<figure><img src="image_92.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4** View of Popocatépetl's summit crater on 3 March 2015 showing that volcanic materials filling the crater had reached within 30 m below the lowest part of the rim (*photograph* downloaded from https://www.whatsapp.com/). While providing useful information about the state of the volcano, this *photograph* was taken by a member of a group of adolescents who had climbed the summit area without authorization (see text for further discussion)</figcaption></figure>

absolute amplitude of the seismometer signals (Murray and Endo 1989; Endo and Murray 1991). From RSAM data, the cumulative seismic energy released by the volcano provides a very good proxy of its vigor of eruptive activity, as it reflects the total seismic energy release from all sources: VTs, explosions, exhalations, tremors, etc. Figure 5 exhibits that the overall level of activity varied little between 1996 and early 2000, with a weak increasing trend from the onset of the activity before sharply increasing in late 2000 and the start of 2001. Afterwards, the

level of activity gradually decreased keeping a relatively low level until a new marked increase in RSAM counts in mid-2010. During the period 2003–2010, however, far fewer reports of visible volcanic manifestations—such as observed explosions, exhalations or lava accumulation—induced many people to believe that the eruptive activity perhaps was approaching its end, despite the seismic-monitoring data indicating otherwise. Expectedly, public interest in the volcano waned and perception of its hazards slowly started to dissipate. Yet, volcano monitoring and the
<figure><img src="image_93.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5** Evolution of seismicity during the period 1996–2015, as recorded by the Chiquipixtle seismic station (PPX), located to the WSW of the crater, at a height of 3980 m. asl. *Above*, each vertical bar represents a ten-minute RSAM average of the seismic signal amplitude sampled at a rate of 100 samples per second. *Below*, cumulative RSEM (sum of successive squared RSAM values, proportional to the total seismic energy detected</figcaption></figure>

by the monitoring station). In December 2000, the activity increased sharply, including recorded manifestations such as saturating harmonic tremors (see Fig. 6). This surge in seismic activity prompted a precautionary evacuation of towns exposed to pyroclastic and lahar flows. The seismic energy release since 2010 has been actually larger, but at a lower rates. The inset in the center shows a zoom of the waning RSEM in the period 2001–2010

information about the volcano activity were never scaled down, as the daily reports on the volcano condition and the status of the VTLAS, which remained in Yellow, were published every day by CENAPRED in its website. Nevertheless, only when activity manifestations such as explosions, exhalations or persistent fumaroles become visible, the media massively reproduces such reports. The proliferation of social networks and fixed webcam sites, such as http://www.webcamdemexico.com/ (with more than half a million followers), has made possible wide dissemination of information about the occurrences of even minor events, thereby improving in this way the persistence of awareness.

# 5 Development of Risk—Mitigation Strategies Since 1994

Perhaps the main challenge in managing the response to the ongoing volcanic activity of Popocatépetl has been posed by its rather pedestrian, anti-climactic character, particularly during the 2003–2010 period. The initially impressive phreatic eruption of 1994 that sharply contrasted with the quietness of the previous 70 years prompted the frenzied making of a Popocatépetl’s volcanic hazards map (Macías et al. 1995) in only a few months under high-stress conditions. This map—the first such for Popocatépetl specifically
intended for use by civil authorities—was made with a general consensus of the involved Mexican and U.S. experts. The high-urgency 1994–95 scientific and governmental response, which also included the development of the VTLAS, then gradually declined until the onset of effusive magmatic activity in 1996. The VTLAS was set at Yellow for the population at the moment of its implementation in mid-1995. The slow decline of the ash-emission events, the direct source of public and authority awareness, was not much in agreement with the data from the volcano-monitoring instruments. The VTLAS thus remained in Yellow even when the volcano appeared to be in a relative state of rest. News media and the public started to joke about a “busted” traffic light. However, in March 1996, the emplacement of the first lava dome confirmed an ongoing level of eruptive activity, and thereby rekindled public and media interest and concern. Unlike the initial 1994 episode, the now much-improved monitoring data allowed a better understanding of the 1996 activity. Because the character of the dome emplacement processes was effusive and confined within the summit crater, the PSC continued to recommend maintaining the VTLAS in Yellow, as the probabilities of pyroclastic flows or lahars were still low. It was at that time that some members of a sport clubs climbed to the crater rim. Tragically, this imprudent action resulted in the above-mentioned casualties caused by the first dome-destruction explosion, again rekindling the interest of public and media.

Dome-emplacement and destruction activity continued in the ensuing years with a somewhat increasing trend, but without exceeding the levels set by the scenarios marked by the VTLAS, so it continued in condition Yellow. However, the dome-destruction explosions in 1997, and particularly the 13 km-high ash column of 30 June that caused ashfalls in Mexico City and impelled closing its airport for 12 h, prompted changing the VTLAS to Red for a few hours. However, no evacuations of populations were ordered, thereby generating some confusion among people and authorities. Studies at other volcanoes (Solana et al. 2008) indicate that, although civil

authorities are aware of the volcanic hazards, their understanding of how to respond during an emergency can be incomplete, and that understanding how people perceive risk is important for improving risk communication and reducing risk-associated conflicts (Haynes et al. 2008).

At this stage, the need of an embedded scale within the three-color alert levels designating the alert level of authorities became immediately evident; see De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling (2008) for a detailed account of the VTLAS levels. The quick return to condition Yellow, as no evacuations were needed, again prompted the news media and public to joke about a “busted” traffic light. Public discussions on this subject, however, ultimately proved to be beneficial, because it helped to convey to the general public and many authorities that the color of the Traffic Light is not a description of the state of the volcano, but rather it is a description of the threat on people and thus reflects the state of awareness of individuals. Hence, the VTLAS remained in Yellow, although the phase, i.e., the level of alert for Civil Protection authorities, has changed several times.

The VTLAS was only temporarily set again in condition Red at the peak of intensity (i.e., rate of seismic energy release) of the entire eruptive episode during December 15–19, 2000. Unlike the 1997 event, the management of the December 2000 eruption was more efficient as lessons were learned from the 1997 experience. The colors and phases of the VTLAS, and a safety radius of 12 km around the crater, were then clearly defined by the PSC. This radius narrowly excluded the closest towns to the volcano. The Red-VTLAS was set on the basis of a 24-h forecast made by the PSC from the large amplitude of the volcanic tremor signals, and using results from a load-and-discharge time-predictable model consisting of a succession of episodes of variable intensity, in which the seismic energy released by a high intensity episode of activity is followed by a lower-intensity period with a duration proportional to the previous energy drop (see for example De la Cruz-Reyna 1991). The exclusion radius was then extended to 13 km, and an evacuation of the towns within that radius was undertaken
<figure><img src="image_94.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 6** Left Seismograms of the December 2000 activity (back), showing highly saturated recordings, compared with seismicity recorded for the largest previous eruptive event in June 1997 (front), which caused ashfall on</figcaption></figure>

Mexico City, obtained from the same CENAPRED monitoring station. Right Images of the evacuation and of evacuees watching the eruption from a safe distance (photographs courtesy of Associated Press)

(Fig. 6). This precautionary action was taken because the dome-destroying eruptions ejected large amounts of hot debris onto the glacial ice that could induce localized melting, such that even minor pyroclastic flows could produce powerful lahars. One of the vexing difficulties in the management of the December 2000 response was a marked overreaction of authorities in some small towns slightly beyond the exclusion radius. Concerned that some nearby towns were being evacuated, these officials decided to order immediate evacuations, without waiting for confirmation of the National Security Committee. No criteria for the return of these people to their homes were defined at the time, and some evacuees remained up to 10 days in temporary shelters. The problems of overreaction and the lack of clear “return” criteria to lower the level of alert have not yet been solved (De la Cruz-Reyna et al. 2000).

The December 2000–January 2001 explosive activity marked a watershed in the evolution of the ongoing volcanic crisis at Popocatépetl. Before 2001, the accumulation rate of dome lavas and debris exceeded the rate of removal by explosive

activity. After a period of irregular activity lasting until 2003, that trend slowly reversed, and the main crater slowly began to recover some of its former capacity (Gómez-Vázquez et al. 2016). After 2003, a lower lava emplacement and explosion rates (shown as a diminishing slope of the cumulative RSEM counts in the inset of Fig. 5) prompted a reduction of the VTLAS phase from Y-3 to Y-2, and then to Y-1 in 2004, still maintaining however condition Yellow on affected populations. The slightly increased seismic activity in late 2005 and 2006 raised the VTLAS phase back to Y-2. Overall, between 2005 and 2009, the rate of dome-lava growth did not exceed the rate of debris removal by explosions and exhalations, so that the crater continued to deepen slightly. Explosive activity gradually increased again in mid-2010 and continued with minor fluctuations through 2011. On 20 November 2011, a powerful explosion ejected large ballistic blocks to distances of 4 km; this explosion also generated a shock wave that was felt by some people as far away as 10 km from the volcano, but luckily with no damaging consequences.
<figure><img src="image_95.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7** The results of a telephone survey of 800 people, conducted on 19 April 2012, to gauge the general public's perceptions of the ongoing, but generally low level, activity of Popocatépetl. (Image from http://kaleydoscopio.mx/)</figcaption></figure>

Since 2001, dome building, exhalations, and explosions have continued sporadically to the date of this writing (July 2016). Accordingly, this persistent, though irregular, activity has necessitated that the VTLAS remains for long times in condition Yellow, leading to some wearisomeness and complacency among the populace and some municipal authorities of towns near the volcano during protracted lull periods. However, no complacency existed among authorities at the federal level. During periods of relative inactivity, the PSC and the CP authorities discussed in depth the pros and cons of making the VTLAS more dynamic, particularly lowering it to Green during relative quiescences. However, after much debate, a strong argument finally gained consensus: Green conditions would immediately allow the occupation and/or reoccupation of previously restricted areas close to the limit of the National Park, and well within the exclusion radius of 11 km. Then, should a new episode of more intense explosive activity arise, it would be much more difficult to evacuate people than it would be had the VTLAS remained in Yellow. Thus, it was decided to retain the current protocols, until there was solid evidence that the now two-decade-long eruptive episode had completely finished and the volcano had re-entered another long repose period.

The continuing, persistent moderate level activity of the volcano, together with the need to keep an intermediate level of alert among people

and authorities, has generated an awkward situation that may well be called a “semi-crisis,” which appears to be taken less seriously than a full-blown crisis among authorities and communities surrounding the volcano. The ambivalence of how this “semi-crisis” is viewed may be gleaned from the results of a telephone survey conducted in April 2012. Of the 800 people surveyed, 49% greatly feared the volcanic activity, 23% were worried about the “situation”, but the remaining 28% had little or no fear, or had no opinion (Fig. 7). Of continuing concern to the authorities, some people clearly do not perceive the volcano as a risk, as evidenced, for example, by the actions of a group of adolescents in March 2015. This group—numbering about 15 and all under the age of 18—had climbed to Popocatépetl’s summit crater five times, against government restrictions and apparently oblivious to dangers from possible volcanic activity during their ascents (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=higZ7j98Og8).

## 6 Scientific Strategies and Scientific Challenges

The main function of the Popocatépetl Scientific Committee (PSC) is to assess the hazards related to the activity of Popocatépetl volcano. From its earliest sessions in 1995, a methodology that proved to be efficient and practical was adopted.
Sessions are chaired by a moderator, usually the
director of CENAPRED, or a high authority from
the National Autonomous University of Mexico
(UNAM) or from the Ministry or Interior, and
usually limited to 2 h, unless a special situation
requires more time. The sessions are split into
three parts. In the initial one, the monitoring
groups describe the recent observations, always
in the same order: seismic, geodetic, visual,
geochemical, and others (Fig. 8). Questions are
allowed, but no discussions are permitted until
the exposition of all the data is complete. In the
second part, the members of the PSC discuss the
observations and propose possible explanations
of the observed data. This discussion is steered
towards interpretations for which consensus
seem to exist. Non-consensual matters are set
aside to be discussed later elsewhere. In the third
part, the PSC proposes the most likely scenarios
based on the consensus of the previous discus-
sions. When a small number of likely scenarios is
agreed upon, the PSC summarizes the likely

scenarios and makes recommendations to the
Civil Protection (CP) authority based on all
previous deliberations. This method, which is
similar to the differential diagnosis used in
medical science, has proved effective to make
diagnostics and prognostics of the volcano
activity, and to present them to CP as a list of the
possible scenarios in a descending order of
likelihood. We re-emphasize that the PSC **does
not** set the level of the VTLAS, which is done by
the CP authorities based on the PSC
recommendations.

The main difficulties faced by the scientists of
the PSC may be summarized in two different
realms: firstly, the scientific and technical one
related to understanding of volcanic processes
and, secondly, the operational aspects in effec-
tively communicating hazards information to the
CP authorities, news media, and the affected
populace. With regard to the former, apart from
the typical instrumental and technological inad-
equacies and limitations in the amount and

<figure><img src="image_96.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 8** A session of the PSC in progress in 2014, at which the relevance of changes in seismic spectrograms related to observed visible signs of volcanic activity is being discussed. The inset shows a session in 2015 at</figcaption></figure>

which the main subject was the policies to deal with
people disregarding the security radius to climb Popoca-
tépetl Volcano. All sessions of the PSC are recorded
quality of monitoring data, an important issue has been the evolution of the precursors' meaning and possible implications. Specifically, what do the variations in precursory activity portend what the volcano might do next? During the initial years of the crisis at Popocatépetl, acquired experience allowed identification of clear precursors to explosions, such as harmonic tremors; repetitive short-duration, low-amplitude LP events (drumbeats); accelerated rate of RSAM counts, etc. However, and with no clear watershed (although it may be related to the change of eruptive regime in 2001–2003), in several instances such seismic signals were not necessarily followed by explosions. On the other hand, cumulative volcano-tectonic (VT) energy release, rate of dome growth, and VT appearing in specific locations seemed to have become more relevant precursors.

With regard to effective communications of hazards information, in addition to the general factors considered previously discussed, an additional recurrent hindrance during the Popocatépetl crisis has been the frequent changes of decision-making authorities over time scales shorter than the duration of the volcanic activity. Federal and state governments change every 6 years, so that within each period of administration the responsible CP authorities with whom the scientists interact may be replaced more than once. Thus, it is always necessary to train the new authorities in the communication process. Fortunately, in all cases, the communication of volcanic risk based on likely scenarios has made it possible to deal with this problem relatively easily.

Although the basic tools for scientific assessment of the hazards and systematic monitoring of the activity have not always been sufficient, CENAPRED has made, and is making, a major effort in maintaining the highest technological standards in the volcano-monitoring networks. In addition, a new volcanic-hazards map by a team of volcanologists at the Instituto de Geofísica, and other UNAM institutes has replaced the current one (Macías et al. 1995), which was prepared under rushed conditions with minimal

data available at the time. The new hazards map considers a wealth of new geological information collated over the past 2 decades (in particular, extent of lahar inundation areas, magnitude and timing of past Plinian eruptions, ash dispersal data, etc.). The updated hazards map and assessment were released by CENAPRED in (2016). Participants in the current map include some of the authors of the 1995 map: Siebe, Macías, Capra, Delgado, and Martin del Pozzo, plus their associates (e.g., postdocs, students). The CP system provided a special fund (FOPREDEN. Disaster Prevention Fund) to finish the new map, although much of the new scientific data were obtained with research projects financed by CONACYT (Mexican National Science Council) and DGAPA (The UNAM fund to support major research projects).

## 7 Concluding Remarks and Future Challenges

The historical activity of Popocatépetl has been characterized by eruptive episodes of activity similar to the current one (1994-present). The relatively low magnitudes of the eruptions reported since the year 1500 have not left enough geological evidence to assess their evolution with time. Nonetheless, historical accounts (detailed in De la Cruz-Reyna et al. 1995, and summarized in De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling 2008) suggest that the described events may correspond to the most visible manifestations (i.e., dome-destruction explosions) within long-duration episodes of successive dome emplacement and destruction. Without further evidence other than the general, and sometimes vague, wording of the reports, the events listed in De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling (2008) may be grouped into about six of such episodes, as shown in Table 1.

