# Collocations as basic-level categories elaborating slots in semantic frames: A usage-based approach

Sonja Poulsen

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DOI: 10.4000/15i64
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Sonja Poulsen, "Collocations as basic-level categories elaborating slots in semantic frames: A usage-based approach", *Lexis* [Online], 26 | 2026, Online since 15 January 2026, connection on 11 February 2026. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/lexis/10195; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/15i64

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# Collocations as basic-level categories elaborating slots in semantic frames: A usage-based approach

Sonja Poulsen

## 1. Introduction to a functional and cognitive account

<footnote n="1">1 The categorization of collocations has been seen as problematic because they are neither freely variable (or fully compositional), nor completely idiomatic (or frozen). From a usage-based point of view, this does not make them “odd comings-together of words” (Palmer [1933]) but a useful language resource, which combines conventionality with variability.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">2 Collocations are combinations of words that do not only occur together, like *steal a bicycle* and *move a piano* but also ‘belong’ together, like *ride a bicycle* and *play the piano*. In verb + nominal object collocations, which is the type that I have analyzed (Poulsen [2022]), a noun, such as *appointment*, evokes a semantic frame, and verbs, like *make*, *break*, or *keep*, elaborate frame slots with specific lexical functions. The range of verbs found in each slot makes up domains of variation, which constitute the intrinsic evidence for analysis as basic-level categories and in terms of cognitive salience. Combinations with generic verbs at the basic-level as well as with more specific, characteristic verbs at the subordinate level of categorization are considered likely to be ‘conventional and entrenched’. On the basis of my analysis, which is qualitative rather than quantitative, I categorize such verbs as support verbs and account for their lexicogrammatical functions.</footnote>

<footnote n="3">3 Combinations with verbs that are neither characteristic nor schematic, but are still part of the domain of variation found in a given slot, are analyzed as ad-hoc variations and categorized as ‘open collocations’. Combinations that do not elaborate any slot in the</footnote>
frame evoked by the noun, like *steal a bicycle*, *move a piano*, and *discuss an appointment*, though perfectly normal, are not categorized as collocations but as 'free combinations'.

However, before turning to my own functional and cognitive account, I describe some aspects of variability that have contributed to giving collocations their reputation of being somehow ‘odd’ and proceed with a brief outline of research that I see as converging towards, and being to a great extent compatible with, a usage-based account.

## 1.1. Why are collocations so “hard to pin down”?

From a usage-based perspective, what makes it a challenge to learn and categorize collocations is the same thing that makes them “bloody useful” (Schmid [2003: 236]) i.e. their variability. In a collocation consisting of a verbal collocate and a nominal base, roughly the same meaning may be expressed by different verbs, depending on the noun. This results in unpredictable differences between languages, e.g., *ride a bicycle* in English corresponds to *faire du vélo* [do some bicycle] in French, and *Rad fahren* [drive bicycle] in German. No less confusing for foreign learners is it that direct equivalents are often possible; thus, English *to run* (or *take*) a *risk* corresponds to French *courir* (or *encourir*) *un risque*, and Spanish *corer* (or *assumir*) *un riesgo*.

Also, within the same language, the choice of collocate to express a given meaning often varies depending on the base resulting in the phenomenon of “overlapping lexical sets” (Howarth [1996: 24]).

<figure><img src="image_3.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1. Overlapping lexical sets (based on Howarth [1996: 24])</figcaption></figure>

An attempt to characterize verb + nominal object collocations based on general semantic characteristics of the verb was made by Aisenstadt [1979: 71]:
The verb is 'grammaticalized', or 'delexicalized', as in *make progress, take a turn*.

The verb is used in a figurative sense, as in *launch a campaign, lift a restriction*.

The verb is used in a specialized or 'technical' sense, as in *compile a dictionary, drill a hole*.

8. But what about combinations like *open the window* and *send a letter* in which the verb expresses what it is that we typically do with the noun? And what about *pay the bill* and *reduce inflation*? A range of verbs is typically available to express different levels of formality, and leaving out the stylistically neutral option because it seems to be fully compositional leads to a misrepresentation of the range.

(1a) *pay* / *settle* / *foot the bill*

(1b) *reduce* / *curb* / *rein in inflation*

9. Such a range, or 'domain of variation', makes it hard to categorize collocations as a classical category in terms of criterial features and calls for an alternative approach as offered by prototype categorization (Rosch [e.g. 1973, 1975, 1978], Taylor [1995, 2015]), (see section 3.4.).

## 1.2. Insights from approaches converging on a usage-based approach

10. According to John Rupert Firth, who was the first one to define collocations theoretically, language is usage-based and “integral in experience” although, for the purpose of analysis, meaning should be construed as being dispersed to four interdependent and ‘mutually congruent’ levels (Firth [1968a. 176]). The four levels are (1) collocation, (2) context of situation, (3) syntax including colligation (relationships between categories), and (4) phonology and phonetics (Firth [1968: 176]). As shown in Figure 2, I claim that the level of context of situation has a special role, since it provides the background for conceptualization in terms of the other levels. This makes it compatible with the cognitive linguistic notion ‘semantic frame’ (Fillmore [1985: 224]), which is described in section 2.3.

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2. Integrated levels of meaning (based on Firth [1968], in Poulsen [2022, Figure 2 p. 37])</figcaption></figure>

11. In the traditional phraseological approach (Nesselhauf [2005]), collocations are defined as syntactic combinations with syntagmatic and paradigmatic usage restrictions. Traditional phraseology has given us the insight that collocations are pervasive in
language and that categorization has to allow for continuity. Trying to explain collocations in terms of restricted compositionality from a foreign learner's perspective therefore has its limitations (Cowie [1998], Howarth [1996]).

12 'Institutionalized expressions' are defined by Bauer [2001: 46] as those which, after having become part of the language norm, "still form part of a synchronically productive series, differing only from potential words in that, by being used, they have come to have a specific reference". They represent a possibility of defining collocations more broadly than allowed by the syntagmatic and paradigmatic restrictions of traditional phraseology, which exclude combinations like *write, read, send* and *receive a letter* from the category of collocations because, although that is what we typically do with letters, they "pose no problems for learners. Although recurrent and familiar, they are composed according to standard rules of syntax and semantics" (Howarth [1996: 181]).

13 Neo-Firthian John Sinclair is identified with the frequency-based, theory-neutral observation of corpus data, in which lexis is treated as an independent level, and collocations are defined as the tendency for lexical items to co-occur in a text, or in a text corpus. A valuable finding of this approach is that lexis is closely integrated with syntactic patterns as formulated in the 'idiom principle' (Sinclair [1991: 210]).

14 The principle of idiom is that a language user has available to him or her a large number of semi-preconstructed phrases that constitute single choices, even though they might appear to be analysable into segments. Research by Erman & Warren [2000] suggests that the idiom principle and the 'open choice principle' each account for about 50% of language.

15 The notion of "lexicogrammar" has been attributed to another neo-Firthian Halliday [1994: 15] (in Hunston & Francis [2000: 28]). His notion of 'lexical set' (Halliday [1966]), the paradigmatic dimension of collocations, is relevant for the discussion of collocational range and the variability of collocations and is furthermore compatible with the notion 'domain of variation' (Geeraerts [2017: 154]). Although Mel'čuk's Meaning-Text Theory (MTT) is rooted in generative linguistics, I argue that his notion of 'lexical function' (Mel'čuk [1998], Erman [2009]) is compatible with a usage-based perspective as a generic term to refer to the functional role of the verb in conventional and entrenched collocations.

16 As indicated, previous approaches include insights that are compatible with a qualitative functional and cognitive approach which proposes new solutions to the problems of categorization and allows for the continuity between convention and variability.

