# Profitability and social impact: Maintaining collective hybridity in social innovation ecosystems

Anaïs Garin, Mathias Béjean, Stefan Meisiek, Willy Allègre

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Anaïs Garin, Mathias Béjean, Stefan Meisiek, Willy Allègre. Profitability and social impact: Maintaining collective hybridity in social innovation ecosystems. IPDMC: Innovation and Product Development Management Conference, Jun 2025, Porto, Portugal. hal-05453544

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PROFITABILITY AND SOCIAL IMPACT: MAINTAINING COLLECTIVE HYBRIDITY
IN SOCIAL INNOVATION ECOSYSTEMS

Anaïs Garin

Université Paris-Est Créteil, IRG, F-94010 Créteil, France Université Gustave Eiffel, IRG, F-
77447 Marne-la-Vallée, France
anais.garin@u-pec.fr

Mathias Béjean

Université Paris-Est Créteil, IRG, F-94010 Créteil, France Université Gustave Eiffel, IRG, F-
77447 Marne-la-Vallée, France
mathias.bejean@u-pec.fr

Stefan Meisiek

The University of Sydney Business School, Australia
stefan.meisiek@sydney.edu.au

Willy Allègre

Kerpape Rehabilitation Center
willy.allegre@vyv3.fr

ABSTRACT

Recently, scholars have explored hybrid value creation at the ecosystem level, in which social and economic value is created collectively by ecosystem actors. While scholars extensively investigated hybridity at the organizational level, for example, in social enterprises, they have seldomly explored it in ecosystems. Yet, understanding how ecosystem actors achieve hybridity collectively is important to support further global actions for tackling grand challenges, which require collective action by diverse actors. Hence, this research builds on a case study of a social innovation ecosystem in the French disability sector to reveal how ecosystem actors manage and maintain such collective hybridity. We find that actors develop a dual management structure in which they achieve both social impact and profitability. Such duality supports the development of cross-interest collaborations and mutual control between actors, hence maintaining a careful balance between social impact and profitability. This research contributes to the ecosystem management literature by investigating collective hybridity management in an ecosystem. It also contributes to a better understanding of social innovation ecosystems, an emerging concept in the ecosystem literature. Finally, we suggest opportunities for future research and identify implications for practitioners and policymakers to address grand challenges through collective hybridity.

KEYWORDS

Social innovation ecosystems; collective hybridity; profitability; social values
# INTRODUCTION

Scholars have recently turned their attention to new forms of organizing and innovating in social enterprises addressing societal and grand challenges (Biggeri et al., 2017; Doherty et al., 2014; Van Der Have & Rubalcaba, 2016). However, addressing such challenges often requires collaboration among diverse actors and a combination of distributed resources. This results in social innovation ecosystems whereby actors aim to collectively achieve profitability and social impact simultaneously (Audretsch et al., 2022; Kaletka et al., 2016; Pel et al., 2020). This refers to the concept of collective hybridity, recently introduced by Grabski-Walls and Ambos to refer to "*the integration of profit and sustainability objectives in business practices, which we refer to as hybrid value creation*" (2024, p. 4). Since different field-logics underpin these goals (Roth et al., 2024), the ecosystems experience tensions, which need to be managed to keep actors together (Jütting, 2020; Pundziene et al., 2023; Silva-Flores & Murillo, 2022; Smolka & Böschen, 2023; Terstriep et al., 2020). How ecosystem management addresses these tensions to maintain collective hybridity remains underexplored in the management literature.

Most research on ecosystem management focuses on the role of a single, powerful actor in managing ecosystems (Gomes et al., 2022; Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018; Linde et al., 2021; Parida et al., 2019; Ritala et al., 2013). Noticing that some ecosystems deviate from this form of management, scholars have developed new concepts such as multi-orchestration (Lingens, Huber, et al., 2022) and collective orchestration (Oskam et al., 2021), suggesting that multiple actors share management activities. Scholars recently introduced transformative governance (Könnölä et al., 2021) or ambidextrous governance (Altman et al., 2022), alluding to ecosystem hybridity. However, it remains unclear how collective hybridity is managed, hence calling for empirical research to explain and theorize how ecosystems maintain the hybrid pursuit of profitability and social impact.

To address this gap, we draw on a single case study of a social innovation ecosystem in France that produces innovations for people with a disability. Through several interviews and observations of meetings, we explore how ecosystem actors share management activities to maintain collective hybridity. It reveals cross-interest collaborations and mutual control between actors in a dual management structure wherein actors articulate social impact and profitability, hence maintaining collective hybridity.

This article is structured as follows: first, we present the literature on hybridity in ecosystems, focusing on social innovation ecosystems. We then review the ecosystem management literature and show the need for new insights to understand collective hybridity management. Afterward, we present the case study and related findings, contributing to the literature on social innovation ecosystems and ecosystem management by showing how ecosystem actors maintain collective hybridity. We conclude with opportunities for future research and the implications of collective hybridity for practitioners and policymakers to address grand challenges.

# HYBRIDITY IN ECOSYSTEMS

Scholars have shown that social innovation ecosystems attempt to accommodate social impact and profitability (Fiandrino et al., 2023; Hooge & Le Du, 2016; Jarvi et al., 2018; Könnölä et al., 2021; Miles & Morrison, 2020; Thomas et al., 2022; Visnjic et al., 2016), hence reaching for collective hybridity (Grabski-Walls & Ambos, 2024). Multiple studies on ecosystems striving for both profitability and social impact suggested that these ecosystems are initiated by non-profit actors, pursue collective hybridity, and share management activities among multiple actors (Germain et al., 2022; Gupta et al., 2020; Jarvi et al., 2018; Lingens, Miehé, et al., 2021; O'Mahony & Karp, 2022). Non-profit actors such as governments (Chen et al., 2021; Prodi et al., 2022), universities (Schaeffer
& Matt, 2016), university incubators (Colombelli et al., 2019), or local authorities (Gupta et al., 2020; Picaud-Bello et al., 2022) may act at initiators. For example, Jarvi et al. (2018) studied an ecosystem initiated by the Finnish government to improve Finland's industrial competitiveness and meet the innovation demands of society. In a more collaborative way, the HZMB ecosystem, consisting of a large-scale infrastructure project, was initiated by mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau (Chen et al., 2021). Other studies suggested that for-profit actors can be involved, but always alongside non-profit actors (O'Mahony & Karp, 2022; Zaoual & Lecocq, 2018). In their research, Taishoff et al. (2022) showed that a close collaboration between Monaco's public authorities and SBM, a high-end tourism organization, led to the emergence of a local luxury service ecosystem.