No statistical analysis of Table 1 is attempted because of the subjective grouping of episodes. However, some hints may be gleaned from the inspection of the information summarized in the table. The current eruptive episode is not anomalously long, and within the range of
<table><caption>**Table 1** Grouping of the 19 known historical eruptions of Popocatépetl volcano (De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling 2008) into six long-duration episodes involving successive dome-emplacements and dome-destruction explosions, interspersed with long periods of quiescence</caption><thead><tr><td>Period</td><td>Estimated minimum duration (y)</td><td>Estimated lapse until next episode (y)</td><td>VEI range of eruptions in the period</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1512–1548</td><td>36</td><td>23</td><td>2–3</td></tr><tr><td>1571–1592</td><td>21</td><td>50</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>1642–1665</td><td>23</td><td>32</td><td>2–3</td></tr><tr><td>1697–1720</td><td>23</td><td>199</td><td>1–2</td></tr><tr><td>1919–1927</td><td>8</td><td>67</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>1994-present</td><td>&gt;20</td><td>?</td><td>2–3</td></tr></tbody></table>

durations of previous historical episodes. Moreover, the expected lapse to a future episode does not seem to be correlated with the duration of the previous episode or the duration of the previous lapse. Unfortunately, the historical information precludes any reliable means to forecast the precise time and explosivity of the next eruptive episode after the current one ends. The possibility that the next episode could involve a destructive Plinian phase cannot be ruled out; Plinian eruptions have occurred in the geologic past, with a mean return period of about 1500 years (Siebe et al 1996; Mendoza-Rosas and De la Cruz-Reyna 2008). A formidable challenge for scientists and the civil authorities in anticipating Popocatépetl's future behavior is to address this question: if the current already-long episode continues as a semi-crisis for a lot more time, what are the best options to counteract the wearisomeness and indifference of some of the stakeholders? There are no easy answers. Suggestions have been made to replace the VTLAS by another alert system. Apart from the confusion that a new, untested system may induce in the large population involved, it may not help necessarily solve the problem, as the dullness of the situation is not caused by the alert system, but instead by the pauses characterized by the absence of major explosions or any other visible expressions of increased volcanic vigor. A positive aspect is that when a highly visible event such as a moderate explosion occurs on a clear day, the public's volcano awareness seems to recover almost instantly, as has been the case

since 2011. Figure 9 illustrates the positive reaction of the news media and the CP preparations in response to a raise in the alert level of the VTLAS to Yellow Phase 3.

Identifying the end of the current, relatively minor eruptive episode or the possible precursors of a much more explosive activity poses other major challenges. In particular, as seismic records constitute the dominant volcano-monitoring data for Popocatépetl and most other active volcanoes, it is crucial to better understand the empirical relationships between the seismic signals recorded since 1994 and the nature and vigor of the observed volcanic activity preceding, during, and following the seismicity. Physical models then can be developed to explain the source of the diverse seismic signals. Such method is inherently non-unique, and in some cases the ambiguity of the possible causes may lead to inadequate or even incorrect assessment of the hazards. Reduction of such levels of non-uniqueness based on integral analysis of different types of geophysical and geochemical data is a critical need to be fulfilled in the future with additional data and more diagnostic analytical methodologies. In the mean-while, however, some pragmatic actions must be implemented. That it is why the Popocatépetl Scientific Committee, in attempting to reduce such a complex problem, has strongly emphasized the consensual approach in its deliberations. In a broader context, experience gained over recent decades at volcanoes worldwide indicates a sobering reality: despite the considerable advances in volcano-monitoring techniques, except for
<figure><img src="image_97.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 9** Front pages of the Puebla City news media announcing the raise in alert level to *Yellow Phase 3* in the VTLAS. This phase requires having emergency shelters</figcaption></figure>

ready (upper right), and CP personnel mobilized to carry
out a possible evacuation (lower right)

very rare exceptions, current state-of-the-art vol-
canology still lacks a routine, reliable capability to
always correctly interpret a volcano's precursory
signals and to accurately predict the outcomes of
volcano unrest (e.g., Tilling 2014).

Maintaining a continuous flow of up-to-date
information to the public about volcanic activity,
hazards, and risk reduction seems to be the best and
most practical solution to minimize the weariness
and indifference that at times develop among the
authorities and populations at risk during lulls of
visible activity. In this regard, the daily posting of
the activity reports of Popocatépetl on the
CENAPED website (http://www.cenapred.gob.
mx/reportesVolcan/BuscarReportesVolcan?opt
Busqueda=1) apparently has been quite effective.
This, together with the exponentially growing
influence of fixed webcam sites and social media
networks, has greatly increased public awareness
of the occurrence of even minor events at Popo-
catépetl and other volcanoes in Mexico or

elsewhere. Nonetheless, we recognize that the
influence of user-generated social media reporting
needs to be regarded with caution, because there is
no assurance of the accuracy of the content of the
transmitted information. Although most reports
and comments diffused via social media are gen-
erally informative, at times scientifically unsup-
ported remarks and predictions are also included,
thereby contributing to possible confusion and
generating a negative impact on the general
awareness. To deal with this problem, SINAPROC
opened a twitter account to spread reliable infor-
mation. Dealing with modern-day modes of
information dissemination poses another major
challenge for all those involved in the management
of volcanic risk.

**Acknowledgements** This research has been partially supported by the UNAM-DGAPA-PAPIIT project IN-106312. We wish to express our appreciation to Jose Luis Macías and an anonymous reviewer for helpful constructive reviews of an earlier version of this paper.
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# Organisational Response to the 2007 Ruapehu Crater Lake Dam-Break Lahar in New Zealand: Use of Communication in Creating an Effective Response

Julia S. Becker, Graham S. Leonard, Sally H. Potter, Maureen A. Coomer, Douglas Paton, Kim C. Wright and David M. Johnston

## Abstract

When Mt. Ruapehu erupted in 1995–1996 in New Zealand, a tephra barrier was created alongside Crater Lake on the top of Mt. Ruapehu. This barrier acted as a dam, with Crater Lake rising behind it over time. In 2007 the lake breached the dam and a lahar occurred down the Whangaehu Valley and across the volcano’s broad alluvial ring-plain. Given the lahar history from Ruapehu, the risk from the 2007 event was identified beforehand and steps taken to reduce the risks to life and infrastructure. An early warning system was set up to notify when the dam had broken and the lahar had occurred. In combination with the warning system, physical works to mitigate the risk were put in place. A planning group was also formed and emergency management plans were put in place to respond to the risk. To assess the effectiveness of planning for and responding to the lahar, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with personnel from key organisations both before and after the lahar event. This chapter discusses the findings from the interviews in the context of communication, and highlights how good communication contributed to an effective emergency management response. As the potential for a lahar was identifiable, approximately 10 years of lead-up time was available to

J.S. Becker (✉) · G.S. Leonard · S.H. Potter

M.A. Coomer · D.M. Johnston

Joint Centre for Disaster Research, GNS Science,

P.O. Box 30368, Lower Hutt, New Zealand

e-mail: j.becker@gns.cri.nz

G.S. Leonard

e-mail: g.leonard@gns.cri.nz

S.H. Potter

e-mail: s.potter@gns.cri.nz

M.A. Coomer

e-mail: m.coomer@gns.cri.nz

D.M. Johnston

e-mail: david.johnston@gns.cri.nz

D.M. Johnston

Joint Centre for Disaster Research, School of

Psychology, Massey University, P.O. Box 756,

Wellington 6140, New Zealand

D. Paton

School of Psychological and Clinical Sciences,

Charles Darwin University, Darwin, NT 0909,

Australia

e-mail: douglas.paton@cdu.edu.au

K.C. Wright

Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency

Management, Wellington, New Zealand

e-mail: Kim.Wright@dpmc.govt.nz
install warning system hardware, implement physical mitigation measures, create emergency management plans, and practice exercises for the lahar. The planning and exercising developed effective internal communications, engendered relationships, and moved individuals towards a shared mental model of how a response to the event. Consequently, the response played out largely as planned with only minor communication issues occurring on the day of the lahar. The minor communication issues were due to strong personal connections leading to at least one incidence where the plan was bypassed. Communication levels during the lahar event itself were also different from that experienced in exercises, and in some instances communication was seen to increase almost three-fold. This increase in level of communication, led to some difficulty in getting through to the main Incident Control Point. A final thought regarding public communication prior to the event was that more effort could have been given to developing and integrating public information about the lahar, to allow for ease of understanding about the event and integration of information across agencies.

Keywords

Volcano · Lahar · Communication · Emergency management planning · Mt. Ruapehu · New Zealand

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background

In 1995 and 1996 Mt. Ruapehu in New Zealand underwent a series of eruptions that initiated approximately 30 eruption-induced lahars, and several ash falls over parts of New Zealand's North Island (Galley et al. 2004; Cronin et al. 1997; Johnston et al. 1999). A tephra layer was also deposited at the head of the Whangaehu Valley on the Ruapehu Crater Lake outflow channel, creating a natural dam to the lake (Manville et al. 2007). Over time it was anticipated that the water in the Crater Lake would rise behind the dam to a volume of 7–9 million cubic metres, and eventually breach it, resulting in a dam-break lahar (Keys and Green 2008). This lahar would travel down the Whangaehu Valley, and despite much of the area being quite remote, people and infrastructure were potentially in

danger (Fig. 1). In addition to many lahars caused by other factors (such as eruptions and rain mobilisation; Keys and Green 2008), previous dam-break lahars are known to have occurred from Ruapehu, including a devastating lahar in 1953. In that instance, the dam-break lahar travelled down the valley and seriously damaged a rail bridge at the location of Tangiwai (Board of Inquiry 1954). Soon after, a passenger train hurtled into the lahar-flooded Whangaehu River and 151 people died. Given the consequences of the 1953 event, and the anticipation that a new dam-break lahar could occur, it was considered imperative that something be done to reduce the risk from a potential future event. Options included removing the tephra dam through to planning an emergency management response to a break-out lahar. The dam-break lahar eventually occurred on 18 March 2007. This chapter describes the mitigation and planning actions that were taken to reduce the risk, and based on a
<figure><img src="image_98.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** Map of Mt. Ruapehu Crater Lake, showing potential lahar path, and locations of significance (adapted from Keys and Green 2008)</figcaption></figure>

series of interviews with those involved in the planning process, outlines the role of communication in creating an effective response.

## 1.2 What to Do About an Anticipated Lahar?

A number of studies were conducted to assess the hazard and risk of a dam-break lahar at Ruapehu (e.g., Hancox et al. 1997, 1998; Taig 2002) and to identify options for reducing the risk (DOC 1999). While some strongly advocated for intervention at the tephra dam, e.g., digging a

tunnel through the barrier to remove the potential for catastrophic collapse (Hancox et al. 1997), it was decided that no engineering intervention should take place (Keys 2007b). Instead, a mixture of warning systems, mitigation works and emergency planning was instigated to deal with the dam-break lahar issue (Keys and Green 2002, 2008; Norton 2002; Massey et al. 2009).

To mitigate the risk of a lahar, a 'bund' (levee) was built in early 2002 at the spill-over point of the Whangaehu River into the Waikato Stream (Galley et al. 2004). The objective of this was to stop a lahar from getting into the catchment of the Tongariro River and thus protecting infrastructure
(i.e. Tongariro Power Station) and people down-
stream. Other mitigation works included making
changes to infrastructure at risk from the lahar,
such as strengthening and raising the road bridge
at Tangiwai by two metres (Wakelin 2006).

At about the same time as the bund was built a
warning system called the Eastern Ruapehu
Lahar Warning System (ERLAWS) was set
up. ERLAWS (a system of sensors and preven-
tative mechanisms) was designed to sense
vibrations when the lahar had been triggered and
send electronic warnings out to people (e.g., via
pager, computers, electronic road signs), so that
emergency responders could initiate a response
(Keys 2009; Leonard et al. 2008; Wakelin 2006;
Massey et al. 2009). The system was expected to
give a maximum of one hour of warning of the
impending lahar at State Highway One (SH1) on
the Desert Road, and two hours warning at the
Tangiwai Bridge (Wakelin 2006).

While the ERLAWS in particular was a good
way of detecting when a Crater Lake lahar had
been triggered, the system was also subject to
being set off accidentally and creating a ‘false
alarm’. This could particularly occur when rain
storm events caused heightened stream flow.

An Eruption Detection warning System (EDS)
was also present on Ruapehu and provided an
additional avenue for warning of lahars. The EDS is
triggered by earthquakes when an eruption of a
certain size occurs, allowing warning for lahars that
are potentially generated by volcanic eruptions
(Leonard et al. 2008). Such lahars usually occur
from hot volcanic material falling on snow and
melting the snow to generate a lahar which could
then impact on the local ski fields. However, an
eruption could also potentially generate a Crater
Lake break-out lahar if a dam has blocked the lake,
and thus the EDS provided another warning option
for the dam-break lahar situation.

Another element of managing a Ruapehu
Crater Lake dam-break lahar was that of emer-
gency planning. It was decided that response
plans should be prepared to deal with a
dam-break lahar if, and when, it occurred (Keys
2009). The region affected by a potential lahar
was divided into two parts: a Northern part which
would only be affected if a lahar were to overtop

the bund and get into the Waikato Stream and
Tongariro River; and a Southern part which was
the main area that would be affected if a lahar
moved from Ruapehu Crater Lake via the
Whangaehu River to the sea. A Northern Rua-
pehu Lahar Planning Group and a Southern
Ruapehu Lahar Planning Group were formed to
develop plans on an effective response for before,
during and after a dam-break lahar event. Both
groups were convened by 2003 (Galley et al.
2004). The following section describes the nature
of the planning undertaken by these groups in the
anticipation of responding effectively to a lahar.

1.3 Planning a Response
to a Ruapehu Crater Lake
Lahar

Taupo District Council (TDC) took on primary
responsibility for developing the Northern
Emergency Management Plan, while the Ruapehu
District Council (RDC) took on primary respon-
sibility for the Southern Emergency Management
Plan. Development and refinement of the plans
took place in collaboration with many other
organisations with responsibilities (Table 1), with
the final sign-off occurring in 2004 for the
Northern Plan (Northern Lahar Planning Group
2004) and in 2005 for the Southern Plan (South-
ern Lahar Planning Group 2005).

A central Incident Control Point (ICP) in the
town of Ohakune was identified in the plan.
The ICP was where the majority of responders
would meet to coordinate response to the lahar.
There were also a number of agencies that would
operate remotely from other Emergency Opera-
tions Centres (EOCs) and from out in the field
where the lahar was occurring.

The plans outlined the actions to be undertaken
before (relating to readiness for the event, and
reducing the risk), during (response phase) and
after (recovery phase) the lahar took place, and the
organisations responsible for those actions. As
part of the readiness and reduction phase, warning
levels numbered from 1 to 5 were assigned for
different levels of the Crater Lake (Table 2). These
warning levels were based on historic records of
<table><caption>**Table 1** Main organisations involved in the Northern and Southern Ruapehu Lahar Planning Groups</caption><thead><tr><th>Organisations</th><th>Northern plan</th><th>Southern plan</th><th>Responsibilities</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>NZ Army</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Provide staff and resources as required</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Department of Conservation (DOC)</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Respond to pager activation and notify DOC staff</li><li>Implement Tongariro National Park Lahar response plan</li><li>Provide advice on lahar status and on-going support to emergency operations centre (EOC)/Incident control point (ICP)</li><li>Provide specialist personnel</li><li>Follow own contingency plans</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Environment Waikato (Regional Council)</td><td>X</td><td></td><td><ul><li>Activate group EOC</li><li>Notify incident controller</li><li>Provide regional liaison officer to ICP</li><li>Monitor situation</li><li>Coordinate regional response as required</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>New Zealand Fire Service</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Provide staff as required to ICP and roadblocks</li><li>Provide staff to assist with evacuations</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Genesis Energy (Power company)</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Follow own contingency plans</li><li>Provide engineering advice to ICP</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Good Health Wanganui (Wanganui District Health Board (DHB))</td><td></td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Establish liaison with St John ambulance</li><li>Implement plans</li><li>Alert other District Health Boards</li><li>Health advisor for EOC provided</li><li>Health media liaison and spokesperson</li><li>Casualty documentation process estimated</li><li>Coordination with police</li><li>DHB and St John develop transport plan</li><li>DHB coordinating health response</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Horizons Manawatu-Wanganui (Regional Council), Lakes DHB, Waikato DHB, Bay of Plenty DHB</td><td></td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Activate Group EOC</li><li>Notify district councils, Incident Controller, EOC staff, National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC)</li><li>Coordinate response across region</li><li>Monitor situation and update NCMC</li><li>Coordinate regional support</li><li>SRLPG<sup>1</sup></li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>GNS Science (GNS-Earth science research agency)</td><td></td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Notify police communications of lahar status</li><li>Monitor lahar status</li><li>Provide advice to EOC</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Justice Department</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Respond to pager</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Ministry of Civil Defence &amp; Emergency Management (MCDEM)</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Notify MCDEM staff</li><li>Provide national liaison officer to ICP</li><li>Monitor situation</li><li>Coordinate national response to lahar as required</li><li>SRLPG</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Opus Consultants</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Contractors for infrastructure assessment</li></ul></td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><caption>**Table 1 (continued)**</caption><thead><tr><th>Organisations</th><th>Northern plan</th><th>Southern plan</th><th>Responsibilities</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>New Zealand Police</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Staff road blocks</li><li>Assist with evacuations</li><li>Initiate Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) structure<sup>2</sup></li><li>Activate fire siren</li><li>Provide staff to ICP/EOC</li><li>Direct agencies as required</li><li>Implement traffic management plan</li><li>Check on state of bund</li><li>Contact transit to open road</li><li>Initiate CIMS structure</li><li>Provide staff to check river</li><li>Coordinate the use of aerial assistance in upper mountain and river areas to make public safe</li><li>Coordinate Search and Rescue personnel</li><li>SRLPG</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Rangitikei and Wanganui District Council</td><td></td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Activate lahar response plan</li><li>Advise local school</li><li>Advise Chief Executive Officer and Roading Manager</li><li>Commence telephone tree call out</li><li>Provide staff as required</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Ruapehu District Council (RDC)</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Notify RDC staff</li><li>Activate siren if not working</li><li>Provide staff to EOC/ICP</li><li>Initiate telephone tree calls</li><li>Monitor RDC assets</li><li>Advise recovery manager</li><li>Maintain EOC</li><li>Provide on-going info to EOC</li><li>Bridge inspection</li><li>Contact transit to open road</li><li>SRLPG</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Search and Rescue (SAR)</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Activate if required</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Taupo District Council (TDC)</td><td>X</td><td></td><td><ul><li>Establish EOC</li><li>Monitor TDC assets</li><li>Resource to the EOC as required</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Transpower (Owns and operates New Zealand's electricity grid)</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Implement agency lahar response plan</li><li>Implement Transpower contingency plan</li><li>Monitor situation</li><li>Provide engineering advice to EOC</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Transit New Zealand<sup>3</sup> (Responsible for the New Zealand State Highway network)</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Notify staff and contractors</li><li>Activate agency lahar response plan</li><li>Deploy contractors to snow huts</li><li>Activate/check variable message signs</li><li>Contractors to close snow gates</li><li>Provide engineering advice to ICP</li><li>Provide contractors to road blocks</li><li>Engineering inspection of Transit assets</li><li>Implement traffic management plan</li></ul></td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><caption>**Table 1** (continued)</caption><thead><tr><th>Organisations</th><th>Northern plan</th><th>Southern plan</th><th>Responsibilities</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Tranz Rail/Ontrack<sup>4</sup> (rail network maintainer and operator)</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Notify Police communications of activation of Tranz Rail lahar warning system</li><li>Cease train traffic</li><li>Isolate power at Tangiwai rail bridge and rail crossing</li><li>Activate agency lahar response plan</li><li>Provide advice to ICP as required</li><li>All train traffic to remain stopped until directed by Incident Controller</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Winstone Pulp International (local business in the lahar path)</td><td></td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Implement lahar response plan</li><li>Alert personnel and evacuate 'at risk sites'</li><li>Advise ICP when evacuation complete</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Works Consultancy</td><td></td><td>X</td><td><ul><li>Contractors for infrastructure assessment</li></ul></td></tr></tbody></table>

