# We are in this together Labour Migration Responses to the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe and North Africa

Hervé Nicolle

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Hervé Nicolle. We are in this together Labour Migration Responses to the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe and North Africa. International Labour Organization. 2021. hal-04392367

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THAMM

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AUGUST 2021

# We are in this together

## Labour Migration Responses to the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe and North Africa

Hervé Nicolle, SAMUEL HALL

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Report produced with the support of:

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International
Labour
Organization

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IOM

UN MIGRATION
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Funded by the European Union

THAMM

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AUGUST 2021

# We are in this together

## Labour Migration Responses to the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe and North Africa

Hervé Nicolle, SAMUEL HALL

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /></figure>

Report produced with the support of:

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /></figure>

International
Labour
Organization

<figure><img src="image_6.png" /></figure>

IOM

UN MIGRATION
<figure><img src="image_6.png" /></figure>

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THAMM

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

Comments are welcomed and should be directed to the author(s).

Suggested citation: International Labour Organization in collaboration with International Organization for Migration. (2021) THAMM Discussion Paper No.1. *We are in this together, Labour Migration Responses to the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe and North Africa*. Hervé Nicolle, SAMUEL HALL.

The SAMUEL HALL team would like to thank Aurelia SEGATTI (ILO), Tanja DEDOVIC (IOM), Majida SADOK (ILO), as well as Andrés ESTÉVEZ MONTES (SH - consultant) for their support and contribution to this work.

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<figure><img src="image_7.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /></figure>

THAMM

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

Comments are welcomed and should be directed to the author(s).

Suggested citation: International Labour Organization in collaboration with International Organization for Migration. (2021) THAMM Discussion Paper No.1. *We are in this together, Labour Migration Responses to the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe and North Africa*. Hervé Nicolle, SAMUEL HALL.

The SAMUEL HALL team would like to thank Aurelia SEGATTI (ILO), Tanja DEDOVIC (IOM), Majida SADOK (ILO), as well as Andrés ESTÉVEZ MONTES (SH - consultant) for their support and contribution to this work.

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We are in this
together

Labour Migration Responses to the
COVID-19 Crisis in Europe and North
Africa

August 2021

Author: Hervé Nicolle, SAMUEL HALL
We are in this
together

Labour Migration Responses to the
COVID-19 Crisis in Europe and North
Africa

August 2021

Author: Hervé Nicolle, SAMUEL HALL
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND .................................................................................. 7

MOBILITY DYNAMICS IN NORTH AFRICA................................................................. 8

Socioeconomic and migration dynamics in North Africa – country analyses .................................................................................................................. 8

Socioeconomic and migration dynamics in North Africa – comparative analysis.................................................................................................................. 13

LABOUR MIGRATION DYNAMICS FROM NORTH AFRICA........................................ 17

Understanding historical dynamics: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt .................................................................................................................. 17

Contemporaneous perspective: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia ................................................................................................................................. 19

Seasonal labour migration from North Africa to EU countries: a case study.................................................................................................................. 20

International students from North Africa ................................................................................................................................. 22

Highly skilled workers from North Africa ................................................................................................................................. 24

LEARNING FROM THE COVID-19 CRISIS ................................................................. 28

Migrant workers contribution to the European COVID-19 response .................................................................................................................. 28

Impact of COVID on migrant workers ................................................................................................................................. 29

Remittances: counter-intuitive resilience? ................................................................................................................................. 31

KEY POLICY TRADEOFFS ................................................................................................. 33

Existing labour migration frameworks: questioning the strategy and narratives.................................................................................................................. 33

A new deal for countries of origin, destination and migrant workers .................................................................................................................. 35

Protection mechanisms and decent work ................................................................................................................................. 36

GLOSSARY................................................................................................................................. 38

INDICATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................. 39
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND .................................................................................. 7

MOBILITY DYNAMICS IN NORTH AFRICA................................................................. 8

Socioeconomic and migration dynamics in North Africa – country analyses .................................................................................................................. 8

Socioeconomic and migration dynamics in North Africa – comparative analysis.................................................................................................................. 13

LABOUR MIGRATION DYNAMICS FROM NORTH AFRICA........................................ 17

Understanding historical dynamics: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt .................................................................................................................. 17

Contemporaneous perspective: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia .................................................................................................................. 19

Seasonal labour migration from North Africa to EU countries: a case study.................................................................................................................. 20

International students from North Africa .................................................................................................................. 22

Highly skilled workers from North Africa .................................................................................................................. 24

LEARNING FROM THE COVID-19 CRISIS ................................................................. 28

Migrant workers contribution to the European COVID-19 response .................................................................................................................. 28

Impact of COVID on migrant workers .................................................................................................................. 29

Remittances: counter-intuitive resilience? .................................................................................................................. 31

KEY POLICY TRADEOFFS ................................................................................................. 33

Existing labour migration frameworks: questioning the strategy and narratives.................................................................................................................. 33

A new deal for countries of origin, destination and migrant workers .................................................................................................................. 35

Protection mechanisms and decent work .................................................................................................................. 36

GLOSSARY................................................................................................................................. 38

INDICATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................. 39
TABLE OF FIGURES

<table><tr><td>Figure 1: Labour force (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (2000-2020)</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 2: Labour force participation rate (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria (2000-2020)</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 3: Female labour force participation rate (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (2000-2020)</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 4: Employment in agriculture in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (2000-2020)</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 5: Vulnerable employment rate (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (2000-2020)</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 6: Growth in real GDP in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (2019-2021) - WB estimates 2021</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 7: Formality and informality through Wage salaried workers</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 8: Trend in total annual emigration from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (1964-2008)</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 9: Evolution of total annual emigration from Algeria to France, Spain, Italy and Germany (1964-2014)</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 10: Evolution of total annual emigration from Morocco to France, Spain, Italy and Germany (1964-2014)</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 11: Evolution of total annual emigration from Tunisia to France, Spain, Italy and Germany (1964-2014)</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 12: Egyptian Migrants in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), (Source: WB, 2016, in thousands)</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 13: Number of new residence permits issued by type in EU 27 countries, 2009-2019 (by reason)</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 14: First permits issued for education reasons by citizenship (2010-2019)</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 15: First permits issued for education reasons to Moroccan students (annual duration) 2015-2019</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 16: First permits issued for education reasons to Algerian students (annual duration) 2015-2019</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 17: First permits issued for education reasons to Tunisian students (annual duration) 2015-2019</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 18: First permits issued for education reasons to Libyan students (annual duration) 2015-2019</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 19: First permits issued for education reasons to Egyptian students (annual duration) 2015-2019</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 20: Unemployment rate by education level and gender (Tunisia - OECD 2020)</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 21: Unemployment rate by education level and gender (Tunisia - OECD 2020)</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 22: EU 27 blue cards for the "highly skilled" labour force</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 23: EU 27 blue cards (by receiving country)</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 24: Share of immigrants among key workers, by occupation - EUFL 2018 (in percentage)</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 25: Share of (extra-EU) immigrant women working in each of the key occupations - EUFL 2018</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 26: Volumes of remittances per country (2000-2020)</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 27: Access to institutional financial instruments in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt (by gender)</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 28: Statistical capacity score (WB - ILOSTAT - 2020)</td><td>34</td></tr></table>
TABLE OF FIGURES

<table><tr><td>Figure 1: Labour force (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (2000-2020)</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 2: Labour force participation rate (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria (2000-2020)</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 3: Female labour force participation rate (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (2000-2020)</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 4: Employment in agriculture in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (2000-2020)</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 5: Vulnerable employment rate (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (2000-2020)</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 6: Growth in real GDP in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (2019-2021) - WB estimates 2021</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 7: Formality and informality through Wage salaried workers</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 8: Trend in total annual emigration from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (1964-2008)</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 9: Evolution of total annual emigration from Algeria to France, Spain, Italy and Germany (1964-2014)</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 10: Evolution of total annual emigration from Morocco to France, Spain, Italy and Germany (1964-2014)</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 11: Evolution of total annual emigration from Tunisia to France, Spain, Italy and Germany (1964-2014)</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 12: Egyptian Migrants in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), (Source: WB, 2016, in thousands)</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 13: Number of new residence permits issued by type in EU 27 countries, 2009-2019 (by reason)</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 14: First permits issued for education reasons by citizenship (2010-2019)</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 15: First permits issued for education reasons to Moroccan students (annual duration) 2015-2019</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 16: First permits issued for education reasons to Algerian students (annual duration) 2015-2019</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 17: First permits issued for education reasons to Tunisian students (annual duration) 2015-2019</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 18: First permits issued for education reasons to Libyan students (annual duration) 2015-2019</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 19: First permits issued for education reasons to Egyptian students (annual duration) 2015-2019</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 20: Unemployment rate by education level and gender (Tunisia - OECD 2020)</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 21: Unemployment rate by education level and gender (Tunisia - OECD 2020)</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 22: EU 27 blue cards for the "highly skilled" labour force</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 23: EU 27 blue cards (by receiving country)</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 24: Share of immigrants among key workers, by occupation - EUFL 2018 (in percentage)</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 25: Share of (extra-EU) immigrant women working in each of the key occupations - EUFL 2018</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 26: Volumes of remittances per country (2000-2020)</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 27: Access to institutional financial instruments in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt (by gender)</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>Figure 28: Statistical capacity score (WB - ILOSTAT - 2020)</td><td>34</td></tr></table>
<table><tbody><tr><td>Table 1: Number of first-time authorisations granted to Extra-EU workers for seasonal work (by sector and gender)</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>Table 2: Countries of origin of North African students in France (Source: MESRI-DGESIP 2017)</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Table 3: Global Medical Brain Drain rate in North Africa</td><td>26</td></tr><tr><td>Box 1: Morocco's institutional efforts towards better migration governance</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Box 2: Tunisia's institutional efforts towards better migration governance</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Box 3: The fast-changing complexity of Libyan migration networks, flows, and hubs</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Box 4: Between soft power and a hard place: the case of Egypt</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Box 5: Collective Management of Hiring in Origin' programme (GECCO) - Spain</td><td>31</td></tr><tr><td>Box 6: Collecting and Analyzing Socio-Economic Data to Inform Policy Dialogue in North Africa</td><td>34</td></tr><tr><td>Box 7: Partnerships between local authorities and diaspora organisations for local development in Morocco</td><td>35</td></tr><tr><td>Picture 1: Credit AFP, Labour Migration to Europe</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>Picture 2: Credit FORMENA</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>Picture 3: Credit Egyptian Street - CAPMAS</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>Picture 4: Credit Maghrebia - Creative Commons</td><td>41</td></tr></tbody></table>

<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>Picture 1: Credit AFP, Labour Migration to Europe</figcaption></figure>
<table><tbody><tr><td>Table 1: Number of first-time authorisations granted to Extra-EU workers for seasonal work (by sector and gender)</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>Table 2: Countries of origin of North African students in France (Source: MESRI-DGESIP 2017)</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Table 3: Global Medical Brain Drain rate in North Africa</td><td>26</td></tr><tr><td>Box 1: Morocco's institutional efforts towards better migration governance</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Box 2: Tunisia's institutional efforts towards better migration governance</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Box 3: The fast-changing complexity of Libyan migration networks, flows, and hubs</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Box 4: Between soft power and a hard place: the case of Egypt</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Box 5: Collective Management of Hiring in Origin' programme (GECCO) - Spain</td><td>31</td></tr><tr><td>Box 6: Collecting and Analyzing Socio-Economic Data to Inform Policy Dialogue in North Africa</td><td>34</td></tr><tr><td>Box 7: Partnerships between local authorities and diaspora organisations for local development in Morocco</td><td>35</td></tr><tr><td>Picture 1: Credit AFP, Labour Migration to Europe</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>Picture 2: Credit FORMENA</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>Picture 3: Credit Egyptian Street - CAPMAS</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>Picture 4: Credit Maghrebia - Creative Commons</td><td>41</td></tr></tbody></table>

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>Picture 1: Credit AFP, Labour Migration to Europe</figcaption></figure>
## CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

The ongoing COVID-19 crisis has shaken up existing labour migration trends and, more specifically, the recruitment and placement of national workers abroad, as well as the socioeconomic integration of foreign workers into national labour markets. The presence of the virus has profoundly slowed, if not halted, human mobility, and it is increasingly likely that population movements - whether for economic migration, asylum-seeking or simply tourism - will be restricted in the coming months and years. This applies in particular to both sides of the Mediterranean. As Schöfberger and Rango (2020) explain, the health pandemic 'has dramatically changed the global migration and mobility landscape and added a layer of complexity to migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean' in a relatively short period of time.<fnref n="1" />

The pandemic has exacerbated salient and often ignored failures of migration governance within and between Europe and North Africa: as global lockdowns and social distancing measures are enforced, closure of borders and travel bans have greatly limited mobility, significantly affecting cross border movement and informal trade, and putting a further spotlight on discriminatory policies and possible outbreaks of xenophobia. On one hand, for North African sending countries – mainly Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Algeria – there are new challenges to face: job losses, a decline in remittances, and returning migrants who need to be reintegrated, all of which add to the already high rates of unemployment especially amongst the youth. On the other hand, European destination countries are grappling with how to ensure that workforce shortages in critical sectors are filled rapidly, to prevent further economic recession. It is still unclear if this appreciation will lead to more acceptance of migrants, in addition to the current move towards regularisation in some countries.²

In this regard, COVID19 might provide an opportunity to reflect on how migration cooperation can better take into account the interests and priorities of African countries and their citizens.<fnref n="3" /> As a follow up to the first THAMM (Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa) Regional Conference, this discussion paper on labour migration responses to the COVID-19 crisis in Europe and North Africa is aimed at gaining a better understanding of the key trends that are currently shaping labour migration governance in a time of crisis and affecting the socioeconomic integration of foreign workers into labour markets, in order to inform the design and implementation of programme activities in North Africa. As the THAMM programme focuses on both South-North and South-South migration patterns, the paper addresses both dimensions and emphasise the differential impacts of the pandemic on each mobility pathway. The present scoping paper aims to achieve the following:

1. Stock-taking of current labour migration and mobility trends observed within and between North Africa and Europe, with special attention given to socioeconomic vulnerabilities and protection gaps, and how these challenges may be addressed by THAMM and regional stakeholders more broadly;

2. Identification of lessons learned and space for further research relative to labour migration trends, taking into consideration the 2021 EU agenda on talent and the future of work;

3. Formulation of concrete and pragmatic policy recommendations based on the discussions of the THAMM Conference, and contribution to strengthening legal pathways for labour migration and the protection of migrant workers sustainably in times of crisis.

<footnote n="1">1 Schöfberger, I. and Rango, M. (2020) COVID-19 and migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean. FULL reference In final version please
2 Many governments, from Southern Europe in particular, took immediate action to open borders to agriculture and food processing workers, issue visas when needed and regularize undocumented migrant workers during the crisis. The Italian government has extended the residence permit to non-EU citizens already living in Italy. Portugal recognized all migrant workers and asylum seekers with pending applications as permanent residents, providing</footnote>

<footnote>them with a temporary residency permit so that they could have access to health care services, welfare benefits, bank accounts, and work and rental contracts. Spain introduced an extension of residency and work permits for foreigners in the context of the declared COVID-19 Emergency, which could lead to regularization pathways.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3 Raty, T. and Shilhav, R. (2020) The EU Trust Fund for Africa, Trapped between aid policy and migration politics, OXFAM.
https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620936/bp-eu-trust-fund-africa-migration-politics-300120-en.pdf</footnote>
## CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

The ongoing COVID-19 crisis has shaken up existing labour migration trends and, more specifically, the recruitment and placement of national workers abroad, as well as the socioeconomic integration of foreign workers into national labour markets. The presence of the virus has profoundly slowed, if not halted, human mobility, and it is increasingly likely that population movements - whether for economic migration, asylum-seeking or simply tourism - will be restricted in the coming months and years. This applies in particular to both sides of the Mediterranean. As Schöfberger and Rango (2020) explain, the health pandemic 'has dramatically changed the global migration and mobility landscape and added a layer of complexity to migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean' in a relatively short period of time.<fnref n="1" />

The pandemic has exacerbated salient and often ignored failures of migration governance within and between Europe and North Africa: as global lockdowns and social distancing measures are enforced, closure of borders and travel bans have greatly limited mobility, significantly affecting cross border movement and informal trade, and putting a further spotlight on discriminatory policies and possible outbreaks of xenophobia. On one hand, for North African sending countries – mainly Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Algeria – there are new challenges to face: job losses, a decline in remittances, and returning migrants who need to be reintegrated, all of which add to the already high rates of unemployment especially amongst the youth. On the other hand, European destination countries are grappling with how to ensure that workforce shortages in critical sectors are filled rapidly, to prevent further economic recession. It is still unclear if this appreciation will lead to more acceptance of migrants, in addition to the current move towards regularisation in some countries.<fnref n="2" />

In this regard, COVID19 might provide an opportunity to reflect on how migration cooperation can better take into account the interests and priorities of African countries and their citizens.<fnref n="3" /> As a follow up to the first THAMM (Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa) Regional Conference, this discussion paper on labour migration responses to the COVID-19 crisis in Europe and North Africa is aimed at gaining a better understanding of the key trends that are currently shaping labour migration governance in a time of crisis and affecting the socioeconomic integration of foreign workers into labour markets, in order to inform the design and implementation of programme activities in North Africa. As the THAMM programme focuses on both South-North and South-South migration patterns, the paper addresses both dimensions and emphasise the differential impacts of the pandemic on each mobility pathway. The present scoping paper aims to achieve the following:

1. Stock-taking of current labour migration and mobility trends observed within and between North Africa and Europe, with special attention given to socioeconomic vulnerabilities and protection gaps, and how these challenges may be addressed by THAMM and regional stakeholders more broadly;

2. Identification of lessons learned and space for further research relative to labour migration trends, taking into consideration the 2021 EU agenda on talent and the future of work;

3. Formulation of concrete and pragmatic policy recommendations based on the discussions of the THAMM Conference, and contribution to strengthening legal pathways for labour migration and the protection of migrant workers sustainably in times of crisis.