These actors do not initiate ecosystems solely to achieve social impact or profitability. Instead, they aim to develop hybridity collectively at the ecosystem level by combining activities for profitability and social impact (Grabski-Walls & Ambos, 2024). For instance, scholars explored ecosystems promoting a region while increasing tourism (Picaud-Bello et al., 2022) or entrepreneurial activities (Carida et al., 2022; Colombelli et al., 2019), fostering industrial actors collaborations while ensuring local sustainable development (Zaoual & Lecocq, 2018), improving a countries innovation capabilities while improving society's well-being and health (Jarvi et al., 2018), or developing entrepreneurship while fostering sustainable practices (Fiandrino et al., 2023; Germain et al., 2022).

Balancing social impact and profitability seems to require actors to share management activities. Scholars' empirical research involved settings where two or more for-profit and non-profit actors managed their ecosystems. For example, in the Canadian innovation ecosystem studied by Tamtik (2018), the author revealed that the Canadian Science Policy Centre was in charge of network coordination, while MaRS Discovery District, a non-profit innovation hub, was in charge of cooperative coordination and the University Vice Presidents Research of Ontario higher education institutions were in charge of political coordination. Similarly, Carida et al. (2022) found that Airbnb, an online marketplace for vacation stays, managed an ecosystem around the Italian Village Project together with two non-profit actors, namely the Italian Ministry of Cultural Heritage and Tourism and the Italian Association of Municipalities.

Collective hybridity is particularly important for social innovation ecosystems, defined as complex systems of highly heterogeneous actors aiming for a desired social change in response to social needs (Jütting, 2020; Silva-Flores & Murillo, 2022) while also pursuing economic returns (Terstriep et al., 2020). Empirical research explored social innovation ecosystems in the context of regions or areas willing to foster social innovation to improve citizens' well-being (Audretsch et al., 2022; Catala et al., 2023; Kadyrova, 2021; Roth et al., 2024; Silva-Flores & Murillo, 2022). In this case, the public, non-profit actors, and civil society played a central role (Jütting, 2020). The embeddedness of these ecosystems in their local context (Jütting, 2020) implies that social innovation emerges through collaborations with local stakeholders to foster legitimation and access to resources (Pel et al., 2020).

While social innovation ecosystems' primary goal is to respond to societal needs, they must achieve profitability to sustain their activities. In Audretsch et al.'s (2022) study of Carinthia, an Austrian State, the emergent social innovation ecosystem aimed to foster entrepreneurial activities to solve the State's economic challenges while positively impacting the region. Kadyrova (2021) outlined a similar case in Utrecht, where the city supports commercial enterprises with a social purpose and encourages collaborations between local universities and private-sector actors. One important asset when configuring social innovation ecosystems is thus integrating social innovation into economic concepts by combining social and economic innovation strategies (Terstriep et al., 2020).

Achieving collective hybridity raises management challenges for social innovation ecosystems. Scholars argued that there has yet to be a successful governance model that includes for-profit and non-profit actors (Terstriep et al., 2020). Yet, integrating stakeholders in such ecosystems is critical
to achieving collective efforts (Maldonado-Mariscal & Papageorgiou, 2024). While research on the management of social innovation ecosystems is emerging, elements from prior research suggest a need to share management activities. For instance, Roth et al. (2024) argued that value creation in a social innovation ecosystem requires coordinating the aspirations of multiple actors through institutional work. The authors identified several pairs of institutional logic (public and market sectors logic, civil society and state logic, or professional and managerial logic) and how they require actors to mix, compromise, and legitimize value creation. Ultimately, the authors advanced that value creation can be orchestrated by coordinating the relationships between diverse actors. Additionally, scholars have advocated for establishing participatory governance when configuring social innovation ecosystems (Catala et al., 2023; Pel et al., 2020; Terstriep et al., 2020). To further understand how actors in social innovation ecosystems maintain collective hybridity (Grabski-Walls & Ambos, 2024), we build on the existing ecosystem management literature.

## SHARING MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES IN ECOSYSTEMS

The traditional approach to ecosystems argued that focal firms initiate and manage ecosystem development (Gomes et al., 2022; Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018; Linde et al., 2021; Parida et al., 2019; Ritala et al., 2013). Their management activities involved structuring the ecosystem and its architecture (Daymond et al., 2023; Lingens, Seeholzer, et al., 2022), coordinating the various actors and their interactions (Gomes et al., 2021; Sun & Wei, 2019), controlling actions to achieve ecosystem goal (Huber et al., 2017; Schreieck et al., 2021), and sustaining ecosystem activities on the long term (Feng et al., 2019; Laczko et al., 2019; Li et al., 2022; Ritala et al., 2013). However, as research flourished, scholars showed that ecosystem management can be shared among multiple actors. They suggested that not only established and powerful firms could manage an ecosystem but also start-ups (Lingens, Böger, et al., 2021), governments (Addo, 2022; Ciasullo et al., 2020) and universities (Busch & Barkema, 2022). While shared management actors carry out similar activities to focal management actors, they do so collaboratively. For instance, shared management actors co-create ecosystem rules (Pereira et al., 2019; Tabas et al., 2023), co-define an ecosystem strategy and value proposition (Colombelli et al., 2019; Könnölä et al., 2021; Randhawa et al., 2022), make decisions collectively (Ciasullo et al., 2020; Dos Santos et al., 2022; Otto & Jarke, 2019), and connect with each other (Carida et al., 2022; Prodi et al., 2022; Zaoual & Lecocq, 2018).

Taking a closer look at shared management reveals it is found in ecosystems pursuing social value, with or without the accommodation of economic value (Gupta et al., 2020; Jarvi et al., 2018; Lingens, Böger, et al., 2021; Oskam et al., 2021; Schaeffer & Matt, 2016). Scholars attempted to differentiate shared management by introducing multi-orchestration (Lingens, Huber, et al., 2022) or collective orchestration (Oskam et al., 2021). Taking a step further from the traditional view, other scholars suggested that transformative governance (Könnölä et al., 2021) or ambidextrous governance (Altman et al., 2022) were needed for shared management actors to carry out ecosystem activities. The former concept requires actors to establish directionality (i.e., the purpose of the ecosystem), polycentricity, redundancy (i.e., similar, repetitive, or varied means to perform the same or overlapping functions), diversity, and connectivity to develop adaptable and resilient ecosystems (Könnölä et al., 2021). While the authors illustrated their argument with a real-life example of the Finnish Transport Act, their insights did not emerge from empirical data, leaving a gap in the existence of transformative governance in practice. Similarly, the ambidextrous governance concept, defined as "*the ability to successfully manage the tensions associated with embracing more than one governance structure at the same time*" (Altman et al., 2022, p. 88), stems from a theoretical review of the ecosystems, platforms, and open innovation literature, thus ruling out empirical data.

