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# The Take-Up of Unemployment Benefit Extensions

Béatrice Boutchenik, Raphaël Lardeux

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Documents de travail

N° G2020/02

Juin 2020

# The Take-Up of Unemployment Benefit Extensions

Béatrice BOUTCHENIK - Raphaël LARDEUX
<figure><img src="image_3.png" /></figure>
Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques

G2020/02

# The Take-Up of Unemployment Benefit Extensions

Béatrice BOUTCHENIK*

Raphaël LARDEUX**

Juin 2020

Département des Études Économiques – Timbre G201

88, avenue Verdier – CS 70 058 – 92 541 MONTROUGE CEDEX – France

Tél. : 33 (1) 87 69 59 54 – E-mail : d3e-dg@insee.fr – Site Web Insee : http://www.insee.fr

*Ces documents de travail ne reflètent pas la position de l'Insee et n'engagent que leurs auteurs.*

*Working papers do not reflect the position of INSEE but only their author's views.*

We would like to thank Youssef Benzarti, Sylvain Chareyron, Claudine Desrieux, François Fontaine, Pauline Givord, Laurence Rioux, Sébastien Roux, Emmanuel Saez, Lionel Wilner and Pôle Emploi for helpful comments, as well as participants of the Insee-D2E, Unédic, IRLE seminars and of the 35th JMA. We also thank the Unédic for access to the FNA files and especially the entire staff of the DEA department for useful advice on how to deal with those data. This paper reflects our opinions and does not express those of our institutions, nor of the Unédic. All errors are our own.

<footnote>* Insee-DMCSI and LEDa Paris-Dauphine au moment de la rédaction de ce document</footnote>

<footnote>** Insee-Dese – Département des études économiques – Division « Redistribution et politiques sociales » and CRED Paris 2 au moment de la rédaction de ce document</footnote>
# Le recours aux extensions d'indemnisation à l'assurance chômage

## Résumé

Lorsqu'ils atteignent la fin de leur allocation, les bénéficiaires de l'assurance chômage ne font pas toujours valoir l'intégralité des extensions d'indemnisation auxquelles ils sont éligibles. En droit, au-delà d'un seuil minimum de jours travaillés, chaque emploi effectué contribue à étendre la durée potentielle d'indemnisation d'une durée équivalente, sous réserve qu'une Attestation Employeur a été envoyée par l'allocataire à Pôle Emploi. De fait, jusque mi-2014, plus d'un cinquième des allocataires ne communiquaient pas l'intégralité de leurs attestations. La réforme des Droits Rechargeables a introduit l'envoi automatique d'un courrier à destination des allocataires dont la fin de droits est prévue après le 1er Octobre 2014 afin de les informer de la nécessité d'envoyer ces attestations. Dans cette étude, nous montrons que ce courrier les a effectivement incités à produire ces documents plus systématiquement, permettant ainsi un allongement de leur durée d'indemnisation potentielle. A partir des données du Fichier National des Allocataires (FNA) de l'Unédic, nous estimons par une régression sur discontinuité que ce courrier a réduit de 14 points la part des allocataires ne certifiant pas l'intégralité de leurs emplois passés et ainsi augmenté d'un mois en moyenne la durée d'indemnisation potentielle. Cet effet de l'information est plus marqué parmi les personnes inscrites à l'Unédic pour la première fois, qui sont également les moins familières de ces démarches.

**Mots-clés** : Recours, Assurance Chômage, Information, Évaluation

# The Take-Up of Unemployment Benefit Extensions

## Abstract

Claimants do not always take-up the Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit extension they are eligible for. The French National Employment Agency grants benefit extensions to recipients who reach benefit exhaustion and have worked for a certain period of time since the start of their spell. To this end, claimants are required to send an Employer Certificate for each contract they undertook. Until mid-2014, above one fifth of unemployed workers did not fully certify their work history. In this paper, we show that a simple informational intervention may strongly increase the take-up of potential UI benefit extensions, especially among recipients with little unemployment experience. The ``renewal-of-entitlement'' reform of October 2014 introduced an informative letter automatically sent to claimants upon benefit exhaustion and emphasizing the role of Employer Certificates. Relying on the administrative file of French UI claimants (FNA) in a regression discontinuity design, we estimate that the letter reduced by 14 points the share of claimants who do not certify their full work history and extended the potential benefit duration by one month on average. This informational mailing narrowed the gap in certification behavior between claimants with different levels of unemployment experience.

**Keywords** : Take-up, Unemployment Insurance, Information, Policy Evaluation

**Classification JEL** : C23, D83, J65
# 1 Introduction

There is a blurred line between employment and unemployment. In France, more than half of unemployed workers take jobs while registered with the National Employment Agency<fnref n="1" />. Above a given threshold of days worked, these contracts may contribute to extend the potential benefit duration (PBD), provided that the claimant sends Employer Certificates for each contract of his work history. For eligible workers, the absence of certification of past jobs implies a loss of potential benefits corresponding to (partial or total) non take-up of UI benefits. Between April and September 2014, 21 % of potentially eligible workers did not certify at least one of their work contracts and half of them lost at least two months of potential UI benefits. Part of this non-certification behavior is simply the result of claimants anticipating that they will find a job shortly after benefit exhaustion. For others, generally poorly informed about the UI system, failure to perceive a benefit extension leads to become dependent on social assistance, at best.

The French “renewal-of-entitlement” reform (Réforme des Droits Rechargeables) impacted information available to unemployed workers regarding benefit extension. Since its implementation<fnref n="2" /> on October 1st, 2014, a letter has been systematically sent to each worker upon benefit exhaustion, mentioning that Employer Certificates are to be provided in order to claim a renewal of entitlement. We exploit the timing of this reform within a regression discontinuity design to identify the effects of information on the certification behavior of unemployed workers. The French administrative file of UI claimants (FNA) provides us with very detailed information about recipients’ unemployment trajectories at a daily level. We directly compare the declared employment history and the employment history actually certified in order to precisely retrace the potential eligibility to a benefit renewal.

A simple plot reveals a sharp drop in the average PBD lost among claimants whose unemployment spell ended on or after October 1st, 2014, and who therefore received the mailing informing them of the necessity to send their Employer Certificates (Figure 1). This simple description of certification patterns depending on the spell exhaustion date must however be considered cautiously, since the renewal-of-entitlement reform induced a change in the probability of reaching benefit exhaustion. In order to circumvent this

<footnote n="1">¹The French National Employment Agency is *Pôle Emploi*. Statistics about unemployed workers who take jobs while registered are available on the website of *Unédic* (Indicateurs de suivi de la Convention d'Assurance Chômage 2014, June 2018). During the third quarter of 2014, on average 1.2 million registered claimants are working each month out of a total of 2.4 million registered unemployed workers. This share increased steadily up to 60% in 2017.</footnote>

<footnote n="2">²The reform was first enacted on May 15th, 2014.</footnote>
differential selection issue, we define instead a Potential Benefit Exhaustion (PBE) date. This assignment variable is defined as the date of benefit exhaustion expected by the claimant when he has N days of UI benefits left and if he does not take a new job. By construction, it is not impacted by the reform. We show that using this PBE date calls for a fuzzy RD design.

Within this framework, we estimate a strong effect of the information letter on the certification behavior of unemployed workers. The share of eligible claimants who did not fully certify their work history dropped by 14 points with the reform, resulting in a decrease by one month in the total duration of uncertified work contracts. The proportion of claimants who certify none of their past jobs was reduced by 5 points. These results are robust to a wide range of specifications. Effects estimated around two placebo reforms on October 1st 2013 and 2015 are non-significant though precisely estimated, and we provide evidence that the local continuity assumption necessary for identification holds in our framework.

These responses highlight the importance of information regarding the undertaking of administrative procedures and the corresponding take-up of unemployment insurance benefits. They also suggest a non-negligible gain from transparency for claimants close to benefit exhaustion. The letter increased their average PBD by 30 days, their average daily benefits are equal to 35€ and they consume nearly all their benefits. In order to convert our estimate into an impact on the effective duration of compensated unemployment, we consider the elasticity of actual benefit duration with respect to PBD of 0.3 estimated by Le Barbanchon et al. [2019]. This elasticity is arguably a lower bound for those unemployed workers who are close to benefit exhaustion without having found a long-term job.<fnref n="3" /> We suggest that the purely informational component of the reform increased UI benefits by at least 300€ per unemployment spell.

Before the 2014 reform, the duration of the uncertified work history is negatively related with recurring experience in unemployment, measured by the number of unemployment spells the claimant has completed in the past (Figure 2 and 3). This correlation may result from a learning process, whereby workers returning to unemployment know the rules better and certify a higher share of their work history. It could also be the consequence of a selection of knowledgeable claimants into recurring unemployment spells, since sending Employer Certificates increases the likelihood of being granted a new entitlement to UI benefits, or it may reflect the existence of firms actively organizing the intermittency of employment and unemployment spells, simultaneously encouraging employees to fully benefit from the UI. In any case, the informative mailing had het-

<footnote n="3">³This elasticity is not structural. Because the letter is likely to have increased the salience of UI benefits, we also expect it to have had a positive impact on this elasticity.</footnote>
erogeneous effects on claimants, ranging from a reduction by nearly 40 days for those unemployed for the first time to a non-significant drop by 10 days for recipients in their fifth spell or above. As illustrated by Figure 3, the reform basically reduced the gap in uncertified work history between claimants with different levels of experience into unemployment. Finally, we find no strong evidence that the informative mailing did reduce disparities in certification behaviors between age groups nor between education levels.

This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of information on the take-up of UI and social benefits. Currie [2006] distinguishes three potential causes for incomplete take-up: stigma, transaction costs and informational barriers.<fnref n="4" /> Here, stigma is not the main concern since the claimants we focus on are already registered with the Employment Agency and receive UI benefits. Furthermore, we analyze a subgroup for which transaction costs and economic incentives (daily benefits and potential duration) remain unchanged by the reform. Therefore, we focus on the role of information on the take-up of UI benefit extensions.

Information provision matters for the take-up of a wide range of programs, among which disability insurance (Armour [2018]), post-secondary education (Barr and Turner [2018]), welfare benefits (Finkelstein and Notowidigdo [2019]), social security (Liebman and Luttmer [2015]), EITC and labor supply (Chetty and Saez [2013]; Guyton et al. [2016]) or retirement savings (Saez [2009]). Information about a program can take many forms and be more or less efficient depending on the underlying issue. On the one hand, reminders prove efficient to increase individuals’ attention about a program, but only in the short run (Guyton et al. [2016]; Manoli and Turner [2014]). Experimental mailing to taxpayers who failed to claim the EITC (Bhargava and Manoli [2015]) or aiming to set up a meeting with social welfare recipients (Chareyron et al. [2018]) show that emphasizing the salience of programs’ benefits raises the response rate and that framing matters for incentives to be accurately perceived (Saez [2009]). If, on the other hand, incomplete take-up is driven by unawareness or lack of knowledge, then interventions may have long-term effects, but require deeper explanations and eventually personal assistance in order to be efficient (Chetty and Saez [2013]). Both dimensions can be combined when the letter highlights expected benefits, individual eligibility, necessary steps for enrollment and may lead to an intervention of state services (Barr and Turner [2018]). Our natural experiment is closer to the setting of a reminder. The informative mailing (Figure 11 in Appendix A) mainly consists of an advice to send Employer Certificates, without further developments about the French UI system, the 2014 reform or the link between past certified jobs and future benefits’ characteristics, nor any individual assessment

<footnote n="4">⁴Before that, Moffitt [1983] models non-participation in welfare programs as a utility-maximizing decision resulting from a stigma cost only.</footnote>
of the situation of the claimant. Non-certification is not necessarily due to a lack of
knowledge about the UI system, but also likely related to behavioral biases such as
procrastination or misperception (of the benefits of certification, of the probability to exit
unemployment,...). Therefore, we may interpret the treatment as increasing claimants
attention towards certification of their work history.

From a welfare perspective, the optimal level of unemployment insurance is deter-
mined by a tradeoff between insuring unemployed workers and providing incentives to
search for a new job, an imperfectly monitored action raising a moral hazard issue
(Chetty [2006]). If the social planner determines the optimal level of benefits assuming
full take-up, any behavior of incomplete take-up would lead to a sub-optimal level of
unemployment insurance (Kroft [2008]). Yet, if he takes into account incomplete take-
up in his social objective and is able to influence it through information provision, it is
not obvious that he should target a full take-up. The optimal policy depends on the
correlation between the take-up behavior and individual characteristics. Informational
interventions are optimal if incomplete take-up is over-represented among poor popu-
lations, for whom it is harder to access relevant information and who may have less
attention to dedicate to complex administrative processes (Banerjee and Mullainathan
[2008]; Mullainathan and Shafir [2013]). This is especially relevant for unemployed work-
ers who spend time searching for a job. In contrast, Kleven and Kopczuk [2011] argue
that imperfect take-up can be the result of an efficient screening, if individuals who
achieve to receive benefits are those who are the most in need. Informational frictions
lead to a second-best economy where UI takers are those with fewer opportunities. Em-
pirically, we should therefore compare the marginal taker of a program to the average
taker before the informational intervention. Finkelstein and Notowidigdo [2019] find a
relatively strong impact of information and assistance on the take-up of the Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), but also estimate that the intervention
decreases targeting: marginal enrollees due to the intervention are less needy than av-
erage recipients in the control group. For the French case, we find that the treatment
effect is slightly-but not significantly-stronger for older and less-educated workers. The
relevant dimension of heterogeneity appears to be the experience in unemployment.

Finally, our paper suggests a new angle, considering the take-up of unemployment
benefit extensions. The take-up of UI benefits is usually defined as the share of unem-
ployed workers who are registered with the National Employment Agency. The take-up
rate ranges from 60% to 80% in OECD countries (Hernanz et al. [2004]), it is equal to
77% in the US (Auray et al. [2019]) and may be even lower in France, around 40% to
60% according to Blasco and Fontaine [2018]. It is a major concern since claiming costs
of unemployment insurance may induce large and heterogeneous welfare losses (Fontaine
and Kettemann [2016]).

There are two advantages in considering the take-up of UI benefit *extensions*, in order to isolate the sole effect of information gains but also for measurement reasons. First, this concept seems economically relevant since, if they find no job and get no benefit extensions, these claimants will incur a major loss of income<fnref n="5" /> and their links with the Employment Agency may get more loose. In contrast, workers virtually unemployed during a transition between two long-term contracts won't register if the administrative cost exceeds their marginal gain. The behavior of the latter is mostly driven by transaction costs while the behavior of the former is related to informational issues. Second, eligibility can be accurately assessed because these unemployed workers are already registered with the National Employment Agency. Their take-up may be easily measured as the duration of their certified past employment duration relative to their total declared past employment duration.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents features of the French UI benefits system and of the 2014 reform which are of interest to us. Section 3 describes the data we use. Section 4 emphasizes the importance of defining a proper assignment date and presents our fuzzy RD design. Section 5 displays the results, discusses their robustness and investigates heterogeneity of the treatment effect. Section 6 concludes.

# 2 The French unemployment insurance & the 2014 reform

In this section, we underline several features of the French unemployment insurance system which are of specific interest for our analysis. We first describe the institutional framework surrounding the entitlement to UI benefits, in connection with employment history and the certification of work contracts. We then outline the 2014 reform of UI benefit renewal, and eventually focus on the information environment of benefit recipients as well as the administrative costs that they face.

## 2.1 Certification of work contracts and benefit entitlement

In France, unemployment insurance benefit duration is determined by past employment history. Nearly all workers from the private sector are affiliated with the unemployment insurance system. One day worked while affiliated to the UI agency ensures one day of benefits, in the limit of 2 years<fnref n="6" />. In order to be granted initial UI entitlement,

<footnote n="5">⁵Median daily UI benefits is 34€ while daily social benefits for long-term unemployed workers (ASS) is 16.5€ in 2018.</footnote>

<footnote n="6">⁶3 years for claimants above 50 years old.</footnote>
total employment history considered within the last 28 months<fnref n="7" /> should be longer than 4 months. Unemployment should be involuntary. During an ongoing unemployment spell, claimants may accumulate new benefits by taking up new jobs. On top of the 28 months rule, jobs considered for a benefit extension must have taken place after the last work contract which was used for current benefit entitlement<fnref n="8" /> and must end before benefit exhaustion.

Whether considering initial entitlement or benefit extension, work contracts may contribute to benefit duration only to the extent that they have been *certified*. Certification of a past job requires unemployed workers to send their Employment Agency an *Employer Certificate*, which should be handed out by the employer at the end of each contract.<fnref n="9" /> The Employer Certificate is the official legal document characterizing the termination of a work contract. It mentions the employment interval, payroll, termination fees, bonuses and the ground for contract termination, which is necessary to ensure that the required conditions for unemployment insurance (especially the condition of involuntary unemployment) are met. Employer Certificates should be sent by both the employer and the employee in order for the work contract to be labeled as *certified*.<fnref n="10" /> Then the EA determines whether the renewal is granted, based on the condition of involuntary unemployment and on certified employment history mentioned in the Employer Certificates. Therefore, the issue of take-up comes into play because affiliation history taken into account for UI benefit extension depends on work contracts certification behavior.

A common difficulty when relying on administrative data to study the take-up of social policies is that eligible non-takers are not observed in the data. One interesting feature of our setting is that, when taking up work contracts while unemployed, workers have to declare them to the Employment agency in order to stop receiving UI benefits temporarily, otherwise facing a penalty.<fnref n="11" /> The declaration of work contracts delays UI benefits, shifting equally the potential benefit exhaustion (PBE) date. However, this *declaration* process is not sufficient for work contracts to contribute to the total work history: *certification* is mandatory. Therefore, the *declared* employment history provides us information about potential eligibility to an entitlement renewal, while *certified* employment history is not considered for UI benefits.

<footnote n="7">⁷36 months for claimants over 50 years old.</footnote>

<footnote n="8">⁸A job that has not been certified for a previous spell cannot contribute to a new entitlement / extension.</footnote>

<footnote n="9">⁹*CT*, *Art. R1234-9*.</footnote>

<footnote n="10">¹⁰Firms failing to send this certificate may be sanctioned by a fine of up to 1500€ (*CT*, *Art. R1238-7*).</footnote>

<footnote n="11">¹¹Legal documents about the French UI can be found on the website of the Unédic. Regarding the declaration of jobs while registered at the EA: *Règlement général (RG) 2014, Art.30*. Pay slips are a supporting document for this declaration of jobs: *Accord d'application n°9 du 14 mai 2014 §1*. Even before 2014, it was mandatory for claimants to send these pay slips in order to keep receiving benefits: *RG 2011 & 2014, Art.25 §4; Code du travail (CT), Art. R5426-3 §3*. Unédic computes the amount of UI benefit extension according to the information on these Certificates: *RG 2014 Art.41 §1*.</footnote>
ployment history determines the actual eligibility. The comparison of these two variables
highlights the take-up of benefit extension.

## 2.2 The 2014 reform: the renewal of UI entitlement

The reform regarding the renewal of UI entitlements was enacted on May 14, 2014 and implemented on October 1, 2014. It was mostly targeted toward workers returning frequently into unemployment. Table 1 summarizes the main features of the French UI system, whether stable over time or impacted by the 2014 reform.

