five-day-eruption, and OVK had to deny three rumours spread through the media. A disaster communication handbook for journalists was conceived after the 2006 eruption, based on the DFID handbook (2003).

The abnormally high number of interlocutors was difficult to manage for the OVK team, showing that the theoretical procedures described in the “Karthala Plan”, 37-page appendix to PNPRU [National Emergency Preparation and Response Plan (Union des Comores 2004)], were not known. In fact, PNPRU has not been widely disseminated or updated since it was created in 2004. For example, in 2006, it did not contain the updated phone numbers of main risk management stakeholders. Moreover, due to Comoros’ colonial past, PNPRU is modelled on French plans without taking into account island contexts. Its operational specification sheets are not necessary adapted to the traditional oral cultural context in Comoros for dealing with locals during a crisis (Morin et al. 2009). Warning dissemination and general information, for example, could rely more on the active local religious networks and non-profit organizations.

Paradoxically, because the monitoring network was still out of order, and despite its team already being overwhelmed, OVK had no other solution than to ask, through a media announcement, that the inhabitants deliver to OVK any testimony about seismicity or suspected volcanic activity. In response, inhabitants made dozens of phone calls to report felt phenomenon (e.g. smells and seismicity) and new “eruptive activity” (most of the time, bushfires). Calls peaked from May 30 to June 1 as earthquakes were felt in the Bahani area, a few kilometres north of Moroni.

The main difficulties in volcanic crisis communication on Grande Comore are mainly due to Comoros being a poor, small, remote island country. The small population implies difficulties in finding local experts in all fields, so that volcanic monitoring and understanding relies on foreign researchers from La Réunion and

mainland France. The whole territory is threatened by volcanic hazards while communication networks are very weak. OVK’s inability to provide information, the inhabitants’ and authorities’ lack of preparedness, and the alarmist news disseminated by the media are amongst main weaknesses, leading to a failure of crisis management and crisis communication on Grande Comore during the last volcanic crises.

## 4 Case Study 3: Fogo Volcano, Cape Verde, Atlantic Ocean

Fogo volcano and island, within the Cape Verde archipelago of hotspot volcanism, lie approximately 600–800 km west of Senegal in Africa. Fogo Island is around 30 km in diameter and is formed entirely of the large stratovolcano of Fogo, which rises 2829 m above sea level and is the most prominent and only historically active volcano in Cape Verde. An approximately 9-km wide lateral collapse structure dominates the island, and is open to the east with very steep headwalls of up to 1 km (Fig. 4; Day et al. 1999). The central cone of Pico do Fogo rises more than 1 km above the partially infilled collapse scar and is home to ‘Chã das Caldeiras’ residents. One of the major hazards for Chã residents, aside from drought and a lack of basic services, is rockfalls from the steep headwalls; more direct volcanic eruption hazards (Fig. 5) have typically been of lesser concern.

Historical accounts indicate that Fogo volcano experienced regular eruptions during the early stages of Portuguese settlement (Fonseca et al. 2003) and that the summit cone of Pico do Fogo last erupted in 1680, producing large ash falls that rendered agricultural lands temporarily unusable and triggered mass emigration from the island (Ribeiro 1960). Recent activity has been more subdued with direct experience restricted to the effusive eruptions of 1951, 1995, and 2014–2015 that occurred from subsidiary flank vents and fissures near the base of Pico (Faria and Fonseca 2014).
<figure><img src="image_131.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5** Location of Fogo Island in the Cape Verde archipelago, with inset: provisional volcanic hazard map for a large explosive eruption similar to the 1680 event (Day 2009)</figcaption></figure>

Official maps outlining potential future volcanic hazards are not publicly available for Fogo; however, Day and Faria (2009) identify three preliminary scenarios in an outline hazard analysis: (1) A continuation of post-1785 effusive activity on volcanic fissures within Chã das Caldeiras; (2) More intense and frequent fissure eruptions similar to those during the 17th and 18th centuries; and (3) A large explosive eruption from the summit of Pico do Fogo as in 1680 (Fig. 4). Additionally, the neighbouring island of Brava, 20 km to the west of Fogo shows geological evidence of Plinian volcanism and, in certain wind conditions, large eruptions from Brava may be expected to deposit significant ash falls on Fogo Island (Jenkins et al. 2014).

Communication of the volcanic hazard and risk on Fogo Island consists predominantly of top-down approaches supported by local monitoring institutions and the army-led National Civil Protection Service (SNPC), which was formed after the eruption in 1995. At the time of the 1995 eruption, Chã das Caldeiras was home to approximately 1,300 people in three villages; prior to the 2014 eruption, this number was estimated at nearly 1,500 (Global Volcanism Program 2014). A further 11,000 people in a number of villages on the steep eastern flanks of Fogo are exposed to overspilling flows.

Following intermittent, felt earthquakes through late March and early April 1995 at Fogo, a fissure eruption began on the night of 2–3 April
1995. Lava fountaining and associated flows cut off the main road into Chã and over the next week lava flows destroyed a village, water reservoir and a few square kilometres of fertile agricultural land (Fig. 6a). On 8 April, remaining residents were ordered to evacuate the Chã das Caldeiras or face arrest (Bulletin of the Global

Volcanism Network 1995). The eruption ended around 28 May 1995 and in the years that followed communities and associated services such as health and education were permanently relocated outside of the collapse scar.

Within two years, Chã had been repopulated and prior to the 2014–2015 eruption was home to

<figure><img src="image_132.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 6** a A 2009 NASA Earth Observatory satellite image of Chã das Caldeiras showing the remaining villages and the extent of the 1995 lava flows; b 1995 permanent relocation sites within the red outline in the</figcaption></figure>

<caption>village of Achada Fuma (image Google Earth); c A building within the now partly abandoned relocation site (photo S. Jenkins)</caption>
around 800 people with most of the population living in Portela and Bangeira (Fig. 6a), as well as a burgeoning wine and tourism industry (Jenkins et al. 2014). The failure of people to permanently relocate following the 1995 eruption is attributed to the close social and economic ties that Chã residents have to their place of origin and because of unsuitable relocation sites that lacked sustainable sources for livelihood. Relocation sites, subsidised by the German government, were positioned outside of the collapse scar in areas of relatively low hazard to the south of the island; however, they provided very small living quarters and limited-to-no agricultural land (Fig. 6b, c). For the family-centred communities for whom farming was the main source of livelihoods for sustenance and trade, these sites offered an unviable alternative to Chã das Caldeiras (Fig. 7).

From November 2014 to February 2015, Fogo produced another effusive eruption similar to that of 1995. The eruption produced explosions and ash emissions, lava fountains and fast-moving lava flows moving up to 20 km/hour). All of the Chã residents were evacuated with lava flows

destroying more than 90 % of the main villages, Portela and Bangeira, a large area of agricultural land, communication poles and the only road into the area (Fig. 5). Intermittent ash explosions dispersed and deposited ash in the main city of São Filipe and across agricultural crops on the island; the airport and tourism industry were also impacted. As of writing, it is unclear if Chã residents will be able to return, but near-complete reconstruction would be required to enable repopulation of Chã.

One of the key issues facing risk communication on Fogo appears to be prioritising concerns about livelihoods for the affected communities. On Fogo, eruptions are not the major concern for at-risk communities; populations are more concerned with a lack of basic services, drought, and associated food shortages. The implementation of Fogo National Park in 2003, which aimed to protect the natural environment and regulate tourism through land-use and livestock restrictions, caused conflict between authorities and Chã residents who claimed that their livelihoods were adversely affected by such restrictions (Texier-Teixeira et al. 2013).

<figure><img src="image_133.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7** Annotated photograph of December 2014 lava flows that buried Portela village. The view is looking approximately due South with Pico do Fogo to the left of</figcaption></figure>

the image and the steep collapse scar walls to the right. (Photo S. Jenkins)
More recent risk communication efforts by the authorities have included evacuation and communication exercises with a community-based focus. They have been carried out by SNPC and one of the local monitoring institutions, the National Institute of Meteorology and Geophysics, with partial support from the Italian Civil Protection and MIA-VITA (a European research project). Unfortunately, the exercises found that tour guides, women, and farmers, some of the most important groups in Chã das Caldeiras, were difficult to engage with the exercises and decision-making (Texier-Teixeira et al. 2013). Future volcanic risk management and communication therefore needs to first address socio-economic vulnerabilities and priorities in order to carry out fully successful risk reduction measures. The government of Cape Verde currently has plans to create a local Fogo civil protection agency to allow for more community-based activities, although this is not yet operational.

The 2014–2015 eruption and the destruction of villages within Chã may have changed the way volcanic hazard and risk at Fogo are communicated from that suggested by the pre-eruption studies. Future studies should investigate.

# 5 Risk and Crisis Communication for Island Communities

Island communities are frequently portrayed as being tight-knit with few people being strangers to each other, suggesting the potential that crisis response is more efficient because information travels quickly, people trust each other, and social structures are more nimble. The three case studies demonstrate that plenty of truth exists in such assumptions, but that does not necessarily ease the situation. Instead, as always with risk- and disaster-related communication and knowledge-policy interfaces, multi-faceted layers intertwine and information flow is not a linear, predictable process (Barclay et al. 2008; Gaillard and Mercer 2013; Weichselgartner 2003).

In all three cases presented here, it was not possible to reach a common denominator and

representation and perception of what a volcanic eruption is, what are the associated risks, what are the timescales of volcanic processes and the necessary timescales of risk prevention policies, and what exactly is happening and could happen in the particular situation under question. The media's role was particularly poignant, with difficulties often resulting for the scientists because the media and scientists did not have a trusting relationship. Particularly in small communities, it is important to avoid viewing the media as a separate or hostile entity, but instead to work them so that their needs are met but reports are accurate and informative. The relationship cannot be built during a crisis, but must start immediately so that all parties involved have already built an understanding of needs when the crisis emerges (see also Barclay et al. 2008; DFID 2003). The communication challenges can further be overcome through expanding the capacity and responsibility of the scientific community to explain its paradigms, its methodologies, different types of uncertainty (epistemic and aleatory), and the limitations to and for different audiences, namely the authorities, decision-makers, crisis responders, economic actors, the public, and the media.

An example from Guadeloupe aiming to do so is the widespread public dissemination of a monthly activity bulletin by the Observatoire Volcanologique et Sismologique de Guadeloupe (OVSG-IPGP) that was launched in 1999 and has continued ever since (http://www.ipgp.fr/fr/ovsg/bulletins-mensuels-de-lovsg; http://www.ipgp.fr/fr/ovsg/actualites-ovsg). A tri-monthly similar bulletin is issued by the Observatoire Volcanologique et Sismologique de Martinique (http://www.ipgp.fr/fr/ovsm/bilans-trimestriels-de-lovsm). It would be useful to enact studies to determine the reach of these bulletins and the understanding by and interest of those who read them. What information and styles could the bulletins include which would appeal to a wider readership and ensure that uptake of the information is increased? Such work will enhance participatory science, as with the media establishing a baseline and trust before an emergency so that crisis communication should be smoother and more widely accepted.
As well, as science evolves, new scientific approaches could assist in better integrating different sectors into volcanic crisis communication processes. Again from Guadeloupe, a recent retrospective Bayesian Belief Network analysis of the unrest of La Soufrière volcano in 1976 (Hincks et al. 2014; Komorowski et al. 2015) demonstrates that a formal evidence-based case could have been made to support the authorities' concerns about public safety and the decision to evacuate in 1976. Development of such novel probabilistic formalism for decision-making could help to reduce scientific uncertainty and better assist public officials in making urgent evacuation decisions or policy choices (Woo 2011) should the mild but sustained and slightly increasing seismic and fumarolic unrest that began in 1992, and further developed in 1998, evolve into renewed eruptive activity (OVSG-IPGP 2015; Villemant et al. 2014; Allard et al. 2014).

Yet the case studies demonstrate the intensity of politics that manifests in these instances—perhaps because of, rather than despite, the smallness and tightness of the communities, amongst other island characteristics. Consequently, improved information and less uncertainty do not straightforwardly lead to better communication or more harmonious acceptance of decision-making processes and of decisions. One fundamental point is the need to engage with —not just consult—local populations regarding risk communication and decision-making, tailoring messages to the various audiences, and being clear regarding what is known and not known, plus what is feasible to do to fill in knowledge gaps to support decisions. Activities to engage citizens in the science emerged to a large degree in the three case studies, suggesting that further possibilities be investigated, based on literature and past work in this area (e.g. Cadag and Gaillard 2012; DFID 2003; Kelman et al. 2015; Mercer and Kelman 2010; Texier-Teixeira et al. 2013). Examples of activities are collecting data, mapping exposure and vulnerability, assisting with communication, and organising town hall meetings between scientists and citizens—all of which should happen before a crisis so that a crisis simply continues this work and the

long-standing relationships, rather than starting anew during the most difficult time period. Methods exist for melding knowledge forms to ensure that local knowledge and non-local knowledge are treated equally, helping to garner respect and turn information conveyance into information exchange (Mercer et al. 2009)—a process implemented for a volcanic crisis in Papua New Guinea (Mercer et al. 2010).

Ultimately, this becomes a collaboration with communities to ensure that no party or knowledge dominates, but instead information is exchanged leading to decisions and decision-making processes which are better understood and accepted by all who are involved. That is, living with volcanic risk means working with communities on their terms.

**Acknowledgements** We would like to thank first and foremost the communities and authorities on the three case-study islands, who have supported studies of volcanic hazard and risk communication and perception on the islands. SFJ would like to thank João Fonseca, Bruno Faria and Simon Day and colleagues at the Laboratory for Civil Engineering of Cape Verde for providing information and field support at Fogo volcano. The work presented in this chapter was supported by the CASAVA Project (Agence Nationale pour la Recherche, ANR-09-RISK-02: JCK), the MIAVITA Project (EU FP7-ENV contract 211393: SFJ) and an AXA Research Fund fellowship (SFJ). JCK is grateful for stimulating and insightful discussions with M. Devès, F. Beauducel, T. Hincks, W. Aspinal, F. Leone, D. Grancher, M. Redon, M. Chenet and the participants of the CASAVA Consortium. JM is grateful to Patrick Bachèlery, Anthony Finizola, Nicolas Villeneuve, Magali Smietana and Hamidou Nassor from La Réunion Island University, Christopher Gomez from Christchurch University, Hamid Soule from OVK, and the AMISEC forces for their logistic support on Karthala volcano. We gratefully acknowledge the editors who invited us to contribute to this volume. This is IPGP contribution 3695.