Building upon these recent developments in the ecosystem management literature, this paper empirically explores the management of collective hybridity in a social innovation ecosystem.
Particularly, we strive to answer the question: *How do actors share management activities to maintain collective hybridity in social innovation ecosystems?*

## METHODOLOGY

Our research draws on a single case study (Yin, 2017) of the “Disability Innovation Territory” (DIT) ecosystem in France. This ecosystem emerged in 2019 to sustain the disability innovation activities of Handinnov, a rehabilitation center, due to policy changes in the French healthcare sector that would restrict funding for such activities. Hence, the ecosystem emerged to raise financial resources and foster collaborations for disability innovations. The DIT ecosystem can be characterized as a social innovation ecosystem striving to achieve collective hybridity. Indeed, its purpose was to “*ensure the inclusion of all citizens with disabilities*” while developing and structuring an economy in the disability sector.

The ecosystem involved 37 heterogeneous members, ranging from health organizations, start-ups, and companies to local authorities, universities, and innovation centers. Additionally, more than 100 associated partners closely followed and interacted with the activities of the ecosystem. Together, the 37 members carried out 61 innovative projects across seven axes to achieve a positive social impact on their territory. The axes covered the life's journey of people with a disability, namely in health organizations, at home, in the city, throughout education, or at work. At the same time, DIT members strived to sustain innovative activities and build the capacity to face future environmental changes. Hence, they created CoWork, a disability innovation center aiming to produce and commercialize disability innovations and connect with the economic world. Collaborating to innovate while seeking to establish a profitable disability economy required ecosystem actors to achieve and maintain collective hybridity.

To do so, DIT actors shared management activities across several governance bodies composed of for and non-profit actors (see Table 1). At the core was the steering committee, involving HandInnov, a rehabilitation center, BioHealth, an innovation technological center, AccessCity, a conurbation representative body, and CoWork. These four actors collaborated closely with the managers of each axis, forming the DIT board. Both governance bodies reported to the strategic committee, which validated decisions for the ecosystem's future without profoundly changing its structure. For more impactful decisions, the general assembly with all 37 members was mobilized, and approval from all members was required.
<table><caption>**Table 1.** The governance bodies of the DIT ecosystem</caption><thead><tr><th>Governance body</th><th>Meeting frequency</th><th>Non-profit actors</th><th>For-profit actors</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Steering committee</td><td>Once a week</td><td>3 actors<br>AccessCity (appointed DIT admin),<br>HandInnov, BioHealth</td><td>1 actor<br>CoWork</td></tr><tr><td>DIT board</td><td>Once a month</td><td>5 actors<br>AccessCity, HandInnov, BioHealth,<br>TechUni, SouthUni</td><td>1 actor<br>CoWork</td></tr><tr><td>Strategic committee</td><td>Three times a year</td><td>6 actors<br>HandInnov, BioHealth, AccessCity,<br>SouthUni, TechUni, a disability<br>association</td><td>2 actors<br>InnoFirm,<br>DigiConnect</td></tr><tr><td>General assembly</td><td>Once or twice a year</td><td>29 actors<br>(Including UrbanEco and RegioGrant)</td><td>8 actors</td></tr></tbody></table>

**Data collection**

We collected data through interviews, online articles, internal documents, a book, non-participants observations, and social media posts, ensuring information triangulation (see Table 2).

<table><caption>**Table 2.** Overview of data collection</caption><thead><tr><th>Sources</th><th>Details</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Interviews</td><td>38 interviews between October 2021 and March 2023<br>433 pages of transcripts</td></tr><tr><td>Non-participants observations</td><td>12 online meetings of the steering committee<br>6 meetings of the DIT board<br>1 meeting of the strategic committee<br>45 hours of observations in total<br>16 meeting reports provided by the DIT admin</td></tr><tr><td>LinkedIn posts</td><td>3,758 posts in total<br>248 posts related to the DIT ecosystem</td></tr><tr><td>Internal documentation</td><td>Application file of DIT for the call for proposals<br>DIT progress report for the year 2022<br>2 mind maps of RegioGrant's strategy<br>One PowerPoint presentation of DIT<br>Document on the organization of sub-projects per axis<br>List of axis managers<br>Visual representation of the DIT governance</td></tr><tr><td>Online articles</td><td>5 news articles from the DIT website<br>A news bulletin from AccessCity<br>8 news articles on HandInnov<br>DIT booklet<br>94 online articles</td></tr><tr><td>Book</td><td>HandInnov's history from 1914 to 2014<br>16 testimonies of former patients and professionals</td></tr><tr><td>CoWork's online inauguration</td><td>2h30 video broadcasted on YouTube<br>Transcribed into a 39-page document</td></tr></tbody></table>
We conducted semi-structured interviews in two rounds, starting with actors from the steering committee. The founders advised us on which actors to interview next, resulting in 16 interviews between October 2021 and March 2022. In the first round, we asked participants about their perception and definition of the DIT ecosystem, the reason for their involvement, and their role. As we became more familiar with the ecosystem, we interviewed 22 additional actors between October 2022 and March 2023 to understand the management structure. These interviews covered the role of actors in the ecosystem, their involvement in management activities, and examples of such activities. In total, we conducted 38 online interviews in French (see Table 3), which lasted between 31 and 80 minutes, and transcribed them with the participants' permission. We were left with a 433-page corpus of interview data.