Before October 1, 2014, benefit extensions were governed by the “comparison-of-benefits” system. In this previous system, workers who went back to unemployment after a work contract and who had accumulated a total affiliation of at least 122 days during their ongoing spell could proceed to a comparison between the remaining entitlement of their current spell, and the potential entitlement triggered by the new work contract(s). The highest daily benefits as well as largest total entitlement were retained, and the duration was calculated as the ratio of the latter to the former. The other potential entitlement was definitively abandoned. A subtlety of this system lied in the moment at which the comparison-of-benefits took place. It could happen as soon as the threshold of 122 days of new work contracts was reached, but it could also be delayed to a certain extent. If unemployed workers de-registered from the EA when they took on a new work contract, then the comparison would be triggered when they got back to unemployment (provided that they had reached the required work affiliation of 122 days). If they did not, they could remain registered and keep resuming their initial entitlement when coming back to unemployment (thus postponing the comparison). In this respect, the 2014 reform simplified the benefit extension mechanism making it independent of the (de-)registration behavior.<fnref n="12" />

The reform of October 1, 2014 enacted the “renewal-of-entitlement” system (recharge-
ment des droits).<fnref n="13" /> Its stated aim was to “value all work periods undertaken after the
start of the initial compensation period, towards a new entitlement, under certain condi-
tions.”<fnref n="14" /> Several dimensions of the reform served that purpose. First, workers returning
into unemployment must now exhaust the remainder of their previous entitlement before
starting a new UI compensation period<fnref n="15" />. Thus in the new system, there are no more

<footnote n="12">¹²The implications of this change are important in terms of differential selection before and after the reform (see Section 4).</footnote>

<footnote n="13">¹³Another rule was modified by the 1st October 2014 reform, regarding the accumulation of wages and UI benefits for unemployed workers having short-term contracts, which we detail in Appendix B. As we will argue in section 4, this other aspect of the reform cannot have affected the certification behavior that we focus on, which concerns past employment contracts that have taken place before the reform.</footnote>

<footnote n="14">¹⁴*La Convention d’Assurance Chômage 2014*, documentation juridique.</footnote>

<footnote n="15">¹⁵This rule was slightly modified in April 2015 by the extended “droit d’option” which allowed recipients</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 1: Main features of the French UI and 2014 reform</caption><thead><tr><th colspan="2">Stable features</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Unemployment</td><td>should be involuntary</td></tr><tr><td>PBD</td><td>1 day worked = 1 day of benefits</td></tr><tr><td>New UI entitlement</td><td>requires at least 122 days worked</td></tr><tr><td>Employer certificate</td><td>required for each work contract</td></tr><tr><td>Declared contracts</td><td>shift BE by the same duration</td></tr><tr><td>Certified contracts</td><td>contribute to UIB entitlement/extension, within 28 month before appliance to UI, after last job of previous spell &amp; before BE</td></tr></tbody><thead><tr><th colspan="3">"Renewal-of-entitlement" reform</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>Before Oct. 2014</th><th>After Oct. 2014</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Information</strong></td><td><strong>Ø letter</strong></td><td><strong>letter</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Min. affiliation</td><td>122 days</td><td>30 days</td></tr><tr><td>Total benefits B</td><td>max(B<sub>0</sub>, B<sub>1</sub>)</td><td>first B<sub>0</sub>, then B<sub>1</sub></td></tr><tr><td>Daily benefits b</td><td>max(b<sub>0</sub>, b<sub>1</sub>)</td><td>first b<sub>0</sub>, then b<sub>1</sub></td></tr><tr><td>Remaining benefits</td><td>abandoned</td><td>available</td></tr><tr><td>Timing of extension</td><td>re-registration</td><td>end of B<sub>0</sub></td></tr><tr><td>Comparison of benefits</td><td>everyone</td><td>available for apprentices</td></tr></tbody><thead><tr><th colspan="3">Other components: jobs while unemployed</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>Before Oct. 2014</th><th>After Oct. 2014</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Max hours p/ month</td><td>110</td><td>removed</td></tr><tr><td>Max wage w<sub>1</sub></td><td>0.7w<sub>0</sub></td><td>removed</td></tr><tr><td>Max duration</td><td>15 months</td><td>removed</td></tr><tr><td>Immediate benefits</td><td>b(1 - w<sub>1</sub>/w<sub>0</sub>)</td><td>max(b - 0.7w<sub>1</sub>, 0)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: $b_0$ and $B_0$ (resp. $b_1$ and $B_1$) refer to daily and total benefits remaining from the previous spell (resp. recently accumulated). In the last part of the table, $w_0$ refers to the monthly reference wage used to determine benefits $b_0$ for the previous spell and $w_1$ is the monthly wage of the job undertaken while unemployed.

"unused" benefits and each work contract may be turned into a corresponding potential benefit entitlement.

Second, any employment history of at least 30 days may now be considered in order to renew one's entitlement to UI benefits, instead of the minimum of 122 days in the pre-reform setting.<fnref n="16" /> Third, the reform implemented a new information framework.

with a disadvantageous initial right to opt for the new one instead.

<footnote n="16">¹⁶The previous threshold of 122 days of affiliation remains for newly unemployed workers without past</footnote>
Although not the most advertised mechanism of the reform, this information setting
also contributed towards valuing all work periods.

## 2.3 Informational environment and administrative costs

The 2014 reform introduced an information letter for all claimants nearing benefit ex-
haustion. Until September 30th 2014, claimants had to contact the Employment Agency
in order to trigger the procedure for benefit extension. In particular, only claimants
who had accumulated more than 122 days of affiliation and had registered to the UI
system for the second time (after a de-registration) would be informed of the conditions
regarding the “comparison-of-entitlement”. Otherwise, continuously registered claimants
could exhaust their entitlement without being informed of the possibility of a new en-
titlement nor of the fact that handing in their Employer Certificates could lead to a
benefit extension.

Since October 1st 2014, claimants are automatically detected and receive a letter
one month before their expected benefit exhaustion.<fnref n="17" /> The letter mentions the date
of expected benefit exhaustion and provides supplementary information depending on
the situation of the claimant. The type of letter depends on the information provided
beforehand to the Employment Agency by the worker.<fnref n="18" /> If he sent pay slips to *declare*
some jobs but did not send enough Employer Certificates in order for the Employment
Agency to ascertain his eligibility to a benefit extension, the letter indicates that he
does not yet fulfill the required conditions and that he should send Employer Certifi-
cates in order to be eligible (Figure 11 in Appendix A). In contrast, if he sent enough
Employer Certificates in order to claim a renewal, the letter mentions that he is eligible
and advises him to send potentially missing Employer Certificates (without indicating
which ones).<fnref n="19" /> Neither the eligibility rule nor the characteristics of the potential benefit
extension are mentioned in these letters.<fnref n="20" /> After benefit exhaustion, claimants were not
able to increase their employment history by taking new jobs, but they could still send
certificates for past jobs and they would be paid their benefits retrospectively.

Finally, this informative letter was created in a more global context of dematerial-
ization of Employer Certificates. Since January 1st 2012, Employer Certificates should

unemployment history.

<footnote n="17">¹⁷See RG 2014, Art.40 §3 regarding the creation of the information letter.</footnote>

<footnote n="18">¹⁸Rapport d'audit sur la mise en oeuvre des droits rechargeables, 9 juillet 2015, Unédic.</footnote>

<footnote n="19">¹⁹Since March 23, 2015, 4 new features are included in the letters: (i) number of reported hours, (ii) the initial date of the employment history, (iii) time periods for which employer certificates are missing and (iv) deadline before which the claimant has to send supportive documents, as shown in Figure 12 in Appendix A.</footnote>

<footnote n="20">²⁰In practice, most claimants whose benefits expired at the end of 2014 received this information after the exhaustion of their UI benefits and the first letters were sent after the implementation of the reform.</footnote>
in principle be sent electronically by firms with more than 10 employees.<fnref n="21" /> In practice, a large fraction of these firms were still sending Employer Certificates in hard copy by the time of the reform. Dematerialization may improve information processing by the National EA but does not exempt claimants from sending Employer Certificates to the EA.<fnref n="22" /> Firms with temporary workers already sent electronically the equivalent of Employer Certificates to the EA (called a “monthly statement of work”) and corresponding jobs were automatically considered as certified.

## 3 Data description and sample selection

In order to precisely analyze the change in certification behavior around the 2014 reform, we rely on the National File of UI Claimants (*Fichier National des Allocataires*, FNA), an exhaustive long-run administrative database provided by Unédic<fnref n="23" /> which tracks trajectories of all UI recipients while unemployed.

We focus on recipients who have reached a work affiliation of at least 122 days, which allows to compare spells that have not been impacted by the change in minimum affiliation duration. We consider these recipients at the point where their remaining UI benefits fall below a threshold of 61 days. Therefore, we make sure to compare claimants who are close to benefit exhaustion and whose accumulation of UI benefits has not been impacted by the reform (cf. Table 1).<fnref n="24" /> Claimants aged 50 or above at the time they submit an application for a benefit entitlement are excluded from the sample since they are concerned by a specific set of rules regarding pre-retirement unemployment insurance. We restrict our analysis to claimants affiliated to the general UI regime or temporary work UI regime. This amounts to excluding specific professions, mostly temporary workers of the entertainment industry, whose UI rules are not only different, but also differently modified by the 2014 reform. We also remove childcare workers, for whom affiliation to UI is much more complex to determine. Finally, the sample is further restricted to the baseline type of benefits (ARE - *Allocation de Retour en Emploi*).<fnref n="25" />

<footnote n="21">²¹Décret n°2011-138.</footnote>

<footnote n="22">²²*Circulaire n°2011-09 du 15 février 2011.*</footnote>

<footnote n="23">²³The National Professional Union for Employment in Industry and Trade, which is responsible for setting the amounts of social contributions and unemployment benefits.</footnote>

<footnote n="24">²⁴For workers with more than 730 days of certified work, supplementary work affiliation will be of no use since they have already reached the two-years cap of benefit duration.</footnote>

<footnote n="25">²⁵We exclude claimants benefiting from very specific benefit conditions (such as the *Contrat de Sécurisation Professionnelle (CSP)*, a support process to help workers concerned by an economic layoff finding a new job). We also remove individuals who were assigned zero benefits or for whom a spell was registered with zero entitlement duration. These cases most probably correspond to registration errors and are overall quite rare.</footnote>
The unit of observation is the administrative unemployment spell, defined here as an entitlement period which may include periods of activity. A new spell thus starts with a new UI entitlement. A spell ends either with benefit exhaustion, or if the claimant finds a permanent contract and definitively quits unemployment before having exhausted his benefits<sup>26</sup>, or–before the reform–if there is a comparison of benefits when the worker gets back to unemployment. An unemployment spell is composed of different sub-periods depending on whether the claimant receives benefits, is working, is on a maternity leave, has been temporarily refused benefits, etc. The dates of these sub-periods and their types are available in the data. In practice, by restricting the estimation to a four-months window around the reform, we observe one spell per claimant. Therefore, we often interpret the results in terms of effects on claimants rather than spells.

We know the exact start and end dates of each terminated work contract. For each one, we also know whether it was only *declared* to the National Employment Agency or if an Employer Certificate has been sent in addition (*certified* work contract). However, the dates when the certificate has been sent and when the status has been updated are not in the data. Our main outcome is the duration of the uncertified employment history, computed as the difference between the declared duration and the certified duration. Alternative outcomes of interest include an index of complete certification (ie. all the work history duration is certified vs. at least part of it is not), and an index of complete non-certification (ie. none of the work contracts are certified vs. at least some are). We only consider work contracts that are over before benefit exhaustion, since those are the only ones taken into account in order to compute affiliation. Among the unemployment spells ending between April 2014 and September 2014 and potentially eligible to a benefit extension, 21.1% included at least one work contract which was not certified: 6.7% certify no work contract at all and 14.4% partially certify their work history. Among spells including at least one uncertified contract, the median “missing” entitlement duration due to these work periods which are not certified is just below two months. When excluding claimants who certify none of their contracts, the median uncertified duration is 27 days.

Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics characterizing the population of interest. Column (1) describes the whole population of claimants with a PBE date in 2014. The average claimant is 29 years old. He is endowed with 34€ of daily benefits for a potential benefit duration (PBD) of 340 days, after which, if he has still found no job, he will either be able to extend his benefits or receive social welfare instead of the UI. Those claimants close to benefit exhaustion consume nearly all their UI benefits. About half of them

<footnote n="26"><sup>26</sup>We leave aside these cases, since those claimants have no interest in benefit extension and therefore in the certification of past employment history.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 2: Sample description</caption><thead><tr><th>Period<br>Population</th><th>jan-dec.<br>all<br>(1)</th><th>jan-dec.<br>sample<br>(2)</th><th>aug-sep.<br>sample<br>(3)</th><th>oct-nov.<br>sample<br>(4)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Age</td><td>29.5</td><td>30.9</td><td>31.1</td><td>31.2</td></tr><tr><td>Daily wage (€)</td><td>55.3</td><td>56.8</td><td>56.6</td><td>57.5</td></tr><tr><td>Daily benefits (€)</td><td>33.9</td><td>34.9</td><td>34.8</td><td>35.2</td></tr><tr><td>PBD (days)</td><td>339.6</td><td>399.7</td><td>407.6</td><td>394.8</td></tr><tr><td>Actual duration (days)</td><td>336.0</td><td>392.8</td><td>401.2</td><td>393.4</td></tr><tr><td><em>Education (%)</em></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&lt; CAP, BEP</td><td>14.7</td><td>14.8</td><td>15.0</td><td>14.9</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;CAP, BEP</td><td>40.5</td><td>40.6</td><td>40.2</td><td>40.5</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;BAC</td><td>25.1</td><td>24.6</td><td>24.6</td><td>24.7</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;BAC +2</td><td>10.8</td><td>11.2</td><td>11.1</td><td>11.6</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&gt; BAC +2</td><td>8.9</td><td>8.8</td><td>9.1</td><td>8.4</td></tr><tr><td><em># u. spell (%)</em></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;First</td><td>31.3</td><td>27.0</td><td>27.2</td><td>25.4</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Second</td><td>23.9</td><td>24.1</td><td>25.3</td><td>23.2</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Third</td><td>16.5</td><td>17.8</td><td>17.6</td><td>18.0</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Fourth</td><td>10.8</td><td>11.9</td><td>11.7</td><td>12.7</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&ge; Fifth</td><td>17.6</td><td>19.3</td><td>18.2</td><td>20.7</td></tr><tr><td>N Obs.</td><td>294,466</td><td>86,458</td><td>11,808</td><td>18,366</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: Claimants below 50 with a Potential Benefit Exhaustion (PBE) date in 2014 and a *declared* affiliation history below 2 years. Claimants from the sample are characterized by a *declared* affiliation history above 122 days when they have two months of benefits left. FNA files (Unédic).

have a high-school degree. The last part of the table highlights the importance of multi-spell unemployment: one third of claimants are in their first unemployment spell, a quarter are in their second spell and more than 17% are at least in their fifth spell. Column (2) displays the same statistics for claimants with a declared affiliation history above 122 days when they have two months of benefits left. They represent nearly 30% of claimants from Column (1). By construction, their PBD is higher than that of the whole population, for they have worked at least 122 days since the start of their unemployment spell. Because they work while unemployed, they are also more likely to start a new unemployment spell after a job and therefore are more often in situations of multi-spell unemployment. Finally, Columns (3) and (4) focuses on the two sub-periods of interest around the 2014 reform and show very similar figures compared to Column (2). The few
differences are related to seasonal processes and appear each year.

<figure><img src="image_4.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1: Average duration of the uncertified affiliation by date of benefit exhaustion</figcaption></figure>

Notes: This figure shows the average duration of the uncertified affiliation in days among claimants reaching benefit exhaustion a given month. We focus on claimants eligible to a benefit extension (having accumulated more than 122 days of declared work affiliation). FNA files (Unédic).

Figure 1 displays a drop in the average duration of the uncertified work affiliation around the date of the reform: claimants reaching benefit exhaustion before September 2014 were missing around 40 to 60 days of potential benefits, whereas this duration has fallen below 20 days since. These raw statistics call for a thorough analysis of claimants behavior upon benefit exhaustion and around the implementation of the informative letter.

Figure 2 shows that the certification of past jobs is not random among the population. In particular, the share of claimants who do not certify their whole employment history is decreasing with the number of previous unemployment spells, showing a positive correlation between experience in unemployment and certification of work contracts. This pattern could result either from a learning process or from a selection into multi-spell unemployment, or reflect the existence of firms actively organizing the intermittency of employment and unemployment spells for their employees.

Figure 3 replicates Figure 1 for two groups of claimants, those who are in their first spell and those in their fifth spell or above. The group with the highest experience in unemployment shows a lower uncertified duration, especially before the reform, and the
<figure><img src="image_5.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2: Certification behavior depending on unemployment history</figcaption></figure>

**Notes:** This figure shows the share of claimants who do not entirely certify their employment history, depending on their number of previous unemployment spells. The horizontal dotted line shows the average across all groups (0.211). We focus on claimants with spell end date between April and September 2014, who are eligible to a benefit extension (having accumulated more than 122 days of declared work affiliation). FNA files (Unédic).

drop in this uncertified duration at the reform appears much smaller than for the less experienced claimants. In the next section, we show that the informative letter increased global knowledge about Employer Certificates and reduced the gap between claimants with different degrees of experience in unemployment.

# 4 Empirical strategy

The reform impacted unemployment spells for which benefits exhausted on or after October 1st, 2014. We exploit this temporal discontinuity in order to identify the effect of the reform on the certification behavior, in a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Identification in a RD Design rests on the local continuity assumption (LCA) of a continuous and smooth relation between the outcome $Y_s$ and the running variable $X_s$.

In Subsection 4.1 and 4.2, we consider two potential dates which may serve as assignment variables in our RD design. First we show that the actual *Benefit Exhaustion* (BE) date, which is used in Figure 1 and determines treatment accurately, may jeopardize the local continuity assumption (LCA). In order to solve this issue, we construct a
<figure><img src="image_6.png" /><figcaption>Figure 3: Experience in unemployment</figcaption></figure>

**Notes:** This figure shows the average duration of the uncertified affiliation in days among claimants reaching benefit exhaustion a given month for two groups: claimants in their first spell (red dots) and claimants in their fifth spell or above (blue diamonds). We focus on claimants eligible to a benefit extension (having accumulated more than 122 days of declared work affiliation). FNA files (Unédic).

*Potential Benefit Exhaustion (PBE) date and use it as an assignment date for the RD analysis, making sure that spells are as good as randomly assigned around the discontinuity according to this assignment date. Solving this issue ensures continuity of the assignment variable density and thus confirms the validity of our RD design (Subsection 4.3). Finally, we show that our sample of interest was not impacted by aspects of the reform other than information (Subsection 4.4).*

## 4.1 Using the *Benefit Exhaustion* (BE) date as the assignment variable: a possible differential selection issue

When a spell comes to an end, whether the *BE* date falls before or after October 1st, 2014 defines actual treatment: if benefit exhaustion falls after October 1st, 2014, the information letter is sent and the new rules of the reform apply. The BE date would therefore appear as the natural assignment date in a sharp RD design, since it determines with certainty whether spells are treated or not.

One must however make sure that the chosen assignment date is such that the key identifying assumption of an RD design, the local continuity assumption (LCA) holds.
Under the LCA, observations on each side of the considered threshold may be consid-
ered as (locally) randomly assigned. Two types of phenomena in particular may call it
into question (Lee and Lemieux [2010]). First, manipulation of the assignment date is
problematic in so far as individuals have *precise* control over this date. Second, an issue
of differential selection of observations on each side of the discontinuity may arise if the
probability of being observed changes sharply at the threshold. In both cases, this may
lead to observations on both sides of the threshold not being comparable in terms of
unobserved characteristics.

Using the BE date as our assignment variable may raise such a differential selection issue: the process according to which spells reach benefit exhaustion is not the same before and after the reform. By definition, when considering the BE date, we are focusing only on the subsample of individuals who actually exhaust their benefits. This is not the same subsample before and after the reform, as a mechanical result of the switch from the old “comparison-of-benefits” system to the new “renewal-of-entitlement” system. As explained in Section 2, after the reform, recipients who come back to unemployment after a work contract keep on consuming their previous entitlement until they eventually reach benefit exhaustion. By contrast, before the reform, part of the recipients who reached the 122 days of affiliation threshold could proceed to a comparison between remaining benefits and potential new entitlement. In this case, a new spell was initiated, and benefit exhaustion of the previous one was never reached. Considering the *BE* date as our assignment variable would mechanically exclude these claimants from our sample<fnref n="27" />. This differential selection issue in the RD design has been raised by Lee and Lemieux [2010]. It could jeopardize the validity of our RD design if selection prior to the reform is linked to (unobservable) knowledge of the UI system, which could be the case since the comparison of entitlements was linked to the (de)registration behavior of unemployed workers.

