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# Prioritizing security awareness in the fourth industrial revolution: strategies and considerations

DR. ANA BUHALJOTI¹, PROF.ASOC. MIRELA MERSINI²

¹ FACULTY OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF TIRANA, ALBANIA, ANA.BUHALJOTI@GMAIL.COM

² FACULTY OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF TIRANA, ALBANIA, MIRELAMERSINI@YAHOO.COM

**Abstract:** Industry 4.0, which is the fourth industrial revolution, includes the integration of digitized physical objects and key partners into digital ecosystems and production processes to improve industrial processes. Unfortunately, these systems have increasingly become vulnerable to cyber-attacks, and significant security risks exist in the supply chain. As a result, security awareness has become crucial to improve behavior and reinforce good security practices. To identify an effective security awareness strategy, semi-structured interviews were held with security experts in the industrial sector. The study recognized the components of security awareness strategy, including knowledge, motivation, communication, training, and evaluation. The findings emphasize the significance of the industrial culture when implementing security awareness, while the most significant challenges are the rapidly increasing digital threats and the managerial shortage of time and resources.

**Keywords:** Information security, industry 4.0, digital transformation, awareness strategy, Albania

## INTRODUCTION

The rapid acceleration of internet connectivity has led to increased automation for organizations, such as the Internet of Things (IoT) (Oscarson, 2019). The IoT has enabled the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), which improves industrial processes through interconnectivity and real-time control systems (Topping et al., 2021). This shift from traditional mechanical industrial methods to digitalization has been referred to as Industry 4.0 and led to new production and supply chain management methods (Pereira et al., 2017).

However, digitalization has intensified digital threats (Oscarson, 2019), and daily reported hacker attacks on supply chains (Zave & Rexford, 2021; Topping et al., 2021). As industries increasingly connect to external networks, hackers gain access to critical processes on the supply chain (Pereira et al., 2017).

Despite this threat, many organizations still do not prioritize security reinforcements and tend to focus on technical security solutions, even though humans are often the cause of security violations (Oscarson, 2019; Corallo et al., 2022; SANS, 2018;). Therefore, it is crucial to work on security awareness to protect industrial processes. This paper aims to identify the aspects of establishing an effective security awareness strategy applied to the industrial setting of Albania.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In recent years, the threat landscape for cyber-attacks has become increasingly sophisticated, and businesses need to prioritize their information security measures. (IFSEC Global 2022) Organizations often rely solely on technical solutions to safeguard their systems, without considering the human factor in cybersecurity. Hackers frequently use social engineering tactics to exploit human weaknesses and gain unauthorized access to networks and sensitive information (SANS 2018). To address this challenge, it is crucial for businesses to implement security awareness programs that educate employees on cybersecurity best practices and raise awareness of the risks posed by cyber threats.

Security awareness can be defined as the process of promoting a culture of security within an organization and encouraging employees to adopt safe security behaviors (Ali Zani, Norman & Abdul Ghani 2020). The goal is to create a security-conscious workforce that understands the importance of information security and takes proactive steps to protect against cyber threats.

Effective security awareness programs may include training sessions, simulations of real-world cyber-attacks, regular communication and reminders of security policies and procedures, and incentives for good
security practices (Légard 2020). By improving employee awareness of cybersecurity risks and promoting a culture of security within the organization, businesses can significantly reduce the risk of successful cyber-attacks. (Wilson & Hash 2003)

Research has shown that there is a need for increased security awareness and strategies for industry 4.0 to prevent security breaches that can cause financial losses. (Corallo et al. 2022, Pereira, Barreto & Amaral 2017) Industrial control system (ICS) are used for critical societal functions like electricity, water supply and transportation. (Knapp & Langill 2015)

Several studies have investigated how to build cybersecurity strategies, such as Legárd (2020), Ponsard & Grandclaudon (2020), Ryttare (2019), and Da viega (2018). However, standards for cybersecurity take time to be updated, and often do not provide advice on behavioral aspects of information security. Leaders' role in ensuring good security awareness levels can affect the entire organization (Hwang, Wakefield, Sanghyun & Kim 2021).

Security awareness review has resulted in the steps of *knowledge, motivation, communication, learning/training, and evaluation* (Oscarson 2019; Legárd 2020).

Different groups within an organization may have different *knowledge* needs regarding cybersecurity. (Oscarson 2019). Besides knowledge, it is important to understand the *motivation* that affects people's behavior, to change their awareness. People are more likely to be engaged and committed to security when they understand not only how to act but also why. (Oscarson 2019). According to Kuppusamy et al., 2019 the most widely used motivation theory in information security behavior studies is the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT). PMT proposes that people's behavior is influenced by two main factors: threat appraisal and coping appraisal. (Kuppusamy et al., 2019)

Threat appraisal refers to individuals' perception of the severity of a potential threat. The more severe the perceived threat, the more motivated individuals are to protect themselves from it. Intrinsic and extrinsic rewards can also influence individuals' motivation to protect themselves.

Coping appraisal, on the other hand, refers to the evaluation of individuals' ability to manage and handle the threat. If individuals believe that the recommended behavior will effectively reduce the threat and they have the skills and resources to implement it, they are more likely to comply with security policies and procedures. (Kuppusamy et al., 2019)

Security policies are sometimes hidden or have very technical language (Oscarson 2019). Studies have shown that information security policies that are written in an easy and clear way are more effective in promoting compliance behavior among employees (Li et al., 2019; Legárd, 2020; Lundgren & McMakin, 2009; Oscarson, 2019). If policies are too technical or difficult to understand, employees may avoid security altogether, increasing the organization's vulnerability to cyber-attacks. A technical background may not always be sufficient to convey complex security concepts to employees who may have little or no technical expertise. As reported by SANS (2019), approximately 80% of security awareness professionals have a technical background but lack adequate communication skills.

According to Lee (2022), dialogic internal *communication* can encourage employees' safety behaviors in the workplace. This can be achieved by engaging employees in two-way conversations to identify and address their concerns. (Men & Yue (2019), Tao, Lee, Sun, Li & He 2022)

Providing practical exercises and real-life scenarios can also help employees understand the importance of security and how to act in a secure manner (Thomas 2014). Moreover, learning and training should not be a one-time event but rather an ongoing process to reinforce security awareness among employees and keep their knowledge up to date.

Oscarson (2019) emphasizes that *measuring* awareness activities is necessary to understand the impact of security awareness on employees' behavior. Measuring only knowledge may not provide an accurate representation of actual behavior, as highlighted by Fertig, Schütz, and Weber (2020). Therefore, organizations should develop customized metrics that align with their specific context and goals (Arabsorkhi & Ghaffari, 2018; Légard, 2020). Programs sometimes lack support from their operations and finance departments and the main reason why transformation fails is internal resistance (Reynolds 2020)

*Evaluating* security awareness programs is essential to understand their effectiveness, and customized metrics should be developed to align with organizational goals. (Legárd, 2020; Oscarson, 2019)

The literature review indicates a gap in security awareness strategy to increase security for industry 4.0.
## RESEARCH METHOD

The use of interviews as a data collection technique allows for in-depth exploration of participants' perceptions and experiences (Myers, 2020). Semi-structured interviews allowed for a balance between a predetermined set of questions based on the theoretical framework (knowledge, motivation, communication, learning/training, and evaluation) and the ability to explore emerging themes or issues during the conversation.

Five experts were interviewed for their insights and experiences in both the information security fields. All experts were chosen based on their role as security responsible in the industry with knowledge and experience in the security building process.

The data analysis process involved transcribing the recorded interviews and conducting a thematic analysis of the data (Spencer et al., 2014). Thematic analysis is a flexible method that can be used in a range of research contexts and allows for the identification of patterns and themes in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2021). The use of a thematic analysis in this study allowed for the identification of common themes across the participants' responses, which were organized into the five categories of the theoretical framework.

## RESULTS

In relation to digital threats, participants mentioned the rapid pace of digitalization, while emphasizing the ransomware attacks and encryption viruses. Legislation and security standards often lag the knowledge of hackers and cybercriminals.

Expert 1: "*There seems to be a perpetual lag in legislation and security standards, and it appears that hackers and criminals are consistently ahead in terms of their knowledge and skills. It's unclear why this is the case, but it's a concerning issue that needs to be addressed.*"

The findings support previous studies that digitalization has increased the level of digital threats (Oscarson, 2019).

All of the participants highlighted the lack of security culture in industries.

Expert 5: "*The industry is behind. Traditional companies that have been forced to enter digitalization to keep up with the market*".

Expert 4: "*We are behind in the security aspects*".

Expert 2: "*Industry workers are not out working with computer on a daily basis*"

These results confirm that industrial security is very problematic since security has not been a priority for industrial control systems evolvement.

All security experts mentioned that security is still not prioritized.

Expert 3 expressed that "*changing people's bad security habits is challenging, especially if they consider those habits effective way of working. De-effectivizing their way of working leads to resistance.*"

On the other hand, Expert 4 noted that the biggest challenge is the existing noise in the organization.

"*It is not just the security department that is trying to communicate to employees, but also other departments such as HR, communication, economy, quality, and environment are competing for their attention.*"

The results confirm that organizations need to prioritize security reinforcements.

### Knowledge

Concerning which knowledge needs to be taught to employees to become more security aware, all the informants agreed to work with knowledge in different levels. Four experts also mentioned sharing knowledge about security breaks. An example of these results are the following comments:

Expert 1 and 2 mentioned the importance of having a baseline level of security measures in place, but also emphasized that "*there is a need for tailoring security efforts to the specific composition and level of knowledge of the staff group*". They stated that the security measures presented must be relevant and practical for the group being addressed. Drawing a parallel to physical safety, Expert 2 likened this approach to the way fire safety measures are implemented and suggested that security awareness efforts can take inspiration from this approach.

Expert 5: "*we are not good at sharing our own mistakes*. "*If we are going to get better in this I think that we need to be sector wise and share experiences and knowledge*".
These results confirm what research is saying, that it is important for organizations to understand threats specific to a sector or organization.

Motivation

Regarding aspects to motivate the employees to become more security aware, three of the informants highlighted the importance of making inclusive and interactive activities.

Expert 2: "I think that the most important motivation is comprehending the reason behind what we are doing".

Expert 3: "If there is a collaboration or interaction, people are more likely to remember and engage."

Expert 4: *To promote people's engagement is more effective.*

These results emphasize the importance of users recognizing the relevance of the subject to them.

Communication

When asked about who should lead the security awareness work, and what qualities are necessary for them to possess, four informants answered communication.

Expert 1: *In my opinion, effective communication is the key to success in this area.*

Expert 4: "I think that it is good if the awareness work is led by a central security function

Expert 5: "It has a lot to do with communication abilities and conveying a message".

According to three interviewees, "it is essential to involve leaders in training activities". This confirms that leaders have a crucial role in promoting security awareness in organizations, as their behavior and decisions can affect the entire organization.

Learning and training

Regarding how to learn and train information security knowledge, security experts mentioned different types of activities.

Examples are the following comments:

* "Attending training courses, workshops or seminars

* Discussing security topics with colleagues or peers

* Participating in security competitions or hackathons

* Sharing knowledge or experiences in communities

*E-Learning*

Evaluation

Concerning how to evaluate security awareness, few respondents mentioned techniques to evaluate knowledge or behavior.

The results confirm that measuring awareness is neglected.

Examples are the following comments:

Expert 4: "The evaluation is a challenge and needs to be done among departments."

Expert 5: "I believe that incorporating discussions and understanding of how people work, and whether they are engaged in these topics and groups, should be integrated into daily work."

The evaluation of security awareness should include measurements of knowledge and behavior, while only one respondent recommended assessing soft character traits.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The research results have shown that one of the biggest digital threats for industries in Albania is the changing industrial processes and that the biggest security awareness challenge is the industrial culture.

The findings suggest that the rapid pace of digitalization poses a significant digital threat, while security measures are not keeping up with the same pace. It is crucial to involve leaders in the security awareness process, as they play a crucial role in influencing employees. However, some of the significant challenges faced by managers include a lack of time and resources, not seeing the value of security awareness, and psychological barriers. In terms of knowledge aspects, it is essential to teach information security knowledge
at different levels and share it across organizational boundaries. Motivational aspects should also be considered, with interactive and context-specific activities being preferred. Experts suggested making learning and training activities interactive, enjoyable, and encouraging people to learn and share knowledge.

It is also important that managers assess culture changes and evaluate security awareness, knowledge and behavior of employees.

The findings can be applicable to security awareness efforts in other nations, as aligning security awareness strategies with the organization's culture has a significant impact.

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# Solidarity of the international trade union movement in the post covid 19 era

IRINA NICOLAESCU

PHD STUDENT, MA IN POLITICAL SCIENCES, LECTURER, FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES, MOLDOVA STATE UNIVERSITY

**Abstract:** International cooperation is the basis of international solidarity, but international solidarity is not limited to international assistance and cooperation, humanitarian assistance and charity. International solidarity should be understood as a broader concept that includes the sustainability of international relations, the peaceful coexistence of all members of the international community, equal partnership and equal distribution of benefits and burdens, refusal to cause harm or create obstacles to the common good, including within the international economic system and the common ecological system. Solidarity is a fundamental element of the trade union movement and an essential aspect of the work of international trade union organizations. It can take many forms: from simple support to trade unions involved in local disputes, to trade union organizations' massive action to engage affiliates and other trade unions to support federation members in major conflicts. It is critically important to make full use of social dialogue to fight the crisis and support the incomes of the workers in the post pandemic era. The cooperation with trade unions at home or together with other countries, internationally, allows respecting human rights in general and the rights of workers, in particular.

**Key words:** solidarity, trade union, trade union movement, post COVID 19.

The idea of solidarity became widespread in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This was due to the objective need to search for new forms of interaction between social actors in the context of the growing class conflict of the bourgeois society, when the former social institutions of traditional society, such as the family, the neighborhood community, and religion, began to lose their significance and strength and there was a threat to the stability of the society. The interpretation of the concept is the identification of the principles of interaction, which implies mutual understanding, consent and cooperation of different subjects of interaction.

The most famous concept among the classics was created by Emile Durkheim. He shared mechanical solidarity, characteristic of early, archaic societies, based on collective ideas, and organic solidarity, characteristic of differentiated societies, associated with the division of labor.<fnref n="1" />

Mechanical solidarity is the social integration of members of a society who have common values and beliefs. These common values and beliefs constitute a “collective conscience” that works internally in individual members to cause them to cooperate. Because, in Durkheim’s view, the forces causing members of the society to cooperate were much like the internal energies causing the molecules to cohere in a solid, he drew upon the terminology of physical science in coining the term *mechanical solidarity*.

In contrast to mechanical solidarity, organic solidarity is social integration that arises out of the need of individuals for one another’s services. In a society characterized by organic solidarity, there is a relatively greater division of labor, with individuals functioning much like the interdependent but differentiated organs of a living body. Society relies less on imposing uniform rules on everyone and more on regulating the relations between different groups and persons, often through the greater use of contracts and laws.

Solidarity means a community of interests, like-mindedness, unanimity, interdependence, interconnectedness, mutual responsibility, joint responsibility. Thus, solidarity is defined as a principle of social existence, involving the pooling of resources and capabilities of the subjects to

<footnote n="1">¹ Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "mechanical and organic solidarity". Encyclopedia Britannica, 9 Feb. 2010, Accessed on 25.04.2023 https://www.britannica.com/topic/mechanical-and-organic-solidarity.</footnote>
achieve common goals, while the interests of each of the subjects are in balance with the interests of the community.

The history of social movements shows that solidarity has been clearly localized over the course of a century and a half. It is a familiar political formula – the solidarity of workers, the solidarity of democratic forces, the solidarity of civil society. For years, even decades, sociologists and political thinkers have been talking about social movements or new types of communities. It is impossible to deny that the solidarity of the members of these social units is a quite obvious, easily observable phenomenon.

Solidarity is one of the main areas of joint work of the trade union movement. Many activities of trade unions such as raising wages and improving working conditions, protecting trade union rights, and combating privatization have common features. Trade unions welcome any form of solidarity that makes them aware that they are not alone and that their actions are part of a common struggle. Any expression of support of its members and other trade union organizations, as well as their protests against the actions of companies, employers and governments, could be an important impetus for the trade unions' own campaigns.

Even a simple expression of solidarity can have a positive effect on the mood of the workers participating in the campaign, as it will allow them to reassure themselves of the support of the entire trade union movement. This may be especially important in countries where union mobilization is particularly difficult. Letters of protest, in turn, can be effective by drawing public attention to employers and governments and thereby bringing a local or national conflict to the international level.

The COVID-19 pandemic has been a test for trade unions in all countries, revealing not only existing weaknesses, but also creating a sense of urgency to mobilize around the protection of members and to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on the labor market.

The global pandemic of COVID-19 has caused a crisis unlike any other in recent history. Millions have been infected and hundreds of thousands have lost their lives worldwide. In addition to the devastating health consequences, this pandemic has resulted in an unprecedented economic downturn that has affected people on a global scale. It is now more important than ever for the international trade union movements to come together in solidarity to protect the working people. The COVID-19 crisis exposed and exacerbated existing challenges, putting increasing pressure on the trade unions. Trade union membership was declining in both developed and developing countries. The future of trade unions depends on their response to pandemics.<fnref n="2" /> In the post COVID-19, it will be necessary to promote cooperation, offering basic services in a different way, recovering and creating decent employment through diverse and complementary organizational models of production.

