contributions are respected. Recognising the different organisational cultures of the responding groups is vital for a better understanding of each party’s needs and limitations and for optimising the design of communication strategies.

Finally, the Italian model demonstrates the benefits of establishing an on-site, inclusive and multidisciplinary institution to produce and coordinate scientific information and to encourage collaboration and camaraderie. It also illustrates the advantages of incorporating external researchers, of sharing resources and of engaging the public to improve the understanding of the volcano in unrest. The allocation of appropriate government funding and resources to all these activities is, of course, key to their success.

**Acknowledgements** We would like to thank the organisers and participants of the VUELCO meeting in Rome in 2013 for their participation in an informal survey and especially Carina Fearnley for her help with the data collection. We also thank the scientific and civil defence personnel involved in the response to the 2011–2012 El Hierro emergency for sharing their opinions and concerns. A special thank you goes to Roger Jennings for highlighting the institutional and managerial differences between private and public organisations and academia. Finally we would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments and advice.

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Integrating Social and Physical
Perspectives of Mitigation Policy
and Practice in Indonesia

Supriyati Andreastuti, Agus Budianto
and Eko Teguh Paripurno

Abstract

Earthquakes, tsunami, landslide and volcanic eruptions occur frequently in Indonesia. The frequency of events combined with high population and widely varied culture, differing levels of education and knowledge of natural hazards, as well as varied income, combine to give the country a high risk for natural disaster. Communication in hazard zones is affected by a number of factors such as: differing terminology and perceptions of hazards by the public, scientists, and disaster managers; how scientists and emergency managers communicate information; and how effectively the media transfers the information to the public. Communication is also complicated by culture, social factors and a wide variety of local languages. In Indonesia, disaster mitigation efforts at the national level are coordinated by National Disaster Management Agency; whereas, provincial and regional disaster agencies are responsible for managing within their domains and in most cases local authorities are responsible for specific mitigation actions, such as evacuations. Transferring hazard information is an important process in mitigation. In order to obtain efficient communication with the public, trusting relationships between scientists and communities are required. An understanding by scientists and emergency managers of local culture, local languages and people's character facilitates communication and contributes to trust. In addition, the media used for information can contribute significantly to improving communication. Hazard communication also aims to improve the capacity of communities through enhancing their knowledge and strengthening of their mitigation institutions. In hazard zones, effective mitigation requires

<footnote>S. Andreastuti (✉) · A. Budianto
Center for Volcanology and Geological Hazard
Mitigation, Jl. Diponegoro no 57, Bandung 40122,
Indonesia
e-mail: s.andreastuti@yahoo.com</footnote>

<footnote>A. Budianto
e-mail: agusbudianto.vsi@gmail.com</footnote>

<footnote>E.T. Paripurno
Universitas Pembangunan Nasional 'Veteran'
Yogyakarta, Jl. SWK 104 (Lingkar Utara),
Condongcatur, Daerah Istimewa, Yogyakarta 55283,
Indonesia
e-mail: paripurno@upnyk.ac.id</footnote>
participation and community empowerment with activities before, during and after disasters. A lesson learned from numerous volcanic eruptions in Indonesia is that each volcano has a different character, based not only on the physical characteristics of eruptions but also on geographic, social and cultural features. These features result in different responses of people during crises and they influence the way scientists and government agencies communicate and deal with the process of evacuation and repatriation.

Keywords

Natural hazards • Hazard communication • Information transfer • Lessons learnt • Community capacity

# 1 Introduction

Indonesia is located between 3 tectonic plates, Indo-Australia, Eurasia and Pacific plates. This plate tectonic configuration exposes the nation to a wide range of geological hazards, i.e. earthquakes, tsunami, landslides and volcano eruptions. According to the Indonesia National Disaster Agency (2014), there are about 200 million people at risk from earthquakes; 4 million at risk from tsunami, 200 million at risk from landslides and 5 million people at risk from volcanic eruptions. With a population of 227,641,326 (Government of Indonesia 2010) and the dense population in hazard zones, risk reduction efforts are a priority of the government.

This chapter will discuss disasters as related to volcanic eruptions. Indonesia has 127 active volcanoes (Fig. 1), 77 are classified Type A, which have experienced one or more eruptions since 1600 AD. Type A are monitoring priority volcanoes. Type B (29 Volcanoes), last erupted before 1600 AD and show evidence of volcanic activity, such as fumaroles or solfatara. Type C (21 volcanoes), do not have any record of historic eruptions, but show fumarole and or Sofatara activity. In 2015 (October), there were 18 volcanoes with activity above normal levels, 2 of those were in level 3 (Watch) and 1 in level 4 (Warning).

In hazard mitigation, there are 3 stages; pre-disaster, syn-disaster, and post disaster.

According to Law no 24 (2007) of the Republic of Indonesia concerning Disaster Mitigation, efforts of mitigation shall be emphasized in pre-disaster activity programs, such as capacity building to prepare community awareness. Communication with the public is an important part of developing community preparedness in volcanic hazard zones. Our experience in Indonesia shows that disaster mitigation can only be achieved successfully if preparedness is carried out at the community level. During this process, participatory action to empower people is the key to people taking action during crisis according to their preparedness (e.g., Paton and Johnston 2001; Ronan and Johnson 2005).

This paper highlights the process of participatory management of crises and empowerment of responsible media to fill communication gaps between scientist and managers on one side and communities on the other side.

Below we describe methods used in Indonesia and lessons learned in seeking optimal preparedness.

# 2 Disaster Mitigation in Indonesia

In Indonesia, implementation for disaster mitigation is coordinated by the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and by Provincial and Regional Disaster Management Agencies (BPBD), who are responsible for managing within their domains. The institution responsible
<figure><img src="image_113.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** Distribution of Indonesia volcanoes. Symbols: red triangles, Type A; yellow triangles, Type B and C</figcaption></figure>
<table><caption>**Table 1** Volcano activity in Indonesia</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="2">Level of volcanic activity in Indonesia</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Normal level</td><td>Visual observations and instrumental records show normal fluctuations, but no change of activity<br>Hazards in the form of poisonous gas may take place near vents according to the volcano's characteristic activity</td></tr><tr><td>Waspada level (advisory)</td><td>According to visual observations and instrumental records there are indications of increasing of volcanic activity</td></tr><tr><td>Siaga level (watch)</td><td>According to visual observation and instrumental records there are prominent indications of increasing volcanic activity. Eruptions may take place but do not threaten settlements and/or activities of communities near the volcano.</td></tr><tr><td>Awas level (warning)</td><td>According to visual observations and instrumental records, there are significant indications of volcanic activity, which are followed eruptions and potentially threaten settlements and or community activities around the volcano</td></tr></tbody></table>

for overall volcano hazard mitigation is the Center for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation (CVGHM), which uses 4 alert levels (Table 1) to communicate hazards and recommend actions to be taken by the Disaster Management agencies. The alert levels are: Normal, Advisory (Waspada), Watch (Siaga) and Warning (Awas). Characteristics of volcanic activity are defined for each alert level and specific activities of mitigation are linked to the alert levels. For Normal, Advisory and Watch levels these activities include socialization, preparation of contingency plans, simulations (e.g., table top exercises), and evacuation drills. When the highest alert level (Warning) is declared, evacuation of people in a specified threatened area is recommended by CVGHM, and the local authorities take the action to evacuate the people.

During levels Watch and Warning, communication to the public and amongst stakeholders becomes intense and frequent. Communication is accomplished in various ways, including telephone (mobile and land-lines), text messaging, fax, television, radio and radio streaming; the latter is arranged by communities and typically utilizes hand-held citizens-band radios for streaming information.

In order to understand the information and disaster mitigation processes, socialization and simulations (table top exercises, “TTX”) are conducted with local disaster mitigation agencies and selected community members (see Fig. 2). Simulations are implemented according to

community contingency plans for threatened areas. These exercises help stakeholders and community members understand volcanic hazard information and what to do to respond according to their contingency plans. A wide range of stakeholders are involved, including both local national authorities, such as representatives from agencies involved in public works, social, health, energy and mineral resources (parent agency for CVGHM), and transportation, as well as the Central Bureau of Statistics, Non-Governmental Agencies (e.g., Red Cross), and volunteers.

## 3 Gaps in Communication

Understanding information flow as a part of early warning systems is essential for dissemination of hazard information to the public. There are a number of factors that can hamper the process of communication, i.e.: culture and language, hazard perception, mandates and policy. According to Damen (1987), culture may be defined as learned and shared human patterns or models for living. Therefore, culture relates to mankind’s adaptive mechanisms and includes local beliefs, religion, language, social habits and communication.

In hazard mitigation, a cultural approach is used to improve the capacity of a community to cope with disaster. Donovan (2009) noted that social and economic factors should be considered, such as during the Merapi crisis of 2006. In Indonesia, the culture of a community largely affects
<figure><img src="image_114.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** Information flow during volcanic activity. This diagram illustrates how information flows from CVGHM to Disaster Management Agencies and other related institutions</figcaption></figure>

individuals' perception of hazards. This perception relates strongly to local beliefs, which are typically associated with the community members' experiences during previous eruptions and with physical barriers or obstructions between them and the volcano (Lavigne et al. 2008). An example of a change in physical barriers was evident during the 2006 eruption of Merapi. People on the southern flank of the volcano had long believed that the Gegerbuaya ridge protected them, as it had for decades. The Gegerbuaya was a steep ridge near the summit of Merapi that protected much of the southern flank, as it directed pyroclastic flows to the southwest. However, during the 2006 eruption, the Gegerbuaya was eroded and subsequent pyroclastic flows and surges in 2006 and during the large "100-year" eruption in 2010 had a profound impact not just to the southwest, but also on the southern flank. Unfortunately, the perception of protection of the southern flank persisted long after the "protector" (the Gegerbuaya) had ceased to exist. Consequently, it was important to overcome this long-held misperception through community education during the 2006–2010 time interval.

In most cases, communication from scientists and disaster managers to the public is

complicated by uncertainty involved in eruption forecasting and by limitations in understanding by public authorities. This may lead to uncertainty in decision-making and accordingly, in public mitigation actions (Morchio 1993). Consequently, effective two-way communication between parties is important. Simple language to deliver hazard information, supported by a cultural approach is one of the solutions.

Indonesia is a nation of diverse cultures and religions, and as noted by Chester (2005) in such environments religious and community leaders have important roles in disaster management. This is the case in certain areas of Indonesia, where communication between government scientists or disaster managers and society is most effective when done through religious or community leaders. For example, hazard communication during the ongoing Sinabung volcanic crisis in Sumatra has been more effective through the local religion leaders; whereas, communication through other community leaders was effective during recent crises at Merapi and Kelud volcanoes in Java.

The manner of communication, including culturally sensitive approaches, use of local languages, and appropriate means of delivery of
information is critical. Indonesia has hundreds of local languages, although Bahasa Indonesia ("language of Indonesia") is the common denominator for hazard communication and in general socialization of hazard information is carried out in Indonesian. However in some places, local languages are still needed for communication and understanding and to be effective. In order to enhance communication and to improve hazard mitigation in this diverse linguistic and cultural nation, CVGHM operates 68 local observatories, staffed by observers from nearby communities who speak local languages.

them to quickly understand the hazard information and respond appropriately during recent crises. In contrast, the communities near Sinabung (which had not erupted in hundreds of years) had less experience, and were thus less aware and less able to respond as effectively during the crisis. This example of a population that is not experienced in volcanic eruptions is by no means unique. For example, Solana et al. (2008) notes that even though local authorities are aware of the hazard at Vesuvius, there is still incomplete understanding among communities as to how to respond during a volcano crisis.

## 3.1 Hazard Perception

The response of disaster mitigation agencies and communities to anticipate disaster depends on a common understanding of the hazards and an ability to take action during the event. Differences in hazard perception among emergency managers and scientists can lead to different and sometimes confusing and dangerous response actions. Our experience is that such differences may be caused by overlaps in mandate and authority, different levels of knowledge, errors in communication and coordination amongst stakeholders, and by ineffective communication between government authorities and communities. These issues are not unique to Indonesia. Qualitative and quantitative studies by Haynes et al. (2008a) of the factors controlling risk perception during the volcanic crisis on the Caribbean island of Montserrat show that difficulties in communication and understanding of uncertainties pertaining to volcanic risk led to confusion and social, economic and political forces resulted in distorted risk messages.

Hazard perceptions of local governments and communities are also influenced by their experiences during previous disasters. Communities from Kelud and Merapi have had far more experience in dealing with eruptions than the communities around Sinabung. The experience of those near Kelud and Merapi has allowed

## 3.2 Mandate and Policy

As previously noted, the responsibility for coordination of disaster management in Indonesia lies with the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and with the Provincial and Regional Disaster Management Agencies (BPBD). BNPB has the mandate to coordinate all the stakeholders and to manage the situation during crisis. Therefore, all reports regarding events are firstly delivered to this agency for action. BNPB also has authority to publish policies, guidelines and protocols related to preparedness, mitigation and emergencies regulation. While this is of great value at the national level, a lack of socialization and understanding of the regulation at the local level may result in less than optimum implementation.

Although specific mitigation actions, such as evacuations are carried out by local authorities and managed by BPBD, the overall mandate for the information that results in the mitigation of volcanic hazards in Indonesia is given to CVGHM. This institution is responsible for volcano monitoring, issuing alert levels, and providing recommendations for evacuation to BNPB, BPBD and local governments and for dissemination of hazards information. The protocol for determination of alert levels is established by CVGHM. Problems have arisen in cases when other institutions or individuals have intervened by issuing
statements to the mass media, in some cases even
causing panic among the public.

4 Problems and Solutions
in Communicating Hazards
and Achieving Community
Preparedness

The aim of the dissemination of knowledge about hazards should be to create awareness among the threatened parties and we suggest that the biggest improvement in communicating hazards in Indonesia will come about through encouraging actors to behave and act equally and in harmony. However, in implementation, we find that there is often a disparity between hazard mitigation actors. Frequently, hazard mitigation institutions attempt to impose their role at levels higher than that of the community. In these cases, key roles of assessment and participatory learning may be considered inappropriate and therefore may not be used. In such cases, dissemination of information tends to be carried out from the top down and centralized, often delaying transmission of critical information and contributing to misunderstanding at the local level. Occasionally, the source of knowledge depends on a single person or group. In other cases during crisis, many groups of people may get involved in dissemination of information without proper knowledge and without adequate coordination with the institution responsible for socialization. We have found that the best result in improving community preparedness is achieved when the style and mode of communication between actors changes gradually. An informal approach is a key factor in good communication, and we find that such an informal mode is an effective means to transfer knowledge through participatory activities during the quiet times between volcanic crises.

**4.1 The Role of Media**

Involvement of media or mass communication is
important to improve public knowledge and
response capacity. Access to public media is very

much a part of daily public life in Indonesia and
at all levels of society. Consequently, it is an
effective means for both long-term education and
for short-term communication of hazard infor-
mation. To transfer hazard information to the
public several mass media methods are used,
namely direct communication through television
programs, interviews and articles in newspapers,
and webpages. In addition, socialization pro-
grams are provided by CVGHM to target priority
audiences, utilizing workshops, seminars, exhi-
bitions and formal or informal discussions with
the public in the areas of concern.

To enhance the effectiveness of mass media
communication, workshops with reporters and
scientists on translation of technical data into
public language have been carried out. Potential
problems include the reporters and the media
companies' own interests in how they deliver
hazard messages. CVGHM recognizes this need
and works with reporters to keep the message
appropriate to the scale of the hazards and to
make sure that critical public safety messages are
effectively communicated. In addition, we rec-
ognize value of involving media in observation
of capacity building of communities before,
during and after disasters. Although the media is
typically less attracted in pre-disaster activities,
our involvement with news reporters during cri-
ses and following disasters helps increase interest
in public-interest and capacity-building stories
about pre-disaster activities, which might other-
wise be neglected by the media.