Adapted from Galley et al. (2004), Northern Lahar Planning Group (2004), Southern Lahar Planning Group (2005)

¹SRLPG agencies specifically named as part of the Southern Group in the group plan

²CIMS is a scalable command and control structure widely used in emergency management in New Zealand and in many other countries under various incident management or coordination system names

³From 2008 Transit New Zealand has been operating as the New Zealand Transport Agency

⁴From 1995 the organisation responsible for maintaining New Zealand's rail network was named Tranz Rail. The name was changed to Ontrack in 2004. Since 2008 the rail network has operated under the new name of KiwiRail

previous lahars and the damage they caused (Galley et al. 2004). At Crater Lake Warning Level 1, when the lake was at a low level, trained staff were expected to be able to “initiate a response” within 30 min (Northern Lahar Planning Group 2004; Southern Lahar Planning Group 2005). In contrast, at Warning Level 4, where the lake level was higher, trained staff were expected to initiate a response within 5 min. As well as using the warning levels for the plan, public information was also provided around the current level of the lake and what this meant in terms of the likelihood and risk of a lahar occurring (e.g. leaflets, websites, free-phone) (Fig. 2).

For the response phase, the Plans outlined actions that each organisation should take for time periods following the activation of ERLAWS (that is, after 5, 30, 60, and 90 min from when a lahar warning had been triggered). For example, in the first 5 min following ERLAWS activation and pager receipt, common activities that agencies listed in the Plans had to do included responding to the pager, and contacting relevant internal and external personnel to notify them of the activation so they could start responding. Within 30 min, Incident Control Points were

required to be set up, the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) structure initiated, road blocks established, lahar visually confirmed (if possible), key contacts and communication established (with any required information flowing), and individual agency contingency plans implemented. Sixty minutes after the lahar warning was received, much of the response was expected to be in ‘monitoring and maintenance mode’, where agencies were watching the progress of the lahar, staff were kept at key points as required (or deployed elsewhere if needed), and communication over the state of affairs was continuing. After 90 min the watching brief was expected to continue, and response was then to move toward the recovery phase.

After an official commencement of the recovery phase, the plans outlined the need for briefings, implementation of traffic management plans, provision of staff as required, engineering inspections of key infrastructure, and coordination of media and communication. These activities and monitoring of the situation continued for two hours, after which it was expected that debriefing and media activities would be occurring.
<table><caption>**Table 2** Crater Lake warning levels</caption><thead><tr><th>Level of readiness</th><th>Lake level (msl)</th><th>%</th><th>Explanation</th><th>Actions</th><th>Indicative time for lake to rise to next alert Level in summer</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Normal</td><td>Below 2527</td><td>&lt;95</td><td>Base level of readiness as per normal civil defence planning</td><td>Planning, preparation, and training</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Level 1</td><td>2526.5</td><td>95</td><td>Critical trigger point, 3 m below the new rock overflow level. Waves caused by eruptions and small landslides could overtop barrier but the probability of a small collapse lahar caused by a resulting barrier failure is extremely low</td><td>Planning completed. Full response capability available and ready. Response within 30 min</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Level 1b</td><td>2529.5</td><td>100</td><td>Lake full to the buried rock rim outlet level and the base of the tephra dam. Probability of barrier failure at this level is still very low</td><td></td><td>1-6 months to fill from Alert Level 1b to 2</td></tr><tr><td>Level 2</td><td>2533</td><td>108</td><td>Sudden collapse could produce a lahar equivalent to the 1975 event. This is the largest historic lahar that has passed under the Tangiwai bridges (without causing damage) and down the Tongariro River Conditional probability of barrier failure at this level is 1-2%</td><td>Response within 20 min</td><td>0.7-1.9 months to fill from Level 2 to 3, or 7.8 months to drop down to Level 2 from Level 3, depending on infill rates. This large variation is due to the possibility of the filling spanning fast and slow filling rates, and seepage. Slow fill rates will probably result in net drops in lake level above about 2532 m</td></tr><tr><td>Level 3</td><td>2535</td><td>113</td><td>Equivalent to a large moderately fast lahar. Conditional probability of barrier failure at this level is 5-10%</td><td>Response within 10 min</td><td>0.4-0.6 months to fill from level 3 to 3b, or 3.2 months to drop down to level 3 from 3b</td></tr><tr><td>Level 3b</td><td>2536</td><td>115</td><td>Conditional probability is 50-60%</td><td></td><td>0.2-0.3 months to fill from level 3b to 4, or 1.1 months to drop down to level 3b from 4</td></tr><tr><td>Level 4</td><td>2536.5</td><td>116</td><td>Equivalent to a large, fast lahar. Conditional probability is 90%</td><td>Response within 5 min</td><td>0.2-0.3 months to fill from level 4 to 5, or 0.7 months to drop down to level 4 from level 5</td></tr><tr><td>Level 5</td><td>2536.9</td><td>117</td><td>Lake at top of the tephra dam. Conditional probability is 100%</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Warning levels were associated with actions in the Northern and Southern Emergency Management Plans. Warning levels were also used to communicate to the public about the height of the lake in relation to the tephra dam and crater rim, and the rate at which the lake was filling with water (from Galley et al. 2004; Massey et al. 2009)

The Plans also included procedures for false alarms generated by ERLAWS. Only the Inci-dent Controller could declare a false alarm based on either expert advice from the Duty Scientist monitoring the lahar, visual confirmation that there was no lahar, or if the time estimated for the lahar to reach Tangiwai had passed (Northern Lahar Planning Group 2004; Southern Lahar

Planning Group 2005). False alarms provided the opportunity to practice for an effective response.

Individual agencies also developed their own emergency management plans (e.g. the Central District Police Lahar Response Plan), which were consistent with both the Northern and Southern Plans.
<figure><img src="image_99.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** Public information about the current level of the lake (e.g. for May 2004) and what this meant in terms of the likelihood and risk of a lahar occurring (replicated</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_100.png" /></figure>

from a leaflet provided by the Wanganui-Rangitikei Emergency Management Committee 2004)

A key part of planning for the lahar included practicing the response using the Plans. A training and exercise schedule was devised and included in the Plans. Some practice was also obtained when ERLAWS was activated accidentally (e.g. by bad weather) or when the EDS detected a small volcanic eruption was in progress in 2006 (Mordret et al. 2010). In this instance, responders received a message on their pagers saying that a “LAHAR [was] POSSIBLE”, and they then knew they needed to start the process of stepping up to respond to a potential event.

## 1.4 Communication

Communication related to the lahar event needed to be considered in three distinct contexts. First, *internal communication* needed to occur between those involved in planning for and responding to the lahar. Inter- and intra-agency communication about the lahar issue developed over a period of 10 years from the occurrence of the 1995–1996 Ruapehu eruptions through to the 2007 lahar. At first, communication was constrained by issues including awareness of the historic Tangiwai disaster; the range and desirability of options available to treat the lahar risk, and differences in opinion over how that risk should be managed (DOC 1999; Keys 2009); a strong desire from

local iwi to let the lahar occur as a natural process; politics over who should be planning for and responding to the risk (Dittmer 2008; Keys 2009); and the quality of initial emergency plans created by RDC for responding to the lahar (Dittmer 2008). Such conflicts raised issues for effective communication around planning. Agencies often disagreed about the best approach to take, and who should be taking it.

The Minister of Conservation made a final decision about management of the lahar in 2001, guided by the Assessment of Environmental Effects report which outlined various treatment options (DOC 1999) and the debate which had occurred around the issue. The Minister's decision included the establishment of a physical warning system and building of a bund, combined with emergency planning (Dempsey 2002). Once the decision was made, a clear path was defined for the context in which future communication would take place. From this point onwards, inter and intra-agency communication developed as emergency management planning for the lahar evolved.

The second primary communication area was the external communication of public information about the status of the Crater Lake levels and response to the lahar event. A Lahar Information Management group, comprising the lead agencies in management of the event, was set up to address media communications related to the
lahar (Southern Lahar Planning Group 2005). A lahar information plan, outlining management of information before, during and after the lahar, was included as part of the main Southern Emergency Management Plan appendices.

The third area of communication related to technical capacity. An effective response to the lahar relied on technical support, the primary one being timely communication about an impending lahar by ERLAWS. Other aspects of technical importance included the hardware required to report to others verbally and visually about the nature and progress of the lahar. It was imperative that these technical aspects were able to operate when the lahar occurred so that responders could communicate effectively.

The organisations involved in the planning process came from different geographic and functional jurisdictions (Leonard et al. 2005). Many agencies had not worked together in the past. This meant that diverse world views and expectations were likely to exist amongst responders, and there was a need to construct a shared mental model over response and communications (Paton et al. 1999). Galley et al. (2004) conducted an analysis of the planning process up to 2003 and made some observations on a variety of issues, many of which pertained to communication. They suggested that clarification of communication roles, lines of communication, and methods of communication should be undertaken to assist with creating a shared mental model. They recommended improving internal communication by continuing to conduct multi-organisation planning meetings, education, training and exercises. There was a need to ensure the technical ERLAWS system was robust and had adequate ‘check-back systems’. Methods were also required for updating new information into plans and processes.

## 2 The Lahar Event

On Sunday 18 March 2007, after a prolonged period of wet weather, the tephra barrier began to breach (Massey et al. 2009). Around 10:06 on Sunday morning slumping started to occur at the

Crater Lake tephra dam. By 11:20 the dam was fully breached by rising lake levels due to heavy rainfall, and a lahar was flowing down the Whangaehu Valley. Although the volume of water was high, water was released in pulses over a 45 min period, and the event was considered ‘moderate’ in size (Wakelin 2007).

The ERLAWS sensor at site 1 on the dam (see Fig. 1) signalled a possible lahar just after 10:00 that morning. Between 10:06 and 11:42 all three ERLAWS sensors (Sites 1–3) and the Genesis sensor (Site 4) were triggered as the lahar travelled down the Valley. The alarms sent data to Tokananu Power Station and warning messages to police, rail and road authorities, and to infrastructure agencies. Alarms also initiated the closure of automatic barrier arms and flashing lights and signs on the State Highways (Keys 2007a).

By 11:00 am the Ohakune Incident Control Point (ICP) was activated, and responders had gathered at the ICP. Police had stopped rail traffic at Waiouru, farmers downstream were notified of the lahar, and signs and road blocks on State Highway 1 and State Highway 49 (SH49) were in place. At 11:28 the Whangaehu Valley telephone tree was activated, notifying valley residents of an impending lahar. By 11:35 the DOC lahar duty staff and response plan were activated and media releases were being prepared (Keys 2007a).

By around 11:44 the lahar had reached the bund built to prevent overflow from the lahar into the Tongariro River, but did not breach it. By 11:50 a helicopter had taken response staff to the area for visual confirmation of the lahar but bad weather and visibility kept observers from viewing the Crater Lake (Wakelin 2007).

From 11:50 to 15:30 other personnel who had not received the initial alerts were notified of the lahar including the Minister of Conservation, additional DoC staff, GNS research scientists, infrastructure providers and the media (Keys 2007a). During the day of the lahar event, over 100 media calls were taken by ICP staff. Lahar updates from the Emergency Operations Centre and the Ruapehu Area Manager fed information into media releases which were given to media as per the Emergency Management Plans' procedures (Wakelin 2007).
The lahar reached Tangawai Rail Bridge and peaked at 13:30 and by 15:48 the warning lights on SH1 were turned off and the highway reo-pened. SH 49 was reopened at 16:06 and the Ohakune Incident Control Point was closed at 18:18 as the lahar passed down the lower Whan-gaehu River on its way to the sea (Keys 2007a). By the end of the day on 18 March the lahar and the emergency management response had run its course, with no major incidents occurring.

## 3 Method for Communication Research

As a Crater Lake tephra dam breach could be anticipated beforehand, it provided an excellent opportunity to study communication aspects of the planned emergency response prior to the lahar, and compare that with what happened in an actual event. Twenty interviews were under-taken between March and May 2006 with indi-viduals from organisations involved in the response to the event. The interviews were semi-structured and contained questions about participants' organisations' plans for the wider response (including response to the ERLAWS warning system, roles and responsibilities, information management, communication, and training) and their expectations for responding to a lahar event. The interviews were repeated between April and June 2007, after the lahar had taken place. The same questions were asked, but this time participants were asked to reflect on how the actual response had gone compared with the anticipated response. All interviews were digitally taped and transcribed, and entered into the software package ATLAS.ti. Coding of the interviews was undertaken and key themes were extracted as described by Braun and Clarke (2006). The themes are organised under the fol-lowing headings, which were identified as important in the discussion above:

1. Internal communication (in the planning and response process)

2. External communication

3. Technical capacity

## 4 Results and Discussion: Communication for the Lahar Event

The following section discusses the key themes related to communication that were identified during analysis of the data.

### 4.1 Internal Communication

#### 4.1.1 Internal Communication During the Planning Process

Two types of internal communication were identified from the interviews. The first related to internal communication during the planning process. It included communication between agencies as the planning process took place, as well as communication within agencies. When the first set of interviews was undertaken in 2006, participants reported that communication during the planning process had been good. This is likely due to the 10-year timeframe it had taken for communication to develop. Tasks such as plan development, meetings, training, exercising and practices all contributed to better communication between agencies over time. These tasks con-tributed twofold: they helped build relationships between personnel; and they helped develop agreement over roles, responsibilities, and pro-tocols for responding to the lahar, which could subsequently be embedded in a plan. An inter-viewee from Ontrack (responsible for the rail network) reflected on how communication had improved over time, based on the activities and training that people had undertaken together:

> We've got better at communicating in the last three or four years. We use text messaging and confer-encing a lot more and so we are actually going, shifting more to CIMS models now than the ad hoc system we used to work, because we all did CIMS training last year and so we therefore tend to work to a CIMS model.

On discussion about planning for future haz-ard events, an interviewee from the Police noted how relationships had been built and communi-cation had improved, which would be useful for the future:
I think what we would [use from the lahar planning] is communications with people like [GNS Science], DOC, Horizons, some of those relationships will last a long time ...and actually put us in good stead...in years to come.

People's expectations in 2006 of how communication would occur during a future lahar event seemed to predominantly correspond with the details in the plans that had been developed. Interviewees noted that communications, including roles and contact information, were "all laid out" in the plan (as quoted by one DOC interviewee). People's knowledge showed that those involved in the future response had a good understanding of how communication was likely to unfold, and their roles and responsibilities. Two people did anticipate that communication during an actual response may go wider than what the plan detailed, and suspected that some people may approach them personally to seek information.

Interviewees commented on the challenge of keeping momentum and interest in the planning process in the lead up to the lahar, due to the long time frame. As one interviewee from Genesis stated, "...it is just a challenge of keeping that [focus] going". They noted the need to keep information updated and circulated to internal staff and external responders so that people knew the status of the Crater Lake and any new readiness or response procedures that were put in place.