## 4.2 Defining a valid assignment date: the *Potential Benefit Exhaustion* (PBE) date

In order to overcome this problem, we construct an assignment date which is not
subject to this differential selection issue: the *Potential Benefit Exhaustion* (*PBE*) date
is defined as the date of benefit exhaustion expected by the claimant when he has *N*
days of UI benefits left and if he does not take a new job. In the baseline estimation, we
consider the point in time when a recipient has *N* = 61 days (two months) of remaining
UI benefits. We note this date *PBE*_{-61} and starting from this, we define the PBE date

<footnote n="27"><sup>27</sup> This differential selection issue is made clear by Figure 13 in Appendix C: starting from October 2014 (month 0), there is a strong rise in the frequency of Benefit Exhaustion dates.</footnote>
as $PBE = PBE_{-61} + 61$ days. The $PBE$ date is therefore defined as the date when benefits would exhaust if the recipient were to consume all her remaining entitlement without any interruption.

<figure><img src="image_7.png" /><figcaption>Figure 4: Examples of potential benefit exhaustion dates before/after the reform</figcaption></figure>

Figure 4 shows an example for two spells exactly identical, except for their initial dates, such that the $PBE$ date falls a few days before the reform for spell 1 and a few days after for spell 2. Two months ahead, from the point of view of date $PBE_{-61}$, spell 2 is expected to be treated and not spell 1. A $BE$ date only exists insofar as the claimant does reach benefit exhaustion. In contrast, the $PBE$ date can be defined as long as he reaches the $PBE_{-61}$ date. Since for both types of spells, the $PBE_{-61}$ falls before the reform, recipients of spells 1 and 2 have the same probability to reach their $PBE_{-61}$ dates and their $PBE$ dates have the same probability to be observed whether they fall before or after the reform. The differential selection issue is thus solved.<fnref n="28" /> We consider the $PBE$ date 61 days ahead as a baseline scenario, and we look at alternative scenarios with one or three months in robustness.

Contrary to the $BE$ date, the $PBE$ is an expectation conditional on information available at date $t(d_0^*)$ when the claimant has $d_0^*$ days of UI benefits left. Since we consider spells within a window around the reform, we can choose $d_0^*$ large enough so that $t(d_0^*)$ always falls before the reform. This $PBE$ date has two interesting properties: (i) first, it only requires claimants to reach the date $PBE_{-d_0^*}$ and not benefit exhaustion, which solves the differential selection issue since treated and control spells have the same probability to reach $PBE_{-d_0^*}$; (ii) second, the set of information available at date $PBE_{-d_0^*}$ depends on work contracts terminated before the reforms, making manipulation virtually impossible.

<footnote n="28">²⁸The $PBE$ also solves potential issues of manipulation of the assignment date since manipulation would most probably occur close to the date of benefit exhaustion.</footnote>
4.3 Local continuity assumption and fuzzy RD design

Using the PBE date rather than the actual BE date (and correcting for seasonality, as developed in Appendix D) jointly allow us to test the local continuity assumption by making sure that the density of the assignment variable is continuous at the threshold of interest. When it comes to RD design, the foremost concern is potential manipulation in order to be located on either side of the threshold. Since we are not looking at actual benefit exhaustion but potential benefit exhaustion defined N = 61 days earlier (for example), any issue of manipulation close enough to benefit exhaustion is taken care of. However, there may remain a concern about manipulation ahead of the $PBE_{-61}$ date. In the current case, unemployed workers whose $PBE_{-61}$ date lies between the announcement of the reform (Mai 15<sup>th</sup>, 2014) and its implementation (October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2014) may have had an interest to take a new job, a sick-day leave or any other way to postpone the end of their spell until after the reform.

<figure><img src="image_8.png" /><figcaption>Figure 5: Density of the PBE date</figcaption></figure>

Note: This figure displays the distribution of the Potential Benefit Exhaustion (PBE) date by day, in a four months window around the reform. Red dots display the raw density while blue diamonds show detrended data. The plain blue line represents third order polynomials estimated below and above the threshold and the dashed blue lines represent the 95% confidence interval. The outlier is August 31st, 2014. FNA files (Unédic).
Figure 5 displays the distribution of the raw (red dots) and detrended (blue dia-
monds) PBE date in a four months window around the reform. Once the monthly trend
in raw data is removed (Appendix D), the distribution of the PBE date is smooth around
the date of the reform. Polynomial approximations on each side of the threshold confirm
the absence of local discontinuity in the distribution of the running variable. Claimants
are therefore not likely to have manipulated their spells in order to take advantage of
the reform. This comforts us regarding the validity of the RD design using the PBE
date as an assignment variable.

Using the *PBE* date as a running variable calls for a Fuzzy RD design. The actual Benefit Exhaustion (BE) date may indeed be postponed by any new work contract happening after *PBE*_{-61}, as shown on Figure 6. In the case of spell 1, the recipient takes on no work contract between *PBE*_{-61} and *PBE* and his Potential Benefit Exhaustion coincides with actual Benefit Exhaustion: *BE* = *PBE*. In the case of spell 1', the recipient takes a 15 days work contract which postpones actual Benefit Exhaustion by 15 days: *BE* > *PBE*. Note that the BE date can only be postponed, but it cannot happen earlier in time: *BE* ≥ *PBE*.<sup>29</sup>

<figure><img src="image_9.png" /><figcaption>Figure 6: Examples of treated/non-treated observations with the same assignment date</figcaption></figure>

Therefore, for PBE dates after the reform, since actual Benefit Exhaustion necessar-
ily happens after the reform, the probability of treatment is close to 1<sup>30</sup>. For PBE dates
before the reform, spells may actually be treated or non-treated depending on work his-
tory posterior to the *PBE*_{-61} date. For spell 1' of Figure 6, the claimant will ultimately

<footnote n="29"><sup>29</sup>Except for some of the individuals in our sample who definitively left unemployment. Individuals who left unemployment before the 1st of October 2014 and never reappeared, while their PBE date falls after the threshold, are considered as non-treated as they were never unemployed after the threshold. They constitute a minority of our observations and classifying them as treated or non-treated does not impact our estimations.</footnote>

<footnote n="30"><sup>30</sup>Such a one-sided fuzzy design implies that there are no defiers (apart from the few exceptions mentioned) and that the treatment effect is identified on compliers.</footnote>
benefit from the reform, but this could not have been anticipated by the econometrician who consider unemployment trajectories from the point of view of the $PBE_{-61}$ date.

Figure 7 displays the treatment $D_s$ as a function of the running variable $X_s$. Since the effective BE date of the spell can only be postponed compared to the PBE date, observations located above the threshold will be treated. In contrast, some spells that should have terminated before the reform according to the PBE date were extended until after as a result of claimants taking new jobs during these spells. Therefore, the average value for $D$ is positive before the reform.<fnref n="31" />

<figure><img src="image_10.png" /><figcaption>Figure 7: Treatment as a function of the running variable</figcaption></figure>

Note: This figure displays the proportion of spells ending after the enactment of the reform, October 1st 2014, ($D = 1$) as a function of the day of the PBE date, in a four month window around the reform. FNA files (Unédic).

A direct application of a sharp design using the $PBE$ date as a running variable would lead to estimate an Intent-To-Treat effect, since some spells that we consider as non treated would in fact be treated. In order to estimate a proper Treatment effect, we should rely on the Fuzzy RD design as described by Lee and Lemieux [2010]; Angrist

<footnote n="31">³¹The fact that the proportion of treated units is not smoothly increasing before the threshold is linked to the seasonality issue mentioned above. When the subpopulation which causes the monthly seasonality is excluded from the sample, the proportion of treated units increases smoothly before the threshold, as shown by Figure 14 in Appendix. Furthermore, notice that the estimations presented in section 5 are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the subsample of individuals causing the monthly seasonality issue.</footnote>
and Pischke [2009]; Imbens and Lemieux [2008].<fnref n="32" /> We therefore instrument treatment with an index of whether the PBE date exceeds the date of the reform or not. Taking the notations of Lee and Lemieux [2010], we estimate through 2SLS:

$$ 
\begin{align} 
Y_s &= \alpha + \tau D_s + f(X_s - c) + \epsilon_s \tag{1} \\ 
D_s &= \gamma + \delta T_s + g(X_s - c) + \nu_s \nonumber 
\end{align} 
$$

where $Y_s$ is the outcome of interest for spell $s$, $X_s$ is the Potential Benefit Exhaustion (PBE) date of spell $s$, $c$ is the date of the reform (October 1st, 2014), $T_s = 1$ [$X_s \ge c$] indicates that benefits are expected to expire after the reform according to the PBE date and $D_s = 1$ [$BE_s \ge c$] indicates whether Benefit Exhaustion occurs after October 1st 2014 and the spell is ultimately treated or not. $f(.)$ and $g(.)$ are polynomials of the PBE date centered around the reform and without constant term, such that $f(0) = g(0) = 0$. $\tau$ captures the treatment effect and $\delta\tau$ the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect that would be estimated in a direct RDD of the outcome on the assignment variable. Intuitively, $\delta$ captures the fuzziness of the RD design measured by the covariance between the treatment and the index of assignment before or after the reform. The lower the $\delta$, the fuzzier the design and the bigger the discrepancy between the ITT and the treatment effects. Parameter $\alpha = \lim_{X_s \to c^-} \mathbb{E}[Y_s|D_s = 0, X_s]$ is the average initial level of the outcome variable for non treated spells when approaching the date of the reform. Finally, $\epsilon_s$ and $\nu_s$ are residuals.

## 4.4 Identifying the effect of the information letter

As explained in Section 2, the “renewal-of-entitlement” reform reduced the minimum affiliation duration required for UI benefit extension. In order to estimate the pure effect of information on the certification behavior, we focus on claimants whose affiliation was always above 122 days and below 730 days, meaning that they could be granted benefit extension before as well as after the reform. Affiliation is defined here as the total work history declared by the claimant<fnref n="33" /> until the PBE$_{-61}$ date at which we consider his situation.

We can check with Table 1 that these claimants were only impacted by the introduction of the informative letter and not by the other components of the reform. First, they were always eligible to a benefit extension provided they certified their work history, because their affiliation is above 122 days.

<footnote n="32">³²In the terminology of Cattaneo et al. [2020], our framework is a one-sided fuzzy design since the probability of treatment is close to 1 to the right of the assignment variable threshold.</footnote>

<footnote n="33">³³Considering solely certified work contracts, which would be endogenous to the outcome of interest.</footnote>
Second, they expect to receive the allocation {$b_1, B_1$} both before and after the reform. Indeed, we select claimants with low remaining benefits and a potentially high new entitlement. In the comparison-of-benefits system, their best choice was the new entitlement {$b_1, B_1$}. Choosing the previous amount of daily benefits would take a disproportionately high $b_0$ compared to $b_1$. Less than 0.1% of spells recipients in our sample who were subject to a comparison-of-benefits chose the remaining benefits from the previous spell rather than the new entitlement. Consequently, each day worked and certified ensures an extra day of entitlement: before the reform because we focus on claimants approaching benefit exhaustion who always choose the new entitlement and after the reform by the definition of the renewal-of-entitlement. The effective incentives to certify work contracts through Employer Certificates remained unchanged by the reform.

Third, the other components of the 2014 reform related to jobs taken while unemployed<fnref n="34" /> cannot have had any impact on the choice of work contracts or on the certification behavior that we examine. Since we consider jobs finishing at least *N* days before the *PBE* date (i.e. terminated before the *PBE*_{-N} date) and we estimate the treatment effect on spells whose *PBE* date lies in a 2*N* days window around the reform, the work contracts we analyze necessarily terminated before October 1st, 2014 by construction.

Beyond the pure components of this reform, some changes have occurred during this period, but our design prevents our estimation to be impacted by these trends. First, caseworkers of Employment Agencies might have more systematically asked unemployed workers for their Employer Certificates associated with jobs started after the implementation of the reform. However, our focus on work contracts finished before the reform prevents this trend from jeopardizing our identification of the certification behavior<fnref n="35" />.

Finally, a potential threat for our interpretation of the letter effect would be for non-certification to result from a strategic behavior rather than actual non-take-up. Certifying contracts impacts not only the duration of the following UI entitlement, but also daily benefits and may therefore imply a trade-off between entitlement duration and daily amount. Since daily benefits are proportional to the average wage of past certified jobs, claimants could have an incentive not to certify low-paid contracts in order to increase their future daily benefits. Although we do not know the wage associated to each job, we know whether the daily benefit chosen in the comparison-of-benefits system is the previous (and non-manipulable) one or the new (manipulable) one. If non-certification resulted from such strategic behavior, it should be predominant for

<footnote n="34">³⁴Cumul allocation-salaire and Droit d’option.</footnote>

<footnote n="35">³⁵This concern is not related to a legal obligation but to a change in practices. The timing of these evolution has been confirmed through a direct exchange with the French National Employment Agency.</footnote>
recipients who perceive their new daily benefits. However, the measured non-certification
behavior is identical whether people chose their previous or new daily benefits.

# 5 Results

In this Section, we first show graphical evidence of the strong impact of the information letter on the take-up of UI benefit extensions. We then estimate the magnitude of this effect within a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design and discuss robustness of these estimates. Finally, we analyze the heterogeneous effects of the reform.

## 5.1 Graphical evidence

Figure 8 highlights a smooth and nearly constant total duration of uncertified work contacts over time, except at the discontinuity induced by the reform. Until October 1st 2014, uncertified employment history was as high as one month on average, meaning that registered unemployed workers used to loose at least one month of potential benefits and even more if this non-certification implied their affiliation to drop below the 122-days threshold. With the reform, this duration is reduced to 20 days. This pattern is dampened compared to Figure 1 since, in this fuzzy RD design, some spells that actually end up being treated contaminate the pre-reform period.

Figure 9 displays similar drops in the proportion of unemployment spells for which at least one job has not been certified (red dots) and in the proportion of those for which no job has been certified (blue squares). Before the reform, the share of incomplete take-up is already quite low, below 30% of unemployment spells, mainly due to the automatic certification of temporary contracts. The information letter appears as efficient to reduce the share of claimants who never certify any contract and the mass of uncertified days of work. On the extensive margin, some claimants were granted benefit extension while it would not have been the case before the reform. On the intensive margin, others received higher benefit extension than they would have absent any reform. These reduced-form effects correspond to the intent-to-treat effect and a fuzzy design should be developed in order to measure a proper treatment effect.

Looking at explanatory variables around the reform is also helpful to track potential flaws in the RD validity (on top of evidence of the continuity of the assignment date density provided in section 4). Figure 16 in Appendix E displays averages of six variables per PBE day in a four months window around the reform: age, reference wage, replacement rate, number of work contracts during the spell, potential benefit duration, and plant size of the last job before the current unemployment spell. All these variables appear smoothly distributed around the reform.
<figure><img src="image_11.png" /><figcaption>Figure 8: Duration of uncertified work around the 2014 reform</figcaption></figure>

Note: This figure displays the total duration of uncertified work contracts as a function of the day of the potential benefit exhaustion (PBE) date, in a four months window around the reform. Each dot shows the average proportion per day. The red line represents third-order polynomials estimated at the left and at the right of the discontinuity. Red dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. FNA files (Unédic).

## 5.2 Estimates from Fuzzy RD design

**Main regression results.** We estimate the Fuzzy RD Design model in order to quantify the incidence of the reform on three outcomes of interest: the share of unemployment spells for which at least one past work contract has not been certified (incomplete take-up), the share of unemployment spells for which no jobs have been certified (non-take-up) and on the total duration of uncertified contracts (uncertified duration). In line with Lee and Lemieux [2010], we favor a local linear regression, which reduces the importance of the bias by an order of magnitude compared to kernel regressions when the slope of the regression line is not equal to zero. Moreover, we show in Appendix E that our results are robust to alternative polynomial estimations and different window widths. In the baseline estimation, the PBE date is defined when remaining benefit duration is equal to two months. Consistently, we estimate the model on a four-months window around the reform, which insures that all jobs taken into account in the past employment history
<figure><img src="image_12.png" /><figcaption>Figure 9: Incomplete certification of employment history around the 2014 reform</figcaption></figure>

Note: This figure displays the proportion of unemployment spells for which at least one job has not been certified (red dots) and the proportion of those for which no job has been certified (blue squares) as a function of the day of the potential benefit exhaustion (PBE) date, in a four-months window around the reform. Each dot shows the average proportion per day. The plain lines represent third-order polynomials estimated at the left and at the right of the discontinuity. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. FNA files (Unédic).

end before October 1st 2014 and thus that they are not affected by the reform.

<table><caption>Table 3: Fuzzy RDD by local linear regression</caption><thead><tr><th>Uncertified Duration</th><th>Incomplete Take-up</th><th>Non Take-Up</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>-30.4<br>(3.8)</td><td>-0.144<br>(0.022)</td><td>-0.054<br>(0.011)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: This table shows the treatment effect estimated from model 1 through 2SLS using a local linear regression in a four-months window around October 1st, 2014. Estimates are all significant at 1%. N = 30,174 observations. Standard errors are in brackets. FNA files (Unédic).

Table 3 displays the effect of the reform $\hat{\tau}$ on the three outcomes of interest. The informative letter had a positive impact on the certification of past jobs: incomplete take-
up was significantly reduced by more than 14 pts, among which 5 pts are related to a drop
in non-take up. Overall, this reduction went on average through the certification of one
extra month of past work contracts. Absent any changes in incentives, this automatic
mailing highlighted the role of Employer Certificates for UI benefit extensions. The
magnitude of this effect is related to the timing of the adjustment: claimants have no
deadline to send their employer certificates and can send them even after reaching benefit
exhaustion. From the first-stage of the regression of uncertified duration, we estimate
$\hat{\delta} = 0.420$ (0.002). Multiplying it by the treatment effect, we find an intent-to-treat
effect of 13 days on the uncertified duration, which is consistent with the gap observed
at the reform on Figure 8.

5.3 Robustness

In this subsection, we provide with robustness checks as regards: (i) the estimation
window, (ii) two placebo reforms, (iii) the choice of the bandwidth, (iv) the functional
form.

Table 4 provides evidence of treatment effect stability for alternative estimation
windows and for two placebo reforms around October 2013 and October 2015. First, in
the baseline estimation, we arbitrarily defined the PBE date when the remaining benefit
duration is equal to two months. We may set any other value, provided that the PBE
date is not too close to benefit exhaustion<fnref n="36" />, and not too far from it because the design
would become extremely fuzzy. Here, we show that the treatment effect remains nearly
unchanged if we define the PBE date when the remaining benefit duration is equal to
one month (three months) and when we consistently set the estimation window to two
months (six months) instead of four months.

Second, the treatment effect could be an unintended consequence of our procedure
of data construction. In order to discard this eventuality, we replicate the exact same
procedure around two placebo reforms: one on October 1st 2013 and the other on October
1st 2015. We replicate the exact same steps as for the baseline estimation and find no
significant treatment effect (only a significantly positive effect for 2015). Figure 15 in
Appendix E replicates Figures 8 and 9 around these two placebo reforms. It shows no
significant gap at the threshold in the outcome variables, meaning that the certification
behavior of claimants remained unchanged.