**4.2 Building Trust**

To build trust between scientist and communi-
ties, equity in level of communication is impor-
tant, in addition to understanding of local culture,
local language and people’s character. Sharing
information to identify problems will also
encourage people be more involved in hazard
mitigation. Various targets and conditions of
communities during the capacity building pro-
cess stimulate scientists to be flexible and modify
procedures and understanding of hazards. This
may include equating perception and
<figure><img src="image_115.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3** Map showing direction of pyroclastic flows of Sinabung volcano on 1 February 2014 (black arrow) and 5 km exclusion zone (magenta dashed circle)</figcaption></figure>

terminology to other more commonly understood threats to communities.

Here we describe how pre-established trust of communities in government (scientists and disaster managers) during the volcano crisis of February 2014 at Kelud resulted in a timely and efficient evacuation. People obtained and distributed information to others by community radio, text messaging and community gatherings. The CVGHM observatory post was one of the main sources of information. New local community leaders emerged from a local disaster preparedness group known as Wajib Latih (Indonesian for “compulsory training”; a group defined in more detail below). Such leaders played an important role in communicating hazard information during the Kelud crisis. The Chief of the District of Ngancar was involved in the distribution of information through radio briefings with the help of local leaders and members of the communities. During the crises, the communities of Kelud were also involved in keeping the public away from exclusion zones.

This case illustrates the independency of communities to take action, and it represents a bottom-up process in mitigation.

In contrast, a low capacity and experience of Sinabung communities resulted in inconsistent responses, such as repeated requests for confirmation of hazard information, attempts to negotiate before taking action, and less consideration in taking risks. A tragic example took place during the Sinabung eruption on 1 February 2014, which resulted in 17 fatalities. As a consequence of ineffective understanding of the risk, these people entered the 5 km exclusion zone (Fig. 3) and were killed by a pyroclastic surge.

Improvements in the capacity of Sinabung communities have resulted from the efforts of staff members of CVGHM conducting socialization work. These improvements are clearly a result of increasing trust of community leaders in the relevant communicator. Such individual trust building is an important way to improve volcanic risk communication (Haynes et al. 2008b).
<figure><img src="image_116.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4** Capacity building in communities and its implementation during volcano eruption according to alert level</figcaption></figure>

Indonesia has a unique involvement of scientists in mitigation actions related to volcanic eruptions. As a mandate holder, CVGHM is responsible not only for monitoring and volcano hazard evaluation, but also for mitigation of volcanic hazards, as alert levels are directly tied to mitigation actions and areas recommended for evacuation are specified in formal CVGHM notifications. Scientists and decision makers who issue volcano alert levels are in the same institution. Scientists from different institutions may provide input based on research but do not to issue alert levels. Further, decision makers communicate directly with disaster managers, such as BNPB and BPBD and provide specific recommendations regarding mitigation actions. BNPB and BPBD arrange, prepare, and through local authorities enact mitigation plans.

# 5 Steps of Knowledge Transfer and Communication

In general, there are several steps in delivering information that we use in Indonesia, namely socialization, preparation of contingency plan documents, simulation and evacuation drills.

## 5.1 Socialization

Socialization is dissemination of hazard information to people at risk. In Indonesia, the level of volcano activity and priority of socialization by CVGHM changes at different alert levels (Fig. 4). At the Normal level, socialization is given to people living close to volcanoes that experience a high frequency of eruptions. At the Advisory level, socialization is carried out with priority to people in the area potentially threatened by hazards. At Watch level, it is carried out in area which will likely be evacuated in the case of a Warning level alert. At the Warning level, additional socialization is conducted in evacuation camps or barracks, if it is needed.

In hazard zones where there is a high frequency of volcanic eruptions, continuity of hazard information is important to maintain awareness of threatened communities. A model of participatory training is most appropriate in these situations. This model aims to implement “training of the trainer” or compulsory training (“Wajib Latih,” in the language of Indonesia). Wajib Latih represents the lowest social level of disaster management and mitigation planning. It is a disaster management learning activity that is undertaken to bring
<figure><img src="image_117.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5** Village risk map shows total number of inhabitants, resources, locations of vulnerable groups and infrastructure for evacuation</figcaption></figure>

together the instructors, local stakeholders and community leaders. Most activities are conducted by CVGHM and result in the creation of a new local leader. From our experience, the creation and establishment of such a local leader plays an important role in effective community evacuation. Through Wajib Latih, information is shared within communities and by members of communities. In this activity, the group has the task to formulate a contingency plan and SOP of evacuation, including making village risk maps (Fig. 5). Each member of the group is given a specific responsibility and as a result, each acts as a leader of their own task. Because the plan is created by the community itself, it is easily understood and effectively utilized by the community.

The Wajib Latih requires a common perception between government and the community in order to create a sharing environment to find solutions. However, even with this community-based process, this condition is difficult to achieve as even in areas near a volcano, hazard perception may vary from sector to sector.

To a significant degree the success of the method depends on the experience of those involved in dealing with the hazard directly and repeatedly.

## 5.2 Contingency Plan

According to UNISDR (2009) “contingency planning is a management process that analyses specific potential events or emerging situations that might threaten society or the environment and establishes arrangements in advance to enable timely, effective and appropriate responses to such events and situations”.

By Public Law in Indonesia, contingency plans include scenarios and goals, establishment of technical and managerial actions, as well as response plans for mobilization of mutually agreed stakeholders (Government of Indonesia 2007). The formulation of a contingency plan is carried out in two ways, namely community-based and stakeholder-based. Contingency plans are prepared by village (through Wajib Latih groups),
and also at regency and national levels (stakeholder-based). At Merapi and Kelud, both of these two approaches were carried out. In preparation of the contingency plans, many stakeholders are involved. Stakeholders involved in Wajib Latih groups include CVGHM, local authorities at village level, community health centers, community preparedness groups, volunteers, and representative community members and leaders. Stakeholder-based contingency plans involve CVGHM, local authorities at regency and provincial levels, local health, public works, social, communication and information, and transportation agencies, community preparedness groups, volunteers, Red Cross/Red Crescent and search and rescue units. During the process of formulating contingency plans, the input of stakeholders is needed to define their appropriate roles. Formulation of the contingency plan includes identification of hazard, threat, and vulnerability, as well as a determination of possible disaster impacts, risk reduction measures, readiness and response mechanisms, and a distribution of tasks, mandates and available resources (Government of Indonesia 2008). Besides providing the contingency plan document and SOP for evacuation, the process also improves communication and coordination of hazard perception amongst stakeholders and community leaders.

The Wajib Latih process is similar to Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) methods implemented in the Solomon Islands (Cronin et al. 2004a, b), which involves stakeholders from communities and government to encourage community-based planning. Wajib Latih and PRA emphasize the important of dialogue among stakeholders to integrate various aspects, both social and physical to derive risk assessment and mitigation plans.

Increased capacity of a community requires not just knowledge of the hazard but also effective communication and coordination, in which those responsible for crisis management understand the policy, guidelines and standard operating procedures of the entire process. Therefore, in the preparation of contingency plans it is important to document and empower hazard mitigation institutions (stakeholders) and the

community at risk. Contingency planning also requires understanding of the mandates of each institution and the distribution and coordination of authorities. During contingency planning and through simulation of the plans, needs and gaps are identified and addressed with solutions that will be effective during future crises. Contingency plans are not only useful to identify hazards and vulnerabilities and to enhance understanding of evacuation procedures, but the preparation of these plans also builds a critical communication network and coordination amongst stakeholders, community leaders and members of villages.

As previously noted, preparation of these plans takes place during Normal or Advisory alert levels. In the Watch level, a review of contingency plan is carried out in order to update all data before a real disaster and the contingency plan is changed to an operation plan. At this time and at higher governmental levels (regency/provincial and national levels) an Incident Commander is appointed. The operational plan is then used by the Incident Commander and all stakeholders to guide the response, typically an evacuation (Fig. 4). Activities of communities in each Alert level are shown in Table 2.

## 5.3 Simulation (Table Top Exercises)

Table top exercises are designed to test the ability of disaster mitigation officials to respond. In this case, the exercise also aims to test and review the procedures set out in the contingency plan. The exercise involves key persons from the various sectors as described in the contingency plan. As used by CVGHM, the nature of the exercise is informal, such that participants may improve the scenarios, share information and experiences, and overall provide input to improve the plan.

## 5.4 Evacuation Drills

Drills are used to practice evacuations involving communities and all stakeholders. These exercises are carried out in the field, involve
<table><caption>**Table 2** Volcano alert levels and community preparedness taken from the Indonesia national standard training guideline for community preparedness to anticipate hazards of volcanic eruption (in press)</caption><thead><tr><th>Alert level</th><th>Activity of community</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Normal (normal, level 1)</td><td><ol><li>Socialization of volcanic hazard map</li><li>Understanding of character of volcano hazards</li><li>Community understanding regarding their settlement within volcanic hazard map</li><li>Census of inhabitants within hazard zones</li><li>Inventory of resources within hazard zones</li><li>Formulation of SOP</li><li>Preparation of sign and evacuation route</li><li>Simulation</li></ol></td></tr><tr><td>Advisory (Waspada, level 2)</td><td><ol><li>Dissemination of increasing alert level</li><li>Updating census of inhabitants</li><li>Updating of vulnerability of inhabitants within hazard zones</li><li>Intensification of inventory of resources within hazard zones</li><li>Preparation of equipment and communication system</li><li>Preparation of evacuation plan</li><li>Preparation of transportation for evacuation</li><li>Preparation of evacuation barracks</li><li>Preparation of logistics</li><li>Explanation to community</li><li>Grouping of communities</li></ol></td></tr><tr><td>Watch (Siaga, level 3)</td><td><ol><li>Dissemination of increased alert level</li><li>Sign of alert is ready to be operated</li><li>Transportation for evacuation is ready to be operated</li><li>Evacuation barracks are ready to be operated</li><li>Logistics are ready to be operated</li><li>Security is ready to be operated</li><li>SOP is ready to be operated</li><li>Equipment and communication system is activated</li><li>Determination of the emergency response command</li></ol></td></tr><tr><td>Warning (Awas, level 4)</td><td><ol><li>Dissemination of increased alert level</li><li>Warning signals are sounded</li><li>Evacuation order from Incident Commander is executed</li><li>Activation of SOP</li><li>Evacuation</li><li>Activation of evacuation barracks</li><li>Activation of logistics</li><li>Activation of security</li><li>Activation of crisis center</li></ol></td></tr></tbody></table>

Alert levels are given in English and Indonesian (in parentheses)

vulnerable people and mobilize resources and communities according to scenarios from the contingency plan. Our experience is that review of the contingency plan during evacuation drills substantially improves the plan. For example, risks related to the route of evacuation, location and facilities at evacuation camps or barracks and modes of transportation are all commonly addressed and solutions found.

## 5.5 Leadership

In disaster management, the role of leadership is important, both for decision makers and local leaders. As previously noted, during the capacity building process of institutions and communities, often a new leader emerges. Such a leader can mobilize disaster management agencies and communities to take action according their
capacity and capability to anticipate disaster. The new leader is typically most effective during the evacuation process. In our experience and across a wide variety of Indonesian cultures, we find that a trusted community leader is patient, open-minded, caring, flexible, and a good communicator. Such a leader also has great endurance. The function of a leader in the community is to serve as a role model and initiator; one who encourages people to take proper action according to their capability.

# 6 Conclusion

Communicating hazard information is a time consuming process, as the interaction between community (social) and scientists (physical perspectives) and disaster management agencies (policy and practice) requires equity in hazard perception. We find that informal approaches are keys to success. An informal nature of communication encourages people to share experience, knowledge and problems without regard to their background differences and is best accomplished through socialization using a participatory knowledge dissemination methods. These activities are carried out through discussion and sharing of experiences among actors, analyzing problems from different perspectives to find solutions, and involvement of various groups to maintain diversity and necessity. The main point of the activity is to identify underlying problems in hazard perception, cultural backgrounds and community characteristics and to harmonize the point of view of both hazard mitigation officials and communities. This is consistent with the conclusion of Howes and Minos-Minopoulos (2004), who pointed out the importance of public perception of hazard, risk and vulnerability in relation to public education programs and disaster management plans.

One of the factors to motivate communities to protect themselves from natural disasters is to encourage people to find out where and how to obtain hazard information and to conduct their own assessments that lead to appropriate actions. This can be achieved by empowerment of

communities through participatory learning. Perry and Lindell (2008) proposed that there is correlation between responsibility for self-protection of the community that has had an experience of property damage and information seeking behavior related to protective action. We find this to be the case in Indonesia.

Both Merapi and Kelud communities are experienced the Wajib Latih process. The core activity of Wajib Latih groups is to encourage people to be capable to respond and take action appropriately during crisis. This behavior can be achieved through intensive training and involvement in the preparation of mitigation plans. The training also emphasizes the difference between evacuating and “being evacuated.” The first case implies being prepared and actively participating and the second reflects being unprepared and passively participating. The evacuation processes at both Kelud and Merapi communities illustrates the value in preparedness. Even during the short-term crisis of the 2014 Kelud eruption (less than one day of warning), part of the community evacuated themselves before a recommendation for evacuation was issued (i.e., Warning level alert being issued). This condition represents independency of the community to anticipate and take action during a crisis according to their capacity and knowledge.

An important lesson from the experience of disaster mitigation in Indonesia is the necessity to maintain effective communication between scientists and those responsible for mitigation by respecting mandates and authorities for disaster management and by directly involving communities in hazard mitigation. Such effective communication and community involvement is supported by development of policy, strategy and mitigation plans by government which involves public participation.

**Acknowledgements** We would like to thank to the Director of Center for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation, Indonesia for providing chance to us to involve in many activities in pre-disaster and during crisis. We are also grateful to John Pallister of the USGS, for provide fruitful comments, and in the preparation and editing of the manuscript.
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Social Representation of Human
Resettlement Associated with Risk
from Volcán de Colima, Mexico

Alicia Cuevas-Muñiz and Juan Carlos Gavilanes-Ruiz

Abstract

This study examines a rural community of several decades of existence called “La Yerbabuena”. La Yerbabuena belongs to the state of Colima and it is situated on the flanks of the active Volcán de Colima; as such, the inhabitants are exposed to high levels of volcanic activity in their daily lives. This community has experienced resettlement on several occasions due to the volcanic risk. The study is based on theories of social representation that deal with how people perceive the events of their daily lives, as well as what happens in their immediate environment, including available information (such as news) and interactions with familiar people. These perceptions are formed partly from personal experience and from information, knowledge, and patterns of thought acquired during a shared tradition, education, and social communication. The social representation of families resettled due to volcanic risk is classified in four categories or assumptions: (a) the volcano represents a potential risk to their lives and possessions; (b) their relocation involved a change in economic, political and cultural factors that impacted on their daily lives; (c) this relocation represented a benefit to their daily lives; and (d) the relocation fractured the social cohesion of the community. Meanwhile, for the families who opposed their own resettlement, social representation was anchored in three aspects: (a) La Yerbabuena is not considered a zone of high volcanic risk; instead the resettlement was a “governmental pretext to expropriate these families of their land and possessions”; (b) the resettlement was a violation of their human rights, given the harassment they received before and during the resettlement process; and (c) their failure to acknowledge a volcanic risk allowed them to implement strategies of resistant, such as generating discussions and actions appropriate only when the volcano was no threat and became a “guardian”. This refers to the old traditional view

A. Cuevas-Muñiz (✉) · J.C. Gavilanes-Ruiz
Universidad de Colima, Colima, Mexico
e-mail: alicia cuevas@ucol.mx
of the volcano as the guardian in which the volcano would protect this community from possible eruptions and it would emit signals in which only these families could perceive and interpret. At the same time, these resistant families depended on the risk management protections implemented by the authorities. Based on this research it is clear that social representation in La Yerbabuena is born from the mental images that both the relocated and the resistant constructed from the sociocultural reality common to all members of the town. It is therefore important that all social actors involved in risk management have an understanding of the culture, risk perception, and forms of social representation of the volcanic risk of the inhabitants of communities high risk zones in order to design plans suitable for prevention. Furthermore, it is critical for the population to have active participation, to facilitate better risk management.