<table><caption>**Table 3.** Overview of the participants interviewed</caption><thead><tr><th>Organizations</th><th>Participant positions</th><th>Governance roles</th><th>Interviews</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="5">HandInnov, a rehabilitation center</td><td>Former engineer (1982 - 2022)</td><td>Steering committee</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Former director (2015 - 2023)</td><td>Former strategic committee member</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Doctor</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Engineer</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Part-time engineer (part-time CoWork's technical director)</td><td>Steering committee, DIT board (axis 3 manager), strategic committee</td><td>1* + 2</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">BioHealth, a technological innovation center</td><td>Project leader for Medical technologies and e-health</td><td>Steering committee, DIT board (axis 4 manager), strategic committee</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Project leader for e-health</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Network manager for Health</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">AccessCity, a conurbation representative body</td><td>DIT admin</td><td>Steering committee, DIT board, strategic committee</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Communication manager</td><td>Steering committee, DIT board (axis 7 manager), strategic committee</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Local elected representative</td><td>Strategic committee</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Assistant Tourism and disability Director Information System department</td><td>DIT board (axis 5 manager)</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">CoWork, a disability innovation center</td><td>Director</td><td>Steering committee, DIT board (axis 2 manager)</td><td>1* + 2</td></tr><tr><td>Project leader</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Project engineer</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">RegioGrant, a regional government organization</td><td>Co-director for Innovation and economic development</td><td>-</td><td>2°</td></tr><tr><td>Project leader for Innovation and economic development</td><td>-</td><td>2°</td></tr><tr><td>Project director for Training, research and innovation</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Regional elected representative</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">InsurHealth, a non-profit health insurer</td><td>General manager</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>President</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>SouthUni, a university</td><td>Vice-president for innovation</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>TechUni, an engineering school</td><td>Researcher</td><td>DIT board (axis 1 manager)</td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><thead><tr><td>Organizations</td><td>Participant positions</td><td>Governance roles</td><td>Interviews</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">UrbanEco, an agency for urban and economic development</td><td>Director for Companies and innovation support</td><td>-</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>General manager</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Market researcher for Employment and training</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>InnoFirm, a healthcare company</td><td>Managing director and co-founder</td><td>Strategic committee</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Public bank</td><td>Venture capital investment officer</td><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes. * and ° indicate that the participants were interviewed together.

Interviews provided us with subjective accounts of how DIT actors experienced and interpreted management activities in the ecosystem. One of the authors attended 19 online meetings of the DIT governance bodies between September 2023 and April 2024 to get a closer stance on the daily management of the ecosystem. This author conducted non-participant observations during twelve steering committee meetings, six DIT board meetings, and one strategic committee meeting. These meetings lasted two to three hours on average, resulting in about 45 hours of observation. The author took notes of the actors' interactions, the meeting content, how topics were addressed, and how decisions were made. Furthermore, the DIT admin sent us her minutes and decision summaries after each meeting.

Additionally, we collected social media data on LinkedIn, a platform dedicated to professional communication, to understand how actors communicated about the DIT ecosystem and their activities. The collection process included 14 actors over the four governance bodies: (1) HandInnov, CoWork, BioHealth, and AccessCity for the steering committee, (2) TechUni and SouthUni to cover the DIT board, (3) InnoFirm and DigiConnect to cover the strategic committee, and (4) UrbanEco, RegioGrant, and four additional actors to cover the general assembly. These additional actors included a patient association, a research institute in digital innovation, the departmental chamber of commerce and industry, and a rehabilitation center. In total, this accounted for 11 non-profit actors and three for-profit actors. To collect the posts, we created our own scraping program as existing tools found on the internet were paid software for marketing or recruitment purposes. Our program automatically collected the number of likes and comments, the date, and the author of the posts. The DIT admin was informed of this and agreed with the collection process beforehand. The scraping process generated an exportable Excel file per actor, yielding 3,758 posts in total. To retain only the relevant posts about the DIT ecosystem, we read them and conducted a keyword search for verification, using the words "DIT", "Disability Innovation Territory", "disability", "#dit", and "CoWork". Applying these criteria, we were left with 248 relevant posts.

We complemented this data set with various sources. The participants sent internal documentation during or after the interviews. As we progressed with the early data analysis, we contacted the DIT admin and requested additional documents to confirm (or not) our understanding of the DIT management structure. Online articles were collected on the website of the interviewed actors. They provided us with contextual information and an external perspective on the emergence and management of the DIT ecosystem. Moreover, we read a book retracing the 100-year history of HandInnov and 16 testimonies from former patients and professionals. Finally, we attended the online inauguration of CoWork in February 2022.

## Data analysis
We began by uploading the data set in NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software, to proceed with an inductive coding process. We searched for evidence that explained how shared management unfolded in the DIT ecosystem and enabled collective hybridity. These grounded first-order codes were then gathered into themes, which gave way to aggregates at a more abstract level. One author was mainly involved in coding the data and frequently exchanged with the other authors to validate, complement, or refute interpretations. After several iterations and discussions, our analysis yielded nine themes and three aggregates: (1) Managing for social impact, (2) Managing for profitability, and (3) Maintaining collective hybridity.

In addition, we followed an insider-outsider approach to data analysis (Louis & Bartunek, 1992). One author of this paper was a complete member researcher (Adler & Adler, 1987), as he was part of the ecosystem studied, actively participated in its emergence, and belonged to multiple governance bodies. The three other authors adopted an outsider stance, did not participate in ecosystem management, and did not conduct explicit interventions to influence the ecosystem. With this approach, we were able to complement the outsider researchers' interpretations with insights from the field that only an insider researcher could provide. However, to reduce biases, we limited the involvement of the insider research to the validation of the analysis made by the three outsider researchers. The former participated indirectly in data collection by providing the latter with rich and valuable insights from within. Eventually, we presented the final analysis to the insider researcher and other members of the DIT ecosystem to ensure a truthful account of shared management in the ecosystem.

## FINDINGS

Our analysis revealed that ecosystem actors maintained collective hybridity through a dual management structure to realize both social impact and profitability. This duality produced three elements central to collective hybridity, namely cross-interest collaborations, balance, and mutual control. Furthermore, these elements interacted to maintain a careful balance between social impact and profitability over time, sustaining collective hybridity (see Table 4).

<table><caption>**Table 4.** A dual management structure to maintain collective hybridity</caption><thead><tr><th>Managing social impact</th><th>Maintaining collective hybridity</th><th>Managing profitability</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Creating a common ground to align actors</td><td>Cross-interest collaborations<br>Sustain ↑ &amp; Enable ↓</td><td>Framing activities to align actors</td></tr><tr><td>Asserting the ecosystem's social impact</td><td>Balance<br>↓</td><td>Asserting the ecosystem profitability</td></tr><tr><td>Controlling social performance</td><td>Require ↑ &amp; Maintain ↓<br>Mutual control</td><td>Controlling economic performance</td></tr></tbody></table>

### Managing social impact
The main goal of the DIT ecosystem was to achieve a positive social impact for people with a disability. This ambition called for collaborations between DIT actors to combine their resources and knowledge and build a common ground. Ultimately, they developed trustful relationships that enabled them to manage the ecosystem and assert its social impact through informal practices.

## Creating a common ground to align actors

Early in our analysis, we were struck by the proximity of ecosystem actors and their ability to share information freely with each other. During each DIT board meeting, the seven axis managers presented their projects' progress, which they called "*the state of play of each axis*". Reviewing projects was a constant item on the agenda, enabling actors to "*have visibility on what is being done*", as stated by BioHealth's project manager for e-health (Axis 4 manager). Actors presented similar reviews of the 61 projects during the general assembly to foster mutual acquaintances, interactions, and potential knowledge exchange between members.

