# Challenges of Volcanic Crises on Small Islands States

Jean-Christophe Komorowski, Julie Morin, Susanna Jenkins, Ilan Kelman

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## ► To cite this version:

Jean-Christophe Komorowski, Julie Morin, Susanna Jenkins, Ilan Kelman. Challenges of Volcanic Crises on Small Islands States: In: Deanne Bird, Carina Fearnley, Kat Haynes, Gill Jolly, and Bill McGuire, (Eds), Observing the Volcano World: Volcano Crisis Communication. Observing the Volcano World, Springer International Publishing, pp.353-371, 2016, Advances in Volcanology, 978-3-319-44095-8. 10.1007/11157_2015_15. hal-03961061

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Carina J. Fearnley

Deanne K. Bird

Katharine Haynes

William J. McGuire

Gill Jolly *Editors*

# Observing the Volcano World

## Volcano Crisis Communication

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Springer Open
**Advances in Volcanology**

An Official Book Series of the International
Association of Volcanology and Chemistry
of the Earth's Interior – IAVCEI, Barcelona,
Spain

**Series editor**

Karoly Nemeth, Palmerston North, New Zealand
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11157
Carina J. Fearnley · Deanne K. Bird
Katharine Haynes · William J. McGuire
Gill Jolly
Editors

# Observing the Volcano
World

Volcano Crisis Communication
Editors

Carina J. Fearnley

Department of Science and Technology

University College London

London

UK

William J. McGuire

UCL Hazard Centre, Department
of Earth Sciences

University College London

London

UK

Deanne K. Bird

Institute of Life and Environmental
Sciences

University of Iceland

Reykjavík

Iceland

Gill Jolly

GNS Science

Lower Hutt

New Zealand

Katharine Haynes

Department of Geography and Planning

Macquarie University

Sydney, NSW

Australia

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ISSN 2364-3277

Advances in Volcanology

ISBN 978-3-319-44095-8

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44097-2

ISSN 2364-3285 (electronic)

ISBN 978-3-319-44097-2 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018932166

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018. This book is an open access publication.

**Open Access** This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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Preface

During 2007–2008 I had the most wonderful privilege of interviewing over 93 people involved in the management of volcanic crisis in the USA as part of my Ph.D. research. From the United States Geological Survey, to the Federal Aviation Authority, the National Weather Service, and local media, I spent over 300 hours listening to years of experiences and stories about successes and failures, and lessons learnt from volcanic crises all around the world. I was overwhelmed with the experience and expertise I encountered. However, little of this ‘experience or expertise’ was published in either the academic or grey literature. I became acutely aware that in the future this knowledge could be lost, and that there was a need now to understand better how to manage a volcanic crisis. Yet, whilst actively publishing in their own research field, each scientist interviewed undervalued their tacit experiences and the contribution they could provide for future volcanic crises. Additionally, there was no clear place to publish these reflections. Publications on seismic studies, petrology, and new technological monitoring techniques are far more common, and perhaps historically a priority within the volcanic community. It is all too clear, however, that many volcanic disasters occur not as a result of uncertain and complex science, but frequently because of a breakdown in communication between the varying stakeholders, a weakness in management structures, and/or a lack of understanding of the risks involved. I felt a moral obligation to capture the knowledge and experiences, in their words, before they were lost for good.

Why is it so important? It is hoped this book will be the first of many that celebrates the challenging job of managing volcanic crises. Without scholarly work that reflects on volcanic crises around the world, how is it possible to identify trends, establish good practices, and help communities develop tools and systems to best mitigate volcanic hazards? This includes examining the warning process, communication between multiple stakeholders, and the difficulties involved in decision-making. As such there is a significant wealth of knowledge that is not yet documented that could be of significant value to a wide range of stakeholders. To date, most literature on volcanic crises lies in the grey literature – that is documents for the United Nations, international, and national meetings reviewing a crisis, and the odd memoir or report that lies buried in archives and libraries globally. It is this literature that provides insights into what actually happened during a crisis; not the analysis of data, but the story of what happened, by who, when, and what strategies worked
and what did not. One of the most enlightening books I have read about volcanic crises is *Volcano Cowboys* by journalist Dick Thompson. This book tells some of the great stories about American volcanologists' personal experiences of working in various crises all over the world. Sadly out of print, this is one of the absolute treasures in the literature on volcanic crises. The events of Mount St Helens in 1980–86, and the eruption of Mt Pinatubo in 1991 produced two classic 'doorstop' books: *The 1980 eruptions of Mount St. Helens, Washington and Fire and Mud*, each with several chapters dedicated to the management of the crises, with reflective and analytical insights. Over the last three decades there have been numerous books published on various individual crises, such as *Surviving Galeras* by Stanley Williams, or *Fire from the Mountain* by Polly Pattullo, but none that try to provide some form of comparison between different crises.

It is clear there is a need to develop our knowledge about past events and document these, so that lessons identified and learnt can be shared, with the hope of developing robust understanding to aid future crises. It is unlikely there are best practices that can be shared globally, but certainly there is a need to share what works and doesn't work so each vulnerable area can make informed management decisions. There has been a steady and growing interest in Volcanic Crisis Communication, as exemplified by the World Organization of Volcano Observatories (WOVO) Volcano Observatories Best Practices Workshops, in recent years, and various academic research projects that have focused on risk communication and scientific advice globally. Another major platform to discuss volcanic crisis communication has been via the Cities on Volcanoes (CoV) conference series. Over my ten years of attending these conferences the focus has increasingly shifted from volcanological sciences towards an ever increasingly interdisciplinary perspective, engaging with those from any background interested in coming together to discuss how the varying cultural, political, economic, and legal contexts manage and respond to the unsolved epistemic uncertainties inherent in volcanology. It is clear progress is being made, from active scholars and practitioners, and undergraduates to leaders in their field; the interdisciplinarity that volcanoes force us to embrace is generating vital findings and a paradigm shift in the field. This book aims to capture, in a small way, this move.

Being part of the IAVCEI Book series *Advances in Volcanology*, our aim is to make an advance on the topic of volcanic crisis communication. This book brings together authors from all over the globe who work with volcanoes, ranging from institutions (e.g. Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres, Civil Aviation, Weather services, Smithsonian Institute), to disaster practitioners (civil protection, emergency managers), observatory volcanologists/scientists, government & NGO officials and practitioners, the insurance sector, indigenous populations, and teachers/educators, and academics (from multiple disciplines). These authors have been asked to reflect on three key aspects of volcanic crises. First, the unique and wide-ranging nature of volcanic hazards that makes them a particularly challenging natural hazard to forecast and manage. Second, lessons learnt on how to best manage volcanic hazards based on a number of crises that have shaped our understanding. Third, the diverse and
wide ranging aspects of communication involved in a crisis that bring together old practices and new technologies in an increasingly challenging and globalised world. Without this knowledge there is little scope to draw on established knowledge to move towards developing more robust volcanic crisis management, and to understand further how the volcano world is observed from a range of perspectives in different contexts around the world. The book is presented in these three parts, with a summary section for each written by the part editors: Part One was edited by William J. McGuire (UCL), Part Two by Gill Jolly (GNS) and myself, and Part Three by Deanne K. Bird (University of Iceland) and Katharine Haynes (Macquarie University). An introduction and summary to the book intend to provide valuable context, and a summary of the key findings from the chapters.

The editorial team was highly dedicated to raising the funds required to make the book open access so that everyone anywhere in the world would be able to read these stories, and hopefully in the future contribute new ones. We would like to thank very much all our generous sponsors, including:

* The Bournemouth University Disaster Management Centre, UK

* GNS Science, New Zealand

* Risk Frontiers, Australia

* The University of Auckland, New Zealand

* King's College London, UK

* Aon Benfield, Australia

* ICAO Meteorology Panel/Chief Meteorological Office, New Zealand

* Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska Fairbanks, USA

We owe our gratitude to Richard Gordon, John McAneney, Gill Jolly and Julia Becker, Jan Lindsay, Amy Donovan, Russell Blong, Peter Lechner, and Peter Webley for helping arrange this sponsorship.

We also recognise that many people would like to have contributed to the book but were unable to. We can only hope that this is just the beginning of a new dialogue, one that cuts across disciplines, stakeholders, and across different natural hazards to explore how volcanic crises can be better managed. This is just the start; there are many more stories to be told, some already known, and some yet to unfold.

This book took longer than any of us anticipated. Whilst this is common for academic publications, it was in fact a car crash that I was a victim in that led to a traumatic brain injury that added the most delay. Determined to complete the project I think my stubbornness certainly helped my miraculous recovery. During this time all five of our editorial team lost close family members, some got married, some had children, some changed jobs, and yet despite this, we were determined to publish the stories that needed to be told. I would like to take this opportunity to thank my editorial team for being so amazing, and keeping things going despite the many challenges we all faced. I would also like to thank our Springer editor, Johanna Schwartz who has been supportive from the very start of this adventure. Thanks must also be given to all the authors and reviewers for their patience, endless feedback and engagement.
I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the people who have provided endless support and love in my life; Gerlinde Fearnley, Geoffrey Fearnley (RIP), Nathan Farrell, the Fearnley and Thorosian families, Deborah Dixon, Phyllis Illari, Clive Prince, Lynn Picknett, Chris Kilburn, Annie Winson, Chiara Ambrosio, John Grattan, and the thriving community at UCL (particularly the Science and Technology Studies Department and the UCL Hazard Research Centre). As always there are plenty more folk to thank, but I think it is important to end by saying this book is dedicated to all those living with volcanic risk. It is hoped that this book will help reduce losses so that those who have suffered or died in previous volcanic crises did not do so in vain.

London, UK

Carina J. Fearnley
We Thank Our Sponsors

Open-access
publication
sponsored by

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RISK
FRONTIERS

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CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY
OF NEW ZEALAND

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Deanne K. Bird has been supported by the Nordic Centre of Excellence for Resilience and Societal Security—NORDRESS, which is funded by the Nordic Societal Security Programme.
# Contents

## Part One Adapting Warnings for Volcanic Hazards

William J. McGuire

**Volcano Crisis Communication: Challenges and Solutions in the 21st Century** 3
Carina Fearnley, Annie Elizabeth Grace Winson, John Pallister and Robert Tilling

**Communication Demands of Volcanic Ashfall Events** 23
Carol Stewart, Thomas M. Wilson, Victoria Sword-Daniels, Kristi L. Wallace, Christina R. Magill, Claire J. Horwell, Graham S. Leonard and Peter J. Baxter

**Volcanic Ash and Aviation—The Challenges of Real-Time, Global Communication of a Natural Hazard** 51
Peter Lechner, Andrew Tupper, Marianne Guffanti, Sue Loughlin and Tom Casadevall

**Volcanic Gases: Silent Killers** 65
Marie Edmonds, John Grattan and Sabina Michnowicz

**Active Hydrothermal Features as Tourist Attractions** 85
Patricia Erfurt-Cooper

**Mapping Hazard Zones, Rapid Warning Communication and Understanding Communities: Primary Ways to Mitigate Pyroclastic Flow Hazard** 107
Franck Lavigne, Julie Morin, Estuning Tyas Wulan Mei, Eliza S. Calder, Muhi Usamah and Ute Nugroho

**The Communication and Risk Management of Volcanic Ballistic Hazards** 121
R. H. Fitzgerald, B. M. Kennedy, T. M. Wilson, G. S. Leonard, K. Tsunematsu and H. Keys

**Imagining the Unimaginable: Communicating Extreme Volcanic Risk** 149
Amy Donovan and Clive Oppenheimer

**Part One Summary: Adapting Warnings for Volcanic Hazards** 165
William J. McGuire and Carina J. Fearnley
## Part Two Observing Volcanic Crises

Gill Jolly and Carina J. Fearnley

### Volcanic Unrest and Hazard Communication in Long Valley

**Volcanic Region, California** .................................... 171

David P. Hill, Margaret T. Mangan and Stephen R. McNutt

### Volcanic Hazard Communication at Pinatubo

**from 1991 to 2015** .................................................... 189

Chris Newhall and Renato U. Solidum

### Instrumental Volcano Surveillance and Community Awareness
in the Lead-Up to the 1994 Eruptions at Rabaul, Papua New

**Guinea** .................................................................... 205

Chris McKee, Ima Itikarai and Hugh Davies

### Challenges in Responding to a Sustained, Continuing

#### Volcanic Crisis: The Case of Popocatépetl

**Volcano, Mexico, 1994-Present** .................................... 235

Servando De la Cruz-Reyna, Robert I. Tilling
and Carlos Valdés-González

### Organisational Response to the 2007 Ruapehu Crater Lake
Dam-Break Lahar in New Zealand: Use of Communication

**in Creating an Effective Response** ................................. 253

Julia S. Becker, Graham S. Leonard, Sally H. Potter,
Maureen A. Coomer, Douglas Paton, Kim C. Wright
and David M. Johnston

### Crisis Coordination and Communication During the 2010

**Eyjafjallajökull Eruption** ........................................ 271

Deanne K. Bird, Guðrún Jóhannesdóttir, Víðir Reynisson,
Sigrún Karlsdóttir, Magnús T. Gudmundsson
and Guðrún Gísladóttir

### Supporting the Development of Procedures for Communications
During Volcanic Emergencies: Lessons Learnt from the Canary

**Islands (Spain) and Etna and Stromboli (Italy)** .................... 289

M. C. Solana, S. Calvari, C. R. J. Kilburn, H. Gutierrez,
D. Chester and A. Duncan

### Integrating Social and Physical Perspectives of Mitigation Policy
and Practice in Indonesia ............................................ 307

Supriyati Andreastuti, Agus Budianto and Eko Teguh Paripurno

### Social Representation of Human Resettlement Associated with
Risk from Volcán de Colima, Mexico ................................ 321

Alicia Cuevas-Muñiz and Juan Carlos Gavilanes-Ruiz

### If I Understand, I Am Understood: Experiences of Volcanic
Risk Communication in Colombia .................................... 335

Carolina García and Ricardo Mendez-Fajury
Challenges of Volcanic Crises on Small Islands States 353
Jean-Christophe Komorowski, Julie Morin, Susanna Jenkins
and Ilan Kelman

Investigating the Management of Geological Hazards and Risks
in the Mt Cameroon Area Using Focus Group Discussions 373
Mary-Ann del Marmol, Karen Fontijn, Mary Atanga, Steve Njome,
George Mafany, Aaron Tening, Mabel Nechia Wantim,
Beatrice Fonge, Vivian Bih Che, Aka Festus, Gerald G. J. Ernst,
Emmanuel Suh, Patric Jacobs and Matthieu Kervyn

Blaming Active Volcanoes or Active Volcanic Blame?
Volcanic Crisis Communication and Blame Management
in the Cameroon 395
Lee Miles, Richard Gordon and Henry Bang

Part Two Summary: Observing Volcanic Crises 411
Gill Jolly and Carina J. Fearnley

Part Three Communicating into the Future
Deanne K. Bird and Katharine Haynes

Communicating Information on Eruptions and Their Impacts
from the Earliest Times Until the Late Twentieth Century 419
David Chester, Angus Duncan, Rui Coutinho, Nicolau Wallenstein
and Stefano Branca

What Can We Learn from Records of Past Eruptions to Better
Prepare for the Future? 445
David M. Pyle

Reflections from an Indigenous Community on Volcanic Event
Management, Communications and Resilience 463
H. Gabrielsen, J. Procter, H. Rainforth, T. Black, G. Harmsworth
and N. Pardo

Fostering Participation of Local Actors in Volcanic Disaster
Risk Reduction 481
Jake Rom Cadag, Carolyn Driedger, Carolina Garcia,
Melanie Duncan, J. C. Gaillard, Jan Lindsay and Katharine Haynes

"There's no Plastic in Our Volcano": A Story About Losing
and Finding a Path to Participatory Volcanic Risk Management
in Colombia 499
Jacqui Wilmshurst

Cultural Differences and the Importance of Trust Between
Volcanologists and Partners in Volcanic Risk Mitigation 515
Chris Newhall