Third, a choice must be made regarding the bandwidth. Figure 10 presents the treat-
ment effect estimated through local linear regressions for different bandwidths around
the date of the reform. Since we rely on exhaustive data and have numerous observa-

<footnote n="36">³⁶In which case we would either have to narrow the window within which we are examining the reform or be facing a selection issue.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 4: Two placebo reforms and different estimation windows</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Outcome</th></tr><tr><th>Uncertified<br>Duration</th><th>Incomplete<br>Take-up</th><th>Non<br>Take-Up</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="4"><em>Baseline</em></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>-30.4<br>(3.8)</td><td>-0.144<br>(0.022)</td><td>-0.054<br>(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4"><em>Four-Months window</em></td></tr><tr><td>2013</td><td>-11.1<br>(6.9)</td><td>-0.027<br>(0.033)</td><td>-0.017<br>(0.021)</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>-0.3<br>(0.9)</td><td>0.024<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.025<br>(0.002)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4"><em>Two Months window</em></td></tr><tr><td>2013</td><td>13.8<br>(8.4)</td><td>0.069<br>(0.038)</td><td>0.032<br>(0.025)</td></tr><tr><td>2014</td><td>-33.6<br>(5.2)</td><td>-0.182<br>(0.029)</td><td>-0.068<br>(0.015)</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>-1.8<br>(1.1)</td><td>0.005<br>(0.008)</td><td>0.009<br>(0.003)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4"><em>Six Months window</em></td></tr><tr><td>2013</td><td>1.0<br>(6.4)</td><td>0.010<br>(0.031)</td><td>0.033<br>(0.020)</td></tr><tr><td>2014</td><td>-21.7<br>(3.7)</td><td>-0.103<br>(0.023)</td><td>-0.041<br>(0.011)</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>1.0<br>(1.0)</td><td>0.027<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.021<br>(0.003)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: This table presents the treatment effect estimated from model 1 through 2SLS, using a local linear regression in a four-month window around October 1st 2014. Regressions are run separately for three different outcomes: the share of incomplete takers, the share of non-takers and the uncertified duration of past work contracts. *From the top to the bottom:* the first part shows the baseline estimation (four months window around October 1st 2014), the second shows similar estimations for two placebo reforms around October 1st 2013 and October 1st 2015, the third and the fourth show the same estimations taking respectively a two months and a six months window instead of a four months window around the reform. Standard errors are in brackets. FNA files (Unédic).
<figure><img src="image_13.png" /><figcaption>Figure 10: Treatment effect for different bandwidths</figcaption></figure>

Note: This figure displays the treatment effect estimated from a local linear regression for different sizes of the bandwidth, from two days up to two months around the reform. The day of the reform (October 1st, 2014) has been removed. Black dots show the value of the estimates and red dots represent the value of the 95% confidence interval. *From the top to the bottom:* incomplete take-up, non-take-up and uncertified duration. FNA files (Unédic).
tions for each PBE date, we are able to focus very precisely on the days around the reform. Therefore, we reproduce the regressions of Table 3 for time intervals from two days to 61 days around the reform. Each panel corresponds to an outcome of interest: share of incomplete takers, share of non-takers and uncertified duration from the top to the bottom. When we increase the size of the bandwidth, estimates become quickly significantly positive, from a two week window around the reform. The estimation is very stable over the range of bandwidths.

Fourth, in the local linear estimation, the local continuity assumption takes the form of a polynomial of order 1 of the assignment variable. However, the smooth relation between the outcome and the running variable could take a more general form and the estimated treatment effect should not radically depend on the hypothesis regarding this relation.

Complementary estimates regarding the robustness of the treatment effect are displayed in Appendix E. Table 8 presents results from polynomial estimations, where order of polynomials ranges from 0 to 4 and coefficients of polynomials are constrained to be identical below and above the threshold. For each one of the three outcomes, the treatment effect is very stable across specifications, always significantly negative in 2014, never significant in 2013 (except for $P = 0$) and not significant or slightly positive in 2015.<fnref n="37" /> Table 10 shows that treatment effects remain unchanged when we allow for the first-degree polynomials $f()$ and $g()$ to have different slopes on each side of the discontinuity in the local linear regression. Table 11 displays treatment effects for different polynomials ranging from order 0 to order 4 and for different bandwidths from 10 days to 120 days around the reform, taking the uncertified duration as the outcome variable. Once again, parameters are significantly negative and stable for bandwidth wider or equal to 20 days around the reform, independently from the order of the polynomial, which confirms the robustness of our estimates to a wide range of specifications.

## 5.4 Heterogeneous effects of the reform

In this section, we investigate for heterogeneous effects of the informative mailing. For this purpose, we compare estimates for the treatment effect $\hat{\tau}$ and for the average initial level of the outcome variable for non treated spells when approaching the date of the reform, defined as $\hat{\alpha} = \lim_{X_s \to c^-} \mathbb{E}[Y_s | D_s = 0, X_s]$.

Table 5 relates the certification behavior to the experience in unemployment. Each line displays estimates among claimants who achieved the same number of spells until

<footnote n="37">³⁷Table 9 in Appendix E presents corresponding ITT effects observed on Figure 9 and estimated from the direct regression of the outcome $Y_s$ on the index $T_s$. This table confirms that parameters stability is already a feature of the ITT estimation.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 5: Uncertified duration and experience in unemployment</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">U. spell</th><th rowspan="3">#</th><th colspan="5">Uncertified duration</th><th rowspan="3">Obs.</th></tr><tr><th>(1)</th><th colspan="2">(2)</th><th colspan="2">(3)</th></tr><tr><th>Treat.</th><th>Before</th><th>After</th><th>Obs.</th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th><th>τ̂<sub>i</sub></th><th>α̂<sub>i</sub></th><th>α̂ + τ̂</th><th>α̂<sub>i</sub> + τ̂<sub>i</sub></th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>First</td><td>i = 1</td><td>-38.7<br>(7.8)</td><td>58.8<br>(5.7)</td><td>3.06</td><td>20.1</td><td>2.18</td><td>7874</td></tr><tr><td>Second</td><td>i = 2</td><td>-33.9<br>(8.0)</td><td>49.9<br>(5.9)</td><td>2.60</td><td>16.0</td><td>1.74</td><td>7247</td></tr><tr><td>Third</td><td>i = 3</td><td>-21.1<br>(8.3)</td><td>35.6<br>(6.2)</td><td>1.85</td><td>14.5</td><td>1.58</td><td>5387</td></tr><tr><td>Fourth</td><td>i = 4</td><td>-24.6<br>(10.9)</td><td>35.2<br>(8.4)</td><td>1.83</td><td>10.6</td><td>1.15</td><td>3719</td></tr><tr><td>Fifth or<br>above</td><td>i = 5</td><td>-10.0<br>(6.8)</td><td>19.2<br>(5.3)</td><td>1</td><td>9.2</td><td>1</td><td>5947</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: This table shows the intercept $\alpha$ and the treatment effect $\tau$ estimated from model 1 through 2SLS, where the outcome is the uncertified duration of past jobs, using a local linear regression in a four-months window around October 1st 2014. Regressions are run for five groups of experience in unemployment. Standard errors are in brackets. FNA files (Unédic).

October 2014. Column (1) shows that the treatment effect is strongly decreasing with the experience in unemployment: the uncertified duration fell by 40 days for claimants in their first spell while it is not significantly reduced for those in their fifth spell or above.<fnref n="38" /> Column (2) displays this duration before the reform in days ($\hat{\alpha}_i$) and relatively to the high experience group ($\hat{\alpha}_i/\hat{\alpha}_5$). Column (3) presents similar statistics after the reform. Before the reform, claimants in their first spell were missing nearly two months of benefit extension by not certifying past work contracts, which is three times the potential benefit duration forgone by the most experienced claimants. After the reform, this ratio scales down to 2.2. The informative mailing partially compensated for the discrepancy in certification behavior between claimants with different level of experience in unemployment.

Table 6 provides information about heterogeneity of the treatment effect along three dimensions: the reference wage, age and the level of education. The reference wage is an average of the wages the claimant earned during a one year period before the start

<footnote n="38">³⁸Also, this treatment effect is stronger than simply multiplicative, since it reduces the initial uncertified duration by $\tau/\alpha \approx 2/3$ in the less experienced group and only by $1/2$ in the more experienced group.</footnote>
<table><caption>Table 6: Heterogeneity of treatment on uncertified duration</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="4">Reference wage<br>(quartile)</th><th colspan="4">Age<br>(quartile)</th><th colspan="4">Education<br>(group)</th></tr><tr><th>Q<sub>1</sub></th><th>Q<sub>2</sub></th><th>Q<sub>3</sub></th><th>Q<sub>4</sub></th><th>Q<sub>1</sub></th><th>Q<sub>2</sub></th><th>Q<sub>3</sub></th><th>Q<sub>4</sub></th><th>G<sub>1</sub></th><th>G<sub>2</sub></th><th>G<sub>3</sub></th><th>G<sub>4</sub></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Initial (â)</td><td>52.0<br>(5.5)</td><td>44.1<br>(5.9)</td><td>30.9<br>(5.3)</td><td>45.5<br>(5.9)</td><td>29.9<br>(4.1)</td><td>47.4<br>(5.2)</td><td>35.4<br>(5.6)</td><td>63.0<br>(6.8)</td><td>51.4<br>(7.4)</td><td>41.1<br>(4.1)</td><td>41.6<br>(5.6)</td><td>48.5<br>(7.3)</td></tr><tr><td>Treat. (τ̂)</td><td>-33.9<br>(7.6)</td><td>-29.1<br>(7.9)</td><td>-19.2<br>(6.9)</td><td>-32.3<br>(7.8)</td><td>-20.2<br>(5.5)</td><td>-36.3<br>(7.0)</td><td>-18.6<br>(7.5)</td><td>-44.8<br>(9.1)</td><td>-36.4<br>(9.7)</td><td>-29.1<br>(5.4)</td><td>-30.1<br>(7.4)</td><td>-26.5<br>(10.0)</td></tr><tr><td>Obs.</td><td>7544</td><td>7543</td><td>7539</td><td>7548</td><td>6477</td><td>7986</td><td>7760</td><td>7951</td><td>4500</td><td>12181</td><td>7436</td><td>6054</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: This table shows the intercept $\alpha$ and the treatment effect $\tau$ estimated from model 1 through 2SLS, where the outcome is the uncertified duration of past jobs, using a local linear regression in a four month window around October 1st, 2014. Regressions are run separately for four groups of reference wage (**left**), four age groups (**middle**) and four groups of education level (**right**). The wage and age groups are respectively defined by the quartiles of the wage and age distributions. The groups of education are defined by diploma: $G_1$ stands for claimants with an education level below the CAP/BEP degree, $G_2$ for the CAP/BEP degree, $G_3$ for the BAC degree and $G_4$ for the BAC+2 level or above. Standard errors are in brackets. FNA files (Unédic).

of his current unemployment spell. It is used to determine the replacement ratio and the daily benefits he will receive. This reference wage can be considered as a proxy for the reservation wage the unemployed worker expects to earn if he finds a permanent job. The reform does not seem to have impacted the four wage groups in significantly different manners. Second, prior to the reform, older claimants where characterized by a higher uncertified duration compared to younger ones, which could result from a selection effect if older unemployed workers are also further away from the labor market and administrative procedures. Through provision of information about Employer Certificates, the letter had a stronger additive impact on older claimants (but a similar multiplicative one). Third, the last part of this table shows estimates for four levels of education, from the lower educated group $G_1$ to the most educated group $G_4$. Here again, the informative mailing seems to compensate for initial differences in certification behavior. The less educated, who were also losing a longer potential duration of benefit extension, experience a stronger impact of the reform than the most educated, although the difference between these treatment effects is not significant.

Through a widespread information about the renewal of entitlement and the role of Employer Certificates, the reform has mostly reduced the gap in certification behaviors between claimants with different levels of experience in unemployment.
# 6 Conclusion

This paper focuses on the incomplete take-up of unemployment benefit extensions by claimants reaching benefit exhaustion. In principle, each day worked should entitle to one extra day of benefits up to 2 years. However, before the 2014 reform, more than 20% of claimants eligible for an extension of their entitlement did not complete all administrative procedures. They failed sending part or all of their Employer Certificates, a document required by the Employment Agency in order to certify that the duration of a past job entitles for an equivalent extension of Potential Benefit Duration.

We show that the informative mailing automatically sent to claimants nearing benefit exhaustion had a strong impact on their certification behavior. The share of claimants who do not fully certificate their work history decreased by 14 points, which represents a rise in the Potential Benefit Duration by one month. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the average gain from the introduction of this letter is at least 300€ per claimant.

This analysis highlights the effectiveness of informational interventions in order to increase the take-up of UI benefit extensions. In particular, it shows how some claimants, especially those with a low experience in the unemployment insurance system, could not fully benefit from it. The first consequence of this is the inequity generated between low and high-experienced unemployed who are entitled to the same rights. The second is the lack of efficiency it might generate: not benefiting from the full insurance system may make low-experienced unemployed workers less sensitive to the incentives that are associated with the insurance scheme. We show here that such situation might be corrected for. In the case studied here, a simple information letter has considerably compensated the discrepancies between low and experienced workers : it has decreased by 40 days the uncertified duration of unemployment for the low-experienced unemployed, without affecting the one of high-experienced unemployed.
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# Appendix

## A Letters

This section presents the main letters that are sent to claimants depending on their situation. One month before their Potential Benefit Exhaustion (PBE) date, they receive either letter in Figure 11 if information about past employment history is too scarce or letter in Figure 12 if it is partially known but some Employer Certificates are missing.

<figure><img src="image_14.png" /><figcaption>Figure 11: Letter if renewal is undetermined</figcaption></figure>

Notes: This letter has been sent on April 26th, one month before the Potential Benefit Exhaustion (PBE) date (May 26th). It mentions that the claimant "does not fulfill the necessary conditions in order to benefit from a renewal of entitlement" and strongly advises him to send any "employer certificate in his possession".
<figure><img src="image_15.png" /><figcaption>Figure 12: Letter if some Employer Certificates are missing</figcaption></figure>

Notes: This letter mentions that 909 hours of work (6 months) have already been certified and that the claimant should send an Employer Certificate for the month of September 2014.
## B Additional details on the French UI system

**Generalities.** Daily unemployment benefits b range from 57% to 75% of a reference wage w determined as the average wage on a 4 to 12 months period before the termination of the last job in the employment history. Benefits are computed as: $b = \min\{0.75w, \max\{28.58\alpha, 0.404w + 11.72\alpha, 0.57w\}\}$ where $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ is the ratio of hours worked over the legal employment duration ($\alpha = 1$ for a full-time job.).

When a worker becomes unemployed, benefit duration is determined by his past employment history. In France, any day worked while affiliated to the UI agency ensures one day of benefits. To be entitled with UI, total employment history should be longer than 4 months within the last 28 months (before 50 years old) or 36 months (above 50). Maximum duration is 2 or 3 years depending on this same age threshold. In order to receive UI benefits, the claimant should not have deliberately quit his job.

For unemployed workers with a previous unemployment spell, the employment history considered for the renewal of UI entitlement begins at the start of the last unemployment period and must be within 28 months from their new unemployment period.

**Former “comparison-of-benefits” system.** In order to clarify how the comparison was operated, let us note $b_0$ the daily benefits and $d_0$ the duration (in days) of remaining entitlement of their current spell: total amount $B_0 = b_0d_0$. In order to be considered, this previous entitlement should not be older than 3 years plus the duration of the entitlement. Otherwise, the claimants lose their rights. Regarding the potential new entitlement, we note $b_1$ and $d_1$ the corresponding daily benefits and duration ($b_1$ is calculated from the new work contracts). Claimants new entitlement is defined as follows:

$$ 
\left\{ 
\begin{array}{l}
\text{Daily benefits} = \max(b_0, b_1) \\
\text{Total benefits} = \max(B_0, B_1) \\
\text{Duration} = \max(B_0, B_1) / \max(b_0, b_1)
\end{array}
\right.
$$

Another rule was modified by the 1st October 2014 reform, regarding the accumulation of wages and UI benefits for unemployed workers doing short-term contracts. In the comparison-of-benefits system, three upper-bounds were limiting this specific employment status: employment duration should be below 110 hours per month, total duration of this accumulation should not exceed 15 month and the monthly wage should not exceed 70% of the former reference wage. The 2014 reform suppressed these rules. Note that working while unemployed does not necessarily imply the accumulation of wages and UI benefits, since workers above the thresholds may choose to maintain registration at the employment agency.
# C Additional information on the dataset

## Description

We use exhaustive administrative data from the National File of UI Claimants (FNA, *Fichier National des Allocataires*), a long-run database provided by the Unédic, which tracks trajectories of all UI recipients while unemployed. Besides socio-economic variables (nationality, diploma, zip code, age), this database gathers very detailed information regarding: the cause of unemployment, features of UI benefits (type, daily amount, reference wage, length of entitlement, UI plan), nature of unemployment periods (paid or unpaid – and reason why in the latter case, training, partial unemployment), the previous employer (firm size, type of industry), employment contracts reported for renewal of entitlement (type, length and ground for termination), possible severance payments. In addition, each date is very precisely registered. This is essential for the present purpose, especially the date of first registration and the start and end dates of unemployment spells, of compensation and of each job. Its main drawback is the lack of information about stable employment, since employment periods are observed only if the worker returns to unemployment afterwards. A second issue is that, once the reference wage is computed, the Employment Agency gets rid of the information about the wage of each contract (except in case of reduced activity). Third, some socio-economic characteristics are only registered at the beginning of the first unemployment spell by the Employment Agency, (marital status, number of children, vocational training) and never updated afterwards. Dimensions that are not mentioned in the descriptive statistics of Section 3 have too many missing values to be informative.

## Structure

The FNA files contains three main datasets gathering informations on the universe of work contracts and unemployment trajectories. In the first table (PAR), each line correspond to a month of reduced activity for a claimant, but different contracts may be collapsed in one month, one contract may stretch out to many months and we do not have information about the bounds of each contract. The second table (PJC) is a decomposition of the unemployment spell in sub-periods, some spans corresponding to reduced activity contract, but this table brings no more information than the first one. In the third table (PAF), each line corresponds either to one work contract if it has been *certified* by the unemployed workers or to a period of work shorter than one month if it has only be *declared*. Unfortunately, it is not possible to match each period of reduced activity (PJC) with a declared work contract (PAF).

**Work affiliation correctly predict future entitlement.** In practice, a most important part of our empirical investigation is to construct the affiliation for each spell of each individual. This work history should be carefully measured since it determines both the sample of interest (claimants with a declared work history between 122 and 730 days) as well as the outcome variable (uncertified work history). This affiliation should be structured with caution in order to combine many jobs into a continuous period, especially when they are not registered in the same time unit (hours and days). In particular, since one day of work entitles to one day of benefits, overlapping contracts should not be counted twice.

Table 7 validates the construction of this work affiliation: both before and after the reform, the *certified* work history is relevant to predict benefit extensions, while the *uncertified* work history is not. Here, we focus on the workers who were actually eligible to a benefit extension before as well as after the reform (more than 122 days of certified work affiliation) once they started a new spell, so that we are able to directly compare their new entitlement to their previous work affiliation duration. This table shows that, both before and after the reform, a
one-day increase in the *certified* work history raises the duration of the new entitlement by one day, whereas the *uncertified* work history barely has any impact on the duration of the new UI entitlement.

<table><caption>Table 7: Validation of in prediction of the work affiliation</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Work affiliation</th><th colspan="2">Duration of new entitlement (days)</th></tr><tr><th>Before the reform</th><th>After the reform</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Certified (days)</td><td>0.974<sup>***</sup><br>(0.004)</td><td>1.045<sup>***</sup><br>(0.004)</td></tr><tr><td>Uncertified (days)</td><td>0.039<sup>*</sup><br>(0.020)</td><td>0.007<br>(0.028)</td></tr><tr><td>Constant</td><td>26.136<sup>***</sup><br>(1.184)</td><td>0.568<br>(1.286)</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>15,671</td><td>15,572</td></tr><tr><td>R<sup>2</sup></td><td>0.889</td><td>0.775</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: These results show how observed certified or uncertified work contracts empirically impact the new entitlement duration in our data, before and after the reform. The sample is restricted to claimants eligible to a benefit extension before as well as after the reform (more than 122 days of certified work affiliation) once they started a new spell, so that we are able to directly compare their new entitlement to their previous work affiliation duration. Standard errors are in brackets. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001. FNA files (Unédic).