As all ecosystem actors were not present at all meetings, they promptly updated each other on their content and past decisions. We observed that actors did not hesitate to ask for a debrief of meetings they did not attend or spontaneously informed others of important decisions. The presence of multiple actors in multiple governance bodies facilitated information sharing. For instance, AccessCity's DIT admin belonged to all governance bodies, playing a key role in relaying information and ensuring a common set of knowledge across governance bodies. Similarly, CoWork's part-time technical director sat on the steering committee and was also the manager for Axis 3 under his part-time engineer position at HandInnov.

The DIT admin actively participated in aligning actors. She ensured that everyone had the necessary information to understand the topics discussed and, if not, provided explanations. For instance, when the Axis 5 manager presented his project reviews, the DIT admin interrupted him to remind all actors of Axis 5's main goals, ensuring they could understand the stakes of the projects discussed. Other actors frequently asked questions and helped each other retrieve information when confusion arose. Moreover, the DIT admin sent meeting minutes to everyone, participating in creating common ground among actors.

Finally, ecosystem actors strived to foster connections with each other by collaborating across axes and governance bodies. For example, all Axis managers brainstormed and collectively participated in finding solutions to issues on an Axis 1 project. This showed that all actors on the DIT board had previously shared the necessary knowledge and updates on the project to tackle issues of the axis. Actors also paid attention to maintaining connections across governance bodies, as illustrated by the DIT admin:

> "We are about to start thematic workshops, where we identified cross-cutting themes that could interest the members and encourage them to work together and share the content of their projects. They might have common issues that can create and encourage collaborations outside of those that we have identified. So, we will be testing these workshops in March, and we will find new formats in the future to promote this mutual knowledge."

The need for connectivity also emerged from the axis managers, who addressed the topic during a DIT board meeting. They requested more "*transversal meetings, rather than a review axis per axis*" (Axis 7 manager) to prevent the creation of silos.

## Asserting the ecosystem's social impact
Through their activities, DIT actors asserted the social impact of the ecosystem. The four founders most often communicated about the DIT's local social impact on LinkedIn, using tags related to #inclusion, #region, and #disability. A word frequency analysis in NVivo showed that the most frequently used words by HandInnov, BioHealth, AccessCity, and CoWork in their LinkedIn posts on DIT included 332 mentions of "disability" and 234 mentions of "innovation" across 85 posts. This represented 65% and 87% of the mentions of these words in the posts by all actors, respectively.

Reaffirming the social impact of the ecosystem was necessary when tackling issues of different projects. During one DIT board meeting, as actors drifted toward economic discussions on a project's financing, the Axis 3 manager reminded everyone of the initial social goal of the project and its assessment criteria in terms of social impact. Similarly, the DIT admin reminded all axis managers to mention the positive impact of their projects on people with a disability and their social contribution to the ecosystem when writing their final reports.

DIT actors also ensured the social impact would endure by sensing opportunities and imagining the ecosystem's future. As explained by HandInnov's former engineer and member of the steering committee:

> "We worked on [next year]'s action plan, so we reviewed what we had done, the strengths and weaknesses, and what needed improvement. From there, we established an action plan. For example, creating more links between partners appeared to be important. [...] What else... Reviewing the projects as well. We have two members: one stopped, and the other did not receive additional funding for its project. So, now the idea is to reuse the available funds, decide by whom, and for what purpose."

During various meetings, actors regularly identified opportunities to deploy ecosystem projects at a larger scale or pursue them in the long term. They also identified potential threats that could hinder the realization of projects' social impact. For example, the Axis 6 manager warned against the potential wariness of organizations to welcome trainees enrolled in a new educational program on disability. In this case, all actors brainstormed solutions and best practices to support the construction of the new program.

## Controlling social performance through informal practice

The brainstorming sessions hinted at informal practices to control the social impact of the ecosystem. HandInnov's part-time engineer testified that "decision-making has always been by consensus. We always manage to find a way to discuss, and everyone has free expression. We are flattened: it's one man/one vote". Such informal practices were mostly present on the steering committee and DIT board. These governance bodies combined included eight non-profit actors and only one for-profit actor, CoWork. Hence, non-profit actors already shared values and practices, facilitating trust and enabling informal decision-making.

Furthermore, actors co-defined several performance criteria to assess the social impact of the ecosystem, such as an evaluation of the situation of people with a disability on the territory, the evolution of accessible accommodation, and the education, employment, and inclusion of people with a disability. This assessment combined quantitative and qualitative methods to measure the concrete impact of DIT projects on citizens' lives.

## Managing profitability
The DIT ecosystem strived to achieve a social impact, but also to fulfil economic goals and develop a profitable disability sector. This ambition aimed to maintain the ecosystem's activities in the long term, particularly once the initial public funding ends.

## Framing activities to align actors

Managing profitability required actors to align their activities with internal and external obligations. Internal rules pertained to deadlines and plans set by the DIT admin and within governance bodies. As explained by the DIT admin:

> "We must provision for the budget of [AccessCity] so that the payments [to projects] are made correctly on time. This is a large part of administrative and financial management that is hidden in the ecosystem but does exist. It is like the skeleton of the ecosystem."

Our observational notes included frequent references to deadlines and pre-defined calendars with which to comply. The heterogeneity of actors involved in the management structure and their interdependence required careful ordering of actions and decision-making. The DIT admin kept reminding actors of the following meetings and assigned them tasks to fulfill by then. Axis managers also framed their activities in terms of clear deadlines, which they sometimes imposed on other actors when feedback was needed. The Axis 5 manager explained:

> "Axis managers do not write the technical or financial reports of the projects. However, they attend the DIT board and are responsible for gathering and ensuring that these documents are submitted on time. There is a proofreading phase of the technical documents to identify the progress of the project and whether everything complies with the calendar, that is, whether we are at the start or end of the project, as everything is very structured. We work with semesters, and we know that in this semester of that year, the project must begin, and in this semester of that year, it must end. So, depending on the technical reports, we can see if we are meeting the deadlines, if we will be late, or if we are ahead of schedule."

Actors collaborated to prepare for meetings with the financers to secure their support and reassure them about the ecosystem's progress. The steering committee drafted the agenda and content of these meetings, which was then reviewed by the DIT board. For instance, the steering committee discussed what they should highlight when reviewing axes, whether they should mention some of the projects' issues, and how to bring it to the financers. Similarly, for strategic committee meetings, which gathered for-profit actors, the DIT admin chose to emphasize quantitative criteria and successes to show the concrete impacts of the ecosystem.

