6/2012 L'Europe Unie

Simion Costea

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Simion Costea. 6/2012 L'Europe Unie. L'EUROPE UNIE, 6, 2012, 6/2012 L'Europe Unie / UNITED EUROPE, PARIS, Nr.6/2012, ISSN Print ISSN: 0248-2851 Print ISSN: 2780-8173 On line ISSN: 2743-4052 Linking ISSN (ISSN-L): 2743-4052 EAN: 99782749700519, DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.29454.06727, https://www.ceeol.com/search/journal-detail?id=1955, 10.13140/RG.2.2.29454.06727 . hal-05044691

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L'EUROPE UNIE

UNITED EUROPE

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No. 6 / 2012

Revue d'études européennes
PARIS
# EDITORIAL

## PROFESSOR TANEL KERIKMÄE

Tallinn Law School, Tallinn University of Technology

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We are living in the age of crisis, and the solutions that are proposed to alleviate the consequences of it are not always acceptable for everyone or do not meet the criteria of what we call legitimate expectations. The controversial age of Prince Metternich (the Concert of Europe) is still bygone and the consensus to be achieved between European nations before introducing radical changes in the European political architecture is an inevitable prerequisite. In history, there have been several strategies that were emerging from the ideas of founding fathers of the European Union, such as Altiero Spinelli and his followers. The question whether the EU, a core institutional framework for Europe should be more centralized is, today, the “hot button” again.

I am sure that most of us believe that “ever closer union” can be possible only in the case we share the common vision. As they say, “the devil is in details” – therefore, the open discussion in academic world must pay attention to many urgent issues, analysing both the advancements and the flops of the current practice in many fields related to EU activities and EU – memberstates relations. The reflection of EU by third countries, widely discussed in this volume can be regarded as an useful source for EU’s future strategies.

I am glad to introduce the sequent volume of *L'Europe unie/United Europe*, an academic journal that is clearly guided by the principles as cross-border cooperation, academic freedom, constructive criticism. The current volume incorporates awesome contributions that are divided into six thematic chapters.

First chapter is explaining the EU foreign ambitions, strategies and neighbourhood policy. Dr. David Ramiro Troitinó and Archil Chochia (both from Tallinn University of Technology) are opening the problematics of EU enlargement – the issue that becomes even more crucial today, during the rearrangements in the EU. The comprehensive contribution is complemented with the separate articles on neighbourhood policy towards Caucasus countries (Archil Chochia) and European patterns the standards of free assembly in Georgia (Dali Gabelaia and Dr. Tanel Kerikmäe). Dr. Nina Didenko presents analytical overview on Ukraine-EU relations and Dr. Nicoleta Vasilcovschi contributed with a synoptic overview on Romanian and Bulgarian strategies.

Second chapter, titled as “Arab Spring” starts with deep look offered by devoted researcher Dr Hedi Saidi on impact of Arab Spring to the EU. The article is complemented by excellent contribution of Dr. Belgacem Brahim from Tunisia, revealing the reasons and essence of the backgrounds of these political events.

Third chapter of the volume, related to the EU values, ethnic and migration issues is completely written by our colleagues from Tallinn Law School. Issues related to national minorities in the EU is illustrated by the paper of Dr. Evhen Tsybulenko and Paolo Amorosa. Dr. Tatjana Evas proceeds the issue of minorities on the basis of Estonian example and Dr. Lehte Roots summarizes this part of the volume with her wide range analysis on recent migration problems in the EU.

Forth part concerns European Union standards, regulations, law and justice. A colleague from Tallinn Law School discusses the horizontal effect of the Nice Charter in Italian case-law. The current chapter contains paper of Dr. Olga Poperová from Palacky University on “European context of the administrative justice in the Czech Republic” by which administrative justice means “an indubitable contribution for the rule of law”. Two following researches discuss two different areas of regulation – the EU aviation law that can be regarded a good example of unity in Europe (Dr. Tanel Kerikmäe and Lelde Plüksna), and the contribution of Dr. Alexandr Svetlicnii on EU merger control, more challenging area of EU regulation.

Fifth Chapter is dedicated to EU environmental policy, health and children. The Chapter starts with innovative approach of Dr Didier Blanc from Université de Perpignon, continues with original comparative approach on sustainable development conducted by Dr. Eric Olszak from Université Catholique de Lille and sums up with the contribution of Albanian expert Anila Nepravishta that studies the issue of violence and corporate punishment of children.

The last Chapter is demonstrating a trilingual feature of the volume as the first time, Italian has been used by two authors. First paper, written by Professor Marcello Pierini, is revealing the political perspectives of the EU. Dr. Simion Costea, Jean Monnet Professor of “Petru Maior” University of Targu-Mures analyses the vision and activity of a vice-president of the European Parliament. The final chord belongs to Dr Colin Swatridge who makes comprehensive overview of the “troubled relationship” between United Kingdom and European Union.

I am sure that the current volume of the journal finds numerous readership among students interested in European integration studies, experts and scholars of EU and non-EU countries, decision makers and professionals from multi-level European administration and politicians who seek for inspiration during these intricate times.

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# The EU Foreign Affairs and the European Values

## Future Enlargements of the EU and limits of the organization

DR. DAVID RAMIRO TROITIÑO

Associate Professor, Tallinn University of Technology and
ARCHIL CHOCHIA

Tallinn Law School, Tallinn University of Technology

**Abstract:** This article tries to explain the problems EU enlargement, the possible problems and obstacles on this way, as well as its connection with the European integration process. This paper talks about the history of the EU building process, the transformation of the community and the possible future scenarios for the organization and its member-states.

**Keywords:** European Union, European integration, EU membership.

European integration process started with a reduced Community of just six members and was originally thought to be an organization to solve the long-term rivalry between France and Germany, and therefore both these countries became the center of the process. The Benelux countries joined the Community because of their strong links with France and Germany. Italy was divided into two parts, a highly developed north and the less wealthy south. The north needed access to the markets of France and Germany and the south needed support to develop further<fnref n="1" />. The borders of the Community were marked by different visions of the European integration, as the British and its supporters, as Ireland and Denmark, highly dependent on the British economy<fnref n="2" />, or by the political situation, as Spain, Portugal and Greece, under military regimes<fnref n="3" />, and by the Cold War in two main aspects, the neutral states and the supporters of Soviet Union. The first group was formed by Austria, Sweden and Finland, they had a status of neutrality during the confrontation between west and east, and hence could not participate in the European process because it was seen as a capitalistic tool sponsored by USA against Soviet Union. A larger part of Europe was under the influence of the Soviet Union, and hence there was no possibility of joining the process<fnref n="4" />.

The situation changed when British economy was under an important stress and thus the government asked for the accession in order to improve its economic situation. Denmark and Ireland followed the UK. Greece, Spain and Portugal became democracies, the Cold War ended and all the countries affected by it became full members of the organization, expanding the original six members to the current twenty-seven plus Croatia and probably Iceland.

<footnote n="1">¹ Urwin, W. D. (1994) The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945 (The Postwar World). Philadelphia: Trans-Atlantic Publication Inc.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Miller, F.; Vandome, A.; McBrewster, J. (2009) European Free Trade Association. London: Alphascript Publishing</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Chilcote, R.; Hadjiyannis, S.; Lopez, F.; Nataf, D. (1990) Transitions from Dictatorship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal and Greece. New York: Taylor & Francis.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Sewell, M. (2002) The Cold War (Cambridge Perspectives in History). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</footnote>
Currently, European Union, after the last enlargements, suffers some „enlargement fatigue”, as 12 countries joined the Union in 2004 and 2007. Beside the positive effects of the enlargements, it provoked alienation of the European people from Brussels because **the sense of identity**, of belonging to a common process diluted. The world financial crisis is not helping either, as the possible candidates will be net receivers of EU funds. But the problem goes beyond these conjectural difficulties and is located on the borders of the Union. Because the limits of the organization were not clear at the beginning of the process and there were different opinions about it<fnref n="1" />. Europe is a concept defined by geographical space and cultural roots. If we take the EU as an organization for the European subcontinent, its limits were easy to identify during the first enlargements, but as the organization reaches the periphery the limits are not clear anymore. If the limit of expansion would depend on geography with borders in the Urals, Russia, North Cape, Norway and the island of Gavdos in Greece, it will include countries as Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey<fnref n="2" />.

Europe can also be defined by religion matters, and hence with flexible boundaries in space and time. The cultural concept of Europe started having a strong identity after the fall of the Roman Empire and the beginning of the Middle age, where Christianity was a fundamental part of Europe. Territories as Spain were thought of being occupied and hence subject to liberate. Turkish occupation of the Balkan region was seen as an aggression to Europe, the German expansion eastwards can be explained as an extension of Christianity, and hence an expansion of Europe. Here there was a conflict with Muslim and pagans, the first were expelled from Spain, Sicily, and most of the Balkans, and the pagans were converted or exterminated<fnref n="3" />.

The French Revolution changed this identification as new ideas spread all over Europe, and again established a new cultural border of Europe, the separation of powers, the limits of the religion to the personal life of the citizen, as a contrast to other regions of the world were the religion was, and still is, a way of organizing the social life of the believers and the inhabitants of the territory. According to this definition of Europe, the east countries could bend in and out of the concept of Europe, depending on the period and the inclusion of some concepts developed during the French revolution. Turkey, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan would not be included, even when Turkey is a secular state but does not have a secular society and it is under a constant threat of a regression in terms of religion, consequence of the implementation of the secular state from the elites to the folk<fnref n="4" />.

Another way to define Europe would be according to politics, democracy and social states, these principles were define by the French Revolution and were developed in England. The French Empire and the troops of Napoleon spread its political principles in Europe in a more radical version. There is an historical identification of Europe with the ancient Greek, and Athens has been seen as the model of democracy, developed in Europe against the Persian-Asian concept of a supreme ruler with absolute power. The Romans keep the concept of democracy but much more restricted in their Republic and especially a nominal concept during the imperial times with the maintenance of the Senate. It was seen as a contraposition to the barbarians and their political ways. After the collapse of the Empire the Middle Age kept some ideals of democracy with the denomination of the different Kings as primus inter pares, the first among equals, and the role of different parliaments in Europe grew during the period, even when they were not properly democratic institutions they represented some social classes and kept alive the ideal of democracy. The absolutism was defeated by the French revolution in cultural terms, and then democracy came back to Europe as an indissoluble part of it. The Europeans or recent descents from Europeans who brought the idea of democracy from Europe

<footnote n="1">¹ Pittaway, M. (2003) The Fluid Borders of Europe (Europe: Culture and Identities in a Contested Continent). Milton Keynes: The Open University Worldwid</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Kaplan, D.; Hakli, J. (2002) Boundaries and Place: European Borderlands in Geographical Context. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Ramos Centeno, V. (2997) Christian Faith, Reason Health and Future of Europe. Madrid: Biblioteca De Autores Cristianos.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Burleigh, M. (2006) Earthly Powers: The Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War. Great Britain: HarperCollins Publishers.</footnote>
to America and afterwards developed their own way defined even the political system of USA, an old
democracy. So, the idea of democracy in Europe is based on a political regime with an historical
background. The social state was developed in Europe and has become a hallmark of it. The
development of policies of the state following the idea of a society organized in political terms for the
benefit of its members, of the citizens. Defining in this way Europe, the limits of the organization are
almost reached, with maybe just the Balkan area to be included in the organization<fnref n="1" />.

Europe is also a cultural concept, a way of organizing the society in all areas, from economy to
literature, from judicial system to common traditions. It is a wide idea with very diffuse border, with
intertwined and overlapping facts mixed and defined as Western culture. It can explain the inclusion
of for example Cyprus in the EU, but also raise the question of Israel and eventually could wider the
borders of Europe to other continents as far as Australia or Canada<fnref n="2" />.

An easier way to find the limits of Europe can be analyzing the members of the European
associations, as the Council of Europe, organization focus on human rights, democracy and the rule
of law, located in France, whose members not belonging to the EU are Albania, Andorra, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro,
Norway, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Belarus was a special guest but
has been suspended because of its poor democratic records. Israel, Canada and Mexico are observers
in the organization and there are two partners for the democracy, Morocco and Palestine<fnref n="3" />. As we see
it is a wide concept of Europe, probably as wider as possible. Canada has a special status, and is also
included in the defense organization of Europe, NATO.

Eurovision is a European song context, and hence just European states can join it, it includes
many countries from outside of the European Union, as Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia,
Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia, Iceland, Israel, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Russia, San Marino,
Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Again the conception of Europe is bigger than the EU and
includes all the periphery states, even those in the borders of Europe with a diffuse European identity<fnref n="4" />.

UEFA is European football governing body, where the European national teams and the clubs
play their European competitions. It includes from out of the Union Albania, Armenia, Andorra,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia, Iceland, Israel, Kazakhstan, Lichtenstein,
Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine<fnref n="5" />. It is
the wider concept of Europe taken by any European organization, and hence could be used as the
ultimate borders of Europe. It includes also Israel even when geographically is a part of Asia because
of political reasons, but also because of the cultural background of the country.

ACCESSION REQUIREMENTS

The EU is an organization that has been expanding since its creation according to some
principles, basically:

1- Politics: Democracy and protection of Human rights

2- Economy: Market economy developed enough to integrate in the European market
without collapsing in an environment of free competence.

3- Ability to incorporate the EU legislation to the national law and the administrative capacity
to implement it

<footnote n="1">¹ Siedentop, L. (2001) Democracy in Europe. London: Penguin.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Lamm, R. (1995) Humanities In Western Culture, Volume Two: A Search for Human Values: v. 2. Hong Kong: McGraw-Hill
Higher Education</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/AssemblyList/AL_DelegationsList_E.asp</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ http://www.eurovision.tv/page/news?id=44483&t=43_countries_represented_at_eurovision_2012</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ http://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/index.html</footnote>
4- Geography: Just countries located in Europe can join the Union. As an example Morocco applied to the membership of the European Communities in 1987 arguing that the country has been united culturally with Europe via the Al-Andalus, the European Muslim state of the medieval times located in Spain and Morocco. This argumentation was rejected<fnref n="1" />.

The enlargements are also determined by the capacity of the Union to absorb new members in economic terms. Croatia as a new member state in 2013 will not generate any problem joining the Union in economic terms as it is a small country, but other states as Turkey create more problems in this field<fnref n="2" />.

## CANDIDATE COUNTRIES

At the moment 2012 there are 5 candidate countries to the full membership of the EU: Iceland, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey. Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey will face difficulties joining the Union. The first two countries were part of Yugoslavia and their aspirations can be included with the whole area of Western Balkans and it will help to stabilize the area and hence the borders of the Union. Turkey on the other hand has become a big problem for the EU, as the country is associated to the European Communities since 1963, and the enlargement negotiations seem stagnant.

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>Enlargements of the European Union</figcaption></figure>

(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/index_en.htm)

## CROATIA

Croatia will become a full member of the EU in June 2013 being the 28th member of the Union. The collapse of the communist regimes had dramatically consequences in Yugoslavia with the dismemberment of the country and the civil war. Slovenia leaved Yugoslavia with some easiness, but Croatia fought a war of independence against a Yugoslavia lead by Serbia. The conflict spread to

<footnote n="1">¹ http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/24/</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Nugent, N. (2004) European Union Enlargement (The European Union Series). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.</footnote>
other areas as Bosnia and Kosovo. It meant an armed conflict in Europe in the 90s, something unthinkable in the EU. The end of the conflict meant the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo<fnref n="1" />.

The war meant a big shock for the Europeans and brought a big instability to the region, with ethnicity as the main trigger for the war. As the war was stopped by the intervention of USA, the EU became involved in the reconstruction of the affected areas. Croatia was one of the main contenders of the war, but rapidly recovered from the conflict adopting European standards in its economy. The **traditional link with Austria and Germany helped the country to overcome the post war crisis** and rebuild the country<fnref n="2" />.

Croatia applied for membership in 2003 and was granted the **candidate status in 2004**. The great economic development of the country made easier the negotiations, but there were three main problematic areas:

1. Collaboration with the International Court: Croatia protected some active fighters of the war as national heroes, when they were criminals charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Croatian authorities did not collaborate with the international institutions in the prosecution of these criminals. After the capture by the Spanish police with the collaboration of its Croatian partners, the issue seems settling.

2. Land ownership: As a consequence of the war, and as a discrimination measure against the Serbian and muslin Bosnian population, there were numerous **obstacles for foreigners** to buy real estate in Croatia. It is a typical nationalistic approach giving all the rights to the holders of the Croatian nationality. The conflict also extended to the EU, as Italians could not purchase land in Croatia, especially in the city of Istria, part of Italy until de Second World War. It was solved by bilateral agreements with the European states, but not with Serbia.