**Open Access** This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, duplication, adaptation, distribution, and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, a link is provided to the Creative Commons license, and any changes made are indicated. The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in the work's Creative
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# Investigating the Management of Geological Hazards and Risks in the Mt Cameroon Area Using Focus Group Discussions

Mary-Ann del Marmol, Karen Fontijn, Mary Atanga, Steve Njome, George Mafany, Aaron Tening, Mabel Nechia Wantim, Beatrice Fonge, Vivian Bih Che, Aka Festus, Gerald G. J. Ernst, Emmanuel Suh, Patric Jacobs and Matthieu Kervyn

## Abstract

The scientific evaluation of hazards and risks remains a primary concern in poorly known volcanic regions. The use of such information to develop an effective risk management structure and risk reduction actions however also poses important challenges. We here present the results of a series of focus group discussions (FGDs) organised with city councillors from three municipalities around Mt Cameroon volcano, Cameroon. The Mt Cameroon area is a volcanically and tectonically active region regularly affected in the historical past by lava flows, landslides and earthquake swarms, and has a potential for crater lake outgassing. The lower flanks of the volcano are densely populated and the site of intense economic development. The FGDs were aimed at the elicitation of (1) the knowledge and perception of geological hazards, (2) the state of preparedness and the implementation of mitigation and prevention actions by the municipalities, (3) the evaluation of the effectiveness of the structure of communication channels established to respond to emergency situations, and (4) the recovery from an emergency. In all three municipalities stakeholders had good knowledge of the risks, except for

M.-A. del Marmol (✉) · K. Fontijn · G. G. J. Ernst · P. Jacobs
Department of Geology, Ghent University, Krijgslaan 281/S8, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
e-mail: jp.m.malingreau@gmail.com

K. Fontijn
Department of Earth Sciences, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3AN, UK

S. Njome · G. Mafany · A. Tening · M. N. Wantim · B. Fonge · V. B. Che · A. Festus · E. Suh
Department of Geology and Environmental Science, University of Buea, P.O. Box 63, Buea, Cameroon

Advts in Volcanology (2018) 373–394
https://doi.org/10.1007/11157_2017_3

© The Author(s) 2017

Published Online: 12 April 2017

M. Atanga
Department of Nursing, University of Bamenda, P.O. Box 39, Bambili, NW Region, Bamenda, Cameroon

G. Mafany · A. Festus
Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation, Institut de Recherches Géologiques et Minières, BP 4110 Yaounde, Cameroon

M. Kervyn
Department of Geography, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
processes never experienced in the region. They generally grasped the causes of landslides or floods but were less familiar with volcano-tectonic processes. Stakeholders identified the lack of strategic planning to monitor hazards and mitigate their impacts as a major weakness, requesting additional education and scientific support. Response to natural hazards is mostly based on informal communication channels and is supported by a high level of trust between local scientists, decision makers and the population. Actions are taken to raise awareness and implement basic mitigation and prevention actions, based on the willingness of local political leaders. The strong centralisation of the risk management process at the national level and the lack of political and financial means at the local level are major limitations in the implementation of an effective risk management strategy adapted to local risk conditions. Our case study highlights the need for earth and social scientists to actively work together with national and local authorities to translate the findings of scientific hazard and risk assessment into improved risk management practices.

**Keywords**

Mount Cameroon • Focus group discussion • Natural hazard • Risk management • Landslide • Volcanic activity

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Mount Cameroon: General Setting and Types of Natural Hazards

Mount Cameroon in SW Cameroon is one of the largest (4095 m high) flow-dominated volcanoes on Earth, and one of the most frequently active volcanoes in Africa (Siebert et al. 2010). It has a NW-SE elongated shape of about 50 by 35 km and is part of the Cameroon Volcanic Line, a chain of Cenozoic volcanic structures extending about 2000 km from the Gulf of Guinea to the Adamawa Plateau in Tchad (e.g. Déruelle et al. 2007; Njome and de Wit 2014). Mount Cameroon erupted seven times in the 20th century, the last two confirmed eruptions taking place in 1999 and 2000 (Suh et al. 2003, 2008). The eruptive style generally comprises effusive and Strombolian-style activity, the latter mostly confined to the broad summit region. Basaltic lava flows occur predominantly along the NE and SW flanks of the volcano. These lava flows are

relatively mobile, reaching lengths of up to 9 km (Bonne et al. 2008; Favalli et al. 2011; Njome et al. 2008; Wantim et al. 2013a, b), and thus pose a potential threat to communities at the base of the volcano. Favalli et al. (2011) and Wantim et al. (2013b) developed idealised lava flow models to be used as a base to alert and potentially evacuate communities at risk of advancing lava flows. Historical eruptions of Mount Cameroon were associated with destruction of plantations and farmland, critical infrastructure such as roads and bridges, as well as houses (e.g. in 1922 and 1999: Déruelle et al. 1987; Suh et al. 2003, 2011). Eruptions were typically also associated with health risks like respiratory problems and contaminated water supplies (e.g. in 1999: Atanga et al. 2009).

Other natural hazards occurring in the Mount Cameroon area include landslides (Che et al. 2011, 2012a, b), especially on the SE flank which records at least one landslide every year. These landslides occur on old hilly volcanic terrain with deeply weathered soils which are cultivated by a growing population (Che et al. 2012a, b).
However, because most of these landslides have not caused fatalities in the past, they are not always recorded or reported (Ayonghe et al. 2004; Diko 2012). Floods (Ndille and Belle 2014), crater lake outgassing and different types of earthquakes are other natural hazards that characterise the Cameroon Volcanic Line. Disastrous crater lake outgassing has occurred twice in the early 1980s at Lakes Monoun and Nyos (Freeth and Kay 1987; Issa et al. 2014). The local population strongly fears earthquakes because they have led to the destruction of houses and other infrastructure on numerous occasions in the past. Ateba et al. (2009) describe the seismic activity as “co-eruptive”, noting that the 2000 eruption was characterised by sequences of earthquake swarms and volcanic tremor. The Global Network for Disaster Reduction reports in 2011 that about 25% of the natural hazards in Cameroon occur along the Cameroon Volcanic Line (GEADIRR 2011).

## 1.2 Project Motivation

The Mount Cameroon area is exposed to a variety of natural hazards and associated risks (Fig. 1). Donovan et al. (2014) suggest that Mount Cameroon is considered as a low risk potential, due to the predominantly effusive nature of its eruptions, but with an extremely high likelihood of an eruption in the next 30 years. A number of volcanic hazard and risk assessments have been performed (Bonne et al. 2008; Thierry et al. 2008; Favalli et al. 2011; Gehl et al. 2013) but these have largely been limited to scientific publications. Translation of relevant scientific information into understandable language for the local population is yet to be fully implemented in the area, and will facilitate the delivery of more efficient assistance in preparedness and response to natural hazards (e.g. Barclay et al. 2008). Previous risk awareness and perception studies have mostly been based on household surveys and found that (volcanic) risk is perceived differently among local scientists (at the University of Buea and the Cameroon Geological Survey) and the local population (Njome

et al. 2010; Pannaccione Apa et al. 2012). Atanga et al. (2009, 2010) assessed the health risks of Mount Cameroon volcanic ash, and studied mitigation approaches by community members and frontline workers. The ability or inability of the exposed population to cope with risk has not been assessed in detail, nor have the preparedness and mitigation efforts from the local authorities been evaluated.

Following the Mount Cameroon eruption crises in 1999 and 2000, a 5-year (2008–2013) bilateral capacity building project for geohazard research and management was established by the Flemish Interuniversity Council—University Development Cooperation (VLIR UOS, Belgium) between the University of Buea (Cameroon) and Ghent University (Belgium). The scientists from the University of Buea had limited training in geohazard crisis management as well as a shortage of laboratory facilities. The societal objectives were to raise the capacity and preparedness of the University of Buea, the local authorities and the population to improve the geohazard management strategy to the benefit of all relevant stakeholders. Scientific objectives included constraining the spatial distribution of lava flows (Wantim et al. 2011, 2013a, b) and landslide susceptibility (Che et al. 2012b, 2013). Another objective was to improve research and training capacity for monitoring volcanic and landslide hazards at the University of Buea.

Various activities were aimed at improving risk awareness and communication efficiency and were performed throughout the project (Fig. 2). All of these activities focused on volcanic hazards relevant to Mount Cameroon, as well as on landslide and crater lake hazards. Two stakeholder workshops were organised to raise awareness about geohazards and to discuss crisis management and early warning systems. The participants represented the Universities of Buea and Ghent, national research institutions, government services, municipal authorities, civil society (NGOs, CSOs, and farmer groups), and traditional authorities (e.g. village chiefs). The second workshop was concluded with the elaboration of various information billboards. Their content and design was informed by discussions
<figure><img src="image_134.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** a Location of the Cameroon Volcanic Line in West Africa; b Mount Cameroon with the surrounding—largely Anglophone—administrative divisions; c Mount</figcaption></figure>

Cameroon with main settlements at risk of a variety of natural hazards, including volcanic eruptions, landslides, floods, crater lake outgassing and earthquakes
<figure><img src="image_135.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_136.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_137.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_138.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** Photos illustrating awareness-raising actions undertaken as part of the 5-year VLIR-UOS project. **a** stakeholder workshop discussion session; **b** billboard in Buea illustrating volcanic hazards and risks; **c** billboard in Limbe illustrating landslide hazards and risks; **d** billboard in Kumba illustrating crater lake outgassing hazards and risks</figcaption></figure>

following introductions by the local and Belgian specialists of various geohazards and related (health) risks. For instance, it was decided that the morphology of the volcano drawn on the billboard (by a local artist from Buea) should represent the realistic view at the specific location where the billboard would be put in place. Further awareness-raising actions such as training of teachers were conducted in various schools and in front of the billboards. Additional sensitisation activities took place in villages and were led by local team members specialised in volcanic hazard and related health issues. A dedicated activity took place on International Women's Day (8th March) which is widely celebrated in Cameroon, and which provided the opportunity to reach a significant proportion of the population. Radio programs were found to be

a successful communication tool as they are very popular amongst the local population, and typically reach a much larger proportion of the population than the written press. Further training initiatives targeted at the press were undertaken to specifically improve communication efficiency and address risk awareness amongst the local population.

## 1.3 Focus Group Discussions

The merit of social studies on risks related to natural hazards lies in the fact that they are able to elicit information which can supplement results of purely scientific studies (e.g. hazard maps) and provide insights on how the population perceives risk (Atanga et al. 2010; Njome
et al. 2010). The participation of communities has been found to be essential in identifying ways to mitigate risks (e.g. Gaillard and Dibben 2008). One way to interact with a community and collect data on the different aspects of the risk management cycle (preparedness, response, recovery, mitigation) is by means of focus group discussions (FGDs; Bohnsack 2004).

The FGD approach provides an open and interactive discussion forum, unlike a structured questionnaire, and is therefore particularly useful to obtain an in-depth understanding because discussions can range from simple to abstract ideas on a specific topic. In such circumstances all the relevant information can be discussed to the point of saturation. Moreover, it has been found that FGD participants tend to speak more freely and with more detail compared to a standard interview or structured questionnaire, which is believed to limit the extent to which people can express their own views (Mercer and Kelman 2010). The participants should be a cross-section of a community including both literate and illiterate people. FGDs provide a qualitative research tool for the scientists, but are particularly meaningful for the stakeholders as well, since they provide a platform for the participants to meet, interact, explore and cross-examine the matter at hand.

To understand how the local communities in the Mount Cameroon area are prepared for and cope with a variety of potential natural hazards, three FGDs were held at the city councils of three strategically selected towns. Each of these towns is prone to certain types of natural hazards (Fig. 1): (1) Buea (ca. 150,000 inhabitants) is located at the E foot of the volcano and has experienced ash fall from 20th century eruptions and significant earthquake damage in 1995; (2) Kumba (ca. 200,000 inhabitants) is located to the NE, too far to be directly impacted by an eruption but is downhill and downstream of a crater lake with the potential to outgas, and which provides the main water supply to the town; it is also prone to landslides and earthquakes; (3) Limbe (ca. 95,000 inhabitants; invited participants from Limbe 1 council) is located near the SE coast with a high risk of lava flow

invasion (Favalli et al. 2011) and has experienced multiple flooding and landslide events in recent decades (Ayonghe et al. 2004; Che et al. 2011). The risk imposed by floods and landslides is enhanced by unregulated building practices (Che et al. 2012b). The FGDs were organised in May 2010 as part of the risk assessment part of the VLIR UOS project. Between 4 and 6 participants were selected from each city council (Wilkinson 2004). Their level of responsibility within the council varied from councillor with or without technical education, to engineer, traditional ruler, local chief, and mayor.

In this study four cardinal points (preparedness, response, recovery and reconstruction) guided the FGDs (Fothergill 1996). The aim of the discussions was to collect the views of the councillors on each of the four points, for risks related to volcanic eruptions, landslides, floods and crater lakes. Each discussion began with a general presentation by a scientist on natural hazards which reminded the participants of some definitions such as hazard versus risk, using a simple every-day example (e.g. the occurrence of rain = hazard; getting wet = risk; carrying an umbrella = mitigating the risk), in order to guide the discussion process. It was established that, prior to and throughout the discussion, the concept of hazard versus risk was understood by all participants in the three cities. A local scientist further introduced the topic and moderated the conversation with the help of a predefined structure (Appendix). Volcanic, landslide or crater lake risks were not specifically mentioned or given as an example in the introduction, in order to avoid biased discussions. Notes were taken by another local scientist. The discussions were carried out in English, the local language mastered and preferred by all participants and researchers, and all discussions were audio- and video-recorded, and photographs were taken, all with consent from the participants. During the discussion it was ensured that the participants valued their role as representatives of their communities, and that they were able to speak on behalf of their community members. The discussion was free as all the participants were at the
same level in discussing with researchers. Each discussion lasted between one to three hours, without predefined time limits.

## 2 Results

The councils of the three main cities around Mount Cameroon where the FGDs took place all have slightly different approaches to the preparation and response to hazards, and post-event reconstruction. Prominent and recurring themes are highlighted in Table 1, following the general structure (Appendix), and further discussed below.

## 2.1 Hazard and Risk Perception and Preparedness

The first section of the FGDs dealt with preparedness to natural hazards (Table 1). The different types of natural hazards constituting a threat in each area were well perceived except in Kumba. The outgassing of the crater lake was not mentioned as a potential hazard/risk. Floods and landslides were extensively discussed: this was not surprising given the high frequency of occurrence of these events.

In Buea, the participants expressed that they were “at the foot of an active volcanic mountain and the mountain can erupt anytime” and that

<table><caption>**Table 1** Schematic overview of responses in each city council to each question of the FGD. Identities of respondents to specific questions have been omitted. The full details of each question can be found in Appendix. Some answers to questions appeared in discussions after subsequent questions, e.g. some specific hazard types (question A1a) were only mentioned in a discussion on associated risks (question A1c). Transcripts of the discussions are available upon request</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="2">Question</th><th colspan="3">City</th></tr><tr><th>Code</th><th>Theme</th><th>Buea</th><th>Kumba</th><th>Limbe 1</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5">Aspect A: Preparedness</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5">A1—Natural hazards that could constitute risk to the municipality</td></tr><tr><td>A1a</td><td>Types of hazard</td><td>- Volcanic eruption<br>- Tremors<br>- Landslides<br>- Floods</td><td>- Landslides<br>- Floods<br>- Thunderstorms<br>Specific locations mentioned by name</td><td>- Floods<br>- Landslides<br>- Volcanic eruption<br>- Tsunami<br>- Coastal subsidence/erosion</td></tr><tr><td>A1b</td><td>Causes of hazards</td><td>- Landslide: heavy rainfall<br>- Floods: blocked gutters</td><td>- Human activity: construction on river embankments: narrowed water courses<br>→ Floods<br>- Human activity: refuse disposal in rivers<br>→ Floods<br>- Human activity: deforestation<br>→ Landslides<br>- Human activity: reclaiming marshy areas<br>- Heavy rainfall<br>→ Floods</td><td>- Topography: Limbe surrounded by hills<br>- Topography: parts of Limbe below sea level<br>- Human activity: deforestation, erosion<br>→ Landslides<br>- Human activity: uncontrolled urbanisation, blocking natural waterways<br>→ Floods</td></tr><tr><td>A1c</td><td>Associated risks</td><td>- Building in mapped (landslide/flood) disaster zones<br>- Damaged to houses due to vibration during an eruption</td><td>- Landslides: buildings on top of hills<br>- Flooding (houses): transport of waste, risk of diseases</td><td>- Lost material property due to uncontrolled urbanisation<br>- Coastal subsidence due to tremors during volcanic eruption</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><caption>**Table 1** (continued)</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="2">Question</th><th colspan="3">City</th></tr><tr><th>Code</th><th>Theme</th><th>Buea</th><th>Kumba</th><th>Limbe 1</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td><ul><li>Clearing debris from the roads after landslide constitutes a risk in itself</li><li>Lake Barumbi linked to Mount Cameroon: eruption affecting the lake water, which provides all the water supply for the town through the Mabungisse river at high risk of flooding</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Coastal erosion: gradual inland movement of the coastline threatening the town</li><li>Heavy rainfall – water table rising above surface in some places</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>A1d</td><td>Warning signs</td><td>None known</td><td><ul><li>Landslides: cracks (lines) opening up in the soil</li><li>Flood-prone zones (near meanders): heavy rain, rising water levels, strange animal behaviour</li><li>People will move already once the water gets to a certain level</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Landslides, floods: several days of consecutive rain</li><li>Eruptions: only observed (fire, volcanic ash) when already taking place</li><li>Tremors</li><li>Vibrations sometimes before, during or after eruptions</li></ul></td></tr><tr><td>A1e</td><td>Source of information</td><td><ul><li>Close collaboration with Ministry of Scientific Research</li><li>Scientists at University of Buea</li><li>Community knows about the volcano, but not about floods</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Presence of town planners carrying out routine checks</li><li>Interaction with the people – who may base themselves on strange animal behaviour</li><li>Ministries:<ul><li>Environment</li><li>Hygiene and Sanitation</li><li>Mines, Water Resources and Energy</li></ul></li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Scientists</li><li>Geological Research Centre</li><li>Surveillance system in place around the mountain</li></ul></td></tr></tbody></table>