## 2. A usage-based approach in a functional and cognitive framework

17 In this section, I pursue the argument that a functional and cognitive approach has greater potential for describing and explaining the variability and flexibility of collocations as a dynamic language resource than approaches that rely on strict categorization and try to account for them as isolated linguistic structures (Poulsen [2022: 12-18, 89-98]). Although cognitive linguists focus on conceptual structures while functional linguists emphasize that conceptual structures interact with the social
processes of communication, the two approaches are complementary. According to Langacker [2016: 466-467], Cognitive Linguistics is usage-based and interactive, and the social basis of language is taken as given.

## 2.1. A cognitive framework

18 The theory of Cognitive Linguistics offers the possibility of looking for explanations at the conceptual level. As formulated by Dobrovol'skij [2007: 789]:

> The main postulate of cognitive linguistics [...] is the idea that there are conceptual structures standing behind the linguistic structures and that, therefore, investigation into linguistic structures has to involve addressing relevant conceptual structures.

19 Cognitive Linguistics uses purely linguistic methods as well as cognitive methods, which, according to Dobrovol'skij, are meant to "extend the explanatory potential of traditional methods". According to Lakoff [1987: 68-74], metaphors like 'frame', 'network', and 'schema' are 'idealized cognitive models', which we use to "organize our knowledge of the world". Metaphors make it possible to discuss abstract concepts in more concrete terms as the image-schematic structure of the source can be used to draw inferences about the target. However, according to 'the invariance hypothesis' (Lakoff [1990], Turner [1993: 301-303]), the source may have image-schematic structure that is not involved in the mapping, and the target is likely to have image-schematic structure of its own. I think of the models as 'conceptual artefacts' (Bereiter [2002], Popper [1972]); they are created by humans for a purpose, and they refer to discussable ideas such as theories and designs that are open for discussion. Metaphors are not always apt, as when conventional and entrenched expressions are said to be "stored" in our memory meaning that they are available as routines, not as "objects". A neurolinguistic perspective is formulated by Langacker [2017: 54]:

> [A]n exemplar ... is a transient neural event, which occurs and then is gone. What is stored is a trace of its occurrence in the guise of adjusted synaptic connections that facilitate occurrence of a comparable event (i.e. recurrence).

20 I find that it is better to think of conventional and entrenched language as something we can "do" than as something that we "have". This is in line with McClelland, Rumelhart & the PDP Research Group [1986: 20] who say about 'schemata', which are knowledge structures based on previous experience, that they are not "representational objects" but that they "emerge at the moment that they are needed from the interaction of large numbers of much simpler elements working in concert with one another", and that they are "implicit in our knowledge".

## 2.2. Function before frequency

21 Conventional expressions or 'formulaic sequences' are described by Wray [2002: 101] as having three main functions: "the reduction of the speaker's processing effort, the manipulation of the hearer (including the hearer's perception of the speaker's identity), and the marking of discourse structure" with "the speaker's promotion of self" as the overriding priority. In pursuing these aims, the speaker needs to strike a balance between "the need for novel expression and the value of reducing either the speaker's own, or the hearer's processing effort". This implies that, when studying collocation from a usage-based perspective, we should look for variability as a
functional dimension of convention. Although ‘the idiom principle’ and ‘the open
choice principle’ cannot be operated simultaneously (Sinclair, in Hunston & Francis
[2000: 23]), we understand both and are able to switch quickly between them (Poulsen
[2022: 298]). ‘Representational redundancy’ is a valuable language resource in a usage-
based framework (Blumenthal-Dramé [2017: 130, section 1.5.]):

[...] unlike received models of language, usage-based models allow for massive representational redundancy, meaning that ‘chunked’ and compositional representations (involving single morphemes and rules for their composition) for one and the same string can coexist.

22

Function comes before frequency. Blumenthal-Dramé [2012: 42] assumes, from a psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic perspective, that “a construction’s distribution is conditioned by its functional role”, also because “if our linguistic knowledge was exclusively driven by statistical preferences, how could we flexibly adapt to new situations and get our specific communicative intentions across?” Collocations cover a wide range of frequency. Sinclair [1991: 113] suggests that, as the outcome of a process of “progressive delexicalization”, highly frequent verbs such as *make*, *break*, *take*, and *have* may be said to have “less of a clear and independent meaning than less frequent words” and that consequently “we are reduced to talking about uses rather than meanings”.

23

In traditional phraseology, restricted collocations with verbs that occur in relatively few combinations are considered to be the norm. I claim that someone looking for the right verb to use with a noun will not bother about what, or how many, other nouns a given verb can be used with, which is ‘extrinsic evidence’ (Poulsen [2022: 10–11]). By contrast, ‘intrinsic evidence’ “makes no reference to entities external to the referent” (Langacker [1987: 160]). I return to these notions in my analysis where I look for ‘intrinsic evidence’ in the domains of variation found in the slots of semantic frames (3.2.).

24

According to Geeraerts [2017: 158], frequency of co-occurrence includes both (1) the ‘experiential frequency’ with which people encounter specific real-world phenomena, (2) the ‘conceptual frequency’ with which these are categorized in a specific way, and (3) the ‘lexical frequency’ with which the categories are expressed by specific forms. Corpora only show lexical frequency and, irrespective of their size, they cannot represent all domains of life equally well (Hanks [2000: 9]).

25

Towards the end of his career, Sinclair said that he found statistical prediction based on chance to be “just irrelevant”, while combinations that were not co-occurring in a statistically significant way, but which appeared “to go together quite often” had been referred to by him and his associates as ‘regular’, ‘familiar’, or ‘important’ collocations (Teubert [2004: xxi–xxii], in Sinclair, Jones & Daley [2004]). I propose a theory for the categorization of verb plus nominal object collocations that is based on qualitative analysis of corpus data, and while I use quantitative evidence as part of the description, I do not use statistical methods. I see language as analogue rather than digital: it grows as we us it.
## 2.3. Semantic frames with slots as part-whole configurations or gestalts

26 Frames are characterized by internal complexity reflecting the part-whole configuration or ‘gestalt’ of typical situations (Fillmore [1985: 224]). The following features of gestalt psychology are relevant for characterizing the meaning side of collocations (Blumenthal-Dramé [2012: 76]): (1) ‘pattern completion’, meaning that each part will evoke the whole, (2) ‘emancipation’, meaning that the perception of the whole will be autonomous from that of its parts, (3) ‘top-down coercion’, meaning that the parts will be perceived and understood in the light of knowledge of the whole, and (4) ‘ease of memory’, meaning that it will be easier to remember chunked than non-chunked bits of information. In relation to frames, it has been expressed like this (Fillmore [1982: 111], in Ziem [2014: 18]):

> By the word ‘frame’ I have in mind any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available.

27 In the case of collocations consisting of a verb plus its nominal object, pattern completion causes a noun like *appointment* to ‘evoke’ the dominant frame, and verbal collocates like *make*, *break* or *keep* to evoke ‘frame slots’, which stand in a metonymic relationship to the whole frame. From a decoding point of view, the process of understanding involves “invoking the frame” (Ziem [2014: 116]). ‘Frame slots’ are characterized by Ziem [2014: 9–10] as being occupied with ‘fillers’, which are values motivated by linguistic expressions and ‘default values’ that are inferred to understand such expressions. By “recurrent schema instantiation”, i.e. through repetition, fillers and default values become entrenched, just like the slots with their continuum of values (Ziem [2014: 176–177, 294]). These values constitute domains of variation which constitute the intrinsic evidence in my analysis (3.2.).

## 2.4. Lexical functions and basic-level categories

28 My approach goes against mainstream Cognitive Linguistics in two ways, firstly by using an abstract superordinate category like ‘lexical function’, which does not have specific form-related semantic and phonological content and therefore does not qualify as a symbolic unit. However, I use it to fill a gap in basic-level categories in which the superordinate level is not lexicalized. The purpose is to group together symbolic units “whose schemas profile a single cognitive domain” (Langacker [1991: 278], in Bache [2002: 84]), as “[...] it provides a relevant cognitive context for describing elements of the speaker’s motivation for choosing a specific symbolic unit and thus adds an important functional dimension to the description” (Bache [2002: 85]). As pointed out by Radden [2008: 6], usage-based basic-level categories represent ‘folk taxonomies’, which “do not always correspond to scientific taxonomies” and “may also lack a superordinate term”. Also, according to Taylor [1995: 49-50]),

> [it] often happens that superordinate terms are simply missing from the English language. English, for instance, has numerous colour terms which are subordinate to basic colour terms but have no superordinate colour terms. Often, if the need for a superordinate term is felt strongly enough, learned terms (such as *sibling* as a
superordinate term to *brother* and *sister* or cumbersome circumlocutions, may be
coined.