<footnote n="1">1 Schöfberger, I. and Rango, M. (2020) COVID-19 and migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean. FULL reference In final version please</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 Many governments, from Southern Europe in particular, took immediate action to open borders to agriculture and food processing workers, issue visas when needed and regularize undocumented migrant workers during the crisis. The Italian government has extended the residence permit to non-EU citizens already living in Italy. Portugal recognized all migrant workers and asylum seekers with pending applications as permanent residents, providing</footnote>

<footnote>them with a temporary residency permit so that they could have access to health care services, welfare benefits, bank accounts, and work and rental contracts. Spain introduced an extension of residency and work permits for foreigners in the context of the declared COVID-19 Emergency, which could lead to regularization pathways.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3 Raty, T. and Shilhav, R. (2020) The EU Trust Fund for Africa, Trapped between aid policy and migration politics, OXFAM. https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620936/bp-eu-trust-fund-africa-migration-politics-300120-en.pdf</footnote>
# MOBILITY DYNAMICS IN NORTH AFRICA

North African countries have historically been significant hubs of migrant destination, transit and departure. Economic, social, political as well as climate instability have contributed to the mixed migration patterns observed in the region. Labour migration policies from as early as the 1950s incentivized mobility and made it a cornerstone of national and regional socioeconomic development. However, local labour markets remain fragmented due to several cleavages (public/private, formal/informal and modern/traditional) and still 'characterised by significant informality and precariousness, very low female participation, high unemployment and significant agricultural employment'.<fnref n="4" /> The share of the population under the age of 30 years has exceeded 60%, and the working-age population (15-64 years old) is approaching 70%.<fnref n="5" /> The main key explanatory factors for the region's endemic unemployment are: 1) the lack of demand and low job creation; 2) demographic pressure with a working-age population of 70% for the whole area; and 3) the persistent 'skills mismatch between the education system and the labour market thus contributing to limited employability'.<fnref n="6" />

## Socioeconomic and migration dynamics in North Africa – country analyses

This section first highlights key socioeconomic trends in North Africa – with a comparative focus on Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya – before synthesizing national characteristics and mobility-related issues using WB data and ILOSTAT estimates.

### Morocco

With a population of 36 million and a base of 27% under the age of 15, compared to 34% in 2000, Morocco is going through an important phase of demographic transition.<fnref n="7" />

The overall unemployment rate in Morocco remains significantly high (9.5% in 2015 and 10.2% in 2020).<fnref n="8" /> According to the HCP<fnref n="9" /> these figures vary considerably when broken down by: 1) gender, with unemployment rates of 14.3% for women versus 8.5 for men in 2020,<fnref n="10" /> and 2) age, with 26.8% of unemployment for the 15-24 year old segment in 2016 (+10.5 percentage point compared to 2007).<fnref n="11" /> According to the ILO, the employed population in a situation of underemployment linked to the number of hours worked reached 443,000 people with a rate of 4.1%. The population in a situation of underemployment linked to insufficient income or the mismatch between training and the job performed is 511,000 people (4.7%). In sum, the volume of underemployment, in its two components, is almost one million people. The overall rate of underemployment fell from 9.7% to 8.8% at national level, from 8.8% to 8.7% in urban areas and from 10.7% to 8.9% in rural areas. Finally, the percentage of young graduates who cannot find a job remains very high (17.8%), which validates the assumption that it is still difficult to value diplomas and skills in a market still dominated by informality and personal relationships. In this context, the lack of job opportunities, especially for Moroccan youth, is one of the main reasons why people emigrate in hopes of finding better opportunities in Europe: 'for me it was out of the question to go and look for a job elsewhere than in my country, but I stayed for months without a job and I was losing my skills (...) At one point I had no choice but to leave'.<fnref n="12" />

On the economic front, the shock of COVID-19 has pushed the Moroccan economy into its first recession since 1995 with a real GDP contraction by 7.5% in 2020, 'primarily as a result of the lockdown but also of a sharp reduction in exports caused by the pandemic's disruption to global value chains and the collapse of receipts from tourism (...)

<footnote n="4">⁴ Castagnone, E. and Termine, P. (2018). Chapitre 7 - Migration des jeunes ruraux méditerranéens : déterminants socio-économiques, défis et opportunités pour l'élaboration de politiques ciblées, in CIHEAM éd., MediTERRA 2018: Migrations et développement rural inclusif en Méditerranée (pp. 145-167). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ UNDESA (2020) Data for North Africa https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Castagnone, E. and Termine, P. (2018). Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ World Bank – ILOSTAT – https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=MA</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Idem.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ HCP (2020) Situation of the labour market in the first quarter of 2020, Haut Commissariat au Plan, Royaume du Maroc.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Idem.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Idem.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Focus Group Participant, Moroccan youth, 24 (Nanterre, France).</footnote>
# MOBILITY DYNAMICS IN NORTH AFRICA

North African countries have historically been significant hubs of migrant destination, transit and departure. Economic, social, political as well as climate instability have contributed to the mixed migration patterns observed in the region. Labour migration policies from as early as the 1950s incentivized mobility and made it a cornerstone of national and regional socioeconomic development. However, local labour markets remain fragmented due to several cleavages (public/private, formal/informal and modern/traditional) and still 'characterised by significant informality and precariousness, very low female participation, high unemployment and significant agricultural employment'.<fnref n="4" /> The share of the population under the age of 30 years has exceeded 60%, and the working-age population (15-64 years old) is approaching 70%.<fnref n="5" /> The main key explanatory factors for the region's endemic unemployment are: 1) the lack of demand and low job creation; 2) demographic pressure with a working-age population of 70% for the whole area; and 3) the persistent 'skills mismatch between the education system and the labour market thus contributing to limited employability'.<fnref n="6" />

## Socioeconomic and migration dynamics in North Africa – country analyses

This section first highlights key socioeconomic trends in North Africa – with a comparative focus on Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya – before synthesizing national characteristics and mobility-related issues using WB data and ILOSTAT estimates.

### Morocco

With a population of 36 million and a base of 27% under the age of 15, compared to 34% in 2000, Morocco is going through an important phase of demographic transition.<fnref n="7" />

The overall unemployment rate in Morocco remains significantly high (9.5% in 2015 and 10.2% in 2020).<fnref n="8" /> According to the HCP<fnref n="9" /> these figures vary considerably when broken down by: 1) gender, with unemployment rates of 14.3% for women versus 8.5 for men in 2020,<fnref n="10" /> and 2) age, with 26.8% of unemployment for the 15-24 year old segment in 2016 (+10.5 percentage point compared to 2007).<fnref n="11" /> According to the ILO, the employed population in a situation of underemployment linked to the number of hours worked reached 443,000 people with a rate of 4.1%. The population in a situation of underemployment linked to insufficient income or the mismatch between training and the job performed is 511,000 people (4.7%). In sum, the volume of underemployment, in its two components, is almost one million people. The overall rate of underemployment fell from 9.7% to 8.8% at national level, from 8.8% to 8.7% in urban areas and from 10.7% to 8.9% in rural areas. Finally, the percentage of young graduates who cannot find a job remains very high (17.8%), which validates the assumption that it is still difficult to value diplomas and skills in a market still dominated by informality and personal relationships. In this context, the lack of job opportunities, especially for Moroccan youth, is one of the main reasons why people emigrate in hopes of finding better opportunities in Europe: 'for me it was out of the question to go and look for a job elsewhere than in my country, but I stayed for months without a job and I was losing my skills (...) At one point I had no choice but to leave'.<fnref n="12" />

On the economic front, the shock of COVID-19 has pushed the Moroccan economy into its first recession since 1995 with a real GDP contraction by 7.5% in 2020, 'primarily as a result of the lockdown but also of a sharp reduction in exports caused by the pandemic's disruption to global value chains and the collapse of receipts from tourism (...)

<footnote n="4">4 Castagnone, E. and Termine, P. (2018). Chapitre 7 - Migration des jeunes ruraux méditerranéens : déterminants socio-économiques, défis et opportunités pour l'élaboration de politiques ciblées, in CIHEAM éd., MediTERRA 2018: Migrations et développement rural inclusif en Méditerranée (pp. 145-167). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">5 UNDESA (2020) Data for North Africa https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock</footnote>

<footnote n="6">6 Castagnone, E. and Termine, P. (2018). Ibid.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">7 World Bank – ILOSTAT – https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=MA</footnote>

<footnote n="8">8 Idem.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">9 HCP (2020) Situation of the labour market in the first quarter of 2020, Haut Commissariat au Plan, Royaume du Maroc.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">10 Idem.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">11 Idem.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">12 Focus Group Participant, Moroccan youth, 24 (Nanterre, France).</footnote>
compounded by the fall in agricultural production due to
a severe drought.¹¹³ As highlighted in a COVID-19 rapid
assessment conducted by the AfDB and the ILO, in a
context where almost 80% of micro and small enterprises
(SMEs) employing 60% of the national workforce are
informal, many Moroccan enterprises have suffered from
this confinement, given the greater difficulty of accessing
cash resources and finance. The positive trend of job
creation observed in recent years in all sectors has been
broken. The Moroccan economy lost 432 000 jobs in 2020
compared to 2019. In the agricultural sector, the annual
loss – compounded by a prolonged drought – was
273,000 jobs compared to only 90,000 jobs over the 2017-
2019 period. In the booming tech sector, the picture is
more contrasted: on the one hand, the containment
resulted in temporary or permanent stoppages for nearly
six out of ten businesses and reduced activity for one fifth
of businesses.<fnref n="14" /> A follow-up Enterprise Survey conducted
by the World Bank in Morocco after the outbreak, on the
impact the pandemic is having on the formal private
sector shows that 6.1% of surveyed formal sector firms
are reported to have ceased their operations, and as
many as 87% report a fall in sales of, on average, 50% of
their pre-pandemic level. By contrast, start-ups active in
the e-commerce, EdTech and fintech industries have
been able to benefit from the crisis.

Box 1: Morocco's institutional efforts towards better migration governance

Morocco alone, out of all the countries in the region, was granted by the EU the position of special partner in 2008. The document on Morocco's “advanced status” defined its objectives as 'supporting the internal dynamics which Morocco is experiencing and accelerating the partnership between Morocco and the European Union'.<fnref n="15" /> In 2013, Morocco signed a mobility partnership agreement with the EU and a number of EU member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) to manage the movement of people over short periods of time, improve legal migration channels and formal labour migration, and strengthen cooperation on migration and development. In 2014, Morocco implemented the

National Immigration and Asylum Strategy (SNIA) as well as the National Strategy for Moroccans of the World (SNMDM) as part of its New Migration Policy (NPM). The SNIA aims to contribute to a better integration of regular migrants in Morocco. The NPM focuses on several areas of intervention (education and culture, youth, health, housing, social and humanitarian assistance, vocational training and employment, and anti-trafficking). Basic services (education, emergency care, the right to health and legal protection) are provided to all, regardless of their administrative status. Other services (regarding employment and vocational training) are available to refugees and regularized migrants. Morocco has also supported the concept of an African Migration and Development Observatory based Rabat, a project that the African Union formally approved in January 2019.<fnref n="16" /> Morocco is not only a country of emigration or transit, it is also a country of destination. The country has taken the pragmatic decision to regularize en masse during two regularization campaigns organized respectively in 2014 (23,056 applications approved) and 2016-2017 (more than 26,000 registered applications are still being processed). A law regulating domestic work was passed in October 2018.<fnref n="17" /> Morocco's emerging regional leadership on labour issues is part of the country's broader foreign affairs strategy of rejoining the African Union (in 2017) and seeking membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Algeria

With a population of 43 million and a percentage of the
population aged 0-14 close to 30.5%,<fnref n="18" /> Algeria faces a
difficult demographic problem – that of integrating its
youth into the labour market. The large share (21%) of 15-
24 year olds who are not in education, employment or
training (NEET) confirms the difficulty of the task.<fnref n="19" />
According to data from the ONS (Office Nationale des
Statistiques) for May 2019, the unemployment rate
reached 11.4% of the active population, with significant
disparities: the unemployment rate for men was 9.1%,
but estimated at 20.4% for women and 27% for youth.
The main employment sectors are construction: 17% of
the total workforce; public administration: 16%; trade:
16%; health and social work: 15%. By contrast, if oil and
gas account for 60% of Algeria's state budget and 94% of
its total exports, even if the production of crude oil has

<footnote n="13">13 World Bank (2020) Morocco Economic Monitor, Fall 2020: From relief to recovery.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 Start Up Square (2020) Covid-19 survey in Morocco, by Startup Square and La Startup Factory (CGEM-HCP).</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 Jaidi, L. and Martin, I. (2010) Comment faire advancer le statut avancé UE-Maroc ? Documents IE Med, 2ème édition, https://www.iemed.org/publicacions/DocsIEMed_5.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 Décisions clés de la 32e session ordinaire de l'Assemblée de l'Union africaine (janvier 2019). https://au.int/fr/pressreleases/20190211/key-decisions-32nd-ordinary-session-assembly-african-union-january-2019</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 Loi no 19-12 du 10 août 2016 fixant les conditions de travail et d'emploi des travailleuses et travailleurs domestiques (Loi relative au travail domestique).</footnote>

<footnote>http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4 detail?p lang=fr&p isn=105362&p count=1&p classification=22)</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 World Bank – ILOSTAT – https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=DZ</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 World Bank – ILOSTAT – https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.NEET.ZS?locations=DZ</footnote>
compounded by the fall in agricultural production due to
a severe drought.¹¹³ As highlighted in a COVID-19 rapid
assessment conducted by the AfDB and the ILO, in a
context where almost 80% of micro and small enterprises
(SMEs) employing 60% of the national workforce are
informal, many Moroccan enterprises have suffered from
this confinement, given the greater difficulty of accessing
cash resources and finance. The positive trend of job
creation observed in recent years in all sectors has been
broken. The Moroccan economy lost 432 000 jobs in 2020
compared to 2019. In the agricultural sector, the annual
loss – compounded by a prolonged drought – was
273,000 jobs compared to only 90,000 jobs over the 2017-
2019 period. In the booming tech sector, the picture is
more contrasted: on the one hand, the containment
resulted in temporary or permanent stoppages for nearly
six out of ten businesses and reduced activity for one fifth
of businesses.<fnref n="14" /> A follow-up Enterprise Survey conducted
by the World Bank in Morocco after the outbreak, on the
impact the pandemic is having on the formal private
sector shows that 6.1% of surveyed formal sector firms
are reported to have ceased their operations, and as
many as 87% report a fall in sales of, on average, 50% of
their pre-pandemic level. By contrast, start-ups active in
the e-commerce, EdTech and fintech industries have
been able to benefit from the crisis.

Box 1: Morocco's institutional efforts towards better migration governance

Morocco alone, out of all the countries in the region, was granted by the EU the position of special partner in 2008. The document on Morocco's “advanced status” defined its objectives as 'supporting the internal dynamics which Morocco is experiencing and accelerating the partnership between Morocco and the European Union'.<fnref n="15" /> In 2013, Morocco signed a mobility partnership agreement with the EU and a number of EU member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) to manage the movement of people over short periods of time, improve legal migration channels and formal labour migration, and strengthen cooperation on migration and development. In 2014, Morocco implemented the

National Immigration and Asylum Strategy (SNIA) as well as the National Strategy for Moroccans of the World (SNMDM) as part of its New Migration Policy (NPM). The SNIA aims to contribute to a better integration of regular migrants in Morocco. The NPM focuses on several areas of intervention (education and culture, youth, health, housing, social and humanitarian assistance, vocational training and employment, and anti-trafficking). Basic services (education, emergency care, the right to health and legal protection) are provided to all, regardless of their administrative status. Other services (regarding employment and vocational training) are available to refugees and regularized migrants. Morocco has also supported the concept of an African Migration and Development Observatory based Rabat, a project that the African Union formally approved in January 2019.<fnref n="16" /> Morocco is not only a country of emigration or transit, it is also a country of destination. The country has taken the pragmatic decision to regularize en masse during two regularization campaigns organized respectively in 2014 (23,056 applications approved) and 2016-2017 (more than 26,000 registered applications are still being processed). A law regulating domestic work was passed in October 2018.<fnref n="17" /> Morocco's emerging regional leadership on labour issues is part of the country's broader foreign affairs strategy of rejoining the African Union (in 2017) and seeking membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Algeria

With a population of 43 million and a percentage of the
population aged 0-14 close to 30.5%,<fnref n="18" /> Algeria faces a
difficult demographic problem – that of integrating its
youth into the labour market. The large share (21%) of 15-
24 year olds who are not in education, employment or
training (NEET) confirms the difficulty of the task.<fnref n="19" />
According to data from the ONS (Office Nationale des
Statistiques) for May 2019, the unemployment rate
reached 11.4% of the active population, with significant
disparities: the unemployment rate for men was 9.1%,
but estimated at 20.4% for women and 27% for youth.
The main employment sectors are construction: 17% of
the total workforce; public administration: 16%; trade:
16%; health and social work: 15%. By contrast, if oil and
gas account for 60% of Algeria's state budget and 94% of
its total exports, even if the production of crude oil has

<footnote n="13">13 World Bank (2020) Morocco Economic Monitor, Fall 2020: From relief to recovery.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">14 Start Up Square (2020) Covid-19 survey in Morocco, by Startup Square and La Startup Factory (CGEM-HCP).</footnote>

<footnote n="15">15 Jaidi, L. and Martin, I. (2010) Comment faire advancer le statut avancé UE-Maroc ? Documents IE Med, 2ème édition, https://www.iemed.org/publicacions/DocsIEMed_5.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="16">16 Décisions clés de la 32e session ordinaire de l'Assemblée de l'Union africaine (janvier 2019). https://au.int/fr/pressreleases/20190211/key-decisions-32nd-ordinary-session-assembly-african-union-january-2019</footnote>

<footnote n="17">17 Loi no 19-12 du 10 août 2016 fixant les conditions de travail et d'emploi des travailleuses et travailleurs domestiques (Loi relative au travail domestique).</footnote>

<footnote>http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4 detail?p lang=fr&p isn=105362&p count=1&p classification=22)</footnote>

<footnote n="18">18 World Bank – ILOSTAT – https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=DZ</footnote>

<footnote n="19">19 World Bank – ILOSTAT – https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.NEET.ZS?locations=DZ</footnote>
plummeted since 2007,<fnref n="20" /> the energy sector is not very labour intensive given the stronger focus on production. Another structuring and concerning characteristics of the Algerian economy is a pervasive informal economy that has continued to grow in the aftermath of the 1990s economic crisis. Like other North African countries facing the same problem, this growth is due to the inability of the formal sector to create enough jobs for the massive influx of young new entrants onto the labour market. Souag notes that the share of the informal sector in the non-agricultural private sector in Algeria increased from 68.5% in 1997 to 72.8% in 2007, the number of informal workers in the non-agricultural private sector increasing from 1.2 to 3.3 million between 1997 and 2007, and up to 3.9 million by 2010.²¹ In this context, informal employment increased from 21.9% of total employment in 1997 to 46% of total employment in 2010, in spite of the 2008 Action Plan for Promoting Employment and Fighting Unemployment, which proved inefficient.

