3.2 Long term effect in the *Smets and Wouters* model**

In the *Smets and Wouters* model, as in most other DSGE models, long term growth is exogenous. However,
in the long term, the model is equivalent to a standard RBC model with monopolistic competition and
GDP as well as other real variables in level depend on structural parameters in a way we can compute.

The long term equilibrium is the result of supply for production factors by households and demand for
these factors by the firms.

Firms' profit maximization implies the following demands

$$
\text{for capital} \quad \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \alpha \zeta^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{\bar{K}}{\bar{L}}\right)^{\alpha-1} = \bar{r}^{\kappa} \qquad (3.1)
$$

$$
\text{for labour} \quad \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} (1-\alpha) \zeta^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{\bar{K}}{\bar{L}}\right)^{\alpha} = \overline{RW} \qquad (3.2)
$$

On households' side, the supply for capital is perfectly elastic because households can substitute financial savings for investment. They provide capital as long as its remuneration is equivalent to that of financial savings $\bar{r}^k = \bar{r}\bar{r} + \delta$, with $\bar{r}\bar{r}$ the real return on the risk free asset. As for labour, their supply is given by their individual consumption-leisure arbitrage:

$$
\overline{RW} = \frac{\theta_w}{\theta_w - 1} (1 + \sigma_l) \bar{c} \frac{\sigma_c}{1 - \sigma_c} \frac{\kappa(1 - \sigma_c) \bar{I}^{(1+\sigma_l)(1-h_l)-1}}{1 - \kappa(1 - \sigma_c) \bar{I}^{(1+\sigma_l)(1-h_l)}} = \frac{\theta_w}{\theta_w - 1} (1 + \sigma_l) \bar{c} f(\bar{I}) \quad (3.3)
$$

with $\bar{c}, \bar{I}$ individual consumption and labour supply respectively and $f$ an increasing function of labour supply.
**Reform on the goods market** A decrease in firms’ market power on the goods market ($\theta$ ↑) fosters output in the long run through different channels. First, as the distortion from the perfectly competitive equilibrium is reduced, firms capture less mark-ups in the production process and distribute more to factor remuneration at given output, hence higher costs (Figure 3). Firms then try to compensate this drop by an increase in production : the demand for production factors is then scaled-up (direct effect of $\theta$ in Equations (3.1) and (3.2), the demand curves on Figure 1 shift from D1 to D’).

In a second round effect, the demand for both factors increases (from D' to D2) as the productivity of each factor is fostered by the other (effect of $L$ in Equation (3.1) and $K$ in Equation (3.2)).

Finally, the supply curve for capital is unchanged (investment crowds out financial savings to meet firms increased demand for capital), but the supply curve for labour is shifted downwards by the increase in consumption consecutive to higher income (from S1 to S2 on Figure 1b), Equation (3.3)). This directly relates to a positive wealth effect in the consumption-leisure arbitrage.<fnref n="7" />

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Effect of lower firms’ market power ($\theta$ ↑) on the capital and labour market</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Effect of lower workers’ market power $\theta_w$ ↑ on the goods and labour market</figcaption></figure>

<footnote n="7">⁷These results are in particular compatible with Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). A permanent increase in the elasticity of substitution across goods eventually leads to higher real wages and labour.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Decomposition of production</figcaption></figure>

**Reform on the labour market** A decrease in households' market power on the labour market directly affects the labour supply curve (Equation (3.3)). As they lose market power, households can not withhold their supply as much for a given wage rate (S1 shifts to S' on Figure 2b).

As labour supply increases, so does capital productivity and in turn firms' demand for this production factor. Symmetrically this increased capital demand fosters labour productivity and firms demand for this second production factor. In all, demand curves shift upwards from D1 to D2 on Figure 2.

Following a reform on the labour market, the relative use of capital and labour is fixed as the return on capital is anchored by the monetary policy rate (Equation (3.1)). Consequently the real wage is also unchanged by the reform (Equation (3.2)). As a consequence, households adjust their consumption-leisure arbitrage by substituting labour for consumption (labour supply shifts from S' to S2 on Figure 2b).

In all, capital and labour increase in the same proportion as output. As a consequence, so does investment and because of market clearing so does consumption. Labour market reforms thus result in an homothetic transformation of real quantities.

**Long term elasticities** Having clarified the underlying key mechanisms leading to an increase in output, we compute the long term elasticities of output to structural reforms to better understand the determinants of the scale of gains. In Campagne and Poissonnier (2016), we solve for the steady state equilibrium in an extended version of the model. These equations can be simplified according to the *Smets and Wouters* set-up.

From the production function we have :

$$ \bar{Y} = \bar{\zeta} \left( \alpha \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \left( \frac{1}{\bar{\beta}} - 1 + \delta \right)^{-1} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \bar{L} \quad (3.4) $$

From households consumption-leisure arbitrage:

$$ \bar{L} = \left( \frac{1}{\bar{\kappa}} \frac{\mathcal{B}(\sigma_c)}{\mathcal{B}(\sigma_c) + 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{(1+\sigma_l)(1-\bar{h}_l)}} \quad (3.5) $$

where $\bar{\kappa} = \kappa(1 - \sigma_c)(\mathbb{N})^{-(1-\bar{h}_l)(1+\sigma_l)}$.
Also, from the market clearing the shares of final demands in total output verify:

$$1 = cy + iy + gy \tag{3.6}$$

with the ratio of private consumption to output cy being fully endogenous, the ratio of government expenditure to output gy being exogenous and the ratio of investment to output iy given by the equilibrium on the capital market:

$$\alpha \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} = \frac{rr + \delta}{g + \delta} iy \tag{3.7}$$

Finally, in equilibrium the real wage verifies:

$$\overline{RW} = \tilde{\zeta} \left( \alpha \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \left( \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta \right)^{-1} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} (1-\alpha) \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \tag{3.8}$$

Differentiating these equilibrium equations with respect to θ or θw we get the following elasticity of output to goods market reforms:

$$\frac{d\bar{Y}}{\bar{Y}} = \left( \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} + \frac{1}{(1+\sigma_l)(1-h_l)(1+B(\sigma_c))} \left(1 + \frac{iy}{cy}\right) \right) \frac{\frac{d\theta}{\theta}}{\theta-1} \tag{3.9}$$

and to labour market reforms:

$$\frac{d\bar{Y}}{\bar{Y}} = \frac{1}{(1 + \sigma_l)(1 - h_l)(1 + B(\sigma_c))} \frac{\frac{d\theta_w}{\theta_w}}{\theta_w - 1} \tag{3.10}$$

We also compute the long term elasticity of households' utility to structural reforms on the goods market:

$$\frac{d\bar{U}}{\bar{U}} = (1 - \sigma_c)(1 - h_c) \left[ \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} - \frac{iy}{cy} \right) + \frac{1 - \frac{\theta_w - 1}{\theta_w} \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - h_l)}{(1 - h_c)cy}}{(1 + \sigma_l)(1 - h_l)(1 + B(\sigma_c))} \left(1 + \frac{iy}{cy}\right) \right] \frac{\frac{d\theta}{\theta}}{\theta - 1} \tag{3.11}$$

and on the labour market:

$$\frac{d\bar{U}}{\bar{U}} = (1 - \sigma_c)(1 - h_c) \frac{1 - \frac{\theta_w - 1}{\theta_w} \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - h_l)}{(1 - h_c)cy}}{(1 + \sigma_l)(1 - h_l)(1 + B(\sigma_c))} \frac{\frac{d\theta_w}{\theta_w}}{\theta_w - 1} \tag{3.12}$$

In all four cases, the elasticity crucially depends on households utility parametrisation (σl, σc, B),<fnref n="8" /> which calls for a detailed sensitivity analysis (Section 4).

The effect of both types of reforms on output and other real variables is positive (Figure 4). Replicating a standard exercise in this literature, decreasing product and labour mark-ups from the average Euro area levels to Europe's best performers levels would imply roughly 10% increases in such variables.

The sign of the elasticity of utility is however ambiguous. This ambiguity does not stem from the term $1 - \sigma_c$ whose sign is the same as the steady state utility $\bar{U}$ but in a more complicated way from the other terms. We give a more detailed explanation of this dependency in section 4.2. However, it is already interesting to see that the absence of unemployment in our model is a key source of this potentially negative externality of structural reforms on utility. Indeed, as mentioned above, the increase in output goes through an increase in hours worked, therefore generating disutility to households. In reality, the increase in output could be channelled through a higher employment at constant per capita hours worked.

<footnote n="8">⁸Note that the sign of B is the sign of $1 - \sigma_c$ and equation 3.5 implies that $1 + B > 0$ for the labour level to be well-defined, as $B/\kappa > 0$. Moreover, $\bar{U}$ is also of the sign of $1 - \sigma_c$.</footnote>
With our calibration, the effect on utility of an output augmenting structural reform is negative (disutility increases, Figure 5).<fnref n="9" /> Following either reform, both consumption and labour supply increase, contributing in opposite ways to households utility. In addition, habits (as in Abel (1990); Fuhrer (2000)) add a negative externality to welfare: the general increase in consumption mitigates the gains from each households' higher consumption (Figure 5b and 5c).

## 3.3 Transition dynamics

Compared to the previous analytical and general explanations of long-term effects, we now focus on specific reforms and simulate labour and goods market reforms comparable to the scenarios proposed by Everaert and Schule (2006). They consider an increase in competition up to the average level of the three best European performers, being Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The reform corresponds to a shift from 33 to 13% mark-up on labour and 20 to 14% mark-up on goods. Figure 6 and 7 present the transition of the economy to the new steady state after such reforms. Quantitative aspects are commented in the next section on sensitivity analysis.

**Increased competition on the goods market - Figure 6** Increasing competition on the goods market ($\theta \uparrow$ or price markup = $\theta/(\theta-1) \downarrow$) induces an immediate change in the distribution of production factors remuneration as explicated in the previous section. As $\theta$ increases, the share of profits in production mechanically diminishes, and the shares paid to capital and labour increase, stirring up the production cost in the short term. On the capital market, adjustment through quantities being sluggish, the return on capital temporarily increases. On the labour market, the real wages only gradually increase, the labour demand overshoots in the short run.<fnref n="10" />

In nominal terms, the reform will eventually imply a decrease in prices. In the Phillips curve, that is in the determination of today's price, the expected deflation motive prevails over the increase in the real marginal cost. As such, prices decrease today, inflation temporarily decreases, and so does the nominal interest rate.

On households' side, the consumption-leisure-investment arbitrage is modified through a mix of substitution and wealth effects, consequence of the particular choice of the utility function as well as its calibration. In all, investment immediately increases upon reform to take advantage of the favourable return on capital, this investment is financed through increased labour supply and crowding out of financial savings. Consumption rapidly increases (without overshooting) in line with the increase in the permanent income (wealth effect).

Eventually, the return on capital returns to steady state (unchanged by the reform) as the real interest rate returns to its initial steady state as well (no arbitrage condition). The long term increase in the real marginal cost therefore fully passes through to real wages. In all, production increases permanently due to both an increase in investment (i.e. capital) during the transition and to increased real wages and labour supply.

In terms of utility (Figure 7), as labour supply overshoots in the transition to finance an early increase in investment and consumption, the disutility of labour outweighs the gains from higher consumption: there is a transition cost to the reform (Jonsson, 2007; Matheron, 2002; Matheron and Maury, 2004). In the long run, goods market reforms can be detrimental to welfare as well (Equation 3.11). We show how this result depends on the specification of utility in a sensitivity analysis (Section 4).