29 Secondly, cognitive linguists tend to be skeptical of paradigmatics, which they associate with Saussurean linguistics; however, domains of variation are not language-internal and self-contained but usage-based and functional.

30 Why use basic-level categorization for analyzing collocational domains of variation? According to Rosch [1973] in Evans [2007: 11], "[...] categories formed at the basic level tend to emerge first both developmentally and in language acquisition, and categories at this level are most easily recognized and identified". According to Ellis [2015: 55] (with reference to Croft [2001, 2012], Goldberg [1995], Levin [1993]):

Linguistic constructions which correspond to basic sentence types encode as their prototypical senses event types that are basic to human experience – those of something moving, something being in a state, someone causing something, someone possessing something, something causing a state of location, someone causing a state of possession, someone undergoing a change of state of location, someone having an effect on someone etc.

31 I find that basic-level categorization can be used to account for the domain of variation found in the frame slots of collocations construed as a prototype category including ‘conventional and entrenched collocations’ as well as ad-hoc, ‘open collocations’. Conventional and entrenched collocations include not only highly schematic basic-level verbs like *make*, *take*, *give*, and *get* but also, at the subordinate level, more specific and characteristic verbs with the same lexical function. Highly specific verbs, which are likely to be ad hoc variants, are categorized as ‘open collocations’ in order to emphasize the continuity between conventional and open collocations within the same domain of variation. Combinations that do not belong to any such domain of variation are not categorized as collocations but as ‘free combinations’.

3. The case of JOKE

3.1. Background, hypothesis, and data

32 In Mel'čuk's Meaning-text Theory [1998: 36–37], as in traditional phraseology, collocations are defined in contrast to 'free' or 'open' word combinations generated by the language system. As pointed out by Hunston & Francis [2000: 9–10], this means that, of the combinations *make*, *crack*, and *tell a joke*, only *crack a joke* counts as a collocation. The other two are categorized as 'free phrases' although neither verb "represents a free choice: all are constrained by collocation, and in each case the precise meaning of the verb is determined by that collocation." Their example illustrates a problem of categorization and inspired me to test the descriptive and explanatory power of a functional and cognitive approach by means of an exemplary study of the noun *joke*. I start from the assumption that the same problem would not arise in a frame-based account in which all three combinations are categorized as conventional and entrenched collocations elaborating the same domain of variation filling the same frame slot at the most schematic basic level (*make a joke*) and at the more specific subordinate level *crack* and *tell a joke*, respectively.
## 3.2. Analysis in terms of semantic frames and basic-level categorization

33 In my analysis of corpus data of verbal combinations with the noun *joke*, I test the taxonomy proposed in Poulsen [2022: 250-255] using the notions of salience and schematicity. The data¹ from the British National Corpus (BNC) consist of concordances for the noun *joke*, which is analyzed as the complex (or polysemous) lexical category JOKE.

34 The study is guided by the following hypothesis: in verb + nominal object collocations, a noun, such as *joke*, evokes a semantic frame, or more in the case of polysemy, and verbs like *make*, *take*, and *pull* elaborate frame slots with lexical functions. The fillers of a slot are domains of variation, which constitute the intrinsic evidence for qualitative analysis as basic-level categories and in terms of cognitive salience.

35 The first step is to identify frame slots and their fillers, which make up the intrinsic evidence to be analyzed as functionally motivated domains of variation. Three readings are hypothesized for JOKE corresponding to the number of frames identified: (1) “verbal joke”, (2) “practical joke”, and (3) “joke ascribing trivial quality”. The analysis includes transitive constructions prototypically including a transitive verb taking *joke* as its object, but also less prototypical transitive constructions such as *be* or *make* *sby the butt of a joke* are included. The third frame is not included since it uses a copula verb. According to Ruppenhofer, Ellsworth, Petruck, Johnson & Scheffzyk [2016: 46], a copula verb is “a special, rather bleached kind of support verb”, which occurs either in a predicative construction (*Messi is the new captain*) or in an ascriptive construction as in these three examples of *joke*, which are used to ascribe the property of being “trivial” or “insignificant” to a situation or a person:

(2a) *she wanted to say it was only a joke*

(2b) [...] *was made to feel like* that from childhood - insignificant, a bit of a joke

(2c) [...] *he was a fool not to join Simon in abusing her, making her into a joke*

36 By contrast, verb + nominal object combinations are defined as “support-verb constructions” if the noun evokes “the dominant frame” as in *take revenge*. If the verb evokes the dominant frame, as in *encourage revenge*, we have a “full-verb construction” (Johnson, Fillmore, Petruck, Baker, Ellsworth, Ruppenhofer & Wood [2003: 2.3.1]). I return to the notion of “support verb” in the discussion of conventional and entrenched collocations as a prototype category of support verbs (section 3.4.).

37 Table 1 is a workspace for analysis and shows the methodology, which reflects the hypothesis. The data are represented at the stage at which frames and frame elements are identified, frame slots with lexical functions are posited, and a subdivision into basic and subordinate levels of categorization is proposed. Elements in each frame consist of participants and processes. The agent is named “joker” in Frame 1 and “player” in Frame 2. The process is named “verbal joke” in Frame 1 and “practical joke” in Frame 2, and, in both frames, there is an “audience” participant, which includes all kinds of “receivers”. In Frame 1, the two participant roles may be merged when jokes are “shared”, “exchanged” or “swapped”. Frame 2 has the “victim” as an extra participant, as it is a defining feature of the frame that someone is “the butt of the joke”. This is not the case in Frame 1 although a verbal joke may also be “at somebody’s expense”.
(3a) Frame 1: [...] he quite liked <u>making jokes</u> at the expense of other authors

(3b) Frame 2: Somebody is <u>playing a sick, horrible joke</u> on you

38 For each of the two frames, two slots are suggested: 'Action' and 'Response' with Mel'čuk's approximately equivalent lexical functions: 'Oper' (to carry out) and 'Real' (to fulfil the requirement contained in the argument) in parentheses (Mel'čuk & Polguère [1987: 272]).