While the country remains poorly diversified economically and heavily dependent on oil and gas revenues, it is also exposed to three parallel migration dynamics: 1) poor socioeconomic situation and the lack of employment opportunities cause certain rural regions in Algeria to continually experience high levels of rural-to-urban migration; 2) regular and irregular emigrations to international destinations (89.4% to EU countries, according to JRC)<fnref n="22" /> raise concerns in terms of safety, protection, and brain drain; and 3) as a country of transit, due to its geographical situation, but also increasingly one of destination, Algeria is also confronted with social and economic issues resulting from the influx of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Libya in particular. Finally, from an institutional standpoint, Algeria supports international cooperation on migration and development and promotes a common regional approach on migration issues and management by participating in dialogue initiatives both in Africa and Mediterranean countries.

## Tunisia

Like Morocco, Tunisia (11.7 million inhabitants in 2019) is on the path of demographic transition with an under-15 demographic segment that has fallen from 29% to 24% in just two decades. According to the INS (National Institute of Statistics) the active population in Tunisia stands at 4,2 million in December 2019 with respectively 71% of men and 29% of women. The unemployment rate recorded for the fourth quarter of 2019 was 15% with 12.1% for men and 21.7% for women. The distribution of the employed population by sector of activity was as follows: 52.1% in the services sector; 18.5% in the manufacturing sector; 15.6% in the non-manufacturing sector; and 13.8% in the agriculture and fisheries sector.²³ Like other countries in the North African zone, gender and age are significant compounding variables, with unemployment rates of 36% for the 15-24 year old segment in 2019 (+6,5 percentage point compared to 2009).²⁴

According to INS indicators published in August 2020, the unemployment rate increased significantly in the second quarter to at least 18%. Over the same period of time (June 2019 to June 2020), the unemployment rate for higher education graduates rose from 28% to 31.2%. The same survey shows that 2 million employees were not present at work in April 2020, which represents 60% of the total employed in a context of general containment between late March and early May 2020. The mechanical and electrical industries, hotels, restaurants, construction and public works recorded historically low attendance rates (between 5% and 10%). In contrast, other sectors such as agriculture and fisheries, banking and insurance, mining and energy – directly essential to economic survival and the functioning of food supply chains – recorded attendance rates of around 70-80%. Regarding wages in April, 47.8% of employees received their wages, compared to 34.4% who did not, and 13.1% who received only part of their wages.

In 2014, Tunisia signed a mobility partnership agreement with the EU and a number of EU member states (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain,

<footnote n="20">20 From 1,400 thousand barrels a day in 2007 to 800 in March 2020 and 300 in January 2021, affected by a lack of investments and the socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-08/an-oil-country-more-algeria-s-energy-exports-sink-rapidly

21 Souag, A. (2018) "Labour Market Policies and Informality in Algeria" FEMISE Research Paper 42-05.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 Urso, G., Sermi, F., Tarchi, D., Koopmans, J. and Duta, A. (2019) Migration Profile Algeria, Bongiardo, D. editor(s), Publications Office of the European Union, JRC, Ispra.

23 INS (2020) The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Tunisian labour market – August 2020.

24 Idem.</footnote>
plummeted since 2007,<fnref n="20" /> the energy sector is not very labour intensive given the stronger focus on production. Another structuring and concerning characteristics of the Algerian economy is a pervasive informal economy that has continued to grow in the aftermath of the 1990s economic crisis. Like other North African countries facing the same problem, this growth is due to the inability of the formal sector to create enough jobs for the massive influx of young new entrants onto the labour market. Souag notes that the share of the informal sector in the non-agricultural private sector in Algeria increased from 68.5% in 1997 to 72.8% in 2007, the number of informal workers in the non-agricultural private sector increasing from 1.2 to 3.3 million between 1997 and 2007, and up to 3.9 million by 2010.²¹ In this context, informal employment increased from 21.9% of total employment in 1997 to 46% of total employment in 2010, in spite of the 2008 Action Plan for Promoting Employment and Fighting Unemployment, which proved inefficient.

While the country remains poorly diversified economically and heavily dependent on oil and gas revenues, it is also exposed to three parallel migration dynamics: 1) poor socioeconomic situation and the lack of employment opportunities cause certain rural regions in Algeria to continually experience high levels of rural-to-urban migration; 2) regular and irregular emigrations to international destinations (89.4% to EU countries, according to JRC)<fnref n="22" /> raise concerns in terms of safety, protection, and brain drain; and 3) as a country of transit, due to its geographical situation, but also increasingly one of destination, Algeria is also confronted with social and economic issues resulting from the influx of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Libya in particular. Finally, from an institutional standpoint, Algeria supports international cooperation on migration and development and promotes a common regional approach on migration issues and management by participating in dialogue initiatives both in Africa and Mediterranean countries.

## Tunisia

Like Morocco, Tunisia (11.7 million inhabitants in 2019) is on the path of demographic transition with an under-15 demographic segment that has fallen from 29% to 24% in just two decades. According to the INS (National Institute of Statistics) the active population in Tunisia stands at 4,2 million in December 2019 with respectively 71% of men and 29% of women. The unemployment rate recorded for the fourth quarter of 2019 was 15% with 12.1% for men and 21.7% for women. The distribution of the employed population by sector of activity was as follows: 52.1% in the services sector; 18.5% in the manufacturing sector; 15.6% in the non-manufacturing sector; and 13.8% in the agriculture and fisheries sector.²³ Like other countries in the North African zone, gender and age are significant compounding variables, with unemployment rates of 36% for the 15-24 year old segment in 2019 (+6,5 percentage point compared to 2009).²⁴

According to INS indicators published in August 2020, the unemployment rate increased significantly in the second quarter to at least 18%. Over the same period of time (June 2019 to June 2020), the unemployment rate for higher education graduates rose from 28% to 31.2%. The same survey shows that 2 million employees were not present at work in April 2020, which represents 60% of the total employed in a context of general containment between late March and early May 2020. The mechanical and electrical industries, hotels, restaurants, construction and public works recorded historically low attendance rates (between 5% and 10%). In contrast, other sectors such as agriculture and fisheries, banking and insurance, mining and energy – directly essential to economic survival and the functioning of food supply chains – recorded attendance rates of around 70-80%. Regarding wages in April, 47.8% of employees received their wages, compared to 34.4% who did not, and 13.1% who received only part of their wages.

In 2014, Tunisia signed a mobility partnership agreement with the EU and a number of EU member states (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain,

<footnote n="20">20 From 1,400 thousand barrels a day in 2007 to 800 in March 2020 and 300 in January 2021, affected by a lack of investments and the socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-08/an-oil-country-more-algeria-s-energy-exports-sink-rapidly

21 Souag, A. (2018) "Labour Market Policies and Informality in Algeria" FEMISE Research Paper 42-05.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">22 Urso, G., Sermi, F., Tarchi, D., Koopmans, J. and Duta, A. (2019) Migration Profile Algeria, Bongiardo, D. editor(s), Publications Office of the European Union, JRC, Ispra.

23 INS (2020) The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Tunisian labour market – August 2020.

24 Idem.</footnote>
Sweden, and the United Kingdom). Among other objectives, this partnership aims to improve the information available to qualified Tunisian citizens on employment, education and training opportunities offered in the EU, and also to facilitate the mutual recognition of professional and academic qualifications. In addition, it aims at a better integration of Tunisian nationals legally residing in the EU and migrants legally residing in Tunisia, and the mobilization of Tunisian communities abroad for the development of Tunisia. In recent years, a relatively modest emigration of Tunisian nationals has been accompanied by irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa and other North African countries (Libya, Algeria, Morocco) and the Middle East (Syrian asylum-seekers and refugees), partly because of the lack of regular migration arrangements.<fnref n="25" /> Due to its geographical location, Tunisia has indeed become an important route for irregular migration to Europe.

Box 2: Tunisia's institutional efforts towards better migration governance

The recent creation of the National Migration Observatory illustrates Tunisia's willingness to address the issue of migration in a comprehensive manner. IOM supports not only the Observatory, but also the Office des Tunisiens à l'étranger (OTE) and the Agence nationale de l'emploi et du travail indépendant (ANETI). In 2016, with ILO support, the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) adopted an action plan on the protection of migrant workers in Tunisia - particularly in Tunis, Sousse, Sfax and Medenine. The Stratégie nationale sur les migrations (SNM) was presented in July 2017 by the Ministry of Social Affairs in collaboration with ILO, IOM and other international partners. This strategy aims to: improve migration governance; defend the rights and interests of Tunisian migrants and strengthen their ties to Tunisia; enhance the contribution of migration to socioeconomic development at the local, regional, and national levels; promote regular migration of Tunisians and prevent irregular migration; and protect the rights of asylum seekers and foreign migrants. Similarly, in August 2017, Tunisia began the process of developing the National Employment Strategy (NES), which proposes an integrated approach to create jobs and mobilize all actors involved in the labour market.

Egypt

Egypt has the largest population in the region, at 100.4 million, with approximately 34% young people below 15.<fnref n="26" /> The demographic factor plays an essential role in the socioeconomic, employment and migration dynamics: from 2010 to 2015, the average annual population growth rate was estimated at 2.2% and the fertility rate at 3.4 children per woman.<fnref n="27" /> Youth account for nearly 80% of the unemployed. Rapid population growth poses a significant challenge to the country's sustainable development. The lack of decent work opportunities has forced some workers to accept precarious and poorly paid work, and others to leave their country in search of better opportunities abroad. As in the region as a whole, far fewer women than men participate in the labour force (23% versus 80%).

According to the World Bank, a series of positive and recent macroeconomic and structural reforms had succeeded in stabilizing the economy with improving fiscal and external accounts. However, 'the adverse repercussions of the pandemic have since undermined this recent progress, shedding light on longstanding challenges [such as]: sluggish private sector activity and job-creation, especially in the formal sector, underperforming non-oil exports and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), elevated government debt-to-GDP ratio (despite its significant reduction in recent years), below-potential revenue mobilization, and an unfavorable budget structure, with limited allocations to key sectors, such as health and education.'<fnref n="28" /> Given the uncertainties around vaccinations and possible new epidemic waves in the region, key economic sectors (oil and gas extractives, tourism, manufacturing, as well as the Suez Canal) continue to be massively impacted by international travel bans, a low and unpredictable demand, and disruptions to national and international supply chains and trade.

During the past decade, Egypt has also received the largest number of migrants among the five countries and now has the largest number of migrants in absolute figures and relative to its population (slightly less than 1%,

<footnote n="25">25 Awad, I. and Selim, H. (2017). Labour Migration Governance in Times of Political Transition: A Comparative Analysis of Egypt and Tunisia, in Migration and Development, vol 6, 2017, issue 1.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">26 World Bank – ILOSTAT –
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.MA.ZS?locations=EG&vi ew=chart</footnote>

<footnote n="27">27 Document d'action du Fonds fiduciaire d'urgence de l'Union européenne, Égypte 2017</footnote>

<footnote>https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/action_document_egypt_ action_fiche_20170523_en.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="28">28 Word Bank (2021) Egypt's Economic Update, April 2021 - https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/9dbe40280b581a94ff950a11cab42f b3-0280012021/original/4-mpo-sm21-egy-egy-kcm2.pdf</footnote>
Sweden, and the United Kingdom). Among other objectives, this partnership aims to improve the information available to qualified Tunisian citizens on employment, education and training opportunities offered in the EU, and also to facilitate the mutual recognition of professional and academic qualifications. In addition, it aims at a better integration of Tunisian nationals legally residing in the EU and migrants legally residing in Tunisia, and the mobilization of Tunisian communities abroad for the development of Tunisia. In recent years, a relatively modest emigration of Tunisian nationals has been accompanied by irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa and other North African countries (Libya, Algeria, Morocco) and the Middle East (Syrian asylum-seekers and refugees), partly because of the lack of regular migration arrangements.<fnref n="25" /> Due to its geographical location, Tunisia has indeed become an important route for irregular migration to Europe.

Box 2: Tunisia's institutional efforts towards better migration governance

The recent creation of the National Migration Observatory illustrates Tunisia's willingness to address the issue of migration in a comprehensive manner. IOM supports not only the Observatory, but also the Office des Tunisiens à l'étranger (OTE) and the Agence nationale de l'emploi et du travail indépendant (ANETI). In 2016, with ILO support, the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) adopted an action plan on the protection of migrant workers in Tunisia - particularly in Tunis, Sousse, Sfax and Medenine. The Stratégie nationale sur les migrations (SNM) was presented in July 2017 by the Ministry of Social Affairs in collaboration with ILO, IOM and other international partners. This strategy aims to: improve migration governance; defend the rights and interests of Tunisian migrants and strengthen their ties to Tunisia; enhance the contribution of migration to socioeconomic development at the local, regional, and national levels; promote regular migration of Tunisians and prevent irregular migration; and protect the rights of asylum seekers and foreign migrants. Similarly, in August 2017, Tunisia began the process of developing the National Employment Strategy (NES), which proposes an integrated approach to create jobs and mobilize all actors involved in the labour market.

Egypt

Egypt has the largest population in the region, at 100.4 million, with approximately 34% young people below 15.<fnref n="26" /> The demographic factor plays an essential role in the socioeconomic, employment and migration dynamics: from 2010 to 2015, the average annual population growth rate was estimated at 2.2% and the fertility rate at 3.4 children per woman.<fnref n="27" /> Youth account for nearly 80% of the unemployed. Rapid population growth poses a significant challenge to the country's sustainable development. The lack of decent work opportunities has forced some workers to accept precarious and poorly paid work, and others to leave their country in search of better opportunities abroad. As in the region as a whole, far fewer women than men participate in the labour force (23% versus 80%).

According to the World Bank, a series of positive and recent macroeconomic and structural reforms had succeeded in stabilizing the economy with improving fiscal and external accounts. However, 'the adverse repercussions of the pandemic have since undermined this recent progress, shedding light on longstanding challenges [such as]: sluggish private sector activity and job-creation, especially in the formal sector, underperforming non-oil exports and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), elevated government debt-to-GDP ratio (despite its significant reduction in recent years), below-potential revenue mobilization, and an unfavorable budget structure, with limited allocations to key sectors, such as health and education.'<fnref n="28" /> Given the uncertainties around vaccinations and possible new epidemic waves in the region, key economic sectors (oil and gas extractives, tourism, manufacturing, as well as the Suez Canal) continue to be massively impacted by international travel bans, a low and unpredictable demand, and disruptions to national and international supply chains and trade.

During the past decade, Egypt has also received the largest number of migrants among the five countries and now has the largest number of migrants in absolute figures and relative to its population (slightly less than 1%,

<footnote n="25">25 Awad, I. and Selim, H. (2017). Labour Migration Governance in Times of Political Transition: A Comparative Analysis of Egypt and Tunisia, in Migration and Development, vol 6, 2017, issue 1.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">26 World Bank – ILOSTAT –
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.MA.ZS?locations=EG&vi ew=chart</footnote>

<footnote n="27">27 Document d'action du Fonds fiduciaire d'urgence de l'Union européenne, Égypte 2017
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/action_document_egypt_action_fiche_20170523_en.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="28">28 Word Bank (2021) Egypt's Economic Update, April 2021 -
https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/9dbe40280b581a94ff950a11cab42f b3-0280012021/original/4-mpo-sm21-egy-egy-kcm2.pdf</footnote>
including refugees): the country has become a destination for thousands of Arab and African immigrants and a major host of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, Sudanese, and Syrian refugees since 2011. Egypt is also a transit country in migrant routes used by sub-Saharan Africans crossing the Mediterranean toward Europe, which has strengthened its political dialogue with the EU. In addition, Egypt is also an emigration country, as highlighted by Awad: 'In the last five decades, tens of millions of Egyptian migrant workers left for employment abroad for periods averaging six years and returned to their country. (...) Europe became a minor destination for Egyptian migrant workers in the last 30 years. Egyptian migration to North America and Australia was of the settlement type.'<fnref n="29" /> In this regard, Egyptian migrant workers contribute to regional labour these markets: 1) Jordan, with 126,000 Egyptian migrant workers and 636,000 (other) Egyptian migrants; 2) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – mainly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.<fnref n="30" />

## Libya

With a few months to go before the presidential election, scheduled for December 2021, Libya is beginning to give signs of renewal and hope to its 6.8 million inhabitants. A series of studies conducted by IOM and the ILO point to three main trends affecting the country's labour market: 'a bloated public sector (still employing 70% of salaried employees), an anaemic private sector, and a poorly planned education system.'<fnref n="31" /> These trends have contributed to a deteriorating business environment, skills mismatch, and the exponential development of informality.<fnref n="32" /> The existing data must of course be taken with caution, due to the lack of political stability since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, as highlighted by the JRC report, which recalls that in 2017 the country was ranked 171st out of 180 in terms of perception of the democratization process.<fnref n="33" /> With these caveats in mind, we note a contrasting unemployment rate between youth (49% for

15-24), women (24%), while standing at around 19% for the overall working population according to ILOSTAT.<fnref n="34" /> The revival of the economy – mainly linked to hydrocarbons and to agriculture to a much lesser extent – could change things quickly if the country finds stability.

Libyan migration dynamics are marked by their great complexity, as noted in the analyses of the Mixed Migration Hub: 'Despite the tremendous focus placed on irregular migration through Libya to Europe, the situation is much more complicated with many migrants, refugees and asylum seekers choosing to remain in Libya while others with initial intentions to transit through becoming stranded in the country. (...) Worsening conditions, including exploitation and abuse in Libya has led or encouraged substantial number of migrants and refugees to cross to Italy from Libya.'<fnref n="35" /> Finally, while Libya is not signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention, it is a signatory to the 1969 African Union Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Libya is a participating state of the Khartoum Process.