International Coordination in Managing Airborne Ash
Hazards: Lessons from the Northern Pacific 529
Yohko Igarashi, Olga Girina, Jeffrey Osiensky and Donald Moore
<table><tbody><tr><td>Decision-Making: Preventing Miscommunication and Creating Shared Meaning Between Stakeholders<br>Emma E. H. Doyle and Douglas Paton</td><td>549</td></tr><tr><td>Using Statistics to Quantify and Communicate Uncertainty During Volcanic Crises<br>Rosa Sobradelo and Joan Martí</td><td>571</td></tr><tr><td>Insurance and a Volcanic Crisis—A Tale of One (Big) Eruption, Two Insurers, and Innumerable Insureds<br>Russell Blong, Catherine Tillyard and George Attard</td><td>585</td></tr><tr><td>Challenges and Benefits of Standardising Early Warning Systems: A Case Study of New Zealand's Volcanic Alert Level System<br>Sally H. Potter, Bradley J. Scott, Carina J. Fearnley, Graham S. Leonard and Christopher E. Gregg</td><td>601</td></tr><tr><td>More Than Meets the Eye: Volcanic Hazard Map Design and Visual Communication<br>Mary Anne Thompson, Jan M. Lindsay and Graham S. Leonard</td><td>621</td></tr><tr><td>The Role of Geospatial Technologies in Communicating a More Effective Hazard Assessment: Application of Remote Sensing Data<br>P. W. Webley and I. M. Watson</td><td>641</td></tr><tr><td>Re-enchanting Volcanoes: The Rise, Fall, and Rise Again of Art and Aesthetics in the Making of Volcanic Knowledges<br>Deborah P. Dixon and Daniel J. Beech</td><td>665</td></tr><tr><td>Living with an Active Volcano: Informal and Community Learning for Preparedness in South of Japan<br>Kaori Kitagawa</td><td>677</td></tr><tr><td>Using Role-Play to Improve Students' Confidence and Perceptions of Communication in a Simulated Volcanic Crisis<br>Jacqueline Dohaney, Erik Brogt, Thomas M. Wilson and Ben Kennedy</td><td>691</td></tr><tr><td>Learning to Be Practical: A Guided Learning Approach to Transform Student Community Resilience When Faced with Natural Hazard Threats<br>Justin Sharpe</td><td>715</td></tr><tr><td>Role of Social Media and Networking in Volcanic Crises and Communication<br>Sally S. K. Sennert, Erik W. Klemetti and Deanne K. Bird</td><td>733</td></tr><tr><td>Part Three Summary: Communicating into the Future<br>Deanne K. Bird and Katharine Haynes</td><td>745</td></tr></tbody></table>
**Volcanic Crisis Communication: Where Do We Go from Here?** ... 751
Carina J. Fearnley, Deanne Katherine Bird, Katharine Haynes, William J. McGuire and Gill Jolly

**Erratum to: Crisis Coordination and Communication During the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull Eruption.** ... E1
Deanne K. Bird, Guðrún Jóhannesdóttir, Víðir Reynisson, Sigrún Karlsdóttir, Magnús T. Gudmundsson and Guðrún Gísladóttir

**Index** ... 757
Part One

Adapting Warnings for Volcanic Hazards

William J. McGuire
Volcano Crisis Communication:
Challenges and Solutions in the 21st
Century

Carina Fearnley, Annie Elizabeth Grace Winson,
John Pallister and Robert Tilling

Abstract

This volume, *Observing the volcano world: volcanic crisis communication*, focuses at the point where the ‘rubber hits the road’, where the world of volcano-related sciences and all its uncertainties meet with the complex and ever-changing dynamics of our society, wherever and whenever this may be. Core to the issues addressed in this book is the idea of how volcanic crisis communication operates in practice and in theory. This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of thinking around the importance of volcanic crisis communication over the last century, bringing together studies on relevant case studies. Frequently, the mechanisms by which volcanic crisis communication occurs are via a number of key tools employed including: risk assessment, probabilistic analysis, early-warning systems, all of which assist in the decision-making procedures; that are compounded by ever-changing societal demands and needs. This chapter outlines some of the key challenges faced in managing responses to volcanic eruptions since the start of the 20th century,

C. Fearnley (✉)

Department of Science and Technology Studies,
University College London, Gower Street, London
WC1E 6BT, UK

e-mail: c.fearnley@ucl.ac.uk

A. E. G. Winson

Department of Geography and Earth Sciences,
Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, Ceredigion
SY23 3FL, UK

J. Pallister

U.S. Geological Survey, David A. Johnston
Cascades Volcano Observatory, 1300 SE Cardinal
Court, Building 10, Suite 100, Vancouver, WA
98683-9589, USA

R. Tilling

U.S. Geological Survey, Volcano Science Center,
345 Middlefield Rd, Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA

Advs in Volcanology (2018) 3–21

https://doi.org/10.1007/11157_2017_28

© The Author(s) 2017

Published Online: 06 December 2017
to explore what has been effective, what lessons have been learnt from key
events, and what solutions we can discover. Adopting a holistic approach,
this chapter aims to provide a contextual background for the following
chapters in the volume that explore many of the elements discussed here in
further detail. Finally, we consider the future, as many chapters in this
book bring together a wealth of new knowledge that will enable further
insights for investigation, experimentation, and development of future
volcanic crisis communication.

# 1 Introduction: The Complexities of Volcanic Crisis Communication

With growing populations in volcanically vul-
nerable areas, it is likely that in the future more
people will be affected by volcanic eruptions,
most of whom will be busy with their daily
concerns. The challenge today remains how to
engage with a vulnerable population so that,
when the time is right, appropriate actions are
taken to mitigate loss of life and livelihood. If
anything, the 21st century presents
ever-increasing challenges to this goal. In part,
this is demonstrated by the issues of mistrust and
poor communication that emerged during the
L'Aquila trial of five scientists and two emer-
gency managers. These individuals were accused
of making poor judgements on uncertainty that
affected their communication to the public, and
the risk-management actions the public took in
response (Benessia and De Marchi 2017;
Alexander 2014; Bretton et al. 2015). Whilst
hugely complex, the L'Aquila case highlights the
role that science plays within the broader field of
crisis communication. As Sir Peter Gluckman,
the Chief Science Adviser to the Prime Minister
of New Zealand states (2014, p. 4):

Science advice is not generally a matter of dealing
with the easy issues that need technical solutions.
Rather it is largely sought in dealing with sensitive
matters of high public concern and inevitably
associated with uncertainty and considerable sci-
entific and political complexity.

Over the last 100 years scientists and various
stakeholders have made significant progress in

volcanic crisis communication. In this volume,
volcanic crisis communication is the term used
to encompass all forms of communication during
a volcanic crisis: from the communication
between monitoring equipment and scientists, to
the interpretation and decision-making between
scientists and, the communication between dif-
fering stakeholders on what actions to take and
when, to name a few examples.

Volcano observation began in a structured
way at the beginning of the 20th century. The
earliest observatories were established in Asama,
Japan and Hawaii, USA (Tilling 1989). As
observations increased, the role of volcanologists
in hazard management and mitigation grew.
Progressive crises have imparted lessons to the
volcanological community, helping to define
different roles in these situations. While this led
to great successes, in which volcanologists
worked closely with civil-defence authorities,
volcanic tragedies have also taken place, requir-
ing reflection on how knowledge was commu-
nicated to stakeholders. For example, ineffective
communication during the Nevado del Ruiz
eruption in Colombia in 1985 resulted in the
tragic catastrophe of over 23,000 deaths. This
was not because of inadequate scientific knowl-
edge or technology, but rather because local
authorities and communities did not act on
warnings (Hall 1990; Voight 1990). This was
especially surprising as there had been a large
effort to educate the population about the risks,
and because an alert was issued in time. It is
believed that a fundamental lack of understand-
ing of terminology used in education campaigns
led the community of Armero to perceive the risk less significantly. The tragedy highlighted the role of scientists in crisis response, and the need to effectively engage with stakeholders. It is important that all information is presented clearly and with recognition that the audience may not possess the same understanding of jargon that scientists are comfortable with.

Effective volcanic crisis communication is a fundamental component of the concepts of mitigation, disaster management, and disaster risk reduction. As part of this communication process, a number of tools have emerged that are regularly employed in volcanic crises that assist in the structure and formulation of communicative processes. This chapter focuses on four vital lessons learnt from key crisis events. First, advocating the need for resources to develop knowledge surrounding dangerous volcanoes and establishing potential threats via risk assessments. Second, the need to communicate the inherent scientific uncertainties in managing volcanic hazards, which has led to probabilistic analysis playing an ever-increasing role in crisis communication. Third, the value of providing warnings, typically through networks commonly known as early-warning systems. Finally, the intricate role of decision-making, increasingly assisted by various tools such as digital maps, automated messaging and alerting tools, as well as new policies and procedures to communicate data and knowledge. Together these lessons have generated a diverse range of volcanic-crisis communication around the world, shaped largely by the crises experienced to date and by the capabilities of the people and institutions engaged in volcano hazard analysis and warning.

## 2 Learning from the Past: Key Events that Shaped Crisis Communication

The Nevado del Ruiz disaster prompted a significant paradigm shift within the global volcanic community towards developing a keener understanding of local contexts when issuing volcanic warnings. This event, however,

is not isolated. A number of other volcanic crises over the last 100 years have demonstrated the powerful influence of the social context on a crisis, and the need to continue to investigate crises where science and society come together in a pressured situation (see Table 1). Societal influence can be demonstrated by: the influence of political interference at Mt. Pelée, Martinique, 1902 (Scarth 2002); miscommunication between scientists and the media in Guadeloupe, 1976 (Fiske 1984); interactions between scientists and authorities in Montserrat, in 1995 (Druitt and Kokelaar 2002); differing levels of trust and understanding of the uncertainties and risks involved in volcanic crises (Haynes et al. 2008a, b); the importance of community leaders and past experience with volcanic crises (Andreastuti et al. 2017) and the ability for early warnings to successfully fulfil their purpose (Peterson and Tilling 1993), as key examples.

This volume addresses many key events that have shaped the paradigm of volcanic-crisis communication. Of the events listed in Table 1, three are especially noteworthy, well-studied case histories: La Soufrière (1976), El Chichón (1982), and Merapi (2010); for these, we have prepared detailed summaries from the many pertinent publications (see online supplementary materials). Acting as constant reminders, these events collectively have shaped practices around volcanic crisis communication.

One author of this chapter (Tilling) played a key role in many of these events in his capacity as head of the Volcano Programme at the United States Geological Survey (USGS). In 1989, Tilling identified five specific measures in volcano hazard mitigation to provide short- or long-term mitigation that collectively brings together the components required for effective volcanic management. He explored the relationships between these groups and their required actions in practice by identifying five key areas: (i) identification of high-risk volcanoes; (ii) hazard identification, assessment and zonation; (iii) volcano monitoring and eruption forecasting; (iv) engineering-oriented measures, and (v) volcanic emergency management (Fig. 1). It is important to note that the critical
<table><caption>**Table 1** Overview of key events that have shaped volcanic crisis communication</caption><thead><tr><td>Volcano, country</td><td>Date</td><td>Event</td><td>References</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>La Grande Soufrière, Guadeloupe</td><td>1976</td><td>Phreatic eruptions in Guadeloupe led to mass evacuations and very public disagreements between scientists</td><td>Fisk (1984), Komorowski et al. (2015)</td></tr><tr><td>Mount St. Helens, USA</td><td>1980</td><td>First successful implementation of volcano alert levels as a warning tool; first use of probabilistic event tree</td><td>Lipman and Mullineaux (1982), Newhall and Hoblitt (2002), Newhall and Pallister (2015)</td></tr><tr><td>Long Valley Caldera, USA</td><td>1980</td><td>First caldera unrest at Long Valley resulting in leaked news that eroded trust between the local communities and the scientists</td><td>Hill et al. (2017, Chap. "Volcanic Unrest and Hazard Communication in Long Valley Caldera, California")</td></tr><tr><td>El Chichón, Mexico</td><td>1982</td><td>Eruption kills 2000 attributable to lack of monitoring, background information and mixed messages from scientists to military emergency managers</td><td>Macías et al. (1997), Espíndola et al. (2002), Tilling (2009)</td></tr><tr><td>Nevado del Ruiz, Colombia</td><td>1985</td><td>Lahars kill 23,000 people. The realisation that science is not enough, it needs to be effectively communicated and understood</td><td>Hall (1990), Voight (1990)</td></tr><tr><td>Pinatubo, Philippines</td><td>1991</td><td>Eruption of Pinatubo, daily use of Volcano Early Warning Systems (VEWS) to alert public and trigger evacuations that saved tens of thousands of lives. Use of IAVCEI sponsored video to demonstrate types of hazard, based mainly on films by Maurice and Katia Krafft</td><td>Newhall and Punongbayan (1996), Punongbayan et al. (1996), Newhall and Solidum (2017, Chap. "Volcanic Hazard Communication at Pinatubo from 1991 to 2015")</td></tr><tr><td>Galeras, Colombia</td><td>1993</td><td>Retrospective analysis suggests need for a more robust appraisal of hazards and introduction of Bayesian Belief Networks to aid decision making</td><td>Aspinall et al. (2003), Garcia and Mendez-Fajury (2017, Chap. "If I Understand, I Am Understood: Experiences of Volcanic Risk Communication in Colombia")</td></tr><tr><td>Rabaul, Papua New Guinea</td><td>1994</td><td>Demonstrating the capacity for the public to self-evacuate and balancing the communication of uncertainty with safety</td><td>McKee et al. (2017, Chap. "Instrumental Volcano Surveillance and Community Awareness in the Lead-Up to the 1994 Eruptions at Rabaul, Papua New Guinea")</td></tr><tr><td>Soufriere Hills, Montserrat</td><td>1995-present</td><td>Communicating uncertainty in long running volcanic crises; use of Science Advisory Committee, Expert Elicitation and links between Volcanic Alert Level System (VALS) and mitigation actions; trust and its influence on risk communication</td><td>Aspinall et al. (2002), Haynes et al. (2008a)</td></tr><tr><td>Huila, Colombia</td><td>2006–2007</td><td>Effective communication and use of VEWS and VALS by INGEOMINAS (now SGC) that saves hundreds of lives from lahars</td><td>Santacoloma et al. (2011, Pulgarin et al. 2011, 2015), Garcia and Mendez-Fajury (2017, Chap. "If I Understand, I Am Understood: Experiences of Volcanic Risk Communication in Colombia")</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><caption>**Table 1** (continued)</caption><thead><tr><td>Volcano, country</td><td>Date</td><td>Event</td><td>References</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Eyjafjallajökull, Iceland</td><td>2010</td><td>Demonstrating how volcanic ash can affect multiple countries and industries at once</td><td>Donovan and Oppenheimer (2012), Bird et al. (2017, Chap. “Crisis Coordination and Communication During the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull Eruption”)</td></tr><tr><td>Merapi, Indonesia</td><td>2010</td><td>Preparedness and practice saves thousands despite rapid development of a major crisis</td><td>Surono et al. (2012), Mei et al. (2013)</td></tr><tr><td>Sinabung and Kelud, Indonesia</td><td>2010-present and 2014</td><td>Preparedness and differences in communication and culture at newly awakening vs. frequently erupting volcanoes; and the importance of local leaders and community engagement</td><td>Andreastuti et al. (2017, Chap. “Integrating Social and Physical Perspectives of Mitigation Policy and Practice in Indonesia”)</td></tr></tbody></table>

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** Schematic diagram of an idealized program to reduce volcanic risk. The apex is separated from the rest of the triangle to emphasize that volcano scientists, while responsible for providing the best possible scientific information and advice, do not typically have knowledge</figcaption></figure>

of other key factors (e.g., socio-economic, cultural, political) and rarely have the authority to make final decisions regarding mitigation measures, including possible evacuation (modified from Tilling 1989, Fig. 1)

role of volcanic emergency management was identified as being undervalued, partly because of the complexities of society. By 1993, Peterson and Tilling demonstrated that volcano warnings were largely hindered by institutional weaknesses in emergency-response procedures

and infrastructures, particularly the poor integration and sharing of critical information, as well as ineffective communications between scientists, decision-makers, and the affected populace. Communications clearly required more focus.
In the 1990s, there was significant focus on the communication of volcanic hazards for the aviation sector following two significant near-disasters and a major eruption that closed multiple airways: the first was the encounter of British Airways Flight 9 that encountered an ash cloud from Galunggung volcano in Java, the second was the near-loss of KLM flight 867 when it encountered the ash cloud of Redoubt volcano in 1989 (Guffanti and Miller 2013); and the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991 that closed airports and airways across a wide region of the western Pacific (Tayag et al. 1996). In response to these crises, previous systems were refined and the schemes that are familiar today, such as the USGS Aviation colour code scheme, were devised (see Fearnley et al. 2012). However, even with variations of these systems now in place there are still questions as to their effectiveness and success globally (Winson et al. 2014; Papale 2017). Another key area of focus was the eruption of Soufriere Hills Volcano in Montserrat, extensively captured within Sparks and Young's memoir (2002). The ongoing eruption enabled significant exploration and experimentation, not just in volcanic monitoring and forecasting, but also in the governance of communication (Haynes et al. 2008a), the use of expert elicitation (Aspinall and Cooke 1998), and in generating maps and warning systems (Haynes et al. 2007). These events have closely shaped organisation and institutional practices within the volcanic and aviation sectors.