3. Border problems with Slovenia: Since the independence there are some disputes over the Gulf of Piran, the national waters, Dragonja River, Žumberak/Gorjanci and the river Mura area. As Slovenia was already a member of the European Union, and all the members have to agree on new accessions, the country blocked the negotiations with Croatia until the problem will be solved. It has been agreed that an **international arbitrator** will solve the problem and both countries will accept its resolutions. As Croatia also have border disputes with Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, it seems likely that the **country will reproduce the Slovenian strategy and block the accession of these countries until the disputes are solved**<fnref n="3" />.

The different agreements reached before the accession of the country in the field of trade and economic exchanges mean in fact an integration of Croatia to the European market, facilitating the enlargement process. In 2009 EU-Croatia trade was 14.024 billion euros, which constitutes 65.3% of the total trade of the country. But there are still some problems unresolved pointed out by the European Parliament, as the **corruption** of the public administration, still very high for the European institution, judicial reforms, organized crime, the **return of Serbs refugees**, and some other minor economic reforms. Once a EU Member in 2013 Croatia will have veto over next enlargements, and the democratic maturity of the state will define the future of Serbia and Montenegro in the EU<fnref n="4" />.

## ICELAND

Iceland was a member of the European Free Trade Association since 1970 with strong economic links with its partners. After the following enlargements of the EU to the UK, Ireland,

<footnote n="1">¹ Glenny, M. (1992) The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War. London: Penguin Books.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Tanner, M. (2010) Croatia: A Nation Forged in War. New Haven: Yale University Press.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ MacDowall, A. (2011) The European Project in the Balkans, Part II (World Politics Review Briefings). World Politics Review (online).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Miller, F.; Vandome, A.; McBrewster, J. (2010) Accession of Croatia to the European Union. London: Alphascript Publishing.</footnote>
Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and Austria the EFTA was left just for Norway, Lichtenstein, Switzerland and Iceland. The European Communities and Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland, integrating the facto these countries in the European Single Market, founded the European Economic Area in 1994. The inclusion of Iceland in the **Schengen** agreement facilitated the free movement of people between most of the European Union states and Iceland. It means that Iceland already has included most of the EU legislation into its national legislation in these fields, and hence the integration of the country should not generate problems in terms of integration. Also the size of Iceland in terms of population, around 320000 inhabitants avoids major problems concerning the enlargement.

Iceland as a member of the EEA has access to the European market and also has to pay as the rest of the member states to the Union, with the difference that Iceland cannot influence the decision making as it is not a member of the organization, and afterwards have to implement the decisions taken maybe in important fields for its economy. At the same time, as a member of the market, Iceland cannot receive funds from many of the European policies. During the crisis of 2009 the financial sector of Iceland collapsed with a huge impact in its economy, especially concerning the public debt, as the national currency dropped its value more than 30%. Iceland needed the support of the European currency, the euro, in the international markets, plus the European funding via the EU policies. Therefore, the national government applied for membership in the Union, and after a fast approval of the Commission and of the Council, it started the negotiations<fnref n="1" />.

The main problem facing Iceland is the national fishing grounds; because once member of the Union, it should open them to the EU flee in equal terms with the local fleet. Currently **the fishing sector provides jobs for 8% of the Icelanders** and has an important impact in the local population. Beside this problem the membership of the EEA and Schengen, the fluid economic relation with other members of the Union and its size will focus the debate on political issues. The main obstacle for the future of Iceland in the EU will be the national referendum to accept the Accession Treaty, and hence there will be big debate inside the country, even when the national government and the EU will agree easily on the terms of the accession. Some experts were very optimistic, saying that if everything goes as expected Iceland could join the EU at the same time than Croatia, in June 2013, finishing one of the fastest enlargements of the history of the Union<fnref n="2" />. However the process is much more complicated and delayed.

## FYR MACEDONIA

Macedonia gained its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 with not much trouble as Bosnia or Croatia. The country initially had problems in the international world because of its name, the same as a region of Greece and homeland of Alexander the Great. Greece boycotted the international recognition of the country until the name was change from Republic of Macedonia to Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Both countries did not normalize their relations until 1995, but the problem of the denomination of the country has not been resolved and negotiations are going on. During the war of Kosovo, many ethnic Albanians took refuge in the border areas of Macedonia, already populated by a majority of Albanians and started an independent movement with the aim of creating the Greater Albania, including Albania, Kosovo and a part of Macedonia. It was presented as a war against Slavs by Albanian extremist who were fighting previously in Kosovo against Serbian forces. The war was fast as the Albanians did not get the support of USA as they did in the case of Kosovo. This strange policy of the **Americans, supporting Albanians in Kosovo but**

<footnote n="1">¹ Bjarnason, M. (2010) The Political Economy of Joining the European Union: Iceland's Position at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Kaute, J. (2010) Warming Up for the EU: Iceland and European Integration: An Analysis of the Factors Contributing to the Changing Perception of Iceland's Political Elites Toward Membership in the European Union. Munchen: GRIN Verlag.</footnote>
not in Macedonia can be explained as a way to destroy the Serbian regime, its impact over the Balkans and the influence of Russia in the area. The conflict was solved after the American support to Macedonia and the protection of the Albanian minority inside Macedonia with important concessions from the government and finally in 2009 an agreement over the border disputes with Kosovo was reached<fnref n="1" />.

The country was granted the **candidate status in 2005** by the European Council; the Stabilization and Association Agreement entered into force in 2004 to help it during its transitional period. Macedonia is receiving currently different funds from the EU through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance. Between 2007 and 2012, it is expected to receive roughly **500 million euros** through the IPA in order to modernize the state. The country is facing different problems for the accession to the Union. Mainly the corruption is widespread in the country. In economic terms the country still needs to increase its economic performance in order to compete in the European Market. The administration of Macedonia is improving but still it has a **reduced capacity to implement** the European legislation, so there is still a big work in Macedonia before the country is in conditions to join the EU<fnref n="2" />. Even fulfilling all the requirements the problem with Greece is still not solved and it can delay the accession of Macedonia sine die as Greece could use its veto right to stop the integration of the country. **Greece argues that the name Macedonia cannot be monopolized** by one country, and that doing so implies a territorial claim over the northern Greek region of the same name. In the coming years no big changes in the situation are expected, following with the standby until the reforms in Macedonia will make the desirable effect.

## MONTENEGRO

It was the country of the former Yugoslavia becoming independent in 2006 and soon was recognized by the member states of the EU. During the dramatic period of the Balkan wars, Montenegro was united to Serbia and suffered less than other parts of the region. But under their Association agreement with Serbia there was a possibility of calling for a referendum for the independence, which resulted in the creation of the new country. This particular case of Montenegro provided the country with enough stability to focus on its accession aspirations to the EU.

After several agreements between Montenegro and the EU, the country was granted officially the candidature to the Union in 2010. The **accession negotiations start in June 2012**. The negotiations will focus on judiciary and fundamental rights and justice, freedom and security. The internal problems to adapt to the European standards are basically corruption, organized crime and freedom of expression<fnref n="3" />. On the positive side it's the size of the country that could not generate problems for the Union absorbing it<fnref n="4" />, and probably the accession negotiations will speed up the internal reforms of the country. Already the currency of the country is the Euro, and it could have positive and negative effects on the European aspirations of the country. The European institutions decided according to different economic indicators which member state of the Union can join the Eurozone and which country has to reform its economy in order to meet the criteria. But the EU has no influence on third countries and on their currency. Hence the decision of the government of Montenegro of installing the Euro as their national currency was unilateral. When Montenegro will join the EU, the country will have to fulfill the different accession criteria, as democracy or free market, plus the conditions to join the Euro, as budget control or public deficit, making the

<footnote n="1">¹ Radke, M. (2011) European Union Influence on Violent Ethnic Conflict in Europe: Case Studies of Northern Ireland, Pais Vasco, and FYR Macedonia. Charleston: BiblioBazaar.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Besimi, F. (2009) Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Macedonia: Accession to the European Union. Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/montenegro/relation/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ http://www.delmne.ec.europa.eu/code/navigate.php?Id=1</footnote>
requirements more complicated. It will be positive if the country already meets the economic criteria to join the Eurozone, and the Euro will act as an important motor for a free market and more stable monetary policy. But it will be negative **if the country fulfills the requirements for the accession but not for the Eurozone, then it will not be accepted in the Union**<fnref n="1" />.

The enlargement to Montenegro will not happen in the short term, and probably will occur at the same time than Macedonia in the middle term unless any external influence will speed up the process. The EU is showing prudence with both states but surely both states will join the Union in some years, the only matter is when they can solve their internal problems.

## TURKEY

The relations between Turkey and the EU have been long and problematic. The country suffered a huge transformation after the WW1 and the war against Greece when Mustafa Kemal, the father of all the Turks, abolished the political system of the Ottoman Empire starting the Republic of Turkey. The country tried to modernize following the European model and economic reforms were introduced. Also some social reforms promoting the secularity of the state were developed. It also was the beginning of the creation of the Turkish identity and the beginning of the Turkish nationalism, as contrast to the previous Ottoman Empire that was a multicultural society. It meant the so called exchanges of population forcing Greek leaving the areas where they had been living for thousands of years, or provoking an exodus of Armenians with dramatic consequences named as genocide by the French Republic or USA. The plans of Ataturk included the north part of Iraq, mostly populated by Kurdish in the future state of Turkey, but the British protectorate over Iraq avoided the inclusion of this territory in the new republic<fnref n="2" />. The creation of the modern state of Turkey was always under the surveillance of the army and political freedom was just a chimera. The country experienced a moderate growth and wealthier performance during this time, separating itself from the Arab world and following the example of the European states.

The relations of Turkey with the European Communities started in 1963 with an agreement based on economic terms and a **customs union**, and applied for full membership on 1987, but the events of Cyprus frozen the relations with the Community and lead to a standstill situation. At the same time Turkey was sending important amounts of people as workers to the territory of the Community, especially to West Germany, placing closer the European Communities and Turkey.

After the end of the Cold War, the EU was expanding eastwards and the negotiations with Turkey started again, the country was granted the status of candidate in 1999 and the negotiations began on 2005 but most of the chapters are still open. In economic terms Turkey and the EU signed a **Custom Union in 1995** focus on trade in manufactured products. Hence Turkey started implementing all the EC legislation related with trade into their national legal system. Trade between the EU and Turkey in agriculture and steel products is regulated by separate preferential agreements. The Custom Union meant an important growth in the economic relations between both areas and today, more than half of Turkey's trade is with the EU. Both areas have equilibrium in their imports and exports to each other and the direct investment of the Europeans in the Turkish economy has grown significantly, accounting nowadays for billions of euro. Currently the negotiations are going on in a slow motion, leading the Turkish society to a frustration in its European dream. **The negotiation process is stalled and suggests a delaying tactic of the member states** of the Union to avoid or at least delay as much as possible the accession of Turkey<fnref n="3" />.

The problems for the enlargement to Turkey are numerous and very different, touching cultural aspects as well as political or economic issues, which makes the enlargement the most

<footnote n="1">¹ Morrison, K. (2008) Montenegro: A Modern History. London: I.B. Tauris</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Stone, N. (2011) Turkey: A Short History, Norman Stone. London: Thames & Hudson.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Arikan, H. (2006) Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.</footnote>
problematic of the history of the European integration process. The conflictive points could be divided in:

## Europeanism of Turkey

There is debate over whether Turkey is European or not based on different aspects. In terms of Geography, the country is **mostly located in Asia**, with a small portion of its territory in Europe. If Turkey is geographically accepted as European, such countries as **Kazakhstan**, **which has more territory in Europe than Turkey**, could also be accepted in the EU. The geography also has an influence in the external borders of the Union, because if Turkey joins the organization, there will be **no borders from, for example, France till Iran**, and the Europeans will share borders with Iran, Iraq or Syria. It is a situation generating negative reactions among some Europeans because of cultural and security concerns.

Culturally there are also some issues rising suspicion in the EU citizens as the history of the country, traditionally considered an enemy of Europe since the Ottoman troops occupied Greece and the Balkan region, reaching even Wien. The following centuries were a continuous war between the European powers against the Turkish to dismantle their European possessions. The identity can be built as an opposition to someone or something, and in this case Turkey was used as the opposition to Europe. Religion is other cultural issue to take into consideration. Currently there are no members of the Union where the majority of the population is Muslim. There are many Muslim immigrants in the most developed states of the Union, as Germany, France or the Netherlands, but as a minority they do not impose their religion over the social order. Turkey as a secular state should follow the European pattern but an important majority of the population supports a mild Muslim political party, which is changing the secularism of the state. The fear related to religion is, that once in the Union, Turkey will push to have more influence of the Muslim religion over the EU affairs, against the secularism of the organization and the traditional Christian roots of Europe. Also different movements from the Turkish government promoting the Turkish leadership of all the Muslims living in Europe, obscures the relationship with the EU, because a Muslim support to Turkey could be translated in the European elections in a domination of the seats of the European Parliament by Turkish supporters from all over Europe. Religion is also link with another cultural issue, the identity of the European people. There are some fears that accepting Turkey inside the Union will lead to a lack of identification of the Europeans among them and with the institutions of the Union and hence with the integration process, stopping the building of Europe in the middle of the way. It is culturally easier to create an identity between those who share many cultural aspects than with cultural groups more different. Here is not a problem of superiority, or discrimination, it is just a problem of creating a European identity to be the base of the future Union. The case of Turkey is very complicated, as, according to some authors, it is „a very **nationalistic** country”, consequence of the policies of Mustafa Kemal and the relative young creation of the Turkish nation. It will clash with the European identity as no other identity than the Turkish will be accepted in the country, at least in the middle term. The nationalistic approach also permeates the government and its policies, creating the doubt if the Turkish know what the EU is and what the integration process is. Of course there are other nationalistic states inside the Union, but with a significantly lower degree than Turkey.

It is also dangerous the new approach of the Turkish government that instead of increasing the cultural convergence with Europe, is promoting a policy focus on a **new Ottoman influence** over the Muslim countries. It is as a childish threat to the EU in order to accelerate the negotiations and the enlargement. This policy is dangerous because it is based on religious affiliation and could give hints of the intentions of the country once inside of the Union about religious matters. It also separates Turkey from Europe, leading the country eastwards because of its own will. It seems clear that Turkey could not play both roles as it wish, and should define itself and its aspirations, being a part of
the EU or being the leader of the Muslim world. Also this policy is mostly unrealistic in practical matters, as the Muslim countries are not interested in a revival of the Ottoman Empire in any form, but the Turkish government seems to look at it as a real possibility<fnref n="1" />.

## The European institutions

As Turkey is a big country in terms of territory and population, and its citizens' fertility rate is bigger than any of the member states, it is likely than in some years Turkey will be more populated than any European country. Once the country is a full member of the organization is going to have the same rights and duties than the other members, without any discrimination. It means that Turkey will be represented in the European Institutions according to its stature and **will be a leading force inside the Union,** moving the Germans and French from the center of the Union. Turkey once a member will have more power in the European Council than any other member state, or more representatives in the European Parliament. The Treaty of Lisbon established a limit in the representation of the member states in the European institutions, and it will equal the Turkish representation to the Germany, but the Treaty will surely be reformed in the future, and the influence of Turkey will grow according to its size. Otherwise it would mean the change of the rules of the European integration just because of Turkey, a clear discriminatory measure against all the principles of the European building process.

Democracy and human rights protection are another concerns related with the European institutions, as the role of the army in the Turkish state. It is a contradiction as **the army has been the leading force of the modernization of the country** and the promoter of the European standards in the society. It has played a role protecting the heritage of Kemal, and hence the Europeanization of the country introducing the reforms from up down, but at the same time it is not acceptable in terms of democracy where the citizens should lead this process, not the army. Recently the Turkish government is reducing the power of the army but at the cost of removing the country from the European model of society in cultural and social terms. The human rights are also a problem, with the **Kurdish** population and their rights as a minority. Here the main problem resides on the fact that the Turkish government does not recognize Kurdish as a minority group as they are seen as Turks, and hence part of the majority. Some improvements have been done in this field, but it is still far from a full normalization of the situation. The question of the **Armenian genocide** is still confronting Turkey and some of the European countries, as France. The Turkish government refuses to recognize a documented historical fact and reacts violently against any contrary opinion, showing very little democratic maturity. Following this example, some authors consider the country is not ready to enter the EU because in case of any conflict in any decision of the EU it could show the same aggressive behavior against the principles of the Union based on dialogue<fnref n="2" />.