### 4.1.2 Internal Communication During the Response

The second type of internal communication related to anticipated and actual communication during the response. In general, according to all of the interviewees communication during the response worked well. People followed procedures that had been agreed upon, written down, and practiced. The relationships that had been developed were found to have largely assisted with response-related communication. People had noted prior to the lahar in 2006 that they sometimes had difficulty in getting hold of others during exercises, but that by following the protocols set down in the plans they were able to make contact with an alternate person.

There were a few instances where a breakdown in communication protocols occurred. In one instance, this was due to the relationships that had been developed during the planning process. Such a strong set of relationships were formed that one of the actions regarding confirmation of lahar activation in the planned response was undertaken out of sequence. A call was made by a key responder to another agency to confirm the lahar had occurred, but this person was not officially supposed to do it. Given the occurrence of this out-of-sequence action, the response was delayed slightly until the proper process was reinstated and the response moved forward as per the plan.

Additionally, some participants had expectations that they would receive calls from one of the primary responders to confirm the lahar activation (even though the plan had not outlined this as an action), but this was not the case. This created a period of anxiety and uncertainty as agencies waited for the official word to reach them that a lahar had indeed occurred.

Interviewees reported that multiple and diverse technical sources of communication during the response were useful, as both primary modes of communication, and as a back-up. Types of communication documented in both the Northern and Southern Emergency Management Plans included VHF radio, radio telephone (RT), landline and mobile telephones (for regular communications, telephone trees to notify local residents of the lahar, etc.), satellite phone, fax (e.g., for situation reports), email, conference calling, and web-cameras showing the river. Participants reported finding a common radio connection useful in aiding connections, as multiple people could sit in and listen on the channel for updates. For instance, in 2006 the Emergency Manager from Taupo District spoke about how they could "turn on our radios and do a listening brief because we can tune into DOC's radios, we can tune into the police radios and just see what's going on". A particular point was also made about the usefulness of having visual information through pictures and video footage of the lahar for understanding of how the event was progressing, and for having a common point
of discussion between agencies that may not be sitting in the same room, but were able to see the same imagery. An emergency manager from Horizons Regional Council reflected on this point by saying:

> I think one of the biggest things, from a management point of view, was the webcam. That was a huge bonus. In fact, far more useful than I had ever expected it to be. I was talking on the phone to [...] the National Controller, and we were just chatting about how things were going and what information we were getting and all that sort of carry on and I said "We're projecting our webcam image up onto the wall" and he said "Yeah, we're doing the same." Which is good. That's what it was there for and we were making sure that the page was refreshing itself regularly and then [the National Controller] said, "Oh, refresh your page." So we refreshed the page and it had gone from the base of the tower to being over the top of the tower within a few minutes and immediately we knew what was going on, the guys in Wellington knew what was going on, we knew roughly how big it was, and from a management point of view that was really beneficial, being able to see it...

The Horizons participant also remarked that methods of communication such as radio, teleconferencing and web-cam were useful for understanding how the event was progressing in "real-time" and that the response needed to evolve to match its progress.

Videoconferencing between the different agencies was not undertaken for this event, but it was noted that for future events video-conferencing would be useful and might add an additional aspect to the response. As a Horizons emergency manager stated, "you look into a room and immediately get a feel for how things are going".

One of the 'surprises' faced by responders was that the amount of communication differed during the actual 2007 lahar event in comparison with the exercises and practices. An interviewee from the Police suggested that communications were of greater number during the event itself —"they tripled"—and that he was called by a variety of people both from official agencies (e.g., other Police, Ohakune ICP, Genesis), and unofficial sources (e.g., the public ringing to enquire about traffic disruption on SH1). The

emergency manager from Wanganui District also said that his cell phone range constantly from agencies who rang him personally. The increase in communication also relates to the fact that relationships were so good between responders, that they would make contact with each other to find out more information, even if it wasn't specifically part of the plan. Conversely, one DOC interviewee located in the ICP said that she did "very little communication, because everyone had everything under control".

Frequent updates of information were praised by responders, who found the frequency useful for understanding what was going on, and responding. An interviewee from Ontrack gives one example of this:

> The NCM [Network Control Manager] sent text messages out in a real timely manner right through the whole event. It was really good. You didn't actually have to ring the Network Control Manager up because the text messages were coming oh, round about every thirty to forty minutes [...] telling you what's going on.

## 4.2 External Communication

### 4.2.1 Communication of Public Information Prior to the Lahar

Prior to the lahar occurring information was provided to the public about the potential lahar and its management. Media interest was high, demonstrated by a number of stories on varying aspects of the lahar (Dittmer 2008). While there was a good effort made to provide timely, relevant and clear information about the potential lahar, sometimes confusion surrounded the information that was presented. The planning group attempted to be proactive in addressing confusion.

For example, some participants perceived that there was confusion amongst the public about the information provided on the warning levels for the lahar, and that more explanation was required. Additionally, as the warning levels changed (i.e. from 1 to 2) messages required updating and clarification. The Horizons
emergency manager explained that in response to these communication needs, the 0800-freephone message was re-written to outline the current level of the lake, the likelihood and risk of the lahar occurring, and stated some actions that people should do. Messages for subsequent warning levels were prepared in advance in case they needed to change at short notice.

Interviewees also reported public confusion around some of the messages that were used on the lahar signs placed on SH1 to warn travellers about the potential for a lahar to occur. The Police noted that people did not understand the word ‘lahar’ that was used on the signs, so the terminology was changed to ‘flash flooding’ instead.

It was suggested by one of the interviewees that while the Lahar Information Group was active in both the readiness and the response phases, it could have directed more of its efforts to providing public information during the readiness phase. This would have allowed the provision of public information prior to the event, and efforts to provide information by various agencies (e.g., DOC, GNS Science, MCDEM, Horizons, etc.) could have been more integrated. It was suggested by one participant that a specific pre-lahar communication plan could have been developed to assist in readiness education.

### 4.2.2 Communication of Public Information During Response to the Lahar

Provision of public information about the lahar during the lahar response was generally effective, likely due to the pre-planning that had occurred to coordinate a media response. There was some discussion following the response that some of the media releases were a bit slow to be produced and disseminated to the public. This was thought to be because the person in charge of the media releases was unable to get to the ICP quickly, and another staff member was required to take over issuing media releases. A DOC interviewee suggested that the delay was related to the person

who took over the media releases being “swamped” or overloaded with work and that it was a “staffing-level thing”.

## 4.3 Technical Capacity

Prior to the Ruapehu lahar, interviewees predominantly reported that they had worked to develop a robust and integrated technical system of communication. ERLAWS needed to be reliable, and report as few false alarms as possible. For the most part this was the case, and it was estimated that there was one false activation per month (pers. comm. Keys 2007c). For the false alarms that did occur, protocols were put in place to identify the false alarm and shut down the response. These procedures were agreed on in the Plans, and practiced by the responders. If false alarms started to become too frequent, (e.g., in April 2006 there were four in one month) this was reviewed and new procedures put in place (pers. comm. Keys 2007c).

It was deemed essential that ERLAWS was linked into response systems of multiple organisations. It was also important that organisations were able to communicate together on compatible equipment. An Ontrack employee described how they ensured that the ERLAWS system was consistent with the other systems the Railways used to keep people safe. In another example, an interviewee from Genesis (2006) remarked:

> All DOC ERLAWS systems go through [...] the Genesis handling systems because we have all the communications that work on the mountain, so it made sense to do that. So obviously, we work really closely with DOC to make sure that their ERLAWS systems which run through ours are robust...

Technical communications worked well on the day of the lahar. ERLAWS was activated as expected, and everyone was able to communicate via the various technical means outlined in the planning and used in the exercises. There were only a couple of reports of responders having difficulty getting through to the ICP. These were
mostly related to “black spots” in the operation of equipment (i.e. remote areas where equipment could not pick up signals), and the fact that the networks were busy. For example, a participant from Ontrack describes their communication difficulties with the ICP:

> Initially, we had some problems trying to get through to the ICP centre at Ohakune. However, when we did get through they were really good. They gave us a cell phone number to get round the telephone numbers and I suggested to the Network Control Manager next time it happens, we've got a fax number for them, fax them instead of a fax saying 'please ring' and to make the contact, because it's important that we make that link.

This demonstrates how communication issues were solved by users being able to use different modes of communication to get around the problem, highlighting the importance of multiple modes of communication.

## 5 Conclusions

This chapter has provided a summary of the organisational communication that occurred before, during and after the 2007 Ruapehu Crater Lake break-out lahar. It is evident that effective communication before and during an event, can assist an effective response. The Ruapehu Crater Lake lahar had approximately 10 years of lead-in time before the event occurred. During this time, agencies were able to agree on an approach to manage the lahar risk, develop a technical warning system, implement mitigation measures, start a planning process, develop plans, hold exercises, and practice responding to false alarms. Being involved in many of these activities helped build a shared mental model of how a diverse collection of agencies were going to respond to the lahar (Galley et al. 2004; Paton et al. 1999). Exercises and practices also contributed to testing whether technical aspects of the warning system were robust, and allowing changes to be made to plans when necessary. The on-going communication and cooperation between agencies developed robust relationships that enabled people to work together in an effective manner. Given these

conditions, the eventual response to the 2007 lahar was very effective, and communication reportedly worked well.

Only a few minor communication issues were reported.

* First, it was suggested that more effort could have been given to developing and integrating public information about the lahar prior to the event.

* Second, a number of participants in the study reported having trouble getting through to the ICP due to communications being very busy, but this problem was averted by responders making use of the diversity of communication modes and networks to find alternative paths to the ICP.

* Third, it was identified that communication levels during the lahar event itself were different from exercises or practices, and in some instances communication was seen to increase almost three-fold. This phenomenon should be highlighted for those planning for future events so that they have realistic expectations of what a response will be like.

* Finally, the development of relationships was extremely important in facilitating communication, planning, and an effective response. However, this produced some downfalls. Personal relationships affected the response, with at least one person bypassing communications actions in the plan in favour of communicating with someone else not noted in the plan, resulting in a brief communication breakdown. This minor issue should also be considered when undertaking planning for future events.

The findings from this research on the 2007 Ruapehu lahar support current literature on good practice for effective warnings. Leonard et al. (2008) suggest that there are 5 key components of an effective warning system including:

1. Early warning system hardware

2. Planning

3. Co-operation, discussions, and communication
4. Education and participation

5. Exercises.

These five components are supported and informed by ‘Research and science advice’ and ‘Effectiveness evaluation’. Although this chapter has focused on the key role of Co-operation, discussions and communication, it is evident that the actual response to the Ruapehu lahar contains most of the elements required for a warning to be effective. More development could perhaps have been undertaken in the areas of ‘Education and participation’ and ‘Effectiveness evaluation, but other areas were robustly handled. This may explain why the response to the Ruapehu lahar was very effective.

The 2007 Ruapehu lahar was a unique event in that the nature of a potential future lahar could be reasonably well anticipated. The Crater Lake took over 10 years to fill to the point where the lahar occurred, which allowed a long lead in time to build relationships and plan for a response. Not every event will have the luxury of such a lead in time and therefore it is even more imperative that relationship-building, planning and communication takes place before events occur, to allow for an effective response. With respect to future events from Ruapehu and the nearby Central North Island volcanoes, the Central Plateau Volcanic Advisory Group has since been established for this purpose. Meeting two to three times per year, scientists, Civil Defence & Emergency Management personnel, planners, communication, emergency services and local community representatives discuss plans for the volcanoes of Ruapehu, Ngauruhoe and Tongariro, and build relationships. This structure is likely to have helped in the response to the eruptions of Tongariro in 2012.

**Acknowledgements** The authors wish to thank all of the participants who talked to us during the course of the research, and shared their experiences about planning for and responding to the 2007 Ruapehu Crater Lake lahar. We also acknowledge the support of the New Zealand Natural Hazards Platform, which provided funding for the research to take place.

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# Crisis Coordination and Communication During the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull Eruption

Deanne K. Bird, Guðrún Jóhannesdóttir, Víðir Reynisson, Sigrún Karlsdóttir, Magnús T. Gudmundsson and Guðrún Gísladóttir

## Abstract

Eyjafjallajökull became Iceland's most infamous volcano in 2010 when the ash cloud from its summit eruption caused unprecedented disruption to the international aviation industry and considerable challenges to local farming communities and villages. The summit eruption, which began on 14 April 2010, was preceded by a 24-day long effusive flank eruption that produced spectacular fire-fountain activity and lava flows. The 39-day long summit eruption, however, was far more explosive and resulted in medium-sized jökulhlaups to the north, small jökulhlaups and lahars to the south and considerable ash fall to the east and east-southeast of the volcano. As in other crises in Iceland, the Department of Civil Protection and Emergency Management (DCPEM) coordinated efforts and facilitated crisis communication, while collaborating with the Icelandic Meteorological Office, the Institute of Earth Sciences at the University of Iceland and the National Crisis Coordination Centre. The DCPEM's role included providing information to the government and its various agencies and feeding information from scientists to local police officials, civil protection committees and the public. Communication with local residents took place through agencies' websites, the national media and frequent open town hall meetings where representatives of institutions responsible for eruption

The original version of this chapter was revised: An affiliation has been updated. The erratum to this chapter is available at 10.1007/11157_2017_22.

D.K. Bird (✉) · G. Gísladóttir
Institute of Life and Environmental Sciences,
University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland
e-mail: deanne.bird@gmail.com

G. Jóhannesdóttir
Department of Civil Protection and Emergency
Management, National Commissioner of the
Icelandic Police, Reykjavik, Iceland

V. Reynisson
South Iceland Police, Reykjavík, Iceland

S. Karlsdóttir
Icelandic Meteorological Office, Reykjavík, Iceland

M.T. Gudmundsson · G. Gísladóttir
Nordvulk, Institute of Earth Sciences, University of
Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland
monitoring, health, safety and livestock handling provided advice. These face-to-face meetings with local residents were critical as ash fall had not affected these areas for over 60 years and plans for dealing with this hazard were not established. This chapter explores these events and in doing so, provides a narrative of crisis coordination and communication in Iceland. The narrative is based on multiple sources, including an analysis of community perspectives of the emergency response and their use and views of the various forms of communication platforms. The chapter also considers the eruptions' impacts at the local level. This exploration reveals that the trust developed through close communication between all involved prior to and during the eruption increased the effectiveness of crisis communication. The experience gained from the Eyjafjallajökull eruption is important for volcanic crisis communication at a local and international level. While the immediate evacuation plans were effective, the ash fall problems illustrated the need for necessary precautions and broadly defined preparedness strategies.

# 1 Introduction

The Eyjafjallajökull volcano (Fig. 1), which is overlain by a 200 m thick ice-cap bearing the same name, has produced three eruptions since the tenth century: in 1612, from 1821 to 1823, and the recent 2010 events. Past eruptions have produced very fined-grained ash deposits typically found within a 10 km radius from the Eyjafjallajökull crater (Larsen et al. 1999) and only small to medium (3000–30,000 m³s⁻¹) glacial outburst floods (jökulhlaups) (Guðmundsson et al. 2005).

Initial volcanic risk management plans, developed from as early as 1973 for southern Iceland, did not include response to an Eyjafjallajökull eruption. These plans have, however, undergone revisions since 2002 to rectify this omission due to the realised threat evidenced by continuing magma intrusions in Eyjafjallajökull. The most dangerous aspect of a sub-glacial eruption, based on historic eruptions not least from Katla the volcano underlying Mýrdalsjökull glacier, are jökulhlaups, i.e. massive glacial outburst floods carrying volcanic debris and ice as sub-glacial eruptions melt through the glacier ice. Efforts made in 2003–2006 were therefore

aimed at understanding and mitigating the risk from eruptions in both Mýrdalsjökull (Katla) and Eyjafjallajökull, in relation to reducing the likelihood of accidents and fatalities to jökulhlaups (Guðmundsson and Gylfason 2005). A high degree of volcanic risk awareness leading up to the 2010 eruption and the semi-established communication lines between key stakeholders were partly the outcome of this work.

As the work, however, had focussed on this most dangerous and life-threatening aspect, relatively little attention had been paid to the social and health effects of weeks of repeated ash fallout on people and the agricultural industry, which is a critical component of the region's economy (Bird and Gísladóttir 2012). Moreover, as the plans were aimed at mitigating jökulhlaup risk, they were developed for a local response only; they did not consider international impacts of an ongoing eruption or a response to deal with the overwhelming international interest in the event (Heiðarsson et al. 2014).

Understandably, local agencies faced significant challenges responding to the 2010 eruptions. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a narrative of crisis coordination and communication in Iceland through the lens of the
<figure><img src="image_101.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** Eyjafjallajökull, Katla and the surrounding districts. The areas impacted by jökulhlaup (flood) inundation and where cumulated ash fall exceeded 1 cm, are shown. Tephra fallout and flood inundation data derived</figcaption></figure>

from Gudmundsson et al. (2012) and Porkelsson (2012). Population data was sourced from Ísólfur Gylfi Pálmason, the head of the Rangárþing eystra municipality, and Statistics Iceland (2016).

Eyjafjallajökull eruptions. This narrative is developed using multiple sources, including an analysis of community perspectives of the emergency response and their use and views of the various forms of crisis communication. The chapter also considers the eruptions' impacts at the local level.