The publication ‘Professional conduct of scientists during volcanic crises’ emanating from the 1999 IAVCEI Subcommittee for Crisis Protocols provides guidance on what procedures and actions to take during a crisis (Newhall 1999). This simple yet powerful checklist is vital in minimizing communication pitfalls and is based on lessons identified by the committee’s wealth of experiences during crises. The IAVCEI protocols seem to be standing the test of time, but society is dynamic and poses new challenges. This is particularly true in the context of: an ever-increasing population at risk, increasing pressures for global levels of warning, new forms

of technologies that aid scientific understanding, and communication—most recently via social media.

By the early 2000s, there was extensive focus around the interaction of volcanic events and cultures, wonderfully captured by Grattan and Torrance (2003, 2007). These two volumes explored a wealth of knowledge to better understand how culture is vital to the forms of communication that are fostered during volcanic crises, providing many a lesson learnt to shape future efforts. A surprising element of these books is the lesson that can be learnt from evaluating how early humans and civilisations ‘sunk or swam’ following volcanic crises.

Continuing the growth in key literature on volcanic crisis communication, in 2008, Barclay et al. (2008) explored the advances in understanding, modelling, and predicting volcanic hazards, and more recent techniques for reducing and mitigating volcanic risk. Providing valuable new insights, the article advocates the role of community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) to aid effective risk communication. The article concludes with the following (p. 165):

> Evidence suggests that the current ‘multidisciplinary’ approach within physical science needs a broader scope to include sociological knowledge and techniques. Key areas where this approach might be applied are: (1) the understanding of the incentives that make governments and communities act to reduce volcanic risk; (2) improving the communication of volcanic uncertainties in volcanic emergency management and long-term planning and development. To be successful, volcanic risk reduction programmes will need to be placed within the context of other risk-related phenomena (e.g., other natural hazards, climate change) and aim to develop an all-risks reduction culture. We suggest that the greatest potential for achieving these two aims comes from deliberative inclusive processes and geographic information systems.

Areas highlighted specifically for further research included: (1) effectively conveying uncertain information, (2) methods for making decisions in uncertain situations, and (3) methods for dealing with dynamic and changing uncertainty without losing credibility and trust. Since 2008, a majority of research within volcanic crisis
communication has focused on these three areas, and this work forms the foundations for this volume.

In an increasingly globalised world, recent volcanic disasters take on a new level of complexity. Whilst relatively minor loss of life may occur, particular events such as the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption demonstrate the possibilities for significant global economic impacts. With ever increasing challenges to volcanic communities, ever more innovative solutions are needed to enhance crisis communication effectiveness for all sectors of society.

## 3 Key Solutions

Based on past events, we identify four key solutions to the challenges presented, alongside valuable lessons learnt: (i) assessing the threat; (ii) assessing and communicating uncertainty; (iii) establishing an early warning system; and (iv) developing and integrating decision-making tools.

### 3.1 Assessing the Threat

Attempts to assess the threat posed by volcanoes, relative to each other, began in the 1980s with three schemes created by: Bailey et al. (1983), Lowenstein and Talai (1984) and Yokoyama et al. (1984). The purpose of these was to identify the volcanoes most likely to generate destructive eruptions specific to the USA (Bailey et al. 1983) and Papua New Guinea (Lowenstein and Talai 1984) and, globally (UNESCO report, Yokoyama et al. (1984)). This would allow for preferential deployment of monitoring equipment for maximum threat mitigation. These three schemes were used as the basis for the U.S. National Volcano Early Warning System (NVEWS) (Ewert et al. 2005, 2007). NVEWS ranked 169 volcanoes in the USA in a combined assessment of 15 hazard and 9 exposure factors to generate a threat score. This scheme notably included a score for the potential exposure of aviation to an eruption of a specific volcano.

Threat scores allow volcanoes to be ranked against each other and thus enable recommendations for varying levels of monitoring (Ewert et al. 2005; Moran et al. 2008). Monitoring efforts are therefore focused on the volcanoes most likely to generate significant risk.

It is important to note that all authors of these types of ranking systems recognize that such comparisons are dependent on the existing quality and quantity of information. If little is known of a volcano, then it is difficult to accurately calculate its threat, except through global comparisons to analogue volcanoes and rapid investigations and monitoring installations during a crisis (i.e., playing “catch up”). For example, the global assessment prepared for UNESCO by Yokoyama et al. (1984) failed to recognize the potential for Pinatubo to produce a large, explosive eruption. This was not an oversight, but rather a reflection of what was known at the time. Less than a decade later, this volcano produced one of the largest recorded eruptions of the century, highlighting the need for vigilance and thorough assessment of any volcanoes near population centres, even if they have appeared dormant for hundreds of years. Although, there was a remarkably successful response that saved an estimated 20,000 lives (Newhall and Punongbayan 1996), it is now widely recognized that playing “catch up” is not the best solution, as it puts the response team in danger and it may not always result in a positive outcome. Consequently, the importance of developing a Volcano Early Warning System (VEWS) well in advance of a crisis, for all high-risk volcanoes, is now widely accepted as best practice. This was one of the major motivations for NVEWS that was first implemented in 2005, and is now used in a number of nations.

### 3.2 Assessing and Communicating Uncertainty

A principal challenge is that the degree of certainty in forecasting varies widely with time before (Newhall 2000). It is possible to forecast eruptions with relative certainty at an
intermittently active volcano over time scales of
centuries, highly uncertain at intermediate time
spans of months to a few years, and with
greatly improved certainty at short time spans of
days to hours. Yet, in spite of these restrictions,
forecasts of eruptions have become relatively
common. Volcano observatories worldwide
issue alert levels, many of which include qual-
itative statements about the probability of an
eruption (e.g., it is “likely”) within certain
periods of time (e.g., “within days to weeks”).
Repeated lava-dome eruptions were predicted
successfully at Mount St. Helens (Swanson
et al. 1983) and forecast at Montserrat (Voight
et al. 1988) using changes in deformation and
seismic rates. Similarly, based mainly on an
escalation in seismicity and observations of
physical changes at Pinatubo, the
USGS-Philippine Institute of Volcanology and
Seismology (PHIVOLCS) team estimated a
40% probability on 17 May 1991 for an erup-
tion, 3 weeks before the eruption started. As
levels and rates of unrest increased through
early June, alert levels were used to warn that
an eruption was likely to begin within 2 weeks
and then within 24 hours (Punongbayan et al.
1996; Newhall and Pallister 2015). Based on
seismic pattern-recognition during precursory
activity and associated conceptual models of
magma dynamics, successful forecasts have
been made at many other volcanoes during the
past several decades (McNutt 1996; Chouet
1996; White and McCausland 2016).

A problem with such forecasts, however, is
that they typically use descriptive terms such as
“likely” to convey the hazard (Doyle et al. 2014).
This is a major shortcoming, because without a
working understanding and effective communi-
cations of probability and uncertainty, emer-
gency managers and the public may not be
convinced of the potential hazard and urgency to
take timely mitigation measures. In order to
make forecasts more quantitative, probabilistic
and statistical methods are now increasingly
used. Probabilistic eruption forecasting typically
utilizes Bayesian statistics, in which the proba-
bilities of subsequent events depend on the out-
comes of prior events; i.e., they are path

dependent and increase in magnitude as the path
is realized and the volcano progresses toward an
event. These methods typically assign initial (a
priori) probabilities on the basis of historical
statistics and then update them into a posteriori
probabilities that are based on interpretation of
monitoring data and on the physical and chemi-
cal processes that are thought to be controlling
the system.

The Bayesian methods may be used in both
long-term and short-term forecasting. The most
common applications of statistics and uncertainty
analyses in short-term eruption forecasting is the
Bayesian Event Tree (Newhall and Hoblitt 2002),
which considers probabilities and uncertainties of
occurrence at each node in a tree-like time series
leading to a potential eruption. Monitoring
information is often combined with
pre-determined patterns or thresholds and with
conceptual models pertaining to the dynamics of
magmatic systems to forecast outcomes of vol-
canic unrest. Current practitioners of Bayesian
Event Tree (BET) analysis use either the
Cooke-Aspinall method (Cooke 1991; Aspinall
2006) or the INGV (National Institute of Geo-
physics and Volcanology) method (Marzocchi
et al. 2004, 2008), although there are other
implementations (e.g., Sobradelo et al. 2014;
Jolly et al. 2014; Newhall and Pallister 2015). In
addition, Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN),
another graphic method that does not require the
same type of linear time progression as in BET
systems, may be used effectively in some situa-
tions (e.g., Lindsay et al. 2010; Hincks et al. 2014;
Aspinall and Woo 2014). All of these methods
integrate some form of elicitation of opinions
from a team of experts to assign probabilities and
uncertainties based on monitoring data, past
eruptive behaviour and conceptual models. They
vary with respect to whether monitoring thresh-
olds are defined in advance for the volcano in
question and in how uncertainties are established.
In comparison, the USGS/Volcano Disaster
Assistance Programme (VDAP) team (Newhall
and Pallister 2015) uses group discussion and
consensus to assign nodal probabilities. In the
INGV method, probability distributions are
established for each node in the event tree
(Marzocchi et al. 2008). In this procedure, the parameters, weights, and thresholds are established through expert opinions, updated using data of past eruptions, and uncertainty is expressed as a probability density function for each node in the tree (Marzocchi and Bebbington 2012).

A daunting challenge for scientists who use any of these methods is to effectively communicate the results to emergency managers and the public; groups who are rarely well versed in statistics. A well-designed VEWS should utilize everyday terminology that is well-known to the population at risk, and be explicitly linked to any assigned numerical probabilities. For example, the USGS/VDAP team generally translates probabilities in terms of odds and rounds to the nearest 10%; e.g., “1 out of 3” or “9 out of 10” and terms such as “unlikely” are defined as <10%, “moderately likely” as 10–70% and “highly likely” as >70%.

## 3.3 Establishing an Early Warning System

Early-warning systems (EWS) are employed globally for a range of rapid onset hazards. The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) recognises EWS as a core component of disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures both in the Hyogo Framework (2005) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015), stipulating the need to ‘substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments to the people by 2030’ (UN ISDR 2015 p. 12). EWS can be defined as ‘the set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss’ (UNISDR 2009, p. 12). This approach is comprised of four key sections: risk knowledge, monitoring and warning service, dissemination and communication, and response capacity (UNISDR PPEW 2006). This definition moves

away from a traditional approach to EWS, as merely technical warnings through a siren or other simple warning method.

According to Leonard et al. (2008), VEWS are composed of five key components (Fig. 2): the early warning system itself, planning, co-operation, education and participation, and exercises. It is widely accepted that VEWS are part of a broader framework of DRR measures including: scientific knowledge and limitation, education, technology capabilities, and policy. EWS are arguably the process by which many DRR measures are implemented, often within a broader mitigation strategy.

The process of developing a VEWS requires cooperation and communication not only across different cultures, but also different languages and political regimes. Garcia and Fearnley (2012) highlight that, whilst an EWS may have four key components as outlined by the UNISDR, it is often the links between these categories that are the focus of systemic failure. With multi-national volcanic events or hazards, these links are likely to be highly stressed. Whilst there are excellent studies on EWS (e.g., Mileti and Sorenson 1990; Kuppers and Zschau 2002; Basher 2006; Golnaraghi 2012), few look beyond the individual case study to focus on more international scale implications of a hazard event (Fig. 2).

It is possible to establish some of the complexities that VEWS have to deal with by applying the concept of classification of mitigation strategies to VEWS (Day and Fearnley 2015). This depends on how the VEWS has been designed. Responsive mitigation strategies prescribe actions after a hazard-source event has occurred, such as evacuations to avoid lahars, which require capacities to detect and quantify the hazard and to transmit warnings fast enough to enable at risk populations to decide and act effectively. Permanent mitigation strategies prescribe actions such as construction of SABO dams or land use restrictions: they are frequently both costly and “brittle” in that the actions work up to a design limit of hazard intensity or magnitude and then fail. Permanent warning systems exist on volcanoes, whereby a warning is
<figure><img src="image_15.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** Effective early-warning systems model with permission from Leonard et al. (2008, p. 204)</figcaption></figure>

triggered, for example, by an automated lahar warning system. Anticipatory mitigation strategies, used in the mitigation of volcanic hazards more than for any other type of hazard, prescribe use of the interpretation of precursors to hazard source events as a basis for precautionary actions. However, challenges arise from uncertainties in hazard behaviour and in the interpretation of precursory signals. For example, evacuating vulnerable populations who live in areas susceptible to pyroclastic density currents prior to the onset of an eruption, pose hard questions about whether an early warning is based on forecasts, or on current activity and observations only, as well as our dependency on technology and statistical methods to make potentially life and death decisions.

Many countries operate so that their early warnings are based only and exclusively on scientific data and probabilistic forecasts. Other countries explicitly consider the social risks involved, alongside the scientific data and forecasts. There is potential for skewing of alert level

assignment, intentionally or unintentionally, when there is prior-knowledge of the risks involved, and when scientists rely upon non-probabilistic decision making (Fearnley 2013). Papale (2017) presents an argument that warnings may be flawed by implicit vested interests, and he recommends that observatories should rely on pre-established thresholds and communication of scientifically based probabilistic forecasts for hazard communication. Dependant on the context, differing approaches may be taken in either adopting a top-down (government led initiative) or bottom-up approach (driven by community based approaches).

What remains a challenge is to define whether a VEWS has been successful or not; this also depends on how success is measured. Paton et al. (1998) state that effectiveness of an integrated response can be constrained by communication and coordination across stakeholders, training experience, and organisational capabilities. It is imperative that all warning communication has one consistent message, with no contradiction to
cause confusion. This is essential to establish trust between the public and other users that the information is correct (Mileti and Sorenson 1990). Further challenges can arise from the accumulation of multiple disasters, e.g., the impact of Typhoon Yunya in the Philippines during the 1991 Pinatubo eruption significantly exacerbated lahars, ashfall distribution and loading (Newhall and Punongbayan 1996). It is also challenging to determine the cost benefit of a VIEWS prior to the impact of the event and as a result, many disregard the value of the system, particularly for events with a long-return frequency.

Science is a necessary evidence base for making decisions and has become a key component in EWS or Incident Command Systems (ICS). In some cases, EWS have become ‘hazard-focused, linear, top-down, expert-driven systems, with little or no engagement of end-users or their representatives’ (Basher 2006, p. 2712). However, there are many examples where major efforts are being made to engage with end users via community outreach and educational activities such as PHIVOLCS (Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology), the USGS, and CVGHM (Center for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation). Typically, government institutions that manage potential disasters use simple prescriptive policy. Within this they recognise that decision-making is more complex and that local practitioners and vulnerable populations are increasingly managing disasters relevant to them using community-based warning and emergency response systems (UN ISDR PPEW 2006). Such community-based warning and response systems are based upon local capabilities and technologies where communities can have ownership, generating a bottom-up approach. Although initially considered a radical approach when introduced by Hewitt (1983), community-based early warning and response systems have gained momentum and have been proven effective and empowering during crises (Andreastuti et al. 2017). Subsequently it is suggested by the UN ISDR PPEW (2006) that these community-based approaches

develop people-centric early warning and emergency response systems.

## 3.4 Decision-Making Tools

The way that people perceive information that has been communicated to them is vitally important, as it will shape how they frame problems and make decisions. There is significant progress in the role of various tools to assist in applying new knowledge making use of communicative products such as: map making, messages in preparedness products, infograms, and the simple verbal conveyance of crisis communication. Equally there are numerous new challenges and benefits to effective communication. For example there may be too little monitoring data, which increases the uncertainties in forecasts. In a few select cases where there are many different types of monitoring methods available, it may be difficult for scientists to synthesise all the information into a forecast in a timely manner. This suggests that there are optimal levels of monitoring and/or procedures for timely data processing and interpretation if the aim is to forecast future activity. Equally, the expansion of social media has opened lines of communication both to and from volcano observatories in new transparent and engaging ways, as seen via Twitter feeds, new citizen science apps, and community based monitoring (e.g., Stone et al. 2014), and in the sharing of knowledge. However, it also has placed pressure on the credibility of information, raising the risk of false data and interpretations that require careful management, and new levels of trust and engagement that must be built between the volcano observatories and the publics.