<table><caption>Table 1. Two JOKE-frames as basic-level categories and domains of variation</caption><thead><tr><th></th><th>Frame 1: Verbal joke (626 tokens)<br>Elements:<br>the joker<br>the verbal joke<br>the audience</th><th>Frame 2: Practical joke (105 tokens)<br>Elements:<br>the player of the joke<br>the practical joke<br>the victim<br>the audience</th><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th>JOKE, n.:<br>Basic-level<br>category</th><th>Slot 1 (522<br>tokens)%</th><th>Slot 2 (104 tokens)<br>%</th><th>Slot 1 (59 tokens)<br>%</th><th>Slot2 (46 tokens)%</th></tr><tr><th>LEVEL</th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><th>SUPERORDINATE:<br>Lexical function</th><th>'Action'<br>(Oper)</th><th>'Response'<br>(Real)</th><th>'Action'<br>(Oper)</th><th>'Response'<br>(Real)</th></tr><tr><th>BASIC:<br>Default case,<br>most schematic</th><th>make a - (241) *<br>46.60<br>have a - (12) *<br>2.68</th><th>see a - (13) 12.50<br>get a - (12) 14.42</th><th>have a - (7) * 11.86<br>make a - (3) * 5.08<br>do a - (1) * 1.69</th><th>take a - (5) * 10.87</th></tr><tr><th>SUBORDINATE 1:<br>Less schematic,<br>more specific</th><th>tell a - (168)<br>32.18<br>crack a - (46) 8.81<br>share a - (20) *<br>3.83<br>swap a - (9) 1.72<br>have a - (8) * 1.53<br>exchange -s (4)<br>0.76<br>do a - (3) 0.57</th><th>appreciate a - (17)<br>16.35<br>understand a - (15)<br>14.42<br>take a - (13) *<br>12.50<br>enjoy a - (12) 14.42<br>share a - (7) * 6.73<br>catch a - (1) * 0.96</th><th>play a - (on sby.)<br>(36)<br>72.90<br>pull a - (on sby.) (3)<br>5.08<br>make sby the butt of<br>a - (2) 3.39</th><th>be the butt of a - (34)<br>73.91</th></tr><tr><th>SUBORDINATE 2:<br>Least schematic,<br>most specific<br>(Ad hoc variation)</th><th>make up a - (4)<br>0.76<br>compose a - (2)<br>0.38<br>produce a - (2)<br>0.38<br>provide a - (2)<br>0.38</th><th>share in a - (1) 0.96<br>take sth. as a - (4)<br>3.85<br>regard as a - (3)<br>2.88<br>indulge in - s (3)<br>2.88</th><th>perpetrate a - (7)<br>13.73</th><th>ignore a - (7) 15.22</th></tr></thead></table>
<table><tr><td></td><td>mistell a - (1) 0.19</td><td>love a - (2) 1.92<br/>complain about a - (1)<br/>0.96</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>OUTSIDE SLOTS</td><td colspan="3">blunt a - (1), collect -s (1), define a - (1), explain a - (7), forget a - (2), give a - (1), have a - (8), have (got)* a - (5), include a - (4), remember a - (5), reveal a - (1), etc.</td></tr></table>

39

The frame slots and their fillers represent the domains of variation, which consist of 626 tokens of the relevant construction in Frame 1 (522 in the 'Action' slot and 104 in the 'Response' slot) and 105 tokens in Frame 2 (59 in the 'Action' slot and 46 in the 'Response' slot).

40

The domains of variation for each of the four frame slots represent the intrinsic evidence for analysis as basic-level categories. No examples are found at the superordinate level, which is characterized in terms of its lexical function. The fillers of each slot are categorized as belonging to the most schematic basic level (the default case) and those that belong to the subordinate level, which is further subdivided depending on schematicity and specificity. At the bottom of the table is a list of verbs that do not fit into any of the slots and are therefore considered to be extrinsic evidence as they do not belong to a domain of variation.

41

Following Table 1, the motivation for the categorization of fillers in each slot is given, and the hypothesis for a taxonomy of word combinations is subsequently proposed (3.3.). Items marked with an asterisk receive special comment.

42

Considerable lexical variation is found in each frame slot with verbs ranging from basic-level verbs to the most specific variants. In Frame 1, *make a joke* as the most schematic expression is categorized at the basic level. Contrasted with *tell a joke*, which may imply that the joke is not new, *to make a joke* has the more general meaning of “creation”:

(4a) *Peggy made quite a good joke.* She leant across and said, “this is all Greek to me”

(4b) [H]is sense of timing was immaculate. This enabled him to *tell old jokes* as if they were new [...]

43

Basic-level verbs do not only conceptualize meaning at the basic level.

44

While, in Frame 1, *take a joke* is categorized at the subordinate level because it is used specifically about a response showing toleration of a provocative joke, it is categorized at the basic level in Frame 2 as the most schematic expression, since the frame 'practical joke' in itself implies that there is a 'victim' who is 'the butt of the joke'.

(5a) Frame 1: *She has the rare gift of being able to take a joke against herself.*

(5b) Frame 2: *I was determined to show them I could take a joke and the next time a big stork went over I pretended not to know what it was.*

45

If basic-level verbs can be used to conceptualize experience at different levels in different frames, it is because of 'top-down coercion', one of the gestalt qualities of semantic frames, implying that the fillers of slots will be understood in the light of knowledge of the frame. This also explains why *do a joke* is categorized at the subordinate level in Frame 1; although *to do* is generally seen as being semantically
empty, usage and top-down coercion may endow it with a specific meaning. The
difference between *make* and *do* appears from this question asked by Dania in a chat
forum² and the reply she got to the effect that “doing jokes” is the preserve of
comedians:

(6a) My first instinct is to say *make a joke*, but sometimes we say *do a joke*. I even pulled up an internet news article about Jerry Seinfeld which states that Seinfeld made a joke about bee colonies, then within the comments about the article someone wrote: "He did this joke last time he was on Conan". Well, here we see that we can somehow interchange the two. However, I wouldn't instinctively say 'he made that joke last time he was on Conan'. Can anyone help me explain to my students when we can or should use *make a joke* as opposed to *do* or *did* a joke? [...]. Thanks, Dania.

(6b) Good point. It shows how tricky language can be. Generally, ‘make a joke’ is correct. From what I can tell, ‘did a joke’ means ‘performed a joke’ (Seinfeld is a stand-up comedian.)

A normal guy wouldn't 'do a joke', but a comedian or Radio DJ would.

46 The occurrences of *do a joke* in my data support this conclusion and justify categorization at the subordinate level in Frame 1. In Frame 2, the only occurrence of *do a joke* was categorized at the basic level, with some reservation because of limited context, while a second example was found on the Quora website:

(7a) Frame 2: I think they just thought I'm the type of person who'd go too far and you know *do a joke* like that, but I'm not.

(7b) Frame 2: *What is the best practical joke you have ever done?*³

47 At the intermediate level, verbs are more specific in one of two ways; either they conceptualize the situation more narrowly, (do a joke in Frame 1 is limited to professionals), or they express the action more precisely (in Frame 1, tell a joke and understand a joke are more specific than make a joke and see or get a joke, respectively, and, in Frame 2, play and pull a joke are more specific and characteristic than make a joke and do a joke). What about the difference between tell a joke and crack a joke? This interchange⁴ shows that even native speakers may be in doubt:

(8a) Question: *This morning my bro told me "I will tell a joke" but my sister said "I will crack a joke". I am confused, which one is right?*

(8b) Answer 1: *Crack a joke* is an idiom, but it sort of means the same. But it gives the impression that a joke has been made spontaneously. Telling a joke gives the impression of telling a forwarded joke. Slight difference but you can ignore it.

(8c) Answer 2: I don't think you should ignore it. "Hey Joe, crack that joke you cracked the other day about the elephant" is not something any native would say - they'd only use tell there.

48 In addition to combinations with metaphorical verbs, like *crack* and *catch* in Frame 1 and *play* and *pull* in Frame 2, the subordinate level in Frame 1 includes combinations with *share*, *swap*, and *exchange* in Slot 1, and *share*, *appreciate*, and *enjoy* in Slot 2. Although they are “institutionalized expressions” as defined by Bauer [2001: 46], they would be excluded from the phraseological spectrum in traditional phraseology and in Mel’čuk’s theory of lexical functions because they are both literal, transparent, and analyzable. The three verbs *share*, *swap*, and *exchange* are special in that they conceptualize “joking” as a process in which the participants take turns at being “joker” and “audience”. Moreover, *share* is used in both frame slots, about (a) the joker
"sharing a joke (with sby)" as well as about (b) "the audience "sharing (in) a joke", and about (c) jokers "having a joke in common":

(9a) *Would Nicco Haberdasher like to <u>share the joke</u> with the rest of the class?*

(9b) *The joke is interpreted as a man's joke which they are not supposed to share.*

(9c) *Keren and Sally (left) <u>share a private joke</u> - possibly at Ben's expense.*

49 The third type has been included in Frame 1, although it is a special case, as in example (9c), in which the participants "sharing the joke" are both "jokers" and the participant, Ben, is the potential "audience" but is not allowed to "share (in) the joke". Such examples remind us that categorization often involves imposing "discreteness" on something that is basically continuous (Langacker [2006: 114]).