Additionally, the ecosystem received public funding and had to comply with rules from the financers, namely the State, RegioGrant, and the public bank. The DIT admin outlined these rules:

> "As funds are made available to the projects, we need to review their finances and comply with some criteria since it is public money. For example, the criteria of public markets. It is an obligation. So, all projects can submit these documents on a shared platform, along with their technical reports and answers to the performance criteria, allowing us to assess the project quantitatively and qualitatively."

The governance bodies had to ensure that all projects fulfilled their documents in time and that they had enough time to review these documents together. Such deadlines were mainly at play when actors prepared the ending of a project. Indeed, if the DIT admin failed to submit the required documents in time to the financers, the project could not close its activities properly and would need to wait an additional six months to do so. These external rules by financers hence framed the activities of the governance bodies.
## Asserting the ecosystem profitability

While the social impact of the ecosystem was made most prominent, DIT actors also emphasized the ecosystem profitability goals. The creation of Cowork openly displayed the economic ambition of the ecosystem. Created by HandInnov, BioHealth, and AccessCity, all non-profit actors, CoWork was established as a disability innovation company and for-profit actor. In hindsight, CoWork itself hosted hybridity in its activities, i.e., supporting innovators in developing solutions for people with a disability while ensuring their commercialization and profitability over time. CoWork offered paid services to individuals, start-ups, or larger organizations to guide them through the regulations and specificities of disability innovation. It gave the ecosystem access to companies and local economic actors. Every year, it organized the “Start-up & Disabilities” competition to reward innovative start-ups and entrepreneurs developing solutions to improve the lives of people with a disability. This competition contributed indirectly to the ecosystem ambitions to create a disability economy in the region.

Moreover, DIT actors tried to seize opportunities to connect with companies. For instance, the DIT ecosystem organized the “Disability month” every year in November, for DIT actors, external organizations, companies, and the general public. The program for the 2024 edition included timeslots for job dating with companies, technologies exhibitions, and disability innovation workshops. An assessment of the event by AccessCity’s communication manager revealed that 57% of the activities organized were meant for professionals. DIT actors also looked for ways to maintain ecosystem profitability over time. The founders created CoWork to sustain the ecosystem without relying on public funds, as explained by the venture capital investment officer at the public bank:

> “[CoWork] is a structure that supports the realization of [DIT] projects, and that potentially becomes able to ensure that the projects’ results can be perpetuated in products or services that can be commercialized or reused in other regions. I think this is the main challenge of [CoWork]. It is a center of expertise that supports projects so that they are realized efficiently and defines how to capitalize on the projects’ results. Then, once projects are done, they create an economic lever for the region or an economic lever for France, and Cowork helps deploy their solutions in other regions.”

The strategic committee often tackled questions related to the future of the ecosystem. For instance, during a meeting at the end of the year 2023, actors in the strategic committee collaboratively identified possible improvements for 2024. These actions included structuring better communication and dissemination of the DIT projects, highlighting relevant results and collaboration with CoWork, guiding the sustainability of the innovations produced, and reinforcing the assessment process of the ecosystem.

## Controlling economic performance through formal practices

The emphasis on economic ambitions was reflected in the performance criteria of the ecosystem. One of the four assessment themes included criteria to measure the “economy and innovation related to disability”, as UrbanEco often communicated on LinkedIn. This actor also put forth the economic aspect of the ecosystem in their online posts, showing that the ecosystem worked on disability “while promoting the economic attractiveness of the territory”.

Assessing the ecosystem performance involved an evaluation of the projects' progress and financial status. AccessCity was responsible for distributing the funds, and the DIT board controlled the use of the budget according to public obligations. The DIT board members also wrote a progress report together, published in 2022 and made public on the ecosystem website. This 85-page report assessed the impact achieved by each axis, both in terms of social and economic implications and
their perspectives for the following year. Such an assessment served to write reports to financers, who controlled the ecosystem's progress according to a pre-defined calendar. AccessCity's local representative, a member of the strategic committee, explained:

> "We must be accountable to the [public bank] and to the State in general to justify the funding we receive. And show that what is done and spent produces the desired and expected effects. So, we have a whole series of evaluations to conduct to report regularly to the financers. There are meetings every year, every 6 months even."

Decisions about the ecosystem's profitability were discussed during the strategic committee meetings or general assemblies. Combined, these governance bodies gathered eight for-profit actors in the ecosystem governance. In comparison, the steering committee and DIT board included only one for-profit actor, CoWork, which is also strongly oriented towards social impact. Hence, actors in the strategic committee and general assembly tended to make decisions more formally. For instance, decisions required to reach a sufficient quorum and were made through formal voting procedures with the options of supporting, disapproving, or abstaining.

## Maintaining collective hybridity

DIT actors adopted a dual structure to manage the ecosystem's social impact and profitability. As the four governance bodies conducted activities for both goals, the DIT actors were able to manage the hybrid value-creation activities of the ecosystem. Particularly, ecosystem actors' alignment within and across governance bodies led them to collaborate despite their divergent interests. Their efforts to assert both DIT's social impact and profitability supported a balance between both goals. Finally, their control activities of social and economic performance fostered mutual control, thus creating a sense of accountability.

## Cross-interest collaborations

DIT actors aligned their management activities by creating common ground and framing them around deadlines and rules. This alignment enabled the DIT admin to tackle similar topics across governance bodies, which indirectly collaborated to craft meeting agendas and contents. For instance, the organization of the general assembly, its agenda, and program were elaborated over four months during six steering committee meetings and three DIT board meetings. By collaborating to define the content of other governance bodies' meetings, actors could add their topics to the agenda, hence ensuring their interests would be represented.

We also found several instances of collaboration between for- and non-profit actors, who integrated their different interests to achieve collective hybridity. When CoWork promoted its "Start-up & Disabilities" competition on LinkedIn, BioHealth, AccessCity, the chamber of commerce, and UrbanEco reposted and promoted the event themselves. Hence, four non-profit actors promoted the activities of a for-profit actor, crossing their interests for the sake of the DIT ecosystem. Similar collaborations were set between ecosystem actors and members of the consultative committees, particularly the users. Their involvement raised the question of paid versus voluntary implications of users who contribute their expertise to the development of disability innovation. The topic was tackled during a DIT board meeting by CoWork's director and during an interview with HandInnov's former director:

> "Integrating users as peer helpers or experts, with different statuses, employees, or interns, requires dialogue and clarity. For example, I went to a conference with someone who volunteered, but his commitment was such that he worked more than the employees. So, I thought, if we need him permanently, we cannot just exploit his knowledge; there must be status, even in terms of
insurance. So, we dug into these subjects, and we are working on his employment contract, which
is super interesting. It also shakes up colleagues who may be sensitive to disability because many
questions arise about how we cooperate."