**A2—Schemes in preparation for disasters**

<table><tr><td>A2</td><td>Scheme in preparation for disasters</td><td><ul><li>City council takes responsibility in case of an event, but no means are reserved specifically to prepare for disasters</li><li>Many councillors unaware of potential disasters</li><li>Spending scheme of council budget needs to be voted on – money more likely reserved for critical infrastructure than for disaster prevention, due to unawareness of councillors</li></ul></td><td><ul><li>Areas declared as risk zones (landslide-prone, regularly flooding): no building permits issued</li><li>Investigations in certain areas at regular risk as to what causes the problems</li><li>Regular (yearly) dredging of specific areas at high risk of flooding<ul><li>River course too narrow</li><li>Surrounding vegetation too compact</li><li>Refuse blocking the water flow</li></ul></li><li>Some budget set aside for crisis management</li><li>Plans to terrace Ntoko Hill, at high risk of landslides</li><li>Most actions happen spontaneously, in case of an event. Preparation measures not systematically documented by the council. Documentation may exist</li></ul></td><td>None</td></tr></table>

(continued)
<table><caption>**Table 1** (continued)</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="2">Question</th><th colspan="3">City</th></tr><tr><th>Code</th><th>Theme</th><th>Buea</th><th>Kumba</th><th>Limbe 1</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>in the form of minutes of meetings.<br/>- Buildings in designated high-risk zones marked to be demolished</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>A2a</td><td>Regulations towards reducing risk</td><td>- Laws/regulations exist, but not implemented due to lack of funding and more pressing basic needs of population</td><td>Administrative levels:<br/>- Government delegate or Mayor - will authorise budget allocation and action to take, based on technical reports written by responsible departments<br/>- Council to follow advise<br/>To approve building permits, the council departments in charge have to go and see what kind of area/environment/building the permit is being asked for.</td><td>- Building regulations, e.g. certain distance from stream banks<br/>- Certain areas declared as risk zones by the government<br/>These regulations are not respected by people</td></tr><tr><td>A2b</td><td>Unit in charge at municipality level</td><td>- Specific committee in charge of community protection<br/>- Close collaboration with the Mayor, Division Officer, Governor and Ministry in case of an event</td><td>Departments of Town Planning and Hygiene and Sanitation: both in charge of approving building permits</td><td>- Town Planning Services, in collaboration with related government services<br/>- Council due to take more responsibility and decisions related preparedness (decentralisation policy)</td></tr><tr><td>A2c</td><td>Facilities to manage risk</td><td>- Bulldozer to clear roads and gutters in case of floods<br/>- No other means</td><td>- Financial resources for major facilities (e.g. dredging works) put at disposal after authorisation by Government Delegate or Mayor based on technical reports<br/>- Basic facilities (equipment, transport, manpower) at disposal of Hygiene service for burials if needed</td><td>- First aid provided when anything happens<br/>- Nothing else—a crisis commission will be created in case of an event</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>A3—Warning systems</strong></td></tr><tr><td>A3a</td><td>Warning systems in place in case of an emergency</td><td>- None<br/>- (billboards explaining natural hazards in a more general way - not for emergencies)</td><td>- Local radio stations—paid on monthly basis to pass on council's announcements in an interactive programme where people can also call themselves and ask questions<br/>- Local churches<br/>- Letters to village chiefs, local quarter heads who will announce the information to their people<br/>- Meeting houses of traditional, tribal groups</td><td>- None<br/>- People tend to rely on themselves, helping each other<br/>- Chiefs and Mayor/Council in contact with each other—system filters down to village level</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><caption>**Table 1** (continued)</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="2">Question</th><th colspan="3">City</th></tr><tr><th>Code</th><th>Theme</th><th>Buea</th><th>Kumba</th><th>Limbe 1</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>A3b</td><td>Population informed about these systems?</td><td>N/A</td><td>- Yes<br/>- Communication channels evaluated through population's response, revised where needed</td><td>N/A</td></tr><tr><td>A3c</td><td>(Other) possible tools to enhance warning efficacy</td><td>- Monitoring equipment on the volcano (was there before, but was taken away)</td><td>- Information boards with warning signals identifying high-risk zones, informing people they should not buy land or construct in those areas. These kinds of boards should be protected from demolition/removal</td><td>- Aspect of spontaneous solidarity raised again<br/>- Mobile phones to communicate between chiefs, Mayor and councillors</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Remarks</td><td>Demand for information seminars at the council and community levels to create more awareness. At the council level, this could lead to more budgets being allocated to risk mitigation.</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Aspect B: Response

B1—Risk communication to the population

<table><tr><td>B1</td><td>Means of communicating risk to population</td><td>- Media<br/>- Intervention unit going door to door to talk to people</td><td>- Radio<br/>- Churches<br/>- Quarter heads<br/>- Meeting houses<br/>All communication to and from the council passes through the Government Delegate</td><td>- Supervisory authority (administration) takes control<br/>- Going round villages, using e.g. whistle and bell to alert people</td></tr><tr><td>B1a</td><td>Anticipated response of population to warnings</td><td>- Some people are stubborn to evacuate (law enforcement used)</td><td>- People following warnings and moving away, especially for short-term hazards like floods<br/>- In other places, e.g. Ntoko Hill at high risk for landslides, people tend to be more adamant and stay. Usually less than 10% of the people.<br/>- About 10% of people have abandoned their houses permanently (usually forced by nature, e.g. permanent flooding)<br/>- Some people try to actively prevent floods by constructing dams to deviate the water (Need to be careful with forced action because of human rights action groups)</td><td>- They follow instructions on what has to be done<br/>- Spontaneous community response</td></tr></table>

(continued)
<table><caption>**Table 1 (continued)**</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="2">Question</th><th colspan="3">City</th></tr><tr><th>Code</th><th>Theme</th><th>Buea</th><th>Kumba</th><th>Limbe 1</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>B1b</td><td>Language used</td><td>- Pidgin english<br>- Local dialect<br>Depending on the area affected</td><td>- Official (written) communication all in English<br>- Local delivery of the message usually in Pidgin English or local dialect, depending on tribal group<br>- Signs (e.g. red paint marks), summon papers or abatement notices used to call on people and invite them to discuss building location</td><td>Pidgin english</td></tr><tr><td>B1c</td><td>Success of communication evaluated</td><td>- Go back and ensure people are safe<br>- Council meeting discussing what has been done</td><td>Evaluated from the level of response</td><td>Message gets across</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>B2—Risk communication to higher authorities</strong></td></tr><tr><td>B2</td><td>Means of communicating risk to higher authorities</td><td>Council workers on site informing Mayor, who will then call the appropriate delegate at the Ministry or other services if more intervention is needed</td><td>- Mostly it is the higher authorities communicating risk to the council. The council depends purely on the population to report, but the government seems to have better mechanisms in place<br>- Phone calls (for emergencies) and/or written letter to subdivision officer, not supported by documents (spontaneous action)<br>- Final report made by the council after the events</td><td>- Phone calls<br>- Administrative writings<br>- Crisis meetings</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>B3—Risk communication to scientists</strong></td></tr><tr><td>B3</td><td>Liaison with researchers/scientists</td><td>First ones contacted as they are best placed to advise what to do</td><td>- One scientist once wrote to the council to warn about rising water levels at certain river. The governor set up a small commission to go out in the field and investigate<br>- NGOs writing advisory reports on what can be done in terms of prevention, e.g. on Ntoko Hill<br>- No set structure to interact with scientists and researchers<br>- It is difficult to know who the scientists are, where they are based and what they are doing. The council expects the scientists to come to them and is then very willing to collaborate</td><td>Cordial relationship</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><caption>**Table 1** (continued)</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="2">Question</th><th colspan="3">City</th></tr><tr><th>Code</th><th>Theme</th><th>Buea</th><th>Kumba</th><th>Limbe 1</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>B4—Immediate response</strong></td></tr><tr><td>B4</td><td>Immediate response in case of a crisis</td><td>- Observe on site<br>- Look for means to evacuate people if needed, in collaboration with law enforcement officers<br>- Contact media<br>- Assistance with material or medical needs<br>- Floods: open waterways and remove debris using bulldozer</td><td>- Go down to site and evaluate the degree of risk, the damage, etc.<br>- Decide what can be done to support victims, e.g. assistance in burials<br>- Provide help on the spot, e.g. trying to save people in danger<br>- People themselves will also assist in relieving the situation<br>- Ensure security to prevent looting<br>- Action depends on the situation</td><td>- Go observe on site<br>- People evacuated to safe place<br>- Material and financial assistance<br>- Population also assists</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>B5/B6—Last crisis</strong></td></tr><tr><td>B5</td><td>Last crisis experienced</td><td>Flood at the hospital 2 years ago (2009)</td><td>- Thunder strike about 1 month ago<br>- Storm yesterday<br>- Flood<br>- Last eruption (Bakingli) affected the lake at the source of the Mabungisse river</td><td>- Frequent floods of different scales<br>- 2001 floods most recent major crisis taking lives<br>- 2009 landslide blocking the road</td></tr><tr><td>B6</td><td>Impacts of last crisis</td><td>- Damage to houses<br>- Damage to hospital fence<br>- Road to hospital blocked</td><td>- Yesterday's storm:<br>• Roof collapses<br>• Damage to crops<br>- Floods:<br>• people displaced<br>• loss of property<br>• loss of lives<br>• reduced farmland (limited impact)<br>• disease outbreaks (diarrhoea, malaria)<br>- People uncomfortable living near place where decomposing bodies are buried (e.g. corpses only recovered from floods after a few days)</td><td>- Sketchy and unbalanced documentation of events<br>- Loss of lives, property<br>- People displaced, some people even moved to America<br>- Depression, traumas<br>- Financial burden<br>- Thieves taking advantage</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>Aspect C: Recovery</strong></td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>C1—Recovery strategy</strong></td></tr><tr><td>C1</td><td>Council strategy to help people overcome basic problems</td><td>- Look for temporary housing for evacuees<br>- Delegation of Health to assess potential of disease outbreak<br>- Extraordinary council session to discuss budget reallocation in case people need financial help to relocate or rebuild houses</td><td>- Council needs formal request for assistance before it can act, e.g. from health services requesting extra vaccinations, or from the population<br>- People often afraid to come to the council if they were living in "no-go areas"</td><td>None</td></tr></tbody></table>

(continued)
<table><caption>**Table 1 (continued)**</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="2">Question</th><th colspan="3">City</th></tr><tr><th>Code</th><th>Theme</th><th>Buea</th><th>Kumba</th><th>Limbe 1</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>C2</td><td>Strategy used in last crisis?</td><td>– Yes</td><td>N/A</td><td>Other organisations (SONARA) came in and built houses to assist people, but in insufficient amounts. Those buildings are now used as a school—council was consulted at first but could not intervene</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><em>Aspect D: Mitigation</em></td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>D1—Policy measures for long-lasting solutions to risk</strong></td></tr><tr><td>D1</td><td>Policy</td><td>Areas indicated where construction is not allowed</td><td>– Contracts with dredger<br/>– No written policy documents guiding actions, all actions spontaneous<br/>– Budget is available from the government for councillors to attend seminars on risk management<br/>Proposals for the full dredging of a high-risk river, or terracing of a high-risk hill, but without financial means and resources, these proposals will not convert into policy</td><td>– Areas designated as risk zones<br/>– Relocation of people living in risk zones</td></tr><tr><td>D1a</td><td>Source of policy</td><td>Government</td><td>Government policy on risk management, none at the level of the council</td><td>Ministry of Town Planning and Housing</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>D2—Strategies to back up policy</strong></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>Keep waterways open</td><td>– Marking houses for demolition<br/>– Regular (small-scale) dredging</td><td>None</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>D3—Implementation of strategy</strong></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>N/A</td><td>– Regular dredging of river at high risk of flooding<br/>– Clearing areas<br/>– Marking houses of demolition</td><td>– Sensitisation and education<br/>– Encouraging people to stop farming but plant trees in risk areas<br/>– Stringent observance of building rules and regulations<br/>– People not actually relocated</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>D4—Other strategies and actions envisaged by the municipality</strong></td></tr><tr><td>D4</td><td>Other strategies that could help</td><td>– Appropriate monitoring of seismic or volcanic activity<br/>– Sensitising communities in the form of seminars, to educate the population about the types of risks, and point out risky areas<br/>– Funding alone will not be sufficient</td><td>– Information seminars for the council</td><td>– Strategic planning<br/>– Relocation of people away from risk zones<br/>– Land now used for plantations freed for people to live; plantations moved to the forest<br/>– Decentralisation, more autonomy and power to the councils</td></tr></tbody></table>
"the community knows much about the volcanic mountain but does not know much about the flood". In Limbe, volcanic eruptions were also mentioned as a potential hazard, but in the other two towns, eruptions did not seem to be considered as a serious hazard. In Limbe it was further noted that coastal subsidence has occurred in the past due to tremors associated with an eruption. These tremors are felt only sometimes before an eruption and taken as a warning signal. Ateba et al. (2009) observed that the tremors are concomitant to an eruption. Although participants easily identified the cause and warning signs of landslides and floods, they did not mention any cause for earthquake and volcanic events nor did they know of warning signs except for tremors.

Heavy rainfall was considered the main natural cause of landslides (Buea and Limbe) and floods (Kumba and Limbe), and was generally also considered as a warning signal for floods. In Kumba it was noted that people will start to evacuate spontaneously once the water levels are rising above a critical point. Topography was also highlighted as a main cause of concern during the heavy rainy days. Nevertheless the causes of floods posing a risk to the population were largely ascribed to human activity: the waterways are narrowed and blocked as a result of "uncontrolled urbanisation" (Limbe and Kumba) with construction near river embankments. In marshy areas, the dumping of refuse in the rivers clogs up waterways. Deforestation is associated with a rise in erosion and landslide occurrence. An increased incidence of diseases as a result of waste transport in floods was highlighted as an associated population health risk in Kumba.

Damage to properties and loss of lives were mentioned as an impact of recent events. Construction in mapped disaster zones (Kumba) and on top of hills on old volcanic terrain (Limbe and Buea) was considered risky.

In Limbe, people have observed that three days of consecutive rainfall will cause people to worry about potential landslides. This timeframe fits well with that observed by Che et al. (2012b,) in their study of landslide occurrence and susceptibility in the Limbe area. In Kumba the population

was aware that cracks opening up in the soil on a hill may also be a warning sign of an imminent landslide. Interestingly, the Kumba council acknowledged that removing landslide debris, e.g. clearing the roads, can in itself also pose a risk.

In Kumba, the Barombi crater lake flows into the frequently flooding Mabungise river. More importantly this river provides water and fish supplies to the city. Volcanic hazards were not mentioned in Kumba, which is understandable given the distance with respect to the volcano. In a previous workshop related to our VLIR-UOS project, the traditional chief of Kumba mentioned his concerns about the fish mortality and the risk of potential landslides of the crater walls and gas release from the lake. Previous occasions of fish mortality were related to the overturned stratified water after large rainfall leading to oxygen scarcity. Also as part of the same project, in 2010 information billboards on crater lake hazards were put up along the road towards the lake and at two entrances of the city (Fig. 2d). Nevertheless, gas release from the crater lake, i.e. similar to what happened at Lakes Nyos and Monoun in the 1980s, was not mentioned as a potential hazard by the FGD participants.