## The capacity of the Union to absorb Turkey

The financial capacity of the Union is medium or even small comparing the EU budget with the national budgets, and it has to pay for all the EU policies. As the EU has its own sources from the member states, whenever Turkey will join the Union will also contribute to the common budget. The problem of absorbing such a big country is **the money the EU will spend on its policies in Turkey,** much more than the money added to the budget by Turkey, and hence the country will be a net receiver in European terms. As Turkey is divided in different areas of development, mainly similar to European standards, (in the area of Istanbul), but the rest of the country is much less developed.

<footnote n="1">¹ McCormick, J. (2010) Europeanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Peterson, J.; Shackleton, M. (2006) The Institutions of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</footnote>
The **Common Agricultural Policy should be reform** before the enlargement to Turkey because the rural areas of the country will have access the funds, and it will mean a big financial effort for the EU budget. As the historical rights have been abolished, the western members of the Union are going to lose an important support to their farmers as the central and east members get equal treatment, a situation potentially deeper if Turkey joins. The member states of the Union will have to face an important reduction of the agricultural payments to their farmers, and hence there will be a crisis in the countryside of countries as France, Spain or even Germany. As it is a Communitarian policy, the national governments could not subsidize their farmers, with the consequence of an important reduction of working places, production and an increase of the social unrest provoked by the transfer of people from the countryside to the cities. It will be very hard to face for the member states and hence the policy should be reform, maybe against all the tendencies of the European integration, making it national again, or reducing the protection of the farmers. The other possibility is that these states will block the enlargement to Turkey to protect their farmers, an important electoral group.

The second main policy of the EU in budgetary terms, the Regional Policy will face similar challenges, with important transfers of money to Turkey to promote growth in the less developed areas investing in infrastructures, productivity and qualification of the labor force. The member states of the Union will have two possibilities also, **increasing the national contributions to the EU budget**, something unlikely to happen under the current crisis, **or blocking the access of Turkey to the Union**.

This could be the main problem of Turkey joining the organization, because once inside it has to be treated equally, and hence the transfers of money will unbalance the EU budget, focusing on Turkey. The problem comes from the size of the country and its level of development that make impossible the absorption in the current shape of the Union<fnref n="1" />.

## CYPRUS

The Mediterranean island has been traditionally inhabited by Greek population, but during the times of the Ottoman Empire some people converted to the Muslim religion and there was some immigration from the main land, creating a minority of Muslim people. The island became a part of the British Empire and hence under the control of London. **The British still have nowadays a big influence over Cyprus, with stable military bases** and an important population impact over the island in terms of tourists and permanent residents. Cyprus became independent in 1960 and at this time the Greek Cypriots represented 78% of the population and the Turkish Cypriots 18%, with a small minority of 4% of the population divided between Armenians, Maronites and Latin people. There were different movements in order to unite the island with Greece and some attacks on the Turkish population followed by the consequent retaliation. Finally Turkey decided to attack the island in 1974, officially to protect the Turkish minority, but made an ethnical cleansing in the North forcing the Greek to leave their homes. **The attack was condemned by United Nations as illegal** but the Turkish army remained in the North. Currently the island is divided in two parts with a buffer zone in-between under the control of the UN. The South is controlled by the Greek Cypriots and the Republic of Cyprus, member of the most important international organizations and full member of the EU. The North is under the control of Turkey, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; it depends completely on the support of the government of Ankara. There have been peace talks but no agreement has been reached in order to withdraw the Turkish army and reunify the island. Even more, since the occupation of the north **Turkey has been promoting a transfer of population** from the mainland to the island in order to populate the area and increase the Turkish influence over

<footnote n="1">¹ Fasina, L. (2008) Understanding Regional Development: Absorption, Institutions and Socio-economic Growth in the Regions of the European Union. Frankfurt: Peter Lang Pub Inc.</footnote>
the territory. It means that Greek people will not be able ever to return to their houses or to recover their material possessions. At the same time, Turkey is investing important amounts of money in the economy of the north to make it stronger and impossible to be absorbed by the South. It is a clear illegal situation with **artificial movements of population following the example of minor Asia and other areas of Turkey formerly populated by Greek and Armenians**<fnref n="1" />.

Currently the Turkish government is following a nationalistic behavior promoting the immigration to the island and investing strongly in its economy. The attitude of Turkey should change in order to access the Union, but the government continues to have tense relations with Cyprus, and hence with the EU. As for example with the Single Market and the prohibition of boats from Cyprus to land in Turkish ports, partially solved, or the intention of Turkey to control a possible oil and gas field in the southern national waters of Cyprus. **As all the member states have the right to veto any enlargement it seems unlikely that Turkey will join the Union unless the dispute is solved.** The Turkish government seems blind in this sense, as it still blames the Republic of Cyprus instead trying to solve the situation. It is a widespread attitude in the Turkish state, a lack of self-criticism, because it is seem as an attack to the Turkish nation, and hence under the nationalistic premises of the state, an unacceptable challenge. The situation can be resumed as Turkish are right and the rest are wrong, **if someone tries to think that maybe Turkish are not right, is automatically an enemy of the Turkish nation. The nationalistic behavior of Turkey in the case of Cyprus is going to block the negotiations until Turkey changes its attitude.** The Turkish seem to pretend to follow as if nothing happens in the island, as if it will be something independent from the enlargement, or even blame the perfidy of the Greek who block their European aspiration without any rational reason<fnref n="2" />.

The issue of Cyprus involves more international actors than Turkey and Cyprus, complicating the solution to the problem. As some states as France and Germany have shown their rejection to the Turkish accession, they could use the conflict to block the negotiations and delay indefinitely the process without getting directly involved in the maneuver. If Turkey will forget its nationalistic approach and find a good solution for the Greek and Turkish people in Cyprus, the main official obstacle to its accession to the EU will be removed. Then, the real reasons for blocking the negotiations will arise and the member states against the Turkish accession should defend their position publicly.

## Positive effects of the Turkish enlargement

Turkey will provide positive effects on the EU as a full member of the organization in four main different fields:

1. The European Union as a peace system: The original target of the European building process was avoiding wars between its members securing the freedoms of its members by sharing in a common organization. Turkey as a full member of the Union will develop the peace system avoiding the possibility of any conflict and solving the current conflicts with Cyprus, the Kurdish and Armenia. It also will expand the influence of this peace system to the Arab world, increasing the rule of law, human rights and democracy in the area. It could have a positive influence in territories as Syria, Lebanon or Iran, acting as an example of peaceful society and cohabitation of different nations of different religions with different languages living together. The current position of Turkey in the conflict between Palestine and Israel is very aggressive as Turkey is acting following the new Ottomanism as the leader of the Arab world, and hence the protector of the Muslim population of Palestine. Its position is not helping to solve the conflict, and is strongly different from the position of

<footnote n="1">¹ Van Der Bijl, N. (2010) The Cyprus Emergency: The Divided Island 1955 – 1974. Great Britain: Pen&Sword Military.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Christou, G. (2004) The European Union and Cyprus. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.</footnote>
the European Union. The enlargement could act positively on Turkey, changing its position to a moderate approach helping to solve the conflict. It is important to outline that the EU is an idealistic project, and hence it is essential for the organization to keep these principles in order to increase the integration.

2) Economy: Turkey has an economy that is growing very healthily. The enlargement will mean a full access in equal terms without discrimination of the European companies to the Turkish market and consumers. The economic relations with Turkey are currently important for the Union, and its importance will grow if the country joins the Union. Beside the full **access to the Turkish market, the European companies** could install their production centers in Turkish soil with the legal protection of the communitarian law, and hence increasing the competitiveness of the European economy. Currently there is a custom agreement with Turkey and the economic integration of the area with Europe is growing with benefits for both areas.

3) Population: the Turkish population if young and growing very fast comparing to the ageing population of Europe. The enlargement to Turkey will provide the EU with young population to solve its structural problems plus an influx of cheap labor force in order to keep, and increase the European economy and hence reassure the European social system. Europe could face a big problem in terms of population in order to **pay the pensions** of the retired people as the funds come from the current workers. If the number of pensioners is going to grow as expected the EU main economies will have troubles to collect enough money to pay the social system. As **the fertility rate of Europe is low, the influx of young population coming from the accession of Turkey** could solve this problem.

4) The EU as an international actor: The enlargement to Turkey will create more international muscle for the Union. The organization will increase its power in the international world, especially in the area of the Middle East because of the historical tights of Turkey with the region plus **the military power of Turkey**, already member of NATO. The European dependence of oil from the area will be more secure with Turkey as a full member following the common positions of the Union. The main problem here is the nationalistic behavior of Turkey, of its government, and of its army, that could lead to a situation where Turkey will act differently from the common positions, generating internal conflicts to the organization, as for example with the alliance of Turkey and Brazil to solve the Iranian conflict against the position defended by the EU. Anyway, if Turkey can be included in the EU in every sense, not just officially, the benefits for the Union in external policies and external influence will be good.

## Future of Turkey and the EU

At the moment the negotiations between the EU and Turkey are developing very slowly and probably will take many years before any agreement is reached. The EU should balance the negative and positive effects to the enlargement to Turkey in order to take a decision. On the other hand, Turkey should learn more about the EU and what it is, and then think if it is worth for them to join the Union. Turkey cannot pretend to change the essence of the Union, and hence Turkey should adapt to the European standards in politics, economy, human rights, democracy or social structures. And the country should be ready for these changes or to refuse the accession. The enlargement process is a free will action from the candidates, and when any state joins any international organization, it has to accept its rules. It cannot pretend to join the organization with special rules for itself. So Turkey should make a big effort to integrate in the EU and its government and population should think if the effort is worthy or not, and then continue with the enlargement process or abandon it.

There are three main options for the future relations between Turkey and the EU:
- Full membership: Turkey after long years of negotiations and delays will join the EU as a full member when its government, economy and society will be ready. On the other side, the EU is not likely to accept a country of big size to the Union in a period of economic crisis, so the enlargement will be paralyzed until a new economic cycle will improve the European economy. Both areas have to be patient with each other and ready for a long-term process.

- Special preferential relations: Former president of France, Sarkozy, with the support of the German premier, Mrs. Merkel, proposed an alternative to the full membership of Turkey, a special association agreement where Turkey and the EU will benefit from an **economic integration without political integration**. The special relation could be developed via the Union for the Mediterranean, an organization created to improve and regulate the relations between the Mediterranean states where the EU acts as a whole, and the Asian and African countries try to act united. The organization is meaningless right now because of different problems, mainly related with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the tremendous differences of the EU and the other Mediterranean states approaches on the conflict. Nevertheless the association could be developed in a way to act as the vehicle of the relations between Turkey and the EU, and as a way to institutionalize the preeminence of Turkey over the Arab world. It could be useful to establish stable relations with Turkey and via this country that will act as a bridge between north and south; west and east in the Mediterranean increase the coexistence between Europe and the Arab world. The Turkish government has rejected this alternative to full membership but if the negotiations will not advance it could become a real option.

- No integration, no cooperation: If the case the EU will not agree on the enlargement or Turkey will refuse the European requirements there could be a total end of the relations between them. Turkey **then will focus on east, trying to become the leader of the Arab world**, something more in the imagination of the Turkish government that in the reality. The economic relations between the EU and Turkey will follow anyway as the current global world will not allow any autarchy in the Turkish economy. In the political field the consequences would be worse, as a rejection of the accession will foster even more **the nationalism** in Turkey with the consequent instability in the borders of the EU and possible armed conflicts in the case of Cyprus. This is the less likely option, being the first two more realistic, but a break between Turkey and Europe could have unpredictable consequences<fnref n="1" />.

## ALBANIA, BOSNIA AND SERBIA

The three countries are future candidates for membership in the EU. It will mean the enlargement of the organization to all the Balkan states, after Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia join the Union with the exception of Kosovo, a more problematic case. Integrating the area is one of the main targets of the Union in terms of enlargements for the short and middle term. It will make the Union compact and will provide peace and integration for an area with a conflictive past. **Probably Albania and Serbia will join at the same time the EU near 2020 or 2025, because otherwise the rivalry between Serbs and Albanians** will be extended and used in the Union using the unanimity required for any new enlargement.

Albania formally applied for membership on 28 April 2009 after negotiating a Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2006, much longer period than any other possible candidate of the area<fnref n="2" />, outlining the probable difficulties in the negotiations for the full membership still to come. Albania is a relative **poor country** according to the European standards, but is growing economically in the last past years when most of the European states were in crisis. But there are different problems in the Albanian economy and in its aspirations for the accessions in the EU, mainly **corruption, organize crime, weak political institutions, high unemployment rate, and energy problems**. The State is not fighting the

<footnote n="1">¹ LaGro, E.; Jørgensen, K. (2007) Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidate-countries/albania/eu_albania_relations_en.htm</footnote>
criminals and the corruption as the EU has asked, with important political and economic implications, as **a corrupt political class** involved in many illegal activities and a danger for the economic growth and for the free market. The energy sector has problems of supply because it is outdated and inefficient, but the different investments from the Italian company ENEL should solve the problem. Other problems for the integration of the country in the EU are gender and minority political participation, because women and **the ethnic minorities of Greek, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Roma and Aromanians are poorly represented in the national Parliament.** Finally the issue of the **3 million Albanians living in South Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia could be solved inside the Union**, in a territory without borders rather than the creation of the Great Albania, a nationalistic project already almost forgotten<fnref n="1" />. The problems of Albania and its role in the criminal activities focusing on Europe, as drugs and human trafficking, make the enlargement to Albania very problematic and surely for a middle term, after the enlargement to Montenegro and Macedonia, probably around 2020 or 2025².

Serbia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2008 and its main obstacle to the accession was the judicial collaboration of the Serbian authorities with the international authorities in the cases of war crimes during the Bosnian war. Lately the Serbian government has removed this barrier by the arrest of several **criminals as Gen Mladic and Radovan Karadzic** and Serbia has been officially recognized as a candidate country on March 2012. Another important problem blocking the European path of Serbia is the issue of Kosovo, considered by Serbia as a part of its territory and hence not as an independent territory. The Serbian government is showing a strong will to compromise about the issue, but **locals Serbians are not keen on any agreement about the Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo**. As Serbia will probably join the EU at the same time than Albania, both countries will look actively and international resolution accepting the independence<fnref n="3" />. The conflict of Kosovo spreads also to the relation of Serbia and Montenegro, when the last recognized the independence of Kosovo there were diplomatic retaliations and their bilateral relations were harm. Both countries should collaborate in many issues, as corruption, money laundry, criminality and the **Serbian minority living in Montenegro** in order to succeed in their European aspirations, but as Montenegro is going to join the Union before Serbia, the second must make bigger efforts in the way of reconciliation<fnref n="4" />. The economic situation of Serbia after so many years of conflicts is not as good as other countries applying for membership and some reforms should be included in order to equate it to the European standards. Another important problem is the organized crime and corruption, a negative aspect common throughout the area against which the country is struggling, but is still far from the minimum conditions that can be accepted by the EU<fnref n="5" />. If these problems are solved, Serbia could become a member state of the EU around 2020 or 2025.

Bosnia-Herzegovina suffered dramatically during the Balkan Wars, the country was divided mainly between Serbs, Croatians and Bosniaks, who were killing each other during the conflict from 1992 till 1995. The war finished thanks to the intervention of USA and afterwards the EU got involved in the reconstruction of the country, where still keeps a peacekeeping force and a police mission. Currently the country is divided in two main autonomous areas, the Republic of Srpska, mostly populated by Serbs, and the Bosniak-Croat federation. The **ethnical tensions** are still important, and could block the access to the country to the EU because currently the country is not really working as one united state<fnref n="6" />, it is more **an artificial body collaborating on basic issues rather than a proper state**. The relation between both areas should be reinforced via constitutional reforms in order to access as a full member of the EU and secure **the viability of Bosnia as a state**. Other major problems are **corruption and**

<footnote n="1">¹ Bogdani, M.; Loughlin, J. (2009) Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey Towards Integration and Accession. London: I.B. Tauris.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² http://www.europeanforum.net/country/albania</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/serbia/relation/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Still buying time: Montenegro, Serbia and the European Union, ICG Balkans report (2002)</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ http://www.europeanforum.net/country/serbia</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ The EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Powers, Decisions and Legitimacy, European Union Institute for Security Studies and European Commission (2011)</footnote>
organize crime<fnref n="1" />, mainly related with the lack of a proper state in the area and hence the impossibility to control the illegal activities. The future of Bosnia Herzegovina in the EU is not clear, as the internal situation is still very unstable and a common administration needs to be built. Probably Serbia and Albania will join before Bosnia; it will help to solve the ethnical confrontation of the area and hence solved the main obstacle of Bosnia joining the Union. **If Serbia and Albania join the Union in 2020, Bosnia could access the organization in 2025.** Other possibility is Bosnia becoming a protectorate waiting to collapse when the international commitment leaves<fnref n="2" />.