<footnote n="9">⁹We choose to refer to the disutility as the steady state level of utility is negative. As such, a negative p.p. differential of utility indicates a lesser negative utility level, that is an improvement in utility. An interpretation in terms of disutility is more convenient and intuitive as a negative p.p. differential of disutility is indeed a decrease in the disutility.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰This increase of both real wages and labour in the transition is in line with the short term effect of a goods market reform in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>The x-axis represents the level of mark-up on goods (i.e. 1/θ - 1) whereas the y-axis represents the mark-up on wages (i.e. 1/θw - 1). The point named *Eurozone* corresponds to the standard calibration of our model and the point *Best practices* to the level of mark-ups in the three best European practices, namely Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, as defined in Everaert and Schule (2006).</figcaption></figure>

<caption>Figure 4: Steady state variations upon reforms in p.p. with respect to the initial calibration</caption>
<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>(a) Total utility</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /></figure>

**Upper figures:** The x-axis represents the level of mark-up on goods (i.e. $1/\theta - 1$) whereas the y-axis represents the mark-up on wages (i.e. $1/\theta_w - 1$). The point named *Eurozone* corresponds to the standard calibration of our model and the point *Best practices* to the level of mark-ups in the three best European practices, namely Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, as defined in Everaert and Schule (2006).

**Lower figures:** Decomposition of changes in disutility following pro-competitive reforms against the output increase induced by the reform. We represent the disutility of households. An increase in the disutility is therefore detrimental to the households. The x-axis indexes structural reforms ($\theta$ or $\theta_w$) by their impact on output in percentage points. The y-axis represents the variation in the disutility in percentage points with respect to its initial level.

This reads as follows : for the left lower figure, for a goods market deregulation that leads to a final increase in output of 5%, the disutility of households increases by 0.14 percentage points. It decomposes in 0.2 p.p. stemming from consumption habits, 0.28 p.p. from labour disutility, mitigated by -0.34 p.p. from consumption.

<caption>Figure 5: Steady state utility levels and decomposition upon reforms</caption>
**Increased competition on the labour market - Figure 6** Following an increase in competition on the labour market ($\theta_w \uparrow$ or wage markup $= \theta_w/(\theta_w - 1) \downarrow$), output, labour, consumption will eventually increase in the same proportion (cf. *supra*).

As for the goods market reform but in a lesser extent, in the transition, labour supply overshoots to finance the increase in consumption and investment, in line with higher capital demand and higher permanent income.

The labour supply overshoot increases capital returns, which in turns causes investment to overshoot. It also generates a small transitory decrease in real wages.<fnref n="11" /> In all, the real marginal cost temporarily increases which puts upward pressure on prices. Consequently, the monetary policy rate also adjusts upward.

In the long run, and as in the previous reform case, the nominal interest rate returns to the initial steady state as inflation converges to the central banker's target. The return on capital follows (no arbitrage condition). Eventually the adjustment of prices offsets the drop of wages so that the real wage returns to the initial steady state as well.

In terms of utility (Figure 7), there is also a cost to the reform in the transition and in the long run as utility decreases. In addition, during the transition this cost is higher than in the long-term. We analyse this result more specifically in Section 4.

For both types of reforms, within a year most of the output gains are achieved, and convergence is obtained within 15 years.

# 4 A sensitivity analysis

In order to ease comparison, transitions presented on Figure 6 correspond, as mentioned above, to the implementation of structural reforms as described in Everaert and Schule (2006). In our baseline, product (resp. labour) market reforms lead to a permanent increase in production of 4.8 p.p (resp. 5.8 p.p.), whereas this increase is of 1.6 p.p (resp. 6.1 p.p.) in the GEM model (Bayoumi et al., 2004).

At first sight, structural reforms are output-enhancing in both models. Whereas magnitudes are close for labour market reforms, still with a long term difference of 0.6 p.p in production, this gap widens to more than 3 p.p. of production in the case of product market reforms.

Indeed, the present model remains a medium scale DSGE model *à la Smets and Wouters*, without the additional rigidities often incorporated in larger institutional DSGE models, and without a distinction between tradable and non tradable goods: results should obviously differ. However, and even though directly comparing results might be partially misleading, one should be cautious to carefully understand the size of production gains. In particular, we showed in Equations 3.9 and 3.10 that the impact of reforms crucially depends on the behaviour of households through their utility function.

Therefore, in this section, we focus on the impact of the specification of households' utility on the strength of structural reforms. In addition, we will take a deeper look at the implications in terms of welfare, and to the changes occurring when introducing hand-to-mouth households<fnref n="12" /> as it is common in institutional DSGE models.

<footnote n="11">¹¹As mentioned by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) there is a trade-off between lower real wages in the short run against higher employment in the long run. However, as wages are sticky in our model, rapid and large gains in labour supply outweigh the small decrease in real wages in terms of income.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹²That is households that consume their current income at each period and do not have access to savings or credit.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_10.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /></figure>

Structural reforms implemented here are the ones of Everaert and Schule (2006), that is of an alignment of markups on the level of the three best European performers.

<caption>Figure 6: Transition following a decrease in the price or wage mark-up</caption>
<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>Structural reforms implemented here are the ones of Everaert and Schule (2006), that is an alignment of mark-ups on the level of the three best European performers. Solid black lines correspond to utilities without reforms, i.e. initial steady state. Coloured solid lines represent the intertemporal utility once the reform is implemented.</figcaption></figure>

<caption>Figure 7: Utility in the transition following a decrease in the price or wage markup</caption>

**4.1 Calibration of households’ utility**

**Range of values** As highlighted in Everaert and Schule (2006), the estimation and identification of the utility function parameters, and in particular the (Frisch) elasticity of labour supply, is very sensitive to the methodology (micro or macro) and the sample considered. As a result, it is important to have a critical eye on the results with respect to these parameters.

Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) calibrate their model with an inverse Frisch elasticity of $\sigma_I = 1$ in line with Kimball and Shapiro (2008). They also consider an alternative based on Cooley and Prescott (1995) with $\sigma_I = 0.33$. These values are in line with the business cycle literature and close to values estimated by Bayesian methods, as for instance the different versions of Smets and Wouters’ model with $\sigma_I = 2.4$ (Smets and Wouters, 2003), $\sigma_I = 2.0$ (Smets and Wouters, 2005) and $\sigma_I = 1.9$ (Smets and Wouters, 2007). However, micro and macro evidences are not easily reconciled and lead to very different values of the Frisch elasticity. Bayoumi et al. (2004) mention that micro studies give a range for $\sigma_I$ from 3 to as large as 20. In alternative scenarios for the GEM model, Bayoumi et al. (2004); Everaert and Schule (2006) set $\sigma_I = 6$ or 7.

For the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption $\sigma_c$, the debate is less fierce and values range from 0.25 (Bayoumi et al., 2004) to 2 (Trabandt and Uhlig, 2011). The different versions of *Smets and Wouters* give $\sigma_c = 1.3$ in Smets and Wouters (2003), $\sigma_c = 1.1$ in Smets and Wouters (2005) and $\sigma_c = 1.4$ in Smets and Wouters (2007).

**Mechanism** Recalling long term elasticities (Equations (3.9) and (3.10)), we can anticipate that both $\sigma_c$ and $\sigma_I$ will play a key role in the size of the impact of pro-competitive reforms. In particular, the inverse Frisch elasticity $\sigma_I$ will be a crucial determinant.
Intuitively, we can expect weaker effects of reforms following an increase in both the inverse intertemporal elasticity of consumption and the inverse Frisch elasticity, as they go in the same direction of more *rigid* households.

In more specific details, an increase in $\sigma_l$ directly translates into flatter labour supply curves on Figures 1 and 2, that is a lower response of labour to variations in real wages (there is less consumption-leisure arbitrage). Recall that the consumption-leisure arbitrage rewrites as follows from Equation 3.3

$$ \frac{\theta_w - 1}{\theta_w} \overline{RW} = (1 + \sigma_c) \bar{C} f(\bar{L}) \qquad (4.1) $$

When conducting a pro-competitive reform on the labour market (Figure 2), the left-hand side term increases at any given $(\overline{RW}, \overline{L})$ through the increase in $(\theta_w - 1)/\theta_w$. As a result, we showed that the supply curve was shifting upwards, the amplitude of this shift being, by definition of the elasticity, negatively related to $\sigma_l$. As a result, the combination of both a flatter supply curve and of a lower shift, as $\sigma_l$ is higher, implies a lower increase in labour and therefore in output.

In the case of a product market reform (Figure 1), the increase in output mainly stems from a movement along the labour supply curve S1 when the labour demand curve shifts upwards. In the case of a flatter supply curve, the induced increase in labour (and therefore output) will be lower.

**Numerical applications** Conducting identical reforms as in the previous section for different calibrations of the utility function, Figure 8 shows that this modification of the behaviour of households can lead to a significant change of the gains from increased competition (for extreme values of $\sigma_l$ closer to 1). Changes in the elasticity of consumption give weak and ambiguous results on these gains.

With respect to the effect on the transition dynamics, Figure 13 to 15 in the Appendix show that even though these parameters indeed appear in the households' first order conditions (Euler equation, wage Phillips curve, Tobins' Q and investment decision equations), their influence is very minor. They mainly scale the effects up or down in line with the impact on the steady state, but do not modify the "shape" of the dynamics.

Similarly for $h_c = 0$, Figures 16 and 20 in the Appendix, show that the role of habits on the transition is non-existent, and negligible in the long-run for consumption habits. For labour habits ($h_l = 0.5$) (Figures 17 and 20), the effect is also a scale effect, the existence of habits scales the *without habits equivalent* inverse Frisch elasticity down.<fnref n="13" /> In the long-run, the introduction of labour habits can boost up the impact of reforms of up to 3 p.p. of production (resp. 6 p.p.) for product(resp. labour) market reforms, in comparison to Figure 8.

## 4.2 Welfare costs - welfare gains

Output gains to structural reforms are positive. This result, we found unchallenged in the literature, is the consequence of diminishing market power and reducing the shortage organized by monopolistic competitors. A negative effect on welfare is rather unusual in the literature. Indeed, Jonsson (2007), Matheron (2002), or Matheron and Maury (2004) insist on the welfare cost of imperfect competition, whereas Everaert and Schule (2006), Gomes et al. (2013) and Forni et al. (2010) show based on institutional model simulations that structural reforms are welfare enhancing.

**Mechanism** The main mechanism behind the positive welfare impact of structural reforms is as follows: as output increases so does households' revenues, consumption and therefore welfare. Indeed, the increase in output also translates into an increase in the disutility incurred from labour. However, in most standard

<footnote n="13">¹³Indeed, terms in $(1 + \sigma_l)$ in the equations are now replaced by $(1 + \sigma_l') = (1 + \sigma_l)(1 - h_l)$, so for a given $\sigma_l$, the equivalent $\sigma_l'$ is lower.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_15.png" /></figure>

The inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption corresponds to σ<sub>c</sub>, and the inverse Frisch elasticity to σ<sub>l</sub>. Structural reforms implemented here are the ones of Everaert and Schule (2006), that is of an alignment of markups on the level of the three best European performers.

SW indicates the calibration of the model following Smets and Wouters for the Euro area. Our standard calibration relies on Smets and Wouters (2005). ES (2006) corresponds to Everaert and Schule (2006).

<caption>Figure 8: Impact of structural reforms in p.p. depending on the calibration of the utility function</caption>

calibrations, this detrimental effect is dominated by the beneficial consumption effect.

Nevertheless, there exists calibrations for which welfare is negatively impacted by the pro-competitive reforms in our model. In particular, recalling the analytical expressions for the long term elasticities (Equations (3.11) and (3.12)), we observe that this conclusion can arise through two mechanisms: habits on consumption or labour, and government consumption.

Let first focus on the latter, and consider a no habit formation case ($h_c = h_l = 0$). In this case, the sign of long-term utility elasticities for both goods and labour markets reforms partly depends on the sign of $A = 1 - (\theta_w - 1/\theta_w)(\theta - 1/\theta)((1-\alpha)/\gamma)$ $= 1 + u_L/u_C$, where $u_x$ is the derivative of the utility function with respect to x. This term depends on the markup level in both goods and labour markets, as well as on the share of private consumption in GDP. It can also be rewritten to show a direct dependency on the ratio of the marginal disutility of labour to the marginal utility of consumption. If $A$ becomes negative, structural reforms can imply welfare losses.