Maps are increasingly being used as a tool in conveying uncertainty, risk, and warnings. Volcano hazard maps are widely used to graphically portray the nature and extent of hazards and vulnerabilities and, in a few cases, the societal risk. Such maps may also be used to designate prohibited, restricted entry, or warning zones. They vary widely in style and content from nation to
nation, and from volcano to volcano. In the most basic form, a volcano hazard map consists of hazard zones based on the underlying geology and history of past eruptions to define the extent of past flows and tephra falls. More sophisticated hazard maps utilize detailed geologic mapping and modelling of potential flow paths, often using Digital Elevation Models (DEMs) and statistical or numerical models that simulate flows of varying volume and duration. Some new approaches use automatic GIS-based systems that incorporate numerical model results and display the results in a GIS format (Felpeto et al. 2007) or that display the results of spatial probability for potential vent locations and flow inundation (Bevilacqua et al. 2015; Neri et al. 2015). These automated methods provide the capability to quickly modify the hazard map during a rapidly developing crisis. In addition, a new generation of numerical models have enabled near-real-time probabilistic forecast maps of ash cloud and ash fall hazards (Schwaiger et al. 2012 and references therein). Regardless of their degree of sophistication, hazard maps are a fundamental means to convey the spatial distribution of danger zones to emergency managers and the public. Although not everyone can effectively read a topographic map, shaded relief and 3D oblique projections using DEMs provide more effective means to communicate map information (Newhall 2000; Haynes et al. 2007).

To date there has been little evaluation of the influence of institutional organisation and the flow of information between different actors in a crisis when deciding what to do with the 'threat'. Fearnley (2013) investigated the role of decision-making in the USGS when assigning a volcano alert level, which established that informal communication is essential to enable key user groups to determine the extent of risk and likelihood of events. This was commonly achieved via face-to-face meetings, workshops and exercises, and telephone conversations, alongside web resources. Interactions are conducted in a multi-directional manner as various stakeholders may discuss relevant issues, moving away from typical one or two-way communication models. Evidence suggested that the ability to develop dialogue enabled key decision-makers

to gauge the volcano's behaviour and forecast in terms relevant to their own geographical, and temporal relations to the hazard. Today, observatories have developed a number of institutional communication tools, whether they are simply telephone calls or meetings that enable dialogue, or a one-way tool of information from the observatory via standardised messages targeted to specific users, such as the Volcano Activity Notice (VAN) or Volcano Observatory Notice for Aviation (VONA). Information can be communicated via daily, weekly, or monthly formal updates, status or information reports, or via Tweets, social networking, and the Smithsonian Weekly Updates. With so many options available it is up to the observatory and their stakeholders to establish what tools best serve their purpose.

In addition, during times of crisis, most observatories also participate in National Incident Command systems, or other similar civil protection procedures. For example, the USGS volcano observatories contribute scientific information to the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which was developed over many decades in response to inter-agency responses to wildfires, and is now used for all types of crises and disasters. The fundamental element of NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS) system, which is used to structure and organize responses by federal, state and local agencies with responsibility for responding to natural as well as man-made crises and disasters. Figure 3 shows how the USGS contributes to the ICS system during volcanic crises. For example, in a disaster response, USGS scientists serve as technical advisors in the Planning Section to provide information about hazards (e.g., forecasts regarding eruptive activity, information about areas likely to be affected, extent and duration of impacts, etc.). They may also have a role in the Operations Section (e.g., in helping coordinate aviation operations). During an ICS response, a Joint Information Center (JIC) and a Joint Operations Center (JOC) are established. Through the JIC, press briefings and other media events are planned and conducted (Dreidger et al. 2004). The JIC and JOC are places where representatives of all involved agencies meet to coordinate information and crisis operations.
<figure><img src="image_16.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3** USGS Volcano Observatories play a role as technical advisors in the U.S. Incident Command System (ICS). This is typically led by emergency-management</figcaption></figure>

agencies. Coordinates response and communication among multiple agencies and jurisdictions. (Source USGS)

## 4 Where Are We Now and What Are the New Challenges?

The above solutions are four of many that exist but are those of greatest focus currently within the field. This volume have been specifically crafted to build on prior research in the field and case studies from over the last 100 years (and sometimes beyond), to show how multidisciplinary approaches can be used to successfully manage a volcanic crisis, and that core to this are the communication processes. It is the intention to enable the next stage of understanding of volcanic crisis management in the 2020s to help navigate strong, easy, and effective communication. To do this, the book has three parts focusing on various lessons surrounding volcanic crisis communication.

First, it is well established that due to the longevity of hazards and the uncertainties in lead-time, and because of their numerous primary and secondary hazards, volcanoes pose a particular challenge. Some may argue volcanologists make too much of this distinction of volcanic crises being 'different' from other hazards and that in terms of the complexities of societal impacts and recovery, they are similar to earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunami and flooding,

etc. However, it is the very challenge of providing warnings with great uncertainties that makes volcanoes one of the most complex phenomena to manage and communicate. Volcanic hazards vary in location, scale and duration as explored independently in Part 1 of the volume. Hazards range from: volcanic bombs within close proximity of a vent (Fitzgerald et al. 2017, Chapter “The Communication and Risk Management of Volcanic Ballistic Hazards”), to pyroclastic flows whose impacts can also be proximal (Lavigne et al. 2017, Chapter “Mapping Hazard Zones, Rapid Warning Communication and Understanding Communities: Primary Ways to Mitigate Pyroclastic Flow Hazard”), lahars that can travel extensive distances often into non-volcanic terrain (Becker et al. 2017, Chapter “Organisational Response to the 2007 Ruapehu Crater Lake Dam-Break Lahar in New Zealand: Use of Communication in Creating an Effective Response”), volcanic gas hazards (Edmonds et al. 2017, Chapter “Volcanic Gases: Silent Killers”) that can influence global climates (Donovan and Oppenheimer 2017, Chapter “Imagining the Unimaginable: Communicating Extreme Volcanic Risk”), and volcanic ash that can affect aviation (Lechner et al. 2017, Chapter
“Volcanic Ash and Aviation—The Challenges of Real-Time, Global Communication of a Natural Hazard”) as well as local populations (Stewart et al. 2017, Chapter “Communication Demands of Volcanic Ashfall Events”). Volcanic hazards often evolve over time, becoming more or less intense, or changing in character e.g., from Plinian to Hawaiian style eruptions. It is this diverse nature that poses significant challenges to the idea of creating a single VEWS to communicate unrest and danger. In fact, there are numerous VEWS in place for volcanoes globally; many tailored for the specific hazard of a particular volcano, e.g., hydrothermal activity at Yellowstone (Erfurt-Cooper 2017, Chapter “Active Hydrothermal Features as Tourist Attractions”), or lahars on Mt Ruapehu (Becker et al. 2017, Chapter “Organisational Response to the 2007 Ruapehu Crater Lake Dam-Break Lahar in New Zealand: Use of Communication in Creating an Effective Response”). Part 1 explores the specific nuances each hazard presents to developing effective volcanic crisis communication, for specific or for a combination of hazards that may occur during a crisis.

In Part 2, the chapters discuss some of the key challenges involved in developing communication procedures and tools, and how these processes have evolved through the development of volcano observatories during the last 100 years. This is done by sharing and analysing some key lessons identified/learnt and best practices to improve the development and implementations of crisis communication following a chronological order (some are highlighted in Table 1). In essence, we are asking how can we move forward and develop more robust and effective early warning and, volcanic hazard, and risk communication. Using a range of international examples, Part 2 considers: small island states (Komorowski et al. 2017, Chapter “Challenges of Volcanic Crises on Small Islands States”), politically contested areas including Mt Cameroon (Marmol et al. 2017, Chapter “Investigating the management of geological hazards and risks in the Mt Cameroon area using Focus Group Discussions”; Miles et al. 2017, Chapter

“Blaming Active Volcanoes or Active Volcanic Blame? Volcanic Crisis Communication and Blame Management in the Cameroon”), challenges of institutional and culturally different approaches to communicating during crises in the Canaries and Italy (Solana et al. 2017, Chapter “Supporting the Development of Procedures for Communications During Volcanic Emergencies: Lessons Learnt from the Canary Islands (Spain) and Etna and Stromboli (Italy)”), extensive work to protect the millions of people that live under the shadow of Popocatépetl (De la Cruz-Reyna et al. 2017, Chapter “Challenges in Responding to a Sustained, Continuing Volcanic Crisis: The Case of Popocatépetl Volcano, Mexico, 1994-Present”), and, challenges of representing those living by a volcano as seen at Colima in Mexico (Cuevas-Muñiz and Gavilanes-Ruiz 2017, Chapter “Social Representation of Human Resettlement Associated with Risk from Volcán de Colima, Mexico”) and at Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland (Bird et al. 2017, Chapter “Crisis Coordination and Communication During the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull Eruption”). There are old stories told with fresh eyes, old stories told for the first time, and some new stories that require humility to learn from.

Part 3 examines the numerous ways in which we communicate, not just across the sciencesociety divide, but also across different disciplines including: religion (Chester et al. 2017, Chapter “Communicating Information on Eruptions and Their Impacts from the Earliest Times Until the Late Twentieth Century”), history and politics (Pyle 2017, Chapter “What Can We Learn from Records of Past Eruptions to Better Prepare for the Future?”). However we choose to communicate, whether via: oral histories (Procter et al. 2017, Chapter “Reflections from an Indigenous Community on Volcanic Event Management, Communications and Resilience”), social media (Sennert et al. 2017, Chapter “Role of Social Media and Networking in Volcanic Crises and Communication”), by drawing maps (Thompson et al. 2017, Chapter “More Than Meets the Eye: Volcanic Hazard Map Design and Visual Communication”), using
satellite data (Webley and Watson 2017, Chapter “The role of geospatial technologies in communicating a more effective hazard assessment: application of GIS tools and remote sensing data”); is vital is to be effective. To achieve this several tools can be adopted: education from children to adults (Kitagawa 2017, Chapter “Living with an Active Volcano: Informal and Community Learning for Preparedness in South of Japan”; Sharpe 2017, Chapter “Learning to be practical: A guided learning approach to transform student community resilience when faced with natural hazard threats”), developing tools such as role-play to enhance the learning process (Dohoney et al. 2017, Chapter “Using Role-Play to Improve Students’ Confidence and Perceptions of Communication in a Simulated Volcanic Crisis ”), to practicing evacuation scenarios with emergency managers and communities (Hudson-Doyle 2017, Chapter “Decision-making: preventing miscommunication and creating sharing meaning between stakeholders”). Awareness of the challenges of communicating across cultures is also of great importance. Miscommunication is a frequent issue and there is a need to understand the psychological elements of decision-making and risk perception given these different cultural reference frames (Wilmshurst 2017, Chapter “There is no plastic in our volcano: A story about losing and finding a path to participatory volcanic risk management in Colombia”). Participatory methods have been highly successful to foster the participation of local communities (Cadag et al. 2017, Chapter “Participatory approaches to foster the participation of local communities in volcanic disaster risk reduction”), but there is often a need to find ways to bridge cultural differences between the scientists and end-users, often worlds apart (Newhall 2017, Chapter “Cultural Differences and the Importance of Trust Between Volcanologists and Partners in Volcanic Risk Mitigation”), or between the science and arts to explore differing understandings around volcanoes (Dixon and Beech 2017,

Chapter “Re-enchanting Volcanoes: The Rise, Fall, and Rise Again of Art and Aesthetics in the Making of Volcanic Knowledges”). Mistakes in managing these numerous complexities can restrict the maintenance of trust between the various stakeholders involved. We can negotiate these difficult interactions by developing tools to reduce the uncertainties and help decision making processes. Such tools include: statistical and probabilistic tools (Sobradelo and Marti 2017, Chapter “Using Statistics to Quantify and Communicate Uncertainty During Volcanic Crises”), establishing a robust EWS (Potter et al. 2017, Chapter “Challenges and Benefits of Standardising Early Warning Systems: A Case Study of New Zealand’s Volcanic Alert Level System”), and using insurance to offset the risks (Blong et al. 2017, Chapter “Insurance and a Volcanic Crisis—A Tale of One (Big) Eruption, Two Insurers, and Innumerable Insureds”). Core to the communication process is the ability to make decisions about what to do, when to do it, and who is affected, what can be done, what resources need to be made available to support these decisions. An exemplary set up is the co-ordination between the USA, Japan, and Russia in managing airbourne ash hazards for aviation (Igarashi et al. 2017, Chapter “International Coordination in Managing Airborne Ash Hazards: Lessons from the Northern Pacific”) where these three nations, at times politically and economically constrained, have managed to foster meaningful and successful coordination.

What all these chapters have in common, is that they demonstrate the value of communication and the open and timely sharing of knowledge, so finding a way to generate meaningful understanding; the need to keep both relationships and procedures strong and current; and the ability to cope with rapid changes in both society and volcanic activity. There have been many lessons learnt and many new tools are available to both volcanologists, emergency management practitioners, and the public; no doubt the future will present us with
new challenges to overcome. The ability to adapt and evolve before, during and after a crisis is of utmost importance and this can only happen through open, honest and robust communication. This sounds simple and this volume provides evidence that simplicity and clarity are often key to successful outcomes in volcanic crisis.

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<figure><img src="image_17.png" /></figure>
Communication Demands
of Volcanic Ashfall Events

Carol Stewart, Thomas M. Wilson,
Victoria Sword-Daniels, Kristi L. Wallace,
Christina R. Magill, Claire J. Horwell, Graham S. Leonard
and Peter J. Baxter

Abstract

Volcanic ash is generated in explosive volcanic eruptions, dispersed by prevailing winds and may be deposited onto communities hundreds or even thousands of kilometres away. The wide geographic reach of ashfalls makes them the volcanic hazard most likely to affect the greatest numbers of people. However, forecasting how much ash will fall, where, and with what characteristics, is a major challenge. Varying social contexts, ashfall characteristics, and eruption durations create unique challenges in determining impacts, which are wide-ranging and often poorly understood. Consequently, a suite of communication strategies must be applied across a variety of different settings. Broadly speaking, the level of impact depends upon the amount of ash deposited and its characteristics (hazard), as well as the numbers and distribution of people and assets (exposure), and the ability of people and assets to cope with the ashfall (resilience and/or vulnerability). Greater knowledge of the likely impact can support mitigation actions, crisis planning, and emergency management activities. Careful, considered, and well-planned communication prior to, and during,

C. Stewart (✉)
Joint Centre for Disaster Research, GNS
Science/Massey University Wellington Campus,
Wellington, New Zealand
e-mail: c.stewart1@massey.ac.nz

T.M. Wilson
Department of Geological Sciences, University of
Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

V. Sword-Daniels
Department of Civil, Environmental and Geomatic
Engineering, University College London, London,
UK

K.L. Wallace
Alaska Volcano Observatory, U.S. Geological
Survey, Anchorage, AK, USA

C.R. Magill
Risk Frontiers, Macquarie University, Sydney,
Australia

C.J. Horwell
Department of Earth Sciences, Institute of Hazard,
Risk and Resilience, Durham University, Durham,
UK

G.S. Leonard
GNS Science, Lower Hutt, New Zealand

P.J. Baxter
Institute of Public Health, Cambridge University,
Cambridge, UK
a volcanic ashfall crisis can substantially reduce physical, economic and psychosocial impacts. We describe the factors contributing to the complex communication environment associated with ashfall hazards, describe currently available information products and tools, and reflect on lessons from a range of case-study ashfall events. We discuss currently-available communication tools for the key sectors of public health, agriculture and critical infrastructure, and information demands created by ash clean-up operations. We conclude with reflections on the particular challenges posed by long-term eruptions and implications for recovery after ashfall.