To provide context, the chapter first describes the roles and responsibilities of local, key agencies involved in civil protection and emergency management in Iceland. This is followed by a description of contributing resources and data collection methods used in this chapter.

## 2 Civil Protection and Emergency Management in Iceland

The Minister of the Interior is head of civil protection and emergency management in Iceland with the National Commissioner of Police (NCIP) responsible for all issues at the national level (Fig. 2). Sitting within the NCIP is the Department of Civil Protection and Emergency

Management (DCPEM), which is responsible for all daily matters including crisis communication, emergency coordination efforts and disaster recovery in relation to all hazards affecting the nation (Almannavarnir 2016a). At the local level, Chiefs of Police (Municipal Authorities) and Civil Protection Committees are responsible for civil protection activities and emergency response plans within their jurisdictions (Johannesdottir 2016).

Representatives from all these levels form the Civil Protection and Security Council, which sets strategies relating to civil protection, security and emergency management for the nation for 3-years at a time. This includes developing and implementing strategies to prevent and/or mitigate physical injury, impacts on public health and damage to the environment and property, in addition to providing emergency relief and assistance (Johannesdottir 2016).

The Civil Protection Act No. 82, 2008 states that NCIP is responsible for assigning alert levels (Text box 1), in collaboration with the relevant Chief of Police, for all natural and man-made
hazards (Ministry of the Interior 2008). Based on their real-time hydrological, meteorological and seismological assessments, notifications of an impending eruption usually come from the Icelandic Meteorological Office (IMO). In this instance, DCPEM call a meeting with experts, such as those from IMO and the Institute of Earth Sciences (IES) at the University of Iceland, to evaluate the risk and make recommendations with respect to the alert levels.

**Text Box 1: Alert Level Phases, as Assigned by the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police (Almannavarnir 2016b)**

**Uncertainty Phase (Óvissustig):**

Uncertainty phase/level is characterized by an event which has already started and could lead to a threat to people, communities or the environment. At this stage the collaboration and coordination between the Civil Protection Authorities and stakeholders begins. Monitoring, assessment, research and evaluation of the situation is increased. The event is defined and a hazard assessment is conducted regularly.

**Alert Phase (Hættustig):**

If a hazard assessment indicates increased threat, immediate measures must be taken to ensure the safety and security of those who are exposed/in the area. This is done by increasing preparedness of the emergency- and security services in the area and by taking preventive measures, such as restrictions, closures, evacuations and relocation of inhabitants. This level is also characterized by public information, advice and warning messages.

**Emergency Phase (Neyðarstig):**

Emergency phase is characterized by an event which has already begun and could lead, or already has led to, harm to people, communities, properties or the environment. At this stage, immediate measures are taken to ensure security, save lives and prevent casualties, damage and or loss.

In addition to their advisory role with DCPEM, IMO is tasked with monitoring, forecasting and disseminating natural hazard warnings to aviation service providers and the public (Karlsdóttir et al. 2010; Vogfjörd et al. 2005). During the Eyjafjallajökull eruption: hydrological sensors were used to monitor river runoff in terms of chemical composition and jökulhlaup risk; meteorological sensors and visual observations were used to assess lightning hazards, behaviour of the eruption cloud and localised ash fall; and, seismic, strain and GPS sensors were used to assess the geophysical components (Gudmundsson et al. 2010; Karlsdóttir et al. 2010).

The main role of IES is research in earth sciences, including a strong emphasis on volcanology. The institute undertakes core research in volcanic activity as well as the associated hazards and environmental impacts. While IES research includes monitoring via GPS measurements, INSAR, glacier surface surveying and seismic measurements, real-time monitoring remains the responsibility of IMO. As such, IES does not have any statutory obligations with respect to the monitoring and communication of volcanic activity. However, IES is called upon to provide advice to DCPEM and other government agencies prior to and during times of volcanic crises (Þorkelsson 2012).

Also sitting under the NCIP and managed by DCPEM is the National Crisis Coordination Centre (NCCC), comprising staff from NCIP, Emergency Call Centre 112, Icelandic Coast Guard, Icelandic Red Cross, National Health Care System, rescue teams (ICE-SAR), ISAVIA (national airport and air navigation service provider of Iceland) and others (Heiðarsson et al. 2015). Based in Reykjavik, NCCC is responsible for coordinating a national response when the event affects several civil protection districts across the nation.

## 3 Methods

Multiple sources of data were used to develop this narrative of crisis coordination and communication during the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull
<figure><img src="image_102.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** Iceland's current Civil Protection Structure, as of November 2016 (from Almannavarnir 2016a)</figcaption></figure>

eruptions. Firstly, published reports and academic articles were critically reviewed with reference to the events as they unfolded, with a particular focus on the activities, challenges and achievements of DCPEM, IMO and IES at the local level. Secondly, personal experience of the authors (Jóhannesdóttir, Reynisson, Karlsdóttir, Gudmundsson) who were heavily involved in response and recovery efforts through their positions within DCPEM, IMO and IES provided added detail to that generated from the published reports and academic articles. Thirdly, survey data collected by Gísladóttir and Bird in August 2010 was used to enhance understanding from a community perspective.

The survey incorporated 15 semi-structured interviews with officials and residents alongside a questionnaire disseminated to households living within the vicinity of the Eyjafjallajökull and

Katla volcanoes. Out of 61 households, 58 completed the survey giving a response rate of 95%. This included 19 households from Vestur-Eyjafjöll, 26 from Austur-Eyjaföll, seven from Sólheimar and six from Álfðtaver (see Fig. 1), covering approximately 141 adults and 38 children. These communities were targeted due to their exposure to volcanic hazards (ash, debris-flows, jökulhlaup, lahars, etc.) during the 2010 eruptions. Every permanent household exposed to volcanic hazards during the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruptions was approached in these communities.

The questionnaire and semi-structured interviews asked respondents to detail their: personal experience prior to and during 20 March and 14 April eruptions; affects of the eruptions on individuals, family, property and businesses (agriculture/tourism); and, use of various media
sources to access information on Eyjafjallajökull and Katla. Katla was included here as earlier response plans were centred on a Katla eruption rather than a response to an Eyjafjallajökull eruption.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to present all survey data (some results have been presented by Bird et al. 2011, Bird and Gisladóttir 2012). However, some pertinent points are raised here as they directly relate to crisis coordination and communication during the 2010 events. These points, identified as ‘survey’ data, are interspersed throughout the following sections. All published reports and academic articles are cited accordingly.

Bringing these sources of information together, the following sections detail the events as they unfolded, with a particular focus on the activities, challenges and achievements of the key agencies and local residents’ views of and responses to crisis coordination and communication.

# 4 Crisis Coordination and Communication During the Eyjafjallajökull Eruptions

## 4.1 20 March 2010 Events

In light of increased seismic rates in and around Eyjafjallajökull at the start of 2010 (Gudmundsson et al. 2010), the regional Chief of Police and the DCPEM organised emergency management meetings with scientists, local police and rescue teams. These meetings began in February 2010 and included 10 community meetings with residents living in the expected hazard zone around Eyjafjallajökull up to one week prior to 20 March 2010 flank eruption. Evacuation plans in case of jökulhlaup from an Eyjafjallajökull eruption were finalised during this period (Bird et al. 2011).

The initial stages of 20 March 2010 eruption were of very modest magnitude and despite comprehensive monitoring systems, it was first observed that evening by farmers who reported

“a fire on top of the mountain” to local police (Bird et al. 2011). Hence, it is not surprising that the survey revealed the majority (50%) of respondents heard about the commencement of the eruption via a family member, friend or neighbour. A further 17% heard from DCPEM while 14% heard of the news over the radio.

As observer reports were received of the initial eruption on 20 March 2010, DCPEM and other authorities began rapid response efforts while IMO and IES scientists monitored real-time data to assess the situation (Porkelsson 2012). The pre-defined plans for evacuation, based on the hazard assessment from 2005 (see Guðmundsson and Gylfason 2005) were implemented for the first time in the early hours of 21 March. The first evacuation orders were disseminated via an automated phone alert system, supervised by the local Chief of Police (Gudmundsson et al. 2010). This was critical, given that a jökulhlaup from an Eyjafjallajökull eruption has the potential to impact inhabited areas within 1 h (Sigurðsson et al. 2011).

However, some survey respondents indicated that they did not receive the SMS or call to evacuate while others who did receive it chose to ignore it.

We did not evacuate our home, in these farms here, because there was no risk that the flood would reach the farms, but there was a possibility that we would be cut off. Everyone in this home was pleased with the decision, because it is better to be cut off being at home than to evacuate and unable to return home and attend the livestock.

...we did not receive any message, neither on the landline nor to the GSM phone. Everyone should have received a message that an eruption had started but we did not receive any for the Fimmvörðuháls eruption or the Eyjafjallajökull eruption.

Nevertheless, approximately 700 residents conformed during the early hours of 21 March and in general, survey respondents were more positive than negative about the coordination of the evacuation (Fig. 3).

The main criticism towards the coordination was in relation to lack of planning, with some residents stating that they were confused about who was to go where.
<figure><img src="image_103.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3** Respondents' feelings towards the management of the evacuations in relation to the 20 March and 14 April eruptions</figcaption></figure>

In our area the planning for the evacuation and the evacuation centre was not good, it should have been planned better.

As soon as the eruption site was located in the early morning on the flank of Eyjafjallajökull and not under the ice-cap, residents were allowed to return to their homes.

Although this eruption was relatively small, its impressiveness attracted thousands of onlookers that hiked the 16 km one-way trek with over 1000 m elevation to witness the eruption (Øorkelsson 2012). Continuing for 24 days, this 'tourist eruption' produced spectacular fire fountains and lava flows. As reported by survey interviewees and Øorkelsson (2012), the main task of DCPEM, the police and rescue teams during this time was managing crowd control on site; a task that was made all the more difficult due to the extreme conditions and often very ill-prepared onlookers who lacked suitable clothing for the cold, were exhausted, and sometimes needed assistance with broken down vehicles. Tragically, two people lost their lives while trying to access a suitable viewing point from the north of Eyjafjallajökull. Although tragic, it is surprising that these were the only fatalities considering the adverse conditions and thousands of keen spectators trying to access the eruption site (Donovan and Oppenheimer 2010).

## 4.2 14 April 2010 Events

On 14 April 2010, after 1–2 days lull in activity, the explosive summit eruption began in the

ice-filled caldera of Eyjafjallajökull (Øorkelsson 2012), creating with it new vents under the ice-cap (Sigmundsson et al. 2010). Preparation done in the years prior to the eruption proved crucial to the execution of monitoring, in particular relating to the life-threatening flood hazard. Direct and rapid communication between monitoring scientists at IMO and IES with DCPEM and local police prompted response such as road closures and evacuations in line with the hazard assessment-based pre-defined plans.

Evacuation orders were again disseminated via the automated phone alert system with approximately 800 residents complying before daybreak on 14 April (Gudmundsson et al. 2010). The need for evacuating the region was realised with the impact of jökulhlaups charged with volcanic debris and icebergs, travelling at very high velocities (<20 km/h) (Sigurðsson et al. 2011). These floods destroyed farmlands and caused some damage to roads and infrastructure but no lives were lost (Gislason et al. 2011).

In comparison to the 20 March eruption, the greatest proportion of survey respondents indicated they heard about the possibility of Eyjafjallajökull erupting for a second time from the Chief of Police/police (40%) but received news of the start of the 14 April eruption over the radio (36%). A further 21% stated they heard about the commencement of the eruption via a family member, friend or neighbour. Survey respondents were more positive about the coordination of the evacuations (see Fig. 3), stating that the
planning was much improved from the 20 March eruption with better information.

The evacuation went better because of the experience from previous eruption.

You never know what will happen and it is good that people are together if something happens.

However, criticism still ensued in relation to the choice of evacuation centre for people living in Vestur-Eyjafjöll. Here, residents were required to evacuate to Heimaland, which is low-lying and considered to be vulnerable to jökulhlaup.

The planning was in general OK especially for Landeyjar. But the evacuation for Vestur-Eyjafjöll was not OK. It was a terrible mistake to evacuate to Heimaland, that place is not safe.

The potentially life threatening flood hazard subsided after 4–5 days. After that, the ash hazard and possible changes to the activity became more central to emergency response efforts. The eruption was producing very fine-grained ash ejected almost 10 km into the atmosphere (Gudmundsson et al. 2010) with extremely sharp and hard particles, justifying grave concerns for aircraft, as the ash had the ability to cause window and body abrasions as well as melt jet engines (Gislason et al. 2011). The summit eruption also produced lightning with a total of 790 strikes detected (Bennett et al. 2010), gas emissions, heavy sound blasts and lava flows reaching over 3 km down the slopes on the north side (Gudmundsson et al. 2012; Veðurstofa Íslands 2010). Linked to the thick ash layers deposited on the glacier and its foot hills, post-eruptive lahars and debris-flows repeatedly impacted rivers to the south of the crater (Jensen et al. 2013).

Already established communication links, which had been tested through regular exercises with London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC), ISAVIA, EUROCONTROL (European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation) and Toulouse VAAC, ensured IMO were better prepared to effectively communicate plume information to relevant international stakeholders. Nonetheless, improvements were made, including 3-hourly reports detailing plume activity for the use of international institutes and organisations and, joint daily reports from IMO

and IES (Karlsdóttir et al. 2010; Þorkelsson 2012), which served the use of DCPEM, the media and general public (see http://en.vedur.is/ earthquakes-and-volcanism/articles/nr/1884).

Other improvements included modifications to the IMO website, in order to enhance communication with the broader population. Launched on the second day of the summit eruption, additional pages containing relevant background and overview information were added to the website, alongside IMOs real-time monitoring data (Þorkelsson 2012). These were done 'in order to achieve the goal of being more flexible and communicative to the public, so guaranteeing its considerable educational value and ensuring the public trust in the IMO services' (Heiðarsson et al. 2014, p. 62).

Similarly, IES developed a designated webpage for the Eyjafjallajökull eruption as part of their website (see http://earthice.hi.is/eruption_eyjafjallajokull_2010). Here, the general public along with government officials and agencies were able to access timely data including status reports, satellite images and maps, GPS time series data, chemical composition analyses of rocks and ash, grain size distribution of ash, photos of the eruption, lahar reports and related academic publications. IES considered it essential to make this unpublished primary scientific data open to the public as soon as it was available, due to the international extent of Eyjafjallajökull's impacts (Þorkelsson 2012).

In addition to sharing information via their websites and through frequent meetings, IMO, IES and other institutions, e.g. DCPEM, ISAVIA, the Environmental Agency, Health Authorities, and ministries and embassies, communicated with external agencies and institutes via informal means such as phone conversations and emails (Þorkelsson 2012).

Based on the joint daily reports from IMO and IES, the NCCC media team produced daily (and sometimes multiple daily) reports in Icelandic and English on the eruption and conditions across the nation (Þorkelsson 2012). The first daily report was disseminated on 14 April 2010, with a standardised form of the joint reports adopted some days later, and continuing every
day during the summit eruption, after which the less frequently issued reports continued until 9 December 2010 (see http://www.sst.is/displayer.asp?cat_id=413).

In addition to posting on the DCPEM website, the reports were disseminated to government cabinets and ministries, foreign embassies located in Iceland. NGOs including the tourism sector and the Icelandic Red Cross, and media (Þorkelsson 2012). As well as detailing the physical status of the eruption, the reports included impacts on the local environment, impacts on the Icelandic population, response measures being implemented and recommendations for effected populations to consider. These reports were openly discussed with local residents at a Temporary Service Centre established in Heimaland to deal with the crisis, which is in close proximity to Eyjafjallajökull. Residents were encouraged to drop into the Heimaland Temporary Service Centre to attend meetings, ask for information or be provided a meal.

Some survey respondents and interviewees reported that these services were very helpful and trustworthy, while others who did not attend any meetings believed they had missed out on accessing some critical information. A branch of the Temporary Service Centre was later established in Vík in Mýrdal for the population east of the eruption since the main centre in Heimaland was too far for many residents to travel, especially in relation to the ongoing ash fall and resuspension. The DCPEM in conjunction with IMO and IES held meetings critical to local residents in Vík, as well as Heimaland, where concerned citizens were given the opportunity to discuss their worries associated with increasing activity.

Despite the plans and strategies that had been developed to deal with volcanic crises in Iceland, all agencies and organisations involved in disaster risk reduction were faced with an event that they had not previously experienced. Ad hoc procedures were therefore added to the processes already in place in order to deal with unanticipated events as they occurred. One resident stated "[The regional police chief] has done some

very good work in trying to make better plans with the residents.” Part of the developing plans included detailed site visits and close collaborations with the tourism industry.

In consideration of the impact the continuing eruption was having on the tourism industry, a special response team was established. Led by the Ministry of Industry and Tourism (now the Ministry of the Interior), this team met every morning during the eruption, and included people from the DCPEM, IMO, IES, tourism operators, airlines and public relations people from the ministries and municipalities. This group played an active role in crisis communication with the responsibility of disseminating information to tourists stranded in Iceland and offering alternative activities to them while they were waiting for flights out of the country.