The effects of the pandemic are far-reaching and affect workers from all the sectors of society. Those worst hit include precarious jobs workers who lack access to basic protective measures; informal or casual workers with no job security; migrant workers struggling with inadequate support from governments; young workers facing increased inequalities; women disproportionately affected by unpaid care duties; and retirees at risk due to reductions in pension schemes. The sheer magnitude of this crisis must be addressed through collective efforts and solidarity among unions around the world.

Social, economic, environmental and developmental changes affect the future of trade unions. The shift from manufacturing towards services, environmental change, the informalization of the economy, automation and technological change determine the capacity of trade unions to organize

<footnote n="2">² Post Covid-19: Towards Trade Union Revitalization. Accessed on 24.03.2023 https://www.ilo.org/actrav/media-center/video/WCMS_815066/lang--ja/index.htm</footnote>
and service workers. Today, legal restrictions and violations of trade union rights, such as the right to organize and to bargain collectively for all workers, are widespread. Not surprisingly, trade union membership is lower where there are violations of trade union rights, but is declining in both developed and developing countries. This, in its turn, also erodes legitimacy in collective bargaining and social dialogue. Such decline in trade union influence has a strong impact on people in non-standard or precarious types of employment, such as temporary and own-account workers or workers in the informal and gig economies. In other words, the changing employment relationship is not only a threat to workers, but also to workers' organizations.<fnref n="3" />

To overcome this challenge, it is essential that international trade unions unite and work together to ensure decent living conditions for all workers, regardless of their location or background. It is important to mention that International Labor Organization had some important conventions and recommendation that was focused on the principle that universal and lasting peace cannot be established or maintained if it is not based on social justice. Crisis situations around the world destroy livelihoods; interrupt business activities, and damage workplaces. Societal institutions stop functioning effectively, countless workers lose their jobs and the rights and social protection they are entitled to. As a result, inequalities and social exclusion are worsened, which leads to a lack of respect for labor standards. Certain population groups, including minorities, children, women, the disabled and the elderly, are particularly affected as well as migrants and populations experiencing forced displacement.

The role of trade unions (as well as employers and governments) in the generation of employment and decent work for the purpose of prevention, recovery, peace, and resilience with respect to fragile environments gained renewed impetus following the adoption of the Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation (No. 205) by the International Labor Conference in 2017. This Recommendation replaces the Employment (Transition from War to Peace) Recommendation (No. 71), adopted in 1944, expanding its scope to crisis situations arising from all conflicts and disasters and extending action to prevention, preparedness, reconstruction and recovery.<fnref n="4" /> Recommendation No. 205 does not offer solutions – it is only a guide that invites social partners to reflect systematically on the ways in which the world of work can play a more sustained and central role in making the planet a safer and more secure world for everyone.

The pandemic has led to an unprecedented global health and economic crisis. In the face of this crisis, it is more important than ever for the international trade union movement to stand in solidarity with workers around the world.

The COVID-19 pandemic has become only a phenomenon that has been exposing accumulated problems. In the economic sphere, COVID-19 has transformed into a coronavirus recession; in the social sphere, it has revealed the problems of poverty and social justice, which for a long time have been pushed into the background under the pretext of prioritizing market mechanisms in the distribution of the social product. The pandemic has demonstrated that the basis for overcoming the crisis is provided by the primacy of sovereign interests and a reasonable share of national egoism, and that the object of anti-crisis measures is not to unite efforts to jointly resist the crisis, but to save the national economy in order to ensure social well-being of the population. The anti-crisis practice has called into question the prospects of the globalist model of the development of society, at least in the form in which it was presented in the pre-COVID period.<fnref n="5" />

<footnote n="3">³ Owidhi George Otieno, Dickson Onyango Wandeda, Mohammed Mwamadzingo, Trade union membership dynamics amidst COVID-19: Does social dialogue matter? in "International Journal of Labour Research", Vol. 10, Issue 1-2, 2021, p. 3</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Workers' Guide to Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation (No. 205), International Labor Office, ACTRAV, Geneva: ILO, 2019, p. 5</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ Gennady A. Shcherbakov, Impact and Consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic:</footnote>
The pandemic has exposed the deep inequalities that exist in our societies. It has shown that our economies are not working for everyone, and that our social safety nets are inadequate to protect workers and their families against hardship. By 2030, the number of people living in extreme poverty is projected to rise by another 130 million. The pandemic has hit people in low-paying, low-skill jobs particularly hard, while more skilled workers have been hit the hardest. As a result, the income gap between the poor and the rich, both individuals and countries, will widen significantly in the world.

It should be stated that a crisis of this magnitude could only be solved by states in cooperation with private companies that will support the production of public goods. A coordinated international response will help confront new risks and disasters. The world is interconnected, so only by joint efforts can we cope with the challenges of the crisis. A new type of international cooperation is required to prevent future consequences, study diseases, innovate medical equipment and research, and redirect significant funds accumulated by private entities to general needs. This is a condition for the preservation of peace.<fnref n="6" />

The pandemic has also highlighted the importance of strong and effective unions. Unions are essential to ensuring that workers have a voice in the decisions that affect their lives, and they play a vital role in protecting workers' rights and advocating for better working conditions. We can name the possible impact on trade unions<fnref n="7" />:

* The balance of power between employers and their employees may look one-sided at present, with normal industrial levers like strikes being unrealistic during periods of economic contraction. Counter-intuitively, this could provide a chance for trade unions to grow, as they offer employees an established mechanism through which to apply collective influence in the workplace, for example based on confidence about safety at work, or through active engagement in restructuring processes.

* There is an opportunity for unions who wish to build a more prominent role to do so and to reassert their relevance in the modern workplace. We have already seen this as employers consult with their unions about tactical issues such as furlough, along with more strategic workforce reshaping.

* Trade unions with an eye to the future may see this as a moment to take the initiative and establish or build a stronger position. Their focus may shift quickly to those businesses where we have recently seen evidence of employee activism, including tech businesses and those in the gig-economy

Now, more than ever, the need to stand in solidarity to demand decent work for all workers is gaining momentum, regardless of where they live or what job they do; there is need to fight for a just recovery from this crisis that puts workers and their families first. And the trade unions together with the governments have to build a better future for all workers, wherever they may be.

For the Republic of Moldova, the coronavirus pandemic represented one of the biggest challenges in recent times. However, COVID 19 was more than a health crisis and has had an unprecedented social-economic impact. It was difficult to predict what would come next, but it was

<footnote>Socio-Economic Dimension in "MIR (Modernization. Innovation. Research).", 12(1):8-22, 2021; (In Russ.), Accessed 24.03.2023 https://doi.org/10.18184/2079-4665.2021.12.1.8-22</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ Alexandr N. Sheremet, Pandemic of inequality. socio-economic aspects and consequences of COVID-19 in "Medicine. Sociology. Philosophy. Applied Research", No. 4, 2020. (In Russ.), Accessed 24.04.2023 URL: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/pandemiya-neravenstva-sotsialno-ekonomicheskie-aspekty-i-posledstviya-covid-19</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Trade unions in the post-pandemic workplace. What should employers be doing now? Accessed on 24.04.2023 https://www.pwc.co.uk/services/human-resource-services/human-resource-management/trade-unions-in-the-post-pandemic-workplace.html</footnote>
certain that more measures must be taken not only in that period, but also in the post-COVID period, measures that would reduce the consequences of this pandemic.

The International Labor Organization supported and provided expertise at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic. In its analysis the "Impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the labor market in the Republic of Moldova and political responses to the stages of restrictions, gradual reopening and recovery" the ILO presents a list of recommendations for priority economic and social recovery measures. This document was presented for discussion within the Permanent Council regarding the restructuring and development of the national economy, financial, fiscal and revenue policies of the National Commission for consultations and collective negotiations.<fnref n="8" />

At the same time we should specify the measures in supporting workers, which were previously proposed by trade unions, and which were included in the Labor Code. These relate to the granting of days off to workers who receive vaccinations, allowances for employees with distance learning children and unemployment benefits following the establishment of a state of emergency, siege and war or as a result of restrictions imposed in a state of emergency of public health.

On the other hand, within the society the pandemic situation strained the communication process and relationship. For fear of not being infected, many employees who were physically active, felt stressed and were afraid of contacts with their colleagues. Apart from this, other components were also impacted: empathy, collaboration and direct communication, unity, sense of collective responsibility, trust, safety, stability, intra-organizational solidarity, team spirit, time management problems, initiative, creativity, psycho-emotional involvement, encouragement, exchange of opinions, personality culture, collective integration actions, employee stimulation, direct participation in decision-making activities, etc.

The Republic of Moldova remains among the world leaders in terms of the scale of the migration process for work purposes, as well as in terms of the degree of dependence of the economy on remittance flows. Given that the pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus has affected all spheres of social life and, in particular, mobility, policies to reduce the impact of the pandemic must take into account the impact of the pandemic on migration processes. The COVID-19 crisis aggravated existing challenges for the Moldovan labor migrants. In March 2020 alone, more than 40,000 Moldovan citizens came back to the country and around 7,000 were seeking help to return home. Most of the workers were employed in Italy, Spain, France and Israel, and they were among those workers that were hit hardest by the wave of factory closures and temporary layoffs as well as the almost complete shut-down of certain sectors, such as tourism, across Europe.<fnref n="9" />

The new dimension that humanity is experiencing is a scary one for some, but also turning into new opportunities of growth and development for others. The unknown and fear increased to some extent solidarity, concern for others, fairness, the ability to communicate, interact, putting the emphasis at the same time on the fact that health is priced the most, something that was often not taken into account. In general, it was concluded that emphasis must be placed on some values which encourages recognition of facts, actions, things that really matters to humanity. They have changed everywhere rules, priorities, hierarchies, social needs.

In conclusion we can say that one of the signs of a democratic trade union is the creation of conditions for the implementation of the principle of freedom of opinion and discussion, respect for

<footnote n="8">⁸ Galina Munteanu, Apel la solidaritate, pentru a ajuta națiunile să se refacă după criza de Covid, in "Vocea poporului", No 38, Noiembrie, 2021. Accesed on 20.04.2023 https://vocea.md/apel-la-solidaritate-pentru-a-ajuta-natiunile-sa-se-refaca-dupa-criza-de-covid/</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Anna Andreeva, Trade unions in transformation: Experiences from Europe and Central Asia, ILO/ACTRAV, Bureau of Workers' Activities, August 2022, p. 25</footnote>
the interests of each member of the trade union, the right of the minority to defend and clarify their
position at the stage of discussing issues. But the basic principle of the union – solidarity – requires
unity of action after decisions are made. The pandemic has led to a profound reassessment of how
we work, where we work, and even why we work, all of which must be negotiated, and where unions
and their members must play a leading role. In the post-pandemic world, there are serious changes
in various spheres of society: unemployment increase, the forms of interaction between citizens and
with the state change. It takes serious damage for business, which is unlikely to deal with without
government support and assistance; digitalization of life continues, including in education. In the
foreseeable future, the world is also expecting a serious adjustment (if not a change) in the economic
model, which today demonstrates its vulnerability. The coronavirus has become a test of the
mobilization capabilities not only of different countries, but also for trade unions and for trade union
movement, during which the ability to quickly respond to events and effectively solve momentary
problems was tested.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Alexandr N. Sheremet, Pandemic of inequality. socio-economic aspects and consequences of COVID-19, in "Medicine. Sociology. Philosophy. Applied Research", No. 4, 2020. (In Russ.), Accessed on 24.04.2023 URL: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/pandemiya-neravenstva-sotsialno-ekonomicheskie-aspekty-i-posledstviya-covid-19

2. Anna Andreeva, Trade unions in transformation: Experiences from Europe and Central Asia, ILO/ACTRAV, Bureau of Workers' Activities, August 2022, 33 p.

3. Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "mechanical and organic solidarity". Encyclopedia Britannica, 9 Feb. 2010, Accessed on 25.04.2023 https://www.britannica.com/topic/mechanical-and-organic-solidarity.

4. Galina Munteanu, Apel la solidaritate, pentru a ajuta națiunile să se refacă după criza de Covid, in “Vocea poporului”, No 38, Noiembrie, 2021. Accesed on 20.04.2023 https://vocea.md/apel-la-solidaritate-pentru-a-ajuta-națiunile-sa-se-refaca-dupa-criza-de-covid/

5. Gennady A. Shcherbakov, Impact and Consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic:

6. Owidhi G. Otieno, Dickson O. Wandeda, Mohammed Mwamadzingo, Trade union membership dynamics amidst COVID-19: Does social dialogue matter? in "International Journal of Labour Research", Vol. 10, Issue 1-2, 2021, 12 p.

7. Post Covid-19: Towards Trade Union Revitalization. Accessed 24.03.2023 https://www.ilo.org/actrav/media-center/video/WCMS_815066/lang--ja/index.htm

8. Socio-Economic Dimension, in “MIR (Modernization. Innovation. Research)”, 12(1):8–22, 2021. (In Russ.), Accessed 24.04.2023 https://doi.org/10.18184/2079-4665.2021.12.1.8-22

9. Trade unions in the post-pandemic workplace. What should employers be doing now? Accessed on 24.04.2023 https://www.pwc.co.uk/services/human-resource-services/human-resource-management/trade-unions-in-the-post-pandemic-workplace.html

10. Workers' Guide to Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation (No. 205), International Labor Office, Bureau for Workers' Activities (ACTRAV). Geneva: ILO, 2019, 52 p.
# The impact of digital transition on education

ANDREEA-ROMANA BAN

LECTURER, "GEORGE EMIL PALADE" UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE, PHARMACY, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY OF TÂRGU MUREŞ, "PETRU MAIOR" FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND LETTERS, TÂRGU MUREŞ, ROMANIA,
ANDREEA.BAN@UMFST.RO

**Abstract:** An area of intense academic focus is the transition from traditional teaching and learning methods to new technologies and the way they contribute to students' creativity and academic performance. Nowadays, information and communication technologies and digital technologies are used on an increasing scale and there are many opportunities for interaction and collaboration in the digital environment, which is leading to new forms of engagement and value creation. The aim of the present paper is to demonstrate how innovation, creativity, and extensive dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge and information enhance the potential for academic growth and competitiveness.

**Keywords:** technology, education, digitisation, evolution, success

**Rezumat:** Un domeniu intens abordat în mediul academic îl reprezintă tranziția metodelor tradiționale de predare și învățare spre noile tehnologii și modul prin care acestea contribuie la dezvoltarea creativității și a performanțelor academice ale studenților. Tehnologiile informației și comunicațiilor, precum și cele digitale sunt utilizate pe o scară tot mai mare și în prezent există numeroase posibilități de interacțiune și colaborare în mediul digital, iar acest fenomen determină apariția a noi forme de implicare și creare de valoare. Scopul lucrării de față este de a demonstra modul prin care inovația, creativitatea, diseminarea largă a cunoștințelor și informațiilor științifice și tehnice sporesc potențialul de creștere și competitivitate academică.

**Cuvinte cheie:** tehnologie, educație, digitalizare, evoluție, succes

## THE NEED FOR INNOVATION IN EDUCATION

New ways of using technology and teaching methods can really help with learning and training, but sometimes they do not work as well as we hope. Some online courses are not completed by a lot of people, and sometimes students do worse when they use computers instead of books. This might be why people have not started using advanced technologies as much. It is harder to know if they can bring good things for students, teachers, and schools, and it is also hard to understand all the risks, costs, and benefits of trying new things.

There continues to be rapid growth in digital learning and the continuously developing technology market, which means it can be difficult to know what is right and what is wrong. Often, the early purchase of infrastructure can be costly before a return on investment is realized. New online learning is also changing the boundaries between formal and non-formal education and training and massively increasing the possibilities for individual learning, but this creates risks for students in terms of how such learning should be validated and by whom.

When someone learns things on their own, it makes us think about how we can be sure that what they learned is true and correct. Nowadays, people are still figuring out how to do this in different parts of the world. People come up with new ways to check if someone really learned something, but it is still important that these new ways are connected to official qualifications that are recognized by the government. Countries that let people learn in their own way and give them chances to prove what they already know might be good at dealing with these new challenges.

A more systematic and interconnected approach is needed to identify the pedagogical costs and benefits of innovation and digital learning technologies and to determine their efficiency and effectiveness. Intermediary structures (new or established on existing ones) are needed that can help coordinate and organize teacher and trainer engagement with new technologies to maximize their benefits and act as knowledge management organizations that can reference good practice.
The ways we learn and teach are changing because of new ideas and tools. Teachers and trainers play an important role in this process. It can be hard for them because things are different than before, but there are also new and exciting possibilities. Technology helps teachers and trainers work together and plan lessons. Some teachers and trainers are worried that these changes will not be accepted by schools or universities.

Teachers and trainers need skills and approaches to be innovative and, in the face of the scale of change facing vocational education and training, there is now a greater need for effective initial training and continuing professional development. Supportive environments in education can provide clear direction, space and time for innovation. This is provided that teachers and trainers get the support they need. There are many opportunities for virtual and physical learning through blended learning techniques and the development of new forms of social learning through online platforms.