**Keywords**

Volcanic ashfalls • Societal impacts • Information demands • Information resources

# 1 Introduction

All explosive volcanic eruptions generate tephra, fragments of glass, rock, and minerals that are produced when magma or vent material is explosively disintegrated. Volcanic ash (tephra < 2 mm diameter) is then convected upwards within the eruption plume and carried downwind, falling out of suspension and potentially affecting communities and farmland across hundreds, or even thousands, of square kilometres. Ashfall is the most widespread and frequent of the hazards posed by volcanic eruptions. Although ashfalls rarely endanger human life directly, disruption and damage to buildings, critical infrastructure services, aviation and primary production can lead to substantial societal impacts and costs, even at deposit thicknesses of only a few millimetres (Table 1; Fig. 1). Impacts vary with proximity to the volcano, how much ash has been deposited, physical and chemical properties of the ash, characteristics of the receiving environment (such as climate and land use) and adaptive capacity of the affected communities (Fig. 1; Wilson et al. 2012). Ashfall impacts are more complex and multi-faceted than for any other volcanic hazards (Jenkins et al. 2015).

Even with small eruptions generating minor quantities of ash, information demands may be

heavy and complex. A recent example is the small, but locally high profile, 6 August 2012 eruption of Tongariro volcano, New Zealand. Despite its small size, following this eruption there was intense demand for information from the public, media, and government agencies on questions such as: Was this event a precursor to larger scale activity? What hazards were expected? Was the ashfall hazardous? (Leonard et al. 2014). Similarly, in Alaska, eruptions occur on average one to two times per year, ashfall deposits are typically only a few mm thick on populated areas, and impacts are considered more disruptive than catastrophic. Yet the demand for information is high. During recent eruptions in Cook Inlet, Alaska, the Alaska Volcano Observatory website received as many as 30 million page views in a single month, up to 3000 emails, and thousands of phone calls seeking information throughout the crises (Fig. 2; Adleman et al. 2010; Schaefer et al. 2011).

In this chapter, we describe the factors contributing to the complex communication environment associated with ashfall hazards, describe currently available information products and tools, and reflect on lessons learned from a range of case-study events. We discuss in more detail: ash hazard assessment tools; communication tools available for the key sectors of public health, agriculture, and critical infrastructure; and
<table><caption>**Table 1** Volcanic ash impacts on society (adapted from GAR 2015 report: Brown et al. 2014)</caption><thead><tr><th>Sector</th><th>Impacts</th><th>Example/photo</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Public health</td><td>Exposure during an ashfall may not often endanger human life directly, except where thick accumulations cause structural damage (e.g., roof collapse) or when reduced visibility or slippery roads cause traffic accidents. However, very fine ash as PM2.5 and PM10 is a health hazard when it is readily suspended in the air by wind and traffic (Carlsen et al. 2012a; Wilson et al. 2012). Short-term effects commonly include irritation of the eyes and lung airways, and exacerbation of pre-existing asthma and chronic lung diseases (Horwell and Baxter 2006; see also www.ivhhn.org). The presence of respirable crystalline silica in some eruptions will cause much concern over the risk of silicosis, a chronic lung disease which is entirely preventable by adequate measures to reduce exposure in prolonged crises (e.g., Montserrat, 1995–2010). Affected communities can also experience psychological stress from disruption of livelihoods and other social impacts (Carlsen et al. 2012a, b).</td><td>Caption Windy conditions in Jacobacci, Argentina on 9 September 2011 leading to high levels of fine airborne ash due to remobilisation of fall deposits from June 2011 eruption of Cordón Caulle. Credit J. Mellado</td></tr><tr><td>Critical infrastructure</td><td>Damage and disruption to critical infrastructure services from ashfall impacts can substantially affect normal functioning of societies. Electricity networks are vulnerable, mainly due to ash contamination causing flashover and failure of insulators (Wilson et al. 2012). Ash can also disrupt transportation networks through reduced visibility and traction; and be washed into drainage systems. Wastewater treatment systems that have an initial mechanical pre-screening step are particularly vulnerable to damage if ash-laden sewage arrives at the plant. Suspended ash may also cause damage to water treatment plants if it enters through intakes or by direct fallout (e.g. onto open sand filter beds). In addition to direct impacts, system interdependence is a problem. For example, air- or water-handling systems may become blocked by ash leading to overheating or failure of dependent systems. Specific impacts depend strongly on network or system design, ashfall volume and characteristics, and the effectiveness of any applied mitigation strategies (Wilson et al. 2012, 2014).</td><td>Caption Suspended ash in waste water caused accelerated wear to pumping station impellers in Bariloche waste-water network, Argentina, following the 2011 eruption of Cordón Caulle. Credit C. Stewart</td></tr><tr><td>Agriculture</td><td>Fertile volcanic soils commonly host farming operations. Impacts will be dependent on how much ash has been deposited, characteristics of the ash, characteristics of the receiving environment, style, intensity and practises of the exposed farm, time of year (as it will determine climate and agricultural activities), and risk management actions taken by the farmer and supporting agencies (Wilson et al. 2011a). Ashfall can contaminate and (if sufficient deposition) bury pastures resulting in reduced availability of feed; contaminate, (if thick enough) lodge and bury horticultural crops, reducing yields and quality; cause adverse effects on livestock health by contaminating feed and (more rarely) cause toxicity hazards; contaminate and disrupt agricultural water supplies; abrade and corrode farm vehicles, machinery and infrastructure increasing maintenance costs; and cause disruption to essential services, such as power supplies, transportation and communication systems.</td><td>Caption Chillis damaged by acidic surface coating during the Merapi 2006 eruption, Indonesia. Credit G. Kaye</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><caption>**Table 1** (continued)</caption><thead><tr><th>Sector</th><th>Impacts</th><th>Example/photo</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td>Ashfalls can be beneficial or detrimental to soil depending on the characteristics of the ash (particularly with respect to its soluble salt burden, which can add plant growth nutrients to pastoral systems). The time of year in the agricultural production cycle strongly determines the level of impact (Cook et al. 1981). For example, ripe crops are usually ash tolerant, but are vulnerable to pollination disruption and contamination when close to harvest. Under very thin ashfall (&lt;1 mm) crops and pastures can suffer from acid damage or shading from light; as ashfall depths increase these effects intensify and loading damage may occur. Thick ashfalls (&gt;100 mm) typically require soil rehabilitation, e.g. thorough mixing or removal, to restore agricultural production (Wilson et al. 2011a; 2015). For livestock, ashfall may cause starvation (damaged or smothered feed), dehydration (water sources clogged with ash), deaths from ingesting ash along with feed, and (more rarely) acute or chronic fluorosis if ash contains moderate to high levels of bioaccessible fluoride (Cronin et al. 2003).</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Buildings</td><td>The load associated with an ashfall can cause the collapse of roofing material (e.g. sheet roofs), the supporting structure (e.g. rafters or walls) or both and, under great enough loads (&gt; &gt; 100 mm), the entire building may collapse (Blong 1984; Spence et al. 2005). Non-engineered, long-span and low-pitched roofs are particularly vulnerable to collapse, potentially under thicknesses of around 100 mm or less. Under thinner ashfall (&lt; 100 mm), structural damage is unlikely although non-structural elements such as gutters and overhangs may suffer damage (Wilson et al. 2015). Wetted ash is up to twice as dense as dry ash thus loading is correspondingly higher. Building components and contents may also be damaged from ashfall due to ash infiltration into interiors, with associated abrasion and corrosion.</td><td><img src="image_0.png" alt="Caption: Volcanic ash cleaned off a hospital roof in Heimaey following 1973 Eldfell eruption, Iceland (tractor for scale). Credit: G. Oskarsson"></td></tr><tr><td>Economy</td><td>Economic losses may arise from damage to physical assets, e.g. buildings, or reductions in production, e.g. agricultural or industrial output. Most economic activities will be impacted, even indirectly, under relatively thin (&lt; 10 mm) ashfall, for example through disruptions to critical infrastructure. Losses may also result from precautionary risk management activities, e.g. business closures or evacuations. During or after an ashfall, clean-up from roads, properties, and airports is often necessary to restore functionality. Large volumes of ash require time-consuming, costly and resource-intensive efforts (Wilson et al. 2012).</td><td><img src="image_1.png" alt="Caption: 20-30 mm of volcanic ash covering aeroplanes during the 2011 Cordón Caulle eruption, Chile. Credit: Bariloche Airport"></td></tr></tbody></table>

<figure><img src="image_18.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_19.png" /></figure>

information demands created by ash clean-up operations. Impacts of airborne ash on aviation are covered elsewhere in this volume. We conclude with reflections on the particular

challenges posed by long-term eruptions and implications for recovery after ashfall.

Increasing attention is being paid to the human health, environmental and aviation
<figure><img src="image_20.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** Schematic of some ashfall impacts with distance from a volcano. This schematic diagram assumes a large explosive eruption with significant ashfall thicknesses in the proximal zone and is intended to be illustrative rather than literal. Three main zones of ashfall impact are</figcaption></figure>

hazards of resuspension and dispersal of ash from fallout deposits (Folch et al. 2014; Wilson et al. 2011b; Hadley et al. 2004). We acknowledge the communication challenges associated with resuspension events, but consider them outside the scope of this chapter.

As a caveat, we note that we, the authors, are all based in countries with advanced economies, and thus our perspective—informed by our own experiences—may be less applicable in dissimilar countries.

# 2 The Complex Communication Environment Associated with Ashfalls

## 2.1 Disaster Risk Reduction Context

Empowering society to utilise scientific and technological advances to reduce the impacts of disasters is a well-established challenge

defined: (1) Destructive and potentially life-threatening (Zone I); (2) Moderately damaging and/or disruptive (Zone II); (3) Mildly disruptive and/or a nuisance (Zone III). From Brown et al. (2014)

(Alexander 2007; Few and Barclay 2011; McBean 2012; Mileti 1999; Cutter et al. 2015). Both the UNISDR Sendai Framework for Action (SFA) and Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR) programs call for more integration of research with the needs of policy and decision makers (ICSU 2008; UNISDR 2015). Few and Barclay (2011) also stress the need to promote integrated, inter-disciplinary approaches, strengthen two-way links between science providers and end-users, and support more effective research/end-user partnerships.

Because of the low recurrence rates of eruptions at many of the world's volcanoes, ashfalls can be rare events, even in volcanically-active regions. Wilson et al. (2014) note that the rarity of volcanic events can result in low risk awareness, particularly during periods of quiescence. Furthermore, even if knowledge of proximity to volcanic hazards and susceptibility to their consequences is reasonable, this does not ensure that mitigative actions will be taken, and preparedness
<figure><img src="image_21.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** Top Daily totals of information items produced during the 2005–6 unrest and eruption at Augustine volcano. Middle Daily totals of recorded phone calls and</figcaption></figure>

emails received. *Lower* AVO Website statistics of gigabytes transferred, webpage served and webpage requests. Reproduced from Adleman et al. (2010)

levels often remain low in proximal regions, even in developed countries (Paton et al. 2008). For risk communication, simply providing information often fails to change risk perception or

motivate volcanic hazard preparedness, implying that more engaged and appropriate strategies are required. Thus, more participatory processes, whereby stakeholders (e.g. communities and
organisations) actively participate as legitimate partners, are recommended (Covello and Allen 1988; Paton et al. 2005; Twigg 2007).

## 2.2 Complex Communication Environment

Effective management of volcanic ashfall risk requires effective communication between a range of groups and individuals during crisis and non-crisis periods (Höppner et al. 2010). Some countries have coordinating structures which aid information sharing to enhance decision-making during these periods. A broad and evolving array of communication channels may be utilised. Communication between parties is ideally two-way; however, specific ashfall hazard, risk and management information needs to be generated and communicated by expert groups for stakeholders to make risk management decisions, often under urgency. Ideally this evolves into discussions as experts tailor communications to the evolving risk and social context with, for example, the media, public, critical infrastructure and other businesses providing vital situational awareness to emergency managers, and useful data to scientists.

Volcano-specific agencies and emergency managers need to work closely as a team. This multi-agency group must conduct pre-planning and joint exercises. Several communication products can and should be pre-prepared, including contingency messaging for the various possible outcomes of ash characterisation, for example in the event of high levels of crystalline silica in respirable size fractions (see Sect. 4.1.1). Other products should have a pre-planned format and framework but need to be completed dynamically in response to the specific event, such as ashfall forecast maps. As many communication channels as possible should be two-way, allowing for dialogue rather than just provision of information. Ashfall mapping, collection, and testing are substantial activities that require rapid, widespread collaboration and are necessary to inform critical communication messages. An idealised representation of the flow

of communication between key actors during a volcanic ashfall crisis illustrates the complex relationships that emerge amongst organisations, processes and communication products (Fig. 3). For example, the provision of authoritative health advice to the public requires wide cooperation between organisations; integration with ash collection and analysis processes; and alignment with other communication products, all at the same time. While these three elements could be illustrated separately, the cross-dependencies would be lost. Figure 3 is adapted from an earlier version developed by Paton et al. (1999), who noted that information management during an eruption is highly complex, owing to the rarity of these events, the complexity of hazard effects and the diversity of agencies involved.

A diverse range of stakeholders have information needs that evolve throughout ashfall crises (Wilson et al. 2012). These are summarised in Table 2 for the following groups: general public, media, emergency management and emergency services, local government, public health agencies, utility managers, farmers and agricultural agencies and private businesses. Experience has shown that information demands are most intense in the following areas:

* Effects on public health from inhaling or ingesting ash (e.g., Horwell and Baxter 2006);

* Potential of ashfall to contaminate water supplies and food chains (e.g., EFSA 2010);

* Impacts of ashfall on agriculture and rural communities (e.g., Wilson et al. 2011a, b);

* Ash clean-up and disposal methods (e.g., Wilson et al. 2012).

Risks to public and animal health are typically considered most urgent by both the public and public health authorities, although often the public concern outweighs the actual risk and the role of the agencies is to allay that concern with event-specific and science-based information. For example, following the April 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull volcano, Iceland, and the subsequent transport of an extensive ash plume over Europe, the European Food Safety
<figure><img src="image_22.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3** Idealised flow of communication between key participants during a volcanic ashfall crisis illustrating the complex relationships that emerge amongst organisations,</figcaption></figure>

processes and communication products (after Paton et al. 1999)

Authority (EFSA) undertook an urgent assessment of risks for public and animal health (EFSA 2010). Information was urgently sought on questions such as the composition of the ash falling across Europe, with particular concern expressed about the fluoride content of the ash; important pathways of dietary exposure; recommendations for further data collection and comments on the effectiveness of mitigation methods.

## 3 Tools for Ash Hazard Characterisation and Dissemination

A range of products exists to meet the information demands of stakeholders. Some products are for an international audience and some have been

produced according to local (domestic) needs. The need for the products evolves with changing risk and social context before, during and after an ashfall. We summarise, in general terms, some of these evolving needs in Table 2. Explanations about the deployment of specific tools throughout an event are provided in Table 3.