Tsunami was another type of hazard, mentioned in Limbe, a coastal town surrounded by hills with parts of the town lying below sea level. Coastal subsidence and erosion are active processes in Limbe, with a significant risk potential: sudden subsidence was observed in the late 1940s (cause unknown) as well as during past eruptive events of Mount Cameroon. In addition, gradual coastal erosion was observed through the rapid degradation of the coastal embankment that was built by the council.

The Buea and Limbe City Councils have well-established links with scientists at the University of Buea and/or the Geological Research Centre (also called Regional Research Centre) in Ekona from which they can obtain scientific information. The Buea councillors however admitted that the general level of hazard knowledge and awareness in the council was too low and dedicated information sessions would be most welcome. The Kumba Council is not
connected to the Buea scientists but strongly welcomed researchers to approach the Council with information regarding hazards and risk. During the FGDs every council requested that the scientists actively provide information and possibly a training session about natural hazards and associated risk.

There is also collaboration with several Ministries in preparation for hazards, e.g. in the form of issuing building regulations and areas declared as high-risk zones for which building permits are in theory not issued. Nevertheless the councils all have limited financial resources, and limited to no facilities exist to manage hazardous events apart from providing basic first aid (Limbe).

A major and well-known problem enhancing the risk of floods and landslides is the disrespect of the building regulations and uncontrolled land use, with people still building houses in areas where they are not allowed to. In some cases those buildings are actively marked for demolition. However the implementation of the regulations, with actual evacuation of people from these zones and demolition of the buildings, does not typically seem to occur, except occasionally in Kumba. The local people are expected to go to the town planning service of the city council themselves to discuss their building plans and the regulations.

The town planning service, in charge of implementing building regulations, works with the related services at the national government level. The Mayor of Limbe indicated that the council is going through a process of increasing manpower to manage most of the regulations themselves, in light of new decentralisation policies. At the time of a disaster however, a special crisis commission is set up to manage it. No actual warning system exists and pre-event awareness-raising is limited to the existing billboards (specifically mentioned in Buea) and school education activities that were developed as part of our project. Commenting on the municipality regulations geared towards reducing risks, the participants agreed that, even if a scheme existed, decisions would still be largely taken "spontaneously" (Limbe).

In Kumba, an interactive communication system with a high penetration rate is in place, and is used to inform the population of the council's actions, but also to raise hazard awareness and issue active warnings in case of an event: "We use the local radio stations, churches, tribal groups, letters and sub-chiefs (in charge of particular neighbourhoods) to inform the population. There are 3 radio stations present in Kumba city. We have already established partnerships with these radio stations and we pay them on a monthly basis to disseminate information." There are specific radio programmes with interviews of departmental heads of the council. During these programmes the population is encouraged to participate and make direct enquiries using their mobile phones. In case of an emergency the people know they have to listen to the radio for updates. The council measures the degree of awareness from the reaction of the people. If they find the message does not get across, authorities change their strategy. Limbe and Buea had not yet developed such a communication system when the FGDs took place.

With respect to the engineering means available in Buea, the following comments were made:

> It depends on the risk: for instance we have some means to manage something like the flood, we have the bulldozer if there is a flood; if there is a blockage we can rush and open up the gutters and so on but if it comes to natural disaster (e.g. the volcano) we do not have materials.

> We know that we have to clean all the gutters of the community. If we neglect it, stones will block it and this will cause floods."

> What is lacking is the knowledge that you people are giving us now. For instance, with the best of my knowledge we are 41 councillors but I don't know if up to 20 are aware that we may have a disaster at any time".

According to the participants from the three towns, little to no means are specifically reserved for hazard preparedness, mostly due to more pressing basic needs within the community. The
councils will however take their responsibility in responding to an event and dealing with recovery as needed, and as is practically possible with the available resources.

## 2.2 Crisis Response Structure and Communication

Section B of the FGDs related to crisis management (Appendix, Table 1). In each town the participants explained the organisation of their respective council, although in Cameroon, the disaster risk management structure is centralised (Bang 2013, 2014).

In Buea, the councillors mentioned that, in case of an event, they “work closely with the Mayor, the Delegate Officer, the Governor and every other Ministry that will be in charge of the disaster, such as the Ministry of Scientific Research”.

On how the council communicates risk to higher authorities, in Buea, the councillors said that “the committee in charge will go down to the field with the council workers in order to see what happened. They will alert the Mayor. He will be the one to call for any intervention from any Ministry... We have to report and then the Mayor takes it to higher quarters.” “The mayor may now make a communiqué to the radio and then transmit it to the other services that are concerned”. The power therefore seems to be relatively centralised in the hands of the Mayor in Buea.

When a significant event occurs, the Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation and the University of Buea will provide information and work in close collaboration with the council and their monitoring units. When questioned about the existence of an early warning system however, the councillors did not really understand what this would encompass.

Kumba is not a city council sensu stricto but a municipality with a Government Delegate in charge of the urban councils. After receiving written technical reports from the various departments in case of an event, the Government Delegate decides and authorises the actions to solve the problems, since he holds the financial

resources. In reality no written document is sent to the Government Delegate, as technically required, but communication occurs directly by telephone, especially in case of an emergency. During an emergency, basic equipment and facilities are made available to deal with immediate response on the ground. This includes equipment for dredging rivers where needed, e.g. in case of floods, but also assistance to the community with burying victims.

In Limbe the engineer reported that many disasters take the community by surprise, but that the council would organise an evacuation dependent on sufficient resources. This is the only time that evacuation is mentioned. Later in the discussion, the Mayor further described the communication to be easy these days: “When a natural disaster occurs it goes around like wild fire”. He referred to the fact that many people use mobile telephones for communicating via text messages (SMS). They may also make use of social media and informal communication channels within the neighbourhoods. The local authorities would also call the scientists. For instance, at the time of the 2010 landslide the Mayor immediately called the PhD researcher (author VBC) he had met at a previous workshop. He had at the time also requested immediate clearing of the road (main evacuation for the town along the ocean).

In every town, FGD participants requested education by the scientists on disaster preparedness. A better understanding of the causes of the hazards, e.g. supported by landslide susceptibility maps, would help in the evacuation of certain areas at critical moments before a disaster ensues, but also in implementing building regulations in the first place. Participants also wanted to know more about precursory signs of imminent events and the potential deployment of monitoring equipment.

## 2.3 Recovery and Reconstruction

None of the cities has a dedicated post-event recovery program of actions (Table 1). In Buea the participants mentioned that a special council session would be held to discuss housing and
financial assistance needs after properties have been destroyed by an event. The councillors would then report to the Governor and the Minister in charge (e.g. Public Health, in case of a risk of cholera outbreak). The level of support provided by the regional and national authorities will depend on the scale of the disaster.

In Limbe, the participants complained about promises made by some private companies to rebuild houses after the last landslide crisis. These promises were not met, and the buildings were finally occupied by a school.

The Limbe council itself is performing sensitisation actions: the people should not farm or build houses in a landslide-prone area (e.g. also billboard shown in Fig. 2c). Instead, tree planting is encouraged. At the council level, they aim to implement stringent building rules and regulations. However they conceded to have a lack of strategic planning at the council level, and instead referred to the Department of Civil Protection at the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation in Yaoundé.

In Kumba, funds for response and recovery are limited but directly available, e.g. for dredging rivers. The funds are provided by the Government Delegate and are part of the annually reviewed budget for risk management, and so rivers are regularly cleaned and dredged both before and after events. At the end of each FGD, participants agreed that a decentralisation of the risk management process, under the authority of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, would be highly advisable, especially for the councils of Buea and Limbe. Discussions between the Ministries and Government Delegates and the local Mayors related to disaster response and recovery were reported to be limited.

## 3 Discussion

The FGDs revealed that the main hazards and risks, e.g. landslides, floods, seismic and volcanic hazards are generally well perceived. Precursory signals of floods and landslides are

recognised as well as tremors as signs for volcanic activity. Because of their higher recurrence rates, landslides and floods are clearly the most pressing concerns to the local communities in terms of natural hazards. Volcanic hazards are of less concern, due to either the relatively frequent but small-scale eruptions typical for Mount Cameroon with limited impact on the urban infrastructure, or the infrequent nature of events such as crater lake outgassing, which do not occur in the living memory of most of the local population. This is reflected in the more limited awareness of these events relative to landslides and floods. We expect that the communication and response practices developed for frequent landslide/flood emergencies—with a background of limited financial resources—will be adopted at similar levels in case of a volcanic crisis. Most FGD participants however agreed that they need more technical information about the nature and causes of hazards that may affect their communities in the future, as well as about appropriate preventive measures.

The scientists realised from their side that they did not make enough pro-active effort on a regular basis to communicate the outcomes of their research. For example, the billboards installed in the framework of the VLIR-UOS project turned out to have limited impact to increase awareness. They were installed with consent of the councils, but councillors were not further informed about the message and purpose of these billboards. Such activities were instead limited to teachers and radio show hosts. Incorporating indigenous knowledge, e.g. passed on by traditional chiefs, into technical assessments and a range of awareness-raising actions may further help local inhabitants to better understand and appreciate natural events, and also behave adequately in case of an emergency.

Facilities to manage risk are practically non-existent except for assistance by the Civil Protection at the national level, intervening only in the case of large-scale events. This lack of adequate means and infrastructure in each of the cities remains a concern. Regional risk management is not yet effectively in charge of taking
decisions to prevent disasters, to handle crises and to recover from or mitigate future events. Continuous occupation of risk zones by new buildings, and the absence of temporary evacuation or relocation plans at the city level are other bottlenecks in the effective reduction of risk impacts.

The general lack of prevention and preparedness actions of local councils is understandable in a country where risk management decisions are mostly taken by Ministries. The fact that the regulations regarding risk management are centralised makes it more complicated to apply actions and adapt communication strategies to the local context. It is clear that the communication chain to the population, e.g. with the use of frequent radio programmes, is best developed in Kumba, which is directly governed by a Government Delegate. The other local authorities are however poorly informed about any preparedness or prevention strategies that may exist at the national level. In addition to centralised regulations, illegal construction and lack of regulation enforcement on the ground are major bottlenecks for the efficiency of any prevention schemes.

The response scheme to hazardous events is largely characterised by spontaneous actions within the community and informal communication channels. Strong social networks typical for African communities strengthen the effectiveness of this informal communication. Although risk management commissions are officially defined, the communication and the decision process during events rely mostly on ad hoc communication between the affected population, local authorities and scientists. The Mayor and the City Council are the main actors for responding to impact, however with limited means. The leadership of the local Mayor and councillors, and their relationship to the national government, via the Government Delegate, control whether more resources and recovery support can be provided. As Kumba depends directly on the Government Delegate, more preventive and response actions are immediately undertaken thanks to rapid money allocation. In Buea and Limbe however, actions are delayed due to

intermediate administrative levels between the Government Delegate and the City Council.

Effective collaboration between local and national authorities, as well as trust and frequent communication between local decision-makers, scientists and the population and their representatives are essential elements in the effectiveness of the management of hazardous events (Barclay et al. 2008). The awareness by the Mayors and councillors for the need of risk reduction actions, as well as the available means are other key elements. The personal participation of the Mayor of Limbe in the FGD demonstrated his interest and dedication. The FGD led to a fruitful exchange between the Mayor and several of the local chiefs, all of them feeling highly responsible for risk management in their local communities. The actions taken within the VLIR-UOS project, including the FGDs, have thus contributed to enhancing the relationships between the city councillors, mayors and scientists.

## 4 Conclusions

FGDs have the advantage of enabling interactions between all actors, with the opinion of all participants being considered at an equal level. Our FGDs contributed to increasing the awareness of risks among the councillors and to identifying the current state and limitations of the schemes aimed at preparing for, responding to and mitigating impacts of natural hazards in the vicinity of Mount Cameroon. The outcome of the FGDs is useful for the scientists and also contributes to raising participants' awareness about the need to address the different steps of the risk management cycle and the challenges faced in implementing them effectively (i.e. scientific knowledge, education and communication actions, preparedness and response plans, resource allocation and decision-making structure).

The scientists who are part of this project have realised they perhaps do not always make enough effort to actively communicate their relevant research results to the local communities and stakeholders. The relationship between the local authorities and the local scientists will hopefully
continue to develop in the future, as requested by all FGD participants. Transfer of knowledge and leadership of the local authority are essential for implementing mitigation and preparedness actions and for effective coordination of the actions during and directly following a crisis.

Decentralisation of the decision process was the main wish expressed from all the councils that took part in our FGDs. Decentralisation of the governmental coordination of risk management related to local natural hazards would allow the development of a locally relevant plan of action to turn disaster prevention policies into practice. However decentralisation of the decision will lead to potential improvement only when associated with availability of sufficient funding earmarked to support implementation.

**Acknowledgements** This project was supported by the Flemish Interuniversity Council—University Development Cooperation (VLIR-UOS), granted to Ghent University and the University of Buea. Karen Fontijn is currently supported by the UK's Natural Environment Research Council grant NE/L013932/1 (“RiftVolc”). We are extremely grateful to all participants of the focus group discussions, as well as numerous people at the University of Buea, research institutes and city councils who have facilitated this work. Constructive reviews by Carina Fearnley and an anonymous reviewer have helped improve this manuscript.

## Appendix: Focus Group Discussion Questions Guiding the Discussions Hosted by a Local Moderator

### Code A — Preparedness

1. Do you perceive any natural hazard in your municipality that could constitute risk?

* If yes, what are the hazards?

* What are the causes?

* How do these hazards constitute risk?

* What are the warning signs of these events?

* From where and whom do you expect to get reliable information on the possible risks associated to the hazard?

2. Is there any scheme in preparation for disaster?

* Does your municipality have regulations geared towards reducing risk?

* Is there anyone in the municipality in charge of implementing such a scheme?

* Does the municipality possess facilities to manage risk?

3. Are there any warning systems in place to alert the population (incase of an emergency) of the risks associated with a natural hazard?

* If yes, elaborate

* Is the population properly informed about it?

* Besides these, are you aware of any other tools that can be used to enhance the warning efficacy?

### Code B — Response

1. How do you communicate risk to the population?

* How do you anticipate the population's response to your warnings?

* What language would you use to reach out to the threatened population?

* How do you evaluate the success of your communication?

2. How do you communicate risk with higher authorities?

3. How do you liaise with researchers/scientists? About...

* Effects to the physical environment

* Psychological impacts

* Economic distortions

4. What will be your immediate response when there is a crisis?

5. What is the last crisis that the municipality experienced?

6. What where the impacts of this crisis?

* Effects to the physical environment

* Psychological impacts

* Physical health

* Economic impacts

* Social impacts.
## Code C — Recovery

1. Does the council have a strategy for helping people to overcome the basic problems within a year of the crisis?

2. Was this strategy used during the last crisis?

## Code D — Mitigation (Reconstruction)

1. Drawing from past experience and knowledge, are there any policy measures to guarantee long lasting solutions to managing risk resulting from natural hazards in your municipality?

* Source of policy?

2. Are there strategies to back up this policy? (probe for strategies and documentation)

3. How are you implementing the strategies? (probe for ongoing action)

4. What other strategies and actions are envisaged by your municipality?

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# Blaming Active Volcanoes or Active Volcanic Blame? Volcanic Crisis Communication and Blame Management in the Cameroon

Lee Miles, Richard Gordon and Henry Bang

## Abstract

This chapter examines the key role of blame management and avoidance in crisis communication with particular reference to developing countries and areas that frequently experience volcanic episodes and disasters. In these contexts, the chapter explores a key paradox prevalent within crisis communication and blame management concepts that has been rarely tested in empirical terms (see De Vries 2004; Brändström 2016a). In particular, the chapter examines, what it calls, the ‘paradox of frequency’ where frequency of disasters leads to twin dispositions for crisis framed as either: (i) policy failure (active about volcanic blame on others), where issues of blame for internal incompetency takes centre stage, and blame management becomes a focus of disaster managers, and/or: (ii) as event failure (in this case, the blaming of lack of external capacity on active volcanoes and thereby the blame avoidance of disaster managers). Put simply, the authors investigate whether perceptions of frequency itself is a major determinant shaping the existence, operation, and even perceived success of crisis communication in developing regions, and countries experiencing regular disaster episodes. The authors argue frequency is important in shaping the behaviour of disaster managers and rather ironically as part of crisis communication can shape expectations of community resilience and (non)-compliance. In order to explore the implications of the ‘paradox of frequency’ further, the chapter examines the case of the Cameroon, where volcanic activity and events have been regular, paying particular attention to the major disasters in 1986 (Lake Nyos Disaster - LND) and 1999 (Mount Cameroon volcanic eruption - MCE).