In particular, it is interesting to note that we can show analytically that without public consumption $A$ is never negative, and households never incur welfare losses. The main mechanism is as follows: by adding public consumption, the gains in output following structural reforms are shared between households (either through consumption or investment) and the public sector. That is the mere decomposition of GDP into C+I+G. However, the increase in output is sustained by an increase in hours worked that is fully borne by households. As such, the crowding out effect of public consumption introduces a wedge for households between their welfare gains from consumption and their welfare loss from labour.

Moreover, we notice that $A$ can only turn negative when $\theta_w - 1/\theta_w$ or $\theta - 1/\theta$ are high, that is when markups are already low.
For goods market reforms, if markups on prices are low, households are already consuming close to the optimum at equilibria, and their marginal utility of consumption is low. Therefore, as goods markets are further deregulated, households indeed consume more but derive relatively less utility from consumption than what they loose from working more.

Similarly, for labour markets reforms, if wage markups are low, households already demand wages close to their marginal cost. Therefore, as wage markups are further decreased, their initial marginal disutility of labour is high, and increasing output will be more detrimental to their welfare than what they gain from consumption. For labour markets reforms, the loss in welfare for households is analogous to the loss in profits for firms when price markups are reduced.

**Habit formation** In addition to the previous mechanism, habit formation plays a crucial role through the term $1 - h_l/1 - h_c$.

First, the higher $h_c$, i.e. the more habits on consumption, the closer to zero the $A$ term is. For strong consumption habits, this $A$ term might even turn negative inducing welfare losses in the long-term. This decline in welfare logically comes from the fact that an increased aggregate consumption level also means stronger negative externalities at the household level, as they compare to the aggregate level.

Similarly, habits on labour (Bayoumi et al., 2004; Ratto et al., 2009) work in a similar fashion as consumption habits, that is as a *social norm* to which households compare. Following a general increase in labour supply, each household incurs a lesser disutility from working longer hours. However, while consumption habits are detrimental to welfare, labour habits are therefore welfare enhancing. Therefore, the higher $h_l$ is, i.e. the more habits on labour, the further away from zero $A$ is.

Note that we introduce habit formation in a multiplicative manner (a choice also made by Abel (1990); Galí (1994); Carroll et al. (2000); Fuhrer (2000)) and only consider external habits (i.e. *Catching up with the Joneses*).<fnref n="14" /> However, Carroll (2000) shows that in the business cycle (i.e. in the linearised equations), multiplicative and additive habits can not be distinguished. However, habit modelled in a multiplicative way affect the long-term elasticity of utility whereas additive habits would be neutral on the long term elasticity of utility to a reform.

**Numerical applications** As shown on Figure 5, utility decreases upon reform in our baseline model. This stems from the introduction of consumption habits that mitigate (and actually offset) the gains from increased consumption. Indeed, considering a recalibration of the model without consumption habits ($h_c = 0$), we find a positive welfare impact of pro-competitive reforms (disutility decreases, Figure 9a and 9b). The transitions to the post reform steady state are almost identical (Figure 16 in the Appendix), and transitional costs remain (Figure 19). These costs (the difference between the final value of intertemporal utility and its value once the reform is effective) is however small relative to the long term gains (the difference between the final value of intertemporal utility and its value before the reform is effective).

Considering labour habits ($h_l = 0.5$) in our model yields very similar shape of transitions (yet different levels, see Figure 17 in the Appendix) but greatly impacts long term effect of the reforms as it is equivalent to a large reduction of the inverse Frisch elasticity at steady state. In terms of utility, the positive externality from labour habits offsets the otherwise overall negative effect on welfare from the reforms (Figure 9c and 9d).

<footnote n="14">¹⁴Internal habit formation would therefore require further sensitivity tests.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_16.png" /></figure>

Decomposition of changes in disutility following pro-competitive reforms against the output increase induced by the reform. We represent the disutility of households. A increase in the disutility is therefore detrimental to the households. The x-axis indexes structural reforms ($\theta$ or $\theta_w$) by their impact on output.

<caption>Figure 9: Steady state utility levels and decomposition upon reforms</caption>
## 4.3 Adding *non-Ricardian* agents

As an additional standard mechanism, we introduce a fraction of hand-to-mouth consumers (Campbell and Mankiw, 1990). This element is often included in institutional neo-Keynesian models and has a sizeable impact on the size of production gains.

**Range of values** The estimation or calibration of the share of *non-Ricardian* agents in the economy $\mu$ is subject to debate. Actually, this parameter is often estimated using Bayesian methods or simply calibrated with *expert* insights as in Everaert and Schule (2006). For instance, this share is estimated to be 35% in France and 45% in the Euro area in GEM, and 40% for both in QUEST III.

However, micro-studies highlight that these estimated shares might be over-evaluated as only a few agents are strictly banned from financial markets. Indeed, a large number of agents, designated as *wealthy hand-to-mouth*, do possess a large illiquid wealth, such as housing, so that their short-term consumption is highly correlated to their current income. However, in the long-term, this conclusion might differ as assets can be traded. Kaplan et al. (2014) compute values for the share of *wealthy hand-to-mouth* agents around 20% for France. Close to Kaplan et al. (2014), Martin and Philippon (2014) focus on the fraction of households with liquid assets representing less than 2 months of total gross disposable income and calibrate their model to a 46.6% share of *non-Ricardian* agents in France.

Moreover Fève and Sahuc (2013) show that once government spending is accounted for in the utility function, the estimated share of *non-Ricardian* agents in a model *à la* Smets and Wouters (2007) drops to 7% only.

We calibrate this share to estimated values in QUEST III, that is $\mu$ = 40%, a value close to the upper bound but rather standard in institutional DSGE models.

**Utility and inequalities between households** The introduction of heterogeneous households allows to study the effect of increased competition on inequalities. Figure 10 presents the long-term responses of *Ricardian* and *non-Ricardian* consumption, labour supply and real wages to both types of pro-competitive reforms. Transitional dynamics and level ratios between both types of households are presented on Figure 18 and 21 in the Appendix.

Deregulating the product market leads to a decrease in consumption and welfare disparities. Indeed both types of households are affected by a wealth effect, positive for *non-Ricardians* as the real wage goes up; negative for *Ricardians* as dividends shrink. Therefore, *non-Ricardians'* consumption markedly increases while *Ricardians'* consumption decreases slightly. On the labour market, *Ricardian* agents supply more labour as opposed to constrained households who decrease their supply. In addition, *Ricardians* are the only suppliers for the increased demand in capital which further crowds out their consumption.

Conversely, reforming the labour market leaves firms' profits untouched. The reform affects both types of households labour supply curve in a similar fashion: both work more. The increase in capital income finances investment, so much so that both types' consumption increases alike. All in all consumption, labour and utility inequalities stagnate.

Increased competition on both markets also leads to a decrease in wages inequalities.

In addition, Figure 11 presents the steady state variation in the disutility of agents following a mark-up reform (indexed by the corresponding variations in production), as well as the contribution of each variable to this disutility: namely individual consumption, external consumption habits, and labour.

In the case of a product market deregulation (left column), disutility of the representative consumer decreases slightly (the utility therefore increases) with increasing output gains. Therefore, in the long term,
<figure><img src="image_17.png" /><figcaption>(a) Ricardian consumption</figcaption></figure>

Ricardian labour supply
(in % deviation)

<figure><img src="image_18.png" /><figcaption>(c) Ricardian labour</figcaption></figure>

Ricardian Real wage
(in % deviation)

<figure><img src="image_19.png" /><figcaption>(e) Ricardian real wage</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_20.png" /><figcaption>(b) non-Ricardian consumption</figcaption></figure>

Non-Ricardian labour supply
(in % deviation)

<figure><img src="image_21.png" /><figcaption>(d) non-Ricardian labour</figcaption></figure>

Non-Ricardian Real wage
(in % deviation)

<figure><img src="image_22.png" /><figcaption>(f) non-Ricardian real wage</figcaption></figure>

The x-axis represents the level of mark-up on goods (i.e. 1/θ - 1) whereas the y-axis represents the mark-up on wages (i.e. 1/θw - 1). The point named *Eurozone* corresponds to the standard calibration of our model and the point *Best practices* to the level of mark-ups in the three best European practices, namely Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, as defined in Everaert and Schule (2006).

<caption>Figure 10: Steady state variations upon reforms in p.p. with respect to the initial calibration the presence of non-Ricardian households</caption>
Contribution to the disutility of consumers

<figure><img src="image_23.png" /><figcaption>(a) Goods market reform - Representative</figcaption></figure>

Contribution to the disutility of consumers

<figure><img src="image_24.png" /><figcaption>(b) Labour market reform - Representative</figcaption></figure>

Contribution to the disutility of Ricardian consumer

<figure><img src="image_25.png" /><figcaption>(c) Goods market reform - Ricardian</figcaption></figure>

Contribution to the disutility of Ricardian consumer

<figure><img src="image_26.png" /><figcaption>(d) Labour market reform - Ricardian</figcaption></figure>

Contribution to the disutility of non-Ricardian consumer

<figure><img src="image_27.png" /><figcaption>(e) Goods market reform - non-Ricardian</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_28.png" /><figcaption>(f) Labour market reform - non-Ricardian</figcaption></figure>

Decomposition of changes in disutility following pro-competitive reforms against the output increase induced by the reform. We represent the disutility of households. A increase in the disutility is therefore detrimental to the households. The x-axis indexes structural reforms ($\theta$ or $\theta_w$) by their impact on output.

<caption>Figure 11: Steady state utility levels and decomposition upon reforms in the presence of constrained households</caption>
the economic desirability of an increased output goes along with an increased utility. However, implications
are very different across households. Indeed, *Ricardian* households are adversely affected by the reform as
labour, individual consumption and consumption habits work in the same way of an increased disutility.

On the contrary, *non-Ricardian* households strongly benefit from the reform as their consumption in-
creases faster than aggregate consumption does (as *Ricardian* consumption decreases upon reform). All in
all, the net effect of consumption (individual consumption minus consumption habits) is strongly welfare
improving. The decrease in labour supply, following the positive permanent income effect of the reform,
also contributes mildly to the decrease in disutility.

For labour market reforms, aggregate disutility is increasing with output gains. Individual consumption increases and contributes positively to the utility. Nevertheless, the total effect of consumption, net of habits, is welfare enhancing, while the increase in labour supply results in a long-term decrease in the utility level. This decomposition is quasi identical across households.

**Numerical implications for reforms' impact** Increasing competition on both the labour and goods markets, in the presence of an increasing share of constrained households (Figure 12) goes for both types of reforms towards weaker long-term production gains. In the presence of liquidity-constrained agents, the effect of product market reforms can be mitigated by more than 0.5 p.p., whereas this effect is negligible for labour market reforms.

<figure><img src="image_29.png" /></figure>

The share of *non-Ricardian* households corresponds to *μ*.
Structural reforms implemented here are the ones of Everaert and Schule (2006), that is of an alignment of markups on the level of
the three best European performers.

Figure 12: Impact of reforms in p.p. with respect to the initial production level depending on the share of non-Ricardian households
# 5 Conclusion

In a standard neo-Keynesian model which is at the core of most large scale institutional models, we evaluate the impact of structural reforms.

The long term gains in output following pro-competitive reforms are well documented in this class of model. Qualitatively, these models provide results in line with stylized facts obtained in deregulation-oriented models such as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). However, these similarities hide quite different economic mechanisms. We explain these mechanisms, stressing in particular the importance of the households' leisure-consumption arbitrage. Quantitatively, we proceed to a sensitivity analysis: whereas qualitative results, including in the transition, are robust to changes in the specification of the model, quantitative results differ across specifications. The simple recalibration of households' utility can lead to additional gains or losses of a few percentage points in output following pro-competitive goods or labour markets reforms.