The role of this group continued well after the eruption was over, with responsibility shifting from crisis communication to the promotion of Iceland through an advertisement campaign entitled 'Inspired by Iceland' in an effort to attract tourists back in the wake of the Eyjafjallajökull eruption. The special response team has also been active during other volcanic crises such as the 2011 Grímsvötn and 2014–15 Bárðarbunga-Holuhraun eruptions.

## 4.3 Impact on Local Residents

While the evacuation was effective in preventing loss of life and serious injury due to jökulhlaup, there were no immediate plans in place with respect to mitigating the impacts of ash (Bird and Gísladóttir 2012; Heiðarsson et al. 2014). And of all the various volcanogenic hazards impacting local communities, survey respondents and interviewees declared the ash caused the greatest concern. A considerable amount of ash was ejected during the eruption, with large amounts deposited and resuspended causing high levels of localised pollution (Gudmundsson et al. 2012; Thorsteinsson et al. 2012). Many survey respondents and interviewees commented on the resuspended ash, with one stating:
The impacts of the eruption are significant on my farm and at my neighbouring farms. It is very misleading and wrong description that the impacts were confined to Eyjafjöll...We still live with ash storm when the wind is blowing.

Air quality in Iceland, measured against the most commonly used health limit, was exceeded by orders of magnitude in local farming communities and villages during and after the Eyjafjallajökull eruption (Thorsteinsson et al. 2012). The health concerns among local residents (Bird and Gísladóttir 2012) were therefore justified, with resuspended ash proving to be of equal importance to that emitted from the volcano (Thorsteinsson et al. 2012). A study conducted by Carlsen et al. (2012) revealed that residents living in affected communities presented a highly increased prevalence of physical health conditions including tightness in the chest, coughing, phlegm, eye irritations and other respiratory problems.

Gissurardóttir (2015) found that residents with direct experience of and exposure to the Eyjafjallajökull eruption were also at greater risk of psychological morbidity in relation to mental distress and post-traumatic stress disorder. Survey respondents and interviewees noted the ongoing psychological impacts of the eruption and lack of crisis communication regarding health issues:

> The ash seems to impact people a lot. They get claustrophobic and become confused and many are not able to make logical decisions.

> The individual authorities' approach, such as those concerning health of residents, is reprehensible. Not enough consultation. No understanding on the psychological state of people [who were living under] ash fall and later ash storms for months. During the eruption, the area should have been evacuated – because it was sometimes uninhabitable there – but all tried to survive – many in a state of shock.

Supporting these comments, Gissurardóttir (2015) revealed the following factors as causes of psychological distress:

* Damage to personal property

* Feelings of insecurity during the eruption

* Being required to use protective equipment when working outside during the eruption

* Spending time outdoors in ash fall during the eruption due to work commitments or other duties

* Living in view of the eruption site

The impacted region was, and still is, an important agricultural region, with 15% of all cattle, 6% of all sheep, 17% of all horses and 12% of all dairy production in Iceland in 2010 (Farmers Association of Iceland 2010). Considering that animals are at a great risk of short and long-term mortality when they inhale or ingest fine ash particles (Lebon 2009; Wilson 2009; Wilson et al. 2011), it was understandable that the agricultural industry (Farmers Association of Iceland 2010) and local residents were gravely concerned about the health and wellbeing of their livestock (Bird and Gísladóttir 2012). Moreover, survey interviewees revealed that post-eruptive lahars and debris-flows also caused significant concern to farmers living south of the crater, where sediments were destroying infrastructure and agricultural land.

Thus, accurate, detailed and timely crisis communication was imperative in the lead up to and during the ongoing eruption, not only in relation to jökulhlaup risk but also covering the broad spectrum of impacts and well into the recovery phase.

## 4.4 Demand for Accurate and Timely Information

The demand for information during the Eyjafjallajökull eruption was unprecedented in Iceland, with communication and media relations suddenly evolving into a major component of the crisis operation (Guðmundsdóttir 2016). Without a doubt, the Eyjafjallajökull eruption dominated international media with the closure of transatlantic and European airspace causing tens of thousands of flights to be cancelled (Harris et al. 2012).

At the local level, the survey data shows that residents were actively using the IMO (Fig. 4)
<figure><img src="image_104.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4** Respondents’ use of the IMO website before, during and after the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruptions</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_105.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5** Respondents’ use of the DCPEM website before, during and after the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruptions</figcaption></figure>

and DCPEM (Fig. 5) websites up to several times per day during the Eyjafjallajökull eruption. The IES website, which was mostly in English but not streaming real-time data, was not used as actively by survey respondents (Fig. 6); however, it was considered a valuable resource at an international level. In the initial stages, these agencies were not prepared to meet this demand (Heiðarsson et al. 2014).

As Porkelsson (2012) points out, IMO did not and still does not have a designated press office

that can deal with a huge demand for crisis information yet they were faced with an enormous influx of requests, fielding calls from around 100 international reporters on just day two of the summit eruption. IES and DCPEM designated around 5–7 fulltime staff to work exclusively on dealing with the demand from international media (Porkelsson 2012).

Due to the demand for information, two media centres were opened under the supervision of DCPEM—one at NCCC in Reykjavík and a
<figure><img src="image_106.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 6** Respondents’ use of the IES website before, during and after the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruptions</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_107.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7** Respondents views towards the statements ‘information released by IMO/IES/DCPEM/police/rescue teams is reliable’</figcaption></figure>

Local Crisis Coordination Centre in Hvolsvöllur (Porkelsson 2012), which is the closest township to Eyjafjallajökull. With an overall aim to provide information with ‘one voice’, the teams based at each centre consisted of experts from DCPEM, ISAVIA, the Icelandic Coast Guard, Red Cross, the Icelandic Transport Authority, the

Icelandic Ministry for the Environment (currently entitled the Icelandic Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources), the Icelandic Road and Coastal Administration, ICE-SAR and others. Overall, survey respondents agreed that the information provided by the various agencies was reliable (Fig. 7).
Press conferences were held at both locations to help deal with the enormous interest in the event (Guðmundsdóttir 2016). In addition to distributing status reports, IMO and IES scientists were interviewed about facts and predictions of the continuing eruption, taking valuable time away from research and monitoring. Guðmundsdóttir (2016) reports, however, that many recognised this as an important part of their role as a scientist because media personnel will always be at the heart of the action and if an expert is not available for interview the media will seek information from anyone who is available and willing.

The National Broadcasting Service, ‘RÚV’ established a crisis-broadcasting studio in the NCCC media centre in Reykjavik enabling them to provide vital information to the Icelandic population (Heiðarsson et al. 2015). Other local news media, such as the ‘Fréttablaðið’ and ‘Morgunblaðið’ newspapers and the English newspaper ‘The Reykjavik Grapevine’ and magazine ‘Iceland Review’ also broadcasted news of the event via their traditional and online platforms.

Overall, the survey data suggests that residents’ more frequently turned to the various media platforms for information (Fig. 8) with television, radio and Internet as the preferred platforms, respectively. However, some respondents also indicated that they accessed

information from newspapers, books and information brochures. Once again, increased usage occurred during the eruption with many respondents accessing media sources several times per day (Fig. 9).

Even though survey respondents and interviewees indicated they trusted information from RÚV, they were overall critical of the media during the 2010 eruptions. When local residents were evacuated on 20 March 2010, the media were permitted to access and report from the evacuation zone. This incensed many survey respondents housed in the evacuation centres, where they watched live broadcasts from their evacuated farms, and in some instances, they hadn’t had time to lock their front doors. One survey interviewee summed up many people’s sentiment with the statement:

> Scientists and media people receive a pass to go into the risk area on their own responsibility. Why are they allowed to go into the risk area when others are not?

Survey interviewees also found it disturbing when the international media portrayed them as helpless victims, dramatizing the summit eruption without any consideration of how people were living their day-to-day lives through the event. For impact, the media sought farmers who were in a state of shock at the realisation of the destructiveness of the heavy ash fall and this angered neighbouring residents.

<figure><img src="image_108.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 8** Respondents usage of various sources for hazard information</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_109.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 9** Respondents’ use of media before, during and after the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption</figcaption></figure>

I also found that the media exaggerated when they were broadcasting news from the area. They described it as such that everything here was covered in ash, and the situation in the area disastrous, but it was absolutely not so. A bit “overdramatizing” if I use slang. And we heard about farmers that were tired of the continuous pressure from the media.

[The media] said that the situation was more severe than it was. The situation was worse in a specific area but not elsewhere. And sometimes the news was erroneous. Media people were too aggressive to the residents, soon after the eruption started.

Residents were also frustrated with the media stating that the Eyjafjallajökull eruptions were “a show and nothing in comparison to what Katla can do”. Residents living in close proximity are well aware of the potential hazards from a Katla eruption. However, this was the last thing they wanted to be reminded of while being impacted by ash fall, lightning, lahars and heavy sound blasts from Eyjafjallajökull’s summit eruption (Bird and Gísladóttir 2012). To the detriment of the overall aim of DCPEM, IMO and IES to provide ‘one voice’, Iceland’s president publicly stated: “you ain’t seen nothing yet” in relation to a Katla eruption (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/8631343.stm).

**5 Beyond Eyjafjallajökull 2010—Lessons Learnt and Improvements Made in an Unpredictable, Multi-hazard Environment**

The enormous workload generated by the Eyjafjallajökull eruptions cannot be denied. Considering Iceland’s limited size in terms of manpower and resources, these events placed tremendous pressure on all those working in volcanic crisis management (Guðmundsdóttir 2016; Þorkelsson 2012). Nevertheless, officials and scientists involved in the response made some great achievements under the circumstances, including:

* Pre-eruption risk communication, in particular at the town hall meetings, enabled trust to develop between emergency management officials and the general public, which increased the effectiveness of communication during the crisis.

* Timely evacuation advice and pre-existing trust led to the smooth evacuation of vulnerable populations during the summit eruption.
* Ad hoc modifications to the IMO, IES and DCPEM websites enhanced the availability of information to key stakeholders including the public.

* Good collaborations were maintained with external partners based on already established communication links.

* Establishment of a crisis information centre enabled local residents to access more detailed information and support.

* Establishment of two media centres, with one being in close proximity to the eruption site, met the enormous demands from local and international media and thus relieved pressure on agencies and institutes involved in the response.

* IMO and IES increased the dissemination of primary scientific data on the physical status of the eruption to meet the growing demand.

However, not all of these initiatives worked well for all those involved. While it was considered essential that unpublished primary scientific data was publicly open and accessible for operational use, some foreign researchers viewed this as an opportunity to use the data for their own research agendas and publications (Porkelsson 2012).

Furthermore, there was some criticism regarding the fact that before the 2010 events, response plans were only in place for jökulhlaup risk while other volcanogenic hazards had not been addressed accordingly (Bird and Gísladóttir 2012). During the eruption, residents were calling for more information about the ash impacts and what these meant to human and animal health in addition to advice on how to mitigate the adverse effects. The need to adopt an all-hazards approach was again apparent during the 2014–15 Bárðarbunga-Holuhraun eruption when poisonous gases were the main cause of health concerns. Since the 2014–15 Bárðarbunga-Holuhraun eruption, NCIP and DCPEM for south Iceland are engaging with local communities in the development of all-hazards crisis management plans. Such engagement invites opportunities to enhance collaboration and communication prior to unrealised events occurring.

Despite these efforts to improve communications and instil learnings internally and externally with key stakeholders (Heiðarsson et al. 2015), more work is needed at the local and national level. For example, as formal guidelines for volcanic crisis communication were not in place prior to March 2010, officials were forced to develop ad hoc strategies during the Eyjafjallajökull eruption. Despite this experience, formal guidelines have not been established.

However, Guðmundsdóttir (2016) postulates a tentative guideline for best practice volcanic crisis communication based on officials’ perspectives of the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull, 2011 Grímsvötn and 2014–15 Bárðarbunga-Holuhraun eruptions. These are:

1. Integrating communication into the management process

2. Cooperating at an institutional level

3. Coordinating messages

4. Providing truthful, honest and transparent information

5. Communicating in a proactive way

6. Being accessible and having a good relationship with the media

7. Understanding, informing and cooperating with the audience

8. Improvising if necessary

9. Planning, preparing, documenting the crisis communication

A key underlying theme here is that all officials worked together through mutual respect and understanding, so as to provide crisis communication via ‘one voice’. To achieve this, Donovan and Oppenheimer (2012) highlight the importance of building and maintaining relationships well before a volcanic crisis ensues. The hazard and risk assessments, development of response plans and engagement of locals in these efforts in the years prior to the 2010 eruption are an excellent example of that approach.

Heiðarsson et al. (2014) also highlights the importance of the science sector providing clear and consistent messaging that is backed up by all government and non-government stakeholders. This is one of many key lessons that have been
documented and investigated through the FUTUREVOLC project. FUTUREVOLC (http://futurevolc.hi.is/), financed by the European Union's Seventh Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration under grant agreement No 308377, was established following the Eyjafjallajökull eruption and has continued while other events and volcanic crises have taken place, e.g. seismic unrest in Bárðarbunga throughout 2014 and the 2014–15 Bárðarbunga-Holuhraun eruption (Heiðarsson et al. 2015).

After the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, IMO and IES began collaborating on a catalogue of Icelandic volcanoes, financed by ICAO. The work was then linked to the FUTUREVOLC project. The aim was to gather all the information electronically in an online catalogue, now available at (http://icelandicvolcanoes.is/), to improve public and official understanding of the current state of Iceland's volcanoes. The catalogue provides descriptions of the geological and tectonic setting of each volcano along with eruption history, characteristics and associated hazards, activity status, monitoring, and possible eruption scenarios. The catalogue has a strong emphasis on ash hazards and impacts, as it is designed with the needs of aviation for rapid information at times of potential crises. It is therefore not comprehensive when it comes to other hazards; e.g. information on flood hazards or air pollution is not extensive, and at present it does not contain information on response or disaster risk reduction plans. The catalogue is written in English, somewhat reducing its potential usefulness for local populations. The aim, however, is to develop an Icelandic version and to include all information and results from the ongoing long-term volcanic risk assessment program for Iceland.

While local residents are, in general, aware of the risks and emergency response procedures associated with a volcanic eruption in southern Iceland (Bird et al. 2009, 2011; Jóhannesdóttir 2005; Jóhannesdóttir and Gísladóttir 2010), tourists are not (Bird et al. 2010; Bird and Gísladóttir 2014). Although volcanic risk awareness among tourists appeared heightened during the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, it did not

result in them seeking more information on safety strategies (Lund et al. 2010).

Since the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, tourism has rapidly grown in all regions across Iceland. Tourism currently accounts for more foreign exchange income than any other industry in Iceland, with employment in tourism-related industries increasing more than in any other sector of the economy (Óladóttir 2015). This growth is expected to continue in the coming years.

Increased tourism, however, ultimately leads to increases in the number of tourists exposed to risks associated with volcanic eruptions. Initiatives like the Catalogue of Icelandic Volcanoes and the introduction of real-time alerts in English using social media and text messaging are aimed at enhancing awareness among international visitors to Iceland (Heiðarsson et al. 2015). However, there is currently little evidence as to whether or not these initiatives are successfully inciting risk reduction behaviours.

The experience gained from the Eyjafjallajökull eruption is important and the immediate crisis communication strategies were effective in promoting the successful evacuation of local residents. However, the ash fall problems illustrated the need for necessary precautions and broadly defined preparedness strategies in order to increase the resilience of affected communities. This need for resilience is not confined to the local population, but also includes the ever-increasing number of tourists who visit Iceland and who engage in activities around Iceland's active volcanoes.

**Acknowledgements** All interviewees and respondents are graciously thanked for their willingness to participate in the survey. Contributions from the Ash Fall Impacts Working Group, Katharine Haynes, Carolina Garcia Londoño and Guðrún Pétursdóttir are appreciated in relation to the development of the questionnaire. The two anonymous reviewers are also thanked for providing invaluable recommendations that helped improve the manuscript from the original. The preparation of this paper has been supported by the Nordic Centre of Excellence for Resilience and Societal Security—NORDRESS, which is funded by the Nordic Societal Security Programme. Þórdis Högnadóttir helped with the preparation of Fig. 1 and Ísólfur Gylfi Pálmason prepared population data for Rangáþing eystra.
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# Supporting the Development of Procedures for Communications During Volcanic Emergencies: Lessons Learnt from the Canary Islands (Spain) and Etna and Stromboli (Italy)

M.C. Solana, S. Calvari, C.R.J. Kilburn, H. Gutierrez, D. Chester and A. Duncan

## Abstract

Volcanic crises are complex and especially challenging to manage. Volcanic unrest is characterised by uncertainty about whether an eruption will or will not take place, as well as its possible location, size and evolution. Planning is further complicated by the range of potential hazards and the variety of disciplines involved in forecasting and responding to volcanic emergencies. Effective management is favoured at frequently active volcanoes, owing to the experience gained through the repeated ‘testing’ of systems of communication. Even when plans have not been officially put in place, the groups involved tend to have an understanding of their roles and responsibilities and those of others. Such experience is rarely available at volcanoes that have been quiescent for several generations. Emergency responses are less effective, not only because of uncertainties about the volcanic system itself, but also because scientists, crisis directors, managers and the public are inexperienced in volcanic unrest. In such situations, tensions and misunderstandings result in poor communication and have the potential to affect decision making

M.C. Solana (✉)

School of Earth and Environmental Sciences,
University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth PO1 2UP, UK
e-mail: Carmen.solana@port.ac.uk

M.C. Solana

Instituto Volcanológico de Canarias (INVOLCAN),
Antiguo Hotel Taoro, Parque Taoro, 22, 38400
Puerto de La Cruz, Tenerife, Spain

S. Calvari

INGV, Piazza Roma 2, 95125 Catania, Italy

C.R.J. Kilburn

UCL Hazard Centre, Department of Earth Sciences,
University College London, Gower Street, London
WC1E 6BT, UK

H. Gutierrez

Servicio de Protección Civil Y Atención de
Emergencias, Gobierno de Canarias, Carretera de La
Esperanza Km 0,8 Edf. Ceplam, 38071 Tenerife,
Spain

D. Chester

Department of Geography and Environmental
Science, Liverpool Hope University, Hope Park,
Liverpool L16 9JD, UK

D. Chester · A. Duncan

Department of Geography and Planning, University
of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, UK
and delay vital operations. Here we compare experiences on communicating information during crises on volcanoes reawakening after long repose (El Hierro in the Canary Islands) and in frequent eruption (Etna and Stromboli in Sicily). The results provide a basis for enhancing communication protocols during volcanic emergencies.