L. Miles (✉) · R. Gordon · H. Bang
Bournemouth University, Dorset House, Poole,
Dorset, UK
e-mail: lmiles@bournemouth.ac.uk
Keywords

Blame games • Blame management • Paradox • Frequency of disasters • Cameroon • Volcano

1 Introduction

Many parts of the world today suffer from a
combination of high vulnerability to, and fre-
quency of, natural hazards. In some instances,
this is because geological factors, such as the
existence of tectonic plate lines, result in repeated
occurrence of earthquakes, tremors, or volcanic
eruptions. In the Philippines, for example, the
complexity of geographical and geological fac-
tors prompts a ‘diversity of hazards’ from
earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, to typhoons
and flash flooding. Yet, any frequency of recur-
ring natural hazards does not automatically lead
to efficient and successful emergency planning or
disaster management. Even the experienced can
be caught out by the unexpected, leading to
public and media blame, and accusations of ‘in-
competency’, amidst government claims of
insufficient capacity or ‘incapacity’ (Wooster
et al. 2005). Within this mix, developing effec-
tive crisis communication remains a constant
challenge, especially in the management of
expectations, and the avoidance of blame
(Brandström 2016a, b). Indeed, debates about
incompetency and/or incapacity are often heard
in economically developing countries, and thus
were resilience capacity is still evolving (Cutter
et al. 2008).

The chapter examines three aspects. First, it
explores the key relationship between crisis
communication and blame avoidance and man-
agement in the context of volcanoes within
developing countries and regions. Second, it
introduces the concept of a ‘Paradox of Fre-
quency’. Thirdly, it discusses the case study of
Cameroon where a major geological volcanic
line, characterized by active and comparatively
regular volcanic and gas activity has clearly
evidenced issues of crisis communication, blame
management and the ‘Paradox of Frequency’.

2 Crisis Communication and Blame
Management: Balancing Meaning
Making, Framing and Blame
Games

2.1 Meaning-Making

As Boin et al. (2005: 82) argues, *meaning making* in crisis and disasters ‘is not just a matter of following existing contingency plans or implementing strategic choices at the outset of a crisis. It entails intuitive and improvised public communication by leaders who are suddenly cast into the hectic pace of crisis reporting’. Disaster managers and their political masters must develop integrated ‘framing’ of crisis communication that successfully embodies, on the one hand, response and recovery imperatives with a strategy for the restoration and continuity of economic activity, and on the other hand, business and national interests.

A frame is then a shared construction of
reality, and likewise, framing activity covers both
the use and the impact of frames. As Boin et al.
(2005: 88) highlights, framing represents ‘the
production of facts, images and spectacles aimed
at manipulating the perception and reaction to a
crisis’, and typically involves selective exploita-
tion of data and arguments. In addition, framing
seeks to build (public) confidence in ‘more or
less standardised sequences’ and processes so
that participants feel part of disaster planning
working towards their own key interests (Boin
et al. 2005).

Meaning making can also, however, involve
‘masking’ where disaster managers conceal
and/or downplay aspects of a disaster (to reduce
the long term impacts) during and after crises.
Above all, the outcome of successful meaning
making should be avoidance, limitation, and
control of ‘blame games’ representing the
‘struggle between protagonists inside and outside government about the allocation of responsibility for negative events’ (Brändström et al. 2008: 114).

## 2.2 Blame-Gaming

Blame management is often seen as being about blame avoidance or at least managing and controlling blame-gaming. Blame games can be seen as situations where leaders (but could be extended to entities) protect their own self-interests by projecting negative aspects of the crisis onto other actors. The attribution of blame can be a major occupation of disaster managers and their policy leaders during a disaster, seeking to avoid or shape future accountability. Boin et al. (2010: 706) argues ‘something or somebody must be blamed—for causing the crisis, failing to prevent it, or inadequately responding to it’, pointing to the fact that the ‘tragedy’ of disaster as an ‘Act of God’ or ‘beyond management’ is no longer seen as a publically or socially acceptable explanation for a crisis. There has to be allocation of blame (Brändström and Kuipers 2003: 291).

For disaster managers, the incentive to inflate or diminish blame could be incentivized by a perceived threat of future demotion or dismissal or even by future progression and promotion (Boin et al. 2009: 99; Hood 2001: 8). This can be particularly true in developing countries, where disaster management frameworks may not be that well developed or resourced, and the pressure upon individuals may even be more intense.

According to Brändström (2016a: 34), blaming theory assumes that the blaming behavior of disaster managers and policy leaders is often determined by three factors—namely (i) the wider institutional and political conditions under which blame games occur, (ii) the blame management strategies that actors employ and, (iii) the skills used to apply these strategies in the public arena. In developing countries, the conditions affecting disaster management are quite challenging—with finite resources, immature institutional arrangements, unstable political conditions, and intense competition between

governmental priorities. In other words, disposition towards blaming can be heightened principally because of the very institutional and political conditions that pertain in developing countries.

Moreover, the skills of disaster managers can also be influential, not least because a disaster provides opportunities to bring out the worst in people who seek to identify scapegoats in order to allocate blame (Ewart and McLean 2015: 169). It may also bring out the best in people and their entrepreneurial skills at times of crisis (see Miles and Petridou 2015; Miles 2016). Certainly, within the realms of crisis communication, disaster managers and policy leaders will be skillful at arming themselves with plentiful explanations to avoid blame (McGraw 1990: 119). Ewart and MacLean (2015: 168), for instance, catalogue six forms of identifiable explanations, from blaming lack of resources; the event itself; previous administration(s); the number of people and agencies involved; the delegated agency; or claiming ignorance to unforeseen consequences.

## 2.3 Framing

A critical feature within crisis communication is thus for disaster managers ‘to position themselves in relation to what caused the event’ (Brändström 2016a: 118) and distinguishing between framing causality as caused by internal (policy/political) or external (operational or other) factors. Often an external frame requires arguing ‘credibly that the events may or may not have been foreseeable’ and also challenge certainty that events were preventable or controllable once they had occurred. In particular, events affecting vulnerable disaster zones in developing countries can be portrayed as ‘forces of nature’—where disaster managers argue that they ‘cannot prevent them from happening and rarely are able to control them when they do’ (Brändström 2016a: 118). Equally, opponents and critics will attempt to link operations to the internal workings of disaster planning, policy and politics.

While there are numerous models for understanding blaming behavior and impacts
(Brändström and Kuipers 2003; Brändström 2016a) certain aspects seem especially relevant for this chapter. First, there is political/policy failure (highlighting internal causes, and examples of individual or multiple mistakes or missed signals) which can be broadly equated with ‘incompetency’. Second, there is systemic failure in relation to external factors—where the disaster management system cannot cope with the magnitude of the external event and thus there is ‘incapacity’ or ‘incapability’ to act effectively against such ‘forces of nature’ (adapted from Brändström 2016a). In this way, blame and accountability are either internalized or externalized. Frames indicating whether the events were foreseeable and controllable internalize accountability, meaning the blame is allocated to identifiable individuals and their policies. Whereas frames externalising accountability allow for disaster managers and policy makers to avoid blame and policies remain unchanged (Boin et al. 2009).

Balancing meaning making, framing, and blame gaming are therefore important for understanding crisis communication and dealing with the question of frequency of disasters also. In addition, managers framing the implications of the frequency of disasters in specific ways may lead to delegation to local actors in developing countries. Rather ironically, blame management may, directly or indirectly, facilitate narrative(s) of resilience in developing countries, where there is a bigger role for local communities and individuals doing more when confronted with ineffective or reluctant governmental action. In this way, the pressures of meaning making, framing and blame management facilitate official, and often unofficial, delegation of disaster management to others.

## 3 Paradox of Frequency: Policy Failure as ‘Incompetency’ and Event Failure as ‘Incapacity’

The ‘paradox of frequency’ highlights how frequency can be framed within crisis communication, and in particular, as a paradoxical situation

where frequency of disasters facilitates twin dispositions for crisis framing.

First, there is the frame where the frequency of disaster leads to a stress and expectation on learning and competence building. Disaster managers, faced with a regularity of events, should be able to learn and hone their competencies in handling such events to a high level. They can internalise this competency within their emergency planning and policies, and even increase their own accountability in terms of blame management. Conversely, when things go wrong, the focus will be on *blame management of ‘incompetency’*. Blame will often focus on not meeting expectations of competency and thus *policy failure* being strongly associated and framed as ‘*incompetency*’. Thus, policy failure in volcanic crisis communication could be seen as *being active about volcanic blame on disasters managers* and others responsible for community resilience. Ironically, the existence of learning leads to assumptions that subsequent inadequacy to respond equates to incompetence (in not getting on top of problems) which build on rising, and at times unrealistic, expectations that successive disaster experiences internally and proportionately enhance resilience. In this case, the frequency of disaster events leads to ever more active volcanic blame management.

Second, there is the frame where the frequency of disasters leads to a stress on the magnitude, size and regularity of the event and on blame avoidance on the grounds of ‘incapacity’. In this context, the ramifications of the disasters are so regular and/or so large that they require society and individuals to treat resilience towards disasters as part of their normal activities and as ‘business as usual’. They need to do the best they can at these often frequent, but challenging times, resulting in limited expectations on government, and beliefs that recovery times may be long given the frequency of successive events. Expectations on government, agencies and disaster managers should therefore be constrained since there is only so much capacity (or incapacity) that can be provided in handling such frequent external occurrence. The dominant frame then is constructed around blaming the
active volcanoes and not the disaster managers or policy leaders or even system. Hence, when things go wrong, it can be framed as simply ‘system failure’ where the frequency and size of disaster as an external event overwhelms the capacity of the disaster management system in place. In simple terms, *an event based failure where there is blame avoidance on the grounds of ‘incapacity’*. Given this line of reasoning, the frequency of events means that disaster managers emphasise the importance of blame avoidance on them since, in operational terms, dispositions are firmly centred on blaming the frequent activity of the respective volcano.

This paradox is all the more important since in terms of crisis communication, disaster managers face a key challenge before, during and after disasters. There is, for example, a tendency for government agencies to want to both ‘own the message’ and ‘be the messenger’, especially as disasters, by definition, exceed the capacity of affected communities and thus the public will look to national or regional leadership for assistance. There is therefore a high propensity for such agencies—by adopting this approach—to be open to both blames on grounds of *incom petence* and *incapacity* simultaneously.

## 4 Communication Challenges in the Context of Volcanic Crisis Management

In theory, disaster managers should do their best work at crisis communicating in the period before a disaster, particularly when focusing on informing, educating and concentrating on themes such as risk reduction and disaster prevention. Campaigns often use printed leaflets (Bird et al. 2010), village elder gatherings (Croinin et al. 2004) and radio broadcasts and typically include schools’ disaster awareness (Ronan et al. 2010), elderly or disabled social outreach, and early warning systems (Garcia and Fearnley 2012). Nevertheless, despite such public awareness campaigns, communities often remain reluctant to engage with government communication agendas. This may be a result of mistrust

from previous inadequate government actions or reactions to earlier disasters leading to an abiding cynicism and uncooperative attitude to subsequent public communication strategies (Haynes et al. 2008). As a result, future disaster related communications are perceived simply as government propaganda to protect reputation. It is arguable then whether governments should always be the sole owner of ‘the message’. Crisis communication officers are thus faced with the twin challenges of not only having the right message but also employing the right messenger (McGuire et al. 2009); it may be necessary to think about incompetence and incapacity dynamics both in terms of *messaging* and in terms of the *messenger* when it comes to blame.

Crisis communication in volcanic crisis management is particularly challenging because volcanoes are highly complex scenarios scientifically, socially and politically with potential dire consequences to human, financial, social, physical and natural capital if not handled properly. This is critical for volcanic crises management in developing countries because action is required in uncertain circumstances where several gaps prevent efficient volcanic risk management. These include lack of adequate human resources and weak response structures; lack of understanding of the vulnerability of exposed elements; lack of assessment of vulnerability and community resilience or the capacity to recover after a catastrophe; lack of understanding of the vulnerability of exposed elements and generally weak disaster risk management frameworks (Bang 2014; MIAVITA 2012).

This complexity in communication (Fig. 1) is not made any easier by the fact that undertaking volcanic risk, hazard and vulnerability assessment ideally requires engagement of scientific agencies with diverse expertise (Brändström 2016a; Smale 2016; MIAVITA 2012; UN 1995), as well as the integration of information flows from stakeholders at the local, regional and national levels. Significant gaps remain in communication and information flows in volcanic crisis management in many parts of the world, including the Cameroon, which are prone to volcanic hazard risks. One commonly
<figure><img src="image_139.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** Methodological framework with related information flows for managing volcanic events. Source MIAVITA (2012: 17)</figcaption></figure>

identifiable problem remains the transmission and translation of scientific early warning and monitoring, whereby: (i) scientific monitoring is regular, providing not only constant information about the hazard to disaster managers or decision-makers, but: (ii) critical assessment that also feeds into key public communications, warnings and/or instructions on the level and kinds of actions to be taken (Volcano Observatory 2016; Smale 2016). Arguably, the former is well developed for a few hundred of the world's active volcanoes (Simkin and Siebert 1994; UN 1995), while the latter is often poorly developed or absent, inadequate and/or ineffective (Sanderson 1998; Clay et al. 1999; Kokelar 2002).

# 5 Volcanic Hazards in the Cameroon

Cameroon is prone to natural hazards mainly due to a geologic/topographic feature in the country known as the Cameroon Volcanic Line (CVL) (Fig. 2). For this chapter, the 1600 km long CVL also fits the criteria of frequency, with

<figure><img src="image_140.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** The Cameroon Volcanic Line (dashed yellow line). Source Favalli et al. (2012: 424)</figcaption></figure>

regular occurrence of landslides, floods, earth tremors, toxic gas emissions (as happened in 1984 and 1986 in Lake Monoum and Lake Nyos respectively) and frequent volcanic eruptions. Located on the CVL, is Mt. Cameroon/Fako, the largest, most active volcano in West and Central
<figure><img src="image_141.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3** Map showing Lava flows produced during eruptions of Mt. Cameroon in the 20th century (red areas), and towns and villages in the region (crosshatched areas). Source Favalli et al. (2012: 424)</figcaption></figure>

Africa (Kling et al. 1987; Duruelle et al. 1987; Fitton 1987; Freeth and Kay 1987; Bang 2012, 2013), having erupted eight times in the 20th century and most recently in 2012 (Global Volcanism Program 2012). The historical record of Mt. Cameroon shows an average period of 17 years (Njome et al. 2010) between successive eruptions. Moreover, Mt. Cameroon is also notable due to its size as an elliptical volcano, straddling the continental margin at the bottom of the Gulf of Guinea in the South West Region (SWR) of Cameroon (Fig. 3), and with a height of 4095 m above sea level and an area of about 3000 km².