50 Like other basic-level verbs, have is a little busybody, though a useful one, and also in combination with joke, it is a multitasker. The 35 combinations of have a joke occur as fillers in frame slots of both frames and also outside frame slots.

(10a) *Frame 1, slot 1, Basic level ("make")*

Well, let him <u>have</u> his little joke!

*Frame 1, slot 1, Subord. level ("share")*

My brother and I used to have a joke.

(10b) *Frame 2, slot 1, Basic level ("make")*

She's an interior decorator. I think she <u>was having a joke</u> at my expense when she did it.

"Come on, then," he said, "you've <u>had</u> your little joke. Give us a hand up now."

(10c) *Outside slots ("know")*

I've <u>got a joke</u> for you, Dave.

Mr. Rice <u>had a genuinely good joke</u>.

Kinnock <u>had all the best jokes</u>

51 In the "Action slot" of Frame 1, *have a joke* is categorized both at the basic level, meaning roughly the same as *make a joke* but focusing on the joker's own amusement, and at the subordinate level meaning roughly the same as *share a joke*, as in example (9c). In the "Action slot" of Frame 2, slot 1, *have a joke* is categorized at the basic level, meaning about the same as *make a (practical) joke*. In order to decide whether *have a joke* belongs to Frame 1 or Frame 2, it is often necessary to have more context than corpus concordances give you, so some uncertainty is involved. Outside frame slots, *have a joke* does not conceptualize "action" or "response" but means that the agent "knows" the joke. I return to these examples of *have a joke* in the context of the claim that, outside frame slots, *have* is a 'full verb' while the verb has developed a more 'functional' role as 'support verb' when elaborating a frame slot, so that a process of 'grammaticalization' may be said to have occurred (section 3.4.).

52 The combinations categorized at subordinate level 2 are the least schematic and most specific. However, as they belong to the same domains of variation, they are part of the intrinsic evidence. The following examples, from the BNC, are from an arts newspaper and a radio program on art, respectively, and the use of *mistell* and *perpetrate* may be explained as part of a style that deliberately deviates from convention with "the speaker's promotion of self" being a priority (Wray [2002: 101]).

(11a) [...] *painting monochrome canvases inscribed with the texts of mistold jokes.*

(11b) *What I'm begging, especially our leaders [...] to do is to stop thinking that it's all kind of a joke that's being perpetrated by idiots [...] against the public.*
53

Readers will be familiar with the prefix mis- from conventional combinations like *misunderstand* and *mislead* and will have no problem understanding *mistell*. By contrast, the combination *to perpetrate a joke* belongs to an ironic or humorous style. Since *perpetrate* is normally used with objects denoting harmful actions like crime, the combination with *joke* requires the ‘conceptual integration’ or ‘blending’ with the dominant frame evoked by joke (Fauconnier & Sweetser [1996], Fauconnier [1997], Fauconnier & Turner [1998], Coulson [2000]).

54

Frequency of co-occurrence varies a great deal both between and within frames. While the substantial difference in token frequency between Frame 1 (626 tokens) and Frame 2 (105 tokens) is probably due to a difference in ‘experiential frequency’, a real-world phenomenon (Geeraerts [2017: 158]), I put down the differences in token frequency within frame slots to differences in conceptualization. In the first slot of Frame 1, *make a joke* account for 241 tokens (46.6%) followed by *tell a joke* with 168 tokens (32.18%) while *mistell a joke* hits the bottom with only one token (0.19%). Only 3 examples of *make a joke* were found in Frame 2 (5.08%), and they were not typical “practical jokes” as in this example where “the butt of the practical joke” is everyone passing by the butcher’s shop:

(12) *The butcher, tired of his bloody work, has made a metaphysical joke of it. Five pigs' heads on a marble counter leer lopsidedly [...]*

55

In Frame 2, by far the most tokens are accounted for by *play a joke* (on sby) in the “Action” slot with 36 tokens (72.9%) and by *be the butt of a joke* with 34 tokens (73.91%) in the “Response” slot, both categorized at the subordinate level. Those who take a statistical perspective on language may find that, also at frame level, there is some evidence of “Zipf’s law”, which states “that the frequency of words decreases as a power function of their rank in the frequency table” (Ellis [2015: 52–53]). This principle is said to apply also to basic categorization “... as concepts need to be refined for clear communication, they are split, then split again hierarchically [e.g., animal, canine, dog, retriever, labrador ...]”. Especially in the “Action” slot of Frame 1, the most frequent fillers account for the lion’s share of tokens and are tailed by a considerable number of increasingly less frequent occurrences. The most frequent tokens as well as fairly frequent ones are likely to be conventional and entrenched while it cannot be assumed that low-frequency tokens are not. Low frequency in a corpus may be accounted for by low experiential or conceptual frequency or by the fact that a corpus cannot cover all domains of life equally well.

56

To sum up my findings so far (see also Table 1), I return to the elements of my hypothesis: Frames, frame elements, frame slots, and domains of variation.

* Two frames were identified for *joke* on the basis of the verbs taking *joke* as object and on the context: Frame 1: ‘Verbal joke’ and Frame 2: ‘Practical joke’.

* For each frame, frame elements were identified: Frame 1: ‘verbal joker’, ‘verbal joke’, and ‘audience’; Frame 2: ‘player of the joke’, ‘practical joke’, ‘victim’, and ‘audience’.

* For both frames, two frame slots were identified: ‘Action’ and ‘Response’, indicating the lexical function of the slot.

* For each frame slot, a domain of variation was identified, which was analyzed as a basic-level category and subdivided into a superordinate level indicating lexical function, a basic level and a subordinate level. The subordinate level was further subdivided according to schematicity or specificity.
* The verbs that could not be attributed to any of the frame slots were recorded as being 'outside slots', meaning that they did not belong to any of the domains of variation identified.

57 I conclude my analysis with a hypothesis for a taxonomy of word combination, based on basic-level categorization and salience.

### 3.3. Hypothesis for a taxonomy of word combinations: salience and basic-level categories

58 For the analysis in terms of 'cognitive salience', I start from the assumption, based on my findings so far, that 'conventional and entrenched collocations' are to be found both at the basic level of categorization and at the less schematic, more specific subordinate level 1 just below. Combinations at the least schematic and most specific subordinate level 2 are assumed to be ad hoc variations and are categorized as 'open collocations'. Combinations that cannot be included in any domain of variation elaborating a frame slot are categorized as 'free combinations'. I combine this hypothesis with the claim that 'cognitive and entrenched collocations' as well as 'open collocations' are cognitively salient, although to different degrees (see Table 2), as they elaborate frame slots, which are salient substructure of a frame and take frame elements as their agent, while the noun evokes the dominant frame. Free combinations do not fulfil this requirement.

59 While 'ontological salience' is related to more or less stable properties of entities in the world that are likely to attract attention, such as a black dog crossing a green field, 'cognitive salience' "concerns the activation of concepts in actual speech events" (Schmid [2007: 120]). The two kinds of salience are related in that ontologically salient entities are more likely to evoke cognitively salient concepts than ontologically nonsalient ones. Cognitive salience, according to Langacker [1987], (in Evans & Green [2006: 217–218]), draws on four kinds of knowledge: 'Intrinsic knowledge', 'generic knowledge', 'characteristic knowledge', and 'conventional knowledge'.

60 So far intrinsic knowledge has been discussed from a speaker / writer point of view as 'onomasiological salience', which includes a socio-communicative perspective and involves choices between competing expressions in a domain of variation (Geeraerts [2017: 154]). However, the analysis in terms of semantic frames also meets the basic condition of intrinsicness that there should be no reference to entities "external to the referent". It is therefore considered to be irrelevant whether verb collocates occur in many, or no, or just a few other combinations. In the case of JOKE, this means that combinations like *make a joke*, *tell a joke*, *understand a joke*, and others that are not 'restricted' as defined in traditional phraseology can all be categorized as 'conventional and entrenched'.