Kosovo is another problematic territory in the Balkans because it has not been recognized as an independent states by all the members of the EU, and Serbia still consider the area as a part of the country. The **ethnic division** between Albanians and Serbs is still very strong, and the peaceful cohabitation is just granted by the international peacekeeping forces. The **viability of Kosovo** as a proper state is still questionable without the presence of the international troops, and it is an obstacle for Albania and Serbia to join the EU. These two parts plus a representation of the local Albanians and Serbs and the protection of the international community, and especially of the EU with financial and political support of the area should solve the problem<fnref n="3" />. Otherwise the territory will collapse and a new conflict could arise. A practical solution could be the creation of an autonomous region inside Serbia with special relations with the EU, and as Serbia and Albania join the EU, Kosovo will be also part of Serbia with a special status. Kosovo could also become an independent state under the influence of the Albanian majority, with the consequent conflict with the Serbian minority. An independent Kosovo could not survive in the world because of its **poverty**, economic situation and political instability, and hence will have to be annexed to Albania, become a protectorate of the EU or collapse<fnref n="4" />. As these three options are less likely to occur, and the involvement of USA is decreasing leaving the main position to the EU, **a compromise solution from Serbia and Albania is expected.**

## European Countries under the European Neighborhood Policy

### Eastern Partners of the European Union

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /></figure>

*(Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm)*

<footnote n="1">¹ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/bosnia_and_herzegovina/relation/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² http://www.europeanforum.net/country/bosnia_herzegovina</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/kosovo/relation/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Weller, M. (2009) Contested Statehood: Kosovo's Struggle for Independence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</footnote>
Currently there are in the eastern part of the continent six states under the European Neighborhood Policy, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The main aim of this policy is establishing relations with the border countries of the Union in order to secure the European borders. The EU provides via different actions stability to these states, and hence to the Union itself because the security of the borders start with the security of the neighbors. It can be applied for Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova as they share physical borders with the territory of the EU, but not Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The main targets are promoting democracy and human rights, access to the European Market in order to develop their economies and hence provide these countries with economic prosperity, and cooperation in areas of common interest as environment, transport, energy or migration. The EU uses different tools for implementing these targets, technical help, political support and economic aid<fnref n="1" />.

The relation of the EU with these six countries is **influenced by Russia**, the main power of the region, which still keeps an important political and economic influence over most of these territories even with military presence in some of them. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, under strong internal changes, did not influence the national political life of these countries, but currently the power of Russia is rising again and its government sees these areas as its natural areas of influence, clashing with the European interest.

## BELARUS

The country is under an authoritarian regime with very poor democratic records and even **poorer human rights protection**. The country has difficult relations with the EU and is much closer to Russia<fnref n="2" />. The possible accession of the country to the EU will depend on a change in the regime. An agreement with Russia will be needed as the economy of Belarus is strongly linked with the Russian market. It makes very difficult any approach in terms of membership in the short and middle term, so the possible inclusion of the country will be in the long term. The EU is currently focusing on environmental issues in its relations with Belarus, because other chapters of cooperation are stalled by the internal political situation of the country<fnref n="3" />. The EU banned more than 200 people from the regime travelling to Europe and has frozen funds of some companies involved with the political elites<fnref n="4" />. The country is more likely to stay as a buffer area between the EU and Russia, with some especial agreements in the economy, but a rapid democratization of the country if the current regime collapse combined with a weaker Russian influence could lead the country to the EU. At the moment it does not seem possible a democratic revolution in Belarus after the breakdown of the opposition after the elections of 2010, and hence the country probably will not become member of the Union until the international arena will allow it **in a long term**.

## UKRAINE

The country is a priority in the east for the EU. It suffered from a great political unrest with successive governments supporting a closer relation with the EU or other governments supporting special relations with Russia. After the Orange Revolution in 2004 it seemed possible for the country to become an official candidate country to access the EU, but the numerous internal problems stopped the process. The main problem facing Ukraine in order to get closer to the EU is basically its relation with Russia, which is problematic in different aspects like Crimea and Russian population in this area plus the Russian fleet based there, energy dependence on Russian supplies,

<footnote n="1">¹ http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/welcome_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² http://eeas.europa.eu/belarus/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Wilson, A. (2011) Belarus: The Last European Dictatorship. New Haven: Yale University Press.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ http://www.europeanforum.net/country/belarus</footnote>
or the Russian minority in the country<fnref n="1" />. Also **the enlargement is seen by some Russian leaders as a threat to Russia, and hence unacceptable because of security reasons.** On the other hand Ukraine also has many internal problems, as a high rate of **corruption** and crime, some **democratic deficit** according to the European Standards. The economy of Ukraine is based on market economy where the **privatization and renationalization of public companies** makes unstable the situation. It also has some structural problems that make difficult the integration in the European Market because it lacks enough competitiveness.

The country has made big efforts in terms of democracy and human rights, and its economic relation with the EU has been strengthening in the last years with the European Market. Currently they are negotiating the creation of a **free trade area** between the Union and Ukraine<fnref n="2" />. The economic aid of the Union is helping the country to meet the basic criteria of convergence improving the local situation. If it continues to reform and sits a Democratic regime with a stable market economy the country could get closer to the EU. The Ukrainian parliament rejected in 2010 any perspective joining the NATO<fnref n="3" />, a military organization seen as the defense community of the EU and USA, as the enlargement to central and east Europe cited as an example, but at the same time the parliament reassured the compromise of the country with the EU. Ukraine could become a member of the Union **in the medium-long term, but just if the problems with Russia are solved.** Hence, the possibility of an enlargement will depend on the bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine and a change in the internal Russian politics could accelerate the process or **simply stop it,** so it makes the situation difficult to foresee<fnref n="4" />. The strong support of Poland, whose territory previously included an important part of the current Ukraine, and the historical and cultural links between both countries, mean a **strong Polish support for the candidature of Ukraine,** and hence could pave the way for a future enlargement of the EU eastwards.

## MOLDOVA

Currently the country is negotiating an Association Agreement with the EU, considered as a previous step for being accepted officially as a candidate country for joining the Union. The agreement will be focus on economic issues, as **free trade area,** and political issues as democracy. The main internal problems acting as obstacles for the integration of the country in the EU are the **Transdniester conflict,** a pro-Russian separatist region and under the protection of the Russian troops acting officially as peacekeepers, poverty, as Moldova is the poorest country of Europe, emigration, 1 million citizens or half of the working force have left the country in the last years, and political and media freedom. The external relations of Moldova are focus on three main partners, Russia, Romania and the EU with different views, as **Russia wants to keep its influence** over the area and Romania wants to get closer to a country where an important part of its territory, **Bessarabia, was part Romania until 1940 and whose language is the same than Moldovan.**

The EU is a priority for the Moldovan government as the best option to keep its independence and raise the living standards of the local population<fnref n="5" />.

The Moldavian aspirations could benefit from the close cultural ties with an already member of the Union, Romania, and its **small size, easy to absorb** for the Union if the country can solve its internal problems<fnref n="6" />. Russia will play a determine role in the accession of the country and probably

<footnote n="1">¹ Kuzio, T.; Umland, A. (2007) Ukraine - Crimea - Russia: Triangle of Conflict (Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society). Stuttgart: Ibidim-Verlag.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ http://www.europeanforum.net/country/ukraine</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Velychenko, S. (2007) Ukraine, The EU and Russia: History, Culture and International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ http://www.europeanforum.net/country/moldova</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Lewis, A. (2004) The EU and Moldova. London: Federal Trust for Education & Research.</footnote>
will not support the integration of Transdniester region in the EU. Because of these reasons the **accession of Moldova could come after Serbia and Albania, perhaps at the same time than Bosnia.**

## THE CAUCASUS

The Neighborhood policy includes three Caucasian countries, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, even when geographically and culturally can be doubts about the Europeanness of these territories. The three territories have in common their Soviet past and hence the influence of the Communism, secular society, Western literature, European art and economic connections. These ex-Soviet Republics have other historical ties with Europe, as the ancient Greek influence, especially in the case of Georgia because of the Black Sea, the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, Christianity in the case of Armenia and Georgia and ethnicity in the case of Georgia. The geographical border between Asia and Europe becomes diluted in the Caucasus as it reaches the periphery of Europe, but a possible enlargement to Turkey will solve the geographical concerns in the enlargements of the EU.

## ARMENIA

The country conducts its relations with the EU via a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement from 1999, and became a part of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2004. During the period of 2011-2013 the country benefited for an economic support of the Union of **157 million euro**. Armenia also is included in other programs such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. Currently Armenia is negotiating an **Association Agreement** with the EU in order to link closer both areas and establish a **free trade area**<fnref n="1" />. Some domestic issues are influencing the relation of the country with the EU, as the minorities, even when Armenia is a very homogeneous country, just 2% of the population comes from different ethnical groups, but there is a division between Armenians, Hayastantsis from proper Armenia, and Karabakhtsis from the **Armenian diaspora**. New legislation gives the Armenians living abroad, the predominant group in the local politics, the possibility of having **double nationality and hence vote** in the Armenian elections. The organization of the society **in clans** has an influence the political life, and hence on the democratic standards of the state, brings an important obstacle for the European concept of society and democracy, becoming more difficult any possible integration. A major issue is the conflict with Azerbaijan, which should be solved before any possible enlargement because it affects another possible candidate. Other problems are **poverty, corruption**, and the involvement of business in politics, **human rights**, gender representation, and weak media<fnref n="2" />.

In the field of international relations Armenia **surprisingly has good relations with Russia, USA, EU and Iran, with difficulties with Azerbaijan and Turkey**<fnref n="3" />. The possibilities of accession to the EU will depend on third parties, as Turkey or Georgia, because the geographical position of the country will make impossible any enlargement if any of those mentioned countries do not access the Union as well. So Armenia is likely to join the Union if Turkey joins the organization and the relations with this country improve. Otherwise Armenia is going to become a strategic partner of the EU, but not a full member of the organization<fnref n="4" />.

<footnote n="1">¹ http://eeas.europa.eu/armenia/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Payaslian, S. (2008) The History of Armenia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ http://www.europeanforum.net/country/armenia</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Bert, A. C. (2011) Armenia - European Union Relations. Germany: Chromo Publishing</footnote>
## AZERBAIJAN

The relations of the country will the EU are following a parallel way with the Armenian and EU relations: A Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the inclusion of the country in the European Neighbourhood Policy, the extension of different European funds to Azerbaijan, and currently the **negotiation for an Association Agreement**<fnref n="1" />. On the other hand, the internal situation of both countries is very different, Azerbaijan is a country with important oil and gas reserves and hence with important **financial incomes and a more strategic partner in terms of energy** for the EU. The political system is closer to a dictatorship than a democracy, with **average winning of the ruling party of 88% of the votes and constant accusations of electoral fraud by Western observers**. This political system is closing the country to Russia and separating it from the EU.

Other internal problems are the gender representation, with women clearly discriminated in the political life, the conditions of the refugees from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the relation between **religion and state**, far from the European secularism of the society even when the Azeri government is strongly secular, **corruption and poverty**<fnref n="2" />.

The EU sees Azerbaijan as an important partner because its energy supplies, but the integration of the country seems difficult. Beside the internal problems, the fact that **the majority of Azeri people are living in Iran, and the problems with Armenia** could block any accession<fnref n="3" />. The integration could just come with a previous access of Turkey to the EU, and it's probably support for the Azeri bid. So probably the EU will encourage economic relations and currently promotes a **pipeline from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey** as a way to improve the energy independence of Europe and influence the country, but the accession seems really unrealistic nowadays.

## GEORGIA

As Armenia and Azerbaijan a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the inclusion of the country in the ENP conduct the relations between Georgia and the EU<fnref n="4" />. It is probably the most European state of the Caucasus because its historical relations with the Greek civilization and its integration in the Russian Empire and afterwards in the Soviet Union. In some extend could be said that the Mediterranean influence over Georgia includes the country culturally with the northern shore of the sea. The Mediterranean was long divided between Christians and Muslims, between European and Africans and Asians, the Christian orthodox religion of the country could have helped with the integration of Georgia with the European Mediterranean states and with Russia, being effectively a link between both influences. Also its historical confrontation with the Ottoman Empire situates the country with historical similarities with the Balkan states<fnref n="5" />.

The internal situation of the state after the independence from the Soviet Union was extremely unstable, with important conflicts, as in the Georgian territories of **Abkhazia and South Ossetia**, and poor economic performance. After the Rose revolution, the political situation of Georgia changed, closing its relations with the Western world and the EU<fnref n="6" />. But the recent conflict in South Ossetia and the Russian intervention have made clear the difficulties of the country to escape away from the Russian influence. **The main obstacle for Georgia joining the EU is its relation with**

<footnote n="1">¹ http://eeas.europa.eu/azerbaijan/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² http://www.europeanforum.net/country/azerbaijan</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Goltz, T. (1999) Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter's Adventures in an Oil-rich, War-torn, Post-Soviet Republic. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/index_en.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Gamakharia, J. (2007) The History of Georgia. Tbilisi: Intelekti.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Coppieters, B.; Legvold, R. (2005) Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution. Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences & MIT Press.</footnote>
Russia, the main power of the area and aggressive in its relation with Georgia because of the Western interest of the Georgian government in Western organizations as NATO or EU.

Beside the fight between the Western world lead by USA and Russia to be the dominant power in Georgia, and hence in the Caucasus, the country has several internal problems making more difficult its approximation to the EU. The gender equality is almost inexistent in the national politics, with an overwhelming majority of men in the parliament and other political institutions, there is a widespread **corruption** strangling the modernization process started by the president Saakashvili, **poverty** is another important internal problem in the country even when **the economic performance has been good in the late years.** There are also environmental concerns about the impact of the construction of a pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey<fnref n="1" />.

A possible EU enlargement to Georgia seems very unlikely at the moment even when the country has a foreign policy based on that approach mainly because of the current dominance of Russia over the area. Just a change in the Russian policy in the Caucasus and the solution of the conflict with the separatist areas could pave the accession of the country. The geographical situation of the country, even when it has a common border with the Union with the Black Sea, seems **complicating any accession until Turkey joins the Union**, giving unity to the EU territory. These are too many premises to be fulfilled in a short or medium term, and hence any enlargement to Georgia seems very unlikely to happen unless the international situation changes radically. Anyway, there is an obvious European interest in the country, and hence it will foster the bilateral agreements and contacts between both areas and Georgia will become the main partner of the EU in the Caucasus area, influencing also other states located in the area.

## RUSSIA

The relations of the EU with Russia are very important for both areas, but in terms of accession to the EU it is a completely chimera to think about Russia joining the European organization. Geographically Russia have some parts of its territory in Europe and the majority of it in Asia, but in terms of population more Russians live in the European side of the country than in Asia. The main ethnic group is Slavic, a predominant group in many other states of Europe. The geographical extension of Russia, **the biggest country of the world**, makes impossible any enlargement because the **Union lacks the capacity to absorb Russia**. Any enlargement to Russia will mean the end of the organization with its current shape leading to a mere free trade area. The cultural matters also have an important influence in the possibilities of expanding the organization to Russia, because **the Russian identity is not really European, and even not Asian**, because the country has created **its own identity** stronger than any identification with Europe, forming its own block.

The political situation of Russia, where the whole population as a minor negative effect coming from the Russian condition vastly accepts the democratic deficit also separates the political systems of the EU and Russia. The especial conditions and historical background of the country have meant a development of a **pseudo democratic regime that the society feels acceptable** but according to the European standards is insufficient. On economic terms Russia has a market economy influenced by the unilateral decisions of the state to protect its interest. It means an important **interference of the State in the economic affairs** with decisions sometimes arguable from a juridical point of view. The Judicial system is united in many cases with the political power, against the basic principle of three independent powers in any European modern state. These are some of the main topics that make Russia different than Europe, and hence impossible to unite to the European integration<fnref n="2" />.