# 1 La Yerbabuena: A Space of Negotiation and Social Interaction

At the foothills of the Colima volcano, which is located between the states of Colima and Jalisco, there are several rural settlements surrounding this colossus. La Yerbabuena town is located 8 km to the southwest of the volcano's summit. It is an "ejido", an area of communal land used for agriculture on which community members get assigned a parcel but maintain communal ownership of the land. It is officially named "Ex-hacienda San Antonio" and it belongs to the municipality of Comala, which is one of the ten municipalities that constitute the state of Colima.

La Yerbabuena is a young town that for decades struggled with the fair distribution of the land. In 1934 workers of the Hacienda San Antonio and those of the Red Union of Small Farmers, made the first written request of endowment of the agricultural communal land to the Governor of the State of Colima. However, it was not until 1968 that the resolution was approved in favor of the 26 applicants who took possession of 540 ha. The new *ejido* was officially called "Ex Hacienda San Antonio La Yerbabuena." The village was established in 1968 by a group of families from the former hacienda San Antonio and nearby towns such as La Becerrera, Suchitlán, and Cofradía de

Suchitlán in Colima; as well as from San José del Carmen, Zapotitlán, and Tamazula in Jalisco (Cuevas 2001).

La Yerbabuena is a traditional social space where power relations are interwoven; social actors perform several traditional acts like maintaining kinship and labor ties as well as negotiating and interacting face to face with the members of the village and some external social groups. In this context, the relocation of a part of the peasantry population formed another community social space with physical-spatial characteristics and habitats different from those of their locality of origin. On February 1999 the government of the state of Colima proposed to relocate La Yerbabuena, but it was not until May 2002 that most of the Yerbabuenians moved to the new settlement (La Nueva Yerbabuena). However, more than 10 families refused to accept the government's conditions and decided to stay at La Yerbabuena. As a result, two groups of settlers formed: those who were "relocated" and, those that were "resistant", building more fractional social relations from that process. The social cohesion of the community was fractionated since that time and it was accentuated by the displacement of part of this rural population.

This study applies the theory of social representation to explore the issues related to the resettlement in the community of La Yerbabuena.
## 2 Theoretical Foundations of Social Representation

Social representation is defined by Moscovici (1973) p. xiii as:

> Systems of values, ideas and practices with a two-fold function; first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it; secondly, to enable communication to take place amongst members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history.

The history of the theory of social representation began with the contributions of Herbart (1825) and French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1893). Herbart developed his concepts from psychosocial situations (understood as the interactions between the individual's mind and its collective environment) and helped to give meaning to the relationship between an individual and society. This is a key factor in the understanding of several situations related to volcanic activity; as an example we have the different cultural roles or perceptions of risk within the village. For his part, Durkheim, speaking of "collective representation" and "cultural factors", proposed the possibility of investigating how this collective representation came to form part of a subjective perspective that positioned an individual against an object and against oneself.

The theory of social representations has been applied in several studies not only related to social psychology but also incorporated into sciences and disciplines as diverse as anthropology, sociology, pedagogy, social work, among others. In fact, recent risk-disaster research includes some areas that have used the theoretical-conceptual tools built by Moscovici (Aparico and Pérez 2014; Bravi 2016).

This study is based on the theory of social representations and its tools used to construct meanings of social actors; in this case, those that resettled and those that resisted. These meanings are socially produced by the actors through culture. Based on them, people organize and give meaning to their experiences and knowledge

through narrations, forming beliefs about their own world and themselves. In this way, people legitimize their world from verbal actions and actions based on the relationship between what is done and what is said (Brunner 1992).

According to Moscovici, social representations are a set of concepts, statements, and explanations originated in daily life and the inter-individual communications. In our society, they correspond to the myths and belief systems of the traditional customs. One could say that they are the contemporary view of commonsense (Moscovici 1981, quoted by Perera 1999, p. 10). The relationship established in this work is between the theory of social representations of Moscovici (1969) and the constructivist view of the social actor of Norman Long based on Habermas' concept of "worlds of life" (1987). With the perspective of the social actor we could only illustrate cultural practices and interpretations developed by both relocated and resistant people in the process of permanent resettlement of La Yerbabuena. However, such a perspective would be insufficient to describe how these actors construct their own meanings of displacement. For this reason, from the relocated and resistant world views of life, we explore how these meanings are constructed: first, starting from the theory of social representations, used as an instrument of analysis, since through it we explore how individuals are oriented and act in their relationships with other individuals; and second, on the basis of meanings or understandings about the world that are being created and transformed as the interactions between social actors in the resettlement as it progressed. That is, how the social actors from their feelings, worlds of life, experiences, perceptions and systems of knowledge are building different meanings about the relocation, that in some of them there are similarities, but also differences.

In addition of the perspectives of Long (1998) and Habermas (1989) that enabled us to consider the advancing interactions between social actors as the central object of this study, we based our research on the sole theory of social representation to examine how individuals react to and act in their relations towards other individuals, and
on the basis of meanings or intentions how they approach their world views that they are creating or transforming. We considered that these theoretical approaches could enhance our understanding of the role of the resettlement of La Yerbabuena in the social construction of risk.

In people's daily lives, the images that are constructed of a certain social process emerge as a mental elaboration that takes into account the history of the people, the experiences of each person's life, the personal cognitive constructions and above all, their world views of life. In these social processes, there are articulated fields of multiple meanings that are shared by belonging to the same social and cultural space, and having very similar meanings of these processes. Hence each social group tends to make appraisals of reality, which are built from their own experience, but also from the interactions they established with other actors; so, it can be said that the knowledge that is acquired from a social process or a reality corresponds to forms of interpretation of the world that are socially constructed and shared by the members of a group in a given context (Moscovici 1979).

Within social psychology, and according to the approaches of Moscovici (1979) and Jodelet and Tapia (2000), social representation is generated from two phases or processes: first, “objectification”, and second, “anchorage”. The first consists of transforming an abstract entity or thing into something concrete and material: products of the imagination into physical reality, concepts into forms. Objectification turns a concept into reality, giving an image its corresponding physical counterpart. The outcome is chiefly cognitive. The amount of meanings that a person receives, expresses, and picks up in their daily cycle of interactions may be superabundant. To decrease the separation between the sheer volume of words in circulation and the objects to which they are related, just as one could not speak of “nothing”, “linguistic signs” latch onto “material structures”: that is to say, the linguistic signs try to attach the word to the thing (Moscovici 1979, p. 75).

Objectification may be defined as an image-forming and representation-structuring process. In this process, the social part translates as the assemblage of knowledge concerning the

subject of a representation articulated by a feature of social thought: to make concrete the abstract; to materialize the word. Furthermore, the process of objectification carries within itself two essential operations: (1) naturalization, and (2) classification. In naturalization, social representation is given concrete evidence through conversion into a “common theory” which can categorize autonomous individuals and their behaviors. Classification makes sense of the world around us and introduces a new order that adapts to the existing one mitigating the impact of any new design.

The second phase of social representation is anchorage, which is a process of categorization whereby we classify and give names to things and to people; the integration of the unfamiliar into the familiar. Anchorage denotes the introduction of knowledge into the hierarchy of values, and between transactions that occur in society. In other terms, “through the process of anchorage, society changes a social purpose by an ordering operation, and this purpose is located on a scale of preferences in existing social relationships.” (Moscovici 1979, p. 121).

In an artificial way, Moscovici clarifies both processes, arguing that “objectification translates knowledge into the domain of being, and anchorage defines knowledge within the realm of doing” (Moscovici 1979, p. 121); that is to say, just as objectification demonstrates how the elements of knowledge are articulated in a social reality, anchorage makes visible the way in which these elements shape social relationships and also how the elements are expressed.

By Moscovici's definition, social representation arises in four constituent elements. The information which is related to what “I am”; the images which “I see”; the opinions which “I think”; and the attitudes which “I feel”. Meanwhile, Jodelet and Tapia (2000) asserts that social representations are areas of knowledge that form part of our personal experiences, but also form information, understanding and patterns of thought that we acquire and share through tradition, education, and social communication. Seen in this way, social representation is directly and exclusively related to common humanity due to the individual reality of all human beings.
## 3 Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative and cross-sectional methodology guided by the theory of social representations (Moscovici 1979) as a tool for the construction of the image and meanings of the resettlement individuals. This study also analyzes the representation of this social object using two techniques: ‘free’ (Abric 2001; Borgatti 1996) and ‘draw lots or sorting’ (Abric 2000; Borgatti 1996), both described further below. These tools explored the meanings attributed both by resistant and resettled individuals to the permanent resettlement. These meanings were constructed by the Yerbabuenians from their own life worlds, experiences, feelings, perceptions, and knowledge of the process of resettlement. The data analysis was carried out using Anthropac 4.9 software (Borgatti 1996), in which a correlation of the knowledge possessed by each informant in relation to the group was calculated to identify the informant’s key words; the ones with the highest scores were the people identified to conduct the in-depth interviews.

The studied population were 30 people (randomly selected), amongst them 20 were relocated settlers and 10 were resistant. The study consisted in: (1) exploratory image of the relocation; (2) the dynamics of obtaining the relocation image; and (3) explanatory of the relocation process.

In the image of the resettlement the free association technique was used, as well as the 3-question semi-structured questionnaire instrument called free listing (Abri 2001; Borgatti

1996). Each questionnaire lasted 20 min, and was recorded both in digital audio as well as written hardcopy. The free association technique consists of asking the social actors to name or write all elements that correspond to an inductive term. For example, *to explore word associations relating to the term “relocation” interviewees were asked:* “Please mention all the words that come to mind when you hear the word *resettlement*.” These word associations, called ‘free listings’ are sets of terms used in additional and subsequent data collection tasks, such as pile sorts or indexes or scales. For the free listings, two databases (resettled and resistant) were developed in the Anthropac 4.9 software, frequently used in anthropological studies to study cultural domains. Anthropac 4.9 counts the number of times each descriptor is mentioned by the interviewees, and then organizes the list on a decreasing frequency scale. In this way, it calculates a list of the descriptors, which includes three columns: the frequency, the order in which they were mentioned, and the cultural weight.

The draw lots or sorting approach is characterized by the descriptive phase of the resettlement image. We described how the different forms of social thought are objectified (Moscovici 1979; Jodelet 1984), which included the image and meanings of the resettlement that both the relocated and resistant people have since being displaced. Fifteen descriptors were identified by the Anthropac analysis to apply the draw of lots or sorting to both groups of interviewees (Table 1). The following descriptors were selected:

<table><caption>**Table 1** Descriptors selected to apply the draw of lots or sorting</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Volcano</th><th>Family</th><th>Emotional status</th><th>Relationship with resettled and resistant</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Benefit</td><td>Explosion</td><td>Houses</td><td>Confidence</td><td>Resentment</td></tr><tr><td>Human rights violation</td><td>Danger</td><td>Do not sow</td><td>Pain</td><td>Disunity</td></tr><tr><td>Government non-compliance</td><td>Risk zone</td><td>More expenses</td><td>Desperation</td><td>Difficulties</td></tr></tbody></table>
# 4 Construction of Meaning: The Process of Human Resettlement and Volcanic Risk as It Affected the Inhabitants of La Yerbabuena

In this section, we present the images and meanings constructed by both the resettled and resistant families of the at-risk community of La Yerbabuena, Colima who in beginning of May 2002, the last evacuation began the process of human resettlement.

## 4.1 Impressions of the Process of Human Relocation

### (a) Impressions of the relocation process formed by resettled habitants of La Yerbabuena

The impressions of the relocation process for displaced families is divided into five descriptors derived from the “Free Listings”: Positive emotional state; trust on government; benefits to family; volcanic threat; and relationship between the resettled and the resistant (Table 2).

From these descriptors, we can observe that the La Yerbabuena's inhabitants have accepted the relocation process, due to the confidence that they had in the authorities (represented by the

highest frequency in the table); moreover, they were amenable to the latter's promises of better services, including health and education, that would benefit all the inhabitants. However, the disadvantages of the relocation process were that it provoked resentment between families and that the resettled families encountered various difficulties in the new settlement. The decision to relocate was not made for the risk that the volcano represented to them, but it was motivated by the promises of the state government, who had assured them that relocation would give them a better quality of life—an assurance that was proved to be false.

### (b) Impressions of the relocation process formed by resistant population of La Yerbabuena

The impressions of the relocation process formed by the families who resisted resettlement were divided into four descriptors: authoritative government, family deterioration, negative emotional state, and volcano threat (Table 3).

These families attributed the relocation process to a decision made by an authoritative government, with hidden intentions, which had nothing to do with their living in a zone of high volcanic risk. They asserted that the displacement of inhabitants was forced because of

<table><caption>**Table 2** Descriptors of the impressions of the relocation process held by displaced families</caption><thead><tr><th>Descriptor</th><th>Fr<sup>a</sup></th><th>%</th><th>Om<sup>b</sup></th><th>Cultural weight<sup>c</sup></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Positive emotional state</td><td>28</td><td>16</td><td>4.3</td><td>2.018</td></tr><tr><td>Trust on government</td><td>61</td><td>35</td><td>2.6</td><td>1.707</td></tr><tr><td>Benefits to family</td><td>47</td><td>27</td><td>4.7</td><td>1.010</td></tr><tr><td>Volcanic threat</td><td>20</td><td>12</td><td>2</td><td>0.566</td></tr><tr><td>Relationship between displaced and resistant families</td><td>17</td><td>10</td><td>10.1</td><td>0.309</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>173</td><td>100</td><td>23.7</td><td>5.61</td></tr></tbody></table>

<footnote><sup>a</sup>Frequency (Fr) refers to the number of times that each descriptor was mentioned</footnote>

<footnote><sup>b</sup>Order of mention (Om) is provided by the subjects according to the order in which the descriptors mentioned the derivatives of the introductory term “relocation”. The order of mention “can reveal aspects of the underlying cognitive structure of this domain” (Borgatti 1996, p. 5)</footnote>

<footnote><sup>c</sup>“Cultural weight” is the correlation between frequency and order of mention, and was obtained through the use of Anthropac 4.9 software (Borgatti 1996). It classifies by type in order to select 15 descriptors for the implementation of the “Drawing Lots” phase of information collection</footnote>
<table><caption>**Table 3** Descriptors of the impression of relocation formed by resistant families</caption><thead><tr><th>Descriptor</th><th>Fr</th><th>%</th><th>Om</th><th>Cultural weight</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Authoritative government</td><td>26</td><td>41</td><td>3.5</td><td>1.385</td></tr><tr><td>Family deterioration</td><td>20</td><td>32</td><td>3.6</td><td>0.949</td></tr><tr><td>Negative emotional state</td><td>12</td><td>19</td><td>4.2</td><td>0.656</td></tr><tr><td>Volcano threat</td><td>5</td><td>8</td><td>3.6</td><td>0.111</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>63</td><td>100</td><td>14.9</td><td>3.101</td></tr></tbody></table>

constant pressures, threats, and harassment from the authorities during the course of their daily lives and during the evacuation processes.<fnref n="1" /> They recounted that, for some, resettlement did not affect the dynamics of daily life and that for others, resettlement afforded fewer opportunities of employment and resulting in economic imbalances in households.