At the same time, the development of networks and communities of practice can enable teachers and trainers to share experiences and expertise on instructional methods, teaching and learning, and digital tools.

Work-based learning is very important in the process of acquiring practical, experiential, and vocational skills to determine how digital tools can best support work-based learning, for example, by making greater use of technologies such as virtual and augmented reality and related artificial intelligence.

Work-based learning, as a form of education and training, is well placed to respond to wider environmental, social, and economic challenges, as it has the potential to meet new skills and provide experiential and practical learning either in schools or in companies or other workplaces, particularly for apprentices. It can therefore support not only technical and job-specific skills but also transversal skills needed for innovation.

A key challenge is therefore to what extent education and training programs should integrate digital learning into their curricula. The Pandemic has shown that there are variations between sectors in the use of digital tools. While they can reduce the unit costs of learning and provide new ways of teaching/training and assessing students, it is questionable how much they can replace real-life practical experiences.

There is the possibility for work-based learning to make more use of digital learning that simulates practical experiences using virtual and augmented reality. In addition, there is also the possibility of improving cooperation and dialogue between education and training providers and companies through the joint use of digital tools for learning and training (especially between teachers and trainers within a company). However, it is important that the pros and cons are carefully weighed and that the optimal mix between real-world and virtual experiences is achieved. Work-based learning with projects helps develop soft skills, and digital platforms can bring people together with different subjects of interest. Overall, digitisation offers an opportunity to rethink the way education and training providers cooperate with businesses, which still have the greatest access to the latest technologies.

## REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIGITAL TRANSITION IN EDUCATION

As mentioned above, the last few years have brought major developments in the digitisation of education. More and more companies are offering digitised resources for learning. In addition to interactive platforms and educational games, there are also textbooks in digital format.

This facilitates the teaching process, as the teacher can access hundreds of resources from anywhere, provided they have an internet connection. On the other hand, technology in education can also be used without internet access.
Accordingly, technology in education can easily become an integral part of teaching and learning. Using simple and accessible applications, teachers can use technology in education to make lessons more interesting and engaging.

## SKILLS REQUIRED BY THE DIGITAL TRANSITION

Teachers need to learn about the latest techniques they can use in the teaching process in order to use technology in education. This is not difficult as the internet is full of tutorials and articles that they can use for support and guidance.

Another aspect to be taken into account is the level of students' digital skills. If they are not doing very well, it is not a major problem. Children and young people learn very quickly and are curious about new things. So, when the teacher uses a new method or platform in the teaching process, they will quickly get used to it and be able to use it easily.

Consequently, using technology in education can start from a low level of digital skills, but as time goes by, the desire to learn more will come naturally.

## BENEFITS OF TECHNOLOGY IN EDUCATION

Technology in education has the primary advantage of diversifying teaching methods. Through the use of educational presentations, videos, or online games, the teacher gives students the opportunity to learn about the topics discussed in innovative ways that involve them as well. In what follows I will highlight the most important uses of the new technology:

* through different multiplayer games and apps, students can interact with each other. In this way, they will be able to work as a team to achieve the aim of the exercise.

* using technology will make it easier for teachers to create worksheets. Using a computer, they can easily change the structure or phraseology in the assignments they prepare for the students. For example, in the case of changing jobs, the teacher can add or remove jobs from the worksheet to keep up to date with the latest jobs. And, in this way, they do not have to recreate the whole worksheet.

* when solving tasks on an application, they are generally more concise. Namely, they often use grid or short answer questions.

* technology increases student engagement. When technology is included in everyday lessons, students are expected to take more interest in the subjects they are studying. Technology offers various opportunities to make learning funnier and more enjoyable as it presents the same information but in more interactive ways.

* technology can enable more dynamic cooperation between students and between students and teachers, which can be difficult to achieve in a conventional teaching environment.

* technology improves knowledge retention among students. It can help empower dynamic cooperation in the classroom, which, in addition, is a significant factor for knowledge retention and long-term memory improvement.

* different types of technology can be used to diversify learning tasks in the classroom and to choose what works best for students according to their age.

* technology helps develop and improve new skills. By using technology in the classroom, both teachers and students can develop essential skills that are fundamental to the 21st century.

* students can improve the cognitive skills that they will use later in their careers. Modern learning through technology is about working with others, solving complex problems, basic reasoning, creating different types of communication and leadership skills, promoting creativity and improving productivity. Furthermore, the use of technology in education can help create many practical skills, including creating interactive presentations, learning to differentiate between safe and unsafe sources on the internet, composing emails, etc.
* technology helps students stay up to date with new technological advances. Students who are able to keep up to date with the latest technological advances will be able to improve their knowledge of different areas and develop new skills that they can use in the future. These students will also be more likely to find employment, as they will have a better understanding of recent trends in various fields.

* technology helps students be prepared for careers in the future. In an economy that is increasingly driven by data, algorithms and artificial intelligence, technological literacy underpins many industries and careers, many of which are rewarding. From computer programming and software development to engineering, many jobs require a high level of technological competence.

* technology simplifies education and distance learning. The COVID-19 pandemic has forced many teachers and students to rely on distance learning tools such as Zoom, Microsoft Teams, Blackboard, etc. These and other examples of educational technology tools make distance learning possible no matter where people are at the time.

* technology offers students flexibility and support. Two students sitting at the same desk will not learn in the same way or at the same pace. In a conventional classroom setting, this can result in students being excluded, they are left behind or not challenged enough to pay attention in class. Technology allows teachers to create dynamic and innovative lesson plans combining many activities and topics, from games and interactive presentations to artificial intelligence-assisted learning, worksheets and digital textbooks. By means of new and flexible ways of learning, educational technology can make it easier for teachers to meet the diverse needs of their students.

* when technology is used properly, it has the potential to make lessons more memorable, accessible and enjoyable.

From facilitating distance learning to preparing students for technology-driven careers, these are just some of the benefits that technology in education can bring. Regardless of the taught subjects, the strategic use of educational technology can enhance any curriculum, making it easier and more exciting for students to excel.

## DRAWBACKS OF TECHNOLOGY IN EDUCATION

The first disadvantage of technology in education is that in this context children work with certain abstract notions. This is difficult for students up to grade 4 because they have difficulty recognizing a notion that is not concrete, or tangible.

If students were to use their personal phones to complete these tasks, they might be distracted. Because they are used to using that phone for other games and relaxing activities, chances are they will forget that they need to pay attention and start playing games on their phone or doing something else entirely. The solution to this problem would be to use phones or other devices only during class time.

We can see how our society is advancing at an unprecedented pace in the technological field. Just reflecting on the last few years of high-speed internet access, smart mobile phones, smart watches, etc., it is not surprising that the use of technology for training and education purposes has gained more and more importance. In order to adapt to our own modern digital needs, it makes sense to incorporate technology into education. Beyond adaptation, properly used technology can actually lead to more effective learning, preparing young people to face career challenges.

## CONCLUSION

All things considered, the use of technology in the educational process has many advantages, especially if we take into account the large percentage it has in our lives. Therefore, teaching and learning through technology can be regarded as a huge benefit.
Hence, technology in education is valuable because in this way students will be able to use something known in order to learn new and interesting things. It can start from five minutes once a week to embedding online platforms in every course.

In recent times, there has been an increasing emphasis on the need to develop education systems that also train young people in practical skills and competences, as it is insufficient to assimilate a large amount of information that students do not know how to apply and use in their daily lives.

There is now more and more talk about globalisation in all fields, but globalisation in education would mean breaking down barriers between students and opening up new perspectives in teaching practice.

There are students who are open to knowledge and want to learn this field of IT technologies, they use it and prefer it instead of traditional methods, but the way it is used and enhanced depends on the teacher's mastery and the way each teacher knows how to combine methods with teaching resources in the success of the didactic approach.

By using modern technology and e-learning platforms, students benefit from improved skills in graphic organization, writing, reading, accurate calculations, etc. It also gives students flexibility in thinking and organizing working time, helps them to concentrate throughout the lesson, increases students' interest in the lesson, and encourages them to work individually and in groups.

Education can benefit from openness to concrete experiences and projects, new learning tools and materials, and open educational resources. Students can gain more autonomy through online collaboration. Access to and use of digital technologies can help to reduce the learning gap between students from advantaged and disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds. Personalised teaching techniques increase student motivation by focusing teachers' efforts individually on each student.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. Adăscăliței, A., (2007), *Instruire Asistată de Calculator*, Editura Polirom, Iași.

2. Bates, A. W. (2015). *Teaching in a digital age*, https://www.tonybates.ca/teaching-in-a-digital-age/, retrieved on 06.08.2023

3. Cerghit, I., (1997), *Metode de învățământ*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București.

4. Cerghit, I., (2002), *Sisteme de instruire alternative și complementare. Structuri, stiluri și strategii*, București, Editura Aramis.

5. Cucoș, C. (2016), *Pedagogie*, Editura Polirom, Iași.

6. Făt, S., Labăr, A., (2009), *Eficiența utilizării noilor tehnologii în educație. EduTIC 2009. Raport de cercetare evaluativă*. București: Centrul pentru Inovare în Educație, București.

7. Goleman, D., (2001), *Emotional Intelligence, The Emotionally Intelligent Workplace*, ed. Cherniss, C. and Goleman, D.

8. Herlo, D., (2005) *Tehnologie informațională computerizată*, Ed. Universității Aurel Vlaicu Arad, p.71-73.

9. Ionescu, M., Radu, I., (2004), *Didactica modernă*, Editura Dacia, Cluj Napoca;

10. Watson, J., (2012), Blending Learning: The Convergence of Online and Face-to-Face Education Promising Practices in online learning, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED509636.pdf, retrieved on 06.08.2023
# What Do National Parties Campaign on during European Elections? Trends from Romania

DR. MIHAELA IVĂNESCU* AND DR. LUIZA-MARIA FILIMON**

“OVIDIUS” UNIVERSITY OF CONSTANTA, ROMANIA

**Abstract:** European elections generally arouse less interest from voters compared to national elections, often because during the electoral campaigns the topics of debate of national interest end up receiving more attention than those focusing on the European Union. The discourse on Europe thus becomes marginal and the essence of the European elections is diluted by local debates or driven by inter-party ideological disputes. In Romania, 2019 marked a peak moment in the turnout during the country's fourth European election which saw more than 50% of the voters participate in the polls. However, this should not be confused with a sudden increase in Romanians' interest in European politics. Using discourse analysis, this paper analyzes the political platforms that the main political parties in Romania campaigned on during the 2019 European elections as we attempt to answer the following question: How much did the Romanian parties focus on messages emphasizing the idea of Europe and how much did they cling to the usual national arguments?

**Keywords:** EU, European elections, electoral campaign, European themes, party manifestos, political discourse, Romanian parties

## INTRODUCTION

With a new election cycle at the European level unfolding in 2024, this paper takes the opportunity to observe how national parties view the elections for the European Parliament (EP), using Romania as a case study<fnref n="1" />. In this sense, we analyze the trends exhibited by the Romanian political parties during the 2019 elections, by trying to ascertain if the parties campaigned on topics of interest at the European level such as the EU budget, the multiannual financial framework of the EU, the future EU energy policy, “green” objectives, debates on a European defense policy. Did they include in their political manifestos references to the main EU common policies that are of interest to Romania (agriculture, regional development, transportation)? Or did they more likely stick to the same old domestic inter-party agenda?

For the 32 seats allotted to Romania in the European Parliament, a number of 33 political formations and independent candidates initially registered in the electoral race for the elections held on May 26, 2019. According to Romanian legislation, a minimum number of signatures of support from the electorate had to be obtained first in order to be able to run: 200,000 signatures for political formations and 100,000 for independent candidates. This condition thinned down the field to just half of the initial contenders, with 16 competitors managing to collect the necessary number of signatures of support to be able to run (12 political parties, one alliance, and three independent candidates)<fnref n="2" />. Meanwhile, the electoral threshold dismissed the non-competitive actors and the 32

<footnote>* Lecturer PhD, Department of History and Political Science, “Ovidius” University of Constanta, Romania; email: mihaela.ivanescu@365.univ-ovidius.ro; ORCID: 0000-0001-8111-3303.</footnote>

<footnote>** Assistant professor, Department of History and Political Science, “Ovidius” University of Constanta, Romania; email: luiza.filimon@365.univ-ovidius.ro; ORCID: 0000-0002-7916-0562.</footnote>

<footnote n="1">¹ For background information about Romania's membership in the EU, see, for example: Simion Costea, *Ideea europeană și interesele statelor*, Cluj-Napoca, Napoca Star, 2005; Simion Costea, Maria Costea (coord.), *Integrarea României in UE: provocări și perspective/Romania's Accession to the EU: Challenges and Perspectives*, Institutul European, Iași, 2007.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² The electoral offer was reduced compared to the previous elections held in 2014, when a number of 23 political parties and independent candidates participated in the elections (14 political parties, an alliance and 8 independent candidates).</footnote>
seats allotted to Romania were split between the six parties that obtained minimum 5% of all the votes cast.

That European elections have often been characterized as second-order electoral competitions is well known, from the classics<fnref n="3" /> to some of the more recent reassessments<fnref n="4" />, and, in this regard, Romania does not stray too far from this tradition. If 2019 looks like an outlier in terms of turnout, that is because it actually was since what massively contributed to the high turnout was the fact that, at the same time as the European elections, Romanians were called to a referendum initiated by the president and aimed at a topic of maximum interest to the Romanian society: the fight against corruption.

Notably, in 2019, Romanian voters were out of step with the right-wing populist swing that had characterized European electoral trends since the 2014 elections. Their voting preferences erred towards traditional center-right (the National Liberal Party – PNL – won ten seats) and center-left parties (the Social Democratic Party – PSD – won nine seats) or more recent iterations of the center-right borrowing from Western liberal rhetoric (the Save Romania Union – USR – in coalition with the Freedom, Unity, and Solidarity Party (PLUS) won eight seats). When considering which party was the target of the anti-corruption referendum, a point can be made that PSD attracted negative votes, castigated by a prominent category of voters for its record of poor governance and numerous corruption scandals. In the meantime, the emergence of Romania’s very own domestic radical right party – the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) – in September 2019, leads us to believe that the country caught up to the right-wing radical steamroller which for the last decade became a mainstream affair in various others Member States of the European Union<fnref n="5" />.

This paper analyzes the party platforms of seven parties from Romania that participated in the **electoral campaign for the European Parliament in 2019** in order to identify what are the prevalent topics that political parties instrumentalize during a period that should be dedicated to European issues. Do their campaigns foster a sense of deeper integration of the state in the EU, seek to bring awareness about European programs and funding opportunities at local, regional, and national levels, or try to showcase how the livelihood of citizens both at home and in the EU can be improved through the institutionalization of European good practices? As the slogans of the main parties indicate – “Romania Deserves Better”, “Romania First”, “Without Theft We Get Far”, “In Europe, with Dignity”, “Proud to Be Romanians, Proud to Be Europeans” – the Romanian politicians embrace a national-centered approach, that is unintendedly Eurosceptic in some cases, entirely opaque to European matters in others, and more or less influenced by the ideological orientation of

<footnote n="3">³ Karlheinz Reif, Hermann Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 8, No. 1, March 1980, pp. 3-44; Michael Marsh, “Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European Elections”, *British Journal of Political Science*, 28, no. 4, October 1998, pp. 591-607; Simon Hix, Michael Marsh, “Second-order effects plus pan-European political swings: An analysis of European Parliament elections across time”, *Electoral Studies*, 30, no. 1, March 2011, pp. 4-15; Sara Binzer Hobolt, Jill Wittrock, “The second-order election model revisited: An experimental test of vote choices in European Parliament elections”, *Electoral Studies*, 30, No. 1, March 2011, pp. 29-40.</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Hermann Schmitt, Alberto Sanz, Daniela Braun, Eftichia Teperoglou, “It All Happens at Once: Understanding Electoral Behaviour in Second-Order Elections”, *Politics and Governance*, 8, No. 1, 2020, pp. 6-18; Piret Ehin, Liisa Talving, “Still second-order? European elections in the era of populism, extremism, and Euroscepticism”; *Politics*, 41, No. 4, November 2021, pp. 467-485; Jan-Eric Bartels, “Are European Elections Second-Order Elections for Everyone”, *Swiss Political Science Review*, 29, No. 3, September 2023, pp. 290-309.</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ See: Mihaela Ivănescu, Luiza-Maria Filimon, “Mainstream Fringes or Fringe Mainstream? An Assessment of Radical Right (Re) Alignments in the European Parliament after the 2014 and 2019 Elections”, *European Review*, 30, No. 1, February 2022, pp. 96-114; Werner Krause, Denis Cohen, Tarik Abou-Chadi, “Does accommodation work? Mainstream party strategies and the success of radical right parties”, *Political Science Research and Methods*, 11, No. 1, 2023, pp. 172-179; Nicolas Bichay, “Come Together: Far-Right Parties and Mainstream Coalitions”, *Government and Opposition*, 2023, pp. 1-22.</footnote>
the actors involved. However, the draught of EU themes that characterized the election did not stem from an anti-EU animus, but from a recurrent and self-defeating cycle of petty rivalries, flaunting the same wooden language used for the last three decades (and counting) by (most of the) Romanian political elite.