<footnote n="1">¹ http://www.europeanforum.net/country/georgia</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Service, R. (2009) The Penguin History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-first Century. London: Penguin.</footnote>
Nevertheless it is an important country for the EU in economic and political terms as it is one of the main trade partners for the Union, a supplier of energy and an important consumer of European products. The stature of Russia in the international affairs makes it a containment area for the expansion of the European organization with a buffer area where both contenders dispute the dominance over it with their own weapons. The relations of Russia and the EU also affects the eastern borders of the Union, with **several conflicts with Estonia, Poland** and other states previously under the influence of Soviet Union, stressing even more the possibility of further enlargements eastwards. Obviously the **EU cannot include Russia in the European integration, Russia is not interested either in such integration**, and hence there is no possibilities expanding further the European organization in this area<fnref n="1" />. The relation of Russia and EU will be focus on economic terms from a privilege position as both areas need each other and **the strength or weakness of Russia will determine the enlargement of the EU** to the countries included in the ENP.

## THE CASE OF KAZAKHSTAN

The country geographically has an **important part of its territory in the European continent, even more than Turkey**, a country accepted as an official candidate to the full membership. Nevertheless Kazakhstan is commonly **considered as an Asian country** and hence without any possibility of joining the EU. Kazakhstan is seen culturally also as Asian although it belonged to the Soviet Union and hence experienced an important influence from the European and Russian communist intelligentsia<fnref n="2" />. The relations between the country and the Union have been focused on energy and transport issues, as an alternative to increase the energetic independence of Europe.

There is a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement working since 1999 but the exclusion of the country from the ENP is an indicator of the impossibility of any enlargement in this direction. Kazakhstan has been included in another group by the EU, the Central Asia states, Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, through the European Union and Central Asia Strategy for a New Partnership adopted in 2007. The geographic situation of the country, linked with the rest of Europe via Russia makes also difficult any closer relation with the EU. So, Kazakhstan will not be a member of the EU even in the long term, unless the European cultural perceptions change dramatically<fnref n="3" />.

## The limits of the organization

The EU clearly will expand in the Balkan area in the coming years and depending on Russia will integrate some eastern areas of Europe. The limits eastwards are clearly define by Russia as the ultimate border of the Union. The Mediterranean area is more complicated because the situation of Turkey, and official candidate for full membership, but with numerous obstacles in its way makes more likely a preference relation than full membership. **The Caucasus states will depend on the enlargement to Turkey to join the Union,** and hence Armenia will face a dichotomy, as it will need a traditional opponent inside the Union to access itself the organization. The southern part of the Mediterranean is not on the EU Enlargement area of the organization because of geographical reasons, as the rejection of the application of Morocco showed. The north of the Union could include Greenland, a territory of Denmark previously part of the European Communities, but its impact in the Union will not be considerable. Other European states as Norway or Switzerland are possible candidates to the membership if their internal opposition changes and the economic

<footnote n="1">¹ Antonenko, O.; Pinnick, K. (2009) Russia and the European Union: Prospects For A New Relationship. Adington: Rouledge.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Rosten, K. (2005) Once in Kazakhstan: The Snow Leopard Emerges. Lincoln: iUniverse.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ http://eeas.europa.eu/kazakhstan/index_en.htm</footnote>
performance of the Union improve. In the medium term the EU will reach its natural borders and then, an organization based on a continuous enlargement since its creation, will define itself again. Europe then will have to face the own essence of the Union and its practical matters with different options:

1. The European Federal State: The EU will have to increase the integration as a substitute for the territorial enlargement. The necessity of new markets will force the Union to integrate even more its own market. It will also need to obtain market access to other areas of the world. In that sense the EU will focus on larger areas than mere states, and hence will promote the integration of other parts of the world. **To deal with these other communities the Union must integrate politically**, and hence the end of the process will be the creation of the European federal state. This possible scenario has the disadvantage of promoting the creation of similar blocks around the globe because it could lead into a confrontation, in economic, military and political terms, between blocks.

2. The Western Block: the EU once reached its limits for further expansion could include countries culturally belonging to Europe even when geographically are far from the continent. These countries were mainly populated by European people during the expansion of Europe during the last centuries and could include such states as Canada, Argentina or Australia. The improvement on the transportation and in the communication will allow this option, but it is not very likely to happen, as USA is the current leader of the Western World, and would not allow this expansion of the Union. In that sense there could be an **economic integration between the culturally European states around the world including USA**, but the leading force of the process will probably be USA and not the European Union, and hence the result will be very different.

3. The World Union: According to Jean Monnet, the father of Europe, the organization should expand until it includes the world, without geographical borders. As the European integration is a peace process, expanding the project to other parts of the world will finally bring as a result a strong world organization where the conflicts can be solved by peaceful means. Something like the **UN but with real power and effective solving problems** between its members. A hardcore area will lead the integration or central states already with a high level of integration and the rest of states will be less integrated. The **periphery will look forward joining the central core** in order to have more power in the institution. It is a very idealistic scenario, and seems quite unrealistic nowadays but also the EU seemed unrealistic less than 100 years ago.

4. The collapse of the organization: As the Union will reach its limits the identification of the European people with the organization could decrease, as the homogeneity among the members will shrink. The economic integration will lead surely to political integration, and it will need more the European people as the real holders of the sovereignty. The **constant need of new markets will force the organization to expand and stress its limits destroying the identification of the people** and therefore the Union giving pace to a mere trade area.

Probably the EU will become some sort of mixture of these four options because the European building process has shown a great capacity of innovation in economic and political fields, adapting to the new situations by creating new models of integration by including diverse aspects of different theories and practices.

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# The European Union and its Policy Towards the Neighbours from South Caucasus

ARCHIL CHOCHIA

Tallinn Law School of Tallinn University of Technology

**Abstract:** This article explores European Neighborhood Policy towards three former Soviet states from South Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. It investigates how successful these countries have been in implementing necessary reform. As for the European Union, paper tries to show why Europe is interested to be engaged in close cooperation with these republics and run various programmes to support their development. Article also talks about possible problems and difficulties the union wants to avoid facing by preventing their causes locally in the region.

**Keywords:** European Neighborhood Policy, South Caucasus and Europe, European integration.

## INTRODUCTION

The subject of my research is the relationships between the European Union and the countries of South Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, precisely European Neighborhood Policy in South Caucasus until 2011, due to its importance to the EU from one side and these countries from another. The EU is very much interested in keeping and improving stability in the region and its direct cooperation with the countries from this region supports this idea. Therefore, the main question of this paper is why the EU is interested in cooperation with the countries of South Caucasus and what are the factors for this policy?

My hypothesis is that the EU became more concerned about the region and interested in closer cooperation with the countries there due to the fact that the union considers it as an important part of process aimed to solve the cross-border problems, such as drug traffic, illegal immigration, human trafficking, and terrorism.

The aim of this research is to prove that preventing the problems the EU fears to face in the region or due to the situation in South Caucasus is the main motivation for the union to be engaged locally as an active political actor and is starting reason for its policy. My work relies mainly on the researches of different academics working on the issue, the information available on the official website of the EU, including regular reports of the Commission dedicated to the detailed explanation of the plans of the organization in each country and the work progress, as well as the declarations of the European Parliament and the high officials of the EU.

In order to understand the issue fully, studying the policy of the EU is essential, what is the policy in details and why the union initiated the policy with its neighbors. This article will try to explain the matter using theory of neofunctionalism.

## THE BEGGING OF THE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH CAUCASUS

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and re-gained independence, the countries of South Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, actively engaged in the bilateral and multilateral programmes of the EU, including the national programmes supporting institutional reforms, Comprehensive Institutional Building Programme (CIB), INOGATE programme supporting energy policy cooperation between the EU and partner countries, TRACECA programme promoting the development of regional transport dialogue and Euro-Asian transport connections, macro-micro financial support, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) starting from 1999. The EU has
also established a regional representation in Tbilisi, Georgia, dealing with the regional issues and last but not least, in 2009 Eastern Partnership Programme started working<fnref n="1" />.

Describing the EU's cooperation with each country, in Georgian case this cooperation has been stably developing since the 90s. The EU regional representation opened in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, in 1995 and it has obviously been a huge factor in developing and improving cooperation with the country, between its government and the institutions of the EU. The representation holds the negotiations with Georgian government over the cooperation programmes, as well as in general it coordinates those programmes. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that came into power in July 1st, 1999, being a legal and political basis for the cooperation, regulates the cooperation between the EU and Georgia<fnref n="2" />. One more document within European Neighborhood Policy regulating the cooperation between the EU and the country is European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan, being a document that defines strategic goals of the bilateral cooperation for five years, with short-term and long-term priorities<fnref n="3" />. On the basis of the Action Plan, the EU and Georgia take obligation to deepen economic integration and develop political cooperation in the fields such are foreign policy, justice, energetic, transport, fighting poverty, freedom and safety, especially in fields of boarder control and migration, environment protection. The main priorities of the cooperation between the EU and Georgia are described in two documents: the Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and National Indicative Programme 2007-2010, each document includes priority fields for cooperation<fnref n="4" />. Furthermore, starting from the 90s, the EU is helping Georgia in solving internal conflicts with its breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, providing various programmes for economic and humanitarian rehabilitation, as well as trust and peace building process. Such programmes include projects on improving living conditions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and supporting them starting up their own small businesses<fnref n="5" />.

For Armenia, the EU has prioritized three fields: strengthening of democratic structure of the government, regular reforms and building of administrational basis, fighting poverty. The EU also has an Action Plan with Armenia that defines the cooperation and the priorities of this cooperation with the country, managing various programmes supporting the development in above mentioned priority fields<fnref n="6" />.

The EU's cooperation with Azerbaijan has defined three priority directions being investments in country's infrastructure, economic integration and partnership in exporting the oil from Caspian Sea. Similarly to Armenia and Georgia, Azerbaijan also has an Action Plan with the EU, which defines the aspects of the cooperation between the country the EU<fnref n="7" />.

It is important to mention that Neighborhood Policy is dedicated to integrate the partner countries with the EU, but not exactly to membership of them in the union. The policy first of all is devoted to help the partner countries to develop and strengthen their democratic institutions, as well as it provides these countries with privileged relations with the EU and somehow, at least permanently, is an alternative of membership. The cooperation promoted and regulated by this policy should be based on taking obligations on common values such rule of law, minority rights, good relations with neighbors, market economy and sustainable development. Thus, practically the main aim and objective of the policy is to functionally integrate partner countries with the European Union<fnref n="8" />.

<footnote n="1">¹ European Commission, "European Union External Action. European Neighborhood Policy – Overview", available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/index_en.htm (Accessed on 28.12.2011).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ European Commission, "Europa – summaries of EU legislation. European Neighbourhood Policy: recommendations for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and for Egypt and Lebanon", available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/eastern_europe_and_central_asia/r14103_en.htm (Accessed on 29.12.2011).</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ European Commission, "European Neighborhood Policy", available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm (Accessed on 29.12.2011).</footnote>
Then president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, stated concerning the Neighborhood Policy, that: in times of globalization, existence of transnational social society, foreign relations of the EU can not exist without taking into account direct neighbors of the union. That, instead of so-called “diving borders”, there should be a path of deeper integration between the EU and its neighbors, which itself will accelerate the political, economical and cultural process of bringing these countries closer to the union<fnref n="1" />.

European Neighborhood Policy undoubtedly brings huge perspectives to the countries of South Caucasus. By political dialogue between the countries of the region and the EU, the spectrum of political cooperation between them will naturally be broaden, the conditions of deeper cooperation in the fields of foreign policy and safety will improve, economic and trade relations will progress, cooperation in environment protections and economic sectors will expand (which itself will play an important role in diversification of energy resources for the EU). Furthermore, the interest of the EU is also due to the conflicts in the region, which keeps the region remaining an unstable area very close to the borders of the EU.

## EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY

At the beginning, one may suggest that, there was a little interest in South Caucasus from the EU, or less than in some other regions, but the interest slowly grew and from 2003 the EU has its special representative in the region<fnref n="2" />. When talking about the issues that might have contributed to increase of interests few them could be mentioned, such as o-called Rose Revolution in Georgia, which increased the possibilities in the country for democratic transformation and more cooperation with the west including the EU, as well as the a big role might have been played by the problem that arose between Russian Federation and Ukraine, that resulted in shortages of energy resources to several European countries and once more highlighted the need for diversification of energy resources and in this concern South Caucasus is an important alternative. The same energy resources related matters have also contributed to EU's more active involvement in conflict resolution processes in the region, of course together with the concerns of safety issues in general<fnref n="3" />.

Therefore, start-up of the Neighborhood Policy was a very important step, which more clearly defined and more importantly planned the policy towards the partner neighboring countries. In the cases of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, they all received individual recommendations even before the policy started operating and later report of the commission was based on the individual reports concerning those recommendations. The commission in details studied economic and political situation in each of these three countries, providing afterwards the recommendations to hold reforms, which differed for each country, however some key elements were common, such as recommendation to reform business environment in a country, public sector modernization, resolution of local conflicts only with peaceful ways and through negotiations, improving the situation with human rights. The main differences concerned the advices on how to fight the corruption, due to the fact that the level of corruption varied in each country, situation in Georgia being better, while in Azerbaijan being the worst out of three countries. Additionally, Azerbaijan was advised to take more active steps on its way to join the World Trade Organization, as the rest, Armenia and Georgia had already joint the organization by that time, Armenia joining in 2003 and Georgia in 2000⁴.

<footnote n="1">¹ Prodi, R. (2002) “A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability”, Sixth ECSA-World Conference, “Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU”.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² *** “Europa – EU Delegations. Delegation of the EU to Georgia”, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/eu_georgia/political_relations/index_en.htm (Accessed on 28.12.2011).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ European Parliament, “The South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia)”, available at: http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/relations/relations/article_7242_en.htm (Accessed on 28.12.2011).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ *** “World Trade Organization. Members and Observers”, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (Accessed on 29.12.2011).</footnote>
Similarly, Armenia got a specific recommendation regarding the modernization of the nuclear power plant Metsamor<fnref n="1" />, which was built back in Soviet period, in 1970, and carried some concerns regarding its safety.

The big enlargement of 2004, when ten new members join the EU, meant some new members with Soviet past, as well as it brought the EU geographically closer to few other former Soviet states. And in that same year, it was decided that the European Neighborhood Policy would cover the countries of South Caucasus. The situation in the area for that period was quite problematic, due to lack of democracy and weakness of the democratic institutions in particular, unsolved local conflicts (Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia), generally high level of corruption, unstable political situation and similar difficulties. Therefore decision to engage more actively in the region in order to improve the situation was a necessary and useful decision, which allowed the EU to have a better understanding of the developments in the countries and possibility to promote needed reforms to overcome the problems. Such commitment would have a direct effect on bring peace and stability on Europe's boarders and thus avoiding the problems caused by the instability in the region.

Three countries of South Caucasus became even closer to the EU geographically after two more new states, Bulgaria and Romania, joined the union. As a result, the problems such as drug traffic, human trafficking, illegal immigration, terrorism, etc. became more worrying to the EU and in order to prevent such issues the union turned to direct cooperation with these three countries. Moreover, geopolitical importance of the region was an additional motivation to the EU, as it opened its direct way to the Central Asia, including its energy resources, which gives the possibility to Europe to lower its dependence on Russian Federation by opening a new energy corridor, trans-Caspian trans-Black Sea. As when it come to energy, South Caucasus plays very important role in the issue, being a part of a the Black Sea region, which has been an important area when it comes to Europe's energy supply, "The Black Sea is a leading theatre in which the new dynamics of energy security are being played out, a theatre in which transit countries as much as producing countries are leading stakeholders"<fnref n="2" />.

European Neighborhood Policy gives the possibility to the countries involved to take part in various programmes for deeper cooperation with the EU in the fields of politics, economics, safety, culture, etc. Such activities, which are based on democratic values, protection of human rights, principles of market economy and sustainable development, bring these countries closer to the union, while ultimate goal not necessarily being a membership<fnref n="3" />.

Within the Neighborhood Policy, the EU has an individual Action Plans with each state involved in the policy. In those Action Plans, the priorities of the cooperation are defined, priorities that are important specifically for particular country, therefore the plans differ from each other. The Action Plans are composed by involvement of both sides, the EU from one side and the country from another and these plans include issues such as political dialogue, economic cooperation, reforms in social field, creation of market economy, country's access to the European market, cooperation in a field of justice<fnref n="4" />. One part of European Neighborhood Policy is Eastern Partnership, which is devoted to strengthen European dimension of the policy, it sets additional goals to the countries for European integration, covering fields of democracy, stability, economic ad political integration, energy safety, etc.<fnref n="5" />

<footnote n="1">¹ Poviliunas, A. (2006), "South Caucasus in the Context of European Neighbourhood Policy", *Lithuanian foreign policy review*, available at: http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2006/Poviliunas.pdf (Accessed on 26.12.2011).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Lesser, I. (2007) "Global Trends, Regional Consequences: Wider Strategic Influences on the Black Sea", *Xenophon Paper*, No 4. International Centre for Black Sea Studies publications, p 13.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ *** "Civil Georgia. European Neighborhood Policy for the region". Available at: http://www.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=15653 (Accessed on 23.12.2011).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ *** "Europa – Eastern Eastern Partnership Summit to strengthen EU links with Eastern Europe and South Caucasus". Available at:</footnote>
August war of 2008, between Georgia and Russian Federation, has also contributed to more active cooperation within Eastern Partnership programme, admitted the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso. The same time underlining that it does not intent to draw new division lines, saying that stability in 21st century will be brought by economy, dialogue and partnership<fnref n="1" />.

For Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, involvement in Eastern Partnership is an important step forward in their cooperation and relations with the EU, being essential contribution in courtiers' development. It provides countries with real possibilities to carry on needed reforms and start cooperating with the EU on higher level.

Majority of the scholars working on the issues of European Neighborhood Policy admit that it is in a away Europe's answer and a reaction to newly arisen challenges and problems coming from the region of South Caucasus. Promoting democracy via implementing such policy towards these countries and stabilizing the situation on the EU's borders could be the best prevention measure that the EU could take.

Implementation of European Neighborhood Policy in this region was a result of the existing safety problems in this area, thinks Lilli Di Puppo, suggesting that the EU decided to promote European democratic values in the region in order to challenge unstable situation there. She believes that when in 2006 the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, was warmly received in Brussels despite the ongoing struggle with the situation of human rights in this former Soviet republic, was due to the fact that the country is a strategic partner of the EU because of its geopolitical status, being a direct neighbor of Iran, which, with its nuclear policy, remains to be seen as a threat to the EU's safety<fnref n="2" />.

Sabine Fisher, researcher at the Paris-based Institue for Security Studies thinks that the EU has
several interests in South Caucasus and only one of them is the energy resource of Azerbaijan. It is
also in Europe's interests to bring economic progress, democracy and stability into this region, as it
has a direct effect on the EU itself<fnref n="3" />.

The EU has fundamental interests in the region, first of all due to the importance of the safety and stability in the region to the safety and stability of the Europe in itself, supposes Elkhan Nuriyev. The matters for concern are extremism, separatism, terrorism, conflicts over territorial disputes, drug and human trafficking, as well as the rise of organized transnational crime<fnref n="4" />. Instability of South Caucasus, especially due to the local conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, might cause serious problems to the EU, by rise of illegal immigration, drug and arm traffic, increase of the organized crime<fnref n="5" />.

DYNAMICS OF THE ACTION PLANS' IMPLEMENTATION

It is interesting to follow the implementation process of the Action Plans, the dynamics of that
implementation. And as the Action Plans different in case of each country, implementation process
should also be review in each country separately.

<footnote>http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/700&format=HTML&aged=0language=DE&guiLanguage =en (Accessed on 28.12.2011).</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹ *** “Civil Georgia. EU Offers Close Partnership to its Six Neighbors”. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20070 (Accessed on 26.12.2011).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Puppo, L. (2007), “The South Caucasus countries and the ENP: Three different paths to Europe?” Available at: http://www.un-az.org/undp/bulnews45/caucasus.php (Accessed on 27.12.2011).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ *** “Energy not EU’s only interest in South Caucasus”, News.Az, available at: http://www.news.az/articles/politics/3268 (Accessed on 26.12.2011).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Nuriev, E. (2007), “The EU policy in South Caucasus: The Case of post-soviet Azerbaijan, New opportunities and future prospects”. Available at: http://swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/SWP_RP_Nuriyev_ks.pdf (Accessed on 26.12.2011).</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Tangiashvili, N., Kobaladze, M. (2006), “EU- Georgian Neigborhood Relations”. Central European University, p 13.</footnote>
The Progress Report 2009 by European Commission says that Georgian government has reached some important priorities within the Action Plan, particularly mentioning key reforms carried on in the fields of penitential system, fighting corruption, improving business environment in the country. But the report also reads that situation with fighting poverty, unemployment and social policy remains quite difficult and challenging.

Concerning democracy, Commission found important the following steps taken by the government: first of all modernization of election code, hold in a special working group where the members of the opposition parties were included, secondly working on a new constitution within the so-called “second wave of democracy” proclaimed by the President Mikheil Saakashvili, furthermore, important progress was achieved in fighting corruption and taking into account the recommendations from GRECO programme (Group of States against Corruption – Council of Europe).

In the filed of protecting human rights, the principal advancement was achieved by signing United Nation's Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in July 2009. However, extremely difficult situation remained with the rights of detained and prisoners, due to the fact that detention facilities continued to be overloaded. While regarding the minorities, the government adopted a new national strategy, however it did not fully corresponded with the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, as well as Georgia had not signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.

In other important fields, problematic matter for Georgia remained competition policy, where little has been done in order to improve the situation. Progress was achieved in border control, where the cooperation with other South Caucasus states has been advanced, the same has been done in regards to visa facilitation process, migration issues, fighting drug traffic and human trafficking. Improvements were made in transport system, including the safety of the goods coming from Caspian Basin through Georgia and to Europe<fnref n="1" />.

Similarly to Georgia, the Progress Report has been released for Armenia as well concerning country's success in implementation of the Action Plan. Report underlined Armenia's achievements in the field of human rights, via political dialogue with the EU. Success has been made regarding overcoming internal crisis as well, which was due to problematic presidential elections in the country in 2008. Needed reforms were carried on also in the financial and competition policies.

However, problems remain in such sectors as economy, where the inflation stayed high and was lack of direct foreign investments, especially after the global financial crisis. Significant achievement in the field of regional cooperation was conducting the negotiations with Turkey to normalize the relations between two countries, including signing official protocol, but later the protocol was not ratified by Armenian side despite the position of the EU, which supported the signature of such document.

Armenia received principle recommendations for more implementation of the Action Plan, including proposal to compile a working group that would investigate the political crisis after the presidential election in 2008. Furthermore, recommendations concerned the need to improve the electoral environment in the country, freedom of press, judicial system, cooperation between the ruling political party and the opposition political groups, which is essential for country's democratic development.

Concerning country's fight against the corruption, even though its legal system provides quite good environment for improvements, not much has been done and the progress remained minor. Regarding the protection of human rights, even though the success has been achieved, the report suggests that more actions should be made, particularly in penitential system, as well as the reports that beating and torturing the journalists had place in various occasions.

<footnote n="1">¹ European Commission (2009), “Progress Report Georgia”. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_513_en.pdf (Accessed on 28.12.2011).</footnote>
As for the situation with the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, in 2009 there were six meetings held within so-called Minsk group, but no significant progress has been made and the situation remains unstable, with time to time escalations and gun-fire on the frontline<fnref n="1" />.

When it comes to the third country of the region, Azerbaijan, it has achieved an important progress in terms of reaching the goals set by the Action Plan, particularly in economic and social fields, as well as it managed to keep inflation rate low during the years following the global economic crisis of 2008. Considerable improvements have been reached in energy cooperation, where Azerbaijan has taken efforts for developing new energy corridor Nabucco – the EU initiated pipeline, which could link Europe not only with Azerbaijan, but could also allow European consumers to get direct access to gas and oil from other former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which itself would mean a huge step for Europe in diversification of its energy resources.

Meanwhile the problematic issues remain country's slow progress in joining the World Trade Organization, as Azerbaijan's steps in this direction have been rather dim. As for the protection of human rights in the country, the situation stayed very difficult, including the rights of detained, as well as the freedom of press, as various occasions of beating and torturing civilians and journalists were reported and the situation was called critical<fnref n="2" />.

The situation described in these reports of the Commission, showed different picture in all three countries concerning the implementation of the Action Plans, some being more successful in certain fields than others. Better results in achieving progress in strengthening democracy in the country compare to other states from the region had Georgia, where country managed to carry one some necessary reforms, first of improving election environment in the country by reforming its election code. Armenia and Azerbaijan had quite good election legislation, however the progress in improving the environment has been rather disappointing, especially highlighted by the events after the presidential elections in Armenia in 2008, therefore the situation needs urgent measures to be taken.

When it comes to protection of human rights, countries' achievements have also been slightly different. Progress has been reported in each country, but still the situation needs to be significantly improved, in main problems differing from country to country, for example several kidnappings have been reported in Armenia that still need to be investigated, as well as the issues of torturing civilians and journalists in Azerbaijan and the situation in detention facilities in Georgia. Some differences were discovered in countries' achievements when fighting corruption.

Above-described differences could be the result of the diverse political situation in each country, especially concerning the position towards the EU in general. In this regards, Georgian government had a very clear pro-European policy, aiming for better and faster integration with the EU institutions. Armenia, while being involved in Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, still remains an ally of Russia and does not have very clear pro-Western and pro-European policy.

## THEORETICAL EXPLANATION

The theory of neofunctionalism could well help to explain the matter and answer the question of this research. The theory well describes the issue of integration, when having common interests gives more possibility for integration. This theory pays more attention to regional matters rather than to global integration. Neofunctionalists argue that integration in one sector will promote integration in another via spillover effect, in their opinion, supranational institutions and organizations will play a

<footnote n="1">¹ European Commission (2009), “Progress Report Armenia”. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_511_en.pdf (Accessed on 28.12.2011).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² European Commission (2009), “Progress Report Azerbaijan”. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_512_en.pdf (Accessed on 28.12.2011).</footnote>
main role in integration process<fnref n="1" />, the EU is definitely one of such supranational organizations. Neofunctionalism suggests that as a result of integration, the role of national institutions will be lowered, as the power will be transferred to above-mentioned new supranational organizations. The theory argues that integration starts from “low politics” such as economics and will go to “upper politics” such as defense and foreign policies<fnref n="2" />.

If we apply the theory of neofunctionalism to the cooperation between the EU and the states of South Caucasus, we may suggest that such closer cooperation and integration will benefit all parties involved and interest groups on both sides. As mentioned above, the EU does not want to draw a new division line, its programmes implemented in the region support such integration and deepening. As for involvement of different interest groups from these countries, important step could be the integration of local youth in different European programmes, where young people from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have a possibility to better understand European values, culture, ideas. The same time cooperation in some sectors of economy will have a spillover effect and should result in deeper cooperation and integration in economy in general, thus bringing the economies of these three states close to the EU economy and European standards.

## CONCLUSION

The aim for this research was to analyze European Neighborhood Policy towards South Caucasus states, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and try to find out what might be reasons for the EU to engage in such close cooperation with these countries and to have such a policy towards them. This work describes the history of the cooperation between the EU and three former Soviet republics, its development, geopolitical importance of the region in general and for the EU in particular, how did the chances of these countries increased for more integration with the EU after their involvement in the policy actions and what are the main obstacles on this way.

The research shows that preventing possible problems coming from the region, or caused by instability there, definitely is a motivation for the EU to have a special, more close relationship with the region, having special policy towards it and putting in the efforts to reform and modernize the countries there. These possible problems, such as drug traffic, illegal immigration, human trafficking, terrorism, might have a direct effect on the EU itself and therefore becomes a threat to its safety. That is why the EU is very much interested to be more active in the region, being able to monitor the situation very closely, having the possibilities to influence the countries more on their way to modernization and democratization, carrying on necessary reforms, in order to built more successful states, with strong democratic institutions, stable market economy, with the values that are common to Europe and in general, safe and stable, developing country. Stability in the region would mean stability and safety on EU borders in general.

The theory of neofunctionalism was used to prove such position, which pays attention to integration and its importance for cooperating parties, its effects on their future. As the theory suggests, integration in one sector has a spillover effect and causes integration in another, upper sector, thus cause more integration in general and bring parties closer. In case of the EU and the countries of South Caucasus, integration in some sectors gives good grounds for the integration in other sectors, thus making it possible to have the countries more similar to the EU and its way to development.

<footnote n="1">¹ Dinana, D. (2000), *Encyclopedia of the European Union*, Macmillan Press, pp. 278-283.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Ibid.</footnote>
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European Standards for Freedom
to Peaceful Assembly in Georgia

DALI GABELAIA

research assistant and

DR. TANEL KERIKMÄE

Jean Monnet Professor at Tallinn Law School, Tallinn University of Technology<fnref n="1" />

**Abstract:** Freedom of assembly is a human right, seen as an important tool to achieve Georgia's integration to European Union. Being relatively successful under neighborhood policy framework, Georgia has to tackle the problems that threaten rule of law and the particular right. Current contribution analyses the legal problems (such as scope of the right, blanket restrictions, uncertain norms, unregulated issues) in current Georgia's legislation and offers solutions that are in accordance with European standards for freedom to peaceful assembly.

**Keywords:** Georgia and Europe, Freedom of assembly, Inconsistency with European standards.

Today, the relations of the European Union with its neighbours are more important than ever. One of the most important allies and neighbours of European Union is Georgia, turning the society and administration to common European understanding of democracy, rule of law and human rights. “Relations between Georgia and the EU are gradually developing into a close, strong and dynamic partnership based on clear common objectives”, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle has recently told participants of the 8th international conference on 'Georgia's European way.'<fnref n="2" /> The reforms of Georgia are especially appreciated in the light of long-term political pressure (conflicts with Russia) that was disturbing the integration process with the EU. There is no question that images have great importance in international law. However, the more open the society and the more clearly the principles of the rule of law are followed, the harder it is to lie about the country<fnref n="3" />.

Despite all the efforts, there seems much still to be done. In particular, there is a need “to consolidate democracy, ensure sustainable growth, reduce social and regional inequalities, create jobs and raise standards of living for the people”<fnref n="4" />. This can be achieved not only by strategic activities of the government but also the inclusion of the members of a society who can express their will convincingly and directly influence the governmental strategies that may lead to the policy closer to the European Union ideals. One of the tools is certainly full ensurement of the right to peaceful assembly as a human right. The problems related to this particular human right are expressed by the international call for respect of the right to freedom of assembly, undersigned by members and partners of the Human Rights House Network (HRHN), condemning the recent repression of peaceful demonstrations in Tbilisi and calling upon the Georgian authorities to fully ensure the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in practice and by law<fnref n="5" />.

<footnote n="1">¹ The publication is a compilation and modification of the Master thesis of Dali Gabelaia, "Influence of European Standards on Development of Legal Framework of the Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Georgia", supervised by prof. Tanel Kerikmäe in 2011</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Füle, Štefan, "European way for Georgia and other Eastern neighbours", ENPI (The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) Info Centre 25.07. 2011</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Kerikmäe, T.; Nyman-Metcalf, K.; Põder, M-L. The August 2008 Russian-Georgian War: Issues of international law, Baltic Yearbook of International Law 10, Martinus Nijhoff, 2011, p.1. The European Court of Human Rights has declared admissible, by a majority, the application in the case of Georgia v. Russia (II) (application no. 38263/08).</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Füle, Štefan, *op cit.*</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ See: http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/16234.html</footnote>
Current article concentrates on the analysis of the right to freedom of assembly in Georgia, recognizing that recent amendments to the "Law on Assembly and Manifestations"<fnref n="1" /> (to be precise some of its provisions) still creates obstacles in adopting European standards concerning protection of the right.<fnref n="2" /> Provisions which can be potentially harmful for the free exercising of the right can be divided into several groups: scope of the right (according to definitions), blanket restrictions, vague norms. There are also gaps in law that leave some issues regarding the right unregulated.

The Constitution of Georgia guarantees freedom of assembly by stating that "everyone, except members of the armed forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs, has the right to public assembly without arms either indoors or outdoors without prior permission." The first article of the "Law on Assembly and Manifestations" (the Law) states that it governs relations arising from exercise of the Constitutional right to assemble publicly and without arms, both indoors and outdoors, without a prior permission. Thus the scope of coverage of the right is the same as in Constitution. Due to a narrow understanding of assemblies and manifestations the article is believed to leave unprotected gatherings with other goals than those stated above.<fnref n="3" /> To eliminate debates regarding the scope of assemblies, the article needs to be extended to an "intentional, temporary gatherings of several persons for a specific purpose."<fnref n="4" />

The Law was often criticized for using the term 'citizen', thus guaranteeing the right to citizens only. While commenting on Article 3 the Constitutional Court of Georgia (the Court) gave the term a wide interpretation by stating, that it was used with the same concept as 'person.'<fnref n="5" /> The question of compliance with the Constitution was raised once again.<fnref n="6" /> Article 5 paragraph 2 stated that non-citizens of Georgia did not have a right to act as responsible persons. According to Article 3, the term 'responsible person' means trustee and organizer of assembly or manifestation. The same article explained who was regarded as trustee – a person who has been trusted by an initiator of an assemblage or manifestation, and as organizer - a person appointed by an initiator of an assemblage or manifestation to organize and lead the movement.