**Comparing spells before and after the reform.** Switching from the old to the new unemployment insurance system impacted more radically the way unemployment spells are registered. In particular, while claimants could previously finish an unemployment spell with remaining benefits and start a new spell, they now systematically resume their previous spell as they return to unemployment. This changes the definition of the unemployment spell and impacts its average duration.
<figure><img src="image_16.png" /><figcaption>Figure 13: Frequency of benefit exhaustion dates</figcaption></figure>

Note: This figure shows the number of unemployment spells by month of BE between 2013 and 2015, centered around the reform. The mechanical rise starting October 2014 is the consequence of the “renewal-of-entitlement” system, whereby claimants should terminate the current unemployment spell before starting a new one.

<figure><img src="image_17.png" /><figcaption>Figure 14: Treatment by PBE date, without seasonality</figcaption></figure>

Note: This figure displays the proportion of spells ending after the enactment of the reform ($D = 1$) as a function of the PBE date, in a four-months window around the reform. It replicates Figure 7 on a subsample excluding the subpopulation causing the monthly seasonality issue. FNA files (Unédic).
D Seasonality

Considering a date as an assignment variable appears very useful when evaluating the impact of a reform on individual trajectories in administrative data, as in Ito [2015]; Kettemann et al. [2017]. Compared to other types of assignment variables, the specific issue of seasonality may arise. A seasonal pattern may be a threat for identification if we were not able to determine whether the jump in the outcome variable at the threshold results from this pattern or from the reform. Consequently, there is a risk of failing the various tests of validity of the design (continuity of the density of the running variable, continuity of other exogenous variables) solely because of the seasonality in the data. However, even if a seasonal pattern induces a discontinuity in the relation between $Y_s$ and $X_s$, this relation may be predicted as long as the pattern happens periodically. Seasonality can be estimated on a large time span around the reform and used to predict the value of the outcome of treated and non treated units around the reform absent any seasonal pattern.

In the present case, our running variable, the *PBE* date, is mechanically impacted by a monthly pattern. Figure 5 shows a clear downward sloping monthly trend in the distribution of the PBE date by day (red dots), in a four months window around the reform. Indeed, work contracts carried out by claimants registered with the Employment Agency are recorded in the FNA files at the end of each month, and not at their exact start and end dates. Therefore if the *PBE*$_{-61}$ date of a spell falls within a month which includes a work contract, the *PBE* date of this unemployment spell will have a higher probability to be located at the beginning than at the end of the month. Otherwise, there also appears to be seasonal patterns for given months of the year, as well as specific effects for the last day of each month, when the density may be higher.

In order to remove these trends, we take a quite conservatory stance and estimate a seasonal pattern over the period spanning from January 1st 2012 to December 31st 2015, excluding the window around the reform which is used for estimation. This seasonal pattern features monthly dummies, a common monthly trend and an index for the last day of the month. The deseasonalization equation therefore writes: $Y_s = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 d_s + \gamma_2 \mathbb{1}_{last} + \sum_m \delta_m \mathbb{1}_{m_s=m} + u_s$ where $Y_s$ is the value of the outcome variable for spell $s$, $d_s$ is a common monthly trend for the day of the month, $\mathbb{1}_{last}$ is an index that the day of the PBE for spell $s$ is the last of the month and $\mathbb{1}_m$ is a dummy equal to 1 when the PBE month is $m$ and $u_s$ are residuals. Reference is September 15th. The deseasonalized version of $Y_s$ is given by: $\tilde{Y}_s = \gamma_0 + u_s$. This procedure is a simpler case of the “augmented” RD design featured in Hausman and Rapson [2018]. In the rest of the paper, we consider detrended variables and show that they respect the local continuity assumption required by RDD estimations.
E Additional material on the RD estimations

<figure><img src="image_18.png" /><figcaption>Figure 15: Some outcomes around two *placebo* reform</figcaption></figure>

Notes: This figure displays a placebo version of Figure 9 as if the reform happened October 1st, 2013 (left column) or October 1st, 2015 (right column). The y-axis presents the proportion of claimants who fully certified their past employment history as a function of the day of the potential benefit exhaustion (PBE) date, in a four months window around the placebo reform. Each dot shows the average proportion per day. The red line represents third-order polynomials estimated below and above the discontinuity. Red dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. In each column, from the top to the bottom, we have respectively the low-, middle- and high-affiliation groups. FNA files (Unédic).
<figure><img src="image_19.png" /><figcaption>Figure 16: Mean of some observables around the reform</figcaption></figure>

Notes: Each graph of this figure represents the average of an observable variable per day of the PBE date in a four month window around the reform. From the top to the bottom, the variables are: (left column) age, reference wage, replacement rate; (right column) number of contracts during the spell, Potential Benefit Duration and the size of the plant the claimant were working before the current unemployment spell.
<table><caption>Table 8: Treatment effect (Fuzzy RDD) by polynomial order</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">2013</th><th colspan="3">2014</th><th colspan="3">2015</th></tr><tr><th>Incomp. Take-Up</th><th>Non Take-up</th><th>Uncert. Duration</th><th>Incomp. Take-Up</th><th>Non Take-up</th><th>Uncert. Duration</th><th>Incomp. Take-Up</th><th>Non Take-up</th><th>Uncert. Duration</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0</td><td>-0.029<br>(0.012)</td><td>-0.011<br>(0.008)</td><td>-9.886<br>(2.468)</td><td>-0.154<br>(0.009)</td><td>-0.066<br>(0.004)</td><td>-29.182<br>(1.500)</td><td>0.011<br>(0.003)</td><td>0.016<br>(0.001)</td><td>0.189<br>(0.427)</td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>-0.027<br>(0.033)</td><td>-0.017<br>(0.021)</td><td>-11.080<br>(6.886)</td><td>-0.144<br>(0.022)</td><td>-0.054<br>(0.011)</td><td>-30.357<br>(3.770)</td><td>0.024<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.025<br>(0.002)</td><td>-0.278<br>(0.930)</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>-0.023<br>(0.033)</td><td>-0.016<br>(0.021)</td><td>-11.056<br>(6.932)</td><td>-0.144<br>(0.023)</td><td>-0.054<br>(0.012)</td><td>-30.717<br>(3.981)</td><td>0.025<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.025<br>(0.002)</td><td>-0.261<br>(0.938)</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>0.061<br>(0.045)</td><td>-0.003<br>(0.030)</td><td>-14.987<br>(9.678)</td><td>-0.134<br>(0.033)</td><td>-0.050<br>(0.017)</td><td>-32.791<br>(5.649)</td><td>0.019<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.027<br>(0.003)</td><td>-0.258<br>(1.352)</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>0.061<br>(0.046)</td><td>-0.004<br>(0.030)</td><td>-15.700<br>(9.862)</td><td>-0.138<br>(0.034)</td><td>-0.045<br>(0.018)</td><td>-33.734<br>(5.975)</td><td>0.018<br>(0.010)</td><td>0.027<br>(0.003)</td><td>-0.147<br>(1.375)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: These results correspond to specification 1 where the treatment effect is estimated through 2SLS and $f(X_s - c)$ and $g(X_s - c)$ are polynomials of order $P$. This table reports the estimate $\hat{\tau}$ of the treatment effect for different order of the polynomial of the running variable. Standard errors are in brackets. FNA files (Unédic).

<table><caption>Table 9: Intent-to-treat effect by polynomial order</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">2013</th><th colspan="3">2014</th><th colspan="3">2015</th></tr><tr><th>Incomp. Take-Up</th><th>Non Take-up</th><th>Uncert. Duration</th><th>Incomp. Take-Up</th><th>Non Take-up</th><th>Uncert. Duration</th><th>Incomp. Take-Up</th><th>Non Take-up</th><th>Uncert. Duration</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0</td><td>-0.015<br>(0.006)</td><td>-0.006<br>(0.004)</td><td>-5.176<br>(1.288)</td><td>-0.082<br>(0.005)</td><td>-0.035<br>(0.002)</td><td>-15.637<br>(0.806)</td><td>0.007<br>(0.002)</td><td>0.010<br>(0.001)</td><td>0.123<br>(0.278)</td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>-0.010<br>(0.012)</td><td>-0.006<br>(0.008)</td><td>-4.113<br>(2.548)</td><td>-0.061<br>(0.009)</td><td>-0.023<br>(0.005)</td><td>-12.754<br>(1.588)</td><td>0.014<br>(0.004)</td><td>0.015<br>(0.001)</td><td>-0.164<br>(0.548)</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>-0.008<br>(0.012)</td><td>-0.006<br>(0.008)</td><td>-4.085<br>(2.553)</td><td>-0.058<br>(0.009)</td><td>-0.022<br>(0.005)</td><td>-12.399<br>(1.611)</td><td>0.014<br>(0.004)</td><td>0.015<br>(0.001)</td><td>-0.153<br>(0.549)</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>0.022<br>(0.016)</td><td>-0.001<br>(0.010)</td><td>-5.308<br>(3.411)</td><td>-0.051<br>(0.012)</td><td>-0.019<br>(0.006)</td><td>-12.390<br>(2.139)</td><td>0.010<br>(0.005)</td><td>0.014<br>(0.002)</td><td>-0.139<br>(0.730)</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>0.021<br>(0.016)</td><td>-0.002<br>(0.011)</td><td>-5.490<br>(3.431)</td><td>-0.050<br>(0.013)</td><td>-0.016<br>(0.006)</td><td>-12.307<br>(2.184)</td><td>0.010<br>(0.005)</td><td>0.015<br>(0.002)</td><td>-0.078<br>(0.732)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: These results correspond to an estimation of the intent-to-treat effect where this effect is estimated through OLS and $f(X_s - c)$ and $g(X_s - c)$ are polynomials of order $P$. This table reports the estimate of the intent-to-treat effect for different order of the polynomial of the running variable. Standard errors are in brackets. FNA files (Unédic).
<table><caption>Table 10: Fuzzy RDD by LLR with different slopes</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Outcome</th></tr><tr><th>Incomplete<br>Take-up</th><th>Non<br>Take-Up</th><th>Uncertified<br>Duration</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2013</td><td>-0.023<br>(0.033)</td><td>-0.016<br>(0.021)</td><td>-11.1<br>(6.9)</td></tr><tr><td>2014</td><td>-0.145<br>(0.023)</td><td>-0.054<br>(0.011)</td><td>-30.6<br>(3.9)</td></tr><tr><td>2015</td><td>0.025<br>(0.007)</td><td>0.025<br>(0.002)</td><td>-0.3<br>(0.9)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: This table presents the treatment effect estimated from model 1 through 2SLS, using a local linear regression in a four month window around the reform, allowing for different slopes at the left and at the right of the discontinuity. Regressions are run separately for three different outcomes: the share of incomplete takers, the share of non-takers and the uncertified duration of past work contracts. Rows display result for the year of the reform (2014) and for two placebo reforms (2013 and 2015). Standard errors are in brackets. FNA files (Unédic).

<table><caption>Table 11: Treatment effect (Fuzzy RDD): polynomial order and bandwidth</caption><thead><tr><th>P</th><th>10</th><th>20</th><th>30</th><th>40</th><th>50</th><th>60</th><th>70</th><th>80</th><th>90</th><th>100</th><th>110</th><th>120</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0</td><td>-40.9<br>(6.6)</td><td>-32.3<br>(4.6)</td><td>-31.0<br>(3.7)</td><td>-30.5<br>(3.2)</td><td>-29.9<br>(2.8)</td><td>-30.1<br>(2.5)</td><td>-28.3<br>(2.2)</td><td>-29.3<br>(2.0)</td><td>-28.9<br>(1.8)</td><td>-29.6<br>(1.7)</td><td>-29.3<br>(1.6)</td><td>-28.9<br>(1.5)</td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>-29.8<br>(15.6)</td><td>-43.0<br>(10.1)</td><td>-41.4<br>(8.3)</td><td>-35.3<br>(7.0)</td><td>-35.0<br>(6.3)</td><td>-32.9<br>(5.5)</td><td>-34.9<br>(5.2)</td><td>-31.2<br>(4.9)</td><td>-31.0<br>(4.6)</td><td>-30.1<br>(4.3)</td><td>-30.3<br>(4.0)</td><td>-30.7<br>(3.8)</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>-25.7<br>(16.8)</td><td>-42.0<br>(10.6)</td><td>-38.1<br>(8.7)</td><td>-34.7<br>(7.2)</td><td>-34.4<br>(6.4)</td><td>-33.1<br>(5.6)</td><td>-36.9<br>(5.6)</td><td>-33.6<br>(5.5)</td><td>-33.6<br>(5.2)</td><td>-30.2<br>(4.7)</td><td>-30.6<br>(4.4)</td><td>-31.3<br>(4.0)</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>-25.3<br>(24.2)</td><td>-42.7<br>(14.9)</td><td>-44.7<br>(12.0)</td><td>-46.9<br>(10.0)</td><td>-38.9<br>(8.8)</td><td>-37.5<br>(8.0)</td><td>-32.9<br>(7.0)</td><td>-36.2<br>(6.5)</td><td>-35.7<br>(6.2)</td><td>-34.4<br>(6.2)</td><td>-33.0<br>(5.9)</td><td>-32.0<br>(5.8)</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>-31.0<br>(25.7)</td><td>-38.7<br>(15.8)</td><td>-45.4<br>(12.5)</td><td>-44.6<br>(10.3)</td><td>-38.6<br>(9.1)</td><td>-36.5<br>(8.3)</td><td>-30.9<br>(6.9)</td><td>-35.1<br>(6.4)</td><td>-35.4<br>(6.3)</td><td>-37.5<br>(6.4)</td><td>-34.6<br>(6.3)</td><td>-32.4<br>(6.1)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: These results correspond to specification 1 where the treatment effect is estimated through 2SLS and $f(X_s - c)$ and $g(X_s - c)$ are polynomials of order $P$. This table reports the estimate $\hat{\tau}$ of the treatment effect for different order of the polynomial ranging from $P = 0$ to $P = 4$ and different bandwidth, from 10 days to 120 days around October 1st 2014. Standard errors are in brackets. FNA files (Unédic).
# Liste des documents de travail de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques

G 9001 J. FAYOLLE et M. FLEURBAEY Accumulation, profitabilité et endettement des entreprises

G 9002 H. ROUSSE Détection et effets de la multicolinearité dans les modèles linéaires ordinaires - Un prolongement de la réflexion de BELSLEY, KUH et WELSCH

G 9003 P. RALLE et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE Indexation des salaires : la rupture de 1983

G 9004 D. GUELEC et P. RALLE Cognitivité, croissance et innovation de produit

G 9005 P. RALLE et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE Les conséquences de la désindexation. Analyse dans une maquette prix-salaires

G 9101 Équipe AMADEUS - Première partie Le modèle AMADEUS - Deuxième partie

G 9102 J.L. BRILLET Le modèle AMADEUS - Deuxième partie - Propriétés variantielles

G 9103 D. GUELEC et P. RALLE Endogenous growth and product innovation

G 9104 H. ROUSSE Le modèle AMADEUS - Troisième partie - Le commerce extérieur et l'environnement international

G 9105 H. ROUSSE Effets de demande et d'offre dans les résultats du commerce extérieur manufacturé de la France au cours des deux dernières décennies

G 9106 B. CREPON Innovation, taille et concentration : causalités et dynamiques

G 9107 B. AMABLE et D. GUELEC Un panorama des théories de la croissance endogène

G 9108 M. GLAUDE et M. MOUTARDIER Une évaluation du coût direct de l'enfant de 1979 à 1989

G 9109 P. RALLE et alii France - Allemagne : performances économiques comparées

G 9110 J.L. BRILLET Micro-DMS **NON PARU**

G 9111 A. MAGNIER Effets accéléré et multiplicateur en France depuis 1970 : quelques résultats empiriques

G 9112 B. CREPON et G. DUREAU Investissement en recherche-developpement : analyse de causalités dans un modèle d'accélérateur généralisé

G 9113 J.L. BRILLET, H. ERKEL-ROUSSE, J. TOUJAS-BERNATE "France-Allemagne Couplees" - Deux économies vues par une maquette macro-économétique

G 9201 W.J. ADAMS, B. CREPON, D. ENCAOUA Choix technologiques et stratégies de dissuasion d'entrée

G 9202 J. OLIVEIRA-MARTINS, J. TOUJAS-BERNATE Macro-economic import functions with imperfect competition - An application to the E.C. Trade

G 9203 I. STAPIC Les échanges internationaux de services de la France dans le cadre des négociations multilatérales du GATT

G 9204 P. SEVESTRE L'économie sur données individuelles- temporales. Une note introductive

G 9205 H. ERKEL-ROUSSE Le commerce extérieur et l'environnement international dans le modèle AMADEUS (révision 1992)

G 9206 N. GREENAN et D. GUELEC Coordination within the firm and endoge nous growth

G 9207 A. MAGNIER et J. TOUJAS-BERNATE Technology and trade: empirical evidences for the major five industrialized countries

G 9208 B. CREPON, E. DUGUET, D. ENCAOUA et P. MOHINEN

G 9209 B. CREPON et E. DUGUET Research and development, competition and innovation; an application of pseudo maximum likelihood methods to Poisson models with heterogeneity

G 9209 B. CREPON et E. DUGUET Research and development, competition and innovation; an application of pseudo maximum likelihood methods to Poisson models with heterogeneity

G 9301 J. TOUJAS-BERNATE Commerce international et concurrence Imparfaite : développements récents et implications pour la politique commerciale

G 9302 Ch. CASES Durées de chômage et comportements d'offre de travail : une revue de la littérature

G 9303 H. ERKEL-ROUSSE Union économique et monétaire : le débat économique

G 9304 N. GREENAN - D. GUELEC / G. BROUSSAUDIER - L. MIOTTI Innovation organisationnelle, dynamisme technologique et performances des entreprises

G 9305 P. JALLARD Le traité de Maastricht : présentation juridique et historique

G 9306 J.L. BRILLET Micro-DMS : présentation et propriétés

G 9307 J.L. BRILLET Micro-DMS - variantes : les tableaux

G 9308 S. JACOBZONE Les grands réseaux publics français dans une perspective européenne

G 9309 L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ Profitabilité de l'investissement productif et transmission des chocs financiers

G 9310 J. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ Les théories sur la structure optimale du capital : quelques points de repère

G 9311 J. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT Les décisions de financement des entreprises françaises : une évaluation empirique des théories de la structure optimale du capital

G 9312 L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ Q de Tobin marginal et transmission des chocs financiers

G 9313 Équipes Amadeus (INSEE), Banque de France, Métric (DP) Presentation des propriétés des principaux modèles macroéconomiques du Service Public

G 9314 B. CREPON - E. DUGUET Research & Development, competition and innovation

G 9315 B. DORMONT Quelle est l'influence du coût du travail sur l'emploi ?

G 9316 B. DORMONT - C. BROUSSE Deux études sur l'âge de la retraite

G 9317 D. BLANCHET Répartition du travail dans une population hétérogène : deux notes

G 9318 D. EYSSARTIER - N. PONTY AMADEUS - an annual macro-economic model for the medium and long term

G 9319 G. CETTE - Ph. CUNÉO - D. EYSSARTIER J. GAUTIÉ Les effets sur l'emploi d'un abaissement du coût du travail des jeunes

G 9401 D. BLANCHET Les structures par âge importent-elles ?

G 9402 J. GAUTIÉ Le chômage des jeunes en France : problème de formation ou phénomène de file d'attente ?

G 9403 P. QUIRION Les déchets en France : éléments statistiques et économiques

G 9404 D. LADIRAY - M. GRUN-REHOMME Lissage par moyennes mobiles - Le problème des extrémités de série

G 9405 V. MAILLARD Théorie et pratique de la correction des effets de jours ouvrables

G 9406 F. ROSENMALD La décision d'investir

G 9407 S. JACOBZONE Les apports de l'économie industrielle pour de finir la stratégie économique de l'hôpital public

G 9408 L. BLOCH, J. BOURDIEU, G. COLIN-SEDILLOT, G. LONGUEVILLE Du défaut de paiement au dépôt de bilan : les banquiers face aux PME en difficulté

G 9409 D. EYSSARTIER, P. MAIRE Impact macro-économiques de mesures d'aide au logement - quelques éléments d'évaluation

G 9410 F. ROSENMALD Suivi conjointurel de l'investissement

G 9411 C. DEFEUILLEY - Ph. QUIRION Les déchets d'emballages ménagers : une analyse économique des bagages français et allemande

G 9412 J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. COLIN-SEDILLOT Investissement, incertitude et irréversibilité Quelques développements récents de la théorie de l'investissement

G 9413 B. DORMONT - M. PAUCHET L'évaluation de l'elasticité emploi-salaire dépend-elle des structures de qualification ?