We develop a framework that maps how party rhetoric shapes electoral turnout with respect to the European Union. In this sense, we provide a comparative review of the platforms of European political families and of the national parties and conclude with a discussion on the 2019 European elections from a Romanian perspective. Our analysis seeks to highlight what part of the Romanian example is illustrative of domestic dysfunction and what references a more systemic issue that concerns the European electoral framework as a whole. From a methodological perspective, our research design is based on a discourse analysis framework consisting of two analytical levels: one which analyzes the parties' political manifestos and another focusing on the speeches of party leaders, regarded as electoral vectors, capable of mobilizing turnout.

## METHODOLOGY

We analyzed the **electoral manifestos** of the Romanian political parties that participated in the 2019 European elections, with a focus on those that won seats in the EP: PNL, PSD, USR PLUS alliance, PRO Romania, PMP (the People's Movement Party), and UDMR (the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania). To arrive at a detailed picture of the national political landscape in the context of European elections, we have first examined the themes advanced by the Euro-parties in their manifestos.

Our paper documents the agenda for EU elections of the main political parties from Romania through a discourse analysis approach of party manifestos<fnref n="6" /> and political speeches. An additional support document that we referenced was the “Guide for informed Romanian voters” published by Europuls, a Romanian center specialized on European expertise<fnref n="7" />. The research framework will trace the themes identified in order to assess the second-order patterns present in the Romanian case and how the deviations from the SOE model are, at best, a reflection of *pro forma* Europeanization démarches. For these purposes, we have operationalized the research questions into three working hypotheses:

(H1) national parties will promote issues concerning the EU during the campaign for European election.

(H2) national parties will promote issues concerning the EU in accordance with the priorities set by the Euro-parties in their manifestos.

(H3) due to the second-order nature of the EP elections, national parties will campaign on topics concerning internal issues.

In addition to the party manifestos, we also accounted for the position of party leaders during the campaign, since they are representative of a certain party consensus at a given time and, as such, could have an influence not only on the direction of the campaign, but on the voters as well. The 2019 elections provide the best example in this matter, since none other than the president himself, Klaus Iohannis, highjacked the campaign for European elections and turned it, inadvertently, into an electoral vehicle against the ruling party, the Social Democrats. This interference was not limited only to advancing topics critical of PSD, but it involved its very own electoral dimension, since the

<footnote n="6">⁶ See: PNL, „Profesioniști în Parlamentul European – Program politic”, 2019, https://www.euractiv.ro/documente/PNL_program_politic_20x20_BT_SMALL%20(1).pdf; USR-PLUS, „Obiectivele Alianței 2020 USR PLUS în parlamentul european”, http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/themes/5c937a87c29480c51ccbfe06/attachments/original/1554893315/Oferta-electorala-Alianta-2020-USR-PLUS.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Europuls, „Ghidul alegătorilor români informați – Alegeri europarlamentare, 26 mai 2019”, 2019, https://www.europuls.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Ghidul-alegatorilor-informati-26-mai-2019.pdf.</footnote>
president initiated a referendum centered on the fight against corruption that was held on the same day as the European elections. Consequently, an argument can be made, that in this case, the SOE model was vitiated and, paradoxically enough, as Ivănescu argues, the election crossed into national first order territory on account of these extraordinary circumstances:

> "If we were to exclude the discussion about the role that the national political events played in the electoral results that those parties obtained at the European elections, it could be argued that this outcome supports the second thesis of the SOE model [authors' note: new or smaller parties register better electoral results]. The contextualization is, however, necessary and it leads us to conclude that, as Hobolt and Wittrock argued, voter choice in the European elections is based more on the national specific preferences (Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011: 30)"<fnref n="8" />.

Furthermore, the first order characterization does not result only from the referendum overlap but needs to be considered in light of the fact that presidential elections were going to be organized in November 2019. Arguably, the two elections from May 2019 acted, therefore, as indirect campaigns for the upcoming presidential contest.

## PARTIES, POLITICS, MANIFESTOS: EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

We assess the manifestos of the **Euro-parties** – the European political families populating the EP, which Hix, Noury, and Roland characterize as “the key agenda-setters in the European Parliament”<fnref n="9" />. The same authors characterize them as having quasi-monopoly on the legislative agenda which they shape through various levers, such as overseeing “the allocation of committee positions, finances, speaking time”<fnref n="10" />. Jabot and Kelbel underline that Euro-parties might not be “fully-fledged supranational partisan structures”, but they play a significant role in the politicization of the EU<fnref n="11" />. This likely happens through a spillover effect, since their view of the European construction and of its future should trickle down to the national parties and from there, to the voters by way of *Euro*-manifestos. For example, in the elections from 2019, the main political families promoted eleven campaign themes (see Figure no. 1), each initiating different debates, depending on which side of the four divide they were on: (1) left wing – right wing; (2) openness – protectionism; (3) strong Europe – light Europe (meaning pro-European sovereignty versus a union of European nations); (4) progressive Europe – reactionary Europe<fnref n="12" />.

These **themes** could be grouped into two categories – “positive” and “controversial”. *Abstract* and *personal* would be two other terms that can be associated with this split. In the former case, the themes focused on the future, citing issues that would be better articulated at the European level or in which the EU should play a bigger role. These included: (1) energy, climate, and environment transition-related policies; (2) combating external threats; (3) pursuit of “Social” Europe; (4) an EU tax system; (5) digital Europe; (6) increasing the efficiency of the EU<fnref n="13" />. In the latter group, the “emotionally-charged themes” were driven by past, present, and recurrent crises and contentious issues. They centered on: (1) migration, the closing of external frontiers, and the distribution of

<footnote n="8">⁸ Mihaela Ivăncescu, “An Electoral Outlier or Second Order Business as Usual? A Decade of European Elections in Romania (2009-2019)”, *Revista de Științe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques*, no. 70, 2021, pp. 160-162.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹ Simon Hix, Abdul Noury, Gérard Roland, “Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 50, No. 2, April 2006, p. 496.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Clément Jadot and Camille Kelbel, “Same, same, but different: Assessing the politicisation of the European debate using a lexicometric study of the 2014 Euromanifestos”, *Politique Européenne*, No. 65, 2017/1, p. 61.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Pascal Lamy et al., “The campaign for the European elections: Theme and divides”, Policy Brief, 11.02.2019, Jacques Delors Institute, p. 2, pp. 7-12, https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ThemesandDivides-Groupedtravailelectionseuropennes-Feb19-1.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ *Ibidem*, pp. 4-6.</footnote>
migratory flows; (2) the nature of the European project – technocracy or democracy; (3) continuing or foreclosing on enlargement policy; (4) who pays and who spends the European budget; (5) the economic policy, austerity, responsible decision-making<fnref n="14" />.

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>**Figure no. 1:** Themes advanced by Euro-parties during the 2019 campaign for the EP (Source: Pascal Lamy et al., “The campaign for the European elections: Theme and divides”, Policy Brief, 11.02.2019, Jacques Delors Institute, https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ThemesandDivides-Groupedtravailelectionseuropennes-Feb19-1.pdf)</figcaption></figure>

Where do the main European parties fall on these topics? Cooper, Dunin-Wąsowicz, and Milanese's analysis of the Euro-groups' manifestos found that the European People's Party focused on security and identity issues with an emphasis on migration, while the Party of European Socialists prioritized the fight against inequality, economic reform, and sustainability. Notably, ideologically related groups of the Big Two campaigned on even more ambitious terms, which would require in-depth reform of certain policy areas: *migration, the Eurozone, and climate change*<fnref n="15" />. In this sense, a brief comparison of the topics promoted by the five largest groups in the EP is illustrative:

(1) The European People's Party (EPP) painted Europe as “**a community of values**”, that has a unified global voice, whose borders are protected, and security is consolidated by pursuing real defense capacity. A strong emphasis on mitigating the migration crisis<fnref n="16" />.

(2) The Social Democrats (S&D) proposed a “**new social contract for Europe**”, centered on social and ecological progress, quality public services, democracy promotion, social justice, and equality. In the pursuit of creating or consolidating various common policies, we find the idea of more Europeanization through integration<fnref n="17" />.

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 2-4.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Luke Cooper, Roch Dunin-Wąsowicz, Niccolò Milanese, “The dawn of a Europe of many visions. What the European election manifestos tell us about the conflict, paralysis, and progress ahead”, London School of Economics – Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit and European Alternatives, May 2019, p. 13, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/107/files/2019/05/euro-manifestos-report.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 15.</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ *Ibidem*.</footnote>
(3) Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) advocated for “**a more liberal Europe**” that fosters entrepreneurship, prosperity, sustainability, which is rule-based and pro-free trade, which *should play a more global role*. A managerial Europe, in other words<fnref n="18" />.

(4) The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) envisaged EU **as a community of nations**, predicated on reducing barriers in the Single Market, private enterprise as a driver of positive change, transparency, and accountability of EU institutions. Notably, EPP's stated vision was that “neither federalist fundamentalists nor anti-European abolitionists offer real solutions to the problems faced by Europe today”<fnref n="19" />.

(5) The Greens promoted the idea of “**A union that leads the world** by protecting people and the planet”; emphasizing the importance of the environment and the climate policy (the future is Green / Green New Deal); social and labor protections were another core issue. The key idea – doing much more together towards an ever-closer union<fnref n="20" />.

In what capacity does the agenda promoted by the families of European parties trickle down at the national level? We see that Europeanization and anti-Europeanization are the driving forces behind most of the themes identified, where the former is understood as what Ladrech defined twenty years ago: the “incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making”<fnref n="21" />. Since then, studies have further analyzed this phenomenon, determining the role of country characteristics in shaping EU issue voting<fnref n="22" />; assessing the content of political discourses on Europe and European integration<fnref n="23" />; considering the necessity of Europeanized elections and parties<fnref n="24" />; or debating whether Europeanization matters after all<fnref n="25" />. Jurado and Navarrete found that “EU issue voting is more intense in bigger European countries” that have a leading role in the EU not only because of how they act within the supranational institutions, but also because the voters in those Member States are more interested in the European agenda of their national parties<fnref n="26" />. In the case of Romania, we have a situation where the political parties and the citizens have long held pro-European views<fnref n="27" />, yet where the process of Europeanization is understood and implemented in a flawed manner, and this, in turn, leaves the national scene vulnerable to radical insurgencies and electoral defections from nominally centrist voters.

## PARTY PLATFORMS AND EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: A DISCUSSION ON ROMANIAN TRENDS

The 2019 European election marked the emergence of several concerning trends regarding the state of the party system and of what this spelled for the future of the democratic enterprise altogether.

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 17.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, March 1994, 32, No. 1, p. 69.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Ignacio Jurado, Rosa M. Navarrete, “The Europeanization of national elections: The role of country characteristics in shaping EU issue voting”, *Electoral Studies*, 71, June 2021, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102286.</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ Osman Sabri Kiratlı, “Political discourses on Europe and European integration in national election manifestos and party programmes”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29, No. 2, 2016, pp. 636-659.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ See chapter on: “The Necessity of Europeanized Elections and Parties”, in Dieter Grimm, *The Constitution of European Democracy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 117-130.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ Tomaž Deželan, “Does Europeanisation matter? The Case of Slovenian Political Party Electoral Campaign for the European Union”, *Politics in Central Europe*, 3, No. 1+2, 2007, pp. 11-25; Jan Kovář, “Europeanisation of EP Election Manifestos: An Application of a New Approach on the Case of Slovak Political Parties”, *Czech Journal of Political Science*, No. 2, 2015, pp. 105-126.</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ Jurado, Navarrete, *op. cit.*, p. 9. As the authors note, this means that in the other cases, “EU issues will remain of second order, whereas in big countries, politicization of European integration will become more decisive in national elections”.</footnote>

<footnote n="27">²⁷ Mihaela Ivănescu, Luiza-Maria Filimon, “Do Eastern Europeans Still Believe in the European Union? An Analysis of People’s Trust in European Institutions in Romania”, *Valahian Journal of Historical Studies*, 22, 2014, pp. 96-117.</footnote>
These developments could be labelled as **Non-Enthusiastic Participation** (N.E.P. – Nationalism, Euroscepticism, Politicization).

The appeal to **nationalism** was one trend that made a return after the collapse of smaller, fringe parties in previous years. While in Western Europe, parties waving nationalist tropes were by this point already entrenched on the political arena<fnref n="28" />, in Romania, parties coopted the quasi-nationalist rhetoric in the absence of a more policy-oriented alternative.

The other trend was a mild iteration<fnref n="29" /> of **Euroscepticism** that did not profess to reject the EU, instead, it was a symptom of the country's rocky integration journey. Twelve years after Romania became a member of the EU, it still was not any closer towards adopting the Euro or being included in the Schengen Area. Meanwhile, the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification was still in place (and it remained active until September 2023), making Romania, along with Bulgaria, the only two Member States to be subjected to this measure. The national parties (see PSD) could easily blame those internal deficiencies in these policy areas on the arbitrary whims of Brussels' supranational institutions.

Finally, the **(re)politicization of the EU** was the accompanying trend to the nationalist and Eurosceptic undercurrents. The European decision-making process has long been characterized by *depoliticization*<fnref n="30" /> – a direction that the majority of political parties in the EP had acquiesced to, in a rather proactive manner. The reverse – often framed in critical terms – is defined by De Wilde as “an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU”<fnref n="31" />. Similarly, in the case of Romania, the politicization of the EU is, while in an inchoate phase, has manifested under the guise of grievances, with the parties pledging to seek a better deal for the Romanian voters.

The **slogans** are a good entry point to determine how these trends were articulated by the parties during the campaign. The two main government and opposition parties lead the charge with two slogans that centered solely on Romania: “Patriots in Europe. Romania Deserves Better” (PSD) and “Romania First” (PNL). The slogans of two smaller parties, which broke away from PSD and PNL, echoed similar sentiments: “Proud to be Romanians. Proud to be European” (PRO Romania) and “United in Europe” (PMP). Another small party which defected from PNL and was, at the time, the junior coalition partner in government – the Romanian ALDE – campaigned on two slogans that were in the same vein as above: “In Europe with Dignity” and “Romania, Respected in Europe”<fnref n="32" />.

There were two exceptions that broke away from this approach: the nominally pro-EU alliance (USR-PLUS) and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). However, USR-

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Sofia Vasilopoulou, Roi Zur, “Electoral Competition, the EU Issue and Far-right Success in Western Europe”, *Political Behavior*, 2022, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-022-09841-y.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ When compared to other cases. See: Michael Kaeding, Johannes Pollak, Paul Schmidt (eds.), *Euroscepticism and the Future of Europe: Views from the Capitalss*, Palgrave Macmillan, Springer Nature, Cham, 2021; Oliver Treib, “Euroscepticism is here to stay: what cleavage theory can teach us about the 2019 European Parliament elections”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28, No. 2, 2021, pp. 174-189; Alessandro Nai, Mike Medeiros, Michaela Maier, Jürgen Maier, “Euroscepticism and the use of negative, uncivil and emotional campaigns in the 2019 European Parliament election: A winning combination”, *European Union Politics*, 23, No. 1, March 2022, pp. 21-42.</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Understood as “the technocratic modes of operation” that govern the EU, Robert characterizes depoliticization as “a way of conducting public policy [that] is, more or less explicitly, likened to a substantial transformation of the issues or activities that it affects, leading them to automatically “lose” their political and conflictual dimension”. See: Cécile Robert, “Depoliticization at the EU Level: Delegitimization and Circumvention of Representative Democracy in the Government of Europe”, in Claudia Wiesner (ed.), *Rethinking politicization in politics, sociology and international relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021, p. 202.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Pieter De Wilde, “No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration”, *Journal of European Integration*, 33, No. 5, September 2011, p. 560.</footnote>

<footnote n="32">³² The party failed to pass the electoral threshold (4.11% < 5%) and did not obtain any seats in the EP. In 2022, it would rejoin PNL.</footnote>
PLUS focused on an issue of national interest: “Without Theft We Get Far” (a continuation of an earlier USR initiative “No Criminals in Public Office”). USR’s choice was peculiar since the party boasted the most Europeanized membership of all: not only was one of the co-leaders, Dacian Cioloş, a former European Commissioner, but, in the upcoming EP group configuration, he would become the leader of Renew Europe – the group that succeeded ALDE. Meanwhile, UDMR lead with a regional, pro-European slogan: “Prosperous Transylvania, Strong Europe”.

Considering these slogans, we looked at the political manifestos to see what was the broader vision that the parties embraced. In the case of PSD, the party did not issue an electoral program for the EP elections, so we derived the themes from electoral materials and the speeches of party leaders or candidates held at electoral rallies. The general theme invoked by the candidates was centered on the need to reduce the differences between Romanian citizens and other European citizens, which was linked to the need to increase the absorption capacity of European funds. Regarding this aspect, Rovana Plumb, the first name on the list of PSD candidates, criticized the European legislation that regulated Romania' access to funds from the EU budget on respect for the principles of the rule of law<fnref n="33" />.