## Box 3: The fast-changing complexity of Libyan migration networks, flows, and hubs

Analysing data from the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) data set of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Di Mario, Leone Sciabolazza and Molini (2020) showed in a World Bank paper that 'migration in Libya can be characterized as forced migration: conflict intensity is the main determinant of the decisions to relocate from one province to another. The analysis of migration flows across provinces indicates a dense network of connections; for each province, there is not a unique migration route from or to any other province, suggesting that individual-level characteristics play an important role in choice of migration route.'<fnref n="36" /> Migrants in Libya mainly originate from Africa and to a lesser extent, the Middle East and West Asia. In January and February 2021, 575,874 migrants from over 41 nationalities were identified in all 100 Libyan municipalities during Round 35 of DTM data collection. More than two thirds of migrants are from neighbouring countries: Niger

<footnote n="29">29 Awad, I. (2021) On occasion of the pandemic: Reflections on Egyptian labour migration, International Migration, IOM, February 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">30 Awad, I. and Selim, H. (2017). Labour Migration Governance in Times of Political Transition: A Comparative Analysis of Egypt and Tunisia, in Migration and Development, vol 6, 2017, issue 1.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">31 Borgnäs, E.; Cottone, L. and Teppert, T. (2021) Labour migration dynamics in Libya, in IOM (2021) Migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean: Trends, Risks, Development and Governance. Chapter 24. Geneva.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">32 Key Informant Interview with UNDP Regional – June 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">33 Urso, G., Sermi, F., Tarchi, D., Koopmans, J. and Duta, A., Migration Profile Libya, Bongiardo, D. editor(s), Publications Office of the European Union, Ispra, 2019.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 World Bank – ILOSTAT – https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=LY</footnote>

<footnote n="35">35 Mixed Migration Hub (2018) Libya Country Brief, funded by IOM and the USDOS. http://www.mixedmigrationhub.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Country-Profile-Libya.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="36">36 Di Maio, M., Leone Sciabolazza, V. & Molini, V. (2020). Migration in Libya: a spatial network analysis, Policy Research Working Paper Series, 9110, The World Bank.</footnote>
including refugees): the country has become a destination for thousands of Arab and African immigrants and a major host of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, Sudanese, and Syrian refugees since 2011. Egypt is also a transit country in migrant routes used by sub-Saharan Africans crossing the Mediterranean toward Europe, which has strengthened its political dialogue with the EU. In addition, Egypt is also an emigration country, as highlighted by Awad: 'In the last five decades, tens of millions of Egyptian migrant workers left for employment abroad for periods averaging six years and returned to their country. (...) Europe became a minor destination for Egyptian migrant workers in the last 30 years. Egyptian migration to North America and Australia was of the settlement type.'<fnref n="29" /> In this regard, Egyptian migrant workers contribute to regional labour these markets: 1) Jordan, with 126,000 Egyptian migrant workers and 636,000 (other) Egyptian migrants; 2) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – mainly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.<fnref n="30" />

## Libya

With a few months to go before the presidential election, scheduled for December 2021, Libya is beginning to give signs of renewal and hope to its 6.8 million inhabitants. A series of studies conducted by IOM and the ILO point to three main trends affecting the country's labour market: 'a bloated public sector (still employing 70% of salaried employees), an anaemic private sector, and a poorly planned education system.'<fnref n="31" /> These trends have contributed to a deteriorating business environment, skills mismatch, and the exponential development of informality.<fnref n="32" /> The existing data must of course be taken with caution, due to the lack of political stability since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, as highlighted by the JRC report, which recalls that in 2017 the country was ranked 171st out of 180 in terms of perception of the democratization process.<fnref n="33" /> With these caveats in mind, we note a contrasting unemployment rate between youth (49% for

15-24), women (24%), while standing at around 19% for the overall working population according to ILOSTAT.<fnref n="34" /> The revival of the economy – mainly linked to hydrocarbons and to agriculture to a much lesser extent – could change things quickly if the country finds stability.

Libyan migration dynamics are marked by their great complexity, as noted in the analyses of the Mixed Migration Hub: 'Despite the tremendous focus placed on irregular migration through Libya to Europe, the situation is much more complicated with many migrants, refugees and asylum seekers choosing to remain in Libya while others with initial intentions to transit through becoming stranded in the country. (...) Worsening conditions, including exploitation and abuse in Libya has led or encouraged substantial number of migrants and refugees to cross to Italy from Libya.'<fnref n="35" /> Finally, while Libya is not signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention, it is a signatory to the 1969 African Union Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Libya is a participating state of the Khartoum Process.

## Box 3: The fast-changing complexity of Libyan migration networks, flows, and hubs

Analysing data from the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) data set of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Di Mario, Leone Sciabolazza and Molini (2020) showed in a World Bank paper that 'migration in Libya can be characterized as forced migration: conflict intensity is the main determinant of the decisions to relocate from one province to another. The analysis of migration flows across provinces indicates a dense network of connections; for each province, there is not a unique migration route from or to any other province, suggesting that individual-level characteristics play an important role in choice of migration route.'<fnref n="36" /> Migrants in Libya mainly originate from Africa and to a lesser extent, the Middle East and West Asia. In January and February 2021, 575,874 migrants from over 41 nationalities were identified in all 100 Libyan municipalities during Round 35 of DTM data collection. More than two thirds of migrants are from neighbouring countries: Niger

<footnote n="29">29 Awad, I. (2021) On occasion of the pandemic: Reflections on Egyptian labour migration, International Migration, IOM, February 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">30 Awad, I. and Selim, H. (2017). Labour Migration Governance in Times of Political Transition: A Comparative Analysis of Egypt and Tunisia, in Migration and Development, vol 6, 2017, issue 1.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">31 Borgnäs, E.; Cottone, L. and Teppert, T. (2021) Labour migration dynamics in Libya, in IOM (2021) Migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean: Trends, Risks, Development and Governance. Chapter 24. Geneva.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">32 Key Informant Interview with UNDP Regional – June 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">33 Urso, G., Sermi, F., Tarchi, D., Koopmans, J. and Duta, A., Migration Profile Libya, Bongiardo, D. editor(s), Publications Office of the European Union, Ispra, 2019.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">34 World Bank – ILOSTAT – https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=LY</footnote>

<footnote n="35">35 Mixed Migration Hub (2018) Libya Country Brief, funded by IOM and the USDOS. http://www.mixedmigrationhub.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Country-Profile-Libya.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="36">36 Di Maio, M., Leone Sciabolazza, V. & Molini, V. (2020). Migration in Libya: a spatial network analysis, Policy Research Working Paper Series, 9110, The World Bank.</footnote>
(21%), Egypt (18%), Chad (15%) and Sudan (15%).<fnref n="37" /> The majority of migrants in Libya are men constituting 90% of the estimated migrant population. Minors are estimated to make up 10% of the migrant population with 40% of them being unaccompanied, according to the Mixed Migration Hub and 2018 data.<fnref n="38" />

## Socioeconomic and migration dynamics in North Africa – comparative analysis

In order to better illustrate the similarities and differences between THAMM's North African partner countries, a comparison using ILOSTAT data allows us to identify some of the motives for labour migration not only within the region but even more so to the other side of the Mediterranean. The following graphs focus in particular on three key dimensions: the labour force participation rate (further disaggregated by gender), the sectoral shift from agriculture to services, and finally the vulnerable employment rate. The size of the labour force follows trends of population growth. Except for Egypt, North African countries exhibit a stable labour force with very little growth. This factor is mechanically correlated with demographic variables as well as the size and composition of migration flows. Labour force participation data reflects populations aging and youth migration patterns, only Tunisia shows a stable participation rate, suggesting low net migration.

<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Labour force (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (Source: World Bank, DataBank, 2000-2020)</figcaption></figure>

The labour force participation rate is a 'measure of the proportion of a country's working-age population that engages actively in the labour market, either by working or looking for work'.<fnref n="39" /> This measure is generally useful to provide an indication of the size of the supply of labour available to engage in the production of goods and services, relative to the population at working age (15 to 64). It is an excellent indicator for assessing aging populations as well as youth migration patterns, particularly in North African countries. As the chart below shows, significant decreases are observed in countries with higher migration rates-Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt in particular. Libya has not been included, given the uncertainties in the available data.

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Labour force participation rate (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria (Source: World Bank, DataBank, 2000-2020)</figcaption></figure>

The distribution of the labour force<fnref n="40" /> by gender provides a good profile of the distribution of the labour force in each North African country. It is also a good sociocultural indicator: estimates of female labour force participation and employment are generally lower than those of men, reflecting social, legal, and cultural trends and norms. Although Algeria has seen a large improvement in women's labour force participation, it remains quite low, reflecting both current trends (pre-COVID-19) and the persistence of a highly gendered society. On the other hand, Tunisia has steadily increased the number of women in its labour force.

<footnote n="37">37 IOM – DTM (2021) Libya – Migrant Report 35 (January–February 2021) - https://dtm.iom.int/reports/libya-%E2%80%94-migrant-report-35-january%E2%80%94february-2021</footnote>

<footnote n="38">38 Mixed Migration Hub (2018) Libya Country Brief, funded by IOM and the USDOS. http://www.mixedmigrationhub.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Country-Profile-Libya.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="39">39 ILO – ILOSTAT Glossary (2016) https://ilostat.ilo.org/resources/concepts-and-definitions/glossary/</footnote>

<footnote n="40">40 Formerly known as the economically active population.</footnote>
(21%), Egypt (18%), Chad (15%) and Sudan (15%).<fnref n="37" /> The majority of migrants in Libya are men constituting 90% of the estimated migrant population. Minors are estimated to make up 10% of the migrant population with 40% of them being unaccompanied, according to the Mixed Migration Hub and 2018 data.<fnref n="38" />

## Socioeconomic and migration dynamics in North Africa – comparative analysis

In order to better illustrate the similarities and differences between THAMM's North African partner countries, a comparison using ILOSTAT data allows us to identify some of the motives for labour migration not only within the region but even more so to the other side of the Mediterranean. The following graphs focus in particular on three key dimensions: the labour force participation rate (further disaggregated by gender), the sectoral shift from agriculture to services, and finally the vulnerable employment rate. The size of the labour force follows trends of population growth. Except for Egypt, North African countries exhibit a stable labour force with very little growth. This factor is mechanically correlated with demographic variables as well as the size and composition of migration flows. Labour force participation data reflects populations aging and youth migration patterns, only Tunisia shows a stable participation rate, suggesting low net migration.

<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Labour force (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (Source: World Bank, DataBank, 2000-2020)</figcaption></figure>

The labour force participation rate is a 'measure of the proportion of a country's working-age population that engages actively in the labour market, either by working or looking for work'.<fnref n="39" /> This measure is generally useful to provide an indication of the size of the supply of labour available to engage in the production of goods and services, relative to the population at working age (15 to 64). It is an excellent indicator for assessing aging populations as well as youth migration patterns, particularly in North African countries. As the chart below shows, significant decreases are observed in countries with higher migration rates-Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt in particular. Libya has not been included, given the uncertainties in the available data.

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Labour force participation rate (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria (Source: World Bank, DataBank, 2000-2020)</figcaption></figure>

The distribution of the labour force<fnref n="40" /> by gender provides a good profile of the distribution of the labour force in each North African country. It is also a good sociocultural indicator: estimates of female labour force participation and employment are generally lower than those of men, reflecting social, legal, and cultural trends and norms. Although Algeria has seen a large improvement in women's labour force participation, it remains quite low, reflecting both current trends (pre-COVID-19) and the persistence of a highly gendered society. On the other hand, Tunisia has steadily increased the number of women in its labour force.

<footnote n="37">37 IOM – DTM (2021) Libya – Migrant Report 35 (January–February 2021) - https://dtm.iom.int/reports/libya-%E2%80%94-migrant-report-35-january%E2%80%94february-2021</footnote>

<footnote n="38">38 Mixed Migration Hub (2018) Libya Country Brief, funded by IOM and the USDOS. http://www.mixedmigrationhub.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Country-Profile-Libya.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="39">39 ILO – ILOSTAT Glossary (2016) https://ilostat.ilo.org/resources/concepts-and-definitions/glossary/</footnote>

<footnote n="40">40 Formerly known as the economically active population.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Female labour force participation rate (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (Source: World Bank, DataBank 2000-2020)</figcaption></figure>

Sectoral information allows to identify shifts in employment and stages of development: from agriculture to more labour intensive industry sectors (construction) and informal services sector (particularly towards its low productivity segments). It also reflects a major trend of most developing countries, in particular in Africa: the rapid and sprawling urbanisation phenomenon, guided by internal rural-to-urban migration, forced internal displacement, and the conversion of land into urban built-up areas. The chart below shows that employment in the agricultural sector has been steadily decreasing between 2000 and 2020: from 45% to 33% in Morocco, from 23% to 10% in Algeria, from 20% to 14% in Tunisia, and finally from 30% to 21% in Egypt. World Bank data confirm the economic shift towards manufacturing sector, in particular in Morocco and Tunisia. Interestingly, female labour force participation seems to have mostly shifted from agriculture directly to the service sector, ‘but we are probably not talking about the same women here. There are no "communicating vessels" between sectors. Those who have lost their jobs in the agricultural sector are sometimes stuck on the outskirts of secondary urban areas, with no possibility of retraining.’<fnref n="41" />

<figure><img src="image_15.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4: Employment in agriculture in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (Source: World Bank, DataBank 2000-2020)</figcaption></figure>

The differences in definitions and coverage across countries render comparisons between North African countries on the existing forms of ‘vulnerable employment’ somewhat challenging.<fnref n="42" /> However, trends and dynamics can be observed and confirm other data on employment and work conditions. Vulnerable employment is often an indication of a large rural and informal economy, with a high proportion of contributing family workers and own-account workers.<fnref n="43" /> According to the World Bank, ‘they are the least likely to have formal work arrangements, are the least likely to have social protection and safety nets to guard against economic shocks, and often are incapable of generating sufficient savings to offset these shocks.’<fnref n="44" /> The parallelism – with the exception of Algeria – between the curves describing the proportion of employees in the agricultural sector and the employment vulnerability curves is explained by the close correlation between the two phenomena: vulnerability remains highest in the agricultural sector, affecting between 60 and 90% of workers in North African, Asian, and Sub-Saharan African countries. At the same time, women are more likely to have lower quality jobs and lower wages than men.

<footnote n="41">41 Key Informant Interview with UNDP, June 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">42 World Bank – ILOSTAT – https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.EMP.VULN.FE.ZS?end=2019&locations=MA-TN-EG-DZ&start=2010</footnote>

<footnote n="43">43 Gammarano, R. (2018) Paid employment vs. Vulnerable employment - A brief study of employment patterns by status in employment – ILOSTAT, Spotlight on work statistics n°3, June 2018. ILO Geneva. https://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/publication/wcms_631497.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="44">44 World Bank – Metadata Glossary – https://databank.worldbank.org/metadataglossary/world-development-indicators/series/SL.EMP.VULN.ZS Indicators of vulnerable employment include: lack of employment contracts especially of durable employment, lack of social security, lack of annual leave, lack of weekly rest, low wages/income, no training, no career advancement. Vulnerable employment includes employment in the informal sector and informal employment in the modern sector.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_15.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Female labour force participation rate (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (Source: World Bank, DataBank 2000-2020)</figcaption></figure>

Sectoral information allows to identify shifts in employment and stages of development: from agriculture to more labour intensive industry sectors (construction) and informal services sector (particularly towards its low productivity segments). It also reflects a major trend of most developing countries, in particular in Africa: the rapid and sprawling urbanisation phenomenon, guided by internal rural-to-urban migration, forced internal displacement, and the conversion of land into urban built-up areas. The chart below shows that employment in the agricultural sector has been steadily decreasing between 2000 and 2020: from 45% to 33% in Morocco, from 23% to 10% in Algeria, from 20% to 14% in Tunisia, and finally from 30% to 21% in Egypt. World Bank data confirm the economic shift towards manufacturing sector, in particular in Morocco and Tunisia. Interestingly, female labour force participation seems to have mostly shifted from agriculture directly to the service sector, 'but we are probably not talking about the same women here. There are no "communicating vessels" between sectors. Those who have lost their jobs in the agricultural sector are sometimes stuck on the outskirts of secondary urban areas, with no possibility of retraining.'<fnref n="41" />

<figure><img src="image_16.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4: Employment in agriculture in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (Source: World Bank, DataBank 2000-2020)</figcaption></figure>

The differences in definitions and coverage across countries render comparisons between North African countries on the existing forms of 'vulnerable employment' somewhat challenging.<fnref n="42" /> However, trends and dynamics can be observed and confirm other data on employment and work conditions. Vulnerable employment is often an indication of a large rural and informal economy, with a high proportion of contributing family workers and own-account workers.<fnref n="43" /> According to the World Bank, 'they are the least likely to have formal work arrangements, are the least likely to have social protection and safety nets to guard against economic shocks, and often are incapable of generating sufficient savings to offset these shocks.'<fnref n="44" /> The parallelism – with the exception of Algeria – between the curves describing the proportion of employees in the agricultural sector and the employment vulnerability curves is explained by the close correlation between the two phenomena: vulnerability remains highest in the agricultural sector, affecting between 60 and 90% of workers in North African, Asian, and Sub-Saharan African countries. At the same time, women are more likely to have lower quality jobs and lower wages than men.