As for the families' impressions associated with the volcano, they acknowledged that the local government displayed that *La Yerbabuena* as a zone of high volcanic risk and thus that the volcano presented a threat to the village's inhabitants. However, they declared that the hidden intention of the authorities was to expropriate them of their property and lands.

For both the resettled and the resistant, impressions of the relocation process are 2-fold. The initial impression of the resettled was one of wellbeing and progress, generated by the expectations and promises of the governmental authorities. The ultimate impression of the process formed by the resistant was that the volcanic threat was a pretext of the government to divest them of their goods and to carry out plans for a tourist project in their community.

## 4.2 Meanings of the Process of Human Relocation

In this section, we explain the phenomenon of resettlement in terms of image and meanings found in the context of everyday lives of social actors of *La Yerbabuena* (both relocated and

resistant), and from their subjective observations. This was achieved through the technique of in-depth interviews.

The results we present are interpretations developed from the theoretical and methodological assumptions of the theory of social representation (Moscovici 1979). These interpretations were elaborated in the analysis of social actors' narratives of their daily lives around the period of displacement of *La Yerbabuena* inhabitants due to volcanic risk. The results are displayed below in two sections: (1) significance of resettlement to relocated families; (2) significance of resettlement to resistant families.

### (1) Significance of resettlement to relocated families:

This section itself is split into three parts: (a) meanings associated with the resettlement process; (b) impressions of daily life after resettlement; and (c) impressions of volcanic risk.

### (a) Meanings associated with the resettlement process:

The following meanings, given by social actors in in-depth interviews, are attributed to the economic imbalance encountered when the new settlement's cost of living was higher than in the actors' place of origin. They recounted how previously, in order to provide for their basic necessities, they spent two hundred pesos each week; in the resettlement place (Cofradia de Suchitlán), their expenses doubled. Before resettling, Mrs. Reyna Cervantes along with another female partner was applying for a small loan. With the loan they hoped to buy a nixtamal mill with the intention of improving domestic savings by grinding maize and making tortillas.

<footnote n="1">¹From November 1998 to May 2002, six evacuations of the population of *La Yerbabuena* occurred. The most comprehensive of these were those of May 10th, 1999 and May 18th, 2002.</footnote>
Once displaced, they continued with their project and, although their incomes were minimal, they were not dissuaded from their objective. *Doña Reyna* said:

> What happened is that here you have to buy everything, and there you didn't. You know that, back there, there is only corn, beans, and sugar—that's all we had; however, here you crave meat... or you want something else. There you only have the produce of the field... here I spend 70 pesos on tortillas alone, and back there I used to make them with two balls of dough, or three balls, each 1.5 kg and people paid 1.50 pesos for each, because I used to grind them myself... for that reason, I think it's better to buy the maize [instead of the tortillas], but only when I have money.<fnref n="2" />

The majority of the inhabitants paid for the transfer of their possessions to the new settlement with their own savings. Furthermore, they enrolled their children in a new school, for which they were required to buy uniforms and school equipment; expenses they did not have encountered in *La Yerbabuena*. For María de la Luz Mejía, interviewed at home, the choice to relocate was made because of the constant evacuations of *La Yerbabuena*, and for the hope that resettlement would involve owning a home, as opposed to renting. She commented:

> Beginning with school, there were differences... [in La Yerbabuena] it didn't cost, here it does. Here at the start of the school semester they asked for 50 pesos and over there, deals were made with produce from the allotments... then, my daughter entered kindergarten and it cost 120 pesos for enrollment and breakfast was 5 pesos each week... and now they're asking us to pay for uniform, shoes and extra ... over there, you went to school with the little you had but here you can't, you have to go every day with shoes, with these closed shoes or with sneakers and socks... and we had to buy it, and of course it costs money, and if you don't have it then you have to get credit to fulfill it.<fnref n="3" />

Relocated Yerbabuena farmers acquired new transportation costs to go daily to their plots of land. This represented an investment in both time and money, mentioned by Eusebio Montejano.

He was always in favor of resettlement, but several weeks after having been relocated, asserted that: “life was much more expensive [in the new resettlement] and it was very difficult to adapt to this new way of life”.

One of the difficulties that resettled families encountered was the diminutive size of their new households. The built area, the distribution of space and the dimensions of individual plots were not equal; in *La Yerbabuena* plots were 30 × 50 m (1500 m<fnref n="2" />), whereas in the new settlement they were 8 × 25 m (200 m<fnref n="2" />), with a built area of 35.86 m<fnref n="2" />. All the new houses were equal in extent and distribution, had a living-dining room, a bathroom, a bedroom, kitchen, and an area of 7 m<fnref n="2" /> which could be used to plant a vegetable garden, store work tools, or construct another bedroom. The people of *La Yerbabuena* who lived here found it cramped and overcrowded.

The urban style of the houses imposes a new form and style of life on people from a rural environment. Furthermore, as the economy in the rural setting is different from that of the urban, very few of the families are able to construct new and adequate spaces to meet their immediate needs. In the rural environment, families own large plots of land with the understanding that the children will inherit a part of it when they grow up and have their own families. Additionally, it gives them an area to grow vegetables. Hence, leaving these conditions and styles of life for an “urban life” increases a family’s vulnerability and limits their access to resources they once had.

The people of *La Yerbabuena* expressed that relocation has brought disunity. Inés Montejano provides one example of family breakup:

> It broke up families as well as people, for example we usually reenact the stages of the cross but this time we did nothing. Here in Cofradía everyone did what he or she wanted. Before the day used to be respected, recently it has not been so, everything has been lost (...) for example in La Yerbabuena we used to have festivals and people were more united (...)<fnref n="4" />

<footnote n="2">²Interview with (18RC-M43/04-04). Cofradía de Suchitlán, Colima.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">³Interview with (6MdLM-Am29/04-04). Cofradía de Suchitlán, Colima.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴Interview with (16IM-M18/04-04). Cofradía de Suchitlán, Colima.</footnote>
For other families, the process of relocation was a benefit as it meant they were distanced from the volcanic hazard, as said by Jesús Montejano:

> For me the people who have come have been given a great benefit, as people who had houses made of cardboard now have higher quality homes.<fnref n="5" />

## (b) Appearance of daily life in resettlement

Relocation, which shows to have an important difference on your daily life, changes your actions relative to both time and space. One of the most significant disturbances the families experienced is the impact it had on the educational environment. Previously they had a kindergarten with one classroom and one community teacher from CONAFE (Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo). At primary level, they had one school with two classrooms for all six grades and one teacher. If one wanted to attend secondary school, they would have to walk to La Becerrera; as mentioned by farmer Jesús Montejano:

> When we lived in La Yerbabuena, I should note, I remember they used to have class three to four times a week and the teacher would have to walk from La Becerrera to La Yerbabuena, and by the time he came in and checked our work he would leave. So what was he teaching us? (...) And here it seems that children have class every day so it is therefore an improvement for them.<fnref n="6" />

Many people considered living in the new homes to mean “a new life” and “a place to live” and furthermore related it with “progress”; this was because many families (especially residents) lived in homes made from flimsy materials. Although the homes were flawed it was a “a new way of life” for the inhabitants; this was expressed by Guadalupe Cueto, municipal commissioner of the new settlement of Corfradía de Suchitlán, and Jesús Montejano, municipal commissioner of La Yerbabuena:

> Because this means we will be starting a new journey, we are starting a new life because we are

beyond what we had and what we were doing, and now we are living in progress (...).<fnref n="7" />

The most important thing for me is that we are removed from danger, because it was a nuisance that we could be evacuated at any moment, that we could be moved to a shelter, this was a trauma I lived through, although one I was used to, I am now distanced from the danger and that is good.<fnref n="8" />

One of the consequences derived from the resettlement was the differences between the relocated and the resistant, a situation that distanced and broke up family relations. Forced displacement dissolved and dispersed the social ties of the town. However, some villagers consider that the land distribution of the ejido which was configured during the 1960–1970 decade, was not equal nor fair for all, and, as a result, the social fragmentation of the community initiated since that time. Living in small homes unsuitable for large families also caused difficulties in people’s daily lives. Ma. De la Luz Mejía, daughter in law of Eusebio Cuellar who was the comisario ejidal (the highest political authority elected by the community) of La Yerbabuena, commented:

> The problem has been around a long time, since they distributed the land. Don Eusebio Cuellar was commissioner at the time, and he moved because the land was being divided, however they gave him a bit more for having fought for everyone, and for this his brother Don Leandro is jealous and it has turned into a rivalry.<fnref n="9" />

## (c) The representation of volcanic risk

The scientific community and the government authorities still consider La Yerbabuena as an area of high volcanic risk (Cuevas and Seefoó 2005; Gavilanes-Ruiz et al. 2009; Cuevas and Gavilanes 2013). This perception differs between professionals and the people; therefore, highlighting that risk is not recognized the same way by all involved. It is a social hierarchy where some participants based their opinions on their scientific and technical

<footnote n="5">⁵Interview with (5JM-Eh56/04-04). Cofradía de Suchitlán, Colima.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶Interview with (10GC-Ah32/04-04). Cofradía de Suchitlán, Colima.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷Interview with (10GC-Ah32/04-04). Cofradía de Suchitlán, Colima.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸Interview with (5JM-Eh56/04-04). Cofradía de Suchitlán, Colima.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹Interview with (6MdLM-Am29/04-04). Cofradía de Suchitlán, Colima.</footnote>
knowledge, and others on their experience and their conviviality with the medium.

Relocated families view the volcanic risk from two sides. The first is that the volcano is dangerous for their physical integrity. Others feel that daily coexistence with volcanic activity forms part of their daily lives and geographic location. That is, living on the slopes of the Colima volcano is an everyday experience and not considered dangerous. Jesús Montejano, having lived in the locality for 34 years with no collective memory<fnref n="10" /> (Halbwachs 1950; cited in Mendoza 2001) of a volcanic eruption having affected them, says the volcanic risk is not a lived experience for relocated families:

> Look, for me personally it is not dangerous because I have not yet had to experience a large eruption. For all those who say it does nothing we can go 70 years back: the only woman to live there (he refers to La Yerbabuena) has told us she did not live in La Yerbabuena at the time (...) but like I said, one says it does nothing because you've lived here a long time and nothing has happened, but 60 or 70 years is not a long time<fnref n="11" />

## (2) Significance of relocation in resistant families

This section consists of three parts: (a) significance related to relocation; (b) representation of daily life in the resistant and (c) the representation of the volcanic risk and the volcano.

### (a) Significance related to relocation

From 2001 when Colima Housing (IVECOL) presented the relocation project to the people of La Yerbabuena many people showed reluctance to relocate, as for them it was only a pretext to

deprive them of their properties and a violation of their human rights. Relocation caused disunity between relocated and resistant families, and an interruption of daily activities such as deprivation to educational services. Antonio Alonso, moral leader of the resistant, states:

> The reason we have been given the volcano is so we can lose (refers to the resistant families) our lives for it, we would be honored to give our lives for this (...) not because someone doesn't impose. We have already stated this publically, we have disclaimed to the government and institutions that are near the volcano, because the right to education is not given and there are 12 children here in the community (...) but we will continue to resist for a few more years.<fnref n="12" />

The displacement caused a shortage of basic products for the resistant families. Shops disappeared and they had to travel to La Becerrera or Comala to buy basic foods. Despite all the drawbacks, none of them are willing to relocate as they argue they had not been requested to do so. The only official petition was realized by the ex-president in 1998 to whom they asked for land to build a house to suit their own needs to inhabit it only during times of volcanic crises without the need for shelters. Antonio Alonso remembers:

> For us the decision we made from the beginning was to stay and that it will be respected. At no point did any of us ask to be relocated. We were also asked at the shelter when the President came to visit; he had very clearly stated that he could provide some ground for everyone to build a home, whether it be made of cardboard or a proper home—everybody needs a home.<fnref n="13" />

The relocation fractured personal relations between people as well as family ties and pre-established social networks. According to the resistant families, the government intended on building a tourist facility in place of the settlement, as stated by Don Eusebio Cuellar:

> The tourist area will be made as it seems one of the Leaño Family wants to by a Cristero Camp (...) and they told me they wanted to build a church and

<footnote n="10">¹⁰The theoretical antecedents of collective memory can be found in the works of the Frenchman Durkheim, the British Federico Bartlett, the Russian Lev S. Vygotsky and the American George Herbert Mead. However, the concept can be attributed to the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. According to this author, collective memory “is the social process of the reconstruction of the past, lived and experienced by a particular group, community, or society” (Mendoza 2001, p. 67).</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹Interview with (5JM-Eh56/04-04). Cofradía de Suchitlán, Colima.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹²Interview with (1AA-Ah48/04-04). La Yerbabuena, Colima.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³Interview with (1AA-Ah48/04-04). La Yerbabuena, Colima.</footnote>
cabanas, and so it will be converted into a tourist area.<fnref n="14" />

(b) *Representation of daily life in the resistant group*

There were notable registered changes in the daily lives of the resistant families. The local government suspended various public services, such as public lighting, from the start of the relocation. Later on the scholarship support program for students (Progresa) disappeared; and soon after then closed the school and cancelled all government help programs in the community. Antonio Alonso retells the story:

> From the start the government were attacking us; they took away Progresa (...) they attacked as if we were no longer there (...).<fnref n="15" />

As time passed, the authorities of state were pressuring the resistant group by threatening to demolish their houses by order of the government.<fnref n="16" /> Subsequently, they made use of their networks and social capital contacting the Civil Committee of the Zapatista Front of National Liberation (CCFZLN) who support the resistant, as noted by Antonio Alonso:

> Don Rafael, a fellow from here, already had contact with them (refers to the C. C. F. Z. L. N.), that is how we joined forces. Therefore, they said we have to work together, we have to be self-sufficient, we have to find a way to resist, and that is how we came into contact with them.

Gratitude and loyalty for the Zapatista prevailed within the resistant families. With their intervention, they adopted adaptive survival strategies. For example, some farmers did both farm work and hand crafts (dream catchers, bracelets, necklaces, volcanic rock engravings, and papermaking with banana fibers). They

argued that one of the strategies for resisting was knowing the Mexican Constitution to defend themselves against violations of their human rights, as told by Alicia Mejía:

> We rely on the law that is in accordance with the law under the articles, they are supposed to be respected as they are articles of the law and we rely on them to defend ourselves.<fnref n="17" />

The participation of the Zapatista Front was one important factor that contributed to the fracture of the social links between the resistant families, as well as with the displaced families. Some internal disagreements were the result of land conflicts that originated from the foundation of the ejido, others were a consequence of the relocation.

The band “Nativo” joined after the intervention of the Zapatista Front and participated in the first homage to the volcano. At this event, it was proposed to build a temazcal<fnref n="18" /> with the objective of obtaining economic resources to cover the costs of the resistant, a proposal that was accepted and consolidated just a few months later. A temazcal was built in one of the houses. The lucky family felt honored but the other families considered that they were victim of some kind of exclusion, which contributed to cause fractures in the social relations.