However, policy recommendations based on welfare analyses are less clear-cut in the long run than recommendations solely based on output analyses. In the transition, welfare losses are large despite the increase in permanent income. Introducing *non-Ricardian* agents allows stylized yet informative inequality analyses showing that goods market reforms reduce inequalities while labour market reforms are neutral between Ricardian and non Ricardian agents.

These results imply two main recommendations: first, and at the very least, an extensive use of sensitivity analyses when building policy recommendations from these models, second, and more fundamentally, a rethink of the mechanisms at play in the long run (and in particular on the labour market) and of differences in elasticities (Frisch and intertemporal substitution of consumption) between the long run and over the business cycle.

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<figure><img src="image_30.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_31.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_32.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_33.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_34.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_35.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_36.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_37.png" /></figure>

(a) Goods market reform

(b) Labour market reform

<caption>Figure 13: Sensitivity of the transition following mark-up reforms to the calibration ($\sigma_c$ = 0.5 compared to baseline)</caption>
<figure><img src="image_38.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_39.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_40.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_41.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_42.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_43.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_44.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_45.png" /></figure>

(a) Goods market reform

(b) Labour market reform

<caption>Figure 14: Sensitivity of the transition following mark-up reforms to the calibration ($\sigma_I$ = 0.3 compared to baseline)</caption>
<figure><img src="image_46.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_47.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_48.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_49.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_50.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_51.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_52.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_53.png" /><figcaption>(a) Goods market reform</figcaption></figure>

<caption>(b) Labour market reform</caption>

<caption>Figure 15: Sensitivity of the transition following mark-up reforms to the calibration ($\sigma_1$ = 6 compared to baseline)</caption>
<figure><img src="image_54.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_55.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_56.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_57.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_58.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_59.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_60.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_61.png" /><figcaption>(a) Goods market reform</figcaption></figure>

<caption>(b) Labour market reform</caption>

<caption>Figure 16: Sensitivity of the transition following mark-up reforms to the calibration ($h_c = 0$ compared to baseline)</caption>
<figure><img src="image_62.png" /><figcaption>Figure 17: Sensitivity of the transition following mark-up reforms to the calibration ($h_l = 0.5$ compared to baseline)</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_63.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_64.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_65.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_66.png" /><figcaption>Figure 18: Sensitivity of the transition following mark-up reforms to the introduction of *non-Ricardian* households ($\mu = 0.4$ compared to baseline)</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_67.png" /><figcaption>Structural reforms implemented here are the ones of Everaert and Schule (2006), that is of an alignment of mark-ups on the level of the three best European performers. Solid black lines correspond to utilities without reforms, i.e. initial steady state. Coloured solid lines represent the intertemporal utility once the reform is implemented. The difference between this line and the final steady state is the transition cost to the reform.</figcaption></figure>

<caption>Figure 19: Utility in the transition following a decrease in the price or wage mark-up without consumption habits ($h_c = 0$)</caption>
<figure><img src="image_68.png" /></figure>

The inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption corresponds to $\sigma_c$, and the inverse Frisch elasticity to $\sigma_l$. Structural reforms implemented here are the ones of Everaert and Schule (2006), that is of an alignment of markups on the level of the three best European performers.

SW (YYYY) indicates the calibration of the model following Smets and Wouters (YYYY) for the Euro area. Our standard calibration relies on Smets and Wouters (2005). ES (2006) corresponds to Everaert and Schule (2006).

<caption>Figure 20: Impact of structural reforms in p.p. depending on the calibration of the utility function for alternative calibrations of the model</caption>
<figure><img src="image_69.png" /></figure>

The x-axis represents the level of mark-up on goods (i.e. $1/\theta - 1$) whereas the y-axis represents the mark-up on wages (i.e. $1/\theta_w - 1$). The point named *Eurozone* corresponds to the standard calibration of our model and the point *Best practices* to the level of mark-ups in the three best European practices, namely Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, as defined in Everaert and Schule (2006). For the utility ratio, it is crucial to know that the steady state utility level is negative. As such, a ratio below one indicates a higher utility level for Ricardian households. The closer it is to one, the less inequality.