Generally, Mt. Cameroon is characterised by three types of eruptions: explosive types, moderately explosive types (that have built the cinder cones) and effusive types, which are responsible for lava flows (Tchoua 1971; Tsafack et al. 2009). Voluminous lava flow, rather than pyroclastic materials is the greatest threat from Mt. Cameroon, often from summit and flank eruptions (Pyle 1999). Recent studies, mapping the risk of lava flow inundation (Fig. 4) and other hazards around Mt. Cameroon (Bonne et al. 2008; Thierry et al. 2008; Favalli et al. 2012; Wantim et al. 2013),

<figure><img src="image_142.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4** Lava flow hazard map around Mt. Cameroon volcano. Source Favalli et al. (2012: 432)</figcaption></figure>

highlight the notable vulnerability of the two biggest towns, and largest population centres in the region. Buea town (90,000 people)—capital of the SWR and administrative headquarters, and Limbe town (85,000 people)—the main tourist town situated along the Atlantic coast, and other villages closer to the Volcano are susceptible to inundation by lava flow. Crisis communication is very important given that there is significant risk to strategic and critical buildings essential to disaster management located in Buea, the capital and regional headquarters of the SWR, and located at the foot of Mt. Cameroon. It should also be noted that such vulnerability also applies to earthquakes and landslides since both felt and instrumentally recorded earthquakes have been documented with the vast majority along or close to the CVL, and largely concentrated in the Mt. Cameroon region (Ateba and Tabod 2009). Volcanic eruptions are usually preceded/or accompanied by volcanic and tectonic earthquakes, indicating that earthquake monitoring remains very important for predicting MCEs.

In terms of crisis communication in the Cameroon, several aspects are also important. First, although the area was seismically active prior to the 1999 eruption, there was no extensive pre-warning or early warning system in place to
warn the population of the threat—severely reducing crisis communication. Secondly, the frequency of volcanic eruptions and the importance of earthquake monitoring have led to some developments in the Cameroon. In the Mt. Cameroon region, for example, the first network of six permanent seismic stations was setup in 1984. Thirdly, the extensiveness of the monitoring has varied at differing points in time. After the Lake Nyos Disaster (LND) in 1986, seismic monitoring of Mt. Cameroon was extended to the region on the Oku Volcanic field where Lake Nyos is situated. However, prior to the 1999 and 2000 eruptions, all but one of the sensors was working, due to lack of maintenance (Ateba et al. 2009). The number of seismic stations was increased after the 1999, and 2000 eruptions, culminating in 32 broadband stations being installed (2005–07) over the CVL and the Congo Craton. All the stations, however, were dismantled in 2007 because they were not operational, except for two, one in Ekona at the foot of Mt. Cameroon and the other in Yaounde (Ateba and Tabod 2009). The volcano is now monitored using a network of six telemeter seismic broadband stations that detect the magnitude and location of earthquakes, and data is processed at a monitoring centre, located at Ekona not far from Buea (Lenhardt and Oppenheimer 2014).

Fourthly, the crisis management framework of the Cameroon is relatively new, with most of the significant developments after the 1999/2000 volcanic eruptions. Clear institutional structures, including communications have been attempted, with volcanic crisis management falling under the remit of civil protection. The government retains the primary responsibility, and has instituted a national policy on crises management that recognises a multi-agency, interdisciplinary and inter-cooperation. The nodal coordinating agency for civil protection is the Department/Directorate of Civil Protection (DCP) in the powerful Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MTAD). Most notably, a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary approach to natural and other hazards has been operational only since 2005. This is supported by governmental legislation setting out a general national

strategy for risk reduction and disaster management that includes a National Risk Observatory, and emphasises three phases of pre-crisis, disaster response and recovery/rehabilitation—all of which stress the importance of information flows and crisis communication (Bang 2012, 2014). There is also a National Disaster Prevention and Management Programme, which ideally, should liaise with the DCP in coordinating all the local, regional, national and international stakeholders in disaster management, and envisages a decentralised structure where authority lies with chief government administrators in these administrative divisions, who double as the main crisis/disaster managers (Bang 2014). Yet as Bang (2014) notes, these policies are only as good as they appear since most have not been implemented in volcanic crisis situations in recent decades.

## 6 Crisis Communication: The Case of the 1999 Eruption of Mt. Cameroon

The 28 March–22 April 1999 eruption of Mt. Cameroon is well documented. Although the Cameroon's scientists and authorities were aware that the volcano was indeed active, the actual eruption took everyone by surprise. In terms of crisis communication when the eruption started, the local community was informed through the official government run regional state radio in Buea (CRTV Buea). The eruption, however, was not forecast in advance and the population was not pre-warned of any impending eruption, highlighting the lack of an early warning system and in tandem, effective crisis communication strategies.

This was very surprising since reports of seismic activities leading up to the eruption were available, and painted a picture of an impending eruption. The eruption, which started on 28 March, was explosive, emitting gases and pyroclastic lava flow. On 30 March, a second vent opened, releasing huge quantities of lava that flowed for about 14 km south-southwest towards the village of Bakingili (Suh et al. 2003). In
2000, a brief fissure eruption at the summit produced a lava flow that spread mostly south eastwards and stopped 4 km from the outskirts of Buea (Favalli et al. 2012). Fortunately, the lava flow rate was slow, providing sufficient time for any ‘at risk’ population on its flow path to be evacuated.

The effects of the 1999 MCE were reasonably profound. Fortunately, there were no human casualties and the damage was mainly restricted to infrastructure and economic activity. The magnitude 4 earthquake damaged houses in Buea, leaving some people homeless. Most notably the lava flow that moved towards the coast, particularly the village of Bakingili, affected over 1000 people including 600 inhabitants of Bakingili village who were subsequently evacuated; the first time ever in the history of MCEs (Atanga et al. 2010). Luckily, the 10–12 m thick lava flow narrowly missed Bakingili village, whose population had been evacuated just a few days earlier, but severely damaged infrastructure, and affected the local economy and tourism resorts of the West Coast. Volcanic ash affected the coastal villages of Batoke, Debundsha, Bakingili and Idenau, causing eye and respiratory problems (Afane et al. 2001). Gas and ash emissions also polluted drinking water for about 2600 residents in the area (Atanga et al. 2010). Although there was no human casualty, the eruption caused a total economic loss estimated at about US$790,000 (Lenhardt and Oppenheimer 2014).

## 6.1 Flaws in Crisis Communication

Three observations can be readily made in terms of the 1999 MCE. Firstly, crisis communication and early warning was found lacking. In taking everybody by surprise, the 1999 MCE exposed flaws in Cameroon’s disaster management system, including both scientific and governmental lack of preparedness, despite frequency of eruptions on Mt. Cameroon. Although various scientific studies had been carried out prior to 1999,

the Cameroonian authorities had no clear idea of the level of risks associated with the volcano (Thierry et al. 2008). In addition, there was no warning system in place to alert the population. Although, and following the 1986 LND, a carbon dioxide detection system was adopted to alert the population (Bang 2012), a more extensive early warning system had not been introduced in other hazard prone regions of the country. Indeed, this was only put in place on Mt. Cameroon after the 1999 MCE (Thierry et al. 2008). Hence, the culture of disaster management was reactive, and did not place sufficient emphasis on preparedness for natural hazards that the government, scientists and the public recognised were frequent in the Cameroon. In short, there were ready-made grounds for claims of incompetency in terms of blame management. Second, even when emergency management effectively began as part of the response phase (Fig. 5), the practical reality was that disaster response was widely dispersed providing multiple points of confusion and tension on crisis communication.

From the perspective of crisis communication, the structure centred on the scientific committee, which provided feedback of its monitoring activities to the governor of the SWR during daily meetings as the eruption continued. The meetings were open, attended by members of the public and the press, who received updates from the scientists/government and gave interviews to heads of the committees/chairpersons who consequently updated the public. Although this was an opportunity to eliminate false rumours or wrong information (Ateba and Tabod 2009), the management of the eruption revealed a plethora of problems. In practice, and as shown in Fig. 5, a complex array of actors participated in the disaster management contributing to multiple information flows and communication. Reports also suggested a striking lack of coordination in terms of sharing results and information even inside the committee, resulting in significant confusion (Ateba and Tabod 2009).

Third, the 1999 experience highlighted that there were major deficiencies in how crisis
<figure><img src="image_143.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5** Organisational structure for the management of the 1999 Mt. Cameroon eruption. Source Authors, adapted from Ateba and Tabod (2009: 45)</figcaption></figure>

communication fed into and shaped key decision-making. A good example of this relates to the specific case of the evacuation of 600 people from Bakingili Village, which occurred comparatively late, and was marred by poor preparations, and revealed many communication problems. Although the lava flow had been approaching the village for weeks, evacuation was not considered a priority, regardless of the fact that scientists monitoring the eruption had warned of the threat to the local population in the area. If the lava flow speed was faster, it would have reached Bakingili village before the evacuation. The authorities were divided about whether to inform people living on the SW flank of the Mountain that lava flow was a threat to their settlements because of fear of panic, which neither the national nor regional authorities were sufficiently prepared to handle. Simultaneously, there were radio, TV and media announcements, reassuring the villagers that any dangers were minimal and urging the population to 'stay vigilant', directly contradicting messages from

scientists monitoring the eruption who had identified that the village was along the flow path of the lava, and there was no sign of the eruption stopping soon. Moreover, field scientists close to Bakingili were warning the villagers of the danger, resulting in an overall picture where the local residents were getting different messages and mixed signals from various media. When the decision was finally taken to evacuate the residents of Bakingili village due to fear of a possible inundation by the lava flow, the confusion and delay meant that the temporary camps hastily built in Tiko, some 40 km away, lacked basic provision and/or facilities for emergency relief operations. This prompted anger amongst the relocated villagers, who subsequently blamed the government for lack of readiness, inadequate resourcing, and/or an unwillingness to adequately cater for their needs in the camps. The consequence was mistrust and miscommunication between the communities, local scientists and emergency managers (Atanga et al. 2010; Njome et al. 2010).
## 6.2 Blame Gaming and Blame Avoidance

From the blame perspective, several aspects were evident. First, blame in terms of ‘incompetency’ was directed at the authorities and identified the lack of preparedness including any emergency plan to evacuate people. This was largely framed as apportioning blame for internal policy failure and incompetence given the threat posed by lava flow in the region was already known from previous eruptions. The blame associated with such internal incompetency and policy failure far outstripped the ability of disaster managers to use blame avoidance strategies based on incapacity and system failure due to the magnitude of external events. In addition, communication on the rate of the advancing flows was not regarded as essential by the authorities, who stressed that prior eruptions had not threatened a settlement in the region before. Although the lava flow rate towards the SW coast was being regularly communicated by scientists to the authorities, nothing was forecast or reported for the ash fall, which caused health hazards affecting many communities. Above all, even as the eruption unfolded, the population in the region was not warned at any stage that this health hazard existed. Hence, the framing and blaming of incompetency was also associated with very poor communication management by the authorities with the local indigenes (Atanga et al. 2010). Compounding this was the setting up of temporary evacuation camps to host the displaced population that lacked basic facilities. Finally, the delay in the final decision to evacuate ‘at risk’ populations, and its then slow transmission to the local population is indicative of incompetence. Here, the authorities were blamed for inept decision-making, incompetent policy implementation and poor communication framed as policy rather than event failure, particularly in relation to the delay in the evacuation of Bakingili residents.

Framing and blaming of ‘incompetency’ compounded, what Atanga et al. (2010) has identified as a culture of limited or non-compliance among the Cameroonian

villages and settlements. Since the villagers had never been informed of scientific studies about risks on Mt. Cameroon, there was a reluctance to accept evacuation orders from the government notwithstanding the strong community support for enhanced crisis communication. Villagers strongly viewed effective crisis communication as the best way to enhance further and optimal co-operation with the government, including executing strategies, which would strengthen community resilience. Above all, the 1999 eruption also highlighted the need to integrate emergency planning with respect for local customs in order to avoid conflicts, which had bearing on attitudes towards compliance. Here crisis communication was also deemed to play a key role; principally in providing feedback on governmental planning and implementation. Following this line of reasoning, modern information dissemination methods need to be accompanied by and integrated with local/traditional methods to facilitate crisis communication; for example, use of the village’s traditional announcement system—‘the gong’,<fnref n="1" /> to facilitate information flow in the event of an emergency.

## 7 Discussion and Conclusions: Cameroon and the Paradox of Frequency

The experience of the 1999 Mt. Cameroon eruption leaves us with several important observations regarding the ‘paradox of frequency’. First, the lack of contingency emergency plan for a frequent event like an eruption reinforces blames framing centred on incompetency rather than incapacity. Second, the 1999 eruption highlights the importance of factoring in the cultural perception of MCEs. The local tribes around the mountain, for instance, believe eruptions are caused by the mountain God (Epasa Moto). Consequently, when he is angry, their

<footnote n="1">¹The gong is a traditional instrument, which when played or sounded; everyone is alerted and comes out to get a message.</footnote>
tribal chief offers sacrifices to appease ‘Epasa Moto’ to prevent the destruction of their villages (Atanga et al. 2010; Njome et al. 2010). Volcanic eruptions on Mt. Cameroon thus forms part of the cultural fabric of the communities, affecting the perception of volcanic hazard among indigenous populations and thus the role of government in mitigating, preparing and responding to it. It is also appropriate to factor such narratives into crisis communication in order to contextualise messaging, facilitate compliance and develop community resilience and orderly volcanic hazard response among communities around the mountain.

Third, the experience of the 1999/2000 volcanic eruptions showed how little has been learnt and embedded from the previous experience of the LND of the 1980s. Functions were duplicated and financial and material destined for the disaster survivors were embezzled (Bang 2012). There were problems with inadequate needs assessments of the disaster survivors. Similarly, in 1999, no staff from the Ministry of Health sat on the crisis committee to provide advice on health risks from the eruption thereby demonstrating deficiencies in learning about the role of scientific advice in shaping crisis communication.

According to Bang (2012), part of the reason for this lack of learning—in spite of the frequency of disasters—was that there was a notable lack of follow-up projects on the social aspects of the LND. Disaster managers failed to learn from internal policy failure and thereby how to turn incompetency into practical competency via lessons learned or at least counter accusation of incompetency via more sophisticated communication strategies. In fact, government officials used framing strategies emphasising the external nature and magnitude of the LND and the later MCE events in a quick, but largely futile, attempt to shift criticisms about policy failures in the management of the crisis from themselves. They highlighted a ‘systemic

failure’ narrative, where they attempted blame avoidance by highlighting the poor financial state of the country, combined with the magnitude of external natural events.

Other factors can be explained by concepts of blame management. Field observations by Bang reveal also that the political context is important in the Cameroon case. Government authorities and officials appointed to manage the various administrative units of the country—who also double as disaster managers—usually behaved to protect/defend their jobs/positions rather than accepting mistakes. Equally, they were resistant to delegating to others more knowledgeable in crisis management to take control, because they might be sympathisers of opposition parties and may take credit for any good job done (Bang 2012).

As a conclusion, there is empirical evidence that demonstrates that frequency of events is not a guarantee of effective learning and enhanced preparedness for the future. Later blame and blame gaming will continue especially since issues of competency remains at the fore even today in the Cameroon. Issues, such as, lack of political resolve or will, and inadequacy of human and financial resources (Bang 2014) remain as relevant today—suggesting that frequency of occurrence is not necessarily the main factor determining levels of preparedness and resilience. At the very least there needs to be continuous commitment and political will as part of the ‘bouncing forwards’ that embodies a quest for change, improvement and innovation (Miles 2016). Learning and review of experience must therefore accompany frequency of events. Simply experiencing frequent events will not automatically lead to effectiveness in handling those events. Only by incorporating more sophisticated ideas of crisis communication can any resistance to learning from previous disasters be addressed within Cameroon’s disaster management system. There is no time to waste. One thing the paradox of frequency tells us—is that time will not wait until the next disaster is upon the Cameroon.
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<figure><img src="image_144.png" /></figure>
# Part Two Summary: Observing Volcanic Crises

Gill Jolly and Carina J. Fearnley

Numerous volcanic crises have been observed, from small and local in scale, to large regional events. Each crisis has its own contingencies, both spatially and temporally. Differing cultures, politics, economics, population sizes, scales of events, types of volcanic hazards, and geographical constraints shape the dynamics of a crisis. It is potentially only with hindsight can the variables be recognised that may have played a significant role in the success or failure of a crisis. Each event can provide valuable insights of issues to be weary of in future crisis, but equally numerous examples can help build a picture of good practices or procedures that can help foster strong links during a crisis, particularly in relation to communication between the various stakeholders.

The chapters that form Part Two of this volume illustrate some of the key issues that emerge in crises, with examples from 6 continents to illustrate the diverse and wide range of issues. These chapters demonstrate that sharing knowledge and experience is vital as long as this is done in a transparent sensitive manner, preferably prior to a crisis, and with some humility.