Even if the language used in PSD's campaign documents was moderate, during the electoral rallies the speeches of PSD leaders had, at times, a nationalist undertone. The targets were “Europeans” and “multinationals”, who, in the view of the party’s president, Liviu Dragnea, wanted to destroy Romania and eliminate PSD from political life. On the occasion of an election rally held in Craiova, in April 2019, Dragnea stated that “For too long we have been told that the interests of the EU are more important than the interests of Romania. Every German, Belgian, Dutch person thinks first of all about his country, because that’s normal”<fnref n="34" />. Dragnea complained that the European institutions mistreat Romania: “We have seen European officials criticizing us. Did they help this country with anything? They scold us for nothing, for something we didn’t do. Why are they not interested in how the PSD government had a positive impact on the people? Maybe they do not like it”<fnref n="35" />.

This critical position was paired with the idea of sending to Brussels patriots who would support the interests of Romania and who, according to Rovana Plumb, would “work every day to bring European money for the development of the country”<fnref n="36" />. With another occasion, though, she stressed the pro-European character of PSD<fnref n="37" />. From this, we can observe that, when European themes were mentioned (EU budget, EU funding programs), they were filtered through a national lens that referenced internal politics and government activity, rather than linking them to PES, the Euro-party PSD belonged to (many of the themes promoted by PES would have resonated with the PSD electorate).

In the case of PNL, there was some disconnection between the rather nationalist slogan (a bastardization of Donald Trump's slogan, “America First”) and the campaign manifesto which contained mentions to important European issues. PNL's political program, entitled “Professionals in the EP”, included a series candidate pledges in support of: Romania's accession to the Schengen

<footnote n="33">³³ Europuls, *op. cit.*, p. 40.</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ HotNews, “Video – Mitingul PSD de la Craiova. Liviu Dragnea: „Cineva mi-a zis: chiar dacă te arestează, venim și te scoatem de acolo” / O nouă serie de atacuri la oficialii UE si companiile străine”, 12.09.2019, https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-23084844-livevideo-mitingul-psd-craiova-liviu-dragnea-iubita-lui-irina-facut-baie-multime.htm.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Digi24, “Rovana Plumb: PSD este cel mai pro-european partid, trebuie să trimitem în PE patrioți”, 17.03.2019, https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/politica/rovana-plumb-psd-este-cel-mai-pro-european-partid-trebuie-sa-trimitem-in-p-e-patrioti-1099229.</footnote>

<footnote n="37">³⁷ Sebastian Pricop, “Rovana Plumb, la mitingul PSD de la Craiova: „Am adus în doi ani de guvernare miliarde de euro în țară” (Video)”, B1, 12.04.2019, https://www.b1tv.ro/politica/rovana-plumb-miting-psd-craiova-271476.html.</footnote>
Area and the Eurozone; increasing the amount of European funds that Romania could access; or attracting European funds for the construction of highways and hospitals<fnref n="38" />.

The party also touched upon the issue concerning the future of the EU, advocating for the idea of a "single-speed Europe" where Romania would be "part of the core that will advance towards greater EU integration"<fnref n="39" />. On this topic, the PNL also supported the need to initiate debates on the revision of the EU Treaties, "which will lead, by 2024, to a new institutional architecture that will result in a Union stronger and more integrated Europe"<fnref n="40" />. Other EU-adjacent themes included the party's support for the future enlargement of the EU that would include the Republic of Moldova (seen as the highest priority) and the region of the Western Balkans.

A common theme shared by the European political programs of PSD and PNL revolved around the idea of the existing **double standards**, in several areas of the single market, **dividing the citizens of Western and Eastern Europe**. In this sense, PNL dedicated an entire chapter of its political program to this theme, campaigning for the application of the same standards across the EU: "We must reject double standards in the EU; Romanian citizens are not second-class citizens"<fnref n="41" />.

The program also included many references to internal politics, ranging from the introduction of electronic voting for the Romanian diaspora and digitalization as a national priority, to investments in education, the energy field, or health services. These priorities might have been closely related to the issue of European funds distribution, but they were the priorities of a future national government and did not directly concern the activity of EP members. Indicative of the emphasis on internal politics are the statements made by the president of the party, Ludovic Orban, at the time of the European elections: "We beat PSD in the collection of signatures and also, on May 26, we will beat PSD in the elections for the European Parliament. I call on all Romanians to come and vote, to express their political option, to use this opportunity to vote for us, because a vote for PNL has the value of a vote for a no-confidence motion against the current government"<fnref n="42" />.

Moving to the small parties, the Save Romania Union participated for the first time in the EP elections from 2019, as part of a coalition that also included the Liberty, Unity, and Solidarity Party (USR-PLUS). From a SOE perspective, the coalition proved successful, winning 22.36% of the votes and coming in the third place<fnref n="43" />. As mentioned earlier, the case of USR-PLUS is curious when considering the themes on which they campaigned and the context of the campaign. As the slogan indicated, USR-PLUS focused on addressing national issues such as the fight against corruption and the independence of the judiciary.

This direction is reflected in their electoral program, which encompassed **three main objectives**: (1) a more credible representation of Romania in the EP; (2) the economic development of Romania by attracting investments and European funds; (3) increasing the standard of living for

<footnote n="38">³⁸ PNL, „Profesioniști în Parlamentul European – Program politic”, 2019, p. 3, https://www.euractiv.ro/documente/PNLProgram_politic_20x20 BT_SMALL%20(1).pdf</footnote>

<footnote n="39">³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 10.</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ In support of this, the program included references about the EU's cohesion policy and the need to eliminate the development gaps between Member States.</footnote>

<footnote n="42">⁴² Alexandra Loy, „Ludovic Orban, după depunerea semnăturilor pentru alegerile europene: „Votul pentru PNL are valoarea unui vot pentru o adevărată moțiune de cenzură împotriva actualei guvernări și va repune România pe un loc de egalitate între statele membre ale UE””, *Calea Europeană*, 27.03.2019, https://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/liderul-pnl-ludovic-orban-dupa-depunerea-semnaturilor-pentru-alegerile-europene-votul-pentru-pnl-are-valoarea-unui-vot-pentru-o-adevarata-motiune-de-cenzura-impotriva-actualei-guvernari-si-va-rep/.</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³ By comparison, the difference between the second ranked party, PSD, and USR-PLUS was slim: only 0.14% separated them.</footnote>
Romanian citizens by providing public services to European standards<fnref n="44" />. Dan Barna, the party's leader, commented on the USR-PLUS' Manifest for the Future of Europe, noting that it contains provisions to improve the livelihood of Romanians and to address the country's position in the EU: "Erasmus scholarships for high school students [...], more funds for highways and hospitals, an MCV for all states. We want Romania's position in the European context to be visible, to matter, and the benefits [of membership] to spread to the citizens"<fnref n="45" />. Aside from this, Barna also took the opportunity to criticize PSD for poorly managing the country and for sidelining it to "the margins of Europe"<fnref n="46" />. In conjunction with the referendum, both PNL and USR-PLUS used the European elections in pursuit of national gains.

In addition, a recurrent theme that PSD, PNL, and USR-PLUS had in common concerned the need to protect the rights of Romanian consumers, rooted in the debates about the differences in the production standards of food and non-food items distributed in Western and Eastern Europe.

On the topic of the offshoot parties, Pro Romania Party (PRO) and the People's Movement Party (PMP) were founded by politicians who had previously held governing positions in Romania: the former Social-Democrat, Victor Ponta, had occupied the prime-minister office between 2012-2015, while Traian Băsescu served two terms as President between 2004-2014. In the former case, PRO Romania framed itself as a pro-European party, critical of PSD, as could be seen from their electoral slogan ("Proud to be Romanians. Proud to be European"). Similar to PSD, PRO did not launch an electoral program dedicated to the European elections. From the speeches of the party leaders and candidates, we identified the main themes which focused on the need to increase investments (especially in the field of innovation and IT) and improve the capacity to attract European funds.

PSD was again the predilect target for electoral attacks, which were used as a springboard to campaign on domestic policy positions (corruption, justice, government performance, etc.). In an interview with *Euractiv*, Ponta stated that: "I cannot be on the same table and on the same page with people who every day criticize and demonize the European Union, like the actual leadership of PSD", which he compared to illiberal figures and parties (Viktor Orban, Matteo Salvini, the Polish conservatives, etc.)<fnref n="47" />. In another interview, Ponta addressed his views on the EU, stating that "The current European model is far from being perfect, but it is, without a doubt, Romania's only chance to develop [as a country] and improve the livelihood of its citizens", underlining once again the anti-European rhetoric adopted by the leadership of PSD<fnref n="48" />. On the topic of European elections and why citizens should go to vote when they do not understand the European decision-making process, Ponta framed his answer in anti-PSD terms, arguing that voting for PSD would worsen the lives of Romanians, who would find themselves isolated in Europe<fnref n="49" />.

<footnote n="44">⁴⁴ USR-PLUS, „Obiectivele Aliantei 2020 USR PLUS în Parlamentul European”, p. 3, http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx-cloudfront.net/themes/5c937a87c29480c51ccbfe06/attachments/original/1554893315/Oferta-electorala-Alianta-2020-USR-PLUS.pdf.</footnote>

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵ Ioana Ene Dogioiu, „Dan Barna: Pe listele USR-PLUS avem 300 de ani de studii reale. In sondaje, oamenii ne asociaza cel mai des cu speranta. Interviu”, *Ziare.com*, 23.05.2019, https://ziare.com/alegeri/alegeri-europarlamentare-2019/dan-barna-s-a-trecut-peste-orice-linie-rosie-societatea-e-mobilizata-simtim-o-mare-responsabilitate-interviu-1562585.</footnote>

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="47">⁴⁷ Georgi Gotev, “Victor Ponta: The ruling PSD in Romania is becoming like Fidesz”, *Euractiv*, 03.04.2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections-2019/interview/victor-ponta-the-ruling-psd-in-romania-is-becoming-like-fidesz/.</footnote>

<footnote n="48">⁴⁸ Lavinia Siclitaru, „Victor Ponta (PRO România) – „PRO România crede că locul nostru este și trebuie să rămână în Europa și sper ca tot mai mulți români să aibă încredere în noi și să ne susțină””, *Ziua de Constanța*, 14.05.2019, https://www.ziuaconstanta.ro/stiri/alegeri-europarlamentare/interviu-victor-ponta-pro-romania-pro-romania-crede-ca-locul-nostru-este-si-trebuie-sa-ramana-in-europa-si-sper-ca-tot-mai-multi-romani-sa-691195.html.</footnote>

<footnote n="49">⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.</footnote>
In the case of PMP, the party issued a Plan for Parliamentary Action for MEPs. The general message promoted by the candidates during the elections was one of unity, which can be analyzed as being directed both towards the future development of the EU and towards one of the key issues promoted by this party, namely the union of Romania with the Republic of Moldova. This two-folded direction was reflected in the party's priorities for the EP: (1) to support the United States of Europe project, therefore embracing a federalist vision for the future of the EU; (2) to support Romanian workers who are employed in EU Member States; (3) to advocate for the union of Romania with the Republic of Moldova.

The candidates' speeches and, in particular, those by Traian Băsescu, also brought attention to other topics, such as: Romania's entry into the Schengen Area, the adoption of the euro currency, or the need to pursue justice reform. However, no concrete solutions were proposed to achieve these objectives. Once again, most of these themes had less to do with the activity of the MEPs, since they were within the purview of the national government. Occupying the first position on the party's list of candidates, Băsescu remarked that the campaign for European elections was centered on the internal dimension instead of focusing on European topics, warning that this lack of transparency in relation to the EU could have dire repercussions in the future, as had happened with the Brexit<fnref n="50" />. On European issues, the former president advanced an anti-immigration rhetoric, describing himself as "an implacable opponent of turning Europe into a mosque"<fnref n="51" />. He stressed that EU needed to adopt "a regulation on migration applicable throughout the EU territory, on the premise that Christianity, European culture, and our customs must be defended"<fnref n="52" />.

Taking a more personal approach, Eugen Tomac, the president of the party, appeared to reduce the stakes of the European elections to the figure of Traian Băsescu, stating that the party's aim in the elections is to send the former president to Brussels: "ever since Romania became a member, there has been an immense void [in Brussels]. No one managed to impose their point of view and explain to the Europeans that we might have entered the EU later, but we are a large nation, with a strong culture, with huge resources and we are eager for a better life, for salaries like in Europe, of pensions like in Europe, of a life we deserve"<fnref n="53" />.

Finally – the case of ALDE. While the party failed to gain any seats in the EP, we included it in our analysis because they were the junior coalition partner, and their electoral manifesto was relevant to our discussion. The document referenced a series of European themes (cohesion policy, education, or health), with the focus being on the development of these fields in Romania, by accessing European funds. As part of the governing coalition, ALDE shared a theme with PSD: the defamation of the country within the European institutions by politicians from other political parties. In this sense, at the launch of the ALDE candidates for the EP, the leader of the party, Călin Popescu Tăriceanu, declared that: "We want to send people to Brussels who know how to fight for our rights. We have had and have in the European Parliament people who defamed Romania. Let's not do this anymore"<fnref n="54" />. On the issue of the European Union, Tăriceanu advocated for a fairer Europe: "the future

<footnote n="50">⁵⁰ HotNews.ro, "Fostul preşedinte Traian Băsescu la HotNews.ro LIVE: „Să ajungi într-o justiție în care procurorii să se acuze reciproc că au creat grup infracţional organizat este mult prea mult”", 20.05.2019, https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-europarlamentare_2019-23152528-plan-are-pmp-pentru-parlamentul-european-fostul-presedinte-traian-basescu-invitat-marti-ora-12-00-hotnews-live.htm.</footnote>

<footnote n="51">⁵¹ *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="52">⁵² *Ibidem*.</footnote>

<footnote n="53">⁵³ Digi24, „Tomac: Cu Traian Băsescu primul pe lista pentru europarlamentare, vrem să obținem un scor de 10%”, 17.03.2019, https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/politica/tomac-cu-traian-basescu-primul-pe-lista-pentru-europarlamentare-vrem-sa-obtinem-un-scor-de-10-1099282.</footnote>

<footnote n="54">⁵⁴ Vlad Rotaru, „ALDE si-a lansat candidatii la europarlamentare in Iasi. Calin Popescu Tariceanu a laudat Capitala Moldovei”, BZI, 14.04.2019, https://arhiva.bzi.ro/alde-si-a-lansat-candidatii-la-europarlamentare-in-iasi-calin-popescu-tariceanu-a-laudat-capitala-moldovei-foto-video-690198.</footnote>
European project cannot be a Europe with multiple speeds, a Europe that leaves part of the states behind. I want it to be a Europe of solidarity, of cohesion, in which all countries are treated on an equal footing. This is the Europe I thought Romania was entering on January 1, 2007”<fnref n="55" />.

single-speed-europe

romania-accession-policy
unequal-standards-concerning-the-production-of-goods-between-eastern-and-western-europe
cohesion-policy
support-for-romanian-citizens-working-in-other-eu-countries
equal-treatment-of-European-citizens
romania-accession-process-to-the-schengen-area
future-of-the-European-Union

european-funds

<caption>**Figure no. 2:** Themes advanced by the Romanian parties during the 2019 campaign for the EP.</caption>

## DISCUSSION

Following the analysis of the electoral programs of the main political parties that ran for the 2019 EU parliamentary elections, we identified a large number of areas where the Romanian political parties had similar visions, listing approximately the same area problems (see Figure no. 2), or even proposing the same solutions. Even if their programs included references to European themes (the most detailed being those of PNL and USR-PLUS), during the electoral campaign, in the speeches of the candidates or during electoral rallies, the political parties tried to mobilize voters mainly by referring to domestic political issues. Among these, the fight against corruption and the need for justice reform were the most important, since they were the subject of the referendum held on the same day as the European elections. Due to this first-order election, Romania registered the highest turnout (51.20%) in a European election since it became a member and the 12th highest in EU. The citizens' interest in the referendum topics meant that not only was turnout in the European elections greatly improved, but also, that the political parties which supported the referendum (USR-PLUS and PNL) also benefited from it, gaining a greater number of votes that they would have otherwise received.

Regarding our three hypotheses, we found that the (H1) *national parties will promote issues concerning the EU during the campaign for European election* is partially confirmed – topics concerning the future of European integration, the development policy, immigration, or agriculture were brought up (if only in a limited manner). However, these were presented as areas where Romania should improve over the next multiannual framework and contained few provisions about the parties’ intended course of action in the EP.

In the case of (H2) *national parties will promote issues concerning the EU in accordance with the priorities set by the Euro-parties in their manifestos* – we could not confirm this hypothesis, finding no mentions about the Euro-groups and how the parties interacted with the broader

<footnote n="55">⁵⁵ Răzvan Bibire, „Tăriceanu: Mergem la Bruxelles să apărăm interesele României”, *Deşteptarea*, 23.03.2019, https://www.desteptarea.ro/tariceanu-mergem-la-bruxelles-sa-aparam-interesele-romaniei/.</footnote>
supranational structure or their peers in other countries. European politicians visited Romania during the campaign, showing their support for the national parties (EPP figures like Manfred Weber, candidate for the presidency of the European Commission, backed PNL, while PES representatives did not come, having earlier criticized the direction of the PSD), but proposals on the broader Euro-parties' agenda were absent. This disconnect between the national and the European levels of campaigning was indicative of a systemic failure to Europeanize the Romanian institutions. After all, prior to the election, with the occasion of Europe Day (9 May), an informal European Council was held in Sibiu to discuss the outcome of the coming EP elections. At the end, the heads of state or government adopted the Sibiu Declaration on the future of the EU, pledging to "reaffirm our belief that united, we are stronger in this increasingly unsettled and challenging world. We recognize our responsibility as leaders to make our Union stronger and our future brighter, while recognizing the European perspective of other European States"<fnref n="56" />. This was not referenced during the elections.