The restriction imposed by the provision could have been regarded as proportional, only if it concerned assemblies and manifestations of political nature. The defenders of the debated Article and restriction provided by it stated that organization-related activity is always a political activity.<fnref n="7" /> The Courts reasoning regarding the issue was as follows: stateless persons who live in Georgia are an integral part of a society. They have special interests in the processes happening in society and take part in them. That makes them subjects to Article 25 of Constitution. Article 27 of Constitution of Georgia limits political activities of non-citizens, but this article cannot be used to deprive citizens of their right to be organizers or initiators of an assembly which does not have a political content.<fnref n="8" /> On

<footnote n="1">¹ The "Law on Assembly and Manifestations" came into force in 1997. Since that it was amended for six times. In this article, however, we are going to discuss consequences of amendments made to the law in 2009 and 2011, since they caused the most significant changes in terms of protection of the right.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Georgia has acceded the ECHR in 1999 and ICCPR in 1994</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ See for example, Report of the office of public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia submitted to the Human Rights Council for the 10th session of Universal Periodic Review, p. 6. available at http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session10/GE/PD</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ M. Nowak, U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR: Commentary, 2005, p.373</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ See the decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia on case Georgian Young Lawyers' Association, Zaal Tkheshelashvili, Lela Gurashvili and others v. Parliament of Georgia, #2/2/180-183, 5 November of 2002, (1)</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ The decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia on case political union of citizens 'Movement for United Georgia', political union of citizens 'Conservative Party of Georgia', citizens of Georgia – Zviad Dzidziguri and Kakha Kukava, Georgian Young Lawyers' Association, citizens Dachi Caguria and Jaba Jishkariani, Public Defender v. Parliament of Georgia, #482,483,487,502, 18 April of 2011, paragraphs 120-128</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Ibid., paragraph 122</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Ibid., paragraphs 126-128</footnote>
this basis, the Court annulled part of the article which did not allow non-citizens of Georgia to be
responsible persons.<fnref n="1" />

To bring the Law in compliance with the Court ruling wording of the discussed article was
changed (now it is article 5 paragraph 3) by resent amendments. Now it states that assembly or
manifestation can not be organized or conducted by citizens of other states or persons who have not
turned 18. These amendments did not change the situation completely, as some groups are still left
without guarantees to exercise the right.

Another apparent inconsistency with the principle of non-discrimination is prohibiting persons who have not attained 18 years to organize an assembly. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child<fnref n="2" /> recognizes the right to freedom of assembly. Since the organization of an assembly is a difficult process requiring responsibility, a state can specify a minimum age requirement<fnref n="3" /> or establish that minor can exercise his/her right if consent of their parents or legal guardians exists.<fnref n="4" /> Georgian legislator has to take this into account and grant children after certain age with the ability to organize assemblies.

One more problematic issue regarding the Article 3 was the definition of ‘principal’. The latter was used to designate political party, association, company, institution, organization or a group of citizens initiating an assemblage or manifestation. This wording of the article excluded an ability of physical person to be a principal. In defense of Article 3 can be said that it does not contradict with Article 25 of Constitution, as the letter guarantees the right to assembly and not the right to organize it.<fnref n="5" /> In its judgment the Court stated that: “restricting the right of individual person to be a principal is the same as limiting person’s right to decide on participation in an assembly individually without agreeing it with others.”<fnref n="6" /> As a result the Court annulled the words “political party, association, company, institution, organization or a group of citizens” of the debated paragraph.

Article 9 of the Law caused a wide debate. The provision limited the right of the participants by prohibiting assemblies within 20 meter radius from the entrance and inside the following buildings: the building of Georgian Parliament, residence of the President of Georgia, buildings of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Georgia, courts, prosecutor's office, police, penitentiary buildings, law enforcement bodies, military units and sites, railway stations, airports, ports, hospitals, diplomatic missions, buildings of governmental institutions, local government bodies, and companies, institutions and organizations of special regime or having armed guards. It also prohibited blockage of the entrances of these objects. Although the aim of the provision was to ensure the effective functioning of the institutions, it was assessed as “a significant and blanket restriction on assemblies on those parts of the public thoroughfare most likely to be sought to be used by those wishing to demonstrate.”<fnref n="7" /> As these institutions play important role in realization of state or public functions, legislator believed that allowing holding assemblies within 20 meter radius from those buildings could cause a threat to their normal functioning.

Opponents argued that in 20 meters radius from the majority of named buildings there was not
enough space for assemblies or the same space fell under the scope of 20 meter radius of another

<footnote n="1">¹ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Georgia acceded the Convention in 1994</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ See for instance, Finland's assembly act (1999) or Law on Public Assemblies of the Republic of Moldova (2008)</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ See Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (2010) p.45 available at
http://legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/3256/file/FoA_Guidelines_II_Edition_2010_en.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ The decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia on case political union of citizens ‘Movement for United Georgia’, political union of citizens ‘Conservative Party of Georgia’, citizens of Georgia – Zviad Dzidziguri and Kakha Kukava, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, citizens Dachi Caguria and Jaba Jishkariani, Public Defender v. Parliament of Georgia, #482,483,487,502, 18 April of 2011, paragraph 130</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Ibid., paragraph 132</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Comments on the Law of Assembly and Manifestations of Georgia by Finola Flanagan p.8 available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL(2009)152-e.pdf</footnote>
building listed in the Article.<fnref n="1" /> With such requirements the right to assembly became a formality. While imposing these limitations the legislator did not “take in due consideration the circumstance that, in order to have a meaningful impact, demonstrations often need to be conducted in certain specific areas in order to attract attention.”<fnref n="2" />

Constitutionality of the Article was questioned. Although court agreed that assemblies could be harmful for proper functioning of institutions, it stated that the blanket prohibition was too strict measure which made no difference between the listed buildings and provided a uniform approach to all of them.<fnref n="3" /> The Court declared words “within 20 meter radius from their entrance” to be contradictory to Article 25 of Constitution of Georgia. The Court admitted, however, that blanket restriction is justifiable for military or penitentiary institutions. As insuring security in such institutions without restriction of the right will be difficult.<fnref n="4" /> In pursuit of legitimate aim – ensuring security and effective functioning of institutions – legislator introduced a new article with a very similar content as the annulled one. According to it, it is still forbidden to hold an assembly inside or within 20 meters from the entrance of the following buildings: prosecutors, police, penitentiary and law enforcement institutions as well as from railway stations, ports and airports. In the part of establishing restrictions in regard to railway stations, ports and air ports amended provision contradicts to the ruling of the Court. Instead of establishing restrictions formally on the basis of 20 meter radius, emphasis should be made on the blocking of entrances of the listed buildings. A new paragraph was added to the discussed article. It states: “Administrative body, near which an assembly is held, shall be entitled to designate a meeting place which will not be exceeding 20 meters limit from the entrance of the building” (article 9 paragraph 4). Conducting an assembly on the court territory is regulated in the same way. In both cases while deciding whether to allow an assembly on their territory or not, relevant authorities must use proportionality principle (the principle is recognized by the article 2 paragraph 3 of the law and is a product of recent amendments to the law).

In its comments on the draft law on amendments to the “Law on Assembly and Manifestations” Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) stated that the draft law expands the list of buildings and makes the annulment of the blanket restriction done by the Court useless.<fnref n="5" /> Lawyers of GYLA claimed that, despite the importance of the court system, prohibition was not necessary to ensure its safety: “It is vital for society members to have ability to express their opinion regarding issues discussed in courts by means of assembly. If, however, there is a threat that an assembly or manifestation held near the court can endanger its proper functioning, the court as an administrative body can establish a 20 meter radius . . . the same procedure should be established for prosecutor’s office as its function also differs from that of other state bodies (e.g. military objects) for which the Court believed the restriction was justified.”<fnref n="6" /> Legislator partly shared this position and excluded courts from blanket restriction, but not the prosecutor’s office. Other opponents were even more radical, claiming that establishing blanket restrictions on assemblies within 20 meter radius from law enforcement bodies “in some cases may result in impossibility of adequately protest, for instance,

<footnote n="1">¹ See, for instance, Report of the Office of Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia Submitted to the Human Rights Council for the 10th session of Universal Periodic Review, p.6, available at http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session10/GE/PD</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice commission), Comments on the Law of Assembly and Manifestations of Georgia by Finola Flanagan p.8 available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL(2009)152-e.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ The decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia on case political union of citizens ‘Movement for United Georgia’, political union of citizens ‘Conservative Party of Georgia’, citizens of Georgia – Zviad Dzidziguri and Kakha Kukava, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, citizens Dachi Caguria and Jaba Jishkariani, Public Defender v. Parliament of Georgia, #482,483,487,502, 18 April of 2011, paras 56-61</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Ibid., para 59</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Comments on the draft law on amendments to the “Law on Assembly and Manifestations” provided by GYLA, p. 5, available at http://gyla.ge/legislature/</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Ibid.</footnote>
because there is not enough space around the building.”<fnref n="1" /> Articles 11 and 11¹ also contain blanket prohibitions and together with the previously discussed article are the most debatable ones. Article 11 prohibits blocking of traffic intentionally, while 11¹ prohibits deliberate blocking of carriageway by using cars, different constructions or other subjects. (Article 11 states: “It shall be prohibited to block traffic intentionally, including violation of provisions stipulated in Article 11¹ of this Law.” Article 11¹ states: “Artificial blockage of a carriageway shall be prohibited unless it is necessary due to the number of people participating in an assemblage or a manifestation. It shall also be prohibited to block a carriageway with the use of vehicles, various structures and /or other objects.” This prohibition was government’s response to mass protests that were held in Tbilisi. In April of 2009 thousands of opposition supporters went into the street demanding early presidential elections. When opposition unity faded and number of participants reduced significantly, the main avenue of the town was blocked by cages with protesters living inside. The protest continued for more than two months.)

Restrictions imposed by the articles were criticized. Two different lines of criticism could be distinguished.<fnref n="2" /> More radical critics asserted that Constitution of Georgia provides and defends right of person (persons) to conduct an assembly or manifestation in any part of the street according to their own will, regardless the fact whether the action hinders the movement of transport and other people or not. The right to block the street, either by participants or by using vehicles, temporary constructions or other subjects (as an acute form of expression), must be guaranteed by the law even when hindering of transport is done deliberately by the participants of assembly when it is regarded to be an effective mean to express their opinion, protest or solidarity.<fnref n="3" /> In other words prohibition of blocking roads by participants when it is not a consequence of their number but a result of their deliberate actions contradicts with constitutional provisions. Instead such actions “should be regarded as an equally legitimate use of public space as the more routine purposes for which public space is used (such as pedestrian and vehicular traffic).”<fnref n="4" /> Another group accepted the restrictions established by the above mentioned articles; however, they believed that Article 11 is vague and may be interpreted as blanket prohibition of any kind of temporary constructions needed for assembly or manifestation.<fnref n="5" /> It was claimed that the norm prohibiting blocking of roads by means of temporary constructions applied even when the road was already lawfully blocked (due to the number of participants of the assembly).<fnref n="6" /> In this case prohibition of temporary constructions when the road is already blocked sounds illogical.

Freedom of assembly often overlaps with interests of non-participants. To balance competing interests state needs to interfere and restrict the freedom. Restriction, however, must be reasonable providing opportunity to exercise conflicting interests. Thus one of the main objectives of Articles 11 and 11¹ was to provide clear and predictable criteria to overcome the collision between different rights. When claimed to be unconstitutional the question the Court had to answer was whether limitations imposed by the state were proportionate to the legitimate aim.

<footnote n="1">¹ Statement made on behalf of the Republican Party by its member Tina Khidasheli regarding the draft law on amendments to the “Law on Assembly and Manifestations” of Georgia, available at http://republicans.ge/index.php?module=A-newsletter&func=display&sid=2818</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² See the decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia on case political union of citizens ‘Movement for United Georgia’, political union of citizens ‘Conservative Party of Georgia’, citizens of Georgia – Zviad Dzidziguri and Kakha Kukava, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, citizens Dachi Caguria and Jaba Jishkariani, Public Defender v. Parliament of Georgia, #482,483,487,502, 18 April of 2011, paragraphs 15-20</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Ibid., paragraph 17</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (2007) p.15 available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/24523</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ See the decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia on case political union of citizens ‘Movement for United Georgia’, political union of citizens ‘Conservative Party of Georgia’, citizens of Georgia – Zviad Dzidziguri and Kakha Kukava, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, citizens Dachi Caguria and Jaba Jishkariani, Public Defender v. Parliament of Georgia, #482,483,487,502, 18 April of 2011, paragraph 20</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Ibid.</footnote>
Regarding this issue the Court stated that: "The right to freedom of assembly and manifestation includes the right to choose place, time, form and content of the assembly. The aim of the participants blocking the road can be drawing government's or society's attention. In this regard restricting freedom of movement of others can be used for achieving maximum effect. Deliberate blocking of roads turns the rights of non-participants into the instrument of achieving the objective. Providing guarantees for blocking streets at any time and place will cause an unjustified restriction of the right of others. It will be wrong to assert, that Article 25 of Constitution grants the participants of the assembly the right to restrict freedoms of others in order to achieve their aims."<fnref n="1" />

On the other hand, analyzing article 11¹ makes clear that the state can not interfere in order to restore traffic movement, if the road is blocked due to the number of participants. When the movement is impossible because of the number of participants the priority is given to the freedom guaranteed by Article 25. As the Court has stated: "... otherwise the freedom of assembly and manifestation will be unattainable to participants of numerous assemblies, as they will be forced to deny their right to assembly and manifestation because of the interests of others."<fnref n="2" />

Another problematic issue is limitation clause introduced by article 2 paragraph 3. It provides basis for interference, but does not contain list of legal aims which can justify state's actions. Instead it refers to the article 24 paragraph 4 of the Constitution of Georgia. The problem is that the latter enlists aims which do not mirror article 11 paragraph 2 of ECHR. Even this limiting clause provides a good basis for interference through wide interpretation.<fnref n="3" /> Wording proposed by recent amendments, however, provides even a broader list of aims including "disclosure of information acknowledged as confidential and ensuring the independence and impartiality of justice."

Article 11² aims to protect interests of those who leave, work, or have business near the place were an assembly is held. The problem is that in order to protect rights of others the relevant authorities are granted with the power to restrict time and place of the assembly or to propose an alternative place for an assembly only on the basis that people listed in the article should not be prevented from performing their normal activity. This article provides authorities with grounds relying on which any assembly can be restricted, as it is unimaginable to hold an assembly without causing inconvenience. That is why it must be clarified that mere interference in normal life of "others" can not be used as a basis for restriction.

Among other vague norms of the amended law a new wording of paragraph 3 of article 11 must be named. This paragraph prohibits visual disfigurement, injury or any other abusive behavior against buildings, monuments or memorials with historic, archeological, architectural or scientific significance while holding assembly or manifestation. It is not clear what exactly is understood by visual disfigurement or injury or 'other abusive behavior'. This must be specified, because action forbidden by the debated article can cause termination of an assembly.