<footnote n="41">41 Key Informant Interview with UNDP, June 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">42 World Bank – ILOSTAT – https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.EMP.VULN.FE.ZS?end=2019&locations=MA-TN-EG-DZ&start=2010</footnote>

<footnote n="43">43 Gammarano, R. (2018) Paid employment vs. Vulnerable employment - A brief study of employment patterns by status in employment – ILOSTAT, Spotlight on work statistics n°3, June 2018. ILO Geneva. https://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/publication/wcms_631497.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="44">44 World Bank – Metadata Glossary – https://databank.worldbank.org/metadataglossary/world-development-indicators/series/SL.EMP.VULN.ZS Indicators of vulnerable employment include: lack of employment contracts especially of durable employment, lack of social security, lack of annual leave, lack of weekly rest, low wages/income, no training, no career advancement. Vulnerable employment includes employment in the informal sector and informal employment in the modern sector.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_16.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5: Vulnerable employment rate (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (Source: World Bank, DataBank 2000-2020)</figcaption></figure>

According to the World Bank, the socio-economic situation after seven months of pandemic in this region was marked by a global recession, affecting all countries in the area except Egypt with +5.6% growth in 2019, +3.5% in 2020 and a forecast of +2.3% in 2021. All other countries are struggling: Algeria (+0.8%, -6.7%, +4.1%), Morocco (+2.5%, -6.3%, +3.4%) and Tunisia (+1%, -9.2%, +5.9%). Libya is mentioned by the World Bank with great caution due to the uncertainties surrounding the available data (+1%, -40.9%, -3.6%).<fnref n="45" />

<figure><img src="image_17.png" /><figcaption>Figure 6: Growth in real GDP in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (2019-2021) - WB estimates 2021.</figcaption></figure>

The crisis has particularly highlighted the lack of diversification and mobility of many households, which have been deprived of a solution to the ongoing recession

and have fallen into deep poverty: in Tunisia, 59% of workers who were deprived of jobs during the lockdown did not receive a salary, 30% kept their salary, and 10% received only part of it. In Morocco, 44% of the poorest households reported receiving no income during the lockdown, a proportion that rises to 10% among the richest households. At the end of 2020, according to Pierre Vermeren, historian and expert on social and economic issues in North Africa, 'the situation was unprecedented for decades: it is actually worrying not only for societies - because unemployment is soaring everywhere, and bankruptcies are multiplying: 40% of artisans have already gone bankrupt in Tunisia, and 35% of small and medium-sized businesses are threatened - but also for macroeconomic and monetary stability, because these countries are already heavily indebted in the crisis'.<fnref n="46" />

The informal sector usually acts as a buffer against negative shocks, temporarily absorbing labor pushed out of the formal sector. As is often the case with the pandemic, however, the results defied expected patterns. Let's look first at the situation before the pandemic, assessed - in the chart below - using payroll employment data to measure the size of the informal sector and the potential improvement in working conditions. The data suggest substantial improvements in Egypt. Morocco has seen the share of its labor force engaged in the formal sector increase by 13 percentage points, although the figure remains low. However, in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, policies of social distancing, containment, and confinement have reinforced the vulnerabilities of the informal sector due to the nature of most informal sector jobs, where remote work is not an option. Informal workers have been forced to choose between complying with health distancing measures or maintaining their livelihoods. In total, 89 percent of informal workers in the MENA region are at risk of losing their jobs and income and have no social protection, according to an Oxfam report.<fnref n="47" />

<footnote n="45">45 Arezki, R., Moreno-Dodson, B., Yuting Fan, R. Gansey, R., Nguyen, H., Nguyen, M.C., Mottaghi, L., Tsakas, C., and Wood, C.A. (2020) Commercer ensemble : vers une relance de l'intégration de la région Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord à l'ère post-COVID. Bulletin d'information économique de la région MENA (Octobre), Washington, The World Bank Group. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34516/211639FR.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="46">46 Vermeren, P. (2021). Le Maghreb assiégé par la crise du coronavirus. Hérodote, 1(1), 165-179.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">47 Uzelac, A. (2020) The real common interest: The converging EU and North African migration agendas – where do people’s interests come in? Oxfam International.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_17.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5: Vulnerable employment rate (ILO estimate) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (Source: World Bank, DataBank 2000-2020)</figcaption></figure>

According to the World Bank, the socio-economic situation after seven months of pandemic in this region was marked by a global recession, affecting all countries in the area except Egypt with +5.6% growth in 2019, +3.5% in 2020 and a forecast of +2.3% in 2021. All other countries are struggling: Algeria (+0.8%, -6.7%, +4.1%), Morocco (+2.5%, -6.3%, +3.4%) and Tunisia (+1%, -9.2%, +5.9%). Libya is mentioned by the World Bank with great caution due to the uncertainties surrounding the available data (+1%, -40.9%, -3.6%).<fnref n="45" />

<figure><img src="image_18.png" /><figcaption>Figure 6: Growth in real GDP in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt (2019-2021) - WB estimates 2021.</figcaption></figure>

The crisis has particularly highlighted the lack of diversification and mobility of many households, which have been deprived of a solution to the ongoing recession

and have fallen into deep poverty: in Tunisia, 59% of workers who were deprived of jobs during the lockdown did not receive a salary, 30% kept their salary, and 10% received only part of it. In Morocco, 44% of the poorest households reported receiving no income during the lockdown, a proportion that rises to 10% among the richest households. At the end of 2020, according to Pierre Vermeren, historian and expert on social and economic issues in North Africa, 'the situation was unprecedented for decades: it is actually worrying not only for societies - because unemployment is soaring everywhere, and bankruptcies are multiplying: 40% of artisans have already gone bankrupt in Tunisia, and 35% of small and medium-sized businesses are threatened - but also for macroeconomic and monetary stability, because these countries are already heavily indebted in the crisis'.<fnref n="46" />

The informal sector usually acts as a buffer against negative shocks, temporarily absorbing labor pushed out of the formal sector. As is often the case with the pandemic, however, the results defied expected patterns. Let's look first at the situation before the pandemic, assessed - in the chart below - using payroll employment data to measure the size of the informal sector and the potential improvement in working conditions. The data suggest substantial improvements in Egypt. Morocco has seen the share of its labor force engaged in the formal sector increase by 13 percentage points, although the figure remains low. However, in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, policies of social distancing, containment, and confinement have reinforced the vulnerabilities of the informal sector due to the nature of most informal sector jobs, where remote work is not an option. Informal workers have been forced to choose between complying with health distancing measures or maintaining their livelihoods. In total, 89 percent of informal workers in the MENA region are at risk of losing their jobs and income and have no social protection, according to an Oxfam report.<fnref n="47" />

<footnote n="45">45 Arezki, R., Moreno-Dodson, B., Yuting Fan, R. Gansey, R., Nguyen, H., Nguyen, M.C., Mottaghi, L., Tsakas, C., and Wood, C.A. (2020) Commercer ensemble : vers une relance de l'intégration de la région Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord à l'ère post-COVID. Bulletin d'information économique de la région MENA (Octobre), Washington, The World Bank Group. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34516/211639FR.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="46">46 Vermeren, P. (2021). Le Maghreb assiégé par la crise du coronavirus. Hérodote, 1(1), 165-179.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">47 Uzelac, A. (2020) The real common interest: The converging EU and North African migration agendas – where do people’s interests come in? Oxfam International.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_18.png" /><figcaption>Figure 7: Formality and informality through Wage salaried workers</figcaption></figure>

Taking into account that the data presented in this
subsection were collected before the outbreak of the
COVID-19 pandemic (March 2020), which is an
aggravating factor for all the social and economic
indicators concerned, several tentative conclusions can
be drawn:

1) The indicators of the five countries concerned are marked by very high unemployment and a lack of socio-economic prospects in the short or medium

term;

2) Women and young people are particularly exposed in each of the five countries;

3) As both countries of origin and transit for migration to Europe, the North African countries have an opportunity to dialogue with the countries of the European Union – themselves in demand for skilled and low-skilled labour in many sectors – to foster a mutually beneficial approach to mobility.

As pointed out by the economist Mehdi Lahlou, about Morocco and Algeria specifically: North African countries 'face a double challenge of the same nature which consists in preserving their respective interests at home and in relation to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the European Union, while acknowledging that the problems posed by irregular migration – which will worsen in the coming years – are solved in the countries of departure.'<fnref n="48" /> A renewed dialogue, of which the COVID-19 pandemic has underlined the urgency, can be usefully initiated during the exchanges within THAMM.

<figure><img src="image_19.png" /><figcaption>Picture 2: Credit FORMENA</figcaption></figure>

<footnote n="48">48 Lahlou, M. (2018) Morocco and Algeria in European migration policies, ECDPM Great Insights magazine, Autumn 2018 (volume 7, issue 4).</footnote>

<footnote>https://ecdpm.org/great-insights/north-africa-hope-in-troubled-times/morocco-algeria-european-migration-policies/</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_19.png" /><figcaption>Figure 7: Formality and informality through Wage salaried workers</figcaption></figure>

Taking into account that the data presented in this subsection were collected before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic (March 2020), which is an aggravating factor for all the social and economic indicators concerned, several tentative conclusions can be drawn:

1) The indicators of the five countries concerned are marked by very high unemployment and a lack of socio-economic prospects in the short or medium

term;

2) Women and young people are particularly exposed in each of the five countries;

3) As both countries of origin and transit for migration to Europe, the North African countries have an opportunity to dialogue with the countries of the European Union – themselves in demand for skilled and low-skilled labour in many sectors – to foster a mutually beneficial approach to mobility.

As pointed out by the economist Mehdi Lahlou, about Morocco and Algeria specifically: North African countries 'face a double challenge of the same nature which consists in preserving their respective interests at home and in relation to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the European Union, while acknowledging that the problems posed by irregular migration – which will worsen in the coming years – are solved in the countries of departure.'<fnref n="48" /> A renewed dialogue, of which the COVID-19 pandemic has underlined the urgency, can be usefully initiated during the exchanges within THAMM.

<figure><img src="image_20.png" /><figcaption>Picture 2: Credit FORMENA</figcaption></figure>

<footnote n="48">48 Lahlou, M. (2018) Morocco and Algeria in European migration policies, ECDPM Great Insights magazine, Autumn 2018 (volume 7, issue 4).</footnote>

<footnote>https://ecdpm.org/great-insights/north-africa-hope-in-troubled-times/morocco-algeria-european-migration-policies/</footnote>
LABOUR MIGRATION DYNAMICS FROM NORTH AFRICA

To understand the dynamics of mobility – and in particular all the issues related to labour migration – between North Africa and the European Union, it is essential to take three temporal components into account:

- On one hand, the long history of colonial rule, liberation struggles, and privileged bilateral relations (in particular with France for Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia; with Libya for Italy). Beyond purely economic or commercial exchanges, this long period of time is notably at the origin of university exchange programmes, collaboration in technical training, as well as more recent agreements for the employment of Moroccan or Tunisian seasonal workers, particularly in Spain or Italy.

- On the other, the shorter time frame and contemporary global dynamics of mobility, strongly influenced by the "Arab Spring" which led to social reforms in Morocco, prolonged demonstrations in Algeria and the fall of the governments in place in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt; but also by migration from sub-Saharan countries, the war in Syria, which have profoundly changed the composition, routes and volume of migration flows to Europe. In the last twenty years, countries on both sides of the Mediterranean have set up numerous programmes and interventions to better control, manage and analyze mixed migration flows from North Africa.

- Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences on the world's economies have played an interrupting and accelerating role, with disastrous effects on employment, certain sectors of the economy, and the most vulnerable individuals (women, informal workers, economic migrants, etc.), while at the same time confronting political decision-makers and socio-economic actors with the immediate and longer-term need for structural reforms.

Leaving Libya aside,<fnref n="49" /> this section considers the long and recent migration history between EU countries and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt because of the volumes involved in terms of stocks and flows, as well as in absolute and relative terms to the population of each of the four countries. This initial historical perspective will be complemented by a typological overview of the three main forms of labour migration from North Africa to Europe: seasonal migrants, international students, and highly skilled professionals. The next section will go into more detail on the lessons learned from the current pandemic: social, societal, economic and political lessons, of which labour migration is certainly an excellent prism for reading.

Understanding historical dynamics:
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt

North Africa and Europe are linked by history and geography. How do these two regions relate to each other? How has their relationship evolved in the past and how to foster their cooperation? This subsection considers the long history and often bilateral relations, in order to recall that the dynamics of economic migration are by no means a new phenomenon. The complex colonial history and socioeconomic relationships between France, on one hand, and Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, on the other, is only a recent episode of centuries of mobility across the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are generally presented – from a European perspective – as a homogeneous block and the historical and national differences between them not taken into consideration. Finally, the political perspective and interests of the Maghreb countries with respect to migration are largely ignored.⁵⁰ Natter's historical analysis distinguishes three main phases:⁵¹

<footnote n="49">49 For two reasons: 1) Libyans do not migrate much to Europe. Libya is a country of destination. Egyptians do, but Europe is not their main destination; 2) most data are inaccurate or outdated. Anecdotal evidence and interviews, however, fuel specific analyses on Libya.
50 Natter, K. (2016). Au-delà de pays d'origine : Schémas migratoires en Algérie, au Maroc et en Tunisie ; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. And Natter, K.</footnote>

<footnote>(2014). Fifty years of Maghreb Emigration : how States Shaped Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Emigration, Oxford, UK: International Migration Institute, University of oxford.
51 Idem. The precise distribution of the three phases also varies by country of destination, as data are not available for all periods in all countries. For example, the period for France is from 1964 to 2008, for Germany from</footnote>
LABOUR MIGRATION DYNAMICS FROM NORTH AFRICA

To understand the dynamics of mobility – and in particular all the issues related to labour migration – between North Africa and the European Union, it is essential to take three temporal components into account:

- On one hand, the long history of colonial rule, liberation struggles, and privileged bilateral relations (in particular with France for Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia; with Libya for Italy). Beyond purely economic or commercial exchanges, this long period of time is notably at the origin of university exchange programmes, collaboration in technical training, as well as more recent agreements for the employment of Moroccan or Tunisian seasonal workers, particularly in Spain or Italy.

- On the other, the shorter time frame and contemporary global dynamics of mobility, strongly influenced by the "Arab Spring" which led to social reforms in Morocco, prolonged demonstrations in Algeria and the fall of the governments in place in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt; but also by migration from sub-Saharan countries, the war in Syria, which have profoundly changed the composition, routes and volume of migration flows to Europe. In the last twenty years, countries on both sides of the Mediterranean have set up numerous programmes and interventions to better control, manage and analyze mixed migration flows from North Africa.

- Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences on the world's economies have played an interrupting and accelerating role, with disastrous effects on employment, certain sectors of the economy, and the most vulnerable individuals (women, informal workers, economic migrants, etc.), while at the same time confronting political decision-makers and socio-economic actors with the immediate and longer-term need for structural reforms.

Leaving Libya aside,<fnref n="49" /> this section considers the long and recent migration history between EU countries and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt because of the volumes involved in terms of stocks and flows, as well as in absolute and relative terms to the population of each of the four countries. This initial historical perspective will be complemented by a typological overview of the three main forms of labour migration from North Africa to Europe: seasonal migrants, international students, and highly skilled professionals. The next section will go into more detail on the lessons learned from the current pandemic: social, societal, economic and political lessons, of which labour migration is certainly an excellent prism for reading.

Understanding historical dynamics:
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt

North Africa and Europe are linked by history and geography. How do these two regions relate to each other? How has their relationship evolved in the past and how to foster their cooperation? This subsection considers the long history and often bilateral relations, in order to recall that the dynamics of economic migration are by no means a new phenomenon. The complex colonial history and socioeconomic relationships between France, on one hand, and Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, on the other, is only a recent episode of centuries of mobility across the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are generally presented – from a European perspective – as a homogeneous block and the historical and national differences between them not taken into consideration. Finally, the political perspective and interests of the Maghreb countries with respect to migration are largely ignored.⁵⁰ Natter's historical analysis distinguishes three main phases:⁵¹

<footnote n="49">49 For two reasons: 1) Libyans do not migrate much to Europe. Libya is a country of destination. Egyptians do, but Europe is not their main destination; 2) most data are inaccurate or outdated. Anecdotal evidence and interviews, however, fuel specific analyses on Libya.
50 Natter, K. (2016). Au-delà de pays d'origine : Schémas migratoires en Algérie, au Maroc et en Tunisie ; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. And Natter, K.</footnote>

<footnote>(2014). Fifty years of Maghreb Emigration : how States Shaped Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Emigration, Oxford, UK: International Migration Institute, University of oxford.

51 Idem. The precise distribution of the three phases also varies by country of destination, as data are not available for all periods in all countries. For example, the period for France is from 1964 to 2008, for Germany from</footnote>
* **1964-1973, Recruitment of foreign workers and promotion of emigration.** During the 1960s and especially in the early 1970s, there was a demand-driven increase in emigration from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Young men with low qualifications in particular migrated as workers to Northern and Western Europe (France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands);

* **1974-1995, Consolidation of migrant communities in Europe.** From 1973 to the mid-1990s, emigration from Algeria decreased sharply, while emigration from Morocco and Tunisia remained relatively stable. At the same time, migrant communities were consolidating in Europe through family reunification and naturalization.

* **1995 to the present day, Multiplication of migratory patterns.** Since the mid-1990s, emigration from Morocco has been increasing rapidly especially to Spain and Italy, while there has been only a moderate increase in emigration from Tunisia and Algeria. At the same time, the profile of migrants is changing: first, irregular migration is increasing considerably, and secondly, the level of education of migrants is on average significantly higher than in the past.

Although since the 1960s there has also been organized labour emigration to other European countries, such as Germany, Belgium, or the Netherlands, it was not until the 1980s that North African emigration shifted more to other destinations, above all to Spain and Italy. Until the 1980s, France was the main destination because of the historical links, colonial period, close economic and political cooperation that developed over the decades between France and the three countries. The figure below provides an overview of the geographic diversification of North African emigration over the past few decades, showing that France's share is declining, while those of Spain and Italy are sharply increasing.

<figure><img src="image_20.png" /><figcaption>Figure 9: Evolution of total annual emigration from Algeria to France, Spain, Italy and Germany (1964-2014)</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_21.png" /><figcaption>Figure 10: Evolution of total annual emigration from Morocco to France, Spain, Italy and Germany (1964-2014)</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_22.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1965">1965 to 2014, for Italy from 1980 to 2010 and for Spain from 1988 to 2011.
Sources: for France, Spain, and Italy: DEMIG C2C Database (DEMIG 2015a);
for Germany: 1965-2009, DEMIG C2C Database (DEMIG 2015a); for 2010-</footnote>

<footnote>2014, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees / Bundesamt für
Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF 2016: 172).</footnote>
* **1964-1973, Recruitment of foreign workers and promotion of emigration.** During the 1960s and especially in the early 1970s, there was a demand-driven increase in emigration from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Young men with low qualifications in particular migrated as workers to Northern and Western Europe (France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands);

* **1974-1995, Consolidation of migrant communities in Europe.** From 1973 to the mid-1990s, emigration from Algeria decreased sharply, while emigration from Morocco and Tunisia remained relatively stable. At the same time, migrant communities were consolidating in Europe through family reunification and naturalization.

* **1995 to the present day, Multiplication of migratory patterns.** Since the mid-1990s, emigration from Morocco has been increasing rapidly especially to Spain and Italy, while there has been only a moderate increase in emigration from Tunisia and Algeria. At the same time, the profile of migrants is changing: first, irregular migration is increasing considerably, and secondly, the level of education of migrants is on average significantly higher than in the past.

Although since the 1960s there has also been organized labour emigration to other European countries, such as Germany, Belgium, or the Netherlands, it was not until the 1980s that North African emigration shifted more to other destinations, above all to Spain and Italy. Until the 1980s, France was the main destination because of the historical links, colonial period, close economic and political cooperation that developed over the decades between France and the three countries. The figure below provides an overview of the geographic diversification of North African emigration over the past few decades, showing that France's share is declining, while those of Spain and Italy are sharply increasing.

<figure><img src="image_21.png" /><figcaption>Figure 9: Evolution of total annual emigration from Algeria to France, Spain, Italy and Germany (1964-2014)</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_22.png" /><figcaption>Figure 10: Evolution of total annual emigration from Morocco to France, Spain, Italy and Germany (1964-2014)</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_23.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="1965">1965 to 2014, for Italy from 1980 to 2010 and for Spain from 1988 to 2011.
Sources: for France, Spain, and Italy: DEMIG C2C Database (DEMIG 2015a);
for Germany: 1965-2009, DEMIG C2C Database (DEMIG 2015a); for 2010-</footnote>

<footnote>2014, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees / Bundesamt für
Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF 2016: 172).</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_23.png" /><figcaption>Figure 11: Evolution of total annual emigration from Tunisia to France, Spain, Italy and Germany (1964-2014)</figcaption></figure>

Sources for figures 9, 10, 11: DEMIG (2015) DEMIG C2C, V.1.2, Full Internal Edition, edited by University of Oxford International Migration Institute (IMI), Oxford, UK.