These cross-interest collaborations enabled actors to achieve a balance between the ecosystem's social impact and profitability. Furthermore, DIT actors ensured these collaborations remained by socializing new actors into the ecosystem. The DIT admin talked about the "educational work" that might be needed to explain the DIT ecosystem, its projects, and values to a new contact person at the public bank. The manager of Axis 5 testified of his own integration into the ecosystem:

"This was the meaning of my first [DIT board meeting] in September. I introduced myself, and I was sponsored by [the DIT admin], who guided us through all the projects of Axis 5. Another person came to support me because I could not explain all the projects yet. I had been there for 3 weeks and was still trying to understand the mechanics of [DIT]. [...] I was a little stressed for the first [DIT board meeting] because we reviewed the 15 projects of axis 5, and it was not easy the first time. But [the DIT admin] reassured me and said I would know the projects best. A priori, I have now more or less understood how [DIT] works."

A similar socializing process was followed when the manager of Axis 4 was replaced. The former Axis 4 manager and the current Axis 3 manager assisted the new manager in getting to know the ecosystem and the projects of her axis. In the first few meetings, the DIT admin ensured the new manager had the necessary information to participate in the brainstorming sessions, thus encouraging her to collaborate with other actors.

We argue that the alignment of DIT actors for managing the ecosystem's social impact and profitability supported collaborations despite their interests in for- and non-profit activities. Ultimately, these cross-interest collaborations enabled actors to balance social impact and profitability, thus participating in maintaining collective hybridity.

Balance

The actors' simultaneous assertion of the social impact and profitability of the ecosystem supported the achievement of a balance between both DIT actors displayed this collective hybridity on social media, participating in promoting both aspects equally. For instance, UrbanEco and CoWork used a combination of #innovation, #disability, and #business tags, and the Chamber of Commerce advanced the goal of "creating an entrepreneurial dynamic for a more inclusive society". CoWork embodied this hybridity the most, being itself a hybrid organization pursuing profitability while supporting the development of disability innovations. Its online posts emphasized its goal to "develop a local network of companies" to support innovation in the disability sector. It also promoted a PhD position to define economic models and tools for the medical devices of people with a disability. At the same time, it highlighted the ecosystem goal of making disability innovations widely available to benefit the most people.

Displaying collective hybridity implied representing the variety of actors involved. Each governance body combined for- and non-profit actors, who had an equal say in decision-making. While this governance mostly included organizations, the DIT admin ensured that individuals and patient associations had their place. During a DIT board meeting, she warned an axis manager of a lack of information on the work carried out with associations. We also observed this attention to represent all the actors involved during the organization of the general assembly. When choosing the topics of workshops and round tables of the general assembly, the DIT board members ensured all axes would be equally represented by tackling a specific topic for each of them. However, representing actors' variety could lead to confusion and blurred ecosystem goals. Hence, DIT actors
also ensured coherence to achieve a clear balance between the ecosystem goals. When preparing Axis presentations for the general assembly, the DIT admin insisted on maintaining coherence across axes. This meant avoiding presenting projects involving the same actors and presenting either new or well-underway projects.

On the one hand, this balance between the ecosystem's social impact and profitability further sustained the actors' cross-interest collaborations. The two elements reinforced each other, as collaborations across various actors enabled the achievement of a balance, which in turn maintained the need for these collaborations. On the other hand, achieving a balance required mutual control between actors to ensure that no for- or non-profit actors took all the credit, threatening to topple the balance towards social impact or profitability only.

## Mutual control

DIT actors exercised control over the ecosystem through informal and formal practices, generally by non-profit and for-profit actors, respectively. Moreover, actors mutually controlled their activities to maintain a balance between their social and economic interests.

The DIT admin played a key role in relaying information across governance bodies, allowing each actor to peer into the activities and decisions of others, ensuring a fit with their interests. This information flow was facilitated by an online shared platform, where actors could upload their progress and all relevant documents. The DIT admin then granted the relevant actors access to the online folders. Actors also used this platform as a medium to work collaboratively on presentations, meeting agendas, and documents. It was a landmark for all actors to find information. We regularly heard actors saying "it is on the platform anyway" when they shared updates or sought more details about the information shared.

Eventually, DIT actors controlled this communication and information flow between governance bodies through templates. The DIT admin took minutes in a template document, stating the presence or absence of actors, and for each topic, the decisions taken, the deadlines to follow, and who was involved. When communicating with the general assembly, the DIT board members had to prepare a one-slide presentation, giving them all the same speaking time. Moreover, these presentations were reviewed collectively in the DIT board and steering committee meetings, allowing actors to control the information communicated. The founders also controlled how actors communicated about the DIT ecosystem. For instance, they asked for access to the introduction speech AccessCity would give during the general assembly to ensure they would convey the right message to all ecosystem actors.

We identified another form of mutual control when DIT actors collectively reviewed the ecosystem performance. The DIT board and steering committee presented the ecosystem performance reports during the general assembly. These reports were based on co-defined criteria that assessed the ecosystem's social and economic performance. As the general assembly gathered for- and non-profit actors, presenting these reports during such meetings enabled actors to control the performance of one another. The DIT admin suggested drawing one summary of the overall performance of the ecosystem and one more detailed overview of its financial performance, both of which should be accessible to all actors.

The last form of mutual control resided in the decision-making path specific to the DIT ecosystem. Each decision required the approval of all actors within a governance body and across governance bodies, with the general assembly as the ultimate step. For instance, founders always agreed with each other on a decision before presenting their ideas to the DIT board, which would do the same before forwarding it to the strategic committee. HandInnov's former engineer, a member of the steering committee, explained why they worked this way:
"This happened once or twice at first, but not anymore, with communication problems. That is, one actor was communicating on one thing, and the other was communicating on another. There was no agreement, and it suddenly created interference. But we quickly discussed it and agreed it would always go through the [steering committee] before."

Similarly, when the Axis 4 manager changed, the steering committee first agreed on a person to take on the role. It then presented its ideas during a DIT board meeting, addressing some doubts and questions. Once an agreement was reached, the DIT admin submitted the proposition to the strategic committee and the extraordinary general assembly, organized specifically for that purpose. This step-by-step approval of all important decisions implied that each actor, for-or non-profit, had an opportunity to accept, refuse or modify the decision to ensure the consideration of his own interests. Ultimately, we argued that this mutual control balanced social impact and profitability, hence maintaining collective hybridity.

# DISCUSSION

Our research aimed at uncovering how actors share management activities to maintain collective hybridity in a social innovation ecosystem. We showed that actors did so through a dual management structure oriented towards the management of social impact and profitability. This duality produced cross-interest collaborations and mutual control, which enabled and sustained a balance between the ecosystem's social impact and profitability.