Effective crisis communication is particularly challenging when dealing with caldera eruptions, especially during large phases of unrest when it is unclear as to whether an eruption is imminent. Given the infrequency of caldera eruptions, experiences remain limited, yet from recent caldera eruptions such as at Rabaul in Papua New Guinea, unrest can result in eruptive activity within very short time frames, in this case <27 h. This results in very little time to respond to a state of unrest, particularly when an eruption could be particularly powerful. The challenges that Hill et al., Chapter “Volcanic Unrest and Hazard Communication in Long Valley Caldera, California” experienced, during the 1980s unrest at Long Valley Caldera, highlight the need for effective messages that can easily be understood by the public at large. This includes open transparency, and being careful with media and public relations. The importance of good sound science is critical to building effective forecasts and also to building effective and credible working relations. Maintaining long-term relationships becomes increasingly challenging in an ever changing, globalised job market where continuity is hard to find. Hill et al. outline the ‘narrow path’ involved in such crises, where there is a small space between overreactions and false alarms, and conservative responses. An important lesson is that although mistakes can be costly, poor relations can be rebuilt over time.

Mt Pinatubo was an extraordinary event that balanced this ‘narrow path’ exceptionally well. Newhall and Solidum, Chapter “Volcanic Hazard Communication at Pinatubo from 1991 to 2015” speak of the ‘pressure-cooker’ that

C. J. Fearnley (✉)
Department of Science and Technology,
University College London, Gower Street,
London WC1E 6BT, UK
e-mail: c.fearnley@ucl.ac.uk

G. Jolly
GNS Science, 1 Fairway Drive, Avalon,
Lower Hutt 5010, New Zealand
e-mail: G.Jolly@gns.cri.nz

Advts in Volcanology (2018) 411–415
https://doi.org/10.1007/11157_2017_25
© The Author(s) 2017
Published Online: 11 November 2017
scientist's face, the battle between the desires to continue to obtain scientific data to reduce the uncertainties, versus the pressures to communicate immediately. Indeed the immediacy of Pinatubo was key to its success; starting educational programmes early when there were still significant levels of uncertainty, employing rigorous checklists, and building in flexibility to response plans. Some of the challenges of Pinatubo were that this caldera eruption occurred following a period of long dormancy, generating scepticism. Embracing potential false alarms, reviewing the various possible scenarios, and striving for scientific coordination are clearly vital to the success of these large scale events. Indeed the recognition of trust and personal connections between the various stakeholders are sometimes more important than the warning itself. The challenges of calderas often only begin with the eruptions, but can continue with various hazards for decades after.

The 1994 eruption of Rabaul in Papua New Guinea is a positive example of an informed responsive community living around an active caldera. McKee et al., Chapter “The 1994 eruptions at Rabaul Volcano, Papua New Guinea: the roles of instrumental volcano surveillance and community awareness in preparing for the outbreak of the eruptions” outline the experiences of those living at Rabaul, many of whom have had to deal with several periods of unrest, most with only a few hours indication of an imminent eruption, across numerous vents. Whilst Papua New Guinea would benefit from the use of automated and continuous data to aid the monitoring process, with raised community awareness surrounding the volcano, crisis communication can become somewhat surplus, particularly when populations decide to self-evacuate. One of the challenges faced in Rabaul was the looting that occurred when the mass evacuation began, which also affected observatory staff. It easy to forget that observatory and civil defence personnel are also affected by looting, and civil unrest can lead to significant logistical issues for those who are trying to do their job, whilst keeping family safe.

Prolonged, low-level volcanic crises produce very different challenges to those of calderas. Popocatepetl volcano in Mexico, surrounded by over 20 million people, and persistently active over the last 20 years presents some of the most challenging conditions to effectively communicate. De la Cruz-Reyna et al., Chapter “Challenges in Responding to a Sustained, Continuing Volcanic Crisis: The Case of Popocatépetl Volcano, Mexico, 1994-Present” outlines potential solutions to maintaining a responsive community despite indifference and weariness at times among the vulnerable populations: use of social media, increasing use of web cameras and the use of their Volcano Traffic Light Alert Systems (VTLAS). The VTLAS translate the level of volcanic hazard into three alert levels for the populations, leaving no room for uncertainty about what needs to be done in response to the warning. Yet, the lessons learnt in Mexico illustrate the value of consensual approaches and deliberations between the scientists and civil protection organisations to manage the uncertainties of forecasting potential activity.

Personal connections are a recurring theme in Part 2, where at Mt Ruapehu in New Zealand, years of preparedness, communication, and building understanding through planning and simulation exercises have resulted in effective lahar management around Mt Ruapehu. Becker et al., Chapter “Organisational Response to the 2007 Ruapehu Crater Lake Dam-Break Lahar in New Zealand: Use of Communication in Creating an Effective Response” highlight the increase in communication during the crisis relative to the simulation. Despite the successful preparation, increased communication presented new challenges to the communication flows between the various stakeholders that was averted by using a diversity of communication channels. This highlights the need to have numerous channels in places, not only as a back up, but to enable multi-actor network communication and collaboration.

The Eyjafjallajökull 2010 eruption was a relatively small infrequent event that caused a significant crisis globally. The management of the crisis demonstrated that pre-eruption risk
communication is critical to building trust between emergency management officials and the general public. Bird et al., in “Crisis Coordination and Communication During the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull Eruption” outline the value of speaking with ‘one voice’, a challenge when many institutions work together, but in this case it was successful with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, not just within Iceland, but also across Europe. This case study highlights the need for dedicated media centers, in order to meet the enormous demands for information, particularly for such an event that causes international chaos and travel disruption.

For both frequently erupting and long-dormant volcanoes, Solana et al., Chapter “Supporting the Development of Procedures for Communications During Volcanic Emergencies: Lessons Learnt from the Canary Islands (Spain) and Etna and Stromboli (Italy)” highlight the challenges of managing these uncertain events. The inexperience of all involved (from the scientists to the public) can create significant tensions and misunderstandings that can result in poor communication, and lead to poor decision making processes. To overcome these challenges, the key is to clearly define roles and responsibilities between responding groups, along with detailing the communication protocols prior to the event. In particular the liability of scientific groups needs to be carefully outlined. To facilitate this, coordinating bodies that sit outside the scientific community are vital to generate consensus and recognise the different cultures, needs and limitations of the responding groups. Solana et al. also highlight the advantages of working with external researcher, sharing resources, and engaging the public, and outline an Italian model that encourages collaboration and camaraderie.

With over 127 active volcanoes, from the supervolcanic to the effusive style, Chapter “Integrating The Social And Physical Perspective In Mitigation Policy And Practice” by Andreastuti et al. outlines that Indonesia has much to teach us about the importance of communicating hazard information. To achieve mutual understandings across different actors and

cultures informal approaches are often seen as the most effective, this is done via ‘socialization’ using participatory knowledge dissemination. This enables local populations to engage with, and understand the hazards and risks they face, empowering them to conduct their own assessments and make their own decisions. The strong focus on public participation helps maintain strong communication networks and lasting relationships. Whilst each volcano is different, each community around a volcano also has different features that result in different responses, that should influence the way scientists and government agencies communicate and manage volcanic crises. Where the social and physical perspectives of the volcano are integrated, meaningful communication that adapts over time is developed.

The experiences of Volcano Colima in Mexico as discussed by Cuevas-Muniz and Gavilanes Ruiz, “Social Representation of Human Resettlement Associated with Risk from Volcán de Colima, Mexico” describe the importance of the social representation of volcanic risk and how it is redefined by daily life. A key lesson learnt from these experiences is that rather than communication processes that omit the knowledge, values, and desires formed by the vulnerable populations, there is a need to find a way to improve social representation. This needs to be established within both the policy and practice of crisis communication and management, particularly when linked to the resettlement of local populations, who need a voice in the decision-making processes. The study of La Yerbauena highlights the consequences of mistrust and resentment that can result from a breakdown in this vital communication.

“If I Understand, I am Understood: Experiences of Volcanic Risk Communication in Colombia” is a poignant phrase from the work of Garcia and Mendez-Fajury that explores risk communication experiences during volcanic emergencies in Colombia. This reflective highlights the importance of a solid social science research program, to not only increase the impact of crisis communication, but also help the authorities and scientists improve their decision-making processes by understanding
the social processes involved. There has been sig-
nificant focus on various education programmes to
foster better understandings around the science of
volcanic eruptions. Whilst the community tends to
trust in the technical work of the scientific volcanic
community of Colombia, further assessment of the
relevance and perception of technical scientific
reports by the public is required to establish how
much of this information is understood and
assimilated.

For island communities living in the shadows
of volcanoes, there is a particularly strong
influence of historical, political, cultural, social,
economic, and environmental factors influencing
the success and failure of volcanic risk commu-
nication. Komorowski et al., Chap-
ter "Challenges of Volcanic Crises on Small
Islands States" outline the particular intensity of
politics that manifests in island communities,
'perhaps because of, rather than despite, the
smallness and tightness of the communities,
amongst other island characteristics'. Given the
small scale and often independent communica-
tion, it is vital these local communities are
engaged rather than 'consulted' so to be able to
work with communities on their terms. This
provides the opportunities for collaboration with
communities rather than being shaped or domi-
nated by one political party or group of actors.
It is vital to be clear what is known and
unknown and what can reasonably be done to fill
the gaps.

Mt Cameroon volcano, Cameroon, like many
volcanic regions around the world is still poorly
understood. Marmol et al., Chap-
ter "Investigating the management of geological
hazards and risks in the Mt Cameroon area using
Focus Group Discussions" provide valuable
guidance on how to develop an effective risk
management structure and generate risk reduc-
tion actions when political, social and economic
conditions are challenging. Problems at Mt
Cameroon range from the physical hazard

aspects, to a lack of resources or capacity to
monitor and mitigate against hazards and little
willingness of political leaders to raise awareness
and implement effective policy. To move to
overcome these obstacles, Marmol et al. describe
how they conducted a series of focus group dis-
cussions (FGDs) with city councillors from three
municipalities around Mt Cameroon volcano,
Cameroon. The authors highlight a strong need
in such cases for scientists to work together with
national and local authorities to translate the
findings of scientific hazard and risk assessment
into improved risk management practices. This
chapter demonstrates that FGDs can provide an
excellent framework in which to implement these
aspirations through enabling interactions
between all actors, with the opinion of all par-
ticipants being considered at an equal level.

Whilst still focusing on Mt Cameroon volca-
noe, Bang et al., "Blaming Active Volcanoes or
Active Volcanic Blame? Volcanic Crisis
Communication and Blame Management in the
Cameroon" outlines the challenges of a 'blame'
culture; they explore how blame can be managed
and avoided, particularly in developing countries
with frequent volcanic activity. Here, 'a paradox
of frequency' can occur whereby a crisis can be
blamed on either policy failure, or event failure.
Blame and conflict between competing scientific
groups can be highly destructive for all stake-
holders and often arises due to a lack of clear and
inclusive protocols. Frequency of crises can be
important in shaping the behaviours of disaster
managers and also of the local populations. Often
Cameroon government authorities act to protect
and defend their jobs rather than accepting mis-
takes and applying learnings. The chapter con-
cludes by noting that it may not be the case that
the frequency of events guarantees effective
learning and enhanced preparedness, but that
continued lack of political will and financial and
human resources may hinder learning those vital
lessons.
**Open Access** This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, a link is provided to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

<figure><img src="image_145.png" /></figure>
Part Three

Communicating into the Future

Deanne K. Bird and Katharine Haynes
# Communicating Information on Eruptions and Their Impacts from the Earliest Times Until the Late Twentieth Century

David Chester, Angus Duncan, Rui Coutinho, Nicolau Wallenstein and Stefano Branca

## Abstract

Volcanoes hold a fascination for human beings and, before they were recorded by literate observers, eruptions were portrayed in art, were recalled in legend and became incorporated into religious practices: being viewed as agents of punishment, bounty or intimidation depending upon their state of activity and the culture involved. In the Middle East the earliest record dates from the third millennium BCE and knowledge of volcanoes increased progressively over time. In the first century CE written records noted nine volcanoes in the Mediterranean region plus Mount Cameroon in West Africa, yet by 1380 AD the record only totalled 48, with volcanoes in Japan, Indonesia and Iceland being added. After this the list of continued to increase, but important regions such as New Zealand and Hawaii were only added during the last 200 years. Only from 1900 did the rate of growth decline significantly, but it is sobering to recall that in the twentieth century major eruptions have occurred from volcanoes that were considered inactive or extinct, examples including: Mount Lamington—Papua New Guinea, 1951; Mount Arenal—Costa Rica, 1968 and Nyos—Cameroon, 1986. Although there were instances where the human impact of historical eruptions were studied in detail, with

D. Chester (✉)
Department of Geography and Environmental
Science, Liverpool Hope University, Liverpool L16
9JD, UK
e-mail: jg54@liv.ac.uk

D. Chester
Department and Planning, University of Liverpool,
Liverpool L69 3BX, UK

A. Duncan
Department of Geography and Planning, University
of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
e-mail: A.M.Duncan@liverpool.ac.uk

R. Coutinho · N. Wallenstein
Centro de Vulcanologia e Avaliação de Riscos
Geológicos, Universidade dos Açores, Rua da Mãe
de Deus, 9501-801 Ponta Delgada, Portugal
e-mail: Rui.MS.Coutinho@azores.gov.pt

N. Wallenstein
e-mail: Nicolau.MB.Wallenstein@azores.gov.pt

S. Branca
Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia,
95125 Catania, Sicily, Italy
e-mail: branca@ct.ingv.it
examples including the 1883 eruption of Krakatau and 1943–1952 eruption of Parícutin, these were exceptions and before 1980 there was a significant knowledge gap about both the short and long-term effects of major eruptions on societies. Following a global review, this chapter provides a discussion of the ways in which information has been collected, compiled and disseminated from the earliest times until the 1980s in two case study areas: the Azores Islands (Portugal) and southern Italy. In Italy information on eruptions stretches back to prehistoric times and has become progressively better known over more than 2,000 years, yet even here there remain significant gaps in the record even for events that took place between 1900 and 1990. In contrast, located in the middle of the Atlantic, the Azores have been isolated for much of their history and illustrate the difficulties involved in using indigenous sources to compile, not only assessments of impact, but also at a more basic level a complete list of historical events with accurate dates.

**Keywords**

History of eruptions · Increase in global knowledge of eruptions · Volcanoes of Southern Italy and the Azores

# 1 Introduction: The Global Picture

The purpose of this chapter is two fold. First, to review the communication of information on eruptions and its dissemination from the earliest times until the onset of the ‘modern’ era of volcanology, which for the purpose of this volume is taken to be the latter part of the 20th century. In the last three decades of the twentieth century volcanology experienced a major change in its scientific status, with events such as the eruption of Mount St. Helens in 1980 and space missions to the terrestrial planets highlighting the important role of volcanism as a planetary process. This in turn focused interest on volcanology and stimulated research funding which, *inter alia*, placed the communication of information on eruptions and their impacts on a more secure footing. The authors are aware that, given the present state of published research, especially on early historic eruptions, this account cannot be truly ‘global’ and will of necessity be strongly biased towards the acquisition and dissemination of information within countries that are part of

the ‘western’ intellectual tradition, though where possible we have endeavoured to spread the net more widely.