<caption>Figure 21: Steady state Ricardian to non-Ricardian level ratios</caption>
<table><tr><td>G 9001</td><td>J. FAYOLLE et M. FLEURBAEY<br>Accumulation, profitabilité et endettement des entreprises</td></tr><tr><td>G 9002</td><td>H. ROUSSE<br>Détection et effets de la multicolinéarité dans les modèles linéaires ordinaires - Un prolongement de la réflexion de BELSLEY, KUH et WELSCH</td></tr><tr><td>G 9003</td><td>P. RALLE et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br>Indexation des salaires : la rupture de 1983</td></tr><tr><td>G 9004</td><td>D. GUELLEC et P. RALLE<br>Compétitivité, croissance et innovation de produit</td></tr><tr><td>G 9005</td><td>P. RALLE et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br>Les conséquences de la désindexation. Analyse dans une maquette prix-salaires</td></tr><tr><td>G 9101</td><td>Équipe AMADEUS<br>Le modèle AMADEUS - Première partie - Présentation générale</td></tr><tr><td>G 9102</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Le modèle AMADEUS - Deuxième partie - Propriétés variantielles</td></tr><tr><td>G 9103</td><td>D. GUELLEC et P. RALLE<br>Endogenous growth and product innovation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9104</td><td>H. ROUSSE<br>Le modèle AMADEUS - Troisième partie - Le commerce extérieur et l'environnement international</td></tr><tr><td>G 9105</td><td>H. ROUSSE<br>Effets de demande et d'offre dans les résultats du commerce extérieur manufacturé de la France au cours des deux dernières décennies</td></tr><tr><td>G 9106</td><td>B. CREPON<br>Innovation, taille et concentration : causalités et dynamiques</td></tr><tr><td>G 9107</td><td>B. AMABLE et D. GUELLEC<br>Un panorama des théories de la croissance endogène</td></tr><tr><td>G 9108</td><td>M. GLAUDE et M. MOUTARDIER<br>Une évaluation du coût direct de l'enfant de 1979 à 1989</td></tr><tr><td>G 9109</td><td>P. RALLE et alii<br>France - Allemagne : performances économiques comparées</td></tr><tr><td>G 9110</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Micro-DMS<br>NON PARU</td></tr><tr><td>G 9111</td><td>A. MAGNIER<br>Effets accélérateur et multiplicateur en France depuis 1970 : quelques résultats empiriques</td></tr><tr><td>G 9112</td><td>B. CREPON et G. DUREAU<br>Investissement en recherche-développement : analyse de causalités dans un modèle d'accélérateur généralisé</td></tr><tr><td>G 9113</td><td>J.L. BRILLET, H. ERKEL-ROUSSE, J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br>"France-Allemagne Couplées" - Deux économies vues par une maquette macro-économétrique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9201</td><td>W.J. ADAMS, B. CREPON, D. ENCAOUA<br>Choix technologiques et stratégies de dissuasion d'entrée</td></tr><tr><td>G 9202</td><td>J. OLIVEIRA-MARTINS, J. TOUJAS-BERNATE</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9203</td><td>I. STAPIC<br>Les échanges internationaux de services de la France dans le cadre des négociations multilaterales du GATT<br>Juin 1992 (1ère version)<br>Novembre 1992 (version finale)</td></tr><tr><td>G 9204</td><td>P. SEVESTRE<br>L'économie sur données individuelles-temporelles. Une note introductive</td></tr><tr><td>G 9205</td><td>H. ERKEL-ROUSSE<br>Le commerce extérieur et l'environnement international dans le modèle AMADEUS (réestimation 1992)</td></tr><tr><td>G 9206</td><td>N. GREENAN et D. GUELLEC<br>Coordination within the firm and endogenous growth</td></tr><tr><td>G 9207</td><td>A. MAGNIER et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br>Technology and trade: empirical evidences for the major five industrialized countries</td></tr><tr><td>G 9208</td><td>B. CREPON, E. DUGUET, D. ENCAOUA et P. MOHNEN<br>Cooperative, non cooperative R & D and optimal patent life</td></tr><tr><td>G 9209</td><td>B. CREPON et E. DUGUET<br>Research and development, competition and innovation: an application of pseudo maximum likelihood methods to Poisson models with heterogeneity</td></tr><tr><td>G 9301</td><td>J. TOUJAS-BERNATE<br>Commerce international et concurrence impartie : développements récents et implications pour la politique commerciale</td></tr><tr><td>G 9302</td><td>Ch. CASES<br>Durées de chômage et comportements d'offre de travail : une revue de la littérature</td></tr><tr><td>G 9303</td><td>H. ERKEL-ROUSSE<br>Union économique et monétaire : le débat économique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9304</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC / G. BROUSSAUDIER - L. MIOTTI<br>Innovation organisationnelle, dynamisme technologique et performances des entreprises</td></tr><tr><td>G 9305</td><td>P. JAILLARD<br>Le traité de Maastricht : présentation juridique et historique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9306</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Micro-DMS : présentation et propriétés</td></tr><tr><td>G 9307</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Micro-DMS - variantes : les tableaux</td></tr><tr><td>G 9308</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br>Les grands réseaux publics français dans une perspective européenne</td></tr><tr><td>G 9309</td><td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURE<br>Profitabilité de l'investissement productif et transmission des chocs financiers</td></tr><tr><td>G 9310</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br>Les théories sur la structure optimale du capital : quelques points de repère</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9311</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br>Les décisions de financement des entreprises françaises : une évaluation empirique des théories de la structure optimale du capital</td></tr><tr><td>G 9312</td><td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURE<br>Q de Tobin marginal et transmission des chocs financiers</td></tr><tr><td>G 9313</td><td>Équipes Amadeus (INSEE), Banque de France, Métric (DP)<br>Presentation des propriétés des principaux modèles macroéconomiques du Service Public</td></tr><tr><td>G 9314</td><td>B. CREPON - E. DUGUET<br>Research & Development, competition and innovation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9315</td><td>B. DORMONT<br>Quelle est l'influence du coût du travail sur l'emploi ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9316</td><td>D. BLANCHET - C. BROUSSE<br>Deux études sur l'âge de la retraite</td></tr><tr><td>G 9317</td><td>D. BLANCHET<br>Répartition du travail dans une population hétérogène : deux notes</td></tr><tr><td>G 9318</td><td>D. EYSSARTIER - N. PONTY<br>AMADEUS - an annual macro-economic model for the medium and long term</td></tr><tr><td>G 9319</td><td>G. CETTE - Ph. CUNÉO - D. EYSSARTIER - J. GAUTIÉ<br>Les effets sur l'emploi d'un abaissement du coût du travail des jeunes</td></tr><tr><td>G 9401</td><td>D. BLANCHET<br>Les structures par âge importent-elles ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9402</td><td>J. GAUTIÉ<br>Le chômage des jeunes en France : problème de formation ou phénomène de file d'attente ?<br>Quelques éléments du débat</td></tr><tr><td>G 9403</td><td>P. QUIRION<br>Les déchets en France : éléments statistiques et économiques</td></tr><tr><td>G 9404</td><td>D. LADIRAY - M. GRUN-REHOMME<br>Lissage par moyennes mobiles - Le problème des extrémités de série</td></tr><tr><td>G 9405</td><td>V. MAILLARD<br>Theorie et pratique de la correction des effets de jours ouvrables</td></tr><tr><td>G 9406</td><td>F. ROSENWALD<br>La décision d'investir</td></tr><tr><td>G 9407</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br>Les apports de l'économie industrielle pour définir la stratégie économique de l'hôpital public</td></tr><tr><td>G 9408</td><td>L. BLOCH, J. BOURDIEU, B. COLIN-SEDILLOT, G. LONGUEVILLE<br>Du défaut de paiement au dépôt de bilan : les banquiers face aux PME en difficulté</td></tr><tr><td>G 9409</td><td>D. EYSSARTIER, P. MAIRE<br>Impacts macro-économiques de mesures d'aide au logement - quelques éléments d'évaluation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9410</td><td>F. ROSENWALD<br>Suivi conjoncturel de l'investissement</td></tr><tr><td>G 9411</td><td>C. DEFEUILLEY - Ph. QUIRION<br>Les déchets d'emballages ménagers : une analyse économique des politiques française et allemande</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9412</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT<br>Investissement, incertitude et irréversibilité<br>Quelques développements récents de la théorie de l'investissement</td></tr><tr><td>G 9413</td><td>B. DORMONT - M. PAUCHET<br>L'évaluation de l'élasticité emploi-salaire dépend-elle des structures de qualification ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9414</td><td>I. KABLA<br>Le Choix de breveter une invention</td></tr><tr><td>G 9501</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. SEDILLOT<br>Irreversible Investment and Uncertainty: When is there a Value of Waiting?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9502</td><td>L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ<br>Imperfections du marché du crédit, investissement des entreprises et cycle économique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9503</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br>Les transformations de la demande de travail par qualification en France<br>Une étude sur la période 1970-1993</td></tr><tr><td>G 9504</td><td>N. GREENAN<br>Technologie, changement organisationnel, qualifications et emploi : une étude empirique sur l'industrie manufacturière</td></tr><tr><td>G 9505</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br>Persistence des hiérarchies sectorielles de salaires: un réexamen sur données françaises</td></tr><tr><td>G 9505<br>Bis</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br>Persistence of inter-industry wages differentials: a reexamination on matched worker-firm panel data</td></tr><tr><td>G 9506</td><td>S. JACOBZONE<br>Les liens entre RMI et chômage, une mise en perspective<br>NON PARU - article sorti dans Économie et Prévision n° 122 (1996) - pages 95 à 113</td></tr><tr><td>G 9507</td><td>G. CETTE - S. MAHFOUZ<br>Le partage primaire du revenu<br>Constat descriptif sur longue période</td></tr><tr><td>G 9601</td><td>Banque de France - CEPREMAP - Direction de la Prévision - Érasme - INSEE - OFCE<br>Structures et propriétés de cinq modèles macro-économiques français</td></tr><tr><td>G 9602</td><td>Rapport d'activité de la DESE de l'année 1995</td></tr><tr><td>G 9603</td><td>J. BOURDIEU - A. DRAZNIEKS<br>L'octroi de crédit aux PME : une analyse à partir d'informations bancaires</td></tr><tr><td>G 9604</td><td>A. TOPIOL-BENSAÏD<br>Les implantations japonaises en France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9605</td><td>P. GENIER - S. JACOBZONE<br>Comportements de prévention, consommation d'alcool et tabagie : peut-on parler d'une gestion globale du capital santé ?<br>Une modélisation microéconométrique empirique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9606</td><td>C. DOZ - F. LENGLART<br>Factor analysis and unobserved component models: an application to the study of French business surveys</td></tr><tr><td>G 9607</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br>La théorie coopérative de la firme</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>G 9608</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br>Technological innovation and employment<br>reallocation</td><td>G 9714</td><td>F. LEQUILLER<br>Does the French Consumer Price Index Over-<br>state Inflation?</td><td>G 9807</td><td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études<br>et Synthèses Économiques - 1997</td><td>Bis</td><td>Une estimation de l'élasticité de l'emploi peu<br>qualifié à son coût</td></tr><tr><td>G 9609</td><td>Ph. COUR - F. RUPPRECHT<br>L'intégration asymétrique au sein du continent<br>américain : un essai de modélisation</td><td>G 9715</td><td>X. BONNET<br>Peut-on mettre en évidence les rigidités à la<br>baisse des salaires nominaux ?<br>Une étude sur quelques grands pays de l'OCDE</td><td>G 9808</td><td>A. MOUROUGANE<br>Can a Conservative Governor Conduct an Ac-<br>comodative Monetary Policy?</td><td>G 9913</td><td>Division « Redistribution et Politiques Sociales »<br>Le modèle de microsimulation dynamique<br>DESTINIE</td></tr><tr><td>G 9610</td><td>S. DUCHENE - G. FORGEOT - A. JACQUOT<br>Analyse des évolutions récentes de la producti-<br>vité apparente du travail</td><td>G 9716</td><td>N. IUNG - F. RUPPRECHT<br>Productivité de la recherche et rendements<br>d'échelle dans le secteur pharmaceutique<br>français</td><td>G 9809</td><td>X. BONNET - E. DUBOIS - L. FAUVET<br>Asymétrie des inflations relatives et menus costs<br>: tests sur l'inflation française</td><td>G 9914</td><td>E. DUGUET<br>Macro-commandes SAS pour l'économie des<br>panels et des variables qualitatives</td></tr><tr><td>G 9611</td><td>X. BONNET - S. MAHFOUZ<br>The influence of different specifications of wages-<br>prices spirals on the measure of the NAIRU: the<br>case of France</td><td>G 9717</td><td>E. DUGUET - I. KABLA<br>Appropriation strategy and the motivations to use<br>the patent system in France - An econometric<br>analysis at the firm level</td><td>G 9810</td><td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br>Sales and Advertising with Spillovers at the firm<br>level: Estimation of a Dynamic Structural Model<br>on Panel Data</td><td>G 9915</td><td>R. DUHAUTOIS<br>Évolution des flux d'emplois en France entre<br>1990 et 1996 : une étude empirique à partir du<br>fichier des bénéfices réels normaux (BRN)</td></tr><tr><td>G 9612</td><td>PH. COUR - E. DUBOIS, S. MAHFOUZ,<br>J. PISANI-FERRY<br>The cost of fiscal retrenchment revisited: how<br>strong is the evidence?</td><td>G 9718</td><td>L.P. PELÉ - P. RALLE<br>Âge de la retraite : les aspects incitatifs du régime<br>général</td><td>G 9811</td><td>J.P. BERTHIER<br>Congestion urbaine : un modèle de trafic de<br>pointe à courbe débit-vitesse et demande<br>élastique</td><td>G 9916</td><td>J.Y. FOURNIER<br>Extraction du cycle des affaires : la méthode de<br>Baxter et King</td></tr><tr><td>G 9613</td><td>A. JACQUOT<br>Les flexions des taux d'activité sont-elles seule-<br>ment conjoncturelles ?</td><td>G 9719</td><td>ZHANG Yingxiang - SONG Xueqing<br>Lexique macroéconomique français-chinois,<br>chinois-français</td><td>G 9812</td><td>C. PRIGENT<br>La part des salaires dans la valeur ajoutée : une<br>approche macroéconomique</td><td>G 9917</td><td>B. CRÉPON - R. DESPLATZ - J. MAIRESSÉ<br>Estimating price cost margins, scale economies<br>and workers' bargaining power at the firm level</td></tr><tr><td>G 9614</td><td>ZHANG Yingxiang - SONG Xueqing<br>Lexique macroéconomique Français-Chinois</td><td>G 9720</td><td>M. HOUDEBINE - J.L. SCHNEIDER<br>Mesurer l'influence de la fiscalité sur la locali-<br>sation des entreprises</td><td>G 9813</td><td>A.Th. AERTS<br>L'évolution de la part des salaires dans la valeur<br>ajoutée en France reflète-t-elle les évolutions<br>individuelles sur la période 1979-1994 ?</td><td>G 9918</td><td>Ch. GIANELLA - Ph. LAGARDE<br>Productivity of hours in the aggregate production<br>function: an evaluation on a panel of French firms<br>from the manufacturing sector</td></tr><tr><td>G 9701</td><td>J.L. SCHNEIDER<br>La taxe professionnelle : éléments de cadrage<br>économique</td><td>G 9721</td><td>A. MOUROUGANE<br>Crédibilité, indépendance et politique monétaire<br>A revenue de la littérature</td><td>G 9814</td><td>B. SALANIÉ<br>Guide pratique des séries non-stationnaires</td><td>G 9919</td><td>S. AUDRIC - P. GIVORD - C. PROST<br>Évolution de l'emploi et des coûts par quali-<br>fication entre 1982 et 1996</td></tr><tr><td>G 9702</td><td>J.L. SCHNEIDER<br>Transition et stabilité politique d'un système<br>redistributif</td><td>G 9722</td><td>P. AUGERAUD - L. BRIOT<br>Les données comptables d'entreprises<br>Le système intermédiaire d'entreprises<br>Passage des données individuelles aux données<br>sectorielles</td><td>G 9901</td><td>S. DUCHÈNE - A. JACQUOT<br>Une croissance plus riche en emplois depuis le<br>début de la décennie ? Une analyse en compa-<br>raison internationale</td><td>G 2000/01</td><td>R. MAHIEU<br>Les déterminants des dépenses de santé : une<br>approche macroéconomique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9703</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br>Train or Pay: Does it Reduce Inequalities to En-<br>courage Firms to Train their Workers?</td><td>G 9723</td><td>P. AUGERAUD - J.E. CHAPRON<br>Using Business Accounts for Compiling National<br>Accounts: the French Experience</td><td>G 9902</td><td>Ch. COLIN<br>Modélisation des carrières dans Destinie</td><td>G 2000/02</td><td>C. ALLARD-PRIGENT - H. GUILMEAU -<br>A. QUINET<br>The real exchange rate as the relative price of<br>nontrables in terms of tradables: theoretical<br>investigation and empirical study on French data</td></tr><tr><td>G 9704</td><td>P. GENIER<br>Deux contributions sur dépendance et équité</td><td>G 9724</td><td>P. AUGERAUD<br>Les comptes d'entreprise par activités - Le pas-<br>sage aux comptes - De la comptabilité<br>d'entreprise à la comptabilité nationale - A<br>paraitre</td><td>G 9903</td><td>Ch. COLIN<br>Évolution de la dispersion des salaires : un essai<br>de prospective par microsimulation</td><td>G 2000/03</td><td>J.-Y. FOURNIER<br>L'approximation du filtre passe-bande proposée<br>par Christiano et Fitzgerald</td></tr><tr><td>G 9705</td><td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br>R & D Investment, Patent Life and Patent Value<br>An Econometric Analysis at the Firm Level</td><td>G 9801</td><td>H. MICHAUDON - C. PRIGENT<br>Présentation du modèle AMADEUS</td><td>G 9904</td><td>B. CREPON - N. IUNG<br>Innovation, emploi et performances</td><td>G 2000/04</td><td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 1999</td></tr><tr><td>G 9706</td><td>M. HOUDEBINE - A. TOPIOL-BENSAÏD<br>Les entreprises internationales en France : une<br>analyse à partir de données individuelles</td><td>G 9802</td><td>J. ACCARDO<br>Une étude de comptabilité générationnelle<br>pour la France en 1996</td><td>G 9905</td><td>B. CREPON - Ch. GIANELLA<br>Wages inequalities in France 1969-1992<br>An application of quantile regression techniques</td><td>G 2000/05</td><td>B. CREPON - F. ROSENWALD<br>Investissement et contraintes de financement : le<br>poids du cycle<br>Une estimation sur données françaises</td></tr><tr><td>G 9707</td><td>M. HOUDEBINE<br>Polarisation des activités et spécialisation des<br>départements en France</td><td>G 9803</td><td>X. BONNET - S. DUCHÈNE<br>Apports et limites de la modélisation<br>« Real Business Cycles »</td><td>G 9906</td><td>C. BONNET - R. MAHIEU<br>Microsimulation techniques applied to inter-<br>generational transfers - Pensions in a dynamic<br>framework: the case of France</td><td>G 2000/06</td><td>A. FLIPO<br>Les comportements matrimoniaux de fait</td></tr><tr><td>G 9708</td><td>E. DUGUET - N. GREENAN<br>Le biais technologique : une analyse sur données<br>individuelles</td><td>G 9804</td><td>C. BARLET - C. DUGUET -<br>D. ENCAOUA - J. PRADEL<br>The Commercial Success of Innovations<br>An econometric analysis at the firm level in<br>French manufacturing</td><td>G 9907</td><td>F. ROSENWALD<br>L'impact des contraintes financières dans la dé-<br>cision d'investissement</td><td>G 2000/07</td><td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br>Microsimulations of the retirement decision: a<br>supply side approach</td></tr><tr><td>G 9709</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Analyzing a small French ECM Model</td><td>G 9805</td><td>P. CAHUC - Ch. GIANELLA -<br>D. GOUX - A. ZILBERBERG<br>Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining<br>Power - Evidence form a Panel of French Firms</td><td>G 9908</td><td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 1998</td><td>G 2000/08</td><td>C. AUDENIS - C. PROST<br>Déficit conjoncturel : une prise en compte des<br>conjonctures passées</td></tr><tr><td>G 9710</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Formalizing the transition process: scenarios for<br>capital accumulation</td><td>G 9806</td><td>J. ACCARDO - M. JLASSI<br>La productivité globale des facteurs entre 1975 et<br>1996</td><td>G 9909</td><td>J.P. ZOYEM<br>Contrat d'insertion et sortie du RMI<br>Évaluation des effets d'une politique sociale</td><td>G 2000/09</td><td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br>Équivalent patrimonial de la rente et souscription<br>de retraite complémentaire</td></tr><tr><td>G 9711</td><td>G. FORGEOT - J. GAUTIÉ<br>Insertion professionnelle des jeunes et processus<br>de déclassement</td><td>G 9911</td><td>G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ<br>Une décomposition du non-emploi en France</td><td>G 9910</td><td>Ch. COLIN - FI. LEGROS - R. MAHIEU<br>Bilans contributifs comparés des régimes de<br>retraite du secteur privé et de la fonction publique</td><td>G 2000/10</td><td>R. DUHAUTOIS<br>Ralentissement de l'investissement : petites ou<br>grandes entreprises ? industrie ou tertiaire ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9712</td><td>E. DUBOIS<br>High Real Interest Rates: the Consequence of a<br>Saving Investment Disequilibrium or of an in-<br>sufficient Credibility of Monetary Authorities?</td><td>G 9912</td><td>B. SALANIÉ<br>Une maquette analytique de long terme du<br>marché du travail</td><td>G 9911</td><td>B. SALANIÉ<br>Une décomposition du non-emploi en France</td><td>G 2000/11</td><td>G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ<br>Temps partiel féminin et incitations financières à<br>l'emploi</td></tr><tr><td>G 9713</td><td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études<br>et Synthèses Économiques - 1996</td><td>G 9912</td><td>Ch. GIANELLA<br>Ch. GIANELLA<br>Local unemployment and wages</td><td>G 9912</td><td>Ch. GIANELLA<br>Ch. GIANELLA</td><td>G 2000/12</td><td>Ch. GIANELLA<br>Local unemployment and wages</td></tr></table>
G2000/13 B. CREPON - Th. HECKEL
- Informatisation en France : une évaluation à partir de données individuelles
- Computerization in France: an evaluation based on individual company data