Finally, (H3) due to the second-order nature of the EP elections, national parties will campaign on topics concerning internal issues is partially confirmed and the conditions for SOE are only partially met, on account of the electoral distortions created by the anti-corruption referendum<fnref n="57" />. Opposition parties were critical of government policies and of the direction in which PSD had taken the country after three years of governing. They pursued a negative campaign, where policy alternatives did not need to be fully articulated, surfing on the idea that, simply on the merit of being anti-PSD, they would be a net improvement. In this way, the EP election gained a first order dimension (though not of the supranational type), being used as an opportunity to strengthen the national consolidation of the opposition parties and of the newer / smaller parties that were building their base at that time.

## CONCLUSION

In 2024, in Romania, the context for the European elections will be one substantially changed from previous cycles. Throughout the year, aside from the European ones, all the other types of elections (local, parliamentary, and presidential) are going to be organized one after the other. Since the EP elections are the first to open the cycle, they could very well be an indicator of things to come. Aside from the electoral circumstances, the pandemic also played a role in changing the political landscape to a fundamental degree from the days of the 2019 election, since PSD (with a new leadership) and PNL are now coalition partners, overseeing the country's post-pandemic recovery. Speaking of fundamental changes, Romania has now a radical party of its own – AUR<fnref n="58" /> – which like other European predecessors is poised to make inroads in the 2024 elections. Mainstream parties do not seem particularly willing to engage in substantial debates, hoping to marginalize AUR on account of their nationalist rhetoric<fnref n="59" />. Much rests on the performance of AUR in the EP elections, as it could lead (once again) to a populist backsliding by PSD (and others). Referring to this possibility, Pârvulescu posits that “Next year, it will all depend on the results from the European elections. In Romania and in Europe. And if the result is a complicated one, unfavorable to the pro-European

<footnote n="56">⁵⁶ European Council, “Informal meeting of heads of state or government, Sibiu, 9 May 2019”, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2019/05/09/</footnote>

<footnote n="57">⁵⁷ See the conclusions on a decade of EP elections in Romania, drawn by M. Ivănescu, op. cit., pp. 163-164.</footnote>

<footnote n="58">⁵⁸ Notably, George Simion, currently the leader of AUR, had campaigned as an independent candidate during the 2019 EP elections, where he garnered 1.29% of the votes.</footnote>

<footnote n="59">⁵⁹ In 2023, the idea of a “Democratic Bloc” was touted by PNL and PSD, which was supposed to be an electoral mammoth, meant to ensure that the two parties would sail through to victory in all four elections from 2024. (See: Andreea Pora, “Analiză: Blocul Democratic, noua invenție a Coaliției PSD-PNL, folosește AUR și echipei Ciucă-Bode-Iohannis”, Europa Liberă, 17.09.2023, https://romania.europalibera.org/a/alianta-electorala-psd-pnl-aur-ciuca-bode-iohannis-/32594467.html).</footnote>
parties, then we can expect a total change”<fnref n="60" />. In the meantime, when it comes to the EU issues, it is business as usual for the national parties that once again are distracted from engaging with the substance of European debates by the extraordinary national circumstances in which they find themselves.

In the five years that have passed, the world went through a pandemic, witnessed a war of aggression at the Eastern border of the EU, and is still coping with the aftereffects of multiple global crises<fnref n="61" />. As such, the political landscape is irreversibly changed, if not where the parties are concerned, then with the larger constellation of voters. The **2024 EP elections** will be a test of resilience for the EU: will the foundations hold, or will they bend to the pressure from within (and without)? The 2019 trends carry early warnings of an unfolding European crisis that should be properly understood and not dismissed as merely a populist storm in a glass that will soon abate. Mainstreaming fringe actors and pursuing respectable marriages in some misguided search of electoral influence jeopardizes the stability of the political system and alienates the more moderate elements of the voting pool. Romania is one case where this process is currently unfolding...

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# A Window of Opportunity with an Existential Stake:
The European integration of the Republic of Moldova

MARCU-ANDREI SOLOMON<fnref n="1" />

LEIDEN UNIVERSITY GRADUATE

**Abstract:** In the context of Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine, an opportunity, previously seen as unrealistic, arose: The Republic of Moldova received an EU candidate status in June 2022. As the Chisinau administration is currently the most pro-European in the country's history, and considering the great mobilisation towards integration on Brussels's side, it is a very relevant endeavour to analyse Moldova's main opportunities and barriers. This paper looks at the European integration process within the Republic of Moldova, by analysing their historical evolution (both within the Soviet Union and post-Soviet).

**Keywords:** EU, Moldova, European integration, hybrid threats

## INTRODUCTION

Russia's unjustified and brutal invasion of Ukraine has caused inconceivable destruction and death, making an increasingly larger majority of post-Soviet countries realize that their future as independent nations can only be built outside of Kremlin's influence. In the case of the subject of the invasion, Ukraine, it is obvious that Europe is not just the better, democratic alternative, but the only option that would sustain the existence of the country and of Ukrainian identity. Meanwhile, another country, heavily targeted by Russia's hybrid warfare, is the Republic of Moldova, who has recently sensed an opportunity in a time of crisis and, along with Ukraine, managed to receive the European Union candidate status in June 2022.<fnref n="2" />

This does not imply a fast-track path towards membership though. The Balkan countries are great examples in that sense, as they have been waiting at Brussels's doorstep for years or even decades in some cases to meet the requirements and get accepted. Nevertheless, while this announcement is not a guarantee *per se*, it certainly signals a paradigm shift from the EU's side coupled with an acceleration in reform efforts by both countries to meet the EU accession criteria. The two countries have made considerable progress over the past year, but the journey towards membership is long, bumpy, and can conceal many unexpected U-turns. Still, if we were to conceive such a geopolitical development a few years ago, that is Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova having a realistic chance to EU membership, it would have seemed idealistic to say the least.

The current geopolitical situation shows that under great challenges arise great opportunities and vigorous mobilisations, and it remains to be seen whether the two post-Soviet countries will be able to escape the “grey zone” status: an area that is neither Kremlin's, nor part of the European family.

This paper will analyse the current European integration process of the Republic of Moldova since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, on the 24th of February 2022.

1. The historical background will be provided, detailing the country's recent geopolitical evolution, with a focus on their post-Soviet developments and rapprochements with the European Union.

<footnote n="1">¹ Marcu-Andrei Solomon is an MA graduate in Russian and Eurasian Studies at Leiden University and the Research Department Coordinator of New Strategy Center, a Bucharest-based think tank. Disclaimer: the views and scenarios presented above reflect the personal views of the author and not of the organisation he represents.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">² “EU leaders grant Ukraine and Moldova candidate status”, Politico, June 23, 2022, URL: https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-grant-ukraine-and-moldova-candidate-status/</footnote>
2. Analyse of the strongest impediments the country is facing in its Europeanization process.

While Ukraine is facing Russia's brutal and unjustified invasion, The Republic of Moldova has been subjected to an insidious hybrid warfare from Moscow. The country is in the proximity of the war and Russia's influence has always been significant here. It consisted, among others, in energy supply blackmail, disinformation campaigns and sabotage attempts directed towards the current pro-European leadership, such as paid protests. While energy dependence has been lowered recently, the Eastern European nation still has to counter aspects such as separatism, corruption, oligarchs, and propaganda.

When it comes to EU integration, thus far, the Republic of Moldova managed to fulfil three of the European Commission's nine recommendations, mainly the ones related to civil society involvement in decision-making and in human rights protection, while also making good progress in the justice and public finances domains.<fnref n="3" /> It fulfilled more conditions than Ukraine and Georgia since June last year. While the progress is palpable, the Chisinau authorities still have a long way to go, as some of the issues they are facing are not novel, but have a deep historical root.

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The Republic of Moldova was under Russian rule during two different political systems: the Czarist Empire from 1812,<fnref n="4" /> being reconnected to Romania only in 1918, only to be lost again in 1940, and then to be fully incorporated within the Soviet Union in 1944. Under Soviet rule, the Republic of Moldova went through a deep denationalization process, as Romanian became a pariah language and was artificially named “Moldovan” by Soviet authorities, to create a cultural separation between Chisinau and Bucharest, both institutionally and socially.<fnref n="5" /> Meanwhile, the Latin script was replaced with Cyrillic and the upper-middle classes of Romanian origins were deported in Siberia and northern Kazakhstan (approximately 35.000 people), being replaced with ethnic Russians.<fnref n="6" />

As a reaction, pro-Romanian identity groups would later emerge in the late 1980s,<fnref n="7" /> Moldova ultimately gaining independence on August 27, 1991, benefiting from the Perestroika. That was the founding moment of what will become a thus-far flawed and corrupted democracy, but a democracy, nonetheless. A year later, in 1992, after a month-long conflict, a pro-Russian separatist regime emerged in the Eastern part of Moldova's territory with Russia's support, named Transnistria.<fnref n="8" /> It has remained a thorn in the flesh of the country's European integration process to this day, with Russia's 14th Army Regiment still active in the region.

<footnote n="3">³ Cristina Popuşoi, "Progress report: Moldova met more conditions for EU membership than Ukraine and Georgia". Radio Free Europe Romania, June 21, 2023, URL: https://romania.europalibera.org/amp/raport-intermediar-moldova-conditii-aderare-ue/32468564.html?mc CID=d263ff3d95&mc eid=cd1f92f96c</footnote>

<footnote n="4">⁴ Bogdan-Alexandru Ciachir. "How did Bessarabia become part of the Russian Empire?", URL: https://historia.ro/sectiune/general/cum-a-ajuns-basarabia-in-componenta-imperiului-585728.html</footnote>

<footnote n="5">⁵ "How it went from Cyrillic to Latin script, as people from the south of Moldova say", Moldova.org, URL: https://www.moldova.org/cum-s-trecut-de-la-chirilica-la-grafia-latina-povestesc-oameni-din-sudul-moldovei/</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶ "The lists of those deported to Siberia in 1949 are available online". Radio Free Europe Moldova, URL: https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/listele-deporta%C8%9Bilor-%C3%AEn-siberia-%C3%AEn-1949-sunt-accesi bile-online-/31929778.html</footnote>

<footnote n="7">⁷ Ion Mardarovici. "NATO and security in the Eastern countries during transition times". NATO Research Fellowships programme, 2002, p. 10.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸ Martin Duffy. "Moldova and the Transnistria Conflict: Still a Regional Cold War?", E-International Relations, 2021, p. 1, URL: https://www.e-ir.info/2021/08/03/moldova-and-the-transnistria-conflict-still-a-regional-cold-w</footnote>
In the 1990s, Moldova was definitely not on the European Union's priority list. Humanitarian aid was the main concern for Western nations regarding one of Europe's poorest countries.<fnref n="9" /> At that time, the small republic was seen as clearly being part of Russia's sphere of influence and its Europeanization process seemed highly unlikely. An important breaking point was recorded in the mid-2000s, when after years of pro-Russian rule, Moldovans from both opposition groups and civil society protested against the 2003 Kozak Memorandum, a settlement that, in the context of a "unified" Republic of Moldova, would have offered asymmetrical federal powers and a veto on foreign affairs to Transnistria and guarantee Russian military presence for the next 20-30 years.<fnref n="10" /> Following the rejection of this memorandum, Moldovan authorities intensified their European integration process, signing a EU-Moldova action plan in 2004.<fnref n="11" /> Moldova was led by the Communist Party since 2001, but its leaders profited from a "best of both worlds" scenario, in which Russian and European economic advantages can be accessed simultaneously, while also maintaining the corrupt political system.

A breaking point was represented by the April 2009 protests, when under the guise of election fraud by the Communist leadership, protesters clashed with the authorities, leading to later snap elections won by the pro-European forces.<fnref n="12" /> Four young people were killed by the authorities during those manifestations.<fnref n="13" />

Still, the subsequent pro-European governments' actions were severely shadowed by their unbridled corruption. As such, the Moldovan authorities (both pro-European and pro-Russian) facilitated the greatest fraud in the country's history, the infamous "billion-dollar theft" from the Republic of Moldova's banking system between 2012-2014. Some of the main architects of this crime were the oligarchs Vladimir Plahotniuc and Ilan Shor. At the time, their deep control of the media sphere, politicians and businesses turned the country into a captured state.<fnref n="14" /> The prime minister at that time, Vlad Filat, was also put under trial.<fnref n="15" />

Currently, the Republic of Moldova is under the most pro-European leadership in its history, whose reforms and track record have been acknowledged by the European Union, leading to being granted the EU candidate status in June 2022, simultaneously with Ukraine.<fnref n="16" /> There is great pressure on the current government to seize this opportunity, considering the ideological divide within society. In an attempt to decrease Moldova's energy dependence on Russia, the country is dealing with a volatile energy market, as end-consumer bills have soared tenfold compared to 2022.<fnref n="17" /> Also, as a result of the energy costs, but also of protesters paid by Russian-backed forces,<fnref n="18" /> manifestations

<footnote n="9">⁹ Ryan Kennedy. "The limits of soft balancing: the frozen conflict in Transnistria and the challenge to EU and NATO strategy." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 3 (2016), p. 6.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 7.</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹ Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="12">¹² Vitalie Ciobanu, "Moldova, 7 April 2009 – the stolen revolution", Deutsche Welle Romania, April 7, 2023, URL: https://www.dw.com/ro/moldova-7-aprilie-2009-revolu%C8%9Bia-furat%C4%83/a-65258382</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³ Victor Moșneag, "April 2009 suspect deaths. Dossier information", Ziarul de Gardă, April 7, 2018, URL: https://www.zdg.md/importante/mortii-suspecti-din-aprilie-2009-informatii-din-dosare/</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴ Andriy Osavoliuk, Igor Savchenko, "Moldova's "Theft of the Century" – ostensible investigations or sincere lust for justice?", Open Dialogue Foundation, July 8, 2021, URL: https://en.odfoundation.eu/a/37290,moldovas-theft-of-the-century-ostensible-investigations-or-sincere-lust-for-justice/</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵ Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="16">¹⁶ "EU leaders grant Ukraine and Moldova candidate status", Politico, URL: https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-grant-ukraine-and-moldova-candidate-status/</footnote>

<footnote n="17">¹⁷ Aura Sabadus, "Moldova Accepts the Price for Energy Independence". CEPA, December 7, 2022, URL: https://cepa.org/article/moldova-accepts-the-price-for-energy-independence/</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸ "Protesters for rent. ZdG undercover investigation: We infiltrated the Shor protesters to show you, from the inside, how people brought to Chisinau are paid and how the protest machine works". September 30, 2022, Ziarul de Gardă, URL:</footnote>
have been common wise in the last months, demanding pro-European authorities to negotiate a better energy deal with Vladimir Putin.<fnref n="19" />

While society has always been divided more or less equally among pro Russians and pro Europeans, Moldova is currently experiencing its biggest EU public support, as almost 60% of the population views EU adherence as the right way forward.<fnref n="20" /> Moldova's path is intertwined with Ukraine's not only in its European integration, but also in the ongoing war. As some analysts claim, the fate of the Republic of Moldova is ultimately decided by the victory or loss of Ukraine against Russia.<fnref n="21" /> If Russia keeps on advancing in Ukraine's south-eastern flank, into the Odessa region, then Moldova's chances of becoming a military target, from both Russia and Transnistria, will increase. In addition to these pivotal external factors, the Republic of Moldova has internal impediments to tackle to enable a European future.

Some of the domains in which the country has to create significant reforms are justice, corruption, deoligarchization, public administration reform and public finances management.<fnref n="22" /> Currently, the Republic of Moldova has received the approval from the European Parliament that accession negotiations can start in late 2023.<fnref n="23" /> That is a first step towards a long process which requires the approval of all member states after a long negotiation process.<fnref n="24" />

In that sense, the organization of the second **European Political Community summit in Chisinau on June 1, 2023**, was a milestone which showed the commitment of both European countries and the Republic of Moldova towards integration.<fnref n="25" /> It marked in a symbolic manner the detachment between Chisinau and Moscow, the former finally forming its true independent identity.