Communication tools and resources can be used during crisis and non-crisis times to contribute to societal resilience<fnref n="1" /> to ashfall events. Effective communications summarise hazards and impacts, recommended preparedness, and

<footnote n="1">¹Resilience: The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions. http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology.</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 2** Evolution of information demands throughout an ashfall crisis/event, by sector</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Groups</th><th colspan="4">Typical Information Demands/Questions</th></tr><tr><th>Quiescence<sup>a</sup></th><th>Before ashfall (volcanic unrest)</th><th>During ashfall</th><th>After ashfall</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>All (including the public)</td><td>Typically minimal interest<br/>• If eruption occurs, how much ash will be received and what will the effects be?</td><td><ul><li>Will the ash be harmful to people? To animals?</li><li>Where is ash likely to fall?</li><li>How much ash is likely to fall at my location?</li><li>When will ashfall start?</li><li>When will ashfall stop?</li><li>What will be the impacts?</li><li>What can be done to prepare (especially for health)?</li><li>How should buildings and services be protected from ash ingress?</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Will the ash be harmful to people? To animals?</li><li>What protective measures can I take?</li><li>How much ash will fall?</li><li>When will the ashfall stop?</li><li>How should buildings and services be protected from ash ingress?</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>What are the longer term health effects?</li><li>Will more ash fall?</li><li>How and when should ash be cleaned up?</li><li>How and where should ash be disposed of?</li><li>Can ash be added to gardens?</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Media</td><td>See 'All'</td><td>See 'All'<br/>Questions follow public interest in eruption and are (ideally) guided by scientific communiques.<br/><ul><li>What can people do to prepare (especially for health)?</li></ul></td><td>See 'All'<br/>Questions follow public interest in eruption and are (ideally) guided by scientific communiques.<br/><ul><li>Where has ash fallen and where will it fall in the future?</li></ul></td><td>See 'All'<br/>Questions follow public interest in eruption and are (ideally) guided by scientific communiques.<br/><ul><li>What is the likelihood of more ashfall? Where would it fall?</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>Emergency Managers and Emergency Services</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• What is the risk of ashfall (function of likelihood and consequences) as part of risk assessment planning?<br/>• Information sources for hazard, impacts and mitigation</td><td>See 'All'<br/>Require broad overview of how to manage ash risk across all sectors.<br/><ul><li>How to access most up to date scientific information on eruption and ashfall crisis</li><li>How to prepare, respond, remediate and recover from ash impacts</li></ul></td><td>See 'All'<br/>Require broad overview of how to manage ash risk across all sectors.<br/><ul><li>How to access most up to date scientific information on eruption and ashfall crisis</li><li>How to prepare, respond, remediate and recover from ash impacts</li></ul></td><td>See 'All'<br/>Require broad overview of how to manage ash risk across all sectors.<br/><ul><li>How to access most up to date scientific information on eruption and ashfall crisis</li><li>How to respond, remediate and recover from ash impacts</li><li>What was learnt from this event?</li></ul></td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><caption>**Table 2** (continued)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Groups</th><th colspan="4">Typical Information Demands/Questions</th></tr><tr><th>Quiescence<sup>a</sup></th><th>Before ashfall (volcanic unrest)</th><th>During ashfall</th><th>After ashfall</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Utility Managers</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• What is the risk of ashfall (function of likelihood and consequences) as part of risk assessment planning<br/>• Sector specific hazard, impact and risk management information and what are the information sources</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• Sector specific hazard, impact and risk management information and what are the information sources</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• Sector specific impact and risk management information<br/>• Engineering characteristics of ash</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• Sector specific impact and risk management information<br/>• Engineering characteristics of ash<br/>• Sector specific best-practice clean-up methods<br/>• What was learnt from this event?</td></tr><tr><td>Farmers and Agricultural Agencies</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• Sector specific hazard, impact and risk management information and what are the information sources<br/>• Agriculturally relevant characteristics of ash</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• Sector specific hazard, impact and risk management information and what are the information sources<br/>• What are the implications of ashfall for food chains?<br/>• What are the agriculturally relevant characteristics of ash<br/>• What are the ash remediation strategies</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• Sector specific hazard, impact and risk management information and what are the information sources<br/>• What are the implications of ashfall for food chains?<br/>• What are the agriculturally relevant characteristics of ash<br/>• What are the ash remediation strategies</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• Sector specific hazard, impact and risk management information and what are the information sources<br/>• What are the implications of ashfall for food chains?<br/>• What are the agriculturally relevant characteristics of ash<br/>• What are the ash remediation strategies</td></tr><tr><td>Public Health Agencies</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• What is the risk of ashfall (function of likelihood and consequences) as part of risk assessment planning<br/>• What are information sources for hazard, impacts and mitigation</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• Health specific hazard, impact and risk management information and what are the information sources<br/>• What are the short and long term health relevant characteristics of the ash<br/>Will be looking to inform standard public health messaging and modify if required</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• Health specific hazard, impact and risk management information and what are the information sources<br/>• What are the short and long term health relevant characteristics of the ash<br/>Will be looking to inform standard public health messaging and modify if required</td><td>See 'All'<br/>• What are the short and long term health relevant characteristics of the ash<br/>• What was learnt from this event?</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><caption>**Table 2** (continued)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Groups</th><th colspan="4">Typical Information Demands/Questions</th></tr><tr><th>Quiescence<sup>a</sup></th><th>Before ashfall (volcanic unrest)</th><th>During ashfall</th><th>After ashfall</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Private Business</td><td>See 'all'<br/>• Some businesses will undertake specific ash risk business continuity planning</td><td>See 'all'<br/>• Business specific hazard, impact and risk management information and what are the information sources</td><td>See 'all'<br/>• Business specific hazard, impact and risk management information and what are the information sources</td><td>See 'all'<br/>• Business specific hazard, impact and risk management information and what are the information sources</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><caption>**Table 3** Evolution of information products and activities throughout an ashfall event<sup>a</sup></caption><thead><tr><th>Quiescent phase</th><th>Pre-event phase</th><th>During eruption</th><th>Post-eruption</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><ul><li>Background hazard maps</li><li>Public hazard and risk education and outreach (e.g. information resources, public talks)</li><li>Sector-specific impact, mitigation and preparedness resources</li><li>Sector-specific hazard and risk information (e.g. volcano science advisory groups, volcanic risk professional courses, engagement with industry/sector groups)</li><li>Development and exercising of communication protocols, structures and guidelines</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Preparation of event-specific hazard maps</li><li>Deployment of ashfall forecast maps</li><li>Enhanced public hazard and risk education</li><li>Dissemination of sector-specific resources (e.g. ashfall preparedness posters for utilities)</li><li>Dissemination of sector-specific hazard and risk information</li><li>Optimisation of communication protocols, structures and guidelines</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Preparation of dynamic crisis hazard maps (iterative process)</li><li>Ashfall forecasts (modelled)</li><li>Ashfall maps (mapped and modelled)</li><li>Consistent public messaging on ashfall preparedness and impact advice</li><li>Syndromic surveillance for health intelligence</li><li>Ash analyses for:<ul><li>Eruption forecasting</li><li>Health hazard assessment</li><li>Agricultural hazard assessment</li><li>Engineering hazard assessment (e.g. resistivity characteristics)</li></ul></li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Ongoing communication about risks of ashfall e.g. health, agriculture, etc.</li><li>Consistent public messaging on ashfall response and recovery advice</li><li>Sharing of lessons learned and revision/optimisation of existing products as required</li><li>Calibration of numerical hazard models with event data</li><li>Continued syndromic surveillance</li><li>Updating of hazard maps</li></ul></td></tr></tbody></table>

response actions, over a variety of user-preferred platforms. Various media products have been developed for communicating ashfall hazard, risk and impacts, including hazard maps, traditional static media such as posters and brochures,

and online resources. Websites have found considerable favour over the past decade, including global resources such as the website of the International Volcanic Health Hazards Network (www.ivhhn.org) and the U.S. Geological

<footnote><sup>a</sup>Level of interest is strongly context-dependent and may be influenced by high-profile eruptions at other volcanoes, proximity to a volcano, previous experiences, etc.</footnote>

<footnote><sup>a</sup>Evaluation and review may be necessary as needs of community evolve</footnote>
Survey-hosted ash impacts and mitigation website http://volcanoes.usgs.gov/ash. Rapidly-emerging technologies include passive and active provision of information on social media and mobile phone applications (apps) (Leonard et al. 2014).

## 3.1 Hazard Maps (Background and Crisis)

Hazard maps are a common component of volcanic warnings. Maps can broadly be grouped into (a) background maps prepared in quiescent times, covering the range of possible future events based on past events and/or geological studies and (b) crisis maps for use during a specific event. Maps can also be grouped into those focussed on proximal hazards, generally with some implication for life safety near a volcano, or maps of more distal, far-reaching hazards, primarily ashfall. In addition, hazard maps may depict a single hazard (e.g., ashfall) or multiple hazards emanating from the volcano (including pyroclastic flows, lava flows and lahars).

Prior to a crisis, hazard maps are a tool for education and planning, providing information on areas most likely to be impacted by ashfall, and the probable accumulation of ash deposits. Hazard maps may be combined with spatial exposure and vulnerability information to estimate building and infrastructure damage, evacuation needs, likely transport and utility disruptions, and clean-up requirements. During a crisis, hazard maps are a valuable communication tool used to complement broadcasted alert levels.

Hazard maps for individual volcanic centres are often based on the extent of past eruptive deposits with local topography and environmental factors taken into account. Numerical modelling is often incorporated to help understand the uncertainties surrounding future activity and is particularly important in assessing ashfall hazard, as variations in wind conditions must be considered in conjunction with potential eruption scenarios. At a regional scale, aggregated multi-volcano probabilistic approaches can enable the long-term estimation of

ashfall hazard at any particular location. For example, Jenkins et al. (2015) present global and regional maps of probabilistic ashfall hazard which show average recurrence intervals for ashfalls exceeding 1 mm (chosen as a threshold that may cause concern for aviation and critical infrastructure). These authors also presented a detailed local assessment for the municipality of Naples, Italy, merging probabilistic ashfall hazards from both Vesuvius and Campi Flegrei to generate a hazard map for ashfall loading on structures (in units of kPa).

Although every region is unique, crisis hazard maps in support of ashfall communication should contain: version, date, period of validity, impact information or links/references to get impact and mitigation information, reference to any other map types (e.g. background probabilistic), north arrow and scale, legend, and disclaimers as needed (e.g. to clarify that ashfall maps are not flight level forecasts). The triggers for revised versions, the revision process and timeframes should be considered.

If no hazard map exists, we recommend eight key areas for consideration: (1) audience; (2) purpose (e.g. life safety, disruption to infrastructure); (3) timeframe (background probabilistic versus crisis); (4) spatial scale (regional, whole volcano, vent/microzone); (5) organisations and their roles with procedures for discussion and ratification; (6) key messages from emergency managers; (7) hazards and zone styles to be depicted; (8) geological, historical and/or computer-modelled input data to be used. These topics should be considered in approximately this order.

## 3.2 Ash Forecasting Products

The ability to forecast where and when ashfall will occur is an essential step towards estimating potential consequences and providing useful warnings to stakeholders. Monitoring agencies and emergency managers aim to deliver warnings and forecasts of impending ashfalls to at-risk communities and organisations. Volcanic ashfall forecast products have been developed by several volcano monitoring agencies (e.g., USGS,
USA; JMA, Japan; GNS Science, New Zealand). Typically, these forecast products are updated regularly leading up to and throughout an eruption, and inform which areas are likely to be impacted by ash and how much ash is forecast to accumulate. More advanced models inform forecast ashfall arrival time and ashfall duration. The forecasts can provide useful warnings to exposed stakeholders (e.g., emergency managers, public health authorities, critical infrastructure, general public, etc.). Products may be in graphical, animated graphical, numeric or text formats, but a graphical map product is most common. Generally, a graphical map product is the most easily understood, particularly if it is from a perspective rather than plan view. This information is ideally released alongside advice about what people should do before, during and after ashfall and may be paired with volcano alert bulletins.

In New Zealand, for example, basic ashfall prediction maps are automatically pre-prepared three times per day for all frequently active New Zealand volcanoes, and are available for rapid deployment within a Volcanic Alert Bulletin in an eruption event or a period of unrest. Nine scenarios are pre-calculated each time, representing combinations of three height scenarios and three volume scenarios. These maps show model results computed using the Ashfall programme (Hurst 1994) and are based on wind models supplied by New Zealand's MetService. An example of the automatically-generated map for 1800 h on 9 November 2015, for the scenario of a 1 km³ volume eruption and 20 km plume height, and incorporating current weather conditions, is shown as Fig. 4. Figure 5 shows an example of a map that was released by the volcano monitoring agency GNS Science on 13 August 2012, following the 6 August 2012 eruption at Te Maari vent (Leonard et al. 2014). This day was forecast to have little low-elevation wind and the most-likely eruption scenario was small volume and low plume height, thus the predicted ashfall extent was localised and centred on Tongariro. While these maps were not a major communication tool during this event, as the

probabilities of a larger event remained low, they would have become more important had the activity escalated (Leonard et al. 2014).

An important distinction is that ashfall prediction maps are not relevant to flight level forecasts, which are issued by Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres (VAACs). Whilst beyond the scope of a chapter on ashfall hazard communication, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has undertaken substantial work in management and communication of ash cloud hazard for aviation, through the International Airways Volcano Watch system (IAVW). There are nine Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres (VAAC) throughout the world tasked with monitoring volcanic ash plumes within their assigned airspace. Analyses are made public in the form of Volcanic Ash Advisories (VAA) and often incorporate the results of computer simulation models called Volcanic Ash Transport and Dispersion (VATD) to analyse the extent, height and concentration of ash particles in the atmosphere for aviation safety.

A number of issues need to be considered when developing ashfall forecasts to allow broad utility and understanding:

* **Forecast dissemination:** Forecasts need to be actively and passively disseminated to appropriate stakeholders in an appropriate format and in a timely manner.

- Where possible dissemination pathways should be established pre-eruption and allowing the forecast product to be made widely available.

- Uncertainty of input parameters, such as eruption plume height and eruption duration, can limit accuracy of the modelled output, and updating these parameters based on observation during an eruption may delay forecast output. Time spent collecting more accurate input parameters and calibration information needs to be balanced with delivering a timely forecast product. Some agencies deal with this challenge by generating pre-eruption and
<caption>**Fig. 4** Example of automatically-generated map for Ruapehu volcano for 1800 Monday 9 November 2015, showing predicted ashfall extent for one of nine pre-calculated scenarios (1 km³ eruption volume, 20 km plume height)</caption>

PREDICTED ASHFALL AREA

For a Ruapehu eruption at 1800 Monday 09 November 2015

<figure><img src="image_23.png" /></figure>

syn-eruption forecasts, with each forecast utilising improved eruption and wind input information. Post-eruption simulations may involve calibration with observed ash accumulation data.

* Hazard intensity measure: Stakeholders may require different hazard intensity measures (HIMs). For example, ash

loading (kg/m²) is critically important for impacts such as roof collapse and loading onto pastures, whereas ground-level airborne particle concentrations (µg/m³) are more directly relevant to assessing exposure to respirable ash, and visibility. Some users may require multiple HIMs. For example, both airborne particle
**Fig. 5** Ashfall prediction map released with Volcanic Alert Bulletin TON-2012/17 (Geonet 2012) on 13 August 2012. The most likely eruption that might occur was small, and there was little wind that day, so the predicted ashfall extent was localised and centred on Tongariro

PREDICTED ASHFALL AREA

For a Tongariro eruption at 0600 Monday 13 August 2012

<figure><img src="image_24.png" /></figure>

concentrations and ashfall loading may be relevant to the management of road networks through impacts on visibility and traction, respectively.

*   **Ashfall model uncertainty:** Uncertainty associated with eruption parameters and climatic conditions, and simplifications applied in numerical simulation, make it challenging to forecast ash dispersal accurately, especially in near

real-time. Therefore such forecasts nearly always have some degree of uncertainty attached to them, which can be challenging to communicate to end-user recipients.

*   **Relating ashfall hazard to consequences:** The numerical models increasingly used to produce both deterministic and probabilistic ashfall hazard forecasts usually do not relate the predicted ash
accumulation to potential consequences. However, this information is essential for stakeholders to make meaning of the forecasts and ultimately improve risk management decision making.

* **Advice**: As with any warning product, ashfall forecasts should either provide or direct recipients to advice so they may take appropriate action.

* **Cartography**: Not all users have a good level of map literacy, thus other forms of communication may be more suitable for some end users in addition to graphical products. Thompson et al. (2015) have noted that map properties (such as colour schemes and data classification schemes chosen) can influence how users engage with and interpret probabilistic volcanic hazard maps.

Many of these issues are dependent on the requirements of the end user and the specific context within which the warning is being received. Developing ashfall forecast products with stakeholders, along with regular review, can optimise communications. This process is also supported by research which relates ashfall quantity, subsequent effects, and appropriate action.

## 3.3 Public Involvement in Ashfall Mapping: The Role of Citizen Science

First-hand observers of ashfall are among the best sources of information because their reports can include details about the timing, amount and nature of ashfalls over vast geographic areas, and they can provide physical samples for detailed characterization. Local residents may be best placed to make observations before ash is removed, remobilised, or compacted. For decades, Alaskans have reported ashfall by telephone, email, web, mail, and social media campaigns (Adleman et al. 2010) to the Alaska Volcano Observatory, as a result of a long-running two-way communication effort by

AVO. A web-enabled database, “Is Ash Falling?” collects ashfall observations and encourages sample collections from the public (Wallace et al. 2015). This tool will soon be operational at other U.S. volcano observatories. It is open-source, and can easily be exported and modified for use at other observatories or agencies that collect information on ashfall around the world.

In the United Kingdom, citizen science-based methods were integrated into a suite of methods used to quantify ash deposition from the May 2011 eruption of Grímsvötn, Iceland (Stevenson et al. 2013). The British Geological Survey in Ecuador, Bernard (2013) has suggested a design for a home-made ash meter, constructed from simple, low-cost materials, to improve field data collection.

## 3.4 Media Releases

Scientists and emergency managers regularly release information to the media in the form of structured media releases. These are often timed to include new warnings or forecasts or are triggered by significant events. The most effective media agencies are those that already understand their importance as a communication device prior to a crisis, have relationships and trust developed with officials, and who feel empowered as part of the crisis-management team or process.