G2001/01 F. LEQUILLER
- La nouvelle économie et la mesure de la croissance du PIB
- The new economy and the measure ment of GDP growth

G2001/02 S. AUDRIC
La reprise de la croissance de l'emploi profite-t-elle aussi aux non-diplômés ?

G2001/03 I. BRAUN-LEMAIRE
Évolution et répartition du surplus de productivité

G2001/04 A. BEAUDU - Th. HECKEL
Le canal du crédit fonctionne-t-il en Europe ? Une étude de l'hétérogénéité des comportements d'investissement à partir de données de bilan agréées

G2001/05 C. AUDENIS - P. BISCOURP - N. FOURCADE - O. LOISEL
Testing the augmented Solow growth model: An empirical reassessment using panel data

G2001/06 R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT
Départ à la retraite, irréversibilité et incertitude

G2001/07 Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2000

G2001/08 J. Ph. GAUDEMET
Les dispositifs d'acquisition à titre facultatif d'annuités viagères de retraite

G2001/09 B. CRÉPON - Ch. GIANELLA
Fiscalité, coût d'usage du capital et demande de facteurs : une analyse sur données individuelles

G2001/10 B. CRÉPON - R. DESPLATZ
Évaluation des effets des dispositifs d'allégements de charges sociales sur les bas salaires

G2001/11 J.-Y. FOURNIER
Comparaison des salaires des secteurs public et privé

G2001/12 J.-P. BERTHIER - C. JAULENT
R. CONVENEVOLE - S. PISANI
Une méthodologie de comparaison entre consommations intermédiaires de source fiscale et de comptabilité nationale

G2001/13 P. BISCOURP - Ch. GIANELLA
Substitution and complementarity between capital, skilled and less skilled workers: an analysis at the firm level in the French manufacturing industry

G2001/14 I. ROBERT-BOBEE
Modelling demographic behaviours in the French microsimulation model Destinie: An analysis of future change in completed fertility

G2001/15 J.-P. ZOYEM
Diagnostic sur la pauvreté et calendrier de revenus : le cas du "Panel européen des ménages »

G2001/16 J.-Y. FOURNIER - P. GIVORD
La réduction des taux d'activité aux âges extrêmes, une spécificité française ?

G2001/17 C. AUDENIS - P. BISCOURP - N. RIEDINGER
Existe-t-il une asymétrie dans la transmission du prix du brut aux prix des carburants ?

G2002/01 F. MAGNIEN - J.-L. TAVERNIER - D. THESMAR
Les statistiques internationales de PIB par habitant en standard de pouvoir d'achat : une analyse des résultats

G2002/02 Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2001

G2002/03 B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET
La cessation d'activité au sein des couples : y a-t-il interdépendance des choix ?

G2002/04 G. BRILHAULT
- Rétropolation des séries de FBCF et calcul du capital fixe en SEC-95 dans les comptes nationaux français

- Retropolation of the investment series (GFCF) and estimation of fixed capital stocks on the ESA-95 basis for the French balance sheets

G2002/05 P. BISCOURP - B. CRÉPON - T. HECKEL - N. RIEDINGER

How do firms respond to cheaper computers? Microeconometric evidence for France based on a production function approach

G2002/06 C. AUDENIS - J. DERROYON - N. FOURCADE
L'impact des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication sur l'économie française - un bouclage macro-économique

G2002/07 J. BARDAJI - B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET
Évaluation de trois réformes du Régime Général d'assurance vieillesse à l'aide du modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE

G2002/08 J.-P. BERTHIER
Réflexions sur les différentes notions de volume dans les comptes nationaux : comptes aux prix d'une année fixe ou aux prix de l'année précédente, séries chaînées

G2002/09 F. HILD
Les soldes d'opinion résument-ils au mieux les réponses des entreprises aux enquêtes de conjoncture ?

G2002/10 I. ROBERT-BOBÉE
Les comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation Destinie - Une comparaison des estimations issues des enquêtes Jeunes et Carrières 1997 et Histoire Familiale 1999

G2002/11 J.-P. ZOYEM
La dynamique des bas revenus : une analyse des entrées-sorties de pauvreté

G2002/12 F. HILD
Prévisions d'inflation pour la France

G2002/13 M. LECLAIR
Réduction du temps de travail et tensions sur les facteurs de production

G2002/14 E. WALRAET - A. VINCENT
- Analyse de la redistribution intragénérationnelle dans le système de retraite des salariés du privé - Une approche par microsimulation
- Intragenerational distributional analysis in the french private sector pension scheme - A microsimulation approach

G2002/15 P. CHONE - D. LE BLANC - I. ROBERT-BOBEE
Offre de travail féminine et garde des jeunes enfants

G2002/16 F. MAUREL - S. GREGOIR
Les indices de compétitivité des pays : inter-prétation et limites

G2003/01 N. RIEDINGER - E.HAUVY
Le coût de dépollution atmosphérique pour les entreprises françaises : Une estimation à partir de données individuelles

G2003/02 P. BISCOURP et F. KRAMARZ
Création d'emplois, destruction d'emplois et internationalisation des entreprises industrielles françaises : une analyse sur la période 1986-1992

G2003/03 Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2002

G2003/04 P.-O. BEFFY - J. DERROYON - N. FOURCADE - S. GREGOIR - N. LAÎB - B. MONFORT
Évolutions démographiques et croissance : une projection macro-économique à l'horizon 2020

G2003/05 P. AUBERT
La situation des salariés de plus de cinquante ans dans le secteur privé

G2003/06 P. AUBERT - B. CRÉPON
Age, salaire et productivité
La productivité des salariés décline-t-elle en fin de carrière ?

G2003/07 H. BARON - P.O. BEFFY - N. FOURCADE - R. MAHIEU
Le ralentissement de la productivité du travail au cours des années 1990

G2003/08 P.-O. BEFFY - B. MONFORT
Patrimoine des ménages, dynamique d'allocation et comportement de consommation

G2003/09 P. BISCOURP - N. FOURCADE
Peut-on mettre en évidence l'existence de rigidités à la baisse des salaires à partir de données individuelles ? Le cas de la France à la fin des années 90

G2003/10 M. LECLAIR - P. PETIT
Présence syndicale dans les firmes : quel impact sur les inégalités salariales entre les hommes et les femmes ?

G2003/11 P.-O. BEFFY - X. BONNET - M. DARRACQ-PARIES - B. MONFORT
MZE: a small macro-model for the euro area

G2004/01 P. AUBERT - M. LECLAIR
La compétitivité exprimée dans les enquêtes trimestrielles sur la situation et les perspectives dans l'industrie

G2004/02 M. DUÉE - C. REBILLARD
La dépendance des personnes âgées : une projection à long terme

G2004/03 S. RASPILLER - N. RIEDINGER
Régulation environnementale et choix de localisation des groupes français

G2004/04 A. NABOULET - S. RASPILLER
Les déterminants de la décision d'investir : une approche par les perceptions subjectives des firmes

G2004/05 N. RAGACHE
La déclaration des enfants par les couples non mariés est-elle fiscalement optimale ?

G2004/06 M. DUÉE
L'impact du chômage des parents sur le devenir scolaire des enfants

G2004/07 P. AUBERT - E. CAROLI - M. ROGER
New Technologies, Workplace Organisation and the Age Structure of the Workforce: Firm-Level Evidence

G2004/08 E. DUGUET - C. LELARGE
Les brevets accroissent-ils les incitations privées à innover ? Un examen microéconomique

G2004/09 S. RASPILLER - P. SILLARD
Affiliating versus Subcontracting: the Case of Multinationals

G2004/10 J. BOISSINOT - C. L'ANGEVIN - B. MONFORT
Public Debt Sustainability: Some Results on the French Case

G2004/11 S. ANANIAN - P. AUBERT
Travailleurs âgés, nouvelles technologies et changements organisationnels : un réexamen à partir de l'enquête « REPONSE »

G2004/12 X. BONNET - H. PONCET
Structures de revenus et propensions différentes à consommer - Vers une équation de consommation des ménages plus robuste en prévision pour la France

G2004/13 C. PICART
Évaluer la rentabilité des sociétés non financières

G2004/14 J. BARDAJI - B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET
Les retraites du secteur public : projections à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE

G2005/01 S. BUFFETEAU - P. GODEFROY
Conditions de départ en retraite selon l'âge de fin d'études : analyse prospective pour les générations 1945 à 1974

G2005/02 C. AFSA - S. BUFFETEAU
L'évolution de l'activité féminine en France : une approche par pseudo-panel

G2005/03 P. AUBERT - P. SILLARD
Délocalisations et réductions d'effectifs dans l'industrie française

G2005/04 M. LECLAIR - S. ROUX
Mesure et utilisation des emplois instables dans les entreprises

G2005/05 C. L'ANGEVIN - S. SERRAVALLE
Performances à l'exportation de la France et de l'Allemagne - Une analyse par secteur et destination géographique

G2005/06 Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Economiques - 2004

G2005/07 S. RASPILLER
La concurrence fiscale : principaux enseignements de l'analyse économique

G2005/08 C. L'ANGEVIN - N. LAÎB
Éducation et croissance en France et dans un panel de 21 pays de l'OCDE
G2005/09 N. FERRARI
Prévoir l'investissement des entreprises
Un indicateur des révisions dans l'enquête de
conjoncture sur les investissements dans
l'industrie.