G 9414 I. KABLA Le Chois de breveter une invention J. BOURDIEU - B. CŒURÉ - B. SEDILLOT Irreversible investment and Uncertainty: When is there a Value of Waiting?

G 9415 B. DORMONT Imperfections du marché du crédit, investissement des entreprises et cycle économique

G 9502 L. BLOCH - B. CŒURÉ Impersonnalité du marché du crédit, investissement des entreprises et cycle économique

G 9503 D. GOUX - E. MAURIN Les transformations de la demande de travail par qualification en France Une étude sur la période 1970-1993

G 9504 N. GREENAN Technologie, changement organisationnel, qualifications et emploi : une étude empirique sur l'industrie manufacturière

G 9505 D. GOUX - E. MAURIN Persistance des hérarchies sectorielles de salaires, un réexamen sur données françaises

G 9505 B. DORST - E. MAURIN Persistance des inter-industry wages differentials: a reexamination on matched worker-firm panel data

G 9505 Bis D. GOUX - E. MAURIN D'implication des inter-industry wages differentials: a reexamination on matched worker-firm panel data

G 9506 S. JACOBZONE Les liens entre RMI et chômage, une mise en perspective NON PARU - article sorti dans *Economie et Privilège* n° 122 (1996) - pages 95 à 113

G 9506 S. JACOBZONE Les liens entre RMI et chômage, une mise en perspective NON PARU - article sorti dans *Economie et Privilège* n° 122 (1996) - pages 95 à 113

G 9507 G. CETTE - S. MAHFOUZ Le partage primaire du revenu Constat descriptif sur longue période

G 9507 G. CETTE - S. MAHFOUZ Le partage primaire du revenu Constat descriptif sur longue période Banque de France - CEPREMAP - Direction de la Prévision - Érasme - INSEE - OFCE Structures et propriétés de cinq modèles macro-économiques français

G 9601 Rapport d'activité de la DESE de l'année 1995 J. BOURDIEU - A. DRAZNIKS L'octroi de crédit aux PME : une analyse à partir d'informations bancaires

G 9602 A. TOPIOL-BENSAID Les implantations japonaises en France

G 9603 L. BOURDIEU - A. DRAZNIKS Les implantations japonaises en France

G 9604 P. GENIER - S. JACOBZONE Comportements de prévention, consommation d'alcool et tabagie, peut-on paier d'une gestion globale du capital santé ?

G 9605 Une modélisation microéconométrique empirique
<table><tr><td>G 9606</td><td>C. DOZ - F. LENGLART<br>Factor analysis and unobserved component models; an application to the study of French business surveys</td></tr><tr><td>G 9607</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br>La théorie coopérative de la firme</td></tr><tr><td>G 9608</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br>Technological innovation and employment reallocation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9609</td><td>Ph. COUR - F. RUPPRECHT<br>L'intégration asymptérique au sein du continent américain: un essai de modélisation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9610</td><td>S. DUCHENE - G. FORGEOT - A. JACQUOT<br>Analysis des évolutions récentes de la productivité apparente du travail</td></tr><tr><td>G 9611</td><td>X. BONNET - S. MAHFOUZ<br>The influence of different specifications of wages-prices spirals on the measure of the NAIRU: the case of France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9612</td><td>PH. COUR - E. DUBOIS, S. MAHFOUZ, J. PISANI-FERRY<br>The cost of fiscal retrenchment revisited: how strong is the evidence?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9613</td><td>A. JACQUOT<br>Les flexions des taux d'activité sont-elles seule-ment conjonctuelles ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9614</td><td>ZHANG Yingxiang - SONG Xueqing<br>Lexique macroéconomique Français-Chinois</td></tr><tr><td>G 9701</td><td>J.L. SCHNEIDER<br>La taxe professionnelle : éléments de cadrage économique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9702</td><td>J.L. SCHNEIDER<br>Transition et stabilité politique d'un système redistributif</td></tr><tr><td>G 9703</td><td>D. GOUX - E. MAURIN<br>Train or Pay: Does it Reduce Inequalities to En-courage Firms to Train their Workers?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9704</td><td>P. GENIER<br>Deux contributions sur dépendance et équité</td></tr><tr><td>G 9705</td><td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br>R & D investment, Patent Life and Patent Value</td></tr><tr><td>G 9706</td><td>M. HOUDEBINE - A. TOPIOL-BENAID<br>Les entreprises internationales en France: une analyse à partir de données individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G 9707</td><td>M. HOUDEBINE<br>Polarisation des activités et spécialisation des départements en France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9708</td><td>E. DUGUET - N. GREENAN<br>Le biais technique : une analyse sur don-nées individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G 9709</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Analysing a small French ECM Model</td></tr><tr><td>G 9710</td><td>J.L. BRILLET<br>Formalizing the transition process: scenarios for capital accumulation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9711</td><td>G. FORGEOT - J. GAUTIÉ<br>Insertion professionnelle des jeunes et proces-sus de déclassement</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9712</td><td>E. DUBOIS<br>High Real Interest Rates: the Consequence of a Saving Investment Disequilibrium or of an insufficient Credibility of Monetary Authorities?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9713</td><td>N. GREENAN - D. GUELLEC<br>La théorie coopérative de la firme</td></tr><tr><td>G 9714</td><td>F. LEQUILLER<br>Does the French Consumer Price Index Over-state Inflation?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9715</td><td>X. BONNET<br>Peut-on mettre en évidence les rigidités à la baisse des salaires nominale?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9716</td><td>N. IUNG - F. RUPPRECHT<br>Productivité de la recherche et rendements d'échelle dans le secteur pharmaceutique français</td></tr><tr><td>G 9717</td><td>E. DUGUET - I. KABLA<br>Appropriation strategy and the motivations to use the patent system in France - An econo metric analysis at the firm level</td></tr><tr><td>G 9718</td><td>L.P. PELÉ - P. RALLE<br>Àge de la retraite : les aspects incitatifs du ré-gime général</td></tr><tr><td>G 9719</td><td>ZHANG Yingxiang - SONG Xueqing<br>Lexique macroéconomique français-chinois, chinois-français</td></tr><tr><td>G 9720</td><td>M. HOUDEBINE - J.L. SCHNEIDER<br>Mesurer l'influence de la fiscalité sur la locali-sation des entreprises</td></tr><tr><td>G 9721</td><td>A. MOUROUGANE<br>Crédibilité, indépendance et politique monétaire<br>Une redevance à la littérature</td></tr><tr><td>G 9722</td><td>P. AUGERAUD - L. BRIOT<br>Les données comptables d'entreprises<br>Le système intermédiaire d'entreprises<br>Passage des données individuelles aux données sectorielles</td></tr><tr><td>G 9723</td><td>P. AUGERAUD - J.E. CHAPRON<br>Using Business Accounts for Compiling National Accounts: the French Experience</td></tr><tr><td>G 9724</td><td>P. AUGERAUD<br>Les comptes d'entreprise par activités - Le pas-sage aux comptes - De la comptabilité à l'entreprise à la comptabilité nationale - A paraître</td></tr><tr><td>G 9801</td><td>H. MICHAUDON - C. PRIGENT<br>Presentation du modèle AIMADEUS</td></tr><tr><td>G 9802</td><td>J. ACCARDO<br>Une étude de comptabilité générationnelle pour la France en 1996</td></tr><tr><td>G 9803</td><td>X. BONNET - S. DUCHENE<br>Apports et limites de la modélisation « Real Business Cycles »</td></tr><tr><td>G 9804</td><td>C. BARLET - C. DUGUET - D. ENCAOUA - J. PRADEL<br>The Commercial Success of Innovations<br>An econometric analysis at the firm level in French manufacturing</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9805</td><td>P. CAHUC - Ch. GIANELLA - D. GOUX - A. ZILBERBERG<br>Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining in Power - Evidence form a Panel of French Firms</td></tr><tr><td>G 9806</td><td>J. ACCARDO - M. JLASSI<br>La productivité globale des facteurs entre 1975 et 1996</td></tr><tr><td>G 9807</td><td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques - 1997</td></tr><tr><td>G 9808</td><td>X. MOUROUGANE<br>Can a Conservative Governor Conduct an Ac-commodative Monetary Policy?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9809</td><td>X. BONNET - E. DUBOIS - L. FAUVET<br>Asymétrie des inflations relatives et menus costs : tests sur l'infographique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9810</td><td>E. DUGUET - N. IUNG<br>Sales and Advertising with Spillovers at the firm level: Estimation of a Dynamic Structural Model on Panel Data</td></tr><tr><td>G 9811</td><td>J.P. BERTHIER<br>Congestion urbaine : un modèle de trafic de pointe à courbe débît-vitesse et demande élastique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9812</td><td>C. PRIGENT<br>La part des salaires dans la valeur ajoutée : une approche macroéconomique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9813</td><td>A.Th. AERTS<br>L'évolution de la part des salaires dans la valeur ajoutée en France reflète-elle les évolutions individuelles sur la période 1979-1994 ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 9814</td><td>B. SALANIÉ<br>Guide pratique des séries non-stationnaires<br>Une croissance plus riche en emplois depuis le début de la décennie ? Une analyse en compa-aison internationale</td></tr><tr><td>G 9901</td><td>Ch. COLIN<br>Modélisation des carrières dans Destineie<br>Ch. COLIN<br>Évolution de la dispersion des salaires : un essai de prospective par microsimulation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9902</td><td>Ch. COLIN<br>Modélisation des carrières dans Destineie<br>Ch. COLIN<br>Évolution de la dispersion des salaires : un essai de prospective par microsimulation</td></tr><tr><td>G 9903</td><td>B. CREPON - N. IUNG<br>Innovation, emploi et performances</td></tr><tr><td>G 9904</td><td>B. CREPON - Ch. GIANELLA<br>Wages inequalities in France 1969-1992<br>An application of quantile regression techniques</td></tr><tr><td>G 9905</td><td>C. BONNET - R. MAHIEU<br>Microsimulation techniques applied to inter-generational transfers - Pensions in a dynamic framework: the case of France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9906</td><td>F. ROSENWALD<br>L'impact des contraintes financières dans la dé-cision d'investissement</td></tr><tr><td>G 9907</td><td>C. BARLET - C. DUGUET - D. ENCAOUA - J. PRADEL<br>The Commercial Success of Innovations<br>An econometric analysis at the firm level in French manufacturing</td></tr><tr><td>G 9908</td><td>J.P. ZOYEM<br>Contrat d'insertion et sortie du RMI<br>Évaluation des effets d'une politique sociale</td></tr><tr><td>G 9909</td><td>Ch. COLIN - FI. LEGROS - R. MAHIEU<br>Bilans contribués comparés des régimes de retraite du secteur privé et de la fonction publique</td></tr><tr><td>G 9910</td><td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br>Équivalent patrimonial de la rente et souscription de retraite complémentaire</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G 9911</td><td>G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ<br>Une décomposition du non-emploi en France</td></tr><tr><td>G 9912</td><td>B. SALANIÉ<br>Une maquette analytique de long terme du marché du travail</td></tr><tr><td>G 9912</td><td>Ch. GIANELLA<br>Une estimation de l'élasticité de l'emploi peu qualifié à son coût</td></tr><tr><td>G 9913</td><td>Division « Redistribution et Politiques Sociales »<br>Le modèle de microsimulation dynamique DESTIMIE</td></tr><tr><td>G 9914</td><td>E. DUGUET<br>Macro-commandes SAS pour l'économétrie des panels et des variables qualitatives</td></tr><tr><td>G 9915</td><td>R. DUHAUTOIS<br>Évolution des flux d'emplois en France entre 1990 et 1996 : une étude empirique à partir du fichier des bénéfices réels normaux (BRN)</td></tr><tr><td>G 9916</td><td>J.Y. FOURNIER<br>Extraction du cycle des affaires : la méthode de Baxter et King</td></tr><tr><td>G 9917</td><td>B. CRÉPON - R. DESPLATZ - J. MAIRESSE<br>Estimating price cost margins, scale economies and workers' bargaining power at the firm level</td></tr><tr><td>G 9918</td><td>Ch. GIANELLA - Ph. LAGARDE<br>Productivity of hours in the aggregate pro duction function: an evaluation on a panel of French firms from the manufacturing sector</td></tr><tr><td>G 9919</td><td>S. AUDRIC - P. GIVORD - C. PROST<br>Évolution de l'emploi et des coûts par quali-fication entre 1982 et 1996</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/01</td><td>R. MAHIEU<br>Les déterminants des dépenses de santé : une approche macroéconomique</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/02</td><td>C. ALLARD-PRIGENT - H. GUILMEAU - A. QUINET<br>The real exchange rate as the relative price of nontrables in terms of tradables: theoretical investigation and empirical study on French data</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/03</td><td>J.-Y. FOURNIER<br>L'approximation du filtre passe-bande proposée par Christiano et Fitzgerald</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/04</td><td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 1999<br>Investment et contraintes de financement : le pôds du cycle</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/05</td><td>Un estimation sur données françaises<br>Une estimation sur données françaises</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/06</td><td>A. FLIPO<br>Les comportements matrimoniaux de fait</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/07</td><td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br>Microsimulations of the retirement decision: a supply side approach</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/08</td><td>C. AUDENS - C. PROST<br>Déficit conjoncturel : une prise en compte des conjonctures passées</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/09</td><td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT<br>Équivalent patrimonial de la rente et souscription de retraite complémentaire</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>G 2000/10</td><td>R. DUHAUTOIS</td><td>Ralentissement de l'investissement : petites ou grandes entreprises ? industrie ou tertiaire ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/11</td><td>G. LAROQUE - B. SALANIÉ</td><td>Temps partiel féminin et incitations financières à l'emploi</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/12</td><td>Ch. GIANELLA</td><td>Local unemployment and wages</td></tr><tr><td>G 2000/13</td><td>B. CREPON - Th. HECKEL</td><td>Informalité en France : une évaluation à partir de données individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/01</td><td>F. LEQUILLER</td><td>- La nouvelle économie et la mesure de la croissance du PIB<br/>- The new economy and the measure of GDP growth</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/02</td><td>S. AUDRIC</td><td>La reprise de la croissance de l'emploi profite-t-elle aussi aux non-riploèmes ?</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/03</td><td>I. BRAJUN-LEMAIRE</td><td>Évolution et répartition du surplus de productivité</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/04</td><td>A. BEAUDU - Th. HECKEL</td><td>Le canal du crédit fonctionne-t-il en Europe ?<br/>Une étude de l'haproférance des comportements d'investissement à partir de données de bilan agrégées</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/05</td><td>C. AUDENIS - P. BISCOURP - N. FOURCADE - O. LOISEL</td><td>Testing the augmented Solow growth model: An empirical reassessment using panel data</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/06</td><td>R. MAHIEU - B. SÉDILLOT</td><td>Départ à la retraite, irréversibilité et incertitude</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/07</td><td>J. Ph. GAUDEMET</td><td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2000</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/08</td><td>B. CRÉPON - Ch. GIANELLA</td><td>Les dispositifs d'acquisition à titre facultatif d'annuïtés viagères de retraite</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/09</td><td>B. CRÉPON - Ch. GIANELLA</td><td>Fiscalité, coût d'usage du capital et demande de facteurs : une analyse sur données individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/10</td><td>B. CRÉPON - R. DESPLATZ</td><td>Évaluation des effets des dispositifs d'alégements</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/11</td><td>J.-Y. FOURNIER</td><td>Comparaison des salaires des secteurs public et privé</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/12</td><td>J.-P. BERTHIER - C. JAULENT</td><td>R. CONVENEVOLE - S. PISANI</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/13</td><td>P. BISCOURP - Ch. GIANELLA</td><td>Substitution and complementarity between capital, skilled and less skilled workers: an analysis at the firm level in the French manufacturing industry</td></tr><tr><td>G 2001/14</td><td>I. ROBERT-BOBEE</td><td>Modelling demographic behaviours in the French</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2002/13</td><td>M. LECLAIR</td><td>Réduction du temps de travail et tensions sur les facteurs de production</td></tr><tr><td>G2002/14</td><td>E. WALRAET - A. VINCENT</td><td>Évaluation de la redistribution intragénérationnelle dans le système de retraite des salariés du privé - Une approche par microsimulation</td></tr><tr><td>G2002/15</td><td>P. CHONE - D. LE BLANC - I. ROBERT-BOBEE</td><td>Offre de travail féminine et garde des jeunes enfants</td></tr><tr><td>G2002/16</td><td>F. MAUREL - S. GREGOIR</td><td>Les indices de compétitivité des pays : interprétation et limites</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/01</td><td>N. RIEDINGER - E.HAUVY</td><td>Le coût de dépollution atmosphérique pour les entreprises françaises: Une estimation à partir de données individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/02</td><td>P. BISCOURP et F. KRAMARZ</td><td>Création d'emplois, destruction d'emplois et internationalisation des entreprises industrielles françaises: une analyse sur la période 1986-1992</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/03</td><td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2002</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>G2003/04</td><td>P.-O. BEFFY - J. DEROYON - N. FOURCADE - S. GREGOIR - N. LAIB - B. MONFORT</td><td>Évolutions démographiques et croissance : une projection macro-économique à l'horizon 2020</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/05</td><td>P. AUBERT</td><td>La situation des salariés de plus de cinquante ans dans le secteur privé</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/06</td><td>P. AUBERT - B. CRÉPON</td><td>Age, salaire et productivité</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/07</td><td>H. BARON - P.O. BEFFY - N. FOURCADE - R. MAHIEU</td><td>La productivité des salariés décline-t-elle en fin de carrière?</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/08</td><td>P. O. BEFFY - B. MONFORT</td><td>Patrimoine des ménages, dynamique d'allocation et comportement de consommation</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/09</td><td>P. BISCOURP - N. FOURCADE</td><td>Peut-on mettre en évidence l'existence de rigidités à la baisse des salaires à partir de données individuelles ? Le cas de la France à la fin des années 90</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/10</td><td>M. LECLAIR - P. PETIT</td><td>Présence syndicale dans les firmes : quel impact sur les inégalités salariales entre les hommes et les femmes?</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/11</td><td>P. O. BEFFY - X. BONNET - M. DARRACO-PARIES - B. MONFORT</td><td>Les comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE - Une comparaison des estimations issues des enquêtes Jeunes et Carrières 1997 et Histoire Familiale 1999</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/12</td><td>J.-P. ZOYEM</td><td>La dynamique des bas revenus : une analyse des entrées-sorties de pauvreté</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/13</td><td>F. HILD</td><td>Prévisions d'inflation pour la France</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2002/13</td><td>M. LECLAIR</td><td>Réduction du temps de travail et tensions sur les facteurs de production</td></tr><tr><td>G2002/14</td><td>E. WALRAET - A. VINCENT</td><td>Évaluation de la redistribution intragénérationnelle dans le système de retraite des salariés du privé - Une approche par microsimulation</td></tr><tr><td>G2002/15</td><td>P. CHONE - D. LE BLANC - I. ROBERT-BOBEE</td><td>Offre de travail féminine et garde des jeunes enfants</td></tr><tr><td>G2002/16</td><td>F. MAUREL - S. GREGOIR</td><td>Les indices de compétitivité des pays : interprétation et limites</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/01</td><td>N. RIEDINGER - E.HAUVY</td><td>Le coût de dépollution atmosphérique pour les entreprises françaises: Une estimation à partir de données individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/02</td><td>P. BISCOURP et F. KRAMARZ</td><td>Création d'emplois, destruction d'emplois et internationalisation des entreprises industrielles françaises: une analyse sur la période 1986-1992</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/03</td><td>Bilan des activités de la DESE - 2002</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>G2003/04</td><td>P.-O. BEFFY - J. DEROYON - N. FOURCADE - S. GREGOIR - N. LAIB - B. MONFORT</td><td>Évolutions démographiques et croissance : une projection macro-économique à l'horizon 2020</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/05</td><td>P. AUBERT</td><td>La situation des salariés de plus de cinquante ans dans le secteur privé</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/06</td><td>P. AUBERT - B. CRÉPON</td><td>Age, salaire et productivité</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/07</td><td>H. BARON - P.O. BEFFY - N. FOURCADE - R. MAHIEU</td><td>La productivité des salariés décline-t-elle en fin de carrière?</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/08</td><td>P. O. BEFFY - B. MONFORT</td><td>Patrimoine des ménages, dynamique d'allocation et comportement de consommation</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/09</td><td>P. BISCOURP - N. FOURCADE</td><td>Peut-on mettre en évidence l'existence de rigidités à la baisse des salaires à partir de données individuelles ? Le cas de la France à la fin des années 90</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/10</td><td>M. LECLAIR - P. PETIT</td><td>Présence syndicale dans les firmes : quel impact sur les inégalités salariales entre les hommes et les femmes?</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/11</td><td>P. O. BEFFY - X. BONNET - M. DARRACO-PARIES - B. MONFORT</td><td>Les comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE - Une comparaison des estimations issues des enquêtes Jeunes et Carrières 1997 et Histoire Familiale 1999</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/12</td><td>J.-P. ZOYEM</td><td>La dynamique des bas revenus : une analyse des entrées-sorties de pauvreté</td></tr><tr><td>G2003/13</td><td>F. HILD</td><td>Prévisions d'inflation pour la France</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2004/02</td><td>M. DUÈE - C. REBILLARD</td><td>La dépendance des personnes âgées : une projection à long terme</td></tr><tr><td>G2004/03</td><td>S. RASPILLER - N. RIEDINGER</td><td>Réglation environnementale et choix de localisation des groupes français</td></tr><tr><td>G2004/04</td><td>A. NABOULET - S. RASPILLER</td><td>Les déterminants de la décision d'investir: une approche par les perceptions subjectives des firmes</td></tr><tr><td>G2004/05</td><td>N. RAGACHE</td><td>La déclaration des enfants par les couples non mariés est-elle fiscalement optimale?</td></tr><tr><td>G2004/06</td><td>M. DUÈE</td><td>L'impact du chômage des parents sur le devenir scolaire des enfants</td></tr><tr><td>G2004/07</td><td>P. AUBERT - E. CAROLI - M. ROGER</td><td>New Technologies, Workplace Organisation and the Age Structure of the Workforce: Firm-Level Evidence</td></tr><tr><td>G2004/08</td><td>E. DUGUET - C. LELARGE</td><td>Les brevets acquis-ils les incitations privées à innover? Un examen microéconométique</td></tr><tr><td>G2004/09</td><td>S. RASPILLER - P. SILLARD</td><td>Affiliating versus Subcontracting: the Case of Multinational</td></tr><tr><td>G2004/10</td><td>J. BOISSINOT - C. L'ANGEVIN - B. MONFORT</td><td>Public Debt Sustainability: Some Results on the French Case</td></tr><tr><td>G2004/11</td><td>S. ANANIAN - P. AUBERT</td><td>Travailleurs âgés, nouvelles technologies et changements organisationalisés: un réexamen à partir de l'enquête «REPONSE»?</td></tr><tr><td>G2004/12</td><td>X. BONNET - H. PONCET</td><td>Structures de revenus et propensions différentes à consommer - Vers une équation de consommation des ménages plus robuste en prévision pour la France</td></tr><tr><td>G2004/13</td><td>C. PICART</td><td>Évaluer la rentabilité des sociétés non financières</td></tr><tr><td>G2004/14</td><td>J. BARDAJI - B. SÉDILLOT - E. WALRAET</td><td>Les retraites du secteur public: projections à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle de microsimulation DESTINIE</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/01</td><td>S. BUFFETEAU - P. GODEFROY</td><td>Conditions de départ en retraite selon l'âge de fin d'études: analyse prospective pour les générations 1945 à 1974</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/02</td><td>C. AFSA - S. BUFFETEAU</td><td>L'évolution de l'activité féminine en France: une approche par pseudo-panel</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/03</td><td>P. AUBERT - P. SILLARD</td><td>Délocalisations et réductions d'effectifs dans l'industrie française</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/04</td><td>M. LECLAIR - S. ROUX</td><td>Mesure et utilisation des emplois instables dans les entreprises</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/05</td><td>C. L'ANGEVIN - S. SERRAVALLE</td><td>Boissements à l'exportation de la France</td></tr></table>
<table><tr><td>G2005/06</td><td>Bilan des activités de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques - 2004</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/07</td><td>S. RASPILLER<br>La concurrence fiscale : principaux enseignements de l'analyse économique</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/08</td><td>C. L'ANGEVIN - N. LAIB<br>Éducation et croissance en France et dans un panel de 21 pays de l'OCDE</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/09</td><td>N. FERRARI<br>Prévoir l'investissement des entreprises<br>Un indicateur des révisions dans l'enquête de conjoncture sur les investissements dans l'industrie</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/10</td><td>P.O. BEFFY - C. L'ANGEVIN<br>Chromage et boucle prix-salaires :<br>apport d'un modèle « qualifiés/peu qualifiés »</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/11</td><td>B. HEITZ<br>A two-states Markov-switching model of inflation in France and the USA: credible target VS inflation spiral</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/12</td><td>O. BIAU - H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - N. FERRARI<br>Réponses individuelles aux enjuvés de conjoncture et prévision macroéconomiques :<br>Exemple de la prévision de la production<br>manufacture</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/13</td><td>P. AUBERT - D. BLANCHET - D. BLAU<br>The labour market after 50: some elements of a Franco-American comparison</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/14</td><td>D. BLANCHET - T. DEBRAND -<br>P. DOUGRON - P. POLLET<br>L'enquête SHARE : présentation et premiers résultats de l'édition française</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/15</td><td>M. DUÉE<br>La modélisation des comportements démographiques dans le modèle de microsimulation<br>DESTINE</td></tr><tr><td>G2005/16</td><td>H. RAOUI - S. ROUX<br>Étude de simulation sur la participation versée aux salaires par les entreprises</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/01</td><td>C. BONNET - S. BUFFETEAU - P. GODEFROY<br>Disparités de retraite de droit direct entre hommes et femmes : quelles évolutions ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/02</td><td>C. PICART<br>Les gazelles en France</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/03</td><td>P. AUBERT - B. CRÉPON - P. ZAMORA<br>Le rendement apparent de la formation continue dans les entreprises : effets sur la productivité et les salaires</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/04</td><td>J.-F. OUVRARD - R. RATHELOT<br>Demographic change and unemployment:<br>what do macroeconomic models predict?</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/05</td><td>D. BLANCHET - J.-F. OUVRARD<br>Indicateurs d'engagements implicites des systèmes de retraite : chiffrages, propriétés analytiques et reactions à des chocs démographiques types</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/06</td><td>G. BIAU - O. BIAU - L. ROUVIERE<br>Nonparametric Forecasting of the Manufacturing Output Growth with Firm-level Survey Data</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2006/07</td><td>C. AFSA - P. GIVORD<br>Le rôle des conditions de travail dans les absences pour maladie</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/08</td><td>P. SILLARD - C. L'ANGEVIN - S. SERRAVALLE<br>Performances comparées à l'exportation de la France et de ses principaux partenaires<br>Une analyse structurelle sur 12 ans</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/09</td><td>X. BOUTIN - S. QUANTIN<br>Une méthodologie d'évaluation comptable du coût du capital des entreprises françaises : 1984-2002</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/10</td><td>C. AFSA<br>L'estimation d'un coût implicite de la pénibilité du travail chez les travailleurs âgés</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/11</td><td>C. LELARGE<br>Les entreprises (industrielles) françaises sont-elles à la frontière technologique ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/12</td><td>O. BIAU - N. FERRARI<br>Theorie de l'opinion<br>Faut-il pondérer les réponses individuelles ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/13</td><td>A. KOUBI - S. ROUX<br>Une réinterprétation de la relation entre productivité et inégalités salariales dans les entreprises</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/14</td><td>R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD<br>The impact of local taxes on plants location decision</td></tr><tr><td>G2006/15</td><td>L. GONZALEZ - C. PICART<br>Diversification, recensement et poids des activités de support dans les groupes (1995-2000)</td></tr><tr><td>G2007/01</td><td>D. SRAER<br>Allégrons de cotisations patronales et dynamique salariale</td></tr><tr><td>G2007/02</td><td>V. ALBOUY - L. LEQUIEN<br>Les rendements non monétaires de l'éducation :<br>le cas de la santé</td></tr><tr><td>G2007/03</td><td>D. BLANCHET - T. DEBRAND<br>Aspiration à la retraite, santé et satisfaction au travail : une comparaison européenne</td></tr><tr><td>G2007/04</td><td>M. BARLET - L. CRUSSON<br>Quel impact des variations du prix du pétrole sur la croissance française ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2007/05</td><td>C. PICART<br>Flux d'emploi et de main-d'œuvre en France : un réexamen</td></tr><tr><td>G2007/06</td><td>V. ALBOUY - C. TAVAN<br>Massification et démocratisation de l'enseignement supérieur en France</td></tr><tr><td>G2007/07</td><td>T. LE BARBANCHON<br>The Changing response to oil price shocks in France, a DSGE type approach</td></tr><tr><td>G2007/08</td><td>T. CHANEY - D. SRAER - D. THESMAR<br>Collateral Value and Corporate Investment<br>Evidence from the French Real Estate Market</td></tr><tr><td>G2007/09</td><td>J. BOISSINOT<br>Consumption over the Life Cycle: Facts for France</td></tr><tr><td>G2007/10</td><td>C. AFSA<br>Interpréter les variables de satisfaction :<br>l'exemple de la durée du travail</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2007/11</td><td>R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD<br>Zones Franches Urbaines : quels effets sur l'emploi salarié et les créations d'établissements ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2007/12</td><td>V. ALBOUY - B. CRÉPON<br>Aléa moral en santé : une évaluation dans le cadre du modèle causal de Rubin</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/01</td><td>C. PICART<br>Les PME françaises : rentables mais peu dynamiques</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/02</td><td>P. BISCOURP - X. BOUTIN - T. VERGÉ<br>The Effects of Retail Regulations on Prices<br>Evidence form the Loi Galland</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/03</td><td>Y. BARBESOL - A. BRIANT<br>Économies d'agglomération et productivité des entreprises : estimation sur données individuelles françaises</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/04</td><td>D. BLANCHET - F. LE GALLO<br>Les projections démographiques : principaux mécanismes et retour sur l'expérience française</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/05</td><td>D. BLANCHET - F. TOUTLEMONDE<br>Évolutions démographiques et deformation du cycle de vie active : quelles relations ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/06</td><td>M. BARLET - D. BLANCHET - L. CRUSSON<br>Internationalisation et flux d'emplois : que d'une approche comptable ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/07</td><td>C. LELARGE - D. SRAER - D. THESMAR<br>Entrepreneurship and Credit Constraints - Evidence from a French Loan Guarantee Program</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/08</td><td>X. BOUTIN - L. JANIN<br>Are Prices Really Affected by Mergers?</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/09</td><td>M. BARLET - A. BRIANT - L. CRUSSON<br>Concentration géographique dans l'industrie manufacturière et dans les services en France : une approche par un indicateur en continu</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/10</td><td>M. BEFFY - É. COUDIN - R. RATHELOT<br>Who is confronted to insecure labor market histories? Some evidence based on the French labor market transition</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/11</td><td>M. ROGER - E. WALRAET<br>Social Security and Well-Being of the Elderly: the Case of France</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/12</td><td>C. AFSA<br>Analyser les composantes du bien-être et de son évolution<br>Une approche empirique sur données individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G2008/13</td><td>M. BARLET - D. BLANCHET -<br>T. LE BARBANCHON<br>Microsimumer le marché du travail : un prototype</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/01</td><td>P.-A. PIONNIER<br>Le partage de la valeur ajoutée en France, 1949-2007</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/02</td><td>Laurent CLAVEL - Christelle MINODIER<br>A. Monthly Indicator of the French Business Climate</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/03</td><td>H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - C. MINODIER<br>Do Business Tendency Surveys in Industry and Services Help in Forecasting GDP Growth?<br>A Real-Time Analysis on French Data</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2009/04</td><td>P. GIVORD - L. WILNER<br>Les contrats temporaires : trappe ou marchéied vers l'emploi stable ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/05</td><td>G. LALANNE - P.-A. PIONNIER - O. SIMON<br>Le partage des fruits de la croissance de 1950 à 2008: une approche par les comptes de surplus</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/06</td><td>L. DAVEZIES - X. D'HAULTFOUEUILLE<br>Faut-il pondérer ?... Ou l'éternelle question de l'économètre confronté à des données d'enquête</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/07</td><td>S. QUANTIN - S. RASPILLER - S. SERRAVALLE<br>Commerce intragroupe, fiscalité et prix de transferts: une analyse sur données françaises</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/08</td><td>M. CLERC - V. MARCUS<br>Élastiques-prix des consommations énergétiques des ménages</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/09</td><td>G. LALANNE - E. POULIQUEN - O. SIMON<br>Prix du pétrole et croissance potentielle à long terme</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/10</td><td>D. BLANCHET - J. LE CACHEUX - V. MARCUS<br>Adjusted net savings and other approaches to sustainability: some theoretical background</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/11</td><td>V. BELLAMY - G. CONSALES - M. FESSEAU -<br>S. LE LAIDÉ - É. RAYNAUD<br>Une décomposition du compte des ménages de la comptabilité nationale par catégorie de ménage en 2003</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/12</td><td>J. BARDAI - F. TALLET<br>Detecting Economic Regimes in France: a Qualitative Markov-Switching Indicator Using Mixed Frequency Data</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/13</td><td>R. AEBERHARDT - D. FOUGÈRE -<br>R. RATHELOT<br>Discrimination à l'embauche: comment exploiter les procédures de testing ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/14</td><td>Y. BARBESOL - P. GIVORD - S. QUANTIN<br>Partage de la valeur ajoutée, approche par données microéconomiques</td></tr><tr><td>G2009/15</td><td>I. BUONO - G. LALANNE<br>The Effect of the Uruguay round on the Intensive and Extensive Margins of Trade</td></tr><tr><td>G2010/01</td><td>C. MINODIER<br>Avantages comparés des séries des premières valeurs publiées et des séries des valeurs révisées - Un exercice de prévision en temps réel<br>de la croissance trimestrielle du PIB en France</td></tr><tr><td>G2010/02</td><td>V. ALBOUY - L. DAVEZIES - T. DEBRAND<br>Health Expenditure Models: a Comparison of Five Specifications using Panel Data</td></tr><tr><td>G2010/03</td><td>C. KLEIN - O. SIMON<br>Le modèle MÉSANGE réestimé en base 2000<br>Tome 1 - Version avec volumes à prix constants</td></tr><tr><td>G2010/04</td><td>M. É. CLERC - É. COUDIN<br>L'IPC, miroir de l'évolution du coût de la vie en France ? Ce qu'apporte l'analyse des courbes d'Engel</td></tr><tr><td>G2010/05</td><td>N. CECI-RENAUD - P.-A. CHEVALIER<br>Les seuils de 10, 20 et 50 salariés : impact sur la taille des entreprises françaises</td></tr></table>
G2010/06
National Origin Differences in Wages and Hierarchical Positions - Evidence on French Full-Time Male Workers from a matched Employer-Employee Dataset