Box 4: Between soft power and a hard place: the case of Egypt

With an estimated population of over 100 million, Egypt is now the largest provider of migrant workers in the MENA region. According to an MPI note, emigration has become a real soft power instrument for Egypt at a time when 'more than 6 million Egyptian emigrants lived in the MENA region as of 2016, primarily in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates (and) another 3 million Egyptian citizens and their descendants reside in Europe, North America, and Australia, where they have formed vibrant diaspora communities.'<fnref n="52" />

<figure><img src="image_24.png" /><figcaption>Figure 12: Egyptian Migrants in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), (Source: WB, 2016, in thousands)</figcaption></figure>

Historically, Egypt has been a country of emigration, most of which has occurred within the broader Arab region. Until the mid-1970s and the oil crisis, Egypt supplied Libya, Iraq, and the oil-producing Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with primarily low- and medium-skilled workers working in the public administration, education, health or agricultural sectors. From the mid-1970s onward, 'international labour migration performs two main functions in the Egyptian economy. It is an external outlet for the growing Egyptian labour force, which reduces pressures on the domestic labour market. It also is a source of financial remittances in hard currencies.' most Egyptian migrant workers headed to the Gulf region, notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. Recruitment of Egyptian workers in the GCC states operates under the Kafala system: in-country sponsor, hold 'considerable power and control over workers.'⁵³

Contemporaneous perspective: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia

The wave of the 'Arab Spring' in 2010 and 2011 had different repercussions, while generating important institutional and socio-economic changes in each North African country. A decade later, some transitions have gone better in some countries than in others, but the socioeconomic problems remain as highlighted in the previous section. On the other side of the Mediterranean, the perception of a *migration crisis* in the media and in national opinion, fueled by the reality of tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea and populist and electoral narratives, have convinced EU countries to accelerate collaboration with North African countries in particular to manage mobility on both sides of the Mediterranean.

The harshest criticisms of the European Union's stance – in particular to the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps, FRONTEX, and to an overall lack of policy coherence between member states – have been made in particular by civil society actors and NGOs, who stressed the extent to which the EU had gone 'from a promoter of human rights in North Africa, to an actor that prioritizes self-interest over the needs and rights of people.'<fnref n="54" /> Other NGOs interviewed for this research generally confirm the diagnosis: 'On the one hand, countries such as Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia are not undertaking the necessary reforms, due to lack of resources, capacities or political will. These reforms are necessary, especially on the issues

<footnote n="52">52 Tsourapas, G. (2018) Egypt: Migration and Diaspora Politics in an Emerging Transit Country
53 Idem.</footnote>

<footnote n="54">54 Uzelac, A. (2020) The real common interest: The converging EU and North African migration agendas – where do people’s interests come in? Oxfam International.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_24.png" /><figcaption>Figure 11: Evolution of total annual emigration from Tunisia to France, Spain, Italy and Germany (1964-2014)</figcaption></figure>

Sources for figures 9, 10, 11: DEMIG (2015) DEMIG C2C, V.1.2, Full Internal Edition, edited by University of Oxford International Migration Institute (IMI), Oxford, UK.

Box 4: Between soft power and a hard place: the case of Egypt

With an estimated population of over 100 million, Egypt is now the largest provider of migrant workers in the MENA region. According to an MPI note, emigration has become a real soft power instrument for Egypt at a time when 'more than 6 million Egyptian emigrants lived in the MENA region as of 2016, primarily in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates (and) another 3 million Egyptian citizens and their descendants reside in Europe, North America, and Australia, where they have formed vibrant diaspora communities.'<fnref n="52" />

<figure><img src="image_25.png" /><figcaption>Figure 12: Egyptian Migrants in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), (Source: WB, 2016, in thousands)</figcaption></figure>

Historically, Egypt has been a country of emigration, most of which has occurred within the broader Arab region. Until the mid-1970s and the oil crisis, Egypt supplied Libya, Iraq, and the oil-producing Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with primarily low- and medium-skilled workers working in the public administration, education, health or agricultural sectors. From the mid-1970s onward, 'international labour migration performs two main functions in the Egyptian economy. It is an external outlet for the growing Egyptian labour force, which reduces pressures on the domestic labour market. It also is a source of financial remittances in hard currencies.' most Egyptian migrant workers headed to the Gulf region, notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. Recruitment of Egyptian workers in the GCC states operates under the Kafala system: in-country sponsor, hold 'considerable power and control over workers.'⁵³

Contemporaneous perspective: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia

The wave of the 'Arab Spring' in 2010 and 2011 had different repercussions, while generating important institutional and socio-economic changes in each North African country. A decade later, some transitions have gone better in some countries than in others, but the socioeconomic problems remain as highlighted in the previous section. On the other side of the Mediterranean, the perception of a *migration crisis* in the media and in national opinion, fueled by the reality of tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea and populist and electoral narratives, have convinced EU countries to accelerate collaboration with North African countries in particular to manage mobility on both sides of the Mediterranean.

The harshest criticisms of the European Union's stance – in particular to the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps, FRONTEX, and to an overall lack of policy coherence between member states – have been made in particular by civil society actors and NGOs, who stressed the extent to which the EU had gone 'from a promoter of human rights in North Africa, to an actor that prioritizes self-interest over the needs and rights of people.'<fnref n="54" /> Other NGOs interviewed for this research generally confirm the diagnosis: 'On the one hand, countries such as Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia are not undertaking the necessary reforms, due to lack of resources, capacities or political will. These reforms are necessary, especially on the issues

<footnote n="52">52 Tsourapas, G. (2018) Egypt: Migration and Diaspora Politics in an Emerging Transit Country
53 Idem.</footnote>

<footnote n="54">54 Uzelac, A. (2020) The real common interest: The converging EU and North African migration agendas – where do people’s interests come in? Oxfam International.</footnote>
of asylum and protection. On the other hand, EU policies focus on rebordering, containment and policing, which creates no real incentive for real reforms and politicizes the debate.’<fnref n="55" /> From a conceptual and political standpoint, the process of rebordering, which has been at the center of EU internal politics for decades, is now at the heart of the issues, as Europe exports its borders - to North Africa, but also to sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey and Central Asia: ‘rebordering pressures result from widening boundary gaps at the EU’s external borders, exogenous shocks to cross-border transactions, growing community deficits of debordering, and their politicization.’<fnref n="56" />

In this context, the dynamics of labor migration from North African countries to Europe should be observed. Recent trends show a real need for skilled and unskilled labor in EU countries. This strong demand, in a context of aging populations in many European countries and a lack of workers in construction or agriculture in particular, could outline the contours of an economically advantageous mobility for all actors, provided that it respects the rights and protection of migrants.

It should first be noted that the overall number of residence permits has increased continuously and globally over the decade 2009-2019, with two main reasons for this growth: employment and associated family reunification. In particular, globally, we note that work-related residence permits increased by 170% between 2014 and 2019. Going back to the ILO-ICLS definition of labor migration-which also includes international students-one can conclude that the total number of new residence permits issued to international migrants in 2019 for the 27 EU countries was 1.6 million (1.2+0.4), compared to only half in 2009 (0.55+0.25). However, if we break down this data by country of origin, we see that the increase is mainly due to Syria (+0.8 million over the period), Ukraine (+0.4 million) and India and China (both with +0.1 million), accounting for 85% of the total; in contrast, the number of new residence permits granted to North African countries is stable with a very slight increase (+0.08 million).

<figure><img src="image_25.png" /><figcaption>Figure 13: Number of new residence permits issued by type in EU 27 countries, 2009-2019 (by reason) - (Source: Eurostat, 2021)</figcaption></figure>

If we consider the ranking of residence permits granted by European Union countries between 2014 and 2019 (in volume of valid, renewed and new permits), Morocco comes out on top with almost 2 million active permits. Algeria also makes the list with more than 0.7 million active permits over the same period. In relation to its population, Tunisia also has a proportionally comparable number of residence permits. This quick overview confirms the important role of North African workers in the European economy. The next section will seek to better qualify – in terms of skills, gender, and age in particular – the contours of this migration that contributes so significantly to the economic and social development of Europe, and in particular of France, Italy, Spain, and Germany.

## Seasonal labour migration from North Africa to EU countries: a case study

Most of the current employment schemes in the EU target migrant workers within specific sectors, such as IT, construction, tourism or agriculture. Some of these sectors have been negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in severe job losses. One essential sector strongly impacted by the crisis is agriculture. In the EU, agriculture is a main source of employment and income for less than 4% of the population, and this rate is

<footnote n="55">55 Key Informant Interview, International NGO, Tunis, June 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="56">56 See in particular:</footnote>

<footnote n="1">1) Vicente Ruffí, J., Richard, Y., Feliu, J. and Berzi, M. « Editorial: Peripheral borders, soft and hard re-bordering in Europe », Belgeo.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2) Bélanger, M., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2021). Politicization and Rebordering in EU Enlargement: Membership Discourses in European Parliaments. Journal of European Public Policy.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3) Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2021). Re-bordering Europe? Collective Action Barriers to 'Fortress Europe'. Journal of European Public Policy.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4) Lutz, P., & Karstens, F. (2021). External borders and internal freedoms: How the refugee crisis shaped the bordering preferences of European citizens. Journal of European Public Policy.</footnote>
of asylum and protection. On the other hand, EU policies focus on rebordering, containment and policing, which creates no real incentive for real reforms and politicizes the debate.’<fnref n="55" /> From a conceptual and political standpoint, the process of rebordering, which has been at the center of EU internal politics for decades, is now at the heart of the issues, as Europe exports its borders - to North Africa, but also to sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey and Central Asia: ‘rebordering pressures result from widening boundary gaps at the EU’s external borders, exogenous shocks to cross-border transactions, growing community deficits of debordering, and their politicization.’<fnref n="56" />

In this context, the dynamics of labor migration from North African countries to Europe should be observed. Recent trends show a real need for skilled and unskilled labor in EU countries. This strong demand, in a context of aging populations in many European countries and a lack of workers in construction or agriculture in particular, could outline the contours of an economically advantageous mobility for all actors, provided that it respects the rights and protection of migrants.

It should first be noted that the overall number of residence permits has increased continuously and globally over the decade 2009-2019, with two main reasons for this growth: employment and associated family reunification. In particular, globally, we note that work-related residence permits increased by 170% between 2014 and 2019. Going back to the ILO-ICLS definition of labor migration-which also includes international students-one can conclude that the total number of new residence permits issued to international migrants in 2019 for the 27 EU countries was 1.6 million (1.2+0.4), compared to only half in 2009 (0.55+0.25). However, if we break down this data by country of origin, we see that the increase is mainly due to Syria (+0.8 million over the period), Ukraine (+0.4 million) and India and China (both with +0.1 million), accounting for 85% of the total; in contrast, the number of new residence permits granted to North African countries is stable with a very slight increase (+0.08 million).

<figure><img src="image_26.png" /><figcaption>Figure 13: Number of new residence permits issued by type in EU 27 countries, 2009-2019 (by reason) - (Source: Eurostat, 2021)</figcaption></figure>

If we consider the ranking of residence permits granted by European Union countries between 2014 and 2019 (in volume of valid, renewed and new permits), Morocco comes out on top with almost 2 million active permits. Algeria also makes the list with more than 0.7 million active permits over the same period. In relation to its population, Tunisia also has a proportionally comparable number of residence permits. This quick overview confirms the important role of North African workers in the European economy. The next section will seek to better qualify – in terms of skills, gender, and age in particular – the contours of this migration that contributes so significantly to the economic and social development of Europe, and in particular of France, Italy, Spain, and Germany.

## Seasonal labour migration from North Africa to EU countries: a case study

Most of the current employment schemes in the EU target migrant workers within specific sectors, such as IT, construction, tourism or agriculture. Some of these sectors have been negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in severe job losses. One essential sector strongly impacted by the crisis is agriculture. In the EU, agriculture is a main source of employment and income for less than 4% of the population, and this rate is

<footnote n="55">55 Key Informant Interview, International NGO, Tunis, June 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="56">56 See in particular:</footnote>

<footnote n="1">1) Vicente Ruffí, J., Richard, Y., Feliu, J. and Berzi, M. « Editorial: Peripheral borders, soft and hard re-bordering in Europe », Belgeo.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2) Bélanger, M., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2021). Politicization and Rebordering in EU Enlargement: Membership Discourses in European Parliaments. Journal of European Public Policy.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3) Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2021). Re-bordering Europe? Collective Action Barriers to 'Fortress Europe'. Journal of European Public Policy.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">4) Lutz, P., & Karstens, F. (2021). External borders and internal freedoms: How the refugee crisis shaped the bordering preferences of European citizens. Journal of European Public Policy.</footnote>
falling. This is partly due to the arduous nature of agricultural occupations and the fact that they generate less income than other activities. The recruitment of local and young labour is complicated in agricultural and rural areas, especially in remote areas, which generally suffer from a poorer quality of services and lower attractiveness. In addition, the agricultural production cycle is characterised by high variability and unpredictability due to alternating seasonal cycles, weather conditions and variations in food demand. This creates the need for a versatile, temporary and flexible workforce: "*Foreign seasonal workers are present in the most intensive sectors: as soon as an agricultural area specialises and industrialises, in short intensifies its production, effective channels for recruiting non-native labour are set up: the only labour force likely to accept the proposed pay and working conditions.*"<fnref n="57" />

Mobility restrictions cut off the usual seasonal inflows of workers from third-countries, disrupting harvests in the spring of 2020 and curbing the sector's productivity (particularly in countries such as Italy and Spain where they play a key role). Reacting to this situation, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the protection of seasonal workers on 19 June 2020, calling on the Commission and Member States to ensure proper implementation of the relevant EU legislation<fnref n="58" /> and issuance of new specific and long-term solutions. The resolution acknowledged that cross-border and seasonal workers had been particularly hit by the crisis and measures taken to contain the spread of the disease – many of them being 'stuck in the country of employment without income, protection, or transport (...) and sometimes even without shelter or access to healthcare and food'.⁵⁹

In the agricultural and tourist year from April 2018 to March 2019, 1,050,000 people were hired on seasonal contracts in France. Over this period, the agricultural sector alone accounted for 270,000 seasonal workers, which represents a third of all its employees over the period.<fnref n="60" /> France receives around 16,000 foreign seasonal workers each year, of which almost 50% come from Morocco (7,000 people, of which around two-thirds are recurring) and Tunisia (1,000) on the basis of labour agreements allowing seasonal workers to be brought in under a simplified procedure. On average, declared seasonal migrants from Morocco and Tunisia working in the agricultural sector in France thus represent 3% of the declared seasonal workforce. This is certainly an underestimated figure, as it only takes into account declared contracts. The immigrant workforce from Morocco and Tunisia, particularly in intensive arboriculture (fruit picking) and greenhouse market gardening, is actually much larger if undeclared workers are taken into account. In some French regions, no production would be possible without their contribution: horticulture in Bouches-du-Rhône, asparagus in Gard and Landes, strawberries in Dordogne or Lot-et-Garonne, etc.

Spain and Italy present two types of seasonal worker profiles, circular and permanent. Spain is the world's top exporter of strawberries and 90% are produced in the province of Huelva (6000 hectares and about 300,000 tonnes a year between February to May). Strawberry farms are heavily reliant on the 50 000 seasonal workers, mainly foreign migrant workers, who come each year. Most legal foreign guest workers are eastern Europeans, followed by Moroccan and Latin Americans. Typical seasonal workers in Spain arrived with local temporary migration programmes and have been coming regularly for six or even eleven years, for a period of three to six months a year. The numerous Moroccan women employed in the strawberry fields are recruited in their

<footnote n="57">57 Decosse, F. and Hellio E. (2015) Migration circulaire ou canalisation utilitariste des mobilités? Les programmes de migration temporaire en agriculture intensive vus d'en bas, in Journée d'étude "La circulation et le retour à l'épreuve des contraintes migratoires?", Université Paris-Diderot, URMIS, Paris, 25 septembre 2015.</footnote>

<footnote n="58">58 According to the European Parliament, 'migrant seasonal workers are covered by the Seasonal Workers Directive (Directive 2014/36/EU), which grants them equal treatment in terms of employment conditions, minimum working age, working conditions and occupational health and safety measures. For the first time, the directive provided a set of harmonised rules for the admission, residence and rights of third country seasonal workers. Seasonal workers have the right to equal treatment with nationals of the host country as regards terms of employment, such as the minimum</footnote>

<footnote>working age, working conditions (such as pay and dismissal, working hours, leave and holidays) and health and safety regulations. The right to equal treatment also applies to social security benefits linked to sickness, invalidity and old age, training and advice on seasonal work.'</footnote>

<footnote>(https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/689347/EPRS_BRI(2021)689347_EN.pdf)</footnote>

<footnote>59</footnote>

<footnote>https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/689347/EPRS_BRI(2021)689347_EN.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="60">60 https://dares.travail-emploi.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/pdf/dares_analyses_emploi_saisonnier_fr ance_2018-2019.pdf</footnote>
falling. This is partly due to the arduous nature of agricultural occupations and the fact that they generate less income than other activities. The recruitment of local and young labour is complicated in agricultural and rural areas, especially in remote areas, which generally suffer from a poorer quality of services and lower attractiveness. In addition, the agricultural production cycle is characterised by high variability and unpredictability due to alternating seasonal cycles, weather conditions and variations in food demand. This creates the need for a versatile, temporary and flexible workforce: "*Foreign seasonal workers are present in the most intensive sectors: as soon as an agricultural area specialises and industrialises, in short intensifies its production, effective channels for recruiting non-native labour are set up: the only labour force likely to accept the proposed pay and working conditions.*"<fnref n="57" />

Mobility restrictions cut off the usual seasonal inflows of workers from third-countries, disrupting harvests in the spring of 2020 and curbing the sector's productivity (particularly in countries such as Italy and Spain where they play a key role). Reacting to this situation, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the protection of seasonal workers on 19 June 2020, calling on the Commission and Member States to ensure proper implementation of the relevant EU legislation<fnref n="58" /> and issuance of new specific and long-term solutions. The resolution acknowledged that cross-border and seasonal workers had been particularly hit by the crisis and measures taken to contain the spread of the disease – many of them being 'stuck in the country of employment without income, protection, or transport (...) and sometimes even without shelter or access to healthcare and food'.<fnref n="59" />

In the agricultural and tourist year from April 2018 to March 2019, 1,050,000 people were hired on seasonal contracts in France. Over this period, the agricultural sector alone accounted for 270,000 seasonal workers, which represents a third of all its employees over the period.<fnref n="60" /> France receives around 16,000 foreign seasonal workers each year, of which almost 50% come from Morocco (7,000 people, of which around two-thirds are recurring) and Tunisia (1,000) on the basis of labour agreements allowing seasonal workers to be brought in under a simplified procedure. On average, declared seasonal migrants from Morocco and Tunisia working in the agricultural sector in France thus represent 3% of the declared seasonal workforce. This is certainly an underestimated figure, as it only takes into account declared contracts. The immigrant workforce from Morocco and Tunisia, particularly in intensive arboriculture (fruit picking) and greenhouse market gardening, is actually much larger if undeclared workers are taken into account. In some French regions, no production would be possible without their contribution: horticulture in Bouches-du-Rhône, asparagus in Gard and Landes, strawberries in Dordogne or Lot-et-Garonne, etc.