## Theoretical contributions

Our findings contribute to the recent social innovation ecosystem literature by exploring how such ecosystems share activities to maintain collective hybridity. The concept of shared and participatory management is not new in the ecosystem literature (Gupta et al., 2020; Lingens, Huber, et al., 2022). However, in the context of social innovation ecosystems, we find that it also enables the management of collective hybridity. Hybridity in ecosystems is a rising concept and implies that ecosystem actors pursue economic and social value-creation activities (Grabski-Walls & Ambos, 2024). Studying collective hybridity, Grabski-Walls & Ambos (2024) suggested a multi-level model between the organizational and national ecosystem level for managing the identity and resource tensions arising from hybridity. Our research complements these insights by analyzing the activities of ecosystem actors. We revealed a dual management structure, and the activities involved in managing an ecosystem's social impact and profitability. We also provide insights into how collective hybridity stems from this dual management structure and how actors manage it over time. Particularly, we show that cross-interest collaborations and mutual control help actors maintain a balance between social and economic value-creation activities.

Introduced about a decade ago (Cameron, 2012), social innovation ecosystems are increasingly studied by scholars due to their many specificities compared to the original business or innovation ecosystems. Scholars have begun identifying their characteristics (Kaletka et al., 2016; Pel et al., 2020), value creation (Roth et al., 2024), and capture (Pundziene et al., 2023) mechanisms. In line with this body of research, we contribute to a better understanding of the management of social innovation ecosystems. We show that actors share management activities with a dual management structure. Previous research hinted at the need for participatory and democratic governance (Catala et al., 2023; Pel et al., 2020; Terstriep et al., 2020) without exploring collective hybridity management explicitly. Hence, we provide empirical evidence for the relevance of shared management in ecosystems pursuing collective hybridity, such as social innovation ecosystems.
Finally, our study contributes to the ecosystem management literature by complementing the developing body of research on shared management. Past research identified the actors involved in shared management and their roles (Busch & Barkema, 2022; Lingens, Böger, et al., 2021; Pikkarainen et al., 2017). Scholars tried to characterize shared ecosystem management under terms such as multi-orchestration (Lingens, Huber, et al., 2022) or collective orchestration (Oskam et al., 2021). They also introduced new concepts such as ambidextrous governance (Altman et al., 2022) and transformative governance (Könnölä et al., 2021), suggesting the accommodation of social value in ecosystems pursuing economic goals. However, scholars provided little empirical evidence of actors' management activities for collective hybridity in ecosystems. Our research does so by analyzing the activities of actors in a social innovation ecosystem across four governance bodies. We provide an inside view of how actors share activities in a dual management structure. We also show that this duality enables the management of collective hybridity. Hence, we contribute to the ecosystem management literature by providing empirical evidence of shared management for ecosystem hybridity.

## Future research

Our analysis of a social innovation ecosystem shows that collective hybridity influences actors' management activities. It suggests that current conceptualizations of ecosystem management may not allow for the management of collective hybridity. Indeed, whether it is for focal or shared management, scholars have explored a single management structure. Yet, our research showed that a dual structure is required, hence calling for further research. Scholars could explore how dual management structures emerged and are implemented by ecosystem actors. They could adopt a longitudinal approach to understand the dynamics and evolution of this duality. For instance, it remains unclear whether ecosystem actors continuously focus on management for social impact and for profitability simultaneously or constantly shift between them. In essence, is duality achieved by actors' ability to handle divergent objectives or by their ability to switch their focus between social and economic objectives regularly?

This paper explores collective hybridity management in a social innovation ecosystem in the healthcare sector. However, collective hybridity may be found in other ecosystem types and sectors, which remain to be identified. Hence, future research could be conducted in social innovation ecosystems in different sectors to understand whether it influences the existence and management of collective hybridity. Indeed, healthcare, rooted in social values, gathers actors willing to contribute to society, which influences their activities. Studies of collective hybridity in social innovation ecosystems evolving in the tourism or food-processing industries could complement our findings. Moreover, scholars have yet to identify other ecosystem types in which actors pursue collective hybridity. Traditional ecosystems such as business, innovation, entrepreneurial, and knowledge ecosystems could be reviewed in light of hybridity to identify manifestations of collective hybridity.

Additionally, the dual management structure introduced in this paper implies cross-interest collaborations and mutual control between ecosystem actors. While we advanced these elements, we do not explore the power interplays and tensions that arise from them. Thus, future research could analyze the interactions between actors in a dual management structure. A longitudinal approach could reveal whether some actors become more powerful over time, hence influencing the weight of their decisions, and the activities and behaviors of other actors.

Finally, our insights open avenues for research on collective hybridity to tackle grand challenges. A single actor cannot solve these challenges, which require collective action to answer societal issues (George et al., 2016). However, sustainable solutions also require economic profitability to maintain activities. Hence, we argue that maintaining collective hybridity in ecosystems can be a relevant
answer to grand challenges. Ritala (2023) and Grabski-Walls and Ambos (2024) have started
exploring the role of ecosystems in addressing grand challenges. A better understanding of collective
hybridity, how it emerges, is maintained, and managed could contribute to this emerging body of
literature, enhancing the practical and societal relevance of academic research in helping to solve (or
mitigate) grand challenges.

Practical implications

For managers in social innovation ecosystems, being part of a dual management structure requires collaboration. As our case study showed, social innovation ecosystems host heterogeneous actors with divergent interests from the for- and non-profit sectors. Collaborating to maintain collective hybridity in ecosystems thus requires them to be open to ideas that may not align with their main activities and values. Managers from non-profit organizations may have to develop skills and a language that for-profit managers understand for effective collaboration, and vice versa. If not, tensions may arise and threaten the careful balance between social and economic value creation. Hence, managers may draw on our findings to develop a mutual understanding of each other's activities. They can prepare for eventual cross-interest collaborations and learn what it means to manage an ecosystem for both objectives.

Our paper also advises policymakers not to typecast ecosystems but to better understand their goals and value-creation activities before regulating them. Indeed, ecosystems pursuing social, economic, or hybrid value-creation activities will need different types of support to thrive. As our case study showed, current regulations tend to ask for reports and economic performance, thus casting aside the social aspects. We recommend that policymakers integrate social impact criteria in their assessment of ecosystems, even more so considering the potentiality of ecosystems to tackle grand challenges. Moreover, policymakers tend to endorse ecosystems through investments and funds, hence addressing their economic aspects. We believe that social innovation ecosystems might benefit more from regulations that support their legitimation and flexibility.
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