<table><caption>Table 2. A taxonomy of verb + nominal object combinations based on basic-level categorization and cognitive salience (based on Poulsen [2022: 254])</caption><tr><td>COGNITIVE SALIENCE<br/>>>></td><td>Intrinsic<br/>knowledge</td><td>Generic<br/>knowledge</td><td>Characteristic<br/>knowledge</td><td>Conventional<br/>knowledge</td><td>Frame 1:<br/>Verbal<br/>joke</td></tr></table>
<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th>Slot 1: Action</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>CONVENTIONAL &amp; ENTRENCHED COLLOCATION: basic-level verb</td><td>+</td><td>+</td><td>-</td><td>+</td><td>make a joke<br>have a joke</td></tr><tr><td>CONVENTIONAL &amp; ENTRENCHED COLLOCATION: more specific verb<br>Subordinate level 1</td><td>+</td><td>-</td><td>+</td><td>+</td><td>do a joke<br>tell a joke<br>crack a joke<br>share a joke<br>have a joke<br>swap a joke<br>exchange a joke</td></tr><tr><td>OPEN COLLOCATION<br>most specific verb<br>Subordinate level 2</td><td>+</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>make sth. into a joke<br>compose a joke<br>produce a joke<br>provide a joke<br>mistell a joke</td></tr><tr><td>FREE COMBINATION<br>Outside domain of variation</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>define a joke<br>explain a joke<br>remember a joke</td></tr></tbody></table>

61

'Generic knowledge', which is opposed to 'specific knowledge' and concerns the degree of generality associated with a particular word, is also an aspect of cognitive salience. The basic-level categorization of the domain of variation in frame slots allows a continuum perspective and concludes that the most generic combinations with basic-level verbs like *make a joke*, *take a joke*, and *get a joke* are likely to be both conventional and entrenched while it is assumed that the most specific combinations like *compose a joke*, *mistell a joke*, *indulge in jokes*, and *perpetrate a joke* are ad hoc variations. They conceptualize processes in a very specific and sometimes creative way as in the case of *perpetrate a joke*. While the most generic combinations will often be the most frequent in a corpus, this is far from always the case (compare *make a joke* in the Action slot of
Frame 1 and Frame 2). More specific combinations with *appreciate* and *understand* are most frequent in the Response slot of Frame 1, and, in the Action slot of Frame 2, *perpetrate a joke* (7 tokens), which has been categorized at the most specific level, is more frequent than *make, do or take a joke*.

62

Cognitive salience also draws on 'characteristic knowledge' which concerns "aspects of the encyclopedic information that are characteristic of or unique to the class of entities that the word designates" (Langacker [1987], in Evans & Green [2006: 217–218]). In my analysis, such characteristic combinations include *crack a joke, catch*⁵ *a joke, play a joke, and be the butt of a joke*, which belong to the type of combination that has been categorized as "restricted" in traditional phraseology. In a basic-level category, these characteristic combinations are categorized as more specific combinations at the subordinate level just below the basic level, together with institutionalized combinations like *tell a joke, share a joke, and appreciate a joke*, which are less characteristic but also add to the specificity of the combination and are likely to be conventional and entrenched although they are not "unique" to verbal jokes.

63

The final aspect of cognitive salience concerns ‘conventional knowledge’, which is
defined as “the extent to which a particular facet of knowledge is shared within a
linguistic community” (Langacker [1987], in Evans & Green [2006: 217–218]). This
implies that it is the result of a social process of ‘conventionalization’ interacting with
the cognitive process of ‘entrenchment’ (Divjak, Levshina & Klavan [2016: 452]). In his
Entrenchment-and-Conventionalization Model, Schmid [2015: 7, 10] defines the two
processes separately. Thus, entrenchment is defined as

[t]he continuous routinization and re-organization of associations, depending on exposure to and frequency of identical or similar processing events, subject to the exigencies of the social environment

and conventionalization is defined as

[t]he continuous mutual coordination and matching of communicative knowledge and practices, subject to the exigencies of the entrenchment processes taking place in individual minds

64

The two sets of processes are said to be linked by ‘pragmatic associations’, which “connect whatever is perceived during the usage event to the pattern of associations activated while processing the linguistic input and output” (Schmid [2015: 20]). In my analysis, the cognitive patterns of association are associated with the frames evoked by *joke* in usage events, what Firth called “finding application in renewal of connection with the sources of the abstraction” (Firth [1968: 200]). The combinations elaborating salient substructure of the frames as part of domains of variation are either conventionalized and entrenched or ad hoc variations. As they elaborate salient substructure of a frame evoked by *joke* and take frame participants as their agent, I propose that ad hoc variants should be included in the category of collocations, even if they are less likely to be conventional and entrenched.

65

The category of collocations includes ‘conventional and entrenched collocations’ with a highly schematic basic-level verb like *make a joke* as well as less schematic, more specific verbs like *tell* and *crack a joke*. To emphasize the continuity with combinations that are considered to be conventional and entrenched at any one time, ad-hoc variations like *make sth. into a joke* and *produce a joke* are included as “open collocations” while combinations that are not considered to be part of the domain of variation are categorized as “free combinations”. (Poulsen [2022: 247, 253–254]). In terms of frame semantics, verb + nominal object collocations can be defined as those combinations in
which the dominant frame is evoked by the noun whereas free combinations like
*explain a joke* and *remember a joke* evoke the frame of the verb.

66

The taxonomy shown in Table 2 is based on the elements of cognitive salience related to level of categorization. While all ‘conventional and entrenched collocations’ represent intrinsic knowledge, not all word combinations representing intrinsic knowledge are conventional and entrenched. This will depend on the extent to which they also represent generic, characteristic, and conventional knowledge.

<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3. Taxonomy of verb + nominal object combinations based on relative salience (based on Poulsen [2022: 255])</figcaption></figure>

The taxonomy as shown in Figure 3 emphasizes the difference between collocations categorizing knowledge that is intrinsic to the frame evoked by the noun and elaborated by the verb, on the one hand, and ‘free combinations’ that categorize knowledge extrinsic to the frame evoked by the noun, on the other. In the analysis, intrinsic evidence consists in the domains of variation found in frame slots while extrinsic evidence consists in the combinations that could not be attributed to such domains.

## 3.4. Conventional and entrenched collocations: a lexicogrammatical prototype category of support verbs

67

On the basis of my analysis, I claim that conventional and entrenched collocations constitute a functional domain, which I propose can be construed as a prototype category (Rosch [e.g. 1973, 1975, 1978], Taylor [1995, 2015]) of support verbs with lexicogrammatical functions. The advantage of prototype categories is that they combine structural stability with flexibility: “new entities and new experiences can be readily associated, perhaps as peripheral members, to a prototype category without necessarily causing any fundamental restructuring of the category system” (Taylor [1995: 53]).

68

The underlying idea is that the relationship between a verb and its object may be so close that they are fused into a complex predicate, which is semantically intransitive. The prototype of a support verb (Bache & Davidsen-Nielsen [1997], Van Durme & van den Eynde [1998], Baron & Herslund [1998]) is a combination of a delexical verb with general meaning and a deverbalized noun with a suffix, which is an “effected object”, i.e. the result of the verbal action, as in *make an appointment*. Less prototypical are combinations in which the meaning of the verb is less general, as in *arrange an appointment* or the noun not so clearly deverbal because it does not have a suffix, as in
make a joke, or not deverbal at all, as in *have a row* or *ride a bicycle*. A characterization by FrameNet researchers (Ruppenhofer et al. [2016: 43]) of a support verb like *take* in the expression *take revenge* is close to the prototype:

they combine with a state noun or an event noun to create a verbal predicate

they allow arguments of the verb to fill the slots of the frame-elements of the frame evoked by the noun

they do not introduce any significant semantics of their own, since constructions of nouns with their support verbs denote the same state of affairs that would be denoted by the noun occurring by itself