G2005/10 P.-O. BEFFY - C. L'ANGEVIN
Chômage et boucle prix-salaires :
apport d'un modèle « qualifiés/peu qualifiés »

G2005/11 B. HEITZ
A two-states Markov-switching model of inflation
in France and the USA: credible target VS
inflation spiral

G2005/12 O. BIAU - H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - N. FERRARI
Réponses individuelles aux enquêtes de
conjoncture et prévision macroéconomiques :
Exemple de la prévision de la production
manufacturière

G2005/13 P. AUBERT - D. BLANCHET - D. BLAU
The labour market after age 50: some elements
of a Franco-American comparison

G2005/14 D. BLANCHET - T. DEBRAND - P. DOUGRONN - P. POLLET
L'enquête SHARE : présentation et premiers
résultats de l'édition française

G2005/15 M. DUÉE
La modélisation des comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation
DESTINIE

G2005/16 H. RAOUI - S. ROUX
Étude de simulation sur la participation versée
aux salariés par les entreprises

G2006/01 C. BONNET - S. BUFFETEAU - P. GODEFROY
Disparités de retraite de droit direct entre
hommes et femmes : quelles évolutions ?

G2006/02 C. PICART
Les gazelles en France

G2006/03 P. AUBERT - B. CRÉPON - P. ZAMORA
Le rendement apparent de la formation continue
dans les entreprises : effets sur la productivité et
les salaires

G2006/04 J.-F. OUVRARD - R. RATHELOT
Demographic change and unemployment:
what do macroeconomic models predict?

G2006/05 D. BLANCHET - J.-F. OUVRARD
Indicateurs d'engagements implicites des
systèmes de retraite : chiffrages, propriétés
analytiques et réactions à des chocs
démographiques types

G2006/06 G. BIAU - O. BIAU - L. ROUVIERE
Nonparametric Forecasting of the Manufacturing
Output Growth with Firm-level Survey Data

G2006/07 C. AFSA - P. GIVORD
Le rôle des conditions de travail dans les
absences pour maladie

G2006/08 P. SILLARD - C. L'ANGEVIN - S. SERRAVALLE
Performances comparées à l'exportation de la
France et de ses principaux partenaires
Une analyse structurelle sur 12 ans

G2006/09 X. BOUTIN - S. QUANTIN
Une méthodologie d'évaluation comptable du
coût du capital des entreprises françaises : 1984-
2002

G2006/10 C. AFSA
L'estimation d'un coût implicite de la pénibilité du
travail chez les travailleurs âgés

G2006/11 C. LELARGE
Les entreprises (industrielles) françaises sont-
elles à la frontière technologique ?

G2006/12 O. BIAU - N. FERRARI
Théorie de l'opinion
Faut-il pondérer les réponses individuelles ?

G2006/13 A. KOUBI - S. ROUX
Une réinterprétation de la relation entre
productivité et inégalités salariales dans les
entreprises

G2006/14 R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
The impact of local taxes on plants location
decision

G2006/15 L. GONZALEZ - C. PICART
Diversification, recentrage et poids des activités
de support dans les groupes (1993-2000)

G2007/01 D. SRAER
Allègements de cotisations patronales et
dynamique salariale

G2007/02 V. ALBOUY - L. LEQUIEN
Les rendements non monétaires de l'éducation :
le cas de la santé

G2007/03 D. BLANCHET - T. DEBRAND
Aspiration à la retraite, santé et satisfaction au
travail : une comparaison européenne

G2007/04 M. BARLET - L. CRUSSON
Quel impact des variations du prix du pétrole sur
la croissance française ?

G2007/05 C. PICART
Flux d'emploi et de main-d'œuvre en France : un
réexamen

G2007/06 V. ALBOUY - C. TAVAN
Massification et démocratisation de
l'enseignement supérieur en France

G2007/07 T. LE BARBANCHON
The Changing response to oil price shocks in
France: a DSGE type approach

G2007/08 T. CHANEY - D. SRAER - D. THESMAR
Collateral Value and Corporate Investment
Evidence from the French Real Estate Market

G2007/09 J. BOISSINOT
Consumption over the Life Cycle: Facts for
France

G2007/10 C. AFSA
Interpréter les variables de satisfaction :
l'exemple de la durée du travail

G2007/11 R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
Zones Franches Urbaines : quels effets sur
l'emploi salarié et les créations
d'établissements ?

G2007/12 V. ALBOUY - B. CRÉPON
Aléa moral en santé : une évaluation dans le
cadre du modèle causal de Rubin

G2008/01 C. PICART
Les PME françaises : rentables mais peu
dynamiques

G2008/02 P. BISCOURP - X. BOUTIN - T. VERGÉ
The Effects of Retail Regulations on Prices
Evidence form the Loi Galland

G2008/03 Y. BARBESOL - A. BRIANT
Économies d'agglomération et productivité des
entreprises : estimation sur données individuelles
françaises

G2008/04 D. BLANCHET - F. LE GALLO
Les projections démographiques : principaux
mécanismes et retour sur l'expérience française

G2008/05 D. BLANCHET - F. TOUTLEMONDE
Évolutions démographiques et déformation du
cycle de vie active : quelles relations ?

G2008/06 M. BARLET - D. BLANCHET - L. CRUSSON
Internationalisation et flux d'emplois : que dit une
approche comptable ?

G2008/07 C. LELARGE - D. SRAER - D. THESMAR
Entrepreneurship and Credit Constraints -
Evidence from a French Loan Guarantee
Program

G2008/08 X. BOUTIN - L. JANIN
Are Prices Really Affected by Mergers?

G2008/09 M. BARLET - A. BRIANT - L. CRUSSON
Concentration géographique dans l'industrie
manufacturière et dans les services en France :
une approche par un indicateur en continu

G2008/10 M. BEFFY - É. COUDIN - R. RATHELOT
Who is confronted to insecure labor market
histories? Some evidence based on the French
labor market transition

G2008/11 M. ROGER - E. WALRAET
Social Security and Well-Being of the Elderly: the
Case of France

G2008/12 C. AFSA
Analyser les composantes du bien-être et de son
 évolution
Une approche empirique sur données
individuelles

G2008/13 M. BARLET - D. BLANCHET - T. LE BARBANCHON
Microsimuler le marché du travail : un prototype

G2009/01 P.-A. PIONNIER
Le partage de la valeur ajoutée en France,
1949-2007

G2009/02 Laurent CLAVEL - Christelle MINODIER
A Monthly Indicator of the French Business
Climate

G2009/03 H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - C. MINODIER
Do Business Tendency Surveys in Industry and
Services Help in Forecasting GDP Growth?
A Real-Time Analysis on French Data

G2009/04 P. GIVORD - L. WILNER
Les contrats temporaires : trappe ou marchepied
vers l'emploi stable ?

G2009/05 G. LALANNE - P.-A. PIONNIER - O. SIMON
Le partage des fruits de la croissance de 1950 à
2008 : une approche par les comptes de surplus

G2009/06 L. DAVEZIES - X. D'HAULTFOEUILLE
Faut-il pondérer ?... Ou l'éternelle question de
l'économètre confronté à des données d'enquête

G2009/07 S. QUANTIN - S. RASPILLER - S. SERRAVALLE
Commerce intragroupe, fiscalité et prix de
transferts : une analyse sur données françaises

G2009/08 M. CLERC - V. MARCUS
Élasticités - prix des consommations énergétiques
des ménages

G2009/09 G. LALANNE - E. POULIQUEN - O. SIMON
Prix du pétrole et croissance potentielle à long
termes

G2009/10 D. BLANCHET - J. LE CACHEUX - V. MARCUS
Adjusted net savings and other approaches to
sustainability: some theoretical background

G2009/11 V. BELLAMY - G. CONSALES - M. FESSEAU - S. LE LAIDIER - É. RAYNAUD
Une décomposition du compte des ménages de
la comptabilité nationale par catégorie de
ménage en 2003

G2009/12 J. BARDAJI - F. TALLET
Detecting Economic Regimes in France: a
Qualitative Markov-Switching Indicator Using
Mixed Frequency Data

G2009/13 R. AEBERHARDT - D. FOUGÈRE - R. RATHELOT
Discrimination à l'embauche : comment exploiter
les procédures de testing ?

G2009/14 Y. BARBESOL - P. GIVORD - S. QUANTIN
Partage de la valeur ajoutée, approche par
données microéconomiques

G2009/15 I. BUONO - G. LALANNE
The Effect of the Uruguay round on the Intensive
and Extensive Margins of Trade

G2010/01 C. MINODIER
Avantages comparés des séries des premières
valeurs publiées et des séries des valeurs
révisées - Un exercice de prévision en temps réel
de la croissance trimestrielle du PIB en France

G2010/02 V. ALBOUY - L. DAVEZIES - T. DEBRAND
Health Expenditure Models: a Comparison of Five
Specifications using Panel Data

G2010/03 C. KLEIN - O. SIMON
Le modèle MÉSANGE réestimé en base 2000
Tome 1 – Version avec volumes à prix constants

G2010/04 M.-É. CLERC - É. COUDIN
L'IPC, miroir de l'évolution du coût de la vie en
France ? Ce qu'apporte l'analyse des courbes
d'Engel

G2010/05 N. CECI-RENAUD - P.-A. CHEVALIER
Les seuils de 10, 20 et 50 salariés : impact sur la
taille des entreprises françaises

G2010/06 R. AEBERHARDT - J. POUGET
National Origin Differences in Wages and
Hierarchical Positions - Evidence on French Full-
Time Male Workers from a matched Employer-
Employee Dataset

G2010/07 S. BLASCO - P. GIVORD
Les trajectoires professionnelles en début de vie
active : quel impact des contrats temporaires ?

G2010/08 P. GIVORD
Méthodes économétriques pour l'évaluation de
politiques publiques
G2010/09 P.-Y. CABANNES - V. LAPÈGUE - E. POULIQUEN - M. BEFFY - M. GAINI Quelle croissance de moyen terme après la crise ?

G2010/10 I. BUONO - G. LALANNE La réaction des entreprises françaises à la baisse des tarifs douaniers étrangers

G2010/11 R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD L'apport des méthodes à noyaux pour mesurer la concentration géographique - Application à la concentration des immigrés en France de 1968 à 1999

G2010/12 M. BARATON - M. BEFFY - D. FOUGÈRE Une évaluation de l'effet de la réforme de 2003 sur les départs en retraite - Le cas des enseignants du second degré public

G2010/13 D. BLANCHET - S. BUFFETEAU - E. CRENNER S. LE MINEZ Le modèle de microsimulation Destinie 2: principales caractéristiques et premiers résultats

G2010/14 D. BLANCHET - E. CRENNER Le bloc retraites du modèle Destinie 2: guide de l'utilisateur

G2010/15 M. BARLET - L. CRUSSON - S. DUPUCH - F. PUECH Des services échangés aux services échangeables : une application sur données françaises

G2010/16 M. BEFFY - T. KAMIONKA Public-private wage gaps: is civil-servant human capital sector-specific?