(c) *The representation of the volcanic risk and the volcano*

For the resistant families, there was no representation of the volcanic risk. Many years of living their daily lives on the slopes of the colossus have allowed them to identify when it going to be dangerous. However, they also denied the

<footnote n="14">¹⁴Interview with (7EC-H68/04-04). La Yerbabuena, Colima.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵Interview with (1AA-Ah48/04-04). La Yerbabuena, Coima.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶In the radio show of the former governor Fernando Moreno Peña, “Un Nuevo Colima”, he declared the following: “Neither I nor my hand will hesitate to make a decision of that nature”; referring to the displacement of inhabitants.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷Interview with (11AM-Am32/04-04). La Yerbabuena, Colima.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸Temazcal comes from the Nahuatl language, meaning ‘steam house’ (Temaz—steam, calli—house). A temazcal is a prehispanic bath that is found throughout Mesoamerican cultures, whose oldest remains are found in archaeological sites in Palenque, México and in Piedras Negras, Guatemala. Historically, temazcals have been used for therapeutic, medicinal, and ceremonial uses; its practice survives in the present day thanks to the oral traditions of diverse indigenous communities in Mexico.</footnote>
possibility of a major eruption affecting their lives, goods, and property. Although, they relate these events to divine powers, as stated by Maximino Ramírez: "If God wants us to die from the volcano, then we will die happy".

With the help of CCFZLN, the residents organized the first Spring Equinox festival "Atlacohualco", where the environmentalist organization Bios-Iguana, A. C. made their first intervention in the area. From this, the organization joined the resistant movement. Many residents showed an interest in ecology, as demonstrated by Maximino Ramírez:

> So we have confidence that nature is something that can deprive us of life (...). For me it would be very honorable to die due to nature, because I come from nature and there I shall go back, how beautiful it will be, to appreciate that.<fnref n="19" />

The relocation brought about a redefinition of the volcano amongst the resistant. From being a mountain that spews smoke, to being called the "guardian". Some inhabitants claim to have had visions of the volcano and they are sure that the colossus sends signals to "the chosen ones", as they call themselves. It is possible that residents of other volcanic regions such as Popocatépetl and Iztaccíhuatl, respectively called Don Gregorio and Doña Manuela, inspire these visions and forms of redefinition of the volcano. For these residents, the volcanoes are like people who occasionally wander through the village, but their presence, now with the risk of a volcanic eruption, is explained differently from their previous wanderings. Julio Glockner (1996) has called some inhabitants of these communities "tiemperos", "graniceros",<fnref n="20" /> or "time workers", who have been sometimes paid by their neighbors to keep the hail stroms (bad for agriculture) away and attract rain.

In the words of Hobsbawn (1983) the visions experienced by the resistant are an "invented

tradition" because they are constructed, formally introduced, and emerge during a short time period. These "invented traditions" are a set of practices normally governed and tacitly accepted as a ritual or something of symbolic nature, which seek to instill values and behavioral norms that imply continuity with the past. One of the principle characteristics is to remain linked in a convenient form to the past—not necessarily the remote past—in which one intends to establish continuity.

For the resistant, the volcano is a being one should respect and learn to live with, because thanks to it, there is life in the location and they can subsist on what Mother Nature has endowed on them.

## 5 In Conclusion

From the start of the resettlement process the social representation constructed in La Yerbabuena was based on volcanic risk resulting from the processes of interactive significance that the inhabitants of the community developed with other social actors and the interaction amongst themselves. In this significant process, shared values and traditions that form a way of life and history have unified individuals in a cultural belongings and built forms of meaning and explanation from the most mundane and most extraordinary events.

According to the testimonies of the people, we can say that social representation is born from the mental images that both the relocated and the resistant constructed with the information they received of the sociocultural reality common to all members. Social representation represents the organizational forms of symbolic space in which a person develops. The reality appears through social representation and discourses that form the social fabric through which actors related in a particular social space, configure the subjective sense of the spheres of their lives and significance attributed to them and their relationships with others.

Knowledge of how social representation is constructed/built by residents helps link the

<footnote n="19">¹⁹Interview with (9MR-Ah58/04-04). La Yerbabuena, Colima.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰Graniceros and tiemperos are people that have been struck by lightning and survived. The amount of energy that struck them opened energy points within their bodies, which gives people the ability to talk to animals, people, and the Popocatepetl (Anaya 2001).</footnote>
process of human resettlement and volcanic risk to understand how communities will respond, act, and implement adaptive or resistant strategies at individual, familial, and communal levels during a volcanic emergency. However, despite these representations, volcanic risk managers in the state have implemented mechanisms of information and hierarchical communication for many years while omitting the knowledge and meaning built by the residents; while authorities and scientists implement prevention and mitigation mechanisms based on largely technical and scientific knowledge only.

Undertaking studies on risks and social representations allows us to recognize the ways and processes through which people form and construct their own social reality and bring us closer to the “worldview” they have. The approach to social representations makes it possible to understand the dynamics of social interactions, and to clarify the determinant factors of social practices since representation, discourse, and practice are mutually generated (Abric 1994).

Finally, the lessons learned from this work are that the knowledge of social representations that the social actors constructed regarding volcanic risk and human relocation helped to understand how they will respond, act, and implement strategies, at individual, familiar and collective levels in situations of risk and/or disaster. It is urgent that all social actors involved in risk management have an understanding of the culture, risk perception, and forms of social representation of the volcanic risk of the inhabitants of the communities settled in zones of high risk in order to design plans suitable for prevention and where the population can have an active participation. These measures will improve risk management while strengthening multidisciplinary research.

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If I Understand, I Am Understood:
Experiences of Volcanic Risk
Communication in Colombia

Carolina García and Ricardo Mendez-Fajury

**Abstract**

In December 1984, after the reactivation of the Nevado del Ruiz Volcano, the Colombian Geological Survey (SGC) began campaigning for the delivery of volcanic risk information. The campaigns, focused mostly on communities located in high volcanic hazard zones, received expert advice and support from national and international volcanologists. Within the context of contrasting, multicultural and multi-ethnic features in Colombia, community reactions to the campaigns have ranged from immediate acceptance of risk, to outright denial and rejection of risk awareness. Religious, political, and philosophical arguments underlie the range of reactions seen in targeted communities. Since December 1984, volcano monitoring has also increased throughout the country. As part of the monitoring strategy, volcanologists have worked on assuring continuous transmission and open access of data to the general public, especially during times of increased volcanic activity. This chapter contains an empirically-based discussion of the measures undertaken by technical volcanologists in Colombia to address volcanic hazard communication for communities located in the hazard zones of Nevado del Ruiz, Nevado del Huila, and the Volcanic Complex Cumbal and Cerro Machin volcanoes. This account is coupled with a review of campaigns described in articles and official reports by the entities in charge of the communication process. The chapter shows how most campaigns focused on delivering technical information to the public. A few cases included inter-agency risk

<footnote>C. García (✉)
Institución Universitaria Colegio Mayor de
Antioquia, Medellín, Colombia
e-mail: cargalon@gmail.com</footnote>

<footnote>R. Mendez-Fajury
Colombian Geological Survey—SGC, Colombia
Volcanological and Seismological Observatory,
Manizales, Colombia
e-mail: ricardomendezfajury@gmail.com</footnote>
communication campaigns involving social science and participatory activities, within interdisciplinary and participatory educational projects. Further research is necessary in order to analyse the impact of the different communication processes in Colombia. This could provide important feedback to the Colombian volcanological community about how to achieve more effective risk communication campaigns that increase the levels of risk perception and awareness of communities at risk.

**Keywords**

Risk communication • Multidisciplinary • Active volcanoes of Colombia

Tell me and I will forget. Show me and I will remember. Involve me and I will understand. Step back and I will act.

Old Chinese proverb

# 1 Introduction

Risk communication aims to increase awareness by encouraging people to adopt preparedness measures that reduce their risk and increase their ability to manage hazard consequences and to make informed and appropriate independent judgments to minimise loss of life and damage to property (Rodriguez et al. 2004; Paton et al. 2008; Haynes et al. 2008). However, providing information about risk is simply not enough, since it is not information by itself that determines whether people act to manage their risk (Paton et al. 2008; Perry and Lindell 2008; Garcia and Fearnley 2012). Rather, decisions to act are determined by how people interpret information in the dynamic context of previous experiences, social relationships, trust and expectations (Perry and Lindell 2008; Haynes et al. 2008). This is especially true when people at risk are in denial about the risk they face or when they expect to be protected by the authorities and emergency personnel, being therefore unprepared to respond appropriately and effectively to warnings. Therefore, risk communication campaigns should intend both to educate and to promote risk reduction (Donovan and Oppenheimer 2014).

Furthermore, the levels of risk perception and awareness are strongly related to the availability, quality and quantity of information, which should be provided at the proper time and should be adapted to the local conditions (Mileti and Sorenson 1990; De Marchi 2007). In this sense, an effective educational or communication campaign needs not just a far-reaching divulgation, but it is fundamental to provide the information in a clear way, using simple language and terminology. To consider local customs and traditions is essential, as well as the real level of perceived risk and the type of information that the population considers more relevant and necessary to improve preparedness.

Several authors agreed that delivering information and disseminating a warning might not be effective at generating an appropriate response unless strongly accompanied by participatory educational campaigns to assure that the warning message is well understood (Paton et al. 2008; IFRC 2009; Bird et al. 2010). Additionally, people are more likely to react appropriately when they have participated in risk education and communication campaigns where there is a process of sharing information among the different stakeholders, among the different actors, a key aspect trust being (Perry and Lindell 2008;
Haynes et al. 2008). Some examples, where sustained prior public education and community preparedness resulted in effective reactions, include the eruption of the Mount Pinatubo Volcano in Philippines 1991 (Punongbayan and Newhall 1998); and, Hurricane Michelle in Cuba 2001 (Wisner 2001).

In Colombia, before the reactivation and subsequent eruption and lahar of Nevado del Ruiz Volcano (NRV) that destroyed the city of Armero in November 1984, volcanology was limited to local studies, especially of geothermal evaluation. It was not only until such reactivation that the study of volcanic hazard and risk assessment began, followed by the dissemination of the results of such studies. Formal volcanic monitoring started after the NRV eruption in November 1985, with the creation of the network of Volcanic and Seismological Observatories of Colombia, based in Manizales (1986), Pasto (1989) and Popayán (1993), the latter being the only volcanological observatory established in Colombia prior to a crisis situation (Agudelo et al. 2012). Regarding volcanic risk communication activities, the ones developed prior to the 1985 Nevado del Ruiz Volcano (NRV) eruption were the first of their kind in Colombia. Since then, the volcanology community has developed regular communication activities, especially during periods of reactivation of any of the fourteen volcanoes considered active in Colombia (Fig. 1). Most of those activities focused on the provision of risk information by technical volcanologists to local communities and authorities. There are however some cases of multidisciplinary risk communication campaigns.

Colombian experiences on volcanic risk communication provide valuable examples of how effective different communicational approaches are, ranging from provision of scientific information to multidisciplinary and participatory communicational campaigns.

On the other hand, there has been an evolution in the use of technical terminology in Colombia. For example, Monsalve and Méndez (1995) pointed out that at that time of NVR reactivation in 1984 “hazard maps” were incorrectly called “risk maps” by the volcanological community. In

fact, at the beginning of volcanological studies in Colombia the term ‘hazard’ was not used. The first hazard maps were entitled “Preliminary Potential Volcanic Risk Maps”. The term ‘hazard’ was first used when the volcanic hazard map of NRV was updated and published in October 1986 (Parra et al. 1986). The definitions used in that map were: “volcanic risk: expected consequences on lives and goods in case of a potentially destructive volcanic eruption”; “volcanic hazard: potentially destructive volcanic event which can affect a specific area” (Parra et al. 1986, p. 1). Nowadays, volcanic risk definition is still the same, whereas the definition for volcanic hazard is “the probability of occurrence of a potentially damaging volcanic event within a specific period of time in a given area” (INGEOMINAS 2012, p. 1).

Regarding the legislative framework, Table 1 contains the first legislative instruments on risk management and volcanic risk in Colombia. After that, the Law 1523 of 2012 provided a breakthrough in the legislative framework of Colombia. This law created the National System for Disaster Risk Management, thus evolving from a Prevention and Attention focus into Disaster Risk Management. The law defined Disaster Risk Management as “a social process with the express purpose of contributing to safety, well-being, people’s quality of life; and to sustainable development, made up of three main components: risk knowledge, risk reduction and disaster management” (Law 1523 of 2012, article 1). Furthermore, Law 1523 states that risk management is “a development policy indispensable to ensure sustainability, territorial security, collective rights and interests, improvements in the quality of life of populations and communities at risk. Therefore, risk management is inherently related to: safe development planning, sustainable territorial environmental management at all levels of government, and effective people’s participation” (Law 1523 of 2012, article 1, paragraph 1).

Besides the above-mentioned laws, the Constitution of Colombia of 1991, has two important articles related to participation and risk management. Article 2 states that some essential
<figure><img src="image_118.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** Location of the active volcanoes of Colombia (Adapted from Ordoñez 2011). The red triangles highlight the Nevado del Ruiz volcano, Cerro Machín, Nevado del Huila and Cumbal</figcaption></figure>

purposes of the State include: "to facilitate the participation of all citizens in the decisions that affect them". It further specifies that: "the authorities of the Republic are instituted to protect everyone residing in Colombia: in their life, honour, property, beliefs and other rights and freedoms." In addition, Articles 16, 18, 20 and 28 of the Constitution are related to the right to free development of personality, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression and to the transmission and reception of truthful and impartial information.

This chapter provides an account of four experiences on volcanic risk communication in Colombia, including the campaigns prior to the 1985 eruption of Nevado del Ruiz Volcano (NRV), followed by the attempts to address volcanic hazards communication in the Nevado del Huila volcano, in the Volcanic Complex Cumbal and in the Cerro Machín volcano. In each of the four cases, a description of the reaction by the local communities is discussed. The data presented in this chapter is drawn from archival data, accounts given by the local
<table><caption>**Table 1** Legislative background on risk management and volcanic risk in Colombia</caption><thead><tr><td>Legislative instrument</td><td>Implication</td><td>Description</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Decree— Law 1400 of 1984</td><td>Establishment of the first Colombian seismic building code</td><td>Generated as a result of the 1983 Popayán earthquake that caused 228 deaths</td></tr><tr><td>Decree 3815 of 1985</td><td>Assigned to INGEOMINAS research activities on all kinds of geological risks, using volcanological techniques, among others</td><td>Following the lahar generated by the NRV eruption of 1985</td></tr><tr><td>Law 46 of 1988</td><td>Created the national system for prevention and attention of disasters (SNPAD, from its Spanish name)</td><td>Following the lahar generated by the NRV eruption of 1985</td></tr><tr><td>Decree 919 of 1989</td><td>Organized the SNPAD</td><td>Established the structure of the SNPAD, including the interagency educational commissions</td></tr><tr><td>Decree 98 of 1993</td><td>Created the national plan for prevention and attention of disasters</td><td>Guidance to develop a national instrument to guide the development of prevention and attention of disasters activities</td></tr><tr><td>Law 1523 of 2012</td><td>Created the national system for disaster risk management (SNGRD, from its Spanish name)</td><td>Following major flooding associated with La Niña of 2010–2011</td></tr></tbody></table>

communities, and the personal experience of the authors via participant observation and engagement.

## 2 Risk Communication Experiences During Volcanic Emergencies in Colombia

In Colombia, volcanic risk communication activities developed by technical volcanology began prior to the 1985 eruption of Nevado del Ruiz Volcano (NRV). Since then, regular activities for the dissemination of volcanic risk information have been developed, including those described in the following sections.