Keywords

Communication • Volcano • Emergencies • Canary islands • Etna • Stromboli

# 1 Introduction

Volcanic crises are complex to manage, owing to uncertainty in the behaviour of volcanoes and of the people and organisations responding to an emergency. Complexity is especially acute at volcanoes showing unrest after long intervals of repose, from several decades to centuries. In such cases, the infrequency of eruptions, and consequent lack of data on the volcanic system, introduces a high level of uncertainty in forecasts of eruptions and their hazards. In addition, few if any of the responding authorities—from monitoring scientists to civil protection agencies and governmental bodies—may have had direct experience of volcanic behaviour. As a result, prepared response plans are either non-existent or tend to be based on generic procedures designed to cover the legal requirements established by the host country for such contingencies. The different authorities may also have been brought together for the first time to address an emergency. In combination, inexperience in the scientific and managerial aspects of a crisis, the absence of a specific response plan and the lack of previous interaction between scientists and emergency managers (and even between scientists of different disciplines) can produce levels of tension among personnel that impair communications between key responders and the quality and timing of the decisions being made (Fiske 1984; Voight 1988a, 1990; Aspinall et al. 2002; Solana and Spiller 2007; Solana et al. 2008; Barclay et al. 2008; McGuire et al. 2009).

The notion to establish professional guidelines for responding to volcanic emergencies has been discussed since at least the 1970s (Tazieff 1977; Bostok 1978; Sigvaldason 1978; Barberi and Gasparini 1979; Fiske 1979; Tomblin 1979). Two decades later, the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior (IAVCEI) published a set of recommendations for the conduct of scientists during volcanic crises (IAVCEI et al. 1999). The recommendations emphasized that emergency responses are optimized by effective teamwork and the presentation by scientists to non-specialists of a unified and objective evaluation of volcanic unrest and its possible outcomes. Although appealing in theory, the recommendations are not binding and have been followed only erratically in practice. An example is the response to the 2011–1012 eruption of El Hierro, in the Canary Islands, which occurred after more than 200 years of repose. Following the El Hierro crisis, the Spanish Civil Protection agency identified the need to develop protocols to enable better communication of information between scientists and with emergency responders and local governmental agencies and argued that these should be integrated into regional emergency planning. This paper presents the experience gained during the crisis and describes how protocols have been designed and the factors that have hindered their development. It also highlights good practice and the importance of building on the experience gained from communicating information about eruptions at frequently active volcanoes, using emergencies from Etna and Stromboli.
## 2 Communications During a Volcanic Crisis

Good communication plays a key role in managing a volcanic emergency effectively (Peterson 1988; Tilling 1989; Solana and Spiller 2007; Solana et al. 2008; McGuire et al. 2009; Doyle et al. 2011). Three common obstacles to good communication are: (1) differences in the organisational cultures with which responders are familiar (2) uncertainty in forecasting volcanic behaviour, and (3) inexperience of addressing volcanic unrest. The potential of these factors to diminish efficient communication is rarely appreciated before an emergency begins and this, in turn, favours poor decisions being made under the conditions of high stress during volcanic unrest (McGuire et al. 2009).

### 2.1 Organisational Cultures

Emergency responses normally require collaboration between academic scientists and the civil authorities. These two groups work in institutions with contrasting organisational cultures. As identified by Handy (1978), academics, scientists and researchers have primarily individualistic personalities. Their association in groups (e.g., universities, research centres or teams) is commonly for personal convenience and to facilitate the advance of individuals in their field of study. Academics do not “willingly take orders [...] or compromise on their own plans” (Handy 1978, p. 39) and are rarely forced to do so by their organisations (Handy 1978). As a result, academic decisions on, for example, the amount and type of information to be communicated during an emergency, normally have to be agreed on an individual basis. This process, although democratic, makes management and decision making through consensus very difficult and time consuming. It is not surprising, therefore, that the key recommendations of IAVCEI et al. (1999)—to value different expertises and approaches equally, to share

information and logistical resources and to work as a team that speaks with a single voice and rewards self-sacrifice—are not always adopted by individuals during emergencies, especially those without previous experience of a volcanic crisis. This was illustrated by an informal survey in 2013 among participants of an international project on volcanic unrest in Europe and Latin-America (Fig. 1). The 21 interviewees represented 12 countries and scientists with different levels of seniority, 15 of which had experience responding or being involved directly or indirectly in 3 or more volcanic crisis. Of these 21 experts, 13 recognised personal ego and individual interests as the main barriers to communications between scientists during volcanic emergencies (Fig. 1).

The individualistic attitudes of many academic scientists contrast sharply with the culture of the civil authorities who are in charge of a crisis. Emergency managers are typically civil servants who work in a hierarchy designed to help their organisation achieve its goals. Individual ideas are rarely expressed except as part of agreed policy (Handy 1978). Managers are thus used to responding to information that has already been agreed by expert advisers and are usually reluctant to engage in evaluating diverging opinions or uncertainty in forecasts of a volcano's behaviour (Solana et al. 2008). Academic debate may therefore be perceived as indecision among experts and so raise questions about the quality of scientific advice being received. As a result, essential information from the advising scientists may not be communicated effectively to the emergency managers.

### 2.2 Uncertainty

Expressions of uncertainty may be perceived as indecision and so hinder the communication of scientific information. A common example is the delivery of eruption forecasts. Forecasts contain numerous sources of uncertainty because of the natural variations in the behaviour of magmatic
<figure><img src="image_110.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** Results from an informal survey of 21 volcanologists during the “Scientific advice, decision-making and risk communication” Vuelco meeting in 2013 (Solana and Fearnley 2013). *Left*, “Personal aspects” include personality, ego, personal interest, visibility, status. “Scientific/academic aspects” include ownership of data, publishing pressure, career progression. “Institutional aspects” include legal frameworks of institutions,</figcaption></figure>

institutional status and agreed responsibilities. “Others” include lack of experience, uncertainty, culture, discipline rivalry. *Right*, Aspects of personal interaction include frequent face to face contact, joint experience in crisis, moderator/expert elicitation methods, grouping all teams together. Legal framework aspects include legalised protocols or rules, pre-agreements for data sharing

systems Marzocchi et al. (2012) and incomplete understanding of a specific volcano (e.g. Doyle et al. 2014) or incomplete data sets from research monitoring networks, especially emergency networks installed after the first signs of unrest. Even when appropriate monitoring is in place, uncertainty remains as to whether unrest will lead to an eruption or intrusion, because both are associated with similar changes in precursory signal (Tilling 1989). Such uncertainty is compounded when monitoring data are contradictory (e.g., increases in geochemical indicators which do not correlate with seismic or deformation data) and can lead to critical delays in forecasting and decision making with fatal consequences, as seen in Mt. Ontake in Japan, where a sudden eruption in September 27, 2014 surprised scientists monitoring the volcano and killed 23 people (Oskin 2014). Eruptions may also occur without detected precursory unrest, such as the so-called “silent” 2004 eruption at Mount Etna in Sicily (Burton et al. 2005) and the “passive” eruptions described for Kilauea in Hawaii (Bell and Kilburn 2011).

To aid the communication of uncertainty, several methodologies have been developed for evaluating the probabilities of an eruption,

including Bayesian statistics and expert elicitation (e.g. Newhall and Hoblitt 2002; Aspinall et al. 2003; Marti et al. 2008; Marzocchi et al. 2008; Marzocchi and Bebbington 2012; Sobradelo et al. 2015), as well as the incorporation of deterministic models (Voight 1988b; Kilburn and Voight 1998; De La Cruz-Reyna and Reyes-Davila 2001; Kilburn 2003, 2012). On their own, however, probabilities are open to different interpretations by scientists and civil authorities and agreement on its meaning might not be reached.

As discussed by Doyle et al. (2011), communicating information does not necessarily have to imply that a consensus has been reached or that uncertainty is lacking, but it is imperative that all such issues are conveyed using appropriate language and with an understanding of the scientific culture of groups involved in advising decision makers. Thus, the civil authorities can favour methods other than probabilities for receiving forecasts (Solana et al. 2008), such as preferred time windows (Swanson et al. 1983), precursory scenarios and comparison with uncertainties associated with events that are locally more familiar. Overall, information will
generally be more effectively communicated when presented in a form preferred by the recipient rather than imposed by the sender.

## 2.3 Inexperience

Lack of experience compounds poor communication due to different organisational cultures and the presentation of scientific information. Experience is gained not only through repeated exposure to volcanic unrest, but also by learning from mistakes. Admitting that mistakes have been made tends to be associated with failure and so not to be recorded. Notable exceptions reflecting on the management of volcanic crisis are Voight (1988a, 1990) on Nevado del Ruiz, Fiske (1984) on St. Vincent and Guadeloupe or Aspinall et al. (2002) in Montserrat. Reluctant recording is especially damaging to responses at volcanoes reawakening after long repose where the inherent uncertainty on the behaviour of volcanic system is highest. By virtue of the long repose intervals, few teams or individuals have the opportunity to respond more than once to such an emergency during their professional careers. The benefit of experience strongly depends, therefore, on published accounts of previous events. When accounts focus only on the successful aspects of a response, a false impression may be conveyed that mistakes are rare; and teams may also minimise the role played by good fortune rather than clear judgement Newhall and Punongbayan (1996). As a result, inexperienced teams may undervalue the potential difficulties in responding to an emergency and so unnecessarily repeat mistakes from the past. Global circumstances today are particularly acute, given the gap of nearly 25 years since the last large, VEI 6 eruption (Pinatubo in 1991) and more than 30 years has elapsed since the last volcanic disaster involving tens of thousands of deaths Chester et al. (2000) i.e. the 1984 eruption of Nevado del Ruiz in Colombia (Voight 1990). Based on statistics from the past 200 years (Siebert et al. 2010), at least half the volcanoes in eruption during the next century are expected to reawaken after a repose interval of 100 years or more. The scientists and officials responsible for

managing an emergency will have no experience of the particular volcano's behaviour and, possibly, little or no direct experience of responding to volcanic eruptions in general.

The 2011–2012 unrest and eruption of El Hierro illustrates how communication during an emergency can be hampered by inexperience, organisational culture and forecasting uncertainty Marrero et al. (2015), Carracedo et al. (2015). This example is compared below with methods that have been developed at Italy's frequently-erupting volcanoes Etna and Stromboli. Together, the case studies indicate best-practice methods for maintaining good communications when responding to volcanic unrest.

# 3 Case Studies

## 3.1 Communications During the 2011–2012 Eruption of El Hierro, Canary Islands

Since the 1990s, the Canary Islands have been recognised as a high-risk volcanic area by the international scientific community. In particular, Mt Teide on Tenerife was selected as a UN-IDNDR decade volcano as well as a EU laboratory volcano. Nevertheless, the long return period of eruptions has encouraged a low perception of volcanic risk among national and local authorities and, hence, a reactive attitude to planning for volcanic emergencies is also evident. An indication of the low priority given to the threat of volcanic activity has been the government's under-investment in a multidisciplinary monitoring system for volcanic activity (Marti et al. 2009). For example, despite a general scientific call for an appropriate monitoring network during the 2004 seismo-volcanic crisis on Tenerife (Salomone 2004), little was invested until the 2011 unrest at El Hierro, when a comprehensive geophysical network was deployed there (López et al. 2012). Initiatives to rationalise and coordinate volcanic research in the region have also lacked economic support. For example, the creation of a comprehensive Volcanological Institute on the Canaries was demanded by the
Spanish Senate in 2005, the Parliament of the Canaries in 2006 and the Spanish Congress in 2009; even so, the only initiative to produce an open and inclusive research group on the islands received only limited funding from the local council in Tenerife and had instead to be created as a commercial entity.

The lack of preparedness was highlighted in 2011, when El Hierro, the westernmost and youngest island in the Canaries, entered eruption in October for the first time in recorded history. It was also the first eruption in the Canaries in 40 years. After four months of low magnitude seismic activity frequently felt by the population, together with enhanced diffuse emissions of CO2 and H2S (Pérez et al. 2012) and continuous surface and ground deformation which reached a maximum of 5 cm (López et al. 2012), an eruption was confirmed off the island's southern coast (Fig. 2). Being submarine, the eruption did not cause personal or material damage, but had an important impact on the small local businesses as well as causing anxiety and insecurity to some of the local population, as is clear on the concerns voiced in the media and directly through the digital version of the local newspaper, *Diario del Hierro* (www.diarioelhierro.com).

The legal context of the Canary Islands is important in framing some of the scientific issues that arose during the crisis. Although constitutional relationships between metropolitan Spain and the Canaries (and Spanish law more

generally) are complex and beyond the scope of the present paper, a general statement of the key issues is presented next. The Canary Islands are a region of Spain with a special political status which allows them a level of self-determination and government in many areas of policy. The Civil Protection is one of the organisations with relative independence and can plan for and manage local and regional emergencies, though within an overall framework of laws approved by the central Spanish Government. Despite legislation requesting a specific plan for volcanic emergencies in Canaries since 1996, the first protocol to respond to an emergency was created as a response to the seismo-volcanic crisis of 2004 in Tenerife (Salomone 2004; PEVOLCA 2010).

Within this legal framework, in 2008 the Canarian Civil Protection produced a plan for volcanic emergencies known as PEVOLCA, Plan de Emergencias Volcanicas de Canarias (Volcanic Emergencies Plan for the Canaries). The plan was approved in 2010 and established which groups would form the scientific advisory committee and their roles and responsibilities. The original 2004 protocol recommended that the scientific committee be comprised of representatives from most of the local and national scientific institutions involved in volcanic research and monitoring in the Canaries. However, the 2010 PEVOLCA plan instead established a scientific advisory committee consisting of the National Geographical Institute (IGN), the

<figure><img src="image_111.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** The island of El Hierro, its position within the Canary Islands (inset) and the location of the offshore 2011 eruption (star). The village of La Restinga (pop. 600) is marked with an open circle</figcaption></figure>
Spanish National Research Centre (CSIC), the National Meteorological Agency (AEMET) and the Civil Protection. This selection created much ill feeling amongst local scientific institutions, which could only participate in the scientific advisory committee meetings by invitation. It also had important implications for the local groups, which, in the absence of a formal role during the emergency, were left in a vulnerable legal position when their staff provided scientific advice and, without specific funding, were placed in financial difficulty when participating in committee meetings.

When the PEVOLCA plan was activated during the 2011–2012 El Hierro emergency, the Civil Protection invited all the principal volcanological research groups to the scientific advisory committee. It soon became apparent that the groups were not readily sharing all the available data, so the Civil Protection authority was eventually forced to act as a mediator. Independently-funded institutions and also groups funded through research projects argued that their data were not public and did not belong to the State. Ill feeling also developed because of the lack of access to resources, such as boats and helicopters for monitoring, and also data: for example, the establishment of an exclusion zone including the eruption site and its surroundings, meant that regular sampling was much easier for members of the Scientific Advisory Committee than it was for other groups. The six-month duration of the crisis also highlighted differences in funding between the formal monitoring group (IGN), that could rely on public funds for their continuous presence on the island and other monitoring groups, which struggled to meet their overheads.

In addition to the PEVOLCA scientists, researchers from other national and international research organisations temporarily joined in monitoring, sampling and research and some occasionally publicized their opinions in the local and national media. Although the majority of opinions were not especially controversial, some of the more speculative comments on the potential evolution of the crisis and the eruption, did create concern within the scientific groups who had followed the crisis from the beginning

as well as some of the local population (see news comments at www.diarioelhierro.com).