Spain and Italy present two types of seasonal worker profiles, circular and permanent. Spain is the world's top exporter of strawberries and 90% are produced in the province of Huelva (6000 hectares and about 300,000 tonnes a year between February to May). Strawberry farms are heavily reliant on the 50 000 seasonal workers, mainly foreign migrant workers, who come each year. Most legal foreign guest workers are eastern Europeans, followed by Moroccan and Latin Americans. Typical seasonal workers in Spain arrived with local temporary migration programmes and have been coming regularly for six or even eleven years, for a period of three to six months a year. The numerous Moroccan women employed in the strawberry fields are recruited in their

<footnote n="57">57 Decosse, F. and Hellio E. (2015) Migration circulaire ou canalisation utilitariste des mobilités? Les programmes de migration temporaire en agriculture intensive vus d'en bas, in Journée d'étude "La circulation et le retour à l'épreuve des contraintes migratoires?", Université Paris-Diderot, URMIS, Paris, 25 septembre 2015.</footnote>

<footnote n="58">58 According to the European Parliament, 'migrant seasonal workers are covered by the Seasonal Workers Directive (Directive 2014/36/EU), which grants them equal treatment in terms of employment conditions, minimum working age, working conditions and occupational health and safety measures. For the first time, the directive provided a set of harmonised rules for the admission, residence and rights of third country seasonal workers. Seasonal workers have the right to equal treatment with nationals of the host country as regards terms of employment, such as the minimum</footnote>

<footnote>working age, working conditions (such as pay and dismissal, working hours, leave and holidays) and health and safety regulations. The right to equal treatment also applies to social security benefits linked to sickness, invalidity and old age, training and advice on seasonal work.'
(https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/689347/EPR S_BRI(2021)689347_EN.pdf)</footnote>

<footnote n="59">59 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/689347/EPRS _BRI(2021)689347_EN.pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="60">60 https://dares.travail- emploi.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/pdf/dares_analyses_emploi_saisonnier_fr ance_2018-2019.pdf</footnote>
country of origin. They generally do not speak Spanish and are sometimes illiterate, which means they are entirely dependent on their employers. Most of the 7,000 Moroccan women who had managed to come to Huelva before Morocco closed its borders on 13 March 2020 found themselves in a dire situation at the end of the strawberry harvest season. Their contracts had expired in mid-June 2020 but their home country was keeping its borders closed having adopted conservative stance to limit the spread of the pandemic. They remained stranded in Spain for some weeks, with very little money, before the Spanish and Moroccan governments came to an agreement to repatriate them.<fnref n="61" /> In February 2020, the United Nations' Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston, stated that some of these migrant workers lived in shantytowns 'with far worse conditions than a refugee camp, without running water, electricity or sanitation'<fnref n="62" />.

In Italy, in Piana del Sele (provincia di Salerno), Moroccan or Tunisian seasonal workers are often in an irregular situation. They enter agricultural activities through personal networks or via an illegal intermediation system, the Caporalato. The Italian agricultural sector is said to have the particularity of capturing irregular seasonal workers who have entered illegally – with tourist visas or false contracts – but also seasonal and non-seasonal workers with permanent European permits, often from Spain. In Italy, for example, the figure of 370,000 migrant workers in agriculture (27% of the legal agricultural workforce) does not reflect the fact that the bulk of seasonal agricultural work is carried out by undocumented migrants or asylum-seekers. It is estimated that Italy's agricultural sector numbers between 400,000 and 500,000 migrant workers, around half of the total agricultural workforce, with a significant and growing proportion of Romanians, Albanians and North African workers.

According to the results of a joint research project by the Research Unit of Germany's Expert Council on Integration and Migration (SVR) and Migration Policy Institute Europe (MPIE), official figures do not reflect reality, as many

migrant seasonal workers go un-recorded. Likewise, according to the Milan Center for Food Law and Policy and the European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions (EFFAT), illegal work in agriculture is estimated to exceed 20% in Italy, Greece, and Spain. In Portugal and Bulgaria, the rate is said to be over 40%. In Southern Italy, although official statistics indicate that migrants account for about half of the labour force employed in agriculture, independent reports suggest that this figure could be as high as 80% if undeclared and irregular migrants were included.<fnref n="63" />

<table><caption>Table 1: Number of first-time authorisations granted to Extra-EU workers for seasonal work (by sector and gender)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th>Number of first-time authorisations granted to third country nationals for seasonal work</th><th>Percentage of first-time authorisations granted to third country nationals for seasonal work in agriculture</th><th>Disaggregation by gender (% of women in the Agriculture sector)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">Spain</td><td>2017</td><td>5,752</td><td>98%</td><td>86%</td></tr><tr><td>2018</td><td>13,789</td><td>99%</td><td>93%</td></tr><tr><td>2019</td><td>11,368</td><td>95%</td><td>92%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td>2017</td><td>2,308</td><td>64%</td><td>11%</td></tr><tr><td>2018</td><td>3,578</td><td>61%</td><td>9%</td></tr><tr><td>2019</td><td>2,650</td><td>63%</td><td>9%</td></tr></tbody></table>

## International students from North Africa

The demand for technical skills and qualifications – particularly in the engineering, new technology and service sectors and even more so in the healthcare sector – is constantly growing. This reality has accelerated and modified existing dynamics in tertiary and higher education, as well as in the migration of skilled workers from North Africa to Europe. In terms of education, the geographical and cultural proximity and the advantage of accessible French-language education make French universities an opportunity to plan a career abroad or to return to North Africa for many young Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians. In contrast, Egyptians largely attend universities in Egypt and only migrate for their first job or postgraduate training to Europe (Italy, France, Germany), the UK or North America. The chart below shows the dynamics over the last decade, with a doubling

<footnote n="61">61 https://www.worck.eu/2020/04/08/strawberry-fields-in-the-spanish-province-of-huelva-migrant-women-under-the-risk-of-covid-19/</footnote>

<footnote n="62">62 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25524&LangID=E</footnote>

<footnote n="63">63 See in particular Borges, A. and Huet, N. (2020) Invisible workers: Underpaid, exploited and put at risk on Europe's farms. Euronews & Lighthouse Reports.</footnote>
country of origin. They generally do not speak Spanish and are sometimes illiterate, which means they are entirely dependent on their employers. Most of the 7,000 Moroccan women who had managed to come to Huelva before Morocco closed its borders on 13 March 2020 found themselves in a dire situation at the end of the strawberry harvest season. Their contracts had expired in mid-June 2020 but their home country was keeping its borders closed having adopted conservative stance to limit the spread of the pandemic. They remained stranded in Spain for some weeks, with very little money, before the Spanish and Moroccan governments came to an agreement to repatriate them.<fnref n="61" /> In February 2020, the United Nations' Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston, stated that some of these migrant workers lived in shantytowns 'with far worse conditions than a refugee camp, without running water, electricity or sanitation'<fnref n="62" />.

In Italy, in Piana del Sele (provincia di Salerno), Moroccan or Tunisian seasonal workers are often in an irregular situation. They enter agricultural activities through personal networks or via an illegal intermediation system, the Caporalato. The Italian agricultural sector is said to have the particularity of capturing irregular seasonal workers who have entered illegally – with tourist visas or false contracts – but also seasonal and non-seasonal workers with permanent European permits, often from Spain. In Italy, for example, the figure of 370,000 migrant workers in agriculture (27% of the legal agricultural workforce) does not reflect the fact that the bulk of seasonal agricultural work is carried out by undocumented migrants or asylum-seekers. It is estimated that Italy's agricultural sector numbers between 400,000 and 500,000 migrant workers, around half of the total agricultural workforce, with a significant and growing proportion of Romanians, Albanians and North African workers.

According to the results of a joint research project by the Research Unit of Germany's Expert Council on Integration and Migration (SVR) and Migration Policy Institute Europe (MPIE), official figures do not reflect reality, as many

migrant seasonal workers go un-recorded. Likewise, according to the Milan Center for Food Law and Policy and the European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions (EFFAT), illegal work in agriculture is estimated to exceed 20% in Italy, Greece, and Spain. In Portugal and Bulgaria, the rate is said to be over 40%. In Southern Italy, although official statistics indicate that migrants account for about half of the labour force employed in agriculture, independent reports suggest that this figure could be as high as 80% if undeclared and irregular migrants were included.<fnref n="63" />

<table><caption>Table 1: Number of first-time authorisations granted to Extra-EU workers for seasonal work (by sector and gender)</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th>Number of first-time authorisations granted to third country nationals for seasonal work</th><th>Percentage of first-time authorisations granted to third country nationals for seasonal work in agriculture</th><th>Disaggregation by gender (% of women in the Agriculture sector)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">Spain</td><td>2017</td><td>5,752</td><td>98%</td><td>86%</td></tr><tr><td>2018</td><td>13,789</td><td>99%</td><td>93%</td></tr><tr><td>2019</td><td>11,368</td><td>95%</td><td>92%</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">Italy</td><td>2017</td><td>2,308</td><td>64%</td><td>11%</td></tr><tr><td>2018</td><td>3,578</td><td>61%</td><td>9%</td></tr><tr><td>2019</td><td>2,650</td><td>63%</td><td>9%</td></tr></tbody></table>

## International students from North Africa

The demand for technical skills and qualifications – particularly in the engineering, new technology and service sectors and even more so in the healthcare sector – is constantly growing. This reality has accelerated and modified existing dynamics in tertiary and higher education, as well as in the migration of skilled workers from North Africa to Europe. In terms of education, the geographical and cultural proximity and the advantage of accessible French-language education make French universities an opportunity to plan a career abroad or to return to North Africa for many young Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians. In contrast, Egyptians largely attend universities in Egypt and only migrate for their first job or postgraduate training to Europe (Italy, France, Germany), the UK or North America. The chart below shows the dynamics over the last decade, with a doubling

<footnote n="61">61 https://www.worck.eu/2020/04/08/strawberry-fields-in-the-spanish-province-of-huelva-migrant-women-under-the-risk-of-covid-19/</footnote>

<footnote n="62">62 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25524&LangID=E</footnote>

<footnote n="63">63 See in particular Borges, A. and Huet, N. (2020) Invisible workers: Underpaid, exploited and put at risk on Europe's farms. Euronews & Lighthouse Reports.</footnote>
of the number of first permits issued for education reasons between 2010 (17,500) and 2019 (35,000). If we disaggregate these data by country of origin, we see that Morocco provides about 50% of the contingents, Algeria and Tunisia more than 20% each and Egypt a little more than 5%.

<figure><img src="image_26.png" /><figcaption>Figure 14: First permits issued for education reasons by citizenship (2010-2019 North Africa, including Egypt and Libya)</figcaption></figure>

If we now consider the European destination countries for North African students, we see that France is by far the preferred country for Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian students – due to their shared history and language. Tunisia was one of the most represented countries among foreign students in France with 12,390 students and 18.3% of foreign students enrolled in doctoral programmes in French universities in 2017. It is in 4th position after Morocco (11.7%), China (8.9%) and Algeria (8.1%), according to the French Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Innovation.

<table><caption>Table 2: Countries of origin of North African students in France (Source : MESRI-DGESIP 2017)</caption><thead><tr><th>Academic year 2017</th><th>Students</th><th>percentage</th><th>International Rank</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Morocco</td><td>38,002</td><td>12%</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Algeria</td><td>26,116</td><td>8%</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Tunisia</td><td>12,390</td><td>4%</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>Other African countries</td><td>69,257</td><td>21%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>TOTAL (World)</td><td>323,933</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

The long-standing relationship between France and North African countries explains the virulence of the reaction sparked in November 2018 by the French government's strategy to attract new foreign students - Welcome to France. This strategy indiscriminately focused on: 1) improved visa and scholarship policy for foreign students, and 2) a significant increase in tuition for non-European students. On both sides of the Mediterranean, universities and academic centers immediately criticized the reform and some French universities even refused to apply it to African and North African students: 'This purely bureaucratic reform, taken from Paris, was misunderstood because it broke with a tradition of dialogue and partnership. Beyond the unfortunate political or diplomatic episode, the reaction shows the importance of educational and academic exchanges between France and the Maghreb countries.'<fnref n="64" />

<figure><img src="image_27.png" /><figcaption>Figure 16: First permits issued for education reasons to Algerian students (annual duration) 2015-2019 – Eurostat 2021</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_28.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="64">64 Key Informant Interview, Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur, de la Recherche et de l'Innovation, Paris, May 2021.</footnote>
of the number of first permits issued for education reasons between 2010 (17,500) and 2019 (35,000). If we disaggregate these data by country of origin, we see that Morocco provides about 50% of the contingents, Algeria and Tunisia more than 20% each and Egypt a little more than 5%.

<figure><img src="image_27.png" /><figcaption>Figure 14: First permits issued for education reasons by citizenship (2010-2019 North Africa, including Egypt and Libya)</figcaption></figure>

If we now consider the European destination countries for North African students, we see that France is by far the preferred country for Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian students – due to their shared history and language. Tunisia was one of the most represented countries among foreign students in France with 12,390 students and 18.3% of foreign students enrolled in doctoral programmes in French universities in 2017. It is in 4th position after Morocco (11.7%), China (8.9%) and Algeria (8.1%), according to the French Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Innovation.

<table><caption>Table 2: Countries of origin of North African students in France (Source : MESRI-DGESIP 2017)</caption><thead><tr><th>Academic year 2017</th><th>Students</th><th>percentage</th><th>International Rank</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Morocco</td><td>38,002</td><td>12%</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Algeria</td><td>26,116</td><td>8%</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Tunisia</td><td>12,390</td><td>4%</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>Other African countries</td><td>69,257</td><td>21%</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>TOTAL (World)</td><td>323,933</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

The long-standing relationship between France and North African countries explains the virulence of the reaction sparked in November 2018 by the French government's strategy to attract new foreign students - Welcome to France. This strategy indiscriminately focused on: 1) improved visa and scholarship policy for foreign students, and 2) a significant increase in tuition for non-European students. On both sides of the Mediterranean, universities and academic centers immediately criticized the reform and some French universities even refused to apply it to African and North African students: 'This purely bureaucratic reform, taken from Paris, was misunderstood because it broke with a tradition of dialogue and partnership. Beyond the unfortunate political or diplomatic episode, the reaction shows the importance of educational and academic exchanges between France and the Maghreb countries.'<fnref n="64" />

<figure><img src="image_28.png" /><figcaption>Figure 16: First permits issued for education reasons to Algerian students (annual duration) 2015-2019 – Eurostat 2021</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_29.png" /></figure>

<footnote n="64">64 Key Informant Interview, Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur, de la Recherche et de l'Innovation, Paris, May 2021.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_29.png" /><figcaption>Figure 18: First permits issued for education reasons to Libyan students (annual duration) 2015-2019 – Eurostat 2021</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_30.png" /><figcaption>Figure 19: First permits issued for education reasons to Egyptian students (annual duration) 2015-2019 – Eurostat 2021</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_31.png" /></figure>

Finally, a quick look at the comparative youth unemployment rates in Egypt and Tunisia reveals important nuances that are due both to socio-cultural differences and to the local labour market situation. In both cases, the inability of highly skilled (tertiary) youth to enter the labour market is largely due to the lack of real opportunities for the type of skills they have to offer in a sluggish and largely informal market. In the Tunisian case, it is noted that highly qualified young people do not find

it easier or more difficult to enter the market - unlike young Moroccans, Algerians or Egyptians – which contributes more to keeping them in the country. Finally, the very high proportion of highly qualified women who cannot enter the labour market (nearly 60%) is linked to socio-cultural obstacles, particularly in times of crisis or recession. For all the countries covered by this study, the difficulty of integrating the most highly qualified people runs the risk of a talent and skills drain; it is also an indicator of more structural issues in countries where informality and underemployment remain endemic.

<figure><img src="image_32.png" /><figcaption>Figure 21: Unemployment rate by education level and gender (Tunisia - OECD 2020)</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_33.png" /></figure>

## Highly skilled workers from North Africa

In the labour market, qualified or highly qualified North Africans ('advanced education') are often particularly exposed to unemployment: 30% for Morocco (2003), 29% for Tunisia (2017), and 22% for Egypt (2018) according to the World Bank and ILOSTAT.<fnref n="65" /> The causes generally mentioned, beyond the difficult economic context, are

<footnote n="65">65 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.ADVN.ZS?locations=MA-TN-EG-DZ</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_30.png" /><figcaption>Figure 18: First permits issued for education reasons to Libyan students (annual duration) 2015-2019 – Eurostat 2021</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_31.png" /><figcaption>Figure 19: First permits issued for education reasons to Egyptian students (annual duration) 2015-2019 – Eurostat 2021</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_32.png" /></figure>

Finally, a quick look at the comparative youth unemployment rates in Egypt and Tunisia reveals important nuances that are due both to socio-cultural differences and to the local labour market situation. In both cases, the inability of highly skilled (tertiary) youth to enter the labour market is largely due to the lack of real opportunities for the type of skills they have to offer in a sluggish and largely informal market. In the Tunisian case, it is noted that highly qualified young people do not find

it easier or more difficult to enter the market - unlike young Moroccans, Algerians or Egyptians – which contributes more to keeping them in the country. Finally, the very high proportion of highly qualified women who cannot enter the labour market (nearly 60%) is linked to socio-cultural obstacles, particularly in times of crisis or recession. For all the countries covered by this study, the difficulty of integrating the most highly qualified people runs the risk of a talent and skills drain; it is also an indicator of more structural issues in countries where informality and underemployment remain endemic.

<figure><img src="image_33.png" /><figcaption>Figure 21: Unemployment rate by education level and gender (Tunisia - OECD 2020)</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_34.png" /></figure>

## Highly skilled workers from North Africa

In the labour market, qualified or highly qualified North Africans ('advanced education') are often particularly exposed to unemployment: 30% for Morocco (2003), 29% for Tunisia (2017), and 22% for Egypt (2018) according to the World Bank and ILOSTAT.<fnref n="65" /> The causes generally mentioned, beyond the difficult economic context, are

<footnote n="65">65 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.ADVN.ZS?locations=MA-TN-EG-DZ</footnote>
often the same: 'skills mismatch and lack of opportunities', 'low salaries and absence of reward', 'lack of adequate opportunities', 'nepotism and lack of network'.<fnref n="66" /> The socioeconomic situation and lack of professional perspectives are important push factors for international migration from North Africa. As highlighted by Almalki, 'with the opening of certain professions to immigrants, the countries of the South participate in the development of the countries of the North.'<fnref n="67" /> These pull factor and subsequent trend are not new and has accelerated considerably in the last decade.