## 3.5 Informal Communication

A substantial proportion of communications between all groups takes the form of telephone calls, emails and face-to-face meetings. These are often not considered as formal communication devices, but they may constitute a large proportion of the time and effort of communicating during a crisis. Ideally these should be linked to the other types of communication and incorporate reference to warnings, hazard maps, and other supporting resources (e.g., preparedness resources). We also note that agencies must have an authoritative, and preferably interactive, presence on social media channels or else misinformed members of the community may occupy this space.
## 3.6 Standard Protocols for Determining Hazardous Characteristics of Ash

As part of the immediate emergency response, there should be rapid dissemination of information about the physical and chemical properties of the ash and its hazardous potential. Volcanic ash can be highly variable in its characteristics, both among and within eruptions. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the hazardous characteristics of ashfall *specifically* for each eruption, and with sufficient sampling to capture within-eruption spatial and temporal variability.

Specific protocols to assess hazardous characteristics of ash have been developed by the IVHHN and are described further in the following sections. These protocols are intended for use by scientists who then communicate their findings to public health and agricultural agencies, who may then modify their standard public advice messages as required. For example, after the 6 August 2012 eruption of Tongariro volcano, health and agricultural agencies were strongly interested in the levels of available fluorine (F) in the ashfall, because of reported livestock deaths from fluorosis following the 1995–1996 eruptions of Ruapehu volcano (Cronin et al. 2003). Expedited analyses of the available F content of the ash enabled distribution of results to public health officials by 10 August 2012. While the F content of the ash was moderate, the hazard to human and animal health was limited by the small volume of ash produced (Cronin et al. 2014).

### 3.6.1 Protocol for Assessment of Respiratory Health Hazards

A protocol for analysis of bulk ash samples for respiratory health hazard assessment (introduced in Damby et al. 2013) has been developed by the International Volcanic Health Hazard Network (IVHHN) and can be downloaded from www.ivhhn.org. The initial (rapid analysis) phase of this protocol involves particle size analysis to determine the proportion of respirable size fractions in each sample. Samples containing <1 %

(by volume) <4 µm or <2 % <10 µm are not considered respirable and do not require further analysis. 'Respirable' samples may require more detailed characterisation (e.g., crystalline silica content for non-basaltic ash), particularly if there is significant or prolonged public exposure to airborne ash (e.g., long-duration eruptions or resuspended ash), to ascertain long-term health hazards. Important health-relevant characteristics of volcanic ashfall include particle size distribution (Horwell 2007), crystalline silica content (Le Blond et al. 2009), and particle surface reactivity (Horwell et al. 2007).

### 3.6.2 Protocol for Assessment of Hazards from Leachable Elements

Freshly-erupted ash may contain a range of potentially toxic soluble elements such as fluorine, which may be released either rapidly or more slowly upon contact with water or body fluids. A protocol to assess the leachable element content of fresh volcanic ashfall has been developed by the IVHHN (Stewart et al. 2013). The methods include a general purpose deionised water leach, relevant to assessing impacts on drinking water supplies, livestock drinking water, fish hatcheries, and availability of soluble elements for plant uptake; and a gastric leach for a more realistic assessment of the hazards of ash ingestion for livestock.

# 4 Sector-Specific Considerations for Communication of Ashfall Hazards and Risks

## 4.1 Public Health

There are wide differences among the responses in high- and low-income countries to the hazards of volcanic ashfall, as reflected in their infrastructure, transport and communication systems. From the health standpoint, low-income countries (where many active volcanoes are located) may have different epidemiological profiles to those of advanced economies with divergent health concerns to match.
Typical public concerns about the health impacts of ashfall (see Table 1) include the effects of inhaling ash; the potential for long-term effects; and the effects on vulnerable groups (Horwell and Baxter 2006). Most concern revolves around vulnerable groups within the population: children, the elderly and those with pre-existing health problems such as cardiovascular and respiratory diseases.

The World Health Organization currently recommends that communities stay indoors during ashfall and wear light-weight, disposable face masks should they go outside. However, staying

indoors is impractical during long-duration events and there is currently little evidence that lightweight masks, such as surgical masks, are effective at blocking the inhalation of respirable ash particles (although an IVHHN study is underway). The IVHHN has produced a pamphlet on “The Health Hazards of Volcanic Ash: A Guide for the Public” (downloadable from www.ivhhn.org). This internationally-ratified pamphlet provides *generally applicable* advice for the public, and is available in nine languages, and is supported by a second pamphlet on how to prepare for ashfall, “Guidelines on Preparedness

<figure><img src="image_25.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 6** Civil defence advice for ashfall, Sistema Nacional de Protección Civil, Colima, México.
*Source:* Dr María Aurora Armienta, UNAM, México City, México</figcaption></figure>
Before, During and After Ashfall", aimed both at the public and emergency managers. Many countries have also developed their own civil defence advice, typically addressing topics such as covering open water supplies, protecting human and animal health, and cleaning up private property (e.g., Fig. 6).

Another common concern is risks to drinking-water supplies, livestock and crops contaminated by ashfall as fresh ash can carry a soluble salt burden that is readily released on contact with water (Stewart et al. 2006). The leachate protocol, described in Sect. 3.6.2, addresses these concerns.

Finally, we note that social and economic disruption resulting from volcanic activity may cause psychological stress that may outweigh physical impacts, particularly for long-lived eruptions. Avery (2004) notes (in relation to the long-lived volcanic crisis on Montserrat) that the social and economic disruption has had a far more profound influence on the health of the ~4500 residents of Montserrat than any purely physical effects related to ash inhalation.

### 4.1.1 Crystalline Silica

The most hazardous eruptions are those generating fine-grained ash with a high content of free crystalline silica, as this mineral has the potential to cause silicosis (a chronic lung disease resulting in scarring damage to the lungs and impairment of their function). Silicosis is primarily an occupational disease associated with occupations such as stone-cutting, tunnel building, and quarrying. To date, no cases of silicosis have been attributed to exposure to volcanic ash, although this may be due to the relatively small population affected.

Rapid determination of quantities (wt%) of free crystalline silica in bulk ash samples after ashfall, using reliable methods, is important (e.g., Damby et al. 2013). Particular care must be taken by agencies conducting and reporting on analyses to avoid any confusion between free crystalline silica (where the individual minerals cristobalite, quartz and tridymite are quantified) and total silica content (commonly used to quantify the bulk

composition of ash). Within days of the 1980 eruption of Mt St Helens, there were reports in the media that the Mt St Helens ash contained 60 % or more free crystalline silica—far greater than the actual 3–7 % in the sub-10 µm size fraction (Mount St. Helens Technical Information Network 1980). This misinformation occurred because of a misunderstanding of the difference between free and total silica, and difficulties interpreting the X-ray diffraction pattern due to overlapping feldspar peaks.

In the event of prolonged population exposure to airborne respirable ashfall with a substantial crystalline silica content (in particular, if the eruption is long-lived or ash is being continuously remobilised by wind) it may be necessary for public health officials to conduct more detailed studies on population exposure by using cyclone air samplers to collect samples of airborne respirable dust. The results can then be compared to occupational and environmental exposure limits (Searl et al. 2002).

The groups most heavily exposed are outdoor workers who have to conduct their jobs while exposed to ash (Searl et al. 2002). They include police and traffic controllers, rescuers, emergency staff in utility companies, road and repair workers, clean-up crews, and farmers, who will need specific health messages and advice on personal protective equipment and occupational health risk assessments. There are occupational exposure limits for respirable crystalline silica and to adhere to these will require occupational health and safety input to monitor exposure of workers and to show legal compliance. For the general public the most appropriate exposure limits for health risk assessment are those for particulate matter (see Sect. 4.1.2). Neither of these enforceable sets of limits were designed for volcanic eruptions and so are unrealistic except as guides for communicating potential health risks; specialist advice will be needed for every new eruption, taking into account local circumstances, as was applied after Mount St Helens in 1980 and the volcanic crisis on Montserrat in 1995 onwards (Baxter et al. 2014).
### 4.1.2 Particulate Matter

In 2013, a review by the World Health Organi- zation concluded that inhalation of any particu- late matter sub-2.5 µm diameter (known as PM<sub>2.5</sub>) may impact chronic and acute morbidity and mortality in relation to a range of diseases including cardiovascular and respiratory diseases (World Health Organization 2013). In the USA and European Union countries, there are legal standards on ambient air quality and established air monitoring networks, together with general awareness about the health effects of low levels of air pollutants from sources such as traffic emissions.

Major concerns exist about the health impacts from breathing in air containing elevated levels of respirable ash particles (of non-specific com- position), especially in children, and the mea- sures needed to prevent such high exposure. A significant problem after explosive eruptions in dry or semi-arid regions, or during unseasonal droughts, is the resuspension of ash deposits by wind and traffic, leading to exceedances of daily PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub> air quality targets by at least one order of magnitude until rain helps to clear the air and consolidate the material, which can be exceedingly fine (including sub-micron parti- cles). The consolidated deposits in inhabited areas should be removed to prevent remobilisa- tion. Strategies such as placing restrictions on vehicle speeds and dampening ash deposits with water may be helpful (Wilson et al. 2013).

Health conditions like asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease are common in the general population, and symptoms of these are likely to be aggravated by exposure to ash. Patients with pre-existing health problems may need to discuss with their physicians the wisdom of moving away from badly affected areas until air quality improves. Public health officials and physicians will need to become well-versed in the acute and chronic health issues surrounding ambient PM<sub>2.5</sub> in particular. These are compli- cated for non-specialists to grasp. A further challenge is the development of expertise in communicating the potential health risks associ- ated with exposure to levels of PM<sub>2.5</sub> that are

considerably higher than typical ambient levels in regulated urban environments. Syndromic surveillance (where real-time data are collected from existing public health networks used to monitor the outbreaks of disease) may be useful in communicating the need for health protection strategies where impacts (such as an increase in asthma cases) are recorded (Elliot et al. 2010).

## 4.2 Agriculture

Impacts of ashfall on agricultural depend on a complex array of factors (Table 1), as well as the inherent vulnerability of the exposed farming systems, on scales ranging from regional (e.g., related to climate) to individual farm-scale (e.g., availability of shelter and supplementary feed). While certain impacts tend to be commonly observed, others may be more site or eruption specific. Thus, in addition to generic impact and mitigation advice, more tailored mitigation strategies may be required.

The assessment of the potential for ashfall to contaminate food chains, as required by modern agricultural production and food safety regula- tions, is critical. This is essential information for a wide range of stakeholders, from farmers who need to manage and minimise impacts, to food safety organisations. Considerable anxiety can be created for farmers, agricultural markets, and consumers if this issue is not managed and communicated effectively. For example, during the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull, Iceland, eruption, the European Commission asked the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to assess the possible short-term threats to food safety in the European Union (EU) from ashfall. The EFSA had no prior information on this hazard and so had to rapidly review and compile scientific information for its assessment (EFSA 2010). No ashfall composi- tion information was available at the time to guide their review. The ESFA identified fluoride as the main component that could pose a short-term risk to food and feed safety, although the risk was assessed as negligible given the very small quantities of ashfall on mainland Europe.
Public anxiety around this issue was considerable, requiring rapid and authoritative communication of the risk to reassure consumers and agricultural markets.

Information demands from farmers, agricultural support organisations, media and other key stakeholders before, during and after an ash-generating eruption can be considerable and diverse, and typically evolve as the risk context changes. Topics on which information is sought include all aspects of volcanic activity, ashfall hazard, likely impacts, and recommended mitigation actions.

From our experience conducting post-event interviews with farmers and farming support organisations, we identify the following information demands that commonly arise before, during, and after ashfall:

1. Will I receive ashfall, and if so, how much and when?

2. What impacts will it have on my farming operations (including effects on pasture, soil, crops, livestock, and farm infrastructure?

3. When will hazard characterisation of the ash be completed? (e.g., characterisation of the environmentally available elements)

4. What actions can I take to mitigate potential consequences before, during, and after ashfall?

5. What support is available? (including sources of advice and direct financial assistance)

In our experience, pre-existing and regularly maintained relationships, protocols, and information resources can greatly ease communication and management demands in a crisis.

The U.S. Geological Survey hosts an ash impacts website, delivering information on ashfall impacts and mitigation for the agricultural sector (U.S. Geological Survey 2015). However, we note that case studies on tropical agricultural systems are limited. Country-specific information resources have been developed for New Zealand (MPI 2012).

## 4.3 Infrastructure

Ashfalls of just a few millimetres can be damaging and disruptive to critical infrastructure services (also known as ‘utilities’ in some countries), such as electricity generation, transmission and distribution networks, drinking-water and wastewater treatment plants, roads, airports and communication networks (Wilson et al. 2012). Additionally, disruption of service delivery can have cascading impacts on wider society. Specific impacts of ashfall vary considerably, depending on factors such as plant or network design, ashfall characteristics (e.g., loading, grain-size, composition and levels of leachable elements), and environmental conditions before and after the ashfall (Wilson et al. 2011a, b). Evidence is growing that a range of preparedness and mitigation strategies can reduce ashfall impacts for critical infrastructure organisations (Wilson et al. 2012, 2014).

Volcanic eruptions that produce heavy ashfall are, in general, infrequent and somewhat exotic occurrences and consequently, in many parts of the world, infrastructure managers may not have devoted serious consideration to management of a volcanic crisis. Therefore, during non-crisis periods, risk communication activities should be primarily concerned with volcanic ashfall hazard and impact awareness and education, and making utility companies aware of where information and expertise resides. This incorporates hazard, impact and risk assessment, vulnerability analysis, and formal and informal network building (Daly and Johnston 2015). During crisis periods, provision of specialist, sector-specific impact information is essential to enable rapid decision making in order to minimise consequences. In both instances, preparation of pre-prepared information resources has been beneficial (Leonard et al. 2014). Ideally, a collaborative, participatory process develops these resources for reach region (Twigg 2007).

A successful example of a collaborative process is the creation of a suite of ten posters designed to improve preparedness of critical
infrastructure organisations for volcanic ashfall hazards (Wilson et al. 2014; see download link provided in Sect. 4.4). Key features of this process were: (1) a partnership between critical infrastructure managers and other relevant government agencies with volcanic impact scientists, including extensive consultation and review phases; and (2) translation of volcanic impact research into practical management tools. Whilst these posters have been developed specifically for use in New Zealand, the authors propose that these posters are widely applicable for improving resilience to volcanic hazards in other settings (Wilson et al. 2014).

## 4.4 Clean-up

The removal of ash from urban areas is vital for recovery. However, clean-up operations are more complex than just removal; the ash also needs to be disposed of and stabilised to avoid future problems from remobilisation. Areas exposed to ash hazards should have clean-up plans in place beforehand, covering the following aspects:

* Personnel and equipment requirements, including mutual support agreements for ash clean-up as part of regional emergency management contingency planning.

* Provisions for management of health and safety risks.

* An incident management system/database to manage the clean-up operation.

* Identification of potential disposal sites.

* Strategies for stabilisation of deposits.

Volunteers commonly assist with clean-up operations following an ashfall. Volunteer labour can significantly speed up these operations, but requires effective management and integration with professional crews. An effective communication strategy should include regular briefings of volunteers, liaison officers and health and safety support (Wilson et al. 2014). Clear and ongoing communication with the public during clean-up operations aids efficiency, public trust

and goodwill. Guidance on appropriate clean-up methods aids effectiveness, and the coordinated clean-up of neighbourhoods will optimise use of resources and reduce recontamination of cleaned sections.

An example of the value of having pre-existing plans in place, and then communicating them clearly to the public, comes from the May 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano, Guatemala, which deposited an estimated 11,350,000 m³ of medium to coarse basaltic ash on Guatemala City, covering approximately 2100 km of roads to depths of 20–30 mm (Wardman et al. 2012). The municipality of Guatemala City utilised a pre-existing emergency plan originally devised for clearing earthquake debris (as a local response to the devastating earthquakes in Haiti and Chile earlier in 2010). An important factor in the success of this clean-up was clear communication with the public. The public were instructed to clear ash from their own properties (roofs and yards), collect it in sacks and to pile the sacks on the street frontage or take them to designated collection points. Sacks were obtained from local sugar and cement companies (Director of Public Works, Municipality of Guatemala City; 2010, pers. comm.). Streets were cleaned with street sweepers or manually, and the ash loaded onto lorries with small excavators. While there were some ongoing problems with flooding caused by ash ingress into storm drains, the main transport routes in Guatemala City (which generates 70% of the GNP of Guatemala) were cleared within days and the city returned rapidly to its pre-existing level of functionality.