69 A great many English verb + nominal object collocations were formed in Old English and have been studied as “complex predicates” typically corresponding to existing “simplex” verbs (Brinton & Akimoto [1999b: 1; 21]). The main motivation was considered to be “ease of modification” of the deverbal noun, as a complex predicate allows the insertion of adjectives and other modifiers. Also, adjectival modifiers of complex verbs are much easier to use than adverbial modifiers of simplex verbs, which may not even be possible:

(13a) *make an obscure / a stupid / a condescending joke*
to joke *obscurely /*stupidly /*condescendingly*

(13b) *The Marquis of Queensberry may be judged, [...] to have made an involuntary*
*and uncharacteristic joke in accusing Wilde [...]*

[...] to have made a joke *involuntarily and uncharacteristically*

70 In addition to their main function “to combine with the nominal object to express verbal meaning” (Ruppenhofer, Baker & Fillmore [2002: 368]), support verbs “serve many important functions” (Fillmore, Baker & Sato [2002: 790]). They list functions 1-5 in Figure 4, to which I have added a 6th function [my examples]:

<table><caption>Table 3. Functions of support verbs (based on Fillmore, Baker & Sato [2002: section 4.2.])</caption><tr><td>(1) Disambiguating an object noun:</td><td>to make a joke ("to joke") vs. to play a joke ("to make a practical joke")</td></tr><tr><td>(2) Profiling different participants:</td><td>to make a joke ('joker') vs. to get a joke ('audience')<br/>to make a (practical) joke ('player of the joke') vs. to take a (practical) joke ('victim')</td></tr><tr><td>(3) Profiling different phases of a scenario:</td><td>to make a joke ('Action') vs. to get a joke ('Response')<br/>to play a (practical) joke (on sby) ('Action') vs. to take a (practical) joke ('Response')</td></tr><tr><td>(4) Selecting a particular register:</td><td>to tell a joke (neutral) vs. to crack a joke (colloquial)<br/>to make a joke (neutral) vs. to pull a joke (on sby) (colloquial)</td></tr><tr><td>(5) Allowing the direct object of a transitive event type to be the subject</td><td>to take a joke ('victim' as subject)<br/>to be the butt of a joke ('victim' as subject)</td></tr></table>
(6) Selecting a particular conceptualization

to make a joke (general emphasis on 'creation')

to do a joke (more specific conceptualization of joker as a professional)

71 It is now possible to characterize the functional domain of support verbs as including, in addition to verbalization and ease of modification, the functions of disambiguation (item 1 in Figure 4) and variation (items 2–6 in Figure 4).

72 In usage-based accounts of grammar both ‘content words’ and ‘function words’ are symbolic units and, instead of imposing a rigid boundary between them, Langacker [1987: 18;353–354], points to the need for a unified account based on variation along two continuous parameters: ‘level of specificity’ and ‘overlap between standard and target’. As regards level of specificity, content words are typically quite specific, while function words are more schematic. As to the second parameter, the greatest overlap between standard and target is found at the grammatical end of the continuum where basic-level verbs like *make* and *do* have been referred to as “light” (Mel’čuk [1998]), ‘quasi-auxiliary’ (Brinton & Akimoto [1999a]), ‘stretched’, ‘thin’ (Allerton [2001]), or ‘delexicalized’ (Aisenstadt [1979]) because their ‘elaboration site’, the place of the nominal object in a transitive construction, comes close to exhausting the meaning of the collocation as a composite expression. However, the data on *joke* show that even in combinations with highly generic verbs like *make a joke* and *do a joke*, the meaning of the collocation is not fully exhausted by *joke*, as *make* verbalizes a general element of “creation” and *do* contributes the conceptualization of the joker as a professional. More specific verbs like *tell*, *crack*, *share*, *swap*, and *exchange* contribute increasingly specific conceptualization but they all belong to the same domain of variation and they share the function of elaborating salient substructure of the JOKE frame, which exerts top-down coercion on the fillers of the slots of frames construed as gestalts or part-whole configurations.

73 I propose that, in a usage-based account, the full range of verbs in conventional and entrenched collocations should be categorized as support verbs, not only basic-level verbs like *make*, *get*, *take*, and *have* but also more specific ones like *tell*, *crack*, *share*, *understand*, *catch*, and *appreciate*. Excluded are only combinations categorized as ad hoc variations like *make up a joke* and *mistell a joke*.

74 The claim that support verbs are function words finds support, at least as far as prototypical support verbs are concerned, in Brinton & Akimoto's characterization of a complex predicate in the introduction to their book [1999a]:

> [...] the verb seems to be serving primarily a grammatical or connective function, as a kind of “quasi-auxiliary” or “light” verb, while the deverbal noun stands as “lexical center” (Algeo [1995: 203–20]) expressing the “eventive” sense of the predicate and serving as the focus of verbal meaning

75 Against this it is argued by Traugott [1999: 257–258] that complex predicates are a product of lexicalization since they are not totally predictable and have to be learned, and that, “[a]s is typical in lexicalization, they have increased dramatically in frequency of both types and tokens, whereas in grammaticalization a dramatic increase in frequency involves primarily frequency of tokens”. A compromise suitable for a usage-based approach, which questions a rigid distinction between content words and
function words, is offered by Haspelmath [1999: 1045], in Campbell & Janda [2000: 94–107]:

76

The most general definition of grammaticalization would therefore not restrict this notion to changes from a lexical category to a functional category but would say that grammaticalization shifts a linguistic expression further toward the functional pole of the lexical-functional continuum.

77

In the analysis of *joke* (section 3.2.), it was found that *have a joke* occurs outside frame slots in combinations with *joke* meaning “know” as well as in frame slots elaborating salient substructure of the two JOKE-frames. This is an example of “layering”: the phenomenon that “the forms reflecting various stages of grammaticalization and non-grammaticalized forms occur side by side” (Fischer, Rosenbach & Stein [2000: 3]). These examples of *have* thus serve as “synchronic evidence of diachronic processes” (Poulsen [2022: 129–131]) testifying to the metaphorical extension of *have* from a “full verb” to a “function verb” or “support verb” (Sweetser [1988: 392]).

78

In the light of the functions described, I propose that from a usage-based and frame-semantic perspective, support verbs are construed as a “lexicogrammatical” prototype category, which means that they have assumed a more functional role (Poulsen [2022: 269]) and can be said to have undergone a certain process of grammaticalization as defined by Haspelmath. This is in line with Sweetser’s unified view of language change as metaphorically structured meaning transfer (Sweetser [1988: 389–393]), which is compatible with the view that lexicon and grammar form a continuum and is supported with the cited examples of *have a joke*.

### 3.5. Evaluation and summary

79

Using a qualitative approach for an exemplary study of a construction makes it possible to look at the data in great detail and find patterns that may apply more generally. I have found that the theory and methodology previously used in a study of *break an appointment* (Poulsen [2022]) could also be applied in my study of *joke* but more studies are required,⁶ including studies of other constructions such as noun + verb, adjective + noun, adverb + verb combinations, which may call for a somewhat different methodology. Moreover, it would be interesting to zoom out from the narrow focus of an exemplary study and compare the collocational patterns of nouns belonging to the same cognitive domain (e.g. *joke*, *pun*, *witticism*, *wisecrack*, etc.) to show how it is conceptualized by means of the frames evoked by different nouns and to study overlaps and variation in their collocational range.¹

80

Frequency is not disregarded but included as part of the overall qualitative analysis. By the same token, a quantitative approach requires a basic qualitative understanding so that the hypotheses on which investigations are based do not remain hidden. Statistical models and algorithms are no more objective than qualitative methods (O'Neil [2016]).

81

Categorization generally involves imposing discreteness on something that is basically more or less continuous (Langacker [2006: 114]) and reminds us of the fuzziness of natural language. Also, the limited context of corpus examples sometimes leaves room for a great deal of guesswork. It should be emphasized, however, that we are not talking about classical categories with criterial features but about prototype categories with graded membership. An analysis based on basic-level categories, which are
prototypical in nature, acknowledges the fact that prototype categories are not
inherent in the data but are construed by means of prototypicality judgements on
which not everybody may agree since they depend on theoretical perspective.
However, if these judgements are guided by a usage-based perspective on natural-
language data and based on relevant theoretical functional and cognitive notions, I
have found that it is possible to arrive at a usage-based understanding of collocations
as a language resource, including their variability.