The blue card model, a European work permit approved by a 2009 directive and implemented very unevenly across the EU, has contributed to accelerating the phenomenon. As shown in the chart below, over the period 2012-2019, Eurostat figures confirm exponential curves for Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco in particular: in 2012, the European Union had granted respectively 105, 18 and 29 blue cards to highly qualified workers from each of these three countries; seven years later, these figures have increased respectively to 1033, 1010 and 609.

<figure><img src="image_34.png" /><figcaption>Figure 22: EU 27 blue cards for the "highly skilled" labour force</figcaption></figure>

In 2019, it was Germany that led the EU countries in the number of blue visas granted to North African countries: for the five countries of origin considered in this study, Germany and France alone account for nearly 95% of the blue cards granted to highly skilled workers. The motivations behind these blue visas seem pragmatic from

a European perspective, as the president of the European Commission emphasized in 2007 when he pointed to: 1) the aging of the European population and its increased need for highly skilled workers; 2) the rights gap between EU citizens and legal immigrants. Moreover, one could argue that North African skilled workers legitimately wish to gain exposure to other contexts, which contributes to their experience and expertise.

<figure><img src="image_35.png" /><figcaption>Figure 23: EU 27 blue cards (by receiving country)</figcaption></figure>

For the Moroccan international economic law professor Tajeddine El Husseini, the blue card paradigm 'is a new form of colonisation, of discrimination, and it will be very hard to find support for it among southern countries'.<fnref n="68" /> In an analysis published in 2010, CARIM already identified a significant brain drain in Egypt, with harmful consequences in terms of social and economic development for the country and the region: 'Migrants to OECD countries are highly-educated professionals, mostly doctors, engineers, and teachers. Their distribution according to specialization reveals that 18.3% were in the medical sciences, 33.2% were engineers, 36.5% were in the social sciences, 8.0% in the basic sciences and 5.0% in agriculture. Egyptian permanent migrants have increased as a percentage of total migrants from 9.6% in 1983 to 38.0% in 2006. They increased at a higher rate (9.7%) than total migration (2.2%).'<fnref n="69" /> Beine, Docquier and Rapoport<fnref n="70" /> investigate how the negative and positive effects of highly skilled international migration balance out. However, the

<footnote n="66">66 Focus Group Discussion, Tunisian and Moroccan students – virtual discussion conducted in June 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="67">67 Almalki, R. (2011). Vous avez dit : immigration choisie ?. Cités, 2(2), 113-118.</footnote>

<footnote n="68">68 El Housseini, T. interviewed by Apps, Peter (26 October 2007). "EU Blue Card Scheme could drain developing world". Reuters - 26 October 2007.</footnote>

<footnote n="69">69 Nassar, H. (2010) 'Migration of Skills, the Egyptian Case', CARIM - Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, EUI - Robert Schumann Center for Advanced Studies.</footnote>

<footnote n="70">70 Beine, M., Docquier, F. and Rapoport, H., (2008). Brain Drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and Losers. The Economic Journal, 118(528), pp.631-652.</footnote>
often the same: 'skills mismatch and lack of opportunities', 'low salaries and absence of reward', 'lack of adequate opportunities', 'nepotism and lack of network'.<fnref n="66" /> The socioeconomic situation and lack of professional perspectives are important push factors for international migration from North Africa. As highlighted by Almalki, 'with the opening of certain professions to immigrants, the countries of the South participate in the development of the countries of the North.'<fnref n="67" /> These pull factor and subsequent trend are not new and has accelerated considerably in the last decade.

The blue card model, a European work permit approved by a 2009 directive and implemented very unevenly across the EU, has contributed to accelerating the phenomenon. As shown in the chart below, over the period 2012-2019, Eurostat figures confirm exponential curves for Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco in particular: in 2012, the European Union had granted respectively 105, 18 and 29 blue cards to highly qualified workers from each of these three countries; seven years later, these figures have increased respectively to 1033, 1010 and 609.

<figure><img src="image_35.png" /><figcaption>Figure 22: EU 27 blue cards for the "highly skilled" labour force</figcaption></figure>

In 2019, it was Germany that led the EU countries in the number of blue visas granted to North African countries: for the five countries of origin considered in this study, Germany and France alone account for nearly 95% of the blue cards granted to highly skilled workers. The motivations behind these blue visas seem pragmatic from

a European perspective, as the president of the European Commission emphasized in 2007 when he pointed to: 1) the aging of the European population and its increased need for highly skilled workers; 2) the rights gap between EU citizens and legal immigrants. Moreover, one could argue that North African skilled workers legitimately wish to gain exposure to other contexts, which contributes to their experience and expertise.

<figure><img src="image_36.png" /><figcaption>Figure 23: EU 27 blue cards (by receiving country)</figcaption></figure>

For the Moroccan international economic law professor Tajeddine El Husseini, the blue card paradigm 'is a new form of colonisation, of discrimination, and it will be very hard to find support for it among southern countries'.<fnref n="68" /> In an analysis published in 2010, CARIM already identified a significant brain drain in Egypt, with harmful consequences in terms of social and economic development for the country and the region: 'Migrants to OECD countries are highly-educated professionals, mostly doctors, engineers, and teachers. Their distribution according to specialization reveals that 18.3% were in the medical sciences, 33.2% were engineers, 36.5% were in the social sciences, 8.0% in the basic sciences and 5.0% in agriculture. Egyptian permanent migrants have increased as a percentage of total migrants from 9.6% in 1983 to 38.0% in 2006. They increased at a higher rate (9.7%) than total migration (2.2%).'<fnref n="69" /> Beine, Docquier and Rapoport<fnref n="70" /> investigate how the negative and positive effects of highly skilled international migration balance out. However, the

<footnote n="66">66 Focus Group Discussion, Tunisian and Moroccan students – virtual discussion conducted in June 2021.</footnote>

<footnote n="67">67 Almalki, R. (2011). Vous avez dit : immigration choisie ?. Cités, 2(2), 113-118.</footnote>

<footnote n="68">68 El Housseini, T. interviewed by Apps, Peter (26 October 2007). "EU Blue Card Scheme could drain developing world". Reuters - 26 October 2007.</footnote>

<footnote n="69">69 Nassar, H. (2010) 'Migration of Skills, the Egyptian Case', CARIM - Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, EUI - Robert Schumann Center for Advanced Studies.</footnote>

<footnote n="70">70 Beine, M., Docquier, F. and Rapoport, H., (2008). Brain Drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and Losers. The Economic Journal, 118(528), pp.631-652.</footnote>
expression brain drain<fnref n="71" /> remains too often the most adequate to qualify the exodus of highly skilled North African professionals to Europe. In this regard, Ait-Larbi notes that the proportion of Highly Educated Algerians immigrating to OECD countries jumped from a rate of 5% in 1990 to 21% in 2010.<fnref n="72" />

The case of the medical professions is undoubtedly the most publicized, especially at a time when societies seem to be unevenly affected by a global pandemic. In France, 220,000 physicians are currently practicing (of which a little more than 10% were trained abroad, nearly half of them in Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia), compared to 70,000 doctors in Morocco, Algeria, 25,000, and 15,000 in Tunisia. In relation to the population, France has 1 physician for 304 inhabitants; Morocco has 1 for 520, Algeria 1 for 1720, and Tunisia 1 for 780. While Morocco is not the worst off country, it has been singled out by the World Health Organization for serious health care shortcomings and its 'deep geographical and socio-economic inequalities.'<fnref n="73" /> According to Najib Akesbi, not only does Morocco not train enough doctors (1,900 per year as opposed to a stated goal of 3,300) but 'doctors are trained for export': low salaries, lack of equipment and infrastructure, etc., all the conditions are there for the exodus.<fnref n="74" /> In Tunisia, public hospitals are usually overwhelmed and lack the necessary resources (protection, tests, resuscitation, respirators, medical equipment and medicines), which condemns the majority of people to stay at home. For example, in Tunisia, a patient from Covid-19, destined for resuscitation, must pay 25,000 dinars (8,200 euros) to be admitted to such a private service, which is the equivalent of 3.5 years of minimum wage.<fnref n="75" /> With such an environment in mind, it goes without saying that the question of the mobility of the most qualified professionals is a crucial issue, with not only economic but also political and societal

consequences: nearly 15,000 Moroccan doctors work in France, according to official figures<fnref n="76" /> with a considerable amount having graduated in their country of origin.<fnref n="77" />

<table><caption>Table 3: Global Medical Brain Drain rate in North Africa
(Source: Zehnati, 2017 and Ait-Larbi, 2021, with data from MSPRH, MSM, MST, CNOM, and INSEE)</caption><thead><tr><th>Physicians' employment status</th><th>Morocco</th><th>Algeria</th><th>Tunisia</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Born in North Africa and settled in France (INSEE, 2012)</td><td>14,847</td><td>6,230</td><td>3,846</td></tr><tr><td>Active in native country (National data)</td><td>48,184</td><td>19,770</td><td>13,640</td></tr><tr><td>Medical Brain Drain</td><td>24%</td><td>24%</td><td>22%</td></tr></tbody></table>

Box 5: Population aging, migration, and productivity - questioning the conventional age-dependency ratio

In a recent contribution, Marois et al. provide a multidimensional 'analysis of the degree to which negative economic consequences of population aging can be mitigated by changes in migration and labour-force participation'. According to a set of alternative projections of future changes in labour-force participation, migration volumes, educational composition and speed of integration for EU member states, the authors show that even if 'demographic aging is unavoidable in Europe, the fears associated with the coming economic burden have been unduly exaggerated through the use of the simplistic and inappropriate conventional age-dependency ratio. There are plausible scenarios where feasible public policies could be effective in coping with the consequences of population aging. Depending on the policy options preferred and available – encouraging higher labour-force participation among the native population and/or education-selective migration together with high integration efforts – Europe could largely avoid the widely assumed negative impacts of aging and maintain a dynamic labour force based on high human capital.'<fnref n="78" /> This analysis does not contradict the traditional view that demographic aging calls for target labour migration policies (in particular from North African countries), which is detrimental and denounced by countries of origin. However, it also clearly identifies the challenges for future socio-economic development: 1) finding a balance between an increased labour-participation rate within the European Union and a mobility of skills with neighbouring countries

<footnote n="71">71 De La Croix, D., and F. Docquier. (2012). "Do brain drain and poverty result from coordination failures?" Journal of Economic Growth 17:1: 1–26; and Docquier, F., (2014). The brain drain from developing countries. IZA World of Labour: 'brain drain' is defined as "the international transfer of resources in the form of human capital and mainly applies to the migration of relatively highly educated individuals from developing to developed countries."</footnote>

<footnote n="72">72 Ait-Larbi, Y. (2021) Health Without Care; A Reflexive Sociology of Human Capital Flight in Post- Colonial Algeria</footnote>

<footnote n="73">73 WHO (2016) Stratégie de coopération OMS-MAROC 2017-2021. Organisation mondiale de la Santé. Bureau régional de la Méditerranée orientale.</footnote>

<footnote n="74">74 Quote from the Moroccan economist Najib Akesbi in Verdier, M. (2020) 'Au Maghreb, des systèmes de santé exsangues' in La Croix du 8 avril 2020 -</footnote>

<footnote>https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Afrique/Au-Maghreb-systemes-sante-exsangues-2020-04-08-1201088418</footnote>

<footnote n="75">75 Saïaïda, O. (dir.), (2020) « Vivre au temps du coronavirus. Chroniques de confinement : regards de chercheurs depuis la Tunisie », IRMC/Éditions Nirvana.</footnote>

<footnote n="76">76 INSEE (2012). Evolution et structure de la population, RP exploitations complémentaires. Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.</footnote>

<footnote n="77">77 Zehnati, A., (2017). Medical brain drain from Maghreb to Northern countries: for a new social dialogue?. The e-Journal of Economics & Complexity, Volume 2 (2016) Number 1 May 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="78">78 Marois, G., Bélanger, A. and Lutz, W. (2020) Population aging, migration, and productivity in Europe, PNAS - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA. http://www.pnas.org/content/117/14/7690</footnote>
expression brain drain<fnref n="71" /> remains too often the most adequate to qualify the exodus of highly skilled North African professionals to Europe. In this regard, Ait-Larbi notes that the proportion of Highly Educated Algerians immigrating to OECD countries jumped from a rate of 5% in 1990 to 21% in 2010.<fnref n="72" />

The case of the medical professions is undoubtedly the most publicized, especially at a time when societies seem to be unevenly affected by a global pandemic. In France, 220,000 physicians are currently practicing (of which a little more than 10% were trained abroad, nearly half of them in Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia), compared to 70,000 doctors in Morocco, Algeria, 25,000, and 15,000 in Tunisia. In relation to the population, France has 1 physician for 304 inhabitants; Morocco has 1 for 520, Algeria 1 for 1720, and Tunisia 1 for 780. While Morocco is not the worst off country, it has been singled out by the World Health Organization for serious health care shortcomings and its 'deep geographical and socio-economic inequalities.'<fnref n="73" /> According to Najib Akesbi, not only does Morocco not train enough doctors (1,900 per year as opposed to a stated goal of 3,300) but 'doctors are trained for export': low salaries, lack of equipment and infrastructure, etc., all the conditions are there for the exodus.<fnref n="74" /> In Tunisia, public hospitals are usually overwhelmed and lack the necessary resources (protection, tests, resuscitation, respirators, medical equipment and medicines), which condemns the majority of people to stay at home. For example, in Tunisia, a patient from Covid-19, destined for resuscitation, must pay 25,000 dinars (8,200 euros) to be admitted to such a private service, which is the equivalent of 3.5 years of minimum wage.<fnref n="75" /> With such an environment in mind, it goes without saying that the question of the mobility of the most qualified professionals is a crucial issue, with not only economic but also political and societal

consequences: nearly 15,000 Moroccan doctors work in France, according to official figures<fnref n="76" /> with a considerable amount having graduated in their country of origin.<fnref n="77" />

<table><caption>Table 3: Global Medical Brain Drain rate in North Africa
(Source: Zehnati, 2017 and Ait-Larbi, 2021, with data from MSPRH, MSM, MST, CNOM, and INSEE)</caption><thead><tr><th>Physicians' employment status</th><th>Morocco</th><th>Algeria</th><th>Tunisia</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Born in North Africa and settled in France (INSEE, 2012)</td><td>14,847</td><td>6,230</td><td>3,846</td></tr><tr><td>Active in native country (National data)</td><td>48,184</td><td>19,770</td><td>13,640</td></tr><tr><td>Medical Brain Drain</td><td>24%</td><td>24%</td><td>22%</td></tr></tbody></table>

Box 5: Population aging, migration, and productivity - questioning the conventional age-dependency ratio

In a recent contribution, Marois et al. provide a multidimensional 'analysis of the degree to which negative economic consequences of population aging can be mitigated by changes in migration and labour-force participation'. According to a set of alternative projections of future changes in labour-force participation, migration volumes, educational composition and speed of integration for EU member states, the authors show that even if 'demographic aging is unavoidable in Europe, the fears associated with the coming economic burden have been unduly exaggerated through the use of the simplistic and inappropriate conventional age-dependency ratio. There are plausible scenarios where feasible public policies could be effective in coping with the consequences of population aging. Depending on the policy options preferred and available – encouraging higher labour-force participation among the native population and/or education-selective migration together with high integration efforts – Europe could largely avoid the widely assumed negative impacts of aging and maintain a dynamic labour force based on high human capital.'<fnref n="78" /> This analysis does not contradict the traditional view that demographic aging calls for target labour migration policies (in particular from North African countries), which is detrimental and denounced by countries of origin. However, it also clearly identifies the challenges for future socio-economic development: 1) finding a balance between an increased labour-participation rate within the European Union and a mobility of skills with neighbouring countries

<footnote n="71">71 De La Croix, D., and F. Docquier. (2012). "Do brain drain and poverty result from coordination failures?" Journal of Economic Growth 17:1: 1–26; and Docquier, F., (2014). The brain drain from developing countries. IZA World of Labour: 'brain drain' is defined as "the international transfer of resources in the form of human capital and mainly applies to the migration of relatively highly educated individuals from developing to developed countries."</footnote>

<footnote n="72">72 Ait-Larbi, Y. (2021) Health Without Care; A Reflexive Sociology of Human Capital Flight in Post- Colonial Algeria</footnote>

<footnote n="73">73 WHO (2016) Stratégie de coopération OMS-MAROC 2017-2021. Organisation mondiale de la Santé. Bureau régional de la Méditerranée orientale.</footnote>

<footnote n="74">74 Quote from the Moroccan economist Najib Akesbi in Verdier, M. (2020) 'Au Maghreb, des systèmes de santé exsangues' in La Croix du 8 avril 2020 -</footnote>

<footnote>https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Afrique/Au-Maghreb-systemes-sante-exsangues-2020-04-08-1201088418</footnote>

<footnote n="75">75 Saïaïda, O. (dir.), (2020) « Vivre au temps du coronavirus. Chroniques de confinement : regards de chercheurs depuis la Tunisie », IRMC/Éditions Nirvana.</footnote>

<footnote n="76">76 INSEE (2012). Evolution et structure de la population, RP exploitations complémentaires. Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.</footnote>

<footnote n="77">77 Zehnati, A., (2017). Medical brain drain from Maghreb to Northern countries: for a new social dialogue?. The e-Journal of Economics & Complexity, Volume 2 (2016) Number 1 May 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="78">78 Marois, G., Bélanger, A. and Lutz, W. (2020) Population aging, migration, and productivity in Europe, PNAS - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA. http://www.pnas.org/content/117/14/7690</footnote>
and regions; 2) not transforming 'education-selective migration'
into exclusionary measures towards other types of migrants or
socio-economic profiles; 3) not contributing to a 'brain drain'
phenomenon from North African countries, which would be
contrary to short-term political and long-term socio-economic
interests; and 4) developing resolute efforts for the integration of
migrants - regardless of the attractiveness of the migratory profile.

<figure><img src="image_36.png" /><figcaption>Picture 3: Credit Egyptian Street – CAPMAS</figcaption></figure>
and regions; 2) not transforming 'education-selective migration' into exclusionary measures towards other types of migrants or socio-economic profiles; 3) not contributing to a 'brain drain' phenomenon from North African countries, which would be contrary to short-term political and long-term socio-economic interests; and 4) developing resolute efforts for the integration of migrants - regardless of the attractiveness of the migratory profile.

<figure><img src="image_37.png" /><figcaption>Picture 3: Credit Egyptian Street – CAPMAS</figcaption></figure>