## 3.2 Lessons Learned on Communications During Recent Eruptions of Etna and Stromboli, Italy

Frequently eruptions at a volcano favour the development of reliable monitoring and efficient communications among scientists, the Civil Protection and the public. Etna and Stromboli (Fig. 3a), for example, have permanent, multidisciplinary monitoring systems which enable precursory signals to be detected and recognised well in advance of an eruption (Bonaccorso et al. 2004; Patané et al. 2004; Puglisi et al. 2004; Martini et al. 2007; Bertolaso et al. 2008a, b; Rizzo et al. 2008; Tarchi et al. 2008; Calvari et al. 2010, 2011; Di Traglia et al. 2014). In addition, the responsibilities of the monitoring scientists have been clearly identified by the Italian Government and Civil Protection authorities. The latter funds monitoring networks and has frequent direct contact with the scientists in charge of coordinating the monitoring (Bertolaso et al. 2008b).

Legal responsibility for volcano and earthquake monitoring in Italy rests with the INGV (Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia). The Civil Protection (DPC, Dipartimento della Protezione Civile) funds not just the INGV, but also university teams that may duplicate or complement the data collected by the INGV. The university teams (called Centri di Competenza or Centres of Expertise) share data and ideas with the INGV and DPC during volcanic crises. Although the number of university personnel is much smaller than for the INGV (several tens compared with 800), the duplication of data from different teams allows alternative interpretations that encourages a more complete view of the phenomena being monitored. During the last fifteen years, implementation of this system has produced well-established and efficient management procedures for responding to crises at both Etna and Stromboli (Bertolaso et al. 2008b;
<figure><img src="image_112.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3** a Google Map displaying southern Italy, with Stromboli volcano (red circle) at the NE end of the Aeolian Archipelago, and Etna volcano just N of Catania, on the East flank of Sicily. The yellow square displays the area magnified in b. b Google map of the eastern flank of Etna volcano, comprising the summit craters, the Valle del Bove depression with the 1991–1993 lava flow field (in red), and the position of Zafferana Etnea town. The white dotted line at the end of the lava flow field shows the position of the earth dam built up in January 1992.</figcaption></figure>

The *yellow square* displays the area magnified in c. c View from East of Etna's eastern flank displaying the Summit Craters, the Valle del Bove, and the position of Zafferana town. Photo by Alfio Amantia, taken from helicopter on 23 December 1991, a few days after the start of the eruption. The *yellow square* displays the area magnified in d. d Photo by Alfio Amantia, taken from helicopter on 5 January 1992, showing the earth dam built up at the exit of the Valle del Bove, with several trucks working on its top, and a large lava flow approaching to it
Bonaccorso et al. 2015). Even under such favourable conditions, however, communications during a crisis can be very challenging when a population is directly threatened, as illustrated by the 1991–1993 eruption on Etna (Barberi and Villari 1994; Calvari et al. 1994) and the 2002–2003 activity on Stromboli (Calvari et al. 2005, 2006; Bertolaso et al. 2008a).

When the safety of people is involved, considerable pressure is placed on the scientists from both the population and government agencies, specifically to analyse data and provide information and forecasts quickly, which diminishes both productivity and efficiency. Data sharing and discussion of differing interpretations is of paramount importance, but the scientific community and Civil Protection must provide an agreed interpretation if they are to keep the trust of the population. The 1991–1993 flank eruption at Etna volcano (Fig. 3b) produced the largest compound lava flow field of the last three centuries, with ~250 million m³ of lava being emplaced along the southern margin of the barren Valle del Bove (VDB) on the eastern flank of the volcano (Calvari et al. 1994; Stevens et al. 1997). From there it approached the village of Zafferana Etnea (Fig. 3b, c), about 9 km from the eruptive fissure (Calvari et al. 1994). The eruption started on 14 December 1991 and, after an initial effusive phase during which the lava rapidly spread within the VDB, the Government decided to build an earthen barrier, 21 m high and 234 m long, across a narrow exit from the valley (Fig. 3b–d) in order to confine the lava and protect Zafferana Etnea (Barberi and Villari 1994). The barrier was completed on January 1st 1992 (Barberi and Villari 1994, Fig. 3d) and worked effectively for three months until April 7th 1992. However, the growth of lava tubes within the lava flow field significantly increased the potential of the lava to spread down slope (Calvari and Pinkerton 1998), and resulted in lava piling up behind and then spilling over the barrier to advance towards Zafferana Etnea (Calvari et al. 1994; Calvari and Pinkerton 1998).

At this stage, the people of Zafferana Etnea were seriously concerned for their safety, because they could observe the lava flows advancing

towards their homes, less than 2 km away. Mistrust of the authorities spread among the population, especially when the first attempts to divert the lava (initially carried out at the lower end of the lava flow field) were unsuccessful. This was reinforced by the attention given by the local and national media to differing opinions expressed by scientists and Civil Protection officials over the best solutions to apply to divert the lava. Disagreements were amplified by the media, thus increasing suspicions, doubts and distrust (Barberi and Villari 1994). The population exerted pressure through their elected representatives to halt attempts for changing the course of the lava (e.g., with the use of bombs and destruction of forests) and public trust started to return only after daily meetings between scientists and the population were organised, with additional information being released by radio and television (Barberi et al. 1993; Barberi and Villari 1994; Barberi and Carapezza 2004). At the daily meetings the scientists explained “step by step” and justified what they were doing (Barberi and Villari 1994). Strangely, trust in and esteem for the scientists did not grow even when the safety of Zafferana Etnea was assured by the successful diversion of lava from a location closer to the eruptive fissure, because the attention of the media by then had already moved on to other, more dramatic topics (Barberi and Villari 1994), so highlighting the important role of the media in influencing public perception.

Ten years later, during a major flank eruption in 2002–2003, information to both the media and the population were communicated, not only by radio and television, but also through the internet, where maps, reports, photos and data were continually updated. The collaboration between scientists working for different institutions and universities (even from different countries) proved essential to understand and model eruptive processes, mitigate risks and obtain the best possible results (Bonaccorso et al. 2015). Following this eruption, a key priority was to produce prompt hazard assessment and develop expertise in the modelling of lava flows within the INGV. This was achieved through projects funded by the Italian Government and the DPC.
Since then, communities on Etna have become involved in the monitoring effort by reporting information on any ash fall to the monitoring room of the INGV's Etna Observatory in Catania. They have also been invited to collaborate with ash sampling, thus allowing a unique and extensive sample collection of the several lava fountain episodes spreading ash over a large area (~30 km wide and over 200 km long) on and beyond the eastern flank of the volcano (Andronico et al. 2008). This collaboration has increased public understanding of eruptive events and served to increase trust in the work of scientists.

During Etna's 2002–2003 eruption, the INGV had simultaneously to face a volcanic crisis at Stromboli, the most active of the Aeolian Islands about 60 km to the north (Fig. 3a). The start of this eruption was marked by a tsunami that injured three people and caused damage along the coastal area of the island (Tinti et al. 2003). The tsunami was triggered by submarine and subaerial landslides (Bonaccorso et al. 2003) and was soon followed by the opening of an eruptive fissure with lava flowing down the north flank of the island to the sea for several months (Calvari et al. 2005). While lava was still pouring out from the fissure, the summit crater produced a very large explosion (Calvari et al. 2006; Bonaccorso et al. 2012) that damaged houses and buildings in nearby villages and triggered fires on vegetated slopes. The Civil Protection responded rapidly, building an observatory (COA, Centro Operativo Avanzato) where all the monitoring signals from the INGV and other universities were received (Bertolaso et al. 2008a). These monitoring networks were greatly expanded and improved using special financial support from the Civil Protection Authority. Daily meetings were organized between academic and INGV scientists and the Civil Protection to enable data comparison and sharing, and this resulted in a much deeper understanding of the volcanic activity (Calvari et al. 2008). The knowledge of the volcanic system was also greatly improved because of the funds and research projects initiated by the DPC (Bertolaso et al. 2008a). Since the monitoring of Stromboli was shared between INGV and other institutions, such as the Universities of Florence

and Rome (Bertolaso et al. 2008a), the communication of scientific results to the population and the media was strictly controlled by the Civil Protection in order to avoid disseminating divergent or contrasting points of view.

When the eruption started, 400 inhabitants were informed of the possibility of tsunamis, and 330 spontaneously decided to leave the island. Access to the island was temporarily denied, except to monitoring scientists, volcanological guides, The Civil Protection and authorized journalists. Although implemented for safety reasons, the exclusion created ill feelings amongst a team of academic scientists not involved in monitoring, who were prevented access for sampling the erupted products. The Italian Civil Protection addressed this problem by sharing a number of samples between the monitoring and the academic teams. The population returned of their own accord two months later, and within three months from the start of the eruption the island was reopened to tourists.

Initially, a conflict between the local population and the media arose, caused by the fear that dramatic information on the activity of this volcano would scare away tourists and damage the local economy (Bertolaso et al. 2008a). To maintain a high level of awareness of volcanic hazards amongst the local population and to provide guidance on personal safety, the DPC has since annually published and distributed leaflets before the start of the tourist season. However, this basic information has not been welcomed by the whole of the local population, again because of concerns of reducing tourism.

## 4 General Aspects of the Development of a Protocol for the Communication, Management and Use of Scientific Information During Volcanic Emergencies in Canaries

The experience gained at Etna, Stromboli and El Hierro reinforce the findings from other volcanoes (e.g., Peterson 1988; Tilling 1989; Solana et al. 2008; McGuire et al. 2009; Doyle et al.
2011) that clear procedures for the sharing, discussion and communication of scientific information are crucial for the effective management of volcanic emergencies, especially on volcanoes with long periods of repose, where uncertainty about the volcanic systems are greatest.

In the Canaries, the Civil Protection has proposed that a new Scientific Committee for the Assessment and Surveillance of Volcanic Phenomena (CSEV) be created as an inclusive committee for the study and analysis of seismo-volcanic risk. This committee will be coordinated by the Civil Protection and consist of representatives from each of the groups within the formal advisory committee of PEVOLCA, as well as from each of the local universities and research centres. External advisors may also be appointed at the discretion of the coordinator.

CSEV's aims and objectives are:

* to identify possible precursory phenomena to eruptions in the Canary Islands;

* to assess data obtained from monitoring networks and instruments;

* to produce forecasts of volcanic activity and the consequences for the Civil Protection Authorities;

* to establish a methodology for monitoring *during* volcanic eruptions, for evaluating data and for formulating hypotheses about the likelihood and potential impact of an eruption.

To avoid the difficulties encountered during the El Hierro crisis, CSEV has further established a series of regulations that must be satisfied for participation:

* the requirement to sign an agreement to obey the rules of the committee;

* the use of information and data must be shared by committee members exclusively to advise the Civil Protection (and not for personal or institutional gain);

* the selection of one representative from each group by democratic procedures;

* compulsory attendance at sessions of the committee;

* the need to produce and submit written reports two days before scheduled meetings with information on forecasts, eruption scenarios and their associated probabilities;

* following debate and discussion of data, the need to reach a consensus and produce a written document on the situation or, if a consensus is not reached, the basis for different interpretations should be clearly noted and explained;

* confidentiality and coordination in the dissemination of information about the results and of debates held within meetings.

## 5 Discussion

The challenges and successes presented in this paper emphasize the varied nature of communication problems that have been encountered in recent crises and the lessons that can be learned. A summary of selected information from these crises is presented in Table 1.

The eruption of El Hierro in 2011 provided the best possible scenario for an eruption from the management point of view. The eruption occurred offshore, meaning that no lives were seriously threatened or property damaged; it affected a sparsely populated area (El Hierro has a population of ca. 10,000, the smallest in the Canary Islands) and hence involved an easily manageable number of people; and it displayed several weeks of increasing precursory activity which permitted emergency arrangements to be put in place. Moreover, a plan to manage volcanic crises was in place before the eruption and therefore, while the scientific management of the crisis presented challenges, the operational management of the crisis ran smoothly. Good fortune certainly helped the smooth operation and, had the 2011 eruption occurred inland, or with brief precursory signals, the consequences might have been more serious.

The difficulties in scientific management stemmed mainly from a non-inclusive policy established by the national government, lack of experience, differences in organisational cultures,
<table><caption>**Table 1** Summary of selected characteristics of the case studies, good practice actions and lessons learnt</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>El Hierro 2011–2012</th><th>Etna 1991–1993</th><th>Etna 2002–2003</th><th>Stromboli 2002–2003</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Previous VE plan</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Previous experience in the volcanic system</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Understanding of the volcanic system</td><td>Low</td><td>High</td><td>High</td><td>High</td></tr><tr><td>Direct threat to life/property</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Previous experience on VE</td><td>Some (1 previous)</td><td>High</td><td>High</td><td>High</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Good practice key points</td><td>Rapid response to crisis</td><td>Coordination of scientific information to the public</td><td>Inclusive and open monitoring effort</td><td>Inclusive and open monitoring effort</td></tr><tr><td>VE plan revised to incorporate lessons learnt</td><td>Post-eruptive needs assessment</td><td>Continuous information to the public</td><td>Regular (yearly) information campaign</td></tr><tr><td>Ethical behaviour of most scientists directly/indirectly involved</td><td>Permits for researchers</td><td>Involvement of the public in monitoring</td><td>Creation of an in-site inclusive observatory</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>Civil protection management of priority research/monitoring funds</td><td>Recognition of the roles of other academic researchers</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">Lessons learnt</td><td>More inclusivity in scientific committee</td><td>Regular communication with the public</td><td>Changeable nature of volcanic threat</td><td>Changeable nature of volcanic threat</td></tr><tr><td>Clearer procedures for involvement of scientific groups</td><td>Management of scientific disagreements</td><td>Importance of duplication in data collection for scientific discussion</td><td>Sharing of scientific data and resources (e.g. samples)</td></tr><tr><td>Need of legal frame to cover liability of collaborating institutions/individuals</td><td>Improved communication with the media and management of media reports</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Need of contingency funding for independent advisors/collaborations</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

VE Volcanic emergency

lack of formal procedures for the sharing of information and the under-funding of monitoring networks. As demonstrated by the success of analogous procedures at Etna and Stromboli, the CSEV model to produce for the Canary Islands a more inclusive scientific advisory group is a positive step towards establishing a more integrated and collaborative volcanological research

community. For successful implementation, the model needs to accommodate four key features.

*Financing aspects* to ensure that participants are not excluded because of lack of funding, not only for data collection and hazard mitigation, but also for the logistics of attending pre- sin- and post- eruption meetings of the advisory committee. One promising option would be to adapt the
Italian system of providing funds through the national Civil Protection. In the longer term, funding is required to establish permanent and multidisciplinary monitoring networks, including local monitoring centres responsible for specific volcanoes in the Canaries. The centres provide a focus for liaising in particular with local communities and the Civil Protection. It is of course much easier to justify the necessary resources at frequently-erupting volcanoes, such as Etna and Stromboli. However, having at least a contingency for the rapid establishment of a multidisciplinary inclusive institution will encourage the coordination and sharing of data and contribute to the feeling of cohesion and camaraderie amongst the groups involved.

Legal aspects to protect against liability exposure (Marrero et al. 2015). Aspinall and Sparks (2004) describe an example from the United Kingdom Office of Science and Technology, which includes a clause that “appears to indemnify individual members of such a [scientific advisory] Committee” when acting “honestly, reasonably, in good faith and without negligence”, although they warn that the phrase “without negligence” is subjective and can be lead to further disputes (quotations from Aspinall and Sparks (2004) pp. 5–6).

Aspects of the format and storage of information, to ensure the effective sharing of data. Examples include:

a. *Type of data that should be shared between scientific groups*, such as real time data, fast data, general data-forecasts, and rock and gas samples.

b. *The content of scientific reports*. On some occasions data would have to be part-processed before being shared in order for non-specialists to understand and be able to use it.

c. *The frequency of delivering information*, to establish how often data are to be received from each group. These timings should be flexible and realistic. For instance, the requirement of the Spanish Civil Protection to receive written forecasts two days in advance of a meeting may be neither feasible nor

helpful, especially if daily meetings are required (following the procedures established at Etna and Stromboli).

d. *The format* preferred by recipients for the communication of forecasts, eruption scenarios and mitigation procedures.

e. *Policies on the storage of information* to decide which agency should be responsible for compiling and storing scientific data, the form of storage (e.g., as an electronic database, or as a website with restricted access), and the length of storage before data are made available for general use.

*Procedures for integrating researchers from outside official monitoring groups*. Volcanic eruptions provide opportunities for advancing the understanding of volcanic processes and, as identified by IAVCEI et al. (1999), establishing official and legal mechanisms to allow external research groups access to field data can yield insights of potential value to mitigation efforts. It would also reduce the possibility of ill feelings caused by exclusion.

# 6 Conclusions

Our experience of emergencies at frequently-erupting and long-dormant volcanoes, reinforce the conclusions by IAVCEI et al. (1999) that the management of crises is optimised by officially approving, before an emergency, clear, and legally binding rules and protocols for the communication of scientific information between responding groups. As well as detailing the type, content, amount, format, frequency, storage and use of the information, the protocols should consider aspects such as confidentiality, inclusiveness, ethics, financing and legal aspects such as the liability of scientific groups.

Another important recommendation is to identify a coordinating body outside the monitoring and scientific teams—such as the Civil Protection—to manage discussions, collate forecasts and scenarios and agree a consensus (or the basis for different interpretations) and to ensure that all involved feel that their views and