G2010/07
S. BLASCO - P. GIVORD
Les trajectoires professionnelles en début de vie active : quel impact des contrats temporaires ?

G2010/08
P. GIVORD
Méthodes éconétriques pour l'évaluation de politiques publiques

G2010/09
P.-Y. CABANNES - V. LAPÈGUE - E. POULIQUEN - M. BEFFY - M. GAINI
Quelle croissance de moyen terme après la crise ?

G2010/10
I. BUONO - G. LALANNE
La réaction des entreprises françaises à la baisse des tarifs douaniers étrangers

G2010/11
R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
L'apport des méthodes à noyaux pour mesurer la concentration géographique - Application à la concentration des immigres en France de 1968 à 1999

G2010/12
M. BARATON - M. BEFFY - D. FOUGÈRE
Une évaluation de l'effet de la réforme de 2003 sur les départs en retraite - Le cas des enseignants du second degré public

G2010/13
D. BLANCHET - S. BUFFETEAU - E. CRENNER
S. LE MINEZ
Le modèle de microsimulation Destinie 2 : principales caractéristiques et premiers résultats

G2010/14
D. BLANCHET - E. CRENNER
Le bloc retraites du modèle Destinie 2 : guide de l'utilisateur

G2010/15
M. BARLET - L. CRUSSON - S. DUPUCH - F. PUECH
Des services échangés aux services échangeables : une application sur données françaises

G2010/16
M. BEFFY - T. KAMIONKA
Public-privée wage gaps : is civil-servant human capital sector-specific?

G2010/17
P.-Y. CABANNES - H. ERKEL-ROUSSE - G. LALANNE - O. MONSO - E. POULIQUEN
Le modèle Mésange réestimé en base 2000
Tome 2 - Version avec volumes à prix chaînes

G2010/18
R. AEBERHARDT - L. DAVEZIES
Conventional Logit with one Binary Covariate: Link between the Static and Dynamic Cases

G2011/01
T. LE BARBANCHON - B. OURLIAC - O. SIMON
Les marchés du travail français et américain face aux chocs conjonctuels des années 1986 à 2007 : une modélisation DSGE

G2011/02
C. MARBOT
Une évaluation de la réduction d'impôt pour l'emploi des salariés à domicile

G2011/03
L. DAVEZIES
Modeles à effets fixes, à effets aléatoires, modeles mixtes ou multi-niveaux : propriétés et mises en œuvre des modélisations de l'hétérogénéité dans le cas de données groupées

G2011/04
M. ROGER - M. WASMER
Heterogeneity matters : labour productivity differentiated by age and skills

G2011/05
J.-C. BRICONGNE - J.-M. FOURNIER
V. LAPÈGUE - O. MONSO
De la crise financière à la crise économique L'impact des perturbations financières de 2007 et 2008 sur la croissance de sept pays industrialisés

G2011/06
P. CHARNOZ - É. COUDIN - M. GAINI
Wage inequalities in France 1976-2004: a quantile regression analysis

G2011/07
M. CLERC - M. GAINI - D. BLANCHET
Recommendations of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report: A few illustrations

G2011/08
M. BACHELET - M. BEFFY - D. BLANCHET
Projet l'impact des réformes des retraites sur l'activité des 55 ans et plus : une comparaison de trol modèles

G2011/09
C. LOUVOT-RUNAVOT
L'évaluation de l'activité dissimulée des entreprises sur la base des contrôles fiscaux et son insertion dans les complètes nationaux

G2011/10
A. SCHREIBER - A. VICARD
La télélisation de l'économie française et le ralentissement de la productivité entre 1978 et 2008

G2011/11
M.-É. CLERC - O. MONSO - E. POULIQUEN
Les inégalités entre générations depuis le baby-boom

G2011/12
C. MARBOT - D. ROY
C. MARBOT - D. ROY
Évaluation de la transformation de la réduction d'impôt en crédit d'impôt pour l'emploi de salariés à domicile en 2007

G2011/13
P. GIVORD - R. RATHELOT - P. SILLARD
Place-based tax exemptions and displacement effects: An evaluation of the Zones Franches Urbaines program

G2011/14
X. D'HAULT-FOEUILLE - P. GIVORD - X. BOUTIN
The Environmental Effect of Green Taxation: the Case of the French "Bonus/Malus"

G2011/15
M. BARLET - M. CLERC - M. GARNEO - V. LAPÈGUE - V. MARCUS
La nouvelle version du modèle MZE, modèle macroéconométrique pour la zone euro

G2011/16
R. AEBERHARDT - I. BUONO - H. FADINGER
Learning, Incomplete Contracts and Export Dynamics: Theory and Evidence form French Firms

G2011/17
C. KERDRAIN - V. LAPÈGUE
Restrictive Fiscal Policies in Europe: What are the Fiscal Effects?