The next EU report regarding the enlargement package is set to be published in November 2023, evaluating the progress made by both Chisinau and Kyiv.<fnref n="26" /> What could accelerate the Republic of Moldova's advancement towards accession, just as in the case of Ukraine, is the current war situation in Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is ultimately Moldova who is the master of its own destiny, the speed of the accession process depending mostly on the success of the reforms.

https://www.zdg.md/investigatii/ancheta/video-protestatari-in-chirie-investigatie-zdg-sub-acoperire-ne-am-infiltrat-
printre-protestatarii-lui-sor-si-va-aratam-din-interior-cum-sunt-platiti-oamenii-adusi-organizat-la-chisinau-si-cum-fun/

<footnote n="19">¹⁹ "DISINFORMATION: The number of Moldovans siding with Russia in the war in Ukraine is growing". Veridica.ro, March 17, 2023, URL: https://www.veridica.ro/en/disinformation/disinformation-the-number-of-moldovans-siding-with-russia-in-the-war-in-ukraine-is-growing</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰ "The condition so that Moldova can join the EU by 2030", Deutsche Welle Romania, March 3, 2023, URL: https://www.dw.com/ro/men%C8%9Binerea-cursului-pro-european-condi%C8%9Bia-ca-moldova-s%C4%83-poat%C4%83-adera-la-ue-p%C3%A2n%C4%83-%C3%AEn-2030/a-64605209</footnote>

<footnote n="21">²¹ Iileana Giurchescu, "Armand Goşu: Moldova's European integration is decided in Ukraine | Transnistrian elite not interested in Russia's victory". January 19, 2023, Radio Free Europe Moldova, URL: https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/armand-go%C8%99u-integrarea-european%C4%83-a-r-moldova-se-decide-%C3%AEn-ucraina-elita-transnistrean%C4%83-nu-este-interesat%C4%83-de-victoria-rusiei/32230583.html</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²² Alla Ceapai, "Chisinau aims to meet EU pre-accession conditions within a year", Radio Free Europe Moldova, August 2, 2022, URL: https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/chi%C8%99in%C4%83ul-%C3%AE%C8%99i-propune-s%C4%83-%C3%AEndeplineasc%C4%83-%C3%AEntr-un-an-condi%C8%9Biile-de-pre-aderare-la-ue-/31970572.html</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³ Vitalie Călugăreanu, "EP calls for opening of accession negotiations with Moldova", Deutsche Welle, April 20, 2023, URL: https://www.dw.com/ro/deshidere-f%C4%83r%C4%83-precedent-moldova-este-practic-invitat%C4%83-%C3%AEn-ue/a-65385788</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴ Nicolae Pânzaru, "One year since Moldova applied for EU membership", Nordews.md, March 3, 2023, URL: https://nordnews.md/un-an-de-cand-r-moldova-a-depus-cererea-de-integrare-la-ue/</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵ "Important moment for Moldova' as European leaders gather for political summit". Euronews, June 1, 2023, URL: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/06/01/important-moment-for-moldova-as-european-leaders-gather-for-political-summit</footnote>

<footnote n="26">²⁶ "The European Commission will soon publish the Enlargement Report which will also contain the evaluation of the progress of the Republic of Moldova". RadioMoldova.md, November 3, 2023, URL: https://radiomoldova.md/p/24200/the-european-commission-will-soon-publish-the-enlargement-report-which-will-also-contain-the-evaluation-of-the-progress-of-the-republic-of-moldova</footnote>
IMPEDIMENTS TO MOLDOVA'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND REFORMS SINCE 2022

* Transnistria and gagauzia

The frozen conflict in Transnistria has been a geopolitical reality for 31 years now. The dictatorial regime instilled in the region is viewed by the European Union as a serious security risk if the Republic of Moldova becomes a member state. Nevertheless, there is a precedent of a nation facing separatism entering the EU, namely Cyprus. There are doubts regarding the acceptance of another similar case, especially when dealing with Russia-backed separatists, who are arguably a more considerable security threat than the Northern Cyprus separatists.

Currently, the Chisinau government's relation with the separatists is tense, but stable. According to the Moldovan parliament speaker, Igor Grosu, since Transnistria has not represented an impediment to EU accession thus far, it will not represent one in the future. Furthermore, he emphasized that the Transnistrian conflict is artificially produced by Russia and that Moldova's constant reform for its integration process will increase the openness to reform of the general population.<fnref n="27" /> Furthermore, from an economic point of view, Transnistria is exporting 70% of its products to the EU market, while its connections with the Russian market have been severely affected since the start of the Ukraine war,<fnref n="28" /> which force the separatists to interact more with Europe.

All leaders from Transnistria are connected to a certain extent to Russia since Moscow has represented a lifeline for the region since its formation in 1992. Despite the dictatorial nature of the regime, there are two rival factions to consider. The first one is a hard-line pro-Russian side, which is fully subservient to the Kremlin, headed by the so-called foreign minister, Vitaly Ignatiev. Second is the “Sheriff” camp, a plutocratic group currently controlling the monopolizing “Sheriff Tiraspol” company and seizing the legislative and executive branches of the regime.<fnref n="29" /> Since the second group currently holds the power grips in Transnistria, this could play into Moldova’s European integration, especially on the economic side. In regard to issues such as human rights or rule of law, little can be expected from the dictatorial regime in Tiraspol, regardless of who is in charge. Still, the “Sheriff” group could be more lenient towards negotiating with Moldova, out of a mercantile interest, in order to protect its business with the European market. It will definitely not be open for European integration, because that would spell the end of Sheriff’s monopoly in Transnistria.

Because of the war in Ukraine, Transnistria is isolated from its nanny state, Russia, indicated also by the decrease in pension payments (Russia covers around 20% of Transnistrian pensions) and of the construction of schools, kindergartens, hospitals.<fnref n="30" /> On the energy situation, the Chisinau authorities managed to reach a deal with the separatists, that allows the former to benefit from electricity while decoupling from Russian gas, and the Transnistrians to continue receiving subsidized gas from Moscow.<fnref n="31" /> As such, relations with the Transnistrians are much more stable at this point, based on an interdependency and on the separatists' need to work with Chisinau.

<footnote n="27">²⁷ “Igor Grosu: Transnistrian problem does not represent an impediment to the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the EU”. RadioMoldova.md, January 22, 2023, URL: https://radiomoldova.md/p/4179/igor-grosu-transnistrian-problem-does-not-represent-an-impediment-to-the-accession-of-the-republic-of-moldova-to-the-eu</footnote>

<footnote n="28">²⁸ Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="29">²⁹ George Scutaru, Marcu Solomon, Ecaterina Dadiverina, Diana Baroian, “Russian hybrid war in the Republic of Moldova”, New Strategy Center, April 4, 2023, URL: https://newstrategycenter.ro/project/russian-hybrid-war-in-the-republic-of-moldova/</footnote>

<footnote n="30">³⁰ Ibidem.</footnote>

<footnote n="31">³¹ Eugen Uruşciuc, “Chisinau will buy electricity from Transnistria at a price of $73 | Moldova will have two sources of gas supply”. Radio Free Europe Moldova, December 3, 2022, URL: https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/chi%C8%99in%C4%83ul-va-cump%C4%83ra-curent-din-transnistria-la-un-pre%C8%9B-de-73-de-dolari-moldova-va-aveadou%C4%83-surse-de-aprovizionare-cu-gaze/32160382.html</footnote>
Furthermore, the experience of the current Moldovan Prime Minister, Dorin Recean, of negotiating with the separatist authorities will prove useful in future encounters.<fnref n="32" />

Gagauzia is a constitutionally recognized autonomous region within the Republic of Moldova with a significant pro-Russian population which can represent a Trojan Horse for Moldova. Whilst Transnistria is a separate entity, de facto, whose totalitarian regime and total dependency on Moscow exclude it from any reintegration or Europeanization talks at this point, Gagauzia is a pro-Russian region within Moldova's territory, whose form of autonomy was constitutionally recognized in 1994. Oftentimes, the region's leadership called for a secession from the country if European integration advanced which was perceived as a possible reunification with Romania by the local leaders.<fnref n="33" />

While Gagauzia expressed its indignation regarding Moldova receiving EU candidate status last year,<fnref n="34" /> the regional protests have been against the pro EU government and the high energy prices<fnref n="35" /> and have not explicitly called for separatism. Thus, it is less likely for Gagauz separatism to take shape, especially in the current geopolitical context, but destabilisation is still on the table. Moldova has the great challenge of integrating Gagauzia, whose informational sphere has been for a long time dominated by Russian propaganda, both on TV and in the online space.<fnref n="36" /> It is the Republic of Moldova's responsibility to make it an active part of the EU accession process, otherwise either the process is slowed down, or it moves forward with an increasingly separatist Gagauzia.

The Chisinau authorities struggled to engage in such a Russophile area to find pragmatic solutions to attract Gagauzia towards European integration, especially by appealing to the local population. Gagauzia is stuck in an ideological and informational bubble that will be harder and harder to pop. Whereas the last governor (or Bashkan), Irina Vlah, was a pro-Russian open to negotiation who did not support separatism, the new Bashkan-elect, Evghenia Gutul, (elected in May 2023) is a member of the “Shor” party, created by the pro-Russian oligarch-in-exile, Ilan Shor.<fnref n="37" /> She could potentially be an agent provocateur, meant to deviate the Republic of Moldova’s course towards the European Union, through negotiation call outs towards Moscow or even through separatism. Nevertheless, having a “Shor” party member on the Bashkan seat does not spell out stability for the current pro-European forces, as once again the influence of oligarchs is showcased, even in their physical absence from the country.

Furthermore, while the elections have been validated by the Gagauz Court of Appeal,<fnref n="38" /> they are under investigation by Moldovan anti-corruption authorities, based on allegations of voter

<footnote n="32">³² "Carp: Dorin Recean is currently in talks with Vadim Krasnoselski, in Varnița", TV8.md, April 28, 2022, URL:https://www.tv8.md/ru/2022/28/04/video-carp-dorin-recean-se-afla-chiar-acum-in-discutii-cu-vadim-krasnoselski-la-varnita/199223</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³ “Gagauzia region of the Republic of Moldova, a "Trojan horse" of Moscow”, Veridica.ro, September 5, 2022, URL: https://www.veridica.ro/editoriale/regiunea-gagauzia-din-republica-moldova-un-cal-troian-al-moscovei</footnote>

<footnote n="34">³⁴ “The Gagauz parliament is outraged that Moldova obtained EU candidate status without taking into account the opinion of the autonomy”, Infotag.md, July 7, 2022, URL: http://www.infotag.md/rebelion-ro/300551/</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵ “Gagauzia region of the Republic of Moldova, a "Trojan horse" of Moscow”, Veridica.ro, September 5, 2022, URL: https://www.veridica.ro/editoriale/regiunea-gagauzia-din-republica-moldova-un-cal-troian-al-moscovei</footnote>

<footnote n="36">³⁶ Piotr Garciu, “Russian Propaganda Dominates Moldova’s Gagauzia”, Institute for war & peace reporting, October 3, 2022, URL: https://iwpr.net/global-voices/russian-propaganda-dominates-moldovas-gagauzia</footnote>

<footnote n="37">³⁷ “Preliminary results: the candidate of the "Shor" Party wins the elections for Bashkan of Gagauzia”, Ziarul de Gardă, May 15, 2023, URL: https://www.zdg.md/stiri/politic/rezultate-preliminare-candidata-partidului-sor-castiga-alegerile-pentru-functia-de-bascan-al-gagauziei/</footnote>

<footnote n="38">³⁸ “The Mandate of the Bashkan of the Gagauz Autonomy has been validated. The Comrat Court of Appeal approved the results of the election one by Evghenia Gutul”. ProTV.md, May 22, 2023, URL: https://protv.md/politic/mandatul-bascanului-autonomiei-gagauze-a-fost-validat-curtea-de-apel-comrat-a-recunoscut-rezultatele-scrutinului-castigat-de-evghenia-gutul-video---2654783.html</footnote>
bribing.<fnref n="39" /> If the investigations are conclusive, the elections might be repeated. In that event, a pro-Russian candidate would still be the most likely to be elected, but it would be a better alternative than a governor backed by Shor. The oligarch's influence in the small autonomous republic is relevant to this day, as he recently met with MPs from Gagauzia's Popular Assembly, leading to an unofficial resolution calling for reforms regarding the autonomy of the region. These reforms, according to the appeal, have to be implemented until September 2023.<fnref n="40" /> In such a tense climate, where the geopolitical aspirations of the central authorities and of Gagauzia are polar opposites, it is to be expected that pro-Russian forces will keep using the region as a thorn in the flesh of Moldova's Europeanization, by sabotaging the reform process and by promoting separatist narratives.

### • Oligarch influence

The two aforementioned oligarchs, Vladimir Plahotniuc and Ilan Shor, fled Moldova in 2019, now allegedly residing in Northern Cyprus and, respectively, in Israel.<fnref n="41" /> While the assets of both within Moldova have been seized in 2019⁴² and in 2022,<fnref n="43" /> – from media to real estate and banking – their foreign assets cannot be amounted and are skilfully hidden in offshores.

Considering their economic power, the two main Moldovan oligarchs can still easily influence Moldovan politics and society and have recently proven their capacity to do that. Plahotniuc threatened last year to return to Moldovan politics, based on what he claimed to be an increasing wave of popular discontent regarding the economic and energy crisis.<fnref n="44" /> Meanwhile, Ilan Shor's influence in Moldova is even more palpable. He still has an eponymous party in parliament with 6 seats (out of 101) and he is the main funder of the latest anti-government protests. To push his pro-Russian agenda, he uses low-income vulnerable populations, who are willing to protest for days if paid even the mere sum of 400 Moldovan lei/day (approx. 20 euros). While these manifestations have been mainly ineffective thus far, and the current pro-European leadership has not been shaken yet, the two oligarchs remain a real concern.

The anti-oligarch reforms are an imperative for the country's EU accession and the Moldovan authorities have made significant advancements at both legislative and execution level. In December 2022, an ambitious draft law was proposed by the Justice Minister, that would be inspired from the US Magnitsky Law. According to this, individuals who are subject to international sanctions will have their assets frozen and will not be able to open bank accounts in the Republic of Moldova. Furthermore, the licenses for their companies will be seized, including media outlets, dominated by pro-Russian oligarchs for many years.<fnref n="45" />

<footnote n="39">³⁹ "Moldova Police Storm Central Election Commission in Gagauzia". Balkan Insight, May 17, 2023, URL: https://balkaninsight.com/2023/05/17/moldova-police-storm-central-election-commission-in-gagauzia/</footnote>

<footnote n="40">⁴⁰ "Speaker of the NSG held a meeting with the chairman of the party "Shor"". Halktoplushu.md, May 19, 2023, URL: https://halktoplushu.md/archives/13041</footnote>

<footnote n="41">⁴¹ Sorin Ioniță, "Rotative in Chisinau: who makes Moscow's games and what role does Romania play in the landscape". Contributors.ro, February 11, 2023, URL: https://wwwcontributors.ro/rotativa-la-chisinau-cine-face-jocurile-moscovei-si-ce-rol-joaca-romania-in-peisaj/</footnote>

<footnote n="42">⁴² Viorica Mija, "DOC// Irrevocable decision regarding the estate of Vlad Plahotniuc", Anticoruptie.md, February 4, 2023, URL: https://anticoruptie.md/en/cases-of-corruption/doc-irrevocable-decision-regarding-the-estate-of-vlad-plahotniuc</footnote>

<footnote n="43">⁴³ Madalin Nescutu, "NEWS Moldova Seizes €75 Million in Assets from Fugitive Oligarch", Balkan Insight, June 14, 2022, URL: https://balkaninsight.com/2022/06/14/moldova-seizes-e75-million-in-assets-from-fugitive-oligarch/</footnote>

<footnote n="44">⁴⁴ Teodor Serban, "Vlad Plahotniuc has announced that he is returning to politics in the Republic of Moldova: "Gives heart palpitations to his partners in Bucharest"", Ziare.com, October 22, 2022, URL: https://ziare.com/plahotniuc/plahotniuc-intoarcere-politica-republica-moldova-sanctiuni-sua-1769048</footnote>

<footnote n="45">⁴⁵ Virginia Nica, "The government presented the "Magnitsky Moldova law". What are the main provisions?" Radio Free Europe Moldova, December 9, 2022, URL: https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/guvernul-a-prezentat-legea-magni%C8%9Bki-moldova-care-sunt-principalele-prevederi-/32169227.html</footnote>
However, there are still some doubts about the law. It is still up for review by the Venice Commission, since originally the law applied only to foreigners and there might be some constitutionality issues.<fnref n="46" /> It is important that beyond the effectiveness of the law, it should be applied democratically and assure that it will not be utilized against pro-European forces in the case of a future pro-Russian government, while also respecting European norms.

Later in February 2023, another draft law was proposed to form the National Deoligarchization Committee, consisting of the Prime Minister, relevant ministers (justice, finance, internal affairs etc.), the Governor of Gagauzia, and other state institution representatives. Under this legislation, the committee can present proposals regarding someone's oligarch status to the parliament, and to be ratified it has to be supported by 3/5 of the Moldovan parliament. A person legally designated as an oligarch would not be able to finance political parties, privatize public goods, create public-private partnerships, control media institutions or organize public demonstrations. The ones who are deemed as oligarchs can only be judged in the context of an appeal by magistrates who went through the pre-vetting process.<fnref n="47" /> If implemented, the draft would significantly reduce oligarch leverage, and would annihilate their ability to conduct hybrid warfare tactics through disinformation and paid protests.