### 2.1 Risk Communication Activities in the Nevado Del Ruiz Volcano (NRV)—States of Caldas and Tolima

After decades of inactivity, reactivation of NVR occurred in 1984, characterized by small fumaroles and earthquakes that generated concern among the population and authorities in the State of Caldas. According to INGEOMINAS (2006)

(National Institute of Mining and Geological Research—nowadays Colombian Geological Survey—SGC), following such reactivation, in January 1985 a new regional body was created and called the Comité de Estudios Volcanológicos de la Comunidad Caldense (Committee of Volcanological Studies for the Caldas Community). This Regional Committee was coordinated by FIDUCAL (Foundation for Scientific Research and University Development of Caldas) and was made up of by representatives of multiple entities such as several universities, CHEC (Hydroelectric of Caldas S.A.), the Committee of Coffee Growers of Caldas, the financial sector and community in general. The goal of the Regional Committee was mainly to articulate research activities, avoiding duplication of efforts. Some of the functions of this committee included the coordination of technical, logistical and financial support and the generation of the necessary policies needed for the implementation of volcanic seismic instrumentation, development of hazard maps and other research work. The Regional Committee obtained statutory recognition in August 1985 with the Decree 0977 of the State Government of Caldas.

Parallel to the creation of the regional committee, a group of technicians gathered to form a
Local Technical Committee in order to advise to the Mayor of Manizales directly. In the absence of a formal structure to deal with a situation without historical antecedents in Colombia, this Technical Committee was in charge of doing preliminary research, developing community awareness activities, providing assistance to authorities, and giving logistic support for national and international specialized missions, among other tasks. The Local Committee was formally established through Decree 079 signed by the Mayor in March 1985. It should be noted that this local committee was the first technical group in Colombia to formally include community awareness programs among its tasks.

On September 11th, 1985 an eruption characterized by phreatic ash emission generated a small lahar in the Azufrado River and block falls up to 2 km from the crater. Subsequently, on September 17th, a delegation with representatives of the scientific community, the Civic Committee (with delegates from the CHEC, the Civic Corporation of Caldas and the Mayor of Manizales) and the Civil Defense, emphatically demanded from the Ministry of Mines a timely response from the State, warning about the imminent hazard and possible direct consequences of the progress of NRV symptoms (Hall 1990, p. 108; INGEOMINAS 2006, p. 35; Presidency of the Republic of Colombia 1986, p. 46). As a result, the Ministry created a national committee for the scientific investigation of the phenomenon. This national committee was composed of two bodies, the Sub-Committee of Volcanic Monitoring, with geophysics and geochemistry tasks, and the Sub-Committee of the Volcanic Hazards Map, coordinated by INGEOMINAS. The national committee was supported by foreign scientists, in addition to professors and geology students of the University of Caldas.

By that time, due to the lack of solid technical information regarding the possibility of the eruption, the local and national media conducted multiple reports, some of them with partial or confusing information, contributing to confusion and fear in the population of the region,

especially in Manizales (Parra and Cepeda 1990; Villegas 2003; INGEOMINAS 2006).

Regarding the communication activities, the first formal attempt to divulge the scientific findings was during the public "Seminar on Volcanic and Seismic Risks Related to NVR", organized by the National University and CHEC on March 26th 1985. During the seminar, members of the regional Committee coordinated by FIDUCAL presented the findings to the local community, since the main goal of the seminar was to "involve the community" in all the activities and decisions regarding NRV (INGEOMINAS 2006, p. 33).

On September 19th, the Sub-Committee of Volcanic Hazards Map initiated the development of the "Preliminary Map of Potential Volcanic Risk of Nevado del Ruiz Volcano". The 1:100,000 map was finished in on October 7 and contained the "delimitation of potential areas subjected to different risks from volcanic eruptions" (INGEOMINAS 2006, p. 39). The map was delivered to national, regional and local government and Civil Defense authorities and it was published in the national, regional and local press (Hall 1990).

Between October 15th and 20th, 1985, several members of local emergency committees from multiple municipalities, including Armero, received technical advice from representatives of INGEOMINAS, SENA (National Learning Service) and the Institute of Territorial Credit—INSCREDIAL. These institutions developed a massive plan to disseminate the preliminary map of potential volcanic risks of the NRV. In addition to delivering to the population at the hazard zone an illustrative brochure developed by SENA, the representatives gave 87 lectures and open forums on risk prevention to the communities that could be affected in case of a volcanic eruption (INGEOMINAS 2006, p. 59). According to Omar Gomez (verbal communication), Head of Civil Defence at that time, the estimated attendance of this lectures and forums was around 5000 people.

During October, volcanic monitoring continued and scientific delegates gave several lectures
in Pereira, Armenia and Manizales to support the organization of Emergency Committees and to improve their knowledge on volcanic phenomena and community preparedness for volcanic disasters (the Presidency of the Republic of Colombia 1986).

Despite the efforts of the scientific community to have a highly accurate volcanic hazards map and disseminate the scientific findings, on 13 November 1985 a small-magnitude eruption of the Nevado del Ruiz Volcano caused lahars that led to the death of about 25,000 people, mainly in Armero and Chichiná municipalities.

It is important to highlight that in Armero, even though the lahars claimed the lives of 22,000 people, about 8000 survived. Many of these survivors evacuated to the nearby hills, previously identified as meeting points. Unfortunately, there are no records of how many people evacuated thanks to the information campaigns developed before the eruption.

In 1985 the Colombian population had no knowledge about previous volcanic disasters and thus there was no experience in risk communication. In consequence, despite the efforts of the scientific community to create risk awareness, the reaction was not effective.

After the 1985 eruption of NRV, there have been varying scenarios in the activity of several volcanoes in Colombia. This variation ranges from mild seismic activity, to eruptive states of different intensity. Consequently, several risk communication activities have been developed, as demonstrated below.

## 2.2 Risk Communication Activities in the Nevado Del Huila Volcano—the State of Huila

The Nevado del Huila Volcanic Complex (NHVC) commonly known as the Nevado del Huila Volcano, is part of the National Natural Park Nevado del Huila Volcano located between the states of Cauca, Huila and Tolima. It is an active volcanic complex formed by stratovolcanoes and several domes whose maximum height is 5364 m. Its activity has been dominantly

effusive, but in most recent development, it has generated pyroclastic flows produced by collapse and/or explosion of domes (INGEOMINAS 1996, p. 16).

In August 1986 the first evaluation of volcanic hazards of NHVC (Cepeda et al. 1986) included in its results a high risk factor for lahars in areas around Páez River. The recommendations of that work included the promotion of: "permanent school education campaigns about volcanic and other natural phenomena that can affect the population, such as earthquakes, floods, landslides, etc." (Cepeda et al. 1986, p. 83). However, at that time no education campaigns were properly conducted. The only activities in this respect were some lectures given to local authorities and community members in the urban area of Belalcázar municipality and the villages of Wila, Tóez and Ireland. These villages were later greatly affected by flooding and debris associated with the 1994 earthquake and the 2008 lahars.

On June 6th 1994 an earthquake of magnitude 6.8 M<sub>w</sub> caused many landslides and consequent flooding of the Paez River, causing more than 1000 deaths. After this disaster, INGEOMINAS (1996) published a second version of the volcanic hazards map. This map included an area of pyroclastic falls and debris avalanches near the crater. The final recommendation of this document was: "the most important measure required is to disseminate the knowledge contained in this report among authorities and inhabitants of the Paez River Basin" (INGEOMINAS 1996, p. 33).

On 19 February and 18 April 2007 and 20 November 2008, the first historically recorded eruptions in the NHVC occurred. There eruptions significantly affected the social fabric and infrastructure in seven municipalities of the states of Cauca and Huila. Afterwards, INGEOMINAS sent to the affected area technicians with broad knowledge of the geology and the hazard of the Nevado del Huila Volcano. These technicians, even if lacking social-science preparation or training, had an extensive experience delivering technical information to potentially affected populations. An intensive communication campaign was then developed between March 6th
<figure><img src="image_119.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** Activities to disseminate volcanic risk information in 2007; addressed to a students and teachers of the Normal School of Belalcázar, later destroyed by the 2008 lahar and b indigenous governors. *Photo* Ricardo Méndez-Fajury</figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="image_120.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3** Development of the map of risk scenarios by the local indigenous community in collaboration with the association of councils Nasa Çxhãçxha. *Photo* Ricardo Méndez-Fajury</figcaption></figure>

and 13th of 2007 addressing about 1000 people from the local community, local emergency committees, students and teachers of the largest school (Escuela Normal) and indigenous governors from the Association of Indigenous Councils Juan Tama and Nasa Çxhã çxha (Fig. 2). Additionally, other lectures were given to Hospital personnel, the NGO Nasa Çxhã çxha and relief organizations like the Red Cross and Civil Defense. Finally, the INGEOMINAS personnel participated in a radio broadcast on the ‘community radio station Eucha’ whose motto is: “If I understand, I am understood”, with simultaneous translation from Spanish to Nasa language, spoken by the indigenous communities of the area.

During the meeting with indigenous governors, a community participant stated that to the indigenous community the volcano was not a threat but a God. Given this fact, the intuitive

response of the INGEOMINAS technician who sought an explanation, adapted to the indigenous world-view, was that the God was angry. He explained that if that God was really angry it was equivalent to what technicians call high activity, if the God was more or less angry it would be medium activity and if the God was only little angry it would be low activity and so on. Eventually, if the God gets very angry there could be damage to the high hazard zone. This explanation was welcomed by the indigenous community since it helped them to understand the technical jargon regarding alert levels.

It is important to highlight the work of the Secretariat of Government and the indigenous community of the region in identifying evacuation routes and developing their own map of risk scenarios, for which they had the important support from the Association of Nasa Councils Çxhãçxha and the OSSO Corporation (Fig. 3).
<figure><img src="image_121.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 4** Evacuation and evacuation paths selected and prepared by the community and local authorities. Map provided by the Government Secretariat Township Belalcázar—Cauca; *Photo* Ricardo Méndez-Fajury</figcaption></figure>

INGEOMINAS also supported the verification of the identified evacuation routes prepared by local authorities and the community (Fig. 4) and suggested extending such routes so the most vulnerable people were able to evacuate in time of emergency. As a result, community and local authorities extended the routes contributing to subsequent successful evacuation.

According to Agudelo et al. (2012), from the moment the Volcanological and Seismological Observatory of Popayán (OVSPo), belonging to INGEOMINAS, reported the increment of activity of the volcano, the local community became aware and participated actively in the preparedness exercises and the monitoring of the volcanic phenomenon. Communities contributed with the worldview of the indigenous communities and their experience of what happened as a result of the 1994 Páez earthquake, thus strengthening the understanding of volcanic phenomena and their response capacity.

With additional support from INGEOMINAS Manizales, the OVSPo continue working with CLOPAD'S, CREPAD'S (today municipal and departmental Risk Management Councils—CMGRD) and communities in urban and rural areas. This work focused on developing contingency plans and providing training in the volcanic area, with the aim of establishing early warning systems for volcanic risk. Additionally,

the OVSPo provided broad and public information on the evolution of the phenomenon through official statements addressed to local and traditional authorities in the area of influence of the volcano, among other joint strategies designed together with the local operational Relief Corps and the community to promote timely and safe evacuation responses (Agudelo et al. 2012).

Besides INGEOMINAS, many organisations participated in the exercise, including the Association of Nasa Çxhâçxha Councils, the OSSO Corporation and the National System for Disaster Prevention and Response (SNPAD), among many others. These organisations contributed to a comprehensive strategic planning exercise for the construction of an Early Warning System—EWS, involving the community in a daily prevention exercise, where each protagonist had a defined role to play in the process, from dialogue and conflict resolution, involving the whole community to reconstruction of the past, definition of the present and planning for the future by the whole community (Peralta 2008).

On 18 April 2007 a lahar that reached speeds close to 80 km/h and average heights up to 13 m, caused damage to the road infrastructure in the area and destroyed six bridges restricting the access to the municipalities of Páez and Belalcázar, whose urban area was also strongly affected (Agudelo et al. 2012). More than
<figure><img src="image_122.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 5** Municipality of Belalcázar on the River Páez bank, before and after the 2008 Lahar. *Photos INGEOMINAS*</figcaption></figure>

5000 people in the lowlands along the river Páez and Simbola areas, were effectively evacuated to the safe areas in a very short time (about 15 min).

The success of the awareness and preparation activities was achieved for several reasons (Hall 1990; Semana 2008; Efe and Reuters 2008), including the articulated inter-agency work that started after the 2007 reactivation. Another reason was the constant monitoring of permanently available information through online seismograph in the institutional website. In addition, a local newspaper “The Swarm” published regular reports about the volcanic activity. Finally, the constant concern and interest of the community in understanding the volcanic phenomenon and make it part of everyday life contributed greatly to the timely and efficient response.

The risk communication process developed on the NHVC is an excellent example of the high effectiveness of long term multi-agency, interdisciplinary and participatory work. This is evidenced in the big difference between what happened in the 1994 Páez Earthquake when 1100 lives were lost, and the evacuation in April 2007 and November 2008 when there were “only” 10 deaths (El Tiempo 2008), even though the 2008 event was more intense than the one of 1994 (Fig. 5).

## 2.3 Risk Communication Activities in the Volcanic Complex Cumbal—State of Nariño

The Cumbal Volcanic Complex—CVC is composed of two active volcanoes: Cumbal and

Mundo Nuevo. Its frequent hazards are mainly lava flows, ash and debris flows, plus hidroclastic and pyroclastic falls and lahars (Monsalve and Méndez 1988). The lava flows covers a 3.5 km radius from the crater and the hazard by pyroclastic flows goes up to 10 km radius from the crater.

From February 1988 on there were a series of reports from the inhabitants of the Cumbal municipality, concerning changes in the normal activity of the Volcán Cumbal, such as noise and changes in the fumaroles. For this reason, the authorities of the state of Nariño requested that the Government draw up a map showing the vulnerable sites in case of a possible volcanic eruption (Monsalve and Méndez 1988), since they feared a similar tragedy to the one in Armero in 1985. The result was the Preliminary Map of Potential Volcanic Hazard Complex Cumbal (Monsalve and Méndez 1988) in which it was shown that the population of Cumbal is located close to the pyroclastic flows hazard zone.

During the development of the hazard map two technical talks were given to the community of two villages in rural Cumbal to explain the mapping process. Later, during a fieldwork session, locals reacted aggressively and forced the withdrawal of the SGC personnel, claiming that scientists were “perverting the volcano” and stealing from it (sampling). What is more, the community did not believe that the volcano was under study, and insisted that mining practices were being carried out instead, which they deduced from the name of the institution: INGEOMINAS (National Institute of Mining
Geological Research). This, coupled with the armed conflict in the area, led to the interruption of the field work. Fortunately this did not stop the completion of the hazard map and its technical report finished by the end of 1988. Soon after the hazard map was finished, three talks were given to the community and local authorities of Cumbal and two talks were given to the regional authority in Pasto.

Over the next 25 years, permanent volcanic telemetric monitoring continued and the volcano did not show any significant changes in activity, until 2011 when the associated seismic activity increased significantly. As a result, the Colombian Geological Survey—SGC, began a process of updating the hazard map.

Activities for updating the hazard map include field work and communication activities to inform the community about the work performed by the SGC. Even though the updated map was about to be completed at the time of preparation of this chapter, it is important to note that great difficulty has been encountered in developing both communication activities talks and fieldwork, as the community, mostly indigenous, has repeatedly rejected the work regarding volcanic phenomena of the SGC, claiming that the SGC works constantly for the multinational mining companies (which is emphatically rejected by local communities).

The SGC repeatedly tried to talk to the Community Action Council, but failed because of constant evasive tactics. There were even threats made to the SGC technicians, which claimed that SGC was entering by force (despite constant attempts to disseminate the scientific information and to explain to the community that the scientific work regarding volcanic phenomena was completely unrelated to mining practices). To resolve conflicts with the community, the SGC has requested the support of local, regional and national authorities, who have been taking action, although, without significant results up to now.