82

In this paper I have identified semantic frames and frame slots on the basis of corpus data including verbs taking the noun *joke* as their object. Subsequently the domains of variation found in each slot were subdivided into different levels on the basis of basic-level categorization, prototypicality judgements and cognitive salience. Combinations that could not be included in any of the slots were categorized as ‘extrinsic evidence’ and named ‘free combinations’.

83

On the basis of the ‘intrinsic evidence’ consisting in the domains of variation found in the slots, a functional taxonomy of collocations of verbs and their nominal object is proposed. While all the fillers of a domain of variation are intrinsic to the frame and are categorized as ‘collocations’ in the taxonomy, not all collocations are assumed to be ‘conventional and entrenched’. The least generic and most specific collocations, which are often among the least frequent, are considered to be ad-hoc variants and are categorized as ‘open collocations’ while conventional and entrenched collocations are categorized as ‘support verbs’ because they have assumed a lexicogrammatical role as complex predicates and make up a functional domain.

4. Winding up

84

The lexicogrammatical diversity and variability of collocations has grown out of language use, and a usage-based approach should embrace it and account for it as a language resource. A functional and cognitive perspective, which looks at collocational range from an onomasiological point of view, as ‘domain of variation’, implies that not only the most generic, the most characteristic or the most frequent combinations belong to the functional domain of collocations but also ‘institutionalized’ combinations, which typically represent the stylistically neutral option. This approach solves the puzzle faced by traditional phraseologists and others who try to categorize collocations as classical categories in terms of deviation from full compositionality and full idiomaticity. Compared to the traditional approach, it allows for the continuity between more and less ‘restricted’ collocations such as *make a joke, tell a joke, and crack a joke*, which belong to the same domain of variation, elaborating the ‘action’ slot in the frame evoked by the noun *joke* meaning ‘verbal joke’. Only ‘free combinations’ that do not elaborate a frame slot are excluded from the category of collocations as extrinsic evidence. Thus, the tables have been turned: collocations are no longer the odd ones out; they represent the normal, usage-based and functionally motivated domain of variation.

85

Let me conclude by quoting two observations made by Sinclair [1991: 100], in Hunston & Francis [2000: 16] about how corpus data may reveal surprising aspects of language:

[...] firstly, that some sequences of words co-occur surprisingly often given that every utterance or written sentence spontaneously produced is unique, secondly,
and in contrast, that even so-called fixed expressions demonstrate surprising amounts of variability.

86 Convention and variability go together – in a usage-based account of collocations, you can’t have one without the other.

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## Web resources

Sketch Engine, auth.sketchengine.eu.

The English Language and Usage Stack Exchange: ESL Forums: http://www.eslhq.com/forums/esl-forums/english-questions/make-do-joke-5952/

Quora platform: https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-best-practical-joke-you-have-ever-done

English examples in context: https://ludwig.guru / catch+the+joke

## NOTES

1. Retrieved from SketchEngine, auth.sketchengine.eu. Corpus size 112,338,376. Search for (simple joke*). number of hits 4,492, of which 3,110 were nouns.

2. Google search for “make or do a joke”. Retrieved on 15 December 2023 from http://www.eslhq.com/forums/esl-forums/english-questions/make-do-joke-5952/; “esl” stands for English as a Second Language.
3. Retrieved on 15 December 2023 from https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-best-practical-joke-you-have-ever-done.

4. Retrieved on 19 December 2023 from The English Language and Usage Stack Exchange at English.stackexchange.com.

5. Although only one example of *catch the joke* was found in the data, a web search indicates that the expression is conventional; thus, Ludwig's website English examples in context: "The phrase "catch the joke" is correct and usable in written English. It is often used to indicate that the audience has understood a joke or pun." Retrieved on 23 January 2024 from https://ludwig.guru / catch+the+joke.

6. As suggested by one of my reviewers, it might also be theoretically relevant to ask whether adding the schematicity dimension to an analysis of the nominal slot influences its combinatorial possibilities.

ABSTRACTS

I claim that it is the variability of collocations rather than their restrictedness that makes it a
challenge for foreign learners to acquire them and for researchers to categorize them (1.1.) and
argue that a usage-based approach drawing on notions from functional and cognitive linguistics
makes it possible to account for collocations as a dynamic and flexible language resource. The
functional and cognitive framework that I propose for the categorization of collocations is one of
several lines of investigation within Usage-based linguistics, an approach evolving since the
1980s as a challenge to the top-down approach of structuralist and generative linguists who
study the language system separately from language use (Langacker [2000: 91-93], Herbst,
Schmid & Faulhaber [2014], Diessel [2017: 1]). I use corpus data in a qualitative approach based on
the theory and methodology developed in Poulsen [2022]. Frequency, which is a complex
phenomenon (Geeraerts [2017: 158]), is part of the description of the data while function is
considered more important for analysis.

In the introduction to the first part of this paper, I give a brief example of the usage-based
framework that I intend to introduce before giving an overview of previous approaches that
include insights converging on a usage-based approach. In the second part, an alternative
functional and cognitive approach is outlined, which is subsequently tested, in the third part, by
means of an exemplary study of the noun joke. Using examples from the study of joke, I argue that
verbs in conventional and entrenched collocations make up a functional domain and can be
construed as a lexicogrammatical prototype category of support verbs.

Cet article avance l'hypothèse que c'est la variabilité des collocations plutôt que leur caractère
restreint qui rend leur acquisition difficile pour les apprenants étrangers et leur catégorisation
difficile pour les chercheurs (1.1.). Il postule qu'une approche basée sur l'usage, s'appuyant sur
des notions issues de la linguistique fonctionnelle et cognitive, permet de considérer les
collocations comme une ressource linguistique dynamique et flexible. Le cadre fonctionnel et
cognitif que l'autrice propose pour la catégorisation des collocations est l'une des nombreuses
pistes de recherche dans le domaine de la linguistique basée sur l'usage, une approche qui s'est
développée depuis les années 1980 en opposition à l'approche descendante des linguistes
structuralistes et générativistes qui étudient le système linguistique séparément de l'usage de la
langue (Langacker [2000 : 91-93], Herbst, Schmid & Faulhaber [2014], Diessel [2017 : 1]). L'autrice
recourt à des données de corpus dans une approche qualitative basée sur la théorie et la méthodologie développées dans Poulsen [2022]. La fréquence, qui est un phénomène complexe (Geeraerts [2017:158]), fait partie de la description des données, tandis que la fonction est considérée comme plus fondamentale pour l'analyse.

L'introduction de la première partie de cet article propose un bref exemple du cadre basé sur l'usage présenté dans cet article, avant de donner un aperçu des approches précédentes qui incluent des idées convergeant vers une approche basée sur l'usage. Dans la deuxième partie, une approche fonctionnelle et cognitive alternative est présentée, qui est ensuite testée, dans la troisième partie, au moyen d'une étude exemplaire du nom « joke ». À partir d'exemples tirés de l'étude des blagues, l'autrice soutient que les verbes utilisés dans des collocations conventionnelles et bien établies constituent un domaine fonctionnel et peuvent être considérés comme une catégorie prototypique lexicogrammaticale de verbes support.

## INDEX

**Keywords:** collocation, semantic frame, basic-level category, domain of variation, lexical function, intrinsic evidence, cognitive salience, grammaticalization, support verb

**Mots-clés:** collocation, cadre sémantique, catégorie de niveau de base, domaine de variation, fonction lexicale, preuves intrinsèques, saillance cognitive, grammaticalisation, verbe support

## AUTHOR

### SONJA POULSEN

University of Southern Denmark, Institute of Language and Communication; Independent researcher since 2009
sonja.poulsen@gmail.com