G2010/17 P.-Y. CABANNES - H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - G. LALANNE - O. MONSO - E. POULIQUEN Le modèle Mésange réestimé en base 2000 Tome 2 - Version avec volumes à prix chaînes

G2010/18 R. AEBERHARDT - L. DAVEZIES Conditional Logit with one Binary Covariate: Link between the Static and Dynamic Cases

G2011/01 T. LE BARBANCHON - B. OURLIAC - O. SIMON Les marchés du travail français et américain face aux chocs conjonctuels des années 1986 à 2007 : une modélisation DSGE

G2011/02 C. MARBOT Une évaluation de la réduction d'impôt pour l'emploi de salariés à domicile

G2011/03 L. DAVEZIES Modèles à effets fixes, à effets aléatoires, modèles mixtes ou multi-niveaux: propriétés et mises en œuvre des modélisations de l'hétérogénéité dans le cas de données groupées

G2011/04 M. ROGER - M. WASMER Heterogeneity matters: labour productivity differentiated by age and skills

G2011/05 J.-C. BRICONGNE - J.-M. FOURNIER V. LAPÈGUE - O. MONSO De la crise financière à la crise économique L'impact des perturbations financières de 2007 et 2008 sur la croissance de sept pays industrialisés

G2011/06 P. CHARNOZ - É. COUDIN - M. GAINI Wage inequalities in France 1976-2004: a quantile regression analysis

G2011/07 M. CLERC - M. GAINI - D. BLANCHET Recommendations of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report: A few illustrations

G2011/08 M. BACHELET - M. BEFFY - D. BLANCHET Projeter l'impact des réformes des retraites sur l'activité des 55 ans et plus : une comparaison de trois modèles

G2011/09 C. LOUVOT-RUNAVOT L'évaluation de l'activité dissimulée des entreprises sur la base des contrôles fiscaux et son insertion dans les comptes nationaux

G2011/10 A. SCHREIBER - A. VICARD La tertiairisation de l'économie française et le ralentissement de la productivité entre 1978 et 2008

G2011/11 M.-É. CLERC - O. MONSO - E. POULIQUEN Les inégalités entre générations depuis le baby-boom

G2011/12 C. MARBOT - D. ROY Évaluation de la transformation de la réduction d'impôt en crédit d'impôt pour l'emploi de salariés à domicile en 2007

G2011/13 P. GIVORD - R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD Place-based tax exemptions and displacement effects: An evaluation of the Zones Franches Urbaines program

G2011/14 X. D'HAULTFOEUILLE - P. GIVORD - X. BOUTIN The Environmental Effect of Green Taxation: the Case of the French "Bonus/Malus"

G2011/15 M. BARLET - M. CLERC - M. GARNEO - V. LAPÈGUE - V. MARCUS La nouvelle version du modèle MZE, modèle macroéconométrique pour la zone euro

G2011/16 R. AEBERHARDT - I. BUONO - H. FADINGER Learning, Incomplete Contracts and Export Dynamics: Theory and Evidence form French Firms

G2011/17 C. KERDRAIN - V. LAPÈGUE Restrictive Fiscal Policies in Europe: What are the Likely Effects?

G2012/01 P. GIVORD - S. QUANTIN - C. TREVIEN A Long-Term Evaluation of the First Generation of the French Urban Enterprise Zones

G2012/02 N. CECI-RENAUD - V. COTTET Politique salariale et performance des entreprises

G2012/03 P. FÉVRIER - L. WILNER Do Consumers Correctly Expect Price Reductions? Testing Dynamic Behavior

G2012/04 M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD School as a shelter? School leaving-age and the business cycle in France

G2012/05 M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD A scarred generation? French evidence on young people entering into a tough labour market

G2012/06 P. AUBERT - M. BACHELET Disparités de montant de pension et redistribution dans le système de retraite français

G2012/07 R. AEBERHARDT - P GIVORD - C. MARBOT Spillover Effect of the Minimum Wage in France: An Unconditional Quantile Regression Approach

G2012/08 A. EIDELMAN - F. LANGUMIER - A. VICARD Prélèvements obligatoires reposant sur les ménages : des canaux redistributifs différents en 1990 et 2010

G2012/09 O. BARGAIN - A. VICARD Le RMI et son successeur le RSA découragent-ils certains jeunes de travailler ? Une analyse sur les jeunes autour de 25 ans

G2012/10 C. MARBOT - D. ROY Projections du coût de l'APA et des caractéristiques de ses bénéficiaires à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle Destinie

G2012/11 A. MAUROUX Le crédit d'impôt dédié au développement durable : une évaluation économique

G2012/12 V. COTTET - S. QUANTIN - V. RÉGNIER Coût du travail et allègements de charges : une estimation au niveau établissement de 1996 à 2008

G2012/13 X. D'HAULTFOEUILLE - P. FÉVRIER - L. WILNER Demand Estimation in the Presence of Revenue Management

G2012/14 D. BLANCHET - S. LE MINEZ Joint macro/micro evaluations of accrued-to-date pension liabilities: an application to French reforms

G2013/01-F1301 T. DERDYON - A. MONTAUT - P-A PIONNIER Utilisation rétrospective de l'enquête Emploi à une fréquence mensuelle: apport d'une modélisation espace-état

G2013/02-F1302 C. TREVIEN Habiter en HLM: quel avantage monétaire et quel impact sur les conditions de logement ?

G2013/03 A. POISSONNIER Temporal disaggregation of stock variables - The Chow-Lin method extended to dynamic models

G2013/04 P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT Does the cost of child care affect female labor market participation? An evaluation of a French reform of childcare subsidies

G2013/05 G. LAME - M. LEQUIEN - P.-A. PIONNIER Interpretation and limits of sustainability tests in public finance

G2013/06 C. BELLEGO - V. DORTET-BERNADET La participation aux pôles de compétitivité : quelle incidence sur les dépenses de R&D et l'activité des PME et ETI ?

G2013/07 P.-Y. CABANNES - A. MONTAUT - P.-A. PIONNIER Évaluer la productivité globale des facteurs en France : l'apport d'une mesure de la qualité du capital et du travail

G2013/08 R. AEBERHARDT - C. MARBOT Evolution of Instability on the French Labour Market During the Last Thirty Years

G2013/09 J-B. BERNARD - G. CLÉAUD Oil price: the nature of the shocks and the impact on the French economy

G2013/10 G. LAME Was there a « Greenspan Conundrum » in the Euro area?

G2013/11 P. CHONÉ - F. EVAIN - L. WILNER - E. YILMAZ Introducing activity-based payment in the hospital industry: Evidence from French data

G2013/12 C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY Natural Disasters: Exposure and Underinsurance

G2013/13 P.-Y. CABANNES - V. COTTET - Y. DUBOIS - C. LELARGE - M. SICSIC French Firms in the Face of the 2008/2009 Crisis

G2013/14 A. POISSONNIER - D. ROY Households Satellite Account for France in 2010. Methodological issues on the assessment of domestic production

G2013/15 G. CLÉAUD - M. LEMOINE - P.-A. PIONNIER Which size and evolution of the government expenditure multiplier in France (1980-2010)?

G2014/01 M. BACHELET - A. LEDUC - A. MARINO Les biographies du modèle Destinie II: rebasage et projection

G2014/02 B. GARBINTI L'achat de la résidence principale et la création d'entreprises sont-ils favorisés par les donations et héritages ?

G2014/03 N. CECI-RENAUD - P. CHARNOZ - M. GAINI Évolution de la volatilité des revenus salariaux du secteur privé en France depuis 1968

G2014/04 P. AUBERT Modalités d'application des réformes des retraites et prévisibilité du montant de pension

G2014/05 C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY - A. KATOSSKY The Impact of Hazardous Industrial Facilities on Housing Prices: A Comparison of Parametric and Semiparametric Hedonic Price Models

G2014/06 J.-M. DAUSSIN-BENICHOU - A. MAUROUX Turning the heat up. How sensitive are households to fiscal incentives on energy efficiency investments?

G2014/07 C. LABONNE - G. LAMÉ Credit Growth and Capital Requirements: Binding or Not?

G2014/08 C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY et C. TREVIEN The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector: the French Example

G2014/09 M. LEQUIEN et A. MONTAUT Croissance potentielle en France et en zone euro : un tour d'horizon des méthodes d'estimation

G2014/10 B. GARBINTI - P. LAMARCHE Les hauts revenus épargnent-ils davantage ?

G2014/11 D. AUDENAERT - J. BARDAJI - R. LARDEUX - M. ORAND - M. SICSIC Wage Resilience in France since the Great Recession

G2014/12 F. ARNAUD - J. BOUSSARD - A. POISSONNIER - H. SOUAL Computing additive contributions to growth and other issues for chain-linked quarterly aggregates

G2014/13 H. FRAISSE - F. KRAMARZ - C. PROST Labor Disputes and Job Flows
G2014/14 P. GIVORD - C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY - H. NAEGELE
How does fuel taxation impact new car purchases? An evaluation using French consumer-level dataset

G2014/15 P. AUBERT - S. RABATÉ
Durée passée en carrière et durée de vie en retraite : quel partage des gains d'espérance de vie ?

G2015/01 A. POISSONNIER
The walking dead Euler equation
Addressing a challenge to monetary policy models

G2015/02 Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO
Indicateurs de rendement du système de retraite français

G2015/03 T. MAYER - C. TREVIEN
The impacts of Urban Public Transportation: Evidence from the Paris Region

G2015/04 S.T. LY - A. RIEGERT
Measuring Social Environment Mobility

G2015/05 M. A. BEN HALIMA - V. HYAFIL-SOLELHAC
M. KOUBI - C. REGAERT
Quel est l'impact du système d'indemnisation maladie sur la durée des arrêts de travail pour maladie ?

G2015/06 Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO
Disparités de rendement du système de retraite dans le secteur privé : approches intergénérationnelle et intragénérationnelle

G2015/07 B. CAMPAGNE - V. ALHENC-GELAS - J.-B. BERNARD
No evidence of financial accelerator in France

G2015/08 Q. LAFFÉTER - M. PAK
Élasticités des recettes fiscales au cycle économique : étude de trois impôts sur la période 1979-2013 en France

G2015/09 J.-M. DAUSSIN-BENICHOU, S. IDMACHICHE, A. LEDUC et E. POULIQUEN
Les déterminants de l'attractivité de la fonction publique de l'État

G2015/10 P. AUBERT
La modulation du montant de pension selon la durée de carrière et l'âge de la retraite : quelles disparités entre assurés ?

G2015/11 V. DORTET-BERNADET - M. SICSIC
Effet des aides publiques sur l'emploi en R&D dans les petites entreprises

G2015/12 S. GEORGES-KOT
Annual and lifetime incidence of the value-added tax in France

G2015/13 M. POULHÈS
Are Enterprise Zones Benefits Capitalized into Commercial Property Values? The French Case

G2015/14 J.-B. BERNARD - Q. LAFFÉTER
Effet de l'activité et des prix sur le revenu salarial des différentes catégories socioprofessionnelles

G2015/15 C. GEAY - M. KOUBI - G de LAGASNERIE
Projections des dépenses de soins de ville, construction d'un module pour Destinie

G2015/16 J. BARDAJI - J.-C. BRICONGNE - B. CAMPAGNE - G. GAULIER
Compared performances of French companies on the domestic and foreign markets

G2015/17 C. BELLÉGO - R. DE NIJS
The redistributive effect of online piracy on the box office performance of American movies in foreign markets

G2015/18 J.-B. BERNARD - L. BERTHET
French households financial wealth: which changes in 20 years?

G2015/19 M. POULHÈS
Fenêtre sur Cour ou Chambre avec Vue ?
Les prix hédoniques de l'immobilier parisien

G2016/01 B. GARBINTI - S. GEORGES-KOT
Time to smell the roses? Risk aversion, the timing of inheritance receipt, and retirement

G2016/02 P. CHARNOZ - C. LELARGE - C. TREVIEN
Communication Costs and the Internal Organization of Multi-Plant Businesses: Evidence from the Impact of the French High-Speed Rail

G2016/03 C. BONNET - B. GARBINTI - A. SOLAZ
Gender Inequality after Divorce: The Flip Side of Marital Specialization - Evidence from a French Administrative Database

G2016/04 D. BLANCHET - E. CAROLI - C. PROST - M. ROGER
Health capacity to work at older ages in France

G2016/05 B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER
MELEZE: A DSGE model for France within the Euro Area

G2016/06 B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER
Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from Mélèze model

G2016/07 B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER
Structural reforms in DSGE models: a case for sensitivity analyses