Secondly, the issues surrounding communication will be explored by means of two case studies: the Azores (Portugal) and Mt. Etna in Sicily. These case studies provide good—in some respects contrasting—examples of the ways in which responses to eruptions and their impacts have evolved, from the earliest recorded eruptions to the situation obtaining towards the close of the twentieth century. Although both the Azores and Mt. Etna provide documentary accounts of activity, in each area the distinctive written source and varying eruptive styles and impacts, allow differing insights to emerge. Etna has one of the most extensive records of volcanic activity which stretches over some 2000 years of recorded history. Early accounts from the classical era sought mythical explanations of activity, although some later Greek and Roman writers suggested more rational explanations, though even these were not usually based on detailed observation (Chester et al. 2000). Sicily is
located at the centre of the Mediterranean Region and historically had excellent communications with the wider European world. The Renaissance led to the early development of empirical science and a letter, for instance, read to the *Royal Society of London* shows insightful observations of the 1669 eruption of Etna (Anon 1669). In the 19th century and following the eighteenth century Enlightenment, Etna became an important field area for many European scientists, including Carlo Gemmellaro (1787–1866), Charles Lyell (1794–1875), George Poulett Scrope (1797–1876) and Wolfgang Sartorius von WALTERSHAUSEN (1809–1876), who went on to make major contributions to the understanding of geology and its development as a discipline. More recently, Etna was selected: as one of decade volcanoes for detailed interdisciplinary study as part of the United Nations designated International Decade of Natural Disaster Reduction (1990–2000); and as a Laboratory Volcano jointly sponsored by the European Economic Communities<fnref n="1" /> and the European Science Foundation. In contrast, the Azores have been historically isolated from mainland Europe. Eruptions before the twentieth century did not attract international attention or, indeed, much interest from mainland Portugal. Records were mostly archived locally and generally did not contribute to the development of scientific thinking more widely until the second half of the twentieth century.

## 2 Communicating Scientific Information: Prehistoric and Historical Perspectives

In the early 1980s it was well established that, even before there were written records of volcanoes and their activity, eruptions were depicted in art, remembered orally and formed part of often elaborate religious rituals, volcanoes being viewed as ‘agents of benevolence, fear or vengeance depending on their state of activity and the society involved’ (Chester 2005, p. 404;

Blong 1982, 1984). In the Middle East, it is often claimed by volcanologists and others that the earliest record of an eruption is a wall painting from the Neolithic town of Çatal Hüyük in Anatolia, showing an eruption with the ejection of blocks and bombs (Mellaart 1967, pp. 59–60, 176–177; Chester 2005). More recently the archaeological team working at the site have concluded that the putative ‘volcano’ is actually a leopard skin with spots (Hodder 2015, personal communication). The earliest definite records of volcanic activity date, however, from Mesopotamia in the third millennium BCE (Foster 1996; Polinger-Foster and Ritner 1996)<fnref n="2" /> and were soon followed by accounts of volcanic activity by Greek, Roman and Islamic writers (Sigurdsson 1999, pp. 14–17).<fnref n="3" /> The eruption of Aso volcano in 553 CE was the earliest recorded eruption in Japan (Simkin et al. 1981, p. 66). It occurred a year after Buddhism had been introduced into the country (Keys 1999, pp. 323–324) and may reflect the importance of religious functionaries in providing written accounts about important events.

Most of the data currently available on historic volcanic activity has been collected by the Smithsonian Institution through the *Global Volcanism Program* (GVP), which collates information on current and past activity over the past 10,000 years. Accounts of current activity are provided by the Smithsonian—USGS *Weekly Activity Report*, and comprehensive summaries of past activity are available in the *Bulletin of the*

<footnote n="1">¹Now the European Union.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">²Accounts include ‘Starry Mountain’ in the Khabur Region. This is probably Kawbab volcano in Mesopotamia (Polinger-Foster and Ritner 1996).</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³Special attention was paid to Santorini (ancient Thera), Vesuvius and Etna. One of the most significant episodes in Islamic intellectual history was the translation of classical texts into Arabic, some of which included accounts of extreme natural events. This took place in Baghdad and other centres of scholarship between the beginning of the eighth and the close of the tenth centuries CE. In some cases this ensured preservation of important information on eruptions. Especially in Spain, the role of Islamic scholars needs to be acknowledged. Authors, who including the philosopher Ibn Rushd (Latin—Averroes), not only engaged with these texts, but also added their own observations on natural phenomena (Stone 2003; Akasoy 2007).</footnote>
*Global Volcanism Network*. These data are periodically archived in successive editions of *Volcanoes of the World* (Simkin et al. 1981; Simkin and Siebert 1994; Seibert et al. 2010). Progress up to the 1980s in both locating volcanoes and cataloguing their eruptions is summarised succinctly in a quotation from the first (1981) edition of *Volcanoes of the World*:

> if a list of... volcanoes had been continually kept, it would, at the time of Christ, have contained only the names of 9 Mediterranean volcanoes and West Africa's Mount Cameroon.<fnref n="4" /> In the next 10 centuries the list would have grown by only 17 names, 14 of them Japanese. The first historic eruptions of Indonesia were in 1000 and 1006, and newly settled Iceland soon added 9 volcanoes to help swell the list to 48 by 1380 AD... The list has continued to grow, with several important volcanic regions such as Hawaii and New Zealand being completely unrepresented until the last 200 years. Only in the present century has the *rate* of growth declined significantly (Simkin et al. 1981, p. 23).

Later editions of *Volcanoes of the World* show that advances in knowledge have not slackened and that, whereas in 1981 there were 627 volcanoes with recorded eruptions, by 1994 this figure had risen to 719 and reached 858 in 2010 (Simkin and Siebert 1994; Seibert et al. 2010), largely due to: better monitoring of present day eruptions—especially of those occurring in isolated areas through the use of satellite-based remote sensing; and improved knowledge of events which occurred in antiquity. With regards to the latter, there have been few years in the past three decades that have not seen major publications dealing with pre-historic eruptions, although reviewing these works is beyond the scope of this chapter (see: Firth and McGuire 1999; Sigurdsson 1999; Harris 2000; McCoy and Heiken 2000; McGuire et al. 2000; Balmuth et al. 2005; Grattan 2006; Grattan and Torrence 2007; Oppenheimer 2011).

In terms of better recording, not only has the *Smithsonian Institution* continued its invaluable work since 1981 in collecting eruption information and disseminating it to the volcanological research community, but data especially on

human impact has also become more widely available. This was not just from academic authors (e.g. Tanguy et al. 1998; Witham 2005; Cashman and Giordano 2008), but from organizations which have included: the Brussels-based *Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters* (or CRED); and re-insurance companies, in particular Munich Re (Auker et al. 2013). Advances continue to be made in the second decade of the twenty-first century as witnessed by the new data-base of large magnitude explosive volcanic eruptions (LaMEVE), which forms part of the larger *Volcanic Global Risk Identification and Analysis Project* (VOGRIPA) (Crosweller et al. 2012), and the improved catalogue of fatalities caused by volcanic activity from 1600 to 2010 (Auker et al. 2013).

When examining the written record between 1400 CE when around 50 volcanoes were identified and 1980, when the figure reached 627, there are several points which require more detailed discussion. First, it is clear from the quotation from *Volcanoes of the World* (1981) which is cited above, that progress did not occur at a constant rate during the 580 years which elapsed from 1400 to 1980. There were two periods of marked growth in the list of known active volcanoes: a steady increase from the beginning of the 16th century to the mid-18th century and a second episode of more rapid growth from the mid-18th century to the mid-20th century (Fig. 1). The first period coincides with the *Renaissance* and *Age of Exploration*, especially Spanish and Portuguese penetration into the New World and the invention of the printing press. The second phase reflects a number of developments which include: the easier dissemination of information because of the more widespread use and distribution of printed material particularly newspapers and magazines; the great increase in industrialization, scientific understanding, technology and global trade and the more open intellectual climate associated with the *Enlightenment*.<fnref n="5" /> This was facilitated by major advances

<footnote n="4">⁴Mount Cameroon was first observed in eruption by Hannon, a Carthaginian navigator in the fifth century BCE (Anon 2015).</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵The *Enlightenment* was an intellectual movement which began in the British Isles in seventeenth century and</footnote>
<figure><img src="image_146.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** The reporting of global volcanic activity up to 1980 CE. *Top* known and active volcanoes, and world population 1400–1980. Volcanoes active per year are plotted as a 10 year running mean. ‘Volcanoes known’ represents the total number to have had historic eruptions. *Bottom* the number of eruptions (**right hand scale**)</figcaption></figure>

producing $\ge 0.1 \text{ km}^3$ of tephra, plotted as a 10-year running mean. Eruptions $\ge 0.1 \text{ km}^3$ of tephra equates to a VEI (i.e. *Volcanic Explosivity Index*) of 4—Newhall and Self (1982). From Siebert et al. (2010, Fig. 9, p. 32 and Fig. 10, p. 33) and reproduced by permission of the University of California Press

developed in other European and North American countries in the eighteenth century. Its leading doctrines were *inter-alia*: a commitment to reason; the notion of progress, based on education, science and the arts; the rejection of the authority of tradition including religious tradition and a stress on nature which can be studied using empirical methods (Inwood 1995).

in communication; first daily newspapers and
from the mid-19th century the electric telegraph.
Growth continued up to 1980 as these tech-
nologies together with others which came into
use—including telex and rapid reliable
air-transport—were further developed. By 2010 a
flattening in the trend line of the number of
volcanoes recorded as active per year, implies

<footnote>(Footnote 5 continued)</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 1** Eruption catalogues from 1825 to 1981 (based on Simkin et al. (1981), with additional information from the references cited in the table and: Simkin (1993, 1994), Sigurdsson (1999, 2000), Simkin and Siebert (2000), Simkin et al. (2001 and the references cited in the table)</caption><thead><tr><th>Catalogue (author, date and abbreviated title)<sup>a</sup></th><th>Volcanoes with dated eruptions</th><th>Comments</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Scrope (1825) Considerations on volcanoes</td><td>150</td><td rowspan="5">From scope's catalogue published in 1825 to that compiled by Schneider (1911), most of the information was derived from archival sources, with relatively little being added from field investigations</td></tr><tr><td>von Humboldt (1858) Kosmas...</td><td>225</td></tr><tr><td>Scrope (1862) Volcanoes...</td><td>191</td></tr><tr><td>Fuchs (1865) Die vulkanischen erscheinungen der Erde</td><td>270</td></tr><tr><td>Mercalli (1907) Vulcani attivi della terra</td><td>231</td></tr><tr><td>Schneider (1911) Die vulkanischen erscheinungen der Erde</td><td>298</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Sapper (1917) Katalog der geschichtlichen Vulkanausbruche</td><td>430</td><td>From the close of the first decade of the twentieth century, field investigations recognised more and more active volcanoes. The dedicated journal, Bulletin Volcanologique, was first published in 1924 and greatly facilitated the dissemination of data collected during field investigations (see below)</td></tr><tr><td>Catalogue of active volcanoes of the world (CAVW 1951–1975)</td><td>441</td><td>In May 1922 at the Rome meeting of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG)<sup>b</sup>, proposed a catalogue authored by geologists familiar with particular regions. The Great Depression of the 1930s and the Second World War delayed this project until the 1950s. Later in 1960 the IUGG decided to publish a Bulletin of Volcanic Eruptions to record eruptions each year. Reports were compiled by the Volcanological Society of Japan and publishing in Bulletin Volcanologique</td></tr><tr><td>Lamb (1970) Volcanic dust in the atmosphere...</td><td>435</td><td>Compiled to study eruptions of meteorological significance</td></tr><tr><td>Macdonald (1972) Volcanoes</td><td>516</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Gushchenko (1979) Eruptions of the volcanoes of the world...</td><td>609</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Simkin et al. (1981) Volcanoes of the world</td><td>627</td><td>This catalogue grew out of the Smithsonian Center for Short-Lived Phenomena (CSLP) which as set up in 1968. In 1975 the Smithsonian incorporated the CSLP into the Washington-based Scientific Event Alert Network (SEAN), which published a monthly bulletin of eruptions and summarised these in the journal Geotimes. The full SEAN was available through subscription</td></tr></tbody></table>

that virtually all volcanic eruptions on land have been identified (Seibert et al. 2010).

With respect to the scientific community, communication was greatly facilitated by the publication of summary catalogues. In the 17th century, the pioneering work of Bernhardus Varenius (1650)<sup>6</sup> was noteworthy, but from the

beginning of the 19th century the number of catalogues burgeoned (Table 1), being formalized in the mid-20th century with the publication of the Catalog of Active Volcanoes of the World (1951–1975). As Table 1 shows, in the early

<footnote><sup>a</sup>There is also the catalogue of von Hoff and Berghaus (1840/41). This is not included because the coverage of not global, but is strongly biased towards the 'old world'</footnote>

<footnote><sup>b</sup>Later this became the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior (IAVCEI)</footnote>

<footnote>(Footnote 6 continued)</footnote>

<footnote>Amsterdam. He was aware of the discoveries of many contemporary Dutch navigators. He listed 21 volcanoes with dated eruptions (Simkin et al. 1981: 1).</footnote>

<footnote n="6"><sup>6</sup>A German geographer, who was also known as Bernhardus Varen (1622–1650), worked mostly in</footnote>
1980s communication was still dominated by paper-based media with circulation being restricted to academic institutions and government research organisations who were both willing and had the financial means to subscribe to learned journals and reports.

Several authors the majority of whom are or have been associated with the *Smithsonian Institution* (Simkin 1993, 1994; Simkin and Siebert 2000; Simkin et al. 2001), have commented further on the historic trends plotted in Fig. 1. They note, *inter alia*:

a. That the increase in the number of active volcanoes<fnref n="7" /> over time is related to growth in the world's population and better communications, and not to any increase in the frequency of volcanic activity.

b. When the period from ca. 1800 is examined in more detail (Fig. 1) peaks and troughs become apparent. Peaks can be seen to follow newsworthy eruptions such as the three large magnitude events of 1902 (i.e. Mont Peleé, Martinique; La Soufriére, St. Vincent and Santa Maria, Guatemala) and Krakatau, Indonesia in 1883. Simkin and Siebert (1994) argue that such peaks are due to increased post-eruption reporting when there was a heightened awareness of activity. Not only did these eruptions produce voluminous newspaper reports in many countries, the London *Times* for example publishing 14 reports on Krakatau alone some of them very detailed,<fnref n="8" /> but also major scientific studies (e.g. Lacroix 1904; Verbeek 1884). Troughs, in contrast, coincide with the disruption of global science brought about by the First and Second World Wars, and the Great

Depression of the 1930s which followed the Wall Street stock market crash of 1929.

c. One measure of the incomplete character of the eruption archive before the last few centuries, is that even the record of large eruptions decays rapidly from an average of more than 5 per decade in recent centuries to 0.7 per decade before the 15th century (Simkin and Siebert 1994). Other studies of underreporting have been published by Deligne et al. (2010) and Furlan (2010).

d. Fatal eruptions are far more likely to be preserved in the historical record than non-fatal ones (Simkin et al. 2001). For eruptions occurring since 1500 CE, detailed information on human impacts is generally more sparse than data on eruptive processes and their effects, although this imbalance was beginning to be redressed albeit in an inchoate fashion in the years leading up to 1980 (e.g. Furneaux 1965; Nolan 1979; Simkin and Fiske 1983; Blong 1984).

e. In many part of the world eruption records are short—often less than one hundred years—whereas repose periods of many volcanoes are much longer (Tazieff 1983). This means that even in the decades immediately before 1980, several large eruptions occurred from volcanoes which were thought by local populations to have been inactive. Examples included: Mount Lamington, in Papua New Guinea which killed ca. 5000 people in 1951; Mount Arenal (Costa Rica) in 1968 and Heimaey (Iceland) in 1973 (Chester 2005). This raises the important question of how scientists can effectively communicate risk to communities who do not consider a given volcano to be active. Long repose is often associated, moreover, with the silicic volcanism of subduction zones, regions in which there are dense clusters of population.

Discussion of the historic increase of information about volcanoes and their eruptions has been focused so far at the global scale, but in the sections that follow progress will be reviewed with reference to the two case studies: the Azores in Portugal and Mount Etna, Sicily (southern

<footnote n="7">⁷An active volcano is frequently defined as one showing historic activity. This definition introduces a lack of consistency, because the span of historic records varies across the world from thousands to less than 200 years. We follow *Volcanoes of the World* in including volcanoes with dated eruptions that have occurred during the Holocene i.e. the last 10,000 years (Simkin and Siebert 1994, p. 12).</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸These are available electronically from *The Times Digital Archive*—last accessed 9/5/14.</footnote>