G2012/01
P. GIVORD - S. QUANTIN - C. TREVIE
A Long-Term Evaluation of the First Generation of the French Urban Enterprise Zones

G2012/02
N. CECI-RENAUD - V. COTTET
Politique salariale et performance des entreprises

G2012/03
P. FEVRIER - L. WILNER
Do Consumers Correctly Expect Price Reductions? Testing Dynamic Behavior

G2012/04
M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD
School as a shelter? School leaving-age and the business cycle in France

G2012/05
M. GAINI - A. LEDUC - A. VICARD
A scarred generation? French evidence on young people entering into a tough labour market

G2012/06
P. AUBERT - M. BACHELET
Disparités de montant de pension et redistribution dans le système de retraite français

G2012/07
R. AEBERHARDT - P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT
Spillover Effect of the Minimum Wage in France: An Unconditional Quantile Regression Approach

G2012/08
A. EIDELMAN - F. LANGUIMERT - A. VICARD
Prélevements obligatoires reposant sur les menaces : des canaux redistributifs différents en 1990 et 2010

G2012/09
O. BARGAIN - A. VICARD
Le RMI et son successeur le RSA décuragent-ils certains jeunes de travailer ? Une analyse sur les jeunes autour de 25 ans

G2012/10
C. MARBOT - D. ROY
Projections du coût de l'APA et des caractéristiques de ses bénéficiaires à l'horizon 2040 à l'aide du modèle Destinie

G2012/11
A. MAUROUX
Le crédit d'impôt dédié au développement durable : une évaluation éconétrique

G2012/12
V. COTTET - S. QUANTIN - V. RÉGNIER
Coût du travail et allégements de charges : une estimation à niveau établissement de 1996 à 2008

G2012/13
X. D'HAULT-FOEUILLE - P. FEVRIER - L. WILNER
Demand Estimation in the Presence of Revenue Management

G2012/14
D. BLANCHET - S. LE MINEZ
Joint macro/micro evaluations of accrued-to-date pension liabilities: an application to French reforms

G2013/01-F1301
T. DEROYON - A. MONTAUT - P-A PIONNIER
Utilisation rétrospective de l'enquête Emploi à une fréquence mensuelle : apport d'une modélisation espace-étab

G2013/02-F1302
C. TREVIEN
Habiter en HLM : quel avantage monétaire et quel impact sur les conditions de logement ?

G2013/03
A. POISSONNIER
Temporal disaggregation of stock variables - The Chow-Lin method extended to dynamic models

G2013/04
P. GIVORD - C. MARBOT
Does the cost of child care affect female labor market participation? An evaluation of a French reform of childcare subsidies

G2013/05
G. LAME - M. LEQUIEN - P-A. PIONNIER
Interpretation and limits of sustainability tests in public finance

G2013/06
C. BELLEGO - V. DORTET-BERNADET
La participation aux pôles de compétitivité : quelle incidence sur les dépenses de R&D et l'activité des PME et ETI ?

G2013/07
P.-Y. CABANNES - A. MONTAUT - P-A. PIONNIER
Évaluer la productivité globale des facteurs en France : l'apport d'une mesure de la qualité du capital et du travail

G2013/08
R. AEBERHARDT - C. MARBOT
Evolution of instability in the French Labour Market During the Last Thirty Years

G2013/09
J.-B. BERNARD - G. CLÉAUD
Oil price: the nature of the shocks and the impact on the French economy

G2013/10
G. LAME
Was there a « Greenspan Conundrum » in the Euro area?

G2013/11
P. CHONÉ - F. EVAIN - L. WILNER - E. YILMAZ
Introducing activity-based payment in the hospital industry: Evidence from French data

G2013/12
C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY
Natural Disasters: Exposure and Underinsurance

G2013/13
P.-Y. CABANNES - V. COTTET - Y. DUBOIS - C. LELARGE - M. SICSI - French Firms in the Face of the 2008/2009 Crisis

G2013/14
A. POISSONNIER - D. ROY
Households Satellite Account for France in 2010. Methodological issues on the assessment of domestic production

G2013/15
G. CLÉAUD - M. LEMOINE - P-A. PIONNIER
Which size and evolution of the government expenditure multiplier in France (1980-2010)?

G2014/01
M. BACHELET - A. LEDUC - A. MARINO
Les biographies du modèle Destinie II : rebasage et projection

G2014/02
B. GARBINTI
L'achat de la résidence principale et la création d'entreprises sont-ils favorisés par les donations et héritages ?

G2014/03
N. CECI-RENAUD - P. CHARNOZ - M. GAINI
Evolution of the volatility of the revenue salariaux du secteur privé en France depuis 1968

G2014/04
P. AUBERT
Modalités d'application des réformes des retraites et prévisibilité du montant de pension

G2014/05
C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY - A. KATOSSKY
The Impact of Hazardous Industrial Facilities on Housing Prices: A Comparison of Parametric and Semiparametric Hedonic Price Models

G2014/06
J.-M. DAUSSIN-BENICHOU - A. MAUROUX
Turning the heat up: How sensitive are households to fiscal incentives on energy efficiency investments?

G2014/07
C. LABONNE - G. LAME
Credit Growth and Capital Requirements: Binding or Not?

G2014/08
C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY et C. TREVIE
The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector: the French Example

G2014/09
M. LEQUIEN et A. MONTAUT
Croissance potentielle en France et en zone euro: un tour d'horsizon des méthodes d'estimation
<table><tr><td>G2014/10</td><td>B. GARBINTI - P. LAMARCHHE<br>Les hauts revenus epargne-ile davantage ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/11</td><td>D. AUDENAERT - J. BARDAJI - R. LARDEUX -<br>M. ORAND - M. SICNIC<br>Wage Resilience in France since the Great<br>Recession</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/12</td><td>F. ARNAUD - J. BOUSSARD - A. POISSONNIER -<br>H. SOAL<br>Computing additive contributions to growth and<br>other issues for chain-linked quarterly<br>aggregates</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/13</td><td>H. FRAISSE - F. KRAMARZ - C. PROST<br>Labor Disputes and Job Flows</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/14</td><td>P. GIVORD - C. GRISLAIN-LETRÉMY<br>- H. NAEGELE<br>How does fuel taxation impact new car<br>purchases? An evaluation using French<br>consumer-level dataset</td></tr><tr><td>G2014/15</td><td>P. AUBERT - S. RABATÉ<br>Durée passée en carrière et durée de vie en<br>retraite : quel partage des gains d'espérance de<br>vie ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/01</td><td>A. POISSONNIER<br>The walking dead Euler equation<br>Addressing a challenge to monetary policy<br>models</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/02</td><td>Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO<br>Indicateurs de rendement du système de retraite<br>français</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/03</td><td>T. MAYER - C. TREVIEN<br>The impacts of Urban Public Transportation:<br>Evidence from the Paris Region</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/04</td><td>S.T. LY - A. RIEGERT<br>Measuring Social Environment Mobility</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/05</td><td>M. A. BEN HALINA - V. HYAFIL-SOLELHAC<br>M. KOUBI - C. REGAERT<br>Quel est l'impact du système d'indemnisation<br>maladie sur la durée des arrêts de travail pour<br>maladie ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/06</td><td>Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO<br>Disparités de rendement du système de retraite<br>dans le secteur privé : approches intergénéra-<br>tionnelle et intragénérationnelle</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/07</td><td>B. CAMPAGNE - V. ALHENC-GELAS -<br>J.-B. BERNARD<br>No evidence of financial accelerator in France</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/08</td><td>Q. LAFFÉTER - M. PAK<br>Élasticités des recettes fiscales au cycle<br>économique : étude de trois impôts sur la<br>période 1979-2013 en France</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/09</td><td>J.-M. DUASSIN-BENICHOU, S. IDMACHICHE,<br>A. LEDUC et E. POULIQUEN<br>Les déterminants de l'attractivité de la fonction<br>publique de l'État</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/10</td><td>P. AUBERT<br>La modulation du montant de pension selon la<br>durée de carrière et l'âge de la retraite : quelles<br>disparités entre assurés ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/11</td><td>V. DORTET-BERNADET - M. SICNIC<br>Effet des aides publiques sur l'emploi en R&D<br>dans les petites entreprises</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2015/12</td><td>S. GEORGES-KOT<br>Annual and lifetime incidence of the value-added<br>tax in France</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/13</td><td>M. POULHÉS<br>Are Enterprise Zones Benefits Capitalized into<br>Commercial Property Values? The French Case</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/14</td><td>J.-B. BERNARD - Q. LAFFÉTER<br>Effet de l'activité et du prix sur le revenu salarial<br>des différentes catégories socioprofessionnelles</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/15</td><td>C. GEAY - M. KOUBI - G de LAGASNERIE<br>Projections des dépenses de soins de ville,<br>construction d'un module pour Destinine</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/16</td><td>J. BARDAJI - J.-C. BRICONGNE -<br>B. CAMPAGNE - G. GAULIER<br>Compared performances of French companies<br>on the domestic and foreign markets</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/17</td><td>C. BELLÉGO - R. DE NUJ<br>The redistributive effect of online piracy on the<br>box office performance of American movies in<br>foreign markets</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/18</td><td>J.-B. BERNARD - L. BERTHET<br>French households financial wealth: which<br>changes in 20 years?</td></tr><tr><td>G2015/19</td><td>M. POULHÉS<br>Fenêtre sur Cour ou Chambre avec Vue ?<br>Les prix hédoniques de l'immobilier parisien</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/01</td><td>B. GARBINTI - S. GEORGES-KOT<br>Time to smell the roses? Risk aversion, the<br>timing of inheritance receipt, and retirement</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/02</td><td>P. CHARNOZ - C. LELARGE - C. TREVIEN<br>Communication Costs and the Internal<br>Organization of Multi-Plant Businesses: Evidence<br>from the Impact of the French High-Speed Rail</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/03</td><td>C. BONNET - B. GARBINTI - A. SOLAZ<br>C. Gender inequality after Divorce: The Flip Side of<br>Marital Specialization - Evidence from a French<br>Administrative Database</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/04</td><td>D. BLANCHET - E. CAROLI - C. PROST -<br>M. ROGER<br>Health capacity to work at older ages in France</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/05</td><td>B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER<br>MELEZE: A DSGE model for France within the<br>Euro Area</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/06</td><td>B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER<br>Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from<br>Mélèze model</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/07</td><td>B. CAMPAGNE - A. POISSONNIER<br>Structural reforms in DSGE models: a case for<br>sensitivity analyses</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/08</td><td>Y. DUBOIS et M. KOUBI<br>Relevement de l'âge de départ à la retraite : quel<br>impact sur l'activité des seniors de la réforme des<br>retraites de 2010 ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/09</td><td>A. NAQUAS - M. ORAND - I. SLIMANI HOUTI<br>Les entreprises employant des salaires au Smic:<br>quelles caractéristiques et quelle rentabilité ?</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/10</td><td>T. BLANCHET - Y. DUBOIS - A. MARINO -<br>M. ROGER<br>Patrimoine privé et retraite en France</td></tr><tr><td>G2016/11</td><td>M. PAK - A. POISSONNIER<br>Accounting for technology, trade and final</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2017/01</td><td>D. FOUGÈRE - E. GAUTIER - S. ROUX<br>Understanding Wage Floor Setting in Industry-<br>Level Agreements: Evidence from France</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/02</td><td>Y. DUBOIS - M. KOUBI<br>Regles d'indexation des pensions et sensibilité<br>des dépenses de retraites à la croissance<br>économique et aux chocs démographiques</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/03</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ - F. GODET<br>L'espérance de vie en retraite sans incapacité<br>sèvère des générations nées entre 1960 et<br>1990 : une projection à partir du modèle Destinine</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/04</td><td>J. BARDAJI - B. CAMPAGNE -<br>M.-B. KHDER - Q. LAFFÉTER - O. SIMON<br>(Insee)<br>A-S) DUFERNEZ - C. ELEZAAR -<br>P. LEBLANC - E. MASSON -<br>H. PARTOUCHE (DG-Trésor)<br>Le modèle macroéconométrique Mésange :<br>rés estimation et nouveautés</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/05</td><td>J. BOUSSARD - B. CAMPAGNE<br>Fiscal Policy Coordination in a Monetary<br>Union at the Zero-Lower-Bound</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/06</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ -<br>A. GODZINSKI<br>Effects of the one-day waiting period for sick<br>leave on health-related absences in the<br>French central civil service</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/07</td><td>P. CHARNOZ - M. ORAND<br>Qualification, prog ress technique et marchés<br>du travail locaux en France, 1990-2011</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/08</td><td>K. MILIN<br>Modélisation de l'inflation en France par une<br>approche macrosectorielle</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/09</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER - R. LARDEUX<br>Homeownership and labor market outcomes:<br>disentangling externality and composition<br>effects</td></tr><tr><td>G2017/10</td><td>P. BEAUMONT<br>Time is Money: Cash-Flow Risk and Export<br>Market Behavior</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/01</td><td>S. ROUX - F. SAVIGNAC<br>SMES' financing: Divergence across Euro<br>area countries?</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/02</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER - A. LUCIANI<br>Computerization, labor productivity and<br>employment: impacts across industries vary<br>with technological level</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/03</td><td>R. MONIN - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO<br>L'effet du CICE sur les prix : une double<br>analyse sur données sectorielles et<br>individuelles</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/04</td><td>R. LARDEUX<br>Who Understands The French Income Tax?<br>Bunching Where Tax Liabilities Start</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/05</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER<br>Financial constraints of innovative firms and<br>sectoral growth</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/06</td><td>R. S.-H. LEE - M. PAK<br>Pro-competitive effects of globalisation on<br>prices, productivity and markups: Evidence<br>in the Euro Area</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/07</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER<br>Consumption inequality in France between<br>1995 and 2011</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/08</td><td>A. BAUER - B. GARBINTI -<br>S. GEORGES-KOT<br>Financial Constraints and Self-Employment<br>in France, 1945-2014</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/09</td><td>P. BEAUMONT - A. LUCIANI<br>Prime à l'embauche dans les PME :<br>évaluation à partir des déclarations<br>d'embauche</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/10</td><td>C. BELLÉGO - V. DORTET-BERNADET -<br>M. TÉPAUT<br>Collaboration de deux dispositifs d'aide à la<br>R&D collaborative public-privé</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/11</td><td>R. MONIN - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO<br>Replication et rapprochement des travaux<br>d'évaluation de l'affet du CICE sur l'emploi<br>en 2013 et 2014</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/12</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ - F. GODET -<br>V. LIN<br>L'introduction d'un gradient social dans la<br>maltrité au sein du modèle Destologie 2</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/01</td><td>M. ANDRÉ - A.-L. BIOTTEAU<br>Effets de moyen terme d'une hausse de TVA<br>sur le niveau de vie et les inégalités : une<br>approche par microsimulation</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/02</td><td>A. BOURGEOIS - A. BRIAND<br>Le modèle Avionic : la modélisation<br>Input/Output des comptes nationaux</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/03</td><td>A. GODZINSKI - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO<br>Short-term health effects of public transport<br>disruptions: air pollution and viral spread<br>channels</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/04</td><td>L. AEBERHARDT - F. HATIER -<br>M. LECLAIR - B. PENTINAT - J.-D. ZAFAR<br>L'économie numérique fausse-t-elle le<br>partage volume-prix du PIB?</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/05</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ - E. YILMAZ<br>Dans quelle mesure les incitations tarifaires<br>et la procédure de mise sous accord<br>préalable ont-elles contribué au<br>développement du chirurgie ambulatoire?</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/06</td><td>J.-P. CLING - S. EGHBAL-TEHERANI -<br>M. ORZONI - C. PLATEAU<br>The Differences between EU Countries for<br>Sustainable Development Indicators:<br>It is (mainly) the Economy!</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/07</td><td>P. CHONÉ - L. WILNER<br>Competition on Unobserved Attributes: The<br>Case of the Hospital Industry</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>G2018/05</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER<br>Financial constraints of innovative firms and<br>sectoral growth</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/06</td><td>R. S.-H. LEE - M. PAK<br>Pro-competitive effects of globalisation on<br>prices, productivity and markups: Evidence<br>in the Euro Area</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/07</td><td>C.-M. CHEVALIER<br>Consumption inequality in France between<br>1995 and 2011</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/08</td><td>A. BAUER - B. GARBINTI -<br>S. GEORGES-KOT<br>Financial Constraints and Self-Employment<br>in France, 1945-2014</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/09</td><td>P. BEAUMONT - A. LUCIANI<br>Prime à l'embauche dans les PME :<br>évaluation à partir des déclarations<br>d'embauche</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/10</td><td>C. BELLÉGO - V. DORTET-BERNADET -<br>M. TÉPAUT<br>Collaboration de deux dispositifs d'aide à la<br>R&D collaborative public-privé</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/11</td><td>R. MONIN - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO<br>Replication et rapprochement des travaux<br>d'évaluation de l'affet du CICE sur l'emploi<br>en 2013 et 2014</td></tr><tr><td>G2018/12</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ - F. GODET -<br>V. LIN<br>L'introduction d'un gradient social dans la<br>maltrité au sein du modèle Destologie 2</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/01</td><td>M. ANDRÉ - A.-L. BIOTTEAU<br>Effets de moyen terme d'une hausse de TVA<br>sur le niveau de vie et les inégalités : une<br>approche par microsimulation</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/02</td><td>A. BOURGEOIS - A. BRIAND<br>Le modèle Avionic : la modélisation<br>Input/Output des comptes nationaux</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/03</td><td>A. GODZINSKI - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO<br>Short-term health effects of public transport<br>disruptions: air pollution and viral spread<br>channels</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/04</td><td>L. AEBERHARDT - F. HATIER -<br>M. LECLAIR - B. PENTINAT - J.-D. ZAFAR<br>L'économie numérique fausse-t-elle le<br>partage volume-prix du PIB?</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/05</td><td>A. CAZENAVE-LACROUTZ - E. YILMAZ<br>Dans quelle mesure les incitations tarifaires<br>et la procédure de mise sous accord<br>préalable ont-elles contribué au<br>développement du chirurgie ambulatoire?</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/06</td><td>J.-P. CLING - S. EGHBAL-TEHERANI -<br>M. ORZONI - C. PLATEAU<br>The Differences between EU Countries for<br>Sustainable Development Indicators:<br>It is (mainly) the Economy!</td></tr><tr><td>G2019/07</td><td>P. CHONÉ - L. WILNER<br>Competition on Unobserved Attributes: The<br>Case of the Hospital Industry</td></tr></table>
G2019/08 P. PORA - L. WILNER

Child Penalties and Financial Incentives:
Exploiting Variation along the Wage
Distribution

G2019/09 E. GAUTIER - S. ROUX - M. SUAREZ
CASTILLO

Do Minimum Wages make Wages more
Rigid ? Evidence from French Micro Data

G2019/10 M. ANDRÉ - A. SIREY JOL

Imposition des couples et des familles :
effets budgétaires et redistributifs de l'impôt
sur le revenu

G2019/11 K. MOHKAM - O. SIMON

L'empreinte matière de l'économie
française : une analyse par matiŁre et
catégorie de produits

G2019/12 S. BUNEL - B. HADJIBEYLI

Évaluation du crédit d'impôt innovation

G2019/13 C. BONNET - F. GODET - A. SOLAZ
Gendered economic determinants of couple
formation over 50 in France

G2019/14 P. GIVORD - M. SUAREZ CASTILLO
Excellence for all? Heterogeneity in high
schools' value-added

G2019/15 G. CETTE - L. KOEHL - T. PHILIPPON

Labor Share in Some Advanced Countries

G2020/01 J. SILHOL - B. VENTELOU

Les zones d'intervention prioritaire reflètent-
elles des écarts de pratiques des médecins
généralistes ?

G2020/02 B. BOUCHTENIK - R. LARDEUX

The Take-Up of Unemployment Benefit
Extensions