European authorities clearly indicated they wanted to see more than legislative reform from the Chisinau authorities, especially results from high-profile cases.<fnref n="48" /> In that sense, the new chief of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office in Moldova, Veronica Dragalin, with experience in the US justice system, has proved to be a great asset. She has pursued criminal investigations against key Kremlin pawns, such as the former president Igor Dodon, for illegal financing of the party, or the "Shor" party president and general secretary,<fnref n="49" /> Ilan Shor and Marina Tauber, first sentenced in absentia to 15 years for the billion dollar bank fraud in Moldova,<fnref n="50" /> second detained in early May 2023 in the Chisinau airport, and being under prosecution for illegal financing.<fnref n="51" /> Not only the most infamous oligarchs and corrupted politicians have started to be sanctioned and prosecuted, but their associates as well. In that sense, the Moldovan Secret Service (SIS) created a list of people suspected of being associated with Shor and Plahotniuc, who are now banned from making financial transactions.<fnref n="52" /> Regarding the seizing of oligarch assets, one of the greatest accomplishments by the current Moldovan leadership was the return of the Chisinau airport in the property of the state. The

<footnote n="46">⁴⁶ “The Magnitsky draft law announced by the Justice Minister might have many deficiencies. The Director of the European politics and reform Institute: „it doesn’t have odds of success””. PRO TV Chisinau, June 24, 2023, URL: https://protv.md/politic/proiectul-legii-magnitsky-anuntat-de-ministerul-justitiei-ar-avea-mai-multe-carente-directorul-institutului-pentru-politici-si-reforme-europene-nu-are-sorti-de-izbanda-video---2640459.html</footnote>

<footnote n="47">⁴⁷ Nicu Gușan, “Deoligarchisation law | How does Moldova intend to fight oligarchs?”, Radio Free Europe Moldova, February 22, 2023, URL: https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/legea-deoligarhiz%C4%83rii-cum-%C3%AE%C8%99i-propune-r-moldova-s%C4%83-lupte-cu-oligarhii-/32283187.html</footnote>

<footnote n="48">⁴⁸ Alla Ceapai, “Chisinau aims to meet EU pre-accession conditions within a year”, Radio Free Europe Moldova, URL: https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/chi%C8%99in%C4%83ul-%C3%AE%C8%99i-propune-s%C4%83-%C3%AEndeplineasc%C4%83-%C3%AEntr-un-an-condi%C8%9Biile-de-pre-aderare-la-ue-/31970572.html</footnote>

<footnote n="49">⁴⁹ Michael Emerson, Tinatin Akhvlediani, Denis Cenusa, Veronika Movchan and Artem Remizov. “EU Accession Prospects of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – first responses to the conditions set by the European Commission”. CEPS, February 2023.</footnote>

<footnote n="50">⁵⁰ “Republic of Moldova: Fugitive MP Ilan Shor sentenced to 15 years in prison in bank fraud case”. Hotnews, April 13, 2023, URL: https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-26205097-republica-moldova-deputatul-fugar-ilan-sor-condamnat-definitiv-15-ani-inchisoare-executare-dosarul-fraudei-bancare.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="51">⁵¹ Darius Muresan, “Marina Tauber, detained directly from the airport in Moldova. "Putin's blonde" was trying to reach Israel, where Ilan Shor is also staying”. Defense24, May 1, 2023, URL: https://www.defenseromania.ro/marina-tauber-retinuta-direct-de-pe-aeroport-in-r-moldova-blonda-lui-putin-incerca-sa-ajunga-in-israel-unde-se-afla-si-ilan-sor_622464.html</footnote>

<footnote n="52">⁵² “Lists drawn up by SIS including persons associated with Plahotniuc, Shor and Ceaika, sanctioned by the US: restrictive measures applied”. Ziarul de Gardă, December 21, 2022, URL: https://www.zdg.md/stiri/politic/doc-listele-intocmite-de-sis-in-care-sunt-incluse-persoanele-asociate-lui-plahotniuc-sor-si-ceaika-sanctionati-de-sua-masurile-restrictive-aplicate/</footnote>
airport was under the ownership of Ilan Shor, after the Moldovan state transferred it to the oligarch under suspicious conditions in 2013.<fnref n="53" />

Moldovan authorities have also been showcasing a zero-tolerance policy towards the bribing of the vulnerable population for political purposes. As such, during the protests organized by Ilan Shor against the pro-European administration, large sums of cash meant to be used to bribe the protesters have been confiscated.<fnref n="54" /> Furthermore, election fraud has also been detected and dealt with quickly in the case of the May 2023 Bashkan elections in Gagauzia. It was determined by the anti-corruption authorities that a voter would receive 15000 Moldovan lei (about 763 euros) to vote for the candidate backed by the oligarch's party.<fnref n="55" />

This shows a clear shift of the Moldovan authorities' play: from letting the authors of the most significant theft in the country's history live in exile, to assuring their associates and similar oligarchic characters can remain in the country, receive a fair trial, and not continue the illegal activities. This can be seen as a big step forward by European authorities, who value action much more than draft laws.

The European authorities themselves are proposing measures to aid the country's efforts to fight the Russian agents of influence. As such, according to the chief of the EU delegation in the Republic of Moldova, Janis Mazieks, the EU will follow the UK and the US's lead in preparing a sanction mechanism targeting individuals who breached Moldova's sovereignty and democracy, which includes Shor and Plahotniuc.<fnref n="56" /> A European and Western consensus regarding the sanctions that should be enacted against Moldovan oligarchs is crucial, as that limits their leeway in conducting financial operations and subsequently in influencing the political and social agenda of the Eastern European nation. Eventually, in late May this year, the European Union decided to impose sanctions against Moldovan oligarchs, including Shor, Plahotniuc, and Tauber, and high-profile individuals connected to the Russian secret service.<fnref n="57" /> This move will not only lower the chances of further destabilization acts from Moldova's exiled oligarchs, but it will also increase the European Union's credibility in the eyes of the Moldovan population.

Lastly, it must be emphasized that the billion-dollar theft is a cataclysmic event from the nation's short history, which has affected all social classes of all political beliefs. If even the undecided or pro-Russian parts of the population will see that the EU is actively working to prevent any similar events, it might convince a considerable percentage of them to support the Republic of Moldova's European pathway.

### • Disinformation

As a remnant of the USSR, disinformation and propaganda narratives coming from Moscow are still effective and prevalent within the Republic of Moldova. Since the Soviet times, Moldovans

<footnote n="53">⁵³ Vitalie Călugăreanu, “Chisinau Airport returns to state management”, Deutsche Welle, November 23, 2022, URL: https://www.dw.com/ro/aeroportul-chi%C8%99in%C4%83u-revine-%C3%AEn-gestiunea-statului-dup%C4%83-ce-a-fost-concesionat-abuziv-%C3%AEn-2013/a-63861997</footnote>

<footnote n="54">⁵⁴ Alina Cotoros. "Searches in the illegal financing case of the Șor party in Rep. Moldova. Money was raised to organize anti-government protests". Adevărul, March 9, 2023, URL: https://adevarul.ro/stiri-externe/republica-moldova/perchezitii-in-dosarul-finantarii-ilegale-a-2248806.html</footnote>

<footnote n="55">⁵⁵ “Corruption of voters in Gagauzia; CNA after raids: 15,000 lei for 30 votes in favour of PP ȘOR candidate”. Jurnal.md, May 7, 2023,; https://www.jurnal.md/ro/news/3a5b5d822fe178fd/coruperea-alegatorilor-in-gagauzia-cna-dupa-perchezitii-15-000-de-lei-pentru-30-de-voturi-in-favoarea-candidatului-pp-sor.html?utm_source=RSS&utm_medium=RSS&utm_campaign=RSS0</footnote>

<footnote n="56">⁵⁶ Robert Lupițu, “EU diplomacy chief: We are preparing a civilian mission in Moldova to strengthen the country's capacity against hybrid threats”, Calea Europeană, March 21, 2023, URL: https://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/seful-diplomatiei-ue-pregatim-o-misiune-civila-in-r-moldova-pentru-a-consolida-capacitatea-tarii-impotriva-amenintarilor-hibride/</footnote>

<footnote n="57">⁵⁷ “EU sanctions pro-Russian oligarch over plan to ‘destabilize’ Moldova”. Politico, May 30, 2023, URL: https://www.politico.eu/article/ilan-shor-moldova-russia-eu-sanctions-pro-russian-oligarch-over-plan-to-destabilize/</footnote>
were kept within a propaganda bubble, which later turned into a nostalgia bubble, where the USSR was portrayed as a saviour from Nazism and glorified as opposed to the “corrupted Western world”. In that sense, a generational gap was created within the Republic of Moldova, making the Soviet-time generation more vulnerable to Russian propaganda.<fnref n="58" />

In the current geopolitical context, with the Ukrainian war in the proximity of the Republic of Moldova's territory, Russian propaganda narratives are circulating through society, both generic themes and specifically tailored for Moldovans. They can be easily considered one of the Kremlin's most effective hybrid weapons, which can sway the Moldovan population away from the Europeanization course pursued by the current government.

Firstly, the recurrent propaganda that is widely promoted in other European countries finds its way through Moldovan news and social media, through the usage of both politicians and of “deepfake” social media accounts. Some of the narratives include urges to demonize and deport Ukrainian refugees, portraying the Ukrainian Army as Nazis and Russia’s war as a liberation mission for the oppressed Russian population, or advancing the rumour that there are American labs in Ukraine containing chemical weapons and viruses.<fnref n="59" />

Secondly, when it comes to Russian propaganda specifically tailored for the Republic of Moldova, there are several narratives which have been pushed since the start of the war. The current leadership is portrayed as a Western puppet, who is slowly pushed into a war with Russia. One way that would be achieved is through an alleged attack on Transnistria. Meanwhile, the government is depicted, much like Ukraine's, as a dictatorial and Russophobe regime, actively persecuting the Russian-speaking population. It also repurposes historical narratives, in which the USSR and its “liberation” of the Republic of Moldova in 1940 led to its development, compared to Romania, who allegedly kept the region underdeveloped and with an illiterate population.<fnref n="60" />

Due to the ethic, linguistic and historical connection between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, the former has always been depicted by Russian propaganda as an aggressor, labelling any unification aspirations as a form of annexation.<fnref n="61" /> As such, some narratives that were induced by Kremlin since the start of the war in Ukraine are: Romania will be using NATO's military support to annex the Republic of Moldova and parts of Ukraine,<fnref n="62" /> or to firstly annex Transnistria,<fnref n="63" /> by instilling military provocations along with the current Chisinau administration.<fnref n="64" /> Especially prone to

<footnote n="58">⁵⁸ “Nicolae Negru: Russian propaganda in Moldova exists due to political forces fuelled by Russia”, IPN.md, October 24, 2023, URL: https://www.ipn.md/en/nicolae-negru-russian-propaganda-in-moldova-exists-due-to-political-8004_1092952.html</footnote>

<footnote n="59">⁵⁹ Stela Mihailovici, "Trolls in Moldova supporting the Russian aggression. Concerted actions and connections with PSRM". TV8.md, March 29, 2022, URL: https://tv8.md/2022/29/03/video-ancheta-trolli-din-moldova-care-sustin-agresiunea-rusiei-actiuni-concertate-si-conexiunile-cu-psrm/196567</footnote>

<footnote n="60">⁶⁰ “The Republic of Moldova 2022: Top FAKE NEWS & DISINFORMATION debunked by Veridica”. Veridica, January 6, 2023, URL: https://www.veridica.ro/en/analyses/the-republic-of-moldova-2022-top-fake-news-disinformation-debunked-by-veridica</footnote>

<footnote n="61">⁶¹ “FAKE NEWS: Brussels greenlights the annexation of the Republic of Moldova by Romania”. Veridica, January 10, 2023, URL: https://www.veridica.ro/en/fake-news/fake-news-brussels-greenlights-the-annexation-of-the-republic-of-moldova-by-romania</footnote>

<footnote n="62">⁶² “FAKE NEWS: NATO forces were brought to Romania to help it annex the Republic of Moldova and part of the territory of Ukraine”. Veridica, January 6, 2023, URL: https://www.veridica.ro/en/fake-news/fake-news-nato-forces-were-brought-to-romania-to-help-it-annex-the-republic-of-moldova-and-part-of-the-territory-of-ukraine</footnote>

<footnote n="63">⁶³ “Russia claims that Romania is planning to annex Moldova with the help of NATO and Ukraine: "A military operation in Transnistria will follow"”. Ziare.com, April 25, 2022, URL: https://ziare.com/razboi-ucraina/rusia-sustine-ca-romania-vrea-sa-anexeze-republica-moldova-atac-transnistria-1737638</footnote>

<footnote n="64">⁶⁴ Ramona Ciobanu, “Marina Tauber, "ŞOR" MP, accuses that the Republic of Moldova, helped by Romania, is planning "provocations" in Transnistria for Easter. Chisinau's reaction”. Libertatea, March 24, 2023, URL: https://www.libertatea.ro/stiri/marina-tauber-republica-moldova-ajutata-de-romania-planifica-provocari-in-transnistria-4490947</footnote>
Russian propaganda is the aforementioned Gagauzia region, were, according to a 2021 pole, 90% of the Gagauz population consumes Russian-language media, which is trusted to a large extent.<fnref n="65" />

Disinformation is a battlefront that the Republic of Moldova will have to face holistically in a society that is indeed becoming more and more pro-European,<fnref n="66" /> but which is split somewhere around the 40-60% mark on almost all foreign policy issues, indicating a still-large societal divide. The measures that the Moldovan state has taken against disinformation have been limited and reactive. The Moldovan Security Services firstly banned TV channels owned by Ilan Shor, responsible for spreading propaganda on the Ukrainian war.<fnref n="67" /> Later, that was followed by a Kremlin-related site ban, such as the Sputnik outlet.<fnref n="68" /> That is not enough to counter Russian disinformation, the government needs to work on active measures to educate and enhance the resilience to propaganda of the general population. Furthermore, although the EU has been investing much more in the Republic of Moldova than Russia in the last years, there's an unawareness among the Moldovans regarding EU advantages and aid. The rampant Kremlin propaganda still makes a large part of Moldovans view Russia favourably. An informative, sustained counter-narrative coming from the European Union and from the Moldovan government is imperative to correctly inform the population.

The EU has also attempted to aid the Republic of Moldova in fighting disinformation (along with other forms of pressure) by sending a civilian taskforce specialised in hybrid warfare.<fnref n="69" /> Moldova has recently officially approved this measure, by creating the “Patriot” Centre, an institution meant to combat Russian propaganda and increase the population’s resilience towards disinformation campaigns.<fnref n="70" /> These are only the first steps towards lowering the impact of Russia’s greatest weapon, disinformation, and it remains to be seen to what extent it is effective.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY/ References

* "Carp: Dorin Recean is currently in talks with Vadim Krasnoselski, in Varnița", TV8.md, April 28, 2022, URL: https://www.tv8.md/ru/2022/28/04/video-carp-dorin-recean-se-afla-chiar-acum-in-discutii-cuvadim-krasnoselski-la-varnita/199223

* "DISINFORMATION: The number of Moldovans siding with Russia in the war in Ukraine is growing". Veridica.ro, March 17, 2023, URL:

https://www.veridica.ro/en/disinformation/disinformation-the-number-of-moldovans-siding-with-russia-in-the-war-in-ukraine-is-growing

* "EU leaders grant Ukraine and Moldova candidate status", Politico, June 23, 2022, URL: https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-grant-ukraine-and-moldova-candidate-status/

<footnote n="65">⁶⁵ Piotr Garciu, "Russian Propaganda Dominates Moldova's Gagauzia". IWPR.net, October 3, 2022, URL: https://iwpr.net/global-voices/russian-propaganda-dominates-moldovas-gagauzia</footnote>

<footnote n="66">⁶⁶ "SURVEY: PRO-EUROPEAN SENTIMENT INCREASED IN MARCH 2023 IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA". Tribuna.md, April 7, 2023, URL: https://tribuna.md/2023/04/07/sondaj-sentimentul-pro-european-ascrescut-in-luna-martie-2023-in-republica-moldova/</footnote>

<footnote n="67">⁶⁷ "Six TV stations temporarily banned in Moldova for broadcasting incorrect information about the war in Ukraine", Euronews, December 17, 2022, URL: https://www.euronews.ro/articole/sase-televiziuni-interzise-temporar-in-republica-moldova-pentru-transmiterea-de-i</footnote>

<footnote n="68">⁶⁸ "The Kremlin's mouthpiece remains without five other portals. SIS blocks Sputnik clones". Deschide.md, March 22, 2023, URL: https://deschide.md/ro/stiri/social/126222/DOC-Portavocea-Kremlinului-r%C4%83m%C3%A2ne-f%C4%83r%C4%83-alte-cinci-portaluri-SIS-blocheaz%C4%83-clonele-Sputnik.htm</footnote>

<footnote n="69">⁶⁹ Robert Lupișu, "EU diplomacy chief: We are preparing a civilian mission in Moldova to strengthen the country's capacity against hybrid threats", Calea Europeană, URL: https://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/seful-diplomatiei-ue-pregatim-o-misiune-civila-in-r-moldova-pentru-a-consolida-capacitatea-tarii-impotriva-amenintarilor-hibride/</footnote>

<footnote n="70">⁷⁰ Madalin Necsutu, "Moldova to Create 'Anti-Propaganda Centre' to Counter Russian Disinformation". Balkan Insight, May 29, 2023, URL: https://balkaninsight.com/2023/05/29/moldova-to-create-anti-propaganda-centre-to-counter-russian-disinformation/</footnote>
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