Lessons from this and other eruptions are summarised on the poster "Volcanic Ashfall: Advice for Urban Cleanup Operations" (Auckland Lifelines 2014).

## 5 Ongoing Communication Demands: Managing Long-Duration Eruptions

In some cases volcanic activity is not confined to a short period of time, but may continue to threaten populations for many years. Some current examples of long-duration and/or ongoing
eruptions include: Sakurajima, Japan (intermittent since 1955); Rabaul, Papua New Guinea (intermittent since 1994); Merapi, Indonesia (events every few years since the turn of the 20th century); Soufrière Hills, Montserrat (1995 to present); and Tungurahua, Ecuador (1999 to present). Long-duration eruptions generate hazards of varying intensity over time, where more frequent hazards include ashfalls, gases and acid rain. These hazards can generate widespread losses across societies (Table 1). In long-duration eruptions, this may undermine resilience in the long-term as losses are often not accounted for by governments and businesses, and become absorbed by households and communities. The recurrent nature of the hazards creates challenges for recovery (Sword-Daniels et al. 2014). The complex range of impacts and losses for infrastructure and societies, their cumulative nature, and their long-term manifestations are not well known (Sword-Daniels et al. 2014; Tobin and Whiteford 2004). In general, there are few studies to inform appropriate communication and management strategies and long-term mitigation options for long-duration eruptions.

At some frequently active volcanoes, communication strategies have been developed between disaster managers and communities, but because hazards may vary over time, challenges in communication can arise when the type of hazard changes or is unforeseen (De Bélizal et al. 2012). In many long-duration eruptions, the type of activity can suddenly switch from effusive (dome-building) to explosive, with each presenting entirely different hazards and impacts for the affected communities. For long-duration eruptions, communication strategies, therefore, need to be flexible under changing hazard conditions, must reach and meet the needs of a diverse range of stakeholders and residents during hazard events, and become established such that they can be quickly enacted even after periods of quiescence.

In Montserrat, West Indies, the onset of a long-duration eruption in 1995 (ongoing at the time of writing) of the Soufrière Hills volcano prompted the creation of an exclusion zone in 1996, and relocation of the population further

from the volcano. Despite this, ongoing ashfalls, acid rain and gases intermittently affected populated areas of this small island (e.g. from November 2009 to February 2010), and continued for prolonged periods of time (Wadge et al. 2014). Communication strategies for managing ashfalls have developed and improved over time, creating both formal (often broadcast via radio) and informal local information networks. These provide information about which areas of the island are affected by ashfalls and any temporarily affected infrastructure and services; and advice for residents about protective actions for public health and safety. In particular, dome-forming eruptions, such as Soufrière Hills, create ash containing abundant crystalline silica which has the potential to cause diseases such as silicosis (Baxter et al. 1999, see Sect. 4.1.1). Thus, monitoring and reporting on the crystalline silica content (to government agencies) allowed informed decision-making on population exposure, and was an important part of hazard communication during this eruption (Baxter et al. 2014).

## 6 Communication Demands During Recovery

Each recovery context is unique, depending on the level of impact (where different impacts are experienced by different groups), available resources, and the social, political and economic context (Smith and Birkland 2012; Tierney and Oliver-Smith 2012). Recovery plans should ideally be in place before a hazard event so that all stakeholders share a common understanding and expectations of the recovery process (Phillips 2009). Tools and strategies that promote community engagement and participation are essential in order to account for multiple perspectives, the needs of different groups, and to guide the recovery process. Effective communication requires clarity and transparency in decision-making during all stages of the process.

In the early stages of recovery after an ashfall event, information and communication should focus on providing emergency assistance (where necessary), undertaking damage assessments,
ashfall clean-up activities, restoring the function of infrastructure and services, access to livelihoods, and providing psychosocial support. Rapid responses may reduce longer-term impacts.

In the longer-term, tools and strategies need to transition to become focused on any changes that can be made to increase resilience. Aspects that may be considered include: livelihood diversity, possible adaptations, improvements in reconstruction techniques, land-use planning for future development, ensuring social wellbeing and social security mechanisms, the preservation of culture, and strategies for long-term economic stability.

## 7 Lessons

Lessons from volcanic ashfall events point to the following key considerations for effective communication:

1. Consistent messages must be delivered from different official agencies wherever possible. This may be fostered through regular inter-agency meetings and structures (e.g., Leonard et al. 2014; Madden et al. 2014) and requires a high level of situation awareness and information sharing.

2. Messages need to be repeated periodically during a prolonged event.

3. Planning needs to allow for time-varying messages. Messages are often evolving, with more data becoming available over time.

4. Agency jurisdictions—over who is authorised to issue different types of messages—need to be discussed and formalised before crises. Usually scientists give information on the volcano status and emergency managers give messages on public safety and instructions to evacuate. However, this needs to be formalised (e.g., Madden et al. 2014).

5. Key messages should be pre-planned wherever possible to ensure complete coverage of essential advice and to reduce workload during crisis periods (e.g., standard public

health messaging). However, there needs to be flexibility in line with the evolving situation.

6. Volcanic ashfall hazard awareness should start with sector-specific background information delivered during quiescent times.

7. Information needs before, during, and after ashfall events vary for different audiences; thus pre-planned messages and resources should be developed and tested with diverse audiences in mind.

**Acknowledgments** For constructive review comments, we thank Bill McGuire and an anonymous reviewer; and Cheryl Cameron of the State of Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys and Game McGimsey of the U.S. Geological Survey. We also thank Emma Hudson-Doyle for helpful discussions.

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<figure><img src="image_26.png" /></figure>
# Volcanic Ash and Aviation—The Challenges of Real-Time, Global Communication of a Natural Hazard

Peter Lechner, Andrew Tupper, Marianne Guffanti, Sue Loughlin and Tom Casadevall

## Abstract

More than 30 years after the first major aircraft encounters with volcanic ash over Indonesia in 1982, it remains challenging to inform aircraft in flight of the exact location of potentially dangerous ash clouds on their flight path, particularly shortly after the eruption has occurred. The difficulties include reliably forecasting and detecting the onset of significant explosive eruptions on a global basis, observing the dispersal of eruption clouds in real time, capturing their complex structure and constituents in atmospheric transport models, describing these observations and modelling results in a manner suitable for aviation users, delivering timely warning messages to the cockpit, flight planners and air traffic management systems, and the need for scientific development in order to undertake operational enhancements. The framework under which these issues are managed is the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW), administered by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO outlines in its standards and recommended practices (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014a, b) the basic volcanic monitoring and communication that is necessary at volcano observatories in Member States (countries). However, not all volcanoes are monitored and not all countries with volcanoes have mandated volcano observatories or equivalents. To add to the efforts of volcano observatories, a system of Meteorological Watch Offices, Air Traffic Management Area Control Centres, and nine specialist Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres (VAACs) are

<footnote>P. Lechner (✉)
New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority, Wellington,
New Zealand
e-mail: peter.lechner@caa.govt.nz</footnote>

<footnote>A. Tupper
Australian Bureau of Meteorology, Melbourne,
Australia
e-mail: a.tupper@bom.gov.au</footnote>

<footnote>M. Guffanti · T. Casadevall
U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, USA
e-mail: guffanti@usgs.gov</footnote>

<footnote>T. Casadevall
e-mail: tcasadevall@usgs.gov</footnote>

<footnote>S. Loughlin
British Geological Survey, Nottingham, UK
e-mail: sclou@bgs.ac.uk</footnote>
responsible for observing, analysing, forecasting and communicating the aviation hazard (airborne ash), using agreed techniques and messages in defined formats. Continuous improvement of the IAVW framework is overseen by expert groups representing the operators of the system, the user community, and the science community. The IAVW represents a unique marriage of two scientific disciplines, volcanology and meteorology, with the aviation user community. There have been many multifaceted volcanic eruptions in complex meteorological conditions during the history of the IAVW. Each new eruption brings new insights into how the warning system can be improved, and each reinforces the lessons that have gone before. The management of these events has improved greatly since the major ash encounters in the 1980s, but discontinuities in the warning and communications system still occur. A good example is a 2014 ash encounter over Indonesia following the eruption of Kelut where the warnings did not reach the aircraft crew. Other events present enormous management challenges—for example the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption in Iceland was, overall, less hazardous than many less publicised eruptions, but numerous small to moderate explosions over several weeks produced widespread disruption and a large economic impact. At the time of writing, while there has been hundreds of millions of US dollars in damage to aircraft from encounters with ash, there have been no fatalities resulting from aviation incidents in, or proximal to volcanic ash cloud. This reflects, at least in part, the hard work done in putting together a global warning system—although to some extent it also reflects a measure of good statistical fortune. In order to minimise the risk of aircraft encounters with volcanic ash clouds, the global effort continues. The future priorities for the IAVW are strongly focused on enhancing communication before, and at the very onset of a volcanic ash-producing event (typically the more dangerous stage), together with improved downstream information and warning systems to help reduce the economic impact of eruptions on aviation.

**Keywords**

Volcanic ash • Aviation • Hazard • Global communication

# 1 Introduction

Since the advent of the jet age in the 1960s, there has been a significant and continuing growth in air travel with ever increasing densities of high technology aircraft in limited available civil airspace. Over the same period, the correspondingly increased probability and potentially dire

consequence of aircraft encounters with volcanic clouds has become clearly apparent.

Damage to aircraft from volcanic ash cloud encounters can be immediate and long term (Casadevall 1993). As aerospace technology develops, jet-turbine running temperatures have increased markedly seeking increasing thrust and economy. Modern high-bypass jet-turbine
engines run at temperatures in excess of the melting point of many minerals and silicates. Similarly, the fine tolerances of airframe fabrication, and electrical, hydraulic, and navigation systems can all be compromised by the nature, density, and size of volcanic ash particles. The accretion of volcanic ash silicates on turbine engine blades can, and has, resulted in engine stalling and inability to restart. The accretion or incidence of volcanic ash silicates on and in the airframe can lead to critical interruption of electrical and hydraulic aircraft systems. Even marginal encounters with low density volcanic ash cloud results in accelerated wear and tear on aircraft and engines (International Civil Aviation Organization 2007, Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds, Doc 9691). Any aircraft encounter with a volcanic ash cloud therefore carries both a safety and an economic consequence.

From 1953 to 2009, there have been over 129 reported incidents of aircraft encountering volcanic ash (Guffanti et al. 2010); 79 of these resulted in some physical damage to the aircraft. Of these damaging encounters, 26 can be

considered severe, including nine incidents that resulted in loss of in-flight power in one or more engines. Some of the latter have been widely documented, such as the first “all engines out” encounter by a Boeing B747 in 1982 with ash near Indonesia from Galunggung volcano, and the Boeing B747 encounter in 1989 with ash from Redoubt volcano over Alaska (Miller and Casadevall 2000). In contrast some encounters have received little public attention, such as an all-engines failure in a Gulfstream II survey aircraft in 2006 over Papua New Guinea due to an encounter with ash from Manam volcano (Tupper et al. 2007a, b).

From 1953 to 2014, eruptions from 40 volcanoes located in 16 countries have caused damaging encounters of aircraft with ash clouds (Fig. 1). While the most damaging encounters have occurred within 24 h of eruption onset and/or within 1000 km of the source, less safety-significant but still economically damaging encounters have occurred at greater distances and extended times (Guffanti et al. 2010).

The potential risk arising from such encounters has often been highlighted by the international

<figure><img src="image_27.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** Map of source volcanoes responsible for damaging encounters of aircraft with ash clouds (modified from Table 7 of Guffanti et al. 2010)</figcaption></figure>
civil aviation community as a priority area in need of systematic global mitigation and further development of risk reduction measures (International Civil Aviation Organization 2012).

## 2 International Airways Volcano Watch

In response to the demand for globally co-ordinated mitigation of the volcanic ash risks to aviation, the IAVW was established in 1987 by ICAO in close co-ordination with the World Meteorological Organization. Since that time a collaborative approach, led by the IAVW, has matured into a comprehensive worldwide monitoring and notification system (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014a, b).

The IAVW system is an operational programme binding on all ICAO member States (countries) through the Chicago Convention.<fnref n="1" /> The system is made up of three main components:

1. Observing component—this comprises existing international ground-based monitoring and observations (including VONA—Volcano Observatory Notice for Aviation), global satellite based detection and in-flight air reports (VAR—volcanic ash reports) to observe/detect volcanic eruptions and ash clouds and pass the information quickly to appropriate Air Traffic Management Area Control Centres, Meteorological Watch Offices, and VAACs.

2. Advisory component—this comprises the production of advisory products by the VAACs for use by Meteorological Watch Offices and air traffic management Area Control Centres. The Volcanic Ash Advisory (VAA) message and its graphical equivalent (VAG) contain information on the position and current eruptive state of the volcano, the current and expected position of any

associated volcanic ash cloud, along with relevant contextual information on plume height, observation sources and expectation for the timing of next issue.

3. Warning component—this provides the necessary warnings to aircraft and air traffic management through two types of messages: SIGnificant METeorological information about aviation weather hazards (SIGMETs) that are issued by Meteorological Watch Offices, and NOTices to Air Men (NOTAMs) for changes in airspace status that are issued by Area Control Centres.

The SIGMETs and NOTAMs are based on advisory information supplied by nine designated VAACs, whose aggregate areas of responsibility cover most of the globe. The VAACs in the IAVW system are: Anchorage, Buenos Aires, Darwin, London, Montreal, Tokyo, Toulouse, Washington and Wellington. The approximate VAAC areas of responsibility are shown in Fig. 2.

IAVW services can also be categorised in four areas: (1) monitoring information on the threat, onset, cessation, scale and characteristics of an eruption, (2) monitoring the volcanic ash in the atmosphere, (3) forecasting the expected trajectory and location of the ash cloud, and (4) communicating the information to the users. Essentially, the success of the IAVW system is entirely dependent on requisite information gathering, analyses and prediction, targeted dissemination of information, and the procedural or automatic application of that information.

Before and during a volcanic eruption, the co-ordination and flow of information regarding the (potential) eruption, and the location and forecast position of the volcanic ash cloud is the primary concern. It involves co-operation among all information providers, and between information providers and operational decision makers. Such co-ordination and co-operation requires planning and preparation before an eruption. The primary providers of information include Meteorological Watch Offices, VAACs, volcano observatories, and aircraft in flight, supplemented by information from the research and broader communities.

<footnote n="1">¹The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation was signed in 1944. Standards and procedures for safe and economic international aviation are set out in detail in 19 Annexes to the Convention.</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_28.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** Areas of responsibility of the nine volcanic ash advisory centres</figcaption></figure>

Users of information (operational decision
makers) are Air Traffic Management Systems
including Aeronautical Information Services, Air
Traffic Control, and Air Traffic Flow Manage-
ment, private and commercial flight crews, and
airline operations centres. Regulatory
co-operation between civil aviation authorities
and aircraft operators using the information
provided is essential for support of the pre-flight
planning process, and the in-flight and post-flight
decision-making processes; all as part of overall
safety risk mitigation.<fnref n="2" />

The lines of communication and responsibility
in the IAVW are shown in Fig. 3.

**3 Volcano Monitoring**

Volcano observatories are loosely organised
under the banner of the World Organization of
Volcano Observatories, a commission of the
International Association of Volcanology and the
Earth's Interior, itself a member association of

the International Union of Geodesy and Geo-
physics. Not all volcanoes are monitored and not
all countries have volcano observatories.

Volcano observatory staff can detect volcanic
unrest, provide eruption forecasts, identify the
onset of an eruption, and advise on the evolution
and end of an eruption. Ideally these volcano
observatories provide guidance on the changing
eruption characteristics through time such as
plume heights, altitudes of dispersing ash layers
in the atmosphere, likely particle size distribution
(post initial eruption) and possible mass eruption
rates that can be used in numerical dispersion and
transport models. Many observatories may anal-
yse eruption products providing information on
composition of ash and also gas emissions that
impact on aircraft systems. Volcano observato-
ries typically also hold information on past
eruptions of a given volcano so they are able to
provide likely eruption scenarios and a range of
likely eruption parameters, such as possible ash
ejection heights, before an eruption occurs. They
are also responsible for monitoring ground haz-
ards such as ash fall and volcanic gas dispersal.

Volcano observatories build long-term rela-
tionships with civil protection/defence

<footnote n="2">²Refer to; ICAO Doc 9974 Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash.</footnote>