SGC issued on its website weekly bulletins that described the changes in the volcanic activity of the Cumbal Volcanic Complex, as well as the description of communication activities

undertaken with communities and authorities. Prominent among these bulletins was the report of an institutional meeting held on 27 March 2014, between the SGC and the Ministry of the Interior called in order to analyse the situation regarding compliance of SGC missionary activity in CVC area, since SGC had not been able to enter the top of the volcano for almost a year because of opposition from some indigenous communities), (Boletín semanal de actividad del Complejo Volcánico Cumbal—Weekly Bulletin Cumbal activity Volcanic Complex 1 April 2014). Later, with the support of the Bureau of Indian Rom and Minorities Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior, between 4 and 6 August 2014, meetings were arranged with indigenous authorities and community members of the Indigenous Cumbal Reserve. The meetings, addressing the problem of admission to the upper Cumbal volcano, established some short-term strategies to move forward in this complex situation (Boletín semanal de actividad del Complejo Volcánico Cumbal, 12 August 2014).

Currently, fluctuations in seismic activity continue as well as gas emissions. The SGC continues with the agenda of proposed activities with the support of the Bureau of Indian Rom and Minorities Affairs and the participation of indigenous communities and members of the Indigenous Reserve Cumbal (Boletín semanal de actividad del Complejo Volcánico Cumbal, 30 September 2014).

## 2.4 Risk Communication Activities in the Cerro Machín Volcano—State of Tolima

The Cerro Machin Volcano is a highly volatile tuff-ring active volcano, reaching a Volcanic Explosive Index—VEI 5 with eruptions dominantly magmatic with highly destructive pyroclastic surges, whose deposits are distributed mainly in about a 12 km radius of the crater (Cepeda et al. 1996).

A group of scientists from INGEOMINAS initiated the study of the Machin volcano in 1988 led by geologist Luis Armando Murcia (RIP).
Following the death by natural causes of Murcia, the study of the volcano was temporarily stopped because the information gathered was partially lost. In 1995 work on the volcano resumed and the results were compiled in an internal document describing the volcanic deposits and different scenarios of volcanic activity, without a hazard analysis (Cepeda et al. 1996). Among its conclusions this document recommends "to disseminate the study results among government authorities, planners, investors and the general public, using methodologies of formal and non-formal education, with emphasis on disaster prevention and knowledge of the physical environment" (Cepeda et al. 1996, p. 45). Despite this recommendation, initiatives to disseminate volcanic risk information were not immediately undertaken.

In 1999 the hazard assessment of the Cerro Machin volcano began and some informative talks were given to advise the community and local authorities about the conducted scientific work. As a result, some relief agencies carried on dissemination activities such as the one shown in Fig. 6, in addition to handing out over a few days, flyers at tollbooths to inform tourists that they were entering into an active volcanic area.

The results of the studies initiated in 1999 were compiled into a document and a hazard map

(Méndez et al. 2002). The document states that the volcano had produced six eruptive periods during the Holocene (four Plinian episodes and two dome collapses), the last one about 800 years ago. It has also produced domes, eruption columns of over 20 km above the crater, pyroclastic flows and surges and large volumes of lahar deposits, (corresponding to debris and hyperconcentrated dacitic flows that cover an area of around 1000 km² to the East, in the valley of the Magdalena River). Currently, nearly one million people live in the area of influence of past eruptions where strategic plans for the national economy are being developed. The area also includes a key viaduct for 50% of domestic and international trade and for the communication between the central and southwest part of the country, including some coffee regions. The main vulnerable population centres are Ibagué, Armenia, Girardot, Calarcá, Cajamarca, Espinal, Flanders and Guamo (Méndez et al. 2002). It is important to clarify that the resulting hazard map does not present hazard levels, but represents the different volcanic products expected in areas of influence.

Regarding the initiatives to disseminate volcanic risk information, Méndez et al. (2002, p. 60) recommended: "The evaluation results should be considered for the development of

<figure><img src="image_123.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 6** Public poster announcing different risk management activities carried out by the Colombian Red Cross and German Red Cross in 1999. *Photo* Ricardo Méndez-Fajury</figcaption></figure>
local, regional and national contingency plans...
In order to achieve this, it is necessary to develop
risk assessment... In this process the participa-
tion of the stakeholders located in hazardous
zones is absolutely necessary."

As a result, in 2004, after the formalization of
the document, multiple communication activities
began in the area of influence. Since then there
have been more than 1000 lectures on Cerro
Machin addressed to the exposed population,
relief agencies, student community and local,
regional and national authorities (Fig. 7).

The talks given by the SGC were completely
technical and included the location and charac-
teristics of the volcano, an account of historical
eruptions, with comparison to similar eruptions,
for example Pinatubo in Philippines.

Among the experiences of volcanic commu-
nication there are a couple of interesting anec-
dotes. On Friday 28 December 2007 at 7:30 pm,
a large earthquakes swarm associated with the
volcano occurred. A strong earthquake was felt
in the cities of Ibagué, Armenia and Pereira,
more than 60 km away from the volcano. Fol-
lowing the instructions of the National Risk
Management System, the emergency alarm pro-
tocol was activated, which is to alert system
members about the variation of the volcanic
activity so it would not take them unaware in
case of a more significant change. The event
coincided with Christmas celebrations, the
Innocents Day and the taking of office of a new
local Mayor (public officials had finished their
contract that day at 6 pm). Because of this

situation, many members of the emergency
phone teams relinquished their responsibilities
and passed them on to the next in the emergency
phone chain claiming they thought the call was a
joke, that they were celebrating, or just that it
was not his/her responsibility.

Another anecdote worthy of mention is that
on November 8th and 9th, 2008 when a large
swarm of earthquakes, including two earthquakes
of magnitude 4.6 activated again the emergency
phone chain. When calling the people located on
the volcano, they reported that the earthquake
had created panic in the Machin community, so
they asked the SGC if it was necessary to evac-
uate. The SGC representative responded that he
could not give the evacuation order, since it was
the responsibility of the Local and Regional
Committees for Risk Management (which SGC
subsequently called). The community decided
not to wait and started the evacuation to Ibague,
even before receiving the official order, showing
high risk awareness. Parallel to this, heavy rains
generated large landslides blocking the roads to
Ibague and Armenia, forcing people on the road,
mostly tourists, to go to the town of Cajamarca.
Tourists felt seismic activity and when asked
what was happening, the local community,
informed them of the existence of an active
volcano nearby, (without further explanation),
causing panic among tourists who had no idea of
what was happening.

Currently, the only information on the Machin
volcano available for tourists, is a big public
board next to the road to Cajamarca. The board

<figure><img src="image_124.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 7** Lectures given in 2004 in the Municipality of Guamo and Toche village in the Municipality of Ibagué. *Photo* Ricardo Méndez-Fajury</figcaption></figure>
<figure><img src="image_125.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 8** Public board next to the road to Cajamarca welcoming visitors to Cerro Machin volcano. *Photo* John Jairo Sánchez</figcaption></figure>

simply welcomes visitors to the Cerro Machín volcano (Fig. 8).

Tourists and other itinerant populations are highly vulnerable during volcanic crisis due to their lack of hazard knowledge. Therefore communication about the specific volcanic hazard and risk to the travelling population is necessary as well as training of staff from tourist enterprises (so they coordinate an appropriate response in case of an event) (Bird et al. 2010).

Regular and systematic documentation of both scientific, and communication activities is very important to ensure the generation of new knowledge, facilitate monitoring and reduce dependence on particular individuals, who may leave the process at any time. In this respect, no reports of risk communication campaigns by the SGC were made in the past because there was no awareness of its importance. The systematization of communicational experiences began only after 2004 as a result of the implementation in SGC of quality certification and corresponding ISO standard, which requires generating indicators of

planned and executed activities on a regular basis. Today the SGC publishes on its website quarterly reports with results of the monitoring and volcanic hazard assessment, as well as the description of the developed communication activities.

## 3 Conclusions and Recommendations

In recent history, Colombia has experienced different volcanic crises with great social and economic impact, from fatal eruptions, to activity changes without reaching eruptive consequences. Volcanological institutions and scientific organizations in Colombia have consistently reiterated the need for communication activities on volcanic hazards and risks. However, on several occasions the local authorities have chosen not to support the communication. In the opportunities where there has been inter-agency support, such communication activities have generated positive results.
Technicians display great technical knowledge about eruption mechanism. Hence, they are important in the process of risk communication. The recommendation is to work together with social scientists, incorporating in the communication activities elements of the social science and techniques of public management to ensure that the message is understood and generates a consequent and timely reaction. A solid social science research program is necessary in order to get a better understanding of not only the impact of the communication of technical information in emergency management and risk reduction, but also to help SGC technicians and local authorities to understand the social processes that influence the decision-making of the public. Additionally, it is relevant to include an analysis of not only the volcanic hazard, but also the different components of vulnerability.

Multidisciplinary approaches that combine natural and social sciences could help address complex elements such as uncertainty and trust-building, as well as to understand what makes the authorities and the local community to react in volcanic crises. Constant feedback and monitoring are critical to improve any communicational processes. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate the cases when the community and local authorities have not supported the hazard and risk communication processes, and also to generate instruments to understand the impact and effectiveness of the communication activities. In addition, any communication and monitoring strategy should always respectfully incorporate the knowledge of communities and local and regional institutions. The previous steps favour trust building between different stakeholders, influencing key elements such as risk perception, effective communication and community reactions to government mandates. In the risk reduction process, it is also very important to include the media from the outset, as well as having non-linear communication protocols to ensure that the message reaches all potentially affected people, even if one link in the communication chain fails.

Regional cultural differences regarding land appropriation have an impact on the way people

react. While North of Cauca ownership is low because the territory was occupied by people descended from other regions (as around Cerro Machín and NRV), ownership in the South is much higher due to traditional cultural attachment of several generations living in the area, as for example around NHVC. This favours or hinders the response to a volcanic alarm. Mining is an economic activity of high social impact in Colombia. In some regions of the country, local communities associate the volcanic research with mining activity, (which is translated into strong opposition and fieldwork obstruction, thus affecting the studies of hazard and risk).

Except for isolated conditions, the community tends to trust in the technical work of the scientific volcanic community of Colombia, particularly, in the scientific information provided by the SGC. However, an assessment of whether such information is understood and assimilated by the population has not been made, and therefore both positive and negative aspects on the likelihood of this information to promote effective response during volcanic crisis is unknown. Furthermore, assessment of the perceptions and knowledge of SGC technicians and main political authorities regarding the relevance of public involvement in risk management has not been carried out.

The Colombian Geological Survey—SGC, is a purely technical body, so its communicational work is limited to the transmission of technical knowledge about volcanic hazards. It would therefore be desirable to combine efforts with organisations or individuals in the social area to help assure responsiveness and understanding of scientific results by the communities and local authorities, in order to achieve the objectives of volcanic risk communication, which include both education and the promotion of risk reduction. A better understanding by geo-scientists and authorities of the social processes that influence the decision-making of the public is also necessary. The above can be achieved through feedback and simulations subsequent to the communication activities. These activities could be coordinated by the local committees of risk management with support of social scientists and
should promote significant participation by the communities, as it was achieved in the successful case surrounding the eruption of the Nevado del Huila Volcano in 2008 described above.

Volcanic risk reduction is not responsibility of one single person or institution but of everyone, including volcanological observatories, technicians, social scientists, academics, politicians, planners, disaster relief agencies, communicators, and of course, the community (Duque 2005). This requires constant, clear, effective and organized communication.

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# Challenges of Volcanic Crises on Small Islands States

Jean-Christophe Komorowski, Julie Morin, Susanna Jenkins and Ilan Kelman

## Abstract

Island communities frequently display specific risk-related characteristics that are attributable to the island locations of volcano-affected communities, in terms of exposure, vulnerability and living with the volcanic risk. This chapter examines volcanic crisis response and communication in island communities. We analyse lessons from volcanic crises in 1976 at La Soufrière (Guadeloupe, France), in 2005 and 2006 at Karthala (Grande Comore, Comoros), and in 1995 at Fogo (Cape Verde). Our analysis underscores the strong influence of deep-seated causes (historical, political, cultural, social, economic, and environmental) on the success and failure of volcanic risk communication, all of which are affected by island characteristics. The case studies demonstrate the intensity of politics that manifests in these instances—perhaps because of, rather than despite, the smallness and tightness of the communities, amongst other island characteristics. Consequently, improved information and less uncertainty would not straightforwardly lead to better communication or more harmonious acceptance of decision-making processes and of decisions.

J.-C. Komorowski (✉)
Institut de Physique Du Globe de Paris, Université Paris Diderot (Sorbonne Paris Cité), UMR CNRS 7154, Equipe "Systèmes Volcaniques" 1, Rue Jussieu, Paris 75238, Cedex 05, France
e-mail: komorow@ipgp.fr; jeanchristophe.komorowski@gmail.com

J. Morin
Laboratoire de Géographie Physique, UMR 8591, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Meudon, France
e-mail: julieapi@yahoo.fr

J. Morin
Institut de Physique Du Globe de Paris, UMR CNRS 7154, Equipe "Systèmes Volcaniques", Paris, France

S. Jenkins
School of Earth Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1RJ, UK
e-mail: Susanna.Jenkins@bristol.ac.uk

I. Kelman
Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction and Institute for Global Health, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK
e-mail: ilan_kelman@hotmail.com

I. Kelman
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway
One fundamental point is the need to engage with—not just consult—local populations regarding risk communication and decision-making, tailoring messages to the various audiences, and being clear regarding what is known and not known, plus what is feasible to do to fill in knowledge gaps to support decisions. Ultimately, it is necessary to foster synergies with communities to ensure that no party or knowledge dominates, but instead information is exchanged leading to decisions and decision-making processes that are better understood and accepted by all who are involved. Living with volcanic risk thus means working with communities on their terms.

**Keywords**

Small island • Volcanic eruptions • Volcanic risk • Crisis management • Guadeloupe • La Soufrière • Comoros • Karthala • Fogo • Cape Verde

# 1 Introduction

This chapter examines volcanic crisis response and communication in island communities. We analyse lessons from volcanic crises in 1976 at La Soufrière (Guadeloupe, France), in 2005 and 2006 at Karthala (Grande Comore, Comoros), and in 1995 at Fogo (Cape Verde). Our analysis underscores the strong influence of deep-seated causes (historical, political, cultural, social, economic, and environmental) on the success and failure of volcanic risk communication, all of which are affected by island characteristics.

Island communities frequently display specific risk-related characteristics that are attributable to the island locations of the volcano-affected communities, in terms of exposure, vulnerability and living with the volcanic risk (Lewis 1999, 2009; Méheux et al. 2007; Mercer and Kelman 2010; Morin 2012; Pelling and Uitto 2001). In fact, research and experience from island communities has been a significant foundation for understanding risk, disaster risk reduction, and disaster response, particularly in volcanic contexts (de Boer and Sanders 2002; Gaillard 2008;

Keesing 1952; Kelman et al. 2011; Pattullo 2000). Regarding specific vulnerabilities:

- small land size, despite large ocean territory, can mean that even moderately sized volcanic hazards threaten the entire territory and population, causing difficulties in planning for risk management, and often needing to consider the possibility of permanent evacuation of the entire island,

- relative inaccessibility and remoteness from centres can often cause problems for decision-making,

- small populations make it difficult to have local experts for all disciplines required, yet small populations do not necessarily increase the community's homogeneity meaning that diverse cultural responses could still be expected.

Regarding living with the risk:

- tight, kinship-based communities can build inherent trust, sometimes supporting rapid information dissemination and response,
- communities with no option but to live in close proximity to the volcano can build up local knowledge regarding volcano behaviour, warning signs, and responses,

- small, diversified economies—including offshore livelihoods such as migration and remittances—can sometimes permit more nimble adjustment to crisis.

- The volcano could have provided a baseline of robust livelihoods, such as through agriculture and tourism, meaning that the population might have resources available to support themselves for some time.