Article 8 is formulated in a way, which makes spontaneous assemblies unlawful. Though there are no provisions in the law explicitly stating that, the requirement of notification provided by article 5 together with the statement that every notification must be signed by the "organizer and trustee" means in practice that spontaneous assemblies are prohibited whilst they must be undoubtedly protected.<fnref n="4" /> Paragraph 98 of the guidelines state that: "The issue of spontaneous assemblies merits special attention with regard to the requirement of prior notification. The law should explicitly provide for an exception from the requirement of prior notification where giving prior notification is impracticable. Furthermore, if there are reasonable grounds for non-compliance with the notification requirement, then no liability or sanctions should

<footnote n="1">¹ Ibid., paragraph 34.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Ibid., para 38</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ N. Jarman and M. Hamilton, "Protecting Peaceful Protest: The OSCE/ODIHR and Freedom of Peaceful Assembly", *Journal of Human Rights Practice*, 2009, p.13</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice commission), Comments on the Law of Assembly and Manifestations of Georgia by Finola Flanagan p.8, available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL(2009)152-e.pdf</footnote>
adhere."<fnref n="1" /> Another question raised regarding this provision concerns the notification period, which is 5 days. The requirement of the provision was even appealed in the Court on the basis that imposition of the notification period restricts the ability to exercise the freedom in regard to actual issues that demand immediate reaction. <fnref n="2" /> The court did not find any incompliance with constitutional provision, as in each case depending on the content, scale and urgency of the issue it may require different (sometimes even longer) period to ensure the conduct of assembly. This means that, if the notification period is less than 5 days, the state probably will not be able to provide guarantees to participants to fully exercise the right. So the Court believes that notification period required by law is an optimal period, especially if taking into consideration the practice of other states. <fnref n="3" />

The fact, that an assembly may cause a threat to normal functioning of organization is not a sufficient basis for restricting an assembly. It may be stated that article 10 paragraph 1 subparagraph 'a' contains an indirect reference to simultaneous and counter demonstrations. Since there are no other provisions in the law referring to the issue, it must be stated here, that law must protect counter demonstrations and potential threat of disorder arising from hostility expressed against participants of the peaceful assembly must not be used to justify the imposition of restrictions. The state should make available adequate policing and other resources to facilitate counter-demonstrations within sight and sound of one another. "The State's duty to protect peaceful assembly is of particular significance where the persons holding, or attempting to hold the assembly, are espousing a view that is unpopular, as this may increase the likelihood of violent opposition." <fnref n="4" /> "A prohibition on conducting public events in the place and time of another public event would be a disproportionate response, unless there is a clear and objective indication that both events cannot be managed in an appropriate manner through the exercise of policing powers."<fnref n="5" />

The recent amendments were made in order to bring the exercise of the right in compliance with European standards. Indeed, changes (granting the right to organize assembly to stateless persons, moving some buildings out of the list provided by article 9 of the Law, introducing proportionality principle on legislative level, replacing blanket restriction by granting local self-government discretion) are steps taken in the right direction. Introducing proportionality principle - instead of complicated mechanism a mere reference to the relevant articles of international instruments is preferable. Also, there are also a number of issues which are still left beyond the Law regulation (stateless persons, children under 18 can not exercise their rights fully, spontaneous assemblies, counter demonstrations and simultaneous assemblies lack regulation).

The authors believe that taking account the analysis, Georgia would better demonstrate its willingness to meet European standards and, even more important, give its society a better chance to be included to the process of democratization. As stated by European Court of Human Rights, "States must not only safeguard freedom of peaceful assembly, but must also refrain from applying unreasonable indirect restrictions upon that right"<fnref n="6" /> And that "the state is required to take measures to ensure that the right to protest does not effectively extinguish or paralyse the right of association". So far, there have been no cases against Georgia at European Court of Human Rights under art 10 of ECHR. The state authorities have to take care in ensuring that it would be seen as *status quo*.

<footnote n="1">¹ Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (2007), p. 50, available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/24523</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² The decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia on case Georgian Young Lawyers' Association, Zaal Tkheshelashvili, Lela Gurashvili and others v. Parliament of Georgia, #2/2/180-183, 5 November of 2002, (6)</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice commission), Comments on the Law of Assembly and Manifestations of Georgia by Finola Flanagan, supra n.19, p.8, available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL (2009)152-e.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice commission), Comments on the Law of Assembly and Manifestations of Georgia by Bogdan Aurescu p.5, available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL (2009)153-e.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Aldemir v Turkey, App. No. 32124/02, 18 December 2007, para. 41 and Platform "Artze fur das Leben" v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 204, para. 32; Ouranio Toxo v Greece, App. No. 74989/01, Judgment of 20 October 2005, para. 37</footnote>
**Bibliography:**

**Books and articles**

1. Costea, Simion (coordinator), *Culture, Elites and European Integration, Volume IV – International Relations and European Union Interdisciplinary Studies* (Preface by dr. Nicolae Paun), PARIS, Editions Prodifmultimedia (FRANCE), 2011, 300 pages.

2. Costea, Simion (coordinator), *For a Stronger and Wider European Union*, (Preface by dr. Nicolae Paun) Cluj-Napoca, Napoca Star Publishing House, 2005, 220 pages.

3. Costea, Simion, "*EU-Ukraine Relations and the Eastern Partnership: Challenges, Progress and Potential*", in *European Foreign Affairs Review* (College of Europe BRUGE -BELGIUM and University of Montreal -CANADA), volume 16, issue 2, 2011, p.259-276.

4. Costea, Simion, "*The European Union's Eastern Partnership: The Objective of regional Cooperation*", in vol. *The Eastern Partnership and the Europe 2020 Strategy: Visions of Leading Policymakers and Academics*, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2012, p.51-62.

5. Costea, Simion, "*The EU Perspective for the Republic of Moldova and the EU Political Message in 2011*", in *Studia Universitatis Petru Măriei Historia* (Targu-Mures), no 11, 2011, p.303-313.

6. Jarman, N; Hamilton, M. *Protecting Peaceful Protest: The OSCE/ODIHR and Freedom of Peaceful Assembly*, Journal of Human Rights Practice, 2009

7. Kerikmäe, T.; Nyman-Metcalf, K.; Põder, M-L. *The August 2008 Russian-Georgian War: Issues of international law*, Baltic Yearbook of International Law 10, Martinus Nijhoff, 2011

8. Labori, Michel et Costea, Simion, *Le Management des Politiques de l'Union Europeenne*, PARIS, Prodifmultimedia, (FRANCE), 2011, 300 pages.

9. Nowak, M. U. N. *Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* CCPR: Commentary, 2005

**Documents and internet sources**

10. Comments on the draft law on amendments to the "Law on Assembly and Manifestations" provided by GYLA, available at http://gyla.ge/legislature/

11. Decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia on case Georgian Young Lawyers' Association,

12. Zaal Tkheshelashvili, Lela Gurashvili and others v. Parliament of Georgia, #2/2/180-183, 5 November of 2002

13. Decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia on case political union of citizens 'Movement for United Georgia', political union of citizens 'Conservative Party of Georgia', citizens of Georgia - Zviad Dzidziguri and Kakha Kukava, Georgian Young Lawyers' Association, citizens Dachi Caguria and Jaba Jishkariani, Public Defender v. Parliament of Georgia, #482,483,487,502, 18 April of 2011

14. European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), comments on the Law of Assembly and Manifestations of Georgia by Bogdan Aurescu, available at

15. http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL(2009)153-e.pdf

16. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Comments on the Law of Assembly and Manifestations of Georgia by Finola Flanagan, available at

17. http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL(2009)152-e.pdf

18. Füle, Štefan, "European way for Georgia and other Eastern neighbours", ENPI (The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) Info Centre 25.07. 2011

19. Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (2007) available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/24523

20. Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (2010) available at

21. http://legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/3256/file/FoA_Guidelines_II_Edition_2010_en.pdf

22. Report of the office of public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia submitted to the Human Rights Council for the 10th session of Universal Periodic Review, available at

23. http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session10/GE/PD

24. Statement made on behalf of the Republican Party by its member Tina Khidasheli regarding the draft law on amendments to the "Law on Assembly and Manifestations" of Georgia, available at

25. http://republicans.ge/index.php?module=A-newsletter&func=display&sid=2818

26. http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/16234.html

**Cases**

27. Aldemir v Turkey, App. No. 32124/02, 18 December 2007

28. Ouranio Toxo v Greece, App. No. 74989/01, Judgment of 20 October 2005

29. Platform "Artze fur das Leben" v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 204
# The Problems of Reform of Public Administration in Ukraine, in European Context

DR. NINA DIDENKO

Professor, Donetsk State University of Management, UKRAINE

**Abstract:** The article is devoted to the main problems of reformation of public administration in Ukraine, possible risks and methods of building the strong state.

**Keywords:** Strong state, Civil society, Social partnership, Social communications.

Analyzing the special features of governance and world order in the XXI century, Francis Fukuyama put forward a thesis that building of the strong state consists of the creation of new governmental institutions and the consolidation of already established<fnref n="1" />. It means that the question of the type of new governmental structures and what should be saved from already existing, is urgent.

Since in Ukraine there is a need in solving of many problems, which were not solved by other countries, the problem of reformation of state governance is very critical. Particularly, it is one of the factors of the approval of new law about state service, creation of the National Agency of state service issues, introduction of changes in the system of state workers' preparation.

The aim of the article is to analyse the main problems of reformation of the state governance in Ukraine, possible risks and ways of building the strong state.

One of the main problem that Ukrainian society experiences now, is an existence of «zones of indifference» and within its framework a person obeys to the state and does not call it in question. In this case, state power is a power of «position», which is based on the traditional attitude towards hierarchical public relations. Switch to the network social connections means a necessity of change from the power of «position » to the power of «leader». According to C. Barnard, this power could be established only with an acceptance by the object of governance. In this case, a person agrees to recognize in the act of communication the status of power only if four conditions will be fulfilled:

1) a person understands, what is demanded from him;

2) by making decisions, a person is confident that it not contradicts with the goals of the organization;

3) a decision does not contradict the interests of a person;

4) a person is physically and mentally able to do, what is needed<fnref n="2" />.

The experience of activity of the governmental structures in Ukraine shows that the existing organization of power is not adapted to the conditions of public communication. There is not only lack in technical funds, information – communication networks, but also lack in the desire of state workers to organize an active dialogue with civil society, listen to public opinion and develop the democratic procedures of achievement of public consensus.

In many cases these problem are connected with the problem of professionalism of managers, who are able to carry out necessary duties. According to Toffler, in the conditions of the informational society, the power of high quality should be effective and achieves goals with minimal sources of power by uniting knowledge, wealth and compulsion. Knowledge, having such indications as flexibility, infinity

<footnote n="1">¹ Фукуяма Ф. Сильное государство: Управление и мировой порядок в XXI веке: (пер. с англ.) / Фрэнсис Фукуяма. - М.:АСТ:АСТ МОСКВА:ХРАНИТЕЛЬ,2006.-220, [4] с.-(Philosophy).</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Барнард Честер. Функции руководителя: власть, стимулы и ценности в организации [Текст]/Ч.Барнард: пер. с англ. В.Кошкина.-М.:Челябинск: Социум, ИРИСЭН, 2009.-332 с.</footnote>
and wide range of application, is the most democratic source of the power, because does not addict directly from the income or belonging to specific social group<fnref n="1" />.

Toffler points an attention to the fact that new informational economics does not accept punctilious bureaucrats; it accepts individualists, radicals, to some extend «commandos» of the business world. In the conditions of «mosaic» democracy, the ability of power to work during mass actions, react on mass movements, mass media is unnecessary, because «mosaic» democracy is an indication of demassified society, where the horizontal self-regulations strengths and the control from the top weakens<fnref n="2" />.

According to Rainey, state managers, especially on the top positions, should expertly build their relations with external instances and political powers, effectively act even in the conditions of the interference and restriction from these powers<fnref n="3" />.

It is very negative, when in one hand, an extreme becomes the social demagogy and populism and, on the other hand, «deafness» of the institutes of power to the wants, interests and opinions of citizens.

R. Putnam proves that the strong state exists only because of strong society and that is then fair, when Rainey by analysing governance in the governmental institutions of US emphasizes the sense of public opinion about the quality and professionalism of state workers. Particularly, it depends on how public perceives clients of the institution, respect the professional skills of workers of the institution and manager, what is the level of support of mission and goals of organization. Exactly these factors together with improvement of state management, established by the US, conditioned in the reconsideration of content of the activity of state institutions against other organizations<fnref n="4" />.

Examples of successful state management actualise the issue of the delegation to the social partners specific managerial authorities on the basis of intellectual potential of self-organization of citizens. T. Carlyle mentions that it is impossible to believe in the collective wisdom of ignorant individuals, therefore, the public should have that intellectual potential, which will provide with self-organization and an opportunity to find a way and methods to achieve a desirable result.

In a society, regardless of power, there is public discourse about the problems both in terms of expectations of negative changes, which are the consequences of suspension of production, crises, political conflicts, depressed mood and stress, and in terms of determining the content of a new life and new power. It is believed that these conditions should favor a pluralist model of interaction between state and civil society institutions, which do not have a monopoly on the privileges and representation of certain groups and the competition is focused around ways to solve pressing problems. This will enable the public sector to learn to work with the state in consultation mode, acquiring the necessary competence and preserving their autonomy.

Such public policy delegation of powers of certain partners on the basis of the intellectual potential of self-organization of citizens leads to the formation of a special system of interdependencies. For example, a common practice in the U.S. transfers the state functions to non-governmental organizations, which is controlled by the government managers, who must have the appropriate skills in collaboration with the public.

<footnote n="1">¹ Тоффлер Э. Метаморфозы власти: Знание, богатство и сила на пороге XXI века / Элвин Тоффлер; [Пер. с англ. В.В.Белокосков и др.]. - М.: АСТ, 2001-669, [1] с.; 21 см.- (Phylosophy).- Библиогр.: с.579-611.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Тоффлер Э. Метаморфозы власти: Знание, богатство и сила на пороге XXI века / Элви Тоффлер; [Пер. с англ. В.В.Белокосков и др.]. - М.: АСТ, 2001-669, [1] с.; 21 см.- (Phylosophy).- Библиогр.: с.579-611.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Рэйни Хэл Дж. Анализ и управление в государственных организациях / Хэл Дж. Рэйни: Пер. с англ.-[Штернгарца М.З.].- 2-е изд.- М.:ИНФРА-М,2002.-XIV,402 с.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Рэйни Хэл Дж. Анализ и управление в государственных организациях / Хэл Дж. Рэйни: Пер. с англ.-[Штернгарца М.З.].- 2-е изд.- М.:ИНФРА-М,2002.-XIV,402 с.</footnote>
H. Rainey points out that in this case many of the challenges faced by public managers' tasks are reduced to evaluating the effectiveness of certain actions or alternatives that may be implemented, as well as the spectrum of political forces that shape and provide a variety of features<fnref n="1" />.

In this case, the requirements of the state to the non-governmental organizations should be as high as in government offices - qualifications of personnel who involved in the activities, transparency and accountability, and strict observance of laws and human rights.

In connection with this thesis, support the conclusions of the project on the reform of public administration, which indicated that for an active dialogue and partnership between government and civil society organizations, must be met a few basic conditions:

1) policy of the participants of public and state cooperation to promote and support cooperation, regardless of the motivation characteristics of each of the parties;

2) determination of the degree of maturity and capacity development of civil society institutions that are necessary for the interest of public authorities in cooperation with them and for clear and accurate expression of their interests, their promotion and protection;

3) existence of the institutional (legal and organizational) framework for cooperation between the public sector, meaning the established forms of cooperation which have developed in practice, or directly established by the legislation or the agreement reached on the basis of the law;

4) economic independence and stability of civil society organizations, their ability to generate human capital and to mobilize additional resources to address public interest issues<fnref n="2" />.

The result of this interaction can be regarded as alternative ways of improving the production and delivery of administrative services, which differ from traditional methods of management and power-bureaucratic activities. This model focuses on strengthening the managerial role of nongovernmental organizations and institutions that require a closer institutional relationship of public and private agencies and to ensure their operational efficiency.

Nowadays, could be seen an increasing role of grass-roots levels of government, which suggests the need for their adequate professionalism and responsibility, the ability to effectively coordinate and improve transparency of the processes of providing administrative services to citizens and the elimination of administrative barriers hampering.

Toffler believes that all social systems and subsystems cannot simultaneously be in complete equilibrium, and therefore cannot be equivalent to the distribution of power between all groups<fnref n="3" />. The art of management is to prevent changes in the balance of power system failure, or do not change toward the struggle for power, which never leads to positive results. Consequently, an important means of improving the system of state power is decentralized and delegated government functions to lower levels of power, which requires them the willingness and ability to deal effectively with the performance of such functions, better coordination and management.

As world practice shows, in order to achieve the efficiency of such a reform is necessary to develop and introduce a special system of indicators to measure the real effectiveness of government and assess its results. Much of the effectiveness of management depends on the status and capabilities of local authorities.

For example, in Ukraine there are over a thousand legal acts, regulating certain matters of organization and functioning of local government, including more than 600 laws. But their position is not fully complying with the European Charter of Local Self-Government, ratified by Ukraine.

<footnote n="1">¹ Рэйни Хэл Дж. Анализ и управление в государственных организациях / Хэл Дж. Рэйни: Пер. с англ.-[Штернгарца М.З.].- 2-е изд.- М.:ИНФРА-М,2002.-XIV, p.122.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² Реформа государственного управления: институциализация консультаций между институтами власти и неправительственными организациями в странах СНГ.- Unated Nations Development Programme, Bratislava. 2002.- pp. 16-17.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³ Тоффлер Э. Метаморфозы власти: Знание, богатство и сила на пороге XXI века / Элвин Тоффлер; [Пер. с англ. В.В.Белокосков и др.]. - М.: АСТ, 2001-669, [1] с.; 21 см.- (Phylosophy).- Библиогр.: p. 576.</footnote>