The legacy of the island case studies presented here, over the decades during which they ensued, has significant implications for crisis response plans and risk communication for potential future eruptions—or eruption threats. The lessons are outlined in terms of engaging with local populations regarding risk communication and decision-making, tailoring messages to the various audiences, and being clear regarding what is known and not known, plus what is feasible to do to fill in knowledge gaps to support decisions.

The bulk of this chapter is presented as the three case studies, with the lessons and island relevance woven into the descriptions. The final section synthesises some general points emerging and provides examples of ways forward.

## 2 Case Study 1: La Soufrière de Guadeloupe, Guadeloupe, Caribbean

Management of the volcanic crisis at La Soufrière of Guadeloupe in 1975-77 remains one of the most contentious in recent times (Fiske 1984; Komorowski et al. 2005; Beauducel 2006; Devès et al. 2015). The chronology of the phenomenology, and the actions taken by scientists and authorities to manage the crisis were summarized by Hincks et al. (2014). The mild but persistent seismic and fumarolic unrest that has slowly increased since 1992 at La Soufrière volcano (Komorowski et al. 2005; http://www.ipgp.fr/fr/ovsg/bulletins-mensuels-de-lovsg; Komorowski

et al. 2013b, 2014) has prompted renewed interest in geologic studies, monitoring, risk modelling, and crisis response planning (Komorowski et al. 2012, 2013a; https://sites.google.com/site/casavaanr/) in order to learn from the 1975–77 crisis and improve the management and response to any potential future crisis at this volcano.

At least 6 phreatic explosive eruptions (1690, 1797–98, 1812, 1836–38, 1956 and 1976–77) have occurred at La Soufrière de Guadeloupe during the historical period since AD 1635. In contrast to previous phreatic eruptions of La Soufrière and elsewhere in the Caribbean, a significant period of increasing volcanic seismicity was recorded and felt in Guadeloupe starting in July 1975, one year prior to the onset of the eruption. This unprecedented and rapidly escalating level of recorded and felt seismicity (Dorel and Feuillard 1980; Feuillard et al. 1983; Feuillard 2011), which in June 1976 reached levels that were 175 times the baseline monthly rate, was not accompanied by any modification of fumarolic activity. The eruption began with an unexpected explosion on 8 July 1976. The subsequent 9-month long period of explosive and ash-venting activity was interpreted as a still-born or failed magmatic event (Feuillard et al. 1983; Villemant et al. 2005; Boichu et al. 2011). Syn-eruptive degassing ($H_2O$, minor $CO_2$, $H_2S$, $SO_2$) with acid condensates (HCl, HF, Br) led to moderate environmental impact with short-term public health implications.

A major controversy emerged among the scientific community (Fiske 1984) as to whether fresh juvenile magmatic components could be recognised in the ejecta, thus raising the probability of a transition from a purely phreatic, non-hazardous scenario to a highly hazardous magmatic 1902 Mount Pelée-style explosive scenario. The scientific disagreement was widely echoed in the media (Loubat and Pistolesi-Lafont 1977; Farugia 1977; De Vanssay 1979; Figs. 1 and 2). On August 15, the emergency plan was enacted by the authorities based on the systematic increase in seismicity and magnitude of explosions. About 70,000 people were evacuated from all of southern Basse-Terre for about six months until December 15, 1976 (Préfecture de
Guadeloupe 1977; De Vanssay 1979; Lepointe 1984, 1999). This evacuation remains controversial today; however, regardless of the interpretation of the eruption's evolution, evacuation of the population in the areas closest to and downwind from the erupting volcano was necessary due to the degassing and ash fallout.

The cost of the preventive evacuation was estimated at 60 % of the total annual per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Guadeloupe in 1976 (Lepointe 1984, 1999; Blérald 1986; Kokelaar 2002) excluding the losses of uninsured personal assets and open-grazing livestock. Hence, this eruption and the evacuation that ensued rank amongst the most costly for the 20th century (Annen and Wagner 2003) although the eruption itself did not cause any fatalities. A few years before the eruption, a public policy was implemented to move the banana export port facilities of the Basse-Terre harbour highly exposed to Caribbean swells to the more sheltered harbour and economic capital Pointe-à-Pitre. The widespread long-lasting evacuation reinforced this shift to Pointe-à-Pitre, contributing to the demise of the economy of the administrative capital, Basse-Terre, and to the feeling among the population of bitterness and of being forsaken.

Lack of a comprehensive and integrated monitoring network prior to and during the crisis, the then-limited knowledge of the eruptive history, and a tendency of caution exacerbated by the memory of past devastating Caribbean eruptions (e.g. the devastating explosive eruptions of Montagne Pelée in May 1902 and of Soufrière of St. Vincent in April 1902) all contributed to a high degree of scientific uncertainty alongside a publically-expressed lack of consensus and trust in available expertise. Hence, analysis, forecasting, and crisis response were highly challenging for scientists and authorities in the context of escalating and fluctuating activity as well as societal pressure in a small island community (Komorowski et al. 2005; Beauducel 2006). Given the uncertain evidence and the absence of scientific consensus on the likely outlook, and the lack prior to the crisis of a well-defined and accepted volcanic emergency response plan, the

authorities felt impelled to adopt an approach involving zero risk of casualties from the volcano—without fully considering other social risks emerging due to the evacuation.

A binary manichean approach appeared in the scientific discourse through a major conflict between two leading, authoritative scientists, C. Allègre and H. Tazieff, that unravelled and escalated in the media and public (Farugia 1977; Loubat and Pistolesi-Lafont 1977; De Vanssay 1979). Within the context of the socio-cultural frustrations the islanders experienced, feeling to be an unimportant appendage to the mainland, the scientific disagreements engendered a distrust of mainland (colonial) science. The authorities expected and demanded that the scientists and volcanology would provide one clear answer, not a range of more likely or less likely outcomes. They operated in a binary framework and expected science to be precise, to provide the answers, and to render decisions easier.

In fact, this crisis epitomized the growing clash of scientific paradigms at the time: one of observational and intuitive empirical science, embodied by Tazieff, versus one of quantitative science relying on models and integrating a probabilistic framework and some degree of uncertainty, embodied by Allègre. In the end facing Hamlet's dilemma—will the eruption evolve into a paroxysmal explosive onset magmatic eruption or not (Fig. 1)—the manichean framework led to a very low acceptance of inherent uncertainty and the advocacy of the predominance and uniqueness of one or a few strands of evidence. The deep disagreement between opinionated scientists who often bypassed the responsible authority to speak directly to the population and the media—with the straightforwardness of attracting a substantial audience in a small, isolated community—thus vented the scientific debate directly to the public without critical and consensual appraisal, forcing authorities to seek alternative advice. Many “special” advisors provided their own cast on the uncertain processes developing at the volcano. This significantly undermined the integrity of the scientific judgement and the trust amongst
<figure><img src="image_126.png" /></figure>

<figure><img src="image_127.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 1** a The Préfet Aurousseau and M. Feuillard reflect at the bedside of La Soufrière. After a drawing by C. Maillaud-Bourdan, published in France-Antilles on 27 September 1976; b H. Tazieff and R. Brousse quarrel over</figcaption></figure>

La Soufrière. After a drawing by C. Maillaud-Bourdan, published in Guadeloupe 2000 No. 46, October-November 1976 (Taken from De Vanssay 1979)

experts, decision-makers, and the exposed population.

In Guadeloupe, the societal perception and translation of these conflicting schools of scientific thinking saw the rise of the image of

maverick, anti-conformist, and heroic scientists (e.g. Tazieff) against more precautionary, conservative scientists (e.g. Brousse and Allègre). A perceived contrast emerged of free, independent scientists fighting for a just cause (the
former) versus scientists who became or were perceived to be aligned with a political agenda and to a system of governance (the latter). The public debate thus became political and polarized based on opposing “truths” from contrasting scientific expertise (Fig. 2) rather than on how science could help constrain epistemic and aleatory uncertainty in order to foster improved decision-making despite uncertainty. This situation acted as an ideal crucible for fuelling a media-hyped controversy on the crisis and its management (Loubat and Pistolesi-Lafont 1977; De Vanssay 1979; Farugia 1977) that was easily prone to wild conspiracy theories. The volcano hence became a catalyst of accumulated island-mainland disputes—a way to engage in a mutual catharsis of the remains of France’s

colonialist past in the region and the sequels in its post-colonialist policies.

The controversy and the conflation of science with long-standing political grievances had significant lasting effects on national and international volcanology. A portion of the population still collectively deems that the evacuation was unnecessary or that the need was largely exaggerated, with many believing that the politics of shifting towards Pointe-à-Pitre superseded science with the justification of applying at the maximum precautionary principle. This has fuelled conspiracy theories and perceptions that the hazard and risk assessment was imported from the mainland, that the scientists' mentality was disconnected from the localised island reality, and that it served a political agenda that had

<figure><img src="image_128.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 2** Photo taken from a television (TF1) debate on 11 November 1976 between C. Allègre, then Director of the Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris (**left**) and</figcaption></figure>

volcanologist H. Tazieff (**right**) with J. Besançon as the moderating journalist (Taken from Loubat and Pistolesi-Lafont 1977)
started prior to the eruption but was fortuitously
reinforced by the eruption. In fact, there was a
blatant underestimation by authorities, scientists,
and media, that for the evacuated and affected
population, the volcano being the source of their
distress and livelihood loss rapidly faded behind
the curtain of long-nurtured socio-political frus-
trations and issues of cultural identity and island
empowerment.

The eruption marked a tipping point in the
recent history of Guadeloupe and symbolized its
unresolved dilemmas and injustices. The volcano
became an excuse to publically express a pro-
found dissatisfaction in public authorities and
policy, in the centralized mainland-focused sys-
tem of governance. All protagonists failed to
recognize that politics became the real driver of
risk perception, the local agenda, and the aspi-
rations of civil society.

However, positive consequences included a
major increase in national funding for volcano
monitoring and research. Lessons learned sig-
nificantly improved volcano crisis management
worldwide and notably for the nearby 1979 St.
Vincent eruption. In the context of increased
population density on the volcano's flanks and
ongoing major development plans for southern
Basse-Terre, even a 1976-77 style eruption will
likely pose major challenges to authorities and
decision-makers despite the presence of a highly
sophisticated monitoring network and the vast
knowledge subsequently acquired about La
Soufrière volcano. Thus, this infamous crisis
exemplified the need for a structured and trans-
parent approach to evidence-based decision-
making in the presence of substantial scientific
uncertainty (Aspinall 2010; Aspinall and Cooke
2013; Aspinall and Blong 2015).

3 Case Study 2: Karthala, Grande
Comore, Comoros, Indian Ocean

Union of Comoros is a volcanic archipelago
(Fig. 3) and one of the world's smallest and
poorest countries (Taglioni 2003; UNDP 2014).
Emigration is assumed by many to be the only
solution to escape poverty, so 200,000

Comorians live in France (Da Cruz et al. 2004),
which was Comoros’ colonial power until 1975.
When independence was proclaimed, France
allegedly illegally kept Maore (one of the four
Comorian Islands) under its political control,
creating a legal battle with Comoros (Oraison
2004). Moreover, the governments of each island
(Nzwani, Mwali, and Ngazidja) regularly contest
their level of autonomy from the Union federal
government. Consequently, it is difficult to define
the exact prerogatives attributed to the islands’
and Union’s governments, including those linked
to the volcanic crises management (Morin and
Lavigne 2009).

Grande Comore Island (or Ngazidja; 1148 km²) is dominated by Karthala, an active basaltic shield volcano which has erupted, on average, every seven years in recent decades. Volcanic hazards threaten the population, as effusive or explosive eruptions may impact upon the whole island (Bachlèry and de Coudray 1993), including coastal villages, Hahaya international airport, and the capital, Moroni (Morin et al. 2016). Electricity and telephone networks are easily and often saturated, disrupted, or inaccessible in some parts of the island that are out of range from the communications relay. Chouaybou (2010) underlines that after each major event on the island, diaspora members call their families, contributing to the network's saturation. As with other Comorian infrastructure, the monitoring network of the local volcano observatory (Observatoire Volcanologique du Karthala—OVK) is poorly developed and difficult to maintain, due to financial, technical and human resource constraints (Morin et al. 2009, 2016).

Additionally, within this context, Morin and
Lavigne (2009), Morin (2012), Morin and Gail-
lard (2012) and Kelman et al. (2015) describe
how some people consciously increase the vol-
canic risk level in their community to have an
easier access to livelihoods. For example, some
villagers repeatedly steal solar panels from the
OVK monitoring network for easier access to
electricity. Some other villagers vandalize the
OVK network to contest foreign post-colonial
"domination" (as the network was mainly funded
<figure><img src="image_129.png" /><figcaption>**Fig. 3** Volcanic risk and hazards zonation for Grande Comore (adapted from Nassor 2001)</figcaption></figure>

by France), or to claim that their deep links with the volcano and their customary chiefs' knowledge are enough to face the volcanic threat. Once the network is degraded, OVK has much reduced capacity to monitor and interpret seismic or volcanic activity. While authorities and OVK have targeted this issue in their last risk awareness campaigns, thefts and degradations continue.

The 2006 eruption demonstrated both the authorities' disorganization in facing crises and OVK's incapacity to deliver prompt, clear and updated information (Morin et al. 2009), making the communication process really poor. People

were informed of the eruption mainly by word-of-mouth or by their own observations; only a third of the population was warned by the media. The lack of warning systems, combined with an absence of any consistent prevention information, created anxiety amongst islanders and affected their responses, negatively impacting the crisis management. One consequence was that the OVK scientific team faced harder and more detailed communication tasks than expected (Fig. 4).

Several 'critical' periods for the OVK team were reported, the worst one being from 28 May 21:10 to 29 May 02:00, just after the eruption's
<figure><img src="image_130.png" /></figure>

**Fig. 4** Main components in the official schedule of the local volcano observatory team during the May 2006 eruption of Karthala (translated from Morin 2012). Due to the multiple and constant internal and external interactions of the six people involved in the May 2006 crisis management at OVK, it is estimated that 30–40 % of official meetings were not listed. Otherwise this register does not include exchanges with the officials who came to enquire personally about the situation, nor the constant calls received by the OVK team from inhabitants requesting or offering information. This ‘informal’ trade is a flow roughly equivalent to the ‘formal’ one

beginning. OVK faced 30 meetings and inter-
views with authorities of both Island and Union
governments, and an agglomeration of hundreds
of civilians at the OVK office, in addition to
dozens of phone calls saturating OVK phone
facilities, while no localization of the eruptive
activity nor a scenario of its evolution was pos-
sible to provide at that time. People suspected
that scientists did not communicate because of
serious ongoing problems while the over-
whelming number of journalists was difficult for
the OVK team to manage, so journalists were
sidelined for a few hours. The first information
was given soon after 23:00, as soon as it had
been decided to fly over the volcano at dawn in
order to observe the nature and location of the
eruption. Rumours circulated by a few local and
international media (such as “lava is flowing
down the slopes of Karthala, threatening

thousands of Comorians”) immediately spread
within villages and then to the international
news. OVK team was forced to monitor the
media three times a day (dawn, noon, and eve-
ning) to be able to quickly deny any wrong
information. A protocol was established to
improve communications efficiency, one of the
rules being to limit the number of scientists
communicating with the media: one in Shiko-
mori (the local language) and another in French
and English.

The second main problematic period was on
29 May from 09:00–12:30, just after the first
flight over the volcano. Once more, rumours
about the evolution and implications of the
eruptive activity spread on the island. This indi-
cates that the information given by the OVK
team was interpreted incorrectly by some jour-
nalists. 47 interviews were given during this